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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE, 

AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE 

KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF 

POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST 

NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA 



PART 7 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation 
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre 



JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952 




THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE, 

AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE 

KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF 

POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST 

NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA 



PART 7 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation 
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre 



JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
93744 WASHINGTON : 1952 






SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, 
EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST 
MASSACRE 

RAY J. MADDEN, Indiana, Chairman 
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GEORGE A. DONDERO, Michigan 

FOSTER FURCOLO, Massachusetts ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin 

THADDEUS M. MACHROWICZ, Michigan TIMOTHY P'. SHEEHAN, Illinois 
John J. Mitchell, Chief Counsel 
ROMAN C. PuciNsKi, Chief Investigator 
II 



d^ 



rji.>. 



CONTENTS 



Statement of — Page 

Bi.ssell, Gen. Clavton 1839, 1864, 2298 

Brown, Ben H., jr 2056, 2218 

Carter, John F 2246 

Cranston, Alan 2174, 2272 

Davis, Elmer 1979 

Earle, George Howard 2196 

Epstein, Julius 2266 

Harriman, W. A 2103 

Holmes, Julius C 2226 

Hopkins, James F 2008 

Jackson, Justice Robert H 1945 

Kreutz, Jan Marion 2012 

Lane, Arthur Bliss 2216, 221» 

Lan,^, Josepli 2002, 201 9- 

Lantaff, Hon. William C 1827 

Lyon, Frederick B 2241 

Meeres, Mildred 1833 

Melby, John F 2149 

M ikolajczyk, Stanislaw _ _' 2155 

Mortimer," Kathleen H 2132 

Olshansky . Boris ^_ 1939 

Phillips, Joseph B 2255 

Richards, Robert K . 2035 

Shea, Mrs. Hilda 2022 

Simon, Arthur 2007, 201 9 

Soron, Casimer . 2020 

Standley, Adn iral William H ._ 2042, 2060 

Welles, Hon. Sumner 2075 

Yeaton, Col. Ivan 1916, 2293 

EXHIBITS 

1. Letter to Mr. Madden from Gen. J. Lawton Collins 1826 

2. Metnorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Maj. Gen. Clayton 

Bissell ' 1 _ _ _ 1839 

3. Memorandum from General Bissell (Roger Kent, general counsel for 

Charles A. Coolidge) 1840 

4. Lett<3r from General Bissell to Julius C. Holmes. Assistant Secretarv of 

State ;_ . _ 1867 

5. Letter from Julius C. Holmes to Generfl Bissell 1894 

6. Statement by Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson to the congressional 

committee 1971 

7. Letter to Mr. Justice Jackson from Polish Government in Exile in 

London 1 975 

8. Mr. Elmer Davis' radio broadcast of May 3, 1943--- 1987 

8A. State Department memorandum, with stamp mark, showing it had 

been deli\ered to Mr. Berle on April 22, 1943 _ _ . 198S 

9. Telegram from Ambass?.dor Standley to Department of State 2045. 

10. Portion of message from Secretary of State Hull to American 

Ambessador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942 2046. 

11. Portion of message from Secretary of State to American .Ambassador 

dated September 5, 1942 2048 

12. Portion of mess.^ge from American Ambassador to State Department 

dated Sertember 10, 1942 2052: 

13. Report from A-nerican Ambassador Pt Moscow regarding Willkie's 

convers: tion with Stalin concerning the Poli.sh situation- 2054 

nx 



IV CONTENTS 

14. Letter and one enclosure forwarded to State Department by American Page 

Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942, detailing search for 

Polish officers.. L . 2057 

15. Telegram from Moscow dated April 26, 1943 2062 

16. Stalin's personal letter to President F. D. Roosevelt 2063 

17. Message from President Roosevelt to Stalin dated April 26, 1943 2064 

18. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2066 

19. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2068 

20. Letter from Under Secretary Sumner Wells to President Roosevelt — 2076 

21. Letter to General Watson from Under Secretary Welles 2082 

22. Report and evidence compiled by Poles regarding discovery at Katyn 

forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Biddle 

on May 20, 1943 2092 

23. Message from Mr. Harriman to Stalin dated November 7, 1941 2112 

23A. Mr. Harriman's dispatch to Washington 2112 

23B. Stalin's reply to Mr. Harriman 2113 

23C. Stalin's second reply to Mr. Harriman 2113 

23D. Polish Embassy letter to Ambassador Harriman 2113 

24. Telegram to United States Embassy in Moscow dated January 25, 

1944 2124 

25. Ambassador Harriman's letter forwarding reports on their ^•isits to 

Katvn bv Mr. Harriman's daughter and an Embassy attache in 

January 1944 2132 

26. Ambassador Earle's letter to President Roosevelt dated June 11, 1944. . 2199 
26A. Mr. Roosevelt's reply 2200 

27. Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Ambassador Earle 2202 

28. President Truman's letter to Ambassador Earle 2210 

29. Ambassador Lane's letter to Mr. Justice Jackson at Nuremberg dated 

December 16, 1945 2218 

30. Ambassador Lane's letter to State Department official 2220 

31. General Holmes' letter of June 9, 1945, to General Bissell 2228 

32. Colonel Van Vliet's statement regarding his treatment at Katyn by 

the Nazis 2230 

32 A. Memorandum from Mr. Carter regarding the Katvn Massacre pre- 
pared on May 31, 1944 J 2252 

33. Letter to Mr. Stone from Mr. Epstein 2267 

34. Letter to Mr. Epstein from Charles W. Thayer, Chief, International 

Broadcasting Division 2267 

35. Letter from Epstein to Mr. Allen 2268 

36. Letter from Mr. Kohler to Mr. Epstein 2269 

37. (Appendix) Excerpt of House Un-American Activities Committee 

hearing 23-'^ 1 

38. (Appendix) Teheran- Yalta-Potsdam agreements 23 9 

39. Major General Bissell's diary certificate 23 2 

40. Major General Bissell's commendations 23l5 

41. Message sent to Department of State by Ambassador Harriman (see 

Mr. Harriman's testimony) 2350 

42. Dispatches describing Polish-Soviet relations . 2357 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACEB 



TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1952 

House of Representatives, 
The Select Committee on the Kattn Forest Massacre, 

Washhigton, D. C. 

The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 336, 
House Office Buildino;, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Furcolo, Machrowicz, Dondero, 
O'Konski, and Sheehan. 

Also present : John J. jNIitchell, chief counsel to the select committee. 

Chairman Madden. The select committee will come to order. 

I might say for the record that tliis meeting of the Select Committee 
on the Katyn Forest Massacre is the sixth in a series of hearings which 
the committee has held. The committee returned a few weeks ago 
from hearings in England, where it heard the testimony of 32 wit- 
nesses, and also from Germany, where it heard the testimony of 28 
witnesses. 

As far as the testimony is concerned, the proceedings of the com- 
mittee to determine the responsibility as to who committed the Katyn 
massacre are practically concluded. The testimony today will lead 
up to the committee's desire to try and determine what happened to 
certain reports that were submitted to the Government departments 
regarding the Katyn massacre. 

The record may also show that all members of the committee are 
present. 

Counsel may now j^roceed. Have you a statement that you wish to 
make ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

You will recall that sometime ago you requested the Army Depart- 
ment Counselor, Mr. Francis Shackelford, to obtain a statement from 
General of the Army J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, relative 
to his interview with Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. Yesterday after- 
noon, at approximately 5 : 15 p. m., I received that statement, which is 
addressed to you, and I herewith hand it to you. 

Chairman Madden. This is a letter dated June 2, 1952, addressed 
to the chairman of this committee and signed bj^ J. Lawton Collins, 
Chief of Staff of the United States Army. 

Will the counsel please read the letter for the record ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The letter is headed "United States Army, the Chief 
of Staff." The letter is dated June 2, 1952. [Reading :] 

Dear Mr. IMadden : Referring to your conversation witli Mr. P. Sliackelford, 
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewitli my 
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to 
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I vpas the commanding general 
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was still 
in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River. 

1825 



1826 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison 
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I had 
known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I was in 
command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me. 

Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told me in a broad 
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of Polish 
officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home and report 
to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to Headquarters, 
First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accordingly, I made the 
necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First Army Head- 
quarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany. 

Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me, 
and I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington. 
Sincerely yours, 

J. Lawton Collins. 

The letter is addressed "Hon. Ray J. Madden, House of Repre- 
sentatives." 

Chairman Madden. Hand it to tlie reporter and have it marked 
"Exhibit 1." 

(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit 1" and made 
a part of the record. Exhibit 1 is as follows :) 

Exhibit 1 

United States Army, 

The Chief of Staff, 

June 2, 1952. 
Hon. Ray J. Madden, 

House of Representatives. 
Dear Mk. Madden : Referring to your conversation with Mr. F. Shackelford, 
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewith my 
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to 
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I was the commanding general 
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was 
still in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River. 

Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison 
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I 
had known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I 
was in command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me. 

Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told nie In a broad 
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of 
Polish officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home 
and report to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to 
Headquarters, First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accord- 
ingly, I made the necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First 
Army Headquarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany. 

Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me, and 
I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington. 
Sincerely yours, 

J. Lawton Collins. 

Mr. ]V[iTCHELL. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is 
Hon. William C. Lantaff, a Representative in Congress from the 
Foni-th District of Florida. 

Chairman Maddex. Cono;rpssninn, do yon solemnly swoar the testi- 
mony you will give licre in the hearing now being conducted will 
be the truth, the whole ti'iith, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Congressman Lantaff, I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1827 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. LANTAFF, A REPRESENTATIVE 
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Mr. Mitchell. CoiigTessiiiun, will you state your full name for the 
record, please '( 

Congressman Laxtaff. William C. Lantaff. 

Mr. Mitchell. And your present address? 

Congressman Lantaff. House Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the conmiittee what 3'our official posi- 
tion was in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, during the 
years 19M and 1945, to the best of your knowledge? 

Congi-essman Lantaff. I was assigned as Chief of the G-2 Secre- 
tariat in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Depart- 
ment, General Staff. I was on duty as Chief of the Secretariat in 
May of 1945. 

My cUities there in that office were essentially administrative in 
nature, to administer the administrative Office of the Assistant Chief 
of Staff. G-2, and to comply with certain other missions which had 
been assigned to me in that office. As such, I was on duty when 
Colonel Van Vliet reported to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff', 
G-2, in May of 1945. 

Of course, it is rather difficult at this time, some 7 years later, to 
recall everything that transpired ; but, as I recall it, and to the best 
of my recollection. Colonel Van Vliet wanted to report to General 
Bissell, and upon inquiry as to the nature of his visit and why he 
wanted to see General Bissell 

Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff', may I interrupt you for a 
moment ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. jNIr. Chairman, in part 2 of the hearings held in 
Washngton, D. C. on February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1 refer you to page 48. 

Mr. Lantaff', I would like to read something here for the record 
now. Mr. Flood is asking the question. [Reading:] 

Mr. Flood. Were you directed by anybody ovei'seas to report to the office of 
G-2 or did you from your Army experience decide that was where you should 
report? 

Colonel Van Vliet. That is where I decided to go. I went to the Office of G-2 
and told enough of my story to convince 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. To whom? 

Colonel Van Vliet. Sir. I don't remember. It was in one of the outer oflSces 
of G-2. I don't know wiiom I spoke to. It was one or two down from the 
G-2. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was his rank, a colonel? 

Colonel Van Vliet. I believe it was a lieutenant colonel, sir ; but I am unable 
to say who or what. They said I should see General Bissell 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. You mean to tell me when you came in there he did not 
introduce himself to you or tell who he was? He did not tell you what his 
position was, nor did you inquire? 

Colonel Van Vliet. His position was known* to me at the time, sir; but that 
has been 7 years ago. and it wasn't at the time important to me to remember 
whom I talked to in that office. I am sorry I don't remember. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Isn't it customary in military — 



1828 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Congressman, I would like to ask yon at this time: Were you that 
lieutenant colonel ? 

Congressman Lantaff. I believe I was; yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you proceed with your statement from there, 
please ? 

Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, Colonel Van Vliet 
told me enough of the incident that he had observed while a prisoner 
of W'ar that 1 determined that he should see General Bissell and, ac- 
cordingly, took him in to see General Bissell. I don't recall whether 
General Bissell was in the office at that time ; but, as well as I recall it, 
it was the same day that he reported that I took him in there. 

After some time — exactly how long I don't recall — General Bissell 
told me to arrange for a stenographer to take down the testimony of 
Colonel Van Vliet and to arrange for quarters for him to do it in. 
Accordingly, I arranged for stenographic assistance and for a space 
for him to dictate his statement about the Katyn Massacre. 

After that was completed, the report was taken by the secretary 
to General Bissell. 

As I recall. Colonel Van Vliet and General Bissell had a further 
conference on that report, and that is about all I remember about 
the incident about which Colonel Van Vliet has testified. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the name of the stenographer? 

Congressman Lantaff. I do now. It was Mrs. ISIeeres. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if Colonel Van Vliet showed you any 
photographs that he had of Katyn ? 

Congi-essman Lantaff. I recall seeing one or two photographs, to 
the best of my memory. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know if they were attached to his report or 
not'^ 

Congressman Lantaff. I do not recall for a certainty, but I believe 
they were. 

Mr. IMitchell. Did you ])ersonally see such a report and read it? 

Congressman LanTxVff. I personally saw the report. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you read it ? 

Congi-essman Lantaff. As well as I re.call, I read the report or I 
had seen it, because I think the notes were returned to me for safe- 
keeping prior to the time Colonel Van Vliet had planned such a 
report. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then there Avas such a report? 

Congressman Lantaff. I recall the report. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the time that the secretary returned the report, , 
did she return it to you or did she return it to Colonel Van Vliet and 
you and General Bissell ? Do you recall the details ^ 

Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall specifically. To the best of 
my recollection, when the report was finished, (\)l()nel Van Vliet re- 
viewed it. Whether he did it in my office or the office that I had made 
available for him, I don't recall; but, to the best of my memory, after 
the report was transcribed, he took it in to General Bissell. 

Mr. Mitchell. He personally delivered it to General Bissell? 

Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall. I think that he was to 
review tlie re])ort and, as I recall, sign it. 

Ml". MrrciiKi.L. Do you recall wlio was iu tl\e imiuediate office of 
General Bissell at that time? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1829 

Congressman Lantaff. I know who was assigned in the immediate 
office. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you give the connnittee the names of those in- 
dividnals. 

Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a Lt. Col. Jack Earman. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. How do you spell it? 

Congressman Lantaff. E-a-r-m-a-n. 

There was General BisselPs secretary, Mrs. Doris Jepson. There 
was a warrant officer, Carulli. Then there were several other per- 
sonnel assigned to the office but who were not in the immediate office 
next to the general, and the other personnel would have no knowledge 
of this incident. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if General Bissell had a safe in his 
office ( 

Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a safe just outside of 
General BisselPs office, alongside of Mrs. Jepson's desk. Then, of 
course, there were numerous combination file cabinets, with combina- 
tion locks. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then Mrs. Jepson was not located in the office with 
General Bissell, nor was the safe ? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. 

I say "safe.*- I don't recall. I think it was one of these combination 
lock safes, three combination safes, which were prescribed for the 
storage of "Top secret" papers. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was this document or report of Colonel Van Vliet's 
labeled "Top secret," to your knowledge? 

Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, it was. I could not 
swear to that, though. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is there any other individual who was connected 
with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at that time, from 
whom a statement should be taken by this committee? 

Congressman Lantaff. I think those are the only people in the 
office who would have had any knowledge of this incident. 

Mr. Mitchell. To your personal knowledge, do you know if any- 
body had access to this safe or combination safe which was the prop- 
erty of General Bissell, other than his secretaiy and himself? 

Congi'essman Lantaff. Everyone in the immediate office did. 

Mr. Mitchell. The individuals you have named ? 

Congressman Lantaff. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. Earman, Jepson and Carulli ? 

Congressman Lantaff. That is correct, and myself. 

Mr. jMitchell. Did yon see this report at any time after Colonel 
Van Vliet had signed it? 

Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was it customary for General BisselPs office to keep 
a log of all documents that were sent out of that office ? 

Congressman Lantaff. All documents that came in through the 
mailroom or cable section, which were retained in the office, were 
signed for by either Colonel Earman or myself, including Joint Chiefs 
of Staff papers and Combined Chiefs of Staff papers. All those 
papers were logged in and recorded; and, of course, if they left the 
office, were logged out ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Who did the logging out ? 



1830 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Congressman Lantaff. That was done by various personnel 
assigned to the office under a captain. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the captain's name ? 

Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall his name. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall ever having logged out the Van Vliet 
report to any other division of G-2 or to any other governmental 
agency or department? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. It was not logged in because, actually, 
the report originated in the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 
and I don't recall ever having logged it out. 

JNIr. Mitchell. But the report, even though it originated in General 
Bissell's office, if it had left the office, the standard procedure was for 
it to be logged out ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Not necessarily; no. General Bissell could 
have originated a "Top secret" paper and could have taken that paper 
to another office or to an authorized recipient, and have left that paper 
with that particular individual. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall whether there was one copy, or just 
the original, or several copies of this Van Vliet report? 

Congressman Lantaff. I only recall an original. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Did I understand you to say that this original 
report was placed in this safe in Bissell's office ? 

Congressman Lx\ntaff. As well as I recall it. I don't recall having 
seen this particular report after Colonel Van Vliet reported in to 
General Bissell with the report to review it with him and to sign it. 
But it could very well have been placed in that particular safe. 

Chairman JMadden. Did the other employees in the office, including 
those that you named in your testimony, have access to the safe where 
the secret files were kept ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Those four people had access to all docu- 
ments in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, because it was 
our function, of course, to work there whenever General Bissell was 
there; and General Bissell would be there from early in the morning 
until late at night. Many times there would be only one of us there 
in the office with him. So, the people that were assigned to his imme- 
diate office had the combinations of all the safes. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any questions? 

Mr. DoNDERo. Can you fix the time, Congressman, when Van Vliet 
came into the office to dictate that report ? 

Congressman Lantaff. I think it was in the morning, but that is 
as well as I remember. 

Mr. DoNDERO. 1 mean, the day, the month, and year. 

Congressman Lantaff, No, I cannot. 

Mr. DoNDEKO. Was it in 1945? 

Congressman Lantaff. May of 1945, as well as I recall it. 

Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, did I understand you correctly to say 
that you did review Van Vliet's report before he signed it. 

(/ongi'ossman Lantaff. No. Colonel Van Vliet came into the office 
and wanted to see General Bissell. Before I would let him see the 
general I wanted to know what he wanted to see him about. 

Mr. Sheehan. After he dictated it to Mrs. Meeres, did you see the 
report ? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1831 

Cono^ressnian Lantaff. I don't recall. I believe that I did, but I 
don't remember. 

Mr. Sheehan. There was something said about his turning over 
some notes to you. 

Congressman Lantaff. As I recall, I had Mrs. Meeres bring back 
her stenographic notes and the portion she transcribed, to me, to put 
in the G-2 safe that night. 

Mr. Sheehax. But were they put in separate from the original 
report, or were they put in with the general's report ? 

Congressman Lantaff. That was before the original report was 
completed. It is a security measure. I had Mrs. Meeres bring them 
back and kept them under our control. 

Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, I have another thought. You men- 
tioned before they had a system of logging out reports in the office, 
and you said it could be possible for General Bissell to take the top- 
secret report out of the office, to vour knowledge, over to some other 
dej^artment or some other Government agency. 

Congressman Lantaff. It would be very possible. I did not say 
other Government agencies. 

Mr. Sheehan. Or some other department of the Army, say. Well, 
let us say that he could take it out of the office, as you understood. 

Congressman L\ntaff. Yes. 

Mr. Sheehan. "Was there anything in the Army regulations that 
required him to get a receipt under such a procedure, or could he just 
take it out under his own free will ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Under the ARCs, the file receipts were, 
of course, to be taken for top-secret documents. 

Mr. Sheehan. That is what I mean. In other words, if General 
Bissell had taken out the report and turned it over to someone else, 
he should have a receipt, under Army regulations? 

Congressman Lantaff. I think you will find considerable dispute 
about that even today in the Department of the Army, as to what 
is required with reference to the handling of top-secret documents. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Congressman, when this report came into your di- 
vision and General Bissell's, there was pretty good evidence that 
here was a case that involved the murder of almost 15,000 Allied 
soldiers. Could yoa give us any hint as to what discussion or what 
impression that created? Was there any discussion about that 
ghastly crime after the report was made, or was it just passed off 
as another report? 

Congressman Lantaff. I don't know. If there would have been 
such, it was beyond the scope of my duties in that office to evaluate it 
or to discuss it. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I understand. 

Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, you were not in any way connected 
with the evaluation of intelligence reports or responsible for the 
evaluation of intelligence reports in that assignment that you had, 
were you ? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. I would say that my assignment there 
was comparable to that of an administrative assistant in one of our 
offices. 

Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, were you there during the entire 
period of General Bissell's regime as Assistant Chief of Staff for 
G-2? 



1832 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Congressman Lantaff. No, I was not. I was ordered to duty 
there after he had been designated as ACofS. G-2, and I was dis- 
charged from the service prior to the time that he was succeeded. 

Mr. JNIrrcHELL. In other words, you left before he was relieved 
of the responsibility of the G-2 assignment? 

Congressman Lantaff. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitciip:ll. Thank you, sir. I have no furtlier questions. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Furcolo. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Wliere was the report physically, the last time you 
ever saw it, if you remember who had it and where it was ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Congressman Furcolo, it is hard for me to 
say for a certainty. As I recall — I am trying to remember what hap- 
pened 7 years ago — the last time I saw the report was when it went 
in with Colonel Van Vliet to General Bissell's office. If there was 
some way I could refresh my memory, it could very well have been 
that that report was in the safe there in General Bissell's office. But 
I am not certain about it. 

Mr. FuRCoi-o. In your best recollection, have you ever seen the repoit 
itself since that time? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. Since May of 1945 I have not seen it. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. In other words, your best recollection would be that 
the last time you saw that report physically was in the hands of 
Colonel Van Vliet walking into the office of General Bissell? 

Congressman Lantaff. As well as I can recall — the reason why I 
have some reservation is that I know that I saw the report and read 
the report, and I don't recall whether I did it before he took it in, or 
afterward. 

Mr. Furcolo. Would it be safe to say that the last time you physi- 
cally saw that report, it was in the G-2 offices there ? 

Congressman Lantaff. Tliat is correct. 

Mr. Furcolo. With reference to the notes, the shorthand notes, 
where were they the last time that you saw them, if you did see them? 

Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that. With reference to the 
notes, Mrs. Meeres can testify better than I can, but I would pi-esume 
that they were destroyed. 

Mr. Furcolo. And from that time on, your best recollection is that 
you have not physically seen the report or the notes ? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. There were many documents which 
were in possession of the G-2, which were kept m his personal pos- 
session. 

Mr. Furcolo. At any time, did you ever discuss the report with 
General Bissell in any way, or with any superior of yours there? 

Congressman Lantaff. No. 

Mr. Furcolo. That is all I have. 

Cliairman Madden. Congressman Lantati', on behalf of the com- 
mittee, we wish to thank you for coming here this morning to testify. 

Congressman Lantaff. Is that all ? 

Chairman Madden. That is all. 

Mrs. Mi hired Meeres. 

Mi's. Meeres, will you just stand and be sworn, please? 

Do you solenndy swear that in tlie lioaring now being hekl you will 
tell the trutli, tlie whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mrs. Meehes. Yes, I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1833 

TESTIMONY OF MILDRED MEERES, WASHINGTON, D. C, ACCOM- 
PANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF 
THE ARMY 

Chairman Madden. Just state your name to the reporter. 

Mrs. Meeres. Mrs. Mildred Meeres. 

Chairman Madden. And vour address ? 

Mrs. Meeres. 2012 O Street NW, Washington. 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. Mi-s. Meeres, how long were you assigned in G-2 
of the Army '( Wlien did the period begin, and how long were you 
connected with G-2 of the Army 'I 

Mrs. Meeres. From 1941 to 1948. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what your position was 
in the Army during 1944 and 1945 in the G-2 division? 

Mrs. Meeres. I worked for Captured Personnel and Material. I 
was secretary to Col. J. Edward Johnston, who was Chief of the X 
section in that division. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you describe to the committee what the X 
section's duties were ? 

Mrs. Meeres. The X section was a secret committee, and I did 
secretarial work along with the secret work that I did for Colonel 
Johnston. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, if it was a secret committee, I 
think she probably should be excused from any further answers to 
that question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what connection you 
had with the report given by Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., in May 
1945 i 

Mrs. Meeres. Colonel Van Vliet dictated the repoit to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you describe in detail to the committee how 
you were selected, where your office was physically located, as con- 
nected with General Bissell's office ? 

Mrs. Meeres. We were about two corridors down the hall from 
General Bissell's office, and it was Captured Personnel and Material, 
which has to do with prisoners of war. So General Bissell's office 
called to have a girl come up to take a statement from a returning 
prisoner of war, and I was asked to go up and take the statement. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who did you first see when you went to General 
Bissell's office? 

Mrs. Meeres. I saw Colonel Lantaff. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did Colonel Lantaff say to you? 

Mrs. Meeres. He briefed me on security and told me I was to take a 
top-secret report. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the connnittee what happened after 
you were briefed. 

Mrs. Meeres. Then he took me into General Bissell's office and intro- 
duced me to Colonel Van Vliet, and then Colonel Van Vliet and Colonel 
Lantaff and I went across the hall, and Colonel Lantaff left us there 
alone and locked the door and Colonel Van Vliet dictated the state- 
ment to me. Then I took the report back to my own office and typed 
it up. And then — my memory is a little hazy on it — I believe I took 
the report back, and I believe that both General Bissell and Colonel 
Van Vliet dictated to me further, in General Bissell's office. But I 



1834 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

specifically remember taking the report and a letter up to General 
Bissell's office. 

But, apparently, I hadn't completed the job, because I remember 
locking the papers up, or giving them to Colonel Lantaff to lock in 
his safe at night, and got them again the next morning. So I can't 
remember exactly whether I finished the report that night, that after- 
noon, or the next morning. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Does the committee desire to ask any questions at 
this point? 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero. 

Mr. Dondero, Did you make any copies? 

Mrs. Meeres. I have been trying to remember. I don't recall mak- 
ing any copies, and I don't think I did, because I did it in draft and it 
was top secret, and usually a top secret is only one copy, until its final 
form. 

Chairman Madden. Until what? 

Mrs. Meeres. Until it is typed in its final form. 

Mr. Dondero. What did you do with your stenographic notes? 

Mrs. Meeres. I put them in double envelopes, and all my mistakes 
and everything, the paper that had to be destroyed, and returned 
everything to Colonel Lantaff when I was finished with the job, the 
notes and everything. 

Mr. Dondero. To whom did you hand the report after it was 
written ? 

Mrs. Meeres. I think I handed it to Colonel Lantaff, but I am not 
exactly sure, sir, whether I took it into General Bissell's office, or not. 

Mr. Dondero. Did you see it after that? 

Mrs. Meeres. The report ? 

Mr. Dondero. Did you see it? 

Mrs. Meeres. No ; I never saw the report after that. 

Mr. Dondero. You were not present when it was signed ? 

Mrs. Meeres. I don't remember that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you take any other dictation from either Colonel 
Van Vliet or General Bissell, or Colonel Lantaff ? 

Mrs. Meeres. From General Bissell, I believe, and Colonel Van 
Vliet. 

Mr. Mitchell. I show you an exhibit on page 51 of the part 2 
hearings of the committee of February 4. There is a letter of the 
War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, G-2, 
Washington. Could you identify this letter for the committee, please ? 

Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir. I believe I typed that memorandum. It 
was dictated to me by General Bissell in his office. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that this 
letter is the letter that Colonel Van Vliet specifically requested from 
General Bissell relative to his keeping silent in connection with the 
report he had rendered to G-2. The witness this morning has said 
that General Bissell dictated this letter. And also the part 2 of the 
hearings held on February 4 will reveal that Colonel Van Vliet him- 
self specifically requested such a letter. 

Tluit is to clarify the record. 

Chairman Madden. On what page of part 2 is that ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Page 51. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. AAHiat did the witness say that General Bissell 
dictated ? 



THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1835 

Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Meeres just stated tliat General Bissell dic- 
tated tliis letter to lier. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mrs. Meeres, you typed other top-secret reports, did 
you not ? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. Was there anything unusual about this particular 
report? Was there more furore or was there more of a tendency to 
create an impression on you, as to this particular report, that it must be 
top secret ? Was it handled with a little more flush and flurry than 
any other top-secret report that was made ? 

Mrs. ]VIeeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. In other words, it sort of struck you that here was 
a report that had great significance because it was impressed upon 
you more than any other top-secret report that you typed that this 
was something unusual, something different, that really must be top 
secret ; was that the impression that you got ? 

Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Siieeiiax. Mrs. Meeres, you stated before that in a top-secret 
document, you only typed one copy, and you said something about 
"until it is typed for final form." AMiat did you mean by "final 
form" ? 

Mrs. Me:erj!:s. Well, this was a statement that I took verbatim from 
Colonel Van Vliet, and usually a statement of that type is corrected 
and written in final form after it is corrected. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Do you mean that usually your procedure was that 
it was corrected, to do it over? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. And in this particular instance you never got it back 
to do it over ? 

Mrs. Meeres. That is right. 

]Mr. Sheehan, And in previous documents that you had typed and 
returned to you with corrections, what was the procedure on the 
number of copies that you would make ? 

Mrs. JSIeeres, It would depend on the report and how many were 
needed. 

Mr, Sheehan. Did you ever before make a single copy and never 
any more ? 

Mrs. Meeres, Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Whatever became of your stenographic notes? What 
was the procedure in the office ? 

Mrs, Meeres. On this particular job, I returned my stenographic 
notes to Colonel Lantaff. But when I was working in my own office, 
we had our own security there, where it was burned by our own security 
officer. 

Mr. Mitchell, Will you explain to the committee what the secu- 
rity procedure was in your office relative to stenographic notes ? 

Mrs. Meeres. Well, after our notes were finished, we saved them in 
the top-secret safe for a little while in case we would have to refer to 
them, and then they were burned. We had a regular procedure for 
that. The security officers took care of it. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ? 



1836 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Mrs. Meeres, you said, as I understood you, that after 
Colonel Van Vliet had dictated to you, you took the report and a letter 
up to General Bissell's office. Did 1 undeistand that correctly i 

Mrs. Mei:res. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Then I understood you to say tliat you did not knt)\v 
if it was finished or not. Is that right ? 

Mi-s. MiiERES. That is right, sir. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Ordinarily, if any person dictated something to you, 
would you, after it had been coin})leted, not show it to that person, or 
would the ordinary procedure be to take it to General Bissell ^ 

Mrs. Meeres. Well, I never did a job just like this before. This was 
out of my regular routine. So I took it back to General BisselFs office. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Was Colonel Van Vliet in the office at that time { 

Mr. Meeres. Well, that is what I can't remember. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. You brought the report physically, the typed report, 
to the best of your knowledge, the only copy ; is that right. 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir; to the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. You brought that sole re})ort to General Bissell's 
office ? 

Mrs. Meeres. I don't know whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaif and 
he brought it in, or whether I brought it in. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Your best recollection is that the last you saw of that 
report, where was it? 

Mrs. Meeres. I can't recall where it was, because I am not sure 
whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaff or 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Would youi- best recollection be tiiat the last you saw 
of that report, it was either in the hands of CoU)nel Lantatl' or in the 
hands of General Bissell? 

You see, what we are trying to do is trace this report down as best 
we can. 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, I know. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. And we do not want any more than your best recol- 
lection. 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

I am positive it was in that office. I am positive I left it up there. 

Mr. FuRCOEO. Where, and with whom ? 

Mrs. Meeres. I gave it to either Colonel Lantatf or Colonel Van 
Vliet, or General Bissell. 

Mr. FuRCoLo. In other words, you are reasonably certain that the 
last you saw of that report, you left it with one of those three men. 
Colonel Lantaff, Colonel Van Vliet, or Geneial Bissell? 

Mi's. Meeres. Yes, sir; that is right. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Did you evei", at any time from that day to this, see 
that I'eport again ^ 

Mrs. Meeres. No, sir. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. With reference to yom- note-:, 1 nnderstood you to 
say that your best recollection is tliat you U'ft those with Colonel 
Lantaff or someone there; is that right? 

Mrs. Meeres. That is right. 

Mr. PuRCOLO. At the present time are you emi)Ioyed by any de- 
I)ai-tment or agency of the United States Government^ 

Mi-s. Meeres. Yes, sir; I am; the Interior Department. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. I just want to ask you one moie question. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1837 

I jiatlier from your testimony tliat apparently this was the first 
time yon had been ca-lled in for a job or some work for General Bis- 
sell, or that office. 

Mi-s. Meeees. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FuRCOEO. Was there any reason for that, that yon know of '^ 

Mrs. Meeres. The only reason was that we v.ere the prisoner of 
war branch, and it had to do with onr branch. We handled all the 
woi-k in connection with ])risoners of war. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, do I understand that Colonel Van 
Vliet Avas retnrnino; as a former prisoner of war ^ 

Mrs. Meeres. That is what I understood at the time. 

Mr. Furc'Olo. Let me ask you this questioii : Assuming that Colonel 
Van Vliet did return as a jn-isoner of war, would there be anything 
umisual about your de})artment's handling it rather than some otlier 
de[)artment '. 

^Irs. Meeres. I believe that usually our department would have 
handled it, except that he went to General Bissell instead. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. I think you partially answered this in answer to a 
question of Congressman O'Konski, but I would be interested in get- 
ting your general opinion as to whether there was anything at all 
about this case, right from the very begining, that impressed itself 
upon your mind as being handled any differently than the ordinary 
to]>-secret case Avould be handled ^ 

Mrs. Meeres. Xo, sir. I don't think it was handled any differ- 
ently, except that I was the one to do it. I wouldn't ordinaiily do 
a job for treneral Bissell. 

Mr. FuRroLo. This connnittee is extremely interested and we in- 
tend to track down, of course, an}- evidence that there may be indicat- 
ing that there was some sort of a cover-up or a hushing up of any facts 
in connection with this entire case. xVre you aware, in any way at all, 
of any acts or statements on the part of anyone to try and cover up 
or hush n]> something in connection M-ith this^ 

Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Xo, sir. In fact, evei- since the investigation, I have 
Ijeen told to tell evei'vthing I can remember about the report. The 
only thing tliat was top secret was the content of the report, at the 
time. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. That is all. 

Chainnan Madde'x. Do you have any questions, Mr. ISIachrowicz ? 

Mr. Maciiroavicz. Yes, sir. 

I believe you said you had been working for the G-2 since 1941? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. And you were working in a secret section of 
that G-2? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MAt'iiowicz. Had you taken quite a number of secret reports 
prior to tliis one '\ 

]Mrs. Meeres. I took several. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Were you briefed before you went upon your 
duties, as to the security precautions? 

Mrs. Meeres. Well,_ in that particular division, they are very 
security-conscious. We Avere constantly being told and briefed, but 
not for a particular job like that, because 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Xot for the particular job? 

93744— 52— pt. 7 2 



183S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Were you always briefed particularly before every secret report 
that you took ? 

Mrs, Meekes. No, sir. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. You were not? 

Mrs. Meekes. Ko. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In this case, I believe a'Ou testified that you were 
briefed specially ? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did that impress upon you the particular im- 
portance given to these reports, as compared to the others in which you 
were never briefed separately ? 

Mrs. Meeres, No, sir, I didn't think much of that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Were there any special security precautions given 
to you on this report that were not given to you in the others? 

Mrs, Meeres, No. It was just the same as the others. 

Mr. Machrow^icz. But this is the only report that you know of, 
from the time you were in the G-2, where you were given special, 
particular security precautions? 

Mrs. Meeres. For a particular job. 

Mr. Machrowicz. This is the only particular job in the course of 
your experience at G-2 where you were given the special, particular 
precautions? 

Mrs. Meeres, No. 

May I take that back, sir, because I told you I worked with the X 
section, and I did some jobs there also that I was specially briefed on. 
I just forgot. You just recalled it to my mind, 

Mr, MACIIR0w^cz. Can you recall any special precautions that were 
given to you in this case that were not given in other cases? 

Mrs. Meeres. No, sir; I can't. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Mr. DoNDERO, When you returned your stenographic notes, were 
they in the form of the ordinary stenographer's notebook? 

Mrs, Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DoNDERo. And you simply handed the book over? 

Mrs, Meeres, I believe I tore my notes out of the book. 

Mr. Dondero. And then they were put into an envelope? 

Mrs. Meeres. I put them in a double envelope. 

Mr. DoNDERO. They were put in an envelope? 

Mrs. Meeres. That is right. 

Mr. Dondero. Did you ever see those notes again? 

Mrs. Meeres. No, sir. 

Mr. DoNDERO, Do you know what was done with them ? 

Mrs, Meeres. I assume that they w^ere burned ; but I don't know. 

Mr. Dondero. Was that the procedure? 

Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dondero. To burn the notes? 

Mrs. Meeres, Yes, sir, 

Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions? Mrs. Meeres, 
on behalf of the committee, I thank you for coming here to testify. 

Mivs. Meeres. Thank you. 

Chairman Madden, Major General Bissell. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1839 

General Bissell, do you solemnly swear that in the hearing- now 
being held you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

General Bissell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON L. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF 
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Chairman Madden. Just state your full name to the reporter, 
General. 

General Bissell. ISIaj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, Air Force, United 
States, retired. 

Chairman AIaddeint. And your present address? 

General Bissell. Signal Mountain, Tenn. ; 102 River Point Road. 

Chairman JNIadden. Will counsel proceed? 

General Bissell. With your permission, I would like to hand you 
two letters at this time. I am handing the counsel two letters at 
this time because I think I should do it at this moment. You judge 
whether you want them, or not. 

Chairman Madden. Yes. 

I have here a letter dated May 21, 1952, written by Clayton L. 
Bissell, major general, USAF, retired, to the Chief of Staff, United 
States Air Force. 

Will you have the reporter mark it "Exhibit 2" ? 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2" and made a 
part of the record as follows :) 

Exhibit 2 

Signal Mountain, Tenn., May 21, 1952. 
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. 
Through : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. 

Subject : Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn 
Massacre. 

The United Press about May 16, 1952, stated that Chairman Roy J. Madden 
of the select committee of the House currently investigating the Katyn massacre 
announced that I would be the first witness l)efore the committee on June 3, 
1052, at a public hearing in Washington. 

I will be very glad to cooperate fully with the committee. Published reports 
of the committee hearings indicate that not only the Katyn matter itself but 
matters directly or indirectly related to Katyn may become the subject of ques- 
tioning. There are many asi^ects of the matter that, as of the date of my retire- 
ment, were still classified. Since my separation from the service, I have had no 
means of knowing which, if any, of these matters have been declassified. 

Written instructions are requested as to what matters I may and may not 
testify about in connection with the Katyn affair, and what action it is desired 
I should take in answering questions relating to State or Defense Department 
material the classification of which I am no longer aware. 

If called, and the committee follows its usual procedure, it is expected they 
will ask me if I have received any instructions from National Defense or other 
sources as to what I should or should not testify. If such a question is asked, 
and there is no olijection, I should like to lay liefore the committee a copy of this 
letter and its reply. If no instructions are received, I will have no alternative 



1840 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

but to lay this letter before the committee and so state, thereafter, answeriiifx 
auy questions asked without regard to security classification of material of 
which I naturally cannot now be aware. 

Clayton L. Bisseix, 
Major General, USAF (Retired). 
A certified true copy : 

Frederic H. Miller, Jr., 

Colonel, USAF. 

Chairman Madden. I have liere a letter headed "Memorandum foi- 
Chiyton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired)'' written by Roger 
Kent, general counsel for Charles A. Coolidge, in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. This letter is dated June 2, 1952, and is in 
answer to the letter set out as exhibit 2. 

Will you have the reporter mark this '"Exhibit 3" ? 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3*' and made a 
part of the record as follows:) 

Exhibit 3 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Washington, D. C, June 2, 1952. 
Memorandum for Clayton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired). 
Subject: Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn 
Massacre. 
In answer to your memorandum of May 21, 1952, to the Secretary of Defense, 
I can advise you, after consultation with the Department of State, that neither 
the Department of State nor the Department of Defense knows of any matters 
connected with the Katyn massacre which now need to remain classified. These 
Departments, therefore, know of no reason why you should not testify freely as 
to all matters connected with the Katyn affair. In doing so, you should not 
disclose sources of intelligence which from your general experience you will 
realize would thereby be jeopardized. 

Testimony concerning official matters not connected with the Katyn massacre, 
the curreut'security classification of which you may not be aware, will be with- 
held pending determination of its current classification status. 

Roger Kent, 
General Counsel for Cliarlen A. Coolidge. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MrrcnELL. Genei-al. where were you born? 

General Bissell. In Kane, Pa. 

Mr. MrrniELL. When were vou born? 

General Bissell. July 29, 1896. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee your educational back- 
gi'oun.d, j)lease i 

(ienoral Bissell. liegulai' grammar school, high school, law school. 

Mr. MrrciiELL. Where did you go to grannnar school and high 
scliool ? 

(jeneral Bissell. (ii-annnar school in Kane, Pa., and liiuh scliool in 
Kane, Pa., ami Glean, N. Y. 

]Mr. INIrrcjiELL. Where did you go to law school? 

General Blssell. Vali)ai'aiso TTniversity, Indiana. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academy ? 

(Joneral I^lssell. I never attended Military Academy. 

Mr. MrrciiELL. What did you do after law school ? 

(leneral Bissell. 1 left law school j)i'ior to graduation, a few months 
before graduation, to enter the first ollicers training camp. 

Mr. AlrrciiELL. AA'hen was this? 

General Bissell. 1917, very early. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1841 

Mr. Mitchell,. Were you later admitted to the bar of Indiana ? 

General Bissell. I was. 

I was criticized for leavino: the school without finishino; the course 
so close to the end, but my pjrades were ^rood and they asked me to 
come back and receive my diplonla in uniform. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you receive your diploma? 

General Bissell. I did, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When? 

General Bissell. At the orraduation of the class in lOlT. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you admitted to the bar of Indiana? 

General Bissell. That is rig-ht, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. ^Y[\en ? 

General Bissell. I couldn't give you the date because I was back 
in training camp, but it went through the usual procedure. It would 
have occurred sometime during the next few months after that, the 
papers being completed and my admission certified. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you discharged from the xVrmy after your 
service in World War I ? 

General Bissell. I stayed on until the 1020 Reorganization Act 
went into etfect, and at that time left the service for a brief period 
and went to work for the Galludet Aircraft Corp., then located in 
Connecticut. 

]Mr. Mitchell. What date was that approximately ? 

General Bissell. Sometime in the summer of 1920, probably the 
date that the law became effective, which was sometime in June, as I 
recall, 1920; probably June 30 at the end of the fiscal year, would 
have been the most normal period. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you return to Army service ? 

General Bissell. Sometime late that fall. I had met General 
Mitchell by coincidence in New York, and he asked me to come back 
and do a specific job. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you an aviator in World War I ? 

General Bissell. I was an aviator in World War I on the British 
front, as a fighter pilot, for about 51^ months. 

Mr. Mitchell. You stated to the committee that you returned to 
military service approximately the fall of 1920; is that right? 

General Bissell. I was out just a few montlis. and I think it was 
either the fall of 1920 or just after the first of the new year. I think 
I met General Mitchell at the Armistice Day dinner in Xew York, 
and he wanted me to come back and do a certain job, and I did go back. 

Mr. Mitchell. On this next question you may refer to notes if 
you would like to. 

Could you tell the committee the various assignments you have had 
from 1920 until September 1, 1939? What was your rank in the fall 
of 1920? 

General Bissell. I was a captain at the time I left the service. I 
had been recommended for a majority, but the promotions were 
frozen at a certain period when the winning of the war was certain. 
There was no use commissioning additional officers. Under the re- 
organization, not being a West Pointer, I would have had to accept 
a first lieutenancy. I did not want to do that because I did not see 
that it was in the national interest at that time. I didn't think I knew 



1S42 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

enough of the military. I knew enougli of the civilian side to go into, 
that. 

After I came back in the service, the job that I was brought in for 
was to assist in the setting up of a school that became known as the 
Air Service Field Officers' School, subsequently the Air Corps Field 
Officers' School, now the Air War College. 

No such thing had ever existed. I had recommended it prior to my 
separation from the service ; and General Mitchell, following through, 
wanted me to come back and assist in getting it going. The purpose 
of it was to give those considerable number of Regular officers who 
did not get overseas because of their training — they were kept over 
here; that is, training others, the West Pointers — they had missed 
the combat side of the war and it seemed to me that a school was the 
only opportunity to pass it on to them while the information was fresh. 

I went to Langley Field for that purpose. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long were you there ? 

General Bissell. I was connected with that school, with short 
breaks, a good deal of time. I started in, I think, in 1920 or early 
1921. I w^as with it through the formation period of the school. 

I was then selected by General Mitchell as an aide to go to Euro])t' 
and visit all European countries, testing and examining aircraft. Wf 
visited most of the countries of Europe that had any air forces. Our 
relationship became very close during that period ; and when I got 
back — shortly after that — I was ordered away from the school and 
imade his aide and was his aide for the following 4 years, and also 
as a direct assistant as Assistant Chief, Army Air Service, as it was 
called in those days. 

Mr. Mitchell. When was your first assignment in the Army in con- 
nection with Military Intelligence? 

General Bissell. When I returned from World War II, after 2 
years in India with Stilwell. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any Military Intelligence background 
at any period of time from 1917 until your return from StilwelT- 
theater ? 

General Bissell. Yes; a rather considerable amount. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee about it? 

General Bissell. Before setting up this school, it was necessary to 
determine what the courses should be; and, naturally, there had to be 
Intelligence in it. My specialty was operations. I didn't deal much 
with Intelligence, but I knew the relationship of Intelligence to Oper- 
ations, and learned more as the years passed. 

When I left the Air Corps school, I attended Leavenworth, where 
there was a 2-year course. There was a considerable amount of em- 
phasis on Intelligence. And I believe Colonel Van Vliet's father 
taught the class out there. I am not sure of that. 

Mr. Mitchell. But you yourself never had a specific assignment 
in the capacity as Military Intelligence officer until your assignment 
after that with General Stilwell ? 

General Btssef.l. Yes: I did. I had one in Air Force immediately 
after my return, with the idea of expanding and reorganizing the 
Air Corps Intelligence. It was the Air Corps Intelligence at that 
time. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you say "Air Corps Intelligence," at that 
time 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1843 

General Bissell. It is Air Force Intelligence now. 

Mr. MrrcHELL (contiiuiing). It was then part of the Department 
of the Army ? 

General Bissell. That is correct, part of the Department of the 
Army. 

Mr. Mitchell. When was that assignment? 

General Bissell. I left India on the 1st day of September, with 
instructions to visit various fronts. 

Mr. Mitchell. What year 'i 

General Bissell. 1943. 

And after visiting various fronts and England, I arrived back here, 
and probably within 30 days took over the duties as A-2, it was called, 
or Air-2 section of the staff, under General Arnold. 

Now, you understand, I had Intelligence oflicers working under me, 
numerous ones, in India, where I commanded the Tenth Air Force 
and all American aviation for a considerable period, as well as initiat- 
ing the first work on crossing the Hump. I had been with the Chinese 
theater in charge at StilwelPs headquarters during the time he was 
cut off in Burma, and I knew much of intelligence from the practical 
user's end, and I had a little of the school or academic background on 
the Intelligence side. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was the exact date on which you took over 
the position to which you have referred, in A-2 ? 

General Bissell. I would have to refer to orders. But I would 
say within 30 to 45 days after my departure from India, which was 
on the 1st of September .1943. 

Mr. Mitchell, You say "30 or 45 days." That would make it 
approximately October 15, 1943; would it? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you become Assistant Chief of Staff for 
G-2, or was there any assignment in between this A-2 assignment 
and your assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff? 

General Bissell. No. It was effective, I think, by order on 5 or 
4 January 1944. The thing that led up to it was that I had worked 
under General Strong, my G-2 predecessor. When he was head of 
the Ai-my War Plans Division, I handled the Air Force plans in 
that office at that time. 

Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Who is General Strong? 

General Bissell. Gen. G. V. Strong, deceased, my predecessor in 
G-2 and a former head of the War Plans Division, the War Depart- 
ment General Staff. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you are telling the committee that you as- 
sumed the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Chief of Staff 
of G-2 on the 4th of January 1944 ; is that correct ? 

General Bissell, Yes; I think that is correct. I would have to 
verify it if I have gone wrong, but I don't think I have. I left India 
in 1943 in September, and the following January the order came out, 

I would like to make that clear, because I think you want some- 
thing — and I know what it is — but I would like to cover the whole 
field, 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show 
that I have never talked to General Bissell, and I don't believe any 
member of the committee has talked to him before. 

General Bissell. That is correct. 



1844 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. I have never asked him a question before this par- 
ticular time. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

General Bissell. The reas(m for my interrpution — and I want to 
apologize — is not any implication whatever, except that I am trying 
to give you everything-, and we are moving rapidly over a lot of 
territory. 

General Strong was ill. I was in the A-2 receiving a considerable 
amount of Intelligence through G-2. 

Chairman Madden. What time are you referring to now? 

General Bissell. Between the period I returned from India, in 
1943, and the time I took over as head of G-2, in January 1944. 

In that period I was convinced we w^ould never get, during the war, 
an effective Intelligence organization in Air Forces. It started too 
late; it did not have sufficient experienced personnel in Intelligence, 
and it wasn't going to work too well, and it was going to be very costly 
and we would get a good set-up, but the wnir Avould be over by the 
time we got it. So I told General Arnold exactly how I felt about 
it and told him I thought a better working arrangement could be made 
with G-2 whereby we w^ould send Air Force officers down there in some 
numbers and they would specialize on the Air Force end of it and we 
wouldn't have to. 

He took that thought to General Marshall. General Marshall had 
some contacts w^ith General Strong. I think I made the suggestion 
on a Saturday morning. I think that afternoon I was informed that 
I would be the next G-2 and go see General Strong. I think physi- 
cally I took over G-2 the next Monday morning because of General 
Strong's condition and that he promptly went to the hospital at 
Walter Reed. 

That was not wdiat I had originally intended at all. I had no 
thought of any such thing and expected to go back to o[)erations, which 
was my specialty. 

The order confirming me in G-2, I think, is dated January, but I 
think I actually went to work there nearly a month earlier, because 
I don't think General Strong was I'elieved until they had given him 
a thorough check at Walter Keed and determined it was not expedient 
to send him back to G-2. His physical condition Avould not stand it. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank at that time, (jeneral^ 

General Bissell. Major general. 

Mr. Mitchell. You stated that from the time you left the Chiiui- 
Burma-lndia theater you made several visits to other stations. Could 
you briefly sketch for the connnittee some of those visits, because it 
covered the period 

Mr. Mac^likowicz. Just a minute, if you will pardon me. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand some of the committee have unavoid- 
able appointuients this afternoon. AVe probably have other matters to 
discuss. I think we should leave Buruia to some other investigation. 
Let us get to the Katyn matter. I do not think it is particidarly 
importaut to us whiit his other assiguments were. 

Mr. MrrciiKLL. Katyn happened in April 194;), it was disclosed, and 
he evidently came from the Near Fast area. 

('hairinan Madden. Does this have some connection with Katyn? 

Mr. Mttciiell. Yes, sir; my line of questions has. 

I will make the qtu^stions more direct if the connnittee so desire.s. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1845 

In April 1943, the Katyn affair was disclosed to the world by the 
Germans. The general left the China-Burma-India theater. I be- 
lieve, on September 1, 1943. The Katyn alfair had become known to 
the world then. I do not know how the general returned to the 
States, but lie did state here this morning that he came through certain 
areas. I vvould like to have him now tell the committee if he had 
heard about the Katyn affair, at what stations. Colonel Szymanski 
was militaiy attache in Cairo, Egypt, at the time. 

Chairman Maddex. Proceed. 

General Bissell. I flew from India, departing from Karachi, in an 
airplane which was furnished to me to proceed as far as Casablanca. 
I was directed to proceed by the usual transport route to Cairo, with 
some diversions authorized to see strategic points en route. I landed 
at Cairo and had a few days there. 

I knew something of Katyn while on duty in India and loaned 
Polish-speaking personnel in my command for use of the British in 
India. There they had families, I think, of some of the Polish 
Army housed somewhere outside of Karachi under pretty terrible con- 
ditions. It was nobody's fault; just there they were. Food was 
scarce in India; Englishmen were scarce, and English, Indian, or 
American people Avho spoke any Polish were still more scarce. So, 
w^e were very glad to help. It was a tricky thing to do. It was not 
my job to take care of Polish refugees but to fight the Japanese. But 
I felt that the small number of Polish people we had who could be 
of assistance wouldn't hurt us and could be of great assistance. So 
that was done. 

I knew where they were camped and saw it from the air. While I 
don't recall it too much in detail, I remember talking to one or two 
of my people who were there, and they painted a picture of distress 
and privation and poverty and suffering and broken families and 
lives and lack of homes and everythino; that was pathetic. They 
didn't know where they were going. They were worn out, and the 
Britisli couldn't move them any farther because they couldn't then 
stand more travel. 

Yes; I knew something of Katj-n, but not the detail probably that 
was available in America, because our messages were pretty short. 
I had heaid of it. 

, When I got to Egypt, I was much more concerned with the Poleski 
operation, which had just been finished. It was one of the brilliant 
Air Force operations of the war. I was very much concerned with 
lend-lease and supply arrangements because we in India were sup- 
posed to get certain supplies to that theater, I wanted to help Stilwell 
every way I could. 

Mr. MricHELL. Did you see Colonel Szymanski while you were in 
Cairo? 

General Bissell. I saw a lot of people in Cairo. I could have seen 
him. I liave no recollection of him. While I have heard his name, 
I have never met the man to remember who he was. I may have met 
him in Cairo. He would be the best judge of that. He would remem- 
ber me much better than I would remember him, because there were 
not many Air Force people passing through there who had been much 
interested in Intelligence, and I w^as. 



1848 THE katyjst forest massacre 

Mr. MiTciiKi.L. You are now tellin<i- tlie comniittee tlmt you had uo 
specific discussions in Cairo with anyone in direct connection with 
the Katyn affair? 

General Bissell, Only that I knew from discussions at headquar- 
ters there that there were Poles in that area and that formation of a 
Polish Army was progressing — not too rapidly, but progressing — and 
that problems of every nature Avere involved. 

Mr. Mitchell. The problems of the forming of the Polish Army 
had no connection with the Katyn affair. 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to know is this : You had no 
discussions at all with anyone at the headquarters at Cairo relative 
to Katyn ; is that correct? 

General Bissell, Not specifically. 

Mr. Mitchell. You do not recall anyone? 

General Bissell. No, sir; not to my recollection. It could have 
happened, but I don't tliink so. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have just stated to the committee that you 
assumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff as a major general 
for G-2 on or about the 4th of Januar}^ 1944. Will you now relate 
to the committee what happened when a Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, 
Jr., was brought to your office in May 1945? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

I was told, probably on Monday, the 21st of May, that Colonel 
Van Vliet wished to see me but that, for some reason, probably be- 
cause of my schedule that day, he was not set up for that day. I had 
a hearing up here, I think, in this House, with some connnitt«e, at 
about that time, and I was preparing for that, and there were many 
urgent things. I had been away from the 16th, the day before 
Colonel Van Vliet arrived in W^ashington, and was away on official 
business until the Sunday, which would have been the 20th, as I re- 
call, when I returned dead-tired from a very long, hard trip. 

I used Monday on very urgent things that had piled up during my 
absence, and on Tuesday I saw Colonel Van Vliet. I cannot tell you 
who brouglit him into my office. I lieard Colonel Lantaff's state- 
ment. He could well have done it. It would have been normal. 

I have prepared some notes which will give in a little more chrono- 
logical order what happened after Colonel Van Vliet came in. I will 
talk from them, if you wish, or I will talk in answer to your questions 
as you present thenu 

Chairman Madden. If you care to refer to your notes, that is sat- 
isfactory. 

General Bissell. I think it will be quicker. 

(chairman Madden. That is all right. 

General Bissell. If I digress or conunent on things that you are not 
interested in, please sto]) me, because I don't want to take the com- 
mittee's time unnecessarily. 

Mr. FuiKOLO. Before you start: When did you prepare those notes? 

(Jeneral Bissell. I have been working on them since I heard I was 
to come u]) here, to get the IhiuLTs down so I would get the chronology 
of the. (hing and arranged the details that way. 

Mr. Fi KcoLo. in other words, these are not notes that you pre- 
pared then? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1847 

General Bissell. Xo; only penciled notes bein*^ revised from day 
to day and as I recall things. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. They are not notes made at that time? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. FtTJCOLO. They are notes you made in the last 2 or 3 weeks? 

General Bissell. Some of them were made a little earlier than 
that. All were prepared since your committee was formed. There 
was no part prepared pi'ior to that time that is in those notes at all. 

You are interested in 1945. I have it right here. I think it will 
be quicker to read it. 

Colonel Van Vliet, who had been liberated from a German prisoner- 
of-war camp south of Berlin when it was overrun by the Russians, 
reached the American lines about May 5, 1945. He reported to me 
in Washington on May 22, 1945. In my office, with only Colonel 
Van Vliet and myself ])resent, he told me the story of the POW 
visit — that is, prisoner-of-war visit — to Katyn. Although he showed 
the effects of his years of imprisonment less than many officers, he 
was tired, tense, and thin. Nevertheless, he told the story of the 
assembly of the American-British prisoner-of-war group and of the 
visit to Kaytan in such a calm, direct, and conservative manner that 
there was iio doubt in my mind that he was telling the truth about 
these events exactly as he remembered what had occurred 2 years 
earlier. 

As was to be expected in such a case, a few of his oral statements 
conveyed a somewhat different meaning after a few questions were 
askecf than as origiPxally made. This is not the slightest implica- 
tion he was not completely honest and straightforward. It was prob- 
ably because he had lived with the story and his reaction to the 
unpleasant experiences so long that he assumed more background 
detail was known to me than actually was the case. 

As I recall, this interview lasted about half an hour. Very early 
in his interview I realized Colonel Van Vliet must be given an oppor- 
tunity to put his report in writing in a way that would be easiest for 
him and that he should be afforded an opportunity to make such cor- 
rections, additions, or deletions as he considered essential for com- 
plete accuracy. I so informed him near the end of our first conference. 

With Colonel Van Vliet's complete agreement, I arranged at once 
for a Mi-s. Mildred Meeres, a competent, experienced and trustworthy 
secretary, to take his dictation and type his report. I also arranged 
for a private security room where they could work undisturbed, to 
be at Colonel Van Vliet's disposal. Either with Colonel Van Vliet 
present oi' i)iomptly after my first conference with Colonel Van Vliet, 
I insured that ^Irs. Meeres knew the security classification of her 
work, would be available exclusively to Colonel Van Vliet, and would 
receive no instructions from anyone that would conflict with these 
arrangements. 

Thereaftel^ the preparation of the report was handled entirely by 
Colonel Van Vliet without suggestion or influence by me or by anyone 
else. 

I then have a reference here in my notes which I think will not fit 
here. I talked to someone in State at that point. 

Do you want it as it came ? 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you mean you talked to someone in the State 
Department ? 



1848 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

General Bissell. Yes. On May 23 I talked to Mr. Fred Lyon, 
of the State Department, about another matter in the State Depart- 
ment's interest. G-2 works in very close cooperation with the State 
Deparment on all matters of joint interest. 

General Holmes and Mr. Lyon were my closest State Department 
contact at this particular time. I am not positive, but it is my 
impression that on May 23, 1945, I told Mr. Lyon of Colonel Van 
Vliet's arrival, that the Colonel Van Vliet report was being pre- 
pared, and that I requested Mr. Lyon to inform General Holmes, 
and assured General Holmes he would receive the report promptly. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Pardon me, but could you tell the committee who 
General Holmes was, what his position was 'i 

General Bissicll. General Holmes, you will have him identified 
very accurately on the letter that I wrote him, which describes his 
position by its exact name. But he went over there to head the 
Intelligence of the State Department, and then they gave him other 
jobs, and he became an Assistant Secretary. I think he probably 
was one at that moment, but I am not sure just when his appointment 
came through. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What is his first name ? 

General Bissfxl. Julius. 

He had been a general with General Eisenhower. "\^Tien I went over 
to England, I met him there. 

I may have passed the information direct to General Holmes on 
the 24th of May 1945, when I had one or two conversations with 
General Holmes. But 7 years have passed since the occurrence of 
these events, and I cannot say with certainty which procedure I used 
to inform General Holmes. I feel certain I took the steps to inform 
him. 

I understand General Holmes has denied any recollection of the 
Van Vliet report. It would be quite understandable. The volume 
and pressure of work in General Holmes' State Department office had 
greatly increased by the ending of the German war a very short time 
before that and no man in his position could be expected to remember 
everything that passed through his office. It is possible that the 
matter slip])ed Mr. Lyon's mind and that General Holmes was not 
informed. Mr. Lyon was also yjushed to the limit in those days. 

I have known both General Holmes and Mr. Lyon over a period of 
years and am confident they are both loyal, honest, and able Americans. 
In my opinion, any implication that either of them would knowingly 
take any action inimical to the United States interests to assist com- 
munism or Russia is absurd. 

The Alger Hiss-Chambers incident makes it appear Ihat classified 
papers considered of interest to (he Conuuunists could and did leave 
the State Department without authority, record, or knowledge of 
res])onsible State Department authoritu^s. Disappearance of the 
Colonel Van Vliet report would have been of interest to.the Russians 
Avhether or not thev were responsible for the K-.ityn killings. As far 
as I know, the State Department has made no statement that Colonel 
Van Vliet's report was ever received, but only that G-2 had no receipt 
from the Stale Department for it. 

I am not fully informed ou State Dei)artment actions in this respect 
because there is lots going on that I don't know anvthino- about. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1849 

When Colonel Van Vliet's report was completed, he a<»;ain came to 
my office. He assured me that he had read over his report carefully 
and that he was satisfied that it represented, to the best of his recol- 
lection, what he knew of the Katyn matter and his connection witli it. 
With Colonel Van Vliet seated in a comfortable chair in my office, 
I read Colonel Van Vliet's completed report. It was a good report, 
which I thought presented the picture more clearly than his previous 
oral report. Colonel Van Vliet's typed report did not differ in any 
fundamental, however, from the previous story told to me. 

I directed the report be classified top secret. Colonel Van Vliet 
signed it, and it was authenticated by him so that no substitution of 
pages would be possible. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. By "authenticate," do you mean he initialed it? 

General Bissei.l. Initialed every page with his own initials. There 
is nothing unusual about that. That is prescribed in the regidations 
some place. It is routine. 

But he hadn't done it, and I understood why he was a prisoner of 
war. He wasn't very fresh on his regulations, and I saw to it that he 
went through that procedure. I remember him initialing the pages. 

The classification "top secret" had been authorized by the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 11)44 for use in the United 
States Armed Forces. It became effective March 15, 1944, while I 
was in G-2. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Do you have a definition of that phrase, "top 
secret" ? 

General Bissell. Yes. It is in the Army regulations. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is it the same one in existence today ? 

General Bissell. I will show you a copy of the one in effect, then, if 
I may, if you will just make a note and have me come back to it. 

Mr. IVIiTCHELL. Surely. 

General Bissell. It was more than a year after Colonel Van Vliet 
was captured by the Germans in Tunisia, in February 1943, before the 
United States Armed Forces used the top secret classification for 
American military material or documents. 

After his liberation from POW camp. Colonel Van Vliet had been 
returned to the United States with dispatch. I was not certain he 
understood the top secret classification in its accepted sense in our 
service, due to lack of opportunity for much, if any, experience in its 
use. As he had been cut off from much information for 2 years in a 
prisoner-of-war camp, I could not expect him to know the possible 
political significance of his report, even though he recognizee! it had 
political implications and was of State Department as well as War 
Department interest. 

It is my recollection that at our first contact, Colonel Van Vliet 
asked me what he should do if questioned about Katyn, and I told 
him to say nothing, that I considered the matter very important and 
top secret. 

I cannot recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memorandum 
to Colonel Van Vliet. I have heard the testimony of INIrs. Meeres. I 
wish the committee would see if your copy has on it a number 920. If 
so, it was done in her section ; if not, I would be interested to know. 
You will find that papers done by her bear the number 920. 

Mr. Mitchell. It is 907. 



1853 THE KATYN FOREST RL\SSACRE 

General Bissell. Someone else wrote it, or someone else (•0})ie(l it,, 
or somethin«T. 

JVIr. Mitchell. It is an exhibit on pn^e 51 of tlie i)art 2 hearings. 

General Bissell. Her work was 020, if my memory serves me cor- 
rectly. I am sure she is mixing something up, and I wnll be glad to 
answer your questions on that, if you want it, and I am sure it was 
inadvertent on her part. 

I cannot now recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memo- 
randum to Colonel Van Vliet. It was not dictated before our first 
conference. It was probably dictated after our conference as it bears 
the date of May 22, 1945. It could have been ty])ed on the 28d and 
still bear the date of May 22, 1945, as it was to confirm verbal orders of 
that date and to be binding therefrom. 

I believe either that I dictated this memo in Colonel Van Vliet's 
presence or asked if he suggested any changes before he signed it, 
because my recollection is clear that Colonel Van Vliet was entirely 
satisfied and happy about the memorandum. 

For the various reasons I have stated, it appeared to me proper, 
prudent, and expedient to furnish Colonel Van Vliet with the brief 
memorandum i-eferring to his report in language that would be clear 
and specific to him but meaningless to anyone into whose hands it 
might fall inadvertenth'. The memo sets forth the restrictions im- 
posed on Colonel Van Vliet for the security of the information con- 
tained in his report. It also stated clearly the procedure to be fol- 
lowed subsequently should he desire to have the restriction removed. 
The reason for imposing the restriction was included. 

After reading the memorandum and indicating he understood it, he- 
signed the memorandum to make his understanding a matter of record. 
He has complied with the letter and spirit of his instructions. 

Also, I may ])ossibly have been infiiienced to be particularly careful 
with the security of the Colonel Van Vliet report by the fact that at 
that time I was pre])aring for testimony before the House Military 
Affairs Conunittee investigating subversive activities within the Arnnv 
before Avhich 1 a})peai-ed on the moi'ning of ^lay 24, 1945. Also, at 
that time, United States security agencies were threatened with Bi 
security leak on anotlier unrelated matter which was important. I 
do not know how many copies, if any, other than the original, were 
made of the Colonel Van Vliet report. Mrs. Meeres, who typed the- 
report, informed me in 1950 she did not know^ positively, but she 
believed she had made only an original. I hope that you will 
secure — well, you have done it — her first-hand statement. 

I didn't know whether you would have her come. If you hadn't,. 
I would Avant you to. 

She gave her reasons for believing she made oidy an original. Since- 
you didn't ask her why, I will tell you what reasons she gave me.. 
She said if she had made copies she would have remembered putting 
carbons in the envelo])e for destruction, because carbons for top- 
secret things had to be desti'oyed as well as stenographer's notes, and 
she said she had no such recollection. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say that was in 1950. On what occasion was- 
it that you were talking about that? You were retired then, were 
you not^ 

(ieneral liissELL. I had not tlicn vet retired. I was assisting 
Mr. Shackelfoi-d. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1851 

I can give that to you in detail, if you like. I have notes on that, 
on whom I contacted and why 1 saw Mrs. Meeres and what I said 
and more of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. We can come back to that later, unless the com- 
mittee decides otherwise. 

(Tcneral Bisseli.. All right ; any time you want to break in, go ahead. 
She gave me her reasons for believing why she made only an 
original. And there were several other reasons. She said she didn't 
remember that her hands got dirty on the job, and they would have 
if she had been handling carbons. That was one of the reasons the 
original came out so clean, that she never corrected any carbons, and 
some very minor corrections were made by Colonel Van Vliet on the 
report — made, as I recall, in ink and initialed. Those, of course, 
would have to be made on the carbons had there been any. 
Mr. FuRCOLO. When did she tell you these things? 
General Bissell. She told me those in 1950 when I was assisting 
Mr. Shackelford, trying to help him get in touch with everybody who 
might know anything about the Van Vliet re])ort. 

And those were repeated in his office, as I recall. They were told 
to me upstairs when I contacted her. I saw her in the section she was 
then working and then recommended to Mr. Shackelford that she 
appear at his office, whicli she did. I sat in when he questioned her. 
Chairman Maddex. We can come back to that later, if you will 
complete your statement. 
General Bissell. Right, sir. 

Normally at least one copy, plus the original, would have been 
made of a report. There were good reasons why, in this case, this 
might not have been done. 

My recollection is that Colonel Van Vliet's report was dated May 24, 
1945, and that it was on May 23 or 24, 1945, when he submitted it and 
when I last saw hiuL 1 know I saw Mrs. Meeres about the report 
and a directly related matter on the afternoon of May 24, 1945. My 
recollection is that Mrs. Meeres was in my office for part of the time 
Colonel Van Vliet was w^ith me for our second conference. 

i\ly normal procedure would have been to afford an opportunity 
for Colonel Van Vliet to speak to me alone if he wished and subse- 
quently have a secretary present for the period slie might be needed. 
Then I have a paragraph : Capt. Donald B. Stewart, a Regular 
Army Artillery officer, did not report to me in person or make any 
report to me on his ]^artici]:)ation in the ])risoner-of-war visit to Katvn 
with Colonel Van Vliet. I did not direct Captain Stewart to make 
a written report. Colonel Van Vliet's reiiort covered the part taken 
by Captain Stewart because Colonel Van Vliet stated Captain Stewart 
was in complete agreement wnth Colonel Van Vliet's statements and 
conclusion, because Colonel Van Vliet stated that he and Captain 
Stewart had talked about Katyn and Captain Stewart ])ossessed no 
information mdmown to Colonel Van Vliet, and because if the State 
Department or any other United States Government agency wanted 
a statement from or a conference with Captain Stewart, the War 
Department could make him available. 

I had com])lete confidence in Colonel Van Vliet's integrity and hon- 
esty. Had Captain Stew^art reported to me in Washington, as I 
expected he would do, I would have had him prepare a written report. 



1852 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

One best learns from experience. I now believe it wo; d have been 
preferable had I directed Captain Stewart to report t. le in Wash- 
ino;ton upon his return to the United States from "World War II. 

I do not remember positively many details of the Colonel Van Vliet 
report. I do not recall whether it was on long or short sheets, single- 
or double-spaced, how many pages it contained; whether or not there 
were carbon copies, whether Colonel Van Vliet or Mrs. ]Meeres per- 
sonally carried the report into my office, or specifically in whose hands 
the report was after Colonel Van Vliet signed it. Neither does he or 
Mrs. Meeres. All of us at that time were primarily interested in its 
contents and security rather than in its format or in its physical ctetails. 
I can assure you its importance was fully recognized by me, and my 
intent was its prompt transmittal through a secure channel either to 
the activity handling war crimes data, or to the State Department. 

G-2 liacl been sending anything received in connection with war 
crimes or atrocities to the agency holding it for the War Crimes Com- 
mission. I do not rememl)er definitely to which agency we sent such 
material for them. I know we had some definite verbal instructions 
from my predecessor. General Strong, which we carried out implicitly. 

I have a distinct recollection of having seen previously the photo- 
gra])hs which are exhibits 3 to 7, both inclusive, of Colonel Stewart's 
testimony; but if such photographs were attached to the Colonel Van 
Vliet report, the Captain Gilder report, or other reports of Katyn I 
handled, I do not remember. 

Chairman Madden. You speak of Colonel Stewart's testimony. 
What do you mean by that ? 

General Bissell. I read what is in the book when he talked to you, 
and he gave you the pictures and I had a chance to see what the pictures 
were. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

General Bissell. I believe I had previously seen the photographs 
also that are exhibits 1 and 2, both inclusive, of Captain Stewart's 
testimony, but I do not have as distinct a recollection of those. 

Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt a minute? 

Mr. Chairman, those exhibits are in part 1. The hearing was held 
October 11, 1951. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Counsel, the general mentioned the Captain Gilder 
report. What was that^ 

General Bissell. I ^;.\.ii^ come to it, if you want me to, and other 
reports I mentioned, if you would like to, on Katyn. 

I cannot be positive what happened to the Colonel Van Vliet report, 
but it is my recollection, confirmed by some available documentary 
material, which I believe has been made available to this committee, 
that the letter of transmittal for the Colonel Van Vliet report was 
dated May 25, 1945, and that it, the Colonel Van Vliet report, and 
the related matter were transmitted to the State Department repre- 
sentative. Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, on May 25, 1945. 

The available documentary material confirming transmission of the 
first Colonel Van Vliet re])oi't — [addressing Mr. Shackelford] and I 
say first as coiuiterdistinguislied from tlie one that was secured by your 
auspices — the one that I i-emeniber as the Hrst one 

Mr. Maciiuowicz. Pardon me, })ut might I just interrupt. 

You referred now to a letter of transmittal from your department 
to the Department of State, which you say also disappeared. If I 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1853 

remember yd '^^ statement a few moments before that, you, I believe, 
said that yotvi tvere not sure whether you transmitted it orally or by 
letter. 

General Bissell. No. I said I didn't know where it had gone. In 
other words, State says they didn't receive it. I can't say they did 
receive it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think if you will refer to the notes from which 
you read, you previously said you are not sure whether you referred 
to it orally or by transmittal ; is that right? 

General Bissell. Of course; it is in the record. I would like to 
give it to you again. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. General, I have just one question. 

In your experience in that particular position, do you know of any 
reports besides this one disappearing? 

General Bissell. I don't know that this one disappeared, frankly; 
but, specifically, what you are after is another case. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I use that term advisedly. 

General Bissell. No ; I don't believe I do. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. As far as you know, to your knowledge, in your 
experience in that department, this is the only report that you know 
of that cannot be located ? 

General Bissell. No. That is not so. There are thousands of them 
that can't be located, that have been destroyed ; thousands of them. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. But there is a record of them that they have been 
destroyed. 

General Bissell. Sometimes there will be and sometimes there will 
not. 

And I have that covered in my notes here some place and the reason 
for it. There was good reason for it. 

Chairman Madden. I think we will make better progress if you 
complete your statement and then the members of the committee can 
cross-examine. 

General Bissell. As you wish il, sir. 

The available documentary confirming transmittal of the first Colo- 
nel Van Vliet report is my secret letter dated August 21, 1945, to 
Frederick Lyon, Acting Director, Office of Controls, room 115, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D. C, which reads : 

Dear Mb. Lyon : Transmitted for the informatio.^ "^e of the State Department 
is a report on Katyn by Stanley S. ,B. Gilder, captain, EAMC (Medical Corps), 
British officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van 
Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes 25 May 1945, and generally substantiates 
all material facts in Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton Bissell, 
Major General, G-2, 
Assistant Chief of Staff. 

The identifying reference on this letter is 700,00061WBA.CSLE. 
This is a decimal identification and a decimal file date. 

The letter also carried the identification MIL920, which w^as a 
G-2 identification. The G-2 identification was for the section in 
which Mrs. Meeres worked. 

This communication shows, by State Department stamps, that it 
was in their Office of Controls August 23, 1945, in their Division of 
Foreign Activities Correlation on the same date, in their Special War 

93744— 52— pt. 7 ^3 



1854 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Problems Division on October 2, 1945, and in the Office of European 
Affairs on October 5, 1945. 

Other entries on the letter indicate that it was probably seen or 
processed by the individuals or activities in the State Department 
identified thereon as F131.ETB.WHM.AVMF.SWP.CE.EE, and that 
the letter was received in State Department confidential file October 
16, 1945, after only 5 days less than 2 months of processing in the 
State Department. 

During this entire period, I continued as G-2. Had the Colonel 
Van Vliet report not been available in the State Department, I woidd 
have received a letter or a telephone call asking for it. because, ob- 
viously, it would have been impossible to compare the Gilder report 
with the Van Vliet report had knowledge of the Colonel Van Vliet 
report not been available in the State Department. 

The Captain Gilder secret report referred to in my August 21, 1945, 
letter, and its enclosure was a British War Office document identified 
by the reference MI-9/BM/973. MI-9 means British Military Intelli- 
gence Office, section 9, and the BM/9T3 was a reference for Britl^h 
itlentification and file location. 

The Captain Gilder report was a history of a visit made to Katyn 
in 1943, consisting of three standard-sized typed pages, written very 
full, and divided into only two paragraphs. It is my understanding 
that the Captain Gilder report has been made available to the com- 
mittee. If not, it should be in State Department files. 

There is also a notation placed in the letter by the State Depart- 
ment. It is 711.62114-A, just written on it. This was the decimal 
file reference number to the matter related to Colonel Van Vliet's 
report, to which I previously referred and will refer again. This 
shows that State had gone into the Katyn report carefully and thor- 
oughly enough to locate the related matter also. It was tied together. 

It has been possible for me to be so specific on details about the 
August 21, 1945, letter because in the fall of 1950, Mr. Shackelford, 
then and now Department Counselor, Department of the Army, was 
conducting an investigation into the Katyn affair, showed me my letter 
which he had secured from the State Department files. 

He (juestioned me about it and authorized me to make a longhand 
copy of the letter to facilitate the location of the file copy which should 
have been back in the G-2 files. 

Chairman Maddp:n. Pardon me. Your letter that you referred to 
was the letter that accompanied tlie Gilder report, was it ( 

General Bissfxl. The one that carried the Ciilder report, referring 
to the Van Vliet report, and asked them to compare the two and 
telling them there was no fundamental dill'erence. 

I was able to locate the file copy of my letter on the Gilder report — 
it was an identical carbon copy — that is, it was in the G-2 files — 
of the text, but, of course, it did not show the State Department 
processing, because it had never been away from G-2. 

Mr. MrrcnKLL. When did you locale' that ^ This is 1950, is it ^ 

Geneial liissKU.. 1950, yes. 1 went down, and Mr. Shackelford had 
the originnl letter, the one that I sent to State. 

ISIr. MrrciiKLL. He got it from Stated 

General Bisseij.. He got it from State. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say now that you found the identical copy 
of it? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1855 

General Bisseix,. Yes. 

Mr, Mitchell. This was September, 1950? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did you find it ? 

General Bissell. In G-2. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where in G-2 ? Maybe we can find the Van Vliet 
report there yet. 

General Bissell. I hope so, but I don't think you will, because I 
tliink we have tried every way we could to locate it. 

A young man who was a captain was acting as a sort of liaison 
officer between you (addressing Mr. Shackelford) and G-2 at that 
time. I gave it to him and then he said it had not enough importance. 
The war was going on in Korea at that time, I went to General Weck- 
erling at that time, who had been my deputy in G-2, during the war 
and asked him to put some pressure on it. General Boiling came in 
while we were talking and I asked him to put some pressure on it. 
It came up. 

When it came up, it carried the following file information, that 
had not been on the original Jetter to the State Department. It read : 
"AC of S, G-2/72577, General Bissell. MM. CPM." 

The 72577 was a reference number. The rest meant that the letter 
originated in my office, that I dictated it personally to MM, who was 
Mrs. Meeres. The (CPM.) meant the "Captured Personnel and Ma- 
terial Section" to which she belonged. 

Mr. Mitchell. What Avas the date on tliat ? 

General Bissell. 21 August, 1945. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

General Bissell. It also contained an entry "Courier Service, 
senders Number C-601, date 22 xiugust, 1945". This meant the letter 
was hand-carried to the State Department. 

There is also a self-explanatory note on the file copy, which reads, 
"Received back in MIS Administrative Records, August 24, 1945". 

The significance of that is to keep people informed when the file 
copy was sent to somebody sometime, and then they got it back and 
made the record. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any acknowledgement of receipt by the 
Department of State ? 

General Bissell. That particular copy we are talking about, this 
file copy, never got out of G-2, so there would be no receipt any place. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication in the Gilder report 
that the letter of transmittal was received? 

General Bissell. It wouldn't be on the letter. All that was on the 
file copy in G-2 was an indication how it had been sent. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Have you found any acknowledgment of re- 
ceipt by the Department of State of the Gilder Report ? I am talking 
about the Gilder Report. 

General Bissell. I didn't look for a copy of a receipt from State 
of the Gilder Report. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why not ? 

General Bissell. Because they answered to that. 

Mr. Sheehax. But you did see the letter from the State Depart- 
ment ? 

General Bissell. I saw the letter I sent to State, my own personally 
signed letter, which Mr. Shackelford had gotten from them. That 



1856 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

was a clue how we might have gotten some more Katyn data, maybe 
put in our files. For one thing, that would be the right place. So I 
took a copy in longhand and checked the files on it through G-2. 
I didn't do it physically. Up came the copy, and it showed you how 
the letter was sent off. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What do you mean, it was the right place? You 
know we had to go to the warehouse in Alexandria to find the right 
place on the Szymanski report. 

General Bissell. Yes ; I imagine you would have to go a lot farther, 
to Kansas City and other places, to find a lot of stuff that happened 
in the war. The paper work got too big and they needed the offices 
for something else. They had either to destroy it or send it away. 

Mr. Machrowicz. On important documents? 

General Bissell. What becomes important is a matter of history 
and development. No one suspected that this one would be of any- 
thing like international significance. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say you recognized the importance of 
the document? 

General Bissell. Yes; I did, you bet — but not the kind of signifi- 
cance it has in today's world, because nobody could have foreseen the 
situation that we have today. I did recognize it. 

I have told you what the mention of the entries on the paper meant, 
and what was on it. I now refer to the related matter previously men- 
tioned, which was dated and directed to the State Department May 
25, 1945, the same date. I believe as Colonel Van Vliet's report. It 
is my letter to Brig. Gen. Julius C Holmes, Assistant Secretary, 
Department of State, and reads : 

Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., Infantry, and a 
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 684, are reported to have 
been given a letter by the Swiss Protecting PovA^er, dated about October 1943, 
which asked them to reply to certain questions. These questions were : 

1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet gone to Katyn? 

2. How had they been treated? 

3. Were any photographs taken? 

4. Had they made a statement? 

Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply. 
are in State Department files. It is requested that this be verified, and if the 
records referred to are in the files of the State Department, that copies be made 
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton Bissell, 
Major General GSC, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

Mr, Machrowicz. Can we get the date of that letter? 

General Bissell. The date of that letter was May 25. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. 1945 ? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. May I interrupt just a minute to ask a question, Mr. 
Chairman ? 

Chairman Madden. Yes. 

Mr. FuRCoLo. On page 67 of the hearings, at the bottom of the 
page, it refers that the only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General 
Bissell to General Holmes", was on another ])hase of this subject, and 
it contains no reference to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is in part II. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1857 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Now, is it your testimony that you did transmit the 
Van Vliet memorandum in that ? 

General Bissell. No. I say that this letter tends to indicate that 
I did one of the two things I intended to do with it. Now, I didn't 
personally ever take any — well, yes, sometimes I did take papers and 
deliver them myself. But all I did in my position there was to make 
decisions, establish policies, and had procedures set up so that I didn't 
do the things myself. Other people did them. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Wliat I am anxious to find out if I can is : From the 
letter that you have read, and having in mind this comment that was 
made on the bottom of page 67, would you be willing to say that you 
did not transmit the Van Vliet memgrandum in that letter ? 

General Bissell. Well, nomenclature is causing a lot of trouble. I 
think we better get straight. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. All right. 

General Bissell. The thing that has caused most of the trouble with 
most of the people that have talked to the committee, in the small 
amount of testimony made available to me in sections 1 and 2, have 
not known that there were two Van Vliet reports written at the same 
time of the first visit. 

The result is they are going in big circles. Now, one of them will 
call a report a letter, another will call it a report. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. What I want to find out on this is : Did you transmit 
any enclosure with this letter of May 25, 1945, whether it is called 
Report No. 1 or 2, or something else ? 

General Bissell. This letter is part of what Colonel Van Vliet said 
occurred, but I don't think it was put in his report of Katyn, because 
it wasn't part of the description of Katyn. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Here is what I am getting at. General — and I do not 
mean to be technical about it. But I understand that you sent a letter 
of May 25, 1945. Now, was anything enclosed in that letter? I am 
not refering to the words and body of that letter of May 25, but did 
you send any enclosure of any kind in that letter? 

General Bissell. I don't believe so because, had it been done, there 
would be written on the lower left-hand corner what the enclosure was. 
And the Van Vliet big report of his story of Katyn wouldn't be at- 
tached to. that thing, because the purpose of this was different, which 
I will explain as I go along. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. That is the point I was getting to. In your letter 
transmitting the Captain Gilder report, I notice as you read it, that 
at the bottom you mentioned "one enclosure." 

General Bissell. Which was the Gilder report. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. You also mentioned it in the letter. 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. FrRcoLO. I notice in the letter of May 25, 1945, there apparently 
is no reference made to an enclosure, and also no reference made at 
the bottom of the letter to an enclosure. 

General Bissell. There shouldn't have been, because it doesn't men- 
tion an enclosure in the text. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Your testimony now, as I understand it, with refer- 
ence to this letter of May 25, 1945, from you, General Bissell, to 
General Holmes is, to the best of your knowledge, that there was no 
enclosure of any kind in that letter? 



1858 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

General Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, there was not. You 
have put a thought in my mind that had never entered it before, and 
that is whether by accident or mistake, the Van Vliet repoit could 
have been put there, but I don't think it is possible. 

But this is the thing some i^eople speak of as the Van Vliet report, 
in good faith, and think they are talking about the thing that you have 
been investigating. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say what people think — you are referring here 
to the letter concerning the Swiss protecting power, are you not? 

General Bissell. Well, that is the deal, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, I never knew, to my personal knowl- 
edge since I have been on this investigation, that there were two re- 
ports by Van Vliet concerning Katyn. I would not phrase it that 
way. I would say there was a report specifically concerning Katyn, 
which was rendered to you by Colonel Van Vliet. This is a subse- 
quent request, as I get it, which may have occurred at the same time, 
which concerned a request by the Swiss protecting power, which he 
is merely reporting for your record, that he was asked these questions, 
about going to Katyn, and so forth. This does not refer in any way 
to what happened at Katyn other than there were photographs taken; 
is that correct ? 

General Bissell. There is quite a lot to it more than that. I would 
like to make my point clear, that people have said it. Mrs. Meeres, 
in her testimony this morning, said, "I took two Van Vliet reports." 
Well, this is the other one. She took this letter, too. 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall her having said that — maj^be she did. 

General Bissell. It is in there — I think it is — that is the way I 
understood it. 

Mr. Sheehan. For the benefit of us members here, I am confused 
on this idea of the two Van Vliet reports. I wish counsel would ques- 
tion him on it and get it straight. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. 

General, there was a report, as I understand it, written by Colonel 
Van Vliet, at your request, which concerned his visit to Katyn when 
he was accompanied by Captain Stewart and several other Allied 
officers. Is that correct? 

General Bissell. There Avas such a report, and this is also the same 
incident. 

Mr. Mitchell. But there was such a report? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. That w\as specific ? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. There was no mention in that rei')ort, was there, of 
anything received from the Swiss protecting power ? 

General Bissell. I cannot recall Colonel Van Vliet's original report 
well enough to tell you whether this was also mentioned in it, or 
whether we handled it separately. I think we handled it separately, 
and I have the reasons in my notes here, if you want them. 

Mr. MrrciiELL. All right, we have it fixed, then, Mr. Sheehan, that 
there was only one real report at this stage of the investigation, namely, 
the Katyn affair, and the visit by Captain Stewart and Colonel Van 
Vliet. What he did at Katyn has been related to the committee by 
both Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet, and it has always been 



THE KATYISr FOREST MASSACRE 1859 

my impression that that was the report that General Bissell ordered 
him to document for the record, as a top-secret document. 

Mr. Sheehan. As of May 21 or May 22, 1945? 

Mr. Mitchell. Right. 

Now, the general is bringing forth another item which specifically 
concerns the Department of State, because it refers to the Swiss pro- 
tecting power, which was then the power in control of the German 
prison camps where Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet were, 
and I believe that a subsequent conversation — the general is trying to 
tell the committee now that Colonel Van Vliet reported this item of 
being called in by the Swiss protecting power. And we have never 
considered that as being a report. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did the Army ever release that rejiort to us? It 
should be in their files. 

General Bissell. I think you have it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we have it. 

General Bissell. If you haven't, I can tell you where to get it. 

Mr. Maciiroavicz. Do you mean tiie Gilder report? 

General Bissell. No ; this is not the Gilder report we are discussing 
now, 

Mr. Machrowicz. Does the SavIss report have anvthing to do with 
Katyn ? 

General Bissell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Could we have for the record — will the general report for the 
record the letter, and what the letter specifically refers to? I am 
sure it will clear it up to the committee. 

When Van Vliet and Stewart returned from Katyn, about 4 or 5 
months later, the Swiss protecting power asked them for some data 
in comiection with it. 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. Flood. Let me make this observation — this is all veiy interest- 
ing, the Swiss report and the inquiries the Swiss made of Van Vliet 
and Stewart, but, nevertheless, it has nothing to do with the thing 
Ave all know we are talking about. There may be something here we 
do not IniOAv we are talking about, but this investigation is concerned 
Avith the Katyn massacre. The one thing AA^e do knoAv that Ave are 
talking about is the Van Vliet report. 

Now, Ave have heard Van Vliet, we haA^e heard everybody else that 
Ave know about. 

At this point I want to read into the record, from part II of our hear- 
ings, page 67, this statement : 

The Department of State has no record of haAang received the memorandum 
of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945. 

I Avant to insert this in parentheses: That refers to the Van Vliet 
report that we all knoAv we are talking about. 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Flood. And the Department of the Army has so far found 
no receipt for it and no covering letter of transmittal. Noav, that 
refers to the Van Vliet report that we all knoAv we are talking about. 
The only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General Bissell to General 
Holmes, was on another phase of this subject, and it contains no refer- 
ence to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum. 



1860 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

General Holmes has been contacted with reference to the matter, 
and does not recall having ever seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's 
memorandum. 

My parentheses again at this point is Van Vliet's memorandum 
is the report that we all know we are talking about, although General 
Bissell remembers having sent it to him. 

My understanding is — I know exactly what everybody means by 
Colonel Van Vliet's memorandum or Colonel Van Vliet's report. This 
thing that just came in here now about a second Van Vliet report 
has to do with this inquiry by the Swiss, It is very interesting, but 
it is not concerned with any mystery about the disappearance of 
the Van Vliet report that we all know about. 

I do not see why anybody has to be mixed up or concerned or con- 
fused about two Van Vliet reports. The one we are talking about 
is the one that we all know about — which is my phrase of identity 
here. 

Mr. Sheehan. The Army did not turn it over to us ; that is what 
1 am looking for. 

Mr. Flood. For the record, I am having no colloquy with any of my 
friends in the committee. 

If you have any statements to make, make them on the record. 
I understand what I understand. If anybody else is uncertain about 
what is going on, say so. 

Mr. Sheehan. I asked a question. 

Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. I merely want to state that I asked the question for 
the simple reason that it is my understanding the Army has turned 
over all the files they have on Katyn, and if they have not turned over 
this report, apparently they have not turned over all the files. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, they have not turned over what is 
referred to in the quotation Congressman Flood has just made for the 
record, which appears on page 67 of part II, under the title "Another 
Phase." I have never seen such a document. It has never been re- 
ceived from the Army, to the best of my knowledge, and I don't believe 
any member of the committee, you or I or anybody else, has seen such 
a document. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Has the committee requested it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe we requested many times of Mr. Shackel- 
ford and everybody else, any paper connected with Katyn. 

Mr. Flood. Let me say this again : 

General, when I say "the Van Vliet report," I am not talking about 
this Swiss business. You know what I am talking about — the Van 
Vliet report that we all know about. 

To your best recollection, a letter was dictated by you to the State 
Department, a letter of transmittal to them, enclosing or attaching 
thereto the Van Vliet report; is that correct? Did you dictate such 
a letter to the State Department? 

General Bissell. I don't know. 

Mr. Flood. Will you say you did ? 

(Jeneral Bissell. No. 

Mr. Flood. Will you say you did not? 

General Bissell. No. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1861 

Mr. Flood. Then, at this point you do not know Avhether or not you 
ever dictated a letter of transmittal to the State Department, having 
to do with the Van Vliet report? 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Let us get your answer on the record. You shook 
your head. 

Mr. Flood. Just a moment. I will yield to you in about 30 minutes. 

Now, just a minute. General. You answered my question that you 
do not know ; did you not ? 

Geneval Bissell. I previously answered also the same thing. 

]Mr. Flood. My colleagues are concerned only that your answer does 
not appear on the record, and that you merely shook your head in 
the negative. 

General Bissell. I am sorry. 

Mr. Flood. The answer is : You do not remember whether you did 
or not ? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

]\Ir. Flood. If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall 
ever having seen a letter from you or the Van Vliet report, you will 
not say that General Holmes is making a misstatement ? 

General Bissell. I have previously made the answer to that question 
in the record. 

Mr. Flood. This is out of an abundance of caution and for repeti- 
tion and for an emphatic purpose. 

General Bissell. All right, sir. I consider General Holmes an 
honorable, forthright, honest man, and he would say what he believed 
to be the truth, under any circumstances. 

Mr. Flood. That is very interesting, and we are glad to have your 
estimate of General Holmes, but what is the answer to my question ? 

Well, I will repeat it for you : 

If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall ever having 
seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliefs report, and if General Holmes 
says that he does not recall ever having seen a letter of transmittal 
from you, you will not say that he is wrong, will you ? 

General Bissell. I will say that I am convinced he is right or thinks 
he is right. 

Mr. Flood. Now, there are a number of other things along this very 
detail I want to ask you, but my brothers here are very anxious on 
that point, so I yield to them, only for the purpose of examining on 
that point, on what I am leading to. 

Chairman Madden. Before we proceed on cross-examination, let 
me ask the general : 

Have you completed your statement yet? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Chairman Madden. You proceed with your statement, and then we 
will proceed. 

Mr. Flood. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I prefer, if there is no 
violent objection, to clearing up this detail at this moment, and I 
want to yield to any member of the committee who wants to examine 
him on what I just introduced. 

Chairman Madden. We will dispose of this detail. 

Mr. Flood. I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Furcolo. 



1862 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. FuRCOLO. General, perhaps I was confused, or did not hear your 
answer correctly, but I understood you just a moment ago, in answer 
to a question by Congressman Flood, to leave your testimony, in effect, 
that you could not say whether or not any enclosure had been sent 
in the letter of transmittal — referring to the letter of May 25, 194r» — 
from General Bissell, from you, to General Holmes. 

When I was questioning you about 5 or 10 minutes ago, I was under 
the impression that you very definitely told me that your best recollec- 
tion was that you did not send any enclosure of any kind in that letter. 
My recollection is that you and I had some discussion about it, and 
during the discussion I pointed out that your letter did not contain 
any reference in the body of the letter to a transmittal, and also there 
was no notation at the bottom of the letter referring to an enclosure. 
We discussed the fact that in your letter of transmittal of the Gilder 
report, there had been a reference in the bod,v of tlie letter, and also 
the end of the letter referred to an enclosure. After going over that, 
I thought that we had concluded the matter. 

Could you finally leave it that your best recollection is that there 
was no enclosure of any kind in the letter of May 25, 1945 ? 

Now, I also thought that your answer to Congressman Flood was 
somewhat at variance. I do not want to be unfair or confusing to 
either you or me. My mind is not clear now on whether your final 
answer was that you do not know whether there was an enclosure or 
not, or whether your final answer is that there was no enclosure. I 
wonder if you could clear that up for us ? 

General Bisseix. My best recollection is that there was no enclosure 
in the letter, and none listed on it, and there seems, in the body of the 
letter, no reason for an enclosure to have been with it. 

Mr. Flood. I will not yield any further now, but 1 will in a moment, 
to Mr. Machrowicz. 

Pursuing Congressman Furcolo's interrogation on the letter of ^lay 
25, and enclosure, that has to do with another phase of the subject, 
that is, the Swiss thing. I am not talking about that. 

I am concerned only with two or three very simple details on this 
report and your connection with it. 

We know the whole story about Van Vliet preparing the report in 
your office and that you got it, and all that kind of business — every- 
body understands that. 

Now, I ask you if you ever dictated a letter to the State Department 
transmitting this Van Vliet report to them, to the State Department? 
You said you do not remember whethej- you did or not. I presume 
you made a search to find out if there was such a letter of transmittal, 
did you not? 

General Bisseix. I asked G-2 to do so. That was in 1950. 

Mr. Flood. In 1950 you asked (i-2 to see whether or not there was 
any such a letter of transmittal from you? Did G-2 ever find it, so 
far as you know ? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Flood. State so, one wa}' or the other. 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Flood. So G-2 produced no co]:)y of such a letter ; is that correct, 
General ? 

General Bissell. That is correct, sir. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1863 

Mr. Flood. General Holmes said that he never saw such a letter 
from you and that he never saw a copy of the report. I asked you 
about that and you said that if he says so, you would not say he is 
wrong? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I have 
only one question that I have been trying to ask, that I think will clear 
up this whole point. 

Mr. Flood. I will yield to you on it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question : Are you prepared now to tell 
tliis committee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were discussing 
all the time was transmitted by you to the Department of State? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You are not ? 

That is all. 

Mr. SiiEEHAisr. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Flood. If you want to follow that up I will yield. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Machrowicz asked him whether or not the State 
Department had it. The general said "No." But a little while ago, 
if you go into the record, you will see that from the exchange of cor- 
respondence on other matters, that they must have had it ; otherwise 
they would have written him asking where was this report. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. Did you not say that, General. 

General Bissell. I did say that. 

Mr. Flood. Just a minute. I am yielding to Mr. Sheehan for a 
question. Will you ask the question? 

Mr. Sheehan. In response to Congressman Machrowicz's question 
as to whether or not he thought the State Department had the Van 
Vliet report, the general just said "No." Is that right or wrong? 

Mr. Flood. That is right. 

Chairman Madden. Who is testifying here now ? 

Mr. Sheehan. Is that true? 

General Bisseix. I didn't know you were asking me. I thought 
you were asking Mr. Flood. I am sorry. 

Chairman Madden. Gentlemen, can we have a little order? 

Mr. Flood. I have just yielded to Mr. Sheehan for a question, or any 
other observation he wants to make in connection with it. 

Will you start from this point? 

Mr. Sheehan. Thank you. 

Following up from the last question Congressman ]\fachrowicz 
asked you, if my memory is right, he asked you your opinion as to 
whether or not the State Department received the Van Vliet report, 
and you just answered "No." Am I right or wrong? 

General Bissell. He didn't ask my opinion. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I did not ask his opinion. 

Mr. Sheehan. What did he ask you ? 

General Bissell. You can get it out of the record ; it was an opinion, 
he asked. 

Mr. Flood. Just a minute ; I still have this witness. 

Mr. Sheehan, if you want the record read after what Mr. Machro- 
wicz said and what the general said, let us have it read. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Reporter, can you get the question asked 
by Congressman Machrowicz ? 



1864 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

(The record was read by the reporter as follows:) 

Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question: Are you prepared now to tell this com- 
mittee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were disc-ussiug all the time 
was transmitted by you to the Department of State? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Your understandiii<2:, then, General, is that you did 
not know that this report was transmitted directly to the Department 
of State? 

Congressman Machrowicz did ask the general whether or not this 
Van Vliet report was transmitted to the Department of State. That 
was his original question ; to which he said "No, sir." 

Now, I am pointing out. General, if my memory is right, previously 
in your statements, when you were reading from your notes, you defi- 
nitely came to the conclusion that the State Department, because of 
various exchange of correspondence, if they did not have it they 
would have asked you where it was ? 

General Bissell. I believe — and I can answer quickly and clearly — 
I stated I did not know whether I had sent the paper to the war-crimes 
people or the State Department, but I was inclined to believe I had 
sent it to State, because of the supporting documentary evidence 
which I have subsequently presented. 

Mr. Sheehan. That is all. 

Mr. Flood. That is your deduction. 

General Bissell. That is just that way. I think it happened for 
that reason. That is what I said. 

Mr. Flood. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Does anybody else have anj^thing on this par- 
ticular point? 

All right. Now, proceed with your statement, General. 

General Bissell. Thank you, sir. 

I had just completed reading the signature on the letter. 

Chairman Madden. We will reconvene at 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p. m. of the same day.) 

AFTER recess 

Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. 
General Bissell. 

TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON I. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF 
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY— Resumed 

Chairman Madden. Before we recessed for lunch I think you were 
going to proceed and complete your statement. Now if you will pro- 
ceed, unless some of the members have some particular question they 
would like to ask regarding some i)articular point in your statement, 
I would like to have you complete your statement. 

General Bissell. Thank you very much. 

For continuity, I had just completed reading a letter. The letter 
was also shown to me in the fall of 1950 by Mr. Shackelford, who had 
secured it from the State Department hies. I believe its contents 
have been available to the committee. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1865 

Mr. Mitchell. May the record show that the contents have not been 
made avaihible to the committee. 

General Bissell. It bears the following notation : 711.62114A, 5-25- 
45, which was its decimal file number and date, to which I have pre- 
viously referred. It also bears the reference number 81998. 

]\Ir. Machrowicz. What report are you referring to ? 

General Bissell. The letter I had just read when the questions 
started. I had just read the signature of the letter and then the com- 
mittee started asking questions. 

Mr. INIachrowicz. The letter of May 25 ? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Since there has been a dispute between the two 
on whether it has or has not been made available, has it or has it not 
been made available to the committee ? 

General Bissell. I said I believe it had, but Mr. Shackelford had 
a copy right here at the table this morning. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the one I showed you a copy of and the 
reply by the Department of State. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you tell us whether the letter of May 25, 
which the general referred to has been made available to the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Shackelford. I believe it was made available to the committee 
through the Inspector General's report. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is incorrect, because there were no exhibits 
connected with the Inspector General's report. That is where it is 
mentioned. It is referred to in there by date. Mr. Sheeham has the 
Inspector General's report. I will have to wait until he returns to get 
it. 

Mr. Shackelford. That can easily be checked. Mr. Machrowicz 
and Mr. Mitchell remember the details. It was referenced in the press 
memorandum that was put out. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You will see it is made available ? 

Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. 

JNIr. Doxdero. So there will be no break in the continuity of thought, 
General Bissell, the letter of May 25, 1945, to which you referred was 
the letter of transmittal to General Holmes? Is that the one you 
referred to ? 

General Bissell. No, sir. It is the letter asking the State Depart- 
ment to verify whether they have received a letter Van Vliet said 
had been forwarded to him by the Swiss at our State Department's 
request. 

Shall I proceed, sir ? 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

General Bissell. It also bears the reference numbers 81998. State 
Department stamps indicate it was in the office of the Assistant Secre- 
tary, Mr. Holmes, May 30, 1945 ; in State Department Special War 
Probes Division May 31, 1945 ; and there was on it an almost illegible 
stamp mark, apparentlv of the OCE-UR Unit. There is written in 
longhand on the letter "SWP May 31, 1945, AH/ABF." This would 
indicate someone in the Special War Plans Division handled the mat- 
ter for Mr. Holmes. 

This is confirmed by another written notation written on the letter 
reading "Answered 6-5-45, W. H. McCahon/EKG." This meant Mr. 
McCahon dictated the reply to EKG, the secretary, on June 5, 1945, 



1866 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

for Mr. Holmes' signature, which was typed on the letter. I do not 
know if General Holmes personally signed this letter. If the original 
is in G-2 files, this point can be clarified. 

State Department's reply under date of June 9, 1945, was addressed 
to me as "G-2, War Department." 

Mr. Shackelford also showed me the State Department copy of their 
reply, and I understand a copy has been made available to the com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Mitchell. One moment. This committee has never seen either 
the original or the copy of the letter you are referring to now, namely, 
the State Department reply which is dated what date, June G, 194r> '. 

General Bissell. June 9, 1945. 

Mr. Mitchell. The committee or no member of its staff had seen the 
original or a copy of it until this morning when Mr. Shackelford 
handed me a copy. 

Mr. Shackelford. We will be glad to supply it. 

Chairman Madden. I wish you would supply it for the record. 

Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. 

General Bissell. The reply read, "Confidential. In reply refer to 
SWP 711.62114A/5-25/45." It is dated June 9, 1945. It follows : 

My Dear General Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain 
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag G4, received from the protect- 
ing power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whether these 
officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You ask 
the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter togetlier with Colonel 
Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State. 

The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in 
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that 
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and 
(\ipt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at 
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request 
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey and 
if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made 
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of 
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time. 

in February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet ami 
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector 
at the time of tlie next visit to that camp would endeavor to obtain the informa- 
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been 
leceived in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that 
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities 
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know whether this is intended or not to 
confuse us. Again you are not referring to the original Colonel Van 
Vliet report ? 

(leneral Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Your answer to me is not changed at all by the 
statement made so far? 

General Bissell. No, sir; but you would notice in the language used 
that they call this second one the report. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Yes, but that is not the report we are talking 
about. 

General Bissell. Yes, that is right. That is my point. I have 
caught it. 

Chairman Madden. You are confusing me a little here. What has 
this got to do with Colonel Van Vliet's original report? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1867 

(leneral Bissell. A great deal, sir, because the State Department 
had considerable knowledge apparently of this matter before Van 
Vliet ever left Germany. They wrote these letters before I ever 
took over G-2. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring now that the State Depart- 
ment had information about the Van Vliet report before Van Vliet 
came to your office ? 

General Bissell. About the Van Vliet visit. They had asked that 
long ago, whether there was a report, and Colonel Van Vliet had made 
a reply to State. That is the status as I read it. There is a little bit 
more to be given to you on it, if you want it. 

Chairman Madden. This is a preliminary report that they are 
referring to in this letter when they say, "Concerning the report that 
Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain Stewart while detained 
as prisoners of war at Oflag 64?" That has nothing to do with the 
original Van Vliet report ? That is not referring to the original report 
that he signed? 

(xeneral Bissell. That is not the report that Van Vliet dictated in 
Washington. 

Mr. Mitchell. May I put that in as an exhibit? 

Chairman Madden. Mark that as an exhibit. 

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit No. -i. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4" and made 
a part of the record as follows :) 

Exhibit 4 

[Confidentiall 

June 9, 1945. 

My Dear Gexeral Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain 
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag 64, received from tlie pro- 
tecting power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whetlier 
these officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You 
ask the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter together with 
Colonel Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State. 

The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in 
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that 
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and 
Capt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at 
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request 
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey 
and if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made 
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of 
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time. 

In February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet and 
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector 
at the time of the next visit to tliat camp would endeavor to obtain the informa- 
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been 
received in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that 
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities 
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government. 
Sincerely yours, 

Julius C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the Army supply the original, 
if they have it, please. This is a copy. 

Chairman Madden. Yes, we would like to have the original. 

Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir; we will be glad to supply you with 
whatever we can. 



186S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. DoNDERO. General, did you in your official capacity receive 
any information from any source affecting the credibility of Colonel 
Van Vliet or Captain Stewart 'i 

General Bissell. That is in the next paragraph or two, and that 
is the reason for my action, in order to get some basis on which to 
evaluate the report they made to me by the only thing I could pin 
down as a yardstick to measure the accuracy of his memory which 
I thought was splendid. 

Mr. DoNDERO. I want you to know of my personal interest in 
this man, because Captain Stewart was my personal appointee to 
West Point. 

General Bissell. I am glad to know of your interest. 

The State Department reply was very significant. It made it 
very clear as early as September 1943, months before I was appointed 
G-2, the State Department had reports of the visit of Colonel Van 
Vliet and Captain Stewart to Katyn. They say so. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That should not be very surprising to you. The 
whole w^orld knew it. The Germans broadcast it. 

General Bissell. They never broadcast the thing about the Van 
Vliet visit. They said that American and British personnel, I think, 
had been taken there or w^ould be taken there, but no names were 
mentioned in anything I ever saw or know about. I can be wrong- 
on this. There is an awful lot of stuff that did not reach G-2 on 
this matter. 

Mr. Mitchell. To clarify that point, sir; Colonel Van Vliet in 
his testimony in part 2 specifically set forth, and so did Captain 
Stewart w^ien he testified, that to their knowledge their names had 
never been revealed by the Germans about their visit to Katyn. 

General Bissell. It is also clear that the instructions from our 
State Department to the American Legation at Bern was responsible 
for the letter Colonel Van Vliet stated he had been given by the 
Swiss protecting power about October 19i3, because the questions 
Colonel Van Vliet said were in the letter he received are almost 
exactly the questions our State Department had directed our Bern 
Embassy to submit. The slight difference in phraseology was prob- 
ably due to the requirement for paraphrasing anything that had been 
sent classified, so that your code cannot be touched by putting it out 
afterward for somebody who had copied the code. 

The channel through which the questions reached Colonel Van Vliet 
was the one our State Department had directed to be used by our 
Bern Legation, and the time factors fitted perfectly. Our State De- 
partment instructions issued in September 1948 apparently had re- 
sulted in the delivery to Colonel Van Vliet while he was a prisoner 
at Oflag 64 of the questions our State Department wanted answered. 
Colonel Van Vliet stated that he replied to them. I^nless Colonel 
Van Vliet was in error, either as to the date he gave, about October 
1943, or about where he was then held prisoner at OHag G4, the in- 
formation that our State Department received in February 1944 re- 
porting his transfer to Oflag 64 could have had no possible bearing 
on the delivery of Colonel Van Vliet's reply, as he had actually re- 
ceived the letter at Oflag No. 64 and answered it 4 months earlier. 

Also significant is the State Department's conclusion that the reason 
no reply was received from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was con 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1869 

sidered likely Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted 
by the Germans. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to have to interrupt you again, because 
I am interested in this whole situation, and I think the members of 
the committee are. I am trying to tell you I am very much confused. 
What was the significance of that letter ? 

General Bissell. I read this part of it here. 

Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. What was the significance ? 

General Bissell. State was proceeding on the theory he had never 
received their letter. 

Mr. IMachrowicz. Wliose letter ? 

General Bissell. Tliis letter sponsored by the Bern Legation. State 
had sent word to Bern to have the Swiss Protecting Power get a letter 
to Van Vliet asking questions. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with the matter we are 
investigating ? 

General Bissell. If Colonel Van Vliet had answered that at the 
time, and I could get my hands on the answers then, I could compare 
all or part of them with the statement he made to me 2 years later 
to measure his memory, his veracity, or anything else. I did not ques- 
tion them, but I had that job as a responsibility to do. 

Mr. ISIachrgwicz. Wliat is the significance ? 

General Bissell. The significance is that the answer State gave 
me that he had changed prison camps had nothing to do with it be- 
cause the letter had reached him and he had replied, according to his 
statement, so the change of prison camps had nothing to do with it. 

]Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. I frankly say I am as much confused as I was in 
the beginning. 

Mr. Dondero. Perhaps I can answer my colleague from Michigan 
by saying I think the significance is that the State Department and the 
Government here knew about this thing long before Colonel Van Vliet's 
report. 

Mr. Machrow^icz. Certainly. So did the Department of Defense 
in 1943. 

General Bissell. But we didn't know Van Vliet's part in it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Neither did the DeiDartment of State, as you say. 

General Bissell. They did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. They didn't know what he had to say. 

General Bissell. No ; but they knew he had been there. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. It is up to the Department of 
Defense to get a statement. 

General Bissell. We didn't know about it. We were not asked to get 
such a statement. This is the State Department's job in time of war? 

IVIr. DoNDERO. They were contacting these two prisoners through 
the delegation in Switzerland. 

General Bissell. Yes. They acted as American Government repre- 
sentatives as a neutral close to Germany. 

Also significant is the conclusion that the reason no reply was re- 
ceived from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was considered likely Colo- 
nel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the Germans. 
Assuming that the Germans had intercepted the Van Vliet reply that 
Russia was guilty of the Katyn massacre, as Germany had stated to 
the world, and assume that Germany was innocent, is it reasonable 

93744— 52— pt. 7 4 



1870 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

that, if innocent, Germany, who had gone to such trouble to take 
Colonel Van Vliet and a sizable party to Katyn for the very purpose 
of having them report German innocence to the world, would not 
allow a letter from Colonel Van Vliet accomplishing such purpose to 
reach the United States ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you claim the letter was received by the Swiss ; 
that it was not intercepted ? 

General Bissell, I don't know. It is a funny reason to give. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim it was received ; do you ? 

General Bissell. No ; I don't claim State got any answer back. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim that Department of State re- 
ceived this information ? 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What is it you claim ? 

General Bissell. I don't believe that the reason they gave for not 
receiving it — that Germany intercepted it — was sound. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with this ? 

General Bissell. Because I am still trying to get Van Vliet 's report 
to check it. 

When the June 9, 1945, reply to my May 25, 1945, letter to State 
Department was received, the question naturally occurred : Why had 
State not made further ert'ort to secure reply from Van Vliet? State 
knew about the Katyn massacre. The State Department did not say 
specifically that the September and December 1943 attempts were 
the only attempts they made. They might have made other attempts 
without tangible results. I considered it purposeless to follow this 
aspect of the matter further because I believe that State had been 
furnished Colonel Van Vliet's report on May 25, 1945. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Because what ? 

General Bissell. I believe that State had been furnished the Colonel 
Van Vliet report on May 25, 1945. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Which report are you referring to ? 

General Bissell. The one made in my office. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not tell me this morning you cannot state 
they received it ? 

General Bissell. But I believe they did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You believe they did ? 

General Bissell. Let us get straight. What I believe is one thing, 
and my positive knowledge is another, I believe that they had re- 
ceived it because it was my intention to get it there or to another place. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where was the other place ? 

General Bissell. The other place was the War Crimes people. 

Mr. Mitchell. You stated this morning that you had discussed this 
matter with Mr. Frederick Lyon. Is that correct ? 

General Bissell. I said I either mentioned it to Mr. Lyon or Mr. 
ITolmos. 

Mr. Mitchell. Over the telephone or in person ? 

General Bissell, I s]>oke to Mv. Lyon only on the phone. On the 
other hand, I saw or talked to Mr. Holmes twice at approximately the 
same day. We had a very hot matter in the Argentine, and I was 
dealing witli both of them at the same time on it. 

This is off the Katyn thing a little bit, but I think it is all right, 
because it is not classified any more. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1871 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to know what were the names of the 
people designated by State to be liaison with the G-2 when you were 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. What were the names of those 
individuals from the Department of State ? 

General Bissell. The two that worked with me most closely were 
Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon. 

Mr. Mitchell. Anybody else at this time that you care to mention ? 
Are there any other names 'i 

General Bissell. Not that have a bearing of any nature in connec- 
tion with Katyn. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are now saying for the record 
at this time that there were no other individuals in the Department 
of State to your knowledge that had any bearing on the Van Vliet 
Katyn report ? 

General Bissell. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are sure? 

Mr, Machrowicz. I want to pursue that line because it is important. 
I think it is important to you and it is important to us all as Ameri- 
cans, because if the Department of State received a report which it 
denies receiving we want to know. Is that not right ? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You told me this morning that you cannot say 
that you forwarded that report. 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, as I understand you, you want to qualify 
it by saying, although you cannot say you sent it to the Department 
of State, you believe you sent it. 

General Bissell. I thought I had. 

Mr. Machrowicz, You still think you did? 

General Bissell. I don't know where it is, and it is pretty difficult 
to pin it down. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You are not much help to this committee. 

General Bissell. I am telling everything I know about people run- 
ning down details that in my opinion don't hit it too closely that bear 
on it. If I give you too much, stop me. 

Mr. MiTCjiELL. General, there is one other question. I asked you 
a minute ago who were the people designated by the State Depart- 
ment with which you did official business in connection with G-2 
matters that State should know about in the line of conunand or 
anywhere else ? 

You told the committee here this morning and again now that the 
two are General Holmes and Mr. Lyon. Is that correct ? 

General Bissell. That could know anything about the Katyn 
matter ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That could know anything about the Katyn 
massacre. 

General Bissell. I don't think so. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who were the individuals in your own organization 
who had liaison with the Department of State who might know any- 
thing about the Katyn matter ? 

General Bissell. Many, many. 

Mr. Mitchell. I mean officially designated by you as head of G-2, 

General Bissell. A man named Dillingham, a colonel at that time 



1872 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

or lieutenant colonel," was my liaison man to handle hot wires that 
came into State. If something came in among their stuff that re- 
quired military consideration or action, he was there watching. I 
don't think he knows a thing about Katyn. 

Mr. Mitchell. I specifically nailed my question down. General, to 
who in your Department was designated to liaison with the State De- 
partment who might know or have any knowledge of the Van Vliet 
report on Katyn. 

General Bissell. No one. 

Mr. Mitchell. No one but yourself ? 

General Bissell. I think that is right. 

]Mr. Mitchell. You are sure? 

General Bissell. I think, as far as Katyn is concerned on this par- 
ticular deal, yes, sir; I think that is right. But I had many contacts 
in the State at every level. 

Mr. Mitchell. At this time will you tell us now who in your De- 
partment had knowledge of the Katyn matter ? 

General Bissell. Mrs. Meeres and an officer who today was con- 
firmed to be Lieutenant Colonel Lantaff. I knew someone in my office 
handled it, but I could not tell you which one. His handling of it was 
not to be present when anything was being made but in connection 
with the papers. 

]Mr. IVIachrgwicz. You do not mean those are the only two people 
in your department that had knowledge of Katyn ? 

General Bissell. I believe they are. Colonel Van Vliet's arrival 
and his procedure was not the routine. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I can assure you you are wrong. I am not guess- 
ing at it. I am stating you are wrong. 

General Bissell. I will try to think hard and see. 

Mr. Sheehan. You said the Katyn matter. Do you mean the Van 
Vliet report ? 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. I said the Van Vliet report on the Katyn affair. 

General Bissell. I thought you were exploiting his question or ex- 
panding it. That is not so. Lots of people had heard of Katyn. 
Loads of them. The whole Polish Liaison Section. We had Poles 
accredited to us who came to G-2. 

Chairman Madden. Everybody knew about Katyn after it was 
broadcast and the bodies were found. So, that is not so ini])ortant. 

]\rr. Mitchell. General, I think you missed the point of my (jues- 
tion. The question I want to get across is: "Who in 3'our staff, as the 
head of G-2, did you specifically designate to take this matter up with 
the Department of State or any other agency of the (lovernment ? 

(jeneral Bissell. I did not designate anybody in my office to take 
it \]\) with the Department of State. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you personally handled the matter yourself? 

General Bissell. As far as I can recollect. AVhen I say "handled 
it," I mean 1 liHudled the direction to be given and what was to be 
done. 

^fr. ^NfrrcMiKLT,. Thou, if you say you "handled it," you must have 
directed somebody to do something about it. 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. MrrcHEi,L. Those are the names I want. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1873 

General Bissell. I directed someone, who from this morning^s 
testimony I believe to be Colonel Lantaff, to secure a proper room 
where this dictation could be handled. 

Mr. Mitchell. We know that. 

General Bissell. To brief Mrs. Meeres, who was doing her first job 
in my office. I think that is about the end of the story. 

Chairman jNIadden. General, is it something unusual while you were 
connected with this assignment over there for a report of this kind 
coming in dealing with the massacre or murder of over 4,000 soldiers? 
That was unusual ? 

General Bissell. It was unusual from beginning to end. 

Chairman Madden. And you were in complete charge of that office? 

General Bissell. I am responsible for everything that my people do. 

Chairman Madden. You just testified that to your knowledge there 
could not be over two people in your office under your supervision 
connected with the Van Vliet Katyn report. 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Chairman Madden. That report that was made by Colonel Van 
Vliet was quite important in your mind ? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Chairman Madden. With this responsibility that you had, and as 
your testimony showed, it was completely unusual, a case of this kind. 
You testified this morning that you could not say whether or not the 
Van Vliet report was ever delivered to the State Department. 

General Bissell. That is correct, sir. I cannot say that. 

Chairman Madden. Do you not think, considering the background 
as you already have testified, that that would be very much on your 
mind to see that a report like that would be transferred over there if 
that was the place it should go ? 

General Bissell. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Madden. Why did you not know that it was transferred 
over there, if it was? 

General Bissell. Because I would have given instructions to have 
had something done, and I w^ould not have personally been doing it. 

Chairman Madden. Did you give instructions to have that done ? 

General Bissell. I am positive I gave instructions. 

Chairman Madden. To whom ? 

General Bissell. I believe now I don't know. I think I could give 
3'ou my story. 

Chairman Madden. Just answer that. Whom did you give instruc- 
tions to? 

General Bissell. I do not recall whether it was Congressman Lan- 
taff, but if it was not 

Mr. Machrowicz. He said it was not. 

General Bissell. I know. If it was not, I don't know what other 
person. 

Mr. Machroavicz. There was only one other person. 

General Bissell. She could not have done it. I don't know who 
actually got the instruction. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Then there were no instructions given. 

General Bissell. That is not something I can swear to as a fact. 



1874 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is the only possible logical conclusion that 
anyone can come to. 

General Bissell. That may be so, but I don't believe you are giving 
me quit-e the opportunity you desire. Katyn, although unusual, was 
unusual because Van Vliet, instead of coming in initially and report- 
ing to the executive officer and being sent by him to the proper section, 
being handled as in every other case coming in, insisted on seeing me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did he do that under anybody's direction ? He said 
he had seen General Collins. He had seen other people over there. 
When he initially came to you, did he tell you he was sent there by 
anybody else? 

General Bissell. He did not, but he told me he had seen (xeneral 
Collins. He told me the others he had seen. He gave me a straight 
story, just about the way he told you here. I think he was right, but 
he did get an unusual handling of his case from that minute on. 

Chairman Madden. Let me ask you this. General, considering your 
testimony that just Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres were the only two 
in your office connected with the Van Vliet report and that you might 
have told Colonel Lantaff to deliver the report to the State Depart- 
ment or you might have told Mrs. Meeres 

(xeneral Bissell. No, I didn't tell her to do any such thing. 

Chairman Madden. You might have told Colonel Lantaff, there 
would not be anybody outside of Lantaff you to\d( 

General Bissell. I don't think so. 

Chairman Madden. Let us concede that you told Colonel Lantaff. 

General Bissell. All right, sir. 

Chairman Madden. Considering the importance of this report deal- 
ing with the massacre of over 4,000 soldiers of our allies, had you told 
Colonel Lantaff, don't you think the most natural thing would be, 
as the head of this department, maybe the next day or the day after, 
to inquire from the colonel if that important report was delivered to 
the State Department ? 

General Bissell. I don't think I would have done that. 

Chairman Madden. Don't you think the colonel would have come 
back and stated to you, as his superior officer, that he had carried out 
your instruction ? 

General Bissell. He would not do that, because I would take it for 
granted. I knew he would carry out instructions. The only thing 
I would have done under the situation you paint there, if I had ques- 
tioned the delivery of that, I would have asked Holmes if he got it. 
That is the point. 

Chairman Madden. Colonel Lantaff testified this, morning that 
there was never any order given to him at all to deliver the report. 

General Bissell. The only instruction ap|)arently I gave Colonel 
Lantalf was to secure, after securing the report, a place for the report 
to be dictated and the briefing of Mrs. Meeres. 

Mr. ]Maciii{owicz. Are you not contradicting your own testimony? 

General Bissei>l. Colonel Lantalf, I think — I have never talked 
with him, T never saw him since he left (x-2 until he came in this room 
this morning, so that there is no suggestion coming from him, and I 
would accept anything he said that he would swear to as being true. 
He would not need to swear to it, if he said it. I think he is con- 
fused on what ha])pened to the report, as I am confused on what hap- 
pened to it. He cannot tell us how it went out of the room, and he 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1875 

does not know whetlier he jxot it back or not. He did reply that lie 
read it in the preparation stai^e. That could have been done. There is 
a strono; feeling in my mind that Van Vliet started one day and fin- 
ished another and that the notes had to be put np overnifrht, and the 
colonel indicated that was the case because he put them u]). 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is not what the colonel says. Colonel Van 
A-^liet said he finished the statement in 1 day. 

General Bissell. The Conoressman, not Colonel Lantaff. Colonel 
Van Vliet says in another ])lace he does not know whether he stayed 
over another day or not. If he had completed it the first day, there 
would have been no reason to i>nt away stenofrrapher's notes that nio-ht 
or anything else or to come back and <ret the papers the next day if he 
had brou^rht them to me that day. I mifjht have been busy. He might 
have tried to. 

Chairman Maddex. Did anybody ever telephone you or call up or 
come into your office after the report was signed by Van Vliet re- 
garding the report, did a telephone call come in to. request to read it 
or anything { 

General Bissell. No. 

Chairman Madden. Xot a person communicated with your office 
regarding it after it was signed ^ 

General Bissell. No, sir, I don't think so. 

Chairman Madden. When did you decide to send it to the State 
De])artment then ? 

General Bissell. My intention had been to have it go to the State 
De]:)artment at once and whether it went, I don't know, as I have 
said. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Let us stick to that now, because you have made 
some very serious and unwarranted inferences which are not at all 
in accord with what you are saying right now. 

General Bissell. If I had not pointed out these things, I think I 
would not have given you all I know on the matter. 

Chairman Madden. Was it the next day you sent it to the State 
Dejiartment or the week after or a month ? 

General Bissell. It would have been done either on the 24:th or 
25th, that it would have gone from the office, had it gone to the State 
Department. 

Chairman Madden. Why do you say it would have gone then ? 

General Bisseijl. Because on the twenty-second, the date that 
Colonel Van Vliet saw me, there could not have been time in my opinion 
to have processed it, and I saw Colonel Van Vliet on two different 
occasions. 

Chairman ]Madden. You thought it was so important that you im- 
mediately sent it over to the State Department the next day? 

General Bissell. And I think it was not ready to go the next day, 
but it would have been ready the following day. 

Chairman Madden. And the following day you sent it over? 

General Bissell. The twenty-fifth, I think; if it ever went from 
G-2 to State, it prol^ably left G-2 on the twenty-fifth. 

Chairman Madden. You don't know whether it went at all or not? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In your letter to Mr. Lyon you state as follows : 

' Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the file of the State 
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain. British Medical 



1876 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Jr., 
forwarded to (Jeueral Holmes on May 25, 1945. 

General Bissell. Written by JSIrs. Meeres, 

Mr. Machrowicz. Signed by Clayton Bissell. 

General Bissell. I did not put in that date. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What date ? 

General Bissell. That it was forwarded on a certain date. That 
was from something that was found in the office or something of the 
kind. I did not put that in. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You signed the letter. 

General Bissell. I signed the letter, and when I dictated it, I dic- 
tated the first paragraph and then I said, 'Tt is the Colonel Van Vliet 
report, and get the dope on the thing and send it in." 

Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, that only contained one 
paragraph. 

General Bissell. That is the second thought. The first thought, 
here comes a letter, and the second thought, compare it with another 
thing. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I will read it to you again : 

Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the files of the State 
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain, British Medical 
Officer. This report supplements statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Ji'., 
forwarded to General Holmes. 

General Bissell. That is the way I remember it. There were two 
sentences. The first one I dictated straight out and I left the follow- 
ing thing blank. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring that you as commanding offi- 
cer, G-2, signed a letter in blank with your secretary filling it in? 

General Bisseij^. It was filled in. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was the date in there. May 25 ? 

General Bissell. The date was filled in. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What was not in then? You signed the letter, 
and May 25 you forwarded it. 

General Bissell. When I signed the letter it was exactly the form 
in which you read it. When I dictated I dictated what I could, out 
of my head, I think in August. 

Mr. Machrowicz. August 25. 

General Bissell. I could not have pulled that date out of my head 
after all that had been happening, with accuracy. 

Mr. Machrowicz. How do you account for the fact that you stated 
in your letter you did forward to General Holmes the Colonel Van 
Vliet report? 

General Bissell. That was my belief at the moment of what had 
happened. They went back to the files apparently and got something 
to set that date up for them. The one that did it I think is Mrs. 
Meeres. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where is that letter or a copy of that letter today ? 

General Bissell. Isn't that one of those you have here ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not referring to this. I am referring to the 
letter where you got the date May 25, 19-1:5' from. 

General Bissell. I did not personally do that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, (ieneral. You stated to Mr. Mach- 
rowicz 1 minute ago that you could not recall this date, so you dic- 
tated all the other data that is in this to the best of your knowledge. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1877 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you probably said, as many men do to their 
secretaries, "Find out when I transmitted that over to General 
Holmes." She inserted this date 25th of May 1945. If she could 
find that on August 21, 1945, why can't we find the same copy of the 
transmittal today ? 

General Bissell. That is what I would like to know. Also, I think 
it is very significant because that is what I believed at that particular 
time and put in writing and I didn't do it myself. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is what you would like to find out and 
that is what we would like to find out. You are inferring the fault 
lies with the Department of State. If those letters were lost, they 
were lost in the Department of Defense, is that right? 

General Bissell. I don't know where they were lost. 

Mr. Machrowicz. They never got out of the Department of De- 
fense. 

General Bissell. I don't know whether they did or not. Wliy 
would we have that kind of letter written in my office if it had not 
gone out. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the original report of Colonel Van 
Vliet. 

General Bissell. That is what I am talking about, too. Why 
would I have referred to it by date if I didn't believe it had gone out? 
And why if it had not gone out didn't State, when they got the letter, 
call me up on the phone : "How about this thing, we haven't got that." 

Mr. Machrowicz. You are inferring you would have let an impor- 
tant document go out without some receipt ? 

General Bissell. I never got a receipt from anybody on anything in 
G-2. I had people who did the receipting for me, and a section in my 
office to process in and out those documents. So far as my particular 
section of the G-2 office is concerned, we had Colonel Lantaff's group 
who did it for me. I never signed one in, I never signed one out. 
When I got through with a communication, it went in my out basket. 
Those people who were cleared for top secret information brought me 
in masses of stuff every day. I acted on it and put it in the out bas- 
ket. 

Chairman Madden. Did they ever bring you in masses of material 
that pertained to the killing of 4,300 soldiers? 

General Bissell. At that time I dichi't know and do not know today 
exactly how many were killed. 

Chairman Madden. You should not classify a report of this im- 
portance with the thousands of little details that come in and out of 
your office. This was an extraordinary, an important event, as you 
testified. 

General Bissell. I was very concerned all of this particular time 
with events that were even more critical to America's war with Japan, 
and this was not going to help win the Japan war one bit except in a 
different way. And that was the reason I was so careful about this 
thing. 

I have a lot of stuff here, and I will spoil it by breaking it up piece- 
rtieal. The UNO conference was one. I had been on there the pre- 
vious week. Our No. 1 objective, other than defeating Japan at that 
time, was to get a UNO going. We didn't know whether we could 
get the Russians to come in. 



1878 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Chairman Madden. You wanted to maintain friendship with the 
Hussians. 

General Bissell. That Avas tlie policy of our Government. 

Chairman Madden. Was that why the report disappeared? 

General Bissell. No, sir, it was not why. I don't know what re- 
port you are talking about on that. That is a fast one. I cannot 
tell you a thing about that. 

Mr. DoxDERO. Mr. Chairman, I think I ought to enter this. T 
notice that my colleague from Michigan, who is critical of your testi- 
mony, even referred to a letter with one sentence in it when there were 
two in it, and the letter was right before hiui. So it shows the falli- 
bility of human nature. 

I want to ask this one question: General, at the time you had this 
Katyn massacre subject before you, were you handling other matters 
for the Government in your department? 

Geueral Bissell. Vast numbei's. 

Mr. DoNDERo. You had other items around the world in relation to 
the war which we were then in, is that correct? 

General Bissell. That is right. I told you I cauie up to this body, 
busy as I was, to testify to them about subversive activities in the 
service. 

Mr. DoNDERO. The Katyn matter was only one of the items that 
^ame across your dessk ? 

Chairman Madde'n. It was the only massacre you had. 

General Bissell. That is not so. It was the ouly one of that magni- 
tude. No; it is not so. I was receiving at the same time that the 
Colonel Van Vliet report came in, the very time, the Dachau and other 
German concentration-camp things where they had wdiolesale mas- 
sacres that make this thing look insignificant. It numbers nearly a 
quarter of a million that went through Dachau. And there were 
Poles in that, lots of them. My driver yesterday taking me from the 
station was a Pole whose father was killed in that thing, and who 
spent as a child, until he got old enough to come to the United States, 
his time in Dachau from 1943 on. 

The Japanese balloon thing was cracking on us. We were having 
a devil of a time to get the press to hold it. We had had the fatali- 
ties in Oregon. We didn't want the American people to know what 
was hap])ening in that thing, and, more than that, we didn't want the 
Japanese to know how successful they were. I was busy trying to 
keep that one from bursting in the press. I had that on my mind. 
The same day, when I was out on the tri]>, I had the Minnea]X)lis 
newspapers on me and came back here and got Price together with 
others of the group that was concerned with it on how we would 
handle that particular thing. I was preparing somethino- for General 
Marshall to Field Marshal ]\faintland-Wilson at that particular time. 
If I racJv my memory, I can show you that the Van Vliet visit took 
30 minutes one day and less the next, on days like I had been working! 
for many months from 7 a. m. until late every night and Sundavs, on I 
everything in the world. I had flown 14 or 15 hours on one day in 
connection with this trip, getting in here to meet Colonel Van Vliet. 
I didn't know he was hero. 

I would like to add just one more thing. Coloiu^l Lantaff is jii-^( 
as honest as can be, but he said that Mrs. Jepson was in the oflice 
and I had loaned Mrs. Jepson to UNO and she was working out theie 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1879 

on that thing. And another lady, whose name slipped his memory, 
I am sure Mrs. Bryant, was the secretary on duty. He didn't tell you 
anj- thing wrong. He told you what he believed and remembered. 
He just overlooked the fact we did loan her out there and she was 
not yet back on duty in my office at the time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. who? 

General Bissell. Miss Bryant. She is now married and living 
down here near Hollis some place. 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Was she married at that time ? 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. SnEEiiAX. General, I have a series of questions; so if you wnll 
be patient with me, because some of them might be a little rehashing 
of something that has been said, and I do that for the purpose of get- 
ting away from the general discussion, so that it will come out and 
be either clarified or amplified. 

Number one: Mrs. Meeres in her testimony stated that top-secret 
reports usually are corrected and i-etyped, and, as you yourself said, 
Colonel Lantaff read this report in the preparation stage. Why wasn't 
that -report handled this way? 

General Bissell. My intention was to have it produced in what we 
call draft ; bring it out in draft. That usually means that a thing 
is typed on long sheets, double or triple space, just the original im- 
pression. Then it is corrected and modified and you do not send a 
dirty copy out, so a retyping is essential. That is what I thought 
would happen in this case, because I thought when Colonel Van Vliet 
got his dictation down and Mrs. Meeres knocked it out the first time, 
she would have misunderstood or misspelled or done a number of other 
things. They would then bring it in to me and we would talk about 
it and I would see if there were any other errors or omissions I could 
ask him about that might help him and then it would be retyped. 

Mr. Mitchell. Right at that particular stage, was this rough draft 
ever converted into an original final draft? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there ever a top secret number given to the Van 
Vliet report ? 

General Bissell. That I would not know, because I didn't handle 
that myself. That was done in Colonel Lantaff's office. 

Chairman Maddex. I suggest that Mr. Sheehan continue his ques- 
tions. 

Mr. Sheehan. I had yielded to the gentleman for that purpose. 

In other words, once you determined a document was top secret, 
you turned it over to Colonel Lantaff or someone else in the office for 
the classification? 

General Bissell. For the handling in accordance with instructions 
that were standard throughout the General Staff. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the mere fact that this top-secret 
document was not handled that way is no fault of yours because you 
turned it over to your subordinates? 

General Bissell. No; it is partly correct and partly not. That is 
the way I wanted it typed up the first time and that is the way I ex- 
pected Van Vliet to bring it to me, and that is the way it was brought to 
me. The only thing corrected in it was maybe a word or two and it 
was not necessary to have a rewrite and it was not rewritten. It was 
a very good job, "that report. 



1880 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan, Colonel Van Vliet stated that on May 5, 1945, he 
showed photographs of the Katyn massacre to a G-2 officer of the 
One Hundred Fouith Infantry stationed overseas. Do you recall any 
report at all on this instance coming into your office? 

General Bissell. I never heard of that except when Colonel Van. 
Vliet told about it. 

Mr. Sheehan. I understand that a Col. Thomas Drake, who was a 
senior American officer at Oflag 64 and was repatriated because of 
stomach ulcers in 1944, that he made out reports on the Van Vliet 
and Captain Stewart testimony and sent a copy of this report to 
G-1, G-2, State Department, Secretary of War Stimson, and to Mr. 
Lauchlin Currie, care of Mr. Roosevelt. Did that G-2 report ever 
come across your desk ? 

General Bissell. I never heard of that phase of it. The only thing 
I know is what Colonel Van Vliet told me and what is in his testimony 
to you. 

Mr. Sheehan. As far as you know, it never came to your attention? 

General Bissell. I don't know anything about it. That would have 
been before my time, you understand. 

Mr. Sheehan. No; you said you came in there in 1944. 

General Bissell. I came in 1944, and that was done when? 

Mr. Sheehan. Colonel Drake was repatriated late in 1944, which 
means he arrived in this country in late 1944 or 1945 to make out 
these reports. 

General Bissell. My impression was that Colonel Van Vliet had 
said shortly after he got back he talked to Colonel Drake on it. 

Mr. Sheehan. That is right; but he was not repatriated until a 
year later. 

General Bissell. I don't know about that. All I have is what is 
in the Colonel Van Vliet report and what he may have mentioned 
to me. 

Mr. Sheehan. In classifying a document top secret, after your 
underlings had done so 

General Bissell. I don't call them that — my helpers. 

Mr. Sheehan. Let us call them subordinates — or any other phase 
of secrecy; do the Army Regulations prescribe for any logging or 
entering of this in the log book in your office ? 

General Bissell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Was that done in this case ? 

General Bissell. I don't know, because, as I said, I never wenti 
back to those. I asked if it was in the log when I was working 
for — I don't believe I asked. I think you did the asking on that; 
I suggested to you, Mr. Shackelford, that you have the log checked. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who in your specific office had charge of your log? 

General Bissell. I thinfe Congressman Lantaff was the senior, and 
that Earman was the next, and they both had to do it because my hours 
were longer than theirs. 

Mr. Sheehan. Counsel, I think the chairman should instruct you 
to check with the Army to see if that thing was logged any place. 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe you have it right there. 

Mr. Sackelford. We have checked tlie logs in regard to that, asi 
well as the receipt books. That was the part of the careful search that| 
was made by the inspector, and with negative results. I 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1881 

Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff this morning said that anyone 
in the G-2 immediate staff offices might have access to your personal 
safe. Is that correct or is that incorrect ? 

General Bissell. It depends on what he says 

Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to have you answer is how many 
people of your immediate staff had access to your safe. 

Genera] Bissell. The safe that he described as my personal safe 
was described in that category because in it was a single drawer which 
had my personal things like invitations, and so on. It was a classified 
routine safe in the G-2 office. Now, the safe he did not mention was 
in my office. And in my office, let ns get straight, too, because that is 
causing a lot of trouble, I had an office in which I worked, a big room. 
On one side was my deputy, on the other side was Colonel Lantaff, 
Colonel Earman, normally Mrs. Jepson, and Mrs. Bryant, and a 
man named Carulli. They were in my immediate office. They were 
all cleared for top secret, and they all know between them if it was 
added up, everything I do. So if I were to be hit by a car crossing 
the street, there is enough there to carry on. But I tried hard to 
keep more people from knowing about important things than needed 
to be. So I didn't try to let all of them know everything and they 
worked better. They w^ere better on the things that each one 
remembered. 

Now, the G-2 office is directly spoken of to include the chief, the 
deputy, the deputy's stenographers, and this little group that I told 
you. However, my office, that is just one room, and I am in there by 
myself. When I want a secretary, I call for her. They worked out- 
side because all the stuff that I talked about was highly classified, or 
maybe General Marshall came in or General Handy, during which 
we would discuss some action, and it would be settled. Anybody 
might come over. The Secretary of the Treasury has visited me 
there, any number of people on all kinds of matters. So I had to 
have a place where there was no one in their hair, they could talk 
freely. 

Now, in my little office I might be called to General Marshall's 
office and he would say, "Come on up here." We had a squawk box. 
He was a cracker] ack man to work for. When I ran, if I had things 
on my desk that were classified, and there usually was nothing else, 
practically nothing unclassified came in, I just picked up my basket. 
I had a three-combination, two-drawer safe, and I dropped the basket 
complete in there, flung the combination, checked it, took down the 
red sign that the safe was open that we had on every safe there and 
put it on top and was on my way, usually hollering when I went 
through I was on my way to General Marshall's office. That safe is 
my personal safe. No one in my office knew the combination of that 
safe except my deputy. General Wackerling. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was the Van Vliet report we speak of put in that 
safe the night that Van Vliet completed it ? 

General Bissell. No ; it was never put there, so far as I know, be- 
cause I didn't put my hands on the thing except to read it. They 
brought it in to me ; I sat down ; I gave Van Vliet a chance to cor- 
rect it. He didn't want to make any corrections. It was not what 
you call authenticated in that there were a number of pages that 
were not initialed. I had him do that. I had him sit back in the 



1882 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

chair comfortably and I went tlu-ough it. My reason for g'oing 
tlirough it primarily was to answer the question whether there was 
any discrepancy between this and what he had told me before, and it 
w^as a crackerjack report; there were no discrepancies. I then said, 
"This is to be classified top secret.'" I can't tell you whether Mrs. 
Meeres, Colonel Van Vliet, or myself actually did the top-secret stamp 
on the top and bottom of ever}' page. 

Mr. Mitchell. Isn't it conventional wdien the secretary is doing 
rough draft to use the stamp "top secret" before handing it back to 
the individual from whom she took the dictation ? 

General Bisskll. Not if she kept it in her possession. She was not 
through with the report yet. However, she did say this morning that 
the envelope which had the notes taken out of her notebook — any spare 
piece of paper tliat was put in, that might carry tlie top-secret infor- 
mation, goes in the same envelope. Outside it is marked "Burn.'' 
And the officer oversaw the burning. 1 don't think you will find 
there are many leaks out of G-2. Maybe we have been too tight, but 
we never lose them. Nothing got to the ])ublic from G-'2. ■ 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. General, in these couple of days here in May when 
Van Vliet w^as in and you said you had thought 

General Bissell. May 22. 

Mr. Sheehan. May 21 to 25 when you had talked to General Van 
Vliet, if I remember correctly, you stated you did i)hone or you 
thought you phoned Holmes and Lyons in the State Department. 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Sheehan. When you talked to any of these gentlemen or with 
Colonel Lantaff about the Van Vliet report did the question come up 
as to the political implication of this report at any time? 

General Bissell. The only reason I would have mentioned it to 
them at all Avould have been its political aspect. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did they agree with you it was vital ? 

General Bissell. No discussion occurred of the contents of the 
re]:)ort at that stage. 

Mr, Sheehan. You are talking about the political implications ? 

General Bissell (reading) : 

There was a man here named Van Vliet who arrived yesterday and who has 
information on the political matter, the Katyn massacre, that we will send ta 
you as soon as we get through with it. 

Mr. Sheehan. You did not discuss the conclusions? 

General Bissell. No. It was only incidental to the talk on the 
other matter. I remember the other matter quite well, I will be 
glad to give it to you in executive session, but it has no bearing on 
Katyn whatever, 

Mr. Sheehan. This might steal a little thunder from my colleague 
over there. This morning Congressman O'Konski asked you a ques- 
tion al)out whether or not any other documents had disappeared or 
were lost or strayed from G-2. I did not use the word "stolen'' ad- 
visedly because tlie Army uses the word "compromise." As I under- 
stand it, from the MacArthur testimony, tlie eight colonels Avho sent 
a top-secret repor-t from Japan or the Near East in which they tried 
to advise the administration of the danger of alining themselves with 
Russia in finisliing off the Japanese war, I understand that report 
disappeared out of G-2. Is that right or wrong? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1883; 

General Bissell. Here is what I don't believe is fully understood 
and probably it is just as well that all the American people don't 
know about 'all of G-2, but if you didn't have some procedure for 
destroying set up with the mass of stuif coming in there, you could not 
get the people that would be required to keep track of it in the Penta- 
gon. There goes on constantly in any large intelligence organization 
a sorting out and a reclassification and a destruction. At the end 
of the German war there was a period when that had to be done ex- 
tensively. The German war had ended just a few days, a short time 
before General Van Vliet's arrival. He got liberated on the 5th of 
May. The war was over on the Tth, as 1 recall, the 8th, and this is; 
the 22d. Now, also, at the end of the German war, by the plans ar- 
ranged in advance, we were to start cutting down personnel drastically. 
The biggest fighting part of the war was over, maybe not the most 
difficult part, but the biggest fighting part. With that cutting dowm, 
your procedure of destruction is weakened because you try to let those 
people go who have come in from civil life and given you fine service 
in the order in which they want to go, in which they can get a job. If 
a fellow got a chance to leave and he was a good man, his boss wants 
him right now when the pressure is off. Those people we would let 
go. Others were cases where they didn't want to go so quickly, and 
Ave tried to be loyal to them, too. During the time I was there, this 
procedure and declassification, two things, must go on. You must 
destroy the things that are no longer necessary and current, and you 
must declassify down and down, as time passes. 

Mr. Sheetiax. The Japanese war was still on at the time? 

General Bissell. I don't know the instance you are talking about. 
I was asked some questions about a report of a number of colonels. 
They were not of ]\IacArthur's staff. They were right here in Wash- 
ington, that group, and I didn't know MacArthur's connection with it. 

Mr. Sheeiian. It came out during the ^NlacArthur hearings that the 
Army G-2 was advised by the group of eight colonels. 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. SiiEEiiAX. Of the dangers of alining themselves with Russia., 
Apparently during the MacArthur hearings they thought this was 
a very vital document. When they went to look for it, they a]5par- 
ently could not find it because it was referred to G-2 and never found 
afterward. ^ 

General Bissell. The way the story came to me was, "Can you tell 
us whether such a report was ever made to you ?" Well, it might have 
been prepai-ed : those people were in my office, but if they prepared 
such a repoi't. it never came to me. 

Mr. Machkowicz. That is the question I would like to know about, 
since you inferred that the Katyn matter was not so important because 
of the tremendous importance of the Japanese affair. Here is a report 
bearing exactly on the issue which you considered paramount now. 
Now you don't remember those eight colonels filing a report with you. 

General Bissell. I have talked to some of the eight colonels and 
they told me they never made such a report. I think you will have 
one here whom you may ask the questions. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was he one of the eight colonels ? 

General Bissell. I think he is. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Col. Truman Smith ? 



1884 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say Col. Truman Smitli did not sign a 
report ? 

General Bissell. I never got such a report as you described from 
him. 

Mr. Machrowicz. At any rate the report is missing in G-2 ? 

General Bissell. I don't know if it ever left the office where it 
originated. I don't know anything about it, because I never saw it. 
Don't get the idea that we didn't appreciate that there was danger in 
the international political situation or danger in our alinement with 
Russia. We had had troubles with the Russians all through the war 
trying to help them and keep them out of our hair. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to know whether the loss of the Van 
Vliet report was not one of those attempts to help them. 

General Bissell. Do you want me to answer that question ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Yes. 

General Bissell. So far as I am concerned, I would be on the other 
side of that fight for every inch that was of me. It did not, with my 
knowledge or my help, and I would like to say further that no person, 
not General Marshall, not the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, not any 
member of the General Staff or any member of the military profession 
or any member of our diplomatic or legislative or judicial or any 
other human, foreign or American, ever suggested to me what to do 
or what not to do with the Van Vliet report or anything comiected 
with it. 

Mr. Mitchell. You are implying you did discuss it with these 
gentlemen ? 

General Bissell. No; I did not. I said none of them ever mem- 
tioned it to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. How could they mention it if they did not know 
about it ? 

General Bissell. Everybody knew about the Katyn affair. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; but you were talking about the Van Vliet 
report. 

General Bissell. I thought you might want to know that no one 
ever influenced my action in any way or tried to. 

Mr. Mitchell. How could they influence your action in any way 
if they didn't know about the Van Vliet report? You must have 
discussed it with these individuals. 

General Bi-sell. I di,^ -nt, nor did they uisc ai me. 

Mr. Sheehan. We have a lot of ring-ar^-- ...^ on i\\\s question 

as to whether or not t^^ '^ta'^p Depa 'imtut gjt this document. I 
am not going to go into i. t^d both 'Congressman Machrowicz and 

myself have had different variations of your answer this morning. 
I want to put a very short bald question to you, and you weigh it 
before you decide to answer it. The question I would like to ask is: 
Would you state it to be a fact that the State Department did receive 
the original Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. Did? 

Mr. Sheehan. Yes. 

General Bisseij^. No ; I would not state it as a fact. 

Mr. Sheehan. O. K. 

On the other hand, he did state when he read the previous testimony 
from all the mail he got, the letters, that they referred to the Van 



THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1885 

Vliet report & . eral times, and he said someone should have asked him 
for it if thev didn't have it. 

Mr. MAciiRowK z. The answer is, he thinks they must have known 
about it, but he will not say they knew about it. 

Mv. ^iiEEiiAN. General, in your testimony you stated m drawing 
some conclusions that the facts show that the State Department had 
gone into the Katvn matter carefully. 

General Bissell>. I told you how long they were at my letters, and 
how many places it had been. Somebody must have looked at it. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. Would you state they were still going into it in 
1945. because previously your testimony was they were trying to get 
it through the Swiss when he was a prisoner of war. Was the State 
Department still interested in that in 1945^ 

General Bissell. I would have thought they should have been. 
Let me see now, 1945, certainly they would have been interested in 
it. They would have wanted anything we had gotten on that subject. 
Chairman ]Madden. Did they ask for it? 

General Bissell. No. That was not going to influence the outcome 
of that war that we were fighting with Germany and Japan. 

Xow, I would like to make a point, and this is only— it is nothing 
that happened, but it is a consideration. Had there been evidence 
positive in the Van Vliet report that any particular nation had been 
ouilty, rather than an opinion, and a conclusion formed in a state- 
ment by a man who says there is no single thing that proves it, just 
a combination of circunistances of the thing makes him believe it, it 
probal)ly would have been of very much greater importance to me. 
But when I got through with Van Vliet's report I did not feel positive 
by any means that he was right. He had reached a conclusion. I 
did not feel at all sure he was right. I felt his statements were as he 
remembei'ed them. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see the Kathleen Harriman report 
dated January 1944?^ 
General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. You never saw it during the period January 1944 
and Mav 1945? 

General Bissell. I never saw it at all. When you say the ' Kath- 
leen" you mean the one that Mr. Harriman would have sent in due 
to his daughter's visit? 
Mr. MiT'TiELL. Correct. 

General ' Wh( ^her that would have been his report or hers, 

I don't know. '! n6ver seen the doer/ t anyhow •' 

Mr. SHEEHAN.'i'f'' i \now it to be a fact that the State Depart- 
ment did receive the^'Br'nTsl. i-epor^^* <? -A, Stanley Gilder on the 
Katyn matter? ' >''Jir>odj' 

General Bissell. I think tliey have it. 

Mr. Siieehax. I think you 'did testify this morning it was referred 
to von in G-2 and you sent it on to State. 

General Bissell. That is right. I would have to check my notes. 
I think there was an ansAver to that. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. You said the State Department stamp showed receipt ? 
General Bissell. This is not the Gilder one. 

^Ir. Shackelford. Mr. Sheehan, the State Department did receive 
the Gilder report. 

Mr. Sheehan. They did receive it ? 

93744— 52— pt. 7 5 



1886 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Do or do you not know whether or not Gilder men- 
tioned about Van Vliet in his report? 

General Bissell. Not ])Ositively. I know he said there were British 
and Americans in the party. 

Mr. DoNDEKO. I think the record will show there were four people 
in the party, one from England and one from South Africa and the 
two American officers. 

General Bissell. But that did not say they were Van Vliet, as I 
remember. 

Mr. Sheehan. The only reason I thought, if you did know that, 
that the State Department was informed in the Gilder report of Van 
Vliet, it would seem to me they would take the precautions to go to the 
Army to find out what the Van Vliet report was. 

General Bissell. Mr. Shackelford has been kind enough to show" me 
the copy that w\as released by the War Department of the Gilder re- 
])ort, and it shows the name of Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Col- 
onel Van Vliet in Gilder's report, a copy of which was contained in the 
War Department release on Katyn sometime ago under date of Sep- 
tember 18, 1950. They published the Gilder report and the Gilder 
report says that Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart 
of the American Army were in the party. So they did know from 
that. 

Mr. Sheeiian. In other w^ords, the State Department knew in 194.5 
this was the proposition and yet apparently took no steps to run it 
down with the Army to find this report; otherwise you would have 
had correspondence ? 

General Bissell. I would have had correspondence. I made that 
point. 

Mr. Sheehan. I am trying to emphasize that here. I am going to 
ask that at this point in the record — you will have to check with Mr. 
Shackelford there whether it is a confidential report from the Inspec- 
tor General on the search for the missing document — that ]\Ir. Shackel- 
fora see to it that whatever security information is necessaiy to be 
deleted is deleted and I would like to have a couple of questions on it. 

General Bissell. I had intended to mention that and have done so 
under my authority in my notes here. 

Mr. Sheehan. These are extracts now from this report in which 1 
see no names, so I cannot say whether they are of confidential nature. 
Do you want to look at them before I recite them ? 

Mr. Shackelford. Go ahead, jNIr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. It seems to me in all candidness and all fairness to 
you that the Inspector General's report — I do not lilvc to use the word 
"onus" — but seems to put the blame on you for the loss of this right in 
3'^our office. I am going to read for you the three conclusions that the 
Inspector General lias reached, and I think at this point in the matter 
you want to get yourself clear so that for the record it does not stay 
as a blot against you. Let me read the three conclusions: 

No. 1, tliiU (lip ori.siinal Van Vliot rei)<>rt made to General Bissell on INIay 22, 
IMH, and coming into the latter's personal possession on May 27), 104.1. has be- 
come permanently lost without trace or reasonable presumption as to its present 
existence or location. 

No. 2, tliat there is no proof that this document ever left the office wherein it 
originated. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1887 

No. 3, that under the circumstances it must be assumed that this document 
has liee'n subjected to compromise in the event that it was originally given a 
security classification. 

In other words, tlie Inspector General says everything happened 
right smack in your office. 

General Bissell. Right. He says it came into my personal posses- 
sion on May 25, and you had sworn testimony from Colonel Van Vliet, 
from Colonel Lantaff this morning and Mrs. ^Meeres this morning, 
that Van Vliet had long since been gone on the 25th, and that it came 
into my possession on a different date. I only mention that one small 
point because if one is in error, all of it can be in error. It is not all 
in error, but I mention that one point. The testimony of Colonel 
Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres this morning did not state that it came into 
my personal possession. They were very careful not to commit them- 
selves. Since no one else knew of it, I do not know from what source 
such information could have been obtained, as no one else could know. 
The man wlio wrote this is honest and he would not have made that 
statement unless he had a reason for doing it. I think the committee 
miglit be interested in finding out just ^yhy he picked the 25th, be- 
cause it would fit into the rest of this picture. 

Mr. Sheeiian. I think when the committee reads the entire testi- 
mony they will see his reasons for his conclusions. 

General Bissell. Riglit. I tliink he is correct that there is no proof 
that the document left the office wherein it originated. I think that 
is correct. 

Cliairman Madden. What office is that ? 

General Bissell. My office, tlie office of G-2, War Department, and 
the Secretariat Section; not the rest of the office being responsible 
at all. 

Chairman Madden. If I get that right, he says it is quite true 

General Bissell. "That there is no proof that this document ever 
left the office wherein it originated." He found no proof. I think 
that is correct. 

Mr. Sheeiian. For our information, before you read further 
you might define what the Army means by that word "compromise" 
there. 

General Bissell. A document is compromised when its contents 
have become known to an unauthorized person. That is one defini- 
tion. There are others. If a document is completely missing and 
you can't account for it, you immediately say it is compromised until 
you find out what happened to it, if anything. If you do not re- 
ceive a document or you do not know what has happened to a document, 
or any break in the chain occurs, you immediately say it is com- 
promised, to freeze everything on it and get right back on checking 
it. But it does not necessarily mean stolen. It does not necessarily 
mean an enemy has seen it. I will give you an illustration. We had 
one very close to the top of the Government during the war where a 
brief case of information disappeared. We immediately put that 
in a compromise status. It subsequently all showed up. It had not 
been seen by any unauthorized persons. W^e had another case where 
part of a plan for the supply of the operations on D-day showed up 
broken open in the post office in Chicago and we certainly compro- 
mised that in a hurry. It apparently had not reached any unauthor- 



1888 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

ized persons. "When the matter M^as clarified, we didn't need to chan<j:e 
the date of tlie landing. We went ahead with things. 

Mr. Sheeiian. In other words, it is like the Hiss-Chambei"s case 
which proves that papers and top-secret documents could have 
been copied, could have been photographed, could have been stolen, 
could have been lost, and any one of those things could have hap- 
pened to it in the State Department. I assume the same thing could be 
true in G-2 or any other department of the Army. 

General Bissell. It is possible. We tried to be tighter there for 
several reasons : First, my office wrote the regulations. Now, that puts 
me in an odd position. The authority to write them implies the au- 
thority to change them or modify them. That gave me a little latitude. 
1 tried not to take advantage of it. The top secret thing was born 
while I was in G-2 and I had to put out the instructions that governed 
at that time. They governed for 2 years, and then they were changed 
in 194G, sometime along there. 

Mr. Mitchell. You say that the classification or designation of top 
secret in lO-ii was changed or originally put into being during that 
period of time ? 

General Bissell. Prior to the issuance of the regulation — but the 
date I read you this morning is the right one, I would have to check 
my memory on it, because we have been throwing dates around here — 
March 15, I believe, approved by the Joint Cheifs of Staff approxi- 
mately a month earlier and then passed over to the regular shops that 
j)ut out the information. Here is the document that came out, Army 
Kegulations 380-5, came out on March 15, 1944. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you were then establishing for the 
entire Army operations and Air Force 

General Bissell. World-wide. 

Mr. SiiEEHAX. World-wide, including the Navy 

General Bissell. No. Not the Navy. 

Mr. Sheehan. The designation "top secret'- for the first time? 

General Bisseli.. We were not doing it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
by agreement with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had done it for the 
J^ritish and ourselves, not only for the military services but for cor- 
responding services working with them. 

Mr. SiiEEifAN. Now^, will you read for the record, please, the des- 
ignation of top secret as of the 15th of March 1944, if you have it 
in that pamphlet ? 

General Bissell Yes, I know it is in here. 

(a) Wlien classified "tox) secret," certain secret documents, information and 
material, the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unautliorized 
disclos\iiv would cause exceptionally grave danger to the Nation, shall l)e classi- 
fied "top secret." The following are examples of matter which normally will he 
graded top secret : 

(1) Plans or particulars of future ma.1or or special operations. 

(2) Particulars of imi)i»rtant disi)ositions or impending moves of o\u' forces or 
convoys in connection with (1) ahove. 

(8) Very inuiortant i>oliti<'al documents dealing with such matters as ally 
alliances and the like. 

(4) Inforni.ition of the method used or success ohtained hy intelligence services 
and counterintelligence service or which imperil secret agents. 

(T)) Critical information of ntnv or improved munitions of war. including proof, 
scientilic, and technical development. 

(6) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptoanalysis. 

Mr. Sheehan. This would fall in classification (3) ? 



THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 1889 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL,. I would like to ask a specific question on that point. 
Will 3'ou explain to the chairman and the members of this committee 
Avhy and to what extent the Van Vliet report fell into the category of 
top secret in May 1945, which was after Germany had surrendered, 
I believe ? 

Mr. DoxDERO. Germany surrendered on May 8. 

General Bissell. We had had the Yalta Conference. You have me 
on a barrel now. I don't know how much of Yalta has been declassi- 
fied. At the time I left the services, part of it was not. I don't know 
whether what I had intended to answer is declassified. Does anybody 
know ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. You had better check before you make the 
answers. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Shackelford the one to check with in regard 
to the Yalta ? 

Chairman Maddex. I might state that Russia has already declassi- 
fied Yaka. 

General Bissell. That does not quite hit what I am talking about. 
I would like to answer, but I am afraid I am caught on it at the 
inoment. 

]\lr. Shackleford. Or he will answer in executive session in the 
event it is still classified by State. 

General Bissell. There is nothing I want to hold from j'ou. It is 
just that I am a little hamstrung by the letter I got. 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to know why the Van Vliet report on the 22d 
of May 1945, after Germany had surrendered on May 8, 1945, was 
classified "top secret" and what its importance or significance was that 
it had to be so classified as "top secret." 

Mr. INIachrowicz. I think probably the statement made by the wit- 
ness is a justifiable statement that the answer to that question should 
be withheld until he has an opportunity to find out whether it is declas- 
sified or not. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let the record show that question will be taken up 
later, please. 

Mr. Sheeiiax. In your capacity as head of G-2 — and I think this 
is a little before your time, so you might have to get the time element — 
did you ever hear of or see Colonel Szymanski's report on Katyn? 
He was a military attache in 1942 and 1943, 1 believe, and was sending 
reports, G-2 reports in. 

General Bissell. I stated this morning I could not state for sure if 
I saw him when I came through Cairo. I never saw the reports while 
G-2. The first I knew of them was the report in the press they were 
before your committee. 

JNIr. Sheehan. Did you have any correspondence or remember any 
correspondence or talk with the State Department about the Holmes' 
report ? 

General Bissell. Not until I saw in the press. I went back and got 
permission to read both of them. 

Mr. Sheehan. You did see them after this was all over? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You saw them in the Department of Defense? 

General Bissell. Yes; and asked authority and they told me I 
could see them if I would come to Washington. I did. 



1890 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. When was that, sir? 

General Bissell. It is all in the story I am trying to read to you. 
It was the 1st to 12th of April I was in Washington and came up to 
get this information and other matters. I had other business up here. 

Mr. Sheehan. You are positive of the fact that you did classify 
the document "top secret" ? 

General Bissell. I am positive. 

Mr. Sheehan. Is there any possibility you could have changed 
your mind afterward ? 

General Bissell. That one would have been a little impossible in 
a way. I had authority to down grade any document by anybody 
else in the military service except General Marshall, but there was 
a string to it. We were in business with the British in this war, 
and the war was being directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
They had set up an arrangement whereby neither nation would down 
grade below the classification, lower classification, of the two nations. 
Since the Gilder report — there was no reason for bringing it here, 
because it was secret and dealt with the same incident as the Van Vliet 
report, so it was not within my independent authority to down grade 
below the grade of "secret." To have done that, that wouldn't have 
let any human, outside of those who needed to know about it, see it. 

Mr. Sheehan. I think that my final question that I am coming to 
might have to do with the possibility of leaks in G-2 while you were 
there. If you will look at the Inspector General's report, you will 
find there is a paragraph which states as follows : 

With further reference to General Bissell's letter to General Holmes of May 
25, 1945, and General Holmes' answer thereto to General Bissell dated June 9, 
1945, a search of the files of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, failed to disclose 
copies of either, although both were recorded in the logbook kept in the office 
at that time. 

Here we have a situation where you have made references in a log- 
book to correspondence which you wrote. Yet, they are nowheres to 
be found in the Department. However, it turns out, according to 
the Inspector General's report, that the copies of these letters were 
obtained from the files of the State Department. The Inspector Gen- 
eral goes on to say — is it not plausible that some sort of master file — 
and I am trying to state that myself — is it not plausible that some sort 
of master file or classification number should identify all of these 
matters pertaining to Katyn in the Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. That was explained in o;reat detail by a man named 
Carulli. I don't know whether he testified to them. He was the 
man I mentioned in my office. I suggested to Mr. Shackelford he 
was the expert and he would be glad to inform the Inspector Gen- 
eral whatever went on. He explained our system. 

Mr. Machrowicz. He did because he is referred to as one of the 
informants. 

General Bissell. That is right. We didn't package things. Mr. 
Carulli explained why. When I was vacating my personal office, 
there were no files in that one. That was not a place for papers to be 
filed. In the one next to it there were quite large files, probably five 
or six big file cabinets full. 

Then the next door to that had a small card index, 10,000, 20,000, 
or 30,000 cards, perhaps, which covered G-2, things that had been 
handled in a recent period. We had to keep some material right 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1891 

there, and we kept that as a quick thing. It worked beautifully. We 
could get things very quickly. General Marshall could call down, 
and I could have the piece of paper up to him in 5 minutes. I could 
never have done that if it were sent to the general files. It is too big. 

The security of those general files required that everything went 
through a certain way in and out. It is clumsy. It is not a quick 
thing. It is a safe thing. You have to compromise between speed and 
absolute security. 

Mr. Sheehan. There is another thought. You mentioned before 
when we were talking about the word "compromise" and your defini- 
tion, something about the "day plans" that were forwarded or opened 
at the Chicago post office. Will you just, for our general benefit, 
elaborate on that ? 

General Bissell. It has been published briefly in the press. It ap- 
pears that the headquarters in London was moving its G-4 depart- 
ment. The individual who had the papers intended to address them 
to himself at the next office he was going to. He was writing a letter 
home, intending to send something home at the same time, and he 
confused them and put them in the wrong envelopes. The plans for 
the supply went to Chicago, and the little favors for his family went 
to the office he intended to move to. He was so frightened that he 
did not report it. By accident the package was broken open in the 
Chicago office, and, as I recall it, the inspectors immediately called the 
military, and we had someone there very quickly. The papers were 
flown up here, and we asked for a man to come from General Eisen- 
hower's headquarters quickly to check the papers and see whether they 
might need to change the landing date. He had General Crawford 
flown over here. I think you will find it mentioned in Top Secrets 
very briefly, in that book, Top Secret. It has been in the press from 
time to time, but very little on it. No harm came of it, although it 
looked very suspicious at first because the boy came from a German 
family. It was addressed to a German family. There were several 
unusual things about that end of it. They were all right. The whole 
thing was all right. No harm was done. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. When you use the phrase "broken up" 

General Bissell. By accident in handling when they dumped the 
contents of the pouches onto the sorting table. That is the way I 
recollect it. There may have been some details I have not described 
100 percent accurate in that brief comment. 

Mr. Sheehan. The only thing that bothers me is the getting around 
this idea of whether the State Department got it or not, because from 
some of your correspondence — and I am quoting from that letter you 
wrote to Mr. Lyon in which you are talking about the Gilder report 
again — your last sentence said : 

This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., for- 
warded to General Holmes, May 25, 1945, and generally substantiating all 
material facts in Col. Van Vliet's report. 

It seems to me, from writing a letter like that to the State Depart- 
ment so shortly after you were processing or handling the documents, 
that you must have sent it to the State Department. They are not 
questioning it, saying "We never got such a report." 

General Bissell. I wouldn't question them. The fact that I make 
that statement is what I believe was the situation when I dictated that 



1892 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

letter. I didn't do it all. I couldirt fill in the date out of my head 
when that thing had been sent the 21st of Angust which was qnite a 
while from the 22d of May, or the 23d or 24th, when this other thing 
was going on. It leads me to believe that there must have been some , 
record from Mrs. Meeres processing that letter where she got that 
information. She couldn't have gotten it without going to some 
place and finding that it had been sent. She didn't know. 

Mr. Machroavicz. Is Mrs. Meeres still here ? 

General Bissell. I don't know. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. I think the question is for Mr. Lijon to answer. He 
got a letter. Did he get it or not ? 

General Bissell. He got that particular letter. I told you how 
many people handled it. They handled it for 2 months in State. 
Many people had a chance to check up on that. I was sitting at my 
desk any time they wanted to call me. That doesn't mean that I am 
trying to throw stones at State. We were a government fighting this 
war. I was getting plenty of help from them and giving them all 
I could. 

Mr. Sheehan. Except we found there were several governments in 
the State Department, you know — Mr. Hiss et al. 

General Bissell. I don't want to leave the impression that I am 
trying to smear somebody that has been convicted or trying to blame 
it on somebody. I can't help but think that it is the kind of document 
the Communists would have liked to have a look at. That is as far 
as I will go. I won't make any inferences or implications. I will 
make the thing the other way : that those two people I worked with — 
Holmes and Lyon— you would never get them mixed up with any 
Communists. I will tell you that. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. You had been making inferences and implica- 
tions that Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon must have known about this. 

General Bissell. I am giving you everything I know — everything 
that touches Katyn as far as you had me proceed. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. I would like to ask you a couple of questions you may 
have answered. If you would refer to your testimony, when the State 
Department was working through, I think you said, the Swiss, trying 
to get Van Vliet's story, when did you find that out? 

General Bissell. Colonel Van Vliet told it to me at the time he made 
his report. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. That was the first time you knew^ of that ? 

General Bissell. The first time I knew of it. It afforded me the 
only opportunity I knew for verification of his re])ort. I don't know 
why Colonel Van Vliet didn't mention that. I don't recall him having 
mentioned it in his statement — oversight. There was no question he 
was giving you everything he could think of. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. We are interested in finding out what happened to 
the report in your office. As I understand your testimony, you have 
stated that if that report were to be mailed to the State Department it 
would have been mailed by one of three people — Mrs. IMeeres. and you 
have testified as I recall that you were positive you did not tell her to 
mail it. Am I correct in that? 

(Jeneral Bissell. She Avouldn't have had anything to do with out- 
going mail. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1893 

Mr. FuRcoLO. So, she is out of the picture. Secondly, you testified 
that you might have told Colonel and now Congressman Lantaff, but 
you were very willing to accept his word that you did not tell him. 
So, as you sit there today, you also exclude Congressman Lantaff. 
I don't want to be unfair about this. I know you are trying to trace 
it just as much as we are ; but, with those two people out of the picture 
on your own story, it comes down to the fact that that was mailed 
to the State Department, then comes back to you ; is that right ? 

General Bissell. If it was what ? Mailed in the State Department? 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Yes. 

(xeneral Bissell. It is left with me. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Up to now we have got it back to you. 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. As I understand it, and I want to be sure about this, 
I understand that you have come to the conclusion that it was mailed 
to the State Department, and you base it on 

General Bissell. Because of that reference. 

Mr. Fltrcol;). Because of your letter of May 25, 1945. Do I get 
your position correctly that you claim if it was mailed to the State 
Department it was mailed in the letter of May 25, 1945 ? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Am I fair in stating that u\) to this point, whether 
or not the document left your hands 

General Bissell. It was never in my hands. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the document ever left the office of 
General Bissell 

General Bissell. Of General Bissell's secretary, because it didn't 
stay in my office except while Colonel Van Vliet was in there. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the Van Vliet document ever left the 
office of General Bissell is determined upon what conclusion this com- 
mittee can come to with reference to the letter of May 25, 1945. Is that 
your position ? 

General Bissell. That and the fact that their having that document 
and never calling back for any comment or verification or anything 
on the letter would indicate they must have had it, plus the fact that 
they knew all about it in advance from other communications. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Well, what you come down to, then, is showing that 
the State Department received the Van Vliet document from your 
office is No. 1, the copy of the letter of May 25, 1945, and second, the 
fact that the State Department never called you back and said, "We 
did not get this document." Is that right ? 

General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that they knew about 
this Swiss business. That is another one. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. In other words, three things. 

General Bissell. Then there was another one because they didn't 
know about the Van Vliet report but they knew about the Katyn 
thing. You are sticking to Van Vliet. Then Lyon. I have a recol- 
lection or a feeling that I told either Lyon or Holmes on the telephone. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. I am not directing my remarks or attention at the 
moment to anyone, but you must have told someone. We are trying 
to look specifically at the transmittal. As far as the transmittal is 
concerned, coming down to the three things mentioned, first, what- 



1894 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

ever that letter of May 25, 1945, may be interpreted as ; and, second, 
the fact that the State Department did not call you back ; and, third^ 
this Swiss business you mentioned. Is that right ? 

General Bissell. There was a specific reference to Lt, Col. John H. 
Van Vliet's report forwarded to General Holmes on a certain date, 
then to Mr. Lyon. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. That is in the letter that transmitted the Gilder 
report ? 

General Bissell. That is right. So, that ties it in, too. 

Mr. FuRCoLo. You interpret that as tying it in, too? 

General Bissell. Certainly. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Can you think of anything else? I don't want to tie 
you down. 

General Bissell. I don't believe so at the moment. I have tried to 
get everything I could when I w\as working with Mr. Shackelford. 
I wasn't involved at all in this thing, except as someone out of the 
picture trying to help. 

Mr. Furcolo. I want to get it first with reference to that letter of 
May 25, 1945. 

In view^ of the wording of that letter, in view of the fact that that 
letter contains no reference to transmitting Van Vliet's memorandum 
and also there is no reference in there to any enclosure, is it not your 
position right now that as far as that letter of May 25, 1945 is con- 
cerned, as far as any proof there may be in that letter alone that you 
transmitted the Van Vliet document in there, that is out of the picture ; 
that that is no proof? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Furcolo, we have been talking about this letter 
of the 25th of May 1945 all day long. Can we kindly get this memo- 
randum into the record since it is not in the record as yet ? This is a 
copy that I have, right here. The committee can read it. From there 
I think the questions can be asked. 

I would like to put it in as exhibit No. 5, with the original to come 
at a later date from the State Department, since they obviously have 
it. 

Mr. DoNDERo. Wliat date is that? 

Mr. Mitchell. The 25th of May 1945. 

Chairman Madden. Mark it. 

(Exhibit No. 5, dated May 25, 1945, was marked and received as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 5 

IMay 25, 1945. 
Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, 

A.f.sistant Sccrctarif, JJcparfment of State, Washington, D. C. 
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Ji'., Infantry, and a 
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 64, are reported to have 
been given a letter by the Swiss Protectinji Power dated about October 1943, which, 
asked tliem to reply to certain questions. The questions were : 

1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel ^'an Vliet gone to Katyn? 

2. How had they been treated? 

3. Were any photographs taken? 

4. Had they made a statement? 

Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply^ 
is in the State Department's files. It is requested that this be verified and, if 
the records referred to ai"e in the files of State Department, that copies be made 
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
Sincerely, 

Clayton Bissell, 
JiSsistant Chief of Staff, 0-2. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1895 

Mr. FuRCOLo. What is your answer to the question? 

General Bissell. I can't phice your question. 

Mr. Ftjrcolo. My question is — that you have based your belief 
that this was transmitted to the State Department on four different 
things, I am now asking you, on the first one of those four, which is 
the letter of May 25, 1945, and I have said to you — in view of the word- 
ing of that letter, particularly the absence of any reference to a trans- 
mittal, in the absence of the word "enclosure" at the bottom of the 
letter, is it not your belief that that letter of May 25, 1945, does not 
help this committee in any way as far as that alone being proof of the 
transmittal? 

General Bissell. This one did not carry the Van Vliet report or it 
would have to be listed. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. So far as that letter transmitting the Van Vliet 
report, you yourself say that that is out of the picture? 

General Bissell. That did not transmit it. 

Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the proceedings I 
would like to have the record show that we already have, as exhibit 
No. 4, the letter from the State Department, signed by Julius C. 
Holmes, dated June 9, 1945, addressed to "My Dear General Bissell." 
That reply is on the record prior to this exhibit No. 5. There is no 
mention of the previous Van Vliet report in either exhibit, either trans- 
ferring it as an enclosure in any shape, form, or manner. Therefore 
we must deduct that based on these two particular letters, namely, 
exhibit No. 4 and exhibit No. 5, there was no enclosure to the letter 
or any reference in either letter to the missing Van Vliet report. 

Chairman Madden. How long after that was it that Van Vliet 
made his report out? 

Mr. Mitchell. Van Vliet had made his report reputedly for the 
record the 22d of May 1945, or about that time, 3 days previous. 

General Bissell. I think he dictated it on the 22d. I think it was 
typed on the 23d or 24th. I think I saw him on the 23d or 24th, the 
last time when we put his initials on it, and that is all I can tell 
you on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the record show in the presence 
of Mr. Brown, for the Department of State, that we woulcl like to 
have the original of the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes, 
and I would like to have Mr. Shackelford produce the original of 
General Holmes' reply to General Bissell dated June 9, 1945. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Before you answer I want to ask counsel whether 
the State Department has transmitted any papers of any kind to this 
committee ? 

]\Ir. Mitchell. No, sir. Chairman Madden has designated a sub- 
committee of Mr. OT^onski, Mr. Sheehan, and Mr. Machrowicz, to 
look at the documents that the State Department has on that. My 
understanding is that they will do it within the next 48 to 72 hours. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In connection with that, we had agreed that 
because there are a lot of documents and the Department of State 
does not know which documents we want, a subcommittee would go 
there and pick the documents out which we feel we need. They offered 
to turn them over to us. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Pertinent to this issue. 

Chairman Maddex. I might say further, last Thursday and on 
Monday I asked the counsel to have that situation in readiness, but 



1896 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

the committee members were not available to go over and see the 
documents. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. I did talk to Mr. Machrowicz and 
Mr. Sheehan and they asked me to set up that meeting for some 
time as soon as we complete this set of hearings now. I will do that 
within the next 24 hours. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. To continue, I will have to ask you the question once 
more. I want to have it in one place. There has been this other 
conversation in the meantime. 

I have understood your testimony to be that your position is, as 
far as that letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, that because of the 
language of that letter your final conclusion is that that letter cer- 
tainly didn't transmit the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest? 

General Bissell. No, sir. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. I also understood your testimony before to be that 
after Van Vliet had dictated his report to Mrs. Meeres, which was 
probably the 21st or tlie 22d of May, you sent it to the State Depart- 
ment, and I wrote down your words. You said you intended to send 
it at once and you believed it was either the 24th or the 25th that you 
sent it. Is that right ? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. By using the words "you sent it" you were referring 
to the Van Vliet report ? 

General Bissell. I am not referring to this exhibit No. 5, the 
May 25 letter. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Let me get to that. By "sent it" you were referring 
to the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacred 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood vou to say that you sent that report on 
either the 24th or the 25th of May 1945. 

General Bissell. This one? 

Mr. FuRCOLo. I don't know what you mean by "this one." You 
sent the A^an Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre, outlining 
what he had seen there, including the bodies and the graves ? 

General Bissell.. It was my intent that report would have moved 
on that date and I didn't see it done myself. I therefore don't know 
it did. So you have me there swearing to it. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. If you would follow me for a minute I will do my 
best if you will answer the questions. Did you say that you sent the 
Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre out in a letter either 
Ma^ 24 or May 25 ? 

(leneral Bissell. I did not. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood you to say that. 

General IJissell. I said I had reason to believe I did because I 
mentioned that date in the letter transmitting the Gilder report. 
I described not this paper but the Van Vliet report. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Did you say that immediately after Van Vliet had 
concluded his report about the massacre of the Polish oflicers at 
Katyn Forest, that it was your intention to send that report at once 
out of your oflice? 

Genei-al Bissell. I'hat is correct. 

Mr. Fuitcoi/). Did you also say that to your best recollection he 
had completed tliat rei)ort about May 22 or May 23, approximately? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1897 

General Bis.sp:ll. ]My recollection was that he had done the dictat- 
ing on the '22d, that it was conii)leted either on the 2;3d or the 24th, 
and bronoht to me on one of those two dates. 

]Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, yon apparently had the Van Vliet 
report of the Katvn Forest massacre on, say, the 23d or the 24th of 
May 1945^ 

(ieneral Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, wdien you 
had that completed report, the purpose in your mind was to send 
that out immediately; is that right? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, when you 
had that completed report, the i)urpose in your mind was to send 
that out immediately ; is that right ? 

General Blssell. That is right. 

]\Ir. FuRCOLO. The very next letter in connection with it that you 
can recall having sent out was the letter of May 25, 1945, to General 
Holmes? 

General Bissell. Yes. Well. I don't know that is so because there 
were lots of other State De})artnient — I can't tell you. I don't know. 

On this subject, certainly. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. On this subject, your best recollection is that the 
very next letter you sent out was to General Holmes on May 25, 1945 ? 

(ieneral Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. And is it for that reason that you believed the Van 
Vliet report of the Katyii Forest massacre was sent in the letter of 
May 25, 1945 ? ' 

General Bissell. No; my reason for believing it is because it was 
so stated in the letter carrying the Gilder report on the 21st of August, 
I think. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Well, the letter carrying the Gilder report does not 
indicate wdien they might have received the Van Vliet report from 
you, but merely in effect says : "Compare the Gilder report W' itli the 
Van Vliet report." 

General Bissell. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945, and 
it generall}' substantiates all material facts in Van Vliet's report. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945. Now, 
does that not completely fix in your mind the fact that if you ever did 
send the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre to General 
Holmes, it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to which this Gilder 
report refers? 

General Bissell. In a letter of May 25. 

Mr. FuRaiLo. In a letter of May 25, 1945. 

General Bissell. A transmittal letter. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. Have we finally got tied down the fact that you say 
that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent in 
a definite letter to General Holmes on a definite date of May 25, 1945? 

General Bissell. I said that in this letter. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. Is that what you say as you sit here today ? 

General Bissell. Today I am not sure it did go because there is no 
in.dication it was received. Something could have happened and I 
don't know Avhat, if anything, ever did. 

Mr. FuRCOix). That is right, but the point is if you did send it, you 
are saying that you sent it on May 25, 1945, in a letter to General 



1898 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Holmes. Would you be willing to say, in view of that, if it was not in 
that letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes, then your position 
would be it apparently did not go ? 

General Bisseix. Almost that. What I actually say is this : there 
were two places it was logical for me to send that, and quick. One 
was to War Crimes, which was not so urgent at that time because they 
were just getting going. The second one was to State. Van Vliet and 
I had both mentioned the State Department aspect of it. I don't 
know w^here the paper was sent. Therefore, I tried to figure back 
where there is any evidence of it being sent. The only evidence is 
that. That is that. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, the only evidence that the Van Vliet 
report was sent to the State Department would be the fact that the 
Glider letter says that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to 
General Holmes? 

General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that the Glider letter 
was then processed for nearly months in State and no one ever made 
a query as to "Where is this thing you are referring to ?" 

Mr. FuRCOLO. That is a separate thing. That is an absence of evi- 
dence rather than a positive indication. 

In other w^ords, your position as you say now is that tlie only docu- 
mentary evidence that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest 
massacre was sent to the State Department was the fact that in the 
Gilder letter it stated it had been sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, 
to General Holmes? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. FuRcoLo. So that is the only documentary evidence. Now, re- 
ferring back to your testimony about 10 minutes ago at the beginning 
of my questioning of you, you agreed with me that as far as just that 
letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, your interpretation of that letter 
would be that there was no enclosure in that. Is that not right ? 

General Bissell. In this one? 

Mr. FuRCOLO. In the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes. You 
stated that about 10 minutes ago and you gave your reasons; is that 
not true ? 

General Bissell. Yes, but I am not talking about the same May 25 
letter. I think there were two of that date. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. You think there might be some other letter of ISIay 
'25,1945? 

General Bissell. Van Vliet was as much a part of getting this 
letter over to State as getting over tlie other one. This all came out 
of him. It would have gone out together. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. The only letter that you have in the files or the only 
letter of which you have seen a copy in the files of G-2, your own office, 
on May 25, 1945, addressed to General Plolmes, having anything 
to do with Van Vliet's report on the Katyn Forest massacre, is this 
letter that you hold in your hand and which we have read into the 
record; is that correct? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. You agree that letter is not any evidence at all of 
the fact tliat the Van Vliet report document was sent, because of the 
wording of the letter? 

General Bissell. That is correct. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1899 

Mr. FuRCOLO. So it is fair to summarize your position as being 
this: your position is, first of all, that you believe the Van Vliet 
report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent to the State Depart- 
ment. You believe that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945. 
That was your original position ? 

General Bissell. In a letter. 

Mr. FuRcoLO. You believe it assent in a letter? 

General Bissell. Not this one. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. Of May 25, 1915. The only letter that you can 
find at G-2, or in your office on May 25, 1945, addressed to General 
Holmes, is that letter which is now exhibit No. 5, I believe? 

General Bissell. That is correct. That is not it. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. You state it is certainly no proof it was sent but in 
fact from the wording of the letter it indicates very clearly that it 
was not sent in that one ? 

General Bissell. It was not sent in that letter of May 25. 

Mr. FuRCOLO. So what it comes down to, in other words, is that 
when you state this Van Vliet report we have been talking about had 
been sent to the State Department in a letter of May 25, 1945, you 
are basing that upon a letter that is nonexistent as far as you, or this 
committee, or anyone in the Government has been able to determine? 

General Bissell. That is correct, at the moment. 

Mr. Siieehan. Or it could have been sent by a courier directly over 
there, without a letter of transmittal ? 

General Bissell. It could but I don't think I did. I could have 
done that. I had a courier, a special one that I started to mention, 
this Mr. Dillingham. He did not follow hardly any of these pro- 
cedures in handling State Department material to us or our material 
to State. His specialty was bringing to me State Department wires 
of certain categories and picking them out over there that I would be 
interested in, getting them to me quickly, things that would come to 
me again later in the regular channels after reproduction. 

On rare occasions, none of which I can remember, I have sent 
things back by him because there could not have been any more a 
secure way to get them over there quickly. I don't think it was clone 
in this case because usually when I sent anything like that, since it 
was short-cutting all the rules, I would call Mr. Holmes and ask him 
if he got it right away. Or I would do the opposite thing, I would 
have Dillingham phone me back, gas line or otherwise and tell me it 
was there, either one of which satisfied him. 

Mr. FuRCOLo. I wanted to say I know your position is the same as 
ours. We are interested in tracing that report. We are not par- 
ticularly concerned about whether we trace it to the State Department 
or trace it to the Department of the Army, or G-2, or anyplace. Your 
position is the same, I know. 

With that in mind I wanted to ask you this : In view of your testi- 
mony, which I know to be true, and I know that you had so many 
of these matters and some at the time were more important than 
others. Later on history will show that some which looked unimpor- 
tant have turned out to be extremely important. 

Might it not appear to you at the present time that actually, with 
all the different things you had to do and the hours you had at the 
time, and short-handed as you were, and with the testimony that has 



1900 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

been developed upon wliich you based your opinion had it been sent, 
that actually the Van Vliet report was just lost in the shuflie some- 
place alon<>; the line ? 

General Bissj:li.. When I started in — Mr. Shackelford is a person 
not involved — I said, "Where is this paper?" It is in State, it is in 
(t-2, it is in War Crimes, or it is in my own personal office file. I was 
no lonfrer in (t-2. We searched every one of those. We p;ot in touch 
Avith all of the people that could have seen it. We went further down 
the line of files than you did. We went to Miss McKenna and then on 
down. When I started down the line, I knew there were some outs 
that were perfectly all ri^ht, that mio;ht block us on findino; it in G-2 
if it had been left there, and never gone out. These are those outs. 

While I was in G-2 we were still cuttino; down files and people to 
get smaller. I was only there some 7 months after the Van Vliet 
arrival, then I was gone. At that time I turned the whole thing over 
to General Vandenberg. I made every assumption that I coidd 
against myself. The first one was, "Maybe yon forgot and put it in 
your personal safe in your own office, the little one." I never took it 
out of there, so if it were taken out of there it had to be taken out 
by someone who had the combination. 

I asked General Weckerling if he had the combination. He said, 
"I might have." I said he did because I had left Washington for as 
much as 2 months at a time. He didn't remember a thing about this 
matter. 

I did not contact General Vandenberg, but it was not appropriate 
as he was my boss. It was not appropriate to ask him this question. 
So I had it asked through Mr. Shackelford's office. The reply from 
General Vandenberg was "Absolutely no." When he opened that safe 
and took over from me, it w^asn't there. He doesn't remember, either, 
any of the papers, if any, that were there, which did not help me. I 
know that the day I left G-2 I had the combination of the safe 
changed. 

So, after that what was in it w^as not mine. General Vandenberg 
did not steal those papers and turn them over to the Commies, or he 
did not hold them up for anybody else. I am sure of that. He was 
busy taking over G-2, and I know what it means. 

Then where could it be? Well, outside the door were these files 
they spoke of as my personal safe. That really wasn't a personal safe, 
except that it had some personal files in one drawer. The rest of them 
were routine safe in the alphabetical number system. It might have 
been in some of those. So we found out where the contents of those 
had been sent first. The safe outside the door — a man named Gen. 
Carter Clark had gone over those with Miss Bryant, who is still 
within reach. She is married and down just south of Alexandria. 
She said she sorted out every ])a])er in there, saying "I will lake this 
one. These are top secret." This is one of the instauces they did not 
go through with the red tape. "I will take this one. You send that 
one to so-and-so." When they were through there were two piles. 
The young lady did not know wdiat was in either pile. She knew she 
transmitted these in the pile she was directed to forward. 

General Clark was contacted and said he didn't see anything about 
Katyn or the Colonel Van Vliet report. We went to the next safe 
where the big files were. We went to the files we had in the office, 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1901 

Avliere we kept them by subject. We ^Yent throuoli those cards. I had 
trouble getting- tha: done because those cards were still extant at 
that time. The papers to which they referred, for the most part, 
were jjone. The reason they were jrone was because they had been 
shipped out to various places to clear the office. The Korean business 
was on. They needed space. Papers in these files were pushed out 
and considerable numbers had been destroyed in the ])eriod between 
my departure from (1-2 in 1045 and this period in 1950, 4 years. 

G-2 had been com])ressed, in the Penta<2:on into much less space. It 
was a smaller machine. It could have been destroyed amonn; those 
])apers. The people that did that destroying, a lot of them were not 
too well qualified. They did the best they could. But how could it 
have gotten into that file? Mr. Lantafi' said it came out to him. He 
told you what file he kept it in. He doesn't know what happened to it. 
Neither do I. As a matter of fact, neither do I, to absolutely say I saw 
ii go there. My ]:)rocedure of having other people do everything ])os- 
sible and that is the only way you get any bigger job done, where I did 
not actually handle the paper — I did not bring it in. Either Van Vliet 
or Mrs. Meeres brought it in. I did handle it a while. One of those 
two, or Lantaff, took it out. After that I never saw the paper again. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am not going to repeat some of the matters that 
wei-e gone into by my colleagues, but there is one thing that I would 
like to find out Avhich concerns all of us, even more than the Katyn 
matter. That is the possibility of the loss of these documents at such 
frequent intervals. 

I would like to find out fi'om you, in view of what you just said, just 
Itow you keep those documents. Let me ask you this : suppose someone 
comes in and talks to you or brings you information about the Katyn 
massacre or Dachau, or some other incident. Do you file that just in 
\ our safe, or do you put it under a certain heading ? 

General Bissell. I keep nothing in my safe. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have it filed under a certain heading. 

General Bissell. A file system is established for the entire office. 
It was established before I came there. The same one was in effect 
when I left. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am not insisting you were to blame for it. I 
want to find out whether there is a system. 

General Bissell. Very definitely. 

Mr. Machrowicz. It is pretty hard for a INIember of Congress to 
break into this wall. It is hard to get information from the Pentagon. 
When you receive information on a particular subject, is that infor- 
mation ])laced in a master file with that name as a heading? 

General Bissell. In G-2, while I was there we had a group called 
the Specialist Group, who specialized on Germany and on Japan. 
They saw everything on their subject. Unless it required action or 
was ready for action, it went to them first and not to me. They had 
everything. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question.* 

General Bissell. They kept a certain amount of this material in 
their offices while it was live. As it passed the live stage and became 
dead, it was sent down to general files. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question. Supposing 
you are interested in obtaining information which G-2 possesses on 

93744— 52— pt. 7 (! 



1902 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

a particular subject, Katyn for example, can you go to the file and 
find under "Katyn" all the information which the Department has on 
that subject ? 

General Bissell. Not now. It has been spread from one end of the 
place to the other. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was it at the time you were there? 

General Bissell. It would all have been in the Russian section. 

Mr. Machrowicz. If you were interested as the head of G-2 to get 
all available information on a specific question, was there not a file to 
which you could look to find out where all the information available 
to G-2 is on that particular subject? 

General Bissell. All the live information, yes. There would be lots 
more information in other places than G-2, but it would not be live. 
Some may be far away. 

Mr. Machrowicz. So I presume there was a file labeled "Katyn"? 

General Bissell. Probably. I can't say for sure. I didn't check it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You know now, although you probably didn't at 
that time, there had been information, and valuable information, re- 
quested and received by G-2 on Katyn prior to the Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. I found out subsequently about the Szymanski 
report and read the letter of transmittal to General Strong. 

Mr. Machrowicz, You know G-2 specifically requested Colonel 
Szymanski to furnish information relative to the Katyn matter ? 

General Bissell. I know that the report came in two ways, one to 
General Strong personally, and exactly the same paper sent another 
way. 

Mr. Macifrowicz. You as the head of G-2 wanted to get all the 
available information on Katyn there was, any place where you could 
look under a filing system and find Katyn and find Szymanski ? 

General Bissell. It would have gone to the Russian specialists, be- 
cause that is Russian territory and a Russian problem. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it would have gone, but there 
was a place where you could have gone and gotten all the available 
information ? 

General Bissell. All I would have had to do was to tell LantalT. 
He would have gotten the Russian specialists. The Russian specialists 
would have gotten the stuff from their office. They would have gotten 
the stuff I needed. 

Mr. Machrowicz. There was a way of finding out available infor- 
mation on any important subject? 

General Bissell. Hot stuff. 

Mr. Machrowicz. When you were told that Colonel Van Vliet was 
coming to see you and make a report on the Katyn massacre, did you 
request from anyone under you to get a complete file on that subject? 

General Bissell. I didn't get any such warning. Ha was in the 
office when I got back from a trip out of town. I wanted to get to 
him in a hurry because I understood ho had bi^en waiting. 

Mr. Machrowicz. When you did talk to him, did you then request 
to ijet that information ? 

General Bissell. No; I did not at that time because I had a copy 
of this letter of May 25. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You did not have it then? 

General Bisskll. No; it was written. While I was talking to Van 
Vliet I didn't want to be influenced by anylhino; but Van Vliet. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1903 

Mr. Machrowicz. He came to see you on May 22. The letter was 
May 25? 

General Bissell. That is right. I put this letter out. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Which letter? 

General Bissell. The letter of May 25, addressed to Julius C. 
Holmes. 

Mr. Mitchell, May ? 

General Bissell. May 25, 1945, to Julius C. Holmes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at either time when you talked to Colonel 
Van Vliet, or afterward, refer to the available live information which 
was in the G-2, to either check his information with other information 
which you received as to his veracity in regard to his observations or 
anything at all ? 

Did you do anything to find out what other available information 
you had in G-2 ? 

General Bissell. I did not go to the general files. I didn't mention 
it to the Russian specialist. 

Mr. Machro\vicz. Did you have anyone else do it? 

General Bissell. No, sir. The reason for that was, had anything 
come in during the period I was G-2 on a matter of that nature, it 
would have been told to me. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You say the Katyn report would have been prop- 
erly filed under Russian affairs? 

General Bissell. The Russian specialist would have had it and he 
would have determined where it was going to go. 

Mr. MACHRo^vIcz. If I am wrong, I hope Mr. Shackelford corrects 
me. It actually was found under Poland ? 

General Bissell. It could well have been. Wliere you have three 
countries, it would go first geographically to the man who handled 
the area. Then he would see that those interested in it would receive 
either copies made for them or have a chance through rotation to see it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was it, at the time you were G-2, a fact that Poland 
and Russia were in the same area known as eastern Europe ? 

General Bissell. There was Eastern Europe Chief. He had sub- 
chiefs for different subareas. 

Mr. MrrcHELL, The reports would have gone to the Eastern Europe 
Section ? 

General Bissell, That is right, 

Mr, Machrowicz. At any rate no attempt was made by you to 
evaluate the Van Vliet report by even trying to compare it with avail- 
able information you already had in G-2 ? 

General Bissell, I was going to use the reply to this letter as the 
starting point for that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you use it as a starting point ? 

General Bissell, No. 

Mr, Machrowicz. Wliynot? 

General Bissell. Because, when it came back, I was just telling you 
my reaction, and why I didn't go along with the State Department's 
comments or their conclusions. I have just mentioned two of them. 
Wlien questions put an end to it, 

Mr, Machrowicz. Their conclusions had nothing to do with the 
evaluation of the Van Vliet report ? 

General Bissell. That is what you say. 



1904 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. Am I right ? What conchisions are vou referring- 
to? 

General Bissell. If State, instead of being able to tell me they didn't 
actually get this reply, had told me, "Yes, we got it : here is what it 
says," and gave me another Van Vliet report, I would have had every- 
tliing I needed to evaluate his report, one sent in 2 years earlier, and 
then this one. That would have established his memory, accuracy^ 
detail of a good many kinds. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Why didn't you look in your own department to 
see what information you had ? 

General Bissell. Because, had anything of significance come in 

Mr. Machrowicz. How do you know ? 

General Bissell. I had a meeting each morning about 7 something, 
at which the specialists of each branch told me everything of impor- 
tance that came in within the last 24 hours. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider the Colonel Szymanski report 
filed with your department at the request of your predecessor, and a 
report w^hich w^as very lengthy and very important, or did you think 
it not important enough to consider ? 

General Bisseu^. Had that report been brought to me without evalu- 
ation, as it came in, the colonel did not say, "This is true, this is 
untrue, this is probably true." 

Mr. Machrowicz. You are talking about Colonel Van Vliet's re- 
port or Colonel Szymanski's? 

General Bissell. Szymanski's. He didn't say "This is based on 
people whose veracity and dependability I know well." 

Mv. Machrowicz. He did not say that ? 

General Bissell. He didn't evaluate it at all. He said, "Trans- 
mitted herewith is so-and-so," a very short letter, to General Strong. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Are you quite positive of that? 

Mr. Mitchell. .Are you referring to the exhibits which are already 
on record with this committee? 

General Bissell. That is the only thing I know about it, what has 
been printed in the press. I read his report in G-2 during that period, 
April 1 to 12. 

Mr. Mitchell. What year ? 

General Bissell. This year. I saw nine exhibits with about this 
mncli of letter transmitted [indicating about 3 inches]. That is all 
Szymanski contributed. It was someone else's material being for- 
warded. I examined each of those. Three of them said they were 
hearsay. Some of them said they were hearsay several times re- 
moved. Three others did not mention Katyn. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What you are referring to is he never got anyone 
actually at Katyn when the shooting took place? 

General Bissell. It was all hearsay. 

Mr. Machroavicz. He never had an eyewitness? 

General Blssell. No. He had neitlier eyewitnesses nor other evi- 
dence. By evidence I mean something that a lawyer can use. For- 
tunately we had lots of lawyers in G-2. They weighed things. They 
had to be right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think you said a few minutes ago that you 
never had the Colonel Van Vliet report in your hands. 

General Bissell. I didn't say I never had it in my hands. I held it 
a while while I read it over with Van Vliet in mv office, and asked 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1905 

him if he wanted to make any chancres. He didn't want to make any. 
I had liim initial the thing. He did that. I don't think I even picked 
it np off my desk. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever order that to be put in the Katyn 
file? 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Why not ? 

General Bissell. Becaiise I didn't want it to get that much circula- 
tion at that point. 

Mr. Machrowicz. If you ever transmitted to anyone 

General Bissell. I would not have needed to say that. If a paper 
came into my office and I did not need to take action on it, just infor- 
mation, my initial was usually put in on it, but not always. It was 
put in the out basket. It went out and was filed properly. I didn't 
personally have anything to do with the filing. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was it properly filed ? 

General Bissell. Maybe only 99.999 percent thereabouts. 

Mr. Machrowicz. If some one subsequent to you, a successor to you, 
the next day, wanted to check the Katyn file and asked the head of 
the Russian or Polish departments about it, would he have been able 
to find the Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Then you would say it was not properly filed, 
was it ? 

General Bissell. If he did not find it, he would have come to my 
secretary and reported the fact. My secretary would say, "Well, this 
is the dope on that." 

Mr. Machrowicz. How could he report a fact which he would not 
have known about ? How could he have known about the report ? 

General Bissell. If he didn't know about it, he couldn't do it. 

Mr. Mitchell. You just said in reply to Mr. Machrowicz that you 
had a daily briefing session with the members of your staff. Did you 
meet these area chiefs at any time and discuss either the Katyn affair, 
or Van Vliet's report at that briefing session? 

General Bissell. I did not. 

Mr. ]\Iitchell. You never have discussed that ? 

General Bissell. Never. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have never discussed it with any other member 
of G-2 except Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres ? 

General Bissell. I didn't discuss it with Lantaff. 

Mr. Mitchell. They are the only two people you knew who knew 
about it ? 

General Bissell. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have any members designated as liaison 
officer with the OWI? 

General Bissell. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Who were they? 

General Bissell. Many people at many times. I can recall no 
names. 

Mr. Machrowicz. At that time, in May 1945. 

General Bissell. I couldn't tell you. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Wlioever they were, did you instruct them to 
give this information to the OWI? 

General Bissell. No. 



1906 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. You did not think the OWI should know this 
information ? 

General Bissell. I think we are getting in trouble on sources of 
information, but I will be glad to tell you in executive session. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Shackelford, does the record of the G-2 office 
in the period while General Bissell was in charge of G-2, show who 
were the liaison officers to OWI and who were the OWI representatives 
to G-2? 

Mr. Shackelford. I would be glad to check the records for that 
information, and if it is in the records, to supply it to the committee. 

Mr. Machrowicz. It would not do any good in view of the testimony 
it was not generally discussed, anyway. 

General Bissell. I did not. 

Mr. Machrowicz. They had no knowledge of the Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. I can't say. 

Mr. Machrowicz. If they did, they got it improperly? 

General Bissell. No. There were other people in the world who 
knew that these people had been there. They had many contacts in 
many places. 

Mr. DoNDORO. Was that a part of your function? 

General Bissell. I was on a committee called the Joint Intelligence 
Committee. There were meetings once a week where I saw representa- 
tives of OSS, State, War, Navy, Air, and sometimes others. This is 
not the nature of a question that would have been taken up there. 
They were not policy recommendations to the combined Chiefs of 
Staff or Joint Chiefs for the conduct of their intelligence arrange- 
ments, prior to major operations, or something that we could think 
of that would help the prosecution of the war. 

I also had conferences with the head of Naval Intelligence and 
the FBI, a little different group. We met periodically and took up 
everything on the counterintelligence side both in the United States 
and world-wide, dividing the duties between us, according to the regu- 
lations in effect at that time, which was an Executive order. 

Beyond that, I don't think I should go into that one. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I presume you read Arthur Bliss Lane's article 
in the American Legion magazine? 

General Bissell. I don't know who wrote it. It doesn't say. I would 
like to have found out. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am not saying this, because I believe statements 
contained in here, but I believe you should be given an opportunity 
to comment. There is a statement there which states : 

We heard that Van Vliet was behind the closed doors of General Bissell's 
private office a long time, alone with the G-2 general. When he reappeared in 
the reception office we learned Van Vliet was flushed, seemed intensely but 
silently angry. He went as directed by Bissell, with the general's personal 
security stenographer across the corridor to a smaller office. 

Colonel Van Vliet made no such statement to us, that he was flushed 
or angry or anything that occurred between you two which Avould give 
rise to that statement. I am going to ask you, have you any comment 
on that? 

GoiuM'nl Bissell. I would welcome you taking Van Vliet's word on 
it, but there was not the sliglitest unpleasantness. My only feeling 
was, shall we push this fellow for this now? He was off the normal 
track. Normally, when some returned person came in, we tried to 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1907 

be sure they were fit to make a report. Colonel Van Vliet was, but 
he was awfully tired. He was ready to oo, it seemed. I don't know 
anything that happened, to my knowledge, that didn't suit him to 
a "t." 

Mr. Maciirowicz. I want this on the record. 

Do you claim that this statement is not justified by the facts? 

General Bissell. As far as I know, there is no basis of fact in it at 
all. I don't know where it could have come from. 

Mr. MrrcnELL. Have you tried to find out? 

General Bissell. No. The only thing I was interested in was having 
a check made to see if any of those were libelous. Wlien you analyze 
them carefully, there is not a firm statement about me in them ; every 
one is a quiz, qualification, or implication, or inference. 

JMr. Mitchell. Have you discussed the article with Arthur Bliss 
Lane ? 

General Bissell. No. I do not go to former State Department 
people except through War Department channels. I am a civilian. 

Mr. Mitchell. So is he. 

General Bissell. His status is different from mine. I am on the 
Government payroll as a retired officer. 

Mr. Mitchell. So is he. 

General Bissell. I didn't know that. Mr. Lane is a nice person. 
I don't think he would be vindictive about me. He might have lent 
himself to something for a purpose, but I don't think he meant any- 
thing vindictive. 

Mr. DoNDERO. I have two or three short questions. 

I try to get in through a crack once in a while between my colleague 
from Michigan and counsel for the committee. 

Here is something that challenges my attention and may yours: 
In the letter that you wrote on August 21, 1945, appears this statement : 

Transmitted — 

and this goes to Mr. Lyon — 

for the information and file of the State Department is the report ou Katyn by 
Stanley S. Gilder, captain, EAMC, British medical officer. This report supple- 
ments statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes, 
May 25, 194.1, and generally substantiates all material facts in Lientpuant 
Colonel Van Vliet's report. 

The word "forwarded" is w^hat challenges my attention. Would 
it be forwarded by mail or would it be forwarded by a messenger? 

General Bissell. I think undoubtedly by top-secret courier. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Now, after that letter was written, was it delivered 
to the State Department ? 

General Bissell. This particular one ? 

Mr. DoNDERO. This letter of August 21, 1945. 

General Bissell. They got this letter all right. 

Mr. Dondero. Did the State Department at any time, from the time 
they received it, up to this hour, ever say to you or to your office that 
they had not received the Van Vliet report? 

General Bissell. No. I pointed out they processed this letter for 
just 5 days less than 2 months. So many people handled it. It seemed 
to me that would have been almost inevitable. 

Mr. Dondero. It goes without saying, if they did not receive it, 
some statement should have come from the Department they did not 
receive it. 



1908 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. I^et's get this correct. Do you say the State 
Department never denied receiving the letter of May 25? 

General Bissell. I thought the State Department had not. I am 
talking about the letter to Lyon carrying the Gilder report, and not 
the May 25 letter. This letter is a letter of August 21. 

Mr. iilACHROwicz. Head page 2 of the Department of Defense re- 
lease in this matter. 

General Bissell. "General Holmes, in reference to the matter" — 
Which matter ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. This is the Department of Defense speaking here. 
They say, "The Department of State has no record of having received 
the memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945, 
and the Department of Army has found no receipt for it and no cover- 
ing letter of transmittal." 

Mr. DoNDERO. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Machrov^icz. September 18, 1950. 

Mr. DoNDERO. That would have been 5 years 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is the date the Department of Defense gave 
the information, not the date from the Department of State. 

Mr. Dondero. That is the only statement I have heard as to what 
the attitude of the Department of State was, whether they received 
that or not. 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to say that is not in any letter form what- 
soever. That is a comment by the Department of the Army at the 
time they passed this memorandum for the press, dated September 
18, 1950. 

The State Department, to my personal knowledge, is not on record 
with this committee or anywhere else. 

Mr. Dondero. That they ever received the report or denied or even 
answered that letter of August 21, 1945, when they had a chance to do 
it, after General Bissell had written this letter to them and said, "This 
supplements the material contained in the Van Vliet report." 

Mr. Machrowicz. I can't understand your statement. 

Mr. Shackelford. The State Department will speak for itself, but 
insofar as tliis Defense Department statement was concerned, it was 
based on a thoroughgoing cooperation on their part. They were as 
anxious. to find it as we were. They gave it the full diligence, when 
they were unable to find it. It is on the basis of that information 
that this statement is based. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Information from the Department of State? 

Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. When they are before your committee, 
they will speak for themselves. 

Mr. Dondero. When tlie State Department receives a letter from 
General Bissell, or received a letter back in August 1945 that he had 
forwarded this report and they did not have it, wouldn't you naturally 
suspect they would come out and say then, not 5 years later, "We 
never received that report"? 

Mr. Shackelford. I l)elieve it would be more satisfactory from 
your standpoint and the conunittee's standpoint if State were to speak 
to that, since it is outside of my province. 

Mr. Dondero. I just wanted to call attention to that. There is one 
other matter, and then I am through. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1909 

I liave before me here a letter written by Mr. Shackelford to me on 
October 6, 1950, in answer to corresi)ondence which I had directed to 
either the Department of the Army or the Department of State, inquir- 
ing- Avhat had become of the Van Vliet report. You answered me. 

In the answer is this statement : 

There was a mistake made — 
I want to read three or four lines — you say : 

Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin in his reply on October 19, 1949, to your letter — 

meaning to me — 

of October 6. 1949, referred to a Katyn massacre report which was partially 
liased on Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's observations. 
In making this statement he erroneously thought — 

and he, I think, refers to General Irwin — 

he erroneously thought that the study entitled "Supplementary Report on Facts 
and Documents Concerning the Katyn Massacre'"— 

which was the report which the Polish government in exile made, if 
I recall correctly — 

was based in part on information supplied by Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet. 
This was not so, and the supplementary report was an independent and detailed 
study made by a Polish committee, which at no time has conferred or consulted 
with Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet. 

How was it possible in that office for General Irwin to make a mis- 
take of that magnitude ? 

Mr. Shackelford. It was a very unfortunate job of mislabeling, 
as is brought out in the Inspector General's report, and through really 
just a plain error. 

This supplemental report, which I believe is approximately some 
45 to 50 pages in length and prepared by the Polish government in 
exile, was incorrectly labeled as partially based on the Van Vliet 
report. It was from that clue, as it ultimately came through to 
General Irwin, his letter was based. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Could it be possible there is some error made regard- 
ing the Van Vliet report, so far as it affects this committee? 

Mr. Shackelford. We have done everything in our power — and 
very aggressively, to try to follow every possible clue that we had, and 
to examine every possible file to turn the report up and to find out 
any error, 

Mr. DoNDERO. I know you have made every effort possible, because 
you have been in my office more than once regarding it. 

Mr. Shackelford. Thank you. 

General Bissell. Mr. Dondero, may I say, when I appeared before 
the Inspector General, I pointed out that several letters had been sent 
out of the Department of Defense that conflicted with each other, to 
Members of Congress and to others, and that I asked the Inspector 
General to especially clear that thing up, I think he did. It was 
because people didn't know what they were handling, and called it 
different names, and because it was handled by different people at 
different times, and they didn't coordinate. I did stress that. 

If you read the testimony there, given to the Inspector General, you 
will find that I especially asked them to go into that and clear it up, 
so that the Secretary of Defense would not be in an untenable position 
as he was in then. 



:1910 THE KA.TYN FOREST MASSACRE 

]Mr. Mitchell. I have one question to ask. 

When were you relieved as assistant G-2? 

General Bissell. In January 1946. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your next assignment ? 

General Bissell. Military and air attache, Court of St. James's, 
London, American Embassy. 

Mr. Mitchell, When did you report for active duty there? 

General Bissell. In May, the 8th day of May 1946. 

Mr. Mitchell. When were you handed the Polish reports, known 
as the facts and documents concerning Polish prisoners of war cap- 
tured by the U. S. S. R. during the 1939 campaign ^ 

General Bissell. I have got that in my story here, I will find it. 

Mr, Mitchell, And the supplemental report on facts and documents 
concerning the Katyn massacre, which is the one that was just re- 
ferred to ? 

General Bissell, That is 1946, and the Polish-London report is 
page 43. 

On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles, 
and during the course of a social evening 

Mr. Mitchell. Wait a minute. What is that date? Was that 
November 27? What year? 

General Bissell. On November 20, 1947 — and I went to London in 
1946. 

You asked me when I got those papers. I am trying to paint the 
picture precisely for you. 

On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles 
and during the course of a social evening in the home of one of these 
Polish couples in London, arrangements were made for me to meet 
with a Polish gentleman who was stated to have assembled all the 
available Polish information on Katyn. The meeting occurred on 
November 25, 1947. 

Again I was told the story of the massacre of thousands of Poles 
by the speaker, who stated he believed that it had been committed by 
the Russians. He wished the information brought to the attention 
of the Americans at Nuremberg. I made a request for all the data 
they wished to furnish me. 

I agi'eed thereafter that the action would be taken that was con- 
sidered appropriate, after a check of the nature of the data furnished 
me. I did not know what they were going to furnish me, and I did 
not want to be committed to get something into Nuremberg if it 
wasn't right. 

Arrangements were made for anotlier meeting at which all the 
available material would be delivered to me in writing. 

Within a week, the material was furnished to me. On December 
2, 1947, I telephoned Gen. Telford Taylor at Nuremberg, telephone 
Justice 6117, and told him guardedly what I had secured, and that it 
was for the United States group at the International ISIilitary Tribu- 
nal, that I thought he sliould see it promptly. 

He said he would soiul a ])lane for it within 3 daj^s. This arrange- 
ment did not eventuate, so other arrangements for delivery were 
made. 

On December 15, 1947, I talked with General Taylor on the tele- 
phone. He then informed me the material had been received, ex- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1911 

pressed appreciation, but made no other comment to me then or ever 
subsequently. 

Following what was routine procedure, G-2 Washington was ad- 
vised of the procurement of this London Katyn report, and of its 
handling, having been forwarded to General Taylor. I believe no 
duplicate copy was available to send to G-2 in Washington, and 1 re- 
quested General Taylor to send to G-2 the copy furnished him when 
it had served his purposes. I believe this copy was duly received, be- 
cause Mr. Shackelford told me he had seen a copy and his comments 
concerning it convinced me that he had. 

The Katyn report forwarded from London to General Taylor and 
subsequently to G-2, consisted of two voluminous reports totaling 529 
images. They were in English. I believe they were anonymous, 
though — as I recall, there was a statement in them that the Polish 
sources had been used; in part the matter w^as repetitious, but it did 
contain a most comprehensive account that obviously had involved 
a great effort. These papers reached no stated conclusion of guilt, 
but tended to build up a case against the Communists. I have rea- 
son to believe that one copy of this report had been before the Nurem- 
berg Tribunal in June 1946 and was rejected. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is the point exactly, right there. 

Mr. Sheehan. Is he right on his dates? 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to point out the Inspector General's report 
is totally inadequate, because it mentions no data as to what the gen- 
eral is giving here. Obviously he must have talked to the general, be- 
cause he is talking about November 1947 and they leave out wdien he 
sent these documents to General Taylor. 

The Nuremberg trials were July 1 and July 2, 1946, when the Katyn 
affair was involved, and it was on the Goering indictment at that time. 

Therefore, the date that was sent to General Taylor in December 
1947, was wholly unnecessary. There was nothing that could have 
been done with it at that particular time. However, the general has 
just made the statement that he had reason to believe that these same 
documents were present at the Nuremberg trials. 

Could you explain that further? 

General Bissell. I never had an opportunity to read the Nuremberg 
report until I came up here last month, when I read them and found 
what I thought was the same thing. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. That is the reason you had to believe they 
were 

General Bissell. The Russian counsel is quoted in the Nuremberg 
reports as describing the paper as anonymous, as in English, as having 
been published in London and as not being admissible, because it was 
from Polish sources and they were not admitting it at Nuremberg, as 
I understood it, in reading it. I did not look at it too carefully. 
There is a lot of stuff on Nuremberg. They were not admitting as 
evidence anything on this particular case, except official Government 
papers. 

The Russian paper was an official Government paper, but the Rus- 
sians had not recognized that Polish Government that was in London 
at this time. They had severed relations with the Poles when the Poles 
asked the International Red Cross to intercede. 

So, that made the document inadmissible. 



1912 THE KATYN FOEEST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. 'Who was offering that document in evidence in 
Nuremberg? I frankly have not seen any mention of it. I don't 
know if our counsel has or not. 

General Bissell. One of the counsel for either 

Mr. Machrowicz. Goering? 

General Bissell. Or another defendant. Two were being tried 
jointly at that particular moment. Now, please don't misunderstand 
me at all. I knew about Nuremberg. I visited Nuremberg when the 
principal criminals were being tried. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was at this time ? 

General Bissell. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Goering was the principal witness. 

General Bissell. But this was 1947, and the time I visited them was 
earlier than that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Frankly, I am confused again. I have not read 
all of the Nuremberg trial proceedings, although I have some of them, 
and frankly I saw no mention of anyone offering in evidence any 
documents obtained from the London government. 

General Bissell. Yes; I think they tried to get this one in. 

Mr. Machrowt:cz. I would like to ask our counsel, who I presume 
has checked the Nuremberg trials, Is there any record of anyone offer- 
ing them in evidence ? 

Mr. Mitchell. If you will recall, when we had Mr. Kempner on 
the stand in Frankfurt, several volumes of the Nuremberg trials were 
mentioned in the course of that, I believe when they were submitting 
documentary evidence, although I have not checked the official docu- 
ments because they are not contained in the trial hearings, as yet. 
But I intended to do that in the near future, and I will check tliat vei y 
point. However, if the general can tell me which volume and where 
it is, I will be very appreciative. 

General Bissell. Mr. Shackleford can. but I can't. His office made 
some references to where things appeared. I didn't have time to 
read many of them. I ran into that one and that is the reason tliat I 
have it in here, because it seems to be bearing on the Nuremberg 
presentation on this particular material. I knew from personally 
being at the Nuremberg trial when the principal criminals were under 
trial, and talking with Telford Taylor there. They couldn't do that 
trial without the electrical set-up for the tiling coming out in many 
languages. That broke down so I had a chance for an liour and a half 
to talk with Taylor. There was no mention of Katyn at that time. 
He was on another case. I was interested in these criminals in the 
box, because they left them there and the judges went out. I knew 
only tlie details on the Nuremberg thing since last April, and then not 
very thoroughly. There is supposed to be a book of document 5. I 
didn't look at it at all at that time. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Our committee was given the infoi-mation in 
Europe that certain documents had been furnished by tlie Polish 
Government in London to the j)roper authorities in Nuremberg, and 
were never ])resented. Now, the information that you give me seems 
to beai- out that that charge is not correct. 

General Bissell. Tliey didn't let them present it. 

Mr. MAcniRowicz. That is different. 

General Bissell. They got tliem ready. 

Mr. Machrowicz. They were offered? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1913 

General Bissell. And the Russian who was presiding that day 
made the decision, "AVe would aaree only to take official documents 
and this one is not an official document because it is not of a <rovern- 
ment recognized by all of the members of the court."' 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that will be confirmed in our hearings, I 
believe, by both Dr. Stahmer and Mr. Kempner. Dr Stahmer was 
the German defense counsel on the Katyn indictment on the Goering 
trial, and I think you will find that that is correct, except that I do 
think there was some mention in the record, which I have not had an 
opportunity to check but which we will take np later when we go in 
that aspect of the case. 

Mr. Shackelford. I will be glad to check our own records with 
i-egard to the Nuremberg trials and volumes and supply any pertinent 
citations which we may have to the committee. 

Mr. Sheehax. Might I ask you to refresh my recollection on the 
Xuremberg trials? Weren't they started in November of 1945 and 
finished in July or August of 1946? 

Mr. Mitchell. What happened was this : They started discussing 
the Katyn affair or indictment. They didn't know where to put it. 
So they finally selected Goering as a major war criminal. They put 
it in his indictment. They came up with the discussion in February 
1946 as to how many witnesses each side would be permitted to call, 
and they haggled over it for 2 or 3 or 4 months. On June 29, if my 
memory serves me correctly, the presiding judge at that time, wdio 
was 

Ml'. DoNDERO, Lawrence, Judge Lawrence. 

Mr. Mitchell. Judge Lawrence, of the British, finally ruled and 
told both of them, "You will have three witnesses and only three 
witnesses," and they had those people up, cross-examination of both 
sides, July 1 and July 2, 1946. There was a summary by Dr. Stahmer, 
the German defense counsel, I believe, on July 6. There was no sum- 
mary by the Russians or tlie Soviets, and the matter was dropped. 

Mr. Sheehan, That is what I am trying to tie up. The general is 
quoting November 1947 and the trials were all over. 

Mr. Machrowicz. It was not stated by any witness in Frankfurt 
that any offer was made to "present any evidence in Nuremberg in the 
form of a document from the Polish Government in London. 

Mr. Mitchell. There was a slight reference in which he gave us a 
reference to a volume, in which I have a reference, and which I intend 
to check. 

General Bissell. I knew^ all of the time when this fellow came to 
me and wanted me to present this particular thing at Nuremberg that 
the main criminal trials were finished and the criminals executed long 
since, or disposed of. Then the court kept on for a long, long time w^ith 
the minor things before they broke it into small particles and it went 
on for a long time. When I first went there — I could get it out of 
these papers but it is not important — it was approximately a year 
earlier, and the main criminals were then on trial. But I knew it was 
not going to change the main trial but was going to get to Nuremberg 
everything I could get as fast as I could get it there. 

Mr. Mitchell. No further questions, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. I have one question, Mr. Chairman. 

Counsel, you asked Colonel Van Vliet in his testimony, when he 
came back and was in General Bissell's office, if Colonel Van Vliet knew 



1914 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

or heard of a Lieutenant Colonel Holloman. Did yon have any par- 
ticular purpose in that? 

Mr. ]\IiTCHELL, Yes, sir ; that was cleared up yesterday by Mrs. Mil- 
dred Meeres when I talked to her. Holloman's identity was mistaken 
for Lantaff. In other words, Lantaff in the record there is Holloman, 
really. Holloman has taken quite a beating from the Inspector Gen- 
eral's office and everything as regards the mistaken identity on the 
part of Mrs. Mildred Meeres, and she went back to the War Depart- 
ment yesterday after meeting Congressman Lantaff and corrected the 
file as far as who the individual was, and it was Congressman Lantaff, 
not Holloman. At that time I was merely exploring. 

General Bissell. I think I can help you on that. Holloman was 
the head of the section for which ]\Irs. Meeres worked, and she only 
was in our office for this one thing. That is why Congressman Lan- 
taff was the man instead of the colonel in his own section. 

Chairman Madden. General Bissell, the committee wishes to thank 
you for testifying here today. Considering the extended versions of 
the testimony presented in regard to the particular report which the 
committee is interested in, there is no doubt but what the committee 
will have to explore further as to whether there is any possible avenue 
to determine the whereabouts or what happened to that particular 
report. We will make every effort by further witnesses which we 
will call. There is a possibility that we miglit want further testimony 
from you. Of course, our committee is merely interested in concrete 
testimony if we can secure it, or proof as to where the original Van 
Vliet report went. Inferences or suppositions will not satisfy the 
public as to what happened to the report. Of course, the testimony 
here today, possibly the highlight of the testimony, was the Inspector 
General's report, and I wrote it down as the testimony came out that 
in the Inspector General's report it said, in conclusions of it, there is 
no proof that the Van Vliet report ever left the office where it orig- 
inated. I asked you about that, and you said that is correct. 

General Bissell. I confirmed it. 

Cliairman Madden. Now, of course, I know that the members of the 
committee are not satisfied as to its proposed exploration to determine 
the wliereabouts or what hap]3ened to the Van Vliet report. So we 
will explore further and possibly we might have you testify again, I 
don't know. But nevertheless we are thankful for your presence here 
today. 

General Bissell. Be assured I not only welcome that, but hope you 
will. 

Chairman Madden. The committee will meet tomorrow morning at 
10 o'clock, in this room. 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a. m., Wednesday, June 4, 1952.) 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1952 

House of Representatives, 
The Select Committee on the 

IvATYN Forest Massacre, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 362,, 
House Office Building, Hon. Eay J. Madden (chairman), presiding. 

Present : Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, O'Konski, 
and Sheehan. 

Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select committee. 

Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I have a few brief remarks I would 
like to direct to the attention of the entire committee. 

You will recall that when we were in Chicago taking the testimony 
of Col. Henry Szymanski, Colonel Szymanski took out of his personal 
file some documents which we put into the record as exhibits. At that 
time the staff of this committee had never seen those ; neither had any 
member of this committee. Yesterday the same incident occurred 
here on the stand when General Bissell was testifying. The War De- 
partment counselor, Mr. Shackelford, brought out some additional 
letters. 

You will also recall that this committee visited with the President 
of the United States in January, at which time this committee was as- 
sured that all official documents pertaining to the missing Polish 
officers and the Katyn massacre would be made available to this 
committee. 

This committee has repeatedly requested verbally of the War De- 
partment counsellor's office all documents connected with it. I am 
sorry to say this morning that I have been placed in a rather em- 
barrassing position several times in the course of these hearings. 

I would like to state openly that all documents in the War Depart- 
ment pertaining to the missing Polish officers and the Katjai affair 
should be presented to this committee. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, would it not be better to wait 
until Mr. Shackelford is here before making that statement ? 

Mr. Mitchell. His representative is here and has heard the remark. 
I am referring to Mr. Faclier. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Is Mr. Shackelford going to be here this 
morning ? 

Mr. Facher (Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford, coun- 
selor. Department of the Army). He will be unable to be here today. 

1915 



1916 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you want to make any statein l in connec- 
tion with that ? 

Mr. Facher. No, sir. We are trying to uncover i> le documents 
for the committee and there are several that are going- to be forwarded 
hiter in the week. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. 

The first witness this morning is Colonel Yeatoix 

Chairman Madden, Colonel Ivan Yeaton. Will you step forward, 
please, and raise your right hand and be sworn ? 

Do you solemnly swear that in this hearing you will tell the trutli, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help your God ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I do, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF IVAN DOWNS YEATON, UNITED STATES ARMY, 
ACCOMPANIED BY JEROME FACHER, ASSISTANT TO F. SHACKEL- 
FORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you tell the committee your 
full name for the record, please? 

Colonel Yeaton. Ivan Downs Yeaton. 

Mr. Mitchell. And your home address, please? 

Colonel Yeaton. My home address at present is Fort Wayne, De- 
troit, Mich. 

Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you state the date of your 
birth? 

Colonel Yeaton. I was born January 2, 1895, at Haverhill, Mass. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly your educational background 
for the committee? 

Colonel Yeaton. Grammar school in Boston or Allston, Mass.; 
high scliool, Pasadena, Calif. 

I have a degree in osteopathy from the College of Osteopathic Phy- 
sicians and Surgeons in Los Angeles, and I took a year's postgraduate 
work in the College of Physicians and Surgeons in San Francisco, 
and interned in the City County Hospital in San Francisco. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academv 
at West Point? 

Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you first enter the Army ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Seventeenth of September 1917. 

Mr. Mitchell. How^ long have you been in the United States Army ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Ever since, with the exception of 1 year's retire- 
ment, wdiich was last year. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your official duty station on September [ 
1, 19)59, and in wdiat capacity w^ere you serving? j 

Colonel Yeaton. September 1, 1939, I was designated as military [ 
attache to the Soviet Union. I am not quite sure wdiere I was. I 
don't tliink I had joined my station, but I was en route. j 

Mr. Mitchell. Was your official position at that time in any way i 
coiuiected with interpretive duties? I 

Colonel Yeaton. At that time I was to be military attache to the { 
Soviet Union. It was my duty to collect information and to evaluate ■ 
it. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you speak the Russian language, or write it, or 
read it? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1919 

Mr. MiTCHr- ')!(■. Do you remember or recall having seen those docu- 
ments coming I'o G-2 from Col. Henry I. Szymanski? 

Colonel YE.-pfff. I did, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee what happened to 
those documents as they were received, what the procedure was in 
connection with such documents? 

Colonel Yeaton. At that time, the organization of G-2 had what 
is known as a reading panel. There were three officers detailed down 
to the records section. Military attache reports came in in 10 copies, I 
believe. The original, from which additional copies could be made, 
was sent to the records section. Of the 10 remaining copies, the read- 
ing panel decided on the distribution. 

And as long as I was the responsible section chief, all extra copies 
w-ould of necessity come to me. In my office these reports were filed 
under my Polish intelligence group. 

Mr. Mitchell. Polish intelligence group — how many individuals 
were working at that time, and what was their primary duty ? 

Colonel Yeaton. My memory doesn't serve me. I am not sure how 
large the section was at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right; proceed, please. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is one section of the question. But the other 
section of the question Avas, What was their primary duty? Could 
you answer that part of the question ? 

Colonel Yeaton. The primary duty of what, sir? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Of tliis particular section, the Polish intelligence 
section. 

Colonel Yeaton. The Polish intelligence subsection's primary 
duties, were to file, evaluate, make such memoranda as they thought 
necessary. 

And our main interest at tliat time was the size and training and 
possible use of tlie Polisli Army in the Far East. 

Therefore, the subject of missing officers was one of vital impor- 
tance to us, if they were still alive and where they were and what action 
it would take, or what help we could give the Poles in getting them 
out of prison camps or wherever they were. They were simply listed 
as missing officers, and, as such, in the Polish file; there was a section 
where reports that dealt with these missing officers were filed sepa- 
rately. 

You must understand at this time we were getting Polish intelli- 
gence from tlie Polish Government in exile and London and through 
the Polisli diplomatic group here in Washington. So I had Polish 
intelligence coming in from at least two sources. 

Hut all reports wound up in the same file. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you sav all the reports wound up in the same 
file? ■ 

Colonel Yeaton. At that time ; yes, sir. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. At that time ? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I 
have never seen any reports, from any other source other than from 
Col. Henry Szymanski. 

Colonel, you have read the exhibits which are in part 3 of Col. Henry 
Szynianski's testimony. Are those all of Col. Henry Szymanski's 
reports, to your knowledge, or were there additional reports? 



1920 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Colonel Yeaton. I think there were more than that, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You think tliere were more than that? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman at this point of the proceedings, 
I would like to ask the representative of the Department of Defense 
where the additional reports are. Mr. Facher is here speaking on 
behalf of the Department of Defense. Is that correct? 

Mr. Facher. That is right. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you identify yourself for the record, please? 

Mr. Facher. I am Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford, 
Department of the Army counselor. 

To the best of our knowledge, we have located all the reports that 
Col. Henry I. Szymanski has sent in. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Have you turned them all over to the committee ? 

Mr. Facher. We have turned all the reports of Colonel Szymanski 
that we have located over to the committee. 

Mr. Machrowicz. There is evidently a difference of opinion be- 
tween you and the colonel. 

Am I correct, Colonel, that you made the statement that not all the 
reports are included in the list of those which you have seen in the 
transcript of testimony ? 

Colonel Yeaton. You must understand, sir, that all the reports 
that Szymanski sent in didn't have to do with Katyn. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Are all the reports of Colonel Szymanski m re- 
lation to tlie Polish officers and Katyn included in that list? 

Colonel Yeaton. 1 can't say positively. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Are there any other reports relating to the miss- 
ing Polish officers, or to Katyn, other than those which have been 
listed in your testimony before the committee, that you know of? 

Colonel Yeaton. That I know of, sir ; no. Not that I know of. 

Chairman Madden. Just a moment. Then your statement that you 
made a moment ago dealt with Colonel Szymanski's reports not only 
concerning Katyn, but as to other matters also ; is that correct? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe the record will show that he was also re- 
sponsible for liaison with the Czechoslovakians ; is that correct? 

General Yeaton. That is true. 

Mr. Mitchell. I think he told us that in Chicago. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, is it your pleasure to question the' 
witness as he goes along, or to wait until he makes his statement ? 

Chairman I^Iadden. Did you have a statement you wanted to makiv 
Colonel? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Chairman Madden. You can pursue your questions, Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, there is a distinction that the gentleman tr 
your right drew. He said that all the papers of Colonel Szymanski 
were turned in. The committee is concerned with all the papers and all 
the reports containing the Katyn Forest massacre, from whatevoi 
source. Has the Army turned over to the committee all the papers 
referring to the Katyn massacre situation, from whatever source^ 

Coloney Yeaton. I have no way of knowing, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Will Mr. Facher answer that? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1921 

Mr. Facher. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Slieelian, that has 
been clone. The search for missing papers is still continuing, and we 
have several other documents which we are going to forward this week. 

I might say that we have forwarded to your committee military 
attache reports from Iran and from other countries. 

I believe Mr. Mitchell will find from some of our forwarding letters 
that we did send some of those reports over. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. The Army turned it over, of course, and it had spe- 
cifically to do with the Van Vliet report. 

We know that Colonel Hulls — which is one of those debatable 
things — made a report, which the Army has refused to declassify, 
although they did turn it over to us. 

We do know that the military attache in Lisbon in 1942 and 1943 
made quite a few reports regarding the Polish missing officers, which 
I do not think the Army has officially turned over. 

Now, it would seem to me that, on the basis of these reports that we 
know about, there must be a lot of other reports. 

You mentioned a while ago that you had a separate section or a 
separate file folder for the various reports on the missing Polish 
officers. Now, could you tell the committee, was this given any par- 
ticular number or file name or something? 

Colonel Yeaton. That question, sir, can only be answered if you 
will put a date to it. 

Mr. Sheehan. Let me put the date from 1941 to 1946, inclusive, 
all reports concerning the missing Polish officers, from whatever 
source. 

Colonel Yeaton. On July 1, 1943, the Eastern European Section 
became a branch. Any reports coming from Spain would not come 
into the Eastern European Section. 

Mr. Sheehan. Even if they specifically referred only to Russians 
and Polish relations? 

Colonel Yeaton. We would be given a copy. 

Mr. Sheehan. Certainly. 

Colonel Yeaton. But the basic reports would not be in our office, 
but we would be kept advised. 

Mr. Sheehan. We are interested in anything. Copies. We do not 
necessarily want the official reports. 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Then on September 1 I became chief of the unit and no longer 
responsible for the files of any of the branches. I was the over-all 
chief of Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and, as such, we didn't keep 
any files in our office. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. What year was that? 

Colonel Yeaton. That was on September 1, 1943. 

Mr. Sheehan. But Colonel, even if you became chief of the Eu- 
ropean Section, someone succeeded you in that Polish-Eussian section, 
did he not? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is true, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. He would inherit all the papers that were there, 
would he not? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right. 



1922 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan. The files would be continued, would they not ? 

Colonel Yeaton. All the files. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we should get after 
the Army. There are still reports we do not know about. 

May I proceed a little while before we go on that ? 

In handling your eastern European end in 1941 and 1943, when 
you were in charge of that, did you work closely with the State De- 
partment in this respect: Assume the State Department got infor- 
mation from the Ambassador or someone directly to the State Depart- 
ment concerning, say, missing Polish officers or military problems, 
would they refer that to you, a copy of it, or something like that? 

Colonel Yeaton. I would say so, normally. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, G-2 was sort of a clearing house 
on all phases of the military situation as it affected the political situa- 
tion also? 

Colonel Yeaton. I would rather say liaison than a clearing house. 

Mr. Sheehan. Then you reported your talk with Anders to Am- 
bassador Steinhardt — and there must be other Ambassadors to Russia 
by this time — who had reports on the missing Polish officers? The 
State Department must have referred some of these reports to the 
Army, did they not? 

Colonel Yeaton. I can only answer that by saying that they at- 
tempted to keep us in the picture. Now, I couldn't pin down any 
one report. 

Mr. Sheehan. No specific one. But by keeping you in the picture 
sometimes between 1941 to 1945, State must have referred items of 
strictly military interest to G-2 concerning Polish officers and the 
Polish-Russian situation. 

The Army, so far as. I know, Mr. Mitchell, has not come up with 
any of that. Has it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. State Department or G-2? 

Mr. Sheehan. G-2 has not come up with any State Department 
reports. 

Mr. Mitchell. No. The only thing I got from G-2 is already on 
the record, or whatever they may have given in my absence during 
the European trip of the committee. I will search the files and correct 
any misstatements that may have been made this morning. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And that was only after we informed them of the 
Existence of the documents, particularly of the Szymanski report. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Machrowicz. They did not submit them to us until we found 
out about them from outside sources. 

Mr. Mitchell. I wnll correct the record on that point. 

If you will recall, Mr. Machrowicz, you were in town last Decem- 
ber. 'We got four of the nine attachments to Col. Henry Szymanski's 
report, and then in January we finally got the rest of them after we 
were informed from outside sources as to their whereabouts. Correct? 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, just to pursue that a minute longer, so I 
can finish at this point here : When you were talking about a lile where 
all these materials were channeled or sent to, do you recall any par- 
ticular designation or file number or file classification given to that, 
from memory, or from any facts you might have there? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1923 

Colonel Yeatox. That file number would be put on down in the 
receiving room by this panel that I spoke about. They determined 
where it would be filed and what the distribution would be. That was 
not a part of the branch chief's duty. 

Mr. Sheehan. Do you remember the names of this panel, for the 
record ? 

Colonel Yeatox. No. It was constantly changing. I know that 
Dave Crist, out of my office, was on it some time, but it wasn't 

Mr. :Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, I would like to interrupt for one 
moment. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to ask the War Department coun- 
selor for a complete personnel breakdown of all individuals in the 
EE section and the Balkan section from the j'ear 1942, when we 
became involved in World War II, through ]\Iay 1945. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. What is the EE section? Is that the Eastern 
European ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That includes Poland and Russia. 

I would also like to see the names of the individuals connected with 
the Balkan section in G-2. 

Mr. Sheehan. I might say for the record here — and INIr. Mitchell 
and Mr. Madden will agree with this — that when we visited the Presi- 
dent, he did not directly say he would have all the executive depart- 
ments deliver to us or send to us whatever material they had on Katyn. 

Is that right, Mr. ]\Iitchell ? Do you remember that ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. I do not recall whether he said that they would take 
the initiative, or whether we would take the initiative, but I do recall 
that when we walked out of that office, I had the very definite under- 
standing that anything that was available this committee could have. 

My protest this morning was on the fact that twice in official testi- 
mony before this committee I have been caught by surprise when wit- 
nesses produced documents either from War Department files or their 
own personal files. 

The latest illustration was General Bissell yesterday, on the letter 
of May 25, 1945, about the Swiss protecting power. 

Thank you, Mr. Sheehan. 

Now, Colonel Yeaton, I would like to show you exhibit No. 12. I 
don't think that the exhibit, in part 3, has on it the routing of the 
various reports as they came in. This is the top cover sheet of exhibit 
No. 12. It comes from the "Military Intelligence Division, WGS, 
military attache report, Poland. Subject : Polish Army in England 
and the Middle East. From : M. A., liaison officer. November 6, 
1942, source and degree of reliability : Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Lt. 
Gen. Wladyslaw Anders." 

Down in the lower left-hand corner is : 

"Auth. : Colonel Yeaton. Date: 11-30-1942. Number of copies: 
13." 

I would like you to read it. Will you read, for the committee, what 
other departments received or were notified of that report? 



1924 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Colonel Yeaton. The Office of Naval Intelligence received a copy. 

The recording section received the original. 

The British Empire section received a copy. 

Air Intelligence received a copy. 

The Middle East section received a copy and the eastern European 
section received six copies. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question in con- 
nection with that. 

What does that report deal with ? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is on the record. The balance of the report is in 
the record. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But just generally, Colonel, can you tell us what 
that report deals with ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Minutes of the meeting on organization of the 
Polish forces in the Middle East, a chart of defensive disposition of 
the Polish Corps in Scotland, a chart of the organization of the First 
Army of the Motorized Corps, and a chart of the organization of the 
territorial units. 

Mr. INIachrowicz. Who had charge of routing copies of this re- 
port to the various other departments ? 

Colonel Yeaton. The reading panel, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have charge of it? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did the Department of State receive a copy? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir; it is not so recorded on here. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just so there will be no misunderstanding, I would 
now like to have the War Department counselor's representative, Mr. 
Facher, make a note that I would like to have the names of the 
various reading panel members in G-2 from April 1942 until Decem- 
ber 1943. 

I believe it was December 18 that Colonel Szymanski was relieved 
of his duty as assistant military attache. Is that correct, Mr. Machro- 
wicz? 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know. I do not remember the date. 

Mr. Mitchell. Are there any further questions from the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. OT^ONSKi. "VAHiy was he relieved of his duty ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. I will tell my colleague from Wisconsin I am 
vei'y much interested in bringing that point out, and I will bring 
it out later in the cross-examination, if I am permitted to do so. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I shall look forward to it very much. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to ask the colonel about page 418, 
part 3, at this time, Mr. O'Konski ? 

Mr. OT^ONSKi. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, I would like to proceed a little further 
by asking what was the procedure within the office of G-2 when such 
reports Avere received, and how did the information channel up to 
the head of G-2 and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or wherever 
else it may have been sent? How was it done? Who did it? Was 
it oral briefing, or was it in memorandum form? What was it? 

Colonel Yeaton. The information that came in on these attache 
reports was broken down according to subject and could have been 
handled in one of several manners. Any intelligence or any informa- 
tion on the Polish troops in the Near East was a matter of great 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1925 

concern to the G-3 section of the War Department, the plans and 
training, because they were responsible for the strategy and the orders 
pertaining to the Allied troops that we had anything to do with. 

Information on the missing Polish officers was of spot intelligence 
value to ns as long as we thought they were alive, because they were 
the cream of the Polish Army, and their presence with the new Polish 
Army would have been of vital importance. Once we were sure they 
were* dead, the question of who killed them, or how, was not of spot 
intelligence value ; it was a matter for further investigation. 

Now to come back to these reports of Szymanski, certain parts 
of the information were broken down into separate reports and sent 
upstairs to the Plans and Intelligence Division where they kept daily 
account of the strength of that organization, its training, and its 
location. 

Information on the whereabouts or the death of the missing officers 
was handled occasionally by verbal report and other informal mem- 
oranda to G-2, so that they could be used as briefing material for the 
Chief of Staff on the following morning. 

"VMien the Germans released their propaganda blast, that was spot 
news for the minute, because we were, as branch chiefs, responsible 
that any information coming in over the air would be immediately 
evaluated by the chief in question and presented to G-2 or the Director 
of Intelligence, so that, if the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff 
called down and said, "Wiat does this latest propaganda mean?" 
G-2 would be in a position to give him at least the evaluation of his 
chief of section. 

I think that answers your question. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you a question in connection with 
that. Colonel. 

Are you now telling us that Colonel Szymanski's report dealt only 
with the death of the Polish ofiicers? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt 
with matters in which your department was concerned ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt 
with the question of maintaining peace in Eastern Europe? 

Let me refer to you one of the statements in his report : 

1. Polish-Soviet relations are marked by differences which are in my humble 
opinion irreconcilable. 

2. These differences are irreconcilable at present because (a) the Soviets did 
not carry out their end of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact; (b) the Soviets 
are not carrying out the provisions of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 
1941; (c) Stalin's promises to Sikorski and Roosevelt are not being kept; (d) 
there are still some 900,000 Polish citizens, deportees, in Russia, slowly being 
exterminated through overwork and undernourishment; (e) there are still some 
50,000 Polish children slowly dying of starvation. 

3. If the Soviets forsake their communistic and imperialistic aspirations there 
is a good chance that peace may reign in the eastern part of Poland. 

4. The Polish Government and Army officials are making a determined effort 
to reconcile the differences. The attitude of the Government is realistic. 

Would you say that that section of the report and the reports which 
preceded it, upon which these conclusions were based, were an im- 
portant thing, so far as your department was concerned ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I don't want to answer that "yes" or "no," sir. 
That report was made by an assistant military attache. His first 



1926 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

duty is to bring that matter that you bring up to the attention of 
the military attache, wlio, in turn, should have brought it immediately 
to the attention of the Ambassador. 

That is a matter that the military are not supposed to get into. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Would you say it is a matter in which the Depart- 
ment of State should get into ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you or anyone in your department bring this 
report to the attention of the Department of State ^ 

Colonel Yeaton. It should have been done in Cairo, sir, not from 
my office. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it should have been done, and 
I do not care about technicalities. I care about realities. 

Was that report which your department received ever brought to 
the attention of the Department of State? 

Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you think it should have been ? 

Colonel Yeaton. This particular report, sir? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean this report we have here, or the one 
you read, sir ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. This particular report that I read from. 

Mr. Mitchell. Which exhibit is it, please? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Exhibit 11. 

Mr. Mitchell. What page is that on, sir ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Page 458 of part 3. 

Mr. Mitchell. "Future Polish-Soviet relations?" 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. 

Colonel Yeaton. Iwould have to see the covering sheet. I am not 
sure that wasn't sent to the State Department, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I might tell you, for your information, that Mr. 
Shackelford testified before our committee and said that it had not 
been sent to the Department of State. 

Now, I am going to ask Mr. Facher, is that correct ? 

Mr. Facher. I am sorry, sir ; I can't say. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think the record will speak for itself that Mr. 
Shackelford said before the committee that that report had never been 
forM'arded to the Department of State for its information. 

If you have something to counter it, I would like to know. 

Colonel Yeaton. I have nothing to counter it. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have the original right here, sir. 

Mr. Chairman and the committee, I show you herewith the original 
letter transmitting the Szymanski reports, with the exhibits to which 
Congressman Machrowicz has referred, one of them he has read into 
the record just now. Here is the original letter. It says: 

"Legation of the United States of America, Office of the Military 
Attache, Cairo, Egypt." 

"W. M. S." is up in the right-hand corner, with the "/LS" as the 
identifying number, IG No. 3600. The subject is: Polish-Russian 
Relations. 

It is addressed to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War 
Department, Washington, D. C. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1927 

The letter states : 

1. A deferred copy of letter submitted by Lt. Col. Henry I. Szymanski, covering 
nine appendixes pertaining to the Katyn affair is forwarded herewith. 

It is signed by William S. Ward, colonel, military attache. 

Down in the lower left-hand corner it states "Enclosure: Letter 
with appendixes." 

Mr. Maciiroavicz. Is there anything to show that it was forwarded 
to the Department of State ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I was going to ask the witness now. 
I cannot see it. There is nothing to show it on here, to my knowledge. 

Mr. Flood. Ask the witness if there is any evidence of it. 

Mr. Mitchell. By Department of State does he mean the Ambas- 
sador in Egypt or here in Washington ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the Department of State. I do not care 
who it was in the Department of State. 

Colonel Yeaton. There is still missing from this document that 
cover sheet, and without that, this can't stick. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am still going to repeat my statement to you, 
Colonel. I realize you probably cannot answer that at this time, but 
Mr. Shackelford, on behalf of the Department of Defense, has already 
verified to this committee that tliat report has never been sent to the 
Department of State. 

Now, I am going to ask you another question, to refer to page 472 
of part 3 of the hearings. That is an excerpt of an enclosure. No. 5,, 
in Colonel Szymanski's report. It is entitled as follows: "Will the- 
Russians Fight Next Spring?" Was that subject matter of impor- 
tance to your department ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was it of importance to the Department of State ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I would say more to us than them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Let me read to you what was contained in that 
report, which has now been declassified : 

Will the Russians Fight Next Spring? 

Yes; if they find the Germans very weak. This winter they will conduct 
limited offensives in order to straighten their lines. Behind these lines, they 
will rest, reorganize, train and equip more divisions. They will wait until the 
Allies and Germans annihilate each other. They will wait until the German 
Army confronting them is so weak that their own effort will bring easy and huge 
results. They will not stop their westward march until the American Army stops 
them. 

Europe is confronted with what seems to many of the powers an "either/or" 
choice ; i. e., either German domination or Soviet domination. 

There is little faith that the United States could control a victorious Russia 
at any ijeace-table conference. 

One of Mr. Willkie's secretaries stated to me in Tehran that Russia and the 
United States will dictate the peace of Europe. When I repeated this (without 
mentioning the source) to a very prominent Pole in Tehran, he at first begged me 
not to jest, and then very suddenly said to me that "In that case Poland has lost 
the war and the Allies have lost the war." 

The choice in Europe is not merely democracy versus Hitler, as so many Amer- 
icans seem to think it is. 

That is signed "Henry I. Szymanski, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 
United States Army, Liaison Officer to Polish Army." 
Was that information important to your department? 



1928 THE KATYN FOREST IMASSACRE 

Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir, 

Mr. Machrowicz. And to the Department of State ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I assume so. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And yet not one bit of evidence has been produced 
here that that report has ever been brought to the attention of the 
Department of State. 

If that is true, would you say there was an error made on somebody's 
part in the Department of Defense ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I can only report, sir, that the channel for this 
to get into the State Department was in Cairo. This military attache 
is working for his ambassador, and it is up to him to report to his 
ambassador anything that even faintly touches a matter concerning 
the state. 

Mr. Machroavicz. Colonel Szymanski was directly under your con- 
trol; was he not? 

Colonel Yeaton. Directly under my control. 

Mr. Machrowicz. When he reported it to you, and if you were not 
the proper source to receive that, was it not your duty to report it to 
the Department of State? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Instead of that, you put it in the warehouse in 
Alexandria? 

Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is where the committee found it. 

I am going to ask you another question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Might I interrupt a minute, sir ? I think that is an 
unfair statement to the colonel. He has come here voluntarily. I am 
sure that these reports were not in the warehouse when the colonel was 
in charge of this. We found them there later ; yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you whether subsequent to the receipt 
of this report you sent a telegram to Colonel Szymanski. 

Colonel Yeaton. I sent him many telegrams, sir. 

Mr. JVIachrowicz. Did you send him one as a direct result of that 
report ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I do not remember, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Facher, do you have that telegram with j'Ou? 

Mr. Facher. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Where is it? 

Mr. Facher. Which telegram are you talking about, sir? 

]\Ir. Machrowicz. I am talking about the telegram which was dis- 
cussed in executive session of our committee, in which Colonel Szy- 
manski was very thoroughly blamed for showing anti-Soviet leanings. 

Let me ask the colonel : Do you remember the telegram ? Now 
that I have refreshed you as to the text of the telegram, do you re- 
member at any time sending a telegram or a cable to Cairo after re- 
ceipt of these reports ? 

Mr. Facher. Mr. Machrowicz, may I interrupt just a second? 

I believe the contents of that telegram are still classified as to the 
personal information. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not agi'ee with you. Of course, the only rea- 
son it is classified is that it is embarrassing to someone in the Depart- 
ment. And I think it is about time we found out. 

Mr. Mitchell. To bring us up to date on that particular phase of it, 
when we returned to Chicago, we had that executive session with Mr. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1929 

Korth. I believe Mr. Shackelford was there, too, at that time. Then 
we departed for Europe. I am still waiting to see what they are going 
to do about that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I do not think we want to wait any longer. 

Did you at that time think that Colonel Szymanski, because of this 
report, showed too much anti-Soviet tendencies ? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever tell him so ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to ask the chairman now that that 
wire should be brought to the attention of the committee. I think we 
have waited long enough, 

Mr. Flood. May I interrupt ? I have no objection to that, but may 
I say this : If you will yield for a question on the same thing 

Mr. Machrowicz. I will be glad to yield. 

Mr. Flood. Do you remember. Colonel, drafting a cable or a wire 
or an order to Colonel Szymanski at Cairo, for General Strong or 
anybody else to Colonel Szymanski? Do you remember drafting 
sucli a statement advising Colonel Szymanski that his attitude was 
too anti-Soviet? 

If you do not remember doing it yourself, on your own order, do 
you remember doing it on the order of General Strong, for General 
Strong, to Colonel Szymanski, advising him that, in the opinion of 
General Strong, Szymanski's conduct was too anti-Soviet ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I don't ever remember that phrase ; no, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us fix the date of that now. 

Where were you in December 19-lo, and what were you in charge of, 
and would you be responsible for drafting such a telegram or cable? 

Colonel Yeaton. December 1943 I was chief of the European unit. 
That is all of Europe, Middle East, and Africa. 

Mr. Mitchell. Europe, Middle East, and Africa. The Middle 
East would be Cairo. 

Colonel Yeaton. If such a telegram originated in the Eastern Eu- 
ropean section — and a draft would have — it would have passed across 
my desk as a matter of information. 

Mr. Flood. Do you remember? 

Colonel Yeaton. I remember there was a telegram sent out at that 
time, but the anti-Soviet part of it, I don't remember any such remark 
as that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, as I remember, the only reason 
Mr. Shackelford did not want to declassify that cablegram was be- 
cause he thought it might be injurious to Colonel Szymanski. 
_ Colonel Szymanski has advised this committee that he has no objec- 
tion to that cablegram being declassified. I think it is important that 
we ought to have it. 

Chairman Madden. It is my understanding that the Department of 
Defense has already gone on record that any matter connected with 
the Katyn problem is declassified. Is not that correct ? 

Mr. Facher. I believe there are still some aspects of it, sir, which 
we furnish you on a classified basis, but we do furnish them. 

Chairman Madden. Why would this particular telegram be 
classified ? 

Mr. Facher. To the best of my recollection, sir, I think, as Con- 
gressman Machrowicz stated, it was because of some derogatory in- 



1930 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

formation. I Avas not present at the executive session; so I can't 
speak first-hand. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Colonel Szymanski feels just as I do, and as 
overy member of this committee thinks ; that anything derogatory in 
there is not derogatory to him ; it is rather complimentary, even though 
the Department thought he was too anti-Soviet. And Colonel Szy- 
manski is perfectly willing to have it declassified. 

Now, if it is embarrassing to the Department, that does not bother 
me at all. It should not be classified if it is embarrassing to the 
Department. 

Mr. Flood. I think it should be declassified, no matter who it em- 
barrasses, Szymanski or the Department. 

Chairman Madden. What reason does the Department give for not 
presenting it to us ? 

Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Chairman, I remember that. I can remember 
the circumstances. Part of the cablegram had to do with recommen- 
dations that Szymanski had made with reference to intelligence, and 
the Department did not want to declassify it because they have now 
followed his recommendations. They did not want to reveal what 
the intelligence was. 

Chairman Madden. Could the telegram be presented now? 

Mr. Facher. I believe the telegram is still classified, sir; but we 
will check it over, and if it can be declassified we will provide it to 
the committee. I am not sure the operational aspects were included 
in the same telegram. 

Mr. Sheeiian. They were not included but referred to. 

iNIr. Facher. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask if there is any reason that you know 
why that section relating to the Dei)artment of Defense, relative to 
Colonel Szymanski, cannot be declassified if he consents to it? 

Mr. Facher. Not to my personal knowledge, sir. "However, I am 
not an Intelligence officer. 

Mr. Sheehan. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman ? 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

Mr. Sheehan. Part of the telegram that the "War Department 
wanted declassified was the part of the telegram that was derogatory 
toward Colonel Szymanski. Without revealing the othei- part of it, 
it would put the colonel in a bad light, and the committee members in 
executive session felt it should not l)e revealed unless the entire cal)lo- 
gram was revealed. 

Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman, who has the authority to classify or 
declassify? 

May I ask the colonel that question: Who has the authority, who 
does the classifying and declassifying? 

Colonel Yeaton. The originating officer does the classifying. Any 
declassifying must be done by a special branch in the Intelligence 
Department. 

Mr. DoNDEKO. Does that come from the Chiefs of Staff, or is that 
down in a lower echelon ? 

Colonel Yeaton. There is another section down in the Joint Staff, 
that is also involved in all War Department document declassification ;j 
yes, sir. 

But matters that pertain only to G-2, they have their own sectionl 
that has that jiower. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1931 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr, Chairman, if I may make an observation there, 
Avliich is not my own, but, as someone else stated, the doctors are able 
to bnry their mistakes and the military classify them "Top secret." 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think, ]Mr. Chairman, it is abont time now we 
make some decision on that cablegram. I think it is important. We 
have waited a long time for it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I will take up the matter with the 
War Department Counselor's office and I will straighten it out before 
our next set of hearings. We will get it into the record. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, Counsel, that was on March 14. This is now 
June 4. March 14 to June 4 seems to me like a sufficient lengfh of time 
for them to make up their minds as to what they are going to do with 
this. 

The problem is very simple. I see no reason why they should be 
the sole judges as to whether a cablegram of this type should be 
declassified. 

]Mr. Mitchell. Sir, if I recall correctly — and I think Congressman 
Sheehan can check me on that — I think that in that particular cable 
that was referenced, the first part of it had the derogatory remark 
about Colonel Szymanski, and then the other part referred to some 
memorandum on a military-intelligence subject that he had written. 
I think the Department is primarily concerned with the reference to 
the military-intelligence scheme or plan that he had recommended 
previously in another memorandum, which you recall. 

I think that that probably is the reason why they are having dif- 
ficulty there on this. 

But I agree with you. 

yiv. Machrowicz. Thiee months seems to be sufficient time to resolve 
the difficulty. 

Mr. jNIitchell. I agree, and I will get on it right away, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show here 
that whenever the word "derogatory'' with reference to Colonel 
Szymanski is used they mean derogatory from the viewpoint of a 
pro-Communist and not derogatorj- from the standpoint of personal 
beliefs in freedom and justice. 

Mr. Mitchell. I stand corrected. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Counsel, may I ask the colonel one or two 
questions ? 

Just before you were being cross-examined here. Colonel, you said 
something to the effect that all the information on the Polish officers 
was of spot-intelligence value to you as long as they were alive. Then 
you went on and said that when the officers were dead the informa- 
tion was not of spot-intelligence value. 

Wlien did you or your section determine officially that the Polish 
officers were dead and were not worth looking for any more^ 

Colonel Yeaton. I did not say they "were not worth looking for," 
sir. I said they were not spot intelligence any more. 

Mr. Sheehan. No. You stated that when they were dead they 
were not of spot intelligence. 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right. 

Mr. Sheehan. When did you determine they were dead? 

Colonel Yeaton. After the investigation that follov\'ed the German 
broadcast. 

Mr. Sheehan. What investigation? 



1932 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Colonel Yeaton. Red Cross. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Polish Red Cross. 

Mr. Sheehan. The Polish Red Cross? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you took their word for it ; did you ? 

Colonel Yeaton. We took their word for it that the officers were 
dead. I didn't mean by that that we didn't continue to believe G-2 
and the staff on all phases of the massacre end of it, but we didn't 
consider that spot intelligence. 

Mr. Sheehan. I see. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did G-2 do at the time of the revelation of 
the Katyn Forest Massacre ? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I have some questions on that. 

Was that the time when a communication went out under the name 
or signature of George Marshall to Colonel Szymanski asking him 
to make a report on the Katyn Massacre ? Do you remember any such 
telegram going out? 

Colonel Yeaton. I drafted it, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. You drafted the telegram ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you remember it? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. May I pursue another question along this line there? 

Yesterday it was brought out that apparently our State Department 
had asked the Swiss Government, as a neutral, to find out from Van 
Vliet, while he was a prisoner of war, certain information. 

Did G-2 take any hand in that ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I don't know, sir. At that time I was coordinator 
of specialists. I wasn't chief of any branch and it was just before 
going overseas. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. At this time. Colonel, I would like to have you run 
down the complete assignments that you had in the Office of G-2 from 
the time of your return from your duties as assistant military attache 
in Moscow ; your respective duty assignments and title of each position. 

Colonel Yeaton. From about the middle of May 1942 to the 30th 
of June 1943, 1 was Chief of the E;ist European Section. 

By June 1943 the sections had grown so large that they were re- 
named branches. So on July 1, 1943, until August 31, 1943, I was 
Chief of the Eastern European Branch. 

On September 1, 1943, I was promoted to Chief of the European 
Unit, which was known before that as a theater group and then known 
as a unit. 

On the IGth of June, when the whole of G-2 was reorganized, the 
branches, which had been up to that time geographical units, were all 
of a sudden, right in the middle of the war, reorganized into func- 
tional units. 

Mr. MiTc^HELL, Wlien was that ? 

Colonel Yeaton. That was the middle of June 1944. And at that 
time the records in every one of the branches, where they had been 
immediately under the supervision of a branch chief and file clerk, 
were all picked np and moved down in the basement in a large room 
and put in one large room. 

Mr. Mitchell. Under whose order was that reorganization? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1933 

Colonel Yeaton. Under General Bissell's. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know why that reorganization took place? 

Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did it strike yon as being rather odd that such a 
reorganization should take place at that particular time, June 1944? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

I didn't agree with it in principle, because I think the geographic 
set-up was the more workable one. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did the other officers who were in G-2 at that time 
feel that this reorganization was necessary, or did they agree one way 
or the other, or disagree? Wliat was the majority opinion ? 

Colonel Yeaton. The majority opinion among the branch chiefs 
was that the reorganization was not well timed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there a drastic shift in the officers in charge 
of these various units at that time? 

Colonel Yeaton. There was. The branqh chiefs became known as 
specialists. 

Mr. Mitchell. Specialists in what line ? Evaluation ? 

Colonel Yeaton. In the line that they had been chiefs in prior. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear of an Alfred McCormack? 

Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. lAHiat was has official position in G-2 ? 

Colonel Yeaton. When I joined G-2 early in 1942 Col. Alfred Mc- 
Cormack was in charge of what was known as the Special Branch. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was the Special Branch, if you are at liberty 
to say here? 

Colonel Yeaton. It had to do with evaluation of crytographic 
material. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive intelligence and evaluate intelligence 
reports in his official capacity ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I wish you would clarify "intelligence reports." 

If you mean military attache reports, the answer is "No." 

Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive, or was he responsible for the trans- 
mission of, any reports that may have been sent in by Szymanski 
cablewise, or through any other means, to G-2 ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Responsible for the evaluation ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

Did yon ever hear of a T. Achilles Polyzoides ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was his position at that time ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I am not sure. I would rather let the record show 
it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

How was liaison with the State Department conducted during 1942 
and 1943, as far as your particular EE section was concerned ? 

Colonel Yeaton. G-2 had a liaison branch that contacted the State 
Department officially. 

But the same thing was true with us as in all other departments, 
there was, as the British say, an old boy liaison between departments 
and like geographic branches. At that time. Ambassador Loy Hen- 

93744— 52— pt. 7 8 



1934 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

dei'son, I think, was in charge of the State Department Eastern Euro- 
pean Section. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know any of the State Department people ? 
Did they ever come to G-2 or did you liave anybody specifically 
assigned from your section or unit to have liaison with the State 
Department ? 

Colonel Yeaton. With the Eastern European branch of State, I did 
the liaisoning myself. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did the question of the missing Polish officers come 
up ^ 

Colonel Yeaton. It did. 

Mr. Mitchell. With whom in the State Department? 

Colonel Yeaton. I think with Ambassador Henderson, who was in 
charge at that time. 

Mr. Dondero. Do you mean Loy Henderson ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have liaison with the office of OWI? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

]Mr. Mitchell. Was anybody from your staff assigned to OWI? 

Colonel Yeaton. No, sir. 

Mr. MiTCHELi.. Was there a section in G-2 that had liaison with 
OWI, another section, or some other means? 

Colonel Yeaton. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

I have no further questions. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. May I have a question ? 

Colonel, you just said a while ago that you knew and drafted the 
cable asking Szymanski, and probably others, to make a report on 
the Katyn massacre. As these reports came in, did you and your 
fellow- workers evaluate these reports and come on to any off-the- 
record conclusions as to who was responsible for that crime? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'Konski. Could j^ou tell us what your conclusions were, to 
the best of your knowledge, at that time, as these reports started to 
come in? 

Colonel Yeaton. My conclusions Avere the same as Szymanski's. 

Mr. O'Konski. That the Russians committed the murders? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir. 

Mr. O'Konski. Was that the generally prevalent opinion around 
your department, that it was the Russians that were responsible, as 
these reports started to come in? 

Colonel Yeaton. I can only si)eak for myself, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKK Did the Slate Dei)artment show a partieidar inter- 
est in the nuirder of these Polish officers? That is, was their interest 
jn this phase of international relations more keen than the average 
observations in their visits with you? 

Colonel Yeaton. I think the peak of interest came the 24 liours 
following the German broadcast. Thereafter, the information on 
those things came in, as you know, in small pieces, and we felt that 
each little bit added another brick to the wall. 

lint witliin itself it was only a matter of vital importance for the 
record. 

The reason I sent that telegram to Szymanski was I felt ])erfectly 
certain that at some future date there would be an investigation, and 



THE 5ATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1935 

I was doing everything' I could at the time to see that my files were 
>() complete that when that day came, my office certainly would not 
})e subject to criticism. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. That is all. 

Thank you, Colonel. 

Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, you stated that you carried on the liaison 
with the State Department yourself. Do you remember in 1942 or 
1943, when the question of the missing Polish officers came up, whether 
you gave any opinion to the State Department as to your opinion, as 
you expressed it, that the Russians were guilty? 

Colonel Yeaton. I did not give any official opinion ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Unofficial ? 

Colonel Yeaton. I undoubtedly expressed myself unofficially. 

Mr. Sheehan. I would like to go back a little bit. 

In your testimony here in the early part, when you stated that 
wdien you were called into G-2 you were asked to prepare a documen- 
tary project paper that you prepared on Russia, you said that at the 
time Russia was the only country in which G-2 did not have the par- 
ticular documentary knowledge; is that right? 

Colonel Yeatox. So far as I know ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did we have documentary knowdedge on England? 

Colonel Yeaton. Oh, yes, sir. We have volumes on it. 

Mr. Sheehan. And France? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the xlrmy intelligence was in the 
peculiar position of having documentary evidence and information 
about every country in the world, including our close allies, except 
Russia? 

Colonel Yeaton. That is almost a true statement, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. It is a sort of reflection, I think, on Army intelli- 
gence, with Russia being what it is, as big a country as it is, that 
nobody ever bothered to find a lot of evidence about it and a lot of 
security information. 

Colonel Yeaton. We were trying, sir. 

Mr. Dondero. I think Colonel, the reason why you did not get it is 
that the Russians saw to it that you did not get it. 

Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir. 

Mr. DoxDERO. I have just one question. 

In what manner was the liaison relationship conducted between G-2 
and State Department ? Was it by messenger, or by mail ? 

Colonel Yea'jox'. By officer liaison. 

Mr. DoNDERO. In other words, if you had documents to send over, 
it was done by a person; is that right? 

Colonel Yeaton^. That is right, sir; so that the document w^ould 
be recorded out and in at the State Department, so that there would 
be no question. If they raised the question, "We did not see the 
document,'" we could point to the record and show where they had 
received it. 

Mr. DoNDERO. The State Department, I assume, had the same pro- 
cedure ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dondero. That is all. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question along those lines, Colonel. 



1936 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

In other words, if any document was turned over to the Depart- 
ment of State by your department, you had something in writing, 
a receipt, to show that that actually was done ? 

Colonel Yeaton. Out of my branch ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have anything to show that these reports 
of Colonel Szymanski were turned over to the Department of State? 

Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. It has been admitted yesterday already that there 
was nothing showing in the department wliich was of a nature to 
indicate that the Van Vliet report was received in the Department of 
State also. 

Mr. Flood. I have listened to this thing for a couple of days, or a 
day and a half. I would like to say that if there is any evidence, any 
place, anywhere, anyhow, of any kind, that information was trans- 
mitted to the Department of State, I would be as anxious to find out 
as anybody else. 

And I have tried hard to find it out. I cannot find a scintilla of 
evidence that the State Department was apprised of this documentary 
reporting from anybody. 

I think it is about time we stopped this torturing every phrase to 
try and establish that the State Department had this information. 

Now, if they got it, I want to know. If they did not get it, let us 
stop this business. 

The Defense Department made a mistake or an error, deliberately 
or inadvertently, in my judgment. These reports did not get to the 
State Department. 

Now, if they did, I want to see how they got there, who took them 
there, and where are the receipts. The evidence, in my opinion, and 
only in my opinion — I am only saying in my opinion — shows very 
clearly that this information did not get to the Department of State ; 
why, I do not know. 

Now, let us find that out. We are wasting time, if there was 
deliberate conspiracy, inadvertence, stupidity, negligence, or anj^- 
thing else, in any of the various areas of the Defense Department, 
if the reports should have gotten to the State Department, why did 
they not? 

Let us do away with this business of spending all week trying to 
find out did the State Department hide this or conspire with the 
Defense people to prevent these reports from getting there, or con- 
spire with somebody to steal them or destroy them to protect Russia. 

I think we have knocked ourselves out trying to prove that, and we 
have not done so. If we have not, let us start on it right now and 
prove it. 

But if we are satisfied that it cannot be proved, let us stop this 
whipping-boy business of the State Department and find out what 
was wrong in the Department of Defense, if we can. If we cannot 
find that out, let us stop this. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I concur 100 percent with the Congressman. 
I wanted to say that I would bo the first to criticize the De]iart- 
ment of State for neiilectinc: to do soniethinii it should have done. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1937 

But I have been looking in vain for one iota of testimony to show 
that any of this information whicli the Department of Defense ob- 
tained was turned over to the Department of State. If I am wrong, 
tlie Department of Defense should liave an opportunity to present 
such proof. If they cannot do so, let us forget it now. Let us not 
Jvcep on sniping at somebody who quite obviously is not at fault. 

Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Flood, I would like to bring you up 
to date now, that Mr. Madden has appointed a subcommittee, consist- 
ing of Congressman O'Konski, Congressman Machrowicz, and Con- 
gressman Sheehan, to meet with the State Department officials tomor- 
row to go over the files and any records they may have concerning the 
missing Polish officers or the Katyn affair. They are going to do that 
tomorrow morning. 

I agree with your statement. 

Mr. Flood. That is all right with me. If you want to go to the 
Bureau of Mines or the Department of Aginculture, go ahead, but 
let us get this thing cleaned up one way or the other. It is going on 
like Tennyson's Brook, going no place. 

Chairman INIadden. Let me suggest that although Congressman 
Sheehan and Congressman Machrowicz, and Congressman O'Konski 
are to investigate the records of the State Department, in which the 
State Department stated they would be glad to cooperate in any way, 
let me suggest that any other member of the committee that wants 
to accompany them on this investigation is at liberty to do so. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, can I ask Mr. Facher whether 
he can have that cable that we are talking about here this afternoon. 

Mr. Facher. I will try, sir. 

Mr. Machroavicz. You have been trying since March 14. That is 
such a simple thing. It should take exactly 5 minutes, not 3 months. 

I am a little bit tired of this "trying" and this informing witnesses 
not to cooperate with the committee. I will bring that out if it is 
necessary, too. 

Chairman Madden". Will you have Mr. Shackelford come over here 
this afternoon ? 

Mr. Facher. Yes, sir. 

(The following letter and cablegram are herewith placed in the 
record by the counsel, John J. Mitchell :) 

Department of the Army, 
Office of the Department Counselor, 

Washington, June 4, 1952. 
Hon. Ray J. Madden, 

Chairman, House Select Committee To 

Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre, 
House of Representatives. 
Dear Mr. Madden : I am inclosing herewith a copy of the telegram of Decem- 
ber 19, 194.3, which your committee requested at the hearing held in Washington 
this morning, .Tune 4. This telegram has remained classified because it contains 
personal information concerning an individual member of the Army. As such 
it was treated in confidence, in accordance with Department of the Army policy 
to treat efficiency reports and similar personal information as confidentiai. 
Upon assurance of your committee that the individual named in this telegram 
has no objection to the information being made public, I have had the telegram 
declassified. 

Sincerely yours, 

F. Shackelford, Department Counselor. 



1938 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Headquarters 
U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East 

MESSAGE FORM 
IN COMING 
[Paraphrase] 

No. 8623 for AMSME from WAR 

DATE: Dec. 19, 1943. 
RECD: Dec. 19, 1943. 
DECD: Dec. 20, l&i3. 
Cite WDGBI from Strong for Osmun Jicame. AMSME 9965. 

Proposed by Szmanski in his draft dated October 30tli project of setting iip' 
Joint Polish Intelligence Agency is disapproved. Reference the above radio 
his visit to London is disapproved. Szynianski is being appointed Milo with the 
Poles and is being relieved as AMA. Answering Jicame 58 Szyraanski is under 
your control as far as Collection Intelligence is concerned. Regarding his im- 
mediate future in that connection all decisions are up to you. As now operating 
there is confidence here in the Jicame set-up. Szymanski should accompany 
them, if and when Poles move into other Theatre and report to MID through 
its representative in the New area. His work has been only satisfactory because 
of small volume and much duplication of information previously received from 
the Poles in the opinion of the Military Intelligence Department. Further- 
more frequently expressed opinions show bias opinion in favor of Polish group 
which is Anti-Soviet. Instruct him to avoid political involvement and recom- 
mend you require him to concentrate on Liaison with Poles. 

ULIO TAG 

Classification Changed To Unclassified, Security Information. 

Bv authority of The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 
Bv Date 4 June 19.52. 

JICAME for ACTION. ( JA) 

Distribution 1-AG, l-G-2. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think it is about time tlie Department of De- 
fense slionld be instructed they have no rio-ht to interfere with wit- 
nesses and tell them not to divulo^e information to the committee. If 
there is any question about that, let us make that clear right now. 
If anybody wants information on that, I will give it to them. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

We want to thank you for your testimony here this morningv 
Colonel Yeaton. 

Is there anything further? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have nothing further of the colonel. 

Chairman Madden. We thank you for your testimony, Colonel. 

Boris Olshansky. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is Mrs. J. P. Feeley, an official 
interpreter for the committee. 

Will you kindly swear her in, please? 

Cliairman Madden. Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret 
the testimony to be given by the witness truthfully, so help you God? 

Mrs. Feeley. I do. 

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman through the inter- 
preter, as follows :) 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Olshansky, will you raise your right hand, 
please? 

Do you solemnly SAvear that in the hearing now being held, you 
will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help ' 
you God? I 

Mr. Olshansky. I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE 1939 

TESTIMONY OF BORIS OLSHANSKY (THKOUGH MRS. J. P. FEELEY, 

INTERPRETER) 

Mr. Mitchell. Will yoii state your full name for the record, please ? 

Mr. Olsiiansky. Boris Olshansky. 

Chairman Maddex. Will you kindl}'^ spell it out? 

Mr. MncHELL. B-o-r-i-s 0-1-s-li-a-n-s-k-y. 

Where were you born, Mr. Olshansky ? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was born in Voronezh, U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Mitchell. When were you born? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was born on the 5th of August 1910. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you educated? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was educated in Voronezh. 

Mr. Mitchell. What schools did you attend ? 

Mr. Olshansky. I attended high school in Voronezh and the State 
University of Voronezh. 

Mr. Mitchell. In what did you specialize at the state university? 

Mr. Olshansky. In mathematics. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where were you, Mr. Olshansky, on September 1, 
1939? 

Mr. Olshansky. In Voronezh. 

Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing in Voronezh on September 
1,1939? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was associate professor at the Voronezh State 
University, in the department of mathematics. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long did you remain in this position? 

Mr. Olshansky. I held this position for 2 years. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you enter the Russian Army? 

Mr, Olshansky. In September 1941. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank and position in the Russian 
Army ? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was a staff officer of the armj' then, and I was a 
major in the Engineering Corps. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and the committee, the witness has 
informed me that he would like to make a brief statement as to his 
position and service in the Russian Army covering the period 1941 
through 1946. 

Will you make a brief statement covering your time and service in 
the Russian Army for the ])eriod 1941-46? 

Mr. Olshansky. From 1941 and until 1942 I was a staff officer in 
the Southwestern Army, 

From the summer of 1942 until 1943, I took part in the Stalingi'ad 
operations, and from 1943 until 1944, I took part in Bielo-Russian 
operations under Marshal Rokosovsky. 

Then from 1944 until the end of the war, I was in the same opera- 
tions under Marshal Zhukov, and he was with the Fifth Army then. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you leave the Russian Army, and where ? 

Mr. Olshansky. I left the army after the war ended, and I stayed 
in Berlin, Germany. 

From 1946 until the end. of 1947 I was inspector of a section of 
German people's education under Soviet military administration, and 
besides, I was a teacher of the Russian schools in Berlin at the same 
time. 



;1940 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. When you say Russian schools, do you mean the one 
that was established after the war ? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes. Those schools were established after the 
war under Soviet military administration. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did you know Professor Burdenko, or Dr. 
Burdenko, who was the head of the Soviet extraordinary state special 
committee to investif^ate the Katyn Forest massacre ? 

Mr. Olshansky. My father was a doctor, and he was a good friend 
of Professor Burdenko from 1919. From 1919 until 1923, Professor 
Burdenko and my father were together in Voronezh. 

After that Professor Burdenko left for Moscow, but he kept his 
friendship with my father and my family. 

My father died in 1929, but every time I visited Moscow I visited 
Professor Burdenko. And Professor Burdenko helped me to finish my 
education and he helped me financially. 

I saw Burdenko before the war for the last time in 1936. From 
1936, Professor Burdenko was personal physician in the Kremlin and 
he was the physician of Stalin, too. 

In 1939 Professor Burdenko had to join the party. Professor Bur- 
denko Avas an outstanding scientist, and he was a member of the old 
Union Academy of Sciences. 

During the war, I met Professor Burdenko in 1944 in Gomel. I 
was wounded then in the hospital, and Professor Burdenko was sent 
there for inspection. At that time. Professor Burdenko was the chief 
surgeon of the Red Army, and he had the rank of lieutenant general 
of the Medical Corps, which was the highest rank assigned in the 
Medical Corps. 

As far as the Katyn massacre was concerned, I could not discuss 
that problem in the hospital. I could not discuss the matter as there 
w^ere too many strangers. So we just interchanged several sentences, 
as far as my house was concerned. 

I heard about the Katyn massacre from the Soviet press at the 
beginning of 1944. I didn't have any doubts right from the beginning 
that it was one of the Soviet tricks. My opinion was shared by many 
officers of the army with whom I was very friendly. AVhen I got into 
Poland with the army of Marshall Rokosovsky, I heard from the 
Polish people the same opinion, and I developed a great desire to find 
out the truth of that matter. 

I left Berlin at the end of April 1946 for Moscow. I was traveling 
to the assignment for 5 days, and I made it my point to visit Professor 
Burdenko, wlio was sick at that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where? 

Mr. Olshansky. In Moscow. 

At that time, Professor Burdenko was the president of the Academy 
of Medical Science of the U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Mitchell. This was in 1946? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes ; it was at the end of xVpril 1946. 

Mr. ISIiTciiELL. 1946? 

Ml-. Olshansky. 1946. 

Mr. Mitchell. Proceed. 

Mr. Olshansky. And Pi-ofessor Burdenko was a member of the 
Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. At the time when I went to visit 
Professor Burdenko, he was sick and he didn't take mucli part in any 
activities. Professor Burdenko was 67 years old at that time. He, 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1941 

ipceived me at his apartment on Iverskoy-Imskoy Street in Moscow. 

When I visited Professor Burdenko, he was wearing his general's 
coat then and, to all appearances, it seemed that he was a well man. 
Knowing that he was not feeling well, I did not want to prolong onr 
conversation, which lasted, in all, 40 minutes. After ^everal sentences 
of usual conversation, I asked him on the matter of Katyn. 

Professor Burdenko answered that there was nothing to think about 
it ; that Katyns existed and are existing and will be existing. Anyone 
who will go and dig up things in our country, Eussia, would find a lot 
of things, that we had to straighten out the protocol given by the 
Germans on the Katyn massacre, 

]Mr. Flood. By the German protocol, do you mean the German 
report and conchisions on their investigation of the Katyn massacre ,*^^ 
is that what you mean ? 

Mr. Olshanskt. Yes. It is the German report. 

Mr. Flood. And the German protocol, the German report, concluded 
that the Russians committed the crime ? 

Mr. Glshansky. Yes. 

Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko meant by clearing up the German 
protocol was that the Russians had to file some kind of a report 
showing that the Germans did it ; is not that what you mean ? 

Mr. Olshansky. There was a special commission established by 
Burdenko. 

Mr. Flood. To prove that the Germans did it ? 

Mr. Olshansky, Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you go on about your conversation with 
Professor Burdenko ? 

Mr. Olskaxsky. I repeat the statement I made previously. He 
said that Katyns are existing, and would be existing, if you would be 
digging out in the country of Russia. 

Now I repeat the words of Professor Burdenko, who later said,. 
"I was appointed by Stalin personally to go to the Katyn place. All 
the corpses were 4 years old." 

And Professor Burdenko said. "For me, as a medical man, this 
problem was quite clear. Our NKVD friends made a mistake." Such 
were the words of Professor Burdenko, which proved what I sup- 
posed before. 

I did not ask him why he signed the protocol because for every 
Soviet citizen it was obvious — he had to lose his head if he would 
not have signed it. I left Professor Burdenko, and he wished me 
all the luck in the West, as he mentioned it, and then I heard that 
he died in November 1946. 

Mr. Flood. This Professor Burdenko was the chief of the Russian 
medical mission which investigated the Katyn massacre, was he? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes. 

Mr. Flood. And this commission made an investigation at Katyn 
and filed a report that the Germans committed the crime ? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes. 

Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko, as the chief of the Russian medical 
mission, signed the report, did he not? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes. 

Mr. Flood. Do you want us to believe now that in your conversation 
with Professor Burdenko, as you have described it, do you construe- 



1942 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Professor Biirdenko's conversation as a complete repudiation by 
Professor Burdenko of the Russian report? 

Mr. Olshansky. When Professor Burdenko signed the report he 
knew that the crime was committed by the NKVD. 

Mr. Flood. Did Professor Burdenko say that the Polish officers, in 
his judgment, had been killed by the Russian NKVD? 

Mr. Olshansky. He stated it himself, that in being a doctor 
himself he didn't have any doubt at all. 

Mr. Flood. Doubt about what ? 

Mr. Olshansky. That the Russian NKVD conniiitted the crime. 

Mr. Flood. That is all. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did you go fi'om Moscow? 

Mr. Olshansky. From Moscow 1 returned to my work in Berlin. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long did you stay in the Berlin zone? 

Mr. Olshansky. I was in Kai'lshorst from 1948, and after that I 
escaped with my family and I became a political refugee. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did you enter the western zone ? 

Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in Regensburg to the American military 
government, and I got protection from the American authorities and 
the right for immigration. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you arrive in the United States? 

Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in the States on January 2, 1952. 

Mr. Flood. Did anybody promise you anything to come here to 
testify? 

Mr. Olshansky. Nobody promised anything, but I consider it my 
moral duty. 

Mr. Flood. Are you a voluntary witness, or were you subpenaed? 

Mr. Mitchell. I will answer that. He is a voluntary witness, sir. 

Mr. Flood. I have just one more question. 

Is it not true that Professor Burdenko, or Colonel General Bur- 
denko, the chief of the Medical Corps of the Russian Army, was also, 
from time to time, the personal physician of Stalin? 

Mr. Olshansky. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Flood. That is all. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Sheehan ? 

Mr. Sheehan. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Flood. We appreciate your interest in these proceedings, Mr. 
Olshansky, and we are grateful to you for taking the time to come 
here and give us the advantage of this very important testimony. 

Mr. Olshansky. I repeat again that it is my moral duty. 

Mr. Flood. The committee will now recess, to reconvene subject to 
call of the Chair. 

(Thereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene 
subject to call of the Chair.) 



THE KATYN FOKEST MASSACKE 



TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1952 

House of Representati\t:s, 
The Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 1301, 
House Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Dondero, OTvonski, and 
Sheehan, 

Also present: John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select com- 
mittee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator. 

Chairman Maddex. The committee will come to order. 

I might say that the hearings this week will terminate the investiga- 
tions of the Katyn committee. 

A year ago in September, Congress authorized the creation of this 
special committee for the purpose of determining officially the guilt 
of the nation responsible for the massacring of approximately 14,000 
Polish soldiers and intelligentsia at the beginning of World War II. 

This connnittee started hearings in October a year ago, and when 
Congress reconvened in January we held hearings in Washington 
•and Chicago in February and March, and in March the Congress 
authorized our committee to go abroad and complete our hearings. 

The members of tlie committee decided last June that it was essential 
that we file an interim rej^ort as to the No. 1 purpose of the committee, 
which was to determine the guilt of the nation committing these mas- 
sacres. 

The Katyn Massacre is the only international crime in world history 
where two nations disputed the guilt. There have been a great num- 
ber of international crimes in history, but the world always knew 
the nation that was responsible, except in the case of the massacre of 
the Polish soldiers and intellectual leaders at Katyn. 

In order to file our report with the Congress before adjournment 
last July, the committee decided to file an interim report dealing with 
the guilt of the nation responsible for the massacre. In our report 
which I have just mentioned, we unanimously decided that the testi- 
mony revealed tliat the Soviet Government, beyond any doubt or 
question wliatsoever, was responsible or guilty for the massacring of 
these Polish soldiers and intelligentsia. 

At the time this committee was created. Members of Congress were 
very much interested in what happened to certain reports that were 
filed immediately after the finding of these bodies at Kaytn. These 
reports disappeared. 

Also, there were a number of questions by the Members of Congress 
at the time this resolution was on the floor of the House, regarding 

1943 



1944 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

the operation of the Nuremberg trials. That is tlie reason why we are 
ho](lin<jj hearings here this weeK. 

We have ah^eady had several witnesses in our former hearings 
testify regarding these reports, but the witnesses that will be heard 
this week will further elaborate for the information of the com- 
mittee as to what happened to these reports. 

Mr. Justice Jackson was very cooperative to volunteer testimony this 
morning as to information regarding the Nuremberg trials. 

I also wish to commend the members of the committee for the out- 
standing work they have done on the hearings both here and abroad. 
The work of the committee has been difficult and its success can be 
attributed to the nonpartisan and diligent work of the committee 
members. 

After the hearings this week, the committee will complete its report 
on the second phase of the hearings, to wit, the disappearance of the 
files and testimony regarding Nuremberg. We will make our final 
report to Congress before the end of the year on this phase of the 
hearings. 

I might further state that in the filing of our interim report, the 
committee made four recommendations to the Congress of the United 
States, which were unanimous: 

No. 1, requesting that the President of the United States forward 
the testimony, evidence, and findings of this committee to the United 
States delegates at the United Nations. 

No. 2, requesting, further, that the President of the United States 
issue instructions to the United States delegates to present the Katyn 
case to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 

No. 3, requesting that the appropriate steps be taken by the General 
Assembly to seek action before the International World Court against 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for committing a crime a^ 
Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recog- 
nized by civilized nations, and. 

No. 4, requesting the President of the United States to instruct the 
United States delegation to seek the establishment of an international 
commission which would investigate other mass murders and crimes 
against humanity. 

Judging from the revelations and the testimony that this committee 
has revealed regarding the Katyn massacre, I believe all members of 
the committee and possibly all Members of Congress will cooperate 
with the members of this committee to investigate other massacres and 
violations of international law which have been committed in Korea. 

I believe that every member of this connnittee would pursue the 
work that ^ye have started to see if something camiot be done to arouse 
world public opinion against international bi-igandry, barbarism, and 
lawlessness of this kind. 

If any othei- members have anything to say, we w^ill be glad to iiear 
them. Otherwise, we can proceed with the testimony. 

In order to finish the hearings this week, we decided to have hear- 
ings today, wliich is Armistice Day. The commitfec and the peo])le 
in the room will stand for a minute to pay tribute to the war dead. 

(An interval of silence.) 

Chairman Madden. Let me say that under the rule in the House of 
Representatives, we do not wish to have photographs taken while the 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1945 

witness is testifying. If any photographer here woukl like to take 
pictures at this time, it is agreeable with the witness and also with the 
committee. 

Mr. Justice, is it agreeable with you to take some pictures now? 

ISIr. Justice Jackson. Yes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 

Chairman Madden. For the purposes of the record, Mr. Justice, 
would you state your name and your title? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Robert H. Jackson. At the present time I am 
associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I was repre- 
sentative and chief of counsel for the United States at the Nuremberg 
prosecutions, at the international trial only. 

Chairman Madden. Do you have a statement you wish to read ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I told your counsel that I would pre- 
pare a statement, with dates as exact as I could get them, so that it 
would be as accurate as possible. I have such a statement, which is 
being handed to your counsel and, if there is no objection on the part 
of the committee, it will be given to the press. It has not been dis- 
tributed so far. 

Chairman Madden. That is satisfactory. 

Will you now proceed with your statement, please? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has 
not been adjudged by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and inquiry into it is 
not inconsistent with the position taken by the United- States prosecu- 
tion at the Nuremberg international trial of Goering and others. 

It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the 
United States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all 
decisions and actions in reference to the Katyn atrocity and the reasons 
which conduced to them. 

The first step that seems pertinent was an agreement to divide pri- 
mary responsibility for preparation and presentation of the case 
among the prosecutors representing the four Allied Powers. This was 
intended to fix on someone responsibility for covering each part of the 
case, to avoid duplication, and to expedite a trial of unprecedented 
complexity. 

To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite 
and wage a war of aggression. The British were assigned the viola- 
tion of specific treaties and crimes on the high seas. Violations of 
the laws of war and crimes against humanity were divided on a 
geographical basis. The French undertook crimes in western Europe, 
and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of preparing and 
presenting evidence of crimes in eastern Europe — an area largely 
in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us had no 
access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet repre- 
sentatives included Katyn Wood and Poland as Avell, but at that time 
it was not known that the Katyn massacre would be involved. 

The first proposal that the Nuremberg trial should take up examina- 
tion of the Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during 
the drawing of the indictment. Preliminary drafts w^ere negotiated 
in London at a series of conferences where I was represented, but not 



1946 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

personally present. At the last London meeting, tlie Soviet prosecutor 
included among crimes charged in the east the following : 

In September 1941, 925 I*olish officers who were prisoners of war were killed in 
the Katyn Forest near Smolensli. 

Both British and American representatives protested, but they 
finally concluded that, despite their personal disapproval, if the 
Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were entitled to do so 
under the division of the case. 

Tlie indictment was brought to Berlin for final settlement and 
filing, where I objected to inclusion of the charge and even more 
strongly when, at the last moment, the Soviet delayed its filing by 
amending the Katyn charge to include 11,000 instead of 925 victims. 
However, it was in the Soviet part of the case and they had inves- 
tigated Katyn; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what 
we knew of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of 
Poland, it did not seem unlikely that this was part of their program, 
and the Soviet claimed to have adequate evidence of Nazi guilt. 

While we did not feel justified in preventing the issue, we warned 
the Soviet delegation that we did not have evidence to support the 
charge nor time nor opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met 
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave 
the entire contest to the Soviet and German lawyers. 

The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to 
participate in its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict 
in several respects with what I considered to be sound trial policy 
for the first such case in history. It was not based upon any convic- 
tion in my own mind about the truth or falsity of the charge. I 
knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that both 
were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to 
commit it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each 
toward Poland. Whatever the facts were, they had become overlaid 
with deep layers of Nazi and Soviet propaganda and counterpropa- 
ganda, and it seemed we could not at the international trial wisely 
undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of separating truth 
from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclusion are 
four: 

First, responsibility for the massacre did not appear to be capable 
of documentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic 
decisions on policy concerning the Nuremburg international trial was 
that we should accuse only defendants whose guilt could be established 
and should charge only offenses whose occurrence could be fully proved 
or substantially corroborated by documentary evidence captured from 
the Germans themselves. 

Because this Avas the first internatioiuil criminal trial in history 
and was held in the wake of war when passions were high, we did 
not want any judgment that Mould rest solely on oral testimony of 
witnesses whose interest, bias, memory, and truthfulness would always 
be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting 
matters because evidence measuring uj) to tliis standard was not then 
obtainable, llowevei', that policy was so far observed thai the tribu- 
nal, in its judgment, said : 

Tilt' rase, thcrefoi-e. a.yainsi the (IcfciHl.-ints rcsis in a l.-iriic nicasiin' in di>c- 
iinicnts (if their own nuikin;:, the antlicnl icit\ of wliicli Ims not been ( lialienyed 
except in one or two cases. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1949 

We had tile diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of 
Poland, acknowledged by him to be authentic, saying : 

We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wlierever it is 
possible. 

In August 1942 he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations 
in Poland : 

That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only mar- 
ginally. It is a matter, of course, that should the Jews not starve to death it 
would, we hope, result in the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures. 

We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such 
as the 75-page leather-bound official report by Major General Stroop 
which recited the killing of men, women, and children of the Warsaw 
ghetto to the exact number of 56,065, and set out the day-to-day 
measures, including shooting, fire, explosion, and chemical extermina- 
tion in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge, accompanied 
by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency. 

We had the report by SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler, 
dated October 1941, of the execution of 135,567 persons in Lithuanian 
area. 

We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly 
details of the operations in the east of gas wagons for killing 
undesirables. 

We also had German protests, official, but not very high minded, 
against such exterminations, in one instance of 150,000 to 200,000 Jews, 
and in another instance of 5,000 Jews, because it was complained they 
should have been spared for use as forced labor. 

Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously 
dramatized it. For example, a death book of the Mauthausen con- 
centration camp recorded 35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203 
persons died of the same ailment, heart trouble, died at brief and regu- 
lar intervals, and, more astonishingly, died in alphabetical order. 
Death came first to Ackermann, at 1 : 15 a. m., and reached Zynger at 
2 p. m. 

Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured Ger- 
man officials. One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi 
extermination program had done away with 4 million persons in 
concentration camps and that 2 million additional were killed by the 
secret police in the east. 

Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf, testified willingly, even boast- 
fully, that he supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women, and 
children in the eastern area. 

The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center, 
swore that under his regime it exterminated 3 million human beings. 
This was by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities com- 
mitted against the Polish people. 

Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war 
had placed in our hands when documents were procurable from other 
sources. An example was the Nazi persecution of the church and 
clergy, particularly vicious in Poland, which the Nazis documented 
with the candor and thoroughness that they did persecution of the 
Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were available to us, we 
could have gathered evidence of the church persecution in Poland, 
since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control 

93744— 52— pt. 7 9 



1950 THE K.\TYN FOREST AIASSACRE 

where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt 
the zeal of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I 
sought an audience with Pope Pius, and obtained from His Holiness 
the Vatican documents in which detailed evidentiary material was 
already collected, and which supported the charge of religious 
persecution. 

As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could 
turn for such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and 
patriotic Poles who might become the leadership of the restoration of 
Poland was provable by document to be consistent with the Nazi policy 
toward Poland. Yet, while they had boasted on paper of the worst 
crimes known to man, we found but one Nazi document that even 
hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that being a 
telegram reporting that the Polish Red Cross had found that German- 
made ammunition was used in the killings. 

A fourth difficulty entered into our reluctance to undertake the 
Katyn murder charge as part of the Nuremberg trial. We were under 
exceedingly heavy pressure to get along with the trial. A persistent 
criticism in the American press during the trial was its long duration. 

Of course, that is forgotten now. 

Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross-examination by 
several counsel, of course takes much more time than documentary 
proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Nuremberg trial had 
to be forthwith interpreted into three other languages. Every exami- 
natio7i or cross-examination had to include any proper questions de- 
sired by more than 20 lawyers representing defendants and 4 for the 
prosecution, and these were trained in 5 different legal systems — 
English, American, French, Russian, and German. 

Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego 
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent 
to which we aA'oided relying on oral proof when I remind you that 
all 4 prosecutors at Nuremberg called only 83 witnesses to testify 
orally on the whole case against the 20 individual defendants, and 
these defendants, in addition to themselves, called only 61 witnesses. 

You have already", according to your interim report, orally ex- 
amined 81 witnesses on this 1 atrocity. 

Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on 
February 14, 11)46, opened tlie subject by presenting to the tribunal a 
report by a Soviet extraordinary state commission of its investigation 
of the Katyn crime. It recited testimony, including a good deal of 
hearsay and medical data, as to the condition of the exhumed bodies. 
On this, experts based opinions that the executions took place during 
the period of (lei'man o('('u])ation and, theivfoi-e, that the Germans 
were resj)onsible. 

\h\ Stahmer, counsel for (ioering, made a ])r()nn)t request to call 
Avilnesses to contradict the Soviet report, whicli occasioned some disa- 
greement between the Soviet prosecutors and those rei)resenting Great 
Britain and tlie United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view 
that, since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the ex- 
traordinary commission as a state document, it could not be contra- 
dicted. Under Soviet hiw it probably could not, but would be en- 
titled to faith and credit — as a jndgnient, statute, or public act would 
be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature was such that it was 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1951 

clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers proposed, if 
the subject were opened, to call 10 witnesses. The tribunal, however, 
ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses 
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact.'" 

Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d 
days of July 1946. What it was is a matter of record — I have cited 
the record to you — and what it is worth is a matter of opinion. 

At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing 
and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially, 
complained that they had been allowed to call only 3 of the 120 wit- 
nesses that appeared liefore the Soviet commission. The tribunal, 
wisely, I think, refused to hear more of the subject. 

The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The 
tribunal did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn mas- 
sacre. Neither did it expressly exonerate them, as the judgment 
made no reference to the Katyn incident. The Soviet judge dis- 
sented in some matters but did not mention Katyn. 

This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to estab- 
lish responsibility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided 
by the Nuremberg tribunal or contended for by the American prose- 
cution will stand in your way. 

Chairman JNIadden. Does that complete your formal statement, Mr. 
Justice? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

And I may say that my files supporting this are open to your coun- 
sel at any time, as I think he understands. 

Chairman Madden. If you have any further comments to make be- 
fore the members propound questions, you are at liberty to many any 
comments you desire. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Thank ^ou, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that tells the story of the situation, and I will be glad to 
answer any questions that the committee wishes to ask about it. 

Chairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have ques- 
tions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I just finish up one part of this 
now ? 

Chairman ]\Iadden. Proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Jackson, will you refer to part 5 of the Katyn 
Forest JNIassacre Committee hearings held in Frankfurt, Germany, 
page 1537, and will you read, please, the statement of Dr. Kempner? 

Mr. Justice Jackson (reading) : 

Count I, conspiracy, and count II, crimes a,u;ainst peace, were handled by the 
United States and by the British. Count III, war crimes, and count IV, crimes 
against humanity, were divided up accordinji' to seographical regions or dis- 
tricts. The French handled the war crimes and crimes against humanity as far 
as Western Europe was concerned. They were, so to siieak, sp<ikesnien, the 
prosecuting spokesmen, for the French, for the Dutch, for the Belgians, and 
other German-occupied western territories. The Kussians were in charge of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity which were allegedly committed in the 
eastei-n areas, and if I say eastern areas, I mean the Soviet Union, Poland, and 
at the time they handled also Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. 

Mr. Mitchell. Your prepared statement of this morning has satis- 
factorily cleared up any doubt that might be in the mind of anybody 
concerning that statement ; is that correct, sir ? 



1952 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I think so. 

Of course, there were crimes against Greece which were also in- 
cluded in the eastern territory. We included some against the Lith- 
uanians, Estonians, and the Baltic groups. 

And while this division prevailed, it was not an absolute division, 
for the reason that conspiracy to commit these crimes was the re- 
sponsibility of the Americans, and in establishing the conspiracy, we 
put in a great deal of evidence on those crimes ourselves, as I pointed 
out. 

We put in a great deal about Poland, although it was not in our 
area on the crimes against humanity. It was in our area in the over-all 
conspiracy charge. 

So that it is a little difficult to say that a very exact division was 
observed, because of the overlapping. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, for the record, I think you should 
identify who Dr. Kempner is. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Dr. Kempner was a man who had been a Ger- 
man lawyer and was in the employ, I believe, of the OSS. My staff 
was not a staff that I hired. I borrowed the staff from other depart- 
ments. I had no budget and I borrowed help. Dr. Kempner was bor- 
rowed from the OSS and assisted us there throughout the trial. 

He tlien took a part in the subsequent trials. 

Mr. Mitchell. While participating, he was an American citizen, 
was he not? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes ; I think that is the case. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you now refer to page 3 of your prepared 
statement, Mr. Justice? 

In paragraph 2 the statement is made that : 

We would keep hands off and leave the entire contest to the Soviet and German 
lawyers. 

Now, there has been a great deal of talk that representatives of the 
United States, members of your staff, in some way or other, by imjili- 
cation or by assistance, tried to assist the Soviets in the proving of this 
case. Do you, to your personal knowledge, know of any individual 
who, in any way, participated in assisting the Soviets in proving this 
case against the Nazis, that is, an American ? 

Mr.Justice Jackson. That is a very difficult question to answer as 
broadly as you have asked it. 

Our captured documents were set up in a document room and our 
captured documents were available to the Soviets and to the Germans. 
For example, the document that the Soviets did use showing the tele- 
gram about the German ammunition, that was an American-captured 
document. 

Our documents were available to both sides. 

But that is the only document that we ever found. 

Now, we did not permit the Soviets to go into our document room 
and make their own selections of documents. If there was something 
tliat bore on particularly their phase of the case, I suppose that some 
of our people furnished them those documents. 

Other than that, I know of no assistance. In fact, there was not a 
^reat deal of even conferring between their staff and ours because the 
Soviets are not very sociable, I might say. They hesitate somewhat 
to be too much with us. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1953 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you clear up for the record, please, the exact 
function of General Mitchell, who was the executive secretary? I 
believe it was he. Was he the American who was in control of mak- 
ing arrangements for the lawyers to meet? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I cannot give you much information about 
General Mitchell. He was not under my control and he was not on my 
staff. 

The tribunal, when it arrived, set up its own staff, and General 
Mitchell was selected by somebody to represent, as general secretary — 
I believe it was called — the tribunal. He did not in any way represent 
me. He was not a lawyer, and I suppose any instructions that he had 
came from the tribunal. 

We had an American that I had asked to remain over there, Mr. 
Willey, now Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, who had gone 
over to help set up courts in that country. I asked him to come to- 
Nuremberg to assist in the clerical work of the tribunal. The tribunal, 
however, got General Mitchell and put him over all four of the repre- 
sentatives. 

Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Do you know, to your own personal knowledge, 
whether any member of your staff' participated in the discussions 
between the German counsel and'the Soviet counsel? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say. I think they may have been 
present as observers, or something of that sort, because we were much 
concerned about not having a situation that would prolong this trial. 
B'ut we took no part in any arrangements between the Soviets and the 
Germans about it. We thought that was their fight. 

Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, any memlier of your staff had no specific 
instructions from you to participate in preparing the case one way or 
the other ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Oh, no. 

Mr. Mitchell. Xo further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Machrowicz. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, referring to the final paragraphs of 
your statement, you state that : 

The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abancioned the charge. The tribunal 
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre * * * 

That is based upon the fact that there were no findings made by the 
tribunal; is that correct? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Since the question has been raised at various 
times, I would like to have you give us your statement as to whether 
it could have been possible, if proper testimony had been adduced at 
the hearing, to convict the Soviets of the crime at the Nuremberg 
trial, in view of the four power nature of that tribunal? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. It could not. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain why? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. They had not been indicted. 

And if you will inake reference to the very first page, you will see 
that my authority was only to prepai'e and pi'osecute charges of atroci- 
ties and war crimes "against such of the leaders of the European Axis 
Powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States 
may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an 
international military tribunal.'' 



1954 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. So it could not have been presented at the Nurem- 
berg trial. 

Mr. Justice Jacksox. It surely could not have been, nor was I at 
liberty to negotiate on any such subject. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at any time receive any instructions from 
anyone in authority to treat the Katyn case in any other manner 
than the other portions of the indictment against the Germans? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No. As a matter of fact, I received very little 
instruction from anybody. The thing was a lawyer's job, and I had 
no instructions. If I may be so blunt as to say so, I thought that 
having once gotten me into it, there was a pronounced disposition to 
leave everything to me. I will not say exactly that it was to "pass the 
buck," but I was in charge of it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have with you the exchange of any cables 
or other messages that Avere sent prior to the presentation of the Katyn 
case between you and any other representative of the United States 
Government ? 

Mr, Justice Jackson. There was no cable that I know of, except 
the cable that I referred to, from General Clay, which I do have here. 
It is classified "Secret," and perhaps should not become a part of the 
record. But I should be perfectly satisfied to have the committee 
see it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask whether you have any recollection of 
receiving a cable from Ambassador Lane in Warsaw? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. This, I suppose, originated with Ambassador 
Lane. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could the committee see that, please? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes, certainly. 

It may be a paraphrase, and may not, I don't know. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Is that dated December 16, 1945? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No; January 21, 1946. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to have you examine this exhibit 
I have here, which purports to be a cablegi'am from Ambassador Lane 
to Secretary of State Stettiiiius at Washington, with a cojjy to Berlin, 
flustice Jackson, Nuremberg, bearing the date of December 16, 1945, 
and I ask you whether you have a recollection of seeing that document ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say whether I ever saw that or not. 
1 certainly would not say that I did not. There was a vast amount 
of material pouring in on us, and we had a number of people working 
on different branches of the case. I surely would not say that it 
might not have come to the attention of somebody in a responsible 
position with me. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember any information received from 
Warsaw or Washington which would give you advice, let us say, 
similar to that contained in that cablegram? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That was consistent with our attitude, and 
I have no recollection of any specific inference. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You referred in your statement to statements 
made by Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colouel Szymanski. 
I believe you referred to Colonel Szymanski, who had testilied before 
this committee. Is that correct? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is Avhere I heard about it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read those statements? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No; I have not. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1955 

Mr. Machrowicz. Have you read the statements of witnesses that 
appeared to give testimony before this committee ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I have not had time to do so. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You are aware, however, that these three, Colonel 
Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, did, prior u> 
December 1945, make reports to the Department of the Defense in- 
dicating Russian guilt for the Katyn massacre ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I am so informed now ; yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Looking in retrospect, would you not think, then, 
that it would have been of assistance to you had you had those reports 
in your possession at the time ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, any information would have been 
helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on 
whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate 
information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all 
to have it in. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it 
out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not 
making the accusation. 

Mr. Machrowicz. The point I wish to make is that you know now 
that prior to December 1945 the United States Government did have 
certain officials reports, namely, reports of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel 
Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, which very strongly indicated Soviet 
guilt. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I understand they had such statements. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you give us any reason that you might know 
of why those reports were not made available to j'ou? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know where they were. You must 
remember that communication at that time was very difficult. I do 
not know where the reports may have been. I do not know what 
their reasons may have been for not calling them to our attention. 

Since we did not propose to go into the litigation of this issue, 
they may have, knowing our attitude, thought they were not important. 
I would not know what their reasons were. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Referring to a remark contained on page 5 of 
your statement, you state that the attitude of the Polish Government 
in exile was that the case should not be presented at Nuremberg; is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is what they concluded. 

I will give you the photostats of the letter. 

Mr. Machrowicz. "WHiich letter are you referring to? The letter 
of the 12 Members of the Parliament ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I will give you photostats of that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. General Anders did offer to testify if he was 
requested to do so, by the tribunal ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I did not know of that until his book, as I 
have said, I did not know that Stahmer, who was Goering's counsel, 
had asked him to testify. I did know that Stahmer knew that these 
conversations to which Anders was a party had taken place, because 
the Germans filed with the tribunal a request for documents which 
would show that they knew that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Is there anything in these documents, Mr. Justice, 
which would indicate that this communication from the members of 
the Polish Parliament was sent to you as a result of instigation by the 



1956 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

British authorities, or as a result of conference with the British 
authorities? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No ; I do not think so. I do not recall any- 
thing in it that would give that indication. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman. . 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero. 

Mr. DoNDERo. Mr. Justice Jackson, there is one thing in your state- 
ment that caused me to raise my eyebrows, and I am sure you may be 
able to help us on it. 

It is on page 4, at the bottom of the page : 

Second, if we were ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary 
evidence, tliis atrocity was not a suitable instance because we knew of no wit- 
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpe- 
trators * * *. 

Now, the Nuremberg trial took place in 1945 and 1946. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

Mr. DoNDERo. There was presented to us — I will have to make this 
statement to you — there was presented to this committee at Frankfurt, 
Germany, what is known as a protocol or statement signed by 12 
medical experts, representing at least 6 different governments of Eu- 
rope, some of them neutral governments, to the effect that when the 
graves of these men were discovered by the Germans they had invited 
in these experts to make an examination of the bodies and to file such 
statement as they saw fit. 

These 12 did so at the grave site, and such statement is now known 
as the protocol whicli was offered in evidence before our committee 
and is now a part of the record. 

Wlien we were in Euroj^e we called before us as witnesses some of 
those 12, who were still living, and I recall the doctor from Denmark, 
Dr. Tramsen, and Dr. Naville, from Switzerland, and Dr. Miloslavich, 
of Yugoslavia. 

It appeared that the other doctors who lived in the countries that 
have since been taken behind the iron curtain have committed suicide, 
or have died. 

I do not have that statement before me, but it is dated as I recall, 
in May of 1943, which would be more than 2 years before the Nurem- 
berg trials. 

They stated that in the protocol these Polish officers or intelligentsia 
were killed, in their opinion, sometime in the autumn of 1989 or the 
early part of 1940. At that time, the ground in which these bodies 
were found was in possession of the Russians, and it is on Russian soil. 

My question is : Did the tribunal of whicli you were a i)ait, have 
before it any of that evidence either of that protocol or of the 12 
doctors, representing some of the neutral nations, who made their 
findings at the graves in 1948 ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. First, I would like to say that I was not a 
part of the tribunal. I was a prosecutor before the tribunal. 

However, we knew of that report. What the tribunal knew about 
it I think Avas put in evidence by the Germans. That report was the 
subject of the controversy. The Germans had their rej^tort signed by 
the 12 doctoi-s. The Russians had theii- extraordinaiy commission re- 
port, in which their doctors had looked at these bodies, not the same 
bodies perhaps, but they had exhumed bodies, and they gave their ex- 
pert opinions. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1957 

Mr. DoNDERO. Was that last-named commission wholly Russian ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

Now, at the request of the Germans, we located Dr. Naville, whom 
I think you swore, and you will find in my statement at page 13, in 
the fine print, Congressman Dondero, that the tribunal allowed him 
to Goering, provided he could be located. 

We found him in Switzerland, but he informed the tribunal that he 
saw no use in coming as a witness for Goering. In other words, some 
of these witnesses that may be available today were not going to help 
Goering and his crowd. That was the attitude of General Anders. 

That correspondence w^as conducted between Goering's lawyer and 
General Anders, and he was not willing to come at their request. 

We did not want to get into expert testimony. The Russians did 
have an enormous number of alleged witnesses, and we would be there 
yet if it called their 120 witnesses and the German witnesses. 

The tribunal limited it to three on a side. That was not at our 
request, although I may say I was greatly relieved when I found 
that they had done it. 

And I do not criticize them for it because, in the conditions of that 
time, I do not think it would have been a profitable inquiry. 

Mr. Dondero. Tlie court had been in session a considerable length 
of time, I think 9 months, and it wanted to wind up its hearings and 
disband. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

Mr. Dondero. Now, I have one more thing. 

You spolve of the German ammunition. Did the tribunal call be- 
fore it any of the manufacturers of German ammunition to testify? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No. There was no request from the Germans 
to do so. 

You will fin.d all that I know about the German ammunition in the 
fine print on note 20, on page 9. There was a letter which followed, 
and we never found the letter. It may be in existence. ^"NHiat the 
letter would have shown, we do not know. 

Mr. Dondero. The reason for asking you that question is this: 
There was presented to this committee in Frankfurt, Germany, the 
head, or the president of the company that made the ammunition, 
with his books, showing that firm had sold ammunition to the three 
Baltic States, and also to Russia some years before World War II 
had broken out. That rather indicated that even though it was 
German ammunition that was used in the killing of these men, there 
was an explanation as to how it got into the hands of the Russians. 
They had purchased it. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That piece of evidence we did not regard as 
of any significance to ourselves, because of the fact that so much 
ammunition changes hands. You might find American-made guns in 
the hands of some of these other people. You cannot tell by the gun 
that is used who shot it. 

Mr. Dondero. The reason why I am inquiring of you, Mr. Justice, 
regarding that protocol of the 12 doctors, is that< this committee felt 
if they could fix the time that these men were killed, they could also 
fix the guilt. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right. 

Mr. Dondero. And these doctors, some of them from neutral coun- 
tries, signing this statement showing that they were shot either in the 



1958 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

fall of 1939 or the cold months of 1940, up to May 1, indicated that 
at that time Russia was in complete control of that part of her terri- 
tory on which the graves were found. So that it made it almost 
physically impossible for the Germans to have committed the crime. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. If you fix the time of that crime, you fix the 
responsibility. I fully agree. 

Mr. DoNDERO. That was the opinion of this committee. 

Mr. Justice Jacksox. But the difficulty, from our point of view, 
about that, was that all that we had by which to fix the time was the 
opinion of doctors, based on the condition of the bodies. 

While I do not want to say anything disrespectful of a brother 
profession, God save the man who has to prove his case by expert testi- 
mony, because it is a terrible proposition. 

The Russians had their doctors, too, and they called one of the 
Gei'man doctors who testified. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Was there anything submitted, Mr. Justice, in the 
Nuremberg trial as to mute evidence found on the bodies of these men ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Except as is found in these reports. 

Mr. DoNDERO. There were presented to this connnittee post cards, 
letters, and other documents found in the ]X)ckets of these men. But 
none of them bore a date later than May 1, 191:0. 

JNIr. Justice Jackson. You had a great deal of evidence that we did 
not have. 

Mr. DoNUERo. That you did not have ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right; a great deal of it. 

Mr. DoNDERO. There is just one thing more, and that is at the bottom 
of page 4 : 

The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at 
Nuremberg which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters. 

At that time, Mr. Justice, Warsaw was in complete control of the 
Russian Government, was it not? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is correct. 

Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski. 

Mr. O'Konski. Mr. Justice, here is the conclusion of the conmiittee : 

The evidence, testimony, records, and exhibits recorded by this committee 
through its investigations and hearings during the last D months overwhelmingly 
will show the people of the world that Russia is directly reseponsible for the 
Katyn massacre. 

And here is the significance : 

Throughout our entire proceedings there has not been a scintilla of proof 
or even any remote circumstancial evidence that could indict any other nation 
In this international crime. 

How many staff members did your division, or your office, have at 
the Nuremberg trials ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. We had a very large number. I do not know 
just what you wish to include in that. We had translators and inter- 
preters. I never knew just what our staff consisted of because the 
Army did a great many things in connection with it. But it was a 
very large number. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would that run into the thousands? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I thiuk that at its maxinuim, including 
translators, people assigned by the Army to run mimeograph ma- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1959 

chines — we had to make copies in four hmguages of everything that 
was used in the tribunal — I think our American personnel at its 
maximum was about 750. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. This committee was made up of seven members, 
and we had one counsel and one investigator. We came to this 
conclusion. 

Now, since the conclusion was so obvious, is it not logical to assume, 
then, that either one of two things happened at Nuremberg : 

No. 1. Your staff did not make a conscientious effort to get the 
evidence, or 

No. 2. The evidence which was available at that time was deliber- 
ately withheld from your people? 

Is not that a logical conclusion after listening to the conclusion 
of this committee? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No; that is not a logical conclusion, Mr. 
OTvonski. You have used a great deal of evidence, if I rely on the 
newspapers, that we could not have introduced. We could not call 
a witness, for instance, who was masked so that his identity could not 
be determined. We could not use that kind of testimony. 

You may be entirely satisfied with evidence because you, no doubt, 
know the man and know his history. 

But I use that merely as an example of the availability of evidence 
to a congressional committee that we could not have used in court 
if we had found it. My staff was never instructed— and I take the 
full responsibility for it — was never instructed to investigate this 
atrocity, because, from the very beginning we told the Soviets, and 
the Germans well understood it, that it was to be settled between 
them. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. ]\Ir. Justice, I have one or two questions with refer- 
ence to the Nuremberg trials and the Korean situation as we know 
it today. 

First of all, on page 6, I want to refer to two sentences in your 
statement. No. 1 is : 

We did not learn of any usable evidence in American possession. 

No. 2 is : 

I knew of nothing, at any time during the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel 
•Stewart, or Colonel Szymanski. 

In talking to Congressman Machrowicz a little while ago, you said 
that if you had some of that evidence brought to your attention at the 
trial you would not have permitted the Katyn phase of it to be put on 
the indictment ; is that right ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. If that had been available to us before October 
20 or the 18th — I have forgotten whether it wa.s the 18th or the 20th 
that the indictment was filed — we might very well have kept this out 
of the case entirely. 

Mr. Sheehan. Is that 1945, or 1946? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. 1945. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did anyone from our State Department make any 
attempt to give you a.nj evidence that they had about the Katyn situa- 
tion, any material? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. No. 



1960 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan. Did anybody in the Army Intelligence, G-2, make 
any attempt at any time to give you an}^ evidence that the}' had i 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I have recited to you exactly what they gave 
us, the date that they gave it, and I liave it in my files available to 
your counsel. 

Mr. Sheehax. Permit me to be sj^ecific. I mean things like the 
Van Vliet report, things which have disappeared that you could not 
have had. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I never heard of the Van Vliet report until I 
heard it was lost. 

Mr. Sheehan. Then there was Captain Gilder, who gave a report to 
G-2, who was a British ofHcer who went to Katyn and testified on this 
report that the Russians were guilty. Did you ever get that report? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I never got that report. 

Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, should not an attempt have been made by 
our American officials in the State Department, the executive, or the 
G-2, to bring to your attention all the evidence they had, such as 
reports from military attaches, ambassadors, and so forth? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I am not prepared to criticize them. 

Mr. Sheehan. It is not criticism; I just called it to your attention. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. It would be criticism if I said they should 
liave brought it to my attention, and did not. 

You have to remember the conditions at that time. The Army was 
closing up a war over there. I am not going to criticize the other 
services. 

If I had known of and asked for something and they had withheld it 
from me, then I should criticize them. But the fact that they did not 
bring something to my attention that now would appear to have been 
useful to have had — you see, we had so much. We had over 100.000 
documents that my staff screened out. We translated over 5,000 doc- 
uments and put in evidence over 4,000 documents, making our 
documentary case. 

It is hard to say that they were under any criticism because they 
did not produce it. That is a conclusion for the committee to draw, 
and not for me to say. 

Mr. Sheehan. I might only remark on that, Mr. Justice, that if we 
waited for some of these documents to come from G-2 and the State 
Department we would be in the same mess you fellows were in in 
Nuremberg. We get Avhat we are looking for specifically, and we 
fight for them. 

Now, I will ask my other question. 

As you can well see, the Nuremberg trials have had an effect on this 
Katyn investigation, and our committee has gone on record rather 
informally that the Congress should do something about the Korean 
pro})lem, because we have found our American soldiers murdered in 
much the same manner as tlie Polish soldiers were, with their hands 
tied behind their backs and with a single bullet hole. Some of us 
have concerned ourselves about the international military tribunal, the 
l)recedent you men set up in London and Nuremberg. So that some of 
the questions our committee is interested in come from that particular 
angle, and I would like to phrase them to you in this way : 

No. 1, I want to ask about the precedent that you set up at Nurem- 
berg. When I say "you,'' I mean the Nuremberg trials, the Int.«i'- 
uatioiial Militarv Tribunal. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1961 

We have heard much in the hist couple of months and several years 
of guilt by association, and you have personal feelings on that, I 
assume. 

However, in State Department Document 3080, you point out — and, 
if you want, I will read it to you — that the purpose of the Nuremberg 
trials was only to find certain organizations guilty so, by the same 
token, you can then find a lot of individuals guilty. 

Is that a good legal and moral premise ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is not the premise that I stated, 

Mr. Sheehan. Just so that we may know the interpretation, may I 
read 3^our direct quotation there '. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. You can take thinks out of context. 

Mr. Sheehan. No; I will read the whole paragraph. All right, 
whatever you like. 

This is document published by the State Department, No, 3080, 
which was the stenographic record of the report of the London Con- 
ference which set up the International Military Tribunal. Yon are 
the author of this particular document, and the quotation I have here, 
according to the document, is : 

I have never thoii.sht of this as a permanent tribunal. The whole American 
plan which was professed here was designed to reach a very large number of 
people at a single trial, or. at most, perhaps a very few trials. That is the 
reason we have tried to reach people through organizations. We have not 
thought of it as a trial of Iri or .30 people, but we have thought of it as a trial 
the result of which would affect thousands of people at least. 

And in your direct testimony here you said you only heard from 13 
oral witnesses. 

Do you think this procedure of indicting a couple of organizations 
and indicting all the people per se is a proper legal and moral thought? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Not if you put it that way. That is not what 
we did ; that is not what we proposed to do. 

I can explain it to you if you care to have the explanation. 

Mr. Sheehan, Yes, 

Mr, Justice Jackson. Certain organizations, such as the SS, the 
SA, the Grestapo, were founded for certain purposes. Men joined those 
well knowing their purposes. We did not propose to start out to 
find each individual and have each individual try the question of the 
character of his party. 

That is one of the difficulties that is inherent in the present situation 
in the United States in which in each individual case involving Com- 
munists you are going over the same old material about the central 
core of the party and its teachings and what they mean. 

We proposed to put the organization on trial and ascertain its pur- 
poses, its character, and have that declared. Anyone who showed any 
interest in it should have the right to come in and make a defense 
of the organization; but, once that had been found, the individual 
could not thereafter say, "Well, it is true I joined it; I participated, 
but it was an innocent organization." 

But what he could say was, "It is true I joined it, but I had a gun 
at my back," or "I was defrauded into it; I did not understand it." 

But the central core of guilt or innocence of the party, the group 
of the SA and the Gestapo, we proposed to dispose of in one trial. 

And I think yon will find that was explained clearly throughout 
those London proceedings. 



1962 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Now, those proceedinfrs took place before we knew that the Control 
Council was going to set up a denazification policy, which I had 
nothing to do with. If we had known that, we would not have 
bothered probably with the organizations, because the denazification 
program went considerable farther, on paper, at least, than any pro- 
posal that we made. 

But the proposal was to try, first, the general purposes, plan, teach- 
ings, and criminality of the organization as such, and then to allow 
any individual to be heard as to why he participated in it. 

Mr. Sheehan. Thank you. 

That straightens that out, because it concerned me that you were 
going to affect thousands of people by trying the organization. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. It is very confusing. Discussions among 
four men with different legal systems is very confusing. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. I am only reading from the record, and we like 
to straighten this out because our committee is concerned about the 
Nuremburg phase. 

Another thing that concerns us and which you probably will be able 
to straighten out is this : You stated in these London hearings, in Docu- 
ment 3080, that you expressed grave doubts about the trial procedure, 
and you went on to make it clear that the proposals were to be con- 
tained, setting up the trial, in an executive agreement by the Presi- 
dent as Commander in Chief. 

Otherwise, you stated, the delays would occur because the agree- 
ment would then have to be ratified by the United States Senate. 

My question is : This idea of bypassing the Senate to get a commit- 
ment on foreign agreements, was that set up to you as a matter of 
policy that you had to follow, or was this your idea ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. How do you mean "set up to" me ? 

Mr. Sheehan. Set up by executive agreement, the Nuremberg trial. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Certainly. That was the policy of the United 
States, to w^ork this out by executive agreement. 

Mr. Sheehan. And not to give in at all to the United States Senate ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. The resolution that Congress had had — I do 
not recall what became of it — went farther than anything we proposed. 

Mr. Sheehan. These are just personal questions. 

Let me put it this way : Do you think that this idea of working out 
all these things by executive agreements and bypassing the Congress 
and the Senate are good for the country in the long run ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. In view of the cases that come before our 
courts sometimes, I think I would rather not express an opinion on 
the general policy of matters of that kind. It depends very much on 
what it is. 

Mr. Sheehan. All right. I respect your opinion. 

The reason why I bring that up is because of this fact: We have 
recently been apprised that a certain Chinese lurist who served on 
the International Militarv Tribunal in tlie Far East crimes has 
brouglit up something. His name is Mei Ju-so. He is accusing the 
United States now of military crimes, germ warfare, et cetera, against 
the Koreans and the Chinese. He has ])roposed publicly someday 
to bring us to trial, if they are ever victorious, for these crimes. 

Now, in view of the precedent that we have set up in the Nurem- 
berg trials, after every war may not there be these wholesale trials 
of both civilian and military personnel? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1963 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I have answered that several times in this 
way, Mr. Sheehan: What is new about the Nuremberg trials is not 
that the conquered is executed by the victor. What is new about the 
Nuremberg trials is that he gets a trial before he is punished. 

And, a I am ever captured by tlie Soviets, I will thank God if I 
get as fair a trial as we gave the Germans at Nuremberg. I do not 
expect it, and I beg for it, because the tribunal acquitted a great many 
of the people that we thought, on the face of what information we had, 
were guilty. 

But many of them were acquitted on some of the charges, and some 
of them were acquitted on all of the charges. 

I. have never heard even the Germans, even Lord Malmesbury, 
criticize us for having trials. He said these trials were fair, and that is 
what I would not expect if I got captured by the other side. 

Mr. Sheehan. I am quite willing to agree with you. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not think we would wait for that. 

Mr. Sheehan. There is one other thought I would like to have you 
dwell on, if you will, and I think that perhaps I ought to read your 
quotation from the report. This is your statement : 

Now, it may be that we were mistaken in our attitude and philosophy and 
that what Germany has done is right and legal, but I am not here to confess 
the error, nor to confess that the United States was wrong in regarding this as 
an illegal war from the beginning and in believing that the great crime of 
crimes in our generation was the launching of a needless war in Europe. 

In other words, from the document, apparently there was some 
question as to whether or not you were right. 

In view of the situation as we see it in Korea, and in view of the 
results of the Nuremburg trials, would you care to make any com- 
ment as to whether or not you think that, as of now, the Nuremberg 
trials served a useful purpose ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, I am not entirely a disinterested 
witness on that, you understand. 

Mr. Sheehan. I realize that. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I think they did. I think that, had it not 
been for the trials, you never could have had the collection of docu- 
ments which exhibit the origin of that war as they do now. 

These men in the dock had a chance to deny these documents and, 
as the tribunal pointed out, there Avere almost none of them denied. 

Then, too, we showed — and I think it is important to the future of 
international law — that the lawyers representing four different sys- 
tems of law can find common ground for settling a controversy by 
judicial process instead of resorting to war. 

I think that maybe in the long run the best thing that was accom- 
plished is that, because heretofore it has always been thouglit that 
you could not do that kind of thing. 

Then, too, there is a store of documents that if they were properly 
used, in my opinion — and it is my opinion you are asking for — if they 
were properly used, would very greatly strengthen the position of 
democracy in Germany. I think they have never been properly used, 
brought to the attention of the German people. 

I will give you one example only, because I do not suppose you want 
to spend all day on this. 

Mr. Speer, who was the Minister of Production, testified as to his 
conversations with Hitler and with other of the hiffh Nazi officials 



1964 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

after it was apparent that we w^ere going to take Germany. He tried 
to get them not to destroy bridges, electric-light plants, and other 
things, pointing out that the German people would be the ones who 
would suffer if those things were destroyed. 

He pointed out it was the German people who had to live there; 
the rest of us did not. And Hitler's remarks about the German people, 
that they were undeserving, I think is one of the most important assets 
the United States and the other powers have for a free Gernumy 
against the rising nazism, if it had been exploited. 

Those things are at least available. 

Then I think we established the principle that aggressive war is a 
crime, and I am for that principle. I do not care whether the aggres- 
sion comes from our side or the other. We cannot have a rule of inter- 
national law that applies only one way. 

I feel that a great deal was accomplished. But, as I say, I am an 
interested witness, and there are those of distinction and ability who 
disagree with me. 

Mr. SnEEHAisr. Could you enlarge on the term "aggressive warfare" ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. By "aggressive warfare" as defined to the 
tribunal, we could not get the Eussians to agree on a definition of it. 
In the document which you have been quoting, you will find we spent 
a good deal of time. We endeavored to adopt their definition as con- 
tained in the Baltic treaties. But they did not want to adopt their 
ow^n definition. 

It was not very important to us for the particular purposes of 
Nuremberg, because, in view of the documents that we had, Hitler's 
instructions to his generals, and his conversations and speeches to 
them in what he thought were private gatherings, his conduct was 
aggressive by anybody's definition. 

So, it did not become very important to us. 

But we have never been able to agree on a definition of what con- 
stitutes aggression. 

Mr. SiiEpniAN. JNIy reason for asking that question, Mr. Justice, is 
that it seems to me that North Korea, in view of the present situation 
in Korea, certainly \jy any standards would be judged an aggressor, 
and, I think, China, with all tlie assistance and everything she has 
been giving to North Korea, there is the possibility of their being 
judged aggressors. 

Also the Ivussians, with their help in ai-ms and anununition and now 
soldiers, tliey might be so judged. 

Hut no nation has called anybody an aggressor except the North 
Koreans. Yet we, by the terms of the j)hilosophy that you are ex- 
])ounding, certainly would classify them as aggressors, and yet we 
take no action to brand them to the world as aggressors. 

You may or may not want to conuuont on that. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. T think I would ratlier not couunent on that. 

Mr. SiiKKHAN. That is all I liave, Mr. Chairman. 

Chaijiuan AfAnnKN. ]\Ir. O'Konski. 

Mr. OlvoNSKi. Would you consider the Russian unprovoked attack 
upon Finland in 1939 as an aggression, Mr. Justice Jackson'^ 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I w^ould ratlier not pass judgment on that, 
because I have never examined the documents, as 1 have in this case. 
If you asked mo my offliand impression from what I read in the news- 
pa])ers, my answer would be the same as yours. If you ask ni}' opinion 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1965 

as one who feels some responsibility for his opinions on legal subjects, 
I would say that I have not adequate information. 

Mr, O'KoNSKi. The same thine; would apply in the case where 
Kussia took over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia before 1040, and the 
same thing; would probably apply to the manner in which Kussia took 
over half of Poland in league witli Hitler in September of Idod. 

That may be neither here nor there, because under the regulations 
and under the manner in which your high tribunal was established — 
by "your," I mean the combined efforts of the four major powers — 
you do not bring the charge, and I notice the United States was 
allocated the over-all responsibility on conspiracy to incite and wage 
a war of aggression. Tliaf was the American responsibility at the 
Nuremberg trials. 

Under the procedure, there was no way in which the LTnited States 
of America, in meeting its responsibilities of this allocation of power, 
could have brought the charge against Russia, of aggression against 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. There was no way 
in which it could be done at Nuremberg, was there? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is true. But you will find, with reference 
to Latvia, Estonia, and the Baltic States, that we refused to accede 
to their description of them in the indictment. We had a consid- 
erable rumpus about it because, from their description, the inference 
was possible that they were a part of Soviet territory, as I guess they 
are now, in fact. 

And we refused to accept that. And we came near not being able 
to file an indictment because of our disagreement about it. 

Finally, in order to get on with the business, I let them file the 
indictment, and I filed with it a statement that nothing in that indict- 
ment could be construed as a recognition of anj^ claims of tlie Soviet 
Union in any of those states. 

So that there could never be a claim made that we had in any way 
recogniz'^d the validity of Russian action in those states. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In the same manner, Mr. Justice, even if the various 
agencies of the Government had given you all this evidence which 
was available, that the Communists were responsible for the Katyn 
murders, still you could not do anything about it even if you had 
that evidence; is not that corrects You could not do anything about 
it, under the procedure of the trial ? 

Mr. Justice J.\cksox. We could not have proceeded against them. 

What we could have done would be that with that strengthening 
our hand, we could have insisted that it not be brought in at all. But 
you would be in the same place you are today; you would not have it 
settled. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Then I would like to have your comment on this, 
Mr. Justice : If a nation has committed vast crimes against humanity 
or has committed vast acts of aggression, be sure to get on the winning 
side of the war, get a seat on the high tribunal, and you can never be 
prosecuted for the crimes that you have committed. 

In other words, suppose, in the closing days of the Korean war, 
Russia should reverse itself and join us as an ally and then sit at the 
table of the high tribunal. As long as they are on the winning side, 
as long as they get a seat on the high tribunal, there is no way in which 
they could ever be prosecuted for their acts, crimes against humanity, 
or acts of aggression ; is not that right ? 

93744— 52— pt. 7 10 



1966 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know how you could ever prosecute 
a prisoner that you cannot capture. Even in our own domestic society 
you first have to get physical power over him before you can do 
anything to him. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. The thing that worries me, Mr. Justice, is that, the 
way the tribunal was set up a nation can go on. From our investiga- 
tion there is no difference between Hitler and Stalin. I think that 
your tribunal did a very good job in hanging the Germans who were 
responsible for these acts against humanity. 

But in our investigation all the way through, we found out that the 
acts of genocide by the Communists are just as vicious as the acts of 
genocide used by Hitler. They are of the same pattern, cut out of 
the same cloth. 

It seems to me that, according to the way the tribunal was set up, 
Russia is going to be able to get by with its program of genocide and 
never get to trial, because they have maneuvered themselves into the 
position of being on the winning side and get a seat as a judge. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I will make a bargain with you, Mr. Congress- 
man. If you will capture Stalin, I will try him. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I will ask for that job myself to be sure he hangs. I 
wouldn't trust another Nuremberg trial. 

Chairman Madden, Mr. Machrowicz. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, apparently there has been some con- 
fusion as to the position of the London government at the time of 
these hearings. So there may be no misunderstanding, I would like 
to read from the last paragraph of the letter you presented us, the let- 
ter from the parliamentary group to you dated February 15, 1946. 
That letter points to the fact that there is strong indication of Russian 
guilt, and they state as follows : 

These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Russian 
POW camps has not yet been fully elucidated. 

The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling oi 
humanity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern tlic 
families of the victims. The entire Polish Nation is entitled to demand that 
this tragedy be cleared up. 

In view of these facts and circumstances, the undersigned would like to express 
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks ol 
the Nuremberg Tribunal. This case is of a special character and needs, in ordei 
to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated indeiiendently by an 
international judicial body. 

Would you not say that their position was that in view of the fact 
that there is a strong indication of Russian guilt and in view of tlie 
fact that the tribunal, as constituted at Nuremberg, could not possibly 
find Russian guilt; that they did not consider that the proper tribunal 
to try the case ? Is that a fair statement of their position ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is a fair statement of their position, and 
that is what I understood their position to be, and I agreed with that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Do any other members of the committee have 
any questions ? 

Mr. Sheehan. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to get this on the record for our purposes, Mr. Justice. 

When you and I were talking, you referred to that Soviet agreement 
in 193;i, where they did agree with certain Baltic States about the 
definition of crimes of aggression. 



THE KATYN FOREST ]VL\SSACRE 1967 

I think, for the purpose of our members here, I would like to read 
the four things they did agree to as being crimes of aggression in this 
] 933 agreement : 

1. Declaration of war upon another state. 

2. Invasion by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war of the 
territory of another state. 

3. Attack by its land, naval, or air forces with or without a declaration of war 
on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state. 

4. Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another 
state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in 
its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all 
assistance or protection. 

That was the agreement that Russia signed in 1933 at a convention 
for the definition of aggression signed at London by Rumania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Poland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. 

I merely relate that to the committee because, judging from the 
conduct of Russia during the last 10 years, she has been guilty of every 
single one of the acts of aggression, by her own definition. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. That is the definition I tried to get adopted, 
because, logically, if you were prosecuting persons for aggression, it 
would be well to include a definition. 

But, as I say, for our purposes, the failure to have a definition of 
aggression was not serious because, under any definition of aggression, 
Hitler's acts would come within it. 

But they refused to accept as general the definition which they had 
applied in these particular treaties. 

Mr. SHEEHAiSr. As a matter of information, for our committee, Mr. 
Justice — and in this I understand in your position on the Supreme 
Court you may not want to talk to us except in an executive session — 
but we were thinking actually of what we could do to bring this to 
the attention of the world in the sense that, from the definitions as we 
know them at Nuremberg, and from the regular practices of law, if, 
on the basis of the findings of Katyn, if we could not still indict 
Russia for aggression on the basis of the knowledge we have? 

Of course, as you say, we did not have the prisoner. It is a question 
of world opinion. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I gathered from joixr interim report that you 
had done that. The difficulty is that you do not have the prisoner. 

Mr. Sheehan. In your opinion, Mr. Justice, do you think it was a 
worth-while gesture, or not ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that the exploration of this subject is a 
thoroughly wholesome thing. That is one of the reasons why 1 co- 
operated with your counsel, or tried to, and why I say that my files are 
open. I am ready to give any help that I can in it. 

Mr, Sheehan. Mr. Justice, I have one more question. 

This, as I understand it, was turned in to the War Crimes Com- 
mission at Nuremberg, and I was just wondering, from your stand- 
point, do you have any idea of when this was turned over, the approxi- 
mate date ? 

I may first preface it with this remark : As I remember it, the origi- 
nal indictment of the Katyn massacre, which the Russians put in the 
indictment, was the fact that the men were killed in September of 
1941, and it would seem to us that this document I have here Avould 
more or less prove or lend a reasonable doubt as to the time. 



1968 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

So if tliis document had been aA-ailnlile to you before the indictment, 
or to your staif, it certainly shouhi have stopped the Russians from 
})uttin<>; in a specific date in the indictment. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know what the indictment is, so I 
cannot say when it was received. 

And I do not know I can do that by looking at it, because we had 
a collection of over 100,000 documents and I did not see them all. 

Mr. Mitchell. For the record, I believe this document w^as sent 
by General Bissell when he was military attache at London, which 
was after 1946 and after the indictment. I do not know whether it 
reached the Nuremberg trials. It was returned. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. It has the date on it, the 4th of August 194U. 
I do not know Avhat that means. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think I can help you on that. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. This is a receipt by General Telford Taylor, 
who was my successor, and he was not appointed brigadier general 
until he was named as my successor. 

This was not only after the indictment, but was after the interna- 
tional trial was practically completed. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think, in answer to that, Mr. Justice, you also, 
wrote a letter after the trials to General Anders saying that you got 
that, but it came too late. And even if that was not the case, there 
was not anything that could be done about it because of the set-up 
of the tribunal. It was not your responsibility to charge crimes 
against humanity. That was a Kussian responsibility. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I remember writing to General Anders when 
he sent me his book. So whatever you say is doubtless correct. 

Cliairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have further 
questions ? 

Does counsel have any questions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Justice, speaking on behalf of the mem- 
bers of the committee, we wish to thaidi you for coming here today 
and giving us your testimony. 

As I stated before, when tlie resohition was befoi'e the Congress, 
a number of Members of Congress incjuired regarding the Nuremberg 
trials. Your testimony has been very enlightening and valuable from 
the standpoint of what this committee will submit to the Congress on 
this i^hase of the hearings. 

I might ask your opinion regarding the matter. If you care to 
preS'ent it, we will be glad to receive it. 

Our connnittee, especially when we were in Europe, ])ublicized the 
testimony of the witnesses. There was testimony brought out by o"2 
witnessses at Fi'nnkfurt and also exliibits were introduced nunibei"ing 
into ()\('i' a Inindred. 

This testimony was daily chronicled, ])rinted, aiul sent out over all 
the free countries of Europe, by the daily newspapers and the radio. 
It was conveyed to the people over there every day. Not only was it 
presented to the free countries, but througli Ridio Free Euroj^e and 
jilso the Voice of America, it was carried behind the iron curtain. 

Just as an exani])le of wliat I am ))r()|>osiiig to ask, I might say this: 
Two members of tlie counnittee visited Berlin. 'Jliere was a conven- 
tion of tlie free jouiMialists of both Fastt'ni and Westei'U Europe in 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1969 

Berlin at the time. Some of these journalists had escaped from behind 
the iron curtain. 

The comment of some of these journalists was that the facts that 
were revealed by our committee while in Frankfurt brought to the 
minds of millions of people in Europe, both ontside and behind the 
iron curtain, a picture of the false propaganda which the Russians 
had been circulating regarding the guilt for the Katyn massacre. 
This testimony completely refuted all this propaganda that the Com- 
munists had been circulating. 

One journalist there in Europe had a reproduction of a broadcast 
that went over the Warsaw radio a few nights before. This broadcast 
tried to explain to the hundreds of people that had requested the reason 
why the Russian Government did not answer our invitation to appear 
before our conmiittee to give testimony on the Katyn massacre. 

Testimony came to the committee that the bodies that were found at 
Katyn were just a fraction of the massacres, barbarities, and genocide 
that the Soviets had been inflicting on other captured countries. 

By bringing out this testimony to the attention of the people in 
Europe behind the iron curtain and also to the world generally, I think 
our committee has contributed a great deal to world public opinion 
that something should and must be done by the free nations about 
international criminals. 

And, of course, the enslaved people behind the iron curtain are 
crying for some kind of termination to the atrocities and the genocide 
that is going on today. 

The members of our committee are going to follow through in the 
next Congress in trying to persuade the United Nations to take steps 
to terminate these atrocities, massacres, and barbarities that the Com- 
munist government today is committing. 

Mr. Justice, from your experience in the Nuremberg trials and as a 
public official, would you have any suggestions or any comment you 
would like to make to this committee as to what could he done in addi- 
tion to what is already being done to try and create a world public 
opinion to see if something could not be done to slow down the genocide 
and the atrocities that are being committed ? 

I might say that since the work of this committee started, we have 
not heard much about atrocities in Korea. I think the work of this 
committee has already slowed up the Communists on some of the 
wholesale slaughters that had been going on in Korea. 

Do 3^ou have anything you would like to state in the way of comment, 
Mr. Justice, for the information of the committee, in that regard? 

INIr. Justice jACKSOisr. I think in that respect that your effort is 
very similar to the purpose that we sought to accomplish at Nurem- 
berg: To pin responsibility where responsibility belongs, to make 
known to the public these atrocities, to bring about a state of public 
opinion in which war will not be the way to settle controversies. 

I see nothing inconsistent there. I think you are working along 
very much the same ultimate lines that we were. But you have a 
particular incident on which you can focus the light, whereas we 
were dealing with a more confused and larger situation growing out 
of the whole war. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Very well. 



1970 THE KATYN FOREST JVIASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Justice, you referred to the masked man who 
appeared before tliis committee. I think I will now have to reveal 
what the committee instructed me to do on that. That masked man 
is available today in the United States. That masked man, if this 
case ever goes beifore the International World Court, will, I am sure, 
stand before that World Court and testify. 

We are not an official court. Consequently, the masked man testi- 
fied in that fashion. He has a family ; he is disfigured . That was no 
publicity stunt, or anything of that kind. 

But I w^ant the record to clearly show that that individual, who 
was the only eyewitness of this massacre, is available, and even if the 
Soviets would like to join in the World Court at that time, I am 
sure that he can be induced to talk to the world. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not want you to take my observations 
as any reflection on your work, because I was answering a question 
as to why we could not do these things, and it is quite plain that you 
can take a gi"eat deal of evidence that we could not. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. This committee has traveled all over the world to 
get that evidence. It is officially documented. This committee will 
stand on that evidence before any international tribunal, and I am 
sure tlie case will stand up. 

That is a personal opinion. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan, do you have any further ques- 
tions ? 

Mr. Sheehan. Along the lines that the chairman brought out, as 
to your opinion on the fact that we are trying to form or develop 
world opinion, I would like to ask you this question, and as a legal 
opinion, not a political opinion, if you may want to answer it: 

Under the present set-up of the World Court of the United Nations, 
does the world have any legal means of trying Russia for the atrocities 
which we assume or allege she is guilty of today? Is there any way 
that we could do it legally ? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that is a question on which I had 
better not express an offhand opinion. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. The thouglit is, Mr. Justice, that, under the princi- 
ples laid down at Nuremberg, of trying to prevent aggression, and as 
the precedent is set up, will we have to wait until after, say, peace 
is declared in the world to try the Communist nations in Korea, and 
can the Nuremberg trials be used as a precedent? 

Mr. Justice Jackson. You have to bear in mind that Nuremberg 
was not something that we thought out as a matter of theory. We 
were confronted with certain facts. We had as prisoners German 
Goering, Ribbenti-o]), aud all of these men. They had been accused 
of the worst tilings iniagina})le. 

Tliere Avere tliree tilings we could do with them, one, we could just 
let them go. And if you will remembei- the tenii)o of those times, you 
know that that would have been impossible. 

Another thing we could do would be to just execute them or other- 
wise punish them, without trial. That always would go against the 
conscience of the American people, in my opinion. 

The only thing left to do was to give them a trial. 

So that the Nuremberg trial grew out of the fact that you had the 
prisoners, you had the charges, and, fortunately, we captured the 
evidence. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1971 

I do not know, to be perfectly candid with you how we ever would 
liave come out if we had had to use oral testimony, because it is so vul- 
lu'iable to attack. The great thing that saved the Nuremberg trial 
was the capture of innumerable incriminating, authentic documents. 

If you do not have those things, you are going to be greatly handi- 
capped in any international trial, in my experience. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ? 

Mr. Justice, we are indeed very grateful to you for coming here and 
testifying. Your testimony is very valuable. 

Mr. Justice Jackson. I shall be glad to be of any help that I can. 

Chairman Madden. Because your prepared statement has many 
footnotes for references which you did not mention when you were 
reading the statement for the committee, we will accept your entire 
statement at this point as exhibit 6. The photostatic copies of corre- 
spondence from the Polish Government in exile in London which you 
mentioned earlier as having received will be marked "Exhibit 7." The 
ommittee will now recess until 1 : 30 p. m. 

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p, m. 
same day.) 

Exhibits 6 and 7 were received in evidence and follow : 

EXHIHIT 6 

The Katyn Forest Massacre and the Nuunberg International Trial 

statement by Robert H. Jackson before Select Committee of House of Represent- 
atives To Investigate the Katyn Massacre 

The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has not been adjudged by the Niirn- 
berg Tribunal and inquiry into it is not inconsistent with the position taken 
by the United States prosecution at the Niirnberg international trial of Goering 
and others. 

It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the United 
States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all decisions and actions 
in reference to tlie Katyn atrocity and the reasons which conduced to them. 

The first step that seems pertinent ^ was an agreement to divide primary re- 
sponsibility for preparation and presentation of the case among the prosecutors 
representing the four allied powers. This was intended to fix on someone re- 
sponsibility for covering each part of the case, to avoid duplication, and to 
expedite a trial of imprecedented complexity. 

To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite and wage 
a war of aggression. The British were assigned the violation of specific treaties 
and crime on the high seas. Violations of the laws of war and crimes against 
humanity were divided on a geographical basis. The French undertook crimes 
in Western Europe, and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of pre- 
paring and presenting evidence of crimes in Eastern Europe — an area 
largely in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us 



1 Earlipr steps incUided my appointment by President Truman on May 2, 1945. The 
order defined the duty as follows : 

'. . . preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of 
the leaders of tlie European Axis powers and tlieir principal agents and accessories as the 
United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an 
international military tribunal." Exec. Order No. 9547, 10 Fed. Reg. 4961. 
Also included was a conference of representatives of the four nations to reach prelimi- 
nary undeistandings as to how, in view of tlieir different languages, systems of hiw and 
methods of trial, they would proceed. The conf(>rence began in Eonf'on, June 23, and 
concluded August 8, 1945, when an agreement was signed by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the KeiJublic of France, subsequently adhered to 
by nineteen other powers. Tlie minutes, proceedings, and agreements are published. 
Ilnternaticnitl Conference on Military Trials, Dept. State Pub. 30S0. 

I I sh;ill cite two i>fticial publications. One is the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression series 
of 11 volumes of the Niirnberg international trial documents in English (GPO). They 
are cited herein as N. C. v<c A. The other is the official transcript of the nroceedings and 
testimony. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 volumes 
in English except the documents, which are set forth in their original language. They 
are cited as Proceedings. 

The indictment is found I N. C. & A. 13 and 1 Proceedings 29. 



1972 THE KATYX FOREST IVIASSACRE 

had access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet representatives 
included Katyu Wood and Poland as well, but at that time it was not known that 
the Katyn massacre would lie involved. 

The first proposal that the Niirnberg trial should take up examination of the 
Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during the drawing of the 
indictment. Preliminary drafts were negotiated in London at a series of con- 
ferences where I was represented Imt not personally present. At the last Lou- 
don meeting, the Soviet prosecutor included among crimes charged in the East 
the following : "In Septeml)er 1941, 925 Polish officers who were prisoners of 
war were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk." P>oth P>ritish and Ameri- 
can representatives protested, but they finally concluded that, despite their 
personal disapproval, if the Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were 
entitled to do so under the division of the case." 

The indictment was brough to Bei'lin for final settlement and filing, where I 
objected to inclusion of the charge and even more strongly when, at the last 
monment, the Soviet delayed its filing by amending the Katyn charge to include 
11,000 instead of 92.j victims. However it was in the Soviet part of the ca.se and 
they had investigated Katyn ; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what 
we know of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of Poland, it did 
not seem unlikely that this was part of their program, and the Soviet claimed 
to have adequate evidence of Nazi kuilt. While we did not feel justified in pre- 
venting the issue, we warned the Soviet delegation tliat we did not have evidence 
to support the charge nor time or opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met 
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave the entire con- 
test to the Soviet and German lawyers. 

The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to participate 
In its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict in several respects with 
what I considered to be sound trial policy for the first such case in history. It 
was not based upon any conviction in my own mind about the truth or falsity 
of the charge. I knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that 
both were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to commit 
it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each toward Poland. 
Whatever the facts were they had liecome overlaid with deep layers of Nazi and 
Soviet propaganda and counterpropaganda, and it seemed we could not at the 
international trial wisely undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of 
separating truth from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclu- 
sion are four : 

First, responsibility for the massacre did not api>ear to be capable of docu- 
mentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic decisions on policy 
concerning the Niirnberg international trial was that we should accuse only 
defendants whose guilt could be established and should charge only offenses 
whose occurrence could be fully proved or substantially corroborated by docu- 
mentary evidence captured from the Germans themselves. Because this was 
the first international criminal trial in history and was held in the wake of war 
when passions were high, we did not want any judgment that would rest solely 
on oral testimony of witnesses wliose interest, bias, memory and trutlifulness 
would always be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting 
matters because evidence measui'ing up to this standard was not then obtain- 
able. However, that policy was so far observed that the Tribunal, in its Judg- 
ment, said : "The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a large measure 
in documents of their own making, the authenticity of which has not been 
challenged except in one or two cases." ^ 

Second, if we w(>re ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary 
evidence, this atrocity was not a suitaltle instance because we knew of no wit- 
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpetrators 
that would meet the high standards of credibility required in a criminal trial. 
Neither the American nor, as far as I have reason to believe, the British prosecu- 
tors knew of such witnesses. 



2 Tlioso nogotiations ure iinl)lisho(l in Alderman (and othors), Negotiating With the 
Kussians (World Peace Foundation, I!),')] ), 49-98. 
'■' N. C. & A., Opinion and .liidgnieiit 3. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1973 

It was plaiu that we could not get such evidence from Polish sources. Atti- 
tudes of Polish authorities at that time were conflicting, which confirmed my 
opinion that we should not participate in the trial of the Nazi-Soviet dispute. 
The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at Niiruberg 
which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters, including, as I under- 
stood it, accusing the Nazis of the Katyn murders. 

The Polish Government in Exile in London, on the contrary, was accusing 
the Soviet. On February 15, 1946, eleven Senators and ten Deputies of the Polish 
Parliamentary Group in London filed with me a letter and statement reciting 
evidence on which they pointed to Russian guilt, concluding with this statement : 

"In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to 
express the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the 
tasks of the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs, 
in order to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated independently 
by an international judicial body." ■* 

It also characterizes the Polish attitude at that time that General Anders, 
while believing in Sm'iet guilt, refused the request of Goering's lawyer to help 
him prove it — a quite understandable attitude in view of what Poland had 
suffered at the hands of those who would benefit from his testimony. He said, 
however, that he would be willing to give his information to the Tribunal "at 
their express written and oflicial request." He did not know, nor do I, whether the 
Tribunal was ever so advised. Certainly I was not. Only three years after the 
trial, when General Anders published his book and thoughtfully sent me a copy, 
did I learn these facts.' 

On January 21, 1946, General Clay transmitted for my "strictly confidential 
information from the Embassy at Warsaw" word that the Germans were not, 
in the opinion of the Polish circles with which the American Embassy was in 
contact, responsible for the Katyn deaths. There was no suggestion that this 
opinion was supported by legal evidence. Apparently it was not, for Mr. Lane, 
then American Ambassador at Warsaw, 2 years later published the information 
then known to him pointing to Soviet guilt, but even then said, "The identity 
of the perpetrators of the outrageous massacre of Katyn, contrary to all laws 
of war and humanity, has never been definitely established. Perhaps it never 
will be."" 

We did not learn of any usuable evidence in American ijossession. Military 
intelligence, on February 26, 1946, delivered to a member of my staff then in 
Washington several documents, classified "Secret," including the German report 
accusing the Soviet, two Soviet documents accusing the Nazis and a paper 
labeled "Excerpts of conversations between Sikorski, Anders, Stalin, and Molo- 
tov." The conversations referred to are substantially those published by Jan 
Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States, in 1947." None of these 
were in condition to be useful as evidence. I knew nothing at any time during 
the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, or Colonel Siemansky. We heard 
nothing of any of the witnesses since claimed to have personal knowledge of the 
crimes. 

Third, we did not need to prove Nazi responsibility for tlie Katyn murder in 
order to establish that the Nazi regime and individual defendants were guilty 
of a conspiracy and a program to exterminate vast numbers of Poles. Poland 
had been the scene and the Polish people had been the victims of many un- 
believable barbarities which put to death much larger numbers of persons than 
the Katyn murders. To make sure that the grievances of the Polish people, as 
well as other Eastern peoples, were proved and proved beyond doubt, we did not 
leave the matter wholly to the Soviet but, as a part of the American case, proved 
by captured documents or by admissions of captive German officials the over-all 
Nazi extermination program embracing many atrocities in Poland and affecting 
the Polish people, as well as others in East Europe. Examples will indicate what 
I mean : 



* I am filinc; a photostatic copy of this pommnnication with the Committee. 
"Anders, An Armv in Exile (1949), 82, 140. 295. 
8 Lane, I Saw Poland Betraved (1948), 36-39. 
' Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (1947), 66-69. 



1974 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 

We had the diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of Poland, 
Acknowledged by him to he authentic, saying, "We must annihilate the Jews 
wherever we find them and wherever it is possible. * * *" * In August 1942, 
he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations in Poland : "That we sentence 
1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only marginally. It is a matter, 
of course, that should tlie Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result in 
the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures." ° 

We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such as the 75- 
page leather-bound official report by Major-General Stroop which recited the 
killing of men, women and children of the Warsaw ghetto to the exact number 
of 56,0G5 and set out the day-to-day measures, including shooting, fire, explosion 
and chemical extermination in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge, 
accompanied by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency." 

We had the report by SS Brigade-Fuehrer Stahlecker to Ilimmler, dated 
October 3941, of the execution of lo.5,.567 persons in the Lithuanian area." 

We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly details of the 
operations in the East of gasivngons for killing undesirables." 

We also had German protests, oflScial but not very high-minded, against such 
exterminations — in one instance of 1.50,000 to 200,000 Jews " and in another 
instance of 5,000 Jews " — because it was complained they should have been 
spared for use as forced labor. 

Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously di'amatized 
it. For example, a deathbook of the Mauthausen concentration camp recorded 
35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203 persons died of the same ailment — ■ 
"heart trouble" — died at brief and regular intervals, and more astonishingly, 
died in alphabetical order. Death first came to Ackermann, at 1 :15 a. m., and 
reached Zynger at 2 p. m.'° 

Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured German officials. 
One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi extermination program 
had done away with four million persons in concentration camps and that two 
million additicmal were killed by the Secret Police in the East." 

Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf , testified willingly, even boastfully, that' he 
supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women and children in the Eastern 
area." The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center, swore 
that under his regime it exterminated three million human beings.^^ This was 
by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities committed against the 
Polish people. 

Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war had placed 
in our hands when documents were procurable from other sources. An example 
was the Nazi persecution of the Church and clergy, particularly vicious in 
Poland, which the Nazis had not documented with the candor and thoroughness 
that they did persecution of the Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were 
available to us, we couid have gathered evidence of the Church pei-secution in 
Poland, since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control 
where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt the zeal 
of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I sought an audience 
with Pope Pius and obtained from His Holiness the Vatican documents in which 
detailed evidentiary material was already collected and which supported the 
charge of religious persecution." 

As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could turn for 
such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and patriotic Poles who 
might become the leadership of the restoration of Poland was provable by docu- 



8 Doc. No. 2233-D-PS (USA exhibit 2S1), Entry of Dec. 16, 1941, pp. 76-77. 4 N. C. 
& A. S91. 

»Doc. No. 22.'^3-E~PS (USA 28.S). Entrv of An?. 24, 1942. 4 N. C. & A. 893. 

10 Doc. No. 1061-PS (USA 275), 3 N. C. & A. 718. 

" Doc. No. U-180 (USA 276), 7 N. C. & A. 978. 

" Doc. No. .501 -PS (USA 288). 3 N. C. & A. 418. 

" Doc. No. 3257-PS (USA 290). .5 N. C. & A. 994. 

'» Doc. No. U-1.S5 (USA 289). 8 N. C. & A. 205. 

'•"' 1 N. C. & A. 907. 

'» Doc. No. 273.S-PS (USA 290). 5 N. C. & A. 380. 

"4 Proceed iiisrs 811-:?.^>4. 

" Doc. No. 3SfiS-PS (USA 819). 6 N. C. & A. 787. 

"These documents, nnniliered from 3261-PS to 3269-PS, inchisive, are published in 
5 N. C. & A., pp. 1009 to 1040, Inclusive. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1975 

ment to be consistent with the Nazi policy toward Toland. Yet, while they had 
boasted on paper of the worst crimes known to tuan, we found but one Nazi 
document tliat even hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that 
being a telegram reporting that the Polish Ked Cross had found that German- 
made ammunition was used in the killings."" 

A fourth ditHcuIty entered into our reluctance to undertake the Katyn murder 
charge as part of the Niirnberg trial. We were under exceedingly heavy pressure 
to get along with the trial. A persistent criticism in the American press during 
the trial was its long duration. Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross- 
examination by several counsel, of course takes nuich more time than docu- 
mentai-y proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Niirnberg trial had to be 
forthwith interpreted iTito three other languages. Every examination or cross- 
examination had to Include any proper questions desired by moi'e than twenty 
lawyers representing defendants and four for the prosecution, and these were 
trained in live different legal systems — English, American, French, Russian, and 
German. Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego 
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent to which 
we avoided relying on oral proof when I remind you that all four prosecutors 
at Niirnberg called only 33 witnesses to testify orally on the whole case against 
the twenty individual defendants, and these defendants, in addition to them- 
selves, called only 61 witnesses. You have ali-eady, according to your interim 
report, orally examined 81 witnesses on this one atrocity. 

Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on February 14, 
1946, opened the subject by presenting to the Tribunal a report by a Soviet 
Extraordinary State Commission of its investigation of the Katyn crime." It 
recited testimony, including a good deal of hearsay and medical data, as to 
the condition of the exhumed bodies. On this, experts based opinions that the 
executions took place during the period of German occupation and therefore 
that the Germans were responsible. Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering, made 
a prompt request to call witnesses to contradict the Soviet report, which occa- 
sioned some disagreement between the Soviet prosecutors and those representing 
Great Britain and the United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view that, 
since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the Extraordinary Com- 
mission as a state document, it could not be contradicted. Under Soviet law 
it probably could not but would be entitled to faith and credit — as a judgment, 
statute, or public- act would be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature 
was such that it was clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers 
proposed, if the subject were opened, to call ten witnesses." The Tribunal, 
however, ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses 
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact." '" 

Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d days of 
July 1946. What it was is a matter of record, and what it is worth is a matter 
of opinion." At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing 



2" Telesrani addressed to the "Government of the Government General, care of First 
Administrative Counseller Weirauch in Krakow." It is marked "Urgent, to be delivered 
at once, secret" : 

"Part of the Polish Red Cross returned yesterday from Katyn. The employees of the 
Polish Red Cross have brou.sht with them the cartridge cases which were used in sliooting 
tite victims of Katyn. It appears that these are German munitions. The caliber is 7.65. 
Tliey are from, the firm Geco. Letter follows." Signed "Heinrich." Doe. No. 402-PS. 
17 Proceedings 365. 

So far as I know, the letter referred to was never found, but the prosecution staff 
screened approximately 100,000 captured German documents, of which only 5.000 were 
selected for full translation for use at the trial. It is impossible, therefore, to say that 
such a letter is not in existence. 

=ilt is USSR Doc. #54. 

=2 March S. 1046, 9 Proceedings 3; May 11, 1946, 13 Proceedings 431; June 3, 1946, 
15 Proceedinss 289-293. 

23 17 Proceedings 273. 

^ The verbatim testimony in English translation is found in 17 Proceedings 275 et seq. 

A summary of the evidence will show its inconclusive character. It must be remembered 
that the Smolensk area, including Katyn Wood, fell to the Germans on or about .July 17, 
1941. If the Polish prisoners bad been executed before that, the Soviet must have been 
responsible: if they were then alive and captured by the Germans, the Germans must have 
been responsible. 

The German defendants led with the witness Ahrens, Commanding Officer of the Signal 
Regiment charged witli guilt in the Soviet report. He denied that Iiis regiment had cap- 
tured any Polish prisoners from the Russians, denied there was any order to slioot Polish 
prisoners, or that any were shot. He testified to exluiming the bodies in 1942. The weak- 
ness of his testimony was that he did not arrive in the Smolensk territory until about the 
second half of November 1041, while the Soviet claimed the executions had been consider- 
ably earlier, and the commander he succeeded was not called. 

The second witness was Bichborn, who also did not arrive on the scene until September 
20, 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot and said he would have 



1976 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE 

and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially, complained 
that they had been allowed to call only three of the 120 witnesses that appeared 
before the Soviet Commission. The Tribunal, wisely I think, refused to hear 
more of the subject."^ 

The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The Tribunal 
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre. Neither did it 
expressly exonerate them, as the Judgment made no reference to the Katyn 
incident. The Soviet judge dissented in some matters but did not mention 
Katyn.-'' 

This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to establish responsi- 
bility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided by the Niirnberg 
Tribunal or contended for by the American prosecution will stand in the way. 



Exhibit 7 — Letter From the Polish Government in Exile in London to Justice 

Jackson 

Polish Parliamentary Group 
74, Cornwall Gardens, London, SW. 7 

London, Fehriiary 15, 1946- 
Mr. Justice Rorert J. Jackson, 

Chief American Prosecutor, Nuremberg. 
Sir: We have the honour to submit to your attention the enclosed copy of a 
letter addressed by us to the members of the Parliaments of all democratic 
Nations throughout the world. 
We are, Sir, 

Yours faithfully. 

On behalf of the Polish Parliamentary Group, 

A. Zalewski. 
J. Godlewski. 
Annexe. 



known about it if eithor had occurred. His testimony was attacked by U. S. S. R. Docu 
ment No. .3, dated Berlin, October 29, 1941, issued by the chief of the Security Police in 
relation to prisoners of war in the rear of the army, which set up task force groups under 
the leadership of an SS, leader. These irregular groui)s, not a part of the army, were the 
usual execution teams. This witness told of an order to shoot certain prisoners of wai 
which, he said, Field Marshal von Kleuge refused to carry out because of regard for th€ 
discipline of his troops. 

The third witness was Gen. Oberhauser, in command of the area, who did not reach 
there until September of 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot 
and denied that the regiment had weapons with which they could have been shot. This 
closed the German case without accounting for the period from the fall of Smolensk in 
the middle of .July to the beginning of September and with an admission that an execution 
squad followed the army into that area. 

The Russians took over and called the Deputy Mayor of Smolensk during the German 
occupation, a professor at the University who served under a German Mayor. He testified 
that there were Polish prisoners of war in the vicinity of Smolensk when the city fell to 
the Germans, that he had a conference with the German Mayor in which he was informed 
that a very severe regime should prevail with respect to prisoners of war. and that Polish 
ones were to be exterminated, l)ut that it should be kejit a secret, and thereafter the Mayor 
told him that the I'olish prisoners of war had all died. On cross-examination it was 
brought out against his crediliility that he was not punished by the Russians for his ad- 
mitted collaboration with the Germans, and not only remained at liberty but was a pro- 
fessor at two Universities under Russian control. 

They followed with a witness Markov, a Bulgarian doctor who had been a nw^mber of 
the commission set up by the Germans to investigate the Polish mass:H're and which 
charged responsibility to the Soviet. Alarkov gave details indicating ;in extremely super- 
ficial examination of the graves and testified that he did not agree with the report but 
signed it under German comi)ulsion. Ooss-examination brouuht out the weakness of his 
testimony in that he was under the control of the Russians at the time of trial. 

The last witness was Prosorovski, a medical legal expert of the Sovi(>t ITnion. Hi-s 
testimony was entirely of the Ru.ssian examination of the trraves. and his conclusions that 
the date of the execution as evidenced by the condition of the bodies must have been during 
the German occup.ntion. During his examination, an American-captured document. No. 
402-PS, Kxhibit V. S. S. R. nOT. was read into the case, being a telegram from Heinrich 
stating that the employees of the Polish Red Cross had found cartridge cases used in shoot- 
ing the victims of Katyn from which it ajipeared that these were German munitions of 
caliber 7.(i.T. The testimony was that all of the deaths had been caused by bullet wounds 
of 7.05 caliber. 

Dr. Naville. one of your rommittee witnesses, was allowed to defendant Goerlng. pro-' 
vided he could l)e located. He was found in Switz(>rland. hut he "informed the Tribunal 
that he sees no use in his ocuning Iier(> as a witnesjf for Goering. * * * 10 Pro- 
ceedings f!4S. 

^•17 Proceedings ."71. 

==« N. C. & A., Opinion and .Tudgment lOfi. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1977 

An Appeal to Members of the Parliaments of All the Nations From the 
Former Deputies and Senators of the Polish Parliament 

74 Cornwall Gardens, 
London, SW. 7, February 19Jf6. 
To the Members of the Free Nations Parliaments. 

Dear Sirs : The German war criminals at present on trial at Nuremberg are 
charged witb tlie murder of about 11,000 Polish officers in the wood of Katyn 
near Smolensk. In connection with this case the undersigned, former Senators 
and Deputies in Parliaments of the Polish Republic, beg to point out certain 
events and to make a number of I'emarks. 

On September 17th 1939 Soviet Forces suddenly and unexpectedly invaded 
Poland and attacked the Polish armies in the rear while these armies were in a 
most difficult position, struggling against the Germans, overwhelmingly superior 
in number and in material. In doing so, the Soviet broke the Pact of Non- 
Aggression and other agreements, freely accepted by them and still in force as 
between the USSR and Poland sucli as the Peace Treaty of Riga signed on March 
18th 1921, The Kellogg Pact, The Moscow Protocol renouncing war as an in- 
strument of national policy, signed on February 9th 1929, by Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, Rumania and the USSR, the Convention on the definition of the Aggressor 
signed on July 3rd 1933, the Moscow Protocol of May 5th 1934, on the Prolonga- 
tion of the Non-Aggression Pact till December 31st, 1945. These agreements 
have been confirmed twice over, by an exchange of notes, on September 10th 1934, 
and by a common communique of November 26th 1938, and finally the Pact 
of the League of Nations was also binding in the USSR. 

As a result of the Soviet attack, Polish resistance collapsed and a great number 
of soldiers of the Polish army fell into Soviet hands. The Soviet autliorities 
grouped the Polish officers in separate camps, the largest of which were those of 
Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostaszkow. At the beginning of 1940 the camp au- 
thorities informed the interned officers that these camps would be broken iip 
and that the prisoners of war would return to their families in Poland. The 
prisoners were again registered in great detail. From April to the middle of 
May 1940 the Soviet authorities removed the officers from the camps in groups 
numbering from 60 to 300 and transported them in unknown directions. At the 
same time the prisoners correspondence with their families in Poland came to an 
end. Whereas in the preceding months letters from them were received fairly 
regularly, after that date they ceased to give any sign of life and they were 
heard of no more. 

After the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30th, 1941. and of 
the Polish-Soviet military convention of Augiist 14th of the same year, when the 
formation of the Polish army was undertaken in the USSR, out of the total of 
15.000 officers taken prisoner by the Soviet, only 2.500 reported themselves to the 
Polish recruiting centres. Of these, only 400 had been inmates of the camp of 
Kozielsk. The absence of the remainder, known to have been removed to unde- 
termined destinations, produced understandable anxiety among their country- 
men. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Ambassador in Kuybyshev, 
and the general commanding the Polish Army in the USSR, addressed them- 
selves to the Soviet authorities asking to be informed of the whereabouts of these 
missing officers. The Soviet Government in the persons of the People's Com- 
misar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, and his deputy, Mr. Vishinsky, answered 
repeatedly that these officers had been released and should have reported them- 
selves to the diffreut Polish military units. On December 3rd, 1941, in a con- 
versation with Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin, General Sikorski raised the same 
question and presented a list of 3,845 missing officers whose names had been 
ascertained by the Polish authorities. Marshal Stalin repeated tlie explanation 
given by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky and assured General Sikorski anew 
that these officers had been released long since. In spite of these declarations 
of the highest Soviet authorities not one of the missing officers ever made his 
appearance and all investigations remained fruitless. 

In April 1943 the Germans published the news that in the wood of Katyn 
near Smolensk mass graves had been discovered containing the bodies of about 
12.000 Polish officers. About 3,000 of them were identified and it followed from 
the checking of lists that they were prisoners from the camp at Kozielsk. As is 
well known, the German authorities did not hesitate to accuse the Soviet Gov- 
ernment of their murder. 



1978 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

AVhen the German armies in their retreat from Russia had evacuated the dis- 
trict of Smolensk, the Soviet authorities formed a commission called upon to 
deal vv^ith the Katyn case. This commission drew up an official report which 
was published by the Soviet Government. 

According to this report two witnesses, the Soviet camp commander. Major 
Vietoshnikov, of the N. K. V. D., and the engineer in control of traflBc in the 
Smolensk sector of Western railway lines, S. Ivanov, testified that the Polish 
officers detained in the P. o. W. camps had not been evacuated in the timft 
and that the camp had been captured by the advancing German army. Other 
witiiesses, Soviet citizens, gave evidence that the Gei'mans murdered the Polish 
officers in Katyn wood and buried them there. 

The region of Smolensk having been occujiied by the Germans in July 1941, the 
question occurs why the Soviet Government did not inform the foolish authori- 
ties immediately after the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations, in the summer 
of 1941, that many Polish officers, who were prisoners of war, had fallen into 
German hands. On the contrary, the Soviet Government answered all inquiries 
on this point over and over again, even as late as March 1942, with the assurance 
that these prisoners of war had been released, in accordance with the concluded 
agreement and should have reported themselves to the Polish military units. 

These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Uussian 
P.o.W. camps has not yet been fully elucidated. 

The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling of human- 
ity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern the families 
of the victims. The entire Polish nation is entitled to demand that this tragedy 
be cleared up. 

In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to express 
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks of 
the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs, in order 
to be fully elucidated, to be examined ai)art and treated independently by an 
international judicial body. 

SENATORS 

Ignacy Balin.ski, Croft House, Sudbury, Suffolk. 
JozefGodlewski, 17, Cleveden Place, S.W.I. 
Alexander Heiman Jarecki, 10"), Hallam Street, W.l. 
Prof. Wojciecli Jastrzebowski, 41, Belsize Square, N.W.3. 
Inz. Jerzv Iwanowski, 11. Dora Road, Wimbledon. S.W.19. 
Tadeusz Katelbach, 112, Eton Hall, Eton College Rd., N.W.S. 
Adam Koc, 46 East TOth Street, New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 
Wanda Norwid-Neugebauer, Eton Hall, Chalk Farm, N.W.S. 
Karol Niezal.ytowski. Hay Lodge, Peeble, Scotland. 
Konstanty Rdultowski, Cairo, Egypt. 
Stefan Rosada, 7. Glenorchy Terrace, Edinburgh. 9. 



Dr. Konstanty Dzieduszycki. 1. Church Hill Place. Edinburgh, 10. 

Stanislaw Jozwiak, 70. Clifton t-ourt. Edgware Road. W.2. 

Kornel Krzeczunowicz. 14, Inverleith Row, Edinburgh. 

Jerzy Paciorkowski, 184, l!e]siz(» Road, N.W.O. 

Tadeusz Schaetzel. Ankara. Turkey. 

Antoiii Zalewski, 8.1. Eaton Place, S.W.I. 

P.ronisiaw Wanke. Rockcliffc l)y Dalbeattie, Scotland. 

Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowski. 2:>, Greystock Court. Hanger Lane, W.fi 

Prof. Wladyslaw Wielhorski, .l. White Hall Gardens, W.3. 

Witold Zj'borski, "Featherstones", 11, Fairlawn Road, Lytham, Lanes. 

AFTER KE(1<:SS 

Chaii'inaii M.vdden. The committee will come to order. 

T\w first, witness will be Mr. Elmer Davis. Will you take the stand. 
Ml". Davis, and be sworn? 

Do yon solemnly swear that the testimony yon will give in the hear- 
ing before (he connnittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing^ 
but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr, Davis. I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1979 

TESTIMONY OF ELMER DAVIS, NEWS BROADCASTER AND COM- 
MENTATOR, AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO., WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Chairman Madoen. Mr. Davis, will you state your full name, please? 

Mr. Davis. Elmer Davis. 

Chairman Madden. And your address? 

Mr. Davis. 1661 Crescent Place, Washington 9, D. C. 

Chairman Madden. And your business? 

Mr. Davis. News broadcaster and commentator for the American 
Broadcasting- Co. 

Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, for. the purpose of this hearing I 
would like to have now read into the record by Mr. Pucinski, the 
testimony taken by the congressional committee investigating the Fed- 
eral Communications Commission. This is the testimony of Mr. 
Joseph Lang, which was taken on August 5 in New York City. 

Mr. Pucinski, will you proceed, please? 

Mr. Pucinski. Yes. I am reading from page 387 of volume 991 of 
the House committee hearings. This volume is from the Senate library. 

The testimony is by Mr. Joseph Lang. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What committee and what date? 

Mr. Pucinski. This testimony was taken during a study and in- 
vestigation of the Federal Communications Commission on Thursday, 
August 5, 1943. The hearings were in New York City. 

Now, this is the testimony of Mr. Joseph Lang, general manager of 
radio station WHOM, New York, N. Y. 

The question being propounded to Mr. Lang is by Mr. Garey, who 
was the committee counsel for this committee, which was headed by 
Congressman Cox. 

Mr. Garey said : 

Mr. Lang, did you ever have a meeting with Mrs. Shea, at which the question 
of the policy that should be adopted toward Russia was discussetl? 

Mr. Lang. I had a meeting with Mrs. Shea and Alan Cranston in my office. 

Mr. Garey. We know who Mrs. Shea is, but I don't think this record shows who 
Alan Cranston is. Will you tell us who Alan Cranston is? 

Mr. Lang. Alan Cranston is head of the Foreign Language Division of the 
Office of War Information. 

Mr. Garey. And about when did this conversation take place? 

Mr. Lang. I believe it was around the middle of May 1943. 

Mr. Garey. And how did the meeting come about? 

Mr. Lang. Mr. Cranston called me, I believe it was on a Monday, and asked 
if he could meet with Mr. Simon and me regarding what he described as the 
Polish situation. He asked if he could meet with us on the following Wednesday. 

Mr. Garey. Where did the meeting take place? 

Mr. Lang. At my office. 

Mr. Garey. Who was present at the meeting? 

Mr. Lang. INIr. Cranston, Mrs. Shea, Mr. Arthur Simon, myself, and I be- 
lieve Mr. Fred Call, who handled public relations for the foreign-language 
radio wartime control. This was a meeting not with us as individual station 
owners but representing the foreign-language radio wartime control. 

Mr. Garey. And Mr. Arthui' Simon is manager of the Bulova station in 
Philadelphia, designed by the call letters WPEN? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Mr. Garey. And he was chairman of that foreign-language radio wartime 
control committee? 

Mr. Lang. He was. 

Mr. Garey. Will you tell us what was said at that meeting, and by whom? 

Mr. Lang. Both Mr. Cranston and :Mrs. Shea were concerned with the sit- 
uation that had been developing between Russia and Poland in regard to the 



1980 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

matter of boundaries, and the fact that Poland, I believe, through its Premier, 
its Government in exile in London, had protested to Russia about the slaying 
of these 10.000 Polish officers in Russia. And they were concerned as to how 
the situation would he handled on different radio stations. 

Mr. Garey. What did Mr. Cranston want you to do? 

Mr. Lang. He asked us — when I say "us" I mean the foreign-; guage radio 
wartime control — if we could straighten out the situation in Dei >>it. 

Mr. Garey. What situation olitained there? 

]\Ir. Lang. From what I could gather, it seemed that on the Polish programs 
out there the Polish news commentators had tal<en a rather antagonistic atti- 
tude toward Russia in this matter, and they felt that it was inimical to the war 
effort find should be straightened out in some way. 

Mr. Garey. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the 
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views on what 
should be put over the air in the United States about t^e Russian situation? 
Thnt is the sum and .substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do? 

Mr. Lang. I don't know that it was expressed that way. That was the 
thought. 

Mr. Garey. Is your answer to my question in the affirmative? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

IMr. Garey. Was the Office of Censorship represented at this meeting? 

Mr. Lang. No ; it was not. 

Mr. Garey. They had been invited to attend, but had reufsed to attend, had 
they not? 

Mr. Lang. I don't know that, sir. 

Mr. Garey. They had failed to attend? 

Mr. Lang. They were not present. 

Mr. Garey. What did Mrs. Shea want you to do? 

Mr. Lang. The same thing. They both expressed the same thoughts. 

Mr. Garey. They wanted the gag put on any criticism of Russia, insofar as 
critic'zing Russia's ambitions to establish a new Polish Frontier in the postwar 
days was concerned? 

Mr. Lang. Tliat seemed to be the gist of the talk. 

Mr. Garey. And didn't they also want the gag put on any news concerning 
the alleged killing of the 10,000 Polish Officers by the Russians in Russia? 

Mr. Lang. That was not expressed. The thought was that if commentators 
were to he permitted to express their own views, there was no limit to what 
they could say. I suggested that if the situation were handled as I handled it on 
my station, whereby commentators, both on Russian and Polish programs were 
permitted to broadcast only the news as it came off the teletype, that would solve 
the situation, because it wouhl mean that only news from the news services 
would be broadcast, and not anyone's views. 

IVIr. Garey. What was the result of the meeting? 

Mr. Lang. Mr. Simon and I said we would get in touch with our committee 
member in Detroit and talk to him and see if we could get the matter straightened 
out. 

Mr. Garey. And did you? 

Mr. Lang. AVe did. We called ^Ir. James Hopkins. 

Mr. Garey. Of what station? 

Mr. Lang. WGBK, in Detroit. And we spoke to liim along these lines, sug- 
gesting that his station, as well as two other stations, the call letters of which 
I don't recollect, stick strictly to their authenticated news service, and not permit 
any individual to express his individual views. 

Mr. Garey. Wliat Ililde Shea and Cranston were doing, they were engaging 
in the censorship of program content: weren't tliey? 

Mr. Lang. I think you miglit put it that way. I wouVl say "Yes." 

Mr. Gakey. Certainly. And the Communications Act of 1944 expressly forbids 
tlie Federal Communications Commission to censor program content; doesn't it? 

Mr. Lang. It does. 

Mr. (Jakey. And the Office of War Information had no .iurisdiction in the matter 
whatever ; did it? j,' 

Mr. Lang. Tliat is right. i 

Mr. MiTCiiKLL. Mr. Davis, at that time I believe you were lioad of '| 

IliP DWT. Could you tell the (.'oiiiniittee when you took' over (he | 

chnirmaiishi|) of the OAVT? |" 

Mr. Davis. The l.'Uh of Juiu' 1042. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1981 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was your predecessor in office ? 

Mr. Davis. We had none. We were a combination of four preceding 
agencies. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how the OWI was 
formed, if ''>Hi please? 

Mr. DA^^P.' It was put together by a combination of what was then 
the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information 
under General Donovan, an organization which had previously been 
combined with what later became the OSS, the Office of Facts and Fig- 
ures, under Archibald MacLeish, the Division of Information of the 
Office of Emergency INIanagement, under Bob Lorton, and the Office 
of Government Eeports under Lowell Mott. They were all brought 
in together into a new organization. 

As I have said elsewhere, I felt like a man, at times, who had married 
a four-time widow and was trying to raise her children by all of her 
previous marriages. 

Mr. Mitchell. Sir, where and to whom did you report as the head 
of OWI ? What was the chain of command ? 

Mr. Davis. President Roosevelt. If I may amplify, INIr. Counsel, 
we reported only to the President for all operations. But on matters 
of foreign policy we had to consult the State Department and conform 
to their views. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how the liaison 
was conducted between these various other Government agencies, 
which affected the war effort. 

Mr. Davis. We had various people assigned to contact each of the 
Government departments, and quite a number of people would con- 
sult different officials in the State Department on different issues to 
see what the Government policy was. With respect to major issues, 
occasionally I had to take them up with the President. But he was 
pretty busy, and I didn't bother him more than I had to. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any kind of a Board or Commission 
established for policy guidance for OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, there was theoretically such a Commission, and I 
was directed to perform my duties after consulting it. It was set up 
with appointees by the other departments, in such shape that it seemed 
to me that its purpose was to keep us from ever doing anything much. 
So, after two consultations with them in the first month that I held 
office, I performed my duties according to the Executive order. They 
never met again. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then could you explain to the committee how policy 
respecting the OWI was accomplished? How did you get your 
directives of advice and consultation ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, on foreign policy matters, as I say, we consulted 
the State Department. On specific issues it was usually done by some- 
body from our overseas branch calling up somebody in the State 
Department who was concerned with that particular division. I had 
frequent consultations with Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles, myself, on 
general policies. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was this on over-all policy, your consultations? 

Mr. Davis. On the way we should handle certain matters in foreign 
propaganda, so that we would conform to the foreign policy of the 
United States. 

93744— 52— pt. 7 11 



1982 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

iMr. Mitchell. Then liaison was otherwise from desk to desk? 

Mr. Davis. We had people who were especially associated with each 
of the other departments, but with most of them our problem was 
to see that the news they handed out was as fresh as possible and as 
accurate as possible, and that there were not too violent conflicts 
between the departments and what they said. 

Mr. Mitchell. And the two individuals that you consulted for 
over-all policy were Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles ? 

Mr. Davis. On foreign policy only. 

Mr. Mitchell. On foreign policy only ? 

Mr. Da^ts. Yes. 

]Mr. Mitchell. Now, could you tell the committee the exact purpose 
or function of OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, it is all set forth in greater length and detail in 
the Executive order, than I can now remember. 

JMr. Mitchell. Briefly. 

Mr. Davis. Its object was to tell the news as fully and as accurately 
as we could to the people of the United States, a function in which we 
were very much limited by the fact that we were only coordinators of 
the new^s issued by the other departments, and also to inform foreign 
nations, both hostile, friendly and neutral, about the policies and 
business of the United States. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did you get the new^s coming in from over- 
seas 'I What agencies furnished that to the OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. We had a division called the Foreign News Bureau, 
whicli obtained the reports of the Federal Broadcast Information 
Service of all of the enemy broadcasts, and all broadcasts, to be sure, 
but primarily the enemy broadcasts, which they would take and 
analyze principally for the purpose of pointing out where the enemy 
was telling a different story to one part of the world than to another. 
They issued their reports on those broadcasts, and they were made 
available to the press. That was the only news we obtained from 
overseas. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was your organization broken up in such a way 
as to have individuals responsible country by country or area by area? 

Mr. Davis. In our propaganda to those countries, yes. The infor- 
mation that we obtained from abroad, as I sa}^, was only through 
this one channel, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and was 
analyzed by our own people and put out for availability to tlie press 
here. 

Mr. Mitchell, The subject matter being investigated by this com- 
mittee concerns Katyn and Poland. Can you tell the committee who 
was in charge of that operation in your Department? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know what you mean b}' "that operation." 

Mr. Mitchell. The overseas broadcasts. 

Mr. Davis. Well, that would be under the general direction of 
Robert Sherwood, who was then the head of the Overseas Branch. 
As to the people who were underneath him, there were quite a number 
of them. 

The policy was supposed to be laid down in Washington and fol- 
lowed by our opei'ating staffs in various points around the world — New 
York, Sail Fi-ancisco, the Southwest Pacific, London, Algiers, and so 
on — although in Algici-s and in the Southwest Pacific, of course, we 
were under military direction. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1983 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have as part of your organization a desk 
or an individual who was responsible for reporting to the American 
people, country by country? 

Mr, Davis. No. 

Mr. ^IiTCHELL. Responsible for reporting the news that came in ? 

JNlr. Davis. No ; we did not. 

Mr. Mitchell. You didn't have an area desk? 

Mr. Davis. Not for reports to the American people. We had area 
desks for propaganda overseas. But normally, we did not produce 
much news for the American people. The great volume of news 
printed in the American press and used on the radio at that time came 
from the news services and special correspondents in foreign countries. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then how can you explain what was read into the 
record a few minutes ago about Mr. Cranston, who was a member of 
.3"our staff, having this meeting in New York with members of the 
Foreign Language Radio Wartime Control? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I can't recall that I have ever heard of that episode 
until it was read to me. But I should say that, in the first place, the 
declaration made by the counsel of that commit tee seems to have been 
contradicted by a statement of one of the broadcasters a little earlier, 
that it was indicated that the news analysts or commentators on those 
stations could handle the news the way they wanted to, but JNIr. Crans- 
ton merely hoped that they would not handle it in such a way as to stir 
up antipathy between two of our allies. 

Mr. Mitchell. I cannot quite understand why Mr. Cranston's par- 
ticular function fitted in with this capacity, since it was not the func- 
tion of the OWI to handle news within the country. 

Mr. Davis. Strictly speaking, he had no authority, and as I think 
that excerpt makes clear, he made no attempt to impose any authority. 
He merely suggested that as a matter of moving toward the winning 
of the war, they should try to avoid stirring up trouble between our 
allies. 

Mr. Mitchell. But that was the function of the Office of Censor- 
ship? 

Mr. Davis. No. The Office of Censorship was supposed to tell them 
what they could not print or what they could not broadcast. We 
didn't attempt to do that, and I think that the excerpt read will indi- 
cate that Mr. Cranston didn't attempt to do that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't understand why Cranston was engaged 
in that particular function of curtailing news within the United States. 
The job of the OWI was outside, was it not ? 

Mr. Davis. The job of the OWI was to provide Government news 
inside the United States, not news from abroad. This was a function 
which had been held over from one of our predecessor organizations in 
an attemi^t to reason with some of the foreign language broadcasting 
stations which at the beginning, immediately after Pearl Harbor, and 
long before OWI — one or two of them, still had some persons of rather 
f ascistic tendencies on their staffs ; and I believe that that work was 
started then to try to persuade them to present their broadcasts so 
as to contribute to the winning of the war. We went very much less 
far in that direction than did George Creel who, by the simple ex- 
pedient of getting hold of the man who controlled all of the advertis- 
ing for the foreign language press, managed to get the foreign lan- 
guage piess to say about what Creel wanted it to say. 



1984 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. What was George Creel's function at that time ? 

Mr. Davis. That was in the old war, it was substantially the same 
as the one I had then. 

Mr. Mitchell. But it had nothinfy to do with this one? 

Mr. Davis. Oh, no. The previous one. 

Mr. Mitchell. I still can't understand why, under the charter 
of the OWI, any individual employed by the OWI would take it upon 
himself, or else by policy direction, or in some way, to contact anyone 
within the United States concerning broadcasts of news. Was it with- 
in the charter ? 

Mr. Davis, I should have to read the charter again to find out 
whether that authority may have lain there. As I say, I didn't know 
•about this situation. But, as I think this testimony will indicate, JNIr. 
Cranston was merely talking to them by way of suggesting that they 
try not to create too much disharmony among two of our allies. It 
really did not attempt to give any instructions, and he did not propose 
to tell them what to say. It is stated in there that the commentators 
could say anything they liked. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that 
time. 

Mr. Davis. What is that? 

Mr. Mitchell. If I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that 
time i 

Mr. Davis, I said "between two of our allies." 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I still can't understand why Cranston, in his 
capacity in the OWI, would in any way — that was a function of some- 
body else, wasn't it? Wasn't it? Was it a function of the OWI? 

Mr. Davis. No ; it certainly wasn't a f miction of anybody else that 
I can think of. I don't know whether it was properly a function of the 
OWL As to why he did this, you had better ask Cranston. As I say, 
I didn't remember this episode. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. We will have Mr. Cranston. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to have Mr. Pucinski read into the 
record a broadcast that Mr. Elmer Davis made on May 3, 1943. 

Chairman Madden. How long is it? 

Mr. Davis. It is 15 miiiutes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is only concerned with the Katyn affair. 

Chairman Madden. -All right. 

Mr. Pucinski. Maybe we had better have Mr. Davis read it. It is 
his exact words, and he will probably like to refer to it while you are 
talking to him. 

Mr. Davis. I appear to be quoting from myself on May 3, 1943. I 
may say, Mr. Chairman, tliat I don't believe I have seen the scripts 
of this broadcast since that date, but I have no doubt that it is correct 
(reading) : 

The Allied s((ueeze is on in Tunisia, and is going to be slow and hard. The 
enemy is fighting with great skill and stubbornness, and dispatches from the 
front report heavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill 
by hill, and every hill means a hard struggle. The critical jioiiit of the Hue is 
the center, where the P.ritish First Army is pushing northeastward from Med.jez 
el Hal). Here an advance of only a few kilometers will brin^- them into tint 
country much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger; 
here their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevetheless the 
enemy is fighting a losing light. The Allied air forces and the British naval 
forces are knocking oil" ships and i)laiu's on which the Axis must depend I'"i' 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1985 

suitplies and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will 
eventually break the enemy down. 

The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on the 
southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the Ger- 
mans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which 
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus from it. 
It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive against 
Russia. 

Mr. Mitchell,. Will you go down now to the part about Katyn ? 
Mr. Davis. I am reading it along as it comes, INIr. Counsel. 
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Please start right there [indicating]. 
Mr. Davis (reading) : 

But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German 
piopaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing 
about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish Govern- 
ment in exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine 
Hitler preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow 
a big lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September 
1939, tlie Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of 
Polish troops prisoners. In June 1941, when the Germans attacked Russia, they 
overran all of this territory and have held it since. Now, almost 2 years later, 
they suddenly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands 
of Polish officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians 
I] years ago. In several respects, this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans 
were quite uncertain about the number of killed. At one time the Japanese and 
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not 
I'oles in' Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000, and then 5,000, before 
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been 
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after 3 years. 
The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet they buried 
every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an investiga- 
tion by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans control 
the area. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpses in uniform 
with identification tags. There is no way the investigators could determine 
whether these men were killed by Russians or by Germans, as they probably 
were. 

I might say, Mr. Counsel, that after the lapse of 9i/^ years, I am 
convinced that they were killed by the Russians ; but this was a state- 
ment made at the time, with the evidence then available. 

The Germans are known to have slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Poles 
after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish prisoners, when 
they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing in the world 
for them to murder them, too — if not at the moment, then later, when they needed 
the corpses for propaganda. 

Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland, they told the world that 
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the 
Poles. Few people believed that story : It is all the more remarkable that any 
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so 
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass 
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for 3i/^ 
years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate attempt to 
exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse suspicion 
and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United States, which would help 
the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecution of the 
war we are all fighting against Germany. Indix'ectly, it might help to prop up 
German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the German civilian 
population — yes, even among the Army — that there is less belief that they can 
ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But the German propaganda 
has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain might call 
off the war, make a compromise peace, and leave Germany free to turn on Russia. 
And of course, more people will believe that if there is trouble between Russia 
and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the United 
Nations, concerns every one of those nations — the United States included^ 
because we must hold together to win the war. 



1986 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. I tliink that is enough, Mr. Davis. Thank you very 
much. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to read a memorandum from the 
Department of State dated April 22, 1943, which was approximately 
8 days previous to the broadcast that Mr. Davis has just put on the 
record. 

In the upper left-hand corner of this memorandum is the stamp 
of the Assistant Secretary of State, dated April 22, 1943, being the 
stamp of Mr. Berle. 

The first name from this memorandum has been deleted, in accord- 
ance with the agreement with the Department of State. 

At the request of Mr. Berle, So-and-So called to ask whether he had any objec- 
tion to Stockholm air.ffram No. so-and-so heins given to the OWI, apparently for 
the purpose of using information contained therein regarding German atrocities 
against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign which OWI wishes to start 
in order to counteract the German propaganda story regarding the alleged exe- 
cution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet authorities. It is felt that 
because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the alleged execution 
of these Polish officers, and on the l)asis of the various conflicting contentions 
of all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking 
any definite stand in regard to this question. Although it is realized that the 
story emanates from German sources, and is being used by the German propa- 
ganda machine in an effort to divide the members of the United Nations, it should 
be borne in mind that whether the story is true or not, it is known that the 
Polish Government has, without success, for the past year and a half been en- 
deavoring to ascertain from the Soviet Government the whereabouts of some 
S,000 Polish officers who, on the best of available evidence, were captured by the 
Soviet forces in 1939. 

In this connection, the Polish Government in the summer of 1942, specifically 
asked the American Ambassador to Moscow to intervene with the Soviet Govern- 
ment in an effort to cause the latter to release the S,000 Polish officers, who were 
reportedly still being held by the Soviet authorities. According to the Polish 
officials here, the Soviet authorities have never released one of the officers on the 
list presented by the Polish Government. Furthermore, according to a telegram 
of April 20, 7 p. m., from Berne, it appears that the International Red Cross 
has agreed to send a delegation to Smolensk to investigate the German allega- 
tions. It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evi- 
dence is available, it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in 
this regard. 

Now, Mr. Davis, it is evident that the Department of State 

Chairman Madden. Pardon me. Did you want that introduced as 
an exhibit? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis. Is that a memorandum to me ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is just a straight memorandum setting forth 
the State Department's policy at that time. 

Chairman Madden. Identify it and mark it as an exhibit. 

Mr. MrrciiELL. Yes, sir. 

This is a memorandum setting forth the policy of the Department 
of State, with respect to the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn. 
It is an unsigned memorandum, the original of which is in the Depart- 
ment of State's files. 

If you desire to see the original, sir, I will ask Mr. Ben Brown of 
the Department of State to produce that. 

Ml'. Davis. I trust you have had a certified copy made ? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is a photostatic copy of it, sir. 

Mr. Davis. All right. 

Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and intro- 
duce it? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1987 

Mr. Mitchell. This will be exhibit 8A, Washington, D. C. 

Chairman Madden. Do you want to have the portion of Mr. Davis' 
broadcast marked as an exhibit and introduce it in evidence? 

Mr. Mitchell. Let us do it in reverse. We will mark this as 8 and 
this as 8A. 

Chairman Madden. Exhibit 8 is Mr. Davis' broadcast and exhibit 
8A is the State Department memorandum. Those documents will be 
accepted in evidence as exhibits 8 and 8A. 

(Exhibits 8 and 8 A were received and follow here :) 

Exhibit 8 — Mr. Elmer Davis' Radio Broadcast of Mat 3, 1943 

{Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 1873 dated June 21, 1943, from the Legation at Stock- 
holm. Submitted as Enclosure 2 to Department on Embassy Despatch 1008, June 
0, 1952.] 

American Legation 
Stockholm 

COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS 

No. 51 Vol. II. May 3, 1943. 

The Weekly War Survey 

lu his weekly l)roadcast, the Director of the Office of War Information, Elmer 
Davis, sixike as follows : 

"The Allied squeeze is on in Tunisia and is going to be slow and hard. The 
enemy is fighting witli great skill and stubborness, and dispatches from the front 
report lieavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill by hill, 
and every iiill means a hard struggle. The critical point of the line is the 
center wiiere the British First Army is pushing northeastward from Medjez 
El Bab : liere an advance of only a few kilometers will bring them into flat coun- 
try much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger; here 
their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevertheless the enemy 
is fighting a losing fight. The Allied air forces and the British naval forces 
are knocking off ships and planes on which the Axis must depend for supplies 
and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will even- 
tually break the enemy down. 

"The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on 
the southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the 
Germans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which 
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus this 
suinmer. It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive 
against Riissia, but they may have enough force this summer for regional at- 
tacks, and the Caucasus with its oilfields is perhaps the most probable target. 
The present Russian attack seems aimed at breaking down that springboard be- 
fore anybody can .lump oft" from it. 

"But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German 
propaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing about 
a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish government in 
exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine Hitler 
preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow a big 
lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September 1939, 
the Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of Polish 
troops prisoners. In June 1941 when the Germans attacked Russia, they overran 
all this territory and have held it since. Now, almost two years later they sud- 
denly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands of Polish 
officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians three 
years ago. In several respects this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans 
were quite uncertain about the number of killed; at one time the Japanese and 
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not 
Poles in Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000 and then 5,000, before 
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been 
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after three 
years. The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet 
they buried every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an 
investigation by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans 



1988 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

control the aroa. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpse 
in uniform with identification tags. There is no way the investigators couN 
determine whether these men were killed by Russians, or by Germans as the; 
probably were. The Germans are l<nuwn to have slaughtered hundreds of thou 
sands of Poles after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish 
prisoners when they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing 
in the world for them to murder them, too, if not at the moment, then later when 
they needed the corpses for propaganda. 

"Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland they told the world that 
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the 
Poles. Few people believed that story ; it is all the more remarkable that any 
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so 
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass 
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for three 
and a half years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate 
attempt to exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse 
suspicion and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United Nations — which 
would help the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecu- 
tion of the war we are all fighting against Germany. Indirectly, it might help 
to prop up German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the 
German civilian population — yes, even among the army — that there is less belief 
that they can ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But German 
propaganda has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain 
might call off the war, make a compromise peace and leave Germany free to turn 
on Russia. And of course more people will believe that if there is trouble between 
Russia and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the 
United Nations concerns every one of those nations — the United States included — 
because we must all hold together to win the war. After the war, if the United 
Nations continue to hold together in some sort of collective security system, there 
will be less danger that any of the great powers may feel it has to safeguard its 
individual security at the expense of its weaker neighbors. That is the only way 
this issue can be treated — as one phase of the problem of world security. 



Exhibit 8A — State Department Memorandum Which Bore a Ruhijer Stamp 
Mark Indicating It Had Been Delivered to Me. Beele on April 22, 1943 

Department of State. 
Division of European Affairs, 

April 22, J9',J. 
memoranduji 

of FC, at the request of Mr. Berle, called to ask whether Eu 



had any objection to Stockholm's airgram No. A-lSl, April 5, 4 p. m., being given 
to OWI apparently for the purpose of using information contained therein 
regarding German atrocities against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign 
which OWI wishes to start in order to counteract the German propaganda story 
regarding the alleged execution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet 
authorities. 

It is felt that because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the 
alleged execution of these Polish oflicers and on the basis of the various con- 
flicting contentions ol" all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to 
refrain from taking any definite stand in regard to this question. 

Although it is realized that the story emanates from German sources and is 
being used by the German propaganda machine in an effort to divide the members 
of the United Nations, it should be borne in mind that whether the .story is true 
or not, it is known that the I'ollsh (lovernment has, without success, for the past 
year and a half been endeavoring to ascertain from the Soviet (Joveriunent the 
whereabouts of some 8,000 Polish oflicers who on the best avnilal>le evidence were 
captured by the Soviet forc(>s in ID.'^O. In this connection the Polish (Jovernmeut 
in tlie summer of 1942 specifically asked that the American Ambassador to 
Moscow intervene with the Soviet Government in an effort to cause tlie latter 
to release the 8,000 Polish oflicers who were? purportedly still being lH>ld by the 
Soviet authorities. According to Polish oflicials here the Soviet authorities have 
never released one of the oflicers on the list presented by tlie Polish Government. 

Furthermore, according to telegram No. 2471, April 20, 7 p. m., from Bern, it 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1989 

apiJears that the International Red Cross has agreed to send a delegation to 
Smolensk to investigate the German allegations. 

It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evidence is 
available it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in this regard. 

If, on the other hand, it is felt that it is imperative to counteract the German 
propaganda it is suggested that such action should be limited to a campaign 
liointing out that the American Government and the American people refuse to 
allow German propaganda stories regarding the alleged execution of the Polish 
officers to detract their attention from the many and continuing crimes which 
have been committed by the German authorities since the beginning of the war. 
In this connection OWI could repeat the many authenticated stories such as that 
of Lidice and might even quote, without giving the source or stating that the 
information has been completely verified, pertinent information from the attached 
telegram from Stockholm. It is not believed that the information in this tele- 
gram should be attributed as coming from official sources since in the last para- 
graph doubt is thrown on the accuracy of the information reported. 

As of possible interest in this connection there is attached a copy of the Polish 
National Council's statement which follows in some way the line suggested for 
OWI. 

(Committee Note. — A copy of the Polish National Council's statement referred 
to in the last paragraph of exhibit 8A appears as exhibit 21 on p. 678 of pt. 4 of 
this committee's published hearings.) 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr, Davis, you have told us previously that on over- 
all policy and on high-level policy matters, you discussed those with 
Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles. I would like to ask you now whether you 
ever discussed this matter specifically at this time with the Department 
of State or any official therein? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember. I may say,. Mr. Counsel, that this 
was not one of the major issues that I had to deal with at that time, 
from my point of view. To a Pole it was certainly the most impor- 
tant issue in the world, but to me, as to the head of every department 
or agency of Government, about that time ol year the principal ques- 
tion was how his budget was- going to get through Congress, and that 
absorbed most of my time. So whether I asked advice on this question 
from either INIr. Hull or Mr. Welles, I don't remember. I don't recall 
seeing this memorandum from Mr. Berle, although it is conceivable 
that I might have. I don't know. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you think the records of the broadcast are avail- 
able today — who prepared it for you? You didn't prepare it? 

Mr, Dwis, Of course — I wrote my own. 

Mr. Mitchell, Then you wrote that broadcast ? 

Mr, Davis, Yes. 

Mr, Mitchell, 'WHiere did you get the information concerning the 
Polish situation at that time? 

Mr. Davis. Do you mean the information in here [indicating ex- 
hibit 8] ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, 

Mr. Davis. There doesn't seem to be much about the Polish situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. I mean the propaganda, 

Mr, Davis, A good deal of it was printed in the newspapers at the 
time. Some of it may even have been in my broadcasts, I imagine 
that the correlation of different stories told by different Axis Powers 
probably came from recorded broadcasts by the FBIS wliich came 
through our Foreign News Bureau. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, since there was a question of doubt at that 
particular time, and since the International Ked Cross was becoming 
involved in this, and since it was after the Polish-Soviet relationship 



1990 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

was severed, wliy did you see fit at that time to take the stand yon 
took in this broadcast ? 

Mr. DA^^s. Because I beh'eved it at that time to be correct. It w:is 
a matter of news. For a period of about 3 months I did a weekly 
broadcast on an over-all survey of the war situation, which I even- 
tually dropped because I could never be quite sure who was broad- 
casting. It was not the executive branch of the Government of the 
United States. That— if that would have been the case, I would have 
had to have Presidential approval for all I said. It wasn't me, be- 
cause I felt that in justice to other broadcasters I should not use. 
even for background interpretation, any confidential information that 
came to me as a result of my Government service. Some of that 
confidential information I probably could have picked up if I had 
been a reporter, by going around, so it was not as good as Davis 
would have been normally, and it was not as authoritative as repre- 
sentations of the Government of the United States. So about the 
end of 3 months, I dropped it, but I was doing it at this time. This 
was a matter of news. 

With regard to the suggestion of Mr. Berle, as I say, I don't remem- 
ber whether I saw it or not, but this was an issue which a news organ- 
ization could hardly overlook. One of our difficulties with the De- 
partment of State Avas that there was only the question of: AVliere is 
the boundary line between policy and implementation of that policy 
by propaganda? They could tell us, unquestionably, the general 
line, but when they attempted to tell us how we could handle it in 
propaganda overseas, they Avere dealing with something which very 
often they didn't know very much about. I do not think any news 
organization could have overlooked this. If I had not happened to 
be broadcasting once a week at that time, I would undoubtedly have 
had nothing to say about this domestically, as it was outside of our 
field. But we were handling it in our foreign propaganda — we 
couldn't overlook it. I mean that is a case where silence would be 
about the worst ]jossible propaganda you could make. 

At the time I made this broadcast, the evidence rested almost en- 
tirely on the word of Josef Goebbels. a man whose reputation for 
veracity was extremely low. 

Now, it appears, with all of the subsequent evidence, that has be- 
come available, that this was the one time he was right; but I had 
no reason to believe so at the time. I have never been able to accept 
the argument that I should have believed the story of the Propaganda 
Minister of a Government with which the Goverinnent of the I"^nited 
States was at war, without some corroboration. 

Mr. Mitchell. But the Polisli Government in exile had alrciidy re- 
quested the International Red Cross to investigate? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, they had requested that; but, as I remember,. the 
Commission of Physicians that finally went in there — was that ap- 
pointed by the International Red Cross? I don't remember. 

Mr. MiTciiElL. No. 

Mr. Davis. That Avas a Gei-man group ? 

Mr. Mitchell. The International Red Cross was prevented from 
going in there because of the fact thai the Soviets refused to partici- 
pate. Conse(iuently, the (Germans formed an International Medical 
Commission. But Poland Avas an ally at tliat time. Poland had re- 
quested at that time an International Red Cross investigation. Re- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1991 

latioiLsliiiDS AYere broken off between the Poles and the Soviets on 
April ^6 1043 Yonr broadcast is dated May 2. So there mnst have 
been son'ie donbt or question. Otherwise the Polish Governn^nt 
wouldn't have gone to the extent of asking for an International iied 

Cross investigation. ■, , x i ^ t ^ i^ ^i . 

Mr D WIS. Oh, there may have been some doubt, but 1 telt that as 
at that moment the doubt should be resolved against the Propaganda 
Minister of the enemy. 

I mav say that that broadcast earned me three columns of denunci- 
ation from 'the Daily Worker and also three columns of denunciation 
from the Polish paper, or at least I was told it was denunciation. I 
couldn't read it. At that moment both the Polish newspaper and the 
Daily Worker knew of what I had said. 

Ml'. Mitchell. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. INIr. Machrowicz? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Davis, how long did you remain with the 
Office of War Information ? When did you sever your relationship 
with the Office of War Information ? 

Mr. Davis. September 15, 1945. 

Mr. Machrowicz. During the time that you were m the Office of 
War Information, had you ever known of the reports of Colonel Van 
Vliet and Colonel Stewart ? 

Mr. Davis. Never, sir. As far as I can recall now, I never heard ol 
those reports until they came out in the investigations of this com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Those reports, which indicated Russian guilty 
were never made known to you ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, how large a staff did you have in the Office 
of War Information ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, at the peak we had about 9,000 here and abroad, 
5,000 Americans, and about 4,000 of what we called locals, chauffeurs 
and interpreters, and things like that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did 3^011 have a so-called Polish Section ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. How were these people selected? 

]\Ir. Davis. A good many of them were there when I came. They 
had come from the predecessor organization, the Coordinator of In- 
formation. I don't remember who selected the man who was the head 
of our Polish desk in Washington, Mr. Ludwig Krzyzanowski, but he 
was a very sound man. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know the late Congressman John 
Lesinski ? 

Mr. Davis. I have had some correspondence with ]Mr. Lesinski. 

Mr. Machrowicz, Was it at the time you were in the Office of War 
Information? 

Mr. Davis. No ; just recently — I mean 2 or 3 years ago. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have a recollection that Congressman 
John Lesinski, the late Congressman — I mean the senior Mr. Lesinski — 
having warned you about the fact that there were several Commu- 
nists in the Office of War Information? 

Mr. Davis. I don't recall that. I recall that he made a speech in 
the summer of 1943 which contained more lies than were ever com- 
prised in any other speech made about the Office of War Information, 



1992 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

and that is saying quite a lot. I may say that I have made that state- 
ment to Mr. Lesinski before he died. I mean that I have not waited 
until after he is dead. I told him so in writing when he repeated 
some of those statements 2 or 3 years ago. I asked him where he got 
the information, because that was a perfectly absurd speech to be 
made by a Member of the Congress of the United States who knows 
anything about American politics or the American news business. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, let me ask you w^hether you received any 
warnings from the then Polish Ambassador to the United States, 
iVmbassaclor Ciechanowski, warning you about the fact that there 
were some Communist employees in the OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. I received a great number of allegations from Mr. 
Ciechanowski. I can't remember all of them now, but they were in- 
vestigated, and, as I recall, there was no convincing evidence to 
support them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Irene Belinska, who was in the 
Polish Section? 

]\Ir. Davis. I don't remember here. 

Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, she was at that time one 
of the members of the Polish Section in your office. 

Mr. Davis. Was she here or in New York ? 

Mr. INIaciirowicz. In Washington. She is the daughter of Ludwig 
Rajchman, who was the first consul of the Polish Communist Em- 
bassy in Washington in 1945. Rajchman engineered the surrender 
of the Polish Government in exile's files to to the Polish Communist 
Government in Washington. In 194:7, this same Miss Balinska re- 
turned to Poland — she was then employed by the Office of War 
Information — returned to Communist Poland and then came back to 
the United States and is now with a Polish Communist publishing 
house which publishes an anti-American newspaper. Did vou know 
that? 

Mr. Davis. She could not have been employed by the Office of War 
Information in 1947, because we had folded up. 

Mr. ]VL\ciirowicz. No, not in 1947. It was prior to that time. 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember. 

Mr. MachSowicz. You don't remember having been warned by 
Ambassador Ciechanowski or by anyone else about the fact that she 
w^as in your employ and that she was a Communist? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember. It may have happened. I don't 
know ; it is a long time ago. 

]Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Mira Zlotowski, who was in your 
employ in 1945 ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't recall. Mr. Krzyzanowski was the only man I 
ever had much dealing with, as I say, as the head of our Polish desk 
in Washington. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know Mrs. Zlotowski, the wife of Prof. 
Ignatius Zlotowski, the coiniselor of the Polish Conununist Embassy 
in Washington, who was denounced as a Communist by General Mo- 
delski of the Polish Embassy, who had resigned? He testified before 
the House Un-American Activities Connnittee that Mrs. Zlotowski 
was a Communist agent. 

Mr. Davis. I have no doubt of that. 

IVIr. Machrowicz. You don't remember her being employed by the 
Office of War Information? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1993 

■' Mr. Davis. She may well have been. I don't remember. As I say, 
the only man I dealt with Avas Mr. Krzyzanowski, who after he left us, 
went to the United Nations. For 3 or 4 years the Polish Communist 
Government tried to get him out of his job at the United Nations 
because he was working for us. I don't know whether he is still 
employed there. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur 
Salman ? 

Mr. Davis. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, he was also employed by 
the Office of War Information in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland, 
and is editor in chief of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means 
The Worker, tlie most outspoken anti-American organ in Warsaw. He 
at that time was also an employee of the Office of War Information. 
You have no recollection of him ? 

Mr. Davis. No. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You have no recollection of either Ambassador 
Ciechanowski or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact 
that these three persons were known Communists, and were in the 
employ of the Office of War Information ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me 
about anything, Mr. Cieclianowski, perhaps by his excessive number 
of warnings, made me forget which particular ones he especially 
spoke about. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you 
that you told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that 
matter ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't know, but I do know that I was often tempted 
to tell various of the representatives of the governments in exile to 
stay out of our business, because almost eveiy one of them seemed to 
think that it was our duty to carry out the policies of his government 
and not those of the United States. There were only two exceptions 
to that that I can remember, of the governments in exile, the Czechs, 
that is, the good Czechs, Benes, and Masaryk and the Filipino Govern- 
ment. 

I will anticipate your next question. Mr. Hof meister, who was head 
of our Czechoslovak desk in New York, after the Communists seized 
power, became a Communist and is now, I believe, the Czechoslovak 
Ambassador in Paris. But he showed no signs of that inclination 
while he was with us that I ever heard of. 

Mr; Machrowicz. You took that attitude, even though they had 
warned you of the presence of Communist agents in the Office of War 
Information ? 

Mr. Davis. If I had taken seriously all of the stories about agents of 
the Communists in the Office of War Information I would have had 
nothing else to do but to fire the whole staff. We investigated every- 
thing as much as we could, and we found that 99 percent of the allega- 
tions were without foundation. I remember that at one time I re- 
ceived a very serious warning in the summer of 1944 about some of our 
people in Hollj^wood who were associating with a dangerous and sub- 
versive character who at that time happened to be the chairman of the 
Dewey comniittee in Hollywood, and who had also written the most 
effective anti-Communist picture that was ever put on the screen. 



1994 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr, Machrowicz. Do you have any doubt about the fact that these 
three persons whom I have mentioned were actually Communists ? 

Mr. Davis. I have no doubt that they are now. They may be band- 
wagon Communists, like a lot of others who wanted to be on the 
winning side. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think that in commenting on the testimony 
taken before the House committee in 1943, you referred to the fact 
that Mr. Cranston was only expressing his hope as to what these com- 
mentators would say ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, that was the way it sounded to me. Counsel for 
the committee phrased it a little differently, but it seemed to me that 
the testimony of one of the witnesses will indicate that it was as you 
say. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I will refer you to this question and answer : 

Mr. Gaket. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the 
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views of what 
should be put over the air in the United States about the Russian situation? 
That is the sum and substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do? 

Mr. Lang. I don't know tliat it was expressed that way. That was the 
thought. 

Would you say that Mr. Cranston was right in trying to get any sta- 
tion in Detroit — or any other station — to conform to the views on 
Avhat should be put over the air? 

Mr. Davis. No. What should be broadcast over the air in the 
United States about the Russian situation? 

Mr, Machrowicz. Yes. 

Mr. Davis. No; that would be quite beyond our authority or quite 
beyond my desires. But if you Avill look back a little further, you will 
find that one of these gentlemen testified rather to the opposite. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I am just referring to this particular question : 
You would say that if he acted in the manner that has been described 
here, he acted improperly ? 

Mr. Davis. I think he acted improperly in that case, j'es — if he so 
did. 

Mr, Machrowicz. Did you at any time after your original broad- 
cast in May 1943, broadcast any information indicating the receipt 
of information showing Russian guilt ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What information did you liave otlier than wliut 
you have already said, upon which to base your belief as to tlie truth 
of the contents of tliat statement of May 3, 1943 ? 

Mr. Davis. Just what I have here, the conflicting stories told by the 
various Axis Nations, and the general uiuvliability of Joseph Goeb- 
bels. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, is it still your opinion, as expressed in that 
bi'oadcast, that the request by the Polish Government for an impartial 
Red Cross investigation was a maneuver, brought about by German 
propaganda? 

Mr. Davis. No. I except to that to the extent that the German 
])i'()pagaiida, bringing in the whole story, touched off the chain re- 
action. I am certainly not implying that the Polish Government was 
responsive to German })ro])aganda ; but it was a very smart thing by 
Joseph Goebbels, which brought an obvious reaction. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1995 

Mr. Machrowicz. As I remember your broadcast, you indicated 
that you thouofht tlie request of the Polish Government for an im- 
partial investigation was a smart maneuver by the German propa- 
ganda. 

Mr. Davis. Well now, wait a minute. Let me see this. It says : 

* * * German propoganda won a strikinj: success last week when it suc- 
ceeded in bringing about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the 
Polish Government in exile. 

I don't think that that implies that the Polish Government was 
responsive to German propaganda, as such; that the story that was 
broken by German propaganda, which had not been broken before 
then, was responsible for this, and that the refusal of the Kussians 
to consider the International Red Cross investigation was responsible 
for the breaking off of relations. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you don't believe — do you? — that the re- 
quest by the Polish Government for an impartial investigation was 
at all caused by German propaganda? 

Mr. Davis. Oh, certainly not. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ? 

Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, there lias been handed to me, since I came 
into the committee room at noon, a pamphlet which contains this state- 
ment [reading] : 

One of the greatest OWI scandals broke when Frederick Woltman published 
his article entitled "A. F. of L. and CIO Charge OWI Radio as Conununistic." 

Woltman's article appears in the New York World-Telegram of October 4, 1943. 
It showed that the A. F. of L. as well as the CIO, the two great American labor 
organizations, which nobody but the Comuuinists ever accused of being reaction- 
ary, withdrew their cooperation from the OWI's labor desk because of the latter's 
outspoken Communist attitude. 

Do you want to comment on that ? 

Mr. Davis, That is correct. We removed the man at the head of 
the desk. 

Mr. Dondero. Who was that man? 

Mr. Davis. I have forgotten his name now, but I remember that it 
happened. 

May I ask what the pamphlet is, sir? 

Mr. Dondero. Yes ; it is a ])ami)hlet entitled "The OWI and Voice 
of America," by Julius Epstein. 

Mr. Davis. That statement is correct, and we did remove the man. 
We had to fire a few people now and then. 

Mr. Dondero. How many, Mr. Davis, did you have to fire because 
of their communistic attitude ? 

Mr. DA\^s. I think it was about a dozen. We fired the head of 
the Greek desk in Xew York because he violated a directive sent from 
Washington about the liandling of the news of Greece. I have for- 
gotten his name, but it happened. There were a few others here 
and there. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Davis, can you tell us how vou were selected for 
the OWI job? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I was selected by the President. I don't know 
how he came to the conclusion. New Yorker magazine was my 



1996 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

original sponsor. I wrote to the editor afterward and told him that 
he seemed to be the man who did it. He said that he was "delighted," 
because that was the second public-service campaign he had ever 
conducted, both successful. The first one was to get the information 
booth in the Pennsylvania Station moved to the middle of the con- 
course. He seemed to think that these two achievements were of about 
equal importance. 

Mr. Sheehan. You stated in the beginning that you reported only 
to the President? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, the President must have given you some 
directives, or some ideas of what he wanted you to do, or what job 
he wanted you to accomplish. Can you relate that ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, Mr. Roosevelt was a pretty busy man. I didn't 
bother him any more than I had to. I think it is fair to say that he 
was not very much interested in propaganda, so that I didn't get very 
many directives from him about specific matters. 

Mr. Sheehan. What do you mean by "not verj- much interested in 
propaganda"? 

Mr. Davis. I don't think that he regarded it as of any major im- 
portance. For example, I don't think that he attached anything like 
the weight to it that President Wilson did. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you just had a cursory talk with 
him. The President didn't lay down any specific principles ? 

Let's be specific. Did he say at any time the way in which you 
should treat Russia or any of our otlier allies? 

Mr. Davis. No ; not other than to 

Mr. Sheehan. Then the whole policy of OWI was entirely within 
your lap ? 

Mr. Davis. We had to check with the State Department, as I say, 
on specific issues; but, very often, we found that the Government 
had no policy. When I say "very often" that is a little exaggeration, 
but there were certain cases in which we found that the Government 
had not decided on policy. We had to keep on presenting news to 
and about certain countries, and there we just had to "roll our own." 

Mr. Sheehan. The State Department, then, did not lay down any 
policy for you at any time ? 

Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; they did on various points, quite a lot of them. 

Mr. Sheehan. To be specific, did they lay down any policy or ask 
you to follow any particular line with reference to the treatment of 
Russian news? 

JNIr. Davis. No. 

Mr. Sheehan. German news? 

Mr. Davis. Well, naturally, we regarded German news with con- 
siderable suspicion. We were at war with Germany, and what came 
out of Germany was Avhat was permitted by Joe Goebbels. We didn't 
have very much confidence in him as a news source. 

Mr. Sheehan. I would like to get back to this talk about F. D. R. 

It seems inconceivable to he that Mr. Roosevelt would have called 
you in and would have said "Hero, Mr. Davis; you take over the OWI. 
It is yours," with no specific instructions, or anything. It seems to 
me that Mr. Roosevelt was a strong-enough-willed man that, if he 
believed he did not Mant your pro[)agun(la, he would have put the 
OWI out of existence. 



THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1997 

Mr. Davis. The propaganda agency had been in existence before 
that. The problem when OWI was "formed was to unify the four 
Government agencies that were then in existence. That was the prin- 
cipal thing that I was concerned with. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did you agree with Mr. Roosevelt that propaganda 
wasn't worth much? 

Mr. Davis. No; though I think that its value often has been over- 
rated. Propaganda never won a war by itself. It can be an extremely 
useful auxiliary to military operations, but it never w^on a war single- 
handedly. 

Mr. Sheehan. On the basis of your experience in OWI — and you 
have probably followed its course since you left it — do you think that, 
as a whole generally, they have done a worthwhile job ? 

Mr. Davis. Whom do you mean ? 

Mr. Sheehan. The propaganda agencies, the OWI and the Voice 
of America ? 

Mr. Davis. I do. 

Mr. Sheehan. You think it has been effective with the people over- 
seas ? 

Mr. Davis. It has been about as effective as it could be. 

Mr. Sheehan. That may be nothing. 

Mr. Davis. Well, it is more effective than that. It has been very 
valuable at times. 

Mr. Sheehan. Do you think, in your own opinion, that we are 
getting our money's worth for the large amount of money we are put- 
ting into this propaganda ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Sheehan. Then, if you were a taxpayer, you would want to 
continue the Voice of America ? 

Mr. Davis. I am a taxpayer, Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. Do you think it should be continued? 

Mr. Davis. It should be continued. It may be, as some have said, 
that a psychological-warfare program will crack the Communist front 
in Korea. I very much doubt that. It will help, but it won't do it by 
itself, in my opinion. However, it will help. 

Mr. Sheehan. Now, this Congress — and I myself, having been 
fortunate enough to be reelected — will have to face the fact that we are 
voting some appropriations for the Voice of America. From what I 
have seen and heard — and I am giving you my own personal opinion — 
I am not too confident. I mean that it is big in size and it is a large 
amount of money that is being spent. Someday we should have some- 
one, an expert like yourself, resolve in our own minds that maybe 
propaganda is in itself valuable. That I would not question. i3ut 
whether we should have 9,000 employees and spend billions of dollars 
are points that a man with your experience should be able to tell us 
about, more or less "off the cuff." 

Mr. Davis. I don't think there is any proposal — any informed pro- 
■posal — to spend billions of dollars. Two or three amateurs have sug- 
gested that we need billion-dollar programs. I do not think it is 
worth an investment of billions, by any means, but I do think that it 
is worth the investment of the money that is going into it now. 

Remember that expenses are considerably higher than they were a 
few years ago when I was operating. The Voice of America at present 

93744— 52— pt. 7 12 



1998 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

gets more money than the OWI ever had, but that is largely due to 
the increase in costs. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. I don't have the facts, and that is why I am asking 
you these questions. 

Mr. Davis. I remember those statements, Mr. Sheehan, by outsiders ; 
that is, about how we ought to pour billions of dollars into a great 
campaign of truth. I do not believe you would get value received for 
billions, but I do believe that, for the kind of money that is going into 
it now, you do. 

Mr. Shp:eiiax. For instance, one of the criticisms — and it will bear 
investigation, because as it stands in my mind I do not have the exact 
facts — is, for instance, that in the radio end of the Voice of America 
at the present time there are more employees than the combined net- 
works in America. It seems to me that the combined networks in 
America are doing a wonderful job of news saturation and dissemi- 
nation. 

Mr. Davis. The combined networks operate in one language. The 
Voice of America overseas probably operates in 40. That is one 
difference right there. 

They have to have relay stations abroad to pick up their short-wave 
stuff and transmit it to medium waves, so that it can reach the audi- 
ences. So, it is a far more expensive operation. 

Mr. Sheehan. That is all I have. 

Mr. DoNDERO. I have one more question. 

Chairman Madden. ATr. Dondero. 

Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, how many people are employed by the 
OWI — that has gone out of business — the Voice of America, today? 

Mr. Davis. I don't know how many they have today. As I say, at 
our peak, we had about 9,000 here and overseas. But that was when 
we had some 30 oversea stations, and there were some 4,000 of those 
who were local people, j^orters, chauffeurs, translators, and things 
like that. 

Mr. Dondero. Our investment in the Voice of America is about 
$85,000,000 annually now. Do you understand that to be about 
correct ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir; but, as I say, the costs have vastly gone up. 
Then there are also certain things such as, for instance, wlien Luxem- 
burg was liberated, our psychological warfare was partly OWI and 
partly British. They liad the great advantage of Kadio Luxemburg. 
But now Kadio Luxemburg lias been given back to Luxemburg, and 
our people have had to build their own relay stations. 

Chairman Madden. As a conunent, T might say this: I think that 
the Voice of America and any medium to send truth behind the iron 
curtain is a good investment. But, referring to some of the ridiculous 
ideas of even some Members of our Congress on expenditures for 
propaganda and truth, it has been revealed by the people over in 
Euroi)e that our committee, through our testimony over there, put 
the liussian proj)aganda nuichine on the defensive. Our conunittee' 
will not cost the Amei-ican taxi)ayers ovei' $S0,000. Yet, when the 
resolution was up on the iloor ol" (he House to i)erniit our conunittee 
to go overseas, tliere were U)(i Members who voted against the reso- 
lution. A great number of them thought the exi)enditure involved 
was too nnich. We only won jjermission to go overseas by nine votes. 

When you consider the millions of dollars that have been spent by 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1999 

Congress for propaganda, I do not think the opinions of some Mem- 
bers of Congress are of very much value when you consider that our 
resohition won by only nine votes. 

Mr. Davis. If I might just offer a sort of supplementary paragraph 
to that, propaganda has to have something to work on. The most 
powerful propaganda is the truth; and the facts about this Katyn 
business which your committee has brought to light will undoubtedly 
be of enormous value to the Voice of America from now on. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, were you warned through several dif- 
ferent sources that you had Connnunists in the Office of War Infor- 
mation ? One statement that you made was that in Mr. Lesinski's 
warning, for example, there were more lies in that article than you 
ever saw before. 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Is it your contention that there were no Commu- 
nists in the OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. But the statements made by Mr. Lesinski were 
itlmost all demonstrably false. As I say, we found about a dozen, and 
Ave fired them. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you recall a Mr. Peter Lyons? 

Mr. Davis. I know the name. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. Do you recall a Mr. Barnes? 

Mr. Davis. Joe Barnes — certainly. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was your estimate of Mr. Barnes? 

Mr. Davis. I thought he was a very able man, but he was too much 
addicted to what we called in the war "localitis." He was head of the 
New York office, and it was eventually found desirable to remove him 
because he didn't seem to be quite sufficiently in sympathy with the 
policies laid down in Washington. But I never had the slightest 
question about his loyalty. 

Mr. O KoNSKi. I am quoting now from the labor report that we 
had reference to. It says here [ reading] : 

It developed that the labor broadcasting desk under Mr. Barnes, through the 
OWI, had broadcast to Europe songs of the Almanac Sailors, who are virtually 
the official songsters of the American Communist Party. 

In other words, for a while there we actually had Communist songs 
going out over the OWI. 

Mr. Davis. I don't know about that, Mr. O'Konski. I would hesi- 
tate to believe it without corroboration, because so many lies were told 
about us. As I say, I didn't know anything about it, and I doubt 
whether Joe Barnes knew anything about it. It is conceivably true, 
but we did remove the head man. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. Did you know that the Ahnanac Sailors were 
broadly proclaiming their anti-American attitude with such tuneful 
songs as "Plow under every fourth American boy" ? 

Mr. Davis. I can't remember that I ever heard of those singers 
having their songs go out over the OWI. 

Mr. O'Konski. In other words, you do admit, though, that the Office 
of War Information did have Connnunist sympathizers? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; we had a few, and we fired them when we caught 
them. 



2000 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was the initiative in firing them started by your 
organization or was it always by some outside pressure, such as the 
CIO and the A. F. of L.? 

Mr. Davis. It was almost always started by our organization. We 
had our own security service, and when they found evidence against 
somebody we threw them out. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you never heard, Mr. Davis, of any of these 
people whom I mentioned ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir ; evidently not, because they didn't find evidence 
sufficient to justify firing them at that time. As you say, no doubt 
they are Communists now, but that was not necessarily true then. I 
admit that we missed one or two. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You caught 10, but you do not know how many 
you missed ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, as I say, I admit that we missed one or two. They 
have since shown themselves to have become Communists. They are 
not the ones that you mentioned. I prefer not to mention their names, 
although I would be glad to give them to the committee in private. 
We missed them only because they didn't show any evidence of 
communistic activities at that time, but have shown them since. I 
don't think there were very many. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Subsequently, since your connection with the OWI 
and the unearthing of all of this evidence, conclusive as it was, and as 
you now observe conditions, do you think that if you had to do it 
over again you would have handled, say, for instance, the Katyn 
story, in the OWI, as you did, knowing what you know now ? 

Mr. Davis. Oh, no. You mean in the broadcast? No; certainly 
not. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would you have handled that broadcast in the 
same way had you known the facts ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. These reports, which seem to me convincing, 
as far as I know, were never heard of by me until they appeared in 
the hearings of this committee this spring. 

Chairman Madden. Have you finished? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, you have already told the committee 
that the function of Alan Cranston was outside the scope of his 
specific duties when he attended this meeting in New York and tried 
to get them to conform ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, if he did as you say. I think that if you will 
read that you will find some conflict in the testimony about that. 

Mr. MncHELL. All right. 

I would like to place in the record now from the same set of hear- 
ings — and I will ask Mr. Pucinski to read it — testimony concerning a 
man by the name of Lee Falk. Do you know Mr. Falk ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I remember the name. I don't remember what 
he did. 

Mr. Mitchell. In OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. I remember him as somebody in OWI; yps. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you proceed to read that, please, Mr. Pucinski? 

Mr. Pucinski. I am reading from page 494 of the same testimony 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2001 

as exhibit 2. This is from volume 991 of the House committee hear- 
ings. This is testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards. 

Chairman Madden. Testimony before what committee? 

Mr. PuciNSKi. The House committee investigating the Federal 
Communications Cormnission, headed by Congressman Cox. This is 
testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards, Assistant to the Di- 
rector of the Office of Censorship. Mr. Richards is rehiting a mem- 
orandum that he had written immediately after a conference he had 
with Sidney Spear, an attorney for the Federal Communications 
Commission, at 2 p. m. August 25, 1942. I am just going to read the 
part of Mr. Richards' memorandum which he prepared following 
that meeting with Spear. 

Mr. Spear is talking about a meeting that he had with Lee Falk. 
I am quoting : 

He related his experiences with Mr. Lee Falk of the Foreign-Language 
Section, Radio Division, Office of War Information. He said that Mr. Falk 
originally had taken on the job of removing unsavory personnel from foreign- 
language stations, because he, Mr. Falk, believed such a job had to be done, 
and no one else seemed to want to do it. 

Mr. Spear told me the following : "We worked it this way. If Lee, meaning 
Lee Falk, found a fellow he thought was doing some funny business, he told me 
about it. Then he waited until the station applied for renewal of license. Say 
the station was WBNX and the broadcaster in question was Leopold Hurdski." 

there is a note here that Hurdski is a fictitious name being used just 
for the purpose of illustration. I am continuing quoting : 

Well, when WBNX applied for renewal, we would tip off Lee, and he would 
drop in on Mr. Alcorn, the station manager. He would say "Mr. Alcorn, I 
believe you ought to fire Leopold Hurdski." Then he would give Mr. Alcorn 
some time to think this over. After a couple of weeks, Mr. Alcorn would begin 
to notice he was having some trouble getting his license renewed. After a 
couple of more weeks of this same thing, he would begin to put two and two 
together and get four. Then he would fire Leopold Hurdski, and very shortly 
after that his license would be renewed by the Commission. This was a little 
extralegal, I admit, and I had to wrestle with my conscience about it, but it 
seemed the only way to eliminate this kind of person, so I did it. AVe can 
cooperate in the same way with you — meaning with the Office of War Censorship. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, would you say that the function of Lee 
Falk, as described therein, that is, in the congressional committee in- 
vestigation, was within the scope of his duties at OWI ? 

Mr. Davis. No, sir. If that is a correct report of what he did, I 
would say that he exceed his proper field. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, your handling of the Katyn story was 
in conformity with the United States military and foreign policy at 
that time, was it not ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know that the military policy came into 
it at all. This memorandum from Mr. Berle would suggest that they 
wanted nothing said about it. As I say, for a news organization, it 
was impossible to say nothing about it. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. If it had not been in conformity with the over-all 
policy at that time, you would have heard from him, would you not 
have? 

Mr. Daa^s. Well, I should imagine so. As I say, I heard about 
it only from the Polish paper and the Daily Worker, neither of which 
liked it. 



2002 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. O'KoNSKT. Tlie reason I mentioned that is because all of this 
evidence started to pile up in the various divisions of our Govern- 
ment. They were not correlated. There was a liush-hush policy on 
the Katyn massacre all the way throufrh, so that at that time, even 
if you liad tried to get the truth about the Katyn massacre, you 
woidd have been unable to do so. 

Mr. Davis, I certainly wouldn't have been able to get the critical 
documents, the reports of Colonel Van Vliet and of these other people 
because, as I understand, they were only available after the Oerman 
collapse in 1945. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In our investigation, Ave found out that there was 
no correlation between the various departments. It seems certain 
that there were never any documents or any bit of evidence pinning 
the crime on the Germans. It was just not available for anyone to 
see. So you couldn't have spoken truthfully. The propaganda in 
your broadcast were based very largely on the suspicion of Goebbels. 
Did you ever have any suspicion about Stalin ? 

But as you observe this whole picture now, don't you think — and 
you do not have to comment on this if you do not want to — that the 
over-all policy in handling the Katyn affair by all of the brandies of 
the United States Government who were concerned, was very badly 
handled? 

Mr. Davis. I don't think they had much evidence until May or 
June of 1945, and the Van Vliet report. Wliat happened after that 
I wouldn't know, because at that time we were principally concerned 
with the Japanese war. Then I went out of office on the 15th of Sep- 
tember of 1945. 

Mr. SiiEEiiAx. May I sa^^ that in the belief of our committee, the 
Voice of America followed the policy of hiding the Katyn affair until 
pretty nearly 1950, although the documents were there. 

We understand that there was not much use made of them in the 
Voice of America. 

Mr. Davis, The OWI could not have concealed that after Septem- 
ber 1945 because after that we did not exist. 

Mr. Sheeiian. I said the Voice of America. 

Mr. Davis. Whether any division of our office ever got the Van Vliet 
report, I don't know. I very much doubt it. I do so, because, if some- 
body had gotten it, I would have been told. 

Chairman Madden, Are there any other questions? 

Mr. Davis, we are grateful to you for coming up here today, 

Mr. Davis, Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman Madden, The next witnesses will be Joseph Lang and 
Arthur Simon, 

We will hear Mr, Joseph Lang first. Will you come forward, Mr. 
Lang, please? 

I will ask the photographers to take their pictures now, in conform- 
ance with the rules. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG, JENKINTOWN, PA. 

Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, do you solemnly swear that the testi- 
mony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Lang. I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2003 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang, will you state your name and address^ 
please, for the reporter? 

Mr. Lang. Joseph Lanrr, Jenkintown, Pa. 

Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, what is your business? 

Mr. Lang. I am in the broadcasting business. 

Chairman Madden. ^Vliere are you employed now? For whom? 
What company? 

Mr. Lang. I am vice president of radio station WIBG in Philadel- 
phia. 

Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Lang, where were you employed in May 1943 ? 

Mr. Lang. I was vice president and general manager of radio sta- 
tion WHOM, New York City. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you present this afternoon when the testimony 
was read into the record from the congressional investigation of 1943 ? 
Have you read it? 

Mr. Lang. I have read it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Then you are familiar with that statement? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Mr. IMiTCHELL. Do you now state before this committee that the 
statements contained therein are true ? 

Mr. Lang. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. That Mr. James F. Hopkins was contacted in 
Detroit? 

Mr. Lang. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. That Mr, Alan Cranston and Mrs, Hilda Shea visited 
your office? 

]Mr. Lang. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. xVnd that present at that meeting was Mr. Simon? 

Mr, Lang. Yes ; that is true. 

Mr. Mitchell, And that no member of the Office of Censorship was 
present ? 

Mr, Lang, They were not. 

]Mr. Mitchell. And that the substance contained therein, that is, 
what you have read from the congressional hearing — and since you 
were the witness, you should certainly know what you said — is defi- 
nitely true ? 

Mr. Lang. That is correct, 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any questions? 

Mr. OTvonski? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Tn this conversation that you had, Mr. Lang, did 
any conversation develop along these lines — that these foreign-lan- 
guage stations are on a temporary license, and that if they didn't con- 
form, somehow it would be made known to them through the Federal 
Communications Commission that the renewal of their license might 
be endangered? Did any conversation or hints ever develop when 
you were meeting with these people about getting these foreign-lan- 
guage stations to conform with OWI policy ? 

Mr. Lang. I would say actual conversations took place encompas- 
sing words like those. But we all knew in the foreign-language field, 
since there were so many people suspect of different leanings, whether 
they were Fascists, Fascist leanings or Communist leanings, that we 



2004 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

were held on the string, you might say, until a lot of these things could 
be cleared up. 

As far as hints go, I wouldn't say there were hints ; but it was gen- 
erally known and discussed among station owners, or station man- 
agers, that that was the situation. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, you are in the radio business as I am. Sup- 
pose you owned a foreign-language station and somebody hinted to 
you that as long as you had John Jones as an announcer or as a news- 
caster on your radio station you might run into a little difficulty in 
getting your license renewed. As a radio-station operator, how long 
would it take you until you would fire that announcer or newscaster ? 

Mr. Lang. Well, frankly, Mr. O'Konski, there isn't any such thing 
as a foreign-language station. These are American stations broad- 
casting in foreign languages. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is right. I will correct the record. 

Mr. Lang. I could not be intimidated by any such talk or threat. 
I have been in the broadcasting business since 1928. I have attended 
a great many hearings before the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion. In my estimation, the owner or the licensee of a radio station 
is the sole person responsible for that license, and it is up to him 
to use his own best judgment as to whether the person should be fired 
or not. I know that when it came to a final analysis, no governmental 
agency could take a license away from a station because, in their judg- 
ment, they saw fit to keep a person on who might be inimical to the 
country's interests or the country's security. If he was, that would 
be a case for the FBI, and that is the way I judge matters like that. 

Mr. O'Konski. That was true in your case. But take some of these 
stations that are barely hanging on economically, having a hard time 
making ends meet. If it was generally hinted to them almost by any- 
body, that they would run into difficulty in getting their license re- 
newed as long as they had this person commenting on the news, what 
do you think most of those owners would do? Would they run the 
risk of antagonizing the Government agency or would they call in the 
commentator and say "I am sorry, but my business is in jeopardy, and 
I cannot take the chance. I will have to dismiss you." 

Mr. Lang. I don't know whether I can answer that. In other 
words, I would be just venturing an opinion, when you ask me what I 
think the}^ would do. 

Mr. O'Konski. Yes ; I understand. 

Mr. Lang. The only thing I can really state definitely is what I 
would do. 

Mr. O'Konski. That is right. 

Mr. Lang. I suppose they would be very much tempted to take the 
easiest wav out, and to let the person go, if they felt that their license 
was in jeopardy. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. Machkowicz. INIr. Lang, as the result of the conference you 
had with Mr. ('ranston, did you contact Mr. Hopkins, Mr. James F. 
Hopkins, of Station WJBK, in Detroit? 

Mr. Lang. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Macjiuowicz. Wliy did you contact him? 

Mr. Lang. Because Mr. Cranston and IVIrs. Shea called me from 
Washington to arrange this meeting, saying that they would like to 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2005 

iret tlie foreign language, or rather, the Polish situation straightened 
(lilt in Detroit, and asking me whether I could help. 

Mr. Machrowicz. "What did they tell you about the so-called foreign 
language situation in Detroit? 

Mr. Lang. That the Polish commentators were — I don't remember 
the exact language — but they used the colloquial expression — "going 
haywire" and making comments on a great many subjects that they 
felt were not in line with what our general thinking should be. 

Mr. Maciirowtcz. Did they specificall}' refer to the Katyn 
massacre ? 

Mr. Lang. The two subjects mentioned were the Katyn massacre 
and — yes, they did refer to that. 

Mr. Maohrow^icz. So that Mr. Cranston objected to the commen- 
tator on Station WJBK making comments indicating Russian guilt 
for the massacre ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And he wanted you to put a stop to that? 

Mr. Lang. Well, he couldn't ask me to put a stop to it, because I had 
no authority. I was chairman of the foreign language committee of 
the National Association of Broadcasters and we had no power, as an 
industry committee, a voluntary industry committee, we had no power 
to discipline anyone. We simply tried to have our programs in the 
national interest. Mr. Cranston asked me what my ideas were on it, 
and I said that I would apply the same procedures and rules that I 
had used there, and had used for a good many years, that is, that I 
would only permit to be broadcast in these foreign languages at a 
critical time, the dispatches we got oif the services that we subscribed 
to. At that time they were the Associated Press and the International 
News Service. 

The reason for that was that I felt that they were checked at the 
source. We received them by teletype in our station. Frankly, there 
was more reliability to those reports, more reliability than we could 
ascertain by checking ourselves, for which we had no facilities. 

On the other hand, if we permitted people to comment on matters, 
they were giving their own versions, their own reports, and I didn't 
know where those ideas were coming from. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In other words, what Mr. Cranston wanted you 
to do was to use your good efforts to try to convince Station WJBK 
in Detroit not to permit these comments, which would indicate Russian 
guilt? 

Mr. Lang. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And wasn't that a form of censorship ? 

Mr. Lang. Yes ; I would suppose you could call it that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was that not contrary to the spirit of the Federal 
Communications Act ? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you did call Mr. Hopkins ? 

Mr. Lang. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did you tell Mr. Hoplrins ? 

Mr. Lang. I told him that I thought — I didn't suggest any way to 
run his station. I told him what I was doing, and thati thought that 
would be a course to pursue which would satisfy the public in getting 
proper news without having it slanted; thatI had used that method, 
and that I felt it very satisfactory. 



2006 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did Mr. Hopkins tell you ? 

Mr. Lang. As I recollect — I do not remember his exact words — he 
said that he would think it over, and, naturally, make his own de- 
cision, as he was the owner of that station. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Let me ask this. Mrs. Shea was definitely not representing the poli- 
cies of the Federal Communications Commission. What she did, she 
did on her own ? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ? 

You may proceed, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. MiTCHEix,. Mr. Lang, in an interview conducted by the commits 
tee staff in September of this year with Mrs. Shea, the following ques- 
tion was asked : 

Unless Mr. Lang is not telling the truth or unless he is confused, or unless the 
regulation is not corrected, it would appear that you were really not exploring. 
You had your mind pretty well made up. From what he said earlier, you were 
concerned about the boundaries, the question of boundaries between Poland and 
Russia ? 

to that Mrs. Shea replied : 

I would like to repeat, I would like again to repeat that Mr. Lang is quite 
mistaken in saying that I .ioined with Mr. Cranston in the recommendation 
that any station could take any position on this Polish-Russian controversy. 

Would you like to comment on that, please? Did she join with 
Cranston ? 

Mr. Lang. Well, the fact that she was at that meeting, whether she 
said a w^ord or not, would certainly indicate to me that she was in 
agreement with what Cranston thought and expressed to me. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was your license up for consideration at that time? 

Mr. Lang. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was she present, then, in that capacity, that is, in 
connection with your license, or was she there on tliis Katyn-Polish 
question ? 

Mr. Lang. Well, she was there, as I understand it, to accompany 
Mr. Cranston. I don't know what her official position was. She 
had no official position, as far as I was concerned, except that they 
Mere both interested in this situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did Cranston have anything to do with the granting 
of licenses ? 

Mr. Lang. No. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why do you think that Cranston was at that meet- 
ing, other than for that Katyn affair? 

Mr. Lang. I do not know. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is Mrs. Shea correct in her statement tluit she did 
not participate in this dicussion? 

Mr. Lan(}. Well, she was certainly there, and, as far as I am con- 
ceined, that is participating in a discussion. I don't recollect any 
exact words, but anyone who was present had to participate in the 
discussion. 

]\Ir. MrrciiKLL. Thank you. I have no further questions. 

Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Thank you, Mr. Lang, for ai)pearing as a witness. 

Chairman Madden. Arthur Simon, please. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2007 

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON, FOREST HILLS, N. Y. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Simon, do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Simon. I do. 

Chairman Madden. Will you state your name, please, Mr. Simon? 

Mr. Simon. Arthur Simon. 

Chairman Madden. And your address? 

Mr. Simon. 7714 One hundred and thirteenth Street, Forest Hills, 
N. Y. 

Chairman Madden. And your business ? 

Mr. Simon. I am a special representative for the Radio and Tele- 
vision Daily, a publication that covers the radio and television news 
of the industry. 

Chaiiman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, you have been present this afternoon 
and heard the discussion of the meeting held in New York in May, 
1943, have you not ? 

Mr. Simon. I have. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in that meeting in New York? 

Mr. Simon. I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that have been 
made here by Mr. Lang? 

Mr. Simon. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that were made 
in that congressional hearing? 

Mr. Simon. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you shed any further light to this committee 
on that particular meeting that was held in New^ York? 

Mr. Simon. No ; I don't believe I can add any more to it with two 
exceptions, namely, that also present was a Mr. Fred Call, who handled 
publicity for the committee, and who came in at the latter part of the 
meeting, and a program director who was called in by Mr. Lang dur- 
ing the course of th.e meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. What did the program director have to say there? 

Mr. Simon. He was asked by INIr. Lang how he ha-ndled his news 
broadcasts, and he repeated in substance the fact that he just took it 
off the new^s tickers and gave it just as it came off those tickers. 

Mr. Mitchell. And when you were present there at that meeting, 
were you participating in the discussion of the Katyn affair, or were 
you participating in the discussion of Mr. Lang's license? 

Mr. Simon. It concerned the Katyn affair and the boundaries be- 
tween Eussia and Poland, both subjects. 

Mr. Mitchell. AVhen you were present, was his license discussed? 

Mr. Simon. No ; it was not. 

Mr. Mitchell. When you were present at this particular meeting, 
the sole subject of conversation was the Katyn affair and the Polish 
boundary question ? 

Mr. Simon. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. And Mrs. Shea was present? 

Mr. Simon. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did she have any comments to make that you can 
recall ? 



2008 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE 

Mr. SiiyiON. I just recall her concurring in Mr. Cranston's state- 
ments. To the best of my knowledge, she joined in that conversation, 
1 know she was present from the beginning to the end. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I have no further questions. 

Chairman JVIadden. Are there any questions? 

Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question. 

Mr. Simon, didn't you consider this request of Mr. Cranston as an 
attempt to gag the radio commentators ? 

Mr. Simon. I did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Didn't you consider that to be a violation of the 
spirit of the Federal Communications Act ? 

Mr. Simon. I did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all I have. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ? 

Mr. DoNDERo. No questions. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, did you ask Mrs. Shea what she was 
doing there ? 

Mr. Simon. No. To the best of my knowledge, I did not. She ap- 
peared with Mr. Cranston. They were both there together. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did she give any justification for her reason for 
being there? 

Mr. Simon. No. There was no justification, outside of the fact 
that she concurred in Mr. Cranston's statement. I recall no other 
reason for her being there, except to be with Mr. Cranston when this 
discussion was taken up. She was there, as I understand it, represent- 
ing the Federal Communications Commission. 

Mr. Mitchell. Woud you call her presence there indirect intimi- 
dation ? 

Mr. Simon. In my opinion? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Simon. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any other questions ? 

Thank you for appearing to testify, Mr. Simon. 

Mr. James F. Hopkins. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. HOPKINS 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Hopkins, will you raise your right hand 
and be sworn? 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Mr. Hopkins. I do. 

Chairman Madden. There will be a 5-minute recess. 

(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing 
was resumed.) 

Chairmnn Madden, The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Hopkins, you have been sworn, have you not? 

Mr. Hopkins. Yes. 

Chairman Madden, And did you give your name and address? 

Mr. Hopkins. James F. Hopkins,. Detroit, Mich. 

Chairman Madden. Your street address? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2009 

Mr. Hopkins. 15865 Rosemont Road. 

Chairman Madden. New York City ? 

Mr. Hopkins. Detroit. 

Chairman Madden. Wliat is your business ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I am the president of the Michigan Music Co., the 
franchise holder for Muzak in Detroit and president of tlie Herrans 
Valley Broadcasters, radio station in Ann Arbor. 

Chairman Madden. Did you formerly own a radio station? 

Mr. Hopkins. I was the manager and part owner of WJBK, Detroit. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Hopkins, have you been present this afternoon 
when the testimonj^ of Mr. Joseph Lang and Mr. Arthur Simon was 
heard ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I have. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you concur in the remarks or the statements that 
ihey made under oath ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were contacted by Mr. Joseph Lang ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I was. 

Mr. Mitchell. On the subject matter of Katyn? 

Mr. Hopkins. I was. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you speak a little louder ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I was. 

Mr. Mitchell. You heard me ask Mr. Elmer Davis about an indi- 
vidual by the name of Mr. Lee Falk. Could you shed any light on the 
type of activities that Mr. Falk was engaged in, when you were the 
part owner of WJBK? 

Mr. Hopkins. I talked to Mr. Falk at one time in Washington rela- 
tive to the foreign-language personnel. Another time he came to De- 
troit and suggested that I discharge certain individuals. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was his method and way of doing that ? Be- 
cause he was with the Office of War Information ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I didn't take him too seriously and told him so in 
so many words, and that I didn't want any part of him. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Why do you not get the names of the persons he 
wanted to have removed ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us the names of the individuals he 
wanted removed ? 

Mr. Hopkins. One of them was Leon Wyszatycki. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain what position Mr. Wyszatycki 
had in your station at that time ? 

Mr. Hopkins. He ran one of the Polish hours broadcasting over 
WJBK. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why did Mr. Falk want him removed ? 

Mr. Hopkins. He didn't give me any concrete reasons. He just 
said he thought we should get rid of him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did he mention the Katyn affair ? 

Mr. Hopkins. No ; I believe this was before the Katyn affair, if my 
recollection serves me properl3^ It was before that. 

Mr, Mitchell. Did you have in your employ at that time a Mr. 
Marian Kreutz ? 
, Mr. Hopkins. Not in my employ. He was broadcasting over the 
station, but was actually in the employ of Mr. Wyszatycki. 



2010 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. Coukl you explain the connection between you and 
Mr. Kreutz at that time ? 

Mr. Hopkins. Well, only that the station made rules as to what 
could be or could not be broadcast in light of the fact that we were 
waging a war. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any direct contact Avith Mr. Marian 
Kreutz ? 

Mr. Hopkins. If I insisted he be discharged for one reason or an- 
other, he would come to the office and we would see if he would 
straighten it out. In that regard, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was he ever discharged ? 

Mr. Hopkins. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. When? Do you recall? 

Mr. Hopkins. I can't give you the exact time. 

Mr. Mitchell. ^Vliy? 

Mr. Hopkins. We felt that he was more interested in broadcasting- 
actual concrete news, whether that story had the proper etfect on the 
Polish audience or not, and we were concerned on whether the stoi-y 
would in any way curtail the war efl'ort of the Polish segment of the 
population of the area. 

Mr. IVfiTCHELL. Was Mr. Kreutz ever suspended from the air? 

Mr. Hopkins. I think he was, for several days, but not for any 
lengthy time. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did yon, yourself, suspend him or could you tell us 
how the suspension was accomplished? 

Mr. Hopkins. Well, inasmuch as he was not working for me, but 
working for Leon Wyszatycki, I would have to call him in and tell 
him to do the dirty work. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Wyszatycki rented an hour from you ; is that 
correct ? 

]\f r. Hopkins. No ; it wasn't — he was actually a representative of the 
station, but an individual contractor. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But he had the right to employ radio com- 
mentators ? 

Mr. Hopkins. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And he employed Mr. INIarian Kreutz as a 
connnentator? 

Mr. Hopkins. Within certain dictates of the station : that is cori-ect. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And then you received your call from whom? 

Mr. Hopkins. From Lang. 

IVfr. Machrowicz. Stating that the nature of the broadcasts of Mr. 
Kreutz Avere not satisfactory ? 

Mr. Hopkins. No; not necessarily that. 

INIr. Machrowicz. What did they tell you about his broadcasts? 

Mr. Hopkins. He told me that there Avere certain stories breaking, 
and that it Avas a geneial consensus of the group that he has named, 
he in no Avay implicated himself, in Avhat he said but that it Avas gen- 
erally felt tiiat perha])s the broadcast of this story Avould create such 
a feeling among the Polish people that it Avould detract from their Avar 
elloi-t. 

Mi-. Machrowicz. Mr. Kreutz Avas known in the coimnunity, was he 
not, foi' his violent anti-(\)minunist feelings? 

Mr. Hopkins. Well, he may have been, but I, of course, can't speak 
or understand Polish, so I can't tell you that. 



THE IvATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2011 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know that you had been receivino coni- 
pLaints from certain Conniiunist grouiDS in Detroit ? 

Mr. HoPKixs. I didn't hear you, sir. 

Mr. Mactirowicz. You received complaints about the nature of his 
testimony from certain Polish Communist groups in Detroit? 

Mr. HoPKixs. Yes: I think I did. I remember a couple of them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. The Connnunists objected to the way he com- 
mented on certain news events ? 

Mr. Hopkins. That is probably substantially true, but I can't re- 
member the exact nature, apparently. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Then these people that called you took it upon 
themselves to censure his broadcasts ? 

Mr. Hopkins. They tried to, they would never get by with that, 

Mr. IMachrow^cz. They succeeded in getting him suspended. 

Mr. Hopkins. No ; I don't think they did. 

Mr. Machrowicz. He was suspended. 

Mr. Hopkins. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Why ? 

Mr. Hopkins. I had a full-time employee, an attorney, by the name 
of Morris Luskin, whose business it was to check over his opinion on 
the effect of certain stories that were proposed to be broadcast. And 
it was on his recommendation that Mr. Kreutz was suspended when 
he was suspended. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You were interested in maintaining good, proper 
connections w^ith the Federal Communications Commission? 

Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir. 

IVIr. Machrowicz. And when you knew the Federal Communica- 
tions Commission was interested in having this man suspended you 
thought it would be good policy to suspend him ? 

Mr. Hopkins. No ; that is not true. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You knew they objected to the nature of the 
broadcasts. 

Mr. Hopkins. That who objected? 

Mr. Machrowicz. The Federal Communications Commission. 

Mr. Hopkins. No ; I didn't. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Well, when Mr. Simon or JNIr. Lang called you, 
they told you they had talked to Mv. Cranston. 

Mr. Hopkins. I never heard of Cranston up until today or yes- 
terday. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What did Mr. Simon tell you? 

Mr. Hopkins. I didn't talk to Simon. 

Mr. ]\L\chrowicz. Mr. Lang. What did Lang tell you? 

Mr. Hopkins. Lang and Simon and myself, and a few other station 
managers, were affiliated in the foreign-language group, who tried to 
keep the foreign-language broadcasts clean and aboveboard and to 
further the effort of the war. When Joe called me and told me that 
he had had a meeting with the group, and I don't think he — he may 
have told me but if he did tell me who he had met, I don't remember, 
but he did tell me he met with a group, and the culmination' was as I 
have stated, that this story would perhaps serve the war effort better if 
it was not broadcast. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of Mr. Kreutz' 
broadcasts? 



2012 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 

Mr. Hopkins. Not all of the time. Mr. Luskin did, as a rule. 
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of those which 
were considered as somewhat objectionable? 
Mr. Hopkins. Yes ; I think I did. 
Mr. Machrowicz. What did you find objectionable in them, if 



any 



Mr. Hopkins. Well, if a story went out in Detroit, claiming that 
the Russians had murdered X number of thousands of Polish officers 
and soldiers, it certainly would turn the, naturally, Polish audience 
against one of our allies. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was that objectionable, if the facts were true? 

Mr. Hopkins. Yes, and no. As far as the war effort is concerned, 
and the winning of the war, it might have had a material effect, and 
an adverse one. After all, the thing had occurred, as bad as it was, 
as atrocious as it was, the very fact that the story should be told, you 
can't compound an evil, and that would be exactly what happened. 
If the Polish people were in any way thrown away from furthering 
the war effort, no good would be done. Certainly the fact that they 
knew it couldn't bring the people back to life that had been murdered. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Then you felt that the news, even if it may be 
true, of Russian guilt, should be withheld from the Americans of 
Polish descent? 

Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you felt that it was proper because if such 
news, even if true, was disseminated, the person who disseminated it 
should be suspended? 

Mr. Hopkins. I didn't say I suspended him on that cause, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What did you suspend him on ? 

Mr, Hopkins. I can't tell you. That was 8 years ago or 10 years 
ago. 

Chairman Madden. Any further questions? 

Thank you for appearing here as a witness, Mr. Hopkins. 

Marian Kreutz. Will you be sworn, Mr. Kreutz ? Do you solemnly 
swear the testimony you give before this committee shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Kreutz. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JAN MARIAN KREUTZ. DETROIT, MICH. 

Chairman Madden. State your name. 

Mr. Kreutz. Jan Marian Kreutz, 11558 La Salle Boulevard, Detroit, 
Mich. 

Chairman Madden. What is your business ? 

Mr. Kreutz. I am a radio news commentator, foreign language, 
Polish. 

Chairman Madden. In the city of Detroit ? 

Mr. Kreutz, In the city of Detroit, emploj'ed now by Station 
WJLB, where I am a coordinator of a Polish program and a radio 
news commentator. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

Mr, Mit('iiell, Mr. Kreutz, have you been present at the hearings 
this afternoon held in this room ? 

]Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Mitchell, You are fully aware of the subject matter under 
discussion ? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



2013 



t f^Z^J^t^^^^l Polisl. commentator in Detroit in May 
Its, when the Katyn affair first became known i 
Mr. IvREUTZ. Yes, sir. . -iA7TT»Tr. ia 

Mr. Machrowicz. At that time you were with btation WJiiiv, is 

it correct? 

Nil- Kreutz. That is correct. 

Mr'. Machrowicz. Was it within the province or the scope ot your 
ties to make comments on news events? 

Mr Kreutz Well, I had been advertised as a news commentator, 
ilrit naturally I should have the right to make some comments. 
Mr. Maciirowitz. Did you make any comments on your station 
at ive to the Katyn massacre? t n fi „f 

Mr Kreutz. In reference to the Katyn massacre, I would say that 
followed in this order : First broke the news given by the (jermans, 
d we ^ave that news without any commentary, with one exception, 
at we^aid this is an enemy source. Of course, the news was too 
uesome and really didn't lend itself to any commentary, ihen, a 
w days after, we had this Russian note to the Polish Government 
cer the Polish Government asked for this Red Cross investigation. 
■ that time we gave the Russian view on it, and naturally followed 
th the Polish view which we took from the Polish telegraph agency, 
lat Avas the third service we employed. We employed Associated 
-ess, and I believe the International News Service at the time, and 
■3 Polish Telegraph Agency, which is PAT. 

Mr. Maciirowitz. Explain what the Polish telegraph agency is; 
erated by whom ? 

Mr. Kreutz. That is, or rather it was, an ofticial press agency ot the 
olisii exiled government, operated from New York, just like, let s 
^, Russian Tass that operates from New York. 

I^lr. Machrowttz. Then what happened? Did you make any fur- 
"er comments on it ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, we didn't have time to make many comments, 
^ause it was a matter of just 10 days when we got through with 
lOse three phases of it. We had news from Mr. Hopkins, through 
y program manager, or program director, that we were supposed to 
op using the PAT, to use only Associated Press and International 
jews Service, and in such a way cut off all the news about Katyn. 
Mr. Machrowitz. Was that specifically mentioned to you ? 
Mr. Kreutz. That was definitely said to me, that that Katyn story 
id to be out. 

Mr. Maciirowitz. What happened after that? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, after that we tried our best. We asked Mr. 
opkins if it was possible to use, let's say, press articles from American 
•ess, or maybe from the Polish press, so he said, "Well, if those arti- 
js had been published already, naturally you can use it." I mean, he 
du't say this to me, he said" that to the program director. I want 
at to be understood. So, as far as w^e were referring to Katyn, we 
ere trying to take up these stories from the Polish Daily News in 
etroit, or some other articles that we could find in American press. 
Well, it turned out to be very unsatisfactory because the station, 
:obably in a few weeks, I don't remember exactly the dates, objected 
?aiii and said, "No more articles from any press because this is still 
Iking Katyn," and by that time we started also picking up from 

03744— 52— pt. 7 13 



2014 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

the press articles on the Polish boundaries that was the controvei 
that came later on. Generally speaking, this censorship fight on a 
off was going on for over 2 years, and finally in 1945 the day afi 
the United States Government recognized Warsaw communistic 
gime, we had already come to a point where the station had put 
monitors on our broadcasting. In other words, there were always t- 
copies of the broadcast. One copy went to me and one copy to t 
station. If I deleted anything or if I went with a few words o^ 
the copy, the monitor would cut off my voice from the air. In otl 
words, it was a foolproof proposition. 

Well, by that time, we couldn't say anything and I was afraid tl 
I couldn't stand any more withholding any real truth and inforn 
tion from my listeners, because after all a Polish commentary is a lit 
different, probably, than American commentary. We have to ha 
listeners, otherwise we can't stay on the air. And if we can't U 
about the Polish question, then we won't have any listeners, becai 
they can pick up any general news from somewhere else. 

So on that day, the day after the Warsaw regime was recognize 
I managed to put in one sentence inside of my broadcast. I just sa 
"Due to the existing censorship on the station, I am not going to t? 
any more on this microphone," and I just got up in the middle of t 
broadcast and walked out from the studic and I never returned to t 
station again. That was the end of the fight. 

Mr. Macheowicz. Then you were not suspended ? 
Mr. Kreutz. Oh, in the meantime yes, we had three suspensio 
liemember, that was a span of time of about 2 years. I had been si 
pended three times. I have been informed by Mr. Wyszatycki tl 
Mr. Hopkins, James F. Hopkins, told him on a certain day, I do 
remember tlie date, that because of the fact that I didn't keep exaci 
to the censorship orders I couldn't go on the air. I was never out i 
a few days like Mr. Hopkins said. I think he just forgot the exr 
terms. Usually about 10 minutes before broadcast I was told "J 
right, you can go on again." 

I think this was usually after a long conference between my direct( 
between Mr. Konstantynowicz who was another director on that st 
tion, and Mr. Hopkins. They usually prevailed on him that he shou 
keep me on. But it wasn't pleasant to go on the air when you didi 
know 10 minutes before if you were going on the air. 

]Mr. Machroavicz. You know that there have been a number 
complaints to your station from the Communist groups in Detr( 
with regard to your broadcasts ; is that right ? 

Mr. Krkutz. Yes, I know about that, and I don't know if th 
should go inside these hearings here, but I have got a personal feelii 
that the person that was actually monitoring ni}^ connnentary nui 
have been a member of the Communist Party in Detroit. I thii 
it must have been monitored by somebody outside the station fro 
this bunch on Chene Street, from the Communist Party. This is, ' 
course, only my private opinion. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Were the suspensions ever for any other reasc 
other than your attitude against the Communist Govermnent? 

Mr. Kreutz. No. All the suspensions were on account of eitb 
Katyn, either Polish boundaries, or the Polish relations. That w:j 
entirely on the account of those questions. I 



THE KATYN' FOREST MASSACRE 2015 

Chairman Madden. I might make an announcement. I have re- 
ceived inquiries regarding tlie program for today and tomorrow. The 
committee has three more witnesses today, and tomorrow morning the 
committee will meet at 10 o'clock, and we will have, as the first wit- 
ness, Ex-Ambassador William Standley, former Under-Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles, Mrs. Mortimer, John Melby, and Averell Harri- 
man. We will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Over this station, where you were employed, were 
there any broadcasts in a Russian language during that period? 

Mr. Kreutz. No ; I don't believe so. But there has been a half-hour 
program, I think it was between 5 : 30 and 6 in the evening 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is what I Avant to ask you now. Were there 
any broadcasts over this station by well-known pro-Soviet or pro- 
Communist groups ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, certainly there were. I was just trying to men- 
tion that. Between 5 : 30 and 6 I believe in the evening, there was a 
program they called it in Polish Promienie Prawdy, which was Eay of 
Truth. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Coming from the pro-Communists ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, the only people that talked on that program 
were well-known Communists. 

Mr. OTvoNSKi. Well-known Communists? 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'KoNSKT. Now let me ask you this question : Were they told 
and called in like you, and were they told to lay off of mentioning or 
commentating on the Katyn thing or on the Polish-boundary question, 
or did they have free sway ? 

Mr. Kreutz. I would say in this way : For a long time they didn't 
have any trouble at all because they were giving the Russian point 
of view on Polish questions. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And they had no trouble at all? 

^ ]\Ir. Kreutz. They didn't have any trouble in putting that point of 
view over. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. They weren't called in and told 10 minutes before 
they went on the air that they could go on, no censorship ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Ol^ONSKT. They could tell the Russian side of the story, and 
blame it onto the Germans, and they had no trouble. 

Mr. Kreutz. This is right. At the end of the period afterward, I 
may mention, they had been taken off the air but that was, I believe, 
around 1945. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were taken off in 1945 ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Yes. 

Mr. O'KoNSKT. I remember that, because I spoke in Detroit in 1945 
and they were still on. 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'KoKSKi. And they took me to task for denouncing Yalta as 
the crime of the ages. I remember that distinctly. But doesn't it 
seem rather incredible to you that you, here, a good American, trying 
to tell the truth, trying to defend another ally far more glorious than 
the Russian ally, who made far more sacrifices than the Russian ally, 
that here you are trying to come a little bit to their defense and you 



2016 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

were closely scrutinized and censored, but at the same time those that 
went on the air to pronounce pro-Soviet lines had no trouble at all ? 
Doesn't that seem rather incredible? 

Mr. Kreutz. That was quite incredible at first. We just didn't 
loiderstand why all this censorship happened. Afterward, we came 
to the conclusion there must have been a strong Communist influence 
somewhere in Washington, because we knew it was coming from 
Washington somehow. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now let me ask you another question. A statement 
was made here a little while ago that one of the reasons why they 
insisted on censoring you was because they were afraid of the effect 
that the truth would have on the Polish population, particularly in 
Hamtramck, which is about 95 percent Polish. 

Mr. Kreutz. That is true. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you go along with that line of reasoning, that 
if the Poles knew the truth that they would stop in their war effort, 
they would quit their factory jobs, they would quit their defense jobs, 
they would quit volunteering, quit dying and bleeding for their coun- 
try ? Do you think that is a correct estimate of the Polish population ? 

Mr. Kreutz. I think that is all wrong, and as a matter of fact I 
remember talking to Mr. Hopkins on it many times during these 2 
years that we ai-e talking about between 1943 and 1945. As a journalist 
I had been a foreign correspondent for a newspaper in Warsaw, and 
I had been trained to get information and give the information to 
the people, and to believe that if the people get the information and 
the truth, they will always get to the right conclusions. 

Now, in this case our program has been very strongly anti-Nazi 
before this Katyn question happened, and it remained anti-Nazi 
until the end of the war. My commentary with that prog'ram was 
in the same way. But when we found out that the Russian ally had 
killed so many Polish officers, we thought that this is something that 
should be given to the people, because this would not stop anybody 
from working for the war effort, I couldn't believe it, anyhow. That 
was Mr. Hopkins' contention. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. You are so sure of the weakness of that argument. 
When the Polish Army was reorganized in Russia, General Anders 
and all of the leaders of the Polish Army, they knew that those Polish 
officers had disappeared, didn't they? 

Mr. Kreutz. They definitely knew it. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And still thev fought on the side of Russia, didn't 
they? 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'Kc^nski. Wlien they were sold down the river at Yalta and 
stabbed in the back, thev still fought, didn't they? 

Mr. Kreutz. They still fought. 

]Mr. O'KoNSKT. Even when tliey knew they were handed over to 
Russia they still fouglit, didn't they? 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. When England was being invaded with German 
bombs, you heard of the Polish air brigade, didn't you, that saved 
London ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKT. They served on the side of Russia. 

Mr. Kreutz. They definitely did. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2017 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. The Polish Army fought in Normandy alongside 
Russia as an ally, didn't they? 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Even after they knew that their officers were mas- 
sacred, they knew that hundreds of thousands of their people disap- 
peared, they still fought alongside Russia as an ally, didn't they ? 

INIr. Kreutz. That is right. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And then they come over here and they say that 
the reason why they censored you was because they were afraid of 
what Polish reaction might be if they learned the truth about Katyn. 
Doesn't that seem rather thin ? 

Mr. Kreutz. I believe that this was the Communist line handed 
over to the station managers, because the station managers usually 
didn't know anything about the Polish politics or about Russia or 
about actually anything outside the United States. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. "Well, is it very significant that you were censored, 
and the pro-Communist line was not censored? It is incredible. 
That is all. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Kreutz, were you ever questioned by any of 
our Government officials from the Federal Communications Com- 
mission ? 

Mr. Kreutz. No ; I never had any contact with them. I don't know 
why, but they never asked me anything. 

Mr. Sheehan. "Were you ever questioned by any members from 
the Office of War Information, OWI? 

Mr. Kreutz. No. 

Mr. Sheehan. In your discussions, you said you had discussed some 
of these matters with Mr. Hopkins. 

Mr. Kreutz. That is right, 

Mr. Sheehan. Did you discuss them with him personally ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did you have any particular arguments with him 
about it ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, there were a few occasions when he called up a 
meeting of all of the Polish broadcasters and newscasters, and he tried 
to tell us that — for example, I can say here on one of those meetings, 
and it must have been in 1944, 1 think, or maybe even 1945, after Yalta, 
he said, "Well, the Polish goose is cooked forever, and so why don't 
you forget it and why don't you stop worrying about Poland." 

That was the beginning. Naturally after that we had a very heated 
discussion and I just walked out of the office. But that was about the 
way it was discussed. 

Mr. Sheehan. In these suspensions that you talked about, what do 
you mean by suspensions ? 

Mr. Kreutz. Well, in other words as I said my program director 
would call me up and say, "Kreutz, you are not going on the air today." 
You know, it takes a few hours to prepare that material. I would say, 
"Why," and he would say, "Well, Mr. Hopkins objects to it." 

I would say, "I will come down to the station and see what is going 
on." 

I would go down to the station and try to prepare material, and wait 
until about 10 minutes before broadcast and sometimes 5 minutes, and 
they would come in there and say, "O. K., you can go on the air; we 
settled the matter with Hopkins." 



2018 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan. Maybe you can help me on this. Didn't we ask Mr. 
Hopkins whether he had any connection with the so-called firing of 
Mr. Kreutz, and he said he had nothing to do with it ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. He said Wyszatycki did the firing. 

Mr. Sheehan, I think we ought to get Hopkins back and see if he 
gave this gentleman instructions, because he tells us he talked with 
Hopkins directly about it, and Hopkins censored the program and 
stopped him. 

Mr. Mitchell. Only after he was suspended or dismissed, only after 
he was dismissed on one occasion. 

Mr. I^EUTZ. Not even then. I talked to Hopkins only on certain 
conferences when he called up the whole staff and started to talk on 
the Polish question. Then I started to discuss the Polish question, 
because I was the one to talk about it. On suspensions and those things, 
whatever Mr. Hopkins was doing he was doing through Mr. Wyszatycki 
the way it was being done. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Hopkins led me to believe that he had nothing 
to do with it. 

Mr. Mitchell. No ; he said he went through the program director. 

Mr. Sheehan. But according to this gentleman's testimony he in- 
structed the program director what to do. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. And Mr. Hopkins didn't say that. He led us to be- 
lieve generally that the program director did this, is that right ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. I stand corrected. I would like to ask one more 
question. You said that you used the AP and UP releases with refer- 
ence to the Polish situation. Were they the American AP and UP 
releases or those coming from Moscow ? 

Mr. Kreutz. No, the American releases. Naturally the news was 
from Moscow in it, because on the Polish questions all of the news was 
coming from Moscow or from Tass. 

Mr. Sheehan. Well, for the members of our committee Henry 
Cassidy brought out, when we questioned him some time ago, when he 
was the head of the AP there, that the dispatches they sent from 
Moscow were completely censored. They were only allowed to send 
from Moscow what the Russian Government permitted. So then, when 
you, as a news broadcaster or radio broadcaster, were sending out dis- 
patches from Moscow, you were reading only what the Communists 
permitted to come out, because Cassidy specifically told us that any- 
thing the Russians didn't like they didn't permit to come out. So you 
were reading censored dispatches. 

Mr. Kreutz. Actually, if I may say, on the Katyn question in par- 
ticular, anythinij that would come from Moscow on AP or UP or Inter- 
national News Service, would be purely a Russian propaganda, some- 
thing I couldn't use for the Polish people because they wouldn't believe 
me. 

Mr. Sheehan. Yet that is what they wanted to have you use. 

Mr. Kreutz. Yes. But the people wouldn't believe me. 

Mr. O'Konski. One more question : The witness, Mr. Hopkins, that 
we had on the stand seems to be a very upright and fine, honornble 
man. In his defense I want to ask you this question : Do you think that 
he or his people under him who censored you did it of their own voli- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2019 

tion, or do you think that pressure was put on them from some outside 
source, that they were extremely worried about it? 

Mr. Kreutz. I would answer that in two ways : As far as Mr. 
Hopkins is concerned, I am quite certain that he was sick with all of 
that proposition, that he simply didn't know enough about the political 
issues, that there had been some pressure from outside on him, and 
he was doing it only under duress. That was the definite impression 
that I had. He wasn't happy with it. But, if we come to Mr. Luskin, 
who was mentioned by JMr. Ho])kins, I would say that I would have 
some doubts as to tlie fact, if he liked it or not. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi, But as far as the ownership of the station was con- 
cerned, you are convinced that in all respects and he appeared so, no 
question about it, he is honorable and upright and that it was a great 
pain on his part to have to do what he did, and very likely he did it 
because he wanted to stay in business? 

Mr. Kreutz. There is no question about it. 

Chairman Madden. Any further questions? I wish to thank you 
for testifying here, Mr. Kreutz. 

Is Mr. Simon still in the room ? Mr. Simon ? 

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON— Resumed 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Simon, the Federal Communications Com- 
mission had special investigators, did it not? 

Mr. Simon, That is correct. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know of your own knowledge whether 
any of these special investigators questioned the foreign language 
commentators, investigated their background ? 

Mr. Simon. To the best of my ability, to the best of my knowledge, I 
believe that they did. 

Mr, Machrowicz. What do you know about their investigating the 
commentators of Polish origin? 

Mr. Simon. Well, I think Mr. Lang probably would have been in a 
better position to talk about the Polish announcers. I think he had 
some controversy with the Polish programs. As far as Polish pro- 
grams are concerned, I think Mr. Lang is here and he would be better 
qualified to talk about that than I would. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Well, can we have Mr. Lang take the stand ? 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang ? Is Mr. Lang here ? Will you take 
the stand, Mr. Lang. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG— Resumed 

Mr. Machrowicz. Without the preliminaries, what do you know 
about the Federal Communications Commission investigators ques- 
tioning Polish commentators ? 

Mr. Lang. I remember that in New York they questioned the Polish 
people very, very thoroughly. 

Mr. Machrowicz, With what in mind ? 
' Mr. Lang. As expressed to me by one or two members who came 
back, who would talk about it, they seemed to want to find out just 
what their attitude would be if a Polish-Kussian crisis came about. 



2020 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

They tried to find out whether they had any leanings toward being 
pro-Russian. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Well, in other words, would you say that they 
wanted to have commentators who would be friendly or unfriendly tc 
the Polish regime in Warsaw, the so-called Soviet-dominated 
regime ? 

Mr. Lang. That would be a very difficult question for me to answer 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In these meetings you had, Mr. Lang, w^as there 
any concern shown over pro-Communist broadcasts in the United 
States ? Was that subject ever brought up ? 

Mr. Lang. No ; I don't think it was. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Just anti-Communist broadcasts? 

Mr. Lang. That is right. That is right. I might cite an experi- 
ence — you may stop me if it is not relative — I had an organization that 
bought some time called the International Workers Order, who bought 
some time on the Polish programs, and who I thought were a fra- 
ternal and social order, as their name implies. They went on twice, on 
a Sunday afternoon period. But it was so filled with pro-Communist 
material that I had to reject them and break their contract and take 
them off the air, because it was so biased that it was ridiculous. In 
other words, as I say, I put them on the air thinking they w^ere going 
to broadcast and propagate their social benefits, if one belonged to 
their order. But there was no criticism to any great extent that I 
recollect of any procommunism. 

Chairman Madden. That is all. Thank you. 

Casimir Soron. 

Will your raise your hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear 
that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. SoRON. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF CASIMIR SOEON, BUFFALO, N. Y. 

Chairman Madden. If you wi]\ just sit down, Mr. Soron, and state 
your full name. 

Mr. SoRON. Casimir Soron. 

Chairman Madden. And your address ? 

Mr. SoRON. U6 Middlesex, Buffalo, N. Y. 

Chairman Madden. And wdiat is your business, Mr. Soron ? 

Mr. SoRON. I have two businesses, one is broadcasting, buying time, 
I am a program director on Station WXRA, and I own a furniture 
store in Buffalo. 

Chairman Madden, Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Soron, have you been present this afternoon in 
this hearing room ? 

Mr. Soron, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Have you heard all of the testimony that has been 
given ? 

Mr. Soron. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you state briefly what your 
position was in 194;5, and the years following. 

Mr. Soron. In 1943 I was employed by radio station WBNY in 
Buffalo as ])rogram director and commentator, 

Mr. Mitchell. What language was that in? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2021 

Mr. SoRON. Polish radio program. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly for this committee what hap- 
pened to you in the course of your engagement in that work ? 

Mr. SoRON. Before being on the radio I used to be a newspaperman 
in Detroit for 8 years, with Polish, and I knew how to read news 
and how to commentate on it, you see. When I read the news about 
Russia striking Poland — well, I was commentating exactly the way 
it was, you see. And then when there was this Katyn case I told 
the public openly that everything indicates that the Russians did it 
because there are facts here and there that show that nobody else 
could do it. 

Now, the owner of the station, Mr. Albertson, told me a few times 
1 should stop talking like tliat, because he had instructions from 
Washington, he told me, that they don't like it. Now, that was 
going on for a few months. Then finally he told me, in fact, he 
showed me a letter from Washington, that they wrote to him, you see, 
that this has to be stopped, you know, because I am talking against 
our allies. 

Finally, you see, he gave me 2 months' notice to continue the pro- 
gram. I had a big business there. I had about a $60,000-a-year 
business. 

Mr. JNliTCHELL. Were you removed from the air ? 

Mr. SoRON. I was removed from the air. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee when you were removed 
from the air? 

Mr. SoRON. I was removed — he gave me notice by the end of 1943, 
and I stopped broadcasting early in 1944. 

Chairman Madden. Do you know who this letter was from? 

Mr. SoRON. Well, I really don't remember. It seems to me it was 
from the Radio Communications Commission, but I am not sure. I 
believe he told me it was from the Radio Communications Commission. 

Chairman Madden. Did you see the letter yourself? 

Mr. SoRON. Well, he showed it to me, you see, but I am not sure 
whether that was from the Radio Communications Commission. 

Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Albertson still alive? 

Mr. SoRON. Yes ; he owns the station. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you think he would have that letter in his pos- 
session today? 

Mr. SoRON. I imagine he would ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. 

Chairman Madden. Any questions ? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any pro-Communist broadcasts over the 
station that you were on by any pro-Communist organizations ? 

Mr. SoRON, On the same station? No, sir; I don't believe there 
were any. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any over any other station of foreign 
language in the Buffalo area ? 

Mr. SoRON. Not that I remember. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. It is very possible that Buffalo would not have very 
much of a Communist cell among those people. It is quite different 
in Detroit. I am not casting any reflections on my good brother liere. 
You didn't have the problem over there, so that wouldn't apply. 

That is all. 



2022 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Chairman Madden. Would you be in a position to find out whether 
or not this person has that letter ? 

Mr. SoRON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position because we parted 
very badly with Mr, Albertson on account of that. 

Chairman Madden. You what? 

Mr. SoRON. We parted in a bad way, you see. 

Chairman Madden. What is Mr. Albertson's address? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe I have it. 

Chairman Madden. All right. Are there any further questions? 
Thank you for testifying here. 

Chairman Madden. Mrs. Hilda Shea. If you will be sworn, Mrs. 
Shea. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give be- 
fore this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and notliing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mrs. Shea. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF MRS. HILDA SHEA, WASHINGTON, D. C. . 

Chairman Madden. Mrs. Shea, please sit down. What is your 
present address? 

Mrs. Shea. 4000 Cathedral Avenue. 

Chairman Madden. Washington? 

Mrs. Shea. Washington, D. C. 

Chairman Madden. And what is your business? 

Mrs. Shea. I am a housewife now. 

Chairman Madden. A housewife? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a letter I re- 
ceived from Mrs. Shea after the invitation I extended on your behalf 
for her to appear before this committee. The letter is from the 
Westchester, Washington, the date November 8, 1952. It is addressed 
to me as chief counsel of this committee : 

Dear Mr. Mitchell: Before talking to you in yoiu- office, I had not reread, 
since 1944, the testimony that I gave in that year l)efore the select committee 
appointed by the House of Representatives in the Seventy-eighth Congress to 
investigate tlie Federal Communications Commission. This testimony was given 
on April 18, 19, and 20, 1944, and api)ears at pages 30&1-3059, 3063-30S8, 3083- 
3119 of the official report of the hearings of that committee. On rereading my 
testimony I find, as might be expected, that my recollection in 1944 was much 
clearer about the events that happened in 1943 than it is now, and the reading 
of the transcript has refreshed my recollection on several points that you asked 
me about in our informal conference. If there are any inconsistencies between 
what I lold you in our informal conference and my testimony before the House 
committee in 1944. and to the extent that my testimony before that committee 
covers details of which I no longer have an independent recollection, I believe 
that the testimony is to be regarded as a more reliable source of information 
because it was given at a point of time much closer to the events which I was 
discussing. While I shall be glad to assist the committee in any way I can, 
I am inclined to thiidv that I am not now in a position to add anything to the 
testimony that I gave to the House committee in 1944, because 1 find that with 
the passage of time my recollection on many of these events has l)ecome vague. 
I assume that you know my prior testimony, but in the circumstances I thought 
I should like to call it to your attention. 
Sincerely yours, 

Hilda D. Shea. 

Mr. O'Konski. May I make just one remark. One of my prior 
statements where I made the remark concerning INIr. Shea, I was con- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2023 

fused with names. It was not Mr. Shea I meant, it was Mr. Cranston 
I meant. So will you correct the record. 
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, when did you first enter Government 
employment? 

Mrs. Shea. March 1934. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Where were you employed at that time, and in 
what position ? 

Mrs. Shea. At the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, as an 
assistant attorney, I believe. 

JNIr. Mitchell. How long were you there at that agency ? 

Mrs. Shea. From March 1934 to July 1935. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your next employment ? 

Mi's. Shea. At the Resettlement Administration, until I believe 
January 1936. 

INIr. Mitchell. In what capacity were you employed at that agency ? 

Mrs. Shea. As an attorney. 

Mr. Mitchell. What was your next position in Government serv- 
ice? 

Mrs. Shea. I then went to the National Labor Relations Board, as 
an attorney. 

Mr. Mitchell. How long were you at the National Labor Relations 
Board? 

Mrs. Shea. With the lapse of about 9 months, I was there until the 
fall of 1942. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were employed as an attorney ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. What Government agency did you go to in the f aU 
of 1942? 

Mrs. Shea. The Federal Communications Commission. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. What was your employment there, as an attorney? 

Mrs. Shea, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was responsible for your employment at the 
FCC ? 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny appointed me, I believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. Who was the counsel when you reported there? 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny, Charles Denny. ' 

Mr. Mitchell. You have been present in the hearing room this 
afternoon during the course of the testimony that has been taken 
here today ? 

Mrs. Shea. I arrived in the middle of Mr. Davis' testimony. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis' testimouA^? 

Mrs. Shea, Ye.s, about 2 o'clock, 

Mr. MiTCiirXL. Then you have been here through a majority of the 
testimony and practically all of it. Do you deny having attended 
that meeting in New York that was referred to by Mr. Lang and Mr. 
Simon ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have heard the comments that they had to make 
this afternoon. Would you like to make a statement in that con- 
nection ? 

Chairman Madden. In what connection? Be more specific on it. 

Mr. Mitchell. They have said that you were present at this meet- 



2024 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

ing in New York when a.license of Mr. Lang, although up for renewal 
at that time, was not discussed at the meeting. Weren't you attending 
that meeting as an attorney for the FCC ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how you came 
to attend such a meeting ? 

Mrs. Shea. I was employed at the time as head of the Foreign 
Language Studies Section in the Law Department of the FCC, and 
part of my job, as I understood it, was to work in liaison 

Chairman Madden. Could you speak a little louder, please? We 
can't hear you. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. With my opposite numbers in other agencies 
handling similar problems. I am a little puzzled at this point on how 
far afield to go. Do you want my version on what happened? 

Mr. Mitchell. I want to know si:)ecifically. Did you know Allen 
Cranston ? 

Mrs. Shea. I had met Allen Cranston as head of the foreign lan- 
guage problems in the OWL I knew him in that capacity. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have many conferences with Allen 
Cranston ? 

Mrs. Shea. Very few. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how you came 
to attend this meeting in New York with Allen Cranston ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. Mr. Cranston called me and said that he had 
been informed by letter from the OWI oflice in Detroit, that a broad- 
caster in the Polish language on a station there was upsetting the 
Polish population by pro-Kussian broadcasts, and asked me whether, 
as a lawyer in the field, I knew of anything that might be done about 
it. I told him that the FCC itself had no power to do anything in a 
situation of that kind, and that the Office of Censorship in Washing- 
ton had expressed no interest in problems of that kind, and the one 
group that might be of any assistance if it cared to be on a purely vol- 
untary basis was the radio wartime control, headed by Mr. Simon and 
Mr. Lang. 

Mr. Cranston then called them and made an appointment and I 
went along as an observer for the FCC. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why did you go along as an observer for the FCC 
when it was not a problem or in any way connected with the FCC, 
which you have just stated to the committee? 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I just told the connnittee that the FCC is with- 
out power to interfere in anything that is said by a broadcaster on 
the air. But it is interested in knowing what he says, and in how 
the station handles problems of the kind for purposes of evaluating 
the stations' use of its license. And so, I was instructed to go as an 
observer, purely, but not to put forward any views or suggestions. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. Who instructed you to go to that meeting? 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you present this problem to Mr. Denny in such 
a way tJiat lie thoroughly understood it at that time? 

Mrs. SiiEA. I don't believe I am in a position to say whether he did. 
He seemed to. He generally is very able to understand things. 

Mr. JMitchell. Did he have access to the German propaganda 
broadcast on Katyn at that time? 
Mrs. Shea. I don't know, sir. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2025 

Mr. Mitchell. They came in and they were monitored right within 
the FCC. FBIS, wasn't that under FCC ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. I think matters of Mr. Denny's knowledge 
ought to be referred to Mr. Denny. Tlie record shows that before the 
conference I had asked Mr. Denny's permission to go, and the per- 
mission was expressly given. That is on page 2802, of part 3 of the 
House committee record. 

I^Ir. Mitchell. Page 2802? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you refer to the record of the committee to 
investigate the Federal Communications Commission? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, notwithstanding your statement, you will 
recall we had that informal talk in my office, at that time you made the 
following statement to me. Well, 1 asked you this : "How did yon 
come to get into this meeting in New York?" "Mrs. Shea: In New 
York?" 

I said, "Yes, in May of 1943 with Cranston." 

"Mrs. Shea : Well, Lang's license was up for renewal. We were 
inquiring about the type of material that was going out over his 
foreign-language radio programs. The held staif was doing a study 
on it, and I believe I went up there in connection with that study." 

Now, this afternoon two witnesses appeared here who specifically 
stated that there was no discussion concerning the license at this par- 
ticular meeting. Could you explain that, please ? 

JNIrs. Shea. Yes, sir. When you questioned me a few weeks ago I 
had forgotten, as I stated in the letter that you read into the record, 
this whole Katyn incident, and it was only after I read the record 
that I recalled those details. However, while I was in New York on 
that occasion I was at the New York offices of the FCC and I did talk 
over with them pending cases. 

Mr. Mitchell. You knew at the time that this meeting was set up 
by Cranston that this did not concern the licensing of Mr. Lang, the 
purpose of the meeting that Cranston arranged. 

Now, Mr. Elmer Davis this afternoon, when he testified here, said 
that he thought that Allen Cranston was outside the scope of his duties. 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I can't comment on the scope of Mr. Cranston's 
duties. 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should have inquired 
about the scope of his duties at the time when he brought this to your 
attention ? You were an attorney employed by the FCC then. 

Mrs. Shea. I was concerned with the scope of my duties, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should inquire about the 
scope of an individual's duties that 3^011 are going to go into a con- 
ference with, if he has the power to do that? You are an attorney. 
I always like to know what an attorney is going to do who accom- 
panies me, or what the individual does, has he got the power to do 
it, or has he not got the power to do it. 

Mrs. Shea. Do you wish to know what assumption I made at the 
time? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mrs. Shea. I don't recall. I was questioned by Mr. Cranston as to 
whether the FCC had any power to do anything about his problem. 



2026 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

My answer was unequivocably no. He said "Well, who might?" I 
said "Well, if the radio wartime control wants to do anything about 
it, perhaps it will." 

Mr. Mitchell. All right, then, why did you go near that meeting 
at all is what I would like to find out definitely. 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I can answer that question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute until I tell you something. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. You had investigators at that time who were em- 
ployed in the field for that specific purpose of finding out if the radio 
stations were conforming with their licensing arrangement. You 
were an attorney, you were not an investigator. You went along on 
this particular meeting, after having tokl Cranston that this was not 
within the scope of the FCC's functions. I would like to know why 
you decided to do that. 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I went along partly because I had a problem, 
described here in the record, which was also without the scope of the 
Commission's power, and I raised that problem with Mr. Simon and 
Mr. Lang as well. Our field people in Texas had reported that the 
war-bond drives and so forth, were using the slogan "Remember the 
Alamo," and the persons of Mexican extraction were very incensed by 
this reference to a past unfortunate incident. 

Mr. Mitchell. But that wasn't raised at this particular meeting? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir, at great length. Mr. Simon so testified at 
length. The State Department had written us about it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Where did Mr. Cranston fit in with that particular 
j)roblem ? 

Mrs. Shea. Not at all, sir. After Mr. Cranston had talked about 
the Polish problem, I said, "Here is another problem that you people 
at the wartime control could do something about if you wished to," and 
left it there. 

It was a purely voluntary matter. As a matter of fact, as far as I 
know the control did nothing about it, and we did nothing about it. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in this discussion on the Katyn 
or the Polish situation in Detroit, the radio station there during this 
meeting, you specifically ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you realize at that moment that by your pres- 
ence there you were in the position of lending support to Cranston's 
position ? 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Mitchell, I did not think so, and may I tell you why ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Go right ahead. 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Lang, as he just told you on the stand, was not an 
ordinary broadcaster. He was very well acquainted with the scope of 
the authority of all of the agencies in AVashington, working on the 
matter, and had sliown complete independence of judgment and action 
all the way through. And he did in tliis case. He was not a man to 
be intimidated and I don't believe he was intimidated. He testified 
he was not intimidated. 

Mr. Machhowicz. Let me see if I understand your situation cor- 
rectly. Mrs. Shea, as an attorney you had advised the Federal Com- 
munications Commission that they had no authority to censor editorial 
comment? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2027 

Mr. Machrowicz. And that is your opinion ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you told them also that the only body that 
could do that would be the foreign-language wartime control? 

Mrs. Shea. In effect, yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. So then, since Mr. Cranston, or Mr. Denny, 
M^anted to do something about it, and couldn't do it legally, you sug- 
gested meeting with the Federal foreign-language radio wartime con- 
trol and do indirectly what you couldn't do directly? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. We were unable to handle the matter, so we 
passed it on, openly, and without any color or pressure, to a group that 
could handle it if it wished to. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Well, your desire was to control or to censor these 
editorial comments, and you knew you couldn't do it, so you suggested 
a meeting with the foreign-language radio wartime control ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Is that not what you told us before ? 

Mrs. Shea. My desire was to get the problem off my desk, into the 
hands of the group that could act on it if they wished to. 

Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. And in order to see that it would be acted upon 
by them, both you and Mr. Cranston went to a meeting with that 
committee ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir; we went there or I went there — I can only 
speak for myself — in order to call the matter to the attention of that 
body. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Call it what you may. But now I notice you 
have a copy of the volume of the hearings of the committee investigat- 
ing the Federal Communications Commission. I wish you would open 
that book to page 3076. Do you have that page ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. There, if you note, you identified a letter that 
was sent out on the week of May 24, 1944, as a result of that conference 
you and Mr. Cranston had with the foreign-language radio wartime 
control. Am I correct ? 

Mrs. Shea. Would you read the question again, please, sir? 

Mr. Machrowicz, As a result of the conference that you and Mr. 
Cranston had with the members of the foreign-language radio war- 
time control, this letter was sent out, which I am about to read. If 
you will follow me, I will ask you if it is correct : 

It is urgently recommended by the ofRcers of the foreign-language radio war- 
time control that news and war commentators be requested to cease, immedi- 
ately, the broadcasting of editorial or personal opinion. 

Am I correct in that ? 

Mrs. Shea. That is what the letter says ; yes. 

Mr. Machrow^itz. That is what the Federal Communications Act 
says you cannot do, so you passed it on to the foreign-language radio 
wartime control to do what you couldn't do legally yourself; am I 
right? 

Mrs. Shea. That is your view of it, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Well, you are asking them to cease immediately 
the broadcasting of editorial and personal opinion, and you say 
further this is especially hazardous in the Russian, Polish, and Croa- 
tian situation ; right ? 

Mrs. Shea. Sir, this isn't my letter. 



2028 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Macheowicz. But that is the letter that resulted from the con- 
ference you and Mr. Cranston had with the members of the foreign- 
language radio wartime control after you advised the FCC that they 
couldn't do this veiy thing legally; am I right? 

Mrs. Shea. This is the letter that went out after that conference, 
sir ; yes. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. And that was after you advised the Federal 
Communications Commission they coukbi't do that very thing legally. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, you have referred to page 2802, previously 
in your testimony. What is that, on page 2802 ? Is that the letter ? 

Mrs. Shea. No; this is part of the testimony of Mr. Denny, the 
General Counsel. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You referred, in your testimony a while ago, to 
a commentator in Detroit who was known for his pro-Communist 
comments ; is that right ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was his name Mr. Novak? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you knew about the fact that he was a pro- 
Communist commentator ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. He never was suspended was lie i 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Congressman, the immediate matter that occasioned 
Mr. Cranston's calling me, and my subsequent course of action in this 
connection were the broadcasts of Mr. Novak. He was the commenta- 
tor in Detroit who was complained about by the local Detroit office of 
the OWI, and the question that was put before the radio wartime 
control was precipitated precisely by Mr. Novak's broadcasts. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider his comment as derogatory to 
the best interests of the United States ? 

Mrs. Shea. As I testihed, this was Mr. Cranston's j^roblem. Mv. 
Cranston put the question to the i-adio wartime control. I did not 
participate in that part of the discussion at that meeting. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But you do know that Mr. Novak was the pro- 
Communist commentator ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Now, I will refer to that very page that you testi- 
fied to, page 2802, Mr. Denny's testimony. I will refer you to what 
was said then, "No specific complaints against Novak's alleged com- 
munism were ever received by the Connnission in Washington.'' 

Do you find that in the third paragraph on the page ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz (reading) : 

No specific complaints against Novak's alleged conimnnisni were ever received 
by the Commission in Washington. The Commission's field representatives who 
were apprised of the general situation in the Detroit area reported nothing in 
Novak's program — 

that is, the pro-Communist program — 

which could be considered propaganda detrimental to the war effort, or other- 
wise contrary to the public interest of the United States. 

Is that correct? 

Mrs. Shea. As far as you are reading, sir, yes. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2029' 

Mr. IMACiiROWicz. That is Mr. Denny's testimony, is it not ? 
Mrs. SiiEA, Mr. Denny goes on to testify further on that. 
Mr. Machrowicz (reading) : 

However, in any event there was no occasion for a Commission investigation 
of Novalv's alleged communism. 

There was evidently some reason to investigate the acts of Mr. 
Kreutz, who was anti-Communist, but there was no occasion for a 
Commission investigation of Novak's alleged communism. It was a 
matter of public knowledge that Novak had been fully investigated 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Communist affiliations. 
He had been indicted on December 11, 1942, in proceedings for de- 
naturalization. Is that correct ? 

Mrs. Shea. That is the testimony ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You didn't think it was hazardous or your Com- 
mission didn't think it was hazardous to the best interests of the United 
States to permit a pro-Communist commentator to continue his broad- 
casts in Detroit, but you thought it necessary to send letters to the 
various radio stations warning against commentators who were anti- 
Communist ? 

Mrs. Shea, Mr. Congressman, the letter of Mr. Lang which you 
previously read was occasioned precisely by Mr. Cranston's calling 
Mr. Novak's broadcast to the attention of the radio wartime control. 
.Vnd may I point out that ]\Ir. Denny's testimony goes on to say, "Mr. 
Novak's program was canceled in February 1944." 

Mr. Machrowicz. But that was by no action of the Federal Com- 
munications Commission or by the foreign-language radio wartime 
control, was it? 

]Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But the broadcasts which were anti-Communist 
were censored and suspended because of action of the Federal foreign- 
language radio wartime control. 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I must disagree, sir. 

jNIr. Machrowicz. You heard the testimony of these two gentlemen 
that testified this afternoon ? 

Mrs. Shea. They testified, so far as I followed their testimony, that 
INIr. Lang's letter suggested a policy to the stations of curbing editorial 
comment by both pro-Soviet and pro-Polish commentators, and that 
whatever action was taken against people who failed to follow the 
recommendation was taken exclusively by the station owners, not the 
Commission. 

Mr. Machrowicz. After a little prodding by the Federal Communi- 
cations Commission, right. 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you agree with ]Mr. Denny's statement that 
Mr. Novak, the Communist — 

Mr. Novak's programs could not be considered propaganda detrimental to the 
war effort or otherwise contrary to the public interests of the United States? 

That is the third paragraph of page 2802, 

Mrs, Shea. Mr. Denny is simply summarizing here the results of 
analyses made of Novak's programs. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, in his opinion, the Communists like 
Mr. Novak were much less dangerous than anti-Communists like Mr. 

93744— 52— pt. 7 14 



2030 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Kreutz, who tried to point out the Russian <Tuilt of the Katyn 
massacre. 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Kreutz is a radio personality I had never encoun- 
tered before, sir ; and I hesitate to testify at all on whether Mr. Denny 
knew of him or what he thought of him. I can't. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Have I misstated Mr. Denny's analysis of Mr. 
Novak's broadcasts. 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I think the statement speaks for itself. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I think so, too. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, this report that my colleague read from, Mr. 
Denny's report, did you have anything to do with the compiling of 
that report? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; I compiled part of that material. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. You did? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Are you positive, in your statement, that whenever 
you were confronted with a question of what can the FCC do about 
these broadcasts, are you positive in your statement that you always 
said as far as the FCC was concerned you were powerless ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I am very glad to hear that, because if it isn't that 
would be very bad. 

Did you have anything to do with the drafting of that letter that 
Mr. Machrowicz read? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir ; nothing whatever. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, your contention is that your posi- 
tion in this entire matter was one of representing the legal arm of the 
FCC, of that branch, and whenever you were confronted with the 
question of what can you do about this objectionable commentator or 
that objectionable commentator, your answer was always that as far 
as the Commission was concerned under the Federal Communications 
Act of 19.34, thev are powerless to do anything about it? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And to your knowledge, Mrs. Shea, you don't know, 
do you, of any attempt that was ever made by the FCC by you or 
any other employee to use the FCC to browbeat these radio station 
owners who discharged what they considered to be objectionable 
people? 

Mrs. SiTEA. No, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is your contention? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; that is. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interrupt for a mo- 
ment. Will you refer 

Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Let the Congressman finish. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Go ahead. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you refer to part 1 ? You have it there, I be- 
lieve. Page ()03. I would like to start reading for the members of 
the committee. Mr. Richards is testifying before the same House 
committee investigating the FCC, page 603 : 

Mr. Howard was the hoad of tlie press section of censorship at that time. He 
had some discussions with the Office of War Information with refiard to censor- 
ship. I am not familiar with tlie discussion except that it toolc place on the basis 
of whether Office of War Information was getting into our field, or whether we 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2031 

-were getting into their field, and wliat the relationship should be under the 
agreement we had reached. 

Mr. Garey, the counsel to the committee, resumed reading, and he 
had this to say : 

Mrs. Shea called to ask whether or not it was true that this Office had relaxed 
its censorship requirements among foreign-language stations by withdrawing 
our request for English translations. I told her we had, after consultation with 
Mr. Jack, of our censorship operating board. In reconstructing our conversation 
from that point, I am relying on notes, and there mitiht be some slight error 
but the general idea is as follows : Mrs. Shea said : "If you are not to ask the 
managers of radio stations to examine the material on their stations, what curb 
will there be on opinions expressed by some of these foreign-born broadcasters?" 
I told her that in censorship we did not recommend any restrictions on expres- 
sion of opinion, as long as such opinion did not cloak facts which would cross 
codes. I reproved her mildly for suggesting that there should be such censor- 
ship, and she said maybe she didn't mean opinion, maybe she meant propaganda 
or the Government line. "Who," she asked, "is going to force these managers to 
see to it that the propaganda on their stations follows the right pattern?" 

"Somebody else, not us," I said. 

This is a member of the Office of Censorship talking, who had 
written this memorandum : 

She said that there was a definite shadow zone in censorship which went 
beyond the definitions contained in our codes, and some supervision should be 
exercised in this zone "for the good of the war effort and for the good of the 
people." I held stoutly to our function as censors for security. This bit had 
the melody if not the lyrics of the score that the Office of War Information sang 
to Mr. Howard. 

"What would you think," Mrs. Shea asked, "if we in the Federal Communica- 
tions Commission undertook to censor programs in this shadow zone." I told 
Mrs. Shea I thought she would want to mull that over a long time before she 
took definite action, because this office was charged with censoring. She then 
rephrased her hypothesis. "What if we should merely suggest to station 
managers that they should maintain only English ti'anslations in order to guide 
properly the propaganda output of their stations?" 

"That is coming pretty close to dictatorship in radio." 

That is a comment by the counsel. 

I told Mrs. Shea that suggestion from the Federal Communications Commission 
might be unfortunate since it would countermand this office request, but that I 
wouldn't presume to advise her on what the Federal Communications Com- 
mission should do, beyond the fact that it should leave censoring to us. Mrs. 
Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not attempt to censor, 
it would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of their own re- 
sponsibility. She asked me to think it over for a couple of days and see if my 
mind changed. I assured her it wouldn't, and she recommended she check my 
opinion by talking it over with Mr. Ryon. 

Mrs. Shea, it seems that you were terribly interested as an attorney 
for FCC in the censorship problem during the course of these hearings 
that we have been quoting here. Now, Mr. Machrowicz has asked you 
was Mr. Novak removed from the air, in Detroit, the pro-Communist? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Was he removed ? 

Mrs. Shea. He was removed. 

Mr. Mitchell. When? 

Mrs. Shea. His contract was canceled 

Mr. Machrowicz. You mean his contract was canceled and wasn't 
renewed, is that right ? 



2032 THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE 

Mrs. Shea. On page 2803 of part 3 of the House committee record, 
Mr. Denny testified that — 

on February 7, 1944, the management of the station WJBK canceled its contract 
with the Kay of Truth program. 

That was Novak's program. Novak then sought a court injunction 
against this action, and he failed to get judicial relief. He also asked 
the Commission to intervene and the Commission replied that the 
matter was outside its jurisdiction. 

Mr. Mitchell. But the thing that this committee is trying to find 
out is this : that the subject matter referred to the Polish commenta- 
tors who were also our allies at that time, who were anti-Connnunist. 
They seemed to be the ones that were having the difficulty, not Novak. 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sticking strictly on Polish. I am not speaking 
of Italian or anything else. 

Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny's testimony, if you will read on page 2803 to 
2804, and my testimony at the time — I can't testify on it from present 
recollection — my testimony at the time was that in point of fact the 
pro-Polish commentators continued very actively to present their 
point of view in many instances. 

Mr. Mitchell. And under very difficult conditions. 

Now, why were you so specifically interested in the censorship policy 
when you as an attorney for the FCC shouldn't have been in that field, 
as Mr. Machrowicz pointed out from the statement of ^Ir. Denny, and 
as you, yourself, have admitted when you talked to Cranston about it. 
You said, "That isn't our i^roblem." Yet here is a memorandum to an 
official committee of Congress, quoting members of the Office of Cen- 
sorship. 

Mrs. Shea. The memorandum from which you read was a memo- 
randum, I believe, bv Mr. Richards? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. 

Mrs. Shea. After numerous inaccuracies and personalities, he con- 
cluded with one of the few accurate statements in the memorandum, 
reasserting my recognition of the limitations of FCC authority in 
the field. 

Mr. Mitchell. What are you reading from? What page? 

Mrs. Shea. House committee hearings, page 604 : 

Mrs. Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not try ta 
censor. It would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of tlieir 
own responsibilities. 

Mr. Mitchell. And that was in the line of duties? 

Mrs. Shea. My duty was to make int^uiries as to whether managers 
were exercising their licensing powers in the public interest. 

Mr. Mitchell. Their licensing powers, that is correct? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I mean their licenses, excuse me. 

Mr. IVIiTCiiELL. Their licenses. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, if I am correct in this — and maybe I am not 
thoi-ougldy familiar with the operations of the FCC, 1 understand 
that they have field offices for that specific job. I understand that they 
also had investigators for that particular job. 

Mrs. Shea. Do you moan the FCC? 

Mr. MrrcHELL, The FCC. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2033 



Mrs. Shea, May I- 



Mr. Mitchell. And. they had monitoring stations. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. May I amplify that statement? The prob- 
lem under discussion in this memorandmn was specifically whether 
station managers should require English translations of foreign- 
language progi-ams and monitoring of the programs, so they could see 
that their submitted scripts were adhered to. Now, that is a pro- 
cedural problem, not related to the substance of the broadcast. 

Mr. Mitchell. I know. 

Mrs. Shea. And our inquiries as to whether the managers were 
doing that, I think, were well within the scope of our authority. 

Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Not as to substance ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, and that is not censorship. 

Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was your sole scope. 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. The commentator always files his broadcast, right, 
Avhat he is going to talk about on the air? It is filed? It is just as 
these Polish commentators had to file theirs ? If they complied with 
what they filed, then they were in line, as far as the FCC is concerned. 
That is procedure, as I understand it. 

Mrs. Shea. Well, that was one of the questions we inquired into. 

Mr. Mitchell. What that commentator had to say didn't make any 
difference to the FCC ; correct? 

Mrs. Shea. Precisely. 

Mr. Mitchell. But yet all afternoon w^e have been getting at the 
point that these Polish commentators were having their difficulties, 
they were suspended, they were taken off the air, all because of this 
meeting in New York. 

Now, let me ask you a question : Wliy wasn't the Office of Censorship 
present at that meeting in New York ? Were they invited to attend 
that meeting in New York with Simon and Lang, Cranston and your- 
self, by you? Did you invite them to attend? You? 

Mrs. Shea. I don't remember precisely whether I invited them to 
attend, but the record is clear that they were invited, and the Wash- 
ington group refused to go. 

Mr. Mitchell. Why did they refuse to go ? 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I don't believe I am the person to answer that 
question, Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, didn't you extend the invitation to them? 
You must have gotten a reason why they didn't want to go, 

Mrs. Shea. I don't recall extending it. The invitation was extended, 
but just now I can't recall who extended it, 

Mr, Mitchell, No further questions. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mrs. Shea, these meetings that we have reference to 
over here, particularly the one that we have discussed most, the one 
in New York, was that meeting initiated by the OWI, or was it initi- 
ated by the FCC ? 

Mrs. Shea. By Mr. Cranston. 

Mr. Sheehan. He was with the OWI ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 



2034 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. SiiEEHAisr. In other words, the FCC had nothing to do with ini- 
tiating that particular meeting, is that correct? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. It was at the invitation of the Office of War 
Information ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things. Did you personally 
have any hand in fixing the FCC policies in this respect, or were you 
told to go and attend that meeting as a legal representative of that 
division of the Federal Communications Commission? In other 
words, was your attendance at that meeting of your own volition or 
were you instructed to go by a higher authority in the Federal Com- 
munications Commission ? 

Mrs. Shea. I called Mr. Denny's office, and he authorized me to go. 

Mr. Sheehan. After you were invited by the Office of War Infor- 
mation to go to that meeting? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. And you got his authority to go ? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did you, Mrs. Shea have any personal feelings of 
your own pertaining to, well, particularly the Polish-Russian contro- 
versy over Katyn ? Did you have any personal feelings in that matter 
at ail? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did any of your feelings ever come into that matter, 
any of the decisions that you had to make when this matter came up? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. It was purely on your standing, legal standing, rep- 
resenting the Federal Communications Commission? 

Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Now, this meeting that was finally called, in New 
York, was that the result of OWI just calling the meeting, or was that 
meeting called as a result of some complaints that they were receiving 
over certain broadcasts? 

Mrs. Shea. The local office of OWI wrote Cranston saying that it 
had come to their attention that the Poles in Detroit were being upset 
by this acrimonious controversy. 

Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things for me. 

Again, as far as you know, Mrs. Sliea, there definitely was not any 
FCC threat to hold the license-renewal proposition, which is the blood 
stream of the radio industry, as fas as you know there was no attempt 
to scare them into thinking that their license would not be renewed, 
if they did not conform ? You don't know of any such thing ? 

Mrs. Shea. That is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. Well, did you have a feeling in these feelings that 
have been outlined, Mrs. Shea, tliat probably the OWI was going 
too far afield in its attempt to censoi- these broadcasts? That will 
have to be conjecture on your part. Did you, anywhere down the 
line, as these things developed, you yourself being a leo;al repre- 
sentative of that division of FCC, get an inkling that somewhere down 
the line they were trying to exert too much pressure down the line 
of censorship? Did that feeling ever occur to you in the develop- 
ments that transpired ? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2035 

Mrs. Shea. Actually I had little contact with the OWI. My 
predecessors had worked more closely with them. I saw Mr. Cran- 
ston very few times, and had barely a nodding acquaintance with him. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did you at any time get the feeling that probably 
the OWI, with your presence at this meeting representing a certain 
legal division of the FCC, didn't you get the idea that probably, un- 
knowingly to you but purposely known to them, the fact that they had 
you there, that they could hold over their heads that you were repre- 
senting the FCC, although you openly were not in any way connected 
and you told them that you had no legal authority ? But didn't you 
get the idea that with your very presence there that probably the OWI 
was using you as a handle to whip these people into line? Did you 
get that impression ? 

Mrs. Shea. Well, I might have felt that had the persons involved 
not been Mr. Lang and Mr. Simon. They had so repeatedly demon- 
strated their complete immunity from intimidation of any kind, 
particularly from the FCC. 

]\ir. Machrowicz. May I ask you, were there any attempts of 
intimidation ? 

Mrs. Shea. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. How could they show immunity from intimida- 
tion if there were no attempts of intimidation? 

Mrs. Shea. The Cox committee hearing shows that there were 
several disagreements on policy between the FCC and the Wartime 
Control, and the OWI, and the Wartime Control, and that Mr. Simon 
and Mr. Lang stuck to their position and carried it through every time. 

Chairman Madden. Is there anotlier witness? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; there is one, but I would like to put just one 
other statement in. 

Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Is there another witness after 
this one ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; just one. 

Mrs. Shea is in Washington. We can recall her if we want to. I 
would like to put Mr. Richards on now. 

Chairman Madden. Well, Mrs. Shea, you stand by just for a little 
while, and we will have Mr. Richards' testimony. If there are no 
further questions of Mrs. Shea, she can stand by. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Richards, will you be sworn. Do you soL- 
emnly swear the testimony you shall give before this committee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Richards. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT K. RICHARDS, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Chairman Madden. State your name, please, your full name. 
Mr. Richards. Robert K. Richards. 
Chairman Madden. Where do you live, Mr. Richards? 
Mr. Richards. 3458 Macomb Street NW., Washington. 
Chairman Madden. What is your business ? 

Mr. Richards. I am assistant to the president of the National Asso- 
ciation of Radio and Television Broadcasters. 
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Counsel. 
Mr. Mitchell. What was your position during the wartime years f 



2036 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Richards. Well, during most of them I was in the Office of 
Censorship as the assistant to the Assistant Director in charge of 
broadcasting. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the Office of Censorship ? 

Mr. Richards. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mitchell. Therefore you had a great deal of business or work, 
then, between the FCC and the OWI ; is that correct? 

Mr. Richards. Yes, yes ; of course. 

Mr. Mitchell. Will you briefly state — I know it is already in the 
record of the congressional committee which investigated the FCC 
in 194.3, l)ut I would like you to briefly summarize for the committee 
the difficulties that the Office of Censorship had to the extent where the 
problem had to be referred to the Attorney General. 

Mr. Richards. Well, you carry me back pretty far, Mr. Mitchell, but 
I will tell 3^ou as my memory serves me about the specific problem we 
encountered, some of which has emerged in testimony I have been 
able to hear this afternoon. The OfKce of Censorship was established 
by Executive order of the President, and his wartime power as the 
censor over domestic communications was passed along by Executive 
order to the Director of Censorship, Mr. Price, who in turn delegated 
such actions as he wished to delegate to various staff members. Censor- 
ship was established under Mr. Price's direction, and the advice of 
our policy-control board, domestically, among the press and the broad- 
casters as a voluntary effort. We established voluntary procedures 
for stations, for example, to follow, areas in which, as unit identifica- 
tion of ships sailing, the security of the Nation could be violated. 
Broadcasters were asked to voluntarily observe these guidepoints. 

Mr. Mitchell. That was the code. 

Mr. Richards. That was the voluntary code of wartime practices. 
In the course of establishing this system among the broadcasting sta- 
tions of the country, we had one specific problem that was peculiar 
to broadcasting, I guess, because we were dealing with about, 150 to 
200 so-called foreign-language broadcasting stations employing as 
many as 35 or 40 different languages. The committee may even be 
interested in knowing that one of those languages we encountered was 
Cajon, and it was pointed out to us that it wasn't a foreign language 
and they didn't have an alphabet. We set up these special controls 
i-n the case of foreign-language broadcasting stations. In the course 
of operating this vohmtary system we did encounter, if I may use the 
term, an inclination on the part of other executive agencies, and I 
ascribe no idterior motives to them, to invade the area of censorship 
which properly was vested in the Office of Censorship. We felt this 
was dangerous, not that we were jealous of our authority, but most of 
us being out of the public media we were zealous about what would 
happen to that authority after the war was over. Among the agencies 
where we encountered this, and I believe your record in the select- 
conunittee investigation reflects this, were the OWI and the Federal 
(]omnuinications Connnission. As a matter of fact, at one time, the 
situation reached a point where Mr. Price, as Director of tlie Office 
of Censorship, asked Mr. Ryan, as assistant in charge of broadcasting, 
who in turn asked Mr. Bronson and me to find out what was going on, 
and if there was an invasion of censorship and if we were sacrificing 
our responsibility to some other agency, to stop it. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2037 

We did investigate it, and again I say, ascribing no motives, we did 
encounter an interest on the part of the Other agencies in censorship, 
and it was stopped, in an agreement between INIr. Price and Mr. Davis, 
and certainly in agreement between Mr. Price and the Commission. 

Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us then a few specific ilhistrations, 
not too elaborate, but just one that you can recall, where the occasion 
was necessary to go to the extent of getting the Attorney General to 
rule, barring these other agencies from the field of censorship ^ 

Mr. Richards. Well, yes. Again this is going back quite a way, and 
I think the record in the select-committee investigation would be 
more accurate than my recollection. But I recall that at least one 
foreign-language broadcaster, I believe his name was Andre Luotto, 
w^as either removed from the air or his reputation was apparently 
somewhat damaged, as a result of the enthusiasm of people employed 
by agencies other than ours to enter into a consideration of the type 
of broadcasting that was going on the air. 

By that, I mean opinion, the opinions that were being expressed. 
I think that is one specific case. Doubtless there are others. They 
must be available to you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did a member of the Office of Censorship attend 
this meeting in Xew York with JNIr. Simon and Mr. Lang^ 

Mr. Richards. Well, if I am thinking of the same meeting tluit you 
have been discussing here, no. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were they invited to attend, do you recall ? 

Mr. Richards. It is my recollection we were invited to attend ; yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall why you did not attend ''i 

Mr. Richards. Well, yes. We felt that it wasn't properly within 
the scope of our activity to discuss what should be done about a com- 
mentator, expressing an opinion on the air. unless that opinion con- 
tained facts endangering the security of the Nation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, the primary duty of censorship was in 
the Office of Censorship ; it rested in the hands of your organization. 
That was determined. 

Mr. Richards. Absolutely ; definitely. 

Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, this particular meeting in New York, 
to which the OC was invited, but which no member of the OC at- 
tended was — Did you hear all of the testimony this afternoon here? 

Mr. Richards. I came in toward the end of Mr. Lang's testim.ony, 
I believe. 

Mr. Mitchell. All right. In your opinion, on recollection today, 
it was in the field of censorship, Ijecause it concerned comments by a 
Polish commentator? 

Mr. Richards. Well, any time you use any method to stop freedom 
of speech, it enters into the area of abridging it, and that, I presume, 
constitutes censorship, yes. In other words, it was our assumption, 
gentlemen, that taking a man off the air was censorship as much as 
putting a blue pencil on his copy. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to read for the record, page 612 of the 
committee investigation, part I, Federal Communications Commission. 
Mr. Garey is talking to you. 

Chairman Madden. When was this letter sent? 



2038 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum is dated May 15, 1943 — 

Now, you received from Mr. Bronson a memorandum dated May 15, 1943, on 
the further talk he had with Mrs. Shea, did you not? 

Mr. Richards replies, "Yes, sir." 

Mr. Garey. That memorandum is dated May 15, 1943. It is addressed to Mr. 
Ryan and Mr. Richards, and it is from Mr. Bronson. The subject is, Now My 
Week Is Complete. It reads : "Up until 3 : IG p. m. today there had been some- 
thing lacking in the week's activities, and then the phone rans and it was Mrs. 
Shea, attorney for the FCC. She asked if I was retaining my figure — personal 
item — and then went on to inquire if we would be interested in the latest wrinkle 
between the Office of War Information, Federal Communications, and the Foreign 
Language Radio Wartime Control. I assured her I was the kind of a person 
who was interested in just an average wrinkle, but one like that was most 
intriguing. She went on to say that the Federal Communications Commission 
(herself), the Oflice of War Information (Mr. Cranston), and the Foreign Lan- 
guage Radio Wartime Control Committee (Mr. Simon and Mr. Lang) had met 
in New York last Wednesday for a cozy little chat on what to do about the 
broadcasters coming to blows over the Russian-Polish situation. It was agreed 
in this event that the foreign-language broadcasters would read only the news as 
received in the stations, via the recognized news printers, and not allow any 
commentary on this topic. She wanted to know if I had been asked to attend 
would I have gone." 

Evidently they didn't, I am sorry. 

"I said that most likely I would have, or that someone from this Office would 
have done so, but I supposed the parties involved assumed it was a discussion 
that did not involve censorship, therefore we weren't asked. Mrs. Shea rallied 
quickly by saying that it was Mr. Cranston who put out the invitation. I later 
learned from Mr. Ryan that we had been invited to send a representative but 
had declined. Mr. Ryan said Mr. Cranston had asked us to attend but due to 
pressure of other work, and the unlikelihood that the meeting would concern 
censorship, no one from this Office went. Then she said that she recalled seeing 
a letter by Mr. Price or Mr. Ryan urging the controversial issue should be treated 
quietly and not ballooned up, as it were. (She is referring here to the Russian- 
Polish impasse, I believe.) I said I was unfamiliar with such a letter, and then 
she said Mr. Marks at her elbow had just advised that the letter was signed by 
Mr. Ryan and would be in Mr. Ryan's files. She then said that she siipposed 
Mr. Simon's outfit was putting out something about the New York office and 
was that all right with us. I said this office was not concerned with it since we 
had no part of the meeting, unless the bulletin crossed into censorship problems 
or quoted or inferred that we were a party to such a release. In the latter 
event, it should be submitted here. She said she didn't know just how the Foreign 
Language Radio Wartime Control Committee went about such things, and we 
both rambled along about what we didn't know. She then said that our relations, 
Government agencies involved and broadcasters, should be more formalized so 
that we would all know what was going on. Having had the feeling now for 9 
months that I was trying to watch the entire field of play through a knothole, and 
a sturdy oak knothole at that, I agreed, as we have agreed to such things before. 
She then hung up on our mutual pledges of cooperation. Two minutes later at 
3 : 31 she called back to say she had forgotten something." 

That was on another subject matter other than the Polish-Russian 
situation. 

Now, that letter in the record definitely shows that, (1) no member 
of OC went to the New York meeting; (2) the reason for not going to 
that meeting was because no censorship problem was supposed to have 
been involved. 

Now that you have heard the testimony of this afternoon, and par- 
ticularly that of Mr. Kreutz — did you hear his testimony? 

Mr. Richards. I was here, but I didn't hear it very well. I was in 
the back of the room. But I think I sot it. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2039 

Mr. Mitchell. "Would you say that the subject matter was within 
the scope of censorship or within the scope of FCC and OWI ? I am 
asking for an opinion. 

Mr. Richards. Well, I would say it is my opinion it was not within 
the scope of censorship. Others would have to speak as to whether or 
not they thought it was within their scope. 

Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Any further questions ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. It is your opinion that the section of the FCC 
attempting to control the commentaries on this matter was strictly 
improper, irregular, and outside of their jurisdiction, is it not? 

Mr. Eichards. Yes, sir. Of course the Communications Act forbids 
censorship. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. And that was your impression at 
this time? 

Mr. Eichards. It was certainly our impression that that was their 
intent, and that they shouldn't do it. It was our proper responsibility. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you see anything that was outlined here, 
other than an attempt to intimidate these broadcasters ? 

Mr. Eichards. I have testified to that at some length before, Mr. 
Congressman, and I think that my answer is evident in the record that 
was previously made at the time. 

Chairman Madden. Thank you for your testimony. 

We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 25 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 12, 1952.) 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1952 

House of Representatives, 
Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, 

Washington, D. G. 

The committee met at 10 a, m., pursuant to call, in room 1301, House 
Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Donclero, O'Konski, and 
Sheehan. 

Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select commit- 
tee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator. 

Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. Will you 
proceed, Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of today's hearings 
before the committee is to put forth the documentation of the records 
that were in the Government agencies on the subject of the Katyn 
massacre and \\\^ missing Polish officers. 

You will recall that yesterday Mr. Jackson said that if sufficient 
documentation had been available at the time of Nuremberg, the case 
would not have been brought up at Nuremberg. At least the hands of 
the United States Government, namely, Mr. Justice Jackson at that 
time, would have been able to prevent it or would have been strength- 
ened. 

Now, through the cooperation of the Department of State, the com- 
mittee has had made available to it all of the records that have been 
in the file since early 1942. This morning we have as the first witness 
former Ambassador William Standley, a retired admiral of the United 
States Navy. 

At the time that Admiral Standley was Ambassador, he had con- 
ferences with Maj. Joseph Czapski and General Anders, and he had 
instructions from the State Department to assist the Polish cause. 

Admiral Standley, in the opinion of the committee staff, having 
carefully read all of the documentation, predicted 

Chairman INIadden. Let him testify. That will be his testimony. 

Mr. Dondero. Let him take the stand. 

Chairman ]NLvdden. I should think that the witness himself, if he 
desires to refresh his mind, can refer to the letters. We can then 
introduce the letters in evidence ; and, if the witness desires to refresh 
his mind, we will be glad to submit the letters to him. 

Mr, Mitchell. Call the first witness, please. 

Chairman ISIadden. Admiral Standley. 

2041 



2042 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY, UNITED STATES 
NAVY, RETIRED, CORONADO, CALIF. 

Chairman Madden. Admiral, will you raise your riglit hand and be 
sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
give the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Admiral Standlet. I do. 

Chairman Madden. Admiral, for the record, will you state your 
full name, please ? 

Admiral Standley. William H. Standley. 

Chairman Madden. And your address, please? 

Admiral Standley. 862 G Avenue, Coronado. 

Chairman Madden. California? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, California. 

Chairman Madden. What is your capacity now ? 

Admiral Standley, I am an admiral on the retired list. 

Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Standley, will you please tell the committee 
what date you reported to Moscow as the Ambassador for the United 
States ? 

Admiral Standley. I think it was the 14th of April 1942. 

Mr. Mitchell. Would you, at this time, like to make a statement 
-to the committee of your knowledge of the missing Polish officers and 
the Katyn massacre, stating what efforts you made and what instruc- 
tions you may have had, sir? A brief statement, if you wish. 

Admiral Standley. Of course, the committee will recognize that 
this situation occurred some 10 or 11 years ago and that, naturally, 
my memory is rather deficient in the facts of the case. I have told 
your counsel that I had made a complete statement concerninj}: my 
relations with the Polish situation, including the Katyn Forest 
nmrder, and that it was published in the Naval Institute Proceedings 
of October. That statement, that article in the Institute contains a 
complete notation of my connections with the Polish situation in 
Moscow and the Katyn Forest murder. 

Chairman Madden. Admiral, October of what year? 

Mr. Mitchell. This year. 

Admiral Standley. That was October of this year, the current 

Now, naturally, my association or connection with the Polish situa- 
tion began even before I was named as the future Ambassador to 
Moscow. When I went into Moscow with the Beaverbrook-Harriman 
mission in September, 1941, the Polish situation was being discussed 
there then, and I became cognizant of the general situation, the fact 
that the Russians had seized a great many Polish soldiers when they 
invaded east Poland and had taken some 10,000 Polish officers. 

The effort was being made then to locate these Polish officers 
especially. 

When I was named as Ambassador to Pussia in the latter part of 
1941 and when I was confirmed, I was immediately importuned by 
many agencies or many individuals who were interested in the 10,000 
Polish officers, that is, in their location and in whether or not thoy were 
alive, and everything concerned with them. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2043 

As soon as I arrived in Moscow — I had received a briefing before I 
left Washington as to the questions I should take up. Even before I 
made my report to Mr. Kalinin, the President of the Soviet Union, 
I received a message from the State Department advising me that I 
was not to take up any of those questions that I had previously been 
briefed upon, a message which I didn't understand, and about which 
I protested immediately. 

But that left me in a position where I couldn't take up the Polish 
question on my first interview with Mr. Molotov. 

Chairman Madden. Who gave you those admonitions or instruc- 
tions? 

Admiral Standley. They were general instructions and briefing 
from various individuals in the State Department. I think Mr. Sum- 
ner Welles was one of them, the Secretary himself. There were various 
other officials. I can't now recall just who they were, but they were 
from various individuals in the State Department. 

So, as I say, I could not and I did not take up these Polish questions. 

INIy first interview with Mr. JNIolotov and my first interview with 
Mr. Stalin — I would like to refresh my memory from this article — ■ 
the first occasion when I took this matter up was in an interview with 
Mr. Stalin some time in April 1942. At that time I told Mr. Stalin 
of the knowledge I had of the missing Polish officers. 

Well, let me go back. Even before that, on my way into Moscow, 
on arrival at Teheran, I found that there were 28,000 Polish soldiers 
that had been evacuated with their families and children from Russia. 
I ins])ected this camp with their children and with their people in it,, 
and observed the terrible condition that these people, and particularly 
the children, were in. They were in all stages of malnutrition, some 
of them practically dying. It was a terrible situation, indicating the 
conditions under which the Poles had been existing, particularly the 
women and children, in Russia. 

As I say, my first interview with Mr. Molotov in which I mentioned 
this was some time after the 14th of April. Then I advised him of my 
knowledge of the situation and of my interest in the Polish situation. 

No satisfaction whatever was obtained from Mr. Molotov at that 
time, and there was only a casual mention of the fact that I was 
interested in the Polish question, and that I came from the United 
States Government, whicli was also interested in this question of tlit 
situation and location of these Polish officers. 

At that tim.e the interpreter, Mr. Pablov, advised me that Mr. 
Molotov had a question which he wished to take up wdth me, and that 
it was the desire of the American Government to set up in Moscow 
an American officer as liaison between the Russians and the Poles. 
Mr. Molotov expressed the view that he saw no reason for such liaison 
as the naval attaches and the military attaches were there and that 
the Poles had their own liaison. I knew nothing of the question, so 
I did nothing about that. 

As you will recall, the Government had been evacuated to Kuibyshev, 
and the representatives there were Mr. Vyshinski and Mr, Lozovski, 
Mr, Molotov had gone to Kuibyshev, but had returned to Moscow. 
]Mr, Stalin had never gone to Kuibyshev, but had remained in Moscow. 

So we had to start our negotiations with the seat of government in 
Moscow or rather in Kuibyshev, and then go up to Moscow to get 



2044 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

the answer because Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski never made any 
decision on anything. So we had to go to Moscow to get your answer 
from Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin. That necessitated trips back and 
forth. 

When I went down to Kuibyshev, I met Dr. Kot. Dr. Kot at 
that time was the Polish Ambassador or Minister, I think " « \vas, to 
the Soviet Government. Immediately began a contact with tiit r^olish 
representative in regard to the missing Polish officers and me: From 
then on there was almost a constant conversation between ir. Kot 
and myself as long as he stayed there — Mr. Kot, the Polish repre- 
sentative, and the Ambassador. 

My next contact with the Russian authorities was on May 27, 1942, 
when I went to see Mr. Vyshinski. My conversation at that time with 
Mr. Vyshinski was along these lines : That our Government was con- 
cerned with the welfare, situation, and location of these officers and 
was very anxious tliat there should be friendly relations between the 
exiled Polish Government in London and the Russians, and I urged 
that there should be close cooperation and a greater effort on tlie part 
of the Russians to conform to the agreements they had made with the 
Poles in regard to the release of Polish officers and men. 

There was an agi-eement at that time in regard to the release of these 
officers in order that they could serve under General Anders in the 
war effort. The 28,000 Polish soldiers that had been released, the 
troops that had been released and that I had found in Teheran later 
served with General Anders in the Italian campaign ; and there was an 
understanding that more of these officers and men should be released. 

My efforts in the beginning were to obtain further cooperation with 
the Polish Government. Then later I souglit an interview with ISIr. 
Molotov in the Kremlin. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What was the reaction of Mr. Molotov and of INIr. 
Vyshinski at that time to your requests? 

Admiral Standley. As I expressed it then and as I have quoted, 
Mr. Vyshinski was silent for a long time while looking doAvn at his 
hands folded on the table before him. The color flooded into the thin 
face. Finally he looked around at me and said, 'T will present your 
views to my government." 

Later I had an interview with Mr. Molotov, and I presented tlie 
same views to Mr. Molotov. Mr. INIolotov made a long statement in 
reply. It was, in substance, that the Polish question was a very diffi- 
cult question to deal with, that to evacuate these women and 
children 

At that time our Government had a proposition to evacuate these 
Poles from Russia and relieve the Russians from taking care of theuT 
and sending tliem down somewhere in Africa, North Africa, or some- 
where else. That was part of my interview with Mr. Molotov at this 
time. 

Mr. Molotov's reply was in substance as follows : "If we had evacu- 
ated the Polish women and children in the beginning, it would have 
been all right. Put to evacuate them now would give the Germans 
the idea tliat we couldn't take care of them. It would create a dis- 
turbance, and we just feci that we are not in a position now to evacu- 
ate these women and children and soldiers." 

Chairman Maddkn. Will you pardon me. Ambassador. I hand you 
a telegram dated Moscow, July 5, 1942, to the Secretary of State, 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2045 

Washington, signed "Standley," and ask if that is the telegram that 
you sent to Washington as of that date ? 

Admiral Standley. That is the telegram. 

Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark it as exhibit 9 
and insert it at this point into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked exhibit 9 and follows :) 

Exhibit 9- -Tf'^.egram From Ambassador Standley to the Departments of State 

-i) 
jr [Paraphrase of telegram] 

Moscow, July 5, 1942. 
Secret art of State, 

Washington. 

In describing to Molotov the Polish evacuation project, I expressed the sincere 
hope of the U. S. Government that the Soviet authorities would allow the 
evacuation of the Polish women and children concerned. I based this on the 
opinion of the U. S. Government that the women and children in question could 
be taken care of more easily in a country where there was no lighting in progress, 
and also on the fact that the evacuation of these women and children would 
make it unnecessary for the Soviet Union to feed and care for them. 

This was not a simple evacuation question, Molotov said, which would not 
be an important matter. The question involved was really a fundamental problem 
affecting the basic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. He added 
that the question might have been satisfactorily disposed of if this group had 
been evacuated along with the first group, although there was no certainty that 
this would have solved the matter, since there were always difficulties where 
Poles were concerned. A second evacuation could create added difficulties and 
instability among the Poles in the Soviet Union, and unfriendly comment against 
the Soviet Union among the Poles in that part of Poland which was occupied 
by Germany, as well as in the world in general, inasmuch as it would most 
certainly be said that the Soviet Union was not able to feed and care for the 
Poles in question and therefore had to send them to Africa. Molotov said that 
during his recent visit to London he had suggested to Sikorski that an attempt 
be made to better the situation of the Poles in the Soviet Union, but he did not 
elaborate to me about how this should be done. Molotov said, however, that 
the Poles could and would be fed by the Soviet Government. He stated that 
he would bring our interests in the matter to the attention of his government. 

Later Molotov referred to the general Polish question with a certain animosity, 
saying, in effect : "Since there are many too many contradictory elements con- 
cerned in Polish politics, there is always trouble whenever Polish questions arise." 

Some of these elements are conducting policies unfriendly to the Soviet Union 
in contradiction to the policies of the London Polish Government. Molotov said, 
and even the sternest measures failed to subordinate these elements to Soviet 
law. Although other elements wished to foster friendly relations with the 
Soviet Government, and tried to do so, it is in general impossible to reconcile the 
two groups. 

My impression on leaving was similar to that I received when I last discussed 
Polish matters with Vyshinski, namely, that the Soviet Government has a purely 
political view of this whole question, and that it is not influenced by considera- 
tions of humanity. It is displeased and even irritated when another power takes 
an interest in Soviet-Polish relations. 

( Signed ) Standley. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Ambassador, if you have no further com- 
ment, I will ask you to identify a message from Secretary of State 
Hull to you of August 19, 1942. 

Admiral Standley. This is a portion of a telegram. I would like 
to say that this covers an interview which comes later on. 

Mr. Mitchell. The Ambassador says that he has some further com- 
ments to make apropos exhibit 9. 

Chairman Madden. All right; proceed, Admiral. 

Admiral Standley. In the succeeding months after this interview 
with Mr. ]\Iolotov, my notes show that the Polish situation in con- 

93744— 52— pt. 7 15 



2046 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

nection witli the Polish military units and civilians still in Russia 
steadily worsened. When the Nazis and the Italians became estab- 
lished in Egypt that fall and almost stabbed into Alexandria, 
threatened the whole Middle East, the Russian Govermnent agreed 
to allow three divisions of Poles and members of their families to 
leave Russia for the Middle East. 

The Polish military authorities were trying to obtain the release 
of 10,000 officers whom they needed badly, but were rejjeatedly ]Hit 
off. No reasons or excuses were given. General Anders and Dr. Kot 
were not informed. That is hearsay ; I can't testify as to that. 

I w^as informed that General Anders and Dr. Kot were not informed 
that the Germans had captured the prison camps before the Poles 
could be evacuated or that they had been transferred to other camps 
or indeed anything at all as far as the Polish authorities could learn. 

These officers had suddenly and completely disappeared from the 
face of the earth. That was shortly after my interview with Mr. 
Molotov. 

Chairman Madden. x\bout what date was that. Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. My interview with jSIr. jNIolotov was after July. 
That was about August, I think, 1942. It was after my interview 
and after that telegram that I sent in regard to my interview with 
Mr. Molotov. 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I would like to ask you this : Do you know 
who made the decision to forget the idea of having Colonel Szymanski 
go to Moscow as the liaison officer? 

Admiral Standley. The decision came through a telegram from the 
State Department. I don't know who made the decision. 

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Standley. A telegram of that kind ahvays came, of course, 
from the State Department; so, I presume the Secretary of State made 
the decision. 

Chairman Madden. Admiral, we will mark this exhibit 10, and I 
will ask the court reporter to insert exhibit 10 at this point in the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 10" and is as 
follows:) 

ExHIltIT 10 
POUTION OF ]\Il<:SSAGE FKOM SkcKETARY OF STATE HUI.T. TO THE AmKKIOAN 

Ambassador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942 

* * * On instructions fi-om the Polisti Government, tlie I'olish Amhassjidor 
in Washington lias asked tlie I'residenfs intei'veiition witli the Soviet Gov- 
ernment in or<l(M' to effect an improvement in I'olisli-Soviet relations. * * * 

* * * Referring to the hope which he expi'essed on several occasions that 
the Soviet Government would tind it jiossihle to interpret as liberally as cir- 
cumstances would permit its agreements with the Polish Government, the 
Ambassador iiarticularly mentioned the desire of the Polish (Jovernment to 
restart recruitinii of its nationals in Russia for the Polish armed forces and 
filKo to tlie f/r.s-//T for the rrlcdsr of some fire to rif/lit tlioiiKiiu<] J'olifih officcru 
who are reported still lieJtl Inj the Sloriet authorities. * * * 

* * * You are therefore authorized to raise witii the Soviet authorities 
the ([uestion of Soviet-Polish relations. You should point out that this Gov- 
ernment liojies liiat the spirit of collaboration evidenced jji (he removal to the 
Middle East of additional Polish divisions may be promoted to the utmost and 
that there will I)e found for the various prol)lems mutually beneficial solu- 
tions. ♦ ♦ * 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2047 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, you have told us that they were 
forming the Polish Army in Russ'ia at that time. Can you tell us 
something about the formation of that army that you may have 
found out from your discussions with General Anders and Dr. Kot? 

Admiral Standley. My onlj^ information in connection with that 
was very general. I have no detailed knowledge of the military set- 
up or organization except through my conversation with Dr. Kot. 

Now, I would like to inject there as part of this, before I get to 
that message, what was happening in the interim. The Polish 
situation, as I stated, was definitely worsening, as was the ques- 
tion of the Polish representatives receiving Polish supplies that Avere 
being sent in for the Polish citizens into Murmansk and into Arch- 
angel. The Soviet authorities eventually seized those officials and 
finally got rid of all of them, and there was no oiie there to repre- 
sent the Polish interests in receiving goods that were sent in for the 
Poles. 

Our rejiresentative there endeavored to take that over, but he 
eventually found that the problem Avas one that he couldn't handle. 
So that was part of the situation. 

The Polish situation was worsening up to the time this message was 
sent. Then I have this message in August 1942, when I received the 
dispatch that you have just read. I have quoted here extracts from 
that dispatch. ^ Shall I read that? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, if you please. 

Admiral Standley. In August 1942, I received a dispatch from 
our State Department, the conclusion of which may be paraphrased as 
follows. I am not quoting, but rather paraphrasing. [Reading:] 

The question of Polish-Soviet relations may be bi-ought up at your discretion 
with the Soviet authorities. While the United States Government does not 
wish to interfere in-this matter, you may point out it nevertheless hopes that 
the splendid collaboration shown in transferring additional Polish divisions to 
the ^Middle East may l)e furthered to the maximum. It is also hoped that solu- 
tions whii-h are mutually beneticial may be found for the various problems under 
discussion. 

At the same time, it is realized tliat only direct negotiations between the two 
governments involved can effect a solution of some of these extremely compli- 
cated problems. 

That is the end of the paraphrase. 

Chairman Maddex. "Will you proceed, Mr. Slieehan. 

Mr. SnEEiiAx. Ambassador, just to get the situation straight, as 
I understand, when you left Washington from Moscow you were 
given insti'uctions to be concerned with Polish affairs. After you 
got to Moscow, as you said, you got instructions not to pay any atten- 
tion to Polish affairs. 

Admiral Staxdley. It didn't mention Polish affairs specifically. 

Mr. SiiEEHAX. The missing officers? 

Admiral Staxdley. When I was being briefed I was given infor- 
mation on matters that I should take up, and the- Polish question 
was one of them. "When I got to Moscow and before I submitted my 
credentials in Moscow, I received a telegram from the State Depart- 
ment saying that I was not to take up any of these questions that 
I had been briefed on before I left. -They didn't mention the Polish 
question specifically. 



2048 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan. Then in 1942, accorcling to the telegram that yon 
jnst read, you o:ot instructions to go forward with the Polish qi'u's- 
tion ; namely, the Polish officers ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. Sheehan. Now, did they give you any information as to why j 
they were interested n the Polish officers at that time? Was it for 
humanitarian reasons or was it for military reasons? 

Admiral Standi>ey. They w^ere interested both from the standpoint 
of the military as well as because of the humane reason of getting the 
Polish citizens out. 

Mr. Sheehan. In other words, we had now reached a position 
where we needed the Polish divisions and thereby needed the officers 
to man the divisions; is that right? 

Admiral Standley. That is as I understood the message to me; 
yes. 

Now, in order to get that message across, I sought an interview with 
Mr. Lozovski, and I met Mr. Lozovski on September 9, 1942. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain who Mr. Lozovski is? 

Admiral Standley. JNIr. Lozovski was one of the Soviet Foreign 
Office representatives in Kuibyshev. As I previously stated, Mr. 
Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski remained in Kuibyshev as the repre- 
sentatives of the Soviet Government. So, I sought an interview with 
Mr. Lozovski, which was granted on September 9, 1942. 

In that interview, as I stated in the paraphrase, our Government 
stated that they did not want to interfere. Mr. Lozovski came right 
back and said, "'Tliis is the best thing that the American Government 
could do." 

In furthering the purpose as expressed in that paraphrased message, 
I still pressed the question of the status of the Polish relief and that of 
the 180 Polish officers that had been delegates and who had been 
arrested in Murmansk and Archangel. Mr. Lozovski again came right 
back bluntly and said, "This work can be carried on by. the remaining 
delegates in a perfectly satisfactory manner. There were too many 
delegates in the first place. We can't have a bunch of hostile Poles 
running all over the Soviet Union unsupervised." 

Again I expressed to Mr. Lozovski the hope that they could collabo- 
rate with us further. 

Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark this document 
^'Exhibit 11", and I will ask the admiral if he can identify it. It is 
a message from the Secretary of State. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 11" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit 11 

Portion of Message from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadob 
AT Kuibyshev, Dated September 5, 1942 

Mr. Willkie was requested by the President to consult with you and Mr. Hender- 
son and then express to Stalin the American Government's hope that all efforts 
will he made to effect an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations. * * * 

The Polish Ambassador today asked whether there had been any representa- 
tions for the release of "3,400" I'olish otficcrs who are reportedly still held by the 
Soviet authorities in Arctic areas. .You may make these representations to- 
gether with Mr. Willkie or separately. * * * 

Mr. Mitchell,. Admiral, can you tell us something about what tran- 
spired at that time? How did Mr. Willkie get into this picture? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2049 

Admiral Standley. As I stated in that message which I recognize 
as one received from the State Department, Mr. Willkie arrived in 
Moscow witli his statf, I think, on September 17. I immediately took 
Mr. Willkie to call upon Mr. Molotov. At that meeting Mr. Molotov 
was asked to arrange for a meeting of Mr. Willkie and Mr. Stalin, to 
which he agreed. As we were leaving, Mr. Willkie said to Mr. Stalin, 
"How will I be informed of that meeting ?" 

Chairman Madden. Not to Mr. Stalin ? 

Admiral Standley. To Mr. Molotov, "How will I be informed of 
that meeting?" 

Mr. Molotov replied, "You will be informed through the American 
Embassy." 

I waited for some time. In the meantime Mr. Willkie's plans had 
been made so that he could visit certain plants, and one morning we 
were to go out to visit an aircraft battery. Before leaving — I had left 
Eddy Page behind ; Eddy Page was my State Department represent- 
ative who spoke Russian fluently — I said to Eddy, "I am going to 
accompany Air. Willkie to this aircraft battery, and, if they have not 
heard anything about Mr. Willkie's interview with Mr. Stalin, I want 
you to make an appointment for me to see Mr. Molotov, because I don't 
understand the delay. When a special representative from a foreign 
government arrives here and asks to see Mr. Stalin, I don't understand 
why there is this delay." 

So, I went over to Mr. Willkie's residence, the residence that is kept 
there for Americans. They had a guard at the door, a Russian who 
spoke English. When I went in and asked Commander Peale, who was 
Mr. Willkie's brother-in-law and who had accompanied him, whether 
Mr. Willkie had received any word about a visit with Mr. Stalin, 
Commander Peale replied "No." 

But the man at the door had said, "Oh, yes, Mr, Willkie has informa- 
tion. He is going to see Mr. Stalin tonight." 

That was the hrst I had heard of Mr. Willkie's visit to Mr. Stalin. 
Later I understood that this meeting was arranged by Mr. Joe Barnes, 
who accompanied Mr. Willkie, and through some of the Reds over 
tliere, the reddest of the Reds, Mr. Omanski, and Mr. Lozovski and 
some of those other Red Russians. They had arranged for this meet- 
ing with Mr. Willkie. 

So, I promptly telephoned Page to never mind, that the meeting 
had been arranged. On the way out I said to Mr. Willkie, "I under- 
stand that you have received an invitation to call on Mr. Stalin. You 
remember that you were informed that you would get that information 
through the Embassy, but I have received no information about it, Mr. 
Willkie. I wonder if you had anything to do with this interview?" 

His reply was, "No, I had nothing to do with it." 

Then I said, as this had been arranged for Mr. Willkie entirely 
without my knowledge, "I presume that I am not supposed to go with 
you ? " 

Mr. Willkie said, "That is correct. You are not supposed to go." 

I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, I am going to make some inquiries about 
that, because I can't understand how the Ambassador has been by- 
passed here by a special representative, and I want to know why." 

"Oh," he said, "Admiral, you mustn't do that. I think you are a big 
man, but, if you do that I think you are a little man." 



2050 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 

I give you that because that in a sense describes my rehitions with 
Mr. Willkie durinfr his time there. He entirely bypassed me, and later 
on he went to see Mr. Stalin. They brought Mr. Barnes and Mr. Coles 
in and had their pictures taken together, from which, of course, the 
Ambassador was excluded. Their whole attitude there was one to dis- 
credit the American representative in the Soviet Union. Those were 
really my relations with Mr. Willkie while he was there. 

Now, after that interview^, Mr. Willkie was leaving the next morn- 
ing at 4 o'clock to go to the front. So, about 11 o'clock at night he 
called me up and asked if he could come back and tell me what Mr. 
Stalin had said. 

I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, it is too late now. You are going to 
leave at 4 o'clock. Tell me when you come back." 

So, when he did come back he came over and gave me some informa- 
tion and then told me that he had received some other information 
which was so secret that lie couldn't even tell it to the American 
Ambassador. 

As a result of this whole episode of IMr. Willkie, I asked the State 
Department to bring me home for consultation in that the situation 
had gotten sort of out of hand and I felt that I needed some evidence 
of confidence in the representative from the President of the United 
States if I were to remain in Moscow. So, I came home for consul- 
tation. 

Mr. Mitchell. When did you come home, sir? 

Admiral Standley. I left there in September of 1942. I am sorry. 
That should be October 10, 1942. I came home then, I went back 
in January and reported back on January 6, 1943. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce 
this document. 

Mr. DoNDERO. While the Chairman is looking that over, may I ask 
the admiral Avhether all of this took place in Moscow or in 
Kuibyshev ? 

Admiral Standley. It was mostly in Moscow. You are getting 
me into a long story, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Don't blame the chairman. It Avas me that asked 
the question. 

Admiral Standley. Oh yes, you. Mr. Dondero. 

iNIr. Willkie's controversy, or rather the controversy with Mr. 
Willkie started before he even got into ^Moscow. When he arrived 
in Turkey I received a message from ^Ir. Willkie stating that he did 
not w^ant to go to Kuibyshev but that he did want to come to Moscow. 
He wanted to come dii-ect to see Mr. Stalin. I replied that the seat 
of government was in Kuibyshev. 

Mind you, I had already made application for visas for Mr. Willkie 
to enter, and I had told the Ivussiau authorities of his coming. They 
had made plans and had arranged for him to visit state farms, collec- 
tive farms, factories, and had arranged quartei's for him in Kuibyshev. 
So I replied to Mr. Willkie that the seat of government was in 
Kuibyshev and that there was the proper place for representatives 
of foreign governments to make their entry, stating that ''The Soviets 
have made plans for your visit here, and unless you have instructions 
which are contraiy to those I received when 1 obtained your visas, 
1 insist that you come to Kuibyshev." 

So Mr. Willkie then came to Kuibyshev, under protest. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2051 

Chairman Madden. This is off the the record. 
(There was a brief statement off the record.) 
Chairman Madden. I will hand yon exhibit 7. 

Mr. DoNDERo. Jnst a moment. Admiral Standley, I have one qnes- 
tion. What was the purpose of Mr. Willkie's visit to Moscow or 
to Kuibyshev^ Was it a visit on the part of a representative of 
the Government or was it a personal visit of his own? 

Admiral Standley. Do you want my opinion or the statement made 
by the State Department? 

Mr. Dondero. I want whatever is the fact. 

Admiral Standley. There are two facts. There are the facts made 
by the State Department's message when it came in. The other facts 
are my opinion based on what happened while he was there. Now, 
which do yon Avant? 

Mr. OTvoNSKi. Tell us both. 

Mr. Dondero. Whatever the truth is. 

Admiral Standley. The State Department stated — and, of course, 
this is 11 years ago and my memory may be a little bit faulty — but, 
in effect, the State Department said, "Mr. Willkie is contemplating a 
visit to the Middle Last to mingle among the people and see for 
himself and get for himself information from the people as to their 
attitude toward the war effort. In that connection Mr. Willkie would 
like to visit Moscow, and I request that you obtain visas for Mr. 
Willkie to enter Moscow." 

Then it continued: "'Mr. Willkie was my opponent in the last cam- 
paign. Mr. Willkie received a large number of American votes. But 
Mr. Willkie is now interested in getting on with the war effort, and 
I feel that this visit will further the war effort. So I would like 
you to furnish every opportunity for Mr. Willkie to accomplish the 
purpose for which he is coming there." 

Now, that was practically the statement on the basis of which he 
came. He was a special representative of the President. That is the 
way he was spoken of. 

Mr. Willkie came to Kuibyshev under protest, as it were. We made 
a trip up the river. I took him about 50 miles up the Volga River to 
a state collective farm, and so forth. At that time Mr. Willkie was 
talking about the second front practically everywhere he went. 
Nearly everyone he spoke to would come right back, ''Mr. Willkie, how 
about this second front?'" 

Now, after I had insisted that Mr. Willkie come to Kuibyshev, he 
acquiesced and came to Kuibyshev. But he said in his message, 
"There will be no interviews and no press releases from Kuibyshev." 

When it came to the newspaper boys, the only one who came down 
was Shapiro. Eddy Gilmore didn't come and none of the other ne^N-s- 
paper boys came. Apparently they had the idea that Mr. Willkie was 
going to Moscow. So as long as they didn't come, INIr. Willkie 
obviated the question of the press release by saying that there would 
be no press releases from Kuibyshev. 

Later on, as was the custom at that time whenever a special repre- 
sentative of the President came, as Mr. Willkie was, when they had 
completed their mission, Mr. Stalin gave him a Kremlin banquet. It 
was at this Kremlin banquet that one of the representatives of Mr. 
Willkie, after we had left the banquet room and had gone out into 
the smoking room and were sitting around the table — and at that table 



2052 THE KATlTsT FOREST MASSACRE 

was Mr. Stalin, Mr. Willkie, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vershilov, General 
Bradley, and myself, and one other whose name I can't recall now. 

Mv. Coles and Mr. Barnes were sitting over at another table. One 
of them pointed over and said, "There is the next President of the 
United States." 

From the events that happened there it was my opinion that Mr. 
Willkie was over there furthering his political fences rather than 
primarily for the Government's interests. Now, that was my personal 
view of the situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I now introduce exhibit 12 ? 

Chairman Madden. Yes. 

Mr, Mitchell. This is a portion of the message from the Ambas- 
sador at Kuibyshev dated September 10, 1942. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 12" and follows:) 

Exhibit 12 

Portion of Message from the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev Dated 

September 10, 1912 

* * * On a number of occasions I have, as instrncted. taken up with Soviet 
authorities different Polisli problems such as tlie evacuation of cliiidren, recruit- 
ment for the army, the release of five thousand to eight thousand Polish ofiicers, 
relief, and the question of moving soldiers together witli their fanulies from 
Tashkent to Iran. 

As instructed, I liave said that my government did not desire to interfere in 
Polish-Soviet relations Early in July, I reported that Molotov was considerably 
irritated when I spoke of the Polish question. Yestei'day wlien I again s;iid my 
government did not wish to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations Mr. Lozovski 
remarked, "that is the best tiling for it to do." 

* * * It is my judgment that Mr. Vv'illkie or other representatives should 
approach the Premier in a firm and frank manner and as a party iu interest 
and not apologetically. The attitude might be expressed that the friction which 
has developed between officials of the two governments, i. e., Polisli and Soviet 
in the Soviet Union is distressing to our government and that friction of this 
kind between allies will be detrimental to our cause and will profit Hitler; that 
the President therefore wants it frankly stated that our government hopes both 
parties will make every effort to resolve their problems generously and in a 
friendly manner, realizing that knowledge of the dispute in the hands of the 
Axis will be a valuable weapon; that a review by l)oth parties of the problems 
can, the President is confident, lead to an understanding provided there is present 
a spirit of good will and mutual confidence. * * * 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, that message is from you, dated 
September 10, 1942. Did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier in a firm 
manner? 

Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. You might ask the admiral 
if that is the message he sent ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes; that is the message I sent. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier, by 
whom I assume you mean Mr. Stalin, in a firm and frank manner, 
and as a party in interest and not apologetically, to your knowledge? 

Admiral Standley. I have no knowledge of Mr. Willkie's attitude 
when he approached Mr. Stalin because I was not there. Later, before 
I\Ir. Willkie left, and in an effort, as I told him, to be put into the 
I)ositi()n of knowledge of the questions which he had taken up with 
^Lr. Stalin so that I could carry on, I asked him what had developed, 
Avhat had happened between him and Mr. Stalin. 

The answer that I got was that "I have told you some of it, but 
the rest of it is so secret that I can't even tell you." 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2053 

So I ^ot very little information from Mr. Willkie about what hap- 
pened between him and Mr. Stalin. 

Mr. DoNDEKO. Mr. Chairman, unless the visit of Mr. AVillkie can 
be connected up with the Katyn massacre, it seems to me that the 
whole matter ouf^ht to be expnniied from the record. I cannot see 
the slightest relevancy between Mr. Willkie's visit — and this is no 
reflection on you, Ambassador — but unless it can be connected up 
so that it is in some way associated with the Katyn massacre, it has 
nothiuir to do with the picture at all, and ought to be stricken from 
this record. 

]\Ir. Machkowicz. Mr. Chairman, I disagree. I think we should 
have the entire picture. A lot of this nuitter may have no direct 
bearing on the Katvn atFair, but it certainly has an indirect bearing; 
and I don't see how we could get a complete picture without having 
the Willkie incident in the record. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Unless you can associate it in some way, I shall 
ask 

Mr. Maciirowicz. It has already been associated. The matter of 
the missing Polish officers was at issue at this time. 

Mr. DoxDERo. That miglit have been an issue at that time, but what 
did Mr. Willkie have to do with it? 

]\[r. Maciirowicz. I think it has already been established that the 
question of the missing Polish officers was an issue that was dis- 
cussed at the time, and the messages between the American Ambas- 
sador and the Department of State indicate that. I see no reason 
why the fact that it hapj^ened to be Mr. Wendell Willkie should 
mean that that should be excluded from the record. With all of the 
rest of it included, that would give us a very incomplete picture. 

Mr. Dondero. Well, I still insist that there is the question of rele- 
vancy. The subject of Mr. Willkie's visit there had nothing to do with 
the Katyn massacre at all. He was not a representative of the 
Government. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Oh, yes: he was a representative of the Gov- 
ernment. 

Mr. Dondero. I did not so understand. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was he a representative of the Government, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Staxdley. I have so stated, that is, that he represented 
the President of the United States and was so treated. 

Chairman Maddex. Admiral, does this testimony that you are pre- 
senting lead up to the Katyn controversy or the Katyn" question in 
any way? 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you discuss the Polish situation with Mr. 
Willkie? 

Admiral Staxdley. Yes; I discussed the Polish situation with Mr. 
Willkie and the ett'orts that I had made. I discussed that with him. 

Chairman Madden. I think the admiral should proceed. 

Mr. MiTCHEix. IVIay I have this document marked as ''Exhibit 1-3"? 

Admiral Staxdley. I would like to add, gentlemen, that Mr. Will- 
kie's visit and the fact that he had entirely bypassed the American 
Ambassador made it difficult for me to continue the discussions in 
regard to the Polish situation. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is with regard to the missing Polish officers ? 



2054 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Admiral Standley. Yes; with regard to the missing Polish offi- 
cers, because I did not know what Mr. Willkie had said to ^Ir. Stalin 
and what Mr. Stalin, in turn, had said to Mr. Willkie. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Did he mention that subject to you? 

Admiral Standley. I asked him in rejiard to it, and he stated in 
regard to the Polish question, "I have other matters that are so secret 
that I can't tell you about them." 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to introduce ex- 
hibit 13. 

Admiral, this is a report from the Ambassador in Moscow regard- 
ing Mr. Willkie's conversation with Stalin concerning the Polish 
situation. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 13" and follows:) 

Exhibit 13 

Report Fhom the American Ambassador at Moscow Regarding Mb. Willkie's 
Conversation With Stalin Concerning the Polish Situation 

Mr. Willkie called at the Embassy on September 25 (1942) and informed the 
Ambassador that he had taken np the Polish qnestion with Mr. Stalin along the 
line that had been indicated in the Department's telegram of September 10, 
pointing out particularly that it was in the conmion interest of the United Nations 
that there should be the maximum cooperation and the least possible cause for 
friction between the different nations fighting against the Axis, that Mr. Stalin 
had asked specific questions in regard to the Polish complaints but that he had 
replied that he did not wish to argue the details of the case. Mr. Stalin finally 
said that he would be willing to discuss the Polish qnestion with Polish officials 
with a view towards ironing out existing difficulties. 

Mr. Machrowicz. When you refer to the Polish question, you refer 
to the question of the missing Polish officers, do 3^011 not? 

Admiral Standley. I couldn't say definitely that I did, but, as a 
matter of fact, the Polish officers were always in the foreground. 

Mr. Maciiroa\^cz, That was the most im]>ortant i')roblem that caused 
the differences between the Polish Government and the Russians? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Chairman Madden. I believe the admiral's testimony is apropos. 

Mr. DoNDERO. If tlie admiral states, as he now states, that it had to 
do with the missing Polish officers, I iiave no objection. I just wanted 
the thing straightened out. That was all. 

Admiral Standley. It had so nnich importance that innnediately 
upon Mr. Willkie's leaving I asked to be sent home for consultation 
because the situation, as a result of Mr. AVillkie's visit, had developed 
to the point that I felt I could no longer remain there without further 
evidence that the Dei)artment had confidence in me and wanted me 
to continue. 

Ml'. DoNDERO. There is one question I Avant to ask. Did you discuss 
this Polish question — and I refer to the missing Polish officers — with 
Stalin up to that time? 

Admiral STANDLt:Y. I don't think I CA'er discussed the Polish quevS- 
tion with Mr. Stalin. It was always with Mr. ]\Iolotov. I don't recall 
that T ever discussed it Avitli Mr. Stalin. 

Mr. DoNDLKo. Now, at the time you discussed it with Mr, Molotov, 
was a inaii by the name of Beria, who was the head of the secret police 
of Ivussia, present, or any other officer of that organization? 

Admiral Standley. Not obviously present, but many times they 
are present when you don't know about it. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2055 

Chairman Madden. What do you mean by that, Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. Well, you ahvaj's ha Ye somebody around when 
you ai'e in Russia. There are ahAays some NKVD boys around. Some- 
times, though, 3'ou know where they are, and sometimes you don't. 
So I can't say when they were there. 

Chairman Madden. You mean that they were concealed some place i 

Admiral Standley. Yes, probably concealed or in a room where 
they could hear. That is one of the conditions in the Soviet Union as 
has been described by Bedell Smith, by Kirk, and by everybody else. 
The American Ambassador is always followed by the XICVD boys. 

Mr. MACHROA\acz. Now, Admiral, one matter that we are particu- 
larly interested in is to know whether or not the Department of State 
or the Department of Defense or any other o-overnmental agency had 
information in 11)42, 1943, and in 1944 regarding the missing Polish 
officers. I want to ask you in connection with that whether you, on 
P^bruary 7, 1942, transmitted to the Department of State a report by 
Major Czapski witli regard to these missing Polish officers. 

Admiral Standley. 1 was not in Moscow at that time. I was not 
there at that time. I was in Washington. 

Chairman Madden. Show this to the admiral and see if he can 
identify it. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Can you identify that photostatic copy? 

Admiral Standley. No, sir. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Who was your predecessor ? 

Admiral Standley. Ambassador Steinhardt. 

He maj' not have been tliere, because Steinhart came out and the 
counselor was Walter Thurston, and he might have been charge 
d'affaires at that time. I am not sure. 

Mr. Mrjx'HELL. Admiral, when did you report to Moscow as the 
United States Ambassador? 

Admiral Standley. In April 1942. It was April 14 I presented my 
credentials and became the Ambassador. I presented my credentials 
to Mr. Kalinin of the Soviet Republic and became the Ambassador. 

Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you were being briefed by the Department 
of State officials, as you told us this morning, before you went over 
there, I assume that would be in February 1942, since you reported 
in April of 1942? 

Admiral Standley. I cannot recall just the date that I was con- 
firmed here, but I was confirmed by the Senate here before I reported 
to Moscow, and I remained in Washington here until February 1942. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. But you were being briefed by the State Depart- 
ment officers as to what your functions and duties were going to be, 
were you not? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you ever shown this message at that time? 

Admiral Standley. I do not recall ever having seen any messages 
of that kind. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is an official State Department 
document dated February 7, 1942, with no signature. It comes from 
the Foreign Service of the United States of America, American 
Embassy, Moscow, U. S. S. R., February 7, 1942, subject, "Trans- 
mitting memorandum concerning Polish prisoners of war in the 
Soviet Union." 



2056 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

We have already received the information contained in this docu- 
ment on the record in our hearings. The import of this whole thing 
is that before Admiral Standley went to Moscow, this was in the files 
of the Department of State. 

Chairman Madden. Admiral Standley could not identify it. 

Mr. Mitchell. He said he never saw this before he went over there. 
Certainly a man who was going to. represent the United States 
Government 

Chairman Madden. I would like to have that identified if you want 
it in the record here. 

Is that already in the record ? 

Mr. JNIlTCHELL. No. 

Chairman Madden. If you can identify it we will submit it for the 
record. 

Mr. Machrowicz. IVIr. Chairman, may I suggest that probably we 
have Mr. Brown, of the Department of State, identify this instrument, 
and then Admiral Standley can continue his testimony. That will 
save a lot of time. 

TESTIMONY OF BEN H. BROWN, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRE- 
TARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 

Chairman JNIadden. Mr. Brown, will you state your full name, 
please ? 

Mr, Brown. Ben H. Brown, Jr. 

Chairman Madden. And your address ? 

Mr. Brown. 3501 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va. 

Chairman jMadden. ^h\j we have the capacity in which you are 
acting here ? 

Mr, Brown. I am Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Con- 
gressional Relations. 

Chairman Madden, Will you raise your hand and be sworn, please? 

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Brown. I do. 

Chairman Madden. You may submit that copy to Mr. Brown, 
counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Brown, will you kindly identify that document 
for the committee, please ? 

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, this is a photostatic copy of a dispatch 
from the American Embassy in Moscow, dated February 7, 1942, 

I am identifying this on the basis of my knowledge of the original 
of this document in the Department's files, and the fact that it was 
on niy instruction that this document was photostated aiul the photo- 
static copy turned over to the committee. 

Chairman Madden. What is that document? 

Mr. Mitchell. Whose signature appears on that document? 

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I will have to look at the original of 
the -document to determine whose signature appears on it. I would 
assume it was the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at the time. 

Mr, Machrowicz. As far as this committee is concerned, I do not 
think it is tremendously im])ortant who signed the document. The 
fact is that on February 7, 11)42, the l)ei)artment of State did receive 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2057 

from the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at Moscow a letter 
transmitting a report by Major Czapski concerning these missing 
Polish officers; is that correct? 

jVIr. Brown. No, sir. The date stamp on this document shows that 
it was received in the Department of State on April 13, 1942, at some- 
thing after 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Now, the document was dated 
February 7, but the date of receipt was April. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But in April 1942 the Department of State would 
have in its possession Major Czapski's extensive report regarding these 
missing Polish officers; is that not correct? 

Mr. Brown. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and receive 
it in evidence. Counsel? 

Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 14. 

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 14" for identi- 
fication and is as follows:) 

Exhibit 14 — Letter and One Enclosure Forwarded to United States State 
Department by American Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942, 
Detailing Search fob Polish Officers 

The Foreign Service of the United States of America 

American Embassy, 
Moscoiv, U. S. S. R., Fehruary 7, 19^2. 
No. 11. 
Subject: Transmitting nu-moranduni ciJiiceiiiing Polish prisoners of war in the 

Soviet Union. 
The Honorable the Secretary of State, 

Washington, D. C. 

Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation prepared by this office 
of a memorandum on Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union which was 
handed to me by its author, Jozef Czapski, a captain in the Polish Army in the 
Soviet Union. Captain Czapski informed me in strict confidence that not only 
had Stalin promised the Polish Ambassador that the Polish officers concerned 
would be liberated but that he had given the most solemn assurance to this 
effect to General Sikorski. Captain Czapski came to Moscow in an effort to 
obtain the implementation of these promises but has been unable to obtain any 
further information as to the whereabouts of these prisoners. He thinks it pos- 
sible, however, that some of them may be imprisoned on Franz Joseph Island 
and as it would be impossible to bring them back from there before the month 
of June, there is a slight possibility that the Soviet authorities are withholding 
any information until such time as they can actually release the prisoners. As 
illustrative of the attitude taken by the Soviet authorities on this question, 
Captain Czapski told me in the strictest confidence that two officers of the 
Polish army in the U. S. S. R. were suddenly arrested in Kuibyshev and re-im- 
prisoned without notice to the Polish Embassy or Military Authorities. The 
Polish Embassy has been unable to secure their release despite the most strenu- 
ous efforts. The Soviet authorities have merely stated that the officers in ques- 
tion are believed to be pro-German. Captain Czapski said he thought the real 
reason for their arrest was the fact that they were members of the Polish Bund. 
Captain Czapski, who was himself a prisoner of war, said that he had been for- 
tunate in being imprisoned in a camp where the prisoners received relatively 
good treatment. He said that the reason for this special consideration was the 
desire of the Soviet authorities to prepare a nucleus of Poles who would be fa- 
vorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and would be useful to the Soviet 
Government after the war, possibly for intervention in Polish internal afCairs. 
He said that while he had no direct evidence he suspected that similar tactics 
were being used with respect to German prisoners of war. Some support to this 
theory is furnished by the recent visit of American correspondents to a Soviet 



2058 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

prison camp near Gorky, where the German prisoners receive a more liberal 
ration than the citizens of Moscow, although it cannot be said that the conditions 
of life there would be likely to win adherents to the Communist Regime. 
Respectfully yours, 



(Committee Note. — The signature on this document was deleted by the State 
Department. See previous testimony.) 

[Translation] 
Aide M]6moike Concerning Missing Polish Prisoners of War 

The prisoners of war concentrated at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow in 
the year 1939-40 (April-May) amounting to over 15,000 men, of which 8,700 
were oflBcers, have not returned from their captivity and the place where they 
were located is absolutely unknown with the excei)tion of 400 or 500 men, about 
3 percent of the total number of prisoners of war at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and 
Ostachkow who were freed in 1941 (most of them having passed through the 
camp at Griazowietz). 

THE CAMP AT STAROBIELSK 

The prisoners arrived at the camp of Starobielsk from the thirtieth of Septem- 
ber to the first of November 1939. At the beginning of the liquidation of the 
camp, about April 5, 1940, the number of prisonA's of war amounted to 3,920 men, 
aside from the generals and colonels who lived apart. In this number there 
were some dozens of civilians for the most part judges, lawyers, and civil ser- 
vants, and about 20 officer candidates (Podehorazy). All of the rest were 
oflSeers of whom at least 50 percent were regular officers, 8 generals, more than 
100 colonels and lieutenant colonels, nearly 250 ma.lors, about 1,000 captains, 
nearly 2,500 lieutenants and sublieutenants distributed among all branches of 
the service ; among others, 380 of the most outstanding doctors of Poland, some 
university professors, etc. 

Kozielsk and Ostachkow were similar prison camps and were liquidated about 
the same time and in the same manner as Starobielsk. 

OSTACHKOW 

When the liquidation of this camp began on April 6, 1940, there were a total 
of 6,570 men, of which 380 were Polish officers, in addition to Polish frontier 
guards and frontier regiments. 

LIQUIDATION OF STAROBIELSK 

On the fifth of April 1940 liquidation was announced and the first group, 195 
men, were sent from Stai'obielsk. The Soviet commander. Colonel Berejkow, 
and the commissar, Kirehin, assured our camp directors that the camp was in 
process of final liquidation and that everyone would be sent to centers of depart- 
ure from which all would be sent to their own country, the Russian side as well 
as the German (none of them were sent). 

They were sent from the fourtli of April to the twenty-sixth of April in groups 
of from C5 to 240 persons. On April 25, after the customary lecture, more than 
100 persons were to leave. There was read a special list containing the names 
of 63 persons who were ordered to hold themselves completely apart during the 
departure at the station. 

After this there was a pause between the twenty-sixth of April and the second 
of Miiy. On the second of May 200 more were sent by little groups of 8, 11, 12 
(my own departure took place in a group of 16) and the rest were sent. This 
group in which I found myself was taken to Pawlichtchew Bor (Smolensk Oblast) 
and we there met the '"spt'cial group" of 63 persons. We were accordingly 79 
otficers of Starobielsk all freed in 1941 (including some otlicer candidates 
"Podehorazy"). If we add to tins number the oliicers sent from Starobielsk 
individually during the winter of 1939-1940 ((Jeneral Jarnuszkiewicz, Colonel 
Koc, C^olonel Gielgud-Aksentowicz, Chaplain Tyczkowski, Colonel Szymanski, 
Captain Rytel, Lieutenant Evert) and who have been freed, we have all together 
86 out of 3,920, (I little over 2 j)ercent of the total ntinifjrr of prisoners of 
Starobielsk. 

The li(iuidati(m of the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow was carried out in a 
similar manner. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2059 

In the camp of Pavvlichtchew Bor there were about 200 officers from Kozielsk 
and about 120 persons from Ostachkow (police, subofficers, and some officers and 
civilians) . The ratio between the number of men that came to Pawlichtchew and 
the total number of prisoners in the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow differed 
little from those I have cited for Starboielsk. 

THE CAMP OF GRIAZOWIETZ NE^Ul VOLOGDA 

After a stay of a month at Pawlichtchew the whole camp, amounting to about 
400 persons, was transferred from Pawlichtchew to Griazowietz, where they 
remained from April IS, 1940, to the time of their liberation (on July 2, 1941, a 
group of 1,250 officers and soldiers interned in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
arrived at Griazowietz). According to our information the camp of Griazowietz 
is the only camp existing in the U. S. S. R. after June 1940, in which the officer 
prisoners of war were in the majority, which was liquidated in September 1941. 

It will soon have been six months since the day of the proclamation of the 
armistice of Polish prisoners on the twelfth of August 1941. The Polish army 
in the U. S. S. R. is constantly receiving, whether by groups or individually, 
officers and soldiers of the Polish army who had been arrested on the spot or at 
the time of their passage of one of the frontiers after September 1939 and who 
now are free to come to us from Siberia, from Kolyma, from Workuta, Komi, 
ASSR, from Karagande, from all Russia, but contrary to the solemn promises 
given to our Ambassador by Stalin himself in November K)41, categoric promises 
of Stalin given to General Sikorski on December 4, 1941, to search for and deliver 
to us the missing prisoners and soldiers of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostachkow, 
tJiere is not a single prisoner of war of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostachkow (aside 
from the group named above) who has returned. Not a single cry for help has 
come to us from them. Having questioned thousands of compatriots who came 
from camps and prisons all over the Soviet Union, we have no news whatever of 
their location apart from vague rumors, usually carried third hand, such as: 
that six to twelve thousand officers and subofficers were sent to Kolyma in 1940 : 
that more than five thousand officers have been concentrated on Franz Joseph 
Island and Nowaya, Zemlya ; that transports have been sent to Tschukotka, 
Kamtschatka ; that 630 prisoners of Kozielsk are located ISO kilometers from 
Piostraya Dreswa (Kolyma) ; that on the thirtieth of August 1941, 150 men in 
tattered officers' uniforms were seen on the banks of the Gari north of Soswa 
( tributary of the river Ob) : that Polish officers were sent to islands in the north 
in large barges containing 1,700 to 2,000 men each and that three of these b:irges 
were sunk. But none of this information is completely certain although tliat 
concerning the northern islands and Kolyma seems the most probable. 

Can it be that the solemn promises of Stalin himself would not allow us to 
hope that we shall at least know where our prisoners of war companions are 
and if they have perished where that took place? It is more than improbalile 
that the heads of the N. K. V. D. should not know where these 15, 000 men are. 
During our stay at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow (19:>9-1940) lists of 
prisoners of war were made many times on special paper with numerous and 
detailed printed questions. These papers were sent to the places of detention 
of the iirisoners everywhere. To them were added the records of numerous 
examinations on the past, tlie political views, etc., of each prisoner. Verified 
photographs were added to the documents, and papers of each prisoner were kept 
in a special dossier "Dielo," which included such documents as the officer's 
certificate, passport, etc. 

The point to which these registrations were made with care is shown by a 
detail : many Polish officers received all of their papers in December 1941, 
documents which had been taken from them at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and 
Ostachkow two yeai'S earlier. 

THE OFFICERS 

The dav of the beginning of the liquidation of the camp of Starobielsk, 
April 5, 1940 : 

The number of prisoners, all officers except some dozens of 
civilians, and about thirty candidate officers (Podchorazy) 
amounted to 3, 920 persons. 

The number of prisoners of Kozielsk the day of its liquida- 
tion, April 3, 1940, was 5,000 officers 4, 500 officers. 

The number of prisoners at Ostachkow the day of its liquida- 
tion was 6,570 of which 380 officers. 

Total S, SOO 



2060 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Subtracting the dozens of civilians at Starobielsk we have 
at least 8, 700 officers. 

There have returned to the Polish army some 3(K) officers of 
Griazowietz (ex-prisoners of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and 
Ostachkow) and some dozens of prisoners sent from prisons 
where they had been held individually after Starobielsk, 
Kozielsk, and Ostachkow, in all not more than 400 oflScers. 

Accordingly the officer prisoners of war who have not returned 
from the camps Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow 
amounted to the figure of 8, 300 oflScers. 

All the officers of the Tolish Army in the U. S. S. R. of which the 
number amounted to 2,300 more or less on January 1, 1942, are with the 
exception of the group of 400 officers mentioned above not as prisoners 
of war but political prisoners arrested after the campaign of 1939 as well 
as those interned from Lithuania, Estonia, and I^atvia. 

This note sets forth the status of the officer prisoners of war not liberated. 
With regard to the soldier prisoners of war not liberated, the question cannot be 
described in such a precise manner. According to official Soviet information 
(Krasnaya Zvezda, September IS, 1940), on the Ukraine front alone the Soviet 
army took 181,223 soldiers and more than 4,000 under officers prisoners. The 
soldiers have been partially sent back, the rest having been held in work camps 
in Komi, A. S. S. R., in Siberia, in the DonBass, in Soviet-occupied Poland, in 
Kazakstan, and in all the prisons of the U. S. S. R. A part of these men have 
been liberated and have formed the cadre of our army in the U. S. S. R. Another 
part not being able to be received in the army drifted toward the south seeking 
their families exported to Kazakstan. A large part have perisiied in work camps 
as well as being freed from cold and from hunger. 

Accordingly, it is only the prisoners of war of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and 
Ostachkow, for the most part officers, that we have been able to determine in 
exact figures. In enlarging the cadres of our army in the South, the need for 
these officers becomes more and more pressing. We lose in them the l^est that 
we had of military specialists, men of character, and patriots. In increasing our 
army the quality of the army is tied to this question of the disappearance of 
our best cadres of officers, to say nothing about how much more difficult this 
makes the creation of confidence in our army towards our Soviet allies, con- 
fidence so necessary for the decisive moment when our army goes into action 
again. 

JozEF CzAPSKi, Captain. 

Moscow, January 29, 19'i2. 

Mr, Brown. Is that all for me at this time, sir? 
Chairman Madden. That is all, Mr. Brown. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OP WILLIAM H. STANDLEY— Resumed 

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, we have now reached the point in your 
career as Ambassador where you asked to be called home as a result 
of the visit Mr. Willkie made. 

Could you tell us what happened, briefly, in Washington, at the 
time you came back, which I believe you stated was October 1942? 

Admiral Standley. When I returned to Washington, I reported, 
of course, directly to the State Department and then had an inter- 
view with the President. I reported to the President virtually what 
I have told this committee about ]\Ir. Willkie's activities over there. 

TluMi I told the President that I had asked to be recalled because of 
the situation Mr. Willkie left me in, and that if I returned to Russia 
I must go back with increased prestige and evidences of that. 

And I told him three tilings that must hapj)en to indicate that 
evidence. One was that my naval attache, who was a captain, should 
be made an admiral ; that my military attache should be made a gen- 
eral, and that General Faymonville, the representative of Lend-Lease, 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2061 

should be directed to report to the Ambassador and not act independ- 
ently, as lie had been doing. 

Those things were accomplished before I went back. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are telling the committee this 
morning that all of your requests were granted by the President; is 
that right? 

Admiral Standlet. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell, And that you then returned in your official ca- 
pacity ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Xow, during your conversation with the President, 
was the subject matter of the missing Polish othcers discussed? 

Admiral Standley. I cannot recall generally, but I did discuss it 
with the President. I cannot remember in detail what the discussion 
was, but it was, in general, along the lines that I have indicated to the 
committee here. I informed the President of the situation as it had 
developed up to that time. 

Mr. Mitchell. In October 1942? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you proceed to tell the committee what 
happened upon your return to Moscow, confining it to the Polish 
question ? 

Admiral Standley. When I returned to Moscow, I found that Dr. 
Kot, who had informed me before I left that he had asked to be re- 
called, had been recalled as the Polish representative, and that Dr. 
Homer had been assigned as the Polish representative in Moscow. 

Upon my return, Mr. Romer made the usual call, and he seemed very 
much pleased because he felt that the Polish situation had improved, 
and he felt encouraged and felt that he was going to accomplish some 
results in connection with that question. 

Then IMr. Homer informed me that on subsequent visits the attitude 
of Mr. Molotov seemed to stiffen again, and then the Polish question 
became again a sore point and became quite a question of controversy. 

Later on Mr. Romer brought a message which stated that their 
Polish Government in London had been informed that the British 
Ambassador and the American Ambassador would receive identical 
notes, which they were supposed to present to the Soviet Government. 

And in due time, I think in about a week, those messages were re- 
ceived and the British Ambassador and myself made appointments 
to see Mr. Molotov. 

We did not go together on this occasion, and when I went into the 
office — we had appointments and mine was after the British Ambas- 
sador's — as I went in, the British Ambassador was coming out. And 
the British Ambassador stated : 

I have talked with Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish situation. I have urged 
that they withhold their statements in regard to the Polish situation and not 
make it public. 

And, of course — 

he said — 

I did not have much success. I hope you will have better success. 

That was in connection with the note that the Soviet Government 
was going to make in regard to the breaking of relations with the 
Polish Government. 

93744 — 52— pt. 7 16 



2062 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Chairman Madden. We have here now a document wliich should be 
marked as the next exhibit. 

Mr. Mitchell. That will be exhibit 15. 

Chairman Madden. Wait just a minute. I think the admiral lia.d 
something further to say. 

Admiral Standley. I had gotten ahead there. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think you had. I would like to bring you 
up to the point. 

I have here a paraphrase of a telegram from Moscow, dated April 
26, 1943 ; which I would like to introduce at this point as exhibit 15. 

(The document referred to Mas marked "Exhibit 15" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit 15 

[Paraphrase of telegram from Moscow] 

Moscow, April 26. 1943. 
Seceetaey of State, 

Washington. 

Two. I called on Molotov at his request this afternoon. As I arrived Clark 
Kerr was leaving and he said in passing "see if you can persuade him to delay 
the publication of the note. This is madness — I have been trying for the past 
hour but I am afraid I was not successful." 

Molotov told me of a mesHUfie of April 21 addressed to Churchill and to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt concerning Polish-Soviet relations. He said that in the absence 
of the President and of Air. Hull this message ivas given to Mr. Welles on the 2Jfth. 
The message, he said, was almost identical to the note which he was "forced" 
to give last night to Ambassador Romer. The message was sent to the President 
to explain the position of the Soviet Government in the present controversy, and 
he felt certain that the Soviet position would be understood by the American 
Government. After reading the note Molotov said, in reply to my question, 
that no answer to Stalin's message had been received from the President. I 
said that the President's absence would account for the lack of a reply, and 
added that I was certain the President would be greatly disturbed at this devel- 
opment. When informed that the note would be published this evening, I said 
that, speaking without instructions, I was certain the American and British 
Governments were exporing the question of Polish-Soviet relations in an attempt 
to find a solution which would make unnecessary a rupture in relations. I added 
that I sincerely hoped that publication of the note could be held up long enough 
to permit a complete examination of the question. 

(Signed) Standley. 

Chairman Madden. That will be received as exhibit 15. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you acknowledge having sent that message, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. And tliat brings me back. I had gotten 
ahead of that in ni}^ testimony. 

As I stated, Mr. Romer found tliat conditions Avere worsening as 
he wont along, and eventually, on A])ril 11^, 194;), came the break. 
And at that time, Mr. Goebbels, the German representative, had an- 
nounced tlie finding of these 5,000 or 8,000 Poli.sh officers and that they 
had been murdered by the Russians. 

At that time it was announced that the Polish Government in exile 
had requested the International Red Cross to investigate this murder 
to determine who had committed the nnirder, whether it was the Rus- 
sians or the Germans. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2063 

My next knowledge in connection with that was when Mr. Romer 
•came into my office the next or following day and asked to see me. 
He made this statement : 

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to get your advice. I was called for an appoint- 
ment with Mr. Molotov last evening, at which time I was presented with a letter 
of such tenor that after I had read it I handed it back to Mr. Molotov, and I said, 
"Mr. Molotov, that letter is couched in language which no ambassador can re- 
ceive," and I refused to receive it. And I left the ofBce. 

He continued, "About 12 o'clock, between 12 and 2 o'clock last 
night" — I think he told me about 12 o'clock — 

a messenger rapped at my door in the hotel, and when he opened the door he 
presented me with a letter from the Russian Foreign Office. And the messenger 
left. When I opened the letter, I found it was the identical letter that he had 
given me in the afternoon, with no change whatever in it. It was the identical 
letter. 

"So," he said, "I came over to ask what you would do about it." 

I first said to Mr. Romer, "Have you seen the British Ambassador?" 

"Yes." 

"Probably," I said, "it will be no use for me to tell you what I would 
do, but if you asked me, if it was my case, I would take that letter 
back to the Kremlin gate and say to the messenger that it was the 
identical letter I had refused to receive, and I could not receive it and 
was returning it, evidently it had been sent to me by mistake." 

As I anticipated, Mr. Romer did not take my advice. He referred 
the matter to the Polish Government, and so that was the breaking of 
relations, and in a short time JVIr. Romer left IMoscow for home. 

Chairman LIadden. At this time I will have the next document 
marked "Exhibit 16," which is entitled "Private and Confidential 
Message of Premier Joseph V. Stalin to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt." 

The docmnent will be received for the record. 

(The document referred to w^as marked "Exliibit 16" for identifica- 
tion, and is as follows :) 

Exhibit 16 

Marshall Stalin's Personal Letter to President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt 

(Note in panel in upper right hand corner states the message was 
received in the State Department "about 3 p. m., April 24, lols") 

The recent conduct of the Polish Government towards the Soviet Union is 
regarded by the Soviet Government as absolutely abnormal and contrary to all 
rules and standards governing relations between allied countries. 

The campaign of calumny against the Soviet Union, initiated by the German 
fascists regarding the Polish officers they themselves slaughtered in the Smolensk 
area, on German-occupied territory, was immediately taken up by the Sikorski 
government and inflated in every possible way by the official Polish press. The 
Sikorski government, far from taking a stand against the vile fascist slander 
of the Soviet Union did not even see fit to ask the Soviet government for in- 
formation or explanations. 

The Hitlerite authorities, after perpetrating an atrocious crime against the 
Polish officers, are now engaged upon an investigation farce for the staging of 
which they have enlisted the help of certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked 
up by them in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where 
honest Poles dare not lift their voices in public. 



2064 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in these "investigations" 
the International Red Cross which is compelled to take part, under conditions 
of a terroristic regime with its gallows and mass extermination of a peaceful 
population, in this investigation farce, under the stage management of Hitler. 
It should be clear that such "investigations," carried out, moreover, behind the 
Soviet Government's back, cannot inspire confidence in persons of any integrity. 

The fact that this campaign against the Soviet Union was launched simul- 
taneously in the German and the Polish press and is being conducted along similar 
lines does not leave any room for doubt that there is contact and collusion between 
Hitler, the enemy of the Allies, and the Sikorski government in the conduct of 
the campaign. 

At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in the 
bitter struggle against Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the 
common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries, the government of Mr. 
Sikorski, pandering to Hitler's tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet 
Union. 

All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to infer that the present 
government of Poland, having fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler 
government, has actually discontinued relations of alliance with the U. S. S. R. 
and assumed a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union. 

In view of these circumstances, the Soviet Government has come to the conclu- 
sion of the necessity for breaking relations with the present Polish government. 

I deem it necessary to inform you of the above and trust that the Government 
of the United States will realize the inevitability of the step which the Soviet 
Government has been compelled to take. • 

April 21, 1943. 

Chairman Maddex. This next document will be marked "Exhibit 
17" and received for the record. It is a message from President Roose- 
velt to Stalin, dated April 26, 1943. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit IT" for identifica- 
tion and is as follows :) 

Exhibit 17 — Message Feom President Roosevelt to Stalin, Dated April 26. 1943 

I have received your telegram while on my Western inspection trip. I can well 
understand your problem, but I hope in the present situation you can find means 
to label your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government 
in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations. 

It is my view that Sikorsky has not acted in any way with Hitler gang, but 
rather that he made a mistake in taking the mutter up with the International 
Red Cross. Also, I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means 
of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in 
the future. 

Let me know if I can help in any way, especially in regard to looking after 
any Poles you may desire to send out of Russia. 

Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, very many of 
them in the Army and Navy. They are all bitter against the Nazis, and knowl- 
edge of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski would not help 
the situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the admiral a 
question. 

Admiral, is this message from Stalin to President Roosevelt the 
one that was referred to in your dispatch when Molotov told you about 
it April 21? 

Admiral Standley. I never saw that message. Mr. Stalin told me 
about it. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. Did you see that message, Admiral ? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

Mr. Maciihowicz. Now, I am going to ask you. Admiral: In your 
relations with the Polish representatives in Moscow, did you find a 
desire on their ]iart to find a way out of the situation with the Russian 
authorities ? Did they seem to be acting in good faith ? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2065 

Admiral Standley. Do you mean the Polish authorities? 

Mr. Machrowicz. The Polish authorities. 

Admiral Standley. Oh, yes. 

IVIr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication that they did not act 
otherwise than in good faith i 

Admiral Standley. Not the slightest. On the other hand, there 
seemed to be every effort of the Poles, Mr. Kot and Mr. Romer, to 
get along, and to solve the problem. 

Mr. ]VIachrowicz. Was there anything that you found in your rela- 
tions with xVmbassador Kot, Ambassador Romer, and the others, 
which would indicate to you that the desire of the Polish Government 
to ask for an International Red Cross investigation was instigated by 
the Germans? 

Admiral Standley. No. The only information we got about that 
came over the radio. We got this word over the radio, and then we 
got the news in regard to Mr. Romer's relief. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Your impression, based on the negotiations and 
the discussions you had with Ambassador Kot and Ambassador Romer, 
was that this was an independent request to the Polish Government, 
with which the Germans had nothing to do; is that correct? 

Admiral Standley. That was the impression we had at the time. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you see anything in this action of the Polish 
Government which would give any reason to ask the President to have 
them act with more common sense in the future ? Was there anything 
tliat was not in conmion sense in requesting the International Red 
Cross to make an investigation? 

Admiral Standley. Not that we could see at the time. There was 
no particular reason why they should not ask a neutral agency to 
investigate, as long as there was a dispute. 

Mr. JVIaciirowicz. Did it not appear to you that it was, on the con- 
trary, acting with common sense in the case of a controversy between 
the Russians and Germans, both of whom were equal enemies of the 
Poles, that the Polish Government wanted an unbiased organization 
like the International Red Cross to investigate? 

Admiral Standley. That is how it appeared to u.s there, that the 
Polish Government was acting in good faith in endeavoring to get 
an honest solution of the controversy. 

Mr. Machroavicz. Then, of course, you disagree with the former 
President's statement that they did not act with conmion sense in 
asking such an unbiased investigation? 

Admiral Standley. I do not know whetlier I would agree with 
that or not. 

Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero. 

Mr. Dondero. Before you proceed further let me ask: Did the 
Polish representatives at all times contact you in regard to the effort 
they made with the Russian Government to find these Polish officers? 

Admiral Standley. I could not say that they contacted me in 
regard to, or informed me of every occasion, but they were continually 
discussing the Polish question with me. 

As a matter of fact, our relations with Minister Kot were very 
friendly. He was a great bridge player, and we played bridge back 
and forth continually. 



2066 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

At these bridge tables we would discuss these questions. Of course,, 
they are not a matter I can recall, but I know we were constantly 
discussing the Polish question. 

Mr. DoNDERo. When you speak of the Polish question or Polish 
problem. Ambassador, you really mean these missing Polisli officers,, 
do you ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. That AA'as the problem. 

Mr. DoNDEUo. Now, there is something about which you have 
aroused the curiosity of all members of this committee. 

Did you at any time after Willkie's visit to Europe learn what was 
the supersecret information that he had which you did not have? 

Admiral Standley. No. At least, if it came to me, it came to me in 
a way that 1 did not know it was information through Mr. Willkie. 

Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have at this time, Mr. Chairnum. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski. 

Mr. O'Konski. I have one question. Admiral, referring to this 
break that finally came between Russia and the Polish Government, 
that was not a surprise to you, was it^ In other words, were you 
not of the opinion that Russia's attitude, considering the situation 
and the way they had to be babied by everybody with regard to even 
talking to the Poles, was it not your opinion that eventually the 
break would come, and that if it had not been on this incident of the 
Red Cross, that they would have found some other incident because 
of the plan they had set? Eventually the'break would have to come 
and they had it in mind. It was just a question of falling upon the 
first opportunity to do it with grace; is that right? Is that your 
opinion ? 

Admiral Standley. Would you state that again ? 

Mr. O'Konski. This break that finally came between the Polish 
Government and the Russian Government was scheduled to come for 
a long time, was it not? In other words, if Russia had not found this 
particular incident as an excuse to sever relations with the Polish 
Government, they would have found some other excuse because it was 
definitely in their plan to eventually sever relations, was it not? 

Admiral Standley. That was not in our minds in JNIoscow. 

Mr. O'Konski. It was not ? 

Admiral Standley. No. We did not anticipate a definite and final 
break between the Poles and the Russians. 

Chairman Madden. Our next document will be marked "Exhibit 
No. 18." It is a telegram to the Secretary of State from Ambassador 
Standley, dated in Moscow April 28, 1943. 

That will be received for the record. 

(The document referred to was marked as ''Exhibit No. 18" for iden- 
tification and is as follows: ) 

Exhibit 18 

[I'araiihrase of telegram from American Ambassador in Moscow to Department of StateJ 

Moscow, April 28, 19^3. 

SKCBErrAKY OF STATE, 

Washington. 
For thk Tuksidknt and thk SKCiuorAUY — Stx^Hicr. 
In my conversation \vitli IMolotov wliifli took pliK'o at ."> o'clock on the clay 
prior to tiio rect'iii't of the I'resident's message to Stalin. I want you to know 
that I requested him very earnestly during almost an hour to hold up publi- 
cation of the Polish note until after the I'resident could reply to Stalin's uies- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2067 

sage. The President had been absent from Washington, I exphiined, and I 
expressed the earnest hope that if pul^Iication could be dehiyed for even two 
or three days so that the President could communicate with Stalin, this might 
have an important bearing on the unfortunate developments. However. INIolo- 
tov was as intransigent as I am informed he had been earlier with the British 
Ambassador. Later I learned that the note bad been read at about the^same 
time to the Chiefs of Mission in Kuibyshev and had been released to the 
press. 

I realize now that intercession on my part or on the part of the British Am- 
bassador could not have helped, since the Kremlin policy was set before my 
interview with Molotov. It would seem, from what I can gather here, that 
hopes for reconciliation were apparently destroyed with the publication today 
in Izvcstiya of an article by Wanda Wasilevskaya, the so-called chairman of 
the Union of Polish Patriots, editor of Wohia Polska and incidentally the 
wife allegedly of Kornechuk who was recently appointed Vice Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs. "The Polish Patriots are against the (lovernment of General 
Sikorski" was the title of this article, which held strongly that the Polish 
Government in London, a left-over from Rydzsmigly's "Government of Poland's 
September defeat," was not chosen by the I'olisli people, did not represent them, 
and is presently controlled by Hitlerite elements. The Army leadership under 
General Anders is accused of anti-Semetism, Chauvanism, anti-Sovietism, and 
even cowardice for "refusing to fight and withdrawing its forces from the Soviet 
Union." The diplomatic representation in the Soviet Union of the Sikorski 
Government are accused of robbing the Polish exiles of both supi)lies and money r 
and the links of the Polish Government with Berlin are said to be as clear as 
its imperialistic intentions toward Soviet territories. The article concludes 
that the Polish Patriots Union has asked for the organization in the Soviet Union 
of Polish imits "which would proceed to the front to fight shoulder to shoulder 
with the Red Army rather than sitting for moutlis in tents." A fuller summary 
of the article is being telegraphed. 

It may be noteworthy that whereas at first the foreign corre.spondents here 
had to use the phrase "suspension of relations." later Soviet censors allowed 
them to call the development a "break" or "rupture" in relations. However, it 
is the con.sensus here that the article mentioned above has now closed the door 
definitely to any rapi>roachment between Moscow and the present Polish 
Government. 

Standley. 

Mr. MiTCHELi.,. Do you acknowledge having sent that telegram? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee what went on 
at this time ^ It is evident from this telegram that the breaking off 
of relations had a more important meaning behind it since it looks like 
they were trying to form another Polish Government. Could you 
explain that to tlie committee, please? 

Admiral Standley. I think that that could be explained by what 
actually happened, because when these relations were broken off, the 
Russian Government set up a Polish representative government in 
Moscow. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Plans for setting up that kind of government just 
do not happen overnight. Where did they find this Wanda Wasilew- 
ska and where did they find these other people ? 

In other words, this thing must have been planned long before they 
even broke diplomatic relations with the real Government of Poland. 
Do you not feel that way : That they must have been planning for it 
for quite some time, otherwise how would they have all these people 
ready ? 

Admiral Standley. You know, hindsight is one thing and foresight 
is another. You are asking me what I thought at that time. At that 
time I did not have the belief or feeling that the rupture was 
imperative. 



2068 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. But now, subsequent developments convince you, do 
they not, Admiral, that this thing was planned long beforehand? 

Admiral Standley. At the present time, with hindsight, I would 
say "yes" ; there is not any question but that that was the plan. 

Cltairman Madden. Admiral, I will present to you exhibit 19, 
headed, "Paraphrase of telegram, Moscow, April 28, 1943," addressed 
to tlie Secretary of State at Washington, signed by "Standley," and 
I will ask counsel to have you identify it. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 19" for identifica- 
tion and is as follows :) 

Exhibit 19 

[Paraphrase of telegram, from American Ambassador in Moscow to United States State 

Department] 

Moscow, April 28, W.'/S. 
Secretary of State, 

WasJiivffton: 

Accordinff to many qualified oliservers here, there may be formed in the near 
future on Soviet soil a '"Free Polish Government" which would hold that it alone 
represented the real Polish people in Poland occupied by Germany and not the 
"reactiimary" emigree Polish circles abroad. This "Free Polish Government" 
would be an offspring of the Union of Polish Patriots and as such a satellite of the 
Soviet Government. I am not convinced that these observers are right although 
it is quite possible they may be. In the lirst place, I doubt whether the realisti<' 
Kremlin has forgotten its unsuccessful attempt at the b^uinning of the Finnish 
War prematui'ely to publicize and organize the Terioki Government. Jn the 
secofid place, there do not appear to be any Polisli leaders here who irould hare 
sufficient stature to make siteh a (jovernntent popular. It would appear more 
likely tliat there will be formed here an organization similar to the French 
National Committee in London. We should in any event be prepared, I think, for 
some move of this sort whether it be in the form of a conunittee or of a Free 
Polish Government, and we should realize that an organization of this kind on 
Soviet soil must be completely under Soviet domination. In addition, a develop- 
ment of this kind is possible in the case of any Slavic or bordering country outside 
the 1041 Soviet fi-ontiers whi<-h does not agree to the policy of the Soviet Union. 

Within tlie Soviet Union can be found the nucleus of any European Government 
and especially of those governments in which the Soviet Union has strategic or 
geographic interests. 

We may, it seems to me, be faced with a reversal in European history. To 
protect itself from the influences of P.olshevism, Western Europe in 1918 at- 
tempted to set up a cordon sanitaire. The Kremlin, in order to protect itself 
from the influences of the west, might now envisage the formation of a belt of 
pro-Soviet states. 

(Signed) Standley. 

Mr. MrrciiELT.. Admiral Standley, this message, is dated April 28, 
194e3. Do you recall having sent that? 

Admiral Standeey. I recall having made that rather military esti- 
mate of the situation; yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, I want to compliment you. I think 
you were very prophetic in your statement there. I think the facts 
proved to be exactly as you prophesied at that time. 

Admiral Standeey. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MrrciJEEL. Now, Achniral, could you briefly sununarize the rest 
of your tour of duly in INIoscow and apjiioximately the time that you 
were sncceeded in the position, and by whom? 

Adinii-al St-andeev. I would like to give you in summary, give the 
committee, soi-t of a ])icture ol" what happened there when the German 
broadcast claimed the finding of these 10,000 Polish ofUcers in the 
Katyn Forest near Smolensk. 



THE KATITST FOREST MASSACRE 2069 

Mr. Mitchell. Please do. 

Admiral Staxdlet. Two days after this, radio Moscow broadcast 
an indignant denial of the Nazi charge. "At last," it said, "these new 
German lies reveal the fate of the Polish officers whom the Germans 
used for constructive work in the Smolensk area." 

The next day, Tass explained that these Polish prisoners had been 
captured alive by the Germans during the Red Army retreat from 
Smolensk in the summer of 1941, and information which combined the 
efforts of the British. American, and Polish Governments has been 
unsuccessful in extracting from the Soviet GoA'ernment until that day. 
The Poles were wild. They knew that many of their officers had been 
removed from the three prison camps in April 1940. If the Soviet 
Government knew that they had been captured by the Germans in 
1941, why had the Russians let the Poles hunt and hope for almost 2 
years ? 

Ambassador Romer urged caution. The Polish Government in 
London proceeded cautiously. 

On April 17, the Polish Cabinet issued a statement, of which I 
obtained a rather poor translation. If you will bear with me, I will 
read that rather short statement : 

There is no Pole who is not deeply shocked by the information loudly pro- 
claimed by German propaganda of the discovery near Smolensk of the huge 
graves filled with corpses of massacred Polish officers missing in the U. S. S. R. 
and about their execution. At the same time, the Polish Government, in the name 
of the Polish nation, refuses to permit the Germans to promote discord among 
the United Nations by shifting that crime in self-defense to the Russians. The 
hjiiocritical indignation of the German propaganda will not conceal from the 
world the cruel crimes committed by the Nazis against the Polish nation. 

Then that statement went on into a list of a long series of crimes, 
and so forth. 

Now, that was the attitude that was presented to us over there, 
and the committee should realize that sitting over there we were rather 
also behind the iron curtain and we did not know very much about 
what was going on except in messages we got that came through from 
the State Department. We had no general news, no general broadcast, 
or anything of that kind. So we were in a way sort of blanketed, too. 
And many of these things that possibly happened on the outside, we 
had no way of knowing. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, j^ou mentioned there that the Russians 
suddenly announced the fact that these Polish officers were taken 
prisoners by the Germans and killed bj^ them. I am going to ask you 
a question. 

In the course of your various talks with Molotov, Stalin, and others, 
did they at any time give you any inference that these Polish officers 
became prisoners of the Germans ? 

Admiral Standlet. No, not the slightest. I never received any 
information as to the location or disposition of these Polish officers. 

Mr. Machrowicz. The first time the story came out that they were 
taken prisoners by the Germans was after German discovery of the 
graves; is that not correct? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, sir. 

And let me give you this instance. While I was being briefed in 
Washington, a lady came in and she said, "I am the wife of an officer 
who was taken out of Poland by the Russians, and I have not heard 



2070 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

from him. Tliey tell me lie is dead. I don't believe he is dead. lam 
jtriviii*^ you this letter to present to this officer when you hnd him,'' 

I took the letter with, of course, rather a hopeless feelino;. And a 
year and a half later, or a year later, I was informed that a civilian 
wanted to see me. When he came in and I asked him his name, he 
^ave me his name, and I reached down into' the di'awer and pidled out 
this letter from his wife and handed it to him. 

This man was a doctor. 1 think he was from Lithnania. Tie had 
been taken prisoner and he had been sent to prison u}) in Siberia, and 
they had an outbreak there of some sort and they released this doctor 
in order for him to aid the sick and disabled. And as a result of his 
efficient work, they released him, and he came into my office on his way 
home. I tried to ^et him to tell me about his story and I <2;ot nothing- 
out of him. lie refused to talk, to say anything. But I asked him if 
there were any Polish officers in this camp, and he said, "No, there 
were none." 

That was really the only positive information I <>ot. 

In connection with that investigation — this I am telling you is in- 
formation that came to me there — the liussians held an investigation 
of this murder case when they took over Smolensk again on the way 
back, and they invited various people down there. 

Now, two newspapermen, William W. N. White and Lauterbach, 
the men who were over there with Eric Johnston, were invited down 
there. Mr. White was rather anti-Connnunist and said that the testi- 
mony given there would not convince a British or an American jury. 

Mr. Lauterbach, on the other hand, who had received quite a few 
favors from the communistic government, said that the testimony 
given there was all convincing that the Germans did the work. 

C^hairman ISIadden. Mr. Dondero. 

Mr. DoxDERO. Achniral, at that time, did Mr. Ilarriman's daughter 
also go with that grouj) to see the graves ? 

Admiral Standley. I have been informed that she did. 

Mr. Mitchell. You were not stationed there at the time ; were you ? 

Admiral Standley. I was not there at the time ; no. 

As a final summing up, as my summation there — -well, I will give 
you this information. It may be of use. You might say it is hearsay. 

But last week, in Coronado, the admiral who was my naval attache 
in Moscow at the time we were discussing this very problem — I had 
then received the letter from the connnittee — stated to me at that time 
that it was the impression of the people in INIoscow that the Kussians 
had committed those nuirders. That was at the time the Katyn Forest 
broke. So, finally, when I left there, I had this question in my mind. 

I stated in regard to this, in summing up, that there were a few 
questions that remained unanswered. 

First, if the Polish officers were captured alive by the Germans in 
December of 11)41, why were not the 1^)1 ish officials told at once ? Why 
was the cpiest of the Polish military authorities foi- theii- lost officers 
allowed to continue for over '2 years ^ Would the uniforms and boots 
be in such excellent condition after 2 years in Russian prison camps? 
Why were there so many letters and documents dated February and 
March 11)40, and only a few dated in 1941? Why were the news dis- 
patches from Moscow so peculiarly censored by Narkomandil — that is 
the censorshi]) — that all the corres[)ondents' doubts of German guilt 
wei-e eliminated from the dispatches? 



THE KAT^-N FOREST MASSACRE 2071 

Those were my last reactions to this Katyn Forest murder. 
Mr. DoxDERO. I might say to you, Admiral, that one statement does 
not quite agree with the evidence we received in Europe. The last 
date of any letter or post card or newspaper found on the bodies of 
these men was May 1, 1940. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Admiral, your suspicions have been verified because 
this connnittee, after making a thorough investigation, has come to 
the uiumimous conclusion that there is not one iota of evidence any- 
where to prove that anybody but the Russians did it. 
Admiral Standley. I was just going to add one other thing. 
The testimony I have given is from the best of my recollection and 
taken from extracts from an article I have written in the Naval Insti- 
tute. These notes were taken from stenographic notes made at the 
time of the interview. 

For instance, I would go to see Mr. Stalin. I would come back and 
sit down innnediatelv and make stenographic notes of my interview. 
The information I got and have given you here is from those steno- 
graphic notes. And, of course, they are only extracts. The notes are 
complete and I have them for reference if anybody wants to use them. 
kSo, as I say, in addition, I have made a complete report. I have 
written a story, and a mainiscrii)t is completed of my entire regime in 
Moscow. Maybe it will be published, maybe not ; I don't know. But 
the complete story of Mr. Willkie is in that. So if anybody wants to 
read it, get my booii. 

And as I sum up these remarks, I conclude with this : There is a 
lesson. Let my fellow citizens beware that they never be caught like 
the Poles, between the upper and the nether millstones. 
Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman Madden. Do you have any questions, Mr. Sheehan? 
Mr. Sheehan. No questions. 
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski ? 

Mr. O'Konski. You were there. Admiral, when the graves were 
discovered by the Germans; were you not? 
Admiral Standlet. Yes. 

Mr. O'Konski. You were there when the Soviet Government broke 
relations with the Polish Government; were you? 
Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. O'Konski. That was a very critical time, and it involved, 
evidently, the murder of somewhere between ten and fifteen thousand 
Polish officers. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. O'Konski. Now, Admiral, was there any honest effort by your 
superiors here in Washington to hnd out who really was guilty of 
this massacre by asking you, or was there, in your opinion, an obvious 
attempt to hush it up because it was too hot to handle and to lav hands 
off? 

Admiral Standley. The reasons back of no request — I could not 
even offer a suggestion — but I received no intimation that I would look 
for that. 

Mr. O'Konski. How long were you there after the graves were 
discovered? 

Admiral Standley. That Mas in April, and I left there in October 
1943. That is about 7 months. 



2072 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you were our representative there, our highest 
representative there? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Durin<>: all that time you received no communication 
whatever from your superiors in Wasliington askino; you to send some 
kind of report to find out which side is telling the truth ; no attempt 
whatever was made to ask you? 

Admiral Standley. None whatever. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did not that seem rather strange to you? 

Admiral Standley. No, because the situation was so turbulent other- 
wise that I would feel that any effort of our Government to inject 
themselves into it would just muddy the water so nuich more. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, at that time, your impression is 
that, from the standpoint of your superiors, Soviet friendship, even 
if they were criminals, meant more to them than finding out who 
murdered 15,000 Polish officers? 

Admiral Standley. I think that is somewhat true. But take this 
situation : The way we felt there, when Mr. Homer left, taking his 
departure, the British Ambassador and myself went to the depot to 
see him off and presented going-away presents to Mr. Romer as in- 
dicating where our sympathies lay. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did you leave the service voluntarily. Admiral ; that 
is, that particular post at Moscow? 

Admiral Standley. Yes; and then again, no. Do you mean leave 
the Ambassador service? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In Moscow ; yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. I submitted my resignation. The last 
words I said to the President -when I left, going back, as I left the door 
in the White House, I said, "Mr. President, you got your fingers 
burned with Mr. Willkie ; don't do it again." 

And when I got word that Mr. Joe Davies was coming in with a 
secret letter which I was not to know about, I sent in my resignation, 
and it was accepted in October. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. The reason I ask that is that the history of ambas- 
sadors at that time was that those that evidently knew what was 
going on, ])articular]y Governor Earle and Bliss Lane and a few 
others, did not last very long; and I wondered if you went the way of 
all those who knew what was going on at that time. 

So, I am glad to hear it was the way it was. 

Admiral Standley. No. I submitted my resignation. 

If you recall, there was an upheaval there in my relations with the 
Russians when I made the announcement to the press that tlie Russians 
wei-e not informing their ]:)eople as to the receij^t of Red Cross relief 
supi)]ios and lend-lease su])plies. Tliat created an ujihoaval, and I 
think the ])ress in the United States and I think Mr. Sumner Welles, 
wlio was i)i'()bal)ly here, thought 1 should be relieved at once. 

Mr. O'KoNSKT. In regard to the lend-lease negotiation, here we were 
giving Russia billions of dollars' Avorth of land-lease, and do you 
know if an effort on our part was made, by our representatives in Gov- 
ernment, to use that more or less as a weapon to get the Russians to 
treat the Poles a little more kindly rather than just having our Presi- 
dent say "Well, if you don't want the Poles in Russia, let me know, 
we will take care of thenr'? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2073 

Admiral Standlby. No. As far as I know, that effort was not in 
evidence. 

You see, I was there with the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission, who 
forced the lend-lease on them. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. They forced it on them? 

Admiral Standley. We practically forced it on them ; yes, sir. 

Then they received the lend-lease and we were giving them the lend- 
lease in an effort to further the war effort. As far as I knew, it did 
not have anything to do with the Polish situation. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were not very anxious to take it; were they? 
What do you mean when you say "we practically forced it on them?" 

Admiral Standley. Their attitude was one of rather not wanting 
to accept help from the outside. They had four meetings with them. 
In the first meeting, they went in and they came back, and Mr. Harri- 
man and Mr. Beaverbrook said: "I wish we would have had the 
agreement ready for them to sign, and I think he would have signed 
last night." 

They had another meeting with Mr. Stalin and said : "Oh, my God ; 
we don't know what we are going to do now. We don't know what to 
give him to get him to agree." 

The third night they came back and said : "Get your papers ready. 
It is all over. We are going to sign the agreement the next morning." 
And this was done. 

We left in a gale of wind on Saturday. No pilot in our country 
would take to the air in those conditions, but we went out. Every- 
body got airsick. It was a terrible storm. The reason for it — and 
the reason, as we realized afterward, that Mr. Stalin agreed to take 
lend-lease and got rid of us — was the fact that the Germans had 
started their attack on Moscow 2 days before, and he wanted to get 
us out of there in order to avoid the embarrassment of having us 
stranded. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, they played like the bride, hard to 
get, because they knew they would get more ? 

Admiral Standley. Maybe that was it. But I think their desire 
to get us out in a hurry was the reason Stalin finally agreed. 

Mr. Sheehan. Admiral, in your reference to Mr, Willkie and Mr. 
Davies, apparently there were many instances when the President by- 
passed you as Ambassador to get to other people in Russia, 

Admiral Standley. That is right. 

Mr. Sheehan. And they never let you know what was happening? 

Admiral Standley. Some parts. The secret letter Mr. Davies 
brought over, Mr. Davies told me that the President felt it would 
be better if I was not there when he presented the letter. And I not 
only did not see the letter to know what was in it, but I was not there 
to see when the letter was presented to Mr. Stalin. 

And the telegi^ams you just read here, is the first time I have ever 
seen those telegrams, which Mr. Stalin sent to Mr. Eoosevelt and 
Roosevelt sent to Stalin, showing you how I sat in the dark behind 
the iron curtain. 

Mr. Sheehan. Only, of course, I realize that both Mr. Willkie and 
Mr. Roosevelt had a lot in common, both being the so-called barefoot 
Wall Street lawyers. It would seem to me that as a Republican, 
we have been screaming for the last 20 years about Government by 
cronj, and I think we have had also international diplomacy by 



2074 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

crony, from tlie looks of things, where individuals worked for the 
President, reported to him. and the rest, even the State Department 
many times did not knoAV what was going on. 

Mr. Machkowicz. Mr. Sheehan. do you want to add Mr. John 
Foster Dulles to that group ? 

Mr. Sheehan. Yes. 

Mr. MACHROwrcz. Would both of you gentlemen? 

Mr. Sheehan. You must remember all this time Poland was an 
ally of ours. We were supposed to be. fighting for them. Jimmy 
Byrnes points out that when he was at Yalta. Mr. Roosevelt, instead 
of being an advocate for the Polish cause was an arbiter, trying to 
settle the dispute by giving away what we had little right to give. 

Mr. DoNDERO. I would like to suggest to the chairman that it is 
past noon. 

Chairman Madden. Is there anything further? 

Now, Admiral, on behalf of the committee, we want to thank you 
for coming here today. You came a long way to testify, and your 
testimony has certainly been very valuable to this committee. Since 
it has be^n in operation over a year, this committee has been trying 
its best to bring out all the facts regarding the Katyn massacre and 
some of the incidents leading thereto. Your testimony has been 
highly valuable, and we wish to thank you for your inconvenience 
in coming here to testify. 

Admiral Standi^ey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Madden. We are, unfortunately, a little behind our 
schedule. 

Ambassador Welles, could you be here at 1 : 30? 

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman INIadden. Thank you. 

Ambassador Welles will go on at 1 : 30 as the next witness. 

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m., 
this same day.) 

AFTER RECESS 

Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to make this announcement for the information of 
some of the news reporters. Last summer, before the committee filed 
its interim re])ort on the first phase of the Katyn hearings, we set 
ui> in our re])ort the following. 

The first ])haso of tlie Katyn hearings was to establish the guilt of 
tlie nation resj)()nsible f(n" the massacre, and the second pliase was 
primarily to comi)]ete testimony regarding the facts and circumstances 
leading up to and concerning the disa})pearance of certain reports, 
documents regarding the Katyn massacre. I will set that out by 
I'cading the two ])araa'rn]ihs as they were ])i'inted in our interim 
repoi't, to wit : 

Fully awiire llicu that this was the first neutral committee ever otficially au- 
(liorized by any finverunieut to iuvestiiiate llie Katyn massacre, tliis eoiMiuiUee 
divided its investigation into two pliases : 

(1) Assemltle evidence which would detcrniini' (he suilt of the country re- 
si(onsil)le for the mass murder of these I'olish Army officers and intellectuals; 
in the Katyn Forest. 

(2) Kstahlish wliy the Katyn massacre with all of its ramihcatioiis never was; 
ad<M|ualely revealed to the Ameiican people and to tlie rest of the world. Tlie 
(•(Uiniiittce likewise included in lliis jiliasc an dfort to deteniiiuc wh> this cr!iuc 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2075 

was not adjudicated iu the Nuremburg trials — where it should have been settled 
in the first instance if the Germans were guilty. 

Now, the reason for this second phase is that when our resohition 
was authorized by Congress, a great number of the Members of our 
Congress inquired as to whether or not the committee would go into 
the phase of the hearings as is set out in part two of our investigation. 
That is the reason for the hearings tliis week. 

I will ask ^Ir. Sumner Welles to take the stand, please. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER 
SECRETARY OF STATE, OXON HILL, MD. 

Chairman Madden. Will you be sworn, please. Do you solenmly 
swear that the testimony you are about to give the committee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Welles. I do. 

Chairman Madden. Sit down, Mr. Welles, please. Will you state 
your name. 

Mr. Welles. Sumner Welles. 
Chairman Madden. And your address ? 
Mr. Welles. Oxon Hill, Md. 
Chairman Madden. And your present capacity? 
Mr. Welles. Author, writer. 

Chairman Madden. You are a former ^Vmbassador and Under 
Secretary ? 

Mr. Welles. I am a former Ambassador to Cuba, and later As- 
sistant Secretary of State and then Under Secretary of State from 
May 1937 until the latter part of the summer of 1943. 
Chairman JNIadden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel. 
Mr. INIiTciiELL. Mr. Welles, when did you first enter the diplomatic 
service of the United States ? 
Mr. Welles. In 1915. 

Mr. Mitchell. You have held successive posts all over the world; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Welles. That is right. 

]\Ir. Mitchell. You became Under Secretary of State on what day ? 
Mr. Welles. I think it was May 26, 1937. 

Mr. IMiTciiELL. And you remained in that position how long, sir? 
Mr. Welles, Until July 1943. 
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do after July 1943 ? 
Mr. Welles. I then wrote a column for the newspapers and wrote 
several books. 

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, from July 1943 until the present 
time, you have been an author? 
Mr. Welles. In private life, yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Were you present in the hearing room this morning 
when Admiral Standley, former Ambassador, testified ? 
Mr. Welles. I was. 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. You heard all of the exhibits that were read into 
the record at that time of the communications that went back and 
forth between Washington and Moscow at that time ? 
Mr. Welles. I did. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce this document as exhibit 20. 



2076 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



Chairman Madden. This document will be marked "Exhibit No. 
20." It is a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to the Presideiit of the 
United States, 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20" a^ , joii,^ 

Exhibit 20 — Letter From Under Secretary Sumner Welles to • '' > . 

Roosevelt 










•1-1 a ' ' 



.1.0 . fil t % 




'l^.a Wilts House. 



LEnclosure No. 1 to Exhibit 120] 




THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2079 

of Polieh forces, particularly to Iran or to the Middle East, I think 

(Jpv.prni «^\'orski became as disconsolate as Dr. Benes must have been 

JNow , . onths of his life since he made the same attempt without 

was i\v .' " 11- 

C^- . ,,,4^fer in that connection to a message that was read this 
morning which I myself have not previously seen. It was a message 
addressed by President Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin. I think the refer- 
ence in that message, if I may dare to interpret, that President Roose- 
velt made to Sikorski's attempt with regard to the Katyn massacre 
was not that it showed lack of common sense in its objective but m 
its method. 

It seems to me that what the President deplored was the fact that 
General Sikorski had not taken him or Prime Minister Churchill 
into consultation before taking the step w^hich otherwise would seem 
to be altogether well-advised. At that time there was no League of 
Nations ; there was no United Nations. 

There was no international body of any kind except the International 
Red Cross that could be regarded as respectable, impartial, and inter- 
national in its character ; and it seemed to me that General Sikorski's 
idea was altogether well taken. However, what the President re- 
gretted was that what had been taken precipitously was without prior 
consultation with the other two govermnents that had been working 
so closely with him to better the relations between the Soviet Gov- 
ernment and the Polish Government in exile. 

Mr. Mitchell. Do you care to proceed ? 

Mr. Machrowitz. In connection with that, may I ask a question, 
Mr, Welles. Would you consider that the action, whether it was 
ill-advised or not, was such an action that would justify the severing 
of relations between Poland and Russia ? 

Mr. Welles. Decidedly not. And it seems to me that the point 
that was brought out in the testimony this morning is altogether 
sound, that is, that that step was merely a pretext for a policy that had 
been determined upon some time before. 

Mr. DoNDERO, Mr. Welles, may I just add my view as to what the 
chairman said. "Wliat we want to know from you as Under Secretary 
of State of this Nation is what you know took place in regard to the 
Katyn massacre from 1939 up until 1943. That is the point. 

Mr. Welles. Unfortunately, without having refreshed my memory 
by going all through the memoranda that are on file in the Department 
of State and some of which I had hoped to see this morning, it would 
be quite impossible for me to go into it in any detailed way. There is 
very little I can add to what has been brought out this morning. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the 
position taken this morning with reference to this development of 
the breaking of the Polish-Russian relationship was of long standing? 
Did you say that position was unsound ? 

Mr. Welles. No ; I said quite the contrary, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Sheehan. That it was sound? 

Mr, Welles. What I said was that what was brought out this 
morning seemed to he entirely correct, that the severance of relations 
on the basis of the attempt of the Polish Government to get the Inter- 
national Red Cross to make a survey and an investigation was merely 
a pretext for a policy that had already been determined upon by the 
Soviet Government some time before. 



2080 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr, Welles, would you say that if General Si- 
korski had consiilted the United States Government at the time, the 
United States Government would have agreed to the request for an 
investigation by the International Red Cross ? 

Mr. Welles. I am quite certain that the President would have re- 
garded it sympathetically, and insofar as I myself was concerned I 
most certainly would have urged it. 

Mr. Maohrowicz. Do you feel that the British Government would 
have done so ? 

Mr. Welles. I am quite sure of it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Then what harm was there done in making that 
request ? 

Mr. Welles. Simply that it afforded the Soviet Government the 
opportunity for breaking relations, which otherwise could conceivably 
have been averted for at least a while. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You just stated that they had planned severing 
relations anyway sooner or later. It was just a question of finding 
some pretext. 

Mr. Welles. I said that that had been brought out clearly this 
morning, but unfortunately we were not aware of that at the time. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Welles, you mentioned the assassination 
of General Sikorski. Could you elaborate on that somewhat? 

Mr. Welles. I have always believed that there was sabotage. You 
will remember, Mr. Chairman, that he was brought down in the plane 
just as he was taking off from Gibraltar. The plane crashed. There 
had been two or three incidents of that kind before. I remember that 
when General Sikorski came to the United States the year before, his 
plane, in taking off from Montreal, had crashed when it was only 
about 100 feet above the ground. 

To put it mildly, it would seem to be a coincidence. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was it not generally conceded that both Molotov 
and Stalin had certain commitments that they had made to General 
Sikorski and that they knew that if he were out of the way they could 
jDossibly get around them? 

Mr. Welles. I don't know whether it is generally conceded or not, 
but it is certainly conceivable. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Secretary, in your position in the State Depart- 
ment, were you informed of the fact from various of our Ambassadors 
that Russia was contemplating this breaking off of Polish relations? 

Mr. Welles. Not that I recall ; no. 

Mr. Sheeiian. On May 2, 1943, there was a telegram to the Secre- 
tary of State from Ambassador Winant in London, who ])ointed out 
that as early as January 16, 1943, when Russia declared all Poles to 
be Russian citizens, that was the beginning of this break-off. The 
Ambassador in London wired on April 21, 1943, pointing out that the 
British Foreign Office felt all the time that this was motivated by Rus- 
sian desires to reinforce and give expression to her territorial 
expansion. 

In other words, our Ambassador sends information in. Who does 
it go to ? Who follows through on it ? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2081 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly we all of us realized that 
the situation was deteriorating rapidly, but an innnediate break of 
relations of that character w^as not evident. 

Mr. Sheehan. Well, it seemed to our Ambassadors and our military 
attaches, who were sending in information to the Secretary of State 
and to the Under Secretary, that these things should be called to your 
attention because the mere fact that Russia was going to break off rela- 
tions with one of our allies, Poland, was not a small matter. That was 
quite a significant matter, 

Mr. Welles. We were doing everything in our power to avert it. 
I was aware of that. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, when did the item of the Katyn massacre 
first come to the attention of the State Department, if you can recall? 

Mr. Welles. There again, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that I 
would have to refresh my memory by looking at the files ; and I have 
not been given that opportunity. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Can you fix it reasonably as to year or month? 

Mr. Welles. Well, I think that what was brought out this morning, 
Mr. Congressman, by Admiral Standley makes that very clear. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. When this atrocity was announced to the world first 
by the Germans, was there any concern in the State Department to 
have liaison, for instance, with G-2 of our military service and other 
branches of the service that could get some information on it ? Was 
there any honest effort on the part of the State Department to pin 
the responsibility of the crime, or was the policy one of being fearful 
that it might further antagonize the Russians and that we had better 
not take the chance ? 

Mr. Welles. No ; I don't think that was the case. I think that at 
the beginning we were rather definitely confused as to the responsi- 
bility for the crime. Certainly there is nothing in the history of the 
Nazi government nor of the Nazi authorities which would have put it 
beyond them to undertake such a massacre because I must remind 
you that the facts came out very slowly and that by the time I had 
left the Department of State — and I have forgotten whether that was 
late July or early August 19-i3 — very little had yet leaked out. 

Mr. O'KoNSKL Did the State Department, to your knowledge, send 
any request to neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden and 
Spain, and we had connections with the Vatican? They had infor- 
mation on this. Was any attempt made by your Department to get 
information from them on this massacre ? After all, they were neutral 
countries. 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that such an effort was made 
as sOon as the facts began to become more evident. 

Chairman Madden. I have here a document dated June 24, 1942, 
signed by Sumner Welles to General Watson. I will ask the counsel 
to submit this to the witness so that he can identify it. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, you might point out that that is a 
photostated copy, and Mr. Welles' signature is not on this copy. 

Chairman Madden". It speaks for itself. It is a photostat. Mark 
this document as exhibit 21 and the counsel will please read it to the 
committee. 



2082 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 
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2084 



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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



2085 




2086 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr, MiTCETELU Mr. Chairman, this letter is dated June 24, 1942, and 
states : 

My Dear General Watson : There are enclosed herewith copies of Mr. Biddle's 
strictly confidential dispatches, Nos. 158, June 2, 1942, and 159, June 2, 1942, 
which were marked for the President. 

The dispatches are concerned with conversations which took place in May 
between Ambassador Biddle and General Sikorski regarding, respectively, miss- 
ing Polish officers in Russia and the evacuation of Polish children from Russia. 
Sincerely yours, 

SuMNEE Welles. 

Enclosures : From Ambassador Biddle, Nos. 158 and 159 of June 2, 1942. 
Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, 
Secretary to the President, 

The White House. 

The attachment to that letter is as follows : 

Embassy of the United States of America, 
Near the Polish Oovemment, London, June 2, 1942. 
No. 158 
Subject: General Sikorski's conversation regarding missing Polish officers 

in Russia. 
For : The President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. 
The honorable the Seceetaey of State, 

Washington. 

Sir: Supplementing my dispatch Polish series No. 157, June 2, 1942, I have 
the honor to report that in recent conversation with General Sikorski he said, in 
effect, the following : 

Missinff officers. — In summer 1940 several thousands of Polish officers, prisoners 
of war, who were kept in three camps in central Russia (Ostashkov, Starobyelsk, 
Kozelsk) were taken to an unknown destination in the far north of Russia. Since 
then they have not been heard of. Their number has been variously described, 
but it is usually accepted as 8,300, one-third of whom are professional officers 
and two-thirds reserve officers. The latter are for the most part professional 
men, including about 800 physicians and many university professors and lec- 
turers as well as a number of distinguished specialists. 

The Polish military authorities have lists covering over 4,800 of these officers. 
These lists have been communicated to Stalin. The Soviet Government have 
many times been requested to release them. They invariably replied that every 
available prisoner of war in Russia had already been released. This statement 
is obviously inaccurate. There are reasons to believe that the officers in ques- 
tion have been deported to Franz Joseph Islands, north of Spitzbergen, and to 
northeastern Siberia to camps on the River Kolyma in the north of the Yakut 
Republic. It is more than probable that most of them have died of hunger, 
scorbut, and cold. 

If the supposition as to their places of imprisonment is correct, there are but 
2 months of summer when, for technical reasons, they could be brought back 
to Russia. Or, on the other hand, they could either be brought via the Kolyma 
River to Alaska or from Franz Joseph Islands to Iceland. The absence of 
these officers is the principal reason of the shortage of officers in the Polish 
forces in Russia, whither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The 
possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a 
severe blow to the Polish national life. Tlieir evacuation during the present 
summer seems to be the last chance to save those who may still be alive. 

In concluding his remarks, the General said that he felt confident that if in 
the course of pending conversations with the Russians in Washington our author- 
ities concerned were to express an interest in the above-mentioned problem, the 
Russians might act favorably in the matter. 
Respectfully yours, 

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 
(In quintuplicate.) 

Mr. Welles, do you acknowledge this document? 
Mr. Welles. I do. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2087 

Mr. Mitchell. This morning, Mr. Welles, Admiral Standley told 
us that he had never seen the dispatch from Moscow dated January 
1942. 

Mr. Welles. I think it was February. 

Mr. Mitchell. February 194:2, because he was en route to Moscow. 
Mr. Brown, of the Department of State, revealed that it did not reach 
the Department of State until April 1942. Now, from Moscow, 
through Admiral Standley later, and from London through Mr. Bid- 
die, come practically the same story to the Department of State regard- 
ing this. There are also the conversations that took place between 
Stalin, Vishinsky, Molotov, Beria, General Anders, Ambassador Kot, 
and General Sikorski about these missing officers. 

Now, our Department of State knew about all of these. There was 
no explanation for the missing officers. Could you elaborate on that? 

Mr. Welles. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, whether any attempt has 
been made to search the memoranda of conversations between the" 
Secretary of State and the several Soviet Ambassadors in Washington 
at that time or my own conversations ? I am very familiar, now that 
I have read this clocument, with all of the facts set forth, and I know 
that I have discussed them many times. 

Mr. Mitchell. No effort has been made because we didn't know 
about it. An effort will be made. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did we ask the State Department to surrender all of 
tlie documents on this case ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. Have they surrendered those documents referred to ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have not seen those documents. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. In answer to Mr. Welles' question, the answer 
should be made that we made a request of the Department of State to 
furnish all of the pertinent documents in connection with these mat- 
ters, and we have been furnished documents, and those you refer to 
have not been included. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. These are not memoranda of conversations between 
officials of the Soviet Union here in AVashington and Mr. Welles or 
others. We have not received any of those. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. I think Mr. Chairman, that while we are on that 
subject the representative of the Department of State should be asked 
if those documents are in their possession and if so why they have 
not been turned over. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Brown is in the hearing room. He has been 
sworn. Will you propound the question to him, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. DoNDERO. If he heard the question, why not let him answer it? 

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I did not hear the question. I was out 
of the room and just came back in. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Brown, the question is this: Mr. Welles has 
raised the question as to whether the committee has seen the memo- 
randa of record of conversations that transpired between himself, 
other State Department officials, and those of officials of the Rus- 
sian Embassy here in Washington. I stated that I have not seen these 
memoranda. The question is now : Are they available ? 

Mr. Brown. Mr. Mitchell, I frankly cannot answer that question. 
We asked for the files on everything connected with the subject matter, 
and I have not seen those documents. I will immediately call back and 
have a further search made. 

Were these on the subject of the Katyn massacre? 



2088 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. Missing Polish officers. Maybe Mr. Welles can 
identify them better. 

Mr. Welles. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman ? 

Chairman Madden. Proceed. 

Mr. Welles. There were a great many conversations, Mr. Brown, 
between the various Soviet Ambassadors and myself and between them 
and Mr. Hull. Very often they had to do mainly with complaints 
of the Soviet Union that they were not getting sufficient lend-lease or 
something of that kind. But very often in those conversations some 
reference would be made to other matters. That is the reason that 
1 think a search might be useful. 

I want to add this, which is of the utmost importance : The Presi- 
dent, unfortunately, very rarely had the habit of keeping memoranda 
of his conversations with foreign diplomats or visiting foreign states- 
men, and I have every reason to believe that this matter was taken 
up by him very frequently both with Mr. Litvinof and Mr. Molotov 
when he came. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you say that he had the habit or that he did 
not have the habit? 

Mr. Welles. He did not have the habit of keeping memoranda of 
conversations. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you recall, or can you to the best of your ability 
tell us, what transpired during your conversations relative to this 
subject, your conversations with those representatives? 

Mr. Welles. Well, whatever representations I made were entirely 
along the lines that were discussed this morning, that nothing could 
be worse for relations between the United Nations than for tliis de- 
teriorating situation between Poland and the Soviet Union to continue 
and that the interests of the United States in Poland were well known 
to the Soviet Government. I think certainly General Sikorski and 
the Polish Government in exile in London were very definitely of 
the opinion that the early steps that had been taken — and I am now 
speaking of the period before 1942 — to release divisions of Polish 
soldiers or refugees to go to Iran and other parts of the Middle East 
were due to the interests displayed by the United States. 

Mr. Mitchell. Throughout this testimony we have continually 
lieard that the Soviet officials never gave any kind of explanation 
for these missing Polish officers. The United States Government knew 
they were missing. The British knew they were missing. But no 
question w^as raised at the time of Katyn concerning the missing Polish 
officers. Rather it was looked at as a German atrocity, and as a Nazi 
atrocity. Can you explain why, with all of the background, and the 
wealth of material, and all of these conversations that they had, the 
Nazis were suspected rather than the Eussians when the Russians 
hadn't given any explanation? 

Mr. Welles. The crime perpetrated against Poland was perpetrated 
by two great })owers, Germany and Russia. I don't think that we felt 
that there was any distinction between the two of thorn insofar as the 
kind of atrocities that they perpetrated were involved ; and there was 
nothing, in my judgment, at the outset to indicate that these particular 
officers referred to in that dispatch from Ambassador Biddle were the 
same who were later found to be massacred at Katyn. I think it took 
some time for the facts to be assembled and for the testimony to become 
conclusive. 



■ THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2089 

Mr. Mitchell. That is true, but the Germans formed an interna- 
tional medical commission which went in there and found documents 
on these bodies which proved that they had been in those graves in 
the spring of 1940, April and May 1940. 

Mr. Welles. I don't think we had very much 

Mr. Mitchell. That was made available to the entire world on 
April 30, 1943, after they had left Smolensk. 

Mr. Welles. I don't think that in the spring of 1943 we had very 
much reason to put faith in the truth of anything that the Nazi Gov- 
ernment put out. 

Mr. Mitchell. This was signed by Dr. Naville, a Swiss neutral. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. What reason was there why we should have put 
faith in what the Russians said? 

Mr. Welles. I beg pardon ? 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. What reason was there to put faith in what the 
Russians said and did? 

Mr. Welles. At that particular time, of course, we were fighting 
on the side that the Russians were fighting on. We were making every 
effort to have a joint war effort. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did not you people in the State Department know 
that already Russia had never kept a commitment, had never kept an 
agreement, had violated every treaty of aggression that they had ever 
had? Did not you people know that? In other words, you people 
are always willing, which is all right, to throw the responsibility to 
the Germans, which they deserve, and to say that because they were 
so vicious they must have been guilty, and that it is hard to conceive 
that the Russians could do it when anybody who knows anything 
about the world situation and Communist history knows that their 
record was just as bad as that of Hitler. But you are willing to accept 
one at face value and not the other. 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the Congressman that 
two gentlemen who are certainly not Communists, namely, Mr. Win- 
ston Churchill in the House of Commons, and Admiral William D. 
Leahy, have both publicly stated in writing that during the war and 
up to that time the Soviet Government had meticulously kept its 
agreements. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I don't think this committee is going to give too 
much credence to what Mr. Churchill said. There are a lot of things 
that he said that this committee does not take much cognizance of. 

Mr. Welles. We were under that impression at that particular mo- 
ment and hoped that it might turn out that way. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for the members of 
our committee and for the press : Too frequently they think that our 
committee is interested only in the fact that the Katyn murder of 
officers had something to do with the Polish question. I might point 
out that I understand a telegram will be read into the record a little 
later which points out that the British Foreign Office was also very 
interested in the disappearance of the Polish officers because, in a tele- 
gram which was sent to the Secretary of State, our Ambassador 
pointed out the fact and emphasized the fact that not only are the 
Polish armed forces in this country, meaning those in England, 
affected by a continuation of tlie present Russian attitude, but the 
Polish troops in the Middle East, totaling over 100,000 soldiers who 
were fully equipped and who would prove to be a valuable armed 
force, are becoming dissatisfied. 



2090 THE KAT^TSr FOREST MASSACRE i 

In other words, England and the United States had a Polish Army 
ready and willing and able, but without officers. So, from our stand- 
point, not only were we interested in the Katyn massacre, but our 
allies were interested in getting officers to man soldiers for our armies. 
So everyone was cognizant that the State Department and the British 
Foreign Office were vitally interested in this matter in 1943. There- 
fore, I think you will agree that, as you stated, there were many con- 
versations on this matter because of the importance of more soldiers 
for the allied cause. Do you agree with that ? 

Mr. Welles. I agree entirely. I also think that our efforts in the 
earlier years to which I referred before did prove determining in get- 
ting out several divisions of Polish troops and officers and women and 
children. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, the Germans made known to the world 
the finding of these graves, and the 12 doctors signed this graveside 
protocol some time, I think, in May 1943. Did that come to the 
attention of the State Department? 

Mr. Welles. It undoubtedly must have come to the attention of the 
Department, Mr. Congi-essman. I can't specifically recall at this 
moment. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Welles, you stated, I believe, some time ago 
that there was no reason to doubt the good faith of our then ally, the 
Soviet Union. Was there any reason to doubt the good faith of our 
other faithful ally, the Polish Government, at the time? 
Mr. Welles. None whatever. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And the Department did have information from 
the Polish Government definitely indicating Kussian guilt for the 
Katyn massacre, did it not? 

Mr. Welles. I think it had later what I would call determining 
evidence. Now, whether that was available as early as the date that 
you fixed, Mr. Congressman, I do not remember. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you find anything in the attitude of the 
Polish Government officials which would indicate anything but a 
desire to settle their differences with Russia in an amicable manner? 

Mr. Welles. From beginning to end, Mr, Congressman, I found 
nothing but a consistent desire on the part of the Polish Government in 
exile and, I repeat, particularly on the part of General Sikorski, to 
find a way out of the impasse through negotiation. I think no man 
coukl liave done more than he did to that end. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Welles, looking now in retrospect, don't you 
think the whole difficulty was that our Government looked too much 
toward appeasing Soviet Russia as opposed probably to some of the 
firm steps recommended by people of the type of xVmbassador Stand- 
ley and others? AVould not a little more firmness probably have 
helped the situation at the time ? 

Mr. Welles. It is a very difficult thing to answer in the light of 
hindsight, Mr. Congressman. As I look at it today, I think you are* 
entirely correct. As we looked at it then, of course, the success of the 
war effort was the major effort; and I must remind the members of the 
committee that the one overshadowing fear on the part of our military 
authorities at that time was a separate peace on the part of the Soviet 
Government with Germany. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is the point I was driving at. In other words, 
]\Ir. Welles, the overshadowing thought and the governing policy of 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2091 

our leaders at that time was to go easy with respect to anything that 
might antagonize Kussia? The fact that there were 10,000 to 15,000 
officers involved didn't make any difference? If there had been 
100,000, 150,000, or 500,000, the policy would have been still the same? 
In other words, there was a general fear, unfounded, in my opinion, 
but in existence at that time that nothing must be done to antagonize 
good old Soviet Russia, so go easy on everything, no matter what 
ghastly crimes they commit and no matter how many treaties they 
violate and no matter how much they insult us ? We still have to go 
easy on them because we need them as an ally. Wasn't that really the 
governing policy ? 

Mr. Welles. No, I would not go nearly as far as that, Mr. Con- 
gressman ; but I think that all of us must agree that at that moment 
the overshadowing consideration was winning the war, and we had 
a mighty difficult time in establishing decent relations with the Soviet 
Union. 

If some of these memoranda do come to the committee, you will see 
that I sat in, I think, 40 conferences with the Soviet Ambassador to 
try to ease things over way back in 1939 and 1940 at the time when 
they were allied with Germany in order to prevent them from going 
too far. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, did it come to your attention or to the 
attention of your Department at that time that the Soviets or Russia 
at first refused or, I would say, discouraged any foreign aid from us 
and that lend-lease had to be forced upon them, as Admiral Standley 
testified ? 

Mr. Welles. I frankly was surprised by Admiral Standley's state- 
ment this morning because that had never been my impression. Of 
course, he was one of the early negotiators, and I was not ; but I can 
assure you that when they came to the point where they were receiv- 
ing lend-lease every request I got was for more and not for less. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In fact, it continued even after the war, did it not? 

Mr. Welles. ^Vliy, certainly. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at any time in your conversations with 
the President urge the recall of Mr. Standley because of the firmness of 
his position ? 

Mr. Welles. Well, Admiral Standley made that statement this 
morning. I think, frankly, it was unfortunate; that is, the remark 
that he made at that particular moment ; but I do not remember going 
nearly so far as he has in mind. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you tell us how far you did go ? 

Mr. Welles. I don't think I actually took any step in that direction, 
if I remember correctly. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Standley this morning stated 
something to the effect that Col. Henry Szymanski, who had been a 
military attache, I believe, in Cairo, was being thought of for the post 
of military attache in Moscow, and then, apparently at the last minute, 
the order was rescinded. Do you know anything about that? 

Mr. Welles. Nothing whatever. That would have been a matter, 
then, for the War Department, not for us. 

Mr. Sheehan. They determined that policy? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Pucinski, did you have some questions ? 



2092 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Yes, Mr. Chairman. May we introduce this docu- 
ment as exhibit 22 ? 

Chairman Madden. Exhibit 22 is a communication addressed by 
the Embassy of the United States to the Premier of the Polish Gov- 
ernment. This can be identified as exhibit 22. 

(The letter referred to, dated May 20, 1943, was marked "Exhbit 
No. 22," and follows:) 

Exhibit 22 — Report and Evidence Compiled by Poles Regarding Discovery at 
Katyn Forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Biddle 
on May 20, 1043 

Embassy of the 
United States of America, 
]:iear the Polish Qovernment, 

May 20, 1943. 
No. 316. 

Subject : Referring to my Despatch Polish Series No. 158, June 2, 1942, and to my 
Cable Polish Series No. 19, April 23, 1943 (7 p. m.) ; attaching copies of a 
secret report from Polish Military Intelligence concerning the missing Polish 
Officers in Russia ; outline of report ; observations ; article by Colonel Berling, 
Polish officer, attacking Polish forces evacuated to Iran; Vishinsky's subse- 
quent attack; factors calling for consideration in light of potential bearing 
upon Russia's forward-looking political-military policy vis-a-vis the "Middle 
Zone" in general. 
For the President, the Secretary and Und&r Secretary 
The Honorable the Secretary of State, 

Washington. 
Sir : Referring to my Despatch Polish Series No. 158, June 2, 1942 and my cable 
Polish Series No. 19, April 23, 1943 (7 p. m.), I have the honor to forward the 
attached copies of a secret report from the Polish Military Intelligence concern- 
ing the missing Polish officers in Russia. 

Outline of secret report 

This report, based upon information from all available confidential sources, isi 
divided into seven parts : 

The first part gives information dating from before the Poli&'h-Soviet Pact 
of 1941. 

The second part deals with diplomatic intervention : a d-marche by Am- 
bassador Kot, immediately upon the establishment of a Polish-Russian diplomatic 
relations in 1941. 

The third part cites the various methods employed by Polis'h sources in 
gathering information about the missing, following the refusal by the Soviet 
authorities to give any information whatsoever concerning them. 

Part four (a) deals with the discovery of the grave near Smolensk, according 
to a telegram received from Poland on April 13, 1943 (It was late in the 
evening of that same day that I first heard mention of the alleged mass'aere 
in the German broadcasts.) ; and (b) gives a chronological summary of the 
principal developments in the resultant Polish-Russian controversy, which led 
up to the suspension of diplomatic relations. 

I'art five reports on the present state of information in possession of the 
Polish Government. 

I'art six is a resumed. 

Part seven, entitled "Forecasts'", suggests that if the present suspension should 
pass into a severance of diplomatic relations, there may be exi>ected the forma- 
tion of an "Independent Polish Government" in Moscow. This the "Forecast" 
continncs, would probably not proclaim Communist ideas, but would pursue 
the indefinite policy represented by the Wolna Polska (published in Mos- 
cow), which proclaimed a Polish program of a vague nature, based on the 
Soviet Union. The "Forecast" goes on to suggest that "should such a govern- 
ment be created, an 'independent' Polish Army may be expected to appear in 
the U. S. S. R." 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2093 

Observatio7is : Articles hy Colonel Bcrling, Polish oiflcer in Russia, attacking 
Polish Forces tvhich evacuated to Iran 

In this connection, Wolna Polska, edited by Wanda Wasilewska, the wife 
of Dr. Kornechuk, the Ukrainian vice-Commissar of U. S. S. R. Foreign Affairs, 
has already carried an article by Colonel Berling, a Polish officer, to effect that 
he was prepared to organise and lead a Polish armed force at the side of the Red 
Army. In this article, Colonel Berling stated he had refused to leave for Iran 
with the rest of the Polish Army under General Anders. He bitterly criticised 
the General and the forces under his command for having refused to fight 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the Red Army. Moreover, he accused the Military 
Intelligence of these Polish forces of having engaged, among other activities, in 
espionage in Russia, collecting information regarding Soviet farms, plants, and 
army depots. 

This article apijeared in the London Daily Wokkeb on May 6, the day follow- 
ing its publication in the Moscow Wolna Polska. My interest was engaged, 
among other aspects, by the fact that in conversation, several days previously, 
with Ambassador Bogomolov, he had pointedly cited the same points, but without 
mentioning Colonel Berling's name. Moreover, the Ambassador presented the 
points in approximately the same form in which they subsequently appeared in 
the article. 

Vyshinsky's suhsequent attack 

I, therefore, have the very definite impression that Bogomolov had had the 
article in his hands for some days in advance of its publication ; that its actual 
publication, both in Moscow and here, was timed as a tactical forerunner for 
the following day's (May 7) release of Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs 
Vishinsky's blast against the Poles on similar counts. It was apparent to my 
mind, that in emphasising these, Vyshinsky meant to exploit them, on the one 
hand, for the benefit of Russian policy ; on the other hand, to discredit the Polish 
Government and its armed forces. For example, I have the impression that 
Vishinsky emphasized the following points for the reasons indicated : 

(a) the espionage charge, by way of justifying the Russian authorities' having 
closed down the Polish Welfare Organisation in Russia ; 

(b) the charge that the Polish forces had refused to fight at the side of the 
Red Army, by way of attempting to discredit, in the eyes of the people in Poland, 
those and other Polish forces outside Russia, as potential forces of liberation; 
this, with a view to bringing the Polish people to look to the Red Army and the 
Polish units at its side, for their deliverance. 

Factors calling for consideration in light of their potential bearing upon Russia's 

forivard-looking political-military policy vis-d-vis the "Middle Zone" in 

general 

In connection with this aspect, the following factors, to my mind, call for 

consideration in light of their potential bearing upon Russia's forward-looking 

political-military policy vis-a-vis the "Middle Zone" in general : 

(a) in several of my conversations with Ambassador Bogomolov, during the 
course of the recent Polish-Russian controversy, which led to the suspension 
of diplomatic relations, he pointedly referred to a public utterance which Gen- 
eral Sikorski had made several months ago, and which was subsequently pub- 
lished in the Polish papers here. In this statement the General had in effect 
stressed the importance that Poland be liberated by British, American, and Polish 
forces. Bogomolov said that, under the circumstances, this idea seemed highly 
impracticable. The fact that the Allied Forces of the West had not yet launched 
a Continental invasion, together with the proximity of the Red Army to Poland, 
made it sufficiently clear as to which of the Allied Forces was the one to which 
Poland would have to look for its liberation. If Sikorski and the military au- 
thorities of the Western Allies, he continued, could show him when and how they 
might propose to march eastward past Berlin to liberate Poland, he had no doubt 
that such a plan would meet with a hearty welcome in Russia. However, in 
absence of evidence of any such plan, he could only return to his original 
thought : that the natural liberator of Poland, under the circumstances, was the 



93744— 52— pt. 7 18 



2094 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Red Army. On each of the several occasions that Bogomolov underlined this 
point, he concluded by pointing out on his map the proximity of the Red Army 
to "that general area" ; 

Respectfully yours, 

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr. 
A. J. Deexel Biddle, Jr. 
AJDBJr : JS 
In triplicate. 
Enclosure : ^ as stated. 

[Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Polish Series No. 136. Dated May 20, 1943, from the 

Embassy at London] 

I. INFORMATION DATING FROM BEFORE THE POLISH-SOVIET PACT OF 1941 

1. On the basis of correspondence with Poland, the Polish authorities knew 
that a large number of officers and men, taken prisoner by the Soviet authorities, 
had been concentrated in about 100 camps. It was established on the basis of 
the same information that officers and cadet officers, as well as State Police 
oflBcers and men and members of the gendarmerie were concentrated in three 
camps, i. e., Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostaszkow (in the last-mentioned the 
police and gendarmerie were concentrated). As far as officers taken prisoner 
after the capitulation of Lwow are concerned, this was a definite violation by the 
Soviets of the conditions of the capitulation. Paragraph 8 of which granted per- 
sonal freedom to officers, and even envisaged their journey to other countries. 
The number of officers staying in Kozielsk and Starobielsk was calculated at 
the time at approximately 9,500 and the number detained in the camp at 
Ostaszkow at approximately 10,000. 

2. In the middle of 1941 a report on the subject of these camps was forwarded 
from Poland. This report had been drawn up on the basis of secret reports sent 
in by men specially sent to Soviet Russia for that purpose; these men had stayed 
in Russian territories up to October 1940. The figures contained in the report 
agreed with data already in the possession of the Polish authorities ; the report 
also confirmed the liquidation of the camps in April 1940 — a matter also 
known — with the additional information that small groups of officers from all 
these three camps had been found in a new camp in Griazowieo. 

II. DIPLOMATIC intervention 

Immediately upon the establishment of diplomatic relations the Polish Gov- 
ernment started the following interventions : 

1. The first demarche was made by Ambassador Kot in his conversation with 
Stalin and Molotov. He received the evasive reply that the Soviet authorities 
were quite unaware of the whereabouts of these officers, that they had been 
released like all the others, and that the Soviet authorities did not possess any 
lists of the above-mentioned camps. In view of this state of affairs attempts 
were made by the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev to draw up a list of the missing 
officers on the basis of statements made by officers who had arrived from the 
camp at Griazowiec and on the basis of letters from the families of these officers 
which had been deported together with a large part of the civilian population 
from Poland to the U. S. S. R. In this way a list comprising 3,845 names was 
drawn up. 

2. This list was handed by General Sikorski to Stalin on 3.12.41. During a 
conversation on the subject, Stalin stated for the second time that they had 
probably become scattered, had possibly crossed over to the Germans, or had pos- 
sibly escaped to Manchuria. In any case there was no mention whatever of 
their having allegedly been sent to do fortification work in the region of 
Smolensk and had subsequently been rounded up by the Germans. 

3. On 18.3.42. General Anders, in a conversation with Stalin, handed him 
an additional list of about 800 names and was given the same evasive answers. 

4. In May 1942, the Polish Embassy deposited with the I'eople's Komisariat for 
Foreign Affairs an exhaustive memorandum concerning the results of the action 
taken on behalf of Polish citizens, of which an enormous number were still de- 
tained in Soviet prisons in contravention of the Polish-Soviet Pact. This memo- 
randum again mentioned the case of the missing officers. The Soviet reply, 
dated 10.7.42. contained the following sentence : "With regard to the Polish offi- 



* See my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 6, January 7, 1942. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2095 

cers, mentioned in Para 3 of the Embassy's memorandum * * ♦ it is the 
opinion of the People's Komisariat for Foreign Affairs that it is impossible to 
reach the conclusion that the decree of 19.8.41 has not, as alleged, been applied to 
n large number of Polish oflS'cers." 

ni. THE GATHERING OF NEWS ABOUT THE MISSING 

Since the Soviet authorities refused any information whatsoever about the 
missing ofBcers, the Embassy and the Command of the Polish army started in- 
vestigations on their own. As rumours began to circulate stating that large 
numbers of Polish officers had been deported to the far North, and that some 
barges, loaded with these officers had capsized, or possibly been expressly sunk 
in the Arctic Ocean, and that some of these officers, who survived, were working 
in the mines in Fbanz Joseph Land, Xovata Zemlya. and the Kolyma region 
(Eastern Siberia), men were sent out to investigate these rumours; nowhere, 
however, were any traces found of these officers, and men sent to Franz Joseph 
Land and Novaya Zemlya never even returned from their search. 

The possibilities of finding the missing officers were now regarded with pessi- 
mism, especially in view of certain remarks dropped en passant by the highest 
Soviet dignitaries. For example, Beria, in a conversation with Colonel Berling, 
an officer of the Polish Army who had been won over by the Soviet authorities, 
when talking about the camps at Kozielsk and Starobielsk, stated twice : "My 
z nimi zdielali bolszuju oszybku" ; Markulow said in a conversation with General 
Anders : "U nas wyszla kakaja to oszybka." 

No one, at that time, made even the slightest mention of the version published 
a few days ago by the Tass Agency, that officers from the Kozielsk camp had 
been sent to do fortification work in the Smolensk region and had been rounded 
up by the Germans, although such a version, wei'e it true, would clear the Soviet 
authorities to a large extent. It should be pointed out here, that among the of- 
ficers in the Kozielsk camp there were many elderly men on the retired list, such 
as General Bohatyrewicz (aged 75) whose body was identified by the Germans 
in the Katyn grave. 

Ttie general opinion of the Poles in Russia on the subject of the missing of- 
ficers which was current at that time was the following : 

From all the three camps, the Soviet authorities had removed small groups 
(totalling several hundred persons) for camouflage and show purposes; these 
were formed into a normal prisoners' camp at Griazowiec which was handed 
over to the Polish authorities after the conclusion of the Pact in 1941. The 
huge majority of the prisoners was sent by a circuitous route, with all traces 
obliterated, to the concentration camps in the North and to the mines in Novaya 
Zemlya and Franz Joseph Land ; during this process part of them were drowned 
accidentally or deliberately in the Arctic Ocean, and the rest perished in the 
camps owing to the appalling conditions. It is possible that such a very small 
handful of them remains, that, fearing revelations, the Soviets do not wish to 
show them. 

IV. DISCOVEEY OF THE GRAVE NEAE SMOLENSK 

1. On 13.4.43. a telegram was received from Poland announcing the discovery 
of the grave by the Germans. The telegram stated that the grave near Smolensk 
had been seen by Poles, who were taken there by the German authorities, that 
the fact was undoubtedly authentic, and public opinion in Poland was deeply- 
stirred. 

2. On 13.4.43. the first German broadcasts on the subject were heard. 

3. On 15.4.43. the first mention, of a general nature, appeared in Polish papers 
published in Great Britain, with strong reservations as to the truth of the 
revelations . 

4. On 16.4.43. General Kxjkiel's communique was published in London. 

5. On 16. 4. 43. a telegram was sent by the Polish F. O. to Berne, with the 
instructions that the International Red Cross should be approached. The mem- 
orandum in question was deposited by the Polish delegate in the offices of the 
International Red Cross at 16.30 on 17. 4. 43. 

6. On 17. 4. 43. the Polish Government published its declaration. 

7. On 20. 4. 43. the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a Note on the 
subject to the U. S. S. R. Ambassador to the Polish Government, Bogomolov, ask- 
ing him for an elucidation of the matter in view of the German revelations. 

8. On 21. 4. 43. a telegram was received from Poland, giving the composition 
of the Polish delegation which, acting under the compulsion of the German 
4iuthorities, states the telegram, proceeded to Smolensk. The telegram at the 



2096 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

same time explains the fact of so late a discovery of the grave near Smolensk, a 
fact of which Soviet propaganda made full use. The telegram states that the 
first persons to pay attention to the grave were Polish workers, brought there by 
the Germans for earthworks. It was these Poles, for whom it was easier than 
for the Germans to communicate with the local population, who learned from 
the local people that there was a grave of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn 
wood. The workers, not knowing what it was all about, only put up two birch 
wood crosses on the grave. In the first months of 1943 this was learned by the 
German I. S., which carried out investigations among the local population. The 
investigations established the fact that in March and April 1940 numerous execu- 
tions had taken place in that wood. Polish prisoners of war were brought there. 
One of the local inhabitants stated that while working on the railway, he had 
seen documents showing that wagons had come from Kozielsk. The prisoners 
were taken to the wood in lorries. Learning this, the Germans started exhuma- 
tions. The telegram further stated that the German authorities had already 
taken the Polish delegation to Smolensk by air by 10. 4. 43. I>etails brought 
back by the Polish delegation prove the absolute authenticity of the fact^. The 
bodies were identified on the basis of letters, notes and diaries, not dated later 
than March and April 1940. 

9. On 24. 4. 43. another telegram was received from Poland, giving further 
details. The group of Poles who had travelled to Smolensk did so under strong 
compulsion from the Germans, without being authorized to do so by the secret 
Polish authorities. German propaganda on this subject in Poland has gone 
berserk. At the same time, the Germans have become more lenient in their 
attitude towards the Poles ; for example, the principle of collective responsibility 
has been abandoned. The reaction of the Polish people is a tremendous indigna- 
tion against the Bolsheviks, but at the same time analogous murders by the 
Germans are also stressed. The Germans are sending further groups of Poles 
to view the grave at Smolensk. So far 3000 bodies have been exhumed and 
200 identified. 

10. On 25.4.43. the Soviet Government addressed a Note to the Polish Govern- 
ment suspending diplomatic relations. 

V. PRESENT STATE OF INFORMATION IN THE POSSESSION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT 

1. Several score names of massacred officers identified by the Germans figured 
on the incomplete list drawn up by the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev, which 
was handed by General Sikorski to Stalin. 

2. After the German revelations, investigations were resumed and a few de- 
tails were noted to which previously no great importance had been attached 
owing to the general prevailing opinion that these prisoners of war had been 
deported to the far North. For example : Cadet-officer (Air Force) Furtek (who 
was in Kozielsk, and, later on, was taken to the camp in Griazowiec together 
with a small group of men saved, and who, on release, after the conclusion of the 
Polish-Soviet Pact, volunteered for service in the Polish Army and is now in 
Great Britain) stated that when travelling from Kozielsk in a prison-wagon, he 
had discovered on the wall of the wagon an inscription, made by one of the pre- 
vious groups of prisoners deported from the Kozielsk camp, stating that they 
were being detrained at the second station beyond Smolensk and that from the 
barred windows of the prison wagon they could see waiting lorries. The same 
inscription is remembered by Zejma, a captain of the Polish navy, who was 
travelling by the same convoy as Furtek. Irrespective of these statements, a 
telegram was received from General Anders stating that two Polish officers in the 
Polish Army in the East, who also escaped from Kozielsk in a similar manner to 
that of Furtek and Ze.jma, had seen the same inscriptions. Captain P. H., also 
with General Anders' army, had seen a similar inscription as late as August 1940, 
when he was being taken from prison in IJialystok, to the concentration camp in 
Kotlas. Finally, Lieutenant St. S., who is also now in the Middle East, stated 
that on 30.4.40 when he was being deported to the camps in the North, he had 
seen a convoy of officers from Kozielsk, being detrained from 10-20 kms. north 
west of Smolensk. It should be stressed here that all the names identified by 
the (U'rmans and found in the list of 3.84.">, were on tliat latter list noted down 
as names of prisoners from Kozielsk. But no names of persons from the Staro- 
lUELKK camp have been found. 

"With regard to the STAIIOBIELSK camp, a statement was made by 2nd lit. 
KAFEL, M. D., now attached to the I'olisli JNIedical Section of the University of 
Bdinburgli, to the cfEect that when travelling from STAHOBIELSK with that 
group which was sent to the GUIiVZOWlEC camp, he had seen on the wall of 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2097 

the prison-wagon an inscription, made by one of the previous groups, stating 
that their lot was being detrained in KHARKOV. KAFEL himself, during the 
stop at KHARKOV, started a conversation with a Soviet worker who was clean- 
ing the wagon, who told him : "Your companions were detrained here, but you 
are going further." General ANDERS, too, mentions a similar inscription, with- 
out giving any more details. 

With regard to the camp at OSTASZKOW — no information whatever has as 
yet been obtained. 

VI. RESUME 

On the basis of information so far at hand, one may reconstruct in a few 
words the fate of these three officers' camps in the following manner : 

In March or April 1940, the highest Soviet authorities decided upon the liqui- 
dation of the camps. In order to obliterate all traces, a small group was taken 
from each camp and transferred to the camp at GRIAZOWIEC, which was given 
over the Polish authorities after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Pact. 

The remainder were liquidated in the following way : 

KOZIELSK— by mass execution in the KATYN wood. 

STAKOBIELSK— either by mass executions in the vicinity of KHARKOV or 
by deportation to the Far North and accidental or deliberate sinking of the whole 
transport or a considerable part in it in the ARCTIC OCEAN. It is possible, 
though not very likely, that there are small numbers of survivors in the concen- 
tration camps in the North or in the mines mentioned before. 

OSTASZKOW— not known. 

VII. FORECASTS 

If the present suspension of diplomatic relations, contained in the last Note of 
the Soviet Government, should pass into a severance of relations, then we may 
anticipate that in the nearest future an "Independent Polish Government" will 
be formed and proclaimed in MOSCOW. This government would most probably 
not proclaim Communist ideals, but would follow the indefinite policy repre- 
sented by the "WOLNA POLSKA" published in MOSCOW, which proclaims a 
Polish program of a vague nature, based on the Soviet Union, and expressed in 
patriotic generalisations. 

Should such a "government" he created, one may assume that an "independent" 
Polish army will appear in the U. S. S. R. ; we have already had information about 
its formation by the Soviets. The creation of such a government and such an 
armv would probablv be preceded bv a press campaign, expressed in letters to 
the editors of "WOLNA POLSKA" and "NOWE WIDNOKREGI" edited by 
WANDA WASILEWSKA, and written by "indignant Polish patriots" wishing to 
separate themselves from the "incomprehensible moves of the government of 
General SIKORSKI, who is assailed by the influence of Fascists and GOEBBEL'S 
agents, hidden in his entourage, or sometbing of this kind. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, another indication of the ap- 
peasement policy at that time is this expression : "Xear the Polish 
Government." They were afraid to antagonize the Russians by ad- 
dressing it to the Polish Ambassador. That is a very new phrase. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did they say how near? 

Mr. Machroa^t:cz. No. 

Mr. AVelles. I may be wrong, Mr. Chairman, but I think we used 
that phraseology for all of the governments in exile. I don't think 
there is any distinction. 

Mr. Maciiro\\^cz. I think that is true for fear of antagonizing the 
Russians. 

Mr. Welles. Oh, no. 

Mr. Machrowicz. AA^iat was the reason? 

Mr. Welles. Because they were not in their own capital. They were 
not in control of their own sovereign territory. 

I see that it is marked on this, Mr. Chairman, that I have read it, so 
I assume that I have. I must have. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Welles, I wonder if I could ask you a few 
questions ? 



2098 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Madden. Will you identify that? 

Mr. Ptjcinski. This has been admitted as exhibit 22. I wonder if 
we can establish a little chronology here. 

When did you, as Under Secretary of State, first come to realize 
that there was a vast pool of Polish soldiers in Russia that could be 
helpful to the Allied cause ? When did you first realize that ? 

Mr. Welles. Considerably before December 1941. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Then through the efforts of the State Department 
you did encourage or rather the United States did encourage the form- 
ing of this army ; is that right ? 

Mr. Welles. Decidedly ; yes. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Can you tell us why this Polish Army was regarded 
as of potential value? 

Mr. Welles. It had potential value for two reasons : First, because 
of the assistance that the Soviet Union could get at the time in defend- 
ing itself against Germany; and, second, for the reasons that have 
already been brought out, for military operations in the Near East. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Now, you have just identified this exhibit 22, which 
is a memorandum sent to the Department of State by Ambassador 
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle on May 20, 1943. Do you recall seeing this ? 

Mr. Welles. It is stamped with the stamp of my office, but I think 
I must point out that in the days which I was living through at that 
time it would have been practically impossible for me to have read 
every long dispatch that came in. But I have no doubt that while 
it did pass through my office it was actually taken care of by some 
other official in the Department. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Earlier this morning we had introduced as exhibit 
14 a document sent to the State Department by the Ambassador who 
preceded Mr. Standley. Do you recall that document? 

Mr. Welles. Yes. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. In that document is included a rather long report by 
Captain Czapski on the search for these Polish officers. 

Mr. Welles. That was referred to this morning. I don't remember 
ever having seen it. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. You do not recall having seen it ? 

Mr. Welles. No. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Well, the only thing I was trying to get straight in 
my mind here, in assembling all of this information on Katyn, is what 
is the relative measure in weight — I mean where did the Polisli Army 
stand in your considerations in the State Department, not as a human- 
itarian move toward Poland but as a realistic military effort to win 
the war? 

Mr. Welles. My impression was very strong, after the many con- 
ferences I had with General Sikorski, that they could be of far greater 
value in north Africa or in Italy. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. And it was because of that opinion and that impres- 
sion that efforts had been made by this Government to locate or help 
locate their officers ? 

Mr. Welles. Well, I think you are limiting it too much, Mr. 
Puciuski. I say again that I think there had been a traditional and 
very close friendship between Poland and the United States; and 
I think that when the Polish Government in exile asked us to use 
our best efforts for their benefit it was more than natural for us to 



THE KATl-N FOREST MASSACRE 2099 

do it, quite apart from strategic considerations, although, of course, 
those came into it. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Wlien you discovered that these intellectual leaders 
of Poland and the leaders of this potential army on which you were 
counting — and I think we have had mention of many instances where 
the United States was counting on this Polish Army— when you 
learned that these men had been massacred in Katyn, what sort of 
reaction did that create in the State Department ? 

Mr. Welles. I think you are now asking about a reaction that 
probably took place after I had already gone. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. If I understood you correctly, sir; you did not 
leave until July of 1943? 

Mr. Welles. That is right. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. Exhibit 22, which I have just shown you and which 
has been identified, bears a rubber stamp indicating that it had gone 
over your desk at least and is dated May 20, 1943. 

Mr. Welles. That is quite right. 

Mr. PucixsKi. Now, that was some time before you left. 

Mr. Welles. But may I say again that I think that at first the 
situation was too confused for us to evaluate it as it later proved it 
should have been evaluated. There was no absolute certainty at that 
time as to who was responsible. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. At the beginning of the hearing this afternoon, 
Mr. Madden said that we are now in the second phase of our investi- 
gation to try and determine whether or not there was any deliberate 
effort made by the various agencies in this country and other coun- 
tries to suppress the knowledge about Katyn and also to keep from 
the American people the real meaning of this thing. What was 
your reaction? What was the attitude on this whole Katyn affair in 
the State Department at that time ? 

Mr. Welles. To the best of my knowledge and belief, until I left 
there was never the slightest effort to play it down or to keep it quiet 
for reasons of appeasement of Russia. It had to do solely with our 
uncertainty as to what the real facts were. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. But you think the fact of the matter is that Poland, 
who at that time was an ally of the United States, was of secondary 
consideration as compared to Russia, which was the first considera- 
tion ? Is that a fair assumption ? 

Mr. Welles. It is very difficult for me to attempt to make the 
balance that you request. It seems to me that the two things are 
separate. Here you have the Soviet Union that was not a govern- 
ment in exile that actually was fighting, and that was of the utmost 
assistance to us at that time. For traditional reasons or for reasons 
of sentiment, for reasons of justice and honor, we wanted to do every- 
thing we could to assist the Polish Government in exile, to get every- 
thing that we could out of the Russians for their benefit, for the pri- 
mary purpose of reestablishing after the war, as I have said before, 
a free and independent Poland governed by the Polish people them- 
selves according to their own desires. 

I don't think you can balance those two things. 

Mr. DoNDERO, I would like to ask a question on this subject. The 
Ambassador from Poland tq Moscow testified before this committee 
that over a period of about 2 years they made 50 separate and dis- 
tinct requests of the Russian Government regarding these missing 



2100 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Polish officers. Did the Embassy here in Washington — and I refer to. 
the Polish Embassy — make known to our Embassy, or our State De- 
partment rather, the information that they were requesting the Hus- 
sion Government to disclose the whereabouts of those officers? 

Mr. Welles. Do I understand correctly, Mr. Congressman, that you 
asked whether the Polish Embassy in Washington made that known 
to the State Department ? 

Mr. DoNDERO. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. That is, made known that their Ambassador in Moscow 
Avas making these requests ? 

Mr. DoNDERo. Yes. 

Mr. Welles. By all means ; certainly. 

Mr. DoNDERO. And you knew that ? 

Mr. Welles. Decidedly, yes. I think the Ambassadors for 2 years 
before I left the Department brought it up constantly in every 
conversation. 

Mr. Dondp:ro. Now, those 2 years would be before the Germans 
made it known to the world in 1943 ; so, it must have been in 1941 and 
1942? 

Mr. Welles. I should think it would have begun as early as 1941, 
Mr. Congressman. Here again it is a matter of record. All of those 
conversations are on file in the Department, the conversations that I 
ever had. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, if I might give an expression of opin- 
ion on this, as I recall, you left in 1943. Prior to that, being in the 
Government service for so long, naturally, in your high position, you 
had occasion to know about the many, many agreements with Russia 
since the recognition in 1933. And you knew and there came across 
your desk information about which agreements were kept and which 
were not kept, because in tlie Eightieth Congress, if my memory serves 
me right, a congressional committee showed 14 printed pages of agree- 
ments that were broken with Russia. 

Now, in your position as one of the high-level policy advisoi*s — and 
there came across your desk the various broken agreements — can you 
say what was the position of our Government in 1942 and 1943 about 
Russia? Did they think that sometime they could come to a general 
agreement with Russia on contractual obligations, or was this a desire 
to go on with the war only ? 

Mr. Welles. I think the primary desire, of course, was to go on with 
the war successfully, to a successful conclusion. But I think that cer- 
tainly — and probably some of the members of the committee will agree 
with me — we would never have gone into the United Nations if we had 
not thought that there was a reasonable chance that we could bring 
the Soviet Government to cooperate rather than to be antagonistic. 

Mr. SiiEEiiAN. Of course, that is one of the places where we on the 
Katyn Committee are very much interested because quite a few of our 
members feel that if this famous Van Vliet report, which was missing, 
had been revealed to tlie American public in May 15)45, when it was 
brought up and when it disap]:)eared from the Army Intelligence — if 
that had been revealed to the Government or to the American public, 
there would have been a sufficient hue and cry and clamor about rela- 
tions with Soviet Russia to the extent that some of us think, as I per- 
sonally think, the United Nations would never have come into being. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2101 

That is one of the reasons why I think some of us think this report 
was suppressed. 

Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with that report. 

Mr. Sheehan. The Van Vliet report, for your information, was 
made in May of 1945. 

Mr. Mitchell. It was dated May 24, 1945. 

Mr. Sheehan. That was while the United Nations was in progress 
and while there was a rupture between Poland and Russia as to 
who was going to represent Poland. An American officer came back 
and stated to General Bissell that, in his opinion and in the opinion of 
another Army man, the Russians liad committed this particular crime. 
Of course, we feel that the disappearance of this report and many 
other reports of a similar nature in the Army Intelligence and in the 
State Department and throughout our Government shows that some- 
place along the line there were people at the top echelon of the Gov- 
ernment trying to protect Russia's interests. That is the only con- 
clusion I can come to. 

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, I am testifying under oath, and I can 
state with complete conviction that I have never participated in the 
suppression of anything of the character that has been mentioned. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Welles, do you now see any dili'erence between 
Stalin and Hitler, judging from subsequent events? 

Mr. Welles. From the general standpoint, they are both of them 
authoritarian dictators, utterly ruthless in their methods. I suppose 
that if you get into details you can point out differences. But, so far 
as the main lines are concerned, I think one authoritarian totalitarian 
regime is as objectionable as another. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you think that Stalin was always that way or 
that he got that way since he got all of the lend-lease he received from 
us in 1945 ? 

Mr. Welles. If you read, as I have read recently, the political bio- 
graphy of Stalin, I should say that there has been no change intrin- 
sically in his character from the beginning until the present moment. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, summarizing this from my view- 
point, we just guessed badly and made a very bad gamble, and we lost. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr, Welles. I suppose that is one way of putting it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, that partially answers my question, 
but I would like to have you answer this, if you feel that you would 
like to. Do you feel now, looking back at the facts as they look today, 
that if our Government had adopted a more firm policy toward Soviet 
Russia in those fateful days of 1942 and 1943 much of our difficulties 
in the world today would have been avoided ? 

Mr. Welles. I would like to answer that categorically, but I don't 
think I can because it seems to me there are imponderables there. I 
have never yet knowni to my own satisfaction how much truth there 
was in the idea of a further arrangement with Germany. After all, 
it had taken place in 1939. Germany had then broken it by invading 
Poland. It is conceivable that it could have happened over again. 

Mr. Machrowicz. 1 agree with you, but that avoids the question. 

Mr. Welles. I did not wish to avoid it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. My question is not asked as to our position to- 
ward Germany, but rather our position toward Russia. I agree 100 



2102 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

percent that there is very little difference between Stalin and Hitler 
as far as their totalitarian methods are concerned ; but don't you think 
that if we had adopted a more firm policy toward Soviet Russia, and 
particularly toward its demands with re^^ard to Poland and other 
similar situations, that we could have avoided much of the troubles of 
the world today ? 

Mr. Welles. As it has turned out, the answer to your question, I 
think, is clearly "Yes." 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Mr. Welles. But I do want to make a reservation. Hard pressed 
as they were in the winter of 1942, if we had told the Russians that 
they were not going to accomplish anything in the world that they 
wanted, it might easily have been possible for them to turn around 
and try to sue for a separate peace with the German Government all 
over again. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Following through on that, now that you know what 
the conditions of the world are and now that you know what Hitler 
was and what Joe Stalin was, do you really think that it was possible 
for those two mad dogs to get together and make an agi'eement and 
keep it? 

Mr. Welles. Not keep it ; no, 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Of course not. 

Mr. Welles. Not definitely, but very much to our inconvenience for 
a short time. 

Mr. Dondero. They did keep it up until at least June 21, 1941 ? 

Mr. Welles. That is right. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to at this time ask a 
question of opinion. You will recall this morning that when we put 
on the record exhibit 14 from Ambassador Standley to the Depart- 
ment of State, dated April 28, this one phrase was in that dispatch : 

In the second place, there does not appear to be any Polish leader who would 
have sufficient stature to make such a government popular. 

Mr. Welles. He was talking about the Polish Communist leaders 
in the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you give your opinion, in the 
light of then and now, because 

Mr. Welles. I am wholeheartedly in accord with that evaluation. 
I think all of the Polish leaders with ability sufficient to lead their 
country out of the tragic situation it finds itself in are either still in 
occupied Poland or outside in the rest of the w^orld. I don't think 
they are in the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Mitchell. I asked you that question because that leads us to 
Yalta and what happened at Yalta about the formation of a free 
Polish Government. I know that you were not in the Department of 
State at that time, but I would like to know whether you would like 
to comment. You are aware that all of Yalta has been declassified 
now. 

Mr. Welles. I think it is preferable for me not to attempt to make 
that estimate now. There are many of us who will make it. I was 
not on the scene, as you have said. I was not behind the scenes. I was 
no longer in touch with all of the secret information that was passing 
over the desks at the various agencies of Government. But I think, 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2103 

-without having had all of that information, it would be very difficult 
iairly to evaluate what was then done. 

Mr, Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Secretary, I have just one final question, 
and this is merely asking for a comment that has nothing whatsoever 
to do with this hearing. Judging from your long experience in inter- 
national affairs, the committee would be interested in getting your 
thoughts regarding the similarity of the actions of the Russian lead- 
ers, Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, regarding the disappearance of these 
Polish officers, and when they postponed and stalled the Polish leaders 
for almost 2 years, giving them no satisfaction whatsoever, although 
they knew that these Polish officers had been murdered and massa- 
cred — do you find a similarity in their tactics with the Polish leaders, 
the free Polish Government, and the negotiations that they are now 
carrying on with the United Nations in Korea ? 

Mr. Welles. I think there is a similarity in objective and a similar- 
ity in technique. 

Chairman Madden. That is all. 

We wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. The 
testimony has been veiy valuable, and we appreciate your taking the 
time to come here and present it. 

Mr. Welles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I express my thanks to. 
the committee for its great courtesy to me. 

Chairman Madden. Thank you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could take a recess 
for 10 minutes to give Mr. Harriman a chance to look over some 
papers. 

Chairman Madden. Let's reduce that to 5 minutes. We will take a 
5-ininute recess. 

(A short recess was taken.) 

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM AVERELL HARRIMAN, DIRECTOR 
FOR MUTUAL SECURITY 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, will you be sworn, please? 

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do. 

Chairman Madden. Please state your full name for the record. 

Mr. Harriman. My name is William Averell Harriman. 

Chairman Madden. And your address, Mr. Harriman? 

Mr. Harriman. My address here in Washington? 

Chairman Madden. Yes. 

Mr. Harriman. 1800 Foxhall Eoad. 

Chairman Madden. And your business? 

Mr. Harriman. I am Director for Mutual Security. 

Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to sum- 
marize for the benefit of Mr. Harriman how far we have progressed 
with this hearing. 

Mr. Harriman, it is my understanding that you became Ambassador 
to Soviet Russia in October 1943 ? 

Mr. Harriman. That is my recollection. It may have been Septem- 
ber. I have forgotten when I was confirmed by the Senate, but I went 



2104 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

to Moscow with Secretaiy Hull to the Moscow Conference in the mid- 
dle of October 1943. 

Mr. MiTCJiiELL. The committee has progressed to the point now in 
its investigation where dispatches, telegrams, memorandums of rec- 
ord, have been received over the period 1941-42-43, concerning the 
missing Polish officers and that all of these communications were in 
the Department of State, from both the Ambassador in Moscow and 
the Ambassador in London. Now, you participated in the discussions 
at Yalta, and the formation of the new, or what is today known as 
the Polish Provisional Government. They were in control during 
1945 through 1947, until after the "free and unfettered" elections of 
1947. Also, there is the matter of the 16 underground members of 
the Polish Government in exile who came out of hiding and were taken 
to Moscow in approximately April of 1945. 

I am sure that you can tell us something about what transpired 
then. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, I think that if Mr. Harriman so 
desires, the committee would be interested in hearing his statement. 

If you care to, Mr. Harriman, we would be glad to hear your state- 
ment of any points which you have, regarding your knowledge of the 
Katyn massacre, or the disappearance of the Polish officers, or any 
knowledge you have, as Ambassador, that is connected with the in- 
vestigation of the committee. Would you care to make a statement? 
Wliether it is a statement of a few minutes or 5 or 10, whatever you 
care to make, the committee would be glad to hear it, if you desire. 

Mr. Harriman. I imagine most of this has been gone over by the 
committee. I do not know that I can contribute anything to it. I 
was very much involved in my work in England. I made two trips 
to Moscow, one in 1941 and one in 1942. 

Chairman Madden. The committee would be very much interested 
in hearing your impressions and versions concerning the facts of the 
Katyn massacre. 

Mr. Harriman. I have very little knowledge about it. I was sent 
to Moscow by President Roosevelt with an Anglo-American Com- 
mission, in which Lord Beaverbrook represented the British, in Sep- 
tember 1941, and I was chairman of the American Commission. I 
had some contact with the Polish problem at that time, and I got to 
know General Sikorsky well because his government was in exile in 
London, and at the suggestion of the President, I did send a telegram 
to Stalin asking for the cooperation of the establishment of the Polish 
Army, and I have a letter coming from the Polish Government in 
exile, thanking me for my efforts, and indicating that it was of great 
use in establishing the first basis for this ami}'. 

Then there was a question, I think, at that time, of moving them 
to Persia for training. I had no knowledge of the missing officer's, 
because I was so occu})ied with my work in London. 

I, of course, do recall the announcement of the Germans of this 
massacre, but I had no knowledge of it except what I saw in the Brit- 
ish press at that time. 

I do recall seeing General Sikorsky after the event, after the Polish 
Government had asked the International Red Cross to make an in- 
vestigation. General Sikoisky told me tliat he had been quite ill at 
the time and regretted tluit tliat particular request had been made, 
that led to the breaking off of relations between the Soviet and Polish 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2105 

Oovernments, and lie felt that the better way would have been to have 
handled it directly with the Soviet Government, as I recall it. That 
was recorded by Mr. Biddle, who was the Ambassador at that time to 
the Polish Government, General Sikorsky died, and I, of course, had 
no further contact with him. 

The subject came up again when the Soviet Government invited 
the American press in Moscow to go to Katyn and witness the exami- 
nation of the graves. At that time I thought it would be useful if a 
member of the Embassy w^ent along. At that time it had not been 
the custom of the Soviet Government to invite members of the Diplo- 
matic Corps to go with the foreign press, and I asked my daughter 
whether she would be willing to go, believing the Russians would be 
more likely to let her go than only an Embassy official. I therefore 
asked the Foreign Office to permit my daughter and a member of 
the American Embassy staff, Mr. John Melby, to go with the press. 
They did go, both of them, and they submitted their reports inde- 
pendently, of what they had seen, and their impressions. I forwarded 
the reports to the State Department, and sent a brief message to the 
President and the Secretary of State, recounting briefly what their 
impressions were. Beyond that I have no knowledge of or informa- 
tion regarding the interchange of information that existed in the re- 
quests for information about the officers or the details which were 
available in Washington or elsewhere regarding the Katyn massacre. 

That is a brief summary of the background of my knowledge of 
those particular events. 

Of course, constantly while I was Ambassador, there were discus- 
sions with the Soviet Government about recognition again of the Pol- 
ish Government in London, and there were a number of different nego- 
tiations, of which Yalta was one, in regard to attempting to get the 
Soviet Government to agree to a Free Poland, and acceptance of the 
principles which the Government of the United States had set forth 
for protection of the Polish interests. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, you have read exhibit 19, sent by 
Admiral Standley to the Secretary of State, dated April 28, 1943, 
in which he predicted the formation of a Free Polish Government. In 
that exhibit is this statement : 

In the second place, tliere do not appear to be any Polish leaders here who 
have sufficient stature to make such a government popular. 

That was April 28, 1943, about 15 days after the disclosure of the 
finding of the mass graves at Katyn. 

Now, I assume that at least a copy of this dispatch was in the files 
at Kuybishev or Moscow when you took over the post of Ambassador? 

Mr. Harriman, I do not recall ever having read it. I did not send 
the telegram. I do not recall reading it until I was shown the tele- 
gram a short time ago. I think it is a sensible telegram. 

Mr. Mitchell. Certainly the subject matter must have been up for 
discussion in the high-level discussions at the time that you were nego- 
tiating and discussing Yalta. You were present at Yalta ; were you 
not? 

Mr. Harriman. I was ; yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. With this statement in the files of the Department 
of State and in Moscow, and with all of the other information that 
was available at that time, the leaders were the ones that were found 



2106 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

in Katyn. This statement specifically says that there is not any Pol- 
ish leader here who would have sufficient stature to make such a gov- 
ernment popular. I would like to ask you to explain to the committee 
just who were the Polish leaders in Moscow when you arrived there, 
and what was your knowledge of them ? 

Mr. Harriman. I don't know any of them. Of course, when it came 
to Yalta, you will recall, the Soviet armies were in substantial occupa- 
tion of the entire Poland, and they had established what we called 
the Lublin Government. Mr. Beirut was the head of it, and the list 
of Ministers I cannot recall now, but it is available. They had been 
established by the Soviet Government under the force of the Red 
Army as the ruling government in Poland. 

Mr. Mitchell. In Lublin ? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. But the Polish Government in exile maintained 
their headquarters in London at that time? 

Mr. Harriman. That is correct. 

Mr. Mitchell. At the same time you knew, when you were Ambas- 
sador to London, that the Polish Government also had underground 
leaders, the Polish Government in exile? 

Mr. Harriman. No; I was not our Ambassador in London. I was 
a special representative of the President, dealing with supply and 
shipping questions during the period I was in London. I was not 
involved in the diplomatic aspect of our Embassy in London. 

Mr. Mitchell. Certainly, General Sikorski, somewhere along the 
line must have told you that they had their people. In effect, there 
were two governments. 

Mr. Harriman. I was not familiar with the underground move- 
ment. I knew that one existed, but I was not familiar with the details 
of that. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you explain to the committee why the Polish 
Government in exile, since they were then recognized by this Govern- 
ment, was not present at Yalta and since it concerned the subject mat- 
ter of Poland ? 

Mr. Harriman. There were no governments present at Yalta, with 
the exception of the British and the Soviet Government and the 
American Government, those three Governments. It was a tri-par- 
tite meeting. 

Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell us what transpired concerning the for- 
mation of this new government at Yalta ? 

Mr. Harriman. There was at the time of Yalta the so-called Lublin 
Government, which had been established by the force of the Soviet 
Government. It had jurisdiction over the civilian affairs of Poland, 
because Poland by that time had been freed from German control by 
the Red army, and the Lublin government had taken over. The 
discussions in Yalta related to a broadening of the base of that Gov- 
ernment, so as to include democratic leaders from within Poland and 
from outside of Poland, which, of course, included the London gov- 
ernment. Agreements were reached at that time with Stalin, in which 
he undertook to cooperate with the American and the British Govern- 
ments in the establishment of a broadly based democratic govei'n- 
ment, with the participation of the other leaders, both from within 
Poland and from outside, and the holding, as promptly as possible, 
of free and unfettered elections. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 



2107 



That acrreement was reached, and the fact that Stalin broke that 
agreement is the reason why Poland is now still under Soviet dom- 

"^Mi°\iTCHELL. But, Mr. Harriman, at that particular time, and 
all during the war, Poland had been an ally of the United States and 
Great Bi?tain, and the Soviet Union, during the latter stages ot the 
war. 

j\Ir. Harriman. That is correct. ^i i i 

Mr Mitchell. The Government was recognized as tlie legal gov- 
ernment of Poland. They were situated in London. What confer- 
ences took place or may have taken place which preceded Yalta, with 
the Polish leaders then ? 

Mr. Harriman. I have no knowledge of that. , i , 4! 

Mr Mitchell. Who brought up the subject of the broad base ot 
representative government in Poland when all three, except the Soviet 
Union, which broke off diplomatic relations, as a result of it—— . 

Mr Harriman. There had been discussions for a considerable period 
of time, over attempting to get the Soviet Government to recognize 
again the Polish Government in London as the Government of Poland 
Those negotiations failed, and the Soviet Government went forward 
with its plan to set up this Lublin Government. . . .1 o • ^ 

Mr Mitchell. Did the United States have to give m to the Soviet 
requirements? The Lublin Government was not recognized by the 

United States? ^ . , 

Mr. Harriman. No; the Lublin Government was never recognized 

bv the United States. , . 

Mr Mitchell. The United States continued to recognize the gov- 
ernment in exile, until July 5, 1945 ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Harriman. That is correct. ^ . ^. 

Mr Mitchell. But yet, at the same time, the Government of the 
United States was negotiating for putting the Lublm Government 
into existence, without telling the Polish Government m exile what 

was going on ? „ , . ^ . 4. ^ ^ 

Mr Harriman. I have no knowledge of what was told or not told 
the Polish Government in London. I do know that President Roose- 
velt and also Prime Minister Churchill attempted to work out ar- 
rangements which would insure Poland's freedom, and that, I believe, 
they thought they had accomplished by the pledge of Stalm to hold 
free and unfettered elections. Now, that was the objective of President 
Eoosevelt, to overcome what was the then existing fact, which was the 
occupation of Poland by the Red armies, the control of Poland by 
the Red army, and the establishment of this government, which was 
done through force, by the Soviets. That was a fact which existexl at 
that time. The diplomatic negotiations having failed to bring about 
the recognition of the Polish Government in London by the Soviets, the 
President attempted to develop another means by which Poland would 
be free, and the Polish people would be protected from this new 
enslavement. .... 

Mr Mitchell. Wliy could not the Polish Government m exile m 
London return to Poland after the war and hold those free and unfet- 
tered elections? n -, . -x 
Mr. Harriman. Because the Soviet Government refused to permit 

them to do so. 



2108 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Mitchell. Yet the United States and Great Britain went alonj 
and accepted the line of the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Harriman. No; the Lublin Government was never recognized 
There was an attempt to set up a provisional government which would 
insure that there would be, with the cooperation of the British and 
American Governments, a free election in Poland, so that the Polish 
people would again have their freedom, and that this enslavement 
would then end. 

Mr. Mitchell. But at the time of Yalta, the United States Govern- 
ment representatives had information about the missing Polish officers 
and they had never received a satisfactory explanation during 1941 
and 1942. These were the leaders of Poland, found at Katyn. Admi 
ral Standley tells us there was no individual in Moscow of sufficient 
stature to be a leader. 

Was that subject considered? We knew at the time of Yalta that 
the Soviets never kept their word. 

Mr. Harriman. Number 1, the Lublin Government, as I recall it, 
were selected from people that came to Moscow subsequent to 1943. 
I do not remember when they came, but they were largely leaders who 
came from Poland, who had been working among the Communists in 
Poland. They were not people sitting in Moscow, but, as I recall it, 
they were the Poles who were brought out of Poland, who had been 
working to develop a Communist movement within Poland. 

This idea that the Soviet Government did not keep its agreements 
is not fully true. The most important agreement during the war 
which was reached with the Soviet Government was the agreement for 
the Red army to attack the Gennan forces shortly after our landing in 
Normandy. I think that one should recall that when we landed in 
Normandy there were 199 German divisions on the eastern front, the 
Russian front, and about 50 satellite divisions, whereas, if I remember 
correctly, there were some 60 German divisions in France and in the 
Low Countries, and our Chiefs of Staff were gravely concerned over 
the posibility of the Germans transferring from the eastern front a 
substantial number of their divisions, which would make the landings 
difficult or, possibly, the German forces would have been able to drive 
us back to the sea. 

Now, Stalin made that agreement, and he kept it. He made that 
agreement at Tehran, and he kept it, and the Red army attacked a 
few weeks after our landing in Normandy and broke through this 
very large German force, and it was because of the keeping of that 
agreement that our successes on the western front were possible. 

I think you will find that our military leaders at that time would 
substantiate that statement, and the keeping of that agreement was 
one of the factors Avhich did influence both i[\e, American and British 
in terms of having hopes that the Soviets would cooperate in the 
peaceful solution of the problems which were concerning us at the 
end of the war. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, you are familiar with the terms of 
the Atlantic Charter, of course? 

Mr. Harkiiman. Yes. 

Mr. MrnuiKLL. One of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter was 
that there would be no territorial gains on the part of any of the Allies. 
Yet the United States (xovernment and Great Britain participated in 
discussions— and I am not sure whether it was in Tehran or Yalta— 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2109 

which in effect was determining the future boundaries of Poland, and 
it was a territorial gain for the Soviet Union. Can you explain that? 

Mr. Harkiman. I am not an an expert on the question of the eastern 
borders of Poland. You will have to ask somebody with the State 
Department about that, where the discussions were, but the Russians 
had contended — and I am not justifying the contention, but I am 
merely stating the fact — they had contended for a considerable period 
of time that the eastern borders of Poland had been unfairly made 
and that ethnologicaily there was a larger percentage of white Rus- 
sians and Ukranians in that area and that the agreement at the end 
of World War I was unfair to the Soviet interests. 

I assume that was the reason why this discussion took place and was 
not considered to be periiaps a violation of the Atlantic Charter. It 
was a correction, as far as the Russians contended — I am not saying 
that was a correction, actually, but the Russians contended that that 
was a rectification of an injustice which had previously been forced on 
them by the military situation at the end of the First World War. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, did I understand you to say 
that that was an unfair designation of the eastern border? 

Mr. Harriman. No — I am saying that was the Russian contention. 
I am just acting as a reporter. I am saying that that was the Russian 
contention. 

Mr. Mitchell. But here are the United States and Great Britain 
violating one of the terms of the Atlantic Charter because of a demand 
by the Soviet Union. Why could not that discussion have taken 
place after the war, after the Polish Government had gone back, and 
then they could have had the government? In effect, what happened 
was that the Soviets, because of the lack of leaders, due to Katyn. put 
the people they wanted into Poland, and the United States and Great 
Britain participated in Yalta or Tehran in violation of one of the 
provisions of the Atlantic Charter. You were there as one of the 
individuals at Yalta. 

Mr. Harriman. I was not involved in terms of the selection of the 
Curzon line. That was a proposal which I don't know the basis of. 
But this discussion was, as I say, in relation to the Soviet contention 
that a wrong had been done after World War I. 

As far as I understand, President Roosevelt's objective was to relieve 
the Polish people at the earliest possible date, of their enslavement, 
j and make it possible to help Poland rebuild her economic life. Every- 
one was generally familiar with the appaljing conditions in Poland, 
and an attempt to help the Polish people regain their independence 
and to help them both through relief and economically rebuild their 
lives was made, and to alleviate the distress in which the people were 
then living. 

So that that, I believe, was the main, or among the reasons why 
President Roosevelt thought it was extremely important to get the 
earliest possible settlement. 

Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Harriman, right at that point let me ask : Was 
there ever a speedy action, as contemplated, a free election, as contem- 
plated, in Poland ? 

Mr. Harriman. Never. 

Mr. DoNDERo. Under the Lublin Government, or any other? 

Mr. Harriman. Never. There were never any free elections in 
Poland. 

j3744— 52— pt. 7 19 



2110 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Ambassador, I do not ask this question to em- 
barrass yon, or cast any reflections, because I have a high regard for 
you, but just clear up the record and to get the motives that were 
operating. 

Will you tell us what part Alger Hiss played in the Yalta Confer- 
ence? What was his capacity? 

Mr, Harriman. I barely knew him. He was a young man that was 
carrying papers for Mr. Stettinius. I had no conversations with him. 
I had a general knowledge that he was one of the men working on the 
United Nations. He never participated in any of the discussions at 
which I was present. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was he ever consulted on matters pertaining to the 
future of Poland? 

Mr. Harriman. Not that I know of. I understood that he was one 
of tlie men that had been working on the terms of the United Nations, 
but beyond that, I never knew that he was consulted. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. His capacity, then, at Yalta, was more or less pre- 
liminary footwork, so to speak, to get the preliminary steps started 
toward the organization of the United Naitons, and that, as far as you 
know, was his capacity at Yalta ? 

Mr. Harriman. That is, as far as I know ; and he never participated, 
as far as I can remember, in any discussions, whatsoever. He was a 
young man from the State Department who had some of the papers 
which Mr. Stettinius would call for. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Thank you. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. Mr. Harriman, might I put some questions to 3'ou? 

Mr. Hickerson, from the State Department, when he was here yester- 
day, testifying, stated that, as an outcome of the Yalta Conference, 
that tliree men were appointed to go over and see if they could consult 
with the Polish leaders and the Polish people with reference to work- 
ing out some sort of situation or agreement. Those were Ambassador 
Clark Kerr, yourself, and Mr. Molotov. Could you tell us what hap- 
pened at those conferences ? 

Mr. Harriman. I can only tell you from memory, as I have not had 
accesss to any papers. 

The three of us met in Moscow, as was provided by the Yalta agree- 
ment, shortly after the end of Yalta. There was a slight delay, as I 
recall it, because Sir Arcliibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador, 
returned by train and it took him a few days. We could not come to 
an agreement, and it ended in a deadlock. 

As I recall, one of the issues was that we wanted to bring in some 
of the Poles in the London Government and some of the Polish leaders 
who were known to be in Poland. We could not get agreement with 
Mr. Molotov. If my recollection is right, the thing we broke on was 
Molotov insisting that we talk to the so-called Lublin Poles first and 
then talk to the otliei's subsequeutly. Sii- Archibald Clark Kerr and I 
took the point of \iew we should consult them together, and I think we 
broke 011 that basis and never got any further. 1 would have to refresh 
my memory to recall that, but they broke down com[)letely, and noth- 
ing was accomi)lished. 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. As I understand, you were at Yalta. Were you at 
Tehran ^ 

Mr. Harriman. I was at Telu-an also. 

Mr. Sheehan. Were you at Potsdam? 



[ THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2111 

Mr. Harriman. I was at Potsdam also. 

Mr. Sheehan. In all these conferences, did you participate in the 
high-level discussions, or were you, like Mr. Hiss 

Mr. Harriman. I was in some of them, not in all of them, but I was 
in some of them. 

Mr. SiiEEiiAN. Then permit me to ask you this : As I understand 
the Yalta Conference 

Mr. Harrimax. You see, there were conferences going on between 
the staffs, our Chiefs of Staff, the combined Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Soviet, and there were certain other discussions. INIr. Roosevelt and 
Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin had some discussions. I think I was 
in most of the conferences between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. 

Mr. Sheehan. According to Mr. Byrnes, who was Secretary of 
State at the time of the Yalta conference, if my memory serves me 
right 

Mr. Harriman. No, he was not Secretary of State. He came as an 
adviser to President Roosevelt. He was not Secretary of State at 
that time. 

Mr. Sheehan. As I remember this situation — and the reason why 
we are bringing it in is to try to find out whether there was any ques- 
tion about the Poles involved — he stated the conference had broken up 
February 10 and most of them had departed, and then the conference 
went on for another 1 or 2 days. According to the history. Hiss stayed 
on and was with Mr. Roosevelt and Stalin, when a very small, select 
group, made further arrangements or commitments at Yalta. Do 
you know anything at all about that? Were you in that group? 

Mr. Harriman. Mr. Hiss had nothing to do with any of these dis- 
cussions. There were some discussions at the last day or two of the 
Yalta Conference, in regard to the Far East and Russia's participation 
in the war against Japan. Those were the last discussions that took 
place in Yalta, if my memory is correct. 

Mr. Sheehan. As far as you know, at Tehran, at Yalta, and Pots- 
dam, did you engage in any discussions at all, with any of our officials 
or foreign officials, with reference to the missing Polish officers, or their 
problem ? 

Mr. Harriman. No; I do not recall the subject came up. 

Mr. Sheehan. However, I do know, unfortunately I do not think 
the State Department has paraphrased it, that as early as November 
1941 you yourself had sent a message to Mr. Stalin in which you had 
asked about the Polish Army and the Polish officers, with a view to- 
ward finding when the Polish forces could be gotten into a fighting 
unit. And Mr. Stalin later sent you some telegrams and some informa- 
tion on that. I would like to have the counsel show this to you to see 
if you can recall it. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes ; I sent a telegram to Mr. Stalin on November 
T, as I recall it, at the request of the President. I would be glad to read 
this into the record, if you wish. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, I believe we have a copy of that 
paraphrased. 

Mr. Harriman. Then I got two replies from Stalin, one that he 
would consider it, and then another one about a talk with Ambassador 
Kot, and then I have a letter from Raczynski in London. I was in 
London at that time. In it he says : 

Beyond doubt, your telegram to Mr. Stalin was instrumental in breaking a very 
undesirable deadlock and facilitating General Sikorski's visit to Russia. 



2112 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

then lie goes on and thanks me for the Polish Government for my 
efforts. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, I offer you what will be marked 
for identification as "Exhibit 23," which you can peruse, and ask you 
if that is the authentic message which you sent on November 7. That 
includes also the attachments to it. I think this is a paraphrase. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes, this seems to be a correct copy of the telegram 
I sent. 

Chairman Madden. Group exhibit 23 is accepted in evidence. 

Mr. Sheehan. If this other one is a paraphrase, I think it would 
be important as part of the record the telegram of November 14 from 
Mr. Harriman to Mr. Stalin, so that we know our Government was 
informed, and Mr. Harriman was cognizant of the fact that the Polish 
situation was of importance even as early as 1941, in November. 

Cliairman Madden. Is that in the exhibit? 

]Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 18, and one of four attachments 
to it. 

(The document was marked "Group Exhibit 23" and received for 
the record.) 

Exhibit 23 — Message Fkom Haeriman to Stalin of November 7, 1941 

The problem of the most effective ways of using unarmed Polish troops now in 
Russia has had close attention and, at the President's suggestion and after 
consulting with him I am bringing certain phases for your consideration to your 
direct attention. It is our understanding that these Polish forces are in the 
general region of the lower Volga and east of there, and that owing to the great 
strain on Soviet resources it is not possible for the Soviet Government fully to 
equip or utilize these troops. The problem therefore would appear to be one 
of reconditioning these troops to their greatest effectiveness under the terms of 
the understanding with the Polish Government that these troops are to fight as a 
national unit against Nazism. These troops are located in an area bordering 
vital regions whose defense is of joint interest to all who oppose the Nazi regime. 

It is our suggestion that these Polish forces be assembled and sent to a 
designated area in Persia, and that this should be done with the agreement as 
well as the assistance of the Soviet Government. With American and British 
help these Poles might there be uniformed, armed, and reconditioned so that 
they could most quickly become a part of the fighting forces in the expectation 
that they would be sent to the Soviet Russian front. 

In cooperation with the P.ritish we are conducting a survey which it is hoped 
will quickly ascertain the supplies necessary and the availability of material 
and the means by which supplies may be delivered to the Poles not only quickly 
but also with the least possible interference with transportation lines for supplj'- 
ing materials to the Soviet Union. 

It would be deeply appreciated if you would express your general views on this 
subject. If you agree it would be helpful if you could inform us when and in what 
numbers it would be possible for the Polish forces to arrive at places outside the 
Soviet Union where our plans as discussed above could be put into operation. 



Exhibit 23A — Ambassador Harriman's Dispatch to Washington 

Embassy of the United States of America, 

London, December 1, 1941. 
The Honorable Cordetx Hull, 

Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. O. 
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you herewith, for the records, copies of 
two cables I have received frtim Stalin, as delivered to me by M. Maisky, in reply 
to a calile sent in my name to Stalin on Noveml)er 12th. 

I am enclosing also copy of a letter from Count Raczynski, the Polish Am- 
bassador. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) A. Harriman. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2113 

Exhibit 23B — Marshal Stalin's First Reply to Ambassador Harriman 

14th NOVEMBEHI, 1941. 

Mr. Averell Harriman : Your telegram of the 12th November received. I have 
not yet had the possibility to acquaint myself with all the details of the Polish 
question in the U. S. S. R. In the course of two or three days, after studying this 
question, I will let you know the attitude of the Soviet Government. In any case 
you should have no doubts that the wishes of the Poles, as well as the interests 
of the friendly relations between the U. S. S. R. and Poland will be taken into 
account by the Soviet Government. 

( Signed ) Stalin. 



Exhibit 23C — Marshal Stalin's Second Reply to Ambassador Harriman 

27th November, 1041. 
Mr. Averell Harriman, 
% American Embassy. 
Dear Mr. Harriman : I am instructed to forward to you the following reply 
of M. Stalin to your telegram : 

"I had recently a conversation with the Polish Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., 
Monsieur Kot. I received the impression that the U. S. S. R. and Poland have 
all the reasons and possibilities to settle all fundamental questions in which both 
parties are interested. For your information, I would like to point out that 
Monsieur Kot did not raise the question, during the conversation, of sending 
Polish military forces from the U. S. S. R. to any other country. 
Yours sincerely, 

Stalin." 
(Signed) I. Maisky. 

Exhibit 23D — Polish Embassy Letter to Ambassador Harriman 

Polish Embassy, 
47 Portland Place, London, W. 1, November 26, 1941. 
Mr. William Averell Harriman, 
Minister Plenipotentiary, 

Dorchester Hotel, Park Lane, W. 1. 
Dear Mr. Harriman : I feel it to be my duty to present to you the Polish Govern- 
ment's very sincere and cordial thanks for your help in our difficult conversations 
with the Soviet authorities regarding the formation of the Polish Army in Russia. 
It is beyond doubt that your telegram sent to M. Stalin was instrumental in 
breaking a very undesirable deadlock and in facilitating General Sikorski's visit 
to Russia. It is the very sincere hope of the Polish Government that this visit 
may bring all the expected results. That it will lay solid foundations for the 
establishment of our army in Russia and contribute to improve the position of 
our civil population in the Soviet Union. 
Believe me. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) Edward Raczynski. 

Mr. Mitchell. Did you want some of these read ? 

Mr. Sheehan. On November 4 Mr. Harriman's telegram to Mr. 
Stalin, and the reply. 

Mr. Harriman. That was November 7, 1941. 

Mr. Sheehan. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 23, message from Harriman to Stalin, 
November 7, 1941 : 

The problem of the most effective ways of using unarmed Polish troops now in 
Russia has had close attention and, at the President's suggeston, and after con- 
sulting with him, I am bringing certain phases for your consideration to your 
direct attention. It is our understanding that these Polish forces are in the 
general region of the lower Volga, and east of that, and that owing to the great 
strain on Soviet resources it is not possible for the Soviet Government fully to 
equip or utilize these troops. The problem, therefore, would appear to be one of 
reconditioning these troops to their greatest effectiveness, under the terms of the 



2114 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

understanding witli the Polish Government that these troops are to fight as a 
national unit against nazism. These troops are located in an ai'ea bordering 
vital regions wliose defense is of joint interest to all who oppose the Nazi regime. 
It is our suggestion that these Polish forces be assembled and sent to a desig- 
nated area in Persia and that this should be done with the agreement as well as 
with the assistance of the Soviet Government. With American and British help, 
these Poles might there be uniformed, armed, and reconditioned so that they 
could most quickly become a part of tlie fighting forces in the expectation that 
they would be sent to-the Soviet Russian front. * * * 

Mr. Siiep:han. Mr. Counsel, I tliiiik that is sufficient reading, be- 
cause the rest of it just ojoes on out. 

That is just to prove the fact that our Government in 1941 was con- 
scious of the Polish Army situation. 

Mr. Mitchell. This is another part of the same exhibit, being dated 
November 14, 1941, addressed to Mr. Averell Harriman: 

Your telegram of November 12 received. I have not yet had the possibility to 
acquaint myself witli all the details of the Polish question in tlie U. S. S. R. 
In the coui'se of 2 or 3 days, after studying this question, I will let you know the 
attitude of the Soviet Government. In any case you should have no doubts that 
the interests of the Poles, as well as the interests of tlie friendly relations between 
the U. S. S. R. and Poland will he taken into account l)y the Soviet Government. 

signed "Stalin." 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Harriman, my thought here is this: 

Starting in 1941, were you acquainted with the problem of the Polish 
Arm}' and the formation of it, and then in 1943, when you became Am- 
bassador, was there any more question now about the Polish Army, 
because at this point, when you were Ambassador, the massacre had 
been discovered ? 

Mr. Harriman. As I recall it — and I may be wrong on it — a good 
many of the Polish soldiers had been brought to Iran and had been 
trained and equipped there, and they did not go back into Russia, they 
went into, I think, the first place, Italy, and fought very gallantly 
there. 

The problem that I was involved in was attempting to get the 
Soviet Government to recognize again the Polish Government in Exile 
as the Government of Poland. They had broken off relationships, as 
you well know, in the spring of 1943. Mr. Hull, as I recall it, took it 
up while he was in Moscow, at the time of the Moscoav Conference, in 
October 1943, and we exerted constant pressure on the Soviet Govern- 
ment to recognize again the Polish Government in London as the Gov- 
ernment of Poland. All of those endeavors were unsuccessful. 

Mr. Siieeitan. Mr. Harriman, this is calling for an expression of 
opinion, insofar as it relates to the Polish situation. 

When Mr. Byrnes was assistant to the President at Yalta, was he 
fairly well informed as to what hap])ened there up to the })()int where 
he left the negotiations and conversations^ 

Mr. Harriman. I do not recall which meetings he was in. I do 
know he was not in the discussions between Stalin and President 
Roosevelt on the Far East. To my own recollection, I do not know 
which meetings he attended. 

Mr. Sheeiian. The reason why I ask that is that Mr. Byrnes had 
made a statement Avhicli, to us in the connnittee, brings up a question. 
I will read the statement, with your permission, because he agreed with 
you with reference to your conversations, about the Lublin Govern- 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2115 

ment, but he also brings out another phase about negotiations with 
Pohmd. I will quote directly. He says : 

Not only Poland's boundaries, but Poland itself was one of the most serious 
issues of the entire conference. More time was spent on this subject than any 
other. Because of the intensity of the argument, Mr. Roosevelt would assume 
the role more of an arbiter than of an advocate, although he, as well as Prime 
Minister Churchill urged the establishment of a new Polish Government in War- 
saw. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wanted to continue the Lublin 
Government. Stalin was willing to add a few persons, but he wanted to make 
certain that those that were added did not affect the Soviet Union's control of 
the Government. 

that last part substantially agrees with what you said in your negotia- 
tions with the three men. 

Mr. Harkiman. I would think that he was right, that of all the 
political subjects, there was more time spent on Poland than any other. 
There were, of course, considerable military discussions. 

Mr. Sheehax. "Would you care to comment on Mr. Byrnes' remarks ? 
He said Mv. Roosevelt spent more time as an arbiter rather than as 
an advocate. 

Mr. Harrimax. I would be inclined to think my recollection is 
correct, as far as the boundary is concerned, but he was very anxious 
to get an early agreement on the establishment of a government which 
would insure the protection of the freedom of the Polish people and 
the holding of a free election at the earliest possible moment. 

Mr. Sheehax. Thank you. 

Mr. Maciirow^icz. Mr." Harriman, I think this has been partially 
covered but I would like to get your answer to it. 

Were any representatives of the Polish Government consulted re- 
garding the Yalta agreement, prior to the agreement? 

Mr. Harriman. Not that I know of. But there may have been 
talks. There have been a number of talks, in London, and Mr. 
Mikolajczvk had come to Moscow in August of 1944 and also in 
October of 1944. 

Mr. Machrow^icz. That was after the Yalta agreement; was it? 

Mr. Harrimax. No ; before the Yalta agreement. Mikolajczyk was 
the Prime INlinister of the Polish Government in London after Gen- 
eral Sikorski's death, and he remained as such during this period. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was he consulted ? 

Mr. Harrimax. He was not consulted, so far as I know, about 
the Yalta agreement, but there were discussions with Mr. Mikolajczyk 
on the subject of a settlement in order to get a provisional govern- 
ment established, which would insure the possibility of holding a free 
election. 

]Mr. Machrowicz. Can you explain why, at the time of the settle- 
ment of the question involving the independence of the nation and 
the future territorial integrity of that country, that no representative 
of that country was invited ? 

Mr. Harrimax. There were no other representatives of any gov- 
ernments at Tehran, except the three governments, the three principal 
allies. There had been discussions with Mikolajczyk over possible 
settlements, both in Moscow and in London. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But no representative was invited to confer? 

Mr. Harrimax. No representative was invited. 



2116 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you consider that the agreement which you 
and Mr. Kerr worked out in Moscow^ in June of 1945 was a satisf actoiy 
sohition of the agreement in Yalta? 

Mr. Harriman. I never thought it was a satisfactory sohition. It 
was the one hope that possibly an interim government might be estab- 
lished which would have enough non-Communist members, in order 
to insure that there would be a free election held. 

Of course, this agreement was unsuccessful and it was the best 
that it appeared at that time that could be obtained and gave some 
hope that there would be a free election and that what we call the 
democratic elements — you know, the Soviets have used that word 
"democratic" in quite a different way than we use it — that the demo- 
cratic forces in Poland would rise, and there could be a free election 
held. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What guaranty did we obtain at Yalta that 
there would be a free and unfettered election in Poland ? 

Mr. Harriman. The only guaranties were the pledged words of 
Stalin. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was that satisfactory to you ? 

Mr. Harriman. I don't know what other pledges you could have 
had. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you think an election controlled by the powers 
which made the Yalta agi'eement could have been held ? 

Mr. Harriman. There was agreement. It was that the three govern- 
ments would work together, and see that a free election would be held. 
We did not bow out of it. In the agreement it was recognized that 
the United States and British Governments had a joint responsibility 
with the Soviet Government in seeing that they were held. But the 
Soviet Government always refused to permit that to happen, and no 
free elections were held in Poland. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And there was nothing that we could do about it, 
was there ? 

Mr. Harriman. There was nothing we could do about it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Because of the agreement made at Yalta. 

Mr. Harriman. No, not because of the agreements made at Yalta, 
but because of the physical occupation of Poland by the Red army. 
That was a reality at Yalta and was still a reality in the summer of 
1945. 

Mr. Machrowicz. While you were at Moscow you wired various 
Polish leaders to come to Moscow to help work out the agreements; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not recall those wires, I have not seen them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember the message to Witos? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. sir. We had certain of them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You had urged him to come to Moscow. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. He was the Peasant leader. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And he refused? 

Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory about that, be- 
cause I have not seen the telegrams recently. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to have Mr. Harriman see these docu- 
ments to see whether that refreshes his memory. 

Mr. Harriman. I have no doubt that is the message I sent him. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2117 

Mr. Machrowicz. You remember you urged Witos to come to Mos- 
cow to participate in these deliberations ? 

Mr. Harkiman. That was in June of 1945. 

Mr, Machrowicz, That is right. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes; that is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What do you know about the 16 Poles who came 
to Moscow as a result of invitations and urgings on the part of both the 
Russian Government and the United States Government, who have 
never been seen since ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not recall any representation by the United 
States Government to have them come to Moscow. As I recall it — 
and I do this from recollection of 7 years — the first I heard about 
this was when I was back here after President Roosevelt's death, and 
this information was received, that they had been brought to Moscow 
and were imprisoned under charges. Mr. Stettinius took it up with 
Mr. Molotov, as I recall it, and protested vigorously. And that sub- 
ject, as I recall it, was one of discussion between Mr. Hopkins at the 
time he visited Moscow, in June of 1945. As I recall it, as a result of 
representations, a number of them were released, although not all of 
them were. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, I believe those discussions took place 
at the United Nations Conference on May 7, 1945. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes ; I believe so. 

Mr. Mitchell, And at that time Mr. Molotov admitted the im- 
prisonment. As a result of the imprisonment of the 16 leaders, did you 
not go to the President and plead with him to send Harry Hopkins 
over there, as reported in the book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, by 
Sherwood ? 

Mr. Harriman. That was one of the questions. The major question 
up with Molotov when he was over here, one of the major questions, 
was carrying out the Yalta agreement that there should be a broadly 
based democratic government. And Mr. Hopkins' primary mission 
to Moscow was to try to work out an agreement with Stalin to carry 
out the Yalta agreement. And, of course, we were all shocked by 
this imprisonment of these Polish leaders, and that was one of the 
things that was discussed, as I recall it, by Mr. Hopkins, in Moscow. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Let me get this correct so that we will all 
understand. 

The 16 Polish leaders were invited to Moscow 

Mr. Harriman. Not by the United States Government. 

Mr. Machrowicz. No; not by the United States Government, but 
with the knowledge of the United States Government. 

Mr. Harriman. No. I don't recall hearing anything about it until 
we learned about it when I was back here in this country. 

Mr. Machrowicz. The declared purpose for the invitation of these 
16 Polish leaders to Moscow was the discussion of the possibility 
of the formation of a so-called representative Polish Government ; am 
I right? 

Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory as to on what 
basis the Soviet Government induced them to come out, under which 
they were seized and brought to Moscow. 

Mr. Machrowicz. At that time you were Ambassador? 



2118 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Harriman. I was in the United States at that time. I came 
from Moscow to Washington, I think, 2 or 3 days after President 
Roosevelt's death. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Yon know now that most of those, after ha vino- 
been invited to Moscow, presumably for discussions, Avere either assasi- 
nated or placed in prison and not heard from. 

Mr. Harriman. We knew they had been brought to Moscow. As 
1 recall it, the first I knew of it was after I had returned to this 
country and, as I say, Mr. Stettinius took it up with Molotov at 
San Francisco. They were put in prison, and we were all very much 
shocked by it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. I believe you testified previously that, in your 
opinion, Stalin and Soviet Russia have never kept the terms of the 
agreement entered into at Yalta ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Harriman. That is correct, as far as any of the political agree- 
ments were concerned. The military agreements, they kept, made 
during the war. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not think it would have been wiser for 
us to have taken some precautions to guarantee the fulfillment of 
these agreements by Soviet Russia ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not know what guaranties you could have 
had. The areas under political discussion were those areas which 
either had already been occupied by the Red army, or would in all 
probability be occupied by the Red army. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Was the possibility of elections under the con- 
trol of the three powers who agreed to the terms of Yalta discussed? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. I think the agreement specified that we should 
work together to see that free elections were held. 

Mr. Machrowicz. No — not to work together; to have the elections 
conducted under the control of the three powers. Would that not have 
given some assurance of free elections ? 

Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory as to the lan- 
guage of the agreement. But, as I recall it, it was clearly under- 
stood the three ])owers would work together to see that free elections 
were held. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, "working together" is a rather loose 
statement, which has no meaning unless we specify in just what way 
we work together. 

Mr. Harriman. If we specified them, they would have still broken 
the agreement, because they broke the basic agreement. 

I think we have to be realistic about it, that other than the use of 
force on the part of the United States and the western allies, there 
would have been no way to have gotten the Soviet Government to agree 
to carry out their agreements. 

Mr. Machrowicz. What advantage did the United States get in the 
agreement at Yalta ? 

Mr. Harriman. The protection of the Poles in terms of holding free 
elections. If there had been no negotiations at all, there would have 
been no chance of free elections and the occupation by the Red army 
would have been, M'ithout a doubt, peri)etuated, and, of course, that 
is what finally hajipened. But President Roosevelt made every effort 
to get an agreement with Stalin, which he got, and the fact that Stalin 
broke those agreements, not only with relation to Poland, but other 
agreements, was the first notice to the civilized world of the duplicity 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2119 

and the aggressive intentions of the Soviet I"'^nion. I think we are 
better oJff to have made the agreements, than if we had not made the 
attempt. I think if President Roosevelt had not made the attempt, 
he would have been subjected to great criticism. 

Mr. JMaciirowicz. That protection was more or less based on the 
bare word of Stalin ; is that right? 

Mr. Hareiman. There is no other physical protection which we 
could have had, unless we had maintained our forces in Europe and 
induced our allies to remain mobilized. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Mr. Harriman. It is a curious thing — they did hold a free election 
in Hungary. That was either in September or the first of October in 
1945. You probably recall that the Communists got a small per- 
centage of the vote and a non-Communist goveriunent was established, 
the leading party being what was known as the Freeholders Party, 
which was a small Peasants' Party. 

, Mr. Sheehax. ]May I say, Mr. Secretary, at that point, that there 
are some of us on the committee that would not agree with the reason- 
ing that it was in 1945 that you first knew about the duplicity of the 
Russian Government, 

Mr. Harriman. No, I said the free world. 

Mr. Sheehak. Because in our State Department, ever since 1943, 
you will recall the evidence of Katyn, reports from various Ambas- 
sadors, and then since 1933, when we first recognized Russia, there 
were many violations of our agreements with her. 

Mr, Harriman. I have been on record, as is generally known, that 
it was my judgment we would have grave difficulties with the Soviet 
Union; that it was a new force in the world which might be as dif- 
ficult to deal with as the Nazi force. That is recorded in Mr. For- 
restal's diary, and many people know that is the view I ex})ressed 
when I came back from Russia in the spring of 1945. 

Mr. Sheeiian. Do you think the Polish Government, as it exists 
today, as it does apparently, as I gather from you — which is in viola- 
tion of the Yalta agreement — is a good thing ? 

Mr. Harriman. The present Government of Poland ? 

Mr. SiiEEHAN. They broke their agreement at Yalta in setting up a 
government, because there was no free election. Is that right or 
wrong ? 

Mr. Harriman. This present Government is not representative of 
the people. It is a puppet government of the Soviet Union, 

Mr. Sheeiian. And it is not representative of the agreement en- 
tered into at Yalta for the forming of such a government ( 

Mr. Harriman. That is correct ; it is not. 

Mr, Sheehan. Then would you care to pass an opinion, in light of 
the fact that it is an illegal government, as to our Government's recog- 
nizing the Polish Government today ^ 

Mr. Harriman. That is a question as to whether we are better off to 
break all relations with the iron-curtain countries, or not. My own 
judgment is that it is better to maintain relationship and to strengthen 
the free world and to expect the da}- to come when Poland again can 
be free. I do not think that it will contribute to the welfare of the 
Polisli people for us to break relations with the Polish Government, 
even though it is a go\ ernment which was established in violation of 
the Yalta agreement. 



2120 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Sheehan. I Avas going to say that at the time we were sort of 
giving sanction to a moral wrong.. 

Mr. Harriman. That is true of the other governments in Eastern 
Europe. 

Mr. Sheehan. After all, as Members of Congress, we are naturally 
interested in our foreign policy and what we are going to do in the 
future, and we ask questions of experienced people like yourself, who 
might help or guide us. As I understand it, you were one of the few 
men, fortunately or unfortunately, who were at the three main con- 
ferences, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. In the light of your experi- 
ence in all of the negotiations with Russia and the agreements she has 
not kept, especially the political agreements, in your judgment should 
we keep on making agreements with somebody who does not want to 
perform ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not think any agreements with the Soviet 
Union are of any value, unless they are based on a position of strength, 
so that they can be forced to carry them out. ' 

Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, any agreements we make should be where 
we have the strength to enforce them ? 

Mr. Harriman. I think we want to get to the day as rapidly as we 
can when the free world is so strong that we can compel the Soviet 
Union to live up to its obligations. 

Mr. Sheehan. In the conference that the Katyn committee had 
with President Truman, w^ith reference to getting his cooperation, 
President Truman stated to our committee when we were talking about 
Russian agreements — and I think he specifically named the date — he 
said that on January 6, 1946, was the date he realized that there would 
be no more use or no more hope of making agreements with Russia. 
Would you care to comment on that in any particular way? 

Mr. Harriman. No ; I cannot comment on that. I think you will 
have to ask him exactly what he meant by that. But I do know that 
when I saw him in April of 1945, he had a clear understanding of the 
difficulties we were going to have with the Soviet Union, and he pressed 
Mr. Molotov very hard, in the first talk we had with Mr. Molotov 
when he came here in 1945, April of 1945, to fulfill the obligations of 
the Soviet Union toward Poland. 

At the same time, we have got to continue at various places where 
we have contact in the United Nations and elsewhere, to attempt to 
get the Soviet Union to agree to proper behavior and to deal with the 
problems which are currently up, including, of course, the Korean 
situation. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Harriman, did. you invite Mikolajczyk to 
come to Moscow to the conference? 

Mr. Harriman. In June 1945. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember that under the Yalta agree- 
ment tliis was to be called a provisional government? 

Mr. Harriman. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But at the time of your conference with Mr. 
Kerr and yourself, the Russians insisted that the word "provisional" 
be left out; am I right? 

Mr. Harihman. I think that is true. I would have to refresh my 
memory. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And the British objected to it; did they not? 

Mr. Harriman. I don't recall that. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2121 

Mr, Machrowicz. For your information, in one of your messages 
in the Department of State you reported that tlie British objected to 
it, but you finally agreed after Beirut and the Poles said they would 
be satisfied to have the word "Provisional" left out, and they very 
much resented the British objection to that. Does that refresh your 
recollection ? 

Mr, HARRiMAisr. That is 7 years ago. I would have to review it. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you get the impression that the Poles were 
satisfied with the arrangements made by you and Mr. Clark Kerr with 
regard to the formation 

Mr. Harriman. I looked upon it as a last attempt to develop the 
situation within Poland which would lead to the freedom of Poland. 
None of us was very optimistic about its outcome, but it was the final 
attempt to obtain freedom for the Poles. That undoubtedly it is. 

Mr. Machrowicz, Do you feel the United States has really shown 
a continued interest in insuring a free election ? 

Mr. Harriman. Well, they have done everything they could. As I 
understand it, the State Department has consistently done everything 
it could to insist on the holding of the elections; and, short of military 
action, there is nothing further tliat I know of that we could have done. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Unfortunately, because of the agreement at 
Yalta, we had no guaranties, and all we could do was plead with 
Stalin ; is that not right ? 

Mr. Harriman. It was not a question of the agreements at Yalta; 
it was the situation of the occupation of Poland by the Red Army, 
which gave them the power to do it, and nothing could dislodge them 
other than the use of force. 

Mr. Machrowicz. After Yalta, there was nothing we could do but 
count on Stalin's word ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Harriman. There was nothing we could do but hope that 
Stalin would keep his word, and the opinion of the free world, which 
he has, of course, completely • 

Mr, Machrowicz. Knowing Soviet Russia as we do today, on the 
basis of facts which occurred subsequent to the Yalta agreement, do 
you feel that, had you known all those facts, you still would have 
recommended the agreement at Yalta? 

Mr. Harriman. I think this : tliat, whether there had been an agree- 
ment at Yalta or whether there had not been, events in Poland would 
have gone forward just as they did, except that the Polish people 
would have suffered more. There would have been no basis for bring- 
ing UNNRA goods in and helping tiie individual Poles in the distress 
which they have had. 

I see no loss by the Yalta agreement, or any of the agreements that 
were made. It proved beyond contradiction to all of the nations of 
the free world, including the people of the United States, the duplic- 
ity and aggressive intents of the Soviet Union, and the fact they broke 
these agreements hg^s been one of the reasons why the free world 
has become more and more united. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not believe that a firmer position by the 
United States at that time, rather than a position of appeasement, as 
undoubtedly took place at Yalta, would have increased the respect for 
the United States today in free Europe ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not accept the word "appeasement" ; I acxiept 
the earnest attempt on the part of President Roosevelt to obtain an 



2122 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 

agreement by Stalin to liold free elections, and he succeeded in obtain- 
ing it. Anything else short of force would have had no other avail. 
We had no troops in that area. Any further language would have 
been broken, just as the language which was written was broken. 

Mr. Maciirowicz. That is all. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski. 

Mr. O'Konski. Ambassador, you said that we agreed to all these 
things with Russia because we wanted certain military commitments 
from Russia. You admit that they violated the political commit- 
ments, and you say they kept the military commitments. 

Mr. PIarriman. That is right. 

Mr. OTvonski. What military commitments or agreements did 
Russia keep with us? 

Mr. Harriman. The principal one was the one that I told you. 

Mr. O'Konski. At the time of the Normandy invasion ? 

Mr. Harriman. Which was the attack on the eastern front 2 weeks 
after we landed in Normand3^ 

Mr. O'Konski. As I understand, the Normandy invasion was 
June 6, 1944. The Yalta Conference was in February 1945, when 
Hitler was already kaput. He was finished when you were in Yalta. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. 

But someone made a statement that Stalin had kept none of his 
agreements. I was explaining he had kept military agreements, and 
there were other agreements that we made which he kept. 

Mr. O'Konski. Like what ? 

Mr. Harriman. Such as the establishment of bases at Poltava and 
otherwise. And a number of other military agreements that were 
made he kept. 

Mr, O'Konski. Do you include in that his entering the Japanese 
War? 

Mr. Harriman. His entry in the Japanese War was one that took 
place when it was quite obvious that Japan was about to surrender. 

Mr. O'Konski. He had 750,000 Japanese prisoners at stake and 
Manchuria, but he certainly did not enter into that war to keep an 
agreement with us ; did he ? 

Mr. Harriman. No. As I have said a number of times, I was al- 
ways convinced that the Soviet Union would enter the war against 
Japan in their own due time. But the objective of our Government, 
on the strong recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, was to get 
agreement from the Soviet Union to come into the war when it would 
help us and avoid the necessity of what was thought to be probable, 
of landing forces on the plains of Tokyo, which would have been a 
very costly operation in terms of American lives. And there was a 
constant desire on the part of our Chiefs of Stafl' to bring the Russians 
into the war against Japan shortly after the defeat of Germany. 

Mr. O'Konski. In September 'l 944, when 250,000 Poles of the Pol- 
ish underground were slaughtered in Warsaw and Joe Stalin had his 
army perched for 90 days waiting while the}' were slaughtered, and 
would not move an inch forward, he kept his military agreement with 
us pretty well then, too ; did he not ? 

INfr. IIahrimax. That Warsaw ui)rising was one of the Aery great 
tra<redies. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2123 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That was at the height of the Normandy invasion. 
That is when we needed him most. And he sat on liis hands. So, he 
certainly did not keep his military agreement. 

Mr. Harrimax. He did not move until early in 1945. Whether, 
militarily, he could have crossed the Vistula or not, I do not know. 

ISIr. O'KoNSKi. Do you still think, Ambassador, that Russia would 
ever make any military maneuver that would benefit the United States 
of America, or that she would make a military maneuver only if it 
benefited Joe Stalin ? 

Mr. Harri3iax. Of all the men I have ever known, Mr. Stalin is the 
most hard-boiled individual and always considers everything from 
his own standpoint. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. I have just a few more questions here. 

The thing that I am driving at here is : As I view this whole set-up, 
Ambassador, there is no question in my mind that you boys were ready 
to give Stalin anything he asked for. The thing that I am most glad 
about is that Stalin did not know that. If he had known how ready 
you boys were to give up and give in, he could have asked not only for 
free elections in Poland but he could have forced us to sign an agree- 
ment that we would have free elections in the United States of Amer- 
ica, the Avay he wanted it. That is how anxious we were to go along 
Avith him. 

Mr. Harrimax. Wait a minute, I must have exception to that. 
President Roosevelt was trying to get Stalin's agreement about the 
treatment of the countries which would be occupied or were occupied 
by the Red army, where we would be unable to exercise any influence 
or force. And there were no concessions made at Yalta. The conces- 
sions — if you want to call them such — were basically made by Stalin. 
The great tragedy of Yalta was that Stalin did not keep his agree- 
ments. Eastern Europe would be free today if he had kept those 
agreements. 

In other words, what I am trying to tell you is that the situation was 
one where Stalin dominated eastern Europe. That was not the situ- 
ation which we created. That was the situation which was created by 
the war. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. Here was a Polish general, Sikorski. He was look- 
ing for somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 Polish officers. All 
of a sudden they find the graves of these officers, and it is announced 
to the world, unfortunately, by the Germans. 

Is it not only humane and natural on General Sikorski's part that 
he, as a general of a gi-eat country, first had the courage to resist Nazi 
aggression by force and, being least prepared, that it should only be 
natural for him to say "why don't we get an international body like 
the Red Cross to come over here and investigate what happened to 
our officers?" 

But then that gives the Russians the reason for severing diplomatic 
relations with them. And then our President writes a letter of 
apology to Joe Stalin that he acted rather without reason; that "It 
is too bad that he acted in that way, but won't you please, Mr. Stalin, 
at least talk to Sikorski once in a while V 

Can you imagine anything so ridiculous as that inquiry and going 
to the point where our President actually apologizes because he asks 



2124 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

for that investigation? Would you not say that was downright 
appeasement ? 

Mr. Harriman. I will tell you what General Sikorski himself told 
me : That he was ill at the time; that if he had not been ill he would 
not have made that particular proposal. He certainly would have 
followed up with the Kussians the question of investigation of this 
case. But all I can tell you is that was his view. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. As to these reports that you sent in, Ambassador, 
you daughter Kathleen's and Melby's, were those sent in at your own 
initiative ? 

Mv. Harriman. My own initiative. 

Chairman Madden. Might I interrupt here a moment ? 

Mr. Harriman, I w^ill hand you what we will mark for identification 
"Exhibit 24," which is a telegram from Moscow, dated January 25. 
1944, to the Secretary of State in Washington, signed "Harriman," 
and I will ask you if you can identify the same ? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. 

Chairman Madden. That will be received for the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 24" for identifica- 
tion and is as follows:) 

Exhibit 24 — Telegbam Feom United States Embassy, Moscow, January 25, 1944 

[Telegram] 

Moscow, January 25, 19^4- 
Seceetary of State, 

Washinffton. 
(For President and Secretary — strictly confidential.) 
Member of Embassy staff and my daughter have returned from trip Smolensk 
witli British and American correspondents. While there they were shown evi- 
dence being collected by special commission to investigate German shooting of 
captured Polish officers in Katyn Forest close to Smolensk. 

None of party was able to judge scientific evidence of autopsies which were 
performed in their presence. Moreover, they were not permitted to make inde- 
pendent investigations except for formal questioning of few witnesses made 
available. Correspondents filed reports telling what they saw without express- 
ing opinions, but for some reason censor has held up these stories. The general 
evidence and testimony are inconclusive, but Kathleen and Embassy staff mem- 
ber believe probability massacre perpetrated by Germans. 

Appears Soviets conducting very detailed examination each body by autopsy 
and by examination clothing, remaining personal effects, and papers. Evidence 
which made greatest impression to strengthen Russian case was : 

(One) Most soldiers exhumed to date were enlisted men rather than officers, 
as Germans claimed. 

(Two) IMethodical method of execution, each having been killed by one shot at 
base of skull. 

(Three) Dates of papers exhibited from November 1940 to June 1041. 
(Four) Testimony by witnesses re unsuccessful attempt to evacuate Poles at 
time of German breakthrough to Smolensk and re Poles engaged road work in 
area for Russians and Germans in 1941. 

Haukiman. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. These reports. Ambassador, were sent on your own 
initiative; were they? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. I asked my daughter and assigned Mr. Melby 
to go tliere. 

Mr. O'Konski. The reason why I ask that is that it leads up to the 
second question I have. 

All during this time that you were the Ambassador, there were some 
15,000 Polish officers murdered, and our Government here in Wash- 
ington did not show enough interest to request you to find the essential 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2125 

facts concerning the case; is that correct? Not once were you com- 
municated with for information. They did not care what happened 
to those officers ; did they ? 

Mr. Hareiman. I cannot say they did not care, but it is a fact they 
did not ask me to do it. I assume they did not think I had any means 
of finding out how it occurred. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. If the answer is not that they did not care, the other 
answer is that they were so afraid they might learn the truth about 
who murdered them that again they might get afraid of that great 
big thing ; that Joe Stalin might get mad at us and make a separate 
peace with Hitler. 

Mr. Hareiman. I don't think that would be the case at all. I never 
saw any evidence of that. There was a constant effort on the part of 
the United States Government to protect the interests of the Poles 
insofar as it was possible to do so. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In that report, as you said, you were more or less 
inclined to believe that the Germans were guilty of the crime ; were 
you not ? 

Mr. Harriman. You see, I did not express any personal opinion. I 
sent the reports on as they were given to me, and I expressed no per- 
sonal view. I sent it on for such value that it would have. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I want to say I respect your honesty in regard to 
that, because being over there and being on one side of the controversy, 
seeing the one side, you might be mistaken. That, in my judgment, 
does not condemn you in any way. 

Mr. Harriman. Or my daughter or Mr. Melby. They went and 
saw it, and many of the other correspondents. It was the only evi- 
dence that they had, and it was such a plausible idea that the Germans 
had started this thing in order to create difficulty among the Allies 
that I think it was a natural thing to draw the conclusions they did. 

If you notice, I did not express any opinion. I simply sent it on 
for what it was worth. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. Let me ask you this further question : Your being 
in there and getting their side of it and, naturally, seeing only their 
demonstration and their propaganda, I can see how that kind of re- 
port would be made. 

Do you think differently now, from what you did then ? 

Mr. Harriman. I read over the preliminary report of your com- 
mittee, and it certainly appears as if the preponderant evidence shows 
that the Russians did it. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. In your negotiations all the way down the line, and 
particularly at Yalta, was there any information of any kind given 
to you by briefing officers of our State Department, or G-2, or Military 
Intelligence ? Was there any information given to you, for example, 
to the effect that, well, to mention a few names, in Moscow the Russians 
had Giorgi Dimitrov ready to go over into Bulgaria, they had Klement 
Gottwald in Moscow all ready to go and take over Czechoslovakia, 
they had Thorez ready to take over France, which he did not ; they had 
Togliatti and Luigi Longo all ready to take over Italy, and they had 
Joseph Broz, commonly known as Tito, waiting in Moscow, all ready 
to go over and take over Yugoslavia; they had Anna Pauker all ready 
to take over Rumania ? 



83744 — 52 — pt. 7 20 



2126 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

At the time of Yalta, these people were already in school and 
developed. They had the traitor Bronislaw Beirut, who turned out to 
be the man they set up to take over Poland. 

Was not there any intelligence service of any kind that relayed 
that information to you people when the Yalta Conference took place? 

Mr. Harriman. We had no information of the kind you speak of. 
There was no way to get it in Moscow. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. It was available, because I read it in December 
1944 in a book written by Earl Browder, in a little pamphlet entitled 
"Life Begins at Tehran." It was all there. 

Mr. Harriman. I did not see it. 

I was frankly concerned, and it was recorded in Forrestal's book 
that I was concerned over the aggressive intentions of the Soviet 
Union, and that I felt we should do everything we could to help 
strengthen Western Europe, or else we would find Western Europe in 
the hands of the Communists. That is recorded in Mr. Forrestal's 
book, and it is, as I recall, what I said to many people at that time. 

But, as to the details of who was being trained for what, I do not 
recall having that detailed information. But I was gravely concerned 
at that time that they would attempt, through subversion, to take over 
the countries of Western Europe, and that, with the bad economic 
conditions, it was important for us to assist the western European 
countries as much as possible to reestablish their economic life. 

Mr. OTvoNSKi. To show you what difficulties you encountered to 
get that kind of briefing and that type of information which I feel 
you should have had, would you be interested in knowing that in G-2 
that type of information was being developed, and just as soon as it 
was developed along those lines that the Communists had designs and 
plans along all those countries the men who wrote that report were 
called in by the head of G-2 and they were told that they were too 
anti-Soviet and they had better start writing different articles if they 
wanted to keep their jobs ? 

Mr. Harriman. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever because my 
statements to my Government and also some background information 
which I gave to the press were in the opposite direction : that we must 
be on our guard and help the western countries against Communist 
subversion in those countries. 

That was based on my general knowledge of the situation, and I do 
not recall knowing of the individuals in different places, although 
we did have knowledge, of course, of some of the Communists in 
France and in Italy who already were working. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. I agree with you on this point to a degree. Ambassa- 
dor. Strength alone does not mean anything. When were we 
stronger than in 1945, when you men were at Yalta? We had the 
greatest Army in the Avorld ; we had the greatest Air Force in the 
world; we had the greatest Navy in the world. We were sitting on 
top of the world. We had more than the rest of the world put to- 
gether, ready to go, while you men were at Yalta. Yet Stalin almost 
got the shirts and i)ants off our men at Yalta. It shows that strength 
does not moan mnch at all. There must be truth, courage, and honor. 

Mr. Harriman. We must remember that Yalta was just after the 
conclusion of the Battle of the Bulge. General MacArthur entered 
Manila, I think, in one of the early days of the conference. The 
bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were still to come, and no 



THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 2127 

one knew how long it would take to win the war against Japan. Esti- 
mates were made as high as 18 months after the defeat of Germany. 
We were still right in the midst of the battle to win tlie war in Europe, 
and there was ahead very difficult fighting, in the view of our military, 
as far as Japan was concerned. 

Those are the realities of the atmosphere of Yalta. It is hard to 
I'ecapture those thoughts because so quickly did Germany collapse and 
so quickly did Japan collapse thereafter. But those were the views of 
the military advisers which President Roosevelt had at that time; 
and, therefore, the military cooperation of the Soviet Union was one 
of prime importance to conclude the war in both sides of the world 
with the minimum loss of American life. 

Mr. O'KoxsKi. Do you go along with the impression that I have: 
that this Katyn massacre is in the position that it is today because 
of our policy of not trying to create ill will toward Soviet Russia, and 
that is wh}' it was hidden from the people of the world and the people 
of America I 

Mr. Harri3iax. Of course, I was in Moscow during that time. All 
the information about it was in the press. I have no knowledge of 
where our Government hid it. 

Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Machrowicz ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Harriman, at the time you sent that messuge 
to Washington relating the findings of Miss Harriman and Mr. Melby, 
did you make any inquiry as to the findings of the 9 or 10 American 
corresj^ondents who went with Mr. Melby and Miss Harriman ? 

Mr. Harrimax. I suppose I talked to them. That is 9 years ago. 
I do not remember the detailed talks, but I rather recall that most of 
them had about the same attitude as the reports of my daughter and 
Mr. Melby. 

Mr, INIachrowicz. For your information, I might state that Mr. Cas- 
sidy testified before this committee and saicl that, outside of Mr. Melby 
and Miss Harriman, they all had the conviction that the Russians were 
guilty. That is a part of the condition. I was wondering how that 
portion of findings was not included in your report to Washington. 

Mr. Harrimax. I do not recall. It is up to the committee to ask 
each one of them. But I know they all felt the same way : that there 
was iio conclusive evidence. 

Mr. Machrow^icz. Mr. Cassidy testified it was quite obviously a 
staged proposition and they all had the impression that the Russians 
were the guilty party. And it rather occurs to me that it is rather 
unusual taat that was not included in your report. 

Mr. Harriman. I do not recall the conversations, and I do not want 
to Cjuote anybody because I do not recall talking to them. But I have 
a general recollection that all of them felt that it was staged, includ- 
ing my daughter and Mr. Melby, but that — a number of them, I think, 
if I remember correctly — on balance it was probably a German atrocity, 

Mr. Machrowicz. Why was not that contained in your report to 
Washington I 

Mr. Harrimax. I do not recall why it was not. I do not know 
that. Because correspondents were interested in filing a story of what 
they liad seen; which they did. That was their objective. I did not 
know that I had aijy right to avsk them what their opinions were. 



2128 THE IL\TYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr, IMachrowicz. I would like to complete tlie record regarding 
the matter I brought up previously. 

I asked you whether or not you had any recollection of the fact 
that the British objected to omitting the word "provisional" from the 
title of tlie Government set-up in June 1945 in Poland, as provided in 
the Yalta agreement. I said that at that time you consented to hav- 
ing the word "provisional" stricken out and that the Poles — I am 
speaking of the Moscow Poles now, of course — concurred with you. 

I now have your message of June 23, 1945, in which you yourself 
state that Clark Kerr received his instructions from the British Gov- 
ernment to object to the word "provisional." 

Subsequently you consented to having the word "provisional" 
stricken from the record. I would like to show you this message of 
June 23, and ask if that will refresh your memory as to that portion 
of the discussions. 

I might state that we have just received this instrument today. It 
has not been paraphrased yet; so I do not want to put it into the 
record at this time. 

(Note. — The documents referred to have been paraphrased and 
appear in the appendix of this record.) 

Mr. Harriman. I want to point out that they were supported by 
Mikolajczyk and other Poles to provide for the elimination of the 
word "provisional." 

Mr. Machrgwicz. I concur with you that Mr. Beirut and Mr. 
Mikolajczyk agreed to that. 

Of course, Beirut was Stalin's representative ; was he not ? 

Mr. Harriman. Yes. Certainly. 

Paraphrasing it, it says : 

This subject came up in discussion between Mr. Vishinsky and myself that 
afternoon, and Vishinsky agreed that the word should be retained. In spite of 
that agreement, Molotov supported Beirut. Clark Kerr supported my position. 
I was arguing. 

Then I said "It would be impossible for me to get any answer for 
at least 48 hours, I asked Beirut to accept the title as laid down by the 
decisions in Crimea." 

Mr. Machrowicz. Of course he said "No."? 

Mr. Harriman. No ; he agreed. But he had a further proposal, that 
the new government, after it had been organized, should take the 
matter up with the three governments for elimination of this word 
"proposal," To this Molotov agreed. 

Then I also explained that the decisions in Crimea Avould not have 
been carried out until free elections had been held to establish a per- 
manent government. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. But the word "Provisional" was 
to be left out of the title of the government ; was it not? 

Mr. Harriman. I indicated that I was not holding out any hope 
that my Government would favor the elimination of the word. 

It is a very long telegram. I showed that I was strongly against 
any changes from the Yalta agreement, which was insisting on pledges 
from the new Polish Government in regard to holding free elections 
and the other details in regard to setting up the government, and 
that our Ambassador should go to Moscow or Warsaw just as quickly 
as possible to see things carried out. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2129 

Mr. Machrowicz. The word "Provisional" was to be stricken out 
of the title of the government; am I right? 

Mr. Harriman. No, I objected to it. You can see that there. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You objected to it originally, but you finally 
did agree to it ; did you not ? 

Mr. Harrimax. I don't think I did. I read that rather quickly. 
I said I could not give an answer to it under 48 hours, or something 
like that. 

Mr. Machrowicz. We will have that put in the record subsequently. 

Mr. Harriman. When you get that paraphrased, you can put it in 
the record. 

It sounded to me when I read it as if I was firmer than the British 
Ambassador. 

Mr. Machrowicz. That is all. 

Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Harriman, I have a couple of questions I would 
like to put to you. 

Mr. Harriman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sheehan. With reference to the Yalta agreement, will you 
agree that we had a moral responsibility to see that there were free 
elections in Poland? 

Mr. Harriman. I certainly do, 

Mr. Sheehan. Did we attempt to send any observers, or anybody, 
to make sure they had free elections ? 

Mr. Harriman. We sent our Ambassador there as he had already 
been appointed, as I recall it, and he was awaiting arrival there. It 
took him some time to get there. I was rather disturbed over the delay 
of his getting there. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did he get there before or after the elections ? 

Mr. Harriman. He got there long before the elections. I think 
he got there early in August. I was anxious for him to arrive early 
in July. 

Mr. Sheehan. The second thought I would like to present to you 
is this : We, in the committee here, after having seen the disappearance 
of all these different types of documents, after having seen the hiding 
of documents, have been informed by members of G-2, the Army 
intelligence, that there was a pro-Russian core in the Army intelli- 
gence in which they contributed to the disappearance of a lot of 
documents. 

Do you think, in the light of all these various things, that there 
existed in our Government either Communist forces or Communist 
sympathizers who had something to do to overemphasize this fear of 
Russia that was being built up in our country ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not think there were any Communist sympa- 
thizers. I have no knowledge of what went on in G-2. 

I had, of course, constant relationships during the war with Gen- 
eral Marshall and Admiral King when I came home, and also, of 
course, in the early days when I was in London in the various con- 
ferences; but I saw no evidence of any Communist infiltration into 
the Army, or any place in our Government. 

Mr. Sheehan. During the war you saw no such evidence? 

Mr. Harriman. I saw none ; no. 

Mr. Sheehan. You admit there has been some? 



2130 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 

Mr. Harkimax. The Alger Hiss case stands on its own evidence and 
conviction. 

Mr. Sheehan. Did President Roosevelt at any time give any specific 
instructions to yon while you were in Moscow, before you went there, 
or at any time at all, about playing down the Russian aims? 

Mr. Harrimax. None whatsoever. My basic mission there was to 
help keep Russia an effective ally fighting for us in the defeat of 
Germany and early entry to help in the defeat of Japan. 

But President Roosevelt wanted to begin very earl}- in trying to 
develop with the Russians a basis on which peace might be maintained. 
And, of course, it was for those reasons, with which you are familiar, 
the various undertakings, that various people induced the Russians to 
sign connnitments which they later violated. 

Although I was involved in the mission that had to do with helping 
to supply the Russians as early as September 1941, I went to Russia 
as President Roosevelt's representative when Mr. Churchill talked 
with Stalin on tlie strategic side of the war. 

My first discussions about the future relations with the Soviet Union 
were at the Moscow Conference, where, if you will recall, there was a 
Moscow Declaration which reaffirmed the agreement on the part of the 
Soviet Union to cooperate in all of the high principles which later 
became adopted in the Charter of the United Nations. 

But consistently through the war, by diplomacy, w^e were able to 
get commitments from Stalin on their behavior after the war, and those 
in the political field they have consistently refused to honor, 

Mr. Sheehax. Who set our basic foreign policv during the war ^ 
Was that Mr. Roosevelt? 

jNIr. Harrimax. Mr. Roosevelt did, in consultation with Mr. Hull. 
And, of course, as far as the military operations were concerned, he 
was in constant contact with the military advisers, Mr. Stimson, Mr. 
Knox, and, of course, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Leahy, who was 
his own personal chief of staff. 

Mr. Sheehax. Who was the final authority ? 

Mr. Harrimax. Mr. Roosevelt. 

Mr. Hopkins - is in tlie White House as Assistant to the President 
and was involved. 

Mr. Sheehax. How do you mean "involved'"? Was he setting 
policies, too? 

Mr. Harrimax. No, sir. He was an adviser to the President in see- 
ing that the President's policies were carried out. He was Chairman 
of the Munitions Assigmnents Board. He was veiy active in the 
su])ply question. 

Mr. MrrcHELL. I would like to ask you one question there. 

Mr. Harrimax. May I say Mr. Hopkins played a very effective role 
in getting action for prosecution of the war. 

Mr. MiTCHEix. As you know, Mr. Harriman, one of the obligations 
of this connnittee is to search for the missing Van Vliet rejwrt. That 
report was made to Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell on May 22, 1915, deliv- 
ered to him personally, personally labeled by him "Toj) secret." At 
the same time, you had gone to the President and asked him to send 
Harry Hopkins to Moscow specifically in connection with the IG 
leaders wlio were (lien in jirisoii, wliicli was adiiiittt>d by Molotov. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2131 

Now, what AAOuld the reaction have been at the United Nations and 
throughont the world if the Van Vliet report, o-iven by an American 
Army officer, who was nentral and impartial, who had visited the 
graves in 194o and who stated in that report that the Soviets had com- 
mitted this atrocity; what would the result have been at that time, as 
far as the IG leaders are concerned and as far as the United Nations is 
concerned ? That is asked for an opinion answer, sir. 

Mr. Hakriman. That is a rather difficult question to answer as to 
just what effect it would have. The actions of the Soviets in so many 
directions are cruel and ruthless, and this would have shocked every- 
one, no doubt. I cannot put myself back exactly to what the reaction 
would have been. There w'ere a series of misdeeds by the Russians. 
from our standpoint, beginning w4th the Ribbentrop treaty, that it 
would have contributed, I think, to further distrust of the Soviets. 

My own views are well knowm. I was full of distrust of the Soviets 
at that time. 

Mr. PuciNSKi. I have one short question. 

In your telegram of January 25 of 1944, which is already in the 
record as exhibit 24, you stated that correspondents filed reports tell- 
ing wdiat they saw, without expressing opinions, but that, for some 
reason, the censor held up the stories. Now, subsequent to this tele- 
gram, did you ever find out why these stories were held up by the 
censor ? 

Mr. Harriman. I do not recall. They were let out, as I recall it, 
in a couple of days. They were often held up. I do not recall why 
they held it up. 

Mr. PuciNsKT. I can tell you Mr. Cassidy testified before this com- 
mittee and said these stories were held up because on the way back 
from Katyn these American correspondents pointed out this situation 
to the Soviets. The Soviets had claimed that these men, these officers, 
had been nuirdered in September 1941. These correspondents asked 
the Soviet officers on the train if these men were murdered in Septem- 
ber of 1941, why had most of them been buried with overcoats on 
when the temperatures in that area, at that time, range somewhere 
between 65 and 75 degrees. The Soviets were stunned with that ques- 
tion. They did not know" just exactly wdiat to answer and it took 
them several days to figure out an answer. Their answ^er was that 
they moved up the execution period from September to December 1, 
1941. 

Had you ever heard that in Moscow ? 

Mr. Harriman. I may have known it. I do not recall it. That 
was 9 years ago. 

Mr. PucixsKi. I have no further questions. 

Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? 

Mr. Harriman, we are very thankful to you for your testimony here 
today. 

Mr. Harriman. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before 
you and the courtesy of you and all the other gentlemen of the com- 
mittee. 

Chairman Madden. Thank you. 

Mrs. Mortimer, will you come up, please ? 



2132 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

TESTIMONY OF KATHLEEN HAERIMAN MORTIMER, 
NEW YORK, N. Y. 

Chairman Madden. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, 
please ? 

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I do. 

Chairman Madden. Please state your full name. 

Mrs. Mortimer. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer. 

Chairman Madden. And your address ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. 149 East Seventy-third Street, New York City. 

Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Mortimer, I believe you have a copy of your 
report there on this subject ; have you not ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I do. 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to put in the record 
exhibit 25. 

Chairman Madden. I now present to you a document entitled "En- 
closure No. 2 to Dispatch No. 207," dated February 23, 1944, from 
American Embassy, Moscow. 

We will mark this "Exhibit 25." 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like the record to show also that the enclo- 
sure No. 1 attached thereto is Mr. John Melby's report. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 25" for identifica- 
1 ion and is as follows. Enclosure No. 2 is Mrs. Mortimer's report and 
enclosure No. 1 is Mr. Melby's report:) 

ExHimT 25 — Ambassador Harkiman's Covering Letter Forwarding Reports on 
Their Visits to Katyn by Mb. Harkiman's Daughter and an Embassy 
Attache in January 1944 

(The two reports also constitute part of this exhibit) 

Embassy of the United States of America, 

Moscow, February 23, lO-ii. 
No. 207 
Subject : Investigation by Soviet Authorities of the Massacre of Polish Soldiers 

in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk. 
Secret 
The Honorable the Secretary of State, 

Washirifjton, D. C, 
Sir : I have the honor to refer to luy secret telegram No. 247 of January 25, 
7 p. in., concerning the activities of the Special Commission to Establish and 
Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders 
of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Woods. On January 21-23, 11)44, the 
foreign correspondents in Moscow made a trip to Smolensk to witness the pro- 
ceedings of the Commission : The correspondents were accompanied by my daugh- 
ter, Kathleen, and Mr. John F. Melby, Third Secretary of the Embassy. I am 
enclosing copies of their memoranda containing their observations on this trip. 
I am also enclosing a copy of the January 29, 1944, Moscow News which contains 
an abridged version of the formal report of the Commission. 
Respectfully yours, 

William An-erell Harriman. 
File No. 711.6. 
Enclosures : 1-2-3-/ as stated. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2133 

Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn 

IN January- 1944 

[Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, 

Moscow] 

On January 23, 1944 members of the foreign press were taken to Smolensk to 
get first hand the evidence compiled by the Commission on the Katyn incident. 

The party was shown the graves in the Katyn Rorest and witnessed post 
mortems of the corpses. As no member was in a position to evaluate the scientific 
evidence given, it had to be accepted at its .face value. 

The testimonial evidence provided by the Commission and witnesses was 
minute in detail and by American standards petty. We were expected to accept 
the statements of the high ranking Soviet officials as true, because they said it 
was true. 

Despite this it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans. 
The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manner in which 
the job was done, something the Commission thought not sufficiently important 
to stress. They were more interested in the medical evidence as conclusive 
proof and the minute circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime. 

Following is a description of what we saw and most particularly the manner 
in which the story was presented. 

1. Inspection of Katyn Forest graves 

The Katyn Forest turned out to be small unspectacular little wood, sparsely 
filled with young trees, the bigger ones having been apparently chopped down 
by the Germans. The soil was orange and very sandy. 

To date the Commission has found seven graves in all — six in the general area 
called Goat Hill, about the size of an acre, and one more several hundred yards 
away. They are still looking for more graves and expect to find from twelve to 
fifteen thousand bodies in all. 

The senior member of the Medical Committee, Burdenko, took us around each 
and every grave— asked that we scrutinize each detail. He willing answered 
every question put to him of medical bearing and was most helpful. 

On the basis of a meticulous post mortem of seven hundred corpses we were 
given the following information. 

1. The corpses were Poles — the majority enlisted men with no rank badges, 
but some officers. Where, as the privates ranged from twenty-five to thirty, the 
officers were considerably older — forty-five to fifty years. 

2. The majority of the corpses were dressed in topcoats, had long underwear. 
Those wearing just tunics had sweaters. 

3. The pockets of the uniforms had been ripped and their documents taken 
out — except for a few that apparently had been missed. 

4. On the basis of a thorough autopsy, the doctor stated that the bodies had 
been in the ground about two years — certainly not four. We were told that 
although sandy .soil in a dry climate tends to mummify bodies, the soil in Katyn 
is damp hence had no preservative qualities. 

5. Two graves had the bodies laid out meticulously in rows three deep, the top 
row being about three meters from the surface. Each one of these corpses had 
a metal tag — (put on by the Germans when they themselves dug up the bodies 
in the spring of 1943). The other graves had either six or eight layers of bodies 
thrown in helter-skelter — the pockets of these soldiers had been ripped. 

6. Each corpse bore the markings of a single wound made either by a 7.65 
mm. bullet or a 9.00 mm. bullet that entered the head at the base of the 
skull and came out at the top of the forehead. We saw enough skulls to see 
that the wounds were all identical, except that a very few had received two 
bullet wounds instead of just one. To date no body wounds have been found. 
In fact the corpses were all proclaimed to be in "good physical condition". The 
minority of the corpses had their hands tied. We were told that the bullets 
had been fired at close range from an "automatic weapon". 

7. Evidence that the bodies were little more than two years old was on the 
basis of the following information. Some skulls still had hair, at any rate 
epidermis ; the internal organs, though considerably flattened and shrunken, were 
only partly decayed ; the liver and spleen green. There was still firm colored meat 
on the thighs. 



2134 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

The autopsies were conducted in heated tents by teams each headed by a 
qualified doctor witli several assistants, including a secretary wlio took page long 
notes on each case. 

Two. Evidence given by Atrocity Commission 

We had two meetings with the members of the "Si>ecial Commission to Estab- 
lish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist 
Invaders of Captive Polish Offic^ers in the Katyn Wood," The first, during the 
afternoon, lasted three hours. We were read prepared statements and allowed to 
ask questions. Besides a detailed stor.y of the sequence of events, we were told 
the substance of data collected from witnesses, much of which was repeated ver- 
batim by the witnesses later on tliat niglit. Alexey Tolstoy, a member of the 
Commission, was of greatest assistance. Some questions we asked required 
informaticm not on hand. He had it for us by night. In the main during this 
session our questions were answered willingly. 

Our second meeting was conducted in the same room. This time there were 
Klieg lights and movies and photos were taken throughout the proceedings. The 
Committee sat along a long table covered by red baize at one end of the room, 
the press were strung along a similar table down one side. Witnesses .sat 
directly opposite the Committee and were brought in one at a time. Aside from 
the photograi>her and one stenographer, there was no one else present. 

At first the Committee refused to interrupt the testimonies for translation, but 
when the members of the press objected they agreed with some lack of grace. 
During tlie testimony the committee chatted and whispered between themselves 
and most didn't appear to listen. We were told we could question any witness, 
through the Committee, but the questions appeared to annoy them though not 
apparently due to their substance. Only one question was called irrelevant 
and not answered — the present job of one of the witnesses. Tolstoy later gave 
it to us. 

The witnesses themselves were very well rehearsd, and they appeared subdued 
rather than nervous, their pieces having been learned by heart. Only the girl had 
an air of self-assurance. 

When the last witness had been heard general questions were asked, some of 
import to the Katyn Incident, others not. Shortly, however, the representatives 
of the Foreign Office Press Department got up and said we'd better break up as 
our train was due to leave shortly. I got the distinct impression that the Com- 
mittee was relieved. They had been told to put on a show for us — the show 
was over — and they did not want to be bothered any further. The meeting 
broke up without any informal chatting. 

3. Members of Commission 

(1) N. N. Burdenko, Member of U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences. 

(2) Alexei Tolstoy. 

(3) Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, Galovski and the Ukraine Republic. 

(4) Lieutenant General A. S. Gunderov, Chairman of the Pan-Slav Commission. 

(5) S. A. Kolesnikov, Chairman of U. S. S. R. Red Cross and Red Crescent. 

(6) V. P. Potemkin, Commissar of Education of the R. S. F. S. R. 

(7) Colonel General E. I. Smirnov, Chief of Central Medical Service Admin- 
istration of the Red Army. 

(8) R. E. Melnikov, Chairman of Smolensk Regional Executive Committee. 
The above-mentioned arrived at Smolensk "a few days" after the Germans 

evacuated Smolensk on September 2.j, 1043, to look into various German atrocities 
committed in the Smolensk region. The Committee did not start to investigate 
the Katyn graves until January IG, 11)44. The reason given was that they had 
other atrocities to investigate first. We were given no inforiiiation about these 
other atrocities, exc-ept the statement that L'i.l.OOO Russians and Jews had been 
killed in the Smolensk ar(>a. Presiunably it is significant that Russians didn't 
think the Katyn gi-aves were worth bothering about until after Polish-Soviet 
i-elatioiis again became a big issue. 

On .January 10 the Connnission's scientific experts opened up the Katyn graves, 
exhumed bodies and sttirted meticulous postmortems on each body. Simultane- 
ously, other members of the Commission (piestioned witnesses of the crime and 
compiled the evidence of the witnesses, and documented all papers found on 
corpses. 

As a result of the work and exhumation of 700 bodies out of an estimated total 
of 12.00(1 the Commission reach ihe following conclusions: 

1. Between August and September 1"J41 the Germans killed Polish prisoners 
of war on Goat Hill (one area of the Katyn Forest) ; 



THE K.\TYX FOREST MASSACRE 2135 

2. Later in the Spring of 1!>4.>. feeling their position unstable, the Germans 
hastily covered up evidence of their crime ; 
;-). For this purpose the Germans : 

(a ) Re-opened gi-aves on Goat Hill. 

(&) Tortured witnesses into giving evidence that the Russians murdered 
the Poles. 

((') Dug up other bodies of Poles murdered elsewhere and brought them 
to the Katyn Forest and buried them there. 

If. The Commission's story 

( 1 ) Position of Polish I*risoners of War Prior to German Invasion. After the 
Russo-l'olish ciiuipaign 2.0S2 Polish soldiers, mostly officers, were evacuated to 
Siberia. The rest were put in three camps : one thirty-five kilometers West of 
Smolensk on the Moscow-Minsk highway, a second, twenty-five kilometers west 
of Smolensk on the Smolensk-Vitebsk higliway, and a third, forty-five kilometers 
West of Smolensk in the Krasnenskoye area. (This information was supplied 
at our asking by Tolstoy.) 

The Polish prisoners of war were brought to the above camps back in 1939. 
They were employed by the Soviets for work on the roads and when the Russo- 
German war began, the Polish prisoners remained in the West Smolensk province 
and continued their work digging and building roads. 

With a sudden tank thrust, the Germans suddenly broke through to Smolensk 
iiu July 15-16. The question immediately arose how should the Polish prisoners 
be evacuated. The Commission told us, and their testimony was later upheld 
by a witness, Ivanov, the station master of Gnezdov railway (village outside 
Smolensk ) that in mid-July 1941 Ivanov received a phone call from the Admin- 
istrator of the I'olish prisoners of war camps asking that he provide empty 
railway cars in which to evacuate the Polish prisoners. He had none, but tried 
to get some from the Smolensk station. The Commission told us that railway 
cars could not be provided from Smolensk because that section of the railway 
running between Smolensk and Gnezdov was already under artillery fire. Fur- 
thermore, the Soviet Government "liad to reconcile itself to the fact that even 
the local inhabitants could not be evacuated. So, due to artillery fire along the 
railway and bick of box cars, the Polish prisoners of war, along with the native 
population, had to remain In this district." 

After tlie arrival of the Germans, the Poles remained in their prison camps. 
A number of witnesses testified (we did not hear any) that the Poles continued 
to do road repair work for the Germans. AVhen autunni came, all ditches were 
cleared and the nuid taken away. (Here It was made clear to us that there 
wasn't any more useful work for the Poles to do. ) 

We were then told that although many witnesses confirmed that for a short 
time the Polish prisoners remained In the Smolensk region, no witness had yet 
been found who saw any Pole after September 1941. 

(2) How atrocity was committed: The Katyn Forest is .situated fifteen kilo- 
meters outside of Smolensk and during i>eacetlme was the favorite Sunday plck- 
nicklng ground for the Smolensk population. One section of Katyn Forest is 
known as Goat Hill. Here the NKVD had a datcha which they used for a rest 
home. The Smolensk population were allowed to walk freely through the NKVD 
property, but when the Germans arrived the whole Katyn Forest area was sur- 
rounded by barbed wire : sentries were stationed at all road entrances and signs 
posted saying to the effect that any trespasser would be shot at sight. The XKVD 
datcha was taken over by the Germans and used as headquarters for the 537th 
"Construction Battalion." 

This headquarters employed three girls from the neighboring village of Borok. 
All three have given evidence on what happened and we heard one of the girls 
testify. 

Thirty German officers and noncommissioned officers lived in the datcha. 
They got up late In the morning, ate well, etc. The servants did not live In, but 
were escorted to and from the main road by guards and were not allowed to 
clean the bedrooms except when a guard was present. 

We heard one girl testify (Anna Mlhailovna Alexeyeva) that towards the end 
of August 1941 she and the other girls noted that often opened and closed cars 
and trucks could be heard turning off the highway at the Goat Hill entrance. 
When this happened invariably the Germans in the datcha would go out into the 
woods. About ten minutes later single shots, fired at regular Intervals, would be 
heard. When the shots ceased the officers, accompanied by German noncom- 
missioned officers and enlisted men driving empty trucks, would return to the 



2136 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

datcha. Always on these days the bath house water was heated. The men went 
directly to the baths and returned to be served a "particularly tasty meal" plua 
double the usual hard liquor ration. The girl said on these days the soldiers 
seemed noisier than usual and talked more. Once Alexeyeva was asked to wash 
off fresh blood from one of the noncommissioned ofBcers' sleeves. 

We were told that "the girls guessed without difficulty that the Germans living 
in the datcha were engaged in killing." The Commission asked witness 
Alexeyeva how she guessed it was Poles, not Russians, who were being killed. 
She answered readily that one day she was ordered to return home early even 
though her work was not yet finished. She was escorted to the main Smolensk- 
Vitebsk road as usual. En route to her village she noticed some German sentriea 
and Polish prisoners walking along the highway. She recognized the Poles by 
their characteristic cap. The group turned off at the Goat Hill entrance. 
Alexeyeva hid in the bushes and waited and soon heard the familiar shots, one 
after another. 

Another day one girl heard noises near the datcha and looked out and saw two 
Poles hovering around under guard. She was ordered back into the kitchen, but 
her "feminine curiosity" got the best of her. She went back to the window and 
saw the Poles were being led away into the woods. Soon after two single shots 
were heard. 

Alexeyeva said that walking down the side road to the highway each day she 
frequently noticed German soldiers digging sand heaps. These grew as time 
went on. Once she asked her sentry what was going on. The reply was, "we 
are digging dugouts." The Commission was asked to ask Alexeyeva if she ever 
noticed any odd smell around Goat Hill and she said "no." 

During this whole period the Germans were combing the countryside for 
Poles — tracking them down. We were told that numerous inhabitants have 
confirmed these searches. In particular, the Metropolitan told us about the state- 
ment of one Father Oblobin, priest at Kuprino, a village in the neighborhood 
of Katyn Forest. Prior to the German invasion he had been priest at the village 
of Katyn, but the Germans tore down his house and he moved to Kuprino. The 
Metropolitan told us that Oblobin was able to give particularly valuable informa- 
tion due to his contact with his parishioners. Oblobin had told him that during 
August 1951 there was much talk among the parishioners about the Poles. Many 
people reported seeing groups of twenty to thirty being taken into the Katyn 
Forest. During 1942 Polish prisoners of war were not mentioned ; but in the 
Spring of 1943 Poles again became a current subject of talk. 

Aside from information obtained from the girls working in the datcha and 
the peasants living nearby, the Commission told us that they had received further 
evidence of the Germans' actions from the assistant burgomaster, Boris 
Bazilevsky. 

We heard Bazilevsky testify. Prior to the German invasion he had been a 
professor of astronomy in Smolensk. He had been asked by the traitor burgo- 
master, Menshagin, to serve as his assistant. He protested on grounds that he 
knew nothing about civil affairs, but on being threatened with death if he re- 
fused, he took the job and held it from July 1941 until October 1942, hoping 
thereby "to be able to help the plight of the local population in some ways." 

Once he approached Bur,L;omaster Menshagin with the request to help get 
a local school teacher out of concentration camp, also to try to improve general 
conditions in camps as epidemics were starting and there was fear that soon 
the entire population might become infected. Menshagin reluctantly agreed. A 
few days later, mid-September 1941, he informed Bazilevsky that von Schwetz, 
head of the German Gestapo in Smolensk, had turned down his request on 
the grounds that he, von Schwetz, had received word from Berlin demanding 
that harsher treatment be given in the Smolensk concentration camps. Bazilevsky 
asked Menshagin if he figured that was possible— to make things any toucher 
than they already were — to which Menshagin replied "yes". Then confidentially 
he whispered in Bazilevsky's ear that things were going to be made tougher 
for the Russian prisoners so that they would die a natur:il death due to exposure, 
disease, etc., but fhat the Polish,prisoners were going to be liquidated ♦ * * 
liquidated in the most precise and literal meaning of the word * ♦ ♦ Some 
days lifter this meeting in the beginning of October 1941 Menshagin told Bazilev- 
sky that the directive about the Poles had been carried out, that they had been 
shot in the neighborhood of Smolensk. 

Bazilevsky relayed this information to his close friend, Professor Yefimov. 
Yefimov, we were told, upholds Bazilevsky's story. As Menshagin left Smolensk 
with the Germans his testimony was not available. 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2137 

Aside 'from this verbal testimony the Commission told us they hnd some 
written evidence- in the form of Menshagin's personal notebook. (We were 
shown a photostatic copy of the crucial pages of this notebook-.) A committee 
of experts had confirmed that these notes were in Menshagin's own handwriting. 

An insert dated Aug"ust 15, 1941, said "all escaped Polish prisoners of war 
should be detained and turned over to the German headquarters." A few pages 
further on was an annotation to remember to ask the chief of the Russian 
police "if there are any rumors circulating among the population about the 
shooting of the Polish prisoners of war." The Commission stressed to us the 
significance of this note, that the Germans must have been worried about talk 
among the villagers of the atrocity, which apparently they wanted to keep 
secret. 

The Commission told us that they had wanted to get information on the 
motive of the crime. Here again Bazilevsky proved useful. He told us about 
a "very candid" conversation between liimself and tlie Gestapo chief in which 
the latter had told him that "the Poles are harmful people and inferior, there- 
fore, the Polish population can serve usefully only as manure and so create 
space for the widening of the Leibensraum of the Germans." The Gestapo 
chief went on to tell him that no intellectual class had been left in Poland 
itself. 

We were later told that other reasons for the German mass killing of the 
Poles was due to the tendency of Poles to go over to the Red Army. 

From September 1941 on until the spring of 1943 all discussion of Polish 
prisoners stopped. 

The Metropolitan quoted Father Oblobin (priest of nearby village) as saying 
that beginning in 1943 there was a marked nervousness amongst the Germans 
and an increase in their harshness. He pointed out that this general change of 
■atmosphere for the worse coincided with the end of the battle of Stalingrad. 
Oblobin believed that the Germans spread rumors of the Russian m.ass killing 
of Poles so as to try and strengthen their position among the local population. 

In the spring of 1943 the Germans published stories in the three quisling 
local papers telling of the murder of Poles at Katyn during March and April 
1940, by the NKVD. The Commission told us that they had interviewed the 
stenographer who had typed the articles. 

Next the Germans searched out witnesses to confirm their story. We saw three 
men who had been questioned and beaten by the Gestapo, one of whom was the 
Gnezdov station master, the two others peasants. All three were tortured into 
signing documents, the contents of which they did not understand. 

Failing to get any direct information from the local population, the Germans 
next issued a poster (we saw a photostat of it) written in grammatically in- 
correct Russian saying the following: "Who can give testimony on the mass 
murder of the Bolsheviks against Polish prisoners and members of the clergy? 
Who saw the Polish prisoners of war in Goat Hill adjoining the Katyn highway? 
Who observed Poles going from Gnezdov to Goat Hill? Who saw or heard the 
shots fired? Who knows members of the population, who can testify? Every bit 
of information will be rewarded. Send information to German Police Head- 
quarters in Smolensk and Gnezdov." The poster was dated May 3, 1943 and 
signed by an ofl^cer of the German police. The Commission told us that the Ger- 
mans, failing to get the needed information, then began the work of setting up 
the proper "stage scenery" on Goat Hill. First, they set about the gruesome 
work of digging up Polish corpses. From concentration camp No. 126 they im- 
ported 500 Red_Army prisoners of war to do the work, and when the work was 
completed the Soviet prisoners of war were marched away to be shot. One 
managed to escape and sought shelter in the house of citizen Moskovskaya. 
Though the Gestapo later found him, she had full details of the story which the 
Commission gave us. 

It goes as follows. Not only did the Germans dig up the Polish bodies in the 
Katyn Forest, but by night they imported in big tarpaulin-covered German trucks 
bodies of Poles that they had massacred elsewhere at the Kozelsky Camp ( in the 
South Smolensk Province) and from the Starobelsky Camp (in the Ukraine be- 
tween 200 to 250 kilometers from Smolensk). We were told that a number 
of witnesses confirmed the story of trucks coming into the Goat Hill, their load 
identified by the unmistakealtle stench. 

As they were dug up, the Germans tagged each corpse with a metal number, 
slit open the pockets and removed all papers they could find that bore dates later 
than March and April 1940 and looted the pockets of any money and valuables. 
They imported a corpse specialist called "Butz" from Berlin to make an investi- 



2138 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

gation and to prove scientifically that the Itodies found were buried in the Sprinj; 
of 1940. 

The German authorities oi'ganized compulsory excursions to Goat Hill, so that 
the local Smolensk population could see for themselves. Among the visitors was 
Zubkov, a Soviet doctor, whom we saw. Zubkov testified that, as a pathological 
anatomist, he could rightly .say that at that time none of the bodies cuuld possibly 
be more than a year and a half old. The Connnission stressed Zubkov's statement 
to us that to his knowledge the (Jermans conducted no autopsies, that the German 
specialist Butz was not interested in conducting a scientific investigation — loot 
from the pockets of the dead was what he was after, and dated documents that 
would compromise the German story. It took Butz three months to accomplish 
his task. 

3. Documents found on the Polish Corpses : The final act of the German^; 
was to route out an i either kill or deport any person who might have information 
proving the whole Polish incident was a fake. They caught all but a few of the 
men they had beaten into signing false evidence and the three girls who had been 
servants at the Goat Hill datcha. 

Despite the thoroughness of the pocket ripping l)y the Germans, out of the 
seven hundred corpses the Commission have so far investigated. 14fi items have 
been found. The earliest date was found on a jiostcard — March 1940 — and the 
latest — an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. We were shown all these 
documents and trinkets and the most important and significant ones were trans- 
lated for us. They included letters from Warsaw and Moscow dated in the 
winter of 1940, receipts for valuables dated in the Spring of 1941 and numerous 
newspaper clippings dated from early 1940. through early 1941. In particular 
we were shown documents with communist leanings. The Commission inferred 
that the Polish prisoners of war had pro-Soviet rather than pro-German leanings. 



Report Written by Mr. John Melby After Visiting Katyn in January 1944 

[Encldsure No. 1 to Despatcli No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from Americau Embass^j-, 

Moscow 1 

Trip to Smolensk and the Katyn Forest, January 21-23, 1944 

We left Moscow, in company with seventeen newspaper men and including 
Czech, Polish, and Spanish newsmen, at 4 : 00 p. m., January 21, for Smolensk 
on a special train which had been put at the disposal of the party. We were 
the first foreigners to visit Smolensk since its occupation by the Russians on 
September 25, 1943. We did not arrive in Smolensk until 10:00 a. m. the fol- 
lowing morning, 220 kilometers from Moscow, presumably because military 
traffic had the right of way on the railroad. Since most of the trip was made by 
dark thei-e was .small opportunity to observe along the way. During the day- 
light hours little rolling stock was seen on the sidings and almost no military 
supplies along the single-track line. We saw only one troop train (sf a dozen 
boxcars, dirty and with straw covering the floor. The troops api)eared to be 
work battalions rather than line troops. Outside Smolensk there were some 
seventy-five boxcars and three locomotives which had been turned off the track 
and burned. The closer we came to Smolensk the more evidence there was of 
destroyed buildings and blown-up bridges. Almost none of the buildings had 
been replaced and generally only enough bridges to supply one or two lines of 
traffic in the railroad yards. The railroad yards in Smolensk itself were a com- 
plete shambles, only enough having been rebuilt to keep operations along. 

We were met in Smolensk by the Secretary of the Special Commission to Es- 
tablish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist 
Invaders of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Woods. lie took us first on a 
short tour of the city to witness the damage. The first thing noticeable was 
that every bri<lge over the Dnieper bad been destroyed, the only crossing point 
for road and motor traffic being one temporary wooden structure. The rail- 
road does not cross the river at this point. In the city it is difficult to find a 
structure which has not been damaged. Most of the destruction seems to have 
been caused by demolition, and there was little evidence of lire. The city once 
contained 7,9(X) buildings. There now remain 300, of which only 64 are stone 
structures, the rest being one-story wooden houses. The remaining population 
lives in the cellars of the wrecked buildings. The Lenin Library is a total loss, 
and the books were either burned or removed by the Germans. According to 
official figures, the population of Smolensk is now about 30,000 as compared with 



THE KL\TYN FOREST MASSACRE 2139 

a prewar figure of 185,000. In and around Smolensk the Germans are alleged 
to have massacred 135,000 Russians. 

After the tour of the city we were taken out to the Katyn Forest, some fifteen 
kilometers west of Smolensk on the Vitebsk highway. We were met there by a 
battery of movie cameras and the surgeon who is in charge of the exhumations of 
Polish bodies and the postmortems. He told us that 700 bodies have already 
been exhumed from seven graves and that there are perhaps a total of twelve to 
fifteen thousand. This is pure estimate. The six graves on which the most work 
has been done are approximately twenty-five feet square and vary in depth from 
three to ten feet. In two of them the bodies are laid out in rows ; in the others 
they are simply piled in. As each body is exhumed it is taken to a tent foi^ 
examination, approximately 120 bodies being examined daily by eleven crews. 
After examination the bodies are laid in rows in a field which we inspected. Des- 
pite the freezing temperature, there was no doubt they had been dead a long time. 

Every one of the bodies seen wore a Polish Army uniform, a preponderance 
being uniforms of enlisted men. Each one had a warm topcoat or heavy under- 
wear. All pockets had been ripped open prior to exhumation by the Russians, 
but a wide selection of documents and miscellaneous items are being found which 
were missed in the previous searching by the Germans. All items found are 
taken to Smolensk for examination and classification. Every skull we saw 
contained a bullet hole at the base of the skull and a second one just above the 
forehead. The holes were made by bullets varying from 7.6 mm. to 9.5 mm. On 
the skulls where skin or hair is left powder burns are in evidence. The brain, 
flesh, and organs of each body are also examined. The doctor in charge said 
that the state of decomposition proves the men cannot have been dead much more 
than two years. A number of the bodies had small, rectangiilar metal clips 
attached to the lapel of their overcoats, bearing only numbers. The highest 
number seen was 2032. These were on the bodies said to have been exhumed 
by the Germans in 1943. 

We were later taken to see tlie dacha which was used as headquarters by the 
German occupation forces in the forest. It had previously been an NKVD rest 
home. It lies about a quarter of a mile from the graves and beyond the road, 
overlooking the river. It was completely destroyed by the Germans when they 
withdrew. 

During the afternoon the Commission held a press conference at which one 
member, V. P. Potemkin, read a previously prepared statement. Its principal 
points were as follows : The Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities in 
Smolensk arrived in the city shortly after its capture from the Germans on 
September 25, 1943. Experts started to work on the Katyn Forest murders on 
January 16, 1944. After the occupation by Russia in 1939 of Eastern part of 
Poland several camps of Polish prisoners of war were established to the West 
of Smolensk. These prisoners were used on road construction work, oflScers in- 
cluded. In July 1941. the Germans suddenly broke through the line at Smolensk 
and enveloped the city. It had been planned to evacuate the Poles to the West 
and a requisition was put in for a train to do so. This request was refused 
because of the shortage of trains to move even the civilian population of Smolensk. 
In any event, the Germans were already shelling the railroad. 

After the occupation the German 537th Construction Battalion moved into 
Katyn and put a wire fence around it. Three Russian girls were put to work 
cleaning the dacha which was used as headquarters. They were constantly 
under sentry guard. In August 1941, according to the testimony of one of 
them, Andreeva, they frequently heard trucks coming into the forest. The 
officers quartered in the dacha would then go out. Shortly after the girls 
heard single shots at regular intervals. Tlie trucks would leave and the 
officers would return, noisy and excited. One time one of the girls noticed 
blood on an officer's tunic. Another time one of the girls saw two Polish 
soldiers outside the window. They were led into the forest by Germans. 
Shortly thereafter she heard shots. Still another time one of the girls while 
walking down the road saw a group of men approaching. She hid in the bushes 
and saw they were a group of Poles who were led into the forest. Later she 
heard shots. All during August and September 1941, Poles were rounded up 
from the countryside. After the end of September 1941, no uue saw any more 
Poles. 

The above statements are further corroborated, according to the Commission, 
by other testimony. The traitor B. G. IMenshagin, a lawyer, was in close com- 
munication as occupation mayor of the town, with the German commander in 
Smolensk, and was assisted by B. V. Bazilevski, formerly director of the Smolensk 



2140 THE ICATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Observatory. In August Menshagin told Bazilevski that orders a re- 

ceived "to liquidate Polish prisoners." He added that the Rus.- ^soners 

would die of "natural causes." Sometime later he said the ord d been 

carried out. He is reported to have given tlie same information to o? persons. 
When Menshagin vpas later evacuated vi'ith the Germans he left bei him his 
notebook. His handwriting has been verified. An entry of Augu 15, 1941, 
states that orders had been issued for all detailed Poles to be turned over to 
the German authorities. Subsequent entries state that execution orders had 
been carried out. 

With reference to the motive for these executions, Bazilevski testified he had 
been told by Hirschfeld of the SD that it is "an historical fact the Poles are an 
inferior race and hence it is a good act to kill them." He added that all Polish in- 
tellectuals had been killed. 

Father Alexander Oslobin, of the parish of Katyn, testified according to 
Potemkin, that his parishioners had talked in 1941 of the events in the forest. 
During 1942 there was no talk. Then it started again in the early part of 1943 
at a time when the Germans were exhibiting great nervousness and greater 
harshness of treatment toward the Russians. The first public notice was in the 
spring of that year when the local German paper printed a story that the NKVD 
had murdered Polish officers in Katyn during March and April of 1940. This 
same story was i-eprinted in three other papers at the same time and was designed 
to improve the position of the Germans. The Germans then began searching 
for witnesses to substantiate their statements, using torture to obtain what 
they wanted. When the Germans evacuated they tried to take with them or 
destroy all witnesses they had used. To strengthen their case further they opened 
some of the graves, using 500 Russian prisoners from concentration camp No. 126 
for labor. Once the job was done the Russians were in turn killed, except for 
one who managed to escape in the melee. He was sheltered by an old peasant 
woman, Moskovskaya, to whom he told the above story before he was recaptured 
and executed himself. During the exhumation the Germans removed all docu- 
ments from the bodies, especially those dated later than April 1940. They did, 
liowever, overlook some, including one unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. 
P>efore closing up the graves the Germans brought to Katyn the bodies of other 
Poles from other graves and camps in order to concentrate in one spot all the 
alleged atrocities by the Russians. And finally, in March 1943, the Germans 
organized compulsory excursions of the local citizenry to the graves before they 
"were again closed. 

Potemkin then stated the conclusions of the Commission : 

1. During August and September 1941, the Germans killed in the Katyn Forest 
all Poles in the vicinity of Smolensk. 

2. Feeling their position insecure in 1943 they attempted to blame the incident 
on the Russians. 

3. To implement this position the Germans opened the graves, searched the 
bodies, sought witnesses for their case, and added bodies from elsewhere to those 
in Katyn. 

In answer to a question, it was stated that prior to August, 1941, there were 
three camps of Polish prisoners : Camp No. 1 was thirty-five kilometers West of 
Smolensk on the Minsk highway, containing 2,932 Poles who were sent to Siberia 
finally; Camp No. 2, twenty-five kilometers West of Smolensk on the Vitebsk 
highway; and Camp No. 3, thirty-live kilometers West of Smolensk. 

We were then taken to inspect the collection of miscellaneous items taken 
from the pockets of the Polish soldiers. This collection consisted of letters, 
books, newspapers, personal items, money. We wore also shown eleven twenty 
United States dollar gold pieces, one fifty dollar note, and numerous dollar bills. 
A major iiortion of the dated evidence, such as letters and newspapei's was prior 
to or during March and April 1940 and included a copy of Izvestiya of Api'il 11, 
1940. There were, however, letters bearing Moscow postmarks as late as June 
1941. 

During the evening the Commission held a session devoted to questioning the 
witnesses whose testimony had earlier boon sunnuarized by Potemlcin. It soon 
became apparent that the session was staged for the benefit of the correspondents 
and that the witnesses were merely repeating stories they had already given the 
Connnission. The show was staged under hot and blinding klicg lights and motion 
picture cameras. In all, five witnesses were produced who added nothing to 
what had been said at tlie press conference. Attemjits by the correspondents to 
question the witnesses were discouraged, and finally permitted reluctantly only 
through the members of the Commission. All witnesses were shunted out of the 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2141 

rodiD . .y as possiWe upon finishing their statement. There was also an 

jn'gun. !t translation of the testimony, this finally being agreed to. 

The I cness told how he had been forced to turn evidence for the Germans 

in 1!)4.'> , >.econd, Alexeyeva, told of her work in the dacha ; the third, Bazilev- 
sky, recc '>d his association as assistant burgomaster; the fourth, Zukhov, an 
expert ii Criminal medicine," told of his "excursion" to the forest in the spring 
of 1943 ai.a his belief that the bodies could not have been three years old; the 
fifth, Ivanov, the local station master who had been unable to supply a requisi- 
tion of forty cars to move the Poles in 1941, told of conditions diiring the German 
break-through and of being forced to give evidence for the Germans in 1943. 

All the statements were glibly given, as though by rote. Under questioning 
the witnesses became hesitant and stumbled, until they were dismissed by the 
Commission. Bazilevsky was ludicrous when one correspondent asked him why 
he was now so excited by the murder of 10,000 Poles when he also knew that 
135,000 Russians had been killed in the same area, and he answei'ed that the 
Poles were prisoners of war and it was an outrageous violation of international 
law for them to be massacred. 

The atmosphere at the session grew progressively tense as the correspondents 
asked one pointed and usually rude question after another. At midnight it was 
announced abruptly that our train would leave in one hour. Just before the 
meeting broke up Alexei Tolstoy, a member of the Commission, who had ap- 
parently .sensed that matters were not going well and who has had the most 
foreign contacts of anyone on the Commission, produced answers to several 
questions which had earlier been passed over. The members of the Commission 
were hasty and formal with us in their farewells, and the earlier atmosphere of 
at least semicordiality had disappeared. 

The Polish corre.spondent who accompanied us, and who slept noisily through 
most of the press conference, a captain in the Polish Army and the editor of 
Wolna Polska under Wanda Wasilevska, told me that the present investigation 
has no interest for the Poles in Russia since it is obvious that the Germans com- 
mitted the crimes and that therefore it is pure "political provocation" on the 
part of the Russians. Certainly the members of the Commission were not at all 
pleased when leading questions were asked. On the return trip the Foreign 
Office officials who accompanied us were almost unduly anxious on the return 
trip to be assured that we were convinced. It is apparent that the evidence in 
the Russian case is incomplete in several respects, that it is badly put together, 
and that the show was put on for the benefit of the correspondents without oppor- 
tunity for independent investigation or verification. On balance, however, and 
despite loopholes the Russian case is convincing. 

Chairman Madden. Can you identify that document, Mrs. Mort- 
imer ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I identify that as my report. 

Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Machrowicz. 

Mr. IVIachrowicz. Mrs. Mortimer, you were in Moscow in Febru- 
ary 1944, were you not ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I was. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And January 1944 ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. Yes, I was, 

Mr. Machrowicz. In what capacity ? 

Mrs. INIoRTiMER. I was then in the capacity as the daughter of my 
father, who was Ambassador, 

Mr. Machrowicz. And in January 1944, members of the foreign 
press were invited by the Soviet authorities to visit the Katyn place ; 
is that right? 

Mrs. IVIoRTiMER. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember how many there were ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I would say otl'hand 20. 

Mr. Machrowicz. How many Americans were in that group ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I would say they were predominantly American 
and British. I really don't remember how many did go. But I would 

93744 — 52 — pt. 7 21 



2142 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

say the members of the foreign press coi'ps that were in Moscow at 
the time went to the Katyn Forest. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ask permission to accompany them ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. My father asked permission for me. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And yon did accompany them ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. And I did accompany them. 

Mr. Machrowicz. And is tliis exhibit 20 a copy of the report whicli 
yon filed ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In that report yon state yonr opinion that the 
Poles were murdered by the Germans. Is that right ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. That is right. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Can you state how you came to that conclusion ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I can state it b}- reading what I said in the report, 
I wrote it .S years ago, and I have refreshed my memory before coming 
down here to testify. 

INIr. Machrowicz. Will you read the first three paragraphs, which 
are the complete statement of the report. The balance is a report of 
the inspection ; am I right ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. That is right. And that was my opinion at that 
time, having been to the Katyn Forest. 

]Mr. ]SIachiiowicz. Would you read those first three paragraphs into 
the record ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. Do you want me to read them aloud ? 

Mr. Machrowicz. If you wish. Or would you rather have me read 
them ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I can read them, 

Mr. Machrowicz. All right. 

Mrs, Mortimer (reading) : 

The party was 8hf)wn the graves in the Katyn Forest and witiiesse^l post 
niortems of the corpses. As no member was in a iK)sition to evaluate the scientitic 
evidence ;;:iven, it had to be accepted at its face value. 

The testimonial evidence provided liy the Commission and witnesses was 
minute in detail and by American standards petty. We were expected to accept 
the statements of the high-ranking Soviet officials as true, because they said it 
was true. 

Despite this it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans. 
The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manni-r in which 
the .job was done, something the C(mimission thought not sufficiently important to 
stress. They were more interested in the medical evidence as conclusive proof 
and the minute circumstantial evidence siirrounding the crime. 

Mr. Machrowicz. The balance of the report is the report of the 
actual ins])ection. That completes the statement of the conclusions; 
am r I'ight '( 

Mrs. Mortimer. I believe so. 

Ml-. Machrowicz. As you stated there, no member was in a })osition 
to evaluate the scientific evidence and you had to accept it at face 
value? 

Mrs. INIORTiMER. That is right, 

Mr. Machrowicz. And you stated also that the testimony was petty, 
by American standards, and you were expected to accept the state- 
ments of the high-ranking Soviet officials as true because they said it 
was true. 

Mrs. Mortimer, Yes, 

Mr, Machrowicz, But, despite that, you came to the conclusion that 
the Poles were murdered by the Germans? 



THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2143 

Mrs. Mortimer. That is rio;ht. 

INIr. Machrowicz. One of tlie reasons that you give in the sentence 
which follows that is : ''The most convincing evidence to uphold this 
was the methodical manner in which the job was done, something the 
Commission thought not sufficiently important to stress.*' 

You felt that because of the methodical manner in which the murder 
Avas conunitted, the Kussians were incapable of it. Is that right ? 

I^Irs. INIoRTiMER. This is trying to remember my train of thought at 
that time. I believe that there were Gernum atrocities that were found, 
in which bodies were piled in the same order with the same type of 
bullet wound, had been found elsewliere. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You do not have that same opinion today as you 
had in February 1944, do you ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I can say that before coming down here I read your 
interim report. 

You had access to every side of the picture, which I did not have 
available to me, and I would say, having read your report, that my 
opinion is that the Russians did kill the Poles. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In fairness to you, it must be stated that you did 
not have access to the information which we have today; did you? 

INIrs. Mortimer. That is right. I merely was a witness of the show 
that the Russians put on for the benefit of the foreign correspondents 
in Moscow. 

IVIr. Machrowicz. You considered it a show put on for the benefit 
of the correspondents in Moscow ; at least you so labeled it later in the 
report; did you not? 

Mrs. Mortimer. Yes. 

Anywhere you went in Russia, a show was put on. You could not 
travel normally anyway. 

Mr. Machrowicz. At the bottom of page 1, paragraph 1, you state: 

The corpses were Poles — the majority enlisted men, with no rank badges, but 
some officers. Where, as tlie privates ranged from 25 to 30, the officers were 
considerably older — 4.5 to 50 years. 

Do you know now that actually there were nothing but officers found 
in those graves ? How did you come to the conclusion that the nuijority 
were enlisted men, with no rank badges? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I presume I did that on the basis that they wore 
enlisted men's uniforms. 

Mr. Machrowicz. In paragraph 2, you state : 

The majority of the corpses were dressed in topcoats, had long underwear. 
Those wearing just tiuaics had sweaters. 

Later on in the report, on page 4, you state that you were informed 
that the (iermans killed these Poles between August and September 
1941. Am I right? 

Mrs. Mortimer. Yes. 

Mr. ISIachrowicz. Did it not occur to you to be strange that between 
August 1 and September 1941, that being summer, that the majority 
of these corpses were still dressed in topcoats, had long underwear, 
and that those just wearing tunics had sweaters ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. That was definitely one of the questions that I 
know was prime in our minds as we were going back to Moscow and 
discussing it among ourselves. 

Mr. IVIachrowicz. That raised some doubt in your mind as to the 
truth of the Russians' story ; did it not ? 



2144 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 

Mrs. IVIoRTiMER. Yes. 

Mr. Machrowicz. But it did not change j^our eventual opinion? 
Were you permitted to question witnesses ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. My Russian was not that sufficiently good. 

Mr. Machrowicz. Were you permitted to question them through an 
interpreter ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I don't believe I asked to. 

Mr. Machrowicz. On page 3 of your report you state : 

At fii'st the committee refused to interrupt the testimonies for translation, liut 
when tlie members of the press objected they agreed with some laelv of grace. 
During the testimony the committee chatted and whispered between themselves 
and most didn't appear to listen. We were told we could question any witness, 
through the committee, but the questions appeared to annoy them though not 
apparently due to their substance. Only one question was called irrelevant and 
not answered — the present job of one of the witnesses. Tolstoy later gave it to us. 

And then you state the following : 

The witnesses themselves were very well rehearsed, and they appeared subdued 
rather than nervous ; their pieces having been learned by heart. Only the girl 
had an air of self-assurance. 

Did the fact that these witnesses appeared to be rehearsed and had 
learned their testimony by heart raise any question of doubt as to the 
truth of the Russian version ? 

Mrs. Mortimer. I can only say that, as I remember it, in the after- 
noon or early evening, we were told by one of the members of the 
Commission what we were going to hear later on that night, and the 
exact, same phraseology was used both times. 

In other words, they were giving us a second showing of what we 
had already heard. 

Mr. Machrowicz. You state further : 

When the last witness had been heard, general questions were asked, some of 
import to the Katyn incident, others not. Shortly, however, the representatives 
of the Foreign Ot