HE KINGDOM OF CANADA
J \f PERIAL FEDERATION
E COLONIAL CONFERENCES
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
OTHER ESSAYS
JOHN M. KELLY LIBRARY
Donated by
The Redemptorists of
the Toronto Province
from the Library Collection of
Holy Redeemer College, Windsor
University of
St. Michael's College, Toronto
Mil* ftEOECME* lIBHARYgWltf&MP
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
IMPEEIAL FEDEKATION, THE COLONIAL
CONFERENCES
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
AND OTHER ESSAYS
BY
JOHN S. EWART, K.C.
TORONTO
MORANG & CO. LIMITED
1908
Wl«w»
Copyright by
JOHN S. EWART
1908
Copyright in Great Britain
u By thy fair salubrious clime,
By thy scenery sublime,
By thy mountains, streams, and woods,
By thine ever-lasting floods —
If greatness dwells beneath the skies,
Thou to greatness shalt arise."
"To know whether it be the interest of this continent to be inde-
pendent, we need only ask this easy, simple question : Is it the interest
of a man to be a boy all his life ? " — Tyler : The Literary History of the
American Revolution, II, 43.
" O child of nations, giant-limbed,
Who stand'st amongst the nations now
Unheeded, unadorned, unhymned,
With unanointed brow.
" How long the ignoble sloth, how long
The trust in greatness not thine own ?
Surely the lion's brood is strong,
To front the world alone!
" How long the indolence, ere thou dare
Achieve thy destiny, seize thy fame —
Ere our proud eyes behold thee bear
A nation's franchise, nation's name ? "
— Charles G. D. Roberts.
hi
CONTENTS
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
PAOZ
The rise and meaning of Canadian Clubs .1
Federation prophecies of nationality 2
*' Kingdom of Canada " proposed as title 3
Freedom from Colonial Office desired 3
Is Canada a nation or a colony ? 4
Definition of colony 6
Canada is a colony 5
Canada's constitutional limitations 6
Instances 7-8
Coasting trade 9
Extra-territoriality 9
Naturalization 11
Treaty-making 12
Dissent and disallowance 15
Governor-General's power 16
Copyright 17
Judicial dependence — Privy Council 19-21
The future 22
British connection 23
Independence 24
Imperial Federation 25
Kingdom or Dominion ? 27
War 28
British connection .29
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
Canada's freedom of choice 31
Comparison of Canadian and Australian constitutions .... 32
Merchant shipping 32
Fisheries 33
Foreign affairs 33
The Pacific islands 35
Independence 36
Amendments of the constitution 37
v
vi CONTENTS
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA: COLONY TO KINGDOM
PAGE
Canada's future divined from her past 39
No tendency away from monarchy 39
Tendency to completest self-government 40
Canada has already a King 40
Case of disagreement with United Kingdom 41
" Reducing the link " 42
Case of disagreement 43
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA : COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907
Colonial independence 47
"Colonies" — or what else ? 60
"His Majesty's Government" 61
THE BRITISH EMPIRE
Duty " to keep the Empire together " 63
Colonial status a "by-gone thing" 53
Imperial Federation impossible 63
The ethical situation very perplexing 63
Loyalty of parts to the whole 64
Imperialists desire dissolution 55
Canada not in position of Cornwall 55
Distinguish between the United Kingdom and the Empire ruled by it . 66
Empire consists of one dominant and several subservient states . . 66
Is Canada a part of the Empire ? 67
Not part of the dominant state .67
Not really one of the subordinate states 67
In form, only, is Canada a part of the Empire 68
Situation during peace 68
Situation during war 69
"Abandoning the mother-country" .61
Summary 63
THE CANADIAN FLAG
Origin of the Union Jack 65
Flags as symbols . . 65
Canadian application of the red ensign 66
Admiralty's assent and objection .66
British statute 67
Canadian application for sanction 67
Lord Stanley's endorsation 68
Admiralty's concession .69
CONTENTS vii
PAGE
Disrespect to Canadian flag 69
Red ensign as Canadian flag 70
American revolutionary flag 70
Canadian requirement 71
The Transvaal flag 71
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
Why so little national sentiment ? 73
Necessity of union 73
Canadians of dual origin 74
Canada's geographical situation 75
The " Canada First " party 76
Crystallization of Canadian sentiment 77
Why was Nova Scotia opposed to federation ? 78
Independence necessary to national sentiment
The " interests of the Empire "
Imperialistic proposals withdrawn 82
Canada becoming self-confident (g£>
Work for Canadian Clubs 84
Imperialism 86
Canada's war position 86
Sir Wilfrid Laurier's pronouncement 87
Is Canada indebted for defence ? 88
The Behring Sea incident 89
Canada's contributions and aid 91
Colonial fiscal independence — a novel situation 94
Study the past 95
Freedom of discussion 96
The Boer War 96
Mental attitude of the clubs 97
EESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
Discovery of parliamentary government 99
Development of responsible government 99„
Contest in England 100
Why recommenced in Canada ? 100
Contest there was between Canadians and the Colonial Office . . 101
The Lower Canadian struggle 101
Suspension of the Assembly 103
Justification of the rebellion 104
The Upper Canadian struggle 104
Governor Head and "republicanism" 106
The rebellion inexcusable . 107
Durham on Canadian grievances 108
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
United Canada — unanimous resolution for responsible government . 109
Lord Metcalfe's opposition 109
Concession of responsible government forced by Canada . . .110
Lord Glenelg's despatch 110
Lord Russell's speech Ill
Joseph Howe's reply 112
Was Russell or Howe right ? .113
The future 114
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
The "divine right" of Kings 115
British monarchy regulated by statute 117
Struggle for popular government 118
Same struggle in America 119
Canadians divided in opinion 120
Sir John Beverley Robinson 121
Parties in Canada ' . . 122
Sir John opposed to responsible government 122
His changed view as to American revolution 123
Subjection of colonials, Sir John's ideal 123
Benefit to United Kingdom of sacrifice of Canadian territory . . 124
And of geographical separation of remaining provinces . . . .124
Exploitation of provinces thus simplified 126
Sir John's opposition to responsible government 126
Character of Sir F. B. Head 127
His view of his duty, and of colonies 128
His overthrow 129
Gubernatorial opposition to Lord Durham 130
Lord Metcalfe's attitude 132
Colonial disloyalty really aspiration for self-government . . . 133
Complete self-government not yet attained 134
Steps toward it 135
MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
The proposals 137
Protection 137
Preferences 138
Mr. Chamberlain's insistence on free trade 138
His change of opinion 138
His proposal of intervention in colonial development . . . .138
Protection of milling in United Kingdom 139
Canadian view of protection and preferences 140
Indirect effect of preferences 140
Retaliation by foreign countries 141
CONTENTS ix
PAGE
Tariff difficulty with Germany 141
United Kingdom and Canada commercially separated . . . .141
Reciprocity with the United States 143
The treaty period, 1864-1866 144
Statistics 145
Summary 146
Mr. Chamberlain's political proposals 147
Establishment of new imperial Parliament 148
Mr. Chamberlain's misrepresentation of Canadian desires . . . 148
The true Canadian attitude 149
Bonds do not bind 150
Mr. Chamberlain's proposal of an imperial Council .... 161
Colonial representation in imperial Parliament 152
Mr. Chamberlain's insistence upon free trade 162
His request for contributions to imperial defence 153
His request for contingents 153
Colonial replies 154
Mr. Chamberlain's failure to appreciate colonial position . . .155
Justification of that position 156
Summary of Canada's attitude 157
Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the military situation ...... 157
IMPERIAL FEDERATION AND THE COLONIAL CONFERENCES
Imperial federation movement . . 159
Imperial Federation League 159
Its agency in summoning the first Conference 160
Its advocacy of further Conferences 161
Lord Salisbury's request for a scheme 161
Report of League's committee 162
Sir Charles Tupper's opposition 162
Deputation to Mr. Gladstone 162
Dissolution of League 163
Separation of its members 163
Chamberlain imperialists and Canadian imperialists .... 164
The Imperial Federation (Defence) League 164
The British Empire League 164
Mr. Chamberlain vs. Canada 165
Little interest shown in Canada 165
Canada well prepared for contest . . . . . . ,166
Mr. Chamberlain's misconceptions 166
His suggestions 167
Canada's opposition . 168
x CONTENTS
IMPERIAL DEFENCE
PAGE
Diversity of interests 169
Australia's situation 169
New Zealand and South Africa 170
Canada's happy situation . . . 171
Australian anxieties 171
Mr. Deakin's reference to Pacific islands 172
Australian defence Conference 175
Admiral Tryon's negotiations 175
Colonial Conference of 1887 176
Agreement of Admiralty and Australasia 177
Result of the Conference 177
Mr. Hoffmeyer's imperial surtax 177
Conference of 1897 178
Mr. Chamberlain's demands 179
Colonial dangers 179
Contributions to the navy 180
Colonial contingents 180
Criticism of Mr. Chamberlain's speech 181
Canada not supported by navy 182
Cape Colony's contribution 183
Australasian resolution . . . 183
Interchange of regiments 184
Conference of 1902 — contributions to navy 184
Mr. Chamberlain somewhat peremptory 184
Colonies not doing their share 185
Colonial expenditure if independent 186
Contributions by all colonies except Canada 187
Table of relative expenditure . . . 188
Colonies should be maritime 188
Conference of 1902 — military defence 188
No existing agreement 189
Request for contingents 190
Reply of Canada and Australia 191
Reply of Cape Colony and Natal . . . . . . . .191
Suggestion of special forces for extra-colonial service . . . . 191
Canada's objection 191
Canada's formulated reply 192
Between the Conferences of 1902 and 1907 194
Australia's dissatisfaction 194
Senator Matheson's address 195
Conference of 1907— naval contributions . . . . . . 196
Canada's justification 196
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's speech 196
Modified imperial proposals 196
CONTENTS xi
PAGE
Lord Tweedmouth's acceptance of the Canadian idea . . . .197
Australia's dissatisfaction with money contributions .... 198
New Zealand's attitude 198
Cape Colony's attitude 198
Newfoundland's attitude 198
Natal's attitude 198
Transvaal's attitude 198
Lord Tweedmouth's speech • . . 199
Australia's explanation 200
Canada's reminder 202
Proposal for colonial expenditure "after consultation with the Ad-
miralty" 203
Canada's opposition 203
Conference of 1907 — military defence 204
Canada's attitude upheld 204
Various speeches 204
The Imperial Defence Committee 206
The General Staff 207
Mr. Haldane's speech 207
Sir Frederick Borden's speech 209
Interchange of officers . 210
Interchange of regiments 211
Summary 212
Contribution without control 213
AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
Mr. Chamberlain's proposal — 1897 217
A Council to give advice with power of development . . . .217
Renewal of proposal in 1902 218
No response by Conference 218
The committee of fifty 218
Its proceedings 218
Its repudiation of federation 219
Its Council with " persuasive authority " 220
Its missionaries in Canada 220
Their failure 220
Mr. Lyttleton's adoption of proposals 220
Colonial replies to circular 221
Proceedings thereupon in Conference 222
Rejection of proposal 223
Lord Elgin's concurrence 223
Proposal of secretariat 223
Establishment of new department in Colonial Office . . . . 224
xii CONTENTS
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
PAGE
" The foot of the throne " . .225
The Privy Council as a " link " 226
Colonial M local prepossession " 226
Uniformity of the law . . . . 227
*' One court in which all have a voice" 228
" Common obedience to the courts of law " 229
Colonial judges on Privy Council 230
Conference of 1897 . . .230
Mr. Chamberlain's suggestions 231
Australian Commonwealth Bill 231
Mr. Chamberlain's opposition 232
His reasons 232
Australian reply 233
Opposition to Mr. Chamberlain in Parliament 235
Compromise 235
A Court of Appeal for the whole Empire . . . . . 237
Inefficiency of the Privy Council 237
Conference of 1901 . .238
Colonial "Law Lords" proposed 238
Colonial objections 240
Conference of 1902 240
Conference of 1907 240
Canada's attitude 243
Concurrence of Lord Chancellor 243
Canadian opinion . 245
Summary 245
IMPERIAL SURTAX ON FOREIGN IMPORTS
Mr. Hoffmeyer's proposal 247
Its revival at Conference of 1907 247
Mr. Lloyd George's speech ♦ . 248
Mr. Deakin's reply 249
Sir Wilfrid Laurier's speech 249
Other speeches 250
Complaint of lack of progress in imperialism 250
Mr. Lloyd George's reply 251
Mr. Deakin's speech 261^
Mr. Lloyd George's resolution . . 252
Other speeches 253
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
Canada's relations with the United States 255
"Reciprocity of trade or of tariffs" . 255
Sir John A. Macdonald's London speech 255
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
Conference of 1887 266
Lord Salisbury's opposition 266
New negotiations with the United States 267
Their failure 267
Treaties with Germany and Belgium 258
Colonies seek denunciation of treaties 268
Lord Salisbury's reply 268
Canadian Parliament's offer 259
Resolution of United Empire Trade League 259
Mr. Bowell's visit to Australia . 259
Ottawa Conference, 1894 — Preferences 259
Colonial Secretary's opposition ...... . . 261
His warning to colonies 263
Canada's curious course 265
Her preferential legislation 266
Conference of 1897 266
Mr. Chamberlain's speech . 267
Resolutions adopted by colonies 267
Denunciation of treaties 268
Resolutions of Conferences of 1902 and 1907 268
Present preferential tariffs 269
Australia's stipulation as to white labor 270
British commencements in protection and preferences . . . .271
Canada's intermediate tariff 271
Summary 272
IMPERIAL CABLES
Sir Sandford Fleming's suggestion 275
Previous and present situations 275
Canadian request of 1884 276
Colonial Conference of 1887 276
Australian Conference of 1888 277
Work of the Egeria 277
Canadians in Australia, 1893 278
Colonial Office opposition 278
Australian Conference, 1894 279
Colonial Conference, 1894 280
Necker Island 281
Negotiations with Hawaii 285
Cable committee of 1896 285
Colonial Conference, 1897 286
Colonial negotiations, 1899 287
Mr. Chamberlain's withdrawal 287
Sir Sandford's protest . 287
Mr. Chamberlain's capitulation 288
xiv CONTENTS
IMPERIAL POSTAGE
PAGE
Revenue of United Kingdom from post-office 289
Canada's deficits 289
Canadian rates, domestic 290
Letters 290
Periodicals 291
Canada's offer of reduced rates 292
Senate's resolution 293
Canadian Press Association resolution 294
Boards of Trade's petition 294
Deputation to British Postmaster-General ...... 295
His opposition 296
New Postmaster-General — agreement made . . . . . . 296
Effect of new rates . . .297
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
Lord Alverstone's treachery . . . . . . . . . 299
Nature of dispute 299
Points in dispute 300
Negotiations for arbitration 301
Anglo-American commission . . . 301
Failure to agree 302
Diplomatic negotiations 302
Clayton-Bulwer treaty 304
Impartial jurists of repute 305
Arrangement between President and Senate 305
American commissioners not impartial 305
Canadian objection to American commissioners 307
Colonial Office's reply 308
Ratification of treaty 309
Sir Wilfrid Laurier's speech 309
The Alverstone award 310
Compromise — why not? 311
The inlet question 312
The mountain question 313
The two contentions 313
The S mountains — how selected 314
A compromise ' . . . . . 315
The proofs 315
Alverstone's language 316
Opinions of Canadian commissioners 318
The four islands 318
The two contentions 319
Alverstone's decision in favor of Canada 319
CONTENTS xv
PAGB
His compromise with the Americans 320
How he carried it out 320
Alverstone's second judgment, with comments .... 323-334
The two judgments collated 334-340
Summary ..." 340
The charge 341
Alverstone and Great Britain 344
Sir Charles Tupper's speech 344
Sir Wilfrid Laurier's speech 345
Canadian commissioners protest 345
Comment of the Times 347
THE FUTURE OF CANADA
Some change will occur 349
Reason and sentiment 350
The King and the King's government . . . . . . . 351
Present road not turning from monarchy 352
Opposition always to Colonial Office 352
The tug-of-war 353
Road leads to self-government . 354
Now nearly independent 354
What does independence mean ? 355
A British or a separate Sovereign 356
Imperial Federation 357
Mr. Chamberlain's schemes 359
Commercial federation 359
Imperial Council 360
Imperial Court of Appeal 361
Contributions to the navy 362
Summary 363.
Eventuality of war 364
Mr. Chamberlain's idea of colonial duty 366
Independence and annexation 367
Canadian methods of cooperation 368
In trade, telegraphy, postal arrangements, "All-Red-Route" . 368-369
The Kingdom of Canada 370
ILLUSTRATIONS
The Canadian Flag Facing 65
Map of Southeastern Alaska and Part of British Columbia . " 299
Map showing the Disputed Southern Boundary ... " 301
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 1
I am very glad to have an opportunity of addressing the
Canadian Club, but I find much greater gratification in the
fact that there is a Canadian Club to address. Effects do
not occur without causes, and it is interesting to inquire into
the meaning of the somewhat sudden rise of these clubs, of
this phenomenal desire for the study of our political situation,
of this simultaneous eagerness for enlightenment with refer-
ence to the problems that confront us.
To my mind the explanation is very simple. Canada has
commenced to realize herself, to believe in herself, and to
recognize that for her, too, there is a principal part to play
upon the stage of the world. Canada has become conscious
of the feelings and aspirations and the strong strivings of
strenuous manhood, and, on the other hand, of the utter im-
possibility of full expression and assertion in mere colonial
status. Divine discontent (the necessary pre-condition of
all improvement), in regard to her political semi-servitude,
has taken strong hold upon Canada, and she is taking stock,
and extending the figures, and considering where she now is,
and what her future is to be.
In my opinion that is the meaning of these clubs ; not social
clubs are they, nor political, but student clubs; meetings, at
short intervals, of serious men for the purpose of helping one
another to resolve those problems of national life which are
now pressing themselves upon us. Every true Canadian has
*The substance of the above article was delivered as an address to
the Canadian Clubs of Toronto and Ottawa in 1904.
B 1
2 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
recently found himself engaged in meditation upon such
questions, and I am to-night to give you such reflections as
seem to me to be of chiefest importance for our consideration.
My -conclusions may not be concurred in by all, but possibly
what I say may be of some assistance in the formation of
more correct opinion.
Prophecies. — The fathers of federated Canada delighted
to proclaim that their offspring was to be a nation, and they
did not hesitate to assign to it, prophetically and proudly, its
place and order among the nations of the earth.
The Hon. Adams G. Archibald (N.S.) said that the united
provinces " would form a nation which in all the elements
that constitute real greatness might be ranked as the third
or fourth on the face of the globe" (Whelan, p. 11).
Lieutenant-Colonel Gray (N.B.) said that they "wanted
a national union, one which would enable them to take an
honorable place among the nations of the earth" (lb. p. 102).
The Hon. Charles Fisher (N.B.) said that the federation
"would be the fourth maritime power in the world. Eng-
land, France, and the United States would alone be superior
to it" (lb. p. 173).
Sir George E. Cartier (Que.) said that the delegates had
"met to inquire whether it were possible for the provinces,
from their present fragmentary and isolated materials, to
form a nation or kingdom" (lb. pp. 9, 10).
And Sir John A. Macdonald (Ont.) said that the delegates
had in view "the noble object of founding a great British
monarchy, in connection with the British Empire, and under
the British Queen" (lb. p. 45). "I am," he said, "a subject
of a great British-American nation, under the government of
Her Majesty, and in connection with the empire of Great
Britain and Ireland" (lb. p. 47). "Confederation," he added,
"would give them the national prowess and strength which
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 3
would make them at least the fourth nation on the face of the
globe" (lb. p. 8). He preferred for the title of the new con-
federation "The Kingdom of Canada/' and he desired an
imperial alliance with the kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, with the Crown as the sufficient bond of union
(3 Imp. Rev. p. 416). At another time Sir John Macdonald
said that the new constitution "was intended to be, as far as
circumstances would permit, similar to that of the imperial
government, and recognizing the Sovereign of Great Britain
as its sole and only head" (Gray, p. 55).
In accordance with these ideas a draft of the Federation
Bill spoke not of the "Dominion of Canada," but of the
"Kingdom of Canada" (Pope, "Confederation Documents,"
p. 181), and Mr. Pope tells us that " Mr. Macdonald made every
effort to retain the phrase," but it was changed (as Sir John
himself wrote to a friend) "at the instance of Lord Derby,
the Foreign Minister, who feared that the word 'kingdom'
would wound the susceptibilities of the Yankees" ("Life of
Sir John A. Macdonald," vol. I, p. 313). What a blessed thing
it is that Providence in His infinite mercy so bountifully pro-
vides these English lords with grace and tact and liberality
sufficient to keep our neighbors in such excellent good humor.
I sometimes wonder if there is not a shade of contempt in
the smiles with which our surrenders are accepted.
The founders of our federation, then, desired that Canada
should be a "nation." They wished to be "subjects of a
great British-American nation," styled "The Kingdom of
Canada," with the British queen for their sovereign. Gen-
tlemen, is not that what we still desire, and that which we
must still diligently seek after?
And well, sir, might the patriotic aspirations of these great
men rise to such a height. In population the provinces
almost equalled that of the thirteen states when they declared
4 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
for an entirely separate existence. As the Hon. George
Brown pointed out, there were forty-eight sovereign nations
in Europe, and thirty-seven of them (including Portugal,
Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Saxony, Hanover, and
Greece) had less population than united Canada ; and Sweden
and Norway, Belgium and Bavaria had very little more. 1
Was it not time, then, thought these men, that British North
America should take on the dignity and importance, the
privileges and responsibilities of nationhood, with the queen
for their sovereign, and in alliance with the United Kingdom ?
Nation or Colony ? — Once again in our history has it become
somewhat fashionable to speak of Canada as a nation. Sir
Wilfrid Laurier would educate us to the use of the word, and
it was his government that suggested that the words "King
of Canada" should be one of the King's titles. Lord Rose-
bery proposed that instead of "King of all the British Domin-
ions beyond the Seas," it should read "King of Britains,"
because, he said, "It takes away from the title any sense of
colony or dependency, which I think all who wish well to the
Empire must be anxious to remove" (Hansard, 1898, 4th Sess.,
p. 528). Mr. Chamberlain speaks of us and our congeners as
"sister states." Kipling, too, renounces the depreciatory
term, and bids us be nations (Reinsch, p. 270). And, finally,
the Marquis of Lome, just before leaving Canada, said to
us, "You are not the subjects, but the allies, of a great
country, the country that gave you birth." (Reply to fare-
well address by Commons.)
But in spite of poetry and all declamation, we are not a
nation; although what we are exactly is a little difficult in a
word to express.
The editor of Sir George Cornewall Lewis's "Government
of Dependencies" would scientifically describe us as a pro-
1 Whelan, p. 32.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 5
tectorate; for, as is well known, a protectorate implies per-
sonal supervision of foreign affairs, rather than political in-
corporation, or physical dominion (Reinsch, p. 100). In this
view protector and protectorate is the beginning and ending
of political paternal association. An empire may declare a
protectorate, for example, over Uganda; elevate it after-
ward to a Crown colony; then to a colony with legislative
powers, but no responsible government; next to a self-gov-
erning colony; and when the power of self-government is
complete, Uganda would again become a protectorate, having
mere personal relation once more with the dominant state.
But Canada is not a protectorate, for she is still under tutelage.
More frequently Canada is thought of as a self-governing
colony; but we resent the "colony/' and are unable to allege
complete powers of self-government. There is no category
in which, strictly speaking, we can be placed; and I desire
for two purposes to ask you to inquire with me to-night into
the precise nature of the relation which at the present moment
exists between us and our political associates: first, that we
may clearly understand what that relation is, and, second,
that, so understanding, we may the more readily and intelli-
gently envisage the future.
From among the many different definitions of a nation, we
may select as common to the most authoritative of those
referring to its political rather than its ethnographical signifi-
cation, the condition that it "is a complete, or self-sufficient
body of free persons" (Grotius); that it is "self-existent,
autonomous, and sovereign" (W. P. Johnston); and that it
is "capable of maintaining relations with all other govern-
ments" (Field, "International Code," 2d ed., p. 2. See Morse,
" Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization," p. 3). Canada's
political position, I regret to say, falls very far short of these
requisites of nationality.
6 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
A good book on colonial government (Reinsch, p. 16) defines
a colony, on the other hand, as " an outlying possession of a
national State, the administration of which is carried on under
a system distinct from, but subordinate to, the government
of the national territory. " And that somewhat exactly
describes our position.
We are a colony, then, but we do not like the word. We
feel that it carries with it a flavor of inferiority. And so
it does. Emigrants are principally of the proletariat class.
Comparatively few of the bourgeoisie, and practically none of
the wealthy or highly cultured, leave the old shores. Colony
implies inferiority — inferiority in culture, inferiority in
wealth, inferiority in government, inferiority in foreign re-
lations, inferiority and subordination. " Colonization/ ' as
Reinsch (p. 14) has it, "implies the exertion of influence by a
higher civilization upon one of a lower order." We recognize
the implication, and therefore dislike the term.
A Self-governing Colony f — But we are, nevertheless, a
colony; and the books would have it that we are a self-gov-
erning colony. Is that true? And, if not, to what extent
are we under authority?
All the power which we have comes from a statute passed
at Westminster. It does not depend in any way upon our
own declaration. The authority of the Parliament of Great
Britain, of France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and
so on, is all self-asserted. Ours is a gift from a power outside
of us, the gift of the Imperial Parliament.
And the Parliament which gave, can take away, or change,
as it pleases. We are not sovereign. We are subordinate.
We are not a nation, but a colony. Our Parliament is a
legislative, but not a constituent, body (Bourinot, in Hod-
gins, "Dominion and Provincial Legislation," p. 1315).
Constitutional Limitations. — More important than the
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 7
derivation of our powers is the answer to the question:
What powers have we?
If Canada wished to have biennial instead of annual
Parliaments, she could not so enact. If she wanted to take
her census every twelve years instead of ten, she would be
powerless to make the change. If the Maritime Provinces
wished to unite and become one province, they would be
advised that it was impossible. If Canada desired to increase
the membership of her Senate, or to decrease the qualifica-
tions for it, or even to change the quorum of the House of
Commons, her power would be found to be inadequate. The
right to make her own coins is forbidden by express statute.
Over such a comparatively trifling matter as the procedure
to be adopted in appropriating her own money, Canada has
no authority. And such a necessary change of the capital
city as that from Ottawa to Winnipeg (I speak as a Winni-
peger) cannot be accomplished by unanimous vote of our
Parliament, our legislatures, and all our people. West-
minster can do these things for us. We cannot do them
for ourselves. Self-government as to such and many other
matters simply does not exist.
Observe some of the points that have actually arisen. Four
years after Federation, doubts were entertained as to the
power of Canada to establish new provinces in the North-
West Territories, and to provide for their representation in
Parliament. Westminster was appealed to, and an Act was
passed there supplementary of our constitution.
In 1869, doubts arose as to the power of Canada to appoint
a deputy to the Speaker of the Senate, and an imperial
statute was enacted to declare that it might be done.
In 1873, Canada passed a statute providing for the exami-
nation of witnesses upon oath by committees of the Senate
and House of Commons; but it appeared that Canada had
8 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
no power so to enact. Westminster came to our assistance,
and we are now permitted to legislate in reference to the
"privileges, immunities, and powers" of our Senate and
House of Commons, provided we do not go beyond those
"held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House" at
Westminster at the date of our legislation. We must do as
they do, or do nothing at all.
In 1875, a Canadian statute, with reference to such a do-
mestic matter as copyright within our own limits, was held
to transcend our authority; and Westminster had again to
be appealed to.
In 1878, our Parliament passed a bill with reference to the
amount of space occupied by deck cargoes liable to tonnage
dues. But Parliament exceeded, it was said, its power in
legislating for all ships in Canadian waters. It should have
confined itself to Canadian ships, and other ships were held
unamenable to our legislation even while in our own waters
(Hodgins, 58 d).
In 1886, Canada wished to add to her Senate some repre-
sentatives from the North-West Territories, but she was power-
less, and assistance once more had to be sought for at West-
minster.
Concluding this enumeration, let me add generally that
every law which we may think necessary to enact, but " which
is or shall be repugnant to the provisions of any (Imp.) Act
of Parliament extending to the colonies,' ' is declared by
imperial statute to "be and remain absolutely void and
inoperative" to the extent of such repugnancy (Col. Laws
Validity Act, 1865).
Our Coasting Trade. — A good example of this sort of limi-
tation can be found in the former customs laws, by which
the colonies were deprived of the power to impose protective
duties upon British goods. We were not permitted to give
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 9
any benefit or preference to our own manufacturers or pro-
ducers. That limitation may be thought to belong to a
colonial policy now happily abandoned, but we have it still
in the Imperial Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, by which
authority is given to colonial legislatures to regulate their
own coasting trade, upon the express condition that they
must "treat all British ships (including the ships of any other
British possession) in exactly the same manner as ships" of
their own (sec. 736). In other words, Canada is powerless
to give preference or protection to her own ships, engaged
in her own coasting trade.
Thus far, then, we have arrived at these points :
1. No Canadian legislation, even with reference to local
affairs, can contravene any Westminster statute extending
to Canada.
2. Even in the absence of any such contravention, Canada
is impotent in very many respects.
i This second statement must, however, be dealt with more
fully, and various illustrations of our limitations given, in
order that its extent may be fully appreciated. Let these
further points, then, be noted.
Extra-territoriality. — In the fact that Canada's powers
are prescribed by statute, and that she is not a nation but
some sort of a subordinate dependency, there is involved the
strict limitation of her legislative jurisdiction to her own
geographical boundaries. Sovereign nations are not so cir-
cumscribed. In this respect the Dominion of Canada is upon
a level with the individual states of the American Union, and
has not the power of Congress at Washington. Judge Cooley's
remarks as to individual state powers applies equally to
Canada :
"The legislative authority of every state must spend its
force within the territorial limits of the state. The legislature
10 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
of the state cannot make laws by which people- outside of the
state must govern their actions, except as they may have occa-
sion to resort to the remedies which the state provides, or deal
with property situated within the state. It can have no au-
thority upon the high seas beyond state lines, because there
is the point of contact with other nations" (p. 149).
And not merely upon the high seas have we no authority,
but we are powerless to punish a man who is living in Canada
for what he may have done beyond the border. Known
criminals may reside here unpunished for their crime, so far
as our laws are concerned, because we have not the legislative
power of Denmark, or Belgium, or any of the hundred sov-
ereign states of the world.
Observe some of the workings of this principle of legislative
limitation. A native of Canada and resident there has half
a dozen wives whom he married in the United States, and he
brings them in turn to live with him in Toronto, and we can-
not punish him for his bigamy (Macleod v. Attorney-General,
N.S.W., 1891, A.C'455). There are thousands of Mormons
in our North- West Territories, thousands more are coming,
and Canada cannot condemn them as bigamists, for their
offences were committed outside of Canada. (Consult Reg. v.
Brierly, 1887, 14 Ont. 525; Reg. v. Plowman, 25 Ont. 656;
re Criminal Code, 1897, 27 S.C. p. 461.)
Take another case : Affidavits are frequently used in Cana-
dian courts, and one might think it reasonable that we should
have power to punish, for perjury, any one who in any such
affidavit swore to that which was false. But we cannot do
so if the affidavits are sworn to outside our own boundaries,
even when the deponents are British subjects and domiciled
in Canada. For example, if a resident of Windsor swore to
the falsehood in Detroit, instead of upon this side of the river,
he might win his suit here, and yet be free, so far as we are
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 11
concerned, of all charge of perjury (Dom. St., 32 Vic. c. 26,
objected to and amended 32-33 Vic. c. 23, s. 3).
Our legislative subordination may be illustrated by two
other cases: An imperial statute provided that affidavits
made in Great Britain should be received in Canadian courts ;
and, of course, we had to receive them, although it was con-
trary to our practice to do so (Gordon v. Fuller, 1836, 5 U.C.,
O.S. 174). But it would be quite out of the question that we
should enact that affidavits made in Canada should be received
in English courts; and just as much out of the question that
we should presume to punish the makers of the English affi-
davits for perjury if their assertions were false. 1
Upon similar principle, British bankruptcy proceedings have
certain effects in Canada, while similar proceedings in Canada
have no corresponding effects in Great Britain. For example,
lands in Canada will vest in an English registrar in bank-
ruptcy by virtue of the Bankruptcy Acts, but no Canadian
law could have any effect upon a bankrupt's land anywhere
outside of Canada (Callender v. Lagos, 1891, A.C. 460)." So,
too, a British discharge of the bankrupt is effective through-
out the Empire, whereas a discharge in Canada has no effect
whatever in Britain. One British judge said that "it might
as well be said that the laws of the state of Maryland would
apply here." Another said that the colonial law "has the
same force here as the law of a foreign country has" (Bartley
v. Hodges, 1861, B. and S. 375).
Naturalization. — The principle under discussion has very
remarkable application to the subject of naturalization of
aliens; for, while we can turn an alien (an American, for
1 In the same way an imperial statute may provide that British
medical men shall be permitted to practise their profession in Canada;
but Canada could give her citizens no status in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere (Reg. v. College of Physicians, etc., 44 U.C., Q.B. 566).
12 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
example) into a " British subject within Canada" (R.S. Can.,
c. 113, sees. 25, 26), and so give him " British nationality
within Canada" (lb. sec. 28), we cannot affect his status in
other parts of the Empire or the world. As Mr. Clement says,
"No legislation by the Parliament of Canada can make an
alien a British subject, quoad the Empire; it can do no more
than give him, within the confines of the Dominion, the privi-
leges, or some of the privileges, of naturalization " (2d ed., p.
230).
For similar reasons, Canadian legislation
"cannot visit upon natural born British subjects, resident in
Canada, any penalty for acts committed without the Dominion,
for without the Dominion they are — quoad Canada — British
subjects only, and their status as citizens of Canada is nought "
(lb. note).
There results from all this, the curious fact that an American
naturalized under Canadian law becomes a "British subject
within Canada," and, therefore, ceases to be an American
citizen; but outside of Canada he has no new status. He
has sworn allegiance to His Majesty "as lawful Sovereign of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the
Dominion of Canada," and has consequently repudiated his
former allegiance to the United States ; but his new situation
is not that of a British subject, but that of a "British subject
within Canada." He is, perhaps, the truest Canadian of us
all. 1
Treaty-making. — Closely associated with the question
of extra-territorial power is the subject of treaty-making.
Much confusion and misunderstanding exist with reference
to it, principally because a very necessary division of the sub-
ject is not made. If we distinguish between war treaties,
commercial treaties, extradition treaties, and settlement-of-
dispute treaties, it becomes clear.
1 Upon this subject see Canadian Law Times, April, 1905.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 13
War treaties we have nothing to do with, nor, indeed, save
indirectly, has the British Parliament anything to do with
them. They are made by the imperial government, by His
Majesty in Council, in which we have no representative, and
over which we exercise no influence. If Mr. Balfour declared
war against France to-morrow, Canada would be at war with
France, and would remain so until the British government
brought it to a close. We would have nothing to do but
fight ; possibly doing some of it amongst ourselves.
Until recently our commercial treaties were made for us,
and when the United Kingdom entered into an arrangement
with a foreign country, we were, as a matter of course, in-
cluded. When Canada's foreign trade had very largely
expanded, more particularly when the trading world (with
the exception of the United Kingdom) entered upon a system
of protective and preferential tariffs, and when Canada's
commercial policy had thus become quite inconsistent with
that of the United Kingdom, a separation of foreign relations
became imperative, and a consequent change in methods of
negotiation ensued.
Our commercial separation commenced with the abrogation
of the navigation laws and the abandonment of all claim to
impose taxation upon our trade. It was emphasized, in 1879,
in most marked fashion by our adoption of the protective
system, and the consequent partial exclusion of British manu-
factures. And it was all but completed in 1898, when we
succeeded in freeing ourselves from the German and Belgian
treaties, which the United Kingdom had made for us without
our assent, and, as they said, by an oversight.
In 1878, we obtained a declaration from the British gov-
ernment that for the future no commercial treaty would be
made by which Canada should be bound, unless she herself
assented to it (Eng. Blue Book, Commercial, No. 5, 1903;
14 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
Can. Sess. Pap., 1892, No. 24, p. 7). The German and Belgian
treaties had been made before that date, but they are now
gone, and we are free for the future from any commercial
treaty obligations other than those of our own making.
More than that, in the negotiation of any such treaty we
now (thanks to Sir Charles Tupper) take the leading part.
The present practice is to associate a Canadian statesman
with a British representative, and to intrust the practical
work to the Canadian, while requiring the agreement to be
signed by both. The other day Sir Wilfrid Laurier, somewhat
to the astonishment of Mr. Chamberlain, carried on negotia-
tions at Ottawa with the German consul at Montreal, without
the leave or knowledge of anybody but his own colleagues.
We have been accustomed for many years to enter into postal
conventions with foreign countries upon our own responsibility,
because no one had any interest in them but ourselves (see
Statutes, Can., 1880, VII). For the same good reason, the
settlement of tariff treaties (call them conventions if you like)
should be entirely and completely in our own hands. 1
Extradition treaties are at present made by the imperial
government. There being no diversity of interest between
us and the United Kingdom, Canada has so far acquiesced in
this qualification of her authority. It is in no sense, however,
an imperial matter, and Canada ought to be in a position to
make her own arrangements with reference to criminals who
seek refuge within her own borders.
The fourth class of treaties, namely, those relating to the
settlement of disputes which we may have with any foreign
country, is not in such a satisfactory position, and the situation
in its application to the Alaska case has led to the assertion
by Sir Wilfrid Laurier of a desire for greater control. I need
1 Negotiations of the French commercial treaty (1907) since the de-
livery of the above address were conducted by Canadians alone.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 15
not detail the facts or discuss the result. For myself, I say
merely that truckling, like everything else, may develop into
a habit; like many another habit, it is a bad one; and that
the sooner it is stopped the better. The Marquis of Lome's
declaration, "You have the power to make treaties on your
own responsibility with foreign nations" {supra) , is not quite
accurate. It ought to be well founded. 1
Summary. — Summarizing thus far, we have ascertained
(1) that Canada holds her power as the gift of a Parliament
which may augment, diminish, or abolish it, at will ; (2) that
she has no power at all over a great variety of subjects;
(3) that she has no part in the declaration of war or peace;
(4) that, practically, she can make such commercial arrange-
ments with foreign nations as she pleases; (5) that extradi-
tion treaties are made for her; and (6) that her situation with
reference to settlement-of-dispute treaties is unsatisfactory.
But our survey of Canada's powers is yet incomplete, for we
have still to notice the control which our Federation Act
gives to Downing Street over those subjects of legislation
which are within our legislative jurisdiction. Even as to
them we are far from sovereign.
Dissent and Disallowance. — This control is exercised in
two ways : (1) Parliament, with its two hundred and ninety-
eight members, may unanimously pass some measure, and
the Governor-General may refuse to assent to it; or (2) the
Governor may assent, and yet, afterwards, and at any time
within two years, Downing Street may disallow it.
By one or other of these methods, many purposes of the
Canadian Parliament have been thwarted; not only when
the interests involved were of large importance (coinage, for
example), but also when they were almost of a private and
1 Upon this subject see Quick and Garran,"The Annotated Constitu-
tion of the Australian Commonwealth," p. 634.
16 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
personal nature, such as the attachment of the salaries of
government officials for payment of their debts, or the grant
of a charter to Bytown, or a divorce to Mr. Harris. These
instances were prior to Federation; but since then, among
other cases, a statute of Canada fixing the Governor-General's
salary at £6500, was disallowed, because Downing Street's
opinion as to a proper amount differed from that expressed
by Parliament (Hodgins, p. 6. This in 1868. See later Act,
1869, c. 74, assented to).
Governor-General's Power. — In other contests with Down-
ing Street we have been more successful. It was asserted by
Lord Carnarvon, for example, that the Governor-General
personally, and not upon the advice of his ministers, was
intrusted with the power of disallowance of provincial statutes.
In other words, that the Governor-General, of his own motion,
and contrary to the advice of his ministers, could veto pro-
vincial legislation. We are indebted to Mr. Blake for the
overthrow of that idea (Blake's Memo., Dec. 22, 1875).
Similar contention was made with reference to the pardon-
ing power — that it was a prerogative of the Crown ; that the
Governor-General represented the Crown ; and that, therefore,
Canadian ministers had nothing to do with the matter. Mr.
Blake successfully combated that notion, too, and the next
Governor's instructions (Lord Lome's) enabled our own men
(except in rare instances) to control the pardons of our
criminals.
More recently (1900) a number of commissions in the
imperial army were offered to Canadians. Nomination of
the candidates was intrusted to Lord Minto, and our gov-
ernment was asked to act as an unofficial advisory committee.
But the ministers declined to make recommendations "sub-
ject to final approval" by the Governor-General, declaring
"that if they were to be responsible at all, the usual rule
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 17
governing ministerial responsibility should prevail" ("The
Canadian Contingents," by Sandford Evans, p. 315).
Copyright. — The most notable instance of Downing Street
interference with Dominion legislation is that relating to
copyright. One would imagine that a nation, even of the
one hundred and fourth rank, would have complete control
over such a matter as the right to sell books within its own
territory, but Canada has no such power, and although it has
been promised again and again, Canada cannot get it.
The trouble commenced with the imperial statute of 1843
(5 & 6 Vic. c. 45), which, as Sir John Thompson said, "was
immediately attended with great hardship and inconvenience
in the North American colonies" (Sess. Pap., 1892, Vol. 12,
No. 81), and was assailed with vigorous protests. In 1875
and 1890, some slight ameliorations of the situation were
obtained, but Canada has never yet been given complete con-
trol of the sale of books within her own territory.
In 1846 Lord Grey acknowledged that British interference
was indefensible, and announced that "Her Majesty's gov-
ernment proposes to leave to the local legislatures the duty
and responsibility of passing such enactments as they may
deem proper, for securing both the right of authors and the
interests of the public" (lb.).
In his despatch of the 31st of July, 1868, the Duke of Buck-
ingham and Chandos declared to the Governor-General that
"the anomalous position of the question in North America
is not denied" (lb.).
In 1892, in a most elaborate report, the imperial depart-
mental officials said, "Admitting, as we must, that the pres-
ent state of the Canadian law is unsatisfactory," etc. (Sess.
Pap., 1.894, Vol. 25, No. 50, Can.).
Lord Cran worth, in his judgment in Low v. Bouverie
(L.R. 3 H.L. 100), said, "That His Majesty's colonial subjects
18 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
are by the statute deprived of rights they otherwise would
have enjoyed, is plain."
Mr. Justice Moss (Smiles v. Belford, 1 Ont. App. 436) puts
the matter fairly and tersely when he says that the effect of
the law "is to enable the British authorities to give an Ameri-
can publisher a Canadian copyright."
To remedy this state of affairs, the Canadian Parliament
passed a bill in 1889. But it remains inoperative to-day,
because Downing Street so decrees. Sir John Thompson
fought vigorously for his country, and his two able and
exhaustive memoranda upon the subject ought to have
resulted (but did not) in something better than inquiries and
reports acknowledging that the "state of the Canadian law
is unsatisfactory." In these documents, Sir John Thompson
demonstrated (and it was not, and could not be, denied) that
the " present policy" resulted in "making Canada a market
for American reprints, and closing the Canadian press for the
benefit of the American press"; he declared that the belief
was growing that "the present state of the law is odious and
unjust"; he requested that, after so many promises and such
long delay, "some step in advance should be taken toward
removing Canadian grievances, beyond the mere routine of
inquiries, reports, and suggestions," and he demanded that
Canada be permitted to withdraw from the Berne Conven-
tion, for, as he said, "Canada has been repeatedly assured that
her continuance in any treaty arrangements of this kind
would be subject to her own desire to withdraw at any time
on giving the prescribed notice."
Sir John's language was of the outspoken sort, and displayed
not a little impatience. But Downing Street was unmoved.
The history of its misdoings was properly labelled and filed,
and the "regrettable incident" was thus brought to a vic-
torious close.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 19
Were we not becoming perfectly accustomed to it, we could
hardly believe that in the Imperial Departmental Report
(just referred to) one of the principal reasons assigned for
declining to sanction our legislation was that it " would at
least be open to the charge of being inconsistent with the
declaration as to the law of the United Kingdom and the
British possessions which was made to the United States last
year." That is to say, because Lord Salisbury "last year"
quite correctly informed the United States what the law then
was, and because the United States may have acted upon
that statement, therefore Canadian law must forever remain
in an "unsatisfactory" state, and the British author must
always be permitted "to give an American publisher a Cana-
dian copyright."
Having to argue against such irritating nonsense and truc-
kling obsequiousness as that, I do not wonder that Canada's
Premier displayed a little impatience. I marvel at his moder-
ation ; and I renew his demand that Canada shall have com-
plete control over the sale of books within her own territory. 1
Litigation. — Canada legislates for half a continent. She
regulates a foreign trade of about a million and a half of dollars
a day. She has established a banking system that is probably
the best in the world, and the capital of her chartered institu-
tions exceeds $75,000,000. She has over a million children
at school, and an army of nearly 30,000 teachers to instruct
them. She writes about 80,000 letters every day. She has
a railway trackage of 19,000 miles, and carried last year
22,000,000 passengers and nearly 50,000,000 tons of freight.
She smokes some 8,000,000 pounds of tobacco in a year,
and she continues to walk fairly correctly under an annual
1 Upon this subject see Low v. Bouverie, L.R. 1 Ch. 42; Hearn, "Gov-
ernment of England," 2d ed., p. 597; Quick and Garran, "The Annotated
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth," p. 348.
20 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
load of 15,000,000 gallons of liquor. But she is not permitted
to settle her own lawsuits. When in 1875 we established our
Supreme Court at Ottawa, we were compelled to forego that
power. The authority that France gives to Algeria, and that
all the midget states of the world possess, is too great to intrust
to Canada. Australia asked for it when, more recently, her
commonwealth charter was under discussion. But in vain.
Colonists — self-governing colonists, they are called — are
not allowed to settle their own lawsuits. The Malay States
can do that much.
And what is the result ? The principal effect is that Canada
is forced to develop according to the ideas of a body of men
out of touch and sympathy with Canadian methods and
notions, instead of being expanded according to the genius
and the wishes of Canadians themselves. Upon a subject
of this sort it behooves a Canadian barrister to speak with
reserve and respect. I shall, therefore, make use of the
language of an English King's Counsel, Mr. Haldane (than
whom no man outside of the Privy Council itself can speak
with greater authority), taken from his eulogy of Lord Wat-
son, one of the ablest men who ever sat upon the Judicial
Committee :
"He was an imperial judge of the very first order. The
function of such a judge, sitting in the supreme tribunal of
the Empire, is to do more than decide what abstract and
familiar legal conceptions should be applied to particular cases.
His function is to be a statesman as well as a jurist, to fill in
the gaps which Parliament has deliberately left in the skeleton
constitutions and laws that it has provided for the British
colonies. The imperial legislature has taken the view that
these constitutions and laws must, if they are to be acceptable,
be in a large measure unwritten, elastic, and capable of being
silently developed, and even altered, as the colony develops
and alters. This imposes a task of immense importance and
difficulty upon the Privy Council judges, and it was this task
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 21
which Lord Watson had to face when some fifteen years ago
he found himself face to face with what threatened to be a
critical period in the history of Canada."
After referring to the Canadian cases, and to the decisions
of the Canadian courts, Mr. Haldane adds :
"Great unrest was the result, followed by a series of appeals
to the Privy Council, which it was discovered still had power
to give special leave for them, was commenced. . . . Lord
Watson made the business, of laying down the new law, that
was necessary, his own. He completely altered the tendency
of the decisions of the Supreme Court" {Juridical Review,
1899, p. 279).
I am inclined to think, gentlemen, that there is something
in this statement that is not very pleasant reading for Cana-
dians; my only remark upon it is that if there is work for
statesmen to do in the development of our constitution, we
ought to do it ourselves.
Leaving aside these constitutional cases, may I not say that
there is, if possible, still less justification for Privy Council
intervention in our everyday actions. Lacking local knowl-
edge, and all those shades of feeling and points of view which
life in Canada alone can give, the Privy Councillors are, as I
think, unable to appreciate some of the arguments which, to
a Canadian, are full of significance and meaning. For ex-
ample, how can men, who have no experience of our systems
of land registration, learn sufficient in one argument to decide
difficult points involved in their practical working? How is
it possible for men who are engaged one day upon Hindoo
law, another upon Burmese law, and the next upon Singalese
law, and so on, to deal satisfactorily, not only with Quebec
law, but with the Torrens system of land registration ? Pro-
fessor Dicey's book, for example, on "The Law of the Constitu-
tion," is the best work on the subject; but what colonial
22 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
lawyer could read it without observing mistakes relating to
colonial law? Although Reinsch is nearer to us geographi-
cally, yet he, too, stumbles badly when referring to Canadian
law. The article by Lord Thring in the March number of
the Nineteenth Century furnishes another example of the same
thing.
But whether these Privy Council judges can or cannot
appreciate our cases, I, as a barrister and a Canadian, decline
to admit that Canada, with her six millions of people, is not
as able as the United States was, with its three and a half
millions, and as the United States is to-day, with its eighty
millions, or as Algeria is, to decide her own lawsuits.
And even if it could be proved that Canadians are unfit to
settle their own quarrels, I would object to the degradation
involved in the admission of it, and I would contend that it
would be better sometimes to make mistakes (the Privy
Council makes lots of them) than to be kept forever in lead-
ing strings. If we cannot settle our own lawsuits, let us learn
to do so by trying.
The Future. — We have now finished our survey of par-
liamentary and judicial power in Canada, and the picture is
sufficiently humiliating. I agree with Dr. Parkin in saying
that
" if the greater British colonies are permanently content with
their present political status, they are unworthy of the source
from which they sprang" (" Imperial Federation," p. 12, and
see p. 31).
What are we going to do about it ? It seems to be taken
for granted that there are but three alternatives before us, —
independence, annexation, and stay as we are. I venture to
suggest a fourth, namely, to go on as we have been going.
Almost every step in Canadian political history has been
toward greater legislative freedom. Every step has been
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 23
taken with difficulty, and in the face not only of Downing
Street opposition, but, strangely enough, of objection and
resistance from many Canadians. Every step has been de-
nounced as involving, or tending toward, a separation from
British connection. And yet (mark this), every step has but
served to strengthen the tie. Lord Thring says truly (in the
article already referred to) that "the history of imperial
union shows that as the legal ties are slackened, the moral
ties are tightened." The Canadian rebellion was not in the
present century, when our freedom is greatest; and our
contingents did not enlist for foreign service in 1837, when we
had British connection up to the hilt. What is the meaning,
then, of these objections from our own people to the extension
of our own legislative power ?
British Connection. — The answer is very simple, but is
almost universally missed. Clearly define what you mean
by British connection, and all becomes clear. Very erro-
neously it is assumed to imply legislative subordination: a
relation of superiority upon the one side and inferiority upon
the other, of leadership and obedience, of control and sub-
jection. And if that be correct, then it is true that every
step toward legislative freedom is a subtraction from British
connection, and it is also momentously true that very few
more steps will end it.
Possessed vaguely of this notion, many excellent Canadians
struggle strenuously against Canada's legislative emancipa-
tion. They regard with the greatest anxiety the snapping
of each tie, as they call it, not understanding that their ties
are mere worrying bits of annoying hindrances to cordial
relationship. I resent, and have always resented, these irri-
tating "Don'ts" and "Mustn'ts," with which Lord This or
That, from time to time, reminds us of our subordination.
And I am not in the least appeased when told that it is good
24 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
for us, and that Downing Street knows better than we do.
An American gets more respect in London than a colonist.
In my opinion, he is entitled to it.
Independence. — Having, gentlemen, some experience of
this rather rigid sort of arguing, I feel that some one wants
to break in upon me at this point, and say, "Very well, then
you are in favor of independence. " To which (risking exas-
peration) I reply, " Define your term, and I shall answer you."
If you mean legislative independence — power to regulate
the sale of books in our own territory, to settle our own law-
suits, to make our own five-cent pieces and our own com-
mercial arrangements, I say, "Yes, I advocate independence/ '
and in return I ask, "Do you advocate dependence, and if so,
for how long?" Until we are ten millions, or twenty-five,
or fifty? Or have we earned an imprescriptible right to
eternal dependence ?
But if by independence you mean separation from the
British Crown, and the election of a new King, or President,
I answer, "No, I do not advocate independence.' ' Let us go
on as we have been going. We have been advancing toward
legislative freedom. Let us advance. We have stood still
upon our allegiance to the British Crown. Let us still stand
steadily there.
British connection, sir, does not involve, or depend upon,
subjection or subordination. If it did, I, and all lovers of
Canada, would, or ought to, set ourselves firmly against it.
This notion, that we are not to govern ourselves, in every
widest and minutest particular, is becoming absolutely in-
tolerable to vast numbers of Canadians, and by our rapidly
advancing development will soon be an anachronism and an
absurdity. British connection has no relation whatever with
paternalism; and there will be no truest British connection
until paternalism is forever finished and sent to limbo.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 25
Instead of the too prevalent self-distrust, self-disparage-
ment, and self-renunciation, I venture to preach to my fellow-
countrymen another doctrine, and to hold out to them a
better future. Canada's Parliament shall be as omnipotent
as that at Westminster. The King's Canadian ministers
shall advise him upon all things Canadian, with the same
constitutional authority as British ministers adyise their
Sovereign upon all things British; our own men shall decide
our own lawsuits, and command our own forces ; and our own
money shall provide for our own defences, and for such
mutual aid as we ourselves may approve.
I adopt Colonel Denison's language as a short expression
of my views: " Independence within the Empire. " But by
" independence " I mean independence, not merely the amount
of it which we have at present. I mean that we are to be as
independent as the United Kingdom itself; that our Parlia-
ment shall be as omnipotent (subject to such safeguards as we
ourselves, and for our own purposes, impose) as the Parlia-
ment at Westminster; that Downing Street shall have no
more control over our legislation than Parliament Hill at
Ottawa has over British statutes; that, even as Sir Elzear
Taschereau and his colleagues exercise no supervision over
British litigation, so also the Privy Council shall cease to
interfere with ours; in short, that we shall be a nation,
"self-existent, autonomous, sovereign," and "capable of main-
taining relations with all other governments."
Imperial Federation. — But if so, what about Imperial
Federation? Is that to be given up? Once more (this is
one of my fads), I ask for definition. What do you mean by
federation ? We have a federation here of our own. It con-
sists of a number of individual states with local legislatures,
and a federal union, with a common Parliament possessed
of very extensive jurisdiction. There is a federation to the
26 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
south of us, and a federation in Germany, and another in
Switzerland. In all of these the distinctive feature is local
state legislatures and a federal Parliament. Now, is that
what you mean by federation of the Empire? If so, I am
opposed to it, and so, I think, are you. If there is to be a
federal legislature, there must necessarily be assigned to it
some subjects in respect of which it may legislate. But
Canadians are absolutely determined that for the future they
are going to make all their own laws. With immense diffi-
culty we have acquired that right in almost complete form.
And "what we have we'll hold." None of it shall go back to
Westminster or to Downing Street. Our federal legislature
is at Ottawa, and there it shall remain. There is, therefore,
nothing for any Imperial Federal Parliament to do; and Im-
perial Federation without an Imperial Parliament remains,
as it always was, a dream.
The only other sort of federation (and I would not give it
that name) is that in which each state is absolutely complete
in itself, but has an arrangement, either organic or otherwise,
with some other state for cooperation in certain prescribed
spheres. If we made a reciprocity treaty, for example, with
the United States, for ten years, we would for that period
give up our right to legislate in derogation of our agreement,
but we would not the less be a nation ; and the United States
and Canada would not be a political federation. And in
the same way, if we arranged for war cooperation with the
United Kingdom, and constituted a Council, or (as in Austro-
Hungary) delegations, with necessary authority in that
respect, we, as also the United Kingdom, although bound
by our agreement, would be sovereign states; and no more,
because of our agreement, would we be politically federated
than are Britain and Japan to-day, or France and Russia.
But, in addition to this association for mutual help in time
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 27
of war (which might form a very important part of our na-
tional arrangements), we must remember that the King is
the bond of imperial union. Although, therefore, political
federation is altogether out of the question, yet union is essen-
tially present, in the sense that the various kingdoms of the
Empire shall have a common sovereign, whose proud title
shall be, not, as at present, King "of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
beyond the Seas," but King "of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas" — a
multiple monarchy such as the world has never seen.
Kingdom or Dominion? — Shall I answer more categorically
why I would substitute "kingdom" for "dominion" in
Canada's name? It is, first, because of the connotations of
the latter word. Blackstone says that
" a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion
of the King in the right of his Crown, and, therefore, neces-
sarily subject to the legislation of the Parliament of Great
Britain" 1 (Hall v. Campbell, Cowp. 208).
I claim independence of the Parliament of Great Britain;
and I object, therefore, to Canada being called a "dominion,"
for the word implies subjection. Further, I object to being
called a "British dominion," for I assert that Canada belongs,
not to the British, but to Canadians (saving always allegiance
to the King). And I resent being lumped with Trinidad,
and Guiana, and Barbadoes, as "British Dominions beyond
the Seas." Canada, I desire to remark, is on this side of the
1 The Latin dominium was used to denote "a right — indefinite in
point of user, unrestricted in power of disposition, and unlimited in point
of duration — over a determinate thing" (Austin, "Jurisprudence," Vol.
I, p. 817). See also Snow on the "Administration of Dependencies," p.
101.
28 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
seas — of the two largest seas in the world ; and it stretches
across, a few thousand miles or so, from one of them to the
other. Secondly, I claim the word " kingdom," because the
assertion of political equality necessarily involves the assump-
tion of an equal title. Until we have that, we shall be thought
of, and shall probably be, subordinate, and colonial, and
somebody's dominions, some thousands of miles in more or
less definite direction, beyond the seas. Had we received at
baptism the name which Sir John A. Macdonald desired, we
would now undoubtedly be, not only in fact but in sentiment,
much more of a nation than we are to-day. We should have
grown to our title.
A gentleman recently said to me, "I do not like the word
• kingdom '; it is too pretentious." Sir, it is the spirit of that
remark that I deplore, and would eradicate, if I could. Is
Canada too humble in origin and too insignificant in fact to
be a nation ? Must she hesitate to assume a title which Scot-
land had centuries ago when her people were clans of mutual
depredators; which Servia and Montenegro and the rest have
to-day; and which Ireland has, although she is without the
self-governing power of our North- West Territories ? Do not
let us be afraid to be as great as we are ; and what we are, let
us try clearly to realize.
War. — Canada is at present loath to prepare for the
eventuality of war, and she declines to subscribe to imperial
necessities. And Canada is right. Let him who calls the
tune pay the piper. Canada has no voice in questions of
war and peace, and rightly enough she distrusts those who
may to-morrow embroil her in conflict. Lord Salisbury
little thought that civil war in Canada might be the result
of his Fashoda ultimatum. That was unnoticed, or, if ob-
served, may have been considered to be a mere unfortunate
necessity. Canadians might have thought differently; and
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 29
might have taken an opportunity to remind Lord Salisbury
of Newfoundland, about which he was not nearly so per-
emptory.
Canada's lack of enthusiasm for imperial preparation is
because she has no voice in the production or evasion of
hostilities; because she is bound up in war treaties without
her consent, and without her knowledge; and because she is
merely told to get ready to fight, and to suffer, and to pay —
fight whom, or for what reason, she has no right to ask, and
is thought to be traitorous and treasonable if she even dis-
cusses the matter.
Gentlemen, it is impossible that that should be a permanent
arrangement. It is intolerably unsatisfactory. It pertains
to the boyhood, and not to the maturity of our people. It
robs us of our nationality. It takes from us a true sense of
our proper responsibilities, and with that (little wonder) goes
all, or nearly all, our incentive to undertake them.
British Connection. — British connection must be based
upon something better and other than Canada's subjection.
It must have for its chief corner-stone that absolute freedom
for which she has so long been struggling, and which is now
within her reach, were we unanimous in the assertion of it.
If it depends upon the continuation of the shreds of pater-
nalism which still remain, if it depends upon keeping us
worried over irritating bits of grandmotherly interference,
then for my part I say to British connection " Adieu." But,
gentlemen, the best sort of association is not that which pro-
vokes constant protest against irksome details of it. It
depends, rather, upon the removal of all annoying hindrances
to that perfect harmony and good-will which are so essentially
necessary to its highest efficiency and its greatest development.
The British Empire. — The British Empire has survived
its feudal stage and must take on other character. Not much
30 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA
longer may the United Kingdom play the part of baron, with
colonies, of the stature of Canada, for feudatories and retain-
ers, who are to submit to his laws, to fight his battles, to pay
him reverence, and to swear to be his men. The feudal sys-
tem was right and necessary enough in the periods fitted for
it; but as education, and commerce, and the conception of
the dignity of man increased, vassalage and all subservience
were succeeded by higher and nobler ideas of brotherhood
and equality.
And the British Empire must assume this grander character,
and rise to its higher ideal. Not inferiority, but equality.
Not subservience, but equipollence. Not subjection either
of Canada to the United Kingdom now, or of the United
Kingdom to Canada when their proportionate importance
shall be reversed, but absolute and unreserved brotherhood,
making with Australia, South Africa, and other great king-
doms "a galaxy of nations" 1 which by their example of
concord and affection, by their strength and widely extended
situation, and by that regard for right conduct which alone
can give true glory to a people, may not merely induce the
world to tread the paths of peace and good-will, but may
inspire among men nobler sentiments concerning their com-
mon humanity, and their duty of mutual helpfulness.
1 Sir Wilfrid Laurier's phrase at Dominion Day banquet, July 3, 1902.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
For the condition of the Canadian constitution, Downing
Street is not altogether to blame. The British North America
Act is very nearly such as Canadians themselves asked that
it should be. Federation of the Dominion was the union of
various colonies at their own request, and it is no disparage-
ment to the Canadians of the time to say that their work —
the creation of the Dominion — has aroused in us dissatis-
faction with those political limitations to which they were
habituated.
Canada, now that the Imperial Federation movement is
ended and Mr. Chamberlain, its last and greatest protagonist,
has suffered physical eclipse, can readily obtain such changes
in her constitution as she desires. Should she wish complete
independence, it is hers; and should she be content with the
mere removal of some of her legislative disabilities, she has
but to make the request. If Canada likes subordination, —
likes to go to London, for example, when she wishes to re-
arrange provincial subsidies, — she may continue it. And if
she wants authority to manage her own affairs as she pleases,
she may have it.
All this has been made perfectly clear by the proceedings
of the late Colonial Conference (1907). Indeed, even prior
to that, the British Parliament's attitude toward the request
of the Australasian colonies for federation had abundantly
proved the progress in ideas of colonial self-government dur-
ing the twenty-four years which had elapsed since the crea-
tion of the Canadian federation.
31
32 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
Bearing in mind the limitations upon Canadian legislative
power (referred to in the previous article), let us turn to the
Australian statute and note the much larger jurisdiction which
that commonwealth enjoys.
To understand it, we must remember that, intermediate
between the period during which the Australasian colonies
were completely separate from one another and the creation
of the commonwealth, there had existed a Federal Council
which exercised throughout Australasia some of the juris-
diction now assigned to the Federal Parliament. This Coun-
cil had been established by the imperial statute of 1885
(48, 9 Vic. c. 60). It was composed of representatives of the
Australasian colonies and of Fiji, New Zealand, and Tas-
mania — two representatives from each of the self-governing
colonies and one from each of the Crown colonies. We shall
find references to this Council in the commonwealth con-
stitution.
Merchant Shipping. — Canada cannot legislate as to any
ships but her own, even in Canadian waters. Australia's
powers are much wider and include authority to legislate,
under some circumstances, even for Canadian ships. Section
5 of the commonwealth statute provides that the
"laws of the commonwealth shall be in force on all British
ships, the Queen's ships of war excepted, whose first port of
clearance and whose port of destination are in the common-
wealth." «
A Canadian ship (that is, one registered in Canada), or
any other British ship, voyaging from Adelaide, for example,
round the world and back again, would be subject to Aus-
1 In the Federal Council's Act the provision was that the Council's
laws should be in force "on board all British ships, other than Her
Majesty's ships, whose last port of clearance, or port of destination, is
in any such possession or colony."
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 33
tralian law. Already there has been a conference in London
at which British officials argued for days with representatives
from Australia and New Zealand in persistent endeavor to
get their wayward colonies to adopt British ideas as to
legislation for British ships. Canada was not invited to the
conference because of her legislative limitations.
Fisheries. — Canada's jurisdiction over the ocean extends
merely (as does that of every country) to a distance of three
miles from the shore. Every sovereign country, neverthe-
less, may make laws binding upon its own citizens in every
part of the world, on land or sea. The United States, for
example, may prohibit its own citizens from shooting seals
in the open ocean; but it could not, of course, impose such
prohibition upon anybody else. Canada is not a sovereign
country, and she cannot legislate, even for the conduct of
Canadians, beyond the three-mile sea limit.
The Australian Federal Parliament, on the other hand, has
authority to pass laws respecting " fisheries in Australian
waters beyond territorial limits.' ' Each of the Australian
states has jurisdiction (with respect to fisheries) over its own
territory (including the three miles) ; and the Federal Parlia-
ment has jurisdiction beyond the three miles and within
" Australian waters" — jurisdiction not merely over Aus-
tralians, observe, but over all British subjects; for the
statute giving the jurisdiction is an imperial statute.
Foreign Affairs. — Canada, as a matter of law, has no
authority over her foreign affairs. She has much influence,
no doubt, with Downing Street and the Foreign Office, and
she has received various promises that she will not be com-
promised without her sanction; but her foreign affairs are
conducted for her by the British Foreign Office.
In Australia the Federal Parliament has jurisdiction over
her "External Affairs," and at the moment of writing the
34 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
Hon. Alfred Deakin is her "Minister of External Affairs."
Some Canadians would cry " Revolution !" if such a thing
were suggested for the Dominion. But it may be worth
their while to observe that this large instalment of inde-
pendence passed both Houses of the British Parliament not
only without opposition but without remark.
To those who regard capability "of maintaining relations
with all other governments" * as a distinguishing character-
istic of sovereignty, the momentous importance of this clause
is very noteworthy. A careful student of the Canadian con-
stitution has very truly said that
"it looks as though the Imperial Parliament intended . . .
to divest itself of its authority over the external affairs of
Australia and commit them to the commonwealth Parlia-
ment." 2
In the opinion of Messrs. Quick and Garran (the authors of
"The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Common-
wealth"),
" This power may therefore be fairly interpreted as applicable
to (1) the external representation of the commonwealth by
accredited agents when required; (2) the conduct of the busi-
ness and promotion of the interests of the commonwealth in
outside countries; and (3) the extradition of fugitive offenders
from outside countries" (p. 632).
Thus far the Australians themselves have placed a very
limited construction upon the words "external affairs." In
1902 the government of the Netherlands complained to the
British government of some disregard of treaty obligations
in South Australia. The Colonial Secretary having applied
to the Australian federal government for information, and
the federal to the state government, the latter declined to
1 Ante, p. 5.
2 Mr. Lefroy, Law Quarterly Review, July, 1899, p. 291.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 35
communicate with the Colonial Secretary through the federal
government, asserting its privilege to direct correspondence.
The Colonial Secretary decided against that view. But
neither the federal nor the state government claimed the
right to communicate with the Netherlands. They agreed
that the words under consideration meant "affairs exclusive
to the commonwealth, but not exclusive to the Empire"; 1
and the Colonial Secretary declared that the commonwealth
had power
"to deal with all political matters arising between them and
any other part of the Empire or {through His Majesty's gov-
ernment) with 'any foreign power." 2
The Pacific Islands. — The clause of the constitution just
considered is followed by another which, without further in-
formation, would seem to supply a strong argument for giving
to the phrase " external affairs" some very narrow meaning,
inasmuch as it gives jurisdiction to the Federal Parliament
over "the relations of the commonwealth with the islands of
the Pacific." Why, it may be asked, should there be a special
clause respecting these islands, if by the previous provision
complete jurisdiction had already been given over all "ex-
ternal affairs"?
The answer is this: Both clauses are subsections of a
section which enumerates all subjects of legislation assigned
to the Federal Parliament. Everything not appearing in this
section would remain within the jurisdiction of the states.
Relations with the islands of the Pacific had been a matter of
state jurisdiction prior to federation. External affairs, other
than these relations, had not. There were, therefore, under
the circumstances, two subjects of legislation to dispose of, —
1 The correspondence is printed in the Br. Sess. Pap., 1903, Vol. 44.
See pp. 89, 95.
2 lb. p. 87.
36 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
one an old subject and the other something new. It was
determined that both of them should be assigned to the
Federal Parliament, and both therefore appear in the section.
Possibly such care was not necessary, but without the second
subsection the inference might have been drawn that "ex-
ternal affairs" was not intended to cover relations already
existing. The nature of these relations, too, is of importance ;
for they had really involved a sort of partnership with the
United Kingdom in the sovereignty over these islands — had
involved the commencement of an Australian Empire. 1
Independence. — If we add to the grant to Australia of
authority to control its "external affairs," the following
additional grant, what shall we say ?
"The exercise within the commonwealth, at the request or
with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the states di-
rectly concerned, of any power which can at the establishment
of this constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia.' '
Does this give to the commonwealth all the jurisdiction
over Australia and its affairs which the United Kingdom
theretofore had? Is it a complete assignment of all legisla-
tive authority? There are, no doubt, the apparently limiting
words "within the commonwealth"; but if by this sub-
section all the jurisdiction of the British Parliament "within
the commonwealth" is given to Australia, and if by a previous
subsection all jurisdiction over its "external affairs" is also
transferred, what is withheld? Messrs. Quick and Garran's
comment is as follows :
" The Parliament of each colony had general power to make
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the colony,
subject only,
1 See Quick and Garran, p. 639. See also Imp. Stat. 35, 6 Vic. c. 19;
38, 9 Vic. c. 51; and the Queensland legislation agreeing to contribute
£15,000 to the cost of the protectorate.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 37
(1) to the general exceptions expressed in the Colonial
Validity Act — that such laws must not be repugnant
to any imperial law expressly extending to the colony ;
(2) to certain particular exceptions expressed in the Consti-
tution Act of each colony; and
(3) to the limitation that such laws could not operate extra-
territorially, except where express authority to that
effect had been given by the Imperial Parliament.
" It would seem, therefore, that the only powers to make laws
for the peace, order, and good government of a colony which
at the establishment of the commonwealth were only ' exer-
cisable' by the Imperial Parliament, are powers which come
within one of these three classes of exceptions or limitations.
Does this subsection enable the Federal Parliament, with the
concurrence of the states, to pass laws for the exercise of any
of these powers?" (p. 650).
Amendments of the Constitution. — Perhaps the most ex-
traordinary provision in the constitution — one which sup-
plements in a most remarkable way the comprehensiveness
of the grants of authority already discussed — is the provision
with reference to its amendment. Section 128 provides :
"This constitution shall not be altered except in the follow-
ing manner — "
namely, by very special provisions as to passage of the
proposed law by Parliament, and its ratification by popular
vote. Canada has no power to amend its federal constitu-
tion. For the smallest change, application has to be made
to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Has Australia
authority to make any amendment in its constitution that
it pleases? Has the British Parliament renounced its juris-
diction over Australia? Is Australia really and legally an
independent state? The preamble of the statute is very
important :
"Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the
38 THE KINGDOM OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA
blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indis-
soluble federal commonwealth, under the Crown of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the constitu-
tion hereby established."
Observe that the constitution is not one imposed upon
the people of Australia, but one agreed to between them-
selves; that part of the agreement is that the constitution
is to be altered only by the people themselves; and that
the Parliament of the United Kingdom has assented to the
constitution, and to the terms upon which, exclusively, it is
to be altered.
This appears to be a very clear renunciation on the part of
Parliament of its authority to alter the constitution without
the assent of the Australian people; and, just as clearly, a
declaration that, with such assent, the Australian Parliament
can alter it for itself.
The constitution of the United States commences in this
way:
"We, the people of the United States ... do ordain and
establish this constitution for the United States of America."
And the clause as to amendment of the constitution provides
for the previous ascertainment of the will of the people.
In this respect, therefore, the only difference between the
constitutions of Australia and the United States is that
the Americans, having agreed upon their constitution, pro-
claimed it themselves ; while the agreement of the Australians
was declared by the British Parliament. In both cases the
people themselves determined for themselves the character
and particular provisions of their own constitution; and in
both cases amendment of the constitution is to be made by
the people themselves and by them only. Does it make very
much difference in what way proclamation was made of the
constitutions ?
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA: COLONY TO KINGDOM
A self-governing community is a community that governs
itself. A colony, on the other hand, is one that does not.
Very well: now what is a self-governing colony?
Canada was at one time a colony, and had no political
authority of any sort. Now she has such large powers of
self-government that the word " colony" is almost completely
outgrown. She is therefore classed neither as self-governing
nor as a colony, but by the contradictory title of " self-gov-
erning colony. " What will she be when she ceases to be a
contradiction ?
What will Canada be — not if something unsuspected hap-
pens (as it may), but if she continues in the line of her present
political development? Where ends the road which, so far,
Canada has travelled? Leaving prophecy and speculation,
and possibility and probability, and even sentiment aside,
what is the answer to the question, Where does the present
road end?
Note the past, and the future (if nothing unsuspected hap-
pens) is clear.
First observe that we have taken no step toward the
deposition of the King, and that there is not at present any
thought tending in that direction. That may be well or ill.
We may shortly be travelling some other road. Nobody
knows. We are inquiring for the moment, merely, where
the present road leads to. And we note that it has not
brought us any further from monarchy than when we com-
menced. A thousand years of the same sort of road will
leave us, in that respect, exactly where we are.
40 COLONY TO KINGDOM
Observe, however, the very necessary distinction between
the King — our titular head — and the King as represented by
Downing Street — our governmental head. The road of our
own political history is strewn with the memorials of contests
with Downing Street — memorials very largely of victories.
Go back to the military Governors ; to the civil Governors who
governed us and told us what to do ; to Family Compacts ;
to elections of representatives to carry on our squabbles with
the Governors; and come down through Lord Durham's
report to our present social Governors, those who for the
most part do as we tell them, and observe what a length of
road we have come — a road from Crown colony to almost
complete self-government.
Now granted (1) that we have not yet moved from mon-
archy; (2) that on the other hand we have been constantly
adding to our powers of self-government; (3) that we intend
to continue the addition until the sum is complete; (4) that
therefore we are not always to be a colony — grant these,
and the end of that road becomes clear to everybody.
Canada may deviate ! Yes, the prophets know all about
that, and each prognosticator knows better than all the
others. For us, all we perceive is that to-morrow some slight
incident or some great world perturbation may occur, and
Canada may be swept into combination that even the proph-
ets have not imagined. We cannot tell. Next week some
sympathetic chord may be touched and Canada may be drawn
into federation that now seems impracticable and impossible.
We don't know. Nothing is certain but this: if we keep to
our present road, (1) we shall keep to monarchy; (2) we shall
attain to absolute self-government — we shall no more be
subject to Britain than Britain is to us; and (3) we shall
therefore no longer be a colony but a kingdom.
But how can that be? Edward VII is King of Great
COLONY TO KINGDOM 41
Britain and Ireland; how can he be King of Canada at the
same time? Well, according to current terminology, Ed-
ward VII is at this moment King of Canada and, nevertheless,
curiously enough, Canada is not a kingdom. His title is
King "of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas." Canada is
called a "Dominion," Australia chose the word "common-
wealth" ; other places are colonies or possessions, and Edward
VII is their King, but they are not kingdoms ! A kingdom
is the Dom. (Dominion) of a King. 1 What is Canada ?
Canada then has already a King; and the only question
is whether she is, or is to be, a kingdom. There may be two
or more separate and even unallied kingdoms with the same
King. Canada may be independent of Downing Street while
retaining Edward VII as her King. England and Scotland
were for a hundred years independent kingdoms but under
the same King. The situation is not only possible, but quite
familiar. 2
To reasoning of this sort the following criticism has been
offered:
"A very learned Canadian lawyer has indeed suggested re-
ducing the link between Great Britain and Canada to a mere
1 personal union ' such as existed between England and Scotland
under the Stuarts. He did not explain what was to happen
if the British ministry and the Canadian ministry (which by
his plan were to be quite unconnected) failed to agree on any
matter touching common interests. A bold assumption of
personal authority by the King might well be the only passage
out of such a deadlock; and no one here needs to be told that
this would be not innovation but revolution. It has not been
seriously proposed that Canada shall have the power of in-
volving the whole Empire in war without consulting the home
1 See ante, p. 27.
2 The United Kingdom and Hanover under the Georges is another
example.
42 COLONY TO KINGDOM
government, but such is the natural consequence of some
things that some Canadian politicians have said." ■
Metaphorical language (possibly one cannot get on without
it) is often misleading. What, for example, is meant by
" reducing the link"? Well, the link originally was military
governorship, and it was reduced. Were we wrong? Then
the link was a series of civil governing Governors, and it was
reduced. Were we wrong, though it took a couple of rebellions
to do it? Was Lord Durham wrong? Then the link was
semi-ruling Governors with ideas as to Canadian matters
having "imperial aspects," or involving "royal prerogatives,"
etc., and it was reduced. Were we wrong? It has been
reduced by insisting upon the right to make our own com-
mercial arrangements with other nations. Were we wrong?
It has been reduced by the development of our military and
naval forces under our own control; by the assumption of
our defences at Halifax and Esquimalt; by the appointment
of a special envoy to negotiate with Japan; by every step
which we have taken toward self-government; by every
departure from leading-strings; by every advance to the
dignity of nationhood. Were we wrong? And if we still
fall short of our honorable, reasonable, and splendid ambi-
tion, if in some few respects we are still colonials and so
unable to rank among the nations of the earth (even such as
Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Roumania, Bulgaria,
Peru, Chili, Venezuela), shall we do wrong if we continue upon
the road which leads to complete self-government? — to
something else than a British Dominion "beyond the Seas"?
— to nationhood under the name of Canada?
The learned Canadian lawyer then does not appear to sug-
gest anything but that we shall keep to the road. In strict
1 "Imperial Organization," by Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart.
COLONY TO KINGDOM 43
truth he suggests nothing at all. He points to the road that
we have travelled and are travelling, and he merely indicates
what we shall find, if we keep on, at the end of it.
Suggestion of innovation and deflection come, not from the
Canadian but from the English lawyer, who appears to desire
that the natural process of Canadian political evolution shall
be stopped; that instead of going forward to complete self-
government, Canada shall remain semi-developed, a sort of
overgrown colony, acting under the guidance or advice of
a somewhat extensive "Imperial Committee," a committee
upon which Canada is to have one representative — our High
Commissioner might be the one, so it is suggested, if our
Premier finds that he cannot leave his responsibilities and
colleagues at Ottawa in order to go and help to advise himself
from London. There always have been people who wanted
to stop our progress at every prior stage of it. They were all
wrong. Nobody now thinks otherwise. Why stop it at this
particular moment? How can you stop it?
Very little importance, moreover, attaches or ever did
attach to the desires of individuals respecting Canada's
political growth. We can all now see that it could not have
been arrested. And Canada's firm conviction is that she is
quite healthy enough to come to maturity. No one detects
symptoms of failure. But in any case, all that is now affirmed
is that if we keep to the present road, maturity means kingdom.
Now a word of explanation (if really necessary) as to what
will happen if the British ministry and the Canadian ministry
fail to agree on any matter touching common interest.
What would happen to-day? One of two things: either
the countries would compose their differences, or they would
separate. And what would happen were Canada a kingdom
instead of being an overgrown colony? Exactly the same
thing.
44 COLONY TO KINGDOM
No one imagines that the slight authority at present held
over Canada can or will be used to coerce her with respect
to anything about which she really wants her own way. At
the present moment, then, we depend, in case of difference,
upon compromise and adjustment, helped by good-will.
Were Canada a kingdom the position would be precisely
the same.
Or is it suggested that the slight authority, although not
sufficient for coercion, would yet suffice for pressure ? Upon
the whole it would be better not to suggest that. It is not
calculated to preserve good relations.
Then it is said that "It has not been seriously proposed that
Canada shall have the power of involving the whole Empire
in war without consulting the home government." True.
And is it seriously argued, on the other hand, that the home
government shall eternally have the power of involving
Canada in war without consulting Canada? If yes, we can
understand the objection to Canada attaining her majority.
If no, the English lawyer should indicate his view of what
will " happen if the British ministry and the Canadian minis-
try failed to agree."
Either Canada is to remain a colony and do as she is told,
or, keeping the present road, she is to become a kingdom
and govern herself. In the one case no differences will arise,
for Canada will always obey — a case as impossible as humili-
ating. In the other, differences may arise : differences such
as arise between brothers or between father and emancipated
son; differences to be settled, not by the slavish submission
of either disputant, but by reasonable adjustments.
Upon the whole the best answer to all questions as to what
will happen if Canada becomes self-governing is that all such
queries and all speculative answers to them are unimportant.
Canada is not to be the only example in the world of an
!
COLONY TO KINGDOM 45
intelligent people declining political freedom because of ques-
tionings and speculations as to what they will do with it.
Canada will settle that for herself — very probably not
to the satisfaction of everybody, but to the satisfaction of
Canada. That is all the pledge she gives.
THE KINGDOM OF CANADA: COLONIAL CON-
FERENCE OF 1907
Since delivery of the address entitled "The Kingdom of
Canada" (ante), the Colonial Conference of 1907 has done
much toward the elevation of Canada from colony to king-
dom. In a later part of this volume will be found a some-
what detailed account of the work of that Conference with
reference to each special subject discussed. Let us note here
three points which may be of more particular interest in the
present connection, namely:
1. Declaration of the independence of the self-governing
colonies ;
2. Recognition of the inappropriateness of the title
"colony";
3. Assertion that a colonial government, equally with
the government of the United Kingdom, is "His Majesty's
government."
Colonial Independence
In 1907, for the first time in their history, the government
of the United Kingdom and the governments of the colonies
met in momentous convocation upon a footing of acknowl-
edged equality. At the Conference of 1902, Mr. Chamber-
lain had assumed the tone of a father addressing his wayward
sons; wanted to know what help the colonies would supply
in case of European war; spoke petulantly of their lack of
previous support; indicated that certain sorts of fiscal legis-
lation by the colonies could not be permitted, and so on.
47
48 COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907
In 1907, not only has all suggestion of supremacy disappeared,
not only is equality admitted, but on various occasions the
British ministers had to listen to language plainer than, with
all their courtesy, they could invariably reply to with perfect
politeness. Much more important than this alteration in
tone, was the fundamental change in the British conception
of inter-imperial relations — the complete abandonment of all
schemes for the tightening of British control and the frank
admission, even the repeated assertion, of colonial inde-
pendence.
Take a few extracts from the proceedings. In his opening
speech, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said :
"You in common with us are representatives of self-govern-
ing communities" ("Proceedings of the Conference," p. 5).
" I am not going to enumerate, still less discuss and criticize
the various schemes more or less ambitious which have been
put forward; but I will just make a remark applicable to all
such proposals. We found ourselves, gentlemen, upon free-
dom and independence — that is the essence of the imperial
connection. Freedom of action on the part of the individual
states, freedom in their relations with each [other and with
the mother country. Anything which militates against that
principle would be wholly contrary to the genius of our race
and our political ideals, and would sooner or later be dis-
astrous" (lb. p. 6).
Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary, concurred in
"the principle which the Prime Minister laid down, that is to
say, the freedom and independence of the different governments
which are parts of the Empire" (lb. p. 74).
Replying to the Prime Minister's address, Sir Wilfrid
Laurier said:
^ " This conference is not, as I understand it (I give my own
view), a conference simply of the Prime Ministers of the differ-
ent self-governing colonies and the Secretary of State; but it
is, if I may give my own mind, a conference between gov-
ernment and governments. It is a conference between the
COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907 49
imperial government and the governments of the self-govern-
ing dependencies of England" (Lord Elgin assented to this,
lb. p. 621).
" But upon one thing we are all agreed, and I believe that if
we can keep this in view we can never go astray, that is to say,
that if the basis of the union which now binds the British
Empire remains as it is now, a proper and always permanent
recognition of the principle that every community knows best
what does for itself, that we cannot go wrong, and our delibera-
tions must be fruitful" (lb. p. 7, and see p. 411).
Sir Joseph Ward (New Zealand) said :
"I think we should be, above all things, strenuous in our
desire to preserve our entity and individuality in the matter of
control of our own country" (lb. p. 31, and see pp. 45, 65).
Dr. Jameson (Cape Colony) said :
"I think we are all unanimous in this room, and I know how
strong the feeling is, that we ought not to delegate any pos-
sibility of any power away from the self-governing colonies,
but that we ought to increase their powers. What we are anxious
to do is, of course, to get each individually into constitutional
equality with the motherland; it may be a very disproportionate
equality, but that is our idea, really that we are going to be
nations, not separate from the United Kingdom, but nations
within the United Empire. ... Of course we may have visions
a thousand years hence of a closer union" (lb. pp. 34, 35).
"I want to explain again that we all say we must have
absolute liberty of action on this [preferential trade] and every
other subject" (lb. p. 437).
Mr. Deakin, in withdrawing Australia from the agreement
to send contributions to the British navy (having determined
to spend the money locally), said:
"We recognize this as a further step in the exercise of our
self-governing powers" (lb. p. 475, and see pp. 7, 44).
General Botha said :
"The position that we take in the Transvaal, now that we
have responsible government, is that the mother country ought
50 COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907
to leave us alone as much as possible to regulate our own
affairs" (lb. p. 304).
The General objected to British legislation as to naturaliza-
tion throughout the Empire, on the ground that
"it is not desirable that legislation should be imposed on a
self-governing colony except by the Parliament of such col-
ony" (lb. p. 535).
Mr. Asquith, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said :
"The special feature of the British Empire has been that
it has combined, and has succeeded in combining in a degree
unknown in any other combination in history, a loyal and
affectionate attachment between the centre and the parts of
the Empire, and between the various parts themselves with
complete practical independence.
" Our statesmen of all parties were wise enough to recognize
that unless they gave to those communities complete fiscal
independence, they were giving them a boon which, in the long
run, was not worth having" (lb. p. 306, and see p. 307).
Mr. Winston Churchill spoke of
"the principle of self-government which is at the root of all
our colonial imperial policy" (lb. p. 402).
11 Colony' 1
The "essence of the imperial connection" having thus been
declared to be "freedom and independence," it is not sur-
prising that an effort should have been made to discard the
word "colonies." Sir Joseph Ward said:
"I think the term 'colony/ so far as our countries are con-
cerned, ought to cease, and that the term ought to apply to the
Crown colonies purely" (lb. p. 30).
Sir Wilfrid Laurier said :
"So far as the colonies represented here are concerned I
wish we could drop the word ' colonies' and try to invent
something which would strike the imagination more" (lb. p. 80).
COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907 51
Mr. Winston Churchill suggested that for the word "colo-
nies" there should be substituted the phrase "His Majesty's
Dominions beyond the Seas" (lb. p. 78). Mr. Deakin's sug-
gestion of "self-governing Dominions" (lb. p. 81) was thought
to be too comprehensive, for it embraced the United Kingdom
itself and faute de mieux " self-governing Dominions beyond
the Seas" was adopted (lb. p. 89). The imagination, however,
did not approve the phrase, and in the subsequent resolutions
we meet: "British Dominions beyond the Seas," "the colo-
nies," the "self-governing colonies," etc.
No one suggested that if the colonies had really ceased to
be colonies, if they were really free and independent, if they
were really "in common with" the United Kingdom "self-
governing communities," no reason could exist why they
should have a less honorable title. If they are, as a matter
of real fact, free and independent, then they are not, and
cannot be, "Dominions," nor can they be "beyond the Seas."
If Canada is free and independent, she is a kingdom.
11 His Majesty 1 s Government"
Another nomenclature difficulty was badly solved. A
resolution having spoken of "His Majesty's government,
and the governments of the self-governing Dominions," Sir
Wilfrid Laurier said:
" Somebody has suggested to me that instead of having • His
Majesty's government' we should have 'the government of
the United Kingdom.' I suppose we are all His Majesty's
governments here."
The Chairman. " It is a technical term for His Majesty's
government here."
Sir Wilfrid Laurier. "Yes, it is very well understood;
but suppose we said ' the government of the United Kingdom, '
as we all claim to be His Majesty's governments."
52
COLONIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907
The resolution was changed to "His Majesty's govern-
ment, and the governments of the self-governing Dominions
beyond the Seas"; and Sir Wilfrid had to be content with
that.
Canada's nationality will never be very strikingly apparent
as long as her power of self-government is so doubtful that it
requires assertion in her title, and as long as she is described
as "beyond the Seas."
Perhaps one more Conference will satisfactorily complete
the unfinished work of 1907.
THE BRITISH EMPIRE
What do Imperialists mean when they speak of a duty " to
keep the Empire together" ?
Not that the present political relations between the differ-
ent parts of the Empire should continue as they are. Upon
the contrary, we are incessantly told that these relations are
unsatisfactory; that the colonies have become sister-states;
and that they should assume their share of the duties and
responsibilities of the Empire. Mr. George R. Parkin, for
example, the prince of Imperialists and their first missionary,
has declared that
"if the greater British colonies are permanently content with
their present political status, they are unworthy of the source
from which they sprang." *
And Professor Leacock, the present crusader, has recently
argued that
"this colonial status is a worn-out, by-gone thing." 2
Imperialists suggest, therefore, some change in imperial
arrangements. The nature of that change they leave un-
formulated, for the very sufficient reason that they have no
idea what it ought to be. Since the commencement of Fed-
eration Leagues to the present time, no scheme has been put
forward by anybody (of any importance), and the latest
travelling apostle of federation has recently appealed to other
people to "find us a way." 3
We are then in an exceedingly difficult ethical situation.
1 "Imperial Federation," p. 18.
2 Professor Leacock' s article in the University Magazine, 1907.
s /6.
63
54 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
It is our duty "to keep the Empire together"; we have not
the slightest notion how it is to be done; and it is becoming
increasingly doubtful whether there is any possibility of doing
it at all.
And that is not our whole difficulty.. Our present position
being " unworthy" of us, it is our duty to terminate it, to
refuse any longer to tolerate a relationship which is " degrad-
ing" x to us; it is our duty to end present arrangements,
something which can very easily be done; and it is our duty
to make new arrangements, something which nobody can do
or even make any suggestion of how to do.
It is a desperate case, and there seems to be nothing for
Canadians but to follow the example of the celebrated Brudder
Jones: "Bredren," shouted the preacher, "dere am but two
roads: one am de straight and crooked road dat leads to
destruction, and de udder am de broad and narrow road dat
leads to damnation." "Wheugh!" cried Brudder Jones, as
he made for the door, " if dat's so, I guess dis yere nigger am
a-gwine to tak to de woods." Luckily for Canada she has
plenty of woods.
But can any one deny the existence of a " duty to keep the
Empire together"? Is no loyalty due as between the parts
of a political whole? May any geographical area of a king-
dom, a republic, or an empire, at any moment, withdraw
from its affiliations? Were not the Northern States of the
American Union justified in denying the attempt of the
Southern States to secede?
Granted — granted. But the peculiarity of the present sit-
uation is that the asserters of the " duty to keep the Empire
together" are the very ones who, were they careful of their
language, would most strenuously deny the existence of any
such duty.
1 Mr. Parkin in "Imperial Federation," p. 15.
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 55
For it is they, most conspicuously, who (as we have seen)
denounce the nature of the present relationship between the
United -Kingdom and the self-governing colonies ; who assert
that it is " crude in form" and " degrading" — "a worn-out,
by-gone thing"; and who demand not that it shall be main-
tained, but that it shall be ended.
What these gentlemen desire is not in the least to "keep
the Empire together," but to dissolve it, and to substitute for
it something entirely new — something, observe, which (as
far as the relations between its parts are concerned) would
not be an empire at all, but a federal union.
Stated in this way, declaration of duty is of course absurd.
Admittedly, political relations may exist which ought to be
treated as indissoluble; and we may recognize that the
County of Cornwall is under obligation to continue her present
political affiliation with the United Kingdom. But predica-
tion of a moral duty to enter into some new form of associa-
tion — new as between the parties and new in the sense of
novel experiment — is impossible.
What, for example, are to be the terms of the new con-
stitution? Or would it be immoral to discuss terms? Per-
haps we ought to federate without any terms? Now that
Nova Scotia is part of Canada, she ought (save under very
extraordinary conditions) to remain there ; but was she wrong
in arranging terms of partnership before consenting to become
a partner ?
Imperialists are not wrong in denouncing the present
relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada and
in demanding its termination; and neither they nor we
should be deterred from maintaining our view by the sug-
gesting of breach of political faith. Were we, as Mr. Cham-
berlain seems to think, as really a part of the British Empire
as is Cornwall, advocacy of the disruption of present rela-
56 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
tions, without suggestion of feasible substitution, would be
a political crime. But that is not our position, as two con-
siderations suffice to show:
1. Our situation is unbearable. It is one of subserviency.
It is " crude" and " degrading. " It is one which it is our duty
to terminate. Cornwall is in no such case.
2. We are not in reality, but only in form and appear-
ance, a part of the British Empire. Declaration of inde-
pendence would be little more than a declaration of existing
fact. That is not the position of Cornwall.
The force of the first of these reasons will be admitted by
Canadian Imperialists. Considering the second of them, let
us try to understand in what sense Canada is to-day a part
of the British Empire.
Distinguish carefully between the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and the Empire which the United
Kingdom owns. On the one hand we have Great Britain
and Ireland; and on the other the larger organism, the
British Empire, which includes in one entity the United
Kingdom and all its possessions.
Distinguish in the same way between the two functions
of the Parliament which sits at Westminster. As a local
Parliament — the Parliament of the United Kingdom — it
legislates for the United Kingdom ; and as the Imperial
Parliament it legislates for all other parts of the Empire.
In this way we get an idea of what an empire is — at least
of what the British Empire is, as distinguished from the United
Kingdom itself. It consists of one dominant state, and one or
more subordinate states.
If politically associated states are equal, they are not an
empire but a federation (as in the case of the United States
of America). If on the other hand several states are merged
together and form one state, we have a kingdom, a republic,
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 57
or some other single political entity. An empire (at all
events in the sense in which there is a British empire as dis-
tinguished from a British kingdom) is a combination of one
dominant and one or more subordinate states.
Then in what sense is Canada a part of the British Empire ?
Clearly enough Canada is not a part of the dominant state.
She is not a part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland. She has no representation in the dominant, the
Imperial Parliament. She takes no part in the government
of India, or of any part of the world but Canada. She is not
the dominant state nor is she a part of it.
If, then, Canada is a part of the British Empire at all, it is
because she is one of the subordinate states. In days not
very long since, no doubt she was subordinate enough — not
only did the Imperial Parliament legislate for her as it pleased,
but Downing Street representatives regulated her most trivial
affairs.
That was " crude" and might almost have been called
"degrading." It is now "worn-out" and "by-gone." Even
the semblance of subordination is rapidly passing away. The
reality is past.
In what sense, then, is Canada a part of the British Empire ?
She is not the dominant state, nor a part of it ? No. And
she is not, in reality, a subordinate state? No. Then she
is not part of the Empire at all? Yes; for the semblance
and appearance of subordination remain. To that extent,
then, and no further, as a matter of constitutional description,
is Canada a part of the British Empire. 1
It would be very absurd to say that two countries might
be parts of the same empire, and yet have no political rela-
tionship of any kind with one another. So long as Canada
1 As Mr. Sydney Brooks well says, "It is an Empire in feeling, per-
haps, but not in fact."
58 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
was politically subordinate to the Imperial Parliament, she
was of course part of the Empire. Bat now that Canada is
independent of the Imperial Parliament, now that imperial
authority has been relinquished and discarded, now that she
has no obligatory political relations with the former dominant
state, how can she be part of Great Britain's Empire ?
To this extent she can: to the extent that the semblance
and appearance of subordination still remain. In form, a
Governor comes to us from Downing Street; in reality, we
govern ourselves. In form, our constitution is an imperial
statute; in reality, it is the declaration of our own wish. In
form, the Imperial Parliament can abrogate or alter our
constitution as it pleases ; in reality, the Imperial Parliament
would as probably legislate for France as for Canada, except
at Canada's request ; in reality, we can to-morrow, if we like,
give ourselves any constitution that we care to assume.
As a matter of form, we are part of the British Empire.
As a matter of living fact, we are an independent nation —
if by that is meant that our position as a colony isa" worn-
out" and "by-gone" thing; that we are masters of our own
destiny ; that we are as free politically and practically as any
nation in the world to do exactly what we like.
Test this statement by its application to the relations be-
tween the countries under the two conditions of peace and
war.
Peace. — During peace (and for that matter during war
also) Canada exercises that greatest right of independence,
the right to tax the goods of the United Kingdom — the right
even to exclude such goods by taxation.
Not only so, but Canada makes such fiscal arrangements
with foreign countries as she thinks right.
And Canada's position in this respect is so free from
metropolitan control, that, were the United Kingdom willing,
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 59
Canada would enter into an agreement with her for reciprocal
trade preferences.
It is said that Canada is a part of the Empire ; but it is of
an Empire that has no fiscal cohesion, of an Empire which
may, as at present, be at fiscal peace, or may at any time be
at tariff war, with itself.
War. — Imperialists urge mutual defence as the great ad-
vantage to be derived from " keeping the Empire together";
if one part is attacked, every part is at war. As France
could not attack Cornwall, and pretend that she was not
invading the United Kingdom; so, were Russia to attack
British India, Canada would ipso facto be at war with Russia.
That is true, if Canada is a part of the British Empire.
Let us test, therefore, Canada's relationship to the Empire
by considering what precisely Canada's position would be
were the United Kingdom and Russia at war.
Imperialists would answer the question with a contemptu-
ous sneer: Of course Canada would aid the United Kingdom
with her whole resources, to the last man. And Canada's
last Governor (Lord Minto) would sniff at "colonial tech-
nicalities." 1 Bearing this with becoming colonial deference,
and protesting that the question is not what Canada would
of course do, but what Canada is by virtue of her political
situation and relationship bound to do, we reply that she is
under no obligation to do anything.
The explanation is historical. Britain planted colonies
(calling them plantations) for the same reason that a farmer
plants cabbages — because of their benefit to himself; and
Britain protected her plantations for the same reason that the
farmer protected his — because he wanted them for himself.
And there was no more idea in the one case than in the other
1 He used the phrase while Canada was considering whether she would
take part in the Boer war.
60 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
that the thing planted would render any service anywhere
but in the locality in which it was put.
Colonists were expected to provide to the best of their
ability for the defence of their homes; but until Mr. Cham-
berlain's time there never was anything approaching official
demand for colonial forces to serve in European wars.
At the Colonial Conference of 1902, Mr. Chamberlain
(through the Colonial Defence Committee) asked for
"some assurance as to the strength of the contingents which
they should be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's
government for extra-colonial service in a war with a Euro-
pean power."
The colonies declined to give any such assurance, Canada
and Australia declaring that colonial action should be de-
cided by each colony for itself "when the need arose." In
other words the colonies declared that they would do as they
pleased.
True enough, say the Imperialists, but all you have shown
is that Canada is under no legal or constitutional duty to take
part in British wars. That does not in the least disprove the
assertion that, whether Canada liked it or not, she, as part of
the British Empire, is always in war-relationship with Brit-
ain's enemy. The destruction of a few of Canada's ships
would very soon make that apparent to her.
Certainly, but if Canada were willing to remain neutral,
Russia would be very polite to Canada's ships. Like other
countries, Russia would much rather fight one power than
two. She might, no doubt, if she so chose, treat Canada as
a part of the Empire and attack her; and Canada might
elect to act as part of the Empire and side with the United
Kingdom. In either case Canada would be at war with Rus-
sia. But if both Canada and Russia preferred that Canada
should be neutral ?
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 61
Canada's present relationship to the Empire is ambiguous.
In form and appearance she is yet a colony, yet subordinate,
yet a part of the British Empire. In reality she is a free and
independent state, if by that is meant that she can do as
she pleases. As a matter of constitutional form, Canada
would be at war with Russia from the moment of the war's
commencement. As a matter of reality she would not, unless
she or Russia chose to say so. And inasmuch as Canadian
neutrality would be very agreeable to Russia, Canadian par-
ticipation in the hostilities would probably be a matter
for Canadian decision. 1
These considerations answer our question; but paying
attention for a moment to imperial protests against the
" ignominy of abandoning the mother country in her hour of
need," let two points be noted:
1. It is difficult to abandon anybody that you have never
promised to support. There has never been any agreement,
expressed or implied, that Canada shall assist the United
Kingdom in case of war.
2. Having not the smallest voice in the making of foreign
wars, is it reasonable that Canada should be under obligation
to contribute to them, no matter where they are, or with
whom, or about what ? The United Kingdom recently made
a war treaty with Japan, under which (if it is much prolonged)
Britain will very probably be required to go to war with the
United States. At the moment of writing, relations between
Japan and the United States are strained, and the American
navy is sailing for the Pacific Ocean. If war should ensue,
and if the United States should take Formosa from Japan
(as it took the Philippines from Spain), the United Kingdom
and the United States would be at war with one another.
1 A Canadian statute provides for the summoning of Parliament in
case of war. Parliament would decide what was to be done.
62 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
And Canada would have to fight against the United States,
or incur " the ignominy of abandoning the mother country in
her hour of need" — so we are told.
Canada had no part in the making of the treaty. She was
not consulted about it. It is diametrically and fundamentally
opposed to her interests. There is at least one Canadian who
refuses to be bound by it, and he is fairly certain that in the
event of war between the United States and Japan, Canada,
if she fights at all, will not do much harm to her neighbors.
Imperialists are most unreasonable in their conception of
Canada's duty in case of British wars. They would per-
petuate Canada's subordination. They maintain that con-
trol and direction should remain in London, and that spon-
taneous and enthusiastic hurrahs should unhesitatingly echo
back from Canada. Some of them indeed, breaking in upon
all British custom, propose that the United Kingdom should
not declare war without the assent of the colonies, or at all
events without consultation with them. But such proposals
are wholly impracticable. War is usually the result of a long
chain of events and the outcome of previous policy. No one
has proposed that the colonies shall be consulted at every
step in British foreign relations. And consultation after war
has become inevitable is useless. Had we what is termed
Imperial Federation, with one central government, the case
would of course be different; but that, too, is impracticable.
Practicable or not, for the present, at least, we have neither
Imperial Federation nor an Imperial Council; and the ques-
tion is whether, in the absence of these, Canada ought to be
eternally ready to hurrah for wars in the making of which
she has no part, which may in her judgment be as foolish as
the Crimean or as unjustifiable as the Chinese, which may
deluge her land with blood, and even involve her political
existence. Canada is fairly well convinced that she ought to
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 63
decide for herself this, as well as all other questions affecting
her interests.
Imperialists do not sufficiently observe the great difference
between a mere colony — a community in leading-strings —
and such a state as Canada.
Peace and. war were originally matters solely within the
royal prerogative. Nominally they are so still. Really
they are discussed and decided upon by the government of
the day. But by what government? In the United King-
dom there is a government of His Majesty, and in Canada
there is also a government of His Majesty. The London
government advises the King upon all matters relating to
the United Kingdom and the Empire, and the Ottawa gov-
ernment advises the King as to all matters relating to Canada.
Which of these governments should advise the King with
reference to Canadian participation in wars?
While Canada was a mere colony, no question could arise.
But now that Canada is a "sister nation," in an Empire
founded upon "freedom and independence" and the equality
of all the component nations, what argument will sustain the
assertion that the London government can involve Canada
in war which will not compel the conclusion that Canada
can also declare an imperial war?
Returning now to the question, and testing our assertion
with reference to Canada's relationship to the Empire by its
application to war, we may say:
1. As a matter of form, if the United Kingdom is at war,
Canada is at war.
2. As a matter of reality, whether Canada is at war depends
upon what the particular enemy and Canada may choose
to say.
3. Canada is under no constitutional or moral obligation
to enter upon wars with the making of which she has nothing
64 THE BRITISH EMPIRE
to do, and which may not only be opposed to her interests
but subversive of her political existence.
4. Canada, therefore, may or may not take part in British
wars. She may do as she likes.
5. In form and appearance, Canada is a part of the British
Empire.
6. In reality, she is not. She is not a part of the dominant
state, and she is not a subordinate state. She is a "sister
nation," bound to her sisters by the ties of respect, of sym-
pathy, and of friendship, and by the tie of common allegiance
to a common Sovereign.
I
THE CANADIAN FLAG
THE CANADIAN FLAG
The Union Jack is the jack or symbol of the union of Eng-
land, Scotland, and Ireland. It is a compound of the indi-
vidual jacks of the three kingdoms. When England and
Scotland united, the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew
were amalgamated; when Ireland joined the union, the cross
of St. Patrick was compounded with the other two; and now
all three may be seen upon the Union Jack. If by any other
adhesion the union were further expanded, the flag of the
newcomer would be incorporated with the Union Jack. A
flag should denote correctly the sovereignty which it repre-
sents. And if Imperial Federation should ever be consum-
mated, — if instead of a British Empire, consisting of one
dominant state and a conglomeration of subservient states,
we should ever have a federal union of all or many of these
states, — the flag which had symbolized the union of England,
Scotland, and Ireland would be quite inappropriate and alto-
gether inadequate for the representation of the new sover-
eignty.
The flag of a country is properly used not only within its
own geographical limits, but wherever its ownership and juris-
diction extend. Over every subject country, the metropolitan
flag is properly flown. When the United Kingdom takes
possession of some hitherto unappropriated territory, her
officers hoist her flag in assertion of her sovereignty. The
flag symbolizes ownership and jurisdiction. Where these are
absent, the flag has no right to fly.
p 65
66 THE CANADIAN FLAG
At one time Canada was within the ownership and juris-
diction of the United Kingdom. The Union Jack was then
her fitting flag — it truly indicated her subjection to the
country whose flag it was. But it is not now as appropri-
ate as it was. It is rapidly becoming still less so. And in-
stinctively — to almost all of us quite unconsciously — our
national aspirations have been urging us to the adoption of
some symbol which would represent our Canadian nationality.
Almost immediately after our federation in 1867 — that
great union which made Canadian nationality possible — our
ship-owners commenced the practice of placing the heraldic
arms of Canada as a badge upon the fly of the red ensign. 1
They had no right to do so. Their ships were British ships,
and ought to have carried the flag prescribed by the Ad-
miralty. 2 But the Admiralty at first made no objection to
the practice. On the contrary, a notification was sent by
its Board to the Colonial Oflice (May 22, 1874) to the effect
that
"no objection would be raised to any vessel registered as be-
longing to one of Her Majesty's colonies flying the red ensign
with the badge of the colony in the fly."
The Admiralty soon changed its mind and on the 25th of
July of the following year intimated to the Colonial Secretary
1 The red ensign is the flag of the British mercantile marine. It is
a red flag with the Union Jack in the upper left-hand corner.
2 It must not be thought, however, that there was no precedent for
defacing (to use heraldic phrase) a national flag with a private badge.
For example, in 1868 (December 16) the Colonial Secretary notified the
Governor-General that colonial government ships, used under 28 Vic.
c. 14, s. 3, "shall use the blue ensign with the seal or badge of the colony
in the fly thereof." By an imperial Order-in-Council of August 7,
1869, it was provided that colonial Governors were "to fly the Union
Jack with the arms or badge of the colony emblazoned in the centre
thereof."
THE CANADIAN FLAG 67
that the only proper flag for the colonial mercantile marine
was "the ensign without any badge."
Canadian ship-owners took little notice of this inhibition,
and finally an imperial statute 1 was passed to put us
straight :
" 1. The red ensign usually worn by merchant ships without
any defacement or modification whatsoever is hereby declared
to be the proper national colors for all ships and boats belong-
ing to any subject of Her Majesty, except in the case of Her
Majesty's ships or boats or in the case of any other ship or boat
for the time being allowed to wear any other national colors
in pursuance of a warrant from Her Majesty or from the
Admiralty."
" 6. Nothing in this Act shall affect any power of the Admi-
ralty in respect of the red ensign usually worn by merchant
ships."
Canada was notified of the passing of this statute (October
3, 1889), and at the same time was informed that there would
"be no objection to colonial merchant vessels carrying dis-
tinguishing flags with the badge of the colony thereon, in
addition to the red ensign."
That was not, however, what Canada wanted, and an
application was made (June 30, 1890) under the provisions of
the statute
" for the issue of a general warrant which will permit Canadian
registered ships to fly the red ensign usually worn by merchant
ships with the Canadian coat of arms."
Objection being made, the Canadian government passed
an Order-in-Council (October 31, 1890) in support of the
previous application, and Sir Charles Tupper wrote to the
Governor-General (Lord Stanley) on November 13, 1890,
saying that :
*52, 3 Vic. c. 73.
68 THE CANADIAN FLAG
"Since about 1869 our ships have been encouraged by the
government of Canada to use the red ensign with the Canadian
coat of arms in the fly. . . . These ships are in every quarter
of the globe."
Afterward (November 7, 1891) Vice-Admiral Watson, then
stationed at Halifax, wrote to the Governor-General:
" I have read with much interest the correspondence relating
to the Canadian flag. It will certainly be a great pity if the
home government insist on its abolition. As a matter of
feeling and sentiment, I know for certain it will cause very
great dissatisfaction in the colony, and I can see no good result
from the enforcement of the order; but on the contrary I think
a change enforced might give rise to trouble and will certainly
cause general ill-feeling. They are proud of their flag, and their
pride in my opinion should be encouraged and not dampened."
The Governor-General took the same view, and in writing
to the Colonial Secretary (December 12, 1891) referred to the
use of the red ensign with the Canadian badge not only at
sea but on shore, where its appearance had become somewhat
general :
"It has been one of the objects of the Dominion as of im-
perial policy to emphasize the fact that by Confederation,
Canada became not a mere assemblage of provinces, but one
united Dominion, and, though no actual order has ever been
issued, the Dominion government has encouraged by precept
and example the use on all public buildings throughout the
provinces of the red ensign with the Canadian badge in the fly.
"Of course it may be replied that no restriction exists with
respect to flags which may be hoisted on shore, but I submit
that the flag is one which has come to be considered as the recog-
nized flag of the Dominion, both ashore and afloat, and on senti-
mental grounds I think there is much to be said for its reten-
tion, as it expresses at once the unity of the several provinces
of the Dominion and the identity of their flag with the colors
hoisted by the ships of the mother country."
Lord Stanley added that the enforcement of the order
"would be attended with an amount of unpopularity very
disproportionate to the occasion, and at a moment when it is
THE CANADIAN FLAG 69
more than usually important to foster rather than to check an
independent spirit in the Dominion which, combined with loyal
sentiments toward the mother country, I look upon as the
only possible barrier to the annexationist feeling which is so
strongly pressed upon us by persons acting in the interests of
the United States." l
Thus pressed, the Admiralty gave way (February 2, 1892),
at the same time retaining its opinion that
" there are not unimportant objections to interference with
the simplicity and uniformity of national colors. Whatever
is conceded to Canada will almost certainly be claimed by the
other colonial governments."
The warrant issued by the Admiralty (February 2, 1892) is
as follows :
" We do therefore by virtue of the power and authority vested
in us hereby warrant and authorize the red ensign of Her
Majesty's fleet with the Canadian coat of arms in the fly, to
be used on board vessels registered in the Dominion."
The Admiralty's warrant was, of course, limited to the use
of the flag on vessels. The Admiralty has no control over its
use on shore. That is a matter for Canadians themselves.
From their own flagstaffs they may fly what they please.
Disrespect to the Canadian flag has been exhibited on two
occasions : In 1895 at Bermuda the master of the Canadian
schooner Emma S. received the following note from the
Colonial Office there:
" I have to inform you that your ship having entered Hamil-
,ton harbor with a red ensign with a badge thereon flying, con-
trary to the provisions of section 1 of the Imperial Merchant
Shipping (Colors) Act 1889, the officer of the Customs at this
port ordered the flag to be hauled down and handed to him,
which was accordingly done."
1 At the Dominion elections of 1891, the question of closer trade
relations with the United States was the principal issue, the Liberals
strongly advocating a policy of unrestricted reciprocity.
70 THE CANADIAN FLAG
An equally ill-informed official — Her Majesty's consul at
Rio Grande do Sol, Brazil — compelled the master of the
M. J. Taylor, in 1904, to remove the Canadian badge from
his red ensign. Upon both occasions the officials underwent
correction; the Emma S. got back her flag, and the consul
sent an apology.
The Canadian flag — the only flag authorized for distinc-
tively Canadian use — is this red ensign with the Canadian
badge in the fly. Its first appearance on Canadian vessels
was an irregularity. With some difficulty imperial sanction
for its use at sea was obtained. Improperly, but with in-
creasing frequency, it has appeared upon land ; has been dis-
played upon our public buildings; has been encouraged by
our government both " by precept and example M ; and has
at length been referred to by a Governor-General as "the
recognized flag of the Dominion both ashore and afloat."
This Canadian flag very appropriately symbolizes and
expresses Canadian constitutional position; for the Union
Jack in the corner indicates our political origin and present
affiliation, while the Canadian coat of arms in the fly denotes
the severance of the umbilical cord and the commencement
of independent national life.
The equivocal use of the flag on shore has its parallel
and its explanation in the ambiguity of our political status.
Were we, in fact as well as theory, a part of the British Empire,
we should of course fly the flag of the Empire alone — the
Union Jack, the symbol of our subordination. And were we,
in theory as well as fact, an independent nation, we should
fly no flag which did not clearly express our status and our
nationality.
In 1776, after the thirteen American colonies had com-
menced concerted action, but prior to the Declaration of
Independence, Washington (January 2) hoisted a flag in-
THE CANADIAN FLAG 71
dicative at once of continued allegiance and of independent
action — a flag of thirteen stripes of alternate white and red
on a blue ground, with the Union Jack in the upper left-hand
corner. Six months afterward the Union Jack disappeared,
and the "new constellation" of thirteen stars took its place.
The greater freedom which Canada enjoys, the easy conces-
sion to her in more recent years of her every wish, the frank
acknowledgment of her independence in every department of
political life, and her admission to the councils of the Empire
upon terms of perfect equality, have deferred indefinitely, if
not removed forever (who can say?), all thought of any flag
which failed to indicate Canadian veneration for the flag of
their youth — the flag of the greatest and the best of all
historic empires.
. On the other hand, Canada's self-respect requires that her
acknowledged right of independent self-government, her ac-
cession to national rank, and her admission to a footing of
equality with the United Kingdom itself, should not only
be amply recognized in imperial conferences, but should be
evidenced by her flag — by the flag of the Dominion of Canada.
Canadians who see something sinister if not altogether
disgraceful and abominable in the suggestion of a Canadian
flag may be helped by perusal of a press despatch from
London of July 8th last :
" Premier Botha and the Colonial Office have approved the
new Transvaal flag, which is the Vieurkleur with the Union
Jack in the corner."
The Vieurkleur was the Transvaal flag before the war.
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 1
Why is there so little national sentiment in Canada ?
Primitive men (or wolves, for that matter) recognize that
their safety and efficiency depend upon loyal combination.
As the tribe expands through various gradations into a nation,
this conviction continues. There is not the same ever present
demonstration of its foundation, but its true basis remains.
It has been fostered, moreover, by song and story, by united
victory and common disaster; it has become a mental and
emotional habit; it has become a passion — often, I am
afraid, an obsession or monomania, and in its worst but some-
what frequent form, a megalomania.
Why, then, is there so little national sentiment in Canada?
It is unnecessary for my purpose this evening to inquire
whether, under ideal conditions, national sentiment is bene-
ficial — whether, indeed, there could then be such a thing;
for if we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, everybody,
including ourselves, will be placed upon a footing of absolute
equality of affection. We are not in the millennium; and I
am afraid that I, for one, would find it a little monotonous
if we were. On the contrary, we are in a somewhat selfish
and harsh sort of a world, and we have to play the game of
contention and strife under protestations of brotherhood and
Christian love, and with our beaks and claws in finest con-
tentious condition. For fighting effectiveness (either in its
secular form of life destruction or in its more distinctively
modern aspect of commercial competition), organization, and
1 The Winnipeg Canadian Club inaugural address, 1904.
73
74 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
consolidation, and unity of interest, are prime requisites. In
other words, for present conditions a national sentiment is an
essential concomitant of national life.
Then why is there so little national sentiment in Canada ?
One reason, no doubt, is our dual race origin, emphasized
as it is by a concurring line of religious difference. In earliest
times, union, or even sympathy, between different races was
impossible. Education has done much to mitigate national
antipathy, and upon occasions there may now even be some
international ebullitions of occasional friendships. But be-
tween the good-will of temporary alliances, acclaimed in after-
dinner speeches, and the fundamental identity of interest,
and thought, and aspiration necessary to the existence of a
national sentiment, there is an exceeding wide gulf.
English and French across the ocean have been tradi-
tional enemies. We may hope that for the future they will
remain at peace. But we cannot tell. To-morrow may see
them once again engaged in mutual, devilish slaughter.
English and French in Canada have been and are friends ;
but they are in origin, nevertheless, English and French.
They have not the same history, the same religion, the same
laws (altogether), or the same methods of thought; they
speak different languages, and they are to some extent out
of sympathy with one another, and even suspicious of one
another. A very prominent and able member of Parliament,
lately deceased, thought that the bayonet would yet compose
their differences, and was not unwilling to see an immediate
appeal to that method of settlement.
One of the few things for which we must thank party
politics is that no Canadian statesman, desirous of office, can
publicly agree with that gentleman. They all want votes,
and they must all, therefore, have, or profess to have, sym-
pathy with both races. The way to power lies along the
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 75
road upon which both English and French are content to
travel ; and the politicians are very unhappy when it becomes
impassable. Upon such occasions the nationalities diverge,
luckily to meet again when the obstruction has been passed.
But the politician cannot in the meantime accompany both
parties, and he is in much trouble.
Adroitly as possible he skips across from one to the other,
shows himself, hurries back, and swears that he was never
absent, that he has been misrepresented and maligned, and
that his opinion is — well, his opinion is that — is that — that
his opponents ought to declare clearly what in reality their
views are. Let there be no beating about the bush. As for
him he is not ashamed of his opinions, and he intends to
maintain and act upon them at all hazards.
It is a poor game this : trying to make people believe that
you are not skipping; that you are following with steady
and unswerving step the identical road that each particular
audience is travelling. But after all, if, as a mere result of
the politician's desire for a quiet and prosperous life, the roads
are kept as close together as possible; if their reunion is
hastened ; and if other obstructions are by wise prevision and
timely action removed; and if English and French from
decade to decade, finding themselves harmoniously treading
the same road — the road which runs along the line of Can-
ada's best development and highest interest — learn to trust
one another, even finally to coalesce with one another, we
shall have to thank very largely the wisely compromising
spirit of the statesman, inspired possibly by the election neces-
sities of the party politician.
A second reason for the absence of Canadian national
sentiment is the geographical relationship of the various
provinces. We are all east and west of one another. Com-
mon lines of longitude are almost unknown. Add to this fact
76 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
that interposed, here and there, are long stretches of water,
of mountain and of waste land, and the force of this second
reason becomes very palpable and unfortunately most potent.
Are there any other reasons? The shortness of our asso-
ciation is sometimes pointed to. But note that the German
and Italian consolidations are still more recent, and yet in
neither of these countries is there any lack of national senti-
ment. It may be replied that the German federation was
formed at the end of a successful war, in which all the con-
stituent parts had shared, and that that fact differentiates
the cases. Yes, but observe Italy. For many years prior
to her consolidation she had been struggling for it, and when
it came it was preceded by military operations hardly more
serious than a parade. Why had not the Canadian provinces
shown the same desire for unity? Why did Nova Scotia
vote against it?
It cannot be said that nationalism has not stirred the
hearts of some of our people. The voice of the Canadian
patriot has never been quite silent; but hitherto it has been
usually the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Let me
remind you of the somewhat notable appearance of the
" Canada First " party under the leadership of Mr. W. A. Fos-
ter, of Toronto. A man of literary and poetic instincts, his
imagination was fired by the consummation of the federation
of the four provinces in 1867. He realized, as few others'
did, the grandeur of the country itself, and the magnificence
of its future; and he strove to rouse his countrymen to a
proper sense of their importance and dignity. After some
preliminary review articles, he produced in 1871 the memor-
able pamphlet entitled "Canada First." It had such effect
that in 1873 "The Canadian National Association" was
founded, with "the cultivation of a national sentiment" as
its object, and 1874 witnessed the institution of " The National
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 77
Club/' which still exists; The Nation, a weekly review; and
The Liberal, a daily newspaper. It had been hoped that
Mr. Edward Blake and Mr. Thomas Moss would join in the
leadership of the movement, but Mr. Blake took office in
1875 and Mr. Moss retired to the Bench. Canada as a whole
was irresponsive, and Mr. Foster reluctantly gave up the task.
It was at that time impossible of accomplishment. The
Liberal lived for about a year, The Nation two years, and
then all was quiet again. Mr. Foster himself died in 1888,
and as Mr. Gold win Smith says:
" The idea, for the time at least, died with him ; the move-
ment, if it did not end its march, halted at his grave. It must
be owned that even before his death the light of the idea had
been growing pale, and the pace of the movement had become
slow."
Mr. Foster made the fatal mistake of linking his prime
object, "the cultivation of a national sentiment," with the
establishment of a new political party. The result was, as
might have been foreseen, that the two existing parties
united against him. He and his associates were denounced
"as annexationists, independents, and know-nothings/ '
and referred to by the Mail as "beardless boys," by the
Globe as "sucking politicians," and by the Leader as "suck-
ing traitors." The first general election (1874) sufficed to
demonstrate the futility of the attempt to oust the traditional
parties; and "Canada First" fell, "the cultivation of a
national sentiment" was discredited, and its realization
indefinitely postponed.
It is possible that Canadian sentiment is not yet ready
to crystallize. That it has found lodgement in the hearts of
a very much larger number of our people than at any previous
period of our history, is plainly evidenced by the establish-
ment of so many of these Canadian Clubs, by their enormous
78 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
membership, by the largeness of the attendance at their
meetings, and by the enthusiastic eagerness which they
display for information and enlightenment upon all points
connected with their country. These clubs must be taken as
an indication of the awakening of that instinct of unity and
nationality which manifests itself in the history of all nations.
The question, however, is still unanswered : Why is there
so little national sentiment in Canada? Making all allow-
ances for the hindrances already referred to, students of the
rise and development of nationalism, commencing slowly as
the Roman grip loosened and culminating in the last cen-
tury with the German and Italian unions, must give a better
answer to the question. The reasons thus far mentioned are
inadequate.
I asked a few minutes ago: Why did Nova Scotia vote
against Canadian federation? The answer to the question
will help us to solve the problem we have under discussion.
What gave rise to the formation of other federations and
confederations ? What was the object of the Achean League,
the Smalkaldic League, the Hanseatic League, the Germanic
Confederation, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy,
and so on? Why do wolves associate, and primitive men
band themselves together? Primarily and principally, no
doubt, for mutual protection. Individuals, indeed, may
enter into partnerships for purposes of trade, or with some
other monetary object. But communities do not coalesce for
financial reasons. In fact, arrangement of financial terms is
more frequently an impediment than an aid to union — as
we may observe in our negotiations with Newfoundland.
Desire for protection is with states the effective constraining
influence.
Then what inducement could have been held out to Nova
Scotia? She considered herself as already protected. The
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 79
ocean and the British fleet were her safeguards. The usual
reason for federation was absent. Nova Scotia felt that she
was safe under powerful sheltering wings, and she was un-
urged to national effectiveness by the customary spur. She
was withdrawn from the stress of struggle; her survival was
not to be dependent upon her own fitness, but upon that of a
people with whom she exchanged a steamer a week.
It is said that, of all sorts of governments, autocracy is
the best, if you can find a perfect autocrat. I do not believe
it. Upon the contrary, I am convinced that the more perfect
and efficient the autocrat, the worse he is for his people. Do
everything for a child, and you may make an idiot of him.
Make him do everything for himself, and you will raise him
to his highest attainable possibility. Let him tumble, so
that he may learn to walk. Let him take risks of drowning
and much else, that he may learn to swim and protect him-
self. Why are Laplanders unprogressive ? Because they
have withdrawn beyond the reach of competition. What
stirred up the Japanese, and what is awakening the Chinese,
but the necessity for national cooperation? No people can
elude the cosmic law that fitness comes by survival — a sur-
vival, not by escape from struggle but by victory in it. In
biological evolution we are told that the birds sealed their
fate when they took to the air; they found safety in flying
rather than in fighting, while man's progenitors remained
on earth and sought success through cunning and combina-
tion.
Nova Scotia, had she been left to her own resources, would
have been glad to enter federation with her neighbors. Be-
ing sheltered and protected she saw no necessity for it, and
she protested in her elections almost unanimously against it.
She had not experienced the stirrings of free nationality, nor
felt the necessity for association.
80 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
You have now, probably, anticipated my view of the rea-
son for the poverty of national sentiment in Canada. We
note our racial and geographical difficulties, but we must
admit that these reasons do not suffice; for it is very clear
that if Canada were absolutely alone in the world she would
at once develop a Canadian consciousness, and with it a
Canadian sentiment. Independence means responsibility;
responsibility, self-reliance; and self-reliance, the sentiment
of nationality.
We have little national sentiment because we are not a
nation. Being a dependency we have, naturally enough, the
feelings of dependents. But as the boy has in him some-
thing of the man, struggling to assert itself, so has a colony
some of the emotions of nationhood; and the closer each of
these is to maturity the more marked and apparent become
the indications of full development.
At present we are distracted. Our unofficial orators
have held up to us, not Canadianism, but Imperialism, and
their failure to achieve success is similar to that of those
who endeavor to love God and yet remain out of sympathy
with their fellow-men. How can Canadians love the British
Empire which they have not seen when they do not love
their own country which they have seen? Is Ontario to
have more sympathy with New South Wales than with
Nova Scotia, or Quebec more affection for British Guiana
than for British Columbia? Love, as Henry Drummond
has taught us, commences with the family unit, and by
habit and association gradually and slowly expands. Some
people would start Canadian affection " imperially," and I
am afraid even fix it there. No, we must have a Canadian
sentiment first. It is a prerequisite of all Imperialism. As
Mr. Sandford Evans has said:
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 81
" From a common Canadianism the forward movement must
begin. This principle must be accepted and acted upon even
though the patience of some of the new Imperialists be tried." 1
We must ourselves be harmonious before we can join har-
moniously with others. If after forty years of practice we
cannot keep in tune with our seven selves, how are we going
to get on with singers from all over the world with voices
quite unlike our own?
I suggest nothing but that it is futile and foolish to en-
deavor to change human nature. I observe that in Britain
"the interests of the Empire" are conceived as "the inter-
ests of the United Kingdom," and that the special interests of
Canada enter very little into the estimate. I do not complain
of that, for it is absolutely unavoidable. That great writer
on "The Government of Dependencies" (Sir George Cornewall
Lewis) says truly that
"the evils arising to the Dependency from the ignorance of the
dominant country respecting its concerns are enhanced by
its indifference. Not only does the dominant country know
little of those concerns, but it has little desire to know anything
of them. Men's sympathies are in general too narrow to com-
prehend a community which is distinct from their own, although
it may be ultimately subject to the same supreme government.
Accordingly the maxim that government exists for the benefit
of the governed, is generally considered by the individual sub-
jects of a supreme government as applicable only to them-
selves; and it is often proclaimed openly that Dependencies
are to be governed not for their own benefit but for the bene-
fit of the dominant state" (pp. 247, 248). "In this manner,"
he adds at another page, "the people of the Dependency become
the sport of questions and interests in which they are not con-
cerned, and the nature of which they do not understand"
(p. 276).
That is all perfectly inevitable, and I do not complain of
it. But we shall go stupidly wrong if we, too, are induced to
1 "The Canadian Contingents," p. 324.
82 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
regard "the interests of the Empire" as the interests of the
United Kingdom merely. It must be our part, and our duty,
to widen the knowledge and the sympathies of the dominant
country by assertion and insistence upon the interests of
Canada, so that treaties, and declarations and prosecutions
of war may have some relation to their effect upon us and
upon our country. We are "the sport of questions we do
not even understand"! How many of us understand why
Canada should engage in a life and death struggle with
Russia or France or the United States for the sake of help-
ing the Japanese whom, by our policy, we exclude from our
shores ? Nevertheless, as Sir George Comewall Lewis says of
a colony,
"its trade may be disturbed, its merchant vessels exposed to
the risk of capture, and its territory even made the theatre of
war, without its having done anything to provoke hostilities,
or having had any means of preventing them, and although
it is only, as it were, a formal party to the dispute" (p. 277).
Let me not be misunderstood. I am not an advocate of
independence, if by that is meant separation from the British
Crown. Upon the other hand, I am not an Imperial Federa-
tionist. I do not know even what it means. In political
science it is a contradiction in terms; and the various propo-
sitions of its advocates, after slight discussion, have all been
dropped. Even Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion for an imperial
Court of Appeal was officially withdrawn; and to-day there
is no proposal of any kind before us for consideration. My
desire is that Canada shall be a nation, in the true sense
of that term — " self -existent, autonomous, sovereign," and
"capable of maintaining relations with all other govern-
ments" — a nation with the British King as its only and
all-sufficient head. We shall then, and not till then, have a
developed national sentiment in Canada.
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 83
It is well, indeed, that for the past few years these Imperial
Federation schemes should have been debated, for we now
understand them, and through them we have obtained some
insight into the true nature of our situation. Their with-
drawal has turned a less divided attention upon ourselves;
and we are again thinking of " Canada First," better equipped
than ever before for its proper and patient study.
This, in brief, is my theory of these Canadian Clubs:
Canadian Federation appealed to the imaginations of a few
in Toronto ; some seed was sown, but it fell among the thorns
of party politics and the thorns sprang up and choked it.
Imperial Federation offered its dream of a Parliament, if not
of the world, at all events of a very great part of it; but
while Imperialism remains as a great and significant force,
Imperial Federation is at an end. Then came the Boer war,
and, simultaneously with it, a most remarkable expansion of
Canadian prosperity. Suddenly we found ourselves recog-
nized as of some importance in the world. We had been
accustomed to place our trust in our metropolitan, and we
found that it had to appeal to us. We had been trained to
unbounded faith in the British army, and we found that
our men were at least as good as they. We had received
visits and heard addresses from many British statesmen,
and we learned that seldom has any man ever so impressed
British audiences as the Premier of Canada. We had almost
resigned ourselves to the annual emigration by thousands of
our people to the United States, and we discovered that they
and many others were entering Canada by tens of thousands.
We had made but little progress in trade and manufactures,
and month by month we saw the figures mount until in seven
short years they had doubled.
Is it any wonder, then, that Canada at last commenced
to believe in herself, to feel the thrill of national life, and
84 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
to seek for expression of it through Canadian Clubs? That,
gentlemen, is in my opinion the explanation of these clubs.
But more important than the reasons for their birth is
the answer to the question, What shall they do ? Allow me
to sketch the reply which I would give.
Perhaps we might say with Mr. Foster that their chief
object is "the cultivation of a national sentiment." Emo-
tions, however, are not cultivated, like cabbages, directly,
but by doing those things which will produce the emotions.
Seek happiness in itself, in anything but good, and you will
find that out. Then what are we to do ?
Very generally, we must try to understand ourselves and
our relations to others. I am aware that a great many people,
who probably never heard of the difference between a fed-
eration and a confederation, imagine that they are now suffi-
ciently instructed for the formation of opinions upon all
points connected with Canada's political existence and rela-
tions, and are ready to announce those opinions at once.
But I must ask for a little forbearance if I suggest that some
of these men have notions, probably inherited, like the shapes
of their noses, but cannot properly be said to have opinions.
And I should like briefly to indicate some of the subjects to
which, as I think, the special attention of Canadian Clubs
should be devoted.
First, then, let us know about Canada. Let some speakers
tell us of our geography ; of our physical characteristics and
capacities; of our mines and our forests; of our farms and
our orchards; of our lakes and our rivers. Few of us know
very much about any province but our own and possibly
one other. Let all be made familiar to us.
Let others teach us our history. Some will relate the
story of our wars; others of our constitution; others of our
material development, and our progress in literature, and art,
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 85
and general culture. We shall not understand Canada until
we know her history.
Let us study our present political status, and our legal
relation to the rest of the Empire. Are we a nation, as is
now so frequently asserted? Are we even a self-governing
colony? If not, in what respects are we still under subjec-
tion ? And is it compatible with the present importance and
dignity of Canada that she should longer acquiesce in outside
control of her own affairs ?
Then, inasmuch as we are a part of the British Empire,
we ought to know something about that great Leviathan.
Many of us are, I fear, but poorly informed upon the subject.
I would that some one, commencing at the reign of Queen
Anne, say two hundred years ago, when the Empire consisted
of little more than the Channel Islands, should, with the help
of Sir John Seeley and other writers, recount to us the his-
tory of British expansion ; and that he should make as clear
to us as he can the oft-asserted difference between the grasping
aggressiveness of the Russian, for example, and the natural,
heaven-appointed growth of Anglo-Saxon domination.
And let us endeavor to form some idea of Imperialism,
and the part that Canada ought to play in it. This is an
admittedly difficult and complex subject. No man can as
yet fully appreciate its meaning, tell its purport, or foresee
whereto it leads, and wherein it shall have its accomplish-
ment. The nations of the world are in a raging stream.
Nationalism has reached its full fruition, and the leadership,
not of the clans of Scotland, or of the states of the Hep-
tarchy, or of the Italian cities, or even of the rival parts of
the Roman Empire, but leadership of the whole world is
now the prize to which all alike aspire. Almost incalculable
amounts of money are annually expended in preparation for
the gigantic conflicts which may at any moment commence,
86 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
and men of all languages are being diligently fitted for fight-
ing. Even the United States, with its Monroe seclusive and
exclusive principles, has been caught in the swell of the
flood, and, under the usual pretext of the necessity for de-
fence, has already carried her conquests beyond her border
and laid the foundations of empire.
So far Canada has remained unmoved; and, save for
some little participation in the Boer war, has acted purely
upon lines of self-defence. What is to be her policy for the
future? Without participation in imperial councils, with-
out effective voice in the policy which may lead to war, is
she to be always ready, not merely to guard herself, but to
send her sons anywhere, to fight anybody, and for any reason ?
Is she in sympathy with the form of Imperialism which in-
duced the Chinese war, the Zulu war, the Afghanistan wars,
the Boer war, the Tibet war, and so on ? Without consulta-
tion she now finds herself bound up in a war treaty with
Japan, aimed principally at Germany and France. Is it cer-
tain that Canada would have agreed to engage in war on
behalf of Japan and against France ? Would any statesman
in Canada approve of such an arrangement ? Would any one
suggest that Canada's resources in men and money should be
devoted to any such purpose ?
If not, then, as we separated ourselves commercially from
the United Kingdom, are we also to think and act for our-
selves in matters pertaining to war ? What is to be thought
of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's pronouncement in the House of
Commons on the 15th of April, 1902, just before leaving for
England to attend the Imperial Conference ?
"We are invited to discuss the commercial situation, the
political situation, and the military situation. Our answer
has gone forth at the same time, that we see little advantage
in discussing the political situation, or the military situation.
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 87
... It would be a most suicidal policy for the Canadian peo-
ple to go into any scheme of that nature. It would be the
most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter
into that vortex in which the nations of Europe — England
included — are engaged at the present time, and which com-
pels them to maintain great military armaments. . . . The
principal item in the British budget is the expenses for naval
and land armaments. . . . Now, my honorable friend ' says
that Canada should follow in the same course, that she should
take part in the scheme of imperial military defence. Sir,
Canada is in a different position. Canada is a nation with an
immense territory, but with a sparse population of five and
three-quarter millions of souls, scattered over an area of three
thousand miles in extent from east to west. The principal items
in the budget of Canada are what ? — public works, the develop-
ment of the country, the construction of railways and harbors,
the opening up of ways of transportation. This is the work to
which we have to devote our energies, and I would look upon
it as a crime to divert any part of that necessary expenditure
to the supply of guns, cannon, and military armaments."
Bearing in mind that these are the words of the Premier
of Canada ; that they were intended as a declaration of Cana-
dian policy in reply to a request from the United King-
dom to discuss military relations; and that no exception was
taken to them, either by the leader of the Opposition, who
spoke in the same debate, or by other challenge, the pro-
nouncement may be regarded as the formulation of a partial
and tentative Monroe doctrine for Canada. And the question
is: Shall it be accepted by the Canadian people? At the
time of its enunciation it passed almost unnoticed. Was that
because we all agreed with it? I regard the pronouncement
as the most important that has ever been made in the Domin-
ion House of Commons. Let Canada discuss it and definitely
adopt or reject it.
A recent speaker, before the Mulock Club in Toronto, used
the following language:
1 Mr. McLean, a private and somewhat independent member.
88 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
"There is a growing feeling that Canada ought to bear her
fair share of the burden of imperial defence. Canadian ship-
ping and interests abroad are now defended by the British
navy at the expense of the taxpayers of England, Scotland, and
Ireland. In the Behring Sea matter, for instance, the seizure
of Canadian ships was prevented solely by the presence of
British ships of war in the Pacific. The United Kingdom paid
the expense; Canada received the benefit. Ordinary self-
respect will prevent Canadians allowing this state of affairs to
continue permanently."
Is that true? Let us carefully inquire, and if so, let us
make our calculations and hand over our conscience money
without the least delay. The charge is of the most serious
character. It directly affects the honor of every Canadian,
and there is, therefore, no fitter place for its consideration
than in a Canadian Club. Let some one of our members
investigate it and report to us. Let him give us the names
of any Canadian vessels that have been defended by British
ships. Let him tell us in what sense Canadian shipping is
"now defended by the British navy." Ships of all nations,
the smallest as well as the largest, sail the seas in time of
peace without protection from navies. Are Canada's ships
an exception? Did the speaker mean that Canadian ships
would be protected in case of war ? If so, before challenging
our self-respect, he might have noticed that the war would
not be of our making, probably not in our interest ; that the
assistance which we would be expected to render would far
overbalance any contra account; that the ship-protection
would very likely be confined to vessels trading to the United
Kingdom, and that the activity in that direction would be
essentially necessary for Britain's own safety. Starvation
would soon end her war if she failed efficiently to police the
home trade routes.
Let our inquiring member devote himself particularly to
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 89
the suggested example of British protection, namely, the
Behring Sea affair. Is it true that "the seizure of Canadian
ships was prevented by the presence of British ships of war
in the Pacific"? Or is it more true that seizures of our
ships were made by the Americans in 1886 and 1887, and
our captains and mates not only fined but imprisoned for
nothing but sealing on the high seas among the waves that
Britannia rules; that during these years the British ships
of war did nothing, and the Foreign Office did nothing more
belligerent than enter the mildest protests at Washington;
that in 1888, owing to negotiations for mutual regulations
of the seal industry, the Americans agreed to give secret
instructions to their cruiser captains to content themselves
with warnings and threats as a means of keeping us at home ;
that in 1889 the seizures recommenced and five more of our
ships were sent to Sitka for condemnation, while the British
fleet remained at anchor and the Foreign Office sent over
another protest; that on the 8th of August the Governor-
General advised the Colonial Office that
"a sense of irritation is growing up in the public mind, not only
against the government of the United States but against the
imperial government/' and that "the sealers may be driven
to armed resistance"; "up to the present time," said Canada,
"there has been every disposition on the part of the people to
rely on the maintenance by the imperial government of the
international rights which the Foreign Office is charged with
the duty of protecting; four years have elapsed since the
seizure of Her Majesty's sealing vessels was commenced by
the United States, and the only result of protests has been a
continuance of the policy";
that the answer sent by Lord Salisbury to the Governor-
General was that, inasmuch as it was
"very unusual to press for diplomatic redress for a private
wrong so long as there is a reasonable chance of obtaining it
90 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
from the tribunals of the country under whose jurisdiction the
wrong complained of has occurred, Her Majesty's government
considers that it would be in a stronger position for dealing
diplomatically with the Behring Sea case if appeals on the cases
of seizure which took place in 1886 were pressed on";
that Canada's reply was that the wrong complained of
occurred in nobody's jurisdiction, but out on the high seas;
that the Foreign Office then telegraphed to the Governor-
General :
"Her Majesty's government communicated with the United
States government with a view to preventing further seiz-
ures," and "instructed the British minister at Washington to
write privately to Mr. Blaine and request him to send instruc-
tions to the United States cruisers to desist";
that the Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries (C. H.
Tupper) reported that
"in view of the firmness with which the rights of British sub-
jects on the high seas have been maintained in the past, the
undersigned fails to appreciate not merely any reason for the
long delay in obtaining satisfaction for the aggressive and
hostile action exercised against British subjects and British
property by the United States, but also for the wanton con-
tinuance of this treatment";
that at the close of this fourth season (November 2, 1889)
we were told that
"Lord Salisbury proposes to await Sir Julian's [Pauncefote's]
report before deciding as to what further steps should be taken
in the matter" beyond "discussing the question with Mr.
Blaine";
that in 1890 a more formal protest was sent to the United
States, and, either because of it or because of negotiations for
settlement, no seizures were then made; that in 1891 Lord
Salisbury undertook that the British navy would assist the
United States cruisers in keeping Canadian ships off that part
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 91
of Behring Sea claimed by the United States ; that accordingly
he sent war vessels to carry out his agreement ; and that one
of them, the Nymph, excused her ill-success on the ground
that "the fogs greatly aided the sealing schooners in escaping
observation"? Thanks to the fogs, we weren't captured by
the British navy \ 1
What is truth ? Is it the fact that
"the seizure of Canadian ships was prevented solely by the
presence of British ships of war in the Pacific" ? and that while
"the United Kingdom paid the expense, Canada received the
benefit"?
If so let us repay the money. Or was the protection of the
same character as that given to the Newfoundlanders ? namely,
an assistance to their opponents — an assistance which re-
sulted in an action at law by Mr. Baird (one of the Islanders)
against the British commanding officer for illegally main-
taining absurd French pretensions — illegally, I say, for the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council so said, and Mr.
Baird got his damages.
And is it the fact that Canada, under the present conditions,
is of no service to the British navy? Is the lecturer to the
Mulock Club, to whom I have just referred, not right when
he says :
"It has become a maxim that the existence of the Empire
and the security of Great Britain depend on the maintenance
of British sea power. Without such coaling stations as Halifax
Lon the Atlantic, and Esquimalt on the Pacific, the maritime
supremacy of British naval power would be seriously jeopar-
dized. The secession of Canada from Great Britain would
probably, therefore, spell the loss of naval supremacy by the
British Empire and danger to the safety of Great Britain."
1 The number of Canadian ships seized by the Americans was as fol-
lows: four in 1886; eight in 1887; nine in 1889; one in 1891, and two
in 1892.
92 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
And ought the expenditure on our transcontinental rail-
ways, connecting these two coaling stations, to be considered
in making up the accounts?
This inquiry might very well be extended and a general
account of mutual benefits made up. To offset, if possible,
our present alleged meanness in not subscribing directly to
imperial defence, let some estimate be made of previous
contributions in order that we may see how the balance
stands. Is Canada, for example, entitled to any credit, and
if so for how much, for her assistance to the United Kingdom
in previous wars ? In 1775 the American revolutionary war
(how foolish it was we now all know) devastated Canada,
and, as Mr. Kingsford tells us,
"The only scrap of territory which remained, at one period,
under British rule was the city of Quebec within the ramparts"
(" History of Canada," Vol. V, p. 483);
and although there was no second invasion of Canada, yet
until the close of the war in 1781 the constantly anticipated
invasion (Kingsford says)
"demanded the presence in the field of all capable of bearing
arms" 1 (vol. vi, p. 436), resulting, as can easily be imagined, in
"the interruption of industry and the blight of enterprise" (Vol.
VII, p. 225).
In the American war of 1812-1815, Canada was largely the
field of the operations. Although, as Mr. Kingsford says:
"The war was forced on Canada, as a member of the imperial
system of Great Britain, without a single act of dereliction on
her part, without even any sentiment of active unfriendliness,"
yet Canada put forth her full power in men and money in
support of the motherland. What estimate is to be placed
on this contribution to imperial necessities? Sir Gordon
1 The statement must not be taken too literally.
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 93
Drummond, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada,
said to the legislature with reference to moneys voted by
the House:
" However small a proportion they may bear to the requisite
expenditures, you have the merit of giving all you had"
(lb. Vol. VIII, p. 437).
Again in 1866 and 1870 the Canadian militia had to defend
their country against Fenian invasions — incursions not be-
cause of any ill-will to us, but because we were the nearest
representatives of British rule. Our losses were properly
chargeable to the government of the United States, upon the
same principle as were American Alabama claims payable
by Great Britain; but while Great Britain paid the Alabama
millions, she declined to insist upon payment of our Fenian
losses. 1
Our contributions in men and money to the Boer war, too,
must not be overlooked ; and even smaller items, such as the
Leopard and Chesapeake affair, and the Trent episode, must
be estimated, for we are charged with dishonorable conduct
and we must clear ourselves if we can.
As against all this must be set whatever there is of contra
account, whether of military, or naval, or diplomatic protec-
tion. Let it be diligently investigated and let us be informed
as to what it is composed of, and what it amounted to. Is it
true, for example, as Sir Charles Dilke declares, that "Brit-
ish diplomacy has cost Canada dear"? And what is the
correct answer to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's question :
" Is there a Canadian anywhere who would not gladly wel-
come the termination of British diplomacy for Canada"?
And let us not be deterred from these inquiries by being
told that we are haggling about mere money. We are not.
1 The United Kingdom herself liquidated our claim for losses by
guaranteeing payment of some of our bonds.
94 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
Our men have gone as well as our money, and our territory,
too. And, moreover, it is about money that we are said to
be in default. While the charge is so constantly repeated, it
is our duty to investigate it, and to disprove it if we can.
Before suggesting one further subject for study, let me
remind you of the character of the political problem that is
before us. Sir George Cornewall Lewis produced his book on
"The Government of Dependencies" in 1841, and, as his
editor tells us,
" never contemplated that colonies, whose commercial relations
with the mother country were precisely the same as those of
foreign nations, could still remain part of the Empire " (Ch.
xxxi).
Lord Durham, too, while advocating the grant of self-
government to Canada, argued that
"the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the
mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations,"
must be retained.
In other words, Canada's protective tariff of 1879 intro-
duced into political science a dependency of an unknown
type. For centuries Spain and England had, by navigation
and trade laws, endeavored to monopolize the trade of their
colonies ; the revolt of the thirteen American states so shook
the system that it was subsequently abandoned ; and in 1879
Canada actually provided for partial exclusion of British
goods in favor of her own, an act which necessarily led
to separation from the United Kingdom with reference to
foreign commercial arrangements, and also to the practical
substitution of our own negotiators for British diplomatists.
And now we have a new thing in the world, namely, an
Empire of which some of the dependencies have almost
complete powers of self-government, interference with which
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 95
would mean separation; an Empire in which controlling
legislation by the dominant state is impracticable and im-
possible; an Empire in which the component parts have
diverse tariffs and are ready to treat and negotiate with
one another (just as though they were politically distinct) for
preferential rates, upon bases of self and separate interest;
an Empire in which there is no common army and no com-
mon navy, in which subscriptions and contributions to war
are not only unregulated but are of purely voluntary char-
acter; an Empire, in short, in which there is a Sovereign who
reigns but may not govern, a supreme Parliament that must
not exercise its functions, an imperial War Office and Ad-
miralty without power over the most important dependencies,
and subordinate states that do very much as they please.
Having studied all this, and having ascertained that our
position is without precedent, we commence to see that the
further development of our political history is a matter for
most anxious and careful consideration. We have reached
commercial independence; we have attained parliamentary
independence ; our union with the rest of the Empire through
the British Crown remains intact; and the problem is to
formulate new relations, for the old are clearly passing
away.
As the future is always best studied in the experience not
only of ourselves but of others, let some of the best of our
members tell us of other constitutions, past and present.
LLet one take up the general subject with Dicey and Seeley
and Pollock; let another study Lowell on parties and gov-
ernments in continental Europe; another Bryce, on the
Holy Roman Empire; another the "Federalist" and Bryce
on the American commonwealth; another Lewis, Jenkyns,
Greswell, and Hurlburt, on dependencies; another Freeman,
Parkin, and Grant, on Imperial Federation, another — but
96 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS
perhaps we have enough for just now; these writers and
others upon the same subject will suffice for the present.
And in all our discussions let us have the prime requisite
of advantageous study, an open mind. Let all who address
us be received not only with toleration and patience, but with
that respect due to those whom we invite to speak. Let us
hear not merely, or even principally, from those with whom
most of us might agree, but chiefly, I should say, from those
men who have ideas of their own, who possess individuality
resulting from study and reflection. Let the Canadian Club
of Winnipeg be liberal enough to hear all things, intelligent
enough to test all things, and strong enough to cleave un-
flinchingly to that which it deems to be good.
For the unpopular man may be the better patriot. The
opponents of many a country's wars and other enthusiasms
have been justified by time, and British history can furnish
many examples of it. Who now agrees with George III
and condemns Chatham and Fox and the other oppo-
nents of the American revolutionary war? Who is there
that does not echo Lord Salisbury's words with reference to
the Crimean war, "We put our money on the wrong horse"?
And now that we have got the Transvaal and don't know
exactly what to do with it, are we not already beginning to
think whether some finer diplomacy, whether some Edward
the Peacemaker could not have saved the expenditure of
hundreds of millions of money, tens of thousands of men,
and the anxieties and mournings of multitudes of women?
Let me offer for your consideration some weighty words of
Lord Hobhouse, a member of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council:
"Large numbers of people think it unpatriotic to decide, or
at least to say, that their own country is wrong in a dispute
with another. Patriotism has nothing to do with the matter;
CANADA AND THE CANADIAN CLUBS 97
it is consistent with either view. Patriotism is a virtue which
leads a man to sacrifice himself for the good of his country.
It is not patriotism to flatter one's own countrymen, or to assure
them that they are right in what they are doing. That is
merely swimming with the stream, one of the most alluring
forms of indolence. A man is not a patriot because he denies
that the community to which he belongs shall be aggrandized
at the expense of other communities to which he does not
belong. To desire the success of a cause because it is his
own, and not because it is right, is a form of selfishness. ' My
country, right or wrong/ is no more patriotic than 'Myself,
right or wrong,' is noble and unselfish. The man who will
take pains to find where lies the right and wrong, or, it may be,
the wise or unwise course; the man who, being convinced that
the existing rulers of his country are wrong or unwise, has the
courage to stand up and say so, who confronts rulers and
penalties, legal or social, and frowns and sneers and howling
multitudes — that man is the patriot, it is he who sacrifices
himself for his country's good " (N. Y. Independent, August 26,
1900).
Let us in this club not be carried away by popular clamor;
nor form our opinions from newspaper head-lines, or unin-
formed conversations. Let us strive to know what is best
for our country, and, with that in view, patiently study our
history, our institutions, and the lives of our great men.
Let us know what they did, what they advocated, and what
their success; even their faults and their failures may have
lessons for us. And let us always put Canada before party,
and our country above any class or section within it. Mak-
ing use of the language of Mr. Sandford Evans's recent book,
I leave you by saying:
" No time in the history of this country, not even the period
when Confederation was the grand problem, had greater need
of enlightenment and temperate statesmanship. That is the
great need of the Empire to-day. The proselytizing zeal of
those who see but one possible outcome, and admit but one
interpretation of what has occurred, is not the desideratum;
h
98 CANADA AND THE CANADIAN GLUBS
nor is the subtle and insistent diplomacy of more masterful
men. Frankness, directness, mutual consideration, and modera-
tion will take Canada safely through the period of discussion
which will dissipate the mists and the false sanctities and let
in the daylight in which men see where they walk and walk
because they see." '
My best wish for our Canadian Clubs is that they may
help to let in the daylight.
1 " The Canadian Contingents," p. 331.
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 1
Great Britain's principal achievement, her greatest contri-
bution to the world's progress, is to be found not in the
realms of art, literature, or science (great as have been her
accomplishments in these lines), but in the discovery and
application of her system of parliamentary government. I
refer, not to representative government, but to that rule of
the game of political-party struggles which is called responsible
government — the rule by which the administration of the
day resigns its executive functions whenever it ceases to
possess the confidence of the people as represented by the
House of Commons.
The development of this rule has been slow — tediously,
often exasperatingly slow — to the point of rebellion. From
the autocracy of the Sultan of Turkey to the autocracy of the
House of Commons, from the rule of one man to the rule of
every man, is a very long distance requiring the progressive
education in political rights of many generations.
And the road was a particularly difficult one. Not in the
schools, nor by public advocacy could progress be made in
dethronement of him who regulated the schools and the plat-
form — not as long as on his side were the strongest members
of society. His prohibitions were effective to the extent to
which, at any time, use and wont, and fear of change, and
religious conviction as to his divine right, were too strong for
the growing democracy which was some day to shatter all
1 The substance of this article was delivered as an address to the
Winnipeg Canadian Club, May, 1907.
100 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
those crude political conceptions based upon the division of
the human race into governors and governed, with God him-
self as the framer of the lists.
The history of the development of responsible government
is the history of a struggle, nominally between the Kings and
Commons, but really between two sets of ideas, between two
classes in the community — the one supporting prerogative
and the other pulling it down, the one pleasantly known by
the name of Loyalists, the other aspersed as Roundheads,
Republicans, low-bred agitators, rebels, and traitors.
Our present notion of responsible government assumed its
final form in Britain in the reign of George III, the power of
the Pelhams and the popularity of Pitt rendering the Stuart
form of government forever after impossible.
By the time constitutional government was conceded to
Upper and Lower Canada, responsible government was well
understood and fairly well established in England. Why,
then, had the contest to be resumed in Canada ? Why did
we commence with Governors who appointed their Executives
and maintained them in spite of their overwhelming denuncia-
tion by popular vote ?
The explanation is to be found in the ideas prevalent as to
the purposes and functions of colonies. The colonial sys-
tem, the mercantile system, are names for the methods pur-
sued by European nations — Spain, Holland, England — in
the pursuit of over-seas wealth. Colonies were subservient
to the purposes of the metropolitan; the trade was monopolized
by it, and England even forbade manufactures within colonial
territory. Not even a horseshoe (so Lord Chatham) could be
made in the colonies, and a special statute preserved the hat
trade to English makers.
If colonies were permitted to legislate for themselves,
these metropolitan privileges would cease. While, therefore,
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 101
popular government with responsible ministries was clearly
the right thing in Britain, just as clearly it could not be
tolerated in the colonies. The colonies must be kept to their
roles: (1) to furnish raw material to the metropolitan alone;
(2) to consume the manufactures of the metropolitan alone;
and (3) to receive and provide for the redundant population
of the metropolitan.
So the struggle for responsible government recommenced
in Canada. The forces opposed to it, however, were much
weakened. The doctrine of the divine right of kings had been
exploded; and no one thought of ascribing divine authority
to Downing Street or to the Colonial Secretary.
Very soon the case became clear; the question was not one
between the King and the Canadian people, but between the
Canadian people and the gentleman who for the moment
directed the Colonial Office in London and sent despatches
to the colonial Governors. Even then there were always
many Canadians who struggled against their own people;
there were always many Canadians who thought that Cana-
dian self-government had gone quite far enough — that
Downing Street prerogative ought to be upheld, and the
agitators put down.
Let us take a hurried glance at the struggle in Lower
Canada. Having been accustomed to do as they were told,
the French objected to the establishment of a popular Assem-
bly, declaring that its purpose was pour nous taxer, and that
it would itself have to be paid for. Forced into a system
of representative government, they soon learned the game;
ascertained the power of the purse ; learned the use the British
Commons had made of it; learned the relief from grievances
that could be obtained by it.
But the Lower Canada Assembly was badly handicapped
by the fact that its power over all its income was not ad-
102 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
mitted. Its possession of the whole of the purse was denied.
Revenue was derived from three sources : (1) duties imposed
by imperial statutes; (2) duties imposed by the Lower
Canadian statutes; and (3) the casual and territorial reve-
nues (sales and leases of lands, fees, fines, etc.); and the
Colonial Office declared that the legislature had nothing to
do with the first and third of these sources of supply.
The Assembly held but one-third of the purse; but that
proved in skilful hands to be enough, for when the Governor
asked the Assembly to vote money supplementary of the
imperial revenues, the Assembly requested (in order that
they might know what supplement was necessary) that they
should be informed of the amounts of the imperial reve-
nues, and what had been done with them. These accounts
(when at last statements were furnished) the Assembly ex-
amined, criticized, and cut down, voting only sufficient funds
to pay such accounts as they thought ought to be paid. For
various years, indeed, they refused to vote anything at all,
and the Governors were obliged either to filch from the army
chest or illegally to spend provincial funds.
That went on until 1828, when after a long investigation
by a committee of the British House of Commons, an elabo-
rate report was adopted condemnatory of the administrative
methods in Lower Canada, and particularly of the illegal
assumption of the right to disburse provincial moneys with-
out the assent of the legislature.
By 1831 the Assembly had obtained the acknowledgment
of the right of the legislature to deal with the duties imposed
by imperial statutes. Two-thirds of the purse were now
theirs; but the lands were becoming valuable, and to check-
mate the Assembly large tracts were sold to a land company
and the proceeds used by the Governors as they pleased.
Lord Aylmer came in 1830 with the best of good intentions
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 103
and good-will, only to find that pleasant speeches would not
be accepted as a substitute for self-government. Again no
supplies; and in 1835 the celebrated ninety-two resolutions
were voted by the Assembly, claiming amongst other things
that the Upper Chamber (the Legislative Council) should be
elected instead of appointed; and that the Executive should
be a responsible Executive.
Lord Gosford arrived in 1835 with conciliation and fair
words, but with instructions which prohibited substantial
concession to these two demands. Concealing that fact, the
new Governor promised investigation and consideration, and
did very well until Sir Francis Bond Head (Lieutenant-
Governor of Upper Canada) for the very purpose of embar-
rassing him, published the instructions. Again no supplies.
In April-May, 1837, the British Parliament intervened
with a series of resolutions, one of which authorized the Gov-
ernor to make use of all Lower Canada moneys without the
assent of the Lower Canada legislature. Two other of the
resolutions were as follows:
44 That it is unadvisable to make the Legislative Council of
Lower Canada an elective body, but that measures be taken to
secure for it a greater degree of public confidence.
"That while expedient to improve the composition of the
Executive Council, it is unadvisable to subject it to the re-
sponsibility demanded by the House of Assembly."
In the summer of the same year, the Lower Canada legis-
lature was summoned in order that the Assembly might make
its submission to imperial will. It refused to submit. The
rebellion came almost immediately afterward.
Next year (1838) the British Parliament suspended popular
government in the province and intrusted legislative as well
as administrative functions to the Governor and an appointed
"Special Council" of not less than five persons. Lord Dur-
104 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
ham tried ruling in that way and produced another rebellion
(autumn, 1838).
If you ask whether these rebellions were justifiable, my only
reply must be that no authority has yet marked out the line
beyond which a people capable of self-government are not
bound to carry their submission. Perhaps the most potent
immediate cause of the American Revolution was the suppres-
sion by the British Parliament of popular government in the
State of New York. In Lower Canada the first rebellion was
produced by the withdrawal from its legislature of that most
essential characteristic of popular government, the right to
spend its own money; and the second, by the abolition of
the legislature. Few persons now say that the American
Revolution was not justifiable. What must be said of the
Lower Canada rebellion? The striking parallel between the
two has heretofore (so far as I am aware) remained unnoticed.
Admitting that the incessant quarrellings between the Gov-
ernors and the Assemblies, the jolting difficulties encountered
upon the road from government by Governor to government
by the people, were not and could not be sufficient ground for
armed resistance to rapidly vanishing authority — admitting
this, what must be said when dying prerogative suddenly
flames up and abolishes its great enemy, the Assembly of the
people's representatives? For less than that, one Stuart
King lost his head, and another had to fly his kingdom.
Remembering that Upper Canadians were English-speak-
ing, and recalling the incessant troubles of the Governors
in the English colonies to the south, one might have ex-
pected that the Upper rather than the Lower Province would
have made the stouter resistance to prerogative. That it did
not is to be attributed to the fact that the most influential
of the Upper Canadians were United Empire Loyalists (or
the descendants of them) whose attachment to prerogative
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 105
had already been tried in fire. They were not men with
average opinions. They belonged to a class.
Nevertheless they were strong men, and their leaders,
while intensely loyal to British connection, were not disposed
to take all their ideas from Governors, and to change them
with each succeeding appointment to that office. Not without
some show of reason were they called the Family Compact
— a compact united in opposition to reforms in political
relations and popular arrangements, but a compact somewhat
jealous of gubernatorial influence and desirous of using pre-
rogative for the furtherance of their own political policy.
The fight was of the three-cornered sort.
The Reformers (although not then so called) had a majority
in the Seventh Assembly (1816-1820). In 1817, the Gov-
ernor for the first time had recourse to sudden prorogation in
order to stop insubordination, and in 1818 and 1820 the As-
sembly refused to vote supply. The Eighth Assembly (1820-
1824) was Tory (although not so called). The Ninth (1824-
1828) was Reform; supply was refused in 1825 and 1828;
resolutions assertive of right to control all revenues became
annual; committees assumed to investigate administrative
matters, to summon officials, to give evidence, and to send
them to gaol for refusal to answer. The Tenth Legislature
(1828-1830) was Reform ; the Governor asked no supply, hav-
ing sufficient revenue from sale of lands to pay all accounts ;
direct votes of want of confidence were passed in each session ;
the Governor-General became sarcastic; and the Assembly
refused to permit a chaplain appointed by him to say prayers
in their presence, etc. The Eleventh Assembly (1831-1834)
was Tory — more clearly so after it had expelled Mackenzie.
Nevertheless it, too, checked closely the Governor's accounts;
reduced some of his figures ; asked for further returns ; voted
to repeal the chaplain's salary; asserted the Assembly's
106 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
right to appoint its own officials. The Twelfth Legislature
(1834-1836) was Reform — completely so, — and the instruc-
tions to the new Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, declared
that
"the supporters of the local government now for the first
time found themselves in a constant minority upon every
controverted question between them and their political an-
tagonists.' '
These were the years of BidwelFs speakership; of William
Lyon Mackenzie's " Seventh Report"; of demands for re-
sponsible government; of the advocacy of it in London by
Robert Baldwin from Upper Canada and Messrs. Crane and
Wilmot from New Brunswick; of renewed refusal of supply.
Governor Head was courageous but vain and foolish.
Determined to extinguish all "Republican and low-bred
antagonists," he dissolved the Assembly; threw himself
heartily into the elections; appealed to loyalty against sedi-
tion and to English against French ; routed the Reformers ;
restored the Tory majority in the Assembly; and imagined
that of responsible government the last had been heard.
Reporting to the Colonial Secretary, he said :
"The great dispute which has so long been raging here
between Constitutionalists and Republicans is (and these peti-
tions prove it) at an end." 1
"I can assure your Lordship that democracy does not now
exist in Upper Canada — it is completely annihilated." 2
" Nothing can be brighter than the moral and political state
of the Canadas ; all is sunshine here and couleur de rose. I have
here no difficulties that are not surmounted, no sickness that
is not cured, no sorrow that is not removed." 3
But Head was wrong. As Lord Durham said in his report,
Head had '
"succeeded in putting the issue [at the elections] in such a
light . . . that a great portion of the people really imagined
1 May 4, 1837. 2 January 13, 1837. 8 July, 1836.
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 107
that they were called upon to decide the question of separation
by their votes."
And Head himself, in his vain-glorious way, had declared
that the question put to the electors was:
"Do you vote for the House of Assembly or for Sir Francis
Head? which amounts in plain terms to this: Are you for a
republican government, or are you not?" *
The electors had voted against separation from the United
Kingdom; but by a large majority they were in favor of
responsible government, as very soon was made quite clear
to everybody.
Beaten at the elections and himself ousted from the As-
sembly, Mackenzie turned his restless activities to prepara-
tions for a rebellion, which for a day or two in November,
1837, attained the importance of an emeute or riot. Little
justification for such an outbreak can be alleged. Grievances
undoubtedly existed, but the progress of Upper Canada
toward self-government had been more rapid than in any
other part of the world. The representative system was in
full operation; freedom of assertion and debate was un-
checked; the power of the Assembly was great and rapidly
growing greater; the constitutional remedy for grievances
had for twenty years (with the exception of 1829 and 1830)
been in operation; while the Reformers had a majority in
the Assembly there was no suggestion of appeal to force.
No doubt the Reformers were unfairly beaten at the elections
Lof 1836; but if in Canada we are to have a rebellion every
time that a general election is carried by unfair methods,
we shall, I am afraid, have little but elections and insurrec-
tions.
Nevertheless, the rebellion undoubtedly was a factor in
the attainment of responsible government. It made ap-
1 See his "Narrative," p. 123.
108 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
parent Governor Head's incompetence, led to his recall, and
contributed to Lord Durham's governorship, which produced
what has not unfitly been termed the charter of colonial
liberties — Lord Durham's report. Read the following ex-
tracts from it:
"The powers for which the Assembly contended appear in
both instances to be such as it was perfectly justified in demand-
ing. It is difficult to conceive what could have been their
theory of government who imagined that in any colony of
England a body, invested with the name and character of a
representative Assembly, could be deprived of any of those
powers which, in the opinion of Englishmen, are inherent in
a popular legislature. It was a vain delusion to imagine that
by mere limitations in the Constitutional Act, or an exclusive
system of government, a body, strong in the consciousness of
wielding the public opinion of the majority, could regard cer-
tain portions of the provincial revenues as sacred from its
control; could confine itself to the mere business of making
laws; and look on as a passive and indifferent spectator while
those laws were carried into effect or evaded, and the whole
business of the country was conducted by men in whose in-
tentions or capacity it had not the slightest confidence. Yet
such was the limitation placed on the authority of the Assem-
bly of Lower Canada; it might refuse or pass laws, vote or
withhold supplies, but it could exercise no influence on the
nomination of a single servant of the Crown. The Executive
Council, the law officers, and whatever heads of departments
are known to the administrative system of the province, were
placed in power without any regard to the wishes of the people
or their representatives ; nor indeed are there wanting instances
in which a mere hostility to the majority of the Assembly
elevated the most incompetent persons to posts of honor and
trust. However decidedly the Assembly might condemn the
policy of the government, the persons who had advised that policy
retained their offices and their power of giving bad advice. ^ If
a law was passed after repeated conflicts, it had to be carried
into effect by those who had most strenuously opposed it. The
wisdom of adopting the true principle of representative gov-
ernment and facilitating the management of public affairs by
intrusting it to the persons who have the confidence of the
representative body, has never been recognized in the govern-
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 109
ment of the North American colonies. All the officers of gov-
ernment were independent of the Assembly; and that body
which had nothing to say to their appointment was left to get
on as it best might with a set of public functionaries whose
paramount feeling may not unfairly be said to have been one
of hostility to itself (p. 54).
"It appears therefore that the opposition of the Assembly
to the government was the unavoidable result of a system
which stinted the popular branch of the legislature of the neces-
sary privileges of a representative body, and produced thereby
a long series of attempts on the part of that body to acquire
control over the administration of the province" (p. 57).
The Canadas were united in 1841. At the first session of
the first Parliament a resolution was unanimously adopted by
the Assembly which declared that the government
" ought to be men possessed of the confidence of the representa-
tives of the people.' '
The Governor refused compliance and wrote to the Colonial
Secretary, saying :
"I have told the people plainly that, as I cannot get rid of
my responsibility to the home government, I will place no
responsibility on the Council; that they are a Council for the
Governor to consult, but no more." *
But the contest was very nearly over. It flared up into
real flame when Lord Metcalfe made appointments to office
without the advice of his ministers; the ministers resigned
(November 27, 1843) ; the home government supported the
Governor; a period of unconstitutionality succeeded; a
new Governor (Lord Elgin) came, saw, and surrendered —
Lord Durham's son-in-law was Canada's first constitutional
Governor. Since him some of them have raised some small
points that need not detain us now. Canada has had respon-
sible government since 1847.
The contest past, British statesmen almost at once com-
1 Quoted from Sir Francis Hincks's "Reminiscences," pp. 41, 42.
110 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
menced to see how foolish they had been. Charged with
conceding to rebellion that which had been denied to rational
appeal, Mr. Gladstone admitted the whole Canadian conten-
tion when he declared that Canadian demands were conceded
" not from terror but because, on seriously looking aithe case,
it was found that after all we had no possible interest in with-
holding them." 1
One still sometimes hears it said that Canadian Reformers,
by their agitations, retarded rather than accelerated the con-
cession of responsible government, suggesting that the British
government were waiting merely for quiescence and proper
behavior before granting self-government. Nothing could
be farther from the truth — nothing is more easily disproved.
The British government gave way before Canadian deter-
mination, gave way not because they wished to, not because
their leading statesmen could not argue and did not continue
to argue that concession was impossible, but because no other
course (save that of George III toward the American colonies)
was open to them. That this may be made clear, let us
read the despatch of Lord Glenelg (Colonial Secretary, 1835-
1838) in reply to Joseph Howe's celebrated twelve resolutions
embodying the New Brunswick demand for responsible govern-
ment:
"To any such demand Her Majesty's government must
oppose a respectful but at the same time a firm declaration that
it is inconsistent with a due adherence to the essential distinc-
tions between a metropolitan and a colonial government, and
is therefore inadmissible." 2
That was always the point: How can you be a colony
and yet do as you like? You cannot; and therefore you
must submit to be governed. The British Parliament's
1 Quoted in "The Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin," p. 32.
2 Quoted by Mr. Longley, " Joseph Howe," p. 46.
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 111
resolution of April-May, 1837, has already been noted. That
it proceeded upon the ground taken by Lord Glenelg is clear
from the language of Lord John Russell (leader of the govern-
ment in the House of Commons) in the debate of December
22, 1837. To him, responsible government in a colony meant
political independence of that colony:
"But what the Assembly insist on is that the Legislative
Council should be made elective. That is one of their demands ;
but they also make another of a most questionable character,
which is, that the members of the Executive Council shall be
placed on the same footing as the members of the administra-
tion in this country; and that they shall be removable when
they no longer possess the confidence of the Assembly. These
two demands form together a demand of absolute independence.
Such a demand I, at least, understand it to be. It is not a
demand for the removal of a grievance, but it is a demand to
have a constitution which must be to all intents and purposes
an independent constitution; because it is impossible that the
ministers of the government in Canada should be removable
at the pleasure of the Assembly, and yet be able to act at the
same time upon orders which they receive from the Queen's
government at home. When, therefore, this extreme demand
of theirs to become an independent state was refused, they, on
their part, refused the supplies to the government of the
Crown, and stopped the whole machinery of that government.
What this country then proposed was, to take the means to
set the machine in motion again. In this there was no act of
oppression upon our part ; it was not a measure of finance, but
a measure of defence. It was a defensive position which we
took up, in order that the provincial administration, with its
machinery, might not be entirely stopped, but be carried on
by some means or other. But that the government had con-
ceded these demands I am by no means prepared to say, for
I do not know that even by those means we should have
secured tranquillity. Suppose the Legislative Council to have
been elective, and a Bill to have been introduced into the
Legislative Assembly for preventing British troops from enter-
ing Quebec or Montreal, and such Bill to have been agreed to
by a Council so constituted, what remedy would remain in
that case? The Governor, indeed, might have rejected it, but
112 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
then he would have been obliged to dismiss his ministers, and
then the Assembly would have refused the supplies. The
difference, therefore, between the two countries would still
have existed, with this distinction, that in the case supposed,
it would have rested on the question of the exclusion of British
troops from Quebec and Montreal, instead of arising out of our
refusal to make the Legislative Council elective and the Execu-
tive Council of the local government like our own Cabinet.
The House of Assembly and the Council would have refused the
supplies in that case, as they actually have done, and thus the
machinery of government must necessarily have been stopped
until the demands of the Assembly had been complied with." 1
In his speech (June 3, 1839) upon the resolutions which
preceded the Bill to unite the Canadas, Lord Russell repeated
the same arguments and announced the same determination :
"It is quite impossible to allow it to be laid down . . . that
such colony shall not be subject to the general superintending
authority of the Crown of these realms.' ' 2
The Tory Legislative Council of Upper Canada, agreeing
with these sentiments, declared
"that the adoption of the plan proposed by the Earl of Durham
in which this [responsible government] is the prominent fea-
ture, must lead to the overthrow of the great colonial Empire
of England. . . . Under such a system colonial dependence
would practically be at an end."
Joseph Howe made strong reply to Lord Russell's speech
of the 3d of June in a series of
"Letters to the Right Honorable Lord Russell on the right
of British Americans to be governed by the principles of the
British Constitution." 3
1 " Mirror of Parliament," p. 1064.
2 lb. p. 2635. His instructions to the next Governor (Mr. Poulett
Thomson) directed him "to refuse any explanation which may be con-
strued to imply an acquiescence in the petitions and addresses upon
this subject."
8 See Parliamentary Pamphlets, Canadian, Vol. 115.
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 113
He denied the validity of Lord Russell's deductions:
" But, it is said, a colony being part of a great empire, must
be governed by different principles from the metropolitan
state ; that unless it be handed over to the minority, it cannot
be governed at all; that the majority, when they have things
their own way, will be discontented and disloyal; that the
very fact of their having nothing to complain of, will make
them desire to break the political compact and disturb the
peace of the empire. Let us fancy that this reasoning were
applied to Glasgow, or Aberdeen, or any other town in Britain,
which you allow to govern itself."
With the light of nearly half a century's experience what
shall we say of these prognostications? First this: that,
as usually happens, large changes in political principles are
not followed by all that they may logically be thought to
imply. Secondary causes — use and wont, respect for tra-
dition, inappreciation of the full import of the change — sec-
ondary causes, whose full static force is always incalculable
and surprising, intervene and postpone, sometimes for gen-
erations, the accomplishment of inevitable effects.
Now it seems to us to be quite possible that colonies shall
be completely self-governing, and yet that they " shall not be
subject to the general superintending authority of the Crown
of these realms." It seems so; but is it the fact? or are we
merely deceiving ourselves with current language? So long
as we are superintended from London, there is the relation-
ship of metropolitan and colony. But when that superin-
tendence ceases, subordination ceases, and colonial status
is at an end. In other words, a "self-governing colony" is
an impossibility, for complete self-government is predicable
of an independent state only. Of course if by a " self-govern-
ing" community you mean one that has some, even some very
large, powers of self-government, but not them all, then no
114 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN CANADA
doubt the community may be a colony — but it is not " self-
governing.' ' It is only partially so.
If Lord Russell meant, not that concession of responsible
government was equivalent to a grant of independence (and
probably he did not), but that responsible government would
eventually involve freedom from "the general superintend-
ing authority of these realms/' and that such freedom might
well be called independence, he was right. Our political
history has made that perfectly clear.
What, then, of the future? What is to be the sequel of
the story of responsible government? What use shall we
make of our freedom? We have still an indefinite associa-
tion with the British Empire. Strong efforts have been
made to define and to fix the relationship, but all proposals
have failed and none now is under consideration. Official
recognition of colonial freedom has thus far been the chief
product of colonial conferences, called for the purpose of
"cementing the Empire" and obtaining colonial subscrip-
tions to the British navy.
Colonial association with the British Empire may continue
as it is (a sort of family association) ; or it may be prolonged
by alliances and treaties, commercial and other — we cannot
surely say; but this at all events we know, that all arrange-
ments will be made, not between metropolitan and colony,
not between dominant Britain and subservient Canada,
but between nations equally free to do as they will. This
much responsible government has brought us. All honor
to those who contributed to its attainment.
Whatever happens, Canada will, no doubt, some day rise
to the dignity, and assume the responsibility of national
manhood, and will take its place among the peoples of the
earth, at once in status and not long afterward in power, the
equal of any nation that anywhere flies a flag.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
Scientists tell us that wavelets, raised by a falling pebble,
diminish as they expand, but never quite cease to influence
in some minutest fashion the sum of earth's physical phe-
nomena. It is the same in the realm of thought. A super-
stition may be discredited, but for centuries it remains visibly,
palpably, and often admittedly influencing, swaying, and
impelling many of those who have learned to flout it, and
imparting to hosts of others a bias which they believe to be
the product of pure reason.
Among such superstitions few have had influence equal
to that which endowed Kings with the sanctity of divine
appointment. Acquiescence in the general idea of God's
governance over everything, even to the fall of a sparrow,
did not exclude belief that, in some very special and peculiar
way, a King was a King because the Almighty had so decreed ;
that "his people" were therefore bound to honor and obey
him; that, in short, his authority was that of God's repre-
sentative.
Few persons would now say that King Edward (whose
right to the throne is based upon an Act of Parliament) can
plead any higher "divine right" than can President Roose-
velt. All history tells us that opinion was far otherwise in
days gone by. "God's anointed" was in general belief "one
particularly designed and chosen by God to be the king." 1
For instance, Samuel, in approaching Saul, said to him,
" The Lord sent me to anoint thee to be king over his people ; " 2
1 Cruden's "Concordance." 2 1 Samuel xv. 1.
115
116 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
and the writer of Acts says, "They desired a king, and God
gave unto them Saul." 1 To rulers thus commissioned,
people ought of course to be reverential and submissive, and
we have accordingly the injunctions: "Touch not mine
anointed;" 2 "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man
for the Lord's sake, whether it be of the king as supreme or
unto governors;" 3 "Fear God, honor the king." 4
This idea attained its apogee when the Popes asserted
(and had acknowledged) their right as God's vicegerents to
appoint (as well as to anoint) kings, and to dismiss them at
will. The Syllabus (1864) refers to
"that salutary power which the Catholic Church . . . ought
to exercise until the end of time, no less over individuals than
nations, over peoples than their sovereigns."
And it stigmatizes as erroneous the assertion that
"kings and princes are not only exempt from the jurisdiction
of the church, but they are even superior to the church in
deciding questions of jurisdiction."
The Westminster Confession of Faith (still the standard
of most of the Presbyterian bodies) declares that
" They who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, shall oppose
any lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be
civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God."
Finally, in the latest British coronation ceremony, among
other anachronisms and shams, the following words were
addressed to the King by the Archbishop of Canterbury:
" Stand firm and hold fast from henceforth the seat and state
of royal and imperial dignity which is this day delivered unto
you in the name and by the authority of Almighty God, and
by the hands of us the bishops and servants of God." 5
1 Acts xiii. 21. 2 Psalms cv. 15. 3 1 Peter ii. 13, 14. 4 lb. 17.
6 As part of his coronation oath the King swore that he would " govern
the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
Dominions thereunto belonging."
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 117
It is quite unnecessary at the present day to argue against
all this. British Kings now hold their office during good
behavior. The Stuarts learned that, 1 and the lesson was
sufficient for all time. But what splendid courage was neces-
sary in the old days for attack upon the seemingly axiomatic
principle of the divine right of Kings ! Was it not founded
upon the Bible and upheld by all religious authority? Had
not its truth been demonstrated in all history by indisputable
signs and uncontrovertible evidences? Scrofulous diseases,
for example, were they not cured by the King's touch ? Who
doubted that the Stuarts could remove the "King's Evil"
from the skins of their people ? And when the second James
fled to France, did not his adherents prove the justice of their
cause and the usurpation of William, by the continuation of
the King's curative power? All this, too, we cease to argue
about, our later King's authority, patently enough, being
founded upon rebellion against a King, and upon parliamentary
resettlement of the right of succession.
Russia and Japan still think of their Sovereigns as in some
very special sense associated with the Almighty; and the
German Kaiser probably believes his own assertion of his
divine agency 2 and gets very many people to accept it, more
or less unreservedly. But from Moses and his waters of
Horeb down to the present time, the physical evidence of the
1 James I said to Lord Coke : " This is a thing regal and proper to
keep every court within its own bounds. As for the absolute power
of the Crown, that is no subject for the tongue of the lawyer, nor is it
lawful to be disputed. It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what
God can do — good Christians content themselves with His will revealed
in His Word : so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to
dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this or that;
but rest in that which is the King's will as revealed by law " (" The
Cambridge Modern History," Vol. Ill, pp. 565, 566).
2 "I regard my position as appointed for me by God, and in this
consciousness I daily labor."
118 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
special inspiration and support of Kings or other Governors
by God has been disappearing before advancing rationality.
For Canadians, at all events, belief in it is as unusual as
dependence upon divine protection against the bacilli of
smallpox.
Nevertheless much of "the divinity that doth hedge a
King" remains in the heart although evicted from the brain.
Good Queen Victoria, with her womanly virtues, drove down
into the life of the people tenderest roots which may yet
suffice to save the oak of monarchy when some foolish branch
of it is bending to the storm. But although monarchy re-
mains, all notion of divine or other right to govern or to rule
is, in the United Kingdom and Canada, forever gone. Cen-
turies of heroic contest against such notion has finally ter-
minated it.
It was a long and arduous struggle. Epics, Homeric and
all other, pale into absolute insignificance in the presence
of these centuries-spanning conflicts of all nations between
privilege and people. What a theme for poetic power, this
contest between patrician and plebeian, between lord and
vassal, between earl and churl; commencing with contempts,
sneers, and blows, and submission, docility, and obedience;
and resulting in equal voice in the election of law-makers, in
the acknowledgment of the dignity of honest labor, in the
anxious study of social problems, even in deference (increas-
ing as elections approach) to the wants and claims — even
the prejudices and stupidities of the great proletariat. "A
man's a man" nowadays, or very nearly so. 1
1 "The story of English history is the record of the struggle of the
House of Commons first for freedom, then for power. The long contest
of the elective chamber with the aristocracy and with the Crown is that
which lends dignity to the annals of our race ; and vies in interest with
the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon peoples in the regions outside Europe "
(Sidney Low, "The Governance of England," p. 55).
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 119
The American colonists were born into subjection, and the
earlier part of their history ran parallel with that of their
compatriots whom they had left behind. Here as there
(according to predilection) were Cromwell and William ac-
claimed or denounced — was the restoration of Charles hailed
or decried. In America (as in Britain) there were many who
upheld the personal right of the King to govern his people
everywhere, and to send rules for their governance across the
ocean. Why should such prerogative be doubted? The
King had assumed to own the continent, to grant it to whom-
soever he pleased, and to appoint Governors and Councils
to carry out his desires. The King's actual power and su-
premacy were apparent to every one, and the advantages to
be gained from their acknowledgment and cordial support
strongly enforced the current opinion in favor of the rights of
royalty. Add to this a feeling of allegiance to the person of
the Sovereign, and a surviving notion of his semi-sanctity,
and we have accounted for the originally widespread deference
paid to kingly authority in America and for its slow dis-
appearance.
Much more strange and illogical, however, was the trans-
ference of such feelings and subjection from King to Downing
Street. As the British Parliament despoiled the King of his
ruling power at home, it claimed to succeed to his authority
over the colonies. Very gradually it usurped his whole au-
thority. Almost insensibly the prerogative of the King be-
came the prerogative of the Colonial Secretary. And so well
was the change concealed under continuation of old-time
phraseology, so unobtrusively was it accomplished, that not
until American revolutionary times was attention clearly
directed to the fact that whereas in earlier days the King
claimed to govern his subjects both in Britain and in the
colonies, now (the King having been displaced) the assertion
120 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
was that the subjects in London had a right to govern the
subjects in America.
Here was evidently a new and an essentially different
claim. 1 Upon both sides of the ocean the people had been
in struggle with the King ; and legislatures, here and there,
had been whittling at his prerogatives, until at length one
turned upon the other and said, "For the future we shall
govern you." That was a curious assertion; but many colo-
nists willingly bowed anew, and went to their .death in, sup-
port of their subjection.
In Canada there have always been thousands (and many
of them among the most cultured of our people) who have
made this principle of subjection a cardinal characteristic of
their lives; who have covered with their obloquy and con-
tempt those desirous of British freedom; and who have
bewailed and deplored, as a step toward the abyss, every
advance in the direction of self-government. "Traitors"
and "rebels," in the eyes of such persons, have been all those
who in Canada have done that which their forefathers did in
Britain ; what their brothers everywhere are doing now ; and
what will continue to be done by the traitors and rebels in
America and elsewhere (Heaven help them) until autocracies
and bureaucracies and all false assumptions are well tumbled
into the ditch.
There seem to be two classes of persons in the world : those
who want to govern, and those who are content to be gov-
1 That it was an illegal claim may be argued from the decision in the
Lord Bishop of Natal, 3 Moo. P.C., N.S., 115, in which Lord Chelms-
ford said : " After a colony has received legislative institutions, the
Crown (subject to the special provisions of any Act of Parliament)
stands in the same relation to that colony or settlement as it does to
the United Kingdom" (p. 148). If that be true, then the King should
act, in Canadian matters, upon the advice of his Canadian ministers
and not upon that of his British advisers.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 121
erned. This second class, in earlier and ruder times, consti-
tuted the vast majority; and the Csesar-and-Pompey and
all other dynastic wars were struggles between two persons
or sets of persons, each wanting to govern a vast number of
other people, who, on their part, had little desire to govern
themselves. Slowly, however, this desire to rule extended
and descended, and took possession of the people; and the
question once fairly and simultaneously asked by some mill-
ions of voices, "Who made thee a King to rule over us?"
was well on its way to being answered.
But only on its way ; for use and wont, abhorrence of change,
dread of the new (if it be only the Torrens system of land
registration), and arguments of some seeming validity, con-
spired with the irruption of lurid spectres of the imagination
— reign of the rogue, rule of the sans-culottes, domination of
the spoiler, eternal French guillotines, and so on — to retard
that answer and make its formulation slow, tedious, and
difficult.
And so every foot of the way was fought — not frequently
with pike or rifle, but usually by the persistent influence of
event-logic upon the growth of opinion. In actual combat
the Governors had their moments of successes; but to the
governed, defeat was usually itself an inspiration, and the
spread of conviction was accelerated in its pace by the force
of the blow — the fable of Antaeus has many applications.
These thoughts have been suggested by a perusal of the
recently published biography of Sir John Beverley Robinson.
A high and pure-minded man, an able statesman, a profound
jurist, he was of those who were content to be governed,
who believed that those who differed with him were rebels
and traitors. Possibly had he not been admitted to the ranks
of those who were allowed to influence governmental action,
he might have been less acquiescent, but I do not think so.
122 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
He was of Tory, aristocratic mould, and he regarded democracy
as republicanism and degradation.
The two classes fought it out in those days prior to the
1840-union of the Canadas. There were, on the one side,
the Governor (a governing, managing Governor insisting
upon having his own way), with his appointed Legislative
Council, and Executive Council ; and on the other side, there
was a popularly elected Legislative Assembly. The Assembly
was practically powerless — save for its explosive faculty.
It might remonstrate, no doubt, and fulminate, and appoint
Committees of Enquiry, and pass disloyal resolutions (dis-
loyal to the Governor) ; but it could enact no law without the
sanction of the Governor and his Legislative Council; and it
had no control over the Executive. In short, its functions
were largely limited to quarrelling with its opponents, and its
activities therefore usually took the form of altercations.
There was of course — or rather is (for we are not yet quite
to the finish of it) — only one possible end to such dispute ;
but let us look in, a little, upon the particular phase of it with
which Sir John was so closely associated; and let us learn
from his experience that, dread it or welcome it as we may,
Canadians in the long run will surely attain to every particular
of nationhood — will make their own arrangements with
reference to their own affairs, and with reference also to their
relations with the rest of the world.
Sir John was of the best of United Empire Loyalist stock.
In the Revolutionary War his family had fought and suffered
for King George; and in Upper Canada, his great talents
having placed him in a leading position, he gladly spent his
strength in the support of prerogative as against the people.
The possibility of responsible government in Canada he con-
templated with dismay, and most resolutely he fought its
every advancing step.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 123
That Sir John's view was sentimental rather than rational,
appears now to be very evident, for were he here to-day, there
can be very little doubt that he would regard the overthrow
of his former principles as the very salvation of imperial con-
nection. This assertion may seem to be impossible of proof,
but his change of opinion as to the American Revolution amply
justifies it. Sixty years had not elapsed since the Declara-
tion of Independence (which to colonials of Sir John's type
in 1776 was an act too base and shameful for description)
before Sir John, looking back upon it, declared it not only
quite natural and inevitable, but a particularly fortunate
occurrence. In his little volume, "Canada and the Canadian
Bill," Sir John said:
" But no one who desires that the British power should con-
tinue for ages to maintain its ground in North America can now
think these events unfortunate.
"Many who bore arms in the contest alluded to are still
living, and yet, in the interval that has elapsed, the American
States have acquired a population twice as great as that of
England was at the time of the struggle.
"It is only necessary to consider this fact, to look at the
almost boundless territory which these states comprise, to
contemplate their increasing trade, the great line of sea-coast,
the variety of climate and productions, and the abundance of
all the materials for forming a powerful nation — it is only
necessary to consider these things for a moment, and we must
arrive at the conviction that the separation of such colonies
from the parent state was inevitable" (p. 14).
Continuation of subjection of the people here to the people
there, was Sir John's chief requisite of right political action.
The American colonies were too big to remain permanently
subordinate, therefore their separation was a blessing. If
they had been smaller, their secession would have continued
to be sacrilegious and despicable. It was fortunate (upon
the same line of reasoning), thought Sir John, that, at the close
124 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
of the Revolutionary War, Britain handed over an immense
area of magnificent territory south of the lakes
" which is now becoming the abode of millions . . . because it
could hardly have been maintained for a long period in dependence
on the British Crown." *
He said:
" Every one knows that at the conclusion of the American
Revolutionary War in 1783, by some strange mismanagement
of the British negotiators, there was ceded to the late American
colonies not merely their independence (which was all they
professed to have been contending for), but with it an immense
region to which they had no claim, and which was greater in
extent, I believe, than all the thirteen colonies together. I
mean that western and northwestern territory which is now
becoming the abode of millions.
"This, too, has been reckoned a misfortune, as it was certainly
a fault in those who made the extraordinary concession; but
a little consideration, I think, will convince us that, after all,
it is not to be regretted. A country of such boundless extent,
of such variety of climate and production, to a great part of
which the Mississippi and not the St. Lawrence is the natural
outlet, would hardly have been maintained for a long period in
dependence on the British Crown. Being divided from the
United States by no natural boundary, the amalgamation of a
people speaking the same language would long before this time
have proceeded to such an extent as to decide almost silently
the question of country. . . .
" We must be thankful then for Britain's blunder in handing
over to the rebellious Americans that immense territory ex-
tending as far south as the Ohio, because it could hardly have
been maintained for a long period in dependence on the British
Crown" (p. 16).
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are fortunately situated,
Sir John thought, because
" They never can in any stage of their advancement, entertain
the idea of associating with Canada in order to form an inde-
1 He referred to the voluntary cession of what is now comprised in
the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 125
pendent nation. Their geographical position forbids it. Pro-
tected and aided by Great Britain, their gallant militia, the
soldiers stationed there, and whatever resources their zeal and
courage can supply, can by her fleets be transported to aid in
the defence of Canada against a common enemy; but their
effective union with Canada, in order to defy Great Britain, is
an event physically impossible, as it is, morally speaking, im-
probable " (pp. 17, 18).
And if Great Britain wants a country to govern and ex-
ploit, "Canada is precisely that country ":
" If, besides her possessions upon the skirts of America, val-
uable for their harbors, their fisheries, and their coal, it is
desirable for Great Britain to have a territory on that conti-
nent of such extent and fertility that she may reckon upon
drawing from it, for ages to come, the timber, the hemp, the
grain that she may have to seek from abroad; a country in
which millions of her subjects, flourishing happily under her
laws, may furnish employment to her manufacturers, her ship-
owners, and her seamen; in which the superabundant popula-
tion of these kingdoms may find a desirable home, and in which
British capital may be usefully and profitably employed ; then,
no man, who will examine and consider, can hesitate for a
moment to declare that Canada is precisely that country" (p. 19).
This old idea of colonies being useful as furnishers of raw
material and consumers of metropolitan manufactures, is,
of course, long since exploded. No one in Canada now thinks
that way, and Sir John would not do so if he were here. But
he would range himself, nevertheless, among those who still
deplore, as a loosening of imperial ties, every new accession
to Canada's independence.
Clearly enough, Canadians, prior to 1837, were entitled to
responsible government. Lord Durham so reported and the
British government followed his advice, but Sir John thought
otherwise, and the result of its denial was (as so frequently)
that rebellion preceded concession of rights. To withstand
such concession, Sir John wrote the book above referred to.
126 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
It was addressed to Lord John Russell, who was then Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies. 1 In it Sir John said :
"With respect to the principle recommended by Lord Dur-
ham under the name of 'responsible government' it is not
surprising that, notwithstanding the distinct rejection of the
innovation by Her Majesty's government, it is still made the
ground of so much hurtful agitation in Upper Canada" (p. 67).
"I greatly apprehend that whatever advantages might be
reasonably expected from a legislative union of the four North
American colonies, if that were found practicable and consider-
ing the character of the population of Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, the effect of uniting the two provinces of Canada
only, will be to create a representative Assembly such as the
government will be unable to withstand, except by measures
which it is painful to anticipate — that it may, at the very
outset, and will certainly, at no distant period, give existence
to a representative body in which the majority will not merely
be opposed in the common spirit of party to any colonial
Governor who shall not be unfaithful to his trust, but a majority
which would be held together by a common desire to separate
the colony from the Crown — a party, consequently, whom it
will be impossible to conciliate by any concession within the
bounds of right. . . .
" The opposition of the Assembly, while it represented Lower
Canada alone, appeared to the government in England to be
so formidable, that the influence of the motives I have just
enumerated was fast weakening the royal authority, and
depriving the constitution of that power of protection which
is necessary for the public good" (p. 117).
"How much greater then will be the danger, when every
threat from the Assembly must be treated as proceeding from
the representatives of the whole of Canada; and when every
perplexing obstacle thrown in the way of the executive gov-
ernment will create in the two provinces the same embarrass-
ment and confusion which under the former system could only
extend to one" (p. 118).
"If the French-Canadians should be violent and clamorous,
they [modifications] would be conceded in the hope of appeas-
ing them ; if they should be for a time plausible and submissive,
they would be conceded from another motive; and sooner or
1 It bears date December 30, 1839.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 127
later the people of Upper Canada would, I apprehend, be left
to take their chance of the union without their securities"
(p. 119).
"Surely it was no error in judgment that they [the Legisla-
tive Council] have always, constantly and firmly but tem-
perately, endeavored to withstand, by constitutional means,
those destructive schemes which the mother country has at
last found it necessary to repress by her armies, and yet it will
be found that in several public discussions they have either
surrendered silently and without vindication to whatever
censures were cast upon them, or the censure has received
countenance where the Council could not but feel that they had
a right to look for support. And now, at the termination of
the contest, it is proposed to change their constitution, appar-
ently for the purpose of moulding it more in accordance with
that branch of the legislature from which all the difficulties
have sprung" (p. 120).
" Frequently, and for years together, the opposition in Upper
Canada has prevailed as decidedly over the government as it
has done in Lower Canada, though not by a majority quite
so disproportionate; and if the two provinces shall be united
upon any principle of representation which Parliament could
think of proposing, it would not be long, I fear, before the
British government would find that their difficulties had, at
least, not been diminished by the measure" (p. 123).
There it is: the "royal authority" must be preserved.
Opposition to the colonial Governor and all "perplexing
obstacles" must be averted. The Governor must do as he
pleases. The people must be humble, submissive, and obe-
dient. Concessions, either to the "insolent and clamorous,"
or to the " plausible and submissive," must be refused. There
shall be no "representative Assembly" that the government
shall be unable to withstand.
Sir F. B. Head was the Governor of Upper Canada in these
troublous times, — the Governor who, Sir John thought,
ought to have been free from "perplexing obstacles." Let
us see what manner of man he was. Concerning the intelli-
gence of Canadians he tells us in "The Emigrant" that
128 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
"On the subject of government they (the colonists) are
infinitely more enlightened than he (the Englishman) is; not
instinctively or intuitively, but simply because, from the days
of their childhood, they have enjoyed advantages of observing
both sides of a most important question of which Englishmen
can only see one } ' (p. 45).
That would seem to be a fairly good reason why laws for
Canada should be made by a legislature elected by Canadians
rather than by one elected by Englishmen. But Sir Francis
did not think so. Upon the contrary, in an election manifesto
he said :
"Never will I allow the power and patronage of this thinly-
peopled province to be transferred from His Majesty's repre-
sentative to the dominion of 'a Provincial Ministry/ an irre-
sponsible and self-constituted Cabinet" (p. 51).
His view of his duty was
"above all, to resist the smallest attempt to introduce that
odious principle of 'responsible government' which a few
republicans in the province had been desirous to force upon
them" (p. 157).
His notion of colonies was that
"the interests of our colonies should be of subsidiary impor-
tance to the great paramount interests of the Empire" (pp. 400,
401).
"Whatever, therefore, may be the value of our colonies —
however convenient they may be to us as outhouses for our
superabundant population, or as nurseries for our seamen/ 7 etc.
(p. 411).
And could he have had his way, he would have issued a
proclamation couched in such language as this :
"Moreover, Her Majesty wishes it to be clearly understood
throughout her North American colonies, that under no pre-
tence however trifling, or for no reward however large, will she
consent to the smallest attempt to conciliate democracy.
" Lastly, Her Majesty has directed me to inform you that the
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY 129
ill-advised experiment of 'responsible government ' is hereby
forever abolished.
"Her Majesty's subjects are constitutionally represented in
their Commons' House of Assembly. They are also members
of the Upper Branch of their legislatures. Her Majesty's
representative will ever be ready to listen to any facts or opinions
which his Council may suggest to him; but Her Majesty hereby
declares that her representative is responsible to HER — not
to Her Majesty's colonial people — for the course he may pur-
sue; and that unless he were so, Her Majesty would virtually
be deprived of all power to maintain the paramount interests
of her Empire, or to afford to her colonial subjects that protec-
tion which it is her happiness to bestow" (pp. 414, 415).
Sir Francis had the mortification not only to see himself
overruled by the British Parliament, but to observe that
many of those whom he had treated as republicans and rebels
were placed in public positions of trust and usefulness, while
he himself was recalled and his recommendations ignored.
He says that
"while Mr. Bidwell, in consequence of having abjured his
allegiance to the British Crown, was receiving in the United
States compliments and congratulations on his appointment
to the American Bar, it appeared from the London Gazette that
the Queen's government had advised Her Majesty to relieve
his opponent [Sir Francis himself] from the administration of
the government of Upper Canada ; in short,
The man recovered from the bite,
The dog it was that died " (pp. 202, 203).
"After the melancholy fact of Her Majesty's Conservative
government having offered, in the name of the Queen, one of
the most honorable and important appointments in the gift of
the Crown [Commissioner of Crown Lands and Executive Coun-
cillor] to a person [Girouard] for whose apprehension as a traitor
Lord John Russell's much abused ' Whig-Radical government '
had honestly offered and had paid five hundred pounds sterling,
it would be tedious as well as needless to detail other instances
of this unnatural policy. Suffice it therefore to say, that in
the Lower Province as well as in the Upper, every rebel, in
130 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
proportion to his guilt, was promoted by the Conservative
government to offices of emolument, trust, or honor " (p. 352).
"Besides these appointments, the Queen was advised by
her Conservative minister to pardon and bring back to Canada
almost every absconded traitor who, like Monsieur Papineau,
had distinguished himself by insulting Her Majesty's representa-
tive, and who by mischievous representations had encouraged
his deluded followers to rebel" (pp. 352, 353).
" ' Who are the rebels now f ' said a convicted traitor, sneering
over his shoulder, as he rode by a group of United Loyalists.
'I guess it's you who are now opposed to your Queen's govern-
ment.' But, alas, it was the Queen's Conservative Prime
Minister in England who was opposed to them" (p. 357).
Admiration for Lord Durham is greatly enhanced by com-
paring him with the Governors (almost all of them) who
preceded him in the American as well as the Canadian colonies
— Governors whose opinions Sir Francis cited as condemna-
tory of Lord Durham's policy :
i
" So long as Monsieur Papineau and Mr. Mackenzie, masking
or rather casting a transparent veil over their real designs, had
asked only for 'reform,' there might have been something like
an excuse for Old England stoutly disbelieving the various
administrators of the government who for the last twenty-
five years, in different voices, had one after another been oppos-
ing the poisonous concessions to democracy which the home
government, under the name of 'domestic medicine,' had been
pouring upon the free, the happy, and the loyal inhabitants of
a new world" (p. 291).
"Sir Robert Peel declared in broad daylight that he should
very reluctantly vote for a measure which he perfectly well
knew had been strenuously opposed :
"1st. For twenty-five years by the successive Executive
Councils of Upper Canada;
"2d. For upwards of forty years by the successive adminis-
trators of the government of that province;
"3d. By the two Houses of Legislature of Upper Canada
who in 1837, fearing that Lord Gosford and the Royal Com-
missioners might possibly recommend the said union, joined
in an address to the King, declaring that such a measure would,
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
131
in their opinion, 'be destructive of their connection with the parent
State';
"4th. By Sir George Arthur, the existing Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor, who in his published despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary
of State, No. 91, dated April 17, 1839, described:
"'The Earl of Durham's scheme for the future government
of Canada as essentially the same as that which was advocated
by Mr. Bidwell, Dr. Rolph, and Mr. Mackenzie/ and in his
published despatches, dated July 2, and August 21, 1839,
added :
" ' There is a considerable section of persons who are disloyal
to the core; reform is on their lips, but separation is in their
hearts. These people, having for the last two or three years
made responsible government their watchword, are now ex-
travagantly elated because the Earl of Durham has recom-
mended that measure. . . .
"'It [responsible government] was Mackenzie's scheme for
getting rid of what Mr. Hume called "the baneful domination
of the mother country; and never was any better devised to
bring about such an end speedily.'""
Lord Durham recommended the grant of responsible govern-
ment, and the union of the Canadas as necessary to their
proper government and their continued connection with the
United Kingdom. Sir Francis, on the other hand, declared
that the Duke of Wellington joined in
" enacting a law which he, as well as every man acquainted with
the subject, perfectly well knew would paralyze the Queen's
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and eventually separate
Her Majesty's North American colonies from the British
Crown" (pp. 302,303).
"The doom of Her Majesty's splendid North American
colonies was now evidently pronounced; the Conservatives,
in melancholy silence, sat behind their leader, watching with
astonishment his mysterious alliance with principles which they
could not comprehend; and thus, almost in funereal silence,
the fatal Bill proceeded" (p. 314).
"I believe every man acquainted with the inhabitants of
these provinces will concur with me in saying that while this
second or degrading course of policy is quite certain to effect
132
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
their separation, the opposite course would as surely prevent
it" (p. 417).
Before the Bill was passed Sir Francis informed Parliament
that it was one
"which must inevitably destroy the Established Church in
Upper Canada, subvert British institutions in both provinces,
and effect the separation from the Empire of the whole of our
North American colonies" (p. 316).
And after it had gone into operation he cited Lord
Metcalfe's experience and judgment as confirmatory of his
opinion :
"When Sir Charles Metcalfe arrived in Canada, he began
by carrying out Sir Robert Peel's unfortunate doctrines with
the utmost fidelity; and he accordingly not only submitted
to 'responsible government/ but in a written document he
publicly declared it to be 'the only way of governing the
Canadas.'
" He persisted in this course for about a year, until of his
own accord he discovered his error. The whole of the remainder
of his administration was employed in a vigorous attempt
to undo what on his arrival he had been induced to do. He
openly declared, in terms of unusual force, that nothing should
induce him to take back to his Council Mr. Robert Baldwin,
Mons. Lafontaine, and others, whom the Conservative govern-
ment had so improperly raised to that post; and he left the
province, openly declaring: 'that the union of the Can-
ADAS WAS A FATAL MEASURE, AND THAT RESPONSIBLE GOV-
ERNMENT WAS AN IMPRACTICABLE THEORY'" (pp. 421, 422).
Of course Lord Metcalfe was wrong. He, too, had been
trying to govern Canada. 1 It was not until Lord Elgin's 2
time that responsible government went into operation, and
since then we have heard little objection to it.
What a lesson have we here touching that colonial "dis-
loyalty" which has always been the chief characteristic of
1 Sir John Bourinot, "The Story of Canada," p. 362.
3 The son-in-law of Lord Durham.
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
133
colonial political growth. Not its existence, but its wonderful
moderation, is that which surprises us. Why for centuries
did the people of England tolerate the pretensions of Kings,
and Kings' favorites, and Kings' wives, and Kings' mistresses ?
And why, with here and there an exasperated remonstrance,
did they submit to the domination they might have ended?
Why, also, for so long, did American and Canadian colonials,
" infinitely more enlightened than the Englishman ... on
the subject of government," 1 nevertheless accept government
at the hands of the Colonial Secretary — government devised,
not principally for the benefit of the colonies, but for the
benefit of the metropolitan ? Force, was one answer to all these
questions; another, the participation by many in benefits
derivable from the existing system; another, the natural
and normal submissiveness of persons fully occupied in their
private affairs; another, their accustomed deference to those
in actual authority; another, religious scruples; another,
use and wont ; and another, lack of enlightenment.
Colonial "disloyalty" has always at bottom meant "desire
for self-government" — disloyalty to the Governors, not
desire for separation from the metropolitan or annexation to
another nation, and not disloyalty to the Sovereign. No
doubt it has often been forced, by continuous oppression, into
impatience and explosion, and the adoption of hostility to
the British government, but that was because the governed
were of the same race as their Governors, and had within them
the same ambitions and the same determination.
More confidently than at any other period of Canadian
history was it said, in 1837, that the " Reformers " were allied
with annexationists and had annexation in view. 2 More
clearly than at any other period did the Heads and the Robin-
sons see that "reform" on their lips was really "rebellion"
1 Ante, p. 128.
2 See "Life of Sir J. B. Robinson," p. 205.
134 COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
in their hearts; that "responsible government " ("so much
hurtful agitation") was something that should be "forever
abolished" — was a "poisonous" scheme for getting rid of
the domination of the mother country.
And yet the Heads and the Robinsons were wrong. Reform
was really what was wanted, and the idea of annexation (so
far as it existed) represented but the impatience and the de-
spair of men whose rights were too long withheld. Reform
attained, colonial "disloyalty" disappeared.
But Canada's legislative freedom is not yet completely
attained. Responsible government is not synonymous with
absolute parliamentary supremacy. Pitt was the first " peo-
ple's minister" in England, and responsible government in
Britain may be dated from his time; but we have to pass
on to the reign of Victoria to reach the period of "constitu-
tional government" (an inappropriate phrase) or government
by the people. And as the elimination of the King in British
legislation was an outcome, rather than an immediate effect,
of the establishment of responsible government in Britain,
so also the complete extrusion of Downing Street from Cana-
dian politics will hereafter be dated not from 1840, nor from
1846, nor from 1867, nor from 1907 (the date of this writing),
but from a period still to be ascertained. If, however, the
King's prerogatives had to disappear, how much more must
the Downing Street assumption of them vanish.
Sir John Beverley Robinson would have had us forever
colonials. See how kind Providence had arranged every-
thing for us, overruling even British mistakes to that happy
end ! How fortunate the success of the American Revolution !
How lucky it was that Britain gave away to "rebellious
America" immense areas that are "now becoming the abode
of millions" ! Canada would have been too large, and com-
pact, and unmanageable ! What a blessing that Nova Scotia
COLONIAL DISLOYALTY
135
and New Brunswick are cut off, geographically, from Canada
— their " power to defy Great Britain is an event physically
impossible" ! And what "a glorious destiny for Canada, that
for "ages to come" she may be counted upon as a place from
which Britain may draw "timber, hemp, grain"; as a place
which will " furnish employment to her manufacturers, her
ship-owners, and her seamen" ; as a pretty farming locality
"flourishing happily under her laws" !
The Canadian rebels of 1837 had very different notions.
They were disloyal to the Governor, but not to Canada.
Their present-day critics object only to their methods. Their
claim of responsible government was right. But for them, its
concession would have been longer delayed — how long we
do not know. Possibly until a later rebellion — this time
a revolution. The condemners of Mackenzie and Papineau
must remember the effect of protecting, with a wasting dam,
a village from a mountain flood.
We are not going to try to balance the account. Much
can, and has been, said on both sides. But all may agree that
Lord Durham's report of 1839 was the product of the rebellion
of 1837; that responsible government in 1846 was the result
of Lord Durham's report; and that Canada's subsequent
advancement towards political independence has been the
consequence and effect of responsible government.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 1
Canada's attitude towards Mr. Chamberlain's proposals
is of some consequence. It may be stated in this way:
1. Mr. Chamberlain advocates the establishment of a pro-
tective tariff. To this Canada says nothing.
2. Mr. Chamberlain proposes preferential tariffs within
the Empire. Canada is almost unanimously in favor of
such tariffs.
3. Mr. Chamberlain desires commercial union of the Empire.
Canada does not.
4. Mr. Chamberlain urges political union of the Empire.
Canada dissents.
PROTECTION
Protection carried the Canadian elections in 1879. Those
who then voted "Nay" are now Protectionists (if they yet
live), and their discarded opinions have been adopted by
nobody. Canadians are inclined to think that protection
would be beneficial to the United Kingdom, but they recog-
nize that the conditions differ, and they leave the debate to
those who are better qualified than they for its discussion.
Protection in the United Kingdom may be detrimental or
advantageous to Canada. If unaccompanied by exemption
of Canadian products, Canada must suffer by its enforcement,
for her exports to the United Kingdom include much that
might be excluded by tariff walls. And if the walls are erected,
Canada will have no right to complain.
1 An article published in The Monthly Review, October, 1905.
137
138 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
PREFERENCES
Canada favors preferential tariffs within the Empire;
but at the same time she intends to maintain her protective
tariff as against everybody. In other words, Canada will re-
main protective (even against other parts of the Empire) with
reference to all articles which she can produce; but as to
those which she must import, she will give preference to
products of the Empire. The resolution of the Canadian
Manufacturers' Association expresses Canadian policy. It
declares that while the
"tariff should primarily be framed for Canadian interests, it
should nevertheless give a substantial preference to the mother
country, and also to any other parts of the British Empire
with which reciprocal preferential trade can be arranged:
recognizing always that under any conditions the minimum
tariff must afford adequate protection to Canadian products."
At first, Mr. Chamberlain objected most strenuously to this
suggestion. In his speech in London before the Canadian
Club there (March 25, 1896) he said:
"But the principle which I claim must be accepted if we
are to make any, even the slightest, progress, is that, within
the different parts of the Empire, protection must disappear,
and that the duties must be revenue duties and not protective
duties in the sense of protecting the products of one part of the
Empire against those of another part." 1
Mr. Chamberlain soon receded from this. He saw that
protection would not disappear, and at Birmingham (May 15,
1903) he suggested a compromise. Canada, he observed, and
the others have made certain progress in manufacturing;
now
" suppose that we intervene in any stage of the process and say
to them, ' There are many things which you do not now make,
1 The Times, March 26, 1896.
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 139
many things for which we have a great capacity of production
— leave them to us as you have left them hitherto/ If we do
not do this, Canada will fall to the level of the United States,
Australia will fall to the level of Canada, South Africa will fall
to the level of Australia."
That is to say, Canada and the others (from their stand-
point) will rise to the level of the United States as a manu-
facturing country. Canada will not agree to any intervention
tending to prevent or retard that consummation; and Cana-
dians are glad to gather from Mr. Chamberlain's later speeches
that from the policy of this one, also, he has receded — that
he is now willing to negotiate preferential tariffs along the
line of Canadian policy.
Indeed, one of his suggestions is a very distinct adoption
of Canadian methods, and indicates the distance travelled
since the declaration that "within the Empire protection
must disappear." I refer to his proposal (Welbeck speech)
"to put such a duty on flour as will result in the whole of the
milling of wheat being done in this country."
Canadian mills would suffer heavily by the imposition of
such a duty, but Canada would not complain — the leaf is
out of her own book.
The flour suggestion is a very good illustration of the diffi-
culties which will have to be met when we come to settle
the terms of preferential treaty — difficulties so great that some
persons declare that the necessary bargaining between differ-
ent parts of the Empire will lead to friction, to ill-feeling, and
possibly to dissolution. Canada's experience lends some
color to this contention. The most formidable Canadian
movement towards annexation with the United States arose
because of the United Kingdom's termination (1846) of the
preference which prior to that date she had given to Canadian
products; and an increasing cordiality between Canada and
140 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
the United States was turned into hostility (1866) by the
termination at the instance of the Americans of the reciproc-
ity treaty. But such possibilities cannot be avoided. We
cannot refrain from the creation of advantageous relations,
either with the United Kingdom, or the United States, or
any other power, merely because of possible differences.
Such possibility must, no doubt, be one of the factors for care-
ful consideration when making our bargain ; and we must see
to it that either we are in some way secured against it, or
that the arrangement is sufficiently advantageous to justify
the risk.
All, then, that Canadians can at present say upon the sub-
ject of protection and preferential tariffs is :
1. We believe in the protection and development of our
manufactures; and we cannot agree (a) that "within the
Empire protection must disappear"; or (b) that, with regard
to articles which we do not now make, we will leave their
manufacture to others; or (c) that we will order our affairs
so that we may not "fall [or rather rise] to the level of the
United States."
2. Nevertheless there is scope for preferential arrange-
ments ; and we believe that a treaty can be made which would
be beneficial both to the United Kingdom and to Canada.
3. We are ready to try what a spirit of good-will can
accomplish.
Thus far there can be little doubt that I have reflected
Canadian opinion. There is another consideration, however,
which has not been adequately (hardly at all) discussed in
Canada. It relates to the indirect effect of preferential tariffs ;
by which I mean the hostility that would be aroused in other
countries by preferential arrangements between the United
Kingdom and Canada.
Some are foolishly inclined to declare that they do not
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 141
care what the effect would be. That, of course, is very
absurd. We propose an arrangement in which we see certain
advantages, and we are stupid indeed if we take no note of
the disadvantages.
Others, with more appearance of reason, protest that Great
Britain and Canada are both parts of one Empire; that we
are perfectly entitled to make internal arrangements without
properly provoking the hostility of anybody else; that the
states of the American union and the German union have such
arrangements, and no one deems them a matter for foreign
protest or reprisal; and that if such countries object to what
they are themselves doing — well, we must fight it out on
that line.
An old adage tells us, " Be sure that you are right ; then go
ahead." As a matter of present and very unpleasant fact
we are aware that Germany and Canada are at this very mo-
ment in a state of tariff war because our duties upon German
goods are higher than on British, that is because of the prefer-
ence which we give to British goods. Has Germany any
reasonable ground for her action?
The essential difference between the case of Germany
(permitting free interchange among her component states,
while charging duty upon foreign imports) and ours is that
Germany is for commercial (and other) purposes a unit. She
is one country, with one tariff, one commercial policy, one
control of foreign arrangements — she is a single fiscal entity.
The United Kingdom and Canada, on the other hand, are,
for commercial purposes, quite separate and distinct. They
have very different tariffs, different commercial policies,
different foreign arrangements — they are two fiscal entities ;
so much so that they have negotiations, and are proposing
commercial treaties with one another. Germans do not object
if Lancashire goods go into London free of duty, even as
142 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
Saxony's output is not subjected to imposts in Berlin. But
Germany regards Canada as commercially distinct from Great
Britain, and so she is. It is not so in other empires : France,
for example, and her colonies form one fiscal unit. Canada,
in obtaining commerical independence while still retaining
her association with the British Crown, has introduced a
new phenomenon in colonial connection, and here is one of
the problems with which it confronts us. 1
It is useless for me to endeavor to settle the question. I
cannot settle it. I state it for Canadian consideration with
a view of enabling them to see the nature of the arguments
against us ; to point out to them that we are already suffering
for our adhesion to our purpose of imperial preference; and
to ask whether we are ready to fight it out on that line, no
matter how disastrous the consequences. I am among the last
to be charged with truckling to the United States, but con-
sideration of reasonable consequences of a preference given
by the United Kingdom to Canadian goods as against those
going from the United States cannot and ought not to
be disregarded. Our trade with our neighbors last year
amounted to about two hundred million dollars ; our imports
from them being no less than sixty per cent, of our total im-
ports. And the practical question is not whether we believe
ourselves to be in the right, but whether we are so clearly,
indisputably, and demonstrably right that we ought to regard
the contrary view as such an unreasonable and unwarrantable
encroachment upon our freedom of action as to be intolerable
— to be repelled, no matter what the consequences.
For my own part I cannot deny that the German view has
1 Of arguments of this sort Mr. Balfour said that it was tantamount
to a declaration that "Canada is not a part of the Empire." That may-
be true (see ante, "The British Empire"); but it does not invalidate
the arguments.
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 143
much to support it. The Crown colonies are in every sense
a part of the British Empire; but for almost all practical,
legislative, and commercial purposes Canada is not. She legis-
lates for herself. She enacts her own tariff. She hits at
Germany (and other nations) without consulting anybody;
and if she makes a preferential bargain with the United King-
dom, it will be because she chooses to do so and not because
of any constitutional subordination to the United Kingdom.
A preferential system, then, may breed reprisals. That will
mean a great deal to the United Kingdom, for her foreign trade
is enormous ; but relatively it may mean very much more to
Canada. Her punishment would come principally, and with
heavy hand, from the United States. Are we ready for it ?
I know that few things could be more unpopular at this
particular moment in Canada than a suggestion of reciprocity
with the United States. I do not seek popularity, and care
little for it. Let me say what I think. Frequently preferen-
tial tariffs with the United Kingdom and reciprocity with the
United States are put in sharp antagonism the one with the
other; and men say that they would rather have the first
than the second. I can give no such answer. You might as
well ask me whether I would rather have a British horse or
an American bull. Everything depends upon the details of
the two propositions. If you say that they would be equally
valuable to me, I have no difficulty in saying that I prefer
the horse. But this exact equality is extremely rare ; and so
I cannot say whether I should prefer British preference or
American reciprocity. If I cannot have both, then I desire
that which is best for Canada.
But why assume that the one necessarily excludes the other ?
Of course we cannot give to the United Kingdom, as against
the United States, such a preference upon articles which they
both produce as would exclude the American prockid; anda
PR8V, TDRONTiNi
144 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
the same time offer, to both their products, equality of access
to our markets. But it must be borne in mind that our im-
ports are of the most varied and diverse character, and it
may well be that with reference to some of the articles com-
prised in what may be called our field for negotiations, there
may be some with reference to which we could bargain with
the United Kingdom, and others which would form the sub-
ject of agreement with the United States.
For example, is there any Canadian who would not gladly
welcome a renewal of our reciprocity treaty with the United
States which existed between the years 1855 and 1866? If
there is, I am inclined to think that he has not given the
subject much thought. That treaty would not, by its terms,
prevent our establishment of the contemplated preferential
arrangements with the United Kingdom, for it related to
natural products only. And it was of vast benefit to us. Let
me give you the figures showing our trade with the United
States. Remember that the treaty period was March 16,
1855, to March 17, 1866. See table, p. 145.
Observe that in the year preceding reciprocity, our exports
to the United States were $8,784,412; that the next year
they were $15,118,289; that at the end of the treaty period
they had risen to $48,528,628; that they had therefore in-
creased over 450 per cent, in twelve years; that in the follow-
ing year they at once dropped to $25,044,005, and that during
the next thirty-four years they reached the highest reciprocity
figure but once.
I am not of the opinion that our neighbors are willing to
renew that treaty. I believe they are not. But I do think
that there is a much stronger disposition south of the line
than there ever has been, since 1866, to enter upon more
sensible and mutually beneficial international trade relations
than are represented by our present antagonistic tariffs. I
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 145
0) <D
Imports into
Exports from
I?
Imports into
Exports from
!•
United States
United States
11
1*
United States
United States
Dollars
Dollars
Dollars
Dollars
1850
5,179,500
9,515,991
1878
25,357,802
38,284,421
1851
5,279,718
11,787,092
1879
26,133,554
30,843,702
1852
5,469,445
10,229,608
1880
33,214,340
30,775,871
1853
6,527,559
12,423,121
1881
38,041,947
39,512,876
1854
8,784,412
24,157,612
1882
51,113,475
38,569,822
1855
15,118,289
27,741,808
1883
44,740,876
46,590,253
1856
21,276,614
29,025,349
1884
39,015,840
46,411,450
1857
22,108,916
24,138,482
1885
36,960,541
40,124,907
1858
15,784,836
23,604,526
1886
37,496,338
34,785,021
1859
19,287,565
28,109,494
1887
38,015,584
36,162,347
1860
23,572,796
22,695,928
1888
43,084,123
37,245,119
1861
22,724,489
22,676,513
1889
43,009,473
42,141,156
1862
18,511,025
20,573,070
1890
39,396,980
41,503,812
1863
17,484,786
27,619,814
1891
39,434,535
39,443,755
1864
29,608,736
26,574,624
1892
35,334,547
44,885,988
1865
33,264,403
28,829,402
1893
38,186,342
48,628,509
1866
48,528,628
24,828,880
1894
31,326,731
58,313,223
1867
25,044,005
21,020,302
1895
37,006,163
53,981,768
1868
26,261,379
24,080,777
1896
41,212,000
61,086,046
1869
29,293,766
23,381,471
1897
40,722,792
66,028,725
1870
36,265,328
25,339,254
1898
32,242,601
84,889,819
1871
32,542,137
32,276,176
1899
31,604,135
89,570,458
1872
36,346,930
29,411,454
1900
39,931,833
97,337,494
1873
37,649,542
34,565,113
1901
42,902,478
107,746,519
1874
34,365,961
43,473,174
1902
48,787,573
111,708,275
1875
28,271,926
36,225,735
1903
55,649,656
125,776,203
1876
29,010,251
35,004,131
1904
52,541,324
133,902,411
1877
24,277,378
39,374,180
146 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
agree in reasonable protection for our own manufacturers;
and I agree in preferential tariffs with the United Kingdom;
but I do not agree that these things necessarily preclude us
from friendly commercial relations with the rest of the world.
If they do, I denounce them as detrimental not only to that
spirit of harmony and good-will which should characterize
our relations with our brother-men wherever they may be
found, but detrimental also to our economic interests, dis-
regard of which would not only be childish but unpatriotic,
and well calculated by its ruinous results to dissolve every
imperial association. The slightest familiarity with the ne-
cessities of the British and Canadian geographical, manu-
facturing, and commercial situation renders this assertion
indisputable.
Summarizing thus far, then, we may say :
1. A protective policy may be of advantage to Great
Britain, and, if so, it will sooner or later be adopted there.
2. Such a policy, unaccompanied by any special arrange-
ments in our favor, would be detrimental to some Canadian
industries.
3. Preferential arrangements between Great Britain and
Canada, productive of direct benefit to both countries, can
be made.
4. Such preferential arrangements (it depends upon the
nature of them) may provoke retaliation on the part of other
countries.
5. Whether the benefits of preferential arrangements will
more than offset the injuries depends entirely (a) upon the
specific nature of the arrangements, and (6) the extent to
which hostility is induced, and the length to which it is
carried.
6. Reasonable regard to the interests of others is not only
proper but profitable.
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 147
7. A Pan-Britannic commercial league against the rest of
the world would mean financial and commercial upheaval
and disaster.
THE POLITICAL PURPOSES OF PREFERENCES
Mr. Chamberlain's purpose in proposing preferential tariffs
within the Empire is predominantly political, and only
secondarily economic. As this is probably not the general
impression, I give some quotations from his speeches:
" I am a fiscal reformer mainly because I am an Imperialist,
mainly because I believe that upon the maintenance of a great
Empire we have inherited depends the greatness of our own
country. In saying that, I do not wish to underestimate the
economic side of the question we have under consideration, only
I say that that is secondary; it is not vital" (Times, July 9,
1904).
" The tariff reformers believe, that by recovering our freedom
of action and by rearming ourselves with the weapon of a
moderate tariff, we may still defend our home market against
unfair competition, and may at the same time secure a modi-
fication of foreign tariffs which would open the way to a fairer
exchange of our respective products than we have hitherto
been able to obtain.
" But they attach even greater importance to the possibility
of securing by preferential and reciprocal arrangements with
our colonies a great development of trade within the Empire
and the nearer approach to a commercial union which, in some
shape or another, must precede or accompany closer political
relations, and without which, as all history shows, no per-
manent cooperation is possible" ("Speeches," Introduction,
p. 9).
"We are prepared to make concession or changes in order
to induce a larger intercourse between ourselves and you, be-
lieving a larger intercourse will tend to closer political union.
We all desire commercial union as the first step towards political
union and organization for common defence " (Rochester).
"Aye, as Yorkshire and Lancashire are bound to Middlesex
and Surrey, so let Australia and Canada be bound to South
Africa, to the United Kingdom" (Newport).
148 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
In his speech to the Canadian Club (already referred to)
he indicated a purpose
u to create a new government for the British Empire — a new
government with large powers of taxation and legislation over
countries separated by thousands of miles, in conditions as
various as those which prevail in our several dependencies and
colonies; and said that he hoped to approach this desirable
consummation by a process of gradual development."
To my mind few things are more remarkable than the per-
sistence of the notion (in spite of all experience to the contrary)
that colonies must be governed and controlled, or they will
cease to be of any use. The history of the growth of colonies
is very largely the history of their struggles to be free, the
history of a determination on the other side to retain su-
premacy. And now that some of the British colonies have
reached their majority and are almost entirely self-controlled,
the old idea is revived, in the more alluring form of a partner-
ship or federation in which the United Kingdom would be
the predominant partner, and to which the colonies would
give up a part of that self-government which with such diffi-
culty they have at last succeeded in securing.
Mr. Chamberlain has frequently been charged with mis-
representing colonial opinion. So far as he has declared that
Canada is desirous of preferential arrangements with the
United Kingdom, he is quite within the truth; but I am
bound to say that he has been misinformed, and is far from
correct when he asserts that Canada wishes either commercial
or political union with Great Britain and Ireland. And it is
but right to correct him upon this point, for Canada at least
does not desire to obtain any advantages by pretending that
she is desirous of commercial or political federation.
I believe that I speak the mind of Canada when I say that
the following language of Mr. Chamberlain is not well founded :
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 149
" Here are eleven millions of white men — flesh of your flesh,
blood of your blood, of the same religion, and with the same
reverence for the British Empire — claiming to share its history
and its glorious past; they are willing to unite their future to
yours" ("Speeches," p. 99).
"Well, what is the position? These great colonies of ours
have decided with a unanimous voice — which is wonderful if
you consider the differences of their circumstances, the variety
of their conditions, the number of their local and separate
interests — that this great question of union can best be
approached on the commercial side" (Birmingham, p. 12).
" What do you say to these men who retain so lively a recol-
lection of their connection with the Old Country, who long for
the time when we shall be indeed a united Empire ? Will you
snub them? Will you reject the offers which they make to
you? Then, indeed, you are not worthy of the inheritance
that you have gained from the ancestors who fought for it
and who have left to you the duty of maintaining it.
"I believe that our children are ready and willing to share
the privileges of the Empire, and at the same time to share its
responsibility. And these growing states — great already, but
whose future greatness it is impossible for any of us to measure
— will now, if we are willing, freely associate their fortunes
with ours.
"In my opinion the two great objects which I have in view
— the prosperity of the home trade and the closer union of the
Empire — are within our reach."
I have not Mr. Chamberlain's ability nor in very many
lines his experience, but, nevertheless, I have some confidence
that I understand the Canadian side of questions better than
he does. In fact, it is quite possible that to the Canadian side
I have given too much attention. Nevertheless, there is a
Canadian side, and I have no hesitation in saying that the
Canadian attitude towards "closer union of the Empire"
is that the powers of self-government which we possess we
shall hold ; that while we are absolutely loyal to our King,
we owe no fealty or subjection whatever to Westminster or
to Downing Street; that we have our own fiscal ideas, and
150 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
we do not intend to submit them for revision to electors who,
as many of our people think, are unable rightly to settle their
own tariff — who are the despair of Mr. Chamberlain himself;
that we have our own notions as to our own development,
and are not inclined to brook criticism of them from those
millions who know little of the conditions and aspirations of
a young, vigorous community of gigantic proportions and
illimitable possibilities; that we are a democratic, peace-
loving community, and that we are ill-suited for political union
with a nation whose characteristics are much more decidedly
aristocratic, hierarchical, and militarist than ours, and whose
predominance in federal councils would make us mere indorsers
of a policy that we do not approve. Cooperation with our
sister British states and not incorporation in them is, in our
judgment, the best way in which all interests may be advanced
and subserved.
Mr. Chamberlain insists upon binding "these folks of ours"
not only " by the bond of commercial unity," but by a political
union which will bind Australia and Canada to South Africa
and the United Kingdom, even " as Yorkshire and Lancashire
are bound to Middlesex and Surrey." Is it possible that a
man of Mr. Chamberlain's acumen has not discovered that
bonds of this sort do not bind ? that it was bonds, legislative
and administrative, that severed the American colonies from
the mother country? that it was bonds that provoked the
Canadian rebellions in 1837? that it was bonds that kept
Ireland poor and discontented? and that it is the removal
of bonds that has partially reconciled the glad green isle, and
has produced in Canada the enthusiastic and demonstrative
loyalty to the British Crown which Mr. Chamberlain so much
admires, but so strikingly misinterprets ? It may be that the
establishment of preferential trade relations with the United
Kingdom will, by encouraging mutually profitable intercourse,
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 151
tend to increase the sympathy between the two countries.
But all that can be done in that way can be accomplished by
treaty. Commercial union is not only not necessary for the
purpose, but would be injurious.
What has thus far been said as to Mr. Chamberlain's pro-
posals has been based upon his speeches merely, and Canada's
reply has been formulated in my own language. Proposals
and reply are, however, to be found in much more satisfactory,
because authoritative, form; namely, in the records of the
various imperial Conferences.
In his opening speech at the Conference of 1897 Mr. Cham-
berlain said that it would be desirable " still further to tighten
the ties which bind us together." He thought
"that it might be feasible to create a great Council of the
Empire to which the colonies would send representative
plenipotentiaries; not mere delegates who were unable to
speak in their name, without further reference to their respec-
tive governments, but persons who by their position in the
colonies, by their representative character, and by their close
touch with colonial feeling, would be able, upon all subjects
submitted to them, to give really effective and valuable advice.
If such a Council were to be created, it would at once assume
an immense importance, and it is perfectly evident that it
might develop into something still greater.''
The reply of the colonial Premiers was as follows :
" The Prime Ministers here assembled are of the opinion that
the present political relations between the United Kingdom and
the self-governing colonies are generally satisfactory under the
existing condition of things."
Mr. Seddon and Sir E. N. C. Braddon dissented. At the
next Imperial Conference (1902), called to discuss "the
political and commercial relations of the Empire and its
naval and military defence," Mr. Chamberlain was a little
more urgent and insistent, if not just a trifle impatient:
152 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
"I say our paramount object is to strengthen the bonds
which unite us, and there are only three principal avenues by
which we can approach this object. They are: through our
political relations, in the first place ; secondly, by some kind of
commercial union; in the third place, by considering the
questions which arise out of imperial defence. These three
great questions were considered at the last Conference, and I
think it is clear they must form the principal subject of our
deliberations on this occasion, and, indeed, of those of any
future Conferences which may afterwards be held. I may be
considered, perhaps, to be a dreamer, or too enthusiastic; but
I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion/the political federa-
tion of the Empire is within the limits of possibility."
Referring to a suggestion for colonial representation in
the imperial House of Commons, he said:
" If it comes to us, it is a proposal which His Majesty's gov-
ernment would certainly feel justified in favorably consider-
ing; but I have always felt myself that the most practical form
in which we would achieve our object would be the establishment
or creation of a real Council of the Empire to which all questions
of imperial interest might be referred, and if it were desired to
proceed gradually, as probably would be our course — we are
all accustomed to the slow ways in which our constitutions
have been worked out — if it be desired to proceed gradually,
the Council might in the first instance be merely an advisory
Council. It would resemble, in some respects, the advisory
Council which was established in Australia, and which, although
it was not wholly successful, did nevertheless pave the way
for the complete federation upon which we now congratulate
them. But although that would be a preliminary step, it is
clear that the object would not be completely secured until
there had been conferred upon such a Council executive func-
tions and perhaps also legislative powers, and it is for you to
say, gentlemen, whether you think the time has come when
any progress whatever can be made in this direction."
For commercial basis, Mr. Chamberlain desired free trade
within the Empire:
"Our first object, then, as I say, is free trade within the
Empire. We feel confident — we think that it is a matter
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 153
which demands no evidence or proof, that if such a result were
feasible it would enormously increase our inter-imperial trade;
that it would hasten the development of our colonies; that it
would fill up the spare places in your lands with an active, in-
telligent, and industrious, and, above all, a British, population;
that it would make the mother country entirely independent of
foreign and raw material."
As to colonial contributions to imperial defence, he said:
"But now that the colonies are rich and powerful, that every
day they are growing by leaps and bounds, their material pros-
perity promises to rival that of the United Kingdom itself, and
I think it is inconsistent with their position — inconsistent with
their dignity as nations — that they should leave the mother
country to bear the whole or almost the whole of the expense.
And I think, therefore, you will agree with me that it is not
unreasonable for us to call your serious attention to a state of
things which cannot be permanent. I hope that we are not
likely to make upon you any demand which would seem to you
to be excessive. We know perfectly well your difficulties, as
you probably are acquainted with ours. Those difficulties are
partly political; partly, principally probably, fiscal difficulties.
The disproportion to which I have called your attention cannot,
under any circumstances, be immediately remedied, but I think
that something may be done — I hope that something will be
done — to recognize, more effectually than has hitherto been
done, the obligation of all to contribute to the common weal. ,,
The Colonial Defence Committee presented a memorandum
to the Conference, in which they said :
" For these reasons the Colonial Defence Committee earnestly
hope that the great self-governing colonies may be able to give
some assurance as to the strength of the contingents which
they should be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's
government for extra-colonial service in a war with a Euro-
pean power."
And Lord Selborne proposed cash contributions to the
British navy.
In their reply the Premiers made no reference to political
relations, probably judging that the resolution of the previous
154 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
Conference sufficiently showed their views. As to commercial
matters, they resolved:
"That this Conference recognizes that, in the present circum-
stances of the colonies, it is not practicable to adopt a general
system of free trade as between the mother country and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas.
"That with a view, however, to promoting the increase of
trade within the Empire, it is desirable that those colonies
which have not already adopted such a policy should, as far
as their circumstances permit, give substantial preferential
treatment to the products and manufactures of the United
Kingdom."
The reply of Canada and Australia to the request for con-
tingents was as follows:
"The representatives of Canada and Australia were of
opinion that the best course to pursue was to endeavor to
raise the standard of training for the general body of their
forces, to organize the departmental services and equipment
required for the mobilization of a field force, leaving it to the
colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to what
extent it should render assistance."
Canada's reply to the request for contribution to the navy
was as follows:
"The Canadian ministers regret that they have been unable
to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Selborne respecting
the navy and Mr. St. John Brodrick respecting the army. The
ministers desire to point out that their objections arise, not so
much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the
acceptance of the proposals would entail an important depart-
ure from the principle of colonial self-government. Canada
values highly the measure of local independence which has been
granted to it from time to time by the imperial authorities,
and which has been so productive of beneficial results, both as
respects the material progress of the country and the strengthen-
ing of the ties that bind it to the motherland. But while, for
these reasons, the Canadian ministers are obliged to withhold
their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and the War
Office, they fully appreciate the duty of the outlay for those
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 155
necessary preparations of self-defence which every country has
to assume and bear.
"That the taxpayers of the United Kingdom should desire
to be relieved of some of the burdens which they bear in con-
nection with military expenditure is quite reasonable. Canada
in the development of its own militia will be found ready to
respond to that desire by taking upon itself some of the services
in the Dominion which have hitherto been borne by the imperial
government. What has already been done by Canada must
give assurance of the disposition of the Canadian people to
recognize their proper obligations.
"At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are
confined to the military side. The Canadian government are
prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On
the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large number of men ad-
mirably qualified to form a naval reserve, and it is hoped that
at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the
training of these men and to the making of their services avail-
able for defence in time of need.
" In conclusion the ministers repeat that, while the Canadian
government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed,
they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make
expenditures for the purposes of defence in proportion to the
increasing population and wealth of the country. They are
willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve
the taxpayer of the mother country from some of the burdens
which she now bears, and they have the strongest desire to
carry out their defence schemes in cooperation with the imperial
authorities, and under the advice of experienced imperial
officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local
self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the
promotion of imperial unity."
Mr. Chamberlain does not quite appreciate this attitude,
and yet it is a necessary corollary from Canada's political
position as recognized by no one, now, more clearly than by
Mr. Chamberlain himself. In his very recent speech to the
Canadian Manufacturers' Association (Birmingham, June 26,
1905) he said:
"What are we all? We are sister states, in which the
mother country, by virtue of her age, by virtue of all that she
156 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
has done in the past, may claim to be first, but only first among
equals. Now the question is, How are we to bring these separate
interests together, these states which have accepted one Crown
and one flag, and which in all else are absolutely independent
one of the other ? "
To Canadians it appears axiomatic that if they are an inde-
pendent state, they ought to build up military and naval
forces of their own, rather than send money to any other
state, of equal or unequal rank with them, to be expended
by it. That we are under one Crown is no reply to this. If it
is, then I say : " Canada has a magnificent lot of men engaged
in her fisheries, as well fitted for naval employment as any
men in the British Isles; but Canada's income must very
largely be spent upon her growth; let, therefore, the United
Kingdom remit to Ottawa a couple of millions annually to
be spent by Canada in the creation of a Canadian navy."
That would appear to our British brothers to be a very ridicu-
lous proposition, but it is really quite as sensible as the sug-
gestion that the check should go from Canada. To my mind,
it is perfectly clear that Canada's contribution to defence
must be along the lines of national growth. She must
strengthen herself, train her own men, maintain her own forces,
and thus learn to do her own fighting. In the past Canada
has done her share, and more than her share, in the Empire's
wars — wars which she had no share in declaring, and as to
which her opinion was not asked. It is now proposed that
besides continuing war help, she should contribute to the
peace establishment, not of the Empire, but of the United
Kingdom. She has declined to do so. And she is right.
Let each part prepare itself in time of peace. The whole will
thus be the stronger when comes the stress of war.
Canada's attitude, then, as to Mr. Chamberlain's proposals
is as follows:
CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA 157
1. Protection is Canada's policy. She offers no suggestion
as to that of the United Kingdom.
2. Canada favors the idea of preferential tariffs through-
out the Empire. The terms, and their effect upon other
nations, are matters for most careful consideration.
3. Canada is an independent state under the same Crown
as is the United Kingdom. She will not enter any commercial
union, nor agree that her tariffs shall be regulated by any
body other than her own Parliament. And no political union,
which would remove from her exclusive governance the con-
trol of any part of her own affairs, would be acceptable to her.
4. At the same time Canada anticipates and desires eternal
association with the United Kingdom; for therein she sees
benefit not only to herself, but to the United Kingdom and to
the world. Cooperation always, incorporation probably never,
is the summation of the whole matter.
5. Lastly, Canada is not prepared to agree beforehand that
she will assist in every war in which, without consultation with
her or without her assent, the United Kingdom may at any
time be engaged. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, speaking against
Imperial Federation, has said (Hansard, April 7, 1892) :
"I do not believe in Imperial Federation. If colonists are
to be represented at Westminster in the same way that English-
men, Irishmen, and Scotchmen are represented, then of course
colonists must assume the duties and responsibilities which are
borne by Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen to carry on
the wars which are almost perpetually engaged throughout the
civilized and uncivilized world. I think these are consequences
before which the people of Canada will recede."
Just before proceeding to the Imperial Conference of 1902
Sir Wilfrid said:
"We are invited to discuss the commercial situation, the
political situation, and the military situation. Our answer has
gone forth at the same time that we see little advantage in
158 CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS AND CANADA
discussing the political situation or the military situation. . . .
It would be a most suicidal policy for the Canadian people to go
into any scheme of that nature. It would be the most suicidal
policy that could be devised for Canada to enter into that
vortex in which the nations of Europe — England included —
are engaged at the present time, and which compels them to
maintain great military armaments. . . . The principal item
in the British budget is the expenses for naval and land arma-
ments. . . . Now my honorable friend ' says that Canada
should follow in the same course, that she should take part in
the scheme of imperial military defence. Sir, Canada is in a
different position. Canada is a nation with an immense terri-
tory but with a sparse population of five and three-quarter
millions of souls, scattered over an area of three thousand miles
in extent from east to west. The principal items in the budget
of Canada are what? — public works, the development of the
country, the construction of railways and harbors, the opening
up of ways of transportation. This is the work to which we
have to devote our energies, and I would look upon it as a crime
to divert any part of that necessary expenditure to the supply
of guns, cannon, and military armaments."
These pronouncements of the Premier of Canada have never
been challenged by any of the leaders of the political party
opposed to him. They indicate that not only as regards com-
mercial questions, but as to all other matters, Canada intends
to control her own affairs. Her affection for the United King-
dom is deep and indisputable, but her national status pre-
cludes the possibility of submission to any governance but
her own.
1 Mr. McLean, a somewhat independent member.
IMPERIAL FEDERATION AND THE COLONIAL
CONFERENCES
The completed history of the Imperial Federation move-
ment may now be written. Based upon racial instincts '
rather than community of interests, upon sentiment rather
than reason, it appealed strongly to that very large class of
persons to whose minds military glory and world domination
are matters of chief est importance. And had its purposes
remained nebular ; had it continued as it commenced, a racial
and sentimental aspiration ; had its advocates, abjuring
schemes and reasons, persisted in preaching "federation in
the abstract " ; had they, more particularly, refrained from the
assembling of colonial statesmen practically to discuss it and
reason about it, federation societies might still be declaiming
and waving, with some little superficial appearance of possible
success. But an appearance only ; for an eternity of preaching
about "federation in the abstract," without a preacher ingen-
ious or bold enough to promulgate some outline of the thing
he was preaching about, could of course produce nothing but
more or less plentiful crops of "hurrahs."
Admonished to this effect, the federationists turned to
federation in the concrete; quarrelled about it; appealed to
Colonial Conferences to tell them how to arrange it; and
are now silent under the authoritative and conclusive reply
that Colonial Conferences will not try to arrange it — that
Colonial Conferences make for colonial independence, and not
for federation at all. Let us follow the story.
The Imperial Federation League. — Slow reaction from the
idea that colonies were millstones round the British neck
159
160 FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES
produced a strong tendency in the contrary direction — pro-
duced in England in 1884 "The Imperial Federation League "
whose principal resolution declared
" that in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire
some form of federation is essential/ '
and whose constitution affirmed that
"the object of the League is to secure by federation the per-
manent unity of the Empire; that no scheme of federation
should interfere with the existing rights of local Parliaments
as regards local affairs; and that any scheme of imperial
federation should combine on an equitable basis the resources
of the Empire for the maintenance of common interests and
adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights.'*
No attempt being made to define "local affairs" or to sug-
gest any plan of combination, the League enlisted the sym-
pathies of men whose general aspirations it expressed, but
whose views as to methods were fundamentally irreconcilable.
For several years all went fairly well. The League published
a journal; some of its members wrote articles and letters;
others, including Lord Rosebery, Lord Brassey, and Mr.
W. E. Forster (the first president), made speeches; Canadian
Imperialists established a branch.
Within two years enthusiastic activity had produced such
seeming success that the League was able to prevail upon Lord
Salisbury to summon a Colonial Conference to consider ques-
tions of imperial defence and imperial postal and telegraphic
communications. The Conference met in the spring of 1887,
and its principal result, the agreement of the Australasian
colonies to contribute for ten years £126,000 per annum
to the imperial navy, seemed like a distinct victory for Im-
perialists. Encouragement was found, too, in the language
of Sir Samuel Griffiths of Queensland, who said at the Con-
ference :
FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES 161
"I think we may look forward to seeing this sort of informal
council of the Empire developed, until it becomes a legislative
body." ■
The propaganda proceeded. Lord Rosebery became presi-
dent of the League in 1888; in 1889 Mr. George R. Parkin
undertook missionary work in Australia; in the same year
the League resolved
"that the establishment of periodical Conferences of the
representatives of the self-governing communities of the
Empire should be the first aim of the Imperial Federation
League,"
and in 1891 it again proceeded in deputation to Lord Salis-
bury, asking
"that the government should convoke at the earliest timely
date a conference of the self-governing countries of the Empire,
to consider the question of securing to them a real and effective
share in the privileges and responsibilities of the Empire."
Lord Salisbury declined to comply until somebody had
proposed something for discussion. He said:
"Lord Brassey, and I think several speakers, rather claimed
it as a virtue on the part of the society that they had no cut-
and-dried scheme to propose. I think that is an extravagant
modesty on their part. I do not know precisely what the
meaning of the adjectives may be, but I think that we are
almost come to the time when schemes should be proposed,
and that without them we should not get very far."
For seven years the League had worked for "imperial
federation in the abstract," and had done wonderfully well.
It had now to encounter the test of practicability. It did
what it could — it appointed a committee. And the com-
mittee did what it could — it obtained opinions, and con-
sidered, and discussed, and compromised, and produced a
1 "Proceedings of the Conference," p. 561.
162 FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES
report (July, 1892) in which it declared that the two essentials
of Empire were
" (a) That the voice of the Empire in peace, when dealing with
foreign powers, shall be, as far as possible, the united voice of
all its autonomous parts.
" (b) That the defence of the Empire in war shall be the com-
mon defence of all its interests and of all its parts, by the
united forces and resources of all its members.
" It may be laid down as a leading principle that as all parts
of the Empire enjoy the benefits of imperial defence, they should
contribute to its cost " — money spent upon local defences to
be deemed a contribution.
The committee proposed the formation of a "Council of
the Empire" (to deal with "imperial defence"), and of a
"Naval and Military Council" ; and that a conference should
be summoned to ascertain the views of the colonies, and to
determine "the basis upon, and the method by which contri-
butions should be raised." The report made reference to
various other subjects which
"though non-essential to the maintenance of the permanent
unity and integrity of the Empire, may be recommended as
conducive to the same end" — matters of trade, postage, etc.
Sir Charles Tupper was a member of the committee.' He
was opposed to colonial contribution to the British navy,
and defended his concurrence in the report as follows:
"Knowing as I do that the most active members of the
committee were mainly intent on levying a large contribution
on the revenues of the colonies for the support of the army
and navy of Great Britain, I am delighted to have been able,
almost single-handed, to obtain such a report from such a
committee."
The report was as close an approach to a scheme as the
League could agree upon, and, with it, a deputation returned
(April, 1893) to the Prime Minister (now Mr. Gladstone),
FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES 163
who demurred to its vagueness, and declared that in any case
the time was inopportune for another conference.
Although not very definite, the scheme, or rather the dis-
cussions which led up to it, had produced such dissension in
the League that its dissolution was inevitable. At its last
meeting the secretary said:
"There is a party within the League which holds that a
commercial union of the Empire is essential to any federation;
and there is a party which holds that such a union would not
constitute a federation, or that in any case a change in the
fixed policy of this country would be too great a price to pay
for it. Again there are those who hold that the combination
of the resources of the Empire for defence is the first and main
point in the federation, and that no permanence of unity can
exist without it. And there are those on the contrary who
hold that to increase the influence and representation of the
colonies in the United Kingdom is good, but that any addition
to the responsibility of the colonies in this matter is unde-
sirable and unnecessary."
Finally the view prevailed that
" the League was formed for the purpose of advocating imperial
federation in the abstract, and that as it had now become
necessary to define more precisely what was aimed at, a fresh
start should be made. ,,
Thus ended in 1893 the Imperial Federation League. 1
The League was dissolved, and the two parties separated, each
to prosecute its own idea — the one urging federation with a
view to war cooperation, and the other seeking for preferential
1 For more detailed history of the League reference may be made to
a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute, January, 1893, by F.
de Labilliere on "British Federalism, Its Rise and Progress," reported
in the Transactions of the R.C.I., Vol. XXIV, p. 95; to the Journal of
the Imperial Federation League, — especially the issue of October, 1892,
Vol. VII, p. 227; to a volume entitled "Papers and Addresses, Lord
Brassey " ; and to an article in the National Review, by Robert Beaden :
"Why the Imperial Federation League was dissolved," Vol. XXII, p. 814.
164 FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES
commercial arrangements merely. The first of these parties
may be called by Mr. Chamberlain's name because he has been
its greatest leader. The second may be called " Canadian " :
first, because it was Sir Charles Tupper (then Canada's High
Commissioner in London) who as a member of the League
upheld the commercial view; secondly, because preferences
were originated in Canada; thirdly, because the Ottawa
Conference of 1894 and Canada's preferential tariff of 1897
forced the cancellation of the Belgian and German treaties
and so made preference possible; fourthly, because Canada
more than any other colony has upheld the principle of colo-
nial self-government. Thus far, neither of these parties has
been completely successful; but while the Chamberlain scheme
is dead, the Canadian preferential plan has been accepted
by the Empire, with the exception of the United Kingdom,
and, through the conversion of Mr. Chamberlain from free
trade to protection, has done much toward gaining that
most important dissentient.
The old League having been dissolved, two new ones were
formed in England, each representing one of the views just
referred to. " The Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, "
formed in 1894, adopted the leading principles of the old League
and specially declared
"that combination for defence of common interests is there-
fore, as was recognized in 1884, the one essential point and the
test of the practicability of imperial federation.
"That if the self-governing colonies take their share in the
cost of such a system of defence [maritime defence], they must
have a proportionate share in its administration and control,
and if those colonies are not willing to take their share in a
common system of defence, it is evident that federation is not
practicable."
"The British Empire League," formed in the same year,
had for its principal object
FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES 165
" To promote trade between the United Kingdom, the colonies,
and India." l V
The operation of these societies need not detain us, for
the following year (1895) marked the commencement of Mr.
Chamberlain's imperialistic activities ; and, he being Secretary
of State for the Colonies, the contest broadened into a contest
between the governments of the United Kingdom and Can-
ada — Mr. Chamberlain using all his great resources and all
the influence of the government of which he was a member
in furtherance of federation; Canada respectfully insisting
upon self-government (refusing to move a hair's breadth from
self-government) and quietly urging her schemes of imperial
cables, imperial commercial preferences, etc. Mr. Chamber-
lain's side has been retired without a single run. Canada
is scoring rapidly.
The importance of the issues involved in this great contest
is not, as yet, fully appreciated; the greatness of Canada's
victories has not been sufficiently recognized; and the
strength, tact, and statesmanship of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and
his colleagues have yet to receive the full measure of acknowl-
edgment and admiration which they merit.
For this there are several reasons. Perhaps the principal
of them is that the Canadian government's actions have al-
ways so completely commended themselves to the vast ma-
jority of Canadians that they have passed, not only without
criticism, but almost without notice.
Another reason is to be found in Mr. Chamberlain's conver-
sion to the Canadian scheme of preferential tariffs and his
great British campaign in favor of its adoption. To very
many people it appeared that Mr. Chamberlain and Canada
1 War cooperation was not omitted, but it was advocated "with a
special view to the due protection of trade routes." In this respect it
went beyond the purely commercial Canadian scheme.
166 FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES
were in complete agreement. They were not. Mr. Cham-
berlain had indeed accepted protection and preferential tariffs,
but for an ulterior purpose — in the hope and in the belief
that commercial cooperation might engender commercial
union, and that from commercial union might spring political
federation. Canada desired no such future, and was not
afraid of Mr. Chamberlain's prognostications.
Canada was well prepared for the contest. Her provinces,
more than the other colonies, had struggled for self-govern-
ment, and it was consequently dearer to her. Consolidation,
moreover, in 1867, had given her an importance, a prestige,
and a nascent consciousness of nationality, little felt by her
sister colonies. Rapidly increasing wealth, too, and clearer
conception of her illimitable possibilities of expansion had
made all schemes of renewed subjection to Old Country ideas
impossible of acceptance — made anything but absolute
self-government an anachronism and an absurdity.
Nevertheless Canada was in danger — not from frontal
attack (Mr. Chamberlain was far too shrewd for that), but
from all sorts of clever turning manoeuvres, exceedingly
difficult to defeat. Boldly and energetically Mr. Chamberlain
tried one scheme after another, delivered one assault after
another upon colonial independence, at the same time telling
us with the utmost frankness what through "a process of
gradual development" his ultimate object was:
" a new government with large powers of taxation and legis-
lation over countries separated by thousands of miles of sea."
It has been said that Mr. Chamberlain understood colonial
feeling better than any other British statesman. That he
completely misunderstood it, is plainly apparent by the use
of such language. It occurred in an address to the Canadian
Club (London, March 25, 1896) :
FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES 167
" In the year 1884 a League was formed — the Imperial
Federation League — under the most favorable auspices.
The late Mr. Forster was its president, and it afterwards en-
joyed the assistance of a long series of distinguished statesmen
and prominent personages ; but two years ago it was dissolved
without having accomplished its object, unless indeed its sole
object was the education of public opinion to the importance
of the subject. But during its career it was again and again
challenged to produce a plan, and it was unwilling or unable
to answer the challenge. Sir, I think that we may, at all
events, learn from its experience that the realization of our
hopes, if they are in the direction of a federation of the Empire
— their final realization — is a matter of such vast magnitude
and such great complication that it cannot be undertaken at
the present time. But it does not follow that on that account
we should give up our aspirations. It is only a proof that we
must approach the goal in a different way; that we must seek
the line of least resistance. To create a new government for
the British Empire — a new government with large 'powers of
taxation and legislation over countries separated by thousands of
miles of sea, in conditions as various as those which prevail in
our several dependencies and colonies — that, indeed, would
be a duty from which the boldest statesman might shrink
appalled. We may, however, approach the desirable consumma-
tion by a process of gradual development."
Why, for example, Mr. Chamberlain asked, should there not
be an imperial Court of Appeal? And why might not the
colonies raise and maintain a certain "Imperial Field Force' '
for foreign service in imperial wars ? What colonial contin-
gents, meanwhile, may be counted upon in case of European
war ? Ought not the colonies in any case to contribute to
the imperial navy ? And why might we not have an imperial
Council — not at all (don't be afraid) to interfere (at the out-
set) with local autonomy; but merely to consider matters
in which we are all interested, and to give very good advice,
and (who knows) to grow into a legislature ? Why not a
permanent "Imperial Secretariat" under direction of the
Council to carry on its work between the sittings?
168 FEDERATION AND THE CONFERENCES
No, said Canada, to every one of these proposals. Every
one of them would be an encroachment upon the principle
of self-government. Every one of them is tainted with colo-
nial subjection, which, with us, is at an end or very nearly
so. But Canada said these negatives very nicely; and she
had the great advantage of being able at the same time to
offer to the United Kingdom preferential trade advantages,
which not only soon proved to be of great value to the British
manufacturer, but which quite distracted attention from her
refusals.
Let us relate the history of Mr. Chamberlain's proposals and
defeats. It is very interesting, and as important in its results
(the maintenance of self-government) as were the struggles
which in earlier days first gained for us responsible govern-
ment, and, at length, the frank acknowledgment of the right
to manage our own affairs.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE
Character being the product of environment, Germany
is militarist and China pacific. If these two countries had
the same Sovereign and the same Parliament and were peo-
pled by the same race, the European would still be warlike
and the Asiatic peaceful ; upon questions of defence, they could
not agree; and "the interests of the Empire as a whole"
would have little common meaning.
It is not otherwise in the British Empire. Insular and
fairly safe from invasion, but having colonial and other in-
terests throughout the world, the United Kingdom aims at
high naval supremacy and maintains an equipment superior
to that of any other two powers. At the same time she is
keenly anxious about the European "balance of power" —
Belgium and Holland and Switzerland must remain indepen-
dent ; Germany must not be allowed to efface France ; Russia
must be impeded in her southern expansion; Turkey must
be kept in order; alliances and ententes for these purposes
must be sought and cultivated.
Australia, a huge, sparsely populated island-continent
with French, German, Dutch, and Asiatic neighbors, lacking
strength sufficient to guard, or even to occupy, her territory,
and without financial ability to provide the naval protection
which might be needed to-morrow — Australia for many
years yet must depend upon association with the British
navy for defence. Mr. Deakin (Australia's Prime Minister),
at the Conference of 1907, said :
170 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
" Our position at the other side of the globe, surrounded by
alien races to whom we cannot look for aid or assistance in this
matter, or indeed in any other, and far from any sources of
supply of arms and material of war, is very different, and we
feel its urgency" ("Proceedings," p. 105).
"Practically every capital, with perhaps the single exception
of Perth, is upon the sea; Sydney, Adelaide, and Hobart are
all easily approachable from the sea. In the case of Melbourne,
Port Phillip Heads and the forts there could, if effective, keep
an attacking force at a distance. Yet, supposing the Heads to
be passed, Melbourne too would lie directly open to any attacks.
Brisbane runs a somewhat similar risk" (lb. p. 474).
But Australia has little interest in the European situation,
save that its disturbance may bring her neighbors upon her.
In much the same case as Australia are New Zealand and
South Africa, while in the latter the presence of a very large
element of Dutch, and overwhelming millions of natives,
forms an additional difficulty and a special ground for appre-
hension. At the Colonial Conference of 1907 Sir Joseph
Ward (New Zealand's Prime Minister) said:
"I do not want to raise questions which might be looked
upon as troublesome, but we do fear some of the eastern coun-
tries, whose teeming millions, so close to Australia and New
Zealand as they are, under an educational process in the years
to come, may find the attractions of our country sufficient to
induce them to give us some trouble" (lb. p. 137).
"I want to make the position clear, so that the Admiralty,
who are no doubt better posted upon these matters than I am,
may know. We have fourteen towns on the sea-coast. The
majority of them are very important towns. There is not one
of them that is more than nine miles, at the outside, from the
ocean or to the port, unless it be the city of Dunedin, which to
the ocean itself, irrespective of the means of ingress and egress
that ships have to take, is only five or six miles away from
the Pacific" (lb. p. 477).
At the same Conference Mr. Moore (NataPs Prime Minister)
said:
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 171
"We feel, sir, that in that part of the world we are especially
bound to take the gravest notice of our military efficiency. We
not only hold a most unique position as regards the Empire in
the event of a general war, being in such a very important
position with regard to all the important trade routes, which is
the imperial aspect, but we also have a very unique position
as regards our local environments with respect to the large
native population that it is our duty and our burden to govern
and control" (76. p. 113).
Canada, more happily situated, has nothing to fear. Her
only neighbor is as pacific as herself. Upon their three
thousand miles of boundary there is no fortification, and upon
their separating lakes there are no warships. Twice, indeed,
they have been at war, but upon no quarrel of their own.
For almost a hundred years they have been friends — friends,
with now and then a friendly disagreement. From over-
sea invasion, Canada is sufficiently secure; for (1) war with
European or Asiatic, upon Canada's own account, is in the
last degree improbable; (2) if the United Kingdom should
enter such a war, her opponent's fleet would almost certainly
have little opportunity to go anywhere, and would assuredly
not come thousands of miles from its nearest coaling-station
to invade Canada; and (3) although we might suffer some
loss, our territory is secure, (a) because we are strong enough
to cope with any expedition that could be sent so far, and
(b) because our friends to the south, if need be, would help to
keep the continent free from outside occupation.
Suppose now that the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, and Canada should meet to discuss
questions of defence — " the interests of the Empire as a
whole" — what shall we expect? The question is not dif-
ficult, even a priori; and the Conferences have made the
answer clear to everybody.
Australian Anxieties. — Until the eighties of the last cen-
172 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
tury little attention was paHd to questions of imperial defence. 1
Australian anxieties in connection with the islands of the
Pacific forced its consideration.
To Australia, the ownership of the scores of islands which
cloud her horizons was a matter of supremest importance.
Governor Philip's patent included in New South Wales terri-
tory the " adjacent islands''; and the New Hebrides were
included in New Zealand at the establishment of that colony.
But the United Kingdom was slow to declare any definite
claim to these associated islands, although the Australian
colonies constantly and urgently pressed the necessity for
action. The whole history cannot be told here, but the Aus-
tralian view, as represented by Mr. Deakin at the recent
Conference (1907), is worth notice as illustrative of diver-
gent opinions produced by dissimilar environment:
"There was a time — and that not so far distant — when
this ocean was ignored and these islands were little visited
because they presented small opportunities of trade or settle-
ment — a time at which Great Britain was so much the pre-
dominating power that almost anything desired in the way of
possession or suzerainty could have been acquired without much
difficulty. Of course the dead past must be left to bury its
dead, but some reference is necessary to the indifferent attitude
of statesmen in this country, a not unnatural attitude because
to the United Kingdom the Pacific is remote and not over the
greater part of it even a highway of much traffic. On the
other hand, to Australia and New Zealand in particular, and
also to Canada, the future of the Pacific is extremely important,
and may become more so at any time, now that attention is
directed to its great spaces where rival nations have found a
footing, and are if anything disposed to strengthen their hold.
This difference of situation led from the first to a different
attitude of mind on the part of the people of the common-
wealth and New Zealand, the people of Australasia, as com-
pared with that of the people of the mother country."
1 See " Proceedings of the Colonial Conference of 1887," p. 277. Note
also the surprise with which, at that Conference, the Secretary of State
for War learned of the amounts expended by the colonies upon defence.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE
173
"Thus the opposite points of view of those who live by the
Pacific Ocean, as in our case, and those on this side whose shores
are washed by the North Sea, have been the chief ground for
difference" ("Proceedings," pp. 548, 549).
Referring to a Colonial Office reply to one of his letters com-
plaining of "the inaction of the imperial government/' Mr.
Deakin said:
"I was directed to this document as expressing the views
which are still held. In this despatch it is pointed out that a
vast extent of territory in the Pacific Ocean has been definitely
brought under British control during the last thirty years.
It must not be forgotten, as I have already said, that it was
indefinitely under British authority before that; but the
statements here made show what parts were definitely brought
under British control during the last thirty years. Reference
is made to Fiji, part of New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the
Gilbert and the Ellice Islands, and the Cook Group, most of
those acquisitions having been made as is admitted mainly
(sometimes entirely) of the interests and sentiments of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. Now that is perfectly true. But for
the action of Australia and New Zealand, there would not be an
island to-day in the Pacific under the British flag. I am old
enough to remember the long agitation which led to the annex-
ation of Fiji, which was very nearly allowed to slip through
our fingers. I remember only too well the warnings trans-
mitted to the imperial government with reference to New
Guinea when we were assured by the then Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Lord Derby, that there was no intention on
the part of Germany to annex any part of that island. It
was in this faith that the flag hoisted without authority by
the Governor of Queensland, the British flag, was hauled down."
Sir Wilfrid Laurier : " By whom ? "
Mr. Deakin: "By order of the British government. Im-
mediately afterwards one-half of that very territory which we
had just been assured was not going to be touched was appro-
priated by the German government. Then, because under
pressure of public opinion that minister for the colonies was
forced to take over the fraction that was left, that is cited to
us years afterwards as a proof of the spirited policy pursued
by the British government. What is true of this island is
174 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
true of the Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.
Whatever losses there are in the Pacific — and there have
been others — have been due to neglect here. Every single
gain has been due to pressure from Australia and New Zealand.
Consequently, whatever credit is due for the acquisition of
these islands rests on the other side of the globe and not on
this. Is it, therefore, to be wondered at that a feeling has
been created and still exists in Australia — an exasperated
feeling — that British imperial interests in that ocean have
been mishandled from the first? . . . There you have our
two absolutely opposite points of view, the point of view of
our part of the world and the point of view in this country,
and it is only because it is necessary, as it appears to me, to
make that fundamental contrast of attitude understood, that
I have ventured to detain the Conference by referring to it"
(lb. pp. 549, 550).
Referring to the New Hebrides, which would have been
entirely French but for the protest of Australia (they are
now administered jointly by the United Kingdom and France),
Mr. Deakin said :
" We have kept on protesting and urging action without any
cessation for the last twenty-four years. Before that, there
were frequent and spasmodic outbursts of complaints as we
saw the islands slipping away, but for the last twenty-four
years there has been systematic agitation, yet practically there
has been nothing to show for it until this last agreement.
"I do not know of any series of public incidents that have
sown more discord in Australia and created more discontent
than those dealing with the Pacific islands. They have caught
and kept the popular eye and inflamed the popular mind. I
think that, after all our unfortunate experiences these years,
we are entitled to expect that, in any dealings with the New
Hebrides, Australia and New Zealand would have been con-
sulted, kept in close touch with the Colonial Office, and afforded
every opportunity of assisting to bring about a fair settle-
ment" (lb. p. 551).
"I have finished with that matter, Mr. Churchill. I have
no desire to revive these incidents except as warnings for the
future and in order to explain the feeling that exists. Lord
Elgin may think that on this matter I hold strong views. I
IMPERIAL DEFENCE
175
do, but they are shared by thousands. On this matter I am
certain that you cannot find a newspaper in Australia that has
a word to say in defence of our treatment in relation to the
New Hebrides" (lb. p. 559).
This extremely important question of neighboring island-
ownership was closely related to the subject of defence, and,
as European nations more and more definitely established
themselves in the southern seas, Australia became more and
more anxious for the integrity of her own domain. Event-
ually in 1881 1 a Conference of the various Australian colo-
nies was held at Sydney, at which after elaborate discussion
it was resolved that the cost of the requisite land defence
should be paid by the respective colonies, but that naval
defence
" should continue to be at the exclusive charge of the imperial
government, and that the strength of the Australian squadron
should be increased." 2
In 1882 the whole subject of imperial defence was considered
by a Royal Commission under the presidency of Lord Car-
narvon. 3
In 1886 Admiral Tryon (acting under instructions of
September 9, 1885, and April 30, 1886) carried on negotiations
with the governments of the Australian colonies with a view
to the increase of the Australian squadron at joint expense.
No agreement was arrived at and the subject was relegated
to the Colonial Conference of 1887.
1 A scheme of defence had been discussed and partially arranged in
1879 between Lieutenant-Governor Sir W. Drummond Jervois and Sir
Peter Scratchley.
3 See the "Proceedings of the Colonial Conference of 1887," p. 213.
'The report may be found among the papers of the "Colonial Con-
ference of 1887," p. 295.
176 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
CONFERENCE OF 1887
The Conference of 1887 was called at the instance of the
Imperial Federation League, for the purpose of considering
imperial defence, and postal and telegraphic communication.
Of these, defence was the chief. In the circular despatch
summoning the Conference (November 25, 1886) the Colonial
Secretary (Stanhope) said:
"In the opinion of His Majesty's government the question
which is at once urgent and capable of useful consideration at
the present time is that of organization for military defence.
"I should deprecate the discussion at the present time of
any of the subjects falling within the range of what is known
as political federation."
In his opening speech the Prime Minister (Salisbury), re-
ferring to a zollverein (commercial union) as something im-
practicable, said:
"I will pass that by and merely point your attention to the
Kriegsverein, which I believe is the real and most important
business upon which you will be engaged, that is to say, the
union for purposes of mutual defence.' '
As incentive to war-union the Prime Minister added:
"The English colonies comprise some of the finest and most
desirable portions of the earth's surface. The desire for foreign
and colonial possessions is increasing among the nations of
Europe." ■
The Colonial Secretary (Holland), speaking in the same
vein, said:
"For myself I shall not consider this Conference to fail if
it does nothing more than place military and naval defence on
a sound footing." 2
1 " Proceedings of the Conference," p. 6.
2 lb. p. 9. A detail of the proposed defences appears at p. 277 of
the "Proceedings of the Conference."
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 177
Something was done. The negotiations between the
Admiralty and the Australasian colonies were completed,
and an arrangement was made by which it was agreed that
five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats were to be added
to the Australian squadron; that these vessels should be
retained "within the limits of the Australian station"; that
they should be removed only "with the consent of the colo-
nial government"; and that, of the cost involved, the colo-
nies should pay not more than £126,000 per annum. 1 This
was the commencement of what has been called colonial
contributions to the British navy. It was an agreement
for defence by so many ships for so much money. The ships
were provided and the money was paid.
An arrangement was also made with Cape Colony as to
the erection and cost of fortifications at Table Bay and Simon's
Bay. 2
No other agreement could be reached ; and great differences
of opinion were disclosed as to relative duty in regard to the
whole subject. Mr. Hoffmeyer (whose celebrated resolution
will be mentioned in a moment), for example, arguing that
" in the matter of coast defence, the first and primary duty
should rest with the imperial government for this reason : that
enemies from whom the colonies might suffer and would suffer
on the coast would not be enemies of their own making, but
would be imperial enemies, enemies made by the imperial
policy, enemies perhaps made, too, in the maintenance of a
policy even opposed to the general interests of the colony
itself." 3
The two agreements (falling somewhat short of placing
"military and naval defence on a sound footing") were the
only achievements of the Conference ; and in his report to the
1 See the "Proceedings," p. 508, and the Appendix, p. 213.
a lb. pp. 245, 425. • lb. p. 414.
N
178 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
Governors of the colonies, the best that the Colonial Secre-
tary could say was the following:
" I believe the Conference has been productive of the greatest
good in the opportunity for the interchange of information
which it has afforded ; and I trust that it will lead to a consolida-
tion of the great military resources of the Empire for the pur-
poses of mutual defence." '
The proposal of Mr. Hoffmeyer at the Conference must be
noticed, not that it was thought even by himself to be imme-
diately practicable, but because it has always had attractions
for many Imperialists, and because of its reappearance " with
a new suit of clothes on" 2 at a later Conference. Mr. Hoff-
meyer proposed :
" To discuss the feasibility of promoting closer union between
the various parts of the British Empire by means of an imperial
customs tariff to be levied independently of the duties payable
under existing tariffs on goods entering the Empire from
abroad, the revenue derived from such tariff to be devoted to
general defence of the Empire." 3
CONFERENCE OF 1897
In 1893 (between the Conferences of 1887 and 1897) the
Imperial Federation League was dissolved, and shaking them-
selves clear of the commercially minded, certain of its members
reorganized as The Imperial Federation (Defence) League
— with emphasis on Defence. Urging their views and forcing
their propaganda with much zeal, they made many converts,
and at the Colonial Conference of 1897 had the great satis-
faction of seeing their ideas championed by Mr. Chamberlain,
then Secretary of State for the Colonies and chairman of the
Conference. This is the way Mr. Chamberlain put the matter :
1 lb. p. ix.
2 As Sir Wilfrid Laurier said at the Colonial Conference of 1907; see
"Proceedings," p. 518. 3 "Proceedings," p. 463.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 179
"This gigantic navy and the military forces of the United
Kingdom are maintained, as you know, at heavy cost. I think
the charge upon the exchequer is at the present time something
like thirty-five millions sterling per annum, and it constitutes
more than one-third of the total income of the country. Now,
these fleets, and this military armament, are not maintained
exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit of the United King-
dom, or for the defence of home interests. They are still more
maintained as a necessity of Empire, for the maintenance and
protection of imperial trade and of imperial interests all over
the world, and if you will for a moment consider the history
of this country during, say, the present century, or, I would say,
during the present reign, you will find that every war, great or
small, in which we have been engaged, has had at the bottom
a colonial interest, the interest, that is to say, either of a colony
or of a great dependency like India. That is absolutely true,
and is likely to be true to the end of the chapter. If we had no
Empire, there is no doubt whatever that our military and our
naval resources would not require to be maintained at any-
thing like their present level" ("Proceedings," p. 7).
Turning to the colonial side of the question, Mr. Chamber-
lain asked what the position of the colonies would be in case
of separation from the United Kingdom:
" Now let it not be supposed for a moment that I suggest as
probable — I hardly like to think that it is even possible —
that there should be a war between Canada, or on behalf of
Canada, either with the United States of America, or with any of
the other powers with which she may come into contact ; but what
I do say is this, that if Canada had not behind her to-day, and does
not continue to have behind her this great military and naval
power of Great Britain, she would have to make concessions to
her neighbors, and to accept views which might be extremely
distasteful to her, in order to remain permanently on good terms
with them. She would not be able to, it would be impossible
that she should, herself control all the details of her own destiny;
she would be to a greater or less extent, in spite of the bravery
of her population and the patriotism of her people, she would
still be, to a great extent, a dependent country" (76. p. 8).
Australia and Cape Colony being in still greater need, why
should not all the colonies contribute to the British navy?
180 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
"I shall be very glad to hear the views of the Premiers in
regard to this question of any contribution which they think
the colonies would be willing to make in order to establish this
principle in regard to the naval defence of the Empire. I am
bound to say that we are still behindhand, although a great deal
has been done in recent years. As you know, the Colonial
Defence Committee of experts has been sitting, and has accom-
plished already, with the assistance of the colonies, a very
great improvement in the state of things which existed before;
but I cannot say from the information at my disposal that
with all the magnificent resources of the colonies their organiza-
tion at present is satisfactory" (lb. pp. 8, 9).
Why, too, should there not be a commencement of military
cooperation — mere interchanging of regiments at first, but
very soon colonial participation in "the dangers and the
glories of the British army"?
"The interchangeability in the several groups (of military
forces) is a matter of great importance, but how much greater
it would be if there were interchangeability between the whole
forces of the Empire, between the forces which you have in the
several colonies and the forces of which you have seen some
examples at home since you came to these shores. That is a
matter which also can be arranged, and to which we shall bring
at all events the utmost good-will. If you have, as Canada has
at Kingston, an important military college, it may be possible
for us to offer occasionally to the cadets of that college com-
missions in the British army. But a still more important mat-
ter which has suggested itself to my mind, and which now I
desire to commend to your earnest attention, is a proposal
which may be described as the interchangeability of military
duties. To put it into plain English, it means this : that, for
instance, a Canadian regiment should come to this country,
take up its quarters for a period of time, at least twelve months,
with the British army, and form, during the whole time that
it is in this country, a part of the British army; and that in
return a similar regiment of British troops, or a brigade of
artillery or cavalry, should go to Canada and should reside and
exercise with the Canadian army, and form a part of that army.
The idea is that this should be chiefly for the purpose of drill
and instruction, and I cannot doubt that it will be of enormous
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 181
advantage to the Canadian troops, and to the troops of the
colonies, to measure themselves against the regular army, and
to learn the discipline and the manoeuvres which are practised
on a large scale in this country.
"But my imagination goes even further. It seems to me
possible that although in the first instance the idea is that such
a regiment coming to this country would come solely for that
purpose and would not be engaged in military operations, yet
if it were their wish to share in the dangers and the glories of
the British army and take their part in expeditions in which
the British army may be engaged, I see no reason why these
colonial troops should not, from time to time, fight side by
side with their British colleagues. That, however, is a matter
which, like everything else which I am putting before you, is
not a recommendation which has any pressure behind it; it
is merely a suggestion to be taken up by you voluntarily if it
commends itself to your minds" (lb. pp. 9, 10).
Upon Canada these arguments had no effect. They were
much too familiar, and the answer to them much too simple.
Had Mr. Chamberlain but pondered his own language he
could hardly have failed to see his mistake. "If we had no
Empire/' he said, "our military and our naval" expenditure
would not be so great. But Mr. Chamberlain would probably
admit that ownership of anything entails expense; and that
of such expense the owner should not complain, for he can
always easily stop it. "If we had no Empire!" If we did
not own Canada, for instance ! In days long past a British
statesman might well have said, "If we had not Canada";
but since Canada has been almost completely a self-governing
community, the language is absurd.
Military and naval expenditure, Mr. Chamberlain said, is
not "even mainly for the benefit of the United Kingdom,"
for every war "has had at the bottom a colonial interest."
If a farmer were to complain that his expenditures were not
for his own benefit but for the benefit of his farm, he would
speak as sensibly as Mr. Chamberlain spoke.
182 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
But Mr. Chamberlain was incorrect in his facts, for surely
it is wrong to say that the Crimean war (in which, as Lord
Salisbury said, "we put our money on the wrong horse")
or the Chinese wars were undertaken, not for British interests
but out of regard for the interests of other people. The Boer
war happened after Mr. Chamberlain spoke; but were the
£250,000,000 spent in the interest of any colony, or merely in
the acquisition of a new one ?
Mr. Chamberlain would agree that the greatness of the
United Kingdom has come to her through her ownership of
dependencies and colonies. She has spent much to get
them; but out of them she has made many times more —
she has made her present position in the world ; she has made
her wealth and her power.
And as colonies become less valuable — become more
independent (sometimes with protective tariffs of their own) —
British interest in them fails and British expenditure upon
them ceases. While the United Kingdom controlled Cana-
dian trade and formulated her fiscal policies, British regi-
ments were quartered in her cities; but free trade (and pro-
tection afterwards) having rendered the ownership of Canada
a matter of indifference, we were told that we were millstones
around British necks and counselled to take care of our-
selves.
Addressing Canada specially, Mr. Chamberlain told her that
if she
"had not behind her . . . this great military and naval power
of Great Britain, she would have to make concessions to her
neighbors and to accept views which might be extremely
distasteful to her in order to remain permanently on good
terms with them."
That may be true; but British policy has inured us to
humiliations of that sort. The "great military and naval
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 183
power" has no doubt been behind us, but so far behind that
it has been of very little service to us.
Had Canadians done their own bargaining with the United
States they would almost certainly have far more territory
than they own to-day. They would never merely "in order
to remain permanently on good terms with them" (the Ameri-
cans) have presented those Americans with all the states
between the Ohio and the Mississippi (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, and Wisconsin) together with a possibility of the
acquisition of all territory between these and the Pacific (Iowa,
Nebraska, Minnesota, Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho,
Oregon, Washington, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Utah,
Nevada, and part of California). We could have bought a
great many concessions with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, for
example. Perhaps with these extra provinces, we might
have been strong enough to resist concessions !
Not having detailed records of this Conference of 1897,
we cannot say whether the colonial Premiers pointed out some
of these things to Mr. Chamberlain. Probably they did not.
It would have been useless labor. Let us note, however, that
if Mr. Chamberlain was permitted the honors of debate, he
got very little else, save from Cape Colony, its Premier an-
nouncing that he was
"prepared to offer on behalf of the colony an unconditional
contribution of the cost of a first-class battleship."
A contribution of £30,000 per annum was afterwards (1898)
substituted for the battleship.
The Australasian Premiers passed the following resolution:
" That the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty with
reference to the Australian squadron is most satisfactory, and
the Premiers of Australasia favor the continuance of the
Australian squadron under the terms of the existing agree-
ment" (lb. p. 18).
184 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
This is all Mr. Chamberlain heard in answer to his request
for the views of the Premiers
"in regard to this question of contribution ... to the naval
defence of the Empire."
As to interchange of regiments, the record of the Conference
has the following:
" The suggestion made for an occasional interchange of mili-
tary units between the mother country and the colonies was
generally recognized as one likely to prove useful in increasing
the efficiency of the colonial forces; and the Premiers of these
colonies which possess permanent forces of a purely military
character expressed their intention of examining on their
return what legislative or other measures might be necessary
in order to give effect to it as opportunity offered " (lb. p. 18).
Nothing was done.
CONFEKENCE OF 1902 — CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
IMPERIAL NAVY
The enormous expenditure upon the Boer war and the
proved inadequacy of the forces of the United Kingdom for
conflict with European armies, induced a very decided alter-
ation in Mr. Chamberlain's attitude toward the colonies.
In 1897 he had said to the Conference:
" We are open to consider in the most friendly and the most
favorable way any representations which may be made to us
by the representatives of the self-governing colonies, having
regard to the present or future relations between the different
parts of the Empire, and in this respect we are in the position
of those who desire rather to learn your views than to press
ours upon you" (" Proceedings," p. 4).
And he distinctly declared that nothing which he said had
"any pressure behind it." In 1902 his tone was captious
and complaining, if not petulant and peremptory:
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 185
"As regards imperial defence, I propose to lay before you,
for your information, a paper which will show the comparative
amount of the ordinary naval and military expenditure of the
United Kingdom and of the different self-governing colonies.
You will find that in the case of the United Kingdom the cost
of our armaments has enormously increased since 1897. That
increase is not entirely due to our initiative, but is forced upon
us by the action of other powers who have made great advances
especially in connection with the navy, which we have found it
to be our duty and necessity to equal. But the net result is
extraordinary. At the present moment the estimates for the
present year for naval and military expenditure in the United
Kingdom — not including the extraordinary war expenses, but
the normal estimates — involve an expenditure per head of
the population of the United Kingdom of 29s. 3d. — 29s. 3d
per head per annum."
Sir Wilfrid Laurier: "Are the military and naval to-
gether?"
Mr. Chamberlain: "Military and naval together. In
Canada the same items involve an expenditure of only 2s. per
head of the population, about one-fifteenth of that incurred
by the United Kingdom. In New South Wales — I have not
the figures for the commonwealth as a whole, but I am giving
those as illustrations — and I find that in New South Wales
the expenditure is 3s. 5d. ; in Victoria, 3s. 3d. ; in New Zealand,
3s. 4d.; and in the Cape and Natal, I think it is between 2s.
and 3s. Now, no one, I think, will pretend that this is a fair
distribution of the burdens of Empire. No one will believe that
the United Kingdom can, for all time, make this inordinate
sacrifice.
" And I would beg of you in this relation to bear in mind that
you are not asked — your people are not asked — to put upon
their own shoulders any burden for the exclusive advantage of
the mother country. On the contrary, if the United Kingdom
stood alone as a mere speck in the northern sea, it is certain that
its expenditure for these purposes of defence might be immensely
curtailed. It is owing to its duties and obligations to its
colonies throughout the Empire; and it is owing to its trade
with those colonies, a trade in which of course they are equally
interested with ourselves, that the necessity has been cast upon
us to make these enormous preparations. And I think, there-
fore, you will agree with me that it is not unreasonable for us
to call your serious attention to a state of things which cannot
186 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
be permanent. I hope that we are not likely to make upon
you any demand which would seem to you to be excessive. We
know perfectly well your difficulties, as you probably are
acquainted with ours. Those difficulties are partly political,
partly, principally probably, fiscal difficulties. The dispro-
portion to which I have called your attention, cannot, under
any circumstances, be immediately remedied, but I think that
something may be done — I hope that something will be done
— to recognize more effectually than has hitherto been done
the obligation of all to contribute to the common weal"
(" Proceedings/' pp. 4, 5).
In a memorandum supplied by the First Lord of the Ad-
miralty is the following :
"In reply to an inquiry I undertook to endeavor to form
an estimate of the naval obligations which would be forced upon
the British Dominions beyond the seas if they were nations with
a separate existence and not, as now, partner-nations of the
British Empire, and it was suggested that the proper compari-
son would be between the commonwealth of Australia and
New Zealand or the Dominion of Canada and some state with
a population of about the same size.
" I pointed out that if such a basis of comparison were chosen,
the annual naval expenditure of Holland is £1,400,000, and
that of Argentina £920,000, not to mention a past capital ex-
penditure of several millions which must have been incurred in
the creation of the fleets and for the proper equipment of dock-
yards and naval bases. These countries were only taken
because their populations roughly correspond in size with those
of Australasia and Canada, and not because they are in other
respects in any way comparable. Indeed, I submitted that
this was not an adequate or satisfactory comparison. Each
great group of Dominions beyond the seas would, so it seemed
to me, have to face the naval position in which it found itself,
and the governing conditions of that position would be the
political and geographical environment of the group. As a
matter of fact, each of these groups would find itself within the
orbit of a great naval power. The Dominion of Canada would
have to frame its naval policy with a view to the navy of the
United States. The commonwealth of Australia and New
Zealand would be forced to remember that France in New
Caledonia, and Germany in New Guinea are near neighbors.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 187
Cape Colony and Natal would constantly find themselves
reminded of the fact that France is their neighbor in the
Indian Ocean, in Madagascar, and that the greater part of
Western South Africa is German" (lb. p. 19).
This English way of regarding Canadian affairs would be
incredible were it not so persistently exemplified. There is
probably not a single man in Canada who, if his country had
"a separate existence/' would dream of forming his "naval
policy with a view to the navy of the United States." Noth-
ing could be more insane. Possibly some Canadians might
advocate establishment of a land force with a view to the
United States army — there would be very few even of these
— but to build up navies against one another, when almost all
the fighting would be done on land, would be idiotic. The
First, and all the other Lords of the Admiralty, might
see, for it is clear enough, that if Canada had "a separate
existence," her reasons for a navy would not be increased,
but would be reduced by the removal of all chances of war
through association with the United Kingdom.
Mr. Chamberlain's influence during the five years between
the Conferences of 1897 and 1902 had had its effect upon every
colony except Canada; and his efforts were now rewarded
by contributions as follows:
Cape Colony £50,000 *
Australia 200,000 2
New Zealand 40,000 2
Natal 35,000 ■
Newfoundland 3,000 2
Notwithstanding these contributions the First Lord of the
Admiralty contended that the British taxpayer was still
paying more than his share; and the following table was
produced to the Conference:
1 Unconditional offer. * Under agreement as to application.
188
IMPERIAL DEFENCE
Population (white)
Naval contribu-
tion per caput
per annum
s. d.
United Kingdom
Cape Colony
Commonwealth of Australia
41,454,621
538,000
3,765,805
15 2
1 10}
1 Of
Dominion of Canada
5,338,883
Nil
Natal
Newfoundland
New Zealand
64,951
210,000
772,719
10 9}
3i
1 0}
The First Lord argued that this was unfair; and with
characteristic insularity added:
"The danger to the Empire which I fear is that Canada, South
Africa, and Australia, being in fact continents, should become
too continental, and too little maritime in their aspirations and
ideas."
He deemed it of great importance, he said :
"that they should cultivate the maritime spirit; that their
population should become maritime as ours are."
The impossibility of making Manitoba people "cultivate
the maritime spirit" rather than their farms was well illus-
trated during the visit to the west, a few years ago, of repre-
sentatives of the Navy League. The railways, as usual, were
short of rolling-stock; the wheat was choking the elevators;
and when applied to for funds for battleships, a farmer re-
plied : " Damn the battleships ; it's box-cars we want." Pos-
sibly the First Lord would describe that reply as somewhat
" too continental " ; but he must remember that it is very diffi-
cult in one lecture to give to an elephant all the special char-
acteristics of an amphibian. \
CONFERENCE OF 1902 — IMPERIAL MILITARY DEFENCE
The indefinite haphazard sort of relationship that exists
between the various parts of the Empire is nowhere better
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 189
exemplified than in regard to the subject of defence. One
would have imagined that if there was nothing in any empire
constitution providing for respective duty in case of war,
there would at all events be some agreement or understanding
with reference to mutual support. But there is none. The
following is an extract from a memorandum presented at the
Conference of 1902 by the War Office:
"Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, so far as
any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole
had been considered, it was assumed that the military responsi-
bilities of our great self-governing colonies were limited to
local defence, and that the entire burden of furnishing re-
enforcements to any portion of the Empire against which a
hostile attack in force might be directed must fall on the
regular army. There may possibly have been some pious hope
that in time of need the colonies might rally to the mother
country, but no definite arrangements were made, nor were
inquiries even on foot as to whether such aid might be expected,
and if so, in what strength. Indeed, the necessity for it was
by no means realized and its reliability was doubted.
"The experience of the South African war has, however,
established two important facts:
" (a) That the regular army, as organized before the war, was
by itself inadequate in strength to the military needs of the
Empire.
" (6) That the self-governing colonies are willing and able to
assist in making good some part of the deficiency in military
strength which the war has disclosed.
" (d) Under the existing conditions of the political constitution
of the Empire, there is no central authority vested in the im-
perial government, which is empowered to draw up in London,
and enforce throughout the Empire, a definite uniform organiza-
tion for imperial service. We can only make suggestions to
the self-governing colonies and rely on the good-will and
loyalty of their various ministries to give effect to our sug-
gestions." '
At this Conference the Admiralty succeeded in obtaining
more complete control of the Australasian squadron, Aus-
1 "Colonial Conference, 1902," pp. 47, 48.
190 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
tralia and New Zealand agreeing that although the base of
the force should be "the ports of Australia and New Zealand,"
yet that its "sphere of operations" might be extended to the
waters of "the China and East India Stations" — in other
words, as far west as the coast of Africa, as far northwest
as the Persian Gulf, and as far north as Siberia. It was not
probable, however, that Australia would very long be satis-
fied with an arrangement of that sort.
Without any previous agreement, and without any legal
or constitutional obligation, Canada had contributed to the
Boer war 8400 men, 1 and $3,000,000. 2 But Mr. Chamberlain
was not satisfied. He asserted that the colonies had not done
their share, 3 and he wanted them to make some definite and
adequate arrangement for the future. At this Conference of
1902 he told the colonies (as we have seen) that it was
"inconsistent with their dignity as nations that they should
leave the mother country to bear the whole, or almost the
whole, of the expense";
and the Colonial Defence Committee presented a memorandum
in which they said:
" For these reasons the Colonial Defence Committee earnestly
hope that the great self-governing colonies may be able to give
some assurance as to the strength of the contingents which
they should be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's
government for extra-colonial service in a war with a European
power."
Here is again the peculiarly English view of things; Mr.
Chamberlain says that it is inconsistent with the dignity of
"nations" not to hand over their men and money to be dis-
1 Including garrison sent to Halifax to relieve the imperial garrison.
2 See "Proceedings of Conference of 1902," p. 42.
* He presented a statement showing that if Canada had contributed
as liberally as the United Kingdom to the war, she should have sent over
40,000 men instead of 8400, and over $150,000,000 instead of $3,013,200.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 191
posed of by another nation. His view is that British states-
men should make such wars as they please; settle without
war such quarrels as they please; and that the colonies,
recognizing " the obligation of all to contribute to the common
weal," should cheerfully and without question or hesitation
send their men and money whenever and wherever demanded.
Canada, on the other hand, believes that compliance with
such a demand would be inconsistent with her dignity as a
self-governing community. The answer of Canada and Aus-
tralia to the committee's proposal was as follows :
"The representatives of Canada and Australia were of
opinion that the best course to pursue was to endeavor to
raise the standard of training for the general body of their
forces, to organize the departmental services and equipment
required for the mobilization of a field force, leaving it to the
colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to what extent
it should render assistance. n
It is difficult to imagine what else Mr. Chamberlain could
have properly expected from "nations." The reply of Cape
Colony and Natal was as follows:
"The enormous preponderance of the native population in
the colonies of the Cape and Natal render it impossible for us
to agree to any proposal involving the obligation to furnish a
military contingent in the event of a war in which the imperial
government may be involved in any other part of the Empire." l
In order that the colonies might have contingents ready
for foreign service when called for, the Colonial Defence
Committee proposed that the colonies should organize special
forces under obligation to go abroad, and offered to pay a
share of the expense involved. 2 Sir Frederick Borden on
behalf of Canada objected. He said :
1 "Conference Report," p. 20.
1 See Toronto Globe, October 24, 1902.
192 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
"The suggestion which was made that there should be a
special force known as the imperial force for service abroad is
one I cannot subscribe to, because I believe in the first place
it would have a derogatory effect on the militia itself. I am
quite certain, from what I know of the militia of Canada, that
to have a special force receiving special favors, specially
named, specially drilled and trained, would have an unfavor-
able effect on the militia at large.
"It seems to me that I do not think it necessary that a set of
men shall be labelled as being set apart for any particular ser-
vice, but that our militia should be made absolutely effective,
so that when the moment arrives, we can take part and assist
the imperial army by a voluntary enlistment." 1
The answer of Canada to all these proposals was put in
precise form and presented to the Conference. It is a reitera-
tion of the principle of colonial self-government — a principle
that Mr. Chamberlain is fond of talking about and even com-
mending, but has never been able to understand. He has,
in recent years, been its most strenuous opponent. Canada's
reply was in these words :
" The Canadian ministers regret that they have been unable
to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Selborne respecting
the navy and by Mr. St. John Brodrick respecting the army.
The ministers desire to point out that their objections arise,
not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that
the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important
departure from the principle of colonial self-government.
Canada values highly the measure of local independence which
has been granted it from time to time by the imperial authori-
ties, and which has been so productive of beneficial results,
both as respects the material progress of the country and the
strengthening of the ties that bind it to the motherland. But
while, for these reasons, the Canadian ministers are obliged to
withhold their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and
the War Office, they fully appreciate the duty of the Dominion,
as it advances in population and wealth, to make more liberal
outlay for those necessary preparations of self-defence which
every country has to assume and bear.
1 Sir Frederick's remarks were quoted by himself at the Conference
of 1907, and, in that way, are known. (See p. 115.)
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 193
"That the taxpayers of the United Kingdom should desire
to be relieved of some of the burdens which they bear in con-
nection with military expenditure is quite reasonable. Can-
ada, in the development of its own militia system, will be found
ready to respond to that desire by taking upon itself some of
the services in the Dominion which have hitherto been borne
by the imperial government. What has already been done
by Canada must give assurance of the disposition of the Cana-
dian people to recognize their proper obligations.
" At present, Canadian expenditures for defence services are
confined to the military side. The Canadian government are
prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On
the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large number of men ad-
mirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped that
at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the
training of these men and to the making of their services avail-
able for defence in time of need.
" In conclusion, the ministers repeat that, while the Canadian
government are obliged to dissent from the measure proposed,
they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make
expenditure for the purposes of defence in proportion to the
increasing population and wealth of the country. They are
willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve
the taxpayer of the mother country from some of the burdens
which he now bears; and they have the strongest desire to
carry out their defence schemes in cooperation with the imperial
authorities, and under the advice of experienced imperial
officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local
self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the
promotion of imperial unity."
It is very extraordinary how impossible it is to get many
people to grasp the full significance of such a simple state-
ment as this. We must not blame Mr. Chamberlain too much
for his failure to appreciate the attitude assumed, for, of all
the colonies, Canada is the only one that has rigidly adhered
to it; and there are not a few Canadians who think that the
principle of self-government can be carried too far.
194 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
BETWEEN THE CONFERENCES OF 1902 AND 1907
Australia was not very well satisfied with the new naval
arrangements made for her at the Conference of 1902. She
was not convinced by the assertion of the Admiralty that in
discussing naval operations " the word ' defence ' would be mis-
leading," and by the argument that its omission is justified,
" because the primary object of the British navy is not to defend
anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy and, by defeat-
ing them, to afford protection to British Dominions, shipping,
and commerce" ("Proceedings," p. 55).
Any other view was condemned by the Admiralty as "heret-
ical," for
"the real problem which the Empire has to face in the case of
a naval war is simply and absolutely to find out where the
ships of the enemy are, to concentrate the greatest possible
force where those ships are, and to destroy those ships. . . .
It follows from this that there can be no localization of naval
forces in the strict sense of the word" (lb. p. 15).
To many persons in Australia that might be true enough,
but they could not quiet the thought that while the British
navy was engaged in finding out " where the ships of the enemy
are" and in looking for them in various wrong places (as Nel-
son did), a few of them might stray over to Australia. Send-
ing every warship into the Arabian Sea or the Sea of Japan
might be the best of strategy, but would England send the
Channel Fleet there? 1
1 In the hand-book of the Navy League (December 2, 1902) the
Editor gives an extract from the report of the committee on naval ma-
noeuvres as follows : "There should always be an effective reserve squad-
ron, absolutely confined to home waters, sufficient to hold the channel
and protect the coasts and commerce of the United Kingdom, in addi-
tion to the coast defence ships which would be required for active local
defence." The Editor adds: "The experience of the Spanish- American
war has shown that public opinion will always clamor for a home
squadron. We had a squadron in the channel all through the Trafalgar
campaign."
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 195
In 1903 Senator Matheson of Australia addressed the Royal
Colonial Institute in defence of the Australian view. He
quoted various authorities, amongst others that of Sir George
Clarke:
" Small expeditions directed, not to effect territorial conquests,
but to destroy national resources, may, nevertheless, as in the
past, evade a superior navy. Such expeditions are of the na-
ture of raids."
Referring to the naval brigades that in earlier days the Aus-
tralian colonies had organized, the Senator said:
" The blighting influence of direct Admiralty control on local
aspirations is beyond dispute, and its clearest evidence can be
found in the fact that in New South Wales alone of all the
states, though provided with one of the most magnificent har-
bors in the world, with a population crazy on yachting and
boating, and with the headquarters of both British and Aus-
tralian squadrons, the local naval forces have been pronounced
a farce. I quote from Sir William Lyne, till recently Premier
of New South Wales, and now Federal Minister for Home
Affairs, who, speaking of the naval brigade of his own state
in Parliament, said as follows :
" ' I do not know whether the members of these forces were
ever on the water, there is certainly no provision for a ship.
It is ridiculous to have so-called Naval Volunteer Artillery and
Naval Brigades which are practically land forces ' — and so
on. Could one find a more striking commentary on the present
position, or a greater justification for Australia's dissatisfaction
at the result of her annual expenditure of £106,000? One
million three hundred and seventy-eight thousand pounds spent
to date (1902) and not a single trained Australian sailor in
return."
The Senator advocated the Canadian idea — the commence-
ment of an Australian fleet:
11 Twelve years' experience of the system under which the
present subsidy is spent has satisfied us that the result of local
control could not at any rate be worse, and might possibly be
better."
196 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
The discussion which followed the lecture is interesting and
instructive. 1
CONFERENCE OF 1907 — NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Colonial Conference of 1907 brought Canada's justi-
fication upon all points relating to naval and military defence.
In the opening speech the Prime Minister (Campbell-Banner-
man) made only one remark about it, but he covered almost
the whole ground :
" On this I may say that I think the views sometimes taken
of the proper relations of the colonies to the mother country
with respect to expenditure on armaments have been, of late,
somewhat modified. We do not meet you to-day as claimants
for money, although we cordially recognize the spirit in which
contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt,
be made in the future. It is, of course, possible to over-
estimate the importance of the requirements of the oversea
Dominions as a factor in our expenditure; but however this
may be, the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs hang together. . . . You in common
with us are representatives of self-governing communities" (" Pro-
ceedings," p. 5).
That is precisely the Canadian view. The First Lord of the
Admiralty (Lord Tweedmouth) said :
"I know that you gave to the government and to the
Admiralty with a free and unstinting hand, the help that you
thought you could manage to give. Gentlemen, I have only
one reservation to make, and in making it I ask that, as we
have proved ourselves successful in the past, you should put
your trust in us now. The only reservation that the Admiralty
desire to make is, that they claim to have the charge of the
strategical questions which are necessarily involved in naval
defence, to hold the command of the naval forces of the coun-
try, and to arrange the distribution of ships in the best pos-
sible manner to resist attacks and to defend the Empire at
large, whether it be our own islands or the Dominions beyond
1 See the Journal of the Institute, p. 297.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 197
the seas. . . . There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there
is one navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help,
and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage
this great service without restraint" (lb. p. 129).
In other words, the Admiralty was of opinion that contribu-
tions under arrangements for local defence were undesirable.
Lord Tweedmouth added that the government was
" ready to consider a modification of the existing arrangements
to meet the views of the various colonies. In the opinion of
the government, while the distribution of the fleet must be
determined by strategical requirements of which the Admiralty
are the judge, it would be of great assistance if the colonial
governments would undertake to provide for local service in the
imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are useful for
defence against possible raids or for cooperation with a squadron ;
and also to equip and maintain docks and fitting establishments
which can be used by His Majesty's ships. It will further be
of much assistance if coaling facilities are provided, and arrange-
ments can be made for a supply of coal and naval stores which
otherwise would have to be sent out specially or purchased
locally.
"I understand that in Australia particularly, and in South
Africa, it is desired to start some naval service of your own. Per-
haps I might suggest that if the provision of the smaller craft
which are necessarily incident to the work of a great fleet of
modern battleships could be made locally, it would be a very
great help to the general work of the navy. You cannot take
the small craft, such as torpedo boats and submarines, across
the ocean; and for warships to arrive in South Africa, or in
Australia or in New Zealand or in Canada, and find ready to
their hand well-trained men in good vessels of this kind would
be an enormous advantage to them. It would be an enormous
advantage to find ready to their hand, men well trained, ready
to take a part in the work of the fleet. There is, I think, the
further advantage in these small flotillas, that they will be an
admirable means of coast defence; that you will be able by the
use of them to avoid practically all danger from any sudden raid
which might be made by a cruising squadron. What I should like
to point out is that, above all things in this work, the submarine
is probably the most important and the most effective weapon.
198 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
It is the weapon with which you can meet a fleet attacking
during the day or individual ships attacking by day. ... I
think perhaps it is impossible suddenly to make a change. /
would suggest that a beginning should be made, and that probably
the best way to start would be to allocate to local purposes certain
portions of the subsidies already given" (lb. pp. 130, 131).
Lord Tweedmouth in this way admitted the correctness
of Australia's contention as to raids and local defence. Mr.
Deakin (Australia) said:
"Australia's responsibility [for naval defence] is now fixed
on a monetary standard; and we submit that this is not the
most acceptable standard for Australia, nor is it likely to further
the objects that we have, or the objects that you have, in main-
taining the present contribution' ' (lb. p. 132).
Sir Joseph Ward (New Zealand) was more reserved. Out
of a small budget, he said:
"we should hesitate to impose upon ourselves the burden of
the construction of ships of war, or of any great liabilities con-
nected with the maintenance of ships of war, or any great
financial responsibilities other than we actually commit our-
selves to in a defined agreement " (lb. p. 135).
The proposal of the Admiralty, he said, for a change from a
"money basis" should be carefully considered. He did not
want
"to raise questions which might be looked upon as trouble-
some, but we do fear some of the eastern countries, whose teem-
ing millions, so close to Australia and New Zealand as they are,
under an educational process in the years to come, may find the
attractions of our country sufficient to induce them to give us
some trouble" (lb. p. 137).
Dr. Smartt (Cape Colony) said:
" I also fully agree, and am perfectly certain that the people
of the Cape will agree, in the necessity of assisting the Ad-
miralty, that the outlying portions of the Empire should pro-
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 199
vide small craft, such as submarines and torpedo-boats, not
alone for the defence of our shores, but to be joined on to any
squadron sent from Great Britain in periods of great emergency,
it being a great difficulty, or almost impossible, to send torpedo-
craft many thousands of miles to sea. As the Admiralty say
they would welcome a departure of that sort, I think the people
at the Cape, knowing that they were really fundamentally
assisting in building up the navy, would, when times improve,
be prepared to increase their contribution; and I also presume
that would be the position of Natal" (lb. p. 142).
Sir Robert Bond (Newfoundland) said :
"In 1902 I entered into an agreement with the Admiralty
on behalf of my colony in the matter of the establishment of
a Naval Reserve, which should be liable for service, if found to
be necessary, beyond the limits of the colony and in any part
of the Empire. Up to the present time it has been a very
marked success indeed. On the roll there are now some five
hundred and ninety men who have distinguished themselves in
His Majesty's service, according to the reports of the commo-
dores upon that station. Any large contribution that the
colony may give in the future must be in the direction of the
service of such men" (lb. p. 143).
Mr. Moore (Natal) said:
"But I do trust also that the Admiralty will meet us in
getting that contribution made more in the direction which
I have tried to indicate than by simply a cold lump sum,
voted on our estimates, for which we have no actual evidence
as directly concerning the people we represent" (lb. p. 146).
General Botha (Transvaal) said:
" I think that at present we are so constituted in the Trans-
vaal that we shall find it difficult to make a contribution to the
navy by way of a money payment."
On a subsequent day, after private correspondence with
the various Prime Ministers, Lord Tweedmouth again ad-
dressed the Conference:
" As I understand, Australia puts forward a proposal that the
agreement of 1902 should be ended, and that Australia should
200 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
start something in the way of a local defence force. I do not
know how far New Zealand concurs in that suggestion. Sir
Joseph Ward asked for some information on the subject, and
he had some talk at the Admiralty about it. He asked that
some information might be given to him with regard to the
cost of such a local defence, which in effect was to be founded
on the establishment of a force of submarines. I do not know
what is Sir Joseph's view, but I think it is rather important I
should know the exact position he takes up if he adopts the
idea of the possible establishment of a submarine service"
(lb. p. 469).
"Then comes the question of South Africa. There, again,
I believe the idea of submarines is not altogether opposed to
the opinion of the South African representatives, and I believe
that the establishment of a flotilla of submarines by degrees
would be favorably considered, at any rate in Cape Colony;
I do not know what Mr. Moore would say with regard to Natal.
As I understand, the South African colonies as a whole would
like to have some definite force of their own, either a submarine
flotilla, or help with regard to their naval volunteers at Cape
Town, Port Elizabeth, and in Natal. Again we should be very
glad to give some help with regard to that" (lb. pp. 469, 470).
Mr. Deakin (Australia) said:
"In conceding perfect freedom, notwithstanding the existence
of an obligation which has yet several years to run, you have
shown in every possible manner your desire to keep in close
accord with the feelings of the outer Dominions. In Australia,
for reasons which have already been put on record in the
despatch which I had the honor of addressing to the Admiralty
about two years ago, the existing contribution has not proved
generally popular. It was passed because it was felt that some
distinct recognition of our responsibility for the defence of
our own country and of the Empire of which it is a part was
necessary, and though it did not take the form which com-
mended itself most to the very large minority, possibly even a
majority, of the electors, we accepted that mode of cooperation
until some better presented itself. Further consideration has
convinced the public that the present agreement is not satisfactory
either to the Admiralty, the political or professional Lords of the
Admiralty, or to the Parliament of the commonwealth" (lb. p.
473).
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 201
"The Committee of Imperial Defence, after giving this
question full consideration, have decided that a regular attack-
ing force is not to be anticipated in our Antipodean situation
under any circumstances that it is necessary to directly pro-
vide for in advance. They look forward to the possibilities of a
raid, consisting in all likelihood of some four fast half-armored
or partly armored cruisers, carrying forces of from five hundred
to, at the outside, one thousand men. Even an expedition of
those small dimensions, calling for a very considerable provision
in the way of fuel and other arrangements, would make only a
transitory dash for our ports and shipping, rather than a series
of prolonged attacks. But whatever the nature of the assault
is to be, its possibility leaves the large population of our sea-
board states with a sense of insecurity, emphasized by the
probability of the withdrawal of the squadron some thousands
of miles away to deal with the expected enemy there. Conse-
quently the demand for some harbor and coast defence has
been pressed upon the minds of the people in general, and has
been lately several times considered by Parliament. It is
thought that while it may be the best possible naval strategy to
withdraw the squadron to remote portions of the seas surrounding
Australia, the contingency of our being raided, even by a few
cruisers, and of our commerce being driven into the harbors
or destroyed or enclosed in the harbors, is not one that a
community ought to contemplate unmoved. Hence our desire
for the local protection to which you have already alluded.
Our proposal to replace the existing agreement by the establish-
ment of a force in Australian waters is not due to motives of
economy. On the contrary, although it will involve a greater
expenditure upon maritime defence than we have ever under-
taken, I believe that those proposals will be willingly accepted
by Parliament " (lb. p. 474).
" For our part, Lord Tweedmouth, your overture will be made
known in the commonwealth. Your words of counsel and
approval will be very highly esteemed. We recognize this as a
further step in the exercise of our self-governing powers with which
are properly attached the responsibilities which can never be dis-
sociated from them" (lb. p. 475).
But it took Australia a good many years to see that point,
even with the help of Canada's example before her. Dr.
Smartt (Cape Colony) said :
202 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
" Further, I take it that the proposition the Admiralty make
is that they would encourage the spirit of local defence and local
assistance for naval purposes, and that the best direction in
which that could take effect would be either in the direction of
submarines, or I suppose the Admiralty would also be prepared
to consider the question of destroyers."
Lord Tweedmouth. "Certainly" (76. p. 479).
Mr. Brodeur pardonably reminded the Conference of Can-
ada's position:
"There was a discussion in previous years to the effect that
we should contribute something directly to the British navy.
I may say with regard to that, there is only one mind in Canada
on that question, and if it was necessary, I should be able to
quote the remarks made lately in an article published by Sir
Charles Tupper, who is certainly one of the men best qualified
to speak in Canada upon the question. I think, perhaps, I
might mention what he said in regard to that. He said: 'It
is known that from the outset I have felt the interests of Canada
and the true interests of the Empire to be opposed to the demand
for colonial contributions to the imperial navy/ and 'I main-
tain that Canada has discharged that duty in the manner most
conducive to imperial interests.' So it shows that both sides
of politics in Canada agree with the policy which has been
going on for some years there. He adds, also, in that article,
that ' Canada protects her fisheries by her own cruisers, and
when the imperial government expressed a wish to be relieved
of the expense of maintaining the strategic points at the har-
bors of Halifax and Esquimalt, the Canadian government at
once relieved them of that large expenditure, amounting to
£185,000 per annum. 7 Negotiations are now going on for
taking over the naval stations there. I do not know exactly
what will be the amount by which the Admiralty will be re-
lieved, but I think it is a somewhat large amount.
"Since the matter has been brought before this Conference,
I may say that Parliament has voted a large sum of money
for the purpose of purchasing another cruiser and putting that
cruiser on the Pacific coast for the protection of our fisheries"
(lb. p. 481).
The Canadian policy, based upon the great principle of
self-government, had hardly been thus unanimously accepted
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 203
before Dr. Smartt (Cape Colony) moved a resolution in
derogation of it:
"That this Conference, recognizing the vast importance of
the services rendered by the navy to the defence of the Empire
and the protection of its trade, and the paramount importance
of continuing to maintain the navy in the highest possible
state of efficiency, considers it to be the duty of the Dominions
beyond the seas to make such contribution toward the upkeep
of the navy as may be determined by their local legislatures —
the contribution to take the form of a grant of money, the
establishment of local naval defence, or such other services, in
such manner as may be decided upon, after consultation with
the Admiralty and as would best accord with their varying
circumstances " (lb. p. 541).
Not having a sufficiently firm grip of the Canadian idea of
self-government, Dr. Smartt said:
"I do not think anybody can take exception to the resolu-
tion, because it distinctly states that it is subject to the votes
of the individual legislatures ; and that though the money will
only be spent after consultation with the Admiralty, it does
not in any way take away from the individual colony its rights
to be heard, and practically to decide the best manner in which
that money can be spent" (lb. p. 541).
Canada's " rights to be heard" as to the manner of spending
her own money are not the sort of rights she asserts. To her,
self-government means something more than spending her
money "after consultation" with somebody. Moreover, as
Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, Canada was not willing to commit
herself to a "general claim," and for that reason said he would
vote against the resolution. He stood alone in opposition to
it. But that was enough. It was withdrawn. The colonies
were left free to spend their own money as they pleased, with-
out the necessity of consultation with anybody. Sir Wilfrid
never swerved from the great principle, which on the first
day of the Conference he formulated in these words:
204 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
" But upon one thing we are all agreed, and I believe that if
we can keep this in view, we can never go astray ; that is to say,
that if the basis of the union which now binds the British Empire
remains as it is now, a proper and always permanent recognition
of the principle that every community knows best what does
for itself, then we cannot go wrong, and our deliberations must
be fruitful. This is the spirit, at all events for my part, in which
I approach the great subjects we have to discuss" (lb. p. 7).
CONFERENCE OF 1907 — MILITARY DEFENCE
The position assumed by Canada and Australia at the Con-
ference of 1902 (each colony to determine for itself what it
should do "when the need arose"), Sir Wilfrid Laurier's
House of Commons speech (declining on behalf of Canada
"to enter into the vortex"), and Sir Frederick Borden's re-
fusal to organize a special force for foreign service — all re-
ceived support at the Conference of 1907. For example,
Sir Joseph Ward (New Zealand) said :
"Our country is very anxious and willing to assist the old
land in the event of trouble arising, to do so voluntarily by
men or by money, and I think always would be ready to do its
share in fighting for the defence of the motherland in any por-
tion of the world. We want to keep clear of the possibility of
being drawn into what one might term continental trouble with
England itself. We want to have a distinct line of demarcation
drawn in that respect between the responsibility we accept of
our own free will and the responsibility that may be imposed
upon us without our having had an opportunity of conference
or discussion with regard to it" (" Proceedings," p. 32).
Sir Frederick Borden (Canada) said :
" It should be pointed out at once that so far as the Dominions
beyond the seas are concerned, at any rate so far as Canada is
concerned, we have no authority under our militia law to do
anything beyond expend money and make preparations for the
defence of Canada itself. We are absolutely limited in words
to that. We cannot call our militia out for active service for
any purpose beyond the defence of Canada. Although Canada
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 205
took part in the troubles in South Africa, it was done by a force
which volunteered specially for the purpose and made a special
contract for that purpose. I do not see very well how any
responsibility could be undertaken to supply any force for any
other purpose without an amendment in the law. Further,
there is a provision within the law of Canada that if it is desir-
able to contribute a force to imperial defence abroad, Parlia-
ment shall be called together; the idea being that each case shall
be dealt with when it arises" (lb. p. 99).
Sir Joseph Ward, speaking again, said :
" I am not going to take up the time of the Conference at any
great length. I want to say that the aspect upon one point
put forward by the Minister of Defence of the Dominion of
Canada, as to the powers of his country to incur responsibilities
outside of his own Dominion, apply with equal force to New
Zealand. We are responsible for the country. Our people in
the past have shown their readiness, and will do so upon every
occasion in the future, I have no doubt whatever, to adopt
flexible conditions to meet extraordinary circumstances, should
they arise" (lb. p. 108).
Dr. Smartt (Cape Colony) proposed the organization of
special forces for foreign service :
"A point upon which I am extremely anxious to hear the
opinion of my friend General Botha is as to whether we should
not disband and reenroll our permanent forces on the under-
standing that they would be under obligations not alone to
serve anywhere in South Africa, but, in an emergency and
with the consent of the governments concerned, anywhere the
Empire might require. I believe the feeling of the people of
Cape Colony, and I hope the feeling of the general population
in South Africa, will be favorable to such a proposition ; and
I think if that principle were accepted by the other colonies,
it would be the first nucleus of a real imperial army. So far
as our permanent forces are concerned (I speak more of the
Cape Police and the C.M.R.), I am perfectly certain that prac-
tically all of them would be prepared to be reenrolled upon that
basis; that is to say, that they would be liable to be called upon
for service in any part of the world where they might be re-
quired " (76. p. 112).
206 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
Curiously enough Mr. Haldane (Secretary of State for War)
opposed this proposal :
" Dr. Smartt has raised a very important point as to whether
it would not be possible for each of the self-governing Dominions
of the Crown to raise a special contingent, as I may call it, for
service in the defence of the Empire. That would practically
put that contingent into the first line, leaving the second line
to be organized out of all the local forces. Well, of course one
sees a great many problems that may arise at once as regards
that, although it would be a most valuable thing if it could be
carried out. One sees the difficulty — to whom would that force
be responsible ? Who would have power to call it out on the out-
break of war t and so on f Would it be a volunteer force or
would it be a force which undertook the same kind of responsi-
bility as the first line itself ? namely, to obey the directions of
the commander-in-chief, whoever he may be, who was nomi-
nated to the supreme command of the war? Those are not
insuperable difficulties by any means, and I merely mention
them to show that that is probably a point upon which this
Conference cannot come to a detailed or definite conclusion
without going into matters" (lb. p. 114).
Sir Frederick Borden said :
" I would like to add a word. This very question was brought
up at the Conference five years ago and discussed thoroughly
and disposed of, for that time at least. I, perhaps, cannot put
the matter better than I put it then. I will read what I said
then." (He read the quotation given ante, p. 192.)
The Imperial Defence Committee. — Not being quite aware
what the Imperial Defence Committee really was, Mr. Deakin
(Australia) moved:
"That it is desirable that the colonies should be represented
on the Imperial Council of Defence, and that the colonies be
authorized to refer to that Council for advice on any local ques-
tions in regard to which any expert opinion or assistance is
deemed necessary."
It was explained to Mr. Deakin by the chairman (Lord
Elgin) that
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 207
"the Committee of Imperial Defence is a body which consists
of one member, the Prime Minister, and the other members are
summoned as occasion requires."
Mr. Haldane said:
" One is very familiar with the composition of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, which is a skeleton or nucleus body. I
always attend it, but I am not a standing member of it. It has
no fixed composition, but consists merely of the people who are
summoned, and, of course, if any question arose affecting any
particular colony, its representative would attend. The Prime
Minister is really the mainspring of the committee, and he
summons it as he wants it" (lb. p. 121).
And the Prime Minister sent the following memorandum:
"The Prime Minister considers that it might be with ad-
vantage made clear to the representatives of the colonies at
the coming Conference that the Committee of Imperial Defence
is intended to provide the means of discussing questions of a
general or local character relating to defence. It should, there-
fore, be open to the government of any self-governing colony
to submit these questions through the Colonial Office and to
obtain such advice as the committee is able to give. If so
desired, any representative of a colony which may wish for
advice may be summoned to attend as a member of the com-
mittee during the discussion on the question raised" (lb. p. 83).
The General Staff. — Referring to Count Von Moltke's
organization of the German armies, Mr. Haldane said :
"That he was able to do this, was due to the fact that the
organization and business administration of the army in peace
was kept entirely distinct from the service which consisted in
the study of war problems and in the higher training of the
staff and of the troops. That was the principle recommended
by the Esher Committee, and it culminated in the provision of
a brain for the army in the shape of a General Staff. That
General Staff we have been at work on for a long time past in
endeavoring to get together. The task was not as difficult
as it seemed at first, because the effect of the war was to bring
to the front a number of young officers who had shown remark-
able capacity and who constituted the nucleus of a serious and
208 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
thoughtful military school. They were got together under the
Esher reorganization, and virtually there has been a General
Staff in existence for some time. But it was not until last
September that it received formal and complete shape in the
Army Order of that month. The General Staff is now a de
jure body; it has been a de facto existing body for some time
past" (lb. p. 95).
"The practical point that we have to put before you is the
desirability of a certain broad plan of military organization for
the Empire. We know that you have all got your own diffi-
culties and the idiosyncrasies of your own people to deal with.
No rigid model is therefore of use. But a common purpose or
a common end may be very potent in furthering military
organization. For ourselves we have, over here, worked out
our organization quite definitely, and indeed the practical form
of it is at present the subject of plans which are before Parlia-
ment. This conception of defence is that the army should be
divided into two parts with distinct functions. There is a
part with defence as its primary main function, and it has no
obligation to go over the sea. That is raised by the citizens of
the particular Dominion of the Crown concerned, simply for
the purpose of home defence. There is the other part which
exists not for local defence, but for the service of the Empire
as a whole, the expeditionary force, which, in a country like
ours, must be naval as well as military — and I go further, and
say primarily naval" (lb. p. 95).
" Our main purpose in bringing this subject before you to-day
is to emphasize the desirability so 'far as possible that these
home forces of the various self-governing Dominions of the
Crown should be organized, if not to a common pattern —
because rigidity of pattern we recognize is impossible with the
varying circumstances of the various countries — yet with a
common end in view and with this common conception.
"My main purpose in addressing the Conference is to sug-
gest for your acceptance the opinion that the General Staff,
which we have created at home and which is in its infancy,
should receive as far as possible an imperial character. I will
define what I mean. It is not that we wish in the slightest
degree even to suggest that you should bow your heads to any
direction from home in military matters, but the General Staff
officer would have as his function this : Trained in a great com-
mon school, recruited, it may be, from the most varying parts
of the Empire, but educated in military science according to
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 209
common principles, he would be at the disposition of the heal
government or of the local Commander-in-Chief, whether he
were Canadian, British, or Australian, or New Zealander, or
South African, for giving advice and furnishing information
based upon the highest military study of the time" (lb. p. 96).
" You have, I think, some five General Staff Officers in Can-
ada at the present time. Now, as regards your General Staff
Officers, although you have a distinguished British General
Staff Officer with you, General Lake, there is no organic con-
nection between what is your General Staff in embryo and our
General Staff as we have just created it here. But suppose
we were studying at home, in the General Staff, great questions
of imperial defence and, amongst others, questions of imperial
defence in Canada, what an advantage it would be to us, and I
think to you also, if we sent you a General Staff Officer in ex-
change for one of your General Staff Officers, who should come
over here and who should be working with us at the very prob-
lems which concern the defence of the Empire as a whole in
Canada. And so with all the other affairs in the Crown's
Dominions. It seems to me that we might broaden the basis
of this General Staff which we have just created. It is a purely
advisory organization of which command is not a function"
(lb. p. 97).
With reference to these proposals, Sir Frederick Borden
said:
"Now I come more to the concrete part of Mr. Haldane's
statement, particularly to the most important proposal, the
resolution which we have before us, with reference to the estab-
lishment of the General Staff. I would like to know exactly,
if I could, whether it is intended that the General Staff, which
is responsible to the home government and to the Army Coun-
cil and the Secretary of State for War, is to be linked in with
General Staffs in the different parts of the Empire, or whether
this central General Staff is to have independent authority
throughout the Empire and in the different Dominions."
Mr. Haldane. "Not independent authority. It would be
a training-school which would send out and lend out experts.
Members of your local General Staff might also be members
of the imperial General Staff."
Sir Frederick Borden. "It seems to me that that is a
most important consideration. I would certainly favor it
210 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
strongly, and, as you have said, Mr. Haldane, Canada has al-
ready established a General Staff in embryo, and we hope to
develop it. We recognize the absolute necessity for the exist-
ence of such a body, but it really seems to me that we should
have our own General Staff responsible to the Canadian govern-
ment, and in the same way, all the other Dominions which
might, as you suggested, I think, exchange officers with your
staff; but I scarcely think it would do to have officers in the different
Dominions who were responsible in the first place to the Secretary
of State for War here"
Mr. Haldane. " The imperial General Staff for this purpose
is a purely advisory body."
Sir Frederick Borden. " So long as that is understood, I
would concur in that view, and I am very strongly indeed in
favor of the idea of exchange of officers. I think we should
do that, and we are doing it between the different departments
of the various services of this country and the Dominion. I
think, however, it is absolutely necessary that that point should
be thoroughly established, because I can see difficulties in the
way of an officer, for instance, in Canada considering himself
to be in a position to advise, whether directly or indirectly,
the War Office, without responsibility to the minister who has
charge of such matters in Canada, and without responsibility
to the principal military authority there. I do not wish to
elaborate that point any further, but I am glad to know that
you entirely concur in that view."
Mr. Haldane. "Certainly; and a memorandum will be
drawn up by Sir Neville Lyttleton which will be submitted to
you making that perfectly clear in detail, if we agree to carry
this resolution into effect" (lb. pp. 99, 100).
Mr. Deakin said :
"As to the interchange of officers, I am specially asked by
my colleague, the Minister of Defence of the commonwealth,
to press for an extension of that principle. We at present enjoy
the privilege of exchanging with Canada and with India and with
yourselves, single officers, sending to you and you sending to us.
We find that, in every way, a useful practice ; but we desire to
carry it out on a larger scale ; that is, larger for us because ours
must be on a small scale, as I need not remind you" (lb. p. 103).
Sir Joseph Ward (New Zealand) said :
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 211
" I would like to say I clearly understood from the observa-
tions of Mr. Haldane that what is suggested by him is in the
direction of suggestion and not anything binding on the part of
the colonies. What they may do will be of their voluntary
act or of their voluntary cooperation and assistance in the direc-
tion of assisting and bringing about a general scheme that would
be of advantage to the Empire as a whole. "
The resolution proposed was amended by inserting "at the
request of the respective governments" (p. 118) and was
passed in the following form :
"That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the
exposition of general principles embodied in the statement
of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to com-
mit any of the governments represented, recognizes and affirms
the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General
Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which
shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect
and disseminate to the various governments military informa-
tion and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes
of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least
interfering in questions connected with command and admin-
istration, shall, at the request of the respective governments, advise
as to the training, education, and war organization of the military
forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire" (lb. pp. v, vi).
INTERCHANGE OF REGIMENTS
Mr. Deakin (Australia), in reply to a suggestion in one of
the papers put in by Mr. Haldane, said :
" Next, apparently a little out of its logical order, comes the
proposal for an interchange of units, which in our case appears
almost impracticable. The great distance which separates
us, not only from this country, but from any other Dominion
in which such an exchange would be proposed, is one obvious
obstacle, but a greater obstacle is that our force of permanent
men is relatively small; it consists of well-trained experts
whom we should be loath to part with, and a unit in that sense
we could hardly spare, even if its position was endeavored to
be taken by an equally competent unit abroad. We have no
possible objection to urge to this proposition except in our own
case the question of its impracticability, that is as to the unit."
212 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
Sir Joseph Ward was of different opinion. He said:
"I would like very much to say that, upon this question of
the interchange of units and officers, I hold a most pronounced
opinion. Unlike my friend, Mr. Deakin, I think that New
Zealand could arrange for interchange of units. We have the
volunteer system there ; we have had for years all the ordinary
organizations referred to by Mr. Deakin in the matter of cadets
and rifle ranges, and these are being excluded ' for private
citizens all over the country" (" Proceedings/ ■ p. 109).
Summary. — Summing up, we may say:
1. Differences in environment produce divergent views
and interests as to matters connected with defence.
2. Canada has less cause for war-anxiety than any other
part of the Empire. Her territory is safe from oversea
expeditions. Her only neighbor is as pacific as herself.
3. At the Conference of 1887 Lord Salisbury proposed
an imperial Kriegsverein, warning the colonies that
"the desire for foreign and colonial possessions is increasing
among the nations of Europe."
4. At that Conference, the Australasian colonies agreed
to pay £126,000 per annum in exchange for the location in
their waters of certain war vessels.
5. At the Conference of 1897, Mr. Chamberlain pleaded
for further contributions to the navy. Cape Colony responded
with a contribution of £30,000 per annum.
6. At the Conference of 1902 Mr. Chamberlain's language
became more peremptory. All the self-governing colonies,
except Canada, agreed to send annual contributions to the
navy, and the arrangements with Australia were modified,
the sphere of operations of the localized warships being ex-
tended to the China and the East Indian stations.
7. At that Conference "some assurance" was asked
As in the "Proceedings," probably a misprint for extended.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 213
" as to the strength of the contingents which they [the colonies]
should be able to place at the disposal of His Majesty's govern-
ment for extra-colonial service in a war with a European power."
Canada and Australia replied that the matter should be
left
" to the colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to
what extent it should render assistance."
8. At the same Conference, the colonies were asked to
organize special forces for extra-colonial service. Canada
objected. Nothing was done.
9. Between the Conferences of 1902 and 1907, Australia
became dissatisfied with her naval arrangements.
10. At the Conference of 1907, the Admiralty proposed
local defence expenditure as a substitute for cash contribu-
tions. Australia declared that
" a monetary standard ... is not the most acceptable standard
for Australia."
and the First Lord of the Admiralty said that he understood
that
" in Australia particularly, and in South Africa, it is desired to
start some naval service of your own."
11. At that Conference, Cape Colony proposed that local
expenditure should be made "after consultation with the
Admiralty." Canada objected, and the motion was dropped.
12. At that Conference, strong support was given to the
previous decision as to military contingents — to act " when
the need arose," and meanwhile no special forces for extra-
colonial service.
CONTRIBUTION WITHOUT CONTROL
There have always been, among Imperialists, some who
agreed with the Canadian view that colonial contributions of
214 IMPERIAL DEFENCE
men and money for imperial wars could not fairly be ex-
pected, unless and until the colonies were admitted to a
share of the responsibility for such wars.
The Imperial Federation (Defence) League frankly acknowl-
edged the correctness of that principle. One of its original
declarations was:
"That if the self-governing colonies take their share in the
cost of such a system of defence [maritime defence], they must
have a proportionate share in its administration and control. "
Lord Brassey, at one time vice-president of the Imperial
Federation League and at another Civil Lord of the Ad-
miralty, declaring that proposals for representation of the
colonies in the Parliament or government of the United
Kingdom were inadmissible, said:
" In view of these objections to any scheme of representation,
we can hardly claim to receive contributions from the colonies
to the imperial exchequer." *
In 1894, the Imperial Federation (Defence) League pre-
sented a memorial to the British government urging that
" the occasion of the Conference should be seized for the estab-
lishment of a system whereby all self-governing countries of
the Empire shall contribute to a common imperial fund" for
the purpose of imperial defence, "provided that arrangements
are made by which those countries can also share in the admin-
istration of the funds so provided." 2
Mr. Sam Hughes, a most ardent Canadian Imperialist, re-
ferring in the House of Commons to the proposal to send
"men and money from the colonies for the up-building of the
British Empire, " said : " That falls to the ground because we
have no representation in the British Parliament, and the prin-
ciple is dear to the heart of every colonial that taxation carries
the right of representation." 3
1 Nineteenth Century, January, 1892, p. 96.
2 The Times, June 29, 1894.
8 February 14, 1907; Hansard, 2898.
IMPERIAL DEFENCE 215
Upon the same occasion Mr. Thomas Chisholm, another
strong Imperialist, referring to the same principle, said:
"In direct violation of that British principle, it is suggested
that Canadians should contribute to Great Britain's navy which
they have no means of controlling; that they should assist in
British wars which they have no means of preventing; and that
they should do all this without having any voice whatever in
the expenditure of the money which they themselves would
contribute for these purposes. Do the inhabitants of Great
Britain imagine that Canadians will submit to something which
they would not tolerate themselves? If they did so, then the
term 'only a colonial' would certainly be appropriate." 1
Apart from the principle involved in these declarations,
the unanswerable practical argument in support of them is
contained in the language of the Imperial Federation (De-
fence) Committee itself (Pamphlet No. 2) :
" It is evident that in stress of war the first call on the navy
must be to defend the United Kingdom, the people of which
pay for and control it. It is inevitable that they should think
of themselves first. History shows that in the war of 1779-1782
the West India Islands — then the most valuable of the British
colonies — were virtually abandoned till the Channel was made
safe" (p. 7).
A second-call navy is not the sort of navy that Canada
would care to pay very much for.
1 Hansard, 2907.
AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
Of all Mr. Chamberlain's proposals the most insidious and
dangerous was the suggestion of an Imperial Council. Why,
said he, at the Colonial Conference of 1897, might it not be
"feasible to create a great Council of the Empire to which the
colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries . . . per-
sons who . . . would be able to give really effective and valu-
able advice ? " *
What objection could any government, British or colonial,
offer to advice? or to the establishment of some "great
Council" to formulate it ? Objection enough, as we shall see,
even if the "great Council' ' confined itself to its seemingly
harmless function of giving advice to countries that would be
fairly certain not to follow it (countries, like persons, while
glad to get reasons, having strong antipathy to advice) ; but
the chief objection was the avowed expectation and intention
that the "great Council" would not limit itself to giving
advice, but would develop into a great Parliament, and take to
itself much of the legislative authority which is now exercised
by the colonies. Mr. Chamberlain was perfectly frank about
that. He said :
" If such a Council were to be created, ... it is perfectly
evident that it might develop into something still greater." a
1 Opening speech, Colonial Conference, 1897.
2 lb. Mr. Chamberlain also said : " In this country, at all events, I
may truly say that the idea of federation is in the air."
217
218 AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
The Conference having declined to approve the proposal/
Mr. Chamberlain at the next Conference (1902) again brought
it forward, saying that
" the Council might in the first instance be merely an advising
Council. . . . But although that would be the preliminary
step, it is clear that the object would not be completely secured
until there had been conferred upon such a Council executive
functions, and perhaps also legislative powers, 2 and it is for
you to say, gentlemen, whether you think the time has come
when any progress whatever can be made in that direction "
(lb. p. 4).
The Conference evidently thought that the time had not
come, for they did nothing.
Then occurred a very curious episode — a mixture of mys-
tery and naivety very amusing to colonials. About fifty
persons in England discussed and debated for about a year
and a half, agreed upon a plan, and chose Sir Frederick Pol-
lock as their spokesman, who on October 17, 1904, and Feb-
ruary 9, 1905, in The Times, and on April 11, 1905, in a
paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute, announced
the scheme.
He declared that among his associates were some very
distinguished people, but although there were reasons which
(except in the case of three persons whom he named) in-
evitably prevented "any disclosure of their names," he as-
sured his readers and hearers that
" whatever else the suggestions I am to lay before you may be,
they are no crude project of doctrinaires or amateurs."
1 The Conference resolved (Mr. Seddon and Mr. Braddon dissenting)
"that the present political relations between the United Kingdom and
the self-governing colonies are generally satisfactory, under the existing
condition of things."
2 The legislative powers which Mr. Chamberlain hoped for included
"large powers of taxation." See ante, "Mr. Chamberlain's Proposals,"
at p. 148.
AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL 219
That these fifty people knew little of the subject when they
first met; that much time was spent before they became
aware of that fact; and that they found out very little else,
is very clear from the glimpse which Sir Frederick gives us
of their meetings:
"For a while we considered the usual expedient of making
a new club or association. But when we tried to formulate
principles, it was borne in upon us gradually and firmly that
general formulas were just what we could not at that stage
agree upon and did not want ; that we should do better without
rules, or even a name, and that the only prospect of useful results
was in perfectly free and confidential discussion among persons
not too many for the purpose." '
Finally, however,
"the tossing of our thoughts at a few meetings . . . disclosed
a tendency to crystallize a definite line, and last October, after
about a year's work of this kind, we were able to put forward
a first collective statement."
The statement put aside all idea of a federal Parliament,
for that
"assumes the consent of several independent legislatures and
involves a considerable modification of their existing authority.
I am not aware of any reason for thinking that the Parliament of
the United Kingdom would easily be persuaded to reduce itself by
a solemn act to a mere State legislature, or that the colonial gov-
ernments would be willing to surrender any substantial part of
their autonomy to some new federal Senate or Council.' '
Colonial representation in the imperial Parliament was also
discussed, but repudiated :
" No one, I believe, is now found to advocate a direct represen-
tation of the colonies in Parliament."
Another point seemed also to be clear: namely,
"that we must distinctly renounce the invention of any new
kind of executive or compulsory power."
1 " Imperial Organization," by Sir Frederick Pollock; a paper read
before The Royal Colonial Institute, April 11, 1905.
220 AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
What then?
"We must therefore be content with a Council of Advice
(an ' Imperial Council or Committee') which will have only
— what is called ' persuasive authority." '
This and a permanent "Secretariat" to act "as a general
intelligence department" were the proposals of the Fifty;
and with a view to their ultimate acceptance Sir Frederick
said that
"It is proposed to carry on our work until the meeting of the
next Colonial Conference at all events."
Conversion of Canada being the knottiest part of the work,
Sir Frederick and Mr. Geoffrey Drage proceeded to Ottawa,
argued with the politicians there, and at meetings in various
places explained the project. Their failure was complete.
Referring to their last meeting, Sir Sandford Fleming, a pro-
nounced and eminent Imperialist, said:
"Yesterday they addressed a public meeting in the rooms
of the Montreal Board of Trade, when Sir Frederick informed
those present to the effect that he and his colleagues had dis-
covered that the time was not ripe for the first part of their
proposal, viz., the formation of an Imperial Council, but that
the strongest reasons exist for immediately instituting an
Imperial Intelligence Department.' ' *
The spokesman of the Fifty made that point, at least, per-
fectly clear to the Canadians who heard him.
Among the undisclosed members of the Fifty was very
probably Mr. Alfred Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary. That
he was at all events in close sympathy with the project was
made manifest by his circular despatch to "the Governors of
the self-governing colonies" of April 20, 1905, in which he
said that
"in the opinion of His Majesty's government it might be well
to discard the title of ' Colonial Conference, ' which imperfectly
1 See Can. Sess. Pap., 1906, No. 67.
AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL 221
expresses the facts, and to speak of these meetings in future as
meetings of the * Imperial Council.' " '
Sir Frederick Pollock's "Secretariat" was also proposed
under the name of a "Commission" with "an adequate
Secretariat Staff." The functions of this commission were to
be "of a purely consultative and advising character," but the
"Imperial Council" was to be unfettered by definition:
"His Majesty's government doubts whether it would be
wise or necessary to give, by any instrument, to this Council a
more formal character, to define more closely its constitution,
or to attempt to delimit its functions. The history of Anglo-
Saxon institutions, such as Parliament or the Cabinet-System,
seems to show that an institution may often be wisely left to
develop in accordance with the circumstances and, as it were,
of its own accord, and that it is well not to sacrifice elasticity
or power of adaptation to premature definiteness of form."
To this plain proposal to plant a Council with the hope
that it might grow into something else, Australia, Cape
Colony, and Natal sent favorable answers. New Zealand's
reply was deferred until after its elections, and is not included
in the published correspondence. Newfoundland dissented,
being fearful of pressure in connection with contribution to
imperial defence and trade preferences. Canada alone made
satisfactory answer. She declined to agree to that which
"might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment
upon the full measure of autonomous legislative and adminis-
trative power now enjoyed by all the self-governing colonies."
Canada had no objection to the substitution of the adjec-
tive "imperial" for "colonial." There seemed indeed to be
some necessity for the change, for as Mr. Lyttleton said in his
circular despatch :
" The Conferences now consist of the Prime Ministers of the
self-governing colonies, together with the Secretary of State
1 See "Correspondence relating to the Future Organization of Colo-
nial Conferences" (Cd. 2785).
222 AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
for the colonies ... for the discussion of matters which con-
cern alike the United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies. "
But the original reason given at the first of the Conferences
(1887) for the use of the word "colonial" instead of "im-
perial" — namely, that "India is not included" * — was over-
looked both by Mr. Lyttleton and the Premiers who assented
to the change.
At the Conference of 1907, Australia proposed the adoption
of Mr. Lyttleton's suggestion, moving
" that it is desirable to establish an Imperial Council to consist
of representatives of Great Britain and the self-governing
colonies chosen ex officio from their existing administrations." 2
Cape Colony and New Zealand made proposals of similar
import. The situation was difficult and full of danger, but
before the logic of the Canadian Order-in-Council the peril
quickly disappeared. Sir Wilfrid Laurier opened the discus-
sion by shrewdly suggesting that before deciding upon a
change of name, it would be advisable that
" we should know beforehand what should be the functions and
the powers and duties of the Council, and define those, and then
according to the functions which were deputed to it the title
would depend." 3
Forthwith everybody disclaimed the idea of allotting any
particular functions to the Council, and Mr. Deakin (Australia)
said:
"Consequently when the despatch of the Prime Minister of
Canada was placed in our hands, and the suggestions derived
from the experience of the government of the connotations of
the word 'Council' were put before us, we at once agreed that
if Sir Wilfrid Laurier thought fit to press that view, for our own
part there would be no objection to adopting the title which he
1 See "Proceedings of the Conference," p. 371.
2 "Minutes of Proceedings" (Cd. 3523), p. 26.
s lb. p. 26.
AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL 223
suggested instead of that which we had proposed. We accept
the term ' Imperial Conference ' instead of ' Imperial Council ' "
(lb. p. 27).
It was fortunate that Mr. Lyttleton had disappeared from the
Colonial Office, and that the new Secretary (Lord Elgin) dis-
agreed with him. At the Conference, Lord Elgin said :
"In what I have said hitherto, I have, no doubt, rather as-
sumed that I was speaking of what I imagine possibly might
be the idea underlying the New Zealand resolution as to an
Imperial Council in place of this Conference. I repeat, that
I do not think that that is practicable, at any rate, in the mean-
time" (lb. p. 37).
Australia and Cape Colony argued strenuously for the
establishment of a Secretariat independent of the Colonial
Office. Sir Wilfrid Laurier opposed the proposal :
"The Colonial Office, which is already divided into depart-
ments, is the proper department to deal under ministerial re-
sponsibility with the self-governing colonies or Crown colonies "
(lb. p. 30, and see p. 40).
New Zealand and the Transvaal sided with Canada, and the
Colonial Secretary joined with them, saying:
"It is not what we have had, and I am afraid it would be
very difficult for me to agree, on behalf of His Majesty's govern-
ment, to the establishment of a body with independent status
or authority. It would be contrary to the freedom and inde-
pendence of which the Prime Minister spoke at our meeting on
Monday. Therefore it was, that we did feel with Canada that
there might be, under a proposal of this kind, a danger to the
autonomy of us all — not only us here, but the self-governing
colonies as well. In the self-governing colonies^ as with us, I
need scarcely remind the members of the Conference, the basis
of all British government is the responsibility of ministers to
their Parliaments; not only as here our responsibility to the
British Parliament, but your responsibility to your Parliaments.
I venture to think that to do anything to establish a body that
might interpose in any way between ministers and the Parlia-
224 AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL
ments to which they are responsible might almost endanger
the liberties which ought to be inviolate. I, for my part, find it
difficult to imagine that a body in any way independent of
ministers here or in the colonies, established in this country,
could be in accordance with the principles to which I have re-
ferred. I know it is said that nothing executive is intended,
and it is to be nothing but advisory. I am afraid I do not think
that that entirely removes the objection. We have, even in
private life, sometimes had experience of the candid friend, the
man whose advice we cannot help listening to, though, perhaps
it does not always strengthen our hands in the process. I ven-
ture to think that there would be a relative danger, but, of
course, under all the circumstances, a much more important
danger, in the establishment of a body, in any way independent,
in connection with these Conferences; and I think I may say
for my colleagues that we all think ministers must be secured
in the direct responsibility which they hold to their Parlia-
ments " (lb. pp. 36, 37).
The Colonial Secretary agreed that any work to be attended
to in connection with the Imperial Conferences should be com-
mitted to a separate department of the Colonial Office. 1 Mr.
Deakin objected that the Colonial Office was too official, and
he pressed for a Secretariat under the control of the Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister declined the responsibility, 2
and the Colonial Secretary's proposal had to be accepted.
Probably we have heard the last of an Imperial Council with
its independent Secretariat.
1 lb. pp. 69, 70, 75, 91, 619, 623. 3 lb. p. 68.
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
That discussion tends not to federation of the Empire, but
to enfranchisement of the colonies, is made very apparent
by the history of the subject of appeals from colonial courts
to courts in London, England.
In earliest days it was the right of every British subject to
take his case to "the foot of the throne," to lay his com-
plaint before his Sovereign; and the King's " prerogative' ' to
right all wrongs, whether done by private individuals or by
his judges, was a reality. In later centuries the King has
had no such power; and no litigant now approaches him
for that purpose. But the phrases persist; no discussion of
colonial appeals is free from them; and many minds are in-
fluenced by a stupid sense of loyalty to the King, which the
language seems to connote. In the imperial Parliament
itself, where every member is perfectly informed of the
facts, Mr. Haldane, as late as the year 1900, had to remind
the speakers
" that the expression, of which in these debates we have heard
much, the ' Queen's prerogative/ is a mere technical phrase and
should be put aside." 1
The "prerogatives" of the Crown have in these later times
become "prerogatives" of the people; and the King now has
no more connection with the administration of justice than
he has with the public lands, or the post-office. In deliver-
ing their judgments, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
1 Debate on the Australian Commonwealth Bill, May 14, 1900.
q 225
226 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
Council still continue to say that they will "humbly advise
His Majesty" to allow or to dismiss the appeal with costs;
but His Majesty in this, as in other matters, always does as
advised — never even considers whether he should do other-
wise. The Judicial Committee is, in reality and downright
fact, nothing but a Court of Appeal, its very constitution
being the subject of legislation ! ; and it has appellate juris-
diction from the colonies only. There is not even a pretence
that Englishmen, Scotchmen, or Irishmen may take their
lawsuits to "the foot of the throne."
No one knows these facts better than the members of the
Judicial Committee, and yet when, in 1871, some of the
Australian colonies suggested the abolition of appeals to
London, the committee defended its existence and jurisdic-
tion in this way:
"It is impossible to overlook the fact that this jurisdiction
is part of Her Majesty's prerogative, and which has been exer-
cised for the benefit of the colonies since the date of their settle-
ment. It is still a powerful link between the colonies and the
Crown of Great Britain, and secures to every subject throughout
the Empire the right to redress from the throne. It provides
a remedy in many cases not falling within the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts of justice. It removes causes from the
influence of local prepossession. It affords the means of main-
taining the uniformity of the laws of England and her colonies,
which derive a great body of their laws from Great Britain;
and enables them, if they think fit, to obtain a decision in the
last resort from the highest judicial authority, composed of
men of the greatest legal capacity existing in the metropolis."
The statement carries its own contradiction on its face:
"This jurisdiction is part of Her Majesty's prerogative," and
it secures "the right to redress from the throne," by obtaining
1 See Imperial Statutes, 3, 4 Wm. IV, c. 41; 6, 7 Vic. c. 38; 7, 8 Vic.
c. 69; 14, 15 Vic. c. 83; 34, 5 Vic. c. 91; 44, 5 Vic. c. 3; 50, 1 Vic. c
70; 58, 9 Vic. c. 44.
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 227
a decision, not from the throne at all, but from "men of
the greatest legal capacity existing in the metropolis."
Their Lordships urge that their appellate control over
colonial courts "is still a powerful link between the colonies
and the Crown of Great Britain." But their Lordships speak
without precision. The existence of the Privy Council may
be and is a link between the colonies and the United King-
dom — a link between two countries. It is one of the few
remaining badges of colonialism, of subordination, of lack of
self-government. In colonial charters down to the last of
them this subjection, or at least some part of it, is continued
and insisted upon. But it is not the Crown that so insists,
but British statesmen. And it is not the prerogative of the
Crown that is upheld, but the right of judges appointed by
the government of the United Kingdom to sit in appeal
from the decisions of judges appointed by the colonies. Ces-
sation of such appeals would have no effect whatever upon
colonial relationship to the Crown, for the Crown has in
reality nothing to do with such appeals.
Their Lordships argue that their court
" provides a remedy in many cases not falling within the juris-
diction of the ordinary courts of justice."
But that language has no application to Canada.
Their Lordships urge that their jurisdiction
"removes causes from the influence of local prepossession."
But very probably they would not regard that as a satis-
factory or sufficient reason for sending English cases to the
Supreme Court at Ottawa. 1 Local information and local
methods are very frequently essential to the understanding of
a dispute. They are not disqualifications for judicial action.
If by "local prepossession" was meant "judicial parti san-
1 The recent Presbyterian Church case, for example.
228 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
ship" (which is probable), their Lordships supplied another
example of their unfamiliarity with colonial affairs.
The last argument — that the court
"affords the means of maintaining the uniformity of the law
of England and her colonies"
is a strong reason for abolishing appeals. Colonial laws are
very different from, in some respects quite contrary to,
English laws. Colonies were given Parliaments, largely be-
cause it was impossible that peoples widely separated should
be content with one set of laws. Colonies do not wish to
maintain their laws uniform with English laws; and they
do not desire that they should be forced into uniformity by
process of judicial decision. In truth, Canada has not been
aware that the Judicial Committee endeavored to maintain
the uniformity their Lordships speak of. It is, we believe,
more true, as Mr. Asquith said during the debate upon the
Australian Commonwealth Bill, that it had been the special
care of their Lordships to maintain
"most jealously and scrupulously the integrity of the different
systems of laws," and they " have prevented as far as they can
any nitration of ideas from a foreign source of law which might
permeate and corrupt another system." "You cannot have
a uniform interpretation of diverse systems of law."
In 1875, the Australian colonies revived the subject of
appeals, and again the Judicial Committee upheld their court
— this time declaring that
"this power had been exercised for centuries over all the de-
pendencies of the Empire by the Sovereign of the mother
country sitting in Council. By this institution, common to
all parts of the Empire beyond the seas, all matters requiring
a judicial solution may be brought to the cognizance of one
court in which all have a voice. To abolish this controlling
power and abandon each colony and dependency to a separate
Court of Appeal of its own, would obviously destroy one of the
most important ties connecting all parts of the Empire in com-
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 229
mon obedience to the courts of law; and to renounce the last
and most essential mode of exercising the authority of the Crown
over its possessions abroad."
The fiction of a "right to redress from the throne," is here
abandoned, and instead of "the throne" we have a "court
in which all have a voice." Did their Lordships mean that
they were elected by universal suffrage? Probably not; but
what then did they mean?
According to the previous statement, cessation of appeals
to a Downing Street court meant the rupture of "a powerful
link between the colonies and the Crown," now it
"would obviously destroy one of the most important ties con-
necting all parts of the Empire in common obedience to the
courts of law."
What that means may be clear enough in England, but
Canadians will find it difficult of interpretation. In any
case, is there really any great necessity for a tie "connecting
all parts of the Empire in common obedience to the courts
of law" ? Obedience to the courts is good, but will obedience
to the courts fail if all parts of the Empire are not tied to-
gether? If so, it would be well for us to know what the
other ties are (this is "one of the most important") in order
that they too may be kept fast — what are they ? Note, too,
that it is common obedience to the "courts of law" that
must be conserved. Does that include the Privy Council?
If so, what was meant by "redress from the throne"?
Is there any overpowering reason inhibitive of the use of
plain, truthful language when discussing the Privy Council?
Was it because Mr. Chamberlain could think of nothing
better to say in support of its continuation that, in the
debate upon the Australian Commonwealth Bill (May 14,
1900), he quoted the above extract? We shall see.
Statute of 1895. — In pursuance of his idea of federation of
230 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
the Empire "by a process of gradual development/' Mr.
Chamberlain, shortly after his accession to the office of
Colonial Secretary, procured the passage of an imperial
statute 1 under which appointments to the Judicial Committee
might be made from Canada, Australasia, and Cape of Good
Hope. That could be done without the assent of the colo-
nies. We shall see what it effected.
Conference of 1897. — At the Conference of 1897, in his
opening speech, Mr. Chamberlain (the Colonial Secretary)
said:
"The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the great
Judicial Court of Appeal of the Empire. 2 It is the nearest ap-
proach, the closest analogy, to the Supreme Court of the United
States. It is a body of almost universal and world-wide repu-
tation and authority, and it is our desire naturally, in pursuit
of the ideas which I am venturing to put before you, to increase
its authority, if that be possible, and to give it a more represen-
tative character ; and with that view we have most gladly secured
the appointment as Privy Councillors of distinguished judges
from the courts of Canada, of Australia, and South Africa, and
they now will take their seats on equal terms with the other
members of the Judicial Committee. Well, gentlemen, that is
a good beginning, but I do not think that you can feel that at
present the arrangement is on a permanent footing. There are
objections to the present system which will present themselves
to every mind. The judges who have been chosen have hitherto
been judges who are still in active practice. That, at the out-
set, raises a considerable difficulty. It will be difficult for these
judges, even if it were consistent with our general idea of what
is right, to take part in appeals in regard to cases upon which
they have already decided. And another difficulty is that,
by the necessity of their position, the greater part of their time
will be spent in the colonies from which they come. They will
only be here for indefinite periods and, as it were, on casual occa-
sions. It is impossible to arrange the business of the Privy
Council or to delay the suitors to meet their convenience; and
the result of that is that though they would sit as judges of the
Privy Council it may very often happen that they would not
1 58, 9 Vic. c. 44. 2 And not "the foot of the throne.'
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 231
be present or be able to serve precisely on the occasions on which
they might be most useful. Now all that could be altered by
the colonies themselves, and this is one of the subjects I recom-
mend to your attention. If these gentlemen were appointed
solely and entirely for the purpose of representing the groups
of colonies on the Privy Council, they could reside permanently
in this country, and not being themselves actively engaged in
judicial work at home, they could sit and assist the Privy Coun-
cil in all cases in which their respective colonies were engaged ;
and I think this would go very far to strengthen the position
of the Privy Council, and at the same time to give to all the
colonies a security that justice would be done when they ap-
peal to this great institution."
So far as appears by the official record of the proceedings
of the Conference, no notice was taken of this part of Mr.
Chamberlain's address. No resolution with reference to it
was passed. The colonies did nothing to make Mr. Chamber-
lain's statute effective.
Australian Commonwealth Bill. — After long negotiations
and discussions, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia,
Queensland, and Tasmania agreed to unite in one indissoluble
federal commonwealth; and they drafted for themselves a
constitution and approved it by popular vote. The clause
of the draft relating to Privy Council appeals was as follows :
" 74. No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council
in any matter involving the interpretation of the constitution
of a state, unless the public interests of some part of Her Maj-
esty's dominions other than the commonwealth or a state are
involved.
"Except as provided in this section, this constitution shall
not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exer-
cise, by virtue of her royal prerogative, to grant special leave
of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council.
" But the Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in
which such leave may be granted. " ■
1 This draft and various other documents connected with the forma-
tion of the commonwealth together with the debates in the British
House of Commons are printed in a volume entitled, "Commonwealth
232 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
To these clauses Mr. Chamberlain (the Colonial Secretary)
took strong exception (1900), arguing that it was the bounden
duty of Her Majesty's government
"to protect the interests of the United Kingdom and of other
parts of the Empire which are also committed to their charge.
"The question of the right of appeal must also be looked at
from the point of view of the very large class of persons inter-
ested in Australian securities or Australian undertakings, who
are domiciled in the United Kingdom. Nothing could be more
prejudicial to Australia than to diminish the security felt by
capitalists who desire to invest their money there. One ele-
ment in the security which at present exists is that there is the
possibility of an ultimate appeal to the Queen in Council, and
there is a very strong feeling against it.
"Article 74 proposes to withdraw from the Queen in Council
matters involving the interpretation of the constitution. It
is precisely on questions of this kind that the Queen in Council
has been able to render most valuable service to the adminis-
tration of law in the colonies, and questions of this kind which
may sometimes involve a good deal of local feeling are the last
that should be withdrawn from a tribunal of appeal with regard
to which there could not be even a suspicion of prepossession."
He added that the article would
"tend to destroy uniformity of decision in constitutional ques-
tions." »
Mr. Chamberlain's real reason, however, for refusing assent
to Australia's draft was not any of these. It was this :
"In conclusion it should be remembered that the question
must be looked at from a still wider point of view.
" The retention of thp prerogative to allow an appeal to Her
Majesty in Council would accomplish the great desire of Her
Majesty's subjects both in England and Australia that the
bonds which now unite them may be strengthened rather than
severed, and by insuring uniform interpretation of the law
throughout the Empire, facilitate that unity of action for the
common interests which lead to a real federation of the Empire.
of Australia Constitution Bill." It is to the pages of that book that
references will be made.
1 Debate in House of Commons.
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 233
"The object of every one at present should be to draw closer
together all parts of the Empire. The existence of the right
of appeal, subject to the leave of the Privy Council, has been a
link effectively binding together every part of Her Majesty's
Dominions; the weakening of this tie would seriously lessen
the value of even so great and beneficent a result as the federa-
tion of Australia.
"If the bill were passed in its present form, while it would
mark a step in advance as far as the federation of Australia is
concerned, it would be a retrograde measure so far as it affects
the larger question of Imperial Federation."
The reply of the Australian delegates (except Queensland)
to all of these reasonings was very good :
"British investors are content to lay out their money in
other parts of the world under alien laws interpreted by alien
tribunals. Australians will be prone to doubt that such in-
vestors can be seriously alarmed at the proposal of having
afforded to their investments in Australia the security of Brit-
ish laws administered by British judges, a security which will
never be questioned.
"The contention for the finality of the judgments of the High
Court is based by Australians on the argument that if they are
fit as is conceded to make a constitution for themselves, they
are fit also to say what that constitution means, and for that
purpose they should be allowed to rely on the decisions of their
High Court. Judicial knowledge of local conditions, invaluable
always, is indispensable in the interpretation of constitutions."
To the argument based upon the destruction of the "uni-
formity of decisions in constitutional cases," the delegates
replied :
"The constitution of Canada is entirely different from the
Commonwealth Bill in many points, but especially as regards
the reservation of residuary powers. . . . Uniformity of de-
cisions in questions such as these would be an attempt to bring
differing constitutions into line, with the result of confusion
and disaster."
And to Mr. Chamberlain's lecture as to what "the object
of every one at present should be," the delegates answered:
234 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
"The delegates reflect with pride that there are sentiments
which will constitute eternal 'links of empire,' but are quite
unable to understand how there can ever be the least hope that
we can merely 'by insuring uniform interpretation of the law
throughout the Empire, facilitate that unity of action for the
common interests which will lead to a real federation of the
Empire.' The 'unity of action' and the 'uniform interpreta-
tion of the law' seem to them wholly unrelated, and certain
to remain so. The consciousness of kinship, the consciousness
of a common blood and a common sense of duty, the pride of
their race and history, these are the links of Empire; bands
which attach, not bonds which chafe. When the Australian
fights for the Empire, he is inspired by these sentiments; but
no 'patriotism was ever inspired or sustained by any thought of
the Privy Council.
"The delegates fail to see how its monopoly of the right of
final interpretation can tend to make the Australian feel that
it binds his affections more closely to the mother of his race.
The tie of affection will last as long as its causes. May that be
forever. The tie which is not rooted in affection is no boon,
it is an injury; and yet we are told it is to be maintained lest
Her Majesty's judges in Australia should give interpretations
to the British laws and the constitution of that land which will
usurp the powers, or endanger the interests of their fellow-
subjects elsewhere. Even now Australian legislatures have
the power to make declaratory laws, and cases have arisen
in which they have declared by Act of Parliament the mean-
ing of their laws to be the reverse of that which the Judicial
Committee has attributed to them. Will it be said that this
legislative power thus exercised by Australians, to interpret
finally their own laws, is a danger to British interests or a
destroyer of any link of Empire? Unless the power is so
chargeable, its existence and exercise seem quite inconsistent
with the position set up by the memorandum of the govern-
ment. Why should not Australians have the alternative of
interpreting their meaning on the bench as in the Senate?
Are their judges less trustworthy than their legislators?"
(" Proceedings/' pp. 163, 164).
The delegates declined to alter a word of their draft bill,
and Mr. Chamberlain changed it without their assent, sub-
stituting the following clause:
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 235
"Notwithstanding anything in the constitution set forth in
the schedule to this Act, the prerogative of Her Majesty to
grant special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council may
be exercised with respect to any judgment or order of the High
Court of the commonwealth or of the Supreme Court of any
state."
Introducing his bill on May 14, Mr. Chamberlain was
at once met with opposition. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman
said:
"Simple people, and I class myself among them, not being
in the least learned in the law, will ask why should it be so
dangerous to leave the interpretation of the Commonwealth
Act to those best acquainted with the circumstances and the
state of feeling out of which it has arisen? Surely those who
have framed it, who have seen the growth of the whole question,
know what was intended when the Act was passed by the Aus-
tralian people, and are better able to judge of the spirit and
intention than persons who, though more learned, have no such
acquaintance with local feeling" (lb. p. 24).
Referring to "links of Empire," Mr. Edward Blake said:
"I believe the condition to be not as the Colonial Secretary
said in his speech on the first reading. I do not believe, as he
said, that they could be snapped by a touch. I believe them
to be strong and real. But I believe them to be absolutely
impalpable, not founded on costly appeals, not on your clauses
of reservation, not on your powers of disallowance, and not on
the paramount legislative power of this Parliament. I am not
complaining of these things. But they are not the real links
that bind the whole " (lb. p. 49).
Unable to have his way, Mr. Chamberlain retreated under
cover of a compromise, the clause, as finally agreed to, read-
ing as follows:
" No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from
a decision of the High Court upon any question, however arising,
as to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the
commonwealth and those of any state or states, or as to the
limits inter se of the constitutional powers of any two or
236 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
more states, unless the High Court shall certify that the ques-
tion is one which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in
Council.
" The High Court may so certify, if satisfied that for any special
reason the certificate should be granted, and thereupon an
appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question with-
out further leave.
"Except as provided in this section this constitution shall
not impair any right which the Queen may be pleased to exer-
cise by virtue of her royal prerogative to grant special leave
to appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council.
" The Parliament may make laios limiting the matters in which
such leave may be asked; but proposed laws containing any such
limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her
Majesty's pleasure."
It will be observed that appeal to the Privy Council in cer-
tain constitutional cases ("the last that should be withdrawn
from a tribunal of appeal") is forbidden, unless the Australian
court gives permission; and that, subject to the possibility
(the great improbability) of an imperial veto, the Australian
Parliament is given power to prohibit all appeals. 1
A Court of Appeal for the Empire. — One reason which Mr.
Chamberlain urged for the retention, in the Commonwealth
Bill, of appeals to the Privy Council has not been stated. It
was as follows :
"But apart from this consideration, the time is specially
inopportune for any proposal to curtail its jurisdiction. Pro-
posals are under consideration for securing a permanent and
effective representation of the great colonies on the Judicial
Committee, and for amalgamating the Judicial Committee with
the House of Lords, so as to constitute a Court of Appeal for
the whole British Empire. It would be very unfortunate if
Australia should choose this moment to take from the imperial
1 Mr. Chamberlain himself acknowledged that the reservation of the
veto-right was little or nothing, for he said during the debates (May 14)
that "it would make it almost a stultification on the part of Her Majesty
if the Committee were advised to exercise that right in a matter which
we had expressly referred and delegated to the new Parliament" (76. p. 16).
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 237
tribunal the cognizance of the class of cases of greatest impor-
tance, and often of greatest difficulty" (lb. p. 152).
Here was another line along which Mr. Chamberlain pro-
posed to work out his Imperial Federation ideas — "a Court
of Appeal for the whole British Empire." He soon aban-
doned it. In a circular letter to the Governors of the self-
governing colonies (February 15, 1901) summoning a con-
ference upon the subject of colonial appeals, he said:
" The two existing courts, the House of Lords and the Privy
Council, have their origin far back in history. Their traditions
and procedure, and the form in which their decisions are con-
veyed, are widely different. These differences, which may be
traced directly to the different sources from which the courts
originated and derived their authority, are of great historical
interest, and reveal the persistence and at the same time the
growth and vitality of English institutions.
"From the point of view of sentiment, therefore, it would be
desirable to endeavor to preserve, as far as possible, the asso-
ciations of the two existing courts. Colonial suitors and their
agents, moreover, are accustomed to the procedure of the one,
while suitors in this country are accustomed to the other; and
there is reason to believe that in the colonies there is a consider-
able body of public feeling in favor of retaining the present
practice under which the final decision on colonial appeals is
the direct act of the Sovereign on the advice of the Judicial
Committee." *
Inefficiency of the Privy Council. — The weakness of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as compared with
the House of Lords (the final Court of Appeal for English,
Scotch, and Irish cases) was one reason for objection to it.
During the debate on the Australian Commonwealth Bill,
Mr. Haldane (who had had large practice before the Privy
Council), referring to the fact that the House of Lords and
Privy Council courts were largely composed of the same men,
said:
1 Mr. Chamberlain had a very erroneous idea of public feeling in the
colonies. Empty forms do not there usually count for very much.
238 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
"If there are two tribunals sitting for the despatch of the
same business, the one is starved in order to keep up the other,
and the judicial strength inevitably gravitates toward the
House of Lords ; and until you make the colonials feel that the
tribunal to which they come is the same as that to which you
yourselves appeal, you will never get their confidence.
"The result has been that though the Privy Council is con-
sidered good enough for the colonies, it is not allowed in Great
Britain and Ireland to be good enough for us." *
Colonial Conference, 1901. — Impressed with the necessity,
from an imperial standpoint, of the maintenance of a colonial
Court of Appeal in England, but abandoning his "Court of
Appeal for the whole Empire," Mr. Chamberlain, with a view
of recommending the Privy Council to the colonies and
popularizing it there, next proposed to appoint from amongst
colonials
"four additional Law Lords with seats in the House of Lords
as well as on the Judicial Committee,"
and in February, 1901, he summoned a Colonial Conference 2
to consider the proposal, saying, quite erroneously, that,
"This proposed measure was regarded by Her Majesty's gov-
ernment as affording a way of meeting the legitimate desire of
the colonies for more effective and continuous representation
on the Judicial Committee than that afforded by the arrange-
ment embodied in the Act of 1895."
During the debates on the Australian Commonwealth Bill
in 1900, Mr. Chamberlain had already, and at greater length,
stated his proposal. Referring to the Act of 1895 under
which one representative from Canada, from South Africa,
1 lb. pp. 34, 35. One of the recommendations of the Conference of
1901 (see infra) was that, "It is desirable that arrangements should be
made for securing a larger attendance of Lords of Appeal at sittings of
the Judicial Committee." Consult Clark's "Australian Commonwealth
Law," pp. 346 ff.
2 See a British Blue Book (Cd. 846), entitled "Correspondence relating
to the Proposed Establishment of a Final Court of Colonial Appeal."
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 239
and from Australia had been appointed to the Privy Council,
he had said :
"The result has been as we expected. It made no provision
for paying these gentlemen. The Australian colonies and the
other colonies concerned — I am not quite certain about
Canada — did not propose to pay themselves, and that con-
fined the selection; and the gentlemen actually selected were
judges of high distinction, but who were still engaged in judicial
functions in the several colonies. The result was that they
could not be here permanently to deal with colonial cases in
which they were interested. Another subsidiary result was
that when they were here and a colonial case came up, it might
be one with which they had already dealt in their judicial
capacity in the colonies. Practically, therefore, although
some Of these judges — I believe all of them — have taken
their seats and have assisted in the deliberations of the Judicial
Committee, we have not secured, by means of that Act, such a
permanent constitution of the Judicial Committee as would
make it certain that on every occasion when a colonial case
was involved there was a colonial judge with full knowledge
of . local conditions well qualified to advise his colleagues.
Therefore what we propose, pending further consideration
which must be given to any greater scheme, is to appoint for
seven years a representative from each of these colonies and
India, to be members of the Privy Council, who shall also act
during that period as Lords of Appeal, and upon whom will
be conferred life peerages so that they may continue to sit in
the House of Lords, although they will not act as judges after
the term of their service has expired. It may be that those
services will be renewed, and provision may be taken to renew
them, if thought desirable. The judges so appointed will be
paid the same salaries as the Lords of Appeal are now paid,
and payment will be made at the cost of the imperial Parlia-
ment. "
Canada sent its Minister of Justice (Mr. David Mills) to the
Conference, giving him instructions by an Order-in-Council :
"The Committee would at the same time observe that your
Excellency's government is not dissatisfied with the manner
in which the Board of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council is at present constituted, and, as now advised, they
240 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
do not see any advantage to be gained by the creation of four
additional Law Lords, to be chosen from the self-governing
colonies, with seats in the House of Lords as well as on the
Judicial Commit tee." 1
The result of the Conference was announced by Mr. Cham-
berlain to the colonial Governors (August 10, 1901) :
"The result of the Conference has been to show that no far-
reaching alteration in the present tribunal is desired or would
be considered satisfactory by the colonies generally, and so
long as the colonies are of that opinion, His Majesty's govern-
ment do not propose to make any material changes for the
establishment of an imperial Court of Appeal" (lb. p. 30).
Colonial Conference of 1902. — At the Colonial Conference
of 1902,
" the subject of an imperial Court of Appeal was brought up by
Sir E. Barton with the view of ascertaining how far the other
Prime Ministers were satisfied with the results of the special
conference on the question held in 1901, and on finding that
there was general acquiescence in the result, he did not press
the matter."
Colonial Conference of 1907. — At the Colonial Conference
of 1907, Mr. Deakin (Australia), taking up Mr. Chamberlain's
abandoned idea, moved
"that it is desirable to establish an imperial Court of Appeal."
He complained that nothing had been done since the 1901
Conference to strengthen the Judicial Committee:
"Since those events the government and, I think, the great
majority of the Parliament and people of Australia have not
altered their attitude upon this question. They are no more
contented with the present condition of appeal cases than
they were in 1900 or 1901. Nor are their sentiments likely
to alter after the judgment given lately in an Australian case,
in which two matters of vital importance came before the con-
sideration of the Judicial Committee.
1 See "Correspondence relating," etc., p. 24.
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 241
" We are aware of the special manner in which this court is
constituted. Attention has been called to that for many years.
During the Australian convention, which resolved upon pro-
posals restricting the appeals to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, that was one of the grounds upon which a very
decided view was taken. Although alterations have been made
from time to time and decided improvements of late, it is evi-
dent that even regarded in its present condition, the system
adopted is by no means satisfactory to us, nor, I think, is it
satisfactory to many other than Australian litigants" ("Pro-
ceedings," p. 202).
Dr. Jameson (the Cape) said that "one final court appeals
to us very much," but urged the establishment of
"a final Court of Appeal in South Africa for all the various
states, so that our Supreme Court of Appeal would be a final
Court of Appeal, except that it might be put into the statute
by which it is created that on certain subjects — possibly on
relations between the various states, and so on — there might
be permitted an appeal to the Privy Council by permission of
that Supreme Court. Those cases would be very few. So
really it would be a final Court of Appeal so far as we are con-
cerned, except in special cases which would be laid down.
At the same time, I would add that the prerogative of the King
— the right of every citizen of the British Empire to appeal to
the King — must be carefully safeguarded ; but that would prac-
tically not be used, because I understand, supposing the right
of appeal was refused in a particular case by the Appeal Court
to the Privy Council and an individual still wished to go to
the Privy Council, as his right is, of course, the practical point
is that if he won his case or lost it, he would still have to pay
all the costs, which would be a considerable deterrent to any
one taking that extreme action" (lb. pp. 207, 208).
General Botha (Transvaal) also desired a Court of Appeal
for South Africa. On his motion it was resolved :
"(1) That when a Court of Appeal has been established
for any group of colonies geographically connected, whether
federated or not, to which appeals lie from the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of such colonies, it shall be competent for the
legislature of each such colony to abolish any existing right
242 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
of appeal from its Supreme Court to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council.
" (2) That the decisions of such Court of Appeal shall be final,
but leave to appeal from such decisions may be granted by the
said court in certain cases prescribed by the statute under
which it is established.
" (3) That the right of any person to apply to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council for leave to appeal to it from
the decision of such Appeal Court shall not be curtailed" (lb.
p. 209).
Sir Wilfrid Laurier said :
" So far as Canada has any concern we have an appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and it has, as a gen-
eral rule, given very great satisfaction. I do not know that all
its decisions have been accepted. There are few courts which
have not their decisions criticized within twenty-four hours,
but as a rule the decisions of the Privy Council, so far as con-
cerns Canada, have been eminently satisfactory. At the same
time everybody must recognize that the constitution of the court
is not, perhaps, quite in accordance with the modern age and
tendencies. It seems to me that the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council should be remodelled if it is to be maintained"
(lb. p. 211).
Sir Wilfrid had
" no objection to an imperial Court of Appeal. I do not care
what name you call it, whether it is the House of Lords, or the
Judicial Committee, or any other body, it matters not very
much" (lb. p. 224).
Sir Wilfrid said that the important question was, not the
establishment of a Court of Appeal or its name, but its juris-
diction, and where it got that jurisdiction. Let the colonies,
in the exercise of their right of self-government, have the
power to declare in what cases, if any, appeals shall go be-
yond Canada — that is the important point, and the point
upon which colonial assertion is necessary. He said:
"The question of jurisdiction will always be, so far as this
court is concerned, the one great difficulty. I am sure that the
AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL 243
imperial government have no desire to impose their views as
to what should be the jurisdiction. This should be left to the
provinces themselves to determine. The Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council have always decided — and it is a matter of com-
mon everyday occurrence — that the King has retained his
prerogative of allowing any one who chooses to take an appeal
before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. That
appeal, which is an appeal of favor, has perhaps passed the
day of its utility, and if I have any opinion to proffer upon this
question, it would be that all matters of jurisdiction should be
relegated altogether to the parties interested — the provinces or
the Parliaments — to determine whether and why 1 there should
be an appeal or not " (lb. p. 211).
The Lord Chancellor dissented from Mr. Deakin's proposal :
"I think our people would be rather surprised and startled,
remembering that this is a new subject to us altogether, if we were
to commit ourselves to the idea of an imperial Court of Appeal,
which means one court for the whole of the British Dominions,
and a reconstruction of the House of Lords, and the Privy
Council" (lb. p. 223).
Mr. Deakin's motion for the establishment of an imperial
Court of Appeal was not put to a vote, and the whole incident
would have had little importance but for the concurrence of
the Lord Chancellor in Sir Wilfrid's point. He said:
" My view is, and I think we shall all agree in it, that in those
circumstances all that can be done is to recognize and act
unreservedly upon the principle of autonomy; that each in-
tegral unit of His Majesty's Dominions should govern itself in
the matter of appeals; that one should not necessarily be the
same as any other; but each should govern itself. I can say
this, that as far as His Majesty's government is concerned,
we most cordially fall in with that and will do all we fairly can
for the purpose of furthering the views of all concerned" (lb.
p. 214).
"Still, if Australia, for example, or any other part of the
British Empire, desire that their cases should be heard, not
merely by the judges of the United Kingdom with the assist-
ance of their own, but also by judges from other parts of the
1 Probably a misprint for when.
244 AN IMPERIAL COURT OF APPEAL
British Dominions, the Cape, Canada, India, and the Crown
colonies, and those countries are willing to send us the judges,
we can have no objection. It seems to me to be a part of the
autonomy of Australia or Canada, for example, that if they
wish it done they are the persons to decide whether it should be
done. It is part of what, in the familiar language of the con-
stitution, is called the order and good government of the colony' 7
(lb. p. 217).
" As regards the last resolution, it says : ' That much uncer-
tainty, expense, and delay would be avoided if some portion
of His Majesty's prerogative to grant special leave to appeal
in cases where there exists no right of appeal were, under defi-
nite rules and restrictions, delegated to the discretion of the
local courts.' I think that is quite right. It is so in India.
It is regulated by codes of civil procedure, and it can be regulated
by your own Parliament. You may pass in the Cape, if you
like, an Act of Parliament; or it may be done, and has been
done by Orders-in-Council. If you should prefer it should be
done by Orders-in-Council, it would be perfectly easy to do
it" (lb. p. 219).
"May I turn now to the other supplementary points Dr.
Jameson has given us? I think his general object is the estab-
lishment of .a final Court of Appeal in South Africa, with certain
restrictions upon the right of appeal from South Africa to the
Privy Council, which is obviously a matter for the South African
colonies to determine for themselves. If they pass their own
Act, they can set up their own Court of Appeal in South Africa,
unless they like to invoke the machinery of the imperial Par-
liament by asking the imperial Parliament to do it. I do not
know whether they wouls against your £100,000, with
no scheme, no plan of spending, not a glimmer of an idea of what
the money is to go to, but simply saying, ' We are to pool it,
and until we can find something to spend it on, let it roll up' —
if that is a scheme for a great commercial Empire, I think it is
a scheme pour rire, if I may say so" (lb. pp. 524, 525).
Somewhat pressed, Mr. Lloyd George proposed the follow-
ing resolution:
" This Conference recommends that in order to develop trade,
commerce, the means of communication, and those of transport
IMPERIAL SURTAX ON FOREIGN IMPORTS 253
within the Empire, it is desirable that some means should be
devised for systematic consultation between the members
of various parts of the Empire, for the purpose of considering
cooperative projects for the general purpose of fostering the
individual forces of the Empire so as to promote its growth
and unity" (lb. pp. 525, 526).
Mr. Deakin had the last word : •
"Please understand that if this resolution of mine were re-
jected by every individual member of the Conference, I should
deplore our divergences, but it would not in any way depress
me. I should take the benefit of all the criticism, not regretting
that I had brought the matter forward. My faith is that it is
better to make a mistake attempting to frame a practical pro-
posal than to do nothing at all. If this was a mistake, and I
am satisfied it was not, I have at least succeeded in bringing
the question right home. We are not here to score verbal vic-
tories by carrying resolutions, or to feel defeated if we do not
carry them, but we are here to make some advance by the frank
discussion of those imperial possibilities. I am obliged to the
minister for getting beyond the accidents of my proposal to
its essence at the close" (lb. p. 529).
It was on the same day that Dr. Smartt said with reference
to objection to naval defence :
" I think it is a great pity that we do not pass something.
We have done so much in the way of pious affirmation, that I
am anxious we should do something of a practical character"
(lb. p. 542).
Mr. Deakin 's motion was not pressed to a vote. The next
day Sir Wilfrid Laurier proposed imperial financial support
for the "All-Red Route" — a story for a later volume than
this.
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
Termination by the United States, in 1866, of the reci-
procity treaty of 1854 disorganized Canadian trade. Per-
sistent efforts were made by the government of Sir John A.
Macdonald to renew it, but without success. Upon accession
to power of the Liberals in 1874, the Hon. George Brown
was sent to Washington with temporarily happy results —
an arrangement was made with the American Executive, but
the Senate declined to approve it ; it never became effective.
Sir John A. Macdonald, on his return to power in 1878,
adopted a new attitude. Declaring that there ought to be
either "reciprocity of trade or reciprocity of tariffs," and that
our neighbors had refused the former, he induced Parlia-
ment to impose protective duties, at the same time offering
to the United States, by a clause in the statute, a certain
measure of trade reciprocity. The offer was not accepted.
Canada might do as she pleased with her tariffs ; her markets
were small and her commercial ill-will negligible.
Then came the beginnings of imperial preferential tariffs.
Canada, said Sir John, was part of an Empire with markets
the largest in the world. Ought the United States to be
permitted to exclude, by import duties, products from one
part of the Empire, and yet be allowed to send goods into
other parts of it without any duties at all? Ought not "reci-
procity of trade or reciprocity of tariffs' ' to become an
imperial maxim? In December, 1885 (at London), Sir John
formulated his proposal:
"Commercially, British federation may be achieved on a
basis of give and take. If you will give colonial produce such
255
256 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
immunities as you give to no foreign nation, I will commit
myself to the expression of belief that the colonies will give
British goods, and only British goods, preferential treatment." 1
By 1887, the date of the first Colonial Conference, the
idea of preferential tariffs within the Empire had been much
discussed. Some of the colonies had adopted protective
tariffs, and all of them were keenly alive to the immensity
of the value of the markets of the United Kingdom. 2 On
the other hand, metropolitan faith in free trade appeared to
be as unalterable as its faith in Christianity, and as little
liable to impairment as the Grampians. Listen to Lord
Salisbury (the British Prime Minister) at the Conference, and
as you listen remember that within ten years he himself,
under colonial pressure, acquired " notions with regard to
fiscal policy' ' very different from those which he then held:
" I fear that we must for the present put in the distant and
shadowy portion of our task, and not in the practical part of
it, any hope of establishing a customs union among the various
parts of the Empire. I do not think that in the nature of
things it is impossible. . . . But the resolutions which were
come to in respect of our fiscal policy forty years ago set any
such possibility entirely aside, and it cannot be now resumed
until on one side or the other very different notions with regard
to. fiscal policy prevail from those which prevail at this moment. "
1 Quoted in pamphlet, "The Empire in Conference," second to last
page.
2 The Premier of Australia (Mr. Deakin) , for example, said at the
Colonial Conference of 1907: "So far as Australia is concerned, the ad-
vantages of recognized preferential treatment from Great Britain are
too obvious to require demonstration" ("Proceedings," p. 248); for,
shut off by protective tariffs from foreign countries, "the question that is
coming home to Australia is : Can the commonwealth without prefer-
ence in the British markets retain even its present trade ? " " If we are
to expand our markets and to place ourselves beyond the reach of
foreign aggression, preferential treatment must be obtained" (lb. p. 249).
"For the last time I repeat our realization, that preference begins as a
business operation to be conducted for business ends" (lb. p. 263).
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 257
Upon the other hand, listen to some of the colonial speeches.
Sir Samuel Griffith (Queensland) said:
"The question I should like to submit for consideration to-day
is . . . whether it should not be recognized as part of the duty
of the governing bodies of the Empire to see that their own
subjects have a preference over foreign subjects in matters of
trade."
Mr. Deakin (Victoria) advocated preferential trade as
"one of the best, and one of the few, means of drawing closer
the bonds of unity, and increasing, as Sir Samuel Griffith phrased
it very properly, the solidarity of the Empire."
Sir John A. Macdonald had not, however, abandoned all
hope of new reciprocity arrangements with the United States,
and in 1891, announcing that negotiations were in progress,
he dissolved Parliament in order that the government might
obtain sufficient popular authority to proceed to a treaty. 1
Sir John's political opponents denied the existence of nego-
tiations; declared that an agreement such as he hoped for
could not be made; and advocated "unrestricted reciprocity"
with the United States — reciprocity not only in certain, but
in all, articles of trade. An incident in the election campaign
enabled Sir John to appeal strongly to British loyalty; he
carried the country; "unrestricted reciprocity" was dropped
by the Liberals ; and Sir John, failing to make his arrange-
ment with the United States, 2 turned once more to imperi-
alism.
1 See Can. Sess. Pap., 1891, Vol. I, pp. 22, 42.
2 That imperial preference was advocated because of the [failure of
negotiations with the United States is clear. As early as May 3, 1872,
Sir John A. Macdonald said in the House of Commons (Hansard, p. 297) :
" It is a matter of history that all their exertions failed, and after their
failure, by the general consent — a consent in which I believe the people
of Canada were as one man — we came to the conclusion that it would
be humiliating to Canada to make any further exertions at Washington
or to do anything more in the way of pressing for the renewal of that
258 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
Two formidable difficulties stood in his way: (1) Treaties
with Germany and Belgium prevented the colonies charging
lower duties on the productions of the United Kingdom than
were charged upon similar productions of Germany and Bel-
gium; and, by the operation of the most-favored nation
clauses in other treaties, the benefit of this inhibition was
extended to various other countries. (2) The constitution of
the Australian colonies forbade all preferential tariffs, except
amongst themselves. The second of these objections was re-
moved by legislation. But how were the colonies to be freed
from the treaties ?
Representations and requests to the imperial government
were put in Colonial Office pigeon-holes, and the agents of
all the self-governing colonies went in deputations to the
Board of Trade without effect. Lord Salisbury could agree
that the treaties were unfortunate and very absurd, but their
denunciation was unthinkable. Using, however (June 17,
1891), such language as the following, it was evident that he
was making some progress :
"With respect to these two unlucky treaties (with Belgium
in 1862 and Germany in 1865, precluding British colonies from
admitting British goods on more favorable terms than foreign
goods) that were made by Lord Palmerston's government some
thirty years ago, I am sure the matter of the relation of our
colonies could not have been fully considered. We have tried
to find out from official records what species of reasoning it was
that induced the statesmen of that day to sign such very un-
fortunate pledges; but I do not think they had any notion
that they were signing any pledges at all. I have not been
able to discover that they at all realized the importance of the
engagements upon which they were entering."
instrument, and the people of this country with great energy addressed
themselves to find other channels of trade, other means of developing
and sustaining our various industries, in which I am happy to say they
have been completely successful."
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 259
On September 30, 1891, the Canadian House of Com-
mons joined with the Senate in an address to Her Majesty
requesting her
"to take such steps as may be necessary to denounce and
terminate the effect of the provisions referred to as well in the
treaties with the German zollverein and with the kingdom of
Belgium as with every other nation."
On April 25, 1892, the Canadian House of Commons
made its first official offer to the United Kingdom of preferen-
tial tariffs. It resolved :
" That if and when the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland
admits Canadian products to the markets of the United King-
dom upon more favorable terms than it accords to the products
of foreign states, the Parliament of Canada will be prepared to
accord corresponding advantages by a substantial reduction in
the duties it imposes upon British manufactured goods."
On June 25, 1892, the United Empire Trade League,
upon motion of Sir Charles Tupper, unanimously adopted the
following resolution :
"That this convention impresses upon the Empire the un-
limited productive resources of the world-wide realms under
the British flag, and their full ability, on the expiration of ade-
quate notice for development, to supply the needs of the mother
country and the other portions of the Empire in every substance
required by any British subject, independently of foreign nations.
It urges the concentration of all patriotic efforts in Britain and
Greater Britain upon pressing this home on the minds of the
people, with a view to the extension of inter-British trade, the
territorial security of Her Majesty's possessions, and the per-
sonal advantage of each individual."
In September, 1893, Mr. Mackenzie Bowell (then Minister
of Trade and Commerce) visited Australia, and succeeded in
' arranging for a conference to be held in Ottawa during the
succeeding year to discuss trade questions.
It met in June, 1894. The Earl of Jersey represented the
British government, and delegates were present from Tas-
260 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
mania, New South Wales, Cape Colony, South Australia, New
Zealand, Victoria, and Queensland. The following resolutions
were passed :
" 1. That provision should be made by imperial legislation,
enabling the dependencies of the Empire to enter into agree-
ments of commercial reciprocity, including power of making
differential tariffs with Great Britain or with one another.
"2. That this Conference is of opinion that any provisions
in existing treaties between Great Britain and any foreign power,
which prevent the self-governing dependencies of the Empire
from entering into agreements of commercial reciprocity with
each other or with Great Britain, should be removed.
" 3. Whereas the stability and progress of the British Empire
can be best assured by drawing continually closer the bonds
that unite the colonies with the mother country, and by the
continuous growth of practical sympathy and cooperation in
all that pertains to the common welfare.
"And whereas this cooperation and unity can in no way be
more effectually promoted than by the cultivation and exten-
sion of the mutual and profitable interchange of their products :
(A) Therefore resolved : That this Conference records its belief
in the advisability of a customs arrangement between Great
Britain and her colonies by which trade within the Empire
may be placed on a more favorable footing than that which
is carried on with foreign countries.
"4. Further resolved: That until the mother country can
see her way to enter into customs arrangements with her
colonies, it is desirable that, when empowered so to do, the
colonies of Great Britain, or such of them as may be disposed
to accede to this view, take steps to place each other's products
in whole or in part on a more favored customs basis than is
accorded to the like products of foreign countries.
" 5. Further resolved : That for the purposes of this resolu-
tion the South African Customs Union be considered as part
of the territory capable of being brought within the scope of the
contemplated trade arrangements."
All the resolutions were carried unanimously, except the
clause marked "A," which was opposed by three of the Aus-
tralasian representatives. Earl Jersey, in reporting the pro-
ceedings to his government, said:
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 261
"Whilst, therefore, laying before your Lordship the views
expressed and the resolutions passed, I feel unable to go further
than to press earnestly the advisability of giving a favorable
consideration to the unanimous request of the Conference for
the removal of any restriction, treaty or statutory, which stands
in the way of inter-colonial trade."
The resolutions met with little sympathy from the imperial
government. In a despatch from the Marquis of Ripon
(Colonial Secretary) to the Governor-General (June 28, 1895)
the whole question of preferential tariffs was elaborately
argued and heartily condemned:
"A consideration of these practical difficulties and of the
more immediate results above indicated of a system of mutual
tariff discrimination, has convinced Her Majesty's government
that, even if the consequences were confined to the limits of
the Empire, and even if it were not followed by changes of
fiscal policy on the part of foreign powers unfavorable to this
country, its general economic results would not be beneficial
to the Empire. Such duties are really a weapon of commercial
war, used as a means of retaliation, and inflicting possibly
more loss on the country employing it than on the country
against which it is directed, and which would not be likely to
view them with indifference.
"Foreign countries are well aware that the colonies differ
in their fiscal policies and systems from the mother country
and each other, and if a policy of the kind advocated were
adopted, our foreign rivals would not improbably retaliate, with
results injurious to the trade of the whole Empire.
"I have dealt with this question at some length, because
the strong support which the proposal met with from the
majority of the representatives at the Conference entitles it to
the fullest consideration, and renders it desirable to set forth
the reasons which have satisfied Her Majesty's government
that it would fail to secure the object aimed at : namely, the
stability and progress of the Empire."
As to preferential tariffs between the colonies, with which
the United Kingdom had less to do, the Colonial Secretary
said:
262 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
"It must be remembered, however, that the primary object
of a differential duty is a diversion rather than an increase of
trade, and that as the proportion of the external trade of most
of the colonies which is carried on with foreign countries is
insignificant compared with that carried on with the mother
country and other parts of Her Majesty's Dominions, it will
be difficult for one colony to give a preference in its markets
to the trade of another solely at the expense of the foreigner
and without at the same time diverting trade from the mother
country or from sister colonies which may not be parties to
the arrangement.
" Serious injury might thus be inflicted on the commerce of
a neighboring colony, and unfriendly feelings generated which
might provoke retaliation, and would in any case estrange the
colonies concerned in a manner which would not conduce to
the great aim which the Conference had in view throughout.
"Any agreement for reciprocal preferential treatment be-
tween two colonies will, therefore, require careful consideration
in regard to its probable effect on the commerce of the rest of
the Empire, and although Her Majesty's government have the
fullest confidence that the loyalty and good feeling happily
prevailing between the various parts of the Empire would
prevent one colony seeking an advantage to itself which could
only be gained at the serious prejudice of other parts of Her
Majesty's Dominions, it is impossible for them to relieve them-
selves of their responsibility in regard to the general interests
of the Empire in such a matter."
Denunciation of the treaties, the Colonial Secretary said,
would be bad for the United Kingdom:
" The denunciation of the treaties with Belgium and Germany
would thus expose the trade of the United Kingdom to some
risks, and might possibly be followed by a loss of some part of
the export trade to those countries, probably of some portion
of it which consists in the distribution of foreign and colonial
produce. With the denunciation of the treaties, the commerce
of the Empire with these countries would have to be carried
on under fiscal conditions subject to constant changes and
fluctuations, or at all events without that permanence
and security which is of primary importance to successful and
profitable interchange. It would be extremely difficult, in
existing circumstances, to negotiate new treaties of a satis-
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 263
factory character at an early date, and the loss which might in
the meantime result to a trade of forty-one millions sterling
would, perhaps, prove to be irreparable. On the other hand
no scheme has been proposed which foreshadows any precise
advantages to be secured to the export trade, amounting to
thirty-five millions sterling, from the United Kingdom to the
British colonies, in the event of the termination of these
treaties."
It would be bad, too, for the colonies :
"I may further observe that the self-governing colonies
themselves would lose any advantage they now derive from
their inclusion in the German and Belgian treaties; since, if
those treaties were denounced, both countries would, in view
of the circumstances attending the passing of the resolutions
of the Colonial Conference and in view of the high tariffs exist-
ing in many of the colonies, no doubt decline to include the
British colonies in any new treaty that might be negotiated;
and considering the small amount of their trade, it would be
very difficult for them, if in an isolated position, to secure
advantageous terms except by very heavy concessions.
"In these circumstances, as preferential arrangements in
which this country should be included cannot, under 'present con-
ditions, be considered a matter of practical politics, and as the
clauses in the treaties do not, in the view of Her Majesty's
government, prevent intercolonial preferential arrangements,
Her Majesty's government consider that it would not be pru-
dent to contemplate the denunciation of the treaties at the
present moment, bearing in mind that this could always be
done on twelve months' notice, if circumstances should here-
after show it to be desirable."
The Colonial Secretary, moreover, in good old Downing-
Street fashion, intimated to the colonies that there were cer-
tain lines of preferential schemes which he as guardian "of
the common interests of the Empire" would not tolerate:
"Further, Her Majesty's government regard it as essential
that any tariff concessions proposed to be conceded by a colony
to a foreign power should be extended to this country and to
the rest of Her Majesty's Dominions.
"As I have already pointed out, there are but few nations
264 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
with which Her Majesty's government have not treaties con-
taining most-favored nation clauses, and to most of these
treaties all or some of the responsible-government colonies
have adhered. Any tariff advantages granted by a colony,
therefore, to a foreign power would have to be extended to all
powers entitled by treaty to most-favored nation treatment
in the colony, and Her Majesty's government presume that
no colony would wish to afford to, practically, all foreign na-
tions better treatment than it accorded to the rest of the Empire
of which it forms a part.
"In regard to the other side of the question, namely, as to
the terms which a colony seeks from a foreign power, the con-
siderations mentioned appear to require that a colony should
not endeavor in such a negotiation to obtain an advantage at
the expense of other parts of Her Majesty's dominions. In the
case, therefore, of preference being sought by or offered to the
colony in respect of any article in which it competed seriously
with other colonies or with the mother country, Her Majesty's
government would feel it to be their duty to use every effort
to obtain the extension of the concession to the rest of the
Empire, and in any case to ascertain as far as possible whether
the other colonies affected would wish to be made a party to
the arrangement. In the event of this being impossible, and
of the result to the trade of the excluded portions of the Empire
being seriously prejudicial, it would be necessary to consider
whether it was desirable , in the common interests, to proceed with
the negotiation.
" Her Majesty's government recognize, of course, that in the
present state of opinion among foreign powers and many of
the colonies as to different duties, and in a matter which, to
some extent, would affect only a particular colony, they would
not feel justified in objecting to a proposal merely on the ground
that it was inconsistent in this respect with the commercial
and financial policy of this country.
" But the guardianship of the common interests of the Empire
rests with them, and they could not in any way be parties to, or
assist in, any arrangements detrimental to these interests as a
whole. In the performance of this duty it may sometimes be
necessary to require apparent sacrifices on the part of a colony,
but Her Majesty's government are confident that their general
policy in regard to matters in which colonial interests are in-
volved is sufficient to satisfy the colonies that they will not,
without good reason, place difficulties in the way of any arrange-
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 265
ments which a colony may regard as likely to be beneficial to
it."
That sort of assumption was possible just twelve years
ago — was possible indeed during the succeeding reigns, at
the Colonial Office, of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Lyttleton.
The Colonial Conference of 1907 has given it a curious ap-
pearance of belated officious paternalism.
In 1895, then, we have the British Colonial Secretary de-
claring that
"preferential arrangements in which this country should be
included cannot, under present conditions, be considered a
matter of practical politics," and " that it would not be prudent
to contemplate the denunciation of the treaties."
What more can Canada do ?
Canada took a very curious course; but before relating it,
let us note that while the Colonial Conference just referred
to was discussing preferential trade within the Empire, Cecil
Rhodes (an enthusiastic Imperialist) had succeeded in getting
a clause placed in his new Rhodesian Charter which was
almost certain to give the United Kingdom a preference
there within a very short time. The clause provided that no
British goods entering Rhodesia should ever be charged duties
higher than those of the then Cape tariff ; namely, nine per
cent. The general tariff of the South African Customs Union
(including Rhodesia) is now twelve per cent., but upon British
goods entering Rhodesia it has necessarily remained at the
lower rate. How Rhodes, in 1894, got John Bull to issue a
charter under which his goods would get the benefit of a
trade preference, has never been explained. Two years after
that date even Mr. Chamberlain was still unconverted to the
colonial notion of local protection and imperial preferences.
In his speech of March 25, 1896, before the British Empire
League, he said:
266 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
" But the principle which I claim must be accepted, if we are
to make any, even the slightest progress, is, that within the
different parts of the Empire, protection must disappear, and
that the duties must be revenue duties and not protective duties,
in the sense of protecting the products of one part of the Empire
against those of another."
Canada, as we have said, took a very curious course. Thus
far Parliaments, and conferences, and individuals had dis-
cussed the abstract question of preferences and had passed
abstract resolutions — what would happen if a concrete statu-
tory offer of preferential tariff rates were formally presented
to British statesmen ? Would they refuse it ? Canada deter-
mined to try, and passed (1897) the statute 60, 1 Vic. c. 16,
which provided that
"17. Where the customs tariff of any country admits the
products of Canada on terms which, on the whole, are as
favorable to Canada as the terms of the reciprocal tariff herein
referred to are to the countries to which it may apply, 1 articles
which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of such coun-
tries, when imported direct therefrom, may then be entered for
duty or taken out of warehouse for consumption in Canada, at
the reduced rates of duty provided in the reciprocal tariff set
forth in schedule * D ' to this Act."
The reductions in schedule "D" were one-eighth of the regular
tariff till June 30, 1898, and one-fourth of it after that
date. 2 The United Kingdom became at once entitled to the
benefits of this statute. What would it do ?
Canada passed the statute just prior to the assembling of
the Colonial Conference of 1897, and its effect was immediate.
In his opening speech at the Conference, Mr. Chamberlain said :
1 The United Kingdom's tariff was within that description.
2 The statute of 61 Vic. c. 37 (1898) confined the preferences to the
limits of the British Empire (for reasons mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain
at the Colonial Conference of 1897; " Proceedings," p. 11); and the
statute 63 Vic. c. 15 (1900) increased the preference from one-fourth
to one-third of the general tariff.
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 267
"But that brings me to another question connected with
commercial relations, and of great importance. I refer to the
treaties at present existing between the mother country, acting
on behalf of the colonies as well as of herself, and foreign coun-
tries. The question has been raised at various times in the
shape of resolutions or suggestions from the colonies that cer-
tain treaties, notably a treaty with Germany and a treaty with
Belgium, should be denounced. It should be borne in mind
that that is for us a most important question. Our trade
with Germany and Belgium is larger than our trade with all
the colonies combined. It is possible that if we denounced
those treaties Germany and Belgium would endeavor, I do
not say whether they would succeed, but they might endeavor,
to retaliate; and for some time, at any rate, our commercial
relations with these two countries might be disturbed. There-
fore a step of that kind is one which can only be taken after
the fullest consideration, and in deference to very strong opinion
both in this country and in the colonies. Now the question is
brought to a practical issue, or may be brought to a practical
issue, by the recent action of Canada. As all are aware, Canada
has offered preferential terms to the mother country, and
Germany and Belgium have immediately protested and claimed
similar terms under these treaties. Her Majesty's government
desire to know from the colonies whether, so far as they are
concerned, if it be found that the arrangements proposed by
Canada are inconsistent with the conditions of those treaties,
they desire that those treaties shall be denounced. If that be
the unanimous wish of the colonies, after considering the effect
of that denunciation upon them as well as upon us, because
they also are concerned in the arrangements which are made
by these treaties, then all I can say at the present time is that
Her Majesty's government will most earnestly consider such a
recommendation from the colonies, and will give to it the favor-
able regard which such a memorial deserves"
The "unanimous wish of the colonies" was expressed in
the following resolutions:
" 1. That the Premiers of the self-governing colonies unani-
mously and earnestly recommend the denunciation, at the
earliest convenient time, of any treaties which now hamper
the commercial relations between Great Britain and her col-
onies.
268 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
"2. That in the hope of improving the trade relations
between the mother country and the colonies, the Premiers
present undertake to confer with their colleagues with the view
to seeing whether such a result can be properly secured by a
preference given by the colonies to the products of the United
Kingdom."
The treaties were forthwith denounced, Lord Salisbury in
his notices saying that
"for many years past the British self-governing colonies have
enjoyed complete tariff autonomy/ '
and that the obnoxious provisions of the treaties
"constitute a barrier against the internal fiscal arrangements
of the British Empire which is inconsistent with the close ties
of commercial intercourse which subsist, and should be consoli-
dated between the mother country and the colonies."
The treaties at last out of the way, the Canadian preferen-
tial tariff went into operation, and the other colonies com-
menced consideration and construction of similar tariffs. In
1902, Mr. Chamberlain began his great effort to convince
the United Kingdom of the advantages of the Canadian
system.
At the Colonial Conferences of 1902 and 1907 the follow-
ing resolutions were passed :
"1. That this Conference recognizes that the principle of
preferential trade between the United Kingdom and His
Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas would stimulate and
facilitate mutual commercial intercourse, and would, by pro-
moting the development of the resources and industries of the
several parts, strengthen the Empire.
"2. That this Conference recognizes that, in the present cir-
cumstances of the colonies, it is not practicable to adopt a
general system of free trade, as between the mother country
and the British Dominions beyond the seas.
" 3. That with a view, however, to promoting the increase of
trade within the Empire, it is desirable that those colonies
which have not already adopted such a policy should, as far
as their circumstances permit, give substantial preferential
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 269
treatment to the products and manufactures of the United
Kingdom.
" 4. That the Prime Ministers of the colonies respectfully
urge on His Majesty's government the expediency of granting
in the United Kingdom preferential treatment to the products
and manufactures of the colonies either by exemption from,
or reduction of, duties now or hereafter imposed."
PRESENT POSITION
In "Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform" for July, 1907, is
the following summary of the present position of imperial
preferential trade arrangements.
"Canada now grants a preference to the United Kingdom,
India, Straits Settlement, Ceylon, New Zealand, Bermuda,
British Guiana, British West Indies, and South Africa, on all
goods, with the principal exceptions of alcoholic and distilled
liquors, tobacco, malt and malt extracts, opium, a few iron
manufactures, and sail- twine and canvas (of hemp or flax).
The amount of preference granted is of varying amounts, from
2\ to 15 per cent., with an average of about 10 per cent, ad
valorem (or about one-third of the general rates of duty).
" South Africa grants a preference to the United Kingdom,
Canada, the Australian commonwealth, and New Zealand, on
all goods except minerals, coffee and chicory, second-hand
clothing, coal and coke, raw cocoa, rice, dates, matches,
skimmed milk, mineral oils, onions and garlic, pills, spirits,
sugar, tea, tobacco, and wine. On specific rates of duty the
rebate varies according to the article, but is equivalent to about
3 per cent, ad valorem; on ad valorem rates of duty, the rebate
allowed is 3 per cent, ad valorem.
" New Zealand grants preference to all British Dominions on
various but mostly manufactured articles such as (i.) cement;
(ii.) boots and shoes, glass, earthenware, and chinaware, hard-
ware, paper, and fancy goods ; and (iii.) iron (sheet, bar, or
plate), rails, gas and oil engines, sail-cloth, canvas, and duck.
Additional duties are imposed on certain foreign goods, viz.,
(i.) double the general duty on cement; (ii.) 50 per cent, of the
general duty (i.e. an increase in most cases of 10 per cent, ad
valorem); (iii.) certain goods on the free list subjected to a
20 per cent, ad valorem duty, remaining free when of British
270 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
production. To South Africa, New Zealand grants prefer-
ence on all articles except spirits ; the preference is of varying
rates, but for the most part 25 per cent, less than the general
rates of duty.
" The commonwealth of Australia grants a preference to South
Africa on butter, cheese, hay and fodder, grain, jams and con-
fectionery, leather, agricultural and mining machinery, meats,
fish, poultry and game, preserved milk, timber, dried fish,
fruits, feathers, spirits, sugar, tobacco, and wine J the preference
is of varying rates, but for the most part about 25 per cent, less
than the general rates of duty.
" In addition to these preferences which are actually in force,
the commonwealth of Australia, according to a resolution passed
on August 30, 1906, granted a preference to the United King-
dom on arms, ammunition, dynamite, bicycles, boots, shoes,
clocks, watches, furniture, engines, paints and colors, pickles
and sauces, cutlery and plated ware, manufactures of wood,
paper-hangings, also paper bags and strawboard. It was pro-
posed to increase certain existing tariff rates on goods not the
produce of the United Kingdoni to the extent of from 5 per
cent, to 10 per cent, ad valorem. Certain specific rates were to
be increased from 20 per cent, to 50 per cent, of the duty, whilst
some free goods were to be subject to a duty of 10 per cent.
ad valorem when not of United Kingdom production. That
resolution has been reserved by the Governor-General for the
signification of His Majesty's pleasure, in consequence of the
stipulation that goods to enjoy preference must be imported
direct in British ships manned by white labor."
That last sentence contains a reference to another subject
upon which the United Kingdom and the colonials are much
at variance. The British view was well represented by Mr.
Asquith (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) when at the recent
Conference (1907) he said :
"We should never under any circumstances accept here a
preference granted to us only in respect of goods carried in
ships in which the whole of our fellow-subjects in India were not
allowed to serve. We could not possibly accede to that, and
everybody here would say we would rather have no preference
at all than preference limited by such a condition as that." '
1 " Proceedings," p. 315.
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 271
At the ensuing session of the Australian Parliament the
condition was eliminated and the various features of the
tariff considerably changed.
Incidentally the British government itself has been caught
by the trend in favor of protection and preferences. Refer-
ence has already been made to the clause in the Rhodesia
Charter under which a preference is given to British goods.
This fact was used as an argument at the Colonial Conference
of 1907, and Dr. Jameson (Cape Colony) moved:
"That while affirming the resolution of 1902, this Conference
is of opinion that as the British government, through the South
African Customs Union which comprised the Basutoland and
Bechuanaland Protectorates, do at present allow a preference
against foreign countries to the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and all other British possessions
granting such reciprocity, His Majesty's government should
now take into consideration the possibility of granting a like
preference to all portions of the Empire on the present dutiable
articles in the British tariff." 1
The British Parliament itself has made a commencement
in protection and preferences, for with a view to encourage
the growth of tobacco in Ireland, it has imposed an excise
upon the Irish product of two shillings per pound, while retain-
ing a duty of three shillings upon other tobacco. 2
So rests for the present the story of imperial preferential
tariffs. The next serious industrial depression in the United
Kingdom may add to it another remarkable chapter, unless
meanwhile, as is possible, the colonies have made other ar-
rangements. 3 Already Canada has enacted an " Intermediate
Tariff" — has made a statutory offer to countries other than
the United Kingdom, of reductions in the British preference
1 "Proceedings," p. 356.
2 lb. p. 346.
8 See Dr. Jameson's remarks, "Proceedings," p. 356.
272 IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS
in return for reciprocal concessions. The effect of this offer
was described in a British Board of Trade memorandum pre-
sented to the last Conference (1907) :
" The principal foreign competitors of this country in Canada
are the United States, Germany, and France, and should at any
time the intermediate tariff be applied to the imports from
these countries, the preference accorded various British imports
wouldy as a consequence, be diminished to such an extent as to
injuriously affect our lead in some lines, and in others to increase
that of our competitors." l
Already has Canada made a treaty with France in pur-
suance of this statute.
Summary. — We may summarize what has been said as
follows :
1. Termination of the reciprocity treaty with the United
States (1854-1866) disorganized Canadian trade.
2. Efforts of both political parties in Canada to renew
the treaty failed.
3. In 1878, Sir John A. Macdonald adopted a new policy :
Reciprocity of trade or reciprocity of tariffs.
4. In 1885, Sir John, in a speech in London, made an
informal offer of preferential trade with the United Kingdom.
5. Speakers at the Colonial Conference of 1887 advocated
imperial preferences. Lord Salisbury thought it "shadowy."
6. In 1891, Sir John again endeavored to arrange reci-
procity with the United States; announced that negotiations
were pending; but was unable to arrive at an agreement.
7. In the same year, the colonies urged the imperial
government to denounce the treaties which prevented im-
perial preferences. Lord Salisbury declined to take action.
8. In the same year, the Canadian Senate and House of
Commons joined in addresses praying for the denunciation
of the treaties.
1 "Papers laid before the Colonial Conference, 1907," p. 341.
IMPERIAL PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS 273
9. In 1892, the Canadian House of Commons made a
formal offer to the United Kingdom of preferential tariffs.
10. At the Ottawa Colonial Conference of 1894, resolu-
tions were passed in favor of imperial preferences and the
denunciation of the treaties.
11. As reply, the British government through the Colonial
Secretary declared that preferential arrangements with the
United Kingdom could not "be considered a matter of prac-
tical politics/' and declined to denounce the treaties.
12. In 1897, the Canadian Parliament passed a statute
containing an offer of preferences to the United Kingdom.
13. At the Colonial Conference of that year, the Premiers
voted unanimously in favor of preferences and of denunciation
of the treaties.
14. Lord Salisbury thereupon gave notice of denunciation.
15. At the Conferences of 1902 and 1907 resolutions in
favor of imperial preferences were again adopted.
16. All the self-governing colonies have passed preferen-
tial tariffs.
17. Will conversion of the United Kingdom occur before
or after the colonies have been induced, by the delay, to
make other arrangements?
IMPERIAL CABLES 1
Having seen the failure of all the Chamberlain attempts at
military and political federation, it is a relief and a pleasure
to turn to those projects of imperial scope which Canada has
from time to time proposed — imperial cables, imperial pref-
erential tariffs, imperial postage, imperial routes of travel.
Hardly had the construction of the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way been commenced before Sir Sandford Fleming (then Chief
Engineer of the Canadian Government Railways) remarked
(1879) that
"If these connections are made, we shall have a complete
overland telegraph from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. It
appears to me to follow that, as a question of imperial impor-
tance, the British possessions to the west of the Pacific Ocean
should be connected by a submarine cable with the Canadian
line. Great Britain will thus be brought into direct communi-
cation with all the greater colonies and dependencies without
passing through foreign coun tries." 2
Prior to that date, cable connection between the United
Kingdom and the Australasian colonies had been established
by lines which, skirting the African shores, passed through
the waters of various foreign countries and were consequently
liable to destruction by any one of them at any moment.
These lines, moreover, were in the hands of a private com-
pany and charged the exorbitant minimum rate of nine
shillings a word.
Twenty-three years after Sir Sandford's suggestion (October
1 Most of the information in this article was obtained from Mr. John-
son's "Annals and Aims of the Pacific Cable."
2 "Annals," p. 8.
275
276 IMPERIAL CABLES
31, 1902), a Pacific cable connecting Canada with Australia
and New Zealand by way of Fanning, Fiji, and Norfolk
Islands was completed and in operation. It was owned and
operated by Great Britain, Canada, and three of the Aus-
tralasian colonies; it landed upon British coasts only; and
its tariff was three shillings per word between the United
Kingdom and Australia, and fifty-eight cents per word be-
tween Canada and Australia. Recognized now by every-
body as a work of the highest imperial significance, Canada
alone foresaw its importance and fought for its construction
against British opposition and Australian hesitation. 1
1884. — The story commences with the Canadian request
(1884-1885) that the Admiralty should undertake a survey
of a route through the Pacific. The Admiralty objected that,
having no available ship, it could not be done. Canada
offered the Alert The Admiralty demurred to the cost. Sir
Sandford Fleming and a friend offered to pay one-half of the
expense ($90,000). The Admiralty declined the offer — "the
Admiralty would have none of it." 2
1886. — In 1886, Sir Sandford proceeded to London and
through Sir Charles Tupper (Canadian High Commissioner)
urged the project upon the British government, with the
result that in the circular summoning the first Colonial Con-
ference (1887) it was said that
"the promotion of commercial and social relations by the
development of our postal and telegraphic communication
could be considered with much advantage by the proposed
Conference."
Colonial Conference of 1887. — The Conference met on
April 4th, 1887, and the British position with reference to
the cable may be judged by the opening remarks of the
Colonial Secretary (Sir Henry Holland):
1 "Annals," pp. 108-212. 2 lb. pp. 72, 73, 80, 84.
IMPERIAL CABLES 277
"The proposal had been from time to time mentioned in
connection with the Canadian Pacific Railway, but it was
opposed by the company which owns the existing telegraph
lines communicating with Australia. ... A very strong case
would have to be made to justify Her Majesty's government in
proposing to Parliament to provide a subsidy for maintaining
a cable in competition with a telegraphic system which, at any
rate, supplies the actual needs of the imperial government." l
Mr. Raikes, the British Postmaster-General, spoke to the
same effect:
"It would be a matter of extreme difficulty, I think without
precedent, for the English government itself to become inter-
ested in such a scheme, in such a way as to constitute itself
a competitor with existing commercial enterprise, carried on
by citizens of the British Empire." 2
All that Canada could get from the Conference was the
following resolutions:
"That the connection recently formed through Canada,
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, by railway telegraph, opens
a new and alternative line of imperial communication over the
high seas and through British possessions, which promises to
be of great value alike in naval, military, commercial, and
political aspects."
" That the connection of Canada with Australasia by direct
submarine telegraph across the Pacific is a project of high im-
portance to the Empire, and every doubt as to its practicability
should, without delay, be set at rest by a thorough and ex-
haustive survey." 3
1888. — In the following year (1888) at a Conference of all
the Australasian colonies, a resolution was passed declaring
the necessity of an early survey — the cost to be defrayed
by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Australasian colonies.
Thus urged, the Admiralty indicated that the Egeria would
proceed with the work; but what, if anything, the Egeria
did has never been disclosed. 4
> "Annals," p. 86. 2 lb. p. 58. 8 lb. pp. 71, 72. 4 lb. p. 86.
278 IMPERIAL CABLES
1893. — Canadian Mission to Australia. — In September of
1893, Sir Mackenzie Bowell (then Canadian Minister of Cus-
toms) visited Australia, hoping to stimulate trade between
the two colonies. Sir Sandford Fleming went with him to
urge cooperation in the cable scheme. This is what he
encountered :
"New South Wales and Victoria, the two leading colonies,
were too dependent on the Eastern Extension Company openly
to favor the Pacific cable without incurring what was regarded
as a serious risk, and lacking the outspoken approval of these
influential governments, the other colonies felt that it would
be imprudent to commit themselves. Sir George Dibbs,
Premier of New South Wales, was well disposed but non-
committal. Hon. J. B. Paterson, Premier of Victoria, was of
the same mind. It was suspected that the attitude of nearly
all the colonies would be altered into positive and active sym-
pathy, if it were once made clear that the cable scheme would
go ahead; and that it would have the necessary financial sup-
port by joint agreement of Great Britain, Canada, and Aus-
tralia." 1
It is somewhat difficult to believe, but nevertheless the
fact is beyond dispute, that the Colonial Office for the express
purpose of thwarting the Canadian project, and of aiding its
opponents in Australia, sent two documents "for the informa-
tion of the Australian colonies," nicely timed (sent September
15) to anticipate the mission of the Canadians. The first of
these documents is a letter from the Secretary of the General
Post-Office (July 5, 1893), of which Sir Sandford Fleming
said:
" It is with a feeling of regret that I find the statements made,
inaccurate and misleading."
The second was a report of the Hydrographer of the Ad-
miralty, nearly seven years old (February 28, 1887), since
which, as Sir Sandford said,
1 "Annals," p. 110.
IMPERIAL CABLES 279
"much light has been thrown on the advantages of a Pacific
cable and the necessity of its establishment."
More than that, while Canada was thus so strongly urging
the connection of Pacific points with other parts of the Em-
pire by state-owned cables, the British government actually
agreed to exclude the proposed lines from Hong Kong. By
"an agreement, dated October 28, 1893, the Eastern Ex-
tension Telegraph Company strengthened its monopoly by
having Canada and the Australasian colonies telegraphically
excluded from Hong Kong, and forbidden to lay, or assist in
laying, any new cable to that port for a period which does not
expire until 1918." 1
1894. — Australian Conference. — The Canadians accom-
plished much by their mission to Australia, and to their in-
fluence must be attributed the passing of the following resolu-
tion of the Postal Conference of the Australasian colonies
early in the following year (1894):
"That considering the important interests involved, both of
a national and commercial character, in the establishment of
a Pacific cable, the representatives of the respective colonies,
assembled at this Conference, recommend their governments to
consider the desirability of entering into a guarantee with the
other countries interested for a period not exceeding fourteen
years, and to guarantee interest at four per cent, on a capital of
not more than £1,800,000 to any company undertaking the
laying of a Pacific cable; the tariff not to exceed 3s. per word
for ordinary telegrams, 2s. per word for government telegrams,
and Is. Qd. per word for press telegrams to and from Great
Britain and the colonies; that the United Kingdom be asked
to join in the guarantee; the routes to be either of the follow-
ing : Brisbane to Ahipara Bay (New Zealand) , Ahipara Bay to
Suva, Suva to Apia, Apia to Fanning Island, Fanning Island
to Sandwich Islands, Sandwich Islands to Vancouver; or from
New Zealand to Suva, Suva to Apia, Apia to Fanning Island,
Fanning Island to Sandwich Islands, Sandwich Islands to
Vancouver." 2
1 " Annals," p. 468. See a resolution passed at the Colonial Conference
of 1902: "Proceedings," p. 39. * "Annals," p. 156.
280 IMPERIAL CABLES
1894. — Colonial Conference. — In June, 1894, a Colonial
Conference met at Ottawa
"for the purpose of discussing the question of trade relations
and telegraphic communication between Canada and the
Australasian colonies."
At this Conference the Hon. Mr. Suttor of New South Wales
declared himself opposed to government ownership:
"The first proposition is that the work should be carried
out through the agency of a company, liberally subsidized, and
the second is that it shall be a public work carried out entirely
under government control, each government interested paying
pro rata for the construction. Now, with regard to these two
proposals made by Mr. Sandford Fleming, I think I shall be
justified in expressing the opinion that, so far as the govern-
ment of New South Wales, of which I am a member, is con-
cerned, I do not think that we can see our way clear to enter
into any arrangement such as that by which this cable will be
constructed directly by the government itself. My govern-
ment is not prepared at the present time to enter into any such
proposal as that. Mr. Fleming admits that he recognizes the
difficulty arising from the obligation of certain of the Aus-
tralian governments to pay the Eastern Extension Company
until May, 1899, an annual subsidy of £32,400, but he con-
siders that it can be readily overcome by providing out of capital
an annuity to meet the subsidy as it annually becomes due.
That, of course, is in the event of the governments of the differ-
ent colonies arranging to carry out this work themselves.
While I do not think it is at all likely that the governments
will enter into any such proposal as that, — I may say here, in
parenthesis, with regard to the Eastern Extension Company,
that the colony I come from (New South Wales) has no feeling
whatever against the company, — we feel that during the time
that it has been in existence it has done good work. We feel
that it has on every opportunity met the wishes of the different
Australian governments, so far as it could within reasonable
limits. And if the construction of the Pacific cable means the
destruction of the other cable, I do not see that by constructing
the Pacific cable and destroying the other we shall be in any
better position than we are at present. Therefore, whilst I am
quite prepared to give all the assistance that I legitimately
can with my instructions, to the consideration of this cable,
IMPERIAL CABLES 281
I do not see that we would be justified in constructing it if it
is going to cause the destruction of the one already in existence.
We feel that there is work for both cables, and that we should
assist in every possible way we can in doubling this communica-
tion between the parts of the Empire concerned. Therefore,
we are of the opinion that whilst we will give all legitimate
assistance to the proposal now under consideration, at the same
time we do not in any way desire to unnecessarily hamper or
restrict or discourage the companies already in existence, by
which we have telegraphic communication between Europe
and Australasia. " *
"I am permitted to say that my government is quite pre-
pared to bear its proportionate share of the expense of that
survey, if the home government do not see their way to meet
it with the ordinary means at their disposal. As to the way
in which the line will be constructed, I do not think that my
government will agree to any proposal by which the work
shall be carried out under the direct control or at the cost of
the governments. . . . We are not prepared to subsidize any
company, but we are quite prepared to enter into a guarantee,
as defined by the Conference in New Zealand, to provide that
any company undertaking this work should not be at a loss;
in other words, that we should provide the difference between
some fixed amount of interest mentioned and the deficiency
that would arise between the net receipts and that amount." 3
The Hon. Mr. Thomas Playford of South Australia was
opposed both to government control and government guar-
antee. Excepting him, all the representatives voted for the
following resolutions:
"That the imperial government be respectfully requested
to undertake, at the earliest possible moment, and to prosecute
with all possible speed, a thorough survey of the proposed cable
route between Canada and Australia; the expense to be borne
in equal proportion by Great Britain, Canada, and the Aus-
tralasian colonies.' ' 3
"Resolved, that the Canadian government be requested,
after the rising of this Conference, to make all necessary in-
quiries, and generally to take such steps as may be expedient,
in order to ascertain the cost of the proposed Pacific cable,
'Annals/' p. 160. a lb. p. 168. 8 lb. p. 87.
282 IMPERIAL CABLES
and promote the establishment of the undertaking in accord-
ance with the views expressed in this Conference/ ' '
The first of these resolutions indicates the lack of progress
since the passing of a similar one seven years before, at the
Conference of 1887. The second of the resolutions was
promptly acted upon in the very practical way of advertis-
ing for tenders for the construction of the cable. 2 Before the
year was out the tenders were in, and all trouble about "a
thorough survey" obviated.
Necker Island. — There is an interesting story of Sir Sand-
ford Fleming's attempt to secure Necker Island as a mid-
ocean landing-place for the cable; and it is very well told in
"Annals and Aims of the Pacific Cable" (Chap. iv). He did
not succeed, and the cable had to continue eight hundred miles
further, at enormously increased expense, to Fanning Island,
before it reached land.
Necker Island belonged to nobody, and was worth nothing
to anybody except as a cable station :
"Very little was known about the island, as no one had ever
landed upon it. What information there was had been pub-
lished chiefly to warn mariners from its inhospitable shores.
Necker Island is, in fact, a mere rock, from one-half to three-
quarters of a mile long and one thousand feet broad, with an
elevation at two points of 250 and 280 feet on the southeast.
Not a single tree is to be found upon the island, but there is
stated to be abundant vegetation on the high land toward
the summit. The shores rise steep as a wall, and the sea
breaks with fury at all points. The island was discovered by
La Perouse on the 1st of November, 1786, but was regarded
as too insignificant for ownership." 3
Canada urged (1893) that the island should be taken pos-
session of; and Sir Sandford obtained the cooperation of
New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland in pressing the
1 "Annals," p. 88. 2 See Sess. Pap., H. of C, Can., No. 51 of 1899.
3 "Annals," p. 124.
IMPERIAL CABLES 283
importance of the step upon the British government. The
reply (December 29, 1893) could have been foretold :
"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will defer action,
pending the establishment of the government of Hawaii upon
a more permanent footing." *
What this meant is told in " Annals and Aims " (p. 127) :
" It will be remembered that the death of King Kamehameha
had been followed by a revolution in which the Queen was
deposed, and a provisional government established. The
members of this government were nearly all citizens of, and in
active sympathy with, the United States. The British gov-
ernment, always anxious to avoid the tender corns of the
United States, possibly felt that to take possession of Necker
Island might cause annoyance at Washington. At any rate,
they evidently felt it necessary to consult the Hawaiian gov-
ernment in the matter, though on what grounds it is somewhat
difficult to determine, as Necker Island did not belong, either
politically or geographically, to the Hawaiian group."
In January of the following year (1894) Sir Sandford,
together with official representatives of Canada, New South
Wales, New Zealand, Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania,
waited upon the Colonial Secretary (Lord Ripon) and urged
action. Lord Ripon (as Sir Charles Tupper reported Jan-
uary 16)
"seemed to be much impressed with our representations and
promised to place himself in communication with the Foreign
Office, with a view of ascertaining what action can be taken in
the matter." 2
Lord Ripon desired that
"they should all be extremely careful to avoid any public
reference to the subject, it being most important that the whole
matter should be held to be strictly confidential, inasmuch as
any reference to it by the newspapers of the day might imperil
the object they all had in view." 3
1 "Annals," p. 126. a lb. p. 128. 8 lb. p. 137.
284 IMPERIAL CABLES
Nothing being done, Sir Charles Tupper appealed to the
Foreign Minister (Lord Rosebery), who considerately
"expressed his desire that the imperial government should do
anything possible in the premises; that Her Majesty's repre-
sentatives at Honolulu had been requested to watch the matter
closely; but he thought it undesirable, in view of the disturbed
relations in the Sandwich Islands, that any definite steps should
be taken for the present." *
Months passed, nothing was done, and Sir Sandford, acting
upon a suggestion from a military official to the effect that
" the best thing to do in a matter of that kind is to act first and
ask for leave afterwards,"
arranged that a retired naval officer should take a trip to
Necker Island, and " leave behind him evidences of his visit"
— in other words run up the British flag. The plans were
well and carefully laid; the retired officer went to Honolulu,
found two steamers at his disposal, and was about to embark
when he ascertained that
" the British government had already recognized — apparently
quite gratuitously — the right of Hawaii to the island of
Necker as an appanage of the Hawaiian Crown or govern-
ment, and had asked the provisional government on what
conditions they would allow Great Britain to have control of
the island for the purpose of landing a cable there." 2
The retired officer abandoned the project, and the next day
(May 25, 1894) one of the ships
"was taken possession of by the Hawaiian government, and
the same afternoon she left for an unknown destination." 3
Two days afterwards the Hawaiian flag was hoisted on
Necker Island.
After the retired officer had started for Honolulu, Sir Sand-
ford confessed his scheme through Sir Charles Tupper to the
"Annals," p. 128. 2 lb. p. 135. 3 lb. p. 138.
IMPERIAL CABLES 285
British government, and on May 31, 1894, Sir Sandford re-
ceived the following cable :
" Rosebery much annoyed at action. Will repudiate. Fears
will destroy good prospect of obtaining Necker. Prevent
action becoming public if possible." '
This injunction turned out to be unnecessary — unneces-
sary because some one having betrayed Sir Sandford to the
Hawaiian government, there was no "action" to conceal. In
the "Annals and Aims" it is said:
"The explanation forms an essential portion of the Necker
Island story, but as it involves the reputation of a gentleman
who was at the time a minister of the Crown, the regrettable
incident is omitted from these pages." 2
Balked in this way, Canada sent Sir Sandford to treat with
the Hawaiian government for the cession of Necker, or of
the necessary rights in respect of it. A satisfactory arrange-
ment was easily made, but subject to the approval of the
United States — the Hawaiian government being debarred
by treaty from acting without American assent. The United
States Senate refused its assent; and the cable had to go by
Fanning Island at an increased cost of about $2,250,000.
"Moreover, it will not be possible to send messages as effec-
tively — that is to say, at the same rate of speed — by the
longer route now adopted. This represents the price the Empire
has to pay for the failure to secure Necker Island; a failure
which, in the end, was certainly inevitable, but at one time
could have been avoided at the mere cost of despatching a
British warship to take formal possession of the island." 3
1896. — The attitude of the British government under-
went some change with the accession of Mr. Chamberlain to
the Colonial Secretaryship. In June, 1896, he created the
Imperial Pacific Cable Committee (composed of two British,
1 "Annals," p. 133. 2 lb. p. 142. » lb. p. 147.
286 IMPERIAL CABLES
two Canadian, and two Australasian representatives) for the
purpose of investigating the project; and on January 5,
1897, the committee's report was ready: the scheme was
practicable; the route should be by Fanning, Fiji, and Nor-
folk Islands; and the cable should be state owned. 1
1897. — Colonial Conference. — Progress might have been ex-
pected, but none came with the Conference of 1897. Mr.
Chamberlain was non-committal. In his opening speech he
said:
" In any matter in which our colonies are themselves deeply
interested they may count on the support and assistance of
the mother country. ... I think that one of the very first
things to bind together the sister nations is to have the readiest
and the easiest possible connection between the several units. ,, 2
And the only specific reference to the cable in the official
account of the proceedings is as follows:
" The question of the proposed Pacific cable was brought up,
but the majority of the provinces desired that the subject
should be deferred until they had had time to consider the
report of the Committee appointed to consider the question last
year. It was, however, pointed out to the members of the
Conference that the matter was not one in which the United
Kingdom was taking the initiative, although Her Majesty's
government were ready to consider any proposal for working
with and assisting the colonies, if they attached great im-
portance to the project; and that they would now wait definite
proposals from the colonies interested before proceeding further
in the matter." 3
In a semi-official way The Standard announced that
"The Conference left the Pacific cable in mid-air, and it is
very unlikely that anything more will be heard of it for a con-
siderable time. The position was entirely changed by a pro-
posal by the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company to lay an
all-British line from Western Australia across the Indian Ocean
'Annals," pp. 214, 239. 2 lb. p. 236. » lb. p. 236.
IMPERIAL GABLES 287
to Mauritius, thence connecting with the Cape and St. Helena
and Ascension. . . . The Eastern Extension Company, it is
understood, does not ask for a direct subsidy for the new lines,
but seeks other concessions from the Australasian governments,
which, if made, will justify them in proceeding with the work." *
1899. — Notwithstanding this announcement the Colonial
Secretary encouraged the colonies to continue negotiations as
to the proportion in which the cost of the cable ought to be
borne; and by August of 1898 an agreement was arrived at
by which the Australasian colonies were to pay eight-eigh-
teenths and Canada five-eighteenths, provided the United
Kingdom would contribute the other five-eighteenths. Months
passed and finally Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed
" Her Majesty's government are anxious to show sympathy
with Canadian and Australasian government by assisting
Pacific cable scheme, but cannot take part in laying or working
the line." 2
As an alternative he proposed that the United Kingdom
would pay five-eighteenths of any loss of revenue (not exceed-
ing £20,000) which might result from operating the cable,
provided that priority was given imperial government mes-
sages, and that they were transmitted at half the ordinary
rates.
Sir Sandford at once issued a vigorous protest "To the
British People" against this refusal and proposal:
"As this proposal, at the eleventh hour, taken by itself,
involves an entire change in the well-known plan upon which
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have been proceeding
in their negotiations for more than two years, and, moreover,
is in itself of no value in securing the establishment of so im-
portant a national work, it is impossible to believe that it is
the full or final judgment of Her Majesty's government, for
the following reasons, viz. :
"1. It would always be regarded as a recession on the part of
Annals," p. 240. * lb. p. 431.
288 IMPERIAL CABLES
the mother country from a common understanding with Can-
ada, Australia, and New Zealand.
"2. It would always be regarded as an attempt to retard
the expansion and cripple the commerce of the Empire in the
interest of a few rich monopolists.
" 3. It would always be regarded by the people of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand as an unjustifiable and discourte-
ous act to them.
" 4. Its effect would be far-reaching, and its immediate effect
would be a fatal blow to the scheme for establishing a system
of State-owned British cables encircling the globe.
"5. It would be a very grave retrograde step in the imperial
movement, which aims to draw closer the bonds between the
mother country and her daughter lands." !
The protest was sustained by the colonial Agents-General
in London; Mr. Chamberlain capitulated and agreed to
assume the proposed five-eighteenths of the cost.
The contract for construction was signed on December 31,
1900. On October 31, 1902, two world-encircling messages
were sent from Ottawa — one to the East and the other to
the West. One of these was as follows :
"To the Governor-General, Ottawa.
Congratulations follow 2 the sun around the globe via Aus-
tralia, South Africa, and England on completion of the Pacific
cable — initiating new era of freest intercourse and cheap
telegraph service throughout the Empire.
"Sandford Fleming."
The Canadian idea of imperial cooperation in State-owned
cables had been realized.
'"Annals," p. 433.
2 "Outspeed" would perhaps have been a better word.
IMPERIAL POSTAGE
Two Canadian methods of "consolidating the Empire" —
imperial preferences and imperial cables — have now been
discussed. There is still a third — imperial postage — and
the story of another great Canadian success remains to be
related.
Even the originators of the postal system must have had
some conception of its tremendous educational as well as com-
mercial advantages, and no one now doubts that cheap post-
age is a powerful aid in the dissemination of culture as well
as in the advancement of the world's welfare.
Curiously enough, however, the great benefits to be derived
from the post-office have always been subordinated in the
United Kingdom to the idea that the office must not only pay
its way, but must be a source of national revenue. And thus
although the distances are short, the population dense, and
the methods of transportation of the best, letters are still
charged a minimum rate of one penny; newspapers (whether
from the office of publication or elsewhere) one half-penny
each; and periodicals eight cents per pound. For the year
1905, the surplus revenue reached the large sum of $18,000,000.
Canada has always acted upon the opposite principle, and
deficits, rather than surpluses, have been the normal condi-
tion of her post-office finances. Although her distances are
immense, her population scattered, and many of her methods
of transportation somewhat primitive, yet the minimum letter
rate is the same as that of the United Kingdom; the rate
upon newspapers and periodicals is a quarter of a cent per
290 IMPERIAL POSTAGE
bulk pound * from the office of publication for distances
within three hundred miles, and a half-cent for longer dis-
tances.
Letter Rates: Canadian, Domestic. — During the period of
British management of Canadian post-office affairs (1763-
1851) the idea that the post-office ought to make money was
applied upon this side of the Atlantic, and thousands of
dollars were each year remitted to London as profits upon
Canadian operations.
During the first year of Canadian management, she re-
duced the average rate of letter postage from eighteen cents
per half ounce to six cents, with the result that in four years
the revenue was greater than it had ever been before:
1851 $362,065
1852 230,629
1853 ' 278,587
1854 320,000
1855 . 368,166
Since 1851 numerous changes (always reductions) have
been made. In 1868 (the year after Federation) the letter
rate was fixed at three cents per half ounce; in 1889 it was
reduced to three cents per ounce ; and in 1899 to two cents
per ounce. In the United Kingdom a penny carries a letter
at farthest 800 or 900 miles (Land's End to Orkney Islands).
In Canada the same amount pays for 5495 miles (Sydney to
Dawson).
Letter Rate between Canada and United Kingdom. — In 1868
the rate between Canada and the United Kingdom was 12|
cents per half ounce. In 1870 it was reduced to six cents,
and in 1875 to five cents for the same weight. Canada was
1 That means that the rate is charged, not upon each separate news-
paper, but upon the weight of the whole number mailed. Each news-
paper therefore usually costs less than the quarter-cent.
IMPERIAL POSTAGE 291
not satisfied, and from time to time endeavored to obtain
British consent to a reduction to three cents. All efforts fail-
ing, Canada took a course somewhat similar to that which she
adopted when the United Kingdom was refusing to accept
preferential customs duties. In that case, Canada passed a
statute (1897) giving the preference, with the result that the
United Kingdom reconsidered the matter and accepted it.
During the same year, the Canadian Postmaster-General (Sir
William Mulock), without any sufficient authority, issued a
notice that after January 1, 1898, the rate upon letters
to the United Kingdom should be three cents per ounce. The
United Kingdom had declared that it would not accept letters
so paid, but Canada's curious performance forced a recon-
sideration, and the United Kingdom suggested consultation.
Sir William withdrew his notice, paid out $91.95 upon letters
sent upon the faith of it, and before the end of the year had
the satisfaction of issuing another (December 21, 1898), this
time well based, declaring that the rate from Canada, not
only to the United Kingdom, but to thirty-six other parts
of the Empire, should be two cents per half ounce. On
October 1, 1907, the rate was further reduced to two cents
per ounce upon Canadian letters to every part of the Empire. 1
Imperial penny postage is largely the result of Canadian
determination.
Periodical Rate: Canadian, Domestic. — In 1868 (just after
Federation) Canada established rates upon newspapers and
periodicals when mailed from the office of publication rang-
ing from five cents each, per quarter, for weekly issues, to
thirty cents each, per quarter, for daily issues. In 1875 the
rate was changed to one cent per bulk pound; in 1882 to
zero ; in 1889 weekly issues (for twenty miles distance) free,
1 Some places (Australia and Rhodesia) still charge more than two
cents on letters to Canada.
292 IMPERIAL POSTAGE
and others (more frequent) one-half cent per bulk pound;
in 1903 this one-half cent was reduced to one-quarter cent
per pound for deliveries within a radius of three hundred
miles.
These same rates applied to transmissions from Canada to
the United States. 1
Periodical Rate between Canada and United Kingdom. — In
1878, Canada became a party to the Universal Postal Union,
with the result that she had to adopt the universal rate of
one cent per two ounces. 2
When, therefore, the Colonial Conference of 1902 met in
London, Canada's position was that though the rate to and
from the United States upon newspapers and periodicals was
one-fourth of a cent per bulk pound for issues more frequent
than weekly within distances of three hundred miles, and one-
half cent for other transmissions, yet that the rate to and
from the United Kingdom was one cent for every individual
two ounces, or eight cents per individual pound.
At the Conference the following resolution was adopted:
"That it is advisable to adopt a principle of cheap postage
between the different parts of the British Empire on all news-
papers and periodicals published therein, and the Prime Minis-
ters desire to draw attention of His Majesty's government to
the question of a reduction in the outgoing rate. They con-
sider that each government shall be allowed to determine the
amount to which it may reduce such rate, and the time for such
reduction going into effect." 3
Canadian Action. — Nothing being done, the Canadian
Postmaster-General issued (1902) a circular letter offering to
1 This was by virtue of a special convention between the two coun-
tries.
2 No special convention could be made; for rates between countries
not contiguous were unalterably fixed by the Postal Union.
3 "Proceedings," pp. xi, 40.
IMPERIAL POSTAGE 293
send Canadian periodicals to all parts of the Empire at the
domestic rate (one-half cent per bulk pound) and offering to
receive at the same rate.
The United Kingdom and some of the colonies ■ agreed to
accept the Canadian publications at the rate offered, but New
Zealand was the only one that offered to reciprocate, and her
offer was not one-half cent per pound, but one penny per
newspaper up to eight ounces.
The reason for the refusal of reciprocity by the United
Kingdom was the existence of the high domestic rate which
the authorities did not wish to reduce. A proposition to
send periodicals to Canada at one-half cent a bulk pound
was plainly unacceptable while the internal rate was one cent
for every individual two ounces. The rate to Canada could
not be made one-sixteenth of the rate from London to
Liverpool.
Canada was disappointed. Canada was being flooded with
American literature, and many of the British publications
that reached her were brought by express to New York, 3
there surrounded with American advertisements, and sent by
post to Canada.
Senate's Resolution. — Expression to Canada's disappoint-
ment was given in a resolution of the Senate (February 22,
1905) moved by Sir George Drummond, as follows:
"That the attention of the government be directed to the
local, foreign and imperial postal charges, with the view of
remedying certain irregularities therein ; and the Senate affirms
the principle that the conveyance of letters, newspapers, books,
periodicals, etc., should be at a lower scale of charge within the
Empire than at the time ruling with any foreign country."
1 Seventeen colonies announced their acceptance in 1903, and ten
others in 1904.
2 At two dollars per hundred pounds — one-quarter of the British
postal rate.
294 IMPERIAL POSTAGE
Sir George, in finishing his speech, said that
" imperial sentiment, which is the deliberate policy of this
country, as affirmed, is the strongest and most effective bond
of union in the Empire; and that in dealing with it in the
miserable haggling way the British Post-Office does, they are
trifling with an important factor in the spread of imperial feel-
ing and sympathy. I do not care to exaggerate sentiment as a
factor, but you may be certain that it is the most potent factor
in all political movements in the world. "
About the same time the Canadian Press Association
adopted the following resolution:
"Believing that a cheap system of news, book, and letter
postage is of the highest necessity in bringing about the full
interchange of thought and knowledge by which the peoples
of the Empire can be brought into a mutual understanding of
each other, into common ground of action, and into closer
commercial relations, this assembly warmly commends the
efforts already made by our Postmaster-General to this end,
and earnestly trusts that the Canadian government will con-
tinue to urge upon the imperial government the early inaugura-
tion of such a postal system for all parts of the British Empire.' p
With a view of pressing the matter upon the attention of
the British government, the following petition addressed to
the British Postmaster-General was signed by the officials of
various Canadian Boards of Trade and Chambers of Com-
merce, by the President of the British Empire League and
others; and on March 16, 1905, a deputation of twenty-one
members of the British House of Commons headed by Sir
Gilbert Parker (a Canadian) presented it to the Postmaster-
General. It was as follows:
"We the undersigned would respectfully draw your atten-
tion to the unsatisfactory circulation of British weeklies and
monthlies in the outlying portions of the Empire, and would
urge that the postal rates for this class of mail-matter be re-
duced from four pence to one penny a pound, when sent from
the office of publication or from news-agencies.
IMPERIAL POSTAGE 295
"The needs of the British Empire demand that the literature
of the people shall be British, and cheaper postal rates seem
positively necessary to this end. Interchange of opinion is
necessary to political unity, and interchange of advertisement
is one great means of promoting inter-imperial trade.
11 We your petitioners would humbly urge upon you the im-
portance of this postal reform in order that Canadians may
receive British periodical literature at a rate as advantageous
as that from foreign coun tries."
Sir Gilbert Parker, in presenting the petition, said :
"British trade is naturally affected by the competition of
American advertisements; in other words, the higher postal
rate on newspapers and magazines going to our colonies is
practically a tax upon the advertisements of British goods and
manufactures, upon the productions of the publishing houses,
upon British printing and upon British authorship ; it provides
protection for American publishers ; it retards the development
of mutual understanding and reciprocity of feelings and senti-
ments; and it is a handicap upon information concerning the
industrial and commercial outputs of this country and of the
general commercial trade; it tends to place Canada, its thought,
feeling, business methods, and commercial life under American
instead of British influence. It is, in fact, a premium upon
Canadian and American reciprocity."
General Laurie, speaking in support of the petition, said
that he had over and over again approached the former Post-
master-General and had always been told that
"we cannot afford to do it. Our business is to collect and
deliver letters and newspapers, etc.; it is not our business to
create sentiment nor to advance trade."
The reply of the Postmaster-General (Lord Stanley) was a
refusal. He said :
"The mere fact of my father having been Governor-General
of Canada would rather predispose me to sympathize with you ;
but, at the same time, in matters like these, one has to put
aside sentiment, at any rate to a certain extent, and deal with
the question on business lines. . . .
296 IMPERIAL POSTAGE
" You have then to see what effect that would have on our
inland postage, and I ask those who know the House of Commons
well, whether it would be possible for me or for any Postmaster-
General to stand up in his place in the House and justify the
institution of a cheaper rate of postage for periodicals and
newspapers sent between London and Canada and between
London and other colonies than is in force for newspapers and
periodicals sent now between London and Oxford."
Upon the change of government in 1905, Mr. Sydney
Buxton (who had been one of the deputation which waited
upon Lord Stanley) became Postmaster-General. His sym-
pathies were with the Canadians, but he had to consider not
only the traditions of his office but the opinions of his col-
leagues. Not long after his accession to office, in reply to a
question in the House of Commons, he referred to the loss
which the adoption of the proposal would involve — a loss
"which could not be recouped, but would only be made greater
by any increase that took place in the amount carried.
" The position of Canada, however, in regard to this matter,
is a peculiar one. But I see, I fear, little prospect of attaining
the desired object unless some special arrangement, entailing
probably some sacrifice on either side, could be devised and in
a form which would not create a precedent."
"Some special arrangement" was soon made. The British
rate to Canada was reduced from 4d. to Id. per pound, Canada
upon her part agreeing to two stipulations :
1. The reduction not being sufficient to overcome the
competition from the United States, Canada agreed to in-
crease her neighbor's rate. From 1875 to 1888, the rate to
publishers on newspapers and periodicals from the United
States to Canada had been two cents per pound. In 1888 it
was reduced to one cent. It was now increased to one cent
for every four ounces. 1 The British publisher, therefore,
1 There was no distinction in those arrangements between newspapers
and periodicals.
IMPERIAL POSTAGE 297
would pay two cents per pound and the United States pub-
lisher four cents per pound.
2. The second stipulation was of less reasonable character ;
namely, that Canada should pay the expense of ocean trans-
portation upon ships going direct to Canada. It was hardly
fair that Canada should pay ocean freight both ways. That
is one of the prices, however, which Canada is willing to pay
for such sorts of imperialism as she approves. And we must
remember that while periodicals coming to Canada pay two
cents per pound, the British domestic rate is still eight cents
per pound. A magazine going from London to Liverpool is
charged four times as much as one coming on to Canada.
Liverpool people will find that out some day and probably
think about it.
The British publisher will also think about it, when he
hears what the effect of the reduction has been. The new
rate took effect on May 1, 1907, and during that month
and the next the number of bags of mail which came to
Canada direct from the United Kingdom was 146 per cent,
greater than for the same months in the previous year. That
is imperialism of the practical Canadian sort.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
The deplorable "History of British Diplomacy in Canada"
has been very well told by Mr. Justice Hodgins down to the
date of the publication of his book. The latest incident, the
only really disgraceful one of the series, — the Alaska boundary
settlement, — remains unrelated.
Compliant concession to United States pretensions, Canada
is well accustomed to. It formed one of the explanations of
her docile acceptance of the Alaska award. Indignation had
been discounted. Both American and Canadian newspapers
foretold the result from the beginning. Everybody knew
what was coming. No one, however, imagined that, this time,
dishonor and treachery, rather than mere compliance, would
be the principal feature attending the loss of another bit of
Canadian territory. The language is not too strong. Let
the story be carefully read. The evidence will be supplied
principally by Lord Alverstone himself — the man charged.
Before we come to his appearance in the transaction, how-
ever, two other parts of it must be related, and the nature of
the dispute understood.
Nature of Dispute. — In 1825 Great Britain and Russia, by
treaty, declared that the boundary between the Russian terri-
tory along the northwest coast of the continent and the
British hinterland should be as follows:
"III. The line of demarcation between the possessions of
the High Contracting Parties, upon the coast of the continent,
and the islands of America to the northwest, shall be drawn in
the manner following :
" Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called
300 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54 p 40'
north latitude, and between the 131st and the 133d degrees of
west longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall
ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel,
as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th
degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point, the
line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains
(la crete des montagnes) situated parallel to the coast, as far
as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longi-
tude (of the same meridian) ; and, finally, from the said point
of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in
its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the
limit between the Russian and British possessions on the con-
tinent of America to the northwest.
"IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down
in the preceding article, it is understood:
"First: That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall
belong wholly to Russia.
"Second: That whenever the summit of the mountains (la
crete des montagnes) which extend in a direction parallel to the
coast, from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of
intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude, shall prove
to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the
ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line
of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall
be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and
which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues
therefrom."
Afterwards Russia sold all its territory to the United States,
who took it, of course, subject to the terms of the treaty.
Three points of dispute arose out of the language just
quoted :
1. Does the boundary line cross deep inlets of the ocean,
or does it run around the ends of the inlets?
2. Which are "the mountains situated parallel to the
coast"?
3. What is the southern boundary? That is to say, does
the line run to the north or to the south of the four islands
there?
REFERENCE
CANADA CONTENDED EOQ
THE LIME
THE UN I TED STATES CONTENDED FOR
THE LINE
THE LINE AWARDED /S THE
CONTINUOUS LINE
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 301
Understanding of these questions will be helped by the two
maps — the first showing upon a small scale the whole region ;
and the second exhibiting upon a larger scale all that is neces-
sary for comprehension of what will be said upon the third
question.
Negotiations for Arbitration. — Canada desired arbitration
of all these questions. In 1895 the United States had forced
the United Kingdom to submit her boundary dispute with
Venezuela to arbitration; why should not the United States
arbitrate the Alaska question upon the same terms? It
should, but it refused. When Lord Salisbury gave a similar
refusal in the Venezuela case, the United States President
advised Congress to ascertain the boundary for itself, and to
adhere to it. His language was not courteous, but his action
was effective. 1 Let us follow, very shortly, the negotiations
with reference to Alaska.
In July, 1898, the Anglo-American Commission (commonly
called the High Joint Commission) was appointed by Great
Britain and the United States (Lord Herschell, English, and
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Richard Cartwright, and Sir Louis
Davies, Canadians, were the British commissioners) with the
hope of settling all outstanding difficulties between Canada
and her neighbor.
After making a good deal of progress the commission
adjourned (February, 1899) without solving anything — ad-
journed because of the Alaska question. Not being able to
make any approach to agreement upon that point, the British
commissioners proposed that it should be referred to three
arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, and the third
by these two, and upon the terms agreed to in the Venezuela
1 President Cleveland said that it was "the duty of the United States
to resist . . . the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands which
after investigation may be determined by right to beloDg to Venezuela."
302 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
case. The American commissioners declined, offering in
return an arbitration board of six " impartial jurists of re-
pute," three to be appointed by each party. The Canadian
commissioners (and probably Lord Herschell too) knew what
that meant and declined it. Then the Americans wanted to
go on with the other subjects in dispute — to get what they
could out of those, while refusing anything, even arbitration
(of real sort), with reference to Alaska; but the British com-
missioners declined, saying :
"The manner in which they would be prepared to adjust some
of the other important matters under consideration must depend
in their view upon whether it is possible to arrive at a settle-
ment of all the questions which might at any time occasion
acute controversy and even conflict.' '
Both sides for once were stiff, and the commission adjourned
sine die. The Alaska dispute went back to the governments.
Dilatory negotiations ensued. Two years after the ad-
journment of the High Joint Commission the United States re-
newed its former proposal of six " impartial jurists of repute,"
each party to appoint three, and Lord Lansdowne replied
(February 5, 1902):
"His Majesty's government have carefully considered, in
communication with the government of Canada, the draft con-
vention communicated to Your Excellency unofficially by Mr.
Hay in May last, which provides for the submission to arbitra-
tion of the Alaska boundary dispute. While most anxious to
reach a solution of this long-pending question by means of
arbitration, they find themselves compelled to dissent from the
terms proposed in the following points," namely (amongst
others), "an even number of arbitrators drawn from either side.
. . . Animated, however, by a strong desire to secure a refer-
ence to arbitration, they [the British Government] are willing
to acquiesce in the proposed number of six, provided that at
least one of the United States arbitrators shall not be a citizen
of the United States, or a citizen or subject of any state directly
or indirectly under the protection of the United States; and
that at least one of the British arbitrators shall not be a British
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 303
subject, or a subject of any power or state directly or indirectly
under the protection of His Britannic Majesty."
The United States refused the proposal. Eleven months
afterwards (January 12, 1903) the Colonial Secretary tele-
graphed the Governor-General as follows :
"Sir M. Herbert [British representative at Washington]
advocates strongly three judges of United States Supreme
Court, with Lord Chief- Justice England, Chief- Justice of Canada,
and Judge of High Court Great Britain on our side, as constitut-
ing a tribunal commanding in highest degree confidence of all
concerned. Your ministers will doubtless give this their serious
consideration. Early expression of views of your ministers
desired as to terms of draft treaty, finality of tribunal's deci-
sion, and its composition. Reply by telegraph."
The Governor-General replied (January 13) :
"Referring to the last proposed Alaskan boundary treaty,
a draft of which you submitted to me, my ministers are satis-
fied with the questions to be submitted to the tribunal, but
they still have the same objection to the composition of the
proposed tribunal, and before assenting to it, they would hope
that another effort should be made to have the questions to be
adjudicated upon submitted either to a Board of Arbitrators
composed in part of independent jurists, not subjects of either
state, as proposed in my despatch to Mr. Chamberlain of
November, 1901, or to the Hague tribunal."
Another effort was made, with this result (Herbert to
Colonial Secretary, January 18, 1903):
" Mr. Hay expressed his regret that the Canadian govern-
ment still entertained objections to the composition of the
tribunal, as he had hoped they would accept the treaty spon-
taneously in view of the alterations which he had made as re-
gards the terms of reference. He said that he could only repeat
what he had frequently intimated to me during the last three
months, that the President was unable to accept any form of
arbitration other than that proposed in the treaty, and that
the Senate would certainly decline to ratify any treaty provid-
ing for the submission of the Alaska boundary dispute either
to the Hague Court or to foreign arbitration."
304 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
The Colonial Secretary then telegraphed the Governor-
General (January 19):
"In view of Herbert's telegram stating that United States
government unable to accept modification of tribunal, hope
your ministers will agree to his now being instructed to sign
treaty. Telegraph reply as soon as possible."
The Canadian reply has not been published. No doubt it
contained the desired assent. On January 23, the British
Ambassador at Washington was instructed to sign the treaty.
The Alaska question was to go to lopsided arbitration — to
six " impartial jurists of repute," each party to appoint three.
The United States had Won its First Point.
CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY
(A parenthesis)
While these negotiations were in progress (1898-1903) the
United States was pressing the British government for modifi-
cation of the terms of the treaty respecting the inter-oceanic
canal in Central America — the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (April
19, 1850). Its principal clause was as follows:
"The governments of the United States and Great Britain
hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever
obtain or maintain exclusive control over the said ship-canal."
The United States wanted the clause abrogated. On
February 5, 1900, by treaty of that date (the Hay-Paunce-
fote treaty), Great Britain agreed to very substantial modifi-
cations; but the Senate of the United States declared that
greater concessions ought to be obtained, and refused to
ratify the agreement. Lord Salisbury declined to accept the
Senate's proposed amendments (February 22, 1901), but was
finally brought to a compromise (November 18, 1901) which
the United States Senate was good enough to accept. 1 The
1 The correspondence is in British Sessional Papers, 1902, Vol. 180.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 305
old treaty was torn up, and the principal clause of the new
one is
"It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the
auspices of the government of the United States."
The United States got that concession for nothing.
The Arbitration Board was to consist of six "impartial
jurists of repute." But would the Senate ratify a reference
to "impartial" people? The American government had de-
clined a board of three, of which each party was to appoint
one, and these two the third; had refused to agree that two
of a board of six should be outsiders; had insisted that one-
half of the board should be selected solely by themselves;
but had agreed that these three should be " impartial." Would
the Senate ratify that? The Senate is usually very jealous
of its control of the treaty-power — will it allow the President
to select the "impartial jurists of repute"?
Difficult questions, no doubt; but got rid of by an agree-
ment between the President and the Senate that the three
"impartial jurists" should, by their positions and known senti-
ments, be not impartial — that they should be a member of
the government and two committed members of the Senate !
Within eighteen days from the signing of the treaty, the
Senate gave its ratification.
The Secretary for War, Mr. Root, although a distinguished
jurist, could not be said to be "impartial." He was a mem-
ber of the government that had already, in diplomatic cor-
respondence, argued the case against Canada — correspond-
ence in which the arguments, not of any individual but of
the government of the United States, were put forward as
conclusive of the controversy. Mr. Root would have failed
306 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
to qualify under American state law even for a juryman,
much less for a judge, in such a case. The contest was be-
tween the two governments, and he was a member of one of
them.
Senator Lodge was not "impartial." Speaking of the
Clayton-Bulwer negotiations, he is reported to have said :
" If we should yield to it, there is not a portion of our northern
boundary which England could not attack. . . . When an
attempt was made to revive negotiations last spring, Canada
came forward again with her Alaska claim and President
Roosevelt refused to recognize it, as any patriotic American
would. ... No nation can afford to surrender its territory
on baseless claims." 1
Senator Turner resided in the state of Washington — the
Pacific coast state having (with its Tacoma and Seattle) the
greatest interest in supporting the American contention.
That, no doubt, is far from conclusive as to his partiality, but
this much may be said: that decision in favor of Canada
would have been easier for any other man in the United States
(except members of the government) than for a politician of
the state of Washington and a resident of Spokane.
Announcement of these three names altered the appearance
of the whole proceeding. Instead of an arbitration of even
such doubtful utility as the treaty provided, it was now ap-
parent that if the United States could not win, at all events
it was not possible for it to lose. The probabilities were
strong in favor of securing the favorable verdict of one at
least of the three British commissioners 2 ; and if not — well,
no harm would be done. As one American newspaper
put it:
1 See Canadian House of Commons Debates, March 13, 1903, p. 34.
2 The British judge, Mr. Justice Hannen, had separated from his
Canadian colleague on the question of Behring Sea regulations in Paris.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 307
"The chances of convincing American jurists of the right-
fulness of Canada's claim are about the same as the prospect
of a thaw in Hades." *
On the 18th of February the Colonial Office telegraphed
the Governor-General:
" Herbert [British ambassador at Washington] telegraphs
that President will appoint Mr. Root, Secretary of State for
War, and Senators Lodge and Turner as American commis-
sioners, Alaska boundary. Shall be glad to have views your
ministers as to British commissioners."
But the Canadian government was in no mood to express
views "as to British commissioners." They wished rather
to say something as to the American appointments, and
on February 21, the Governor-General telegraphed to the
Colonial Secretary:
" My ministers call attention to the fact that they agreed to
a court of six members on the stipulation conveyed in the
treaty that members of said court would be impartial jurists,
and in the hope that judges of the highest courts in the United
States would be appointed as American commissioners, my
ministers also agreeing that British commissioners should be
judges of the highest standing.
" My ministers most strongly represent that this consideration,
having been material in causing their assent to the treaty,
should be made good, otherwise the ground upon which they
based their assent would be changed, and it is feared whole
situation would require to be reconsidered.
" My ministers would be ready to implement their part of
the understanding as to the composition of British side of the
commission, but do not think it advisable to submit their
views until question raised about American commission is
satisfactorily disposed of."
The Governor-General also telegraphed objections to the
personal fitness of the American commissioners, declaring
that they were not impartial. 2
1 Canadian House of Commons Debates, March 13, 1903, p. 34.
2 This telegram has not been published. That there must have
308 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
In answer to the Canadian telegrams, the Colonial Office
said (February 26):
"His Majesty's government were as much surprised as your
ministers at the selection of the American members of the
tribunal. The situation is full of difficulty, and His Majesty's
government earnestly desire to have the concurrence of your
ministers in dealing with it.
"His Majesty's government are convinced that it would be
useless to press the United States to withdraw the names put
forward, and arguments against the personal fitness of the
three American representatives, however convincing, would
fail to lead to any practical result.
"His Majesty's government are, therefore, virtually in the
position of having to choose between breaking off the negotia-
tions altogether, or of accepting the American nominations and
appointing as their colleagues representatives appropriate to the
altered circumstances of the case. The first alternative they
would regard as a grave misfortune to the interests of Canada,
and they would prefer that the inquiry should proceed, in the
confident hope that it would not prejudice Canadian or British
interests, since, even in the event of failure, much important
information on the controverted points would be collected and
placed before the public, thus facilitating a reasonable settle-
ment of the question at some future date.
" His Majesty's government earnestly hope that your ministers
will weigh these considerations carefully, and, if they share in
the opinion stated above, will [favor His Majesty's govern-
ment with an expression of their views as to the most advantage-
ous manner of constituting the British portion of the tribunal."
There is the old story. Downing Street is "as much sur-
prised" as anybody that the United States would do such a
thing, but recommends silence and acquiescence. For Down-
ing Street comfort, that is undoubtedly much the best course.
"It would be useless to press the United States to withdraw
the names"; we should only get a refusal; is it not better
to appear as though we were quite satisfied? It is very
been such a message is shown by the reply to it, and by Sir Wilfrid
Laurier's references in the House of Commons, March 13, 1903, p. 44;
October 23, 1903, p. 14815.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 309
essential that we should remain on good terms with the
United States; and "arguments against the personal fitness
of the three American representatives" — wheugh! just
think what a row ! Surely, instead of objecting to the Ameri-
can representatives it would be much better to appoint "as
their colleagues, representatives appropriate to the altered
circumstances of the case." Will not the Canadian govern-
ment be kind enough to express "their views as to the most
advantageous manner of constituting the British portion of the
tribunal"? Poor Downing Street! To what depths will a
British Colonial Secretary descend in order to remain on good
terms with the United States !
Ratifications of the treaty had not yet been exchanged,
and it was therefore not yet consummated. The British
government had been duped, and had been "much surprised"
at it. The Canadian government had protested, had indi-
cated that the "whole situation would require to be recon-
sidered," and had declined going further (declined to submit
views as to Canadian commissioners) "until question raised
about American commissioners is satisfactorily disposed of."
The Colonial Office in reply had suggested a dishonorable
course of action. That was the situation when (March 3),
without Canadian assent or concurrence, ratifications of the
treaty were exchanged — no doubt with the customary hand-
shaking and congratulatory speeches. Canada lost territory
only by that transaction.
On October 23, 1903, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said in the
House of Commons:
" Now, after we had given our assent to this treaty, after we
had consented to refer the question to this tribunal, which was
to be composed of six impartial jurists, we were notified that
the jurists which were to be appointed by the American gov-
ernment were gentlemen who, with all respect be it said, could
not qualify as impartial jurists. They had expressed their
310 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
opinions upon this question already with a good deal of empha-
sis. We protested against the appointment of these gentlemen,
and we asked the British authorities to convey our protest to
the President of the United States, representing that gentle-
men who had expressed on the floor of Congress opinions upon
this question could not come within the term l impartial
jurists/ such as were contemplated by the treaty. And, Sir,
what took place? Before our protest had been taken into con-
sideration the treaty was ratified by the British authorities. " *
The United States had Won its Second Point.
THE ALVERSTONE AWARD
Canada followed neither bad example nor evil suggestion.
She nominated as arbitrators the Lord Chief-Justice of Eng-
land, Mr. Justice Armour of the Canadian Supreme Court,
and Sir Louis Jett6, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and
formerly a judge of the Superior Court, as British commis-
sioners. These were appointed. Shortly afterwards Mr.
Justice Armour died, and Mr. A. B. Aylesworth succeeded
to the vacancy. 2
In due time the award was made and, as had been expected
in Canada, Lord Alverstone sided with the United States.
No compromise with the American commissioners being pos-
sible upon the first question (whether the boundary crossed,
or ran round the ends of the inlets) , he concurred in the full
American contention. Upon the second and third, he com-
promised with the Americans, giving them, upon the second,
a large part of what they claimed, and, upon the third, two
islands out of the four.
Compromise. — Why should he not have compromised ?
Because he was appointed to act as a judge. The parties to
1 Debates, 1903, Vol. VI, p. 14815.
2 It was expected that Mr. Aylesworth was about to accept a seat in
the Supreme Court, but he declined the offer made to him.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 311
a quarrel may compromise, if they please; it is because they
cannot agree that they go to courts; and the function of a
judge is, not to compromise, but to decide.
Sometimes, indeed, disputes are referred to arbitrators
(rather than to judges) and authority is given them to con-
sider the equities and the reasonabilities of the case, as well
as the strict right of the parties. That was the course adopted
in the Venezuela case, and that was the course which Canada
strongly desired should be applied to the Alaska dispute.
But the United States absolutely and repeatedly refused to
agree to a tribunal of that sort. Its position was made per-
fectly clear in a despatch from Mr. Choate (American Am-
bassador) to Lord Salisbury (January 22, 1900) :
"The Venezuela Treaty was calculated, and, as the result has
shown, well and properly calculated, to enable the tribunal
to make by compromise a boundary line in respect of which there
had never been an agreement between the parties, and to evolve
a fair adjustment of their respective claims out of the facts
of discovery, occupation, and other historical circumstances in
which their dispute as to the boundary had been involved for
more than a century, during which the question had been
always open. But in the present instance there is an express
agreement of the parties defining the boundary — in the treaty
of 1825 — which has subsisted ever since, practically without
dispute as to its interpretation on the principal point. A clear
and distinct interpretation on this point was put Upon it by
both parties in the written negotiations which resulted in the
meeting of their minds upon it. This interpretation was re-
garded by both parties as vital, and very important to their
respective interests. It was publicly declared and acted upon
by Russia from the date of the treaty until she conveyed to the
United States in 1867, and all that time, at any rate, it was
acquiesced in by Great Britain. The United States continued
publicly to maintain and act upon the same interpretation,
with the acquiescence of Great Britain, confessedly until 1885,
and, as we claim, until 1898, when a new and wholly different
interpretation on this main point is put forward by Great
Britain. The two interpretations thus presented are absolutely
distinct, and are not involved in any confused or doubtful his-
312 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
torical explorations. One or the other is right, and can and
should be ascertained and determined so to be, to the exclusion
of the other, and neither party wishes to acquire an inch of the
territory rightly belonging to the other. Surely the tribunal
which is to pass upon such a question should not be enabled to
compromise it, but should be required simply to decide it. If the
difference thus raised is to be compromised, it should be compro-
mised by the parties themselves, so that they can know exactly
what they are doing."
The United Kingdom assented to this, and the arbitration
treaty provided that each member of the tribunal should
"subscribe an oath that he will impartially consider the argu-
ments and evidence presented to the tribunal and will decide
thereupon according to his true judgment."
It goes without saying that Lord Alverstone understood
his position and the oath which he took ; but if there should
be any doubt upon that point, read what he said in his judg-
ment upon the inlet question :
" But these considerations, strong as they are, in favor of a
just and equitable modification of the treaty, do not in my
opinion enable one to put a different construction upon the
treaty."
In other words, he was bound to decide according to the
treaty. He could not regard the equities. He had no right
to compromise. Nevertheless, when dealing with the two
other questions, he did compromise.
The First Question. — The inlet question was of the greatest
importance. If the boundary line, instead of following the
general trend of the coast, ran round the head of all the
narrow inlets, then Canada had no ocean port for the Yukon
Territory or for the northern part of British Columbia.
Lynn Canal, for example, is the most important of these
inlets. It is ninety miles long and from two or three to seven
or eight miles wide. Is that all ocean? Ought a line "par-
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 313
allel to the windings of the coast," and at the most ten leagues
from it, to fall back one hundred miles ?
It is impossible to give here a complete view of the argu-
ments adduced upon this question, and no partial statement
should be made. However strong the Canadian argument
may have been upon the point, we must assume for the pur-
poses of this essay (but for that purpose only) that they were
not conclusive, and that it was possible for Lord Alverstone,
acting conscientiously, to have decided in favor of the
American contention.
Nothing can be said here, therefore, in impeachment of his
judgment on this first question, except this: that if in dis-
cussing the second and third we find good reason to doubt
his good faith, if we find conclusive evidence that his decision
of one or both of them was dishonest, then we shall not be
able to suppress the belief that all his decisions were of the
same character.
The Second Question. — That Lord Alverstone's judgment
upon the second question (Which are " the mountains situated
parallel to the coast " ?) was not a judicial decision, but a mere
compromise with the Americans, is very clear. A glance at
the map will show the two contentions, and the compromise
line between them. Possibly, however, it may be said that
the commissioners found that both contentions were wrong,
and that the intermediate line was agreed to, not by com-
promise but by a truer interpretation of the treaty. That
is not the fact. The proof is ample.
Canada contended that the boundary should "follow the
summit of the mountains" lying nearest to the coast —
mountains of any sort, whether joined together or separated
from one another. The United States contended that moun-
tains, to form a boundary, must constitute a connected range;
that
314 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
" such mountains do not exist within ten marine leagues from
the coast" 1 ; and consequently that "the line was to be drawn
at a uniform and regular distance of thirty-five miles (ten marine
leagues) from the coast." 2
United States counsel said :
" The whole region is full of mountains. . . . The general
appearance is that of a heterogeneous jumble of irregular moun-
tain masses.
" It was never the intention under the treaty to draw the line
along the summits of disconnected peaks, and it is impossible
on the American theory for any tribunal to determine which
of such peaks shall be chosen." 3
They ridiculed the possibility of such selection.
The decision of Lord Alverstone and the three American
commissioners was very curious. They held that boundary
mountains did exist within the ten leagues ; that these moun-
tains were not those nearest the coast ; that they were some-
where else among the " heterogeneous jumble of irregular
mountain masses"; and they selected certain summits and
marked them upon a map with the letter S.
These four commissioners so decided; but not one of
them attempted in their long written opinions to offer any
reason for the selection of the S mountains. All that they
said was
"that the mountains marked S on the aforesaid map are the
mountains referred to as situated parallel to the coast."
Why they declined to adopt the mountains nearest to the
coast, they do not say. Why they did not pitch upon those
farthest away, they do not say. By what process or upon
what principle they selected the S mountains, they do not
say. So far as the American commissioners in their written
judgments express an opinion, it is against the selection of
1 Case, p. 206. 2 Judgment of Sir Louis Jett6, pp. 74, 75.
8 Argument, p. 135.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 315
the S mountains, and in favor of the American contention
that the boundary ought not to follow mountains at all.
Lord Alverstone omitted almost all reference to the subject.
Why, then, were the S mountains chosen ?
The S mountain boundary was clearly a matter of com-
promise between Lord Alverstone and the American com-
missioners; and really the only point left for speculation is
as to the length and nature of the negotiations leading up to
the selection of these S mountains. Did Lord Alverstone
haggle over them? or did he leave the details to the Ameri-
cans, merely stipulating that Canada should get something
not altogether too insignificant? Information upon that
point would be interesting, even if useless.
How do we know that the judgment was a compromise
and not a judicial determination? In this way:
1. The written (now printed) opinion of the American
commissioners was in favor of the full American contention
— that there was no mountain boundary at all, and that the
line should run, irrespective of mountains, at a distance of
ten leagues from the coast. After referring to twelve maps
which they said " furnished an interpretation of the treaty,"
they added:
" In all of these maps the boundary line is drawn around the
heads of the inlets. It is not contended that this boundary
line was an accurate location of the true boundary. In the
absence of knowledge as to the mountains, it appears to
have been drawn on the ten-marine-league line, measuring
from the heads of the bays and inlets. It precludes no one
from saying that the occurrence of a mountain crest within
ten marine leagues of the coast would call for a change of the
position of the line. But it is manifest that in every case the line
was drawn in accordance with the American theory of what con-
stituted the coast, and not in accordance with the theory now
maintained by the counsel for Great Britain as to what con-
stitutes the coast.' '
316 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
If this is not a perfectly clear declaration in favor of the
full American contention, all that can be said is that it is
taken from their reasons for their opinion upon the inlet
question; that they gave no reasons at all for their opinion
as to the S mountains; and that we have thus to gather
their opinion as to the mountain boundary from what they
say when discussing the inlet question.
2. The American commissioners wrote long reasons for
their opinions with reference to the inlets and the islands;
why did they shun all argument in support of the S moun-
tains ? One specific question submitted to the commissioners
was
" What, if any exist, are the mountains referred to as situated
parallel to the coast, which mountains, when within ten marine
leagues from the coast, are declared to form the eastern boun-
dary?"
Why in reply did they say merely "the mountains marked
S on the aforesaid maps"? Why did they refuse to give
their reasons?
3. Lord Alverstone also gave long reasons for his opinion
upon the inlet question, holding that upon that point
"the parties knew and understood what they were bargaining
about and expressed the terms of their bargain in terms to
which effect can be given."
He gave no reason at all with reference to the S mountains;
but, in his judgment upon the inlet question, he wrote as
follows :
"I have felt it my duty to express the reasons which have
led me to the conclusion to which I have come, that the answer
to the fifth [the inlet] question should be in the affirmative, be-
cause I am constrained to take a view contrary to that pre-
sented by the advocates on behalf of Great Britain ; but it must
not be thought that I am insensible to the fact that there are
strong arguments which might be urged in favor of the British
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 317
view. I have little doubt that, if shortly after the making of
the treaty of 1825, Great Britain and Russia had proceeded to
draw the boundary provided by the treaty in accordance with
the terms thereof, the difficulties, and, in certain events, the im-
possibilities, of drawing a boundary in strict accordance with the
treaty would have been made evident. If, for instance, it had
become necessary to draw a boundary in accordance with para-
graph 2 of Article IV of the treaty, I believe that the view ex-
pressed by both the American and British authorities, that it is
impossible to do so, would at once have become apparent. And
in the same way, if the contention of the United States be well
founded, that no mountains exist on the coast which correspond
with the treaty, a further difficulty would have been made manifest"
These words Lord Alverstone used at the same moment that
he declared that according to the treaty the S mountains
formed the true boundary!
Observe that he speaks of "the difficulties, and, in certain
events, the impossibilities, of drawing a boundary in strict
accordance with the treaty." What were the "events"?
Did they transpire? How were the difficulties or impos-
sibilities surmounted, when he agreed to the S mountains ?
Notice particularly that Lord Alverstone had not as yet
made up his mind as to the validity of the American conten-
tion "that no mountains exist on the coast which correspond
with the treaty." If, he said, that contention "be well
founded, ... a further difficulty would have been made mani-
fest." And now the curious question is: If Lord Alverstone
did not know whether such mountains existed, how did he
ascertain that the eighty S summits belonged to them ?
It may be that strong reasons can be given in support of
the full American contention. That is not now under de-
bate. We have it that all the arbitrators agreed that that
contention was erroneous — they held that boundary moun-
tains did exist within the ten-league limit. All that we are
now endeavoring to ascertain is, why were the S mountains
318 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
selected ? Lord Alverstone and the American commissioners
give us no help. Let us turn to the Canadian commissioners.
Sir Louis Jette said :
"There is, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the moun-
tains indicated by the treaty are those situated nearest to the
coast.
" Nevertheless, instead of following the evident meaning of
the treaty, the majority of the tribunal has adopted a line
which, at a number of points of its course, rests on mountains
which lie far from the coast, and are separated from it by
nearer ones, which ought consequently to have been chosen
in their stead, as the points of demarcation of the line.
" I found it impossible, under such circumstances, to concur
in this arbitrary determination of a line which, although it
does not concede all the territory they claimed to the United
States, nevertheless deprives Canada of the greater part of that
to which she was entitled.' '
Mr. Aylesworth said :
"The words of the treaty, ' montagnes situes parallelement
a la cote,' and the idea of parallelism thereby conveyed, imply
the line of mountains next adjacent to the coast. Apart from the
circumstance that no kind of reason can be assigned for skip-
ping over one or two, or it may be half-a-dozen, lines of moun-
tains between the coast and the boundary, the very fact that
the treaty couples the boundary line directly with the coast-
line argues in favor of the first line of mountains being meant.
I think any one who spoke of two lines as parallel one to the
other would scarcely have in contemplation a third line par-
allel to each, but situated between the two."
The Third Question. — Differ, if you will, from the conclu-
sions just arrived at, but read the proof of Lord Alverstone's
treachery in connection with the four islands — in connection
with the southern boundary — and quarrel with that if you
can. The description of that boundary declared that, com-
mencing at Point Muzon on Prince of Wales Island,
" the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called
Portland Channel."
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 319
But where was the entrance to Portland Channel ? In their
printed case, the Americans stated the opposing contentions :
"The British Case, p. 50, correctly states that 'as to the
greater part of the length of the Portland Channel above
shortly described, there is not, and could not be, any dispute.'
Reference to the charts will show that, at any rate, that por-
tion of the westerly water which extends inland from the upper
end of Pearse Island to the head of the channel marked Port-
land Canal must be comprised in Vancouver's Portland Canal.
And this is the common case of both sides. The dispute is as
to the remainder of the channel.
"That is to say, the matter which remains in dispute is this:
Is Portland Channel, below the point of agreement, that body
of water which goes seaward between Pearse, Wales, Sitklan,
and Kannaghunut Islands on the east and south and the con-
tinental shore, Fillmore and Tongass Islands on the west and
north ; or is it that body of water which goes seaward between
Pearse Island and the peninsula, passes Ramsden Point, in (or
at the entrance of) Observatory Inlet, and reaches the ocean
by the channel between Pearse and Wales Islands on the west
and the easterly continental shore, entering the ocean between
Point Wales on the west and Point Maskelyne on the east? " l
That is to say, is the boundary line on the north or the south
of the four islands? During the argument, the Americans
contended, in the alternative, that both of these bodies of
water might be considered as Portland Channel ; and that the
one to the south of the four islands, being the larger, should
be preferred " upon the doctrine of the thalweg."
After the arguments had been completed Lord Alverstone
informed the Canadian commissioners that, in his opinion,
the Canadian contention was the true one ; namely, that the
boundary lay to the north of the four islands. Afterwards
he wrote a judgment to that effect, and gave a copy of it to
the Canadian commissioners, which they still have. It was
to this judgment that the Canadian commissioners referred
Argument, p. 31.
320 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
in their communication to the Times, the day after the award
was published:
11 When the members of the tribunal met after the argument
and considered this question, the view of the three British
commissioners was that the Canadian contention was abso-
lutely unanswerable. A memorandum was prepared and read
to the commissioners embodying our views; and showing it to
be beyond dispute that the Canadian contention on this branch
of the case should prevail, and that the boundary line should
run to the northward of the four islands, thus giving them to
Canada."
No intimation of any change of view was given by Lord
Alverstone to the Canadian commissioners, and they had no
reason to suspect any, until the final meeting of all the com-
missioners when the decisions were declared. Meanwhile,
however, Lord Alverstone had been negotiating with the
American commissioners and had agreed to a compromise
— had agreed that the United States should have two of the
islands and Canada the other two; had agreed to award
that the entrance to Portland Channel was at a place for
which there was not a tittle of evidence, which the Americans
had never claimed, and in favor of which American counsel
had not advanced a single argument.
I say that, after writing a judgment in which he declared
that the four islands belonged to Canada and that he could
find nothing to throw any doubt on that conclusion, Lord
Alverstone made a compromise with the American com-
missioners and gave two of the islands to the United States.
The proof is clear.
Lord Alverstone acted as president of the commission.
As such, when the last meeting was held (October 20,
1903), instead of putting to the vote the only question
argued :
"Does Portland Channel run to the north or south of the
four islands ?".
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 321
he first asked :
"Does Portland Channel run to the north of Pearse and
Wales Islands?"
And the American commissioners voted with Lord Alverstone
and the Canadian commissioners, that it ran to the north of
these islands — that these islands belonged to Canada.
Imagine the surprise of the Canadians. Had a thaw hap-
pened in Hades ? Wait a moment :
" Does the Portland Channel run to the north of Sitklan and
Kannaghunut Islands?"
And Hades grew hotter as Lord Alverstone joined with
the Americans in voting that it did not. Remember that
until that moment there had not been a suggestion that the
line could possibly run anywhere but north or south of all
four islands. 1 Without a previous agreement with Lord
Alverstone, the American commissioners would have been as
much surprised as the Canadians at Lord Alverstone's separa-
tion of the question into two parts. And without Lord Alver-
stone's promise to vote with the Americans upon the second
part of the question, they would not have voted in favor of
Canada on the first part. As Mr. Wade, one of the Canadian
counsel, has said:
" If this was not a compromise, is it not singular that at the
moment when the United States commissioners decided to
change their mind as to two of the islands, and Lord Alverstone
decided to change his judgment as to the other two, his Lord-
ship was the one to come forward with a subdivided question
which just met the new conditions?" *
The bargain is clearly proved. The American commis-
1 Mr. Turner's interpolations at pages 77 to 79 do not affect the
correctness of this assertion.
2 Canadian Magazine, Vol. 22. For confirmation of the facts above
stated see the judgment of Sir Louis Jette" at page 68 of the "Correspond-
ence respecting the Alaska Boundary M (Cd. 1877).
T
322 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
sioners voted in favor of Canada as to two islands, in con-
sideration that Lord Alverstone would vote against Canada
as to the other two.
But is it not possible that Lord Alverstone had merely
reconsidered the subject and changed his opinion? No; for
the very simple reason that no reconsideration of the argu-
ments addressed to him could have led to a division of the
islands. No such argument had ever been made. Division
was never thought of or suggested by anybody until the
compromise was agreed to.
If that answer as to the possibility of change of conviction
is not sufficient, look at the judgment which Lord Alverstone
filed in support of the division. Study it a little carefully,
and these most remarkable, nearly incredible, facts will appear :
1. Almost every argument in it supports Canada's title
to all four of the islands.
2. Almost every argument in it condemns its conclusion
— six paragraphs of it abundantly refute its final deductions.
3. With the change of one word in one clause ; the omis-
sion of two words in another clause; and the interjection of
one whole clause, this second judgment of Lord Alverstone is
really his first judgment — the memorandum handed to the
Canadian commissioners, in which he showed the Canadian
ownership of all four islands "to be beyond dispute."
Now is that possible? Lord Alverstone wrote a long
reasoned judgment deciding clearly and without hesitation
in favor of awarding all the four islands to Canada; after-
wards he wrote another judgment giving two of those islands
to the United States; in that second judgment he repeated
every argument that he had advanced in the first; although
he changed one word, omitted two, and interjected a single
paragraph, yet not one of these alterations materially sup-
ported his second conclusion, and not one of them was in-
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 323
consistent with his first conclusion; and of the seven clauses
which in the first judgment support Canada's title to all four
islands, five reappear unaltered in the second judgment, and
one has a verbal, an immaterial, alteration only. That is
what is alleged. Is that possible?
We must read the second judgment and comment upon it
as we go. A little attention to it will enable us to reconstruct
the first judgment, for we shall require merely:
1 . To copy all the introductory and therefore common clauses.
2. To copy all the arguments that support Lord Alver-
stone's first conclusion.
3. For these purposes to copy every clause in the judgment
except one (we may speak of it as the interjected paragraph).
4. Changing, however, one word in one clause and adding
two in another — the former change being of some importance,
but the latter of none.
LORD ALVERSTONE'S SECOND JUDGMENT AS TO PORTLAND
CHANNEL *
1. "The answer to this question, as indicated by the
learned counsel on both sides, depends upon the simple ques-
tion: What did the contracting parties mean by the words
'the channel called the Portland Channel' in Article III of the
treaty of 1825 ? This is a pure question of identity. In order
to answer it one must endeavor to put one's self in the position
of the contracting parties, and ascertain as accurately as pos-
sible what was known to them of the geography of the district
so far as relates to the channel called the Portland Channel."
(This paragraph was no doubt in the first judgment.)
2. "There are certain broad facts which, in my opinion,
establish beyond any reasonable question that the negotiators
1 Printed in British Blue Book (Cd. 1877), p. 52, "Correspondence
respecting the Alaska Boundary."
324 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
had before them Vancouver's maps, the Russian map (No. 5
in the British, No. 6 in the American atlas), Arrowsmith's
maps (probably the map numbered 10 in the American atlas),
and Faden's maps (British Appendix, pp. 10 and 11). "
(This paragraph was no doubt in the first judgment.)
3. "I have, moreover, no doubt that the negotiators
were acquainted with the information contained in Van-
couver's narrative. I do not think it necessary to state in
detail the evidence which has led me to this conclusion beyond
stating that, quite apart from the overwhelming probability
that this was the case, there are passages in the documents
which, in my judgment, establish it to demonstration; but,
for the purpose of my reasons, it is sufficient to say that I
have come to that clear conclusion after the most careful
perusal of the documents."
(This finding is in favor of the Canadian and against the
American first contention. The United States relied upon Van-
couver's map. Canada contended that Vancouver's narrative
should be read with the map. The finding was essential to
Lord Alverstone's first judgment, and no doubt formed a part
of it. It is consistent with the second judgment.)
4. "I will now endeavor to summarize the facts relating
to the channel called Portland Channel, which the informa-
tion, afforded by the maps and documents to which I have
referred, establishes. The first and most important is that it
was perfectly well known before, and at the date of the
treaty, that there were two channels or inlets, the one called
Portland Channel, the other Observatory Inlet, both of them
coming out to the Pacific Ocean. "
(This paragraph was no doubt in the first judgment.)
5. "That the seaward entrance of Observatory Inlet was
between Point Maskelyne on the south and Point Wales on
the north."
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 325
(This paragraph was no doubt in the first judgment.)
6. "That one entrance of Portland Channel was between
the island now known as Kannaghunut and Tongass Island."
(This paragraph, with the substitution of the word "the"
for " one/' was no doubt in the first judgment. Observe that
in this, the second, judgment Lord Alverstone clearly affirms
that at least one entrance to Portland Channel lies to the north
of all four islands. And (1) watch if he anywhere declares
that there was undoubtedly a second, (2) if he does so declare,
watch if he anywhere compares the claims of these two, and (3)
watch if he does more than mention the possibility of a second.)
7. "That the latitude of the mouth or entrance to the
channel called Portland Channel, as described in the treaty
and understood by the negotiators, was at 54° 45'."
(This clause was undoubtedly a part of the first judgment.
It is in irreconcilable conflict with the conclusion of the second,
for it gives the four islands to Canada. The very point in dis-
pute was whether the entrance was, as Canada said, at 54° 45',
or, as the United States contended, at 54° 40'. The American
printed argument dealt with the subject at great length 1 and
concluded in this way :
"There is therefore no warrant for the following statement
in the British case (p. 56) : 'This shows that the British under-
standing, communicated to and not questioned by Russia, was
that Portland Channel entered the ocean at 54° 45V " 2
Lord Alverstone having now declared the exact location of
the entrance, we shall expect that if he adds anything further
to his judgment it will be for the purpose of supplying reasons
in support of his declaration. The first judgment did proceed
in that way. It supplied several arguments in support of the
declaration. We know that, for we shall read them, in a min-
ute, in this his second judgment, where they are completely out
of place. The new— the interjected— paragraph alone sepa-
rates us from them. It is a curiosity.)
1 See "Correspondence respecting the Alaska Boundary" (Cd. 1878),
* pp. 21 to 56.
J lb. p. 48.
326 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
8. "The narrative of Vancouver refers to the channel
between Wales Island and Sitklan Island, known as Tongass
Passage, as a passage leading south-southeast towards the
ocean — which he passed in hope of finding a more northern
and westerly communication to the sea, and describes his
subsequently finding the passage between Tongass Island on
the north and Sitklan and Kannaghunut on the south. The
narrative and the maps leave some doubt on the question
whether he intended the name Portland Canal to include
Tongass Passage, as well as the passage between Tongass Island
on the north and Sitklan and Kannaghunut Island on the
south. In view of this doubt, I think, having regard to the
language, that Vancouver may have intended to include
Tongass Passage in that name, and looking to the relative
size of the two passages, I think the negotiators may well
have thought that the Portland Channel, after passing north
of Pearse and Wales Islands, issued into the sea by the two
passages above described." 1
(This is the only paragraph of the two judgments that could
not very well have formed part of the first.
To prevent confusion we must keep clearly separated the two
entrances to Portland Channel contended for by the Americans,
and the two entrances suggested as possible by Lord Alverstone.
The Americans suggested that one entrance lay to the north
of all four islands and the other to the south of them; and
they claimed the latter "upon the doctrine of the thalweg."
This claim is dealt with by Lord Alverstone in clause 13 of his
judgment (post) and held to be without foundation.
The two possible entrances to which Lord Alverstone makes
reference are, first, that which runs north of all four islands
1 In connection with this clause should be read a paragraph of Mr.
Aylesworth's judgment: "There is simply not the slightest evidence
anywhere that I am able to find, that either Vancouver or any subsequent
explorer or map-maker ever considered, or so much as spoke of, Portland
Channel as having two entrances to the ocean."
The italics here and elsewhere are not in the original.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 327
(the same as the first of the American alternatives) and second,
that which would pass downTongass Passage — that is, between
two of the islands.
Observe that of these two last possibilities, Lord Alveretone
has said, with confidence, that the one to the north of all four
islands was "one entrance to Portland Channel"; and as to
the other, that Vancouver "may have intended," and that "the
negotiators may well have thought " it to be one entrance. One
was clear and the other was doubtful.
What, then, shall we expect in the remaining clauses of the
judgment — expect, before we reach the conclusion that the
certain entrance was not, but that the doubtful one was, the
true one? Some discussion of their respective claims? Some
reasons? Yes, no doubt. But we should be wrong. There
is not a word upon the subject. This doubtful entrance —
Tongass Passage — is never again referred to. The remaining
paragraphs of the judgment are those which appeared in the
first judgment, giving conclusive reasons in favor, not of the
doubtful passage, but of the certain one — the one to the north
of all four islands. And yet the conclusion of the judgment
is in favor of the doubtful passage !
Before proving this assertion, let it be noted that Lord Alver-
stone's surmise as to his two entrances is quite beyond all
probability. Lord Alverstone would have us suppose that the
representatives of Great Britain and Russia were declaring that
their boundary should be a line along Portland Channel; that
they thought that that channel bifurcated and had really two
mouths; and that they did not specify which one they had
agreed upon ! That is what Lord Alverstone thinks that the
negotiators may have done. No one else ever thought so.
Suppose, however, that Lord Alverstone was right in his
suggestion that Vancouver may have intended two entrances,
and that the negotiators may well have thought the same thing,
there could have been no reason for hesitating between the
two. Had Lord Alverstone been honest he would have said,
"But although Vancouver may have intended two entrances,
no one has ever heretofore suggested that he did; no one pre-
tends that he was ever in Tongass Passage; no one has written
or spoken a word in favor of Tongass Passage as the entrance,
or as one entrance, to Portland Channel; during the whole
length of the argument of the American counsel I heard not a
syllable in favor of any such proposition; and I cannot myself
think of anything which supports it."
328 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
Instead of this, Lord Alverstone having declared that there
may have been two entrances, proceeds to give various reasons
for selecting one of them; and then decides in favor of the
other. Is that possible?)
9. " For the purpose of identifying the channel, commonly
known as Portland Channel, the maps which were before the
negotiators may be useful. This is one of the points upon
which the evidence of contemporary maps as to general repu-
tation is undoubtedly admissible. It is sufficient to say that
not one of the maps which I have enumerated above in any
way contradicts the precise and detailed situation of Portland
Channel and Observatory Inlet given by Vancouver's narra-
tive, and the other documents to which I have referred.
The Russian map of 1802 shows the two channels distinctly,
and the same may be said of Faden's maps, on which so
much reliance was placed on the part of the United States.' '
(This clause was undoubtedly in the first judgment. It is
completely out of harmony with the second for several reasons :
1. It is, in the second, out of logical sequence; it follows a
clause which declared that there may have been two entrances
to Portland Channel; and we should therefore have expected
the present paragraph to commence the statement of reasons
for selecting one or the other of them. But there is not a
word upon that subject.
Upon the contrary, the present paragraph abandons the in-
terjected suggestions of Lord Alverstone's two entrances to
Portland Channel and returns to the discussion of the situation
of the two channels — Portland Channel and Observatory Inlet
— that is to a discussion of the Americans' first contention.
That the interjected clause was really interjected may be
proved by observing that if it be struck out the sequence of
the document is restored ; for it will now read in this way :
(Par. 4) : " There were two channels, Portland and Observa-
tory"; (Par. 5) i : "The seaward entrance of Observatory Inlet
was" so and so; (Par. 6) : "The entrance of Portland Channel
was" so and so; and now, "not one of the maps . . . con-
tradicts the precise and detailed situation of Portland Channel
and Observatory Inlet," etc.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 329
2. The clause under consideration contradicts almost in
terms the interjected clause. In that clause Lord Alveretone
said that " the narrative and maps leave some doubt on the ques-
tion," etc. Now it is said that " not one of the maps which I
have enumerated above in any way contradicts the precise
and detailed situation of Portland Channel."
3. Observe, at all events, that there is nothing in the para-
graph in favor of Tongass Passage.)
10. "I do not attach particular importance to the way
in which names on the maps are written or printed, and
therefore I do not rely upon the fact that, in the case of some
of these contemporary maps, the words ' Portland Channel '
are written so as to include within the name the lower part
of the channel which is in dispute. From long experience I
have found that it is not safe to rely upon any such pecul-
iarities.' '
(This clause was undoubtedly in the first judgment. It pur-
sues the sequence above pointed out. It is still distinguishing
Portland Channel from Observatory Inlet — still combating
the Americans' first contention. It has no reference whatever
to the two possible entrances of the interjected paragraph.
These are still ignored — Tongass Passage is still unmentioned.)
11. "After the most careful consideration of every docu-
ment in this case, I have found nothing to alter or throw any
doubt on the conclusion to which I have arrived, and there
are certain general considerations which strongly support it."
(Reading the first judgment (as above indicated), this clause
is perfectly appropriate. Lord Alverstone had clearly defined
Portland Channel and Observatory Inlet; had stated with
absolute precision the entrance of each of them; had said
"that not one of the maps" contradicts the "precise and de-
tailed situation" given by Vancouver's narrative; and now he
says that he has " found nothing to alter or throw any doubt on
the conclusion to which I have arrived" — any doubt that the
Canadian contention is correct.
In his second judgment Lord Alverstone, by altering a word
in one clause (6) and interjecting another clause (8), had changed
330 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
his conclusion into a problem — had said, not that the entrance
to Portland Channel was so and so, but that there may have
been two entrances. And now he says of the problem as before
he said of the conclusion: "I have found nothing to alter or
throw any doubt on the conclusion to which I have arrived."
There is still not a word in favor of Tongass Passage.)
12. "Russia and Great Britain were negotiating as to the
point on the coast to which Russian dominion should be con-
ceded. It is unnecessary to refer to all the earlier negotia-
tions, but it is distinctly established that Russia urged that
her dominion should extend to 55° of latitude, and it was in
furtherance of this object that Portland Channel, which issues
into the sea at 54° 45', was conceded and ultimately agreed to by
Great Britain. No claim was ever made by Russia to any of
the islands south of 54° 45', except Prince of Wales Island, and
this is the more marked because she did claim the whole of
Prince of Wales Island, a part of which extended to about
54° 40'. The islands between Observatory Inlet and the
channel to which I have referred above as the Portland Channel
are never mentioned in the whole course of the negotiations."
(This clause was undoubtedly in the first judgment. It is
absolutely inconsistent with the second for three clear reasons :
(1) The exact latitude is given, and that agrees only with the
Canadian contention; (2) Russia never claimed islands south
of 54° 45'. It therefore never claimed the two islands that
Lord Alverstone gave to Russia's successors, the United States ;
(3) The language, " the channel to which I have referred above
as Portland Channel," was quite appropriate in the first judg-
ment, but is meaningless in the second, for in the second Lord
Alverstone had said that part of the channel may have been
in one of two places, and as yet he has not specifically declared
which is the true one.
Not a syllable yet in favor of Tongass Passage.
Thus far (excepting the interjected paragraph) Lord Alver-
stone has been dealing with the Americans' first contention —
that Portland Channel lay to the south of the four islands. He
has decided against that view ; and he now turns to the alterna-
tive contention :)
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 331
13. "It is suggested on behalf of the United States that
Portland Channel included both the channels; namely, the
channel coming out between Point Maskelyne and Point
Wales, and that running to the north of Pearse and Wales
Islands, and that, upon the doctrine of the thalweg, the
larger channel must be taken as the boundary. It is suffi-
cient to say that, in my opinion, there is no foundation for
this argument. The lengths and the points of land at their
entrances are given in the case of each channel by Vancouver
in a way which precludes the suggestion that he intended to
include both channels under one name, and it must be remem-
bered that he was upon a voyage of discovery, and named
these channels when he had discovered and explored them."
(This clause, with the insertion of the words "Sitklan and
Kannaghunut" after the word "Wales" and before the word
"islands," was almost certainly a part of the first judgment.
When changing the conclusion of his first judgment, Lord
Alverstone struck out the names of those two islands, intending
probably that the clause should thus be brought into harmony
with the altered conclusion. But elision of the names effected
nothing. The clause still refers to the two channels which the
United States had compared with one another for the purposes
of the doctrine of the thalweg. These two channels were the
one to the north and the other to the south of the four islands.
Speaking then of these two channels, Lord Alverstone says:
" The lengths and the points of land at their entrances are given
in the case of each channel by Vancouver in a way which pre-
cludes the suggestion that he intended to include both channels
under one name, and it must be remembered that he . . .
named these channels when he had discovered and explored
them. 11
Lord Alverstone therefore declared, as to the two channels
about which he was speaking, that one of them only was Port-
land Channel; that Vancouver had explored both of them;
that he had given " the lengths and the points of land at their
entrances," and that he had named them when he "discovered
and explored them 11
We have therefore these results :
332 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
1. The clause was a part of the first judgment and was
pertinent and important there.
2. In transferring it to the second judgment, Lord Alverstone
elided the names of two of the islands.
3. Such elision had no effect upon the meaning of the
clause.
4. The clause is a clear decision against the American alter-
native contention that Portland Channel included the passage
to the south of the islands as well as that to the north of
them.
5. It is also a decision that the true entrance to Portland
Channel was not the Tongass Passage.
(a) Because it shows that the entrance to Portland Channel
was "explored" by Vancouver, whereas Vancouver never ex-
plored Tongass Passage.
(6) And because it shows that Vancouver gave " the lengths
and points of land" at the entrance to Portland Channel;
whereas Vancouver never was at the entrance of Tongass
Passage.
8. The clause therefore completely contradicts the conclu-
sion of the second judgment.
There is but one paragraph more before we reach the deci-
sion that Tongass Passage is the true boundary. So far all
that has been said for it is that Vancouver " may have in-
tended " it as one of two entrances, and that " the negotiators
may well have thought " that there were " two passages."
A good deal, moreover, has been said against its being the
boundary. There is but one paragraph left in which to establish
its claims. Let us read it.)
14. "Inasmuch as the question submitted to us only in-
volves the determination of the channel described in the
treaty by the words already cited, 'the channel called Port-
land Channel/ subsequent history can throw no light upon
this question; but I think it right to say that the use in the
year 1853 of the name Portland Inlet in the British Admiralty
Chart, upon which much reliance was placed on behalf of the
United States, has, in my opinion, no bearing upon the ques-
tion; and the references to Tongass Island in 1835 as being
on the frontier of the Russian Straits, and in 1863 as being
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 333
on the north side of the Portland Canal, and in 1869 as to
Tongass being on the boundary between Alaska and British
Columbia, are strongly confirmatory of the view at which I
have arrived upon the consideration of the materials which
were in existence at the date of the treaty."
(This clause was, no doubt, word for word, in the first judg-
ment; and thus evidence that was "strongly confirmatory"
of one view in the first judgment is apparently declared to be
"strongly confirmatory" of the contrary view in the second.
Observe that every argument of the clause supports the
Canadian contention and condemns Tongass Passage. After
repelling an argument "upon which much reliance was placed
on behalf of the United States," the language is, "and" three
specified facts " are strongly confirmatory of the view at which
I have arrived." The use of the conjunction "and" shows the
continuity of the line of thought — of the intention to continue
the refutation of the American contention.
More conclusive, however, than the phraseology is the fact
that the three specified facts are, beyond all controversy,
"strongly confirmatory," not of the conclusions of Lord Alver-
stone's second judgment, but of those of his first. They con-
tradict the second:
1. Tongass Island is "on the frontier of the Russian Straits."
If so, Lord Alverstone's first judgment was right, and his
second wrong. Look at the map.
2. Tongass Island is "on the north side of the Portland
Canal." That fact confirms the first judgment, and refutes the
second.
3. Tongass Island is "on the boundary between Alaska and
British Columbia." If so, why did Lord Alverstone replace a
judgment which so declared by one which denied it?)
(We are now ready for the decision. Lord Alverstone has
followed two lines of argument. Down to and inclusive of
clause twelve (excepting the interjected paragraph) he has dis-
cussed and disposed of the Americans' first contention. In
clause thirteen he has declared the alternative argument to
be untenable. He has interjected a suggestion of a possible
entrance by Tongass Passage ; but he has said not a word in
its favor, and has by various arguments proved the impossibil-
334 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
ity of its being accepted as the boundary. The reasoning
leaves room for but one conclusion; but we shall get not it,
but its contrary:)
15. " I therefore answer the second question as follows : The
channel which runs to the north of Pearse and Wales Islands,
and issues into the Pacific between Wales and Sitklan Islands.
" Alverstone."
(Tongass Passage is the boundary! And that which the
present writer principally resents is not Lord Alverstone's
treachery, not even his gift of the two islands to the United
States, but his contemptuous indifference in leaving on record
the arguments which establish our case and affixing to it a
decision against us. Does he really imagine that among all
the " colonials " there is no one with wit enough to detect the
imposition, or with courage enough to denounce it ?)
If our reconstruction of the first judgment be accurate,
the two will compare in this way:
11 What Channel is the Portland Channel?"
First Judgment: Second Judgment:
1. The answer to this ques- 1. The same,
tion, as indicated by the
learned counsel on both sides,
depends upon the simple ques-
tion: What did the contract-
ing parties mean by the words
"the channel called the Port-
land Channel M in Article III of
the treaty of 1825 ? This is a
pure question of identity. In
order to answer it one must en-
deavor to put one's self in the
position of the contracting
parties, and ascertain as accu-
rately as possible what was
known to them of the geog-
raphy of the district so far as
relates to the channel called
Portland Channel.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
835
First Judgment:
2. There are certain broad
facts which in my opinion es-
tablish beyond any reasonable
question that the negotiators
had before them Vancouver's
maps, the Russian map (No. 5
in the British, No. 6 in the
American atlas), Arrowsmith's
maps (probably the map num-
bered 10 in the American
atlas), and Faden's maps
(British Appendix, pp. 10 and
11).
3. I have, moreover, no
doubt that the negotiators
were acquainted with the in-
formation contained in Van-
couver's narrative. I do not
think it necessary to state in
detail the evidence which has
led me to this conclusion be-
yond stating that, quite apart
from the overwhelming prob-
ability that this was the case,
there are passages in the docu-
ments which, in my judgment,
establish it to demonstration,
but, for the purpose of my
reasons, it is sufficient to say
that I have come to that clear
conclusion after the most care-
ful perusal of the documents.
4. I will now endeavor to
summarize the facts relating
to the channel called Portland
Channel, which the informa-
tion afforded by the maps and
documents to which I have re-
ferred establishes. The first
and most important is that it
was perfectly well known be-
fore, and at the date of the
Second Judgment
2. The same.
3. The same.
4. The same.
336
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
First Judgment:
treaty, that there were two
channels or inlets, the one
called Portland Channel, the
other Observatory Inlet, both
of them coming out to the
Pacific Ocean.
5. That the seaward en-
trance of Observatory Inlet
was between Point Maskelyne
on the south and Point Wales
on the north.
6. That the entrance of
Portland Channel was between
the island now known as Kan-
naghunut and Tongass Island.
7. That the latitude of the
mouth or entrance to the chan-
nel called Portland Channel, as
described in the treaty and un-
derstood by the negotiators,
was at 54° 45'.
Second Judgment
5. The same.
6. That one entrance of
Portland Channel was between
the island now known as Kan-
naghunut and Tongass Island.
7. The same.
8. The narrative of Van-
couver refers to the channel
between Wales Island and Sit-
klan Island, known as Tongass
Passage, as a passage leading
south -southeast towards the
ocean, which he passed in
hope of finding a more northern
and westerly communication to
the sea, and describes his sub-
sequently finding the passage
between Tongass Island on the
north and Sitklan and Kan-
naghunut on the south. The
narrative and the maps leave
some doubt on the question
whether he intended the name
Portland Canal to include Ton-
gass Passage as well as the pas-
sage between Tongass Island
on the north and Sitklan and
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
837
First Judgment
8. For the purpose of iden-
tifying the channel, commonly
known as Portland Channel,
the maps which were before
the negotiators may be useful.
This is one of the points upon
which the evidence of contem-
porary maps as to general repu-
tation is undoubtedly admissi-
ble. It is sufficient to say that
not one of the maps which I
have enumerated above in any
way contradicts the precise
and detailed situation of Port-
land Channel and Observatory
Inlet given by Vancouver's
narrative, and the other docu-
ments to which I have re-
ferred. The Russian map of
1802 shows the two channels
distinctly; and the same may
be said of Faden's maps, on
which so much reliance was
placed on the part of the
United States.
9. I do not attach particu-
lar importance to the way in
which names on the maps are
Second Judgment:
Kannaghunut Island on the
south. In view of this doubt,
I think, having regard to the
language, that Vancouver may
have intended to include Ton-
gass Passage in that name, and
looking to the relative size of
the two passages, I think that
the negotiators may well have
thought that the Portland
Channel, after passing north
of Pearse and Wales Islands,
issued into the sea by the two
passages above described.
9. The same as eight.
10. The same as nine.
338
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
First Judgment:
written or printed, and there-
fore I do not rely upon the fact
that, in the case of some of
these contemporary maps, the
words " Portland Channel " are
written so as to include, within
the name, the lower part of the
channel which is in dispute.
From long experience I have
found that it is not safe to rely
upon any such peculiarities.
10. After the most careful
consideration of every docu-
ment in this case, I have found
nothing to alter or throw any
doubt on the conclusion to
which I have arrived, and
there are certain general con-
siderations which strongly sup-
port it.
11. Russia and Great Brit-
ain were negotiating as to the
point on the coast to which
Russian dominion should be
conceded. It is unnecessary
to refer to all the earlier ne-
gotiations, but it is distinctly
established that Russia urged
that her dominion should ex-
tend to 55° of latitude, and
it was in furtherance of this
object that Portland Channel,
which issues into the sea at
54° 45', was conceded and ulti-
mately agreed to by Great
Britain. No claim was ever
made by Russia to any of the
islands south of 54° 45', ex-
cept Prince of Wales Island,
and this is the more marked
because she did claim the
whole of Prince of Wales Is-
Second Judgment:
11. The same as ten.
12. The same as eleven.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
880
First Judgment:
land, a part of which extended
to about 54° 40'. The islands
between Observatory Inlet
and the channel, to which I
have referred above as the
Portland Channel, are never
mentioned in the whole course
of the negotiations.
12. It is suggested on be-
half of the United States that
Portland Channel included
both the channels; namely,
the channel coming out be-
tween Point Maskelyne and
Point Wales, and that running
to the north of Pearse and
Wales, Sitklan and Kannagh-
unut Islands, and that, upon
the doctrine of the thalweg,
the larger channel must be
taken as the boundary. It is
sufficient to say that in my
opinion there is no founda-
tion for this argument. The
lengths and the points of land
at their entrances are given in
the case of each channel by
Vancouver in a way which
precludes the suggestion that
he intended to include both
channels under one name, and
it must be remembered that
he was upon a voyage of dis-
covery, and named these chan-
nels when he had discovered
and explored them.
13. Inasmuch as the ques-
tion submitted to us only in-
volves the determination of
the channel described in the
treaty by the words already
cited, " the channel called Port-
Second Judgment:
13. The same as twelve,
with the omission of the words
"Sitklan and Kannaghunut."
14. The same as thirteen.
340
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
First Judgment:
land Channel," subsequent his-
tory can throw no light upon
this question; but I think it
right to say that the use in the
year 1853 of the name Port-
land Inlet in the British Ad-
miralty Chart, upon which
much reliance was placed on
behalf of the United States,
has, in my opinion, no bear-
ing upon the question, and
the references to Tongass Is-
land in 1835 as being on the
frontier of the Russian Straits,
and in 1863 as being on the
north side of the Portland
Canal, and in 1869 as to
Tongass being on the boun-
dary between Alaska and Brit-
ish Columbia, are strongly
confirmatory of the view at
which I have arrived upon the
consideration of the materials
which were in existence at the
date of the treaty.
14. I therefore answer the
second question as follows:
The channel which runs to the
north of Pearse, Wales, Sitklan,
and Kannaghunut Islands.
(Sgd.) Alverstone.
Second Judgment
15. I therefore answer the
second question as follows:
The channel which runs to the
north of Pearse and Wales
Islands, and issues into the
Pacific between Wales Island
and Sitklan Island.
(Sgd.) Alverstone.
Summary. — Let us summarize the results of this examina-
tion of Lord Alverstone's second judgment :
1. It is a strong, well-reasoned argument in favor of the
Canadian contention, and utterly contradictory of the con-
clusion with which it ends.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 341
2. Not only is it replete with such arguments, but various
clauses of it are clear and unmistakable declarations that
Portland Channel is where Canada said it was.
3. The interjected clause (the only new one in the second
judgment) effected no real change in the first:
(a) All it suggested was " that Vancouver may have intended
to include Tongass Passage in the name " and " that the nego-
tiators may well have thought that the Portland Channel . . .
issued into the sea by the two passages."
(6) It gave no indication of choice between the two pas-
sages.
(c) It was preceded by a clause which declared in favor of
one of those passages; it was followed by various arguments
in support of that one ; and by an award in favor of the other.
(d) It had no effect upon the first judgment except to break
its continuity and to introduce a little confusion — that is,
to spoil its literary appearance.
4. The two other slight alterations (in clauses 6 and 13)
were immaterial.
5. In all essential respects, therefore, Lord Alverstone's
second judgment, in which he decides one way, is his first in
which he decides the other way, and gives unanswerable
reasons for doing so.
The Charge. — The proof being ample, I now, with all due
sense of responsibility, repeat that
1. Lord Al vers tone wrote a long reasoned judgment
deciding clearly and without hesitation in favor of award-
ing all four islands to Canada.
2. Afterwards he wrote another judgment, giving two of
these islands to the United States.
3. In the second judgment he repeated every argument
that he had advanced in his first, changing one word, omit-
ting two, and adding a single paragraph.
4. Not one of these alterations materially supported the
conclusion of the second judgment.
342 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
5. Not one of them was inconsistent with the conclusion
of the first judgment.
6. There are fourteen paragraphs in the second judg-
ment (excluding the conclusion). All of them are consistent
with the conclusion of his first judgment; eight (the first six,
the eighth, and the tenth) are consistent with the conclusions
of both judgments; and six (the seventh, the ninth, and the
last four) are inconsistent with the conclusion of the second
judgment.
7. Those who say that it is incredible that Lord Alver-
stone could have changed his decision without having first
seen good reason to change his convictions, will have much
difficulty in explaining why Lord Alverstone reiterated his
old convictions in the document which announced his new
decision.
Why did he not write a new judgment? It would have
been troublesome, no doubt, for he had said that " after the
most careful consideration of every document in the case"
he had found nothing even to throw any doubt on his first
conclusion. Why did he not try to do it ?
To Lord Alverstone, all this Alaska question was of the
slightest importance. He saw in it, as did Oswald and Ash-
burton before him, nothing but a squabble over a little use-
less territory — nothing but a squabble that ought to be got
rid of in order that the United Kingdom might have com-
fortable relations with the United States. It ought to be
got rid of, no doubt, with as little humiliation and as little
Canadian irritation as possible, but in any case it must be
got rid of.
But how to get rid of it? After many days of oral argu-
ment by ablest lawyers, and "after the most careful considera-
tion of every document in the case/' Lord Alverstone could
find nothing "to throw any doubt on the conclusion" to
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 343
which he had arrived in Canada's favor. How, then, to get
rid of it?
A weaker man than Lord Alverstone could not have done
it. One less contemptuous of criticism would have done it
more carefully. But Lord Alverstone! well, his rough im-
petuosity overclouded his sense of duty; his self-sufficiency
obviated regard for his colleagues; and his indifference to
censure made him indifferent to public opinion.
His carelessness was extreme, as we have seen. It ex-
tended, however, farther than has been related; and the
instances already given will be more easily accepted when it
is known that Lord Alverstone in writing his second judgment
not merely omitted to make the arguments of his first judg-
ment conform to his new conclusion, but that, actually, in
stating the second conclusion itself, he made it unintelligible.
He declared that the Portland Channel was
"the channel which runs to the north of . . . the islands of
Sitklan and Kannaghunut and issues into the Pacific between
Wales and Sitklan Islands.' ' 1
Such a channel was of course impossible, for if the channel
ran to the north of Sitklan and Kannaghunut Islands, it could
not issue into the Pacific between Wales and Sitklan Islands.
Nevertheless that was the conclusion of Lord Alverstone's
second judgment as he delivered it. He was permitted to
change it afterwards. He left the arguments untouched,
although Mr. Aylesworth had already pointed to some of
them as inconsistent with his conclusion.
With Lord Alverstone's Help the United States had Won
their Third Point and the Case.
1 Quoted in Mr. Aylesworth's judgment.
344 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
ALVERSTONE AND GREAT BRITAIN
Although Alverstone's methods were far from British, he
shared with his race the traditional attitude towards Canada
and the United States. At the very outset of the Alaska
question a willing British ear was lent to the misrepresenta-
tions of the United States. While the matter was still before
the High Joint Commission, the Canadian case and Canadian
purposes and methods were denounced so effectively that one
of the Canadian commissioners (Sir Louis Davies) was sent
to England and spent many weeks there trying to remove
prejudicial impressions. He found, he said, the Colonial
Office most sympathetic. "I did what I could to dissipate
this prejudice/' was all that he could report. 1
Sir Charles Tupper, who for some years had been Canadian
High Commissioner in London, speaking in the Canadian
House of Commons (July 22, 1899), said:
"Those who have read the American papers, and those who
have read the London Times , know that a great deal of mis-
apprehension has existed with regard to this question, and that
the steady and persistent efforts of the press of the United
States of America to mislead the public mind on the question
have been eminently successful in that country, and I regret
to say too successful in Great Britain. . . . But I now come
to a very important question, and that is the reluctance on the
part of Her Majesty's government to do that with the United
States that they would do with any other country in the world.
I speak from intimate knowledge, and from my personal ac-
quaintance and official association with both the great govern-
ing parties in England — because there were many changes
of government while I held the position of High Commissioner,
and I was necessarily thrown, in relation to these matters,
into intimate association with both — when I say that from
1868, when I had occasion to deal with an important question
relating to Canadian interests with Her Majesty's government,
1 See Canadian House of Commons Debates, March 5, 1902, p. 814.
See also ib., February 19, 1902, pp. 143 ff., 760, 811,
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 345
down to the present hour, I have been struck very forcibly with
the unwillingness on the part of Her Majesty's government
to allow any circumstance whatever to even threaten a collision
with the United States."
Probably a little irritated for once, Sir Wilfrid Laurier,
after the award had been given, said in the House of Com-
mons (October 23, 1903) :
"I am sorry not only that we have not the treaty-making
power, but that we are not in such an independent position
that it is in my power to place before Parliament the whole of
the correspondence as it passed between the Canadian govern-
ment and the British government. But we shall have that
correspondence, and it will be placed before Parliament at the
next session; the whole of it, no matter what protest may
come from abroad, we shall have the whole of it, and then this
country may know exactly what has taken place, and what
share of responsibility must rest upon each of the parties con-
cerned in this matter." l
Sir Wilfrid Laurier had said that
"The British authorities have not allowed the communication
to Parliament of certain portions of the correspondence."
Thus far, Sir Wilfrid has not made good his insubordinate
threat.
The Canadian commissioners would have been more than
mortal could they have tolerated, without vigorous protest,
the treachery of Lord Alverstone and the light contempt
with which he treated them. Not only had he privately
negotiated with the American commissioners for a com-
promise of Canadian claims; not only had he agreed to that
compromise without giving to his Canadian colleagues the
slightest hint of what he was doing; 2 but he so agreed after
1 Hansard, 1903, VI, p. 14814.
2 In some way or other suspicion of Lord Alverstone' 8 negotiations
arose, and on the 11th of October (the award was made on the 20th)
346 THE ALASKA BOUNDARY
he had told the Canadians that Canada's claim to the four
islands was clear, after he had given to them (in type) a copy
of his reasoned opinion to that effect, saying that there was
nothing
" to throw any doubt on the conclusion to which I have arrived,"
and while they still believed him honest. He left them in
ignorance of his bargain with the American commissioners
until all had assembled to declare their opinions, when not
only the bargain but the very details of the method by which
it was to be carried out (separation of the one question into
two) was presented to them. The iniquity of his action was
so great, it was (as Mr. Aylesworth said)
" so opposed to the plain requirements of justice, and so abso-
lutely irreconcilable with any disposition of that branch of the
case upon principles of a judicial character,"
that the Canadian commissioners declined to sign the award.
It became effective without their signatures. The next day '
a communication from them appeared in the Times, in which
they said :
"We have been compelled to witness the sacrifice of the
interests of Canada, powerless to prevent it."
a press cable came from London as follows: "I am informed on what
may be accepted as high authority that a majority of the Alaskan com-
mission will shortly give judgment adverse to the Canadian contention.
It is understood that Great Britain's representative on the commission,
Lord Alverstone, has pointedly intimated to diplomatic and Colonial
Office officials that he is convinced that a stronger case is made out by
the United States, and that he intends to give judgment accordingly. A
majority of the commission will thus agree upon a verdict, and the two
Canadian commissioners will, if they register in the issue, be unable
to affect the result." — Hansard (Can.), VI, p. 13671. For Lord Alver-
stone's denial, see ib. p. 13806.
1 October 21, 1903.
THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 347
Editorially the Times was pleasantly sympathetic, but re-
flected the traditional British attitude when it added :
" The inestimable gain of settling definitely a question which
offered perennial opportunities for exciting discord between
the two great kindred nations is one that far outweighs any
disappointment aroused by a decision which after all practi-
cally leaves things as it in fact found them." *
Territory probably half as large as Scotland went by the
award — by the compromise — to the United States ; Canada
was excluded by it from every port on the coast north of
56°; and the Times, as indifferent as Lord Alvestone, declared
that "practically" the decision " leaves things as it in fact
found them" ; what does it all amount to compared with "the
inestimable gain" of American good- will?
There are still people who say that Canada ought to sub-
scribe to the British navy, " because it protects its."
1 All that can be said for the Times assertion is that the United States
was in disputed possession of some of the territory on Lynn Canal. To
give legal validity to a disputed claim is not to leave things as they were.
And the United States never pretended to have had possession of other
parts of the territory.
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 1
I have accepted the invitation of our committee to address
the club upon the political future of Canada, and yet I feel
compelled to admit that I do not know what that future
will be.
I believe, nevertheless, that study and analysis will enable
us to discriminate among the various possibilities that our
imaginations may conceive, and to form some opinion as to
probabilities. All that I shall attempt to do to-night is to
offer to you such suggestions as seem to me to be of chiefest
importance in the consideration of this most interesting
subject.
Perhaps we may assume, as a point of commencement,
that we shall not indefinitely remain in our present political
position. We are a colony — at least a British Dominion
" beyond the Seas" (that is our official title); we are not a
nation; we are in a position of subordination to a govern-
ment and Parliament in which we have no representation ; we
have to ask for permission to do many things; our foreign
relations are beyond our own control.
I am not complaining of that situation; I am not even
arguing that any present change should be made in it. All
that I am saying is that a position of subordination is one
that cannot last forever. Canada must some day rise to the
dignity of full nationhood, and either alone or in some partner-
ship have and exercise the highest powers of government.
1 An address delivered before the Canadian Club at Ottawa, December,
1907.
349
350 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
Canada's future will most probably be one of the five fol-
lowing :
1. Union with the United States;
2. An independent republic ;
3. Union with the United Kingdom ;
4. An independent monarchy with a Canadian King;
5. An independent monarchy with the same Sovereign as
the United Kingdom ;
— which of these we do not know ; but nevertheless, as the
very enumeration of the possibilities will suggest, we may
reason and form some opinion as to their respective proba-
bilities.
And let us reason rather than proceed upon mere senti-
ment. I do not deny the importance of sentiment. I should
be foolish to do so, for it is undoubtedly one of the greatest
impelling forces of the world. But it is changeable. It is
the result of conditions, and changes with them. Individual
feeling frequently undergoes modifications, and we can have
no security that the sentiment of the present generation in
Canada shall be that of fifty years from now. In my boy-
hood, we always spoke of the British Isles as "home." Now
we never do. We have learned to think of Canada as our
home. That alone indicates a most important change in
sentiment. Many of us still speak of the "old country."
Probably those words, too, will gradually drop out of use.
And no one can pretend to predict what the prevailing Cana-
dian sentiment will be fifty years from now, when we have
assimilated some millions of Americans, Swedes, Germans, and
others, further than to say that probably it will not be the
same as ours. My own idea (but I am as likely to be
wrong as anybody else) is that fifty years from now the pre-
vailing Canadian sentiment will be Canadian — very strongly
Canadian.
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 351
But how are we to reason about Canada's future? Well,
there is only one way that I know: you must study the
past, and try to comprehend the present. You will thus see
in what direction Canada is moving — upon what road she
is travelling, and you may be able to form some opinion as
to whether she will probably cease to go forward, or will
probably deflect and go some other way.
In such an examination as this we proceed as mere students
examining phenomena, and while we exclude our personal
desire that the solution shall be this or that, we do not and
must not exclude the sentiments of the Canadian people, for
that is one of the factors which we must take into account.
Very well. But before commencing our examination of the
political road which Canada has thus far travelled, let me
call attention to the very important distinction between the
King (our titular head) and the King's government — that
is, the ministry of the day.
Prior to the establishment in England of what we call
constitutional government, the King was a sort of German
Kaiser — he took an active public part not only in adminis-
tration but in legislation, and in the House of Commons
there were the King's friends and those opposed to the King.
Situations of that sort sometimes led not merely to rebellions
against the King, but even to his deposition or decapitation.
Now, as you are aware, the King takes no public part in
the discussion of political affairs, and opposition is always
directed, therefore, not against him, but against the govern-
ment that represents for the moment the verdict of the last
elections. The King holds himself aloof from all discussion.
He devotes himself to the good of the people in a hundred
other ways, and he is revered by everybody.
Looking back upon the road which Canada has travelled,
we see but few and insignificant disloyalties to the King, and
352 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
what we here and there see were but the expressions of a
feeling that relief from some grievances could be obtained
only by separation from him. These episodes were always
short-lived. Most of us are not old enough to remember one
of them. Good Queen Victoria always received Canadian
acclaim, and for her worthy son we have the greatest ad-
miration and affection. The present road — the road which
Canada has travelled for one hundred and fifty years — has
not then taken us a single step from monarchy — from the
monarch that wears the British crown.
Turning now to the British government, as distinguished
from the British King, observe that in the United Kingdom,
during these one hundred and fifty years, sharp criticism and
strenuous opposition have been directed against every gov-
ernment that has ever been formed, and that every govern-
ment but the present one has been deposed and turned out
of office by the votes of the people.
Every British government encountered opposition not
only "at home" (is the expression familiar to your ears?)
but in Canada also; and, curiously enough, while British
opposition to these governments was thought to be quite
right, Canadian opposition to them was decried as not
merely presumptuous but disloyal.
Note now the difference between the power of the two
oppositions, — the British and the Canadian. The British
could turn the government it disliked out of office and sub-
stitute one that it approved. But the Canadian could do
nothing. It had no vote, and it sent no member to Parlia-
ment to represent it there. Canada merely waited until, for
reasons of their own, British electors condemned the govern-
ment.
And the Canadian situation was a great deal worse than
that, for a change of government in the United Kingdom
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 353
meant nothing to Canada. The new one was no more accept-
able to Canada than its predecessor, for Canadians having no
votes, the attitude of the ministers of the day was not affected
by the elections. A change meant merely that a new man
became Colonial Secretary — usually one who knew nothing
about the colonies. The old Colonial Office officials pursued
the same old methods, and the same old despatches went out
over the signature of a man who lacked the experience of his
predecessor. That was all.
Canadian opposition therefore was not directed particularly
against one or other of the political parties in the United
Kingdom, but against the Colonial Office, and with that
institution Canada was in perpetual conflict over the great
question of the right to govern Canadians.
Canada and the Colonial Office were engaged in a tug-of-
war. Each was hauling at the end of a rope called "gov-
ernment." At first Canada had but a precarious grip — she
had few people and but a short piece of the rope. What she
had, however, was well belayed round her sturdy maples,
and she never lost an inch of it. On through the years she
struggled, gaining a little here and there, and always deftly
taking in the slack.
A great man arose in the Colonial Office, James Stephen,
first counsel and afterwards Under-Secretary — a remarkable
member of a remarkable family. Now and then he willingly
(an Upper Canada Governor said traitorously) let go a few
more fathoms of the rope, and Canadians gladly gathered it
in. Lord Durham came in 1838, and on his return issued his
famous report, the "charter of colonial liberties"; responsible
government was voted unanimously in the first session of the
first Assembly of United Canada; and since that date (1841)
Canada has had the long end of the rope. From 1867, when
the Canadian Federation took joint hold of it, eventual pos-
354 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
session of every foot of it has never been doubtful. In 1870
the North-West joined us, and in 1871 our end of the rope
was long enough to give British Columbia a grip of it. I may
again be wrong, but my notion is that no part of that rope
will ever recross the ocean.
It is a grand story, that of Canada's fight for freedom —
for the great British right of self-government, and it is full
of interesting and even exciting dramatic incident. All
Canadians should know it well. It is the chiefest part of
Canadian history. And when we know it, we know the politi-
cal road which Canada has persistently and with the most
unswerving determination pursued from the commencement
of her history down to the present day.
That road, need I say, is the road which leads to complet-
est self-government. At every stage of it there have been
many of our own people (often some of the best of them)
who thought that we had gone far enough, and who depre-
cated any further advance. But Canada as a whole has
never faltered and never hesitated. As she grew stronger
the feeling — the sentiment (let us note it) — has also grown
stronger, that Canadians better than anybody else know
what is best for themselves.
Observe now that the road of Canada's political develop-
ment has not led us an inch from the British King, but that
it has led us towards completest self-government.
What, now, is our present position? You know it, and I
shall not dwell upon it. We are very near the end of the
road. Practically, although not theoretically, we enjoy legis-
lative independence and administrative independence; we
make our own tariffs ; we tax the British manufacturers as
we please, and do not now receive official remonstrance; we
negotiate with foreign states for reciprocity arrangements;
and by sending Mr. Lemieux to Japan, we have added a long
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 355
step to our previous advance towards the management of our
own foreign affairs.
We are so very nearly independent that the British gov-
ernment itself has given us (at the recent Conference) the
clearest and most satisfactory acknowledgment of that fact.
Take the language of the British Prime Minister :
"We found ourselves, gentlemen, upon freedom and inde-
pendence — that is the essence of the imperial connection.
Freedom of action on the part of the individual states, freedom
in their relations with one another and with the mother
country.' '
The Colonial Secretary (the first of his kind) said that he
concurred
"in the principle which the Prime Minister laid down, that is
to say, the freedom and independence of the different govern-
ments which are part of the British Empire."
And the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies spoke to the same effect.
After those speeches, gentlemen, let no Canadian be afraid
to speak of Canadian independence. It is "the essence of
the imperial connection." Not every one understands that;
but to those who have studied the question it is now very
clear. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has again and again given expres-
sion to it. I am not aware that Mr. Borden has done so in
precise language, but all that he has said has been in hearty
accordance with it.
We are now probably agreed that the road which Canada
has been following leads to complete self-government — that
is, to independence under the British Sovereign, and that
there is no appearance of halting upon that road. Now what
precisely in such case would be our position?
We should be free from control by anybody but ourselves;
we should cease to be subordinate; we should be upon a
356 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
footing of political equality with the United Kingdom itself;
and we should not be a British Dominion " beyond the Seas,"
but a Canadian kingdom on this side of the seas in connec-
tion with the British Empire " beyond the Seas." We should
be what the fathers of our federation looked forward to and
hoped that we should be. We should have worked out the
destiny which they foretold and of which they laid so well
the foundations. It was Sir John A. Macdonald himself who
wished for the title, "The Kingdom of Canada," and it was
he who said that he had in view
"the noble object of founding a great British monarchy in
connection with the British Empire and under the British
Queen . . . recognizing the Sovereign of Great Britain [not
the Colonial Office, you will observe] as its sole and only head."
We should be, as the Marquis of Lome somewhat propheti-
cally said to us when leaving Canada :
"You are not the subjects, but the allies. of a great country,
the country that gave you birth."
The language may be unfamiliar, but the fact nevertheless
is that King Edward is to-day the King of Canada. Shall
not the future make us a kingdom, or shall we always be
some sort of an inferiority?
Gentlemen, I think we now see the end of the present road.
Let us consider the chances of deflection from it.
One word only as to the alternative between a kingdom
under the British Sovereign and a kingdom under separate
sovereignty. For my own part a desire to remain in con-
nection with "the old country"; a feeling that the full blaze
of royalty would be something unaccustomed and possibly
for a time not a little irksome; and a perfect contentment
with our Governors-General, more especially may I say with
the present most genial and popular occupant of Rideau
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 357
Hall — all these contribute to the conclusion that in this
respect we shall not diverge from the present road of our
political development.
Another possibility is that we may unite with our neigh-
bors to the south. I do not know the future. In some far-
off year, under some unforeseen circumstances, such may be
the destiny of Canada. A racial war with the Asiatic millions
may throw us into war-union with the United States, and
battle-comradeship may lead, as it often does, to political
partnership. I am not a prophet. All that I say at present
is, that the present road does not lead to union with the
United States, and I see no tendency to turn in that direction.
The second possibility — an independent republic — is a
result less probable than the one we have just considered.
We may discard it.
But what of our third possibility, Imperial Federation? In
1884 the Imperial Federation League was formed, declaring
as its fundamental, assertion
"that in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire,
some form of federation is essential."
But the League could not suggest any form. It lectured
and published, and finally went to Lord Salisbury (1891),
asking him to call a Colonial Conference to consider the ques-
tion. In reply Lord Salisbury declined to do so until he had
some proposal to lay before the Conference.
" We are almost come," he said, " to the time when schemes
should be proposed . . . without them we should not get
very far."
Not being able to agree upon any scheme, the League dis-
solved in 1893, and no other such league has ever since been
formed.
The truth was that discussion had proved that Imperial
358 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
Federation was impracticable. Imagine the reception which
would be given in the United Kingdom to any proposal that
the colonies should have pro rata representation in the
British Parliament — a representation that would soon out-
number the British members ! What would they do with us ?
And more particularly what should we do with them ? Federa-
tion is impossible.
The "New Imperialists/' as I believe they call themselves,
have completely discarded the idea of a present Federal Par-
liament. Sir Frederick Pollock, for example, who came here
as their spokesman a short time ago, after pointing out that
it would involve modifications in the jurisdiction of the
existing legislatures, continued in these words:
" I am not aware of any reason for thinking that the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom would easily be persuaded to
reduce itself by a solemn act to a mere state legislature, or that
the colonial governments would be willing to surrender any
substantial part of their autonomy to some new Federal Senate
or Council."
And speaking of the other alternative, he said :
" No one, I believe, is now found to advocate a direct repre-
sentation of the colonies in Parliament."
Mr. Chamberlain, at the outset of his imperialistic efforts,
recognized the same thing, and he admitted the hopelessness
of even framing a proposal for Imperial Federation. In 1896,
referring to the history of the League, he said :
"During its careeer it was again and again challenged to
produce a plan, and it was unwilling or unable to answer the
challenge. Sir, I think we may, at all events, learn from its
experience that the realization of our hopes, if they are in the
direction of a federation of the Empire — their final realization
— is a matter of such magnitude and such great complication
that it cannot be undertaken at the present time."
What could not be done in the lump, so to speak, Mr.
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 359
Chamberlain set himself to accomplish by instalments. With
great courage, versatility, and persistence he proposed one bit
of federation after another, only to meet defeat and failure
upon every point. He failed, if for no other reason than
because at the very outset he told us quite frankly that his
object was
" to create a new government for the British Empire — a new
government with large powers of taxation and legislation over
countries separated by thousands of miles of sea."
Taxation from thousands of miles across the sea was some-
thing which had a rather unpleasant sound in Canadian ears,
and our statesmen did not at all agree that it was, as Mr.
Chamberlain thought,
"a desirable consummation to be approached by a process of
gradual development."
As a first instalment of federation, Mr. Chamberlain en-
deavored to bring about a commercial union of the Empire
— that is, to provide for some joint control over the making
of customs-tariffs for the whole Empire. This, he said, was
the preliminary step to German consolidation, and it would
lead to political union of the British Empire. But Mr.
Chamberlain at once antagonized all the colonies, and proved
the hopelessness and impracticability of joint control, by in-
sisting that commercial union must be based upon the aban-
donment of protection within the Empire. In the speech
already quoted from, he said:
"But the principle which I claim must be accepted, if we
are to make any, even the slightest, progress, is that within
the different parts of the Empire protection must disap-
pear."
Mr. Chamberlain soon became convinced that protection
would not disappear, and he abandoned the attempt to create
360 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
his commercial union. He is now a strong believer in the
Canadian system of protection and preferences — each part
of the Empire maintaining control of its own tariff, but giving,
either voluntarily or by agreement, the benefit of preferential
rates to other parts of the Empire. 1
The difference between this system and commercial union
is the difference between cooperation and incorporation —
the same difference that marks all contrasts between Cham-
berlain imperialism and Canadian imperialism. Cooperation,
not incorporation, is a short but correct description of Canada's
conception of all imperial relations. 2
Another of Mr. Chamberlain's proposals was the institu-
tion of an Imperial Council. Feeling that he could not pro-
pose the admission of colonials into the British Parliament,
he suggested at the Conference of 1907 that it might be
" feasible to create a great Council of the Empire to which the
colonies would send representatives . . . persons who . . .
would be able to give really effective and valuable advice,"
adding that, "if such a Council were to be created ... it is
perfectly evident that it might develop into something still
greater."
Sir Frederick Pollock called it a Council with "persuasive
1 In " Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform " for April, 1905 (Mr. Cham-
berlain's special publication), it is said "that a central imperial Parlia-
ment or council with power to control tariffs, is no part of Mr.
Chamberlain's scheme. What is proposed is a preferential arrangement
by conference and treaty between the United Kingdom and the several
colonial governments — neither government surrendering parliamentary
control of taxation, except in the sense in which such control is limited
by any commercial treaty between nations, e.g. by the Cobden treaty
between England and France."
2 An Australian newspaper (The Bulletin) suggests the phrase "Al-
liance not Dependence," saying that it "welcomes the British alliance,
but detests the British supremacy."
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 361
authority." The Conference declined to approve the pro-
posal, resolving instead
" that the present political relations between the United King-
dom and the self-governing colonies are generally satisfactory
under the existing condition of things."
What a great advisory Council of the Empire would be,
may be judged to some extent by the proceedings of the late
Conference, when, with the exception of Canada, the colonies
expressed disapproval of the British government's attitude
to protection and preferences. Canada offered no criticism,
nor would she be inclined to pay much deference to the judg-
ments of Australian, South African, and even British Premiers
should they agree in condemning some policy which she had
approved. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was undoubtedly right when
he said at the Conference that imperial relations must rest
upon this,
"that every community knows best what does for itself."
Canada would not tolerate "persuasive authority" from
any gathering outside of Canada.
The proposal of a Council is dead. At the last Conference,
Mr. Lyttleton (Mr. Chamberlain's successor) endeavored to
change the word "Conference" to "Council," but as soon as
Sir Wilfrid pointed out the connotations of the word "Council "
the Conference unanimously declined to make the change.
Another instalment of federation attempted by Mr. Cham-
berlain was the establishment of an Imperial Court of Appeal.
In 1900, the Australian colonies requested the grant of a
federal constitution. No objection was offered by Mr. Cham-
berlain (then Colonial Secretary) except to the clause limiting
appeals of lawsuits to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. Upon this point he was somewhat obstinate be-
cause, as he said,
362 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
"it would be a retrograde measure so far as it affects the larger
question of Imperial Federation."
And it would interfere, he said, with proposals
"for amalgamating the Judicial Committee with the House of
Lords so as to constitute a Court of Appeal for the whole British
Empire."
That proposal, however, was almost immediately aban-
doned. Mr. Chamberlain found that his own people would
not give up their appeal to the House of Lords, and his reason
for denying to the Australians the right to settle for them-
selves such of their own lawsuits as they pleased, disappeared.
In announcing the withdrawal of this proposal, Mr. Cham-
berlain put forward another, and called a special Colonial
Conference in 1901 to consider it. Asserting, erroneously,
that the colonies desired a
"more effective and continuous representation on the Judicial
Committee"
than they then had, Mr. Chamberlain proposed to appoint
from the colonies
"four additional Law Lords with seats in the House of Lords
as well as on the Judicial Committee."
Seats in the Lords were, however, not a sufficient bait, and
Mr. Chamberlain had to report that
"the result of the Conference has been to show that no far-
reaching alteration in the present tribunal is desired or would
be considered by the colonies generally."
Contributions from the over-sea parts of the Empire in
support of the British navy was an instalment of federation
upon which Mr. Chamberlain was especially insistent. Before
his time (in 1887), Australia had commenced what has been
called subscriptions to the British navy, but what was really
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 363
payments of money in exchange for the permanent sta-
tioning of certain British war ships in Australian waters.
Other colonies followed Australia's lead, and by 1902 Canada
was left alone as a non-subscriber. Canada was upbraided,
but she continued her own course, founding herself upon the
principle that any money available for naval defence she
would spend for herself upon her coast defences and the
commencement of a naval force. Canada spends large sums
annually upon her land forces. Will any one say that it
would have been better had she always subscribed to the
British army, rather than equip soldiers of her own?
The last Conference was remarkable for many things, but
for nothing in so great a degree as the conversion not only of
Australia but of the Admiralty itself to the Canadian idea. 1
Some people unaware of the result of Australian and other
experience still speak as though Canada ought to subscribe to
the British navy. But no one can help sympathizing with
the view of Natal, for example, whose Premier spoke of her
subscriptions as
" simply a cold lump sum voted on our estimates, for which we
have no actual evidence as concerning the people we represent."
In this matter, as in all others, Canadian policy is coopera-
tion and not incorporation — development of our own forces,
military and naval, so that when the time comes we may be
ready to cooperate with the other parts of the Empire in
such wars as the Empire may undertake.
Summarizing what I have said, observe that
1. The road of our political development has not led us
away from monarchy, nor from the British Sovereign.
2. It has led us to almost complete independence.
1 Even the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee aeems to have
accepted the same idea. See the Times, November 13, 1907.
364 THE FUTURE OF GANADA
3. The termination of the road is not far off, and it is the
Kingdom of Canada under the British Sovereign.
4. Probably we shall not turn from that road to join the
United States.
5. Nor shall we become a republic by ourselves.
6. Imperial Federation either in the lump or by instal-
ments is impracticable and impossible.
It will be observed that although I have said that we are
near the end of the road, I have not asserted that there is
any general desire to hurry to its termination. We have
little reason to complain of the usual course of our ordinary
political life. But there is one feature of our relations to the
Empire which is in a most unsatisfactory position and ought
to be settled before it brings us embarrassment. I refer to
the eventuality of war.
At present, in case of hostilities, we are under no legal
or constitutional obligation to aid other parts of the Em-
pire and they are under none to help us. No colony has
any forces enrolled for over-sea service, and Canada on
statute under which her men can be ordered out of
Canada.
Further, Canada has no voice, is not even consulted, as to
the propriety or necessity for war. It has been assumed that
the making of peace and war shall be settled in London, and
that the colonies shall have nothing to do but to fight when
told to.
That situation is, I say, intolerably unsatisfactory. I am
not arguing what Canada would do to-morrow if called upon.
My own notion is that, as in the Boer war, more men would
volunteer than could be accommodated with places. But I
do say that Canada cannot be satisfied with an arrangement
which gives her no voice whatever in the matter which is of
all others the most important to her.
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 365
Remember, for example, the Fashoda incident. Lord Salis-
bury's prompt and peremptory ultimatum to France brought
the two nations to the very verge of war, and Canada would
have been expected to send her men. But Lord Salisbury
probably never imagined what that might mean to Canada.
With statesmanlike tact, British and French descendants
have in Canada been almost welded into one people. But
not entirely so. If Canada is to take part in a war against
France, it should be in pursuance of arrangements well
thought out and agreed to under unexciting circumstances.
Look, too, at the British-Japanese war alliance, by which
each party guaranteed the eastern territory of the other.
Should Japan and the United States go to war, and should
the United States take Formosa (as from Spain she took the
Philippines), the United Kingdom and the United States would
be at war. And Canada ? Well, all that I say is that event-
ualities of that sort ought to be provided for. If Canada
had had any voice in the making of war treaties for the Em-
pire, she would never have agreed to the Japanese alliance.
No one who has had the pleasure of visiting the Japanese
islands can have failed to be impressed alike with the
beauty of the country and the energy and capacity of the
people. But we do not wish Japanese jurisdiction established
either in Alaska or Puget Sound. It would alter our whole
domestic economy, and we cannot agree to help them as
against the United States.
But what can be done? We cannot expect to be kept in-
formed upon every step in British foreign negotiation, even
though it may be such as to involve the possibility of war.
Why then speak of being consulted? War comes suddenly
and consultation by cable is impossible.
Quite true. But is there one alternative only, namely, that
for all time Canada is to be a mere appendage and to have
366 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
no voice at all in matters of peace and war ? If so, I for one
vote against being an appendage.
There is fortunately another alternative. There is the
usual method of procedure when two nations wish to act
together in case of war. They make an agreement about it.
They do not interfere with one another's foreign affairs.
One does not, usually, consult the other. One agrees merely
to support the other in certain eventualities.
Are we ready to agree to engage in war with France, or the
United States, or Japan? Are we ready to send contingents
to fight with Germany ? Are we willing — no matter what
the cause of the war, even though it be one wholly opposed
to Canadian interests ? Are we willing — although at the
same time settlement of our own quarrels is taken out of our
hands and hushed down by generous diplomatic concession
"in the interests of the Empire at large," as goes the cus-
tomary phrase? If so, let us deliberately say so. For my
part, I think we shall not say so.
And if we think such a position too humiliating, altogether
too unworthy of a people twice the size of the United States
on its first independence day, let us say that too, and let us,
if we can, enter into some well-defined arrangement with the
United Kingdom. Let the promises, and the powers, and the
advantages, be mutual. Canada must some day have some-
thing to say upon the greatest of all national questions — the
question of peace and war.
We cannot accept Mr. Chamberlain's idea of our duty. At
the Colonial Conference of 1902, through the Colonial Defence
Committee, he asked the colonies
"to give some assurance as to the strength of the contingents
which they should be able to place at the disposal of His Maj-
esty's government for extra-colonial service in a war with a
European power."
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 367
He said nothing, you will see, as to the cause of the war,
or the power against which we were to fight, or as to consult-
ing us beforehand. He merely wished to know how many
men we would send. Natal and the Cape said that they
could not send any. Canada and Australia replied that
that matter should be left
" to the colony, when the need arose, to determine how and to
what extent it should render assistance."
Under present circumstances that was the proper reply; but
it was proper only because of the ambiguity of our situation.
It is a direct assertion of Canada's right to settle such matters
for herself. But my idea is that she should settle them, not
under pressure, but during some period of tranquillity.
It is sometimes suggested that Canadian independence
would speedily result in enforced ingulfment in the United
States. Sir, I believe that one of the greatest benefits to be
derived from independence is that by it we should be com-
pelled to place our war relations upon some satisfactory basis.
If we are willing to agree to supply men and money for every
British war and under all conditions, we should have to say
so, instead of returning evasive answers. And if, in return
for such help, the humiliating period of ever recurring kow-
towing to the United States is to cease, then that also should
be stated and specifically agreed to.
The advent of Canadian independence will necessitate
some definite arrangement. If an agreement can be made,
we shall be stronger against the United States than we are
to-day. And if none be possible, we shall all know, what
indeed is already sufficiently apparent, that our present situa-
tion, while it involves our participation in foreign wars, affords
us no security against United States aggression.
Now do not take me as advocating independence in this
368 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
address. I am doing nothing at the moment but pointing
out to you the road that we are on, and suggesting what
its termination will be, if we do not turn from it. I am
not pretending either, that independence under the British
Crown is a position free from objection. There are, indeed,
examples, but not of the most encouraging character, of two
countries with no other organic union than a common King,
— such as England and Scotland under the Stuarts, and
Great Britain and Hanover under the Georges. The first of
these ended in political union, and the second in complete
separation. How long the United Kingdom and Canada
would continue to acknowledge the same Sovereign, no one
can venture to say. Some untoward incident might speedily
terminate the situation; but if the Canadian schemes of im-
perial cooperation are allowed free play, a vast increase in
sympathy and interest might prolong it indefinitely.
I have no time to dwell upon these schemes, or to trace
the difficulties which Canada has encountered in getting them
into operation. I can do little else than mention them.
First, there is the Canadian system of imperial preferences.
Canada has converted the Empire, with the sole exception of
the United Kingdom, to that great idea, and by converting
Mr. Chamberlain has so impressed the sole dissentient that a
strong political party is now advocating colonial preferences.
Imperial cooperation in trade.
Secondly, there is the Canadian idea of imperial cables —
direct and cheap communication with all parts of the Em-
pire, and landings upon territory of the Empire only. Thanks
to Sir Sandford Fleming's persistence, we have already a
large instalment of such cables, owned and managed by
various parts of the Empire. Imperial cooperation in teleg-
raphy.
Thirdly, there is the Canadian idea of cheap imperial
THE FUTURE OF CANADA 8N
postage. Thanks very largely to Sir William Mulock, an
ounce letter may now go to any part of the Empire for two
cents, and the rate of postage upon British periodicals has
been reduced from last year's rate of four pence a pound to
this year's rate of a penny a pound. What that means may
be imagined when we know that its immediate effect was to
increase the number of bags of British mail by Canadian
steamers (the only ones affected) in May and June of this
year by one hundred and sixty-four per cent, over the corre-
sponding months of the previous year. Imperial cooperation
in cheap postage.
And fourthly, there is the Canadian idea of an " All-Red
Route " of transportation, which is meeting with the usual
opposition, but which we shall have. Imperial cooperation in
transportation.
We now see clearly the difference between Chamberlain
imperialism and Canadian imperialism. Canada has suc-
cessfully opposed all attack upon her powers of self-govern-
ment. Imperial federation in the lump has been given up.
The instalment plan has been rejected. No statesman and
no organization now suggest commercial union, or an Im-
perial Council with " persuasive authority," or an Imperial
Court of Appeal, or subscriptions to the British navy (even
the Navy League and the Admiralty have abandoned that
idea), or ready contingents for over-sea service under all
conditions.
Canada has resisted all attempts at political incorporation,
and when I say "Canada," I do not mean merely the present
government of Canada. They, indeed, have been, by neces-
sity, our representatives, but that they represented us fairly is
well attested by the fact that no word of complaint or criti-
cism of their actions has been offered by the political party
opposed to them.
370 THE FUTURE OF CANADA
Last July Sir Wilfrid Laurier returned from the recent
Colonial Conference. Since then Mr. Borden has delivered a
most interesting series of addresses throughout the Dominion.
He has attacked Sir Wilfrid upon every point except his
conduct at the Colonial Conference. 1 Mr. Borden has never
given us the slightest reason to suspect that he is less of a
Canadian than the very best of us.
Gentlemen, I have finished, and my last word must be that
if in some proximate or some far-off day the future of Canada
shall be as I have indicated — nationhood; self-control; politi-
cal equality with the United Kingdom, instead of subordina-
tion and subserviency to the Colonial Office; the Kingdom of
Canada, instead of one of many " Dominions beyond the
Seas"; imperial cooperation in all matters of mutual advan-
tage; cooperation in war under agreed conditions; coopera-
tion in trade; cooperation in communications by cables, by
post, and by speediest methods of travel; the increase and
advancement, by these means, of imperial sympathy and
friendship and brotherhood — if this be our future, then I
say that we shall yet reach the goal aimed at by Sir John A.
Macdonald forty years ago; we shall yet be
"a great British monarchy in connection with the British
Empire and under the British Queen . . . recognizing the
Sovereign of Great Britain as its sole and only head."
Gentlemen, that is, I think, a future of which we need
neither be afraid nor ashamed.
1 Since the delivery of the above address, Parliament has met and the
debate upon the Speech from the Throne has taken place. No member
complained of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's attitude at the Conference.
PR8V, TOROHTII^)
*
'
JL 31 .E8 1908 SMC
Ewart, John S. (John
Skirving), 1849-1933.
The kingdom of Canada,
imperial federation,
ABE-5721 (mcsk)
