^
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PURCHASED FROM
B^
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE,
AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF
POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST
NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA
PART 7
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre
JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE,
AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF
POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST
NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA
PART 7
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre
JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93744 WASHINGTON : 1952
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS,
EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST
MASSACRE
RAY J. MADDEN, Indiana, Chairman
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GEORGE A. DONDERO, Michigan
FOSTER FURCOLO, Massachusetts ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
THADDEUS M. MACHROWICZ, Michigan TIMOTHY P'. SHEEHAN, Illinois
John J. Mitchell, Chief Counsel
ROMAN C. PuciNsKi, Chief Investigator
II
d^
rji.>.
CONTENTS
Statement of — Page
Bi.ssell, Gen. Clavton 1839, 1864, 2298
Brown, Ben H., jr 2056, 2218
Carter, John F 2246
Cranston, Alan 2174, 2272
Davis, Elmer 1979
Earle, George Howard 2196
Epstein, Julius 2266
Harriman, W. A 2103
Holmes, Julius C 2226
Hopkins, James F 2008
Jackson, Justice Robert H 1945
Kreutz, Jan Marion 2012
Lane, Arthur Bliss 2216, 221»
Lan,^, Josepli 2002, 201 9-
Lantaff, Hon. William C 1827
Lyon, Frederick B 2241
Meeres, Mildred 1833
Melby, John F 2149
M ikolajczyk, Stanislaw _ _' 2155
Mortimer," Kathleen H 2132
Olshansky . Boris ^_ 1939
Phillips, Joseph B 2255
Richards, Robert K . 2035
Shea, Mrs. Hilda 2022
Simon, Arthur 2007, 201 9
Soron, Casimer . 2020
Standley, Adn iral William H ._ 2042, 2060
Welles, Hon. Sumner 2075
Yeaton, Col. Ivan 1916, 2293
EXHIBITS
1. Letter to Mr. Madden from Gen. J. Lawton Collins 1826
2. Metnorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Maj. Gen. Clayton
Bissell ' 1 _ _ _ 1839
3. Memorandum from General Bissell (Roger Kent, general counsel for
Charles A. Coolidge) 1840
4. Lett<3r from General Bissell to Julius C. Holmes. Assistant Secretarv of
State ;_ . _ 1867
5. Letter from Julius C. Holmes to Generfl Bissell 1894
6. Statement by Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson to the congressional
committee 1971
7. Letter to Mr. Justice Jackson from Polish Government in Exile in
London 1 975
8. Mr. Elmer Davis' radio broadcast of May 3, 1943--- 1987
8A. State Department memorandum, with stamp mark, showing it had
been deli\ered to Mr. Berle on April 22, 1943 _ _ . 198S
9. Telegram from Ambass?.dor Standley to Department of State 2045.
10. Portion of message from Secretary of State Hull to American
Ambessador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942 2046.
11. Portion of message from Secretary of State to American .Ambassador
dated September 5, 1942 2048
12. Portion of mess.^ge from American Ambassador to State Department
dated Sertember 10, 1942 2052:
13. Report from A-nerican Ambassador Pt Moscow regarding Willkie's
convers: tion with Stalin concerning the Poli.sh situation- 2054
nx
IV CONTENTS
14. Letter and one enclosure forwarded to State Department by American Page
Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942, detailing search for
Polish officers.. L . 2057
15. Telegram from Moscow dated April 26, 1943 2062
16. Stalin's personal letter to President F. D. Roosevelt 2063
17. Message from President Roosevelt to Stalin dated April 26, 1943 2064
18. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2066
19. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2068
20. Letter from Under Secretary Sumner Wells to President Roosevelt — 2076
21. Letter to General Watson from Under Secretary Welles 2082
22. Report and evidence compiled by Poles regarding discovery at Katyn
forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Biddle
on May 20, 1943 2092
23. Message from Mr. Harriman to Stalin dated November 7, 1941 2112
23A. Mr. Harriman's dispatch to Washington 2112
23B. Stalin's reply to Mr. Harriman 2113
23C. Stalin's second reply to Mr. Harriman 2113
23D. Polish Embassy letter to Ambassador Harriman 2113
24. Telegram to United States Embassy in Moscow dated January 25,
1944 2124
25. Ambassador Harriman's letter forwarding reports on their ^•isits to
Katvn bv Mr. Harriman's daughter and an Embassy attache in
January 1944 2132
26. Ambassador Earle's letter to President Roosevelt dated June 11, 1944. . 2199
26A. Mr. Roosevelt's reply 2200
27. Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Ambassador Earle 2202
28. President Truman's letter to Ambassador Earle 2210
29. Ambassador Lane's letter to Mr. Justice Jackson at Nuremberg dated
December 16, 1945 2218
30. Ambassador Lane's letter to State Department official 2220
31. General Holmes' letter of June 9, 1945, to General Bissell 2228
32. Colonel Van Vliet's statement regarding his treatment at Katyn by
the Nazis 2230
32 A. Memorandum from Mr. Carter regarding the Katvn Massacre pre-
pared on May 31, 1944 J 2252
33. Letter to Mr. Stone from Mr. Epstein 2267
34. Letter to Mr. Epstein from Charles W. Thayer, Chief, International
Broadcasting Division 2267
35. Letter from Epstein to Mr. Allen 2268
36. Letter from Mr. Kohler to Mr. Epstein 2269
37. (Appendix) Excerpt of House Un-American Activities Committee
hearing 23-'^ 1
38. (Appendix) Teheran- Yalta-Potsdam agreements 23 9
39. Major General Bissell's diary certificate 23 2
40. Major General Bissell's commendations 23l5
41. Message sent to Department of State by Ambassador Harriman (see
Mr. Harriman's testimony) 2350
42. Dispatches describing Polish-Soviet relations . 2357
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACEB
TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1952
House of Representatives,
The Select Committee on the Kattn Forest Massacre,
Washhigton, D. C.
The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 336,
House Office Buildino;, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Furcolo, Machrowicz, Dondero,
O'Konski, and Sheehan.
Also present : John J. jNIitchell, chief counsel to the select committee.
Chairman Madden. The select committee will come to order.
I might say for the record that tliis meeting of the Select Committee
on the Katyn Forest Massacre is the sixth in a series of hearings which
the committee has held. The committee returned a few weeks ago
from hearings in England, where it heard the testimony of 32 wit-
nesses, and also from Germany, where it heard the testimony of 28
witnesses.
As far as the testimony is concerned, the proceedings of the com-
mittee to determine the responsibility as to who committed the Katyn
massacre are practically concluded. The testimony today will lead
up to the committee's desire to try and determine what happened to
certain reports that were submitted to the Government departments
regarding the Katyn massacre.
The record may also show that all members of the committee are
present.
Counsel may now j^roceed. Have you a statement that you wish to
make ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
You will recall that sometime ago you requested the Army Depart-
ment Counselor, Mr. Francis Shackelford, to obtain a statement from
General of the Army J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, relative
to his interview with Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. Yesterday after-
noon, at approximately 5 : 15 p. m., I received that statement, which is
addressed to you, and I herewith hand it to you.
Chairman Madden. This is a letter dated June 2, 1952, addressed
to the chairman of this committee and signed bj^ J. Lawton Collins,
Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
Will the counsel please read the letter for the record ?
Mr. Mitchell. The letter is headed "United States Army, the Chief
of Staff." The letter is dated June 2, 1952. [Reading :]
Dear Mr. IMadden : Referring to your conversation witli Mr. P. Sliackelford,
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewitli my
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I vpas the commanding general
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was still
in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River.
1825
1826 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I had
known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I was in
command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me.
Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told me in a broad
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of Polish
officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home and report
to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to Headquarters,
First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accordingly, I made the
necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First Army Head-
quarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany.
Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me,
and I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
J. Lawton Collins.
The letter is addressed "Hon. Ray J. Madden, House of Repre-
sentatives."
Chairman Madden. Hand it to tlie reporter and have it marked
"Exhibit 1."
(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit 1" and made
a part of the record. Exhibit 1 is as follows :)
Exhibit 1
United States Army,
The Chief of Staff,
June 2, 1952.
Hon. Ray J. Madden,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mk. Madden : Referring to your conversation with Mr. F. Shackelford,
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewith my
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I was the commanding general
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was
still in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River.
Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I
had known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I
was in command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me.
Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told nie In a broad
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of
Polish officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home
and report to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to
Headquarters, First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accord-
ingly, I made the necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First
Army Headquarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany.
Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me, and
I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
J. Lawton Collins.
Mr. ]V[iTCHELL. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is
Hon. William C. Lantaff, a Representative in Congress from the
Foni-th District of Florida.
Chairman Maddex. Cono;rpssninn, do yon solemnly swoar the testi-
mony you will give licre in the hearing now being conducted will
be the truth, the whole ti'iith, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Congressman Lantaff, I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1827
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. LANTAFF, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Mitchell. CoiigTessiiiun, will you state your full name for the
record, please '(
Congressman Laxtaff. William C. Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. And your present address?
Congressman Lantaff. House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the conmiittee what 3'our official posi-
tion was in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, during the
years 19M and 1945, to the best of your knowledge?
Congi-essman Lantaff. I was assigned as Chief of the G-2 Secre-
tariat in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Depart-
ment, General Staff. I was on duty as Chief of the Secretariat in
May of 1945.
My cUities there in that office were essentially administrative in
nature, to administer the administrative Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff. G-2, and to comply with certain other missions which had
been assigned to me in that office. As such, I was on duty when
Colonel Van Vliet reported to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff',
G-2, in May of 1945.
Of course, it is rather difficult at this time, some 7 years later, to
recall everything that transpired ; but, as I recall it, and to the best
of my recollection. Colonel Van Vliet wanted to report to General
Bissell, and upon inquiry as to the nature of his visit and why he
wanted to see General Bissell
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff', may I interrupt you for a
moment ?
Congressman Lantaff. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. jNIr. Chairman, in part 2 of the hearings held in
Washngton, D. C. on February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1 refer you to page 48.
Mr. Lantaff', I would like to read something here for the record
now. Mr. Flood is asking the question. [Reading:]
Mr. Flood. Were you directed by anybody ovei'seas to report to the office of
G-2 or did you from your Army experience decide that was where you should
report?
Colonel Van Vliet. That is where I decided to go. I went to the Office of G-2
and told enough of my story to convince
Mr. O'KoNSKi. To whom?
Colonel Van Vliet. Sir. I don't remember. It was in one of the outer oflSces
of G-2. I don't know wiiom I spoke to. It was one or two down from the
G-2.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was his rank, a colonel?
Colonel Van Vliet. I believe it was a lieutenant colonel, sir ; but I am unable
to say who or what. They said I should see General Bissell
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You mean to tell me when you came in there he did not
introduce himself to you or tell who he was? He did not tell you what his
position was, nor did you inquire?
Colonel Van Vliet. His position was known* to me at the time, sir; but that
has been 7 years ago. and it wasn't at the time important to me to remember
whom I talked to in that office. I am sorry I don't remember.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Isn't it customary in military —
1828 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman, I would like to ask yon at this time: Were you that
lieutenant colonel ?
Congressman Lantaff. I believe I was; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you proceed with your statement from there,
please ?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, Colonel Van Vliet
told me enough of the incident that he had observed while a prisoner
of W'ar that 1 determined that he should see General Bissell and, ac-
cordingly, took him in to see General Bissell. I don't recall whether
General Bissell was in the office at that time ; but, as well as I recall it,
it was the same day that he reported that I took him in there.
After some time — exactly how long I don't recall — General Bissell
told me to arrange for a stenographer to take down the testimony of
Colonel Van Vliet and to arrange for quarters for him to do it in.
Accordingly, I arranged for stenographic assistance and for a space
for him to dictate his statement about the Katyn Massacre.
After that was completed, the report was taken by the secretary
to General Bissell.
As I recall. Colonel Van Vliet and General Bissell had a further
conference on that report, and that is about all I remember about
the incident about which Colonel Van Vliet has testified.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the name of the stenographer?
Congressman Lantaff. I do now. It was Mrs. ISIeeres.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if Colonel Van Vliet showed you any
photographs that he had of Katyn ?
Congi-essman Lantaff. I recall seeing one or two photographs, to
the best of my memory.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know if they were attached to his report or
not'^
Congressman Lantaff. I do not recall for a certainty, but I believe
they were.
Mr. IMitchell. Did you ])ersonally see such a report and read it?
Congressman LanTxVff. I personally saw the report.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you read it ?
Congi-essman Lantaff. As well as I re.call, I read the report or I
had seen it, because I think the notes were returned to me for safe-
keeping prior to the time Colonel Van Vliet had planned such a
report.
Mr. Mitchell. Then there Avas such a report?
Congressman Lantaff. I recall the report.
Mr. Mitchell. At the time that the secretary returned the report, ,
did she return it to you or did she return it to Colonel Van Vliet and
you and General Bissell ? Do you recall the details ^
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall specifically. To the best of
my recollection, when the report was finished, (\)l()nel Van Vliet re-
viewed it. Whether he did it in my office or the office that I had made
available for him, I don't recall; but, to the best of my memory, after
the report was transcribed, he took it in to General Bissell.
Mr. Mitchell. He personally delivered it to General Bissell?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall. I think that he was to
review tlie re])ort and, as I recall, sign it.
Ml". MrrciiKi.L. Do you recall wlio was iu tl\e imiuediate office of
General Bissell at that time?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1829
Congressman Lantaff. I know who was assigned in the immediate
office.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you give the connnittee the names of those in-
dividnals.
Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a Lt. Col. Jack Earman.
]\Ir. Mitchell. How do you spell it?
Congressman Lantaff. E-a-r-m-a-n.
There was General BisselPs secretary, Mrs. Doris Jepson. There
was a warrant officer, Carulli. Then there were several other per-
sonnel assigned to the office but who were not in the immediate office
next to the general, and the other personnel would have no knowledge
of this incident.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if General Bissell had a safe in his
office (
Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a safe just outside of
General BisselPs office, alongside of Mrs. Jepson's desk. Then, of
course, there were numerous combination file cabinets, with combina-
tion locks.
Mr. Mitchell. Then Mrs. Jepson was not located in the office with
General Bissell, nor was the safe ?
Congressman Lantaff. No.
I say "safe.*- I don't recall. I think it was one of these combination
lock safes, three combination safes, which were prescribed for the
storage of "Top secret" papers.
Mr. Mitchell. Was this document or report of Colonel Van Vliet's
labeled "Top secret," to your knowledge?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, it was. I could not
swear to that, though.
Mr. Mitchell. Is there any other individual who was connected
with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at that time, from
whom a statement should be taken by this committee?
Congressman Lantaff. I think those are the only people in the
office who would have had any knowledge of this incident.
Mr. Mitchell. To your personal knowledge, do you know if any-
body had access to this safe or combination safe which was the prop-
erty of General Bissell, other than his secretaiy and himself?
Congi'essman Lantaff. Everyone in the immediate office did.
Mr. Mitchell. The individuals you have named ?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Earman, Jepson and Carulli ?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct, and myself.
Mr. jMitchell. Did yon see this report at any time after Colonel
Van Vliet had signed it?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it customary for General BisselPs office to keep
a log of all documents that were sent out of that office ?
Congressman Lantaff. All documents that came in through the
mailroom or cable section, which were retained in the office, were
signed for by either Colonel Earman or myself, including Joint Chiefs
of Staff papers and Combined Chiefs of Staff papers. All those
papers were logged in and recorded; and, of course, if they left the
office, were logged out ?
Mr. Mitchell. Who did the logging out ?
1830 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman Lantaff. That was done by various personnel
assigned to the office under a captain.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the captain's name ?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall his name.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall ever having logged out the Van Vliet
report to any other division of G-2 or to any other governmental
agency or department?
Congressman Lantaff. No. It was not logged in because, actually,
the report originated in the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
and I don't recall ever having logged it out.
JNIr. Mitchell. But the report, even though it originated in General
Bissell's office, if it had left the office, the standard procedure was for
it to be logged out ?
Congressman Lantaff. Not necessarily; no. General Bissell could
have originated a "Top secret" paper and could have taken that paper
to another office or to an authorized recipient, and have left that paper
with that particular individual.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall whether there was one copy, or just
the original, or several copies of this Van Vliet report?
Congressman Lantaff. I only recall an original.
Mr. Mitchell. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Did I understand you to say that this original
report was placed in this safe in Bissell's office ?
Congressman Lx\ntaff. As well as I recall it. I don't recall having
seen this particular report after Colonel Van Vliet reported in to
General Bissell with the report to review it with him and to sign it.
But it could very well have been placed in that particular safe.
Chairman JMadden. Did the other employees in the office, including
those that you named in your testimony, have access to the safe where
the secret files were kept ?
Congressman Lantaff. Those four people had access to all docu-
ments in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, because it was
our function, of course, to work there whenever General Bissell was
there; and General Bissell would be there from early in the morning
until late at night. Many times there would be only one of us there
in the office with him. So, the people that were assigned to his imme-
diate office had the combinations of all the safes.
Chairman Madden. Are there any questions?
Mr. DoNDERo. Can you fix the time, Congressman, when Van Vliet
came into the office to dictate that report ?
Congressman Lantaff. I think it was in the morning, but that is
as well as I remember.
Mr. DoNDERO. 1 mean, the day, the month, and year.
Congressman Lantaff, No, I cannot.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Was it in 1945?
Congressman Lantaff. May of 1945, as well as I recall it.
Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, did I understand you correctly to say
that you did review Van Vliet's report before he signed it.
(/ongi'ossman Lantaff. No. Colonel Van Vliet came into the office
and wanted to see General Bissell. Before I would let him see the
general I wanted to know what he wanted to see him about.
Mr. Sheehan. After he dictated it to Mrs. Meeres, did you see the
report ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1831
Cono^ressnian Lantaff. I don't recall. I believe that I did, but I
don't remember.
Mr. Sheehan. There was something said about his turning over
some notes to you.
Congressman Lantaff. As I recall, I had Mrs. Meeres bring back
her stenographic notes and the portion she transcribed, to me, to put
in the G-2 safe that night.
Mr. Sheehax. But were they put in separate from the original
report, or were they put in with the general's report ?
Congressman Lantaff. That was before the original report was
completed. It is a security measure. I had Mrs. Meeres bring them
back and kept them under our control.
Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, I have another thought. You men-
tioned before they had a system of logging out reports in the office,
and you said it could be possible for General Bissell to take the top-
secret report out of the office, to vour knowledge, over to some other
dej^artment or some other Government agency.
Congressman Lantaff. It would be very possible. I did not say
other Government agencies.
Mr. Sheehan. Or some other department of the Army, say. Well,
let us say that he could take it out of the office, as you understood.
Congressman L\ntaff. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. "Was there anything in the Army regulations that
required him to get a receipt under such a procedure, or could he just
take it out under his own free will ?
Congressman Lantaff. Under the ARCs, the file receipts were,
of course, to be taken for top-secret documents.
Mr. Sheehan. That is what I mean. In other words, if General
Bissell had taken out the report and turned it over to someone else,
he should have a receipt, under Army regulations?
Congressman Lantaff. I think you will find considerable dispute
about that even today in the Department of the Army, as to what
is required with reference to the handling of top-secret documents.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Congressman, when this report came into your di-
vision and General Bissell's, there was pretty good evidence that
here was a case that involved the murder of almost 15,000 Allied
soldiers. Could yoa give us any hint as to what discussion or what
impression that created? Was there any discussion about that
ghastly crime after the report was made, or was it just passed off
as another report?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't know. If there would have been
such, it was beyond the scope of my duties in that office to evaluate it
or to discuss it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I understand.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, you were not in any way connected
with the evaluation of intelligence reports or responsible for the
evaluation of intelligence reports in that assignment that you had,
were you ?
Congressman Lantaff. No. I would say that my assignment there
was comparable to that of an administrative assistant in one of our
offices.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, were you there during the entire
period of General Bissell's regime as Assistant Chief of Staff for
G-2?
1832 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman Lantaff. No, I was not. I was ordered to duty
there after he had been designated as ACofS. G-2, and I was dis-
charged from the service prior to the time that he was succeeded.
Mr. JNIrrcHELL. In other words, you left before he was relieved
of the responsibility of the G-2 assignment?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct.
Mr. Mitciip:ll. Thank you, sir. I have no furtlier questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Furcolo.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Wliere was the report physically, the last time you
ever saw it, if you remember who had it and where it was ?
Congressman Lantaff. Congressman Furcolo, it is hard for me to
say for a certainty. As I recall — I am trying to remember what hap-
pened 7 years ago — the last time I saw the report was when it went
in with Colonel Van Vliet to General Bissell's office. If there was
some way I could refresh my memory, it could very well have been
that that report was in the safe there in General Bissell's office. But
I am not certain about it.
Mr. FuRCoi-o. In your best recollection, have you ever seen the repoit
itself since that time?
Congressman Lantaff. No. Since May of 1945 I have not seen it.
Mr. FuRcoLO. In other words, your best recollection would be that
the last time you saw that report physically was in the hands of
Colonel Van Vliet walking into the office of General Bissell?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I can recall — the reason why I
have some reservation is that I know that I saw the report and read
the report, and I don't recall whether I did it before he took it in, or
afterward.
Mr. Furcolo. Would it be safe to say that the last time you physi-
cally saw that report, it was in the G-2 offices there ?
Congressman Lantaff. Tliat is correct.
Mr. Furcolo. With reference to the notes, the shorthand notes,
where were they the last time that you saw them, if you did see them?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that. With reference to the
notes, Mrs. Meeres can testify better than I can, but I would pi-esume
that they were destroyed.
Mr. Furcolo. And from that time on, your best recollection is that
you have not physically seen the report or the notes ?
Congressman Lantaff. No. There were many documents which
were in possession of the G-2, which were kept m his personal pos-
session.
Mr. Furcolo. At any time, did you ever discuss the report with
General Bissell in any way, or with any superior of yours there?
Congressman Lantaff. No.
Mr. Furcolo. That is all I have.
Cliairman Madden. Congressman Lantati', on behalf of the com-
mittee, we wish to thank you for coming here this morning to testify.
Congressman Lantaff. Is that all ?
Chairman Madden. That is all.
Mrs. Mi hired Meeres.
Mi's. Meeres, will you just stand and be sworn, please?
Do you solenndy swear that in tlie lioaring now being hekl you will
tell the trutli, tlie whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mrs. Meehes. Yes, I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1833
TESTIMONY OF MILDRED MEERES, WASHINGTON, D. C, ACCOM-
PANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
Chairman Madden. Just state your name to the reporter.
Mrs. Meeres. Mrs. Mildred Meeres.
Chairman Madden. And vour address ?
Mrs. Meeres. 2012 O Street NW, Washington.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Mi-s. Meeres, how long were you assigned in G-2
of the Army '( Wlien did the period begin, and how long were you
connected with G-2 of the Army 'I
Mrs. Meeres. From 1941 to 1948.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what your position was
in the Army during 1944 and 1945 in the G-2 division?
Mrs. Meeres. I worked for Captured Personnel and Material. I
was secretary to Col. J. Edward Johnston, who was Chief of the X
section in that division.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you describe to the committee what the X
section's duties were ?
Mrs. Meeres. The X section was a secret committee, and I did
secretarial work along with the secret work that I did for Colonel
Johnston.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, if it was a secret committee, I
think she probably should be excused from any further answers to
that question.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what connection you
had with the report given by Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., in May
1945 i
Mrs. Meeres. Colonel Van Vliet dictated the repoit to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you describe in detail to the committee how
you were selected, where your office was physically located, as con-
nected with General Bissell's office ?
Mrs. Meeres. We were about two corridors down the hall from
General Bissell's office, and it was Captured Personnel and Material,
which has to do with prisoners of war. So General Bissell's office
called to have a girl come up to take a statement from a returning
prisoner of war, and I was asked to go up and take the statement.
Mr. Mitchell. Who did you first see when you went to General
Bissell's office?
Mrs. Meeres. I saw Colonel Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. What did Colonel Lantaff say to you?
Mrs. Meeres. He briefed me on security and told me I was to take a
top-secret report.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the connnittee what happened after
you were briefed.
Mrs. Meeres. Then he took me into General Bissell's office and intro-
duced me to Colonel Van Vliet, and then Colonel Van Vliet and Colonel
Lantaff and I went across the hall, and Colonel Lantaff left us there
alone and locked the door and Colonel Van Vliet dictated the state-
ment to me. Then I took the report back to my own office and typed
it up. And then — my memory is a little hazy on it — I believe I took
the report back, and I believe that both General Bissell and Colonel
Van Vliet dictated to me further, in General Bissell's office. But I
1834 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
specifically remember taking the report and a letter up to General
Bissell's office.
But, apparently, I hadn't completed the job, because I remember
locking the papers up, or giving them to Colonel Lantaff to lock in
his safe at night, and got them again the next morning. So I can't
remember exactly whether I finished the report that night, that after-
noon, or the next morning.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Does the committee desire to ask any questions at
this point?
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero, Did you make any copies?
Mrs. Meeres. I have been trying to remember. I don't recall mak-
ing any copies, and I don't think I did, because I did it in draft and it
was top secret, and usually a top secret is only one copy, until its final
form.
Chairman Madden. Until what?
Mrs. Meeres. Until it is typed in its final form.
Mr. Dondero. What did you do with your stenographic notes?
Mrs. Meeres. I put them in double envelopes, and all my mistakes
and everything, the paper that had to be destroyed, and returned
everything to Colonel Lantaff when I was finished with the job, the
notes and everything.
Mr. Dondero. To whom did you hand the report after it was
written ?
Mrs. Meeres. I think I handed it to Colonel Lantaff, but I am not
exactly sure, sir, whether I took it into General Bissell's office, or not.
Mr. Dondero. Did you see it after that?
Mrs. Meeres. The report ?
Mr. Dondero. Did you see it?
Mrs. Meeres. No ; I never saw the report after that.
Mr. Dondero. You were not present when it was signed ?
Mrs. Meeres. I don't remember that.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you take any other dictation from either Colonel
Van Vliet or General Bissell, or Colonel Lantaff ?
Mrs. Meeres. From General Bissell, I believe, and Colonel Van
Vliet.
Mr. Mitchell. I show you an exhibit on page 51 of the part 2
hearings of the committee of February 4. There is a letter of the
War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington. Could you identify this letter for the committee, please ?
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir. I believe I typed that memorandum. It
was dictated to me by General Bissell in his office.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that this
letter is the letter that Colonel Van Vliet specifically requested from
General Bissell relative to his keeping silent in connection with the
report he had rendered to G-2. The witness this morning has said
that General Bissell dictated this letter. And also the part 2 of the
hearings held on February 4 will reveal that Colonel Van Vliet him-
self specifically requested such a letter.
Tluit is to clarify the record.
Chairman Madden. On what page of part 2 is that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Page 51.
Mr. FuRcoLo. AAHiat did the witness say that General Bissell
dictated ?
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1835
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Meeres just stated tliat General Bissell dic-
tated tliis letter to lier.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mrs. Meeres, you typed other top-secret reports, did
you not ?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Was there anything unusual about this particular
report? Was there more furore or was there more of a tendency to
create an impression on you, as to this particular report, that it must be
top secret ? Was it handled with a little more flush and flurry than
any other top-secret report that was made ?
Mrs. ]VIeeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. In other words, it sort of struck you that here was
a report that had great significance because it was impressed upon
you more than any other top-secret report that you typed that this
was something unusual, something different, that really must be top
secret ; was that the impression that you got ?
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Siieeiiax. Mrs. Meeres, you stated before that in a top-secret
document, you only typed one copy, and you said something about
"until it is typed for final form." AMiat did you mean by "final
form" ?
Mrs. Me:erj!:s. Well, this was a statement that I took verbatim from
Colonel Van Vliet, and usually a statement of that type is corrected
and written in final form after it is corrected.
Mr. Sheeiian. Do you mean that usually your procedure was that
it was corrected, to do it over?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. And in this particular instance you never got it back
to do it over ?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
]Mr. Sheehan, And in previous documents that you had typed and
returned to you with corrections, what was the procedure on the
number of copies that you would make ?
Mrs. JSIeeres, It would depend on the report and how many were
needed.
Mr, Sheehan. Did you ever before make a single copy and never
any more ?
Mrs. Meeres, Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoNDERO. Whatever became of your stenographic notes? What
was the procedure in the office ?
Mrs, Meeres. On this particular job, I returned my stenographic
notes to Colonel Lantaff. But when I was working in my own office,
we had our own security there, where it was burned by our own security
officer.
Mr. Mitchell, Will you explain to the committee what the secu-
rity procedure was in your office relative to stenographic notes ?
Mrs. Meeres. Well, after our notes were finished, we saved them in
the top-secret safe for a little while in case we would have to refer to
them, and then they were burned. We had a regular procedure for
that. The security officers took care of it.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
1836 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. FuRCOLO. Mrs. Meeres, you said, as I understood you, that after
Colonel Van Vliet had dictated to you, you took the report and a letter
up to General Bissell's office. Did 1 undeistand that correctly i
Mrs. Mei:res. Yes, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Then I understood you to say tliat you did not knt)\v
if it was finished or not. Is that right ?
Mi-s. MiiERES. That is right, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Ordinarily, if any person dictated something to you,
would you, after it had been coin})leted, not show it to that person, or
would the ordinary procedure be to take it to General Bissell ^
Mrs. Meeres. Well, I never did a job just like this before. This was
out of my regular routine. So I took it back to General BisselFs office.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Was Colonel Van Vliet in the office at that time {
Mr. Meeres. Well, that is what I can't remember.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You brought the report physically, the typed report,
to the best of your knowledge, the only copy ; is that right.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir; to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. FuRCOLo. You brought that sole re})ort to General Bissell's
office ?
Mrs. Meeres. I don't know whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaif and
he brought it in, or whether I brought it in.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Your best recollection is that the last you saw of that
report, where was it?
Mrs. Meeres. I can't recall where it was, because I am not sure
whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaff or
Mr. FuRCOLO. Would youi- best recollection be tiiat the last you saw
of that report, it was either in the hands of CoU)nel Lantatl' or in the
hands of General Bissell?
You see, what we are trying to do is trace this report down as best
we can.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, I know.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And we do not want any more than your best recol-
lection.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
I am positive it was in that office. I am positive I left it up there.
Mr. FuRCOEO. Where, and with whom ?
Mrs. Meeres. I gave it to either Colonel Lantatf or Colonel Van
Vliet, or General Bissell.
Mr. FuRCoLo. In other words, you are reasonably certain that the
last you saw of that report, you left it with one of those three men.
Colonel Lantaff, Colonel Van Vliet, or Geneial Bissell?
Mi's. Meeres. Yes, sir; that is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Did you evei", at any time from that day to this, see
that I'eport again ^
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. With reference to yom- note-:, 1 nnderstood you to
say that your best recollection is tliat you U'ft those with Colonel
Lantaff or someone there; is that right?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
Mr. PuRCOLO. At the present time are you emi)Ioyed by any de-
I)ai-tment or agency of the United States Government^
Mi-s. Meeres. Yes, sir; I am; the Interior Department.
Mr. FuRcoLO. I just want to ask you one moie question.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1837
I jiatlier from your testimony tliat apparently this was the first
time yon had been ca-lled in for a job or some work for General Bis-
sell, or that office.
Mi-s. Meeees. Yes, sir.
Mr. FuRCOEO. Was there any reason for that, that yon know of '^
Mrs. Meeres. The only reason was that we v.ere the prisoner of
war branch, and it had to do with onr branch. We handled all the
woi-k in connection with ])risoners of war.
Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, do I understand that Colonel Van
Vliet Avas retnrnino; as a former prisoner of war ^
Mrs. Meeres. That is what I understood at the time.
Mr. Furc'Olo. Let me ask you this questioii : Assuming that Colonel
Van Vliet did return as a jn-isoner of war, would there be anything
umisual about your de})artment's handling it rather than some otlier
de[)artment '.
^Irs. Meeres. I believe that usually our department would have
handled it, except that he went to General Bissell instead.
Mr. FuRcoLO. I think you partially answered this in answer to a
question of Congressman O'Konski, but I would be interested in get-
ting your general opinion as to whether there was anything at all
about this case, right from the very begining, that impressed itself
upon your mind as being handled any differently than the ordinary
to]>-secret case Avould be handled ^
Mrs. Meeres. Xo, sir. I don't think it was handled any differ-
ently, except that I was the one to do it. I wouldn't ordinaiily do
a job for treneral Bissell.
Mr. FuRroLo. This connnittee is extremely interested and we in-
tend to track down, of course, an}- evidence that there may be indicat-
ing that there was some sort of a cover-up or a hushing up of any facts
in connection with this entire case. xVre you aware, in any way at all,
of any acts or statements on the part of anyone to try and cover up
or hush n]> something in connection M-ith this^
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Xo, sir. In fact, evei- since the investigation, I have
Ijeen told to tell evei'vthing I can remember about the report. The
only thing tliat was top secret was the content of the report, at the
time.
Mr. FuRcoLO. That is all.
Chainnan Madde'x. Do you have any questions, Mr. ISIachrowicz ?
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Yes, sir.
I believe you said you had been working for the G-2 since 1941?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Maciirowicz. And you were working in a secret section of
that G-2?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAt'iiowicz. Had you taken quite a number of secret reports
prior to tliis one '\
]Mrs. Meeres. I took several.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were you briefed before you went upon your
duties, as to the security precautions?
Mrs. Meeres. Well,_ in that particular division, they are very
security-conscious. We Avere constantly being told and briefed, but
not for a particular job like that, because
Mr. Maciirowicz. Xot for the particular job?
93744— 52— pt. 7 2
183S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Were you always briefed particularly before every secret report
that you took ?
Mrs, Meekes. No, sir.
Mr. Maciirowicz. You were not?
Mrs. Meekes. Ko.
Mr. Machrowicz. In this case, I believe a'Ou testified that you were
briefed specially ?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir,
Mr. Machrowicz. Did that impress upon you the particular im-
portance given to these reports, as compared to the others in which you
were never briefed separately ?
Mrs. Meeres, No, sir, I didn't think much of that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there any special security precautions given
to you on this report that were not given to you in the others?
Mrs, Meeres, No. It was just the same as the others.
Mr. Machrow^icz. But this is the only report that you know of,
from the time you were in the G-2, where you were given special,
particular security precautions?
Mrs. Meeres. For a particular job.
Mr. Machrowicz. This is the only particular job in the course of
your experience at G-2 where you were given the special, particular
precautions?
Mrs. Meeres, No.
May I take that back, sir, because I told you I worked with the X
section, and I did some jobs there also that I was specially briefed on.
I just forgot. You just recalled it to my mind,
Mr, MACIIR0w^cz. Can you recall any special precautions that were
given to you in this case that were not given in other cases?
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir; I can't.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Mr. DoNDERO, When you returned your stenographic notes, were
they in the form of the ordinary stenographer's notebook?
Mrs, Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. DoNDERo. And you simply handed the book over?
Mrs, Meeres, I believe I tore my notes out of the book.
Mr. Dondero. And then they were put into an envelope?
Mrs. Meeres. I put them in a double envelope.
Mr. DoNDERO. They were put in an envelope?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. Did you ever see those notes again?
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir.
Mr. DoNDERO, Do you know what was done with them ?
Mrs, Meeres. I assume that they w^ere burned ; but I don't know.
Mr. Dondero. Was that the procedure?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dondero. To burn the notes?
Mrs. Meeres, Yes, sir,
Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions? Mrs. Meeres,
on behalf of the committee, I thank you for coming here to testify.
Mivs. Meeres. Thank you.
Chairman Madden, Major General Bissell.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1839
General Bissell, do you solemnly swear that in the hearing- now
being held you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God ?
General Bissell. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON L. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Chairman Madden. Just state your full name to the reporter,
General.
General Bissell. ISIaj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, Air Force, United
States, retired.
Chairman AIaddeint. And your present address?
General Bissell. Signal Mountain, Tenn. ; 102 River Point Road.
Chairman JNIadden. Will counsel proceed?
General Bissell. With your permission, I would like to hand you
two letters at this time. I am handing the counsel two letters at
this time because I think I should do it at this moment. You judge
whether you want them, or not.
Chairman Madden. Yes.
I have here a letter dated May 21, 1952, written by Clayton L.
Bissell, major general, USAF, retired, to the Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force.
Will you have the reporter mark it "Exhibit 2" ?
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2" and made a
part of the record as follows :)
Exhibit 2
Signal Mountain, Tenn., May 21, 1952.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.
Through : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
Subject : Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn
Massacre.
The United Press about May 16, 1952, stated that Chairman Roy J. Madden
of the select committee of the House currently investigating the Katyn massacre
announced that I would be the first witness l)efore the committee on June 3,
1052, at a public hearing in Washington.
I will be very glad to cooperate fully with the committee. Published reports
of the committee hearings indicate that not only the Katyn matter itself but
matters directly or indirectly related to Katyn may become the subject of ques-
tioning. There are many asi^ects of the matter that, as of the date of my retire-
ment, were still classified. Since my separation from the service, I have had no
means of knowing which, if any, of these matters have been declassified.
Written instructions are requested as to what matters I may and may not
testify about in connection with the Katyn affair, and what action it is desired
I should take in answering questions relating to State or Defense Department
material the classification of which I am no longer aware.
If called, and the committee follows its usual procedure, it is expected they
will ask me if I have received any instructions from National Defense or other
sources as to what I should or should not testify. If such a question is asked,
and there is no olijection, I should like to lay liefore the committee a copy of this
letter and its reply. If no instructions are received, I will have no alternative
1840 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
but to lay this letter before the committee and so state, thereafter, answeriiifx
auy questions asked without regard to security classification of material of
which I naturally cannot now be aware.
Clayton L. Bisseix,
Major General, USAF (Retired).
A certified true copy :
Frederic H. Miller, Jr.,
Colonel, USAF.
Chairman Madden. I have liere a letter headed "Memorandum foi-
Chiyton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired)'' written by Roger
Kent, general counsel for Charles A. Coolidge, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. This letter is dated June 2, 1952, and is in
answer to the letter set out as exhibit 2.
Will you have the reporter mark this '"Exhibit 3" ?
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3*' and made a
part of the record as follows:)
Exhibit 3
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C, June 2, 1952.
Memorandum for Clayton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired).
Subject: Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn
Massacre.
In answer to your memorandum of May 21, 1952, to the Secretary of Defense,
I can advise you, after consultation with the Department of State, that neither
the Department of State nor the Department of Defense knows of any matters
connected with the Katyn massacre which now need to remain classified. These
Departments, therefore, know of no reason why you should not testify freely as
to all matters connected with the Katyn affair. In doing so, you should not
disclose sources of intelligence which from your general experience you will
realize would thereby be jeopardized.
Testimony concerning official matters not connected with the Katyn massacre,
the curreut'security classification of which you may not be aware, will be with-
held pending determination of its current classification status.
Roger Kent,
General Counsel for Cliarlen A. Coolidge.
Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. MrrcnELL. Genei-al. where were you born?
General Bissell. In Kane, Pa.
Mr. MrrniELL. When were vou born?
General Bissell. July 29, 1896.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee your educational back-
gi'oun.d, j)lease i
(ienoral Bissell. liegulai' grammar school, high school, law school.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Where did you go to grannnar school and high
scliool ?
(jeneral Bissell. (ii-annnar school in Kane, Pa., and liiuh scliool in
Kane, Pa., ami Glean, N. Y.
]Mr. INIrrcjiELL. Where did you go to law school?
General Blssell. Vali)ai'aiso TTniversity, Indiana.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academy ?
(Joneral I^lssell. I never attended Military Academy.
Mr. MrrciiELL. What did you do after law school ?
(leneral Bissell. 1 left law school j)i'ior to graduation, a few months
before graduation, to enter the first ollicers training camp.
Mr. AlrrciiELL. AA'hen was this?
General Bissell. 1917, very early.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1841
Mr. Mitchell,. Were you later admitted to the bar of Indiana ?
General Bissell. I was.
I was criticized for leavino: the school without finishino; the course
so close to the end, but my pjrades were ^rood and they asked me to
come back and receive my diplonla in uniform.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you receive your diploma?
General Bissell. I did, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. When?
General Bissell. At the orraduation of the class in lOlT.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you admitted to the bar of Indiana?
General Bissell. That is rig-ht, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. ^Y[\en ?
General Bissell. I couldn't give you the date because I was back
in training camp, but it went through the usual procedure. It would
have occurred sometime during the next few months after that, the
papers being completed and my admission certified.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you discharged from the xVrmy after your
service in World War I ?
General Bissell. I stayed on until the 1020 Reorganization Act
went into etfect, and at that time left the service for a brief period
and went to work for the Galludet Aircraft Corp., then located in
Connecticut.
]Mr. Mitchell. What date was that approximately ?
General Bissell. Sometime in the summer of 1920, probably the
date that the law became effective, which was sometime in June, as I
recall, 1920; probably June 30 at the end of the fiscal year, would
have been the most normal period.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you return to Army service ?
General Bissell. Sometime late that fall. I had met General
Mitchell by coincidence in New York, and he asked me to come back
and do a specific job.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you an aviator in World War I ?
General Bissell. I was an aviator in World War I on the British
front, as a fighter pilot, for about 51^ months.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated to the committee that you returned to
military service approximately the fall of 1920; is that right?
General Bissell. I was out just a few montlis. and I think it was
either the fall of 1920 or just after the first of the new year. I think
I met General Mitchell at the Armistice Day dinner in Xew York,
and he wanted me to come back and do a certain job, and I did go back.
Mr. Mitchell. On this next question you may refer to notes if
you would like to.
Could you tell the committee the various assignments you have had
from 1920 until September 1, 1939? What was your rank in the fall
of 1920?
General Bissell. I was a captain at the time I left the service. I
had been recommended for a majority, but the promotions were
frozen at a certain period when the winning of the war was certain.
There was no use commissioning additional officers. Under the re-
organization, not being a West Pointer, I would have had to accept
a first lieutenancy. I did not want to do that because I did not see
that it was in the national interest at that time. I didn't think I knew
1S42 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
enough of the military. I knew enougli of the civilian side to go into,
that.
After I came back in the service, the job that I was brought in for
was to assist in the setting up of a school that became known as the
Air Service Field Officers' School, subsequently the Air Corps Field
Officers' School, now the Air War College.
No such thing had ever existed. I had recommended it prior to my
separation from the service ; and General Mitchell, following through,
wanted me to come back and assist in getting it going. The purpose
of it was to give those considerable number of Regular officers who
did not get overseas because of their training — they were kept over
here; that is, training others, the West Pointers — they had missed
the combat side of the war and it seemed to me that a school was the
only opportunity to pass it on to them while the information was fresh.
I went to Langley Field for that purpose.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you there ?
General Bissell. I was connected with that school, with short
breaks, a good deal of time. I started in, I think, in 1920 or early
1921. I w^as with it through the formation period of the school.
I was then selected by General Mitchell as an aide to go to Euro])t'
and visit all European countries, testing and examining aircraft. Wf
visited most of the countries of Europe that had any air forces. Our
relationship became very close during that period ; and when I got
back — shortly after that — I was ordered away from the school and
imade his aide and was his aide for the following 4 years, and also
as a direct assistant as Assistant Chief, Army Air Service, as it was
called in those days.
Mr. Mitchell. When was your first assignment in the Army in con-
nection with Military Intelligence?
General Bissell. When I returned from World War II, after 2
years in India with Stilwell.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any Military Intelligence background
at any period of time from 1917 until your return from StilwelT-
theater ?
General Bissell. Yes; a rather considerable amount.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee about it?
General Bissell. Before setting up this school, it was necessary to
determine what the courses should be; and, naturally, there had to be
Intelligence in it. My specialty was operations. I didn't deal much
with Intelligence, but I knew the relationship of Intelligence to Oper-
ations, and learned more as the years passed.
When I left the Air Corps school, I attended Leavenworth, where
there was a 2-year course. There was a considerable amount of em-
phasis on Intelligence. And I believe Colonel Van Vliet's father
taught the class out there. I am not sure of that.
Mr. Mitchell. But you yourself never had a specific assignment
in the capacity as Military Intelligence officer until your assignment
after that with General Stilwell ?
General Btssef.l. Yes: I did. I had one in Air Force immediately
after my return, with the idea of expanding and reorganizing the
Air Corps Intelligence. It was the Air Corps Intelligence at that
time.
Mr. Mitchell. When you say "Air Corps Intelligence," at that
time
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1843
General Bissell. It is Air Force Intelligence now.
Mr. MrrcHELL (contiiuiing). It was then part of the Department
of the Army ?
General Bissell. That is correct, part of the Department of the
Army.
Mr. Mitchell. When was that assignment?
General Bissell. I left India on the 1st day of September, with
instructions to visit various fronts.
Mr. Mitchell. What year 'i
General Bissell. 1943.
And after visiting various fronts and England, I arrived back here,
and probably within 30 days took over the duties as A-2, it was called,
or Air-2 section of the staff, under General Arnold.
Now, you understand, I had Intelligence oflicers working under me,
numerous ones, in India, where I commanded the Tenth Air Force
and all American aviation for a considerable period, as well as initiat-
ing the first work on crossing the Hump. I had been with the Chinese
theater in charge at StilwelPs headquarters during the time he was
cut off in Burma, and I knew much of intelligence from the practical
user's end, and I had a little of the school or academic background on
the Intelligence side.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the exact date on which you took over
the position to which you have referred, in A-2 ?
General Bissell. I would have to refer to orders. But I would
say within 30 to 45 days after my departure from India, which was
on the 1st of September .1943.
Mr. Mitchell, You say "30 or 45 days." That would make it
approximately October 15, 1943; would it?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you become Assistant Chief of Staff for
G-2, or was there any assignment in between this A-2 assignment
and your assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff?
General Bissell. No. It was effective, I think, by order on 5 or
4 January 1944. The thing that led up to it was that I had worked
under General Strong, my G-2 predecessor. When he was head of
the Ai-my War Plans Division, I handled the Air Force plans in
that office at that time.
Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Who is General Strong?
General Bissell. Gen. G. V. Strong, deceased, my predecessor in
G-2 and a former head of the War Plans Division, the War Depart-
ment General Staff.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you are telling the committee that you as-
sumed the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Chief of Staff
of G-2 on the 4th of January 1944 ; is that correct ?
General Bissell, Yes; I think that is correct. I would have to
verify it if I have gone wrong, but I don't think I have. I left India
in 1943 in September, and the following January the order came out,
I would like to make that clear, because I think you want some-
thing— and I know what it is — but I would like to cover the whole
field,
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show
that I have never talked to General Bissell, and I don't believe any
member of the committee has talked to him before.
General Bissell. That is correct.
1844 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. I have never asked him a question before this par-
ticular time.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. The reas(m for my interrpution — and I want to
apologize — is not any implication whatever, except that I am trying
to give you everything-, and we are moving rapidly over a lot of
territory.
General Strong was ill. I was in the A-2 receiving a considerable
amount of Intelligence through G-2.
Chairman Madden. What time are you referring to now?
General Bissell. Between the period I returned from India, in
1943, and the time I took over as head of G-2, in January 1944.
In that period I was convinced we w^ould never get, during the war,
an effective Intelligence organization in Air Forces. It started too
late; it did not have sufficient experienced personnel in Intelligence,
and it wasn't going to work too well, and it was going to be very costly
and we would get a good set-up, but the wnir Avould be over by the
time we got it. So I told General Arnold exactly how I felt about
it and told him I thought a better working arrangement could be made
with G-2 whereby we w^ould send Air Force officers down there in some
numbers and they would specialize on the Air Force end of it and we
wouldn't have to.
He took that thought to General Marshall. General Marshall had
some contacts w^ith General Strong. I think I made the suggestion
on a Saturday morning. I think that afternoon I was informed that
I would be the next G-2 and go see General Strong. I think physi-
cally I took over G-2 the next Monday morning because of General
Strong's condition and that he promptly went to the hospital at
Walter Reed.
That was not wdiat I had originally intended at all. I had no
thought of any such thing and expected to go back to o[)erations, which
was my specialty.
The order confirming me in G-2, I think, is dated January, but I
think I actually went to work there nearly a month earlier, because
I don't think General Strong was I'elieved until they had given him
a thorough check at Walter Keed and determined it was not expedient
to send him back to G-2. His physical condition Avould not stand it.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank at that time, (jeneral^
General Bissell. Major general.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated that from the time you left the Chiiui-
Burma-lndia theater you made several visits to other stations. Could
you briefly sketch for the connnittee some of those visits, because it
covered the period
Mr. Mac^likowicz. Just a minute, if you will pardon me.
Mr. Chairman, I understand some of the committee have unavoid-
able appointuients this afternoon. AVe probably have other matters to
discuss. I think we should leave Buruia to some other investigation.
Let us get to the Katyn matter. I do not think it is particidarly
importaut to us whiit his other assiguments were.
Mr. MrrciiKLL. Katyn happened in April 194;), it was disclosed, and
he evidently came from the Near Fast area.
('hairinan Madden. Does this have some connection with Katyn?
Mr. Mttciiell. Yes, sir; my line of questions has.
I will make the qtu^stions more direct if the connnittee so desire.s.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1845
In April 1943, the Katyn affair was disclosed to the world by the
Germans. The general left the China-Burma-India theater. I be-
lieve, on September 1, 1943. The Katyn alfair had become known to
the world then. I do not know how the general returned to the
States, but lie did state here this morning that he came through certain
areas. I vvould like to have him now tell the committee if he had
heard about the Katyn affair, at what stations. Colonel Szymanski
was militaiy attache in Cairo, Egypt, at the time.
Chairman Maddex. Proceed.
General Bissell. I flew from India, departing from Karachi, in an
airplane which was furnished to me to proceed as far as Casablanca.
I was directed to proceed by the usual transport route to Cairo, with
some diversions authorized to see strategic points en route. I landed
at Cairo and had a few days there.
I knew something of Katyn while on duty in India and loaned
Polish-speaking personnel in my command for use of the British in
India. There they had families, I think, of some of the Polish
Army housed somewhere outside of Karachi under pretty terrible con-
ditions. It was nobody's fault; just there they were. Food was
scarce in India; Englishmen were scarce, and English, Indian, or
American people Avho spoke any Polish were still more scarce. So,
w^e were very glad to help. It was a tricky thing to do. It was not
my job to take care of Polish refugees but to fight the Japanese. But
I felt that the small number of Polish people we had who could be
of assistance wouldn't hurt us and could be of great assistance. So
that was done.
I knew where they were camped and saw it from the air. While I
don't recall it too much in detail, I remember talking to one or two
of my people who were there, and they painted a picture of distress
and privation and poverty and suffering and broken families and
lives and lack of homes and everythino; that was pathetic. They
didn't know where they were going. They were worn out, and the
Britisli couldn't move them any farther because they couldn't then
stand more travel.
Yes; I knew something of Katj-n, but not the detail probably that
was available in America, because our messages were pretty short.
I had heaid of it.
, When I got to Egypt, I was much more concerned with the Poleski
operation, which had just been finished. It was one of the brilliant
Air Force operations of the war. I was very much concerned with
lend-lease and supply arrangements because we in India were sup-
posed to get certain supplies to that theater, I wanted to help Stilwell
every way I could.
Mr. MricHELL. Did you see Colonel Szymanski while you were in
Cairo?
General Bissell. I saw a lot of people in Cairo. I could have seen
him. I liave no recollection of him. While I have heard his name,
I have never met the man to remember who he was. I may have met
him in Cairo. He would be the best judge of that. He would remem-
ber me much better than I would remember him, because there were
not many Air Force people passing through there who had been much
interested in Intelligence, and I w^as.
1848 THE katyjst forest massacre
Mr. MiTciiKi.L. You are now tellin<i- tlie comniittee tlmt you had uo
specific discussions in Cairo with anyone in direct connection with
the Katyn affair?
General Bissell, Only that I knew from discussions at headquar-
ters there that there were Poles in that area and that formation of a
Polish Army was progressing — not too rapidly, but progressing — and
that problems of every nature Avere involved.
Mr. Mitchell. The problems of the forming of the Polish Army
had no connection with the Katyn affair.
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to know is this : You had no
discussions at all with anyone at the headquarters at Cairo relative
to Katyn ; is that correct?
General Bissell, Not specifically.
Mr. Mitchell. You do not recall anyone?
General Bissell. No, sir; not to my recollection. It could have
happened, but I don't tliink so.
Mr. Mitchell. You have just stated to the committee that you
assumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff as a major general
for G-2 on or about the 4th of Januar}^ 1944. Will you now relate
to the committee what happened when a Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet,
Jr., was brought to your office in May 1945?
General Bissell. Yes.
I was told, probably on Monday, the 21st of May, that Colonel
Van Vliet wished to see me but that, for some reason, probably be-
cause of my schedule that day, he was not set up for that day. I had
a hearing up here, I think, in this House, with some connnitt«e, at
about that time, and I was preparing for that, and there were many
urgent things. I had been away from the 16th, the day before
Colonel Van Vliet arrived in W^ashington, and was away on official
business until the Sunday, which would have been the 20th, as I re-
call, when I returned dead-tired from a very long, hard trip.
I used Monday on very urgent things that had piled up during my
absence, and on Tuesday I saw Colonel Van Vliet. I cannot tell you
who brouglit him into my office. I lieard Colonel Lantaff's state-
ment. He could well have done it. It would have been normal.
I have prepared some notes which will give in a little more chrono-
logical order what happened after Colonel Van Vliet came in. I will
talk from them, if you wish, or I will talk in answer to your questions
as you present thenu
Chairman Madden. If you care to refer to your notes, that is sat-
isfactory.
General Bissell. I think it will be quicker.
(chairman Madden. That is all right.
General Bissell. If I digress or conunent on things that you are not
interested in, please sto]) me, because I don't want to take the com-
mittee's time unnecessarily.
Mr. FuiKOLO. Before you start: When did you prepare those notes?
(Jeneral Bissell. I have been working on them since I heard I was
to come u]) here, to get the IhiuLTs down so I would get the chronology
of the. (hing and arranged the details that way.
Mr. Fi KcoLo. in other words, these are not notes that you pre-
pared then?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1847
General Bissell. Xo; only penciled notes bein*^ revised from day
to day and as I recall things.
Mr. FuRCOLo. They are not notes made at that time?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. FtTJCOLO. They are notes you made in the last 2 or 3 weeks?
General Bissell. Some of them were made a little earlier than
that. All were prepared since your committee was formed. There
was no part prepared pi'ior to that time that is in those notes at all.
You are interested in 1945. I have it right here. I think it will
be quicker to read it.
Colonel Van Vliet, who had been liberated from a German prisoner-
of-war camp south of Berlin when it was overrun by the Russians,
reached the American lines about May 5, 1945. He reported to me
in Washington on May 22, 1945. In my office, with only Colonel
Van Vliet and myself ])resent, he told me the story of the POW
visit — that is, prisoner-of-war visit — to Katyn. Although he showed
the effects of his years of imprisonment less than many officers, he
was tired, tense, and thin. Nevertheless, he told the story of the
assembly of the American-British prisoner-of-war group and of the
visit to Kaytan in such a calm, direct, and conservative manner that
there was iio doubt in my mind that he was telling the truth about
these events exactly as he remembered what had occurred 2 years
earlier.
As was to be expected in such a case, a few of his oral statements
conveyed a somewhat different meaning after a few questions were
askecf than as origiPxally made. This is not the slightest implica-
tion he was not completely honest and straightforward. It was prob-
ably because he had lived with the story and his reaction to the
unpleasant experiences so long that he assumed more background
detail was known to me than actually was the case.
As I recall, this interview lasted about half an hour. Very early
in his interview I realized Colonel Van Vliet must be given an oppor-
tunity to put his report in writing in a way that would be easiest for
him and that he should be afforded an opportunity to make such cor-
rections, additions, or deletions as he considered essential for com-
plete accuracy. I so informed him near the end of our first conference.
With Colonel Van Vliet's complete agreement, I arranged at once
for a Mi-s. Mildred Meeres, a competent, experienced and trustworthy
secretary, to take his dictation and type his report. I also arranged
for a private security room where they could work undisturbed, to
be at Colonel Van Vliet's disposal. Either with Colonel Van Vliet
present oi' i)iomptly after my first conference with Colonel Van Vliet,
I insured that ^Irs. Meeres knew the security classification of her
work, would be available exclusively to Colonel Van Vliet, and would
receive no instructions from anyone that would conflict with these
arrangements.
Thereaftel^ the preparation of the report was handled entirely by
Colonel Van Vliet without suggestion or influence by me or by anyone
else.
I then have a reference here in my notes which I think will not fit
here. I talked to someone in State at that point.
Do you want it as it came ?
Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you mean you talked to someone in the State
Department ?
1848 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. Yes. On May 23 I talked to Mr. Fred Lyon,
of the State Department, about another matter in the State Depart-
ment's interest. G-2 works in very close cooperation with the State
Deparment on all matters of joint interest.
General Holmes and Mr. Lyon were my closest State Department
contact at this particular time. I am not positive, but it is my
impression that on May 23, 1945, I told Mr. Lyon of Colonel Van
Vliet's arrival, that the Colonel Van Vliet report was being pre-
pared, and that I requested Mr. Lyon to inform General Holmes,
and assured General Holmes he would receive the report promptly.
Mr. Machrowicz. Pardon me, but could you tell the committee who
General Holmes was, what his position was 'i
General Bissicll. General Holmes, you will have him identified
very accurately on the letter that I wrote him, which describes his
position by its exact name. But he went over there to head the
Intelligence of the State Department, and then they gave him other
jobs, and he became an Assistant Secretary. I think he probably
was one at that moment, but I am not sure just when his appointment
came through.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is his first name ?
General Bissfxl. Julius.
He had been a general with General Eisenhower. "\^Tien I went over
to England, I met him there.
I may have passed the information direct to General Holmes on
the 24th of May 1945, when I had one or two conversations with
General Holmes. But 7 years have passed since the occurrence of
these events, and I cannot say with certainty which procedure I used
to inform General Holmes. I feel certain I took the steps to inform
him.
I understand General Holmes has denied any recollection of the
Van Vliet report. It would be quite understandable. The volume
and pressure of work in General Holmes' State Department office had
greatly increased by the ending of the German war a very short time
before that and no man in his position could be expected to remember
everything that passed through his office. It is possible that the
matter slip])ed Mr. Lyon's mind and that General Holmes was not
informed. Mr. Lyon was also yjushed to the limit in those days.
I have known both General Holmes and Mr. Lyon over a period of
years and am confident they are both loyal, honest, and able Americans.
In my opinion, any implication that either of them would knowingly
take any action inimical to the United States interests to assist com-
munism or Russia is absurd.
The Alger Hiss-Chambers incident makes it appear Ihat classified
papers considered of interest to (he Conuuunists could and did leave
the State Department without authority, record, or knowledge of
res])onsible State Department authoritu^s. Disappearance of the
Colonel Van Vliet report would have been of interest to.the Russians
Avhether or not thev were responsible for the K-.ityn killings. As far
as I know, the State Department has made no statement that Colonel
Van Vliet's report was ever received, but only that G-2 had no receipt
from the Stale Department for it.
I am not fully informed ou State Dei)artment actions in this respect
because there is lots going on that I don't know anvthino- about.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1849
When Colonel Van Vliet's report was completed, he a<»;ain came to
my office. He assured me that he had read over his report carefully
and that he was satisfied that it represented, to the best of his recol-
lection, what he knew of the Katyn matter and his connection witli it.
With Colonel Van Vliet seated in a comfortable chair in my office,
I read Colonel Van Vliet's completed report. It was a good report,
which I thought presented the picture more clearly than his previous
oral report. Colonel Van Vliet's typed report did not differ in any
fundamental, however, from the previous story told to me.
I directed the report be classified top secret. Colonel Van Vliet
signed it, and it was authenticated by him so that no substitution of
pages would be possible.
Mr. FuRCOLO. By "authenticate," do you mean he initialed it?
General Bissei.l. Initialed every page with his own initials. There
is nothing unusual about that. That is prescribed in the regidations
some place. It is routine.
But he hadn't done it, and I understood why he was a prisoner of
war. He wasn't very fresh on his regulations, and I saw to it that he
went through that procedure. I remember him initialing the pages.
The classification "top secret" had been authorized by the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 11)44 for use in the United
States Armed Forces. It became effective March 15, 1944, while I
was in G-2.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Do you have a definition of that phrase, "top
secret" ?
General Bissell. Yes. It is in the Army regulations.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it the same one in existence today ?
General Bissell. I will show you a copy of the one in effect, then, if
I may, if you will just make a note and have me come back to it.
Mr. IVIiTCHELL. Surely.
General Bissell. It was more than a year after Colonel Van Vliet
was captured by the Germans in Tunisia, in February 1943, before the
United States Armed Forces used the top secret classification for
American military material or documents.
After his liberation from POW camp. Colonel Van Vliet had been
returned to the United States with dispatch. I was not certain he
understood the top secret classification in its accepted sense in our
service, due to lack of opportunity for much, if any, experience in its
use. As he had been cut off from much information for 2 years in a
prisoner-of-war camp, I could not expect him to know the possible
political significance of his report, even though he recognizee! it had
political implications and was of State Department as well as War
Department interest.
It is my recollection that at our first contact, Colonel Van Vliet
asked me what he should do if questioned about Katyn, and I told
him to say nothing, that I considered the matter very important and
top secret.
I cannot recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memorandum
to Colonel Van Vliet. I have heard the testimony of INIrs. Meeres. I
wish the committee would see if your copy has on it a number 920. If
so, it was done in her section ; if not, I would be interested to know.
You will find that papers done by her bear the number 920.
Mr. Mitchell. It is 907.
1853 THE KATYN FOREST RL\SSACRE
General Bissell. Someone else wrote it, or someone else (•0})ie(l it,,
or somethin«T.
JVIr. Mitchell. It is an exhibit on pn^e 51 of tlie i)art 2 hearings.
General Bissell. Her work was 020, if my memory serves me cor-
rectly. I am sure she is mixing something up, and I wnll be glad to
answer your questions on that, if you want it, and I am sure it was
inadvertent on her part.
I cannot now recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memo-
randum to Colonel Van Vliet. It was not dictated before our first
conference. It was probably dictated after our conference as it bears
the date of May 22, 1945. It could have been ty])ed on the 28d and
still bear the date of May 22, 1945, as it was to confirm verbal orders of
that date and to be binding therefrom.
I believe either that I dictated this memo in Colonel Van Vliet's
presence or asked if he suggested any changes before he signed it,
because my recollection is clear that Colonel Van Vliet was entirely
satisfied and happy about the memorandum.
For the various reasons I have stated, it appeared to me proper,
prudent, and expedient to furnish Colonel Van Vliet with the brief
memorandum i-eferring to his report in language that would be clear
and specific to him but meaningless to anyone into whose hands it
might fall inadvertenth'. The memo sets forth the restrictions im-
posed on Colonel Van Vliet for the security of the information con-
tained in his report. It also stated clearly the procedure to be fol-
lowed subsequently should he desire to have the restriction removed.
The reason for imposing the restriction was included.
After reading the memorandum and indicating he understood it, he-
signed the memorandum to make his understanding a matter of record.
He has complied with the letter and spirit of his instructions.
Also, I may ])ossibly have been infiiienced to be particularly careful
with the security of the Colonel Van Vliet report by the fact that at
that time I was pre])aring for testimony before the House Military
Affairs Conunittee investigating subversive activities within the Arnnv
before Avhich 1 a})peai-ed on the moi'ning of ^lay 24, 1945. Also, at
that time, United States security agencies were threatened with Bi
security leak on anotlier unrelated matter which was important. I
do not know how many copies, if any, other than the original, were
made of the Colonel Van Vliet report. Mrs. Meeres, who typed the-
report, informed me in 1950 she did not know^ positively, but she
believed she had made only an original. I hope that you will
secure — well, you have done it — her first-hand statement.
I didn't know whether you would have her come. If you hadn't,.
I would Avant you to.
She gave her reasons for believing she made oidy an original. Since-
you didn't ask her why, I will tell you what reasons she gave me..
She said if she had made copies she would have remembered putting
carbons in the envelo])e for destruction, because carbons for top-
secret things had to be desti'oyed as well as stenographer's notes, and
she said she had no such recollection.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that was in 1950. On what occasion was-
it that you were talking about that? You were retired then, were
you not^
(ieneral liissELL. I had not tlicn vet retired. I was assisting
Mr. Shackelfoi-d.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1851
I can give that to you in detail, if you like. I have notes on that,
on whom I contacted and why 1 saw Mrs. Meeres and what I said
and more of it.
Mr. Mitchell. We can come back to that later, unless the com-
mittee decides otherwise.
(Tcneral Bisseli.. All right ; any time you want to break in, go ahead.
She gave me her reasons for believing why she made only an
original. And there were several other reasons. She said she didn't
remember that her hands got dirty on the job, and they would have
if she had been handling carbons. That was one of the reasons the
original came out so clean, that she never corrected any carbons, and
some very minor corrections were made by Colonel Van Vliet on the
report — made, as I recall, in ink and initialed. Those, of course,
would have to be made on the carbons had there been any.
Mr. FuRCOLO. When did she tell you these things?
General Bissell. She told me those in 1950 when I was assisting
Mr. Shackelford, trying to help him get in touch with everybody who
might know anything about the Van Vliet re])ort.
And those were repeated in his office, as I recall. They were told
to me upstairs when I contacted her. I saw her in the section she was
then working and then recommended to Mr. Shackelford that she
appear at his office, whicli she did. I sat in when he questioned her.
Chairman Maddex. We can come back to that later, if you will
complete your statement.
General Bissell. Right, sir.
Normally at least one copy, plus the original, would have been
made of a report. There were good reasons why, in this case, this
might not have been done.
My recollection is that Colonel Van Vliet's report was dated May 24,
1945, and that it was on May 23 or 24, 1945, when he submitted it and
when I last saw hiuL 1 know I saw Mrs. Meeres about the report
and a directly related matter on the afternoon of May 24, 1945. My
recollection is that Mrs. Meeres was in my office for part of the time
Colonel Van Vliet was w^ith me for our second conference.
i\ly normal procedure would have been to afford an opportunity
for Colonel Van Vliet to speak to me alone if he wished and subse-
quently have a secretary present for the period slie might be needed.
Then I have a paragraph : Capt. Donald B. Stewart, a Regular
Army Artillery officer, did not report to me in person or make any
report to me on his ]^artici]:)ation in the ])risoner-of-war visit to Katvn
with Colonel Van Vliet. I did not direct Captain Stewart to make
a written report. Colonel Van Vliet's reiiort covered the part taken
by Captain Stewart because Colonel Van Vliet stated Captain Stewart
was in complete agreement wnth Colonel Van Vliet's statements and
conclusion, because Colonel Van Vliet stated that he and Captain
Stewart had talked about Katyn and Captain Stewart ])ossessed no
information mdmown to Colonel Van Vliet, and because if the State
Department or any other United States Government agency wanted
a statement from or a conference with Captain Stewart, the War
Department could make him available.
I had com])lete confidence in Colonel Van Vliet's integrity and hon-
esty. Had Captain Stew^art reported to me in Washington, as I
expected he would do, I would have had him prepare a written report.
1852 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
One best learns from experience. I now believe it wo; d have been
preferable had I directed Captain Stewart to report t. le in Wash-
ino;ton upon his return to the United States from "World War II.
I do not remember positively many details of the Colonel Van Vliet
report. I do not recall whether it was on long or short sheets, single-
or double-spaced, how many pages it contained; whether or not there
were carbon copies, whether Colonel Van Vliet or Mrs. ]Meeres per-
sonally carried the report into my office, or specifically in whose hands
the report was after Colonel Van Vliet signed it. Neither does he or
Mrs. Meeres. All of us at that time were primarily interested in its
contents and security rather than in its format or in its physical ctetails.
I can assure you its importance was fully recognized by me, and my
intent was its prompt transmittal through a secure channel either to
the activity handling war crimes data, or to the State Department.
G-2 liacl been sending anything received in connection with war
crimes or atrocities to the agency holding it for the War Crimes Com-
mission. I do not rememl)er definitely to which agency we sent such
material for them. I know we had some definite verbal instructions
from my predecessor. General Strong, which we carried out implicitly.
I have a distinct recollection of having seen previously the photo-
gra])hs which are exhibits 3 to 7, both inclusive, of Colonel Stewart's
testimony; but if such photographs were attached to the Colonel Van
Vliet report, the Captain Gilder report, or other reports of Katyn I
handled, I do not remember.
Chairman Madden. You speak of Colonel Stewart's testimony.
What do you mean by that ?
General Bissell. I read what is in the book when he talked to you,
and he gave you the pictures and I had a chance to see what the pictures
were.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. I believe I had previously seen the photographs
also that are exhibits 1 and 2, both inclusive, of Captain Stewart's
testimony, but I do not have as distinct a recollection of those.
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt a minute?
Mr. Chairman, those exhibits are in part 1. The hearing was held
October 11, 1951.
Mr. Sheeiian. Counsel, the general mentioned the Captain Gilder
report. What was that^
General Bissell. I ^;.\.ii^ come to it, if you want me to, and other
reports I mentioned, if you would like to, on Katyn.
I cannot be positive what happened to the Colonel Van Vliet report,
but it is my recollection, confirmed by some available documentary
material, which I believe has been made available to this committee,
that the letter of transmittal for the Colonel Van Vliet report was
dated May 25, 1945, and that it, the Colonel Van Vliet report, and
the related matter were transmitted to the State Department repre-
sentative. Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, on May 25, 1945.
The available documentary material confirming transmission of the
first Colonel Van Vliet re])oi't — [addressing Mr. Shackelford] and I
say first as coiuiterdistinguislied from tlie one that was secured by your
auspices — the one that I i-emeniber as the Hrst one
Mr. Maciiuowicz. Pardon me, })ut might I just interrupt.
You referred now to a letter of transmittal from your department
to the Department of State, which you say also disappeared. If I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1853
remember yd '^^ statement a few moments before that, you, I believe,
said that yotvi tvere not sure whether you transmitted it orally or by
letter.
General Bissell. No. I said I didn't know where it had gone. In
other words, State says they didn't receive it. I can't say they did
receive it.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think if you will refer to the notes from which
you read, you previously said you are not sure whether you referred
to it orally or by transmittal ; is that right?
General Bissell. Of course; it is in the record. I would like to
give it to you again.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. General, I have just one question.
In your experience in that particular position, do you know of any
reports besides this one disappearing?
General Bissell. I don't know that this one disappeared, frankly;
but, specifically, what you are after is another case.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I use that term advisedly.
General Bissell. No ; I don't believe I do.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. As far as you know, to your knowledge, in your
experience in that department, this is the only report that you know
of that cannot be located ?
General Bissell. No. That is not so. There are thousands of them
that can't be located, that have been destroyed ; thousands of them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But there is a record of them that they have been
destroyed.
General Bissell. Sometimes there will be and sometimes there will
not.
And I have that covered in my notes here some place and the reason
for it. There was good reason for it.
Chairman Madden. I think we will make better progress if you
complete your statement and then the members of the committee can
cross-examine.
General Bissell. As you wish il, sir.
The available documentary confirming transmittal of the first Colo-
nel Van Vliet report is my secret letter dated August 21, 1945, to
Frederick Lyon, Acting Director, Office of Controls, room 115, Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D. C, which reads :
Dear Mb. Lyon : Transmitted for the informatio.^ "^e of the State Department
is a report on Katyn by Stanley S. ,B. Gilder, captain, EAMC (Medical Corps),
British officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van
Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes 25 May 1945, and generally substantiates
all material facts in Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
Major General, G-2,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
The identifying reference on this letter is 700,00061WBA.CSLE.
This is a decimal identification and a decimal file date.
The letter also carried the identification MIL920, which w^as a
G-2 identification. The G-2 identification was for the section in
which Mrs. Meeres worked.
This communication shows, by State Department stamps, that it
was in their Office of Controls August 23, 1945, in their Division of
Foreign Activities Correlation on the same date, in their Special War
93744— 52— pt. 7 ^3
1854 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Problems Division on October 2, 1945, and in the Office of European
Affairs on October 5, 1945.
Other entries on the letter indicate that it was probably seen or
processed by the individuals or activities in the State Department
identified thereon as F131.ETB.WHM.AVMF.SWP.CE.EE, and that
the letter was received in State Department confidential file October
16, 1945, after only 5 days less than 2 months of processing in the
State Department.
During this entire period, I continued as G-2. Had the Colonel
Van Vliet report not been available in the State Department, I woidd
have received a letter or a telephone call asking for it. because, ob-
viously, it would have been impossible to compare the Gilder report
with the Van Vliet report had knowledge of the Colonel Van Vliet
report not been available in the State Department.
The Captain Gilder secret report referred to in my August 21, 1945,
letter, and its enclosure was a British War Office document identified
by the reference MI-9/BM/973. MI-9 means British Military Intelli-
gence Office, section 9, and the BM/9T3 was a reference for Britl^h
itlentification and file location.
The Captain Gilder report was a history of a visit made to Katyn
in 1943, consisting of three standard-sized typed pages, written very
full, and divided into only two paragraphs. It is my understanding
that the Captain Gilder report has been made available to the com-
mittee. If not, it should be in State Department files.
There is also a notation placed in the letter by the State Depart-
ment. It is 711.62114-A, just written on it. This was the decimal
file reference number to the matter related to Colonel Van Vliet's
report, to which I previously referred and will refer again. This
shows that State had gone into the Katyn report carefully and thor-
oughly enough to locate the related matter also. It was tied together.
It has been possible for me to be so specific on details about the
August 21, 1945, letter because in the fall of 1950, Mr. Shackelford,
then and now Department Counselor, Department of the Army, was
conducting an investigation into the Katyn affair, showed me my letter
which he had secured from the State Department files.
He (juestioned me about it and authorized me to make a longhand
copy of the letter to facilitate the location of the file copy which should
have been back in the G-2 files.
Chairman Maddp:n. Pardon me. Your letter that you referred to
was the letter that accompanied tlie Gilder report, was it (
General Bissfxl. The one that carried the Ciilder report, referring
to the Van Vliet report, and asked them to compare the two and
telling them there was no fundamental dill'erence.
I was able to locate the file copy of my letter on the Gilder report —
it was an identical carbon copy — that is, it was in the G-2 files —
of the text, but, of course, it did not show the State Department
processing, because it had never been away from G-2.
Mr. MrrcnKLL. When did you locale' that ^ This is 1950, is it ^
Geneial liissKU.. 1950, yes. 1 went down, and Mr. Shackelford had
the originnl letter, the one that I sent to State.
ISIr. MrrciiKLL. He got it from Stated
General Bisseij.. He got it from State.
Mr. Mitchell. You say now that you found the identical copy
of it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1855
General Bisseix,. Yes.
Mr, Mitchell. This was September, 1950?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you find it ?
General Bissell. In G-2.
Mr. Mitchell. Where in G-2 ? Maybe we can find the Van Vliet
report there yet.
General Bissell. I hope so, but I don't think you will, because I
tliink we have tried every way we could to locate it.
A young man who was a captain was acting as a sort of liaison
officer between you (addressing Mr. Shackelford) and G-2 at that
time. I gave it to him and then he said it had not enough importance.
The war was going on in Korea at that time, I went to General Weck-
erling at that time, who had been my deputy in G-2, during the war
and asked him to put some pressure on it. General Boiling came in
while we were talking and I asked him to put some pressure on it.
It came up.
When it came up, it carried the following file information, that
had not been on the original Jetter to the State Department. It read :
"AC of S, G-2/72577, General Bissell. MM. CPM."
The 72577 was a reference number. The rest meant that the letter
originated in my office, that I dictated it personally to MM, who was
Mrs. Meeres. The (CPM.) meant the "Captured Personnel and Ma-
terial Section" to which she belonged.
Mr. Mitchell. What Avas the date on tliat ?
General Bissell. 21 August, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
General Bissell. It also contained an entry "Courier Service,
senders Number C-601, date 22 xiugust, 1945". This meant the letter
was hand-carried to the State Department.
There is also a self-explanatory note on the file copy, which reads,
"Received back in MIS Administrative Records, August 24, 1945".
The significance of that is to keep people informed when the file
copy was sent to somebody sometime, and then they got it back and
made the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any acknowledgement of receipt by the
Department of State ?
General Bissell. That particular copy we are talking about, this
file copy, never got out of G-2, so there would be no receipt any place.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication in the Gilder report
that the letter of transmittal was received?
General Bissell. It wouldn't be on the letter. All that was on the
file copy in G-2 was an indication how it had been sent.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you found any acknowledgment of re-
ceipt by the Department of State of the Gilder Report ? I am talking
about the Gilder Report.
General Bissell. I didn't look for a copy of a receipt from State
of the Gilder Report.
Mr. Mitchell. Why not ?
General Bissell. Because they answered to that.
Mr. Sheehax. But you did see the letter from the State Depart-
ment ?
General Bissell. I saw the letter I sent to State, my own personally
signed letter, which Mr. Shackelford had gotten from them. That
1856 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
was a clue how we might have gotten some more Katyn data, maybe
put in our files. For one thing, that would be the right place. So I
took a copy in longhand and checked the files on it through G-2.
I didn't do it physically. Up came the copy, and it showed you how
the letter was sent off.
Mr. Machrowicz. What do you mean, it was the right place? You
know we had to go to the warehouse in Alexandria to find the right
place on the Szymanski report.
General Bissell. Yes ; I imagine you would have to go a lot farther,
to Kansas City and other places, to find a lot of stuff that happened
in the war. The paper work got too big and they needed the offices
for something else. They had either to destroy it or send it away.
Mr. Machrowicz. On important documents?
General Bissell. What becomes important is a matter of history
and development. No one suspected that this one would be of any-
thing like international significance.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say you recognized the importance of
the document?
General Bissell. Yes; I did, you bet — but not the kind of signifi-
cance it has in today's world, because nobody could have foreseen the
situation that we have today. I did recognize it.
I have told you what the mention of the entries on the paper meant,
and what was on it. I now refer to the related matter previously men-
tioned, which was dated and directed to the State Department May
25, 1945, the same date. I believe as Colonel Van Vliet's report. It
is my letter to Brig. Gen. Julius C Holmes, Assistant Secretary,
Department of State, and reads :
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., Infantry, and a
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 684, are reported to have
been given a letter by the Swiss Protecting PovA^er, dated about October 1943,
which asked them to reply to certain questions. These questions were :
1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet gone to Katyn?
2. How had they been treated?
3. Were any photographs taken?
4. Had they made a statement?
Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply.
are in State Department files. It is requested that this be verified, and if the
records referred to are in the files of the State Department, that copies be made
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
Major General GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Mr, Machrowicz. Can we get the date of that letter?
General Bissell. The date of that letter was May 25.
Mr. FuRCOLO. 1945 ?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. FuRCOLO. May I interrupt just a minute to ask a question, Mr.
Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr. FuRCoLo. On page 67 of the hearings, at the bottom of the
page, it refers that the only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General
Bissell to General Holmes", was on another ])hase of this subject, and
it contains no reference to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum.
Mr. Mitchell. That is in part II.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1857
Mr. FuRCOLO. Now, is it your testimony that you did transmit the
Van Vliet memorandum in that ?
General Bissell. No. I say that this letter tends to indicate that
I did one of the two things I intended to do with it. Now, I didn't
personally ever take any — well, yes, sometimes I did take papers and
deliver them myself. But all I did in my position there was to make
decisions, establish policies, and had procedures set up so that I didn't
do the things myself. Other people did them.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Wliat I am anxious to find out if I can is : From the
letter that you have read, and having in mind this comment that was
made on the bottom of page 67, would you be willing to say that you
did not transmit the Van Vliet memgrandum in that letter ?
General Bissell. Well, nomenclature is causing a lot of trouble. I
think we better get straight.
Mr. FuRCOLO. All right.
General Bissell. The thing that has caused most of the trouble with
most of the people that have talked to the committee, in the small
amount of testimony made available to me in sections 1 and 2, have
not known that there were two Van Vliet reports written at the same
time of the first visit.
The result is they are going in big circles. Now, one of them will
call a report a letter, another will call it a report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. What I want to find out on this is : Did you transmit
any enclosure with this letter of May 25, 1945, whether it is called
Report No. 1 or 2, or something else ?
General Bissell. This letter is part of what Colonel Van Vliet said
occurred, but I don't think it was put in his report of Katyn, because
it wasn't part of the description of Katyn.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Here is what I am getting at. General — and I do not
mean to be technical about it. But I understand that you sent a letter
of May 25, 1945. Now, was anything enclosed in that letter? I am
not refering to the words and body of that letter of May 25, but did
you send any enclosure of any kind in that letter?
General Bissell. I don't believe so because, had it been done, there
would be written on the lower left-hand corner what the enclosure was.
And the Van Vliet big report of his story of Katyn wouldn't be at-
tached to. that thing, because the purpose of this was different, which
I will explain as I go along.
Mr. FuRCOLo. That is the point I was getting to. In your letter
transmitting the Captain Gilder report, I notice as you read it, that
at the bottom you mentioned "one enclosure."
General Bissell. Which was the Gilder report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. You also mentioned it in the letter.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FrRcoLO. I notice in the letter of May 25, 1945, there apparently
is no reference made to an enclosure, and also no reference made at
the bottom of the letter to an enclosure.
General Bissell. There shouldn't have been, because it doesn't men-
tion an enclosure in the text.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Your testimony now, as I understand it, with refer-
ence to this letter of May 25, 1945, from you, General Bissell, to
General Holmes is, to the best of your knowledge, that there was no
enclosure of any kind in that letter?
1858 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, there was not. You
have put a thought in my mind that had never entered it before, and
that is whether by accident or mistake, the Van Vliet repoit could
have been put there, but I don't think it is possible.
But this is the thing some i^eople speak of as the Van Vliet report,
in good faith, and think they are talking about the thing that you have
been investigating.
Mr. Mitchell. You say what people think — you are referring here
to the letter concerning the Swiss protecting power, are you not?
General Bissell. Well, that is the deal, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, I never knew, to my personal knowl-
edge since I have been on this investigation, that there were two re-
ports by Van Vliet concerning Katyn. I would not phrase it that
way. I would say there was a report specifically concerning Katyn,
which was rendered to you by Colonel Van Vliet. This is a subse-
quent request, as I get it, which may have occurred at the same time,
which concerned a request by the Swiss protecting power, which he
is merely reporting for your record, that he was asked these questions,
about going to Katyn, and so forth. This does not refer in any way
to what happened at Katyn other than there were photographs taken;
is that correct ?
General Bissell. There is quite a lot to it more than that. I would
like to make my point clear, that people have said it. Mrs. Meeres,
in her testimony this morning, said, "I took two Van Vliet reports."
Well, this is the other one. She took this letter, too.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall her having said that — maj^be she did.
General Bissell. It is in there — I think it is — that is the way I
understood it.
Mr. Sheehan. For the benefit of us members here, I am confused
on this idea of the two Van Vliet reports. I wish counsel would ques-
tion him on it and get it straight.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
General, there was a report, as I understand it, written by Colonel
Van Vliet, at your request, which concerned his visit to Katyn when
he was accompanied by Captain Stewart and several other Allied
officers. Is that correct?
General Bissell. There Avas such a report, and this is also the same
incident.
Mr. Mitchell. But there was such a report?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. That w\as specific ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. There was no mention in that rei')ort, was there, of
anything received from the Swiss protecting power ?
General Bissell. I cannot recall Colonel Van Vliet's original report
well enough to tell you whether this was also mentioned in it, or
whether we handled it separately. I think we handled it separately,
and I have the reasons in my notes here, if you want them.
Mr. MrrciiELL. All right, we have it fixed, then, Mr. Sheehan, that
there was only one real report at this stage of the investigation, namely,
the Katyn affair, and the visit by Captain Stewart and Colonel Van
Vliet. What he did at Katyn has been related to the committee by
both Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet, and it has always been
THE KATYISr FOREST MASSACRE 1859
my impression that that was the report that General Bissell ordered
him to document for the record, as a top-secret document.
Mr. Sheehan. As of May 21 or May 22, 1945?
Mr. Mitchell. Right.
Now, the general is bringing forth another item which specifically
concerns the Department of State, because it refers to the Swiss pro-
tecting power, which was then the power in control of the German
prison camps where Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet were,
and I believe that a subsequent conversation — the general is trying to
tell the committee now that Colonel Van Vliet reported this item of
being called in by the Swiss protecting power. And we have never
considered that as being a report.
Mr. Sheehan. Did the Army ever release that rejiort to us? It
should be in their files.
General Bissell. I think you have it.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we have it.
General Bissell. If you haven't, I can tell you where to get it.
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Do you mean tiie Gilder report?
General Bissell. No ; this is not the Gilder report we are discussing
now,
Mr. Machrowicz. Does the SavIss report have anvthing to do with
Katyn ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Could we have for the record — will the general report for the
record the letter, and what the letter specifically refers to? I am
sure it will clear it up to the committee.
When Van Vliet and Stewart returned from Katyn, about 4 or 5
months later, the Swiss protecting power asked them for some data
in comiection with it.
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Flood. Let me make this observation — this is all veiy interest-
ing, the Swiss report and the inquiries the Swiss made of Van Vliet
and Stewart, but, nevertheless, it has nothing to do with the thing
Ave all know we are talking about. There may be something here we
do not IniOAv we are talking about, but this investigation is concerned
Avith the Katyn massacre. The one thing AA^e do knoAv that Ave are
talking about is the Van Vliet report.
Now, Ave have heard Van Vliet, we haA^e heard everybody else that
Ave know about.
At this point I want to read into the record, from part II of our hear-
ings, page 67, this statement :
The Department of State has no record of haAang received the memorandum
of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945.
I Avant to insert this in parentheses: That refers to the Van Vliet
report that we all knoAv we are talking about.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Flood. And the Department of the Army has so far found
no receipt for it and no covering letter of transmittal. Noav, that
refers to the Van Vliet report that we all knoAv we are talking about.
The only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General Bissell to General
Holmes, was on another phase of this subject, and it contains no refer-
ence to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum.
1860 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Holmes has been contacted with reference to the matter,
and does not recall having ever seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's
memorandum.
My parentheses again at this point is Van Vliet's memorandum
is the report that we all know we are talking about, although General
Bissell remembers having sent it to him.
My understanding is — I know exactly what everybody means by
Colonel Van Vliet's memorandum or Colonel Van Vliet's report. This
thing that just came in here now about a second Van Vliet report
has to do with this inquiry by the Swiss, It is very interesting, but
it is not concerned with any mystery about the disappearance of
the Van Vliet report that we all know about.
I do not see why anybody has to be mixed up or concerned or con-
fused about two Van Vliet reports. The one we are talking about
is the one that we all know about — which is my phrase of identity
here.
Mr. Sheehan. The Army did not turn it over to us ; that is what
1 am looking for.
Mr. Flood. For the record, I am having no colloquy with any of my
friends in the committee.
If you have any statements to make, make them on the record.
I understand what I understand. If anybody else is uncertain about
what is going on, say so.
Mr. Sheehan. I asked a question.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. I merely want to state that I asked the question for
the simple reason that it is my understanding the Army has turned
over all the files they have on Katyn, and if they have not turned over
this report, apparently they have not turned over all the files.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, they have not turned over what is
referred to in the quotation Congressman Flood has just made for the
record, which appears on page 67 of part II, under the title "Another
Phase." I have never seen such a document. It has never been re-
ceived from the Army, to the best of my knowledge, and I don't believe
any member of the committee, you or I or anybody else, has seen such
a document.
Mr. Machrowicz. Has the committee requested it ?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe we requested many times of Mr. Shackel-
ford and everybody else, any paper connected with Katyn.
Mr. Flood. Let me say this again :
General, when I say "the Van Vliet report," I am not talking about
this Swiss business. You know what I am talking about — the Van
Vliet report that we all know about.
To your best recollection, a letter was dictated by you to the State
Department, a letter of transmittal to them, enclosing or attaching
thereto the Van Vliet report; is that correct? Did you dictate such
a letter to the State Department?
General Bissell. I don't know.
Mr. Flood. Will you say you did ?
(Jeneral Bissell. No.
Mr. Flood. Will you say you did not?
General Bissell. No.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1861
Mr. Flood. Then, at this point you do not know Avhether or not you
ever dictated a letter of transmittal to the State Department, having
to do with the Van Vliet report?
Mr. FuRCOLO. Let us get your answer on the record. You shook
your head.
Mr. Flood. Just a moment. I will yield to you in about 30 minutes.
Now, just a minute. General. You answered my question that you
do not know ; did you not ?
Geneval Bissell. I previously answered also the same thing.
]Mr. Flood. My colleagues are concerned only that your answer does
not appear on the record, and that you merely shook your head in
the negative.
General Bissell. I am sorry.
Mr. Flood. The answer is : You do not remember whether you did
or not ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
]\Ir. Flood. If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall
ever having seen a letter from you or the Van Vliet report, you will
not say that General Holmes is making a misstatement ?
General Bissell. I have previously made the answer to that question
in the record.
Mr. Flood. This is out of an abundance of caution and for repeti-
tion and for an emphatic purpose.
General Bissell. All right, sir. I consider General Holmes an
honorable, forthright, honest man, and he would say what he believed
to be the truth, under any circumstances.
Mr. Flood. That is very interesting, and we are glad to have your
estimate of General Holmes, but what is the answer to my question ?
Well, I will repeat it for you :
If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall ever having
seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliefs report, and if General Holmes
says that he does not recall ever having seen a letter of transmittal
from you, you will not say that he is wrong, will you ?
General Bissell. I will say that I am convinced he is right or thinks
he is right.
Mr. Flood. Now, there are a number of other things along this very
detail I want to ask you, but my brothers here are very anxious on
that point, so I yield to them, only for the purpose of examining on
that point, on what I am leading to.
Chairman Madden. Before we proceed on cross-examination, let
me ask the general :
Have you completed your statement yet?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Chairman Madden. You proceed with your statement, and then we
will proceed.
Mr. Flood. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I prefer, if there is no
violent objection, to clearing up this detail at this moment, and I
want to yield to any member of the committee who wants to examine
him on what I just introduced.
Chairman Madden. We will dispose of this detail.
Mr. Flood. I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Furcolo.
1862 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. FuRCOLO. General, perhaps I was confused, or did not hear your
answer correctly, but I understood you just a moment ago, in answer
to a question by Congressman Flood, to leave your testimony, in effect,
that you could not say whether or not any enclosure had been sent
in the letter of transmittal — referring to the letter of May 25, 194r» —
from General Bissell, from you, to General Holmes.
When I was questioning you about 5 or 10 minutes ago, I was under
the impression that you very definitely told me that your best recollec-
tion was that you did not send any enclosure of any kind in that letter.
My recollection is that you and I had some discussion about it, and
during the discussion I pointed out that your letter did not contain
any reference in the body of the letter to a transmittal, and also there
was no notation at the bottom of the letter referring to an enclosure.
We discussed the fact that in your letter of transmittal of the Gilder
report, there had been a reference in the bod,v of tlie letter, and also
the end of the letter referred to an enclosure. After going over that,
I thought that we had concluded the matter.
Could you finally leave it that your best recollection is that there
was no enclosure of any kind in the letter of May 25, 1945 ?
Now, I also thought that your answer to Congressman Flood was
somewhat at variance. I do not want to be unfair or confusing to
either you or me. My mind is not clear now on whether your final
answer was that you do not know whether there was an enclosure or
not, or whether your final answer is that there was no enclosure. I
wonder if you could clear that up for us ?
General Bisseix. My best recollection is that there was no enclosure
in the letter, and none listed on it, and there seems, in the body of the
letter, no reason for an enclosure to have been with it.
Mr. Flood. I will not yield any further now, but 1 will in a moment,
to Mr. Machrowicz.
Pursuing Congressman Furcolo's interrogation on the letter of ^lay
25, and enclosure, that has to do with another phase of the subject,
that is, the Swiss thing. I am not talking about that.
I am concerned only with two or three very simple details on this
report and your connection with it.
We know the whole story about Van Vliet preparing the report in
your office and that you got it, and all that kind of business — every-
body understands that.
Now, I ask you if you ever dictated a letter to the State Department
transmitting this Van Vliet report to them, to the State Department?
You said you do not remember whethej- you did or not. I presume
you made a search to find out if there was such a letter of transmittal,
did you not?
General Bisseix. I asked G-2 to do so. That was in 1950.
Mr. Flood. In 1950 you asked (i-2 to see whether or not there was
any such a letter of transmittal from you? Did G-2 ever find it, so
far as you know ?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Flood. State so, one wa}' or the other.
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Flood. So G-2 produced no co]:)y of such a letter ; is that correct,
General ?
General Bissell. That is correct, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1863
Mr. Flood. General Holmes said that he never saw such a letter
from you and that he never saw a copy of the report. I asked you
about that and you said that if he says so, you would not say he is
wrong?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I have
only one question that I have been trying to ask, that I think will clear
up this whole point.
Mr. Flood. I will yield to you on it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question : Are you prepared now to tell
tliis committee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were discussing
all the time was transmitted by you to the Department of State?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are not ?
That is all.
Mr. SiiEEHAisr. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Flood. If you want to follow that up I will yield.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Machrowicz asked him whether or not the State
Department had it. The general said "No." But a little while ago,
if you go into the record, you will see that from the exchange of cor-
respondence on other matters, that they must have had it ; otherwise
they would have written him asking where was this report.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Did you not say that, General.
General Bissell. I did say that.
Mr. Flood. Just a minute. I am yielding to Mr. Sheehan for a
question. Will you ask the question?
Mr. Sheehan. In response to Congressman Machrowicz's question
as to whether or not he thought the State Department had the Van
Vliet report, the general just said "No." Is that right or wrong?
Mr. Flood. That is right.
Chairman Madden. Who is testifying here now ?
Mr. Sheehan. Is that true?
General Bisseix. I didn't know you were asking me. I thought
you were asking Mr. Flood. I am sorry.
Chairman Madden. Gentlemen, can we have a little order?
Mr. Flood. I have just yielded to Mr. Sheehan for a question, or any
other observation he wants to make in connection with it.
Will you start from this point?
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you.
Following up from the last question Congressman ]\fachrowicz
asked you, if my memory is right, he asked you your opinion as to
whether or not the State Department received the Van Vliet report,
and you just answered "No." Am I right or wrong?
General Bissell. He didn't ask my opinion.
Mr. Machrowicz. I did not ask his opinion.
Mr. Sheehan. What did he ask you ?
General Bissell. You can get it out of the record ; it was an opinion,
he asked.
Mr. Flood. Just a minute ; I still have this witness.
Mr. Sheehan, if you want the record read after what Mr. Machro-
wicz said and what the general said, let us have it read.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Reporter, can you get the question asked
by Congressman Machrowicz ?
1864 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
(The record was read by the reporter as follows:)
Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question: Are you prepared now to tell this com-
mittee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were disc-ussiug all the time
was transmitted by you to the Department of State?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Your understandiii<2:, then, General, is that you did
not know that this report was transmitted directly to the Department
of State?
Congressman Machrowicz did ask the general whether or not this
Van Vliet report was transmitted to the Department of State. That
was his original question ; to which he said "No, sir."
Now, I am pointing out. General, if my memory is right, previously
in your statements, when you were reading from your notes, you defi-
nitely came to the conclusion that the State Department, because of
various exchange of correspondence, if they did not have it they
would have asked you where it was ?
General Bissell. I believe — and I can answer quickly and clearly —
I stated I did not know whether I had sent the paper to the war-crimes
people or the State Department, but I was inclined to believe I had
sent it to State, because of the supporting documentary evidence
which I have subsequently presented.
Mr. Sheehan. That is all.
Mr. Flood. That is your deduction.
General Bissell. That is just that way. I think it happened for
that reason. That is what I said.
Mr. Flood. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Does anybody else have anj^thing on this par-
ticular point?
All right. Now, proceed with your statement, General.
General Bissell. Thank you, sir.
I had just completed reading the signature on the letter.
Chairman Madden. We will reconvene at 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p. m. of the same day.)
AFTER recess
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
General Bissell.
TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON I. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY— Resumed
Chairman Madden. Before we recessed for lunch I think you were
going to proceed and complete your statement. Now if you will pro-
ceed, unless some of the members have some particular question they
would like to ask regarding some i)articular point in your statement,
I would like to have you complete your statement.
General Bissell. Thank you very much.
For continuity, I had just completed reading a letter. The letter
was also shown to me in the fall of 1950 by Mr. Shackelford, who had
secured it from the State Department hies. I believe its contents
have been available to the committee.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1865
Mr. Mitchell. May the record show that the contents have not been
made avaihible to the committee.
General Bissell. It bears the following notation : 711.62114A, 5-25-
45, which was its decimal file number and date, to which I have pre-
viously referred. It also bears the reference number 81998.
]\Ir. Machrowicz. What report are you referring to ?
General Bissell. The letter I had just read when the questions
started. I had just read the signature of the letter and then the com-
mittee started asking questions.
Mr. INIachrowicz. The letter of May 25 ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Since there has been a dispute between the two
on whether it has or has not been made available, has it or has it not
been made available to the committee ?
General Bissell. I said I believe it had, but Mr. Shackelford had
a copy right here at the table this morning.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the one I showed you a copy of and the
reply by the Department of State.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you tell us whether the letter of May 25,
which the general referred to has been made available to the com-
mittee ?
Mr. Shackelford. I believe it was made available to the committee
through the Inspector General's report.
Mr. Mitchell. That is incorrect, because there were no exhibits
connected with the Inspector General's report. That is where it is
mentioned. It is referred to in there by date. Mr. Sheeham has the
Inspector General's report. I will have to wait until he returns to get
it.
Mr. Shackelford. That can easily be checked. Mr. Machrowicz
and Mr. Mitchell remember the details. It was referenced in the press
memorandum that was put out.
Mr. Machrowicz. You will see it is made available ?
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
JNIr. Doxdero. So there will be no break in the continuity of thought,
General Bissell, the letter of May 25, 1945, to which you referred was
the letter of transmittal to General Holmes? Is that the one you
referred to ?
General Bissell. No, sir. It is the letter asking the State Depart-
ment to verify whether they have received a letter Van Vliet said
had been forwarded to him by the Swiss at our State Department's
request.
Shall I proceed, sir ?
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. It also bears the reference numbers 81998. State
Department stamps indicate it was in the office of the Assistant Secre-
tary, Mr. Holmes, May 30, 1945 ; in State Department Special War
Probes Division May 31, 1945 ; and there was on it an almost illegible
stamp mark, apparentlv of the OCE-UR Unit. There is written in
longhand on the letter "SWP May 31, 1945, AH/ABF." This would
indicate someone in the Special War Plans Division handled the mat-
ter for Mr. Holmes.
This is confirmed by another written notation written on the letter
reading "Answered 6-5-45, W. H. McCahon/EKG." This meant Mr.
McCahon dictated the reply to EKG, the secretary, on June 5, 1945,
1866 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
for Mr. Holmes' signature, which was typed on the letter. I do not
know if General Holmes personally signed this letter. If the original
is in G-2 files, this point can be clarified.
State Department's reply under date of June 9, 1945, was addressed
to me as "G-2, War Department."
Mr. Shackelford also showed me the State Department copy of their
reply, and I understand a copy has been made available to the com-
mittee.
Mr. Mitchell. One moment. This committee has never seen either
the original or the copy of the letter you are referring to now, namely,
the State Department reply which is dated what date, June G, 194r> '.
General Bissell. June 9, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. The committee or no member of its staff had seen the
original or a copy of it until this morning when Mr. Shackelford
handed me a copy.
Mr. Shackelford. We will be glad to supply it.
Chairman Madden. I wish you would supply it for the record.
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
General Bissell. The reply read, "Confidential. In reply refer to
SWP 711.62114A/5-25/45." It is dated June 9, 1945. It follows :
My Dear General Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag G4, received from the protect-
ing power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whether these
officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You ask
the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter togetlier with Colonel
Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State.
The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and
(\ipt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey and
if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time.
in February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet ami
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector
at the time of tlie next visit to that camp would endeavor to obtain the informa-
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been
leceived in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know whether this is intended or not to
confuse us. Again you are not referring to the original Colonel Van
Vliet report ?
(leneral Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Your answer to me is not changed at all by the
statement made so far?
General Bissell. No, sir; but you would notice in the language used
that they call this second one the report.
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes, but that is not the report we are talking
about.
General Bissell. Yes, that is right. That is my point. I have
caught it.
Chairman Madden. You are confusing me a little here. What has
this got to do with Colonel Van Vliet's original report?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1867
(leneral Bissell. A great deal, sir, because the State Department
had considerable knowledge apparently of this matter before Van
Vliet ever left Germany. They wrote these letters before I ever
took over G-2.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring now that the State Depart-
ment had information about the Van Vliet report before Van Vliet
came to your office ?
General Bissell. About the Van Vliet visit. They had asked that
long ago, whether there was a report, and Colonel Van Vliet had made
a reply to State. That is the status as I read it. There is a little bit
more to be given to you on it, if you want it.
Chairman Madden. This is a preliminary report that they are
referring to in this letter when they say, "Concerning the report that
Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain Stewart while detained
as prisoners of war at Oflag 64?" That has nothing to do with the
original Van Vliet report ? That is not referring to the original report
that he signed?
(xeneral Bissell. That is not the report that Van Vliet dictated in
Washington.
Mr. Mitchell. May I put that in as an exhibit?
Chairman Madden. Mark that as an exhibit.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit No. -i.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4" and made
a part of the record as follows :)
Exhibit 4
[Confidentiall
June 9, 1945.
My Dear Gexeral Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag 64, received from tlie pro-
tecting power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whetlier
these officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You
ask the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter together with
Colonel Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State.
The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and
Capt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey
and if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time.
In February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet and
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector
at the time of the next visit to tliat camp would endeavor to obtain the informa-
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been
received in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government.
Sincerely yours,
Julius C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the Army supply the original,
if they have it, please. This is a copy.
Chairman Madden. Yes, we would like to have the original.
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir; we will be glad to supply you with
whatever we can.
186S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. DoNDERO. General, did you in your official capacity receive
any information from any source affecting the credibility of Colonel
Van Vliet or Captain Stewart 'i
General Bissell. That is in the next paragraph or two, and that
is the reason for my action, in order to get some basis on which to
evaluate the report they made to me by the only thing I could pin
down as a yardstick to measure the accuracy of his memory which
I thought was splendid.
Mr. DoNDERO. I want you to know of my personal interest in
this man, because Captain Stewart was my personal appointee to
West Point.
General Bissell. I am glad to know of your interest.
The State Department reply was very significant. It made it
very clear as early as September 1943, months before I was appointed
G-2, the State Department had reports of the visit of Colonel Van
Vliet and Captain Stewart to Katyn. They say so.
Mr. Machrowicz. That should not be very surprising to you. The
whole w^orld knew it. The Germans broadcast it.
General Bissell. They never broadcast the thing about the Van
Vliet visit. They said that American and British personnel, I think,
had been taken there or w^ould be taken there, but no names were
mentioned in anything I ever saw or know about. I can be wrong-
on this. There is an awful lot of stuff that did not reach G-2 on
this matter.
Mr. Mitchell. To clarify that point, sir; Colonel Van Vliet in
his testimony in part 2 specifically set forth, and so did Captain
Stewart w^ien he testified, that to their knowledge their names had
never been revealed by the Germans about their visit to Katyn.
General Bissell. It is also clear that the instructions from our
State Department to the American Legation at Bern was responsible
for the letter Colonel Van Vliet stated he had been given by the
Swiss protecting power about October 19i3, because the questions
Colonel Van Vliet said were in the letter he received are almost
exactly the questions our State Department had directed our Bern
Embassy to submit. The slight difference in phraseology was prob-
ably due to the requirement for paraphrasing anything that had been
sent classified, so that your code cannot be touched by putting it out
afterward for somebody who had copied the code.
The channel through which the questions reached Colonel Van Vliet
was the one our State Department had directed to be used by our
Bern Legation, and the time factors fitted perfectly. Our State De-
partment instructions issued in September 1948 apparently had re-
sulted in the delivery to Colonel Van Vliet while he was a prisoner
at Oflag 64 of the questions our State Department wanted answered.
Colonel Van Vliet stated that he replied to them. I^nless Colonel
Van Vliet was in error, either as to the date he gave, about October
1943, or about where he was then held prisoner at OHag G4, the in-
formation that our State Department received in February 1944 re-
porting his transfer to Oflag 64 could have had no possible bearing
on the delivery of Colonel Van Vliet's reply, as he had actually re-
ceived the letter at Oflag No. 64 and answered it 4 months earlier.
Also significant is the State Department's conclusion that the reason
no reply was received from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was con
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1869
sidered likely Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted
by the Germans.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to have to interrupt you again, because
I am interested in this whole situation, and I think the members of
the committee are. I am trying to tell you I am very much confused.
What was the significance of that letter ?
General Bissell. I read this part of it here.
Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. What was the significance ?
General Bissell. State was proceeding on the theory he had never
received their letter.
Mr. IMachrowicz. Wliose letter ?
General Bissell. Tliis letter sponsored by the Bern Legation. State
had sent word to Bern to have the Swiss Protecting Power get a letter
to Van Vliet asking questions.
Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with the matter we are
investigating ?
General Bissell. If Colonel Van Vliet had answered that at the
time, and I could get my hands on the answers then, I could compare
all or part of them with the statement he made to me 2 years later
to measure his memory, his veracity, or anything else. I did not ques-
tion them, but I had that job as a responsibility to do.
Mr. ISIachrgwicz. Wliat is the significance ?
General Bissell. The significance is that the answer State gave
me that he had changed prison camps had nothing to do with it be-
cause the letter had reached him and he had replied, according to his
statement, so the change of prison camps had nothing to do with it.
]Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. I frankly say I am as much confused as I was in
the beginning.
Mr. Dondero. Perhaps I can answer my colleague from Michigan
by saying I think the significance is that the State Department and the
Government here knew about this thing long before Colonel Van Vliet's
report.
Mr. Machrow^icz. Certainly. So did the Department of Defense
in 1943.
General Bissell. But we didn't know Van Vliet's part in it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Neither did the DeiDartment of State, as you say.
General Bissell. They did.
Mr. Machrowicz. They didn't know what he had to say.
General Bissell. No ; but they knew he had been there.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. It is up to the Department of
Defense to get a statement.
General Bissell. We didn't know about it. We were not asked to get
such a statement. This is the State Department's job in time of war?
IVIr. DoNDERO. They were contacting these two prisoners through
the delegation in Switzerland.
General Bissell. Yes. They acted as American Government repre-
sentatives as a neutral close to Germany.
Also significant is the conclusion that the reason no reply was re-
ceived from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was considered likely Colo-
nel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the Germans.
Assuming that the Germans had intercepted the Van Vliet reply that
Russia was guilty of the Katyn massacre, as Germany had stated to
the world, and assume that Germany was innocent, is it reasonable
93744— 52— pt. 7 4
1870 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
that, if innocent, Germany, who had gone to such trouble to take
Colonel Van Vliet and a sizable party to Katyn for the very purpose
of having them report German innocence to the world, would not
allow a letter from Colonel Van Vliet accomplishing such purpose to
reach the United States ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you claim the letter was received by the Swiss ;
that it was not intercepted ?
General Bissell, I don't know. It is a funny reason to give.
Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim it was received ; do you ?
General Bissell. No ; I don't claim State got any answer back.
Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim that Department of State re-
ceived this information ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is it you claim ?
General Bissell. I don't believe that the reason they gave for not
receiving it — that Germany intercepted it — was sound.
Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with this ?
General Bissell. Because I am still trying to get Van Vliet 's report
to check it.
When the June 9, 1945, reply to my May 25, 1945, letter to State
Department was received, the question naturally occurred : Why had
State not made further ert'ort to secure reply from Van Vliet? State
knew about the Katyn massacre. The State Department did not say
specifically that the September and December 1943 attempts were
the only attempts they made. They might have made other attempts
without tangible results. I considered it purposeless to follow this
aspect of the matter further because I believe that State had been
furnished Colonel Van Vliet's report on May 25, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. Because what ?
General Bissell. I believe that State had been furnished the Colonel
Van Vliet report on May 25, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. Which report are you referring to ?
General Bissell. The one made in my office.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not tell me this morning you cannot state
they received it ?
General Bissell. But I believe they did.
Mr. Machrowicz. You believe they did ?
General Bissell. Let us get straight. What I believe is one thing,
and my positive knowledge is another, I believe that they had re-
ceived it because it was my intention to get it there or to another place.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was the other place ?
General Bissell. The other place was the War Crimes people.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated this morning that you had discussed this
matter with Mr. Frederick Lyon. Is that correct ?
General Bissell. I said I either mentioned it to Mr. Lyon or Mr.
ITolmos.
Mr. Mitchell. Over the telephone or in person ?
General Bissell, I s]>oke to Mv. Lyon only on the phone. On the
other hand, I saw or talked to Mr. Holmes twice at approximately the
same day. We had a very hot matter in the Argentine, and I was
dealing witli both of them at the same time on it.
This is off the Katyn thing a little bit, but I think it is all right,
because it is not classified any more.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1871
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to know what were the names of the
people designated by State to be liaison with the G-2 when you were
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. What were the names of those
individuals from the Department of State ?
General Bissell. The two that worked with me most closely were
Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon.
Mr. Mitchell. Anybody else at this time that you care to mention ?
Are there any other names 'i
General Bissell. Not that have a bearing of any nature in connec-
tion with Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are now saying for the record
at this time that there were no other individuals in the Department
of State to your knowledge that had any bearing on the Van Vliet
Katyn report ?
General Bissell. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. You are sure?
Mr, Machrowicz. I want to pursue that line because it is important.
I think it is important to you and it is important to us all as Ameri-
cans, because if the Department of State received a report which it
denies receiving we want to know. Is that not right ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. You told me this morning that you cannot say
that you forwarded that report.
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, as I understand you, you want to qualify
it by saying, although you cannot say you sent it to the Department
of State, you believe you sent it.
General Bissell. I thought I had.
Mr. Machrowicz, You still think you did?
General Bissell. I don't know where it is, and it is pretty difficult
to pin it down.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are not much help to this committee.
General Bissell. I am telling everything I know about people run-
ning down details that in my opinion don't hit it too closely that bear
on it. If I give you too much, stop me.
Mr. MiTCjiELL. General, there is one other question. I asked you
a minute ago who were the people designated by the State Depart-
ment with which you did official business in connection with G-2
matters that State should know about in the line of conunand or
anywhere else ?
You told the committee here this morning and again now that the
two are General Holmes and Mr. Lyon. Is that correct ?
General Bissell. That could know anything about the Katyn
matter ?
Mr. Mitchell. That could know anything about the Katyn
massacre.
General Bissell. I don't think so.
Mr. Mitchell. Who were the individuals in your own organization
who had liaison with the Department of State who might know any-
thing about the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. Many, many.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean officially designated by you as head of G-2,
General Bissell. A man named Dillingham, a colonel at that time
1872 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
or lieutenant colonel," was my liaison man to handle hot wires that
came into State. If something came in among their stuff that re-
quired military consideration or action, he was there watching. I
don't think he knows a thing about Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. I specifically nailed my question down. General, to
who in your Department was designated to liaison with the State De-
partment who might know or have any knowledge of the Van Vliet
report on Katyn.
General Bissell. No one.
Mr. Mitchell. No one but yourself ?
General Bissell. I think that is right.
]Mr. Mitchell. You are sure?
General Bissell. I think, as far as Katyn is concerned on this par-
ticular deal, yes, sir; I think that is right. But I had many contacts
in the State at every level.
Mr. Mitchell. At this time will you tell us now who in your De-
partment had knowledge of the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. Mrs. Meeres and an officer who today was con-
firmed to be Lieutenant Colonel Lantaff. I knew someone in my office
handled it, but I could not tell you which one. His handling of it was
not to be present when anything was being made but in connection
with the papers.
]Mr. IVIachrgwicz. You do not mean those are the only two people
in your department that had knowledge of Katyn ?
General Bissell. I believe they are. Colonel Van Vliet's arrival
and his procedure was not the routine.
Mr. Machrowicz. I can assure you you are wrong. I am not guess-
ing at it. I am stating you are wrong.
General Bissell. I will try to think hard and see.
Mr. Sheehan. You said the Katyn matter. Do you mean the Van
Vliet report ?
Mr. IMiTCHELL. I said the Van Vliet report on the Katyn affair.
General Bissell. I thought you were exploiting his question or ex-
panding it. That is not so. Lots of people had heard of Katyn.
Loads of them. The whole Polish Liaison Section. We had Poles
accredited to us who came to G-2.
Chairman Madden. Everybody knew about Katyn after it was
broadcast and the bodies were found. So, that is not so ini])ortant.
]\rr. Mitchell. General, I think you missed the point of my (jues-
tion. The question I want to get across is: "Who in 3'our staff, as the
head of G-2, did you specifically designate to take this matter up with
the Department of State or any other agency of the (lovernment ?
(jeneral Bissell. I did not designate anybody in my office to take
it \]\) with the Department of State.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you personally handled the matter yourself?
General Bissell. As far as I can recollect. AVhen I say "handled
it," I mean 1 liHudled the direction to be given and what was to be
done.
^fr. ^NfrrcMiKLT,. Thou, if you say you "handled it," you must have
directed somebody to do something about it.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. MrrcHEi,L. Those are the names I want.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1873
General Bissell. I directed someone, who from this morning^s
testimony I believe to be Colonel Lantaff, to secure a proper room
where this dictation could be handled.
Mr. Mitchell. We know that.
General Bissell. To brief Mrs. Meeres, who was doing her first job
in my office. I think that is about the end of the story.
Chairman jNIadden. General, is it something unusual while you were
connected with this assignment over there for a report of this kind
coming in dealing with the massacre or murder of over 4,000 soldiers?
That was unusual ?
General Bissell. It was unusual from beginning to end.
Chairman Madden. And you were in complete charge of that office?
General Bissell. I am responsible for everything that my people do.
Chairman Madden. You just testified that to your knowledge there
could not be over two people in your office under your supervision
connected with the Van Vliet Katyn report.
General Bissell. That is right.
Chairman Madden. That report that was made by Colonel Van
Vliet was quite important in your mind ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Chairman Madden. With this responsibility that you had, and as
your testimony showed, it was completely unusual, a case of this kind.
You testified this morning that you could not say whether or not the
Van Vliet report was ever delivered to the State Department.
General Bissell. That is correct, sir. I cannot say that.
Chairman Madden. Do you not think, considering the background
as you already have testified, that that would be very much on your
mind to see that a report like that would be transferred over there if
that was the place it should go ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Why did you not know that it was transferred
over there, if it was?
General Bissell. Because I would have given instructions to have
had something done, and I w^ould not have personally been doing it.
Chairman Madden. Did you give instructions to have that done ?
General Bissell. I am positive I gave instructions.
Chairman Madden. To whom ?
General Bissell. I believe now I don't know. I think I could give
3'ou my story.
Chairman Madden. Just answer that. Whom did you give instruc-
tions to?
General Bissell. I do not recall whether it was Congressman Lan-
taff, but if it was not
Mr. Machrowicz. He said it was not.
General Bissell. I know. If it was not, I don't know what other
person.
Mr. Machroavicz. There was only one other person.
General Bissell. She could not have done it. I don't know who
actually got the instruction.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then there were no instructions given.
General Bissell. That is not something I can swear to as a fact.
1874 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the only possible logical conclusion that
anyone can come to.
General Bissell. That may be so, but I don't believe you are giving
me quit-e the opportunity you desire. Katyn, although unusual, was
unusual because Van Vliet, instead of coming in initially and report-
ing to the executive officer and being sent by him to the proper section,
being handled as in every other case coming in, insisted on seeing me.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he do that under anybody's direction ? He said
he had seen General Collins. He had seen other people over there.
When he initially came to you, did he tell you he was sent there by
anybody else?
General Bissell. He did not, but he told me he had seen (xeneral
Collins. He told me the others he had seen. He gave me a straight
story, just about the way he told you here. I think he was right, but
he did get an unusual handling of his case from that minute on.
Chairman Madden. Let me ask you this. General, considering your
testimony that just Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres were the only two
in your office connected with the Van Vliet report and that you might
have told Colonel Lantaff to deliver the report to the State Depart-
ment or you might have told Mrs. Meeres
(xeneral Bissell. No, I didn't tell her to do any such thing.
Chairman Madden. You might have told Colonel Lantaff, there
would not be anybody outside of Lantaff you to\d(
General Bissell. I don't think so.
Chairman Madden. Let us concede that you told Colonel Lantaff.
General Bissell. All right, sir.
Chairman Madden. Considering the importance of this report deal-
ing with the massacre of over 4,000 soldiers of our allies, had you told
Colonel Lantaff, don't you think the most natural thing would be,
as the head of this department, maybe the next day or the day after,
to inquire from the colonel if that important report was delivered to
the State Department ?
General Bissell. I don't think I would have done that.
Chairman Madden. Don't you think the colonel would have come
back and stated to you, as his superior officer, that he had carried out
your instruction ?
General Bissell. He would not do that, because I would take it for
granted. I knew he would carry out instructions. The only thing
I would have done under the situation you paint there, if I had ques-
tioned the delivery of that, I would have asked Holmes if he got it.
That is the point.
Chairman Madden. Colonel Lantaff testified this, morning that
there was never any order given to him at all to deliver the report.
General Bissell. The only instruction ap|)arently I gave Colonel
Lantalf was to secure, after securing the report, a place for the report
to be dictated and the briefing of Mrs. Meeres.
Mr. ]Maciii{owicz. Are you not contradicting your own testimony?
General Bissei>l. Colonel Lantalf, I think — I have never talked
with him, T never saw him since he left (x-2 until he came in this room
this morning, so that there is no suggestion coming from him, and I
would accept anything he said that he would swear to as being true.
He would not need to swear to it, if he said it. I think he is con-
fused on what ha])pened to the report, as I am confused on what hap-
pened to it. He cannot tell us how it went out of the room, and he
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1875
does not know whetlier he jxot it back or not. He did reply that lie
read it in the preparation stai^e. That could have been done. There is
a strono; feeling in my mind that Van Vliet started one day and fin-
ished another and that the notes had to be put np overnifrht, and the
colonel indicated that was the case because he put them u]).
Mr. Machrowicz. That is not what the colonel says. Colonel Van
A-^liet said he finished the statement in 1 day.
General Bissell. The Conoressman, not Colonel Lantaff. Colonel
Van Vliet says in another ])lace he does not know whether he stayed
over another day or not. If he had completed it the first day, there
would have been no reason to i>nt away stenofrrapher's notes that nio-ht
or anything else or to come back and <ret the papers the next day if he
had brou^rht them to me that day. I mifjht have been busy. He might
have tried to.
Chairman Maddex. Did anybody ever telephone you or call up or
come into your office after the report was signed by Van Vliet re-
garding the report, did a telephone call come in to. request to read it
or anything {
General Bissell. No.
Chairman Madden. Xot a person communicated with your office
regarding it after it was signed ^
General Bissell. No, sir, I don't think so.
Chairman Madden. When did you decide to send it to the State
De])artment then ?
General Bissell. My intention had been to have it go to the State
De]:)artment at once and whether it went, I don't know, as I have
said.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let us stick to that now, because you have made
some very serious and unwarranted inferences which are not at all
in accord with what you are saying right now.
General Bissell. If I had not pointed out these things, I think I
would not have given you all I know on the matter.
Chairman Madden. Was it the next day you sent it to the State
Dejiartment or the week after or a month ?
General Bissell. It would have been done either on the 24:th or
25th, that it would have gone from the office, had it gone to the State
Department.
Chairman Madden. Why do you say it would have gone then ?
General Bisseijl. Because on the twenty-second, the date that
Colonel Van Vliet saw me, there could not have been time in my opinion
to have processed it, and I saw Colonel Van Vliet on two different
occasions.
Chairman ]Madden. You thought it was so important that you im-
mediately sent it over to the State Department the next day?
General Bissell. And I think it was not ready to go the next day,
but it would have been ready the following day.
Chairman Madden. And the following day you sent it over?
General Bissell. The twenty-fifth, I think; if it ever went from
G-2 to State, it prol^ably left G-2 on the twenty-fifth.
Chairman Madden. You don't know whether it went at all or not?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. In your letter to Mr. Lyon you state as follows :
' Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the file of the State
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain. British Medical
1876 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Jr.,
forwarded to (Jeueral Holmes on May 25, 1945.
General Bissell. Written by JSIrs. Meeres,
Mr. Machrowicz. Signed by Clayton Bissell.
General Bissell. I did not put in that date.
Mr. Machrowicz. What date ?
General Bissell. That it was forwarded on a certain date. That
was from something that was found in the office or something of the
kind. I did not put that in.
Mr. Machrowicz. You signed the letter.
General Bissell. I signed the letter, and when I dictated it, I dic-
tated the first paragraph and then I said, 'Tt is the Colonel Van Vliet
report, and get the dope on the thing and send it in."
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, that only contained one
paragraph.
General Bissell. That is the second thought. The first thought,
here comes a letter, and the second thought, compare it with another
thing.
Mr. Machrowicz. I will read it to you again :
Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the files of the State
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain, British Medical
Officer. This report supplements statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Ji'.,
forwarded to General Holmes.
General Bissell. That is the way I remember it. There were two
sentences. The first one I dictated straight out and I left the follow-
ing thing blank.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring that you as commanding offi-
cer, G-2, signed a letter in blank with your secretary filling it in?
General Bisseij^. It was filled in.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was the date in there. May 25 ?
General Bissell. The date was filled in.
Mr. Machrowicz. What was not in then? You signed the letter,
and May 25 you forwarded it.
General Bissell. When I signed the letter it was exactly the form
in which you read it. When I dictated I dictated what I could, out
of my head, I think in August.
Mr. Machrowicz. August 25.
General Bissell. I could not have pulled that date out of my head
after all that had been happening, with accuracy.
Mr. Machrowicz. How do you account for the fact that you stated
in your letter you did forward to General Holmes the Colonel Van
Vliet report?
General Bissell. That was my belief at the moment of what had
happened. They went back to the files apparently and got something
to set that date up for them. The one that did it I think is Mrs.
Meeres.
Mr. Mitchell. Where is that letter or a copy of that letter today ?
General Bissell. Isn't that one of those you have here ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not referring to this. I am referring to the
letter where you got the date May 25, 19-1:5' from.
General Bissell. I did not personally do that.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, (ieneral. You stated to Mr. Mach-
rowicz 1 minute ago that you could not recall this date, so you dic-
tated all the other data that is in this to the best of your knowledge.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1877
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you probably said, as many men do to their
secretaries, "Find out when I transmitted that over to General
Holmes." She inserted this date 25th of May 1945. If she could
find that on August 21, 1945, why can't we find the same copy of the
transmittal today ?
General Bissell. That is what I would like to know. Also, I think
it is very significant because that is what I believed at that particular
time and put in writing and I didn't do it myself.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is what you would like to find out and
that is what we would like to find out. You are inferring the fault
lies with the Department of State. If those letters were lost, they
were lost in the Department of Defense, is that right?
General Bissell. I don't know where they were lost.
Mr. Machrowicz. They never got out of the Department of De-
fense.
General Bissell. I don't know whether they did or not. Wliy
would we have that kind of letter written in my office if it had not
gone out.
Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the original report of Colonel Van
Vliet.
General Bissell. That is what I am talking about, too. Why
would I have referred to it by date if I didn't believe it had gone out?
And why if it had not gone out didn't State, when they got the letter,
call me up on the phone : "How about this thing, we haven't got that."
Mr. Machrowicz. You are inferring you would have let an impor-
tant document go out without some receipt ?
General Bissell. I never got a receipt from anybody on anything in
G-2. I had people who did the receipting for me, and a section in my
office to process in and out those documents. So far as my particular
section of the G-2 office is concerned, we had Colonel Lantaff's group
who did it for me. I never signed one in, I never signed one out.
When I got through with a communication, it went in my out basket.
Those people who were cleared for top secret information brought me
in masses of stuff every day. I acted on it and put it in the out bas-
ket.
Chairman Madden. Did they ever bring you in masses of material
that pertained to the killing of 4,300 soldiers?
General Bissell. At that time I dichi't know and do not know today
exactly how many were killed.
Chairman Madden. You should not classify a report of this im-
portance with the thousands of little details that come in and out of
your office. This was an extraordinary, an important event, as you
testified.
General Bissell. I was very concerned all of this particular time
with events that were even more critical to America's war with Japan,
and this was not going to help win the Japan war one bit except in a
different way. And that was the reason I was so careful about this
thing.
I have a lot of stuff here, and I will spoil it by breaking it up piece-
rtieal. The UNO conference was one. I had been on there the pre-
vious week. Our No. 1 objective, other than defeating Japan at that
time, was to get a UNO going. We didn't know whether we could
get the Russians to come in.
1878 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. You wanted to maintain friendship with the
Hussians.
General Bissell. That Avas tlie policy of our Government.
Chairman Madden. Was that why the report disappeared?
General Bissell. No, sir, it was not why. I don't know what re-
port you are talking about on that. That is a fast one. I cannot
tell you a thing about that.
Mr. DoxDERO. Mr. Chairman, I think I ought to enter this. T
notice that my colleague from Michigan, who is critical of your testi-
mony, even referred to a letter with one sentence in it when there were
two in it, and the letter was right before hiui. So it shows the falli-
bility of human nature.
I want to ask this one question: General, at the time you had this
Katyn massacre subject before you, were you handling other matters
for the Government in your department?
Geueral Bissell. Vast numbei's.
Mr. DoNDERo. You had other items around the world in relation to
the war which we were then in, is that correct?
General Bissell. That is right. I told you I cauie up to this body,
busy as I was, to testify to them about subversive activities in the
service.
Mr. DoNDERO. The Katyn matter was only one of the items that
^ame across your dessk ?
Chairman Madde'n. It was the only massacre you had.
General Bissell. That is not so. It was the ouly one of that magni-
tude. No; it is not so. I was receiving at the same time that the
Colonel Van Vliet report came in, the very time, the Dachau and other
German concentration-camp things where they had wdiolesale mas-
sacres that make this thing look insignificant. It numbers nearly a
quarter of a million that went through Dachau. And there were
Poles in that, lots of them. My driver yesterday taking me from the
station was a Pole whose father was killed in that thing, and who
spent as a child, until he got old enough to come to the United States,
his time in Dachau from 1943 on.
The Japanese balloon thing was cracking on us. We were having
a devil of a time to get the press to hold it. We had had the fatali-
ties in Oregon. We didn't want the American people to know what
was hap])ening in that thing, and, more than that, we didn't want the
Japanese to know how successful they were. I was busy trying to
keep that one from bursting in the press. I had that on my mind.
The same day, when I was out on the tri]>, I had the Minnea]X)lis
newspapers on me and came back here and got Price together with
others of the group that was concerned with it on how we would
handle that particular thing. I was preparing somethino- for General
Marshall to Field Marshal ]\faintland-Wilson at that particular time.
If I racJv my memory, I can show you that the Van Vliet visit took
30 minutes one day and less the next, on days like I had been working!
for many months from 7 a. m. until late every night and Sundavs, on I
everything in the world. I had flown 14 or 15 hours on one day in
connection with this trip, getting in here to meet Colonel Van Vliet.
I didn't know he was hero.
I would like to add just one more thing. Coloiu^l Lantaff is jii-^(
as honest as can be, but he said that Mrs. Jepson was in the oflice
and I had loaned Mrs. Jepson to UNO and she was working out theie
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1879
on that thing. And another lady, whose name slipped his memory,
I am sure Mrs. Bryant, was the secretary on duty. He didn't tell you
anj- thing wrong. He told you what he believed and remembered.
He just overlooked the fact we did loan her out there and she was
not yet back on duty in my office at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. who?
General Bissell. Miss Bryant. She is now married and living
down here near Hollis some place.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Was she married at that time ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. SnEEiiAX. General, I have a series of questions; so if you wnll
be patient with me, because some of them might be a little rehashing
of something that has been said, and I do that for the purpose of get-
ting away from the general discussion, so that it will come out and
be either clarified or amplified.
Number one: Mrs. Meeres in her testimony stated that top-secret
reports usually are corrected and i-etyped, and, as you yourself said,
Colonel Lantaff read this report in the preparation stage. Why wasn't
that -report handled this way?
General Bissell. My intention was to have it produced in what we
call draft ; bring it out in draft. That usually means that a thing
is typed on long sheets, double or triple space, just the original im-
pression. Then it is corrected and modified and you do not send a
dirty copy out, so a retyping is essential. That is what I thought
would happen in this case, because I thought when Colonel Van Vliet
got his dictation down and Mrs. Meeres knocked it out the first time,
she would have misunderstood or misspelled or done a number of other
things. They would then bring it in to me and we would talk about
it and I would see if there were any other errors or omissions I could
ask him about that might help him and then it would be retyped.
Mr. Mitchell. Right at that particular stage, was this rough draft
ever converted into an original final draft?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there ever a top secret number given to the Van
Vliet report ?
General Bissell. That I would not know, because I didn't handle
that myself. That was done in Colonel Lantaff's office.
Chairman Maddex. I suggest that Mr. Sheehan continue his ques-
tions.
Mr. Sheehan. I had yielded to the gentleman for that purpose.
In other words, once you determined a document was top secret,
you turned it over to Colonel Lantaff or someone else in the office for
the classification?
General Bissell. For the handling in accordance with instructions
that were standard throughout the General Staff.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the mere fact that this top-secret
document was not handled that way is no fault of yours because you
turned it over to your subordinates?
General Bissell. No; it is partly correct and partly not. That is
the way I wanted it typed up the first time and that is the way I ex-
pected Van Vliet to bring it to me, and that is the way it was brought to
me. The only thing corrected in it was maybe a word or two and it
was not necessary to have a rewrite and it was not rewritten. It was
a very good job, "that report.
1880 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan, Colonel Van Vliet stated that on May 5, 1945, he
showed photographs of the Katyn massacre to a G-2 officer of the
One Hundred Fouith Infantry stationed overseas. Do you recall any
report at all on this instance coming into your office?
General Bissell. I never heard of that except when Colonel Van.
Vliet told about it.
Mr. Sheehan. I understand that a Col. Thomas Drake, who was a
senior American officer at Oflag 64 and was repatriated because of
stomach ulcers in 1944, that he made out reports on the Van Vliet
and Captain Stewart testimony and sent a copy of this report to
G-1, G-2, State Department, Secretary of War Stimson, and to Mr.
Lauchlin Currie, care of Mr. Roosevelt. Did that G-2 report ever
come across your desk ?
General Bissell. I never heard of that phase of it. The only thing
I know is what Colonel Van Vliet told me and what is in his testimony
to you.
Mr. Sheehan. As far as you know, it never came to your attention?
General Bissell. I don't know anything about it. That would have
been before my time, you understand.
Mr. Sheehan. No; you said you came in there in 1944.
General Bissell. I came in 1944, and that was done when?
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel Drake was repatriated late in 1944, which
means he arrived in this country in late 1944 or 1945 to make out
these reports.
General Bissell. My impression was that Colonel Van Vliet had
said shortly after he got back he talked to Colonel Drake on it.
Mr. Sheehan. That is right; but he was not repatriated until a
year later.
General Bissell. I don't know about that. All I have is what is
in the Colonel Van Vliet report and what he may have mentioned
to me.
Mr. Sheehan. In classifying a document top secret, after your
underlings had done so
General Bissell. I don't call them that — my helpers.
Mr. Sheehan. Let us call them subordinates — or any other phase
of secrecy; do the Army Regulations prescribe for any logging or
entering of this in the log book in your office ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Was that done in this case ?
General Bissell. I don't know, because, as I said, I never wenti
back to those. I asked if it was in the log when I was working
for — I don't believe I asked. I think you did the asking on that;
I suggested to you, Mr. Shackelford, that you have the log checked.
Mr. Mitchell. Who in your specific office had charge of your log?
General Bissell. I thinfe Congressman Lantaff was the senior, and
that Earman was the next, and they both had to do it because my hours
were longer than theirs.
Mr. Sheehan. Counsel, I think the chairman should instruct you
to check with the Army to see if that thing was logged any place.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe you have it right there.
Mr. Sackelford. We have checked tlie logs in regard to that, asi
well as the receipt books. That was the part of the careful search that|
was made by the inspector, and with negative results. I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1881
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff this morning said that anyone
in the G-2 immediate staff offices might have access to your personal
safe. Is that correct or is that incorrect ?
General Bissell. It depends on what he says
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to have you answer is how many
people of your immediate staff had access to your safe.
Genera] Bissell. The safe that he described as my personal safe
was described in that category because in it was a single drawer which
had my personal things like invitations, and so on. It was a classified
routine safe in the G-2 office. Now, the safe he did not mention was
in my office. And in my office, let ns get straight, too, because that is
causing a lot of trouble, I had an office in which I worked, a big room.
On one side was my deputy, on the other side was Colonel Lantaff,
Colonel Earman, normally Mrs. Jepson, and Mrs. Bryant, and a
man named Carulli. They were in my immediate office. They were
all cleared for top secret, and they all know between them if it was
added up, everything I do. So if I were to be hit by a car crossing
the street, there is enough there to carry on. But I tried hard to
keep more people from knowing about important things than needed
to be. So I didn't try to let all of them know everything and they
worked better. They w^ere better on the things that each one
remembered.
Now, the G-2 office is directly spoken of to include the chief, the
deputy, the deputy's stenographers, and this little group that I told
you. However, my office, that is just one room, and I am in there by
myself. When I want a secretary, I call for her. They worked out-
side because all the stuff that I talked about was highly classified, or
maybe General Marshall came in or General Handy, during which
we would discuss some action, and it would be settled. Anybody
might come over. The Secretary of the Treasury has visited me
there, any number of people on all kinds of matters. So I had to
have a place where there was no one in their hair, they could talk
freely.
Now, in my little office I might be called to General Marshall's
office and he would say, "Come on up here." We had a squawk box.
He was a cracker] ack man to work for. When I ran, if I had things
on my desk that were classified, and there usually was nothing else,
practically nothing unclassified came in, I just picked up my basket.
I had a three-combination, two-drawer safe, and I dropped the basket
complete in there, flung the combination, checked it, took down the
red sign that the safe was open that we had on every safe there and
put it on top and was on my way, usually hollering when I went
through I was on my way to General Marshall's office. That safe is
my personal safe. No one in my office knew the combination of that
safe except my deputy. General Wackerling.
Mr. Mitchell. Was the Van Vliet report we speak of put in that
safe the night that Van Vliet completed it ?
General Bissell. No ; it was never put there, so far as I know, be-
cause I didn't put my hands on the thing except to read it. They
brought it in to me ; I sat down ; I gave Van Vliet a chance to cor-
rect it. He didn't want to make any corrections. It was not what
you call authenticated in that there were a number of pages that
were not initialed. I had him do that. I had him sit back in the
1882 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
chair comfortably and I went tlu-ough it. My reason for g'oing
tlirough it primarily was to answer the question whether there was
any discrepancy between this and what he had told me before, and it
w^as a crackerjack report; there were no discrepancies. I then said,
"This is to be classified top secret.'" I can't tell you whether Mrs.
Meeres, Colonel Van Vliet, or myself actually did the top-secret stamp
on the top and bottom of ever}' page.
Mr. Mitchell. Isn't it conventional wdien the secretary is doing
rough draft to use the stamp "top secret" before handing it back to
the individual from whom she took the dictation ?
General Bisskll. Not if she kept it in her possession. She was not
through with the report yet. However, she did say this morning that
the envelope which had the notes taken out of her notebook — any spare
piece of paper tliat was put in, that might carry tlie top-secret infor-
mation, goes in the same envelope. Outside it is marked "Burn.''
And the officer oversaw the burning. 1 don't think you will find
there are many leaks out of G-2. Maybe we have been too tight, but
we never lose them. Nothing got to the ])ublic from G-'2. ■
Mr. SiiEEHAN. General, in these couple of days here in May when
Van Vliet w^as in and you said you had thought
General Bissell. May 22.
Mr. Sheehan. May 21 to 25 when you had talked to General Van
Vliet, if I remember correctly, you stated you did i)hone or you
thought you phoned Holmes and Lyons in the State Department.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. When you talked to any of these gentlemen or with
Colonel Lantaff about the Van Vliet report did the question come up
as to the political implication of this report at any time?
General Bissell. The only reason I would have mentioned it to
them at all Avould have been its political aspect.
Mr. Sheehan. Did they agree with you it was vital ?
General Bissell. No discussion occurred of the contents of the
re]:)ort at that stage.
Mr, Sheehan. You are talking about the political implications ?
General Bissell (reading) :
There was a man here named Van Vliet who arrived yesterday and who has
information on the political matter, the Katyn massacre, that we will send ta
you as soon as we get through with it.
Mr. Sheehan. You did not discuss the conclusions?
General Bissell. No. It was only incidental to the talk on the
other matter. I remember the other matter quite well, I will be
glad to give it to you in executive session, but it has no bearing on
Katyn whatever,
Mr. Sheehan. This might steal a little thunder from my colleague
over there. This morning Congressman O'Konski asked you a ques-
tion al)out whether or not any other documents had disappeared or
were lost or strayed from G-2. I did not use the word "stolen'' ad-
visedly because tlie Army uses the word "compromise." As I under-
stand it, from the MacArthur testimony, tlie eight colonels Avho sent
a top-secret repor-t from Japan or the Near East in which they tried
to advise the administration of the danger of alining themselves with
Russia in finisliing off the Japanese war, I understand that report
disappeared out of G-2. Is that right or wrong?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1883;
General Bissell. Here is what I don't believe is fully understood
and probably it is just as well that all the American people don't
know about 'all of G-2, but if you didn't have some procedure for
destroying set up with the mass of stuif coming in there, you could not
get the people that would be required to keep track of it in the Penta-
gon. There goes on constantly in any large intelligence organization
a sorting out and a reclassification and a destruction. At the end
of the German war there was a period when that had to be done ex-
tensively. The German war had ended just a few days, a short time
before General Van Vliet's arrival. He got liberated on the 5th of
May. The war was over on the Tth, as 1 recall, the 8th, and this is;
the 22d. Now, also, at the end of the German war, by the plans ar-
ranged in advance, we were to start cutting down personnel drastically.
The biggest fighting part of the war was over, maybe not the most
difficult part, but the biggest fighting part. With that cutting dowm,
your procedure of destruction is weakened because you try to let those
people go who have come in from civil life and given you fine service
in the order in which they want to go, in which they can get a job. If
a fellow got a chance to leave and he was a good man, his boss wants
him right now when the pressure is off. Those people we would let
go. Others were cases where they didn't want to go so quickly, and
Ave tried to be loyal to them, too. During the time I was there, this
procedure and declassification, two things, must go on. You must
destroy the things that are no longer necessary and current, and you
must declassify down and down, as time passes.
Mr. Sheetiax. The Japanese war was still on at the time?
General Bissell. I don't know the instance you are talking about.
I was asked some questions about a report of a number of colonels.
They were not of ]\IacArthur's staff. They were right here in Wash-
ington, that group, and I didn't know MacArthur's connection with it.
Mr. Sheeiian. It came out during the ^NlacArthur hearings that the
Army G-2 was advised by the group of eight colonels.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. SiiEEiiAX. Of the dangers of alining themselves with Russia.,
Apparently during the MacArthur hearings they thought this was
a very vital document. When they went to look for it, they a]5par-
ently could not find it because it was referred to G-2 and never found
afterward. ^
General Bissell. The way the story came to me was, "Can you tell
us whether such a report was ever made to you ?" Well, it might have
been prepai-ed : those people were in my office, but if they prepared
such a repoi't. it never came to me.
Mr. Machkowicz. That is the question I would like to know about,
since you inferred that the Katyn matter was not so important because
of the tremendous importance of the Japanese affair. Here is a report
bearing exactly on the issue which you considered paramount now.
Now you don't remember those eight colonels filing a report with you.
General Bissell. I have talked to some of the eight colonels and
they told me they never made such a report. I think you will have
one here whom you may ask the questions.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he one of the eight colonels ?
General Bissell. I think he is.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Col. Truman Smith ?
1884 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say Col. Truman Smitli did not sign a
report ?
General Bissell. I never got such a report as you described from
him.
Mr. Machrowicz. At any rate the report is missing in G-2 ?
General Bissell. I don't know if it ever left the office where it
originated. I don't know anything about it, because I never saw it.
Don't get the idea that we didn't appreciate that there was danger in
the international political situation or danger in our alinement with
Russia. We had had troubles with the Russians all through the war
trying to help them and keep them out of our hair.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to know whether the loss of the Van
Vliet report was not one of those attempts to help them.
General Bissell. Do you want me to answer that question ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes.
General Bissell. So far as I am concerned, I would be on the other
side of that fight for every inch that was of me. It did not, with my
knowledge or my help, and I would like to say further that no person,
not General Marshall, not the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, not any
member of the General Staff or any member of the military profession
or any member of our diplomatic or legislative or judicial or any
other human, foreign or American, ever suggested to me what to do
or what not to do with the Van Vliet report or anything comiected
with it.
Mr. Mitchell. You are implying you did discuss it with these
gentlemen ?
General Bissell. No; I did not. I said none of them ever mem-
tioned it to me.
Mr. Mitchell. How could they mention it if they did not know
about it ?
General Bissell. Everybody knew about the Katyn affair.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; but you were talking about the Van Vliet
report.
General Bissell. I thought you might want to know that no one
ever influenced my action in any way or tried to.
Mr. Mitchell. How could they influence your action in any way
if they didn't know about the Van Vliet report? You must have
discussed it with these individuals.
General Bi-sell. I di,^ -nt, nor did they uisc ai me.
Mr. Sheehan. We have a lot of ring-ar^-- ...^ on i\\\s question
as to whether or not t^^ '^ta'^p Depa 'imtut gjt this document. I
am not going to go into i. t^d both 'Congressman Machrowicz and
myself have had different variations of your answer this morning.
I want to put a very short bald question to you, and you weigh it
before you decide to answer it. The question I would like to ask is:
Would you state it to be a fact that the State Department did receive
the original Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. Did?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
General Bisseij^. No ; I would not state it as a fact.
Mr. Sheehan. O. K.
On the other hand, he did state when he read the previous testimony
from all the mail he got, the letters, that they referred to the Van
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1885
Vliet report & . eral times, and he said someone should have asked him
for it if thev didn't have it.
Mr. MAciiRowK z. The answer is, he thinks they must have known
about it, but he will not say they knew about it.
Mv. ^iiEEiiAN. General, in your testimony you stated m drawing
some conclusions that the facts show that the State Department had
gone into the Katvn matter carefully.
General Bissell>. I told you how long they were at my letters, and
how many places it had been. Somebody must have looked at it.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Would you state they were still going into it in
1945. because previously your testimony was they were trying to get
it through the Swiss when he was a prisoner of war. Was the State
Department still interested in that in 1945^
General Bissell. I would have thought they should have been.
Let me see now, 1945, certainly they would have been interested in
it. They would have wanted anything we had gotten on that subject.
Chairman ]Madden. Did they ask for it?
General Bissell. No. That was not going to influence the outcome
of that war that we were fighting with Germany and Japan.
Xow, I would like to make a point, and this is only— it is nothing
that happened, but it is a consideration. Had there been evidence
positive in the Van Vliet report that any particular nation had been
ouilty, rather than an opinion, and a conclusion formed in a state-
ment by a man who says there is no single thing that proves it, just
a combination of circunistances of the thing makes him believe it, it
probal)ly would have been of very much greater importance to me.
But when I got through with Van Vliet's report I did not feel positive
by any means that he was right. He had reached a conclusion. I
did not feel at all sure he was right. I felt his statements were as he
remembei'ed them.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see the Kathleen Harriman report
dated January 1944?^
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. You never saw it during the period January 1944
and Mav 1945?
General Bissell. I never saw it at all. When you say the ' Kath-
leen" you mean the one that Mr. Harriman would have sent in due
to his daughter's visit?
Mr. MiT'TiELL. Correct.
General ' Wh( ^her that would have been his report or hers,
I don't know. '! n6ver seen the doer/ t anyhow •'
Mr. SHEEHAN.'i'f'' i \now it to be a fact that the State Depart-
ment did receive the^'Br'nTsl. i-epor^^* <? -A, Stanley Gilder on the
Katyn matter? ' >''Jir>odj'
General Bissell. I think tliey have it.
Mr. Siieehax. I think you 'did testify this morning it was referred
to von in G-2 and you sent it on to State.
General Bissell. That is right. I would have to check my notes.
I think there was an ansAver to that.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You said the State Department stamp showed receipt ?
General Bissell. This is not the Gilder one.
^Ir. Shackelford. Mr. Sheehan, the State Department did receive
the Gilder report.
Mr. Sheehan. They did receive it ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 5
1886 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheeiian. Do or do you not know whether or not Gilder men-
tioned about Van Vliet in his report?
General Bissell. Not ])Ositively. I know he said there were British
and Americans in the party.
Mr. DoNDEKO. I think the record will show there were four people
in the party, one from England and one from South Africa and the
two American officers.
General Bissell. But that did not say they were Van Vliet, as I
remember.
Mr. Sheehan. The only reason I thought, if you did know that,
that the State Department was informed in the Gilder report of Van
Vliet, it would seem to me they would take the precautions to go to the
Army to find out what the Van Vliet report was.
General Bissell. Mr. Shackelford has been kind enough to show" me
the copy that w\as released by the War Department of the Gilder re-
])ort, and it shows the name of Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Col-
onel Van Vliet in Gilder's report, a copy of which was contained in the
War Department release on Katyn sometime ago under date of Sep-
tember 18, 1950. They published the Gilder report and the Gilder
report says that Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart
of the American Army were in the party. So they did know from
that.
Mr. Sheeiian. In other w^ords, the State Department knew in 194.5
this was the proposition and yet apparently took no steps to run it
down with the Army to find this report; otherwise you would have
had correspondence ?
General Bissell. I would have had correspondence. I made that
point.
Mr. Sheehan. I am trying to emphasize that here. I am going to
ask that at this point in the record — you will have to check with Mr.
Shackelford there whether it is a confidential report from the Inspec-
tor General on the search for the missing document — that ]\Ir. Shackel-
fora see to it that whatever security information is necessaiy to be
deleted is deleted and I would like to have a couple of questions on it.
General Bissell. I had intended to mention that and have done so
under my authority in my notes here.
Mr. Sheehan. These are extracts now from this report in which 1
see no names, so I cannot say whether they are of confidential nature.
Do you want to look at them before I recite them ?
Mr. Shackelford. Go ahead, jNIr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. It seems to me in all candidness and all fairness to
you that the Inspector General's report — I do not lilvc to use the word
"onus" — but seems to put the blame on you for the loss of this right in
3'^our office. I am going to read for you the three conclusions that the
Inspector General lias reached, and I think at this point in the matter
you want to get yourself clear so that for the record it does not stay
as a blot against you. Let me read the three conclusions:
No. 1, tliiU (lip ori.siinal Van Vliot rei)<>rt made to General Bissell on INIay 22,
IMH, and coming into the latter's personal possession on May 27), 104.1. has be-
come permanently lost without trace or reasonable presumption as to its present
existence or location.
No. 2, tliat there is no proof that this document ever left the office wherein it
originated.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1887
No. 3, that under the circumstances it must be assumed that this document
has liee'n subjected to compromise in the event that it was originally given a
security classification.
In other words, tlie Inspector General says everything happened
right smack in your office.
General Bissell. Right. He says it came into my personal posses-
sion on May 25, and you had sworn testimony from Colonel Van Vliet,
from Colonel Lantaff this morning and Mrs. ^Meeres this morning,
that Van Vliet had long since been gone on the 25th, and that it came
into my possession on a different date. I only mention that one small
point because if one is in error, all of it can be in error. It is not all
in error, but I mention that one point. The testimony of Colonel
Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres this morning did not state that it came into
my personal possession. They were very careful not to commit them-
selves. Since no one else knew of it, I do not know from what source
such information could have been obtained, as no one else could know.
The man wlio wrote this is honest and he would not have made that
statement unless he had a reason for doing it. I think the committee
miglit be interested in finding out just ^yhy he picked the 25th, be-
cause it would fit into the rest of this picture.
Mr. Sheeiian. I think when the committee reads the entire testi-
mony they will see his reasons for his conclusions.
General Bissell. Riglit. I tliink he is correct that there is no proof
that the document left the office wherein it originated. I think that
is correct.
Cliairman Madden. What office is that ?
General Bissell. My office, tlie office of G-2, War Department, and
the Secretariat Section; not the rest of the office being responsible
at all.
Chairman Madden. If I get that right, he says it is quite true
General Bissell. "That there is no proof that this document ever
left the office wherein it originated." He found no proof. I think
that is correct.
Mr. Sheeiian. For our information, before you read further
you might define what the Army means by that word "compromise"
there.
General Bissell. A document is compromised when its contents
have become known to an unauthorized person. That is one defini-
tion. There are others. If a document is completely missing and
you can't account for it, you immediately say it is compromised until
you find out what happened to it, if anything. If you do not re-
ceive a document or you do not know what has happened to a document,
or any break in the chain occurs, you immediately say it is com-
promised, to freeze everything on it and get right back on checking
it. But it does not necessarily mean stolen. It does not necessarily
mean an enemy has seen it. I will give you an illustration. We had
one very close to the top of the Government during the war where a
brief case of information disappeared. We immediately put that
in a compromise status. It subsequently all showed up. It had not
been seen by any unauthorized persons. W^e had another case where
part of a plan for the supply of the operations on D-day showed up
broken open in the post office in Chicago and we certainly compro-
mised that in a hurry. It apparently had not reached any unauthor-
1888 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ized persons. "When the matter M^as clarified, we didn't need to chan<j:e
the date of tlie landing. We went ahead with things.
Mr. Sheeiian. In other words, it is like the Hiss-Chambei"s case
which proves that papers and top-secret documents could have
been copied, could have been photographed, could have been stolen,
could have been lost, and any one of those things could have hap-
pened to it in the State Department. I assume the same thing could be
true in G-2 or any other department of the Army.
General Bissell. It is possible. We tried to be tighter there for
several reasons : First, my office wrote the regulations. Now, that puts
me in an odd position. The authority to write them implies the au-
thority to change them or modify them. That gave me a little latitude.
1 tried not to take advantage of it. The top secret thing was born
while I was in G-2 and I had to put out the instructions that governed
at that time. They governed for 2 years, and then they were changed
in 194G, sometime along there.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that the classification or designation of top
secret in lO-ii was changed or originally put into being during that
period of time ?
General Bissell. Prior to the issuance of the regulation — but the
date I read you this morning is the right one, I would have to check
my memory on it, because we have been throwing dates around here —
March 15, I believe, approved by the Joint Cheifs of Staff approxi-
mately a month earlier and then passed over to the regular shops that
j)ut out the information. Here is the document that came out, Army
Kegulations 380-5, came out on March 15, 1944.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you were then establishing for the
entire Army operations and Air Force
General Bissell. World-wide.
Mr. SiiEEHAX. World-wide, including the Navy
General Bissell. No. Not the Navy.
Mr. Sheehan. The designation "top secret'- for the first time?
General Bisseli.. We were not doing it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
by agreement with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had done it for the
J^ritish and ourselves, not only for the military services but for cor-
responding services working with them.
Mr. SiiEEifAN. Now^, will you read for the record, please, the des-
ignation of top secret as of the 15th of March 1944, if you have it
in that pamphlet ?
General Bissell Yes, I know it is in here.
(a) Wlien classified "tox) secret," certain secret documents, information and
material, the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unautliorized
disclos\iiv would cause exceptionally grave danger to the Nation, shall l)e classi-
fied "top secret." The following are examples of matter which normally will he
graded top secret :
(1) Plans or particulars of future ma.1or or special operations.
(2) Particulars of imi)i»rtant disi)ositions or impending moves of o\u' forces or
convoys in connection with (1) ahove.
(8) Very inuiortant i>oliti<'al documents dealing with such matters as ally
alliances and the like.
(4) Inforni.ition of the method used or success ohtained hy intelligence services
and counterintelligence service or which imperil secret agents.
(T)) Critical information of ntnv or improved munitions of war. including proof,
scientilic, and technical development.
(6) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptoanalysis.
Mr. Sheehan. This would fall in classification (3) ?
THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 1889
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL,. I would like to ask a specific question on that point.
Will 3'ou explain to the chairman and the members of this committee
Avhy and to what extent the Van Vliet report fell into the category of
top secret in May 1945, which was after Germany had surrendered,
I believe ?
Mr. DoxDERO. Germany surrendered on May 8.
General Bissell. We had had the Yalta Conference. You have me
on a barrel now. I don't know how much of Yalta has been declassi-
fied. At the time I left the services, part of it was not. I don't know
whether what I had intended to answer is declassified. Does anybody
know ?
Mr. Machrowicz. You had better check before you make the
answers.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Shackelford the one to check with in regard
to the Yalta ?
Chairman Maddex. I might state that Russia has already declassi-
fied Yaka.
General Bissell. That does not quite hit what I am talking about.
I would like to answer, but I am afraid I am caught on it at the
inoment.
]\lr. Shackleford. Or he will answer in executive session in the
event it is still classified by State.
General Bissell. There is nothing I want to hold from j'ou. It is
just that I am a little hamstrung by the letter I got.
Mr. Mitchell. I want to know why the Van Vliet report on the 22d
of May 1945, after Germany had surrendered on May 8, 1945, was
classified "top secret" and what its importance or significance was that
it had to be so classified as "top secret."
Mr. INIachrowicz. I think probably the statement made by the wit-
ness is a justifiable statement that the answer to that question should
be withheld until he has an opportunity to find out whether it is declas-
sified or not.
Mr. Mitchell. Let the record show that question will be taken up
later, please.
Mr. Sheeiiax. In your capacity as head of G-2 — and I think this
is a little before your time, so you might have to get the time element —
did you ever hear of or see Colonel Szymanski's report on Katyn?
He was a military attache in 1942 and 1943, 1 believe, and was sending
reports, G-2 reports in.
General Bissell. I stated this morning I could not state for sure if
I saw him when I came through Cairo. I never saw the reports while
G-2. The first I knew of them was the report in the press they were
before your committee.
JNIr. Sheehan. Did you have any correspondence or remember any
correspondence or talk with the State Department about the Holmes'
report ?
General Bissell. Not until I saw in the press. I went back and got
permission to read both of them.
Mr. Sheehan. You did see them after this was all over?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. You saw them in the Department of Defense?
General Bissell. Yes; and asked authority and they told me I
could see them if I would come to Washington. I did.
1890 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. When was that, sir?
General Bissell. It is all in the story I am trying to read to you.
It was the 1st to 12th of April I was in Washington and came up to
get this information and other matters. I had other business up here.
Mr. Sheehan. You are positive of the fact that you did classify
the document "top secret" ?
General Bissell. I am positive.
Mr. Sheehan. Is there any possibility you could have changed
your mind afterward ?
General Bissell. That one would have been a little impossible in
a way. I had authority to down grade any document by anybody
else in the military service except General Marshall, but there was
a string to it. We were in business with the British in this war,
and the war was being directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
They had set up an arrangement whereby neither nation would down
grade below the classification, lower classification, of the two nations.
Since the Gilder report — there was no reason for bringing it here,
because it was secret and dealt with the same incident as the Van Vliet
report, so it was not within my independent authority to down grade
below the grade of "secret." To have done that, that wouldn't have
let any human, outside of those who needed to know about it, see it.
Mr. Sheehan. I think that my final question that I am coming to
might have to do with the possibility of leaks in G-2 while you were
there. If you will look at the Inspector General's report, you will
find there is a paragraph which states as follows :
With further reference to General Bissell's letter to General Holmes of May
25, 1945, and General Holmes' answer thereto to General Bissell dated June 9,
1945, a search of the files of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, failed to disclose
copies of either, although both were recorded in the logbook kept in the office
at that time.
Here we have a situation where you have made references in a log-
book to correspondence which you wrote. Yet, they are nowheres to
be found in the Department. However, it turns out, according to
the Inspector General's report, that the copies of these letters were
obtained from the files of the State Department. The Inspector Gen-
eral goes on to say — is it not plausible that some sort of master file —
and I am trying to state that myself — is it not plausible that some sort
of master file or classification number should identify all of these
matters pertaining to Katyn in the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. That was explained in o;reat detail by a man named
Carulli. I don't know whether he testified to them. He was the
man I mentioned in my office. I suggested to Mr. Shackelford he
was the expert and he would be glad to inform the Inspector Gen-
eral whatever went on. He explained our system.
Mr. Machrowicz. He did because he is referred to as one of the
informants.
General Bissell. That is right. We didn't package things. Mr.
Carulli explained why. When I was vacating my personal office,
there were no files in that one. That was not a place for papers to be
filed. In the one next to it there were quite large files, probably five
or six big file cabinets full.
Then the next door to that had a small card index, 10,000, 20,000,
or 30,000 cards, perhaps, which covered G-2, things that had been
handled in a recent period. We had to keep some material right
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1891
there, and we kept that as a quick thing. It worked beautifully. We
could get things very quickly. General Marshall could call down,
and I could have the piece of paper up to him in 5 minutes. I could
never have done that if it were sent to the general files. It is too big.
The security of those general files required that everything went
through a certain way in and out. It is clumsy. It is not a quick
thing. It is a safe thing. You have to compromise between speed and
absolute security.
Mr. Sheehan. There is another thought. You mentioned before
when we were talking about the word "compromise" and your defini-
tion, something about the "day plans" that were forwarded or opened
at the Chicago post office. Will you just, for our general benefit,
elaborate on that ?
General Bissell. It has been published briefly in the press. It ap-
pears that the headquarters in London was moving its G-4 depart-
ment. The individual who had the papers intended to address them
to himself at the next office he was going to. He was writing a letter
home, intending to send something home at the same time, and he
confused them and put them in the wrong envelopes. The plans for
the supply went to Chicago, and the little favors for his family went
to the office he intended to move to. He was so frightened that he
did not report it. By accident the package was broken open in the
Chicago office, and, as I recall it, the inspectors immediately called the
military, and we had someone there very quickly. The papers were
flown up here, and we asked for a man to come from General Eisen-
hower's headquarters quickly to check the papers and see whether they
might need to change the landing date. He had General Crawford
flown over here. I think you will find it mentioned in Top Secrets
very briefly, in that book, Top Secret. It has been in the press from
time to time, but very little on it. No harm came of it, although it
looked very suspicious at first because the boy came from a German
family. It was addressed to a German family. There were several
unusual things about that end of it. They were all right. The whole
thing was all right. No harm was done.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. When you use the phrase "broken up"
General Bissell. By accident in handling when they dumped the
contents of the pouches onto the sorting table. That is the way I
recollect it. There may have been some details I have not described
100 percent accurate in that brief comment.
Mr. Sheehan. The only thing that bothers me is the getting around
this idea of whether the State Department got it or not, because from
some of your correspondence — and I am quoting from that letter you
wrote to Mr. Lyon in which you are talking about the Gilder report
again — your last sentence said :
This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., for-
warded to General Holmes, May 25, 1945, and generally substantiating all
material facts in Col. Van Vliet's report.
It seems to me, from writing a letter like that to the State Depart-
ment so shortly after you were processing or handling the documents,
that you must have sent it to the State Department. They are not
questioning it, saying "We never got such a report."
General Bissell. I wouldn't question them. The fact that I make
that statement is what I believe was the situation when I dictated that
1892 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
letter. I didn't do it all. I couldirt fill in the date out of my head
when that thing had been sent the 21st of Angust which was qnite a
while from the 22d of May, or the 23d or 24th, when this other thing
was going on. It leads me to believe that there must have been some ,
record from Mrs. Meeres processing that letter where she got that
information. She couldn't have gotten it without going to some
place and finding that it had been sent. She didn't know.
Mr. Machroavicz. Is Mrs. Meeres still here ?
General Bissell. I don't know.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I think the question is for Mr. Lijon to answer. He
got a letter. Did he get it or not ?
General Bissell. He got that particular letter. I told you how
many people handled it. They handled it for 2 months in State.
Many people had a chance to check up on that. I was sitting at my
desk any time they wanted to call me. That doesn't mean that I am
trying to throw stones at State. We were a government fighting this
war. I was getting plenty of help from them and giving them all
I could.
Mr. Sheehan. Except we found there were several governments in
the State Department, you know — Mr. Hiss et al.
General Bissell. I don't want to leave the impression that I am
trying to smear somebody that has been convicted or trying to blame
it on somebody. I can't help but think that it is the kind of document
the Communists would have liked to have a look at. That is as far
as I will go. I won't make any inferences or implications. I will
make the thing the other way : that those two people I worked with —
Holmes and Lyon— you would never get them mixed up with any
Communists. I will tell you that.
Mr. Maciirowicz. You had been making inferences and implica-
tions that Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon must have known about this.
General Bissell. I am giving you everything I know — everything
that touches Katyn as far as you had me proceed.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I would like to ask you a couple of questions you may
have answered. If you would refer to your testimony, when the State
Department was working through, I think you said, the Swiss, trying
to get Van Vliet's story, when did you find that out?
General Bissell. Colonel Van Vliet told it to me at the time he made
his report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. That was the first time you knew^ of that ?
General Bissell. The first time I knew of it. It afforded me the
only opportunity I knew for verification of his re])ort. I don't know
why Colonel Van Vliet didn't mention that. I don't recall him having
mentioned it in his statement — oversight. There was no question he
was giving you everything he could think of.
Mr. FuRcoLO. We are interested in finding out what happened to
the report in your office. As I understand your testimony, you have
stated that if that report were to be mailed to the State Department it
would have been mailed by one of three people — Mrs. IMeeres. and you
have testified as I recall that you were positive you did not tell her to
mail it. Am I correct in that?
(Jeneral Bissell. She Avouldn't have had anything to do with out-
going mail.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1893
Mr. FuRcoLO. So, she is out of the picture. Secondly, you testified
that you might have told Colonel and now Congressman Lantaff, but
you were very willing to accept his word that you did not tell him.
So, as you sit there today, you also exclude Congressman Lantaff.
I don't want to be unfair about this. I know you are trying to trace
it just as much as we are ; but, with those two people out of the picture
on your own story, it comes down to the fact that that was mailed
to the State Department, then comes back to you ; is that right ?
General Bissell. If it was what ? Mailed in the State Department?
Mr. FuRCOLO. Yes.
(xeneral Bissell. It is left with me.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Up to now we have got it back to you.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. FuRCOLO. As I understand it, and I want to be sure about this,
I understand that you have come to the conclusion that it was mailed
to the State Department, and you base it on
General Bissell. Because of that reference.
Mr. Fltrcol;). Because of your letter of May 25, 1945. Do I get
your position correctly that you claim if it was mailed to the State
Department it was mailed in the letter of May 25, 1945 ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Am I fair in stating that u\) to this point, whether
or not the document left your hands
General Bissell. It was never in my hands.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the document ever left the office of
General Bissell
General Bissell. Of General Bissell's secretary, because it didn't
stay in my office except while Colonel Van Vliet was in there.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the Van Vliet document ever left the
office of General Bissell is determined upon what conclusion this com-
mittee can come to with reference to the letter of May 25, 1945. Is that
your position ?
General Bissell. That and the fact that their having that document
and never calling back for any comment or verification or anything
on the letter would indicate they must have had it, plus the fact that
they knew all about it in advance from other communications.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Well, what you come down to, then, is showing that
the State Department received the Van Vliet document from your
office is No. 1, the copy of the letter of May 25, 1945, and second, the
fact that the State Department never called you back and said, "We
did not get this document." Is that right ?
General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that they knew about
this Swiss business. That is another one.
Mr. FuRCOLo. In other words, three things.
General Bissell. Then there was another one because they didn't
know about the Van Vliet report but they knew about the Katyn
thing. You are sticking to Van Vliet. Then Lyon. I have a recol-
lection or a feeling that I told either Lyon or Holmes on the telephone.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I am not directing my remarks or attention at the
moment to anyone, but you must have told someone. We are trying
to look specifically at the transmittal. As far as the transmittal is
concerned, coming down to the three things mentioned, first, what-
1894 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ever that letter of May 25, 1945, may be interpreted as ; and, second,
the fact that the State Department did not call you back ; and, third^
this Swiss business you mentioned. Is that right ?
General Bissell. There was a specific reference to Lt, Col. John H.
Van Vliet's report forwarded to General Holmes on a certain date,
then to Mr. Lyon.
Mr. FuRCOLO. That is in the letter that transmitted the Gilder
report ?
General Bissell. That is right. So, that ties it in, too.
Mr. FuRCoLo. You interpret that as tying it in, too?
General Bissell. Certainly.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Can you think of anything else? I don't want to tie
you down.
General Bissell. I don't believe so at the moment. I have tried to
get everything I could when I w\as working with Mr. Shackelford.
I wasn't involved at all in this thing, except as someone out of the
picture trying to help.
Mr. Furcolo. I want to get it first with reference to that letter of
May 25, 1945.
In view^ of the wording of that letter, in view of the fact that that
letter contains no reference to transmitting Van Vliet's memorandum
and also there is no reference in there to any enclosure, is it not your
position right now that as far as that letter of May 25, 1945 is con-
cerned, as far as any proof there may be in that letter alone that you
transmitted the Van Vliet document in there, that is out of the picture ;
that that is no proof?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Furcolo, we have been talking about this letter
of the 25th of May 1945 all day long. Can we kindly get this memo-
randum into the record since it is not in the record as yet ? This is a
copy that I have, right here. The committee can read it. From there
I think the questions can be asked.
I would like to put it in as exhibit No. 5, with the original to come
at a later date from the State Department, since they obviously have
it.
Mr. DoNDERo. Wliat date is that?
Mr. Mitchell. The 25th of May 1945.
Chairman Madden. Mark it.
(Exhibit No. 5, dated May 25, 1945, was marked and received as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 5
IMay 25, 1945.
Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes,
A.f.sistant Sccrctarif, JJcparfment of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Ji'., Infantry, and a
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 64, are reported to have
been given a letter by the Swiss Protectinji Power dated about October 1943, which,
asked tliem to reply to certain questions. The questions were :
1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel ^'an Vliet gone to Katyn?
2. How had they been treated?
3. Were any photographs taken?
4. Had they made a statement?
Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply^
is in the State Department's files. It is requested that this be verified and, if
the records referred to ai"e in the files of State Department, that copies be made
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
JiSsistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1895
Mr. FuRCOLo. What is your answer to the question?
General Bissell. I can't phice your question.
Mr. Ftjrcolo. My question is — that you have based your belief
that this was transmitted to the State Department on four different
things, I am now asking you, on the first one of those four, which is
the letter of May 25, 1945, and I have said to you — in view of the word-
ing of that letter, particularly the absence of any reference to a trans-
mittal, in the absence of the word "enclosure" at the bottom of the
letter, is it not your belief that that letter of May 25, 1945, does not
help this committee in any way as far as that alone being proof of the
transmittal?
General Bissell. This one did not carry the Van Vliet report or it
would have to be listed.
Mr. FuRCOLO. So far as that letter transmitting the Van Vliet
report, you yourself say that that is out of the picture?
General Bissell. That did not transmit it.
Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the proceedings I
would like to have the record show that we already have, as exhibit
No. 4, the letter from the State Department, signed by Julius C.
Holmes, dated June 9, 1945, addressed to "My Dear General Bissell."
That reply is on the record prior to this exhibit No. 5. There is no
mention of the previous Van Vliet report in either exhibit, either trans-
ferring it as an enclosure in any shape, form, or manner. Therefore
we must deduct that based on these two particular letters, namely,
exhibit No. 4 and exhibit No. 5, there was no enclosure to the letter
or any reference in either letter to the missing Van Vliet report.
Chairman Madden. How long after that was it that Van Vliet
made his report out?
Mr. Mitchell. Van Vliet had made his report reputedly for the
record the 22d of May 1945, or about that time, 3 days previous.
General Bissell. I think he dictated it on the 22d. I think it was
typed on the 23d or 24th. I think I saw him on the 23d or 24th, the
last time when we put his initials on it, and that is all I can tell
you on it.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the record show in the presence
of Mr. Brown, for the Department of State, that we woulcl like to
have the original of the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes,
and I would like to have Mr. Shackelford produce the original of
General Holmes' reply to General Bissell dated June 9, 1945.
Mr. DoNDERO. Before you answer I want to ask counsel whether
the State Department has transmitted any papers of any kind to this
committee ?
]\Ir. Mitchell. No, sir. Chairman Madden has designated a sub-
committee of Mr. OT^onski, Mr. Sheehan, and Mr. Machrowicz, to
look at the documents that the State Department has on that. My
understanding is that they will do it within the next 48 to 72 hours.
Mr. Machrowicz. In connection with that, we had agreed that
because there are a lot of documents and the Department of State
does not know which documents we want, a subcommittee would go
there and pick the documents out which we feel we need. They offered
to turn them over to us.
Mr. DoNDERO. Pertinent to this issue.
Chairman Maddex. I might say further, last Thursday and on
Monday I asked the counsel to have that situation in readiness, but
1896 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the committee members were not available to go over and see the
documents.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. I did talk to Mr. Machrowicz and
Mr. Sheehan and they asked me to set up that meeting for some
time as soon as we complete this set of hearings now. I will do that
within the next 24 hours.
Mr. FuRCOLO. To continue, I will have to ask you the question once
more. I want to have it in one place. There has been this other
conversation in the meantime.
I have understood your testimony to be that your position is, as
far as that letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, that because of the
language of that letter your final conclusion is that that letter cer-
tainly didn't transmit the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I also understood your testimony before to be that
after Van Vliet had dictated his report to Mrs. Meeres, which was
probably the 21st or tlie 22d of May, you sent it to the State Depart-
ment, and I wrote down your words. You said you intended to send
it at once and you believed it was either the 24th or the 25th that you
sent it. Is that right ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. By using the words "you sent it" you were referring
to the Van Vliet report ?
General Bissell. I am not referring to this exhibit No. 5, the
May 25 letter.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Let me get to that. By "sent it" you were referring
to the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacred
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood vou to say that you sent that report on
either the 24th or the 25th of May 1945.
General Bissell. This one?
Mr. FuRCOLo. I don't know what you mean by "this one." You
sent the A^an Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre, outlining
what he had seen there, including the bodies and the graves ?
General Bissell.. It was my intent that report would have moved
on that date and I didn't see it done myself. I therefore don't know
it did. So you have me there swearing to it.
Mr. FuRcoLo. If you would follow me for a minute I will do my
best if you will answer the questions. Did you say that you sent the
Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre out in a letter either
Ma^ 24 or May 25 ?
(leneral Bissell. I did not.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood you to say that.
General IJissell. I said I had reason to believe I did because I
mentioned that date in the letter transmitting the Gilder report.
I described not this paper but the Van Vliet report.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Did you say that immediately after Van Vliet had
concluded his report about the massacre of the Polish oflicers at
Katyn Forest, that it was your intention to send that report at once
out of your oflice?
Genei-al Bissell. I'hat is correct.
Mr. Fuitcoi/). Did you also say that to your best recollection he
had completed tliat rei)ort about May 22 or May 23, approximately?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1897
General Bis.sp:ll. ]My recollection was that he had done the dictat-
ing on the '22d, that it was conii)leted either on the 2;3d or the 24th,
and bronoht to me on one of those two dates.
]Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, yon apparently had the Van Vliet
report of the Katvn Forest massacre on, say, the 23d or the 24th of
May 1945^
(ieneral Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, wdien you
had that completed report, the purpose in your mind was to send
that out immediately; is that right?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, when you
had that completed report, the i)urpose in your mind was to send
that out immediately ; is that right ?
General Blssell. That is right.
]\Ir. FuRCOLO. The very next letter in connection with it that you
can recall having sent out was the letter of May 25, 1945, to General
Holmes?
General Bissell. Yes. Well. I don't know that is so because there
were lots of other State De})artnient — I can't tell you. I don't know.
On this subject, certainly.
Mr. FuRCOLO. On this subject, your best recollection is that the
very next letter you sent out was to General Holmes on May 25, 1945 ?
(ieneral Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And is it for that reason that you believed the Van
Vliet report of the Katyii Forest massacre was sent in the letter of
May 25, 1945 ? '
General Bissell. No; my reason for believing it is because it was
so stated in the letter carrying the Gilder report on the 21st of August,
I think.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Well, the letter carrying the Gilder report does not
indicate wdien they might have received the Van Vliet report from
you, but merely in effect says : "Compare the Gilder report W' itli the
Van Vliet report."
General Bissell. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945, and
it generall}' substantiates all material facts in Van Vliet's report.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945. Now,
does that not completely fix in your mind the fact that if you ever did
send the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre to General
Holmes, it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to which this Gilder
report refers?
General Bissell. In a letter of May 25.
Mr. FuRaiLo. In a letter of May 25, 1945.
General Bissell. A transmittal letter.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Have we finally got tied down the fact that you say
that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent in
a definite letter to General Holmes on a definite date of May 25, 1945?
General Bissell. I said that in this letter.
Mr. FuRcoLo. Is that what you say as you sit here today ?
General Bissell. Today I am not sure it did go because there is no
in.dication it was received. Something could have happened and I
don't know Avhat, if anything, ever did.
Mr. FuRCOix). That is right, but the point is if you did send it, you
are saying that you sent it on May 25, 1945, in a letter to General
1898 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Holmes. Would you be willing to say, in view of that, if it was not in
that letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes, then your position
would be it apparently did not go ?
General Bisseix. Almost that. What I actually say is this : there
were two places it was logical for me to send that, and quick. One
was to War Crimes, which was not so urgent at that time because they
were just getting going. The second one was to State. Van Vliet and
I had both mentioned the State Department aspect of it. I don't
know w^here the paper was sent. Therefore, I tried to figure back
where there is any evidence of it being sent. The only evidence is
that. That is that.
Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, the only evidence that the Van Vliet
report was sent to the State Department would be the fact that the
Glider letter says that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to
General Holmes?
General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that the Glider letter
was then processed for nearly months in State and no one ever made
a query as to "Where is this thing you are referring to ?"
Mr. FuRCOLO. That is a separate thing. That is an absence of evi-
dence rather than a positive indication.
In other w^ords, your position as you say now is that tlie only docu-
mentary evidence that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest
massacre was sent to the State Department was the fact that in the
Gilder letter it stated it had been sent in the letter of May 25, 1945,
to General Holmes?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRcoLo. So that is the only documentary evidence. Now, re-
ferring back to your testimony about 10 minutes ago at the beginning
of my questioning of you, you agreed with me that as far as just that
letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, your interpretation of that letter
would be that there was no enclosure in that. Is that not right ?
General Bissell. In this one?
Mr. FuRCOLO. In the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes. You
stated that about 10 minutes ago and you gave your reasons; is that
not true ?
General Bissell. Yes, but I am not talking about the same May 25
letter. I think there were two of that date.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You think there might be some other letter of ISIay
'25,1945?
General Bissell. Van Vliet was as much a part of getting this
letter over to State as getting over tlie other one. This all came out
of him. It would have gone out together.
Mr. FuRCOLO. The only letter that you have in the files or the only
letter of which you have seen a copy in the files of G-2, your own office,
on May 25, 1945, addressed to General Plolmes, having anything
to do with Van Vliet's report on the Katyn Forest massacre, is this
letter that you hold in your hand and which we have read into the
record; is that correct?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You agree that letter is not any evidence at all of
the fact tliat the Van Vliet report document was sent, because of the
wording of the letter?
General Bissell. That is correct.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1899
Mr. FuRCOLO. So it is fair to summarize your position as being
this: your position is, first of all, that you believe the Van Vliet
report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent to the State Depart-
ment. You believe that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945.
That was your original position ?
General Bissell. In a letter.
Mr. FuRcoLO. You believe it assent in a letter?
General Bissell. Not this one.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Of May 25, 1915. The only letter that you can
find at G-2, or in your office on May 25, 1945, addressed to General
Holmes, is that letter which is now exhibit No. 5, I believe?
General Bissell. That is correct. That is not it.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You state it is certainly no proof it was sent but in
fact from the wording of the letter it indicates very clearly that it
was not sent in that one ?
General Bissell. It was not sent in that letter of May 25.
Mr. FuRCOLO. So what it comes down to, in other words, is that
when you state this Van Vliet report we have been talking about had
been sent to the State Department in a letter of May 25, 1945, you
are basing that upon a letter that is nonexistent as far as you, or this
committee, or anyone in the Government has been able to determine?
General Bissell. That is correct, at the moment.
Mr. Siieehan. Or it could have been sent by a courier directly over
there, without a letter of transmittal ?
General Bissell. It could but I don't think I did. I could have
done that. I had a courier, a special one that I started to mention,
this Mr. Dillingham. He did not follow hardly any of these pro-
cedures in handling State Department material to us or our material
to State. His specialty was bringing to me State Department wires
of certain categories and picking them out over there that I would be
interested in, getting them to me quickly, things that would come to
me again later in the regular channels after reproduction.
On rare occasions, none of which I can remember, I have sent
things back by him because there could not have been any more a
secure way to get them over there quickly. I don't think it was clone
in this case because usually when I sent anything like that, since it
was short-cutting all the rules, I would call Mr. Holmes and ask him
if he got it right away. Or I would do the opposite thing, I would
have Dillingham phone me back, gas line or otherwise and tell me it
was there, either one of which satisfied him.
Mr. FuRCOLo. I wanted to say I know your position is the same as
ours. We are interested in tracing that report. We are not par-
ticularly concerned about whether we trace it to the State Department
or trace it to the Department of the Army, or G-2, or anyplace. Your
position is the same, I know.
With that in mind I wanted to ask you this : In view of your testi-
mony, which I know to be true, and I know that you had so many
of these matters and some at the time were more important than
others. Later on history will show that some which looked unimpor-
tant have turned out to be extremely important.
Might it not appear to you at the present time that actually, with
all the different things you had to do and the hours you had at the
time, and short-handed as you were, and with the testimony that has
1900 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
been developed upon wliich you based your opinion had it been sent,
that actually the Van Vliet report was just lost in the shuflie some-
place alon<>; the line ?
General Bissj:li.. When I started in — Mr. Shackelford is a person
not involved — I said, "Where is this paper?" It is in State, it is in
(t-2, it is in War Crimes, or it is in my own personal office file. I was
no lonfrer in (t-2. We searched every one of those. We p;ot in touch
Avith all of the people that could have seen it. We went further down
the line of files than you did. We went to Miss McKenna and then on
down. When I started down the line, I knew there were some outs
that were perfectly all ri^ht, that mio;ht block us on findino; it in G-2
if it had been left there, and never gone out. These are those outs.
While I was in G-2 we were still cuttino; down files and people to
get smaller. I was only there some 7 months after the Van Vliet
arrival, then I was gone. At that time I turned the whole thing over
to General Vandenberg. I made every assumption that I coidd
against myself. The first one was, "Maybe yon forgot and put it in
your personal safe in your own office, the little one." I never took it
out of there, so if it were taken out of there it had to be taken out
by someone who had the combination.
I asked General Weckerling if he had the combination. He said,
"I might have." I said he did because I had left Washington for as
much as 2 months at a time. He didn't remember a thing about this
matter.
I did not contact General Vandenberg, but it was not appropriate
as he was my boss. It was not appropriate to ask him this question.
So I had it asked through Mr. Shackelford's office. The reply from
General Vandenberg was "Absolutely no." When he opened that safe
and took over from me, it w^asn't there. He doesn't remember, either,
any of the papers, if any, that were there, which did not help me. I
know that the day I left G-2 I had the combination of the safe
changed.
So, after that what was in it w^as not mine. General Vandenberg
did not steal those papers and turn them over to the Commies, or he
did not hold them up for anybody else. I am sure of that. He was
busy taking over G-2, and I know what it means.
Then where could it be? Well, outside the door were these files
they spoke of as my personal safe. That really wasn't a personal safe,
except that it had some personal files in one drawer. The rest of them
were routine safe in the alphabetical number system. It might have
been in some of those. So we found out where the contents of those
had been sent first. The safe outside the door — a man named Gen.
Carter Clark had gone over those with Miss Bryant, who is still
within reach. She is married and down just south of Alexandria.
She said she sorted out every ])a])er in there, saying "I will lake this
one. These are top secret." This is one of the instauces they did not
go through with the red tape. "I will take this one. You send that
one to so-and-so." When they were through there were two piles.
The young lady did not know wdiat was in either pile. She knew she
transmitted these in the pile she was directed to forward.
General Clark was contacted and said he didn't see anything about
Katyn or the Colonel Van Vliet report. We went to the next safe
where the big files were. We went to the files we had in the office,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1901
Avliere we kept them by subject. We ^Yent throuoli those cards. I had
trouble getting- tha: done because those cards were still extant at
that time. The papers to which they referred, for the most part,
were jjone. The reason they were jrone was because they had been
shipped out to various places to clear the office. The Korean business
was on. They needed space. Papers in these files were pushed out
and considerable numbers had been destroyed in the ])eriod between
my departure from (1-2 in 1045 and this period in 1950, 4 years.
G-2 had been com])ressed, in the Penta<2:on into much less space. It
was a smaller machine. It could have been destroyed amonn; those
])apers. The people that did that destroying, a lot of them were not
too well qualified. They did the best they could. But how could it
have gotten into that file? Mr. Lantafi' said it came out to him. He
told you what file he kept it in. He doesn't know what happened to it.
Neither do I. As a matter of fact, neither do I, to absolutely say I saw
ii go there. My ]:)rocedure of having other people do everything ])os-
sible and that is the only way you get any bigger job done, where I did
not actually handle the paper — I did not bring it in. Either Van Vliet
or Mrs. Meeres brought it in. I did handle it a while. One of those
two, or Lantaff, took it out. After that I never saw the paper again.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not going to repeat some of the matters that
wei-e gone into by my colleagues, but there is one thing that I would
like to find out Avhich concerns all of us, even more than the Katyn
matter. That is the possibility of the loss of these documents at such
frequent intervals.
I would like to find out fi'om you, in view of what you just said, just
Itow you keep those documents. Let me ask you this : suppose someone
comes in and talks to you or brings you information about the Katyn
massacre or Dachau, or some other incident. Do you file that just in
\ our safe, or do you put it under a certain heading ?
General Bissell. I keep nothing in my safe.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have it filed under a certain heading.
General Bissell. A file system is established for the entire office.
It was established before I came there. The same one was in effect
when I left.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not insisting you were to blame for it. I
want to find out whether there is a system.
General Bissell. Very definitely.
Mr. Machrowicz. It is pretty hard for a INIember of Congress to
break into this wall. It is hard to get information from the Pentagon.
When you receive information on a particular subject, is that infor-
mation ])laced in a master file with that name as a heading?
General Bissell. In G-2, while I was there we had a group called
the Specialist Group, who specialized on Germany and on Japan.
They saw everything on their subject. Unless it required action or
was ready for action, it went to them first and not to me. They had
everything.
Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question.*
General Bissell. They kept a certain amount of this material in
their offices while it was live. As it passed the live stage and became
dead, it was sent down to general files.
Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question. Supposing
you are interested in obtaining information which G-2 possesses on
93744— 52— pt. 7 (!
1902 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
a particular subject, Katyn for example, can you go to the file and
find under "Katyn" all the information which the Department has on
that subject ?
General Bissell. Not now. It has been spread from one end of the
place to the other.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it at the time you were there?
General Bissell. It would all have been in the Russian section.
Mr. Machrowicz. If you were interested as the head of G-2 to get
all available information on a specific question, was there not a file to
which you could look to find out where all the information available
to G-2 is on that particular subject?
General Bissell. All the live information, yes. There would be lots
more information in other places than G-2, but it would not be live.
Some may be far away.
Mr. Machrowicz. So I presume there was a file labeled "Katyn"?
General Bissell. Probably. I can't say for sure. I didn't check it.
Mr. Machrowicz. You know now, although you probably didn't at
that time, there had been information, and valuable information, re-
quested and received by G-2 on Katyn prior to the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. I found out subsequently about the Szymanski
report and read the letter of transmittal to General Strong.
Mr. Machrowicz, You know G-2 specifically requested Colonel
Szymanski to furnish information relative to the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. I know that the report came in two ways, one to
General Strong personally, and exactly the same paper sent another
way.
Mr. Macifrowicz. You as the head of G-2 wanted to get all the
available information on Katyn there was, any place where you could
look under a filing system and find Katyn and find Szymanski ?
General Bissell. It would have gone to the Russian specialists, be-
cause that is Russian territory and a Russian problem.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it would have gone, but there
was a place where you could have gone and gotten all the available
information ?
General Bissell. All I would have had to do was to tell LantalT.
He would have gotten the Russian specialists. The Russian specialists
would have gotten the stuff from their office. They would have gotten
the stuff I needed.
Mr. Machrowicz. There was a way of finding out available infor-
mation on any important subject?
General Bissell. Hot stuff.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you were told that Colonel Van Vliet was
coming to see you and make a report on the Katyn massacre, did you
request from anyone under you to get a complete file on that subject?
General Bissell. I didn't get any such warning. Ha was in the
office when I got back from a trip out of town. I wanted to get to
him in a hurry because I understood ho had bi^en waiting.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you did talk to him, did you then request
to ijet that information ?
General Bissell. No; I did not at that time because I had a copy
of this letter of May 25.
Mr. Machrowicz. You did not have it then?
General Bisskll. No; it was written. While I was talking to Van
Vliet I didn't want to be influenced by anylhino; but Van Vliet.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1903
Mr. Machrowicz. He came to see you on May 22. The letter was
May 25?
General Bissell. That is right. I put this letter out.
Mr. Machrowicz. Which letter?
General Bissell. The letter of May 25, addressed to Julius C.
Holmes.
Mr. Mitchell, May ?
General Bissell. May 25, 1945, to Julius C. Holmes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at either time when you talked to Colonel
Van Vliet, or afterward, refer to the available live information which
was in the G-2, to either check his information with other information
which you received as to his veracity in regard to his observations or
anything at all ?
Did you do anything to find out what other available information
you had in G-2 ?
General Bissell. I did not go to the general files. I didn't mention
it to the Russian specialist.
Mr. Machro\vicz. Did you have anyone else do it?
General Bissell. No, sir. The reason for that was, had anything
come in during the period I was G-2 on a matter of that nature, it
would have been told to me.
Mr. Machrowicz. You say the Katyn report would have been prop-
erly filed under Russian affairs?
General Bissell. The Russian specialist would have had it and he
would have determined where it was going to go.
Mr. MACHRo^vIcz. If I am wrong, I hope Mr. Shackelford corrects
me. It actually was found under Poland ?
General Bissell. It could well have been. Wliere you have three
countries, it would go first geographically to the man who handled
the area. Then he would see that those interested in it would receive
either copies made for them or have a chance through rotation to see it.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it, at the time you were G-2, a fact that Poland
and Russia were in the same area known as eastern Europe ?
General Bissell. There was Eastern Europe Chief. He had sub-
chiefs for different subareas.
Mr. MrrcHELL, The reports would have gone to the Eastern Europe
Section ?
General Bissell, That is right,
Mr, Machrowicz. At any rate no attempt was made by you to
evaluate the Van Vliet report by even trying to compare it with avail-
able information you already had in G-2 ?
General Bissell, I was going to use the reply to this letter as the
starting point for that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you use it as a starting point ?
General Bissell, No.
Mr, Machrowicz. Wliynot?
General Bissell. Because, when it came back, I was just telling you
my reaction, and why I didn't go along with the State Department's
comments or their conclusions. I have just mentioned two of them.
Wlien questions put an end to it,
Mr, Machrowicz. Their conclusions had nothing to do with the
evaluation of the Van Vliet report ?
General Bissell. That is what you say.
1904 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Am I right ? What conchisions are vou referring-
to?
General Bissell. If State, instead of being able to tell me they didn't
actually get this reply, had told me, "Yes, we got it : here is what it
says," and gave me another Van Vliet report, I would have had every-
tliing I needed to evaluate his report, one sent in 2 years earlier, and
then this one. That would have established his memory, accuracy^
detail of a good many kinds.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why didn't you look in your own department to
see what information you had ?
General Bissell. Because, had anything of significance come in
Mr. Machrowicz. How do you know ?
General Bissell. I had a meeting each morning about 7 something,
at which the specialists of each branch told me everything of impor-
tance that came in within the last 24 hours.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider the Colonel Szymanski report
filed with your department at the request of your predecessor, and a
report w^hich w^as very lengthy and very important, or did you think
it not important enough to consider ?
General Bisseu^. Had that report been brought to me without evalu-
ation, as it came in, the colonel did not say, "This is true, this is
untrue, this is probably true."
Mr. Machrowicz. You are talking about Colonel Van Vliet's re-
port or Colonel Szymanski's?
General Bissell. Szymanski's. He didn't say "This is based on
people whose veracity and dependability I know well."
Mv. Machrowicz. He did not say that ?
General Bissell. He didn't evaluate it at all. He said, "Trans-
mitted herewith is so-and-so," a very short letter, to General Strong.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you quite positive of that?
Mr. Mitchell. .Are you referring to the exhibits which are already
on record with this committee?
General Bissell. That is the only thing I know about it, what has
been printed in the press. I read his report in G-2 during that period,
April 1 to 12.
Mr. Mitchell. What year ?
General Bissell. This year. I saw nine exhibits with about this
mncli of letter transmitted [indicating about 3 inches]. That is all
Szymanski contributed. It was someone else's material being for-
warded. I examined each of those. Three of them said they were
hearsay. Some of them said they were hearsay several times re-
moved. Three others did not mention Katyn.
Mr. Machrowicz. What you are referring to is he never got anyone
actually at Katyn when the shooting took place?
General Bissell. It was all hearsay.
Mr. Machroavicz. He never had an eyewitness?
General Blssell. No. He had neitlier eyewitnesses nor other evi-
dence. By evidence I mean something that a lawyer can use. For-
tunately we had lots of lawyers in G-2. They weighed things. They
had to be right.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think you said a few minutes ago that you
never had the Colonel Van Vliet report in your hands.
General Bissell. I didn't say I never had it in my hands. I held it
a while while I read it over with Van Vliet in mv office, and asked
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1905
him if he wanted to make any chancres. He didn't want to make any.
I had liim initial the thing. He did that. I don't think I even picked
it np off my desk.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever order that to be put in the Katyn
file?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why not ?
General Bissell. Becaiise I didn't want it to get that much circula-
tion at that point.
Mr. Machrowicz. If you ever transmitted to anyone
General Bissell. I would not have needed to say that. If a paper
came into my office and I did not need to take action on it, just infor-
mation, my initial was usually put in on it, but not always. It was
put in the out basket. It went out and was filed properly. I didn't
personally have anything to do with the filing.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it properly filed ?
General Bissell. Maybe only 99.999 percent thereabouts.
Mr. Machrowicz. If some one subsequent to you, a successor to you,
the next day, wanted to check the Katyn file and asked the head of
the Russian or Polish departments about it, would he have been able
to find the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then you would say it was not properly filed,
was it ?
General Bissell. If he did not find it, he would have come to my
secretary and reported the fact. My secretary would say, "Well, this
is the dope on that."
Mr. Machrowicz. How could he report a fact which he would not
have known about ? How could he have known about the report ?
General Bissell. If he didn't know about it, he couldn't do it.
Mr. Mitchell. You just said in reply to Mr. Machrowicz that you
had a daily briefing session with the members of your staff. Did you
meet these area chiefs at any time and discuss either the Katyn affair,
or Van Vliet's report at that briefing session?
General Bissell. I did not.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. You never have discussed that ?
General Bissell. Never.
Mr. Mitchell. You have never discussed it with any other member
of G-2 except Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres ?
General Bissell. I didn't discuss it with Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. They are the only two people you knew who knew
about it ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have any members designated as liaison
officer with the OWI?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who were they?
General Bissell. Many people at many times. I can recall no
names.
Mr. Machrowicz. At that time, in May 1945.
General Bissell. I couldn't tell you.
Mr. Machrowicz. Wlioever they were, did you instruct them to
give this information to the OWI?
General Bissell. No.
1906 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. You did not think the OWI should know this
information ?
General Bissell. I think we are getting in trouble on sources of
information, but I will be glad to tell you in executive session.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Shackelford, does the record of the G-2 office
in the period while General Bissell was in charge of G-2, show who
were the liaison officers to OWI and who were the OWI representatives
to G-2?
Mr. Shackelford. I would be glad to check the records for that
information, and if it is in the records, to supply it to the committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. It would not do any good in view of the testimony
it was not generally discussed, anyway.
General Bissell. I did not.
Mr. Machrowicz. They had no knowledge of the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. I can't say.
Mr. Machrowicz. If they did, they got it improperly?
General Bissell. No. There were other people in the world who
knew that these people had been there. They had many contacts in
many places.
Mr. DoNDORO. Was that a part of your function?
General Bissell. I was on a committee called the Joint Intelligence
Committee. There were meetings once a week where I saw representa-
tives of OSS, State, War, Navy, Air, and sometimes others. This is
not the nature of a question that would have been taken up there.
They were not policy recommendations to the combined Chiefs of
Staff or Joint Chiefs for the conduct of their intelligence arrange-
ments, prior to major operations, or something that we could think
of that would help the prosecution of the war.
I also had conferences with the head of Naval Intelligence and
the FBI, a little different group. We met periodically and took up
everything on the counterintelligence side both in the United States
and world-wide, dividing the duties between us, according to the regu-
lations in effect at that time, which was an Executive order.
Beyond that, I don't think I should go into that one.
Mr. Machrowicz. I presume you read Arthur Bliss Lane's article
in the American Legion magazine?
General Bissell. I don't know who wrote it. It doesn't say. I would
like to have found out.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not saying this, because I believe statements
contained in here, but I believe you should be given an opportunity
to comment. There is a statement there which states :
We heard that Van Vliet was behind the closed doors of General Bissell's
private office a long time, alone with the G-2 general. When he reappeared in
the reception office we learned Van Vliet was flushed, seemed intensely but
silently angry. He went as directed by Bissell, with the general's personal
security stenographer across the corridor to a smaller office.
Colonel Van Vliet made no such statement to us, that he was flushed
or angry or anything that occurred between you two which Avould give
rise to that statement. I am going to ask you, have you any comment
on that?
GoiuM'nl Bissell. I would welcome you taking Van Vliet's word on
it, but there was not the sliglitest unpleasantness. My only feeling
was, shall we push this fellow for this now? He was off the normal
track. Normally, when some returned person came in, we tried to
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1907
be sure they were fit to make a report. Colonel Van Vliet was, but
he was awfully tired. He was ready to oo, it seemed. I don't know
anything that happened, to my knowledge, that didn't suit him to
a "t."
Mr. Maciirowicz. I want this on the record.
Do you claim that this statement is not justified by the facts?
General Bissell. As far as I know, there is no basis of fact in it at
all. I don't know where it could have come from.
Mr. MrrcnELL. Have you tried to find out?
General Bissell. No. The only thing I was interested in was having
a check made to see if any of those were libelous. Wlien you analyze
them carefully, there is not a firm statement about me in them ; every
one is a quiz, qualification, or implication, or inference.
JMr. Mitchell. Have you discussed the article with Arthur Bliss
Lane ?
General Bissell. No. I do not go to former State Department
people except through War Department channels. I am a civilian.
Mr. Mitchell. So is he.
General Bissell. His status is different from mine. I am on the
Government payroll as a retired officer.
Mr. Mitchell. So is he.
General Bissell. I didn't know that. Mr. Lane is a nice person.
I don't think he would be vindictive about me. He might have lent
himself to something for a purpose, but I don't think he meant any-
thing vindictive.
Mr. DoNDERO. I have two or three short questions.
I try to get in through a crack once in a while between my colleague
from Michigan and counsel for the committee.
Here is something that challenges my attention and may yours:
In the letter that you wrote on August 21, 1945, appears this statement :
Transmitted —
and this goes to Mr. Lyon —
for the information and file of the State Department is the report ou Katyn by
Stanley S. Gilder, captain, EAMC, British medical officer. This report supple-
ments statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes,
May 25, 194.1, and generally substantiates all material facts in Lientpuant
Colonel Van Vliet's report.
The word "forwarded" is w^hat challenges my attention. Would
it be forwarded by mail or would it be forwarded by a messenger?
General Bissell. I think undoubtedly by top-secret courier.
Mr. DoNDERO. Now, after that letter was written, was it delivered
to the State Department ?
General Bissell. This particular one ?
Mr. DoNDERO. This letter of August 21, 1945.
General Bissell. They got this letter all right.
Mr. Dondero. Did the State Department at any time, from the time
they received it, up to this hour, ever say to you or to your office that
they had not received the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. No. I pointed out they processed this letter for
just 5 days less than 2 months. So many people handled it. It seemed
to me that would have been almost inevitable.
Mr. Dondero. It goes without saying, if they did not receive it,
some statement should have come from the Department they did not
receive it.
1908 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. I^et's get this correct. Do you say the State
Department never denied receiving the letter of May 25?
General Bissell. I thought the State Department had not. I am
talking about the letter to Lyon carrying the Gilder report, and not
the May 25 letter. This letter is a letter of August 21.
Mr. iilACHROwicz. Head page 2 of the Department of Defense re-
lease in this matter.
General Bissell. "General Holmes, in reference to the matter" —
Which matter ?
Mr. Machrowicz. This is the Department of Defense speaking here.
They say, "The Department of State has no record of having received
the memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945,
and the Department of Army has found no receipt for it and no cover-
ing letter of transmittal."
Mr. DoNDERO. What is the date of that ?
Mr. Machrov^icz. September 18, 1950.
Mr. DoNDERO. That would have been 5 years
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the date the Department of Defense gave
the information, not the date from the Department of State.
Mr. Dondero. That is the only statement I have heard as to what
the attitude of the Department of State was, whether they received
that or not.
Mr. Mitchell. I want to say that is not in any letter form what-
soever. That is a comment by the Department of the Army at the
time they passed this memorandum for the press, dated September
18, 1950.
The State Department, to my personal knowledge, is not on record
with this committee or anywhere else.
Mr. Dondero. That they ever received the report or denied or even
answered that letter of August 21, 1945, when they had a chance to do
it, after General Bissell had written this letter to them and said, "This
supplements the material contained in the Van Vliet report."
Mr. Machrowicz. I can't understand your statement.
Mr. Shackelford. The State Department will speak for itself, but
insofar as tliis Defense Department statement was concerned, it was
based on a thoroughgoing cooperation on their part. They were as
anxious. to find it as we were. They gave it the full diligence, when
they were unable to find it. It is on the basis of that information
that this statement is based.
Mr. Machrowicz. Information from the Department of State?
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. When they are before your committee,
they will speak for themselves.
Mr. Dondero. When tlie State Department receives a letter from
General Bissell, or received a letter back in August 1945 that he had
forwarded this report and they did not have it, wouldn't you naturally
suspect they would come out and say then, not 5 years later, "We
never received that report"?
Mr. Shackelford. I l)elieve it would be more satisfactory from
your standpoint and the conunittee's standpoint if State were to speak
to that, since it is outside of my province.
Mr. Dondero. I just wanted to call attention to that. There is one
other matter, and then I am through.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1909
I liave before me here a letter written by Mr. Shackelford to me on
October 6, 1950, in answer to corresi)ondence which I had directed to
either the Department of the Army or the Department of State, inquir-
ing- Avhat had become of the Van Vliet report. You answered me.
In the answer is this statement :
There was a mistake made —
I want to read three or four lines — you say :
Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin in his reply on October 19, 1949, to your letter —
meaning to me —
of October 6. 1949, referred to a Katyn massacre report which was partially
liased on Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's observations.
In making this statement he erroneously thought —
and he, I think, refers to General Irwin —
he erroneously thought that the study entitled "Supplementary Report on Facts
and Documents Concerning the Katyn Massacre'"—
which was the report which the Polish government in exile made, if
I recall correctly —
was based in part on information supplied by Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet.
This was not so, and the supplementary report was an independent and detailed
study made by a Polish committee, which at no time has conferred or consulted
with Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet.
How was it possible in that office for General Irwin to make a mis-
take of that magnitude ?
Mr. Shackelford. It was a very unfortunate job of mislabeling,
as is brought out in the Inspector General's report, and through really
just a plain error.
This supplemental report, which I believe is approximately some
45 to 50 pages in length and prepared by the Polish government in
exile, was incorrectly labeled as partially based on the Van Vliet
report. It was from that clue, as it ultimately came through to
General Irwin, his letter was based.
Mr. DoNDERO. Could it be possible there is some error made regard-
ing the Van Vliet report, so far as it affects this committee?
Mr. Shackelford. We have done everything in our power — and
very aggressively, to try to follow every possible clue that we had, and
to examine every possible file to turn the report up and to find out
any error,
Mr. DoNDERO. I know you have made every effort possible, because
you have been in my office more than once regarding it.
Mr. Shackelford. Thank you.
General Bissell. Mr. Dondero, may I say, when I appeared before
the Inspector General, I pointed out that several letters had been sent
out of the Department of Defense that conflicted with each other, to
Members of Congress and to others, and that I asked the Inspector
General to especially clear that thing up, I think he did. It was
because people didn't know what they were handling, and called it
different names, and because it was handled by different people at
different times, and they didn't coordinate. I did stress that.
If you read the testimony there, given to the Inspector General, you
will find that I especially asked them to go into that and clear it up,
so that the Secretary of Defense would not be in an untenable position
as he was in then.
:1910 THE KA.TYN FOREST MASSACRE
]Mr. Mitchell. I have one question to ask.
When were you relieved as assistant G-2?
General Bissell. In January 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next assignment ?
General Bissell. Military and air attache, Court of St. James's,
London, American Embassy.
Mr. Mitchell, When did you report for active duty there?
General Bissell. In May, the 8th day of May 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. When were you handed the Polish reports, known
as the facts and documents concerning Polish prisoners of war cap-
tured by the U. S. S. R. during the 1939 campaign ^
General Bissell. I have got that in my story here, I will find it.
Mr, Mitchell, And the supplemental report on facts and documents
concerning the Katyn massacre, which is the one that was just re-
ferred to ?
General Bissell, That is 1946, and the Polish-London report is
page 43.
On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles,
and during the course of a social evening
Mr. Mitchell. Wait a minute. What is that date? Was that
November 27? What year?
General Bissell. On November 20, 1947 — and I went to London in
1946.
You asked me when I got those papers. I am trying to paint the
picture precisely for you.
On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles
and during the course of a social evening in the home of one of these
Polish couples in London, arrangements were made for me to meet
with a Polish gentleman who was stated to have assembled all the
available Polish information on Katyn. The meeting occurred on
November 25, 1947.
Again I was told the story of the massacre of thousands of Poles
by the speaker, who stated he believed that it had been committed by
the Russians. He wished the information brought to the attention
of the Americans at Nuremberg. I made a request for all the data
they wished to furnish me.
I agi'eed thereafter that the action would be taken that was con-
sidered appropriate, after a check of the nature of the data furnished
me. I did not know what they were going to furnish me, and I did
not want to be committed to get something into Nuremberg if it
wasn't right.
Arrangements were made for anotlier meeting at which all the
available material would be delivered to me in writing.
Within a week, the material was furnished to me. On December
2, 1947, I telephoned Gen. Telford Taylor at Nuremberg, telephone
Justice 6117, and told him guardedly what I had secured, and that it
was for the United States group at the International ISIilitary Tribu-
nal, that I thought he sliould see it promptly.
He said he would soiul a ])lane for it within 3 daj^s. This arrange-
ment did not eventuate, so other arrangements for delivery were
made.
On December 15, 1947, I talked with General Taylor on the tele-
phone. He then informed me the material had been received, ex-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1911
pressed appreciation, but made no other comment to me then or ever
subsequently.
Following what was routine procedure, G-2 Washington was ad-
vised of the procurement of this London Katyn report, and of its
handling, having been forwarded to General Taylor. I believe no
duplicate copy was available to send to G-2 in Washington, and 1 re-
quested General Taylor to send to G-2 the copy furnished him when
it had served his purposes. I believe this copy was duly received, be-
cause Mr. Shackelford told me he had seen a copy and his comments
concerning it convinced me that he had.
The Katyn report forwarded from London to General Taylor and
subsequently to G-2, consisted of two voluminous reports totaling 529
images. They were in English. I believe they were anonymous,
though — as I recall, there was a statement in them that the Polish
sources had been used; in part the matter w^as repetitious, but it did
contain a most comprehensive account that obviously had involved
a great effort. These papers reached no stated conclusion of guilt,
but tended to build up a case against the Communists. I have rea-
son to believe that one copy of this report had been before the Nurem-
berg Tribunal in June 1946 and was rejected.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the point exactly, right there.
Mr. Sheehan. Is he right on his dates?
Mr. Mitchell. I want to point out the Inspector General's report
is totally inadequate, because it mentions no data as to what the gen-
eral is giving here. Obviously he must have talked to the general, be-
cause he is talking about November 1947 and they leave out wdien he
sent these documents to General Taylor.
The Nuremberg trials were July 1 and July 2, 1946, when the Katyn
affair was involved, and it was on the Goering indictment at that time.
Therefore, the date that was sent to General Taylor in December
1947, was wholly unnecessary. There was nothing that could have
been done with it at that particular time. However, the general has
just made the statement that he had reason to believe that these same
documents were present at the Nuremberg trials.
Could you explain that further?
General Bissell. I never had an opportunity to read the Nuremberg
report until I came up here last month, when I read them and found
what I thought was the same thing.
Mr. Maciirowicz. That is the reason you had to believe they
were
General Bissell. The Russian counsel is quoted in the Nuremberg
reports as describing the paper as anonymous, as in English, as having
been published in London and as not being admissible, because it was
from Polish sources and they were not admitting it at Nuremberg, as
I understood it, in reading it. I did not look at it too carefully.
There is a lot of stuff on Nuremberg. They were not admitting as
evidence anything on this particular case, except official Government
papers.
The Russian paper was an official Government paper, but the Rus-
sians had not recognized that Polish Government that was in London
at this time. They had severed relations with the Poles when the Poles
asked the International Red Cross to intercede.
So, that made the document inadmissible.
1912 THE KATYN FOEEST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. 'Who was offering that document in evidence in
Nuremberg? I frankly have not seen any mention of it. I don't
know if our counsel has or not.
General Bissell. One of the counsel for either
Mr. Machrowicz. Goering?
General Bissell. Or another defendant. Two were being tried
jointly at that particular moment. Now, please don't misunderstand
me at all. I knew about Nuremberg. I visited Nuremberg when the
principal criminals were being tried.
Mr. Mitchell. That was at this time ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Goering was the principal witness.
General Bissell. But this was 1947, and the time I visited them was
earlier than that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Frankly, I am confused again. I have not read
all of the Nuremberg trial proceedings, although I have some of them,
and frankly I saw no mention of anyone offering in evidence any
documents obtained from the London government.
General Bissell. Yes; I think they tried to get this one in.
Mr. Machrowt:cz. I would like to ask our counsel, who I presume
has checked the Nuremberg trials, Is there any record of anyone offer-
ing them in evidence ?
Mr. Mitchell. If you will recall, when we had Mr. Kempner on
the stand in Frankfurt, several volumes of the Nuremberg trials were
mentioned in the course of that, I believe when they were submitting
documentary evidence, although I have not checked the official docu-
ments because they are not contained in the trial hearings, as yet.
But I intended to do that in the near future, and I will check tliat vei y
point. However, if the general can tell me which volume and where
it is, I will be very appreciative.
General Bissell. Mr. Shackleford can. but I can't. His office made
some references to where things appeared. I didn't have time to
read many of them. I ran into that one and that is the reason tliat I
have it in here, because it seems to be bearing on the Nuremberg
presentation on this particular material. I knew from personally
being at the Nuremberg trial when the principal criminals were under
trial, and talking with Telford Taylor there. They couldn't do that
trial without the electrical set-up for the tiling coming out in many
languages. That broke down so I had a chance for an liour and a half
to talk with Taylor. There was no mention of Katyn at that time.
He was on another case. I was interested in these criminals in the
box, because they left them there and the judges went out. I knew
only tlie details on the Nuremberg thing since last April, and then not
very thoroughly. There is supposed to be a book of document 5. I
didn't look at it at all at that time.
Mr. Machrowicz. Our committee was given the infoi-mation in
Europe that certain documents had been furnished by tlie Polish
Government in London to the j)roper authorities in Nuremberg, and
were never ])resented. Now, the information that you give me seems
to beai- out that that charge is not correct.
General Bissell. Tliey didn't let them present it.
Mr. MAcniRowicz. That is different.
General Bissell. They got tliem ready.
Mr. Machrowicz. They were offered?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1913
General Bissell. And the Russian who was presiding that day
made the decision, "AVe would aaree only to take official documents
and this one is not an official document because it is not of a <rovern-
ment recognized by all of the members of the court."'
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that will be confirmed in our hearings, I
believe, by both Dr. Stahmer and Mr. Kempner. Dr Stahmer was
the German defense counsel on the Katyn indictment on the Goering
trial, and I think you will find that that is correct, except that I do
think there was some mention in the record, which I have not had an
opportunity to check but which we will take np later when we go in
that aspect of the case.
Mr. Shackelford. I will be glad to check our own records with
i-egard to the Nuremberg trials and volumes and supply any pertinent
citations which we may have to the committee.
Mr. Sheehax. Might I ask you to refresh my recollection on the
Xuremberg trials? Weren't they started in November of 1945 and
finished in July or August of 1946?
Mr. Mitchell. What happened was this : They started discussing
the Katyn affair or indictment. They didn't know where to put it.
So they finally selected Goering as a major war criminal. They put
it in his indictment. They came up with the discussion in February
1946 as to how many witnesses each side would be permitted to call,
and they haggled over it for 2 or 3 or 4 months. On June 29, if my
memory serves me correctly, the presiding judge at that time, wdio
was
Ml'. DoNDERO, Lawrence, Judge Lawrence.
Mr. Mitchell. Judge Lawrence, of the British, finally ruled and
told both of them, "You will have three witnesses and only three
witnesses," and they had those people up, cross-examination of both
sides, July 1 and July 2, 1946. There was a summary by Dr. Stahmer,
the German defense counsel, I believe, on July 6. There was no sum-
mary by the Russians or tlie Soviets, and the matter was dropped.
Mr. Sheehan, That is what I am trying to tie up. The general is
quoting November 1947 and the trials were all over.
Mr. Machrowicz. It was not stated by any witness in Frankfurt
that any offer was made to "present any evidence in Nuremberg in the
form of a document from the Polish Government in London.
Mr. Mitchell. There was a slight reference in which he gave us a
reference to a volume, in which I have a reference, and which I intend
to check.
General Bissell. I knew^ all of the time when this fellow came to
me and wanted me to present this particular thing at Nuremberg that
the main criminal trials were finished and the criminals executed long
since, or disposed of. Then the court kept on for a long, long time w^ith
the minor things before they broke it into small particles and it went
on for a long time. When I first went there — I could get it out of
these papers but it is not important — it was approximately a year
earlier, and the main criminals were then on trial. But I knew it was
not going to change the main trial but was going to get to Nuremberg
everything I could get as fast as I could get it there.
Mr. Mitchell. No further questions, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. I have one question, Mr. Chairman.
Counsel, you asked Colonel Van Vliet in his testimony, when he
came back and was in General Bissell's office, if Colonel Van Vliet knew
1914 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
or heard of a Lieutenant Colonel Holloman. Did yon have any par-
ticular purpose in that?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL, Yes, sir ; that was cleared up yesterday by Mrs. Mil-
dred Meeres when I talked to her. Holloman's identity was mistaken
for Lantaff. In other words, Lantaff in the record there is Holloman,
really. Holloman has taken quite a beating from the Inspector Gen-
eral's office and everything as regards the mistaken identity on the
part of Mrs. Mildred Meeres, and she went back to the War Depart-
ment yesterday after meeting Congressman Lantaff and corrected the
file as far as who the individual was, and it was Congressman Lantaff,
not Holloman. At that time I was merely exploring.
General Bissell. I think I can help you on that. Holloman was
the head of the section for which ]\Irs. Meeres worked, and she only
was in our office for this one thing. That is why Congressman Lan-
taff was the man instead of the colonel in his own section.
Chairman Madden. General Bissell, the committee wishes to thank
you for testifying here today. Considering the extended versions of
the testimony presented in regard to the particular report which the
committee is interested in, there is no doubt but what the committee
will have to explore further as to whether there is any possible avenue
to determine the whereabouts or what happened to that particular
report. We will make every effort by further witnesses which we
will call. There is a possibility that we miglit want further testimony
from you. Of course, our committee is merely interested in concrete
testimony if we can secure it, or proof as to where the original Van
Vliet report went. Inferences or suppositions will not satisfy the
public as to what happened to the report. Of course, the testimony
here today, possibly the highlight of the testimony, was the Inspector
General's report, and I wrote it down as the testimony came out that
in the Inspector General's report it said, in conclusions of it, there is
no proof that the Van Vliet report ever left the office where it orig-
inated. I asked you about that, and you said that is correct.
General Bissell. I confirmed it.
Cliairman Madden. Now, of course, I know that the members of the
committee are not satisfied as to its proposed exploration to determine
the wliereabouts or what hap]3ened to the Van Vliet report. So we
will explore further and possibly we might have you testify again, I
don't know. But nevertheless we are thankful for your presence here
today.
General Bissell. Be assured I not only welcome that, but hope you
will.
Chairman Madden. The committee will meet tomorrow morning at
10 o'clock, in this room.
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at
10 a. m., Wednesday, June 4, 1952.)
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1952
House of Representatives,
The Select Committee on the
IvATYN Forest Massacre,
Washington^ D. C.
The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 362,,
House Office Building, Hon. Eay J. Madden (chairman), presiding.
Present : Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, O'Konski,
and Sheehan.
Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select committee.
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
]\Ir. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I have a few brief remarks I would
like to direct to the attention of the entire committee.
You will recall that when we were in Chicago taking the testimony
of Col. Henry Szymanski, Colonel Szymanski took out of his personal
file some documents which we put into the record as exhibits. At that
time the staff of this committee had never seen those ; neither had any
member of this committee. Yesterday the same incident occurred
here on the stand when General Bissell was testifying. The War De-
partment counselor, Mr. Shackelford, brought out some additional
letters.
You will also recall that this committee visited with the President
of the United States in January, at which time this committee was as-
sured that all official documents pertaining to the missing Polish
officers and the Katyn massacre would be made available to this
committee.
This committee has repeatedly requested verbally of the War De-
partment counsellor's office all documents connected with it. I am
sorry to say this morning that I have been placed in a rather em-
barrassing position several times in the course of these hearings.
I would like to state openly that all documents in the War Depart-
ment pertaining to the missing Polish officers and the Katjai affair
should be presented to this committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, would it not be better to wait
until Mr. Shackelford is here before making that statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. His representative is here and has heard the remark.
I am referring to Mr. Faclier.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is Mr. Shackelford going to be here this
morning ?
Mr. Facher (Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford, coun-
selor. Department of the Army). He will be unable to be here today.
1915
1916 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you want to make any statein l in connec-
tion with that ?
Mr. Facher. No, sir. We are trying to uncover i> le documents
for the committee and there are several that are going- to be forwarded
hiter in the week.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir.
The first witness this morning is Colonel Yeatoix
Chairman Madden, Colonel Ivan Yeaton. Will you step forward,
please, and raise your right hand and be sworn ?
Do you solemnly swear that in this hearing you will tell the trutli,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help your God ?
Colonel Yeaton. I do, sir.
TESTIMONY OF IVAN DOWNS YEATON, UNITED STATES ARMY,
ACCOMPANIED BY JEROME FACHER, ASSISTANT TO F. SHACKEL-
FORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you tell the committee your
full name for the record, please?
Colonel Yeaton. Ivan Downs Yeaton.
Mr. Mitchell. And your home address, please?
Colonel Yeaton. My home address at present is Fort Wayne, De-
troit, Mich.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you state the date of your
birth?
Colonel Yeaton. I was born January 2, 1895, at Haverhill, Mass.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly your educational background
for the committee?
Colonel Yeaton. Grammar school in Boston or Allston, Mass.;
high scliool, Pasadena, Calif.
I have a degree in osteopathy from the College of Osteopathic Phy-
sicians and Surgeons in Los Angeles, and I took a year's postgraduate
work in the College of Physicians and Surgeons in San Francisco,
and interned in the City County Hospital in San Francisco.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academv
at West Point?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first enter the Army ?
Colonel Yeaton. Seventeenth of September 1917.
Mr. Mitchell. How^ long have you been in the United States Army ?
Colonel Yeaton. Ever since, with the exception of 1 year's retire-
ment, wdiich was last year.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your official duty station on September [
1, 19)59, and in wdiat capacity w^ere you serving? j
Colonel Yeaton. September 1, 1939, I was designated as military [
attache to the Soviet Union. I am not quite sure wdiere I was. I
don't tliink I had joined my station, but I was en route. j
Mr. Mitchell. Was your official position at that time in any way i
coiuiected with interpretive duties? I
Colonel Yeaton. At that time I was to be military attache to the {
Soviet Union. It was my duty to collect information and to evaluate ■
it. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you speak the Russian language, or write it, or
read it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1919
Mr. MiTCHr- ')!(■. Do you remember or recall having seen those docu-
ments coming I'o G-2 from Col. Henry I. Szymanski?
Colonel YE.-pfff. I did, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee what happened to
those documents as they were received, what the procedure was in
connection with such documents?
Colonel Yeaton. At that time, the organization of G-2 had what
is known as a reading panel. There were three officers detailed down
to the records section. Military attache reports came in in 10 copies, I
believe. The original, from which additional copies could be made,
was sent to the records section. Of the 10 remaining copies, the read-
ing panel decided on the distribution.
And as long as I was the responsible section chief, all extra copies
w-ould of necessity come to me. In my office these reports were filed
under my Polish intelligence group.
Mr. Mitchell. Polish intelligence group — how many individuals
were working at that time, and what was their primary duty ?
Colonel Yeaton. My memory doesn't serve me. I am not sure how
large the section was at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. All right; proceed, please.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is one section of the question. But the other
section of the question Avas, What was their primary duty? Could
you answer that part of the question ?
Colonel Yeaton. The primary duty of what, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz. Of tliis particular section, the Polish intelligence
section.
Colonel Yeaton. The Polish intelligence subsection's primary
duties, were to file, evaluate, make such memoranda as they thought
necessary.
And our main interest at tliat time was the size and training and
possible use of tlie Polisli Army in the Far East.
Therefore, the subject of missing officers was one of vital impor-
tance to us, if they were still alive and where they were and what action
it would take, or what help we could give the Poles in getting them
out of prison camps or wherever they were. They were simply listed
as missing officers, and, as such, in the Polish file; there was a section
where reports that dealt with these missing officers were filed sepa-
rately.
You must understand at this time we were getting Polish intelli-
gence from tlie Polish Government in exile and London and through
the Polisli diplomatic group here in Washington. So I had Polish
intelligence coming in from at least two sources.
Hut all reports wound up in the same file.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you sav all the reports wound up in the same
file? ■
Colonel Yeaton. At that time ; yes, sir.
]\Ir. Mitchell. At that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
have never seen any reports, from any other source other than from
Col. Henry Szymanski.
Colonel, you have read the exhibits which are in part 3 of Col. Henry
Szynianski's testimony. Are those all of Col. Henry Szymanski's
reports, to your knowledge, or were there additional reports?
1920 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. I think there were more than that, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You think tliere were more than that?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman at this point of the proceedings,
I would like to ask the representative of the Department of Defense
where the additional reports are. Mr. Facher is here speaking on
behalf of the Department of Defense. Is that correct?
Mr. Facher. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you identify yourself for the record, please?
Mr. Facher. I am Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford,
Department of the Army counselor.
To the best of our knowledge, we have located all the reports that
Col. Henry I. Szymanski has sent in.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you turned them all over to the committee ?
Mr. Facher. We have turned all the reports of Colonel Szymanski
that we have located over to the committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. There is evidently a difference of opinion be-
tween you and the colonel.
Am I correct, Colonel, that you made the statement that not all the
reports are included in the list of those which you have seen in the
transcript of testimony ?
Colonel Yeaton. You must understand, sir, that all the reports
that Szymanski sent in didn't have to do with Katyn.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are all the reports of Colonel Szymanski m re-
lation to tlie Polish officers and Katyn included in that list?
Colonel Yeaton. 1 can't say positively.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are there any other reports relating to the miss-
ing Polish officers, or to Katyn, other than those which have been
listed in your testimony before the committee, that you know of?
Colonel Yeaton. That I know of, sir ; no. Not that I know of.
Chairman Madden. Just a moment. Then your statement that you
made a moment ago dealt with Colonel Szymanski's reports not only
concerning Katyn, but as to other matters also ; is that correct?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe the record will show that he was also re-
sponsible for liaison with the Czechoslovakians ; is that correct?
General Yeaton. That is true.
Mr. Mitchell. I think he told us that in Chicago.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, is it your pleasure to question the'
witness as he goes along, or to wait until he makes his statement ?
Chairman I^Iadden. Did you have a statement you wanted to makiv
Colonel?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Chairman Madden. You can pursue your questions, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, there is a distinction that the gentleman tr
your right drew. He said that all the papers of Colonel Szymanski
were turned in. The committee is concerned with all the papers and all
the reports containing the Katyn Forest massacre, from whatevoi
source. Has the Army turned over to the committee all the papers
referring to the Katyn massacre situation, from whatever source^
Coloney Yeaton. I have no way of knowing, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Will Mr. Facher answer that?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1921
Mr. Facher. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Slieelian, that has
been clone. The search for missing papers is still continuing, and we
have several other documents which we are going to forward this week.
I might say that we have forwarded to your committee military
attache reports from Iran and from other countries.
I believe Mr. Mitchell will find from some of our forwarding letters
that we did send some of those reports over.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. The Army turned it over, of course, and it had spe-
cifically to do with the Van Vliet report.
We know that Colonel Hulls — which is one of those debatable
things — made a report, which the Army has refused to declassify,
although they did turn it over to us.
We do know that the military attache in Lisbon in 1942 and 1943
made quite a few reports regarding the Polish missing officers, which
I do not think the Army has officially turned over.
Now, it would seem to me that, on the basis of these reports that we
know about, there must be a lot of other reports.
You mentioned a while ago that you had a separate section or a
separate file folder for the various reports on the missing Polish
officers. Now, could you tell the committee, was this given any par-
ticular number or file name or something?
Colonel Yeaton. That question, sir, can only be answered if you
will put a date to it.
Mr. Sheehan. Let me put the date from 1941 to 1946, inclusive,
all reports concerning the missing Polish officers, from whatever
source.
Colonel Yeaton. On July 1, 1943, the Eastern European Section
became a branch. Any reports coming from Spain would not come
into the Eastern European Section.
Mr. Sheehan. Even if they specifically referred only to Russians
and Polish relations?
Colonel Yeaton. We would be given a copy.
Mr. Sheehan. Certainly.
Colonel Yeaton. But the basic reports would not be in our office,
but we would be kept advised.
Mr. Sheehan. We are interested in anything. Copies. We do not
necessarily want the official reports.
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Then on September 1 I became chief of the unit and no longer
responsible for the files of any of the branches. I was the over-all
chief of Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and, as such, we didn't keep
any files in our office.
Mr. MrrcHELL. What year was that?
Colonel Yeaton. That was on September 1, 1943.
Mr. Sheehan. But Colonel, even if you became chief of the Eu-
ropean Section, someone succeeded you in that Polish-Eussian section,
did he not?
Colonel Yeaton. That is true, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. He would inherit all the papers that were there,
would he not?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
1922 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. The files would be continued, would they not ?
Colonel Yeaton. All the files.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we should get after
the Army. There are still reports we do not know about.
May I proceed a little while before we go on that ?
In handling your eastern European end in 1941 and 1943, when
you were in charge of that, did you work closely with the State De-
partment in this respect: Assume the State Department got infor-
mation from the Ambassador or someone directly to the State Depart-
ment concerning, say, missing Polish officers or military problems,
would they refer that to you, a copy of it, or something like that?
Colonel Yeaton. I would say so, normally.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, G-2 was sort of a clearing house
on all phases of the military situation as it affected the political situa-
tion also?
Colonel Yeaton. I would rather say liaison than a clearing house.
Mr. Sheehan. Then you reported your talk with Anders to Am-
bassador Steinhardt — and there must be other Ambassadors to Russia
by this time — who had reports on the missing Polish officers? The
State Department must have referred some of these reports to the
Army, did they not?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only answer that by saying that they at-
tempted to keep us in the picture. Now, I couldn't pin down any
one report.
Mr. Sheehan. No specific one. But by keeping you in the picture
sometimes between 1941 to 1945, State must have referred items of
strictly military interest to G-2 concerning Polish officers and the
Polish-Russian situation.
The Army, so far as. I know, Mr. Mitchell, has not come up with
any of that. Has it ?
Mr. Mitchell. State Department or G-2?
Mr. Sheehan. G-2 has not come up with any State Department
reports.
Mr. Mitchell. No. The only thing I got from G-2 is already on
the record, or whatever they may have given in my absence during
the European trip of the committee. I will search the files and correct
any misstatements that may have been made this morning.
Mr. Machrowicz. And that was only after we informed them of the
Existence of the documents, particularly of the Szymanski report.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. They did not submit them to us until we found
out about them from outside sources.
Mr. Mitchell. I wnll correct the record on that point.
If you will recall, Mr. Machrowicz, you were in town last Decem-
ber. 'We got four of the nine attachments to Col. Henry Szymanski's
report, and then in January we finally got the rest of them after we
were informed from outside sources as to their whereabouts. Correct?
Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, just to pursue that a minute longer, so I
can finish at this point here : When you were talking about a lile where
all these materials were channeled or sent to, do you recall any par-
ticular designation or file number or file classification given to that,
from memory, or from any facts you might have there?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1923
Colonel Yeatox. That file number would be put on down in the
receiving room by this panel that I spoke about. They determined
where it would be filed and what the distribution would be. That was
not a part of the branch chief's duty.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you remember the names of this panel, for the
record ?
Colonel Yeatox. No. It was constantly changing. I know that
Dave Crist, out of my office, was on it some time, but it wasn't
Mr. :Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, I would like to interrupt for one
moment.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to ask the War Department coun-
selor for a complete personnel breakdown of all individuals in the
EE section and the Balkan section from the j'ear 1942, when we
became involved in World War II, through ]\Iay 1945.
Mr. Maciirowicz. What is the EE section? Is that the Eastern
European ?
Mr. Mitchell. That includes Poland and Russia.
I would also like to see the names of the individuals connected with
the Balkan section in G-2.
Mr. Sheehan. I might say for the record here — and INIr. Mitchell
and Mr. Madden will agree with this — that when we visited the Presi-
dent, he did not directly say he would have all the executive depart-
ments deliver to us or send to us whatever material they had on Katyn.
Is that right, Mr. ]\Iitchell ? Do you remember that ?
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I do not recall whether he said that they would take
the initiative, or whether we would take the initiative, but I do recall
that when we walked out of that office, I had the very definite under-
standing that anything that was available this committee could have.
My protest this morning was on the fact that twice in official testi-
mony before this committee I have been caught by surprise when wit-
nesses produced documents either from War Department files or their
own personal files.
The latest illustration was General Bissell yesterday, on the letter
of May 25, 1945, about the Swiss protecting power.
Thank you, Mr. Sheehan.
Now, Colonel Yeaton, I would like to show you exhibit No. 12. I
don't think that the exhibit, in part 3, has on it the routing of the
various reports as they came in. This is the top cover sheet of exhibit
No. 12. It comes from the "Military Intelligence Division, WGS,
military attache report, Poland. Subject : Polish Army in England
and the Middle East. From : M. A., liaison officer. November 6,
1942, source and degree of reliability : Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Lt.
Gen. Wladyslaw Anders."
Down in the lower left-hand corner is :
"Auth. : Colonel Yeaton. Date: 11-30-1942. Number of copies:
13."
I would like you to read it. Will you read, for the committee, what
other departments received or were notified of that report?
1924 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. The Office of Naval Intelligence received a copy.
The recording section received the original.
The British Empire section received a copy.
Air Intelligence received a copy.
The Middle East section received a copy and the eastern European
section received six copies.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question in con-
nection with that.
What does that report deal with ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is on the record. The balance of the report is in
the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. But just generally, Colonel, can you tell us what
that report deals with ?
Colonel Yeaton. Minutes of the meeting on organization of the
Polish forces in the Middle East, a chart of defensive disposition of
the Polish Corps in Scotland, a chart of the organization of the First
Army of the Motorized Corps, and a chart of the organization of the
territorial units.
Mr. INIachrowicz. Who had charge of routing copies of this re-
port to the various other departments ?
Colonel Yeaton. The reading panel, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have charge of it?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did the Department of State receive a copy?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir; it is not so recorded on here.
Mr. Mitchell. Just so there will be no misunderstanding, I would
now like to have the War Department counselor's representative, Mr.
Facher, make a note that I would like to have the names of the
various reading panel members in G-2 from April 1942 until Decem-
ber 1943.
I believe it was December 18 that Colonel Szymanski was relieved
of his duty as assistant military attache. Is that correct, Mr. Machro-
wicz?
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know. I do not remember the date.
Mr. Mitchell. Are there any further questions from the com-
mittee ?
Mr. OT^ONSKi. "VAHiy was he relieved of his duty ?
Mr. Machrowicz. I will tell my colleague from Wisconsin I am
vei'y much interested in bringing that point out, and I will bring
it out later in the cross-examination, if I am permitted to do so.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I shall look forward to it very much.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to ask the colonel about page 418,
part 3, at this time, Mr. O'Konski ?
Mr. OT^ONSKi. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, I would like to proceed a little further
by asking what was the procedure within the office of G-2 when such
reports Avere received, and how did the information channel up to
the head of G-2 and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or wherever
else it may have been sent? How was it done? Who did it? Was
it oral briefing, or was it in memorandum form? What was it?
Colonel Yeaton. The information that came in on these attache
reports was broken down according to subject and could have been
handled in one of several manners. Any intelligence or any informa-
tion on the Polish troops in the Near East was a matter of great
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1925
concern to the G-3 section of the War Department, the plans and
training, because they were responsible for the strategy and the orders
pertaining to the Allied troops that we had anything to do with.
Information on the missing Polish officers was of spot intelligence
value to ns as long as we thought they were alive, because they were
the cream of the Polish Army, and their presence with the new Polish
Army would have been of vital importance. Once we were sure they
were* dead, the question of who killed them, or how, was not of spot
intelligence value ; it was a matter for further investigation.
Now to come back to these reports of Szymanski, certain parts
of the information were broken down into separate reports and sent
upstairs to the Plans and Intelligence Division where they kept daily
account of the strength of that organization, its training, and its
location.
Information on the whereabouts or the death of the missing officers
was handled occasionally by verbal report and other informal mem-
oranda to G-2, so that they could be used as briefing material for the
Chief of Staff on the following morning.
"VMien the Germans released their propaganda blast, that was spot
news for the minute, because we were, as branch chiefs, responsible
that any information coming in over the air would be immediately
evaluated by the chief in question and presented to G-2 or the Director
of Intelligence, so that, if the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff
called down and said, "Wiat does this latest propaganda mean?"
G-2 would be in a position to give him at least the evaluation of his
chief of section.
I think that answers your question.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you a question in connection with
that. Colonel.
Are you now telling us that Colonel Szymanski's report dealt only
with the death of the Polish ofiicers?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt
with matters in which your department was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt
with the question of maintaining peace in Eastern Europe?
Let me refer to you one of the statements in his report :
1. Polish-Soviet relations are marked by differences which are in my humble
opinion irreconcilable.
2. These differences are irreconcilable at present because (a) the Soviets did
not carry out their end of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact; (b) the Soviets
are not carrying out the provisions of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30,
1941; (c) Stalin's promises to Sikorski and Roosevelt are not being kept; (d)
there are still some 900,000 Polish citizens, deportees, in Russia, slowly being
exterminated through overwork and undernourishment; (e) there are still some
50,000 Polish children slowly dying of starvation.
3. If the Soviets forsake their communistic and imperialistic aspirations there
is a good chance that peace may reign in the eastern part of Poland.
4. The Polish Government and Army officials are making a determined effort
to reconcile the differences. The attitude of the Government is realistic.
Would you say that that section of the report and the reports which
preceded it, upon which these conclusions were based, were an im-
portant thing, so far as your department was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't want to answer that "yes" or "no," sir.
That report was made by an assistant military attache. His first
1926 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
duty is to bring that matter that you bring up to the attention of
the military attache, wlio, in turn, should have brought it immediately
to the attention of the Ambassador.
That is a matter that the military are not supposed to get into.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Would you say it is a matter in which the Depart-
ment of State should get into ?
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you or anyone in your department bring this
report to the attention of the Department of State ^
Colonel Yeaton. It should have been done in Cairo, sir, not from
my office.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it should have been done, and
I do not care about technicalities. I care about realities.
Was that report which your department received ever brought to
the attention of the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you think it should have been ?
Colonel Yeaton. This particular report, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean this report we have here, or the one
you read, sir ?
Mr. Machrowicz. This particular report that I read from.
Mr. Mitchell. Which exhibit is it, please?
Mr. Machrowicz. Exhibit 11.
Mr. Mitchell. What page is that on, sir ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Page 458 of part 3.
Mr. Mitchell. "Future Polish-Soviet relations?"
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right.
Colonel Yeaton. Iwould have to see the covering sheet. I am not
sure that wasn't sent to the State Department, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. I might tell you, for your information, that Mr.
Shackelford testified before our committee and said that it had not
been sent to the Department of State.
Now, I am going to ask Mr. Facher, is that correct ?
Mr. Facher. I am sorry, sir ; I can't say.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think the record will speak for itself that Mr.
Shackelford said before the committee that that report had never been
forM'arded to the Department of State for its information.
If you have something to counter it, I would like to know.
Colonel Yeaton. I have nothing to counter it.
Mr. Mitchell. I have the original right here, sir.
Mr. Chairman and the committee, I show you herewith the original
letter transmitting the Szymanski reports, with the exhibits to which
Congressman Machrowicz has referred, one of them he has read into
the record just now. Here is the original letter. It says:
"Legation of the United States of America, Office of the Military
Attache, Cairo, Egypt."
"W. M. S." is up in the right-hand corner, with the "/LS" as the
identifying number, IG No. 3600. The subject is: Polish-Russian
Relations.
It is addressed to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War
Department, Washington, D. C.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1927
The letter states :
1. A deferred copy of letter submitted by Lt. Col. Henry I. Szymanski, covering
nine appendixes pertaining to the Katyn affair is forwarded herewith.
It is signed by William S. Ward, colonel, military attache.
Down in the lower left-hand corner it states "Enclosure: Letter
with appendixes."
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Is there anything to show that it was forwarded
to the Department of State ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I was going to ask the witness now.
I cannot see it. There is nothing to show it on here, to my knowledge.
Mr. Flood. Ask the witness if there is any evidence of it.
Mr. Mitchell. By Department of State does he mean the Ambas-
sador in Egypt or here in Washington ?
Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the Department of State. I do not care
who it was in the Department of State.
Colonel Yeaton. There is still missing from this document that
cover sheet, and without that, this can't stick.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am still going to repeat my statement to you,
Colonel. I realize you probably cannot answer that at this time, but
Mr. Shackelford, on behalf of the Department of Defense, has already
verified to this committee that tliat report has never been sent to the
Department of State.
Now, I am going to ask you another question, to refer to page 472
of part 3 of the hearings. That is an excerpt of an enclosure. No. 5,,
in Colonel Szymanski's report. It is entitled as follows: "Will the-
Russians Fight Next Spring?" Was that subject matter of impor-
tance to your department ?
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it of importance to the Department of State ?
Colonel Yeaton. I would say more to us than them.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me read to you what was contained in that
report, which has now been declassified :
Will the Russians Fight Next Spring?
Yes; if they find the Germans very weak. This winter they will conduct
limited offensives in order to straighten their lines. Behind these lines, they
will rest, reorganize, train and equip more divisions. They will wait until the
Allies and Germans annihilate each other. They will wait until the German
Army confronting them is so weak that their own effort will bring easy and huge
results. They will not stop their westward march until the American Army stops
them.
Europe is confronted with what seems to many of the powers an "either/or"
choice ; i. e., either German domination or Soviet domination.
There is little faith that the United States could control a victorious Russia
at any ijeace-table conference.
One of Mr. Willkie's secretaries stated to me in Tehran that Russia and the
United States will dictate the peace of Europe. When I repeated this (without
mentioning the source) to a very prominent Pole in Tehran, he at first begged me
not to jest, and then very suddenly said to me that "In that case Poland has lost
the war and the Allies have lost the war."
The choice in Europe is not merely democracy versus Hitler, as so many Amer-
icans seem to think it is.
That is signed "Henry I. Szymanski, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
United States Army, Liaison Officer to Polish Army."
Was that information important to your department?
1928 THE KATYN FOREST IMASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir,
Mr. Machrowicz. And to the Department of State ?
Colonel Yeaton. I assume so.
Mr. Machrowicz. And yet not one bit of evidence has been produced
here that that report has ever been brought to the attention of the
Department of State.
If that is true, would you say there was an error made on somebody's
part in the Department of Defense ?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only report, sir, that the channel for this
to get into the State Department was in Cairo. This military attache
is working for his ambassador, and it is up to him to report to his
ambassador anything that even faintly touches a matter concerning
the state.
Mr. Machroavicz. Colonel Szymanski was directly under your con-
trol; was he not?
Colonel Yeaton. Directly under my control.
Mr. Machrowicz. When he reported it to you, and if you were not
the proper source to receive that, was it not your duty to report it to
the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Instead of that, you put it in the warehouse in
Alexandria?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is where the committee found it.
I am going to ask you another question.
Mr. Mitchell. Might I interrupt a minute, sir ? I think that is an
unfair statement to the colonel. He has come here voluntarily. I am
sure that these reports were not in the warehouse when the colonel was
in charge of this. We found them there later ; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you whether subsequent to the receipt
of this report you sent a telegram to Colonel Szymanski.
Colonel Yeaton. I sent him many telegrams, sir.
Mr. JVIachrowicz. Did you send him one as a direct result of that
report ?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not remember, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Facher, do you have that telegram with j'Ou?
Mr. Facher. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Machrowicz. Where is it?
Mr. Facher. Which telegram are you talking about, sir?
]\Ir. Machrowicz. I am talking about the telegram which was dis-
cussed in executive session of our committee, in which Colonel Szy-
manski was very thoroughly blamed for showing anti-Soviet leanings.
Let me ask the colonel : Do you remember the telegram ? Now
that I have refreshed you as to the text of the telegram, do you re-
member at any time sending a telegram or a cable to Cairo after re-
ceipt of these reports ?
Mr. Facher. Mr. Machrowicz, may I interrupt just a second?
I believe the contents of that telegram are still classified as to the
personal information.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not agi'ee with you. Of course, the only rea-
son it is classified is that it is embarrassing to someone in the Depart-
ment. And I think it is about time we found out.
Mr. Mitchell. To bring us up to date on that particular phase of it,
when we returned to Chicago, we had that executive session with Mr.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1929
Korth. I believe Mr. Shackelford was there, too, at that time. Then
we departed for Europe. I am still waiting to see what they are going
to do about that.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not think we want to wait any longer.
Did you at that time think that Colonel Szymanski, because of this
report, showed too much anti-Soviet tendencies ?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever tell him so ?
Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to ask the chairman now that that
wire should be brought to the attention of the committee. I think we
have waited long enough,
Mr. Flood. May I interrupt ? I have no objection to that, but may
I say this : If you will yield for a question on the same thing
Mr. Machrowicz. I will be glad to yield.
Mr. Flood. Do you remember. Colonel, drafting a cable or a wire
or an order to Colonel Szymanski at Cairo, for General Strong or
anybody else to Colonel Szymanski? Do you remember drafting
sucli a statement advising Colonel Szymanski that his attitude was
too anti-Soviet?
If you do not remember doing it yourself, on your own order, do
you remember doing it on the order of General Strong, for General
Strong, to Colonel Szymanski, advising him that, in the opinion of
General Strong, Szymanski's conduct was too anti-Soviet ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't ever remember that phrase ; no, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Let us fix the date of that now.
Where were you in December 19-lo, and what were you in charge of,
and would you be responsible for drafting such a telegram or cable?
Colonel Yeaton. December 1943 I was chief of the European unit.
That is all of Europe, Middle East, and Africa.
Mr. Mitchell. Europe, Middle East, and Africa. The Middle
East would be Cairo.
Colonel Yeaton. If such a telegram originated in the Eastern Eu-
ropean section — and a draft would have — it would have passed across
my desk as a matter of information.
Mr. Flood. Do you remember?
Colonel Yeaton. I remember there was a telegram sent out at that
time, but the anti-Soviet part of it, I don't remember any such remark
as that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, as I remember, the only reason
Mr. Shackelford did not want to declassify that cablegram was be-
cause he thought it might be injurious to Colonel Szymanski.
_ Colonel Szymanski has advised this committee that he has no objec-
tion to that cablegram being declassified. I think it is important that
we ought to have it.
Chairman Madden. It is my understanding that the Department of
Defense has already gone on record that any matter connected with
the Katyn problem is declassified. Is not that correct ?
Mr. Facher. I believe there are still some aspects of it, sir, which
we furnish you on a classified basis, but we do furnish them.
Chairman Madden. Why would this particular telegram be
classified ?
Mr. Facher. To the best of my recollection, sir, I think, as Con-
gressman Machrowicz stated, it was because of some derogatory in-
1930 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
formation. I Avas not present at the executive session; so I can't
speak first-hand.
Mr. Machrowicz. Colonel Szymanski feels just as I do, and as
overy member of this committee thinks ; that anything derogatory in
there is not derogatory to him ; it is rather complimentary, even though
the Department thought he was too anti-Soviet. And Colonel Szy-
manski is perfectly willing to have it declassified.
Now, if it is embarrassing to the Department, that does not bother
me at all. It should not be classified if it is embarrassing to the
Department.
Mr. Flood. I think it should be declassified, no matter who it em-
barrasses, Szymanski or the Department.
Chairman Madden. What reason does the Department give for not
presenting it to us ?
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Chairman, I remember that. I can remember
the circumstances. Part of the cablegram had to do with recommen-
dations that Szymanski had made with reference to intelligence, and
the Department did not want to declassify it because they have now
followed his recommendations. They did not want to reveal what
the intelligence was.
Chairman Madden. Could the telegram be presented now?
Mr. Facher. I believe the telegram is still classified, sir; but we
will check it over, and if it can be declassified we will provide it to
the committee. I am not sure the operational aspects were included
in the same telegram.
Mr. Sheeiian. They were not included but referred to.
iNIr. Facher. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask if there is any reason that you know
why that section relating to the Dei)artment of Defense, relative to
Colonel Szymanski, cannot be declassified if he consents to it?
Mr. Facher. Not to my personal knowledge, sir. "However, I am
not an Intelligence officer.
Mr. Sheehan. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Sheehan. Part of the telegram that the "War Department
wanted declassified was the part of the telegram that was derogatory
toward Colonel Szymanski. Without revealing the othei- part of it,
it would put the colonel in a bad light, and the committee members in
executive session felt it should not l)e revealed unless the entire cal)lo-
gram was revealed.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman, who has the authority to classify or
declassify?
May I ask the colonel that question: Who has the authority, who
does the classifying and declassifying?
Colonel Yeaton. The originating officer does the classifying. Any
declassifying must be done by a special branch in the Intelligence
Department.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Does that come from the Chiefs of Staff, or is that
down in a lower echelon ?
Colonel Yeaton. There is another section down in the Joint Staff,
that is also involved in all War Department document declassification ;j
yes, sir.
But matters that pertain only to G-2, they have their own sectionl
that has that jiower.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1931
Mr. Sheehan. Mr, Chairman, if I may make an observation there,
Avliich is not my own, but, as someone else stated, the doctors are able
to bnry their mistakes and the military classify them "Top secret."
Mr. Machrowicz. I think, ]Mr. Chairman, it is abont time now we
make some decision on that cablegram. I think it is important. We
have waited a long time for it.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I will take up the matter with the
War Department Counselor's office and I will straighten it out before
our next set of hearings. We will get it into the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, Counsel, that was on March 14. This is now
June 4. March 14 to June 4 seems to me like a sufficient lengfh of time
for them to make up their minds as to what they are going to do with
this.
The problem is very simple. I see no reason why they should be
the sole judges as to whether a cablegram of this type should be
declassified.
]Mr. Mitchell. Sir, if I recall correctly — and I think Congressman
Sheehan can check me on that — I think that in that particular cable
that was referenced, the first part of it had the derogatory remark
about Colonel Szymanski, and then the other part referred to some
memorandum on a military-intelligence subject that he had written.
I think the Department is primarily concerned with the reference to
the military-intelligence scheme or plan that he had recommended
previously in another memorandum, which you recall.
I think that that probably is the reason why they are having dif-
ficulty there on this.
But I agree with you.
yiv. Machrowicz. Thiee months seems to be sufficient time to resolve
the difficulty.
Mr. jNIitchell. I agree, and I will get on it right away, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show here
that whenever the word "derogatory'' with reference to Colonel
Szymanski is used they mean derogatory from the viewpoint of a
pro-Communist and not derogatorj- from the standpoint of personal
beliefs in freedom and justice.
Mr. Mitchell. I stand corrected.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Counsel, may I ask the colonel one or two
questions ?
Just before you were being cross-examined here. Colonel, you said
something to the effect that all the information on the Polish officers
was of spot-intelligence value to you as long as they were alive. Then
you went on and said that when the officers were dead the informa-
tion was not of spot-intelligence value.
Wlien did you or your section determine officially that the Polish
officers were dead and were not worth looking for any more^
Colonel Yeaton. I did not say they "were not worth looking for,"
sir. I said they were not spot intelligence any more.
Mr. Sheehan. No. You stated that when they were dead they
were not of spot intelligence.
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. When did you determine they were dead?
Colonel Yeaton. After the investigation that follov\'ed the German
broadcast.
Mr. Sheehan. What investigation?
1932 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. Red Cross.
Mr. Mitchell. The Polish Red Cross.
Mr. Sheehan. The Polish Red Cross?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you took their word for it ; did you ?
Colonel Yeaton. We took their word for it that the officers were
dead. I didn't mean by that that we didn't continue to believe G-2
and the staff on all phases of the massacre end of it, but we didn't
consider that spot intelligence.
Mr. Sheehan. I see.
Mr. Mitchell. What did G-2 do at the time of the revelation of
the Katyn Forest Massacre ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I have some questions on that.
Was that the time when a communication went out under the name
or signature of George Marshall to Colonel Szymanski asking him
to make a report on the Katyn Massacre ? Do you remember any such
telegram going out?
Colonel Yeaton. I drafted it, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You drafted the telegram ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you remember it?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. May I pursue another question along this line there?
Yesterday it was brought out that apparently our State Department
had asked the Swiss Government, as a neutral, to find out from Van
Vliet, while he was a prisoner of war, certain information.
Did G-2 take any hand in that ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't know, sir. At that time I was coordinator
of specialists. I wasn't chief of any branch and it was just before
going overseas.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Mitchell. At this time. Colonel, I would like to have you run
down the complete assignments that you had in the Office of G-2 from
the time of your return from your duties as assistant military attache
in Moscow ; your respective duty assignments and title of each position.
Colonel Yeaton. From about the middle of May 1942 to the 30th
of June 1943, 1 was Chief of the E;ist European Section.
By June 1943 the sections had grown so large that they were re-
named branches. So on July 1, 1943, until August 31, 1943, I was
Chief of the Eastern European Branch.
On September 1, 1943, I was promoted to Chief of the European
Unit, which was known before that as a theater group and then known
as a unit.
On the IGth of June, when the whole of G-2 was reorganized, the
branches, which had been up to that time geographical units, were all
of a sudden, right in the middle of the war, reorganized into func-
tional units.
Mr. MiTc^HELL, Wlien was that ?
Colonel Yeaton. That was the middle of June 1944. And at that
time the records in every one of the branches, where they had been
immediately under the supervision of a branch chief and file clerk,
were all picked np and moved down in the basement in a large room
and put in one large room.
Mr. Mitchell. Under whose order was that reorganization?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1933
Colonel Yeaton. Under General Bissell's.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know why that reorganization took place?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did it strike yon as being rather odd that such a
reorganization should take place at that particular time, June 1944?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
I didn't agree with it in principle, because I think the geographic
set-up was the more workable one.
Mr. Mitchell. Did the other officers who were in G-2 at that time
feel that this reorganization was necessary, or did they agree one way
or the other, or disagree? Wliat was the majority opinion ?
Colonel Yeaton. The majority opinion among the branch chiefs
was that the reorganization was not well timed.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there a drastic shift in the officers in charge
of these various units at that time?
Colonel Yeaton. There was. The branqh chiefs became known as
specialists.
Mr. Mitchell. Specialists in what line ? Evaluation ?
Colonel Yeaton. In the line that they had been chiefs in prior.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear of an Alfred McCormack?
Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. lAHiat was has official position in G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. When I joined G-2 early in 1942 Col. Alfred Mc-
Cormack was in charge of what was known as the Special Branch.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was the Special Branch, if you are at liberty
to say here?
Colonel Yeaton. It had to do with evaluation of crytographic
material.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive intelligence and evaluate intelligence
reports in his official capacity ?
Colonel Yeaton. I wish you would clarify "intelligence reports."
If you mean military attache reports, the answer is "No."
Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive, or was he responsible for the trans-
mission of, any reports that may have been sent in by Szymanski
cablewise, or through any other means, to G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. Responsible for the evaluation ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Did yon ever hear of a T. Achilles Polyzoides ?
Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was his position at that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. I am not sure. I would rather let the record show
it.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
How was liaison with the State Department conducted during 1942
and 1943, as far as your particular EE section was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. G-2 had a liaison branch that contacted the State
Department officially.
But the same thing was true with us as in all other departments,
there was, as the British say, an old boy liaison between departments
and like geographic branches. At that time. Ambassador Loy Hen-
93744— 52— pt. 7 8
1934 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
dei'son, I think, was in charge of the State Department Eastern Euro-
pean Section.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know any of the State Department people ?
Did they ever come to G-2 or did you liave anybody specifically
assigned from your section or unit to have liaison with the State
Department ?
Colonel Yeaton. With the Eastern European branch of State, I did
the liaisoning myself.
Mr. Mitchell. Did the question of the missing Polish officers come
up ^
Colonel Yeaton. It did.
Mr. Mitchell. With whom in the State Department?
Colonel Yeaton. I think with Ambassador Henderson, who was in
charge at that time.
Mr. Dondero. Do you mean Loy Henderson ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have liaison with the office of OWI?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
]Mr. Mitchell. Was anybody from your staff assigned to OWI?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. MiTCHELi.. Was there a section in G-2 that had liaison with
OWI, another section, or some other means?
Colonel Yeaton. Not that I know of, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
I have no further questions.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. May I have a question ?
Colonel, you just said a while ago that you knew and drafted the
cable asking Szymanski, and probably others, to make a report on
the Katyn massacre. As these reports came in, did you and your
fellow- workers evaluate these reports and come on to any off-the-
record conclusions as to who was responsible for that crime?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. Could j^ou tell us what your conclusions were, to
the best of your knowledge, at that time, as these reports started to
come in?
Colonel Yeaton. My conclusions Avere the same as Szymanski's.
Mr. O'Konski. That the Russians committed the murders?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. Was that the generally prevalent opinion around
your department, that it was the Russians that were responsible, as
these reports started to come in?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only si)eak for myself, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKK Did the Slate Dei)artment show a partieidar inter-
est in the nuirder of these Polish officers? That is, was their interest
jn this phase of international relations more keen than the average
observations in their visits with you?
Colonel Yeaton. I think the peak of interest came the 24 liours
following the German broadcast. Thereafter, the information on
those things came in, as you know, in small pieces, and we felt that
each little bit added another brick to the wall.
lint witliin itself it was only a matter of vital importance for the
record.
The reason I sent that telegram to Szymanski was I felt ])erfectly
certain that at some future date there would be an investigation, and
THE 5ATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1935
I was doing everything' I could at the time to see that my files were
>() complete that when that day came, my office certainly would not
})e subject to criticism.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. That is all.
Thank you, Colonel.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, you stated that you carried on the liaison
with the State Department yourself. Do you remember in 1942 or
1943, when the question of the missing Polish officers came up, whether
you gave any opinion to the State Department as to your opinion, as
you expressed it, that the Russians were guilty?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not give any official opinion ; no, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Unofficial ?
Colonel Yeaton. I undoubtedly expressed myself unofficially.
Mr. Sheehan. I would like to go back a little bit.
In your testimony here in the early part, when you stated that
wdien you were called into G-2 you were asked to prepare a documen-
tary project paper that you prepared on Russia, you said that at the
time Russia was the only country in which G-2 did not have the par-
ticular documentary knowledge; is that right?
Colonel Yeatox. So far as I know ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did we have documentary knowdedge on England?
Colonel Yeaton. Oh, yes, sir. We have volumes on it.
Mr. Sheehan. And France?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the xlrmy intelligence was in the
peculiar position of having documentary evidence and information
about every country in the world, including our close allies, except
Russia?
Colonel Yeaton. That is almost a true statement, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It is a sort of reflection, I think, on Army intelli-
gence, with Russia being what it is, as big a country as it is, that
nobody ever bothered to find a lot of evidence about it and a lot of
security information.
Colonel Yeaton. We were trying, sir.
Mr. Dondero. I think Colonel, the reason why you did not get it is
that the Russians saw to it that you did not get it.
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir.
Mr. DoxDERO. I have just one question.
In what manner was the liaison relationship conducted between G-2
and State Department ? Was it by messenger, or by mail ?
Colonel Yea'jox'. By officer liaison.
Mr. DoNDERO. In other words, if you had documents to send over,
it was done by a person; is that right?
Colonel Yeaton^. That is right, sir; so that the document w^ould
be recorded out and in at the State Department, so that there would
be no question. If they raised the question, "We did not see the
document,'" we could point to the record and show where they had
received it.
Mr. DoNDERO. The State Department, I assume, had the same pro-
cedure ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dondero. That is all.
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question along those lines, Colonel.
1936 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
In other words, if any document was turned over to the Depart-
ment of State by your department, you had something in writing,
a receipt, to show that that actually was done ?
Colonel Yeaton. Out of my branch ; yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have anything to show that these reports
of Colonel Szymanski were turned over to the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. It has been admitted yesterday already that there
was nothing showing in the department wliich was of a nature to
indicate that the Van Vliet report was received in the Department of
State also.
Mr. Flood. I have listened to this thing for a couple of days, or a
day and a half. I would like to say that if there is any evidence, any
place, anywhere, anyhow, of any kind, that information was trans-
mitted to the Department of State, I would be as anxious to find out
as anybody else.
And I have tried hard to find it out. I cannot find a scintilla of
evidence that the State Department was apprised of this documentary
reporting from anybody.
I think it is about time we stopped this torturing every phrase to
try and establish that the State Department had this information.
Now, if they got it, I want to know. If they did not get it, let us
stop this business.
The Defense Department made a mistake or an error, deliberately
or inadvertently, in my judgment. These reports did not get to the
State Department.
Now, if they did, I want to see how they got there, who took them
there, and where are the receipts. The evidence, in my opinion, and
only in my opinion — I am only saying in my opinion — shows very
clearly that this information did not get to the Department of State ;
why, I do not know.
Now, let us find that out. We are wasting time, if there was
deliberate conspiracy, inadvertence, stupidity, negligence, or anj^-
thing else, in any of the various areas of the Defense Department,
if the reports should have gotten to the State Department, why did
they not?
Let us do away with this business of spending all week trying to
find out did the State Department hide this or conspire with the
Defense people to prevent these reports from getting there, or con-
spire with somebody to steal them or destroy them to protect Russia.
I think we have knocked ourselves out trying to prove that, and we
have not done so. If we have not, let us start on it right now and
prove it.
But if we are satisfied that it cannot be proved, let us stop this
whipping-boy business of the State Department and find out what
was wrong in the Department of Defense, if we can. If we cannot
find that out, let us stop this.
Mr. Machrowicz. I concur 100 percent with the Congressman.
I wanted to say that I would bo the first to criticize the De]iart-
ment of State for neiilectinc: to do soniethinii it should have done.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1937
But I have been looking in vain for one iota of testimony to show
that any of this information whicli the Department of Defense ob-
tained was turned over to the Department of State. If I am wrong,
tlie Department of Defense should liave an opportunity to present
such proof. If they cannot do so, let us forget it now. Let us not
Jvcep on sniping at somebody who quite obviously is not at fault.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Flood, I would like to bring you up
to date now, that Mr. Madden has appointed a subcommittee, consist-
ing of Congressman O'Konski, Congressman Machrowicz, and Con-
gressman Sheehan, to meet with the State Department officials tomor-
row to go over the files and any records they may have concerning the
missing Polish officers or the Katyn affair. They are going to do that
tomorrow morning.
I agree with your statement.
Mr. Flood. That is all right with me. If you want to go to the
Bureau of Mines or the Department of Aginculture, go ahead, but
let us get this thing cleaned up one way or the other. It is going on
like Tennyson's Brook, going no place.
Chairman INIadden. Let me suggest that although Congressman
Sheehan and Congressman Machrowicz, and Congressman O'Konski
are to investigate the records of the State Department, in which the
State Department stated they would be glad to cooperate in any way,
let me suggest that any other member of the committee that wants
to accompany them on this investigation is at liberty to do so.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, can I ask Mr. Facher whether
he can have that cable that we are talking about here this afternoon.
Mr. Facher. I will try, sir.
Mr. Machroavicz. You have been trying since March 14. That is
such a simple thing. It should take exactly 5 minutes, not 3 months.
I am a little bit tired of this "trying" and this informing witnesses
not to cooperate with the committee. I will bring that out if it is
necessary, too.
Chairman Madden". Will you have Mr. Shackelford come over here
this afternoon ?
Mr. Facher. Yes, sir.
(The following letter and cablegram are herewith placed in the
record by the counsel, John J. Mitchell :)
Department of the Army,
Office of the Department Counselor,
Washington, June 4, 1952.
Hon. Ray J. Madden,
Chairman, House Select Committee To
Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Madden : I am inclosing herewith a copy of the telegram of Decem-
ber 19, 194.3, which your committee requested at the hearing held in Washington
this morning, .Tune 4. This telegram has remained classified because it contains
personal information concerning an individual member of the Army. As such
it was treated in confidence, in accordance with Department of the Army policy
to treat efficiency reports and similar personal information as confidentiai.
Upon assurance of your committee that the individual named in this telegram
has no objection to the information being made public, I have had the telegram
declassified.
Sincerely yours,
F. Shackelford, Department Counselor.
1938 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Headquarters
U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East
MESSAGE FORM
IN COMING
[Paraphrase]
No. 8623 for AMSME from WAR
DATE: Dec. 19, 1943.
RECD: Dec. 19, 1943.
DECD: Dec. 20, l&i3.
Cite WDGBI from Strong for Osmun Jicame. AMSME 9965.
Proposed by Szmanski in his draft dated October 30tli project of setting iip'
Joint Polish Intelligence Agency is disapproved. Reference the above radio
his visit to London is disapproved. Szynianski is being appointed Milo with the
Poles and is being relieved as AMA. Answering Jicame 58 Szyraanski is under
your control as far as Collection Intelligence is concerned. Regarding his im-
mediate future in that connection all decisions are up to you. As now operating
there is confidence here in the Jicame set-up. Szymanski should accompany
them, if and when Poles move into other Theatre and report to MID through
its representative in the New area. His work has been only satisfactory because
of small volume and much duplication of information previously received from
the Poles in the opinion of the Military Intelligence Department. Further-
more frequently expressed opinions show bias opinion in favor of Polish group
which is Anti-Soviet. Instruct him to avoid political involvement and recom-
mend you require him to concentrate on Liaison with Poles.
ULIO TAG
Classification Changed To Unclassified, Security Information.
Bv authority of The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Bv Date 4 June 19.52.
JICAME for ACTION. ( JA)
Distribution 1-AG, l-G-2.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think it is about time tlie Department of De-
fense slionld be instructed they have no rio-ht to interfere with wit-
nesses and tell them not to divulo^e information to the committee. If
there is any question about that, let us make that clear right now.
If anybody wants information on that, I will give it to them.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
We want to thank you for your testimony here this morningv
Colonel Yeaton.
Is there anything further?
Mr. Mitchell. I have nothing further of the colonel.
Chairman Madden. We thank you for your testimony, Colonel.
Boris Olshansky.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is Mrs. J. P. Feeley, an official
interpreter for the committee.
Will you kindly swear her in, please?
Cliairman Madden. Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret
the testimony to be given by the witness truthfully, so help you God?
Mrs. Feeley. I do.
(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman through the inter-
preter, as follows :)
Chairman Madden. Mr. Olshansky, will you raise your right hand,
please?
Do you solemnly SAvear that in the hearing now being held, you
will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help '
you God? I
Mr. Olshansky. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE 1939
TESTIMONY OF BORIS OLSHANSKY (THKOUGH MRS. J. P. FEELEY,
INTERPRETER)
Mr. Mitchell. Will yoii state your full name for the record, please ?
Mr. Olsiiansky. Boris Olshansky.
Chairman Maddex. Will you kindl}'^ spell it out?
Mr. MncHELL. B-o-r-i-s 0-1-s-li-a-n-s-k-y.
Where were you born, Mr. Olshansky ?
Mr. Olshansky. I was born in Voronezh, U. S. S. R.
Mr. Mitchell. When were you born?
Mr. Olshansky. I was born on the 5th of August 1910.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you educated?
Mr. Olshansky. I was educated in Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. What schools did you attend ?
Mr. Olshansky. I attended high school in Voronezh and the State
University of Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. In what did you specialize at the state university?
Mr. Olshansky. In mathematics.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you, Mr. Olshansky, on September 1,
1939?
Mr. Olshansky. In Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing in Voronezh on September
1,1939?
Mr. Olshansky. I was associate professor at the Voronezh State
University, in the department of mathematics.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you remain in this position?
Mr. Olshansky. I held this position for 2 years.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you enter the Russian Army?
Mr, Olshansky. In September 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank and position in the Russian
Army ?
Mr. Olshansky. I was a staff officer of the armj' then, and I was a
major in the Engineering Corps.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and the committee, the witness has
informed me that he would like to make a brief statement as to his
position and service in the Russian Army covering the period 1941
through 1946.
Will you make a brief statement covering your time and service in
the Russian Army for the ])eriod 1941-46?
Mr. Olshansky. From 1941 and until 1942 I was a staff officer in
the Southwestern Army,
From the summer of 1942 until 1943, I took part in the Stalingi'ad
operations, and from 1943 until 1944, I took part in Bielo-Russian
operations under Marshal Rokosovsky.
Then from 1944 until the end of the war, I was in the same opera-
tions under Marshal Zhukov, and he was with the Fifth Army then.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you leave the Russian Army, and where ?
Mr. Olshansky. I left the army after the war ended, and I stayed
in Berlin, Germany.
From 1946 until the end. of 1947 I was inspector of a section of
German people's education under Soviet military administration, and
besides, I was a teacher of the Russian schools in Berlin at the same
time.
;1940 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. When you say Russian schools, do you mean the one
that was established after the war ?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes. Those schools were established after the
war under Soviet military administration.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you know Professor Burdenko, or Dr.
Burdenko, who was the head of the Soviet extraordinary state special
committee to investif^ate the Katyn Forest massacre ?
Mr. Olshansky. My father was a doctor, and he was a good friend
of Professor Burdenko from 1919. From 1919 until 1923, Professor
Burdenko and my father were together in Voronezh.
After that Professor Burdenko left for Moscow, but he kept his
friendship with my father and my family.
My father died in 1929, but every time I visited Moscow I visited
Professor Burdenko. And Professor Burdenko helped me to finish my
education and he helped me financially.
I saw Burdenko before the war for the last time in 1936. From
1936, Professor Burdenko was personal physician in the Kremlin and
he was the physician of Stalin, too.
In 1939 Professor Burdenko had to join the party. Professor Bur-
denko Avas an outstanding scientist, and he was a member of the old
Union Academy of Sciences.
During the war, I met Professor Burdenko in 1944 in Gomel. I
was wounded then in the hospital, and Professor Burdenko was sent
there for inspection. At that time. Professor Burdenko was the chief
surgeon of the Red Army, and he had the rank of lieutenant general
of the Medical Corps, which was the highest rank assigned in the
Medical Corps.
As far as the Katyn massacre was concerned, I could not discuss
that problem in the hospital. I could not discuss the matter as there
w^ere too many strangers. So we just interchanged several sentences,
as far as my house was concerned.
I heard about the Katyn massacre from the Soviet press at the
beginning of 1944. I didn't have any doubts right from the beginning
that it was one of the Soviet tricks. My opinion was shared by many
officers of the army with whom I was very friendly. AVhen I got into
Poland with the army of Marshall Rokosovsky, I heard from the
Polish people the same opinion, and I developed a great desire to find
out the truth of that matter.
I left Berlin at the end of April 1946 for Moscow. I was traveling
to the assignment for 5 days, and I made it my point to visit Professor
Burdenko, wlio was sick at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Where?
Mr. Olshansky. In Moscow.
At that time, Professor Burdenko was the president of the Academy
of Medical Science of the U. S. S. R.
Mr. Mitchell. This was in 1946?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes ; it was at the end of xVpril 1946.
Mr. ISIiTciiELL. 1946?
Ml-. Olshansky. 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. Proceed.
Mr. Olshansky. And Pi-ofessor Burdenko was a member of the
Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. At the time when I went to visit
Professor Burdenko, he was sick and he didn't take mucli part in any
activities. Professor Burdenko was 67 years old at that time. He,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1941
ipceived me at his apartment on Iverskoy-Imskoy Street in Moscow.
When I visited Professor Burdenko, he was wearing his general's
coat then and, to all appearances, it seemed that he was a well man.
Knowing that he was not feeling well, I did not want to prolong onr
conversation, which lasted, in all, 40 minutes. After ^everal sentences
of usual conversation, I asked him on the matter of Katyn.
Professor Burdenko answered that there was nothing to think about
it ; that Katyns existed and are existing and will be existing. Anyone
who will go and dig up things in our country, Eussia, would find a lot
of things, that we had to straighten out the protocol given by the
Germans on the Katyn massacre,
]Mr. Flood. By the German protocol, do you mean the German
report and conchisions on their investigation of the Katyn massacre ,*^^
is that what you mean ?
Mr. Olshanskt. Yes. It is the German report.
Mr. Flood. And the German protocol, the German report, concluded
that the Russians committed the crime ?
Mr. Glshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko meant by clearing up the German
protocol was that the Russians had to file some kind of a report
showing that the Germans did it ; is not that what you mean ?
Mr. Olshansky. There was a special commission established by
Burdenko.
Mr. Flood. To prove that the Germans did it ?
Mr. Olshansky, Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you go on about your conversation with
Professor Burdenko ?
Mr. Olskaxsky. I repeat the statement I made previously. He
said that Katyns are existing, and would be existing, if you would be
digging out in the country of Russia.
Now I repeat the words of Professor Burdenko, who later said,.
"I was appointed by Stalin personally to go to the Katyn place. All
the corpses were 4 years old."
And Professor Burdenko said. "For me, as a medical man, this
problem was quite clear. Our NKVD friends made a mistake." Such
were the words of Professor Burdenko, which proved what I sup-
posed before.
I did not ask him why he signed the protocol because for every
Soviet citizen it was obvious — he had to lose his head if he would
not have signed it. I left Professor Burdenko, and he wished me
all the luck in the West, as he mentioned it, and then I heard that
he died in November 1946.
Mr. Flood. This Professor Burdenko was the chief of the Russian
medical mission which investigated the Katyn massacre, was he?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. And this commission made an investigation at Katyn
and filed a report that the Germans committed the crime ?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko, as the chief of the Russian medical
mission, signed the report, did he not?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Do you want us to believe now that in your conversation
with Professor Burdenko, as you have described it, do you construe-
1942 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Professor Biirdenko's conversation as a complete repudiation by
Professor Burdenko of the Russian report?
Mr. Olshansky. When Professor Burdenko signed the report he
knew that the crime was committed by the NKVD.
Mr. Flood. Did Professor Burdenko say that the Polish officers, in
his judgment, had been killed by the Russian NKVD?
Mr. Olshansky. He stated it himself, that in being a doctor
himself he didn't have any doubt at all.
Mr. Flood. Doubt about what ?
Mr. Olshansky. That the Russian NKVD conniiitted the crime.
Mr. Flood. That is all.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you go fi'om Moscow?
Mr. Olshansky. From Moscow 1 returned to my work in Berlin.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you stay in the Berlin zone?
Mr. Olshansky. I was in Kai'lshorst from 1948, and after that I
escaped with my family and I became a political refugee.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you enter the western zone ?
Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in Regensburg to the American military
government, and I got protection from the American authorities and
the right for immigration.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you arrive in the United States?
Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in the States on January 2, 1952.
Mr. Flood. Did anybody promise you anything to come here to
testify?
Mr. Olshansky. Nobody promised anything, but I consider it my
moral duty.
Mr. Flood. Are you a voluntary witness, or were you subpenaed?
Mr. Mitchell. I will answer that. He is a voluntary witness, sir.
Mr. Flood. I have just one more question.
Is it not true that Professor Burdenko, or Colonel General Bur-
denko, the chief of the Medical Corps of the Russian Army, was also,
from time to time, the personal physician of Stalin?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Flood. That is all.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Sheehan ?
Mr. Sheehan. No.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Mr. Flood. We appreciate your interest in these proceedings, Mr.
Olshansky, and we are grateful to you for taking the time to come
here and give us the advantage of this very important testimony.
Mr. Olshansky. I repeat again that it is my moral duty.
Mr. Flood. The committee will now recess, to reconvene subject to
call of the Chair.
(Thereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene
subject to call of the Chair.)
THE KATYN FOKEST MASSACKE
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1952
House of Representati\t:s,
The Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington^ D. C.
The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 1301,
House Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman), presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Dondero, OTvonski, and
Sheehan,
Also present: John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select com-
mittee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Maddex. The committee will come to order.
I might say that the hearings this week will terminate the investiga-
tions of the Katyn committee.
A year ago in September, Congress authorized the creation of this
special committee for the purpose of determining officially the guilt
of the nation responsible for the massacring of approximately 14,000
Polish soldiers and intelligentsia at the beginning of World War II.
This connnittee started hearings in October a year ago, and when
Congress reconvened in January we held hearings in Washington
•and Chicago in February and March, and in March the Congress
authorized our committee to go abroad and complete our hearings.
The members of tlie committee decided last June that it was essential
that we file an interim rej^ort as to the No. 1 purpose of the committee,
which was to determine the guilt of the nation committing these mas-
sacres.
The Katyn Massacre is the only international crime in world history
where two nations disputed the guilt. There have been a great num-
ber of international crimes in history, but the world always knew
the nation that was responsible, except in the case of the massacre of
the Polish soldiers and intellectual leaders at Katyn.
In order to file our report with the Congress before adjournment
last July, the committee decided to file an interim report dealing with
the guilt of the nation responsible for the massacre. In our report
which I have just mentioned, we unanimously decided that the testi-
mony revealed tliat the Soviet Government, beyond any doubt or
question wliatsoever, was responsible or guilty for the massacring of
these Polish soldiers and intelligentsia.
At the time this committee was created. Members of Congress were
very much interested in what happened to certain reports that were
filed immediately after the finding of these bodies at Kaytn. These
reports disappeared.
Also, there were a number of questions by the Members of Congress
at the time this resolution was on the floor of the House, regarding
1943
1944 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the operation of the Nuremberg trials. That is tlie reason why we are
ho](lin<jj hearings here this weeK.
We have ah^eady had several witnesses in our former hearings
testify regarding these reports, but the witnesses that will be heard
this week will further elaborate for the information of the com-
mittee as to what happened to these reports.
Mr. Justice Jackson was very cooperative to volunteer testimony this
morning as to information regarding the Nuremberg trials.
I also wish to commend the members of the committee for the out-
standing work they have done on the hearings both here and abroad.
The work of the committee has been difficult and its success can be
attributed to the nonpartisan and diligent work of the committee
members.
After the hearings this week, the committee will complete its report
on the second phase of the hearings, to wit, the disappearance of the
files and testimony regarding Nuremberg. We will make our final
report to Congress before the end of the year on this phase of the
hearings.
I might further state that in the filing of our interim report, the
committee made four recommendations to the Congress of the United
States, which were unanimous:
No. 1, requesting that the President of the United States forward
the testimony, evidence, and findings of this committee to the United
States delegates at the United Nations.
No. 2, requesting, further, that the President of the United States
issue instructions to the United States delegates to present the Katyn
case to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
No. 3, requesting that the appropriate steps be taken by the General
Assembly to seek action before the International World Court against
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for committing a crime a^
Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations, and.
No. 4, requesting the President of the United States to instruct the
United States delegation to seek the establishment of an international
commission which would investigate other mass murders and crimes
against humanity.
Judging from the revelations and the testimony that this committee
has revealed regarding the Katyn massacre, I believe all members of
the committee and possibly all Members of Congress will cooperate
with the members of this committee to investigate other massacres and
violations of international law which have been committed in Korea.
I believe that every member of this connnittee would pursue the
work that ^ye have started to see if something camiot be done to arouse
world public opinion against international bi-igandry, barbarism, and
lawlessness of this kind.
If any othei- members have anything to say, we w^ill be glad to iiear
them. Otherwise, we can proceed with the testimony.
In order to finish the hearings this week, we decided to have hear-
ings today, wliich is Armistice Day. The commitfec and the peo])le
in the room will stand for a minute to pay tribute to the war dead.
(An interval of silence.)
Chairman Madden. Let me say that under the rule in the House of
Representatives, we do not wish to have photographs taken while the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1945
witness is testifying. If any photographer here woukl like to take
pictures at this time, it is agreeable with the witness and also with the
committee.
Mr. Justice, is it agreeable with you to take some pictures now?
ISIr. Justice Jackson. Yes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Chairman Madden. For the purposes of the record, Mr. Justice,
would you state your name and your title?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Robert H. Jackson. At the present time I am
associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I was repre-
sentative and chief of counsel for the United States at the Nuremberg
prosecutions, at the international trial only.
Chairman Madden. Do you have a statement you wish to read ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I told your counsel that I would pre-
pare a statement, with dates as exact as I could get them, so that it
would be as accurate as possible. I have such a statement, which is
being handed to your counsel and, if there is no objection on the part
of the committee, it will be given to the press. It has not been dis-
tributed so far.
Chairman Madden. That is satisfactory.
Will you now proceed with your statement, please?
Mr. Justice Jackson. The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has
not been adjudged by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and inquiry into it is
not inconsistent with the position taken by the United- States prosecu-
tion at the Nuremberg international trial of Goering and others.
It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the
United States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all
decisions and actions in reference to the Katyn atrocity and the reasons
which conduced to them.
The first step that seems pertinent was an agreement to divide pri-
mary responsibility for preparation and presentation of the case
among the prosecutors representing the four Allied Powers. This was
intended to fix on someone responsibility for covering each part of the
case, to avoid duplication, and to expedite a trial of unprecedented
complexity.
To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite
and wage a war of aggression. The British were assigned the viola-
tion of specific treaties and crimes on the high seas. Violations of
the laws of war and crimes against humanity were divided on a
geographical basis. The French undertook crimes in western Europe,
and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of preparing and
presenting evidence of crimes in eastern Europe — an area largely
in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us had no
access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet repre-
sentatives included Katyn Wood and Poland as Avell, but at that time
it was not known that the Katyn massacre would be involved.
The first proposal that the Nuremberg trial should take up examina-
tion of the Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during
the drawing of the indictment. Preliminary drafts w^ere negotiated
in London at a series of conferences where I was represented, but not
1946 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
personally present. At the last London meeting, tlie Soviet prosecutor
included among crimes charged in the east the following :
In September 1941, 925 I*olish officers who were prisoners of war were killed in
the Katyn Forest near Smolensli.
Both British and American representatives protested, but they
finally concluded that, despite their personal disapproval, if the
Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were entitled to do so
under the division of the case.
Tlie indictment was brought to Berlin for final settlement and
filing, where I objected to inclusion of the charge and even more
strongly when, at the last moment, the Soviet delayed its filing by
amending the Katyn charge to include 11,000 instead of 925 victims.
However, it was in the Soviet part of the case and they had inves-
tigated Katyn; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what
we knew of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of
Poland, it did not seem unlikely that this was part of their program,
and the Soviet claimed to have adequate evidence of Nazi guilt.
While we did not feel justified in preventing the issue, we warned
the Soviet delegation that we did not have evidence to support the
charge nor time nor opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave
the entire contest to the Soviet and German lawyers.
The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to
participate in its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict
in several respects with what I considered to be sound trial policy
for the first such case in history. It was not based upon any convic-
tion in my own mind about the truth or falsity of the charge. I
knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that both
were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to
commit it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each
toward Poland. Whatever the facts were, they had become overlaid
with deep layers of Nazi and Soviet propaganda and counterpropa-
ganda, and it seemed we could not at the international trial wisely
undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of separating truth
from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclusion are
four:
First, responsibility for the massacre did not appear to be capable
of documentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic
decisions on policy concerning the Nuremburg international trial was
that we should accuse only defendants whose guilt could be established
and should charge only offenses whose occurrence could be fully proved
or substantially corroborated by documentary evidence captured from
the Germans themselves.
Because this Avas the first internatioiuil criminal trial in history
and was held in the wake of war when passions were high, we did
not want any judgment that Mould rest solely on oral testimony of
witnesses whose interest, bias, memory, and truthfulness would always
be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting
matters because evidence measuring uj) to tliis standard was not then
obtainable, llowevei', that policy was so far observed thai the tribu-
nal, in its judgment, said :
Tilt' rase, thcrefoi-e. a.yainsi the (IcfciHl.-ints rcsis in a l.-iriic nicasiin' in di>c-
iinicnts (if their own nuikin;:, the antlicnl icit\ of wliicli Ims not been ( lialienyed
except in one or two cases.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1949
We had tile diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of
Poland, acknowledged by him to be authentic, saying :
We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wlierever it is
possible.
In August 1942 he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations
in Poland :
That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only mar-
ginally. It is a matter, of course, that should the Jews not starve to death it
would, we hope, result in the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures.
We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such
as the 75-page leather-bound official report by Major General Stroop
which recited the killing of men, women, and children of the Warsaw
ghetto to the exact number of 56,065, and set out the day-to-day
measures, including shooting, fire, explosion, and chemical extermina-
tion in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge, accompanied
by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency.
We had the report by SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler,
dated October 1941, of the execution of 135,567 persons in Lithuanian
area.
We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly
details of the operations in the east of gas wagons for killing
undesirables.
We also had German protests, official, but not very high minded,
against such exterminations, in one instance of 150,000 to 200,000 Jews,
and in another instance of 5,000 Jews, because it was complained they
should have been spared for use as forced labor.
Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously
dramatized it. For example, a death book of the Mauthausen con-
centration camp recorded 35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203
persons died of the same ailment, heart trouble, died at brief and regu-
lar intervals, and, more astonishingly, died in alphabetical order.
Death came first to Ackermann, at 1 : 15 a. m., and reached Zynger at
2 p. m.
Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured Ger-
man officials. One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi
extermination program had done away with 4 million persons in
concentration camps and that 2 million additional were killed by the
secret police in the east.
Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf, testified willingly, even boast-
fully, that he supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women, and
children in the eastern area.
The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center,
swore that under his regime it exterminated 3 million human beings.
This was by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities com-
mitted against the Polish people.
Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war
had placed in our hands when documents were procurable from other
sources. An example was the Nazi persecution of the church and
clergy, particularly vicious in Poland, which the Nazis documented
with the candor and thoroughness that they did persecution of the
Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were available to us, we
could have gathered evidence of the church persecution in Poland,
since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control
93744— 52— pt. 7 9
1950 THE K.\TYN FOREST AIASSACRE
where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt
the zeal of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I
sought an audience with Pope Pius, and obtained from His Holiness
the Vatican documents in which detailed evidentiary material was
already collected, and which supported the charge of religious
persecution.
As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could
turn for such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and
patriotic Poles who might become the leadership of the restoration of
Poland was provable by document to be consistent with the Nazi policy
toward Poland. Yet, while they had boasted on paper of the worst
crimes known to man, we found but one Nazi document that even
hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that being a
telegram reporting that the Polish Red Cross had found that German-
made ammunition was used in the killings.
A fourth difficulty entered into our reluctance to undertake the
Katyn murder charge as part of the Nuremberg trial. We were under
exceedingly heavy pressure to get along with the trial. A persistent
criticism in the American press during the trial was its long duration.
Of course, that is forgotten now.
Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross-examination by
several counsel, of course takes much more time than documentary
proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Nuremberg trial had
to be forthwith interpreted into three other languages. Every exami-
natio7i or cross-examination had to include any proper questions de-
sired by more than 20 lawyers representing defendants and 4 for the
prosecution, and these were trained in 5 different legal systems —
English, American, French, Russian, and German.
Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent
to which we aA'oided relying on oral proof when I remind you that
all 4 prosecutors at Nuremberg called only 83 witnesses to testify
orally on the whole case against the 20 individual defendants, and
these defendants, in addition to themselves, called only 61 witnesses.
You have already", according to your interim report, orally ex-
amined 81 witnesses on this 1 atrocity.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on
February 14, 11)46, opened tlie subject by presenting to the tribunal a
report by a Soviet extraordinary state commission of its investigation
of the Katyn crime. It recited testimony, including a good deal of
hearsay and medical data, as to the condition of the exhumed bodies.
On this, experts based opinions that the executions took place during
the period of (lei'man o('('u])ation and, theivfoi-e, that the Germans
were resj)onsible.
\h\ Stahmer, counsel for (ioering, made a ])r()nn)t request to call
Avilnesses to contradict the Soviet report, whicli occasioned some disa-
greement between the Soviet prosecutors and those rei)resenting Great
Britain and tlie United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view
that, since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the ex-
traordinary commission as a state document, it could not be contra-
dicted. Under Soviet hiw it probably could not, but would be en-
titled to faith and credit — as a jndgnient, statute, or public act would
be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature was such that it was
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1951
clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers proposed, if
the subject were opened, to call 10 witnesses. The tribunal, however,
ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact.'"
Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d
days of July 1946. What it was is a matter of record — I have cited
the record to you — and what it is worth is a matter of opinion.
At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing
and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially,
complained that they had been allowed to call only 3 of the 120 wit-
nesses that appeared liefore the Soviet commission. The tribunal,
wisely, I think, refused to hear more of the subject.
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The
tribunal did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn mas-
sacre. Neither did it expressly exonerate them, as the judgment
made no reference to the Katyn incident. The Soviet judge dis-
sented in some matters but did not mention Katyn.
This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to estab-
lish responsibility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided
by the Nuremberg tribunal or contended for by the American prose-
cution will stand in your way.
Chairman JNIadden. Does that complete your formal statement, Mr.
Justice?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
And I may say that my files supporting this are open to your coun-
sel at any time, as I think he understands.
Chairman Madden. If you have any further comments to make be-
fore the members propound questions, you are at liberty to many any
comments you desire.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Thank ^ou, Mr. Chairman.
I think that tells the story of the situation, and I will be glad to
answer any questions that the committee wishes to ask about it.
Chairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have ques-
tions ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I just finish up one part of this
now ?
Chairman ]\Iadden. Proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Jackson, will you refer to part 5 of the Katyn
Forest JNIassacre Committee hearings held in Frankfurt, Germany,
page 1537, and will you read, please, the statement of Dr. Kempner?
Mr. Justice Jackson (reading) :
Count I, conspiracy, and count II, crimes a,u;ainst peace, were handled by the
United States and by the British. Count III, war crimes, and count IV, crimes
against humanity, were divided up accordinji' to seographical regions or dis-
tricts. The French handled the war crimes and crimes against humanity as far
as Western Europe was concerned. They were, so to siieak, sp<ikesnien, the
prosecuting spokesmen, for the French, for the Dutch, for the Belgians, and
other German-occupied western territories. The Kussians were in charge of war
crimes and crimes against humanity which were allegedly committed in the
eastei-n areas, and if I say eastern areas, I mean the Soviet Union, Poland, and
at the time they handled also Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Mitchell. Your prepared statement of this morning has satis-
factorily cleared up any doubt that might be in the mind of anybody
concerning that statement ; is that correct, sir ?
1952 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think so.
Of course, there were crimes against Greece which were also in-
cluded in the eastern territory. We included some against the Lith-
uanians, Estonians, and the Baltic groups.
And while this division prevailed, it was not an absolute division,
for the reason that conspiracy to commit these crimes was the re-
sponsibility of the Americans, and in establishing the conspiracy, we
put in a great deal of evidence on those crimes ourselves, as I pointed
out.
We put in a great deal about Poland, although it was not in our
area on the crimes against humanity. It was in our area in the over-all
conspiracy charge.
So that it is a little difficult to say that a very exact division was
observed, because of the overlapping.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, for the record, I think you should
identify who Dr. Kempner is.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Dr. Kempner was a man who had been a Ger-
man lawyer and was in the employ, I believe, of the OSS. My staff
was not a staff that I hired. I borrowed the staff from other depart-
ments. I had no budget and I borrowed help. Dr. Kempner was bor-
rowed from the OSS and assisted us there throughout the trial.
He tlien took a part in the subsequent trials.
Mr. Mitchell. While participating, he was an American citizen,
was he not?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes ; I think that is the case.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you now refer to page 3 of your prepared
statement, Mr. Justice?
In paragraph 2 the statement is made that :
We would keep hands off and leave the entire contest to the Soviet and German
lawyers.
Now, there has been a great deal of talk that representatives of the
United States, members of your staff, in some way or other, by imjili-
cation or by assistance, tried to assist the Soviets in the proving of this
case. Do you, to your personal knowledge, know of any individual
who, in any way, participated in assisting the Soviets in proving this
case against the Nazis, that is, an American ?
Mr.Justice Jackson. That is a very difficult question to answer as
broadly as you have asked it.
Our captured documents were set up in a document room and our
captured documents were available to the Soviets and to the Germans.
For example, the document that the Soviets did use showing the tele-
gram about the German ammunition, that was an American-captured
document.
Our documents were available to both sides.
But that is the only document that we ever found.
Now, we did not permit the Soviets to go into our document room
and make their own selections of documents. If there was something
tliat bore on particularly their phase of the case, I suppose that some
of our people furnished them those documents.
Other than that, I know of no assistance. In fact, there was not a
^reat deal of even conferring between their staff and ours because the
Soviets are not very sociable, I might say. They hesitate somewhat
to be too much with us.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1953
Mr. Mitchell. Could you clear up for the record, please, the exact
function of General Mitchell, who was the executive secretary? I
believe it was he. Was he the American who was in control of mak-
ing arrangements for the lawyers to meet?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I cannot give you much information about
General Mitchell. He was not under my control and he was not on my
staff.
The tribunal, when it arrived, set up its own staff, and General
Mitchell was selected by somebody to represent, as general secretary —
I believe it was called — the tribunal. He did not in any way represent
me. He was not a lawyer, and I suppose any instructions that he had
came from the tribunal.
We had an American that I had asked to remain over there, Mr.
Willey, now Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, who had gone
over to help set up courts in that country. I asked him to come to-
Nuremberg to assist in the clerical work of the tribunal. The tribunal,
however, got General Mitchell and put him over all four of the repre-
sentatives.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Do you know, to your own personal knowledge,
whether any member of your staff' participated in the discussions
between the German counsel and'the Soviet counsel?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say. I think they may have been
present as observers, or something of that sort, because we were much
concerned about not having a situation that would prolong this trial.
B'ut we took no part in any arrangements between the Soviets and the
Germans about it. We thought that was their fight.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, any memlier of your staff had no specific
instructions from you to participate in preparing the case one way or
the other ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Oh, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Xo further questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, referring to the final paragraphs of
your statement, you state that :
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abancioned the charge. The tribunal
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre * * *
That is based upon the fact that there were no findings made by the
tribunal; is that correct?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Since the question has been raised at various
times, I would like to have you give us your statement as to whether
it could have been possible, if proper testimony had been adduced at
the hearing, to convict the Soviets of the crime at the Nuremberg
trial, in view of the four power nature of that tribunal?
Mr. Justice Jackson. It could not.
Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain why?
Mr. Justice Jackson. They had not been indicted.
And if you will inake reference to the very first page, you will see
that my authority was only to prepai'e and pi'osecute charges of atroci-
ties and war crimes "against such of the leaders of the European Axis
Powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States
may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an
international military tribunal.''
1954 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. So it could not have been presented at the Nurem-
berg trial.
Mr. Justice Jacksox. It surely could not have been, nor was I at
liberty to negotiate on any such subject.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at any time receive any instructions from
anyone in authority to treat the Katyn case in any other manner
than the other portions of the indictment against the Germans?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. As a matter of fact, I received very little
instruction from anybody. The thing was a lawyer's job, and I had
no instructions. If I may be so blunt as to say so, I thought that
having once gotten me into it, there was a pronounced disposition to
leave everything to me. I will not say exactly that it was to "pass the
buck," but I was in charge of it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have with you the exchange of any cables
or other messages that Avere sent prior to the presentation of the Katyn
case between you and any other representative of the United States
Government ?
Mr, Justice Jackson. There was no cable that I know of, except
the cable that I referred to, from General Clay, which I do have here.
It is classified "Secret," and perhaps should not become a part of the
record. But I should be perfectly satisfied to have the committee
see it.
Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask whether you have any recollection of
receiving a cable from Ambassador Lane in Warsaw?
Mr. Justice Jackson. This, I suppose, originated with Ambassador
Lane.
Mr. Mitchell. Could the committee see that, please?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes, certainly.
It may be a paraphrase, and may not, I don't know.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is that dated December 16, 1945?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; January 21, 1946.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to have you examine this exhibit
I have here, which purports to be a cablegi'am from Ambassador Lane
to Secretary of State Stettiiiius at Washington, with a cojjy to Berlin,
flustice Jackson, Nuremberg, bearing the date of December 16, 1945,
and I ask you whether you have a recollection of seeing that document ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say whether I ever saw that or not.
1 certainly would not say that I did not. There was a vast amount
of material pouring in on us, and we had a number of people working
on different branches of the case. I surely would not say that it
might not have come to the attention of somebody in a responsible
position with me.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember any information received from
Warsaw or Washington which would give you advice, let us say,
similar to that contained in that cablegram?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That was consistent with our attitude, and
I have no recollection of any specific inference.
Mr. Machrowicz. You referred in your statement to statements
made by Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colouel Szymanski.
I believe you referred to Colonel Szymanski, who had testilied before
this committee. Is that correct?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is Avhere I heard about it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read those statements?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; I have not.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1955
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you read the statements of witnesses that
appeared to give testimony before this committee ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I have not had time to do so.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are aware, however, that these three, Colonel
Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, did, prior u>
December 1945, make reports to the Department of the Defense in-
dicating Russian guilt for the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I am so informed now ; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Looking in retrospect, would you not think, then,
that it would have been of assistance to you had you had those reports
in your possession at the time ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, any information would have been
helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on
whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate
information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all
to have it in. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it
out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not
making the accusation.
Mr. Machrowicz. The point I wish to make is that you know now
that prior to December 1945 the United States Government did have
certain officials reports, namely, reports of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel
Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, which very strongly indicated Soviet
guilt.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I understand they had such statements.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you give us any reason that you might know
of why those reports were not made available to j'ou?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know where they were. You must
remember that communication at that time was very difficult. I do
not know where the reports may have been. I do not know what
their reasons may have been for not calling them to our attention.
Since we did not propose to go into the litigation of this issue,
they may have, knowing our attitude, thought they were not important.
I would not know what their reasons were.
Mr. Machrowicz. Referring to a remark contained on page 5 of
your statement, you state that the attitude of the Polish Government
in exile was that the case should not be presented at Nuremberg; is
that correct ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is what they concluded.
I will give you the photostats of the letter.
Mr. Machrowicz. "WHiich letter are you referring to? The letter
of the 12 Members of the Parliament ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I will give you photostats of that.
Mr. Machrowicz. General Anders did offer to testify if he was
requested to do so, by the tribunal ; is that correct ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I did not know of that until his book, as I
have said, I did not know that Stahmer, who was Goering's counsel,
had asked him to testify. I did know that Stahmer knew that these
conversations to which Anders was a party had taken place, because
the Germans filed with the tribunal a request for documents which
would show that they knew that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is there anything in these documents, Mr. Justice,
which would indicate that this communication from the members of
the Polish Parliament was sent to you as a result of instigation by the
1956 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
British authorities, or as a result of conference with the British
authorities?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No ; I do not think so. I do not recall any-
thing in it that would give that indication.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman. .
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoNDERo. Mr. Justice Jackson, there is one thing in your state-
ment that caused me to raise my eyebrows, and I am sure you may be
able to help us on it.
It is on page 4, at the bottom of the page :
Second, if we were ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary
evidence, tliis atrocity was not a suitable instance because we knew of no wit-
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpe-
trators * * *.
Now, the Nuremberg trial took place in 1945 and 1946.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. DoNDERo. There was presented to us — I will have to make this
statement to you — there was presented to this committee at Frankfurt,
Germany, what is known as a protocol or statement signed by 12
medical experts, representing at least 6 different governments of Eu-
rope, some of them neutral governments, to the effect that when the
graves of these men were discovered by the Germans they had invited
in these experts to make an examination of the bodies and to file such
statement as they saw fit.
These 12 did so at the grave site, and such statement is now known
as the protocol whicli was offered in evidence before our committee
and is now a part of the record.
Wlien we were in Euroj^e we called before us as witnesses some of
those 12, who were still living, and I recall the doctor from Denmark,
Dr. Tramsen, and Dr. Naville, from Switzerland, and Dr. Miloslavich,
of Yugoslavia.
It appeared that the other doctors who lived in the countries that
have since been taken behind the iron curtain have committed suicide,
or have died.
I do not have that statement before me, but it is dated as I recall,
in May of 1943, which would be more than 2 years before the Nurem-
berg trials.
They stated that in the protocol these Polish officers or intelligentsia
were killed, in their opinion, sometime in the autumn of 1989 or the
early part of 1940. At that time, the ground in which these bodies
were found was in possession of the Russians, and it is on Russian soil.
My question is : Did the tribunal of whicli you were a i)ait, have
before it any of that evidence either of that protocol or of the 12
doctors, representing some of the neutral nations, who made their
findings at the graves in 1948 ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. First, I would like to say that I was not a
part of the tribunal. I was a prosecutor before the tribunal.
However, we knew of that report. What the tribunal knew about
it I think Avas put in evidence by the Germans. That report was the
subject of the controversy. The Germans had their rej^tort signed by
the 12 doctoi-s. The Russians had theii- extraordinaiy commission re-
port, in which their doctors had looked at these bodies, not the same
bodies perhaps, but they had exhumed bodies, and they gave their ex-
pert opinions.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1957
Mr. DoNDERO. Was that last-named commission wholly Russian ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Now, at the request of the Germans, we located Dr. Naville, whom
I think you swore, and you will find in my statement at page 13, in
the fine print, Congressman Dondero, that the tribunal allowed him
to Goering, provided he could be located.
We found him in Switzerland, but he informed the tribunal that he
saw no use in coming as a witness for Goering. In other words, some
of these witnesses that may be available today were not going to help
Goering and his crowd. That was the attitude of General Anders.
That correspondence w^as conducted between Goering's lawyer and
General Anders, and he was not willing to come at their request.
We did not want to get into expert testimony. The Russians did
have an enormous number of alleged witnesses, and we would be there
yet if it called their 120 witnesses and the German witnesses.
The tribunal limited it to three on a side. That was not at our
request, although I may say I was greatly relieved when I found
that they had done it.
And I do not criticize them for it because, in the conditions of that
time, I do not think it would have been a profitable inquiry.
Mr. Dondero. Tlie court had been in session a considerable length
of time, I think 9 months, and it wanted to wind up its hearings and
disband.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. Now, I have one more thing.
You spolve of the German ammunition. Did the tribunal call be-
fore it any of the manufacturers of German ammunition to testify?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. There was no request from the Germans
to do so.
You will fin.d all that I know about the German ammunition in the
fine print on note 20, on page 9. There was a letter which followed,
and we never found the letter. It may be in existence. ^"NHiat the
letter would have shown, we do not know.
Mr. Dondero. The reason for asking you that question is this:
There was presented to this committee in Frankfurt, Germany, the
head, or the president of the company that made the ammunition,
with his books, showing that firm had sold ammunition to the three
Baltic States, and also to Russia some years before World War II
had broken out. That rather indicated that even though it was
German ammunition that was used in the killing of these men, there
was an explanation as to how it got into the hands of the Russians.
They had purchased it.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That piece of evidence we did not regard as
of any significance to ourselves, because of the fact that so much
ammunition changes hands. You might find American-made guns in
the hands of some of these other people. You cannot tell by the gun
that is used who shot it.
Mr. Dondero. The reason why I am inquiring of you, Mr. Justice,
regarding that protocol of the 12 doctors, is that< this committee felt
if they could fix the time that these men were killed, they could also
fix the guilt.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. And these doctors, some of them from neutral coun-
tries, signing this statement showing that they were shot either in the
1958 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
fall of 1939 or the cold months of 1940, up to May 1, indicated that
at that time Russia was in complete control of that part of her terri-
tory on which the graves were found. So that it made it almost
physically impossible for the Germans to have committed the crime.
Mr. Justice Jackson. If you fix the time of that crime, you fix the
responsibility. I fully agree.
Mr. DoNDERO. That was the opinion of this committee.
Mr. Justice Jacksox. But the difficulty, from our point of view,
about that, was that all that we had by which to fix the time was the
opinion of doctors, based on the condition of the bodies.
While I do not want to say anything disrespectful of a brother
profession, God save the man who has to prove his case by expert testi-
mony, because it is a terrible proposition.
The Russians had their doctors, too, and they called one of the
Gei'man doctors who testified.
Mr. DoNDERO. Was there anything submitted, Mr. Justice, in the
Nuremberg trial as to mute evidence found on the bodies of these men ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Except as is found in these reports.
Mr. DoNDERO. There were presented to this connnittee post cards,
letters, and other documents found in the ]X)ckets of these men. But
none of them bore a date later than May 1, 191:0.
JNIr. Justice Jackson. You had a great deal of evidence that we did
not have.
Mr. DoNUERo. That you did not have ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right; a great deal of it.
Mr. DoNDERO. There is just one thing more, and that is at the bottom
of page 4 :
The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at
Nuremberg which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters.
At that time, Mr. Justice, Warsaw was in complete control of the
Russian Government, was it not?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is correct.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. Mr. Justice, here is the conclusion of the conmiittee :
The evidence, testimony, records, and exhibits recorded by this committee
through its investigations and hearings during the last D months overwhelmingly
will show the people of the world that Russia is directly reseponsible for the
Katyn massacre.
And here is the significance :
Throughout our entire proceedings there has not been a scintilla of proof
or even any remote circumstancial evidence that could indict any other nation
In this international crime.
How many staff members did your division, or your office, have at
the Nuremberg trials ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. We had a very large number. I do not know
just what you wish to include in that. We had translators and inter-
preters. I never knew just what our staff consisted of because the
Army did a great many things in connection with it. But it was a
very large number.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would that run into the thousands?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I thiuk that at its maxinuim, including
translators, people assigned by the Army to run mimeograph ma-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1959
chines — we had to make copies in four hmguages of everything that
was used in the tribunal — I think our American personnel at its
maximum was about 750.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. This committee was made up of seven members,
and we had one counsel and one investigator. We came to this
conclusion.
Now, since the conclusion was so obvious, is it not logical to assume,
then, that either one of two things happened at Nuremberg :
No. 1. Your staff did not make a conscientious effort to get the
evidence, or
No. 2. The evidence which was available at that time was deliber-
ately withheld from your people?
Is not that a logical conclusion after listening to the conclusion
of this committee?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; that is not a logical conclusion, Mr.
OTvonski. You have used a great deal of evidence, if I rely on the
newspapers, that we could not have introduced. We could not call
a witness, for instance, who was masked so that his identity could not
be determined. We could not use that kind of testimony.
You may be entirely satisfied with evidence because you, no doubt,
know the man and know his history.
But I use that merely as an example of the availability of evidence
to a congressional committee that we could not have used in court
if we had found it. My staff was never instructed— and I take the
full responsibility for it — was never instructed to investigate this
atrocity, because, from the very beginning we told the Soviets, and
the Germans well understood it, that it was to be settled between
them.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. ]\Ir. Justice, I have one or two questions with refer-
ence to the Nuremberg trials and the Korean situation as we know
it today.
First of all, on page 6, I want to refer to two sentences in your
statement. No. 1 is :
We did not learn of any usable evidence in American possession.
No. 2 is :
I knew of nothing, at any time during the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel
•Stewart, or Colonel Szymanski.
In talking to Congressman Machrowicz a little while ago, you said
that if you had some of that evidence brought to your attention at the
trial you would not have permitted the Katyn phase of it to be put on
the indictment ; is that right ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. If that had been available to us before October
20 or the 18th — I have forgotten whether it wa.s the 18th or the 20th
that the indictment was filed — we might very well have kept this out
of the case entirely.
Mr. Sheehan. Is that 1945, or 1946?
Mr. Justice Jackson. 1945.
Mr. Sheehan. Did anyone from our State Department make any
attempt to give you a.nj evidence that they had about the Katyn situa-
tion, any material?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No.
1960 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Did anybody in the Army Intelligence, G-2, make
any attempt at any time to give you an}^ evidence that the}' had i
Mr. Justice Jackson. I have recited to you exactly what they gave
us, the date that they gave it, and I liave it in my files available to
your counsel.
Mr. Sheehax. Permit me to be sj^ecific. I mean things like the
Van Vliet report, things which have disappeared that you could not
have had.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I never heard of the Van Vliet report until I
heard it was lost.
Mr. Sheehan. Then there was Captain Gilder, who gave a report to
G-2, who was a British ofHcer who went to Katyn and testified on this
report that the Russians were guilty. Did you ever get that report?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I never got that report.
Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, should not an attempt have been made by
our American officials in the State Department, the executive, or the
G-2, to bring to your attention all the evidence they had, such as
reports from military attaches, ambassadors, and so forth?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I am not prepared to criticize them.
Mr. Sheehan. It is not criticism; I just called it to your attention.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It would be criticism if I said they should
liave brought it to my attention, and did not.
You have to remember the conditions at that time. The Army was
closing up a war over there. I am not going to criticize the other
services.
If I had known of and asked for something and they had withheld it
from me, then I should criticize them. But the fact that they did not
bring something to my attention that now would appear to have been
useful to have had — you see, we had so much. We had over 100.000
documents that my staff screened out. We translated over 5,000 doc-
uments and put in evidence over 4,000 documents, making our
documentary case.
It is hard to say that they were under any criticism because they
did not produce it. That is a conclusion for the committee to draw,
and not for me to say.
Mr. Sheehan. I might only remark on that, Mr. Justice, that if we
waited for some of these documents to come from G-2 and the State
Department we would be in the same mess you fellows were in in
Nuremberg. We get Avhat we are looking for specifically, and we
fight for them.
Now, I will ask my other question.
As you can well see, the Nuremberg trials have had an effect on this
Katyn investigation, and our committee has gone on record rather
informally that the Congress should do something about the Korean
pro})lem, because we have found our American soldiers murdered in
much the same manner as tlie Polish soldiers were, with their hands
tied behind their backs and with a single bullet hole. Some of us
have concerned ourselves about the international military tribunal, the
l)recedent you men set up in London and Nuremberg. So that some of
the questions our committee is interested in come from that particular
angle, and I would like to phrase them to you in this way :
No. 1, I want to ask about the precedent that you set up at Nurem-
berg. When I say "you,'' I mean the Nuremberg trials, the Int.«i'-
uatioiial Militarv Tribunal.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1961
We have heard much in the hist couple of months and several years
of guilt by association, and you have personal feelings on that, I
assume.
However, in State Department Document 3080, you point out — and,
if you want, I will read it to you — that the purpose of the Nuremberg
trials was only to find certain organizations guilty so, by the same
token, you can then find a lot of individuals guilty.
Is that a good legal and moral premise ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is not the premise that I stated,
Mr. Sheehan. Just so that we may know the interpretation, may I
read 3^our direct quotation there '.
Mr. Justice Jackson. You can take thinks out of context.
Mr. Sheehan. No; I will read the whole paragraph. All right,
whatever you like.
This is document published by the State Department, No, 3080,
which was the stenographic record of the report of the London Con-
ference which set up the International Military Tribunal. Yon are
the author of this particular document, and the quotation I have here,
according to the document, is :
I have never thoii.sht of this as a permanent tribunal. The whole American
plan which was professed here was designed to reach a very large number of
people at a single trial, or. at most, perhaps a very few trials. That is the
reason we have tried to reach people through organizations. We have not
thought of it as a trial of Iri or .30 people, but we have thought of it as a trial
the result of which would affect thousands of people at least.
And in your direct testimony here you said you only heard from 13
oral witnesses.
Do you think this procedure of indicting a couple of organizations
and indicting all the people per se is a proper legal and moral thought?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Not if you put it that way. That is not what
we did ; that is not what we proposed to do.
I can explain it to you if you care to have the explanation.
Mr. Sheehan, Yes,
Mr, Justice Jackson. Certain organizations, such as the SS, the
SA, the Grestapo, were founded for certain purposes. Men joined those
well knowing their purposes. We did not propose to start out to
find each individual and have each individual try the question of the
character of his party.
That is one of the difficulties that is inherent in the present situation
in the United States in which in each individual case involving Com-
munists you are going over the same old material about the central
core of the party and its teachings and what they mean.
We proposed to put the organization on trial and ascertain its pur-
poses, its character, and have that declared. Anyone who showed any
interest in it should have the right to come in and make a defense
of the organization; but, once that had been found, the individual
could not thereafter say, "Well, it is true I joined it; I participated,
but it was an innocent organization."
But what he could say was, "It is true I joined it, but I had a gun
at my back," or "I was defrauded into it; I did not understand it."
But the central core of guilt or innocence of the party, the group
of the SA and the Gestapo, we proposed to dispose of in one trial.
And I think yon will find that was explained clearly throughout
those London proceedings.
1962 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Now, those proceedinfrs took place before we knew that the Control
Council was going to set up a denazification policy, which I had
nothing to do with. If we had known that, we would not have
bothered probably with the organizations, because the denazification
program went considerable farther, on paper, at least, than any pro-
posal that we made.
But the proposal was to try, first, the general purposes, plan, teach-
ings, and criminality of the organization as such, and then to allow
any individual to be heard as to why he participated in it.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you.
That straightens that out, because it concerned me that you were
going to affect thousands of people by trying the organization.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It is very confusing. Discussions among
four men with different legal systems is very confusing.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I am only reading from the record, and we like
to straighten this out because our committee is concerned about the
Nuremburg phase.
Another thing that concerns us and which you probably will be able
to straighten out is this : You stated in these London hearings, in Docu-
ment 3080, that you expressed grave doubts about the trial procedure,
and you went on to make it clear that the proposals were to be con-
tained, setting up the trial, in an executive agreement by the Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief.
Otherwise, you stated, the delays would occur because the agree-
ment would then have to be ratified by the United States Senate.
My question is : This idea of bypassing the Senate to get a commit-
ment on foreign agreements, was that set up to you as a matter of
policy that you had to follow, or was this your idea ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. How do you mean "set up to" me ?
Mr. Sheehan. Set up by executive agreement, the Nuremberg trial.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Certainly. That was the policy of the United
States, to w^ork this out by executive agreement.
Mr. Sheehan. And not to give in at all to the United States Senate ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. The resolution that Congress had had — I do
not recall what became of it — went farther than anything we proposed.
Mr. Sheehan. These are just personal questions.
Let me put it this way : Do you think that this idea of working out
all these things by executive agreements and bypassing the Congress
and the Senate are good for the country in the long run ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. In view of the cases that come before our
courts sometimes, I think I would rather not express an opinion on
the general policy of matters of that kind. It depends very much on
what it is.
Mr. Sheehan. All right. I respect your opinion.
The reason why I bring that up is because of this fact: We have
recently been apprised that a certain Chinese lurist who served on
the International Militarv Tribunal in tlie Far East crimes has
brouglit up something. His name is Mei Ju-so. He is accusing the
United States now of military crimes, germ warfare, et cetera, against
the Koreans and the Chinese. He has ])roposed publicly someday
to bring us to trial, if they are ever victorious, for these crimes.
Now, in view of the precedent that we have set up in the Nurem-
berg trials, after every war may not there be these wholesale trials
of both civilian and military personnel?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1963
Mr. Justice Jackson. I have answered that several times in this
way, Mr. Sheehan: What is new about the Nuremberg trials is not
that the conquered is executed by the victor. What is new about the
Nuremberg trials is that he gets a trial before he is punished.
And, a I am ever captured by tlie Soviets, I will thank God if I
get as fair a trial as we gave the Germans at Nuremberg. I do not
expect it, and I beg for it, because the tribunal acquitted a great many
of the people that we thought, on the face of what information we had,
were guilty.
But many of them were acquitted on some of the charges, and some
of them were acquitted on all of the charges.
I. have never heard even the Germans, even Lord Malmesbury,
criticize us for having trials. He said these trials were fair, and that is
what I would not expect if I got captured by the other side.
Mr. Sheehan. I am quite willing to agree with you.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not think we would wait for that.
Mr. Sheehan. There is one other thought I would like to have you
dwell on, if you will, and I think that perhaps I ought to read your
quotation from the report. This is your statement :
Now, it may be that we were mistaken in our attitude and philosophy and
that what Germany has done is right and legal, but I am not here to confess
the error, nor to confess that the United States was wrong in regarding this as
an illegal war from the beginning and in believing that the great crime of
crimes in our generation was the launching of a needless war in Europe.
In other words, from the document, apparently there was some
question as to whether or not you were right.
In view of the situation as we see it in Korea, and in view of the
results of the Nuremburg trials, would you care to make any com-
ment as to whether or not you think that, as of now, the Nuremberg
trials served a useful purpose ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, I am not entirely a disinterested
witness on that, you understand.
Mr. Sheehan. I realize that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think they did. I think that, had it not
been for the trials, you never could have had the collection of docu-
ments which exhibit the origin of that war as they do now.
These men in the dock had a chance to deny these documents and,
as the tribunal pointed out, there Avere almost none of them denied.
Then, too, we showed — and I think it is important to the future of
international law — that the lawyers representing four different sys-
tems of law can find common ground for settling a controversy by
judicial process instead of resorting to war.
I think that maybe in the long run the best thing that was accom-
plished is that, because heretofore it has always been thouglit that
you could not do that kind of thing.
Then, too, there is a store of documents that if they were properly
used, in my opinion — and it is my opinion you are asking for — if they
were properly used, would very greatly strengthen the position of
democracy in Germany. I think they have never been properly used,
brought to the attention of the German people.
I will give you one example only, because I do not suppose you want
to spend all day on this.
Mr. Speer, who was the Minister of Production, testified as to his
conversations with Hitler and with other of the hiffh Nazi officials
1964 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
after it was apparent that we w^ere going to take Germany. He tried
to get them not to destroy bridges, electric-light plants, and other
things, pointing out that the German people would be the ones who
would suffer if those things were destroyed.
He pointed out it was the German people who had to live there;
the rest of us did not. And Hitler's remarks about the German people,
that they were undeserving, I think is one of the most important assets
the United States and the other powers have for a free Gernumy
against the rising nazism, if it had been exploited.
Those things are at least available.
Then I think we established the principle that aggressive war is a
crime, and I am for that principle. I do not care whether the aggres-
sion comes from our side or the other. We cannot have a rule of inter-
national law that applies only one way.
I feel that a great deal was accomplished. But, as I say, I am an
interested witness, and there are those of distinction and ability who
disagree with me.
Mr. SnEEHAisr. Could you enlarge on the term "aggressive warfare" ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. By "aggressive warfare" as defined to the
tribunal, we could not get the Eussians to agree on a definition of it.
In the document which you have been quoting, you will find we spent
a good deal of time. We endeavored to adopt their definition as con-
tained in the Baltic treaties. But they did not want to adopt their
ow^n definition.
It was not very important to us for the particular purposes of
Nuremberg, because, in view of the documents that we had, Hitler's
instructions to his generals, and his conversations and speeches to
them in what he thought were private gatherings, his conduct was
aggressive by anybody's definition.
So, it did not become very important to us.
But we have never been able to agree on a definition of what con-
stitutes aggression.
Mr. SiiEpniAN. JNIy reason for asking that question, Mr. Justice, is
that it seems to me that North Korea, in view of the present situation
in Korea, certainly \jy any standards would be judged an aggressor,
and, I think, China, with all tlie assistance and everything she has
been giving to North Korea, there is the possibility of their being
judged aggressors.
Also the Ivussians, with their help in ai-ms and anununition and now
soldiers, tliey might be so judged.
Hut no nation has called anybody an aggressor except the North
Koreans. Yet we, by the terms of the j)hilosophy that you are ex-
])ounding, certainly would classify them as aggressors, and yet we
take no action to brand them to the world as aggressors.
You may or may not want to conuuont on that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. T think I would ratlier not couunent on that.
Mr. SiiKKHAN. That is all I liave, Mr. Chairman.
Chaijiuan AfAnnKN. ]\Ir. O'Konski.
Mr. OlvoNSKi. Would you consider the Russian unprovoked attack
upon Finland in 1939 as an aggression, Mr. Justice Jackson'^
Mr. Justice Jackson. I w^ould ratlier not pass judgment on that,
because I have never examined the documents, as 1 have in this case.
If you asked mo my offliand impression from what I read in the news-
pa])ers, my answer would be the same as yours. If you ask ni}' opinion
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1965
as one who feels some responsibility for his opinions on legal subjects,
I would say that I have not adequate information.
Mr, O'KoNSKi. The same thine; would apply in the case where
Kussia took over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia before 1040, and the
same thing; would probably apply to the manner in which Kussia took
over half of Poland in league witli Hitler in September of Idod.
That may be neither here nor there, because under the regulations
and under the manner in which your high tribunal was established —
by "your," I mean the combined efforts of the four major powers —
you do not bring the charge, and I notice the United States was
allocated the over-all responsibility on conspiracy to incite and wage
a war of aggression. Tliaf was the American responsibility at the
Nuremberg trials.
Under the procedure, there was no way in which the LTnited States
of America, in meeting its responsibilities of this allocation of power,
could have brought the charge against Russia, of aggression against
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. There was no way
in which it could be done at Nuremberg, was there?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is true. But you will find, with reference
to Latvia, Estonia, and the Baltic States, that we refused to accede
to their description of them in the indictment. We had a consid-
erable rumpus about it because, from their description, the inference
was possible that they were a part of Soviet territory, as I guess they
are now, in fact.
And we refused to accept that. And we came near not being able
to file an indictment because of our disagreement about it.
Finally, in order to get on with the business, I let them file the
indictment, and I filed with it a statement that nothing in that indict-
ment could be construed as a recognition of anj^ claims of tlie Soviet
Union in any of those states.
So that there could never be a claim made that we had in any way
recogniz'^d the validity of Russian action in those states.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In the same manner, Mr. Justice, even if the various
agencies of the Government had given you all this evidence which
was available, that the Communists were responsible for the Katyn
murders, still you could not do anything about it even if you had
that evidence; is not that corrects You could not do anything about
it, under the procedure of the trial ?
Mr. Justice J.\cksox. We could not have proceeded against them.
What we could have done would be that with that strengthening
our hand, we could have insisted that it not be brought in at all. But
you would be in the same place you are today; you would not have it
settled.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Then I would like to have your comment on this,
Mr. Justice : If a nation has committed vast crimes against humanity
or has committed vast acts of aggression, be sure to get on the winning
side of the war, get a seat on the high tribunal, and you can never be
prosecuted for the crimes that you have committed.
In other words, suppose, in the closing days of the Korean war,
Russia should reverse itself and join us as an ally and then sit at the
table of the high tribunal. As long as they are on the winning side,
as long as they get a seat on the high tribunal, there is no way in which
they could ever be prosecuted for their acts, crimes against humanity,
or acts of aggression ; is not that right ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 10
1966 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know how you could ever prosecute
a prisoner that you cannot capture. Even in our own domestic society
you first have to get physical power over him before you can do
anything to him.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The thing that worries me, Mr. Justice, is that, the
way the tribunal was set up a nation can go on. From our investiga-
tion there is no difference between Hitler and Stalin. I think that
your tribunal did a very good job in hanging the Germans who were
responsible for these acts against humanity.
But in our investigation all the way through, we found out that the
acts of genocide by the Communists are just as vicious as the acts of
genocide used by Hitler. They are of the same pattern, cut out of
the same cloth.
It seems to me that, according to the way the tribunal was set up,
Russia is going to be able to get by with its program of genocide and
never get to trial, because they have maneuvered themselves into the
position of being on the winning side and get a seat as a judge.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I will make a bargain with you, Mr. Congress-
man. If you will capture Stalin, I will try him.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I will ask for that job myself to be sure he hangs. I
wouldn't trust another Nuremberg trial.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, apparently there has been some con-
fusion as to the position of the London government at the time of
these hearings. So there may be no misunderstanding, I would like
to read from the last paragraph of the letter you presented us, the let-
ter from the parliamentary group to you dated February 15, 1946.
That letter points to the fact that there is strong indication of Russian
guilt, and they state as follows :
These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Russian
POW camps has not yet been fully elucidated.
The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling oi
humanity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern tlic
families of the victims. The entire Polish Nation is entitled to demand that
this tragedy be cleared up.
In view of these facts and circumstances, the undersigned would like to express
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks ol
the Nuremberg Tribunal. This case is of a special character and needs, in ordei
to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated indeiiendently by an
international judicial body.
Would you not say that their position was that in view of the fact
that there is a strong indication of Russian guilt and in view of tlie
fact that the tribunal, as constituted at Nuremberg, could not possibly
find Russian guilt; that they did not consider that the proper tribunal
to try the case ? Is that a fair statement of their position ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is a fair statement of their position, and
that is what I understood their position to be, and I agreed with that.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Do any other members of the committee have
any questions ?
Mr. Sheehan. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to get this on the record for our purposes, Mr. Justice.
When you and I were talking, you referred to that Soviet agreement
in 193;i, where they did agree with certain Baltic States about the
definition of crimes of aggression.
THE KATYN FOREST ]VL\SSACRE 1967
I think, for the purpose of our members here, I would like to read
the four things they did agree to as being crimes of aggression in this
] 933 agreement :
1. Declaration of war upon another state.
2. Invasion by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war of the
territory of another state.
3. Attack by its land, naval, or air forces with or without a declaration of war
on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state.
4. Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another
state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in
its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all
assistance or protection.
That was the agreement that Russia signed in 1933 at a convention
for the definition of aggression signed at London by Rumania, Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan.
I merely relate that to the committee because, judging from the
conduct of Russia during the last 10 years, she has been guilty of every
single one of the acts of aggression, by her own definition.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is the definition I tried to get adopted,
because, logically, if you were prosecuting persons for aggression, it
would be well to include a definition.
But, as I say, for our purposes, the failure to have a definition of
aggression was not serious because, under any definition of aggression,
Hitler's acts would come within it.
But they refused to accept as general the definition which they had
applied in these particular treaties.
Mr. SHEEHAiSr. As a matter of information, for our committee, Mr.
Justice — and in this I understand in your position on the Supreme
Court you may not want to talk to us except in an executive session —
but we were thinking actually of what we could do to bring this to
the attention of the world in the sense that, from the definitions as we
know them at Nuremberg, and from the regular practices of law, if,
on the basis of the findings of Katyn, if we could not still indict
Russia for aggression on the basis of the knowledge we have?
Of course, as you say, we did not have the prisoner. It is a question
of world opinion.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I gathered from joixr interim report that you
had done that. The difficulty is that you do not have the prisoner.
Mr. Sheehan. In your opinion, Mr. Justice, do you think it was a
worth-while gesture, or not ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that the exploration of this subject is a
thoroughly wholesome thing. That is one of the reasons why 1 co-
operated with your counsel, or tried to, and why I say that my files are
open. I am ready to give any help that I can in it.
Mr, Sheehan. Mr. Justice, I have one more question.
This, as I understand it, was turned in to the War Crimes Com-
mission at Nuremberg, and I was just wondering, from your stand-
point, do you have any idea of when this was turned over, the approxi-
mate date ?
I may first preface it with this remark : As I remember it, the origi-
nal indictment of the Katyn massacre, which the Russians put in the
indictment, was the fact that the men were killed in September of
1941, and it would seem to us that this document I have here Avould
more or less prove or lend a reasonable doubt as to the time.
1968 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
So if tliis document had been aA-ailnlile to you before the indictment,
or to your staif, it certainly shouhi have stopped the Russians from
})uttin<>; in a specific date in the indictment.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know what the indictment is, so I
cannot say when it was received.
And I do not know I can do that by looking at it, because we had
a collection of over 100,000 documents and I did not see them all.
Mr. Mitchell. For the record, I believe this document w^as sent
by General Bissell when he was military attache at London, which
was after 1946 and after the indictment. I do not know whether it
reached the Nuremberg trials. It was returned.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It has the date on it, the 4th of August 194U.
I do not know Avhat that means.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think I can help you on that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. This is a receipt by General Telford Taylor,
who was my successor, and he was not appointed brigadier general
until he was named as my successor.
This was not only after the indictment, but was after the interna-
tional trial was practically completed.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think, in answer to that, Mr. Justice, you also,
wrote a letter after the trials to General Anders saying that you got
that, but it came too late. And even if that was not the case, there
was not anything that could be done about it because of the set-up
of the tribunal. It was not your responsibility to charge crimes
against humanity. That was a Kussian responsibility.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I remember writing to General Anders when
he sent me his book. So whatever you say is doubtless correct.
Cliairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have further
questions ?
Does counsel have any questions ?
Mr. Mitchell. No further questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Justice, speaking on behalf of the mem-
bers of the committee, we wish to thaidi you for coming here today
and giving us your testimony.
As I stated before, when tlie resohition was befoi'e the Congress,
a number of Members of Congress incjuired regarding the Nuremberg
trials. Your testimony has been very enlightening and valuable from
the standpoint of what this committee will submit to the Congress on
this i^hase of the hearings.
I might ask your opinion regarding the matter. If you care to
preS'ent it, we will be glad to receive it.
Our connnittee, especially when we were in Europe, ])ublicized the
testimony of the witnesses. There was testimony brought out by o"2
witnessses at Fi'nnkfurt and also exliibits were introduced nunibei"ing
into ()\('i' a Inindred.
This testimony was daily chronicled, ])rinted, aiul sent out over all
the free countries of Europe, by the daily newspapers and the radio.
It was conveyed to the people over there every day. Not only was it
presented to the free countries, but througli Ridio Free Euroj^e and
jilso the Voice of America, it was carried behind the iron curtain.
Just as an exani])le of wliat I am ))r()|>osiiig to ask, I might say this:
Two members of tlie counnittee visited Berlin. 'Jliere was a conven-
tion of tlie free jouiMialists of both Fastt'ni and Westei'U Europe in
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1969
Berlin at the time. Some of these journalists had escaped from behind
the iron curtain.
The comment of some of these journalists was that the facts that
were revealed by our committee while in Frankfurt brought to the
minds of millions of people in Europe, both ontside and behind the
iron curtain, a picture of the false propaganda which the Russians
had been circulating regarding the guilt for the Katyn massacre.
This testimony completely refuted all this propaganda that the Com-
munists had been circulating.
One journalist there in Europe had a reproduction of a broadcast
that went over the Warsaw radio a few nights before. This broadcast
tried to explain to the hundreds of people that had requested the reason
why the Russian Government did not answer our invitation to appear
before our conmiittee to give testimony on the Katyn massacre.
Testimony came to the committee that the bodies that were found at
Katyn were just a fraction of the massacres, barbarities, and genocide
that the Soviets had been inflicting on other captured countries.
By bringing out this testimony to the attention of the people in
Europe behind the iron curtain and also to the world generally, I think
our committee has contributed a great deal to world public opinion
that something should and must be done by the free nations about
international criminals.
And, of course, the enslaved people behind the iron curtain are
crying for some kind of termination to the atrocities and the genocide
that is going on today.
The members of our committee are going to follow through in the
next Congress in trying to persuade the United Nations to take steps
to terminate these atrocities, massacres, and barbarities that the Com-
munist government today is committing.
Mr. Justice, from your experience in the Nuremberg trials and as a
public official, would you have any suggestions or any comment you
would like to make to this committee as to what could he done in addi-
tion to what is already being done to try and create a world public
opinion to see if something could not be done to slow down the genocide
and the atrocities that are being committed ?
I might say that since the work of this committee started, we have
not heard much about atrocities in Korea. I think the work of this
committee has already slowed up the Communists on some of the
wholesale slaughters that had been going on in Korea.
Do 3^ou have anything you would like to state in the way of comment,
Mr. Justice, for the information of the committee, in that regard?
INIr. Justice jACKSOisr. I think in that respect that your effort is
very similar to the purpose that we sought to accomplish at Nurem-
berg: To pin responsibility where responsibility belongs, to make
known to the public these atrocities, to bring about a state of public
opinion in which war will not be the way to settle controversies.
I see nothing inconsistent there. I think you are working along
very much the same ultimate lines that we were. But you have a
particular incident on which you can focus the light, whereas we
were dealing with a more confused and larger situation growing out
of the whole war.
Mr. Mitchell. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Very well.
1970 THE KATYN FOREST JVIASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Justice, you referred to the masked man who
appeared before tliis committee. I think I will now have to reveal
what the committee instructed me to do on that. That masked man
is available today in the United States. That masked man, if this
case ever goes beifore the International World Court, will, I am sure,
stand before that World Court and testify.
We are not an official court. Consequently, the masked man testi-
fied in that fashion. He has a family ; he is disfigured . That was no
publicity stunt, or anything of that kind.
But I w^ant the record to clearly show that that individual, who
was the only eyewitness of this massacre, is available, and even if the
Soviets would like to join in the World Court at that time, I am
sure that he can be induced to talk to the world.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not want you to take my observations
as any reflection on your work, because I was answering a question
as to why we could not do these things, and it is quite plain that you
can take a gi"eat deal of evidence that we could not.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. This committee has traveled all over the world to
get that evidence. It is officially documented. This committee will
stand on that evidence before any international tribunal, and I am
sure tlie case will stand up.
That is a personal opinion.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan, do you have any further ques-
tions ?
Mr. Sheehan. Along the lines that the chairman brought out, as
to your opinion on the fact that we are trying to form or develop
world opinion, I would like to ask you this question, and as a legal
opinion, not a political opinion, if you may want to answer it:
Under the present set-up of the World Court of the United Nations,
does the world have any legal means of trying Russia for the atrocities
which we assume or allege she is guilty of today? Is there any way
that we could do it legally ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that is a question on which I had
better not express an offhand opinion.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. The thouglit is, Mr. Justice, that, under the princi-
ples laid down at Nuremberg, of trying to prevent aggression, and as
the precedent is set up, will we have to wait until after, say, peace
is declared in the world to try the Communist nations in Korea, and
can the Nuremberg trials be used as a precedent?
Mr. Justice Jackson. You have to bear in mind that Nuremberg
was not something that we thought out as a matter of theory. We
were confronted with certain facts. We had as prisoners German
Goering, Ribbenti-o]), aud all of these men. They had been accused
of the worst tilings iniagina})le.
Tliere Avere tliree tilings we could do with them, one, we could just
let them go. And if you will remembei- the tenii)o of those times, you
know that that would have been impossible.
Another thing we could do would be to just execute them or other-
wise punish them, without trial. That always would go against the
conscience of the American people, in my opinion.
The only thing left to do was to give them a trial.
So that the Nuremberg trial grew out of the fact that you had the
prisoners, you had the charges, and, fortunately, we captured the
evidence.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1971
I do not know, to be perfectly candid with you how we ever would
liave come out if we had had to use oral testimony, because it is so vul-
lu'iable to attack. The great thing that saved the Nuremberg trial
was the capture of innumerable incriminating, authentic documents.
If you do not have those things, you are going to be greatly handi-
capped in any international trial, in my experience.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Justice, we are indeed very grateful to you for coming here and
testifying. Your testimony is very valuable.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I shall be glad to be of any help that I can.
Chairman Madden. Because your prepared statement has many
footnotes for references which you did not mention when you were
reading the statement for the committee, we will accept your entire
statement at this point as exhibit 6. The photostatic copies of corre-
spondence from the Polish Government in exile in London which you
mentioned earlier as having received will be marked "Exhibit 7." The
ommittee will now recess until 1 : 30 p. m.
(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p, m.
same day.)
Exhibits 6 and 7 were received in evidence and follow :
EXHIHIT 6
The Katyn Forest Massacre and the Nuunberg International Trial
statement by Robert H. Jackson before Select Committee of House of Represent-
atives To Investigate the Katyn Massacre
The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has not been adjudged by the Niirn-
berg Tribunal and inquiry into it is not inconsistent with the position taken
by the United States prosecution at the Niirnberg international trial of Goering
and others.
It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the United
States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all decisions and actions
in reference to tlie Katyn atrocity and the reasons which conduced to them.
The first step that seems pertinent ^ was an agreement to divide primary re-
sponsibility for preparation and presentation of the case among the prosecutors
representing the four allied powers. This was intended to fix on someone re-
sponsibility for covering each part of the case, to avoid duplication, and to
expedite a trial of imprecedented complexity.
To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite and wage
a war of aggression. The British were assigned the violation of specific treaties
and crime on the high seas. Violations of the laws of war and crimes against
humanity were divided on a geographical basis. The French undertook crimes
in Western Europe, and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of pre-
paring and presenting evidence of crimes in Eastern Europe — an area
largely in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us
1 Earlipr steps incUided my appointment by President Truman on May 2, 1945. The
order defined the duty as follows :
'. . . preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of
the leaders of tlie European Axis powers and tlieir principal agents and accessories as the
United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an
international military tribunal." Exec. Order No. 9547, 10 Fed. Reg. 4961.
Also included was a conference of representatives of the four nations to reach prelimi-
nary undeistandings as to how, in view of tlieir different languages, systems of hiw and
methods of trial, they would proceed. The conf(>rence began in Eonf'on, June 23, and
concluded August 8, 1945, when an agreement was signed by the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the KeiJublic of France, subsequently adhered to
by nineteen other powers. Tlie minutes, proceedings, and agreements are published.
Ilnternaticnitl Conference on Military Trials, Dept. State Pub. 30S0.
I I sh;ill cite two i>fticial publications. One is the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression series
of 11 volumes of the Niirnberg international trial documents in English (GPO). They
are cited herein as N. C. v<c A. The other is the official transcript of the nroceedings and
testimony. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 volumes
in English except the documents, which are set forth in their original language. They
are cited as Proceedings.
The indictment is found I N. C. & A. 13 and 1 Proceedings 29.
1972 THE KATYX FOREST IVIASSACRE
had access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet representatives
included Katyu Wood and Poland as well, but at that time it was not known that
the Katyn massacre would lie involved.
The first proposal that the Niirnberg trial should take up examination of the
Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during the drawing of the
indictment. Preliminary drafts were negotiated in London at a series of con-
ferences where I was represented Imt not personally present. At the last Lou-
don meeting, the Soviet prosecutor included among crimes charged in the East
the following : "In Septeml)er 1941, 925 Polish officers who were prisoners of
war were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk." P>oth P>ritish and Ameri-
can representatives protested, but they finally concluded that, despite their
personal disapproval, if the Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were
entitled to do so under the division of the case."
The indictment was brough to Bei'lin for final settlement and filing, where I
objected to inclusion of the charge and even more strongly when, at the last
monment, the Soviet delayed its filing by amending the Katyn charge to include
11,000 instead of 92.j victims. However it was in the Soviet part of the ca.se and
they had investigated Katyn ; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what
we know of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of Poland, it did
not seem unlikely that this was part of their program, and the Soviet claimed
to have adequate evidence of Nazi kuilt. While we did not feel justified in pre-
venting the issue, we warned the Soviet delegation tliat we did not have evidence
to support the charge nor time or opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave the entire con-
test to the Soviet and German lawyers.
The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to participate
In its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict in several respects with
what I considered to be sound trial policy for the first such case in history. It
was not based upon any conviction in my own mind about the truth or falsity
of the charge. I knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that
both were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to commit
it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each toward Poland.
Whatever the facts were they had liecome overlaid with deep layers of Nazi and
Soviet propaganda and counterpropaganda, and it seemed we could not at the
international trial wisely undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of
separating truth from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclu-
sion are four :
First, responsibility for the massacre did not api>ear to be capable of docu-
mentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic decisions on policy
concerning the Niirnberg international trial was that we should accuse only
defendants whose guilt could be established and should charge only offenses
whose occurrence could be fully proved or substantially corroborated by docu-
mentary evidence captured from the Germans themselves. Because this was
the first international criminal trial in history and was held in the wake of war
when passions were high, we did not want any judgment that would rest solely
on oral testimony of witnesses wliose interest, bias, memory and trutlifulness
would always be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting
matters because evidence measui'ing up to this standard was not then obtain-
able. However, that policy was so far observed that the Tribunal, in its Judg-
ment, said : "The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a large measure
in documents of their own making, the authenticity of which has not been
challenged except in one or two cases." ^
Second, if we w(>re ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary
evidence, this atrocity was not a suitaltle instance because we knew of no wit-
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpetrators
that would meet the high standards of credibility required in a criminal trial.
Neither the American nor, as far as I have reason to believe, the British prosecu-
tors knew of such witnesses.
2 Tlioso nogotiations ure iinl)lisho(l in Alderman (and othors), Negotiating With the
Kussians (World Peace Foundation, I!),')] ), 49-98.
'■' N. C. & A., Opinion and .liidgnieiit 3.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1973
It was plaiu that we could not get such evidence from Polish sources. Atti-
tudes of Polish authorities at that time were conflicting, which confirmed my
opinion that we should not participate in the trial of the Nazi-Soviet dispute.
The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at Niiruberg
which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters, including, as I under-
stood it, accusing the Nazis of the Katyn murders.
The Polish Government in Exile in London, on the contrary, was accusing
the Soviet. On February 15, 1946, eleven Senators and ten Deputies of the Polish
Parliamentary Group in London filed with me a letter and statement reciting
evidence on which they pointed to Russian guilt, concluding with this statement :
"In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to
express the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the
tasks of the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs,
in order to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated independently
by an international judicial body." ■*
It also characterizes the Polish attitude at that time that General Anders,
while believing in Sm'iet guilt, refused the request of Goering's lawyer to help
him prove it — a quite understandable attitude in view of what Poland had
suffered at the hands of those who would benefit from his testimony. He said,
however, that he would be willing to give his information to the Tribunal "at
their express written and oflicial request." He did not know, nor do I, whether the
Tribunal was ever so advised. Certainly I was not. Only three years after the
trial, when General Anders published his book and thoughtfully sent me a copy,
did I learn these facts.'
On January 21, 1946, General Clay transmitted for my "strictly confidential
information from the Embassy at Warsaw" word that the Germans were not,
in the opinion of the Polish circles with which the American Embassy was in
contact, responsible for the Katyn deaths. There was no suggestion that this
opinion was supported by legal evidence. Apparently it was not, for Mr. Lane,
then American Ambassador at Warsaw, 2 years later published the information
then known to him pointing to Soviet guilt, but even then said, "The identity
of the perpetrators of the outrageous massacre of Katyn, contrary to all laws
of war and humanity, has never been definitely established. Perhaps it never
will be.""
We did not learn of any usuable evidence in American ijossession. Military
intelligence, on February 26, 1946, delivered to a member of my staff then in
Washington several documents, classified "Secret," including the German report
accusing the Soviet, two Soviet documents accusing the Nazis and a paper
labeled "Excerpts of conversations between Sikorski, Anders, Stalin, and Molo-
tov." The conversations referred to are substantially those published by Jan
Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States, in 1947." None of these
were in condition to be useful as evidence. I knew nothing at any time during
the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, or Colonel Siemansky. We heard
nothing of any of the witnesses since claimed to have personal knowledge of the
crimes.
Third, we did not need to prove Nazi responsibility for tlie Katyn murder in
order to establish that the Nazi regime and individual defendants were guilty
of a conspiracy and a program to exterminate vast numbers of Poles. Poland
had been the scene and the Polish people had been the victims of many un-
believable barbarities which put to death much larger numbers of persons than
the Katyn murders. To make sure that the grievances of the Polish people, as
well as other Eastern peoples, were proved and proved beyond doubt, we did not
leave the matter wholly to the Soviet but, as a part of the American case, proved
by captured documents or by admissions of captive German officials the over-all
Nazi extermination program embracing many atrocities in Poland and affecting
the Polish people, as well as others in East Europe. Examples will indicate what
I mean :
* I am filinc; a photostatic copy of this pommnnication with the Committee.
"Anders, An Armv in Exile (1949), 82, 140. 295.
8 Lane, I Saw Poland Betraved (1948), 36-39.
' Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (1947), 66-69.
1974 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE
We had the diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of Poland,
Acknowledged by him to he authentic, saying, "We must annihilate the Jews
wherever we find them and wherever it is possible. * * *" * In August 1942,
he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations in Poland : "That we sentence
1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only marginally. It is a matter,
of course, that should tlie Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result in
the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures." °
We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such as the 75-
page leather-bound official report by Major-General Stroop which recited the
killing of men, women and children of the Warsaw ghetto to the exact number
of 56,0G5 and set out the day-to-day measures, including shooting, fire, explosion
and chemical extermination in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge,
accompanied by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency."
We had the report by SS Brigade-Fuehrer Stahlecker to Ilimmler, dated
October 3941, of the execution of lo.5,.567 persons in the Lithuanian area."
We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly details of the
operations in the East of gasivngons for killing undesirables."
We also had German protests, oflScial but not very high-minded, against such
exterminations — in one instance of 1.50,000 to 200,000 Jews " and in another
instance of 5,000 Jews " — because it was complained they should have been
spared for use as forced labor.
Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously di'amatized
it. For example, a deathbook of the Mauthausen concentration camp recorded
35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203 persons died of the same ailment — ■
"heart trouble" — died at brief and regular intervals, and more astonishingly,
died in alphabetical order. Death first came to Ackermann, at 1 :15 a. m., and
reached Zynger at 2 p. m.'°
Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured German officials.
One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi extermination program
had done away with four million persons in concentration camps and that two
million additicmal were killed by the Secret Police in the East."
Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf , testified willingly, even boastfully, that' he
supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women and children in the Eastern
area." The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center, swore
that under his regime it exterminated three million human beings.^^ This was
by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities committed against the
Polish people.
Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war had placed
in our hands when documents were procurable from other sources. An example
was the Nazi persecution of the Church and clergy, particularly vicious in
Poland, which the Nazis had not documented with the candor and thoroughness
that they did persecution of the Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were
available to us, we couid have gathered evidence of the Church pei-secution in
Poland, since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control
where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt the zeal
of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I sought an audience
with Pope Pius and obtained from His Holiness the Vatican documents in which
detailed evidentiary material was already collected and which supported the
charge of religious persecution."
As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could turn for
such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and patriotic Poles who
might become the leadership of the restoration of Poland was provable by docu-
8 Doc. No. 2233-D-PS (USA exhibit 2S1), Entry of Dec. 16, 1941, pp. 76-77. 4 N. C.
& A. S91.
»Doc. No. 22.'^3-E~PS (USA 28.S). Entrv of An?. 24, 1942. 4 N. C. & A. 893.
10 Doc. No. 1061-PS (USA 275), 3 N. C. & A. 718.
" Doc. No. U-180 (USA 276), 7 N. C. & A. 978.
" Doc. No. .501 -PS (USA 288). 3 N. C. & A. 418.
" Doc. No. 3257-PS (USA 290). .5 N. C. & A. 994.
'» Doc. No. U-1.S5 (USA 289). 8 N. C. & A. 205.
'•"' 1 N. C. & A. 907.
'» Doc. No. 273.S-PS (USA 290). 5 N. C. & A. 380.
"4 Proceed iiisrs 811-:?.^>4.
" Doc. No. 3SfiS-PS (USA 819). 6 N. C. & A. 787.
"These documents, nnniliered from 3261-PS to 3269-PS, inchisive, are published in
5 N. C. & A., pp. 1009 to 1040, Inclusive.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1975
ment to be consistent with the Nazi policy toward Toland. Yet, while they had
boasted on paper of the worst crimes known to tuan, we found but one Nazi
document tliat even hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that
being a telegram reporting that the Polish Ked Cross had found that German-
made ammunition was used in the killings.""
A fourth ditHcuIty entered into our reluctance to undertake the Katyn murder
charge as part of the Niirnberg trial. We were under exceedingly heavy pressure
to get along with the trial. A persistent criticism in the American press during
the trial was its long duration. Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross-
examination by several counsel, of course takes nuich more time than docu-
mentai-y proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Niirnberg trial had to be
forthwith interpreted iTito three other languages. Every examination or cross-
examination had to Include any proper questions desired by moi'e than twenty
lawyers representing defendants and four for the prosecution, and these were
trained in live different legal systems — English, American, French, Russian, and
German. Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent to which
we avoided relying on oral proof when I remind you that all four prosecutors
at Niirnberg called only 33 witnesses to testify orally on the whole case against
the twenty individual defendants, and these defendants, in addition to them-
selves, called only 61 witnesses. You have ali-eady, according to your interim
report, orally examined 81 witnesses on this one atrocity.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on February 14,
1946, opened the subject by presenting to the Tribunal a report by a Soviet
Extraordinary State Commission of its investigation of the Katyn crime." It
recited testimony, including a good deal of hearsay and medical data, as to
the condition of the exhumed bodies. On this, experts based opinions that the
executions took place during the period of German occupation and therefore
that the Germans were responsible. Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering, made
a prompt request to call witnesses to contradict the Soviet report, which occa-
sioned some disagreement between the Soviet prosecutors and those representing
Great Britain and the United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view that,
since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the Extraordinary Com-
mission as a state document, it could not be contradicted. Under Soviet law
it probably could not but would be entitled to faith and credit — as a judgment,
statute, or public- act would be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature
was such that it was clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers
proposed, if the subject were opened, to call ten witnesses." The Tribunal,
however, ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact." '"
Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d days of
July 1946. What it was is a matter of record, and what it is worth is a matter
of opinion." At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing
2" Telesrani addressed to the "Government of the Government General, care of First
Administrative Counseller Weirauch in Krakow." It is marked "Urgent, to be delivered
at once, secret" :
"Part of the Polish Red Cross returned yesterday from Katyn. The employees of the
Polish Red Cross have brou.sht with them the cartridge cases which were used in sliooting
tite victims of Katyn. It appears that these are German munitions. The caliber is 7.65.
Tliey are from, the firm Geco. Letter follows." Signed "Heinrich." Doe. No. 402-PS.
17 Proceedings 365.
So far as I know, the letter referred to was never found, but the prosecution staff
screened approximately 100,000 captured German documents, of which only 5.000 were
selected for full translation for use at the trial. It is impossible, therefore, to say that
such a letter is not in existence.
=ilt is USSR Doc. #54.
=2 March S. 1046, 9 Proceedings 3; May 11, 1946, 13 Proceedings 431; June 3, 1946,
15 Proceedinss 289-293.
23 17 Proceedings 273.
^ The verbatim testimony in English translation is found in 17 Proceedings 275 et seq.
A summary of the evidence will show its inconclusive character. It must be remembered
that the Smolensk area, including Katyn Wood, fell to the Germans on or about .July 17,
1941. If the Polish prisoners bad been executed before that, the Soviet must have been
responsible: if they were then alive and captured by the Germans, the Germans must have
been responsible.
The German defendants led with the witness Ahrens, Commanding Officer of the Signal
Regiment charged witli guilt in the Soviet report. He denied that Iiis regiment had cap-
tured any Polish prisoners from the Russians, denied there was any order to slioot Polish
prisoners, or that any were shot. He testified to exluiming the bodies in 1942. The weak-
ness of his testimony was that he did not arrive in the Smolensk territory until about the
second half of November 1041, while the Soviet claimed the executions had been consider-
ably earlier, and the commander he succeeded was not called.
The second witness was Bichborn, who also did not arrive on the scene until September
20, 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot and said he would have
1976 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE
and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially, complained
that they had been allowed to call only three of the 120 witnesses that appeared
before the Soviet Commission. The Tribunal, wisely I think, refused to hear
more of the subject."^
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The Tribunal
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre. Neither did it
expressly exonerate them, as the Judgment made no reference to the Katyn
incident. The Soviet judge dissented in some matters but did not mention
Katyn.-''
This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to establish responsi-
bility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided by the Niirnberg
Tribunal or contended for by the American prosecution will stand in the way.
Exhibit 7 — Letter From the Polish Government in Exile in London to Justice
Jackson
Polish Parliamentary Group
74, Cornwall Gardens, London, SW. 7
London, Fehriiary 15, 1946-
Mr. Justice Rorert J. Jackson,
Chief American Prosecutor, Nuremberg.
Sir: We have the honour to submit to your attention the enclosed copy of a
letter addressed by us to the members of the Parliaments of all democratic
Nations throughout the world.
We are, Sir,
Yours faithfully.
On behalf of the Polish Parliamentary Group,
A. Zalewski.
J. Godlewski.
Annexe.
known about it if eithor had occurred. His testimony was attacked by U. S. S. R. Docu
ment No. .3, dated Berlin, October 29, 1941, issued by the chief of the Security Police in
relation to prisoners of war in the rear of the army, which set up task force groups under
the leadership of an SS, leader. These irregular groui)s, not a part of the army, were the
usual execution teams. This witness told of an order to shoot certain prisoners of wai
which, he said, Field Marshal von Kleuge refused to carry out because of regard for th€
discipline of his troops.
The third witness was Gen. Oberhauser, in command of the area, who did not reach
there until September of 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot
and denied that the regiment had weapons with which they could have been shot. This
closed the German case without accounting for the period from the fall of Smolensk in
the middle of .July to the beginning of September and with an admission that an execution
squad followed the army into that area.
The Russians took over and called the Deputy Mayor of Smolensk during the German
occupation, a professor at the University who served under a German Mayor. He testified
that there were Polish prisoners of war in the vicinity of Smolensk when the city fell to
the Germans, that he had a conference with the German Mayor in which he was informed
that a very severe regime should prevail with respect to prisoners of war. and that Polish
ones were to be exterminated, l)ut that it should be kejit a secret, and thereafter the Mayor
told him that the I'olish prisoners of war had all died. On cross-examination it was
brought out against his crediliility that he was not punished by the Russians for his ad-
mitted collaboration with the Germans, and not only remained at liberty but was a pro-
fessor at two Universities under Russian control.
They followed with a witness Markov, a Bulgarian doctor who had been a nw^mber of
the commission set up by the Germans to investigate the Polish mass:H're and which
charged responsibility to the Soviet. Alarkov gave details indicating ;in extremely super-
ficial examination of the graves and testified that he did not agree with the report but
signed it under German comi)ulsion. Ooss-examination brouuht out the weakness of his
testimony in that he was under the control of the Russians at the time of trial.
The last witness was Prosorovski, a medical legal expert of the Sovi(>t ITnion. Hi-s
testimony was entirely of the Ru.ssian examination of the trraves. and his conclusions that
the date of the execution as evidenced by the condition of the bodies must have been during
the German occup.ntion. During his examination, an American-captured document. No.
402-PS, Kxhibit V. S. S. R. nOT. was read into the case, being a telegram from Heinrich
stating that the employees of the Polish Red Cross had found cartridge cases used in shoot-
ing the victims of Katyn from which it ajipeared that these were German munitions of
caliber 7.(i.T. The testimony was that all of the deaths had been caused by bullet wounds
of 7.05 caliber.
Dr. Naville. one of your rommittee witnesses, was allowed to defendant Goerlng. pro-'
vided he could l)e located. He was found in Switz(>rland. hut he "informed the Tribunal
that he sees no use in his ocuning Iier(> as a witnesjf for Goering. * * * 10 Pro-
ceedings f!4S.
^•17 Proceedings ."71.
==« N. C. & A., Opinion and .Tudgment lOfi.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1977
An Appeal to Members of the Parliaments of All the Nations From the
Former Deputies and Senators of the Polish Parliament
74 Cornwall Gardens,
London, SW. 7, February 19Jf6.
To the Members of the Free Nations Parliaments.
Dear Sirs : The German war criminals at present on trial at Nuremberg are
charged witb tlie murder of about 11,000 Polish officers in the wood of Katyn
near Smolensk. In connection with this case the undersigned, former Senators
and Deputies in Parliaments of the Polish Republic, beg to point out certain
events and to make a number of I'emarks.
On September 17th 1939 Soviet Forces suddenly and unexpectedly invaded
Poland and attacked the Polish armies in the rear while these armies were in a
most difficult position, struggling against the Germans, overwhelmingly superior
in number and in material. In doing so, the Soviet broke the Pact of Non-
Aggression and other agreements, freely accepted by them and still in force as
between the USSR and Poland sucli as the Peace Treaty of Riga signed on March
18th 1921, The Kellogg Pact, The Moscow Protocol renouncing war as an in-
strument of national policy, signed on February 9th 1929, by Estonia, Latvia,
Poland, Rumania and the USSR, the Convention on the definition of the Aggressor
signed on July 3rd 1933, the Moscow Protocol of May 5th 1934, on the Prolonga-
tion of the Non-Aggression Pact till December 31st, 1945. These agreements
have been confirmed twice over, by an exchange of notes, on September 10th 1934,
and by a common communique of November 26th 1938, and finally the Pact
of the League of Nations was also binding in the USSR.
As a result of the Soviet attack, Polish resistance collapsed and a great number
of soldiers of the Polish army fell into Soviet hands. The Soviet autliorities
grouped the Polish officers in separate camps, the largest of which were those of
Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostaszkow. At the beginning of 1940 the camp au-
thorities informed the interned officers that these camps would be broken iip
and that the prisoners of war would return to their families in Poland. The
prisoners were again registered in great detail. From April to the middle of
May 1940 the Soviet authorities removed the officers from the camps in groups
numbering from 60 to 300 and transported them in unknown directions. At the
same time the prisoners correspondence with their families in Poland came to an
end. Whereas in the preceding months letters from them were received fairly
regularly, after that date they ceased to give any sign of life and they were
heard of no more.
After the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30th, 1941. and of
the Polish-Soviet military convention of Augiist 14th of the same year, when the
formation of the Polish army was undertaken in the USSR, out of the total of
15.000 officers taken prisoner by the Soviet, only 2.500 reported themselves to the
Polish recruiting centres. Of these, only 400 had been inmates of the camp of
Kozielsk. The absence of the remainder, known to have been removed to unde-
termined destinations, produced understandable anxiety among their country-
men. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Ambassador in Kuybyshev,
and the general commanding the Polish Army in the USSR, addressed them-
selves to the Soviet authorities asking to be informed of the whereabouts of these
missing officers. The Soviet Government in the persons of the People's Com-
misar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, and his deputy, Mr. Vishinsky, answered
repeatedly that these officers had been released and should have reported them-
selves to the diffreut Polish military units. On December 3rd, 1941, in a con-
versation with Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin, General Sikorski raised the same
question and presented a list of 3,845 missing officers whose names had been
ascertained by the Polish authorities. Marshal Stalin repeated tlie explanation
given by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky and assured General Sikorski anew
that these officers had been released long since. In spite of these declarations
of the highest Soviet authorities not one of the missing officers ever made his
appearance and all investigations remained fruitless.
In April 1943 the Germans published the news that in the wood of Katyn
near Smolensk mass graves had been discovered containing the bodies of about
12.000 Polish officers. About 3,000 of them were identified and it followed from
the checking of lists that they were prisoners from the camp at Kozielsk. As is
well known, the German authorities did not hesitate to accuse the Soviet Gov-
ernment of their murder.
1978 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
AVhen the German armies in their retreat from Russia had evacuated the dis-
trict of Smolensk, the Soviet authorities formed a commission called upon to
deal vv^ith the Katyn case. This commission drew up an official report which
was published by the Soviet Government.
According to this report two witnesses, the Soviet camp commander. Major
Vietoshnikov, of the N. K. V. D., and the engineer in control of traflBc in the
Smolensk sector of Western railway lines, S. Ivanov, testified that the Polish
officers detained in the P. o. W. camps had not been evacuated in the timft
and that the camp had been captured by the advancing German army. Other
witiiesses, Soviet citizens, gave evidence that the Gei'mans murdered the Polish
officers in Katyn wood and buried them there.
The region of Smolensk having been occujiied by the Germans in July 1941, the
question occurs why the Soviet Government did not inform the foolish authori-
ties immediately after the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations, in the summer
of 1941, that many Polish officers, who were prisoners of war, had fallen into
German hands. On the contrary, the Soviet Government answered all inquiries
on this point over and over again, even as late as March 1942, with the assurance
that these prisoners of war had been released, in accordance with the concluded
agreement and should have reported themselves to the Polish military units.
These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Uussian
P.o.W. camps has not yet been fully elucidated.
The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling of human-
ity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern the families
of the victims. The entire Polish nation is entitled to demand that this tragedy
be cleared up.
In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to express
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks of
the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs, in order
to be fully elucidated, to be examined ai)art and treated independently by an
international judicial body.
SENATORS
Ignacy Balin.ski, Croft House, Sudbury, Suffolk.
JozefGodlewski, 17, Cleveden Place, S.W.I.
Alexander Heiman Jarecki, 10"), Hallam Street, W.l.
Prof. Wojciecli Jastrzebowski, 41, Belsize Square, N.W.3.
Inz. Jerzv Iwanowski, 11. Dora Road, Wimbledon. S.W.19.
Tadeusz Katelbach, 112, Eton Hall, Eton College Rd., N.W.S.
Adam Koc, 46 East TOth Street, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.
Wanda Norwid-Neugebauer, Eton Hall, Chalk Farm, N.W.S.
Karol Niezal.ytowski. Hay Lodge, Peeble, Scotland.
Konstanty Rdultowski, Cairo, Egypt.
Stefan Rosada, 7. Glenorchy Terrace, Edinburgh. 9.
Dr. Konstanty Dzieduszycki. 1. Church Hill Place. Edinburgh, 10.
Stanislaw Jozwiak, 70. Clifton t-ourt. Edgware Road. W.2.
Kornel Krzeczunowicz. 14, Inverleith Row, Edinburgh.
Jerzy Paciorkowski, 184, l!e]siz(» Road, N.W.O.
Tadeusz Schaetzel. Ankara. Turkey.
Antoiii Zalewski, 8.1. Eaton Place, S.W.I.
P.ronisiaw Wanke. Rockcliffc l)y Dalbeattie, Scotland.
Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowski. 2:>, Greystock Court. Hanger Lane, W.fi
Prof. Wladyslaw Wielhorski, .l. White Hall Gardens, W.3.
Witold Zj'borski, "Featherstones", 11, Fairlawn Road, Lytham, Lanes.
AFTER KE(1<:SS
Chaii'inaii M.vdden. The committee will come to order.
T\w first, witness will be Mr. Elmer Davis. Will you take the stand.
Ml". Davis, and be sworn?
Do yon solemnly swear that the testimony yon will give in the hear-
ing before (he connnittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing^
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr, Davis. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1979
TESTIMONY OF ELMER DAVIS, NEWS BROADCASTER AND COM-
MENTATOR, AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO., WASHINGTON, D. C.
Chairman Madoen. Mr. Davis, will you state your full name, please?
Mr. Davis. Elmer Davis.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Davis. 1661 Crescent Place, Washington 9, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And your business?
Mr. Davis. News broadcaster and commentator for the American
Broadcasting- Co.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, for. the purpose of this hearing I
would like to have now read into the record by Mr. Pucinski, the
testimony taken by the congressional committee investigating the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. This is the testimony of Mr.
Joseph Lang, which was taken on August 5 in New York City.
Mr. Pucinski, will you proceed, please?
Mr. Pucinski. Yes. I am reading from page 387 of volume 991 of
the House committee hearings. This volume is from the Senate library.
The testimony is by Mr. Joseph Lang.
Mr. Machrowicz. What committee and what date?
Mr. Pucinski. This testimony was taken during a study and in-
vestigation of the Federal Communications Commission on Thursday,
August 5, 1943. The hearings were in New York City.
Now, this is the testimony of Mr. Joseph Lang, general manager of
radio station WHOM, New York, N. Y.
The question being propounded to Mr. Lang is by Mr. Garey, who
was the committee counsel for this committee, which was headed by
Congressman Cox.
Mr. Garey said :
Mr. Lang, did you ever have a meeting with Mrs. Shea, at which the question
of the policy that should be adopted toward Russia was discussetl?
Mr. Lang. I had a meeting with Mrs. Shea and Alan Cranston in my office.
Mr. Garey. We know who Mrs. Shea is, but I don't think this record shows who
Alan Cranston is. Will you tell us who Alan Cranston is?
Mr. Lang. Alan Cranston is head of the Foreign Language Division of the
Office of War Information.
Mr. Garey. And about when did this conversation take place?
Mr. Lang. I believe it was around the middle of May 1943.
Mr. Garey. And how did the meeting come about?
Mr. Lang. Mr. Cranston called me, I believe it was on a Monday, and asked
if he could meet with Mr. Simon and me regarding what he described as the
Polish situation. He asked if he could meet with us on the following Wednesday.
Mr. Garey. Where did the meeting take place?
Mr. Lang. At my office.
Mr. Garey. Who was present at the meeting?
Mr. Lang. INIr. Cranston, Mrs. Shea, Mr. Arthur Simon, myself, and I be-
lieve Mr. Fred Call, who handled public relations for the foreign-language
radio wartime control. This was a meeting not with us as individual station
owners but representing the foreign-language radio wartime control.
Mr. Garey. And Mr. Arthui' Simon is manager of the Bulova station in
Philadelphia, designed by the call letters WPEN?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Garey. And he was chairman of that foreign-language radio wartime
control committee?
Mr. Lang. He was.
Mr. Garey. Will you tell us what was said at that meeting, and by whom?
Mr. Lang. Both Mr. Cranston and :Mrs. Shea were concerned with the sit-
uation that had been developing between Russia and Poland in regard to the
1980 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
matter of boundaries, and the fact that Poland, I believe, through its Premier,
its Government in exile in London, had protested to Russia about the slaying
of these 10.000 Polish officers in Russia. And they were concerned as to how
the situation would he handled on different radio stations.
Mr. Garey. What did Mr. Cranston want you to do?
Mr. Lang. He asked us — when I say "us" I mean the foreign-; guage radio
wartime control — if we could straighten out the situation in Dei >>it.
Mr. Garey. What situation olitained there?
]\Ir. Lang. From what I could gather, it seemed that on the Polish programs
out there the Polish news commentators had tal<en a rather antagonistic atti-
tude toward Russia in this matter, and they felt that it was inimical to the war
effort find should be straightened out in some way.
Mr. Garey. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views on what
should be put over the air in the United States about t^e Russian situation?
Thnt is the sum and .substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do?
Mr. Lang. I don't know that it was expressed that way. That was the
thought.
Mr. Garey. Is your answer to my question in the affirmative?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
IMr. Garey. Was the Office of Censorship represented at this meeting?
Mr. Lang. No ; it was not.
Mr. Garey. They had been invited to attend, but had reufsed to attend, had
they not?
Mr. Lang. I don't know that, sir.
Mr. Garey. They had failed to attend?
Mr. Lang. They were not present.
Mr. Garey. What did Mrs. Shea want you to do?
Mr. Lang. The same thing. They both expressed the same thoughts.
Mr. Garey. They wanted the gag put on any criticism of Russia, insofar as
critic'zing Russia's ambitions to establish a new Polish Frontier in the postwar
days was concerned?
Mr. Lang. Tliat seemed to be the gist of the talk.
Mr. Garey. And didn't they also want the gag put on any news concerning
the alleged killing of the 10,000 Polish Officers by the Russians in Russia?
Mr. Lang. That was not expressed. The thought was that if commentators
were to he permitted to express their own views, there was no limit to what
they could say. I suggested that if the situation were handled as I handled it on
my station, whereby commentators, both on Russian and Polish programs were
permitted to broadcast only the news as it came off the teletype, that would solve
the situation, because it wouhl mean that only news from the news services
would be broadcast, and not anyone's views.
IVIr. Garey. What was the result of the meeting?
Mr. Lang. Mr. Simon and I said we would get in touch with our committee
member in Detroit and talk to him and see if we could get the matter straightened
out.
Mr. Garey. And did you?
Mr. Lang. AVe did. We called ^Ir. James Hopkins.
Mr. Garey. Of what station?
Mr. Lang. WGBK, in Detroit. And we spoke to liim along these lines, sug-
gesting that his station, as well as two other stations, the call letters of which
I don't recollect, stick strictly to their authenticated news service, and not permit
any individual to express his individual views.
Mr. Garey. Wliat Ililde Shea and Cranston were doing, they were engaging
in the censorship of program content: weren't tliey?
Mr. Lang. I think you miglit put it that way. I wouVl say "Yes."
Mr. Gakey. Certainly. And the Communications Act of 1944 expressly forbids
tlie Federal Communications Commission to censor program content; doesn't it?
Mr. Lang. It does.
Mr. (Jakey. And the Office of War Information had no .iurisdiction in the matter
whatever ; did it? j,'
Mr. Lang. Tliat is right. i
Mr. MiTCiiKLL. Mr. Davis, at that time I believe you were lioad of '|
IliP DWT. Could you tell the (.'oiiiniittee when you took' over (he |
chnirmaiishi|) of the OAVT? |"
Mr. Davis. The l.'Uh of Juiu' 1042.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1981
Mr. Mitchell. Who was your predecessor in office ?
Mr. Davis. We had none. We were a combination of four preceding
agencies.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how the OWI was
formed, if ''>Hi please?
Mr. DA^^P.' It was put together by a combination of what was then
the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information
under General Donovan, an organization which had previously been
combined with what later became the OSS, the Office of Facts and Fig-
ures, under Archibald MacLeish, the Division of Information of the
Office of Emergency INIanagement, under Bob Lorton, and the Office
of Government Eeports under Lowell Mott. They were all brought
in together into a new organization.
As I have said elsewhere, I felt like a man, at times, who had married
a four-time widow and was trying to raise her children by all of her
previous marriages.
Mr. Mitchell. Sir, where and to whom did you report as the head
of OWI ? What was the chain of command ?
Mr. Davis. President Roosevelt. If I may amplify, INIr. Counsel,
we reported only to the President for all operations. But on matters
of foreign policy we had to consult the State Department and conform
to their views.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how the liaison
was conducted between these various other Government agencies,
which affected the war effort.
Mr. Davis. We had various people assigned to contact each of the
Government departments, and quite a number of people would con-
sult different officials in the State Department on different issues to
see what the Government policy was. With respect to major issues,
occasionally I had to take them up with the President. But he was
pretty busy, and I didn't bother him more than I had to.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there any kind of a Board or Commission
established for policy guidance for OWI ?
Mr. Davis. Well, there was theoretically such a Commission, and I
was directed to perform my duties after consulting it. It was set up
with appointees by the other departments, in such shape that it seemed
to me that its purpose was to keep us from ever doing anything much.
So, after two consultations with them in the first month that I held
office, I performed my duties according to the Executive order. They
never met again.
Mr. Mitchell. Then could you explain to the committee how policy
respecting the OWI was accomplished? How did you get your
directives of advice and consultation ?
Mr. Davis. Well, on foreign policy matters, as I say, we consulted
the State Department. On specific issues it was usually done by some-
body from our overseas branch calling up somebody in the State
Department who was concerned with that particular division. I had
frequent consultations with Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles, myself, on
general policies.
Mr. Mitchell. Was this on over-all policy, your consultations?
Mr. Davis. On the way we should handle certain matters in foreign
propaganda, so that we would conform to the foreign policy of the
United States.
93744— 52— pt. 7 11
1982 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
iMr. Mitchell. Then liaison was otherwise from desk to desk?
Mr. Davis. We had people who were especially associated with each
of the other departments, but with most of them our problem was
to see that the news they handed out was as fresh as possible and as
accurate as possible, and that there were not too violent conflicts
between the departments and what they said.
Mr. Mitchell. And the two individuals that you consulted for
over-all policy were Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles ?
Mr. Davis. On foreign policy only.
Mr. Mitchell. On foreign policy only ?
Mr. Da^ts. Yes.
]Mr. Mitchell. Now, could you tell the committee the exact purpose
or function of OWI ?
Mr. Davis. Well, it is all set forth in greater length and detail in
the Executive order, than I can now remember.
JMr. Mitchell. Briefly.
Mr. Davis. Its object was to tell the news as fully and as accurately
as we could to the people of the United States, a function in which we
were very much limited by the fact that we were only coordinators of
the new^s issued by the other departments, and also to inform foreign
nations, both hostile, friendly and neutral, about the policies and
business of the United States.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you get the new^s coming in from over-
seas 'I What agencies furnished that to the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. We had a division called the Foreign News Bureau,
whicli obtained the reports of the Federal Broadcast Information
Service of all of the enemy broadcasts, and all broadcasts, to be sure,
but primarily the enemy broadcasts, which they would take and
analyze principally for the purpose of pointing out where the enemy
was telling a different story to one part of the world than to another.
They issued their reports on those broadcasts, and they were made
available to the press. That was the only news we obtained from
overseas.
Mr. Mitchell. Was your organization broken up in such a way
as to have individuals responsible country by country or area by area?
Mr. Davis. In our propaganda to those countries, yes. The infor-
mation that we obtained from abroad, as I sa}^, was only through
this one channel, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and was
analyzed by our own people and put out for availability to tlie press
here.
Mr. Mitchell, The subject matter being investigated by this com-
mittee concerns Katyn and Poland. Can you tell the committee who
was in charge of that operation in your Department?
Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know what you mean b}' "that operation."
Mr. Mitchell. The overseas broadcasts.
Mr. Davis. Well, that would be under the general direction of
Robert Sherwood, who was then the head of the Overseas Branch.
As to the people who were underneath him, there were quite a number
of them.
The policy was supposed to be laid down in Washington and fol-
lowed by our opei'ating staffs in various points around the world — New
York, Sail Fi-ancisco, the Southwest Pacific, London, Algiers, and so
on — although in Algici-s and in the Southwest Pacific, of course, we
were under military direction.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1983
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have as part of your organization a desk
or an individual who was responsible for reporting to the American
people, country by country?
Mr, Davis. No.
Mr. ^IiTCHELL. Responsible for reporting the news that came in ?
JNlr. Davis. No ; we did not.
Mr. Mitchell. You didn't have an area desk?
Mr. Davis. Not for reports to the American people. We had area
desks for propaganda overseas. But normally, we did not produce
much news for the American people. The great volume of news
printed in the American press and used on the radio at that time came
from the news services and special correspondents in foreign countries.
Mr. Mitchell. Then how can you explain what was read into the
record a few minutes ago about Mr. Cranston, who was a member of
.3"our staff, having this meeting in New York with members of the
Foreign Language Radio Wartime Control?
Mr. Davis. Well, I can't recall that I have ever heard of that episode
until it was read to me. But I should say that, in the first place, the
declaration made by the counsel of that commit tee seems to have been
contradicted by a statement of one of the broadcasters a little earlier,
that it was indicated that the news analysts or commentators on those
stations could handle the news the way they wanted to, but JNIr. Crans-
ton merely hoped that they would not handle it in such a way as to stir
up antipathy between two of our allies.
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot quite understand why Mr. Cranston's par-
ticular function fitted in with this capacity, since it was not the func-
tion of the OWI to handle news within the country.
Mr. Davis. Strictly speaking, he had no authority, and as I think
that excerpt makes clear, he made no attempt to impose any authority.
He merely suggested that as a matter of moving toward the winning
of the war, they should try to avoid stirring up trouble between our
allies.
Mr. Mitchell. But that was the function of the Office of Censor-
ship?
Mr. Davis. No. The Office of Censorship was supposed to tell them
what they could not print or what they could not broadcast. We
didn't attempt to do that, and I think that the excerpt read will indi-
cate that Mr. Cranston didn't attempt to do that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't understand why Cranston was engaged
in that particular function of curtailing news within the United States.
The job of the OWI was outside, was it not ?
Mr. Davis. The job of the OWI was to provide Government news
inside the United States, not news from abroad. This was a function
which had been held over from one of our predecessor organizations in
an attemi^t to reason with some of the foreign language broadcasting
stations which at the beginning, immediately after Pearl Harbor, and
long before OWI — one or two of them, still had some persons of rather
f ascistic tendencies on their staffs ; and I believe that that work was
started then to try to persuade them to present their broadcasts so
as to contribute to the winning of the war. We went very much less
far in that direction than did George Creel who, by the simple ex-
pedient of getting hold of the man who controlled all of the advertis-
ing for the foreign language press, managed to get the foreign lan-
guage piess to say about what Creel wanted it to say.
1984 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. What was George Creel's function at that time ?
Mr. Davis. That was in the old war, it was substantially the same
as the one I had then.
Mr. Mitchell. But it had nothinfy to do with this one?
Mr. Davis. Oh, no. The previous one.
Mr. Mitchell. I still can't understand why, under the charter
of the OWI, any individual employed by the OWI would take it upon
himself, or else by policy direction, or in some way, to contact anyone
within the United States concerning broadcasts of news. Was it with-
in the charter ?
Mr. Davis, I should have to read the charter again to find out
whether that authority may have lain there. As I say, I didn't know
•about this situation. But, as I think this testimony will indicate, JNIr.
Cranston was merely talking to them by way of suggesting that they
try not to create too much disharmony among two of our allies. It
really did not attempt to give any instructions, and he did not propose
to tell them what to say. It is stated in there that the commentators
could say anything they liked.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, if I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that
time.
Mr. Davis. What is that?
Mr. Mitchell. If I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that
time i
Mr. Davis, I said "between two of our allies."
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I still can't understand why Cranston, in his
capacity in the OWI, would in any way — that was a function of some-
body else, wasn't it? Wasn't it? Was it a function of the OWI?
Mr. Davis. No ; it certainly wasn't a f miction of anybody else that
I can think of. I don't know whether it was properly a function of the
OWL As to why he did this, you had better ask Cranston. As I say,
I didn't remember this episode.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. We will have Mr. Cranston.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to have Mr. Pucinski read into the
record a broadcast that Mr. Elmer Davis made on May 3, 1943.
Chairman Madden. How long is it?
Mr. Davis. It is 15 miiiutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mitchell. This is only concerned with the Katyn affair.
Chairman Madden. -All right.
Mr. Pucinski. Maybe we had better have Mr. Davis read it. It is
his exact words, and he will probably like to refer to it while you are
talking to him.
Mr. Davis. I appear to be quoting from myself on May 3, 1943. I
may say, Mr. Chairman, tliat I don't believe I have seen the scripts
of this broadcast since that date, but I have no doubt that it is correct
(reading) :
The Allied s((ueeze is on in Tunisia, and is going to be slow and hard. The
enemy is fighting with great skill and stubbornness, and dispatches from the
front report heavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill
by hill, and every hill means a hard struggle. The critical jioiiit of the Hue is
the center, where the P.ritish First Army is pushing northeastward from Med.jez
el Hal). Here an advance of only a few kilometers will brin^- them into tint
country much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger;
here their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevetheless the
enemy is fighting a losing light. The Allied air forces and the British naval
forces are knocking oil" ships and i)laiu's on which the Axis must depend I'"i'
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1985
suitplies and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will
eventually break the enemy down.
The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on the
southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the Ger-
mans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus from it.
It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive against
Russia.
Mr. Mitchell,. Will you go down now to the part about Katyn ?
Mr. Davis. I am reading it along as it comes, INIr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Please start right there [indicating].
Mr. Davis (reading) :
But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German
piopaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing
about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish Govern-
ment in exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine
Hitler preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow
a big lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September
1939, tlie Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of
Polish troops prisoners. In June 1941, when the Germans attacked Russia, they
overran all of this territory and have held it since. Now, almost 2 years later,
they suddenly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands
of Polish officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians
I] years ago. In several respects, this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans
were quite uncertain about the number of killed. At one time the Japanese and
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not
I'oles in' Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000, and then 5,000, before
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after 3 years.
The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet they buried
every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an investiga-
tion by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans control
the area. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpses in uniform
with identification tags. There is no way the investigators could determine
whether these men were killed by Russians or by Germans, as they probably
were.
I might say, Mr. Counsel, that after the lapse of 9i/^ years, I am
convinced that they were killed by the Russians ; but this was a state-
ment made at the time, with the evidence then available.
The Germans are known to have slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Poles
after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish prisoners, when
they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing in the world
for them to murder them, too — if not at the moment, then later, when they needed
the corpses for propaganda.
Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland, they told the world that
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the
Poles. Few people believed that story : It is all the more remarkable that any
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for 3i/^
years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate attempt to
exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse suspicion
and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United States, which would help
the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecution of the
war we are all fighting against Germany. Indix'ectly, it might help to prop up
German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the German civilian
population — yes, even among the Army — that there is less belief that they can
ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But the German propaganda
has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain might call
off the war, make a compromise peace, and leave Germany free to turn on Russia.
And of course, more people will believe that if there is trouble between Russia
and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the United
Nations, concerns every one of those nations — the United States included^
because we must hold together to win the war.
1986 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. I tliink that is enough, Mr. Davis. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to read a memorandum from the
Department of State dated April 22, 1943, which was approximately
8 days previous to the broadcast that Mr. Davis has just put on the
record.
In the upper left-hand corner of this memorandum is the stamp
of the Assistant Secretary of State, dated April 22, 1943, being the
stamp of Mr. Berle.
The first name from this memorandum has been deleted, in accord-
ance with the agreement with the Department of State.
At the request of Mr. Berle, So-and-So called to ask whether he had any objec-
tion to Stockholm air.ffram No. so-and-so heins given to the OWI, apparently for
the purpose of using information contained therein regarding German atrocities
against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign which OWI wishes to start
in order to counteract the German propaganda story regarding the alleged exe-
cution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet authorities. It is felt that
because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the alleged execution
of these Polish officers, and on the l)asis of the various conflicting contentions
of all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking
any definite stand in regard to this question. Although it is realized that the
story emanates from German sources, and is being used by the German propa-
ganda machine in an effort to divide the members of the United Nations, it should
be borne in mind that whether the story is true or not, it is known that the
Polish Government has, without success, for the past year and a half been en-
deavoring to ascertain from the Soviet Government the whereabouts of some
S,000 Polish officers who, on the best of available evidence, were captured by the
Soviet forces in 1939.
In this connection, the Polish Government in the summer of 1942, specifically
asked the American Ambassador to Moscow to intervene with the Soviet Govern-
ment in an effort to cause the latter to release the S,000 Polish officers, who were
reportedly still being held by the Soviet authorities. According to the Polish
officials here, the Soviet authorities have never released one of the officers on the
list presented by the Polish Government. Furthermore, according to a telegram
of April 20, 7 p. m., from Berne, it appears that the International Red Cross
has agreed to send a delegation to Smolensk to investigate the German allega-
tions. It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evi-
dence is available, it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in
this regard.
Now, Mr. Davis, it is evident that the Department of State
Chairman Madden. Pardon me. Did you want that introduced as
an exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis. Is that a memorandum to me ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is just a straight memorandum setting forth
the State Department's policy at that time.
Chairman Madden. Identify it and mark it as an exhibit.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Yes, sir.
This is a memorandum setting forth the policy of the Department
of State, with respect to the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn.
It is an unsigned memorandum, the original of which is in the Depart-
ment of State's files.
If you desire to see the original, sir, I will ask Mr. Ben Brown of
the Department of State to produce that.
Ml'. Davis. I trust you have had a certified copy made ?
Mr. Mitchell. This is a photostatic copy of it, sir.
Mr. Davis. All right.
Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and intro-
duce it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1987
Mr. Mitchell. This will be exhibit 8A, Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. Do you want to have the portion of Mr. Davis'
broadcast marked as an exhibit and introduce it in evidence?
Mr. Mitchell. Let us do it in reverse. We will mark this as 8 and
this as 8A.
Chairman Madden. Exhibit 8 is Mr. Davis' broadcast and exhibit
8A is the State Department memorandum. Those documents will be
accepted in evidence as exhibits 8 and 8A.
(Exhibits 8 and 8 A were received and follow here :)
Exhibit 8 — Mr. Elmer Davis' Radio Broadcast of Mat 3, 1943
{Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 1873 dated June 21, 1943, from the Legation at Stock-
holm. Submitted as Enclosure 2 to Department on Embassy Despatch 1008, June
0, 1952.]
American Legation
Stockholm
COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS
No. 51 Vol. II. May 3, 1943.
The Weekly War Survey
lu his weekly l)roadcast, the Director of the Office of War Information, Elmer
Davis, sixike as follows :
"The Allied squeeze is on in Tunisia and is going to be slow and hard. The
enemy is fighting witli great skill and stubborness, and dispatches from the front
report lieavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill by hill,
and every iiill means a hard struggle. The critical point of the line is the
center wiiere the British First Army is pushing northeastward from Medjez
El Bab : liere an advance of only a few kilometers will bring them into flat coun-
try much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger; here
their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevertheless the enemy
is fighting a losing fight. The Allied air forces and the British naval forces
are knocking off ships and planes on which the Axis must depend for supplies
and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will even-
tually break the enemy down.
"The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on
the southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the
Germans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus this
suinmer. It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive
against Riissia, but they may have enough force this summer for regional at-
tacks, and the Caucasus with its oilfields is perhaps the most probable target.
The present Russian attack seems aimed at breaking down that springboard be-
fore anybody can .lump oft" from it.
"But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German
propaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing about
a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish government in
exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine Hitler
preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow a big
lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September 1939,
the Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of Polish
troops prisoners. In June 1941 when the Germans attacked Russia, they overran
all this territory and have held it since. Now, almost two years later they sud-
denly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands of Polish
officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians three
years ago. In several respects this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans
were quite uncertain about the number of killed; at one time the Japanese and
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not
Poles in Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000 and then 5,000, before
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after three
years. The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet
they buried every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an
investigation by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans
1988 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
control the aroa. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpse
in uniform with identification tags. There is no way the investigators couN
determine whether these men were killed by Russians, or by Germans as the;
probably were. The Germans are l<nuwn to have slaughtered hundreds of thou
sands of Poles after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish
prisoners when they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing
in the world for them to murder them, too, if not at the moment, then later when
they needed the corpses for propaganda.
"Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland they told the world that
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the
Poles. Few people believed that story ; it is all the more remarkable that any
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for three
and a half years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate
attempt to exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse
suspicion and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United Nations — which
would help the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecu-
tion of the war we are all fighting against Germany. Indirectly, it might help
to prop up German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the
German civilian population — yes, even among the army — that there is less belief
that they can ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But German
propaganda has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain
might call off the war, make a compromise peace and leave Germany free to turn
on Russia. And of course more people will believe that if there is trouble between
Russia and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the
United Nations concerns every one of those nations — the United States included —
because we must all hold together to win the war. After the war, if the United
Nations continue to hold together in some sort of collective security system, there
will be less danger that any of the great powers may feel it has to safeguard its
individual security at the expense of its weaker neighbors. That is the only way
this issue can be treated — as one phase of the problem of world security.
Exhibit 8A — State Department Memorandum Which Bore a Ruhijer Stamp
Mark Indicating It Had Been Delivered to Me. Beele on April 22, 1943
Department of State.
Division of European Affairs,
April 22, J9',J.
memoranduji
of FC, at the request of Mr. Berle, called to ask whether Eu
had any objection to Stockholm's airgram No. A-lSl, April 5, 4 p. m., being given
to OWI apparently for the purpose of using information contained therein
regarding German atrocities against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign
which OWI wishes to start in order to counteract the German propaganda story
regarding the alleged execution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet
authorities.
It is felt that because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the
alleged execution of these Polish oflicers and on the basis of the various con-
flicting contentions ol" all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to
refrain from taking any definite stand in regard to this question.
Although it is realized that the story emanates from German sources and is
being used by the German propaganda machine in an effort to divide the members
of the United Nations, it should be borne in mind that whether the .story is true
or not, it is known that the I'ollsh (lovernment has, without success, for the past
year and a half been endeavoring to ascertain from the Soviet (Joveriunent the
whereabouts of some 8,000 Polish oflicers who on the best avnilal>le evidence were
captured by the Soviet forc(>s in ID.'^O. In this connection the Polish (Jovernmeut
in tlie summer of 1942 specifically asked that the American Ambassador to
Moscow intervene with the Soviet Government in an effort to cause tlie latter
to release the 8,000 Polish oflicers who were? purportedly still being lH>ld by the
Soviet authorities. According to Polish oflicials here the Soviet authorities have
never released one of the oflicers on the list presented by tlie Polish Government.
Furthermore, according to telegram No. 2471, April 20, 7 p. m., from Bern, it
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1989
apiJears that the International Red Cross has agreed to send a delegation to
Smolensk to investigate the German allegations.
It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evidence is
available it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in this regard.
If, on the other hand, it is felt that it is imperative to counteract the German
propaganda it is suggested that such action should be limited to a campaign
liointing out that the American Government and the American people refuse to
allow German propaganda stories regarding the alleged execution of the Polish
officers to detract their attention from the many and continuing crimes which
have been committed by the German authorities since the beginning of the war.
In this connection OWI could repeat the many authenticated stories such as that
of Lidice and might even quote, without giving the source or stating that the
information has been completely verified, pertinent information from the attached
telegram from Stockholm. It is not believed that the information in this tele-
gram should be attributed as coming from official sources since in the last para-
graph doubt is thrown on the accuracy of the information reported.
As of possible interest in this connection there is attached a copy of the Polish
National Council's statement which follows in some way the line suggested for
OWI.
(Committee Note. — A copy of the Polish National Council's statement referred
to in the last paragraph of exhibit 8A appears as exhibit 21 on p. 678 of pt. 4 of
this committee's published hearings.)
Mr. Mitchell. Mr, Davis, you have told us previously that on over-
all policy and on high-level policy matters, you discussed those with
Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles. I would like to ask you now whether you
ever discussed this matter specifically at this time with the Department
of State or any official therein?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember. I may say,. Mr. Counsel, that this
was not one of the major issues that I had to deal with at that time,
from my point of view. To a Pole it was certainly the most impor-
tant issue in the world, but to me, as to the head of every department
or agency of Government, about that time ol year the principal ques-
tion was how his budget was- going to get through Congress, and that
absorbed most of my time. So whether I asked advice on this question
from either INIr. Hull or Mr. Welles, I don't remember. I don't recall
seeing this memorandum from Mr. Berle, although it is conceivable
that I might have. I don't know.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think the records of the broadcast are avail-
able today — who prepared it for you? You didn't prepare it?
Mr, Dwis, Of course — I wrote my own.
Mr. Mitchell, Then you wrote that broadcast ?
Mr, Davis, Yes.
Mr, Mitchell, 'WHiere did you get the information concerning the
Polish situation at that time?
Mr. Davis. Do you mean the information in here [indicating ex-
hibit 8] ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes,
Mr. Davis. There doesn't seem to be much about the Polish situation.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean the propaganda,
Mr, Davis, A good deal of it was printed in the newspapers at the
time. Some of it may even have been in my broadcasts, I imagine
that the correlation of different stories told by different Axis Powers
probably came from recorded broadcasts by the FBIS wliich came
through our Foreign News Bureau.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, since there was a question of doubt at that
particular time, and since the International Ked Cross was becoming
involved in this, and since it was after the Polish-Soviet relationship
1990 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
was severed, wliy did you see fit at that time to take the stand yon
took in this broadcast ?
Mr. DA^^s. Because I beh'eved it at that time to be correct. It w:is
a matter of news. For a period of about 3 months I did a weekly
broadcast on an over-all survey of the war situation, which I even-
tually dropped because I could never be quite sure who was broad-
casting. It was not the executive branch of the Government of the
United States. That— if that would have been the case, I would have
had to have Presidential approval for all I said. It wasn't me, be-
cause I felt that in justice to other broadcasters I should not use.
even for background interpretation, any confidential information that
came to me as a result of my Government service. Some of that
confidential information I probably could have picked up if I had
been a reporter, by going around, so it was not as good as Davis
would have been normally, and it was not as authoritative as repre-
sentations of the Government of the United States. So about the
end of 3 months, I dropped it, but I was doing it at this time. This
was a matter of news.
With regard to the suggestion of Mr. Berle, as I say, I don't remem-
ber whether I saw it or not, but this was an issue which a news organ-
ization could hardly overlook. One of our difficulties with the De-
partment of State Avas that there was only the question of: AVliere is
the boundary line between policy and implementation of that policy
by propaganda? They could tell us, unquestionably, the general
line, but when they attempted to tell us how we could handle it in
propaganda overseas, they Avere dealing with something which very
often they didn't know very much about. I do not think any news
organization could have overlooked this. If I had not happened to
be broadcasting once a week at that time, I would undoubtedly have
had nothing to say about this domestically, as it was outside of our
field. But we were handling it in our foreign propaganda — we
couldn't overlook it. I mean that is a case where silence would be
about the worst ]jossible propaganda you could make.
At the time I made this broadcast, the evidence rested almost en-
tirely on the word of Josef Goebbels. a man whose reputation for
veracity was extremely low.
Now, it appears, with all of the subsequent evidence, that has be-
come available, that this was the one time he was right; but I had
no reason to believe so at the time. I have never been able to accept
the argument that I should have believed the story of the Propaganda
Minister of a Government with which the Goverinnent of the I"^nited
States was at war, without some corroboration.
Mr. Mitchell. But the Polisli Government in exile had alrciidy re-
quested the International Red Cross to investigate?
Mr. Davis. Yes, they had requested that; but, as I remember,. the
Commission of Physicians that finally went in there — was that ap-
pointed by the International Red Cross? I don't remember.
Mr. MiTciiElL. No.
Mr. Davis. That Avas a Gei-man group ?
Mr. Mitchell. The International Red Cross was prevented from
going in there because of the fact thai the Soviets refused to partici-
pate. Conse(iuently, the (Germans formed an International Medical
Commission. But Poland Avas an ally at tliat time. Poland had re-
quested at that time an International Red Cross investigation. Re-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1991
latioiLsliiiDS AYere broken off between the Poles and the Soviets on
April ^6 1043 Yonr broadcast is dated May 2. So there mnst have
been son'ie donbt or question. Otherwise the Polish Governn^nt
wouldn't have gone to the extent of asking for an International iied
Cross investigation. ■, , x i ^ t ^ i^ ^i .
Mr D WIS. Oh, there may have been some doubt, but 1 telt that as
at that moment the doubt should be resolved against the Propaganda
Minister of the enemy.
I mav say that that broadcast earned me three columns of denunci-
ation from 'the Daily Worker and also three columns of denunciation
from the Polish paper, or at least I was told it was denunciation. I
couldn't read it. At that moment both the Polish newspaper and the
Daily Worker knew of what I had said.
Ml'. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. INIr. Machrowicz?
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Davis, how long did you remain with the
Office of War Information ? When did you sever your relationship
with the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. September 15, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. During the time that you were m the Office of
War Information, had you ever known of the reports of Colonel Van
Vliet and Colonel Stewart ?
Mr. Davis. Never, sir. As far as I can recall now, I never heard ol
those reports until they came out in the investigations of this com-
mittee.
Mr. Machrowicz. Those reports, which indicated Russian guilty
were never made known to you ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, how large a staff did you have in the Office
of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. Well, at the peak we had about 9,000 here and abroad,
5,000 Americans, and about 4,000 of what we called locals, chauffeurs
and interpreters, and things like that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did 3^011 have a so-called Polish Section ?
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. How were these people selected?
]\Ir. Davis. A good many of them were there when I came. They
had come from the predecessor organization, the Coordinator of In-
formation. I don't remember who selected the man who was the head
of our Polish desk in Washington, Mr. Ludwig Krzyzanowski, but he
was a very sound man.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know the late Congressman John
Lesinski ?
Mr. Davis. I have had some correspondence with ]Mr. Lesinski.
Mr. Machrowicz, Was it at the time you were in the Office of War
Information?
Mr. Davis. No ; just recently — I mean 2 or 3 years ago.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have a recollection that Congressman
John Lesinski, the late Congressman — I mean the senior Mr. Lesinski —
having warned you about the fact that there were several Commu-
nists in the Office of War Information?
Mr. Davis. I don't recall that. I recall that he made a speech in
the summer of 1943 which contained more lies than were ever com-
prised in any other speech made about the Office of War Information,
1992 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
and that is saying quite a lot. I may say that I have made that state-
ment to Mr. Lesinski before he died. I mean that I have not waited
until after he is dead. I told him so in writing when he repeated
some of those statements 2 or 3 years ago. I asked him where he got
the information, because that was a perfectly absurd speech to be
made by a Member of the Congress of the United States who knows
anything about American politics or the American news business.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, let me ask you w^hether you received any
warnings from the then Polish Ambassador to the United States,
iVmbassaclor Ciechanowski, warning you about the fact that there
were some Communist employees in the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. I received a great number of allegations from Mr.
Ciechanowski. I can't remember all of them now, but they were in-
vestigated, and, as I recall, there was no convincing evidence to
support them.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Irene Belinska, who was in the
Polish Section?
]\Ir. Davis. I don't remember here.
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, she was at that time one
of the members of the Polish Section in your office.
Mr. Davis. Was she here or in New York ?
Mr. INIaciirowicz. In Washington. She is the daughter of Ludwig
Rajchman, who was the first consul of the Polish Communist Em-
bassy in Washington in 1945. Rajchman engineered the surrender
of the Polish Government in exile's files to to the Polish Communist
Government in Washington. In 194:7, this same Miss Balinska re-
turned to Poland — she was then employed by the Office of War
Information — returned to Communist Poland and then came back to
the United States and is now with a Polish Communist publishing
house which publishes an anti-American newspaper. Did vou know
that?
Mr. Davis. She could not have been employed by the Office of War
Information in 1947, because we had folded up.
Mr. ]VL\ciirowicz. No, not in 1947. It was prior to that time.
Mr. Davis. I don't remember.
Mr. MachSowicz. You don't remember having been warned by
Ambassador Ciechanowski or by anyone else about the fact that she
w^as in your employ and that she was a Communist?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember. It may have happened. I don't
know ; it is a long time ago.
]Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Mira Zlotowski, who was in your
employ in 1945 ?
Mr. Davis. I don't recall. Mr. Krzyzanowski was the only man I
ever had much dealing with, as I say, as the head of our Polish desk
in Washington.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know Mrs. Zlotowski, the wife of Prof.
Ignatius Zlotowski, the coiniselor of the Polish Conununist Embassy
in Washington, who was denounced as a Communist by General Mo-
delski of the Polish Embassy, who had resigned? He testified before
the House Un-American Activities Connnittee that Mrs. Zlotowski
was a Communist agent.
Mr. Davis. I have no doubt of that.
IVIr. Machrowicz. You don't remember her being employed by the
Office of War Information?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1993
■' Mr. Davis. She may well have been. I don't remember. As I say,
the only man I dealt with Avas Mr. Krzyzanowski, who after he left us,
went to the United Nations. For 3 or 4 years the Polish Communist
Government tried to get him out of his job at the United Nations
because he was working for us. I don't know whether he is still
employed there.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur
Salman ?
Mr. Davis. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, he was also employed by
the Office of War Information in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland,
and is editor in chief of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means
The Worker, tlie most outspoken anti-American organ in Warsaw. He
at that time was also an employee of the Office of War Information.
You have no recollection of him ?
Mr. Davis. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. You have no recollection of either Ambassador
Ciechanowski or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact
that these three persons were known Communists, and were in the
employ of the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me
about anything, Mr. Cieclianowski, perhaps by his excessive number
of warnings, made me forget which particular ones he especially
spoke about.
Mr. Machrowicz. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you
that you told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that
matter ?
Mr. Davis. I don't know, but I do know that I was often tempted
to tell various of the representatives of the governments in exile to
stay out of our business, because almost eveiy one of them seemed to
think that it was our duty to carry out the policies of his government
and not those of the United States. There were only two exceptions
to that that I can remember, of the governments in exile, the Czechs,
that is, the good Czechs, Benes, and Masaryk and the Filipino Govern-
ment.
I will anticipate your next question. Mr. Hof meister, who was head
of our Czechoslovak desk in New York, after the Communists seized
power, became a Communist and is now, I believe, the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Paris. But he showed no signs of that inclination
while he was with us that I ever heard of.
Mr; Machrowicz. You took that attitude, even though they had
warned you of the presence of Communist agents in the Office of War
Information ?
Mr. Davis. If I had taken seriously all of the stories about agents of
the Communists in the Office of War Information I would have had
nothing else to do but to fire the whole staff. We investigated every-
thing as much as we could, and we found that 99 percent of the allega-
tions were without foundation. I remember that at one time I re-
ceived a very serious warning in the summer of 1944 about some of our
people in Hollj^wood who were associating with a dangerous and sub-
versive character who at that time happened to be the chairman of the
Dewey comniittee in Hollywood, and who had also written the most
effective anti-Communist picture that was ever put on the screen.
1994 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, Machrowicz. Do you have any doubt about the fact that these
three persons whom I have mentioned were actually Communists ?
Mr. Davis. I have no doubt that they are now. They may be band-
wagon Communists, like a lot of others who wanted to be on the
winning side.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think that in commenting on the testimony
taken before the House committee in 1943, you referred to the fact
that Mr. Cranston was only expressing his hope as to what these com-
mentators would say ; is that correct ?
Mr. Davis. Well, that was the way it sounded to me. Counsel for
the committee phrased it a little differently, but it seemed to me that
the testimony of one of the witnesses will indicate that it was as you
say.
Mr. Machrowicz. I will refer you to this question and answer :
Mr. Gaket. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views of what
should be put over the air in the United States about the Russian situation?
That is the sum and substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do?
Mr. Lang. I don't know tliat it was expressed that way. That was the
thought.
Would you say that Mr. Cranston was right in trying to get any sta-
tion in Detroit — or any other station — to conform to the views on
Avhat should be put over the air?
Mr. Davis. No. What should be broadcast over the air in the
United States about the Russian situation?
Mr, Machrowicz. Yes.
Mr. Davis. No; that would be quite beyond our authority or quite
beyond my desires. But if you Avill look back a little further, you will
find that one of these gentlemen testified rather to the opposite.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am just referring to this particular question :
You would say that if he acted in the manner that has been described
here, he acted improperly ?
Mr. Davis. I think he acted improperly in that case, j'es — if he so
did.
Mr, Machrowicz. Did you at any time after your original broad-
cast in May 1943, broadcast any information indicating the receipt
of information showing Russian guilt ?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember.
Mr. Machrowicz. What information did you liave otlier than wliut
you have already said, upon which to base your belief as to tlie truth
of the contents of tliat statement of May 3, 1943 ?
Mr. Davis. Just what I have here, the conflicting stories told by the
various Axis Nations, and the general uiuvliability of Joseph Goeb-
bels.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, is it still your opinion, as expressed in that
bi'oadcast, that the request by the Polish Government for an impartial
Red Cross investigation was a maneuver, brought about by German
propaganda?
Mr. Davis. No. I except to that to the extent that the German
])i'()pagaiida, bringing in the whole story, touched off the chain re-
action. I am certainly not implying that the Polish Government was
responsive to German })ro])aganda ; but it was a very smart thing by
Joseph Goebbels, which brought an obvious reaction.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1995
Mr. Machrowicz. As I remember your broadcast, you indicated
that you thouofht tlie request of the Polish Government for an im-
partial investigation was a smart maneuver by the German propa-
ganda.
Mr. Davis. Well now, wait a minute. Let me see this. It says :
* * * German propoganda won a strikinj: success last week when it suc-
ceeded in bringing about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the
Polish Government in exile.
I don't think that that implies that the Polish Government was
responsive to German propaganda, as such; that the story that was
broken by German propaganda, which had not been broken before
then, was responsible for this, and that the refusal of the Kussians
to consider the International Red Cross investigation was responsible
for the breaking off of relations.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you don't believe — do you? — that the re-
quest by the Polish Government for an impartial investigation was
at all caused by German propaganda?
Mr. Davis. Oh, certainly not.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ?
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, there lias been handed to me, since I came
into the committee room at noon, a pamphlet which contains this state-
ment [reading] :
One of the greatest OWI scandals broke when Frederick Woltman published
his article entitled "A. F. of L. and CIO Charge OWI Radio as Conununistic."
Woltman's article appears in the New York World-Telegram of October 4, 1943.
It showed that the A. F. of L. as well as the CIO, the two great American labor
organizations, which nobody but the Comuuinists ever accused of being reaction-
ary, withdrew their cooperation from the OWI's labor desk because of the latter's
outspoken Communist attitude.
Do you want to comment on that ?
Mr. Davis, That is correct. We removed the man at the head of
the desk.
Mr. Dondero. Who was that man?
Mr. Davis. I have forgotten his name now, but I remember that it
happened.
May I ask what the pamphlet is, sir?
Mr. Dondero. Yes ; it is a ])ami)hlet entitled "The OWI and Voice
of America," by Julius Epstein.
Mr. Davis. That statement is correct, and we did remove the man.
We had to fire a few people now and then.
Mr. Dondero. How many, Mr. Davis, did you have to fire because
of their communistic attitude ?
Mr. DA\^s. I think it was about a dozen. We fired the head of
the Greek desk in Xew York because he violated a directive sent from
Washington about the liandling of the news of Greece. I have for-
gotten his name, but it happened. There were a few others here
and there.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Davis, can you tell us how vou were selected for
the OWI job?
Mr. Davis. Well, I was selected by the President. I don't know
how he came to the conclusion. New Yorker magazine was my
1996 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
original sponsor. I wrote to the editor afterward and told him that
he seemed to be the man who did it. He said that he was "delighted,"
because that was the second public-service campaign he had ever
conducted, both successful. The first one was to get the information
booth in the Pennsylvania Station moved to the middle of the con-
course. He seemed to think that these two achievements were of about
equal importance.
Mr. Sheehan. You stated in the beginning that you reported only
to the President?
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, the President must have given you some
directives, or some ideas of what he wanted you to do, or what job
he wanted you to accomplish. Can you relate that ?
Mr. Davis. Well, Mr. Roosevelt was a pretty busy man. I didn't
bother him any more than I had to. I think it is fair to say that he
was not very much interested in propaganda, so that I didn't get very
many directives from him about specific matters.
Mr. Sheehan. What do you mean by "not verj- much interested in
propaganda"?
Mr. Davis. I don't think that he regarded it as of any major im-
portance. For example, I don't think that he attached anything like
the weight to it that President Wilson did.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you just had a cursory talk with
him. The President didn't lay down any specific principles ?
Let's be specific. Did he say at any time the way in which you
should treat Russia or any of our otlier allies?
Mr. Davis. No ; not other than to
Mr. Sheehan. Then the whole policy of OWI was entirely within
your lap ?
Mr. Davis. We had to check with the State Department, as I say,
on specific issues; but, very often, we found that the Government
had no policy. When I say "very often" that is a little exaggeration,
but there were certain cases in which we found that the Government
had not decided on policy. We had to keep on presenting news to
and about certain countries, and there we just had to "roll our own."
Mr. Sheehan. The State Department, then, did not lay down any
policy for you at any time ?
Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; they did on various points, quite a lot of them.
Mr. Sheehan. To be specific, did they lay down any policy or ask
you to follow any particular line with reference to the treatment of
Russian news?
JNIr. Davis. No.
Mr. Sheehan. German news?
Mr. Davis. Well, naturally, we regarded German news with con-
siderable suspicion. We were at war with Germany, and what came
out of Germany was Avhat was permitted by Joe Goebbels. We didn't
have very much confidence in him as a news source.
Mr. Sheehan. I would like to get back to this talk about F. D. R.
It seems inconceivable to he that Mr. Roosevelt would have called
you in and would have said "Hero, Mr. Davis; you take over the OWI.
It is yours," with no specific instructions, or anything. It seems to
me that Mr. Roosevelt was a strong-enough-willed man that, if he
believed he did not Mant your pro[)agun(la, he would have put the
OWI out of existence.
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1997
Mr. Davis. The propaganda agency had been in existence before
that. The problem when OWI was "formed was to unify the four
Government agencies that were then in existence. That was the prin-
cipal thing that I was concerned with.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you agree with Mr. Roosevelt that propaganda
wasn't worth much?
Mr. Davis. No; though I think that its value often has been over-
rated. Propaganda never won a war by itself. It can be an extremely
useful auxiliary to military operations, but it never w^on a war single-
handedly.
Mr. Sheehan. On the basis of your experience in OWI — and you
have probably followed its course since you left it — do you think that,
as a whole generally, they have done a worthwhile job ?
Mr. Davis. Whom do you mean ?
Mr. Sheehan. The propaganda agencies, the OWI and the Voice
of America ?
Mr. Davis. I do.
Mr. Sheehan. You think it has been effective with the people over-
seas ?
Mr. Davis. It has been about as effective as it could be.
Mr. Sheehan. That may be nothing.
Mr. Davis. Well, it is more effective than that. It has been very
valuable at times.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you think, in your own opinion, that we are
getting our money's worth for the large amount of money we are put-
ting into this propaganda ?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Then, if you were a taxpayer, you would want to
continue the Voice of America ?
Mr. Davis. I am a taxpayer, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you think it should be continued?
Mr. Davis. It should be continued. It may be, as some have said,
that a psychological-warfare program will crack the Communist front
in Korea. I very much doubt that. It will help, but it won't do it by
itself, in my opinion. However, it will help.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, this Congress — and I myself, having been
fortunate enough to be reelected — will have to face the fact that we are
voting some appropriations for the Voice of America. From what I
have seen and heard — and I am giving you my own personal opinion —
I am not too confident. I mean that it is big in size and it is a large
amount of money that is being spent. Someday we should have some-
one, an expert like yourself, resolve in our own minds that maybe
propaganda is in itself valuable. That I would not question. i3ut
whether we should have 9,000 employees and spend billions of dollars
are points that a man with your experience should be able to tell us
about, more or less "off the cuff."
Mr. Davis. I don't think there is any proposal — any informed pro-
■posal — to spend billions of dollars. Two or three amateurs have sug-
gested that we need billion-dollar programs. I do not think it is
worth an investment of billions, by any means, but I do think that it
is worth the investment of the money that is going into it now.
Remember that expenses are considerably higher than they were a
few years ago when I was operating. The Voice of America at present
93744— 52— pt. 7 12
1998 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
gets more money than the OWI ever had, but that is largely due to
the increase in costs.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I don't have the facts, and that is why I am asking
you these questions.
Mr. Davis. I remember those statements, Mr. Sheehan, by outsiders ;
that is, about how we ought to pour billions of dollars into a great
campaign of truth. I do not believe you would get value received for
billions, but I do believe that, for the kind of money that is going into
it now, you do.
Mr. Shp:eiiax. For instance, one of the criticisms — and it will bear
investigation, because as it stands in my mind I do not have the exact
facts — is, for instance, that in the radio end of the Voice of America
at the present time there are more employees than the combined net-
works in America. It seems to me that the combined networks in
America are doing a wonderful job of news saturation and dissemi-
nation.
Mr. Davis. The combined networks operate in one language. The
Voice of America overseas probably operates in 40. That is one
difference right there.
They have to have relay stations abroad to pick up their short-wave
stuff and transmit it to medium waves, so that it can reach the audi-
ences. So, it is a far more expensive operation.
Mr. Sheehan. That is all I have.
Mr. DoNDERO. I have one more question.
Chairman Madden. ATr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, how many people are employed by the
OWI — that has gone out of business — the Voice of America, today?
Mr. Davis. I don't know how many they have today. As I say, at
our peak, we had about 9,000 here and overseas. But that was when
we had some 30 oversea stations, and there were some 4,000 of those
who were local people, j^orters, chauffeurs, translators, and things
like that.
Mr. Dondero. Our investment in the Voice of America is about
$85,000,000 annually now. Do you understand that to be about
correct ?
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir; but, as I say, the costs have vastly gone up.
Then there are also certain things such as, for instance, wlien Luxem-
burg was liberated, our psychological warfare was partly OWI and
partly British. They liad the great advantage of Kadio Luxemburg.
But now Kadio Luxemburg lias been given back to Luxemburg, and
our people have had to build their own relay stations.
Chairman Madden. As a conunent, T might say this: I think that
the Voice of America and any medium to send truth behind the iron
curtain is a good investment. But, referring to some of the ridiculous
ideas of even some Members of our Congress on expenditures for
propaganda and truth, it has been revealed by the people over in
Euroi)e that our committee, through our testimony over there, put
the liussian proj)aganda nuichine on the defensive. Our conunittee'
will not cost the Amei-ican taxi)ayers ovei' $S0,000. Yet, when the
resolution was up on the iloor ol" (he House to i)erniit our conunittee
to go overseas, tliere were U)(i Members who voted against the reso-
lution. A great number of them thought the exi)enditure involved
was too nnich. We only won jjermission to go overseas by nine votes.
When you consider the millions of dollars that have been spent by
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1999
Congress for propaganda, I do not think the opinions of some Mem-
bers of Congress are of very much value when you consider that our
resohition won by only nine votes.
Mr. Davis. If I might just offer a sort of supplementary paragraph
to that, propaganda has to have something to work on. The most
powerful propaganda is the truth; and the facts about this Katyn
business which your committee has brought to light will undoubtedly
be of enormous value to the Voice of America from now on.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, were you warned through several dif-
ferent sources that you had Connnunists in the Office of War Infor-
mation ? One statement that you made was that in Mr. Lesinski's
warning, for example, there were more lies in that article than you
ever saw before.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Is it your contention that there were no Commu-
nists in the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. But the statements made by Mr. Lesinski were
itlmost all demonstrably false. As I say, we found about a dozen, and
Ave fired them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you recall a Mr. Peter Lyons?
Mr. Davis. I know the name.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Do you recall a Mr. Barnes?
Mr. Davis. Joe Barnes — certainly.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was your estimate of Mr. Barnes?
Mr. Davis. I thought he was a very able man, but he was too much
addicted to what we called in the war "localitis." He was head of the
New York office, and it was eventually found desirable to remove him
because he didn't seem to be quite sufficiently in sympathy with the
policies laid down in Washington. But I never had the slightest
question about his loyalty.
Mr. O KoNSKi. I am quoting now from the labor report that we
had reference to. It says here [ reading] :
It developed that the labor broadcasting desk under Mr. Barnes, through the
OWI, had broadcast to Europe songs of the Almanac Sailors, who are virtually
the official songsters of the American Communist Party.
In other words, for a while there we actually had Communist songs
going out over the OWI.
Mr. Davis. I don't know about that, Mr. O'Konski. I would hesi-
tate to believe it without corroboration, because so many lies were told
about us. As I say, I didn't know anything about it, and I doubt
whether Joe Barnes knew anything about it. It is conceivably true,
but we did remove the head man.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Did you know that the Ahnanac Sailors were
broadly proclaiming their anti-American attitude with such tuneful
songs as "Plow under every fourth American boy" ?
Mr. Davis. I can't remember that I ever heard of those singers
having their songs go out over the OWI.
Mr. O'Konski. In other words, you do admit, though, that the Office
of War Information did have Connnunist sympathizers?
Mr. Davis. Yes; we had a few, and we fired them when we caught
them.
2000 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was the initiative in firing them started by your
organization or was it always by some outside pressure, such as the
CIO and the A. F. of L.?
Mr. Davis. It was almost always started by our organization. We
had our own security service, and when they found evidence against
somebody we threw them out.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. And you never heard, Mr. Davis, of any of these
people whom I mentioned ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir ; evidently not, because they didn't find evidence
sufficient to justify firing them at that time. As you say, no doubt
they are Communists now, but that was not necessarily true then. I
admit that we missed one or two.
Mr. Machrowicz. You caught 10, but you do not know how many
you missed ?
Mr. Davis. Well, as I say, I admit that we missed one or two. They
have since shown themselves to have become Communists. They are
not the ones that you mentioned. I prefer not to mention their names,
although I would be glad to give them to the committee in private.
We missed them only because they didn't show any evidence of
communistic activities at that time, but have shown them since. I
don't think there were very many.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Subsequently, since your connection with the OWI
and the unearthing of all of this evidence, conclusive as it was, and as
you now observe conditions, do you think that if you had to do it
over again you would have handled, say, for instance, the Katyn
story, in the OWI, as you did, knowing what you know now ?
Mr. Davis. Oh, no. You mean in the broadcast? No; certainly
not.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would you have handled that broadcast in the
same way had you known the facts ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. These reports, which seem to me convincing,
as far as I know, were never heard of by me until they appeared in
the hearings of this committee this spring.
Chairman Madden. Have you finished?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, you have already told the committee
that the function of Alan Cranston was outside the scope of his
specific duties when he attended this meeting in New York and tried
to get them to conform ?
Mr. Davis. Well, if he did as you say. I think that if you will
read that you will find some conflict in the testimony about that.
Mr. MncHELL. All right.
I would like to place in the record now from the same set of hear-
ings— and I will ask Mr. Pucinski to read it — testimony concerning a
man by the name of Lee Falk. Do you know Mr. Falk ?
Mr. Davis. Well, I remember the name. I don't remember what
he did.
Mr. Mitchell. In OWI ?
Mr. Davis. I remember him as somebody in OWI; yps.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you proceed to read that, please, Mr. Pucinski?
Mr. Pucinski. I am reading from page 494 of the same testimony
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2001
as exhibit 2. This is from volume 991 of the House committee hear-
ings. This is testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards.
Chairman Madden. Testimony before what committee?
Mr. PuciNSKi. The House committee investigating the Federal
Communications Cormnission, headed by Congressman Cox. This is
testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards, Assistant to the Di-
rector of the Office of Censorship. Mr. Richards is rehiting a mem-
orandum that he had written immediately after a conference he had
with Sidney Spear, an attorney for the Federal Communications
Commission, at 2 p. m. August 25, 1942. I am just going to read the
part of Mr. Richards' memorandum which he prepared following
that meeting with Spear.
Mr. Spear is talking about a meeting that he had with Lee Falk.
I am quoting :
He related his experiences with Mr. Lee Falk of the Foreign-Language
Section, Radio Division, Office of War Information. He said that Mr. Falk
originally had taken on the job of removing unsavory personnel from foreign-
language stations, because he, Mr. Falk, believed such a job had to be done,
and no one else seemed to want to do it.
Mr. Spear told me the following : "We worked it this way. If Lee, meaning
Lee Falk, found a fellow he thought was doing some funny business, he told me
about it. Then he waited until the station applied for renewal of license. Say
the station was WBNX and the broadcaster in question was Leopold Hurdski."
there is a note here that Hurdski is a fictitious name being used just
for the purpose of illustration. I am continuing quoting :
Well, when WBNX applied for renewal, we would tip off Lee, and he would
drop in on Mr. Alcorn, the station manager. He would say "Mr. Alcorn, I
believe you ought to fire Leopold Hurdski." Then he would give Mr. Alcorn
some time to think this over. After a couple of weeks, Mr. Alcorn would begin
to notice he was having some trouble getting his license renewed. After a
couple of more weeks of this same thing, he would begin to put two and two
together and get four. Then he would fire Leopold Hurdski, and very shortly
after that his license would be renewed by the Commission. This was a little
extralegal, I admit, and I had to wrestle with my conscience about it, but it
seemed the only way to eliminate this kind of person, so I did it. AVe can
cooperate in the same way with you — meaning with the Office of War Censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, would you say that the function of Lee
Falk, as described therein, that is, in the congressional committee in-
vestigation, was within the scope of his duties at OWI ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. If that is a correct report of what he did, I
would say that he exceed his proper field.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, your handling of the Katyn story was
in conformity with the United States military and foreign policy at
that time, was it not ?
Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know that the military policy came into
it at all. This memorandum from Mr. Berle would suggest that they
wanted nothing said about it. As I say, for a news organization, it
was impossible to say nothing about it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. If it had not been in conformity with the over-all
policy at that time, you would have heard from him, would you not
have?
Mr. Daa^s. Well, I should imagine so. As I say, I heard about
it only from the Polish paper and the Daily Worker, neither of which
liked it.
2002 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Tlie reason I mentioned that is because all of this
evidence started to pile up in the various divisions of our Govern-
ment. They were not correlated. There was a liush-hush policy on
the Katyn massacre all the way throufrh, so that at that time, even
if you liad tried to get the truth about the Katyn massacre, you
woidd have been unable to do so.
Mr. Davis, I certainly wouldn't have been able to get the critical
documents, the reports of Colonel Van Vliet and of these other people
because, as I understand, they were only available after the Oerman
collapse in 1945.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In our investigation, Ave found out that there was
no correlation between the various departments. It seems certain
that there were never any documents or any bit of evidence pinning
the crime on the Germans. It was just not available for anyone to
see. So you couldn't have spoken truthfully. The propaganda in
your broadcast were based very largely on the suspicion of Goebbels.
Did you ever have any suspicion about Stalin ?
But as you observe this whole picture now, don't you think — and
you do not have to comment on this if you do not want to — that the
over-all policy in handling the Katyn affair by all of the brandies of
the United States Government who were concerned, was very badly
handled?
Mr. Davis. I don't think they had much evidence until May or
June of 1945, and the Van Vliet report. Wliat happened after that
I wouldn't know, because at that time we were principally concerned
with the Japanese war. Then I went out of office on the 15th of Sep-
tember of 1945.
Mr. SiiEEiiAx. May I sa^^ that in the belief of our committee, the
Voice of America followed the policy of hiding the Katyn affair until
pretty nearly 1950, although the documents were there.
We understand that there was not much use made of them in the
Voice of America.
Mr. Davis, The OWI could not have concealed that after Septem-
ber 1945 because after that we did not exist.
Mr. Sheeiian. I said the Voice of America.
Mr. Davis. Whether any division of our office ever got the Van Vliet
report, I don't know. I very much doubt it. I do so, because, if some-
body had gotten it, I would have been told.
Chairman Madden, Are there any other questions?
Mr. Davis, we are grateful to you for coming up here today,
Mr. Davis, Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Madden, The next witnesses will be Joseph Lang and
Arthur Simon,
We will hear Mr, Joseph Lang first. Will you come forward, Mr.
Lang, please?
I will ask the photographers to take their pictures now, in conform-
ance with the rules.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG, JENKINTOWN, PA.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, do you solemnly swear that the testi-
mony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Lang. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2003
Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang, will you state your name and address^
please, for the reporter?
Mr. Lang. Joseph Lanrr, Jenkintown, Pa.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, what is your business?
Mr. Lang. I am in the broadcasting business.
Chairman Madden. ^Vliere are you employed now? For whom?
What company?
Mr. Lang. I am vice president of radio station WIBG in Philadel-
phia.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Lang, where were you employed in May 1943 ?
Mr. Lang. I was vice president and general manager of radio sta-
tion WHOM, New York City.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you present this afternoon when the testimony
was read into the record from the congressional investigation of 1943 ?
Have you read it?
Mr. Lang. I have read it.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you are familiar with that statement?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Do you now state before this committee that the
statements contained therein are true ?
Mr. Lang. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. That Mr. James F. Hopkins was contacted in
Detroit?
Mr. Lang. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. That Mr, Alan Cranston and Mrs, Hilda Shea visited
your office?
]Mr. Lang. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. xVnd that present at that meeting was Mr. Simon?
Mr, Lang. Yes ; that is true.
Mr. Mitchell, And that no member of the Office of Censorship was
present ?
Mr, Lang, They were not.
]Mr. Mitchell. And that the substance contained therein, that is,
what you have read from the congressional hearing — and since you
were the witness, you should certainly know what you said — is defi-
nitely true ?
Mr. Lang. That is correct,
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any questions?
Mr. OTvonski?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Tn this conversation that you had, Mr. Lang, did
any conversation develop along these lines — that these foreign-lan-
guage stations are on a temporary license, and that if they didn't con-
form, somehow it would be made known to them through the Federal
Communications Commission that the renewal of their license might
be endangered? Did any conversation or hints ever develop when
you were meeting with these people about getting these foreign-lan-
guage stations to conform with OWI policy ?
Mr. Lang. I would say actual conversations took place encompas-
sing words like those. But we all knew in the foreign-language field,
since there were so many people suspect of different leanings, whether
they were Fascists, Fascist leanings or Communist leanings, that we
2004 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
were held on the string, you might say, until a lot of these things could
be cleared up.
As far as hints go, I wouldn't say there were hints ; but it was gen-
erally known and discussed among station owners, or station man-
agers, that that was the situation.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, you are in the radio business as I am. Sup-
pose you owned a foreign-language station and somebody hinted to
you that as long as you had John Jones as an announcer or as a news-
caster on your radio station you might run into a little difficulty in
getting your license renewed. As a radio-station operator, how long
would it take you until you would fire that announcer or newscaster ?
Mr. Lang. Well, frankly, Mr. O'Konski, there isn't any such thing
as a foreign-language station. These are American stations broad-
casting in foreign languages.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is right. I will correct the record.
Mr. Lang. I could not be intimidated by any such talk or threat.
I have been in the broadcasting business since 1928. I have attended
a great many hearings before the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. In my estimation, the owner or the licensee of a radio station
is the sole person responsible for that license, and it is up to him
to use his own best judgment as to whether the person should be fired
or not. I know that when it came to a final analysis, no governmental
agency could take a license away from a station because, in their judg-
ment, they saw fit to keep a person on who might be inimical to the
country's interests or the country's security. If he was, that would
be a case for the FBI, and that is the way I judge matters like that.
Mr. O'Konski. That was true in your case. But take some of these
stations that are barely hanging on economically, having a hard time
making ends meet. If it was generally hinted to them almost by any-
body, that they would run into difficulty in getting their license re-
newed as long as they had this person commenting on the news, what
do you think most of those owners would do? Would they run the
risk of antagonizing the Government agency or would they call in the
commentator and say "I am sorry, but my business is in jeopardy, and
I cannot take the chance. I will have to dismiss you."
Mr. Lang. I don't know whether I can answer that. In other
words, I would be just venturing an opinion, when you ask me what I
think the}^ would do.
Mr. O'Konski. Yes ; I understand.
Mr. Lang. The only thing I can really state definitely is what I
would do.
Mr. O'Konski. That is right.
Mr. Lang. I suppose they would be very much tempted to take the
easiest wav out, and to let the person go, if they felt that their license
was in jeopardy.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machkowicz. INIr. Lang, as the result of the conference you
had with Mr. ('ranston, did you contact Mr. Hopkins, Mr. James F.
Hopkins, of Station WJBK, in Detroit?
Mr. Lang. Yes; I did.
Mr. Macjiuowicz. Wliy did you contact him?
Mr. Lang. Because Mr. Cranston and IVIrs. Shea called me from
Washington to arrange this meeting, saying that they would like to
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2005
iret tlie foreign language, or rather, the Polish situation straightened
(lilt in Detroit, and asking me whether I could help.
Mr. Machrowicz. "What did they tell you about the so-called foreign
language situation in Detroit?
Mr. Lang. That the Polish commentators were — I don't remember
the exact language — but they used the colloquial expression — "going
haywire" and making comments on a great many subjects that they
felt were not in line with what our general thinking should be.
Mr. Maciirowtcz. Did they specificall}' refer to the Katyn
massacre ?
Mr. Lang. The two subjects mentioned were the Katyn massacre
and — yes, they did refer to that.
Mr. Maohrow^icz. So that Mr. Cranston objected to the commen-
tator on Station WJBK making comments indicating Russian guilt
for the massacre ; is that correct ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he wanted you to put a stop to that?
Mr. Lang. Well, he couldn't ask me to put a stop to it, because I had
no authority. I was chairman of the foreign language committee of
the National Association of Broadcasters and we had no power, as an
industry committee, a voluntary industry committee, we had no power
to discipline anyone. We simply tried to have our programs in the
national interest. Mr. Cranston asked me what my ideas were on it,
and I said that I would apply the same procedures and rules that I
had used there, and had used for a good many years, that is, that I
would only permit to be broadcast in these foreign languages at a
critical time, the dispatches we got oif the services that we subscribed
to. At that time they were the Associated Press and the International
News Service.
The reason for that was that I felt that they were checked at the
source. We received them by teletype in our station. Frankly, there
was more reliability to those reports, more reliability than we could
ascertain by checking ourselves, for which we had no facilities.
On the other hand, if we permitted people to comment on matters,
they were giving their own versions, their own reports, and I didn't
know where those ideas were coming from.
Mr. Machrowicz. In other words, what Mr. Cranston wanted you
to do was to use your good efforts to try to convince Station WJBK
in Detroit not to permit these comments, which would indicate Russian
guilt?
Mr. Lang. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And wasn't that a form of censorship ?
Mr. Lang. Yes ; I would suppose you could call it that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that not contrary to the spirit of the Federal
Communications Act ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you did call Mr. Hopkins ?
Mr. Lang. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did you tell Mr. Hoplrins ?
Mr. Lang. I told him that I thought — I didn't suggest any way to
run his station. I told him what I was doing, and thati thought that
would be a course to pursue which would satisfy the public in getting
proper news without having it slanted; thatI had used that method,
and that I felt it very satisfactory.
2006 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did Mr. Hopkins tell you ?
Mr. Lang. As I recollect — I do not remember his exact words — he
said that he would think it over, and, naturally, make his own de-
cision, as he was the owner of that station.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Let me ask this. Mrs. Shea was definitely not representing the poli-
cies of the Federal Communications Commission. What she did, she
did on her own ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
You may proceed, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. MiTCHEix,. Mr. Lang, in an interview conducted by the commits
tee staff in September of this year with Mrs. Shea, the following ques-
tion was asked :
Unless Mr. Lang is not telling the truth or unless he is confused, or unless the
regulation is not corrected, it would appear that you were really not exploring.
You had your mind pretty well made up. From what he said earlier, you were
concerned about the boundaries, the question of boundaries between Poland and
Russia ?
to that Mrs. Shea replied :
I would like to repeat, I would like again to repeat that Mr. Lang is quite
mistaken in saying that I .ioined with Mr. Cranston in the recommendation
that any station could take any position on this Polish-Russian controversy.
Would you like to comment on that, please? Did she join with
Cranston ?
Mr. Lang. Well, the fact that she was at that meeting, whether she
said a w^ord or not, would certainly indicate to me that she was in
agreement with what Cranston thought and expressed to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Was your license up for consideration at that time?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Was she present, then, in that capacity, that is, in
connection with your license, or was she there on tliis Katyn-Polish
question ?
Mr. Lang. Well, she was there, as I understand it, to accompany
Mr. Cranston. I don't know what her official position was. She
had no official position, as far as I was concerned, except that they
Mere both interested in this situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Did Cranston have anything to do with the granting
of licenses ?
Mr. Lang. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Why do you think that Cranston was at that meet-
ing, other than for that Katyn affair?
Mr. Lang. I do not know.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mrs. Shea correct in her statement tluit she did
not participate in this dicussion?
Mr. Lan(}. Well, she was certainly there, and, as far as I am con-
ceined, that is participating in a discussion. I don't recollect any
exact words, but anyone who was present had to participate in the
discussion.
]\Ir. MrrciiKLL. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Thank you, Mr. Lang, for ai)pearing as a witness.
Chairman Madden. Arthur Simon, please.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2007
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON, FOREST HILLS, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Simon, do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Chairman Madden. Will you state your name, please, Mr. Simon?
Mr. Simon. Arthur Simon.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Simon. 7714 One hundred and thirteenth Street, Forest Hills,
N. Y.
Chairman Madden. And your business ?
Mr. Simon. I am a special representative for the Radio and Tele-
vision Daily, a publication that covers the radio and television news
of the industry.
Chaiiman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, you have been present this afternoon
and heard the discussion of the meeting held in New York in May,
1943, have you not ?
Mr. Simon. I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in that meeting in New York?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that have been
made here by Mr. Lang?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that were made
in that congressional hearing?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you shed any further light to this committee
on that particular meeting that was held in New^ York?
Mr. Simon. No ; I don't believe I can add any more to it with two
exceptions, namely, that also present was a Mr. Fred Call, who handled
publicity for the committee, and who came in at the latter part of the
meeting, and a program director who was called in by Mr. Lang dur-
ing the course of th.e meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. What did the program director have to say there?
Mr. Simon. He was asked by INIr. Lang how he ha-ndled his news
broadcasts, and he repeated in substance the fact that he just took it
off the new^s tickers and gave it just as it came off those tickers.
Mr. Mitchell. And when you were present there at that meeting,
were you participating in the discussion of the Katyn affair, or were
you participating in the discussion of Mr. Lang's license?
Mr. Simon. It concerned the Katyn affair and the boundaries be-
tween Eussia and Poland, both subjects.
Mr. Mitchell. AVhen you were present, was his license discussed?
Mr. Simon. No ; it was not.
Mr. Mitchell. When you were present at this particular meeting,
the sole subject of conversation was the Katyn affair and the Polish
boundary question ?
Mr. Simon. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. And Mrs. Shea was present?
Mr. Simon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Did she have any comments to make that you can
recall ?
2008 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE
Mr. SiiyiON. I just recall her concurring in Mr. Cranston's state-
ments. To the best of my knowledge, she joined in that conversation,
1 know she was present from the beginning to the end.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Chairman JVIadden. Are there any questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question.
Mr. Simon, didn't you consider this request of Mr. Cranston as an
attempt to gag the radio commentators ?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. Didn't you consider that to be a violation of the
spirit of the Federal Communications Act ?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all I have.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ?
Mr. DoNDERo. No questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, did you ask Mrs. Shea what she was
doing there ?
Mr. Simon. No. To the best of my knowledge, I did not. She ap-
peared with Mr. Cranston. They were both there together.
Mr. Mitchell. Did she give any justification for her reason for
being there?
Mr. Simon. No. There was no justification, outside of the fact
that she concurred in Mr. Cranston's statement. I recall no other
reason for her being there, except to be with Mr. Cranston when this
discussion was taken up. She was there, as I understand it, represent-
ing the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Woud you call her presence there indirect intimi-
dation ?
Mr. Simon. In my opinion?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Simon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any other questions ?
Thank you for appearing to testify, Mr. Simon.
Mr. James F. Hopkins.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. HOPKINS
Chairman Madden. Mr. Hopkins, will you raise your right hand
and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. Hopkins. I do.
Chairman Madden. There will be a 5-minute recess.
(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing
was resumed.)
Chairmnn Madden, The committee will come to order.
Mr. Hopkins, you have been sworn, have you not?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes.
Chairman Madden, And did you give your name and address?
Mr. Hopkins. James F. Hopkins,. Detroit, Mich.
Chairman Madden. Your street address?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2009
Mr. Hopkins. 15865 Rosemont Road.
Chairman Madden. New York City ?
Mr. Hopkins. Detroit.
Chairman Madden. Wliat is your business ?
Mr. Hopkins. I am the president of the Michigan Music Co., the
franchise holder for Muzak in Detroit and president of tlie Herrans
Valley Broadcasters, radio station in Ann Arbor.
Chairman Madden. Did you formerly own a radio station?
Mr. Hopkins. I was the manager and part owner of WJBK, Detroit.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Hopkins, have you been present this afternoon
when the testimonj^ of Mr. Joseph Lang and Mr. Arthur Simon was
heard ?
Mr. Hopkins. I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you concur in the remarks or the statements that
ihey made under oath ?
Mr. Hopkins. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. You were contacted by Mr. Joseph Lang ?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. On the subject matter of Katyn?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you speak a little louder ?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. You heard me ask Mr. Elmer Davis about an indi-
vidual by the name of Mr. Lee Falk. Could you shed any light on the
type of activities that Mr. Falk was engaged in, when you were the
part owner of WJBK?
Mr. Hopkins. I talked to Mr. Falk at one time in Washington rela-
tive to the foreign-language personnel. Another time he came to De-
troit and suggested that I discharge certain individuals.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was his method and way of doing that ? Be-
cause he was with the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't take him too seriously and told him so in
so many words, and that I didn't want any part of him.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why do you not get the names of the persons he
wanted to have removed ?
Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us the names of the individuals he
wanted removed ?
Mr. Hopkins. One of them was Leon Wyszatycki.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain what position Mr. Wyszatycki
had in your station at that time ?
Mr. Hopkins. He ran one of the Polish hours broadcasting over
WJBK.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did Mr. Falk want him removed ?
Mr. Hopkins. He didn't give me any concrete reasons. He just
said he thought we should get rid of him.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he mention the Katyn affair ?
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I believe this was before the Katyn affair, if my
recollection serves me properl3^ It was before that.
Mr, Mitchell. Did you have in your employ at that time a Mr.
Marian Kreutz ?
, Mr. Hopkins. Not in my employ. He was broadcasting over the
station, but was actually in the employ of Mr. Wyszatycki.
2010 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Coukl you explain the connection between you and
Mr. Kreutz at that time ?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, only that the station made rules as to what
could be or could not be broadcast in light of the fact that we were
waging a war.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any direct contact Avith Mr. Marian
Kreutz ?
Mr. Hopkins. If I insisted he be discharged for one reason or an-
other, he would come to the office and we would see if he would
straighten it out. In that regard, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he ever discharged ?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When? Do you recall?
Mr. Hopkins. I can't give you the exact time.
Mr. Mitchell. ^Vliy?
Mr. Hopkins. We felt that he was more interested in broadcasting-
actual concrete news, whether that story had the proper etfect on the
Polish audience or not, and we were concerned on whether the stoi-y
would in any way curtail the war efl'ort of the Polish segment of the
population of the area.
Mr. IVfiTCHELL. Was Mr. Kreutz ever suspended from the air?
Mr. Hopkins. I think he was, for several days, but not for any
lengthy time.
Mr. Mitchell. Did yon, yourself, suspend him or could you tell us
how the suspension was accomplished?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, inasmuch as he was not working for me, but
working for Leon Wyszatycki, I would have to call him in and tell
him to do the dirty work.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Wyszatycki rented an hour from you ; is that
correct ?
]\f r. Hopkins. No ; it wasn't — he was actually a representative of the
station, but an individual contractor.
Mr. Machrowicz. But he had the right to employ radio com-
mentators ?
Mr. Hopkins. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he employed Mr. INIarian Kreutz as a
connnentator?
Mr. Hopkins. Within certain dictates of the station : that is cori-ect.
Mr. Machrowicz. And then you received your call from whom?
Mr. Hopkins. From Lang.
IVfr. Machrowicz. Stating that the nature of the broadcasts of Mr.
Kreutz Avere not satisfactory ?
Mr. Hopkins. No; not necessarily that.
INIr. Machrowicz. What did they tell you about his broadcasts?
Mr. Hopkins. He told me that there Avere certain stories breaking,
and that it Avas a geneial consensus of the group that he has named,
he in no Avay implicated himself, in Avhat he said but that it Avas gen-
erally felt tiiat perha])s the broadcast of this story Avould create such
a feeling among the Polish people that it Avould detract from their Avar
elloi-t.
Mi-. Machrowicz. Mr. Kreutz Avas known in the coimnunity, was he
not, foi' his violent anti-(\)minunist feelings?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, he may have been, but I, of course, can't speak
or understand Polish, so I can't tell you that.
THE IvATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2011
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know that you had been receivino coni-
pLaints from certain Conniiunist grouiDS in Detroit ?
Mr. HoPKixs. I didn't hear you, sir.
Mr. Mactirowicz. You received complaints about the nature of his
testimony from certain Polish Communist groups in Detroit?
Mr. HoPKixs. Yes: I think I did. I remember a couple of them.
Mr. Machrowicz. The Connnunists objected to the way he com-
mented on certain news events ?
Mr. Hopkins. That is probably substantially true, but I can't re-
member the exact nature, apparently.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then these people that called you took it upon
themselves to censure his broadcasts ?
Mr. Hopkins. They tried to, they would never get by with that,
Mr. IMachrow^cz. They succeeded in getting him suspended.
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I don't think they did.
Mr. Machrowicz. He was suspended.
Mr. Hopkins. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why ?
Mr. Hopkins. I had a full-time employee, an attorney, by the name
of Morris Luskin, whose business it was to check over his opinion on
the effect of certain stories that were proposed to be broadcast. And
it was on his recommendation that Mr. Kreutz was suspended when
he was suspended.
Mr. Machrowicz. You were interested in maintaining good, proper
connections w^ith the Federal Communications Commission?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir.
IVIr. Machrowicz. And when you knew the Federal Communica-
tions Commission was interested in having this man suspended you
thought it would be good policy to suspend him ?
Mr. Hopkins. No ; that is not true.
Mr. Machrowicz. You knew they objected to the nature of the
broadcasts.
Mr. Hopkins. That who objected?
Mr. Machrowicz. The Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I didn't.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, when Mr. Simon or JNIr. Lang called you,
they told you they had talked to Mv. Cranston.
Mr. Hopkins. I never heard of Cranston up until today or yes-
terday.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did Mr. Simon tell you?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't talk to Simon.
Mr. ]\L\chrowicz. Mr. Lang. What did Lang tell you?
Mr. Hopkins. Lang and Simon and myself, and a few other station
managers, were affiliated in the foreign-language group, who tried to
keep the foreign-language broadcasts clean and aboveboard and to
further the effort of the war. When Joe called me and told me that
he had had a meeting with the group, and I don't think he — he may
have told me but if he did tell me who he had met, I don't remember,
but he did tell me he met with a group, and the culmination' was as I
have stated, that this story would perhaps serve the war effort better if
it was not broadcast.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of Mr. Kreutz'
broadcasts?
2012 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE
Mr. Hopkins. Not all of the time. Mr. Luskin did, as a rule.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of those which
were considered as somewhat objectionable?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes ; I think I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did you find objectionable in them, if
any
Mr. Hopkins. Well, if a story went out in Detroit, claiming that
the Russians had murdered X number of thousands of Polish officers
and soldiers, it certainly would turn the, naturally, Polish audience
against one of our allies.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that objectionable, if the facts were true?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, and no. As far as the war effort is concerned,
and the winning of the war, it might have had a material effect, and
an adverse one. After all, the thing had occurred, as bad as it was,
as atrocious as it was, the very fact that the story should be told, you
can't compound an evil, and that would be exactly what happened.
If the Polish people were in any way thrown away from furthering
the war effort, no good would be done. Certainly the fact that they
knew it couldn't bring the people back to life that had been murdered.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then you felt that the news, even if it may be
true, of Russian guilt, should be withheld from the Americans of
Polish descent?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you felt that it was proper because if such
news, even if true, was disseminated, the person who disseminated it
should be suspended?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't say I suspended him on that cause, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did you suspend him on ?
Mr, Hopkins. I can't tell you. That was 8 years ago or 10 years
ago.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions?
Thank you for appearing here as a witness, Mr. Hopkins.
Marian Kreutz. Will you be sworn, Mr. Kreutz ? Do you solemnly
swear the testimony you give before this committee shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Kreutz. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JAN MARIAN KREUTZ. DETROIT, MICH.
Chairman Madden. State your name.
Mr. Kreutz. Jan Marian Kreutz, 11558 La Salle Boulevard, Detroit,
Mich.
Chairman Madden. What is your business ?
Mr. Kreutz. I am a radio news commentator, foreign language,
Polish.
Chairman Madden. In the city of Detroit ?
Mr. Kreutz, In the city of Detroit, emploj'ed now by Station
WJLB, where I am a coordinator of a Polish program and a radio
news commentator.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr, Mit('iiell, Mr. Kreutz, have you been present at the hearings
this afternoon held in this room ?
]Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr, Mitchell, You are fully aware of the subject matter under
discussion ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2013
t f^Z^J^t^^^^l Polisl. commentator in Detroit in May
Its, when the Katyn affair first became known i
Mr. IvREUTZ. Yes, sir. . -iA7TT»Tr. ia
Mr. Machrowicz. At that time you were with btation WJiiiv, is
it correct?
Nil- Kreutz. That is correct.
Mr'. Machrowicz. Was it within the province or the scope ot your
ties to make comments on news events?
Mr Kreutz Well, I had been advertised as a news commentator,
ilrit naturally I should have the right to make some comments.
Mr. Maciirowitz. Did you make any comments on your station
at ive to the Katyn massacre? t n fi „f
Mr Kreutz. In reference to the Katyn massacre, I would say that
followed in this order : First broke the news given by the (jermans,
d we ^ave that news without any commentary, with one exception,
at we^aid this is an enemy source. Of course, the news was too
uesome and really didn't lend itself to any commentary, ihen, a
w days after, we had this Russian note to the Polish Government
cer the Polish Government asked for this Red Cross investigation.
■ that time we gave the Russian view on it, and naturally followed
th the Polish view which we took from the Polish telegraph agency,
lat Avas the third service we employed. We employed Associated
-ess, and I believe the International News Service at the time, and
■3 Polish Telegraph Agency, which is PAT.
Mr. Maciirowitz. Explain what the Polish telegraph agency is;
erated by whom ?
Mr. Kreutz. That is, or rather it was, an ofticial press agency ot the
olisii exiled government, operated from New York, just like, let s
^, Russian Tass that operates from New York.
I^lr. Machrowttz. Then what happened? Did you make any fur-
"er comments on it ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, we didn't have time to make many comments,
^ause it was a matter of just 10 days when we got through with
lOse three phases of it. We had news from Mr. Hopkins, through
y program manager, or program director, that we were supposed to
op using the PAT, to use only Associated Press and International
jews Service, and in such a way cut off all the news about Katyn.
Mr. Machrowitz. Was that specifically mentioned to you ?
Mr. Kreutz. That was definitely said to me, that that Katyn story
id to be out.
Mr. Maciirowitz. What happened after that?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, after that we tried our best. We asked Mr.
opkins if it was possible to use, let's say, press articles from American
•ess, or maybe from the Polish press, so he said, "Well, if those arti-
js had been published already, naturally you can use it." I mean, he
du't say this to me, he said" that to the program director. I want
at to be understood. So, as far as w^e were referring to Katyn, we
ere trying to take up these stories from the Polish Daily News in
etroit, or some other articles that we could find in American press.
Well, it turned out to be very unsatisfactory because the station,
:obably in a few weeks, I don't remember exactly the dates, objected
?aiii and said, "No more articles from any press because this is still
Iking Katyn," and by that time we started also picking up from
03744— 52— pt. 7 13
2014 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the press articles on the Polish boundaries that was the controvei
that came later on. Generally speaking, this censorship fight on a
off was going on for over 2 years, and finally in 1945 the day afi
the United States Government recognized Warsaw communistic
gime, we had already come to a point where the station had put
monitors on our broadcasting. In other words, there were always t-
copies of the broadcast. One copy went to me and one copy to t
station. If I deleted anything or if I went with a few words o^
the copy, the monitor would cut off my voice from the air. In otl
words, it was a foolproof proposition.
Well, by that time, we couldn't say anything and I was afraid tl
I couldn't stand any more withholding any real truth and inforn
tion from my listeners, because after all a Polish commentary is a lit
different, probably, than American commentary. We have to ha
listeners, otherwise we can't stay on the air. And if we can't U
about the Polish question, then we won't have any listeners, becai
they can pick up any general news from somewhere else.
So on that day, the day after the Warsaw regime was recognize
I managed to put in one sentence inside of my broadcast. I just sa
"Due to the existing censorship on the station, I am not going to t?
any more on this microphone," and I just got up in the middle of t
broadcast and walked out from the studic and I never returned to t
station again. That was the end of the fight.
Mr. Macheowicz. Then you were not suspended ?
Mr. Kreutz. Oh, in the meantime yes, we had three suspensio
liemember, that was a span of time of about 2 years. I had been si
pended three times. I have been informed by Mr. Wyszatycki tl
Mr. Hopkins, James F. Hopkins, told him on a certain day, I do
remember tlie date, that because of the fact that I didn't keep exaci
to the censorship orders I couldn't go on the air. I was never out i
a few days like Mr. Hopkins said. I think he just forgot the exr
terms. Usually about 10 minutes before broadcast I was told "J
right, you can go on again."
I think this was usually after a long conference between my direct(
between Mr. Konstantynowicz who was another director on that st
tion, and Mr. Hopkins. They usually prevailed on him that he shou
keep me on. But it wasn't pleasant to go on the air when you didi
know 10 minutes before if you were going on the air.
]Mr. Machroavicz. You know that there have been a number
complaints to your station from the Communist groups in Detr(
with regard to your broadcasts ; is that right ?
Mr. Krkutz. Yes, I know about that, and I don't know if th
should go inside these hearings here, but I have got a personal feelii
that the person that was actually monitoring ni}^ connnentary nui
have been a member of the Communist Party in Detroit. I thii
it must have been monitored by somebody outside the station fro
this bunch on Chene Street, from the Communist Party. This is, '
course, only my private opinion.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Were the suspensions ever for any other reasc
other than your attitude against the Communist Govermnent?
Mr. Kreutz. No. All the suspensions were on account of eitb
Katyn, either Polish boundaries, or the Polish relations. That w:j
entirely on the account of those questions. I
THE KATYN' FOREST MASSACRE 2015
Chairman Madden. I might make an announcement. I have re-
ceived inquiries regarding tlie program for today and tomorrow. The
committee has three more witnesses today, and tomorrow morning the
committee will meet at 10 o'clock, and we will have, as the first wit-
ness, Ex-Ambassador William Standley, former Under-Secretary of
State Sumner Welles, Mrs. Mortimer, John Melby, and Averell Harri-
man. We will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Over this station, where you were employed, were
there any broadcasts in a Russian language during that period?
Mr. Kreutz. No ; I don't believe so. But there has been a half-hour
program, I think it was between 5 : 30 and 6 in the evening
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is what I Avant to ask you now. Were there
any broadcasts over this station by well-known pro-Soviet or pro-
Communist groups ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, certainly there were. I was just trying to men-
tion that. Between 5 : 30 and 6 I believe in the evening, there was a
program they called it in Polish Promienie Prawdy, which was Eay of
Truth.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Coming from the pro-Communists ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, the only people that talked on that program
were well-known Communists.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. Well-known Communists?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Now let me ask you this question : Were they told
and called in like you, and were they told to lay off of mentioning or
commentating on the Katyn thing or on the Polish-boundary question,
or did they have free sway ?
Mr. Kreutz. I would say in this way : For a long time they didn't
have any trouble at all because they were giving the Russian point
of view on Polish questions.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And they had no trouble at all?
^ ]\Ir. Kreutz. They didn't have any trouble in putting that point of
view over.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They weren't called in and told 10 minutes before
they went on the air that they could go on, no censorship ?
Mr. Kreutz. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Ol^ONSKT. They could tell the Russian side of the story, and
blame it onto the Germans, and they had no trouble.
Mr. Kreutz. This is right. At the end of the period afterward, I
may mention, they had been taken off the air but that was, I believe,
around 1945.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were taken off in 1945 ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. I remember that, because I spoke in Detroit in 1945
and they were still on.
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoKSKi. And they took me to task for denouncing Yalta as
the crime of the ages. I remember that distinctly. But doesn't it
seem rather incredible to you that you, here, a good American, trying
to tell the truth, trying to defend another ally far more glorious than
the Russian ally, who made far more sacrifices than the Russian ally,
that here you are trying to come a little bit to their defense and you
2016 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
were closely scrutinized and censored, but at the same time those that
went on the air to pronounce pro-Soviet lines had no trouble at all ?
Doesn't that seem rather incredible?
Mr. Kreutz. That was quite incredible at first. We just didn't
loiderstand why all this censorship happened. Afterward, we came
to the conclusion there must have been a strong Communist influence
somewhere in Washington, because we knew it was coming from
Washington somehow.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now let me ask you another question. A statement
was made here a little while ago that one of the reasons why they
insisted on censoring you was because they were afraid of the effect
that the truth would have on the Polish population, particularly in
Hamtramck, which is about 95 percent Polish.
Mr. Kreutz. That is true.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you go along with that line of reasoning, that
if the Poles knew the truth that they would stop in their war effort,
they would quit their factory jobs, they would quit their defense jobs,
they would quit volunteering, quit dying and bleeding for their coun-
try ? Do you think that is a correct estimate of the Polish population ?
Mr. Kreutz. I think that is all wrong, and as a matter of fact I
remember talking to Mr. Hopkins on it many times during these 2
years that we ai-e talking about between 1943 and 1945. As a journalist
I had been a foreign correspondent for a newspaper in Warsaw, and
I had been trained to get information and give the information to
the people, and to believe that if the people get the information and
the truth, they will always get to the right conclusions.
Now, in this case our program has been very strongly anti-Nazi
before this Katyn question happened, and it remained anti-Nazi
until the end of the war. My commentary with that prog'ram was
in the same way. But when we found out that the Russian ally had
killed so many Polish officers, we thought that this is something that
should be given to the people, because this would not stop anybody
from working for the war effort, I couldn't believe it, anyhow. That
was Mr. Hopkins' contention.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You are so sure of the weakness of that argument.
When the Polish Army was reorganized in Russia, General Anders
and all of the leaders of the Polish Army, they knew that those Polish
officers had disappeared, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. They definitely knew it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And still thev fought on the side of Russia, didn't
they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'Kc^nski. Wlien they were sold down the river at Yalta and
stabbed in the back, thev still fought, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. They still fought.
]Mr. O'KoNSKT. Even when tliey knew they were handed over to
Russia they still fouglit, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. When England was being invaded with German
bombs, you heard of the Polish air brigade, didn't you, that saved
London ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. They served on the side of Russia.
Mr. Kreutz. They definitely did.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2017
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The Polish Army fought in Normandy alongside
Russia as an ally, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Even after they knew that their officers were mas-
sacred, they knew that hundreds of thousands of their people disap-
peared, they still fought alongside Russia as an ally, didn't they ?
INIr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And then they come over here and they say that
the reason why they censored you was because they were afraid of
what Polish reaction might be if they learned the truth about Katyn.
Doesn't that seem rather thin ?
Mr. Kreutz. I believe that this was the Communist line handed
over to the station managers, because the station managers usually
didn't know anything about the Polish politics or about Russia or
about actually anything outside the United States.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. "Well, is it very significant that you were censored,
and the pro-Communist line was not censored? It is incredible.
That is all.
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Kreutz, were you ever questioned by any of
our Government officials from the Federal Communications Com-
mission ?
Mr. Kreutz. No ; I never had any contact with them. I don't know
why, but they never asked me anything.
Mr. Sheehan. "Were you ever questioned by any members from
the Office of War Information, OWI?
Mr. Kreutz. No.
Mr. Sheehan. In your discussions, you said you had discussed some
of these matters with Mr. Hopkins.
Mr. Kreutz. That is right,
Mr. Sheehan. Did you discuss them with him personally ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you have any particular arguments with him
about it ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, there were a few occasions when he called up a
meeting of all of the Polish broadcasters and newscasters, and he tried
to tell us that — for example, I can say here on one of those meetings,
and it must have been in 1944, 1 think, or maybe even 1945, after Yalta,
he said, "Well, the Polish goose is cooked forever, and so why don't
you forget it and why don't you stop worrying about Poland."
That was the beginning. Naturally after that we had a very heated
discussion and I just walked out of the office. But that was about the
way it was discussed.
Mr. Sheehan. In these suspensions that you talked about, what do
you mean by suspensions ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, in other words as I said my program director
would call me up and say, "Kreutz, you are not going on the air today."
You know, it takes a few hours to prepare that material. I would say,
"Why," and he would say, "Well, Mr. Hopkins objects to it."
I would say, "I will come down to the station and see what is going
on."
I would go down to the station and try to prepare material, and wait
until about 10 minutes before broadcast and sometimes 5 minutes, and
they would come in there and say, "O. K., you can go on the air; we
settled the matter with Hopkins."
2018 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Maybe you can help me on this. Didn't we ask Mr.
Hopkins whether he had any connection with the so-called firing of
Mr. Kreutz, and he said he had nothing to do with it ?
Mr. Machrowicz. He said Wyszatycki did the firing.
Mr. Sheehan, I think we ought to get Hopkins back and see if he
gave this gentleman instructions, because he tells us he talked with
Hopkins directly about it, and Hopkins censored the program and
stopped him.
Mr. Mitchell. Only after he was suspended or dismissed, only after
he was dismissed on one occasion.
Mr. I^EUTZ. Not even then. I talked to Hopkins only on certain
conferences when he called up the whole staff and started to talk on
the Polish question. Then I started to discuss the Polish question,
because I was the one to talk about it. On suspensions and those things,
whatever Mr. Hopkins was doing he was doing through Mr. Wyszatycki
the way it was being done.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Hopkins led me to believe that he had nothing
to do with it.
Mr. Mitchell. No ; he said he went through the program director.
Mr. Sheehan. But according to this gentleman's testimony he in-
structed the program director what to do.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. And Mr. Hopkins didn't say that. He led us to be-
lieve generally that the program director did this, is that right ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. I stand corrected. I would like to ask one more
question. You said that you used the AP and UP releases with refer-
ence to the Polish situation. Were they the American AP and UP
releases or those coming from Moscow ?
Mr. Kreutz. No, the American releases. Naturally the news was
from Moscow in it, because on the Polish questions all of the news was
coming from Moscow or from Tass.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, for the members of our committee Henry
Cassidy brought out, when we questioned him some time ago, when he
was the head of the AP there, that the dispatches they sent from
Moscow were completely censored. They were only allowed to send
from Moscow what the Russian Government permitted. So then, when
you, as a news broadcaster or radio broadcaster, were sending out dis-
patches from Moscow, you were reading only what the Communists
permitted to come out, because Cassidy specifically told us that any-
thing the Russians didn't like they didn't permit to come out. So you
were reading censored dispatches.
Mr. Kreutz. Actually, if I may say, on the Katyn question in par-
ticular, anythinij that would come from Moscow on AP or UP or Inter-
national News Service, would be purely a Russian propaganda, some-
thing I couldn't use for the Polish people because they wouldn't believe
me.
Mr. Sheehan. Yet that is what they wanted to have you use.
Mr. Kreutz. Yes. But the people wouldn't believe me.
Mr. O'Konski. One more question : The witness, Mr. Hopkins, that
we had on the stand seems to be a very upright and fine, honornble
man. In his defense I want to ask you this question : Do you think that
he or his people under him who censored you did it of their own voli-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2019
tion, or do you think that pressure was put on them from some outside
source, that they were extremely worried about it?
Mr. Kreutz. I would answer that in two ways : As far as Mr.
Hopkins is concerned, I am quite certain that he was sick with all of
that proposition, that he simply didn't know enough about the political
issues, that there had been some pressure from outside on him, and
he was doing it only under duress. That was the definite impression
that I had. He wasn't happy with it. But, if we come to Mr. Luskin,
who was mentioned by JMr. Ho])kins, I would say that I would have
some doubts as to tlie fact, if he liked it or not.
Mr. O'KoNSKi, But as far as the ownership of the station was con-
cerned, you are convinced that in all respects and he appeared so, no
question about it, he is honorable and upright and that it was a great
pain on his part to have to do what he did, and very likely he did it
because he wanted to stay in business?
Mr. Kreutz. There is no question about it.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions? I wish to thank you
for testifying here, Mr. Kreutz.
Is Mr. Simon still in the room ? Mr. Simon ?
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON— Resumed
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Simon, the Federal Communications Com-
mission had special investigators, did it not?
Mr. Simon, That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know of your own knowledge whether
any of these special investigators questioned the foreign language
commentators, investigated their background ?
Mr. Simon. To the best of my ability, to the best of my knowledge, I
believe that they did.
Mr, Machrowicz. What do you know about their investigating the
commentators of Polish origin?
Mr. Simon. Well, I think Mr. Lang probably would have been in a
better position to talk about the Polish announcers. I think he had
some controversy with the Polish programs. As far as Polish pro-
grams are concerned, I think Mr. Lang is here and he would be better
qualified to talk about that than I would.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, can we have Mr. Lang take the stand ?
Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang ? Is Mr. Lang here ? Will you take
the stand, Mr. Lang.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG— Resumed
Mr. Machrowicz. Without the preliminaries, what do you know
about the Federal Communications Commission investigators ques-
tioning Polish commentators ?
Mr. Lang. I remember that in New York they questioned the Polish
people very, very thoroughly.
Mr. Machrowicz, With what in mind ?
' Mr. Lang. As expressed to me by one or two members who came
back, who would talk about it, they seemed to want to find out just
what their attitude would be if a Polish-Kussian crisis came about.
2020 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
They tried to find out whether they had any leanings toward being
pro-Russian.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, in other words, would you say that they
wanted to have commentators who would be friendly or unfriendly tc
the Polish regime in Warsaw, the so-called Soviet-dominated
regime ?
Mr. Lang. That would be a very difficult question for me to answer
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In these meetings you had, Mr. Lang, w^as there
any concern shown over pro-Communist broadcasts in the United
States ? Was that subject ever brought up ?
Mr. Lang. No ; I don't think it was.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Just anti-Communist broadcasts?
Mr. Lang. That is right. That is right. I might cite an experi-
ence— you may stop me if it is not relative — I had an organization that
bought some time called the International Workers Order, who bought
some time on the Polish programs, and who I thought were a fra-
ternal and social order, as their name implies. They went on twice, on
a Sunday afternoon period. But it was so filled with pro-Communist
material that I had to reject them and break their contract and take
them off the air, because it was so biased that it was ridiculous. In
other words, as I say, I put them on the air thinking they w^ere going
to broadcast and propagate their social benefits, if one belonged to
their order. But there was no criticism to any great extent that I
recollect of any procommunism.
Chairman Madden. That is all. Thank you.
Casimir Soron.
Will your raise your hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear
that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. SoRON. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CASIMIR SOEON, BUFFALO, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. If you wi]\ just sit down, Mr. Soron, and state
your full name.
Mr. SoRON. Casimir Soron.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. SoRON. U6 Middlesex, Buffalo, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. And wdiat is your business, Mr. Soron ?
Mr. SoRON. I have two businesses, one is broadcasting, buying time,
I am a program director on Station WXRA, and I own a furniture
store in Buffalo.
Chairman Madden, Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Soron, have you been present this afternoon in
this hearing room ?
Mr. Soron, Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you heard all of the testimony that has been
given ?
Mr. Soron. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you state briefly what your
position was in 194;5, and the years following.
Mr. Soron. In 1943 I was employed by radio station WBNY in
Buffalo as ])rogram director and commentator,
Mr. Mitchell. What language was that in?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2021
Mr. SoRON. Polish radio program.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly for this committee what hap-
pened to you in the course of your engagement in that work ?
Mr. SoRON. Before being on the radio I used to be a newspaperman
in Detroit for 8 years, with Polish, and I knew how to read news
and how to commentate on it, you see. When I read the news about
Russia striking Poland — well, I was commentating exactly the way
it was, you see. And then when there was this Katyn case I told
the public openly that everything indicates that the Russians did it
because there are facts here and there that show that nobody else
could do it.
Now, the owner of the station, Mr. Albertson, told me a few times
1 should stop talking like tliat, because he had instructions from
Washington, he told me, that they don't like it. Now, that was
going on for a few months. Then finally he told me, in fact, he
showed me a letter from Washington, that they wrote to him, you see,
that this has to be stopped, you know, because I am talking against
our allies.
Finally, you see, he gave me 2 months' notice to continue the pro-
gram. I had a big business there. I had about a $60,000-a-year
business.
Mr. JNliTCHELL. Were you removed from the air ?
Mr. SoRON. I was removed from the air.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee when you were removed
from the air?
Mr. SoRON. I was removed — he gave me notice by the end of 1943,
and I stopped broadcasting early in 1944.
Chairman Madden. Do you know who this letter was from?
Mr. SoRON. Well, I really don't remember. It seems to me it was
from the Radio Communications Commission, but I am not sure. I
believe he told me it was from the Radio Communications Commission.
Chairman Madden. Did you see the letter yourself?
Mr. SoRON. Well, he showed it to me, you see, but I am not sure
whether that was from the Radio Communications Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Albertson still alive?
Mr. SoRON. Yes ; he owns the station.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think he would have that letter in his pos-
session today?
Mr. SoRON. I imagine he would ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Chairman Madden. Any questions ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any pro-Communist broadcasts over the
station that you were on by any pro-Communist organizations ?
Mr. SoRON, On the same station? No, sir; I don't believe there
were any.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any over any other station of foreign
language in the Buffalo area ?
Mr. SoRON. Not that I remember.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. It is very possible that Buffalo would not have very
much of a Communist cell among those people. It is quite different
in Detroit. I am not casting any reflections on my good brother liere.
You didn't have the problem over there, so that wouldn't apply.
That is all.
2022 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. Would you be in a position to find out whether
or not this person has that letter ?
Mr. SoRON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position because we parted
very badly with Mr, Albertson on account of that.
Chairman Madden. You what?
Mr. SoRON. We parted in a bad way, you see.
Chairman Madden. What is Mr. Albertson's address?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe I have it.
Chairman Madden. All right. Are there any further questions?
Thank you for testifying here.
Chairman Madden. Mrs. Hilda Shea. If you will be sworn, Mrs.
Shea. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give be-
fore this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and notliing but
the truth, so help you God ?
Mrs. Shea. I do.
TESTIMONY OF MRS. HILDA SHEA, WASHINGTON, D. C. .
Chairman Madden. Mrs. Shea, please sit down. What is your
present address?
Mrs. Shea. 4000 Cathedral Avenue.
Chairman Madden. Washington?
Mrs. Shea. Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And what is your business?
Mrs. Shea. I am a housewife now.
Chairman Madden. A housewife?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a letter I re-
ceived from Mrs. Shea after the invitation I extended on your behalf
for her to appear before this committee. The letter is from the
Westchester, Washington, the date November 8, 1952. It is addressed
to me as chief counsel of this committee :
Dear Mr. Mitchell: Before talking to you in yoiu- office, I had not reread,
since 1944, the testimony that I gave in that year l)efore the select committee
appointed by the House of Representatives in the Seventy-eighth Congress to
investigate tlie Federal Communications Commission. This testimony was given
on April 18, 19, and 20, 1944, and api)ears at pages 30&1-3059, 3063-30S8, 3083-
3119 of the official report of the hearings of that committee. On rereading my
testimony I find, as might be expected, that my recollection in 1944 was much
clearer about the events that happened in 1943 than it is now, and the reading
of the transcript has refreshed my recollection on several points that you asked
me about in our informal conference. If there are any inconsistencies between
what I lold you in our informal conference and my testimony before the House
committee in 1944. and to the extent that my testimony before that committee
covers details of which I no longer have an independent recollection, I believe
that the testimony is to be regarded as a more reliable source of information
because it was given at a point of time much closer to the events which I was
discussing. While I shall be glad to assist the committee in any way I can,
I am inclined to thiidv that I am not now in a position to add anything to the
testimony that I gave to the House committee in 1944, because 1 find that with
the passage of time my recollection on many of these events has l)ecome vague.
I assume that you know my prior testimony, but in the circumstances I thought
I should like to call it to your attention.
Sincerely yours,
Hilda D. Shea.
Mr. O'Konski. May I make just one remark. One of my prior
statements where I made the remark concerning INIr. Shea, I was con-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2023
fused with names. It was not Mr. Shea I meant, it was Mr. Cranston
I meant. So will you correct the record.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, when did you first enter Government
employment?
Mrs. Shea. March 1934.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Where were you employed at that time, and in
what position ?
Mrs. Shea. At the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, as an
assistant attorney, I believe.
JNIr. Mitchell. How long were you there at that agency ?
Mrs. Shea. From March 1934 to July 1935.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next employment ?
Mi's. Shea. At the Resettlement Administration, until I believe
January 1936.
INIr. Mitchell. In what capacity were you employed at that agency ?
Mrs. Shea. As an attorney.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next position in Government serv-
ice?
Mrs. Shea. I then went to the National Labor Relations Board, as
an attorney.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you at the National Labor Relations
Board?
Mrs. Shea. With the lapse of about 9 months, I was there until the
fall of 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. You were employed as an attorney ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What Government agency did you go to in the f aU
of 1942?
Mrs. Shea. The Federal Communications Commission.
]\Ir. Mitchell. What was your employment there, as an attorney?
Mrs. Shea, Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was responsible for your employment at the
FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny appointed me, I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was the counsel when you reported there?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny, Charles Denny. '
Mr. Mitchell. You have been present in the hearing room this
afternoon during the course of the testimony that has been taken
here today ?
Mrs. Shea. I arrived in the middle of Mr. Davis' testimony.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis' testimouA^?
Mrs. Shea, Ye.s, about 2 o'clock,
Mr. MiTCiirXL. Then you have been here through a majority of the
testimony and practically all of it. Do you deny having attended
that meeting in New York that was referred to by Mr. Lang and Mr.
Simon ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You have heard the comments that they had to make
this afternoon. Would you like to make a statement in that con-
nection ?
Chairman Madden. In what connection? Be more specific on it.
Mr. Mitchell. They have said that you were present at this meet-
2024 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ing in New York when a.license of Mr. Lang, although up for renewal
at that time, was not discussed at the meeting. Weren't you attending
that meeting as an attorney for the FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how you came
to attend such a meeting ?
Mrs. Shea. I was employed at the time as head of the Foreign
Language Studies Section in the Law Department of the FCC, and
part of my job, as I understood it, was to work in liaison
Chairman Madden. Could you speak a little louder, please? We
can't hear you.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. With my opposite numbers in other agencies
handling similar problems. I am a little puzzled at this point on how
far afield to go. Do you want my version on what happened?
Mr. Mitchell. I want to know si:)ecifically. Did you know Allen
Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. I had met Allen Cranston as head of the foreign lan-
guage problems in the OWL I knew him in that capacity.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have many conferences with Allen
Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. Very few.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how you came
to attend this meeting in New York with Allen Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. Mr. Cranston called me and said that he had
been informed by letter from the OWI oflice in Detroit, that a broad-
caster in the Polish language on a station there was upsetting the
Polish population by pro-Kussian broadcasts, and asked me whether,
as a lawyer in the field, I knew of anything that might be done about
it. I told him that the FCC itself had no power to do anything in a
situation of that kind, and that the Office of Censorship in Washing-
ton had expressed no interest in problems of that kind, and the one
group that might be of any assistance if it cared to be on a purely vol-
untary basis was the radio wartime control, headed by Mr. Simon and
Mr. Lang.
Mr. Cranston then called them and made an appointment and I
went along as an observer for the FCC.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did you go along as an observer for the FCC
when it was not a problem or in any way connected with the FCC,
which you have just stated to the committee?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I just told the connnittee that the FCC is with-
out power to interfere in anything that is said by a broadcaster on
the air. But it is interested in knowing what he says, and in how
the station handles problems of the kind for purposes of evaluating
the stations' use of its license. And so, I was instructed to go as an
observer, purely, but not to put forward any views or suggestions.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Who instructed you to go to that meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you present this problem to Mr. Denny in such
a way tJiat lie thoroughly understood it at that time?
Mrs. SiiEA. I don't believe I am in a position to say whether he did.
He seemed to. He generally is very able to understand things.
Mr. JMitchell. Did he have access to the German propaganda
broadcast on Katyn at that time?
Mrs. Shea. I don't know, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2025
Mr. Mitchell. They came in and they were monitored right within
the FCC. FBIS, wasn't that under FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. I think matters of Mr. Denny's knowledge
ought to be referred to Mr. Denny. Tlie record shows that before the
conference I had asked Mr. Denny's permission to go, and the per-
mission was expressly given. That is on page 2802, of part 3 of the
House committee record.
I^Ir. Mitchell. Page 2802?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you refer to the record of the committee to
investigate the Federal Communications Commission?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, notwithstanding your statement, you will
recall we had that informal talk in my office, at that time you made the
following statement to me. Well, 1 asked you this : "How did yon
come to get into this meeting in New York?" "Mrs. Shea: In New
York?"
I said, "Yes, in May of 1943 with Cranston."
"Mrs. Shea : Well, Lang's license was up for renewal. We were
inquiring about the type of material that was going out over his
foreign-language radio programs. The held staif was doing a study
on it, and I believe I went up there in connection with that study."
Now, this afternoon two witnesses appeared here who specifically
stated that there was no discussion concerning the license at this par-
ticular meeting. Could you explain that, please ?
JNIrs. Shea. Yes, sir. When you questioned me a few weeks ago I
had forgotten, as I stated in the letter that you read into the record,
this whole Katyn incident, and it was only after I read the record
that I recalled those details. However, while I was in New York on
that occasion I was at the New York offices of the FCC and I did talk
over with them pending cases.
Mr. Mitchell. You knew at the time that this meeting was set up
by Cranston that this did not concern the licensing of Mr. Lang, the
purpose of the meeting that Cranston arranged.
Now, Mr. Elmer Davis this afternoon, when he testified here, said
that he thought that Allen Cranston was outside the scope of his duties.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I can't comment on the scope of Mr. Cranston's
duties.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should have inquired
about the scope of his duties at the time when he brought this to your
attention ? You were an attorney employed by the FCC then.
Mrs. Shea. I was concerned with the scope of my duties, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should inquire about the
scope of an individual's duties that 3^011 are going to go into a con-
ference with, if he has the power to do that? You are an attorney.
I always like to know what an attorney is going to do who accom-
panies me, or what the individual does, has he got the power to do
it, or has he not got the power to do it.
Mrs. Shea. Do you wish to know what assumption I made at the
time?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mrs. Shea. I don't recall. I was questioned by Mr. Cranston as to
whether the FCC had any power to do anything about his problem.
2026 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
My answer was unequivocably no. He said "Well, who might?" I
said "Well, if the radio wartime control wants to do anything about
it, perhaps it will."
Mr. Mitchell. All right, then, why did you go near that meeting
at all is what I would like to find out definitely.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I can answer that question.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute until I tell you something.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You had investigators at that time who were em-
ployed in the field for that specific purpose of finding out if the radio
stations were conforming with their licensing arrangement. You
were an attorney, you were not an investigator. You went along on
this particular meeting, after having tokl Cranston that this was not
within the scope of the FCC's functions. I would like to know why
you decided to do that.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I went along partly because I had a problem,
described here in the record, which was also without the scope of the
Commission's power, and I raised that problem with Mr. Simon and
Mr. Lang as well. Our field people in Texas had reported that the
war-bond drives and so forth, were using the slogan "Remember the
Alamo," and the persons of Mexican extraction were very incensed by
this reference to a past unfortunate incident.
Mr. Mitchell. But that wasn't raised at this particular meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir, at great length. Mr. Simon so testified at
length. The State Department had written us about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did Mr. Cranston fit in with that particular
j)roblem ?
Mrs. Shea. Not at all, sir. After Mr. Cranston had talked about
the Polish problem, I said, "Here is another problem that you people
at the wartime control could do something about if you wished to," and
left it there.
It was a purely voluntary matter. As a matter of fact, as far as I
know the control did nothing about it, and we did nothing about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in this discussion on the Katyn
or the Polish situation in Detroit, the radio station there during this
meeting, you specifically ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you realize at that moment that by your pres-
ence there you were in the position of lending support to Cranston's
position ?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Mitchell, I did not think so, and may I tell you why ?
Mr. Mitchell. Go right ahead.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Lang, as he just told you on the stand, was not an
ordinary broadcaster. He was very well acquainted with the scope of
the authority of all of the agencies in AVashington, working on the
matter, and had sliown complete independence of judgment and action
all the way through. And he did in tliis case. He was not a man to
be intimidated and I don't believe he was intimidated. He testified
he was not intimidated.
Mr. Machhowicz. Let me see if I understand your situation cor-
rectly. Mrs. Shea, as an attorney you had advised the Federal Com-
munications Commission that they had no authority to censor editorial
comment?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2027
Mr. Machrowicz. And that is your opinion ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you told them also that the only body that
could do that would be the foreign-language wartime control?
Mrs. Shea. In effect, yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. So then, since Mr. Cranston, or Mr. Denny,
M^anted to do something about it, and couldn't do it legally, you sug-
gested meeting with the Federal foreign-language radio wartime con-
trol and do indirectly what you couldn't do directly?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. We were unable to handle the matter, so we
passed it on, openly, and without any color or pressure, to a group that
could handle it if it wished to.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, your desire was to control or to censor these
editorial comments, and you knew you couldn't do it, so you suggested
a meeting with the foreign-language radio wartime control ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is that not what you told us before ?
Mrs. Shea. My desire was to get the problem off my desk, into the
hands of the group that could act on it if they wished to.
Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. And in order to see that it would be acted upon
by them, both you and Mr. Cranston went to a meeting with that
committee ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir; we went there or I went there — I can only
speak for myself — in order to call the matter to the attention of that
body.
Mr. Machrowicz. Call it what you may. But now I notice you
have a copy of the volume of the hearings of the committee investigat-
ing the Federal Communications Commission. I wish you would open
that book to page 3076. Do you have that page ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. There, if you note, you identified a letter that
was sent out on the week of May 24, 1944, as a result of that conference
you and Mr. Cranston had with the foreign-language radio wartime
control. Am I correct ?
Mrs. Shea. Would you read the question again, please, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz, As a result of the conference that you and Mr.
Cranston had with the members of the foreign-language radio war-
time control, this letter was sent out, which I am about to read. If
you will follow me, I will ask you if it is correct :
It is urgently recommended by the ofRcers of the foreign-language radio war-
time control that news and war commentators be requested to cease, immedi-
ately, the broadcasting of editorial or personal opinion.
Am I correct in that ?
Mrs. Shea. That is what the letter says ; yes.
Mr. Machrow^itz. That is what the Federal Communications Act
says you cannot do, so you passed it on to the foreign-language radio
wartime control to do what you couldn't do legally yourself; am I
right?
Mrs. Shea. That is your view of it, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, you are asking them to cease immediately
the broadcasting of editorial and personal opinion, and you say
further this is especially hazardous in the Russian, Polish, and Croa-
tian situation ; right ?
Mrs. Shea. Sir, this isn't my letter.
2028 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Macheowicz. But that is the letter that resulted from the con-
ference you and Mr. Cranston had with the members of the foreign-
language radio wartime control after you advised the FCC that they
couldn't do this veiy thing legally; am I right?
Mrs. Shea. This is the letter that went out after that conference,
sir ; yes.
Mr. Maciirowicz. And that was after you advised the Federal
Communications Commission they coukbi't do that very thing legally.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, you have referred to page 2802, previously
in your testimony. What is that, on page 2802 ? Is that the letter ?
Mrs. Shea. No; this is part of the testimony of Mr. Denny, the
General Counsel.
Mr. Machrowicz. You referred, in your testimony a while ago, to
a commentator in Detroit who was known for his pro-Communist
comments ; is that right ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was his name Mr. Novak?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you knew about the fact that he was a pro-
Communist commentator ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. He never was suspended was lie i
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Congressman, the immediate matter that occasioned
Mr. Cranston's calling me, and my subsequent course of action in this
connection were the broadcasts of Mr. Novak. He was the commenta-
tor in Detroit who was complained about by the local Detroit office of
the OWI, and the question that was put before the radio wartime
control was precipitated precisely by Mr. Novak's broadcasts.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider his comment as derogatory to
the best interests of the United States ?
Mrs. Shea. As I testihed, this was Mr. Cranston's j^roblem. Mv.
Cranston put the question to the i-adio wartime control. I did not
participate in that part of the discussion at that meeting.
Mr. Machrowicz. But you do know that Mr. Novak was the pro-
Communist commentator ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, I will refer to that very page that you testi-
fied to, page 2802, Mr. Denny's testimony. I will refer you to what
was said then, "No specific complaints against Novak's alleged com-
munism were ever received by the Connnission in Washington.''
Do you find that in the third paragraph on the page ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz (reading) :
No specific complaints against Novak's alleged conimnnisni were ever received
by the Commission in Washington. The Commission's field representatives who
were apprised of the general situation in the Detroit area reported nothing in
Novak's program —
that is, the pro-Communist program —
which could be considered propaganda detrimental to the war effort, or other-
wise contrary to the public interest of the United States.
Is that correct?
Mrs. Shea. As far as you are reading, sir, yes.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2029'
Mr. IMACiiROWicz. That is Mr. Denny's testimony, is it not ?
Mrs. SiiEA, Mr. Denny goes on to testify further on that.
Mr. Machrowicz (reading) :
However, in any event there was no occasion for a Commission investigation
of Novalv's alleged communism.
There was evidently some reason to investigate the acts of Mr.
Kreutz, who was anti-Communist, but there was no occasion for a
Commission investigation of Novak's alleged communism. It was a
matter of public knowledge that Novak had been fully investigated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Communist affiliations.
He had been indicted on December 11, 1942, in proceedings for de-
naturalization. Is that correct ?
Mrs. Shea. That is the testimony ; yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. You didn't think it was hazardous or your Com-
mission didn't think it was hazardous to the best interests of the United
States to permit a pro-Communist commentator to continue his broad-
casts in Detroit, but you thought it necessary to send letters to the
various radio stations warning against commentators who were anti-
Communist ?
Mrs. Shea, Mr. Congressman, the letter of Mr. Lang which you
previously read was occasioned precisely by Mr. Cranston's calling
Mr. Novak's broadcast to the attention of the radio wartime control.
.Vnd may I point out that ]\Ir. Denny's testimony goes on to say, "Mr.
Novak's program was canceled in February 1944."
Mr. Machrowicz. But that was by no action of the Federal Com-
munications Commission or by the foreign-language radio wartime
control, was it?
]Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. But the broadcasts which were anti-Communist
were censored and suspended because of action of the Federal foreign-
language radio wartime control.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I must disagree, sir.
jNIr. Machrowicz. You heard the testimony of these two gentlemen
that testified this afternoon ?
Mrs. Shea. They testified, so far as I followed their testimony, that
INIr. Lang's letter suggested a policy to the stations of curbing editorial
comment by both pro-Soviet and pro-Polish commentators, and that
whatever action was taken against people who failed to follow the
recommendation was taken exclusively by the station owners, not the
Commission.
Mr. Machrowicz. After a little prodding by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, right.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you agree with ]Mr. Denny's statement that
Mr. Novak, the Communist —
Mr. Novak's programs could not be considered propaganda detrimental to the
war effort or otherwise contrary to the public interests of the United States?
That is the third paragraph of page 2802,
Mrs, Shea. Mr. Denny is simply summarizing here the results of
analyses made of Novak's programs.
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, in his opinion, the Communists like
Mr. Novak were much less dangerous than anti-Communists like Mr.
93744— 52— pt. 7 14
2030 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Kreutz, who tried to point out the Russian <Tuilt of the Katyn
massacre.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Kreutz is a radio personality I had never encoun-
tered before, sir ; and I hesitate to testify at all on whether Mr. Denny
knew of him or what he thought of him. I can't.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have I misstated Mr. Denny's analysis of Mr.
Novak's broadcasts.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I think the statement speaks for itself.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think so, too.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, this report that my colleague read from, Mr.
Denny's report, did you have anything to do with the compiling of
that report?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; I compiled part of that material.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You did?
Mrs. Shea. Yes.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Are you positive, in your statement, that whenever
you were confronted with a question of what can the FCC do about
these broadcasts, are you positive in your statement that you always
said as far as the FCC was concerned you were powerless ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I am very glad to hear that, because if it isn't that
would be very bad.
Did you have anything to do with the drafting of that letter that
Mr. Machrowicz read?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir ; nothing whatever.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, your contention is that your posi-
tion in this entire matter was one of representing the legal arm of the
FCC, of that branch, and whenever you were confronted with the
question of what can you do about this objectionable commentator or
that objectionable commentator, your answer was always that as far
as the Commission was concerned under the Federal Communications
Act of 19.34, thev are powerless to do anything about it?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And to your knowledge, Mrs. Shea, you don't know,
do you, of any attempt that was ever made by the FCC by you or
any other employee to use the FCC to browbeat these radio station
owners who discharged what they considered to be objectionable
people?
Mrs. SiTEA. No, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is your contention?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; that is.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interrupt for a mo-
ment. Will you refer
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Let the Congressman finish.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you refer to part 1 ? You have it there, I be-
lieve. Page ()03. I would like to start reading for the members of
the committee. Mr. Richards is testifying before the same House
committee investigating the FCC, page 603 :
Mr. Howard was the hoad of tlie press section of censorship at that time. He
had some discussions with the Office of War Information with refiard to censor-
ship. I am not familiar with tlie discussion except that it toolc place on the basis
of whether Office of War Information was getting into our field, or whether we
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2031
-were getting into their field, and wliat the relationship should be under the
agreement we had reached.
Mr. Garey, the counsel to the committee, resumed reading, and he
had this to say :
Mrs. Shea called to ask whether or not it was true that this Office had relaxed
its censorship requirements among foreign-language stations by withdrawing
our request for English translations. I told her we had, after consultation with
Mr. Jack, of our censorship operating board. In reconstructing our conversation
from that point, I am relying on notes, and there mitiht be some slight error
but the general idea is as follows : Mrs. Shea said : "If you are not to ask the
managers of radio stations to examine the material on their stations, what curb
will there be on opinions expressed by some of these foreign-born broadcasters?"
I told her that in censorship we did not recommend any restrictions on expres-
sion of opinion, as long as such opinion did not cloak facts which would cross
codes. I reproved her mildly for suggesting that there should be such censor-
ship, and she said maybe she didn't mean opinion, maybe she meant propaganda
or the Government line. "Who," she asked, "is going to force these managers to
see to it that the propaganda on their stations follows the right pattern?"
"Somebody else, not us," I said.
This is a member of the Office of Censorship talking, who had
written this memorandum :
She said that there was a definite shadow zone in censorship which went
beyond the definitions contained in our codes, and some supervision should be
exercised in this zone "for the good of the war effort and for the good of the
people." I held stoutly to our function as censors for security. This bit had
the melody if not the lyrics of the score that the Office of War Information sang
to Mr. Howard.
"What would you think," Mrs. Shea asked, "if we in the Federal Communica-
tions Commission undertook to censor programs in this shadow zone." I told
Mrs. Shea I thought she would want to mull that over a long time before she
took definite action, because this office was charged with censoring. She then
rephrased her hypothesis. "What if we should merely suggest to station
managers that they should maintain only English ti'anslations in order to guide
properly the propaganda output of their stations?"
"That is coming pretty close to dictatorship in radio."
That is a comment by the counsel.
I told Mrs. Shea that suggestion from the Federal Communications Commission
might be unfortunate since it would countermand this office request, but that I
wouldn't presume to advise her on what the Federal Communications Com-
mission should do, beyond the fact that it should leave censoring to us. Mrs.
Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not attempt to censor,
it would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of their own re-
sponsibility. She asked me to think it over for a couple of days and see if my
mind changed. I assured her it wouldn't, and she recommended she check my
opinion by talking it over with Mr. Ryon.
Mrs. Shea, it seems that you were terribly interested as an attorney
for FCC in the censorship problem during the course of these hearings
that we have been quoting here. Now, Mr. Machrowicz has asked you
was Mr. Novak removed from the air, in Detroit, the pro-Communist?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he removed ?
Mrs. Shea. He was removed.
Mr. Mitchell. When?
Mrs. Shea. His contract was canceled
Mr. Machrowicz. You mean his contract was canceled and wasn't
renewed, is that right ?
2032 THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE
Mrs. Shea. On page 2803 of part 3 of the House committee record,
Mr. Denny testified that —
on February 7, 1944, the management of the station WJBK canceled its contract
with the Kay of Truth program.
That was Novak's program. Novak then sought a court injunction
against this action, and he failed to get judicial relief. He also asked
the Commission to intervene and the Commission replied that the
matter was outside its jurisdiction.
Mr. Mitchell. But the thing that this committee is trying to find
out is this : that the subject matter referred to the Polish commenta-
tors who were also our allies at that time, who were anti-Connnunist.
They seemed to be the ones that were having the difficulty, not Novak.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I am sticking strictly on Polish. I am not speaking
of Italian or anything else.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny's testimony, if you will read on page 2803 to
2804, and my testimony at the time — I can't testify on it from present
recollection — my testimony at the time was that in point of fact the
pro-Polish commentators continued very actively to present their
point of view in many instances.
Mr. Mitchell. And under very difficult conditions.
Now, why were you so specifically interested in the censorship policy
when you as an attorney for the FCC shouldn't have been in that field,
as Mr. Machrowicz pointed out from the statement of ^Ir. Denny, and
as you, yourself, have admitted when you talked to Cranston about it.
You said, "That isn't our i^roblem." Yet here is a memorandum to an
official committee of Congress, quoting members of the Office of Cen-
sorship.
Mrs. Shea. The memorandum from which you read was a memo-
randum, I believe, bv Mr. Richards?
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mrs. Shea. After numerous inaccuracies and personalities, he con-
cluded with one of the few accurate statements in the memorandum,
reasserting my recognition of the limitations of FCC authority in
the field.
Mr. Mitchell. What are you reading from? What page?
Mrs. Shea. House committee hearings, page 604 :
Mrs. Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not try ta
censor. It would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of tlieir
own responsibilities.
Mr. Mitchell. And that was in the line of duties?
Mrs. Shea. My duty was to make int^uiries as to whether managers
were exercising their licensing powers in the public interest.
Mr. Mitchell. Their licensing powers, that is correct?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I mean their licenses, excuse me.
Mr. IVIiTCiiELL. Their licenses.
Mrs. Shea. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, if I am correct in this — and maybe I am not
thoi-ougldy familiar with the operations of the FCC, 1 understand
that they have field offices for that specific job. I understand that they
also had investigators for that particular job.
Mrs. Shea. Do you moan the FCC?
Mr. MrrcHELL, The FCC.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2033
Mrs. Shea, May I-
Mr. Mitchell. And. they had monitoring stations.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. May I amplify that statement? The prob-
lem under discussion in this memorandmn was specifically whether
station managers should require English translations of foreign-
language progi-ams and monitoring of the programs, so they could see
that their submitted scripts were adhered to. Now, that is a pro-
cedural problem, not related to the substance of the broadcast.
Mr. Mitchell. I know.
Mrs. Shea. And our inquiries as to whether the managers were
doing that, I think, were well within the scope of our authority.
Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Not as to substance ?
Mrs. Shea. No, and that is not censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That was your sole scope.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The commentator always files his broadcast, right,
Avhat he is going to talk about on the air? It is filed? It is just as
these Polish commentators had to file theirs ? If they complied with
what they filed, then they were in line, as far as the FCC is concerned.
That is procedure, as I understand it.
Mrs. Shea. Well, that was one of the questions we inquired into.
Mr. Mitchell. What that commentator had to say didn't make any
difference to the FCC ; correct?
Mrs. Shea. Precisely.
Mr. Mitchell. But yet all afternoon w^e have been getting at the
point that these Polish commentators were having their difficulties,
they were suspended, they were taken off the air, all because of this
meeting in New York.
Now, let me ask you a question : Wliy wasn't the Office of Censorship
present at that meeting in New York ? Were they invited to attend
that meeting in New York with Simon and Lang, Cranston and your-
self, by you? Did you invite them to attend? You?
Mrs. Shea. I don't remember precisely whether I invited them to
attend, but the record is clear that they were invited, and the Wash-
ington group refused to go.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did they refuse to go ?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I don't believe I am the person to answer that
question, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, didn't you extend the invitation to them?
You must have gotten a reason why they didn't want to go,
Mrs. Shea. I don't recall extending it. The invitation was extended,
but just now I can't recall who extended it,
Mr, Mitchell, No further questions.
Mr. Sheehan. Mrs. Shea, these meetings that we have reference to
over here, particularly the one that we have discussed most, the one
in New York, was that meeting initiated by the OWI, or was it initi-
ated by the FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. By Mr. Cranston.
Mr. Sheehan. He was with the OWI ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
2034 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. SiiEEHAisr. In other words, the FCC had nothing to do with ini-
tiating that particular meeting, is that correct?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It was at the invitation of the Office of War
Information ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things. Did you personally
have any hand in fixing the FCC policies in this respect, or were you
told to go and attend that meeting as a legal representative of that
division of the Federal Communications Commission? In other
words, was your attendance at that meeting of your own volition or
were you instructed to go by a higher authority in the Federal Com-
munications Commission ?
Mrs. Shea. I called Mr. Denny's office, and he authorized me to go.
Mr. Sheehan. After you were invited by the Office of War Infor-
mation to go to that meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. And you got his authority to go ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you, Mrs. Shea have any personal feelings of
your own pertaining to, well, particularly the Polish-Russian contro-
versy over Katyn ? Did you have any personal feelings in that matter
at ail?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did any of your feelings ever come into that matter,
any of the decisions that you had to make when this matter came up?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It was purely on your standing, legal standing, rep-
resenting the Federal Communications Commission?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, this meeting that was finally called, in New
York, was that the result of OWI just calling the meeting, or was that
meeting called as a result of some complaints that they were receiving
over certain broadcasts?
Mrs. Shea. The local office of OWI wrote Cranston saying that it
had come to their attention that the Poles in Detroit were being upset
by this acrimonious controversy.
Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things for me.
Again, as far as you know, Mrs. Sliea, there definitely was not any
FCC threat to hold the license-renewal proposition, which is the blood
stream of the radio industry, as fas as you know there was no attempt
to scare them into thinking that their license would not be renewed,
if they did not conform ? You don't know of any such thing ?
Mrs. Shea. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, did you have a feeling in these feelings that
have been outlined, Mrs. Shea, tliat probably the OWI was going
too far afield in its attempt to censoi- these broadcasts? That will
have to be conjecture on your part. Did you, anywhere down the
line, as these things developed, you yourself being a leo;al repre-
sentative of that division of FCC, get an inkling that somewhere down
the line they were trying to exert too much pressure down the line
of censorship? Did that feeling ever occur to you in the develop-
ments that transpired ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2035
Mrs. Shea. Actually I had little contact with the OWI. My
predecessors had worked more closely with them. I saw Mr. Cran-
ston very few times, and had barely a nodding acquaintance with him.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you at any time get the feeling that probably
the OWI, with your presence at this meeting representing a certain
legal division of the FCC, didn't you get the idea that probably, un-
knowingly to you but purposely known to them, the fact that they had
you there, that they could hold over their heads that you were repre-
senting the FCC, although you openly were not in any way connected
and you told them that you had no legal authority ? But didn't you
get the idea that with your very presence there that probably the OWI
was using you as a handle to whip these people into line? Did you
get that impression ?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I might have felt that had the persons involved
not been Mr. Lang and Mr. Simon. They had so repeatedly demon-
strated their complete immunity from intimidation of any kind,
particularly from the FCC.
]\ir. Machrowicz. May I ask you, were there any attempts of
intimidation ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. How could they show immunity from intimida-
tion if there were no attempts of intimidation?
Mrs. Shea. The Cox committee hearing shows that there were
several disagreements on policy between the FCC and the Wartime
Control, and the OWI, and the Wartime Control, and that Mr. Simon
and Mr. Lang stuck to their position and carried it through every time.
Chairman Madden. Is there anotlier witness?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; there is one, but I would like to put just one
other statement in.
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Is there another witness after
this one ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; just one.
Mrs. Shea is in Washington. We can recall her if we want to. I
would like to put Mr. Richards on now.
Chairman Madden. Well, Mrs. Shea, you stand by just for a little
while, and we will have Mr. Richards' testimony. If there are no
further questions of Mrs. Shea, she can stand by.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Richards, will you be sworn. Do you soL-
emnly swear the testimony you shall give before this committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Richards. I do.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT K. RICHARDS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Chairman Madden. State your name, please, your full name.
Mr. Richards. Robert K. Richards.
Chairman Madden. Where do you live, Mr. Richards?
Mr. Richards. 3458 Macomb Street NW., Washington.
Chairman Madden. What is your business ?
Mr. Richards. I am assistant to the president of the National Asso-
ciation of Radio and Television Broadcasters.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your position during the wartime years f
2036 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Richards. Well, during most of them I was in the Office of
Censorship as the assistant to the Assistant Director in charge of
broadcasting.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the Office of Censorship ?
Mr. Richards. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore you had a great deal of business or work,
then, between the FCC and the OWI ; is that correct?
Mr. Richards. Yes, yes ; of course.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you briefly state — I know it is already in the
record of the congressional committee which investigated the FCC
in 194.3, l)ut I would like you to briefly summarize for the committee
the difficulties that the Office of Censorship had to the extent where the
problem had to be referred to the Attorney General.
Mr. Richards. Well, you carry me back pretty far, Mr. Mitchell, but
I will tell 3^ou as my memory serves me about the specific problem we
encountered, some of which has emerged in testimony I have been
able to hear this afternoon. The OfKce of Censorship was established
by Executive order of the President, and his wartime power as the
censor over domestic communications was passed along by Executive
order to the Director of Censorship, Mr. Price, who in turn delegated
such actions as he wished to delegate to various staff members. Censor-
ship was established under Mr. Price's direction, and the advice of
our policy-control board, domestically, among the press and the broad-
casters as a voluntary effort. We established voluntary procedures
for stations, for example, to follow, areas in which, as unit identifica-
tion of ships sailing, the security of the Nation could be violated.
Broadcasters were asked to voluntarily observe these guidepoints.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the code.
Mr. Richards. That was the voluntary code of wartime practices.
In the course of establishing this system among the broadcasting sta-
tions of the country, we had one specific problem that was peculiar
to broadcasting, I guess, because we were dealing with about, 150 to
200 so-called foreign-language broadcasting stations employing as
many as 35 or 40 different languages. The committee may even be
interested in knowing that one of those languages we encountered was
Cajon, and it was pointed out to us that it wasn't a foreign language
and they didn't have an alphabet. We set up these special controls
i-n the case of foreign-language broadcasting stations. In the course
of operating this vohmtary system we did encounter, if I may use the
term, an inclination on the part of other executive agencies, and I
ascribe no idterior motives to them, to invade the area of censorship
which properly was vested in the Office of Censorship. We felt this
was dangerous, not that we were jealous of our authority, but most of
us being out of the public media we were zealous about what would
happen to that authority after the war was over. Among the agencies
where we encountered this, and I believe your record in the select-
conunittee investigation reflects this, were the OWI and the Federal
(]omnuinications Connnission. As a matter of fact, at one time, the
situation reached a point where Mr. Price, as Director of tlie Office
of Censorship, asked Mr. Ryan, as assistant in charge of broadcasting,
who in turn asked Mr. Bronson and me to find out what was going on,
and if there was an invasion of censorship and if we were sacrificing
our responsibility to some other agency, to stop it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2037
We did investigate it, and again I say, ascribing no motives, we did
encounter an interest on the part of the Other agencies in censorship,
and it was stopped, in an agreement between INIr. Price and Mr. Davis,
and certainly in agreement between Mr. Price and the Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us then a few specific ilhistrations,
not too elaborate, but just one that you can recall, where the occasion
was necessary to go to the extent of getting the Attorney General to
rule, barring these other agencies from the field of censorship ^
Mr. Richards. Well, yes. Again this is going back quite a way, and
I think the record in the select-committee investigation would be
more accurate than my recollection. But I recall that at least one
foreign-language broadcaster, I believe his name was Andre Luotto,
w^as either removed from the air or his reputation was apparently
somewhat damaged, as a result of the enthusiasm of people employed
by agencies other than ours to enter into a consideration of the type
of broadcasting that was going on the air.
By that, I mean opinion, the opinions that were being expressed.
I think that is one specific case. Doubtless there are others. They
must be available to you.
Mr. Mitchell. Did a member of the Office of Censorship attend
this meeting in Xew York with JNIr. Simon and Mr. Lang^
Mr. Richards. Well, if I am thinking of the same meeting tluit you
have been discussing here, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Were they invited to attend, do you recall ?
Mr. Richards. It is my recollection we were invited to attend ; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall why you did not attend ''i
Mr. Richards. Well, yes. We felt that it wasn't properly within
the scope of our activity to discuss what should be done about a com-
mentator, expressing an opinion on the air. unless that opinion con-
tained facts endangering the security of the Nation.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, the primary duty of censorship was in
the Office of Censorship ; it rested in the hands of your organization.
That was determined.
Mr. Richards. Absolutely ; definitely.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, this particular meeting in New York,
to which the OC was invited, but which no member of the OC at-
tended was — Did you hear all of the testimony this afternoon here?
Mr. Richards. I came in toward the end of Mr. Lang's testim.ony,
I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. All right. In your opinion, on recollection today,
it was in the field of censorship, Ijecause it concerned comments by a
Polish commentator?
Mr. Richards. Well, any time you use any method to stop freedom
of speech, it enters into the area of abridging it, and that, I presume,
constitutes censorship, yes. In other words, it was our assumption,
gentlemen, that taking a man off the air was censorship as much as
putting a blue pencil on his copy.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to read for the record, page 612 of the
committee investigation, part I, Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Garey is talking to you.
Chairman Madden. When was this letter sent?
2038 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum is dated May 15, 1943 —
Now, you received from Mr. Bronson a memorandum dated May 15, 1943, on
the further talk he had with Mrs. Shea, did you not?
Mr. Richards replies, "Yes, sir."
Mr. Garey. That memorandum is dated May 15, 1943. It is addressed to Mr.
Ryan and Mr. Richards, and it is from Mr. Bronson. The subject is, Now My
Week Is Complete. It reads : "Up until 3 : IG p. m. today there had been some-
thing lacking in the week's activities, and then the phone rans and it was Mrs.
Shea, attorney for the FCC. She asked if I was retaining my figure — personal
item — and then went on to inquire if we would be interested in the latest wrinkle
between the Office of War Information, Federal Communications, and the Foreign
Language Radio Wartime Control. I assured her I was the kind of a person
who was interested in just an average wrinkle, but one like that was most
intriguing. She went on to say that the Federal Communications Commission
(herself), the Oflice of War Information (Mr. Cranston), and the Foreign Lan-
guage Radio Wartime Control Committee (Mr. Simon and Mr. Lang) had met
in New York last Wednesday for a cozy little chat on what to do about the
broadcasters coming to blows over the Russian-Polish situation. It was agreed
in this event that the foreign-language broadcasters would read only the news as
received in the stations, via the recognized news printers, and not allow any
commentary on this topic. She wanted to know if I had been asked to attend
would I have gone."
Evidently they didn't, I am sorry.
"I said that most likely I would have, or that someone from this Office would
have done so, but I supposed the parties involved assumed it was a discussion
that did not involve censorship, therefore we weren't asked. Mrs. Shea rallied
quickly by saying that it was Mr. Cranston who put out the invitation. I later
learned from Mr. Ryan that we had been invited to send a representative but
had declined. Mr. Ryan said Mr. Cranston had asked us to attend but due to
pressure of other work, and the unlikelihood that the meeting would concern
censorship, no one from this Office went. Then she said that she recalled seeing
a letter by Mr. Price or Mr. Ryan urging the controversial issue should be treated
quietly and not ballooned up, as it were. (She is referring here to the Russian-
Polish impasse, I believe.) I said I was unfamiliar with such a letter, and then
she said Mr. Marks at her elbow had just advised that the letter was signed by
Mr. Ryan and would be in Mr. Ryan's files. She then said that she siipposed
Mr. Simon's outfit was putting out something about the New York office and
was that all right with us. I said this office was not concerned with it since we
had no part of the meeting, unless the bulletin crossed into censorship problems
or quoted or inferred that we were a party to such a release. In the latter
event, it should be submitted here. She said she didn't know just how the Foreign
Language Radio Wartime Control Committee went about such things, and we
both rambled along about what we didn't know. She then said that our relations,
Government agencies involved and broadcasters, should be more formalized so
that we would all know what was going on. Having had the feeling now for 9
months that I was trying to watch the entire field of play through a knothole, and
a sturdy oak knothole at that, I agreed, as we have agreed to such things before.
She then hung up on our mutual pledges of cooperation. Two minutes later at
3 : 31 she called back to say she had forgotten something."
That was on another subject matter other than the Polish-Russian
situation.
Now, that letter in the record definitely shows that, (1) no member
of OC went to the New York meeting; (2) the reason for not going to
that meeting was because no censorship problem was supposed to have
been involved.
Now that you have heard the testimony of this afternoon, and par-
ticularly that of Mr. Kreutz — did you hear his testimony?
Mr. Richards. I was here, but I didn't hear it very well. I was in
the back of the room. But I think I sot it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2039
Mr. Mitchell. "Would you say that the subject matter was within
the scope of censorship or within the scope of FCC and OWI ? I am
asking for an opinion.
Mr. Richards. Well, I would say it is my opinion it was not within
the scope of censorship. Others would have to speak as to whether or
not they thought it was within their scope.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions ?
Mr. Machrowicz. It is your opinion that the section of the FCC
attempting to control the commentaries on this matter was strictly
improper, irregular, and outside of their jurisdiction, is it not?
Mr. Eichards. Yes, sir. Of course the Communications Act forbids
censorship.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. And that was your impression at
this time?
Mr. Eichards. It was certainly our impression that that was their
intent, and that they shouldn't do it. It was our proper responsibility.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you see anything that was outlined here,
other than an attempt to intimidate these broadcasters ?
Mr. Eichards. I have testified to that at some length before, Mr.
Congressman, and I think that my answer is evident in the record that
was previously made at the time.
Chairman Madden. Thank you for your testimony.
We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 5 : 25 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 12, 1952.)
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1952
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington, D. G.
The committee met at 10 a, m., pursuant to call, in room 1301, House
Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Donclero, O'Konski, and
Sheehan.
Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select commit-
tee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. Will you
proceed, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of today's hearings
before the committee is to put forth the documentation of the records
that were in the Government agencies on the subject of the Katyn
massacre and \\\^ missing Polish officers.
You will recall that yesterday Mr. Jackson said that if sufficient
documentation had been available at the time of Nuremberg, the case
would not have been brought up at Nuremberg. At least the hands of
the United States Government, namely, Mr. Justice Jackson at that
time, would have been able to prevent it or would have been strength-
ened.
Now, through the cooperation of the Department of State, the com-
mittee has had made available to it all of the records that have been
in the file since early 1942. This morning we have as the first witness
former Ambassador William Standley, a retired admiral of the United
States Navy.
At the time that Admiral Standley was Ambassador, he had con-
ferences with Maj. Joseph Czapski and General Anders, and he had
instructions from the State Department to assist the Polish cause.
Admiral Standley, in the opinion of the committee staff, having
carefully read all of the documentation, predicted
Chairman INIadden. Let him testify. That will be his testimony.
Mr. Dondero. Let him take the stand.
Chairman ]NLvdden. I should think that the witness himself, if he
desires to refresh his mind, can refer to the letters. We can then
introduce the letters in evidence ; and, if the witness desires to refresh
his mind, we will be glad to submit the letters to him.
Mr, Mitchell. Call the first witness, please.
Chairman ISIadden. Admiral Standley.
2041
2042 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY, UNITED STATES
NAVY, RETIRED, CORONADO, CALIF.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, will you raise your riglit hand and be
sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God ?
Admiral Standlet. I do.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, for the record, will you state your
full name, please ?
Admiral Standley. William H. Standley.
Chairman Madden. And your address, please?
Admiral Standley. 862 G Avenue, Coronado.
Chairman Madden. California?
Admiral Standley. Yes, California.
Chairman Madden. What is your capacity now ?
Admiral Standley, I am an admiral on the retired list.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Standley, will you please tell the committee
what date you reported to Moscow as the Ambassador for the United
States ?
Admiral Standley. I think it was the 14th of April 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you, at this time, like to make a statement
-to the committee of your knowledge of the missing Polish officers and
the Katyn massacre, stating what efforts you made and what instruc-
tions you may have had, sir? A brief statement, if you wish.
Admiral Standley. Of course, the committee will recognize that
this situation occurred some 10 or 11 years ago and that, naturally,
my memory is rather deficient in the facts of the case. I have told
your counsel that I had made a complete statement concerninj}: my
relations with the Polish situation, including the Katyn Forest
nmrder, and that it was published in the Naval Institute Proceedings
of October. That statement, that article in the Institute contains a
complete notation of my connections with the Polish situation in
Moscow and the Katyn Forest murder.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, October of what year?
Mr. Mitchell. This year.
Admiral Standley. That was October of this year, the current
Now, naturally, my association or connection with the Polish situa-
tion began even before I was named as the future Ambassador to
Moscow. When I went into Moscow with the Beaverbrook-Harriman
mission in September, 1941, the Polish situation was being discussed
there then, and I became cognizant of the general situation, the fact
that the Russians had seized a great many Polish soldiers when they
invaded east Poland and had taken some 10,000 Polish officers.
The effort was being made then to locate these Polish officers
especially.
When I was named as Ambassador to Pussia in the latter part of
1941 and when I was confirmed, I was immediately importuned by
many agencies or many individuals who were interested in the 10,000
Polish officers, that is, in their location and in whether or not thoy were
alive, and everything concerned with them.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2043
As soon as I arrived in Moscow — I had received a briefing before I
left Washington as to the questions I should take up. Even before I
made my report to Mr. Kalinin, the President of the Soviet Union,
I received a message from the State Department advising me that I
was not to take up any of those questions that I had previously been
briefed upon, a message which I didn't understand, and about which
I protested immediately.
But that left me in a position where I couldn't take up the Polish
question on my first interview with Mr. Molotov.
Chairman Madden. Who gave you those admonitions or instruc-
tions?
Admiral Standley. They were general instructions and briefing
from various individuals in the State Department. I think Mr. Sum-
ner Welles was one of them, the Secretary himself. There were various
other officials. I can't now recall just who they were, but they were
from various individuals in the State Department.
So, as I say, I could not and I did not take up these Polish questions.
INIy first interview with Mr. JNIolotov and my first interview with
Mr. Stalin — I would like to refresh my memory from this article — ■
the first occasion when I took this matter up was in an interview with
Mr. Stalin some time in April 1942. At that time I told Mr. Stalin
of the knowledge I had of the missing Polish officers.
Well, let me go back. Even before that, on my way into Moscow,
on arrival at Teheran, I found that there were 28,000 Polish soldiers
that had been evacuated with their families and children from Russia.
I ins])ected this camp with their children and with their people in it,,
and observed the terrible condition that these people, and particularly
the children, were in. They were in all stages of malnutrition, some
of them practically dying. It was a terrible situation, indicating the
conditions under which the Poles had been existing, particularly the
women and children, in Russia.
As I say, my first interview with Mr. Molotov in which I mentioned
this was some time after the 14th of April. Then I advised him of my
knowledge of the situation and of my interest in the Polish situation.
No satisfaction whatever was obtained from Mr. Molotov at that
time, and there was only a casual mention of the fact that I was
interested in the Polish question, and that I came from the United
States Government, whicli was also interested in this question of tlit
situation and location of these Polish officers.
At that tim.e the interpreter, Mr. Pablov, advised me that Mr.
Molotov had a question which he wished to take up wdth me, and that
it was the desire of the American Government to set up in Moscow
an American officer as liaison between the Russians and the Poles.
Mr. Molotov expressed the view that he saw no reason for such liaison
as the naval attaches and the military attaches were there and that
the Poles had their own liaison. I knew nothing of the question, so
I did nothing about that.
As you will recall, the Government had been evacuated to Kuibyshev,
and the representatives there were Mr. Vyshinski and Mr, Lozovski,
Mr, Molotov had gone to Kuibyshev, but had returned to Moscow.
]Mr, Stalin had never gone to Kuibyshev, but had remained in Moscow.
So we had to start our negotiations with the seat of government in
Moscow or rather in Kuibyshev, and then go up to Moscow to get
2044 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the answer because Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski never made any
decision on anything. So we had to go to Moscow to get your answer
from Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin. That necessitated trips back and
forth.
When I went down to Kuibyshev, I met Dr. Kot. Dr. Kot at
that time was the Polish Ambassador or Minister, I think " « \vas, to
the Soviet Government. Immediately began a contact with tiit r^olish
representative in regard to the missing Polish officers and me: From
then on there was almost a constant conversation between ir. Kot
and myself as long as he stayed there — Mr. Kot, the Polish repre-
sentative, and the Ambassador.
My next contact with the Russian authorities was on May 27, 1942,
when I went to see Mr. Vyshinski. My conversation at that time with
Mr. Vyshinski was along these lines : That our Government was con-
cerned with the welfare, situation, and location of these officers and
was very anxious tliat there should be friendly relations between the
exiled Polish Government in London and the Russians, and I urged
that there should be close cooperation and a greater effort on tlie part
of the Russians to conform to the agreements they had made with the
Poles in regard to the release of Polish officers and men.
There was an agi-eement at that time in regard to the release of these
officers in order that they could serve under General Anders in the
war effort. The 28,000 Polish soldiers that had been released, the
troops that had been released and that I had found in Teheran later
served with General Anders in the Italian campaign ; and there was an
understanding that more of these officers and men should be released.
My efforts in the beginning were to obtain further cooperation with
the Polish Government. Then later I souglit an interview with ISIr.
Molotov in the Kremlin.
Mr. Machrowicz. What was the reaction of Mr. Molotov and of INIr.
Vyshinski at that time to your requests?
Admiral Standley. As I expressed it then and as I have quoted,
Mr. Vyshinski was silent for a long time while looking doAvn at his
hands folded on the table before him. The color flooded into the thin
face. Finally he looked around at me and said, 'T will present your
views to my government."
Later I had an interview with Mr. Molotov, and I presented tlie
same views to Mr. Molotov. Mr. INIolotov made a long statement in
reply. It was, in substance, that the Polish question was a very diffi-
cult question to deal with, that to evacuate these women and
children
At that time our Government had a proposition to evacuate these
Poles from Russia and relieve the Russians from taking care of theuT
and sending tliem down somewhere in Africa, North Africa, or some-
where else. That was part of my interview with Mr. Molotov at this
time.
Mr. Molotov's reply was in substance as follows : "If we had evacu-
ated the Polish women and children in the beginning, it would have
been all right. Put to evacuate them now would give the Germans
the idea tliat we couldn't take care of them. It would create a dis-
turbance, and we just feci that we are not in a position now to evacu-
ate these women and children and soldiers."
Chairman Maddkn. Will you pardon me. Ambassador. I hand you
a telegram dated Moscow, July 5, 1942, to the Secretary of State,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2045
Washington, signed "Standley," and ask if that is the telegram that
you sent to Washington as of that date ?
Admiral Standley. That is the telegram.
Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark it as exhibit 9
and insert it at this point into the record.
(The document referred to was marked exhibit 9 and follows :)
Exhibit 9- -Tf'^.egram From Ambassador Standley to the Departments of State
-i)
jr [Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, July 5, 1942.
Secret art of State,
Washington.
In describing to Molotov the Polish evacuation project, I expressed the sincere
hope of the U. S. Government that the Soviet authorities would allow the
evacuation of the Polish women and children concerned. I based this on the
opinion of the U. S. Government that the women and children in question could
be taken care of more easily in a country where there was no lighting in progress,
and also on the fact that the evacuation of these women and children would
make it unnecessary for the Soviet Union to feed and care for them.
This was not a simple evacuation question, Molotov said, which would not
be an important matter. The question involved was really a fundamental problem
affecting the basic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. He added
that the question might have been satisfactorily disposed of if this group had
been evacuated along with the first group, although there was no certainty that
this would have solved the matter, since there were always difficulties where
Poles were concerned. A second evacuation could create added difficulties and
instability among the Poles in the Soviet Union, and unfriendly comment against
the Soviet Union among the Poles in that part of Poland which was occupied
by Germany, as well as in the world in general, inasmuch as it would most
certainly be said that the Soviet Union was not able to feed and care for the
Poles in question and therefore had to send them to Africa. Molotov said that
during his recent visit to London he had suggested to Sikorski that an attempt
be made to better the situation of the Poles in the Soviet Union, but he did not
elaborate to me about how this should be done. Molotov said, however, that
the Poles could and would be fed by the Soviet Government. He stated that
he would bring our interests in the matter to the attention of his government.
Later Molotov referred to the general Polish question with a certain animosity,
saying, in effect : "Since there are many too many contradictory elements con-
cerned in Polish politics, there is always trouble whenever Polish questions arise."
Some of these elements are conducting policies unfriendly to the Soviet Union
in contradiction to the policies of the London Polish Government. Molotov said,
and even the sternest measures failed to subordinate these elements to Soviet
law. Although other elements wished to foster friendly relations with the
Soviet Government, and tried to do so, it is in general impossible to reconcile the
two groups.
My impression on leaving was similar to that I received when I last discussed
Polish matters with Vyshinski, namely, that the Soviet Government has a purely
political view of this whole question, and that it is not influenced by considera-
tions of humanity. It is displeased and even irritated when another power takes
an interest in Soviet-Polish relations.
( Signed ) Standley.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Ambassador, if you have no further com-
ment, I will ask you to identify a message from Secretary of State
Hull to you of August 19, 1942.
Admiral Standley. This is a portion of a telegram. I would like
to say that this covers an interview which comes later on.
Mr. Mitchell. The Ambassador says that he has some further com-
ments to make apropos exhibit 9.
Chairman Madden. All right; proceed, Admiral.
Admiral Standley. In the succeeding months after this interview
with Mr. ]\Iolotov, my notes show that the Polish situation in con-
93744— 52— pt. 7 15
2046 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
nection witli the Polish military units and civilians still in Russia
steadily worsened. When the Nazis and the Italians became estab-
lished in Egypt that fall and almost stabbed into Alexandria,
threatened the whole Middle East, the Russian Govermnent agreed
to allow three divisions of Poles and members of their families to
leave Russia for the Middle East.
The Polish military authorities were trying to obtain the release
of 10,000 officers whom they needed badly, but were rejjeatedly ]Hit
off. No reasons or excuses were given. General Anders and Dr. Kot
were not informed. That is hearsay ; I can't testify as to that.
I w^as informed that General Anders and Dr. Kot were not informed
that the Germans had captured the prison camps before the Poles
could be evacuated or that they had been transferred to other camps
or indeed anything at all as far as the Polish authorities could learn.
These officers had suddenly and completely disappeared from the
face of the earth. That was shortly after my interview with Mr.
Molotov.
Chairman Madden. x\bout what date was that. Admiral?
Admiral Standley. My interview with jSIr. jNIolotov was after July.
That was about August, I think, 1942. It was after my interview
and after that telegram that I sent in regard to my interview with
Mr. Molotov.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I would like to ask you this : Do you know
who made the decision to forget the idea of having Colonel Szymanski
go to Moscow as the liaison officer?
Admiral Standley. The decision came through a telegram from the
State Department. I don't know who made the decision.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Standley. A telegram of that kind ahvays came, of course,
from the State Department; so, I presume the Secretary of State made
the decision.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, we will mark this exhibit 10, and I
will ask the court reporter to insert exhibit 10 at this point in the
record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 10" and is as
follows:)
ExHIltIT 10
POUTION OF ]\Il<:SSAGE FKOM SkcKETARY OF STATE HUI.T. TO THE AmKKIOAN
Ambassador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942
* * * On instructions fi-om the Polisti Government, tlie I'olish Amhassjidor
in Washington lias asked tlie I'residenfs intei'veiition witli the Soviet Gov-
ernment in or<l(M' to effect an improvement in I'olisli-Soviet relations. * * *
* * * Referring to the hope which he expi'essed on several occasions that
the Soviet Government would tind it jiossihle to interpret as liberally as cir-
cumstances would permit its agreements with the Polish Government, the
Ambassador iiarticularly mentioned the desire of the Polish (Jovernment to
restart recruitinii of its nationals in Russia for the Polish armed forces and
filKo to tlie f/r.s-//T for the rrlcdsr of some fire to rif/lit tlioiiKiiu<] J'olifih officcru
who are reported still lieJtl Inj the Sloriet authorities. * * *
* * * You are therefore authorized to raise witii the Soviet authorities
the ([uestion of Soviet-Polish relations. You should point out that this Gov-
ernment liojies liiat the spirit of collaboration evidenced jji (he removal to the
Middle East of additional Polish divisions may be promoted to the utmost and
that there will I)e found for the various prol)lems mutually beneficial solu-
tions. ♦ ♦ *
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2047
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, you have told us that they were
forming the Polish Army in Russ'ia at that time. Can you tell us
something about the formation of that army that you may have
found out from your discussions with General Anders and Dr. Kot?
Admiral Standley. My onlj^ information in connection with that
was very general. I have no detailed knowledge of the military set-
up or organization except through my conversation with Dr. Kot.
Now, I would like to inject there as part of this, before I get to
that message, what was happening in the interim. The Polish
situation, as I stated, was definitely worsening, as was the ques-
tion of the Polish representatives receiving Polish supplies that Avere
being sent in for the Polish citizens into Murmansk and into Arch-
angel. The Soviet authorities eventually seized those officials and
finally got rid of all of them, and there was no oiie there to repre-
sent the Polish interests in receiving goods that were sent in for the
Poles.
Our rejiresentative there endeavored to take that over, but he
eventually found that the problem Avas one that he couldn't handle.
So that was part of the situation.
The Polish situation was worsening up to the time this message was
sent. Then I have this message in August 1942, when I received the
dispatch that you have just read. I have quoted here extracts from
that dispatch. ^ Shall I read that?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, if you please.
Admiral Standley. In August 1942, I received a dispatch from
our State Department, the conclusion of which may be paraphrased as
follows. I am not quoting, but rather paraphrasing. [Reading:]
The question of Polish-Soviet relations may be bi-ought up at your discretion
with the Soviet authorities. While the United States Government does not
wish to interfere in-this matter, you may point out it nevertheless hopes that
the splendid collaboration shown in transferring additional Polish divisions to
the ^Middle East may l)e furthered to the maximum. It is also hoped that solu-
tions whii-h are mutually beneticial may be found for the various problems under
discussion.
At the same time, it is realized tliat only direct negotiations between the two
governments involved can effect a solution of some of these extremely compli-
cated problems.
That is the end of the paraphrase.
Chairman Maddex. "Will you proceed, Mr. Slieehan.
Mr. SnEEiiAx. Ambassador, just to get the situation straight, as
I understand, when you left Washington from Moscow you were
given insti'uctions to be concerned with Polish affairs. After you
got to Moscow, as you said, you got instructions not to pay any atten-
tion to Polish affairs.
Admiral Staxdley. It didn't mention Polish affairs specifically.
Mr. SiiEEHAX. The missing officers?
Admiral Staxdley. When I was being briefed I was given infor-
mation on matters that I should take up, and the- Polish question
was one of them. "When I got to Moscow and before I submitted my
credentials in Moscow, I received a telegram from the State Depart-
ment saying that I was not to take up any of these questions that
I had been briefed on before I left. -They didn't mention the Polish
question specifically.
2048 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Then in 1942, accorcling to the telegram that yon
jnst read, you o:ot instructions to go forward with the Polish qi'u's-
tion ; namely, the Polish officers ?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, did they give you any information as to why j
they were interested n the Polish officers at that time? Was it for
humanitarian reasons or was it for military reasons?
Admiral Standi>ey. They w^ere interested both from the standpoint
of the military as well as because of the humane reason of getting the
Polish citizens out.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, we had now reached a position
where we needed the Polish divisions and thereby needed the officers
to man the divisions; is that right?
Admiral Standley. That is as I understood the message to me;
yes.
Now, in order to get that message across, I sought an interview with
Mr. Lozovski, and I met Mr. Lozovski on September 9, 1942.
Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain who Mr. Lozovski is?
Admiral Standley. JNIr. Lozovski was one of the Soviet Foreign
Office representatives in Kuibyshev. As I previously stated, Mr.
Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski remained in Kuibyshev as the repre-
sentatives of the Soviet Government. So, I sought an interview with
Mr. Lozovski, which was granted on September 9, 1942.
In that interview, as I stated in the paraphrase, our Government
stated that they did not want to interfere. Mr. Lozovski came right
back and said, "'Tliis is the best thing that the American Government
could do."
In furthering the purpose as expressed in that paraphrased message,
I still pressed the question of the status of the Polish relief and that of
the 180 Polish officers that had been delegates and who had been
arrested in Murmansk and Archangel. Mr. Lozovski again came right
back bluntly and said, "This work can be carried on by. the remaining
delegates in a perfectly satisfactory manner. There were too many
delegates in the first place. We can't have a bunch of hostile Poles
running all over the Soviet Union unsupervised."
Again I expressed to Mr. Lozovski the hope that they could collabo-
rate with us further.
Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark this document
^'Exhibit 11", and I will ask the admiral if he can identify it. It is
a message from the Secretary of State.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 11" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit 11
Portion of Message from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadob
AT Kuibyshev, Dated September 5, 1942
Mr. Willkie was requested by the President to consult with you and Mr. Hender-
son and then express to Stalin the American Government's hope that all efforts
will he made to effect an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations. * * *
The Polish Ambassador today asked whether there had been any representa-
tions for the release of "3,400" I'olish otficcrs who are reportedly still held by the
Soviet authorities in Arctic areas. .You may make these representations to-
gether with Mr. Willkie or separately. * * *
Mr. Mitchell,. Admiral, can you tell us something about what tran-
spired at that time? How did Mr. Willkie get into this picture?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2049
Admiral Standley. As I stated in that message which I recognize
as one received from the State Department, Mr. Willkie arrived in
Moscow witli his statf, I think, on September 17. I immediately took
Mr. Willkie to call upon Mr. Molotov. At that meeting Mr. Molotov
was asked to arrange for a meeting of Mr. Willkie and Mr. Stalin, to
which he agreed. As we were leaving, Mr. Willkie said to Mr. Stalin,
"How will I be informed of that meeting ?"
Chairman Madden. Not to Mr. Stalin ?
Admiral Standley. To Mr. Molotov, "How will I be informed of
that meeting?"
Mr. Molotov replied, "You will be informed through the American
Embassy."
I waited for some time. In the meantime Mr. Willkie's plans had
been made so that he could visit certain plants, and one morning we
were to go out to visit an aircraft battery. Before leaving — I had left
Eddy Page behind ; Eddy Page was my State Department represent-
ative who spoke Russian fluently — I said to Eddy, "I am going to
accompany Air. Willkie to this aircraft battery, and, if they have not
heard anything about Mr. Willkie's interview with Mr. Stalin, I want
you to make an appointment for me to see Mr. Molotov, because I don't
understand the delay. When a special representative from a foreign
government arrives here and asks to see Mr. Stalin, I don't understand
why there is this delay."
So, I went over to Mr. Willkie's residence, the residence that is kept
there for Americans. They had a guard at the door, a Russian who
spoke English. When I went in and asked Commander Peale, who was
Mr. Willkie's brother-in-law and who had accompanied him, whether
Mr. Willkie had received any word about a visit with Mr. Stalin,
Commander Peale replied "No."
But the man at the door had said, "Oh, yes, Mr, Willkie has informa-
tion. He is going to see Mr. Stalin tonight."
That was the hrst I had heard of Mr. Willkie's visit to Mr. Stalin.
Later I understood that this meeting was arranged by Mr. Joe Barnes,
who accompanied Mr. Willkie, and through some of the Reds over
tliere, the reddest of the Reds, Mr. Omanski, and Mr. Lozovski and
some of those other Red Russians. They had arranged for this meet-
ing with Mr. Willkie.
So, I promptly telephoned Page to never mind, that the meeting
had been arranged. On the way out I said to Mr. Willkie, "I under-
stand that you have received an invitation to call on Mr. Stalin. You
remember that you were informed that you would get that information
through the Embassy, but I have received no information about it, Mr.
Willkie. I wonder if you had anything to do with this interview?"
His reply was, "No, I had nothing to do with it."
Then I said, as this had been arranged for Mr. Willkie entirely
without my knowledge, "I presume that I am not supposed to go with
you ? "
Mr. Willkie said, "That is correct. You are not supposed to go."
I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, I am going to make some inquiries about
that, because I can't understand how the Ambassador has been by-
passed here by a special representative, and I want to know why."
"Oh," he said, "Admiral, you mustn't do that. I think you are a big
man, but, if you do that I think you are a little man."
2050 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE
I give you that because that in a sense describes my rehitions with
Mr. Willkie durinfr his time there. He entirely bypassed me, and later
on he went to see Mr. Stalin. They brought Mr. Barnes and Mr. Coles
in and had their pictures taken together, from which, of course, the
Ambassador was excluded. Their whole attitude there was one to dis-
credit the American representative in the Soviet Union. Those were
really my relations with Mr. Willkie while he was there.
Now, after that interview^, Mr. Willkie was leaving the next morn-
ing at 4 o'clock to go to the front. So, about 11 o'clock at night he
called me up and asked if he could come back and tell me what Mr.
Stalin had said.
I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, it is too late now. You are going to
leave at 4 o'clock. Tell me when you come back."
So, when he did come back he came over and gave me some informa-
tion and then told me that he had received some other information
which was so secret that lie couldn't even tell it to the American
Ambassador.
As a result of this whole episode of IMr. Willkie, I asked the State
Department to bring me home for consultation in that the situation
had gotten sort of out of hand and I felt that I needed some evidence
of confidence in the representative from the President of the United
States if I were to remain in Moscow. So, I came home for consul-
tation.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you come home, sir?
Admiral Standley. I left there in September of 1942. I am sorry.
That should be October 10, 1942. I came home then, I went back
in January and reported back on January 6, 1943.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce
this document.
Mr. DoNDERO. While the Chairman is looking that over, may I ask
the admiral Avhether all of this took place in Moscow or in
Kuibyshev ?
Admiral Standley. It was mostly in Moscow. You are getting
me into a long story, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DoNDERO. Don't blame the chairman. It Avas me that asked
the question.
Admiral Standley. Oh yes, you. Mr. Dondero.
iNIr. Willkie's controversy, or rather the controversy with Mr.
Willkie started before he even got into ^Moscow. When he arrived
in Turkey I received a message from ^Ir. Willkie stating that he did
not w^ant to go to Kuibyshev but that he did want to come to Moscow.
He wanted to come dii-ect to see Mr. Stalin. I replied that the seat
of government was in Kuibyshev.
Mind you, I had already made application for visas for Mr. Willkie
to enter, and I had told the Ivussiau authorities of his coming. They
had made plans and had arranged for him to visit state farms, collec-
tive farms, factories, and had arranged quartei's for him in Kuibyshev.
So I replied to Mr. Willkie that the seat of government was in
Kuibyshev and that there was the proper place for representatives
of foreign governments to make their entry, stating that ''The Soviets
have made plans for your visit here, and unless you have instructions
which are contraiy to those I received when 1 obtained your visas,
1 insist that you come to Kuibyshev."
So Mr. Willkie then came to Kuibyshev, under protest.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2051
Chairman Madden. This is off the the record.
(There was a brief statement off the record.)
Chairman Madden. I will hand yon exhibit 7.
Mr. DoNDERo. Jnst a moment. Admiral Standley, I have one qnes-
tion. What was the purpose of Mr. Willkie's visit to Moscow or
to Kuibyshev^ Was it a visit on the part of a representative of
the Government or was it a personal visit of his own?
Admiral Standley. Do you want my opinion or the statement made
by the State Department?
Mr. Dondero. I want whatever is the fact.
Admiral Standley. There are two facts. There are the facts made
by the State Department's message when it came in. The other facts
are my opinion based on what happened while he was there. Now,
which do yon Avant?
Mr. OTvoNSKi. Tell us both.
Mr. Dondero. Whatever the truth is.
Admiral Standley. The State Department stated — and, of course,
this is 11 years ago and my memory may be a little bit faulty — but,
in effect, the State Department said, "Mr. Willkie is contemplating a
visit to the Middle Last to mingle among the people and see for
himself and get for himself information from the people as to their
attitude toward the war effort. In that connection Mr. Willkie would
like to visit Moscow, and I request that you obtain visas for Mr.
Willkie to enter Moscow."
Then it continued: "'Mr. Willkie was my opponent in the last cam-
paign. Mr. Willkie received a large number of American votes. But
Mr. Willkie is now interested in getting on with the war effort, and
I feel that this visit will further the war effort. So I would like
you to furnish every opportunity for Mr. Willkie to accomplish the
purpose for which he is coming there."
Now, that was practically the statement on the basis of which he
came. He was a special representative of the President. That is the
way he was spoken of.
Mr. Willkie came to Kuibyshev under protest, as it were. We made
a trip up the river. I took him about 50 miles up the Volga River to
a state collective farm, and so forth. At that time Mr. Willkie was
talking about the second front practically everywhere he went.
Nearly everyone he spoke to would come right back, ''Mr. Willkie, how
about this second front?'"
Now, after I had insisted that Mr. Willkie come to Kuibyshev, he
acquiesced and came to Kuibyshev. But he said in his message,
"There will be no interviews and no press releases from Kuibyshev."
When it came to the newspaper boys, the only one who came down
was Shapiro. Eddy Gilmore didn't come and none of the other ne^N-s-
paper boys came. Apparently they had the idea that Mr. Willkie was
going to Moscow. So as long as they didn't come, INIr. Willkie
obviated the question of the press release by saying that there would
be no press releases from Kuibyshev.
Later on, as was the custom at that time whenever a special repre-
sentative of the President came, as Mr. Willkie was, when they had
completed their mission, Mr. Stalin gave him a Kremlin banquet. It
was at this Kremlin banquet that one of the representatives of Mr.
Willkie, after we had left the banquet room and had gone out into
the smoking room and were sitting around the table — and at that table
2052 THE KATlTsT FOREST MASSACRE
was Mr. Stalin, Mr. Willkie, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vershilov, General
Bradley, and myself, and one other whose name I can't recall now.
Mv. Coles and Mr. Barnes were sitting over at another table. One
of them pointed over and said, "There is the next President of the
United States."
From the events that happened there it was my opinion that Mr.
Willkie was over there furthering his political fences rather than
primarily for the Government's interests. Now, that was my personal
view of the situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I now introduce exhibit 12 ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr, Mitchell. This is a portion of the message from the Ambas-
sador at Kuibyshev dated September 10, 1942.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 12" and follows:)
Exhibit 12
Portion of Message from the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev Dated
September 10, 1912
* * * On a number of occasions I have, as instrncted. taken up with Soviet
authorities different Polisli problems such as tlie evacuation of cliiidren, recruit-
ment for the army, the release of five thousand to eight thousand Polish ofiicers,
relief, and the question of moving soldiers together witli their fanulies from
Tashkent to Iran.
As instructed, I liave said that my government did not desire to interfere in
Polish-Soviet relations Early in July, I reported that Molotov was considerably
irritated when I spoke of the Polish question. Yestei'day wlien I again s;iid my
government did not wish to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations Mr. Lozovski
remarked, "that is the best tiling for it to do."
* * * It is my judgment that Mr. Vv'illkie or other representatives should
approach the Premier in a firm and frank manner and as a party iu interest
and not apologetically. The attitude might be expressed that the friction which
has developed between officials of the two governments, i. e., Polisli and Soviet
in the Soviet Union is distressing to our government and that friction of this
kind between allies will be detrimental to our cause and will profit Hitler; that
the President therefore wants it frankly stated that our government hopes both
parties will make every effort to resolve their problems generously and in a
friendly manner, realizing that knowledge of the dispute in the hands of the
Axis will be a valuable weapon; that a review by l)oth parties of the problems
can, the President is confident, lead to an understanding provided there is present
a spirit of good will and mutual confidence. * * *
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, that message is from you, dated
September 10, 1942. Did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier in a firm
manner?
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. You might ask the admiral
if that is the message he sent ?
Admiral Standley. Yes; that is the message I sent.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier, by
whom I assume you mean Mr. Stalin, in a firm and frank manner,
and as a party in interest and not apologetically, to your knowledge?
Admiral Standley. I have no knowledge of Mr. Willkie's attitude
when he approached Mr. Stalin because I was not there. Later, before
I\Ir. Willkie left, and in an effort, as I told him, to be put into the
I)ositi()n of knowledge of the questions which he had taken up with
^Lr. Stalin so that I could carry on, I asked him what had developed,
Avhat had happened between him and Mr. Stalin.
The answer that I got was that "I have told you some of it, but
the rest of it is so secret that I can't even tell you."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2053
So I ^ot very little information from Mr. Willkie about what hap-
pened between him and Mr. Stalin.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Mr. Chairman, unless the visit of Mr. AVillkie can
be connected up with the Katyn massacre, it seems to me that the
whole matter ouf^ht to be expnniied from the record. I cannot see
the slightest relevancy between Mr. Willkie's visit — and this is no
reflection on you, Ambassador — but unless it can be connected up
so that it is in some way associated with the Katyn massacre, it has
nothiuir to do with the picture at all, and ought to be stricken from
this record.
]\Ir. Machkowicz. Mr. Chairman, I disagree. I think we should
have the entire picture. A lot of this nuitter may have no direct
bearing on the Katvn atFair, but it certainly has an indirect bearing;
and I don't see how we could get a complete picture without having
the Willkie incident in the record.
Mr. DoNDERO. Unless you can associate it in some way, I shall
ask
Mr. Maciirowicz. It has already been associated. The matter of
the missing Polish officers was at issue at this time.
Mr. DoxDERo. That miglit have been an issue at that time, but what
did Mr. Willkie have to do with it?
]\[r. Maciirowicz. I think it has already been established that the
question of the missing Polish officers was an issue that was dis-
cussed at the time, and the messages between the American Ambas-
sador and the Department of State indicate that. I see no reason
why the fact that it hapj^ened to be Mr. Wendell Willkie should
mean that that should be excluded from the record. With all of the
rest of it included, that would give us a very incomplete picture.
Mr. Dondero. Well, I still insist that there is the question of rele-
vancy. The subject of Mr. Willkie's visit there had nothing to do with
the Katyn massacre at all. He was not a representative of the
Government.
Mr. Machrowicz. Oh, yes: he was a representative of the Gov-
ernment.
Mr. Dondero. I did not so understand.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was he a representative of the Government,
Admiral ?
Admiral Staxdley. I have so stated, that is, that he represented
the President of the United States and was so treated.
Chairman Maddex. Admiral, does this testimony that you are pre-
senting lead up to the Katyn controversy or the Katyn" question in
any way?
Mr. Mitchell. Did you discuss the Polish situation with Mr.
Willkie?
Admiral Staxdley. Yes; I discussed the Polish situation with Mr.
Willkie and the ett'orts that I had made. I discussed that with him.
Chairman Madden. I think the admiral should proceed.
Mr. MiTCHEix. IVIay I have this document marked as ''Exhibit 1-3"?
Admiral Staxdley. I would like to add, gentlemen, that Mr. Will-
kie's visit and the fact that he had entirely bypassed the American
Ambassador made it difficult for me to continue the discussions in
regard to the Polish situation.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is with regard to the missing Polish officers ?
2054 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Admiral Standley. Yes; with regard to the missing Polish offi-
cers, because I did not know what Mr. Willkie had said to ^Ir. Stalin
and what Mr. Stalin, in turn, had said to Mr. Willkie.
Mr. DoNDERO. Did he mention that subject to you?
Admiral Standley. I asked him in rejiard to it, and he stated in
regard to the Polish question, "I have other matters that are so secret
that I can't tell you about them."
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to introduce ex-
hibit 13.
Admiral, this is a report from the Ambassador in Moscow regard-
ing Mr. Willkie's conversation with Stalin concerning the Polish
situation.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 13" and follows:)
Exhibit 13
Report Fhom the American Ambassador at Moscow Regarding Mb. Willkie's
Conversation With Stalin Concerning the Polish Situation
Mr. Willkie called at the Embassy on September 25 (1942) and informed the
Ambassador that he had taken np the Polish qnestion with Mr. Stalin along the
line that had been indicated in the Department's telegram of September 10,
pointing out particularly that it was in the conmion interest of the United Nations
that there should be the maximum cooperation and the least possible cause for
friction between the different nations fighting against the Axis, that Mr. Stalin
had asked specific questions in regard to the Polish complaints but that he had
replied that he did not wish to argue the details of the case. Mr. Stalin finally
said that he would be willing to discuss the Polish qnestion with Polish officials
with a view towards ironing out existing difficulties.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you refer to the Polish question, you refer
to the question of the missing Polish officers, do 3^011 not?
Admiral Standley. I couldn't say definitely that I did, but, as a
matter of fact, the Polish officers were always in the foreground.
Mr. Maciiroa\^cz, That was the most im]>ortant i')roblem that caused
the differences between the Polish Government and the Russians?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Chairman Madden. I believe the admiral's testimony is apropos.
Mr. DoNDERO. If tlie admiral states, as he now states, that it had to
do with the missing Polish officers, I iiave no objection. I just wanted
the thing straightened out. That was all.
Admiral Standley. It had so nnich importance that innnediately
upon Mr. Willkie's leaving I asked to be sent home for consultation
because the situation, as a result of Mr. AVillkie's visit, had developed
to the point that I felt I could no longer remain there without further
evidence that the Dei)artment had confidence in me and wanted me
to continue.
Ml'. DoNDERO. There is one question I Avant to ask. Did you discuss
this Polish question — and I refer to the missing Polish officers — with
Stalin up to that time?
Admiral STANDLt:Y. I don't think I CA'er discussed the Polish quevS-
tion with Mr. Stalin. It was always with Mr. ]\Iolotov. I don't recall
that T ever discussed it Avitli Mr. Stalin.
Mr. DoNDLKo. Now, at the time you discussed it with Mr, Molotov,
was a inaii by the name of Beria, who was the head of the secret police
of Ivussia, present, or any other officer of that organization?
Admiral Standley. Not obviously present, but many times they
are present when you don't know about it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2055
Chairman Madden. What do you mean by that, Admiral?
Admiral Standley. Well, you ahvaj's ha Ye somebody around when
you ai'e in Russia. There are ahAays some NKVD boys around. Some-
times, though, 3'ou know where they are, and sometimes you don't.
So I can't say when they were there.
Chairman Madden. You mean that they were concealed some place i
Admiral Standley. Yes, probably concealed or in a room where
they could hear. That is one of the conditions in the Soviet Union as
has been described by Bedell Smith, by Kirk, and by everybody else.
The American Ambassador is always followed by the XICVD boys.
Mr. MACHROA\acz. Now, Admiral, one matter that we are particu-
larly interested in is to know whether or not the Department of State
or the Department of Defense or any other o-overnmental agency had
information in 11)42, 1943, and in 1944 regarding the missing Polish
officers. I want to ask you in connection with that whether you, on
P^bruary 7, 1942, transmitted to the Department of State a report by
Major Czapski witli regard to these missing Polish officers.
Admiral Standley. 1 was not in Moscow at that time. I was not
there at that time. I was in Washington.
Chairman Madden. Show this to the admiral and see if he can
identify it.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Can you identify that photostatic copy?
Admiral Standley. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who was your predecessor ?
Admiral Standley. Ambassador Steinhardt.
He maj' not have been tliere, because Steinhart came out and the
counselor was Walter Thurston, and he might have been charge
d'affaires at that time. I am not sure.
Mr. Mrjx'HELL. Admiral, when did you report to Moscow as the
United States Ambassador?
Admiral Standley. In April 1942. It was April 14 I presented my
credentials and became the Ambassador. I presented my credentials
to Mr. Kalinin of the Soviet Republic and became the Ambassador.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you were being briefed by the Department
of State officials, as you told us this morning, before you went over
there, I assume that would be in February 1942, since you reported
in April of 1942?
Admiral Standley. I cannot recall just the date that I was con-
firmed here, but I was confirmed by the Senate here before I reported
to Moscow, and I remained in Washington here until February 1942.
Mr. MrrcHELL. But you were being briefed by the State Depart-
ment officers as to what your functions and duties were going to be,
were you not?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you ever shown this message at that time?
Admiral Standley. I do not recall ever having seen any messages
of that kind.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is an official State Department
document dated February 7, 1942, with no signature. It comes from
the Foreign Service of the United States of America, American
Embassy, Moscow, U. S. S. R., February 7, 1942, subject, "Trans-
mitting memorandum concerning Polish prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union."
2056 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
We have already received the information contained in this docu-
ment on the record in our hearings. The import of this whole thing
is that before Admiral Standley went to Moscow, this was in the files
of the Department of State.
Chairman Madden. Admiral Standley could not identify it.
Mr. Mitchell. He said he never saw this before he went over there.
Certainly a man who was going to. represent the United States
Government
Chairman Madden. I would like to have that identified if you want
it in the record here.
Is that already in the record ?
Mr. JNIlTCHELL. No.
Chairman Madden. If you can identify it we will submit it for the
record.
Mr. Machrowicz. IVIr. Chairman, may I suggest that probably we
have Mr. Brown, of the Department of State, identify this instrument,
and then Admiral Standley can continue his testimony. That will
save a lot of time.
TESTIMONY OF BEN H. BROWN, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Chairman JNIadden. Mr. Brown, will you state your full name,
please ?
Mr, Brown. Ben H. Brown, Jr.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Brown. 3501 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va.
Chairman jMadden. ^h\j we have the capacity in which you are
acting here ?
Mr, Brown. I am Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations.
Chairman Madden, Will you raise your hand and be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Brown. I do.
Chairman Madden. You may submit that copy to Mr. Brown,
counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Brown, will you kindly identify that document
for the committee, please ?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, this is a photostatic copy of a dispatch
from the American Embassy in Moscow, dated February 7, 1942,
I am identifying this on the basis of my knowledge of the original
of this document in the Department's files, and the fact that it was
on niy instruction that this document was photostated aiul the photo-
static copy turned over to the committee.
Chairman Madden. What is that document?
Mr. Mitchell. Whose signature appears on that document?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I will have to look at the original of
the -document to determine whose signature appears on it. I would
assume it was the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at the time.
Mr, Machrowicz. As far as this committee is concerned, I do not
think it is tremendously im])ortant who signed the document. The
fact is that on February 7, 11)42, the l)ei)artment of State did receive
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2057
from the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at Moscow a letter
transmitting a report by Major Czapski concerning these missing
Polish officers; is that correct?
jVIr. Brown. No, sir. The date stamp on this document shows that
it was received in the Department of State on April 13, 1942, at some-
thing after 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Now, the document was dated
February 7, but the date of receipt was April.
Mr. Machrowicz. But in April 1942 the Department of State would
have in its possession Major Czapski's extensive report regarding these
missing Polish officers; is that not correct?
Mr. Brown. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and receive
it in evidence. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 14.
(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 14" for identi-
fication and is as follows:)
Exhibit 14 — Letter and One Enclosure Forwarded to United States State
Department by American Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942,
Detailing Search fob Polish Officers
The Foreign Service of the United States of America
American Embassy,
Moscoiv, U. S. S. R., Fehruary 7, 19^2.
No. 11.
Subject: Transmitting nu-moranduni ciJiiceiiiing Polish prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union.
The Honorable the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation prepared by this office
of a memorandum on Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union which was
handed to me by its author, Jozef Czapski, a captain in the Polish Army in the
Soviet Union. Captain Czapski informed me in strict confidence that not only
had Stalin promised the Polish Ambassador that the Polish officers concerned
would be liberated but that he had given the most solemn assurance to this
effect to General Sikorski. Captain Czapski came to Moscow in an effort to
obtain the implementation of these promises but has been unable to obtain any
further information as to the whereabouts of these prisoners. He thinks it pos-
sible, however, that some of them may be imprisoned on Franz Joseph Island
and as it would be impossible to bring them back from there before the month
of June, there is a slight possibility that the Soviet authorities are withholding
any information until such time as they can actually release the prisoners. As
illustrative of the attitude taken by the Soviet authorities on this question,
Captain Czapski told me in the strictest confidence that two officers of the
Polish army in the U. S. S. R. were suddenly arrested in Kuibyshev and re-im-
prisoned without notice to the Polish Embassy or Military Authorities. The
Polish Embassy has been unable to secure their release despite the most strenu-
ous efforts. The Soviet authorities have merely stated that the officers in ques-
tion are believed to be pro-German. Captain Czapski said he thought the real
reason for their arrest was the fact that they were members of the Polish Bund.
Captain Czapski, who was himself a prisoner of war, said that he had been for-
tunate in being imprisoned in a camp where the prisoners received relatively
good treatment. He said that the reason for this special consideration was the
desire of the Soviet authorities to prepare a nucleus of Poles who would be fa-
vorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and would be useful to the Soviet
Government after the war, possibly for intervention in Polish internal afCairs.
He said that while he had no direct evidence he suspected that similar tactics
were being used with respect to German prisoners of war. Some support to this
theory is furnished by the recent visit of American correspondents to a Soviet
2058 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
prison camp near Gorky, where the German prisoners receive a more liberal
ration than the citizens of Moscow, although it cannot be said that the conditions
of life there would be likely to win adherents to the Communist Regime.
Respectfully yours,
(Committee Note. — The signature on this document was deleted by the State
Department. See previous testimony.)
[Translation]
Aide M]6moike Concerning Missing Polish Prisoners of War
The prisoners of war concentrated at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow in
the year 1939-40 (April-May) amounting to over 15,000 men, of which 8,700
were oflBcers, have not returned from their captivity and the place where they
were located is absolutely unknown with the excei)tion of 400 or 500 men, about
3 percent of the total number of prisoners of war at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow who were freed in 1941 (most of them having passed through the
camp at Griazowietz).
THE CAMP AT STAROBIELSK
The prisoners arrived at the camp of Starobielsk from the thirtieth of Septem-
ber to the first of November 1939. At the beginning of the liquidation of the
camp, about April 5, 1940, the number of prisonA's of war amounted to 3,920 men,
aside from the generals and colonels who lived apart. In this number there
were some dozens of civilians for the most part judges, lawyers, and civil ser-
vants, and about 20 officer candidates (Podehorazy). All of the rest were
oflSeers of whom at least 50 percent were regular officers, 8 generals, more than
100 colonels and lieutenant colonels, nearly 250 ma.lors, about 1,000 captains,
nearly 2,500 lieutenants and sublieutenants distributed among all branches of
the service ; among others, 380 of the most outstanding doctors of Poland, some
university professors, etc.
Kozielsk and Ostachkow were similar prison camps and were liquidated about
the same time and in the same manner as Starobielsk.
OSTACHKOW
When the liquidation of this camp began on April 6, 1940, there were a total
of 6,570 men, of which 380 were Polish officers, in addition to Polish frontier
guards and frontier regiments.
LIQUIDATION OF STAROBIELSK
On the fifth of April 1940 liquidation was announced and the first group, 195
men, were sent from Stai'obielsk. The Soviet commander. Colonel Berejkow,
and the commissar, Kirehin, assured our camp directors that the camp was in
process of final liquidation and that everyone would be sent to centers of depart-
ure from which all would be sent to their own country, the Russian side as well
as the German (none of them were sent).
They were sent from the fourtli of April to the twenty-sixth of April in groups
of from C5 to 240 persons. On April 25, after the customary lecture, more than
100 persons were to leave. There was read a special list containing the names
of 63 persons who were ordered to hold themselves completely apart during the
departure at the station.
After this there was a pause between the twenty-sixth of April and the second
of Miiy. On the second of May 200 more were sent by little groups of 8, 11, 12
(my own departure took place in a group of 16) and the rest were sent. This
group in which I found myself was taken to Pawlichtchew Bor (Smolensk Oblast)
and we there met the '"spt'cial group" of 63 persons. We were accordingly 79
otficers of Starobielsk all freed in 1941 (including some otlicer candidates
"Podehorazy"). If we add to tins number the oliicers sent from Starobielsk
individually during the winter of 1939-1940 ((Jeneral Jarnuszkiewicz, Colonel
Koc, C^olonel Gielgud-Aksentowicz, Chaplain Tyczkowski, Colonel Szymanski,
Captain Rytel, Lieutenant Evert) and who have been freed, we have all together
86 out of 3,920, (I little over 2 j)ercent of the total ntinifjrr of prisoners of
Starobielsk.
The li(iuidati(m of the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow was carried out in a
similar manner.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2059
In the camp of Pavvlichtchew Bor there were about 200 officers from Kozielsk
and about 120 persons from Ostachkow (police, subofficers, and some officers and
civilians) . The ratio between the number of men that came to Pawlichtchew and
the total number of prisoners in the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow differed
little from those I have cited for Starboielsk.
THE CAMP OF GRIAZOWIETZ NE^Ul VOLOGDA
After a stay of a month at Pawlichtchew the whole camp, amounting to about
400 persons, was transferred from Pawlichtchew to Griazowietz, where they
remained from April IS, 1940, to the time of their liberation (on July 2, 1941, a
group of 1,250 officers and soldiers interned in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
arrived at Griazowietz). According to our information the camp of Griazowietz
is the only camp existing in the U. S. S. R. after June 1940, in which the officer
prisoners of war were in the majority, which was liquidated in September 1941.
It will soon have been six months since the day of the proclamation of the
armistice of Polish prisoners on the twelfth of August 1941. The Polish army
in the U. S. S. R. is constantly receiving, whether by groups or individually,
officers and soldiers of the Polish army who had been arrested on the spot or at
the time of their passage of one of the frontiers after September 1939 and who
now are free to come to us from Siberia, from Kolyma, from Workuta, Komi,
ASSR, from Karagande, from all Russia, but contrary to the solemn promises
given to our Ambassador by Stalin himself in November K)41, categoric promises
of Stalin given to General Sikorski on December 4, 1941, to search for and deliver
to us the missing prisoners and soldiers of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostachkow,
tJiere is not a single prisoner of war of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostachkow (aside
from the group named above) who has returned. Not a single cry for help has
come to us from them. Having questioned thousands of compatriots who came
from camps and prisons all over the Soviet Union, we have no news whatever of
their location apart from vague rumors, usually carried third hand, such as:
that six to twelve thousand officers and subofficers were sent to Kolyma in 1940 :
that more than five thousand officers have been concentrated on Franz Joseph
Island and Nowaya, Zemlya ; that transports have been sent to Tschukotka,
Kamtschatka ; that 630 prisoners of Kozielsk are located ISO kilometers from
Piostraya Dreswa (Kolyma) ; that on the thirtieth of August 1941, 150 men in
tattered officers' uniforms were seen on the banks of the Gari north of Soswa
( tributary of the river Ob) : that Polish officers were sent to islands in the north
in large barges containing 1,700 to 2,000 men each and that three of these b:irges
were sunk. But none of this information is completely certain although tliat
concerning the northern islands and Kolyma seems the most probable.
Can it be that the solemn promises of Stalin himself would not allow us to
hope that we shall at least know where our prisoners of war companions are
and if they have perished where that took place? It is more than improbalile
that the heads of the N. K. V. D. should not know where these 15, 000 men are.
During our stay at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow (19:>9-1940) lists of
prisoners of war were made many times on special paper with numerous and
detailed printed questions. These papers were sent to the places of detention
of the iirisoners everywhere. To them were added the records of numerous
examinations on the past, tlie political views, etc., of each prisoner. Verified
photographs were added to the documents, and papers of each prisoner were kept
in a special dossier "Dielo," which included such documents as the officer's
certificate, passport, etc.
The point to which these registrations were made with care is shown by a
detail : many Polish officers received all of their papers in December 1941,
documents which had been taken from them at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow two yeai'S earlier.
THE OFFICERS
The dav of the beginning of the liquidation of the camp of Starobielsk,
April 5, 1940 :
The number of prisoners, all officers except some dozens of
civilians, and about thirty candidate officers (Podchorazy)
amounted to 3, 920 persons.
The number of prisoners of Kozielsk the day of its liquida-
tion, April 3, 1940, was 5,000 officers 4, 500 officers.
The number of prisoners at Ostachkow the day of its liquida-
tion was 6,570 of which 380 officers.
Total S, SOO
2060 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Subtracting the dozens of civilians at Starobielsk we have
at least 8, 700 officers.
There have returned to the Polish army some 3(K) officers of
Griazowietz (ex-prisoners of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow) and some dozens of prisoners sent from prisons
where they had been held individually after Starobielsk,
Kozielsk, and Ostachkow, in all not more than 400 oflScers.
Accordingly the officer prisoners of war who have not returned
from the camps Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow
amounted to the figure of 8, 300 oflScers.
All the officers of the Tolish Army in the U. S. S. R. of which the
number amounted to 2,300 more or less on January 1, 1942, are with the
exception of the group of 400 officers mentioned above not as prisoners
of war but political prisoners arrested after the campaign of 1939 as well
as those interned from Lithuania, Estonia, and I^atvia.
This note sets forth the status of the officer prisoners of war not liberated.
With regard to the soldier prisoners of war not liberated, the question cannot be
described in such a precise manner. According to official Soviet information
(Krasnaya Zvezda, September IS, 1940), on the Ukraine front alone the Soviet
army took 181,223 soldiers and more than 4,000 under officers prisoners. The
soldiers have been partially sent back, the rest having been held in work camps
in Komi, A. S. S. R., in Siberia, in the DonBass, in Soviet-occupied Poland, in
Kazakstan, and in all the prisons of the U. S. S. R. A part of these men have
been liberated and have formed the cadre of our army in the U. S. S. R. Another
part not being able to be received in the army drifted toward the south seeking
their families exported to Kazakstan. A large part have perisiied in work camps
as well as being freed from cold and from hunger.
Accordingly, it is only the prisoners of war of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and
Ostachkow, for the most part officers, that we have been able to determine in
exact figures. In enlarging the cadres of our army in the South, the need for
these officers becomes more and more pressing. We lose in them the l^est that
we had of military specialists, men of character, and patriots. In increasing our
army the quality of the army is tied to this question of the disappearance of
our best cadres of officers, to say nothing about how much more difficult this
makes the creation of confidence in our army towards our Soviet allies, con-
fidence so necessary for the decisive moment when our army goes into action
again.
JozEF CzAPSKi, Captain.
Moscow, January 29, 19'i2.
Mr, Brown. Is that all for me at this time, sir?
Chairman Madden. That is all, Mr. Brown. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OP WILLIAM H. STANDLEY— Resumed
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, we have now reached the point in your
career as Ambassador where you asked to be called home as a result
of the visit Mr. Willkie made.
Could you tell us what happened, briefly, in Washington, at the
time you came back, which I believe you stated was October 1942?
Admiral Standley. When I returned to Washington, I reported,
of course, directly to the State Department and then had an inter-
view with the President. I reported to the President virtually what
I have told this committee about ]\Ir. Willkie's activities over there.
TluMi I told the President that I had asked to be recalled because of
the situation Mr. Willkie left me in, and that if I returned to Russia
I must go back with increased prestige and evidences of that.
And I told him three tilings that must hapj)en to indicate that
evidence. One was that my naval attache, who was a captain, should
be made an admiral ; that my military attache should be made a gen-
eral, and that General Faymonville, the representative of Lend-Lease,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2061
should be directed to report to the Ambassador and not act independ-
ently, as lie had been doing.
Those things were accomplished before I went back.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are telling the committee this
morning that all of your requests were granted by the President; is
that right?
Admiral Standlet. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell, And that you then returned in your official ca-
pacity ?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Xow, during your conversation with the President,
was the subject matter of the missing Polish othcers discussed?
Admiral Standley. I cannot recall generally, but I did discuss it
with the President. I cannot remember in detail what the discussion
was, but it was, in general, along the lines that I have indicated to the
committee here. I informed the President of the situation as it had
developed up to that time.
Mr. Mitchell. In October 1942?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you proceed to tell the committee what
happened upon your return to Moscow, confining it to the Polish
question ?
Admiral Standley. When I returned to Moscow, I found that Dr.
Kot, who had informed me before I left that he had asked to be re-
called, had been recalled as the Polish representative, and that Dr.
Homer had been assigned as the Polish representative in Moscow.
Upon my return, Mr. Romer made the usual call, and he seemed very
much pleased because he felt that the Polish situation had improved,
and he felt encouraged and felt that he was going to accomplish some
results in connection with that question.
Then IMr. Homer informed me that on subsequent visits the attitude
of Mr. Molotov seemed to stiffen again, and then the Polish question
became again a sore point and became quite a question of controversy.
Later on Mr. Romer brought a message which stated that their
Polish Government in London had been informed that the British
Ambassador and the American Ambassador would receive identical
notes, which they were supposed to present to the Soviet Government.
And in due time, I think in about a week, those messages were re-
ceived and the British Ambassador and myself made appointments
to see Mr. Molotov.
We did not go together on this occasion, and when I went into the
office — we had appointments and mine was after the British Ambas-
sador's— as I went in, the British Ambassador was coming out. And
the British Ambassador stated :
I have talked with Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish situation. I have urged
that they withhold their statements in regard to the Polish situation and not
make it public.
And, of course —
he said —
I did not have much success. I hope you will have better success.
That was in connection with the note that the Soviet Government
was going to make in regard to the breaking of relations with the
Polish Government.
93744 — 52— pt. 7 16
2062 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. We have here now a document wliich should be
marked as the next exhibit.
Mr. Mitchell. That will be exhibit 15.
Chairman Madden. Wait just a minute. I think the admiral lia.d
something further to say.
Admiral Standley. I had gotten ahead there.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think you had. I would like to bring you
up to the point.
I have here a paraphrase of a telegram from Moscow, dated April
26, 1943 ; which I would like to introduce at this point as exhibit 15.
(The document referred to Mas marked "Exhibit 15" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit 15
[Paraphrase of telegram from Moscow]
Moscow, April 26. 1943.
Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
Two. I called on Molotov at his request this afternoon. As I arrived Clark
Kerr was leaving and he said in passing "see if you can persuade him to delay
the publication of the note. This is madness — I have been trying for the past
hour but I am afraid I was not successful."
Molotov told me of a mesHUfie of April 21 addressed to Churchill and to Presi-
dent Roosevelt concerning Polish-Soviet relations. He said that in the absence
of the President and of Air. Hull this message ivas given to Mr. Welles on the 2Jfth.
The message, he said, was almost identical to the note which he was "forced"
to give last night to Ambassador Romer. The message was sent to the President
to explain the position of the Soviet Government in the present controversy, and
he felt certain that the Soviet position would be understood by the American
Government. After reading the note Molotov said, in reply to my question,
that no answer to Stalin's message had been received from the President. I
said that the President's absence would account for the lack of a reply, and
added that I was certain the President would be greatly disturbed at this devel-
opment. When informed that the note would be published this evening, I said
that, speaking without instructions, I was certain the American and British
Governments were exporing the question of Polish-Soviet relations in an attempt
to find a solution which would make unnecessary a rupture in relations. I added
that I sincerely hoped that publication of the note could be held up long enough
to permit a complete examination of the question.
(Signed) Standley.
Chairman Madden. That will be received as exhibit 15.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you acknowledge having sent that message,
Admiral ?
Admiral Standley. Yes. And tliat brings me back. I had gotten
ahead of that in ni}^ testimony.
As I stated, Mr. Romer found tliat conditions Avere worsening as
he wont along, and eventually, on A])ril 11^, 194;), came the break.
And at that time, Mr. Goebbels, the German representative, had an-
nounced tlie finding of these 5,000 or 8,000 Poli.sh officers and that they
had been murdered by the Russians.
At that time it was announced that the Polish Government in exile
had requested the International Red Cross to investigate this murder
to determine who had committed the nnirder, whether it was the Rus-
sians or the Germans.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2063
My next knowledge in connection with that was when Mr. Romer
•came into my office the next or following day and asked to see me.
He made this statement :
Mr. Ambassador, I would like to get your advice. I was called for an appoint-
ment with Mr. Molotov last evening, at which time I was presented with a letter
of such tenor that after I had read it I handed it back to Mr. Molotov, and I said,
"Mr. Molotov, that letter is couched in language which no ambassador can re-
ceive," and I refused to receive it. And I left the ofBce.
He continued, "About 12 o'clock, between 12 and 2 o'clock last
night" — I think he told me about 12 o'clock —
a messenger rapped at my door in the hotel, and when he opened the door he
presented me with a letter from the Russian Foreign Office. And the messenger
left. When I opened the letter, I found it was the identical letter that he had
given me in the afternoon, with no change whatever in it. It was the identical
letter.
"So," he said, "I came over to ask what you would do about it."
I first said to Mr. Romer, "Have you seen the British Ambassador?"
"Yes."
"Probably," I said, "it will be no use for me to tell you what I would
do, but if you asked me, if it was my case, I would take that letter
back to the Kremlin gate and say to the messenger that it was the
identical letter I had refused to receive, and I could not receive it and
was returning it, evidently it had been sent to me by mistake."
As I anticipated, Mr. Romer did not take my advice. He referred
the matter to the Polish Government, and so that was the breaking of
relations, and in a short time JVIr. Romer left IMoscow for home.
Chairman LIadden. At this time I will have the next document
marked "Exhibit 16," which is entitled "Private and Confidential
Message of Premier Joseph V. Stalin to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt."
The docmnent will be received for the record.
(The document referred to w^as marked "Exliibit 16" for identifica-
tion, and is as follows :)
Exhibit 16
Marshall Stalin's Personal Letter to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt
(Note in panel in upper right hand corner states the message was
received in the State Department "about 3 p. m., April 24, lols")
The recent conduct of the Polish Government towards the Soviet Union is
regarded by the Soviet Government as absolutely abnormal and contrary to all
rules and standards governing relations between allied countries.
The campaign of calumny against the Soviet Union, initiated by the German
fascists regarding the Polish officers they themselves slaughtered in the Smolensk
area, on German-occupied territory, was immediately taken up by the Sikorski
government and inflated in every possible way by the official Polish press. The
Sikorski government, far from taking a stand against the vile fascist slander
of the Soviet Union did not even see fit to ask the Soviet government for in-
formation or explanations.
The Hitlerite authorities, after perpetrating an atrocious crime against the
Polish officers, are now engaged upon an investigation farce for the staging of
which they have enlisted the help of certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked
up by them in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where
honest Poles dare not lift their voices in public.
2064 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in these "investigations"
the International Red Cross which is compelled to take part, under conditions
of a terroristic regime with its gallows and mass extermination of a peaceful
population, in this investigation farce, under the stage management of Hitler.
It should be clear that such "investigations," carried out, moreover, behind the
Soviet Government's back, cannot inspire confidence in persons of any integrity.
The fact that this campaign against the Soviet Union was launched simul-
taneously in the German and the Polish press and is being conducted along similar
lines does not leave any room for doubt that there is contact and collusion between
Hitler, the enemy of the Allies, and the Sikorski government in the conduct of
the campaign.
At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in the
bitter struggle against Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the
common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries, the government of Mr.
Sikorski, pandering to Hitler's tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet
Union.
All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to infer that the present
government of Poland, having fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler
government, has actually discontinued relations of alliance with the U. S. S. R.
and assumed a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union.
In view of these circumstances, the Soviet Government has come to the conclu-
sion of the necessity for breaking relations with the present Polish government.
I deem it necessary to inform you of the above and trust that the Government
of the United States will realize the inevitability of the step which the Soviet
Government has been compelled to take. •
April 21, 1943.
Chairman Maddex. This next document will be marked "Exhibit
17" and received for the record. It is a message from President Roose-
velt to Stalin, dated April 26, 1943.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit IT" for identifica-
tion and is as follows :)
Exhibit 17 — Message Feom President Roosevelt to Stalin, Dated April 26. 1943
I have received your telegram while on my Western inspection trip. I can well
understand your problem, but I hope in the present situation you can find means
to label your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government
in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.
It is my view that Sikorsky has not acted in any way with Hitler gang, but
rather that he made a mistake in taking the mutter up with the International
Red Cross. Also, I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means
of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in
the future.
Let me know if I can help in any way, especially in regard to looking after
any Poles you may desire to send out of Russia.
Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, very many of
them in the Army and Navy. They are all bitter against the Nazis, and knowl-
edge of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski would not help
the situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the admiral a
question.
Admiral, is this message from Stalin to President Roosevelt the
one that was referred to in your dispatch when Molotov told you about
it April 21?
Admiral Standley. I never saw that message. Mr. Stalin told me
about it.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Did you see that message, Admiral ?
Admiral Standley. No.
Mr. Maciihowicz. Now, I am going to ask you. Admiral: In your
relations with the Polish representatives in Moscow, did you find a
desire on their ]iart to find a way out of the situation with the Russian
authorities ? Did they seem to be acting in good faith ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2065
Admiral Standley. Do you mean the Polish authorities?
Mr. Machrowicz. The Polish authorities.
Admiral Standley. Oh, yes.
IVIr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication that they did not act
otherwise than in good faith i
Admiral Standley. Not the slightest. On the other hand, there
seemed to be every effort of the Poles, Mr. Kot and Mr. Romer, to
get along, and to solve the problem.
Mr. ]VIachrowicz. Was there anything that you found in your rela-
tions with xVmbassador Kot, Ambassador Romer, and the others,
which would indicate to you that the desire of the Polish Government
to ask for an International Red Cross investigation was instigated by
the Germans?
Admiral Standley. No. The only information we got about that
came over the radio. We got this word over the radio, and then we
got the news in regard to Mr. Romer's relief.
Mr. Machrowicz. Your impression, based on the negotiations and
the discussions you had with Ambassador Kot and Ambassador Romer,
was that this was an independent request to the Polish Government,
with which the Germans had nothing to do; is that correct?
Admiral Standley. That was the impression we had at the time.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you see anything in this action of the Polish
Government which would give any reason to ask the President to have
them act with more common sense in the future ? Was there anything
tliat was not in conmion sense in requesting the International Red
Cross to make an investigation?
Admiral Standley. Not that we could see at the time. There was
no particular reason why they should not ask a neutral agency to
investigate, as long as there was a dispute.
Mr. JVIaciirowicz. Did it not appear to you that it was, on the con-
trary, acting with common sense in the case of a controversy between
the Russians and Germans, both of whom were equal enemies of the
Poles, that the Polish Government wanted an unbiased organization
like the International Red Cross to investigate?
Admiral Standley. That is how it appeared to u.s there, that the
Polish Government was acting in good faith in endeavoring to get
an honest solution of the controversy.
Mr. Machroavicz. Then, of course, you disagree with the former
President's statement that they did not act with conmion sense in
asking such an unbiased investigation?
Admiral Standley. I do not know whetlier I would agree with
that or not.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Before you proceed further let me ask: Did the
Polish representatives at all times contact you in regard to the effort
they made with the Russian Government to find these Polish officers?
Admiral Standley. I could not say that they contacted me in
regard to, or informed me of every occasion, but they were continually
discussing the Polish question with me.
As a matter of fact, our relations with Minister Kot were very
friendly. He was a great bridge player, and we played bridge back
and forth continually.
2066 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
At these bridge tables we would discuss these questions. Of course,,
they are not a matter I can recall, but I know we were constantly
discussing the Polish question.
Mr. DoNDERo. When you speak of the Polish question or Polish
problem. Ambassador, you really mean these missing Polisli officers,,
do you ?
Admiral Standley. Yes. That AA'as the problem.
Mr. DoNDEUo. Now, there is something about which you have
aroused the curiosity of all members of this committee.
Did you at any time after Willkie's visit to Europe learn what was
the supersecret information that he had which you did not have?
Admiral Standley. No. At least, if it came to me, it came to me in
a way that 1 did not know it was information through Mr. Willkie.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have at this time, Mr. Chairnum.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. I have one question. Admiral, referring to this
break that finally came between Russia and the Polish Government,
that was not a surprise to you, was it^ In other words, were you
not of the opinion that Russia's attitude, considering the situation
and the way they had to be babied by everybody with regard to even
talking to the Poles, was it not your opinion that eventually the
break would come, and that if it had not been on this incident of the
Red Cross, that they would have found some other incident because
of the plan they had set? Eventually the'break would have to come
and they had it in mind. It was just a question of falling upon the
first opportunity to do it with grace; is that right? Is that your
opinion ?
Admiral Standley. Would you state that again ?
Mr. O'Konski. This break that finally came between the Polish
Government and the Russian Government was scheduled to come for
a long time, was it not? In other words, if Russia had not found this
particular incident as an excuse to sever relations with the Polish
Government, they would have found some other excuse because it was
definitely in their plan to eventually sever relations, was it not?
Admiral Standley. That was not in our minds in JNIoscow.
Mr. O'Konski. It was not ?
Admiral Standley. No. We did not anticipate a definite and final
break between the Poles and the Russians.
Chairman Madden. Our next document will be marked "Exhibit
No. 18." It is a telegram to the Secretary of State from Ambassador
Standley, dated in Moscow April 28, 1943.
That will be received for the record.
(The document referred to was marked as ''Exhibit No. 18" for iden-
tification and is as follows: )
Exhibit 18
[I'araiihrase of telegram from American Ambassador in Moscow to Department of StateJ
Moscow, April 28, 19^3.
SKCBErrAKY OF STATE,
Washington.
For thk Tuksidknt and thk SKCiuorAUY — Stx^Hicr.
In my conversation \vitli IMolotov wliifli took pliK'o at ."> o'clock on the clay
prior to tiio rect'iii't of the I'resident's message to Stalin. I want you to know
that I requested him very earnestly during almost an hour to hold up publi-
cation of the Polish note until after the I'resident could reply to Stalin's uies-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2067
sage. The President had been absent from Washington, I exphiined, and I
expressed the earnest hope that if pul^Iication could be dehiyed for even two
or three days so that the President could communicate with Stalin, this might
have an important bearing on the unfortunate developments. However. INIolo-
tov was as intransigent as I am informed he had been earlier with the British
Ambassador. Later I learned that the note bad been read at about the^same
time to the Chiefs of Mission in Kuibyshev and had been released to the
press.
I realize now that intercession on my part or on the part of the British Am-
bassador could not have helped, since the Kremlin policy was set before my
interview with Molotov. It would seem, from what I can gather here, that
hopes for reconciliation were apparently destroyed with the publication today
in Izvcstiya of an article by Wanda Wasilevskaya, the so-called chairman of
the Union of Polish Patriots, editor of Wohia Polska and incidentally the
wife allegedly of Kornechuk who was recently appointed Vice Commissar of
Foreign Affairs. "The Polish Patriots are against the (lovernment of General
Sikorski" was the title of this article, which held strongly that the Polish
Government in London, a left-over from Rydzsmigly's "Government of Poland's
September defeat," was not chosen by the I'olisli people, did not represent them,
and is presently controlled by Hitlerite elements. The Army leadership under
General Anders is accused of anti-Semetism, Chauvanism, anti-Sovietism, and
even cowardice for "refusing to fight and withdrawing its forces from the Soviet
Union." The diplomatic representation in the Soviet Union of the Sikorski
Government are accused of robbing the Polish exiles of both supi)lies and money r
and the links of the Polish Government with Berlin are said to be as clear as
its imperialistic intentions toward Soviet territories. The article concludes
that the Polish Patriots Union has asked for the organization in the Soviet Union
of Polish imits "which would proceed to the front to fight shoulder to shoulder
with the Red Army rather than sitting for moutlis in tents." A fuller summary
of the article is being telegraphed.
It may be noteworthy that whereas at first the foreign corre.spondents here
had to use the phrase "suspension of relations." later Soviet censors allowed
them to call the development a "break" or "rupture" in relations. However, it
is the con.sensus here that the article mentioned above has now closed the door
definitely to any rapi>roachment between Moscow and the present Polish
Government.
Standley.
Mr. MiTCHELi.,. Do you acknowledge having sent that telegram?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
]\Ir. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee what went on
at this time ^ It is evident from this telegram that the breaking off
of relations had a more important meaning behind it since it looks like
they were trying to form another Polish Government. Could you
explain that to tlie committee, please?
Admiral Standley. I think that that could be explained by what
actually happened, because when these relations were broken off, the
Russian Government set up a Polish representative government in
Moscow.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Plans for setting up that kind of government just
do not happen overnight. Where did they find this Wanda Wasilew-
ska and where did they find these other people ?
In other words, this thing must have been planned long before they
even broke diplomatic relations with the real Government of Poland.
Do you not feel that way : That they must have been planning for it
for quite some time, otherwise how would they have all these people
ready ?
Admiral Standley. You know, hindsight is one thing and foresight
is another. You are asking me what I thought at that time. At that
time I did not have the belief or feeling that the rupture was
imperative.
2068 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But now, subsequent developments convince you, do
they not, Admiral, that this thing was planned long beforehand?
Admiral Standley. At the present time, with hindsight, I would
say "yes" ; there is not any question but that that was the plan.
Cltairman Madden. Admiral, I will present to you exhibit 19,
headed, "Paraphrase of telegram, Moscow, April 28, 1943," addressed
to tlie Secretary of State at Washington, signed by "Standley," and
I will ask counsel to have you identify it.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 19" for identifica-
tion and is as follows :)
Exhibit 19
[Paraphrase of telegram, from American Ambassador in Moscow to United States State
Department]
Moscow, April 28, W.'/S.
Secretary of State,
WasJiivffton:
Accordinff to many qualified oliservers here, there may be formed in the near
future on Soviet soil a '"Free Polish Government" which would hold that it alone
represented the real Polish people in Poland occupied by Germany and not the
"reactiimary" emigree Polish circles abroad. This "Free Polish Government"
would be an offspring of the Union of Polish Patriots and as such a satellite of the
Soviet Government. I am not convinced that these observers are right although
it is quite possible they may be. In the lirst place, I doubt whether the realisti<'
Kremlin has forgotten its unsuccessful attempt at the b^uinning of the Finnish
War prematui'ely to publicize and organize the Terioki Government. Jn the
secofid place, there do not appear to be any Polisli leaders here who irould hare
sufficient stature to make siteh a (jovernntent popular. It would appear more
likely tliat there will be formed here an organization similar to the French
National Committee in London. We should in any event be prepared, I think, for
some move of this sort whether it be in the form of a conunittee or of a Free
Polish Government, and we should realize that an organization of this kind on
Soviet soil must be completely under Soviet domination. In addition, a develop-
ment of this kind is possible in the case of any Slavic or bordering country outside
the 1041 Soviet fi-ontiers whi<-h does not agree to the policy of the Soviet Union.
Within tlie Soviet Union can be found the nucleus of any European Government
and especially of those governments in which the Soviet Union has strategic or
geographic interests.
We may, it seems to me, be faced with a reversal in European history. To
protect itself from the influences of P.olshevism, Western Europe in 1918 at-
tempted to set up a cordon sanitaire. The Kremlin, in order to protect itself
from the influences of the west, might now envisage the formation of a belt of
pro-Soviet states.
(Signed) Standley.
Mr. MrrciiELT.. Admiral Standley, this message, is dated April 28,
194e3. Do you recall having sent that?
Admiral Standeey. I recall having made that rather military esti-
mate of the situation; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, I want to compliment you. I think
you were very prophetic in your statement there. I think the facts
proved to be exactly as you prophesied at that time.
Admiral Standeey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. MrrciJEEL. Now, Achniral, could you briefly sununarize the rest
of your tour of duly in INIoscow and apjiioximately the time that you
were sncceeded in the position, and by whom?
Adinii-al St-andeev. I would like to give you in summary, give the
committee, soi-t of a ])icture ol" what happened there when the German
broadcast claimed the finding of these 10,000 Polish ofUcers in the
Katyn Forest near Smolensk.
THE KATITST FOREST MASSACRE 2069
Mr. Mitchell. Please do.
Admiral Staxdlet. Two days after this, radio Moscow broadcast
an indignant denial of the Nazi charge. "At last," it said, "these new
German lies reveal the fate of the Polish officers whom the Germans
used for constructive work in the Smolensk area."
The next day, Tass explained that these Polish prisoners had been
captured alive by the Germans during the Red Army retreat from
Smolensk in the summer of 1941, and information which combined the
efforts of the British. American, and Polish Governments has been
unsuccessful in extracting from the Soviet GoA'ernment until that day.
The Poles were wild. They knew that many of their officers had been
removed from the three prison camps in April 1940. If the Soviet
Government knew that they had been captured by the Germans in
1941, why had the Russians let the Poles hunt and hope for almost 2
years ?
Ambassador Romer urged caution. The Polish Government in
London proceeded cautiously.
On April 17, the Polish Cabinet issued a statement, of which I
obtained a rather poor translation. If you will bear with me, I will
read that rather short statement :
There is no Pole who is not deeply shocked by the information loudly pro-
claimed by German propaganda of the discovery near Smolensk of the huge
graves filled with corpses of massacred Polish officers missing in the U. S. S. R.
and about their execution. At the same time, the Polish Government, in the name
of the Polish nation, refuses to permit the Germans to promote discord among
the United Nations by shifting that crime in self-defense to the Russians. The
hjiiocritical indignation of the German propaganda will not conceal from the
world the cruel crimes committed by the Nazis against the Polish nation.
Then that statement went on into a list of a long series of crimes,
and so forth.
Now, that was the attitude that was presented to us over there,
and the committee should realize that sitting over there we were rather
also behind the iron curtain and we did not know very much about
what was going on except in messages we got that came through from
the State Department. We had no general news, no general broadcast,
or anything of that kind. So we were in a way sort of blanketed, too.
And many of these things that possibly happened on the outside, we
had no way of knowing.
Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, j^ou mentioned there that the Russians
suddenly announced the fact that these Polish officers were taken
prisoners by the Germans and killed bj^ them. I am going to ask you
a question.
In the course of your various talks with Molotov, Stalin, and others,
did they at any time give you any inference that these Polish officers
became prisoners of the Germans ?
Admiral Standlet. No, not the slightest. I never received any
information as to the location or disposition of these Polish officers.
Mr. Machrowicz. The first time the story came out that they were
taken prisoners by the Germans was after German discovery of the
graves; is that not correct?
Admiral Standley. Yes, sir.
And let me give you this instance. While I was being briefed in
Washington, a lady came in and she said, "I am the wife of an officer
who was taken out of Poland by the Russians, and I have not heard
2070 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
from him. Tliey tell me lie is dead. I don't believe he is dead. lam
jtriviii*^ you this letter to present to this officer when you hnd him,''
I took the letter with, of course, rather a hopeless feelino;. And a
year and a half later, or a year later, I was informed that a civilian
wanted to see me. When he came in and I asked him his name, he
^ave me his name, and I reached down into' the di'awer and pidled out
this letter from his wife and handed it to him.
This man was a doctor. 1 think he was from Lithnania. Tie had
been taken prisoner and he had been sent to prison u}) in Siberia, and
they had an outbreak there of some sort and they released this doctor
in order for him to aid the sick and disabled. And as a result of his
efficient work, they released him, and he came into my office on his way
home. I tried to ^et him to tell me about his story and I <2;ot nothing-
out of him. lie refused to talk, to say anything. But I asked him if
there were any Polish officers in this camp, and he said, "No, there
were none."
That was really the only positive information I <>ot.
In connection with that investigation — this I am telling you is in-
formation that came to me there — the liussians held an investigation
of this murder case when they took over Smolensk again on the way
back, and they invited various people down there.
Now, two newspapermen, William W. N. White and Lauterbach,
the men who were over there with Eric Johnston, were invited down
there. Mr. White was rather anti-Connnunist and said that the testi-
mony given there would not convince a British or an American jury.
Mr. Lauterbach, on the other hand, who had received quite a few
favors from the communistic government, said that the testimony
given there was all convincing that the Germans did the work.
C^hairman ISIadden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoxDERO. Achniral, at that time, did Mr. Ilarriman's daughter
also go with that grouj) to see the graves ?
Admiral Standley. I have been informed that she did.
Mr. Mitchell. You were not stationed there at the time ; were you ?
Admiral Standley. I was not there at the time ; no.
As a final summing up, as my summation there — -well, I will give
you this information. It may be of use. You might say it is hearsay.
But last week, in Coronado, the admiral who was my naval attache
in Moscow at the time we were discussing this very problem — I had
then received the letter from the connnittee — stated to me at that time
that it was the impression of the people in INIoscow that the Kussians
had committed those nuirders. That was at the time the Katyn Forest
broke. So, finally, when I left there, I had this question in my mind.
I stated in regard to this, in summing up, that there were a few
questions that remained unanswered.
First, if the Polish officers were captured alive by the Germans in
December of 11)41, why were not the 1^)1 ish officials told at once ? Why
was the cpiest of the Polish military authorities foi- theii- lost officers
allowed to continue for over '2 years ^ Would the uniforms and boots
be in such excellent condition after 2 years in Russian prison camps?
Why were there so many letters and documents dated February and
March 11)40, and only a few dated in 1941? Why were the news dis-
patches from Moscow so peculiarly censored by Narkomandil — that is
the censorshi]) — that all the corres[)ondents' doubts of German guilt
wei-e eliminated from the dispatches?
THE KAT^-N FOREST MASSACRE 2071
Those were my last reactions to this Katyn Forest murder.
Mr. DoxDERO. I might say to you, Admiral, that one statement does
not quite agree with the evidence we received in Europe. The last
date of any letter or post card or newspaper found on the bodies of
these men was May 1, 1940.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Admiral, your suspicions have been verified because
this connnittee, after making a thorough investigation, has come to
the uiumimous conclusion that there is not one iota of evidence any-
where to prove that anybody but the Russians did it.
Admiral Standley. I was just going to add one other thing.
The testimony I have given is from the best of my recollection and
taken from extracts from an article I have written in the Naval Insti-
tute. These notes were taken from stenographic notes made at the
time of the interview.
For instance, I would go to see Mr. Stalin. I would come back and
sit down innnediatelv and make stenographic notes of my interview.
The information I got and have given you here is from those steno-
graphic notes. And, of course, they are only extracts. The notes are
complete and I have them for reference if anybody wants to use them.
kSo, as I say, in addition, I have made a complete report. I have
written a story, and a mainiscrii)t is completed of my entire regime in
Moscow. Maybe it will be published, maybe not ; I don't know. But
the complete story of Mr. Willkie is in that. So if anybody wants to
read it, get my booii.
And as I sum up these remarks, I conclude with this : There is a
lesson. Let my fellow citizens beware that they never be caught like
the Poles, between the upper and the nether millstones.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Madden. Do you have any questions, Mr. Sheehan?
Mr. Sheehan. No questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski ?
Mr. O'Konski. You were there. Admiral, when the graves were
discovered by the Germans; were you not?
Admiral Standlet. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. You were there when the Soviet Government broke
relations with the Polish Government; were you?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. That was a very critical time, and it involved,
evidently, the murder of somewhere between ten and fifteen thousand
Polish officers.
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. Now, Admiral, was there any honest effort by your
superiors here in Washington to hnd out who really was guilty of
this massacre by asking you, or was there, in your opinion, an obvious
attempt to hush it up because it was too hot to handle and to lav hands
off?
Admiral Standley. The reasons back of no request — I could not
even offer a suggestion — but I received no intimation that I would look
for that.
Mr. O'Konski. How long were you there after the graves were
discovered?
Admiral Standley. That Mas in April, and I left there in October
1943. That is about 7 months.
2072 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you were our representative there, our highest
representative there?
Admiral Standley. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Durin<>: all that time you received no communication
whatever from your superiors in Wasliington askino; you to send some
kind of report to find out which side is telling the truth ; no attempt
whatever was made to ask you?
Admiral Standley. None whatever.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did not that seem rather strange to you?
Admiral Standley. No, because the situation was so turbulent other-
wise that I would feel that any effort of our Government to inject
themselves into it would just muddy the water so nuich more.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, at that time, your impression is
that, from the standpoint of your superiors, Soviet friendship, even
if they were criminals, meant more to them than finding out who
murdered 15,000 Polish officers?
Admiral Standley. I think that is somewhat true. But take this
situation : The way we felt there, when Mr. Homer left, taking his
departure, the British Ambassador and myself went to the depot to
see him off and presented going-away presents to Mr. Romer as in-
dicating where our sympathies lay.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did you leave the service voluntarily. Admiral ; that
is, that particular post at Moscow?
Admiral Standley. Yes; and then again, no. Do you mean leave
the Ambassador service?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In Moscow ; yes, sir.
Admiral Standley. Yes. I submitted my resignation. The last
words I said to the President -when I left, going back, as I left the door
in the White House, I said, "Mr. President, you got your fingers
burned with Mr. Willkie ; don't do it again."
And when I got word that Mr. Joe Davies was coming in with a
secret letter which I was not to know about, I sent in my resignation,
and it was accepted in October.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The reason I ask that is that the history of ambas-
sadors at that time was that those that evidently knew what was
going on, ])articular]y Governor Earle and Bliss Lane and a few
others, did not last very long; and I wondered if you went the way of
all those who knew what was going on at that time.
So, I am glad to hear it was the way it was.
Admiral Standley. No. I submitted my resignation.
If you recall, there was an upheaval there in my relations with the
Russians when I made the announcement to the press that tlie Russians
wei-e not informing their ]:)eople as to the receij^t of Red Cross relief
supi)]ios and lend-lease su])plies. Tliat created an ujihoaval, and I
think the ])ress in the United States and I think Mr. Sumner Welles,
wlio was i)i'()bal)ly here, thought 1 should be relieved at once.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. In regard to the lend-lease negotiation, here we were
giving Russia billions of dollars' Avorth of land-lease, and do you
know if an effort on our part was made, by our representatives in Gov-
ernment, to use that more or less as a weapon to get the Russians to
treat the Poles a little more kindly rather than just having our Presi-
dent say "Well, if you don't want the Poles in Russia, let me know,
we will take care of thenr'?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2073
Admiral Standlby. No. As far as I know, that effort was not in
evidence.
You see, I was there with the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission, who
forced the lend-lease on them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They forced it on them?
Admiral Standley. We practically forced it on them ; yes, sir.
Then they received the lend-lease and we were giving them the lend-
lease in an effort to further the war effort. As far as I knew, it did
not have anything to do with the Polish situation.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were not very anxious to take it; were they?
What do you mean when you say "we practically forced it on them?"
Admiral Standley. Their attitude was one of rather not wanting
to accept help from the outside. They had four meetings with them.
In the first meeting, they went in and they came back, and Mr. Harri-
man and Mr. Beaverbrook said: "I wish we would have had the
agreement ready for them to sign, and I think he would have signed
last night."
They had another meeting with Mr. Stalin and said : "Oh, my God ;
we don't know what we are going to do now. We don't know what to
give him to get him to agree."
The third night they came back and said : "Get your papers ready.
It is all over. We are going to sign the agreement the next morning."
And this was done.
We left in a gale of wind on Saturday. No pilot in our country
would take to the air in those conditions, but we went out. Every-
body got airsick. It was a terrible storm. The reason for it — and
the reason, as we realized afterward, that Mr. Stalin agreed to take
lend-lease and got rid of us — was the fact that the Germans had
started their attack on Moscow 2 days before, and he wanted to get
us out of there in order to avoid the embarrassment of having us
stranded.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, they played like the bride, hard to
get, because they knew they would get more ?
Admiral Standley. Maybe that was it. But I think their desire
to get us out in a hurry was the reason Stalin finally agreed.
Mr. Sheehan. Admiral, in your reference to Mr, Willkie and Mr.
Davies, apparently there were many instances when the President by-
passed you as Ambassador to get to other people in Russia,
Admiral Standley. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. And they never let you know what was happening?
Admiral Standley. Some parts. The secret letter Mr. Davies
brought over, Mr. Davies told me that the President felt it would
be better if I was not there when he presented the letter. And I not
only did not see the letter to know what was in it, but I was not there
to see when the letter was presented to Mr. Stalin.
And the telegi^ams you just read here, is the first time I have ever
seen those telegrams, which Mr. Stalin sent to Mr. Eoosevelt and
Roosevelt sent to Stalin, showing you how I sat in the dark behind
the iron curtain.
Mr. Sheehan. Only, of course, I realize that both Mr. Willkie and
Mr. Roosevelt had a lot in common, both being the so-called barefoot
Wall Street lawyers. It would seem to me that as a Republican,
we have been screaming for the last 20 years about Government by
cronj, and I think we have had also international diplomacy by
2074 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
crony, from tlie looks of things, where individuals worked for the
President, reported to him. and the rest, even the State Department
many times did not knoAV what was going on.
Mr. Machkowicz. Mr. Sheehan. do you want to add Mr. John
Foster Dulles to that group ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. MACHROwrcz. Would both of you gentlemen?
Mr. Sheehan. You must remember all this time Poland was an
ally of ours. We were supposed to be. fighting for them. Jimmy
Byrnes points out that when he was at Yalta. Mr. Roosevelt, instead
of being an advocate for the Polish cause was an arbiter, trying to
settle the dispute by giving away what we had little right to give.
Mr. DoNDERO. I would like to suggest to the chairman that it is
past noon.
Chairman Madden. Is there anything further?
Now, Admiral, on behalf of the committee, we want to thank you
for coming here today. You came a long way to testify, and your
testimony has certainly been very valuable to this committee. Since
it has be^n in operation over a year, this committee has been trying
its best to bring out all the facts regarding the Katyn massacre and
some of the incidents leading thereto. Your testimony has been
highly valuable, and we wish to thank you for your inconvenience
in coming here to testify.
Admiral Standi^ey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. We are, unfortunately, a little behind our
schedule.
Ambassador Welles, could you be here at 1 : 30?
Mr. Welles. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INIadden. Thank you.
Ambassador Welles will go on at 1 : 30 as the next witness.
(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m.,
this same day.)
AFTER RECESS
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
I would like to make this announcement for the information of
some of the news reporters. Last summer, before the committee filed
its interim re])ort on the first phase of the Katyn hearings, we set
ui> in our re])ort the following.
The first ])haso of tlie Katyn hearings was to establish the guilt of
tlie nation resj)()nsible f(n" the massacre, and the second pliase was
primarily to comi)]ete testimony regarding the facts and circumstances
leading up to and concerning the disa})pearance of certain reports,
documents regarding the Katyn massacre. I will set that out by
I'cading the two ])araa'rn]ihs as they were ])i'inted in our interim
repoi't, to wit :
Fully awiire llicu that this was the first neutral committee ever otficially au-
(liorized by any finverunieut to iuvestiiiate llie Katyn massacre, tliis eoiMiuiUee
divided its investigation into two pliases :
(1) Assemltle evidence which would detcrniini' (he suilt of the country re-
si(onsil)le for the mass murder of these I'olish Army officers and intellectuals;
in the Katyn Forest.
(2) Kstahlish wliy the Katyn massacre with all of its ramihcatioiis never was;
ad<M|ualely revealed to the Ameiican people and to tlie rest of the world. Tlie
(•(Uiniiittce likewise included in lliis jiliasc an dfort to deteniiiuc wh> this cr!iuc
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2075
was not adjudicated iu the Nuremburg trials — where it should have been settled
in the first instance if the Germans were guilty.
Now, the reason for this second phase is that when our resohition
was authorized by Congress, a great number of the Members of our
Congress inquired as to whether or not the committee would go into
the phase of the hearings as is set out in part two of our investigation.
That is the reason for the hearings tliis week.
I will ask ^Ir. Sumner Welles to take the stand, please.
TESTIMONY OF HON. SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE, OXON HILL, MD.
Chairman Madden. Will you be sworn, please. Do you solenmly
swear that the testimony you are about to give the committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Welles. I do.
Chairman Madden. Sit down, Mr. Welles, please. Will you state
your name.
Mr. Welles. Sumner Welles.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Welles. Oxon Hill, Md.
Chairman Madden. And your present capacity?
Mr. Welles. Author, writer.
Chairman Madden. You are a former ^Vmbassador and Under
Secretary ?
Mr. Welles. I am a former Ambassador to Cuba, and later As-
sistant Secretary of State and then Under Secretary of State from
May 1937 until the latter part of the summer of 1943.
Chairman JNIadden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. INIiTciiELL. Mr. Welles, when did you first enter the diplomatic
service of the United States ?
Mr. Welles. In 1915.
Mr. Mitchell. You have held successive posts all over the world;
is that correct ?
Mr. Welles. That is right.
]\Ir. Mitchell. You became Under Secretary of State on what day ?
Mr. Welles. I think it was May 26, 1937.
Mr. IMiTciiELL. And you remained in that position how long, sir?
Mr. Welles, Until July 1943.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do after July 1943 ?
Mr. Welles. I then wrote a column for the newspapers and wrote
several books.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, from July 1943 until the present
time, you have been an author?
Mr. Welles. In private life, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you present in the hearing room this morning
when Admiral Standley, former Ambassador, testified ?
Mr. Welles. I was.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. You heard all of the exhibits that were read into
the record at that time of the communications that went back and
forth between Washington and Moscow at that time ?
Mr. Welles. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro-
duce this document as exhibit 20.
2076
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. This document will be marked "Exhibit No.
20." It is a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to the Presideiit of the
United States,
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20" a^ , joii,^
Exhibit 20 — Letter From Under Secretary Sumner Welles to • '' > .
Roosevelt
•1-1 a ' '
.1.0 . fil t %
'l^.a Wilts House.
LEnclosure No. 1 to Exhibit 120]
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2079
of Polieh forces, particularly to Iran or to the Middle East, I think
(Jpv.prni «^\'orski became as disconsolate as Dr. Benes must have been
JNow , . onths of his life since he made the same attempt without
was i\v .' " 11-
C^- . ,,,4^fer in that connection to a message that was read this
morning which I myself have not previously seen. It was a message
addressed by President Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin. I think the refer-
ence in that message, if I may dare to interpret, that President Roose-
velt made to Sikorski's attempt with regard to the Katyn massacre
was not that it showed lack of common sense in its objective but m
its method.
It seems to me that what the President deplored was the fact that
General Sikorski had not taken him or Prime Minister Churchill
into consultation before taking the step w^hich otherwise would seem
to be altogether well-advised. At that time there was no League of
Nations ; there was no United Nations.
There was no international body of any kind except the International
Red Cross that could be regarded as respectable, impartial, and inter-
national in its character ; and it seemed to me that General Sikorski's
idea was altogether well taken. However, what the President re-
gretted was that what had been taken precipitously was without prior
consultation with the other two govermnents that had been working
so closely with him to better the relations between the Soviet Gov-
ernment and the Polish Government in exile.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you care to proceed ?
Mr. Machrowitz. In connection with that, may I ask a question,
Mr, Welles. Would you consider that the action, whether it was
ill-advised or not, was such an action that would justify the severing
of relations between Poland and Russia ?
Mr. Welles. Decidedly not. And it seems to me that the point
that was brought out in the testimony this morning is altogether
sound, that is, that that step was merely a pretext for a policy that had
been determined upon some time before.
Mr. DoNDERO, Mr. Welles, may I just add my view as to what the
chairman said. "Wliat we want to know from you as Under Secretary
of State of this Nation is what you know took place in regard to the
Katyn massacre from 1939 up until 1943. That is the point.
Mr. Welles. Unfortunately, without having refreshed my memory
by going all through the memoranda that are on file in the Department
of State and some of which I had hoped to see this morning, it would
be quite impossible for me to go into it in any detailed way. There is
very little I can add to what has been brought out this morning.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the
position taken this morning with reference to this development of
the breaking of the Polish-Russian relationship was of long standing?
Did you say that position was unsound ?
Mr. Welles. No ; I said quite the contrary, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Sheehan. That it was sound?
Mr, Welles. What I said was that what was brought out this
morning seemed to he entirely correct, that the severance of relations
on the basis of the attempt of the Polish Government to get the Inter-
national Red Cross to make a survey and an investigation was merely
a pretext for a policy that had already been determined upon by the
Soviet Government some time before.
2080 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr, Welles, would you say that if General Si-
korski had consiilted the United States Government at the time, the
United States Government would have agreed to the request for an
investigation by the International Red Cross ?
Mr. Welles. I am quite certain that the President would have re-
garded it sympathetically, and insofar as I myself was concerned I
most certainly would have urged it.
Mr. Maohrowicz. Do you feel that the British Government would
have done so ?
Mr. Welles. I am quite sure of it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then what harm was there done in making that
request ?
Mr. Welles. Simply that it afforded the Soviet Government the
opportunity for breaking relations, which otherwise could conceivably
have been averted for at least a while.
Mr. Machrowicz. You just stated that they had planned severing
relations anyway sooner or later. It was just a question of finding
some pretext.
Mr. Welles. I said that that had been brought out clearly this
morning, but unfortunately we were not aware of that at the time.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Welles, you mentioned the assassination
of General Sikorski. Could you elaborate on that somewhat?
Mr. Welles. I have always believed that there was sabotage. You
will remember, Mr. Chairman, that he was brought down in the plane
just as he was taking off from Gibraltar. The plane crashed. There
had been two or three incidents of that kind before. I remember that
when General Sikorski came to the United States the year before, his
plane, in taking off from Montreal, had crashed when it was only
about 100 feet above the ground.
To put it mildly, it would seem to be a coincidence.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was it not generally conceded that both Molotov
and Stalin had certain commitments that they had made to General
Sikorski and that they knew that if he were out of the way they could
jDossibly get around them?
Mr. Welles. I don't know whether it is generally conceded or not,
but it is certainly conceivable.
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Secretary, in your position in the State Depart-
ment, were you informed of the fact from various of our Ambassadors
that Russia was contemplating this breaking off of Polish relations?
Mr. Welles. Not that I recall ; no.
Mr. Sheeiian. On May 2, 1943, there was a telegram to the Secre-
tary of State from Ambassador Winant in London, who ])ointed out
that as early as January 16, 1943, when Russia declared all Poles to
be Russian citizens, that was the beginning of this break-off. The
Ambassador in London wired on April 21, 1943, pointing out that the
British Foreign Office felt all the time that this was motivated by Rus-
sian desires to reinforce and give expression to her territorial
expansion.
In other words, our Ambassador sends information in. Who does
it go to ? Who follows through on it ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2081
Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly we all of us realized that
the situation was deteriorating rapidly, but an innnediate break of
relations of that character w^as not evident.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, it seemed to our Ambassadors and our military
attaches, who were sending in information to the Secretary of State
and to the Under Secretary, that these things should be called to your
attention because the mere fact that Russia was going to break off rela-
tions with one of our allies, Poland, was not a small matter. That was
quite a significant matter,
Mr. Welles. We were doing everything in our power to avert it.
I was aware of that.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, when did the item of the Katyn massacre
first come to the attention of the State Department, if you can recall?
Mr. Welles. There again, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that I
would have to refresh my memory by looking at the files ; and I have
not been given that opportunity.
Mr. DoNDERO. Can you fix it reasonably as to year or month?
Mr. Welles. Well, I think that what was brought out this morning,
Mr. Congressman, by Admiral Standley makes that very clear.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. When this atrocity was announced to the world first
by the Germans, was there any concern in the State Department to
have liaison, for instance, with G-2 of our military service and other
branches of the service that could get some information on it ? Was
there any honest effort on the part of the State Department to pin
the responsibility of the crime, or was the policy one of being fearful
that it might further antagonize the Russians and that we had better
not take the chance ?
Mr. Welles. No ; I don't think that was the case. I think that at
the beginning we were rather definitely confused as to the responsi-
bility for the crime. Certainly there is nothing in the history of the
Nazi government nor of the Nazi authorities which would have put it
beyond them to undertake such a massacre because I must remind
you that the facts came out very slowly and that by the time I had
left the Department of State — and I have forgotten whether that was
late July or early August 19-i3 — very little had yet leaked out.
Mr. O'KoNSKL Did the State Department, to your knowledge, send
any request to neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden and
Spain, and we had connections with the Vatican? They had infor-
mation on this. Was any attempt made by your Department to get
information from them on this massacre ? After all, they were neutral
countries.
Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that such an effort was made
as sOon as the facts began to become more evident.
Chairman Madden. I have here a document dated June 24, 1942,
signed by Sumner Welles to General Watson. I will ask the counsel
to submit this to the witness so that he can identify it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, you might point out that that is a
photostated copy, and Mr. Welles' signature is not on this copy.
Chairman Madden". It speaks for itself. It is a photostat. Mark
this document as exhibit 21 and the counsel will please read it to the
committee.
2082
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
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THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2085
2086 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, MiTCETELU Mr. Chairman, this letter is dated June 24, 1942, and
states :
My Dear General Watson : There are enclosed herewith copies of Mr. Biddle's
strictly confidential dispatches, Nos. 158, June 2, 1942, and 159, June 2, 1942,
which were marked for the President.
The dispatches are concerned with conversations which took place in May
between Ambassador Biddle and General Sikorski regarding, respectively, miss-
ing Polish officers in Russia and the evacuation of Polish children from Russia.
Sincerely yours,
SuMNEE Welles.
Enclosures : From Ambassador Biddle, Nos. 158 and 159 of June 2, 1942.
Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
The attachment to that letter is as follows :
Embassy of the United States of America,
Near the Polish Oovemment, London, June 2, 1942.
No. 158
Subject: General Sikorski's conversation regarding missing Polish officers
in Russia.
For : The President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary.
The honorable the Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
Sir: Supplementing my dispatch Polish series No. 157, June 2, 1942, I have
the honor to report that in recent conversation with General Sikorski he said, in
effect, the following :
Missinff officers. — In summer 1940 several thousands of Polish officers, prisoners
of war, who were kept in three camps in central Russia (Ostashkov, Starobyelsk,
Kozelsk) were taken to an unknown destination in the far north of Russia. Since
then they have not been heard of. Their number has been variously described,
but it is usually accepted as 8,300, one-third of whom are professional officers
and two-thirds reserve officers. The latter are for the most part professional
men, including about 800 physicians and many university professors and lec-
turers as well as a number of distinguished specialists.
The Polish military authorities have lists covering over 4,800 of these officers.
These lists have been communicated to Stalin. The Soviet Government have
many times been requested to release them. They invariably replied that every
available prisoner of war in Russia had already been released. This statement
is obviously inaccurate. There are reasons to believe that the officers in ques-
tion have been deported to Franz Joseph Islands, north of Spitzbergen, and to
northeastern Siberia to camps on the River Kolyma in the north of the Yakut
Republic. It is more than probable that most of them have died of hunger,
scorbut, and cold.
If the supposition as to their places of imprisonment is correct, there are but
2 months of summer when, for technical reasons, they could be brought back
to Russia. Or, on the other hand, they could either be brought via the Kolyma
River to Alaska or from Franz Joseph Islands to Iceland. The absence of
these officers is the principal reason of the shortage of officers in the Polish
forces in Russia, whither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The
possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a
severe blow to the Polish national life. Tlieir evacuation during the present
summer seems to be the last chance to save those who may still be alive.
In concluding his remarks, the General said that he felt confident that if in
the course of pending conversations with the Russians in Washington our author-
ities concerned were to express an interest in the above-mentioned problem, the
Russians might act favorably in the matter.
Respectfully yours,
A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
(In quintuplicate.)
Mr. Welles, do you acknowledge this document?
Mr. Welles. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2087
Mr. Mitchell. This morning, Mr. Welles, Admiral Standley told
us that he had never seen the dispatch from Moscow dated January
1942.
Mr. Welles. I think it was February.
Mr. Mitchell. February 194:2, because he was en route to Moscow.
Mr. Brown, of the Department of State, revealed that it did not reach
the Department of State until April 1942. Now, from Moscow,
through Admiral Standley later, and from London through Mr. Bid-
die, come practically the same story to the Department of State regard-
ing this. There are also the conversations that took place between
Stalin, Vishinsky, Molotov, Beria, General Anders, Ambassador Kot,
and General Sikorski about these missing officers.
Now, our Department of State knew about all of these. There was
no explanation for the missing officers. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Welles. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, whether any attempt has
been made to search the memoranda of conversations between the"
Secretary of State and the several Soviet Ambassadors in Washington
at that time or my own conversations ? I am very familiar, now that
I have read this clocument, with all of the facts set forth, and I know
that I have discussed them many times.
Mr. Mitchell. No effort has been made because we didn't know
about it. An effort will be made.
Mr. Sheehan. Did we ask the State Department to surrender all of
tlie documents on this case ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Have they surrendered those documents referred to ?
Mr. Mitchell. I have not seen those documents.
Mr. Maciirowicz. In answer to Mr. Welles' question, the answer
should be made that we made a request of the Department of State to
furnish all of the pertinent documents in connection with these mat-
ters, and we have been furnished documents, and those you refer to
have not been included. Is that correct ?
Mr. Mitchell. These are not memoranda of conversations between
officials of the Soviet Union here in AVashington and Mr. Welles or
others. We have not received any of those.
Mr. Maciirowicz. I think Mr. Chairman, that while we are on that
subject the representative of the Department of State should be asked
if those documents are in their possession and if so why they have
not been turned over.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Brown is in the hearing room. He has been
sworn. Will you propound the question to him, Mr. Counsel ?
Mr. DoNDERO. If he heard the question, why not let him answer it?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I did not hear the question. I was out
of the room and just came back in.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Brown, the question is this: Mr. Welles has
raised the question as to whether the committee has seen the memo-
randa of record of conversations that transpired between himself,
other State Department officials, and those of officials of the Rus-
sian Embassy here in Washington. I stated that I have not seen these
memoranda. The question is now : Are they available ?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Mitchell, I frankly cannot answer that question.
We asked for the files on everything connected with the subject matter,
and I have not seen those documents. I will immediately call back and
have a further search made.
Were these on the subject of the Katyn massacre?
2088 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Missing Polish officers. Maybe Mr. Welles can
identify them better.
Mr. Welles. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Welles. There were a great many conversations, Mr. Brown,
between the various Soviet Ambassadors and myself and between them
and Mr. Hull. Very often they had to do mainly with complaints
of the Soviet Union that they were not getting sufficient lend-lease or
something of that kind. But very often in those conversations some
reference would be made to other matters. That is the reason that
1 think a search might be useful.
I want to add this, which is of the utmost importance : The Presi-
dent, unfortunately, very rarely had the habit of keeping memoranda
of his conversations with foreign diplomats or visiting foreign states-
men, and I have every reason to believe that this matter was taken
up by him very frequently both with Mr. Litvinof and Mr. Molotov
when he came.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you say that he had the habit or that he did
not have the habit?
Mr. Welles. He did not have the habit of keeping memoranda of
conversations.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you recall, or can you to the best of your ability
tell us, what transpired during your conversations relative to this
subject, your conversations with those representatives?
Mr. Welles. Well, whatever representations I made were entirely
along the lines that were discussed this morning, that nothing could
be worse for relations between the United Nations than for tliis de-
teriorating situation between Poland and the Soviet Union to continue
and that the interests of the United States in Poland were well known
to the Soviet Government. I think certainly General Sikorski and
the Polish Government in exile in London were very definitely of
the opinion that the early steps that had been taken — and I am now
speaking of the period before 1942 — to release divisions of Polish
soldiers or refugees to go to Iran and other parts of the Middle East
were due to the interests displayed by the United States.
Mr. Mitchell. Throughout this testimony we have continually
lieard that the Soviet officials never gave any kind of explanation
for these missing Polish officers. The United States Government knew
they were missing. The British knew they were missing. But no
question w^as raised at the time of Katyn concerning the missing Polish
officers. Rather it was looked at as a German atrocity, and as a Nazi
atrocity. Can you explain why, with all of the background, and the
wealth of material, and all of these conversations that they had, the
Nazis were suspected rather than the Eussians when the Russians
hadn't given any explanation?
Mr. Welles. The crime perpetrated against Poland was perpetrated
by two great })owers, Germany and Russia. I don't think that we felt
that there was any distinction between the two of thorn insofar as the
kind of atrocities that they perpetrated were involved ; and there was
nothing, in my judgment, at the outset to indicate that these particular
officers referred to in that dispatch from Ambassador Biddle were the
same who were later found to be massacred at Katyn. I think it took
some time for the facts to be assembled and for the testimony to become
conclusive.
■ THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2089
Mr. Mitchell. That is true, but the Germans formed an interna-
tional medical commission which went in there and found documents
on these bodies which proved that they had been in those graves in
the spring of 1940, April and May 1940.
Mr. Welles. I don't think we had very much
Mr. Mitchell. That was made available to the entire world on
April 30, 1943, after they had left Smolensk.
Mr. Welles. I don't think that in the spring of 1943 we had very
much reason to put faith in the truth of anything that the Nazi Gov-
ernment put out.
Mr. Mitchell. This was signed by Dr. Naville, a Swiss neutral.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. What reason was there why we should have put
faith in what the Russians said?
Mr. Welles. I beg pardon ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. What reason was there to put faith in what the
Russians said and did?
Mr. Welles. At that particular time, of course, we were fighting
on the side that the Russians were fighting on. We were making every
effort to have a joint war effort.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did not you people in the State Department know
that already Russia had never kept a commitment, had never kept an
agreement, had violated every treaty of aggression that they had ever
had? Did not you people know that? In other words, you people
are always willing, which is all right, to throw the responsibility to
the Germans, which they deserve, and to say that because they were
so vicious they must have been guilty, and that it is hard to conceive
that the Russians could do it when anybody who knows anything
about the world situation and Communist history knows that their
record was just as bad as that of Hitler. But you are willing to accept
one at face value and not the other.
Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the Congressman that
two gentlemen who are certainly not Communists, namely, Mr. Win-
ston Churchill in the House of Commons, and Admiral William D.
Leahy, have both publicly stated in writing that during the war and
up to that time the Soviet Government had meticulously kept its
agreements.
Mr. Machrowicz. I don't think this committee is going to give too
much credence to what Mr. Churchill said. There are a lot of things
that he said that this committee does not take much cognizance of.
Mr. Welles. We were under that impression at that particular mo-
ment and hoped that it might turn out that way.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for the members of
our committee and for the press : Too frequently they think that our
committee is interested only in the fact that the Katyn murder of
officers had something to do with the Polish question. I might point
out that I understand a telegram will be read into the record a little
later which points out that the British Foreign Office was also very
interested in the disappearance of the Polish officers because, in a tele-
gram which was sent to the Secretary of State, our Ambassador
pointed out the fact and emphasized the fact that not only are the
Polish armed forces in this country, meaning those in England,
affected by a continuation of tlie present Russian attitude, but the
Polish troops in the Middle East, totaling over 100,000 soldiers who
were fully equipped and who would prove to be a valuable armed
force, are becoming dissatisfied.
2090 THE KAT^TSr FOREST MASSACRE i
In other words, England and the United States had a Polish Army
ready and willing and able, but without officers. So, from our stand-
point, not only were we interested in the Katyn massacre, but our
allies were interested in getting officers to man soldiers for our armies.
So everyone was cognizant that the State Department and the British
Foreign Office were vitally interested in this matter in 1943. There-
fore, I think you will agree that, as you stated, there were many con-
versations on this matter because of the importance of more soldiers
for the allied cause. Do you agree with that ?
Mr. Welles. I agree entirely. I also think that our efforts in the
earlier years to which I referred before did prove determining in get-
ting out several divisions of Polish troops and officers and women and
children.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, the Germans made known to the world
the finding of these graves, and the 12 doctors signed this graveside
protocol some time, I think, in May 1943. Did that come to the
attention of the State Department?
Mr. Welles. It undoubtedly must have come to the attention of the
Department, Mr. Congi-essman. I can't specifically recall at this
moment.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Welles, you stated, I believe, some time ago
that there was no reason to doubt the good faith of our then ally, the
Soviet Union. Was there any reason to doubt the good faith of our
other faithful ally, the Polish Government, at the time?
Mr. Welles. None whatever.
Mr. Machrowicz. And the Department did have information from
the Polish Government definitely indicating Kussian guilt for the
Katyn massacre, did it not?
Mr. Welles. I think it had later what I would call determining
evidence. Now, whether that was available as early as the date that
you fixed, Mr. Congressman, I do not remember.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you find anything in the attitude of the
Polish Government officials which would indicate anything but a
desire to settle their differences with Russia in an amicable manner?
Mr. Welles. From beginning to end, Mr, Congressman, I found
nothing but a consistent desire on the part of the Polish Government in
exile and, I repeat, particularly on the part of General Sikorski, to
find a way out of the impasse through negotiation. I think no man
coukl liave done more than he did to that end.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Welles, looking now in retrospect, don't you
think the whole difficulty was that our Government looked too much
toward appeasing Soviet Russia as opposed probably to some of the
firm steps recommended by people of the type of xVmbassador Stand-
ley and others? AVould not a little more firmness probably have
helped the situation at the time ?
Mr. Welles. It is a very difficult thing to answer in the light of
hindsight, Mr. Congressman. As I look at it today, I think you are*
entirely correct. As we looked at it then, of course, the success of the
war effort was the major effort; and I must remind the members of the
committee that the one overshadowing fear on the part of our military
authorities at that time was a separate peace on the part of the Soviet
Government with Germany.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is the point I was driving at. In other words,
]\Ir. Welles, the overshadowing thought and the governing policy of
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2091
our leaders at that time was to go easy with respect to anything that
might antagonize Kussia? The fact that there were 10,000 to 15,000
officers involved didn't make any difference? If there had been
100,000, 150,000, or 500,000, the policy would have been still the same?
In other words, there was a general fear, unfounded, in my opinion,
but in existence at that time that nothing must be done to antagonize
good old Soviet Russia, so go easy on everything, no matter what
ghastly crimes they commit and no matter how many treaties they
violate and no matter how much they insult us ? We still have to go
easy on them because we need them as an ally. Wasn't that really the
governing policy ?
Mr. Welles. No, I would not go nearly as far as that, Mr. Con-
gressman ; but I think that all of us must agree that at that moment
the overshadowing consideration was winning the war, and we had
a mighty difficult time in establishing decent relations with the Soviet
Union.
If some of these memoranda do come to the committee, you will see
that I sat in, I think, 40 conferences with the Soviet Ambassador to
try to ease things over way back in 1939 and 1940 at the time when
they were allied with Germany in order to prevent them from going
too far.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, did it come to your attention or to the
attention of your Department at that time that the Soviets or Russia
at first refused or, I would say, discouraged any foreign aid from us
and that lend-lease had to be forced upon them, as Admiral Standley
testified ?
Mr. Welles. I frankly was surprised by Admiral Standley's state-
ment this morning because that had never been my impression. Of
course, he was one of the early negotiators, and I was not ; but I can
assure you that when they came to the point where they were receiv-
ing lend-lease every request I got was for more and not for less.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In fact, it continued even after the war, did it not?
Mr. Welles. ^Vliy, certainly.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at any time in your conversations with
the President urge the recall of Mr. Standley because of the firmness of
his position ?
Mr. Welles. Well, Admiral Standley made that statement this
morning. I think, frankly, it was unfortunate; that is, the remark
that he made at that particular moment ; but I do not remember going
nearly so far as he has in mind.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you tell us how far you did go ?
Mr. Welles. I don't think I actually took any step in that direction,
if I remember correctly.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Standley this morning stated
something to the effect that Col. Henry Szymanski, who had been a
military attache, I believe, in Cairo, was being thought of for the post
of military attache in Moscow, and then, apparently at the last minute,
the order was rescinded. Do you know anything about that?
Mr. Welles. Nothing whatever. That would have been a matter,
then, for the War Department, not for us.
Mr. Sheehan. They determined that policy?
Mr. Welles. Yes.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Pucinski, did you have some questions ?
2092 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. Yes, Mr. Chairman. May we introduce this docu-
ment as exhibit 22 ?
Chairman Madden. Exhibit 22 is a communication addressed by
the Embassy of the United States to the Premier of the Polish Gov-
ernment. This can be identified as exhibit 22.
(The letter referred to, dated May 20, 1943, was marked "Exhbit
No. 22," and follows:)
Exhibit 22 — Report and Evidence Compiled by Poles Regarding Discovery at
Katyn Forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Biddle
on May 20, 1043
Embassy of the
United States of America,
]:iear the Polish Qovernment,
May 20, 1943.
No. 316.
Subject : Referring to my Despatch Polish Series No. 158, June 2, 1942, and to my
Cable Polish Series No. 19, April 23, 1943 (7 p. m.) ; attaching copies of a
secret report from Polish Military Intelligence concerning the missing Polish
Officers in Russia ; outline of report ; observations ; article by Colonel Berling,
Polish officer, attacking Polish forces evacuated to Iran; Vishinsky's subse-
quent attack; factors calling for consideration in light of potential bearing
upon Russia's forward-looking political-military policy vis-a-vis the "Middle
Zone" in general.
For the President, the Secretary and Und&r Secretary
The Honorable the Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir : Referring to my Despatch Polish Series No. 158, June 2, 1942 and my cable
Polish Series No. 19, April 23, 1943 (7 p. m.), I have the honor to forward the
attached copies of a secret report from the Polish Military Intelligence concern-
ing the missing Polish officers in Russia.
Outline of secret report
This report, based upon information from all available confidential sources, isi
divided into seven parts :
The first part gives information dating from before the Poli&'h-Soviet Pact
of 1941.
The second part deals with diplomatic intervention : a d-marche by Am-
bassador Kot, immediately upon the establishment of a Polish-Russian diplomatic
relations in 1941.
The third part cites the various methods employed by Polis'h sources in
gathering information about the missing, following the refusal by the Soviet
authorities to give any information whatsoever concerning them.
Part four (a) deals with the discovery of the grave near Smolensk, according
to a telegram received from Poland on April 13, 1943 (It was late in the
evening of that same day that I first heard mention of the alleged mass'aere
in the German broadcasts.) ; and (b) gives a chronological summary of the
principal developments in the resultant Polish-Russian controversy, which led
up to the suspension of diplomatic relations.
I'art five reports on the present state of information in possession of the
Polish Government.
I'art six is a resumed.
Part seven, entitled "Forecasts'", suggests that if the present suspension should
pass into a severance of diplomatic relations, there may be exi>ected the forma-
tion of an "Independent Polish Government" in Moscow. This the "Forecast"
continncs, would probably not proclaim Communist ideas, but would pursue
the indefinite policy represented by the Wolna Polska (published in Mos-
cow), which proclaimed a Polish program of a vague nature, based on the
Soviet Union. The "Forecast" goes on to suggest that "should such a govern-
ment be created, an 'independent' Polish Army may be expected to appear in
the U. S. S. R."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2093
Observatio7is : Articles hy Colonel Bcrling, Polish oiflcer in Russia, attacking
Polish Forces tvhich evacuated to Iran
In this connection, Wolna Polska, edited by Wanda Wasilewska, the wife
of Dr. Kornechuk, the Ukrainian vice-Commissar of U. S. S. R. Foreign Affairs,
has already carried an article by Colonel Berling, a Polish officer, to effect that
he was prepared to organise and lead a Polish armed force at the side of the Red
Army. In this article, Colonel Berling stated he had refused to leave for Iran
with the rest of the Polish Army under General Anders. He bitterly criticised
the General and the forces under his command for having refused to fight
shoulder-to-shoulder with the Red Army. Moreover, he accused the Military
Intelligence of these Polish forces of having engaged, among other activities, in
espionage in Russia, collecting information regarding Soviet farms, plants, and
army depots.
This article apijeared in the London Daily Wokkeb on May 6, the day follow-
ing its publication in the Moscow Wolna Polska. My interest was engaged,
among other aspects, by the fact that in conversation, several days previously,
with Ambassador Bogomolov, he had pointedly cited the same points, but without
mentioning Colonel Berling's name. Moreover, the Ambassador presented the
points in approximately the same form in which they subsequently appeared in
the article.
Vyshinsky's suhsequent attack
I, therefore, have the very definite impression that Bogomolov had had the
article in his hands for some days in advance of its publication ; that its actual
publication, both in Moscow and here, was timed as a tactical forerunner for
the following day's (May 7) release of Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Vishinsky's blast against the Poles on similar counts. It was apparent to my
mind, that in emphasising these, Vyshinsky meant to exploit them, on the one
hand, for the benefit of Russian policy ; on the other hand, to discredit the Polish
Government and its armed forces. For example, I have the impression that
Vishinsky emphasized the following points for the reasons indicated :
(a) the espionage charge, by way of justifying the Russian authorities' having
closed down the Polish Welfare Organisation in Russia ;
(b) the charge that the Polish forces had refused to fight at the side of the
Red Army, by way of attempting to discredit, in the eyes of the people in Poland,
those and other Polish forces outside Russia, as potential forces of liberation;
this, with a view to bringing the Polish people to look to the Red Army and the
Polish units at its side, for their deliverance.
Factors calling for consideration in light of their potential bearing upon Russia's
forivard-looking political-military policy vis-d-vis the "Middle Zone" in
general
In connection with this aspect, the following factors, to my mind, call for
consideration in light of their potential bearing upon Russia's forward-looking
political-military policy vis-a-vis the "Middle Zone" in general :
(a) in several of my conversations with Ambassador Bogomolov, during the
course of the recent Polish-Russian controversy, which led to the suspension
of diplomatic relations, he pointedly referred to a public utterance which Gen-
eral Sikorski had made several months ago, and which was subsequently pub-
lished in the Polish papers here. In this statement the General had in effect
stressed the importance that Poland be liberated by British, American, and Polish
forces. Bogomolov said that, under the circumstances, this idea seemed highly
impracticable. The fact that the Allied Forces of the West had not yet launched
a Continental invasion, together with the proximity of the Red Army to Poland,
made it sufficiently clear as to which of the Allied Forces was the one to which
Poland would have to look for its liberation. If Sikorski and the military au-
thorities of the Western Allies, he continued, could show him when and how they
might propose to march eastward past Berlin to liberate Poland, he had no doubt
that such a plan would meet with a hearty welcome in Russia. However, in
absence of evidence of any such plan, he could only return to his original
thought : that the natural liberator of Poland, under the circumstances, was the
93744— 52— pt. 7 18
2094 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Red Army. On each of the several occasions that Bogomolov underlined this
point, he concluded by pointing out on his map the proximity of the Red Army
to "that general area" ;
Respectfully yours,
A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
A. J. Deexel Biddle, Jr.
AJDBJr : JS
In triplicate.
Enclosure : ^ as stated.
[Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch Polish Series No. 136. Dated May 20, 1943, from the
Embassy at London]
I. INFORMATION DATING FROM BEFORE THE POLISH-SOVIET PACT OF 1941
1. On the basis of correspondence with Poland, the Polish authorities knew
that a large number of officers and men, taken prisoner by the Soviet authorities,
had been concentrated in about 100 camps. It was established on the basis of
the same information that officers and cadet officers, as well as State Police
oflBcers and men and members of the gendarmerie were concentrated in three
camps, i. e., Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostaszkow (in the last-mentioned the
police and gendarmerie were concentrated). As far as officers taken prisoner
after the capitulation of Lwow are concerned, this was a definite violation by the
Soviets of the conditions of the capitulation. Paragraph 8 of which granted per-
sonal freedom to officers, and even envisaged their journey to other countries.
The number of officers staying in Kozielsk and Starobielsk was calculated at
the time at approximately 9,500 and the number detained in the camp at
Ostaszkow at approximately 10,000.
2. In the middle of 1941 a report on the subject of these camps was forwarded
from Poland. This report had been drawn up on the basis of secret reports sent
in by men specially sent to Soviet Russia for that purpose; these men had stayed
in Russian territories up to October 1940. The figures contained in the report
agreed with data already in the possession of the Polish authorities ; the report
also confirmed the liquidation of the camps in April 1940 — a matter also
known — with the additional information that small groups of officers from all
these three camps had been found in a new camp in Griazowieo.
II. DIPLOMATIC intervention
Immediately upon the establishment of diplomatic relations the Polish Gov-
ernment started the following interventions :
1. The first demarche was made by Ambassador Kot in his conversation with
Stalin and Molotov. He received the evasive reply that the Soviet authorities
were quite unaware of the whereabouts of these officers, that they had been
released like all the others, and that the Soviet authorities did not possess any
lists of the above-mentioned camps. In view of this state of affairs attempts
were made by the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev to draw up a list of the missing
officers on the basis of statements made by officers who had arrived from the
camp at Griazowiec and on the basis of letters from the families of these officers
which had been deported together with a large part of the civilian population
from Poland to the U. S. S. R. In this way a list comprising 3,845 names was
drawn up.
2. This list was handed by General Sikorski to Stalin on 3.12.41. During a
conversation on the subject, Stalin stated for the second time that they had
probably become scattered, had possibly crossed over to the Germans, or had pos-
sibly escaped to Manchuria. In any case there was no mention whatever of
their having allegedly been sent to do fortification work in the region of
Smolensk and had subsequently been rounded up by the Germans.
3. On 18.3.42. General Anders, in a conversation with Stalin, handed him
an additional list of about 800 names and was given the same evasive answers.
4. In May 1942, the Polish Embassy deposited with the I'eople's Komisariat for
Foreign Affairs an exhaustive memorandum concerning the results of the action
taken on behalf of Polish citizens, of which an enormous number were still de-
tained in Soviet prisons in contravention of the Polish-Soviet Pact. This memo-
randum again mentioned the case of the missing officers. The Soviet reply,
dated 10.7.42. contained the following sentence : "With regard to the Polish offi-
* See my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 6, January 7, 1942.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2095
cers, mentioned in Para 3 of the Embassy's memorandum * * ♦ it is the
opinion of the People's Komisariat for Foreign Affairs that it is impossible to
reach the conclusion that the decree of 19.8.41 has not, as alleged, been applied to
n large number of Polish oflS'cers."
ni. THE GATHERING OF NEWS ABOUT THE MISSING
Since the Soviet authorities refused any information whatsoever about the
missing ofBcers, the Embassy and the Command of the Polish army started in-
vestigations on their own. As rumours began to circulate stating that large
numbers of Polish officers had been deported to the far North, and that some
barges, loaded with these officers had capsized, or possibly been expressly sunk
in the Arctic Ocean, and that some of these officers, who survived, were working
in the mines in Fbanz Joseph Land, Xovata Zemlya. and the Kolyma region
(Eastern Siberia), men were sent out to investigate these rumours; nowhere,
however, were any traces found of these officers, and men sent to Franz Joseph
Land and Novaya Zemlya never even returned from their search.
The possibilities of finding the missing officers were now regarded with pessi-
mism, especially in view of certain remarks dropped en passant by the highest
Soviet dignitaries. For example, Beria, in a conversation with Colonel Berling,
an officer of the Polish Army who had been won over by the Soviet authorities,
when talking about the camps at Kozielsk and Starobielsk, stated twice : "My
z nimi zdielali bolszuju oszybku" ; Markulow said in a conversation with General
Anders : "U nas wyszla kakaja to oszybka."
No one, at that time, made even the slightest mention of the version published
a few days ago by the Tass Agency, that officers from the Kozielsk camp had
been sent to do fortification work in the Smolensk region and had been rounded
up by the Germans, although such a version, wei'e it true, would clear the Soviet
authorities to a large extent. It should be pointed out here, that among the of-
ficers in the Kozielsk camp there were many elderly men on the retired list, such
as General Bohatyrewicz (aged 75) whose body was identified by the Germans
in the Katyn grave.
Ttie general opinion of the Poles in Russia on the subject of the missing of-
ficers which was current at that time was the following :
From all the three camps, the Soviet authorities had removed small groups
(totalling several hundred persons) for camouflage and show purposes; these
were formed into a normal prisoners' camp at Griazowiec which was handed
over to the Polish authorities after the conclusion of the Pact in 1941. The
huge majority of the prisoners was sent by a circuitous route, with all traces
obliterated, to the concentration camps in the North and to the mines in Novaya
Zemlya and Franz Joseph Land ; during this process part of them were drowned
accidentally or deliberately in the Arctic Ocean, and the rest perished in the
camps owing to the appalling conditions. It is possible that such a very small
handful of them remains, that, fearing revelations, the Soviets do not wish to
show them.
IV. DISCOVEEY OF THE GRAVE NEAE SMOLENSK
1. On 13.4.43. a telegram was received from Poland announcing the discovery
of the grave by the Germans. The telegram stated that the grave near Smolensk
had been seen by Poles, who were taken there by the German authorities, that
the fact was undoubtedly authentic, and public opinion in Poland was deeply-
stirred.
2. On 13.4.43. the first German broadcasts on the subject were heard.
3. On 15.4.43. the first mention, of a general nature, appeared in Polish papers
published in Great Britain, with strong reservations as to the truth of the
revelations .
4. On 16.4.43. General Kxjkiel's communique was published in London.
5. On 16. 4. 43. a telegram was sent by the Polish F. O. to Berne, with the
instructions that the International Red Cross should be approached. The mem-
orandum in question was deposited by the Polish delegate in the offices of the
International Red Cross at 16.30 on 17. 4. 43.
6. On 17. 4. 43. the Polish Government published its declaration.
7. On 20. 4. 43. the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a Note on the
subject to the U. S. S. R. Ambassador to the Polish Government, Bogomolov, ask-
ing him for an elucidation of the matter in view of the German revelations.
8. On 21. 4. 43. a telegram was received from Poland, giving the composition
of the Polish delegation which, acting under the compulsion of the German
4iuthorities, states the telegram, proceeded to Smolensk. The telegram at the
2096 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
same time explains the fact of so late a discovery of the grave near Smolensk, a
fact of which Soviet propaganda made full use. The telegram states that the
first persons to pay attention to the grave were Polish workers, brought there by
the Germans for earthworks. It was these Poles, for whom it was easier than
for the Germans to communicate with the local population, who learned from
the local people that there was a grave of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn
wood. The workers, not knowing what it was all about, only put up two birch
wood crosses on the grave. In the first months of 1943 this was learned by the
German I. S., which carried out investigations among the local population. The
investigations established the fact that in March and April 1940 numerous execu-
tions had taken place in that wood. Polish prisoners of war were brought there.
One of the local inhabitants stated that while working on the railway, he had
seen documents showing that wagons had come from Kozielsk. The prisoners
were taken to the wood in lorries. Learning this, the Germans started exhuma-
tions. The telegram further stated that the German authorities had already
taken the Polish delegation to Smolensk by air by 10. 4. 43. I>etails brought
back by the Polish delegation prove the absolute authenticity of the fact^. The
bodies were identified on the basis of letters, notes and diaries, not dated later
than March and April 1940.
9. On 24. 4. 43. another telegram was received from Poland, giving further
details. The group of Poles who had travelled to Smolensk did so under strong
compulsion from the Germans, without being authorized to do so by the secret
Polish authorities. German propaganda on this subject in Poland has gone
berserk. At the same time, the Germans have become more lenient in their
attitude towards the Poles ; for example, the principle of collective responsibility
has been abandoned. The reaction of the Polish people is a tremendous indigna-
tion against the Bolsheviks, but at the same time analogous murders by the
Germans are also stressed. The Germans are sending further groups of Poles
to view the grave at Smolensk. So far 3000 bodies have been exhumed and
200 identified.
10. On 25.4.43. the Soviet Government addressed a Note to the Polish Govern-
ment suspending diplomatic relations.
V. PRESENT STATE OF INFORMATION IN THE POSSESSION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT
1. Several score names of massacred officers identified by the Germans figured
on the incomplete list drawn up by the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev, which
was handed by General Sikorski to Stalin.
2. After the German revelations, investigations were resumed and a few de-
tails were noted to which previously no great importance had been attached
owing to the general prevailing opinion that these prisoners of war had been
deported to the far North. For example : Cadet-officer (Air Force) Furtek (who
was in Kozielsk, and, later on, was taken to the camp in Griazowiec together
with a small group of men saved, and who, on release, after the conclusion of the
Polish-Soviet Pact, volunteered for service in the Polish Army and is now in
Great Britain) stated that when travelling from Kozielsk in a prison-wagon, he
had discovered on the wall of the wagon an inscription, made by one of the pre-
vious groups of prisoners deported from the Kozielsk camp, stating that they
were being detrained at the second station beyond Smolensk and that from the
barred windows of the prison wagon they could see waiting lorries. The same
inscription is remembered by Zejma, a captain of the Polish navy, who was
travelling by the same convoy as Furtek. Irrespective of these statements, a
telegram was received from General Anders stating that two Polish officers in the
Polish Army in the East, who also escaped from Kozielsk in a similar manner to
that of Furtek and Ze.jma, had seen the same inscriptions. Captain P. H., also
with General Anders' army, had seen a similar inscription as late as August 1940,
when he was being taken from prison in IJialystok, to the concentration camp in
Kotlas. Finally, Lieutenant St. S., who is also now in the Middle East, stated
that on 30.4.40 when he was being deported to the camps in the North, he had
seen a convoy of officers from Kozielsk, being detrained from 10-20 kms. north
west of Smolensk. It should be stressed here that all the names identified by
the (U'rmans and found in the list of 3.84.">, were on tliat latter list noted down
as names of prisoners from Kozielsk. But no names of persons from the Staro-
lUELKK camp have been found.
"With regard to the STAIIOBIELSK camp, a statement was made by 2nd lit.
KAFEL, M. D., now attached to the I'olisli JNIedical Section of the University of
Bdinburgli, to the cfEect that when travelling from STAHOBIELSK with that
group which was sent to the GUIiVZOWlEC camp, he had seen on the wall of
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2097
the prison-wagon an inscription, made by one of the previous groups, stating
that their lot was being detrained in KHARKOV. KAFEL himself, during the
stop at KHARKOV, started a conversation with a Soviet worker who was clean-
ing the wagon, who told him : "Your companions were detrained here, but you
are going further." General ANDERS, too, mentions a similar inscription, with-
out giving any more details.
With regard to the camp at OSTASZKOW — no information whatever has as
yet been obtained.
VI. RESUME
On the basis of information so far at hand, one may reconstruct in a few
words the fate of these three officers' camps in the following manner :
In March or April 1940, the highest Soviet authorities decided upon the liqui-
dation of the camps. In order to obliterate all traces, a small group was taken
from each camp and transferred to the camp at GRIAZOWIEC, which was given
over the Polish authorities after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Pact.
The remainder were liquidated in the following way :
KOZIELSK— by mass execution in the KATYN wood.
STAKOBIELSK— either by mass executions in the vicinity of KHARKOV or
by deportation to the Far North and accidental or deliberate sinking of the whole
transport or a considerable part in it in the ARCTIC OCEAN. It is possible,
though not very likely, that there are small numbers of survivors in the concen-
tration camps in the North or in the mines mentioned before.
OSTASZKOW— not known.
VII. FORECASTS
If the present suspension of diplomatic relations, contained in the last Note of
the Soviet Government, should pass into a severance of relations, then we may
anticipate that in the nearest future an "Independent Polish Government" will
be formed and proclaimed in MOSCOW. This government would most probably
not proclaim Communist ideals, but would follow the indefinite policy repre-
sented by the "WOLNA POLSKA" published in MOSCOW, which proclaims a
Polish program of a vague nature, based on the Soviet Union, and expressed in
patriotic generalisations.
Should such a "government" he created, one may assume that an "independent"
Polish army will appear in the U. S. S. R. ; we have already had information about
its formation by the Soviets. The creation of such a government and such an
armv would probablv be preceded bv a press campaign, expressed in letters to
the editors of "WOLNA POLSKA" and "NOWE WIDNOKREGI" edited by
WANDA WASILEWSKA, and written by "indignant Polish patriots" wishing to
separate themselves from the "incomprehensible moves of the government of
General SIKORSKI, who is assailed by the influence of Fascists and GOEBBEL'S
agents, hidden in his entourage, or sometbing of this kind.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, another indication of the ap-
peasement policy at that time is this expression : "Xear the Polish
Government." They were afraid to antagonize the Russians by ad-
dressing it to the Polish Ambassador. That is a very new phrase.
Mr. Sheehan. Did they say how near?
Mr. Machroa^t:cz. No.
Mr. AVelles. I may be wrong, Mr. Chairman, but I think we used
that phraseology for all of the governments in exile. I don't think
there is any distinction.
Mr. Maciiro\\^cz. I think that is true for fear of antagonizing the
Russians.
Mr. Welles. Oh, no.
Mr. Machrowicz. AA^iat was the reason?
Mr. Welles. Because they were not in their own capital. They were
not in control of their own sovereign territory.
I see that it is marked on this, Mr. Chairman, that I have read it, so
I assume that I have. I must have.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Welles, I wonder if I could ask you a few
questions ?
2098 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Welles. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Will you identify that?
Mr. Ptjcinski. This has been admitted as exhibit 22. I wonder if
we can establish a little chronology here.
When did you, as Under Secretary of State, first come to realize
that there was a vast pool of Polish soldiers in Russia that could be
helpful to the Allied cause ? When did you first realize that ?
Mr. Welles. Considerably before December 1941.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Then through the efforts of the State Department
you did encourage or rather the United States did encourage the form-
ing of this army ; is that right ?
Mr. Welles. Decidedly ; yes.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Can you tell us why this Polish Army was regarded
as of potential value?
Mr. Welles. It had potential value for two reasons : First, because
of the assistance that the Soviet Union could get at the time in defend-
ing itself against Germany; and, second, for the reasons that have
already been brought out, for military operations in the Near East.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Now, you have just identified this exhibit 22, which
is a memorandum sent to the Department of State by Ambassador
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle on May 20, 1943. Do you recall seeing this ?
Mr. Welles. It is stamped with the stamp of my office, but I think
I must point out that in the days which I was living through at that
time it would have been practically impossible for me to have read
every long dispatch that came in. But I have no doubt that while
it did pass through my office it was actually taken care of by some
other official in the Department.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Earlier this morning we had introduced as exhibit
14 a document sent to the State Department by the Ambassador who
preceded Mr. Standley. Do you recall that document?
Mr. Welles. Yes.
Mr. PuciNSKi. In that document is included a rather long report by
Captain Czapski on the search for these Polish officers.
Mr. Welles. That was referred to this morning. I don't remember
ever having seen it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You do not recall having seen it ?
Mr. Welles. No.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Well, the only thing I was trying to get straight in
my mind here, in assembling all of this information on Katyn, is what
is the relative measure in weight — I mean where did the Polisli Army
stand in your considerations in the State Department, not as a human-
itarian move toward Poland but as a realistic military effort to win
the war?
Mr. Welles. My impression was very strong, after the many con-
ferences I had with General Sikorski, that they could be of far greater
value in north Africa or in Italy.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And it was because of that opinion and that impres-
sion that efforts had been made by this Government to locate or help
locate their officers ?
Mr. Welles. Well, I think you are limiting it too much, Mr.
Puciuski. I say again that I think there had been a traditional and
very close friendship between Poland and the United States; and
I think that when the Polish Government in exile asked us to use
our best efforts for their benefit it was more than natural for us to
THE KATl-N FOREST MASSACRE 2099
do it, quite apart from strategic considerations, although, of course,
those came into it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Wlien you discovered that these intellectual leaders
of Poland and the leaders of this potential army on which you were
counting — and I think we have had mention of many instances where
the United States was counting on this Polish Army— when you
learned that these men had been massacred in Katyn, what sort of
reaction did that create in the State Department ?
Mr. Welles. I think you are now asking about a reaction that
probably took place after I had already gone.
Mr. PuciNSKi. If I understood you correctly, sir; you did not
leave until July of 1943?
Mr. Welles. That is right.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Exhibit 22, which I have just shown you and which
has been identified, bears a rubber stamp indicating that it had gone
over your desk at least and is dated May 20, 1943.
Mr. Welles. That is quite right.
Mr. PucixsKi. Now, that was some time before you left.
Mr. Welles. But may I say again that I think that at first the
situation was too confused for us to evaluate it as it later proved it
should have been evaluated. There was no absolute certainty at that
time as to who was responsible.
Mr. PuciNSKi. At the beginning of the hearing this afternoon,
Mr. Madden said that we are now in the second phase of our investi-
gation to try and determine whether or not there was any deliberate
effort made by the various agencies in this country and other coun-
tries to suppress the knowledge about Katyn and also to keep from
the American people the real meaning of this thing. What was
your reaction? What was the attitude on this whole Katyn affair in
the State Department at that time ?
Mr. Welles. To the best of my knowledge and belief, until I left
there was never the slightest effort to play it down or to keep it quiet
for reasons of appeasement of Russia. It had to do solely with our
uncertainty as to what the real facts were.
Mr. PuciNSKi. But you think the fact of the matter is that Poland,
who at that time was an ally of the United States, was of secondary
consideration as compared to Russia, which was the first considera-
tion ? Is that a fair assumption ?
Mr. Welles. It is very difficult for me to attempt to make the
balance that you request. It seems to me that the two things are
separate. Here you have the Soviet Union that was not a govern-
ment in exile that actually was fighting, and that was of the utmost
assistance to us at that time. For traditional reasons or for reasons
of sentiment, for reasons of justice and honor, we wanted to do every-
thing we could to assist the Polish Government in exile, to get every-
thing that we could out of the Russians for their benefit, for the pri-
mary purpose of reestablishing after the war, as I have said before,
a free and independent Poland governed by the Polish people them-
selves according to their own desires.
I don't think you can balance those two things.
Mr. DoNDERO, I would like to ask a question on this subject. The
Ambassador from Poland tq Moscow testified before this committee
that over a period of about 2 years they made 50 separate and dis-
tinct requests of the Russian Government regarding these missing
2100 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Polish officers. Did the Embassy here in Washington — and I refer to.
the Polish Embassy — make known to our Embassy, or our State De-
partment rather, the information that they were requesting the Hus-
sion Government to disclose the whereabouts of those officers?
Mr. Welles. Do I understand correctly, Mr. Congressman, that you
asked whether the Polish Embassy in Washington made that known
to the State Department ?
Mr. DoNDERO. Yes.
Mr. Welles. That is, made known that their Ambassador in Moscow
Avas making these requests ?
Mr. DoNDERo. Yes.
Mr. Welles. By all means ; certainly.
Mr. DoNDERO. And you knew that ?
Mr. Welles. Decidedly, yes. I think the Ambassadors for 2 years
before I left the Department brought it up constantly in every
conversation.
Mr. Dondp:ro. Now, those 2 years would be before the Germans
made it known to the world in 1943 ; so, it must have been in 1941 and
1942?
Mr. Welles. I should think it would have begun as early as 1941,
Mr. Congressman. Here again it is a matter of record. All of those
conversations are on file in the Department, the conversations that I
ever had.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, if I might give an expression of opin-
ion on this, as I recall, you left in 1943. Prior to that, being in the
Government service for so long, naturally, in your high position, you
had occasion to know about the many, many agreements with Russia
since the recognition in 1933. And you knew and there came across
your desk information about which agreements were kept and which
were not kept, because in tlie Eightieth Congress, if my memory serves
me right, a congressional committee showed 14 printed pages of agree-
ments that were broken with Russia.
Now, in your position as one of the high-level policy advisoi*s — and
there came across your desk the various broken agreements — can you
say what was the position of our Government in 1942 and 1943 about
Russia? Did they think that sometime they could come to a general
agreement with Russia on contractual obligations, or was this a desire
to go on with the war only ?
Mr. Welles. I think the primary desire, of course, was to go on with
the war successfully, to a successful conclusion. But I think that cer-
tainly— and probably some of the members of the committee will agree
with me — we would never have gone into the United Nations if we had
not thought that there was a reasonable chance that we could bring
the Soviet Government to cooperate rather than to be antagonistic.
Mr. SiiEEiiAN. Of course, that is one of the places where we on the
Katyn Committee are very much interested because quite a few of our
members feel that if this famous Van Vliet report, which was missing,
had been revealed to tlie American public in May 15)45, when it was
brought up and when it disap]:)eared from the Army Intelligence — if
that had been revealed to the Government or to the American public,
there would have been a sufficient hue and cry and clamor about rela-
tions with Soviet Russia to the extent that some of us think, as I per-
sonally think, the United Nations would never have come into being.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2101
That is one of the reasons why I think some of us think this report
was suppressed.
Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with that report.
Mr. Sheehan. The Van Vliet report, for your information, was
made in May of 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. It was dated May 24, 1945.
Mr. Sheehan. That was while the United Nations was in progress
and while there was a rupture between Poland and Russia as to
who was going to represent Poland. An American officer came back
and stated to General Bissell that, in his opinion and in the opinion of
another Army man, the Russians liad committed this particular crime.
Of course, we feel that the disappearance of this report and many
other reports of a similar nature in the Army Intelligence and in the
State Department and throughout our Government shows that some-
place along the line there were people at the top echelon of the Gov-
ernment trying to protect Russia's interests. That is the only con-
clusion I can come to.
Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, I am testifying under oath, and I can
state with complete conviction that I have never participated in the
suppression of anything of the character that has been mentioned.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Welles, do you now see any dili'erence between
Stalin and Hitler, judging from subsequent events?
Mr. Welles. From the general standpoint, they are both of them
authoritarian dictators, utterly ruthless in their methods. I suppose
that if you get into details you can point out differences. But, so far
as the main lines are concerned, I think one authoritarian totalitarian
regime is as objectionable as another.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you think that Stalin was always that way or
that he got that way since he got all of the lend-lease he received from
us in 1945 ?
Mr. Welles. If you read, as I have read recently, the political bio-
graphy of Stalin, I should say that there has been no change intrin-
sically in his character from the beginning until the present moment.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, summarizing this from my view-
point, we just guessed badly and made a very bad gamble, and we lost.
Is that correct ?
Mr, Welles. I suppose that is one way of putting it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, that partially answers my question,
but I would like to have you answer this, if you feel that you would
like to. Do you feel now, looking back at the facts as they look today,
that if our Government had adopted a more firm policy toward Soviet
Russia in those fateful days of 1942 and 1943 much of our difficulties
in the world today would have been avoided ?
Mr. Welles. I would like to answer that categorically, but I don't
think I can because it seems to me there are imponderables there. I
have never yet knowni to my own satisfaction how much truth there
was in the idea of a further arrangement with Germany. After all,
it had taken place in 1939. Germany had then broken it by invading
Poland. It is conceivable that it could have happened over again.
Mr. Machrowicz. 1 agree with you, but that avoids the question.
Mr. Welles. I did not wish to avoid it.
Mr. Machrowicz. My question is not asked as to our position to-
ward Germany, but rather our position toward Russia. I agree 100
2102 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
percent that there is very little difference between Stalin and Hitler
as far as their totalitarian methods are concerned ; but don't you think
that if we had adopted a more firm policy toward Soviet Russia, and
particularly toward its demands with re^^ard to Poland and other
similar situations, that we could have avoided much of the troubles of
the world today ?
Mr. Welles. As it has turned out, the answer to your question, I
think, is clearly "Yes."
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Mr. Welles. But I do want to make a reservation. Hard pressed
as they were in the winter of 1942, if we had told the Russians that
they were not going to accomplish anything in the world that they
wanted, it might easily have been possible for them to turn around
and try to sue for a separate peace with the German Government all
over again.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Following through on that, now that you know what
the conditions of the world are and now that you know what Hitler
was and what Joe Stalin was, do you really think that it was possible
for those two mad dogs to get together and make an agi'eement and
keep it?
Mr. Welles. Not keep it ; no,
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Of course not.
Mr. Welles. Not definitely, but very much to our inconvenience for
a short time.
Mr. Dondero. They did keep it up until at least June 21, 1941 ?
Mr. Welles. That is right.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to at this time ask a
question of opinion. You will recall this morning that when we put
on the record exhibit 14 from Ambassador Standley to the Depart-
ment of State, dated April 28, this one phrase was in that dispatch :
In the second place, there does not appear to be any Polish leader who would
have sufficient stature to make such a government popular.
Mr. Welles. He was talking about the Polish Communist leaders
in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you give your opinion, in the
light of then and now, because
Mr. Welles. I am wholeheartedly in accord with that evaluation.
I think all of the Polish leaders with ability sufficient to lead their
country out of the tragic situation it finds itself in are either still in
occupied Poland or outside in the rest of the w^orld. I don't think
they are in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Mitchell. I asked you that question because that leads us to
Yalta and what happened at Yalta about the formation of a free
Polish Government. I know that you were not in the Department of
State at that time, but I would like to know whether you would like
to comment. You are aware that all of Yalta has been declassified
now.
Mr. Welles. I think it is preferable for me not to attempt to make
that estimate now. There are many of us who will make it. I was
not on the scene, as you have said. I was not behind the scenes. I was
no longer in touch with all of the secret information that was passing
over the desks at the various agencies of Government. But I think,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2103
-without having had all of that information, it would be very difficult
iairly to evaluate what was then done.
Mr, Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Secretary, I have just one final question,
and this is merely asking for a comment that has nothing whatsoever
to do with this hearing. Judging from your long experience in inter-
national affairs, the committee would be interested in getting your
thoughts regarding the similarity of the actions of the Russian lead-
ers, Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, regarding the disappearance of these
Polish officers, and when they postponed and stalled the Polish leaders
for almost 2 years, giving them no satisfaction whatsoever, although
they knew that these Polish officers had been murdered and massa-
cred— do you find a similarity in their tactics with the Polish leaders,
the free Polish Government, and the negotiations that they are now
carrying on with the United Nations in Korea ?
Mr. Welles. I think there is a similarity in objective and a similar-
ity in technique.
Chairman Madden. That is all.
We wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. The
testimony has been veiy valuable, and we appreciate your taking the
time to come here and present it.
Mr. Welles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I express my thanks to.
the committee for its great courtesy to me.
Chairman Madden. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could take a recess
for 10 minutes to give Mr. Harriman a chance to look over some
papers.
Chairman Madden. Let's reduce that to 5 minutes. We will take a
5-ininute recess.
(A short recess was taken.)
TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM AVERELL HARRIMAN, DIRECTOR
FOR MUTUAL SECURITY
Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, will you be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Harriman. I do.
Chairman Madden. Please state your full name for the record.
Mr. Harriman. My name is William Averell Harriman.
Chairman Madden. And your address, Mr. Harriman?
Mr. Harriman. My address here in Washington?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr. Harriman. 1800 Foxhall Eoad.
Chairman Madden. And your business?
Mr. Harriman. I am Director for Mutual Security.
Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to sum-
marize for the benefit of Mr. Harriman how far we have progressed
with this hearing.
Mr. Harriman, it is my understanding that you became Ambassador
to Soviet Russia in October 1943 ?
Mr. Harriman. That is my recollection. It may have been Septem-
ber. I have forgotten when I was confirmed by the Senate, but I went
2104 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
to Moscow with Secretaiy Hull to the Moscow Conference in the mid-
dle of October 1943.
Mr. MiTCJiiELL. The committee has progressed to the point now in
its investigation where dispatches, telegrams, memorandums of rec-
ord, have been received over the period 1941-42-43, concerning the
missing Polish officers and that all of these communications were in
the Department of State, from both the Ambassador in Moscow and
the Ambassador in London. Now, you participated in the discussions
at Yalta, and the formation of the new, or what is today known as
the Polish Provisional Government. They were in control during
1945 through 1947, until after the "free and unfettered" elections of
1947. Also, there is the matter of the 16 underground members of
the Polish Government in exile who came out of hiding and were taken
to Moscow in approximately April of 1945.
I am sure that you can tell us something about what transpired
then.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, I think that if Mr. Harriman so
desires, the committee would be interested in hearing his statement.
If you care to, Mr. Harriman, we would be glad to hear your state-
ment of any points which you have, regarding your knowledge of the
Katyn massacre, or the disappearance of the Polish officers, or any
knowledge you have, as Ambassador, that is connected with the in-
vestigation of the committee. Would you care to make a statement?
Wliether it is a statement of a few minutes or 5 or 10, whatever you
care to make, the committee would be glad to hear it, if you desire.
Mr. Harriman. I imagine most of this has been gone over by the
committee. I do not know that I can contribute anything to it. I
was very much involved in my work in England. I made two trips
to Moscow, one in 1941 and one in 1942.
Chairman Madden. The committee would be very much interested
in hearing your impressions and versions concerning the facts of the
Katyn massacre.
Mr. Harriman. I have very little knowledge about it. I was sent
to Moscow by President Roosevelt with an Anglo-American Com-
mission, in which Lord Beaverbrook represented the British, in Sep-
tember 1941, and I was chairman of the American Commission. I
had some contact with the Polish problem at that time, and I got to
know General Sikorsky well because his government was in exile in
London, and at the suggestion of the President, I did send a telegram
to Stalin asking for the cooperation of the establishment of the Polish
Army, and I have a letter coming from the Polish Government in
exile, thanking me for my efforts, and indicating that it was of great
use in establishing the first basis for this ami}'.
Then there was a question, I think, at that time, of moving them
to Persia for training. I had no knowledge of the missing officer's,
because I was so occu})ied with my work in London.
I, of course, do recall the announcement of the Germans of this
massacre, but I had no knowledge of it except what I saw in the Brit-
ish press at that time.
I do recall seeing General Sikorsky after the event, after the Polish
Government had asked the International Red Cross to make an in-
vestigation. General Sikoisky told me tliat he had been quite ill at
the time and regretted tluit tliat particular request had been made,
that led to the breaking off of relations between the Soviet and Polish
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2105
Oovernments, and lie felt that the better way would have been to have
handled it directly with the Soviet Government, as I recall it. That
was recorded by Mr. Biddle, who was the Ambassador at that time to
the Polish Government, General Sikorsky died, and I, of course, had
no further contact with him.
The subject came up again when the Soviet Government invited
the American press in Moscow to go to Katyn and witness the exami-
nation of the graves. At that time I thought it would be useful if a
member of the Embassy w^ent along. At that time it had not been
the custom of the Soviet Government to invite members of the Diplo-
matic Corps to go with the foreign press, and I asked my daughter
whether she would be willing to go, believing the Russians would be
more likely to let her go than only an Embassy official. I therefore
asked the Foreign Office to permit my daughter and a member of
the American Embassy staff, Mr. John Melby, to go with the press.
They did go, both of them, and they submitted their reports inde-
pendently, of what they had seen, and their impressions. I forwarded
the reports to the State Department, and sent a brief message to the
President and the Secretary of State, recounting briefly what their
impressions were. Beyond that I have no knowledge of or informa-
tion regarding the interchange of information that existed in the re-
quests for information about the officers or the details which were
available in Washington or elsewhere regarding the Katyn massacre.
That is a brief summary of the background of my knowledge of
those particular events.
Of course, constantly while I was Ambassador, there were discus-
sions with the Soviet Government about recognition again of the Pol-
ish Government in London, and there were a number of different nego-
tiations, of which Yalta was one, in regard to attempting to get the
Soviet Government to agree to a Free Poland, and acceptance of the
principles which the Government of the United States had set forth
for protection of the Polish interests.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, you have read exhibit 19, sent by
Admiral Standley to the Secretary of State, dated April 28, 1943,
in which he predicted the formation of a Free Polish Government. In
that exhibit is this statement :
In the second place, tliere do not appear to be any Polish leaders here who
have sufficient stature to make such a government popular.
That was April 28, 1943, about 15 days after the disclosure of the
finding of the mass graves at Katyn.
Now, I assume that at least a copy of this dispatch was in the files
at Kuybishev or Moscow when you took over the post of Ambassador?
Mr. Harriman, I do not recall ever having read it. I did not send
the telegram. I do not recall reading it until I was shown the tele-
gram a short time ago. I think it is a sensible telegram.
Mr. Mitchell. Certainly the subject matter must have been up for
discussion in the high-level discussions at the time that you were nego-
tiating and discussing Yalta. You were present at Yalta ; were you
not?
Mr. Harriman. I was ; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. With this statement in the files of the Department
of State and in Moscow, and with all of the other information that
was available at that time, the leaders were the ones that were found
2106 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
in Katyn. This statement specifically says that there is not any Pol-
ish leader here who would have sufficient stature to make such a gov-
ernment popular. I would like to ask you to explain to the committee
just who were the Polish leaders in Moscow when you arrived there,
and what was your knowledge of them ?
Mr. Harriman. I don't know any of them. Of course, when it came
to Yalta, you will recall, the Soviet armies were in substantial occupa-
tion of the entire Poland, and they had established what we called
the Lublin Government. Mr. Beirut was the head of it, and the list
of Ministers I cannot recall now, but it is available. They had been
established by the Soviet Government under the force of the Red
Army as the ruling government in Poland.
Mr. Mitchell. In Lublin ?
Mr. Harriman. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. But the Polish Government in exile maintained
their headquarters in London at that time?
Mr. Harriman. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. At the same time you knew, when you were Ambas-
sador to London, that the Polish Government also had underground
leaders, the Polish Government in exile?
Mr. Harriman. No; I was not our Ambassador in London. I was
a special representative of the President, dealing with supply and
shipping questions during the period I was in London. I was not
involved in the diplomatic aspect of our Embassy in London.
Mr. Mitchell. Certainly, General Sikorski, somewhere along the
line must have told you that they had their people. In effect, there
were two governments.
Mr. Harriman. I was not familiar with the underground move-
ment. I knew that one existed, but I was not familiar with the details
of that.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you explain to the committee why the Polish
Government in exile, since they were then recognized by this Govern-
ment, was not present at Yalta and since it concerned the subject mat-
ter of Poland ?
Mr. Harriman. There were no governments present at Yalta, with
the exception of the British and the Soviet Government and the
American Government, those three Governments. It was a tri-par-
tite meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell us what transpired concerning the for-
mation of this new government at Yalta ?
Mr. Harriman. There was at the time of Yalta the so-called Lublin
Government, which had been established by the force of the Soviet
Government. It had jurisdiction over the civilian affairs of Poland,
because Poland by that time had been freed from German control by
the Red army, and the Lublin government had taken over. The
discussions in Yalta related to a broadening of the base of that Gov-
ernment, so as to include democratic leaders from within Poland and
from outside of Poland, which, of course, included the London gov-
ernment. Agreements were reached at that time with Stalin, in which
he undertook to cooperate with the American and the British Govern-
ments in the establishment of a broadly based democratic govei'n-
ment, with the participation of the other leaders, both from within
Poland and from outside, and the holding, as promptly as possible,
of free and unfettered elections.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2107
That acrreement was reached, and the fact that Stalin broke that
agreement is the reason why Poland is now still under Soviet dom-
"^Mi°\iTCHELL. But, Mr. Harriman, at that particular time, and
all during the war, Poland had been an ally of the United States and
Great Bi?tain, and the Soviet Union, during the latter stages ot the
war.
j\Ir. Harriman. That is correct. ^i i i
Mr Mitchell. The Government was recognized as tlie legal gov-
ernment of Poland. They were situated in London. What confer-
ences took place or may have taken place which preceded Yalta, with
the Polish leaders then ?
Mr. Harriman. I have no knowledge of that. , i , 4!
Mr Mitchell. Who brought up the subject of the broad base ot
representative government in Poland when all three, except the Soviet
Union, which broke off diplomatic relations, as a result of it—— .
Mr Harriman. There had been discussions for a considerable period
of time, over attempting to get the Soviet Government to recognize
again the Polish Government in London as the Government of Poland
Those negotiations failed, and the Soviet Government went forward
with its plan to set up this Lublin Government. . . .1 o • ^
Mr Mitchell. Did the United States have to give m to the Soviet
requirements? The Lublin Government was not recognized by the
United States? ^ . ,
Mr. Harriman. No; the Lublin Government was never recognized
bv the United States. , .
Mr Mitchell. The United States continued to recognize the gov-
ernment in exile, until July 5, 1945 ; is that correct ?
Mr. Harriman. That is correct. ^ . ^.
Mr Mitchell. But yet, at the same time, the Government of the
United States was negotiating for putting the Lublm Government
into existence, without telling the Polish Government m exile what
was going on ? „ , . ^ . 4. ^ ^
Mr Harriman. I have no knowledge of what was told or not told
the Polish Government in London. I do know that President Roose-
velt and also Prime Minister Churchill attempted to work out ar-
rangements which would insure Poland's freedom, and that, I believe,
they thought they had accomplished by the pledge of Stalm to hold
free and unfettered elections. Now, that was the objective of President
Eoosevelt, to overcome what was the then existing fact, which was the
occupation of Poland by the Red armies, the control of Poland by
the Red army, and the establishment of this government, which was
done through force, by the Soviets. That was a fact which existexl at
that time. The diplomatic negotiations having failed to bring about
the recognition of the Polish Government in London by the Soviets, the
President attempted to develop another means by which Poland would
be free, and the Polish people would be protected from this new
enslavement. ....
Mr Mitchell. Wliy could not the Polish Government m exile m
London return to Poland after the war and hold those free and unfet-
tered elections? n -, . -x
Mr. Harriman. Because the Soviet Government refused to permit
them to do so.
2108 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Yet the United States and Great Britain went alonj
and accepted the line of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Harriman. No; the Lublin Government was never recognized
There was an attempt to set up a provisional government which would
insure that there would be, with the cooperation of the British and
American Governments, a free election in Poland, so that the Polish
people would again have their freedom, and that this enslavement
would then end.
Mr. Mitchell. But at the time of Yalta, the United States Govern-
ment representatives had information about the missing Polish officers
and they had never received a satisfactory explanation during 1941
and 1942. These were the leaders of Poland, found at Katyn. Admi
ral Standley tells us there was no individual in Moscow of sufficient
stature to be a leader.
Was that subject considered? We knew at the time of Yalta that
the Soviets never kept their word.
Mr. Harriman. Number 1, the Lublin Government, as I recall it,
were selected from people that came to Moscow subsequent to 1943.
I do not remember when they came, but they were largely leaders who
came from Poland, who had been working among the Communists in
Poland. They were not people sitting in Moscow, but, as I recall it,
they were the Poles who were brought out of Poland, who had been
working to develop a Communist movement within Poland.
This idea that the Soviet Government did not keep its agreements
is not fully true. The most important agreement during the war
which was reached with the Soviet Government was the agreement for
the Red army to attack the Gennan forces shortly after our landing in
Normandy. I think that one should recall that when we landed in
Normandy there were 199 German divisions on the eastern front, the
Russian front, and about 50 satellite divisions, whereas, if I remember
correctly, there were some 60 German divisions in France and in the
Low Countries, and our Chiefs of Staff were gravely concerned over
the posibility of the Germans transferring from the eastern front a
substantial number of their divisions, which would make the landings
difficult or, possibly, the German forces would have been able to drive
us back to the sea.
Now, Stalin made that agreement, and he kept it. He made that
agreement at Tehran, and he kept it, and the Red army attacked a
few weeks after our landing in Normandy and broke through this
very large German force, and it was because of the keeping of that
agreement that our successes on the western front were possible.
I think you will find that our military leaders at that time would
substantiate that statement, and the keeping of that agreement was
one of the factors Avhich did influence both i[\e, American and British
in terms of having hopes that the Soviets would cooperate in the
peaceful solution of the problems which were concerning us at the
end of the war.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, you are familiar with the terms of
the Atlantic Charter, of course?
Mr. Harkiiman. Yes.
Mr. MrnuiKLL. One of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter was
that there would be no territorial gains on the part of any of the Allies.
Yet the United States (xovernment and Great Britain participated in
discussions— and I am not sure whether it was in Tehran or Yalta—
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2109
which in effect was determining the future boundaries of Poland, and
it was a territorial gain for the Soviet Union. Can you explain that?
Mr. Harkiman. I am not an an expert on the question of the eastern
borders of Poland. You will have to ask somebody with the State
Department about that, where the discussions were, but the Russians
had contended — and I am not justifying the contention, but I am
merely stating the fact — they had contended for a considerable period
of time that the eastern borders of Poland had been unfairly made
and that ethnologicaily there was a larger percentage of white Rus-
sians and Ukranians in that area and that the agreement at the end
of World War I was unfair to the Soviet interests.
I assume that was the reason why this discussion took place and was
not considered to be periiaps a violation of the Atlantic Charter. It
was a correction, as far as the Russians contended — I am not saying
that was a correction, actually, but the Russians contended that that
was a rectification of an injustice which had previously been forced on
them by the military situation at the end of the First World War.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, did I understand you to say
that that was an unfair designation of the eastern border?
Mr. Harriman. No — I am saying that was the Russian contention.
I am just acting as a reporter. I am saying that that was the Russian
contention.
Mr. Mitchell. But here are the United States and Great Britain
violating one of the terms of the Atlantic Charter because of a demand
by the Soviet Union. Why could not that discussion have taken
place after the war, after the Polish Government had gone back, and
then they could have had the government? In effect, what happened
was that the Soviets, because of the lack of leaders, due to Katyn. put
the people they wanted into Poland, and the United States and Great
Britain participated in Yalta or Tehran in violation of one of the
provisions of the Atlantic Charter. You were there as one of the
individuals at Yalta.
Mr. Harriman. I was not involved in terms of the selection of the
Curzon line. That was a proposal which I don't know the basis of.
But this discussion was, as I say, in relation to the Soviet contention
that a wrong had been done after World War I.
As far as I understand, President Roosevelt's objective was to relieve
the Polish people at the earliest possible date, of their enslavement,
j and make it possible to help Poland rebuild her economic life. Every-
one was generally familiar with the appaljing conditions in Poland,
and an attempt to help the Polish people regain their independence
and to help them both through relief and economically rebuild their
lives was made, and to alleviate the distress in which the people were
then living.
So that that, I believe, was the main, or among the reasons why
President Roosevelt thought it was extremely important to get the
earliest possible settlement.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Harriman, right at that point let me ask : Was
there ever a speedy action, as contemplated, a free election, as contem-
plated, in Poland ?
Mr. Harriman. Never.
Mr. DoNDERo. Under the Lublin Government, or any other?
Mr. Harriman. Never. There were never any free elections in
Poland.
j3744— 52— pt. 7 19
2110 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Ambassador, I do not ask this question to em-
barrass yon, or cast any reflections, because I have a high regard for
you, but just clear up the record and to get the motives that were
operating.
Will you tell us what part Alger Hiss played in the Yalta Confer-
ence? What was his capacity?
Mr, Harriman. I barely knew him. He was a young man that was
carrying papers for Mr. Stettinius. I had no conversations with him.
I had a general knowledge that he was one of the men working on the
United Nations. He never participated in any of the discussions at
which I was present.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was he ever consulted on matters pertaining to the
future of Poland?
Mr. Harriman. Not that I know of. I understood that he was one
of tlie men that had been working on the terms of the United Nations,
but beyond that, I never knew that he was consulted.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. His capacity, then, at Yalta, was more or less pre-
liminary footwork, so to speak, to get the preliminary steps started
toward the organization of the United Naitons, and that, as far as you
know, was his capacity at Yalta ?
Mr. Harriman. That is, as far as I know ; and he never participated,
as far as I can remember, in any discussions, whatsoever. He was a
young man from the State Department who had some of the papers
which Mr. Stettinius would call for.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Thank you.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Mr. Harriman, might I put some questions to 3'ou?
Mr. Hickerson, from the State Department, when he was here yester-
day, testifying, stated that, as an outcome of the Yalta Conference,
that tliree men were appointed to go over and see if they could consult
with the Polish leaders and the Polish people with reference to work-
ing out some sort of situation or agreement. Those were Ambassador
Clark Kerr, yourself, and Mr. Molotov. Could you tell us what hap-
pened at those conferences ?
Mr. Harriman. I can only tell you from memory, as I have not had
accesss to any papers.
The three of us met in Moscow, as was provided by the Yalta agree-
ment, shortly after the end of Yalta. There was a slight delay, as I
recall it, because Sir Arcliibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador,
returned by train and it took him a few days. We could not come to
an agreement, and it ended in a deadlock.
As I recall, one of the issues was that we wanted to bring in some
of the Poles in the London Government and some of the Polish leaders
who were known to be in Poland. We could not get agreement with
Mr. Molotov. If my recollection is right, the thing we broke on was
Molotov insisting that we talk to the so-called Lublin Poles first and
then talk to the otliei's subsequeutly. Sii- Archibald Clark Kerr and I
took the point of \iew we should consult them together, and I think we
broke 011 that basis and never got any further. 1 would have to refresh
my memory to recall that, but they broke down com[)letely, and noth-
ing was accomi)lished.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. As I understand, you were at Yalta. Were you at
Tehran ^
Mr. Harriman. I was at Telu-an also.
Mr. Sheehan. Were you at Potsdam?
[ THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2111
Mr. Harriman. I was at Potsdam also.
Mr. Sheehan. In all these conferences, did you participate in the
high-level discussions, or were you, like Mr. Hiss
Mr. Harriman. I was in some of them, not in all of them, but I was
in some of them.
Mr. SiiEEiiAN. Then permit me to ask you this : As I understand
the Yalta Conference
Mr. Harrimax. You see, there were conferences going on between
the staffs, our Chiefs of Staff, the combined Chiefs of Staff, and the
Soviet, and there were certain other discussions. INIr. Roosevelt and
Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin had some discussions. I think I was
in most of the conferences between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.
Mr. Sheehan. According to Mr. Byrnes, who was Secretary of
State at the time of the Yalta conference, if my memory serves me
right
Mr. Harriman. No, he was not Secretary of State. He came as an
adviser to President Roosevelt. He was not Secretary of State at
that time.
Mr. Sheehan. As I remember this situation — and the reason why
we are bringing it in is to try to find out whether there was any ques-
tion about the Poles involved — he stated the conference had broken up
February 10 and most of them had departed, and then the conference
went on for another 1 or 2 days. According to the history. Hiss stayed
on and was with Mr. Roosevelt and Stalin, when a very small, select
group, made further arrangements or commitments at Yalta. Do
you know anything at all about that? Were you in that group?
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Hiss had nothing to do with any of these dis-
cussions. There were some discussions at the last day or two of the
Yalta Conference, in regard to the Far East and Russia's participation
in the war against Japan. Those were the last discussions that took
place in Yalta, if my memory is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. As far as you know, at Tehran, at Yalta, and Pots-
dam, did you engage in any discussions at all, with any of our officials
or foreign officials, with reference to the missing Polish officers, or their
problem ?
Mr. Harriman. No; I do not recall the subject came up.
Mr. Sheehan. However, I do know, unfortunately I do not think
the State Department has paraphrased it, that as early as November
1941 you yourself had sent a message to Mr. Stalin in which you had
asked about the Polish Army and the Polish officers, with a view to-
ward finding when the Polish forces could be gotten into a fighting
unit. And Mr. Stalin later sent you some telegrams and some informa-
tion on that. I would like to have the counsel show this to you to see
if you can recall it.
Mr. Harriman. Yes ; I sent a telegram to Mr. Stalin on November
T, as I recall it, at the request of the President. I would be glad to read
this into the record, if you wish.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, I believe we have a copy of that
paraphrased.
Mr. Harriman. Then I got two replies from Stalin, one that he
would consider it, and then another one about a talk with Ambassador
Kot, and then I have a letter from Raczynski in London. I was in
London at that time. In it he says :
Beyond doubt, your telegram to Mr. Stalin was instrumental in breaking a very
undesirable deadlock and facilitating General Sikorski's visit to Russia.
2112 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
then lie goes on and thanks me for the Polish Government for my
efforts.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Harriman, I offer you what will be marked
for identification as "Exhibit 23," which you can peruse, and ask you
if that is the authentic message which you sent on November 7. That
includes also the attachments to it. I think this is a paraphrase.
Mr. Harriman. Yes, this seems to be a correct copy of the telegram
I sent.
Chairman Madden. Group exhibit 23 is accepted in evidence.
Mr. Sheehan. If this other one is a paraphrase, I think it would
be important as part of the record the telegram of November 14 from
Mr. Harriman to Mr. Stalin, so that we know our Government was
informed, and Mr. Harriman was cognizant of the fact that the Polish
situation was of importance even as early as 1941, in November.
Cliairman Madden. Is that in the exhibit?
]Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 18, and one of four attachments
to it.
(The document was marked "Group Exhibit 23" and received for
the record.)
Exhibit 23 — Message Fkom Haeriman to Stalin of November 7, 1941
The problem of the most effective ways of using unarmed Polish troops now in
Russia has had close attention and, at the President's suggestion and after
consulting with him I am bringing certain phases for your consideration to your
direct attention. It is our understanding that these Polish forces are in the
general region of the lower Volga and east of there, and that owing to the great
strain on Soviet resources it is not possible for the Soviet Government fully to
equip or utilize these troops. The problem therefore would appear to be one
of reconditioning these troops to their greatest effectiveness under the terms of
the understanding with the Polish Government that these troops are to fight as a
national unit against Nazism. These troops are located in an area bordering
vital regions whose defense is of joint interest to all who oppose the Nazi regime.
It is our suggestion that these Polish forces be assembled and sent to a
designated area in Persia, and that this should be done with the agreement as
well as the assistance of the Soviet Government. With American and British
help these Poles might there be uniformed, armed, and reconditioned so that
they could most quickly become a part of the fighting forces in the expectation
that they would be sent to the Soviet Russian front.
In cooperation with the P.ritish we are conducting a survey which it is hoped
will quickly ascertain the supplies necessary and the availability of material
and the means by which supplies may be delivered to the Poles not only quickly
but also with the least possible interference with transportation lines for supplj'-
ing materials to the Soviet Union.
It would be deeply appreciated if you would express your general views on this
subject. If you agree it would be helpful if you could inform us when and in what
numbers it would be possible for the Polish forces to arrive at places outside the
Soviet Union where our plans as discussed above could be put into operation.
Exhibit 23A — Ambassador Harriman's Dispatch to Washington
Embassy of the United States of America,
London, December 1, 1941.
The Honorable Cordetx Hull,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. O.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you herewith, for the records, copies of
two cables I have received frtim Stalin, as delivered to me by M. Maisky, in reply
to a calile sent in my name to Stalin on Noveml)er 12th.
I am enclosing also copy of a letter from Count Raczynski, the Polish Am-
bassador.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) A. Harriman.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2113
Exhibit 23B — Marshal Stalin's First Reply to Ambassador Harriman
14th NOVEMBEHI, 1941.
Mr. Averell Harriman : Your telegram of the 12th November received. I have
not yet had the possibility to acquaint myself with all the details of the Polish
question in the U. S. S. R. In the course of two or three days, after studying this
question, I will let you know the attitude of the Soviet Government. In any case
you should have no doubts that the wishes of the Poles, as well as the interests
of the friendly relations between the U. S. S. R. and Poland will be taken into
account by the Soviet Government.
( Signed ) Stalin.
Exhibit 23C — Marshal Stalin's Second Reply to Ambassador Harriman
27th November, 1041.
Mr. Averell Harriman,
% American Embassy.
Dear Mr. Harriman : I am instructed to forward to you the following reply
of M. Stalin to your telegram :
"I had recently a conversation with the Polish Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.,
Monsieur Kot. I received the impression that the U. S. S. R. and Poland have
all the reasons and possibilities to settle all fundamental questions in which both
parties are interested. For your information, I would like to point out that
Monsieur Kot did not raise the question, during the conversation, of sending
Polish military forces from the U. S. S. R. to any other country.
Yours sincerely,
Stalin."
(Signed) I. Maisky.
Exhibit 23D — Polish Embassy Letter to Ambassador Harriman
Polish Embassy,
47 Portland Place, London, W. 1, November 26, 1941.
Mr. William Averell Harriman,
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Dorchester Hotel, Park Lane, W. 1.
Dear Mr. Harriman : I feel it to be my duty to present to you the Polish Govern-
ment's very sincere and cordial thanks for your help in our difficult conversations
with the Soviet authorities regarding the formation of the Polish Army in Russia.
It is beyond doubt that your telegram sent to M. Stalin was instrumental in
breaking a very undesirable deadlock and in facilitating General Sikorski's visit
to Russia. It is the very sincere hope of the Polish Government that this visit
may bring all the expected results. That it will lay solid foundations for the
establishment of our army in Russia and contribute to improve the position of
our civil population in the Soviet Union.
Believe me.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Edward Raczynski.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you want some of these read ?
Mr. Sheehan. On November 4 Mr. Harriman's telegram to Mr.
Stalin, and the reply.
Mr. Harriman. That was November 7, 1941.
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 23, message from Harriman to Stalin,
November 7, 1941 :
The problem of the most effective ways of using unarmed Polish troops now in
Russia has had close attention and, at the President's suggeston, and after con-
sulting with him, I am bringing certain phases for your consideration to your
direct attention. It is our understanding that these Polish forces are in the
general region of the lower Volga, and east of that, and that owing to the great
strain on Soviet resources it is not possible for the Soviet Government fully to
equip or utilize these troops. The problem, therefore, would appear to be one of
reconditioning these troops to their greatest effectiveness, under the terms of the
2114 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
understanding witli the Polish Government that these troops are to fight as a
national unit against nazism. These troops are located in an ai'ea bordering
vital regions wliose defense is of joint interest to all who oppose the Nazi regime.
It is our suggestion that these Polish forces be assembled and sent to a desig-
nated area in Persia and that this should be done with the agreement as well as
with the assistance of the Soviet Government. With American and British help,
these Poles might there be uniformed, armed, and reconditioned so that they
could most quickly become a part of tlie fighting forces in the expectation that
they would be sent to-the Soviet Russian front. * * *
Mr. Siiep:han. Mr. Counsel, I tliiiik that is sufficient reading, be-
cause the rest of it just ojoes on out.
That is just to prove the fact that our Government in 1941 was con-
scious of the Polish Army situation.
Mr. Mitchell. This is another part of the same exhibit, being dated
November 14, 1941, addressed to Mr. Averell Harriman:
Your telegram of November 12 received. I have not yet had the possibility to
acquaint myself witli all the details of the Polish question in tlie U. S. S. R.
In the coui'se of 2 or 3 days, after studying this question, I will let you know the
attitude of the Soviet Government. In any case you should have no doubts that
the interests of the Poles, as well as the interests of tlie friendly relations between
the U. S. S. R. and Poland will he taken into account l)y the Soviet Government.
signed "Stalin."
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Harriman, my thought here is this:
Starting in 1941, were you acquainted with the problem of the Polish
Arm}' and the formation of it, and then in 1943, when you became Am-
bassador, was there any more question now about the Polish Army,
because at this point, when you were Ambassador, the massacre had
been discovered ?
Mr. Harriman. As I recall it — and I may be wrong on it — a good
many of the Polish soldiers had been brought to Iran and had been
trained and equipped there, and they did not go back into Russia, they
went into, I think, the first place, Italy, and fought very gallantly
there.
The problem that I was involved in was attempting to get the
Soviet Government to recognize again the Polish Government in Exile
as the Government of Poland. They had broken off relationships, as
you well know, in the spring of 1943. Mr. Hull, as I recall it, took it
up while he was in Moscow, at the time of the Moscoav Conference, in
October 1943, and we exerted constant pressure on the Soviet Govern-
ment to recognize again the Polish Government in London as the Gov-
ernment of Poland. All of those endeavors were unsuccessful.
Mr. Siieeitan. Mr. Harriman, this is calling for an expression of
opinion, insofar as it relates to the Polish situation.
When Mr. Byrnes was assistant to the President at Yalta, was he
fairly well informed as to what hap])ened there up to the })()int where
he left the negotiations and conversations^
Mr. Harriman. I do not recall which meetings he was in. I do
know he was not in the discussions between Stalin and President
Roosevelt on the Far East. To my own recollection, I do not know
which meetings he attended.
Mr. Sheeiian. The reason why I ask that is that Mr. Byrnes had
made a statement Avhicli, to us in the connnittee, brings up a question.
I will read the statement, with your permission, because he agreed with
you with reference to your conversations, about the Lublin Govern-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2115
ment, but he also brings out another phase about negotiations with
Pohmd. I will quote directly. He says :
Not only Poland's boundaries, but Poland itself was one of the most serious
issues of the entire conference. More time was spent on this subject than any
other. Because of the intensity of the argument, Mr. Roosevelt would assume
the role more of an arbiter than of an advocate, although he, as well as Prime
Minister Churchill urged the establishment of a new Polish Government in War-
saw. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wanted to continue the Lublin
Government. Stalin was willing to add a few persons, but he wanted to make
certain that those that were added did not affect the Soviet Union's control of
the Government.
that last part substantially agrees with what you said in your negotia-
tions with the three men.
Mr. Harkiman. I would think that he was right, that of all the
political subjects, there was more time spent on Poland than any other.
There were, of course, considerable military discussions.
Mr. Sheehax. "Would you care to comment on Mr. Byrnes' remarks ?
He said Mv. Roosevelt spent more time as an arbiter rather than as
an advocate.
Mr. Harrimax. I would be inclined to think my recollection is
correct, as far as the boundary is concerned, but he was very anxious
to get an early agreement on the establishment of a government which
would insure the protection of the freedom of the Polish people and
the holding of a free election at the earliest possible moment.
Mr. Sheehax. Thank you.
Mr. Maciirow^icz. Mr." Harriman, I think this has been partially
covered but I would like to get your answer to it.
Were any representatives of the Polish Government consulted re-
garding the Yalta agreement, prior to the agreement?
Mr. Harriman. Not that I know of. But there may have been
talks. There have been a number of talks, in London, and Mr.
Mikolajczvk had come to Moscow in August of 1944 and also in
October of 1944.
Mr. Machrow^icz. That was after the Yalta agreement; was it?
Mr. Harrimax. No ; before the Yalta agreement. Mikolajczyk was
the Prime INlinister of the Polish Government in London after Gen-
eral Sikorski's death, and he remained as such during this period.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was he consulted ?
Mr. Harrimax. He was not consulted, so far as I know, about
the Yalta agreement, but there were discussions with Mr. Mikolajczyk
on the subject of a settlement in order to get a provisional govern-
ment established, which would insure the possibility of holding a free
election.
]Mr. Machrowicz. Can you explain why, at the time of the settle-
ment of the question involving the independence of the nation and
the future territorial integrity of that country, that no representative
of that country was invited ?
Mr. Harrimax. There were no other representatives of any gov-
ernments at Tehran, except the three governments, the three principal
allies. There had been discussions with Mikolajczyk over possible
settlements, both in Moscow and in London.
Mr. Machrowicz. But no representative was invited to confer?
Mr. Harrimax. No representative was invited.
2116 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you consider that the agreement which you
and Mr. Kerr worked out in Moscow^ in June of 1945 was a satisf actoiy
sohition of the agreement in Yalta?
Mr. Harriman. I never thought it was a satisfactory sohition. It
was the one hope that possibly an interim government might be estab-
lished which would have enough non-Communist members, in order
to insure that there would be a free election held.
Of course, this agreement was unsuccessful and it was the best
that it appeared at that time that could be obtained and gave some
hope that there would be a free election and that what we call the
democratic elements — you know, the Soviets have used that word
"democratic" in quite a different way than we use it — that the demo-
cratic forces in Poland would rise, and there could be a free election
held.
Mr. Machrowicz. What guaranty did we obtain at Yalta that
there would be a free and unfettered election in Poland ?
Mr. Harriman. The only guaranties were the pledged words of
Stalin.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that satisfactory to you ?
Mr. Harriman. I don't know what other pledges you could have
had.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you think an election controlled by the powers
which made the Yalta agi'eement could have been held ?
Mr. Harriman. There was agreement. It was that the three govern-
ments would work together, and see that a free election would be held.
We did not bow out of it. In the agreement it was recognized that
the United States and British Governments had a joint responsibility
with the Soviet Government in seeing that they were held. But the
Soviet Government always refused to permit that to happen, and no
free elections were held in Poland.
Mr. Machrowicz. And there was nothing that we could do about it,
was there ?
Mr. Harriman. There was nothing we could do about it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Because of the agreement made at Yalta.
Mr. Harriman. No, not because of the agreements made at Yalta,
but because of the physical occupation of Poland by the Red army.
That was a reality at Yalta and was still a reality in the summer of
1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. While you were at Moscow you wired various
Polish leaders to come to Moscow to help work out the agreements;
is that correct ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not recall those wires, I have not seen them.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember the message to Witos?
Mr. Harriman. Yes. sir. We had certain of them.
Mr. Machrowicz. You had urged him to come to Moscow.
Mr. Harriman. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. He was the Peasant leader.
Mr. Harriman. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he refused?
Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory about that, be-
cause I have not seen the telegrams recently.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to have Mr. Harriman see these docu-
ments to see whether that refreshes his memory.
Mr. Harriman. I have no doubt that is the message I sent him.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2117
Mr. Machrowicz. You remember you urged Witos to come to Mos-
cow to participate in these deliberations ?
Mr. Harkiman. That was in June of 1945.
Mr, Machrowicz, That is right.
Mr. Harriman. Yes; that is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. What do you know about the 16 Poles who came
to Moscow as a result of invitations and urgings on the part of both the
Russian Government and the United States Government, who have
never been seen since ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not recall any representation by the United
States Government to have them come to Moscow. As I recall it —
and I do this from recollection of 7 years — the first I heard about
this was when I was back here after President Roosevelt's death, and
this information was received, that they had been brought to Moscow
and were imprisoned under charges. Mr. Stettinius took it up with
Mr. Molotov, as I recall it, and protested vigorously. And that sub-
ject, as I recall it, was one of discussion between Mr. Hopkins at the
time he visited Moscow, in June of 1945. As I recall it, as a result of
representations, a number of them were released, although not all of
them were.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Harriman, I believe those discussions took place
at the United Nations Conference on May 7, 1945.
Mr. Harriman. Yes ; I believe so.
Mr. Mitchell, And at that time Mr. Molotov admitted the im-
prisonment. As a result of the imprisonment of the 16 leaders, did you
not go to the President and plead with him to send Harry Hopkins
over there, as reported in the book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, by
Sherwood ?
Mr. Harriman. That was one of the questions. The major question
up with Molotov when he was over here, one of the major questions,
was carrying out the Yalta agreement that there should be a broadly
based democratic government. And Mr. Hopkins' primary mission
to Moscow was to try to work out an agreement with Stalin to carry
out the Yalta agreement. And, of course, we were all shocked by
this imprisonment of these Polish leaders, and that was one of the
things that was discussed, as I recall it, by Mr. Hopkins, in Moscow.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me get this correct so that we will all
understand.
The 16 Polish leaders were invited to Moscow
Mr. Harriman. Not by the United States Government.
Mr. Machrowicz. No; not by the United States Government, but
with the knowledge of the United States Government.
Mr. Harriman. No. I don't recall hearing anything about it until
we learned about it when I was back here in this country.
Mr. Machrowicz. The declared purpose for the invitation of these
16 Polish leaders to Moscow was the discussion of the possibility
of the formation of a so-called representative Polish Government ; am
I right?
Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory as to on what
basis the Soviet Government induced them to come out, under which
they were seized and brought to Moscow.
Mr. Machrowicz. At that time you were Ambassador?
2118 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Harriman. I was in the United States at that time. I came
from Moscow to Washington, I think, 2 or 3 days after President
Roosevelt's death.
Mr. Machrowicz. Yon know now that most of those, after ha vino-
been invited to Moscow, presumably for discussions, Avere either assasi-
nated or placed in prison and not heard from.
Mr. Harriman. We knew they had been brought to Moscow. As
1 recall it, the first I knew of it was after I had returned to this
country and, as I say, Mr. Stettinius took it up with Molotov at
San Francisco. They were put in prison, and we were all very much
shocked by it.
Mr. Machrowicz. I believe you testified previously that, in your
opinion, Stalin and Soviet Russia have never kept the terms of the
agreement entered into at Yalta ; is that correct ?
Mr. Harriman. That is correct, as far as any of the political agree-
ments were concerned. The military agreements, they kept, made
during the war.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not think it would have been wiser for
us to have taken some precautions to guarantee the fulfillment of
these agreements by Soviet Russia ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not know what guaranties you could have
had. The areas under political discussion were those areas which
either had already been occupied by the Red army, or would in all
probability be occupied by the Red army.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was the possibility of elections under the con-
trol of the three powers who agreed to the terms of Yalta discussed?
Mr. Harriman. Yes. I think the agreement specified that we should
work together to see that free elections were held.
Mr. Machrowicz. No — not to work together; to have the elections
conducted under the control of the three powers. Would that not have
given some assurance of free elections ?
Mr. Harriman. I would have to refresh my memory as to the lan-
guage of the agreement. But, as I recall it, it was clearly under-
stood the three ])owers would work together to see that free elections
were held.
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, "working together" is a rather loose
statement, which has no meaning unless we specify in just what way
we work together.
Mr. Harriman. If we specified them, they would have still broken
the agreement, because they broke the basic agreement.
I think we have to be realistic about it, that other than the use of
force on the part of the United States and the western allies, there
would have been no way to have gotten the Soviet Government to agree
to carry out their agreements.
Mr. Machrowicz. What advantage did the United States get in the
agreement at Yalta ?
Mr. Harriman. The protection of the Poles in terms of holding free
elections. If there had been no negotiations at all, there would have
been no chance of free elections and the occupation by the Red army
would have been, M'ithout a doubt, peri)etuated, and, of course, that
is what finally hajipened. But President Roosevelt made every effort
to get an agreement with Stalin, which he got, and the fact that Stalin
broke those agreements, not only with relation to Poland, but other
agreements, was the first notice to the civilized world of the duplicity
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2119
and the aggressive intentions of the Soviet I"'^nion. I think we are
better oJff to have made the agreements, than if we had not made the
attempt. I think if President Roosevelt had not made the attempt,
he would have been subjected to great criticism.
Mr. JMaciirowicz. That protection was more or less based on the
bare word of Stalin ; is that right?
Mr. Hareiman. There is no other physical protection which we
could have had, unless we had maintained our forces in Europe and
induced our allies to remain mobilized.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Mr. Harriman. It is a curious thing — they did hold a free election
in Hungary. That was either in September or the first of October in
1945. You probably recall that the Communists got a small per-
centage of the vote and a non-Communist goveriunent was established,
the leading party being what was known as the Freeholders Party,
which was a small Peasants' Party.
, Mr. Sheehax. ]May I say, Mr. Secretary, at that point, that there
are some of us on the committee that would not agree with the reason-
ing that it was in 1945 that you first knew about the duplicity of the
Russian Government,
Mr. Harriman. No, I said the free world.
Mr. Sheehak. Because in our State Department, ever since 1943,
you will recall the evidence of Katyn, reports from various Ambas-
sadors, and then since 1933, when we first recognized Russia, there
were many violations of our agreements with her.
Mr, Harriman. I have been on record, as is generally known, that
it was my judgment we would have grave difficulties with the Soviet
Union; that it was a new force in the world which might be as dif-
ficult to deal with as the Nazi force. That is recorded in Mr. For-
restal's diary, and many people know that is the view I ex})ressed
when I came back from Russia in the spring of 1945.
Mr. Sheeiian. Do you think the Polish Government, as it exists
today, as it does apparently, as I gather from you — which is in viola-
tion of the Yalta agreement — is a good thing ?
Mr. Harriman. The present Government of Poland ?
Mr. SiiEEHAN. They broke their agreement at Yalta in setting up a
government, because there was no free election. Is that right or
wrong ?
Mr. Harriman. This present Government is not representative of
the people. It is a puppet government of the Soviet Union,
Mr. Sheeiian. And it is not representative of the agreement en-
tered into at Yalta for the forming of such a government (
Mr. Harriman. That is correct ; it is not.
Mr, Sheehan. Then would you care to pass an opinion, in light of
the fact that it is an illegal government, as to our Government's recog-
nizing the Polish Government today ^
Mr. Harriman. That is a question as to whether we are better off to
break all relations with the iron-curtain countries, or not. My own
judgment is that it is better to maintain relationship and to strengthen
the free world and to expect the da}- to come when Poland again can
be free. I do not think that it will contribute to the welfare of the
Polisli people for us to break relations with the Polish Government,
even though it is a go\ ernment which was established in violation of
the Yalta agreement.
2120 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. I Avas going to say that at the time we were sort of
giving sanction to a moral wrong..
Mr. Harriman. That is true of the other governments in Eastern
Europe.
Mr. Sheehan. After all, as Members of Congress, we are naturally
interested in our foreign policy and what we are going to do in the
future, and we ask questions of experienced people like yourself, who
might help or guide us. As I understand it, you were one of the few
men, fortunately or unfortunately, who were at the three main con-
ferences, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. In the light of your experi-
ence in all of the negotiations with Russia and the agreements she has
not kept, especially the political agreements, in your judgment should
we keep on making agreements with somebody who does not want to
perform ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not think any agreements with the Soviet
Union are of any value, unless they are based on a position of strength,
so that they can be forced to carry them out. '
Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, any agreements we make should be where
we have the strength to enforce them ?
Mr. Harriman. I think we want to get to the day as rapidly as we
can when the free world is so strong that we can compel the Soviet
Union to live up to its obligations.
Mr. Sheehan. In the conference that the Katyn committee had
with President Truman, w^ith reference to getting his cooperation,
President Truman stated to our committee when we were talking about
Russian agreements — and I think he specifically named the date — he
said that on January 6, 1946, was the date he realized that there would
be no more use or no more hope of making agreements with Russia.
Would you care to comment on that in any particular way?
Mr. Harriman. No ; I cannot comment on that. I think you will
have to ask him exactly what he meant by that. But I do know that
when I saw him in April of 1945, he had a clear understanding of the
difficulties we were going to have with the Soviet Union, and he pressed
Mr. Molotov very hard, in the first talk we had with Mr. Molotov
when he came here in 1945, April of 1945, to fulfill the obligations of
the Soviet Union toward Poland.
At the same time, we have got to continue at various places where
we have contact in the United Nations and elsewhere, to attempt to
get the Soviet Union to agree to proper behavior and to deal with the
problems which are currently up, including, of course, the Korean
situation.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Harriman, did. you invite Mikolajczyk to
come to Moscow to the conference?
Mr. Harriman. In June 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember that under the Yalta agree-
ment tliis was to be called a provisional government?
Mr. Harriman. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. But at the time of your conference with Mr.
Kerr and yourself, the Russians insisted that the word "provisional"
be left out; am I right?
Mr. Harihman. I think that is true. I would have to refresh my
memory.
Mr. Machrowicz. And the British objected to it; did they not?
Mr. Harriman. I don't recall that.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2121
Mr, Machrowicz. For your information, in one of your messages
in the Department of State you reported that tlie British objected to
it, but you finally agreed after Beirut and the Poles said they would
be satisfied to have the word "Provisional" left out, and they very
much resented the British objection to that. Does that refresh your
recollection ?
Mr, HARRiMAisr. That is 7 years ago. I would have to review it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you get the impression that the Poles were
satisfied with the arrangements made by you and Mr. Clark Kerr with
regard to the formation
Mr. Harriman. I looked upon it as a last attempt to develop the
situation within Poland which would lead to the freedom of Poland.
None of us was very optimistic about its outcome, but it was the final
attempt to obtain freedom for the Poles. That undoubtedly it is.
Mr. Machrowicz, Do you feel the United States has really shown
a continued interest in insuring a free election ?
Mr. Harriman. Well, they have done everything they could. As I
understand it, the State Department has consistently done everything
it could to insist on the holding of the elections; and, short of military
action, there is nothing further tliat I know of that we could have done.
Mr. Machrowicz. Unfortunately, because of the agreement at
Yalta, we had no guaranties, and all we could do was plead with
Stalin ; is that not right ?
Mr. Harriman. It was not a question of the agreements at Yalta;
it was the situation of the occupation of Poland by the Red Army,
which gave them the power to do it, and nothing could dislodge them
other than the use of force.
Mr. Machrowicz. After Yalta, there was nothing we could do but
count on Stalin's word ; is that correct ?
Mr. Harriman. There was nothing we could do but hope that
Stalin would keep his word, and the opinion of the free world, which
he has, of course, completely •
Mr, Machrowicz. Knowing Soviet Russia as we do today, on the
basis of facts which occurred subsequent to the Yalta agreement, do
you feel that, had you known all those facts, you still would have
recommended the agreement at Yalta?
Mr. Harriman. I think this : tliat, whether there had been an agree-
ment at Yalta or whether there had not been, events in Poland would
have gone forward just as they did, except that the Polish people
would have suffered more. There would have been no basis for bring-
ing UNNRA goods in and helping tiie individual Poles in the distress
which they have had.
I see no loss by the Yalta agreement, or any of the agreements that
were made. It proved beyond contradiction to all of the nations of
the free world, including the people of the United States, the duplic-
ity and aggressive intents of the Soviet Union, and the fact they broke
these agreements hg^s been one of the reasons why the free world
has become more and more united.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not believe that a firmer position by the
United States at that time, rather than a position of appeasement, as
undoubtedly took place at Yalta, would have increased the respect for
the United States today in free Europe ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not accept the word "appeasement" ; I acxiept
the earnest attempt on the part of President Roosevelt to obtain an
2122 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE
agreement by Stalin to liold free elections, and he succeeded in obtain-
ing it. Anything else short of force would have had no other avail.
We had no troops in that area. Any further language would have
been broken, just as the language which was written was broken.
Mr. Maciirowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. Ambassador, you said that we agreed to all these
things with Russia because we wanted certain military commitments
from Russia. You admit that they violated the political commit-
ments, and you say they kept the military commitments.
Mr. PIarriman. That is right.
Mr. OTvonski. What military commitments or agreements did
Russia keep with us?
Mr. Harriman. The principal one was the one that I told you.
Mr. O'Konski. At the time of the Normandy invasion ?
Mr. Harriman. Which was the attack on the eastern front 2 weeks
after we landed in Normand3^
Mr. O'Konski. As I understand, the Normandy invasion was
June 6, 1944. The Yalta Conference was in February 1945, when
Hitler was already kaput. He was finished when you were in Yalta.
Mr. Harriman. Yes.
But someone made a statement that Stalin had kept none of his
agreements. I was explaining he had kept military agreements, and
there were other agreements that we made which he kept.
Mr. O'Konski. Like what ?
Mr. Harriman. Such as the establishment of bases at Poltava and
otherwise. And a number of other military agreements that were
made he kept.
Mr, O'Konski. Do you include in that his entering the Japanese
War?
Mr. Harriman. His entry in the Japanese War was one that took
place when it was quite obvious that Japan was about to surrender.
Mr. O'Konski. He had 750,000 Japanese prisoners at stake and
Manchuria, but he certainly did not enter into that war to keep an
agreement with us ; did he ?
Mr. Harriman. No. As I have said a number of times, I was al-
ways convinced that the Soviet Union would enter the war against
Japan in their own due time. But the objective of our Government,
on the strong recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, was to get
agreement from the Soviet Union to come into the war when it would
help us and avoid the necessity of what was thought to be probable,
of landing forces on the plains of Tokyo, which would have been a
very costly operation in terms of American lives. And there was a
constant desire on the part of our Chiefs of Stafl' to bring the Russians
into the war against Japan shortly after the defeat of Germany.
Mr. O'Konski. In September 'l 944, when 250,000 Poles of the Pol-
ish underground were slaughtered in Warsaw and Joe Stalin had his
army perched for 90 days waiting while the}' were slaughtered, and
would not move an inch forward, he kept his military agreement with
us pretty well then, too ; did he not ?
INfr. IIahrimax. That Warsaw ui)rising was one of the Aery great
tra<redies.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2123
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That was at the height of the Normandy invasion.
That is when we needed him most. And he sat on liis hands. So, he
certainly did not keep his military agreement.
Mr. Harrimax. He did not move until early in 1945. Whether,
militarily, he could have crossed the Vistula or not, I do not know.
ISIr. O'KoNSKi. Do you still think, Ambassador, that Russia would
ever make any military maneuver that would benefit the United States
of America, or that she would make a military maneuver only if it
benefited Joe Stalin ?
Mr. Harri3iax. Of all the men I have ever known, Mr. Stalin is the
most hard-boiled individual and always considers everything from
his own standpoint.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. I have just a few more questions here.
The thing that I am driving at here is : As I view this whole set-up,
Ambassador, there is no question in my mind that you boys were ready
to give Stalin anything he asked for. The thing that I am most glad
about is that Stalin did not know that. If he had known how ready
you boys were to give up and give in, he could have asked not only for
free elections in Poland but he could have forced us to sign an agree-
ment that we would have free elections in the United States of Amer-
ica, the Avay he wanted it. That is how anxious we were to go along
Avith him.
Mr. Harrimax. Wait a minute, I must have exception to that.
President Roosevelt was trying to get Stalin's agreement about the
treatment of the countries which would be occupied or were occupied
by the Red army, where we would be unable to exercise any influence
or force. And there were no concessions made at Yalta. The conces-
sions— if you want to call them such — were basically made by Stalin.
The great tragedy of Yalta was that Stalin did not keep his agree-
ments. Eastern Europe would be free today if he had kept those
agreements.
In other words, what I am trying to tell you is that the situation was
one where Stalin dominated eastern Europe. That was not the situ-
ation which we created. That was the situation which was created by
the war.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Here was a Polish general, Sikorski. He was look-
ing for somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 Polish officers. All
of a sudden they find the graves of these officers, and it is announced
to the world, unfortunately, by the Germans.
Is it not only humane and natural on General Sikorski's part that
he, as a general of a gi-eat country, first had the courage to resist Nazi
aggression by force and, being least prepared, that it should only be
natural for him to say "why don't we get an international body like
the Red Cross to come over here and investigate what happened to
our officers?"
But then that gives the Russians the reason for severing diplomatic
relations with them. And then our President writes a letter of
apology to Joe Stalin that he acted rather without reason; that "It
is too bad that he acted in that way, but won't you please, Mr. Stalin,
at least talk to Sikorski once in a while V
Can you imagine anything so ridiculous as that inquiry and going
to the point where our President actually apologizes because he asks
2124 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
for that investigation? Would you not say that was downright
appeasement ?
Mr. Harriman. I will tell you what General Sikorski himself told
me : That he was ill at the time; that if he had not been ill he would
not have made that particular proposal. He certainly would have
followed up with the Kussians the question of investigation of this
case. But all I can tell you is that was his view.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. As to these reports that you sent in, Ambassador,
you daughter Kathleen's and Melby's, were those sent in at your own
initiative ?
Mv. Harriman. My own initiative.
Chairman Madden. Might I interrupt here a moment ?
Mr. Harriman, I w^ill hand you what we will mark for identification
"Exhibit 24," which is a telegram from Moscow, dated January 25.
1944, to the Secretary of State in Washington, signed "Harriman,"
and I will ask you if you can identify the same ?
Mr. Harriman. Yes.
Chairman Madden. That will be received for the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 24" for identifica-
tion and is as follows:)
Exhibit 24 — Telegbam Feom United States Embassy, Moscow, January 25, 1944
[Telegram]
Moscow, January 25, 19^4-
Seceetary of State,
Washinffton.
(For President and Secretary — strictly confidential.)
Member of Embassy staff and my daughter have returned from trip Smolensk
witli British and American correspondents. While there they were shown evi-
dence being collected by special commission to investigate German shooting of
captured Polish officers in Katyn Forest close to Smolensk.
None of party was able to judge scientific evidence of autopsies which were
performed in their presence. Moreover, they were not permitted to make inde-
pendent investigations except for formal questioning of few witnesses made
available. Correspondents filed reports telling what they saw without express-
ing opinions, but for some reason censor has held up these stories. The general
evidence and testimony are inconclusive, but Kathleen and Embassy staff mem-
ber believe probability massacre perpetrated by Germans.
Appears Soviets conducting very detailed examination each body by autopsy
and by examination clothing, remaining personal effects, and papers. Evidence
which made greatest impression to strengthen Russian case was :
(One) Most soldiers exhumed to date were enlisted men rather than officers,
as Germans claimed.
(Two) IMethodical method of execution, each having been killed by one shot at
base of skull.
(Three) Dates of papers exhibited from November 1940 to June 1041.
(Four) Testimony by witnesses re unsuccessful attempt to evacuate Poles at
time of German breakthrough to Smolensk and re Poles engaged road work in
area for Russians and Germans in 1941.
Haukiman.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. These reports. Ambassador, were sent on your own
initiative; were they?
Mr. Harriman. Yes. I asked my daughter and assigned Mr. Melby
to go tliere.
Mr. O'Konski. The reason why I ask that is that it leads up to the
second question I have.
All during this time that you were the Ambassador, there were some
15,000 Polish officers murdered, and our Government here in Wash-
ington did not show enough interest to request you to find the essential
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2125
facts concerning the case; is that correct? Not once were you com-
municated with for information. They did not care what happened
to those officers ; did they ?
Mr. Hareiman. I cannot say they did not care, but it is a fact they
did not ask me to do it. I assume they did not think I had any means
of finding out how it occurred.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. If the answer is not that they did not care, the other
answer is that they were so afraid they might learn the truth about
who murdered them that again they might get afraid of that great
big thing ; that Joe Stalin might get mad at us and make a separate
peace with Hitler.
Mr. Hareiman. I don't think that would be the case at all. I never
saw any evidence of that. There was a constant effort on the part of
the United States Government to protect the interests of the Poles
insofar as it was possible to do so.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In that report, as you said, you were more or less
inclined to believe that the Germans were guilty of the crime ; were
you not ?
Mr. Harriman. You see, I did not express any personal opinion. I
sent the reports on as they were given to me, and I expressed no per-
sonal view. I sent it on for such value that it would have.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I want to say I respect your honesty in regard to
that, because being over there and being on one side of the controversy,
seeing the one side, you might be mistaken. That, in my judgment,
does not condemn you in any way.
Mr. Harriman. Or my daughter or Mr. Melby. They went and
saw it, and many of the other correspondents. It was the only evi-
dence that they had, and it was such a plausible idea that the Germans
had started this thing in order to create difficulty among the Allies
that I think it was a natural thing to draw the conclusions they did.
If you notice, I did not express any opinion. I simply sent it on
for what it was worth.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Let me ask you this further question : Your being
in there and getting their side of it and, naturally, seeing only their
demonstration and their propaganda, I can see how that kind of re-
port would be made.
Do you think differently now, from what you did then ?
Mr. Harriman. I read over the preliminary report of your com-
mittee, and it certainly appears as if the preponderant evidence shows
that the Russians did it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In your negotiations all the way down the line, and
particularly at Yalta, was there any information of any kind given
to you by briefing officers of our State Department, or G-2, or Military
Intelligence ? Was there any information given to you, for example,
to the effect that, well, to mention a few names, in Moscow the Russians
had Giorgi Dimitrov ready to go over into Bulgaria, they had Klement
Gottwald in Moscow all ready to go and take over Czechoslovakia,
they had Thorez ready to take over France, which he did not ; they had
Togliatti and Luigi Longo all ready to take over Italy, and they had
Joseph Broz, commonly known as Tito, waiting in Moscow, all ready
to go over and take over Yugoslavia; they had Anna Pauker all ready
to take over Rumania ?
83744 — 52 — pt. 7 20
2126 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
At the time of Yalta, these people were already in school and
developed. They had the traitor Bronislaw Beirut, who turned out to
be the man they set up to take over Poland.
Was not there any intelligence service of any kind that relayed
that information to you people when the Yalta Conference took place?
Mr. Harriman. We had no information of the kind you speak of.
There was no way to get it in Moscow.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. It was available, because I read it in December
1944 in a book written by Earl Browder, in a little pamphlet entitled
"Life Begins at Tehran." It was all there.
Mr. Harriman. I did not see it.
I was frankly concerned, and it was recorded in Forrestal's book
that I was concerned over the aggressive intentions of the Soviet
Union, and that I felt we should do everything we could to help
strengthen Western Europe, or else we would find Western Europe in
the hands of the Communists. That is recorded in Mr. Forrestal's
book, and it is, as I recall, what I said to many people at that time.
But, as to the details of who was being trained for what, I do not
recall having that detailed information. But I was gravely concerned
at that time that they would attempt, through subversion, to take over
the countries of Western Europe, and that, with the bad economic
conditions, it was important for us to assist the western European
countries as much as possible to reestablish their economic life.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. To show you what difficulties you encountered to
get that kind of briefing and that type of information which I feel
you should have had, would you be interested in knowing that in G-2
that type of information was being developed, and just as soon as it
was developed along those lines that the Communists had designs and
plans along all those countries the men who wrote that report were
called in by the head of G-2 and they were told that they were too
anti-Soviet and they had better start writing different articles if they
wanted to keep their jobs ?
Mr. Harriman. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever because my
statements to my Government and also some background information
which I gave to the press were in the opposite direction : that we must
be on our guard and help the western countries against Communist
subversion in those countries.
That was based on my general knowledge of the situation, and I do
not recall knowing of the individuals in different places, although
we did have knowledge, of course, of some of the Communists in
France and in Italy who already were working.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I agree with you on this point to a degree. Ambassa-
dor. Strength alone does not mean anything. When were we
stronger than in 1945, when you men were at Yalta? We had the
greatest Army in the Avorld ; we had the greatest Air Force in the
world; we had the greatest Navy in the world. We were sitting on
top of the world. We had more than the rest of the world put to-
gether, ready to go, while you men were at Yalta. Yet Stalin almost
got the shirts and i)ants off our men at Yalta. It shows that strength
does not moan mnch at all. There must be truth, courage, and honor.
Mr. Harriman. We must remember that Yalta was just after the
conclusion of the Battle of the Bulge. General MacArthur entered
Manila, I think, in one of the early days of the conference. The
bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were still to come, and no
THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 2127
one knew how long it would take to win the war against Japan. Esti-
mates were made as high as 18 months after the defeat of Germany.
We were still right in the midst of the battle to win tlie war in Europe,
and there was ahead very difficult fighting, in the view of our military,
as far as Japan was concerned.
Those are the realities of the atmosphere of Yalta. It is hard to
I'ecapture those thoughts because so quickly did Germany collapse and
so quickly did Japan collapse thereafter. But those were the views of
the military advisers which President Roosevelt had at that time;
and, therefore, the military cooperation of the Soviet Union was one
of prime importance to conclude the war in both sides of the world
with the minimum loss of American life.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Do you go along with the impression that I have:
that this Katyn massacre is in the position that it is today because
of our policy of not trying to create ill will toward Soviet Russia, and
that is wh}' it was hidden from the people of the world and the people
of America I
Mr. Harri3iax. Of course, I was in Moscow during that time. All
the information about it was in the press. I have no knowledge of
where our Government hid it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Machrowicz ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Harriman, at the time you sent that messuge
to Washington relating the findings of Miss Harriman and Mr. Melby,
did you make any inquiry as to the findings of the 9 or 10 American
corresj^ondents who went with Mr. Melby and Miss Harriman ?
Mr. Harrimax. I suppose I talked to them. That is 9 years ago.
I do not remember the detailed talks, but I rather recall that most of
them had about the same attitude as the reports of my daughter and
Mr. Melby.
Mr, INIachrowicz. For your information, I might state that Mr. Cas-
sidy testified before this committee and saicl that, outside of Mr. Melby
and Miss Harriman, they all had the conviction that the Russians were
guilty. That is a part of the condition. I was wondering how that
portion of findings was not included in your report to Washington.
Mr. Harrimax. I do not recall. It is up to the committee to ask
each one of them. But I know they all felt the same way : that there
was iio conclusive evidence.
Mr. Machrow^icz. Mr. Cassidy testified it was quite obviously a
staged proposition and they all had the impression that the Russians
were the guilty party. And it rather occurs to me that it is rather
unusual taat that was not included in your report.
Mr. Harriman. I do not recall the conversations, and I do not want
to Cjuote anybody because I do not recall talking to them. But I have
a general recollection that all of them felt that it was staged, includ-
ing my daughter and Mr. Melby, but that — a number of them, I think,
if I remember correctly — on balance it was probably a German atrocity,
Mr. Machrowicz. Why was not that contained in your report to
Washington I
Mr. Harrimax. I do not recall why it was not. I do not know
that. Because correspondents were interested in filing a story of what
they liad seen; which they did. That was their objective. I did not
know that I had aijy right to avsk them what their opinions were.
2128 THE IL\TYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, IMachrowicz. I would like to complete tlie record regarding
the matter I brought up previously.
I asked you whether or not you had any recollection of the fact
that the British objected to omitting the word "provisional" from the
title of tlie Government set-up in June 1945 in Poland, as provided in
the Yalta agreement. I said that at that time you consented to hav-
ing the word "provisional" stricken out and that the Poles — I am
speaking of the Moscow Poles now, of course — concurred with you.
I now have your message of June 23, 1945, in which you yourself
state that Clark Kerr received his instructions from the British Gov-
ernment to object to the word "provisional."
Subsequently you consented to having the word "provisional"
stricken from the record. I would like to show you this message of
June 23, and ask if that will refresh your memory as to that portion
of the discussions.
I might state that we have just received this instrument today. It
has not been paraphrased yet; so I do not want to put it into the
record at this time.
(Note. — The documents referred to have been paraphrased and
appear in the appendix of this record.)
Mr. Harriman. I want to point out that they were supported by
Mikolajczyk and other Poles to provide for the elimination of the
word "provisional."
Mr. Machrgwicz. I concur with you that Mr. Beirut and Mr.
Mikolajczyk agreed to that.
Of course, Beirut was Stalin's representative ; was he not ?
Mr. Harriman. Yes. Certainly.
Paraphrasing it, it says :
This subject came up in discussion between Mr. Vishinsky and myself that
afternoon, and Vishinsky agreed that the word should be retained. In spite of
that agreement, Molotov supported Beirut. Clark Kerr supported my position.
I was arguing.
Then I said "It would be impossible for me to get any answer for
at least 48 hours, I asked Beirut to accept the title as laid down by the
decisions in Crimea."
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course he said "No."?
Mr. Harriman. No ; he agreed. But he had a further proposal, that
the new government, after it had been organized, should take the
matter up with the three governments for elimination of this word
"proposal," To this Molotov agreed.
Then I also explained that the decisions in Crimea Avould not have
been carried out until free elections had been held to establish a per-
manent government.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. But the word "Provisional" was
to be left out of the title of the government ; was it not?
Mr. Harriman. I indicated that I was not holding out any hope
that my Government would favor the elimination of the word.
It is a very long telegram. I showed that I was strongly against
any changes from the Yalta agreement, which was insisting on pledges
from the new Polish Government in regard to holding free elections
and the other details in regard to setting up the government, and
that our Ambassador should go to Moscow or Warsaw just as quickly
as possible to see things carried out.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2129
Mr. Machrowicz. The word "Provisional" was to be stricken out
of the title of the government; am I right?
Mr. Harriman. No, I objected to it. You can see that there.
Mr. Machrowicz. You objected to it originally, but you finally
did agree to it ; did you not ?
Mr. Harrimax. I don't think I did. I read that rather quickly.
I said I could not give an answer to it under 48 hours, or something
like that.
Mr. Machrowicz. We will have that put in the record subsequently.
Mr. Harriman. When you get that paraphrased, you can put it in
the record.
It sounded to me when I read it as if I was firmer than the British
Ambassador.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Harriman, I have a couple of questions I would
like to put to you.
Mr. Harriman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. With reference to the Yalta agreement, will you
agree that we had a moral responsibility to see that there were free
elections in Poland?
Mr. Harriman. I certainly do,
Mr. Sheehan. Did we attempt to send any observers, or anybody,
to make sure they had free elections ?
Mr. Harriman. We sent our Ambassador there as he had already
been appointed, as I recall it, and he was awaiting arrival there. It
took him some time to get there. I was rather disturbed over the delay
of his getting there.
Mr. Sheehan. Did he get there before or after the elections ?
Mr. Harriman. He got there long before the elections. I think
he got there early in August. I was anxious for him to arrive early
in July.
Mr. Sheehan. The second thought I would like to present to you
is this : We, in the committee here, after having seen the disappearance
of all these different types of documents, after having seen the hiding
of documents, have been informed by members of G-2, the Army
intelligence, that there was a pro-Russian core in the Army intelli-
gence in which they contributed to the disappearance of a lot of
documents.
Do you think, in the light of all these various things, that there
existed in our Government either Communist forces or Communist
sympathizers who had something to do to overemphasize this fear of
Russia that was being built up in our country ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not think there were any Communist sympa-
thizers. I have no knowledge of what went on in G-2.
I had, of course, constant relationships during the war with Gen-
eral Marshall and Admiral King when I came home, and also, of
course, in the early days when I was in London in the various con-
ferences; but I saw no evidence of any Communist infiltration into
the Army, or any place in our Government.
Mr. Sheehan. During the war you saw no such evidence?
Mr. Harriman. I saw none ; no.
Mr. Sheehan. You admit there has been some?
2130 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Harkimax. The Alger Hiss case stands on its own evidence and
conviction.
Mr. Sheehan. Did President Roosevelt at any time give any specific
instructions to yon while you were in Moscow, before you went there,
or at any time at all, about playing down the Russian aims?
Mr. Harrimax. None whatsoever. My basic mission there was to
help keep Russia an effective ally fighting for us in the defeat of
Germany and early entry to help in the defeat of Japan.
But President Roosevelt wanted to begin very earl}- in trying to
develop with the Russians a basis on which peace might be maintained.
And, of course, it was for those reasons, with which you are familiar,
the various undertakings, that various people induced the Russians to
sign connnitments which they later violated.
Although I was involved in the mission that had to do with helping
to supply the Russians as early as September 1941, I went to Russia
as President Roosevelt's representative when Mr. Churchill talked
with Stalin on tlie strategic side of the war.
My first discussions about the future relations with the Soviet Union
were at the Moscow Conference, where, if you will recall, there was a
Moscow Declaration which reaffirmed the agreement on the part of the
Soviet Union to cooperate in all of the high principles which later
became adopted in the Charter of the United Nations.
But consistently through the war, by diplomacy, w^e were able to
get commitments from Stalin on their behavior after the war, and those
in the political field they have consistently refused to honor,
Mr. Sheehax. Who set our basic foreign policv during the war ^
Was that Mr. Roosevelt?
jNIr. Harrimax. Mr. Roosevelt did, in consultation with Mr. Hull.
And, of course, as far as the military operations were concerned, he
was in constant contact with the military advisers, Mr. Stimson, Mr.
Knox, and, of course, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Leahy, who was
his own personal chief of staff.
Mr. Sheehax. Who was the final authority ?
Mr. Harrimax. Mr. Roosevelt.
Mr. Hopkins - is in tlie White House as Assistant to the President
and was involved.
Mr. Sheehax. How do you mean "involved'"? Was he setting
policies, too?
Mr. Harrimax. No, sir. He was an adviser to the President in see-
ing that the President's policies were carried out. He was Chairman
of the Munitions Assigmnents Board. He was veiy active in the
su])ply question.
Mr. MrrcHELL. I would like to ask you one question there.
Mr. Harrimax. May I say Mr. Hopkins played a very effective role
in getting action for prosecution of the war.
Mr. MiTCHEix. As you know, Mr. Harriman, one of the obligations
of this connnittee is to search for the missing Van Vliet rejwrt. That
report was made to Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell on May 22, 1915, deliv-
ered to him personally, personally labeled by him "Toj) secret." At
the same time, you had gone to the President and asked him to send
Harry Hopkins to Moscow specifically in connection with the IG
leaders wlio were (lien in jirisoii, wliicli was adiiiittt>d by Molotov.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2131
Now, what AAOuld the reaction have been at the United Nations and
throughont the world if the Van Vliet report, o-iven by an American
Army officer, who was nentral and impartial, who had visited the
graves in 194o and who stated in that report that the Soviets had com-
mitted this atrocity; what would the result have been at that time, as
far as the IG leaders are concerned and as far as the United Nations is
concerned ? That is asked for an opinion answer, sir.
Mr. Hakriman. That is a rather difficult question to answer as to
just what effect it would have. The actions of the Soviets in so many
directions are cruel and ruthless, and this would have shocked every-
one, no doubt. I cannot put myself back exactly to what the reaction
would have been. There w'ere a series of misdeeds by the Russians.
from our standpoint, beginning w4th the Ribbentrop treaty, that it
would have contributed, I think, to further distrust of the Soviets.
My own views are well knowm. I was full of distrust of the Soviets
at that time.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I have one short question.
In your telegram of January 25 of 1944, which is already in the
record as exhibit 24, you stated that correspondents filed reports tell-
ing wdiat they saw, without expressing opinions, but that, for some
reason, the censor held up the stories. Now, subsequent to this tele-
gram, did you ever find out why these stories were held up by the
censor ?
Mr. Harriman. I do not recall. They were let out, as I recall it,
in a couple of days. They were often held up. I do not recall why
they held it up.
Mr. PuciNsKT. I can tell you Mr. Cassidy testified before this com-
mittee and said these stories were held up because on the way back
from Katyn these American correspondents pointed out this situation
to the Soviets. The Soviets had claimed that these men, these officers,
had been nuirdered in September 1941. These correspondents asked
the Soviet officers on the train if these men were murdered in Septem-
ber of 1941, why had most of them been buried with overcoats on
when the temperatures in that area, at that time, range somewhere
between 65 and 75 degrees. The Soviets were stunned with that ques-
tion. They did not know" just exactly wdiat to answer and it took
them several days to figure out an answer. Their answ^er was that
they moved up the execution period from September to December 1,
1941.
Had you ever heard that in Moscow ?
Mr. Harriman. I may have known it. I do not recall it. That
was 9 years ago.
Mr. PucixsKi. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Harriman, we are very thankful to you for your testimony here
today.
Mr. Harriman. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before
you and the courtesy of you and all the other gentlemen of the com-
mittee.
Chairman Madden. Thank you.
Mrs. Mortimer, will you come up, please ?
2132 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
TESTIMONY OF KATHLEEN HAERIMAN MORTIMER,
NEW YORK, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn,
please ?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I do.
Chairman Madden. Please state your full name.
Mrs. Mortimer. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mrs. Mortimer. 149 East Seventy-third Street, New York City.
Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Mortimer, I believe you have a copy of your
report there on this subject ; have you not ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to put in the record
exhibit 25.
Chairman Madden. I now present to you a document entitled "En-
closure No. 2 to Dispatch No. 207," dated February 23, 1944, from
American Embassy, Moscow.
We will mark this "Exhibit 25."
Mr. Mitchell. I would like the record to show also that the enclo-
sure No. 1 attached thereto is Mr. John Melby's report.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 25" for identifica-
1 ion and is as follows. Enclosure No. 2 is Mrs. Mortimer's report and
enclosure No. 1 is Mr. Melby's report:)
ExHimT 25 — Ambassador Harkiman's Covering Letter Forwarding Reports on
Their Visits to Katyn by Mb. Harkiman's Daughter and an Embassy
Attache in January 1944
(The two reports also constitute part of this exhibit)
Embassy of the United States of America,
Moscow, February 23, lO-ii.
No. 207
Subject : Investigation by Soviet Authorities of the Massacre of Polish Soldiers
in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk.
Secret
The Honorable the Secretary of State,
Washirifjton, D. C,
Sir : I have the honor to refer to luy secret telegram No. 247 of January 25,
7 p. in., concerning the activities of the Special Commission to Establish and
Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders
of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Woods. On January 21-23, 11)44, the
foreign correspondents in Moscow made a trip to Smolensk to witness the pro-
ceedings of the Commission : The correspondents were accompanied by my daugh-
ter, Kathleen, and Mr. John F. Melby, Third Secretary of the Embassy. I am
enclosing copies of their memoranda containing their observations on this trip.
I am also enclosing a copy of the January 29, 1944, Moscow News which contains
an abridged version of the formal report of the Commission.
Respectfully yours,
William An-erell Harriman.
File No. 711.6.
Enclosures : 1-2-3-/ as stated.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2133
Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn
IN January- 1944
[Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy,
Moscow]
On January 23, 1944 members of the foreign press were taken to Smolensk to
get first hand the evidence compiled by the Commission on the Katyn incident.
The party was shown the graves in the Katyn Rorest and witnessed post
mortems of the corpses. As no member was in a position to evaluate the scientific
evidence given, it had to be accepted at its .face value.
The testimonial evidence provided by the Commission and witnesses was
minute in detail and by American standards petty. We were expected to accept
the statements of the high ranking Soviet officials as true, because they said it
was true.
Despite this it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans.
The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manner in which
the job was done, something the Commission thought not sufficiently important
to stress. They were more interested in the medical evidence as conclusive
proof and the minute circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime.
Following is a description of what we saw and most particularly the manner
in which the story was presented.
1. Inspection of Katyn Forest graves
The Katyn Forest turned out to be small unspectacular little wood, sparsely
filled with young trees, the bigger ones having been apparently chopped down
by the Germans. The soil was orange and very sandy.
To date the Commission has found seven graves in all — six in the general area
called Goat Hill, about the size of an acre, and one more several hundred yards
away. They are still looking for more graves and expect to find from twelve to
fifteen thousand bodies in all.
The senior member of the Medical Committee, Burdenko, took us around each
and every grave— asked that we scrutinize each detail. He willing answered
every question put to him of medical bearing and was most helpful.
On the basis of a meticulous post mortem of seven hundred corpses we were
given the following information.
1. The corpses were Poles — the majority enlisted men with no rank badges,
but some officers. Where, as the privates ranged from twenty-five to thirty, the
officers were considerably older — forty-five to fifty years.
2. The majority of the corpses were dressed in topcoats, had long underwear.
Those wearing just tunics had sweaters.
3. The pockets of the uniforms had been ripped and their documents taken
out — except for a few that apparently had been missed.
4. On the basis of a thorough autopsy, the doctor stated that the bodies had
been in the ground about two years — certainly not four. We were told that
although sandy .soil in a dry climate tends to mummify bodies, the soil in Katyn
is damp hence had no preservative qualities.
5. Two graves had the bodies laid out meticulously in rows three deep, the top
row being about three meters from the surface. Each one of these corpses had
a metal tag — (put on by the Germans when they themselves dug up the bodies
in the spring of 1943). The other graves had either six or eight layers of bodies
thrown in helter-skelter — the pockets of these soldiers had been ripped.
6. Each corpse bore the markings of a single wound made either by a 7.65
mm. bullet or a 9.00 mm. bullet that entered the head at the base of the
skull and came out at the top of the forehead. We saw enough skulls to see
that the wounds were all identical, except that a very few had received two
bullet wounds instead of just one. To date no body wounds have been found.
In fact the corpses were all proclaimed to be in "good physical condition". The
minority of the corpses had their hands tied. We were told that the bullets
had been fired at close range from an "automatic weapon".
7. Evidence that the bodies were little more than two years old was on the
basis of the following information. Some skulls still had hair, at any rate
epidermis ; the internal organs, though considerably flattened and shrunken, were
only partly decayed ; the liver and spleen green. There was still firm colored meat
on the thighs.
2134 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The autopsies were conducted in heated tents by teams each headed by a
qualified doctor witli several assistants, including a secretary wlio took page long
notes on each case.
Two. Evidence given by Atrocity Commission
We had two meetings with the members of the "Si>ecial Commission to Estab-
lish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist
Invaders of Captive Polish Offic^ers in the Katyn Wood," The first, during the
afternoon, lasted three hours. We were read prepared statements and allowed to
ask questions. Besides a detailed stor.y of the sequence of events, we were told
the substance of data collected from witnesses, much of which was repeated ver-
batim by the witnesses later on tliat niglit. Alexey Tolstoy, a member of the
Commission, was of greatest assistance. Some questions we asked required
informaticm not on hand. He had it for us by night. In the main during this
session our questions were answered willingly.
Our second meeting was conducted in the same room. This time there were
Klieg lights and movies and photos were taken throughout the proceedings. The
Committee sat along a long table covered by red baize at one end of the room,
the press were strung along a similar table down one side. Witnesses .sat
directly opposite the Committee and were brought in one at a time. Aside from
the photograi>her and one stenographer, there was no one else present.
At first the Committee refused to interrupt the testimonies for translation, but
when the members of the press objected they agreed with some lack of grace.
During tlie testimony the committee chatted and whispered between themselves
and most didn't appear to listen. We were told we could question any witness,
through the Committee, but the questions appeared to annoy them though not
apparently due to their substance. Only one question was called irrelevant
and not answered — the present job of one of the witnesses. Tolstoy later gave
it to us.
The witnesses themselves were very well rehearsd, and they appeared subdued
rather than nervous, their pieces having been learned by heart. Only the girl had
an air of self-assurance.
When the last witness had been heard general questions were asked, some of
import to the Katyn Incident, others not. Shortly, however, the representatives
of the Foreign Office Press Department got up and said we'd better break up as
our train was due to leave shortly. I got the distinct impression that the Com-
mittee was relieved. They had been told to put on a show for us — the show
was over — and they did not want to be bothered any further. The meeting
broke up without any informal chatting.
3. Members of Commission
(1) N. N. Burdenko, Member of U. S. S. R. Academy of Sciences.
(2) Alexei Tolstoy.
(3) Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, Galovski and the Ukraine Republic.
(4) Lieutenant General A. S. Gunderov, Chairman of the Pan-Slav Commission.
(5) S. A. Kolesnikov, Chairman of U. S. S. R. Red Cross and Red Crescent.
(6) V. P. Potemkin, Commissar of Education of the R. S. F. S. R.
(7) Colonel General E. I. Smirnov, Chief of Central Medical Service Admin-
istration of the Red Army.
(8) R. E. Melnikov, Chairman of Smolensk Regional Executive Committee.
The above-mentioned arrived at Smolensk "a few days" after the Germans
evacuated Smolensk on September 2.j, 1043, to look into various German atrocities
committed in the Smolensk region. The Committee did not start to investigate
the Katyn graves until January IG, 11)44. The reason given was that they had
other atrocities to investigate first. We were given no inforiiiation about these
other atrocities, exc-ept the statement that L'i.l.OOO Russians and Jews had been
killed in the Smolensk ar(>a. Presiunably it is significant that Russians didn't
think the Katyn gi-aves were worth bothering about until after Polish-Soviet
i-elatioiis again became a big issue.
On .January 10 the Connnission's scientific experts opened up the Katyn graves,
exhumed bodies and sttirted meticulous postmortems on each body. Simultane-
ously, other members of the Commission (piestioned witnesses of the crime and
compiled the evidence of the witnesses, and documented all papers found on
corpses.
As a result of the work and exhumation of 700 bodies out of an estimated total
of 12.00(1 the Commission reach ihe following conclusions:
1. Between August and September 1"J41 the Germans killed Polish prisoners
of war on Goat Hill (one area of the Katyn Forest) ;
THE K.\TYX FOREST MASSACRE 2135
2. Later in the Spring of 1!>4.>. feeling their position unstable, the Germans
hastily covered up evidence of their crime ;
;-). For this purpose the Germans :
(a ) Re-opened gi-aves on Goat Hill.
(&) Tortured witnesses into giving evidence that the Russians murdered
the Poles.
((') Dug up other bodies of Poles murdered elsewhere and brought them
to the Katyn Forest and buried them there.
If. The Commission's story
( 1 ) Position of Polish I*risoners of War Prior to German Invasion. After the
Russo-l'olish ciiuipaign 2.0S2 Polish soldiers, mostly officers, were evacuated to
Siberia. The rest were put in three camps : one thirty-five kilometers West of
Smolensk on the Moscow-Minsk highway, a second, twenty-five kilometers west
of Smolensk on the Smolensk-Vitebsk higliway, and a third, forty-five kilometers
West of Smolensk in the Krasnenskoye area. (This information was supplied
at our asking by Tolstoy.)
The Polish prisoners of war were brought to the above camps back in 1939.
They were employed by the Soviets for work on the roads and when the Russo-
German war began, the Polish prisoners remained in the West Smolensk province
and continued their work digging and building roads.
With a sudden tank thrust, the Germans suddenly broke through to Smolensk
iiu July 15-16. The question immediately arose how should the Polish prisoners
be evacuated. The Commission told us, and their testimony was later upheld
by a witness, Ivanov, the station master of Gnezdov railway (village outside
Smolensk ) that in mid-July 1941 Ivanov received a phone call from the Admin-
istrator of the I'olish prisoners of war camps asking that he provide empty
railway cars in which to evacuate the Polish prisoners. He had none, but tried
to get some from the Smolensk station. The Commission told us that railway
cars could not be provided from Smolensk because that section of the railway
running between Smolensk and Gnezdov was already under artillery fire. Fur-
thermore, the Soviet Government "liad to reconcile itself to the fact that even
the local inhabitants could not be evacuated. So, due to artillery fire along the
railway and bick of box cars, the Polish prisoners of war, along with the native
population, had to remain In this district."
After tlie arrival of the Germans, the Poles remained in their prison camps.
A number of witnesses testified (we did not hear any) that the Poles continued
to do road repair work for the Germans. AVhen autunni came, all ditches were
cleared and the nuid taken away. (Here It was made clear to us that there
wasn't any more useful work for the Poles to do. )
We were then told that although many witnesses confirmed that for a short
time the Polish prisoners remained In the Smolensk region, no witness had yet
been found who saw any Pole after September 1941.
(2) How atrocity was committed: The Katyn Forest is .situated fifteen kilo-
meters outside of Smolensk and during i>eacetlme was the favorite Sunday plck-
nicklng ground for the Smolensk population. One section of Katyn Forest is
known as Goat Hill. Here the NKVD had a datcha which they used for a rest
home. The Smolensk population were allowed to walk freely through the NKVD
property, but when the Germans arrived the whole Katyn Forest area was sur-
rounded by barbed wire : sentries were stationed at all road entrances and signs
posted saying to the effect that any trespasser would be shot at sight. The XKVD
datcha was taken over by the Germans and used as headquarters for the 537th
"Construction Battalion."
This headquarters employed three girls from the neighboring village of Borok.
All three have given evidence on what happened and we heard one of the girls
testify.
Thirty German officers and noncommissioned officers lived in the datcha.
They got up late In the morning, ate well, etc. The servants did not live In, but
were escorted to and from the main road by guards and were not allowed to
clean the bedrooms except when a guard was present.
We heard one girl testify (Anna Mlhailovna Alexeyeva) that towards the end
of August 1941 she and the other girls noted that often opened and closed cars
and trucks could be heard turning off the highway at the Goat Hill entrance.
When this happened invariably the Germans in the datcha would go out into the
woods. About ten minutes later single shots, fired at regular Intervals, would be
heard. When the shots ceased the officers, accompanied by German noncom-
missioned officers and enlisted men driving empty trucks, would return to the
2136 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
datcha. Always on these days the bath house water was heated. The men went
directly to the baths and returned to be served a "particularly tasty meal" plua
double the usual hard liquor ration. The girl said on these days the soldiers
seemed noisier than usual and talked more. Once Alexeyeva was asked to wash
off fresh blood from one of the noncommissioned ofBcers' sleeves.
We were told that "the girls guessed without difficulty that the Germans living
in the datcha were engaged in killing." The Commission asked witness
Alexeyeva how she guessed it was Poles, not Russians, who were being killed.
She answered readily that one day she was ordered to return home early even
though her work was not yet finished. She was escorted to the main Smolensk-
Vitebsk road as usual. En route to her village she noticed some German sentriea
and Polish prisoners walking along the highway. She recognized the Poles by
their characteristic cap. The group turned off at the Goat Hill entrance.
Alexeyeva hid in the bushes and waited and soon heard the familiar shots, one
after another.
Another day one girl heard noises near the datcha and looked out and saw two
Poles hovering around under guard. She was ordered back into the kitchen, but
her "feminine curiosity" got the best of her. She went back to the window and
saw the Poles were being led away into the woods. Soon after two single shots
were heard.
Alexeyeva said that walking down the side road to the highway each day she
frequently noticed German soldiers digging sand heaps. These grew as time
went on. Once she asked her sentry what was going on. The reply was, "we
are digging dugouts." The Commission was asked to ask Alexeyeva if she ever
noticed any odd smell around Goat Hill and she said "no."
During this whole period the Germans were combing the countryside for
Poles — tracking them down. We were told that numerous inhabitants have
confirmed these searches. In particular, the Metropolitan told us about the state-
ment of one Father Oblobin, priest at Kuprino, a village in the neighborhood
of Katyn Forest. Prior to the German invasion he had been priest at the village
of Katyn, but the Germans tore down his house and he moved to Kuprino. The
Metropolitan told us that Oblobin was able to give particularly valuable informa-
tion due to his contact with his parishioners. Oblobin had told him that during
August 1951 there was much talk among the parishioners about the Poles. Many
people reported seeing groups of twenty to thirty being taken into the Katyn
Forest. During 1942 Polish prisoners of war were not mentioned ; but in the
Spring of 1943 Poles again became a current subject of talk.
Aside from information obtained from the girls working in the datcha and
the peasants living nearby, the Commission told us that they had received further
evidence of the Germans' actions from the assistant burgomaster, Boris
Bazilevsky.
We heard Bazilevsky testify. Prior to the German invasion he had been a
professor of astronomy in Smolensk. He had been asked by the traitor burgo-
master, Menshagin, to serve as his assistant. He protested on grounds that he
knew nothing about civil affairs, but on being threatened with death if he re-
fused, he took the job and held it from July 1941 until October 1942, hoping
thereby "to be able to help the plight of the local population in some ways."
Once he approached Bur,L;omaster Menshagin with the request to help get
a local school teacher out of concentration camp, also to try to improve general
conditions in camps as epidemics were starting and there was fear that soon
the entire population might become infected. Menshagin reluctantly agreed. A
few days later, mid-September 1941, he informed Bazilevsky that von Schwetz,
head of the German Gestapo in Smolensk, had turned down his request on
the grounds that he, von Schwetz, had received word from Berlin demanding
that harsher treatment be given in the Smolensk concentration camps. Bazilevsky
asked Menshagin if he figured that was possible— to make things any toucher
than they already were — to which Menshagin replied "yes". Then confidentially
he whispered in Bazilevsky's ear that things were going to be made tougher
for the Russian prisoners so that they would die a natur:il death due to exposure,
disease, etc., but fhat the Polish,prisoners were going to be liquidated ♦ * *
liquidated in the most precise and literal meaning of the word * ♦ ♦ Some
days lifter this meeting in the beginning of October 1941 Menshagin told Bazilev-
sky that the directive about the Poles had been carried out, that they had been
shot in the neighborhood of Smolensk.
Bazilevsky relayed this information to his close friend, Professor Yefimov.
Yefimov, we were told, upholds Bazilevsky's story. As Menshagin left Smolensk
with the Germans his testimony was not available.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2137
Aside 'from this verbal testimony the Commission told us they hnd some
written evidence- in the form of Menshagin's personal notebook. (We were
shown a photostatic copy of the crucial pages of this notebook-.) A committee
of experts had confirmed that these notes were in Menshagin's own handwriting.
An insert dated Aug"ust 15, 1941, said "all escaped Polish prisoners of war
should be detained and turned over to the German headquarters." A few pages
further on was an annotation to remember to ask the chief of the Russian
police "if there are any rumors circulating among the population about the
shooting of the Polish prisoners of war." The Commission stressed to us the
significance of this note, that the Germans must have been worried about talk
among the villagers of the atrocity, which apparently they wanted to keep
secret.
The Commission told us that they had wanted to get information on the
motive of the crime. Here again Bazilevsky proved useful. He told us about
a "very candid" conversation between liimself and tlie Gestapo chief in which
the latter had told him that "the Poles are harmful people and inferior, there-
fore, the Polish population can serve usefully only as manure and so create
space for the widening of the Leibensraum of the Germans." The Gestapo
chief went on to tell him that no intellectual class had been left in Poland
itself.
We were later told that other reasons for the German mass killing of the
Poles was due to the tendency of Poles to go over to the Red Army.
From September 1941 on until the spring of 1943 all discussion of Polish
prisoners stopped.
The Metropolitan quoted Father Oblobin (priest of nearby village) as saying
that beginning in 1943 there was a marked nervousness amongst the Germans
and an increase in their harshness. He pointed out that this general change of
■atmosphere for the worse coincided with the end of the battle of Stalingrad.
Oblobin believed that the Germans spread rumors of the Russian m.ass killing
of Poles so as to try and strengthen their position among the local population.
In the spring of 1943 the Germans published stories in the three quisling
local papers telling of the murder of Poles at Katyn during March and April
1940, by the NKVD. The Commission told us that they had interviewed the
stenographer who had typed the articles.
Next the Germans searched out witnesses to confirm their story. We saw three
men who had been questioned and beaten by the Gestapo, one of whom was the
Gnezdov station master, the two others peasants. All three were tortured into
signing documents, the contents of which they did not understand.
Failing to get any direct information from the local population, the Germans
next issued a poster (we saw a photostat of it) written in grammatically in-
correct Russian saying the following: "Who can give testimony on the mass
murder of the Bolsheviks against Polish prisoners and members of the clergy?
Who saw the Polish prisoners of war in Goat Hill adjoining the Katyn highway?
Who observed Poles going from Gnezdov to Goat Hill? Who saw or heard the
shots fired? Who knows members of the population, who can testify? Every bit
of information will be rewarded. Send information to German Police Head-
quarters in Smolensk and Gnezdov." The poster was dated May 3, 1943 and
signed by an ofl^cer of the German police. The Commission told us that the Ger-
mans, failing to get the needed information, then began the work of setting up
the proper "stage scenery" on Goat Hill. First, they set about the gruesome
work of digging up Polish corpses. From concentration camp No. 126 they im-
ported 500 Red_Army prisoners of war to do the work, and when the work was
completed the Soviet prisoners of war were marched away to be shot. One
managed to escape and sought shelter in the house of citizen Moskovskaya.
Though the Gestapo later found him, she had full details of the story which the
Commission gave us.
It goes as follows. Not only did the Germans dig up the Polish bodies in the
Katyn Forest, but by night they imported in big tarpaulin-covered German trucks
bodies of Poles that they had massacred elsewhere at the Kozelsky Camp ( in the
South Smolensk Province) and from the Starobelsky Camp (in the Ukraine be-
tween 200 to 250 kilometers from Smolensk). We were told that a number
of witnesses confirmed the story of trucks coming into the Goat Hill, their load
identified by the unmistakealtle stench.
As they were dug up, the Germans tagged each corpse with a metal number,
slit open the pockets and removed all papers they could find that bore dates later
than March and April 1940 and looted the pockets of any money and valuables.
They imported a corpse specialist called "Butz" from Berlin to make an investi-
2138 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
gation and to prove scientifically that the Itodies found were buried in the Sprinj;
of 1940.
The German authorities oi'ganized compulsory excursions to Goat Hill, so that
the local Smolensk population could see for themselves. Among the visitors was
Zubkov, a Soviet doctor, whom we saw. Zubkov testified that, as a pathological
anatomist, he could rightly .say that at that time none of the bodies cuuld possibly
be more than a year and a half old. The Connnission stressed Zubkov's statement
to us that to his knowledge the (Jermans conducted no autopsies, that the German
specialist Butz was not interested in conducting a scientific investigation — loot
from the pockets of the dead was what he was after, and dated documents that
would compromise the German story. It took Butz three months to accomplish
his task.
3. Documents found on the Polish Corpses : The final act of the German^;
was to route out an i either kill or deport any person who might have information
proving the whole Polish incident was a fake. They caught all but a few of the
men they had beaten into signing false evidence and the three girls who had been
servants at the Goat Hill datcha.
Despite the thoroughness of the pocket ripping l)y the Germans, out of the
seven hundred corpses the Commission have so far investigated. 14fi items have
been found. The earliest date was found on a jiostcard — March 1940 — and the
latest — an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. We were shown all these
documents and trinkets and the most important and significant ones were trans-
lated for us. They included letters from Warsaw and Moscow dated in the
winter of 1940, receipts for valuables dated in the Spring of 1941 and numerous
newspaper clippings dated from early 1940. through early 1941. In particular
we were shown documents with communist leanings. The Commission inferred
that the Polish prisoners of war had pro-Soviet rather than pro-German leanings.
Report Written by Mr. John Melby After Visiting Katyn in January 1944
[Encldsure No. 1 to Despatcli No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from Americau Embass^j-,
Moscow 1
Trip to Smolensk and the Katyn Forest, January 21-23, 1944
We left Moscow, in company with seventeen newspaper men and including
Czech, Polish, and Spanish newsmen, at 4 : 00 p. m., January 21, for Smolensk
on a special train which had been put at the disposal of the party. We were
the first foreigners to visit Smolensk since its occupation by the Russians on
September 25, 1943. We did not arrive in Smolensk until 10:00 a. m. the fol-
lowing morning, 220 kilometers from Moscow, presumably because military
traffic had the right of way on the railroad. Since most of the trip was made by
dark thei-e was .small opportunity to observe along the way. During the day-
light hours little rolling stock was seen on the sidings and almost no military
supplies along the single-track line. We saw only one troop train (sf a dozen
boxcars, dirty and with straw covering the floor. The troops api)eared to be
work battalions rather than line troops. Outside Smolensk there were some
seventy-five boxcars and three locomotives which had been turned off the track
and burned. The closer we came to Smolensk the more evidence there was of
destroyed buildings and blown-up bridges. Almost none of the buildings had
been replaced and generally only enough bridges to supply one or two lines of
traffic in the railroad yards. The railroad yards in Smolensk itself were a com-
plete shambles, only enough having been rebuilt to keep operations along.
We were met in Smolensk by the Secretary of the Special Commission to Es-
tablish and Investigate the Circumstances of the Shooting by the German Fascist
Invaders of Captive Polish Officers in the Katyn Woods. lie took us first on a
short tour of the city to witness the damage. The first thing noticeable was
that every bri<lge over the Dnieper bad been destroyed, the only crossing point
for road and motor traffic being one temporary wooden structure. The rail-
road does not cross the river at this point. In the city it is difficult to find a
structure which has not been damaged. Most of the destruction seems to have
been caused by demolition, and there was little evidence of lire. The city once
contained 7,9(X) buildings. There now remain 300, of which only 64 are stone
structures, the rest being one-story wooden houses. The remaining population
lives in the cellars of the wrecked buildings. The Lenin Library is a total loss,
and the books were either burned or removed by the Germans. According to
official figures, the population of Smolensk is now about 30,000 as compared with
THE KL\TYN FOREST MASSACRE 2139
a prewar figure of 185,000. In and around Smolensk the Germans are alleged
to have massacred 135,000 Russians.
After the tour of the city we were taken out to the Katyn Forest, some fifteen
kilometers west of Smolensk on the Vitebsk highway. We were met there by a
battery of movie cameras and the surgeon who is in charge of the exhumations of
Polish bodies and the postmortems. He told us that 700 bodies have already
been exhumed from seven graves and that there are perhaps a total of twelve to
fifteen thousand. This is pure estimate. The six graves on which the most work
has been done are approximately twenty-five feet square and vary in depth from
three to ten feet. In two of them the bodies are laid out in rows ; in the others
they are simply piled in. As each body is exhumed it is taken to a tent foi^
examination, approximately 120 bodies being examined daily by eleven crews.
After examination the bodies are laid in rows in a field which we inspected. Des-
pite the freezing temperature, there was no doubt they had been dead a long time.
Every one of the bodies seen wore a Polish Army uniform, a preponderance
being uniforms of enlisted men. Each one had a warm topcoat or heavy under-
wear. All pockets had been ripped open prior to exhumation by the Russians,
but a wide selection of documents and miscellaneous items are being found which
were missed in the previous searching by the Germans. All items found are
taken to Smolensk for examination and classification. Every skull we saw
contained a bullet hole at the base of the skull and a second one just above the
forehead. The holes were made by bullets varying from 7.6 mm. to 9.5 mm. On
the skulls where skin or hair is left powder burns are in evidence. The brain,
flesh, and organs of each body are also examined. The doctor in charge said
that the state of decomposition proves the men cannot have been dead much more
than two years. A number of the bodies had small, rectangiilar metal clips
attached to the lapel of their overcoats, bearing only numbers. The highest
number seen was 2032. These were on the bodies said to have been exhumed
by the Germans in 1943.
We were later taken to see tlie dacha which was used as headquarters by the
German occupation forces in the forest. It had previously been an NKVD rest
home. It lies about a quarter of a mile from the graves and beyond the road,
overlooking the river. It was completely destroyed by the Germans when they
withdrew.
During the afternoon the Commission held a press conference at which one
member, V. P. Potemkin, read a previously prepared statement. Its principal
points were as follows : The Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities in
Smolensk arrived in the city shortly after its capture from the Germans on
September 25, 1943. Experts started to work on the Katyn Forest murders on
January 16, 1944. After the occupation by Russia in 1939 of Eastern part of
Poland several camps of Polish prisoners of war were established to the West
of Smolensk. These prisoners were used on road construction work, oflScers in-
cluded. In July 1941. the Germans suddenly broke through the line at Smolensk
and enveloped the city. It had been planned to evacuate the Poles to the West
and a requisition was put in for a train to do so. This request was refused
because of the shortage of trains to move even the civilian population of Smolensk.
In any event, the Germans were already shelling the railroad.
After the occupation the German 537th Construction Battalion moved into
Katyn and put a wire fence around it. Three Russian girls were put to work
cleaning the dacha which was used as headquarters. They were constantly
under sentry guard. In August 1941, according to the testimony of one of
them, Andreeva, they frequently heard trucks coming into the forest. The
officers quartered in the dacha would then go out. Shortly after the girls
heard single shots at regular intervals. Tlie trucks would leave and the
officers would return, noisy and excited. One time one of the girls noticed
blood on an officer's tunic. Another time one of the girls saw two Polish
soldiers outside the window. They were led into the forest by Germans.
Shortly thereafter she heard shots. Still another time one of the girls while
walking down the road saw a group of men approaching. She hid in the bushes
and saw they were a group of Poles who were led into the forest. Later she
heard shots. All during August and September 1941, Poles were rounded up
from the countryside. After the end of September 1941, no uue saw any more
Poles.
The above statements are further corroborated, according to the Commission,
by other testimony. The traitor B. G. IMenshagin, a lawyer, was in close com-
munication as occupation mayor of the town, with the German commander in
Smolensk, and was assisted by B. V. Bazilevski, formerly director of the Smolensk
2140 THE ICATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Observatory. In August Menshagin told Bazilevski that orders a re-
ceived "to liquidate Polish prisoners." He added that the Rus.- ^soners
would die of "natural causes." Sometime later he said the ord d been
carried out. He is reported to have given tlie same information to o? persons.
When Menshagin vpas later evacuated vi'ith the Germans he left bei him his
notebook. His handwriting has been verified. An entry of Augu 15, 1941,
states that orders had been issued for all detailed Poles to be turned over to
the German authorities. Subsequent entries state that execution orders had
been carried out.
With reference to the motive for these executions, Bazilevski testified he had
been told by Hirschfeld of the SD that it is "an historical fact the Poles are an
inferior race and hence it is a good act to kill them." He added that all Polish in-
tellectuals had been killed.
Father Alexander Oslobin, of the parish of Katyn, testified according to
Potemkin, that his parishioners had talked in 1941 of the events in the forest.
During 1942 there was no talk. Then it started again in the early part of 1943
at a time when the Germans were exhibiting great nervousness and greater
harshness of treatment toward the Russians. The first public notice was in the
spring of that year when the local German paper printed a story that the NKVD
had murdered Polish officers in Katyn during March and April of 1940. This
same story was i-eprinted in three other papers at the same time and was designed
to improve the position of the Germans. The Germans then began searching
for witnesses to substantiate their statements, using torture to obtain what
they wanted. When the Germans evacuated they tried to take with them or
destroy all witnesses they had used. To strengthen their case further they opened
some of the graves, using 500 Russian prisoners from concentration camp No. 126
for labor. Once the job was done the Russians were in turn killed, except for
one who managed to escape in the melee. He was sheltered by an old peasant
woman, Moskovskaya, to whom he told the above story before he was recaptured
and executed himself. During the exhumation the Germans removed all docu-
ments from the bodies, especially those dated later than April 1940. They did,
liowever, overlook some, including one unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941.
P>efore closing up the graves the Germans brought to Katyn the bodies of other
Poles from other graves and camps in order to concentrate in one spot all the
alleged atrocities by the Russians. And finally, in March 1943, the Germans
organized compulsory excursions of the local citizenry to the graves before they
"were again closed.
Potemkin then stated the conclusions of the Commission :
1. During August and September 1941, the Germans killed in the Katyn Forest
all Poles in the vicinity of Smolensk.
2. Feeling their position insecure in 1943 they attempted to blame the incident
on the Russians.
3. To implement this position the Germans opened the graves, searched the
bodies, sought witnesses for their case, and added bodies from elsewhere to those
in Katyn.
In answer to a question, it was stated that prior to August, 1941, there were
three camps of Polish prisoners : Camp No. 1 was thirty-five kilometers West of
Smolensk on the Minsk highway, containing 2,932 Poles who were sent to Siberia
finally; Camp No. 2, twenty-five kilometers West of Smolensk on the Vitebsk
highway; and Camp No. 3, thirty-live kilometers West of Smolensk.
We were then taken to inspect the collection of miscellaneous items taken
from the pockets of the Polish soldiers. This collection consisted of letters,
books, newspapers, personal items, money. We wore also shown eleven twenty
United States dollar gold pieces, one fifty dollar note, and numerous dollar bills.
A major iiortion of the dated evidence, such as letters and newspapei's was prior
to or during March and April 1940 and included a copy of Izvestiya of Api'il 11,
1940. There were, however, letters bearing Moscow postmarks as late as June
1941.
During the evening the Commission held a session devoted to questioning the
witnesses whose testimony had earlier boon sunnuarized by Potemlcin. It soon
became apparent that the session was staged for the benefit of the correspondents
and that the witnesses were merely repeating stories they had already given the
Connnission. The show was staged under hot and blinding klicg lights and motion
picture cameras. In all, five witnesses were produced who added nothing to
what had been said at tlie press conference. Attemjits by the correspondents to
question the witnesses were discouraged, and finally permitted reluctantly only
through the members of the Commission. All witnesses were shunted out of the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2141
rodiD . .y as possiWe upon finishing their statement. There was also an
jn'gun. !t translation of the testimony, this finally being agreed to.
The I cness told how he had been forced to turn evidence for the Germans
in 1!)4.'> , >.econd, Alexeyeva, told of her work in the dacha ; the third, Bazilev-
sky, recc '>d his association as assistant burgomaster; the fourth, Zukhov, an
expert ii Criminal medicine," told of his "excursion" to the forest in the spring
of 1943 ai.a his belief that the bodies could not have been three years old; the
fifth, Ivanov, the local station master who had been unable to supply a requisi-
tion of forty cars to move the Poles in 1941, told of conditions diiring the German
break-through and of being forced to give evidence for the Germans in 1943.
All the statements were glibly given, as though by rote. Under questioning
the witnesses became hesitant and stumbled, until they were dismissed by the
Commission. Bazilevsky was ludicrous when one correspondent asked him why
he was now so excited by the murder of 10,000 Poles when he also knew that
135,000 Russians had been killed in the same area, and he answei'ed that the
Poles were prisoners of war and it was an outrageous violation of international
law for them to be massacred.
The atmosphere at the session grew progressively tense as the correspondents
asked one pointed and usually rude question after another. At midnight it was
announced abruptly that our train would leave in one hour. Just before the
meeting broke up Alexei Tolstoy, a member of the Commission, who had ap-
parently .sensed that matters were not going well and who has had the most
foreign contacts of anyone on the Commission, produced answers to several
questions which had earlier been passed over. The members of the Commission
were hasty and formal with us in their farewells, and the earlier atmosphere of
at least semicordiality had disappeared.
The Polish corre.spondent who accompanied us, and who slept noisily through
most of the press conference, a captain in the Polish Army and the editor of
Wolna Polska under Wanda Wasilevska, told me that the present investigation
has no interest for the Poles in Russia since it is obvious that the Germans com-
mitted the crimes and that therefore it is pure "political provocation" on the
part of the Russians. Certainly the members of the Commission were not at all
pleased when leading questions were asked. On the return trip the Foreign
Office officials who accompanied us were almost unduly anxious on the return
trip to be assured that we were convinced. It is apparent that the evidence in
the Russian case is incomplete in several respects, that it is badly put together,
and that the show was put on for the benefit of the correspondents without oppor-
tunity for independent investigation or verification. On balance, however, and
despite loopholes the Russian case is convincing.
Chairman Madden. Can you identify that document, Mrs. Mort-
imer ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I identify that as my report.
Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. IVIachrowicz. Mrs. Mortimer, you were in Moscow in Febru-
ary 1944, were you not ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I was.
Mr. Machrowicz. And January 1944 ?
Mrs. Mortimer. Yes, I was,
Mr. Machrowicz. In what capacity ?
Mrs. INIoRTiMER. I was then in the capacity as the daughter of my
father, who was Ambassador,
Mr. Machrowicz. And in January 1944, members of the foreign
press were invited by the Soviet authorities to visit the Katyn place ;
is that right?
Mrs. IVIoRTiMER. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember how many there were ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I would say otl'hand 20.
Mr. Machrowicz. How many Americans were in that group ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I would say they were predominantly American
and British. I really don't remember how many did go. But I would
93744 — 52 — pt. 7 21
2142 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
say the members of the foreign press coi'ps that were in Moscow at
the time went to the Katyn Forest.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ask permission to accompany them ?
Mrs. Mortimer. My father asked permission for me. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And yon did accompany them ?
Mrs. Mortimer. And I did accompany them.
Mr. Machrowicz. And is tliis exhibit 20 a copy of the report whicli
yon filed ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. In that report yon state yonr opinion that the
Poles were murdered by the Germans. Is that right ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you state how you came to that conclusion ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I can state it b}- reading what I said in the report,
I wrote it .S years ago, and I have refreshed my memory before coming
down here to testify.
INIr. Machrowicz. Will you read the first three paragraphs, which
are the complete statement of the report. The balance is a report of
the inspection ; am I right ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right. And that was my opinion at that
time, having been to the Katyn Forest.
]Mr. ]SIachiiowicz. Would you read those first three paragraphs into
the record ?
Mrs. Mortimer. Do you want me to read them aloud ?
Mr. Machrowicz. If you wish. Or would you rather have me read
them ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I can read them,
Mr. Machrowicz. All right.
Mrs, Mortimer (reading) :
The party was 8hf)wn the graves in the Katyn Forest and witiiesse^l post
niortems of the corpses. As no member was in a iK)sition to evaluate the scientitic
evidence ;;:iven, it had to be accepted at its face value.
The testimonial evidence provided liy the Commission and witnesses was
minute in detail and by American standards petty. We were expected to accept
the statements of the high-ranking Soviet officials as true, because they said it
was true.
Despite this it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans.
The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manni-r in which
the .job was done, something the C(mimission thought not sufficiently important to
stress. They were more interested in the medical evidence as conclusive proof
and the minute circumstantial evidence siirrounding the crime.
Mr. Machrowicz. The balance of the report is the report of the
actual ins])ection. That completes the statement of the conclusions;
am r I'ight '(
Mrs. Mortimer. I believe so.
Ml-. Machrowicz. As you stated there, no member was in a })osition
to evaluate the scientific evidence and you had to accept it at face
value?
Mrs. INIORTiMER. That is right,
Mr. Machrowicz. And you stated also that the testimony was petty,
by American standards, and you were expected to accept the state-
ments of the high-ranking Soviet officials as true because they said it
was true.
Mrs. Mortimer, Yes,
Mr, Machrowicz, But, despite that, you came to the conclusion that
the Poles were murdered by the Germans?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2143
Mrs. Mortimer. That is rio;ht.
INIr. Machrowicz. One of tlie reasons that you give in the sentence
which follows that is : ''The most convincing evidence to uphold this
was the methodical manner in which the job was done, something the
Commission thought not sufficiently important to stress.*'
You felt that because of the methodical manner in which the murder
Avas conunitted, the Kussians were incapable of it. Is that right ?
I^Irs. INIoRTiMER. This is trying to remember my train of thought at
that time. I believe that there were Gernum atrocities that were found,
in which bodies were piled in the same order with the same type of
bullet wound, had been found elsewliere.
Mr. Machrowicz. You do not have that same opinion today as you
had in February 1944, do you ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I can say that before coming down here I read your
interim report.
You had access to every side of the picture, which I did not have
available to me, and I would say, having read your report, that my
opinion is that the Russians did kill the Poles.
Mr. Machrowicz. In fairness to you, it must be stated that you did
not have access to the information which we have today; did you?
INIrs. Mortimer. That is right. I merely was a witness of the show
that the Russians put on for the benefit of the foreign correspondents
in Moscow.
IVIr. Machrowicz. You considered it a show put on for the benefit
of the correspondents in Moscow ; at least you so labeled it later in the
report; did you not?
Mrs. Mortimer. Yes.
Anywhere you went in Russia, a show was put on. You could not
travel normally anyway.
Mr. Machrowicz. At the bottom of page 1, paragraph 1, you state:
The corpses were Poles — the majority enlisted men, with no rank badges, but
some officers. Where, as tlie privates ranged from 25 to 30, the officers were
considerably older — 4.5 to 50 years.
Do you know now that actually there were nothing but officers found
in those graves ? How did you come to the conclusion that the nuijority
were enlisted men, with no rank badges?
Mrs. Mortimer. I presume I did that on the basis that they wore
enlisted men's uniforms.
Mr. Machrowicz. In paragraph 2, you state :
The majority of the corpses were dressed in topcoats, had long underwear.
Those wearing just tiuaics had sweaters.
Later on in the report, on page 4, you state that you were informed
that the (iermans killed these Poles between August and September
1941. Am I right?
Mrs. Mortimer. Yes.
Mr. ISIachrowicz. Did it not occur to you to be strange that between
August 1 and September 1941, that being summer, that the majority
of these corpses were still dressed in topcoats, had long underwear,
and that those just wearing tunics had sweaters ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That was definitely one of the questions that I
know was prime in our minds as we were going back to Moscow and
discussing it among ourselves.
Mr. IVIachrowicz. That raised some doubt in your mind as to the
truth of the Russians' story ; did it not ?
2144 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mrs. IVIoRTiMER. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. But it did not change j^our eventual opinion?
Were you permitted to question witnesses ?
Mrs. Mortimer. My Russian was not that sufficiently good.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were you permitted to question them through an
interpreter ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I don't believe I asked to.
Mr. Machrowicz. On page 3 of your report you state :
At fii'st the committee refused to interrupt the testimonies for translation, liut
when tlie members of the press objected they agreed with some laelv of grace.
During the testimony the committee chatted and whispered between themselves
and most didn't appear to listen. We were told we could question any witness,
through the committee, but the questions appeared to annoy them though not
apparently due to their substance. Only one question was called irrelevant and
not answered — the present job of one of the witnesses. Tolstoy later gave it to us.
And then you state the following :
The witnesses themselves were very well rehearsed, and they appeared subdued
rather than nervous ; their pieces having been learned by heart. Only the girl
had an air of self-assurance.
Did the fact that these witnesses appeared to be rehearsed and had
learned their testimony by heart raise any question of doubt as to the
truth of the Russian version ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I can only say that, as I remember it, in the after-
noon or early evening, we were told by one of the members of the
Commission what we were going to hear later on that night, and the
exact, same phraseology was used both times.
In other words, they were giving us a second showing of what we
had already heard.
Mr. Machrowicz. You state further :
When the last witness had been heard, general questions were asked, some of
import to the Katyn incident, others not. Shortly, however, the representatives
of the Foreign OtHce press department got up and said we had better break up
as our train was due to leave shortly.
then you follow up with these words :
* * * I got the distinct impression that the committee was relieved. They
had been told to put on a show for us — the show was over — and they did not
want to be bothered any further. The meeting broke up without any informal
chatting.
Mrs. Mortimer. That was my impression.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you discuss with the American members of
the committee what their impression was?
Mrs. Mortimer. I remembei' tluit going l)ack on the train, certainly
we sat around and talked. We brouglit up various points that had
impressed us.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Cassidy testified that on the way back to
Moscow the correspondents joked among themselves and said tliat the
Russians certainly i)ut on a show, they tried to put on a show, and they
lemarked about the fact that there was no sincerity about the testi-
mony that Avas given to tliem. Do you remember any sucli connnents?
Mrs. Mortimer. I don't remember sitting at the same table in the
dinner car witli Mr. Cassidy. I may have but I don't remember that.
I said myself tliey put on a show. And I can't imagine spontaneity
coming into tliis type of investigation, to which foreign correspondents
"would be invited, at: that time, in Russia.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2145
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Cassidy also testified that the exhibits which
you refer to as having been taken from the bodies of the deceased
actually were not taken fi'om the bodies in the presence of the com-
mittee, but were under a glass case.
j\Irs. MoRTiMKR. They were in a relic museum, in glass cases.
Mr. Machrowicz. Actually, then, no member of the group saw these
exhibits taken from the bodies of the deceased, but they were already
in a museum, in a separate building?
Mrs. Mortimer. No. I witnessed the post mortems that were going
on in the tents by the graves.
Mr. IMachrowicz. You witnessed the post mortems but, as you stated
in your report, as no member was in position to evaluate the scientific
evidence, you had to accept it at its face value ; is that right ?
j\frs. Mortimer. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. But these exhibits that you referred to as having
been found on the corpses, Avere not taken from the corpses in your
x^resence. they were in a museum at the time ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right — in Smolensk, which was some dis-
tance away.
Mr. Machrowicz. "Wliether or not they were fabricated or taken
from some other place you do not know ; you just had to take the word
of the Russians for it ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I can state that, chie to the odor in the room, that
there would be no question in my mind that these documents had been
taken from bodies that had been buried a considerable length of time.
Mr. Machrowicz. There could have been some documents added to
those that had been taken, could there not ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I would think so. I would be in no position to
judge that.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you yourself observed the fact that most of
these corpses were in topcoats, with long underwear, and sweaters?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right.
Mr. IMachrowicz. Despite the fact the Russians claimed the mas-
sacre had taken place between August and September 1941 ?
Mrs. Mortimer. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoxDERO. Mrs. Mortimer, were there any other nationalities
present, outside of the American reporters, and the Russian commis-
si on ?
]Mrs. Mortimer. I believe there was a Frenchman.
Mr. JSIiTCHELL. Was he a reporter ?
INIrs. Mortimer. Yes ; a French reporter. And I think there was a
Polish one.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Yes, there was, because they slept through the whole
performance.
Mr. IMachrowicz. Two of them.
Mr. Dondero. Were there any others besides that ?
Mrs. Mortimer. Not that I recall. The press group in Moscow was
predominantly American and British, and this one Frenchman.
Mr. Dondero. Was there any other correspondent — and I refer par-
ticularly to the American correspondents — that wrote a report similar
to yours, or came to the same conclusion ?
2146 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mrs. Mortimer. I do think that Richard Lauterbach, in liis article in
Time, which came out at that period, I think that you will find that he
said that most of us thought that the Germans liacl done it.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Where is Richard Lauterbach today ?
Mrs. Mortimer. He died.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it very well known that he was pro-Soviet, pro-
Connnunist, at that time, when you were over there?
Mrs. Mortimer. I could not say so.
Mr. Mitchell. For your information, Ed Angley, Henry Cassidy,
Bill Lawrence, all of whom were with you, saicl that he jumped the
fence and was very pro-Soviet-minded at that time.
Mr. DoNDERO. Just a moment.
You news reporters have a saying among yourselves, I am informed,
that if a thing is ''phony,'' the story is, you say, "rigged.'' Did you
have any impression wliile there, from things you observed, that that
story might have been "rigged" ? And I refer to the statement made
that the witnesses seemed to have their words rehearsed, and so forth.
Mrs. Mortimer. I believe, as already has been brought out, that I
did say that they put on a show for us. Well, I had been in Moscow
some time before I want to Katyn. It was quite usual, whenever I
went anywhere, that a show was put on for you, and that if speeches
were made, they were rehearsed. So that did not necessarily surpi-ise
me.
Mr. DoNDERO. All those who took part, as far as concerned showing
you the corpses, in the commission, were all Russians; is that correct'^
Mrs. Mortimer. They were.
Mr. DoNDERO. Did they talk English to you ?
Mrs. Mortimer. Xo; I cannot remember if IVIr. Tolstoy spoke Eng-
lish or not. I believe he did.
Mr. DoNDERO. How far is the Katyn Forest from Moscow?
Mrs. Mortimer. It was overnight by train, and I think it was two-
hundred-odd kilometers.
Mr. DoNDERo. How long did you stay there ?
Mrs. Mortimer. We were there a full day.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you at the forest itself, at the
graves ?
Mrs. Mortimer. In terms of hours, I would not know. I could not
remember. I know we arrived early in the morning, and we probably
got back on the train at 2 a. m. the following morning.
Mr. DoNDEKo. Did the other American coi-respondents write their
conclusions of that visit?
Mrs. MoRTiiMER. I was not there at the time, so I did not see what
they reported. I mean I did not have access to the American press
there in Moscow, so I would not know.
Mr. DoNDKRO. From your statement, there were 15 or 20 in the party,
but tliey were nearly all Americans. Outside of yourself and INIr.
Lauterbacli, you know of no other story that corresponded with yours,
or youi- conclusions?
Mrs. Mortimer. The only story that I read was my own.
Mr. DoNDKRo. You did not see any story of any of the other corres-
])()n(lents?
Mis. Mortimer. No.
Mr. DoNDERo. Whether they wrote any or not. vou are not informed
astodiat?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2147
Mrs. Mortimer. I am afraid I am not.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all.
Chairman Madden. How many bodies did you view ?
Mrs. Mortimer. There were several graves opened. I know that I
had to see more post mortems than anybody else, because each one of
the doctors involved wanted me to see one.
Chairman Madden. Did you see 10, or 20, or 30?
Mrs. Mortimer. You mean bodies lying around?
Chairman Madden. Yes ; that you viewed ?
Mrs. JVIortimer. I would say several hundred, or hundreds.
Chairman Madden. Did you know that the Germans had made a
similar autopsy?
Mrs. Mortimer. Yes, and tliey had put little metal tags on the uni-
forms, numbered tags.
Chairman Madden. Did they tell you that a year and a half before,
the Germans had made a similar investigation?
Mrs. Mortimer. I was in London at the time of the German an-
nouncement, and I read about that in the British press.
Chairman Madden. Did the Russians tell you about that investi-
gation that the Germans had made there at the grave site?
Mrs. Mortimer. What they told us was subsequently published in
their report, and I cannot, oflTliand, remember if they mentioned the
German report, or not.
Chairman jNIadden. Did they not mention anything about the Ger-
man investigation there, at the grave site?
Mrs. Mortimer. No. In other words, they did not present it to us
as "The Germans said this, and we say it is not so." They presented a
case, as I remember it, without any reference.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. OT^^ONSKi. Mrs. Mortimer, your report, in fact, reminds me
of a Congressman from my home State who at one time talked about
a half hour against a certain bill and he concluded by saying that,
"Now I talked myself out of it and I am going to vote for it."
The thing that amuses me about your report is that your reasoning
destroys your conclusion. In other words, as I read your report, and,
frankly, I read it at least 10 times — you have in it more reasons why
the Russians did it and not the Germans, than you have that the
Germans did it. I cannot understand how you could have arrived at
that conclusion.
Frankly, as I read your report, I come to the conclusion that it was
not the Germans who did it, it was the Russians.
That leads me to ask you this question : How old were you when you
went on this mission?
Mrs. Mortimer. Twenty-five.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would you tell us why your father selected you in-
stead of, perhaps, somebody older and somebody who, perhaps, was a
medical authority or something of that nature ? Your father touched
on it, but, I think, for the record, that ought to be brought out again.
Why did your father select you to go on this mission ?
Mrs. Mortimer. My impression is that he selected me because he
thought it would be more difficult for them to refuse him if he asked
that I go than if he asked a medical officer or somebody else.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That sounds losrical.
2148 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
I asked that question, because the first time your name did come
up, that you went on this mission, the average criticism immediately
was, "Well, why would so young a girl be picked for so responsible
a job?" I am glad to get the answer to that question, because it was
a very serious mission that you went on. That clarifies it.
Coming back to my original connnent, that as I read your reasoning
I cannot agree w'ith your conclusion in your report, that prompts me
to ask this question :
Did you arrive at your conclusion independently and entirely on
your own reasoning, entirely on your own thinking? Did anybody
exert any pressure or any force or any hint to you at all in arriving
at your conclusion ?
Mrs. Mortimer. No.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. One of the reports, either yours or Mr. Melby's, tells
how the Polish representatives
Mrs. ]\IoRTiMER. That was Mr. Melby's report, I believe.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Seemingly slept through the whole demonstration
and exhibition. Do you remember that also ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I do remember it was a very small room. As I
said, I think I remember we were quite close to this museum where the
personal effects of these corpses had been placed. It was terribly hot,
there were kleig lights. We were there for many, many hours, and I
can well understand how some of the people would have been drowsy,
because we had to hear the testimony not only twice, but four times,
because it had to be translated to us in English.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But even then, they were not truly representative of
the Polish people. Do you think that under those conditions they
w^ould be found asleep, when it comes to finding out something about
what happened to 15,000 murdered fellow men?
Mrs. Mortimer. That I truly cannot answer. I know^ I stayed
awake.
Mr. JVIitchell. Were there any pictures taken ?
Mrs. jNIortimer. As I remember it, there were certainly facilities, in
terms of the kleig lights. How often the cameras were rolling, I
don't know.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you ever seen yourself in that film ?
Mrs. Mortimer. No ; I have never seen myself in it.
Mr. Mitchell. I will be delighted to show it to you sometime. It
is a picture of you and the correspondents going there. I would like
to have you verify some of the names in that for the members of the
committee, of the people Mdio were with you in that film.
Mrs. Mortimer. I will be very pleased to do so, to the best of my
ability.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I wonder if you would straighten out one point
for us here.
Tliei-e has been some speculation that you went to Katyn as a cor-
res])ondent or adviser or observer for the OWL Did you have any
connect ions with the OWI at that time ?
INIi's. Mortimer. I was a correspondent in London for News-week
magazine, before I went to Moscow, and I resigned from that post when
I went to Moscow with my fathei'. T woi-ked foi- the OAVI in a purely
unofficial capacity. Everybody there at the Embassy Avas very short-
staffed and, in other Avords, pitched in and helped.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2149
Mr. PuciNSKi. Did you file any reports for the OWI as a result of
your visit to Katyn ?
Mrs. Mortimer. Xo ; this was the only thing I wrote.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I have one more question : You were quite admired
in Moscow, were you not ^ You were 25 years old, and the Ambassa-
dor's daughter, and people sort of looked to you with a great deal of
respect, did they not 'i
Mrs. Mortimer. At the time I went to Moscow I was the only Ameri-
can woman there.
Mr. PuciNSKi. The reason why I asked that question is this : I was
wondering, had your observations and had your conclusions been dif-
ferent, had you believed in all the reasoning through your report, which
indicated so strongl}^ that the Soviets committed this massacre, could
you, or were you in a position to so state; or were you somewhat bound
by your position in Moscow to say that it was the Germans who did
this?
Mrs. ]\Iorti:mer. I would not say that my position in Moscow would
have any bearing on what I would write in a report. I have been a
correspondent before, and writing up a news story was not something
that
Mr. PuciNSKi. You were free of any pressures, to state your con-
clusions as you saw them ?
Mrs. Mortimer. When I came home, my father asked me to write
down what I had seen, and that is what I did.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And what is your conclusion today ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I have since had the opportunity to read your in-
terim report and read what the New York press has said about your
committee, and you had access to every side of the picture, and I think,
undoubtedly
Mr. PuciNSKi. Aside from our report,
Mrs. Mortimer. Well, that is my information on it,
Mr. PuciNSKi. Aside from our report, can you think of anything
that you observed there in 1944 at Katyn, which may strengthen the
evidence that we have already compiled, to the conclusion that the
Soviets murdered these men? In retrospect today, is there anything
that you observed at that time that would strengthen that belief today?
Mrs. ISIoRTiMER. I would say that would be, offhand, hard to answer
now, without going over your report here and mine here.
Mr. PuciNSKi. No further questions.
Chairman Madden. As a final question let me ask: You would
testify today, would you, that the Russians committed the massacre
at Katyn ?
Mrs. Mortimer. I Avould.
Chairman Madden. Thank you for appearing before us today as a
witness.
Mrs. jMortimer. Thank you very much for inviting me.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Melby.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. MELBY, ALEXANDEIA, VA.
Chairman Madden. Will you be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Melbt. I do.
2150 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are John Melby?
Mr. Melby. John F. Melby ; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is your address ?
Mr. Melby. 123 Prince Street, Alexandria, Va.
Mr. IVLvcHROWicz. And in January and February 1944, you were
in Moscow as the Third Secretary of the United States Embassy, were
you not?
Mr. Melby. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. You filed a report of your investigation of the
Katyn massacre, did you ?
Mr. Meij5Y. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you were present, were you not, at the same
time that Miss Harriman was?
Mr. Melby. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And your report also had the conclusion that the
Germans were responsible; is that right?
Mr. Melby. That it was a fairly convincing case.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not think you used the word "fairly" there.
Mr. Melby. Well, "convincing."
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to point out to you and ask you
whether or not you did not include this in your report :
During the evening the Commission held a session devoted to questioning
the witnesses wliose testimony liad earlier been summarized by I'otemkin. It
soon became apparent that the session was staged for the benefit of the cor-
respondents and that the witnesses were merely repeating stories that they
had already given the Commission. The show was staged under hot and
blinding kleig lights, and motion-picture cameras. In all, five witnesses were
produced who added nothing to what had been said at the press conference.
Attempts by the correspondents to question the witnesses were discouraged,
and finally permitted reluctantly only through the members of the Commission.
All witnesses were shunted out of the room as rapidly as possible upon finishing
their statement. There was also an argument about translation of the testi-
mony, this finally being agreed to.
and further on you state as follows :
All the statements were glibly given, as though by rote. Under questioning,
the witnesses became hesitant and stumbled, until they were dismissed by the
Commission. IJazilevsky was ludricous when one correspondent asked liim why
he was now so excited by the murder of 10,000 Poles, when he also knew that
1^5,000 Russians had been killed in the same area, and he answered that the
Poles were [jrisoners of war and it was an outrageous violation of international
law. foi' them to be ma.ssacred.
The atmosi)liere at the session grew progressively tense as the correspondents
asked one pointed and usually rude (luestion after another. At midnight it
was announc<'d abruptly that our train would leave in 1 hour. Just before th.'
meeting broke up. Alexei Tolstoy, a member of the Commission, who had ap-
parently sensed that matters were not going well, and who has had the most
foreign contacts of anyone on the Connnission, produced answers to several
questions which had earlier been pass(>d over. The members of the Connnission
were hasty and formal with us in their farewells, and the earlier atmosphere
of at least seimcordiality had disappeared.
you further state as follows :
* -K * Cortainly the members of the Commission were not at all pleased
wlien leading questions were asked. On the return trip the Foreign Office
officials who acconqianied us were almost unduly anxious on the return trip
to be assuriKl that we were convinced. It is apparent that the evidence in the
Russian case is incomplete in several respects, that it is badly put together,
and that the show was put on for the benefit of the correspondents, without
opportunit.v for indeiMMident investigation or veritication.
now, this is all in your report.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2151
Then you add one very brief sentence:
* * * On balance, however, and despite loopholes, the Russian case is
convincing.
now, can you tell us how that last sentence could be put in there in
view of all the statements wdiich you, yourself, put in just preceding
tliat which, of course, created doubt as to the veracity of the Russian
story.
Mr. Melby. As I think you suggested there, I was not 100 percent
convinced, by any means. I think it should also be noted that I had
had the benefit only of the Russians' side of the story. I was, as a
matter of fact, not really aware of what the German charges had
been, since I had been in travel status when they came out with them,
and I knew nothing of anything they had talked about in any report
that they had made. I knew only what the Russians had shown, and
also, at' that time, anything I might have heard on the Germans
would have naturally been discounted, since we had had considerable
experience with atrocities on their part at that time, and practically,
none as far as the Russians w^ere concerned, because they were not
publicizing anything they were doing.
Mr. Machrowicz. And earlier in the report you also stated that all
of the officers wore overcoats and sweaters and winter clothing.
Mr. Meijjy. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And that, despite the fact that the story given
to you by the Russians was that the Germans had killed them in
August 1941 — in a summer month ?
Ml'. Melby. That seemed curious that they should be in that kind
of clothing tlien. But it is a fairly cool part of the country, and the
only thing I could think of there was that perhaps they kept them in
year-round clothing at the time, rather than having them change it.
Mr. Machrowicz. But you were still convinced that the Russians
were telling the truth?
Mr. Melby. On the basis of what we knew there, it seemed so.
My. M\chrowicz. Is that still your opinion today ?
Mr. Melby. No ; it is not.
Mr. ^Machrowicz. Do you feel now that you were in error in filing
this report ?
Mr. Melby. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Mr. PuciNSKi. ]Mr. Chairman, I have one question.
Chairman Maddex. Very well.
Mr. PucixsKi. Mr. Melby, did you discuss your visit to Katyn, and
what you saw there, witli tlie Soviet officials on your way back to
Moscow '(
Mr. Melby. I don't remember talking about it to the Soviet officials.
There were one or two people from the Foreign Office w^ho escorted us,
and I don't remember any others. I don't remember discussing it
with them.
Mr. PucixsKi. Did any Soviet official suggest to you that you might
come up with the conclusion that it was the Germans that did this?
INIr. Melby. The Commission themselves that investigated it.
Mr. PucixsKT. I mean on tlie train, in personal conference.
Mr. Melby. Xo.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Did you feel at the time you wrote this report^and,
obviouslv. as Mr. Machrowicz said, it is difficuh for us to reconcile
2152 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
how you could write this whole report and then draw a conclusion
that the Germans did this— did you feel that that possibly was the
answer your superiors in the State Department and Washington
would prefer ?
Mr. Melby. No ; I had no reason to have any idea as to what kind
of answer they would want.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You had no reason?
Mr. Melby. No.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Nevertheless, you knew that there were very close
relations at that time between the United States and the Soviet Union ?
Mr. Melby. Yes, sir.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And did you feel that you might be somewhat put-
ting yourself in an unfavorable light if you drew your conclusions
on the basis of your reasoning and the rest of your report, and con-
cluded the Soviets did this ?
Mr. Melby, No, sir ; not at all.
Mr. PuciNSKi. There was no such fear in your mind ?
Mr. Melby. No, sir ; not at all.
Mr. DoNDERO. How long were you there, Mr. Melby ?
Mr. Melby. We arrived early one morning, 7 or 8 o'clock, and
were there in the area until about 2 a. m. the following morning.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Frankly, Mr. Melby, I am at a loss — I am per-
fectly frank and honest in saying that I am at a loss — to understand
why you included so many paragraphs creating a doubt as to the truth
of the Russian story if you came to the conclusion that they were tell-
ing the truth?
Mr. Melby. I wanted to put in as much as I saw, so that perhaps
somebody else could clarify later on.-
Mr. Machrowicz. Ninety-five percent of your report is a report
stating that the Russians are lying, and then you finally say, in five or
six Avords, that, despite that, the Russians
Mr. Melby. Not that they "are lying" but that there are unanswered
questions.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Melby, are you aware of the fact that the Allied
correspondents who went to Katyn refused to voice a conclusion?
They wrote their stories on what they saw, but they refused to try
and voice a conclusion.
Mr. Melby. I never saw any of the stories that they wrote; we did
not get the press back.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Maybe we can clear up a question that ISIr. INIachro-
wicz was asking you :
Why did you come to a conclusion when, on your own evidence, you
could not reach a conclusion ?
Mr. Meij^y. Because I had no other basis on which to go except the
Russian side of the story.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Were you asked to come to a conclusion ^
Mr. MF.L!«,r. No.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You volunteered the conclusion yourself ^
Mr. Melby. Yes.
Mr. Maciihowicz. Would it not be more fair to you to state that the
conclusion, under the circumstances, was that "I am unable to state
who is responsible for these murders ?"
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2153
Mr. Melby. I probably should have put in a qualifying clause in
there that, although they may make their case, this is only one-half of
the story. I should have known all sides of it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And you are certain that nobody asked you to voice a
conclusion on your visit to Katyn "t
Mr. Melbt. Absolutely certain.
Chairman Madden. How long were you in Russia before you went
to Katyn ^
Mr. Melby. I arrived there in May 1943.
Chairman Madden. How many months before ?
Mr. Melby. It would have been about 7 months.
Chairman ^Madden. How long were you there after you went to
Katyn.
Mr. Melby. Until April 1945, a little over a year more.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
(There was no response.)
Chairman Madden. That is all, Mr. Melby. Thank you for appear-
ing as a witness.
llr. Melby. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Madden. The committee will recess now to convene to-
morrow morning at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m..
Thursday, November 13, 1952.)
THE KATYN FOKEST MASSACRE
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1952
House or Representatives,
The Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 1301,
House Office Buildino;, the Honorable Ray J. Madden (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Dondero. Olvonski, and
Sheehan.
Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select commit-
tee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Madden. The connnittee will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF STANISLAW MIKOLAJCZYK, PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL PEASANT UNION
Chairman Madden. Mr. Mikolajczyk, would you take the chair
there and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are to offer at this hear-
ing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Will you state your full name for the record,
please ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. 1402 Delafield Place NW., Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And your business?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. I am president of the International Peasant
Union. Its head office is located here in Washington.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, where were you born?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. I was born in 1901, in Hols'terhausen, Germany.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you briefly tell the committee what you did
prior to World War II? What were you duties at that time? Were
you in the Government of Poland?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. I left as a child from Germany and was working
as a farmer in Poland.
In 1918 I took p^rt in the uprising against the Germans for a free
and independent Poland.
In 1920 I was a soldier in the army fighting the Bolsheviks.
2155
2156 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
And after tliat I was workin.o; as a cliairmaii of the farm organ-
ization, a member of the Parliament, and as a chairman in the youth
organization.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on September 1, 1939?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I was at that time in the army. I volunteered
in the army, and in Se])tember 1939 I was a soldier in the western
front of Poland.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what happened to you
after that, please ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Afterward I was interned in a prisoner-of-war
camp in Hungary. From Hungary I escaped to France. Then there
I was entrusted by General Sikorski to ju-epare the formation of a
parliament in exile. The chairman was Mr. Paderewski, and I was
his acting vice chairman.
Mr. Mitchell. At the time you were in Hungary, you were in a
German prisoner-of-war camp ; were you ?
Mr. ^MiKOLAjczi-K. No. I was in a Hungarian prisoner-of-war
camp. We were interned in Hungary.
Mr. Mitchell. You were interned in Hungary?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you escaped from there and went to France;
is that right?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the Polish Army in France ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZY'K. I repeat, in France I was entrusted by General
Sikorski to prepare the creation of the Polish Parliament in Exile,
and here, under the chairmanship of Mr, Paderewski, I was acting as
a Vice Chairman of the Polish Parliament in Exile in France.
Mr. Mitchell. In what year was the formation of the Polish Gov-
ernment in Exile ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. In 1939, its seat was first in Paris, later in
Angers, in France.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien did the Polish Government in Exile go to
London ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. 1940.
Mr. Mitchell. When the Polish Government in Exile Avent to
London, what was your position at that time ?
Mr. ]\Tikolajczyk. I was still the Chairman of the Polish Parlia-
ment in Exile, and in 1941 I became the Vice Premier and the INIinister
of the Interior.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you remain as Vice Premier and
Minister of the Interior for the Polish Government in London?
Mr. ]Mikolajczyk. Until 1943, Avhen, unfortunately, in the catas-
trophe in Gibraltar, our Prime Minister, General Sikoi'ski, died.
Mr. ArrrcHELL. AVas that that airplane crash that the committee was
told about yesterday?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr, MrrcHELL. On April 13, 1943, Goebbels announced to the world
the finding of the mass graves of Polish officers at Kaytn, AVill you
tell this committee exactly what the Polish Government in Exile did
at that time, from your own personal knowledge?
Mv. MiKOLAJCZYK. Before I answer your question. I would like to
tell the connnittee that, as Minister of" the Interior, I was following
very closely the developments in Poland.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2157
Already in 1939 and 1940 we were getting news from Poland that
in December 1939 the Polish officers who had been taken prisoner of
war in Soviet Russia were expected to be released and be sent back
nnder the German occupation.
Later, all news was cut, and no news arrived in Poland.
After the Sikorski-Stalin agreement, we tried to get the news about
these officers from the Soviets. There were many personal conversa-
tions between General Sikorski and Mr. Kot, the Ambassador, and
General Anders. There were notes sent over to the Soviet Ambassador
I)Ogomslov, in London.
We always got the answer "Your prisoners of war have been re-
leased, and they must be free."
Stalin even told General Sikorski personally that maybe they had
escaped to Manchuria. But we could not locate these people. They
did not appear in the headquarters of the Polish Army, at that time
formed in Soviet Eussia, and even until March 1942, Bogomslov was
answering in his notes to the Polish Government tliat all prisoners
of war were free and had been released by the Soviet authorities.
Mr. MiTCHELi.. What was Bogomolov's position at that time?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. He was ambassador of Soviet Russia to the
Polish Government in London.
Finally, in April 1943, we got the news that the Germans annoiniced
that the bodies of the Polish officers had been found near the Kaytn
Forest.
It was very interesting because the first communique which was
announced b}' the Soviets gave the explanation that probably there
were misunderstandings because this place which had been announced
by the Germans Avas an old cemetery and maybe the Germans just
found the old place with the bodies.
A few days later, the Soviets announced that the Polish officers,
being still prisoners of war, had been taken over by the Germans and
had been murdered.
We really knew from all the evidence through the underground,
througli the letters, and also through a special mission sent by the
underground to investigate the case, that this was not the case.
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt a minute ?
When did the Polish underground in Poland start investigating the
missing Polish officers ?
You, as the Minister of the Interior, knew a great deal about the
Polish underground operations ; is that correct ?
Mr. JNIiKOLAJczYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When did the Polish underground in Poland first
start trying to locate or find out any information about the missing
Polish officers who were interned in the Soviet Union ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. We were trying to locate these people all the
time from 1939, and, as I said before, we were getting the news that
they were Soviet prisoners of war. They were writing to Poland
until the beginning of 1940, and from that time no news was heard
from them.
Mr. Mitchell. You were telling the committee about the announce-
ment about the old burying ground on the part of Molotov of the
Soviet Union ; is that correct, when I interrupted you ?
Mr, MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you please proceed now ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 22
2158 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. The Polish Government announced their wish
to investigate the case, and thereafter a note was sent to the Interna-
tional Red Cross at Geneva
Mr. Mttchell. Before you take that up, sir, let me ask: Did the
Polish Government in Exile rely solely on the information of the
Goebbels broadcast, or did you receive any information from your
Polish underground sources in Poland ?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. We did not believe Goebbels at all, and the com-
munique at that time released by the Polish Government denounced
the Germans.
The Poles knew very well what the Goebbels propaganda was worth
after all that the Nazis had practiced against the Polish and Jewish
people in Poland. Therefore, we were not viewing this thing from the
point of view of Goebbels' propaganda.
But we knew a long time before that that these officers were missing.
We knew that something had happened to them, because communica-
tion with them and the letters which were being received from them
had stopped.
And, more, we got official answers from the Soviets, including the
note that they had been released.
Therefore, we were convinced long before. We had such good con-
tacts with Poland under the German occupation, as well as the Russian
occupation, that we could locate immediately men or some group of
men who would be freed. Therefore, we knew that these men had
vanished.
We could not find what had happened to them.
We knew also, and were getting news from Soviet Russia.
Therefore, Avhen the announcement came, there wasn't any doubt
on our part that the Soviets did it, and it was our duty to ask the
International Red Cross for investigation.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you proceed with what you did in connection
with the International Red Cross? Wliat happened with that?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Unfortunately, the reaction to the demand to
investigate was very bad from the Soviets, who denounced it, saying
that it was just purely Goebbels propaganda and they would not par-
ticipate in it, as well as by the western public opinion and western
governments who were of the opinion at that time that this would
rather spoil the Allies' relations in the big fight against Germany.
So, finally, General Sikorski, the Prime Minster, after this attempt
failed, had to withdraw the demand from the Red Cross.
Mr. Maciirowtcz. Would you care to state now whether you feel,
in your own opinion, it was a mistake to ask the International Red
Cross to investigate ?
Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. No. I stated in my book, as I also want to
state here, tliat it was the duty of the Polish Government to do so. I
stated — and I want to state today — that in the conversation with the
British Ambassador to the Polish Government, Mr. O'Malley, I said,
"Yesterday there was discussion in the House of Commons. During
this discussion, one of the Labor Members of the Parliament, Mr. Shin-
well, went up and asked Mr. Eden to ask the Soviet Government to
intervene in Japan, where American and British prisoners of war
have been maltreated."
And I asked, "Is there a difference between an American or British
soldier and a Polish soldier? Haven't we at least the same right to
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2159
ask the Red Cross as here is being asked on behalf of the American
and British officers and soldiers maltreated in Japan?"
Mr. Machrowicz. The point was raised, as you probably know, yes-
terday, that President Roosevelt felt that your Government erred in
not having consulted with the American and British Governments
before making that request. Do you have any comment on that ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consult with the American or British
Governments before making the request?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I was not in charge at that time; therefore, I
could not tell you how much consultation was going on on the subject.
Mr. Machrow^icz. That is all.
Mr. DoNDERO. I have a question or two, if counsel has completed
his questioning on that.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
IVIr. DoxDERO. ]\Ir. Witness, do you know anything about the files
of the NKVD being ca]5tured by the Germans at Minsk, Russia?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No ; I don't know.
What I wanted to tell the committee is the other problem about
files, namely, when I returned to Poland after June 1945, I was ap-
proached by the prosecutor, Mr. Sawicki. Mr. Sawicki one day ap-
peared in my office and asked me about the Katyn case.
Mr. DoNDERO. Was that the Russian prosecutor?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. It was the Polish prosecutor in 1946.
He told me, "Myself and the Minister of Justice, Mr. Swiatkowski,
are intending to bring a public trial about the Katyn case in Poland.
What is your opinion about that?"
I said, ''I think it is absolutely necessary to clear the Katyn case and
have a public trial."
Mr. Sawicki asked me then. "And what would you like to tell in
such a public trial ?"
I said, "Only the truth. And I will tell in this trial how we tried to
locate these people; how we got from the Soviets all assurances that
they had been already been released, and later the communique of the
Soviets which had been published, that they were still prisoners of
war at the time of their death."
At that time, through secret sources, I knew also that there was still
some material obtainable in files in Poland.
Mr. Sawicki went back for a conference with Mr. Swiatkowski.
They both flew over to Moscow, and later I got the news that Moscow
ordered them not to touch the matter at all.
Mr. DoxDERO. Do you know anything about these files that were
captured by the Germans at Minsk, Russia, being later found in Pil-
sen, Czechoslovakia, by Patton's United States Army when he moved
into that area ?
Do you know anything about that ?
Those files were later sent here to Washington.
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I was trying to trace what happened with the
files which were in possession of the German authorities as well as in
the possession of the Polish Red Cross. They were very well kept
under guard during the German occupation in Krakow, They seemed
to be so valuable to the Germans that they were taking special care of
those files.
2160 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
So when the Russian Army was approaching Krakow, these files
were brought, as far as I could trace, to Wotclaw. There in Wotclaw
surrounded by Russian troops there was a 3-week fight. There the
Germans razed the buildings on the market place, and their airplanes
were flying in and out.
And I could still trace that this material had been sent into Germany
proper and later into Czechoslovakia.
Mr. DoNDERO. Are those the files about which I am asking you?
Mr. MiKoLAJzcYK. I could not exactly say if these are the files about
the NKVD. But they were these files which the German authorities
were keeping under special guard and evacuating them as the most
valuable things.
Mr, DoNDERO. Did you know a man b_/ the name of Roman Martini ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No.
Mr. DoNDERO. Did you ever hear that he was appointed by the Lub-
lin government, which is the Russian-dominated Communist govern-
ment of Poland, being picked out or selected to make a study of the
Katyn massacre for the Russians?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I don't know about that.
Mr. DoNDERO. Did you ever publish any article on that subject?
INIr. MiKOLAJCZYK. On this subject of Mr. Martini?
Mr. DoNDERO. Yes.
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No,
Mr. DoNDERO. Did you know anything of a man being sent there
ostensibly to bring in a report favorable to the Russians, but instead
of that, he brought in a report holding that the Russians were guilty
of killing these Polish officers? Do you know anything about that?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I don't know about Martini. I know of INIr,
Sawicki, who tried to find material favorable to Russia and didn't
find it, and has been advised by Moscow to drop the case.
Mr. DoNDERO. Do you know, or did you know, anything about Mar-
tini later being murdered, and that his murderers had conveniently
escaped ?
]\Ir. INIiKOLAJCZYK. I read this in the newspapers. Personally, I
don't know.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, we had reached the point where
the Polish Government in exile had requested the International Red
Cross to conduct a neutral, international investigation at Katyn.
Could you tell us what happened during that period of time, be-
tween April 15, 1043, and May 1, 1943, on the high-level discussions
between the British and American authorities on the International
Red Cross situation ?
IMr. MiKOLAJCZYK. As I said, our demand for investigating that by
the Red Cross was received very badly even in the west, and during a
cabinet meeting. Prime Minister Sikorski told us that he had ex-
changed arguments with the British Government about the case and
he was going to withdraw the demand for the International Red Cross
investigiition.
Mr. ^IriciiELL. General Sikorski was killed on July 4 or 5, 1943;
is tliat right?
Mr. Ml KOLAJCZYK. That is right.
Mr. Mn CHELL. When did you become Prime Minister of Poland fer-
tile government in exile in London ?
THE KATYN . 'OREST MASSACRE 2161
]Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I was Acting Vice Premier at the moment when
'General Sikorski was killed. I sent a telegram to the nndergronnd
authorities because part of the Polish Government in exile was in the
underground, namely, the Deputy Prime Ministers and three Minis-
ters, and there was an underground parliament. I sent a telegram,
and in about 2 weeks' time after the discussion, they asked me to take
over the prime-ministership, and from that time I was appointed as
the Prime Minister.
Mr. MrrcHEi.L. In your official capacity as Prime Minister, when
•did you first talk to Mr. Eoosevelt, the President ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. It w^as June 1944.
Mr. Mitchell. Was the Katyn affair mentioned at that time?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. When I became Acting Prime Minister, the
Polish situation became much worse. Relations were already broken
with the Soviets. The attempts of General Sikorski to restore the
relations did not succeed, and we were in a very desperate siutation.
Our underground, which at that time grew very strong, about 300,-
000 soldiers in the home army and peasant battalions, was in the
middle between the Nazis, under the occupation, and the advancing
Soviet armies.
Therefore, my effort was to find a solution so the situation would
be not so that the same people who were fighting against the Nazi
occupation would either have to fight the new occupation or be mur-
dered by the Soviets.
Therefore, all efforts M^ere made to restore the relation with Soviet
Russia and to find a guaranty and a help both from the United States
as well as from the British (rovernment to save the situation in Poland.
Therefoi'e, I approached the American Ambassador in London with
the request to see President Roosevelt, especially when we got the
news that in a short time the conference in Casablanca would be held.
I asked even by a telegram for the possibility to meet the President
on his way to Casablanca.
Later the Tehran Conference was held.
]Mr. Mitchell. When was that, sir ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. December 1944.
Officially, the communique which was published speaking about the
freedom, independence of Iran and China, seemed very favorable,
■condemning every totalitarianism and other things.
It was just what we would like also to have for Poland. We also
got reports that the question of Poland had been discussed there. But
we could not find anv proof how this problem had been solved, if it
had.
In March 1944 I sent a letter to President Roosevelt, which is a
public document — I will not repeat it — emphasizing in this letter the
situation of Poland and all the problems which were facing us.
The visit had been delayed for a few weeks still, but finally it was
set for June 1944. Here, in a conversation with the President, I dis-
cussed all those problems with him which were facing us.
But I must say that we knew that the Soviets were bandits, but some-
times when you are in a situation when you cannot escape the presence
of the bandits in your home, in this moment you will not raise the
question of the previous murders in Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, at that conference with the Presi-
dent, did you discuss the boundaries of Poland ?
2162 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. MiKOLAJczYK. I asked President Roosevelt to back us up in our
rights about the Polish territories and the frontiers of 1939. Presi-
dent Roosevelt answered that he would back us up, that he was con-
vinced that he could help us to retain Lwow, Tarnopol, the potash
mines in Kaluez and oil in Drohobycz, Kalisz, but he was very doubt-
ful if he could convince Stalin about Wilno.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, the Atlantic Charter was in effect
at that time. One of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter was that
there be no territorial gains on the part of any of the Allies.
Now, you are in the position of discussing the matter with President
Roosevelt in June 1944; is that correct?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. At that time the President is telling you that he is
not convinced in his own mind that he can save all the boundaries, but
that he can save part of the eastern portion of Poland; is that correct?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes.
Mr, Mitchell. What transpired after this discussion ? What did
you report back to your Government.
Mr. Mikolajczyk. The position of our Government was to ask the
American as well as the British Government to not deal with the ques-
tion of frontiers during wartime. And my discussion with President
Roosevelt was along this line.
The Soviets were always bringing two conditions in jjublic for the
restoration of the Polish-Soviet relations, one, to make changes in the
Polish Government in London; second, to recognize the so-called
Curzon line.
Unofficially, the first demand always Avas that we should denounce
our demand for the International Red Cross investigation and should
announce that we were wrong in asking for that investigation.
So, as far as July 1944, Lebicdcu, in London, was emphasizing that
maybe the Soviet demands about the reorganization of the Polisli
Government, about Poland eastern frontiers, would be changed if we
announced that we were wrong in bringing the Katyn case to the In-
ternational Red Cross.
And the situation was getting worse and worse in Poland. Tliere
was a tragic situation. The orders given to the Polish undeiground
by the Polish Government and military authorities were to fight the
Gei-mans to the end and then try to go in contact with the advancing-
Soviet armies.
And for a few months hi the eastern part of Poland, I must say
that the Soviets were very favorable to collaboration with the Polish
iindei'ground armies.
But the officers of the Red army were always saying. "AVait 2 or 3
da.ys and you will see what will hai)|)en." And exactly after the job
luid l)een done in a certain area, the officers and soldiers of the l\)lish
undeiground army, who were in the connnon fight first in the under-
ground against the (Jernums and later in the open fight against the
Gei'inans. in view of the Russians' advancing forces, were arrested and
sent to Siberia.
Mr. Mrrc^iiELL. Are these the Polish underground forces that were
there all during the war?
Mr. INIiKOLAJczYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. And as soon as they Morked with the Soviets and
came out in the open and started lo light against the Gei-mans. after
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2163
that particular area was conquered they were shipped off to Siberia ; is
that correct?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Yes. Some of them were shot and some were
arrested and sent to Siberia.
Now, coming back to the frontier question, we tried to get an agree-
ment, and we announced that maybe a demarcation line would serve
this problem. This was rejected. And only at the conference at
Moscow in October I got to know that the question of the Polish
frontiers was discussed
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that October 1944?
Mr. MikoijAjczyk. Yes; had been discussed and settled in Tehran,
namely, during the discussion, when I was still fighting in the interests
of the Polish state, Molotov
Mr. MrrciiP:LL. Excuse me a minute so we will understand that.
Who was present at this conference that you had in October in
Moscow in 1944 ?
Mr. ^NfiKOLAJczYK. There was Mr. Stalin, Molotov, Mr. Churchill
and Mr. p]den, and Mr. Harriman, Professor Gravski, and Mr. Romer,
and myself.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Proceed, Mr. Mikolajczyk, please.
Mr. ]\liK0LAJCZYK. There during this meeting, when I was arguing
with Stalin, Molotov rose and said, ""But, gentlemen, what are we
speaking about I This problem was already settled in Tehran.''
And it was the first official acknowledgment given to me that the
problem of the Polish frontiers had been settled in Tehran.
JNIr. Mitchell. When did Tehran take place?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. December 1944.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do I understand, then, that the first time you or
any other member of the Polish Government in exile knew that the
boundaries of Poland had been already determined was in Moscow
in December 1944?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. How many months was that already after it
had been accomplished?
Mr. JNliKOLAjczYK. I made a mistake about the year. It was De-
cember 1943, Tehran. And I was speaking about October 1944.
Mr. Machrowicz. Tehran was December 1943, and your Govern-
ment, the officially recognized Government of Poland at that time,
was first notified of territorial changes of Poland how many months
after the accomplished fact ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. The Soviets, in their public demand, were de-
manding it all the time through.
Mr. ^Machrowicz. I mean how many months after Tehran?
Mr. INIikolajczyk. About 9 months.
Mr. Machrowicz. Nine months after Tehran you were first notified
in Moscow that your own boundaries had been changed and that there
was nothing more to do, nothing more to talk about ?
]Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes.
Mr, Machrowicz. And no rei)resentative of the Polish Government
was present at Tehran, was there?
Mr. ]\flK0LAJCZYK. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Then it was not at Yalta that the boundaries were
settled. - Actuallv, thev were settled at Tehran and vour first informa-
2164 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
tion concerning; it was at this meeting in Moscow in October 1944; is
that correct ?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Yes.
^[v. Mitchell. Proceed, please. Tell us what happened at Moscow
in October 1944.
]VIr. MiKLOAJCZYK. The conference did not bring any results because
of the demand of the Soviets to recognize these frontiers in the first
place. I went back to London.
Mr. Machrow^icz. Just a moment before you go into that.
At that conference in Moscow in 1944, was the question of Katyn
discussed?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No, sir.
Mr. Machrow^icz. Did you not raise the question?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why not ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. As I told you, sir, at that time it was a question
of life and death of the Polish Nation to make oi* to find a certain
solution in the catastrophical situation in Poland.
At that time it was not only a question of those who are already dead,
but those who have been again murdered, transferred to Soviet Russia,
arrested. And all our effort was to stop this.
Mr. Mitchell. You returned to London after this Moscow con-
f ei'ence ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you tell your Government at that time?
What did you tell your Government in London ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I reported the situation, all the demands. And
the Government sent two letters, one to President Roosevelt, the other
to the British Government, asking some explanation and Jilso raising
some ])oints about the Polish problem.
I don't want to repeat these documents. The answer of the British
Government is publicly known, as well as the letter of President Roose-
velt, whose letter was brought to me by Mr. Harriman, who announced,
being on his way from the White House to INIoscow, that the President
asked him to ask the Polish Govermiient if he should raise once more
with Stalin the question of the Polish territory. But he was em-
powered to do so, to speak to Stalin on behalf of the southeastern part,
but not about Wilno.
]\rr. INIiTCHELL. In other words, what you are telling the conmiittee
this morning is that Mr. Harriman told you that when he went through
Loudon on his way to INIoscow, he had permission from the President
of the ITnited States to discuss only the portion of Poland that you had
previously discussed with the President, the southeastei-n jiortion, and
no other discussion?
Were those the instructions ^Nfr. Hai'riman had to discuss with
Stalin?
.Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. As I say, Mr. Harriman brought the letter which
was in answer to the Polish Government to all other questions, and he
told me that he was empowered to approach once more ]\Ir. Stalin, if
the Polish Government Avould see that it would be useful, and fight on
behalf of us for the eastern territories, concerning the southeastern
tei'ritories, not the Wilno area.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2165
I Avant to make it clear that it does not mean he said, "I acknowledge
that this territory slionkl be ceded." He said he was empowered to
fifjht for those territories.
Mr. Mitchell. Only the sontheastern part ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCzYK, Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, there was to be a chaiioe, in the eyes of
the American representatives, of some type ?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. I wonkl say that is much of the same line that
President Roosevelt told me, that he was convinced that he wonld be
able to save for ns from Stalin the sontheastern territories, but he
was doubtful if we would be able to save Wilno.
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question, turning back again to this
Moscow meeting.
When you, as the then Prime JMinister of the legally recognized
Govermnent of Poland, were informed that several months prior
thereto tlie boundaries of your own country had already been deter-
mined, did you make any protestations?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I asked the q,uestion immediately at the meeting.
Mr. Machrowicz. I mean during the meeting.
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you make any protestations during that
meeting ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I asked, "Is it true?'" because it was a shock
to me.
From the British side, it was acknowledged. I asked Mr. Harriman.
After the conference he said, "It must be a misunderstanding. I will
ask the President and will give you all information."
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you make any other protestations ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. The whole meeting was a protestation. I was
sitting alone against the Big Powers.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you tell the committee what happened in
London when you reported back to your Government?
Mr. ]\IiK0LAjczYK. My Government Avas of the opinion that if we
were getting help only for the southeastern part, that meant we were
conceding the other part.
My personal opinion was that we don't concede anything, but in this
tragic situation we should seek every help and in every form which is
available. Therefore, I resigned.
]VIr. ]\IiTCiiELL. You resigned at that time ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you give us a specific reason wh}^ you resigned ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. There was a difference of opinion. The majority
of the Government was of the opinion that if we could not get the back-
ing of all our interests concerning the eastern frontiers, and if we
should ask INIr. HariTman that he would apj^roach once more about
the southeastern part, that meant we were giving up the other part,
our rights to the other part.
I was of the opinion that we were not giving up our rights and that
we, in our desperate situation, should take and ask for every help
which was possible under the circumstances.
Therefore, I resigned.
2166 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machkowicz. Do I understand, then, the reason for your break-
ing with the London Polish government was your insistence on not
giving in at all on territorial concessions? Is that correct?
Mr. MiKOLAJczYK. Yes.
INIr. Machrowicz. Mr. Mikolajczyk, in other words, what you were
doing for breaking with the London government is that you were
taking the position of President Roosevelt; is that correct?
In other words, you were accepting the fact that it was best to be on
the side of the big powers in this discussion ?
Mv. Mikolajczyk. I don't think it is a question to be on one side
or the other. I was always on the side of the Polish nation.
But I was in the position of the weak, who have to take sometimes,
even with humiliation, what is oU'ered to them and ask for help in a
terrible situation, even if a big and strong one is not giving you every-
thing which you w\ant.
Mr. Mitchell. Now will you tell the committee what happened to
you from 1944 through June of 1945 ?
And when I am referring to that period, I refer to the Yalta pro-
visions which provided that the three ambassadors, Molotov, Clark-
Kerr, the British Ambassador, and Harriman would get together then
to try to work out some kind of an arrangement. I understand that
you were a private citizen in England at that time.
Mr. INIiKOLAJCzYK. After my resignation I was a private citizen and
also the chairman of the Polish Peasant Party.
Mr. Mitchell. You were chairman of tlie Polish Peasant Party :*
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes. Mr. Witos, the former three-times Polish
Minister, was in Poland. We tried to bring him out fi-om Poland in
1944. Unfortunately, the airplane that was flying didn't find the
right conditions, and the next month it was already too late to bring
him out from Poland.
Mr. Mitchell. Was the Polish Peasant Party still a member of the
government in exile after you resigned ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. The Polish Peasant Party was not a member of
the government in exile in London, but was still a member of the imder-
ground j^arliament and underground government in Poland. In
February 1945 the Yalta Conference took place. After the Yalta Con-
ference, on the 17th of March, the Policy Deputy Priuie ISIiuister in
Warsaw, Mr. Janrowski, was approached by a Soviet officer named
Pimonow.
After the second meeting there, they were asked to meet with Soviet
General Iwanow, a member of the Parliament and a member of the
underground goveinment, i)lus (Tcneral Okulicki, former conunauder
of the underground home army, whicli at tliat time had been dissolved.
On March 28, 1945, there also went 12 other umlerground leaders to
meet the Soviet genei-al.
Mr. Mitchell. Had the so-called Lublin government been estab-
lished by tlie Soviets at that time?
Ml'. INIiKOLAJC^zYK. There were two stages in establishing the so-
called Lublin government. First, after my visit to the White House
in June 1944, President Koosevelt telegrai)hed Stalin if he would re-
ceive me for a conversation. He got a negative answer. Then the
Bi-it ish (lovcM'nment took over the initiat ive aiul pressed for a meeting.
On the .'loth of July 19-14, I made my first trip to Moscow. Only
wlien I was in Cairo did I get the news that in the meantime, (m the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2167
25th of July, the Soviets had recognized the Lublin group, but not as
a government, but rather as a so-called administrative body. It
turned out later that this administrative body had to sign the conces-
sion, on the 2-ith of July 1944, about the Curzon line, conceding all of
the territories, east from that line to Soviet Russia and, secondly, to
agree that all of the justice on the whole Polish territory would be
done by the Soviet commander of the advancing Red Army.
So I was considering in Tehran whether there was still reason to
fly in when the day before this had occurred. I got a telegram en-
couraging me to go in, and I went to Moscow.
jNIr. Machrow^icz. Was this telegram from Mr. Harriman?
Mr. MiKOLAJCzYK. No. It was a telegram from my Government
at that time.
Mr. INIachrowicz. You mean the London Government?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk was still Prime Minister.
Mr. Mikolajczyk. And at this moment there was also an uprising
in Warsaw, against the Germans took place. My first duty, there-
fore, was to ask Stalin for help in the Warsaw uprising. After the
first 4 days, I got the answer that there was no uprising at all, that
there was no fighting at all, that it was only propaganda of the Polish
underground.
After 6 days they acknowledged the flight in Warsaw, and Mr.
Stalin promised to send his liaison officers, and there was even some
technical advice given from Warsaw through London to Moscow how
the contact could be made. But after the conversation and my return
to London, Stalin didn't send any help and even acted against the
lielp for the Warsaw uprising.
When I asked Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt to intervene
Stalin opposed it for a long time, although 104 American airplanes
were I'eady to fly from the London airports over Warsaw and drop
supplies.
Mr. DoNDERO. May I ask whether the uprising was one led by Gen-
eral Bor ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the first step in the formation of the Lub-
lin government ?
Mr. jSIikolajczyk. Yes. The second step was in December 1944,
Avhen the Lublin administrative body, so-called, announced themselves
as the Polish Government, On the 7th of January 1945, they were
recognized by the Soviet as the Polish Government. Unfortunately,
the text of the Yalta agreement, de facto, recognized this Lublin gov-
ernment and spoke only about the reconstruction of this government.
As I said before, in March 1945, the 16 leaders went in AVarsaw sup-
posedly for a conference with General Iwanow. There they were told
that they would be flown over to Moscow for a political conversation,
a conference. They were even promised that after the conversation in
Moscow they would have the right to fly over to London. But instead
of a political conversation, they were landed about 100 miles from
Moscow, by accident, on snow and were brought by train to the Mos-
cow prison.
In the meantime in April 1945 Mr. Stalin made an agreement with
Mr. Bierut, of the Lublin government, about the political and mili-
tary alliance between Poland and Soviet Russia.
2168 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The news about the arrest of the 16 leaders became known when
finally Mr. Molotov, at San Francisco, I think in May 1945, an-
nounced that the leaders were in prison in Moscow.
Mr. Mitchell. You were tellino; the committee that Molotov had
conceded or announced in May 1915, at the San Francisco Conference
of the United Nations, that these 16 underground leaders who were
formerly members of the Polish Government in exile were imprisoned
in Moscow at that time. Is that correct?
Mr. MiKOLAJCzYK. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell us briefly now what happened from
then until July 5, 1945? I would like to have you discuss specifically
the meeting that you had with Clark-Kerr, Averell Harriman, and
Molotov in June 1945, how you happened to be invited to that meet-
ing, and what transpired at that meeting. This was in conformity
with the Yalta agreement.
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. In June 1945, I got an invitation to participate
in the consultation of the three Ambassadors who, it had been an-
nounced at the conference, were first to form a provisional Polish
Government and, secondly, to secure a free and unfettered election in
Poland.
Mr. Mitchell. Who did you get that invitation from?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. I got the invitation from the three members
of the Commission — Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Clark-Kerr.
Mr. Mitchell. And it was signed by all three of them ?
Mr. MiKOLxVjczYK. Yes.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Let me ask you a question there. The Polish Gov-
ernment in exile in London was still functioning?
Mr. ]\IiKOLAJczYK. Yes.
Mr, Maciirowicz. Were any members of that Government invited?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you raise that point at the time you arrived
in Moscow ?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No.
]Mr. Machrowicz. Why not?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. If I have to answer that question, I Avill have
to use more time to explain the Polish political situation.
Mr. ISIachrowicz. The fact is that the Polish Government in exile
was not invited; is that right?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. The provisions of the agreement at Yalto did
not foresee that.
Mr, Machrowicz. Although you knew that the purpose of the meet-
ing was to discuss the future governmental structure and the terri-
torial boundaries of Poland?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Not the territory.
Mr. Machrowicz. The governmental structure.
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. Tlunv was tlie (luestion of the fonuing of the
provisional Polish (iovernment and the question of the free and un-
fettered elections in l*oland.
Mr. Machrowicz. But nevertheless the Polish Government in exile
and no representative of that government was invited to attend?
Mr. MiKOLAJCZYK. No.
Mr. Mitchell. At that time, for the record, will you please clarify
your position ? What were you at that time ? You were not a member
of any goxcniment, the Polish Government, I mean.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2169
Mr. MiKOLAjczTK. I think since Congressman Maclirowicz asked
that question, I should exphiin this situation. Unfortunately, before
the war the Polish Constitution, after the coup d'etat of Marshal
Pilsudski, was a totalitarian one and was thrown on the Polish people
without the consent of those people.
Mr. Machrowicz. I don't think we want to go into that. Regard-
less of how that constitution was formed, it did not bar you from
becoming a member of that Government.
Of course, Mr. Chairman, if the witness wants to go into the
question of the Pilsudski regime, it is all right with me.
Mr. MiKOLAJCzYK. Therefore the forming the first Polish Govern-
ment in exile was not the question of the constitution. It was a
question of the political agreement based on the Polish authorities
of the main Polish democratic parties. As a result of this, the Polish
Government in exile consisted of members of the Parliament as well
as of the underground.
Chairman Madden. Let us confine this to the testimony on the
Katyn massacre.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, let me see if we can get back on
the track here. We would like to have you explain at this particular
time what transpired at the time of the conference between the three
ambassadors, Averell Harriman, Molotov, and Clark-Kerr, and what
discussions you had as an individual or as a representative of the
Polish Peasant Party at that meeting in Moscow in June of 1945.
Just tell us what transpired.
Mr. Mikolajczyk, As I say, my departure from Moscow was
delayed for 24 hours because I asked the release of the 16 arrested
leaders of the underground. Before going to Moscow I was told that
this question would be brought up at the meeting of the three mem-
bers. Mr, Clark-Kerr telegraphed that he was conviced that this
problem would be satisfactorily^ solved before the consultation took
place.
Unfortunately the situation reversed itself. At the same moment
when the consultation was taking place the trial of the 16 leaders
occurred in Moscow, Secondly, they discussed the candidates from
Poland who should be invited and that they again met the opposition
of Mr. Molotov or Stalin.
Anyhow, there was the question of inviting Cardinal Sapieha.
There was the question of inviting Mr. Trampczynski. There was
the question of inviting Mr. Witos. There was the question of inviting
the former President living in Poland, Wojciechowski.
The agreement among the three was to invite from Poland Mr.
Witos, Mr. Zulawski, and Professor Kutrzeba.
When we arrived in Moscow the first conversation was with
Mr. Zulawski and the dean of the Cracow University , Professor
Kutrzeba.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mikolajczyk, the fact remains, as far as we
are concerned now, that you have explained that you were invited to
this conference of the three ambassadors which was provided for in the
Yalta agreement. Now, as far as I am concerned, I don't have any
more questions. You have clarified the record up through and includ-
ing yesterday because Mr. Harriman testified here yesterday and
admitted to that conference that you had in Moscow in June of 1945.
2170 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Now, I believe, Mr. Chairman, some of the members of the com-
mittee may liave some questions.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I have a couple of questions.
Mr. Maciirowicz. If I may, I would like to finish.
What was the reason for your break with the London Government?
Mr. MiKOLAJczTK. I said that I was of the opinion that we should
take every kind of help even when it was not satisfactory from the
big powers. My other members said that if we don't get the whole
thing, tliat means we are conceding our right to some Polish territory,
while my opinion was we are conceding nothing and we should take
every help which we are able to get.
It was rather a question of tactics.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Tlien you subsequently became the Vice Premier
of the so-called Unity Government in Warsaw; is that rights
Mr. Mikolajczyk. The Provincial Polish Government.
Mr. Maciirowicz. The Provisional Government under the Yalta-
agreement ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes,
Mr. Machrowicz. Were any of the members of the Polish London
Government — did any of them participate in that Government?
Mr. Mikolajczyk, You mean previous members of the Government ?
Mr. Maciirowicz. Yes; previous members.
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who ?
Mr, Mikolajczyk. Mr, Stanczyk.
j\Ir, Maciirowicz. He was a member of your party who resigned
with you ; is that correct?
IVIr. Mikolajczyk. No.
Mr. Machrowicz, AYlio is he ?
Mr, Mikolajczyk. He is a Socialist.
Mr, Machrowicz, When you became Vice Premier of Poland in
Warsaw, did you make any attempts to investigate the Katyn
massaci'e ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk, Yes,
Mr, Maciirowicz. What did you do?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. I could do this only by secret activity, you under-
stand. The situation was such at that time that I couldn't do
Mr. Machrowicz. What secret activity could you conduct in a coun-
try dominated by the Connnunists?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. At that time the situation was such that we
could do this.
Ml'. Machrowicz. You understood this to be a unit government, not
a Gonuuunist-controUed government. Isn't that rigiit ^
]\Ir. Mikolajczyk. No. I have never had any iUusion tliat this,
agreement made with the Soviets or with the Polish Gomunniists would
be kept. The question was not a question of unity. I'he (juestion was,
first of all, to stop the deportation and the arrest of the thousands of
Polish underground peojde. As a chairman of the Polish Peasant
Party, I and some of tlie Polish peasantry and the Peasantry Battalion
were involved and liad the duty to do this.
Secondly, we had been accused as Poles of not being friends with our
neighboi-s, of being such (|uarrelsome peoi)le, and so on, and so on.
Thirdly, by the most conservative press in the United States at that-
time we were accused that we diihTt know what were the feelings of
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2171
the Polish 23eople, that the situation had changed, and so on, and so
on, and that we had to prove once more that we could establish good
neighborly relations and help to bring about free and unfettered
elections.
Mr. Machrowicz. Xow, I understood you to say that when you
entered this (Tovernment you knew that it was a Communist-domi-
nated government i'
Mr. MiKOLAJczYK. Sure.
]Mr. Machrowicz. And you knew that the London Government had
refused to participate in it?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Yes. I knew also that the London Government
was asked by the Polish underground to resign.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, 1 have here a message dated June 23, 1945,
from Ambassador Harriman to the Department of State, in which
he makes this comment. I will read the comment and then ask for
your comments on it.
(The portion of the message referred to was off the record.)
]\lr. Machrowicz. Do you have any comments about that statement
made by Ambassador Harriman?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. What i« that statement ? Is that a public state-
ment ?
Mr. Machrowicz. This is a message which you sent to the Depart-
ment of State on June 23, 1915. Does that correctly express your
views?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Not exactly, but it was probably taken from the
official conferences.
Mr. Machrow^icz. What is that ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. It was probably taken from the official announce-
ments that I made and which I had to make if I wanted to have the
possibility to fight in Poland for two and a half years that we had.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you express tlien your confidence that this
was one of the best pacts for a free and independent Poland?
]\Ir. Mikolajczyk. No. I hoped that that way would lead to a free
and independent Poland.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say that that would insure the participa-
tion in the Government of the great independent parties ?
INIr. Mikolajczyk. I did at that time.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you call for closer cooperation with the
Soviet Union ?
Mr. ]MiKOLAJCZYK. We were always saying publicly and in front of
Mr. Stalin that we wanted friendly relations with Soviet Russia, but as
a free and independent people.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, did you subsequently change your mind as
to the wisdom of your joining the Polish Government in Warsaw, the
so-called Unity Government ?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Is that a political question or a witness question?
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, it is a question which you may refuse to
answer, if you wish.
Mr. Mikolajczyk. I am convinced that the millions of Polish
people who were for two and a half years fighting Soviet domination
in Poland with my help and with my participation did the best for
their country as well as for the awareness of the Communist danger
by the whole democratic world. From that point of view, I feel that
2172 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
it was my duty to do so, and we have done our duty in my conscience
well.
Mr. Machrowicz. On or about November 25, 1944, did you have a
conversation with Ambassador Winant in London ?
Mr. MiKOLA jczYK. When ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Around November 25, 1944?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. I don't recall that. I remember once a confer-
ence with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Winant as a guest.
Mr. Machrowicz. I may say to you that on November 25, 1944,
Ambassador Winant notified the Department of State as follows :
(The quoted statement was off the record.)
Mr. MiKOLA jczK. Exactly as I said before.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you feel that your colleagues in Government
were right, and that your estimate of the future was wrong?
Mr. MiKOLAJCzYK. Today I would say, after all of the books which
have been published, that I feel I was right. We should not have
rejected the help of the United States at that time even w^hen it was
not fully satisfactory for Poland.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was not the matter not a question of the rejec-
tion of the help of the United States, but a question of appeasing
Soviet Russia by accepting a shameful compromise ?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. I don't think so.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Mikolajczyk, as the leader of the Polish Peas-
ant Party, did you not undertake to seek out any evidence inside of
Poland after the Katyn massacre about who was guilty of it?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. Sir, I will express myself in this way : We were
in a situation
Mr. Sheehan. Did you or did you not seek out any information?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. We were in a situation where officially nothing
-could be done.
Mr. Sheehan. Then you did not seek out any evidence?
Mr. Mikolajczyk. No. I did everything that was possible as a
person to find material, and I reported about the conference with Mr.
Sawicki.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, what was the date of your question?
Was it when he was Prime Minister, or afterward ?
Mr. Sheehan. While he was Prime Minister and afterward, at any
time.
Mr. Mitchell. As Prime Minister I thought you brought out this
morning that when you were the head of the interior you were working
with the underground of Poland.
Mr. Mikolajczyk. That is what I tried to bring out.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Mr. Sheehan, I believe you want to ask the
witness what he did on his return.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you at any time seek out any evidence inside of
Poland about the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Mitchell. The answer is "Yes."
Mr. Sheehan. What did you do with that evidence? Where is it
today ?
IVIr. Mikolajczyk. I turned it over to the Government files.
Mr. Sheehan. Which government, the government in exile ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2173
]\Ir. MiKOLAjczTK. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you. Are you familiar with any attempt on
the part of the Warsaw Communist government to collect or destroy
any evidence regardino- the Katyn massacre in 1945 or thereafter^
Air. JNliKOLAjczTK. Congressman, as I was telling you in the
beginning
Chairman Madden. Speak a little louder, please.
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. I was telling you that the Communist gov-
ernment tried to get all of the material, and have a public trial in
Poland to clear the Soviets of the responsibility.
Mr. Sheeiian. When was that ? What year ?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. In 1945 and 1946.
Mr. Sheehan. 1945 and 1946?
Mr. MiKOLAjczYK. Yes. But, as I said, when the Minister of Jus-
tice, who was Mr. Swiatkowski, together with Mr. Sawicki, went to
Moscow, he got the answer to drop this case, and that they didn't
want it.
Mr. Sheeiian. I have no further questions.
Mr. ]\1itciiell. No further questions.
Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask this question : In your opinion, who
was guilty of the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Mikolajcztk. There was never any doubt for me — the Soviets.
]Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever express any other opinion in any
interview to the newspapers ?
Mr. MIKOLAJCZYK. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
]Mr. OlvoNSKi. I have several questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. OTvonski.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Mikolajczyk, in your dealings with the Ameri-
can authorities during this critical time, did you get the impression
that you should not force the issue on such things as the Katyn
massacre and the truth about Stalin and the truth about Russia; that
your attitude should be one more or less of compromise rather than
telling the truth ? Did you get the general impression in dealing with
the American authorities, that is, that you should go easy on the
Russians ? Is that more or less the feeling that you got as represented
by our country ?
Mr. Mikolajcztk. I didn't have the opportunity to discuss that
exactly w'ith the American authorities, but it was at that time gen-
erally said to us : "You have to settle the problems of the Polish-Soviet
relations. These people are dead. You will not help them, but you will
spoil the collaboration of the Allies. Therefore, keep silent."
In my letter to President Roosevelt, in 1944, I said that there were
many things that had happened to us which we were not revealing
so as not to spoil the relations between the Allies, but that we were
appealing for help and the knowledge of truth. I had in mind this.
Mr. OlvoNSKL That is all.
Chairman Madden. We wish to thank you for appearing here today
as a witness, Mr. Mikolajczyk.
93744— 52— pt. 7 23
2174 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
TESTIMONY OF ALAN CRANSTON, LOS ALTOS, CALIF.
Chairman Madden. Our next witness is Mr. Alan Cranston.
Will you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly
swear that you will testify to the truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you God ?
Mr. Cranston. I do.
Chairman Madden. State your full name, please.
Mr. Cranston. Alan Cranston.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Cranston. 1237 Hilltop, Los Altos.
Chairman Madden. Los Angeles ?
Mr. Cranston. Los Altos, Calif.
Chairman Madden. And your business ?
Mr. Cranston. I am in the building and real estate business.
Chairman Madden. All right, proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Cranston, where were you born ?
Mr. Cranston. In Palo Alto, Calif.
Mr. Mitchell. What year ?
Mr. Cranston. June 19, 1914.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you go to school ?
Mr. Cranston. Stanford University.
Mr. Mitchell. What year did you graduate ?
Mr. Cranston. 1936.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do upon your graduation ?
Mr. Cranston. I went to work for the Hearst newspapers, working
for Universal Service and the International News Service as a for-
eign correspondent.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was that work, in the United States or out-
side the United States ?
Mr. Cranston. It was outside the United States, primarily in Eng-
land, Italy, and in Ethiopia.
Mr. Mitchell. England, Italy, and Ethiopia ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you return to the United States ?
Mr. Cranston. In the late part of 1938.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do upon your return to the United
States?
Mr. Cranston. I went to work for an organization called the
Common Council for American Unity. That was an organization
that worked closely with the Department of Justice and other Gov-
ernment agencies in transmitting information to foreign-language
newspapers and radio stations in this country in regard to America
and American life and government problems, and which also sought
to diminish discrimination in this country against people of foreign
birtli and extraction of all various faiths and nationalities.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you say that this organization, the Common
Council for American Unity, worked closely with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation?
Mr. Cranston. I didn't say the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I said the De]xirtment of Justice. We collaborated witli the Alien
Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in getting informa-
tion out to foreign-born people in this country about the Alien
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2175
Eegistration Act and were under contract with the Department of
Justice for a time.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you aflBliated with that Council for
American Unity ?
Mr. Cranston. I think it was something like 2 years.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do after that ?
Mr. Cranston. I went to work for the United States Government
shortly after Pearl Harbor, for the Office of Facts and Figures, which
subsequently was merged into the Office of War Information.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you give us the date on which you entered the
Office of Facts and Figures ?
Mr. Cranston. It was either in December 1941 or January 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your official position in the Office of
Facts and Figures ?
Mr. Cranston. At that time I was Chief of the Foreign Language
Division, which had responsibilities inside this country in dealing
with foreign-language press, radio, and foreign-language newspapers
in general.
Mr. Mitchell. You were Chief of the Foreign Language Division ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes. I had the same title in the Office of War
Liformation.
Mr. Mitchell. This concerned only domestic matters?
Mr. Cranston. Yes; dissemination within the borders of this
country.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, as we refer to it, it was not overseas^
but it was domestic ?
Mr. Cranston. That is right, although we dealt with information
relating to problems overseas, the war, and so forth, and so on.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you received the information com-
ing in from overseas and then had control of the distribution of it
among the foreign-language press and radio of this country?
Mr. Cranston. We did distribute to foreign-language press and
radio groups in this country.
Mr. Mitchell. You said that you had the same position in the
Office of War Information?
Mr. Cr-^nston. Yes. The Division was carried on in the Domestic
Branch of the OWL There were two branches, the Overseas Branch,
which dealt abroad, and the Domestic Branch, which dealt within
the borders of this country.
Mr. Mitchell. I think that the OWI came into existence on July
25,1942. Is that correct?
Mr. Cranston. Approximately at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Elmer Davis testified to that the other day.
Now, will you tell us your specific duties in this position ?
Mr. Cranston. The primary purpose was to distribute information
to people who depended primarily upon foreign languages for their
information. First of all we put out information about price control^
about selective service, about war manpower needs, and so forth^,
working in, I think, up to 27 different languages in this country.
Mr. Mitchell. Concerning American issues ?
Mr. Cranston. We sought to develop the understanding of these
people who depended upon foreign languages of their responsibilities
in the American war effort, in understanding why we were fighting^
2176 THE KATYN FOREST ]VIASSACRE
and we sought to cement down or nail down their k)yalty to this
country. We sought to keep them from developing loyalties to other
nations. We wanted their loyalties to this country and to our war
effort.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, it was more or less an interpretation of
the news of the various emergency agencies and things of tliat nature
that you were primarily concerned with ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, but we were also concerned with a great many
disputes and arguments which arose among these foreign-language
groups due to the loyalties of some members of those to perhaps other
countries or to the interests of other nations. We sought to play them
down and to lay emphasis in our releases and activities that we under-
took upon their devotion to the United States and to the cause of the
United Nations.
I would like to say that this was a very difficult field. There were
many difficult problems and personalities that we had to contend with.
It was work in the foreign-language field where some 12,000,000
Americans, I believe, were foreign born and something like anoth.er
54,000,000 were the children of foreign-born parents. Some of these
could not imderstand any language except their own.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. If I may interrupt for just one question, wasn't the
real purpose of your organization to instigate and sponsor loyalty
to Russia ?
Mr. Cranston. Absolutely not.
Mr. Mitchell. How were you first appointed to the Office of Facts
and Figures? What individual or organization was responsible for
your appointment to the Office of Facts and Figures ?
Mr. Cranston. As I recall, three individuals recommended me for
that position. I recall the names of two. I am not sure who the
t bird one was. One was M. E. Gilf ond.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was he?
Mr. Cranston, He was in the Department of Justice and in charge
of public relations and information and Avas an assistant to the At-
torney General at that time, who, I think, was INIr. Jackson. The
second was R. Keith Kane. He is now a New York attorney and a
member of the Harvard Corp. He is on the board, in other words,
of Harvard University.
I don't recall the third person. Possibly it was Mr. Read Lewis,
wlio is the executive director of the Common Council for American
Unity, the organization I worked for. But I am not sure that he
specifically recommended me.
Mr. Mitchell. Are those the individuals whose names you put on
your Government form when you applied for a position ?
Mr, Cranston. I believe that the first two that I named were on
the Government form. I know that they recommended me.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you ever in the United States Army?
Mr. Cranston. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. When ?
Mr. Cranston. The OWI sought to defer me in the early part of
1944. I asked them not to, and I enlisted as a private in 1044. I was
in until after VJ-day.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did you decide to make that decision?
IVIr. Cranston. I just didn't want to be deferied. I felt that it was
up to the Army to decide manpower needs, atul (hat if tlu\v wanted me
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2177
I ^Yas ready to go. I just didn't want to be deferred. I wanted to
participate.
Mr. ^IiTCHELL. You were in a very, very important job, according
to your description of your duties at that time, and 1944 was a very
critical year. I would like to know why you decided that your serv-
ices in the Office of War Information were not, shall we say, of greater
value to the national interest than joining the Army as a private.
Mr. Craxstox. I stated in a memorandum to mj^ superiors in the
OWI that I felt that I had developed a division there that could stand
on its own feet, that I had trained others who could carry on the work
of the organization.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you reported to the United States Army,
where did you report for duty ?
Mr. Craxstox. I was assigned first of all to this camp which is
right over here in ISIaryland. I have forgotten the name of it. Then
I was sent down to Camp Croft in South Carolina for basic training.
Mr. Mitchell. What were your duties ?
Mr, Craxstox. I took basic training in the Infantry.
Mr. iSIiTCHELL. After you finished the Infantry School, where were
you assigned?
Mr. Craxstox. I was thereafter assigned to the Army Service
Forces, first in, I think it was, the Seventy-first Division, which was
at a camp in Missouri. Thereafter I was assigned to New York City
and to the Army Service Forces and worked on a publication called
Army Talk, which was a document prepared for distribution once a
week through the Army Service Forces for discussion purposes within
the Armed Forces.
i\Ir. ]\IiTCHELL. In other words, after you joined the Army you went
through the Infantry School and then practically reverted back to
the same type of work you M^ere doing in the OWI ?
Mr. Craxstox. But within the Armed Forces, yes.
Mr. ]MiTcnELL. You say but within the armed services ?
Mr. Crax^stox. Yes.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. What was your rank or rate when you reported for
duty with Army Talk, and in what year was that ?
Mr. Craxstox. It was in 1944. I was a private. I became a
sergeant.
Mr. Mitchell. In what year did you become a sergeant?
Mr. Crax^stox. I presume early in 1945.
Mr. Mitchell, When did you leave the United States Army ?
Mr. Craxstox". It was not very long after VJ-day, August or Sep-
tember or possibly October 1945.
IMr. Mitchell. "Wliat did you do after that ?
Mr. Craxstox. For a time I worked in Washington for an organi-
zation called the Council for American-Italian Affairs, which was
seeking to increase understanding in this country of the problems of
Italy in the postwar period. I spent considerable time in Italy working
for the Hearst papers, and that is why I became involved in this
particular thing.
After that I returned to California and went into the building and
real estate business.
Mr. Mitchell. Reverting back to your position in the Office of War
Information, will you explain to this committee how your particular
2178 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
division was set up within the OWI? Was it organized, shall we
say. through editors or desks or something along that line?
Mr. Cranston. I don't understand your question precisely. It was
a division established for the purpose of disseminating information
through the press, radio, and in every conceivable way in regard to
the war effort.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you had specialists on various assignments;
is that it?
Mr. Cranston. Yes. In certain languages we had individuals who
would write or translate material in those languages.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was your Polish-language man ?
Mr. Cranston. In the beginning we had one person handling the
Slavic field in general. His name was Paul Sturman. At some later
time a man named Adam Kulikowski handled the Polish-language
work on a part-time basis. He worked, as it was called, "WOC,"
without compensation.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you had no individual of Polish descent or
extraction in the OWI when you were there?
Mr. Cranston. Yes. We first had Mr. Sturman and then Mr. Kuli-
kowski, who was of Polish extraction.
Mr. Mitchell. When did he get there ?
Mr. Cranston. I am not really certain of the precise date. I pre-
sume it was late in 1942 or early in 1943, possibly toward the middle
of 1943. I am not sure of the date.
Mr. Machrowicz. Pardon me. May I ask along those lines whether
you had in your employ a Mira Zlotowski ?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. For the record, she worked for the OWI. She
was the wife of Prof. Ignatius Ludowski, who was the counselor of
the Communist Polish Embassy in Washington.
Mr. Cranston. She did not work under my supervision at any
time that I was in the OWI.
I might say that many times, in delving into the aifairs of the OWI,
there have been mix-ups between the Foreign Language Division, the
Domestic Division, and the Overseas Branch, which had a Polish desk.
Mr. Machrowicz. The Polish desk of the OWI ?
Mr. Cranston. She may have been there, but I do not know. But
I had no supervisional control in any way over that branch.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have in your employ an Irene Balinska?
Mr. Cranston. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. She was the daughter of the first counselor of the
Communist Polish Embassy in Washington.
Mr. Cranston. I never heard of her. She did not work for me.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have a Stefan Arski alias xVrthur Sal-
man?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. He is now the editor. in chief of a Communist
newspaper in Poland, an anti-American newspaper.
Mr. Cranston. To my knowledge I never met him.
Mr. M\ciiRowicz. All of these three people are former emplo3^ees
of the OWI.
Mr. Cranston. But not of the division in which I worked, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you explain to the committee why, with a pop-
ulation, I would say, of approximately 6,000,000 Polish people m
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2179
the United States, you did not have a full-time Polish employee in
your division?
Mr. Cranston. It was primarily a matter of budget. We started
off with somebody working on the Italian and German groups because
they were, I think, the largest. They were groups derived from lands
with which we were at war, and we felt that the problems there were
particularly acute. We sought to add people for other groups when
the budget permitted, but we were always under a pretty slim budget.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. What was the name of that Polish individual again
whom you employed early in 1943 ?
Mr. Cranston. Adam Kulikowski.
Mr. Mitchell, When the Katyn affair broke out on April 13, 1943,
did you consult him about it ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't recall what occurred in our branch or in our
division in direct relationship to the Katyn massacre.
When I received your letter indicating that you wished me to testify,
I wrote to him and to Sturman, who handled the Slavic languages
and who helped on the Polish work. I have received no reply from
Kulikowski. I have received a reply from Sturman indicating that
a release was put out on this question and that he consulted Kulikow-
ski on it.
Apparently Kulikowski was not there full time at that moment.
That is all I remember about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know what was in the release ?
Mr. Cranston. I do not have a copy of it. I do not remember it.
He states that he believed that at that time it went along the general
assumption that this was a Nazi propaganda trick, and he cited only
one fact that he remembers : that it stated in the release that the bodies
of the men had been shot in the nape of the neck in a manner typical
of slaughters that were knowm to have been committed by the Nazis
at various times.
Mr. Mitchell. Who stated that ?
Mr. Cranston. That was stated by Paul Sturman in the letter to
me when I wrote to him asking him whether he recalled anything about
this.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you have that letter ?
Mr. Cranston. I have it here.
Mr. Mitchell. May I have it, please, because I have searched
through history looking for one indication where the Nazis have used
that method of the extermination of people, and I have even gone as
far as the Army Historical Division to come up with an answer on
that since last fall when I started on this investigation.
Mr. Cranston. He does not cite any instance of this. He simply
states this.
Mr. Mitchell. May I have that for the record, please ?
Mr. Cranston. You may.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Mr. Dondero. Wasn't that also the Russian method of execution?
Mr. Cranston. Apparently it was.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know where Adam Kulikowski lives now ?
Mr. Cranston. So far as I know, he lives in Chicago.
Mr. Machrowicz. Chicago, 111. ; that is correct.
Mr. Cranston. The last I knew, he was the editor of a trade
magazine.
2180 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Was the name of the magazine "Success" ?
Mr. Cranston. No; "Opportunity."
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know that he has a reputation among
Americans of Polish descent in Chicago as a pro-Soviet sympathizer ?
Mr. Cranston. I do not.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to put this letter on the record, if you
don't mind, and then read it.
Mr. Cranston. Certainly.
Mr. Mitchell. The letter is dated November 5, 1952. The letter
is as follows :
Washington, D. C, November 5, 1952.
Mr. Alan Cranston,
12370 Hilltop, Los Altos, Calif.
Dear Alan : I have but a hazy recollection of the facts concerning an OWI
news release on the Katyn Forest massacre, but I do recall that a release was pre-
pared by me in cooperation with Adam Kulikowski.
Our source at that time, I believe, was the News Digest published in England.
The Nazis were charged with the crime as far as I can remember. The story
gave some details how the Polish Army officers were all shot in the nape of the
neck, a metliod practiced by Nazi executioners.
A copy of the release could be located in the Archives Building, or at least
traced from there to its final depository, for upon completion of OWI activities
the files of the Foreign Language Division, including copies of all releases, were
packed, marked, and addressed for delivery to the National Archives Building.
Perhaps the Select Committee To Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre is in
possession of the release in question, or at least a published copy thereof.
While in Washington, should you find time available, visit us.
With best wishes,
Paul Sturman.
Now, when you were the head of this Foreign-Language Division,
Domestic, did you have a staff of investigators under you ?
Mr. Cranston. No ; not a staff of investigators. We depended for
whatever loyalty checks were made on people employed by the Divi-
sion upon the OWI, which I believe worked with the Civil Service
Commission and the FBI and the other normal agencies of investiga-
tion. We at some time had had an investigative unit in the 0^^^
under the direction of some admiral, and his job was to check the
loyalty of people who applied for employment with the OWI.
Mr. Mitchell. That refers to individuals who were employed by
the OWI?
Mr. Cranston. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. I am talking about individuals who might have been
employed as investigators of the news content that was going out
within the United States in connection with reactions and so forth.
Did you liave anybody investigating that ?
Mr. Cranston. No; I don't believe we had anybody investigating
that. In the Office of Facts and Figures, and I guess in the OWI,
there was a bureau called the Bureau of Intelligence. I have for-
gotten who directed that, but it Avas cliarged with the task of checking
on the reception and use of releases put out by the OWI and also
on the general content of American newspapers and what was going
on in the radio stations both in tlie English language and in foreign
languages.
IVIr. Mitchell. Are you familiar with Mr. James D. Secrest?
Mr. Cranston. I don't recall the name.
Mr. Mitchell. Or a Robert LaBlond?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir.
THE KL^TYN FOREST MASSACRE 2181
Mr. MiTCHELii. We have heard testimony this week that you were
instrumental or took the initiative in setting up a meeting in New
York on May 12 or 13, 1943, with Mrs. Shea of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, Joseph Lang, and Arthur Simon. Now, can
you tell the committee the details and the various processes
Mr. Machrowicz. You might state that Joseph Lang and Arthur
Simon were members of the Wartime Foreign-Language Radio Con-
trol Committee.
Mr. Craxston. Would you permit me to go back a bit over the
nature of the problem that we faced ?
Mr. Mitchell. Surely.
Mr. Cranston. In foreign-language radio and in the foreign-langu-
age press, before the beginning of the war and thereafter when I had
some responsibilities in regard to them, there was a great deal of
propaganda going on which seemed to serve the purposes of the Nazis
and the Fascists and our enemies, much of which seemed to be de-
signed to diminish the loyalties of people of foreign extraction to this
country and to the war effort. Much of this was very subtle and very
hard to put your finger on and very hard to develop as a point of
attack requiring action by the Department of Justice. I would like to
give a couple of examples.
At one time a German-language radio broadcast to New York City
contained an announcement that Rommel had driven the British and
I think the Americans back 50 miles and was advancing on Alamein.
The news broadcast was abruptly stopped and they played the victory
march from Aida, which seems to have been a form of rather subtle
propaganda.
At another time a speech of President Roosevelt, the Commander in
Chief, was quoted in an Italian-language broadcast. It was a speech
calling for Americans to throw everything they had into the war effort.
At the conclusion of the recounting of this speech on this news broad-
cast, again there was some music. This time it was "I Will Be Glad
When You Are Dead, You Rascal."
These are not things you can nail down, but they are symptomatic
of the methods of people in the foreign-language radio and press.
When the Treasury Department announcements were made urging
]3eople to buy war bonds, at one time they were told on one station,
following that announcement, that it would be "wiser to put their
money into diamonds because they were sure to be worth something
after the war, implying that war bonds might not be. I think the
purpose of that was to persuade people not to invest their money in
war bonds, although they were required to broadcast the requests that
these people buy war bonds.
I would like to now quote from a book by Louis Loclmer. This is
a quotation which states how foreign-language gropps in this country
were the subject of intense interest by our enemies in the war. He
refers there to a quotation from a secret press release issued in 1940
in Goebbels' office. The quotation is as follows :
November 24
Chairman Madden. What year?
Mr. Cranston. 1940. [Reading:]
November 24: Slovakia's adhesion to tlie Three Powers Pact must be evalu-
ated on the basis of the number of Slovaks living in America and not on the
2182 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
basis of Slovakia's misht or economic strength. Under no circumstances may
reference be made to the connection which our Ausland organizations main-
tained with certain Slovali societies in America.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have, Mr. Cranston, any quotations show-
ing the extent of the pro-Communist foreign-nationality groups in
this country?
Mr. Cranston. I don't, but I will make a reference to that at a
later point, if I may.
I have a photostat of something that appeared in the Washington
Star. I regret that the date is not clear on this. The headline is "FCC
Probes Report of Tips to Nazi Submarines in Radio Programs."
At one point during the war there was some fear on the part of the
FCC and tlie OWI and the Department of Justice that German-
language broadcasts in New York City were being used by code mes-
sages to signal to Nazi submarines as to when ships were departing.
You will remember that there was a time when, with mystifying suc-
cess, the Nazi submarines seemed to know the departures of ships from
New York Harbor, and many were sunk.
Mr. Mitchell.. But that was the duty of the Office of Censorship ;
was it not?
Mr. Cranston. It was no doubt the duty of the Office of Censorship
when it entered this field. At this time, when this happened, there
seemed to be nobody fully responsible. We had received information
that this might be going on in the German-language radio in New
York City. We called it to the attention of the Department of Justice,
to the FBI, and I believe to the Office of Censorship, but we were
merely passing on information that seemed to us highly pertinent to
the war effort.
I would like to read a quotation from a Polish-language newspaper,
Nowy Swiat, of March '21, 1942. This is the largest Polish-language
daily in the United States. This is a quotation symptomatic of the
divisive nature of many things that appeared in the foreign-language
press which might tend to diminish the desire of those who read them
in their own tongues to go along with the war effort. The quotation
is as follows:
One must not tell the Poles, French, Turks, Letts, Lithuanians, Hungarians,
Serbs "fight," because when Hitler is conquered with your help you will be given
over to the "benevolent" care of Stalin.
I would like to add that the principal writer on that newspaper,
although at that time it was a newspaper designed to be read by Amer-
ican citizens, was a man named Matuzewski, who was required to reg-
ister as a foreign agent by the Department of Justice.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. No matter what he was, he spoke the truth ; didn't
he ? That is actually what happened ; did it not ?
Mr. Cranston. It was true in the case of the Poles.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. It was true in the case of the Latvians, the Estoni-
ans, the Bulgars, the Rumanians, and the Serbs.
Mr. Cranston. It is not true in the case of the French. They fought
and thov won liberation.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They had ])lans for the French, you know.
Mr. Cranston. I assume they did, and I assume they had plans for
us ; but the tenor of this was not to fight the Nazis. That was the im-
plication of that release.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2183
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Cranston, I think we have had enough of the
background. First of all, I assume our committee counsel has in-
formed you why we have asked you to come here in connection with
the Katyn Massacre?
Mr. Cranston. In general terms; yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Just so there will be no question about it, there was
censorship or what we feel was censorship of certain foreign-language
broadcasts in America in the Polish language about Katyn, as we un-
derstand it; and what we are trying to determine is what particular
position you or your office had in that censorship program. So, there-
fore, you know how you are connected with the Katyn massacre. Are
you familiar with Hilda Shea's testimony this week?
Mr. Cranston. In the vaguest sense. I have not seen it. I read a
brief extract in the newspapers.
Mr. Sheehan. Have you talked to her?
Mr. Cranston. No ; I sought to reach her this morning, and I failed
to. I asked the committee whether it was possible to read the tran-
script of yesterday's testimony, but it was not available.
Mr. Mitchell. It wasn't available to me here either until I walked
in here today.
Mr. Sheehan. According to our information — and we had Mrs.
Hilda Shea on the stand — a meeting was called in New York, as the
counsel told you, with reference to talking to these industry members
and talking to radio-station operators with a view toward silencing
them on their broadcasts about the Katyn Forest massacre. According
to our records, Mrs. Shea said that you called that meeting. Are you
familiar with it?
Mr. Cranston. I don't recall the meeting. If she says I called it,
I assume I did.
Mr. Sheehan. Mrs. Shea then went on in her testimony, according
to my memory, to state that you had asked her or the Federal Com-
munications Commission into this meeting. Have you any recollec-
tion of that?
Mr. Cranston. I assume that that is correct, because we were work-
ing with the FCC and with Censorship and with the Department of
Justice on these matters, and if I initiated a meeting I assume I
wanted them in on it.
Mr. Sheehan. Mrs. Shea further went on to state that she told you
that the FCC had no business at a meeting of that kind for the simple
reason that they had no powers of censorship or telling anybody what
to broadcast, but she still went along and said that she sat there pretty
much as a silent participant.
Mr. Cranston. I do recall some occasion — and perhaps this was
the occasion — when the FCC stated that they would only attend a
meeting as an observer. That would tend to corroborate her
testimony.
Mr. Sheehan. If she couldn't do anything, why did you ask her
to appear as an observer ?
Mr. Cranston. I assume because they were interested in the gen-
eral field of foreign-language radio and had responsibilities in it. I
felt it would be helpful to have a witness from that organization at
this meeting. I assume that was my reasoning.
2184 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you feel it was possible to exert a little more
pressure on some of these people who were present in that way ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't believe that is the reason ; and if it was the
reason and she didn't talk, she couldn't have exerted a pressure.
Mr. IVIitCHELL. Who advised you to go ahead and set up this
meeting ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know since I don't recall the meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea has already admitted that she was the
one who told you how to go about it, but at the same time advised you
that the FCC could not participate.
Mr. DoNDERO, I have just one question there. Was that the occa-
sion when the FCC had limited the licenses of broadcasting stations
to 30 days?
Mr. Cranston. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I don't believe
that that was the case, but I do not know.
Mr. Sheehan. When you called this meeting, assuming that you
called it — and you say that you think you did — who set the particular
policy of determining that you were going to stop these broadcasts?
Were you in charge in setting the policy of the Department?
Mr. Cranston. Would you permit me to retrace my steps a little bit
in this field ? I will come back to that point as fast as I can.
I want to go back to a meeting of the foreign-language stations.
This was the industry itself meeting in 1942 at a convention of the
National Association of Broadcasters, who met in Cleveland. There
tliey admitted that they had very perplexing problems and troubles
in this field.
There was one New York station manager who told of a foreign-
language announcer on his station who had broadcast a farewell to a
ship about to leave New York Harbor, clearly violating the censor-
ship rules. He said that he had fired the announcer and that that
announcer was immediately hired by a rival New York station.
It was revealed at that meeting that the managers of the stations
had no monitoring system, that they had no idea what was being
broadcast on their own stations in the language of the enemy country.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all very interesting, but I think we ought
to get back to the question of Mr. Sheehan. I don't think we have
sufficient time to go into matters that have no relation to this particular
matter. We are interested in this particular complaint against certain
stations.
Mr. Cranston. Well, sir, on this point, the industry was reluctant
to do policing of its own or to set up a committee because they were
afraid apparently that station operators would perhaps get rid of
good announcers. They actually asked the Foreign-Language Di-
vision of the O^VI whether we would serve as liaison from the Govern-
ment to the industry on matters regarding personnel on foreign-lan-
guage broadcasts. I would like to read a quotation.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2185
This is a letter from Arthur Simon, who I understand testified here
and who was president of the industry committee. I don't have the
date, but he said the following in his letter :
For our protection, it is tremendously important that such persons are not
hired by other stations —
meaning people fired for possible subversive activity.
We have asked Lee Falk of the OWI—
who was in my division —
if his office would be willing to help us on this matter. He has agreed to give
us whatever advice he has available. Therefore, we respectfully suggest that
you contact Lee Falk, Chief of Radio of the Foreign-Language Division of the
OWI in Washington, before engaging anyone connected with the preparation or
presentation of foreign-language programs. He will give you a prompt answer
as to whether the person or persons you have in mind for emi^oyment have a
clean bill of health as far as his information can determine.
Now, at their request we then sought information from the Depart-
ment of Justice or the FBI on individuals when they had some doubt
and asked us. We did not divulge the nature of the information. We
would tell the industr}^ whether it would be in their best interests and
in the country's best interests to employ a man or not to employ him.
That was done at their request. We were not imposing anything
on the industry.
Now, to get to the matter that you were directly concerned with, on
May 1, 1943, the OWI field office in Detroit reported that these Polish-
language commentators were dividing the heavy Polish population in
this vital war-production center. The only example cited — and this
will get back to the question you asked me awhile ago, sir — by the OWI
field office was that of an extremely pro-Russian commentator who
was feeding his listeners a strictly Russian line.
Now, apparently, there were polemics going on in the Polish radio
stations in New York among people broadcasting in Polish, some tak-
ing a strictly pro-Russian line, some taking a strictly anti-Russian
and pro-Polish line, I assume that because of the date of this memo-
randum from Detroit this revolved around the Katyn affair, although
I do not know that to be the case.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was this gentleman's name Stanley Novae, if you
remember ?
Mr. Cranston. I have no idea whether he was an employee of the
OWI who was under my supervision.
Mr, Machrowicz. I mean this announcer.
Mr. Cranston. I don't know.
Mr. Sheehan. Then this matter came to your attention through the
industry, as you say?
Mr. Cranston. No
Mr. Mitchell. Did you say that Novak was an employee at the
OWI?
Mr. Cr^vnston. No; I did not. I don't know who Novak was.
2186 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The field office in Detroit of the OWI reported to the office here in
Washington that there were problems arising out of the Polish-lan-
guage broadcasts.
Mr. Sheehan. That was brought to your attention then?
Mr. Cranston. That was brought to our attention m that fashion^
Mr. Sheehan. Who referred it to you?
Mr. Cranston. This came in to what, I think, was called the field
division of the OWI. It was not something under my Division. But
then this particular report was referred to me because it related to
foreign-language broadcasts.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you discuss with anybody else as to policy, or
was the policy already set?
Mr. Cranston. The policy was pretty well set that we were against
polemics going on which related or which would tend to diminish
interest in the American war.eflfort and divide people along national-
ity lines in this country.
Mr. Sheehan. Who was your immediate superior in the OWI?
Mr. Cranston. I do not recall precisely who it was at that time.
The associate director with whom I worked was Milton Eisenhower,
the brother of General Eisenhower. Elmer Davis was the Chief of
the Division.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, getting back to Hilda Shea for a while, was
this a routine inquiry you made of the FCC for somebody to accom-
pany you?
Mr. Cranston. Yes ; I think it was. I assume that it was. I do not
recall.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you know Hilda Shea very well ?
Mr. Cranston. Not particularly well. I knew three or four people
there who worked in a field related to our activities.
Mr. Sheehan. She was just a casual governmental acquaintance?
Mr. Cranston. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Cranston, one of the things we are interested
in — of course, from our angle, we agree that on a lot of this we have
seen the horses stolen out of the barn and the barn has been opened —
we are trying to go back because in our committee hearings we find
a lot of people who are involved in Communist or pro-Russian
sympathies.
Some of the questions that have come to our mind are concerned with
the fact that in the OWI there have been quite a few Communists
turned up in this particular Division who were helping to shape our
policy and our censorship.
Mr. Cranston. May I stress, sir, that insofar as I know — and I want
to differentiate between the Overseas Branch of the OWI which had
people of foreign extraction in it, and my own Division — I don't know
of anyone who has been branded a Omnnmist who worked in my Divi-
sion, but tliere were some in the Overseas Branch who apparently were
discharged as Communists.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Kulikowski was in your Division?
Mr. Cranston. He was. I do not know, sir, that he has ever of-
ficially or unofficially been branded a Communist.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is his general reputation in the city of
Chicago.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was David Carr?
Mr. Cranston. He worked in my Division.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2187
Mr. Sheehan. If you will refer to the House Appropriation Com-
mittee hearings in July 1943, you will see the following quotation in
one of their reports :
Policies have been practiced by the OWI, particularly in the Foreign Section,
which have tended to further the interests of Soviet foreign diplomacy.
Now, that comes from the House of Representatives and a report of
that body.
What we are trying to find out is whether censorship was going
on to promote Soviet foreign diplomacy, and to hold down some of
our allies. That is why we are interested in it from the Katyn angle.
Mr. Ckanston. I say that I had heard of this report of the House
Appropriations Committee sometime ago that I instituted a search
to drag it down and I did not find that specific report or any other.
But I do not believe that that language refers to the Foreign Language
Division of the OWI by name. I believe that it refers to the Foreign
Section, which, I believe, meant the Overseas Branch. I believe also
that if you will examine that in the context of the hearings at that
time you will find that it did not relate to the Division which I headed.
That is my assumption — I have not seen it, but I am quite sure
that that is the case.
Mr. Sheehan. For instance, we find that there was an Italian Com-
munist by the name of Carlotta
Mr. Cranston. That would tend to substantiate my contention.
He did not work in my Division. He was in the Overseas Branch.
Mr. Sheehan. You did not know him when he worked there ?
Mr. Cranston. No.
Mr. Sheehan. You did not know him at all?
Mr. Cranston. No ; I did not.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you feel that the only people you
had control of were those who were directly in your own particular
Division ?
Mr. Cranston. I certainly had no responsibility over those em-
ployed by a totally different branch, and whose offices were in New
York City.
Mr. Sheehan. Counsel just mentioned to you the name of David
Carr. It has been brought to our attention — and this may be misin-
formation— that he was recommended by you for his position. Now,
his position was that of Assistant Chief of the Foreign Language
Division.
Mr. Cranston. That is correct. He was in my Division.
Mr. Sheehan. How long did you know him ?
Mr. Cranston. I knew him fairly well. I knew him before he
became employed there.
ISIr. Sheehan. Did you recommend him yourself?
Mr. Cranston. Yes; I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that his real name ?
Mr. Cranston. It is his real name now. I believe that his name
was originally something else.
. Mr. INIiTCHELL. What was his name before ?
Mr. Cranston. I believe it was David Katz.
Mr. Mitchell. AVould you spell that? K-a-t-z?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know.
2188 THE KATi^N FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, O'KoNSKi. Did he change his name Avhen he started to work
witli you ?
Mr. Cranston. No ; I never knew him under that name. I always
knew him as David Carr.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Did you know when you hired him that he was a
member of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir. I did not know that he was or is a Com-
munist.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. It is our understanding that he was a card-carrying
Communist. That bears further investigation, but that is the infor-
mation given to us.
Mr. Cranston. I would like to repeat again that I relied upon
loyalty checks and for clearances of employees, upon the FBI, the
Civil Service Commission, and the agency which checked people
before they were employed. As to others who went to work in my
Division, there were long delays while they were being investigated
as a routine matter, by those who were charged with that responsi-
bility. Wlien they approved somebody, I assumed they had been
approved in accordance with their practices.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was he employed before you hired him?
Mr. Cranston. I believe that he worked for a press association
here ; I do not recall which one it was.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know that he also was a part-time reporter
for the Daily Worker ?
Mr. Cranston. I knew that at the age of 17 he had written two
signed articles for the Daily Worker. He had told me that he was
not a Communist; that he was just a "kid" who was Jewish, who was
violently aroused over the Nazi activities, and felt that the Com-
munists were more aware of them than others at that time, and
that he, therefore, wrote these two articles at the tender age of 17.
He denied that he had ever been a Communist. I have no knowledge
that he ever was one. He told me that after doing that at the age of
17, he had decided. that that was not the soundest approach, that
he did not sympathize with the Communist viewpoint, that he was a
loyal American.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you remember when it was that you recom-
mended that he be hired, the specific date?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know the specific date. I would think it
was between January and March of 1942.
Mr. Sheehan. How long a lag was there after you recommended
him before he came into your Department?
Mr. Cranston. At least several weeks, I would assume. I know
there was some lag. He was recommended for his position by the
people that he named on his application, amongst whom were several
high officials of the American Government who knew him and who
apparently assumed that he was O. K.
Mr. Sheehan. I understand that you have taken quite a bit of in-
terest in the support of Mr. Harry Bridges; is that right?
Mr. Cranston. That is absolutely wrong. I would like to explain
the reason for the misunderstanding at this time. I am glad to have
the opportunity to do that.
Mr. SiHCEHAN. Our committee w^ould like to know.
Mr. Cranston. Yes.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2189
At tlie time that I worked for the organization called the Common
Council for American Unity, I was charged with writing a report-
about once a month on legislation pending in Congress relating to
aliens, relating to naturalization and immigration problems.
At one time a bill was pending in the American Congress — a private
bill, for the deportation of Harry Bridges. I mentioned this fact in
an article in Avhich I was summarizing all legislation then pending.
I mentioned that the then Attorney General, now Mr. Justice Jackson,
stated that in his belief, this was unconstitutional. I did not state my
own opinion. I was simply doing a reporting job. I never at any
time favored or opposed that bill. I had nothing to do with it. I
never had any relationship to Harry Bridges. It was simply a mat-
ter of doing a newspaper job, a reporting job, in this case. I have
absolutely no other connection with Harry Bridges. I have never
met liim.
Mr. Sheehan. Some of the committee members have informed us
that you were pretty well acquainted with Louis Aclamic. Is that
right ?
Mr. Cranston. He was a director of Common Council for Ameri-
can Unity or was on the board before I became employed there. I
came to know him after I was employed by Common Council for
American Unity. Incidentally, it is my assumption that he was mur-
dered by the Communists.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you know him very well?
Mr. Cranston. Fairly well — not intimately.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you ever visit with him?
Mr. Cranston. I never visited him at his home. I believe that once
he visited me in Washington at my apartment and had dinner, or
dropped by and met my wife and myself. The occasion when he did
tliat, I recall, was when he was on his way to or returning from the
White House, where he had had dinner with President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill. So far as I know, that is the only time
he ever visited my apartment.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. This organization which Louis Adamic headed, was
that one of the list of those organizations declared subversive by the
Department of Justice ?
Mr. Cranston. No ; it has never been. I would like to repeat that
it worked for the Justice Department on a contractual basis. It has
never been questioned as to loyalty. It is financed by such responsible
foundations as the Carnegie Foundation, the Russell Sage Founda-
tion, and other such organizations.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, your whole testimony here tends to
show that your connections with Katyn were only coincidental with
that letter or request that arrived for the hearing in Detroit. Is that
the situation ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. And you only originated the meeting because of the
request ?
Mr. Cranston. We originated the meeting because of the complaint
that came from the field office of the OWI to the headquarters here in
Washington. It was then referred to me for consideration and action,
if I felt action was necessary.
Mr. Sheehan. You acted on it yourself?
93744— 52— pt. 7- 24
2190 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Cranston. Yes. I would like to say that this is after it had
become agreed upon by Government agencies that the primary respon-
sibility was not that of OWI to deal affirmatively with these things,
that Censorship had now a greater role in it, and also it was after the
industry itself had asked us for help in these problems. It was then
that we merely suggested to the industry committee that it consider
this problem.
I would like to say, also, that the committee itself, or the radio
people in the industry, determined what to do about this, and they
took action on it.
I would like to mention one further point that I think would sub-
stantiate that.
In an article that appeared in the Radio Daily, a trade magazine
in the radio field, on July IG, 1943, Joseph Lang and Arthur Simon
collaborated in describing this situation in Detroit that arose out of
the polemics between Poles of pro-Russian and anti-Polish and Poles
of anti-Russian and pro-Polish attitudes.
They described this as an acute predicament and a threat to the
productivity of American Poles and the war effort in Detroit.
Mr. Machkowicz. Was that after the meeting with you ?
Mr. Cranston. This appeared after the meeting ; yes. I would like
to add one point, and that is that Mr. Lang and Mr. Simon in this
article which they jointly signed, stated that the action of the industry
committee on this matter was an excellent example of the industry's
ability to regulate itself.
Mr. Sheehan. May I say in passing that, as I understood, when
you read that letter asking for help, they specifically stated in there
tliat the problem was to help to keep those who were being fired from
one station from being hired by others; is that right?
Mr. Cranston. That was the reason they were reluctant to do it
themselves. They were afraid to set up an industry committee.
Mr. Sheehan. Was it possible that, with your pressure and the
pressure of the FCC, when you fellows said that someone was doing
a job that was wrong, they had to fire those people, and now they were
writing to you for help because they didn't want any other station to
hire them ?
Mr. Cranston. That was part of the problem, apparently.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, your meeting them was only to pro-
tect the stations who had already had to fire people ?
Mr. Cranston. Or who were reluctant to deal with the problem
without the guidance of the (lovernment.
Mr. Sheehan. The letter doesn't say that they were worrying about
somebody hiring people who were fired? Read the paragraph about
the firing.
Mr. Cranston. The only quotation I have from Mr. Simon's letter
is as follows :
For our own protcotion, it is extremely important that such persons are not
hired by other stations.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the only reason the meeting was
called was because they had already fired someone and you were trjnng
to get protection for these people?
Mr. Cranston. Prior to Pearl Harbor there had been discussions
of the instability and of the dangers of the material going out on the
air, and at a meeting in May 11)42 of the National Association of
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2191
Broadcasters, some military spokesman — I don't know who he was —
was present, and warned them that unless this situation rapidly im-
proved, Government action would be necessary.
I believe that these men, with heavy investments in foreign lan-
guage radio stations were afraid that they would be summarily taken
off the air and not permitted to broadcast in German and in Italian.
Mr. Sheehan. You are voicing an opinion now ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, but I am positive of that. I could produce
facts, I am sure.
Mr. Mitchell. Who would remove them ?
Mr. Cranston. They were afraid that their industry would be jeop-
ardized unless it was properly organized to prevent Axis propaganda
from going out on the air.
Mr. Mitchell. But who would have removed them from the air?
Mr. Cranston. A military spokesman at this meeting in May —
and I do not know who he was or what Department of the Army he
represented — warned them — and I believe that this is recounted in
either Variety or Broadcasters — that if they didn't improve the situa-
tion they might well be removed from the air. I assume that who
would finally order them from the air would be either the Depart-
ment of Defense in the interests of the war effort or the Federal Com-
munications Commission or the Department of Justice.
Mr. Sheehan. The FCC with the 30-day cancellation clause.
Mr. Mitchell. Actually, none of them would have. It was the
duty and the obligation of the Office of Censorship, and that only on
one basis, Mr. Cranston — if they would come up with something that
would break the code.
Mr. Sheehan. There was no censorship of anything within this
country, was there ?
Mr. Cranston. The Bureau of Censorship, or whatever it was
called, was interested in this, and part of the industry code said that
no person shall be employed whose past record indicates he may not
faithfully continue with the war effort. That was, however, a code of
the industry itself.
I would like to read you one quotation from Variety, if I may.
Mr. Mitchell. No; that is not necessary. I would like to know
right now whether, when you set up this meeting with Simon and Lang
in New York, you asked for the Office of Censorship to be represented ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know,
Mr. Mitchell. Why didn't you?
Mr, Cranston. I simply don't recall whether I did or not. It is
quite possible that I did, and possibly I didn't. I don't know.
Mr. Sheehan. J have one more question, Mr. Cranston, This is a
little apart from the Katyn investigation, although it may bear on it
indirectly.
Wliat is your position with United World Federalists ?
Mr, Cranston, I am an ex-president of that organization, I am
now a member of the national executive council.
Mr, Sheehan. And you are still very active in it ?
Mr, Cranston. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. I want to make just this offhand remark. World-
wide cornmunism eventually envisions a united world under Commu-
nist domination ?
Mr. Cranston. I assume it does.
2192 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. If you have read anything on the philosophy of
communism, you know that it does.
Mr. Cranston. Yes.
Mr. SiiEEiiAN. The United World Federalists are attempting a
similar aim eventually, aren't they?
Mr. Cranston. For a totally different purpose, not a dictatorship,
not a Connnunist one. It is one based u])on democracy.
I would like to state that the United World Federalists has in its
bylaws a provision against membership by anyone of Communist be-
liefs, in the organization. We are non-Communists. We have never
been attacked by any Government agency as Communist, and there
are many Members of Congress who know well of our organization,
who think well of it, who work with the leadership of the organization,
people of both parties.
Mr. Sheeiian. In other words, your ultimate aim and that of com-
munism are the same, except that they want to lead the world.
Mr. Cranston. I would certainly not agree with you that our aims
are those of the Communists. They want a Communist world; we
want a democratic world.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to come back to that New York
meeting with Mr. Lang and Mr. Simon. Now, you say that prior
to that you had received one complaint from Detroit and that was
about a Communist commentator ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes. I don't have the full text of that complaint,
but it stated that there was a controversy raging between different
commentators. The only one it cited was a pro-Communist one. I
assume that that meant that he was arguing with people about the
others' viewpoint.
Mr. Machrowicz. Being very familiar with that situation, I can
tell you that his name was Stanley Novak.
Mr. Cranston. Was he making Communist propaganda ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Stanley Kovak was accused of Communist propa-
ganda. Now, did you mention his name at the time of the meeting in
New York?
Mr. Cranston. I don't believe that I knew his name. I suppose
that if the meeting was held at this time and came out of this report —
and it is my assumption that we called it to the attention of Lang,
Simon, and whoever else was there — that people were going to ex-
tremes on both sides of the fence, that is, that pro-Communists were
attacking in an extremely divisive way, and that anti-Communists
were doing likewise.
Mr. Sheeiian. My question, then, is this : Since your only complaint
from Detroit was about a Communist, how did it happen that at the
New York meeting the only com])laint was about those who made
connnents which were anti-Connnunist?
Mr. Cranston. I just said, sir, that so far as I know — and I do not
recall this specific meeting — if the meeting came out of this May 1
report — and I assume that it did — I am positive that we presented
at that meeting the fact that there were two sources of trouble in
Doti-oit, one being this extreme pro-Communist announcer, tlie other
being whatever otlier announcers there were, who Avere being rather
extreme about the Katyn massacre on the other side.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2193
Mr. Machrowicz. May I quote from the House committee hearings
( )f 19-13 ? You undoubtedly have read this :
Mr. Garey. "Will you tell us what was said at that meeting and by whom?
Mr. Lang. Both Mr. Cranston and Mrs. Shea were concerned with the situa-
tion that had been developing between Russia and Poland in regard to the
matter ctf boundaries and the fact that Poland, I believe through its Premier,
its Government in exile in London, had protested to Russia about the slaying
of these 10,000 Polish officers in Russia, and they were concerned as to how
the situation would be handled on dirt'erent radio stations.
Mr. Garey. What did Mr. Cranston want you to do?
Mr. Lang. He asked us — when I say "us," I mean the foreign-language radio
wartime control — if we could straighten out the situation in Detroit.
Mr. Garey. What situation obtained there?
Mr. Lang. From what I could gather, it seemed that on the Polish programs
out there the Polish news commentators had taken a rather antagonistic attitude
toward Russia in this matter, and they felt that it was inimical to the war effort
and should be straightened out in some way.
Mr. Garey. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views on what
should be put over the air in the United States about the Russian situation?
That is the sum and substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do?
Mr. Lang.. I don't know that it was expressed that way. That was the thought.
Now, in view of the fact that the only complaint you had was about a
Communist commentator in Detroit, why did you pay so much at-
tention to these commentators who were anti-Communists?
Mr. Cranston. Sir, the only incident cited in this report from De-
troit of May 1, which came to us, referred to a pro- Communist an-
nouncer, whom you now tell me was Novak. However, it indicated
that there were violent arguments on both sides going on. In that
context, we stated this problem to the people at this meeting in New
York, because I am quite positive that we would not have singled out
the pro-Communist. If we presented this side, we would have pre-
sented both sides, and would have told them to calm down.
Mr. Machrowicz. As a result of this conference, Mr. Kreutz, who
was the anti-Communist commentator, was taken off the air and Mr.
Novak, against whom you obtained the complaint, and who was the
Coimnunist, remained on the air.
Mr. Cranston. I would attribute that to laxity on the part of the
industry. We made a recommendation ; we were not able to enforce
it.
Mr. Machrowicz. In my opinion, it was due to the pressure you
brought to bear, and pressure brought to bear by others.
Mr. Cranston. I would like, if I may, to have the privilege of plac-
ing all of this in the context of the situation that prevailed in this
country at high Government levels in regard to the Nazi announcement
in regard to Katyn.
It was apparent that Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary,
President Roosevelt, and Sumner Welles, all felt that the disclosures
were presumably a Nazi trick. They seemed to assume that the thing
was done by the Nazis. They certainly assumed and felt that a wild
ruckus about this in the American press, and particularly among the
foreign-born in this country, would not be conducive to the best inter-
ests of the war effort.
As you heard in testimony from Mr. Elmer Davis 2 days ago, he
made a broadcast assuming that this was simply a Nazi trick.
2194 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
We were not making policy ; we were just going along in my division
with what seemed to be American policy at that time.
Mr. Machrowicz. But you tried to do something that you had no
right to do. You tried to censor others who were telling the truth.
Mr. Cranston. We only made a recommendation at the request of
the industry that had asked for our recommendation, and we acted
upon a disclosure, a report which came from Detroit.
Mr. Machrowicz. But you did succeed in getting off the air those
people who actually, as we know today, were telling the truth. That
was the net result of your work.
Mr. Cranston. The truth was known by very few people at that
time, and I had no access to such, which does indicate conclusively^
it seems to me, that the massacre was conducted by the Communists.
Mr. Sheehax. Where did you get the information that Mr.
Anthony Eden, President Roosevelt, and Mr. Sumner Welles believed
that the Nazis were guilty ?
Mr. Cranston. Perhaps I stated that carelessly, but I would like
to read to you a quote from Defeat and Victory, by John Cheka-
nowski, who was the Polish Ambassador to this country. This appears
at page 159.
Mr. Sheehan. Excuse me for a moment. You said that as of that
time, when this was being held in New York, Sumner Welles, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, and Anthony Eden felt that the Nazis did this. This
book was writtep long after that.
Mr. Cranston. Let me correct my statement. I said that carelessly.
They felt that that was Nazi propaganda, a Nazi propaganda trick.
Mr. Sheehan. You didn't know at that time, in 1943, when this
meeting was being held, that that was their belief ?
Mr. Cranston. I did know that my chief, Mr. Elmer Davis, had
made a broadcast.
Mr. Sheehan. Would you like to correct the record to have it show
that in 1943 you did or did not know that Sumner Welles and Presi-
dent Roosevelt knew the Nazis did it ?
Mr. Cranston. I did not know what Sumner Welles and President
Roosevelt knew or felt at that time. I did know that my boss, Elmer
Davis, made a broadcast, calling this a Nazi trick. I read in the New
York Times that he had requested the Poles to stop making provoca-
tions over this incident.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Cranston, am I right in assuming this: That
the standard under which your office operated was virtually this:
Anything tliat was said against the Russians was the same as saying
something against the war effort ? Was that more or less the standard
under wliich you were operating?
Mr. Cranston. No; I don't think that is a fair statement. We
were opposed to statements against any one of the United Nations
which would tend to diminish the desire of the people of American
citizenship, regardless of what their extraction was, to go along with
the war effort, and if things became divisive, we felt that they had
become harmful.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is rather begging the question, because, to
my knowledge, there was no criticism of any other all)'^ ever. The
only criticism that ever was expressed — and which criticism was
doubted by people who turned out to be right — while you people
turned out to be 1,000 percent wrong, as history now bears out — the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2195
fact of the matter is that the only aiitially talk that we ever had
duriiio; the war was against Russia. So when you say "any other
country" that really does not mean anything.
Mr. Cranston. No, sir; there was a great deal of propaganda
against the British. There was violent Polish propaganda against
the British, feeling that they were doing things that were a dis-
service to the Polish cause. There were violent attacks upon Chiang
Kai-shek, who was an ally of ours, at that time. There were many
attacks upon him.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But your organization did not discourage any
attacks against Chiang Kai-shek 'i
Mr. Cranston. We sought to discourage attacks against any of
our allies where we felt they were harmful.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I am glad to hear that, because this is the first time
that I have heard of a Government agency which at that time dis-
couraged any attacks against Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact,
I think history will bear out the fact that he was more or less dis-
couraged by the same group that tried to protect Russia at every
turn of the road.
Mr. Cranston. There was a man named Bradford Smith, who was
in my division, in charge of the work with the Japanese and Chinese
press in this country. He was a stanch supporter of the Chiang
Kai-shek government. He was an intimate friend of "Walter Judd,
who I am sure you know, in the Congress, and he would have taken
the position in any issue that arose that necessitated it that attacks
upon Chiang Kai-shek were harmful to the American war effort.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Further to bear out my point, and further to show
what happened: After the investigation into the Detroit situation,
the anti-Communists were taken off the air and the pro-Communists
were left on the air. That is what actually happened in Detroit,
after your intercession on behalf of the OWI, and getting the FCC
in on it. That is actually what happened.
You were called in there to investigate a complaint of pro-Com-
munist broadcasts. After you had gotten out there, and your inves-
tigation had been carried out, it was found that it had been conducted
in such a way that the pro-Communists were left on the air and the
anti-Communists were taken off the air. Did you know that happened ?
Mr. Cranston. I had not known that until having been told that
by the committee today, but I would repeat, that we undoubtedly
called to the attention of the industry the fact that there were pro-
Communists and anti-Communists making trouble in Detroit. We had
no authority over what action they might choose to take. And if
they chose only to fire the anti-Communists, that is their responsibility,
and not mine.
Mr. Machrowicz. They told us differently. They told us that you
ordered them to conform to your views, and that you made no com-
plaints against the Communists, but rather, only against Mr. Kreutz.
Mr. Cranston. Do you have specific testimony from Mr. Lang to
that effect? '
Mr. IMacrowicz. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to call
for a recess, and ask that Mr. Cranston stand by until tomorrow.
Mr. O KoNSKi, I suggest we reconvene at 2 o'clock.
2196 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Maohrowicz. That is satisfactory to me. Do you want to have
Mr. Cranston resume the stand at 2 o'clock ?
Mr. Mitchell. No ; I would like to have him stand by, and we will
call him later. We have a full schedule for this afternoon.
Mr. Machrowioz. The hearings will be recessed until 2 p. m,
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m. the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
The hearing reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.
Chairman Madden. Will the committee come to order, please?
TESTIMONY OP GEORGE HOWARD EARLE, CORAL GABLES, FLA.
Chairman Madden. Governor Earle, will you raise your right hand,
and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth in the hearing now being held, so help you God ?
Mr. Earle. I do.
Chairman Madden. Now, will you just give your full name and
address to the reporter, please, for the record ?
Mr. Earle. George Howard Earle, 6508 Cabalero Boulevard, Coral
Gables, Fla.
Chairman Madden. Wliat is your business ?
Mr. Earle. I am retired at present.
Chairman Madden. All right, proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Governor Earle, I realize that you have just told me
this morning you had a serious operation recently. I have just men-
tioned it to the members of the committee, and they will respect that
fact.
Rather than go back and retrace your history up to now, I would like
to have you, since you offered to testify and since you gave this com-
mittee a statement on June 3 that you had been Minister to Bulgaria
and Rumania, I believe, under naval cover during the war
Mr. Earle. No ; Minister to Bulgaria and Minister to Austria, and
Special Emissary for President Roosevelt in Turkey for Balkan
Affairs.
Chairman Madden. And, Governor, previous to that, you were Gov-
ernor of what State ?
Mr. Earle. Governor of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you tell the committee at this
time your specific knowledge concerning the conversations you had
with President Roosevelt concerning the Katyn massacre.
Mr. Earle. In order that you gentlemen and those who are in-
terested should not think this is an aftermath of the last election, I
would like to read what I testified to 4 years and 8 months ago, to the
day, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
I said that I went to Casablanca as a gunnery officer on a Navy
transport. General Patton, an old polo-playing friend of mine, gave
me a report on the North African operations, which I brought back
to the President.
When I warned the President at that time, in December of 1942, after return-
ing from Casablanca, of the great Russian menace, greater than tlie German
menace, he said, "George, don't worry, Russia is so big it would break up when
this war is over." I told him I did not thinlj so. Then I went over to Turkey
THE KATYX FOREST IVIASSACRE 2197
and was undercover agent to report on the Balkan affairs to President Roosevelt,
and try to get Bulgaria out of the war. For a while I was entirely against the
Nazis. Then when I received evidence of how Russia, while we were saving
them, was issuing propaganda to the underground against us, preparatory to
destroying our influence in Europe, things changed.
Acting Chairman Maloney, of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, said :
How early was that?
As early as the first part of 1044. In May 1944 the President recalled me for
consultation. I will not forget how an old friend of mine, Joe Levy, of the New
York Times, went to the station and said, "George, you don't know what you are
going to over there." He said, "Harry Hopkins has complete domination over
the President and the whole atmosphere over there is 'pink'." He said, "If you
go over and report against Russia, you, who would be the best authority for
the administration in the Balkans, would be finished."
I said, "Well, Joe, I appreciate that very much." Joe did not do it as a matter
of policy to his paper, or anything else. He was a friend of mine, and I said,
"Joe, after all. my country and children and grandchildren come before what will
happen to me." So I went over and reported on it. To my horror, when I got
here I found the President really believed that the massacre of those 10,000
Polish officers by the Russians, of which I had all the proofs and pictures, was
done by the Germans, which was of course absolutely incorrect. The Polish
Ambassador in both Moscow and Ankara had been asking where the officers
were, and the Russians were saying they were scattered through Russia. The
Germans were not within hundreds of miles of where the Polish officers, 10,000
of them, were murdered.
I felt pretty hopeless after that.
In the anteroom there I met Secretary Forrestal of the Navy and
talked to him about it and he said :
My God, I think this is dreadful. We were all alone over here. Russia can
do no wrong. It is perfectly dreadful.
He said : "They just simply are blind to the whole situation.''
Now, in August of 1941, 1 sent to the President what I consider the
most important document I ever sent to him. It was a report on
Eussia of a neutral ambassador to Russia. I turned that report over
to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
In Istanbul, on August 22, 1944, 1 wrote this letter to the President
at the Wliite House :
My Dear Mr. President : The enclosure with this letter I consider the most
important communication I have ever sent to you. I beg of you to read it very
carefully. * * *
Chairman Maddex. What date was that ?
Mr. Earle. August 22, 1944.
Now, he wrote there and summarized the whole Communist situa-
tion. Gentlemen, I want to say it is the most magnificent thing I ever
read. It could not be better today, and that was 8 years ago. I fear
he is right about Russia.
Here is my letter, and I made two observations :
* * * An American banker said to me a few weeks ago, "We should have
been warned of Japan's intentions by the simple fact that every Japanese tourist
in America is pictured with a camera, and American tourists were not permitted
cameras in Japan." In the same way I say by the fact Russia will not permit
our soldiers to fight with them nor our correspondents to go to the front should
warn us of Russia's intentions.
Also, and far more important is the fact the moment fighting is over, there will
be irresistible pressure from the people of the democracies to demobilize and
return home our soldiers. There will be no such pressure to demobilize the
Russian soldiers since the lot of a Russian is far more comfortable in the Army
than at home.
.2198 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
My most fervent hope is that a year from today you can say, "George Earle was
a fool and an alarmist."
Cordially and respectfully yours,
George H. Eakle.
Now, I just want to read one little excerpt from this magnificent
report of this neutral diplomat. He gives three classes of people
and their attitude toward Russia. Now, you gentlemen think over
this third class and see how many people it applied to in Washington :
A third class of people have decided to display an extraordinary agnosticism
and do not want to hear anything about a Russian problem, because it presently
disturbs the comfortable line of thought they have been driven into by the
radio and the press, viz, that there is a big black wolf called Germany, after
the destruction of which the world will be happy and free forever. These
people, when placed before certain uncomfortable facts, just answer "It's all
German propaganda."
At least those who have a responsibility in allied countries must try to think
of the Russian problem as seriously as the Russian leaders think of the European
problems.
Now, gentlemen, I kept on reporting. I was sick at heart when
I saw the President with the proofs that I brought him — which I
will come back to in a minute.
These are all letters from the President. I have about 50 or a
hundred of them.
It is a very interesting thing about his letters. No matter what you
wrote him, how unimportant it was, he always answered unless he
disagreed with you. If he disagreed with you, no matter how im-
portant it was, he never answered.
Mr. Mitchell. Governor, will you kindly select those letters that
have pertinency to the Katyn investigation ?
Mr. Earle. Yes. Now, in order, first of all, that I might prove my
right to be his special emissary as — I mean to say I want to prove
that first of all — he gave me a cover as a naval attache in Turkey,
because after a certain episode when I hit a Nazi officer over the head
with a champagne bottle President Roosevelt said the Nazis might
kidnap and shoot me. So he gave me a diplomatic cover as an
assistant naval attache.
On June 11, 1944, 1 wrote to the President:
With all the tremendous burdens now upon you
Chairman Madden. Is this a letter you are reading now?
Mr. Earle. This is a letter I wrote to President Roosevelt. This
will give you my credentials as his special emissary.
Chairman Madden. I understand. But let us mark these letters as
exhibits.
Can we have those letters as exhibits for the record? They will be
returned to you later.
Mr. Earle. Certainly.
Cliairman Madden. Can you identify the letter as you read it.
Mr. Earle. This is my letter to the President, of 11th of June
1944.
Chairman Madden. We will mark that first letter "Exhibit No.
26."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2199
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26" for identifica-
tion and is as follows : )
Exhibit 26 — Ambassador Eagle's Letter to President Eoosevelt
June 11, 1944.
My Dear SIr. President: With all the tremendous burdens now upon you I
am terribly sorry to bother you with a comparatively unimportant and per-
sonal matter.
As I have had 26 months of active service as a lieutenant commander, United
States Naval Reserve, I am now eligible for promotion; however, since all my
reports have gone only to you, either directly or through Harry Hopkins, I
am told by the naval officers I have consulted that there is no one but you who
can give nie a fitness report or recommend me for promotion.
I therefore enclose my fitness report. If it bothers you in the slightest, please
don't hesitate to throw it in the waste-paper basket.
Cordially and respectfully yours,
The President,
The White House.
Mr. Earle. This one is from the White House, June 26. 1944 :
Mr. PucixsKi. Mr. Chairman, we will mark these "Exhibits 26 and
26-A," the letter and the reply.
Chairman Madden. All right.
(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 26-A" for
identification, and appears on p. 2200.)
Mr. Earle. Gentlemen, I think this is so important to show you
the attitude of the White House.
For instance, I personally believe that Alger Hiss is guilty as hell.
But I think the greatest guilt is not — well
Cliairman Madden. Now, wait a minute. Let us confine this to
the Katyn hearing.
Mr. Earle. Aren't you being a little partisan, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Madden. What is that?
Mr. Earle. Aren't you being a little partisan in not wanting to
liear a little against your dear Democrats ?
Chairman Madden. We would like to go into all this, but, never-
theless, we have a great number of other witnesses and we would like
to confine the testimony to the purposes of the committee.
Mr. Earle. Mr. Chairman, I have listened here to irrelevant testi-
mony for hours today, so I don't see why you should deny me the
right to do so.
Chairman Madden. Just so we are not detained indefinitely.
Mr. Earle. I don't think this will detain you indefinitely. This
will show you the complete refusal of the White House to hear any-
thing against the Russians. I think that is very relevant.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Earle. I wrote to the President that my duties in Turkey
were finished because the Turks had broken off relations with the
Germans. I asked to be recalled, which he did.
I returned here, and he thanked me very much and told me rny
work had been good service. I told him I was willing to stay in
the Navy. He told me at my age it wasn't necessary.
2200 THE KATYN FOKEST MASSACRE
Exhibit 26-A — Mb. Roosevelt's Reply
THE WHITE MOUSE
WASMiHGTON
So I wrote him March 22 saying that unless I heard to the contrary,
I was going to publish a complete statement about Katyn, about how
Russia was a much greater menace to America than Germany ever
was, because they had the men, the raw materials, and these millions
of hfth columnists.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2201
]Mr. Machrowicz. What year would that be, Governor ?
Mr. Earle. That is March 22, 1945, about 3 weeks before he died,
when I returned.
Here is his letter.
I liad addressed the letter to his daughter Anna requesting her to
read it to him because Steve Earley was not there and I was afraid
he would not get it.
May I say, gentlemen, this was in March of 1945. It was about the
time Hitler and Eva Braun, his new^ wife, had committed suicide in
the bunker outside of Berlin and the atomic bomb was almost com-
pleted, the war was practically finished. There was nothing but
guerrilla w^arf are left.
This is March 24, 1945 :
Dear George: I have read your letter of March twenty-first to my daughter
Anna and I have noted with concern your plan to publicize your unfavorable
opinion of one of our allies at the very time when such a publication from a
former emissary of mine might do irreparable harm to our war effort. As you
say. you have held important positions of trust under your government. To
publish information obtained in those positions without proper authority would
be all the greater betrayal. You say you will publish unless you are told before
March twenty-eighth that I do not wish you to do so. * * *
I was loyal to him. I said I would not publish it if he told me not
to do it.
* * * I not only do not wish it, but I specifically forbid you to publish any
information or opinion about an ally that you may have acquired while in
office or in the service of the United States Navy.
In view of your wish for continued active .service, I shall withdraw any pre-
vious understanding that you are serving as an emissary of mine and I shall
dii'ect the Navy Department to continue your employment wherever they can
make use of your services * * *."
I got orders to go to Samoa, as far as they could get me from Moscow,
where there was complete censorship.
I am sorry that pressure of affairs prevented me from seeing you on Monday.
I value our old association and I hope that time and circumstance may some day
permit a renewal of our good understanding.
Now, gentlemen, that was after the war was practically finished.
Chairman Madden. Can we have that as on exhibit '\
Mr. Earee. This letter I have been offered fifteen hundred dollars
for, and please don't lose it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you read the letter to which this was an
answer
Mr. Earle. No. I did not keep my letters.
Mr. Machrowicz. You do not have a copy of it ?
Mr. Earle. No.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, in view of the value of this letter to
the Commander, can we just read it into the record and return it to
him at this time rather than keep it? He said it is worth fifteen
hundred dollars to him.
Mr. Mitchell. We have not lost one document yet, and we have
taken documents from all over the world.
Mr. Earle. I was offered that by Mr. Rosenbach.
Chairman Madden. That will be the next exhibit.
Mr. PuciNSKi. That is exhibit No. 27.
2202 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
(The document referred was marked "Exhibit 27," and is as
follows:)
Exhibit 27 — Me. Roosevelt's Letter to Ambassadob Eaele
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHiNGTON
Mr. Earle. Now, gentlemen, just one other thing in this matter.
It is very interesting to show how active mentally the President was
before he died.
I wrote him I did not want to go to Samoa, the war had passed it by.
However, Steve Early told me later. I had concluded my letter by
saying :
May God guide you right through this Russian mess.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2203
The President knew very well who was responsible for the Russian
mess, and here is his answer — that remark got me sent to Samoa
Dear George: Your letter of March twenty-sixth has just reached me, and
your orders to duty on the Pacific have already been issued as I have already
changed instructions once. I think you had better go ahead and carry them out
and see what you think of the Pacific War as one of our problems * * *
He had heard all he wanted to hear from me about the European
problems.
With all good wishes.
Feankun D. Roosevelt.
Gentlemen, I want to point out to you how very loyal I was to the
President. I said I wouldn't publish anything if he told me not to.
In spite of that, down I went to Samoa.
When I returned from there, the Chief of Personnel of the Navy and
Commodore Vardaman, the President's Navy aide, both called me in to
apologize to me and said they were very sorry, that the Navy De-
partment had nothing to do with it.
And then. Commodore Vardaman, one of Harry Truman's closest
friends, made a very interesting remark. He said —
We Truman people never turn over a Roosevelt stone that we don't find a
snail under it.
I don't know what he meant by it, but possibly you gentlemen do.
Now, I would like to go into this Katyn massacre.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your permission to bring
in what I consider showing the attitude here in Washington.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Earle. The Katyn massacre we knew all about in Turkey. Of
course, the Turks, you know, their foreign policy is purely one of being
anti-Russian, because they know Russia wants their warm-water
seaports.
Now, we knew all about that and we, of course, had our very strong
opinions.
But one day, one of my agents, a White Russian, brought me these
photographs of the Katyn massacre. And then one of my agents in
Bulgaria brought me three letters, two from two members of the
Bulgarian Red Cross and one whom I had known, and one from the
Rumanian Red Cross, whom I had known only by reputation.
These men gave these affidavits that they had gone up there and
personally inspected this Katyn situation, and they said that by the
state of decomposition of the bodies, by many other evidences, there
could be no question that it was the Russians who had done it.
Now, I went to Captain Trammel, of the United States Navy, a very
able intelligence officer in Istanbul. I was not under his orders ; I was
reporting directly to the President. We worked together very well.
I showed him these pictures. They were very bulky, and, as you know,
in those days airplane travel weight was important.
So the smaller folders were given to me, and I gave the larger
folders, but not the affidavits, to Captain Trammel.
And as I wrote you gentlemen 2 or 3 months ago, if you ask him, he
still has the big ones. The small ones I took in to President Roosevelt
with a magnifying glass and showed them to the President.
2204 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE
He said, "George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German
plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this."
I said, "Mr. President, I think this evidence overwhelming."
Mr. Mitchell. When was this?
Mr. Earle. The President recalled me for consultation in May of
1944. Now, this was a year after this had happened, but this evi-
dence, conclusive evidence, had never been given to me before. It had
been given to me, I think, about February that year, and I wasn't
called for consultation — I wanted to present them personally to the
President — I wasn't called for consultation until May of 1944.
These were the President's words. He said :
George, you have been worried about Russia ever since 1942. Now —
he said —
let me tell you I am an older man than you are and I have had a lot of exi>eri-
ence. These Russians, they are 180 million people, speaking 120 different dialects.
When this war is over they are going to fly to pieces like a centrifugal machine
cracked through and through, traveling at high speed.
He said this to me three times. That was his stock-in-trade answer,
we had nothing to fear from the Russians because they would fly to
pieces.
Now, as I say, I felt very ho})eless. As I went out of the door, I
said, "Mr. President, please look those over again."
Mr. Mitchell. From whom w^ere those affidavits?
Mr. Earle. The affidavits were from two Bulgarian Red Cross men
and one Rumanian.
And, gentlemen, my memory is poor for those foreign names, and
particularly poor when their families are still behind the iron curtain.
Mr. Mitchell. We do not want the names on the record. We are
not asking to have the names on the record if you have the slightest
doubt in that regard. It has always been the policy of this committee
to do that.
Mr. Earle. I understand.
Gentlemen, that has been 8 or 9 years ago, and I really do noi re-
member those names. But if I did remember I would have to give
them to you in confidence.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Mr. Earle. But now, of course, the way I feel is this : As you know,
when the Poles demanded a neutral Red Cross investigation- .)f course,
you could hardly consider Bulgaria and Rumania a neutral Red Cross
because they were occupied by the Germans at that time, the spring
of 1942 — l)ut what defense could Stalin liave to this if he were guilty?
The only defense Stalin could have was to fly into a rage and abso-
lutely say :
This is an outrageous thing; this is a dreadful thing, and T am going to break
off relations with these horrible Poles for saying such terrible things about us
fine Riissians.
That was the only possible defense he had. Suppose he had
kept up relations with them; how could he have refused them the
right to send those neutral Red Cross agents in there? He could
not have done it.
So, he took the only defense he had, and that was to fly into a fury
of outraged righteousness and break off relations with the Poles.
What else could he do?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2205
Mr. Mitchell. You are speculating now, are you not? At the
time you saw the President in May 1944, was that part of your
conversation ?
Mr. Earle. Wliat?
Mr. Mitchell, ^^liat you are recounting to the committee here
now?
Did you tell him, '"^Miat else could Stalin do?" Are you relating
a conversation you had with the President ?
Mr. Earle. No ; I did not say that to the President.
Mr. jNIitciiell. You are speculating then?
Mr. Earle. Yes ; I am speculating.
Mr. Mitchell. In 1943 or 1944 — in fact, until this committee came
into being — everybody thought it was an international mystery, be-
cause there was so much propaganda on either side.
I would like to have you tell the committee then specifically what
went on between vou and President Roosevelt in that conference in
May 1944.
Mr. SiiEEHAisr. Mr. Counsel, may I correct the record?
You say "everybody thought it was an international mystery."
We got information from militaiy attaches in 1942 saying the Rus-
sians had done it.
Mr. Mitchell. This committee was on record as already saying
in the re]xjrt that the Russians did it.
Mr. Sheehax. I am correcting the record.
Mr. Earle. As I say, I came in there with this book of photographs.
You can get the original photographs if you don't already have
them. Captain Trammel must have kept them.
Mr. Mitchell. I have checked with the Navy Department and I
have gotten the same, identical pictures which were put on the record
in Frankfurt, Germany, this last April,
Mr. Earle. Do you have them ?
Mr. iSIiTCHELL. Yes.
Mr. Earle. I went in there and I said, "Mr. President, I am very
much worried about this Russian situation. I feel that they are a
great menace, and I feel that they have done their best to deceive
the American people about this Katyn massacre, and, also, primarily
and most important of all, by this dreadful book of Joe Davies,
Mission to Moscow, which made Stalin out a benign Santa Claus.
We never iecovered from that. It made such an impression on the
American people."
"Now," I said, "Mr. President, these Russians, you have no idea
already, in the countries of Rumania and Bulgaria, what they are
trying to do to us."
And then, gentlemen, I showed him a picture which they had dis-
tributed, which I always regretted I did not keep. It Avas a picture
of Babe Ruth with a bat over his shoulder — a great, big picture —
and an adoring little American boy looking up at him. And, under-
neath it, it said in the language of these iron-curtain countries, "Typi-
cal of democratic America : this great American brute is about to club
this little American boy to death."
I always regret I did not keep that picture. I gave it to the
President.
Mr. Mitchell. I think you are making a slight mistake there
when you say "iron-curtain countries." They are iron-curtain coun-
93744— 52— pt. 7 25
2206 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
tries today, but then they were Nazi-dominated countries; were thev
not?
Mr. Earle, 1944, no, sir. Do you mean to say Rumania and Bul-
garia weren't in the hands of Russia in 1944?
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Wlien were they taken over, specifically ?
Mr. Eakle. The latter part of 1943 or in 1944. This was in May
1944.
Do you mean to tell me they were not in the hands of the Russians
in May 1944, when I spoke to the President ?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe you placed that "at that time" as having
been under the control of one of the Allies in wartime, which was
1944; is not that correct?
The phrase "iron curtain" did not come into being until after the
war.
]\Ir. Earle. Oh, I beg your pardon. They may not have called it
the iron curtain
Mr. DoNDERO. May I suggest we are wasting time. The record will
show that.
Mr. Earle. Your contention is that Rumania and Bulgaria were
not in the control of Russia in May 1944.
Mr. Mitchell. I do not want to get into a debate with you. I am
talking about the phrase "iron curtain," and I want the record to show
that. You may say what you like about it, but I do not believe that
at that time, in 1944
Mr. Earle. Oh, no.
Chairman Madden. Let us proceed.
Mr. Earle. Well, I came back and I showed him this picture, and
I told him how worried I was about the whole Russian situation.
"Now," I said, "about this Katyn massacre, Mr. President, I just
cannot believe that the American President and so many people still
think it is a mystery or any doubt about it." I said, "Here are these
pictures; here are these affidavits, and here is the invitation of the
German Government to let the neutral Red Cross go in there and make
their examination. What greater proof could you have?"
He said, "George, they could have rigged things up. The Germans
could have rigged things up."
He even mentioned the fact that they might put in other bodies or
something to make them look older or younger, or older or newer
deaths, or something like that.
He said, "Those Nazis are very smart, and they could rig it up for
the Red Cross."
"Well," I said, "Mr. President, if you send in the proper kind of
representatives, the neutral Red Cross men, they could not do it."
Then he said — the rest of his conversation was — ''Now, I want you
to find out something about the veterans of this war, whether they
should have a new organization or use the old organization. Also, I
want you to go out over the country and spend 3 weeks finding out
whether I can be elected or not." "V^Hiich I did. I went through the
country and tele})h()ned him he was sure of election, but begged lum not
to run. I told him, "You have had a magnificent career, and this
Russian question can be solved only by blood and tears. For God's
sake don't run."
That was my advice to hinu
Mr. Mitchell. Did that toi-niinate the convei'sation?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2207
Mr. Earle. I went into greater detail, as I said before : that they
had the natural resources ; thej^ had a million fifth columnists, whereas
the Germans had only a few highly paid ones ; how they hated democ-
racy. And I told him Lenin's words, how the world must be made
communistic. And I said they are so much a greater menace than the
Germans there was no comparison.
At my conference when I got up and was leaving, I asked him to go
over the testimony I had left and the evidence I had left. And he
did not answer, and I walked out of the room, and that is the last I
ever saw him.
I called him on the telephone and told him about the information
he asked me to get about the veterans and about whether he would be
reelected.
Chairman Mvdden. What year or month was that?
Mr. Earle. That was in May 1944, just before the landings in
Normandy.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. In other words, Governor, after you gave him the
report that you were convinced that the Russians slaughtered these
10,000 or 15,000 Polish officers, his reaction to that was that you should
go around the country and find out if he could get reelected or not?
Mr. Earle. That and the veterans' matter ; that is what he wanted
me to find out.
And I came back telephoned him he would be reelected. And 4
weeks later I was promoted to commander. I don't think it had
anything to do with it; it was just a coincidence.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Governor, was it not your impression that, through-
out this whole period, even if Russia had murdered 100,000 or even
as many as 500,000 Polish officers, and we knew it to be true, that
he still would have covered up for the Russians because of the policy
we were carrying on at that time?
Mr. Earle. I think that the love and respect and belief in Russia
in the ^^Hiite House was simply unbelievable to me. I just cannot
understand it. Everywhere I went there were just a few people,
Forrestal and Bullitt and myself and a few others — I am not sure
of all the names because I wasn't here, so I don't know — but I don't
understand it.
The liberals got all twisted up. They seemed to think that com-
munism was liberalism, whereas, in reality, communism is the worst
enemy of liberalism. There is no freedom of the press; no right of
collective bargaining; no freedom of speech. It violates every tenet
of liberalism.
Yes; I think these Americans for Democratic Action should be
called Americans for Socialistic Action.
May I say the American people don't know the difference between
socialism and communism. Let me tell j^ou the difference. I am sure
that many of you know it.
The only difference is tliis : They both believe in Lenin's teaching.
The only difference is that the Communists believe in seizing it by
a militant minority, any kind of crime to get it, by violence, while
the Socialists mean to get it by legal means or by the vote of the
people. There is no difference. They both believe absolutely in the
teachings of Lenin.
There is no difference except the method of attaining it. Very few
people realize that.
2208 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were you in any way forewarned about the change
in complexion of the "White House before you arrived there for this
conference ?
Mr. Earle. Yes. Were you here when I read about what Joe Levy
said to me?
And I want to tell you another very important thing that shows
you about that.
In the fall of 1944, the head of the OSS in Istanbul was Lt. Col.
Packy McFarland. He had his nickname from the old prize fighter.
He was a banker from Chicago. He asked me to come to lunch and
he said, "Now, George, you don't realize that you are one of the fair-
haired boys of the White House, but these reports that you are putting
in against Russia are getting you very much in wrong. You are not
going to be recognized there very soon."
Now, gentlemen, as you know, of course, memories are pretty
tricky.
First of all, what I thought he said was this, "We have definite
orders in the OSS not to do any espionage work against the Russians
or to put in any derogatory reports about them."
Now% I saw General Donovan, who was head of the OSS, who is a
magnificent American, a great soldier, wdio has been awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor, who is absolutely honest. I told him
about that, and he said no such orders were ever issued.
My memory may trick me on that because Donovan's denial of the
order from headquarters was absolutely certain for me. However,
Farland may have said, "We wouldn't think of endangering our-
selves over here by doing it." Or he might have said, "We wouldn't
think of doing such a thing."
Later on, the same McFarland was dropped in Yugoslavia with
young Churchill, and he came out of there seeing the brand of com-
munism of Tito, who was, after all, nothing but a murderous Com-
munist. He happens to be our murderous Communist at present ; so
we get along with him. But he said he came out so exercised about
the dreadful dangers of communism that he came over here after he
got out of the OSS and went from department to department of this
Government trying to awaken them to the dangers of communism. He
was so impressed by them in Yugoslavia.
Now, gentlemen, McFarland might clarify that situation because
I know Donovan speaks the truth and McFarland seemed like a truth-
ful fellow. I may have misunderstood him. The least he said was we
wouldn't think of doing espionage work against the Russians, or mak-
ing derogatory reports about them.
That he did say. Now, whether it was orders, or he wouldn't dare
do it, my memory is not certain. But I do believe General Donovan,
gentlemen.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Governor, even after the war in Europe ended, you
no longer needed Russia as an ally. I mean that is the pretense they
always used : that, after all, Russia was an ally, and they were afraid
we would lose them ; so we had to play along with them.
Here the \\nr was ended, and certain Americans were quite dis-
turbed about this Communist business. There w'ere a great many
Americans who started an organization called the American Anti-
Communist Association.
Mr. Earle. That is correct, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2209
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You were asked to head that organization; were
you not ?
Mr. Earle. Yes ; that is correct.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. What was the reaction among your superiors when
you assumed the post of president of the American Anti- Communist
Association after the war was ended?
Mr. Earle. I can give you that from a letter from President Tru-
man.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The reason why I am familiar with that phase of
it is that after you resigned the only person they could get in America
to lead it was myself, and I succeeded you ; is that correct ?
Mr. Earle. Yes.
Now, gentlemen, I resigned from the American Anti-Communist
Association as president, and I wrote to President Truman that I had
done so. But I warned him that the party that took the greatest,
strongest stand against this infiltration of communism, which meant
the destruction of all our liberties if it succeeded, would merit the
undying gratitude of the American people.
And he wrote me back this letter in February 28, 1947.
And since the war, Russia has broken promise after promise and
has violated every kind of treaty she has made.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And already exercised 30 vetoes at the United
Nations.
Mr. Earle. That is right.
This is from the White House, Washington, February 28, 1947:
Deak Governor : I appreciate very much your note of February 26, and I am
very happy to be informed of your decision with regard to the American Anti-
Communist Association. * * *
Now, the reason I gave for resigning had nothing to do with pro-
communism; quite the contrary.
* * * People are very much wrought up about the Connnunist "buga-
boo" * * *
"Bugaboo," gentlemen, Webster defines as an imaginary object
of fright. I wonder if our boys in Korea think communism is an
imaginary object of fright.
* * * People are very much wrought up about the Communist '•bugaboo,"
but I am of the opinion that the country is perfectly safe so far as communism
is concerned. * * * We have too many sane people. Our Government is
made for the welfare of the people, and I don't believe there will ever come a
time when anyone will really want to overturn it.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman.
Chairman Madden. That will be marked "Exhibit 28."
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 28," and
appears on p. 2210.)
Mr. OTvoNSKi. Let us get back to the Katyn story now. Governor.
In other words, the Katyn story is not significant* in itself; but, no
matter what kind of story might have emanated that was derogatory
to the Russian interests, that kind of story would liave gotten the same
kind of treatment, as far as subduing it is concerned, from high places
in our Government, just as the Katyn story did? It is not Katyn
alone that was subdued, but any information derogatory to the Rus-
sians would be subdued in the same way ; would it not ?
2210 THE KATYN FOREST ]MASSACRE
ExHiuiT 28 — President Truman's Letter to Ambassador P]arle
"He WHITE HOUSE.
■A' A s K 1 ^; O T O M
Februarv 2a, !94-7
Dear Governor:
I appreciated very much your note o£ ^
February twi'-nty- sixth Anc5 I ain very j
happy to be informed of your decision ' «
with regard to t]ie Ainerican Anti- "^
Comniunist Association. . j
People are very much wrought up about
t}ie Communist bugaboo but I tim of the '
opinion that the country is perfectly sate "
so far as Conan-mnism is concerned - we "
have too rnany saae people. Our Governrntiiii
is made for tlie welfare of the people and I i
don 1 believe there will ever come a time i
when anyone v/ill really wtint to overturn it, i
Sincerely vours.
/^isf-t-v^ ■^j/^^.^i^-'t^'
Honorable George H. Earie
Grays Lane
Haverford, Pennsylvania
Mr. Earle. Anything exco])t one thing, tincl that Avould be mass
murder of Americans. I can't think of anything else that \voul(l have
caused tlie Wliite House to take any derogatory ])osition to Russia,
If they had murdered a lot of Americans, they might have, nothing
less.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, their story always was that anything
anti-llussian was really anti-war-effort. Was that the general im-
l^ression they tried to convey?
Mr. Earlk. Over here, with the war nearly over, you see what
President Roosevelt says in his letter :
I forbid you to say a word against an ally.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2211
This when the war was practically over.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. At the same time, did the same people who said they
were afraid that they might disturb the war effort show any inclination
whatever to subdue any anti-Polish propaganda? And Poland was
one of our gallant allies. Did they make any effort to subdue that
kind of propaganda?
Mr. Earle. That I did not know about. I was in Turkey. I would
not know about it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did they make any effort to subdue anti-Chiang
Kai-shek propaganda ?
IVIr. Earle. As I say, I was in Turkey. I cannot answer that ques-
tion.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. This thing strikes me as funny. The only ally they
were always concerned about in not trying to create any suspicions
about was Russia. Whatever they might say about some of the other
glorious Allies, like Poland and Chiang Kai-Shek, they were perfectly
free to go ahead and say it; but Russia must never be touched, she
must never be criticized.
They were afraid she might leave us and make a separate peace with
Hitler, and then where would we be? That was their attitude? How
incredible.
Mr. Earle. That is right.
Of course, I want to tell you that right after Tehran the Russians
absolutely promised to give the people in the Balkans the right of
self-determination. Only a short time after the Russians occupied
Bulgaria, and only a very few short weeks, I think, after Tehran,
when they promised the self-determination to the people, the Rus-
sian soldiers were arresting the Bulgarian liberals who used to meet
with me at 2 or 3 o'clock in tlie morning on lonely roads to plan how
to take action against the Nazis when I was Minister. They were
executing those liberals and democrats within a few weeks after their
promise at Tehran, when they promised that the Balkan people should
have self-determination. That is how long they kept their promise.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Just to make this thing fair on all sides — this is
not critical with me in any sense — let me ask : Do you really understand
what was the mission of Wendell Willkie's going over to Russia?
What part did he play in the cover-up and apology of the Soviet
Union, the "great democratic forces" of Soviet Russia ?
Were you ever informed as to what part he played in this cover-up
of Soviet Russia ?
Mr. Earle. There, again, I only had sketchy reports from the
Turkish press.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. You had no contact with him?
Mr. Earle. I just met him when he went through there, but he
said nothing to me of interest.
Of course, one of the most terrific things to me and one of the things
I regret most of all was when I met Forrestal. He said, "Please come
over, George, and talk this thing over with me," and I didn't do it.
I was in such a hurry to carry out these orders of the President and
go back to Turkey.
Just those few words. He burst out and said, "Oh, my God, we are
almost alone here. Anything Russia does is right, and they don't
see the menace of it, George."
2212 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
And he said, "It is dreadful. I am worried sick." And, as you
know, later he committed suicide, probably brought on by his worry
over the trend of the present American foreign policy with regard to
Russia.
Mr. Sheehan. Governor, may I point out an observation on the
so-called bi])artisan foreign policy ? It seems to me that every time
one of the Republicans got in with Mr. Roosevelt, he silenced him on
his word of honor not to reveal what they know.
So, therefore, a bipartisan policy means only a policy of the party
in power.
Mr. Earle. That would be true, sir, under those conditions.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you have any other letters, Governor, from any-
body, that could shed a little light on this thing? You were in a posi-
tion where you turned out to be the man who was 100 percent correct,
and your superiors were found to be 1,000 percent wrong. Do you
have any other letters or documents of any kind that you could insert
in the record, that will show us the picture that prevailed at that time?
If Russia had committed mayhem, rape, plunder, no matter what
acts of atrocity or international crime she committed, that would never
be told to the American people, we would cover up for them.
Do you have any other information to give us ?
Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean concerning Katyn?
Mr. Earle. Yes. This concerns Katyn.
You gentlemen have had no testimony from Prince Mirsky, or
Princess Mirsky ?
Mr. Mitchell. No.
Mr. Dondero. From what country ?
Mr. Earle. Prince Mirsky was a Polish officer, and he was taken
into prison in Katyn. He got his title of prince in a kind of nebulous
way, he told me, because he was descended from Russian exiles, and
they had a tradition that if anybody had a Scandinavian name like
Rollo or something like that, then that person got the title of prince.
He married a Polish woman. He was captured with tlie other Polish
officers and taken to Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was he taken ?
Mr. Earle. He was taken to Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. Are you calling for the record to say that lie was
taken to Katyn? In the investigation of this conunittee
Mr. Earle. He was imprisoned in Katyn, let us say.
Mr. Mitchell, We have never found a Russian prisoner-of-war
camp any closer to Katyn than 11 miles.
Mr. Earle. Well, they called it Katyn. The murder was near the
prison of Katyn. He said he was in the prison camp.
Mr. Mitchell. Maybe Kozielsk. Kozielsk is about 11 miles east of
Smolensk.
Mr. Earle. Wherever the nnirders were connnitted, that was the
prison camp.
Mr. ISfiTCHELL. No; it was not, Governor. I want to correct you on
that point. The murders were in a forest called Katyn.
Mr. Earle. That is right; yes.
Mv. Mitchell. There was no prison camp in Katyn.
Mr. Earle. I mean the ])rison camp nearest to Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. That is Kozielsk. It is about 30 miles.
Mr. Earle. All riffht.
THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 2213
Now, as you know, tlie way tliey found it out was that the old
liussian peasant told them there was firing in the forest of Katyn, and
the Germans went up there and found them.
This is what Mirsky said, that at that time, the Germans and Rus-
sians Avere working together, and he had some estates or something
in Rumania, and the Rumanians got him out of there a few days be-
fore the massacre. And when he tried to correspond with his fellow
prisoners in there, he said, they told him, "Well, don't bother about
that : we got you out just in time and you will never hear from them
again.*"
Now. if you get this Prince Mirsky, he will give you that testimony.
Now, gentlemen, I just want to tell you this little story about his
wife. His wife was put into a prison. She was a Polish woman
and slie Avas put into ])rison Ijecause of the fact that she had the title
of princess, they thought she might have information they could get
from lier.
She told me this story herself.
So tliey put her down in this dungeon and they tried to get her,,
even in those early days, to give evidence that the real cause of the
war was that the democracies wanted to destroy communism in Russia.
"Of course", she said, "'I had no such evidence."
''So"-, she said, "finally I refused to testify to that because I didn't
know anything about it anyway. So they brought me up in this
room Avith a Russian Komissar and nine Russian soldiers."
He said, "Now are you going to testify that the democracies are
now plotting to destroy Russia?"
And she said, "No, I won't testify to any such thing."
He said, "We are going to show you Avhat is going to happen if
jou don't."
So they ])rought up a Polish girl of 16 and said, "Are you going to
become a Conununist f, and she said she could not become a Com-
munist, tliat she was a good Catholic.
So he gave the signal, and these Russian soldiers, one after the other
attacked her and left her unconscious on the floor.
He said, "Noav, this is what is going to happen to you if you don't
tell us Avhat Ave want to know."
The next day down in the dungeon they brought in beautiful gold
ornaments that belonged to the Czar and otTerecl her that as a bribe
to tell. She refused that.
A few days later Germany attacked Russia and she was released
and made her way to the Turkish border.
That is a true story about Prince Mirsky and his wife.
AVhile the Americans at home were reading ISIission to Moscow,
I Avas hearing people tell similar stories to Mirsky's, hundreds of them,
JeAvs and Gentiles, Mohammedans and everything else, refugees from
Russia's other slaA^e labor camps, about the terrible situation in Russia.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. While you Avere on the scene oA^er there. Governor,
there never Avas any eAddence, by any agency of our GoA^ernment, in-
telligence. State, executive, there was never any effort of any nature,
manner or form, or shape whatsoever to try to get from you what you
knew about the kind of people the Russians were; there neA^er was
any such effort made?
Mr. Eakle. NeA'er. I went down steadily in standing the more
reports I put in against them.
2214 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoxsKi. As a matter of fact, when you volunteered informa-
tion as to tlie nature and the long-range plan that the Russian Com-
munists actually had, you were discouraged from using it and told
to change your ophiions about them, were you not ?
Mr, Earle. Absolutely.
Now, gentlemen, that letter there is the most interesting letter on
communism.
May I tell you one other thing which will show what I think is
the most interesting thing that happened to me in my whole life — in
any part of my career.
In 1943, early in 1943, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the great Chief of
the German Wehrmacht, the great Chief of the German Military
Intelligence, was always our friend. He saved Churchill from assas-
sination. He notified the Low Countries of their invasion before it
happened.
Finally, Hitler caught up to him, and 2 weeks before Hitler com-
mitted suicide he had him tortured to death by the S. S. in a prison
camp.
Canaris came to me in early 1943 and he said to me :
The German Army hates the Nazi leaders. They dislike Himmler ; they hate
Ribbentrop, and the whole crowd. Now, we will take over control and we will
surrender to the allies unconditionally, except with one condition. We will turn
over to you everything. You can punish the Nazi leaders as you see fit.
Now, all this, gentlemen, you will find in a book by Ian Calvin, an
Englishman I never saw. It is published by McGraw-Hill. Master
Spy. It is a biography of Canaris.
He came to me and made this offer, on one condition :
You can take the Nazi leaders and execute them, punish them, anything you
please. You can do with us anything you want. We just ask one condition, that
you keep the Russians out of Eastern and Central Europe and you can use the
German Army to do it.
I thought it was the most wonderful proposition I had heard. And
I sent it to the President by pouch and every possible means I possibly
could. That was again one of the letters to which I never had an
answer.
Steve Early later told me President Roosevelt had received it and
said there shall be nothing but unconditional surrender. I often think
of where we would be today if we had accepted the })roposition.
Mr. Mitchell. Governor Earle, during the course of investigation
by this committee, I would like you to know that Congressman Flood
and I talked to Canaris' secretary in Germany last year and asked her
if she knew where we could find any of the records in connection with
ihe Katyn episode, the German records. She told us all those German
records had fallen into the Allied Powers' hands.
We subsequently found those records in the Allied Powers' hands in
London, and they all have been made a part of the record of this com-
mittee. You can find them in part 5 of the hearings of this committee.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Earle. What I stated about Canaris had nothing to do with
Katyn.
Mr. MiTCHELi.. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Governor, I have one more question.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2215
If you had subjected yourself and followed the pro-Communist line
instead of the anti-Communist line, do you suppose you could still be
in the ambassadorial service?
Mr. Earle. I can only tell you that my former secretary, Harry
Kalodner, now judge in the United States circuit court of appeals, told
me that when I returned in 1946 and made that terrific blast about
Russia, he told me that if I had not made it I would have been given
an ambassadorship immediately. That is Harry Kalodner, a leading
Democrat of Pennsylvania, and one whom all the Democratic Party
in Pennsylvania follow because he is very able and shrewd and honest ;
that is all I know.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The basis on which Ambassadors were selected was
whether they were pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet.
Mr. Earle. There certainly could not be an Ambassador who was
anti-Soviet in the last two administrations.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. It is fantastic. One wonders why they do not al-
ready control the world.
Mr. Sheehan. In the hearings before this committee it has been
brought out by various officials of the State Department that one of
the reasons for our particular line during those years was, as the State
Department and other officials said, that they were continuously afraid
that maybe Russia and Hitler would strike up a peace arrangement
and decide to end the war and leave us in the middle.
From your experience, from where you were, what do you think of
that proposition ?
Mr. Earle. I think, gentlemen, my thoughts go into very vulgar
slang when I think of such a proposition.
Do you mean to tell me that even Stalin, after the dreadful punish-
ment the Germans had given him, could possibly have switched sides
with his people ? It would have been absolutely impossible.
Hitler in his fanaticism against the Communists would not have
thought of such a thing, and I do not think Stalin could have swung
his people to go over to the Germans again after the terrible slaughter
they had taken.
Don't forget this, gentlemen, that Germany took two-thirds of Rus-
sian industries. They killed several millions of men. They took
half of Russian European territory, and they administered it. How
could they possibly have ever hit on such a ridiculous, fantastic
thought, that they could ever have patched it up after that had
happened 1
Mr. Sheehan. What did the Europeans think of that idea outside
of yourself ?
Mr. Earle. I never heard any European express such a possibility.
Mr. Sheehax. It is my understanding — is that not right, Mr.
Counsel — that the State Department people, when they were before
us, always held that out before us.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe Mr. Sumner Welles yesterday, and Mr.
Averell Harriman contended that way ; yes, sir.
Chairman Maddex. Are there any further questions ?
Thank you for appearing before us as a witness, Mr. Earle.
We will now hear our next witness, Arthur Bliss Lane.
2216 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR BLISS LANE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Cliairman Maudex. Will you be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear tliat you will tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but tlie truth in the hearing now being held, so help you
God?
Mr. Lane. I do.
Chairman AIadden. State your full name for the reporter, please.
Mr. Lane. Arthur Bliss Lane.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Lane, 2442 ^Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And what is your business?
Mr, Lane. I have no business at the ]>resent time, but I have been,
since my resignation as Ambassador, engaged as a lecturer and a
writer.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You aie an unemployed anti-Communist.
Mr. Lane, That is right, sir.
Chairman Madden, Proceed, Mr, Counsel,
Mr. Mitchell. How long have you been in the Foreign Service of
the United States, Mr. Lane ?
Mr, Lane, Thirty-one years.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first enter the service ?
Mr. Lane. In 1016.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was your first ajDpointment ?
Mr. Lane. As secretary to the American Ambassador at Rome.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your position in 1939?
Mr. Lane, I was Minister in Yugoslavia at that time,
Mr, Mitchell. How long were you in that position ?
Mr. Lane. I was there for 4 years, until 1941, when the Germans
came in,
Mr, Mitchell, Where did you go in 1941 ?
Mr, Lane, I came back home. After a few months in the Depart-
ment, I was sent to Costa Rica as Minister.
Mr, Mitchell, How^ long were you in Costa Rica ?
Mr, Lane, Just about 3 months. And Ihen I Avas appointed Ambas-
sador to Colombia.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you in Colombia ?
Mr. Lane. About 2 years and a half.
Then I was appointed Ambassador to the Polish Government in
exile in London, but I never ari'ived there.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the specific date, if you recall?
Mr. Lane. I think my appointment was September 21, 1944.
Mr. Mitchell, Your ai)pointment to the Polish Goverment in
exile?
Ml', Lane. That is right,
Mr, Mitchell, Why did you not arrive there?
Mr, Lane, Because there was disagreement at that time among the
Big Three as to what the disposition of Poland was to be,
Mr, Mitchell, Had you been confirmed by the Senate?
Mr. Lane, Yes ; I had been.
Mr. Mitchell, This was September 1944?
Mr, Lane. 1944, And I remained in Washington then until I ac-
tually left for Poland on July 5, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. During the ])eri()(l that you were in Washington, I
assume you were working in the Department of State?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2217
Mr. Lane. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. In your briefing; to assume your position as United
States Ambassador to the Polish Government in exile, what were you
informed concerning the Katyn massacre?
Mr. Lane. The only document that I was able to see was the report
that came from the American Embassy in Moscow, which had been
prepared by Miss Harriman.
Mr. Mitchell. During the course of time from September 1944
until you departed in July 1945, did you, of your own personal knowl-
edge, not official, find out anything about the Katyn massacre, and, if
so, from whom, and when ?
Mr. Lane. I did not find anything except that one report, although
I endeavored to find out if there were any files in the Department of
State on that subject.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever talk to the Polish Ambassador here
about the subject, Ambassador Ciechanowski ?
Mr. Lane. "Yes, I did.
Mr. Mitchell. When?
Mr. Lane. I cannot exactly recall the date, but it was obA'iously be-
tween September 1944 and the spring of 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. There was a Mr. Durbrow in the Department of
State, I believe, at that time. He was the man in charge of the Polish
desk at that time. Did you discuss the Katyn massacre with Mr.
Durbrow ?
Mr. Lane. Yes, I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ask him to let you see any reports tliat may
have come in on it ?
Mr. Lane. Yes. And I am certain if he had those reports he would
have let me see them.
Mr. Mitchell. Does it not strike you as rather strange that the
head of the Polish desk in the State Department between the period
September 1944 and July 1945 had not received or seen any reports on
the Katyn massacre, when this committee this last week has laid on
on the record many reports dating way back to 1943 ?
Mr. Lane. Of course, it surprised me.
Mr. Mitchell. What briefing did you receive from State Depart-
ment officials concerning the Katyn massacre before you departed in
July 1945?
Mr. Lane. No briefing at all, except that one report by Miss
Harriman.
Mr, Mitchell. That is the only thing you saw on the Katyn
massacre ?
Mr. Lane. As far as I can recall at this elate.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I believe you saw Mr. Mikolajczyk in Pottsdam in
July 1945; is that right?
Mr. Lane. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you discuss the Katyn massacre with him at
that time?
Mr. Lane. No, I did not, because I did not have a private conver-
sation with him. There were other people present,
]\Ir, Mitchell, He was not an official of the government in exile
at that time, was he?
Mr. Lane. He was an official in the new aovernment.
2218 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you reached Warsaw, Avhicli I believe was
aroimcl August 1945
Mr. Lane. 31st of July.
Mr. Mitchell. At that time, what information did you find out
about the Katyn massacre?
Mr. Lane. I obtained some information from people who had for-
merly been in the underground, and they were the ones who first gave
me definite information as to what had happened at Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. When you say formerly in the underground, do you
mean the underground of the Polish Government in exile?
Mr. Lane. Yes. In other words, I knew that they were anti-
Communist.
Mr. Mitchell. What were their reactions to the Katyn massacre?
Mr. Lane. They felt that the Russians had been responsible.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairaian, at this time I w^ould like to introduce
exhibit No. 29.
Chairman Madden. Very well, that will be received for the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 29," and is
as follows:)
Exhibit 29 — Ambassador Lane's Letter to Mr. Justice Jackson at Nuremberg,
Sent from the United States Embassy in Warsaw, December 16, 11)4.5
[Telegram]
December 16, 1945.
Secretary of State, Washington.
Berlin : Justice Jackson at Nuremberg.
I understand from sources here wliich are unfriendly to the Soviet Govern-
ment that the Katyn Forest Massacre of Polish officers may be brought up by
German War Criminals at Nuremberg. According to other sources this mas-
sacre may have been carried out by both Germans and Russians working to-
gether in period of Nazi-Soviet honeymoon. Poles, even those opposed to present
Government are very apprehensive about this information being made pul)lic
since as they see it, it can only work to increase anti-Polish feeling on the part of
the Soviet Government.
(Signed) Lane.
Mr. Mitchell. This is a paraphrase of the dispatch you sent from
Warsaw to the Secretary of State, to the attention of Justice Jackson
at Nuremberg.
Do you recognize that dispatch ?
Mr. Lane. No, I don't. I frankly don't recall that dispatch.
But may I read a report that I have got, which was before this?
]\Ir. Mitchell. We will delay putting that in the record right now.
Mr. Lane. I frankly don't recall. But if that was furnished by
the State Department, I don't deny its authenticity.
Mr. JNIachrowicz. So that there will be no question, will you have
Mr. Brown take the stand and identify that?
Mr. Brown, would you mind identifying that?
You have been previously sworn and you will not have to be sworn
again.
TESTIMONY OF BEN H. BROWN, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS— Resumed
Chairman Madden. For the record, Avill you state your name,
please ?
Mr. Brown, Ben H. Brown, Jr.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2219
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Brown. 3501 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va.
Chairman Madden. What is your assignment?
Mr. Brown. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations.
Chairman Madden. Handing you exhibit 24, can you identify that?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I identify this as a paraphrase of a
cablegram in the files of the State Department, which was directed
to Mr. Justice Jackson in Nuremberg and repeated to the Department
in Washington.
Mr. Machrowicz. A cablegram from whom ?
Mr. Brown. It is signed "Lane."
Mr. Machrowicz. t rom wliere is it?
Mr. Brown. From our Embassy, Warsaw.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is the date?
Mr. Brown. December 16, 1915.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who was Ambassador to Poland at that time?
Mr. Brown. I have no personal knowledge of that, sir, but Mr. Lane
has just testified he was.
Mr. Lane. I was Ambassador, yes.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Brown, for the benefit of the committee, will you
tell us what you mean by paraphrasing a cablegram ?
Mr. Brown. Well, sir, classified cablegrams come in code, and when
they are decoded, the decoded telegram, if it got into the hands of
someone who was not entitled to it, would be of assistance in breaking
the code had the coded message been intercepted.
So a paraphrase of a telegram is a rearrangement of the wording, a
use of synonymous terms at times, in order to convey the same mes-
sage, but not in the same language as the coded message.
The purpose of it is to prevent a break in the code.
Mr. Machrowicz. But the text is the same. In other words, there
is no change in the text ?
Mr. Brown. That is quite correct, sir.
Chairman Madden. We will now go back to Mr. Lane.
TESTIMONY OF AETHUK BLISS LANE— Resumed
Mr. Mitchell. Did you want to read a statement?
Mr. Lane. Yes, if I might, Mr. Counsel.
This is a letter which I wrote to H. Freeman INIatthews, who was at
that time Director of the Division of European Affairs in the Depart-
ment of State, on November 5, 1945. As far as I know, this is the
only report I made to the State Department on Katyn, with the excep-
tion of this telegram.
Mr. Mitchell. Is this an official report?
Mr. Lane. It is a personal letter, and I was particularly anxious to
send it in a personal letter to liim because I did not want to endanger
the lives of my informants, although I did not mention them.
Mr. Mitchell. Are you going to mention names now ?
Mr. Lane. No. I would rather not.
Mr. Mitchell. If you do not know where the individuals are
Mr. Lane. Tlie individuals are in Poland, and I think they are in
prison at the present time. May I give it to the committee?
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do you have the names in there ?
2220 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Lane. The names were never in this letter.
Chairman Madden. That will be marked "Exhibit 30'' and it will
be accepted in evidence.
(The docmnent referred to was marked as "Exhibit Xo. 30" for
identification, and is as follows:)
Exhibit 30 — Ambassador Lank's Letter to State Department Offici.vl
[Extract from letter to H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs,
Department of State]
The American Embassy,
Warsaw, Poland, November 5, 19 '(5.
Top secret.
Dear Doo : * * * I have some information now from a reliable source who
formerly worked in the Polish underground which throws considerable light on
the foregoing qu«^stions (I — who was really responsible for the murder of thou-
sands of Polish officers in Katyn forest) * * *
I. Katyn Forest. My informant was an officer in a Polish cavalry regiment
in the east of Poland in 1930. This detachment had been able to avoid capture
by the Germans but during the last week in September they came upon the ad-
vancing Soviet troops which were marching westward. According to my friend,
the Soviets greeted the Poles as though they were allies but at the same time
requested them to travel eastward with them, taking their liorses with them,
the Soviets retracing their steps. Before doing so, however, the Polish officers
were disarmed. Every morning the Polish officers were told that they would
arrive at their final destination later during that day. This assurance was,
however, repeated day after day until they had traveled east for two weeks.
By this time many of the Polish officers had become suspicious of what their final
fate would be and some of them, including my friend, escaped and returned to
the west. My friend said that there is no doubt in the minds of his former
colleagues and himself that the Soviet authorities and not the Germans were
responsible for the murder of the Polish officers at Katyn forest, which was the
final destination of the group of captured officers. Unfortunately, it is very
difficult to persuade the Poles in general to discuss the Katyn forest episode, due
to their apprehension of the consequences.
*******
Tours as ever,
[s] Arthur Bliss Lane.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Ambassador,, I am personally satisfied that
you have always felt that the Russians were guilty of this offense.
Frankly, I am mystified by this telegram of December 16. Do you
have any explanation for it?
Mr. Lane. I don't recall why I sent that telegram, unless it was that
somebody who was anti-Communist persuaded me to do it. And I
really do not recall if
Mr. Machrowicz. I would hardly believe that you, the author of the
book I Saw Poland Betrayed, was swayed by Communists.
Mr. Lane. Oh, I was not swayed by Comnuuiists.
Mr-. Maciiijowicz. Did you say anti-Communists ?
Mr. Lane. Yes.
Mr. Machhowkz. Do you remember that in the book which you
wrote, I Saw Poland Betrayed, and in the article which you published
in the American Legion magazine, entitled "The Truth About the
Katyn Forest Massacre," you made this query, this being in your
article :
Who manipulated the techniques of the 1946 Nuremberg trials when the Van
Vliet, Stewart, and other evidence was available so that no Soviet crime or
criminal was punished, so that the crime of Katyn, the greatest singk" mass
execution of captives of the entire war, was never even mentioned in the tribunal's
verdict?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2221
Why, then, did you send a messaoe to Justice Jackson not to bring
the matter up at the Nuremberg trial ?
Mr. Lane. I did not tell him not to bring it up. I merely expressed
the opinion that had been given to me. I merely passed on this
recommendation.
And I frankly don't recall now who made the recommendation to me.
Mr. Machkowicz. I will just repeat this again to you :
I understand from sources here which are unfriendly to the Soviet Govern-
ment that the Katyn Forest massacre of Polisli officers may be brought up by
German war criminals at Nuremberg-. Accordius to other sources this massacre
may have been carried out by both (^ermans and Russians working together in
period of Nazi-Soviet honeymoon. Poles, even those opposed to the present
government —
That is the present Soviet-dominated government, am I right?
Mr. Lane. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz (continuing) :
are very apprehensive about this iriformation being made public since as they
see it, it can only work to increase anti-Polish feeling on the part of the Soviet
Government.
I can construe this telegram only as urging Justice Jackson not to
present the evidence against the Soviets at the Xitremberg trial. Can
you construe it any other way ?
Mr, Lane. My understanding was that I always felt that it ought
to come out. I knew that the Polish Connnunist government did not
wish to have it come out.
Mr. Machrowicz. But what was your purpose in sending this
message ?
Mr. Lane. I cannot remember now, after all these years, and I
would want to see the original of the telegram and not a paraphrase
before giving an opinion on that.
Mv. O'KoNSKi. Was it possible that somebody else from your office
could have sent that telegram and signed your name?
Mr. Lane. It is very possible someone else may have sent it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But you are definitely assured that that telegram
does not in any way express what your feelings were at that time, or
your official actions ?
Mr. Lane. No. My feelings were expressed in the letter which I
read to the committee. It is quite possible I may have been out of
town. That was around Christmas and the telegram may have been
sent in my name.
INIr. ]\Iachrowicz. Would a telegram of this nature be sent under
your name in your absence, without your being notified about it ?
Mr. Lane. I should have seen it, of course. I don't want to disclaim
responsibility for the telegram.
The only thing I want to disclaim responsibility for is the fact that
I was opposed to having the truth come out.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is it possible, Mr. Lane, that at the time you sent
the telegram, you were opposed to the matter being brought up at
Nuremberg, and then you subsequently changed your mind?
Mr. Lane. No, I was not. I was just repeating the information
that came in.
Mr. Machrowicz. What was the purpose of repeating it ?
Mr. Lane. My duty as Ambassador was to turn in any information
that came to me. I did not make any recommendation to Justice
Jackson.
93744— 52— ijt. 7 26
2222 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. To attempt to convince Justice Jackson the testi-
mony should not be presented ?
Mr. Lane. I wasn't tryino; to convince him. I was merely acting
as a re]:)orter, reporting the information I received.
]\Ir. Machrowicz. Is that information true, that the Poles opposed
to the Soviet Government did not want the matter presented at
Nuremberg?
Mr. Lane. If I reported that, that information nnist have come
to the Embassy.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you not remember now whether it was true?
Mr. Lane. I do not recall after all these years.
But w^hat I do recall, because I have it in my files, is the views I
expressed to Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you recall tliat in your l)ook you mentioned
the fact that the Poles were very much incensed over the fact that
the massacre was not presented properly at Nuremberg?
Mr. Lane. Yes. That telegram I sent was a long time before this
came up.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is what I meant. Probably you changed
your mind subsequently.
Mr. Lane. I did not change my mind. I was merely reporting the
facts, the information which came to me, because I reported much
information to Washington that I did not agree with.
For instance, I disagreed with what some of the Polish Govern-
ment authorities told me. I naturally reported that to Washington
in an objective way.
Mr. Machrowicz. The only reason I ask these questions, Mr. Lane,
is that I know you have been very critical of the appeasement policy
toward Poland.
Mr. Lane. I have been.
Mr. Machrowicz. And this is entirely out of harmony with what
you professed subsequently ?
Mr. Lane. Excuse me, Mr. Machrowicz, with all due respect to
you, I would like to emphasize that that is not an expression of my
view. It is merely a reporting telegram, because an ani])assador's
chief function is to report to his government wluit he hears, and even
though he may not agree with what he hears, he is supposed to
report it.
Mr. Machrowicz. But in yo\n- book you said you heard just the
opposite. You heard that the Poles were very apprehensive that the
matter was not presented properly at Nuremberg.
Mr. Lane. Undoubtedly, I must have made otlier reports to the
Department in 194G when it did come up at Nureuiberg.
Mv. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Ambassador, if in any way you misunderstood
the motives, you had a large com[)auy following you in misunder-
standing the motives of the Russians in this entire episode. I have
just two questions I want to ask you. How long were you in Warsaw,
Poland?
Mr. Lane. I was there from July 31, 1945, until February 24, 1947.
Mr. Dondero. Did the State Department give you any iufonnation
whatever that they had some statement on record regarding the Katyn
Forest massacre?
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 2223
Mr. Lane. No ; the}' did not.
Mr. DoNDERO, What information did you get from the underground
in Poland, that is, the element working against Russia ?
Mr. Lane. Well, this was the underground that had been working
against the Germans and which was being disarmed by the Russians
in 1945 and 1946.
Mr. DoNDERO. Is that the information that was included in that
telegram ?
Air, Lane. No ; not the telegram. In the letter.
Mr. Dondero. The letter which you read ?
Mr. Lane. Yes.
Mr. Dondero. Were you personally at Katyn Forest ?
Mr. Lane. No ; I never was.
Mr. Dondero. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. You would not have any recollection, Ambassador,
would you, that that telegram in question was sent initially by you, of
your own volition, or whether some such report was asked of you ?
Mr. Lane. I don't think any report was asked of me ; and, as I say,
I had forgotten completely that the telegram had been sent.
Mr. O'Konski. Before you went as Ambassador to Poland, you were
briefed — were you not ? — by the State Department.
Mr. Lane. I was given access to the files which were in the Division
of Eastern European Affairs.
Mr. O'Konski. And during all that time the question of what hap-
pened to 10,000 to 15,000 Polish officers was still very hot, but no-
where down the line was any indication given whether in briefing you,
and giving you information, to give you what information was al-
ready on hand in Government sources in the United States ; was there ?
In other words, they kept you absolutely blind about the whole
proposition ; did they ?
Mr. Lane. I had no information whatever except that one dispatch
from Miss Harriman.
Mr. O'Konski. "Wlio gave you that dispatch ?
Mr. Lane. That came through the Eastern European Division and,
as a matter of course, it came to my attention.
Mr. O'Konski. Of course, the Harriman report pins the responsi-
bility on the Germans.
Mr. Lane. On the Germans ; yes.
Mr. O'Konski. And that is the only report that they gave you ?
Mr. Lane. That is the only report that I got.
Mr. O'Konski. They never gave you any report of any nature that
other American officials had prepared, or any other documents that
were in existence which would show the opposite ? The only one that
they gave you was the Harriman report ?
Mr. Lane. That is correct.
Mr. Dondero. I have this one short comment. Our opposition to
this Government and our Government's policy of appeasement toward
Russia seems to have been pretty well developed, in view of the facts
that have been developed since this committee has been set up.
Mr. Lane. That is right, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. Ambassador, if you had swung in line and acted in
the direction of pro-Soviet tendencies in the administration of your
2224 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ambassadorial post, do you still tliink that you might liave been an
Ambassador ?
Mr. Lane. It is quite possible, but that is purely speculative. I felt
<-ertain tliat I woukl have to resign Avhen I opposed the loan of
$90,000,000 to Poland or to the Polish Government, rather.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Have you ever started to organize in America an
Association of Anti-Communist Ambassadors?
Mr. Lane. No ; I have never thought of that, but we did the next
best thing. We organized a private committee to investigate the
Katyn massacre.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yes; and you are to be very highly complimented
for that. In that respect, while we are on this record. I think this
ought to be cleared up, because the opposition very naturally takes
every opportunity they can. Will you tell us. Ambassador, how this
organization in the United States years ago got started in invest-
igating the Katyn Massacre, long before CongTess got busy on it?
Give us a bit of the history. It has a bearing on this.
Mr. Lane. The person who initiated the investigation or the com-
mittee was Mr. Julius Epstein, who is right here at my right. He
approached me in the summer of 1949 and asked whether I would
act as chairman of a committee to investigate the massacre.
Mr Epstein had been making very careful research and, on the
basis of what he had, we felt we had enough information to warrant
going ahead. Let me say that tliis committe was completely non-
partisan. We had Democrats and Republicans, Catholics, Jews, and
Protestants on the committe.
We had our first meeting in November 1949 in New York City.
The press was admitted. We had quite a number of difficulities in
organization.
First of all, there was a lack of funds, and, of course, we didn't
have any power of subpena.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. In that connection, I wish you would also clear
something up so that no reflection will ever be cast on the work of
your committee. What was the source of your funds ?
Mr. Lane. We got the funds from the Polish- American Congress,
and also
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Is that the organization headed by Charles
Rozworek ?
Mr. Lane. Yes. Also, we got funds from the National Committee
for a free Europe. Also, we got some personnal contributions from
private individuals.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But you got no funds whatsoever, no financial help
whatsoever, from any so-called Fascist or Nazi organization?
Mv. Lane. None whatever.
We had difficulty in organizing because we weren't able to get a k\£ral
subcommittee formed. I approaclied several very prominent people
like Justice Roberts and John W. Davis, to see if they would take over
the chairmanship. But, unfortunately, that fell through.
Finally, Mr. Epstein and I approached Members of Congress and
interested them in the matter.
I think all that we really accomplished was to stimulate an interest
in Congress regarding the impoitance of bringing out the truth. Also,
I may say that I have been making many speeches during the last 3
years, trying to bring the facts before the American people.
THE KATXN FOREST MASSACRE 2225
I think tliat the most important thing, if I may say so, gentlemen,
that yonr committee has accomplished is to educate the American
public on the danger of communism and the horrible methods em-
ployed by the Communists.
Mr. OivoxsKi. That is all I have.
Mr. Sheeham. ]Mr. Lane, I have a couple of questions with reference
to the organization of your committee, and you might shed some light
on it.
It has been rumored that, when your committee was organized and
you w^ere receiving money to operate, you went to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department and tried to get an
exem])tion on the basis that you were an educational institution. What
was the ])osition of the Treasury Department?
j\Ir. Lane. The answer was — from the Commissioner, whose name,
I think, was Schoeneman — to the effect that our request w^as denied
because it had no educational value. Our reply to him was that, to
my mind, was the most cynical letter I liad ever seen written by an
official of the LTnited States Government.
Mr. Sheehan. Did any similar organization get a tax exemption?
Mr. Lane. Well, I suppose they did.
Mr. SiiEEiiAN. But you are guessing?
Mr. Lane. I assume that many other organizations get tax exemp-
tions.
I have a photostatic copy of the letter written by Mr. Schoeneman,
which I will be very glad to put into the record if the committee so
desires.
Chairman Madden, We will receive it.
Mr. ]\riTCHELL. That will be exhibit 26.
(The letter was marked "Exhibit 26" and received for the record.)
Chairman ]Madden. The letter has been placed in the record in order
to complete the record.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I have one other question, Mr. Lane.
]Mr. MITCHELL. ]Mr. Lane, w^ould vou suggest the subject of the
letter ?
Mr. Lane. It is a tax-exemption letter from Mr. Schoeneman.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. While they were being denied exemption, many
organizations labeled "Communist" by the Attorney General did have
a definite tax exemption.
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. For the purpose of the record, I would like to
identify the document.
This is a letter from the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue George
J. Schoeneman, addressed to the American Committee for the Investi-
gation of the Katyn Massacre, Inc. It is dated -Tune 1, 1950.
That is all.
Mr. SnEEiiAN. The sum and substance of that letter is that they
were denied tax exemption; is that right ?
Mr. Lane. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. Some of the members of our committee, Mv. Lane,
haA'e been questioned about the Voice of America, in reference to the
Lane committee ; and I think that for the record we ought to straighten
the matter out.
Our counsel tells me that we have a representative from the State
Department in the room who will help straighten this question out.
2226 THE KATYN FOREST . MASSACRE
Some members of our committee have been informed that the Voice
of America had refused for quite a while to broadcast the findings
of the Lane committee. This was after the organization was formed,
and, say, in 1949 and 1950, Now, is that a true statement or not?
Mr. Lane. That is my understanding. I would prefer, however, if
the committee would question Mr. Epstein on that, because he got the
information directly.
INlr. Sheehan. That is up to the committee chairman.
Mr. Lane. My understanding was, of course, that the Voice of
America did not, for a considerable period of time, broadcast our
activities. Finally they did, but I am hazy as to the dates.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Counsel, perhaps if yon have your State Depart-
ment man here, he ought to clear up the record for Mr. Lane.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Will you have one here tomorrow ?
Mr. Mitchell. We have one here today, but do you want him on
now?
Mr. Sheehan. No. When this witness has finished.
Mr. Dondero, Mr. Ambassador, you devoted a considerable amount
■ of time and effort to this subject of the Katyn massacre. Based on
your own research work in regard to it, what is your opinion of the
work of this committee in relation to the same subject?
Mr. Lane. I think the conmiittee is to be greatly congratulated on
what it has done, the painstaking way in which you have gotten your
evidence, and the results of your findings.
Mr. Dondero. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
We thank j^ou. Ambassador Lane, for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JULIUS C. HOLMES, CARE OF AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, ENGLAND
Chairman Madden. Our next witness is Mr. Holmes.
Mr. Holmes, will you raise your right hand and l)e sworn?
Do you solenndy swear that the testimony you are about to give
will be the truth, the whole trutli, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God ?
Mr. Holmes. I do.
Cliairman Madden. Will you state your full name and address,
please?
Ml-. HoLiNiEs. Julius C. Holmes, care of the American Embassy^
London, England.
Chairman Madden. And your present position ?
Ml-. Holmes. I am a member of the Foreign Service presently as-
signed as American Minister in London.
Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Dondero. Before the counsel proceeds, Mr. ISIinister, I think
you are the same gentlemen who was so extremely courteous and kind
and li('l|)ful to us while we were in London, England.
Mr. Holmes. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Holmes, will you please tell the committee when
you first entered the employ of the Foreign Service of the United
States?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2227
Mr. HouviEs. I first entered in April of 1925.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your position at that time ?
Mr. Holmes. I was commissioned as a Foreign Service officer, clas-
sified. I was sent to my first post as vice consul to Marseilles, France.
Mr. Mitchell. Where Avere you on September 1, 1939 ?
Mr. Holmes. I was in New York City.
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. With the State Department ?
Mr. Holmes. No; not with the State Department, not with the
Foreign Service.
Mr. Mitchell. When had you left the Foreign Service ?
Mr. Holmes. I resigned from the Foreign Service in October of
1937.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you please tell the committee where you were
on September 1,1939?
Mr. Holmes. I was in New York.
Mr. Mitchell. In private business ?
Mr. Holmes. I was in New York as vice president of the New York
World's Fair.
Mr. Mitchell. "W^ien did you enter the armed services of the United
States?
Mr. HoLiNfES. I first entered the armed services of the United States
in 1918.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean with reference to World War II ?
Mr. Holmes. In World War II, in February of 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you assigned at that time ?
Mr. Holmes. I was assigned to the Combined Chiefs of Staff here
in Washington, where I was executive officer.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you take over the position of Assistant
Secretary of State? I believe your title at that time was brigadier
general.
Mr, Holmes. I had in the meantime served in the Army from 1942,
the early beginning of 1942, abroad, almost the whole time. Then,
in January of 1945, I was ordered back to Washington and became
Assistant Secretary of State. I think the date was the 29th of
January.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien did you first hear about the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Holmes. I am not quite sure when I first heard of it. If you
had asked me that sometime ago, I would have said, "When your com-
mittee began to work." I have since seen documents in the State De-
partment which show that I had seen something about the Katyn
massacre as early as May 1945.
Mr. Mitchell, But, previous to INIay 1945, you can't recall ever
having heflrd anything about the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Holmes. Very vaguely. I no doubt heard of it. I was in the
Army during that time, either in the Mediterranean or in England or
in Normandy, and I do not remember when I first learned of it.
Mr. Mitchell. General Holmes, this committee has previously
heard — Minister Holmes, I should say — testimony from General Bis-
sell. At that time we ]Dut in the record a letter of the 25th of May
1945 which was addressed to you by General Bissell. Have you seen
that letter?
Mr. Holmes. I liave seen that letter.
2228 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. For the benefit of the committee, I would like to read
the letter, if I may :
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
May 25, 1945.
Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes,
Assistant Secret a nj, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Miet, Jr.. Infantry, and a
Captain Stewart, wliile prisoners of \yar at Oflat No. 64, are reported to have
been given a letter by the Swiss protecting power, dated about October 1943,
which asked them to reply to certain questions. The questituis were :
1. Had Captain Stewart and Lt. Col. Van Vliet gone to Katyu?
2. How had they been treated?
3. Were any photographs taken?
4. Had they made a statement?
Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply,
are in the State Department's files. It is requested that this be verified and, if the
records referred to are in the files of State Department, that copies be made
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Clayton Bissell,
Major Ge)ieral, OSC, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Have you ever seen this letter? Now did yon see this letter on the
25th of May or the 26th of May 1945 ?
Mr. Holmes. Presumably I saw it. I have no recollection of seeing
it. I have seen the original. It was shown to me by officers of the
State Department within the past few days.
Mr. Mitchell. Were your initials on that original ?
Mr. Holmes. There is a stamp of my office on it. I don't think my
initials are on it.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know the contents of the letter ? The con-
tents do not refer to the famous missing Van Vliet report. They refer
only to how Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet were treated.
Now, did you reply to that letter of the 25th of May 1945 ?
Mr. Holmes. I have been shown in the State Department a copy of
the reply, which I no doubt signed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, we have been provided with a copy
of that letter. I would like to make it exhibit No. 31.
Cliairman Madden. Will you identify it?
Mr. Mitchell. This is General Holmes' replv to General Bissell of
June 27, 1945.
Chairman Madden. It may be received as exhibit 31. Has the wit-
ness identified that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Have you identified this letter ?
Mr. Holmes. I have seen it, yes.
(The letter referred to was received for the record as exhibit 31.)
ExHiiUT 31 — General Holmes' Letter of June 0, 104."), to General Bissell
June 9, 1945.
Maj. (Jen. Clayton Bissell,
OSC, As.Histant Chief of Staff, 0-2, War Department,
Washin!tt07i, D. C.
My Dear General Bissell: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
May 2."), l<)4r., concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and
Captain Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at OHag ()4. iHx^eived from
the protecting power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2229
whether these officers had been required by the German authorities to visit
Katyn. You ask the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter, to-
gether with Colonel Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department
of State.
The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in
Decejnber of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that
x'eports reaching the Department indicated that lA. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and Capt.
D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at Oflag
9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request the
Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey and, if
so, to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made any
statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of any
statements made or any photographs taken at the time.
In February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet and
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector
at the time of the next visit to that camp would endeavor to obtain the informa-
tion desired. No further communication regarding ihe matter has ever been
received in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that
Colonel Van Vliet "s reply may have l)een intercepted by the German authorities
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government.
Sincerely yours,
JuLixjs C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Mitchell, Can yon tell the committee, Mr. Holmes, briefly,
the significance of the letter?
Mr. Holmes. The letter recites the inqniry made by General Bis-
sell and states that inquiry has been made twice of the protecting
l^ower for this information, that it was not in the files of the State
Department, and ended by saying that it is therefore presumed that
Colonel Van Vliet's letter had been intercepted by the Germans.
Mr, Mitchell. Yon are correct in that interpretation of the letter.
Now, Mr. Chairman, last Friday I had delivered to me copies of
the original letters, signed by Van Vliet and Stewart, on the oOth
of April 1943, that is, by both of them, another one by a British
officer by the name of Brigadier Nicholson, senior British officer
who was in charge'of the prison camp they were both in.
All that I would like to have Mr. Brown identify in this letter, and
then ask that it be put in the record as an exhibit to show when it was
received in the Department of State.
This letter comes from the Foreign Service of the United States
of America, American legation at Bern, Switzerland, and is dated
May 2, 1944. It is No. 8064.
The subject is, American interest in the German visit of American
officers to Katyn.
It is addressed to the Honorable Secretary of State. May we place
it in the record as exhibit 32 ?
Chairman Madden, Are you putting those into the record col-
lectively?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; collectively. I don't think we have to read
them all. We will read the Van Vliet report.
Chairman Madden. As exhibit 32?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir ; as exhibit 32.
Chairman Madden. Is Mr. Brown going to identify them?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Chairman Madden. They may be admitted as exhibit 32.
2230
THE K^\TYN FOREST MASSACRE
(The letters referred to were marked ''Exhibit 32.")
EIxHiBiT 32 — Colonbh:, Van Vliet'.s Statement to Swiss Protecting Poweb
Regarding His Treatment at Katyn by the Nazis
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2231
2232
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2233
2234
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. MnciiKJ.L. i would like ro h:i\e Mr. Hiown now identify when
this document was i-eeeived in (lie Department of State.
Mr. JiKow'x. Ml'. Clniirman, I identify this as a })h<)t()static copy
of a document in the files of the Department of State. It oriirinated
in the American legation, in Bern, Switzerland. It is dated May "2,.
1J)44. It has a stamp indicating): that it was received in the Depart-
ment of State on May 24, 1944, at 10 : 04 a. m.
Mr. MiTCTiKLL. Air. Chairman, these documents which have just
been identified by Mr. Brown were in the Department of State at the
time (Jeneral Bissell sent his request to Mr. Holmes. The letter of
June 9 indicates tliat they were not available, or at least that they could
not be found at that particular time.
Were you in error at that i)articular time, and can you explain it?
Mr. Holmes. Apparently I was in error. The explanation that I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE ZZSi)
liave received about it, which I iindei'stand has been given to the
committee as well, from
Mr. Mitchell. One minute. Mr. Dondero and Mr. O'Konski and
Mr. Sheehan heard the explanation in executive session on Monday
afternoon.
Proceed, please.
Mr. Holmes. Does the fact that it was an executive session prevent
me
Mr. MrrcHp:LL. Xo; you go ahead and say anything you want. I
just wanted to let the chairman know that.
Mr. Holmes. JVIr. Cahon, wlio drafted the letter for my signature,
tells me that when General Bissell's request came in he sent one of
his assistants to do the research and to try to find the report which
General Bissell had asked for. The assistant who made the search
came back and reported to him that it had not been found and that
the report was not in the files of the State Department. He then
drafted the reply which has been placed in e^ddence.
Now he says that he has discussed this with the assistant who made
the search and who explains that she looked under a certain indicator
for the file, which I believe was the number and the name of the prison
camp where Colonel Van Vliet was held, and didn't find it. But it
subsequently turned up in another file which was headed, "Prisoners
of War, General."
He also pointed out to me that although this report did not turn
up and the information that was given to General Bissell, that it was
not in the State Department, was incorrect, the fact remained that
much earlier this report had been sent to two officers in the War
Department, one I believe, the Provost Marshal General, and the
other being — I am not certain whether it was G-1 or War Crimes
Division.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, these reports that we have now put
on the record were in the War Department at the time you received this
letter from General Bissell ?
Mr. Holmes. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Proceed.
Mr. Holmes. That is the whole explanation, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Holmes, we have heard testimony from General
Bissell as of last June 3. 1 believe I have given you the courtesy of
reading that testimony.
Mr. Holmes. You have.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to make any comment on what you
have read, or shall I proceed to ask questions ?
Mr. HoLULES. Wliichever is the most convenient.
Mr. Mitchell. I would rather have you make the statement. Didn't
General Bissell at that time indicate to this committee that he had a
direct line of communication or squawk box connecting with your
office?
Mr. HoLiMES. He did. I think he referred to it as a gas line.
Mr. MncHELL. That is right.
I believe General Bissell saw Colonel Van Vliet on May 22 or May
23 or May 24.
Chairman Madden. What year?
Mr. Mitchell. 1945. At that time he indicated that he may have
used the gas line to discuss the subject matter. Did he do so?
2236 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Holmes. I have no recollection whatever that he did so.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever receive personally or in any other way
from. General Bissell any information concerning what Colonel Van
Vliet had told him at that time ?
Mr. Holmes. I have no recollection of having received any infor-
mation from him on that subject.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Holmes, if you had, you would no doubt
recollect it ; isnt' that true ?
Mr. Holmes. I should think so. I can't be absolutely certain, Mr.
Chairman. After all, there has been a lapse of quite some time. If I
had discussed the substance of this Van Vliet report, with the signifi-
cance that was attached to it, I think it reasonable to suppose that I
should remember.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think that in fairness to Mr. Holmes, it should
be stated that General Bissell said that he had no positive recollection
of having done so, but that he thought he might have.
Mr. Holmes. Yes, sir; that is the way I read his testimony.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Holmes, did General Bissell ever hand you any
written document concerning, or rather labeled, "Top Secret" con-
cerning Katyn, which was known as the Van Vliet Report?
Mr. Holmes. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you during your period as Assistant Secretary
of State, subsequent to May 25, 19J:5, ever personally discuss the Katyn
case with him ?
Mr. Holmes. I have no recollection of ever discussing it with him.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you remain as Assistant Secretary of
State?
Mr. Holmes. Until August 17, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. By whom were you succeeded ?
Mr. Holmes. I was succeeded by Colonel McCarthy.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel McCarthy from G-2 ?
Mr. Holmes. Yes. I am not certain that he was in G-2. I think
he was in the secretary, General Staff.
Mr. Mitchell. Secretary, General Staff. That is right. At this
time I have no further questions.
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question, Mr. Minister. Isn't it true
that if General Bissell had sent you the original Van Vliet report, as
has been inferred — he maye have ; it has never been said that he has,
but he may have — wouldn't it have been receipted for by you and would
not the receipt have been on file in General Bissell's office ?
Mr. Holmes. I should think so. With the evidence having been
given me that it was classified as top secret — top-secret documents, in
accordance with the regulations, always required a receipt at the time
of delivery.
Mr. Machrowicz. As I remember, General Bissell said that he had
no knowledge of any such receipt in his file, which to mo would indicate
that the report might not have been received by you.
Mr. Holmes. That is my opinion.
Mv. Mitchell. At that time you were a general in the x\rmy?
Mr. Holmes. No ; I was not. I was Assistant Secretary of State at
that time.
Mr. MiTciiELi.. Why was he addressing you as brigadier general?
Mr. Holmes. I had ceased being a brigadier general of the Army
just a while before, and he continued using the Army title.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2237
Mr. Mitchell. But you kiieAv the Army recrnlations well enough
to know that you always got a receipt for a. top-secret document?
Mr. Holmes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In fact, those regulations had been promulgated
sometime prior to that?
Mr. Holmes. Yes.
Mr. Sheehax. Did you ever get a top-secret document without
signing a receipt for it?
Mr. HoivMES. I don't believe I ever got a top-secret document, Mr.
Sheehan, from another command, or another entity of the Govern-
ment. Within our own office, yes.
Mr. Sheehax. And nobody would bring a document marked "Top
Secret" bodily over and deposit it on your desk without taking a
receipt for it ?
Mr. Holmes. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Did your secretary maintain a list of top-secret
documents that were both from within and without your Depart-
ment and that came into your office?
INIr. Holmes. She did. Whether that was a permanent record, T
am not certain,
Mr. Mitchell. But it was the usual custom to do that?
Mr. Holmes. That is true.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think that for the record, Minister, it can be
stated that there has been no attempt to cast any aspersions or reflec-
tions on you whatsoever, in your capacity. We are just trying to
trace some missing documents, and you happen to have been em-
ployed in the channel where these things were passing through. We
are trying to trace things down. That is our only purpose in having
you here.
There is just one question that ought to be asked, and that is this :
You state in your letter that probably the reason why those docu-
ments from the Swiss protecting power have not been received is
because they were very likely intercepted by the German authorities.
Did it not strike you that here was a report, presumably white-
washing the Germans of this atrocity, and did it not strike you that
since this report from both Van Vliet and Stewart would whitewash
the Germans, rather than accuse them of the crime, that there w^ould
be very little likelihood that they would intercept that kind of a
docimient? Did that ever strike you ?
Mr. Holmes. I never considered it. It didn't strike me,
Mr, Machrowicz. You are confused. That is not the report.
Mr. Mitchell. That was not the Van Vliet report,
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the subsequent report. The only Van
Vliet report is not involved in this particular letter. Am I right in
that, counsel ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. The situation and the facts at that time were
the State Department, on its own initiative in 1943, September 1948,
heard that both of these officers had been in Katyn. Consequentl}'',
they had asked the Swiss protecting power to ascertain if they had
been there. The Swiss protecting power then came back with this
document which I just read to everybody here, which specifically
said that "I have made no oral or written statement to anyone at all
concerning my opinion of the Katyn incident,"
This letter is dated the 24th of JNIarch 1944.
93744— 52— pt. 7 27
2238 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
This committee has ah-eady heard testimony that the first ])eison
that Colonel Van Vliet discussed this subject with was General Col-
lins, who expedited his way home, and the next person was General
Bissell. So the subject matter of the Van Vliet report could not
have been considered at the time that Mr. Holmes Avrote his letter
of June 9. It was just concerning their treatment as prisimers of
war.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get some points
straight here with regard to General BisseH's testimony, and, if you
don't mind, Mr. Minister, to refresh your memory I will read to you a
portion of his testimony. His testimony was taken on June 3 of this
year here in Washington.
Mr. Sheehan asked a question, as follows :
General, in those couple of days here in May when Van Vliet was in and you
said you had thought
General Bissell. May 22.
Mr. Sheehan. May 21 to 25 — when you had talked to General Van Vliet, if
I reiueniher correctly, you stated you did phone, or you thought you phoned
Holmes and Lyon in the State Department?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. W^hen you talked to any of these gentlemen or with Colonel
Lantaff about the Van Vliet report, did the question come up as to the political
implication of this report at any timeV
General Bissell. The only reason I would have mentioned it to him at all
would have been the political aspect.
Mr. Sheehan. Did they agree with you it was vital?
General Bissell. No discussion of the contents of the report at that stage.
Mr. Sheehan. You are talking about the political implications?
General Bissell (reading) : "There was a man here named Van Vlier. who
arrived yesterday and who has information on the political matter, the Katyn
massacre, that we will send to you as soon as we get through with it."
Mr. Sheehan. You did not discuss the conclusions?
General Bissell. No. It was only incidental to the talk on the other matter.
I remember the other matter quite well. I will be glad to give it to you in
executive session, but it has no bearing on Katyn whatever.
Mr. Sheehan. This might steal a little thunder from my colleague over there.
This morning. Congressman O'Konski asked you a question abcmt whether
or not any other documents had disappeared or were lost or strayed from G-2.
I did not use the word "stolen" advisedly, because the Army uses the word
"compromise." As I understand it from the MacArthur testimony, the eight
colonels who sent a top-secret report from Japan or the Near East in which they
tried to advise the administration of the danger of alining themselves with Russia
in finishing off the Japanese war, I understand that report disappeaied out of
G-2. Is that right or wrong?
General Bissell. Here is what I don't believe is fully understood, and probably
it is just as well —
then he goes on.
Now, I was wondering, Mr. Minister, about this: General Bissell
is rather certain here in his testimony that he did discuss Avith you the
political implications of this neutral American officer's observations,
and indictment.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think you are taking the testimony out of con-
text. You will find later on that he was not certain.
Mr. PuciNSKF. In this partictdar instance 1 want to find out whether
General Bissell is correct.
Mr. Mactiuowicz. In answer to my questions, he said ]u> wasn't cer-
tain whet Iter he discussed it.
Mr. ruciNSKi. In this particuhir instance he said he was reasonably
certain.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2239
Mr. Machrowicz. I know that General Bissell made various state-
ments, and that at another time he thought he must have, but he wasn't
sure he may have.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute.
You have read the entire testimony in which your name was men-
tioned in connection witli this?
Mr. Holmes. I read the testimony that was sent to me by Mr. Brown,
which I presume was selected, and I presume it is complete.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. It is complete. I can assure you of that. What is
your comment on that testimony?
We have General Bissell one moment saying that he called you on
his gas line, and said that he had something of political significance.
The next time we have him saying that he thinks he may have, or
that he doubts it. Could you give us your candid opinion?
Mr. Holmes. Well, my opinion is simply this, Mr. Chairman : I
have no recollection of ever discussing this matter with General Bissel
at all, either on the gas-line, telephone or face to face. It is within
the realm of possibility that we may have discussed it, but I do not
recall it; but, if we had discussed the substance of this, with the im-
plication wliich it has, I think now I would have remembered it.
Mr. Mitchell. Not only "now*' but you would have at that time ?
JNIr. Holmes. That is coi-rect.
So far as sending the report to me is concerned, it just seems veiy,
very improbable that it ever came.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you be the correct individual for such a
report, a report of the nature of the Van Vliet report, to go to?
Mr. Holmes. Yes: I would.
Mr. Mitchell. With all of what you know toda}^ to be its political
significance?
Mr. Holmes, I should think so.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Can we find out, Mr. Minister — and you were an
Assistant Secretary of State then?
Mr. Holmes. That is right.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Can we find out from you here now what you think
would have been its political significance if that report had become
known on the 25th of May 1945?
Mr. Mitchell. That would be his opinion.
Mr. PucixsKi. Of course, it is an opinion, and we would like to have
it.
Mr. Holmes. It is a speculative question to ask, and I am afraid that
my answer would not be very competent, because I haA^e.not read the
Van Vliet report.
Mr. PucixsKi. You are not the only one.
Chairman Madden. Let us see the political significance.
Mr. PucixsKi. I would like to develop this point because it is very
important, I think, in the course of this investigation. They were
having trouble regarding the Polish situation in San Francisco at
the time that the United Nations was being organized, and that was
what — o weeks before Van Vliet arrived in this country? It was
April 25, 1945. to be exact, was it not ?
Mr. Holmes. I am not certain about that date. Presumably it
was just about then.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And they were having difiiculty on this Polish
question in Sail Francisco?
2240 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Holmes. Yes. But my knowledge of any difficulty on the
Polish question at San Francisco was only incidental.
Mr. Mitchell. You were not concerned Avith it ?
Mr. Holmes. I was not concerned with the San Francisco Con-
ference except for the administration and the running of the Secre-
tariat and setting it up.
Mr. PuciNSKT. Mr. JHolmes, the theory on which the staff has been
proceeding — and I am wondering whether you can throw some light
on this — is that it is interesting that the Van Vliet report disappeared
at a crucial time as this was. You have the San Francisco Con-
ference, dealing with the United Nations. You had the 16 Polish
officers interned in Moscow, who were going to join the so-called unity
government, or provisional government, in Poland. You had the
problem of recognition by the United States and Great Britain and
the hope of getting some sort of unit, the recognition of the new
provisional government in Poland on July 5, 1945.
Now, we have been proceeding along on the possibility that this
report just didn't disappear along with thousands of other documents
that disappear, and later are found to have been misfiled, because
of its political significance.
Mr. Madden asked me a moment ago what I mean by "political
significance," and I am now returning to that discussion.
What do you suppose this report would have meant had it become
known at that time ?
Mr. Holmes. My opinion on that, Mr. Chairman, I don't think
has very much usefulness.
In the first place, as I said a minute ago, I have not read the report.
Also it was something about which I learned from reading the
newspapers.
Chairman Madden. If you can answer the question, do so.
Mr. Holmes. Wliether or not a report from one officer on such a
subject would have had some influence on political decisions that
were made in San Francisco, I don't know, but I should not have
thought that it would have great influence. The actual presentation
of that report to the people concerned in San Francisco obviously
would have had some influence on them, but my opinion is — since it
has been asked — that it probably would not have changed the trend
of events at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I have one more question, Mr. Minister. I don't
know whether you are in a position to answer this question, but would
you know why the State Department was trying in 1913 and 1944 to
get an opinion from Van Vliet and Stewart — or rather, to learn how
they were treated by the Nazis wliile they were taken to Katyn?
Would you have an opinion on that?
Mr. Holmes. No. I had no personal knowledge of this at the time.
What inspired the inquiry of the protecting power I don't know.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Would you be in a position to tell us who in the
State Department today would be in the best position to answer
that question ?
Ml-. Holmes. No ; I just don't know. I have been out of the State
Department a long time, and I don't know. That question should be
asked, I think, of departmental officials.
Mr. PuciNSKi. All right.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2241
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Maddex. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Just one more word, Mr. Minister.
Your conjecture was absohitely right. If this report liad been made
public, it would not have altered the situation. If we had had 150,000
Polish officers murdered, not 15,000, it still would not have altered the
situation, because there were certain definite foreign policies that we
were following, and it would have not have affected the situation one
iota. Saving Russia and not America was our guiding force.
Chairman Maddeist. Mr. Sheehan?
Mr. Sheehan. No questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
(There was no response.)
Chairman Mm>den. I wish to thank you, Mr. Holmes, for your
testimony, and for your trouble in coming here. Your testimony has
indeed been valuable.
Mr. Holmes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY OF FREDEEICK B. LYON, CARE OF UNITED STATES
EMBASSY, PARIS, FRANCE
Chairman Madden. Our next witness is Mr. Frederick B. Lyon.
Mr. Lyon, will you raise your right hand and be sworn ?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give,
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God ?
Mr. Lton. I do.
Chairman Madden. Will you state your full name, Mr. Lyon, please ?
Mr. Lyon. My name is Frederick B. Lyon.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Lyon. My address is: care of the American Embassy, Paris,
France.
Chairman Madden. And your present title ?
Mr. Lyon. Consul general.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Lyon, when did you first enter the employ of the
Foreign Service?
Mr. Lyon. In December 1923.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on September 1, 1939 ?
Mr. Lyon. I was in Washington, I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you employed by the Department of State?
Mr. Lyon. Yes.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. How long did you remain there?
Mr. Lyon. I was here — well, may I go back just a bit to answer this?
I entered the Service in December 1923. I left the Foreign Service
in 1933 and I was with the Department of Agi'iculture for 2 years.
Then I went with the Golden Gate International Exposition in San
Francisco as commissioner to foreign countries.
In 1937, also December, I came back into the Department, the de-
partmental service, as opposed to the Foreign Service. That was for
what is known as the departmental service, not the Foreign Service.
I was then in the Department all of the time, from December 1937
till I came back into the Foreign Service. It was December, I believe.
2242 THE Kj\tyn forest massacre
of 1946, that I came back into the Foreign Service. I have been in
the Foreign Service since that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you in uniform when you were employed by
the Department of State as an official there?
Mr. Lyon. No; I was not in uniform.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you were a civilian employee during
the period roughly September 1, 1939, through 1946?
Mr. Lyon. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your official position in May 1945?
Mr. Lyon. In May 194.5, if I recall correctly, I was the Acting
Director of the Office of Controls in the State Department.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the function of that particular office, if
3^ou can state it to the committee, please ?
Mr. Lyon. That function was merely to supervise the over-all work
of several divisions, one of which was the Division of Special War
Problems.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the Division that I would like to have you
explain to the committee. Will you explain to the committee what
that particular Division did? I don't believe you are are restricted
today. You can talk freely about that now, can you not?
Mr, Lyon. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to have you explain to the com-
mittee is. What was the function of this Division ?
Mr. Lyon. Well, the function of that Division was largely the pro-
tection of American interests and American people abroad, but there
was one other division that maybe vou had in mind, that came under
that.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Will you name the other division ? Let me tell you
what I want.
Under your control and in your set-up at that particular time was a
certain little room or something over there in the Department of State
where a lot of papers came.
Mr. Lyon. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. One of the functions of your office was to see that
they were distributed within the Department of State, was it not?
Mr. Lyon. That is true.
Mr. MiTciiELi.. That room included top-secret documents, all the
way down to personal letters, practically, did it not?
Mr. Lyon. Yes, indeed.
Mr, Mitchell, But it was mostly concerned with what we call
classified material?
Mr. Lyon. That is true,
]Mr, ]MiTciiELL. You were there on ]\Iay 22, 1945 ?
Ml', Lyon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. In that position ?
Mr, Lyon, Yes, sir.
Mr, Mitchell. You have heard Minister Holmes testify; have you
not?
Mr. Lyon. I have.
]\Ir, Mitchell. You i-oceived the transcript of the record that was
taken, from General Bissell on June 3, that is, the portion, at least,
that concerned your interests?
Mr. Lyon. Yes ; 1 have seen that.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2243
^Ir. ^Mitchell. Did vou receiA^e the Van Vliet report on or about
May 22 or May 23 or May 24, 1945 ?
Mr. Lyox. To the best of my recollection, I did not.
Mr. Mitchell. But if that report was sent in the usual manner,
that report would have, of necessit}^, come to your office; is that right?
Mr. Ltox. That is correct. Either it would have come to Mr.
Holmes as Assistant Secretary or it would have come to the Division
of Foreign Activities Correlation.
Mr. Mitchell. Let's asume that the report — although we have heard
Mr. Holmes say that it did not — did come there. Would it have been
recorded in your office ?
Mr. Lyox. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, if Mr. Holmes was to have received
a top-secret document in his capacity, a record would have been made
of it in your office ?
Mr. Lyox. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. I know that you have received many communica-
tions in the Department of State relative to the missing Van Vliet
report, dating way back to, I think, 1949. Both the Inspector General
of the Army and the Department of State at that time were trying
to find the missing report, the Van Vliet report. Can you tell us
something of what your replies to the Secretary of State were con-
cerning the missing Van Vliet report in 1949 and 1950 or whenever
they contacted you ?
Mr. Lyox. Right at the moment, I don't recall when I received a
telegram asking me whether I had ever seen this Van Vliet report,
to which I replied that I had no recollection whatsoever of it.
Mr. Mitchell. In this office that you had control of at that time,
did they ever receive a top-secret document for which no receipt was
given ?
Mr. Lyox. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you ever had any previous difficulty with any
other document that has disappeared?
]Mr. Lyox. >so, sir; not to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. jSIitchell. In other words, it was the ctistomary practice that
if a top-secret document were delivered to this office for dissemination
to an individual in the Department of State, you always had a receipt
for it ?
Mr. Lyox. Always.
Mr. Mitchell. Then your office and you have not been in trouble on
anv other report ?
Mr. Lyox. Not to the best of my knowledge.
]Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the Department of State and no one
else has asked you to justify
Mr, Lyox. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to read for Mr.
Lyon's benefit a letter which we have already put in the record, dated
August 21, 1945. It is from General Bissel to Mr. Frederick B. Lyon.
The letter is as follows :
Mr. Frederick B. Lyon,
Acting Director, Office of Controls,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and file of the State Depart-
ment's report on Katyn, by Stanley S. B. Gilder, captain, EAMC, British medical
2244 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr.,
forwarded to General Holmes 25th of May 1945, and generally substantiates all
material fact of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report.
Sincerely,
Clatton Bissel,
Major General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
In the lower left-hand corner appears "Enclosure Dept." or report,
"on Katyn, by Stanley S. B. Gilder, captain, EAMC."
Have yo useen that corespondence ?
Mr. Lyon. Yes ; I have seen it.
Mr. Mitchell. Eecently?
Mr. Lyon. Just recently; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were there attachments to that letter ?
Mr. Lyon. Well, if I recall, there was just one. The letter from
this Captain Gilder, who was a doctor, if I recall a British doctor,
was the enclosure.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the subject matter of ^hat? Would you
like to see it to refresh your memory ?
Mr. Lyon. Yes; I would.
The subject matter, as I recall, was the recital of his visit to Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. As a prisoner of war ?
Mr. Lyon. As a prisoner of war; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Did it mention his observations at Katyn?
Mr. Lyon. I don't recall that it did, actually.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to read it hurriedly ? If so, you may
do so.
Mr. Lyon. Yes. I went over this thing and, to the best of my knowl-
edge, he did not actually give an opinion.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe, to nail it right straight down — I have read
that letter about half a dozen times myself — ancl to be quite frank with
you, I can't see anywhere in that letter a reference to his conclusions
or observations or anything else of what he discovered or found out
at Katyn. Is that your opinion ?
Mr. Lyon. That is my opinion ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. An allegation has been made — I have a copy of that.
You may retain it. Will you look at the covering letter of August
21, 1945?
Mr. Lyon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell (reading) :
This report supplements statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet. Jr., forwarded
to General Holmes, 25th of IMay 1945, and generally substantiates all material
facts in Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report.
Mr. Lyon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. This question has been asked by General l^issell:
If the Van Vliet report was not in the State De]iartment files at that
timej why didn't you come back and ask for the Van Vliet report?
Have you any comment on that?
Mr. Lyon. Well, I thouglit of that wlien I saw this thing, this letter.
Mr. Mitchell. You thought of it wlien? When you saw the letter
now or then?
Mr. Lyon. Well, when I was looking at it now, and just the other
day when I saw it here.
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to have you answer, INIr. Lyon, is
whether you thought of that when you received the letter there.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2245
Mr. Lyon. No ; I didn't think of that. Do yon mean, making refer-
ence back to the Van Vliet report that is referred to here ?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. In other words, why don't yon describe to the com-
mittee what wonkl have happened when this report of General Bissell's
came to you with this statement, stating tliat "this report supplements
statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet." What would you have
done, or what did you do with that attachment, Gilder's report?
Mv. Lyon, Well, had I seen this report, and had I attached the
importance to it that apparently this refers to the Van Vliet report —
to tlie receipt of the Van Vliet report — I would have taken it up im-
mediately with Mr. Holmes, or would have sent it up directly to the
Division of European Affairs, of Eastern European Affairs.
Mr. Mitchell. In August of 1945?
Mr. Lyon. Oh, yes,
Mr. Mitchell, You would have taken it up?
Mr. Lyon. Not with Mv. Holmes. I would have taken it up then
with either Mr. McCarthy, who was Assistant Secretary then, or with
the Division of Eastern European Affairs, because I would have seen
that it was of great importance. But this report attached here does
not say either "Yes" or "No" — that is, that it was the Russians or the
Germans who did it. I am referring to the report of Dr. Gilder.
Mr, ]\IiTCHELL, Well, there is a reference to another report that is
supposed to have been transmitted previously, on the 25th of May, the
report of Van Vliet. Have you seen the original correspondence, to
show where this letter of the 21st of August went to, in the Department
of State?
Mr. Lyon, What correspondence are you referring to ?
]Mr. Mitchell. I am talking about the original of the letter of the
21st of August. I mean the original correspondence that they have
enough signatures and enough initials on to sink a battleship.
Mr. Lyon, Yes, sir,
Mr, Mitchell. Have you seen that letter recently ?
Mr. Lyon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did this letter go? For your information,
I have not seen it yet, I know that I can have it whenever I want it,
but I would just as soon not look at it,
Mr, Lyon, Well, I don't recall where it went to. This space on the
letter is covered up in the photostat, and it has been declassified. But
I imagine that it went to the Division of Eastern European affairs.
Mr. jSIitchell. Mv. Brown, do you have the letter with you and,
if you have it, will you give it to Mr. Lyon, please ?
Mr. Lyon. This came to the Division of Foreign Activities Cor-
relation, It went to the Eastern European Division.
Mr, Mitchell. In other words, your office sent it to the Eastern
European Division?
Mr. Lyon, Yes, sir,
Mr, Mitchell, Do you have any recollection of the Eastern Euro-
pean Division coming back and asking you where the correspondence
was that was referred to ?
Mr, Lyon, No, sir ; I do not.
Mr, Mitchell. Do you recall who w^as the head of the Eastern
European Division at that time ?
2246 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Lyon. No; I don't recall right at this moment. It might pos-
sibly have been — no; it would not. I was thinking of the Near East-
ern Division. I was thinking of Loy Henderson, whom I was going
to mention, but I don't believe it was him.
Mr. IMrrciiELL. Well, Poland was contained in the Eastern Euro-
pean Division of the Department of State at that time; is that right?
]\Ir. Lyon. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore in the Eastern European Division of the
Department of State at that time, it would have gone to the Polish
specialist on the Desk? Would that have been the right channel?
Mr. Lyon. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know who that Polish specialist was?
Mr. Lyon. I have forgotten whether it was Durbrow or Stevens,
possibly, although I think he was an Assistant Chief then.
Mr. Mitchell. You have heard Mr, Lane say this afternoon that
Durbrow was the one ?
Mr. Lyon. Yes ; probably it was Durbrow.
Mr. Mitchell. Is he in Washington or in New York ?
Mr. Lyon. He is in Rome.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Durbrow never came back to you or anybody
else asking for the Van Vliet report, on the 25th of May ?
Mr. Lyon. Not that I recall ; no, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you at any time discuss the Van Vliet report
with General Bissell or anybody else?
Mr. Lyon. To the best of my knowledge no — I never heard of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think that you would have remembered it,
because of its contents?
Mr. Lyon. Oh, I think so — yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. I have no questions. LTuless, .as far as I am con-
cerned, there is some further testimony on the Department of Defense,
I am satisfied that neither Mr. Holmes nor Mr. Lyon had any knowl-
edge of these documents.
Chairman Madden. Thank you for testifying here this afternoon,
Mr. Lyon.
Mr. Lyon. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Madden. Do we have another witness for today?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I would like to call one more. Mr. John
Carter, please.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. CARTER, ALBANY, N. Y.
Cfiairman Madden. Mr. Carter, will you come forward, please?
Will you raise your right hand and be sworn ?
Do you solennily swear that the testimony you are about to give the
committee, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. (yARTER. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is rather a surprise witness. He
voluntarily came to the committee yesterday afternoon and said that
he had some information that might interest this committee.
I talked to Mr. Carter this morning at 9 o'clock. I think he has
some information which will be made brief, and which I think the
committee will be interested in hearing.
■ THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2247
Mr. Carter, will you state your full name for the record ?
Mr. Carter. John Franklin Carter.
Mr. MiTCHKLL. \^niere do you live ?
Mr. Carter. 1 Elk Street, Albany, N. Y.
Mr. Mitchell. Where are you presently employed?
Mr. Cariter. The New York State Department of Commerce,
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you on September 1, 1939 ?
Mr. Carter. In Washino-ton.
Mr. Mitchell. Had you been in the State Department previously ?
Mr. Carter. I had.
Mr. Mitchell. During what years?
Mr. Carter. From 1918 through 1921 and then again from 1928
to June 1932.
Mr. Mitchzll. When did you reenter the employ of the Department
of State ? Did you ever ?
Mr. Carter. Technically not. Actually I worked under a contract
with the Office of the Secretary of State to make special reports for
the President.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you please tell the committee the position you
occupied during the wartime years?
Mr. Carter." I reported regularly to President Roosevelt from
roughly the 15th of February 1941 and, of course later, to President
Truman, to the end of December 1915.
Mr. Mitchell. As you know, this committee is concerned with the
investigation of the Katyn Massacre. You told me this morning that
you had information concerning a German by the name of
Hanfstaengl.
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you kindly spell his name, please?
]\Ir. Carter. The name is spelled H-a-n-f-s-t-a-e-n-g-1.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know his full name ?
]Mr. Carter. Ernst Seidrick Hanfstaengl.
Mr. INIiTCHELi.. Would you tell the committee briefly your connec-
tion with this individual ?
Mr. Carter. Dr. Hanfstaengl had originally been one of the Nazi
group who put Hitler into power. He had also been Hitler's foreign
press chief. I had met him in Munich in 1932. I had a letter of
introduction to him from Nicholas Eoosevelt, who at that time was
President Hoover's Minister to Hungary. Later on, when I was do-
ing special Intelligence reporting to the White House, it occurred to
me that Hanfstaengl might have some useful information. That was
because he had fled from Germany in 1938, alleging fear of assas-
sination, and had taken refuge in England.
It so happened that Hanfstaengl had gone to Harvard University
and knew personally and was personally acquainted with President
Roosevelt, and also, I believe, with Sumner Welles. So I thought that
they woud be in a position to evaluate, on the basis of their knowledge
of the man, such information as he might have.
Arrangements were made with the British to transfer him from
a prison camp, where he had been interned, to Washington, and he
was placed in my custody. I believed that he could help take the
Nazi regime apart, because he said he had helped put it together.
He was installed under strict security and not far from Washington,
and was given a short-wave radio-receiving set and kept tyned con-
2248 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
stantly to the Berlin propaganda radio. His reports were submitted
to me personally in writing. They were often submitted verbally, too.
I distributed those reports in duplicate to the President direct, to
Summer Welles direct, to the British Ambassador direct, and also to
Elmer Davis, Bill Donovan, and the heads of G-2, and, as I recollect,
also to the FBI.
When anything of particular importance, in his opinion, came up,
I also would report it directly to the President.
I saw Ih'esident Roosevelt when he w^as in Washington on the aver-
age of twice a week, usually after press conferences, when I would sit
and give him verbal reports supplementing those that I had alreadj'
submitted to him through special handling conducted by his secretary,
who was then Miss Grace Tully.
His instructions were that my reports would go direct to her, and
w^ere to be brought directly by her to his desk, so that there would be
no opportunity for anyone to intercept them and keep from the Presi-
dent those reports which I submitted.
On or about the 14th of April, Hanfstaengl became extremely ex-
cited by the news from the German radio about the Katyn massacre.
He said it was the most important political event of World War II.
He said also that he knew Goebbels well enough to know that at that
time Goebbels was telling the truth. He hated and distrusted Goeb-
bels as a politician.
Chairman Madden. Who said this? '
Mr. Carter. Hanfstaengl. He said that he hated and distrusted
him, but that he could always tell when he was not lying, because it
was so rarely.
Naturally, on the basis of that report, I submitted directly and with-
in 24 hours or less, to both President Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, and
to Elmer Davis, as well as to the other recipients of these reports, his
statement to that effect. I also later — and I do not recollect the exact
date because I kept no records myself — saw President Roosevelt and
told him that Hanfstaengl was of the strong opinion that the Rus-
sians were responsible for the Katyn massacre and that he, Hanfs-
taengl, declared that he knew that Goebbels was telling the truth for
once.
Now, that is the extent to which I went. I did not evaluate the
reports, but I would add that I never had any doubt of Hanfstaengl's
good faith.
Sumner Welles told me that he believed that Hanfstaengl was on
the level and so did President Roosevelt. Whether they cliose to ig-
nore his opinion on that point is something which I am not competent
to pass any judgment on.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You said earlier that you were in the Political In-
telligence Branch, assigned to the White House ?
Mr. Carter. No; I was not assigned to the White House from the
Political Intelligence Branch. The White House decided early in 1041
that they would institute a small very flexible, very informal intelli-
gence unit directed by me, to act on assignment from the "Wliite House,
and also to prepare and submit such reports as were requested. This
Hanfstaengl operation was part of the operations of my office, di-
rectly authorized by the President.
Mr. PuciNSKi, What was the official reaction to the Katyn report ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2249
Mr. Carter. The official reaction was that they didn't want to be-
lieve it, and that if they had believed it they would have pretended
not to. I assume that it was because of the desire to retain the war-
time alliance with Russia.
Mr. PucixsKi. Is it your contention then that the matter of the
Katyn discovery was brought to their attention ?
Mr. Carter. That is my contention, yes, that it was.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Your yourself, as a political adviser, had recom-
mended that that was true ?
Mr. Carter. I had recommended the information as being accurate,
an accurate report from Hanfstaengl, and that I believed that he was
telling the truth. Of course, I couldn't guarantee that Hanfstaengl
could not be mistaken.
Mr. DoxDERo. Will you fix the date, as near as you can, when that
information came to you ?
Mr. Carter. It came to me either on the 13th or the 14th of April.
Mr. DoNDERO. Of what year ?
Mr. Carter. Of 1943.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, at this time we would like to intro-
duce into evidence as exhibit 29 a document which has been attached
to the following words: "Memo from John Franklin Carter, dated
May 31, 1944, giving report on the Katyn massacre, prepared by Mr.
Drohojowaki of the Polish Ministry of Information, London."
This document deals with a rather exhaustive analysis of the Katyn
discovery and the efforts by the Polish Government prior to the dis-
covery, to locate the missing Polish officers.
If you have no objection, I will have the witness identify this.
Chairman Maddex. Have the witness identify it, and then mark it
as an exhibit. Do vou want the whole document introduced, or part
of it?
Mr. Mitchell. It isn't necessary to read it. We can put the whole
document in the file.
Mr, Carter. It is very lengthy.
Mr. PucixsKi. Do you recognize it ?
Mr. Carter. Yes, I do.
Mr. Mitchell. This will be exhibit No. 32.
(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit 32" was received
for the record and appears at the end of Mr. Carter's testimony.)
Mr. PucixsKi. I would like to ask this witness how he happened
to be in possession of this document.
Mr. Carter. That document came to me in continuation of my in-
telligence reports to the White House.
I established, after Katyn, through my subordinates, contacts with
the Polish secret intelligence. Naturally, the Polish secret intelli-
gence was very desirous of bringing to the attention of the American
authorities what they had to say about the Katyn massacre.
After considerable difficulty, we obtained this, report, and I, of
course, forwarded it to, in this case, only the State Department and the
President. I believe also I forwarded it to G-2. I am not sure about
G-2.
Mr. PucixsKi. Did the contents of this document in any way help
you to draw a conclusion in 1944 as to the nation that was guilty of
this crime ?
2250 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Carter. I personally had no doubt from the start that the
Russians were guilty.
Mr. PuciNSKi. And what did you do with this document, Mr.
Carter^
Mr. Carter. This one [indicating] ?
Mr. PuciNSKi. Yes.
Mr. Carter. I sent it to the President. I also sent it to the State
Department. I believe I also sent it to G-2. I couldn't answer about
G-2.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Did you send it to the OWI ?
Mr. Carter. I don't think I sent it to the OWI.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Carter, you said that as soon as you got the
notice of April 13 or 14 you inunediately dispatched copies to Presi-
dent Roosevelt and to Elmer Davis ?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Siieehan. Mr. Counsel, didn't Elmer Davis testify yesterday
that he didn't know anything about it when he did his broadcast ?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Can we get any documentation on that as to whether
or not Mr. Davis got that copy ?
Mr. Mitchell. We can try to.
Mr. Sheehan. Maybe it will jog his memory.
In talking to Mr. Roosevelt, as you say, Mr. Carter, you did on
occasion between 194o and 1945, did you ever talk to him personallj'^
about the Katyn affair ?
Mr. Carter. My recollection is that as soon as I saw him after
this Katyn thing broke, I told him Hanfstaengl's strong belief that
Goebbels was telling the truth, and that the Russians had killed these
soldiers. That was my report to him.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you talk to him about the Katyn matter at
any other times after that?
Mr. Carter. I don't recollect having discussed it subsequent to
that.
Mr. Sheehan. But you did give him written reports after that?
I refer, for instance, to this report.
Mr. Carter. Yes; that is right.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you are firmly of the belief that
long before the Yalta Conference Mr. Roosevelt had been acquainted
at least several times, with the circumstances surrounding the Katyn
massacre?
Mr. Carter. Certainly.
Mr. Sheehan. So he should have been conscious of all the activi-
ties?
Mr. Carter. I should assume so ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. What was the late President's reaction when you
called this to his attention?
Mr. Carit:r. I can't recollect whether he just raised his eyebrows
and laughed, or something. I don't know.
Mr. Sheehan. But you were a foreign political adviser, somewhat?
Mr. Carter. I was not an adviser, sir. I didn't advise. I rei)orted.
If my advice was asked, I gave it, but it was hardly ever asked.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2251
Mr. Sheehan. Well, did the President at that time tell you that
he had any difficulty in trying to recognize this material when it be-
came known ?
Mr. Carter. No; I don't recollect him saying anything about it.
Mr. Sheehan. Did he ever discuss with you the political signifi-
".ance of this thing ?
Mr. Carter. No, but I will tell you, if I may, that at the outset of
my assignment President Roosevelt felt strongly that Germany
should be saved for the world as a democratic. Christian nation, and
until the unconditional surrender formula came along, and the Mor-
genthau plan, that was the basic policy on which I was working, and
which I believed was the correct policy. Once that decision to ob-
literate Germany was taken, then, frankly, I lost interest in the politi-
cal foreign policy of our Government during the war, because there
didn't seem to be a policy. It was pugilism.
Mr. Sheehan. At any time, in submitting copies of your reports,
as you say, to the OWI and the State Department, did anyone come to
question you about these reports, or ask you as to their authenticity?
Mr. Carter. No. There was, I will have to admit, great scepticism
about the value of Hanfstaengl's reports. He had been a contro-
versial figure. He Avas quite an emotional type, and the British in
particiular were disturbed by our utilizing his services.
The other intelligence organizations didn't think much of him
because he was not their baby. He was somebody else's baby. There-
fore, lie couldn't be as good as their babies. It was rather difficult. In
fact, Elmer Davis once said that I was in the position of a man with
a giraffe trying to find another man who wanted to buy a giraffe. That
was true. They didn't want to hear anything which ran in the least
bit counter to their preconceived ideas, and Hanfstaengl's ideas were
not those adopted as the official party line by the American Govern-
ment in time of war, naturally.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Did you ever discuss the Katyn massacre with Mr.
Elmer Davis ?
Mr. Carter. Not that I recollect, no.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Counsel, I have a lot of respect for my friend,
Mr. Ben Brow^n, in the State Department, but at this time I will have
to ask what the State Department did with those reports that they
never turned over ?
Mr. ;Machrowicz. Let's first find out if they ever got them.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I think it should be pointed out that this exhibit 29
which we have introduced in the record came from the State Depart-
ment. We got that out of their files.
Mr. ]Mitcheu.. I got so much out of the State Department I can't
select all of the records and documents. What I did was to select the
things that we thought were appropriate.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions? Thank you
for appearing as a witness, Mr. Carter.
The committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, at
which time the first witness will be Joseph Phillips, of the Depart-
ment of State, Alan Cranston, and then General Bissell.
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday,
November 14, 1952.)
2252 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Exhibit 32A — Memo From John Franklin Carter Regarding the Katyn
Massacre Prepared on Mat 31, 1944
[Memo from John Franklin Carter dated May 31, 1944, giving report on the Katyn
Massacre, prepared by Mr. Drohojowski of the Polish Ministry of Intormation, London]
Report on the Massacre at Katyn Near Smolensk
1. During the fighting between September 17 and the beginning of October,
1939, about 181,000 Polish Soldiers were taken prisoners by the Soviet Forces,
anions who were about 10,000 Officers.
2. These Officers, with certain civilians of distinction and several thousand
members of the Polish Police were placed in three large Prison Camps as
follows :
(a) Kozielsk in the Province of Smolensk.
(b) Starobielsk in the Ukraine.
(c) Ostashkov in the Province of Kalinin.
3. Early in 1940 all these prisoners were photographed, their fingerprints
taken and lists prepared. The Camp Authorities informed the prisoners that
these measures were taken with the object of sending all these prisoners to
their homes and families and "liquidating" the Camps.
4. Early in April, 1940, prisoners from Kozielsk were sent away in batches
of two or three hundred, mostly in the direction of Smolensk.
5. Four hundred and five Officers were transferred from the three Camps to
others, and finally sent together in June, 1940, to Griazovets in the Vologda
Province.
6. Hitler's invasion of Russia on the 22nd of June, llHl, was followed by
the signing on July 30, 1941, of a Polish-Soviet Treaty, and by a Military
Agreement signed on August 14, 1941, under which all Poles were to be liberated.
Accordingly, the Polish Government proceeded to form a Polish Army in Russia
to fight the Germans.
7. A Polish Centre was formed at Buzuluk to which the four hundred and
five Polish Officers were brought at the end of August, 1941, from the Camp at
Griazovets, but as, up to October, 1941, none of the Officers from Kozielsk,
Starobielsk, and Ostashkov had appeared, the Polish Ambassador at Moscow,
Professor Kot had an interview with Mons. Wyszynski, the Deputy People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in order to obtain information as to what had
become of the missing Officers.
The interview took place on October 6, 1941. Mons. Wyszynski stated that
the missing Officers must be among the three hundred thousand Polish citizens
who had already been set free by the Russians. The Polish Ambassador replied :
"There are no men from the Camps I have mentioned in the Army at all."
8. On October 22, Professor Kot had an interview with Mons. Molotov, and
again asked for information about the missing Officers. Mons. Molotov replied
that "The matter would have to be cleared up."
On November 2, Professor Kot had another conversation wnth Mons. Wys-
zynski on the same subject, and the latter promised : "I shall continue my
endeavours to obtain the information for wiiich you asked me sometime ago."
9. On November 14, Professor Kot had a conversation with Mars'hal Stalin
to whom he complained that the Officers from the Camps at Kozielsk, Staro-
bielsk, and Ostashkov were still missing.
Marshal Stalin replied : "Wo have released everybody." Professor Kot denied
this and said : "My request to you, Mr. I'resident, consists in this that orders
should be given for the release of these Officers' whom we need to organize
our Army."
Marshal Stalin then rang up the N. K. W. D. and askcnl if all Poles had been
released from prison as the Polish Ambassador declared that this was not
the case. But Mars'hal Stalin did not vouchsafe any further explanation as a
result of this telephonic conversation.
10. On December 3, 1941, General Sikor.ski and General Anders were received
by Marshal Stalin and presented to him a list of the names of throe thousand,
eight hundred and forty-three Officers, stating at the same time that this list
had l)een compiled from memory and was therefore very incomplete.
General Slkorski said: "I gave orders that these men should be searched for
in Poland itself, with which I am in constant touch. Not a single one is eith»>r
in Poland or in the Polish-Prisoner-of- War-Camps in Germany. Tliese men
are here in Russia, and none of (hem has yet returned." Marshal Stalin said:
"They have certainly been released, but have not yet arrived."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2253
An additional list of eight hundred missing Officers was handed to Marshal
Stalin by General Anders on March 18, 1942.
11. Finally Profess'or Kot had a conversation with Mons. Wyszynski on July 8,
1942, when the Ambassador again brought up the question of the eight thousand
Polish Officers who had not been released. Mons. Wyszynski denied that there
could still be Poles held as prisoners in Russia.
12. On April 13, 1943, the German Radio Station began to broadcast news
of the discovery of the mass graves of Polish Officers in the Katyn Forest near
Smolen.sk. The number of bodies discovered there was estimated by the Germans
to be about 10,000.
13. The very large number of photographs in the possession of the Polish
Government prove that the victims were almost all Polish Officers, because
the uniforms are clearly Polish, being thos'e of Generals, Colonels, Majors,
Captains, and Lieutenants. The photographs show Polish Medals, Shoulder
Ba«ids, clearly depicting the rank of the Officers concerned, certiticates of the
award of the Silver Cross, "Virtuti Militari,", etc., etc.
14. Representatives of the Polish Red Cross from Warsaw, after investigation
on the spot reported by telegram to the International Red Cross at Geneva on
April 21, 1948, that :
( a ) Large common tombs of Polish Officers have been discovered at Katyn
near Smolensk.
(b) After examining about three hundred disinterred corpses, the Polish
Red Cross Representatives state that the Officers had been killed by bullets
from a revolver, fired at the back of the neck, and that from the similarity of
the wounds, it is possible to conclude that the executions were carried out
by specialists.
(c) According to the Papers found on the corpses the murders must have
taken place about the months of March and April 1940.
15. The numerous photographs of the skulls of the victims confiiTn the fact that
the revolver bullets entered the back of the head or nape of the neck. In most
cases one shot was sufficient, in others two or even three were required, as the
photographs clearly show.
If). The Polish Government has a list of nearly four thousand Officers, proved
to be Poles by their uniforms, the vast majority of whom it has been possible to
identify by name, owing to the papers found on their corpses. These include
letters from home but not posted, diaries, notebooks, birth and marriage certifi-
cates, photographs of wives, fiancees, certificates of inoculation, etc.
17. The first reply of the Russians to the charges of the German broadcasting
stations appeared on April 15, 1943. The Soviet Information Bureau states:
"In their clumsily concocted fabrication about the numerous graves which
the Germans allegedly discovered near Smolensk the Hitlerite Liars mentioned
the village of Guezdovaja. But, like the swindlers they are, they are silent about
the fact that it was near the village of Guezdovaja that the Archaeological Ex-
cavations of the historic 'Guezdovaja Burial Place' were made."
18. It was only on April 16 that, according to the Official Tass communique
the Soviet Authorities stated for the first time that some Polish Officers had been
employed in building fortifications near Smolensk, and that they had fallen into
the hands of the Germans when they conquered this district.
This Official Statement is entirely contrary to the claims put forth during a
period of nearly two years that all Polish Officers who had been prisoners of war
had been set free. It is permissible to ask why the Russian Authorities had
never disclosed these facts to the Polish Ambassador who had made so many
repeated efforts to ascertain the fate of the missing Polish Officers.
19. On April 16, 1943, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant
General Kukiel, issued an official communique in which he stated :
"The necessity has arisen that the mass graves which have been discovered
should be investigated and the facts verified by a proper International Body, such
as the Authorities of the International Red Cross. The Polish Government is
approaching that institution with a view to their sending a delegation to the
place in which the Polish Prisoners-of-War are said to have lieen massacred."
20. On April 26, 1943, Mons. Molotov sent a note to Mons. Romer, the Polish
Ambassador at Kuibyschev, in which he stated. that the campaign of slander set
on foot by the Germans with regard to the Polish Officers slain by the Germans
themselves near Smolensk had been taken up by the Polish Government and sup-
ported by the official Polish Press by every means in their power, and that the
Polish Government had thus treacherously stabbed the Soviet Union in the back.
The existing Polish Government was on the road to an understanding with
93744— 52— pt. 7 — —28
2254 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Hitler and consequently the Soviet Government had decided to break off all
diplomatic relations with it.
Conclusion. — It would appear from all the above considerations that the Polish
■Government was fully justified in demanding that an impartial inquiry should
he held, and "the facts verified by a proper International Body such as the
Authorities of the International Red Cross."
APPENDIX
Written confirmation of the conversations exchanged between the Polish rep-
resentatives and the Soviet Government as detailed above.
1. November 8, 19'il. — Note sent by Mr. Molotov to Professor Kot in reply to
the Polish note of November 1. 1041.
"... (1) In accordance with the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the U. S. S. R. dated August 13, 1941, concerning the amnesty, all
Polish citizens who were deprived of freedom as prisoners of war or on other
sufficient grounds are free. . . ."
2. November I'f, 19Jfl. — Note from Ambassador A. Bogomolov to the Prime
Minister of Poland, (Jeneral Sikorski, in reply to the note of October 16. l'.)41.
". . . All Polish Officers who are on U. S. S. R. territory have also been set free.
Your supposition, Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that a large number
of Polish Officers are dispersed throughout the northern regions of the U. S. S. U.
is, it would appear, based on inaccurate information. . . ."
3. March IS, 19'i2. — Note from Ambassador Bogomolov to Foreign Minister
Raczynski in reply to his note dated January 28, 1942.
". . . In the reply contained in the note of Mr. D. M. Molotov, dated November
8, 1941, and addressed to M. Kot, and in the Aide-Memoire of the People's Com-
missariat for Foi-eign Affairs, dated November 19, it was already stated that the
application of amnesty to the Polish citizens had been strictly carried out."
". . . The Polish Officers and soldiers having been set free in the same manner
as other Polish citizens, i. e., pursuant to the decree of August 12, 1941, every-
thing which has been said above applies equally to Polish Officers and
soldiers. . . .
•'In any case, whenever it is learned that certain isolated cases of delay in
setting Polish citizens free exist anywhere, the competent Soviet Authorities
immediately undertake the measures necessary for their release. . . ."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1952
House of Representatives,
The Select Committee ox the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington^ D. C.
The committee met at 10 : 15 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 1301,
Xew House Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Dondero, O'Konski, and
Sheehan.
Also present: John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select com-
mittee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
Our first witness this morning is Mr. Joseph B. Phillips.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH B. PHILLIPS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRE-
TAEY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Chairman ]Madden. Mr. Phillips, will you be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Phillips. I do.
Chairman Madden. Will you sit down and give the reporter your
full name and address.
Mr. Phillips. Joseph Becker Phillips, 506 Cameron Street, xVlex-
andria, Va.
Chairman Madden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. What is your position with the State Department,
please (
Mr. Phillips. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
At the present time I am Acting Assistant Secretary in the absence
of Mr. Howland Sargeant.
Mr. Mitchell. How long have you been in that position ?
Mr. Phillips. I have been Deputy Assistant Secretary since Febru-
ary of this year.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Phillips, during testimony taken yesterday af-
ternoon from former Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, Mr. Lane stated
that the Voice of America failed to carry any broadcasts after he had
formed the private committee to investigate the Katyn massacre with
relation to the activities of that committee. I believe that committee
was formed in 1949. I think the record will reveal that efforts were
made on the part of that organization to have the Voice of America
broadcast their activities concerning the Katyn massacre.
2255
2256 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The committee would like to have you explain to them why the
Voice of America didn't do that at that particular time and also to
have you tell us when they started broadcastino- material concerning
the Katyn massacre.
Mr. Phillips. Mr. Chairman, yon understand that I was not in
the Department at that time. Consequently, I am speaking from the
record that has been compiled on this case.
I find that, in fact, the Voice of America did carry a broadcast on
November 22, 19-19, covering the formation of Mr. Lane's committee.
From that time on they reported on several occasions the activities
of that committee.
It is quite correct, however, that they did not at that time make
a prolonged campaign out of the activities of the Lane committee or
the investigation of the Katyn massacre. The motives for that, as
I understand, was that there was a paucity of hard and fast news on
the subject which could have been played with authenticity over the
Voice of America.
The coverage of the subject by the Voice of America increased
perceptibly and considerably with the formation of this committee,
and from the time of the debates in Congress on the formation of this
committee and the organization of this committee, its activities have
been covered extensively by the Voice of America.
Mr. Mitchell. When was the first broadcast by the Voice of Amer-
ica concerning the private committee?
Mr. Phillips. On November 22, 1949.
Mr. Mitchell. The Voice of America at that time did broadcast
information of the private investigating committee headed by Mr.
Lane; is that correct?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir, on Noveml)er 22, 1949, the Voice of Amer-
ica carried 11 lines of news about the formation of a new group to
gathei' evidence in connection with the Katyn massacre. A Voice
of Ameiica reporter was present at the meeting of the committee
at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was that meeting of the committee held?
Mr. Phillips. That I do not know.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it in New York City?
Mr. Phillips. I believe so; but I am not sure. ]My record does
not show where the meeting was.
Mr. Mitchell. What \vas the next broadcast that was carried by
the Voice of America concerning the Katyn massacre?
Mr. Phillips. The next broadcast concerning the Kat^'n massacre
Avas on January 24, 1950, but that did not have to do with the Lane
committee. This was a news item on genocide hearings before the
Senate subcommittee and consisted of a 19-line summary of Judge
]5lair F. Gunilier's testimony on the Katyn massacre. That was the
next recorded broadcast on that sul)ject.
Ml-. Mitchell. Wliat was the next broadcast on the subject of tlie
Katyn massacre t
Mr. Phillips. It was on September 19, 1950, ;nul consisted of ."]()
lines of news on Lt. Col. John Van VlieCs rei)ort on the Katyn crime
which was made public by the United States Defense Department.
Mr. Mit(^hell. In other words, when the Army, after their seari-h
for the missing Van Vliet re])ort, released the vei-sion that he Iiad
c()m])iled at their request at that time, it was released to (lie world '.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2257
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir; that is correct.
]Mr. ]\liTCHELL. By the Voice of America ?
Mr. Phillips. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the next broadcast ?
Mr. Phillips. The next broadcast was on the following da}', on
which occasion the same story was repeated, the release of the Van
Vliet report.
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL. Did it have world-wide coverage?
Mr. Phillips. I believe it did; yes, sir. It did have world-wide
coverage.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the next broadcast on the Katyn
massacre?
Mr. Phillips. Four days later, on September 24, there was a re-
view of the Van Vliet report in a review of the week's events, which
is a regular feature of the Voice of America.
Mr. Mitchell. And that was in 1950 ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, 1950 ; September 24, 1950.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was the next broadcast in which the Katyn
massacre was discussed?
Mr. Phillips. On October 6, 1950, there was a satirical piece
broadcast in one of their humorous — one of their satirical, not humor-
<His — a satirical program taking the line that in Korea the Commu-
nist hordes are perpetrating murders of prisoners of war just as hap-
pened at Katyn.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. ^Vliat was that again, please?
]Mr. Phillips. The theme of this satirical broadcast script was that
in Korea the Communist hordes are perpetrating murders of prison-
ers of war just as happened at Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the date of that broadcast ?
Mr. Phillips. That was on October 6, 1950,
]Mr. ]\Iitchell. "V^^iat was the next broadcast ?
Mr. Phillips. It was on October 26, 1950, and was a new round-up
on the Katyn committee's letter to Vishinski.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you refer to the private investigating committee
headed by Arthur Bliss Lane?
Mr. Phillips. It is my understanding that that committee did send
an open letter to Mr. Vishinski.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct ; and it was broadcast on the Voice
of America ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, on October 26, 1950.
Mr. Sheehan. If I may interrupt, Mr. Phillips, when Mr. Lane
testified the other day he stated that you gave very little time in the
Voice of America to broadcasting facts about Katyn, although he
did intimate that the Voice of America permitted information about
the formation of the committee as such without permitting any
opinion as to the guilt of Katyn to be broadcast. Was that the policy
that the State Department followed on that?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir ; that was the policy at that time. The at-
tempt was to broadcast the news as it developed.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, at that time the Voice of America was very
active in propaganda which was to reach behind the iron curtain.
That was such propaganda, wasn't it ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.
2258 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Even if it was only hearsay, it was propaganda in-
tended to break the hold of the people controlling the people behind
the iron curtain. Well, why be squeamish about permitting something
like this to be broadcast even if it w^as purely opinion?
Mr, Phillips. The record of the policy directives at that time make
these points : In the first place, it is not wise propaganda to put on an
extended propaganda campaign unless it is supported by hard news.
There is always the chance that it will backfire.
In the second place, the main consideration at that time was the
broadcast to Poland itself. Everyone i-ecognized that most of the
Poles understood perfectly well who was responsible for the Katyn
massacre. It w\as feared that for us to broadcast a campaign on that
subject at that time might arouse some Polish individuals, some friends
of ours, to actions which would react against them and which would
cause their arrest or their murder or other action against them. That
was one of the considerations that entered into it.
Mr. Sheehan. May I interpose there to say that the mere fact that
somebody might listen to a Voice of America broadcast would tend
to have recriminations against them, so why should the}' even be
listening to your broadcasts?
Mr. Phu^lips. The other point, Mr. Sheehan, was that the Voice of
America during that period was broadcasting a number of other
propaganda themes to countries behind the iron curtain and the Katyn
massacre story took its place with them.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, if I can summarize, you state that one of the
reasons the Department had for not permitting the story of the Katyn
massacre to be broadcast over the Voice of Ajnerica is that you did
not have sufficient facts on it.
Mr. Phillips. That is the reason we did not make a propaganda
campaign out of it ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Have you followed the evidence that has been pre-
sented here all week ?
Mr. Phillips. No, I have not personally. I have read it in the
newspapers.
Mr. Sheehan. I think that somebody in the Department is fast
asleep because, from the evidence that has been presented here, offi-
cials in our State Department and in our Executive knew, since 1942,
that we have loaded our record with many documents directly out of
the State Department and from the Executive sliowing that we had
the factual evidence all of the time.
In other words, who is laying down the policy that ignores the
facts that they have in the Department?
Mr. Phili^tps. Well, from this record, the main consideration at
that time of the people who laid down the propaganda policy was
that the Voice of America should only handle published and estab-
lished news.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you ignored everything, else unless
it Avas published, des])ite w^hat you might have in your own files?
Ml-. Phillips. I am speaking from this record, Mr. Sheehan. That
is coi-rect.
Mr. Sheehan. Don't you think that is a silly attitude? You say that
you wanted the ti'uth. If you got the ti-utli from your files, you should
have published it whether it was public or not.
I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2259
Mr. Phh^lips. I can't speak of those from first-hand knowledge
becanse I don't know what was in tlie files at that time.
Mr. SiiEEiiAx. What we are tryinor to bring out here is that all of
that information was in the files and yet it was denied to people
within your own Department of the Government. That is what we
are trying to have explained here. That is the purpose of our second
phase of our investigation. AMiy, with the Government having all
of this information at its dis])osal, did it refuse to use it? Can you
enlighten our committee so that we can find out why these things;
happened ?
Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I am sorry, but since I was not in the De-
partment at that time I really cannot. I don't know the thinking
behind that particular fact.
Mr. Sheeiian. By your own statement, didn't it seem contradictory
that you wanted to publisli the truth ? You had the truth, and yet
you failed to reveal it because it had not been made public to the
American people? Is that not a contradictory set of circumstances'?
Mr. Phillips. Well, as a general thing, if this is in answer to your
question, the Voice of America, relying as it does on its standing as a
news organization, devotes itself mostly to the transmission of news,
which has been developed in the public and which is public news.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, I woidd say from my own observation that
the Voice of America falls down on its job terrifically. It is meant
as a propaganda organization, and it is meant to disrupt the members
behind the iron curtain. If they refuse to use all of the news to do
that, they have no business existing. I would say that the Depart-
ment is very lax.
Mr. Phillips. Their statement of their coverage at that time is
that they did use the news as it developed from the Lane committee
and from other sources.
Mr. Sheehan. I know, but you admit that they merely said that
the Lane committee was formed to investigate. They said nothing
about the Russians being guilty. They merely gave the news that
the committee had been developed. How effective is that?
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. How many news gatherers do you have here
in Washington?
Mr. Phillips. Here in Washington, Mr. Chairman, I don't know
specifically how many there are. I know that there are at least half
a dozen of them who function here in the capital.
Chairman Madden. Have you had a representative here this week?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. At these hearings ?
Mr. Phillips. It is my understanding that the International In-
formation Administration has had someone here throughout these
hearings.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Phillips, I think it is fair to say that a good
reason existed, at least while the war. was in progress, why nothing
should be done to irritate our ally, Russia. She was our ally at that
time. What is difficult to understand, however, is that there should
be such silence on the part of our Government since the war's end.
I refer to the appeasement of Russia, of course. If there is any one
thing that this record shows and that the people of the world know,.
2260 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Russia is the one Government tliat should not have been appeased
since tlie World War's end for this reason: That she is the fly in the
ointment in bringing about workl peace.
For that reason, it does seem that Voice of America has been lax in
not presenting to the people of the vv^orld what information it had in
its files that they knevs^ was there since 1942,
Have you any different reaction or opinion to express on that?
Mr. Phillips. Well, sir, I am told that at that time, that is, in
1948 and 1949 and early in 1950, the controlliog factor in the Voice of
America policy on this subject was the possible effect in Poland and
that it was not a consideration of the Soviet Union. That did not
enter into it. Since tlie formation of this committee and since 3'our
activities began, the Voice of America transmissions have stepped up
to a very great extent.
Mr. DoNDERo. Let me comment on the statement that you made that
it was thouglit it might excite our friends, the Poles. The Poles have
been under the domination of the Russian Government since early in
the war; and, if there is one thing that it might have done, it might
have aroused the ire of the Polish people against their, let us say,
their conqueror because that is what it means in substance. I refer
to the Lublin government, the Communist-dominated Government of
Poland. That was a mistaken policy. Instead of doing good, I think
it did great harm to the Poles to withhold that information from
them.
Now, I am interested in the rest of your statement, and I will be
glad to hear it.
Mr. Phillips. Well, on the question of the Poles, may I read, since
I was not in the Department, the statement that was prepared here
on that subject, that part of the subject.
The Poles, of all people, did not have to he told who was responsible for the
Katyn massacre. Their experiences since September 1945 were calculated to
make them believe the worst of the Russians. In such circumstances, it was
possible that extensive treatment of the Lane committee project would lead
many Polish patriots to conclude that such an airing of the subject was for a
purpose other than mere information, namely, to arouse overt action on their
part.
It is the concern of the official propaganda to the satellite people
to nourish their hope of freedom and national independence without
doing anything to expose them to seizure, torture, and death by reason
of an untimely revolt. That, I understand, was one of the major policy
considerations in tlie directives for the play of the Katyn massacre
investigation.
Mr. DoxDERO. The Department then took the position that the
broadcasting of the facts might so irritate Russia that she would take
it out, so to speak, on the Poles, especially tlie patriotic Poles who
were doing what they could to resist Russian aggression. Was that
about the situation?
Mr. Phillips. Frankly, that is not what I gather from this state-
ment of policy.
Mr. SiiEEiFAN. Mr. Chairman, may I again remark that the whole
purpose of this jiropaganda is eventually to get all of the nations tc^
do overt acts against their oppressoi-s. Isn't that the purpose of
propaganda in the final analysis?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2261
Mr. Phillips. It is ; yes, sir. But I think the experience in the
last war, as most people remember vei-y vividly, showed that it is
veiy futile and very dangerous propaganda to incite people to action
unless you are in a position to support them.
Mr. Sheehan. I know, but do you think that the Poles, in the light
of their experience at the Warsaw uprising, when the Allies instigated
them to rise up against their oppressors and then left them for a long
period of time — do you think that the Poles, if they have any sense at
all, would rise up again unless they knew help was near at hand?
Mr. Phillips. I can only say that that was one of the considerations
that lead to the formation of this policy.
Mr. Sheehan. I say that whoever is laying down the policy doesn't
know the facte of life and should consult some good newspapermen on
how to put on a good propaganda campaign.
Mr. DoNDERO. The very fact is that this committee, when it went
to Europe, the Old World, to get the facts, instilled a note of hope
in those people behind the iron curtain.
Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. Of course, I might add this, Mr. Chairman, that
one thing your office completely overlooked was that the Lane com-
mittee, as a matter of fact, had an entirely different function, that is^
not to rouse the Poles, but to awaken the Americans to the true danger
of communism. I think that is a very worthy purpose both of that
committee and of this committee.
Mr. Phillips. The Voice of America's coverage of this committee^
as I said, has been very extensive,
]\Ir. Machrowicz. The Lane committee had the very same func-
tion.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you can tell us, Mr.
Phillips, when the so-called tnith bomb started in the Voice of
America ?
Mr. Phillips. The so-called truth bomb — I am afraid I don't un-
derstand.
Mr. PuciNSKi. W^asn't there a period when you came before Con-
gress to seek appropriations at which time you told Congi-ess that
you were going to start a truth bomb and needed appropriations for
that purpose ?
Mr. Phillips. Do you refer to the campaign of truth ?
Mr. PuciNSKi. You called it tlie truth bomb.
Mr. Phillips. I believe it was the campaign of truth. I came into-
the Department in the spring of 1950, and I believe that efforts under
that name had started just before then.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I would like to refer to it as the truth bomb. What
was envisioned under that program?
Mr. Phillips. Under that program, as I understand and as we
work in it now, there were envisioned these things : In the first place^
an increase of our propaganda facilities and our propaganda output
activities. In the second place, a sharpening in our attacks on com-
munism and on the Soviet Union and on the policies of the Soviet
Government. In the third place, at that time, it was quite clear in
our minds that one of our major efforts should be in the cementing
of our friendships with other nations, particularly those of Western
Europe. *
2262 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. How nmch money did you get at that time; do you
recall offhand ?
Mr. Phillips. No, sir, I don't recall that accurately.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Julius Epstein, who has been mentioned before
this committee previously, told me or rather Mr. Mitchell and myself
when we talked last on this subject that when Colonel Stewart testified
before this comnuttee in 1951 — and I am going to read you one short
paragra]:)h from Mr. Epstein's statement.
He said, for instance —
When Colonel Stewart testified — and Colonel Stewart testified for 2 hours,
you will remember, from 10 until 12 — at 5 o'clock I went down to the Voice's
news ofiiee in Washington and asked, "Could I see the release?"
They found a release of 25 lines. I said, "You have three reporters for the
Hill, and you don't know this? This was made for the Voice."
Now, I don't think that I quite agree with Mr. Epstein's final con-
clusion, but I was just wondering, when you related all of these men-
tions of Katyn earlier this morning, how much mention was there
and what sort of a campaign did the Voice of America put on ? Were
the broadcasts similar to the 25 lines mentioned about Stewart, an
American officer who identified the Soviets as the murderers of these
Poles?
Mr. Phillips. In these earlier broadcasts — and I do not have the
complete file of each broadcast, although I have some record of the
lines given. Tlie first broadcast, for example, was 11 lines.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe Mr. Pucinski is referring to what happened
after Stewart testified.
Mr. Phillips. Well, this was in 1951 ?
Mr. Pucinski. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. On October 19, 1951.
Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, but I don't have the record of that par-
ticular broadcast. I do have some scripts for September 1951, which
show a very extensive coverage. In 1952 I have a record of scripts,
most of them being 15 minutes and 20 minutes.
Mr. Pucinski. Are those on the work of this committee ?
Mr. Phillips. They are on the work of this committee.
Mr. Pucinski. That leads me to my next question, Mr. Phillips.
If until 1951 you had feared, as a policy of the Voice of America,
that publishing or carrying broadcasts into Poland about Katyn
might lead to an uprising, what has changed your mind this year?
Sir. Phillips. May I go back ?
Mr. Pucinski. I mean, don't the same conditions prevail today that
prevailed 5 years or 4 years or 3 years ago ?
Mr. Phillips. No, sir. In the considerations that guided this policy,
r understand that there is a feeling that conditions have changed. In
the first place, this committee itself is an official committee and, conse-
quently, its information is of the highest order of newsworfhiness.
In tlie second place — and here, since I wasn't in the Department in
1948 and 1949, it is a bit difficult for me to speak about it — there is a
feeling that our whole broadcast, our whole output tuned to the
satellite counti'ies between tlie iron curtain has considerably increased
in sharpness and in impact within the past 2 years.
Mr. Pucinski. But don't the same conditions, the same fears that
existed in the Voice of America through 1949 and 1950, that is, with
relation to a premature uprising, exist today even though this is a
congressional connnittee? Don't you have those same fears today?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2263
I am trying to find out wliat has liappened in those intervening years
to change your policy so drastically.
Mr. Phillips. Certainly those fears do exist. That fear will always
be there, that is, that you should not incite people to overt action unless
you can support them. That is a standard and a real policy consid-
eration always.
The main "thing that has happened is the formation of this com-
mittee and the testimony you have developed.
Chairman JNIaddex. Let me ask you this: Do you have any knowl-
edge of the extensiveness of the coverage that was given this committee
when we were holding hearings in Frankfort? I refer to the broad-
casts beliind the iron curtain.
Mr. Mitchell. May the chairman see that list?
Mr. Phillips. Yes. I would like to have that done.
^ Chairman Madden. Will the witness answer my question first?
]\Ir. I^HiLiJps. Here is the list in Frankfort, Mr. Chairman. April
21, a 13-minute broadcast. April 22, an 11-minute broadcast. April
23, one 12-minute broadcast and one 22-minute broadcast. April 24,
a 1214-minute broadcast and a 19-minute broadcast. April 25, a
3-minute broadcast and a 16-minute In-oadcast. April 26, a Qi^-minute
broadcast and a 21-minute broadcast.
Chairman Madden. You have mentioned the 15- and 20-minute
broadcasts. AYere they devoted to Katyn, to the Katyn testimony?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, "sir. They are identified here. The 13-minute
broadcast on the twenty-first, for example, dealt with the testimony of
Jozef Cza])ski before the Katyn Congressional Committee. The next
one is the testimony of the German witnesses before the congressional
committee.
Chairman Madden. Those broadcasts were carried behind the iron
curtain by the Voice of America?
Mr. Phillips. That is correct.
Mr. Prc'iNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I think it has been pointed out
repeatedly, as we know from our experience, that the Voice of America
has been doing a very good job since this committee was started. As a
matter of fact, I think we should point out here that the Voice of
America, I think, has done a sufficiently good job to force the Com-
munist regime in Poland to put out a 250-page book denouncing this
whole committee. So apparently you are reaching your goals now.
The only question that we have been trying to delve into is why this
wasn't done as early as 1945, 1946, as least 1946 when officially Mr.
Truman said that the policies toward the Soviets has changed. That
is what we are trying to find out.
Mr. Phillips. Well, I have given you the three policy considerations
that entered into that.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You will agTee that the big policy, the one of the
fear of getting the Poles to uprise, was a totally erroneous one because
now you are publishing this committee's work and you are not afraid
of that, are you ?
Mr. Phillips. I can only say that that was the consideration that
entered into their minds in 1948. May I answer as to Colonel Stew-
art? I do find that I have a record of the broadcast on Colonel
Stewart's testimony. This was a broadcast on February 4, 1952, deal-
ing with the de])osition of Colonel Stewart before the Katyn Congres-
sional Committee, and was a 15-minute broadcast.
2264 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. Then, Mr. Phillips, you are saying that Mr. Epstein
^Yas in error when he advised Mr. Mitchell and myself that there were
only 25 lines devoted to that ?
Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I don't think we are talking about the
same thing.
Mr. Mitchell. May I clarify that? I was present. Mr. Pucinski
was not on the committee at the time that the Stewart testimony was
taken. I did not release it to the Voice of America or to anybody else
until we started our major investigation, which was in February, be-
cause the members of the committee had recessed until January and
consequently I didn't publish anything because I thought a premature
release at that time, without some continuity, would have very little
value.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Phillips, you stated that someone set that policy
from above. Who were your superiors that set that particular policy ?
Do you know ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir. The guidance and the policy responsibility
for these matters related to the Voice of America and our propaganda
policy would be that of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.
Mr. Sheehan. Who was that at that time?
Mr. Phillips. At that time, in early 1950, it was Mr. Barrett. Be-
fore that, for several months, I believe I am correct in stating that
Mr. Sargeant, as deputy was acting, and previous to that it was Mr.
Allen, the present Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
Mr. Sheehan, We have been faced with so many contradictions
here, such as the fact that Elmer Davis when he testified the other
day said that he never knew about Katyn, yet another gentleman came
up and said that 2 days after Katyn happened he was handed a memo-
randum about Katyn. From the State Department and the OWI and
everything connected with it we get contradictions, and from a con-
gressional standpoint I know that it is going to make me look very
closely into appropriations for the Voice of America next year if the
only thing they are going to publish is what is already in the news-
papers. We want the truth to go to the countries behind the iron
curtain regardless of where it comes from.
Mr. DoNDERO. A question I had in mind was this : Does the Depart-
ment have on record any concrete evidence of whether these broadcasts
of the Voice of America really hit behind the iron curtain and what
effect they have ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir. We do have on record the statements of
people who have escaped from behind the iron curtain and who have
listened to the Voice of America. We have some generalizations from
them as to people, their friends and neighbors, who they know listen
to the Voice of America. It is not direct evidence, but it is fairly
convincing. We have the attacks that are made on the Voice of
America by Communist publications and by the Communist radio.
We also have the enormous jamming effort that is made to cut out the
Voice of America broadcasts, which certainly wouldn't be done unless
they were reaching people.
Mr. DoNDEKo. It would somewhat recommend it to me if the Com-
munist press attacks the Voice of America as thoy did us while we
were in Euroi)e.
Mr. CKoNSKi. Mr. Pliillips, has any comparison been made between
the effectiveness of the Voice of America behind the iron curtain as
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2265
compared, let us say, for example, with Radio Madrid of Spain, Radio
France of Paris ? Did you know, for instance, that the Hooper rating
for behind the iron curtain of the Voice of America gives it the booby
prize while Radio France and Radio Madrid are way ahead? Inci-
dentally, Radio France spends 1 percent of the money that we spend
on the Voice of America.
In other words, we spend 100 times more on the Voice of America
than they do on Radio France, and our Hooper rating behind the
iron curtain hardly rates compared with theirs. Have you made a
comparative study of that ?
Mr. Phillips. Yes ; we make a comparative study of that all of the
time. Naturally, a good deal of the evidence is hearsay. We cannot
have Hooper rating people getting behind the iron curtain and ques-
tioning people directly. I must say, sir, that most of the evidence
Ave get does not mention anything except that the Voice of America
and the British Broadcasting Corp. are being really effective.
I do not have any record and I have never seen a record myself
that put the French radio and the Spanish radio in the same class
with the Voice of America for general listening.
JNIr. O'KoNSKi. I will give you an illustration of why they probably
have more listeners. When we were in Paris, Radio France contacted
this committee, and they came over and invited us to appear on Radio
France. I said, "What is your policy on Radio France? Should we
hold back or should we tell the truth, or just what is your policy on
Radio France?"
The said, "Mr. Congressman, the more you give the Russians hell,
the better we like it. That is the kind of broadcast we want. That
is what they want to hear behind the iron curtain."
Now, to my knowledge, I have never been contacted by the Voice
of America in all of the years of its existence, and I am sure that if
I did appear on the Voice of America everything I would say would
have to be censored by some higher authority. They certainly
wouldn't say, "Go ahead. Congressman, give them hell. The more
hell you give them, the more listeners we have behind the iron curtain."
There is your difference. The same thing is true of Radio Madrid.
Their programs are all anti-Communist, and that is why they have
listeners.
In talking to some people who have escaped from the other side of
Europe, they say the trouble with the Voice of America is that there
is too much pussy-footing and that they don't know where we stand.
They say that we give them nothing to hang their hats on. That is
why they listen to Radio Madrid. That is why they listen to Radio
France.
So it seems to me that we are setting up this organization primarily
to tell the truth about communism, and we just don't do enough. I
don't think it justifies its purpose. This idea of telling how the people
live in Virginia, how many automobiles we have per capita of popula-
tion, how many radios we have per capita of population, how many
washing machines we have per capita of population, I think, to
the people behind the iron curtain antagonizes them and makes them
our enemies instead of our friends.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
2266 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
I had another question I was going to ask, but I have forgotten
what it was. I was enraptured by my colleague's talk.
We are very grateful to you for your evidence today. I wonder
if you will leave with us that list of broadcasts.
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir; I would like to leave the list of broadcasts
from 1048 to 1951, and the broadcasts of 1952 since this committee has
been functioning.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Is that a record of all of the broadcasts on Katyn ?
Mr. Phillips. This is a record up to June 26, 1951, and from Febru-
ary 1952 up to May. It is not a complete record; no. sir. I also
have some scripts for 1951 if you would like to have them left.
Mr. SiiEEiiAN. I think you ought to turn them over to the connnittee
without having them put in the record so that we at least will have
TESTIMONY OF JULIUS EPSTEIN, NEW YORK CITY. N. Y.
Chairman Madden. Our next witness is Mr. Julius Epstein.
Mr. Epstein, will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please ?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. Epstein. I do.
Chairman Madden. Will you state your full name, please?
Mr. Epstein. Julius Epstein.
Chairman Madden. And your address.
Mr. Epstein. 92-40 Queens Boulevard, New York City.
Chairman Madden. And your business?
]Mr. Epstein. I am a writer and a foreign correspondent.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Epstein, I understand that you want to put
some letters in the record which you exchanged with officials of the
De]:)artment of State and the Voice of America ; is that correct?
Mr. Epsticin. That is correct.
Mr. JSIiTCHELL. Will you please proceed to do so.
Mr. Epstein. I wrote a letter to William T. Stone on February 10^
1949, oifering him a comi)lete tile on Katyn with exclusive news which
had never been broadcast over the OWI or the Voice of America.
After 10 weeks
Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of that letter?
Mr. Epstein. February 10, 1949.
Chairman Madden. Let me interrupt you there. This letter is in
what connection?
Mr. Epsti:in. This letter is addressed to ;Mr. William T. Stone,
special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Department of
State, Washington, D. C. The letter states :
Dkar Mr. Stone: Thank you very much for your kind letter of February 7 ■
]\Ir. Mitchell. May we have that letter for the record, please?
Mr. Epstein, Yes.
Ml-. Mitchell. May we get an exhibit muuber on it?
Chairman Madden. Will vou mark it as '"Exhibit 33."'
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2267
Mr. Mitchell. For the record, this is exhibit Xo. 33. This is a
copy of a letter dated February 10, 1949, from Julius Epstein to
William T. Stone, special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State,
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 33'' and follows:)
Exhibit 33 — Letter to Mk. Stone Fkom Mr. Epsteix
Febkuary 10, 1949.
Mr. William T. Stone,
S2)ccial Assistmit to the Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Me. Stone : Thank you very much for your kind letter of February 7 ; I
was very glad to hear that you liked my letter to the editor and that you want
' to make use of it in connections with the Voice of America. In the meantime, I
learned that this article was inserted in the Congressional Record of February 7.
I should like to tell you that I just linished a long and thorough research on
the Katyn murder of more than 4,(X)0 I'olish officers by the Russians. I un-
earthed completely new evidence. Among it are letters I received from some of
the scientists who went to Smolensk in 1943 and investigated the case. There
is not the slightest doultt that all circumstantial evidence points to Stalin as
the responsible man. Don't you think it would be a good idea to write a fifteen-
minute broadcast for the Voice? I would gladly do it. I would be very grateful
if you could tell me your opinion or if you would consult with IMr. Allen. It
would take me just a few days to send you the broadcast. I could write it in
German or English or in both languages.
With many thanks,
Very sincerely yours,
Julius Epstein.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you let us have the reply that you
received ?
Mr. Epstein. On April 20, 1949, 1 got an answer.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. This is a letter, exhibit No. 34, on the official sta-
tionery of the department of state. New York, N. Y., dated April 20,
1949, from Charles W. Thayer, Chief, International Broadcasting Di-
vision, addressed to Mr. Julius Epstein, 468 Fourth Avenue, New
York 16, N. Y.
Mr. Epstein. That was my office address.
(The document referred to was marked ""Exhibit 34*' and follows:)
Exhibit 34
Department of State,
251 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, N. Y., April 20, 1949.
Mr. JuLirs Epstein,
468 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Epstein : Your letter of Feliruary 10, 1949, to Mr. William T. Stone
was referred, during his absence from Washington, to the New York oflice of
the International Broadcasting Division, first to Mr. Victor Hunt and then to me.
I regret the long delay in acknowledging your kind offer to write a script about
the Katyn case for use by the Voice of America.
We have decided against making use of the material at this time. Your offer
was, however, appreciated.
Thank you for your interest.
Sincerely yours,
Charles W. Thayer.
Chief, International Broadcasting Division.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any further correspondence with the
International Broadcasting Division that you would like to put on
the record, Mr. Epstein?
Mr. Epstein. Yes. I will come to this later, if you will permit me
to make a few remarks. On July 3 and 4, 1949
Chairman ISIadden. Now, where is this letter to?
2268 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, Mitchell. He doesn't have a letter. He is reading from notes
that he has here.
Mr. Epstein. Well, I have other letters, too.
Mr. Mitchell. Why don't we just listen to that comment and then
he can give it to us later ? Will you proceed with what you have right
there?
Mr. Epstein. Yes. On July 3 and 4, 1949, two articles of mine ap-
peared in the New York Herald Tribune about the Katyn massacre.
They also appeared in the European edition of the Herald Tribune ;
and they found a great response, which I saw from the letters I
received.
The Voice of America at that time was broadcasting daily a press
survey, telling the people before and behind the iron curtain what the
news of the press was, together with certain features. As I found out,
they did not mention anything about this series of articles.
Mr. Mitchell. What you are saying now is that the Voice of Amer-
ica did not broadcast or mention the two articles that you wrote?
Mr. Epstein. The two articles I wrote for the Heralct Tribune.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Mr. Epstein. On July 13, 1949, 1 had a telephone conversation with
one of my friends on the Russian desk of the Voice of America and I
asked him, "Did you read the articles?"
He said, "Yes ; of course."
I asked him, "Did the Voice of America make any use of that?"
and he said, "No."
I also spoke to the Polish desk and to the chief of the Polish desk,
who told me that it would create too much hatred against Stalin
among the Poles and that he hadn't gotten the green light from Wash-
ington to use anything of my articles about Katyn.
On October 15, 1949, I wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of
State, Mr. George V. Allen, Department of State, Washington, D, C.
May I read this letter ?
Mr. Mitchell. Surely. That will be exhibit 35. This is a copy
of a letter, that is, exhibit No. 35, dated October 15, 1949, from Julius
Epstein, then executive secretary to the Lane committee investigating
Katyn. It is addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr.
George V. Allen, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 35" and follows:)
Exhibit 35 — Letter From Mb. Epstein to Mb. Allen
OCTOBEB 15, 1949.
Assistant Secretaey of State Mr. George V. Allen,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Allen : I want to inform you that the former Ambassador to Poland,
Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, will hold a pross conference on Monday, November 21,
1949, at 4 P. M. at the Le Pilleinent Suite at the Waldorf Hotel in New York.
Ambassador Lane will at this press conference announce the formation of the
American Ccmimittee For The Investigation Of The Katyn Massacre, Inc. The
press conference will be attended by the members of this conunittee as listed on
this letterhead and distinguished guests from New York, Washington, and
Baltimore.
• Amliassador Lane will deliver the main speech in which he will explain the
reason and the jmrpose of the fonndiitioii of the American Katyn ronnnittee.
There will also be i)resent the only survivor of the massacre of Polish officers
who is now living in the U. S. He will tell his story and answer questions from
the press.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2269
We sive you this advance information in order to enable the Voice of America
to make the necessary arrangements to carry this press conference over its
foreign-language network.
We are ready to help the Voice of America in any way you should desire
and would be grateful to you to learn with whom in your New York office we
■could talk over the details of the broadcasts.
Very sincerely yours,
Julius Epstein,
Executive Secretafy.
Mr. Sheehan. What was the date of that letter, Mr. Epstein ?
Mr. Epstein. The date of this letter is October 15, 1949. An al-
most identical letter was sent to Mr, Foy D. Kohler, Chief of the New
York office of the Voice of America, on the same date. I don't have
to read that as it is exactly the same.
On November 14, 4 weeks later, and just a week before the press
conference in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Mr. Kohler answered this
letter. Mr. Allen had not answered it at all.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that you o;ot no reply from Mr. Allen?
Mr. Epstein. No ; I did not.
Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 36, being on the official letterhead
of the Department of State, Voice of xlmerica. New York, N. Y. The
letter is dated November 14, 1949. It is addressed to Mr. Julius
Epstein, executive secretary, American Committee for the Investiga-
tion of the Katyn Massacre, Inc., 470 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1209, New
York 16, N. Y. It is signed by Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Chief, Interna-
tional Broadcasting Division.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 36" and follows:)
ExHiTiiT 30 — Letter From Mr. Kohler to Mr. Epstein
Department of State,
Voice of America,
251 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y., November 14, 1949.
Dear Mr. Epstein : This will acknowledge the receipt officially of your recent
letters addressed to Mr. Lehrbas, of Oil, as well as to a number of individual
members of IBD including myself with regard to the press conference to be held
by The Honorable Arthur Bliss Lane on Monday, November 21, at 4 P. M. at
the Waldorf Astoria.
As you were informed in our conversation on Wednesday last, the Voice of
America will be glad to have a representative at this press conference and
appreciates your invitation. However, as we also pointed out in our conver-
sation, the usefulness of the work of the proposed committee to the Voice will
depend largely on the seriousness and objectivity of its approach to the Katyn
investigation and to the production thereby of new factual information and hard
news.
Foy D. Kohler,
Chief, International Broadcasting Division.
Mr. Julius Epstein,
Executive Secretari/, American Committee for the Investigation of the
Katyn Massacre, Inc., Jp'O Fourth Avenue, Suite 1209, New York 16,
Neic York.
Mr. Mitciieix. Do you have any more correspondence that you
would like to put on the record, Mr. Epstein?
Mr. Epstein. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask some questions?
Chairman Madden. Go ahead.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Epstein, as I understand it, the press conference
and your news releases were in 1949?
Mr. Epstein. November 1949,
93744— 52— pt. 7 29
2270 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan". And you called this definitely to the attention of the
Voice of America as indicated by the letters that you have put in the
record now ?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. And you talked to people from the Voice of America
personally ?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you hear Mr, Phillips here state the policy of
the Voice of America, that is, that they would only broadcast on the
Voice of America material that was published ?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. This was published, was it not?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. It was published in the newspapers ?
Mr. Epsti:in. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. And was of general import ?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, in spite of the fact that certain men
in the State Department laid down the policy, the Voice of America
did not even bother to follow the policy ?
Mr. Epstein. Yes.
So I went to Washington in Januar}' and went to the State
committee ?
Mr. Epstein. I was executive secretary of the American Committee
for the Investigation of the Katyn Massacre.
Mr. Sheehan. How long has the committee been in existence ?
Mr. Eps'n^iN. The committee was in existence about 2 years.
Mr. Sheehan. When did you first contact my office with reference
to turning over some material that you had ?
Mr. Epstein. I contacted your office, Mr. Congressman — just a
second — in June 1951.
Mr. Shp:ehan. What date in June?
Mr. Epstein. I think I made an error. Just a second. No, it was
in May 1951.
Mr. Sheehan. That is close enough. I want to yield to Mr.
O'Konski for one question.
Mr. O'KoNsKi. Mr. Epstein, isn't it true that the work of your com-
mittee was chiefly financed by Americans of Polish descent in the
United States ?
Mr. Epstein. That is true.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Don't you think that it would have been of tre-
mendous value to the people in Poland to know that their descendants
in the United States of America were raising money to finance this
committee to find out the truth about the Katyn massacre? Don't
you think that even somebody in the Voice of America should have
had intelligence enough to see the value of that?
Mr. Epstkin. I agree with you.
Mr. OTvoNsKi. But they didn't?
Mr. Epstein. Tliey did not.
Let me tell you what happened at the press conference. We I'ust
heard that tlie Voice of America wanted to broadcast hard news. Now,
there was very interesting hard news origiiuiting in the AValdorf on
November 21, 1949. I have here the really great speech made
Mr. Sheehan. May I continue, Mr. Epstein. I just yielded to Mr.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2271
O'Konski for one question. I had asked when you had contacted my
office, and you said that it was in May 1951.
Mr. Epsteix. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you know when the first resolution was intro-
duced in Congress to investigate the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Epsteix. It was in June 1951.
Mr. Sheehax. Who introduced that resolution?
Mr. Epsteix. Congressman Sheehan.
Mr. Mitchell. Did jou contact any other member of this committee
before you contacted Mr. Sheehan ?
Mr. Epstein. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Epstein, think before you say that.
Mr. Epstein. Pardon me. Please repeat the question.
Mr. Mitchell. Before you contacted Mr. Sheehan, had you con-
tacted any other Member of Congress ?
Mr. Epstein. Well, I was in steady correspondence with manj^ ]\Iem-
bers of Congress. On May 1, 1951, Congressman Flood printed my
pamphlet The Mj'steries of the Van Vliet Report completely in the
Congressional Record. I also saw Mr. Madden and repeatedly before
this date I saw Mr. Dondero, who had correspondence with the Penta-
gon about the Van Vliet report.
Mr. Sheehax. Mr. Epstein, the only reason for asking the question
is because of the fact that yesterday the committee was passing out
bouquets to the Polish-American Congress, to the Lane Committee,
to the people who had contributed, and I just thought that maybe we
ought to bring to the attention that Mr. Sheehan was the first one to
introduce the resolution.
]Mr. Epsteix. You were the first one to introduce the Katyn
resolution.
Now, let me come back to the press conference at the Waldorf.
There Mr. Lane delivered a speech and Mr. Max Eastman, the vice
president, read Mr. Lane's letter to Vishinsky in which Mr. Lane in-
vited Vishinski to appear before the committee. Hard news, that was,
which was carried on the front pages of the American press ; but the
Voice of America neither broadcast Mr. Lane's speech nor his letter to
Vishinsky.
So I went to Washington in January and went to the State
Department.
Chairman Madden. Now, what does this have to do with the inquiry ?
Mr. Epstitx. Pardon me?
Chairman Maddex. What does this have to do with the inquiry ?
Mr. Epsteix. It has to do with the deliberate suppression of the
truth about the Katyn massacre by the Voice of America.
Chairman JMaddex. I think you are getting a little off the track.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. You have already published that in the newspapers,
have you not?
Mr. Epstein. Yes. I published a pamphlet.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Then it is a matter before the public and for the
world to read?
Mr. Epstein. Yes, but it is not a matter of record before this
committee. You heard much testimony that you had heard long be-
fore. Everything that Mr. Mikolajczk said is a matter of public
record.
Mr. Mitchell. Not everything Mr. Mikolajczyk said.
2272 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Epstein, we have a schedule that we must maintain.
Chairman Madden. Thank you for appearing as a witness, Mr
Epstein.
TESTIMONY OF ALAN CRANSTON, LOS ALTOS, CALIF.— Resumed
Chairman Madden. Is Alan Cranston here ?
You have been sworn ; have you not, Mr. Cranston ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes; I have.
Chairman Madden. And your address is already in the record
You may proceed, Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Macheowicz. Mr. Cranston, I will read your answer to my last
statement when we last adjourned your testimony. I stated a««
follows :
They told us differently. They told us that you ordered them to conform to
your views and that you made no complaints against the Communist but, rather
only against Mr. Kreutz.
The "They" means Mr. Lang and Mr, Simon. Then, Mr. Cranston,
you asked this question :
Do you have specific testimony from Mr. Lang to that effect?
I answered "Yes." I thought probably you should know what Mr.
Lang and Mr. Simon testified.
I would like to read to you what I had in mind, which evidently
you had no knowledge of at the time. I am quoting now from the
official transcript as recorded November 12, 1952, in these hearings.
This is Mr. Lang testifying [reading] :
Mr. Macheowicz. What did they tell you about the so-called foreign-language
situation in Detroit?
The "They" referred to you, Mr. Cranston, and Mrs. Shea. The record
continues :
Mr. Lang. That the Polish commentators were — I don't remember the exact
language, but they used the colloquial expression "going haywire" — making com-
ments on a great many subjects that they thought were not in line with what our
general thinking should be.
Of course, that, as you understand, is very much like Stalin does,
what the "general thinking should be."
I thought in this country we did not tell people what the general
thinking should be, but let the people decide for themselves. Then
(his follows :
Mr. Machrowicz. Did they specifically refer to the Katyn massacre?
Mr. Lang. The two subjects mentioned were the Katyn massacre and — yes,
they did refer to that.
Mr. aiACHKOwicz. So that Mr. Cranston objected to the commentator on
Station WJBK making comments indicating Russian guilt for the massacre ; is
that correct?
Mr. L^VNG. Yes.
And later on this appears :
Mr. Machrowicz. In other words, what Mr. Cranston wanted you to do was
to use your good efforts to try to convince Station WJBK in Detroit not to
l>ermit those comments whicli would indicate Russian guilt?
Mr. Lang. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And wasn't Ihat a form of censorship?
Mr. Lamg. Yes ; I would suppose you could call it that.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2273
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that not contrary to the spirit of the Federal Communi-
cations Act?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Now, just to get the record straight, Mr. Simon testified as follows
on the same day :
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question. Mr. Simon, didn't you consider this
request of .Mr. Cranston as an attempt to gag the radio commentators?
And that is referring to the same request as has been testified
before.
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. Didn't you consider that to be a violation of the spirit of
the Federal Communications Act?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Do you wish to make any comments on that ?
Mr. Cranston, In the first place, Mr. Machrowicz, I feel their
memory is faulty in that I am quite certain, although I do not have
a direct memory of this, as I stated yesterday, on this, that at this
meeting we must have told them there were extreme views being
stated on both subjects.
Mr. Machrowicz. They did not make that remark; I will say that,
but they did say that the particular commentary you objected to was
that of Mr. Kreutz, because it did not conform to what you thought
our general thinking should be.
Mr. Cranston. I am quite sure we would have objected to both,
sir, although, as I stated, I do not remember precisely what happened
at the meeting.
It was also within the framework of American policy not to tell the
Seople what to think, but to seek and play up support for the United
fations.
Mr. Machrowicz. Am I to understand that it was not within the
scope of your duties to tell anyone what your general thinking should
be?
Mr. Cranston. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am very happy to hear that.
Mr. CrxVnston. I might also say there the attitude toward the meet-
ing has changed since the time, following the meeting being held,
because at a time shortly thereafter, as I testified yesterday, Mr. Lang
and Mr. Simon published an article in which they made no criticism
of OWI in relation to the meeting, and, as a matter of fact, indicated
a feeling that there be good cooperation between us in dealing with
what they called an acute predicament in Detroit.
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, they were station owners — were they
not? — and they did not want to do anything to antagonize the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ?
Mr, Cranston. We had no authority over licenses, and we at no
time discussed with the FCC whether license applications were pend-
ing or not.
Mr, Machrowicz. But if you will refresh your memory, which I
gather is hazy on that point again, they did testify to the very same
thing just a few minutes after this happened, before the special con-
gressional committee investigating the Federal Communications
Commission.
2274 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
So, they did not change their minds. But that is the very same
thing they said there. And, if yon care to, I will read that testimony.
Of course, I did not see the article, but I can understand how a
person who operates a radio station would do everything not to an-
tagonize the FCC.
Mr. Mitchell. For your information, Mr. Lang testified before the
committee that Joe Lang's license was up for renewal exactly at the
same time that you people were in New York City. Is that a strange
coincidence ?
Mr. Cranston. The coincidence was brought about by the fact that
there was trouble.
To my knowledge, this was not a radio station involving Mr.
Lang.
Did he own this station, or was it another station ?
Mr. Mitchell. He owned the station. I do not remember which
one it was.
Mr. Cranston. In Detroit?
Mr. Mitchell. No; in New York.
Mr. Cranston. The meeting in New York, as far as all your ques-
tions concerning me dealt with a radio station in Detroit.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. But Mr. Lang's own personal radio
station at that time was up for license renewal.
Mr. Cranston. But that would have nothing to do with a complaint
on a radio station in Detroit.
Mr. Machrowicz. The fact is that you did indirectly what you had
no right to do directly under the law, and you did succeed in having
removed from the radio station in Detroit a commentator who had
anti-Communistic leaning, whereas the commentator who had Com-
munist leanings was permitted to remain.
Mr. Cranston. I don't believe we requested anyone to be withdrawn
from the air, because we had no authority to do so.
Mr. Machrowicz. But there are gentle ways to have it under-
stood.
Mr. Cranston. But we suggested that they tone down controversies
going on on the air in Detroit which, in our opinion, jeopardized the
American war effort.
But, I want to repeat, this had nothing to do apparently with Mr.
Lang's radio station and his license. He was present at the meeting.
He was a member of the committee which dealt with it on a Nation-
wide basis. His own station was not involved.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you think that any broadcast, whether in
Polish, English, or any language, which tended to warn the Amer-
icans about the dangers of connnunism, was dangerous to our na-
tional interests?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir; I do not. I do feel that broadcasts which
would tend to disrupt the United Nations at a time that we were in
a war may jeopardize the national interests.
Mr. Machrowicz. Particularly with i-eference to the Russians.
I want to quote to you Mr. Davis' testimony. Mr. Davis was at that
time your chief. He testified on November 11 before this committee
as follows — Mr. Mitchell propounded this question :
I cannot understand why Mr. Cranston's pjirlicnlar function fitted in with
this capacity, since it was not the function of the OWI to handle news within
the country.
Mr. Davis. Strictly speaking, he had no authority.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2275
Later on the testimony is as follows :
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I still can't understand why Cranston, in his capacity
in the OWI, would in any way — that was the authority of somebody else ;
wasn't it? Wasn't it the function of the OWI?
Mr. Davis. No ; it certainly wasn't the function of anyone else that I could
think of. I don't know that it was properly the function of the OWI. As to
why he did this you had better ask Cranston.
That was not your function ; was it ?
Mr. Cranston. Sir, you asked what the policy of the United States
Government was in these matters.
Mr. Machrowicz. I want to know if this was your function — to try
to remove someone Avhose vie^YS did not concur with yours.
Mr. Cranston. I repeat, we did not try to remove anyone. At a
meeting in September 1942 it was clearly established that the final
question as to removal involved the Office of Censorship.
Mr. Machrowicz. But this particular matter was outside the scope
of your particular activity.
Mr. Cranston. I believe the content of the material on the air,
short of the question of whether or not a man should be expelled
from the air, did continue to be a function of the Office of War Infor-
mation because we were seeking to reach foreign groups in this
country, where the material may make them decide to increase their
support of the war effort.
This was particularly important in areas like Detroit, where there
was extensive war work going on in factories.
Mr. Machrowicz. All I can say is that Mr. Davis, your chief,
disagrees with you.
Mr. Cranston. All I can say is that Mr. Davis never rebuked me
for activity in the OWI as to this or any other matter; that my
efficiency ratings were always of the highest; that wlien I left OWI
I received letters from ISIr. Davis and others praising me for the
work I had done in OWI.
Mr. Machrowicz. I might also say that you were so concerned with
winning the war that you forgot the fact that we must also win the
peace.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Cranston, suppose you owned a so-called for-
eign-language station in the city of Detroit, and suppose you had
probably $40,000 or $50,000 in mortgage on that station, and that
everything you had, everything you owned, was invested in that
radio station.
Then suppose someone gently came over to you indirectly and whis-
jDered in your ear a rumor, say, that tlie OWI is on your back; they
are investigating a certain commentator and certain things that are
going on the air in the Polish language, and they also convey to you
the rumor that the FCC had a representative at this meeting where
it was discussed, and that there is a possibility that the FCC is
interested in this thing.
Even if the}^ directly did not say, "Remove that man off the air,"
put yourself in their position. If those rumors were flying around,
what woidd you do with that commentator ? Would you fire him ?
Mr. Cranston. I am not certain that I would. I would examine
wdiat he had said, but I w^ould have my interests and my activities
guided by my business interests and by the success of the war effort.
2276 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yon would be quite a worried man if that happened ;
would you not ?
Mr. Cranston. I would be if I was told by a representative of the
American Government that material going out on the air over my
radio station was deemed to be interfering witli tlie American war
effort. 1 would be deeply concerned.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Even if you knew that those plans of broadcasts
were going to people who had the highest rate of voluntary enlistments
of any segment of our population, who had the lowest absentee rating
in war industries throughout the United States of America of any
segment of our population, and even if those people in that particular
area listening to those broadcasts were the first who oversubscribed
their quota on war bonds ?
In other words, if you had definite proof that those broadcasts were
not interferring with the war effort, you would still be a worried man.
would you not, if that kind of pressure was put on you ?
Mr. Cranston. Mr. O'Konski, if these broadcasts had just com-
menced, which apparently was the case, I might be afraid they would
jeopardize the high record of that community.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did anybody inform you that in spite of the fact
tliat Poland was betrayed by Eussia in league with Hitler in 1939, in
September of that year, that the Poles still fought on the side of the
Russians ?
Was that ever brought out to you ?
It did not jeopardize their effort.
Mr. Cranston. Did you say they fought on the side of the Russians?
Mr. O'Konski. Yes, in league with Hitler, in September 1939, Stalin
and Hitler made an agreement, and they dissected Poland between
themselves.
In other words, they were stabbed in the back by Russia. And still
they organized an army and they fought alongside of Russia. They
fought at Tobruk, at Monte Cassino. They were the only army sent
to Narvik, Norway. They helped in the evacuation at Dunkirk. They
fought in London when Hitler was attacking London. They fought
in Normandy.
And that was all after Russia gave them the kind of treatment she
did.
They were stabbed in the back at Yalta and they still fought along-
side Russia.
In other words, there were no people who could have been persecuted
and dissected more than they were, by the Russians, but they still
fought on and did not lose their patriotism.
Did anybody ever point out to you that they were not the kind of
people who would be likely to waver or slow down in the war effort if
those things were brought out to the people?
Mr. Cranston. I was aware of these facts and I know that tlie Polish
record was very great and very gallant in the war.
Mr. O'Konski. But still you were afraid this might change their
attitude and they might let down ?
Mr. Cranston. I would like to cite one reason for having that
opinion. There came across my desk at that time something I can't
quote to you directly. But there was a memorandum from the OSS.
I made a notation about it because it seemed important and pertinent.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2277
It was from the Foreign Nationality Branch of the OSS, dated June
'24:, 1942. The OSS, you will recall, was headed by Gen. "Wild Bill"
Donovan, who was one of those men who was well aware of the Russian
]nenace early in the game. The OSS was directly under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
This memorandum analyzed the Eussian-Polish controversy as it
was going on in this comitry among Polish xVmericans and other
groups, and with particular emphasis upon the activities of those
who were stirred up by the border controversy, by Katyn, and so forth,
and so on.
And the conclusion in this report was that there was being trans-
ferred to American soil this Polish-Russian battle in a manner which
might well jeopardize interallied relations and the American war
effort.
Now, that is not my conclusion; that is an OSS report that I am
referring to.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In 1942?
Mr. Cranston. 1942 or 1943 • I am not sure. I can't read my writing
here on this note.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In 1942, the question of
Mr. Cranston. If it was 1942, Katyn was not in it. But this
related to this whole controversy which was a running controversy,
as you know, throughout the war in this country.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. 1942 was evidently when the Colonel Szymanski
report must have shown up in the Pentagon Building.
Mr. Cranston. Possibly. I don't know.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Are you familiar with the fact that in August 1941
began the formation of the Polish Army to fight on the side of the
Allies?
Mr. Cranston. I know one was formed, but I don't know exactly
when.
Mr. Mitchell. That was August 1941.
Mr. Cranston. I would like also to state that no one of the docu-
ments that you gentlemen have uncovered, which were available to
our Government during the war, tending to indicate Soviet guilt for
the massacre, ever came to my attention, or the attention of my
Division throughout the war.
They never reached there,
Mr. SnEEHAN. Of course, you see, your last remark is the whole
nub and substance of what we are trying to do here today.
Mr. Cranston. I recognize that.
Mr. Sheehan. We are trying to find out why Soviet Russia was
protected at all levels of the government. " We feel it is our duty
to the American people to bring out the facts so that the American
people can realize that some place along the line someone has tried
to hide the duplicity of the Soviet Government.
Mr. Cranston. I recognize that. I think you have done a mar-
velous job, and I simply want to point out that this never even reached
me. I had no chance to suppress it because it never reached me and
I never would have had a chance to suppress it because if it had
reached me, I think the facts should have been brought out to the
American people.
2278 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. The reason why we bring it out is that we hoped
you would help to give us the clues as to where we eventually want
to go, because, as you can see from the testimon}^ Mr. Machrowicz
brought out, Mr. Lang's and Mr. Simon's testimony is exactly opposite
to what you said.
Mr. Cranston. I recognize that.
Mr. Sheehan. They stated practically categorically that you told
them not to broadcast.
Now, to get the record straight, when you were on the stand the
other day we were talking about a David Carr and also brought in
the idea of the United World Federalists.
I want to say, frankly, that I, personally — and I know some of the
other members of the committee — am concerned about a fellow with
your particular background in the United World Federalists, that
your leanings were toward Russia at that time.
Now, as you explained, you did not have the information. But we
want to correct the record in asking you about Mr. David Carr, whom
you personally hired and personally recommended, because Mr. Carr
stated in previous testimony that he did no apply for a job with the
Government.
Mr. Cranston. I don't understand that. How did he not apply if
he was employed? You have to actually apply, I believe, to be
employed.
Mr. Sheehan. If you look at the record that the committee has,
he apparently contacted you, and you asked him to come to the Gov-
ernment. He himself did not go to the Government for a position.
Mr. Cranston. That is quite possible. But he then applied.
Mr. Sheehan. Yes; after contacting you, he came at your recom-
mendation.
You went on to state, with reference to Mr. Carr and his Commu-
nist affiliations, in your testimony, about when you hired him :
I knew him fairly well. I knew him before he became employed there.
That was with reference to Mr. Carr.
Then you went on a little bit later in your testimony and said :
I knew that at the age of 17 he hud written two signed articles for the D;^\ly
Worker. He had told me he was not a Communist ; that he was just a kid who
was Jewish, who was violently aroused over the Nazi atrocities and felt that the
Communists were more aware of them than any others at that time, and he
therefore wrote these two articles at the tender age of 17. He denied he had
ever been a Communist.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, you are reading from the official rec-
ord now, are you ?
Mr. Sheehan. From the transcript as Mr. Cranston testified the
other day.
I am sure you just did that because of lack of facts, because if you
refer to the hearings of April 6, in an investigation by the Un-Amer-
ican Activities Committee of un-American ])ropaganda activities in
the United States, held by a subcommittee of a Special Conunittee To
Investigate Un-American Activities in the House of Representatives,
the following will lie found in that report:
No. 1, that Mr. Carr was not at the tender age of 17 at the time,
because he was born on August 4, 1918.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2279
Mr. Cranston. I was referring to the time lie wrote for the Daily
Worker. Do you have the date of those articles ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes. I am coming to that. This is when he was
born.
Mr. Cranston. 1918.
Mr. Sheehan. Right.
Now, in the Daily Worker he was employed there in 1938, which
would make him 20 years old. So he was not a kid who did not know
the facts of life. Is that right, or wrong ?
Mr. Cranston. If that is the date of his birth and of the articles ;
yes, he was 20 years old.
Mr. Sheehan. If you don't mind, I will put it in the record, or, if
it is wrong, I can change it. But I want to go on with this.
Now, Mr. Carr was testifying here on page 3389 of the hearing
record, and he was talking about his affiliations with the Daily Worker.
I am quoting him from page 3389 :
I visited him —
That is a Mr. Wakefield, who was, I believe, an editor of the Daily
Worker —
a number of times at the Daily Worker offices and we became friendly. He asked
me if I would write down certain material for him. I wrote it down for him
and he asked me if he could print it. After considering it briefly I said yes.
As a result, about five or six articles, including the attack upon the chairman of
this committee by myself, were printed in the Daily Worker.
And a little bit later on, Mr. Matthews, who was the questioner,
asked :
How long a period did you collaborate in the way in which you stated it, with
Lowell Waivefield and the Daily Worker?
Mr. Carr. Oh, it could not have been 4 or 5 months.
In other words, it was slightly under 4 mo.nths at the most.
So, to correct the record, Mr. Carr was no novice 17 years old and
he did not write just one or two articles ; he worked very closely with
the Daily Worker for a period of months,
Mr. Machrowicz. Could I ask one question there ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to correct the record in another
instance.
You testified here 2 days ago that a man named Matuzewski was
the principal writer and editor of the Nowt Swiat.
Mr. Cranston. Not the editor, sir. He wrote articles for it.
Mr. Machrowicz. I will read your testimony, if your memory is
hazy on that :
I would like to add that the principal writer on that newspaper was a man
named Matuzewski
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you still say that ?
Mr. Cranston. His writings, I would say, dominated the pages be-
cause they were brilliantly written, hard-hitting polenics.
Mr. Machrowicz. And, further :
who was required to register as a foreign agent by the Department of Justice.
2280 THE KATYN FOREST IMASSACRE
I might say that since yon made that statement I have examined the
files and records and I find that he wrote only several articles within
a year's period for that newspaper ; that he was not a principal writer
and this foreign agent that you are speaking of, of this "terrible gov-
ernment which I thought probably was a Nazi jjower," but happens to
be the London Polish Government.
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Maciirowicz. So he was an agent of a government which was
allied with us at that time.
Mr. Cranston. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he was not a principal writer. He wrote a
few articles, all of them urging Americans of Polish descent to co-
operate with the United States as the last hope of the Poles.
Mr. Cranston. His articles did attract a great deal of attention.
Mr. Machrowicz. They certainly should have. I regret very much
they were not reprinted in the English language. They were very
interesting and had some very valuable material.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Cranston, we are following this line of reasoning
because there is a doubt in my mind that maybe you did have some-
thing to do with setting official policy, and you did have something
to do with holding down the Katyn information on Russia, because
of your past connections.
You got the chance to clear yourself enough, and that is what we
want you to do, because we find, in looking over the organizations to
whicli you belong and your connections, that there is possibly some
question.
For instance, you were president of the United World Federalists
during November 1949, were you not ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Dr. Harold Urey, the atomic physicist announced
his resignation as director of the United World Federalists in Novem-
ber 1949, on the ground that he could not agree with the organization's
"stand on Russia." Do you know why he quit?
Mr. Cranston. It has been the position of the United World Fed-
eralists and was at that time that our ultimate objective was to get a
stronger United Nations, with all nations in the world in it, including
ourselves and the Soviet Union where, among other things, they would
be deprived of the veto which they had exercised so many times, which
Mr. O'Konski referred to yesterday.
We believe that is the way to ultimately solve this problem of war
and peace. We believe all nations should be in it.
I believe he resigned because he thought perhaps it could not be
done with the Soviet Union in it. He now subscribes to a different
point of view, which advocates the federation of an Atlantic
democracy.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you still felt that, as the president,
that at all costs, in other words, we are going to try to work with
Russia on some basis?
Mr. CrxVnston. Not at all costs.
Mr. Sheehan. Some costs, I should say.
Mr. Cranston. We believe the United Nations is stronger now with
the Russians in it than out of it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2281
Mr. Sheehan. Do the United World Federalists believe that in
spite of all the evidence printed np that they do not keep political
a greements
Mr. Cranston. "We don't believe it should be based on paper prom-
ises that they are able to tear np at any time. We believe it should
be done by law, so that they would be forced to keep agreements once
reached, as are the people under American law.
I would like to say that the Communists have been violently op-
posed to the United World Federalists. I could present to you, if I
had the opportunity to get them, many quotations from the Daily
Worker, from Radio Moscow, from Pravda, from various Communist
leaders, bitterly attacking the policies of the United World Federalists.
They believe we are opposed to their interests, and we believe we
are opposed to their interests.
People who support the program of the United World Federalists
in this country and in other countries range from many prominent
business leaders and labor leaders, to many people in this Congress,
who were not members of our organization, but who have supported
resolutions that we have introduced.
I would like to cite just one, because he is symptomatic on this
point, and that is Walter Judd. I would also like to add that Pope
Pius himself has in general endorsed the theoiy of a stronger United
Nations with the power of law. He received a delegation of ours in
Rome about a year ago.
Mr. Sheehan. Of course, the Pope did not want the national unity
of the independent countries to be submerged.
Mr. Cranston. To which we agree.
Mr. Sheehan. In so far as concerns the aims and beliefs of the
United World Federalists and your opposition to communism, I
would suggest you get the report of the House Un-American Activities
Committee dealing with the United World Federalist Inc. They
have gotten out a 12-page documentation on the subject of the United
World Federalists, and I am going to cite a couple of things from
there to show you that it is quite a bit at variance with your thoughts.
No. 1 is that you have, as a member of your board of directors, a
Mrs. J. Borden Harriiiian. If yoii will look at this record you will
find out that she has been connected with quite a few fronts. Com-
munist fronts, and is still apparently connected with them, which
have been termed subversive and Communist by the Attorney Gen-
eral, Tom Clark.
Now, if you are interested and intent on getting rid of all these
people who are so close to Russian causes, do you think that she
should be on the board of directors ?
And if you will check this record you will find about 4 or 5 pages
in which they have direct references to Walter Reuther, who is also
a member of your board of directors, where he has been named in
instances as a member of the Communist Party.
And I will quote directly, so that there will be no question about
what I am saying, that I am saying it. In this pamphlet, on page
4, there is a heading "Walter P. Reuther," and there is testimony in
here from John P. Frey, who was president of the Metal Trades De-
partment of the American Federation of Labor, when he gave this
2282 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE i
report before the Sepcial Committee on Un-American Activities on
Au^st 13, 1938.
Mr. Frey apparently handed over a list of people who were Com-
munists, or closely affiliated with Communists. He names among
them, item No. 134, Walter Reuther, Detroit, Mich. :
This fellow is one of the leaders of the Auto Workers Union, and President
Martin has pi'eferred charges against him. He visited Soviet Russia and sent
back a letter to this country which included the following paragraph :
"Carry on the fight for a Soviet America."
Then this goes on and lists about five pages on Mr. Reuther.
Chairman Madden. Wlio is it that made that statement there?
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Frey, in a congressional hearing, who is presi-
dent of the metal trades department of the American Federation of
Labor. That is John P. Frey.
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Is that part of a Congressional
Record ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
Chairman Madden. Do you want to incorporate that as part of
€ur record ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, I would like to. This is taken from a docu-
nient of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and they are
quoting from the Congressional Record.
Chairman Madden. I think that where a charge like that is behiof
made before this committee regarding anybody, they ought to have
an opportunity to come in here and answer some of these questions.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we make this part of our
record, classify it as an exhibit.
Mr. Mitchell. That will be exhibit 37.
Chairman Madden. It may be so marked.
(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 37." <ind
appears in the appendix of this record.)
Mr. Sheehan. In all due deference to Mr. Reuther, it is not stated
he is a Communist now, whether he has been cleared, or whether
he never was, that I don't know. I am merely quoting from the
record.
It seems to me there are enough fuzzy-minded people — I think tliat
is an apt expression — in yoiu' organization who go along with the
aims of Communist Russia.
Chairman Madden. Wait just a minute here.
Would you read the statement, Mr. Reporter, that Mr. Sheehan
made about Mr. Reuther, that he is not a Communist now ?
Mr. Sheehan. I said that.
Chairman Madden. I think that is a bad inference. You made
the statement that Mr. Reuther is not a Communist now. You are
inferring that he was a Communist.
Mr. Sheehan. No. I say he was named in congressional hear-
ings as a member of the Communist Party.
Chairman Madden. But you made the statement for our connnit-
tee's record that Mr. Reuther is not a Connnunist now.
Mr. Sheehan. Let us change that, in fairness to him.
Chairman Madden. You are inferring there that he was a Com-
munist.
Mr. Sheehan. I don't mean to infer that, because, as far as I
know, he never was.
THE KATYISr FOREST MASSACRE 2283
Chairman Madden. I think you ought to change the wording.
You said that he is not a Communist now, and a statement like Ihat
would infer that he had been a Communist.
Mr. Sheehan. Let us change that to say that it is my opinion,
from the record, that Mr. Reuther, as far as is known, is not a
Communist — period.
Is that right ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And as far as I am concerned, so that there be
no misunderstanding, it is my firm opinion that he never was a Com-
munist. As a matter of fact, he is very active in removing communism
from labor ranks.
Mr. Sheehan. I said, "He is not a Communist — period."
Chairman Madden. I think you are deviating a great deal from
the Katyn hearing when you are going all over right and left field in
covering some of this testimony that you are going into now.
I think our committee now, up until this seance that you are going
into here, has had a wonderful record about not smearing people, and
I think that is an indirect smear at Mr. Reuther.
Mr. Sheehan, It was not meant to be that, I assure you.
Chairman Madden. Let us confine ourselves to the Katyn hearing
and not go back over volumes of testimony from other committees of
CongTess.
After all, that testimony is on record. I do not think it is going
to help our committee to bring in a lot of names that have been men-
tioned in other congressional committee hearings back through the
years.
And I cannot see any purpose for it. I think we ought to confine
ourselves to the Katyn hearings. We have a wonderful record so
far in confining our hearings to the Katyn massacre.
Mr. Sheehan. Might I have 2 minutes to bring it right back to
Katyn ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr. DoNDERo. Just a moment.
I think the chairman is correct in wanting to confine it to the subject
of Katyn. But what Mr. Sheehan is trying to bring out is the fact
that the witness is a member of the World Federalists organization,
which contains people whose views, so far as Americanism is con-
cerned, certainly can be questioned.
Chairman Madden. Absolutely. I agree with Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Sheehan. That is the only reason why I put this in, to show
that this gentleman's connection with the World Federalists and some
of the people connected with it might have been influencing him in his
work with the Government in 1943.
Chairman Madden. Let us confine the testimony to the witness then.
Mr. Sheehan. You heard the statement, Mr. Cranston, and you
naturally have a chance to say whether or not it is a fact that the
]3eople you associated with did not have something to do with your
setting ithe policy in 1943 and 1944.
Mr. Cranston. My association with all the people in the United
World Federalists came later, after my period in OWL
I would like to say that I am proud, and also, let me say, a bit
relieved, to find that 5 of the 13 pages of this report from the Un-
American Activities Committee are based upon Walter Reuther, who
2284 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
is noted for his violent, strong, vigorous anticommunism in American
labor circles. I think that is symptomatic of the sort of people who
are active in the leadership of the United World Federalists, and we
have been equally vigilant about Communists in our organization.
Mr. Sheehan. But could you, on the basis of your interest in a
United World and trying to protect Russia
Mr, Cranston. The purpose is not to protect Russia ; it is to keep
this country out of ever-recurring, ever-more destructive war.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. That is a matter of opinion.
Mr. Cranston. If you would read the documents of the United
World Federalists, you could see our policy. You can see we say
nothing about appeasing Russia.
Mr. Sheehan. But you don't say anything bad about her, either,
in spite of all the evidence we have built up in our committee.
Mr. Cranston. I could furnish you many speeches of mine in which
I said many unpleasant things about the Soviet Union.
We also have in our bylaws a provision against Communist mem-
bership in UWF, which I think relates directly to that point, sir.
Chairman Madden. I want to make this comment for the record :
I am indeed sorry that Walter Reuther's name has been brought into
this hearing.
When Congressmen Dondero, Machrowicz, and myself were sailing
to London and Germany to hold hearings we met representatives of
union labor on the boat. Members representing the AFL, the CIO,
and the railroad brotherhoods. They were representatives of Ameri-
can labor going over to work in conjunction with labor unions in
Europe to advise then on fighting communism within the ranks of
labor unions in Europe.
This was not their first trip. These men representing American
labor unions, had made a number of trips during the last 5 or 6 years
to Europe. Their mission was at union expense, not at the expense
of the taxpayers. They were fighting the Communists that were
infiltrating labor unions in Europe. Labor leaders and unions have
done great work curbing communism both in America and Europe.
And it is unfair at this hearing to bring out the name of a promi-
nent man connected with a prominent labor union and unjustl}'' infer
communistic tendencies.
I can say that the Communist strategy has alwa3'S been to infiltrate
labor. Labor organizations in America have done more not only
here in America, but across the water, to curb the infiltration of
communism than any other organization.
You may proceed, Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. CKoNSKT. Mr. Cranston, you, of course, now know the true
story about Katyn, do you not ?
Mr. Cranston. I believe that it was done by the Communists, from
the evidence that I found this committee has put out.
Mr. O'Konski. As one interested in world federation and the estab-
lishment of international court tribunals to punish international
crhninals, do you feel, from what you now know, that you would put
the weight of your organization, the United World Federalists, to
bring Russia to trial for this ghastly crime and to mete out some just
punishment to them ? Would you go along with that?
Mr. Cransix)N. I don't think the organization would feel that it,
as an organization, should become involved in that particular thing.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2285
I, as an individual, feel — and I can't speak for it, I am not president
of the organization now — I do feel that the people who were respon-
sible for that crime should be brought to trial, and I hope there will
be world institutions capable of dealing with them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You strongly feel so?
Mr, Cranston. I do.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Thank you very much.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to ask one question.
I do not quote follow your line of thinking. You say you are con-
vinced now that the Communists committed the crime. If you had
been convinced back then that the Communists committed the crime,
would you still continue your effort to gag the commentators because
it might interfere with the war effort?
Mr. Cranston. I don't think so, sir. I do not feel we should have
suppressed facts as facts existed, whether they were against one of
our allies, or not. Part of the motivation at that time was the general
assumption that this was a Nazi propaganda trick.
Mr. Machrowicz. And the only reason you attempted to gag it
is that you did not happen to believe the same thing that other people
believed?
Mr. Cranston, We felt it was a Nazi propaganda trick and we felt it
was divisive to the American war effort at that time.
And we had reports such as the one from the OSS which was under
the military, which indicated that was the fact.
Mr. Machrowicz, At that time there were frequent attacks in the
radio and in the press, and there are now, as a matter of fact, attacks
against Great Britain,
Did you ever attempt to gag any conunentator because he attacked
Great Britain ?
Mr, Cranston. I don't think we made any attempt to gag anyone.
Mr. Machrowicz, Indirectly,
Mr, Cranston, We did at times. We did, the Italian-language
newspapers to start harping so much about the British,
Mr, Machro"\vicz, That is all,
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions.
Chairman ]VL\dden. Go right ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Cranston, yesterday when you were testifying,
you were setting forth your duties in OWI. For the record, again,
will you specifically enumerate the position you had ?
What I mean exactly is this : What was your direct connection with
radio in the OWI?
Mr. Cranston, We used the press and foreign-language media
among others, for dissemination of information,
Mr, Mitchell. Did you have control of radio work in the OWI?
Mr. Cranston. In the Domestic Branch.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was Lee Falk ?
Mr. Cranston. He was my assistant.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr, Pucinski has a question or two on that.
Mr. Pucinski. Mr. Cranston, did you hire Lee Falk?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pucinski. Did you place a great deal of confidence in his
ability ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes. I wouldn't have employed him had I not.
93744 — 52— pt. 7 30
2286 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. Had you at any time given him any specific in-
structions on what his job was?
Mr. Cranston, I am sure I did ; yes, sir.
Mr. PuciNSKi. What was his job?
Mr. Cranston. His primary job was to prepare materials for re-
lease through foreign-language radio stations to be in touch with
people working in that field in this country.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Did you ever instruct him to make any effort to re-
move from the air people who were not going along with the OWI
line ?
Mr. Cranston. No, sir. I have to qualify this answer, however, not
a flat no.
What occurred, as I told you yesterday, was that the committee
asked us, and they specifically asked Lee Falk, the committee of the
radio industry in the foreign-language field, if we would help clear
personnel where there was a question as to their relial)ility on the air.
This was done at their request, not at our instigation.
Thereafter, when there was some doubt in the minds of managers
of the radio stations, or the program manager, as to the desirability
of someone being on the air in relationship to the success of the Ameri-
can war effort, they would ask us about that person. We would then
ask the FBI and other agencies if they had any information on that
man. And, without giving details or sources, we would then indicate
our belief about this man back to this committee.
The committee was then left to act at its own discretion, whether
they wished to bar someone from the air, or not bar them.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You have just told Mr. Machrowicz — and I am going
to try and quote you correctly — that, "We at no time attempted to gag
anyone."
Mr. Cranston. We did not attempt to gag. At the request of in-
dustry, we gave them information on people they had on the air, and
it was up to them to gag or not to gag.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I am going to read you very bi'iefiy two excerpts and
show how^ they compare now to what you just said regarding Mr.
Falk. The first is a conversation Mr. Falk had had with Mr. Kich-
ards, who was then with the Office of War Censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. What is the source of that ?
Mr. PuciNSKi. From page 494 of volume I of the Cox committee
hearings on the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Ixichards has identified this memorandum to us. He quotes
an experience that he had with Mr. Lee Falk, of the Foreign Language
Section, Radio Division, Office of War Information. He said that Mr.
Falk originally had taken on a job of removing unsavory personnel
from foreign-language stations because he, JSIr. Falk, believed such a
job had to be done and no one else seemed to want to do it.
Mr. Lee Falk is quoted as working it this way by ]\Ir. Richards :
If Lee foniid a follow ho thonylit was (loins soiiu^ funny bnsint'ss, he told nip
about it.
That is, he told Mr. Spears, of the Federal Connnunications legal
stall'.
Then we waited until the station miplied for a renewal of license. Say the
station was WHNX and the broadcaster in question was Leopold ITurdsky. Well,
when WBNX applied for a renewal, we would tip off Lee, and we would droi> in
on Mr. Elkhorn, the station manager. He would say, "Mr. Klkhorn, I believe you
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2287
ought to fire Leopold Hiirclsky." Then he would give Mr. Elkhorn some time to
think this over. After a couple of weeks, Mr. Elkhorn would begin to notice he
was having some trouble getting his license renewed. After a couple of more
weeks of this same thing, he would begin to put two and two together and get
four. Then he would fire Leopold Hurdsky and very shortly thereafter his
license would be renewed by the Commission. This was a little extralegal, I
admit, and I had to wrestle with my conscience about it, but it seemed the only
way to eliminate this kind of person, so I did it. "We can coui^erate in the same
way," Mr. Falk told Mr. Richards.
Now, was that in the scope of Mr. Falk's ditties ?
Mr. Cranston. Who was it that said there this seemed extralegal
that we cooperated because there was no other way to do it?
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Spear, of the FCC.
Now, would you tell me, was that within the scope of Mr. Falk's
duties, your assistant ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't have knowledge of any such elaborate plan
designed to bring pressure upon the radio stations.
I think that was within the scope of his duties to call attention to
people on radio stations where there were people who were broadcast-
ing material inimical to the war effort.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I am going to read you another excerpt from a
memorandum of Mr. Richards. This is taken from page 486 of the
same volume I previously quoted from.
Mr. Mitchell. "Wliich was taken in public testimony.
You know who Mr. Richards is ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, I do.
Mr. PuciNSKi. This conversation Mr, Richards had with Mr. Falk
was on August 25, 1942. I am not going to read the whole state-
ment. Among other things, Mr. Richards quotes Mr. Falk as say-
ing— and, incidentally, Mr. Richards has already identified this memo-
randum as being correct — he says :
Lee Falk said, "You can listen to tliese broadcasts day after day for months
and not get enough on them. You must find out what their past associations have
been and if they were open to suspicion, convict them on that and take them
off the air. You might find out what their past associations have been, and if
they are guilty of that, convict them on that and take them off the air." He
asked that we notify the Oflice of War Information on any plans we had to take
a man off the air before we took him off. He said this would give the OWI
some candidate to replace the man. And these candidates would be submitted
to the station managers for consideration. I wonder how a station manager
would look upon such a procedure.
Now, you notice Mr. Falk introduces an interesting document of
guilt by association to begin with. Was that within his duties as
your assistant?
Mr. Cranston. I would like to point out that that would seem to
coincide, that business of looking into a man's background, with a
statement that was issued by the Attorney General's office on Septem-
ber 18, 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Was he an investigator ?
Mr. Cranston. Mr. Falk ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Cranston. No, he was not.
Mr. Mitchell. You testified yesterday that your organization, the
OWI, had a security and loyalty investigative unit; is that correct?
ISIr. Cranston. I testified that we had none in my division.
Mr. Mitchell. Over-all ?
2288 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Cranston. I testified that there was a checking board under
some admiral at one point, just to check the loyalty of OWI officials.
There was an intelligence bureau which checked on what went
on in American newspapers and radio. Neither of these was under
my supervision.
The point I was about to make was that the Attorney General,
on September 18, issued a statement in which he described what
should be done by the Bureau of Censorship, with cooperation
Mr. Mitchell. "Wliat year?
Mr. Cranston. September 18, 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. I know all about that statement.
Mr. Cranston. Let me read the pertinent part about the so-called
get by association.
The point I want to make is that they thought a man's activities
had some relationship to his desirability on the air. They said,^
in regard to people who should be considered for exclusion from
the air :
The information need not establish the commission of an offense against
the subversion or other criminal laws, but only that further broadcasts by
the individual would be dangerous or detrimental if received abroad. Both
the content of broadcasts by the individual and his record of activities would
be relevant.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Following that same principle, Mr. Cranston, then,'
I am sure you have no objection when we today, in trying to find
out why Katyn was suppressed by an agency that you headed, go
far afield and try and determine your past associations. You have
no objection to that, do you?
Mr. Cranston. Absolutely none. I think it is fair and justified. I
think you have every reason to do that.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do you want to refute the memorandum as pre-
pared by Mr. Richards on Mr. Falk's extracurricula activities in trying
to remove these broadcasters from the air?
Mr. Cranston. No; I don't, because I have no knowledge of any
such intricate plan for this purpose.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Then do you still want to stand on a statement
you made to this committee, that your agency had never attempted
to gag anyone ?
Mr. Crxnston. We did not make direct recommendations, to my
knowledge, for anyone to be removed from the air. We suggested
that the activities of certain people were inimical to the war effort,
to my knowledge.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I am going to read you another statement, then, and
see if that stacks up to what you are telling us.
I am reading now a memorandum prepared by Mr. Richards, based
on a conversation that he had on August 27, 1942, with Mr. Simon,
who had previously testified before this committee. And thut mem-
orandum of Mr. Richards appears on page 501 of the Cox committee
hearings on the FCC. The memorandum reads:
It seems that INIr. Simon was very nuich disturbed about the interference
of Lee Falk in the OWI. And you had some comments on that.
Then I am asking Mr. Richards:
The point that I want to ask you ab(mt here is, What did you say in your
memorandum V
I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2289
Mr. Richards said :
Simon said that he had fired from WBEN one Michael Fioriollo and one
Archangelo Leopowiso, Italian language broadcasters, on the recommendation
of Falk. He said that he had discharged them on August 24.
I am not going to quote but just to give you a little background.
Mr. Simon became very worried about this action, firing these two
men on the recommendation of Falk. So he contacted the Office of
War Censorship and he told Richards the following :
And you fellows in the Ofiice of Censorship will have to back up the Office of
War Information on these dismissals.
Now, do you want to refute Mr. Richards' memorandum of that
date?
Mr. Cranston. I don't want to refute it. I want to again cite
something which I won't bother to quote now. A letter from Simon
to the industry, indicating they asked us to help them on these matters,
specifically asked Lee Falk to help them.
Mr. Mitchell. That brings us exactly to the point. Wlio were the
industry members? What did they do? Weren't they all station
owners? Let us be specific. You can say "Yes" or "No" to that.
Who were the members? Were they all station owners?
Mr. Cranston. They were managers, executives, owners. They
formed it on their own initiative at that time in May and asked us to
help them.
Mr. MrrcHELL. And they all had to go to the FCC to get a license;
is that right ?
Mr. Cranston. Congress had given the FCC the power to give
licenses in the national interest.
Mr. Mitchell. Just say "Yes" or "No." That is the procedure,
and you know it and I know it.
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. When you got that letter from Detroit complaining
about the pro-Russian attitude of a particular announcer by the name
of Novak, you called Hilda Shea, Mrs. Hilda Shea. She told you at
that time :
The FCC has no control over this ; absolutely no control over it.
She has said that in this hearing room this week. Yet you still
took the initiative, you were the one that, on your own initiative,
set up the meeting in New York.
But you brought her along. Why did you. bring her along?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know whether she came at my request or at
orders from the FCC.
Mr. Mitchell. You were the one that set up the meeting.
Mr. Cranston. I set up the meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. You asked her to go ; did you not ?
Mr. Cranston. I don't know whether I did or not,
Mr. Mitchell. She testified here you asked her to go.
Mr. Cranston.- If she testified I did, I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliy did you want her there? You could have
handled this yourself.
Mr. Cranston. The FCC was on agency involved in this field, and
it seemed useful to have them represented at the meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. But she already told you, Mr. Cranston, that she
could not be involved in this ; this had program content in it.
2290 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Cranston. She apparently could be involved to the extent of
being an observer, and she came for that purpose.
Mr. Mitchell. You still have not answered my question. I want
to know, after slie told you on tlie telephone and she was quoted not
only in this committee, but the Cox committee, as saying she told you
that
Mr. Cranston. We felt it was useful to have the FCC aware of our
activities and of the activities in this field in general, and that is why
we requested her presence.
Mr. Mitchell. Specifically, let us get down to it. Poland was an
ally of ours at that time ; is that right, Mr. Cranston ?
Mr. Cranston. Right.
Mr. Mitchell. Russia was ally of ours at that time also.
Mr. Cranston. Right.
Mr. Mitchell, IVliy, in any way, did you people take it upon your-
selves in the Office of War Information to close up either the pro-
Russian or the pro-Polish point of view ?
Mr. Cranston. Because, as I have cited reports from other agencies,,
there was some reason to believe that these controversies were divert-
ing people's attention from the war effort and making them con-
centrate
Mr. Mitchell. I have one more question to ask.
Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party ?
Mr, Cranston. I am glad under oath to have the opportunity to-
say "No."
Mr. Mitchell. You are saying "No" ?
Mr. Cranston. I am saying "No," flatly.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't want any aspersions cast one way or the
other about it. That is why I asked you the question, because there
may be some innuendo.
Mr. Cranston, Thanks for the opportunity.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr, Cranston, would you not say it all resolves
down to this : Ambassador Ciechanowski, in one of his last conferences
with President Roosevelt — and I do not say this in a derogatory sense
at all — in a conversation with him, points out in his book, for instance,
that in the last days of his association with President Roosevelt, the
President seemed extremely worried, and the Ambassador had occa-
sion at one time to ask the President why he was so worried. He said :
I am fearful that we Iiave oversold Russia to the American people.
Would you not go along with that and say that that also applies to
your agency, that OWI was a part of that, including the executive and
all the other agencies of our Government, that actually did oversell
Russia to the American people?
Mr. Cranston. I believe that to be true.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You believe that also ?
Mr. Cranston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question I have been requested to ask,
nnd that is this: Do you know anytliing about the firing in Buffalo of
"W'Bl commentator Casimir Sdren?
Mr. Cranston. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are there any other questions ?
Mr. Pucinski. We have had various witnesses from the OWI and the
FCC to carry out tlie mandate of this connnittee. The second phase
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2291
of this committee''s hearings was to establish why the Kaytn massacre,
with all its ramifications, was never adequately reported to the Ameri-
can people and to the rest, of the world.
You were one of the kingpins in formulating the policy of OWI in
that particular section we are dealing with. I wonder if it is a fair
assumption, Mr. Cranston, that you a^nd Mr. Falk and Mrs. Shea and
various other officials of the OWI and the FCC, working in harmony
or conspirac}', zealous of perpetuating and furthering the friendship
of this country with Russia, had cast aside other of our allies in order
to make sure that this country had a greater respect for the Soviet
efforts. Is not that a fair analysis ?
Mr. Cranston. No ; I don't think that is. I think that that goes
to extremes.
Mr. PuciNSKi. At what point do we go to extremes ?
Mr, Cranston. The Katyn incident was relatively a minor one in
terms of what we did in my Division in the OWI. It was not in the
headlines ; it was not explosive.
Mr. PuciNSKi. But it was part of the general atmosphere, was it
not ?
Mr. Cranston. It was an incident that arose that we had to deal
with to some degree. But I reject the idea that there was any con-
spiracy.
You used that word. There was never any evidence of anything
along the lines you suggest. I think Mr. O'Konski stated the matter
fairly well.
Mr. Machrowicz. If there are no further questions, the committee
will recess until 1 : 30 p. m.
Will counsel announce the witnesses for this afternoon, please?
Mr. Mitchell. Col. Ivan Yeaton, formerly military attache in
Moscow, and in G-2 during the war, and Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissel,
formerly Assistant Chief of Staff of Gr-2.
Mr. Machrowicz. Very well. We will now stand in recess until
1 : 30 p. m.
(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 1 : 30 p. m. same day) .
after recess
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Cranston, you said that you had something you wanted to add
that you overlooked this morning. Is that right?
Mr. Cranston. Yes ; I did, sir.
Chairman Madden. Take the stand.
Mr. Cranston. Certain facts have just been called to my attention
that I want to take this opportunity to place on the record in order
to have them placed in proper perspective and in focus to my testimony
and earlier testimony.
I understand that at an earlier phase the facts were brought out
that following receipt by the Office of War Information on May 1,
1943, of a complaint about Polish-language broadcasts in Detroit, with
emphasis upon a broadcast that was pro-Communist in character but
with indications that all sorts of broadcasts were causing trouble, and
following the meeting with the representatives of the industry, the
following things occurred in Detroit :
Kreutz, who was the anti-Russian commentator, the man who was
trying to pin Katyn upon the Russians at that time, had been sus-
2292 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
pended previously on three occasions for a matter of a couple of hours
or so. He was not barred from the air. He was asked to restrict his
activities on the air, however, to news from reputable American wire
services and was requested to avoid making propaganda over the air.
I understand now that he was permitted to continue on the air until
1945, when he resigned voluntarily.
On the other hand, Novak, who was the pro-Communist commenta-
tor and who made the remarks that were brought to the attention of the
Office of War Information, was permitted to remain on the air only
until his contract with his station expired Presumably the station
wanted to get rid of him "following the statements that we made to the
industry at the time that his activities were called to our attention.
The moment his contract expired the station did get rid of him.
That was in February 1944, His contract was not renewed and he
was removed from the air.
Now, I submit that these facts tend to substantiate the position that
I have stated that the OWI did call the industry's attention to the
trouble caused by the man making pro-Communist propaganda in De-
troit as well as the activities of the anti-Communist, and that the re-
sult was that the Communist was permanently taken from the air.
I appreciate your letting me make that statement, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, there is nothing that has been
said that is not in the record, but I think your inferences are out of
line. The facts are that Mr. Kreutz was suspended on a number of
occasions and permitted to remain only upon his assurance that he
would not mention the Katyn Forest matter.
On the other hand, Mr. Novak was never called in, as Mr. Hop-
kins testified, but after his contract expired his contract was not re-
newed as were neither the contracts of any of the announcers of the
foreign-language programs. So I don't think that proves anything.
Mr. Cit^iNSTON. All that I am proving is that the Communist was
ipnt off the air.
Mr. Machrowicz. He wasn't put off the air. He was permitted
to remain with his Communist propaganda, whereas Mr. Kreutz was
stopped very effectively.
Mr. Cranston. Kreutz remained on the air. and the man who first
went off the air happened to be the Communist, Mv. Novak.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Cranston, you have been in the newspaper field
for quite some time. I believe that one of the members of this com-
mittee pointed out yesterday that all of the — in fact, ]\Ir. Harriman
testified before this committee and said that everything that came out
of AP, UP, and so forth was censored out of Kussia, out of INIoscow.
Mr. Cranston. '\^^iat was, sir ?
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, nothing got out of there by any of
our famous wire services that was anti-Ivussian in any way, shape, or
form. Now, can you explain to this conunittee how Kreutz, for in-
stance, by being restricted to the news service wires, and so forth, could
get the information to the American people ? The effect of j'our visit
to New York was to restrict his comments and his broadcasting to the
wire services.
]Mr. Henry Cassidy, then with the AP, now a National Broadcasting
Co. news editor, testified before this committee last February and said
at that time tliat his story on Katyn was censored. He was asked
when was the first time he had had an opportunity to express an
THE KATYN FOREST JNIASSACRE 2293
opinion on what he saw at Katyn, and he said, "When I testified
today.''
By the very act of restricting the activities of these Polish com-
mentators to AP, UP, and so forth, yon were accomplishing the same
i^urpose.
Mr. Cranstox. Mr. ISlitchell, I am sure that Mr. Kreutz was not
restricted to using AP, UP, INS, and other wire service reports which
were originated in Russia and were thus cleared by the Moscow censor-
ship. He was permitted to use wire service reports which emanated
from any center in the world ; and there were things on the wire services
from time to time pertaining to Katyn that did not necessarily origi-
nate in Russia.
There were statements made in England and in Washington in this
country about Katyn which didn't go through Russian censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
We thank you, Mr. Cranston.
Mr. Cranston. Thank you very much, sir.
Chairman Madden. Who is the next witness ?
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton.
TESTIMONY OF IVAN DOWNS YEATON, COLONEL, INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL'S DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY— Resumed
Chairman Madden. Colonel Yeaton, you have already been sworn.
Will you give j'our name and address.
Colonel Yeaton. My name is Ivan Downs Yeaton, colonel. Inspector
General's Department, United States Arm3\
Mr. MiT'CHELL. For the record, may I say that Colonel Yeaton was
sworn in on June 4, 1952, and that this is a continuation of his
testimony taken at that time.
Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of bringing the committee up to
date, I would like to make a brief remark. Colonel Yeaton was from
1939 to 1941 military attache in Moscow. In September 1941 he
attended a dinner party. Present at that dinner party was General
Anders, who had just been released shortly before from the Lubianka
Prison.
Chairman Madden. Let the witness testify.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you start at that point, Colonel, and
briefly bring us up to date. Just briefly tell us what you heard and
then how you got into G-2 and bring us up to now.
Colonel Yeaton. You mean from the dinner for General Anders?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; from the dinner.
Colonel Yeaton. Colonel Anders at that time had just been released
from the Lubianka Prison and his first consideration was the missin^
Polish officers and noncommissioned officers. He made inquiries and
he had received evasive answers. So he spoke to me briefly after
luncheon and said that he would do everything within his power to
locate these officers.
From that time on in my business the subject of the missing Polish
officers was so labeled.
When I got back to Washington I was put in charge of the Eastern
European Section, which included Poland. So I immediately set up
2294 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
in my files tlie Polish files of wliicli the missing Polish officers was
a part.
On April 13, when the Germans
Mr. Mitchell. 1943 ?
Colonel Yeaton. 1943. When the Germans released their Katyn
story my Polish file was again broken down and I set up a separate
file for katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to hand
to the witness a book called Mass Graves of Polish Officers Near
Smolensk. This was supplied this committee by the War Department
counselor's office last spring.
Mr. PuciNSKi. This is not an exhil)it. It is too voluminous.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the witness explain about this
book and how it came into existence.
You have already testified, Colonel Yeatou, that you had another
file called the missing Polish officers file Avhich you maintained from
what time ?
Colonel Yeaton. The missing Polish officers file was part of the
regular Polish file. It was only as of the date of the German broad-
cast that this file was started.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, there were two separate files then ?
There was a file maintained called the missing Polish officers file and
this was beginning with the date of Goebbels' broadcast of April
13- 1943?
Colonel Yeaton. No. The papers from the other file were the start
of this file.
Mr. Mitchell. The papers from the other file were the beginning
of this file?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Fine. Could you roughly tell us what you did and
how you built this file up ?
Colonel Yeaton. As of that Geinian release, I took action on two
things immediately. One was to send a wire to Szymanski in Cairo
to devote all of his time and as quickly as possible to get me a report
from the Poles themselves.
The other one was to instruct my own crew on the Polish desk to
make this file as complete as they could and include in it all of the re-
ports pertinent to the subject.
Mr. Mitchell. At that time, what was your specific position in G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. I was Chief of the Section at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. Which section?
Colonel Yeaton. The Eastern European Section.
Mr. MiTCHFXL. Did that include Poland?
Colonel Yeaton. It did, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did it include Russia ?
Colonel Yeaton. It did.
Mr. ]N[iTcHr.r>L. Then, Colonel, that file there should contain every-
thing concerning Katyn and the missing Polish officers?
Colonel Yeaton. This file should be complete. Anything in the
G-2 section pertaining to Katyn should be in this fde.
Mr. Mitchell. All right. Now, there was a reorganization in G-2
early in 1944, Will you explain to the committee Avliat happened at
the time of that reorganization ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2295
Colonel Yeaton. At the time of the reorganization the files from all
of the geographic branches were sent down into a single file room.
Mr. Mitchell. Were they available to the peoj^le working in the
various desks?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell, Did this reorganization hamper or assist the pro-
gram at that time ?
Colonel Yeatox. As far as I am concerned, it hampered it because
I didn't believe in the reorganization and I still don't.
Mr. INIitchell. The reorganization of G-2 ?
Colonel Yeatox. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Why didn't you ?
Colonel Yeaton. Because it was set up and, I thought, running as
well as could be expected. It was set up on the same lines as the State
Department. As a matter of fact, every intelligent group in any
country that I know anything about is set up geographically.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the effect of the reorganization ? Did they
break up the geographic areas?
Colonel Yeaton. The chiefs of the branches were made specialists
and. as such, were assigned to writing opinions. They had access to
their files, but there was confusion for months, and the only way we
could keep it running was because we knew the persons concerned and
where the files were.
Mr. jSIitchell. In May 1945, what was your position ?
Colonel Yeaton. In May 1945, I was chief or coordinator of
specialists.
Mr. Mitchell. Was that for all specialists?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you were the coordinator. Who was your
immediate superior?
Colonel Yeaton. I think he is a Senator now. I liave forgotten his
name. He is a lad from Vermont. He was only in there a short time.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Gibson ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. He is a Federal judge in Xew York, or rather in
Vermont.
Now, you have just told this committee that everything that came
in concerning Katyn and the missing Polish officers would be in that
file?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. And these specialists you had at that particular time
had access to that file?
Colonel Yeaton. At the time this file was set up, my office was
broken down into three subsections : military, political, and economic.
At the head of the military was a Major Shimkin. At the head of
the political was Maj. David Crist. At the head of the economic was
a man named Kaymond.
The papers on Katyn were shown first to the Military Section, which
would be Shimkin's subsection so that he could more closely evaluate
the strength of the Polish Army which was being reformed. It was
sent to the political desk for file.
2296 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Now, later in the Political Section we had Dr. Johnson, who may
or may not have assisted in putting this file together. I am not sure
of that.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Wliere was Dr. Johnson employed at that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. He was in G-2, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. He was in G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was his specialty at that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. He was in the political desk, if I remember
correctly.
Mr. Mitchell. Of which country ?
Colonel Yeaton. Both the Soviet Union and Poland. He would
have written opinions on either.
Mr. Mitchell. On either subject?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. At the time that the Van Vliet report was filed with
General Bissell, where would be the logical place for that report to go?
That was May 22 or May 23 or May 24, 1945.
Colonel Yeaton. Unless its classification prohibited it, it would be
in this file.
Mr. Mitchell. Were there top secret papers in that file at any time ?
Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Mitchell. But the logical place for it to go, if it were not
classified, would be that file ; is that correct ?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir. The only reason I ever classi-
fied any document in this file was to protect its source. Certainly the
subject matter was not such as to require classifying it.
Mr. Mitchell. General Bissell has already testified that that docu-
ment was labeled "top secret" by him. Now, have you ever seen the
Van Vliet report yourself ?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever discuss the Van Vliet report with
General Bissell ?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Or he with you ?
Colonel Yeaton. Not from my knowledge.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first hear about the Van Vliet report?
Colonel Yeaton. From this committee here.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions right now.
Chairman Madden. Are there any questions? All right, Mr.
Pucinski.
Mr. Pucinski. Colonel Yeaton, did you personally place the docu-
ments in that file ?
Colonel Yeaton. No ; never personally.
Mr. Pucinski. Will you tell us who were some of the people who
worked on that book with you ?
Colonel Yeaton. These files were not kept by me personally because
I was Chief of the Branch. The persons that could have kept the file
would be Col. Richard Park, Jr. He might have been one. David
Crist would be one. Dr. Johnson, possibly.
Mr. Pucinski. Will you identify Dr. Johnson a little further, please.
Mr. Mitchell. What was his first name ?
Colonel Yeaton. William, Dr. William Johnson.
THE ICATYX FOREST MASSACRE 2297
Mr. Mitchell, Where did you first know Dr. Jolmson or hear of
him ?
Colonel Yeatox. When he reported for duty in G-2, sir. I had
heard of him before that through General Faymonville.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was he ?
Colonel Yeaton. He was the first military attache in the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Mitchell. Was Johnson working for him ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't think he was working for him, but he knew
him in Moscow. As I understand it, Dr. Johnson was a student in
Moscow.
Mr, PuciNSKi. Do you care to name any others as best you can
recollect ?
Colonel Yeatox. I have named Park, Shimkin, Crist, Raymond,
Johnson. I don't remember any more at this time, sir.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do I understand you correctly, then, that if a docu-
ment pertaining to Katyn came into your Branch any one of these
people who had access to this book could have placed it in the book ?
Do I understand you correctly ?
Colonel Yeaton. We also had a girl who was a file clerk. She might
have actually physically put it in there. Any one of them could have
designated which file it would go into or had access to the file.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Anyone of these people had access to your file there 'i
Colonel Yeaton. That is right. This was never a highly classified
file anyway.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I have nothing further.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You mentioned this Dr. Johnson. You said that you
first heard of him through someone connected with the Russian Em-
bassy ; is that correct ?
Colonel Yeaton. The Embassy in Moscow, sir.
Mr, O'Konski. The American Embassy in Moscow ?
Colonel Yeaton. True.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Wliat did you hear about him from this Embassy in
Moscow ?
Colonel Yeaton. General Faymonville mentioned casually several
Americans that had been over there during his tour. He knew them
all, and I am sure he liked them all.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. What kind of a tour was this that he was on ?
Colonel Yeaton. He was the first military attache to the Soviet
Union.
Mr. O'Konski. Johnson was ?
Colonel Yeaton. No, Faymonville.
Mr. O'Konski. And he met Johnson in Moscow ?
Colonel Yeaton. Tliat is the way I understood it, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. In what year was that ?
Colonel Yeaton. Well, it must have been some time between 1934
and 1937.
Mr. O'Konski. Judging from that, then, the conclusion could be
drawn that Johnson was pretty favorable to the Soviet Union. Is
that the impression that you got from the conversation you had ?
Colonel Yeaton. I couldn't say that; no, sir.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Maybe we can reword the question.
Colonel Yeaton. He was interested, certainlv.
2298 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. Can you tell us what you know about IVIr. Johnson
and his connection with your department?
Colonel Yeaton. All I know is that he was sent to us as an expert on
the Soviet Union, and as long as I was Chief of the Branch I used him
to write, to evaluate incoming information, and to write such papers
as were necessary.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In liis writings and in the analyses that he gave you
of information that was coming in, how were his writings and reports
slanted ? Were they favorable or unfavorable to the Soviet Union ?
Colonel Yeaton. Most of the time I think we agreed. On a few
things possibly he was more favorable than I was.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Could you elucidate on that a little bit?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't see what more I could say.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Wliat do you mean when you say that he was more
favorable than you on a few things ? What were your views at that
time as far as the Soviet Union was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. I looked on everything I saw and everything that
was shown me as a show, as pure projDaganda. I believed, and I hope
that in saying this I am not doing Bill an injustice when I say this,
that he and some of the other boys over there didn't so evaluate what
they saw. There have been a lot of people who have made that same
mistake.
Mr. PuciNSKi. What was the nature of their evaluation?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't know, sir.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You were the head of the department, sir.
Colonel Yeaton. Yes. I would have to have a detinite paper, to
Mr. PuciNSKi. I have nothing further.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Are there any further questions?
Thank you very much. Colonel.
Colonel Yeaton, Thank you, sir,
TESTIMONY OF GEN. CLAYTON BISSELL, UNITED STATES ARMY.
RETIRED— Resumed
Chairman Madden. Our next witness is General Bissell.
Mr. Mitchell. Tlie general was sworn on June o. Have the record
show that this is a continuation of the hearing held on June 3, 1952,
at which time General Bissell testified before this connnittee.
Mr. Maciikowicz. You may proceed, Mv. Counsel.
Mv. Mitchell. General Bissell, were you in the hearing room yester-
day when Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon testified ?
General Bissell, I was.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you hear what they had to say?
General Bissell. Not all of it, but I think I have the sense of it. The
acoustics were poor, and some of the talk was very low,
Mr. Mitchell. I provided you with a co])y of the transcript of the
hear-iug of June 3; is that correct?
General Bissell.. Yes, for which I am very appreciative.
Mr. PuciNSKi. General Bissell, just briefly, for the purpose of
review, you were the G-2 in May of 1945 when Colonel Van Vliet was
sent here by the now Chief of Staff, General Collins, to report to you
relative to observations that he had made while he visited the graves at
Katyn. He had been taken there as a Gernuin prisoner of war and he
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2299
had told General Collins that he thought the Soviets had committed
this crime.
He came back to America and filed a report with you at your instruc-
tions which you had marked ''top secret" on the 22d of May 1945. On
the 25th of May 1945 you had dispatched a letter to General Holmes,
then Assistant Secretary of State, asking him for questions as to Van
Vliet's treatment by the Germans while he was a prisoner of war and
taken to Katyn.
On June 9 you received a reply from General Holmes. On August
21, 1945, you had sent a letter to Mr. Lyon of the State Department
advising him
General Bissell. May I interrupt ?
Mr. PuciNSKi. May I finish the chronology and then you can correct
it if I am wrong.
On the 21st of August 1945 you had sent a letter to Mr. Lyon of the
State Department advising him that you were sending him a copy of
the Stanley S. B. Gilder report — Gilder was a British officer who was
equally or likewise taken to Katyn — and in that letter of the 25th or
rather, excuse me, the 21st of August, you made reference to the fact
that Gilder's I'eport substantiated in effect "the statement of Col. John
H. Van Vliet forwarded to General Holmes on the 25th of May 1945
and generally substantiates all material facts in Lieutenant Colonel
Van Vliet's report."
Now, this committee has been trying to find the report filed by Van
Vliet which you at that time, the 22d of May 1945, had stamped "Top
secret," and it was your contention at the last hearing here before this
committee that you believed that you may have sent that report to
General Holmes at the State Department.
At the June 3d hearings you admitted that you had received the
report from Van Vliet, that you had marked it "Top secret," and that
you think you had sent it to the State Department.
Does that bring us up to date as of this moment?
General Bissell. There are some minor errors, but substantially
that is correct. I couldn't have stamped the report "Top secret" on
the 22d, the date you fixed, because it wasn't written yet. That kind
of thing is in several places in your statement. I saw no orders from
General Collins. You said that he was ordering Van Vliet. That is
of no consequence, but I just want to be sure that I am not confirming
something that is incorrect.
The substance of the long sentence that you have given me is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the difficulty with making a summary
statement. We will accept the record as correct, regardless of the state-
ments made.
General Bissell. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. PucixsKi. Well, take it from there. General.
Mr. Mitchell. General Bissell, the last time you testified before
this committee you stated that you personally were responsible for
labeling the Van Vliet report "Top secret."
General Bissell. I directed it be labeled "Top secret."
Mr. Mitchell. At that time you gave as the reason for labeling it
"Top secret" the discussions that had taken place at Yalta. Is that
correct ?
2300 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. No; I did not. I told you in the record that it
fell within, I think, paragraph 3 of a document that deals with the
definition of "Top secret." I told you that I tliought because of its
political implications that it should be "Top secret." I don't think
I said anything about it being based on Yalta, because you will
remember that I stopped at that point, not knowing the classification
of Yalta, and you suggested that I not answer.
Mr. Mitchell. You are correct, because at that time Mr. Sheehan
was asking you to put on the record the various classifications of
"Top secret," and you read from a record propounded in 1944. You
said that you had labeled the Van Vliet report "Top secret" because
of its political implications at that time. Then later on, when I
asked you why you did that, you said, "Well, that concerned Yalta."
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell (quoting). "You have me over a barrel."
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Machrowicz then asked you to find out what
had been disclosed at Yalta, and we left the subject of Yalta alone
at that time.
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I have received from the Depart-
ment of State a statement that all of the Yalta Conference has been
released. That is the Yalta statement from the State Department.
Mr. Machrowicz. The exhibit that you have handed me is a com-
bination of documents formulated at the Crimea [Yalta] conference.
Are you asking that this be incorporated in evidence ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I think that would be exhibit 38.
Mr. Machrowicz. It may be received.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
(The document referred to was received in evidence as exhibit 38
and appears in the index of these hearings.)
Mr. Mitchell. General Bissell, you have been provided with a
copy of exhibit 38 by either the State Department or the Army De-
partment Counselor's office?
General Bissell. I was directed, I believe, by your committee that
this matter would be taken up later and that I would find out its
status. I asked the Counselor for the Department of the Army to
make it available to me, but he was not yet prepared to do so not
because of the classification but because he wanted to get some infor-
mation from the Department of State. He had some exchanges with
the Department of State, and on the 26th of June Mr. Shackelford
WTote me. I don't think the letter was mailed because they verified
something else and then another one, I think, was attached on July 9th,
and they forwarded me the papers stating substantially what you have
said : That it was all released.
My current understanding is that it is all released; and if your
records show that — it is piecemeal here with me, but I think it is all
covered, and I have the paper — I will be glad to comment.
Mr. Mitchell. We have it on the record now anyway. I think
you have about the same thing.
General Bissell. It appears to be the same mimeograph.
Mr. Machrowicz. If this committee has succeeded in having the
Yalta papers declassified, we have accomplished something already.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2301
Mr. BissELL. May I ask something? Am I to understand then
from the State Department that it is all declassified and that I can
go ahead and talk?
Mr. Mitchell,. That is correct. That is my understanding. Mr.
Ben Brown from the State Department is here.
Mr. Machrowicz. INIr. Brown, do you care to make any comment?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a copy of it with me, but
1 wrote Mr. Shackelford a letter dated June 20, 1952, which perhaps
you would like to liave me furnish you.
Mr. Machrowicz. Does it concern the declassification of these in-
struments ?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. All right.
Mr. Brown. In fact, it not only states that they were declassified
but also it gives the initial date of the publication of each of the parts
of the Yalta Agreement.
I might add that this document which General Bissell has here is
a copy of the letter which I sent to Mr. Shackelford.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you verify now that the documents concerning
the Crimea Conference, the so-called Yalta Conference, have been
declassified ?
Mr. Brown. That is right sir. And the document which Mr. Mitch-
ell has placed in evidence is a duplicate of the document which I
enclosed with my letter to Mr. Shackelford and which General Bissell
has in his possession here.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I think, for your information, Mr. Chairman, and
for the committee's information, we should point out that the so-called
unclassified or declassified document of the Yalta Conference is the
release that was made shortly after the Yalta Conference was consum-
mated. But it does not carry with it the transcript of any discussions,
off-the-record discussions, this may have been held at the Crimea Con-
ference.
Mr. Machrowicz. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. For the purposes of this discussion this afternoon,
the general is in no way bound by anything of secrecy or otherwise
from Yalta. He is at perfect liberty to discuss that.
I believe you understand that to be correct. Isn't that correct ?
General Bissell. That was the purpose of my question; that is, to
get freedom of action, because it has been done so piecemeal.
I know that this is probably not verbatim, and a lot of the stuff
doesn't look exactly the same.
In other words, I saw what was purported to be the report of Yalta
by the peo})le who had been there while it was in their hands, but
completely classified.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
General Bissell. I never saw this, you understand [indicating the
enclosure sent by Mr. Brown to Mr. Shackelford] .
Mr. Machrow^icz. Let's proceed further. It has been declassified.
Let us proceed with the questioning.
Mr. Mitchell. Xow, I would like you to explain to the committee
why you labeled it "Top secret."
General Bissell. Well, there are two things in this that I think I
can point out to you, and then you may wish them read into the record,
or they may be already in the record.
93744— 52— pt. 7 31
2302 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
On pacre 13 is the agreement refjarding Japan. To paraphrase that
and to put the two pages into a couple of sentences, a deal was made
with the Russians to break a treaty obligation they had with the
Japanese, a mutual-alliance defense arrangement, and stab the Japa-
nese in the back when it would do us, the most good and save us the
most Americans.
]\tr. Mitchell. "VVliat does that have to do with the Van Vliet report ?
General B"issell. The point I am making is that that deal had not
yet been consummated; had not yet been effected. It was an agree-
ment •
Mr. Machrowicz. I don't think. General, we are going to have the
time nor are we in authority to analyze the entire Yalta Conference,
and the commitments made, particularly with reference to Japan.
I think we had better stick to the Katyn incident.
General Bissell. The word "Katyn" is not mentioned in here, but
the purpose of the decision here is to get the Russians to help you and
have them make an attack within 60 clays, or whatever the time period
specified in here, on the Japanese, and in order to help us shorten the
war.
Mr. Machrowicz. You mean to help us shorten the war with the
Japanese?
Mr. PuciNSKi. In other words, what you are trying to say, General,
is that you are well aware of the effort being made in this country at
that time to assuage the Soviets toward helping us.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Is that what you are trying to say?
General Bissell. And these papers show the big price that we were
prepared to pay for that in territorial concessions and in every other
thing, and they also show what decisions were taken with regard to
Poland which were set forth at that time under the- President's signa-
ture, as I recall. I believe it is at the end of this thing.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you refer to those commitments as "a stab in
the back" ?
General Bissell. I don't know where to stop. I would like to go
ahead and talk, or else answer your questions.
It disposes of Poland completely, and what the United States is
going to do.
Now, that is the policy of the United States enunciated by the
President in wartime, the Commander in Chief, and that is an order
to me.
I am shown it when it is secret to everybody but a very small hand-
ful, and I am supposed to have sense enough to know that, when the
President signs something in wartime as the Commander in Chief,
that is it.
Now, I am not asked for any views. I am not asked for my
comments.
The purpose was to get Russia to fight and help us in the Japanese
war instead of letting us exhaust ourselves and then having them turn
on us.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, General, what you are really saying
is that the actions whicli you took, particularly in the instant case rel-
ative to Katyn, you took in order to implement the foreign policy of
people above you ; is that correct ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2303
General Bissell. I was doing this because it had on it the signature
of tlie Commander in Chief. I wasn't doing it because he was the
President and a politician. I was doing it because he was the Com-
mander in Chief under our Constitution, and I am working for him
under oath to do everything I can to further his policies.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, in your actions you were merely
implementing this jDolicy that was set down ?
General Bissell. Now, I am classifying Katyn "Top secret" in view
of this. I laiow it is "Top secret" at the time, and Van Vliet even
recognized it as "Top secret" without that background.
I saw in it great possibilities of embarrassment ; so, I classified it the
way I have told you, and I think I had no alternative.
Mr. DoNDEKO. General, you made one statement regarding terri-
torial concessions that we made at Yalta as the price that we paid to
get Eussia to help us in the Japanese War.
General Bissell. That was only part of the price we paid. We
paid more than territorial concessions.
Mr. DoNDERO. We are still paying the price in Korea ?
General Bissell. It is all such a different deal that I don't think
anybody would pretend to say that at the time of Yalta, anybody
could visualize the Russia of today.
I mean that we are 5 or 7 years later, and that is hindsight. But I
am agreeing with you that we paid a great deal for it, and we are
still paying.
Mr. Dondero. I am not asking you that to be critical of you. I
am simply asking you what happened.
General Bissell. All right, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You answered- a lot of questions for me in just
stating that you were implementing foreign policy. I would like to
ask one or two other questions in that respect.
You, as head of G-2 at that time, naturally asked for various re-
ports, for instance, on what the situation was in Greece and what
the future picture might be.
General Bissell. I am not hearing you too well, sir.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. In your job as head of G-2, it came within your
province and you did at times, for instance, ask for a complete report
and evaluation of the situation, say, for instance, in Greece, or in
Rumania or Bulgaria. Do you remember ever asking for such reports
for those respective countries?
General Bissell. I will answer that this way: Every morning,
with some few rare exceptions, when I was in Washington, the special-
ists on each area or country — a good many each time, 10, 12, 15 of
them altogether — came into my office with the maps, with the charts,
and with everything that had come in pertaining to the area in which
they were primarily responsible. They painted for me the picture of
the change from the day before in the world, piece by piece, or the
change over a period of time. It might be a progressive report cover-
ing 20 days, 50 days, or the change from last year.
It kept you up to date in all respects, and I was briefed that way
every single solitary morning.
Now, if I wanted more detail on what they told me and didn't
want to consume the time of all of these men who had lots of work
to do, I would call individuals in later in the day and ask for further
2304 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
amplification, or I might direct that they make a study for the Chief
of Staff and present on the next day in greater detail what they had
found the next day, or, if it was urgent, later the same day.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you remember, in receiving some of those re-
ports. General, telling some of these people that were giving you
these reports that their reports were too anti-Soviet and that they
would have to tone down the nature of their reports before you would
accept them?
General Bissell. I believe I might have done so. I tried to have my
office staffed with experts and then, where there were two views, 1
tried to have an expert representing each view.
In the case of Russia, I tried to get a man who had served in
Russia, if I could get him, a military attache, or some other similar
attache who hated the devil out of the Russians and who would bring
out everything that was bad about them.
Then I wanted also a man who liked them and who would bring out
the other side.
You had to find a middle ground because both of them were not
always 100 percent right, obviously.
In the controversial areas, you have to have a good chance of getting
both sides aired.
Now, those people who liad lived in Russia and M'ho had served
there in some cases despised the Russians, while some of them admired
them. That was the kind of thing you had to deal with. But I think
I always had a fairly well balanced group. If I thought it was out of
balance, I would have tried to balance it.
Do I make my point clear?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yes.
Now, for example, do you remember, or did you have anything to
do with these Chinese interpretation courses that were given; for
instance, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Camp
Ritchie in 1945 ?
General Bissell. That was one of my activities. They were not
only give there but in many other universities in the United States
and in many other languages, such as Japanese, German, French.
Many universities were working with G-2.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Can you give any reason M'hy in those courses the
interpretation was given that was very favorable to Mao, who is now
the Communist leader in China ?
You know, of course, wliat they are doing to our boys in Korea
now. Can you give any reason why tliat course went along with tlie
policy of actually instructing our military people that "Mao really is
not a Communist; he is just an agrarian reformer.-' Can you give me
any reason why that interpretation was ap])roved by G-2?
General Btssell. It was never approved by me and that particular
type of teaching had no business in the schools. They were teaching,
among others, the Chinese language to people who were going to
Chiang Kai-shek's China.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And instead of teaching them the language
General Bissell. That might have happened. I couldn't be in every
class.
In the case of the teaching of the Chinese, because it is a hard lan-
guage, a great deal of it was done with microphones and the man
would study it as long as he could take it and when he was so full of
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2305
it that he couldn't remember the sounds, he would go to something
else. Then he would take some more.
Then we had classes where they rounded out the training. But
you are not interested in the details of technique.
This other thing you are talking about has no place there. We
told them to make the courses as interesting as they could, and they
did give them a good deal of background of the country.
Now, I don't know anything about the particular thing, you are
mentioning. I never heard of it until this minute.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Well, they were considerably slanted in favor of the
group that is now causing us all of the worry and anxiety in Korea.
General Bissell. There is one thing I would like to say Mr. Con-
gressman, in that connection. The word "Communist" as used in
China in those days was not the word "Communist" as it is used in
the world today. Those who differed with Chiang Kai-shek were
Communists, but that was not meant the kind of Communist that
took over China later, nothing like it.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. In that respect. General, am I correct in this ob-
servation ? I think I am. In view of the Yalta agreement and in view
of this anxiety of getting Russia into the war against Japan, there was
practically no limit all the way down the line and the general policy
was to protect the Russians as much as possible, not to arouse their
anger and antagonize them in any manner, shape, or form, but to go
along with them in every way whatever so that we could continue to
keep them as our ally ? Wasn't that really the guiding policy of G-2
and practically every agency of the Government at that time ?
General Bissell. I can't speak for other Government agencies.
We were not going to violate the spirit of this thing, although the
facts were going to go to our people who acted on them if they
pertained to how you got on with the war, whether they be favorable
or unfavorable.
Mr. PuciNSKi. By "this thing," you mean the Yalta agreement?
General Bissell. I mean that the Yalta agreement made us follow
a certain course.
Now, much information came in that was anti-Russian which was
classified, and a lot of it wouldn't have gone to the public anyhow.
They didn't need to know those things. It wouldn't have helped them.
But those things that came in and which our military leaders needed
to know were passed on to them. If it influenced the prosecution of
the war, it was put right out to the people who could use it.
We were collectors primarily for the Army and the Air Force and
disseminators and evaluators. However, I had other functions as G-2
to provide information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to do many
other things.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words. General, we set a definite policy and
course of action that we were to follow, signed, as you say, by the
President of the United States. If you had not implemented that
policy and followed that policy, you very likely would have been
removed from your position. Isn't that right ?
General Bissell. Yes, but I wouldn't have thought of not imple-
menting it. I was sworn, as every officer is, to uphold — you take an
oath when you go in there to do certain things. You lose a lot of your
rights and your citizenship privileges. So when you are in there, you
2306 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
give them away, and, in return, you take an oath, and that is all
there is to it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words. General, here were 15,000 Polish
officers who were murdered.
General Bissell. We are talking about Katyn, and I think your
figure is 4,300, just being precise.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Even if there had been 150,000 of them murdered, it
wouldn't have made any difference because you still would have had
to implement the foreign policy ?
General Bissell. No matter what number had been involved here, I
would have tried to get these papers to one of two agencies whose
business it was. It didn't involve the war against Germany any more.
Poland couldn't participate in the war against Japan.
The Russians could participate in it.
Those were factors.
Mr. PuciNSKi. What agencies were those. General Bissell?
General Bissell. Sir?
Mr. PuciNSKi. What agencies were those?
General Bissell. That is in the record again and again. War
Crimes or State Department.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all.
Mr. Sheeiian. General, in talking with Mr. O'Konski, you brought
out the fact that in evaluating this information you tried to get some-
body who was every much anti-Russian and somebody who was very
much pro-Russian.
General Bissell. That was where you had a controversial thing,
where you had bitterness and hatred and where people might be sour
in their views because of service in Russia, or something like that.
You had to try to get the best thing.
Mr. Sheeiian. We are having a witness coming up after you. Dr.
William Johnson. Will you state where he fitted into this picture?
General Bissell. I never to my knowledge talked to him. I never
saw him, to my knowledge. I saw his back here. I might know him
if I saw him. I don't know.
I would have wanted to know the views of Colonel Yeaton and
another officer who worked right in that section every time, and they
came into these meetings regularly every day.
McKellar is the other officer.
Mr. PuciNSKi. In view of what you have just told this committee,
then, on May 22, 1945, you signed a letter which you gave to General
VanVliet?
General Bissell. A memorandum, to be precise.
Mr. PuciNSKi. A memorandum that you gave to him after he had
given you the report.
In part, you said :
Due to the nature of your report, and the possible political implications, it is
directed that you neither mention nor discuss this matter with anyone in or
out of the service without specific approval in writing from the War Department.
Now, we understand that this gag on Van Vliet was requested by
him and concurred in by j^ou. I presume that the gag on Van Vliet
was placed because of the reasoning that you have described before
this committee prior to this time. Is that right?
General Bissell. That is correct.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2307
I would like to say one thing more. When Van Vliet was released
from that restriction in order to make a second report which was
leleasecl in the War Department publications before this committee —
when they got through with it, they slapped it right on again many,
manj^ years after I put it on, so maybe I wasn't so far off after all.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Just so that this record is complete, w^ill you briefly
tell us what you mean by political implications ?
General Bissell. I mean those things that will have a political
effect now or later. It might be 20 years later ; it might be the next
day.
Political implications are anything — of course, politics goes into all
of your life. It is a political implication when you vote, but that isn't
what I am talking about.
I am talking about political implications on a world-w^ide basis.
Poland had been in he fire in World War I and before. You all
remember the Polish corridor. Poor Poland has always been between
these two big wheels. Those are political implications, and this was
certainly political.
I think you have had enough before this committee to show that if
Katyn haci been perpetrated by the Russians, which appears now to be
the case, that was for a political purpose.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Let me finish, if I may.
Now, in your prior testimony before this committee, you said that
you thought you discussed this Katyn report of Van Vliet with Gen-
eral Holmes of the State Department. You heard General Holmes
testify yesterday, didn't you?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. PucixsKi. AVliat is your statement today ?
General Bissell. The same thing, exactly. I gave an illustration
under oath of exactly what I meant by discussing. I gave a para-
phrase of approximately what I might have said. That shows the
extent of the discussion I would have had.
Mr. PuciNSKL On Katyn ?
General Bissell. On Van Vliet being here. I think you mean Van
Vliet, don't you?
Mr. PuciNSKi. Yes.
General Bissell. All right.
Mr. Holmes said that he had no recollection of that. He didn't say
I didn't do it. He was very guarded in his statement. I have a copy
of it here.
Mr. Mitchell. General, before you go any further with that, I
have one question.
Chairman Madden. Let him finish that sentence.
General Bissell. You have wrecked me.
Mr. PuciNSKi. You were talking about your conversation with Mr.
Holmes.
General Bissell. My conference.
Mr. Mitchell. He said that he had no recollection of it.
General Bissell. I was in the room at the time, and if I heard him
correctly I believe that his statement was that he does not recall any
conversation on either matter and that he can't be certain he would
remember it. I jotted it down quickly. I may have gotten it down
wrong, but I think that is substantially correct.
2308 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Then you asked him whether I ever handed him a top-secret report
for which he didn't sign a receipt, and he told you he had no recol-
lection of that.
I spoke to him on the way out. We agreed that there had been
dozens and dozens of them passed without any receipt.
Mr. Machrowicz. We can't take into consideration what was said
on your way out.
General Bissell. I only mention that in passing. He is still avail-
able, I believe, if you want to verify that.
Mr. Machrowicz. We must consider the testimony under oath.
General Bissell. All right. I will state under oath that we passed
a great many secret communications without any paper work, because
we both sat most Wednesday afternoons as common members of a
committee known as the Joint Intelligence Commitee. Perodically
we sat as common members with the British and our allies, our other
allies, as the Combined Intelligence Committee.
We would bring in there a paper for action by that committee, or
for their consideration, and the top-secret papers would be passed
around by everybody. We even took them home for study.
Mr. Machrowicz. General, this is a highly specialized office that
you were in and that Mr. Holmes was in, and it has been testified by
botli you and him that such documents were not ordinarily passed
without a receipt.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you today intensify that point by saying
that this was a tremendously top secret document.
Do you have a receipt from him for having conveyed that document
to him?
General Bissell. I do not have a receipt from him.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you do not remember having delivered it
to him ?
General Bissell. I do not remember ever having handed that docu-
ment to General Holmes.
Mr. PuciNSKi. How about Mr. Lyon ?
General Bissell. I don't remember ever having handed it to Mr.
Lyon.
Mr. PuciNSKi. If I am not mistaken, that is in the record.
General Bissell. There are many errors in the record, but that is
because you have not had a chance to check it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do you ever recall discussing the Van Vliet report
with General Marshall ?
General Bissell. I never discussed it with him.
Mr. PuciNSKi. How about Mr. McCloy?
General Bissell. I mentioned a great many people, specifically in
my previous testimony I had not discussed the Van Vliet report with
and you asked me how I could have discussed it with them when I
hadn't shown it to them,
Mr. Mitchell. General, at this point I would like to take over on
thi.s question.
General, I believe you know that we have talked to every member
of your personal secretariat.
(ienei'al Bisskix. I hope so.
Mr. MrrciiFJ.L. All but Mrs. Doris Jej)son, who was your jiersonal
secretary both in the China, Burma, India theater, and" in G-2. She
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2309
is the only individual we have not had a chance to talk to, because she
is located in India today.
In addition to talking to the members of 3'our own stalf, we have
talked to, I would say, roughly 30 people of G-2. Now, I will tell
you this right now. There isn't a single solitary person that we talked
to who said that General Bissell would take that document or send it
to the Department of State without .talking to a higher superior, that
you were too clever, that you knew j-our business, and it may be said to
your credit that they have a great respect for your mental ability.
Now, did 3^ou or did you not talk to anybody higher than you about
the Van Vliet report Avhen you received it in the Army or in the Sec-
retary's office, or in the Joint Chiefs of Staffs
General Bissell. There is a possibility that I may have mentioned it
to General Marshall or to the Secretary. I have no distinct recol-
lection of having done so, and I don't see much reason wdiy I should
have.
Mr. Mitchell, Well, we see a lot of reason why you should have.
Genei'al Bissell. Well, I know, but- — —
]Mr. Mitchell. You will recall that at that time the United Nations
were being formed and also that the 16 leaders of the Polish under-
ground were admitted by JMolotov to have been imprisoned in Moscow.
They were the 16 Polish underground leaders.
You had a report on ]\Iay 22 in person from Van Vliet saying that
11,000 Polish officers had been killed at Katyn, murdered by the
Kussians.
Now, that is quite significant. You had been at the United Nations
just prior to the time you talked with Van Vliet. You knew the
situation at the United Nations.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. You knew it better than any man in the country
at that time, and yet here you got this particular report.
Now, bringing you right back to a moment ago, none of your staff,
from the\analysts all the way up to your generals that you had working
for you — and you know that I have talked to them.
General Bissell. I hope so.
Mr. Mitchell. None of them said to me that 3^011 would do anything
with that but go to a higher superior.
Now, did you, or did you not go to a higher authority ?
General Bissell. I told you
Mr. Mitchell. And if you did go to a higher authority, did you
get any instructions about this report?
General Bissell. I told you that I had no distinct recollection of
having taken it up to General ]\Iarshall or to the Secretaiy, but that
I might possibly have done so, and that I see no reason why I should
have done it because it had nothing to do with the i)rosecution of the
war at that time.
The European war was over ; it was finished, and this thing was a
matter for war crimes or the State Department.
Chairman Madden. May I interrupt you there ? If you had taken
that to General Marshall or to the Secretary, don't you think that you
would remember it?
General Bissell. I don't think so because I took so many things to
General Marshall.
2310 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. We are talking about this report. Don't you
think you would remember this report, as important as it was if you
had talked to General Marshall or the Secretary about it?
General Bissell. I don't believe so.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you keep a day-by-day record of the events ?
General Bissell. Well, now, yes and no.
Mr. Mitchell. Let's say "Yes."
General Bissell. I had what is "known as an appointment list which
was kept on my desk, just a commercial calendar of pretty good size
which had the day divided up into periods of 30 minutes, or hours.
On that 1 jotted down, or it was jotted down for me, if I didn't do it,
by my secretary, with whom I had made appointments, and it would
also show the appointments in the future. All the past stuff was
taken off by the secretary in the outer office where a similar record
was kept of the appointments I had kept that day or things I did that
I told them about. They didn't know a good many things that went
on.
Wlien I had time, I tried to take those two pieces of paper, the one
my secretary kept and the one I had, and I dictated the sense from
them of what I had done, not with the idea that it would become com-
prehensive, but to nail down who and w^hat and where and on what
given day.
Now, I do have that particular material.
Mr. Mitchell. General, in the course of the investigation we have
conducted, we have been told not by one, but my many that you main-
tained such a record of events — I am not going to refer to it as a diary
because of General Grow — which we will call a record of events. I
think we will both agree that diaries were quite common on those days.
Those were the wartime days.
I referred to it as a diary when I talked to you in Tennessee the
other day. I asked you to bring the records with you of your con-
versations and of who you saw between May 15 and June 1, 1945, and
between August 15 and August 25, 1945.
I selected those dates particularly because of the fact that both of
the letters that went to the Department of State were in that period of
time.
Do you have that with you ?
General Bissell. I told you that I would bring it up but that I
would have to find out what to do about those mattei^ that might still
be classified and not pertinent to Katyn.
I would like to call attention, if I may, to the fact that there is in
the record as exhibit No. 3 to my testimony a prohibition against my
talking about things under certain categories. You have that in the
record. I think you will remember it.
Now, I asked whether this was still binding on me when I came up
the other day, and I was told that it was still in effect.
Mr. Mitchell. Does the War Department today, G-2, have a rec-
ord of your diary ?
General Bissell. Now, wait a minute. I just got through clearing
this prohibition.
Mr. Mitchell. The question is most specific.
General Bisseu.. All right.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2311
Mr. Mitchell. The question is this : Has G-2 today in their files a
record of these conversations or memoranda that you made at that
time?
General Bissell. They do not have.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did we get them today ? From you ?
General Bissell. Well, you don't have them today, but you are
going to get them from me by the procedure which you arranged with
Mr. Monahan.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, just a minute. They are in your pos-
session, today ?
General Bissell. Not this minute, no, but they are mine.
Mr. Mitchell. And they were in Tennessee with you ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. You maintain those under lock and key ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What right do you have to those today ? They are
top-secret messages.
General Bissell. No, sir; they are not.
Mr. Mitchell. They must be top secret because I can't look at any-
thing that is in that record. Your letter is a binding letter on this
committee, the letter you produced the last time.
Now, why do you have those when G-2 doesn't have them and when
this committee can't get them ?
General Bissell. Now, wait just a minute. I have them because I
made them.
Mr. Mitchell. Correct.
General Bissell. That is why I have them. Now, they are not of-
ficial documents. There may be plenty of mistakes in them. Many
of them I have never read at all.
Mr. Mitchell. They contain the highest secrets of the United
States.
General Bissell. Wliat is that?
Mr. Mitchell. They contain the highest secrets of the United States
Government.
General Bissell. No, they don't.
Mr. Mitchell. Material that has not been declassified today.
Otherwise, I wouldn't be restricted from seeing them.
That is the problem I have.
General Bisseli>. No, there isn't as much in them as you think, and
as you will find out when you see this thing.
Mr. Mitchell, That may be true, but it just strikes me that when
you brought in an official letter from the War Department when you
first testified here, stating that you can't say this and that because
some stuff may be still classified, and wlien you retain in your own
home in Tennessee something which the War Department doesn't have
and which you say we can't have
General Bissell. Do you purport to say what I have in my home in
Tennessee ?
Mr. Mitchell. No; I don't, but we do know that you have this
document, this diary, and that diary is very important.
Chairman Madden. Will you confine yourself to questions and
answers. Counsel ?
2312 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. Well, General, I wonder if we can get this straight
now. What you have there is what is purported to be an extract of
your record of events from your own personal files, or is that from the
files of G-2 as obtained by you within recent weeks ?
General Bissell. This is from my own personal files.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do you know that as a matter of fact G-2 has a
similar record of events ?
General Bissell. I doubt whether they would. Some of these items
are chicken feed. In other words, they Avouldn't have this: "Tele-
phoned to Doris to welcome her back."
Mr. PuciNSKi. Now, you are not answering my question. General.
General Bissell. That is highly classified.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I want to ask you this: I am trying to establish
whether or not you know the record of events you dictated every day
at the end of the day has been kept and is in G-2 today.
General Bissell. No; there is no official record of it that has been
kept ; and it isn't in G-2 today.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Do you know that as a matter of fact ?
General Bissell. Well, now, no one ever knows anything really
as a matter of fact. Somebody might possibly have broken into G-2
and have broken into the safe, despite the nightwatchman, and might
have copied this so that there would be another one in existence. I
can't go as far as you want me to.
Mr. PuciNSKi. May we now liave for the record the abstract which
you have there ?
General Bissell. Most certainly.
Chairman Madden. What is that ?
General Bissell. This was prepared, as it was arranged for, by
Mr. Monahan of the Department of the Army.
I had nothing to do Avith it whatever.
Chairman Madden. Mark that as an exhibit,
Mr. Machrowicz, Does it have any relation to the Kaytn matter?
Mr, PuciNSKi, Yes, sir; very much so.
Mr. Chairman, we would like to read this now for the committee's
information. On the 21st of May
. Chairman Madden. Wait a minute.
Mr. DoNDERO. Has it been marked and has it been received in
evidence ?
Chairman Madden. What exhibit is that?
Mr. PuciNSKL No. 39.
Chairman Madden. It will be received in evidence as exhibit 39.
(The document referred to was marked for identification as "Ex-
hibit No. 39" and is as follows :)
Exhibit 39 — Genebal Bissei^l's Diary
CEllTIFICATR
NOVTIMBER 11, 10.'l2.
At the request of IMr. .Tohn .T. Mitchell, Chief Counsel, Select Committee to
Investigate Katyn Forest Massacre, House of Representatives, the undersiiined
has personally examined a summary of Major General Clayton Bissell's daily
apiK)intments for the periods 20 May 1945-1 June 1945, inclusive, and 15 August
1945-25 August 1945, inclusive. As a result of that examination, the under-
signed certifies that the extracts from that summary listed helow are the imly
portions thereof which refer to the Katyn Massacre, to Brigadier General
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2313
Julius Holmes, to Lieutenant Colonel John 11. Van Vliet, Jr., to Doris Jepson,
and to Colonel Telford Taylor.
*******
20 May-21 May '45
None.
22 May '|5
1. Telephoned to Doris to welcome her bacjf.
2. Talked to Mrs. Meers about some more information on Colonel Van Vliet's
statements. She is to carry out specific instructions on this matter.
23 May '45
1. Talked to Mr. Lyons of State Department and made a note for record on
our conversation. It bore on Lang's and Harris' status.
24 May '45
1. Talked to Mrs. Meers about Colonel Van Vliet's report. There was another
angle to the matter which we consolidated with the previous material and put
away for further reference.
2. With Colonel Cox, I dictated a note for record, on a telephone call to
General Holmes with reference to Mr. Braden. Holmes agreed to write Braden
again and make clear that the latter must not interfere with certain of Harris'
activities.
Mr. Mitchell. Does that concern Van Vliet in anj^ ^^ay, that com-
ment, General ?
General Bissell. Yes. I would like to explain each of those items.
Mr. PuciNSKi. May I read these others, General?
General Bissell. I thought you had finished.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Then we will discuss them individually. [Continues
reading:]
3. General Berry called and later came in to find out about the Interdepart-
mental Security Committee. A telephone conversation with General Holmes
indicated that it had expired and that it was unnecessary to appoint anyI)ody
to take General Strong's position on that committee. Its work has been taken
over by the Swan Committee.
25 May '45
None.
26 May '45
1. Colonel Taylor came in to bid me goodby. He has done a grand job in
London and is returning to further service, this time with the War Crimes Com-
mission. While this will get him back to professional work, I hate to see him sever
his connections with Intelligence.
27 May-1 June '45
None.
15 All f/. -25 Aug. '45
None.
Miles Reber,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out at this time that we
had asked the War Department counselor to let us look at the com-
plete record of events of Colonel Bissell's activities during the period
that he dealt with the Van Vliet report, namely, the period from the
•22d of May to the 25th of iNIay when he wrote his letter to General
Holmes and also that period from the 21st of August when he wrote
a subsequent letter dealing with the Katyn affair.
The War Department counselor advised the staff of this committee
that it would be impossible for us to look at those records, and this
digest that the general has handed us now is a digest which has been
approved by the War Department. We do not know, because we have
2314 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
not seen the original, whether the general had any conversations that
day with his superiors and whether or not those conversations per-
tained to Katyn because we have not seen the original record of
events of the general's activities for that period.
Is that fairly correct, General ?
General Bissell. You have not seen them.
Mr. PuciNSKi. They have not been made available to this committee.
I called Mr. Fashion just a little while ago and told him to bring the
complete record of events down here.
General Bissell. I would like to explain those one by one and show
their pertinency.
With reference to the first one about Doris Jepson, I just got through
saying that the item is "Telephoned to Doris to welcome her back."
She had had an appendix removed in San Francisco and she was not
in the office that day and was still out on leave, I think recuperation
leave. That item had nothing to do, I think, with the Van Vliet re-
port. I have made a similar statement before. It just happened to
appear in the thing.
The next one is, I think
Mr. Mitchell. Do you have a copy of this ?
General Bissell. No; I don't. I am following it from memory.
Mr. Mitchell. I will hand you this document.
General Bissell. The next one has been fully covered in my previous
testimony. I stated at that time that I had taken special care to be
sure that Mrs. Meers would be briefed before she handled the Van
Vliet thing and that she would have a place to work. I checked with
her, and she said that she would carry out her instructions implicitly.
That is in my previous sworn testimony.
I have stated to you that I had talked to Mr. Lyon at the State
Department on the 23d, and this next item verifies that. It is no
good as evidence. I could have written it up yesterday.
Mr. Machrowicz, Does it say that you spoke to him regarding the
Katyn matter?
General Bissell. No ; nor did I ever say that I spoke to him regard-
ing the Katyn matter, nor did I say specifically that I spoke to Holmes
about it. I said what I did in the course of these two conversations
or at another time. That is my previous testimony.
Mr. Mitchell. Both of these gentlemen testified yesterday — and
you were present at that time — that if you had talked to them about
it they certainly would have remembered it.
General Bissell. That is true. They did state that tliey probably
would have remembered it. They also stated that they had no recol-
lection of seeing a letter which you handed them, and they stated
also, more emphatically, that
Mr. Mitchell. Stick to that one point, please.
General Bissell. They are not infallible.
Mr. Mitchell. They did say that if you had discussed the Van'
Vliet report or had shown it to them they would definitel}^ have
remembered it. That is what they stated yesterday.
General Bissell. I stated before and I state again that I would
not under any circumstances have discussed any details of the report
with them. I would have told them that we had received this thing
and were working on it and that we would got it to them as soon as
we could.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2315
The note here states :
Talked to Mr. Lyon, of State Department, and made a note for record of our
conversation. It bore on Lang's and Harris' status.
I told you that it was on another matter and that I might have
spoken to them in connection with the Van Vliet report.
On the 24th appears this note :
Tallied to Mrs. Meers about Colonel Van Vliet's report. There was another
angle to the matter which we consolidated with the previous material and put
away for further reference.
That is the business about the Swiss protecting power.
The next item states:
With Colonel Cox, I dictated a note for record, on a telephone call to General
Holmes with reference to Mr. Braden. Holmes agreed to write Braden again
and make clear that the latter must not interfere with certain of Harris'
activities.
Now, there was another item I might have talked to them about.
I told you that I had made a note for the record of this conversation
that I had not been able to find it in G-2, and that would show what
I actually said.
The next note is :
General Berry called and later came in to find out about the Interdepart-
mental Security Committee.
I told you that I had talked twice to General Holmes. This was the
second talk with General Holmes, which indicated that the committee
had expired and that it was unnecessary to appoint anybody to take
General Strong's position on that committee.
INIr. INIttchell. At no time did you talk in the course of these 2 or 3
days with your superiors, according to your memorandum of events ?
General Bissell. AVell, I very seldom did. After all, what does the
term "Assistant Chief of Staff" mean ? It means that one handles all
of those matters that belong in your field of responsibility, and that
one was certainly mine.
Mr. IMiTCiiELL. You testified before this committee on June 3 that
you had a gas pipe direct to General Marshall ; didn't you ?
General Bissell. No; I did to his house but not to his office. I had
a squawk box to his office which could have been heard in many rooms
in the building.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I would like to have you distinguisn between a gas
pipe and a squawk box, just for the record.
General Bissell. I think you might like to know, if you think that
a gas line is something you gas on, you are just barking up the wrong
tree.
Mr. Mitchell. I think we know what it is.
General Bissell. I think we know what it is, and I would not like
to explain it. It is still a useful thing. I would be glad to tell you
individually, but I don't think it ought to be put into the papers.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you have any objecion to the members of
this committee looking at the transcript of your memoranda of record
in executive session, you personally ?
General Bissell. I personally would have no objection to that, but
T don't think that a lot of the stuff there has any connection whatever
with this committee.
Mr. Mitchell. You have no objection ?
2316 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. And I would say that there is absolutely nothing
in there directly or indirectly relating to Katyn or to the Van Vliet
thing. But I would love to have the chairman look at it. I don't
believe that it is the sort of thing that should be spread on the record.
Mr. Mitchell. It won't be spread on the record.
My specific question then, (ireneral, is this: You personally have no
objection to the members of this committee looking at that true record
as it stands, not abstracted or in any other way ?
Chairman Madden. He already answered that.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute.
General Bissell. I have some trouble with that. I have two prohi-
bitions against it. A smart fellow with a little background in intelli-
gence could find out something about sources if he had enough about it.
If he got a little of it, it wouldn't be worth a darn to him, but if he
got enough of it, it might be of considerable value. I couldn't give you
anything about sources, as you know.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you for the compliment.
General Bissell. You are smart enough.
Now, that is the situation I am in. I have to comply with my orders.
My hands are tied. If you get them to change my orders, I will go
as far as they permit me to. You got my letter telling you that I
would like to tell you the works.
Mr. Mitchell. I am not asking you about your hands being tied.
I will take care of the Army a little later on that matter.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have agreed that we
are going to close the hearings this afternoon.
General Bissell. Let me finish the last entry here, if I may. "Colo-
nel Taylor came in to bid me good-bye." He was the General Telford
Taylor who was Chief Justice Jackson's No. 2 man and who did the
work
Mr. Mitchell. On the secondary crimes?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. He had nothing to do with the first crimes ?
General Bissell. No. He is the man to whom I said in my testi-
mony I sent the Polish-London Katyn report.
Mr. Mitchell. And you sent that to him when you were a military
attache ?
General Bissell. In London.
Mr. Mitchell. In 1046 and 1947?
General Bissell. Yes, when it came to me the first time.
Mr. Mitchell. That was long after the Katyn case was heard in
Nuremb n-<i because it was heard in Nuremberg on July 1 and July 2.
General Bissell. At that particular time and until I came here, I
think in June, I didn't know the sequence in which trials were held
except from what I noticed from personal observation in being present
at the Nuremberg trial when the main trials were on and the major
criminals were in the box. I tliink I nuMitioned that in my testimony.
Mr. Machrowicz. Has this anything to do M'ith the Van Vliet
report ?
Mr. MrrciiELL. No, sii-. General P>issell just wanted (o clarify the
record.
General BissklI.. I wanted to get clear everything wliich was di-
rectly or indirectly related.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2317
Mr. Mitchell. General, I would like to go back to this specific
question again. Did you or did you not talk to a higher authority in
tlie AVar Department or in the Army or anywhere else about the Van
Vliet report and its contents I *
General Bissell. I repeat, as I did in my previous testimony, I did
not recall doing so.
]Mr. PucixsKi. General, the question has come up — we have dealt
with this Van Vliet report, and we know that you were a very busy
man at that time and that you still had the conquest of Japan in
mind. Exactly how important at that time was the Van Vliet report
to you ?
General Bissell. Van Vliet stated that his second report is exactly,
as he I'emembers it, like the first one. I am quite sure that the state-
ment appears in both of them that he had not, in his whole observa-
tion, a single factor that in itself was positive evidence, but rather
that it was based on what he saw in people's faces, what he observed
at the graves, what they had discussed afterward, and the conclusions
reached by them. It was on that basis that he had reached his con-
clusion, and then he stated something which was a conclusion after
he had said that he had no fact of evidence to establish it.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Xow, General. We are going into something
which is unnecessary, but I would like to correct you. He didn't say
anything about the fact that he judged this from the looks that he
saw on people's faces.
Geneial Bissell. May I read that paragraph?
Mr. Machrowicz. I don't remember that.
General Bissell. I will be glad to explain it. I think it is in the
War Department release. I believe I have a copy of that here.
Mr. Mitchell. I think you will find he stressed the boots more
than anything else.
Mr. Maciirowicz. He stressed the conditions of the bodies.
General Bissell. Just let me read this, and I think I can clear it up.
He says, "I have thought about this a lot in the past 7 years and
freely admit that there was never presented to me any single piece of
evidence that could be taken as absolute proof, but. the sum of the cir-
cumstantial evidence, impressions formed at the time of looking at the
graves, what I saw in people's faces, all forces the conclusion that
Russia did it."
Mr. PuciNSKi. Well, General, you didn't answer my question. The
question was this : What value did you personally, as G-2 of the United
States Army, place on this particular document that Van Vliet dic-
tated and signed?
General Bissell. That by itself was not evidence. Combined with
other things which would probably be in the State Department, it
would probably be very important and therefore should be gotten to
the State Department. It was a matter, I felt, that would involve War
Crimes, and should be gotten to War Crimes. If it went to the State
Department, they had a section that dealt with war crimes. I could
have short-cut it direct to War Crimes, but my intention was to get
it to the State Department first.
Mr. PuciNSKi. But you did place enough significance and impor-
tance on this document to
General Bissell. What is that ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 32
2318 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. PuciNSKi. You did place enough significance and importance
on this document, the Van Vliet report, to, one, get a special secre-
tary to take the dictation and have her destroy the notes.
General Bissell, No, I would like to clear that up.
Mr. PuciNSKi. All right.
General Bissell. If Van Vliet had come back, as he should have,
under orders, like all returning prisoners of war, he would have gone
up to Colonel Lantaff and he would have been assigned to the Cap-
tured Prisoners Personnel, Materiel section. Now, there he would
have gone to the American or Allied subsection. There was also a
foreign section that handled foreign prisoners of war.
If he had gone there, he would have found people specializing in
just that sort of thing, and he would have been one of a number of
cases. His was a more important one. There he would have met the
same girl that took his dictation up in my office, a girl who was fa-
miliar with that kind of work.
Now, he didn't come in that way. He came to my office, and he
insisted on seeing me. I had no objection. I didn't know he was there
until I got to the office.
Chairman Madden. Didn't you testify to this before ?
General Bissell. Sir?
Chairman Madden. Didn't you testify to this before?
General Bissell. Yes, I did testify to it. Now, that is the only
reason that I called for a secretary from the CPM section. That was
the only branch that knew about it.
Mr. PuciNSKi. General, the only thing I am trying to get from you
now is this : You must keep in mind that the staff of this committee has
spent a lot of time looking for this Van Vliet report.
General Bissell, So have I.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Because this staff considers the Van Vliet report
very, very important in the Katyn story. Now, we want to find out
from you now whether or not 5^ou share with us that same opinion.
Was it a very important document at that time ?
General Bissell. It was very important at the time because the con-
sensus of expressed opinion was that the Germans had done it, and
here was something on the other side.
Mr. Mitchell. Why didn't you order a study of it?
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Let the witness complete his
answer.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was going to ask him why he didn't order a
study of it.
Chairman Madden. Don't interrupt the witness. Go ahead.
General Bissell. I felt that under those circumstances — there had
been this previous announcement by the Germans accusing the Rus-
sians, and an announcement by the Russians accusing the Germans.
Therefore it ought to go over to where all of this information would
go, which would be the State Department.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think the general has already stated at least
a dozen times tliat he considered it so important that he labeled it
"top secret" and that he still considers it important.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2319
Mr. Mitchell. You heard the general himself testify this after-
noon that he had all kinds of specialists. He had a whole file of miss-
ing Polish officers. He had a file on Katyn handled by Colonel Yeaton.
Why didn't the general ask some member of his staff to make up a
study on this to determine one way or the other ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That leads to a question I want to ask.
Mr. Mitchell. Wait a minute. He hasn't answered that one. Why
didn't you do that?
General Bissell. This particular matter would not have been one
that would have gone to the specialists under any consideration.
Mr. Mitchell. You had political specialists there.
General Bissell. Yes. Now, wait, you have to get set here. If
this material had come through the mail, it would probably have gone
to CPM, right where the girl came from who took the dictation. If
it had come in there unlabled and if a relatively new person in G-2,
someone with only 30 days of experience had handled it, he might have
sent it to either one of two specialists. He might have said, "Well, this
is a Russian thing," or he might have said, "It is a Polish thing," or
he might have said, "It is a German thing." So it could have gone to
a German specialist or a Russian specialist or a Polish specialist — the
Russian and the Polish specialists were together every day, the two of
them.
If it had gone down there, they would have checked it, and Van
Vliet wouldn't have gotten through so quickly. They would have
been on the lookout, and they would have gone over it with Van Vliet,
and they would have checked it, and I would have received some re-
ports on it. It would have been in G-2 for a long time.
Mr. Mitchell. Why didn't you send Van Vliet to your Russian
specialists ?
General Bissell. Because I felt that the Van Vliet situation was
such that I had to make a decision as to whether it was better for the
man in his then condition to get this out of his system, which he was
certainly anxious and eager to do, or to send him down and let him
go through the mill or to send him to Walter Reed and see if he was
physically all right to testify before we put him on the griddje.
Although I had met him and knew that he was tired, I also knew
that he was so full of this that there was no doubt to me but that he
would do the best job if I were to let him make his statement and get
it off his chest and then get him on to his home, as he wished ; and I
did that. I am human, and I knew he had been in a prison camp.
Mr. Mitchell. So am I. Wliy didn't you then turn over the Van
Vliet report to McKellar or to Yeaton, who had both been military
attaches in Moscow ?
General Bissell. Because anything that would have been in their
files would have been in the State Department files. Tlierefore, send-
ing this to the State Department gave them the same opportunity.
Also the State Department had primary interest in political matters,
not the Army.
Mr. INIitchell. Why didn't you make an extra copy then for your
own files ?
2320 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. I told you the details of the making of the copies
and exactly why there was not a second one made. That is all covered
in my testimony and sworn to.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. General, to cut this short, let me ask you one ques-
tion. Let's be realistic about this.
General Bissell. Sir?
Mr. O'KoxsKi. To shorten this, let me ask you this : Let's be realistic
about this. Even if the Russians had admitted that they had com-
mitted the crime of Katyn, the policy which your branch of the service
followed and the policy which our State Department and our Defense
Department followed would have been the same because we were
having a jjolicy of not doing anything at that time to arouse the ire of
Russia. Isn't that correct?
General Bissell. Well, studying it would not have aroused their
ire. Only publicity would have aroused their ire. xVs long as you
kept it within Government services, that would not have influenced
that particular part of it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Then let me ask you this question: If you had
handled the Van Vliet or the Katyn incident in accordance with the
expressed views and hopes of the higher-ups above you, you certainly
would have heard about it, would you not. General ?
General Bissell. Well, let's get this straight. I wasn't actuated or
induced to do anything from fear of reprisal. That kind of man is
no good in a key job in the War Department. You have got to have
somebody who will act on his own responsibility, knowing the chief's
policies.
]Mr. O'KoxsKi. That isn't what I meant. What I mean is this: You,
in liandling tlie Katyn matter in the way that you did, felt that you
were carrying out your duties and responsibilities under your oath
and your commander in chief in implementing the foreign policy in
existence at tliat time?
General Bissell. As I understood it at that minute with the facts
available then.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is right. This is the basis of the whole story.
Now, I have one other question. Knowing what you do now about
the Katyn matter and the terrible price that we are paying for that
policy of appeasement, do you think that it was a wise policy? I am
asking just for a conjecture on your part.
Considering how the matter was handled at the time, do you think
you would handle it in the same manner as it was handled at that thiie
knowing what you know now?
General Bissell. With the facts of Y years' experience with the
Russians, I certainly would not. There is no doubt about that.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Thank you.
(ieneral Bissell. But you wouldn't have had the same kind of thing
7 years later. That is an impossible (piestion to answer, but I think
I know what you are driving at.
With all the knowledge of all of the changes that have devel()i)ed
since — sure we will do whatever we can now to get our story to the
])e()ple of America and to the people of the world. We have to.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2321
Mr, PuciNSKi. General, I wonder if I can just read one paragraph
from your previous testimony. When you testified before tliis com-
mittee on June 3, you said :
What becomes important is a matter of history and development. Xo one
suspected that this one thing —
meaning the Van Vliet report —
would be of anything like international significance.
Mr. Machrowicz at that time asked j^ou :
Did you say you recognized the imiwrtance of the document?
You replied at that time — and this is at page 78 of the written
transcript :
Yes ; I did. You bet, but not the kind of significauce it has in today's world
because nobody could have foreseen the situation that we have today.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say the very same thing today, that is,
that you did consider it important ?
General Bissell. I certainly did consider it important.
Mr. PuciNSKi. May I ask you this. General : You heard Mr. Holmes
and Mr. Lyon ?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. PuciNSKi. We discussed this matter with you at frequent in-
tervals. Are you satisfied. General
General Bissell. What do you mean when you say that you dis-
cussed it with me at frequent intervals ?
Mr. PuciNSKi. I think Mr. Mitchell
General Bissell. We have never talked off the record.
Mr. PuciNSKi. No.
General Bissell. On any of these things. He has never asked my
views.
Mr. Mitchell. You and I have never talked.
General Bissell. That is right. It has only been administrative.
Now, let's not get anything wrong.
Mr. PuciNSKi. In the light of everything that has been presented
here, the testimony of Mr. Holmes and the testimony of Mr. Lyon,
together with the letters of transmittal, and your own doubt as to
whether or not you sent it to the State Department, are you today
satisfied in your own mind that this report did not go to the State
Department ?
General Bissell. I am more strongly of the belief that it did go
there because of what Mr. Holmes showed you yesterday. He an-
swered a letter saying that they didn't have a certtiin report that they
hacl had for a year. Now, I believe that because you have the evidence
on it. He had already said in writing to me, sjieaking for the Secre-
tary and as his assistant, that it wasn't in the State Department.
I expressed to you a doubt about that, and you wanted to know
what was the significance. The significance w'as, as I said, that I
dichi't think they would have stopped going after it if they didn't
have it.
2322 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE
Well, I was right. They had it. It did bring out that the Van
Vliet report was there for the first time for sure.
Now, they had known it before, but that was the first time that —
and it confirmed Van Vliet's statements, not his conclusions.
It confirmed that he would never talk to anybody until he got to his
own people in a neutral country or his home.
Now, I wish I had gotten my teeth into that.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I have just one short question.
General, did the State Department ever show you any real interest
in the Katyn massacre? Did they ever ask you for information re-
garding the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. No. I am sorry; I think I didn't follow you.
Suppose I made a mistake. Make the assumption that I didn't send
it. Why didn't they come back on that letter?
You asked Mr. Lyon why he didn't check back. A check had been
made in one office, but there were a lot of offices where the paper
might have gone in the State Department. It had been processed
there for 5 days less than 2 months.
You asked him about one office. Why didn't he check in others?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, they were not very interested ?
General Bissell. They might have been interested, but had a policy.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. At that time, as you know now, they had more
information than you had.
General Bissell. I know, because you brought out one document
here that I never saw before.
Mr. Machrowicz. I have only one question to ask, and that is be-
cause a statement has been made which contradicts the record, and I
think you want to correct it because I think it is important. It has
no direct bearing on the Katyn massacre, but was a statement that you
made this afternoon.
At the time the Yalta Conference was being discussed, you said that
we paid a terrible price to Russia in terms of territorial concessions.
I think that what you wanted to say was not that we were paying a
heavy price for territorial concessions, but that they were asking our
ally, Poland, to pay a heavy price in territorial concessions, even
though they were not invited to Yalta, because actually we made no
territorial concessions ; did we ?
General Bissell. She got no part of the United States, but if you
think that passing the Kurile Islands to Russia wasn't a territorial
concession — that backs right up against us
Mr. Machrowicz. The one big territorial concession was turning
Poland over to Russia ; wasn't it ?
General Bissell. History will have to write which will be the more
important one. Poland will rise again if Russia doesn't swallow the
world. Poland always will.
Mr. DoNDERO. How about Manchuria, which had belonged to China ?
General Bissell. I don't think that is going to prove to be the most
important. Poland can rise again if communism doesn't swallow the
world. Poland has that kind of people.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2323
Mr. FuciNSKi. General, as a summation of our effort to find this
report, it is still your conclusion today that the State Department got
the Van Vliet report as far as you know ?
General Bissell. I still have the same reasons to believe it went
there and stronger ones.
Chairman Madden. Are we going back over that again?
Mr. Machrowicz. If you ask him that 10 more times, the answer
will be the same.
Am I right. General ?
General Bissell. I will tell the truth every time you ask me.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Would you like to finish that statement for the
record, General ?
General Bissell. I don't know where I was.
Mr. PuciNSKi. I had asked you if it is your contention today in
finality that the State Department received the Van Vliet report from
you?
General Bissell. I have never said they received it. I said I had
reason to believe it did, and I stated the reasons. How can I know
whether they received it ?
Mr. PucnsrsKi. All right.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the answer you will always give?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions.
General Bissell. If I may, I would like to introduce at this time
three papers which I think the committee would be interested in.
Chairman Madden. Congi-essman Sheehan has a couple of ques-
tions.
Mr. Sheehan. You stated earlier in your testimony, General, that
one of the reasons you were following this line of action was because
you had received your orders from President Roosevelt and he had
shown you the Yalta agreement
General Bissell. President Roosevelt never showed me the Yalta
agi'eement. I had seen the Yalta agreement.
Mr. Sheehan. You had seen it?
General Bissell. Yes. President Roosevelt never showed it to me.
Mr. Sheehan. You had seen the Yalta agreement in which they
had set up the provisions for forming the United Nations; is that
right?
General Bissell. I will have to look at it. That wasn't one of the
conclusions I outlined here.
Mr. Sheehan. It is in there.
General Bissell. All right.
Mr. Sheehan. I was wondering whether when you looked at the
Van Vliet report you may have thought about how it might have
affected the formation of the United Nations and whether that was
in your mind.
2324 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. Certainly, the United Nations were very close to
me for several reasons. They took my best secretary away, and yon
miss a thing like that, and I was hot about it.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Wait a minute. I want to correct that one.
Chairman Madden. Correct it after he gets through. Give the wit-
ness the privilege of answering the question.
Mr. Mitchell. All riglit.
General Bissell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Madden. Go ahead.
General Bissell. My secretary was going to Yalta. I would much
rather have had her in my office. I needed her and hated to give her
up. But that is chicken feed. That is the sort of thing you have in
front of you when somebody else is doing good work.
But I also knew the im])ortance of the thing, and months before the
United Nations got into the form of a final draft, a draft passed over
my desk and I was asked to comment on it. I knew about this thing
long months before and had a good background in what was going on
in the United States in those days as far as the fields in which I was
interested, that is, intelligence, bore any influence.
Mr. Sheehan. In other w^orcls, in your opinion, if the Van Vliet
report, which its conclusions had become public property at that time,
would it or would it not have had any effect on the formation of the
United Nations ?
General Bissell. I don't think the Russians w^ould have sat down
the first time if that liad come out. They would have gotten mad just
like when you all asked them for some help.
Mr. Sheehan. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Are tliere any further questions?
General Bissell. May I introduce these three papers?
Chairman Madden. JProceed. What are they? How voluminous
are they ?
General Bissell. You don't have to read these if you don't want to.
There have been inferences that I jumped over my boss' head and
should have gone through him. I would like to submit these docu-
ments which deal with two of the three Distinguished Service Medals
that were awarded me as G-2 and which recite why for the period
covered by these particular citations.
I would like to have the originals back, if I may. I would also like
to put into the record sometliing that has ])reviously been restricted,
a decoration from the Polish (ifovernment in exile awarded to me on
the day before Van Vliet came into my office. It was restricted until
yesterday or the day before.
Mr. Dondeko. I do not want to object to this, but I think you are
famous enough without those three.
General Bissell. I am not famous at all.
Mr. PuciNSKi. Mr. Chairman, these three letters will become group
exhibit No. 40.
Chairman Madden. Without objection, group exhibit No, 40 will
be admitted into evidence.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2325
(The document referred to was marked for identification as "Group
Exhibit No. 40,-' and are as follows :)
Exhibit 40 — General Bissell's Commendations
KANCLERZ ORDERU
ODRODZENIA POLSKI
t stwierdza
ze
PREZYDENT RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ
dekretem z dni'a
18-go UAJA 1945 roku
zaliczyJ"
UAJOH.GEIIERAL CLAYTOZI I. BISSEII
w poczet
Kawalerow Orderu
Odrodzenia Polshi
nadaj^c Mu odznaki
KRZy^A KOUAITDORSKIEGO
tego orderu
KANCLERZ
TQuUIU^C^ </#^AX>*WV(^*
SEKRETARZ
kJ^ Ut.
2326 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL
(Oak Leaf Cluster)
Major General Clayton Bissell performed outstanding services
as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff,
from February 1944 to Septemtier 1945. He displayed vigorous
leadership in reorganizing the 0-2 Division on a highly practical
basis to provide the General Staff and the combat theaters with
operational intelligence of great value. By integrating special
communications with the dissemination of operational intelligence,
he made possible a quicker, more effective use of intelligence by
all theater commanders. Through a keen appreciation of the
relationship between intelligence activities and combat operations,
he contributed materially to the successful prosecution of the war.
His repeated contacts with all theater commanders, air force
commanders and Allied intelligence activities brought about a
mutual understanding and confidence which resulted in better
coordination and integration of Allied and American military
intelligence. He was at all times available for counsel and advice
to other staff sections and was extremely helpful to them in their
work. His aid in evolving broad policies proved of high value to
the Chief of Staff at various international conferences. As "\A/kr
Department representative on United States Joint Security Control
he was responsible in large measure for the success attained by
both the United States Joint Security Control and the Combined
Security Control organizations in maintaining security of infor-
mation and in developing and executing the War Department's stra-
tegic deception responsibilities. By his dynamic ability to
integrate intelligence activities and apply them quickly and
directly to the ever-changing global situation, General Bissell
performed noteworthy services for the United States.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2327
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
IN REPUV REFER TOl
WASHINGTON 23, O. C.
CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL
(2nd Oak Leaf Cluster)
Major General Clajrton Bissell performed services of
the utmost importance as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War
Department General Staff, from September 1945 to January
1946. Envisioning the Military Intelligence Division as a vital
link in any national intelligence agency of the future, at the
conclusion of the war with Japan he vigorously applied himself
to reorganizing the division for peacetime. His keen
appreciation of intelligence capabilities, foresightedness,
leadership and ability to discharge great responsibilities
successfuUy bridged the gap between a large, complex in-
telligence organization geared to the problems of war and
that of an effective machine prepared for post-war eventuali-
ties. His soundand timelyadvice totheSecretary of Warand
the Chief of Staff on intelligence and allied problems was
extremely helpful in the formulation of broad policies of
far-reaching effect on the military establishment.
2328
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden, Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi, I have just one comment.
(jreneral, if you had acted any diti'erently it wouhl not have done
any j^ood, because you would have been overruled anyhow.
General Bissell. It never entered my mind to do it auy other way
than the way I did do it, so I don't know what would have happened.
Chairnum Madden. General, we want to thank you for j^our testi-
mony here this afternoon.
(xeneral Bis.seix, May I take this opportunity \o thank the com-
mittee aiul its counsel for the fairness with which they treated me. I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2329
think tliey wished to get at the bottom of the matter, and yet they have
been courteous and gentlemen. I like it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, before we close the testimony, I
have a matter to bring up.
Mr Sheehan has received information regarding a witness which I
think is very important. If we conclude the hearings today, I think
it should be done with the understanding that depositions will be
taken of this witness and made a part of the record. Depositions can
be taken in the next 2 or 3 days.
I would rather not reveal the name, but he is a witness who will
testify as to whether or not the broadcasts were censored with relation
to the Katyn incident.
Chairman Madden Do you want this admitted in evidence?
Mr. Machrowicz. No. I think we should take a deposition.
Mr. DoNDERO. My comment is this: It would seem to be merely
cumulative, and there are volumes of it in the record now. It is
mounting a little higher, but I cannot see any motive to be served.
Chairman Maddex. The counsel will analyze the letter and get an
affidavit after consulting with the chairman.
Mr. Sheehan. Let me say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that letter
is from the chap who is head of one big broadcasting unit of one of the
big broadcasting chains. He states that he was head of one of the big
broadcasting chains, of the foreign short-wave section, and he was
given information or directions by the Office of War Information to
-play down, not to mention Katyn at all. He tells us where he can get
the evidence where the communications came from, from the Office of
"War Information. That is important.
If that is so, Mr. Cranston and Mr. Elmer Davis and all of them
have been telling stories. If it is not true, then it won't even be in
there.
Chairman Madden. We will get his testimony, then.
This closes the testimony of the Katyn hearings. We started the
testimony in October 1951, and when Congress convened this last
spring, we held hearings in Washington and Chicago.
Afterward, we held hearings in London, England, and Frankfurt,
Germany.
I want to thank the members of the committee, and the staff, for
their diligence and their outstanding work in this arduous task, be-
cause when we started the work of the committee we were indeed
pioneering.
When this resolution appeared before the Rules Committee and
when it appeared before the Congress we had very little to work on.
There were very few Members of Congress that had any recollection of
the Katyn massacre.
But, nevertheless, to the credit of Cojigress, they approved our
resolution and gave this committee authority to act. They also gave
us authority, under another resolution, to go to England and Europe
to take evidence, for which we are very grateful.
The committee also desires to express deep appreciation to all other
individuals who cooperated in the work of this committee in investi-
gating the Katyn massacre. We especially want to commend the
Acting Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, Mr. Ben H.
Brown, Jr., also former War Department Counselor Francis Shackel-
2330 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ford, and the present War Department counselor, Mr, B. A. Monahan,,
for their cooperation.
We also wish to thank the chairman of the Banking and Currency
Committee. We owe him deep gratitude for allowing us to use this
hearing room.
We also wish to thank the Members of the House Banking and
Currency Committee staff, who deserve commendation, Mr. William
J. Callahan, clerk, and Miss Helen Ryan.
We also wish to thank especially the members of the press for their
diligent and honest reporting of the proceedings of the committee, who
have covered the hearings here especially this week, and who, in ac-
cordance with the American tradition, presented all sides of the Katyn
question to the American people.
Now, as the members of the committee know, and the press knows,
this testimony is what the committee decided would be the second
phase of the hearings. We filed our interim report before Congress
adjourned in July, which recorded the findings of the committee as to
the guilt of the nation that committed the massacre.
By agreement of the committee it was decided to hold hearings re-
garding the disappearance of the files pertaining to the Katyn massacre
at the present hearings. The final report will be prepared by the com-
mittee, and it is the hope of the committee that we will get this final
report filed at the earliest possible time.
It must be filed before December 31 of this year.
I wish to thank again the members of the committee and the staff
for their cooperation.
Mr. DoxDERO. Might I make a statement here, Mr. Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Certainly, Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman, as the ranking Republican member
of this committee, I want to express, on their behalf and my own, our
complete satisfaction with your fairness and justice, your patience
and tolerance all through the hearings, both here in America and in
England and Germany.
You have conducted the hearings with great ability, with com-
petence and, I think, with justice at all times uppermost in your mind
and fairness for everybody involved.
I just want the Congress to know we appreciate the work you have
done. I think you have done a fine job in discharging your duty and
responsibility in a very creditable way.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I want to second that.
Mr. Sheehan. I join with my colleagues.
Mr. Machrowicz. So will I.
Chairman Madden. Thank you.
The committee is adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 3 ; 45 p. m., the hearing was adjourned.)
APPENDIX
Exhibit 37 — Excerpt of House Un-American Activities Committee Heabin©
( File in Appendix )
Date : November IS, 1952.
Subject : United World Federalists, Inc.
Public records, files, and publications of the Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties contain the following information concerning the organization known as
United World Federalists, Inc. :
The Washington, D. C, Evening Star reported in an article in the April 4, 1947,
issue (p. A-16) that the United World Federalists was formed in a merger of
Americans United for World Government, World Federalists, Student Federal-
ists, Massachusetts Committee for World Federation, and World Citizens of
Georgia. Neither the United World Federalists, Inc., nor any of the organizations
which merged to form it has ever been investigated by the Committee oa
Un-American Activities or cited as a Communist-front organization by any
official government agency.
A folder published by the New York State branch of the United World Federal-
ists shows that this group is a member of the AVorld Movement for World Federal
Government, "an international coordinating association with member organiza-
tions in the' following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Great Britain, India, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland. United States of America."
In the issue of Newsweek magazine dated October 18, 1948 (p. 3G), the United
World Federalists, Inc., was described as "the nation's biggest world-government
group * * *."
The Washington representative of the United World Federalists, Inc., has
offered the full cooiieration of his group to this Committee at any time it might
become necessary.
The following excerpts are from articles appearing in Communist literature
regarding such organizations as United World Federalists and are being .set forth
herein merel.v for informative purposes :
A feature article in the Worker for March 19, 1950 (p. 5, magazine section), is
entitled "The World Government Plan" by Frieda P. Halpern. She says : "The
slogan for 'world government,' whatever it may mean to many honest advocates
of peace, is, in reality, but a reflection in the area of political ideology of the
aspirations of American foreign policy to dominate the world. This slogan, with
its promise of a peaceful world, represents, in reality, a movement toward Amer-
ican world empire. How can a slogan, which has rallied thousands who reject
the concept of American imperialism, lie at the same time for peace and for world
empire? The key to this seeming riddle is to be found, not in the membership
of the 'world government' organizations but in their sponsorship. There, among
the sponsors, one will find as fine a collection of the monopolists, military men,
and anti-Soviet careerists as can be found anywhere, together with luiiversity
presidents, National Democratic and Republican Committeemen, and church-
men, the whole adding up to a sponsorship both very 'respectable' and most
obviously nonradical. The 'world government' movement in the United States
is sponsored by a number of organizations, each with its own particular form
of 'world government" and each having Russia on the brain." Among the organ-
izations listed for condemnation in this article is "The United World Federalists.""
The Cominform organ. For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, for
April 7, 1950, carries an article entitled "Struggle of Communist Parties Against
Bouregois Ideology" from which we quite :
2331
2332 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
"American imperialists, together witli the bourgeoisie and the Riglit Socialists
in the Marshallized countries are trampling ever more cynically and openly upon
the national sentiments of peoples, and oppose the idea of national sovereignty.
They seek to poison the working class with the venom of cosmopolitanism to
make it submit to the rule of American monopolists."
The following is quoted from the July 1949 issue of Political Affairs, theoretical
organ of the Communist Party, USA, which reprinted this article from the Mos-
cow New Times of April 6, 1949 (No. 15) , by A. Leontyev :
"False chatter of a universal culture and science, of a 'world government,'
of a United States of Europe and even of the whole world, serves in practice as a
screen for the dissemination and propagation of slavish crawling before the venal
science of the dollar and decaying bourgeois culture, belief in the charlatan myths
about the vaunted 'American way of life,' receptivity to any blackmail of piratical
Wall Street diplomacy" (p. 64).
According to the Washington Post of November 23, 1949 (p. 4), Dr. Harold C.
Urey, atomic physicist, announced his resignation as a dii'ector of the United
World Federalists on the ground that he could not agree with the organization's
stand on Russia.
An undated letterhead of the United World Federalists, Inc., 7 East 12th Street,
New York 3, New York, which was received for files on September 29, 1950, lists
the following officers of the organization :
President : Alan Cranston.
Chairman Executive Council : A. J. G. Priest.
Chairman Executive Committee : Cord Meyer, Jr.
Vice Presidents :
Cass Canfield, Chairman of the Board, Harper & Brothers.
Greenville Clark, Lawyer.
Norman Cousins, Editor, Saturday Review of Literature.
Hon. William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court. .
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Former U. S. Minister to Norway.
W. T. Holliday, Chairman of the Board, Standard Oil Co. of Ohio.
George H. Olmsted, Chairman of the Board, Hawkeye Casualty Co.
Walter P. Reuther, President, United Automobile Workers.
Robert B. Sherwood, Author, Playwright.
Raymond Swing, Radio News Commentator.
Financial Vice President : Joseph U. Milward.
Program Vice President : Vernon Nash.
Secretary : J. A. Migel.
Treasurer: Duncan M. Spencer, Chairman of the Board, Fiduciary Trust Co.
Counsel : Abraham Wilson.
Assistants to the President :
Robert J. Walker.
Mrs. Marion Etcheverry.
Executive Director : Mrs. J. Donald Duncan.
Field Director : Edward W. McVitty.
Legislative Director : Jerome Spingarn.
Public Relations Director : Richard Strouse.
Organization Liaison : Harden L. Crawford.
Public records, files, and publications of the Committee contain the following
information concerning persons listed above : (There is no information reflected
in the said records regarding the other named officers.)
Alan Cranston
In a speech before the House of Representatives, November 4, 1943, the Hon-
oral)le Fred E. Busbey identified Alan Cranston as Chief of the Foreign Language
Division of OWL Mr. Busbey further stated that an article by Alan Cranston
which apppared in Common Ground in the sunnner of 1941 opposed the "alien
registration bill, wliich in tlie minds of many was a very necessary war measure.
He came out in supi)ort of the Comnuinist, Harry Bridges. His article, in many
respects, parallels the program of the Comnuinist I'arty" (Congressional Recortl,
November 4, 1943 ) .
On February 1<S, 1944, Mr. Busl)ey airain referred to Alan Cranstfm in a speech
before the House; he (juoted from testimony of David Karr before the Sju'cial
Committee on l^n-Anierican Activities. April (J, 1943, in wliich Karr claimed that
Alan (ranston sixnisored him for the position of senior liaison oflicer in the
Ofiice of Facts and Figures. In the sanu' sworn testimony, Mr. Karr identified
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2333
himself to the Committee as liaving been a writer for the Communist publication,
the Daily Worker, and for Equality, a Communist-front publication.
The name of Alan Cranston appears in a Study and Investigation of the Federal
Communications Commission by the Select Committee To Investigate the F. C. C,
House of Representatives, 1943.
It should be further noted that, according to the New York Times of February
26, 1950, page 7, Alan Cranston, president of the United World Federalists, Inc.,
denied a charge that his organization "stinks of Communist government" and
stated that Communists are barred from membership in his organization.
Norman Cousins
In an article which appeared in the Communist Daily Worker of January 13,
1948, it was reported that "Thirty-five well-known authors, editors, clergymen,
and other public figures today called on the new Federal employees Loyalty
Review Board to prevent injustices to individuals in the Government's Loyalty
check." Norman Cousins was one of those who signed the letter, addressed to
Seth W. Richardson, Board Chairman. This article also appeared in the New
York Times on the preceding day, January 12, 1948 (p. 10) .
In the report of the Committee on Un-American Activities entitled, "Review of
the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace," dated April 19, 1949,
on pagel3, we find the following in reference to the speech of Norman Cousins
before that organization :
"In answer to this totalitarian philosophy of dragooning culture, Norman
Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review of Literature, declared amid a great deal
of hissing and booing, that : 'democracy must mean intellectual freedom, that it
must protect the individual against the right of the state to draw political and
cultural blueprints for its painters and writers and composers to castigate them,
or to enter into those matters of the mind in which the individual is sovereign.' "
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman
The Call to the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship shows Mrs. Borden
Harriman as a sponsor of the Congress held November 6-8, 1943 under the au-
spices of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. (See Call
* * *, p. 4). A letterhead of the National Council of American-Soviet
Friendship, Inc., dated March 13, 1946, named Mrs. J. Borden Harriman as a
sponsor of the organization, as did a memorandum issued by the Council,
March 18, 1946. In 1944, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities
stated : "In recent months, the Commvinist Party's principal fi-ont for all things
Russian has been known as the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship''
(Report 1311, March 29, 1944, p. 156). The organization was listed later as
"subversive" and ''Communist" by Attorney General Tom Clark (Letters to
Loyalty Review Board, released December 4, 1947 and September 21, 1948).
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman was one of those who sponsored the United States
participation in the World Youth Festival held in Prague from July 20 to Au-
gust 17, 1947, according to the Call to World Youth Festival (p. 3), and the Fact
Sheet of the United States Committee for World Youth Festival, New York City.
^he Call to World Youth Festival (p. 3) also shows that the Prague Festival,
1947, was sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the In-
ternational Union of Students. The World Federation of Democratic Youth
* * * was founded in London in November 1945 by delegates from over 50 na-
tions. * * * From the outset the World Federation of Democratic Youth
demonstrated that it was far more interested in serving as a pressure group in
behalf of Soviet foreign policy than it was in the specific problems of inter-
national youth. * * * So strong was tie Communist domination at the
London conference that it aroused the deepest concern of. the English bishops.
{See Report No. 271, Committee on Un-American Activities, April 17, 1947, p.
12-13.)
Walter P. Renther
In the testimony of John P. Frey, president of the Metal Trades Department
of the American Federation of I-abor, given before the Special Committee on
Un-American Activities, August 13. 1938, we find :
"Mr. Frf.y. These are tlie two-binulred-and-eighty-odd members of the Com-
munist Party who are now or have been on CIO organization payrolls. There
are one or two who have not been on the payroll, but I will call attention to
them.
93744— 52— pt. 7 ^3
2334 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
"If if is the committee's desire, I will read all these names and turn them over.
They are all numbered '1', '2', '3', '4', '.">', and so forth, and I will comnient on
those which are of a more interesting or important character * * *
■^i •* * * ^s * *
"134. Walter Reuthek, Detroit, Mich. This fellow is one of the leaders of
the Auto Workers Union and President Martin has preferred charges against
him. He visited Soviet Russia and sent back a letter to this country which
included the following paragraph :
•• 'Carrv on the fight for a Soviet America.'" (Public hearings, vol. 1, pp.
112 and 125.)
"Mr. Frey. * * * There are two disrupting factoi-s in the automobile work-
ers at the present time. One consists of the bulk of the membership who very
much resent the Communist control that was .secured of national offices. The
other is an internal fight between two factions of the Communist Party. With
that I do not want to deal. All that I desire to call your attention to- is a complete
report of their last meeting, which I am submitting — my report of what went
on * * *
"Before the United Automobile Workers Union convention opened in Mil-
waukee, the Communist Party members held a fraction meeting or caucus
Wyndham Mortimer, Ed. Hall, Walter Reuther, and about 90 delegates to the
convention who were actual Con;munist Party members. Also present were
William Weinstone, Michigan secretary of the Communist Party; Jack Stachel,
of New York. * * *"
Mr. Frey also submitted a report of the Second Annual Convention, United
Automobile Workers of America, from which these excerpts are taken :
"Since Martin controlled a majority of the delegates to the convention, which
he had lined up before the opening day, Lovestone advised a drive to eliminate
the regular Communist Party members in the leadership of the so-called unity
faction, led by Vice Presidents Wyndham Mortimer, of Flint, Mich. ; Ed Hall,
of Milwaukee, Wis. ; and Walter Reuther, head of the west side local of the
union in Detroit. Lovestone's policy was to eliminate Mortimer, Hall, and
Reuther and thus strengthen the position of the Trotskyist group behind Mai'tin.
There is no question that Martin and Frankensteen. influenced by Lovestone,
were preparetl to clean house of the Communist group, and it is equally true that
up to a month before the convention the Mortimer-Hall-Reuther faction was
trying to get rid of President Martin.
m ***** *
"When President Martin, much to the surprise of John L. Lewis and the
Mortimer-Hall-Reuther faction, lined up a majority of the delegates to the con-
vention, the latter faction was forced to change its policies. As stated before,
the Mortimer-IIall-Reuther faction is Communist-controlled but disguised that
fact by calling themselves the Unity Group, as, under the guise of unity, they
thought they could save their own necks and possibly build a fire under Martin
during the course of the convention.
*******
"Mortimer, Hall and Reuther worked closely with Ora Gassaway, a pers<mal
representative of John L. Lewis; Ray Ednuind.son, president of the Illinois dis-
trict of the United Mine Workers and CI(» director in that State and David
Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers" L^nion. On
the evening of August 25, Charles S. Zimmerman. i)resident of the powerful New
York Local No. 22 of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union aiul a
leading Trotskyite and follower of Lovestone, arrived in Milwaukee to use his
influence on Dubinsky.
"On the same d:i.v (Wednesday) a load of Communist leaders came from
Chicago, among them Joe Weber, Steel Workers' Organizing Committee organizer
in South (Chicago; Harry Shaw and .huk Johnstone, who liad in the interim
returned to Chicago. Upon the arrival of the Chicai^o group, another Connuuni.st
Party caucus was called, to which only the top elements were invited. Those
present were Jack Stachel, Roy Hudson, \\illiam Weinstone, Ned Sparks, Wynd-
ham Mortimer, Ed Hall. Walter Reuther. and I'.. K. (!el)(>rt * * *." (Public
Hearings, Vol. 1. pj). 248-2.51.)
"Mr. Frey. The only materi.al in connection with the Automobile Workers'
Union whic-h I want to file with the connniltee is a publication known as 'The
Great Sit-Down Strike.' It w:is prepared liy William Weinstone, who Is a mend)er
of tiie central committee, lie has ati impressive record. His name is William
Wolf Weinstone, and he is district organizer of district No. 7, Comnumist Party,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2335
headquarters, Detroit. He has had direct charge of party activities within the
Auto Workers' Union from the beginning. Among those reporting to him are
Maurice Sugar, who is the counsel for one group of the auto workers, and has
been a candidate for office in Detroit on the Communist ticlvet ; also active with
him are Roy Reuthcr, Walter Reuther, William Raymond, and Wyndbam Morti-
mer." ( Public Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 25-"). )
In the testimony of Walter S. Steele, National Republic, Chairman of the
American Coalition Committee on National Security, representing various organi-
zations, given before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in public
hearings, August 17, 1938, the following reference was made to W^alter Reuther :
"Among those sending greetings to the Second National Negro Congress
were * * * Walter Reuther, communistic president of Local 174, of the
United Auto Workers Association * * *." (Public Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 626.)
The National Negro Congress was cited by the Special Committee on Un-
American Activities as "the Communist-front movement in the United States
among Negroes" in its report dated January 3. 1039 (p. si) ; also cited in reports
of January 3, 1940 (p. 9) ; June 25, 19-12 (p. 20) : and March 29, 1944 (p. ISO).
Attorney General Francis Riddle cited the National Negro Congress as "sponsored
and supported by the Communist Party" as shown l)y the Congressional Record,
September 24, 1942 (pp. 76S7 and 7688). Attorney General Tom Clark cited the
organization as "subversive" and "Communist" in letter furnished the Loyalty
Review Board and released to the press by the U. S. Civil Service Commission,
December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.
In the testimony of John I>. McGillis, Secretary, Detroit Council 305, Knights
of Columbus, given before the Special Comiuittee on Un-American Activities
in public hearings on October 11, 1938, it was shown that Doctors Lendrum
and Shafarman of Detroit gave physical examinations to members of the Com-
munist Party, who were able to pay for such examination, but instead billed
the City of Detroit. These examinations were in connection with recruiting
for Loyalist Spain, and in some cases the doctors "have given them to other
people prominent in communistic activities in Detroit." Among the latter Mr.
McGillis listed "Walter Reuther and his wife; * * *" (Public Hearings,
Vol. 2, pp. 1239, 1247-1248.)
In the testimony of Sgt. Harry Mikuliak, Detroit Police Department, given
before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in public hearings,
October 12, 1938, tlie following reference was made to Walter Reuther:
"Sergeant Mikuliak: * * * Walter P. Reuther is president of the West
Side Local 174, and he signs this TB test stating that he could not afford to pay
for the examination." (Public Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 1286.)
(Sergeant Mikuliak's testimony refer.s to the same matter as that referred
to in the testimony of John D. McGillis quoted above.)
In the testimony of Clyde Morrow, a Ford Motor Co. employee, given in public
hearings before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on October
21, 1938, the following reference was made to Walter P. Reuther :
"Mr. Morrow. Mr. Martin, in his haste to get the automobile workers o.r-
ganized. went out and hired Communist members to do It. I think Martin
thought he could use them 3 or 4 months and get rid of them.
"The Chairman. And they have gotten to the point where they might get rid
of him ?
"Mr. Morrow. That is right. They might get rid of Martin the wav it looks
to me. I hope not.
"The Chairman. Why cannot the international officers get rid of these men?
"Mr. IMoKRow. Here is the set-up in Detroit. I only speak for Detroit because
that is all I know about in Michigan. The international union has tired many
Communist Party organizers. * * * Now, what happens to them when
Martin fires them? We have three or four 'red* locals in Detroit, Local 155,
which is a haven for discharged officers, and when they are discharged by
Martin these 'red' locals immediately hire them as their financial sec-retaries
or recording secretaries, or organizers. Local 174 is what I would call an old
soldiers' home for discharged Communist Partv members whom Martin has
fired. They are immediately taken in l^y the Communists in cbart.'e of their
locals, such as Lloyd Jones and Walter Reuther. and people like that " (Pnblic
Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 16.52-10.53.) • i u j i<_
The following excerpts from the testimony of John M. Barrlnirer City Manager
and Director of Publicity of Flint. ^.Tichigan. given in public hearings. 6ct-''^er 21
1938, before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, concern the sit-
down strike at the Chevrolet Motor Co.. December 3, 1936 :
2336 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
"Mr. Hosier. What part would you say that memhers of the Communist Party,
Socialist Party, or the left-wing group of the Socialist Party played in that strike':'
"Mr. Barkinger. They played a very prominent part. We came in -contact
in every trouble with the Reuther brothers, Travis, and men of that sort.
"Mr. MosiER. They were men you knew ; and, while you could not prove they
were members of the Communist Party, you knew they were in sympathy with
them.
"Mr. Barringer. That is right." (Public Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 1682.)
In the testimony of J. B. INIatthews given before the Special Committee on Un-
American Activities in public hearings, November 7, 193S, the following reference
was made to tlie Reuther brothers :
"Mr. Matthews. * * * j had personal contact with all three of the Reuther
brothers, who have been prominent in the automobile workers union — Walter,
Victor, and Roy. The night that Walter and Victor Reuther sailed for Russia,
many years ago, I had dinner with them and saw theni off, and had some contact
with them while they were in Russia and sul)sequent to their return. I do not
know what their exact political connections are at the present time. I only know
that their ideology, if I may be permitted to use the word here, is Communist."
(Public Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 2188.)
In the testimony of Zygmund Dobrzynski, member of the UAW, given before
the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in public hearings, November
14, 1938, the following reference occurred :
"The Chairman. ]\Ir. Dobrzynski, I believe you were testifying before lunch
with reference to the conferences or conversations you had with Mr. Weinstone,
Did those conversations take place in his office?
"Mr. Dobrzynski. Yes, sir ; they took place in the Communist Party head-
quarters. * * *
"He also mentioned the Reuther brothers, Victor, Walter, and Roy. as workers
with them. He stated, of course that they were members of the Socialist Party
and not of the Communist Party, but that on certain policies they worked in
conjunction with each other.
"The Chairman. You say he mentioned Roy, Victor, and Walter Reuther?
"Mr. Dobrzynski. Y'^es, sir ; as workers with him in the union on certain poli-
cies. He stated to me that they were not members of the Communist Party but
were members of the Socialist Party." (Public Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 2219-2221.)
A Report of the United States Cliamber of Commerce, "Communists Within
the Labor Movement," which was inserted in the record in connection with the
testimony of Dr. Emerson Schmidt in public hearings before the Committee on
Un-American Activities on March 26, 1947, contains the following reference to
Walter Reuther :
"Gains or even demands made in one sector of the A. P. of L. or the CIO
tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. It must be remembered that the labor
movement is intensely political. If non-Communist leaders do not gain as much
as their opponents, they may soon find themselves with an active Communist
opposition in their own union. The opposition makes capital of the reasonable
demands of the honest leadership. Hence irresponsibility in labor tends to
become infectious.
"An illustration of this analysis can be found in the policies of Walter Reuther.
In the political struggles of labor, Reuther is considered a leader of the anti-
Communist l)loc. But at the same time he is head of a union whicli has a power-
ful Communist minoi'ity. He faces sabotage not only from this cliipie but also
from tlie national hea(l(iuarters of the Cl(^. Communist influem-es there have
persuaded the top leadeship tiiat Reuther is a threat to their positions. As a
result, Reuther faces an alternative: he must either I)e aggressive or retire in
favor of some Communist dujie. This exjilains in part the eonHict in his public
statements. On the one liand, he may favor increased laiior productivity and
decry inflationary wage rises. On the other haiul, he makes wage demands
which cannot I)e other than inflationary." (Hearings on H. R. 1S84 and II. R.
2122, March 24-2S, 1947, p. 173.)
Fui-ther i-ef'erences to Walter Reuther occur in tlie (^)iiuiuttee's "Hearings
Regarding Conununism in Tia))or Ihiioiis" in tlie public testimony of Leon E.
Venue and Walter Petersen on February 27, 1947, as follows:
"INlr. STiiU'i.iNG. .lust a moiiient, Mr. V(>iiiie. In connection with the strike,
Mr. Chairman, I would like for the record to show the attitude of the now presi-
dent of the United Automobile Workers with reference to this local.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2337
"The Chairman. What is his name?
"Mr. Stripling. Walter P. Renther.
"In a newspaper article which appeared in the Buffalo Courier Express on
August 5. 1941, Walter P. Reuther charged that the Allis-Chalniers local was
'dominated by political racketeers of Communist stripe.' He described a local
248 election as 'the worst kind of strong-armed political racketeering.' "
*******
"Ml-. Venne. * * * I believe that labor, in order to make any of the gains
that labor must make, must clean house,, and it doesn't start at the bottom, but
it starts at the top. We seen in Allis-Chalmers today a situation that has come
about through p<^litical maneuvering of two people who want the same job
in the United Automobile Workers of America; namely, Walter Reuther and
R. J. Thomas. R. J. Thomas is now using the Allis-Chalmers strike to insure
that at the next convention he will have 87 votes to cast in favor of his presi-
dency. R. J. Thomas — I mean R. J. Thomas — belongs to the left-wing bloc in
the international.
AVhile I don't pretend to call him a Communist, he accepts their support.
* * * ^ * 4i 4c
"Mr. Vexne. The international — I mean local 248 — is exonerated from paying
per capita tax to the international union while a strilve is in progress. On April
29, the day the strike was called, local 248 had 87 votes at the international con-
vention ; that is, they have a vote f<n- every one of the members. They will still
carry that 87 votes at the convention that is to be held ; I believe it is in
September.
"Providing that — I am getting ahead of myself.
"The constitution of the United Auto Workers states that a per capita tax will
be based on a period of 1 year preceding (iO days from the convention date, which
means that, if the strike continues to approximatel.v June 81. then local 248 >vilL
carry 87 votes to supiwrt R. J. Thomas in his fight against Walter Reuther ;
whereas if the strike was settled, say, today, we will have to figure some months
on an 87 basis and some months at possil)ly — I would state that if the strike were
settled today the members of local 248 would drop to an all-time low of prob-
ably 2,000 to 3.000 on th^ outside, and probably less.
"The Chairman. Then, Mr. Yenne, do you mean to imply that the real purpos*>
of this strike is to determine the national leadership between Reuther and
Thomas?
"Mr. Yenne. I will put it this way, sir : The continuation of this strike — ^the
continuance of the strike, is due to the — rests on the political angle of — the inter-
national fight for the presidency of the U. A. W. of A."
*******
"Mr. Stripling. Did you hear the testimony of the preceding witness, Mr.
"Venne ?
"Mr. Petersen. Yes.
"Mr. Stripling. What do you have to say concerning his testimony about the
87 votes?
"Mr. Petersen. That is right. If the strike is prolonged until June 1947, which
M'ould be about 60 days before the date of the convention, local 248 would still
carry 87 votes * * * ; and. if the strike was settled befoi'e that, they would
lose, approximately, about 30 votes. * * *
"Mr. MuNDT. You mean the.v would lose about 60 votes?
"Mr. Petersen. They would lose about 60 votes.
"Mr. Stripling. Have you made any effort to oust the Communists — as a
member of good standing?
"Mr. Petersen. Y'es ; we did. We have been in and out of this fight practically
since 1939. In 1941, I had much correspondence with Clare Hoffman. We;
already knew about it.
"Mr. Stripling. Did you ever communicate with any of the international of-
ficers of the union?
"Mr. Petersen. I did.
"Mr. Stripling. Did you communicate with them? Who did you communicate
with?
"Mr. Petersen. I communicated with Mr. Reuther and Mr. Murray both.
"Mr. Stripling. 'SA'alter Reuther?
"Mr. Petersen. Yes. ,
4: ***** *
2338 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
"Mr. Stripling. Did you get any response?
"Mr. I'ETKKSEN. We never received any respon.se from them whatsoever."
*******
"Mr. Stripling. Were you alone in your petition to IMr. Murray and Mr.
Reuther?
"Mr. I'KTKKSEN. No. Tliis dates back to last September 1946. There was about
four or five of us from our department who got together and talked things over
and we gradually expanded * * *. We decided at last that there was no
way we could Ijeat them l)ut by going on the ether side of the fence and with-
drawing our support from the union, which we did. There was at that time
about 3,000 of us that went in and more workers came in right along and in the
latter part of November we had repudiation cards printed * * *
"Mr. Stkipling. * * * How many members of local 248 signed such a card?
"Mr. Petersen. We had approximately — at the time we sent the petition in,
we had 2,600 of those cards signed.
"Mr. Stripling. Where did you send the petition?
"Mr. Petersen. We sent it to Mr. Reuther — one to Mr. Reuther and one to
Mr. Murray.
"Mr. Stripling. And you received no reply from them?
"Mr. Petersen. We received no reply whatsoever.
jt ***** *
"Mr. Petersen. * * *
"It happened that on December 8, Walter Reuther was in town, was in Mil-
waukee, and we made an attempt to contact him. I had tried to contact him all
that day at different points around town. I knew where he was and failed to
make connections. When the rioting happened on this Monday, we put out a
call for a special meeting for that evening * * *.
"During the course of the meeting I stated the fact that Reuther was in town
the day before and failed to notify us or get in touch with us, and I failed to
contact him, and what happened that day out at the plant. We took that for
his answer to our demands." (Hearings Regarding Communism in Labor
Unions in the United States, February 27, July 23, 24, and 25, 1947, pages
36, 48, .'51-r,3. )
It is to be noted that Walter Reuther has been president of the United Auto
Workers since 1938 and that this organization, under the leadership of Walter
Reuther, has for the past few years made a determined effort to rid itself of
Communist Party members who had infiltrated its official family.
It is also noted that Walter P. Reuther was one of the signers of an anti-
Communist statement of the organization, Americans for Democratic Action, as
reported in the "ADA World," June 18, 1947, page 2.
According to its organizers, the organization known as Americans for Demo-
cratic Action was designed to "expand the New Deal social and economic program
at home and support 'democratic movements based on the Four Freedoms through
the World,' " and the group also rejected "any alliance with totalitarian forces
of the left or right." ( See Washington Evening Star for January 4, 1947, p. A-4. )
Robert E. Sherwood
It is noted that the Worker of December 19, 1948. page M-10, listed Robert E.
Sherwood's book, ''Roosevelt and Hopkins," among the "Best Book Buys for
Holidays." The Woiker is the Sunday edition of the Daily Worker official organ
of the Communist Party.
Raymond Swing
The following references to Raymond Gram Swing are found in the records of
the Committee :
Raymond Gram Swing was a sponsor of the Soviet Russia Today dinner cele-
brating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army, as shown in "Soviet
Russia Today" for April 1943 (p. 31).
"Soviet Russia Today" was cited as a Connnunist-front publication in Reports
of the SptHial Conuuittee on Un-American Activities dated June 25, 1942, and
March 29, 1944.
A letterhead dated March 1:5, 194(), and a memorandum dated March 18, 1946,
issued by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, listed Raymond
Swing as a sponsor of the organizatioiL The citation of the National Council of
American-Si>viet Friendship appears on page 4 of this memorandum.
Refereiic(> to Kavmond Oram Swing api>ears in public bearings held September
25, 1947, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, regarding llanns Eisler.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2339
A letter adtlressecl to the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, :Crom
Kayiuoncl Gram Swing, 36 East Fortieth Street, New York City, dated March
28, 1939, was introduced as evidence by Mv. llobert E. Stripling, Chief Investigator
for the Committee. In this letter, Mr. Swing urged extensions of stay in the
United States for Mr. and Mrs. Ilanns Eisler (Hearings Before the Committee on
Un-American Activities, September 24. 2.j. 26, 1947. p. 134).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered the deportation of Hanns
Eisler. The deportation order came after an immigration hearing in New York
into a charge that Eisler "was a member in Germany of a group advocating the
violent overthrow of this Government." (See Washington Evening Star for
February 13, 194S, p. B-5 ; also New York Times for February 13, 1948, p. 12.)
It is noted that Raymond Gram Swing was one of those who signed an anti-
Communist statement of the Americans for Democrafic Action, which statement
appeared in the "'ADA World" for .Inne IS. 1947, page 2. See page 11 of this
memorandum for a characterization of the Americans for Democratic Action.
ExHiniT 38 — Teiikan-Yalta-Potsdam Agrf:ements
[Documents formulated at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, February 4-11, 1945]
Protocol of the Pi!Ocp:edings of the Crimea Conference
The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States
of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which took place from February 4th to 11th, came to the following conclusions :
I. WORLD ORGANISATION
It was decided —
(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation
should be summoned for Wednesday, 25tli April 1945, and should be held in the
United States of America.
(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be —
(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February 1945; and
(&) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common
enemy by 1st March 1945. (For this purpo.se by the term "Associated Na-
tions" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the
Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United
Kingdom and the United States of America will support a proposal to admit
to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics; i. e., the Ukraine and
White Ru.ssia.
(3) That the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should
consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in re-
gard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed.
World Organisation.
(4) that the text of the invitation to be is.sued to all the nations which would
take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows :
Invitation
"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of
the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the Republic of China, and of the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, invite the Government of to send representatives
to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April 1945, or soon
thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America, to prepare a
Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
"The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as afford-
ing a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General
International Organisation, which were made public la.st October as a result
of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented
by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI :
"C. Voting
'1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
'2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by
an aflBrmative vote of seven members.
2340 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
'3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by
an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under CJiapter VIII, Section
A, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C,
a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
"In the event that the Government of desires in advance of the
Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and
comments to the other participating Governments."
Territorial trusteeship
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on tlie
Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Confer-
ence on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that
territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League
of Nations; (6) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present
war ; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship ;
and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming
United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a
matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories
will be placed under trusteeship.
II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
The following declaration has been approved :
"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of Ajnerica have
consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their coun-
tries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement
to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the
policies of their three governments in assiting the peoples liberated from the
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states
of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic
problems.
"The establishment of order in Eui'ope and the rebuilding of national economic
life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to
destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institu-
tions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right
of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live — the
restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have
been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these
rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European
liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment
conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; ib) to carry out
emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim
govei'ninental authorities hroadl.v representative of all democratic elements in
the i)opui,ition and pledged to the earliest possible estahlishnu'nt thi'ongh free
elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate
where necessar.v the holding of such elections.
"The three governments will consi;lt the other United Nations and provisional
authorities or other governments in Europe Avhen matters of direct interest to
them are under consideration.
"When, in the opinion of the three goverimients, conditions in any European
liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action
necessary, they will immediatel.y consult ti>getlier on the measures necessary to
discliarge the joint responsibilities s(>t forth in this declaration.
"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the i)rineiples of the Atlantic
Charter, our pledge in the Declai'ation by tlie United Nations, and our determina-
tion to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under
law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.
"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the
Provisional (Jovernment of the French Republic may be associated with them
in the procedure suggested."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2341
III. DISMEMBERME3NT OF GERMANY
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should
be amended to read as follows :
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist liepublics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany.
In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the
complete disarmament, demilitarisation, and the dismemberment of Germany,
as they deem requisite for future peace and security."
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred
to a Conimitte>e, consisting of Mr. Eden (Cliairman) , Mr. Winant, and Mr. Gousey.
This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French i-ep-
resentative.
IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces,
should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British
and American zones, and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans
in consultation with the French Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited
to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
v. REPARATION
The following protocol has been approved :
Protocol on the talks between the Heads of the Three Governments at the Crimean
Conference on the question of the German reparation in kind
The Heads of the Three Governments have agreed as follows :
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations
in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by
those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the
heaviest losses, and have organised victory over the enemy.
2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms :
(a) Removals (within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the
cessation of organised resistance) from the national wealth of Germany
located on the territory of Germany herself, as well as outside her territory,
equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad,
shares of industrial, transport, and other enterprises in Germany, etc., these
removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential
of Germany.
( b ) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be
fixed.
(c) Use of German labour.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction
of reparation from Germany, an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in
Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of Soviet
Socialist Repul)lics, one from the United Kingdom, and one from the United
States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the
distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggres-
sion, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows :
"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a
basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum
of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (&) of the paragraph 2
should be 20 billion dollars, and that 50 percent of it should go to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the
reparation question liy the Moscow Reparation Commission, no figures of repara-
tion should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation
Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.
2342 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
The Conference agreed tluit the question of the major war criminals should
be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course
after the close of the Conference.
VII. POLAND
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference :
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete
liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Pro-
visional Government which can l)e more broadly based than was possible before
the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. The Provisional Govern-
ment which is now functioning in I'oland should therefore be reorganized on a
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland
itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a com-
mission to consult in the tirst instance in Moscow with members of the present
Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within
Polan 1 and from abroad, with a view to the i-eorganisation of the present Govern-
ment along the above lines. This I'olish Provisional Government of National
Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put
forward candidates.
"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which
now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Governn)ent of
Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom ami the (iovernment of the
U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Gov-
ernment of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports
the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five
to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive
substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the
opinion of the new Poli.sh Provisional (iovernment of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimita-
tion of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace
Conference."
VI II. YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic —
(fl) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement sliould immediately be i)ut into effect and
a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare —
(i) that the Anti-Fascist As.sembly of National Liberation (AUXOJ) will
be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have
not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming
a body to be known as a temporary Parliament ; and
(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National
Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Con-
stituent Assembly ;
and that this statement should be published in the communiqu«5 of the Conference.
IX. IT ALO- YUGOSLAV FKONTIKR AND ITALO-AUSTRIA FKONTIKU
Notes on these subjects were put in by the Pritisb delegation, and the American
and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.
X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the ques-
tion of the desiral»ility of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question
at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to
enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian
and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2343
Mr. Stettinius suggested that the Rritsh and American Ambassadors should dis-
cuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the
proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on
the following subjects :
(«) the Control Commission in Bulgaria;
(&) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particulai'ly with reference to repara-
tions ;
(c) Oil equipment in Roumania.
XII. IRAN
Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, and B. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in
Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic
channel.
XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES
The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for con-
sultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as
necessary, probably about every three or four mouths.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting
being held in London.
XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretarie-s, to
be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was undei'stood the
Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention
and report to their Governmeuts. The Turkish Government should be in-
formed at the appropriate moment.
The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secre-
taries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.
E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
M. Molotov.
Anthony Eden.
Protocol on the talks between the heads of the three governments at the Crimean
Conference on the question of the German reparation in kind
The Heads of the Three Governments agreed as follows :
1. Germany must pay i.i kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied na-
tions in the course of the war. Reparation are to be received in the first in-
stance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have
suffered the heaviest losses, and have organised victory over the enemy.
2. Reparation in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following
forms :
(a) Removals (within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the
cessation of organised resistance) from the national wealth of Germany
located on the territory of Germany herself, as well as outside her terri-
tory, equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock. German investments
abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany,
etc., these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the
war potential of Germany.
(&) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to
be fixed.
(c) Use of German labour.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction
of reparation from Germany, an Allied Reparation Commission will b3 set
up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives — one from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom, and one from the
United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the
distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggres-
sion, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as foUows :
2344 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
"The Moscow Reparation Commission slionld take in its initial studies as a
basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum
of the reparation, "in accordance with the points (a) and (&) of the paragraph
2, should be 20 billion dollars, and that 50 percent of it should go to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the
reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission, no figures of repara-
tion should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation
Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.
Winston S. Churchill.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Joseph V. Stalin.
February 11, 1945.
Agreement regarding Japan Agreement
The leaders of the thi-ee Great Powers — the Soviet Union, the United States
of America, and Great Britain — have agreed that, in two or three months after
Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet
Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on con-
dition that —
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall
be preserved ;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan
in 1904 sliall be restored, viz :
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent
to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union ;
(&) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-
eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and
the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored.
(c) the Chinese-P^astern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad,
which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the estab-
lishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the
preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China
shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is under-
stood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads
referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice
from Marshal Stalin.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the
Soviet Union sliall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union exiiressed its readiness to conclude with the
National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the
U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed
forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
J. Stalin.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Winston S. Churchill.
February 11, 1945.
Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces
Operating Under Soviet Connnand and Forces Operating Under United States
of America Command
The Government of tlie T'nited States of America on the one hand and the
Government of the T^nion of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing
to make nrr:ingenieiits for the care and repatriation of United States citizens
freed l)y forces operating undpr Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by
forces operating under United States command, have agretnl as follows:
Article 1. All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United
States connnand and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating
under (lie Soviet command will, without d(^lay after their liberation, be separated
from enemy jirisoners of war and will be maintained seiiarately from them in
camps or points of concentration until they liave been handed over to the Soviet
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2345
or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon betweeu
those authorities.
United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the neces-
sary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy
bombing, artillery hre, etc.
■ Article 2. The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities
shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding
citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time
take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet
and United States repatriation repi-esentatives will have the right of immediate
access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located
and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up
the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure
and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own
nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the
respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside
protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be
established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in
whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a
commandant, who shall have the tinal responsibility for the over-all adminis-
tration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.
The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of
liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or
United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated
citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary
agreement provided the competent anthoiities are immediately notified of such
removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed
against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be
permitted.
Article 3. The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply lib-
erated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing, and medical attention both
in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until
they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed
upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing,
and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a
basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for
civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other
similar services which their authorities may supply resiiectively to liberated
citizens of the other contracting party.
Article 4. Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agree-
ment with the other party such of its own means of tran.sport as may be available
for the repatriation of its citizens held l)y the other contracting party. Similarly
each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the
other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by
the other contracting party.
Article 5. Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such
advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the
other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities
shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their
occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory,
the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made
to their citizens necessary settlements with the Governments of the territory
concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for
this purpose.
Article 6. Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties
may. mitil their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance, and
administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also
be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps
in fui-therance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be
reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The ques-
tion of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement
between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the
respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and
procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.
2346 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
AuTK'i.E 7. The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all prac-
ticable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these lil)erated citizens.
They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens
to places to be agreed upon vs^here they can be handed over to the Soviet or
United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated
citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their
temporary employment.
Article 8. The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the
foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail
and fiom time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the
several theatres.
ARTICLE 9. This Agreement shall come into force on signature.
D(me at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and llussian languages,
both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 194.3.
For the Goi-rrumrnt of the United
States of America:
John R. Deane,
Major General, U. S. A.
For the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Repuhlics:
Lieutenant General Gbyzlov
Report of the Crimea Conference
For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal
J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff
and oilier advisors in the Crimea.
In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the
Conference :
For the United States of America:
Edwai'd R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State,
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President,
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President,
Justice James F. P)yrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization,
General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A.. Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Serv-
ice Forces,
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator,
Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S.
Army Air Forces,
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.,
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department,
Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political AtVairs. Department
of State,
Charles E. Bohlen. Assistant to the Secretary of State,
together with political, military, and technical advisors.
For Ihc United Kinftdoni:
Anllumy Eden, Seci'etary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport,
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow,
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs,
Sir Edward Bi-idges, Secretary of the War Cabinet,
Field Marshal Sir Alan P.roo'ke, (Miief of the Imperial General Staff.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal. Chief of the Air Staff,
.^dmiral of tiie Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningiiam, First Sea Lord,
General Sir Hastings Ismay, Cliief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,
together witli
Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
Th(>atre,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2347
Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington.
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington,
together with military and diplomatic advisors.
For the Soviet Union:
V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.,
Admiral Kuznetsov, l'eoi)le's Commissar for the Navy,
Army General Autonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army,
A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Conmiissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U. S. S. R.,
I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.,
Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov,
F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain,
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.
The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the
President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of
Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of
the Crimean Conference :
I. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY
We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied
powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three
allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These
meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted
in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before.
The fullest information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and coordi-
nation of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and
air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have
been fully agreed and planned in detail.
Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but
we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staff's
attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the
three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.
Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their
defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.
II. THE OCCtlPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY
We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional
surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German
armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known
until the final defeat of Germany has l)een accomplished. Under the agreed
plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany.
Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan
through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders
of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France
should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a
zone of occunation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Com-
mission. Th^ limits of the French Zone will be agreed by the four governments
concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to en-
sure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world.
We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces ; break up
for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resur-
gence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment;
eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military produc-
tion ; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact repara-
tion in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans ; wipe out the Nazi party,
Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, rpiuove all Nazi and militarist in-
llueuces from public ofiice and from the cultural and economic life of the German
people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be neces-
sary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy
the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extir-
pated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in
the comity of nations.
2348 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
III. REPARATION BY GERMANY
We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the
Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged
to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible.
A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Com-
mission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods
for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Com-
mission will work in Moscow.
IV. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of
a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe
that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political,
economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration
of all peace-loving peoples.
The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of
voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present
conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.
We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet
at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter
of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations
at Dumbarton Oaks.
The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be
immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference joint-
ly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France
has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made
Ijublic.
V. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EVROPE
We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This
Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint
action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated
Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration
is as follows :
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, and the I'resident of the United States of America have
consulted with each (itlier in tlie common interests of the peoples of their coun-
tries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement
to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated lOurope the
policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the
domination of Nazi (Jermany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states
of Europe to solve by democratic means their i>ressing political and economic
problems.
The establishment of order in Phirope and the I'ebuilding of national economic
life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to
destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat [sic] democratic
institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Cliarter — the
right of all peoples to choose the foi'm of goverinuent under which they will
li\ii — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples
who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these
rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European lib-
erated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where, in their judgment,
conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (ft) to carry out
emergency measui'es for the I'elief of distressed people; (c) to form interim gov-
ernmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the
population and pledged to the eai'liest possible establishment through free elec-
tions of governments nvsponsive to the will of the people; and ((/) to facilitate
where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three governiiieHls will consult the other United Nations and provisional
authorities (tr other .governnuMits in Europe when matters of direct interest to
them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European
liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2349
necessary, they will immediately consult tvigether on the measures necessary to
discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reafhrm onr faith in the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, onr pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determi-
nation to bnild in cooperation witli other peace-loving nations a world order
under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and the general well-being of
all mankind.
In issuing this declaration the Three Powers express the hope that the Provi-
sional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the
procedure suggested.
VI. POLAND
We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about
Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reafltirm our com-
mon desire to see establishe<l a strong, free, independent, and democratic Poland.
As a result of our discussions, we have agreed on the conditions in which a new
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner
as to command recognition by the three major powers.
The agreement reached is as follows :
A new situation has been createil in I'oland as a result of her complete libera-
tion by the Ited Army. This calls for the estal»lishment of a Polish Provisional
Govermnent which can be more broadly Itased than was possible before the recent
liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now func-
tioning in Poland should, therefore, be reorganized on a broader democratic basis,
with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself amd from Poles abroad.
This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity.
M. Molotov, Mv. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Com-
mission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present
Provisional GovernmeTit and with other Polish democratic leaders from within
Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Govern-
ment along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National
Unit.v shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections
all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put
forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which
now maintains di]>lomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of
Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Goverment of the
United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity and will exchange Ambassadors, by whose reports
the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line, which digressions from it in some regions of five
to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive
substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the
opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimita-
tion of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace
Conference.
VII. YUGOSLAVIA
We have agreed to recommend to ^Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agree-
ment between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Govern-
ment should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.
We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it
should declare that :
(i) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be
extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who
have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming
a body to be known as a temporary Parliament ; and
(ii) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Libera-
tion (Aunoj) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.
There was also a general review of other Balkan questions [sic].
93744— 52— pt. 7 34
2350 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
VIII. MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES
Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Gov-
ernments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign
Secretaries and their advisers have also i)een held daily.
These meetings have proved of the utmost value, and the Conference agreed
that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the
three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be neces-
sary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held
in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after
the United Nations Conference on world organization.
IX. UNITY FOB PEACE AS FOR WAR
Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to
maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action
which has made victory possible and certain for. the United Nations in this war.
We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our
peoples and to all the peoples of the world.
Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our
three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration
of humanity be realized — a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of
the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live
out their lives in freedom from fear and want."
Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organiza-
tion will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years
to come the essential conditions of such a peace.
Winston S. Churchill.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Joseph V. Stalin.
February 11, 1945.
(Prepared by the Assistant for Treaty Affairs. Office of the Legal Adviser,
D.'partment of State, Washington, D. C, July 2, 1951.)
Exhibit 41 — INIessages Sent to Department of State by Ambassador Habriman
During Formation of Polish Provisional Government — See Harriman
Testimony
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, November 23, 1944-
Secretary of State,
Waslmigton.
(For the President and the Secretary. Secret.)
Today at lunch with Romer and Mikolajczyk, the latter stated that he had had
talks with his colleagues in the London I'olish Government subsequent to the
receipt of your letter. It is now his conviction tliat he cannot obtain any support
for his program of reconciliation with the Lublin Poles and the Soviets.
The leaders of the other three parties in the London Polish Government are all
definitely against a settlement now, altliough he has obtained complete support
and authority to act from the I'easant I'arty leaders inside Poland. Since he
could not obtain the agreement of his associates to a boundary settlement at
piesent,.he cannot, under the circumstances, in fairness ask for your intervention
with Stalin in an effort to get a more favorable settlement of the frontier to
include the LWOW area. I will not therefore discuss with Stalin at this time
the question of LWOW unless you instruct me otherwise.
For your letter and sympathetic consideration of Polish problems, Mikolajczyk
is very grateful and he will so inform you directly. He has requested me to
convey his apologies for having recpiested that you intervene at a time when, as
it worked out. he is not able to win the support of his colleagues in the effort to
attain a realistic settlement with the Soviets.
In the opinion of his associates, Soviet policy was to communize Poland,
Mikolajczyk said. His associates plan to wait until after the liberation of Poland,
to continue within the country a resistance to the domination of Soviet Russia,
and to liojK. iii;it the influence of the I'nited States and of Great Britain might
be brought to bear on the Soviet Union at .some future time to induce that country
to permit the Polish pi'ople the right freely to choose their own government.
Ihis policy is not shared by Mikolajszyk personally and he deeply regrets that
THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 2351
he is not able to persuade his colleagues to join him in an earnest effort to find a
solution now.
After he has talked further with Eden and Churchill, it is the intention of
Mikolajczyk, under these circumstances, to resign. It is his feeling that to remain
Prime Minister would be to become involved in accusations and counter-accusa-
tions with the Soviets. He feels that no good will come from this, and that his
usefulness to his people in the future will be lost.
I am staying here for an additional day in order to talk with Eden and
Churchill, and I will send you reports concerning their reactions tc these
developments.
In addition. Mikolajczyk informed me that in the Lublin Committee the commu-
nist influence was becoming greater and that several individuals, who were
more independent had resigned or been forced out. Mikolajczyk said that he
feared the result will be terrorism and counter-terrorism. The developments in
London and Liiblin have made him very pessimistic, and he considers that his
best cour.se is to withdraw, at the same time holding himself available to be of
help in the future if the moment arises. Even with lull Soviet support the Lubic
Committee cannot compel Polish sentiment, in his opinion, and he t'eels that a
compromise of some sort may be found some day which will allow an opportunity
for Polish nationalism to express itself.
WiNANT.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, Nortmbcr 25, ID^'f.
Sechetauy of State,
Washington.
Mikolajczyk, wliom I saw this morning, informed me that the reason for his
resignation as Prime Minister was his feeling that an agreement between Poland
and the Soviet Union was necessary at this time, whereas the three major politi-
cal parties, except for his own Peasant Party, wei'e of the opinion that frontier
questi<ms should not be taken up until after the war was ended. (This telegram
is from Schoenfeld.)
Mikolajczyk knew that he would have been the object of attacks if his govern-
ment had made the concessions which the Soviets desired, but Mikolajczyk rea-
soned that if an agreement were not reached, the risk for Poland would be not
only the loss of territories in the East but also in all probability the loss of real
compensation in the West. He felt that American and British public opinion,
once the war had come to an end, would n<it stand behind thorough going com-
pensation for Poland in the West. Furthermore, if there were no agreement, it
was certain that Poland would be subjected to severe attempts to communize the
country. Those elements of the Lublin Committee which were not communist
were being sjieedily eliminated, and that Committee was already largely com-
munist. The members of the London (4overnment might be successful in pre-
venting Poland's communization if they were able to return to Poland soon.
There were those wlio doubted Soviet intentions, and he could agree with them,
but he felt that they should at least try if there was the slightest chance of
success. P)esides this, in view of advances by the Soviets from the southeast and
from the north, the Polish (iovernment, in the absence of an agreement, was faced
with the likelih()od of additional difficttlty in keeping up comnuinications with
the underground organization in Poland, and in supplying it.
He would also have wished to gather up and keep intact the "capital of energy"
which is still at the disposition of Poland abroad if he had liad more time. It
would have been a source of strength to withstand efforts aimed at the conuutini-
zation of Poland if the parties had been able to unite on a policy, but the parties
were necessarily ineffective when they were divided. In addition, there were
perhaps even a million Poles in Germany and several hundred thotisand in
Western Europe. In German territory which was captured recently a surprising
number of Poles had already been foitnd in prison camps. In the interests both
of the war effort and of rehabilitation of tlie.se Poles he would have wished to
recruit tliem for military service. They would have been useftil as a nucleus for
the rebttilding of Poland. But in the opinion of the Supreme Allied Command,
It was too late to train these Poles for the war effort and only the numbers suf-
ficient to make up losses in presently existing Poli.vh military units were per-
mitted. So loiifT as there was no tinity among the parties and in the absence of
more suppoil from the Allies, it was not possible for him to effect this pres-
ervation of Polish energies.
2352 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mikolajczyk had not felt that he could take advantage of the President's ofiEer
to intervene with Stalin reiiardins the oil areas of Galicia and Lwow inas-
much as he was not able in any event to obtain the support of his own govern-
ment to the general boundary settlement which had been proposed by the Soviets.
He said that he was grateful to the President for this offer. This was in the
course of a reference to his recent conversation with Harriman. It was pos-
sible, Miko]a.iczyk said, that "the others" were right in their estimate of the
future and that he was wrong, but his own estimate was his honest conviction
and he did not feel that he could continue as Prime Minister under the
circumstances.
In reply to my question Mikolajczyk said that he would not undertake to form
a government if Kwapinski's attempt failed. So far as his immediate plans
were concerned, he said that he did not know what he would do.
Throughout this conversation Mikola.iczyk spoke with quiet simplicity and
kept his normal calm and self-possession, although he was somewhat more sub-
dued than customary. He showed emotion only as I was taking leave and when
I expressed my sorrow that he had resigned. He asked me to convey to the
President his great admiration and appreciation and said that he appreciated
deeply the miderstanding which had always been siiown him from the
American side.
WiNANT.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, Jioie 15, 19. 'i5.
Secretaky of State,
Wusliington:
Together with the British Ambassador I met with Molotov afternoon today,
and it was agreed that we should send another communication to Witos to urge
him to come to Moscow despite his earlier decision not to do so, offering to
see that all necessary arrangements were made for his medical attention and
comfort both in Moscow and en route, and emphasizing the importance which
we attached to his being here. We further agreed that Kiernik should be
Invited in tlie place of Witos if the latter finally decided that he could not
come. It was the position of Molotov that the question of an interview in
Poland between Witos and Mikolajczyk i^hould be postponed until the consul-
tations had already begun.
The British Ambassador and I gave our concurrence to inviting Kowrdzei
instead of Zakowski, in connection with the agreement to Kiernik by Molotov.
Molotov declined to reconsider I'opiel.
At 7 p. m. tomorrow (Saturday) the Commission will receive all of the
Poles, and it is a matter of urgent necessity that Stanczyk and Mikolajczyk
should leave London tomorrow morning early. If possible it would seem
desirable to bring Kolodzei. to whom an invitation is to be extended by the
Foreign Office. We will meet witii the others after we have met with the
represi'ntatives of the Warsaw Government on Monday.
Molotov gave his concurrence to the rotation of the chairmansliip among
Commission members. This was at the suggestion of Clark Kerr. Inasmuch
as Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, had referred to Molotov as Chairman,
I spoke against the proposal but concurred in the majority vote.
Hariuman.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, June 21, 19.'i5.
Secretary of State,
Washinyton:
An agreement whidi was reached among the Voles themselves was reported
toniglit to the Commission.
Tlie National Council presidium will consist of the following: President —
Bierut, Deputy Presidents — Witos, Szwalbe, and Grabski, jtlus three additional
present members. When the Council is not in session, the presidium is the
source of jjower of the (Jovernment. (This tel(>gram was also sent to Ambas-
sador Winant in London and to Minister Schoenfeld also in London.)
Morawski remains as Prime Minister in the (Jovernment and (Jonnilka of
the Wori<ers' I';nty slays on as Vice I'rime Minister. The offices of Vice Prime
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2353
Minister and Minister of Afiriculture will be assumed by Mikolajczj-k, with
no substantial changes in the other Ministers except that the Minister of
Public Administration will be Kiernik of the Peasant Party, and the Minister
of Lat)or and Social Welfare will be Stanczyk, the Minister of Posts and
Telegraph will be Thugutt of the Peasant Party from London, Kolodziejski, a
nonparty man, will be Minister without Portfolio and the Minister of Educa-
tion will be Wycech of the Peasant Party within Poland. Thus out of a total
of twenty there will be six new Ministers. An invitation will be extended to
Popiel of the Christian Labor Party to return to Poland and to participate
in public affairs. ]\Iikolajczyk hopes that at a later date Popiel will be given a
Ministry.
The Peasant Party representatives, Mikolajczyk and Kiernik, have brought in
four new Peasant leaders and have therefore not done bac?ly. A very strong
position was not taken by the Socialists, however, and the only new Socialist
Minister is Stanczyk. It is their hope that the old-time Socialists will be able
to increase their intiuence after the organization of the new government. The
agreement reached by the Polish conferees was accepted by the Commission and
tomorrow, Friday evening, a meeting will be held for the purpose of agreeing on
the public announcement. No publicity is to be given in the meantime. I asked
for instructions urgently but unless instructions to the contrary are received by
1 o'clock Washington time, S o'clock Moscow time, I will accept the settlement
as complying with the agreement at Yalta.
It was made clear by Clark Kerr and myself that the forming of the provi-
sional government of national unity was the first step only and tliat there would
be no fulfillment of the Y'alta decision until a truly free election was held.
Agreement has been reached in principle only on some additional understand-
ings. For example, that the National Council shall be re-formed to include
equitable representation of the various parties which have members in the
government and that the same proportion shall be used in selecting the men for
under-ministerial posts. It is the fundamental basis of the government, as
reorganized, that the Socialist Party, the Workers' Party, and the Peasant Party
each will have six ministries, and other democratic parties are to have two.
Although there is no assurance that this will be done, it is the hope of both
the old-line socialists not at present affiliated w^th the W^arsaw Government,
and of Mikolajczyk as well, that they can replace some of the weaker men who
hold portfolios at a later date.
I must report in frankness that this settlement was reached because all the
non-Lublin Poles are so concerned about the situation now in Poland that they
are prepared to agree to any compromise which would offer some hope for
individual freedom and for I'olish independence. I asked for assurances at the
meeting tonight that the principal parties concerned would promise to maintain
the basic agreement until it was possible to hold a free election. Definite assur-
ances were given. In addition. I asked for assurances of freedom to discuss and
of assembly in the party before the election, and for amnesty to benefit people
within Poland who were charged with political oft"enses. The answers were in
generalities only, but after the meeting Bierut assured me privately that there
was already acceptance for the principle of amnesty and he said that it was his
expectation that SO percent of the people now under arrest in Poland would
be released.
*******
It was impossible not to have the impression that the Warsaw Poles and
Molotov were in high spirits and that serious concern was felt by the other Poles,
who hoped that as a result of the trust they had demonstrated for the good faith
of Moscow there would be a freer hand for the Poles to conduct their own
affairs. For my part I am much relieved that a settlement has been agreed to by
the Poles themselves, and there is no reason tliat I can see why we should not
accept it. We must face the fact on the other hand that the Poles are relying
on us for continued interest in making sure that there will be a free election.
Harriman.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, June 23, 1945.
Secretary of State,
Washinffton:
1 presided at the last meeting of the Commission yesterday evening. The
first matter considered was the communique which was agreed to in the form
2354 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
in which it was was later released. Because he has for personal reasons declined
to serve, Kolodziejski was not included in the list of new ministers. With
the support of the other Poles, including Mikola.iczky, Bierut spoke in favor
of the dropping of "Provisional" in the name of the new government, urging
that this would increase the effectiveness and prestige of the govei-nment. This
matter was discussed by Vyshinski and myself that afternoon and since he had
agreed that the word should be retained, I assumed that the S(jviets would
support my contention that the name of the government had been decided, after
a thorough consideration, at Yalta by the three heads of government. Bierut
was supported by Molotov, despite my agreement with Vyshinski. Molotov
suggested that the three governments might be consulted in this matter, although
he conceded that my position was in literal agreement with the Crimean decision.
He said that there was no objection on the part of the Soviet Government to
eliminating the word.
At that point I said that owing to the time difference between the United
States and Moscow, at least 4S hours would be required to obtain an answer
from my Govei'nment. Molotov withdrew his suggestion on hearing this. To
my question as to whether the Poles accepted the Crimean decision on the title
of the government, Bierut expressed his agreement but advanced a proposal
that after the new government had been organized it should suggest three
governments the elimination of the word "Provisional." This was agreed to
by Molotov. While I did not express opposition to this, I explained that until
free elections had occurred which would establish a permanent government,
the Crimea decision would not be fulfilled. I also indicated that it was not my
intention to offer any hope that the Government of the United States would
agree to a change from the decision on this question by President Roosevelt.
Bierut answered in the afBimative my question as to whether he agreed that the
word "I^rovisional" would not be changed without the agreement of the United
States and British Governments.
In order to eliminate any misunderstanding about the translation, it was
agreed that the official text for the use of the Poles among themselves should
be the Polish text of the agreement.
I said that the Government of the United States had agreed to the Crimea
decision and that my Government woiild carry out its commitments under that
decision when the new government was formed as provided therein. I also
said that while 1 accepted the settlement as a member of the t^onnuission, I had
not yet heard from my Government.
I then referred to supplementary understandings which had been reached
among the Poles themselves at a previous meeting, and which had been mentioned
in various statements, but which were not included, I discovered, in the written
statement and I requested an explanation of these understandings so that
I would be able to report them accurately to the Government of the United
States. Specifically 1 made reference to the statement of Bierut the night before
with reference to the National Council and inquired if my understanding was
correct that there would be a broadening of tlie National Council on the same
democratic basis as the government. Bierut made reference to the provision
in the written agreement regarding additioiuTl members of the presidium. I then
asked for further information concerning the membership of the Council itself.
At this point there was an interruption by Molotov, who talked at length raising
the question as to the appropriateness to ask about private nuitters of the Polish
Government. It was quite proper for the Government of the I'nited States to
be informed completely with regard to all agreements which had been reached
amonu' the Pol(>s, 1 maintained. The (piestion was one which should be discussed,
Mikola.jczyk said, since the Supreme Authority of the Polish Government was
the National Council, and he thought that tlie Poles had nothing to hide. At
this P.lerut enlarged and conlirmed the statement he had made last evening,
explaining that the Council had only 140 members at this time and that there
would be a broadening of the Council's ba.se through the local councils so that
broader rt'prescntation from groups now not rei)resented could be brought in,
and that there would be invitations to join the Council to all the conferees in
Moscow and that after their return to W^arsaw there would be further considera-
tion of the question.
Molotov iiilcrruiitt'd again when I inquired concerning the understanding with
regard to Under-Ministerial posts. He said that since this question had not been
previously raised, he did not see why we should examine into the affairs of the
Poles, and be added that he was thoroughly satisfied. (My raising of this ques-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2355
tion was motivatefl by the fact that Miko]ajczyk had informed me that a propor-
tional distribution of the Under-Ministerial posts had been agreed to by Bierut
but that the latter had failed at the previous meeting to report this.) I did not
get a direct reply from Bierut, although I pressed him for one. Bierut said that
there was in Poland plenty of work for all able men and that democratic elements
which would contribute to the competence of the Government would be brought
in but that individual ability rather than party affiliation should be the base for
apptnntments. He added that this was a democratic principle. Although agree-
ing generally, Mikolajczyk pointed out that recognition was given in democratic
governments to the relative strength among the people of the different parties, and
that there should be recognition for this principle as well. Bierut commented
that there was a firm agreement to work together and that he was confident
that this question could be settled among themselves without interference by the
Allies.
I said that I wished to make clear the point that I had raised these questions
so that the Government of the United States could fully understand the agree-
ment which the Poles themselves had reached and also the manner in which the
Poles planned to achieve the unity which was the common objective of all of us.
At the close of the meeting there was expression of mutual thanks and confi-
dence in the settlement which had been achieved.
I entertained all participants at the Embassy after the meeting.
In my opinion the discussion concerning supplementary understandings was
useful, although Molotov expressed objections to that discussion. Almost all of
the outside Poles thanked me profusely after the meeting, expressing the belief
that it would be of assistance to them in securing a fair interpretation of oral
understandings which had been reached.
Unfortunately there is a clue in the remarks of Molotov that he may resist the
execution of the understanding i-eached at Yalta that our Governments would
continue to interest themselves in Polish developments through our Ambassadors
in Warsaw. It is of the utmost importance, in my judgment that the United
States Ambassador should arrive in Warsaw at the earliest possible date after
the new government is formed. It is also of real importance, I think, that prior
to his arrival in Warsaw I should see him personally so that I can give him a
complete picture of the talks here.
In private conversations with me, Bierut and his associates have made it clear
that they wish and need American economic and moral support and that they are
prepared to establish frank and closer relations than Molotov seems to wish at
present. For their part the other Polish leaders from inside Poland have clearly
indicated that their only hope of securing reasonable personal freedom and inde-
pendence lies in the continued interest of the American and British Governments
in the implementation of the agreements which have been reached.
Haekiman.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, June 23, lOJ/S.
Secretary of State,
Washitiffton:
I wish to make a fuller report supplementing my earlier telegram, in view of
the importance of the meeting Thursday.
In accordance with the agreed rotation of chairmen, Clark Kerr was in the
chair. * * *
* * * rit * * *
Bierut read a statement which all the Poles had agreed to describing the pro-
posed reorganization of the Provisional Government along the lines which I
have described previously. In reply to a question, he described the functions
of the Polish National Council as the highest legislative organ and of the pre-
sidium of the National Council which functions as a legislative organ in the
interim between regular Council sessions.
In response to a request for his views, Mikolajczyk said that he agreed with
settlement which had been reached and felt that it was one of the best paths
to an independent and free Poland. The settlement would assure, he said, the
participation of great democratic parties and the masses of the Polish people
in the government. He called for close relations with the Soviet I'nion, treaties
of alliance with P^rance and the United Kingdom and sincere cooperation and
friendship with the United States and also for collaboration with all the Slavic
peoples. In joining the Government of National Unity, he said that it was his^
2356 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
nuderstanding that he and his colleagues obtained the right to put forward
a claim of the Polish nation to the western boundaries contemplated by the Yalta
Conference and also the speediest possible return of democratic Poles to Poland.
He requested that Blerut should confirm his understanding that the possibility
had not been excluded that Popiel would be included in the government and
that there should be a widening of the National Council on the basis of the
participation of all democratic parties and on proportional representation.
Bierut made a long statement in reply to this, urging the great powers to give
their support in principle to the demand.-; of Poland concerning western bound-
aries. In addition, he confirmed INIikolajczyk's understanding on the possibility
of broadening the National Council and of including Popiel.
^ * * * * ^ 0
I limited myself to the remark that the Crimea decision stood and that the
determination of the position of the American Government would be made when
the new government was formed. In addition, I said that I felt sure that Wash-
ington would welcome the news that agreement had been reached among the
Poles themselves.
*******
Molotov said that the Soviet Government would welcome the formation of th?
new government and give it every support.
***** i|c :|c
He added that the attitude of the Soviet Government concerning western
boundaries was based on the decision at Yalta and said that the Soviet Govern-
ment felt that the claims of Poland to the Oder Neisse Line were well founded
and fully justified.
In reply to a request for my views, I said that there was nothing I could add
to the terms of the Yalta decision.
•k ***** *
Osobka Morawski then requested permission to speak and advance Polish
claims concerning participation in Reparations Commission, and in the War
Crimes Commission, which had been brought up in his telegram to the Govern-
ment of the United States. He also advanced Polish claims concerning the
repatriation of Poles. * * * j made no commitment.
I said in effect that I would like to be able to inform my Government that
the parties had pledged themselves to maintain the agreement until the holding
of elections, and I pointed out that I was not referring to future changes in
ministerial posts but to the observance of the basic principles of the agreement
which had been reached among tlie parties. In reply Bierut said that an agree-
ment had been reached, and that they would strive to achieve a lasting unity and
to hold free elections and to broaden the legislative organs along the lines agreed.
This statement was subscribed to by Mikola.iczyk on behalf of his party and he
said that he thought he was expressing the opinion of other parties also.
I brought up the question of assurances of freedom of discussion and of
assembly during the election campaign and the proposal for immunity of persons
accused of political offenses. I also stressed the importance attached by us to
the participation of the Christian Labor Party in the new government. IMolotov,
without giving Bierut a chance to answer my questions, said that he did not wish
to go into a discussion of the future activities of the new government but said
that he was confident, on the basis of the agreement which had been reached,
that tiie new government would find the correct solution to the problems which
faced it. The new Polisli Government, he said again, would enjoy the full con-
fidence of the Soviet Government, a confidence in the abilities and possilnlities
of the democratic force of new Poland. Taking his lead from Molotov, Bierut
spoke only in generalities, saying that he was confident that the Poles could
solve all the diflicult problems confronting them in the spirit of the agreement.
It was decided in the remainder of the meeting, which was devoted to a discussion
of the press release concerning the agreement which had been reached, tliat the
statement would l)e redrafted by the Poles today and that before the meeting of
the Commission tliis evening there would be worked out the text of the press
release. A report on this meeting will follow-
Haukiman.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2357
Exhibit 42 — Dispatches Describing Polish-Soviet Relations Prepared by
American Ambassadob to the Polish Government in Exile in London,
J. Anthony Dkexell Biddle
[Portion of message from Ambassador Biddle in London dated April 23, 1943]
"* * * Sikorski characterized Soviet denials as vague and as attempts to
hide a grim example of preseut-day Russia's return to Ivan the Terrible methods.
When he had questioned Stalin concerning the whereabouts of the missing
officers during their talks in Moscow in December 1941, Sikorski definitely had
the impression from Stalin's marked evasiveness that he knew what had hap-
pened to these officers at the hands of Russian authorities. Sikorski then men-
tioned the following additional piece of circumstantial evidence. In evacuating
the three prison camps originally holding Polish officers in the spring of 1940,
the Soviet authorities had sent a relatively small number to another camp in
Eastern Russia, from which the men were released in July 1941, while the re-
mainder, about eight or ten thousand, were sent to an usiknown place, which
was understood later to have been west of Smolensk. The present Justice Min-
ister, Komarnicki was one of the part.v sent to Eastern Russia, and several officers
of the other party had told him that the Soviet authorities had said that
Smolensk was their probable destination. Besides this, all the Polish officers
had, at the beginning, been allowed to write to their families in Eastern, as well
as Western, Poland. By the spring of 1940, this correspondence stopped, except
for the gi'oup which had been sent to Eastern Russia. * * *
In response to a request by the Chief of the Polish underground. General
Sikorski sent him an order to maintain quiet about the German charges, and to
keep in mind that their number one enemy was Germany and that everything
must be done to defeat Germany.
* * * In speaking of the Polish press Sikorski felt as I personally did that
further polemics could effect him personally. He could, therefore, instruct
Minister of Information Kot. to quiet the tone of the Polish press and to direct
the press and Polish speakers also to take the line that "regardless of whether the
German charges were true or not, the Germans could be expected to describe the
situation in a way to further their own ends * * *."
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, April 27, 1943.
Secretary op State,
Washington:
Sikorski informs me that the Polish Ambassador at Moscow reported yesterday
a meeting early yesterday morning at which Molotov read to him the gist of the
Soviet Government's note telling the Polish Government of the decision to break
relations. The Polish Ambassador in his report said that he had refused to
receive the note.
This is a telegram from Biddle in the Polish series.
I was also informed by General Sikorski that an additional telegram from
Ambassador Romer which came in today tells that Molotov later sent the note
to the Embassy of Poland. Romer added that after studying it he found that the
Soviet Government used the term "suspend" relations instead of "sever" as he
had thought previously. Ambassador Romer therefore feels that the door may
thus be still open for talks.
I am also informed by General Sikorski that in a meeting with Mr. Eden on
Saturday, the latter told him that Stalin had telegraphed to Prime Minister
Churchill to the effect that the Soviet Government would break relations with the
Polish Government unless the German allegations concerning the fate of the
Polish officers near Smolensk were personally denied by General Sikorski and
unless General Sikorski would withdraw the request of the International Red
Cross for an investigation of the matter. I am told by General Sikorski that he
informed Mr. Eden that it would not be possible for him to comply with the
conditions of Stalin but that he, Sikorski, would agree to Mr. Churchill's inform-
ing Stalin that the Polish press would be "soft pedalled" by Sikorski in the matter
of the missing officers and, moreover, that he would not press for the Inter-
national Red Cross investigation but that he desired permission by the Soviets
for the evacuation of certain categories of Poles from the Soviet Union. General
Sikorski states that he was assured that a message of this kind would be sent.
2358 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The next development was the note to Ambassador Romer by the Soviet
Government.
I am also informed by Sikorski that the matter was discussed fully today
in the Polisli Cabinet and that the Sikorski Government proposes, subject to
the approval of IMr. Churchill, to issue a statement described by General Sikorski
as "polite, ilrni, and dignified." The text of this statement is still in Polish,
but General Sil<orski informs me that it is about as follows :
(a) a review of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland subsequent to
their agreement of 1941 ;
(b) despite the fact that difficulties arose for the Polish Government owing
to a lack of precise information about the fate of the missing Polish officers,
the Government of Poland desired to keep up good relations with the Government
of the Soviet Union ;
(c) information concerning these officers had been received by the Polish
Government from Polish sources before the German allegations were made ;
(d) it would be denied that there had been collaboration with the German
Government both in the matter of tlie allegations and in the question of the
request for an investigation by the International Red Cross ;
(e) the policy of the Polish Government is to protect Polish interests and the
citizens of Poland and to reinforce the unity of the common front against the
€nemy.
So far as General Sikorski is concerned, he is not at all certain what may
lie behind the move by the Soviets. General Sikorski feels that it may be either
a move intended to compel the Polish Government now in existence or a re-
constructed Polish Government to pay a high price for the resumption of rela-
tions, or it might be an idea entertained for a long time by the Soviet Union
of attempting to find a pretext favorable to the Kremlin to justify tlie break
in relations with the Government of Poland. In support of the first theory
there is the use of the term "suspend" in the recent note. In support of the
other theory, however, General Sikorski thinks that there are the following
considerations: A radical leftist of Krakow, named Droboner, has been built up
by the Soviets as a possible chief leading a national committee of some sort,
as the Soviets threatened in the summer of 1941 durinrr the Polish-Russian
negotiations ; moreover, the establishment of a communist Polish armed force
under General Rogoszowski ; and finally the publication of Wolna Polska, a
Polish communist newspaper. In any event General Sikorski felt that the belief
of the Soviet Government, that it should adopt an offensive rather than a de-
fensive policy, to distract attention from the alleged massacre of Polish officers
and the suggested investigation by the International Red Cross, was the primary
motivation in the Soviet Government's desire to suspend relations with the
Sikorski Government.
WiNANT.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, May 8, JO.'/S.
Secretary of State,
Washington:
I am not reporting in detail my conversation with the British Ambassador
concerning his conversation with Stalin last night since he tells me that the
Deiiartment will be informed fully by his Foreign Office. It is noteworthy that
the Ambassador stated that Stalin did not seem to attach too great importance
to the break with PoUxnd and that although Stalin did not apparently hold
Sikor.ski in high regard, asserting that he was weak and open to influence from
the pro-German elements in the I'olish Government, Stalin, however, was inclined
to accept Sikorski as the leader of a reconstituted Polish Government provided
that the President and Mr. Churchill desired it. There would have to be a
chiinge in the top position of the Polish Government, however, before relations
could be resumed.
The British .Vmbassador said that his Embassy liad taken over Polish interests
for the time being although it did not seem practical to handle day-to-day
matters actively while they were engaged in the broader as])ects of the dispute.
It had been proposed, therefore, that the Australians or the Canadiaiis who
did not have a great deal to do here should take over the work. It was still
hoped that the Australians would assume the responsibility, although the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2359
Canadians had declined to accept it. I said to Molotov on May 6 that, spealiing
personally and without instructions in the matter, I lioped he would not liesi-
tate to call on me if there were anything I could transmit to my government in
order to regularize the present unfortunate state of Polish-Soviet i-ehitions.
Molotov said that Stalin's letter to Parker explained the position of the Soviet
Government, which had only good intentions towtird Poland and wished to
do anything in tlie common interests to further the common effort of the Allies
provided, of co^irse, that the interests of the Soviet Union were reserved. He
said this with .bitterness, adding, however, as a personal comment, that he
doulited it would be possible to come to an agreement with the present Polish
Government.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
LoxDON, A2)rn 28, JD'fS.
Secretary of State,
Wofthirigtoii:
The Polish Government plans to issue following declaration this evening.
"The Polish Government athrm that their policy aiming at a friendly under-
standing between Poland and Soviet Russia on tlie l)asis of the integrity and
full sovereignty of the Polish Republic, was and continues to be fully supported
by the Polish nation.
Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the
Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the
cornerstone of fufure victory, they were the first to approach the Soviet Govern-
ment with a jiroposal for a common understanding, in spite of the many tragic
events which had taken place from the moment <>f the entry of the Soviet armies
on the territory of the Republic, i. e., September 37, 1939.
Having regulated their relatioTis with Soviet Russia by tlie agreement of July
30, 1941, and by the understanding of December 4, 1941, the Polish Government
have scrupulously discharged their oliligations.
Acting in close union with their government, the Polish people, making the
extreme sacrifice, fight implacalily in Poland and outside the frontiers of their
country against tlie German invader. No traitor Quisling has sprung from
Polish ranks. All collaboration with the Germans has been scorned. In the
ligbt of facts known throughout the world, the Polish Government and Polish
nation have no need to defend themselves from anj- suggestion of contact or
understanding with Hitler.
In a public statement of April 17, 1943, the Polish Government categorically
■denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of Polish officers for her own
perfidious schemes. They unhesitatingly denounce Nazi propaganda designed to
■create mistrust between Allies. About the same time a note was sent to the
Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for
information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers.
The Polish (Tovernment and iieople look to the future. They appeal in the
name of the solidarity of the United Nations and the elementary humanity for
the release from U. S. S. R. of the thousands of the families of Polish soldiers
who are fighting or who in Great Britain and in the Middle East are preparing
to take their part in the fight — tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children
for the education of whom they would take full responsibility, and who now, in
view of the German mass slaughter, are particularly precious to the Polish people.
The Polish army, in waging the war against Germany, will also require for rein-
forcement all fighting Polish males who are now on Soviet soil, and the Polish
Government ai)peal for their release. They reserve their right to plead their
cause to the world. In conclusion, the Polish (Jovernment ask for the continua-
tion of relief welfare for the mass of I*olish citizens who will remain in the
U. S. S. R.
In defending the integrity of the Polish Republic, which accepted the war
with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never claimed and do not claim,
in accordance with their statement of February 2^>, 1943, any Soviet territories.
It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of
Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which the United Nations are
fighting and also the making of all efforts for strengthening their solidarity in
this .struggle again.st the common enemy remain the unchanging basis of the
policy of file Polish Government.
Win ANT.
2360 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
rParaphrase of telegram]
London, April 21, JOJ/S.
Secretary of State,
Washington:
Within tiae next few days, according to information we received at tlie Foreign
Office, the British plan to approach the United States in order to suggest a parallel
or joint demarche at a liigh level in Moscow in the liope of effecting some ameliora-
tion of Russian-Polish relations. It is our understanding thr""''iis suggestion
originated prior to the recent bitter exchange on the question of the fate of the
8,000 Polish officers and that it is quite separate from this question. It is the
belief of the Foreign Office that an American and British appeal to the Soviet
Government, based on the necessity for United Nations unity and on the fact
that if relations between the Poles and Russians continue bitter, it will only be
playing the German game. The Foreign Office feels that this appeal may have
some effect and might lead to a certain relaxation of the Russian attitude toward
Poles in the Soviet Union. The Russian desire to reinforce and express Russian
territorial aspirations in Eastern Poland is the motivation for the measures
taken against such Poles since January, in the view of the Foreign Office. The
point is stressed that the approximately 100,000 Polish troops in the Middle
East, who are now fully equipi)ed and who will turn out to be a valuable armed
force, are becoming increasingly dissatisfied and, moreover, the Polish armed
forces in the United Kingdom are also affected by the continuance of the present
Russian attitude.
In addition to this there is the question of the possible evacuation from the
Soviet Union of several hundred thousand Poles, their ultimate destination,
and the possibilities of transporting them. The Soviet attitude concerning this
possible evacuation is not known.
With respect to the German propaganda account of the 8,000 officers, the
Foreign Office while understanding Sikorski's position and the fact that it has
not been possible for the Poles to discover the whereabouts of these officers,
tends to take the view that a mistake was made in accepting the German bait
and in particular in the apijeal for an investigation by the International Red
Cross. Whatever the fate of these officers may have been, it seems strange, the
Foreign Office feels, that the Germans after being in Smolensk so long should
only now have discovered the 8,000 graves and be prepared with the identity
cards of the alleged victims completely in order. The Foreign Office considers
that it is now too late to remedy this particular incident in any way, unfortunate
as it is, in creating anti-Soviet sentiments among the Poles and anti-Polish
sentiments in Moscow as a result of the Polish ct)mnninique. The opinion is
expressed in the Foreign Office that any Anglo-American move at Moscow
should be directed toward the need to effect an improvement in the near future.
WiNANT.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, May 1, 19)3.
Secretary of State,
WasJiington:
Moscow is insisting that Sikorski personally make a public statement with-
drawing the reipiest of the Polish Government for an International Red Cross
investigation. General Sikorski was informed of this yesterday by Mr. Eden.
General Sikorski .explained to INIr. Eden that he could not make such a public
statement, but suggested instead that the BBC be allowed to broadcast a
"Polisli Telegraph Agency" statement to the effect that it had been informed
that the Government of Poland, following the reply of the International Red
Cross explaining the difficulties of complying with tl>e Polish request for an
investigation, regarded its appeal to the International Red Cross as having
lapsed. A statement as described above was broadcast by the BI'.C last night,
according to General Sikorski, who said that Mr. Eden had accepted his sug-
gestion.
It remains to be seen whether a statement in this form satislied the request
of Moscow. A biting criticism in today's Daily Worker is the only indication
thus far of Moscow's reaction in the matter. An "Inqnident gesture at the
United Nations'' and "a piece oi somewhat shop-soiled political ventrilo(iuisni"
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2361
were the descriptions which the "diplomatic correspondent" of the Daily Worker
gave to the statement above mentioned. The British Government will probably
not receive before Sunday or Monday Moscow's official reaction either to the
above-mentioned statement or to the Polish Government's statement of April 28,
according to- General Sikorski.
Win ANT.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, April 26, 19^3.
Seceetaey of State,
Washington:
I am informed by General Sikorski that the Soviet Government handed Ambas-
sador Romer his passport and broke relations with Ambassador Romer this
morning.
I am seeing General Sikorski again tomorrow morning. He has no further
details at present.
This telegram is from Ambassador Biddle, in the Polish series.
WiNANT.
[Message from the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev dated May 28, 1942]
I told Vyshinski in my conversation with him last week that my Government
hoped that the most liberal interpretation possible would be made by the Soviet
Government of the agreements between Poland and the Soviet Union. I stated
merely that it was felt by my Government that it would further the United
Nations' cause if the fighting forces of Poland were to be increased in the Near
East and the Soviet Union as much as possible and if the Soviet Government,
in interpreting the clauses in the Soviet-Polish Agreement regarding the evacua-
tion and release of Polish civilians, would display as humanitarian and as liberal
an attitude as possible in the circumstances. I tried to make it clear, however,
that it was not the desire of the American Government to interfere in Polish-
Soviet relations or in internal Soviet affairs. The reply given to me by Vyshinski
was to the effect that Soviet agreements with Poland were being fulfilled to the
letter by the Soviet Government, and he made a conunent to the effect that little
disposition had been shown by the Poles to engage in actual warfare although
for more than six months they had been arming. From the attitude shown by
Vyshinski the distinct impression was received by me that my overtures did not
strike a sympathetic chord in him and that the interests shown by us in Soviet
affairs might even have aroused his resentment.
[Paraphrase of telegram]
London, May 2, 1943.
Secretary of State,
Washington:
During a long conversation with Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador, the
larger part of his remarks were in the form of a tirade against (a) the attitude
of the Government of Poland in general, and in particular against the "viciously
anti-Soviet element" of the Polish Government, and (b) the provocative tone
of the Polish press after he had assumed his duties in London.
I have these impressions in evaluating the implications of his comments and
of the continued harsh tone of both the Moscow-inspired press here and of the
Moscow press itself:
Firstly : That the case against the Polish Government had been prepared by
the Soviet Government simultaneously with or perhaps even prior to the sending
of the Russian note of January 16, 1943, which in effect declared all Poles in the
Soviet Union to be Soviet citizens.
Secondly : That from the standpoint of the Soviet Government the basic issues
concerned go further than even the question of the frontiers between Poland
and the Soviet Union and include additional Soviet postwar "security — frontiers"
aims in the "Middle East."
2362 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Thirdly: Tliat the Kremlin was merely waitins f<>r a pretext which it might
use to tiie lieiietit of its own interests in the future.
Fourihly : That the Soviet Government intends to exploit to the full the present
political crisis in order to gain the assent of the British and United States
Government to its proposed territorial "claims" at a time when, in the view
of Polish government people, it is statedly considered by the Soviet Government
that both the British and American Gf)vernments would be "reluctant to offend
Moscow" (it does not appear to be without significance in connection with the
above that iMoscow for the first time took the opportunity, in its stiff note sus-
pending diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, to state officially and
publicly that it considered the Polish Ukraine, White Kussia, and Lithuania to be-
already a part of the Soviet Union).
The Soviet Ambassador considered that the situation necessitated a recon-
struction of the I'olish Government and he pointedly denied that the Kremlin
contemplated the formation on Russian soil of a "Polish National Committee."
In his view there were among the Poles here a sufficient number to permit
the formation of a "more reasonable and realistic" government than the one
at present. According to Bogomolov the situation would result in a victory for
the United Nations rather than for Dr. Goebbels if the pre.sent crisis resulted in
the removal from the Polish Government of "fifth columnists" who were con-
stantly endangering the solidarity of the United Nations. I gained the impres-
sion in this connection that the indignation of the Soviet Ambassador is particu-
larly directed at the foi'mer Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Kot, who is now
Minister of Information, and at Mr. Seyda, who is Minister of Post War Recon-
struction. The Soviet Ambassador made known his suspicion that the request
for tlie International Red Cross investigation was thought up by Minister Kot
and that Kot drafted this particular comnnuiique. (Kot's re.sponsibility in
this connection is known to me. Sikorski's closest associates told me that after
the conimuniqii^ had been written by Kot, Kot succeeded in influencing General
Sikorski by telephone to permit Kot to release the communi(iue. This hap-
pened at a moment when General Sikorski was ill and tired. I am also informed
tli:it on thinking the matter over Sikorski wished to withdraw the comnmnique,
I ut it had already been given to the press.)
With a view to the future, and in this connection, I have given Sikorski
to understand that in my personal opinion (repeat personal) this "diplomatic
blunder" had presented the Kremlin with an excuse for coming to grips with
the I'oli.sh Government : that the fact that the Polish Government had failed
to consult with either the British Government or the Government of the United
States or either of them before releasing the communique had unfortunately
given the impression in my mind that when General Sikorski's Government was
creating trouble it would rather not consult us but that when it got into trouble
it turned to us to get it out. General Sikoi'ski greeted these observations witlt
full comprehension, accepting them as my personal reaeticn.
WiNANT.
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