Kidd's Social evolution

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KIDD'S

"SOCIAL EVOLUTION."

By GEO. S. PATTON, A. M.

V. KIDD'S SOCIAL EYOLUTION.^

In his recent book on Barwinianism Mr. Stirling quotes from
a letter of Dr. Thomas Brown to the elder Darwin, as follows:

'^Sir: In acknowledging the delight which I received from the
perusal of Zoonoiiiia^ I only agree with the public voice. I am,
however, surprised, that while every one has been delighted, no
one as yet has answered. The transition is natural from passive
admiration to a strict examination. Such, at least, was my men-
tal history on reading. The reasoning appeared to me in some
passages more specious than solid. I, therefore, for my own
amusement, marked down my observations."

Thus "expatiating Brown," then at tlie mature age of eighteen,
modestly expressed himself in regard to the then celebrated
work of the great Erasmus Darwin. The quotation not unfairly ex-
presses our own impression of Mr. Kidd's Social Evolution^ and may
serve as a fittting introduction to our comments upon it.

Mr. Kidd's book proved an immediate success. It received
speedy and flattering recognition from the public. It has been
widely read and much talked of; the daily and weekly press has
praised it highly. It has been called a remarkable book ; certainly
it is an able and stimulating book, and its success has been de-
served. There is ample reason for the popularity of Social Evo-
lution, It treats a live subject, and meets a demand of the time.
It treats a difficult, not to say an abstruse, subject, yet it is not a
hard book to read. Though needlessly repetitious, and by no

'A paper read before the Sociological Society of Princeton Seminary Although
this paper was written before the appearance of Mr. Kidd's article in the February
number of The Nineteenth Century, I have not deemed it necessary, after reading
what is practically a brief restatement of his argument, to make any changes in
what I had written; nor do I find it necessary to add anything; which is, perhaps,
fortunate, since, though the subject is boundless, the space at my disposal is lim-
ited. On the contrary, Mr. Kidd's article has rather confirmed me in the positions
that I had taken. I venture, moreover, to think that I have avoided the error
into which Mr. Kidd, not unjustly, complains that his critics have for the most
part fallen, the tendency, namely, "to draw off attention into subsidiary chan-
nels and upon merely side-issues," to the neglect of the fundamental theses and
central argument of the book.

kidd's social evolution. 449

means free from inelegancies and inaccuracies of diction, it is
written in a plain, straightforward style whicli carries the reader
easily along. Mr. Kidd is certainly not a stylist — far from it —
but he moves on. His treatment of his subject is popular in char-
acter, yet with all the appearance of being scientific in method.
He has a great theme, and he treats it in broad outline. He is
mowing over a big field, and he cuts a wide swath. He belongs
to the impressionist school, and is working on a large canvas in
bold, strong strokes. Details are so unimportant that he can af-
ford to be inaccurate in regard to them, provided the ensemUe is
vivid, provided he makes you see and feel as he felt and saw; and
in this he succeeds admirably. The picture is clear and strong
enough ; the only question is, Is it true ? Can water be such a
blue, grass such a green, shadows such ?

I suppose that a book which did not provoke thought, and that
did not raise many more questions than it answered, would not
amount to much. Mr. Kidd's hook, as already remarked, cer-
tainly stimulates thought and is fertile in suggestion; hence it is
well worth reading. To us, moreover, it is interesting as another
illustration of the fact that religion (whatever may be true or false
of it in its various different forms of manifestation) is, at all events,
a phenomenon that has come, and has come to stay, and that it is
a tremendous social force, with which every one, willingly or not,
has to reckon. We admire especially the fine spirit in which Mr.
Kidd writes. If we cannot join in the unstinted praise of his
book, it is because we do not find ourselves in agreement with
two or three, at least, of what we take to be his fundamental
theses. Social Evolution is open to, and is likely to meet with,
some pretty severe attacks. No doubt the very fact of its general
popularity would imply that the specialist will not treat it kindly,
even as Mr. Stirling's brilliant book above mentioned, after being
warmly praised by the many who rejoice in his style of " elevated
recklessness," was fanned by the whirlwind of the biologists' criti-
cism; for scientists write "no admittance," in letters large enougli,
over the entrances to their particular specialties, however ready
they may be to make excursions into other provinces — nay, to
construe the universe by running it into the groove of their ow^

450 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

departments. For our own part, I trust that we are not so jeal-
ous. We like, for example, to hear what Professor Huxley ha&
to say about ethics, especially when he comes, as it were, modestly
under the mantle of an ancient moralist, as in his recent Romanes
Lecture, to which he prefixes the very proper sentiment from
Seneca: ^'Soleo enim et in aliena castra transire^ non tanqiiam
transfuga^ sed tanquavi exploratory But we have changed all
that since Seneca, and in these days, when one scarcely dares call
his soul his own, for fear of the specialists, I see nothing for the
theologian and tlie biblical critic to do except to do as the rest —
to stand up for the dignity of his department ; to insist that he,
too, is a specialist ; and to smile pityingly upon the outsider who
ventures to intrude with his opinion. Why should Mr. Huxley
discourse to us of Semitic tradition, or the Gadarene swine ? Or
why should any one give the least heed to him, if he does ?

Mr. Kidd's aim is to apply the Darwinian method to man in
society. Tlie book opens with an admirable restwie of the pre-
sent social situation: "Despite the great advances which science
has made during the past century in alniost every other direction,
there is, it must be confessed, no science of human society, pro-
perly so called." Science, which has accomplished such splendid
achievements during the last century, when she ascends in the scale
of life and comes to man, stands helpless in his presence. The
reason of this is, that science has not been true to her calling.
At tlie very place where she ought to apply her method most
thoroughly, she has stopped short. The historian especially,
though he is "dealing with the record of life in its highest forms,"
.... strange to say, feels "it scarcely necessary to take any in-
terest in those sciences [namely, the biological] which, in the
truest sense, lead up to his subject." The only hope for history
and for social science is, "for the biologist to advance over the
frontier and carry the methods of his science boldly into human
society, where he has but to deal with the phenomena of life,
where he encounters life at last under its highest and most com-
plex aspect." This, then, is what Mr. Kidd attempts. We cannot
help thinking: What a pity it is that Gibbon was not a biologist;
and what a splendid account of the Sicilian expedition Thucydides

kidd's social evolution. 451

might have given us, had he only been acquainted with the Dar-
winian hypothesis !

"\Ye may, perhaps, at the outset raise a query as to the legiti-
macy of Mr. Kidd's so-called new method. Will the biological
method suffice to explain the social organism ? Will an examina-
tion of the lower forms of life suffice to explain the higher? Are
we to explain a development in terms of its lower or of its higher
stages? The answer to these questions would introduce us to
one of the main points at issue between Hegelians and Spenceri-
ans. Here it must suffice to say that the idealists undoubtedly
have the best of the argument. We can only know what man is
by seeing a full-grown human being. One who saw a child could
not possibly predict what he would become, unless he had already
seen one that had become. Study of the acorn would not lead us
to a knowledge of the spreading oak.

This, of course, does not mean that we are not to derive all the
help we can from the study of the lower stages in the develop-
ment of that w^hich we are trying to interpret. It does not mean
that we are not to get what light we can by tracing the historic
growth of the moral sentiments ; nor that there is nothing to learn
in seeking the genesis of the idea of God. It does not mean that
the study of comparative anatomy is unessential to a knowledge
of the human body. It does not mean that a knowledge of the
process will not help us to an understanding of the product. It
only means that antecedence is not identical with causality, and
that similarity is not identity. It means that, having traced g
back toy, and/* to e, and so on back to a, the origin, we are then
to find the key to the process, not in the starting-point, but in the
whole process as seen from the end to the beginning. In other
words, the true nature of anything can be known, not from the
l^ 00, but from the riXo;.

On the other hand, this does not mean that, because wdiat is
last in time may be first in thought, we are therefore first to
study the finished product, and then to read into the beginning of
the process everything that we have found at the end; that we
are to attribute sensation to plants, or thought to shell-fish, or
conscience to birds of prey. Professor Drummond's rhapsody on

452 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

the death of tlie flowers, or his discovery of the first great act of
the moral life in " the conscious self-sacrifice of protoplastic fis-
sion," speaks very highly for his poetic imagination, but will not
increase his reputation as a man of science. It may be worth while
to remark in passing, tliat, while it is customary to twit theists and
Christian theologians with making their God in their own image,
the anthropomorphism wliich does this (and there is sufficient
reason for it, apart from Scripture) is nothing to the anthropo-
morphism which attributes to plant and brute creation all the
characteristics which are properly distinctive of man. It may be
that "man, who was made in the image of God, was also made in
the form of the ape " ; but it by no means follows that the ape, or
the insect, or the oyster is a ^coop ?.oyuop -ohzaov (pcWlvjlov.

If, for example, it can be shown that conscience in man pre-
sents points of similarity to instinct in brutes, it by no means fol-
lows that there is no more in conscience than there is in instinct,
so that to trace the former back to the latter is to give a final ex-
planation of the idea of obligation. It makes small difi'erence
whether (with Mr. Spencer) you begin with instinct, and derive
conscience from it, or whether (with Professor Drummond), start-
ing from the other end, and finding moral obligation in man, you
give a moral value to the instinctive acts of brutes, if, after all,
conscience and instinct are only different names for the same
thing. Most certainly they are not the same ; and we cannot see
that Professor Drummond gains very much by taking his science
from Mr. Spencer and reading it backwards by the light of Pro-
fessor Caird's evolutionary philosophy, while practically ignoring
(though he quotes Professor Caird at length on this very point)
what is just here the most important point of all; for, as Pro-
fessor Caird shows, the very notion of development should carry
with it the implication that there is r/iore in the later steps than
there was in tlie earlier; and if these accretions bring with them
not only quantitative, but qualitative additions as well, as un-
doubtedly they do, it is obvious that what may have been an ade-
quate account of the earlier and simpler form may leave untouched
the new elements which have come in.

The bearing of this on Social Evolution is not far to seek. It

EVOLUTION. 453

means that what is a right scientific method fur one branch of sci-
ence, for one stage in a development, is inadequate for another
and higher stage. No one would assert that the method of the
pure mathematician would suffice for the chemist, or the chemist's
method for tlie biologist. Tlie higher sphere implies greater
complexity, new factors to deal with ; hence, changed methods.
Now, with the advent of man certain new factors come into play,
with which the biologist has not had to reckon. These are: man's
social capacities, his reason, and his religious instincts. Mr. Kidd,
indeed, fully recognizes this, and is at great pains to emphasize
the fact ; yet, so far, at least, as method is concerned, he practically
ignores it ; for he first determines what are the conditions of pro-
gress in the sphere of biology, and then transfers these conditions
bodily from biology to the social organism, tacitly assuming that
what is true in the lower sphere is necessarily true also in the
higher, which by no means follows. It by no means necessarily
follows, for instance, that because, in the non-human world, pro-
gress may be comprehensively defined in terms of " the struggle
for existence," that the struggle for existence is the sufficient ex-
planation of progress in the world of man. It is rather curious,
however, and, perhaps, worthy of remark, that this very idea of
*'the struggle for existence" was first suggested to Darwin by
reading Malthus On Pajnilaiion ; so that now Mr. Kidd, borrowing
his constructive principle from biology, and applying it to man in
society, is only returning to Darwin's starting-pokit.

The chief peculiarity of Mr. Kidd's book consists, however, not
so much in the application of the biological method to man in
society— for that had been done before— as in the fact that he
builds upon the liypothesis which represents the most advanced
thought at the present time in biology. The biologists, as every
one knows, are divided into two camps in regard to the very im-
portant point as to whether or not inherited characteristics can be
transmitted. If they can, then it is easy to see how. Mr. Spencer
can build up his moral system on the principle that ethical ideas
grow pari passti with, the development of society, this society be-
ing an organism so constituted that the interests of the individual
members of it and the general interest of the whole tend to come

454 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

into equilibrium. Altruism is not only as natural as egoism, but
it is as essential to the well-being of the individual. The Weis-
mannists, on the other hand, emphasize the idea of struggle ; they
admit no disinterested, altruistic actions, scarcely even coopera-
tion. Here we have a fundamental difference of much signifi-
cance upon a point as to which few of us have any right to an
opinion. Here the roads part, and it is, obviously, of the greatest
consequence which one we choose to follow. If sociology be only
" biology 'writ large,' " it makes all the difierence in the world to the
former what the small letters spell. If the foundations are utterly
dissimilar, the superstructures cannot present the same propor-
tions. What are we to do when the doctors of science disagree ;
when, for example. Professor Huxley and Mr. Kidd define pro-
gress in terms of " the struggle for life," and tell us that there is
nothing ethical about nature; that "the cosmic process has no
sort of relation to moral ends"; that ''the imitation of it by man
is inconsistent with the first principles of ethics"; while Mr.
Spencer and Professor Drummond, making much of altruism and
the struggle for the life of others, would teach us that " all nature
is on the side of the man who tries to rise," and that nature is
" henceforth to become the ethical teacher of the world " ? If the
temple of truth in the sphere of social science is to be builded
upon the foundations of biology, we fear that the time has not
yet come. Until there is more agreement than at present exists
among naturalists, they can scarcely contribute much toward the
solution of social problems. "Physician, lieal thyself." If the
Weismannists are wrong, it is obvious that many of Mr. Kidd's
conclusions must be vitiated for us at the start, since he builds
his entire system upon their (as yet unproved) hypothesis, unless
the results he reaches can be separated from his method; and
this, I think, is to some extent possible. Indeed, it seems to me
that his book is valuable just in proportion as it is possible to
separate its results from the method employed in reaching them,
and that most of the author's paradoxes result just from an im-
perfect method.

For suppose we admit that the doctrine of natural selection is
sufiicient to account for progress from the beginning up to and

kidd's social evolution. 455

including man the individual, it by no means follows that this prin-
ciple will apply to man in society. Mr. Kidd assumes that society
is an organism; but, if so, it is difficult to see how the interests
of the individual can always be antagonistic to the interests of
the organism, and vice versa^ as Mr. Kidd says they are. "We do
not so reason in regard to other organisms. Physicans endeavor
to build up the system, in order to overcome local disorders; and,
<jonversely, inflammation or disease of the members affects the
health of the whole body. So, also, the different parts are de-
pendent upon eacli other. ''The eye cannot say unto the hand, I
have no need of thee ; nor the head to the feet, I have no need of
you." Here Mr. Spencer, who was in this particular point antici-
pated by Paul, is certainly more self -consistent than Mr. Kidd.

Again, Mr. Kidd assumes that the interests of the organism are
of paramount importance, and that it does not matter about the
individual, except, of course, to the individual himself. We
need some one to show that the organism exists for the individual,
as well as the individual for the organism ; and certainly, on the
basis of a materialistic evolution, this would seem to be more
logical and natural: for, if there be no intelligence back of the
process for which the organism could be said to exist, then
man is the highest intelligence in the universe, and it is right
that he sliould be regarded as the end for which the universe ex-
ists, the goal toward which the cosmic process has been working.
It would seem strange to make the highest life in the universe
subordinate to a life such as tliat manifested in an unteleological
cosmic process. If the individual exists for the organism, this
theory needs a God, a Higher Intelligence, to help it out; other-
wise what is highest in the order of life would be only means to
end: intellect, spirit, will, would be the servants of matter.

If, however, it be said that the individual exists, not as subor-
dinate to an unintelligent cosmic process, but as a part, a member
of society, and that it is the social organism as constituted ])y in-
dividuals, and not the individuals tliemselves, that is of import-
ance, then it may be asked : Why am not I as worthy of consid-
eration as my neighbor? Why should I consider the organism
with its future unborn millions? My own interests, my own

456 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

pleasure and happiness, are of as much account as the happiness
of the human beings who shall live five hundred or five thousand
years hence. In other words, we find here the same antinomy
that exists between egoistic and universalistic hedonism. If you
define conduct in terms of pleasure and pain merely, it is difficult
to make the transition from one's self to one's neighbor. When
individual and social interests are harmonious, well and good;
there is then a rational sanction for conduct in the nature of
things. But suppose interests clash. Humanity is the fruit and
flower of nature, the highest life in the universe, the end toward
which nature has been striving; but why one man rather tlian
another? Why my neighbor rather than myself? As we shall
see later, Mr. Kidd feels this difficulty, and, in order to solve it,
he is forced either to abandon materialism, or to dethrone reason.
Even Mr. Spencer admits that "the welfare of the species is an
end to be subserved only as subserving the welfare of individu-
als." " But," he adds, " since disappearance of the species, imply-
ing absolute disappearance of all individuals, involves absolute
failure in achieving the end, whereas disappearance of individu-
als, though carried to a great extent, may leave outstanding such
numbers as can, by continuance of the species, make subsequent
fulfihnent of the end possible, the preservation of the individual
must, in a variable degree according to circumstances, be subordi-
nated to the preservation of the species, where the two conflict."
In this statement it is to 1)0 noticed, ia the first place, that though
preservation of the species is enjoined, this is only in order that,
though many individuals may disappear, other individuals may
remain to fulfil their ends. It is, after all, the individual that is
of paramount importance. In the second place, Mr. Spencer has
here brought in a new element, namely, the end. What, then, is
the end? It is the welfare of individuals. It can, indeed, never
be anything else. But there we are back at the old question.
Why the welfare of one individual rather than of another? Still
further, suppose you say that this welfare is not happiness, but
self-development; or suppose jou say that it merely is spiritual
growth — "that ye may have life, and may have it more abun-
dantly": then we may hold that the kind of life which we iden-

kidd's social evolution. 4:57

tify with spiritual growth would facilitate the preservation of the
species. We do hold that; wo should quite agree with Mr.
Leslie Stephen in refusing to recognize as mural such conduct as
could be shown to lead to the extinction of the species: Init that
is a very different thing from saying that the preservation of the
species is the end. It would seem to be necessary to determine
what the end of conduct or of life is, before laying down rules
looking to the attainment of that end. And here, again, a meta-
physic, a theory of the universe, is involved; and it ought not to
be' quietly assumed that economic or social progress is the end for
which nature is striving. ^ ^

We can better understand how those who put a spiritualistic
construction upon the universe should make the individual subor-
dinate to the organism, for in that case the whole cosmic process,
the whole world of nature, inorganic, organic, human, all would be
but the visible manifestation of spiritual life; the whole universe
of mind and matter would exist through and for the spirit back
of things— very much as the Calvinist says that all things exist
for the glory of God. Man in this case might be, as it were, but
a button on the garment of Deity, and, as such, of infinitely less
importance than the garment itself. The garment would exist
for the wearer ; the button would exist for the garment.

But it is not true. Professor Haeckel to the contrary notwith-
standing, that it is dualism which gives an anthropocentric con-
struction to the universe. On the contrary, it is only a material-
istic monism which can assert that "man is the central point of
the universe, the last and highest final cause of creation, and that
the rest of nature was created . merely for the purpose of servmg
man." (Moiiism, p. 14.) This is at least as bad theology as it is
bad science. Paul and the Hebrew prophets were as violently
opposed to the anthropocentric view as were Darwin and Coper-
nicus, though the latter names, no doubt, carried more weight,
speaking as they did in the name of science, while the former
spoke only by inspiration of the Most High. Dualism may teach
that the individual man is of greater consequence than the sum of
all the elements that enter into his non-human environment; but
it does not teach "that the rest of nature was created merely for
the purpose of serving man."

458 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

So much as to method. What are the results according to Mr.
Kidd of the application of these principles? I shall state them
very briefly. In the first place, then, the life of man is a con-
tinual straggle for existence, liis own interests being invariably
antagonistic to the interests of the social organism of which he
forms a part. "We have a rational creature whose reason is
itself one of the leading factors in the progress he is making, but
who is nevertheless subject, in common with all other forms of
life, to certain organic laws of existence which render his progress
impossible in any other way than by submitting to conditions that
can never have any ultimate sanction in his reason." " If pro-
gress is to continue, the individual must be compelled to submit
to conditions of existence of the most onerous kind, which, to all
appearace, his reason actually gives him the power to suspend-r—
and all to further a development in which he has not, and in
which he never can have, qua individual, the slightest practical
interest."

And yet, strange to say, man has not ceased to make progress.
He has persistently disregarded the voice of reason telling him
to look out for himself. How do we explain this strange resistance
on the part of man to the urging of reason and interest com-
bined ? Mr. Kidd answers it is to be explained by the phenomena
of religion. Religious belief is the integrating force in the social
organism, and provides "a sanction for social conduct which is
always of necessity ultra-rational, and the function of which is to
secure in the stress of evolution the continual subordination of
the interests of the individual units to the larger interests of the
longer-lived social organism to which they belong." In other
words, reason teaches pure individualism, selfishness, which w^ould
put an end to progress. Yet, as a matter of fact, progress has
been continuous, and is bound to continue. This is owing to the
subordination of individual interests to the wider social interests.
Egoism lias given way to altruism, because religion has taught
the latter and has enforced its teaching with positive sanctions.
Yet these sanctions have themselves no foundation in reason.
There is no such thing as a rational religion. "A rational re-
ligion is a scientific impossibility." What, then, does Mr. Kidd

459

mean by saying tliat tliere is no sncli thing as a rational religion ?
There is certainly clumshiess of statement, if not confusion of
thought, here. How, in the first place, if one be a thorough-going
Weismannist, can there be for such an one any such thing as a su-
pernatural sanction? For does not Weismannism just mean that
everything that is has come to be simply through the working of
the cosmic process — the grinding of the wheels of nature — and
are not our ideas, then, even our idea of tlie supernatural, simplj'
the product, and at tlie same time a part, of this process? Cer-
tain arrangements of the molecules of matter have at last pro-
duced mind — or, let us say, rather, ideas, thoughts — for mind
itself is only a series of thought-images strung togetlier — "a
series of feelings aware of itself." Now what right have these
ideas, these simple products of a mechanical process which dis-
tributes and arranges matter in space — what riglit have tliese
misbegotten little creatures to tell us to believe in something out-
side or beyond (supernatural) the cosmic process (nature) which
has given them birth, whose they are and whom they serve ? In
short, if you start with an empirical theory of knowledge, how
can you ever get beyond the world of sight and sound and taste
and smell? Or, to put the matter in another way, if AVeis-
mannism is materialistic, it would make the cosmic process sum
up and include the universe. Nature would embrace everything
that has been, is, and will be. How, then could there be any-
thing beyond what is everything — any supernatural ? ' We, indeed,
are not warranted in asserting that Weismannism is necessarily
materialistic. Weismann himself tells us that " the mechanical
conception of nature very well admits of being united with a
teleological conception of the universe," and that '^without teleo-
logy there would be no mechanism." "The consciousness," he
says, "that behind that mechanism of the universe which is alone
comprehensible to us there still lies an incomprehensible teleo-

^ Mr. Kidd says, in the Niueteeuth Century article above cited, that it was his
purpose "to state in simple, scientific terms, and witJwut the necessity for starting
with any equipment of teleological assumption, that which presents itself to me [him]
as a natural law of human evolution hitherto unenunciated." But it is one pur-
pose of this article to indicate that such a simple limitation of the subject as Mr.
Kidd proposes is impossible.

460 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

logical universal cause, necessitates quite a different conception of
the universe — a conception absolutely opposed to that of the ma-
terialist." This is plain enough; the mechanism of natural phe-
nomena may be but the manifestation of the plan of an intelli-
gent first cause — may be "purpose" externalized and made to live
in space, as it existed before only in thought. But Weismann
does not say that he himself believes in the existence of this
"Universal Cause." What he does make clear is the statement
that if there be any directive power in the universe " we must
not imagine this to interfere directly in the mechanism of the
universe, but to be rather behind the latter as the final cause of
this mechanism." The fact of the existence of matter and of the
laws which govern it, does not satisfy our intellectual need for
causality, and if we choose to assume a universal cause under-
lying the laws of nature, no one could show that such assumption
is erroneous. But we can not prove that there is any "spiritual
first cause of the universe," and if there be, it is inconceivable in
its nature, and of it we can say only one thing with certainty,
namely, that it must be teleological. But it is certain that
directive power and mechanical causes cannot work together. In
other words, if there be any teleology in the universe it must re-
side in the mechanic who made the machine and set it going; but
the machine once set in motion, cannot have crank, lever, or screw-
pin touched from without. It cannot be oiled or regulated in
any way. To do this would stop the natural working of its
wheels. This God the clock-maker theory of the universe is
not atheistic. It is nineteenth century scientific Deism ; but so
far as its practical bearing on morality is concerned, we may
doubt whether it is so very much better tlian atheism. If, more-
over, Weismann be asked "whether the development of the mind
can be conceived as resulting from purely mechanical laws," he
answers "unhesitatingly with the pure materialist," though he
does not agree with him as to the manner in which he derives
mental phenomena from matter, but would rather, as Haeckel does,
attribute consciousness to matter. Further than this, in his theory
of knowledge he is agnostic. His essay sums up to this : that if
there be any teleological power in the universe it can only be con-

KIDD S SOCIAL EVOLUTION.

461

ceived of as a first cause, Init by no means as a " pliyletic vital
force" or directive power. Thus conceiving of it, it would not
be inconsistent with the mechanical conception of nature, but its
existence can only be assumed, not proved/

Oar author's position is much les3 definite than his master's,
and we can only judge his vague statements on this point by their
implications. We may, therefore, ask: if tlie mechanical concep-
tion of nature be not inconsistent with teleology ; i. e., in other
words, with the belief that there is a plan back of the develop-
mental process, this plan implying intelligence, and religion being
but the belief in and feeling of dependence upon this supreme
intelligence, how, then, can religion be irrational? Teleology
implies a plan. A plan implies the existence of an intelligent
beincr. If there be such a being it cannot be irrational to hold
that he exists, with whatever implications, moral or otherwise,
such a belief would involve. Professor Drummond tells us that
<' instead of giving up nature and reason .... Mr. Kidd should
have given up Darwin." Perhaps; but allowing him to keep
Darwin, if he would only concede the rationality of religion the
whole thing would work out simply enough.

Mr. Kidd insists that the essential element in all religions is the
conception of the supernatural. Here he undoubtedly strikes at
the root of the matter, and his discussion of this point cannot be
too highly praised. The chapter in which he pictures the visit of
an inhabitant of another planet to our western civilization and
describes the impression produced upon the visitor by the various
phenomena connected with our religious life, and the chapter on
"the function of religious beliefs in the evolution of society,"
are both admirable. We need not pause to question his right to
impose his own meaning on the phrase "social organism," nor to
remark upon his somewhat clumsy definition of religion— perhaps
any one is foolish to attempt to define religion— and perhaps Mr.
Kidd's definitions are adequate for the purpose he has in view.
Neither shall we pause to inquire into the meaning of the word
progress— important as such an inquiry is— it would take us too

1 Weismann, essay on ''The Mechanical Conception of Nature," in Studies in
the Theory of Descent, Vol. 1.

462 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

far afield. Mr. Kicld uses tlie word to indicate a change of social
conditions, to signify the difference, c. g.^ between society as it is
to-day, and as it was, say a century or ten centuries ago. Such an
idea of progress as this invites scrutiny, analysis. Is mere change
of external conditions, mode of life, complexity of social intercourse,
progress? What is progress? Does it imply that the sum total
of happiness is greater than formerly ? or of wealth ? Has pro-
gress any moral quality ? or intellectual ? or is it merely economic?
These are interesting and important questions, but Mr. Kidd does
not touch upon them. For our present purpose it is, however,
sufficient that with his fundamental contention at this point we
are in most hearty agreement; the contention, viz., that ethical
systems always have rested, and do rest, upon the supernatural
sanctions of religious belief, and that progress has been due to
the conduct imposed by these sanctions. So much is clear and
strong. Tliis is a tremendous concession to religion.

But what does Mr. Kidd mean when he says that religion is
irrational? Does he only mean that religion leads us into a world
where the pure reason fails to penetrate ? If so, he only holds
with the schoolmen who said : Fides non est contra rationern^ seel
supra rationem. There may be rational grounds for the belief in
the supernatural, though that belief carries with it certain ultra-
rational implications. Or, does Mr. Kidd mean that the belief in
the supernatural, upon which such great issues hang, is itself con-
trary to the dictates of reason? It is impossible to tell what he
himself liolds. For a man who pretends to scientific accuracy,
his use of the words "rational," "irrational," "ultra-rational" and
" supernatural," is bewilderingly vague. If he is intentionally non-
committal, as his statement that " the question of real importance
is not whether .... these beliefs are without any foundation in
reason, but whether religious systems have a function to perform
in the evolution of society," would seem to imply, he has suc-
ceeded admirably in his effort to involve this point in obscurity.
But the point cannot be tlius evaded. If it be said that Mr. Kidd
means right and that in making him pronounce belief in the su-
pernatural to be contrary to reason we are only setting up a
straw-man for a target, the answer is, that we have no desire to

zidd's social evolution. 463

misrepresent Mr. Kidd, but only to demand consistency and clear-
ness upon a very important point. For it is not enough to say
that religious beliefs '^must have some immense utilitarian func-
tion to perform in the evolution which is proceeding." This is
good as far as it goes, and instead of saying that religion is irra-
tional, we would make this concession serve as an argument for
the reasonableness of the belief in the supernatural; i. <?., just as
Kant founded a moral argument for the existence of God on
the necessity of finding a supernatural sanction for individual
conduct, so we would say that the necessity that the social organi-
ism is under of finding a supernatural sanction for such conduct as
will insure its continued life and progress is ijyso facto an argu-
ment for the rationality of that sanction; unless, indeed, progress
itself be irrational. But if progress be a good (as I take it all
evolutionists must hold) then that which makes it possible must
be a good, which the belief in tlie supernatural can scarcely be
if it is founded on a lie. This is another of Mr. Kidd's paradoxes.
He states the same thought in another way when he says: "The
most distinctive feature of human evolution as a whole is that
through the operation of the law of natural selection the race
must o:row ever more and more relii>;ious." We do not know liow
much Mr. Kidd was striving after effect in stating the matter in
this way, but to those who have regarded the Darwinian hypothesis
as the sworn enemy of supernatural religion this statement is suffi-
ciently striking.

Still, the real question is, not whether a belief in the super-
natural is necessary to social progress, but whether there is
rational ground for such belief. Mr. Kidd shows small appre-
ciation of the subject when he says that " this is not the question
at issue at all." For suppose, in explaining the phenomena of
religion, you explain religion away. The well-being and progress
of society in the past and in the present has been dependent upon
a morality conditioned by supernatural sanctions. But how long
will these sanctions prove binding when they are shown to be
irrational? "Will men fear God if they believe that he is dead, or
that he sleepeth, or is gone on a journey? Men have hitherto
believed in religions and acted under their sanctions. How did
31

464: THE PRESBYTERIAIf QUARTERLY.

they come to have these beliefs? If you can explain the belief
in the supernatural in a naturalistic way, you may satisfy the de-
mands of the historic spirit by showing how these things came to
be, but you may at the same time leave nothing to believe in ex-
cept the belief that belief is impossible. "We are in hearty sym-
pathy with Mr. Kidd in his "impatience at the triviality and
comparative insignificance of the explanation offered" by Mr.
Spencer to account for our religious beliefs. But on this funda-
mental point Spencer's position is luminous with insight compared
with Mr. Kidd's. If Spencer, in accounting for the genesis of
our religious ideas, explains them away, he at least does not at-
tempt to rear the structure of his ethical system upon the baseless
fabric of a vision. On the contrary, he tells us that it is his
specific object to establish rules of conduct on a scientific basis,
independent of all religious sanctions. Whether he succeeds in
doing so is another question. But it is beyond conjecture how
Mr. Kidd, of all men, holding as he does to the religious basis of
morality, of all altruistic action, holding that " if our conscious
relationship to the universe is measured by the brief span of in-
dividual existence, then the intellect can know of orly one duty
in the individual, namely, his duty to himself to make the most
of the few precious years of consciousness he can ever know,"
holding that without a supernatural sanction for conduct self-
indulgence would reign supreme, and that nations, by neglecting
the moral law, which is the law of progress, and which is founded
upon the sanctions of religion, would degenerate and disappear;
holding all this as the teaching of science, it is beyond conjecture,
I say, how he can regard it as beside the question whether or not
these religious beliefs have any foundation in reason.

Indeed, it seems to me that alike the fundamental weakness
and the greatest strength of Social Evolution lie right here : its
greatest strength in the recognition of tlie necessity of religion as
a social factor ; its fundamental weakness, more serious even than
the building of the whole argument upon an unproved hypothesis,
in the position the author takes in regard to the rationality of re-
ligion ; for this is to build upon foundations of sand. It is to saw
off the limb on which he is sitting. For to what, after all, does

465

his contention come? Simply to this: that what has been, will
be ; that because religious systems have hitherto been necessary to
the working of the cosmic process in the various stages of social
development, therefore they will continue to play the important
part in the future that they have played in the past, because with-
out them social progress could not continue. But why, we may
ask, should progress continue ? And if it does continue, whither
is it tending? What is the goal, the end, the aim? This, again,
is a question of metaphysics, and is beyond the sphere of the bio-
logical method. So true is it that we cannot learn from nature —
i. e., external, mechanical nature — alone, but must bring with us
to nature the clue to its interpretation. So far as the present in-
quiry is concerned, it is sufficient that reason and religion made
tlieir advent together, and have always existed side by side, some-
times in harmonious cooperation, sometimes in friendly rivalry;
now in armed neutrality and again in open conflict, but still to-
gether. Man has universally been a religious animal, and has
acted under supernatural sanctions. But, now, suppose you de-
rationalize religion, destroying the supernatural sanctions of con-
duct, what will happen? One of two things, either progress will
stop or it must go forward UJider new conditions. We cannot
say that either alternative is a 2^^'iori impossible. Because a cer-
tain thing has been is no guarantee that it will continue eternally.
Astronomers tell us that the planets are burning themselves out.
If so, the time must come when they can no longer support life.
Progress, therefore, in the sense in which we now use the word,
could not be everlasting, and man must be destined sooner or later
to disappear from tlie face of the earth. This period may be dis-
tant by millions of years. It may be that we are destined to go
on developing a higher civilization, a more perfect humanity, "for
a period longer than that now covered by history." We may
realize many of the lofty visions of the future which Mr. Frede-
ric Harrison so eloquently pictures, even though they do not
come to pass under the religion of humanity. But we have no
guarantee of this. The bloom of the flower is of short duration
compared with the life of the plant which bears it. And so the
flower of our civilization may endure but for a moment in com-

466 THE FRESBrrERIAN QUARTEKLT.

parison with the infinitely longer life of the world in w^hich we
live. What guarantee have we that nature, which has hitherto
been as cruel to "the type" as she has been to the individual, will
act more kindly toward man than toward the countless species
that have forever vanished? Hitherto the disappearing type has
but vanished in yielding to a higher type, one better adapted to
its environments. But some day the zenith of ascent will be
reached, and by the reverse process the descent toward the nadir
will begin.

"Many an feon moulded earth before her highest, man, was born;
Many an ccon, too, may pass when earth is mauless and forlorn."

The fact that man had outgrown religion might indicate that
in the next stage of the world's history, for that "crowning race"
of whom the poet speaks, morality might be fostered under new
conditions, and without the aid of supernatural sanctions; but it
might just as w^ell indicate that with the loss of religious faith
would begin the decay of morality and the general reverse pro-
cess. Who shall say that the first step toward the time when

"Many a planet by many a sun may roll with the dust of a vanished race"

may not be taken with the derationalizing of religion ? The pen-
dulum has swung to the end of its reach; it may now swing back.
The onward movement has thus far had a certain impetus, a pro-
pelling force, back of it ; take that away, and may the movement
not cease? Certainly it may; nay, it inevitably must cease unless
some new impetus be found to take the place of the old one.
Electricity might take the place of steam, but the engine could
not run without any motive power whatever. Everybody, appar-
ently, recognizes this fact, except Mr. Kidd. Hence it is that
serious-minded, thinking men who have lost their own religious
faith and are trying to rob the rest of the world of theirs, are
endeavoring in various ways to provide a substitute for that
which has been lost. Hence, too, it is that we, who do not be-
lieve in either the rationality or the practical efficacy of any of
these substitutes, tenaciously cling to, and zealously defend, that
belief in the supernatural which always has been, and which, it
seems to us, always will be, the only rational sanction for moral-

• kidd's social evolution. 467

itj and the only hope for the liuman race. Professor Huxley
pitting the microcosm against the macrocosm, and giving the
youth not even a shng with which to fight against the giant; Mr.
Frederic Harrison bidding us worship humanity, and Professor
Huxle}^ replying tliat he would as soon worship a wilderness of
apes; Mr. Spencer resolving our gods into ghosts, and telling us
that duty and pleasure tend to become identical, though right be
only conformity to custom ; Professor Drummond following Mr.
Spencer in assuring us that we need not look beyond nature for
the highest sanctions for conduct, and then covertly introducing
the idea of the divine (which, if it means anything at all, must
mean pretty much what Mr. Ividd means by the supernatural) by
including it in the environment in which the evolutionary process
takes place; or Mr. Charles H. Pearson lamenting "the decay of
character" and "the decline of family life," and seeking a substi-
tute for an obligatory morality in the "religion of the state" —
what if we cannot accept the doctrine of these new teachers of
righteousness? The voice may be the voice of Jacob, but the
hands seem to us like the hands of Esau.

Nevertheless, it is conceivable that progress may continue,
though the conditions of progress may change, just as a calculat-
ing machine, as Babbage showed, might be constructed to work
for any fixed length of time according to a certain law, and then
might, from a ceVtain point, proceed according to an entirely dif-
ferent law. To us it does not seem so strange that social progress
should take place up to a certain point under ape and tiger in-
stincts, and that beyond that point progress may continue only by
letting the ape and the tiger in us die (though Professor Huxley
has been criticised for splitting up "the world-order into two
separate halves," and going back on his fundamental principle
of continuity). This only means that with the advent of man
came in certain new elements, namely, reason and conscience, in
virtue of which what was before a natural or non-moral world
was converted into an ethical world. Instead of the thorn has
sprung up the fir tree, and instead of the brier has sprung up the
myrtle tree. But the strange thing is, that these latest coijxist-
ing products should, according to the present theory, be inherently

468 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

antagonistic. In other words, suppose we admit that progress is
necessary, and say that the cosmic process, whether there be mind
back of it or not, is working out its own ends in developing con-
science; with the advent of conscience came also reason, which
must also have a part to plaj, and an important part, in this great
drama. But here nature seems to be divided against herself in
making conscience dictate one thing and reason another. Keason
says, "Strive only for self"; conscience says, "Consider your
neighbor." What shall we do ? The parable reminds us that this
division-status is an unstable one. Nature has conceived and
brought forth twins, which, instead of furthering life, seem bent
upon destroying each other. Thus Professor Huxley and thus
Mr. Kidd, only with this difference : that the former chooses the
nobler part, and says that man must ally himself with conscience
and combat the cosmic process, while the latter says that man
will not act contrary to the dictates of reason.^

Now it is obvious that there may be two ways out of this
dilemma. In the first place, we may refuse to admit the validity
of the distinction between the "ethical" and the "natural"

' It is a little curious that I should have expressed ray opinion here in words so
similar to those subsequently used by Mr. Kidd in a foot-note to the article above
cited in deprecation of the very criticism here offered. Says Mr. Kidd: "I do not
know whether any reader of Social Evolution who has done me the honor to study the
book closely will feel that what has been said here suggests a criticism that I have
taken pains to answer beforehand in the book itself, namely, that I might be taken
to have represented the nature of man as a house divided against itself. I have en-
deavored to make it clear throughout that the religious feeling, that is, the willing-
ness to submit to sanctions beyond reason, is not only just as much part of man's
nature as any other, but that it is the most characteristic part of it — a part which
is being continually developed by the process of evolution in progress. The sanc-
tion for submitting to the cosmic process is in man ; it is not in his reason. It is
not beyond him; it is simply beyond his reason." To which we may reply, sub-
stantially in the words of Mr. Balfour, that this resolves the religious feeling into an
instinct, which is "nothing better than a device of nature to trick us into the per-
formance of altruistic actions. " It is one of nature's devices to insure the survival
of the species and to further social progress, and may be fittingly compared "to
the protective blotches on the beetle's back." {Foundations of Belief , pp. 16, 18.)
The question, then, still remains as to the relation between reason and this "re-
ligious instinct;" as to whether reason can invalidate or "circumvent" this in-
stinct, as it has already circumvented some of the most important of them. (Cf.
IVie Nineteenth Century, February, 1895, p. 229.)

kidd's social evolution. 4:69

world, as well as the antinomy between reason and conscience.
In other words, we may insist that the " strugcijle for the life of
others" is as natural and as rational as the "straggle for life,"
and may seek to show not only that the interest of the individual
and the welfare of the organism are always identical, but also that
the moral life begins with the amceha or the oyster or the ape, as
the case may be. Authorities differ. Haeckel is less compli-
mentary to the brutes than Drummond, for the German profes-
sor holds that "it is only in the most highly developed vertebrates
— birds and mammals — that we discern the lirst beginnings of
reason, the first traces of religious and ethical conduct." Or, in
the second place, we may follow Professor Huxley in refusing to
see any morality in the workings of non-human nature. Ethic
begins with man and not with lamprey-eels, or monkeys. This
is the view taken by our author, and we have no hesitation in
following him here. There remains, then, the antagonism between
reason the egoist, and conscience the altruist. And this, again,
can be settled in one of two ways : either by showing that there
is no casus helli and that the would-be enemies should be friendly
allies, or by the lawful, rational submission of one of the
parties.

As to the former alternative, it may be said that there is some
truth in Mr. Spencer's view. We do not believe that the indi-
viduaFs interest and the interest of the organism are commonly
at variance. We hold that honesty is not only right, but is, ordi-
narily, the best policy also ; that a man shall reap as he sows ; that
God's ordinary way of punishing is by the working of natural
law and not by miracle, so that if a man abuse the laws of health
he will suffer; if improvident he may starve, and will certainly
have to beg. There is much rational sanction for conduct in the
nature of things. Further than this, there is the fear of social
ostracism, and the danger of falling into the hands of the police.
These furnish wholesome restraints upon conduct. Again, Mr.
Kidd probably over-emphasizes the pure selfishness of man.
Doubtless there is at least a modicum of altruistic feeling which
is natural to man. He is not wholly vile. This is one thing we
had in mind in saying that Mr. Kidd's method could to some ex-

470 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

tent be separated from his results. For it is one thing to say that
(3onscience is only developed instinct and that the idea of obliga-
tion has its origin in experience, and quite a different thing to
say that the idea of oughtness being ultimate, experience has
educated the conscience and filled up the categories of obligation.
The former view would no doubt invalidate the moral argument
and undermine the authority of conscience. For suppose we
grant that conscience is a growth, a development from experience,
and that we see its rudimentary forms in the instincts of animals ;
man then follows his instincts, i. e., his conscience, just as animals
do. But the difference is, that man has also his reason to reckon
with, and if he finds that his instincts are irrational, or, in other
words, if he explains away his conscience, he will no longer follow
what it dictates. On the other hand, it is conceivable that we
may have an obligatory morality based upon a theistic conception,
of the universe, without at the same time excluding the idea of
development and the function of experience from the moral life.
Given conscience, it may be that God speaks through it with in-
creasing clearness, just as, for example, he spoke to the Jewish
people with ever-increasing fulness of revelation.

Mr. Spencer and the evolutionary ethic may be right in con-
tending that experience has played an important part in develop-
ing the moral sentiments. But, as M. Molinari, in his little
book on jReligioji, points out, the conscience must be armed
as well as enlightened, and while it may be the function of
Bcience and political economy to enlighten the conscience, it is
only religion that can arm it with authority. Experience
can teach expediency but not obligation. It may back up
its teachings by the sanctions of worldly prudence expressed
in very high terms. It may teach that the individual's in-
terest is in the majority of cases identical with the interest of
the social organism. But what we want is an ethic that will ex-
plain the ultimate ethical problem, the idea of obligation, without
destroying the feeling of obligation, and will (in order to secure
progress, so far as the present discussion is concerned) compel the
individual to subordinate his own interests to the interests of the
social organism in those cases where they seem to be at variance.

kidd's social evolution. 4:71

This leads us to the second of the alternatives mentioned above,
namely, the conflict between reason and conscience. How can
we settle this difficulty ?

Our position is analogous to that of the theologian who makes
his final appeal to the teaching of the church or to the words of
Scripture. Not that in so doing lie dishonors reason: in a certain
sense reason must be the '^ seat of autliority in religion," tlie final
court of appeal, for it is only by the use of the reason that we
decide that the teaching of the church or of the Scriptures is to
be accepted as authoritative and ultimate. But having once con-
stituted the church or the Bible as the ultimate authority in mat-
ters of religious faith, having once by the use of reason found an
infallible norm, it is illogical to appeal back again to the reason
to correct the norm. There cannot be two norms. The differ-
ence between rationalists and their opponents is not that the
former make their appeal to reason while the latter walk by faith
(the one appeals to reason as much as the other), but rather that
the ratiocinative faculty demands of the latter that they submit to
the decision of the higher court, while the former do not see suf-
ficient ground for this submission. Either position is rational
enough. The irrational position is that which first sets up the
Bible or the church as the constituted norm of religious truth
and then, having accepted such truth in toto, rejects it in jKcrtibus,^
or which having declared " Lo, here is a greater, let us hear him,"
turns again from Master to disciple. Just as the consistent theo-
logian, having "proved all things," and having decided upon
rational grounds that tlie teaching of the Scriptures or of the
church is infallible in all matters of faith and practice, does not
then seek to wrest the things therein which are hard to be under-
stood ; so here, having convinced ourselves by a broad survey, by
a study of all tlie elements concerned, that the higher reason tells
us to follow the dictates of conscience, we will no longer be trou-
bled that the lower reason speaking only in the name of present
worldly interest bids us pursue a policy of selfish individualism.
This is, of course, only another way of saying that the individual's
apparent present interests are disregarded only in order to further
his real welfare. The individual submits to supernatural sanctions

472 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

of conduct, not perhaps because such conduct as is enforced is
pleasing, but because it is rational; because, that is, everj^thing
considered, such conduct is best for him, will contribute most to
his welfare.

We are not now seeking to show that there can be no adequate
basis for morality apart from the sanctions of religion. We do
not believe that there can be — and the agnostics' recent answer
to the question, "Why lead a moral life?" has not tended to
weaken our opinion — but this is not here the question. What
we here maintain is, that in order to arrive at the knowledge of
man's true welfare, everything must be taken into account; and,
if our world-view includes the ideas of God, and immortality, and
the authority of conscience, then the antinomy between conscience
and the lower or hedonistic reason vanishes. The apparent anti-
nomy which exists between conscience and the lower reason, which
is identical with self-interest, is swallowed up in the higher unity
of the practical reason. Scale this height, and the whole outlook
is wonderfully changed. Stand upon this vantage-ground, and
Mr. Kidd's paradoxes disappear.

Take socialism, for example: Mr. Kidd holds that "the only
social doctrines current in the advanced societies of to day which
have the assent of reason for the masses are the doctrines of so-
cialism. These doctrines may be ... . utterly destructive
to the prospects of future progress and to the future interests
of society; but .... this is no concern of the individual whose
interest it is, not to speculate about a problematical future for
unborn generations, but to make the best of the present for him-
self, according to his lights." In other words, the conditions
which favor the progress of the race are distinctly antagonistic to
the welfare of the masses of that race, and these conditions, there-
fore, have no sanction in reason. It seems a paradox that the
conditions under which social progress is possible are without the
sanction of reason, while social conditions which reason does jus-
tify are not only impractical)le, but would effectually stop pro-
gress. Is progress, then, an evil? Or is rationality an evil? Or
is there something the matter with the thesis that the only condi-
tions under which progress is possible are irrational? At any

kidd's social evolution. 473

rate, the fact remains, that man has continued to progress, and
with the full use of his reason. Take the view above indicated,
and man's long and weary uphill march is justified; otherwise
his toil was unreasonable and foolisli. May it not be that it is
the existence of conditions which would stop progress that is un-
reasonable as well as impracticable ?

For if it be true, as Mr. Kidd acutely points out, that the ma-
terialistic socialism of the school of Karl Marx is really the purest
kind of individualism, why not consistently carry out the princi-
ple? These men are socialists, not from love of their fellow-men
and the disinterested motive of promoting their welfare, but from
the desire for "happiness in the Benthamite sense of plenty of
pigs' wash." If, then, we proceed on the principle of individual-
ism, selfishness, competition, struggle for life (that is, under con-
ditions of progress) ; if we adopt

"the simple plan,

That they should take who have the power.
And they should keep who can,"

why not, then, let the masses and "the four hundred," labor and
capital, the have-nots and the haves, fight it out as best they can,
and so insure progress? But if, on the other hand, the strong
yield to the weak through the operation of altruistic sentiment,
then why not extend the application of this principle to the fur-
thest limit, so as to take into consideration the future conditions
and progress of the race ? If it is the interest of the individual
simply "to make the best of the present, according to his light,"
why, then, should I consider the masses? But, if I do consider
the masses, why not consider the condition of the whole social
organism, say two hundred years hence ?

Social Evolution will be of value, not so much for the worth of
its constructive results as for its illustration of one or two import-
ant principles. In the first place, it shows that social science
must be approached from the side of ethics, and is to be treated
in connection with moral philosophy rather than as a branch of
political economy. I suppose it would be generally admitted that,
as Professor Flint well says, "any proposed solution of a social
problem would be suflaciently refuted as soon as it is shown logic-

474 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

ally to issue in immorality." The same writer continues, in tlie
words of the Duke of Argyll: "In mathematical reasoning, the
* reduction to absurdity' is one of the familiar methods of dis-
proof. In political reasoning, the 'reduction to iniquity' ought
to be of equal value." (Flint, Socialising p. 344.) If "the moral
law is the law of progress," as all men, from Mr. Lecky to Mr.
Lilly, seem to admit, it would seem to be necessary, first of all, to
turn our attention to the study of conduct. What are right, and
what are wrong, acts? Why are certain acts right, and certain
others wrong? What is the ethical ideal? Has it changed; and,
if so, how and why? What ought I to do, and what to leave un-
done? And lohy ought I to do either? Granted that a certain
line of conduct will bring about certain results, how insure such
conduct? The answer to these questions involves much. It in-
volves a theory of the universe. One cannot get rid of meta-
physic by turning one's back upon it. The fundamental social
problem is an ethical problem, and the fundamental ethical prob-
lem is metaphysical.

Again, Mr. Kidd's book is an illustration of the vagueness and
uncertainty attaching to the study of social phenomena. Men,
young men, college men especially, are continually turning away
from the study of metaphysics and theology to social science and
political economy, because, they say, they want something practi-
cal, substantial, solid ; they want less speculation and larger results.
They complain of the unfruitfulness of metaphysics and the un-
certainty of theology, not seeing that if there is ever to be cer-
tainty and agreement about anything it must begin with tliose
primary convictions which underlie all social systems, and that
just in proportion as there is disagreement as to fundamental
questions will there be divergence and confusion in the systems
built upon them. And not only so; not only do men apply dif-
ferent principles, but they read the facts very differently. So
that in social science we have not only the variant systems arising
from the various standpoints of their authors, but we have in
addition to this the manifold differences aiising from disagree-
ment as to the facts themselves. I have spoken of the divergence
between Mr. Kidd and Professor Drummond. But what are we

kidd's social evolution. 475

to think when Mr. Kidd attributes progress to the influence of
religion, and Mr. Charles H. Pearson regards it as one evidence of
progress that religion is dying out ; when Mr. Kidd holds that
progress is inevitable and has been due to altruism which has
brought about increased rivalry and competition, and Mr. Pearson
asserts that state socialism is unavoidable and with it the cessation
of competition ? The recent discussions of social questions by
Mackenzie, Drummond, Flint, Pearson, and Kidd furnish suffi-
cient illustration of the divergent views that prevail in regard to
human society. A recent experience in reading these books has
made me long to flee from this region of "noise and smoke " back
to the peace and certainty of the " eternal verities " and has con-
vinced me more than ever that one needs to have a comprehensive
grasp of the problems of philosophy and Christian theology before
attempting to grapple with the difficulties of social science. One
should have his lamp lit and his loins girt and his bearings fixed
before setting out for this misty, confusing region.

Finally, it is only in the light of a Christian theology that
social problems can be solved. Grant the rationality of religion
and the truth of Christianity, and Mr. Kidd's paradoxes disappear
and his book furnishes an ingenious witness to the presence of
" God in history." Instead of saying that progress depends upon
ethical ideas which derive their sanction from a theistic construc-
tion of the universe, we may say that God works in history by
putting in the hearts of men certain intuitive ethical ideas which,
acted upon, lead to progress. Thus far apart from Kevelation.
But we may go a step farther and use the same line of argument
in reference to the nature and mission of the church, and say
that the church is the line along which God works in history
toward the redemption of the world, since the church is the
medium which God has chosen for the spread of those ethical
ideas on which moral growth and social evolution depend. Still
further, the Christian view of the world harmonizes for us what
our author considers an inherent antagonism, since the view of
life which the Christian ethic presents, while insuring the con-
tinually developing life of the social organism, at the same time
provides a way of salvation for the individual. The Christian

476 THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

scheme not onh^ rationalizes altruism; it glorifies the individual.
The individual in order to realize his own best interests (pure
individualism) is, according to the Christian scheme, bound also
at the same time to manifest that "brotherly love" (altruism),
which is the life of the community and the condition of progress.
And conversely, in the manifestation of that "love of the
bretliren" which has its root in " the love of God," the indi-
vidual attains to that perfect happiness which passe th knowledge.
It is along such lines as these, and along such lines alone, that
the problems of social evolution can be solved.

George S. Patton.
Princeton College.