Labour in war time

3 1822 00179 6770

JNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AN DIEGO

3 1822 00179 6770

A)

\\

LABOUR IN WAR TIME

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE WORLD OF LABOUR

A STUDY OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
OF TRADE UNIONISM

BY

G. D. H. COLE

WITH A FRONTISPIECE BY WILL DYSON
Cheaper Edition, 2s. net

"We heartily commend this book, first to Trade Unionists,
but to all others as well who are interested in the greatest
problem of our time — the problem of the control of industry in
a democratic State." — New Statesman.

" By far the most informative and best-written book on the
labour problem we have ever read." — English Review.

LONDON : G. BELL & SONS, LTD.
YORK HOUSE, PORTUGAL STREET, W.C.
NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO.
BOMBAY: A. H. WHEELER & CO.

LABOUR
IN WAR TIME

BY

G. D. H. COLE

AUTHOR OF "THE WORLD OF LABOUR1

LONDON

G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.
1915

PREFACE

THE present book has a strictly limited aim. It does
not discuss in any way the question whether Great
Britain's participation in the present war is right or
wrong, either from the Labour or from any other
standpoint. It aims merely at giving a short account
of the manner in which the war has affected Labour
and of the industrial problems to which it has given
rise. The general question of " war and class- war "
has been introduced only in so far as it is relevant to
the determination of the attitude adopted by Labour
during the war on industrial questions.

It is, of course, impossible for a book of this kind
to be quite up-to-date. I have stopped with the
passage of the Munitions Act.

G. D. H. COLE.

MAGDALEN COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

WAR AND CLASS- WAR . '. i

CHAPTER II

LABOUR AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR . . 22

CHAPTER III

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT . ... , . 63

CHAPTER IV

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT — THE FIRST PHASE

— THE PREVENTION AND RELIEF OF DISTRESS . 80

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND PHASE — PRICES AND PROFITS . . 115

CHAPTER VI

THE THIRD PHASE — WAGES IN WAR TIME . .138

viii LABOUR IN WAR TIME

CHAPTER VII

ASE — THE ORGAI
INDUSTRY . 168

PAGE

THE FOURTH PHASE — THE ORGANISATION OF

CHAPTER VIII
WOMEN AND THE WAR .... 227

CHAPTER IX
CHILD LABOUR — THE FACTORY ACTS . . .254

CHAPTER X

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR . . . .275

APPENDIX
THE MUNITIONS ACT, 1915 . . . 293

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .309

INDEX . . .. . 313

LABOUR IN WAR TIME

CHAPTER I

WAR AND CLASS-WAR

IT is a commonplace that those who talk most glibly
of national solidarity are those who least understand
what national solidarity implies. The cry against
" setting class against class " has always been raised
in the interest of those who desire to preserve the
status quo, and never on behalf of the oppressed. The
appeal, in fact, has always been to a false idea of
national unity : at the best it has come from the
benevolent autocrats of Toryism or the benevolent
bureaucrats of Liberalism. Those to whom democracy
is more than a political catchword have refused to be
deceived by such specious solemnities : they have
seen that only a radical change in the present economic
system can make national solidarity either possible
or desirable. The division of the nation into masters
and servants is not swept away merely by calling
them employers and employees : it can disappear only
with the collapse of the wage-system and the establish-
ment of industrial democracy.

But all this, it may be said, is the reasoning of
peace time. A nation at war, we are told, must set

B

2 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

aside for the time being all minor antagonisms : in-
dustrial and social dissensions must give way before
the supreme need of the nation as a whole. This is
indeed the feeling of many who are not deluded by
peace time pleas for unity : recognising the fact of the
class-struggle, they hold none the less that it should
be suspended " for the duration of the war only."

It must be admitted that much of the somewhat
artificial philosophy of international relations which
the Labour movement constructed for itself in times
of peace now proves to have been shallow and unreal.
No one, who is not of the most incorrigible and self-
satisfied section of either Jingoes or pacifists, will deny
the need for revision and restatement of the Labour
position. But there is danger that the great bulk of
the leaders, at any rate, will be stampeded into accept-
ing the philosophy of national unity too nearly at its
face value. If indeed the old internationalism is
crumbling, all the greater need for a new internation-
alism that shall take its place.

It will be universally agreed that the great mass of
the workers alike in Great Britain, in Germany, and
in France — wherever, in fact, there is an articulate
body of working-class opinion — desired peace at least
up to the moment when war actually broke out.
Between the organised workers of the European Powers
there is no quarrel capable of provoking war, no
national antagonism strong enough to stand against
the very real sense of international working-class
solidarity. Yet it is undeniable that, when once war
had broken out, the majority of those who had been
against intervention were prepared to support their
respective countries in the trenches, in Parliament,
and in the workshops.

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 3

It was clearly not without uneasiness that they
came to this decision ; but there was never any doubt
how they would decide. International Congresses before
the war had made it plain, from the speeches delivered
if not from the resolutions passed, that in the event of
war actually breaking out most of the various Labour
and Socialist bodies would be likely to place their
national before their class loyalty. They were con-
scious of the conflict of loyalties ; but clearly they held
their national loyalty, in the circumstances, the more
binding. Only the simplest type of revolutionary
intelligence would be prepared, without further debate,
to declare this decision a breach of class-faith. The
situation in which the organised workers found them-
selves was indeed extraordinarily difficult . They desired
to support their country, and they desired — or at least
the best of them desired — to be true to their class, both
nationally and internationally. Their quarrel was
with capitalism, national and international ; yet they
found themselves fighting for one capitalist State
against another. The situation was none the less
ironic because the capitalist State for which they
fought was in some sense their own.

Here, then, is the problem which the revolutionary
is compelled to face. Is allegiance due first of all to
the nation, which includes some of all classes, or to the
class, which includes some of all nations ?

On the one hand, national divisions are clearly, in
the majority of cases, natural divisions also. Whatever
may be true of the British Empire, the unity of all the
inhabitants of Great Britain is not the merely artificial
unity of legal subjection to a common sovereign.
Nations are real persons, and the individuals who
compose them are conscious of their part in the national

4 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

life. This does not mean that the group-consciousness
of the nation absorbs or submerges the consciousness of
the individual ; but it does mean that the individual,
to whatever groups besides he may feel an attachment,
cannot see with indifference the defeat or downfall
of the nation to which he belongs. The tie that binds
together the members of a community is far stronger
than mere neighbourhood : it is the tie of a common
descent or at least of a common inheritance.

The mere force in history of the national idea is
enough to prove this, if indeed proof is needed. Where
nationality has been threatened, other considerations
have generally been put aside. The cosmopolitan
crusades of mediaeval Christendom failed more than
once through national antagonisms. Not even the
great cosmopolitan idea of the mediaeval Church could
annihilate nationalist considerations, though, broadly
speaking, the whole of each nation sincerely professed
loyalty to the Church. Is then the cosmopolitan class
loyalty of the modern Labour movement, to which
only a part of each nation owes allegiance, likely
to be strong enough to stand against the call of the
State ? I say " of the State " and not " of the
nation," and therein lies the final complication of the
problem.

This power of the national idea is based not only
on the community of blood or tradition which binds
the members of the nation together : it gets powerful
support from other sources. The nation is small
enough and compact enough to be recognised as a unit :
the spirit of the national idea is made flesh in the daily
life of every citizen. Not so the cosmopolitan idea of
class ; for the toilers are scattered over the world,
lacking community of neighbourhood, blood, tradition,

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 5

or language, united only by the bond of a common
exploitation. It takes either a rationalist or a senti-
mentalist to be a cosmopolitan — and most men are
neither. They love realities and, still more, manageable
realities.

Now, the State, which is the national machine, is
a reality and a manageable reality. It does things,
right or wrong : it is capable of being influenced, as
capitalism has taught the workers to their cost. It
is manageable, even if it is now managed by the wrong
people. Cosmopolis, on the other hand, has no
Parliament : it does not act, or pass laws, or coerce
offenders. It is, at the most, a mere ideal, scarcely
even based on fact ; and, on that account, the ordinary
man thinks little of it.

The man in the street, then, is a nationalist, and
that very easily makes him a statist. The welfare of
his nation seems to be bound up with the success of
the State which claims to express the national unity,
and he is therefore easily induced, in times of stress,
to throw in his lot even with a capitalist State. More-
over, the inducement becomes greater in proportion
as the State extends its hold. The politician who said,
" We are all Socialists now," only meant that nowadays
we all recognise the immense extension of State activity
that has taken place.

Precisely this recognition of the State has often been
proclaimed by modern Socialists as the dividing-line
between themselves and the Anarchists. The political
Socialists have set out to capture the State and all the
national political institutions : the Anarchists, regard-
ing the State merely as the " protector of property,"
have sought rather to destroy it. Anarchism, then,
owes no loyalty to the State : even if the Anarchist

6 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

believes in nationality, he seeks to realise the triumph
of nationality through the overthrow of national
Governments. For him, no conflict of allegiance
can arise ; his duty is to his class, and the revolu-
tion to which he looks is a cosmopolitan class
movement.

The Socialist, on the other hand, who seeks to
capture the State, obviously must seek also to keep it
alive and vigorous. It is an instrument which he
desires to wrest from his enemy, and he therefore wishes
to keep it bright and ready for use. When it is the
State and not capitalism that is threatened, he argues
that he must fly to its aid, even if this brings him
into temporary alliance with the capitalist. He may
strive to prevent his State from entering into war ; he
may refuse to aid it in a war of wanton aggression ;
but as soon as " the national existence is threatened,"
his duty, he holds, is with the capitalists on the barri-
cades. And if, in the hour of trial, the capitalists are
still busy making profits out of the fighting- line, it is
his business, he believes, to hold the barricades alone
in the common interest.

If this line of argument is valid, the occasions on
which Labour should support the capitalist State in
war time are not simply those in which the State has
a righteous cause, but those in which " the national
existence is threatened." The reason for Labour's
support lies not in the righteousness of the cause, but
in the danger to the State. It is in the main not as
moralists, but as nationalists, that the Socialists can
justify their action. Arguments about " brave little
Belgium " are, on this showing, as irrelevant as
arguments about " the sinister menace of Czar-
dom " : it is the threat of foreign domination or

WAR AND CLASS-WAR 7

trade supremacy that induces all classes to make com-
mon cause.1 This is clearly the justification for their
policy put forward by the Socialists of Germany.

Furthermore, it goes far to explain the difference
between the Labour attitude to the Boer War and the
Labour attitude to-day. In the Boer War, it was never
suggested that the nation was seriously threatened.
In the present war, it can be argued that the
nation is threatened, and our cause is at any rate
no worse than that of our enemies. If not, then,
our cause, at least our danger, induces many Labour
leaders to support the war, and induces many of these
who think we should have remained neutral to say
with Mr. MacDonald that " we ought to go through
with it."

There is, however, still an important minority
among Socialists that holds it always wrong to support
any war entered into by a capitalist Government.
This minority is important, because it claims to be
alone true to the principles of internationalism, to have
alone kept its head when all other Socialists and Labour
men have broken faith. No act of a capitalist Govern-
ment, these somewhat pathetic pacifists affirm, can
alter the fact of human brotherhood. Have not the
workers constantly affirmed their international solid-
arity ? And can their faith be shaken by an act
that is none of theirs — by the act of capitalists and
exploiters ?

This division of opinion among Socialists is of the

1 It is nevertheless clear that the violation of Belgium did
more than anything else to make Labour support the present war.
This one event certainly counted, in men's minds, far more than
all the logical theories in the world. The violation was certainly
a crime ; but no less certainly it was for the Government a very
fortunate accident.

8 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

greatest importance for the future of the working-class
movement, both in this country and internationally.
It is therefore worth while, even in the midst of war,
to attempt a clear statement of the position. And I
shall begin by affirming that no solution of the problem
can be of the slightest use, unless it both recognises
nationality as having a real claim on the workers and
at the same time safeguards the class-idea and class-
loyalty.

The history of the world has been the history of two
wars — the war of nation with nation and the war of
class with class. Nor have these wars been less real
because they have been the wars of indefinables. No
one can define a nation, and no one can say exactly
where one nation leaves off and another begins. In
exactly the same way, there is no definition of class
that will hold for all times and places, and no one can
say exactly where the dividing-line between class and
class should be drawn. Yet class war and national
war, though sometimes, for centuries on end, one or
other has seemed in abeyance, have been the constant
accompaniment of man's social life.

Moreover, these two wars have reacted on each
other in curiously complicated ways. In both cases
there is an appeal to the loyalty of the individual,
whether the loyalty is to country or to class. Hitherto,
save at moments of exceptional stress, it cannot be
denied that " national " spirit has been far stronger
than " class " spirit. But the growth of industrialism
and the spread of popular education have tended to
foster class-consciousness, while cosmopolitan finance
and international trade have weakened the " little
national " spirit which comes of isolation. For many
years, the workers of the world, and still more the

WAR AND CLASS-WAR 9

" intellectuals " attached to the cause of Labour, have
been debating on the rights and possibilities of this
conflict of loyalties. The drama that is being enacted
in Europe to-day is not merely a drama of national
antagonisms : its deepest interest is psychological.
From it we may hope to learn at last the true relation
between nationalism and class-consciousness.

But all that, it may be said, we know already.
The bastard internationalism of the Labour and
Socialist movement collapsed last August like a house
of cards, and only a miserable remnant of devotees
was left repeating the old phrases amid the ruin of
their hopes and their ideals. This is true in a sense ;
but in another sense there can be no profounder
mistake. Only the first act of the drama has been
played. The democracies of Europe have failed to
prevent war : but in the midst of war they are thinking,
feeling their way towards a clearer conception of
nationalism and of internationalism, clearing their
minds of cant, and preparing to face the future.
The real conflict — the conflict of ideas — is only
beginning.

The Labour movement has always been vague and
uncertain in its attitude to nationalism and to Govern-
ments. It has appeared on one day as the champion
of oppressed nationalities, and on the next day it has
declared that the workers have no country. In Great
Britain it has stood for reduction of armaments, on
the ground that we need only a large enough force for
defence ; yet at the same time it has counselled active
intervention on our part in Persia and elsewhere. It
has dallied with the doctrine of non-resistance ; yet
it has cherished aspirations to be the knight-errant of
world democracy. In short, it has claimed to have

io WAR AND CLASS- WAR

everything both ways ; and, in consequence, all its
plans have ended in smoke.

For the last quarter of a century the Labour and
Socialist bodies in the various nations of Europe have
been slowly drawing together into International
Federations. In 1889 the first International Socialist
Congress x met in Paris : in 1900 there grew out of it
the more permanent International Socialist Bureau.
In 1901 was held the first formal International Trade
Union Congress, out of which has grown the Inter-
national Federation of Trade Unions. During the
'nineties less formal international Labour Congresses
were several times held, and in 1894 the first Inter-
national Congress of Textile Workers set a precedent
which has since been followed in many of the chief
industries. There are now International Federations
of Miners, Textile Workers, Metal Workers, Wood
Workers, Transport Workers, etc., mostly centred in
Germany, but drawing their members from almost
every country in Europe.

Labour has thus built up the skeleton of an elaborate
international organisation. The bodies concerned fall
into two clearly distinct groups. On the one side are
the various political parties and Socialist Societies,
whose Federation forms the international political
organ of the movement : on the other side are the
International Federation of Trade Unions and the
various International Federations of single industries,
all these latter forming the industrial organs of inter-
national Labour.

What was the attitude of these bodies and of the

1 The old Marxian " International " was formally wound up in
1876. The movement of 1889 was Labour's second attempt at
international organisation.

WAR AND CLASS-WAR n

sections composing them to the prospect of war up to
last July ? In the main, the industrial organisations
did not attempt to face the problem. The International
Federation of Trade Unions is almost purely a statistical
and debating body, and has hardly considered the
possibility of united industrial action ; and when, some
years ago, the French General Confederation of Labour
sent in to the Congress resolutions dealing with anti-
militarism and the General Strike against war, the
International Trade Union Congress definitely refused
them a place on the agenda, on the ground that they
would be more properly raised at the International
Socialist Congress.

The International Federations of the various in-
dustries have also naturally avoided the discussion of
the general question of internationalism. They exist
to deal with the problems which are common to the
workers in certain industries wherever they are carried
on, and the excellent work which they do could only be
hampered if the internationalist red herring were
drawn across their track. The International Transport
Workers' Federation, for instance, has also refused
to table a resolution on the General Strike against war,
apparently on the ground that it might complicate
relations with the German authorities.

It is, then, in the main to the International Socialist
Congress and to the International Socialist Bureau
that we must look for a definite pronouncement on
the attitude of Labour to war. There, in the reports
of the Congress of 1907, we shall find the record of
the most important debate on the question and of the
resolution carried at the close.1 As it was the policy

1 A good account of this debate is to be found in H. N. Brailsford's
The War of Steel and Gold, pp. 187 ff. The whole of chapter vi.
of Mr. Brailsford's book deals with this question.

12 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

recommended by the International in 1907 that the
Socialists of Europe at least began to put into effect
last July, both the debate and the resolution are of
the greatest importance for an understanding of the
Labour position.

The discussion arose at the instance of the French
delegates, who had for more than ten years before
been holding heated arguments about it in France,
where the Syndicalist Confederation of Labour and a
section of the Socialists, led by nerve", had advocated
uncompromising anti-militarism. In response to the
challenge of the Syndicalists, Jaures and the leaders
of the Socialist Party formulated their policy of anti-
militarism, and carried it to the International Congress
for discussion.

The actual debate, which ended in the passing of a
specially drafted resolution by unanimous vote, was
remarkable chiefly for the conflict of views between
the French and German Socialists. Alike in rejecting
the idea that Socialists should support their country,
" right or wrong," they differed hi the alternative
policies which they suggested. The French held that
the Socialist Parties should be guided by the rights and
wrongs of the particular occasion, and should always
throw their weight against the aggressor, even if it
were their own country. The Germans, on the other
hand, preferred to be guided by the general character
of the contending Powers, and held that Socialists should
take the side most likely to forward Socialism and
democracy. Bebel declared that he would shoulder
a rifle for Germany against Russia on these grounds :
it did not appear whether he would as unhesitatingly
have taken the part of Great Britain or France against
Germany.

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 13

While the various nations differed in their view of
the right tactics to adopt if war should actually break
out, they all agreed that it would be the duty of Social-
ists in every country to use all their endeavours to
prevent war from breaking out. So far, the action
taken by them in 1914 follows the lines laid down in
the resolution, of which the final wording was as
follows :

// war threatens to break out it is the duty of the working-
class in the countries concerned and of their Parliamentary
representatives, with the help of the International Socialist
Bureau as a means of co-ordinating their action, to use every
effort to prevent war by all the means which seem to them most
appropriate, having regard to the sharpness of the class war
and to the general political situation.

Should war none the less break out, their duty is to intervene
to bring it promptly to an end, and with all their energies to
use the political and economic crisis created by the war to
rouse the populace from its slumbers, and to hasten the fall
of capitalist domination.

Like most resolutions that are carried unanimously
at the end of a controversial debate, this declaration
merely avoids the greatest difficulties. It falls, as
we have seen, sharply into two parts. On the action
to be taken in face of the threat of war, its instructions
are clear and definite ; for on this point all Socialist
and Labour bodies are agreed. On the action to be
taken in the event of war its answer is evasive and
ambiguous.

Last July it became very suddenly the duty of
European Labour to put the first clause of the resolu-
tion into effect. During the week or so when the
decision for war or peace seemed to hang in the balance,
Socialist and Labour bodies in all the countries con-

14 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

cerned held imposing meetings and demonstrations
to protest against intervention by the countries to
which they belonged. The International Socialist
Bureau met and counselled this course, and its lead
was everywhere followed with alacrity. But despite
demonstrations and resolutions, the working-class
leaders well knew that the decision for peace or war
would not in reality rest with the workers, that in
fact the crisis through which Europe was passing was
the result of a long series of diplomatic manoeuvres
in which the workers had had no say, and that it was
in reality vain to protest at the eleventh hour. Labour
everywhere protested on principle ; but from the first
the tone of its protest was dead and hopeless. It
gained only this : that the workers in every country
can say that, down to the outbreak of war, they kept
faith with the International.

What, then, of the second clause in the resolution,
round which the controversy really centres ? In this
clause there were two recommendations, dealing
respectively with the war in its international and in
its social aspects. In the first place, the workers were
urged to intervene promptly in order to bring the war
to an end, and in the second place they were " to use
the political crisis created by the war to rouse the
populace from its slumbers, and to hasten the fall
of capitalist domination."

It is comparatively easy to urge that your country
shall not intervene in a war : it is far more difficult
to urge that it shall make peace when it has once
entered upon war. Until war has actually begun,
there is always the possibility of arbitration, of a
conference of the Powers, or the like : when the nation
is at war, peace suggestions, however necessary they

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 15

may be, are very difficult to make. A nation at war
almost inevitably develops a belief in the righteousness
of its cause ; it almost inevitably comes to believe that
till it has destroyed, or at least clipped the wings of,
its adversary, there can be no secure peace. In short,
it easily — and the more easily the larger the area of
conflict — comes to look on itself as the saviour of the
world. The will to live and the will to power are
strong in the consciousness of nations, and they easily
become the will to kill and the will to domination. All
the greater, no doubt, is the need for a public opinion
that will press for peace on terms honourable to all
concerned ; but as Labour bodies consist of men, and
not always of very wise or clever men, their nationalism
readily goes Jingo under the stress of the national
crisis. Thus, there has been practically no attempt in
any country, except by small minorities in the working-
class bodies, to give effect to the second clause of the
International's command. The Independent Labour
Party in Great Britain, certain Russian and Austrian
Socialists, and a minority of the German Socialists,
together with a certain number of French Trade
Unionists, have demanded peace, and a larger section
has demanded that the Governments shall publish in
advance the terms on which they are prepared to make
peace ; but apart from these scattered and, for the
most part, unofficial endeavours, nothing has been done.
The official parties and working-class organisations
seem convinced of the Tightness of their respective
countries' causes : the Germans wish to humble
Czardom and punish Great Britain, while the British
and the French speak of crushing German militarism.
Doubtless, as this is an English book, my readers
will say that our national feeling is easily explained

16 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

by the righteousness of our cause. It is no part of
my plan to discuss the ethics of the present war, and
I will only make the answer that is relevant to my
purpose. It is clear, I reply, that if this were a German
book, the average German would say the same. Herein
lies the weakness of the policy recommended by the
French delegates to the International Socialist Con-
gress. Socialists, they maintained, should always
oppose the aggressor. But who is the aggressor ?
It is no doubt simple to decide such a question in times
of peace, and with the aid of hypothetical instances ;
but an international body is seldom likely to agree in
singling out the aggressor when all Europe is ablaze.
The International can have no common policy so long
as it tries to apportion the blame : its only consistent
course is to go on in war time demanding the reference
to arbitration or to a conference of all the Powers
which it urged when war threatened. It will not be
listened to in any case ; but here, too, it has the chance
of keeping its hands clean. Under capitalism, that
would seem to be all the Socialist can hope to do in
international affairs.

If the recommendations which we have discussed
seem academic and unreal, the third suggestion of the
International brings us back with a start to the world
of realities. The workers of all countries are definitely
urged to use the situation created by the war for the
purpose of undermining the capitalist system. It is
when we come to discuss this clause that the omissions
in the International resolution become most obvious.
It is manifest that a working-class body, if it uses the
situation created by the war as a weapon against
capitalism, may well hamper the nation in the conduct
of war. Yet of this the resolution says not a word.

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 17

It does not say under what circumstances, if ever,
the workers ought to support a war ; and though
clearly most of the speakers at the Congress thought
that there were such circumstances, its last recom-
mendation seems to imply that the working-class
organisations should stand aloof and look after their
economic interests. In fact, this clause conceals the
real unwillingness of the International to commit
itself on the one point that is of practical importance.

For here we come at last to a question which has
been faced by organised Labour — or at least by its
leaders — and decided in a manner which has made
a real difference. For in the economic sphere Labour,
more especially in war time, cannot be pushed aside
as a nonentity ; politically more impotent than in
peace, it finds its economic power increased tenfold.
Not only can it hold up the ordinary supplies of the
nation : it can prevent munitions of war from reaching
the firing line.

The actual course pursued by the British Labour
movement we shall be able to follow in more detail
in the next chapter : here I am only discussing the
general principle involved. Should the workers use
the opportunity created by a war " to hasten the
downfall of capitalist domination " or should they not ?
The International Socialist Congress apparently answers
that they should, and thus in effect surely says that it
is not right for the workers to support any war.

It would be clearly absurd at the same time to say
to one's country, " Go in and win," and to cut off its
supplies at the source. If Labour determines to sup-
port a war, it implicitly determines also to supply the
necessary munitions, and undertakes to attempt no
offensive movement likely to hamper the nation in the

c

i8 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

conduct of war. In short, it cannot, at least upon a
large scale, attempt " to hasten the downfall of capitalist
domination."

There are, then, three possible courses before a
national Labour organisation, if it desires to act
logically. It may decide that the wars of capitalist
Governments are not, and cannot be, its business, and
it may accordingly declare its absolute aloofness.1
In this case it is clearly free to follow the advice of the
International, and to use the situation created by the
war for the purpose of undermining capitalism. But
such an attitude, as we have seen, really involves the
repudiation of nationality. Logical enough, it is so
flagrantly a violation of natural instincts that it cannot,
in the last resort, be sustained.

In the second case, while affirming the duty of
defending their country in case of need, the workers
may decide that, in a particular war, the national
security is not threatened, and may in such a case hold
themselves at liberty to stand aloof from the war
and reap what benefits they can from the economic
situation it produces. This is a logical attitude,
consistent both with nationalism and with international-
ism, but not applicable to all cases.

Thirdly, the workers may decide that the national
security is threatened and that it is their duty to come
to their country's aid. In such a case, as we have seen,
they cannot logically take advantage of the economic
situation for an attack on capitalism, if in so doing
they hamper the country in the conduct of war. This
seems to have been the position taken up by the

1 For practical purposes, though not in theory, the so-called
" Tolstoyan " attitude of non-resistance coincides with this first
view. Thus, Tolstoyans and working-class cosmopolitans are now
found together in the " stop the war " movement.

WAR AND CLASS- WAR 19

majority of British Labour leaders on the outbreak
of war. It remains to enquire what action the workers,
if they hold this view, are still entitled to take.

The enemies of Labour will of course claim that,
for the period of the war, the workers must hand
themselves over tied and bound to their lords and
masters, that they must submit to every indignity and
to every exaction, without protest and without re-
taliation. This plea is obviously the merest nonsense.
At the most the worker is only bound not to hamper
wantonly the work of war — that is, not to take the
offensive against capitalism where such action is likely
to be hampering in its effects. If the capitalist is
entitled to demand the maintenance of the status quo
to this extent, clearly the workers are entitled to demand
it absolutely. Labour is the aggressor in its war with
capitalism ; and if Labour gives up for the moment
the right of aggression, there is a double reason why
capitalism should surrender its right of retaliation.
The State, as it exists to-day, is a mere parody of the
true expression of the national unity : Labour, in
granting it allegiance, is offering it service by virtue
of what it might be. The State, then, at least owes
Labour the return of not serving out to it a double
measure of kicks in exchange for its ha'pence.

We shall have to deal with this whole question more
thoroughly when we come to consider the actual
experiences and actions of Labour in Great Britain
during the present war. Here it is enough to lay down
the general principle. Even if Labour decides to
support a particular war, and thereby implicitly
undertakes to do nothing to hamper the successful
prosecution of it, this by no means implies uncon-
ditional surrender on the part of the workers. They

20 WAR AND CLASS- WAR

have the right to see that the status quo is maintained,
they have a right to fair treatment by the State and
by the employers, they have a right to be taken into
the Government's confidence wherever they are closely
concerned — in short, they have rights as well as duties,
and not least among their rights is the right to be
treated as responsible beings. Moreover, they have
the right, if these just claims are not granted, to use
their economic power for the purpose of enforcing
them.

We return, then, to the point that the double allegi-
ance of the worker exists no less in war time than in
peace. It is his duty, as well as his right, to act as a
citizen of the nation to which he belongs ; but it is
also his duty, as well as his right, to see that the war is
not used by his enemies for the purpose of exploiting
still further the class of which he is a member. He
has on his conscience this double system of rights and
duties ; but the obligations that fall upon him are not
irreconcilable.

But, it may be urged, this solution forgets inter-
nationalism altogether. The worker's duty to his
class, as it is here conceived, seems to be his duty to his
class within the nation, not to the exploited of every
nation. What has become of the fine old Marxian
cry, " Workers of the world, unite ! You have nothing
to lose but your chains, and a world to win " ?

It is indeed true that the theory here advanced is
not cosmopolitanism ; but it is, I maintain, internation-
alism. That is to say, it does not deny the validity
and the value of all national boundaries, traditions,
and aspirations, or seek to confound all social sense in
a vast, vague sentiment of the individual brotherhood
of all men. It is based on nationality, and the brother-

WAR AND CLASS-WAR 21

hood on which it rests is the brotherhood not of in-
dividuals but of nations. It is truly international, in
that it seeks to preserve nations and nationality while
removing national antagonisms.

The world will become a Socialist world when, and
only when, the nations of the world become Socialist
nations. The pure class-conscious cosmopolitan of
some Socialist theory is as unnatural and as unreal as
the pure " economic man " of the older economists.
If the pure economic man of capitalist thought con-
fronted in the real world the pure class-conscious
proletarian of revolutionary thought, the class-war
would soon be over. As things are, consciousness of
class is at the most only one of two dominant ideas :
and if it sets itself in opposition to the idea of nation-
ality, it will, even if it scotches nationalism, only
destroy itself in the process. The way to class-
emancipation lies through national action. Inter-
nationally, the workers must be always ready to hold
out a helping hand from one country to another ;
but the real battles will be fought out in each separate
national group. This applies not only to political
battles, but at least as much to industrial battles.
The wage-system will end when National Guilds
replace it.

CHAPTER II

LABOUR AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

" IF war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the
working class in the countries concerned ... to use
every effort to prevent war. ..." This, as we have
seen, was the policy prescribed to Labour organisations
by the International Socialist Congress of 1907. Let
us see how it worked out in actual practice last
July.

The Austrian Note to Servia was delivered on
July 23, and the declaration of war followed on Saturday
the 25th. During the week-end the Austrian Socialist
deputies published a manifesto protesting against the
war, and anti-war demonstrations were held in Berlin
and elsewhere under the auspices of the German
Socialist Party. The first body to move in Great
Britain was the British Socialist Party, whose Executive
passed on the 28th a resolution protesting against the
Austrian Note and declaration of war, and congratulat-
ing continental Socialists on their efforts to keep the
peace. On the same day, protests against the war
were passed by the French and German sections of the
Internationa] Socialist Bureau, while the French
Socialist deputies passed a resolution in which they
urged the French Government " to act towards our

LABOUR AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 23

ally, Russia, so that this Power, under the pretext of
defending Slav interests, should not be allowed to
satisfy aggressive designs. This effort corresponds
with the German Socialists' demand for pacific pressure
by their own Government on Austria, its ally." The
next day the French General Confederation of Labour
issued a manifesto against war.

Meanwhile, a meeting of the International Socialist
Bureau had been summoned at Brussels. At this
meeting the French, German, and Austrian delegates
alike declared that the workers in their countries were
unanimously against war. It was decided that the
International Socialist Congress, which was to have
been held in Vienna late in August, should be held in
Paris on August 9. It need hardly be said that, in
the event, the Congress was not held.

The first duty of the Bureau was to carry out the
terms of the 1907 resolution. This it did by issuing
the following declaration :

In assembly of July 29 the International Socialist
Bureau has heard declarations from representatives of
all nations threatened by a world war, describing the
political situation in their respective countries.

With unanimous vote, the Bureau considers it an obliga-
tion for the workers of all concerned nations not only to
continue but even to strengthen their demonstrations
against war in favour of peace and of a settlement of the
Austro-Servian conflict by arbitration.

The German and French workers will bring to bear on
their Governments the most vigorous pressure in order
that Germany may secure in Austria a moderating action,
and in order that France may obtain from Russia an
undertaking that she will not engage in the conflict. On
their side the workers of Great Britain and Italy shall
sustain these efforts with all the power at their command.

The Congress urgently convoked in Paris will be the

24 LABOUR AND THE

vigorous expression of the peaceful will of the workers of
the whole world.

As the Congress was never held, this was as far as
international action carried the workers. We can now
proceed to trace the course of events in Great Britain,
which closely resembles their course in the other
countries concerned.

The first to issue a pronouncement were the Labour
Members of Parliament, who, on July 30, passed
unanimously the following resolution :

That the Labour Party is gratified that Sir Edward
Grey has taken steps to secure mediation in the dispute
between Austria and Servia, and regrets that his proposal
has not been accepted by the Powers concerned ; it hopes,
however, that on no account will this country be dragged
into the European conflict in which, as the Prime Minister
has stated, we have no direct or indirect interest, and the
Party calls upon all Labour organisations in the country
to watch events vigilantly so as to oppose, if need be, in
the most effective way any action which may involve us
in war.

Two days later, on the day when the assassination
of Jaures became known, the British Section of the
International Socialist Bureau issued its manifesto in
accordance with the decisions of the International.

MANIFESTO TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE

The long-threatened European war is now upon us.
For more than 100 years no such danger has confronted
civilisation. It is for you to take full account of the
desperate situation and to act promptly and vigorously
in the interest of peace. You have never been consulted
about the war.

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the sudden,
crushing attack made by the militarist Empire of Austria

OUTBREAK OF WAR 25

upon Servia, it is certain that the workers of all countries
likely to be drawn into the conflict must strain every nerve
to prevent their Governments from committing them to
war.

Everywhere Socialists and the organised forces of
Labour are taking this course. Everywhere vehement
protests are made against the greed and intrigues of
militarists and armament-mongers.

We call upon you to do the same here in Great Britain
upon an even more impressive scale. Hold vast demonstra-
tions against war in every industrial centre. Compel those
of the governing class and their Press who are eager to commit
you to co-operate with Russian despotism to keep silence and
respect the decision of the overwhelming majority of the people,
who will have neither part nor lot in such infamy. The
success of Russia at the present day would be a curse to the
world*

There is no time to lose. Already, by secret agreements
and understandings, of which the democracies of the
civilised world know only by rumour, steps are being
taken which may fling us all into the fray.

Workers, stand together therefore for peace ! Combine
and conquer the militarist enemy and the self-seeking
Imperialists to-day, once and for all.

Men and women of Britain, you have now an un-
exampled opportunity of rendering a magnificent service
to humanity, and to the world !

Proclaim that for you the days of plunder and butchery
have gone by ; send messages of peace and fraternity to
your fellows who have less liberty than you. Down with
class rule. Down with the rule of brute force. Down
with war. Up with the peaceful rule of the people.

(Signed on behalf of the British Section of the Inter-
national Socialist Bureau.)

J. KEIR HARDIE.
ARTHUR HENDERSON.

Thus on August I the bodies affiliated to the

1 Italics mine.

26 LABOUR AND THE

International, including not only the Independent
Labour Party, the British Socialist Party, and the
Fabian Society, but also the Labour Party, were
decisively against war and against the Russian alliance.
The next day, Sunday, August 2, a great anti-war
meeting was held in Trafalgar Square under the auspices
of the British Section. Among the speakers were
Mr. Keir Hardie, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Will
Thorne, and Mr. Lansbury. The following resolution
was carried with enthusiasm by a crowded meeting
representative of all sections of the working-class
movement :

That this demonstration, representing the organised
workers and citizens of London, views with serious alarm
the prospects of a European war, into which every European
Power will be dragged owing to secret alliances and under-
standings which in their origin were never sanctioned by
the nations, nor are even now communicated to them ;
we stand by the efforts of the International Working-Class
Movement to unite the workers of the nations concerned
in their efforts to prevent their Governments from entering
upon war, as expressed in the resolution passed by the
International Socialist Bureau ; we protest against any
step being taken by the Government of this country to support
Russia, either directly or in consequence of any understanding
with France, as being not only offensive to the political tradi-
tions of the country but disastrous to Europe, and declare
that as we have no interest, direct or indirect, in the threatened
quarrels which may result from the action of Austria in
Servia, the Government of Great Britain should rigidly
decline to engage in war, but should confine itself to efforts to
bring about peace as speedily as possible.1

This was on Sunday : on the Monday followed the
German threat to Belgium and Sir Edward Grey's

1 Italics mine.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 27

speech in the House of Commons. In the debate Mr.
Ramsay MacDonald made his last pronouncement as
leader of the Labour Party.

" Whatever may be said about us," he said, " we shall
say that this country ought to have remained neutral,
because in our deepest hearts we believe that is right,
and that alone is consistent with the honour of the country
and the traditions of the party now in office."

On the same day Mr. Will Crooks gained the
distinction of being the first member of the Labour
Party to declare for war. The day after, Great Britain
was actually at war with Germany.

The declaration of war at once changed the situation.
The first part of the policy recommended by the
International had been tried in vain : Labour had
failed to prevent war. The important question that
now faced the workers was the attitude they ought to
adopt in war time. Were they " to intervene to bring
the war promptly to an end," and, if so, how ? And
were they " to use the economic and political crisis
created by the war to rouse the populace from its
slumbers, and to hasten the fall of capitalist domina-
tion " ?

Labour's first move was in the direction of safeguard-
ing its economic interests. Already, before the declara-
tion of war, the Joint Board of the Labour Party, the
Trades Union Congress, and the General Federation of
Trade Unions had summoned a representative confer-
ence of the most important working-class bodies for
the purpose of forming a National Labour Peace
Emergency Committee, presumably for the purpose
of carrying on agitation against British intervention.
The declaration of war changed the character of this
conference, which met on August 6. The suggested

28 LABOUR AND THE

peace campaign was abandoned, and instead of a
" peace committee " Labour formed the " War
Emergency Workers' National Committee," of which
the duty was to be the safeguarding of Labour interests.
As we shall have much to say of this Committee in a
later chapter, we need here only notice its formation.
Up to this point, Labour was still keeping to the spirit
of the International resolution, in at least one respect,
by concentrating on its own peculiar problems.

It is, however, interesting to notice that, even when
the declaration of war was inevitable, some of the
promoters of the Labour conference had not given up
the idea of a Peace Committee. Mr. Arthur Henderson,
interviewed in the Daily Citizen of August 5, said of
the work of the proposed committee : " One important
thing will be to come to a decision to take all necessary
steps for the promotion of an early and permanent
peace." In the same interview he laid stress on the
economic collapse which might be expected to follow
the outbreak of war, and in the need for a strong body
to serve as a mouthpiece of the claims of Labour.

The resolutions passed at the great Labour confer-
ence on August 5 had, in fact, no reference to the ethics
of the war or to the need for peace. The conference
dealt solely with the economic situation caused by the
war and adopted a series of recommendations intended
to assist the workers in facing the industrial crisis.
This concentration on the work of relief was endorsed
the following day by a resolution adopted by the
Executive Committee of the Labour Party.1 This

1 The Executive Committee of the Labour Party is a different
body from the party meeting of Labour M. P. 's. The Labour Party
is a federation of Trade Unions and Socialist bodies, governed by
an Executive Committee and represented in Parliament by the
Labour members, who, as we shall see, took a rather different line.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 29

resolution was published on August 7 with the following
covering letter :

DEAR SIR — We beg to inform you that a special meeting
of the National Executive of the Labour Party was held
on August 5 and 6 to consider the European crisis, when
it was decided to forward to each of the affiliated organisa-
tions the following resolutions : —

" That the conflict between the nations of Europe in
which this country is involved is owing to Foreign Ministers
pursuing diplomatic policies for the purpose of maintaining
a balance of power ; that our own national policy of
understandings with France and Russia only, was bound
to increase the power of Russia both in Europe and Asia,
and to endanger good relations with Germany.

" That Sir Edward Grey, as proved by the facts which
he gave to the House of Commons, committed, without
the knowledge of our people, the honour of the country
to supporting France in the event of any war in which she
was seriously involved, and gave definite assurances of
support before the House of Commons had any chance of
considering the matter.

" That the Labour movement reiterates the fact that
it has opposed the policy which has produced the war,
and that its duty is now to secure peace at the earliest
possible moment on such conditions as will provide the
best opportunities for the re-establishment of amicable
feelings between the workers of Europe.

" That without in any way receding from the position
that the Labour movement has taken in opposition to our
engaging in a European war, the executive of the party
advises that, while watching for the earliest opportunity
for taking effective action in the interests of peace and the
re-establishment of good feeling between the workers of
the European nations, all Labour and Socialist organisa-
tions should concentrate their energies meantime upon the
task of carrying out the resolutions passed at the Conference
of Labour organisations held at the House of Commons
on August 5, detailing measures to be taken to mitigate

30 LABOUR AND THE

the destitution which will inevitably overtake our working
people while the state of war lasts."

Your attention is specially called to Clause 3 of the
attached resolutions, agreed upon at the Labour and
Socialist Emergency Conference. Citizen committees are
being formed in county and urban areas, and every effort
should be made to secure a fair and adequate representation
of Labour, including woman, upon these committees. We
also urge the great importance of all Labour organisations
giving every possible assistance in the relief work organised
by these citizen committees. — Yours very sincerely,

W. C. ANDERSON, Chairman.
ARTHUR HENDERSON, Secretary.

On the same day as the Labour Party Executive
met the Labour members held their weekly meeting,
at the close of which the announcement was made that
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had resigned the leadership
of the Party, and that, for the time being, Mr. Arthur
Henderson would take his place.

The cause of Mr. MacDonald's retirement was given
as " disagreement with some of his colleagues on
certain aspects of the European crisis." Already the
forces of Labour were becoming divided : some wished
to sink all differences in the " national danger," while
others thought that the working-class movement
should continue to take an independent line.

It is important to understand that this cleavage
did not coincide with the division between those who
thought the war ought to be supported and those who
thought it should still be opposed. Speaking at
Leicester the day after his resignation, Mr. MacDonald
made his position quite clear. He dwelt on the share
which British foreign policy had had in bringing about
the war.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 31

" We are not fighting for the independence of Belgium,"
he said. " We are fighting because we are in the Triple
Entente ; because the policy of the Foreign Office for a
number of years has been anti-German, and because that
policy has been conducted by secret diplomacy on the
lines of creating alliances in order to preserve the balance
of power. We are fighting because we have got prejudices
against very strong commercial rivals."

Mr. MacDonald continued with a plea for good
feeling towards Germany, and for frank recognition of
her national greatness. " But," he said, " whatever
our view may be on the origin of the war we must go
through with it." A month later, on September n,
Mr. MacDonald went even further. The following
letter from him was read at a recruiting meeting in
Leicester :

MY DEAR MR. MAYOR — I am very sorry indeed that I
cannot be with you on Friday. My opinions regarding
the causes of the war are pretty well known, except in so
far as they have been misrepresented, but we are in it.
It will work itself out now. Might and spirit will win,
and incalculable political and social consequences will
follow upon victory.

Victory, therefore, must be ours. England is not
played out. Her mission is not accomplished. She can,
if she would, take the place of esteemed honour among
the democracies of the world, and if peace is to come with
healing on her wings, the democracies of Europe must be
her guardians. There should be no doubt about that.

Well, we cannot go back, nor can we turn to the right
or to the left. We must go straight through. History
will, in due time, apportion the praise and the blame, but
the young men of the country must, for the moment,
settle the immediate issue of victory. Let them do it in
the spirit of the brave men who have crowned our country
with honour in the times that are gone. Whoever may be
in the wrong, men so inspired will be in the right. The

32 LABOUR AND THE

quarrel was not of the people, but the end of it will be the
lives and liberties of the people.

Should an opportunity arise to enable me to appeal to
the pure love of country — which I know is a precious
sentiment in all our hearts, keeping it clear of thoughts
which I believe to be alien to real patriotism — I shall
gladly take that opportunity. If need be I shall make it
for myself. I want the serious men of the Trade Union,
the Brotherhood, and similar movements to face their
duty. To such men it is enough to say " England has
need of you " ; to say it in the right way. They will
gather to her aid. They will protect her, and when the
war is over they will see to it that the policies and condi-
tions that make it will go like the mists of a plague and
the shadows of a pestilence. — Yours very sincerely,

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

It is clear then that what caused Mr. MacDonald
to resign was not his refusal to accept the fact of war
and the responsibility involved in it, but his desire
to preserve a free hand in criticism, to be free to state
the case against British diplomacy and to criticise the
Government. Already the cry of national solidarity
was being used to stifle criticism, and there were some
among the working-class leaders who, in the first flush
of their new-found patriotism, were inclined to accept
the muzzle that capitalism was not slow to thrust
upon their mouths.

Mr. MacDonald's resignation and other indications
made it plain that the majority of the Parliamentary
Labour Party had thrown in their lot with the war
and the Government. The Labour Party Executive,
on the other hand, and the Workers' Emergency
Committee had urged concentration on relief work,
and had said nothing about the war as such. The
division of opinion was first publicly proclaimed when

OUTBREAK OF WAR 33

the National Administrative Council of the Independent
Labour Party, which is the largest Socialist society in
the country, launched its manifesto on August 13.
This document must be quoted in part, as it is the
only authoritative expression of opinion against the
war that this country has produced. It begins with
a long denunciation of British foreign policy, of the
Triple Entente, of the doctrine of the balance of power,
and of the race of armaments. It continues with an
attack on secret diplomacy, and points out the horror
and waste that war involves. It then ends by reaffirm-
ing its faith in internationalism and Socialism in the
following terms :

The war conflagration envelops Europe : up to the
last moment we laboured to prevent the blaze. The
nation must now watch for the first opportunity for
effective intervention.

As for the future, we must begin to prepare our minds
for the difficult and dangerous complications that will
arise at the conclusion of the war.

The people must everywhere resist such territorial
aggression and national abasement as will pave the way
for fresh wars ; and throughout Europe the workers
must press for frank and honest diplomatic policies, con-
trolled by themselves, for the suppression of militarism
and the establishment of the united states of Europe,
thereby advancing toward the world's peace. Unless
these steps are taken Europe, after the present calamity,
will be still more subject to the domination of militarism,
and increasingly liable to be drenched with blood.

We are told that international Socialism is dead, that
all our hopes and ideals are wrecked by the fire and pestil-
ence of European war. It is not true.

Out of the darkness and the depth we hail our working-
class comrades of every land. Across the roar of guns,
we send sympathy and greeting to the German Socialists.

D

34 LABOUR AND THE

They have laboured unceasingly to promote good relations
with Britain, as we with Germany. They are no enemies
of ours but faithful friends.

In forcing this appalling crime upon the nations, it is
the rulers, the diplomats, the militarists who have sealed
their doom. In tears of blood and bitterness the greater
democracy will be born. With steadfast faith we greet
the future : our cause is holy and imperishable, and the
labour of our hands has not been in vain.

Long live Freedom and Fraternity ! Long live Inter-
national Socialism !

The Independent Labour Party was the only
Socialist body that took a definite line against the war.
The second large Socialist society, the British Socialist
Party, decided, through its executive, to support the
war, though subsequent conferences of the members
have made it more than doubtful whether this support
reflected the view of the rank and file. The Fabian
Society, true to its traditions, made no pronouncement,
and confined itself to taking an active part in suggesting
measures for the relief of distress. The Trade Unions,
too, remained for a time silent : to their action in the
crisis we shall refer later.

Through the latter half of August the Labour bodies
were mainly occupied in trying to adjust themselves
to the new economic situation. It was not until the
end of the month that any important new step was
taken in defining the Labour attitude to the war.
The Government and the Opposition together, under
the terms of the party truce, decided to initiate a
parliamentary recruiting campaign, and the Labour
members were invited to take part. The majority of
them accepted this invitation, and it became necessary,
if the Party was to act as a whole, that the endorsement
of the National Executive of the Labour Party should

OUTBREAK OF WAR 35

be obtained. An emergency meeting of the National
Executive was held on August 29, and the following
resolution was agreed to, though it is clear that there
was considerable difference of opinion. The terms of
the resolution seem to imply that the Labour members
had already practically committed the Party.

That in view of the serious situation created by the
European war the executive committee of the Labour
Party agrees with the policy of the ^Parliamentary party
in joining in the campaign to strengthen the British Army,
and agrees to place the central office organisation at the
disposal of the campaign, and further recommends the
affiliated bodies to give all possible local support.

Mr. Arthur Henderson, who was soon afterwards
made a Privy Councillor, was accordingly appointed,
together with the Prime Minister and Mr. Bonar Law,
as a President of the Parliamentary Recruiting Com-
mittee, while Mr. James Parker, Mr. F. W. Goldstone,
and Mr. J. Pointer were also placed on the Committee.

This decision naturally gave rise to considerable
discussion, opposition to participation in an inter-
party recruiting campaign being by no means confined
to those who were opposed to the war. It was widely
held, even among those who thought that Labour
ought to appeal for recruits, that it would be better for
the Labour bodies either to run a separate recruiting
campaign of their own, or to leave sections and in-
dividuals to take action on their own responsibility.
There were many who held that recruiting was no
business of Labour as such, and still more who felt
unable to appear on the same platform with members
of capitalist parties.

The duty of Labour, these dissentients held, was to
safeguard the interests of the workers. A capitalist

36 LABOUR AND THE

Government could not be expected all of a sudden to
change its spots, and there would therefore be need
for continual vigilance and criticism not only in Parlia-
ment, but more especially up and down the country.
It was felt by many that such criticism would be
impossible from a common platform, and that the
working class would only stultify itself by sinking its
identity. A certain number of the Labour M.P.'s,
including the I.L.P. members, and a greater proportion
of Labour leaders outside Parliament, have acted in
accordance with this view.

It does indeed seem absurd to suppose that the
class-struggle can be altogether eclipsed by any national
crisis. A national crisis means that the nation has
many difficult problems to face, and a capitalist
Government, left to itself, is hardly likely to face them
in a manner agreeable to the workers. Surely at all
costs the forces of Labour should have preserved their
identity : but participation in an inter-party recruiting
campaign was hardly the best way of doing this. Still
less so, it would seem, is participation in a Coalition
Cabinet : yet to this, too, Labour has at last come.1

The decision of the Parliamentary Labour Party,
however, mattered the less in this case, as Parliament
is clearly not an important body in time of war.
Despite the immense mass of ill-digested legislation
which the war has produced, it is nonsense to pretend
that Parliament has gained in prestige during the last
six months. Emergency legislation has not, in fact,
emanated from Parliament at all : Parliament has

1 When Mr. Henderson was invited to join the Coalition Govern-
ment, he placed the proposal before a meeting of Labour members,
which actually rejected it. It was subsequently carried by a
majority at a joint meeting with the Executive of the Labour
Party.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 37

abrogated in favour of the Cabinet. The result has
been that, more nakedly than ever, the course of
legislation has been determined by an open conflict
of economic forces. The Cabinet has proposed ; the
final decision has depended on the amount of pressure
which conflicting interests have been able to apply.
Thus, the Stock Exchange and the bankers at once
secured full protection : Labour, on the other hand,
having foolishly begun by signing away its economic
power, has only gained small concessions after infinite
trouble and at the cost of receding from its original
attitude.

What really matters to Labour, in times of war no
less than of peace, is to keep its economic power
undiminished. This means that the industrial organ-
isation must be kept in repair, and that there must be
no slackening of effort in the industrial field. Having
sketched the history of Labour's changing attitude to
the war itself, more especially in the political sphere,
I come now to the action taken by Labour on the
industrial field.

There are two bodies which attempt to co-ordinate
the work of the Trade Unions in the economic sphere,
the Trades Union Congress, which has over three million
members in its affiliated organisations, and the General
Federation of Trade Unions, which has about one
million, in most cases also affiliated to the Trades Union
Congress. Only the second of these is affiliated to the
International Federation of Trade Unions. The Trades
Union Congress is administered by a Parliamentary
Committee, and the General Federation by a Manage-
ment Committee. Both these Committees have issued
manifestos on the war.

The manifesto of the Management Committee of

38 LABOUR AND THE

the General Federation of Trade Unions is important
because that body is in touch with the international
Trade Union movement. It begins by denning its
attitude to the war as such, and concludes that " the
responsibility for the war does not rest upon the
policy or conduct of Great Britain."

Having declared itself convinced of the justice of
the war, it proceeds to discuss the economic problems
that arise out of it.

Not less imperative than the problems of national
defence are those problems which affect the political and
economic life of the State during the war, and which will
continue to affect it long after the war is over. The con-
sideration of these does not imply hostility or lack of
patriotism : it simply indicates foresight, and a desire to
turn the extraordinary circumstances of the war to national
account.

The manifesto goes on to point out the significance
of the newly assumed Government control of transport
and of the fixing of maximum food prices : " The
impossibilities of years became actualities in an hour
when the alternative was national disaster." It
criticises the Government's relief measures as utterly
inadequate, demands reasonable subsistence wages
for soldiers and sailors and their dependents, useful
work for the workless, and the co - ordination of
charitable funds. It presses especially for Government
aid to the Trade Unions which are affected adversely
by the crisis. In short, it makes some attempt to
sketch an industrial programme for Labour during the
war, identical in most respects with the policy pursued
by the War Emergency : Workers' Committee, with
which I deal in a later chapter. At the same time,
while it emphasises its connection with the Interna-

OUTBREAK OF WAR 39

tional, and the fact that " it is, and always has been,
on the side of international as well as industrial peace,"
it supports the war, and pronounces Great Britain
blameless in a far less uncertain manner than any other
Labour manifesto had then dared to do.

The larger industrial body, the Trades Union Con-
gress, as represented, or possibly as misrepresented,
through its Parliamentary Committee, issued its
" Manifesto to the Trade Unionists of the Country "
at the beginning of September. This document must
be quoted in full.

GENTLEMEN — The Trade Union Congress Parliamentary
Committee, at their meeting held yesterday, had under
consideration the serious position created by the European
war and the duty which Trade Unionists, in common with
the community in general, owe to themselves and the
country of which they are citizens.

They were especially gratified at the manner in which
the Labour Party in the House of Commons had responded
to the appeal made to all political parties to give their
co-operation in securing the enlistment of men to defend
the interests of their country, and heartily endorse the
appointment upon the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
of four members of the party, and the placing of the
services of the national agent at the disposal of that com-
mittee to assist in carrying through its secretarial work.

The Parliamentary Committee are convinced that one
important factor in the present European struggle has to
be borne in mind, so far as our own country is concerned —
namely, that in the event of the voluntary system of
military service failing the country in this its time of need,
the demand for a national system of compulsory military
service will not only be made with redoubled vigour, but
may prove to be so persistent and strong as to become
irresistible. The prospect of having to face conscription,
with its permanent and heavy burden upon the financial
resources of the country, and its equally burdensome effect

40 LABOUR AND THE

upon nearly the whole of its industries, should in itself
stimulate the manhood of the nation to come forward in
its defence, and thereby demonstrate to the world that a
free people can rise to the supreme heights of a great
sacrifice without the whip of conscription.

Another factor to be remembered in this crisis of our
nation's history, and most important of all so far as Trade
Unionists and Labour in general are concerned, is the fact
that upon the result of the struggle in which this country
is now engaged rest the preservation and maintenance of
free and unfettered democratic government, which in its
international relationships has in the past been recognised,
and must unquestionably in the future prove to be the
best guarantee for the preservation of the peace of the
world.

The mere contemplation of the overbearing and brutal
methods to which people have to submit under a govern-
ment controlled by a military autocracy — living, as it
were, continuously under the threat and shadow of war
— should be sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of the
nation in resisting any attempt to impose similar con-
ditions upon countries at present free from military
despotism.

But if men have a duty to perform in the common interest
of the State, equally the State owes a duty to those of its
citizens who are prepared — and readily prepared — to
make sacrifices in its defence and for the maintenance of
its honour. Citizens called upon voluntarily to leave
their employment and their homes for the purpose of under-
taking military duties have a right to receive at the hands
of the State a reasonable and assured recompense, not so
much for themselves as for those who are dependent upon
them, and no single member of the community would do
otherwise than uphold a Government which in such an
important and vital matter took a liberal and even generous
view of its responsibilities toward those citizens who come
forward to assist in the defence of their country.

We respectfully commend this suggestion to the favour-
able consideration of the Government of the day.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 41

Long life to the free institutions of all democratically-
governed countries !

Yours faithfully, the Parliamentary Committee,

J. A. SEDDON W. MOSSES.

(Chairman). J. W. OGDEN.

W. J. DAVIS J. SEXTON.

(Vice-Chairman). A. SMITH.

A. EVANS. H. SMITH.

H. GOSLING. J. B. WILLIAMS.

J. HILL. J. E. WILLIAMS.

J. JENKINS. C. W. BOWERMAN
W. MATKIN. (Secretary).

Thus, the Trades Union Congress, like the General
Federation of Trade Unions, pronounces unhesitatingly
in favour of the war, without even the reservations
contained in every manifesto issued by the various
Socialist bodies. It whole - heartedly endorses the
Labour participation in the Parliamentary Recruiting
Committee, and seems undisturbed by economic con-
siderations.

This manifesto, it will be noticed, deals only with
recruiting. We have now to sketch the action taken
by the Parliamentary Committee and by the Trade
Unions in their own sphere of industrial activity.

The Trades Union Congress was to have been held
at Portsmouth in September ; but on August 13 the
Parliamentary Committee issued a notice that it was
" postponed for a short time." In fact, it was can-
celled altogether. That is to say, just when Labour
problems of every sort were bound to become acute,
the one representative body co-ordinating the Trade
Union forces was abolished by order of the Trade
Union leaders themselves.

Doubtless, the reason advanced was that a still

42 LABOUR AND THE

more representative body, in which the political and
the industrial sides of the movement were co-ordinated,
had been constituted specially to deal with the War
Emergency. Doubtless, too, it was feared that the
Congress might fall out about the war, and so split the
movement just when unity was essential. But neither
of these reasons ought to have weighed against the
paramount need to keep the rank and file awake to
industrial problems. Though the War Emergency :
Workers' National Committee covers a wider field
than the Trades Union Congress, it is not a more
representative body : it is a self-appointed council of
leaders, and not a democratically chosen body of
delegates representing the rank and file. Such a
Congress ought to have been summoned, if not last
September, at any rate as soon as possible, to formulate
a common policy on such questions as overtime, Trade
Union regulations, and the like. These are peculiarly
Trade Union problems with which the Congress would
have been far better fitted to deal than a composite
body like the Workers' National Committee. As
Mr. Mellor and myself wrote, with only too much
foresight, in the Daily Herald of August 20 :

At any moment the Government and the capitalists
whom they represent will be able to abrogate all the laws
on the plea of " national emergency." If Labour continues
throughout the war to allow gains won by industrial
warfare in times of international peace to be filched from
it, it is laying up a store of misery and hardship in the
future. All the old battles will have to be fought over
again, and, instead of being further on the road to emanci-
pation, Labour will have lost ground.

None the less, the Congress was cancelled, and the
pledge that it should be held at the earliest possible

OUTBREAK OF WAR 43

moment was never redeemed.1 Much excellent work
has been done, as we shall see, by the Workers' National
Committee ; but the rank and file of the Unions have
never been consulted or invited to take counsel together.
A Trades Union Congress is, however, to be held in
September 1915, and it is to be hoped that here at
last the rank and file will be given a chance of formulat-
ing the policy they desire the leaders to pursue. The
character of the demonstrations in the big industrial
centres convened by the Workers' National Committee
indicates that they are likely to press for a less acqui-
escent policy. It may, however, well be the case that
months of irritant tactics on the part of the employers
and the Government have changed their temper, and
that, had they been consulted last August, they would
have taken much the same line as their leaders took
in their name.

Be that as it may, the declaration of war was the
signal for an " industrial truce." The important
strikes which were in progress when war broke out
were quickly settled, generally without consultation
of the rank and file. The two strikes of agricultural
labourers in North Essex and in Herefordshire were
settled on August 4 by the granting of the men's terms :
a few days later the impending lock-out covering the
whole Scottish coalfield was averted by the decision
of the owners to withdraw temporarily their claim
for a reduction of wages, without prejudice to their

1 This scrapping of national Labour machinery has not been
confined to the Trades Union Congress. Early in the war, the
Daily Herald was forced to become a weekly, and in June the Daily
Citizen, in which hundreds of thousands of pounds of Trade Union
money had been sunk, came to an inglorious end. Though the
Citizen never succeeded in expressing the true spirit of the Labour
movement, the loss is a calamity. It is to be hoped that the Herald
will be able again to become a daily later on.

44 LABOUR AND THE

action in the future. The general strike in the building
trades at Oxford was settled by a reference to arbitra-
tion, while in the important and difficult dispute between
the Mersey Docks Board and its employees work was
resumed without a settlement, the question at issue
being held over till the end of the war. Finally, the
long lock-out in the London building industry was
settled without consultation of the men during the
second week in August, the questions still in dispute
being referred to the National Conciliation Board. Of
the conflicts actually in progress, only in a few in-
significant cases was there no immediate settlement.

Not only were actual disputes terminated : impend-
ing forward movements were also cancelled.

A special conference, representing the Parliamentary
Committee of the Trades Union Congress, the Manage-
ment Committee of the General Federation of Trade
Unions, and the Executive Committee of the Labour
Party met on August 24 and passed the following
among other recommendations :

That an immediate effort be made to terminate all
existing trade disputes, whether strikes or lock-outs, and
whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war
period a serious attempt should be made by all concerned
to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a
strike or lock-out.

The other resolutions were in the nature of requests
for Government action for the prevention of unemploy-
ment by the stopping of overtime, and for the provision
of adequate relief funds to meet the unemployment
that could not be avoided. To these requests I shall
recur in a subsequent chapter : the point I desire to
make here is that the industrial truce was declared,
not conditionally on the granting of these demands,

OUTBREAK OF WAR 45

but absolutely without conditions. The demands were
only made subsequently in the form of requests, with
no sanction of economic power behind them.

Moreover, many of the Unions issued special circulars
to their branches and passed Executive resolutions
deprecating strikes in war time. On all hands, an
industrial truce was declared, on the initiative more
of the men than of the employers. The number of
new industrial disputes fell from 99 in July 1914 to
15 in August, as compared with 109 and 102 in 1913.
During the first seven months of 1914 there were 836
disputes, involving 423,000 workers : during the last
five months there were only 137, involving only 23,000,
and at the end of December there were only 10 very
small disputes in progress.

Moreover, the railwaymen who had just put forward
a national programme, and who were negotiating with
the Companies for an improved scheme of conciliation,
accepted — or rather their Executive accepted in their
name — a temporary continuation of the old unsatis-
factory conciliation scheme, and consented to drop the
National Programme for the period of the war. The
autumn of 1914, which had seemed likely to be a
period of great industrial unrest, was, in fact, a period
of almost unbroken tranquillity.

A glance at the records of the War Emergency :
Workers' Committee will show that this was by no
means because there was a complete absence of dis-
content. Many employers, mostly in the smaller
trades and in commerce, took advantage of the situation
to reduce salaries or staffs, while the Committee had
continually to protest against the unfair treatment of
the workers by contractors in the service of the Govern-
ment. Hut-building and clothing scandals were par-

46 LABOUR AND THE

ticularly numerous, and a Trade Union official went
so far as to say that " if there is a contractor who is
particularly infamous as a sweater, the War Office
can be trusted to give him a large order."

These cases are, however, independent of the
situation in the staple industries, in which the em-
ployers were only too glad for the most part to accept
the industrial truce. For, as the exploited class,
Labour is necessarily the aggressor hi the war with
capitalism, and an industrial truce therefore means,
as a rule, that the employer gets what he wants — the
preservation of the status quo. As things turned out,
he got in this instance a great deal more ; for hi many
important branches of industry the effect of the war
was an unexpectedly large increase in profits, while,
on the other hand, as we shall see, the growth of prices
left the workers far worse off than they had been
before the war.

As I shall explain in a later chapter, these causes
led, early in 1915, to a partial resumption of industrial
hostilities. I am here concerned only with Labour's
action at the beginning of the war. How far was
Labour right in declaring an industrial truce last
August ?

I gave, in the last chapter, a general view of the
rights and duties of Labour in time of war. We have
now to ask how far the actual course pursued last July
was in accordance with the principles there laid down.

What is most evident is that, economically as well
as politically, Labour was taken altogether by surprise.
If the deliberations of the International had given the
workers but doubtful guidance for their political
action in the crisis, there had been still less an attempt
to forecast the industrial situation that would be

OUTBREAK OF WAR 47

created or the action that Labour ought to pursue.
We have already noticed the ambiguity of the advice
given by the International on this point : and it is
clear that the recommendations there made were not
based on any intelligent forecast of the probable
position. Industrially, as well as politically, the mind
of the workers was in a state of bewilderment when
war broke out.

The supremely important decision as to Labour's
industrial policy was therefore taken on the impulse
of the moment, without much forethought or fore-
sight. For the most part the Unions contented them-
selves with declaring an industrial truce without any
attempt to lay down the conditions of the truce. They
made no provision for taking action in the event of an
undue inflation of either profits or prices, and still
less did they attempt to obtain concessions in return
for the concessions they themselves were making.
They did not go to the Government and the employers
and say, " If you wish us to keep the peace these are
our terms," though this was the course pursued by the
various capitalist groups whose interests were affected
by the war. They said, " We will keep the peace,"
and then went to the Government cap in hand.

It is, of course, easy to prophesy after the event,
and we can readily see now that the effect of this
policy has been, in the long run, to create industrial
disturbance rather than to prevent it. A firm stand
at the outset might well have modified profoundly
the Government's industrial policy. It is, however,
not difficult to find extenuating circumstances. The
Labour leaders had no idea what was going to happen :
they feared immense dislocation of employment and
a consequent weakening of economic power. Some of

48 LABOUR AND THE

them, no doubt, feared that an attempt to stand up to
the Government might end in disastrous defeat for
Labour.

In the main, however, they were certainly actuated
much less by this fear than by an instinctive, if mis-
taken, idea of patriotism. They desired to see the
country united, and they were prepared to make
concessions in order to secure unity. In their haste
they unfortunately made their concessions without
first obtaining corresponding concessions from the
other side. This initial abdication is largely responsible
for subsequent bickerings, and is a lamentable chapter
in the history of British Trade Unionism.

What, then, had they a right to demand ? I do
not suggest that they ought to have conducted a great
forward movement for better conditions or for the
overthrow of capitalism. But surely they should have
demanded, and insisted on, guarantees that their
economic position would not be worsened by the war,
that prices would be kept down, or, as an alternative,
wages raised, and that the Trade Unions would be
taken into the Government's confidence and used as
the official means of dealing with the problems that
arose in connection with the workers. Had they
insisted on this last demand, the neglect and con-
tumely which have since been poured upon the Unions
by the Government would have been impossible.

Moreover, there is another concession which Labour
has clearly the right to demand as the price of its
co-operation. No sooner was war declared than
private capitalism was found inadequate for its conduct,
and the State was forced to step in either to save the
capitalists or to secure efficient service. Where such
extensions of State interference are to the advantage

OUTBREAK OF WAR 49

of Labour, the workers have surely a right to demand
that capitalist control shall not be restored intact at
the end of the war.

I have given reasons for thinking the entry of Labour
into the inter -party recruiting campaign wrong in
any case ; but the decision to take part in it should
at least have been combined with insistence on these
demands and on the right to urge them from the inter-
party platforms. This, I believe, was the policy
recommended by the British Socialist Party.

The industrial truce, then, was declared uncon-
ditionally. But strikes were not the only form of
Labour activity that the war brought to a standstill.
Last summer the Trade Unions were engaged on
several important schemes for setting their own house
in order. Most of these schemes seem to be in abey-
ance, at least for the period of the war, though an
important fusion of Unions in the clothing industry
has been accomplished, and the engineering and
shipbuilding Unions have now resumed the attempt
to formulate a scheme of closer unity. Two projects
of the greatest importance must be mentioned here —
the Triple Alliance and the proposed transport and
general labour amalgamation.

Before the war meetings were being held for the
elaboration of a policy of united action among miners,
railwaymen, and transport workers, numbering not
far short of a million and a half of organised workers.
Nothing has been heard of this project since the war
broke out, and, in view of the independent negotiations
that have been carried on since by miners and railway-
men, there seems to be a danger that nothing will
come of it. It is probable that there are some among
the men's leaders who would welcome its collapse, as

E

50 LABOUR AND THE

they fear the revolutionary possibilities of such a
movement ; but of this it is difficult to speak without
very intimate inside knowledge.

The second scheme is one for the fusion of all the
very numerous competing, overlapping, and sectional
Unions of transport workers and general labourers into
a single great national organisation. Even before the
war there were signs of a desire to side-track this
proposal ; the effect of the war emergency seems to be
that it is shelved altogether. There are of course
difficulties in the way of carrying through such a
scheme completely during the war ; 1 but it would
at least be quite possible to use the war period for the
formulation of a completely satisfactory scheme, and
to bring into actual being as a temporary expedient
a close type of federation which would make the
actual amalgamation later on a mere matter of form.

Even if it is only for the period of the war, the
abandonment of these schemes is a calamity. It is
clear that the restoration of normal industrial con-
ditions at the " outbreak of peace " will be a difficult
and a perilous business, in which Labour will need all
its wits and all its strength. In this coming struggle
the Triple Alliance of miners, railwaymen, and trans-
port workers ought to have provided the nucleus of a
united Labour army, round which the Unions in other
industries could rally. The transport and general
labour amalgamation, too, would be of the greatest
importance in such a situation. The less skilled
workers will have most intricate problems of their
own to face at the close of the war, and it is of the

1 For instance, the law demands a two-thirds majority of the
whole membership for all Trade Union fusions. This it would in
some cases be impossible to get owing to the absence of members
at the war.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 51

greatest importance, both to themselves and to the
skilled workers, that they should be strongly organised.
If the present chaos of conflicting Unions still exists
when peace returns, it will be almost impossible for
them to present a united front to the capitalists.
Labour should at all costs push on with its schemes
for better organisation during the war, conscious that
with peace will come its time of supreme trial.

If, under the influence of a sort of war-panic, Labour
has been careless of its industrial organisation at home,
if the Trades Union Congress has been abandoned and
amalgamation schemes postponed, what has happened
to the international Trade Union organisation ?

Of the International Federation of Trade Unions
little has been heard since the outbreak of war. A
letter written by the Secretary, C. Legien of Germany,
on August 27 to Mr. Appleton, of the General Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, was published in the October
Federationist, together with Mr. Appleton's reply.
Herr Legien expresses his determination to keep in
touch with the Trade Unions, " at least in neutral
countries," protests against the accusations of in-
humanity made against the Germans, and asserts that
the action of the Social Democrats in voting for the war
credits " cannot by those in other lands be regarded as
a reproach, if this fact is borne in mind, that Germany
found itself at war with both Russia and France."

" In this matter," he continues, " the Social Democratic
Parties of other lands, which have greater Parliamentary
influence than we, have done just the same. In any
case, our decision cannot be so interpreted that we have
abandoned the ideals of the international significance of
the Labour movement."

This, however, tells us little about international

52 LABOUR AND THE

Trade Unionism. In fact, the only important move-
ment in connection with the International Federation
was made in February, when the representatives of the
French General Confederation of Labour and the
General Federation of Trade Unions met in London
and sent a joint letter to Mr. Samuel Gompers, President
of the American Federation of Labour, asking him to
use his influence to secure the removal of the head-
quarters of the International Federation of Trade
Unions to a neutral country, preferably Switzerland.
Mr. Gompers wrote to Herr Legien in this sense ; but
up to the present there has been no result. A special
conference has been summoned to Holland to consider
the question ; but it seems doubtful if this will be
at all representative. The allied nations are opposed
to the conference, and urge immediate removal of the
headquarters to Switzerland. So far at any rate as
this country is concerned, the affairs of the International
Federation of Trade Unions are for the time being
suspended.

Nor are there many signs of activity on the part
of the International Federations in special industries
whose headquarters are also, in the majority of cases,
situated in Germany. The only exception is the
International Transport Workers' Federation, whose
Secretary, Herr Jochade, has kept regularly hi touch
with Great Britain. An interesting account of his
views appeared in the Federationist for December 1914.

At the outbreak of war the International Transport
Workers' Federation was about to call a conference
consisting of one delegate from each nation to draw up
a revised constitution. This, Herr Jochade says, will be
done as soon as peace is restored. The following further
extract from the Federationist is of especial interest :

OUTBREAK OF WAR 53

Jochade, or one of his colleagues, says that it was the
impression that the international machinery should have
been used to attempt to prevent the present awful cata-
strophe, but states that the International Federation exists
expressly for economic rather than political action. There
is a comment to the effect that we had better honestly
state that our international movement had not the political,
and even less the Trade Union, influence to prevent the
war, for which all the nations had been preparing for years.

Clearly the writer is here thinking of the general
strike against war which has been so long suggested in
Socialist and Syndicalist circles. This was the policy
which was put forward by M. Herve before the Inter-
national Socialist Congress of 1907 ; this was the
subject of the resolution tabled by the French General
Confederation of Labour for discussion at the Inter-
national Trade Union Congress, and ruled out of order
by the Committee : this is the action which Mr. Keir
Hardie has long been advocating in this country.
Now that we have had actual experience of the way in
which Europe goes to war, it seems unlikely that the
suggestion will be revived ; but it is worth while to
make a few comments upon it.

The general strike against war is clearly a political
rather than an industrial act, in so far as the two can
be distinguished. It was on this ground that the
International Federation of Trade Unions referred
the suggestion to the International Social Bureau, as
belonging rather to its province. In fact, where in
the past, as in Belgium, a general strike has been
declared for a political object, the body controlling
it has been rather the Socialist Party than the Trade
Union movement. It was in pursuance of this idea
that the British Section, in accordance with the decision
of the International Socialist Bureau and of the Labour

54 LABOUR AND THE

Party Conference, sent a circular letter to all affiliated
societies in 1912, including all the Unions affiliated to
the Labour Party, asking for their views on the following
question :

Are you in favour of the organised Working -Class
Movements of all countries being asked to come to a
mutual agreement whereby in the event of war being
threatened between any two or more countries, the workers
of those countries would hold themselves prepared to try
to prevent it by a mutual and simultaneous stoppage of
work in the countries affected ?

It appears that practically no answers were received,
and that there was not the smallest indication of willing-
ness to proceed along the lines suggested. It is one of
the ironies of fate that the whole question was to have
been rediscussed, in the light of similar enquiries in all
countries, at the International Socialist Congress in
August 1914. The last Congress, held in 1910, rejected
the motion by Mr. Keir Hardie and M. Vaillant in
favour of a general strike against war by 131 votes to
51, and " in the resolution which was finally carried laid
special emphasis on the need for political action, so that
the workers, by controlling the machinery of Govern-
ment, would have the deciding voice in the matter." 1

There is, in short, save among the French Syndical-
ists, no indication of any general desire that the policy
of the general strike against war should be adopted.
I can only refer to what I have said in an earlier book : 2
" The strike against war may be ruled out at once as a
sheer impossibility."

I have dealt with the manifestos published by the
various sections of the Labour movement at the time

1 Extract from the covering letter sent with its questions by
the British Section in 1912.

* The World of Labour, p. 147.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 55

of the outbreak of war. It remains to continue the
series with one or two important documents of later
date. On October 15, " to clear away once and for
all misconceptions which have been circulated as to
the attitude of the British Labour movement," the
following manifesto was issued, signed by most of
the Labour Members of Parliament, by the Parlia-
mentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress,
by the Management Committee of the General Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, and by other Labour leaders :

The British Labour movement has always stood for
peace. During the last decade it has made special efforts
to promote friendly relations between the peoples of Great
Britain and Germany. Deputations of Labour representa-
tives have taken messages of goodwill across the North
Sea despite the obstacles to international working-class
solidarity which existed. In turn, German Labour leaders
on similar missions have been welcomed in this country
by the organised workers. A strong hope was beginning
to dawn that out of this intercourse would grow a permanent
peaceful understanding between the two nations.

But this hope has been destroyed, at least for a time,
by the deliberate act of the ruler of the military Empire
of Germany. The refusal of Germany to the proposal
made by England that a conference of the European Powers
should deal with the dispute between Austria and Servia,
the peremptory domineering ultimatum to Russia, and
the rapid preparations to invade France, all indicate that
the German military caste were determined on war if the
rest of Europe could not be cowed into submission by other
means. The wanton violation of the neutrality of Belgium
was proof that nothing, not even national honour and
good faith, was to stand between Germany and the realisa-
tion of its ambitions to become the dominant military
power of Europe, with the Kaiser the dictator over all.

The Labour Party in the House of Commons, face to
face with this situation, recognised that Great Britain,

56 LABOUR AND THE

having exhausted the resources of peaceful diplomacy,
was bound in honour, as well as by treaty, to resist by arms
the aggression of Germany. The party realised that if
England had not kept her pledges to Belgium, and had
stood aside, the victory of the German army would have
been probable, and the victory of Germany would mean
the death of democracy in Europe.

Working-class aspirations for greater political and
economic power would be checked, thwarted, and crushed,
as they have been in the German Empire. Democratic
ideas cannot thrive in a State where militarism is dominant ;
and the military state with a subservient and powerless
working class is the avowed political ideal of the German
ruling caste.

The Labour Party, therefore, as representing the most
democratic elements in the British nation, has given its
support in Parliament to the measures necessary to enable
this country to carry on the struggle effectively. It has
joined in the task of raising an army large enough to meet
the national need by taking active part in the recruiting
campaign organised by the various Parliamentary parties.
Members of the party have addressed numerous meetings
throughout the country for this purpose, and the central
machinery of the party has been placed at the service of
the recruiting campaign. This action has been heartily
endorsed by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade
Union Congress, which represents the overwhelming
majority of the Trade Unionists of the country. The
Committee, in a manifesto on the war, states :

The mere contemplation of the overbearing and brutal
methods to which people have to submit under a govern-
ment controlled by a military autocracy — living, as it
were, continuously under the threat and shadow of war —
should be sufficient to arouse the enthusiasm of the nation
in resisting any attempt to impose similar conditions upon
countries at present free from military despotism.

The policy of the British Labour movement has been
dictated by a fervent desire to save Great Britain and

OUTBREAK OF WAR 57

Europe from the evils that would follow the triumph of
military despotism. Until the power which has pillaged
and outraged Belgium and the Belgians, and plunged
nearly the whole of Europe into the awful misery, suffering,
and horror of war, is beaten, there can be no peace. While
the conflict lasts England must be sustained both without
and within ; combatants and non-combatants must be
supported to the utmost. The Labour movement has
done and is doing its part in this paramount national duty,
confident that the brutal doctrine and methods of German
militarism will fail. When the time comes to discuss the terms
of peace the Labour movement will stand, as it has always
stood, for an international agreement among all civilised
nations that disputes and misunderstandings in the future
shall be settled not by machine guns but by arbitration.

The most notable absentees from the list of
signatories to this document are among the Labour
Members, and include Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Snowden,
Mr. Jowett, and Mr. Keir Hardie. There are certain
names absent from the General Federation of Trade
Unions' list ; but this has probably no significance.
The document seems to represent the almost unanimous
opinion of the Trade Union leaders.

The second important document is a series of
resolutions passed at an informal conference of the
Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations,
held in London on February 14, 1915. France,
Belgium, Russia, and Great Britain were represented,
all sections of the political Socialist and Labour move-
ment in this country being invited.1 The resolutions
were carried unanimously, with the endorsement of
the I.L.P. representatives.

1 The representatives of the French General Confederation of
Labour were only with difficulty persuaded to remain when they
found that representatives of the Trade Union movement in Great
Britain had not been invited.

58 LABOUR AND THE

(i) This conference cannot ignore the profound general
causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product
of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society
and of the policy of colonial dependencies and aggressive
imperialism, against which international Socialism has
never ceased to fight, and in which every government has
its share of responsibility.

The invasion of Belgium and France by the German
armies threatens the very existence of independent nation-
alities, and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In these
circumstances a victory for German imperialism would be
the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty
in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium,
France, and Russia do not pursue the political and economic
crushing of Germany ; they are not at war with the peoples
of Germany and Austria, but only with the governments of
those countries by which they are oppressed. They de-
mand that Belgium shall be liberated and compensated.
They desire that the question of Poland shall be settled
in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, either
in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another State,
or in that of complete independence. They wish that
throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the
Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by
force shall receive the right freely to dispose of themselves.

While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved
to accomplish this task of liberation, the Socialists are
none the less resolved to resist any attempt to transform
this defensive war into a war of conquest, which would
only prepare fresh conflicts, create new grievances, and
subject various peoples more than ever to the double
plague of armaments and war.

Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles
of the International, the members of the conference express
the hope that the working classes of all the different
countries will before long find themselves united again in
their struggle against militarism and capitalist imperialism.
The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for
popular liberty, for unity, independence, and autonomy

OUTBREAK OF WAR 59

of the nations in the peaceful federation of the United
States of Europe and the world.

(2) On the conclusion of the war the working classes
of all the industrial countries must unite in the International
in order to suppress secret diplomacy, put an end to the
interest of militarism and those of the armament makers,
and establish some international authority to settle points of
difference among the nations by compulsory conciliation and
arbitration, and to compel all nations to maintain peace.

(3) The conference protests against the arrest of the
deputies of the Duma, against the suppression of Russian
Socialist papers and the condemnation of their editors,
as well as against the oppression of Finns, Jews, and
Russian and German Poles.

So far as the allied nations are concerned, this is
the nearest approach there has been during the war
to international action among Socialists. Socialists
of some neutral countries have also conferred ; and
it is announced that there will shortly be a representa-
tive meeting, including Socialists of the nations at
war. But, on the whole, the International Socialist
Bureau has been perforce inactive ; nor does the
present bitterness on both sides seem likely to make
its restoration after the war more easy.

Throughout this chapter we have necessarily been
dealing almost entirely with the resolutions and
opinions of leaders. Save by acquiescing in the actions
of the leaders, the rank and file gave no sign of their
view in the earlier months of the war. In later chapters
we shall see a change in this respect, beginning with
the meetings of protest against food prices and the
Clyde strike. It may be that the absence of defi-
nite evidence as to the attitude of the rank and file
during the early months is due largely to the fact that
the workers had no definite attitude. They were

6o

LABOUR AND THE

bewildered, and it took them time to collect their
thoughts.

One piece of evidence that might be useful is un-
fortunately only available in a very incomplete form.
There are no reliable figures showing the total enlist-
ment among Trade Unionists, though the following
table, prepared by the Workers' Emergency Com-
mittee, indicates the position in certain cases some
time ago. It is not stated at what date the figures
were compiled ; but they were laid before the Com-
mittee in February 1915 :

TRADE UNIONISTS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY.

Trade Union.

Members
enlisted.

Average weekly wages.

Beamers, Twisters, etc.

500

283. to 503.

Blastfurnacemen

.

1, 060

323. 6d. to 963.

Boot and Shoe Operatives

2,960

Builders' Labourers, National

Association

I.OOO

253.

Bookbinders and Machine Rulers

500

34S.

Bleachers, Dyers, etc.

.

1,500

305. to 353.

Card and Blowing Room

Opera-

tives ....

. .

400

303. to 353.

Coachmakers

.

I.OOO

403.

Clerks ....

.

500

353. to 403.

Gasworkers and General

14 4.Q<>

1 8s. to 6os.

Ironfounders

.

T>'^J 3

1,400

363. to 433.

National Amalgamated

Union

of Labour

4,500

233. to 403.

Machine Workers

.

650

34S.

Plasterers

250

42S.

Postmen's Federation *

.

10,000

355. (London)

26s. (Provinces)

us. (part-time)

363. rod. (general)

1 The figures for these districts are incomplete.

OUTBREAK OF WAR 61

TRADE UNIONISTS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY — continued

Trade Union.

Members
enlisted.

Average weekly wages.

Railwayman, National Union of

45,000

353. (guards)

503. (drivers)

Shipwrights, etc.

1,000

423. to iocs.

Shop Assistants ....

8,000

275. 6d.

Steel Smelters ....

2,700

253. to ^10

Stevedores

700

453. (minimum)

Teachers

4.500

403. to 1403.

Typographical Association

1,200

305. to 503.

Toolmakers

550

38s.

Vehicle Workers ....

6,000

393. to 563.

Watermen, Lightermen, etc.

250

503.

Workers' Union ....

4,000

In addition to above there must be

added many tens of thousands from

the Transport Trade Unions

Ayrshire Miners ....

1,700

363. to 453.

Bristol Miners ....

150

303. to 353. (with

house and coal)

Derbyshire Miners

3,700

415. 8d.

Cannock Chase Miners

700

403.

Clackmannanshire Miners .

250

405. to 503.

Cleveland Miners

900

323. 6d.

Cumberland Miners .

I.IOO

42S.

Durham Miners ....

30,000

303. to 353. (with

house and coal)

Forest of Dean Miners

450

283.

Lanarkshire Miners .

7,000

35s.

Lancashire and Cheshire Miners l

4,000

323. 6d. to 423.

Leicestershire Miners .

550

403.

Mid and East Lothian Miners .

2,000

375. 6d. to 453.

Northumberland Miners .

10,000

(403. with house

and coal)

North Staffordshire Miners

3.500

303. to 383. gd.

North Wales Miners .

3,000

35S.

Nottingham Miners .

3.500

Old Hill (Staffs) Miners .

360

223. to 35S.

Stirlingshire Miners .

1,000

353. to 403.

South Derbyshire Miners .

400

3OS.

South Wales Miners 1

20,000

26s. 8d. to 6os.

West Lothian Miners

600

243. to 403.

Yorkshire Miners

15,000

323. to loos.

1 The figures for these districts are incomplete.

62 LABOUR AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

These figures were exceedingly incomplete at the
time of publication, as they take account only of the
largest Trade Unions. They are, of course, now far
more incomplete.1 But even so they indicate a very
considerable response from the better-paid workers
to the call for recruits.

If it is inquired what were the motives that led
to this enlistment, it is at once clear from the wages
given in the above table that mercenary considerations
can have had little to do with them. Doubtless, many
men enlisted owing to actual or prospective unemploy-
ment ; but the majority of these were unskilled workers
and many of them non-unionists. The above table
shows that there was a large enlistment among workers
who were not threatened with unemployment and who
were actually earning good wages. To assign their
respective shares to other motives, such as patriotism,
love of change, and love of adventure, is a task beyond
my power. The reader will be in a better position to
estimate the part played by economic causes in facili-
tating recruiting when he has read the next chapter.

1 For instance, the number of enlisted miners according to the
above table is 115,000, whereas according to the Coal Mining
Organisation Committee, 191,170 miners had already enlisted in
February. Many more enlisted in the months immediately following.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

WHEN war broke out, the workers, the capitalists, and
the Government seem to have been equally in the
dark as to its probable effects upon industry. No
one knew what would be its reaction upon the credit
system and on external trade ; no one knew how far
the home demand was likely to suffer contraction ;
no one foresaw the scale on which the war would be
carried on, or the immense demands it would make
upon production. It was, of course, anticipated that
a few industries ministering directly to military needs
would be busy beyond their wont ; but even here
nothing like what has actually happened was expected
in the early days of August. On every side people
made up their minds that there was bound to be a very
severe dislocation of the industrial machine, if not a
complete collapse. The event has in the main falsified
these expectations, though that is far from meaning
that no problem of unemployment has existed or now
exists. What was not realised was that side by side
with unemployment there would soon be the opposite
problem of a shortage of labour.

That is to say, few persons anticipated that Great
Britain would raise its army to anything like the

63

64 THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

present strength, or that anything like the present
amount of stores and munitions would be required.
Armies consume largely even in peace time : under
the conditions of modern warfare their consumption is
enormous. The war is costing us several million
pounds a day, and much of this goes in commodities
which provide work at home. Moreover, the allied
Powers are getting from us a great part of their stores
and munitions.

At the beginning of the war there were a number
of reasons which led every one to expect widespread
unemployment. Chief among these was, no doubt,
the expected collapse of the credit system, which
became to some extent actual in the early days of the
war. Even before this country was actually at war,
there were plentiful signs of impending collapse.
Birmingham, for instance, which produces largely for
export, was already suffering considerably on August 2,
and there was great uneasiness on the Newcastle
coal exchange. It was foreseen that if the mechanism
of international credit suffered even the most tem-
porary collapse, on the one hand foreign orders could
not be delivered and new orders could not come in,
and on the other hand there would almost at once be a
serious shortage of raw materials which would throw
the whole system out of gear. The cotton industry
was, of course, the most seriously affected ; but the
iron and steel trades were also in a bad way, and the
dislocation at once communicated itself to the coal-
mining industry. In the Fifeshire coalfield alone
nearly 20,000 men were said to be workless on August 4.
A few days later the industry and transport services
of Liverpool were almost at a standstill, and the
Yorkshire woollen industry was in a serious state of

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 65

depression. Moreover, in the prevailing uncertainty,
all classes at once began to economise, and the luxury
trades suffered heavily. With the measures taken to
relieve this distress, which fell with exceptional severity
upon women workers, I shall deal in later chapters.
Here I am only concerned to state the position.

In any estimate of the effects of the war on em-
ployment it is necessary to take into account the state
of trade before the war. The following is the summary
given in the Board of Trade Labour Gazette for August
of the position in July 1914 :

Employment in July showed a further decline, but still
remained good on the whole at the end of the month.
There was little change in the building, iron and steel,
tinplate, and engineering trades, but the shipbuilding
trades were not so fully employed, and there was a decrease
in the number of pig-iron furnaces in blast. There was
some recovery in the lace and hosiery trades, but employ-
ment in other branches of the textile industries showed a
further contraction, especially in the cotton trade.

Compared with July 1913, employment showed a
falling-off in most of the principal industries. The decline
was most marked in the pig-iron, iron and steel, cotton
and woollen trades. In the tinplate trade there was a
considerable increase in the number of mills working.

Thus, even before the war, employment was on
the down-grade. The position, however, was serious
only in one instance. The cotton industry, after
experiencing a period of very great prosperity, was
declining rapidly ; and so certain was the prospect of
further contraction that an agreement to limit pro-
duction by extending holidays and working short time
had already been reached between employers and
employed. In other cases, trade was still prosperous,
though there was a decline from the great boom of 1913.

F

66 THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

In the case of the cotton industry, the war brought
instant disaster. The temporary collapse of credit
and, when that cause had been removed, the high
insurance premiums on cargoes stopped the influx of
raw material, while, on the other hand, export became
difficult — for a time almost impossible — and there
was a serious contraction of demand both at home and
abroad. The Indian market, always liable to violent
fluctuations according to the plentifulness of money in
India, was especially affected. Fully 200,000 cotton
operatives were at one time totally unemployed,
and many more were on short time. At the beginning
of September the Weavers' Amalgamation alone
had 88,551 members totally unemployed, while among
Cardroom Operatives the percentage unemployed
varied between 20 and 50. Burnley, which was
producing 75 per cent of its normal output in July,
sank to 25 per cent in August, and even to 20 per cent
in October. This was, no doubt, an extreme case ;
but many other towns were not much better off. For
the earlier months of the war, until the revival of
credit and the fall in insurance rates, the outlook in
Lancashire was gloomy in the extreme.

We are fortunately provided with fairly full figures
on which to form an estimate of the total amount of
unemployment caused by the war. Not only have we
the regular monthly returns of the Board of Trade,
which are often misleading : we have also the special
reports drawn up by the Government in October,
December, and February. These contain figures
covering 4,000,000 workers in industry, showing the
state of employment in the various months. The
following tables refer solely to industry : they cover
the big employers more completely than the small

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

67

ones, and may therefore incline to underestimate the
amount of unemployment ; but in the main the
impression conveyed by them can be relied upon.
No figures are given for August, when the dislocation
was at its worst : but as the August phenomena were
largely temporary, this is really an advantage. They
show the state of affairs, first, before the war ; secondly,
when things and persons began to adjust themselves
to new conditions ; and, subsequently, as more and
more enlistments reduced the displacement of male
labour to less than nothing. The tables exclude
transport, commercial work, and State and municipal
employment, which, if they were included, would
certainly not increase the proportion unemployed.

These figures are most expressive when, as in the
Government's report last October, they are expressed
in actual numbers instead of percentages.

EMPLOYMENT IN JULY, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 1914.

September.

October.

Males.

Females.

Males.

Females.

Still on full time .
On overtime
On short time .
Contraction of employ-
ment ....

Known to have joined
the Forces .
Net displacement ( - ) or
replacement (+)

4,214,000
252,000
I,82O,OOO

714,000

1,203,750

47.250
8lO,OOO

189,000

4,676,000
364,000
I,2II,OOO

749,000

1,392,750
132,750
585,000

139,500

6l6,OOO
- 98,000

iSg.OOO

742,000
- 7,000

139,500

Thus in September, out of about 9,250,000 wage-
earners in industrial occupations, including about
2,250,000 women, 98,000 men and 189,000 women

68

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

were out of work, despite the fact that 616,000 such
men had joined the Forces.

In October the displacement of women's labour
in industrial occupations had only fallen to 139,000,
whereas, though less men were being employed, the
net displacement of male labour had fallen to 7000.

First, then, it is obvious that after the first month
or so the actual hardship was very unevenly dis-
tributed between men and women. Loss of work drove
many thousands of men into the army : the displaced
women, on the other hand, were thrown back on
various forms of charity or relief. With the measures
taken to provide such relief I shall deal later : I am
here concerned only with the fact that there was an
enormous displacement of women's labour. This was
largely due to the depression in most branches of the
textile and clothing industries, in which the greater
number of women wage-earners ard employed.

Let us turn now to the corresponding figures for
December and February, expressed this time as per-
centages of the total volume of industrial employment
last July.

STATE OF EMPLOYMENT AT VARIOUS DATES SINCE THE OUTBREAK

OF WAR COMPARED WITH STATE OF EMPLOYMENT IN JULY.

(Numbers employed in July = ioo.)

Males.

Females.

Sept.
1914.

Oct.
1914.

Dec.
1914.

Feb.
1915-

Sept.
1914.

Oct.
1914.

Dec.

1914.

Feb.
1915-

I. ed in July .
S' . ^.i full time
Oi. overtime . . .
On short time .
Contraction of numbers em

ICO

60.2

H

26.0

10.2

100

66.8
5- a
'7-3

10.7

100

65.8

12.8

10. 5
10.9

ICO

68.4
13-8
6.0

n.8

no

53-5

2.1
36.0

8.4

IOO

61.9

5-9
26.0

6.2

IOO

66.6

10.8
19.4

3-2

IOO

75-o

IO.Q

12.6

*«3

Known by employers to have
joined the Forces
Net displacement (-) or re-
placement (+)

8.8
-1.4

10.6
-0.1

'3-3
4-2.4

15-4
+3.8

-8.4

-6.2

-3.2

-1.5

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 69

We can see from this table that, whereas there was
a net displacement of o.i per cent (or 7000) male
wage-earners in industry in October, there were
actually 2.4 per cent (or 168,000) more such wage-
earners either in employment or known to be with the
Forces in December, and 3.6 per cent (or more than a
quarter of a million) in February 1915. Among
women, the contraction of labour in the same group of
occupations fell from 6.2 per cent (or 139,500) in
October to 3.2 per cent (or roughly 75,000) in December,
and 1.5 per cent (or roughly 35,000) in February.
Since then there has undoubtedly been a very great
reduction of unemployment, and in addition new sources
of both male and female labour have been tapped.

If we ask whence the new male labour has come,
the answer is that it has come partly from the absorp-
tion of those who were unemployed last July — of
whom, it should be observed, the above tables take no
account — and partly by the entry of new labour into
the industries concerned. This has taken the form
both of a return to work of men who had ceased to be
so employed, and of a transference of labour from
commercial and other occupations to industry. The
first of these applies with even greater force in the case
of women employed in certain industries : in woollen
work, for instance, a good many married women have
returned to their old occupations.

The monthly returns published in the Board of
Trade Labour Gazette indicate the nature of the surplus
labour available for absorption in the various industries
last July, and the extent to which it has actually been
absorbed. The facts are clearest in the case of the
trades compulsorily insured against unemployment
under Part II. of the National Insurance Act. In

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

these cases figures are available for the whole, 01
nearly the whole, of the workers employed, and there
is a much smaller margin for error than in the case of
the Trade Union unemployment returns.

The following is the table showing the state of
employment in insured trades last July, with com-
parative figures for a month and for a year earlier :

Increase (+)or

Unemployed at

Decrease ( - ) in per-

Trade.

Number
insured*

end of July.

centage unemployed
as compared with a

Per-

Month

Year

Number.

centage.

ago.

ago.

Building and Construc-

tion of Works .

956,890

36,599

3-8

-O.2

Engineering and Iron-

founding

817.931

26,549

3-2

-O.I

+ 0.9

Shipbuilding .

264,217

12,491

4-7

+ 0.6

+ i-3

Construction of Vehicles

209,985

6,376

3-o

+ 0.4

+0.4

Sawmilling

12,029

381

3-2

-0.4

+ 1.0

Other insured work-

people ....

64,546

1,016

1.6

+0.7

All insured work-people

2,325-598

83,412

3-6

+0.1

+0.5

I give now the comparative percentages for succeed-
ing months :

PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN INSURED TRADES.1

July.

Aug. Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

April.

May.

Kuilding and Con-

struction of

Works .

1.8

6.2

6.1

5-3

5-4

5.0

4-5

3-5

2.2

'•7

i-4

Engineering and

Ironfounding .

3-2

6.6

4-9

3-2

2-3

1.8

I.O

o-9

0.7

0.7

o-S

Shipbuilding

4-7

4-9

4-4

3-9

2-7

2.1

1.2

i.i

0.9

0.9

0-7

Construction of

Vehicles .

3-°

7-5

S-6

3-9

3-3

2-9

1.8

'•4

I.O

0.8

0-5

Sawmilling .

3-2

4-i

V6

2-5

a-3

1.8

i-4

'•5

M

'•4

1.2

Other insured

work-people

1.6

3. a

2-5

'•7

i-3

I.O

0.9

0.7

0.6

0-4

0.4

All insured)
work-people /

3.6

6.2

5-4

4-2

3-7

3-3

2.6

2.O

'•4

i.i

0.9

1 The figures refer in every case to the end of tlie month.

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 71

Thus, in the insured trades, which, it should be
pointed out, do not include any of the industries most
severely hit by the war, the general level of unemploy-
ment had become normal, or less than normal, by the
end of November, and would have been normal in
October, but for the continued depression in the
building industry. By the spring of 1915 only an
almost irreducible minimum of unemployment due to
unavoidable causes was left in the engineering and
shipbuilding industries. The surplus labour was
absorbed, and, as we have seen from earlier tables, a
great deal of labour was attracted from outside.

It will be well to set beside these figures the Trade
Union percentages, which are compiled from returns
sent to the Board of Trade by Unions which pay
unemployed benefit. They are less reliable, since they
cover only certain trades in the industries to which
they refer ; but they are important as almost the only
statistical indication of the effect of unemployment on
Trade Unionists as distinguished from the general body
of workers. The figures for insured trades, of course,
cover Unionists and non-Unionists alike.

I begin with the table showing the state of Trade
Union unemployment in July 1914.

[TABLE

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

TRADE UNION PERCENTAGES OF UNEMPLOYED.
(Based on 3138 Returns.)

Trade Unions with a net membership of 988,946 reported 28,013
(or 2.8 per cent) of their members as unemployed at the end of July
1914, compared with 2.4 per cent at the end of June 1914, and 1.9
per cent at the end of July 1913.

Increase (+) or

Trade.

Membership
at end of
July 1914,

Unemployed at end
of July 1914.

Decrease ( - ) in per-
centage unemployed
as compared with a

of Unions

reporting.

Number.

Per-

Month

Year

centage.

ago.

ago.

Building 1

72,559

2,291

3-2

+ 0.3

-O.I

Coal Mining2 .

166,866

792

0-5

+ 0.1

Iron and Steel

37,662

2,078

5-5

+ 2-5

Engineering .

233,985

7,908

3-4

+0.4

+ 1-5

Shipbuilding .

74,365

4,896

6.6

+ 2.2

+ 3-8

Miscellaneous Metal

37,035

519

1.4

-O.I

-0.4

Textiles 2 : —

Cotton

88,567

3,455

3-9

+ i-7

+2.3

Woollen and Worsted

8,641

370

4-3

-0.8

-0.4

Other ....

62,700

1,205

i-9

+0.7

+0.6

Printing, Bookbinding,

and Paper

67,274

1,688

2-5

-0.7

-0.8

Furnishing and Wood-

working .

56,466

1,299

2-3

+0.3

-O.I

Clothing . . ...

67,768

1,127

i-7

+0.1

Leather ....

4,270

221

5-2

+0.5

+ 1.0

Glass

986

6

0.6

+ 0.1

+ 0.2

Pottery .

7,503

55

o-7

-O.I

+0.1

Tobacco ....

2,299

103

4-5

+0.9

-0.2

Total .

988,946

28,013

2.8

+0.4

+ 0.9

1 The Trade Union Returns relate mainly to carpenters and
plumbers.

2 In addition to the ordinary short time which occurs in all
trades, it should be noted that in the mining and textile industries
a contraction in the demand for labour is more generally met by a
reduction in the time worked per week by a large number of work-
people than by the discharge of a smaller number.

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

73

A comparison of these figures with those for insured
trades at once shows how wide is the margin for
error in this table. There are 956,000 " insured "
building workers ; the Trade Union percentages,
which are, of course, wholly incomplete, only cover
72,000 of these. The engineering figures only relate
to 233,000 out of 817,000, and the shipbuilding figures
to 74,000 out of 264,000. Apart from building,
however, there is some correspondence in the figures.
In engineering the percentages are 3.4 in the Trade
Union and 3.2 in the Insurance figures : in shipbuilding
they are 6.6 and 4.7. I give the figures for subsequent
months for what they are worth.

Trade.

July.

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mac,

April.

May.

Building .
Coal Mining .

3-2

0.5

7-4

5-6
1.9

2-5

1.8
1.6

2.1
1.4

2.2

0.9

2.6

0.9

2.7
0.3

2.8
0.2

3.2

O.I

Iron and Steel

5-5

7-6

2.6

3-1

1.9

3-o

2.1

2.2

1.6

2.2

1.9

Engineering.

3-4

7-1

4.8

3-3

1.8

1.4

I.O

0.7

0.6

o-5

0.6

Shipbuilding .

6.6

6-3

5-7

6-5

2.8

1.9

0-7

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.5

Miscellaneous

Metal .

1.4

9.0 f

4.0

2.2

1.5

1.4

I.I

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.4

Textiles :—

Cotton

3-9

17.7

14-5

9.2

6.3

5-2

3-°

2.2

2.5

2-5

2.7

Woollen and

Worsted

4-3

7.2

6.1

6.1

5-1

3-7

1.7

0.9

0.7

i.i

2.8

Other

1.9

6.1

8.2

6.4

6.5

5-2

3-9

2.2

i.i

0.9

0.8

Printing, Book-

binding, and

Paper

2-5

7-4

7.0

6.7

4-7

4-5

5.0

4-2

3-7

3-4

3-6

Furnishing )
Wood-working (

2-3

9.8

8-3

6.2

8.1

2.2

7-4
1.9

6-5

1.6

4.6
i.i

3-9

I.O

o.S

Clothing

1.7

5-3

2.6

1.5

1.3

I.I

0.7

0.7

o-5

o-3

0.3

Leather

5-2

6.2

4.2

2-9

2.1

2-4

1.8

0.7

0.8

Glass .

0.6

i.i

1.6

2.0

1.9

1.8

2.0

2-3

2.2

2-3

Pottery

0.7

2-7

1.5

i-3

1.4

I.O

1.3

O-S

0.5

O.2

O.I

Tobacco

4-5

14.0

20.5

12.8

6-5

6.3

4-9

3-7

3-6

2.8

2.4

Total .

2.8

7-x

5-6

4-4

2-9

2-5

1.9

1.6

i,3

1.2

1.2

These figures clearly show that whereas up to the
end of 1914 there was still considerable uncertainty and
fluctuation, early in 1915 the various industries had
found their equilibrium, and the proportion of un-
employed became almost a fixed quantity, though,

74 THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

despite the very low percentage already reached,
there was still a continuous decrease in engineering
and shipbuilding unemployment. When it is re-
membered that bad trade in the textile industries is
generally met by working short time, the figure of
17.7 per cent totally out of work in the cotton industry
at the end of August is nothing short of appalling.

It should, moreover, be remembered that all these
tables relate to the end of the various months. They
therefore leave altogether out of account the tem-
porary, " panic " unemployment of the earlier weeks
of August.

The cumulative evidence of all these figures gives a
perfectly clear conclusion. Apart from certain luxury
trades, which affect many women, there is no real
problem of unemployment to-day. The problem is
rather one of shortage, especially of skilled labour.
This, however, is no indication of the future course
of events, as much of the production of to-day is
artificial. There must be, sooner or later, a retransfer-
ence of labour at least as great as that which dislocated
industry during the latter months of 1914. But,
severe as this dislocation was, it was not, taken as a
whole, worse than the dislocation caused by a severe
depression of trade. We weathered it, thanks to the
relief caused by enlistment ; but there will be no
enlistments to help us weather the " outbreak of peace."
Instead, there will be a return to the labour market
of those who have been with the Forces.

Broadly speaking, then, it is true to say, at any rate
in the case of male wage-earners, that whereas un-
employment was the problem during the first few
months of the war, scarcity of labour is far more the
problem to-day. This does not indeed apply univer-

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 75

sally : in certain trades there are still men unemployed.
These are, however, in the main workers in highly
skilled and specialised occupations, who, despite the
collapse of their own trade, find it difficult or impossible
to transfer to any other. This is true as a rule only of
old or middle-aged men, or of workers in highly localised
industries, and it does not, in any case, present a grave
problem.

So far I have dealt solely with the general volume
of employment. It should not, however, be assumed
that because there are now few male wage-earners out
of work, all of these are now back at their old trades.
The recovery of industry has been to a great extent not
natural, but artificial. That is to say, it is now working
to satisfy a temporary and exceptional demand, which
will not persist in the same form after the war. In-
dustry may, then, be expected to revert largely to the
old channels ; for the moment there has been a great
deal of adaptation and transformation.

This is borne out very forcibly by the following
table, in which the contraction or expansion of the
number employed since the war is given by industries.
The figures relate solely to males, and the industries
are divided into the following three groups :

1. Industries in which there is a marked shortage of
male labour, and in which it has been necessary to attract
men from the outside ;

2. Industries which are in a fairly normal condition as
regards male labour ; and

3. Industries in which the contraction of numbers
employed is considerably greater than the withdrawal
of men for the Forces.

76

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT IN DECEMBER 1914 AND FEBRUARY 1915 COMPARED WITH
EMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE WAR.

DECEMBER 1914.

FEBRUARY 1915.

Con-

Net Dis-

Con-

Net Dis-

Approxi-

traction

Cnown

place-

traction

Cnown

place-

mate

or Ex-

to

ment

or Ex-

to

ment

On

On

Trade Groups.

Industrial
Population
Census,

pansion
of
numbers

have
joined
the

Replace-
ment

pansion
of
numbers

have
joined
the

(-)or
Replace-
ment

Short
Time.

Over-
time.

1911.

em-

Forces.

(+)•

em-

Forces.

ployed.

ployed.

Group 1.

»

V

g

%

y

Shipbuilding
Leatiier and Leather Goods
Chemicals (including ex-

164,000
67,000

- 6.0

- I.O

fj.6
14.2

+ 7.6
+13.2

- 2.4

+ 2.5

13-9
l6.0

+ 11.5
+18.5

0.7

2.6

44-5
40.7

plosives) .

122,000

- 3-3

15.4

+12.1

+ 1.2

17.4

+18.6

I.O

24.1

Engineering
Woollen and Worsted
Boot and Shoe

665,000
129,000
199,000

- 8.7
+ 0.7
- 3-3

,4.6

7-2

9-9

+ 5.9
+ 7.9
+ 6.6

- 9-i
+ 0.3
- i.i

16.1
q.o
10.9

+ 7.0
+ 9.3

+ 9.8

3-6
3-3

29.8
27.1
36.1

Hosiery

18,000

- 0.7

73

+ 6.8

- 2.7

12.3

+ 9.6

3-9

14.7

Iron and Steel

311,000

- 7-5

13-9

+ 6.4

- 5-7

16.1

+10.4

5-7

iS-7

Food

— c fi

+ 7.8

- 8.6

16. i

+ 7.5

2*5

16*0

Sawmilling

315,000
44,000

5.0
- 6.2

14.2

+ 8.0

- 12.0

16. i

+ 4.1

10. 1

6.3

Coal and other Mines1

1,164,000

-10.4

'3-7

+ 3.3

-13.8

17.2

+ 3.4

2.3

0.6

Group 9.

Clothing ....

235,000

-14.1

12.5

- 1.6

-13-7

14.0

+ 0.8

11.5

14.1

Paper and Printing .
Linen, Jute, and Hemp .

240,000
42,000

- 12.2
- 8.2

12.5

+ 0.3
+ 6.8

-14.1

- I2.I

14.4
17.1

+ 0.3
+ 5.0

9.9
27.7

8.5
4-9

Cotton . . _ .

259,000

-I3-3

'S9'.6

- 3.7

- II. I

U.6

+ 0.5

II. 2

2.2

Cycle Motor, Carriage and

Waggon Building .
China, Pottery, and Glass

202,000
83,000

-17-5

- II. 2

14.3
13-3

- 8.2

+ 2.1

-I7.8
-I6.3

16.9

- 0.9

- 0.8

6.4

16.6

23-7
2-7

Group 3.

Building ....

1,023,000

-21.5

12.2

- 9.3

-22-9

14.7

- 8.2

7-1

7.0

Furniture and Upholstery .

141,000

-20.3

'3-5

- 6.8

-23.5

tS-3

- 8.2

14.0

4.1

Brick, Cement, etc. .

78,000

— 20. 2

'3-5

- 6.7

-27.2

fj.6

-11.6

14.6

3-o

Tinplate . . .. .

23,000

-II-5

- 3.2

-14.2

I I.O

- 3.2

29.6

0.2

1 In the case of Coal Trade, the Miners' Eight Hours Act prevents the working of overtime in the
ordinary sense, though it does not limit the number of shifts that may be worked per week.

In practically every case — the only important
exception being the woollen industry — there is a
contraction in the number employed since last July ;
but this contraction varies very much in different cases,
and a comparison with the enlistment figures at once
shows that in certain industries a great deal of new
labour has been called in. Thus, in shipbuilding,

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 77

nearly 14 per cent have enlisted, yet the contraction
in the numbers employed only amounts to 2.4 per cent.
Coal-mining, where the enlistment is 17 per cent and
the contraction nearly 14 per cent, seems the only
outstanding instance in which it has been impossible
to call in much new labour. Conversely, cotton
operatives have not to any great extent transferred
themselves to other industries. Agriculture, of course,
is not included in the return, which relates solely to
industry proper.

Indeed, transference to new occupations is perhaps
the most remarkable feature in the whole situation.
Those who prophesied widespread unemployment
usually based their forecasts on a clear demonstration
that this or that industry was bound to be greatly
depressed. Very often their forecasts were right in
this respect ; but there was after all far less unemploy-
ment than they had expected. The surplus labour,
where it did not or could not enlist, transferred itself
with surprising rapidity to industries in which a boom
could be anticipated. In a few months, many thousands
of workers had changed their occupations, and settled
down to their new tasks. For instance, the depression
in the building trade has not had the expected results,
because vast numbers of men, including some furniture-
makers, have found work on hut-building and similar
jobs. Even on August 19, Mr. Herbert Samuel was
already saying that the first stress of unemployment
had been considerably abated, and that things had
turned out to be not so bad as they were expected to
be.

But, if the general situation soon gave cause for
congratulation, this did not mean that there were not
considerable sections of wage-earners in severe distress.

78 THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT

The Lancashire cotton trade was paralysed, and is still,
except where there are large Government contracts,
only recovering slowly : women in the other textile
trades, in the clothing industry, and in many smaller
luxury trades, not to mention women clerks, dress-
makers, domestic servants, and charwomen, suffered
most severely. What is most surprising, and a striking
comment on the Government's lack of foresight, is
that in the woollen industry, which has now for months
been working overtime to supply khaki for the troops,
unemployment was allowed to grow continually worse
down to September. The General Union of Textile
Workers had 426 members unemployed in August,
whereas in September the number rose to 1113. By
November it had no one at all out of work.

Again, the Boilermakers had over 4000 members
unemployed right up to November, whereas now
there has been for some months a cry for more men.
Nothing was for some time done to give such men
work, and they were allowed to be driven by unem-
ployment into enlisting just when their services were
about to be urgently required in industry.

Enough has been said to show that the incidence
of unemployment has throughout the war been spread
very unevenly among the various trades. This
naturally meant that the burden fell with altogether
unequal severity upon the different Trade Unions.
In a few cases the war has actually meant increased
financial prosperity, despite the advantageous terms
which most Unions have given to their members who
are absent on military service ; in others, it has meant,
if not ruin, at least severe financial stress and almost
entire depletion of funds. The cotton industry
furnishes the most striking example of such losses,

THE WAR AND EMPLOYMENT 79

though the Lacemakers, the Felt Hatters, and other
Unions have suffered no less heavily in proportion to
their strength.

I shall now proceed to examine the suggestions
made, and the steps actually taken to enable the workers
to weather the crisis of last autumn.

CHAPTER IV

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT — THE FIRST PHASE

IN an earlier chapter we saw how Labour treated the
Government on the outbreak of war : we have now to
enquire how the Government treated Labour. Claim-
ing to act in the name of the whole nation, demanding
the co-operation of all classes, setting aside by pro-
fession all party considerations, the Cabinet might
surely have been expected, if only by those who did
not know it, to take the workers into its confidence
and to devolve upon them rights and responsibilities
as well as duties. In fact, it did nothing of the sort :
Liberalism, even in war tune, lost none of its distrust
of democracy and freedom. It put off the workers
with as little as it could give, and, thanks to the lack
of decision on the Labour side, it got off with very
little indeed. The first phase of the class-struggle
under war conditions ended in the rout of the Labour
forces. Steps were indeed taken in the direction of
extending State control, and these steps were acclaimed
as " Socialism " ; but in their real task of gaining
freedom and responsibility the workers were given no
encouragement whatsoever. The war opened no one's
eyes : the blind only continued, rather more rapidly
than before, to lead the blind into the Servile State.

80

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 81

At the outset the Government acted wisely in
scotching a purely panic rise in food prices by the
supposedly " Utopian " and " uneconomic " course of
fixing maximum prices. This move was entirely
successful in stopping an artificial inflation which must,
in any case, soon have ceased. On August 2 the Board
of Agriculture sent round a reassuring circular on the
subject of the food supply, and on August 5 a further
statement was issued by a special Cabinet Committee
on Food Prices. The subsequent Government pur-
chase of sugar, hailed as a further instalment of " Social-
ism," seems to have been less successful.

When the Government assumed control of the
railways for the period of the war, this, too, was called
" Socialism," though it did nothing to change the
ownership of the railway service, and involved merely
a temporary change in administrative control. In a
Socialist society the Government would, no doubt,
own the railways ; but it is the most elementary of
logical errors to conclude that the administrative
change was " Socialism." Yet many who call them-
selves Socialists were no less foolish than the Bishop
who wrote in December : " We have had a taste of
Socialism, and we like it."

The outstanding domestic problem at the beginning
of the war was that of dealing with unemployment.
In the last chapter I made some attempt to show the
magnitude of the problem : I shall now try to show
how it was met, as well as how Labour asked that it
should be met.

Inevitably, the Government got in first. The
Labour conference which became the War Emergency
Workers' Committee met on August 5, and on the
same day the Government announced the appointment

G

82 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

of a Government Committee to deal with distress,
under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Samuel. Mr.
Ramsay MacDonald was Labour's representative on
this Committee, which issued a circular on August 6.
This circular announced that an appeal for a National
Relief Fund was about to be issued by the Prince of
Wales, urged the necessity of subscribing to this fund,
asked employers not to dismiss their staffs, announced
the readiness of the Local Government Board to con-
sider schemes under the Unemployed Workmen Act,
and made the following further pronouncement :

Steps are being taken to form central committees in
the boroughs, the larger urban districts, and the counties,
under the chairmanship of the mayors and chairmen of
councils, which will consider the needs of the localities
and control the distribution of such relief as may be
required. These committees will include representatives
of the municipal, education, and poor law authorities,
distress committees, Trade Unions, and philanthropic
agencies. Attention is at the same time drawn to the
importance of securing the services of women as members
of these committees.

The Prince of Wales's Fund and the Local Relief
Committees, together with certain recommendations for
expediting public works under local authorities, the
Road Board, the Development Commission, and other
agencies, formed the Government's plan for relieving
distress. In the following circular, issued to mayors
and other heads of local Committees on August 8, the
Local Government Board gave its definition of the
powers and scope of these Committees :

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD, WHITEHALL, S.W.

August 8, 1914.

SIR — I am directed by the Local Government Board to
refer to the Circular which they addressed to you on the

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 83

6th instant with regard to the formation of a Local Repre-
sentative Committee for dealing with any distress which
may arise in consequence of the war, and to state that
they will feel obliged if you will forward to them as soon
as possible particulars on the enclosed form of the constitu-
tion of the Committee.

The Cabinet Committee on the Prevention and Relief
of Distress have had under consideration questions relating
to the organisation of the work and the procedure of the
local Committee, and I am directed to acquaint you with
their views in regard to these matters.

The primary duty of the Committee will be to survey
the existing conditions of employment in the locality, and
to consider what measures might be adopted with a view
to preventing distress through lack of employment and
alleviating such distress should it unhappily occur.

It is in the highest degree desirable that employers
should do all in their power to avert the sudden closing
of works, and also that temporary appointments should
be made to fill all vacancies caused by the mobilisation of
His Majesty's forces.

The Committee, including as it will representatives of
Local Authorities, public bodies, and philanthropic agencies,
will comprise amongst its members persons who are
intimately acquainted with local industrial conditions,
as well as those who have experience in matters such as
those with which the Committee will be called upon to
deal. It will thus be well equipped for forming an accurate
estimate of the situation and for concerting measures for
the prevention and mitigation of distress. If any of the
local industries show signs of failing, the Committee should
at once inform the Local Government Board, who will
bring the matter before the Cabinet Committee.

In the event of distress becoming acute, the Committee
will be responsible for the co-ordination of all relief agencies
in the locality, whether official or voluntary, as well as for
the distribution of grants made from the National Fund.
For this purpose it will be necessary that the Committee
should have a register of assistance.

84 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

The Board are addressing a communication to the
Guardians requesting them to provide the Committee
with a list of the persons in receipt of poor relief. If the
Distress Committee have opened a register, a copy of this
should be made available. The Committee itself should
also keep a register of the persons who receive assistance
from the National Fund.

It is suggested that the register should be kept on a
rough card index system, possibly with reference to areas
or streets.

The object of the register is to enable the Committee
readily to discriminate between applicants for assistance
and to avoid overlapping.

It is not intended that the organisation of the Local
Committee should be utilised by persons who have been
for a continuous period in receipt of relief, and such persons
should be referred back to the Guardians.

With regard to other applicants, it is highly desirable
that any relief afforded should take the form of work for
wages when it is possible to provide work. In this con-
nection the Local Authority will, of course, continue to
push on all works already in progress, and it is hoped
that in many cases they will be able to expedite other
schemes of public work and thus absorb a considerable
amount of labour. In other cases the Distress Committee
in co-operation with the Local Authority will probably be
able to initiate schemes of work by which provision could
be made for the more deserving and necessitous cases.
Such schemes will be aided by grants made by the
Board out of the money provided by Parliament for
the purposes of the Unemployed Workmen Act. In areas
where there are no Distress Committees similar schemes
of work can, it is hoped, be devised which can also
be aided by the Local Government Board out of public
funds.

The Local Education Authority will have received from
the Board of Education a circular with respect to the
exercise of the powers for the feeding of school-children
conferred by the Act which has just been passed by Parlia-

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 85

ment, and the Committee will, of course, take this into
consideration.

The National Fund will be available for, and generally
speaking should be restricted to, those cases which for
various reasons cannot be dealt with by any of the methods
of assistance above indicated. It may be mentioned
that the work of the National Relief Fund will be closely
co-ordinated with that of the Cabinet Committee.

The Board have no doubt that the Clerk to the Local
Authority would be willing to give the Committee the
benefit of his experience and advice, and, if so desired, to
place his staff at their disposal. They direct me to add
that they understand that many offers of help have been
made by various persons and organisations, including
women's associations, and the Committee will probably
desire to avail themselves of such assistance if necessary. —
I am, Sir, Your obedient servant,

H. C. MONRO, Secretary.

The Chairman of the County Council,
The Lord Mayor,
The Mayor,

or
The Chairman of the Urban District Council.

At the same time, forms were issued asking for a
list of the organisations represented on the Com-
mittees, and showing the number of women members.

It is patent that the above circular was not intended
to give any very clear indication of the Government's
policy. It said very little about the principle on which
money would be distributed for relief, and it held out
only slender hopes that money would be forthcoming
in adequate amounts for the prevention of unemploy-
ment. It clearly stated that "it is highly desirable
that any relief afforded should take the form of work
for wages when it is possible to provide such work " ;
but it showed no sign of being prepared to pay for the
general adoption of that very expensive policy. And,

86 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

where the alternative policy of relief was adopted,
it gave no guidance as to scales of relief or as to
the conditions on which relief was to be given. It
was, as we shall see, on these faults in the scheme
that the Workers' National Committee concentrated its
criticism.

The immediate result of the Government's policy
was that, on the one side, money poured steadily into
the National Relief Fund, and, on the other, a network
of Local Relief Committees sprang up all over the
country. For the most part these Committees were
essentially not of a character likely to be acceptable
to Labour. " Responsible," as the Government told
them, " for the co-ordination of all relief agencies in
the locality, whether official or voluntary," they
inevitably consisted largely of " social workers," of
those who had long been connected with the Poor Law,
the Charity Organisation Society, and other relief
agencies. The Labour representatives, even where
they were given seats on the Committees, were nearly
always swamped by the mass votes of the officials and
charity-mongers. The social worker, long used to
the relief of a peculiar type of distress, could not realise
that the special distress created by the war was of a
quite different character and demanded different
treatment. Accustomed to bullying the very poor,
the Committees set out with eagerness to bully the
regular wage-earners whom the war had thrown out
of work. They prepared case-papers, they made
house-to-house visitations, they tried to pry into
every detail of the private lives of those who, through
no fault of their own, found themselves unemployed.
The idea of " deterrence," familiar to the charitable
mind, entered largely into these practices, and secured

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 87

a great measure of success. In many districts, notably
in parts of Lancashire where the distress was acute,
the self-respecting wage-earners refused to go to the
Relief Committees, preferring to exhaust savings
and accumulate debts. In these cases the Committees
became the Mecca of cadgers and undeserving cases,
and when the workers were at last driven to appeal
to them, their habits of inquisition had grown even
worse than before.

It cannot be denied that these mischievous in-
quisitions were in fact stimulated by the circular sent
out from the Local Government Board on August 17,
in which the following paragraph occurred :

It will be necessary for the Committee in determining
the question of assistance to be given in any case to have
regard to all the circumstances of the applicant, and for
this purpose they should ascertain —

The ordinary occupation of the applicant ;

Dependents ;

In the case of insured persons, the Approved Society
to which applicant belongs and number in that Society,
or if a Deposit Contributor his number ;

Whether registered at Labour Exchange ;

Any special qualification or experience for any class of
work ;

Date and place of last employment ; and

Any source of income.

In particular, they should have on record any sickness
or disablement benefit, meals given to school children,
unemployment benefit, half -pay or other assistance from
employer, or aid from charitable funds. It will, of course,
be desirable to obtain this information in a manner which
will not appear unduly inquisitorial to the applicant.

The mild disclaimer in the last sentence did little
or nothing to mitigate the ferocity of the " social

88 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

experts," who had no intention of wasting the oppor-
tunity of a life-time.

The Government's proposals were fully elaborated
in the following memorandum, which was sent out
from the Local Government Board on August 20.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE
LOCAL COMMITTEES FOR THE PREVENTION
AND RELIEF OF DISTRESS.

1. The National organisation that has been set up for
the purpose of dealing with any distress which may arise
in consequence of the war is not intended to deal with
cases of ordinary poverty. While it may not always be
possible to discriminate between ordinary distress and
distress caused by the war, it is not intended that the local
committees which have been constituted should supersede
the Poor Law authorities.

2. The Committee is entrusted with the duty of co-
ordinating all relief agencies in the locality with a view
both to preventing overlapping and to seeing that cases
which require assistance are not overlooked.

3. It is essential for these purposes that a register
should be kept on the lines laid down in the Board's circular
letter of the iyth August.

4. Obviously the best way to provide for persons
thrown out of their usual employment as a result of the
war is to provide them with some other work for wages.
Wherever possible, such work should be work which is
normally required to be taken in hand either by public
authorities or private employers. It is only when these
fail that recourse should be had to relief works. Accord-
ingly the Committee should co-operate as closely as possible
with any Board of Trade Labour Exchange or other agency
in its area to which any applicant for assistance for whom
suitable work either in his own locality or elsewhere may
be available could be referred. The Labour Exchanges
have been instructed to co-operate with the Committees

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 89

in regard to this matter, and will be prepared to take any
steps desired to invite notification of vacancies from
employers.

5. The Committee will have the advantage of including
among its members persons who are well acquainted with
the conditions of industry in their area, and, as pointed
out in previous circulars, it is one of the first duties of the
Committee to make themselves acquainted with the con-
ditions of local trade and industry.

6. For this purpose the Committee should, so far as
possible, use the existing agencies, such as the Labour
Exchanges (in respect of the conditions of employment)
and the Poor Law authorities (in respect of pauperism),
and should make further inquiries of their own only in so
far as it is found to be necessary to supplement this in-
formation. The Labour Exchanges have been instructed
to give such general information as is in their possession
as to the state of employment.

7. Where the demands of the normal labour market
are inadequate the Committee should consult the local
authorities as to the possibility of expediting schemes of
public utility, which might otherwise not be put in hand
at the present moment.

8. Whatever work is undertaken by local authorities,
whether it be normal work or expedited work, it should
in all possible cases be performed in the ordinary way by
men speciaUy suited to that particular class of work and
selected as such in the ordinary labour market, rather than
by men selected from the register of applicants to the
Committee. The men engaged should be required to
conform to the ordinary standards of competence in that
class of work, and should of course be paid wages in the
ordinary way.

9. Under the Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905, Distress
Committees are empowered to provide or contribute to
the provision of work for unemployed persons, and in
areas where such a Distress Committee has been set up,
able-bodied men out of employment, for whom no work
can be found through a Labour Exchange, should be

go LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

referred to that Committee. Work so provided would,
in suitable cases, be aided out of the Parliamentary grant
for the purposes oi the Unemployed Workmen Act.

10. Where relief works are provided, each man should
only be employed a certain number of days per week.

11. So far as possible applicants for assistance should
be offered work which they can perform efficiently, and no
assistance from the Relief Fund should be offered to any
person for whom suitable work is available.

12. Single men who are physically fit and within the
prescribed ages for enlistment in the army, navy, or
territorial forces should not ordinarily receive assistance
from the local Committee until other applicants have been
provided for.

13. Relief without work should only be given when no
other means of assistance are available, and so far as it
may prove necessary in the last resort to provide relief
without work, it must be recognised that the demands
upon the funds available will in all probability be such as
to make it impossible to do more than to provide relief
upon a minimum scale.

14. In cases in which it is necessary to give relief it is
essential that the principles upon which such relief shall
be given shall be definitely laid down by the Committee
in order that persons in similar circumstances may receive
similar treatment.

15. For this branch of their work the Committee will
doubtless find it desirable to appoint a special sub-com-
mittee or sub-committees composed of members who are
specially experienced in the relief of distress.

16. In determining the allowance to be made the
Committee should take into consideration all the sources
of income at present available for the household. As
suggested in the circular letter of the I7th August, they
should take steps to ascertain whether the applicant or any
members of his family are in receipt of sickness, disable-
ment, or unemployment benefit, whether they are receiving
half-pay or any assistance from their employers or are
on part-time employment, whether the children are receiv-

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 91

ing meals provided by the education authority, and whether
they are receiving aid from charitable funds or any othei
sources.

17. So far as practicable, allowances should be made,
not in money, but by way of food tickets on local shops
or stores. These tickets should be given to the women
rather than to the men.

In this document there is still no guidance on the
question of scales of relief, and no attempt to deter
Committees from deterrent methods of administering
relief. On the other hand, there is a clearer insistence
on the need for providing as much useful employment
as possible at regular wages, and it is emphasised that
the labour for such work should be taken on in the
ordinary way. " Relief " works were not to be in-
stituted till everything had been done to maintain the
volume of employment. At the same time, further
defects emerge : renewed stress is laid on the objection-
able circular of August 17, and in clause 12 a definite
beginning is made in the system of economic compul-
sion to enlist, which has since been carried further,
and was, in fact, carried further at the time by some
Local Committees. Moreover, the objectionable system
of giving food tickets instead of money was recom-
mended to the Committees.

This last provision at once led to abuses, of which
the action taken by the Newcastle Relief Committee
was only a particularly glaring example. This Com-
mittee, not content with issuing food tickets, actually
published a " list of goods which may be purchased in
exchange for Food Coupons at prices as under," and
proclaimed that " only goods named in above list
are purchasable with a Food Coupon." Thus the
workers had their diet prescribed to them by the

92 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

Relief Committee, and, in addition, there was no
provision for the purchase of clothes or other necessaries
besides food.

Such extreme examples were fortunately excep-
tional, and the worst cases were corrected by the Local
Government Board under pressure from the Workers'
National Committee. Lesser abuses, however, pre-
vailed to an alarming extent, and the workers not only
found their right to representation refused in many
districts, but also, where they were represented, could
do little against the combined efforts of " charitable "
persons and capitalist representatives. All over the
country the Relief Committees earned an unpopularity
which did much to irritate the workers, and was calcu-
lated to destroy that sense of national unity which the
Government presumably desired to stimulate.

Nor was this the only complaint made against the
Government's scheme. The Government Committee
early in August issued an appeal for the centralisation
of all Relief Funds. Local needs, they said, would be
relieved out of the National Fund, and there was no
need for separate local funds. This manoeuvre having
succeeded, everything obviously depended on the
administration of the central fund, which soon amounted
to several million pounds. It is quite clear that the
Government soon decided that its policy should be to
spend as little as possible. £120,000 was granted at
once for the relief of distress among the families of
soldiers and sailors ; but the Local Committees found
the greatest difficulty in getting grants. For a long
time the National Relief Fund maintained the greatest
possible secrecy as to its disbursements, and when at
last a very incomplete account of its work up to March i
was issued, it was found that £1,400,000 had already

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 93

been expended on relief for the families of soldiers and
sailors, a charge which should obviously have fallen,
not on a fund intended primarily for the relief of civil
distress, but on the Government directly.

Not only was parsimony the ruling principle of
those who administered the National Relief Fund :
efforts were also made to economise in other directions.
The Government had only attempted at the outset
to justify its relief policy on the ground that relief
should be a last resort, and that everything should
first be done to maintain the volume of employment.
But such a policy was totally contradicted by the
speech which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made
to representatives of the municipalities on September 8
— a speech which, carefully worded as it was in order
to enable the Chancellor to reply to critics, bore in
every sentence the moral that local authorities should
economise. Mr. Lloyd George referred to the immense
financial needs of the war, which, he said, would be
fought with silver bullets. No one who heard or read
his speech could help going away with the impression
that he desired as little money as possible to be spent.
The following paragraph contains the gist of his
speech :

We must relieve distress. We must see that our people
suffer as little as is possible under these terrible conditions,
and therefore we are prepared to meet you, but we do not
want a penny spent which is not absolutely essential to
relieve distress, because, after all, if you go into the market
it is the same market we go into. We raise the 10 millions
for you in the same market as we raise the 10 millions for
our armies on the Continent. Therefore, in my judgment,
the last few hundred millions may win this war. This is
my opinion.

Mr. Samuel, on behalf of the Local Government

94 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

Board, also made a significant reply. For the present,
he said, the Local Government Board only asked local
authorities to prepare schemes which must necessarily
take some time to elaborate, so that if in any locality
distress arose, or was imminent, these schemes could
be put into operation without a moment's delay. He
also expressed his fear that distress would be far worse
after the war.

These two speeches should be read in connection
with Mr. Samuel's speech in the House of Commons
two days later, when, as we have seen, he said that
there was no evidence of any widespread distress. In
fact, the Government, having been to some extent
stampeded into adopting the policy of preventing
unemployment at the beginning of the war, were openly
anxious to abandon it by the beginning of September,
partly because the distress was, in fact, less than they
had anticipated, and partly because they had realised
what the prevention of unemployment was likely to
cost. By working for the mere relief of distress through
inquisitorial and deterrent Local Committees, they did
succeed in getting off very cheaply — of course at the
cost of the workers.

With the Government's special policy in dealing
with distress among women — which, as we have seen,
was more serious than among men — we shall be con-
cerned in a later chapter. Here I will only mention
the formation, in the third week of August, of the
Queen's Work for Women Fund and the appointment of
an Advisory Committee, on which women workers were
very strongly represented. Whatever the merits of this
scheme, it is certain that the Government itself deserves
little of the credit for it.

We are now in a position to comment upon the

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 95

Government's provision for the relief and prevention
of distress taken as a whole. The first thing that
emerges is the considerable divergence between its
professions and its practice. Proclaimed with a great
flourish of trumpets, the policy of preventing un-
employment was, in the majority of cases, soon allowed
to lapse, while in relieving actual distress the Govern-
ment and its advisory Committees were as parsimonious
as they dared to be.

Criticism, however, can be levelled not only at the
administration of the Government's scheme, but also
at the scheme itself. In the first place, the whole idea
of relieving distress out of a national voluntary fund
was bound to lead to parsimony. The existence of the
Prince of Wales 's Fund all along hindered the pro-
vision of any effective relief, because it seemed to
relieve the Government of any further responsibility.
The avoidance of responsibility and the shuffling off
of it on to other incompetent bodies seems, indeed, to
have been the chief characteristic of the Government's
action.

Secondly, the working of relief through the Local
Committees was at once a further avoidance of re-
sponsibility and a grave mistake in itself. The Local
Committees, as we have seen, usually adopted the
mental outlook of the Charity Organisation Society
and similar bodies. Relief was given to those in distress
owing to the war, not as a right, but on conditions and
as a charitable dole.

Yet surely the Government might have realised
that the distress due to the war was altogether different
from the distress of normal times. The war brought
certain industries to a standstill, and reduced to dis-
tress, not the submerged tenth of the industrial popula-

96 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

tion, but the ordinary regular and self-respecting wage-
earners. To offer such workers relief on the principles
on which relief in this country is ordinarily administered
was an insult and an outrage. It was cheap, no doubt ;
but it was also mean and dishonourable. The wage-
earners who were thrown out of work by the war had
a right to demand, not conditional relief, but either
work at wages or unconditional maintenance. They
should have been given not doles but wages, and,
instead of being watched and abused at every turn,
they should have been left no less free in the spending
of their allowances than the Trade Unionist is free hi
the spending of his unemployment benefit, or the
worker under Part II. of the Insurance Act in the
spending of his State benefit.

It is not very profitable now to go into details con-
cerning the more statesmanlike courses that were
open to the Government. Wholesale extension of
Part II. of the Insurance Act to all workers, which
was one of the courses suggested, was probably not the
best way ; but it would not have been difficult to
devise a scheme whereby the payment of benefit to all
persons thrown out of work could have been adminis-
tered by the Labour Exchanges on the same principle
as they now administer Part II. Workers would have
been compelled — as indeed they generally were — to
register at the Exchanges, and unconditional out-of-
work pay could have been given them till work at
reasonable wages was found for them. Such a policy
would have had the merit of recognising the right of
the citizen to maintenance by the community in a
crisis not of his making, and it would have saved the
workers from the charity-mongering excesses of un-
employed members of the upper and middle classes.

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 97

A truly democratic Government would have com-
bined this remedy with another of far greater signifi-
cance. Instead of neglecting Trade Unionism, which
has built up a great machine capable of being used for
the prevention of distress, it would have taken the
Trade Unions into partnership, and would have used
them as organs of the nation. A scheme on these lines
was actually put forward early in the war.1 The Trade
Unions might have been subsidised by the State to the
extent of any disbursements beyond the average of
recent years which they might have to make to their
unemployed members ; and, further, a grant might
have been given to enable those who joined a Union
to come into benefit at once, without the usual pro-
bationary periods. The adoption of such a scheme
would have made the Trade Unions, which understand
the work, the Government's accredited agents in the
distribution of unemployment pay, and would have
left the Local Committees — or better the Labour
Exchanges — the residuary task of relieving those who
remained outside the Unions.

Such a course, however, which would have involved
the national recognition of Trade Unionism, did not
find favour with the Wilful Wontsees of the Liberal
Government. They chose the cheapest method, and
refused to grant either rights or responsibilities to the
organised workers. Thus even the far too moderate
requests made by the representatives of Trade Unionism
were first shelved and then, for the most part, refused.

Having summarised and commented generally upon
the Government's action, we may now turn to the

1 See the Nation, September 5 (Trade Unions and the War),
September 19 and October 3 (Relief or Maintenance) ; and articles
by the present writer in the Manchester Guardian for September n
and 23.

H

98 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

Labour criticism and demand. Unfortunately this
demand pursued two independent courses, which there
was for a long time little or no attempt to co-ordinate.
On the one hand we have the Workers' National
Committee, accepting in principle the Government
scheme and trying to get the Government to put its
principles into practice ; on the other hand, we find
the Trade Unions, through the Joint Board, pressing
the Government for special help to tide them over
the crisis. We must deal separately with these two
aspects of the Labour demand.

The War Emergency : Workers' National Committee
was formed at a conference of Labour and Socialist
bodies held on August 5, which elected an Executive
Committee representative of the Trades Union Con-
gress, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the
Labour Party, the Miners' Federation, the National
Union of Railwaymen, the Women's Trade Union
League, the Women's Labour League, the British
Socialist Party, and the Fabian Society. To these
were added subsequently the Co-operative Union, the
Co-operative Wholesale Society, the Textile Factory
Workers' Association, the Transport Workers' Federa-
tion, the Women's Co - operative Guild, and other
bodies. It is thus in one sense the most representative
Labour body there has ever been, inasmuch as no body
has contained members from so many sections of the
Labour movement. In another sense it is not repre-
sentative at all ; for most of its members were never
appointed by the organisations they are there to
represent. The Committee was elected by the Con-
ference, which was a self-appointed body. But,
despite its constitutionally anomalous position, the
Workers' National Committee does deserve to be called

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 99

the most representative Labour body that has ever
existed, for never before have the Trade Unions, the
Labour Party, the Co-operators, the Socialist Societies,
and the women's Labour bodies worked together in a
single great organisation. Labour has long needed such
a co-ordinating Committee, and attempts have from
time to time been made to form one, never with any
chance of immediate success, till the war crisis came
as a dissolvent of old animosities. It is to be hoped
that the excellent beginning will have a still better
continuation ; not only that the Committee will per-
sist after the war, but also that it will be regularised
and democratised. It needs to be made really repre-
sentative of the bodies whose members now compose
it : it needs to have its functions denned and its
constitution approved. The useful work of criticism
it has done already leads to the hope that either it or
its successor will do much in the future to remedy
the prevailing disorder of Labour organisation.

The Conference of August 5, which created the
Workers' National Committee, itself passed the follow-
ing resolutions :

That arrangements be made at once to press upon
the Government and municipal authorities measures for
officially controlling : (a) the purchase and storage of
food ; (b) the fixing of maximum prices of food and trade
necessities ; and (c) the distribution of food.

That the citizen committees proposed to be set up be
urged to guard against the exploitation of the people by
unnecessarily high prices.

That an appeal be issued to all Labour, Socialist,
Co-operative, and women's organisations to render whole-
hearted assistance in the work of the citizen committees.

That the Government be urged to appoint a standing
departmental committee to stimulate and co-ordinate the

ioo LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

efforts of Government departments, local authorities, and
other employers to maintain the aggregate volume of
employment by keeping their staffs at the fullest possible
strength, and, if circumstances allow, to undertake addi-
tional enterprises in order to prevent the occurrence of as
much unemployment as possible.

That an appeal be made to the Government for the
powers under the Development Commission and Road
Board, together with the Unemployed Workmen Act, to
be put into extensive operation in order that works of
public utility may be expedited.

That an appeal be made to the Board of Education to
use its influence on local education authorities to adopt
the Education (Provision of Meals) Act, including the
powers contained in the Amending Bill about to become
law.

That the Local Government Board be requested to
issue a circular to health committees calling upon them to
arrange to supply milk to nursing mothers, infants, young
children, and sick people.

Thus, at the outset, the Conference adopted the
policy of demanding the prevention of unemployment
in preference to the mere relief of distress as it occurred.
At the same time, it urged Government control of
food prices, and called on local authorities to adopt
the Provision of Meals Act, which, partly through
Labour pressure, was amended so as to extend its
scope and make it easier of general adoption.

The Executive Committee, which has met regularly
through the war, lost no time in getting to work ;
nor was there any dearth of work for it to perfomi.
Throughout the early months of the war it was kept
busy in attempting to hold the Government to its
promises. It began with an effort to secure adequate
Labour representation on the Local Committees. For
instance, early in September, Mr. J. S. Middleton,

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 101

the Secretary, wrote to the Local Government Board
giving a list of districts, including several important
industrial centres, in which the local bodies had ignored
the Government's circular advising the representation
of Trade Unions on the Committees. In this work it
was in the main successful, though, as we have seen,
the Trade Union representatives were in almost all
cases too few to alter the character of the local bodies.

The outstanding activity of the Workers' National
Committee in August was its advocacy of the policy of
preventing unemployment. A Memorandum, issued
early in the month by the Fabian Society, drew atten-
tion to the importance of this policy. It had a wide
circulation in this form, and attracted still more notice
when it appeared in an enlarged form as a pamphlet
by Mr. Sidney Webb, entitled The War and the Workers.
Suffering yet another metamorphosis, it reappeared
in a different form as The War Emergency : Suggestions
for Labour Members on Local Committees, published
by the Workers' National Committee. In fact, the
Workers' National Committee was engaged, during
the earlier months, in pushing a policy sketched out
for it by the Fabian Society, or, what is much the
same, by Mr. Sidney Webb.

In its advocacy of the prevention of unemployment
in preference to the mere relief of distress, this policy
was essentially sound, though, as we saw, the Govern-
ment lost no time in shuffling out of it as soon as they
found their chance. In the form advocated by Mr.
Webb, it was open to mere objection. Where useful
and productive work could not be found, Mr. Webb
urged, on the lines of conditional relief laid down in the
Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, that
the Local Committees should " find really educational

102 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

employment." Instead of recommending uncondi-
tional maintenance, Mr. Webb wished to hand over the
unemployed to the tender mercies of the Committees,
in order that the men might be " taught how to cook
and to sew and to cobble " and the women taken on at
Women's Training Centres. There could be no objec-
tion to such provisions if they were voluntary ; but
Mr. Webb's suggestion was that they should be the
conditions on which alone relief could be obtained.
He refused to recognise the workers' right to uncondi-
tional maintenance, and conceded only a conditional
right.

These objectionable provisions, however, entered
less into the Committee's work than the completely
sound attempt to secure the maintenance of the
volume of employment. They continually recom-
mended schemes of various kinds to the Government,
particularly building and improvement schemes suitable
for execution by local bodies with State assistance.
This, however, is far from exhausting the catalogue
of their early activities. Soon they realised the
unwillingness of the self-respecting Trade Unionist
to appeal to the Local Committees. To meet this
difficulty they continued their efforts to improve the
Committees, and, further, issued the following resolu-
tion on August 25 :

The committee strongly urges upon all wage -earners
who may be thrown out of work or become poverty-stricken
to apply at once for employment or relief to the organised
national or local committees before they attempt to sell
or pawn any of their furniture or personal effects.

In the case of persons who apply for Poor Law relief,
if it is clear that they need relief in consequence of the war,
they should not be paid out of the rates but out of the

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 103

special fund until such time as they can be dealt with by
the local committee.

That there should have been need for such a resolu-
tion is the best possible indication of the lamentable
spirit displayed by many Local Committees.

By September the general lines of the Government
policy were settled, and attention shifted to questions
of administration. Foremost among these was the
question of the scale of relief to be adopted by the
Local Committees. It was not until the fourth week
of October that the Government Committee and the
Executive Committee of the National Relief Fund
jointly fixed model scales of relief, which were to
operate with only slight variations over the whole
country. The official scales, arrived at after consider-
able dispute, were as follows, and it was further an-
nounced that, in determining the amount of relief to
be granted, all sources of income available to the
household should be taken into account, with the
exception of income from savings, including sickness
and unemployment benefit : outside

London. London,

s. d. s. d.

One adult . . . .100 80

Two adults . . . 14 o 12 o

Each additional adult . .46 46

Two adults and one child . 15 61 13 61

Two adults and two children . 17 o1 15 o1

Two adults and three children . 18 61 16 61

Two adults and four children . 20 o1 18 o1

Maximum coming into household 20 o 18 o

1 Less 6d. per week in respect of each child receiving meals at
school.

This totally inadequate scale, which in fact replaced
an even lower one that had been communicated
privately to the L.G.B. inspectors, was opposed by

104 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

the Workers' National Committee which had already,

on October 5, laid down the scale which it considered

adequate, and forwarded its recommendation to the

Committee of the National Relief Fund. The scale

suggested by Labour was this : s- d-

One adult . . . . . 12 6

Two adults . . . „ . 17 6

One adult and one child . . . 15 o

Two adults and one child . . 20 o

Two adults and two children . . 22 6

2s. 6d. for each additional child, and an additional
33. 6d. for adoption in London boroughs.

Thus the Committee fought in vain to secure from
the Government the adoption of a twenty-shilling family
minimum. There were only a few Local Committees
that defied the Government by continuing to pay relief
on a more adequate scale.

No sooner had Labour suffered defeat in the combat
for a more satisfactory scale than a new cause of dispute
arose.1 At the beginning of the war a good many
Trade Unions imposed levies on their members on
behalf of the National Relief Fund, on the understand-
ing that their members in distress would receive relief
from it on an adequate scale. This was done especially
by the miners ; but it was not long before dissatis-
faction with the administration of the Fund became
articulate and threatening. On November 23 a
deputation was appointed to interview the Executive
of the Fund on the position of Trade Unionists in
relation to it. The complaints were in the first place
that relief was refused until the applicant was in a

1 All through this period the Committee was also engaged in
a vain struggle to secure the exclusive use of the National Relief
Fund for civil distress, while the Government showed itself bent
on securing all it could for the dependents of soldiers and sailors.

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 105

state of destitution, and in the second that in-
quisitorial methods were being adopted. On both
points the reply was that such was not the intention
of the L.G.B. circulars ; but nothing was done.
The Workers' National Committee thereupon made
the demand " that the Government Committee should
agree to arrangements being made for Trade Unions
to collect contributions for the National Relief Fund
from their respective memberships, to dispense relief
to their necessitous members, and to remit the balances
to the Central Fund." The refusal of the South Wales
miners to go on paying into the Fund on the old terms
had already led to the adoption of such a scheme
in their case, and the Government now declared its
willingness to consider proposals for extending the
practice.

No wonder Trade Unionists, who for months had
been paying perhaps sixpence a week voluntarily into
the Fund, resented the inquisitions to which they were
submitted as soon as they wanted anything out of it.
There can have been few such contributors who did
not realise bitterly that the whole policy of Trade
Union contributions to the Relief Fund had been a
mistake, and that the Unions would have been far
better advised to form a central fund of their own for
the relief of distress among Trade Unionists, or like the
National Union of Teachers,1 to form special funds for
the relief of their own members. The same disgust
at the administration of the National Fund as led some
localities to raise Local Funds of their own soon spread
among the workers ; the Government's tardy recogni-
tion of the bare possibility of granting Trade Unionists

1 This policy was only adopted by the National Union of Teachers
when, having paid large sums into the National Relief Fund, they
became thoroughly disgusted with its administration.

io6 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

some sort of share in the administration of relief came
much too late to be of use and has, in fact, been almost
inoperative.

It is impossible even to outline the whole of the
immense mass of detailed work done by the Workers'
National Committee during the earlier months of the
war. No one who reads through its minutes can help
being struck by the wide range of the subjects discussed.
There are only one or two further aspects of its work
to which I have space to refer. It is impossible to pass
by without mention the work of the special Government
Contracts Sub - Committee, which became especially
active about the middle of November, when the War
Office's hut - building operations were in full swing.
Both in pressing for the publication of full lists of
Government contractors and in tracking down cases
of sweating among hut-builders and clothing employers
the Committee did admirable work. The Government
Departments, especially the War Office, cold-shouldered
it as much as they dared, and there is no doubt that
much sweating went unnoticed and unchecked ; but
there is equally little doubt that a vast deal of sweating
was prevented by the activity of the Workers' National
Committee. The widespread sub-letting of hut-build-
ing contracts by War Office contractors was especially
productive of sweating, and the Committee, before
which many actual employees came to give evidence,
was able to prove not merely sweating, but scandal-
ously inflated profits in many cases. The Workers'
National Committee pressed in vain for a full Govern-
ment enquiry into contracts. Though this was never
secured, it takes away nothing from the value of the
Committee's work.

With some aspects of the Committee's activities

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 107

we shall have to deal later, when we come to the special
questions to which they relate. Thus, I have reserved
the whole question of Child Labour for a special section :
all problems relating to women are treated in another
chapter ; and the work of the Committee with regard
to prices, which forms the second phase of its struggles
with the Government, is reserved to the following
chapter. Nor have I entered into its attempts to
secure better payment for the dependents of soldiers
and sailors, though this campaign, started on October 2
by a letter from Mr. G. N. Barnes in the Daily Citizen,
stood for some time in the forefront of the Labour
programme, and actually achieved a very considerable
raising of the allowances payable to dependents. I
have said enough to show that the War Emergency :
Workers' National Committee became the representa-
tive Labour body, and to a great extent replaced
Parliament as the organ of Labour's political criticism.
Of defects I shall have something to say later on.

So far we have been speaking only of one side of
the Labour demand, which, as we saw, pursued,
through the early months of the war, two independent
courses. While the Workers' National Committee was
acting as watchdog for Labour in connection with
relief work, the Joint Board, representing the united
forces of Trade Unionism and the Labour Party, was
pressing the Government for a fairer treatment of the
Unions. As we have given reason for believing that
the right course in the crisis would have been to make
the Unions the national agencies for relief, it is import-
ant to follow out the actual demand made by them in
some detail. We shall see that they did not act in a
manner calculated to get concessions from the Govern-
ment.

io8 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

In the first place, the Joint Board did not meet
till August 24 to consider the report drawn up by
Mr. Henderson on Trade Unions and the crisis. Mr.
Henderson pointed out that the result of the war had
been to produce in some Unions a very high rate of
unemployment, which, if it continued, would mean
insolvency. The funds of the Unions, he said, could
only be realised, on short notice and in the war emer-
gency, at very great loss, while in some cases the funds
would be quite insufficient to meet the situation. He
urged the Joint Board to agree on a policy and to
approach the Prime Minister with a view to its adoption.

After discussion, the Joint Board appointed a
deputation, and passed a series of resolutions. It
should be noticed that the closing of all strikes was
recommended unconditionally, and not on condition
of the Government's granting the Unions' requests.
The Unions, on the other hand, were only asked to
subscribe to the Prince of Wales's Fund " in the event
of the Government agreeing to make the necessary
provision for unemployment." None the less, the
refusal of the Government did not prevent many of
them from subscribing. Labour pursued its usual
policy of giving first and then appealing in vain to the
gratitude of the Government. Moreover, as we shall
see, the very vagueness of the demand made it easier
for the Government to refuse the requests conveyed
in the following resolutions, which were sent to the
Prime Minister together with the request that a
deputation should be received :

i. That an immediate effort be made to terminate all
existing trade disputes, whether strikes or lock-outs, and
whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war
period a serious attempt should be made by all concerned

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 109

to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a
strike or lock-out.

2. That the Government be requested to use its influence
with the employing classes so that wherever possible there
may be brought about a complete cessation of overtime
in order that unemployment may be minimised. It is
also suggested that short time should become operative
in any trade or workshop where full time cannot be main-
tained rather than that the non - employment of many
workers should be rendered necessary.

3. That the Government be requested to take into
consideration the serious position in which Trade Unions
must inevitably be placed if compelled to use their funds
to make provision for unemployment existing during the
war period, and to take steps through the provision of an
appropriation grant for subsidising the unions or by giving
the necessary assistance through the local Relief Com-
mittees, which will enable all working-class citizens to
obtain uniform assistance and incidentally enable the
unions to continue the payment of sick, superannuation,
and similar beneficent benefits.

4. That in the event of the Government agreeing to
make the necessary provision for unemployment those
unions whose rules provide for unemployment benefit
agree to suspend to the extent of the weekly amount of
the Government subsidy payment of this benefit during
the war period, including the benefit under the Insurance
Act, Part II., and to carry into effect the following pro-
posals :

(a) That all members of the union called up as Reservists
or as Territorials, or who may volunteer for
service during the war period, shall be free from
the payment of contributions and levies during
their service in the ranks, when absent with the
colours, except where rates of pay during such
service equal or exceed ordinary trade rates, but
to be reinstated on application upon resumption
of civil life and upon production of certificate of
discharge.

no LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

(b) That the unions be recommended to urge upon
their working members to subscribe liberally to
the Prince of Wales's Fund.

The deputation, which saw the Prime Minister on
August 27, made two important requests. It asked,
first, that where Unions found it necessary to realise
their funds they should be helped in this respect by
the Government ; and, in the second place, that the
Government should give the Unions an appropriation
grant to enable them to meet the drain on their funds.
Throughout, though the deputation made its request
gravely and Mr. Asquith answered " sympathetically,"
it was quite clear from the tone on both sides that
neither expected anything to come of the interview.
The following is a fair sample :

The PRIME MINISTER — I do not know exactly what
you are asking.

Mr. HENDERSON — I am trying to explain if my two
colleagues have not.

The PRIME MINISTER — They have pointed out the
trouble and necessity for relief ; but I want you to put
in a concrete form what you want the Government to do.
I understand this proposal about insurance. I do not say
whether it is practicable or not. That is quite intelligible.
Let me call your attention to the words of the trade resolu-
tion : "To take steps through the provision of an appropria-
tion grant for subsidising the unions."

Mr. HENDERSON — That is the point I am coming to.

The PRIME MINISTER — I want to have that explained.

Mr. HENDERSON — I was proceeding to say that it was
a tall order. It is a tall order.

The PRIME MINISTER — I am afraid it is a very tall
order ; but I want to know how tall it is.

In reality the trouble was not that the order was
too tall, but that it was not tall enough. Had the
Unions openly demanded the exclusive right to

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT in

administer relief to their members, they would have
had a far better chance of securing it than they had
of securing an appropriation grant to save them from
insolvency. They went as petitioners in bankruptcy ;
they should have gone with a demand for responsibility.
The Prime Minister evidently saw that for the time
being there was nothing to fear from the Unions. He
therefore returned an evasive answer and tried to
shelve the whole question. The Joint Board was kept
waiting for its answer till October, and then the
Government produced a scheme which bore only the
most distant resemblance to the demands made by the
deputation. No help was to be afforded to the Unions
in the realisation of their funds : all that was given
was an extension of the subsidies made to Unions
under Clause 106 of the Insurance Act. Under that
Act, any Union, on complying with stringent conditions,
could obtain from the Board of Trade a refund of
one-sixth of its total expenditure on Unemployment
Insurance. To this were now, in certain cases, to be
added special emergency grants. These grants, how-
ever, were only to be made on the following conditions :

1. That the Association should be suffering from
abnormal unemployment.

2. That the Association should not pay Unemploy-
ment Benefit above a maximum rate of 173. per week
(including any sum paid by way of State Unemployment
Benefit).

3. That the Association should agree while in receipt
of the emergency grant to impose levies over and above
the ordinary contributions upon those members who remain
fully employed.

The amount of the emergency grant (in addition to the
refund of one-sixth already payable) will be either one-
third or one-sixth of the expenditure of the Association

H2 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

on Unemployment Benefit (exclusive of Strike Benefit).
The rate of the grant will be determined by the amount of
the levy in accordance with the following scale :

Maximum rate of Unemployment Benefit
paid by Association.

Rate of Weekly Levy required to
obtain Emergency Grant of

One-sixth.

One-third.

Not more than 173. . . .
,, ,, ,, 153. . . .

3d.
2d.
id.

6d.
4d.

2d.

I 33.

For example, an Association paying unemployment
benefit at the rate of 12s. a week will by imposing a levy
of 2d. per week on the employed members be qualified
for an emergency grant of one-third of its expenditure,
i.e. a total refund of one-half, taking into account the
present refund of one-sixth.

The same Association, if it prefers only to impose a
levy of id. per week, will be qualified for an emergency
grant of one-sixth, i.e. for a total refund of one-third.

Associations paying higher rates of benefit would have
to impose higher levies in order to qualify for the same
proportionate refunds.

Applications will also be entertained for emergency
grants, which will be subject to special conditions, in
respect of expenditure already incurred by Associations
on unemployment benefit since August 4, 1914.

Many of the conditions attaching to this scheme
are obviously unfair in their incidence. It seems,
in fact, to be worked on the principle that " unto him
that hath shall be given." Where a Union is rich
enough to pay out large sums in benefit, and able in
addition to exact a sixpenny levy, it secures a pro-
portionately large refund : where it is too poor to pay
much in benefits and unable to exact so high a levy,

LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT 113

it gets nothing. Moreover, the whole principle of a
compulsory levy was surely wrong. Unemployment
due to the war should be a charge upon the community
and not upon the trade affected. As I said before,
the statesmanlike course would have been to refund to
the Unions all sums over the average of past years
spent on out-of-work benefit. Here, too, however, the
Government desired to get off as cheaply as possible,
and had no desire to give the Unions any share in
national responsibility. How cheaply they have got
off appears from the following table, which shows the
amounts spent on emergency grants up to the end of
March.

Applications Granted.

Trade Group.

Number of
Associations.

Membership.

Amounts Paid.

£ s. d.

Building .

I

61

463

Metal ! .

18

8,372

1,165 JI 2

Cotton2 .

133

220,954

64,772 4 7

Other Textile

7

5,4°2

2,120 13 Q

Printing .

6

23,260

4,948 13 8

Woodwork

8

I7,302

1,801 7 o

Other Trades3

9

8,427

1,943 8 8

TOTAL

182

283,778

76,756 5 i

1 Textile Machinery and Jewellery workers.
a Including Bleaching, Dyeing, and Finishing in Cotton.
3 Leather workers, Basket makers, Hatters, Tobacco (Cigar)
workers, etc.

Thus, the total grant amounts to £76,000 for seven
months, and of this £64,000 has gone to the cotton
industry. Yet we know from the annual reports of
the cotton Trade Unions that this sum has been
utterly inadequate to save them from enormous losses

i

H4 LABOUR AND THE GOVERNMENT

on last year's working. For the first quarter after the
beginning of the war, the Oldham Cardroom Association
alone expended £23,000, and to set against it an income
of only £7500, a loss of well over £15,000 on the quarter's
working. The Government's scheme was miserly to
the last degree, and it is to be hoped that the Unions
will remember it against them in the future.

This brings us to the end of our double survey of
the Labour demand and of the Government's action
for the relief of distress. This we may call the first
phase in the relations between Labour and the State
during the war. In the main, it clearly amounts to a
defeat of the Labour forces, due mainly to the fact
that a Government hostile to Labour was in possession
of the national resources, but also partly to the failure
of Labour itself to press its case. A more determined
demand at the beginning might well have saved much
of the bickering that has happened since.

The commercial interests affected by the war made
no such mistake, as indeed they encountered no such
determined opposition. Throughout, where business has
been unable to go on "as usual," business has been com-
pensated.1 Labour alone has been expected to make
every sacrifice without return or gratitude. Employed,
even the war worker was sometimes handed over to the
sweater ; unemployed, he fell into the clutches of the
Relief Committee : as consumer, he was the victim of
profiteers whom the Government would not control ;
but as soon as he stirred a finger in his own interest, he
was proclaimed a traitor and ordered back to work.

I come now to the second phase — to the struggle of
Labour against high prices and exploitation.

1 Business not necessary for the war has been allowed to suffer
along with labour.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND PHASE — PRICES AND PROFITS

WE have seen that Labour, or rather the Labour
leaders, proclaimed an industrial truce without any
guarantee that the existing rates of real wages would
be maintained. Laying down the sword of industrial
action, they trusted to the Government to secure them
against exploitation by a rise in prices. Any encourage-
ment they may have received from the Government's
action during the first weeks of August has certainly
not been reinforced since then. All the demands of
Labour for the reduction of food and coal prices were
treated either with a bare denial of their possibility
or with a contemptuous " Wait till June."

The struggle of Labour against high prices forms the
second phase of its conflict with the Government. As
we shall see, it was not until the " prices campaign "
had been definitely proved fruitless that the real
industrial unrest began. Labour did everything it
could to persuade the Government to take action on
the nation's behalf : it was only in face of a definite
refusal that some of the rank and file determined — all
too hesitantly — to take action on behalf of themselves
and their fellows. The Labour unrest followed the
prices campaign, and was to a great extent a result

"5

n6 PRICES AND PROFITS

of its failure. There can be little doubt that the policy
of making the prices campaign the first plank in the
Labour platform was from the first a mistake. Many
among the rank and file felt this all along, and an
earlier wages campaign would certainly have met with
a far more satisfactory response.

It is a commonplace, as well as an obvious fact,
that every rise in prices means a fall in real wages
unless it is counterbalanced by a corresponding advance.
The trick of nullifying wage advances by means of a
rise in prices is well known to capitalism, and the rise
in the cost of living is often used by the workers as
an argument for an increase in rates of wages. The
industrial truce left the employers free to raise prices,
while it prevented the workers from securing higher
wages. It therefore involved an immediate fall in
the real rates of wages.

It is often said, by those who admit the fall in
standard rates, that the balance was in fact restored
by the increase in actual earnings. Increased rapidity
in production, better factory organisation, Sunday
labour, and overtime, we are told, increased the actual
earnings of the workers more than the rise in prices
depressed them. This extraordinary argument gives
rise to several important considerations.

In the first place, the workers, it seems, ought to be
content to work longer hours for the same real reward.
This argument is presumably based on the plea for
" sacrifice among all classes," of which we shall have
more to say later on. Here let us only notice that it
totally ignores the effect on the worker of overtime,
Sunday labour, and speeding-up (which is what is
usually meant by " better factory organisation ").
Labour for long hours, seven days or even six days a

PRICES AND PROFITS 117

week, means overstrain and physical harm, and leads
in many cases to sickness and prolonged absence from
work. Large earnings in one week may, then, often
be counterbalanced by no earnings at all the week
after. When to long hours is added work done under
abnormal conditions of speeding-up (in the name of
national service) the risk is multiplied twofold.
Higher earnings for a time are poor payment for long-
lived, or even permanent impairment of earning power.
Secondly, there is an even greater flaw in the
" higher earnings " argument. It is true that, in
certain trades, not a few workers are earning money
more than adequate to meet the rise in the cost of
living. Let it be added that, for the work they have
done, they richly deserve far more than they have got.
It is also true that the transference of labour from one
occupation to another has resulted in very many cases
in largely increased earnings. The silver workers of
Sheffield and the jewellery workers of Birmingham,
for instance, who are now doing work on munitions, are
earning as a rule far more than they ever earned at their
old trades. But, admitting these cases, what are we
to say of the distribution of the increase ? The higher
earnings have come only to certain workers in certain
highly necessary jobs : millions of workers in other
industries, no less truly necessary, have had no share
in them. Many were working short time or not at all
during the early months of the war : not a few, despite
the shortage of Labour, are still unemployed or on
short time. In many cases these workers have even
now received no advances in wages : in nearly all,
the earlier months of the war meant for them a serious
fall in real wages and earnings, and often in nominal
wages and earnings as well. Those who have gained

n8 PRICES AND PROFITS

in purchasing power are, on the one hand, the workers
in some skilled trades — whose gains are almost wholly
the result of increased exertion and overtime — and,
on the other, the dependents of some of the less skilled
workers who have enlisted. A vast army of wage-
earners, especially among those who could least afford
it, have lost heavily in real earnings as a result of the
war.

The reason why Labour decided to inaugurate a
" Food Prices Campaign " now becomes apparent. It
needed a programme which would have something
to offer to every class of worker, that would do some-
thing to relieve the pressure in every working-class
household, that would help not only the organised
Trade Unionists, but also the vast mass of helpless
and grossly underpaid male and female labour that
could do nothing to help itself. All grades of workers
alike needed greater purchasing power, and this a fall
in food prices would give them.

Add to this the ascertained fact that in certain
quarters large fortunes were being made by shipowners,
coalowners, and coal merchants, purveyors and pre-
parers of food and other classes of capitalists. Face
to face with this exploitation, face to face with the
common need of the community, the War Emergency :
Workers' National Committee embarked upon its
campaign in favour of lower prices for food and fuel.
It failed : indeed, success was hardly to be expected.
The Government was not frightened of the workers,
and therefore it did nothing for them.

Before we pass to the record of the Labour Food
Prices campaign, it will be well to have before us the
facts about the rise in prices and also the ascertained
movements of rates of wages from month to month.

PRICES AND PROFITS

119

The following table shows the rise in the retail prices
of foodstuffs from August 1914 to June 1915. It is
calculated so as to include those commodities in which
there was no change of price as well as those which
were affected by war conditions. It is compiled from
successive issues of the Board of Trade Labour Gazette,
and is the result of special information furnished from
all the chief centres. It may therefore be regarded as
authoritative.

PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF RETAIL FOOD PRICES ON NORMAL
PRICES IN JULY 1914.

d\

_>>
>-»

£

<

M

u>

<

*s

1

w

ti
o

o

o

8
Q

a
a
>-»

j$

£

$

s

P.

>>

M

S3

V

1— »

Large Towns .

100

116

III

III

113

"3

"7

119

"3

125

I2S

127

132

Small Towns and Villages

too

"5

109

109

III

112

"5

117

I2O

122

122

124

129

The articles included are meat, fish, flour, bread, sugar, milk, potatoes, margarine, butter,
cheese, eggs, tea, coffee, and cocoa.

There has thus been a net increase in the cost of
food of more than 30 per cent, and the upward tendency
still continues. The 15 per cent increase during the
first week of August was largely a panic increase, which
was checked partly by the Government's action in
fixing maximum prices, but still more by the natural
evaporation of the panic. The disquieting fact is
that since the middle of September there has been a
continuous steady increase, most marked about the
New Year, and that there is no indication that a climax
has been reached.

The real meaning of these percentages can be con-
veyed more easily in terms of actual expenditure than
by the percentage method of the Board of Trade. If
a family was spending 255. on food during a week of

I2O

PRICES AND PROFITS

last July, it would have to spend 335. at the end of
May 1915 in order to secure the same amount of
commodities. Since that date there has been a
further increase.

The only statistical comparison that can be made
with this table showing the rise in prices is the table,
published monthly by the Board of Trade, showing
changes in rates of wages. This table — which excludes
rural workers, seamen, railwaymen, police and Govern-
ment employees — furnishes a fairly reliable guide to
the movement of standard rates of wages, though not,
of course, to the fluctuation of actual earnings. It
should be mentioned that the decreases given in the
table are in nearly all cases the result of automatic
sliding scale agreements in the iron and steel trades
and in coal-mining.

CHANGES IN RATES OF WAGES.1

Increases.

Decreases.

Total Increase or
Decrease.

Numbers

Amount

Numbers

Amount

Numbers

Amount

affected.

per week.

affected.

per week.

affected.

per week.

August .

18,708

£l,OIO

36,200

£1,188

54,906

-/I?*

September .

2,142

'73

. .

2,142

+ 173

October

58,081

2,297

9,l82

1 80

67,263

+ 2,117

November .

31,452

3,502

M7,405

5,385

178.857

-1,883

December

49,658

3.692

49,658

+ 3.692

January

44,770

4,240

77.535

2,324

122,305

+ 1,916

February

149,988

?

3,650

?

153,638

+ 17,889

March .

446,267

72,713

446,267

+ 72,713

April

192,655

12,894

192,655

+ 12,894

May

969,680 •

188,485

• •

••

969,680

+ 188,425

1 This table excludes agricultural workers, seamen, railwaymen, police
and Government employees.

• 823,900 persons and £169,333 of this increase are accounted for by
the mining industry.

PRICES AND PROFITS 121

A corrected estimate in the Board of Trade Labour
Gazette for May gives aggregate figures showing the
net increase during the first five months of 1915.
During the period from January to May, 1,987,444
workers had their rates of wages changed, either per-
manently or for the period of the war. The result of
these changes was an increase of £343,374 per week,
or an average of nearly y>. 6d. per head.

It is important to notice how these increases were
distributed among the various industries, and the
mining industry alone accounted for £171,187, or half
the total increase ; engineering and shipbuilding trades
£81,359, or rather less than half the remainder. The
transport trades claimed £25,618, the textile trades
(i.e. woollens) £15,665, the iron and steel trades £9310,
and the building trades £3775. It will be seen that
the important increases are confined to trades doing
work essential for the conduct of the war.

The biggest increase was in May, when a million
workers engaged in coal-mining received increases ; but
still little or nothing has been done for the workers in
less essential industries. The demands of the cotton
workers, for instance, have been rejected in the most
cavalier manner by the cotton employers. Two
million wage-earners form only a very small proportion
of the whole number, and it is noticeable that women
workers have received hardly any benefits.

It is clear, then, that, apart from certain favoured
industries which have been in a strong enough position
to make terms, the rise in prices has meant a serious
decline in the spending power of the workers. It
remains to enquire to what causes the rise is to be
attributed.

As Professor Bowley has stated in a lecture on

122 PRICES AND PROFITS

" Prices and Earnings in Time of War," only some of
the causes are such as could be anticipated before the
outbreak of war. The stoppage of supplies from
certain Continental countries, higher insurance rates,
and so on, were causes which could be calculated in
advance. But, in fact, since the first weeks, these
causes have been quite secondary in importance.
Shipping has not been greatly interrupted, and insur-
ance rates have been low in comparison with what
was expected.

On the other hand, causes which were not taken into
account beforehand have had a very great effect. It
was anticipated that the prices of home products
would not greatly change. Here, no less than in the
case of imports, calculations have been thrown out
by the increase hi freight charges. The amount of
shipping has been greatly curtailed by the com-
mandeering of many vessels for Government service,
while the German submarine campaign has also reduced
the number of vessels available. The docks, working
with reduced or less skilled staffs than normally, have
had to cope with an immense mass of Government
work, and there has been much congestion, involving
expensive delays and storage of produce. The supply
of railway trucks has not equalled the demand, or at
any rate the supply has not been so organised as to
meet the demand. Last, but not least, the power of
monopoly, operating through the " rings " which
control most of our principal industries, has been
exercised unscrupulously at the expense of the people.
The rise in prices has, in fact, been due even more to
internal conditions than to the effect of the war on
importation and exportation.

The history of the attempts of Labour to combat

PRICES AND PROFITS 123

the forces making for high prices will bring out these
points in more detail. The Labour prices campaign
falls into two distinct periods, the first extending
from August to October 1914, and the second from
January to March 1915.

We have seen, in Chapter IV., that the programme
outlined by the Labour Conference of August 5, which
called the War Emergency : Workers' National Com-
mittee into being, contained two general proposals.
It pressed for the prevention of unemployment, and
it passed the following significant recommendations :

That arrangements be made at once to press upon the
Government and municipal authorities measures for offici-
ally controlling : (a) the purchase and storage of food ;
(b) the fixing of maximum prices of food and trade neces-
sities ; and (c) the distribution of food.

That the citizen committees proposed to be set up be
urged to guard against the exploitation of the people by
unnecessarily high prices.

These resolutions, as we saw, were passed during
the first week of the war, when the first " panic " rise
in prices was at its height. The upward movement
began on August i, was accelerated on August 3, and
reached its height on August 8, when prices were
15 or 16 per cent above the July level. From that
point there was a steady fall till September 12, when
they were about 10 per cent above the July level.
During this period of slightly falling prices following
on the panic rise, negotiations were going on between
the Workers' National Committee and the Board of
Trade on the question of Government control ; but it
was not till September 28, when the rise had set in
anew, that energetic action began to be taken. On
that date the Food Prices Sub-Committee presented a

124 PRICES AND PROFITS

report in which it urged that the Board of Trade should
be requested to state what action it was taking with
regard to the supply of sugar, meat, and cereals, and
that an interview should be requested with the Board
of Agriculture on the development of agricultural
resources. The week after, this last matter was
pressed further by the passage of the following resolu-
tion :

That the price of wheat having risen to a figure (385. to
455. per quarter) which allows a reasonable margin of profit
for home growers, who are being advised, against the truest
interests of the nation, to refrain from growing more wheat
until prices rule considerably higher, this Committee is of
opinion that the Government should appoint a Royal Com-
mission on Wheat with the following definite objects :

1. To commandeer all present stocks of English wheat
at prices from 353. to 405. per quarter.

2. To sell the same at current market prices. In case
of a surplus to pay a bounty of 5 per cent to the growers
and the balance into the Treasury.

3. To secure that all holders of land other than market
gardens up to five acres in extent shall put at least one-fifth
of their holdings, where suitable, under wheat, and main-
tain the same from year to year under the conditions set
out above.

On October 26 the Committee issued its programme,
including the following demands dealing with food
prices :

5. The encouragement and development of home-
grown food supplies by the National Organisation of Agri-
culture, accompanied by drastic reductions of freight
charges for all produce, in the interests of the whole people.

6. Protection of the people against exorbitant prices,
especially in regard to food, by the enactment of maxima
and the commandeering of supplies by the nation wherever
advisable.

PRICES AND PROFITS 125

Thus already in October the burden of heavy
freight charges was making itself felt and the need for
a national campaign to deal with food prices was
faintly realised. Nevertheless, the matter seems for
the time to have been carried no further. The Food
Prices Sub-Committee was allowed to lapse, and the
Workers' National Committee turned its attention to
other questions, especially to the pressing problem of
the administration of the National Relief Fund, with
which we have already dealt, and to the deplorable
conditions under which Government contracts were
being allotted and executed.

The beginning of the real Prices Campaign dates
from January 14, 1915, when the Workers' National
Committee reissued its demand of October 5, and
reappointed the Food Prices Sub-Committee. By
this time food prices were considerably over 20 per
cent above the pre-war level.

The Sub -Committee lost no time. A week later
it issued an exhaustive Memorandum dealing with
wheat prices, tracing the rise unmistakably to the
increased freight charges. It was pointed out that
the commandeering of ships for Government service
and, even more, the driving of German commerce from
the seas, had created a situation highly favourable to
British shipowners, who had not hesitated to exact
the full monopoly prices for the service of their vessels.
As a statement in the Journal of Commerce for
November 27, 1914, declared :

The opportunities now open to British shipping are
obvious. There are no more cut rates by subsidised German
vessels. German ships being swept off the sea, we have
now no serious competitors in the carrying trade of the
world.

126 PRICES AND PROFITS

The Memorandum admits that congestion at the
docks, due to the partial closing of the East Coast
ports, has to some extent affected carrying charges ;
but it goes on to prove that the actual rise in freights
is in no way accounted for by the increase in standing
charges. In short, it shows conclusively that ship-
owners have not scrupled to exact full monopoly
prices. In addition, it points out that many of our
vessels continue to carry between foreign ports, and
urges the recall of vessels flying the British flag for
home service. Its general recommendation is in the
following terms :

That the most effective action that the Government can
now take to reduce wheat prices is to intervene to remedy
the deficiency in carrying-ships ; and we recommend,
therefore, that the Government should at once take steps
to obtain the control of more ships and itself bring the
wheat from Argentina and Canada at the bare cost of
transport.

From the wheat supply the Committee passed to
the question of coal. A second Memorandum, dealing
with Coal Prices, was issued on January 28. Here
the Committee found itself faced with the exploitation
of the consumer by three distinct groups of capitalists :
coalowners, coal merchants, and shipowners. Some-
times, where the colliery owned its own shipping or
acted as its own merchant, a double profit was ac-
cruing to it ; but as a rule there were found to be three
distinct bodies of exploiters.

The most astonishing fact revealed by the Com-
mittee's enquiries was the margin of profit accruing
to the London coal merchants on the cheaper kinds of
coal. A large proportion of the output of the collieries
is sold to manufacturers and merchants on contract

PRICES AND PROFITS

127

prices arranged in advance ; but there generally
remains a surplus, which is sold at current prices at
the pit mouth. Basing its conclusions mainly on the
conditions governing the London supply, the Com-
mittee found that the great bulk of the house coal on
sale had been contracted for at prices ruling before the
war. Nevertheless, the prices at which the surplus
coal was being sold by the colliery companies were
found to be governing to a considerable extent the
retail prices for all classes of coal. That is to say, the
difference between contract prices and current prices,
not to mention a big margin over either, was going into
the pockets of the coal-merchants.

This contention was fully borne out by the figures
published by the Committee, showing the margin be-
tween contract and current prices and advertised
retail rates per ton in London :

Contract Prices.

Current Prices.

Advertised

Quality.

prices in
London.1

Pit

mouth.

Rail
rate.

Total.

Pit
mouth.

Rail
rate.

Total.

Best Wallsend

s. d.

s. d.

s. d.

s. d.

s. d.

s. d.

s. d.

(selected)

32 o

14 o

8 2

22 2

20 0

8 2

28 2

Silkstones

32 o

14 3

7 6

21 9

19 o

7 6

26 6

Derby Blights

31 o

13 6

7 6

21 O

18 o

7 6

25 6

Bright Nuts

30 o

12 6

7 6

20 0

18 o

7 6

25 6

Best House

30 o

ii 6

7 6

19 o

18 o

7 6

25 6

Best Kitchen .

30 o

ii 3

7 9

19 o

17 o

7 9

24 9

Hard Cobbles .

30 o

10 0

6 7

16 7

17 o

6 7

23 7

Hard Nuts

30 o

9 9

7 6

17 3

17 o

7 6

24 6

»>

30 o

9 9

7 o

16 9

17 o

7 °

24 o

Stove Coal

30 o

9 9

6 3

16 o

15 o

6 3

21 3

1 NOTE. — These prices are for deliveries of quarter ton or more. When
bought by the cwt. by the poorer section of the people the prices vary
from is. gd. to 2s. per cwt., or 353. to 403. per ton.

128 PRICES AND PROFITS

The most important fact emerging from this table
is that the margin of profit to the merchant is far
greater in the cases of the cheaper kinds of coal than
of the more expensive. In comparison with winter
prices in 1913, the more expensive kinds of coal went
up 2s. to 35. a ton, while the cheaper kinds went up
from 6s. to 8s. Allowing 35. per ton, which is the
usual estimate for cartage charges and cost of delivery,
there is a marginal profit still to be accounted for of
55. or 6s. in the case of the more expensive kinds of
contract coal, and of no less than us. in the case of
the cheaper varieties. The Memorandum points out
that the supposed competition between the London
coal merchants is really an illusion, that some firms
trade under various names, apparently in competition
one with another, and that prices are always fixed by
a close ring. The case against the merchants is made
out beyond the possibility of doubt : they exacted large
monopoly profits throughout the winter of 1914-15.

The case against the coalowners is less glaring,
but no less clear. At the time when the Memorandum
was issued, certain small rises in miners' wages in
Cumberland and elsewhere had been more than balanced
by reductions in Northumberland and Durham. The
net result of all changes in miners' wages had been
a considerable decrease. Nevertheless, though from
September to November contract prices were higher
than current prices at the pit mouth, there was already
in the New Year a very considerable increase in current
over contract prices, and no part of this had gone to
the workers. As the advances subsequently obtained
by the miners through arbitration conclusively prove,
the coalowners, too, were exacting an exorbitant
profit.

PRICES AND PROFITS 129

Thirdly, just as the increase in overseas freights had
increased wheat prices, the increase in coasting freight
charges affected the price of coal and diverted much
coal from the sea to the railways. Thus additional
congestion was created, and prices were forced yet
higher. The colliery companies which own their own
ships made a double profit.

The Committee therefore issued the following
recommendations :

1. That maximum prices for coal should be fixed by the
Government.

2. That railway trucks, belonging both to the separate
railway companies and to private traders, should be pooled
and run to their fullest economic use.

3. That in fixing shipping freights for vessels under their
control the Government should have regard to normal
rates rather than to the excessive rates inflicted by private
shipowners. We also reiterate our demand for public
control of general merchant shipping.

4. That the Government commandeer coal supplies
and distribute to household consumers through municipal
or co-operative agencies.

5. That district conferences on this and kindred subjects
be organised in various industrial centres.

In these two Memoranda the Prices Campaign of
the Workers' National Committee took shape, and it
was arranged that a series of District Conferences
should be held on February 13, on the same lines as
the November conferences on Military and Naval
Pensions, in the chief industrial centres.

Two days before the date fixed for these Conferences
an important debate on prices took place in the House
of Commons. The Labour Party had tabled a motion
in the following terms :

That, in the opinion of this House, the present rise in

K

130 PRICES AND PROFITS

the prices of food, coal, and other necessities of life is not
justified by any economic consequence of the war, but is
largely caused by the holding-up of stocks and by the in-
adequate provision of transport facilities. This House is
therefore further of opinion that the Government should
prevent this unjustifiable increase by employing the shipping
and railway facilities necessary to put the required supplies
on the market, by fixing maximum prices, and by acquiring
control of commodities that are or may be subject to artificial
costs.

This motion was, however, set aside by the Govern-
ment, and preference was given to a non-committal
motion tabled by a Mr. Ferens, a Liberal Member.
The Labour motion was therefore moved only as an
amendment. The debate occupied two days, February
ii and February 17, and between these two days the
District Conferences occurred.

The debate on February n must rank among the
principal causes of Labour unrest. Mr. Asquith chose
this occasion for making his famous " Wait till June "
speech. He asserted that things were not so bad as
they had been after the Franco-Prussian War, or as
" the most sober-minded and best-informed judgments
in the country would have apprehended." Apart
from a slight concession in the matter of pooling railway
trucks, he pooh-poohed in succession each suggested
remedy, and ended by suggesting that conditions
might improve if the nation would quietly " wait till
June." Mr. Bonar Law, being in opposition, made a
slightly more sympathetic speech.

The Prime Minister's speech acted as an irritant.
When the District Conferences met two days later,
there were clear signs of. a changing spirit among the
workers. Conferences in London, Liverpool, Birming-
ham, Bradford, Cardiff, Leicester, and Portsmouth

PRICES AND PROFITS 131

passed a resolution endorsing the demands made by
the Workers' National Committee. The preamble was
in these terms :

That this conference expresses its deep indignation and
disappointment at the refusal of the Government to take
effective measures to deal with the alarming rises in the
cost of food and fuel. It appeals to the House of Commons
to force the Government to take immediate steps to relieve
the unsupportable burden which the cost of the necessaries
of life is imposing upon the working classes, and to demand
that the following definite proposals be substituted for the
policy of inaction put forward by the Prime Minister.

The terms of this resolution were not stringent
enough to please the great London Conference, at
which the following amendment was carried :

That we express our approval of the splendid stand made
by Mr. J. R. Clynes, M.P., in the House of Commons on
Thursday during the debate on food prices. Further, we
express the hope that the Labour Party, in view of the
Prime Minister's speech, will force the issue in support of
their own resolution to a division unless a more satisfactory
statement be secured from the Government.

The importance of this amendment lay in the fact
that the Labour Party had announced that it would
not press its amendment to a division. The tone of
the other Conferences was hardly less militant, and
in Manchester a resolution urging a complete cessation
of work in default of drastic action by the Government
was carried.

When the debate was resumed on February 17 a
new Labour amendment was moved, advocating the
fixing of maximum prices and Government control of
commodities likely to be subject to artificial costs.

132 PRICES AND PROFITS

The debate, in the course of which Mr. Runciman made
another " cold water " speech, while Sir Harry Verney
at last conceded, on behalf of the Government, an
enquiry into coal prices, was memorable for a scathing
attack on the Prime Minister by Mr. Philip Snowden.
The Labour attempt to secure a division on the amend-
ment was defeated by the Speaker, who refused to put
the question. There seems, however, to have been
no adequate protest against this from the Labour
benches.

The Workers' National Committee met the next
day and resolved, in view of the unsatisfactory attitude
of the Government, to call a National Conference on
March 12. At a subsequent meeting it was decided
that this Conference should be asked to endorse the
Committee's proposals with regard to the prices of
food and coal.

When the Conference actually met, it proved once
again to be more militant than had been expected.
The resolutions endorsing the proposals of the National
Committee were carried, and the following significant
addition was passed, in face of the opposition of several
Labour members, though only by a majority of one
vote :

That should the Government decline to cany out what
is demanded by this Conference the Conference calls upon
the Labour Party in the House to take all and every measure
possible — by drastic political action, by dividing the House
or by any other steps — to force the Government to take
action in the manner indicated.

" I hope," said the Chairman, Mr. Arthur Henderson,
after the vote had been taken, " that after that vote
you will allow the Labour Party some discretion."
As nothing has been done by the Government, and the

PRICES AND PROFITS 133

Labour Party is now represented in a Coalition Ministry,
it seems to have taken all the discretion it needed.

With this climax the Labour campaign against high
prices virtually came to an end, at least for the time.
It failed to move the Government to take any drastic
action, and it is at least plausible to attribute its
failure to the fact that there was no economic power
behind it. Though there were already abundant signs
of anger, there was no sign of any widespread break-
down of the industrial truce. The Government still
felt safe in flouting the workers, and its feeling of
security was justified by results.

One small concession Labour did gain. A Committee
of six was appointed by the Government to enquire
into the causes of the rise in price of household coal,
and on this Committee were Professor W. J. Ashley,
Mr. Will Crooks, and Mr. J. J. Dent. Its Report,
issued at the beginning of April, bore out the conten-
tions of the Workers' National Committee. It pointed
out that prices had risen steadily from September 25,
and that, in the case of good quality coal, there had
been a rise of gs. a ton by February 17, as against 2s.
in the winters of 1912-13 and 1913-14. Moreover,
the inferior qualities had risen far more, and large
quantities of poor coal, which could usually find no
market, were being sold at highly profitable rates.
The rise in price, the Committee held, was first occa-
sioned by a temporary scarcity in November, but had
not passed with the resumption of more nearly normal
conditions of production and transport. It was shown
that while prices were not fixed by " definitely con-
stituted " rings, they were in effect settled for the
whole industry by a few leading firms, and that, as
owners and merchants had a common interest in high

134 PRICES AND PROFITS

prices, these had been maintained at an unduly high
level. The recommendations of the Committee must
be set out in full :

The Committee direct attention to the fact that certain
owners have made a practice of reducing their deliveries
under contract, on the ground of reduction of output. The
Committee have grave doubts as to the legality of this
practice, and cannot but regard it as highly questionable
when it enables the coalowner to sell a larger quantity of
" free coal " at greatly enhanced prices.

The Committee regard the outlook for next winter as
serious and requiring immediate consideration. They con-
sider that the question can only be dealt with by measures
affecting the coal industry as a whole (including gas and
industrial coal as well as household coal) ; and they recom-
mend :

(a) The temporary restriction of exports to neutral
countries ;

(b) Consultation with the London County Council and
other public bodies concerned, with a view to considering
whether those bodies should not, during the coming summer,
acquire and store in or near London stocks of household
coal to be sold to traders supplying small consumers during
next winter ;

(c) A further reduction of freights on the interned
steamers now being used to convey coals, especially gas
coals, from the North ;

(d) Use for coal transport of suitable enemy ships con-
demned by prize courts ;

(e) " If prices do not shortly return to a reasonable level,
the Government should consider a scheme for assuming
control of the output of collieries during the continuance of
the war."

It is now some months since this drastic report was
published, all too late for the winter of 1914-15. It
is to be hoped, though the Government has given no
sign as yet, that its recommendations will be put in

PRICES AND PROFITS 135

force soon, with a view to the possible conditions next
winter. Early action is essential if the next winter is
not to be merely a repetition of the last ; for contracts
governing next winter's prices are already being
entered into all over the country. Unless something
is done on the lines laid down in this report, it must
be said that the whole Labour agitation against high
prices has been utterly without effect.

Throughout the foregoing section we have been
speaking primarily of prices ; but through these has
been the sinister hint that inflated prices are the
correlative of no less inflated profits. In the agitation
against the high price of wheat, Labour came face to
face with the monopolistic power of the shipowners :
in the coal Prices Campaign it found itself confronted
by an unholy alliance of profiteers — coalowners, coal
merchants, and, once again, shipowners. The distrust
created by these experiences of business as usual had
a great effect on the temper of the workers. Up to
that point they had been content to sacrifice much in
what they were told was the national cause ; but
when once they began to believe that they were being
" done," they began to examine the situation more
carefully, and in a less acquiescent spirit. The begin-
ning of widespread Labour unrest dated from the
failure of the Prices Campaign, and originated in the
workers' new-born sense of being cheated.

The lesson which the revelations brought about
by the Prices Campaign served to bring home to the
workers was all through the winter being learnt from
other sources also. In the last chapter something
was said about the work of the Government Contracts
Sub-Committee of the Workers' National Committee.
We saw how the Committee continually pressed for a

136 PRICES AND PROFITS

full enquiry into the conditions under which Govern-
ment contracts were being given and executed, and
how it was able to prove in many cases, especially
in hut-building, not merely that the workers were
being sweated, but also that shamefully inflated profits
were being made. In hut-building, in army catering,
in clothing, in transport services of all kinds, and in
the getting and distribution of coal, it soon became
apparent that business was very much as usual, and
that undue profits were being extracted as a result of
the war. The very strong suspicion that the same
thing was happening in the engineering and ship-
building industry had a great deal to do with the
outbreak of Labour troubles on the Clyde.

Impossible to prove in detail till long after the
event, the charge of undue profiteering has gained
considerable support from the balance sheets and
annual meetings of the great companies. In all
industries ministering to the needs of the army and
navy, the capitalists seem to be making a good thing
out of the war. What wonder if the workers, com-
manded to make sacrifices in the name of patriotism
by employers who are themselves making money
hand over fist, refuse to acquiesce any longer in the
absurd conditions created by the industrial truce.
When the Prices Campaign had failed, Labour demanded
not merely higher wages to meet the increased cost of
living, but also the limitation of capitalist profits
arising out of the war.

Thus Labour passes from the second phase, the war
against high prices, to the third phase of Labour
unrest. It would, however, be unfair to dismiss the
Prices Campaign without some reference to the im-
portant practical work accomplished by the Co-

PRICES AND PROFITS 137

operative movement. In the panic of the first week
in August the Co-operative Stores did very useful
work in refusing to raise their prices unduly or to be
infected by the momentary panic which surrounded
them. Indeed, throughout the war many of the
Stores and the two Wholesale Societies have tried to
keep prices as low as possible, though a few Stores
have resolutely refused to sacrifice high dividends in
favour of more reasonable prices. Especially note-
worthy was the action of some of the Stores in relation
to the coal supply. Certain Stores, especially in the
London district, refused to comply with the prices
fixed on the Coal Exchange, and continued to sell at
273. 6d. and 283. when the outside price was 303.
for the same class of coal. The influence of the Stores
in steadying prices has been very useful, and might
be far more useful were there a greater element of
central control to guide it.

CHAPTER VI

THE THIRD PHASE — WAGES IN WAR TIME

THE first result of the war was, as we have seen, an
almost complete cessation of industrial unrest. The
number of workers on strike fell from nearly 100,000
in July and 50,000 early in August l to 13,000 in
September, and, after a slight rise, to 3000 in December,
when there was no dispute of importance in progress.
Moreover, these figures give an entirely inadequate
idea of the real position. The only actual dispute
of any magnitude that was in progress during July
was the London Building Lock-out, then dragging to
its close. But if there were singularly few disputes
actually in being, there was the threat of very severe
trouble. It is the suspension of all the threatened
forward movements, far more than the closure of
actual disputes, that is significant of the change of
attitude.

I have now to show the circumstances that led, in
the New Year, to the partial breakdown of this in-
dustrial truce, the terms of which can be most con-
veniently summed up by a reference to the emergency
agreement made between the railway companies and

1 Practically all the disputes in progress in August were survivals
from the pre-war period. New disputes only involved 2000 workers.

138

WAGES IN WAR TIME 139

the National Union of Railwaymen and the Associated
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. The
railwaymen, it will be remembered, were negotiating
to secure a better conciliation scheme and advances
in wages, together with the other demands embodied
in their National Programme. At the outbreak of
war they abandoned their forward movement, and
entered into the following agreement :

At a conference between the Railways' General
Managers' Committee and representatives of the National
Union of Railwaymen and the Associated Society of
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, on October i, an
agreement was arrived at with regard to the Conciliation
Board Scheme. It was resolved that, notwithstanding
the notice of determination which expires on November
30, 1914, the scheme of conciliation settled at the Board
of Trade Conference on December u, 1911, should remain
in force, and that the men's side of the Boards on each
of the several railways as at present constituted should
continue to act, provided that either of the parties could
give six weeks' notice to determine the agreement, and
thereupon the parties should agree as to the arrangements
to be adopted for the future.

It was further agreed that all existing contracts and
conditions of service should remain in operation, and that
no new agreements should be made by the companies
either with deputations or Conciliation Boards during this
suspensory period.

The last clause of this agreement explicitly recog-
nised that nominal wages should remain the same
during the suspensory period. Power was reserved
to terminate the agreement ; but clearly the intention
was the preservation of existing wage-rates during
the war. Possible increases in the cost of living,
though they already threatened, were not taken into
account.

140

WAGES IN WAR TIME

Three causes combined to create a partial change
of attitude by the New Year. The first, but perhaps
the least important, was the Government's policy in
its dealings with Trade Unionism ; the second was the
rise in the cost of living ; the third, probably the
greatest in its psychological effect, was the growing
suspicion that the capitalists were making a good
thing out of the war. With these causes I have dealt
in the foregoing chapters : it now remains to estimate
the extent to which the truce broke down, and to give
an account of the later events in Trade Union annals
during the war.

It is simplest to begin with a table showing the
actual number and extent of trade disputes during
the war period :

LABOUR DISPUTES DURING THE WAR.

Workers involved in New

Disputes
beginning.

Disputes.

Workers
involved in
all Disputes.

Directly.

Indirectly.

June * .

118

35,606

7511

82,752

July1 .

99

45,747

3623

98,112

August

15

1,975

29

49,804

September

23

2,972

383

I3.025

October

27

5,026

4420

20,677

November

25

4.665

427

8,061

December

17

1,190

2

3,065

January

30

3,436

646

5.889

February

47

26,129

2878

31,060

March .

74

12,982

3377

33,903

April .

44

5-137

440

10,222

May

63

39,913

8327

51,575

1 The figures for June and July 1914 are given to show the fall
in the number of disputes which followed the declaration of war.

It will be noticed that the revival of stoppages
begins in February, which, it should be remembered,

WAGES IN WAR TIME 141

was also the first month of the war during which there
was any considerable increase in wages.1

Even after the revival there were singularly few
stoppages of work, the total number of workers affected
in either February or March being only a little over
30,000, as against 98,000 last July and 50,000 last
August. Moreover, most of the stoppages were of
very short duration, as may be seen from the following
list, which includes every stoppage of any importance
during the war period.

PRINCIPAL LABOUR DISPUTES DURING THE WAR.

Duration in
Days.

Aug. 1,200 Miners, Bishop Auckland (ab-
normal places) . . -4
Sept. 750 Shipyard workers, Leith (altera-
tion in walking-time allowance) 5
,, 600 Leather workers, Birmingham

(wages) .... i
Oct. 260 Builders' labourers, Cork (wages) . 34
Nov. i,375 Miners, Ruabon (Minimum Wage

Act) .... 4

„ 1,000 Seamen, Liverpool (wages) . 10

Dec. None

Jan. 500 Moulders, etc., Birmingham (wages) 5
„ 266 Boot operatives, Rushden (refusal

to work with non-unionists) . 3
Feb. 700 Navvies, etc., Edinburgh (wages) 15
,, 4,000 Carpenters and Labourers, Salis-
bury Plain (against deductions
for bad time-keeping) 2 . ....

», 8,350 Engineers, etc., Clyde (wages) . 14
„ 4,000 Jute workers, Dundee (wages) . 6
„ 5,000 Dockers, London (demand for en-
gagement outside dock gates) . 6

1 See table on p. 120.
Strike soon broken. No actual settlement.

142 WAGES IN WAR TIME

Duration in
Days.

Mar. 2,136 Miners, Merthyr Tydvil (against

employment of non-unionists) . 2

„ 464 Engineers, etc., Sandbach (wages-

recognition) . . ?

„ 2,000 Dockers, Birkenhead (against new

agreement . 4 week-end stoppages

,, 1,500 Stevedores, London (wages) . 5

April. 850 Miners, Pontardawe (against em-
ployment of non-unionists) . 7

„ 600 Moulders, Paisley (wages) . . i

„ 570 Malleable iron casters, etc., Walsall

(wages) . . . .18

May. 1,500 Builders' labourers, Woolwich

(wages) .... 3

„ 639 Building workers, Northampton

(wages) . . . .24

„ 3,000 Miners, Dudley (dispute about war

bonus) . . • . .3

„ 5,000 Miners, Cannock and Pelsall (dis-
pute about war bonus) . . 3

„ 700 Motor-cycle makers, Bristol (wages) 8

„ 1,047 Engineers, Leicester (against cheap

labour) . . . . ? *

„ 10,000 Hosiery workers, Leicester (wages) 2

„ 6,900 Tramway workers, London (wages,

etc.) .... . 19

* Soon settled.

It can be seen at once from this table how insignifi-
cant both in number and in magnitude have been
the strikes during the war. It would, however, be a
profound mistake to interpret this as meaning that
there has been no Labour unrest. Though the number
of actual stoppages is so small, there have been,
during 1915, many disputes which have been settled
without stoppages, many claims for war bonuses or
advances in wages, many cases in which friction has
arisen over the employment of unskilled and female
Labour. If the Clyde strike has been the only stoppage

WAGES IN WAR TIME 143

of any magnitude, there have been several occasions
when much larger stoppages have only been averted
by the efforts of the Trade Union officials and the
Government.

During the last five months of 1914 there were
practically no important advances in wages. Only
two cases deserve mention : 20,000 engineers in the
London district secured advances of 7^ per cent on
piece rates, or 35. a week or f d. an hour on time rates ;
and 15,000 Birmingham engineers won 5 per cent or
2s. a week. In January 1915 the advances were still
confined to the engineering industry : 7500 Liverpool
engineers secured 7^ per cent or 33. a week, and 6100
Bolton engineers 2\ per cent or is. a week. In
February the war bonus movement set in, and advances
began to be won in other industries.

At the very outset the pitch was queered by the
railwaymen. Forced at last by their own rank and
file to make some demand, the railwaymen, about the
middle of February, entered into a settlement under
which the railway companies agreed to pay a war
bonus of 35. a week to all men earning less than 303.,
and of 2s. a week to all who were earning more than 303.
There are several points in this agreement which call
for comment.

In the first place, the concessions accepted were
entirely inadequate to meet the rise in the cost of
living. This was true not only of the 2s. advance
given to the higher grades, but also of the 35. advance
which was received by the lower-paid workers. The
acceptance of so small an advance by the railwaymen
was used by employers in other industries as an excuse
for refusing demands that real wages should be brought
up to the pre-war level. When, for instance, the

144 WAGES IN WAR TIME

transport workers put in for advances during February
and March, the employers in certain centres countered
by offering the same concessions as had been secured
by the railwaymen. The following paragraph, written
at the time by Mr. Robert Williams, Secretary of the
Transport Workers' Federation, forms an excellent
commentary on the railwaymen's settlement.

In London the position was certainly not helped by the
settlement of the Railwaymen's proposals. For us, as
transport workers, the position has been appreciably
worsened by this example. In Hull, Bristol, Leith, Cardiff,
advances have been secured ranging from 45. to 75. per
week. In London the Employers' Committee countered
the claim put forward by the Dockers' Union for an increase
of 2d. per hour by saying that the cost of living had not
increased more for dock labourers than for railwaymen,
and the increase was accordingly fixed at 33. per week for
the permanent men and 6d. per day for casuals. Whatever
desire men may have, in these circumstances, to face the
issue is vitiated by the fact that this altogether unsatis-
factory precedent has been established — the 2s. and 35.
of the Railwaymen. There is not the slightest doubt that
the Manchester Ship Canal Co. will adhere to their similar
offer to the Salford Dockers, on the same lines, and there
is a warrantable presumption that the demands submitted
in Liverpool for an increase of is. per day will be dealt
with similarly.

If a further indication is needed, it may be found
in the fact that the railwaymen themselves are already
demanding a further advance.

Secondly — and this raises an important question
of principle — the railwaymen obtained a " war bonus,"
and not a permanent increase in rates of wages. They
thus set the fashion, and, just as they queered the
pitch by accepting too little, queered it by accepting
merely temporary concessions. When once a war

WAGES IN WAR TIME 145

bonus had been accepted in any great industry, it
became difficult, if not impossible, for workers in other
industries to secure permanent advances.

What, then, is the case against the war bonus ?
It is, briefly, that it will involve Labour in a struggle
for the maintenance of standard rates just when Labour
is weakest — in the period immediately succeeding the
war. In the words of the three " impartial " persons
who form the Committee on Production, a war bonus
is denned as " war wages, recognised as due to and
dependent on the existence of the abnormal conditions
now prevailing in consequence of the war." What
are the " abnormal conditions " in question ? Is the
reference solely to the increased cost of living, or does
it include the conditions arising from dislocation of
industry and the return of men from military service
at the end of the war ? The definition given by the
Committee on Production clearly leaves the matter
vague, and it may be confidently predicted that in
some cases the employers will take advantage of this
vagueness to cancel bonuses just when organised
Labour is too weak to resist.

Sometimes the definition of a war bonus is made
more explicit. Some advances are to terminate
automatically six months after the end of the war.
But what assurance can there be that industry will
resume its normal condition within six months ? It
is probable that those who have made agreements on
this basis will find their bonus removed from them
just when they need it most.

In fact, the whole war bonus movement has been
a mistake. In collective bargaining between employers
and wage-earners, the cost of living is normally one
of the factors that are taken into account. The

146 WAGES IN WAR TIME

importance attaching to it in comparison with other
factors varies ; but it is almost always present. Why,
then, should not the usual procedure have been followed
during the war ? It would then have been open for
the employers to demand reductions when the cost of
living fell. As things are, the employers will first
terminate the war bonus, and then, having reverted
to the old standard rates, will be free to put in for
reductions on them also. The decision of that struggle
will depend on the economic power of the parties ;
but the war bonus system will cause the workers to
go into the struggle with a severe handicap against
them.

The concessions accepted by the railwaymen are
all the more surprising when the position of the rail-
ways in war time is taken into account. Railwaymen
are recognised national servants, and, as such, are
prevented from enlisting for military service. This
surely entitles them to a little consideration. More-
over, the terms under which the Government assumed
control of the railways have been interpreted officially
as involving the payment of a part — what proportion
we have not been told — of the railwaymen's bonus
out of the State Exchequer. At the same time, the
Government has officially stated that it took no part
in the war bonus negotiations, which were left wholly
to the railway companies and the men.

If these facts are borne in mind, it is hardly possible
to doubt that the railwaymen could have got far
better terms had they offered a bolder front. But it
was clear to the companies from the start that the
men did not really mean business, and accordingly
they were put off with ridiculously small concessions.
This would not matter so much if they alone had to

WAGES IN WAR TIME 147

suffer for their weakness ; but the effect of the settle-
ment on wages disputes in other industries was im-
mediate and all to the bad.

Fortunately, the railwaymen's settlement came
too late to prevent more advantageous settlements
for real wage advances, varying from 35. to 75. a week,
to transport workers in Hull, Liverpool, and Birken-
head, Glasgow, Bristol, Leith, and other centres.
Fortunately, too, the next important event in the world
of Labour showed a greater spirit of militancy. On
February 16 there began a stoppage which soon spread
to nearly all the engineering shops on the' Clyde,
involving some 9000 workers. The strike, which was
unofficial, came as the climax to a long series of negotia-
tions. As it is not only the largest, but also by far
the most significant, stoppage during the war period,
a fairly full account of it must be given.1

The Union primarily concerned in the Clyde dispute
was the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, though
several other engineering Unions were also directly
involved. In the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
the initiative in wages movements and the final
acceptance or rejection of the employers' offers rest,
not with the National Executive, but with the district
concerned. The Clyde area forms a distinct district,
which has its own wage agreement with the employers.
At the same time, the district is not wholly self-
governing in relation to disputes : it is bound by
certain " Provisions for Avoiding Disputes," agreed to
by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the
Employers' Federation, and applying to all districts.

1 For more detailed accounts, see the Political Quarterly for
May 1915 (article by J. H. Jones), and the New Statesman for
March 27.

148 WAGES IN WAR TIME

In January 1912 the Glasgow engineers entered
into a three years' agreement, under which a standard
rate of 8|d. an hour was fixed. This agreement would
thus in the ordinary course of events have come up
for revision in January 1915. Before the war, in
June 1914, the District Committee decided to press
for an advance of 2d. an hour on the expiry of the
agreement. Thus the application made by the engineers
was decided on before the war broke out, and independently
of the rise in the cost of living due to the war.

The three years during which the agreement ran
were years in which other industries, and engineers
in other districts, secured large advances in wages.
The Clyde workers, however, adhered to their agree-
ment, and therefore found themselves, on the outbreak
of war, in a considerably worse position than their
fellows in other engineering centres. The position
was only tolerable because a considerable advance
in January 1915 was looked upon as certain. During
the period of the agreement trade had been booming
on the Clyde, and the employers had netted large
profits.

On December 16 the men sent to the employers
their application for a rise of 2d. an hour. The em-
ployers, taking advantage of a technical flaw in the
drafting of the application, delayed their answer till
December 30, when they replied with a curt refusal
of the demand as unreasonable. The reason for this
manoeuvre was clear. Under the " Provisions for
Avoiding Disputes," there can be no stoppage of work
till an application has been considered first by a local
conference, and subsequently by a central (or national)
conference of employers and workers. The result of
the employers' delay was that there was no time for

WAGES IN WAR TIME 149

the application to reach the Central Conference of
January 8. This meant the postponement of the
demand till the next Central Conference on February
12, and the clear loss of a month's potential advances
in wages to the workers.

The District Committee, in response to this man-
oeuvre, at once ordered its members, failing a satis-
factory reply, to cease work on January 20. This
scared the employers into agreeing to a local con-
ference on January 19. At this meeting, and at an
adjourned session on January 22, the employers
offered, first a farthing at once and another farthing
in three months, and then an immediate advance
of £d. an hour. This was refused, and the ques-
tion stood adjourned to the Central Conference of
February 12.

By this time the men were thoroughly exasperated,
both by the paltry offer made by the employers and
by the unreasonable delay. An unofficial meeting
demanded that no overtime should be worked till a
Special Central Conference was summoned. The
District Committee and the National Executive l in
vain counselled the continuance of overtime : the
men took matters into their own hands, and overtime
ceased in the principal shops.

In these circumstances the Central Conference met
on February 12. The employers refused to give more
than fd. an hour increase, and that was to be not a
permanent increase but a war bonus. The National
Executive of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
however, for reasons which have never been satis-

1 They seem to have had cause to fear that the employers would
treat the refusal to work overtime as a stoppage of work, and refuse,
in accordance with the " Provisions for Avoiding Disputes," to
negotiate further.

150 WAGES IN WAR TIME

factorily explained, agreed to recommend this advance
to their members. They had no power to accept
it ; they only agreed to submit it to a ballot of
the Clyde district. The only explanation seems
to be pure fright : they were afraid of Government
intervention, and wanted their members to accept
a settlement which they knew to be wholly unjust
and inadequate. Their next step was no less un-
fortunate. They fixed the date for the return of
ballot papers from the district for March 9, or nearly
a month ahead, thus postponing the issue once again,
despite the almost certain expectation that the offer
would be rejected.

The immediate result of the Executive's action was
a strike, no less against the dilatory and pusillanimous
policy of the Union Executive than against the em-
ployers. On February 16 the stoppage began, and it
rapidly extended from shop to shop, till about 8000
men were out. Moreover, disgusted with official
leadership, the rebels created a new authority of their
own. A Shop Stewards' Committee, which had had
much to do with the cessation of overtime, was enlarged
and formed into the Central Withdrawal of Labour
Committee, which assumed control of the movement.
This was essentially a body emanating directly from
the rank and file, and dominated by impulses different
from those which moved the Executive. Round it
rallied the Industrial Unionist, Syndicalist, and Guild
Socialist elements, and it clearly had the almost
united backing, for the struggle that called it
into being if not for the theory behind it, of the
body of Clyde engineers. The new Committee
claimed that, as it alone represented all the men on
strike — i.e. all the Unions — the future negotiations

WAGES IN WAR TIME 151

should be carried on by itself and not by the A.S.E.
Executive.

These events forced the Executive to take action.
The ballot, which was brought forward to February 24,
resulted in the decisive rejection of the employers'
terms by 8927 votes to 829. At this point the Govern-
ment intervened. On February 26 the representatives
of the employers and of the Unions concerned were
summoned to meet the Industrial Commissioners,
and the following letter, signed by the Chief Industrial
Commissioner, was handed to both parties :

SIR — From enquiries which have been made as to the
position of the disputes in the engineering trade in the
Glasgow district, it appears that the parties concerned
have been unable to arrive at a settlement. In consequence
of the delay the requirements of the nation are being
seriously endangered.

I am instructed by the Government that important
munitions of war urgently required by the navy and army
are being held up by the present cessation of work, and
that they must call for a resumption of work on Monday
morning, March ist.

Immediately following resumption of work arrange-
ments will be made for the representatives of the parties
to meet the Committee on Production in Engineering
and Shipbuilding Establishments for the purpose of the
matters in dispute being referred for settlement to a Court
of Arbitration, who shall also have power to fix the date
from which the settlement shall take effect. — I am, yours
faithfully, G> R ASKWITH,

Chief Industrial Commissioner.

This letter at once created a further storm. The
wording suggested — and was clearly meant to suggest —
a command, and it was asked what authority the
Government had to order men back to work. On this

152 WAGES IN WAR TIME

point a discreet silence was observed, and indeed the
letter was clearly worded so that it could be read in
two ways. The Government was " trying it on,"
and left " a loophole for escape should the men prove
obdurate." Its " command " had no binding force ;
it was at the most a threat of future action.

Whatever its nature, it was quite enough to terrify
the Executive Committee, which at once repaired to
the Clyde and called for an immediate resumption,
using as arguments, first, the Government's threat and
the dangers of compulsory arbitration, and secondly,
that rule in the " Provisions for Avoiding Disputes "
which, it was said, prevented further negotiation till
after a return to work. The Withdrawal of Labour
Committee proposed an alternative policy, urging
the men to resume on Thursday, March 4, three days
after the expiration of the Government's ultimatum,
and also recommending the adoption of ca' canny
until a settlement was reached. In fact, the resump-
tion began on Wednesday and was complete by the
week-end. The policy of ca' canny does not seem to
have been anywhere adopted.

Work was resumed ; but the discontent remained,
and even grew more bitter. On March 6 a further
Central Conference met, but no agreement was reached.
The question was therefore referred, by request of the
Government, to the newly established Committee on
Production. The employers accepted this reference to
arbitration ; the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
in accordance with its rules, took a ballot of its
Clyde members on the question of accepting the
Government award as final. On a very small vote,
this ballot resulted decisively in favour of acceptance,
despite the opposition of the Withdrawal of Labour

WAGES IN WAR TIME 153

Committee, which decided to continue permanently
in existence. It is clear that many of the malcontents
must have abstained from this vote.

On March 24, the Government Committee issued
its award in the following terms :

We have given full consideration to the arguments
advanced by the respective representatives and to all the
circumstances of the case, and our finding is that in settle-
ment of the application for an advance the wages of the
workers in the trades represented should be increased as
follows, viz. : — id. per hour or 45. per week (according to
the custom of payment in the various shops) on time rates,
and 10 per cent on piece rates, the advances to come into
operation as from the beginning of the first full pay week
after February 22, 1915, and to be regarded as war wages
and recognised as due to and dependent on the existence
of the abnormal conditions now prevailing in consequence
of the war.

Thus, instead of a permanent increase of 2d. an
hour, which the Clyde engineers had already decided
to demand before the war, they received only a war
bonus of id. an hour. That is to say, whereas an
increase of at least i|d. an hour was due before the
war to bring the Clyde engineers up to other great
districts, they have secured no permanent increase,
but only a war bonus quite inadequate to meet the
rise in the cost of living since the war.1

The award created great discontent, and it is a
great tribute to the men's forbearance that it was
accepted at all. It cannot be said even now that the
trouble is at an end ; for the District Committee is
considering a further application, independent of the

1 The cost of living has risen even more in Glasgow than else-
where, as house-rents have gone up about 10 per cent. This raising
of rents seems to be peculiar to Glasgow.

154 WAGES IN WAR TIME

war bonus, for an increase of id. an hour in standard
rates. There seems every reason for the granting of
such an increase, and it is probable that, if the war
lasts long, the men will refuse to wait till it ends.
Then, they know that they will be weak ; now, with
good leadership, they might get at least an instalment
of the advance that is their due.

All through the Clyde strike matters were made
much worse by the tone of newspaper comment. Any
fair statement of the case clearly shows that the men
had a very real and serious grievance : yet, while the
Government was congenially engaged in terrorising
the A.S.E. Executive, the capitalist press of both
parties was no less congenially employed in flinging
mud. The Daily Chronicle, in a leading article headed
" For Shame ! " spoke of the strike as an " indelible
stain " on the honour of Scotland : other journals
vied with one another in applying such epithets as
" traitors." There was hardly any attempt to under-
stand the case, or to apportion to the employers their
due share of the guilt. The attitude of the Press
towards Labour disputes is bad enough in tune of
peace : during the war it has done untold mischief
from its own point of view. The comments of the
newspapers on the Clyde strike and on the London
tramway strike have taught the workers much about
the real attitude of the governing class to Labour.

It was during the Clyde dispute that the Govern-
ment first began to develop a Labour policy. In view
of the impending offensive in France and Belgium
it became pressing to expedite the manufacture of
munitions of war. Accordingly, on February 4 the
Government appointed a Committee on Production
in Engineering and Shipbuilding Establishments " to

WAGES IN WAR TIME 155

enquire and report forthwith, after consultation with
the representatives of employers and workmen, as to
the best steps to be taken to ensure that the productive
power of the employees in engineering and shipbuilding
establishments working for Government purposes shall
be made fully available so as to meet the needs of the
nation in the present emergency."

The Committee, which consisted of Sir G. Askwith,
Sir F. Hopwood, and Sir G. Gibb, lost no time in
getting to work, and by March 4 had issued four reports,
covering six different questions. Since that date it
has issued no general reports, but many awards
dealing with wages and conditions of labour in various
industries.

Its first report, issued on February 17, dealt with
irregular time-keeping in the shipyards. Its recom-
mendations had to do solely with the " broken squad "
difficulty, which has for many years caused a great
deal of time to be lost. Riveting work is carried out
by squads of workmen, and the absence of one of these
from any cause used to throw the whole squad idle.
The Committee recommended the Government to
intimate to both parties " that it is essential that the
employers and work-people should agree upon and
establish within ten days an arrangement for dealing
effectively with the question of broken squads." To
some extent, this recommendation was carried out.
The Boilermakers' Society met the employers, and a
reserve of workers was created, out of which the places
of absentees were filled.

The second report, issued on February 20, dealt
with two questions of great importance. The first
section, on " Production of Shells and Fuses," recom-
mended that production should be expedited by the

156 WAGES IN WAR TIME

relaxation of Trade Union rules ; the second section
suggested certain provisions for " Avoidance of Stop-
page of Work " during the war period. These were
followed on March i by a report on wages in the
shipbuilding industry. On March 4 the Committee
issued another very important report on " Demarcation
of Work " and on the " Utilisation of Semi-skilled or
Unskilled Labour." To all these reports we shall
have to return.

After the issue of the second report, the Government
expressed its concurrence, and extended the powers
of the Committee so as to enable it to act as an arbitra-
tion court when disputes were referred to it by the
parties. It will be convenient to deal first with its
action as an arbitration court on wages questions.
We have already referred to its decision in the case
of the Clyde dispute.

The first important wages question referred to the
Committee was the application of the shipyard workers
for an advance of 6s. a week on time rates and 15 per
cent on piece rates. This was a joint application from
all the skilled trades in the shipyards, the Boilermakers
and the Shipwrights being the two most important
Unions concerned. The Shipbuilding Employers'
Federation offered 2s. or 5 per cent. The Arbitration
Committee might seem to have reached its award by
the simple process of splitting the difference ; for it
conceded 43. or 10 per cent war bonus.1 Despite the
fact that this was a bonus and not an advance in
standard rates, it seems to have been received with
satisfaction in the shipyards. It was certainly far

1 It should be noted that the shipyard labourers followed suit
in obtaining, by negotiation, advances corresponding to those in
the skilled trades.

WAGES IN WAR TIME 157

better treatment than was subsequently meted out
to the Clyde engineers.

It is at least plausible to look for the explanation
of this difference rather to the circumstances of the
two disputes than to abstract justice. The shipyard
workers and their employers met in conference, and
failed to agree, on February 23, when the Clyde strike
was in full swing. The reference to arbitration took
place on February 24, by agreement between the
parties. It was then, from the point of view of the
Government, supremely important to secure a satis-
factory settlement. The shipyard dispute was of
national extent, and affected, among other districts,
the Clyde area. In view of the new spirit manifesting
itself in the Labour world, it was imperative to satisfy
the shipyard workers. Is it too much to say that
these considerations had much to do with the compara-
tively good terms conceded by the Committee ? If
the Clyde engineers got little for themselves, they
certainly helped the shipyard workers to a fairly
substantial advance.

By the time the Committee issued its award on
the Clyde dispute, these considerations were no longer
paramount. The award was delayed as long as
possible, and, thanks to the action of the men's own
Executive, there seemed, for the moment, no further
risk of trouble. The Committee appears to have
settled the Clyde dispute in a punitive spirit, by
conceding as little as it possibly could.

The subsequent wages awards of the Committee
only call for passing mention. In March they required
that the standard rates agreed to by masters and men
in the boot and shoe trade must be paid by all employers,
federated or unfederated, for Government work. They

158 WAGES IN WAR TIME

were also entrusted with the settlement of the claims
put forward by the Admiralty Dockyard employees,
which they decided on lines roughly corresponding to
their award for workers in private shipyards. During
April they dealt with a much larger number of cases,
the most important being that of the Manchester
engineers, to whom they conceded 35. a week or 7^
per cent on piece rates.

A body which has settled so many claims must, it
would be thought, be acting on some defined, or at
least some discernible principle. In fact, however,
no such principle can be discovered. None is embodied
in the terms of reference of the Committee, or in the
subsequent order enlarging its powers : none has ever
been proclaimed by itself. It gets no nearer a defini-
tion than to state as a rule that the increases which it
grants are " war wages, recognised as due to, and
dependent on, the abnormal conditions now prevailing
in consequence of the war."

This would lead to the supposition that the Com-
mittee decides its awards by a reference to the change
in the cost of living. But such a supposition cannot
be reconciled with the facts. In hardly any case are
the rises large enough to meet the increased cost,
while the Clyde and the shipyard disputes, as we saw,
were settled on totally different principles. In fact,
the Committee's action appears to be purely oppor-
tunist : broadly speaking, it gives or refuses according
to the economic power of the applicant.

This is only possible because the Government has
refused to give any guidance. Throughout, the
Government has given no indication of possessing any
policy on the wages question except that of conceding
as little as it can. This is clear, not only in its action

WAGES IN WAR TIME 159

with regard to the Committee on Production, but also,
still more markedly, in its relations to its own employees.
In March the National Joint Committee of Postal
and Telegraph Associations petitioned the Postmaster-
General for a war bonus. For several weeks no reply
was received, and when the answer came it was in the
following terms :

The Government have decided that the rise in the cost
of living is not by itself a sufficient reason at the present
time for increasing the wages of their employees. They
regard this rise as a burden which must be shared in common
by all classes in the country.

The rise in the cost of living appears, then, in the
Government's eyes, to warrant rises in wages to those
who are employed by private capitalists, at all events
where the workers are strong enough to make refusal
difficult ; but it does not warrant rises to the Govern-
ment's own employees, who are no less hardly hit by
the war. This doctrine of " a burden to be shared in
common by all classes in the country " is the merest
nonsense when it is applied to those whose wages are
ordinarily such as to leave no margin to meet a rise
in prices.1

Fortunately, in this case the Government was
compelled to climb down. The postal Associations
were indignant at the treatment received, and de-
manded that the question should be referred to
arbitration. To this the Government finally agreed,
with the proviso that it would resist the claim before
the arbitrator. Despite its resistance a war bonus
has now been secured ; but this is no credit to the
Government.

1 The only more infamous case is the Government's refusal to
raise the scale of Old Age Pensions to meet the rise in the cost of
living.

160 WAGES IN WAR TIME

The same argument has recurred again and again
in the case of local authorities. All over the country
municipal employees have put hi claims for war bonuses.
In many cases these have in the end been granted,
though they have generally been on a very inadequate
scale ; but there have been not a few instances in
which the doctrine of equal sacrifices has been given
as a ground for refusal. The burden of the increases,
we are told, would fall on the impoverished rate-payer,
and therefore the worker must be content to forgo
his bonus. This is to say that the public service ought
to be the least eligible of all forms of employment.
But surely the State and local authorities ought to be
model employers, and should show the way to the
private capitalist. Instead, throughout the present
crisis, they have lagged behind, and have made only
the most niggardly concessions. Advocates of State
and municipal control of industry would do well to
ponder on these significant facts. Public authorities
have not scrupled to use the argument that wages
come out of public money in order to reject demands
that have been conceded by the private employer.

This attitude was seen at its worst in the case of
the London tram strike in May. The General Purposes
Committee of the Council refused any war bonus to
those of its employees who were earning over thirty
shillings a week. The drivers and conductors on the
trams then applied to the Highways Committee, their
direct employer. The reasons given by the Highways
Committee for refusing an advance were, first, that it
was paying £80,000 a year hi allowances to dependents
of employees who had enlisted, and that it could not
afford more, as the Council had insisted, despite pro-
tests, that the tramway receipts should bear the whole

WAGES IN WAR TIME 161

of this burden. That is to say, the tramwaymen
were to maintain, by accepting low wages, the de-
pendents of those who enlisted, while the London
County Council, at their expense, was to reap the
glory of being a benevolent employer. The London
County Council first threw an illegitimate charge on
the tramway receipts, and then made it an excuse for
keeping down wages. Secondly, it was argued that,
since the receipts had to bear this charge, an increase
in wages would have to come either out of the rates
or from increased fares. In either case the consumer
would be hit, and a municipality, existing to protect
the consumer, could not surfer this. The long and
short of it was that the tramwaymen were to get no
bonus. Despite this mischievous reasoning, or perhaps
because of it, the London County Council beat the
tramwaymen.

It found opportunity, however, to add to itself one
further injustice in the course of the dispute. It
announced that it would take back no men of military
age who were physically fit. Thus a public body not
only refused reasonable wage demands, but also adopted
the most detestable form of economic compulsion to
drive its employees into the army.1 It is no glory to
the London County Council that its threat broke
down in practice, and that many men of military age
and fitness seem actually to have been taken back.
It is a sign of the municipal attitude that blacklegs of
military age and fitness were actually used to run cars
during the strike.

Neither the State nor the local authorities as em-
ployers come well out of the present crisis. Their

1 It is said that the War Office expressed disapproval of this
policy.

M

162 WAGES IN WAR TIME

object throughout has been, like that of the private
capitalist, to yield as little as possible. No considera-
tion of justice has weighed with them at all. No
wonder, then, that the Government's nominees, the
Committee on Production, have been guided by purely
opportunist motives.

These motives were no less apparent when Mr.
Asquith himself had to deal with the coal crisis that
arose in April. The Miners' Federation of Great
Britain decided to demand a war bonus of 20 per cent
on earnings, and demanded a national conference with
the coalowners on the question. The owners replied
that they were ready to confer locally, through the
ordinary local machinery for wage negotiation, but
that their national organisation, the Mining Association
of Great Britain, had no jurisdiction in wages questions.
They refused to consent to a national meeting on the
further ground that the circumstances differed so much
from locality to locality that no national settlement
was possible. When a deadlock seemed to have been
reached, a national meeting was finally secured by the
instrumentality, and under the chairmanship, of the
Prime Minister, on the undertaking of the Miners'
Federation that it should not be regarded as a pre-
cedent. At this conference, the miners refused the
owners' offer of a 10 per cent advance nationally, to
be followed by local negotiations for further advances.
Finally, it was agreed to leave the question in the hands
of Mr. Asquith, who, after considerable delay, decided
that the amount of the bonus should be decided locally,
with a reference to arbitration where the two parties
failed to agree. Thus the miners, after all their talk,
accepted for the moment compulsory arbitration, to
which, as we shall see, they refused to accede at the

WAGES IN WAR TIME 163

request of Mr. Lloyd George when the famous Treasury
Conferences were held.

The results of the miners' applications, while they
are by no means satisfactory, have not on the whole
been as bad as might have been expected. Some
districts where trade is adversely affected by the war
did very badly : Northumberland and Durham, for
instance, got only 15 per cent on the standard, or less
than half of what had been demanded, and even this
was to be merged in any future increases under the
sliding scale. On the other hand, Lord Coleridge's
award gave the workers in the Federated Area, which
includes Lancashire and Cheshire, Yorkshire, the
Midlands, and North Wales, an advance of 15 per cent
on earnings. The Scottish miners also did fairly well
in getting i8£ per cent on their standard, while South
Wales got 17! per cent, again on its standard. The
full 20 per cent on earnings, however, was nowhere
granted.

This struggle had, in fact, a deeper significance than
appeared on the surface. It was really a struggle for
the recognition and the centralisation of the Miners'
Federation of Great Britain. The forward spirits in
the Federation have long desired to make it, instead
of the local Associations, the unit for collective bargain-
ing. This desire had much to do with the intensity of
the demand for a national conference, though the
ostensible reason, that, as the rise in the cost of living
was everywhere equal, the bonus also should be equal,
was a quite reasonable argument in itself. The
employers on their side fully realised the accession of
economic power which the centralisation of the Miners'
Federation would mean, and their opposition to the
national conference was dictated no less by this fear

164 WAGES IN WAR TIME

than by a natural desire that, as profits varied from
locality to locality, the bonus should also vary. The
result was a compromise. The national conference
was held, with the proviso that it should not con-
stitute a precedent : the settlement was sectional,
and varied in the different districts.1

Only one further wages dispute calls for separate
mention, and of this it is more difficult to speak, as
no award has yet been made. As we have seen, the
great industry most severely affected by the outbreak
of war was the cotton industry, in which any claim for
increased wages would have been impossible during
the early months of the war. During this period the
cotton Unions were chiefly preoccupied with the relief
of distress ; and hi almost all cases, despite Government
subsidies, their funds were very seriously depleted.
During this period emergency agreements for the
prevention of disputes were entered into by the Card
and Blowing Room Operatives in November, and by
the Spinners in December. In March 1915 the
Weavers, the section which had been most seriously
hit by the war, applied for a war bonus, but the
employers refused to grant this on account of bad
trade, though they expressed sympathy with the
position of the operatives.

When the crisis arose in May, it came on the spinning
side of the industry. The Cardroom Amalgamation
became convinced that trade had recovered to such
an extent that excessive profits were being made in
mills spinning 36 counts and below,2 not only on
Government contracts, but also on private work,

1 For the recent events in the South Wales coalfield, see p. 226,
note.

s I.e. the coarser counts.

WAGES IN WAR TIME 165

and that their demand for a bonus was justified.
The employers refused to entertain this general ap-
plication, while they professed themselves willing to
grant a bonus where it could be shown that abnormal
profits were being made on Government work. This
assurance did not satisfy the cardroom workers, and
notices were posted in certain mills. These duly
expired, and a few strikes began without any nearer
approach to a settlement. A few unfederated firms
granted the demand, but the Masters' Federation
not only stood firm, but also announced that it would
declare a general lock-out unless the strikers returned
to work. A general lock-out, it should be observed,
is the customary weapon of the cotton employers.
Thereupon the Spinners, who would be at once stopped
by such a lock-out, declared their intention to regard
it as a violation of agreement, and to demand a war
bonus for themselves. This, in turn, the employers
denounced as a breach of agreement.

The facts are these. In July 1910 the Spinners
entered into a five years' wages agreement, which
accordingly expires in July 1915. They had all along
intended to apply for advances when this agreement
ran out — naturally enough, since it has prevented
them from sharing in the big advances gained in other
industries during the last few years. They therefore
found themselves in this position. If they allowed
themselves to be locked out without making a demand,
they would exhaust their funds and so be unable to
press their claim in July. They therefore took the
very natural course of treating the general lock-out
as a declaration of hostilities, and decided to press
their claim at once. Notices of the general lock-out
were duly posted by the employers ; but before these

166 WAGES IN WAR TIME

actually took effect the Board of Trade intervened,
and the whole question was referred to the Committee
on Production with the consent of the two Trade
Unions and the three employers' associations involved.
The award has not yet been issued : it will apply both
to the Cardroom operatives and to the Spinners. If
the general lock-out had occurred, not only the Spinners,
but also the Weavers, who would soon have been
stopped by shortage of yarn, would certainly have
demanded a war bonus. In view of the reference to
arbitration they are now asking to have their demand
dealt with by arbitration at the same time ; and this
is likely to be done.

When only wages movements are taken into account,
it is clear from what has been said that the calm
promise of the autumn is not being fulfilled this year.
The Labour unrest is real and growing. But it should
be borne in mind that in no single case have the workers
asked for larger increases than the rise in the cost of
living warrants. In practically every case the advances
gained have been quite inadequate to meet the rise.
If actual earnings are taken into account, this de-
ficiency is made up in certain cases ; but this is only
where long hours of overtime have been worked, and
for such work Labour is surely entitled to extra pay-
ment. Moreover, the advances in wages have borne
no relation to the need of the recipients : they have
depended on economic power, and advances in rates
have gone to the very workers whose earnings have
risen. Workers hi depressed trades, and especially
women workers, have had little share in the increases :
not only have their rates not been advanced ; their
actual earnings have in many cases gone down. The
whole position is, indeed, thoroughly unsatisfactory.

WAGES IN WAR TIME 167

The wages question is, however, only a minor part
of the great Labour problem to which the war has
given rise. I turn now to examine the question in
aspects which are of far greater ultimate importance
to the cause of Labour.

CHAPTER VII

THE FOURTH PHASE — THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

ON February 4, 1915, as we have seen, the Government
appointed a Committee on Production in Engineering
and Shipbuilding Establishments. It was with the
formation of this Committee that the deliberate attempt
to organise the nation for the production of munitions
of war really began. For the first six months of the
war, the provision of munitions was left in the hands
of the War Office and the Admiralty, aided by a few
technical advisers. Now it was perceived for the first
time that a crucial question was the organisation of
Labour. Left to itself, private capitalism was proving
unequal to the task : the Committee on Production
was the first attempt to deal with the problem in
relation to the workers.

The shortage of skilled labour in the engineering
industry was already becoming acute in November
1914. During the first months of the war there had
been a good deal of unemployment, and no less than
10,000 skilled men who were soon to be urgently
needed at home were allowed to enlist without protest.
Lack of foresight on the part of the Government, if it
did not create the scarcity, at least doubled its intensity.
A little more preparedness for the emergency would,

168

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 169

in this, as in many other cases, have saved much
trouble later on. No one seems to have anticipated
the extent of the demands that would have to be made
on the industry, and, even when this could be clearly
foreseen, no one seems to have thought of securing at
once that the necessary resources should be available.

However that may be, it soon became clear that
the shortage of skilled men was a fact. The engineering
employers in December approached the Unions with
proposals for overcoming the difficulty ; the Unions
replied with counter-proposals, which the employers
dismissed as useless. The Unions thereupon declared
their willingness to meet the employers again in
conference ; the latter airily replied that they were
willing to confer, provided the Unions first conceded
all their demands. To this preposterous proposal
the Unions answered, reiterating their readiness to
confer, but refusing to make concessions in advance.

What, then, were the proposals which the employers
made ? They can be very briefly described. They
demanded that the Unions should agree " not to press
the following questions to an issue, but to confine
themselves to noting any such by way of protest for
the purpose of safeguarding their interests " — manning
of machines and of hand operations, the demarcation
of work between trades, the employment of non-Union
labour and of female labour, and the whole question
of the limitation of overtime. That is to say, the
employers' demands covered the whole field of Trade
Union working rules, and the proposal was that an
absolutely free hand should be given to the masters,
subject only to a right of protest, which could not be
backed up by action of any sort on the men's side.

It is true that with these proposals the employers

170 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

coupled certain guarantees which they were prepared
to give. They promised that the innovations should
be for the period of the war only, and that they would
revert to the old conditions at its close. They also
undertook to pay to all workers the standard rates for
the jobs on which they might, for the moment, be
engaged. Why, then, in face of these promises, did
the Unions remain obdurate ?

Their reasons are clear. In the first place, the
guarantee came only from the federated employers.
There are, however, many engineering employers not
in the Federation, and it is in the unfederated shops
that Trade Unionism is, generally speaking, weakest.
If, then, the unfederated employers refused at the end
of the war to revert to the old conditions, the Unions
would have to fight a series of battles just where they
are weakest, with the knowledge that, if they failed
to bring the unfederated employers into line, the
masters in the Federation would find themselves
undercut by the lower rates paid outside, and would,
sooner or later, themselves be forced to attempt to
lower wages or to reimpose the emergency conditions.
A mere guarantee from the Employers' Federation
could therefore in no circumstances be enough ; it
would have to be coupled with a guarantee from the
Government that the unfederated employers would
be brought into line.

Even if this difficulty were surmounted, a still
graver objection remained. The employers demanded
an absolutely free hand in setting unskilled and semi-
skilled workers on the machines which are now the
monopoly of the skilled men. The effect of this would
be that, by the end of the war, there would be a
great surplus of trained workers competing for a very

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 171

restricted number of skilled jobs. The policy of limita-
tion, on which the rates of the skilled men rest, would
be no longer possible, and the competition of those
who returned from the front, and those who found
their occupation of making war munitions gone, would
depress the level of skilled wages all over the country
to an unprecedented extent. Moreover, a fall in the
rates of skilled men would inevitably be followed by a
similar fall in the rates of semi-skilled and unskilled
workers. The engineers were asked, in the name of
patriotism, to bring upon themselves an aggravated
depression which would rob them of all the victories
of the last half-century.

However anxious both parties might be not to
hamper the Government, there could be no settlement
on such lines. It remains to see, first, what were the
counter-proposals made by the Unions, and, secondly,
whether the employers could not have made a more
reasonable demand. Let us begin with the suggestions
made by the men.

They proposed that firms engaged on private work
not connected with the war should be given Govern-
ment work (in effect, an application to the Government
to extend its contract list to firms then outside it),
that those firms which were even then working short
time should transfer their surplus workers to the
busier centres ; that a subsistence allowance should
be paid by the Government to induce such workers to
migrate ; that skilled men should be drafted from
other parts of the Empire (the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers, it may be said, had still seven hundred
unemployed members in its overseas branches), and
that the skilled men who had enlisted should, wherever
they were not needed for skilled work with the Army,

172 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

be recalled to the more pressing work which they had
left. The five Unions concerned — the Engineers, the
Steam Engine Makers, the Toolmakers, the United
Machine Workers, and the Scientific Instrument
Makers — contended that, if these proposals were carried
into effect, the shortage would cease. Though this
was no doubt an exaggeration, they would certainly
have gone far towards solving the problem.

It may be admitted that these suggestions would
not have completely met the case. This, however,
was no reason for demanding that the men should
accept the complete and unconditional surrender
claimed by the employers, which would have involved
widespread discontent, and might well have resulted
in a policy of ca' canny. It is noteworthy that the
employers' proposals were absolutely sweeping; they
asked, not for the relaxation of this or that particular
rule relating to demarcation, manning of machines, or
the like, but, to all intents and purposes, for the
complete and general abrogation of the rules as a whole.
If they had come to the men with a request for the
modification of some specific rule, there can be little
doubt that their request would have received sym-
pathetic consideration.

It was because they chose to ask for everything
that the Unions were unwilling to give anything at all.
They would have been mad to allow the employers,
under pretext of the national emergency, to make a
holocaust of all safeguards.

This was the position when the Committee on
Production was appointed. Before the issue of its
first report, the Government committed its first great
error of tact in dealing with the question, and showed
its utter inability to appreciate the working-class point

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 173

of view. On February 8 Mr. H. J. Tennant asked the
Labour Party in the House to secure relaxations of
Trade Union rules. His speech showed no sign of
an understanding of the momentous issues involved,
and contained no hint that the Government was
willing to do anything to secure the workers against
the results of relaxing their rules, or to prevent the
extra profits due to such relaxations from going into
the pockets of the employers. To the criticisms
levelled against him by Labour members Mr. Tennant
did not even deign to reply. His speech was an
employers' speech, and it was justly resented through-
out the world of Labour. Only a few weeks before,
the Government had been overflowing with compli-
ments to the workers : now there was a sudden change
of face. Mr. Tennant 's speech was the beginning of
a series of attacks on Trade Unionism. The whole
history of the months that follow is a curious medley
of attacks on the working class coupled with attempts
to get the Trade Unions to make concessions. It is a
series of ridiculous errors in tact and wanton mis-
representations on the one hand, coupled with a half-
sincere but faint-hearted attempt to give the workers
at least an appearance of possessing rights and responsi-
bilities in the conduct of industry. The Labour Party
very justly resented Mr. Tennant's attack, and pointed
out that in any case it was for the Unions themselves
to decide what concessions they were prepared to
make. Accordingly, the next stage in the struggle
was the direct approach made to the Unions by the
Government.

While the direct negotiations between the Trade
Unions and the Employers' Federation were in progress,
matters came to a head in one of the largest works in

174 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

the country. On February 18 the engineers at the
Elswick works of Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth
& Company, tendered notice to cease work unless
the firm dispensed with the unskilled labour which
had been introduced on skilled jobs. The Company,
which was engaged almost entirely on Government
work, had taken on and set on skilled jobs various
types of workers from depressed industries — copper-
smiths, lacemakers, cotton operatives, silversmiths,
and unskilled workers. The introduction of these
workers constituted a breach of working rules.

The immediate result of the threat to cease work
was a conference between the management and
delegates from each shop in the works. As a result
of this conference, strike notices were suspended and
a provisional agreement was reached, pending the
reference of the whole question to a Central Conference
between the Unions and the Employers' Federation.
The provisional settlement was important, as a number
of the points urged by the workers were conceded.

It was at once admitted by the firm that, whatever
labour was taken on, the district rate for the job
concerned must always be paid. This being granted,
the men put to the management two further questions,
the answers to which constituted the substantial gain
that they made. They asked, first, whether the firm
would agree that the Unions should be allowed to
inspect the credentials of the imported workers, and,
further, to inspect the actual work done by them.
After prolonged discussion, this concession on the
employers' part was definitely made. The men's
representatives then brought forward a further point.
They demanded that the employers should furnish
them with a complete return, showing the names of

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 175

all unskilled men taken on, and in addition the name
of the Trade Union of which they were members. To
this, too, the firm agreed. The men then asked for
a guarantee that the services of all such workers would
be dispensed with at the end of the war, and that
copies of the list containing their names should be
sent to every member of the Engineering Employers'
Federation, with the instruction that they should in
no case be employed. This guarantee was also given
by the firm. Last, but not least, the management
promised that, for the present, no further unskilled
workers should be set on skilled jobs, and that the
representatives of the skilled crafts should be first
consulted in all cases in which doubt could arise.
This meant that the question of introducing further
unskilled labour would depend upon the settlement
to be arrived at nationally by the Engineering Em-
ployers' Federation and the engineering Unions con-
cerned, but the precedent created in the case of the
largest firm had a material influence on the course of
these negotiations.

The men, by the threat of industrial action, thus
secured a small initial victory.1 The national negotia-

1 In other cases difficulties have been caused by the employment
of Belgian refugees. A strike at the Wolsingham Steel Works,
Durham, in February was due to this cause. Unskilled Belgians
having been put on to skilled jobs, the men struck. After an inter-
view between the firm and Sir Ernest Hatch, Chairman of the
Government Departmental Committee for the Employment of
Belgian Refugees, the strike was settled to the satisfaction of the
British workers. A more serious case was that in which Belgians
were compelled by the local Relief Committee to remain at work
during the engineering strike at Sandbach. Here, too, Sir Ernest
Hatch settled the case in favour of the men, and the Belgians were
not allowed to go on working. Both these instances are typical
of a number that have arisen in connection with the employment
of Belgian refugees. Ultimately, most of the available Belgian
labour has been absorbed without serious friction. The Committee

176 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

tions with the employers, however, did not result in a
settlement of the question, though the Unions agreed
to withdraw restrictions on overtime. The wider
question of the suspension of Trade Union regulations
became, in fact, for some time the most important
point at issue in the great three-cornered contest
between the Trade Unions, the employers, and the
Government, to which the above events formed the
prelude.

Before the Government made any direct approach
to the Unions, the Committee on Production issued
the series of important reports to which reference has
already been made. Of the brief report on lost time
in shipyards we have already spoken ; of far greater
interest is the second report, issued on February 20.

This contains two memoranda, of which the first
deals with the production of shells and fuses, and the
second with the avoidance of industrial disputes. It
was followed on March 4 by a further report dealing
with demarcation and the relations between skilled
and unskilled workers.

The " shells and fuses " report is important as the
first definition of the official policy with regard to
Trade Union rules in particular cases. The provision
of shells was one of the most urgent of the problems
with which the Committee was appointed to deal ; it
also seemed one of the simplest, as, in the words of
the report, " the only consumers of shells are the
Government," and as shell-making is quite distinct
from other branches of the metal industry. The

insists on the payment of standard rates, and so prevents the under-
cutting of British labour, of which there were at first a good many
cases. It also refuses to allow Belgian labour to be employed where
British workers are available, or where there is a labour dispute.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 177

following passages indicate the lines of the Com-
mittee's recommendations :

(1) We are of opinion that the production of shells and
fuses would be considerably accelerated if there were a
relaxation of the present practice of the workmen confining
their earnings, on the basis of the existing piece rates, to
" time-and-half," or whatever the local standard may be.
We understand this practice is due to some extent to a
desire to protect the piece rates ; we agree that the present
circumstances should not be utilised as a means of lowering
rates of wages, and we think the rates in question should
be protected. This can be adequately done, however,
by other means than restriction of earnings and output.
As the only consumers of shells are the Government, we
recommend that firms engaged in the production of shells
and fuses should give an undertaking to this Committee
on behalf of the Government to the effect that in fixing
piecework prices the earnings of men during the period of
the war should not be considered as a factor in the matter,
and that no reduction in piece rates will be made, unless
warranted by a change in the method of manufacture —
e.g. by the introduction of a new type of machine. The
protection afforded by this guarantee should remove appre-
hensions on the part of the men that their piece rates might
be endangered, and we think, therefore, that the Govern-
ment would be fully justified in calling upon each man
to increase his production to the fullest possible extent,
irrespective of his former limits of earnings or shop customs.

Any difference which may arise on this matter which
cannot be settled by the parties directly concerned or by
their representatives should be referred as suggested in
our recommendation respecting " Avoidance of Stoppage of
Work."

(2) We are satisfied that, in the production of shells
and fuses, there are numerous operations of a nature that
can be, and are already in some shops, suitably performed
by female labour. We therefore recommend that, in order
to increase the output, there should be an extension of the

N

178 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

practice of employing female labour on this work, under
suitable and proper conditions.

The Committee thus recommended the abolition
of restrictions on output, coupled with a guarantee
that increased output should not be used as an argu-
ment for cutting down piece-rates — a guarantee only
made possible by the fact that the Government is the
only consumer. It further advised the introduction
of female labour, " under suitable and proper condi-
tions " ; but it gave no indication what it would
consider proper conditions, though it recommended
that disputes on the matter should be referred to itself
for settlement.

This agreement has been accepted by the Amalga-
mated Society of Engineers, though no less than twelve
branches, in London alone, are known to have voted
against it.

The report on demarcation is no less noteworthy.
It is common knowledge that, in normal times, ques-
tions of the demarcation of work between trades form
one of the most fruitful causes of internal dissension
in the Trade Union world, as well as a frequent source
of dispute with the employers. Many Trade Unionists
have long been no less impatient with these quarrels
than the employers themselves, and there have been
repeated attempts in peace time to set up machinery
to deal with them. But nothing is more certain than
the necessity for the existence of a clear delimitation
of trades, while the present structure of Trade Unionism
persists. The standard rates in the skilled trades
depend largely on limitation of the supply of labour,
and this is broken down no less if men of another craft
become potential competitors than if the labourer is
allowed to take the work of a skilled man. Disputes

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 179

between skilled tradesmen and labourers have never
been recognised by the Unions as belonging to the
category of demarcation disputes. A separate report
dealing with them was therefore added.

The Committee began by pointing out the delay
caused by the rules governing the demarcation of
trades and the importance of accelerating the pro-
duction of munitions. The following are its practical
suggestions :

We understand that in the Government Establishments
the demarcation restrictions are less numerous than in
private shipyards and workshops ; where they exist in
Government Establishments we think they should at once
be suspended.

In private establishments we are of opinion that on
work required for Government purposes or affecting the
same the demarcation restrictions which at present exist
in regard to the work of the different skilled trades in the
engineering and shipbuilding industries should be suspended
during the continuance of the war. The suspension should
be accompanied by the following safeguards : —

(1) That the men usually employed on the work re-
quired are not available.

(2) That if no suitable labour is available locally, but
men can be found from a distance who are unemployed or
who can be spared from their existing employment, and
the work is of sufficient magnitude to warrant the transfer
of men from a distance, opportunity of employment shall
be given to such men providing that the work in hand is
not delayed by waiting for them.

(3) That the relaxation of existing demarcation restric-
tions shall not affect adversely the rates customarily paid
for the job. In cases where the men who ordinarily do
the work are adversely affected by relaxation, the necessary
readjustments should be mutually arranged.

(4) That a record of the nature of the departures from
the status quo shall be kept.

i8o THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

(5) That any difficulties which cannot be settled between
the parties or their representatives shall be referred to the
Board of Trade within seven days for speedy settlement.
Pending such reference there shall be no stoppage of work.

(6) That the form of guarantee to workpeople which we
have suggested in our Second Interim Report, of February
2oth, shall be adopted.1

Utilisation of Semi-Skilled or Unskilled Labour

Where an employer is unable to meet the requirements
of the Government because of his inability to secure the
necessary labour customarily employed on the work, we
think it imperative that during the war it should be open
to him to make greater use of unskilled or semi-skilled
labour, with proper safeguards and adjustments to protect
the interests of the workpeople and their trade unions. We
have suggested, in our Second Interim Report, of February
2oth, a form of guarantee which we consider satisfactory
for the purpose of safeguarding the position of the trade
unions and of the workpeople concerned.

If it is claimed by the workpeople or their representatives
that the arrangements in any specific case are not necessary
or are unduly prejudicial to their interests, the matter
should at once be discussed between the firm and the men's
representatives. If the question cannot be amicably
adjusted, it should be referred in accordance with our
recommendation as to " avoidance of stoppage of work."

I have left till last the more important section of
the Committee's second report, issued on February 20.
This deals with the " Avoidance of Stoppages on Work
for Government Purposes." It begins with a preamble
in the following terms :

Whatever may be the rights of the parties at normal
times, and whatever may be the methods considered
necessary for the maintenance and enforcement of those

1 See later, p. 181.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 181

rights, we think there can be no justification whatever for
a resort to strikes or lock-outs under present conditions,
when the resulting cessation of work would prevent the
production of ships, guns, equipment, stores, or other
commodities required by the Government for the purposes
of the war.

Its recommendation is as follows :

Avoidance of Stoppages on Work for Government Purposes

With a view to preventing loss of production caused by
disputes between employers and workpeople, no stoppage
of work by strike or lock-out should take place on work
for Government purposes. In the event of differences
arising which fail to be settled by the parties directly con-
cerned, or by their representatives, or under any existing
agreements, the matter shall be referred to an impartial
tribunal nominated by His Majesty's Government for
immediate investigation and report to the Government
with a view to a settlement.

The Committee further recommended that, " in
order to safeguard the position of the Unions and the
workpeople concerned, each contracting firm should
give an undertaking, to be held on behalf of the Unions,
in the following terms " :

To His Majesty's Government.

We hereby undertake that any departure during the war
from the practice ruling in our workshops and shipyards
prior to the war shall only be for the period of the war.

No change in practice made during the war shall be
allowed to prejudice the position of the workpeople in our
employment or of their Trade Unions in regard to the re-
sumption and maintenance after the war of any rules or
customs existing prior to the war.

In any readjustment of staff which may have to be
effected after the war, priority of employment will be given
to workmen in our employment at the beginning of the war

182 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

who are serving with the colours or who are now in our
employment.

Name of Firm -

Data

Disputes arising out of this guarantee, it was urged,
should be referred to arbitration under the conditions
suggested in the case of threatened stoppages of work.

These recommendations, which had of course no
force until they were confirmed by the Trade Unions
concerned, led directly to the now famous Treasury
Conference of March 17, which met the day after the
passing of the Defence of the Realm Act that gave the
Government power to commandeer any factory capable
of turning out munitions of war.

Representatives of the Trades Union Congress,
the General Federation of Trade Unions, and the chief
Unions connected with the production of commodities
needed for the war were invited to confer with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the
Board of Trade " to consider the general position in
reference to the urgent need of the country in regard
to the large, and a larger, increase in the output of
munitions of war, and the steps which the Government
propose to take to organise the industries of the country
with a view to achieving that end." It is worth while
to give a list of the organisations represented.1

A. General.

The Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union

Congress.2
The General Federation of Trade Unions.2

1 The Miners' Federation of Great Britain was represented on
the first day, but withdrew as it was unwilling to accept compulsory
arbitration. See pp. 163 and 216 ff.

* Federations consisting wholly or partly of Unions which were
separately represented.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 183

B. Engineering.

Amalgamated Society of Engineers.
Steam Engine Makers.
United Machine Workers.
Amalgamated Toolmakers.
United Patternmakers.
Friendly Society of Ironfounders.
Associated Ironmoulders of Scotland.
Associated Blacksmiths and Ironworkers.
Electrical Trades Union.

Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding
Trades.1

C. Shipbuilding.

United Boilermakers.

Shipwrights' Association.

Sheet Iron Workers and Light Platers.

Shipbuilding Trades Agreement Committee.1

D. Iron and Steel Trades.

British Steel Smelters.

Associated Iron and Steel Workers.

E. Other Metal Trades.

National Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers.
General Union of Braziers and Sheet Metal Workers.
Operative Plumbers.

F. Woodworkers.

Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners.

General Union of Carpenters and Joiners.

House and Ship Painters and Decorators.

Scottish Painters.

Furnishing Trades Association.

Woodcutting Machinists.

Amalgamated Cabinet Makers.

G. Labourers.

Gas and General Workers.

Workers' Union.

National Amalgamated Union of Labour.

1 Federations consisting wholly or partly of Unions which were
separately represented.

184 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

H. Transport.

National Union of Railwaymen.

National Transport Workers' Federation.
I. Woollen.

General Union of Textile Workers.

J. Boot and Shoe.

Boot and Shoe Operatives.

Thus the Unions from which those present were
drawn, while they by no means included all the Unions
concerned in the making of munitions, formed a very
representative gathering, and covered a very large
membership. How far the attitude of the leaders
represented that of the rank and file is another, and a
far more difficult, question.

To this great gathering Mr. Lloyd George made a
speech in which he set forth his proposals. He began
by insisting on the need for the national organisation
of industry, and by quoting the example of France,
in which he said, under stress of invasion, it had been
accomplished by voluntary effort. He then referred
to the Government's power to assume control of factories
under the Defence of the Realm Acts ; but, he said,
" although we have the power, we cannot exercise it
unless we have the complete co-operation of employers
and workmen." He then passed to his suggestions.
" Above all," he said, " we propose to impose a limita-
tion of profits, because we see that it is very difficult for
us to appeal to Labour to relax restrictions and to put
out the whole of its strength, unless some condition of
this kind is imposed." He then went on to say that he
did not propose to discuss then and there the methods of
limiting profits, as this would be a matter for subsequent
discussion with the employers. He appealed to the
workers to accept arbitration in Labour disputes and

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 185

to relax, under adequate safeguards, their Trade Union
rules. In this part of his speech he followed the lines
laid down by the Committee on Production. Lastly,
he referred to the drink question, of which so much
was to be heard later.

After Mr. Lloyd George had spoken, a Sub-Committee
of seven was appointed to draw up proposals for sub-
mission to the Conference. This was done on the
following day, in consultation with Mr. Lloyd George
and Mr. Runciman. The Sub-Committee was as
follows :

Arthur Henderson (Ironfounders).

C. W. Bowerman (Parliamentary Committee).

John Hill (Boilermakers).

W. Mosses (Patternmakers).

A. Wilkie (Shipwrights).

Frank Smith (Cabinetmakers).

J. T. Brownlie (Engineers).

On the following day an agreement was arrived at,
and endorsed by the representatives of all the Unions
with the very important exception of the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, whose representatives were
dissatisfied with the safeguards offered. This accept-
ance had, of course, as Mr. Henderson said in an
interview, no binding force until it had been submitted
to the Unions concerned. The agreement was in the
following terms :

The Workmen's Representatives at the Conference will
recommend to their members the following proposals with
a view to accelerating the output of munitions and equip-
ments of war : —

(i) During the war period there shall in no case be any
stoppage of work upon munitions and equipments of war
or other work required for a satisfactory completion of the
war.

186 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

All differences on wages or conditions of employment
arising out of the war shall be dealt with without stoppage
in accordance with paragraph (2).

Questions not arising out of the war should not be made
the cause of stoppage during the war period.

(2) Subject to any existing agreements or methods now
prevailing for the settlement of disputes, differences of a
purely individual or local character shall unless mutually
arranged be the subject of a deputation to the firm repre-
senting the workmen concerned, and differences of a general
character affecting wages and conditions of employment
arising out of the war shall be the subject of Conferences
between the parties.

In all cases of failure to reach a settlement of disputes
by the parties directly concerned, or their representatives,
or under existing agreements, the matter in dispute shall
be dealt with under any one of the three following alter-
natives as may be mutually agreed, or, in default of agree-
ment, settled by the Board of Trade.

(a) The Committee on Production.

(6) A single arbitrator agreed upon by the parties or
appointed by the Board of Trade.

(c) A court of arbitration upon which Labour is repre-
sented equally with the employers.

(3) An Advisory Committee representative of the
organised workers engaged in production for Government
requirements shall be appointed by the Government for
the purpose of facilitating the carrying out of these recom-
mendations and for consultation by the Government or
by the workmen concerned.

(4) Provided that the conditions set out in paragraph
(5) are accepted by the Government as applicable to all
contracts for the execution of war munitions and equip-
ments the workmen's representatives at the Conference
are of opinion that during the war period the relaxation
of the present trade practices is imperative, and that each
Union be recommended to take into favourable considera-
tion such changes in working conditions or trade customs

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 187

as may be necessary with a view to accelerating the output
of war munitions or equipments.

(5) The recommendations contained in paragraph (4)
are conditional on Government requiring all contractors
and sub-contractors engaged on munitions and equipments
of war or other work required for the satisfactory com-
pletion of the war to give an undertaking to the following
effect : —

Any departure during the war from the practice ruling
in our workshops, shipyards, and other industries prior to
the war, shall only be for the period of the war.

No change in practice made during the war shall be
allowed to prejudice the position of the workpeople in our
employment, or of their Trade Unions in regard to the
resumption and maintenance after the war of any rules or
customs existing prior to the war.

In any readjustment of staff which may have to be
effected after the war, priority of employment will be given
to workmen in our employment at the beginning of the
war who are serving with the colours or who are now in
our employment.

Where the custom of a shop is changed during the war
by the introduction of semi-skilled men to perform work
hitherto performed by a class of workmen of higher skill,
the rates paid shall be the usual rates of the district for that
class of work.

The relaxation of existing demarcation restrictions or
admission of semi-skilled or female labour shall not affect
adversely the rates customarily paid for the job. In cases
where men who ordinarily do the work are adversely
affected thereby, the necessary readjustments shall be made
so that they can maintain their previous earnings.

A record of the nature of the departure from the con-
ditions prevailing before the date of this undertaking shall
be kept and shall be open for inspection by the authorised
representative of the Government.

Due notice shall be given to the workmen concerned,
wherever practicable, of any changes of working conditions
which it is desired to introduce as the result of this arrange-

i88 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

ment, and opportunity of local consultation with men or
their representatives shall be given if desired.

All differences with our workmen engaged on Govern-
ment work arising out of changes so introduced, or with
regard to wages or conditions of employment arising out
of the war, shall be settled without stoppage of work in
accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph (2).

It is clearly understood that, except as expressly
provided in the fourth paragraph of clause 5, nothing in
this undertaking is to prejudice the position of employers
or employees after the war.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.
WALTER RUNCIMAN.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

(Chairman of Workmen's Representatives).
WM. MOSSES

(Secretary of Workmen's Representatives).
March 19, 1915.

The refusal of the engineers to come in was so
serious a matter that a further conference was held on
March 25 between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Runciman
and the representatives of the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers. At this meeting the engineers gave their
assent, on condition that the following further state-
ments made by Mr. Lloyd George were put on record.
There had been no statement about the limitation of
profits in the general agreement, and the safeguards
provided had seemed insufficient to the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers' delegates :

(i) That it is the intention of the Government to con-
clude arrangements with all important firms engaged
wholly or mainly upon engineering and shipbuilding work
for war purposes, under which these profits will be limited
with a view to securing that benefit resulting from the
relaxation of trade restrictions or practices shall accrue
to the State.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 189

(2) That the relaxation of trade practices contemplated
in the agreement relates solely to work done for war pur-
poses during the war period.

(3) That in the case of the introduction of new inventions
which were not in existence in the pre-war period the class
of workman to be employed on this work after the war
should be determined according to the practice prevailing
before the war in the case of the class of work most nearly
analogous.

(4) That on demand by the workmen the Government
Department concerned will be prepared to certify whether
the work in question is needed for war purposes.

(5) That the Government will undertake to use its
influence to secure the restoration of previous conditions
in every case after the war.

This statement was signed by Mr. Lloyd George,
Mr. Runciman, and four representatives of the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers.

It is now time to comment more generally upon the
results of this Conference, which was at once hailed
with delight by all sections of the Press, from the
Times to the New Age. The one side saw in it a way
of breaking down " the tyranny of Trade Unionism,"
while the other saw in it a new step towards the full
recognition of Trade Unionism by the State, or rather
towards a full partnership between the Unions and
the State in the control of industry. Mr. Lloyd George,
in an interview published in the Daily Citizen, also
took the latter line. He spoke of the Conference as
" opening up a great new chapter in the history of
Labour in its relations with the State." " If," he
added, " Labour works this thing in a broad and gener-
ous spirit and not in a haggling spirit this document
that was signed on Friday ought to be the great
charter for Labour."

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

As the New Age said upon this occasion : " Being a
man without either prejudices or principles, Mr. Lloyd
George has a capacity for pouring himself into any set
of circumstances and taking their shape." The danger
of such a man, however, lies in the facility with which
he can adopt the phraseology of the moment without
understanding its spirit. There can be no question
that the " great charter " of Labour means something
very different to Mr. Lloyd George from what it means
to Mr. Orage — if, indeed, it means to the former any-
thing at all, and did not merely serve him as a con-
venient form of words. It was no doubt a very
significant departure for the State to confer with the
great Unions, over the heads of the employers, concern-
ing the organisation of industry ; but despite this step
in advance, it may be argued that the effect of the
recommendations adopted was to weaken, rather than
to strengthen, Trade Unionism.

For, in the first place, the Conference did not, as was
at the time assumed, speak with a united voice. The
miners, refusing to accept compulsory arbitration on
any terms, left at the end of the first day ; the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers, whose concurrence was
vital to the settlement of the problem of war munitions,
refused to concur in the recommendations issued by
the Conference. The " complete agreement " of which
all the papers made so much was, in fact, no agreement
at all. The miners were bent on pushing their demands,
irrespective of the Government's schemes ; the engineers
were not prepared to accept the agreement without
further safeguards ; the transport workers, though
they signed, pressed for a separate advisory committee
to deal with questions of transport alone.

Complete agreement was, no doubt, brought con-

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 191

siderably nearer by the entry of the engineers into the
agreement ; but even so, the document left many
problems unsolved. Compulsory arbitration was ac-
cepted ; but no indication was given by the Govern-
ment of the principle by which they wished the
arbitrators to be guided in wages disputes.

What is far more important is the question of what
is going to happen when the war ends. This was at
the bottom of the delay of the engineers in coming to
an agreement with the Government. Obviously, if
the Trade Unions relax their rules for the period of the
war, they must be given safeguards that their rights
will not be infringed later on. The original demand
of the employers, as we have seen, was for a holocaust
of all rules and regulations ; it was at least encouraging
to find that the Government did nothing to countenance
so preposterous a claim. The recommendations pro-
vided for special scheduled relaxations of particular
rules.

But there remained one fatal weakness in the Govern-
ment's scheme. While the employer was to deposit
with the Government a guarantee that he would return
to the old customs after the war, absolutely no State
machinery was set up by which relaxations were to
be scheduled now and refusals to return to the old
rules prevented later on. The task of scheduling
relaxations was left to the employers and the Unions,
and it is not difficult to see that there will be no dearth
of disputes after the war as to the nature of the old
customs and the departures from them. The Govern-
ment promised, at the second conference, to " use its
influence," but still nothing was said about the form
which its interference should take. The workers
cannot be expected to abandon their hard-won rules

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

— the Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus of Labour —
unless they are sure that the general guarantee given
by the employer will be enforced in every particular
instance. Inevitably, numerous disputes will arise as
to the restoration of old rules. There must be in every
district bodies equipped with the knowledge and the
power to see that workers get their due. In fact, now,
it would seem, is the time for the establishment of
those Industrial Courts, purely judicial in character,
and confined to questions of interpretation, for the
trial of Labour cases which have been so long suggested
without avail.

The view seems to be very general that Trade Union
rules form a material drag upon production, and that
their removal will mean a great impetus to industry.
This is very far from being the case. There are certain
rules restricting the employment of semi-skilled
workers, which, in view of the shortage of skilled
workmen, are now hampering production. These
rules might be relaxed for the time being, provided
real safeguards for their restoration can be afforded to
the workers. But the bulk of the Trade Union working
rules are not of this character. They are designed to
protect the workman at his work, and are really a
species of industrial health legislation extending the
principles embodied in the Factory Acts. Especially
is this the case with the rules relating to overtime and
to the number of workers required for the manning
of the various machines. They are essentially pro-
tections for the worker against sickness and industrial
accident, and with their removal will go a big increase
in both. The employer, careless of the future of the
employee, may desire to live only for the day, and to
sweep away all these restrictions ; but if the nation

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 193

wants the maximum production over a considerable
period of time, it will be wise not to be too hasty in
helping the employer to overwork his men. Already,
overtime rules and the like have been strained to
breaking-point, and already there is an alarming
increase in the number of trade unionists who are on
sick benefit. If the employers are given their way,
and if the process of speeding-up is carried further,
the result may be a momentary acceleration of pro-
duction, but in the long run it will be a decrease.
Trade Union rules serve the interests of the nation as
well as the interests of the men who framed them.

The Treasury conference was significant in that it
seemed to mark the adoption of a new Labour policy
by the Government. Till then, the workers had been
ignored wherever possible ; no attempt had been made
to conciliate them, presumably because they seemed,
judged by their Parliamentary leaders, perfectly ready
to give everything for nothing. It would appear that
the Government at last realised that there was a
growing volume of discontent ; but if it desired to allay
this and to secure Labour's co-operation, it would
have done well to begin by raising the wages of all
Government servants to meet the rise in prices, and
by laying down the same principle for the guidance
of the Committee on Production and of the various
arbitrators it may appoint. When it had done that,
it would have been able to consult the Trade Unions
with better hopes of a really final settlement ; but it
should beware of attempting to impose a general
measure of compulsory arbitration against the will
of the great mass of workers, or of taking at their
face value the interested appeals of employers for
the abrogation of the essential safeguards of Trade

o

194 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

Unionism. For the working rules of the Trade Unions,
and not last week's provisional agreement with the
Government, form the true charter of the liberties
of Labour.

Since I have passed certain unfavourable comments
upon the Treasury agreement, it is only fair that I
should mention the fact that it has struck some
qualified observers in another light. Writing in the
Daily Citizen on March 24, primarily for the purpose
of getting the Amalgamated Society of Engineers to
agree to the document, Mr. G. N. Barnes gave the
following summary of its provisions :

1. The document provides for the maintenance of
existing rates of pay for any particular job, so that there
is no danger of a reduction of wages. On the contrary,
there is in this stipulation as to rates of pay a double safe-
guard. It not only maintains the wage-rate, but sets up
a tendency towards ultimate automatic displacement of
the new class of labour. The employer, if he has to pay
the same rates of pay, will want to retain the higher degree
of skill.

2. The provision as to rates being based on the job
rather than on the individual worker affords a means of
lessening the wretched squabbles about demarcation of
work which have weakened and discredited trade unionism.
It has been open hitherto to the employer to employ a
worker on lower pay on the ground of a lower degree of
skill. That has been, in fact, the underlying cause of most
demarcation trouble. This document removes it for the
time being. The employer must pay the same for a job,
no matter who does the job.

3. The employers are to register any change in work-
shop practice, and, where practicable, give notice of it to
the workpeople, who, providing there is no stoppage of
work, will then have a right to demand discussion of it.
This is actually an improvement on the existing working
agreement between engineering employers and the Amal-

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 195

gamated Society of Engineers, because under that agree-
ment employers are not required in any circumstances to
give notice of change. Moreover, under the new document
any change has to be recorded, and such record has to be
open to Government inspection. The document, therefore,
provides for a return on the termination of the war to pre-
document conditions.

4. Employers are to be required to give an under-
taking embodying the above provisions as a condition of
getting Government work, and even then they have to be
subject to another condition limiting their profits, this
latter to be made a feature of the separate agreement
between them and the Government. Employers, therefore,
become really civil servants. They will have no interest
in reducing wages. On the contrary, they will be disposed
to increase them, because their profits will be in the form
of interest on outlay.

5. An advisory committee is to be appointed repre-
sentative of the organised workers engaged in the production
of Government requirements for consultation either by
the Government or by the workmen. This committee will
consist of trained and trusted trade union leaders, who,
in this connection, will have as their chief concern the
interests of organised Labour. The Amalgamated Society
of Engineers' members may rest assured that nothing will
be assented to which will be in any way unfair or un-
necessary, or likely to weaken trade unionism.

I conclude, therefore, that the legitimate interests of
engineers are quite safe. There is one omission in the
document, namely that there is no provision for sub-
sidising unskilled or semi-skilled workers' unions when
the war is ended. We are calling upon these men to serve
our turn in the war, and we are deliberately planning then
to throw them overboard. This is not fair ; they are
willing to take the risk. But that is no reason why we
should take advantage of them. We should be ready
when the time comes to ease their lot by a special subsidy
under Part II. of the Insurance Act. Perhaps Mr. Lloyd
George will make a note of this.

196 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

The validity of this reasoning depended on the
assumption that the Government guarantees were
satisfactory. I have already given my reasons for
rejecting this assumption.

So different a critic as the New Age also welcomed
the Conference as a beginning of a system of partner-
ship between the State and the Unions. " Never
before in the history of human society," said the
writer of " Notes of the Week " on March 25, " has
the executive of a great State addressed so frank,
so egalitarian an appeal to the proletariat of their
nation."

The real question is whether the frankness of the
appeal was more than verbal. This obviously depended
on the working-out of the scheme laid down at the
Conference. The first step was the formation of a
Labour Advisory Committee, consisting of the seven
Trade Unionists who had drafted the scheme, to
advise the Government on questions connected with
the organisation of Labour. This Committee was
duly appointed as soon as the Engineers had accepted
the agreement ; but there were for a long time practic-
ally no signs of its functioning, except that it issued a
highly adverse report on the Government White Paper
on " Lost Time." It came to the fore again, as we
shall see, with the formation of the Ministry of Muni-
tions in June.

Far more important are the local Armaments
Committees which soon afterwards began to be set
up in some of the chief centres, especially the North-
East Coast and the Clyde. These two committees
consist of an equal number of representatives of
employers and workmen, together with a certain
number of Government and other supposedly " im-

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 197

partial " representatives. If the Treasury agreement
was to have any meaning, it was obviously necessary
to create local machinery for the purpose of carrying
it into effect. This could only be done by means of
local Committees and Sub-Committees in touch with
every workshop.

The North-East Coast Munitions of War Committee
was the first to be established and will serve to indicate
the character of the others.

Though there are grave dangers still to be faced,
it may be said that, on the whole, the workers did not
make a bad beginning, thanks largely to the efforts
of Mr. John Hill and the boilermakers. On the
North-East Coast Committee they have seven repre-
sentatives as against seven of the employers and a
certain number appointed by the Government. In
actual voting they will clearly still be outweighed by
the supposedly " impartial " nominees of the State ;
but if the Trade Unions rise to the occasion, mere
voting will not be the deciding factor. The Trade
Union representation on the Committee is strong
enough, if it only uses its strength to good purpose,
to secure reasonable terms. The mere fact that, on
such a body, the workers have been able to secure
nominally equal representation with the employers
proves that neither the Government nor the masters
dare offend the Trade Unions at the present time.
They know full well that the compliance of organised
Labour is absolutely essential to the rapid output of
munitions, and they are now prepared, much against
their will, to make concessions. Everything upon the
Committee will depend on the use which the Labour
representatives make of their new-found power. If
they refuse to be terrorised into giving way when the

igS THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

employers make unreasonable demands they have a
good chance of making satisfactory terms.

The Committee has, moreover, a far wider signific-
ance than any immediate advantage the workers can
hope to gain from it. It will go down to history as the
first definite and official recognition of the right of the
workers to a say in the management of their own
industries. Here for the first time the nominees of
the workers meet those of the masters on equal terms,
to discuss not merely wages, hours, or conditions of
labour, but the actual business of production. Under
stress of the emergency the workers are being recognised,
however grudgingly, as partners in industry.

This does not mean that Trade Unionists should
have thrown up their caps and proclaimed that the
revolution had come. Never was there such need as
there was during May and June for wise and wakeful
leadership and for a vigorous and intelligent rank and
file. Later developments have clearly shown that
neither the Government nor the employers have the
smallest intention of giving Labour an inch more than
they are forced to give, and that both will be equally
eager to take back at the earliest opportunity any
advantage that may now be wrung from them. More-
over, Labour was being asked to make large concessions
in return for the infinitesimally small share of responsi-
bility which was being conceded to it.

If, however, the Trade Union leaders had been
persuaded to play their cards well, they might have
been able to make it impossible for the State to return
to its time-honoured practice of ignoring Labour.
They might have succeeded in forcing the State to
abandon to some extent its old alliance with capital,
and to join them in wringing from the employers not

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 199

only better wages but some share in industrial responsi-
bility and self-government. The capitalist system
has been tried in the present emergency and has
proved itself wasteful, anti-social, and inefficient.
This even the capitalist Government has been com-
pelled to recognise, and it has turned at last to the
Unions to help it out of its difficulty.

It was never expected, of course, that the Committees
would by themselves solve the problem : they were
merely an instrument which the workers could have
used, if they had realised the position, for the purpose
of righting the capitalist in the heart of his own country
— the control of industry. If, on the other hand, as
recent events seem to indicate, the Trade Unions desire
to commit suicide, the more perfect the weapon the
more finished a job they are likely to make of their
self-destruction. It is vital that Trade Unionists
should be alive to the opportunities and the dangers
which confront them. The wage-system will only be
destroyed when the capitalist ceases to control industry.

As I write, we have had a few weeks' experience of
the working of these local Committees, and already
very grave defects have presented themselves. The
most serious fact is that they have so far had neither
definite functions nor definite powers : as in the case
of much of the machinery set up during the war, the
Government founded them, and then refrained from
telling them what to do and from empowering them to
do what they wanted to do. On the Clyde, for instance,
one of the chief tasks of the Committee has been to
stimulate good time-keeping. It has had no powers
whatsoever under the law in this respect ; but of this
the bulk of the workers have not been aware. It has
therefore employed a gigantic system of bluff, com-

200 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

manding where it has had no right to command, and,
for the most part, getting itself obeyed. Probably the
same is true of other centres.

In other centres, while the employers are show-
ing great activity on the Munitions Committees, the
working-class leaders are remaining utterly apathetic.
In some important centres the workmen's side of the
Munitions Committee has hardly met ; in other cases
the leaders have not even thought it worth while to
claim equal representation on the local Committees.

At first it seemed possible that this lack of definite
function was largely due to the inchoate condition in
which the national organisation of industry still
remained, and that it would be altered as the Ministry
of Munitions got into full working order. This ex-
pectation has been completely falsified by the scheme
finally adopted by Mr. Lloyd George, in which, as we
shall see, the Trade Unions seem to be given no powers
at all.

No sooner were the Treasury Conferences over and
a provisional settlement arrived at in the case of Trade
Union rules than the nation was informed that, after
all, Trade Union rules were not the cause of the
insufficient output of munitions. Drink was found to
be the evil, and was stigmatised by Mr. Lloyd George
as worse than the Prussians. At once all the papers
became full of frenzied attacks on the slack and
intemperate habits of the working-class, although,
only a week or two before, they had been acclaiming
the great settlement arrived at between the State and
the Trade Unions. Prohibitionists saw a chance of
forcing their policy on the country under cover of the
war, and Mr. Lloyd George went about insulting the
workers whom he had so recently cozened.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 201

The whole campaign was very carefully arranged.
It began with a deputation from the Shipbuilding
Employers' Federation to Mr. Lloyd George. It was
continued in the Press and in a series of speeches by
Mr. Lloyd George, which even drew a reply from Mr.
Asquith. Just when all over the country we were
being told that drink was the cause of the small output,
Mr. Asquith went to Newcastle and made a speech
which discredited the whole idea. " Nor, again,"
said he, " is it true or fair to suggest that there has been
anything in the nature of a general slackness in this
branch of industry on the part of either employers or
employed. I am told on the best authority that the
main armament firms registered the very high average
figure of from sixty-seven to sixty-nine hours per week
per man."

The campaign reached a climax with the publication,
on May i — Labour Day — of a Report and Statistics of
Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions, and Trans-
port Areas, presented to the House of Commons by
Mr. Lloyd George. This consists of reports from various
officers in the service of the War Office and the Ad-
miralty, from the Home Office, from certain factory
inspectors, and from the Shipbuilding Employers'
Federation. This astonishing document, since it bore
the Government imprint, was at once treated as
authoritative by the greater part of the Press, which
did not hesitate, on the strength of it, to denounce
large sections of the workers as slackers and drunkards.
In fact, it contains hardly any definite figures : it is
drawn up throughout in an ex parte manner, and,
even taken at its face-value, it does not substantiate
the allegations which it makes. The Labour Party's
protest in the House of Commons was certainly

202 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

none too strong. " Until some method is found,"
said Mr. Arthur Henderson, " whereby the other
side of the case can be stated, it will be impossible
for the Government to expect from the Labour Party
a continuance of that solid support which they have
given during the period of the war." And, what is
far more important, it is impossible for the Government
to expect the co-operation of Labour in the workshops
if insults of this kind are to be flung at them without a
chance being given them to reply.

Mr. Henderson dwelt on the fact that " all the
evidence against the workers is that of employers or
officials." " The workmen's side of the case has never
been stated, and, what is more, has never been asked."
The Government seems to have accepted the allegations
of the shipbuilding employers at their face-value — it
even printed them in an official document without
giving the workers a chance of answering them — and
it is plain, from the White Paper itself, that a lead
was given to Government officials to sum up against
the workers. Methods like these are calculated to have
a far more adverse effect on output than any amount
of drinking.

Let me examine the allegations made in the White
Paper in more detail. In the first place, it is noticeable
that throughout no comparative figures are given.
Though the employers often speak of what they call
" normal time " under peace conditions, they make
no comparison between the actual hours worked
during, say, March 1915, and a similar month in peace
time. The fact is that the " normal time " to which
they refer has no relation to actual time worked ; they
are comparing the actual hours worked now with a
full week under peace conditions. The comparison

203

is, then, obviously absurd. In the second place, no
figures are given of the time actually worked during
the earlier months of the war. It is, to say the least
of it, probable that the publication of these figures
would show that much of the lost time at present is
due not to drink, but to overstrain. The rapid growth
in the number of Trade Unionists drawing sickness
benefit supports this contention.

Moreover, no indication is given of the method
adopted by the employers of reckoning lost time.
All the figures which show a considerable amount of
time lost refer to ironworkers in the shipyards. But
such work is carried on under conditions which almost
necessarily involve the loss of time. The work is to
a great extent outdoor work, and is affected by weather
conditions. If the weather is bad, either the work
is stopped and time is lost, or the worker, if he goes
on working, is exposed to climatic conditions that
cannot but impair his efficiency and drive him to the
public-house. The boilermaker often leaves his work
wet through ; he has the choice of catching cold or
adjourning to the nearest public-house. Only now
are the employers beginning to build shelters under
which the boilermaker can work. Had they done this
long ago, they would have saved the country a large
proportion of the time that has been lost on these
processes.

Again, the employers seem to assume that they have
a right to expect a full week's work from every worker.
In view of the very heavy nature of much shipyard
work, this contention is in itself absurd. It is the more
absurd in that they appear to ignore the fact, the
importance of which is recognised in some of the
reports by Government officials, that the average

204 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

physique and character of the men are now nothing
like what they are in times of peace. Many of the
best workers have enlisted, and the men who have
been taken on in their places are in many cases, apart
from drink, physically incapable of a full week of such
hard work as, say, riveting. Lost time due to the
" broken squad " difficulty, which is in the main the
employers' own fault, is also ignored.

If the employers are careless in their allegations,
they are at least careful in their reticences. They have
made no answer to the men's allegations that they are
keeping many men on private work, and so delaying
Government work, and that they are keeping the best
men on private work, and giving the Government the
benefit of the inefncients. A Government purporting
to be impartial should surely have taken account of
the criticisms passed upon each other by both sides.

So much for the employers' evidence, which forms
the most heavily documented part of the White Paper.
It is tainted at the source, and can only be considered
when the men have been given an opportunity of
answering it. I come now to the evidence of Govern-
ment officials.

The figures showing the hours worked in Govern-
ment dockyards are highly satisfactory, and reflect
credit on the officials and on the workers. The system
under which work is organised in the Government
yards is, however, so different from that obtaining in
private shipyards as to afford no basis of comparison.
The Government workers have been afforded reasonable
periods of rest ; the Government's best workers have
not been allowed to enlist ; the Government has no
profitable private contracts to which it can divert its
best workers.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 205

Apart from the reports of the Home Office and the
Factory Inspectors, the official evidence is, for the
most part, mere generalisation. It ranges from Sir
John Jellicoe's letter, which is obviously a mere
second-hand impression based on the one-sided evidence
which alone he has had an opportunity of hearing, to
absurd generalisations like that of Captain Greatorex,
Director of Naval Equipment, who roundly declares
that " the condition of labour is deplorable."

More might have been learnt from the reports of
the special inspectors sent out by the Home Office to
some of the big centres ; but these have unfortunately
been condensed into a series of impersonal reports of
a somewhat one-sided character. Even so, they
cannot be said to bear out the alarming statements of
the employers and the War Office and Admiralty
officials. They lay stress on the fact that inefficient
workers are now being regularly employed, and they
point out certain useful reforms which might well be
carried out by the employers. For instance, where
there is no " pooling of squads," the absence of one
man often sends all the rest to the public-house ; but
this difficulty can be, and is being, overcome. More-
over, the system of paying the whole wages of a squad
to the head man of it leads to treating. And so on.

One very important report, which is in danger of
being overlooked, is that of the Factory Inspector
for the Clyde district. " There does not appear," he
says, "to be any noticeable increase of drinking since
the war began. The quantity consumed is about
normal. The same men frequent the same premises,
and those inclined to drink too much continue as
before the war commenced. . . . While drinking is an
important cause of bad time-keeping, it is only one

206 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

cause. . . . Riveting is hard and exhausting work,
and it is frequently and necessarily carried on in trying
conditions — exposure in winter to bitter cold and
damp. The temptation to take a morning or a day
off during very cold or very hot weather is great, as
the riveter knows he is indispensable at present, and
will not lose his job if he does lie off."

Certain obvious recommendations may be made
as a result of these statistics. Sunday labour is
wasteful, and conduces in the end to lost time, if it is
made a regular practice. It should therefore be
abolished, in the shipbuilding yards at any rate.
Secondly, a very large proportion of the lost time is
lost before breakfast. As Mr. Brownlie, Chairman of
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, suggested
some time ago, better time would be kept if work
started later, as at Woolwich Arsenal. Thirdly,
excessive hours do not mean good work ; the ship-
builder's normal day of nine and a half hours is too
long. Changes in these directions would make far
more difference to output than any restriction of the
facilities for drinking. The same may be said of the
provision of canteens, which, where it has been put into
effect, has had the result of diminishing drinking
without compulsion.

With the few figures in this White Paper that relate
to engineers and metal workers other than shipyard
ironworkers, it is not necessary to deal, since it is
admitted that not even the shadow of a case has been
made out against them. Drinking, as in normal times,
is only at all serious in thirsty trades, such as riveting
and some forms of dock labour, especially coal-heaving.
With regard to shipyard ironworkers, enough has been
said to show that the statements in the White Paper

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 207

should be received with the greatest reserve, and that
Labour had a full right to resent the publication of
such ex parte documents without any answering
statement of the men's case. Mr. Henderson pressed
in the House for a Committee of Enquiry with Labour
representation, and the Government apparently granted
this ; but, at the time of writing, there are no signs of
the Committee's report. Labour has clearly a right
to demand that the charges made should be either
withdrawn or substantiated.

The whole episode matters the less in that the
whole drink agitation now seems to be dead and
buried. The Government has indeed secured further
powers over licensed premises in munition areas ; but
Mr. Lloyd George's far-reaching proposals for liquor
taxation have met with ignominious defeat at the
hands of the licensed interests, and have been com-
pletely dropped. It is a queer commentary on the
state of Britain that they should have been averted
not by the action of the workers, whom Mr. Lloyd
George had insulted, but by a handful of brewers,
publicans, and distillers.

Since these events there have been great changes
in the Government itself. The Liberal Government
has fallen, and has been replaced by a Coalition
Ministry, including Labour as well as Unionist repre-
sentatives. What is of more immediate relevance is
the establishment of a separate Ministry of Munitions,
with Mr. Lloyd George at its head.

The Liberal Ministry fell partly owing to the
machinations of a section of the Press, which, despite
its success, suffered a good deal of discredit. It there-
fore sought to recover its prestige by raising the cry
of conscription. In view of the absurdity of demanding

208 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

conscription when we had already more soldiers than
we were able to arm, this cry was changed, in some
quarters, into the cry for industrial conscription.
Every one, it was urged, who was not a soldier or a
worker in some absolutely essential trade, should be
forced into the making of munitions, and martial law
should be proclaimed in the workshops.

It is difficult to argue seriously with those who
make these proposals, in view of their obvious absurdity.
The number of unskilled workers who can be profitably
employed is strictly limited by the number of skilled
workers available. So far the whole difficulty has
lain in the shortage of skilled workers. It may be
possible to increase the number of these : indeed, this
is already being done. Men are being brought back
from the Colours, skilled men are being imported from
Canada and elsewhere, and very large numbers of
semi-skilled and unskilled workers are being promoted.
But there is absolutely no indication that, even with
this increase, there will be any shortage of unskilled
workers. On grounds of expediency, there is absolutely
no reason for compulsion either in the army or in the
workshop.1 Those who advocate compulsion want
compulsion for its own sake, and not for any practical
benefit it would bring.

As I write, Parliament has just passed a Bill pro-
posing to establish a compulsory National Register
of all persons of both sexes between the ages of
fifteen and sixty-five. Forms are to be sent out on
which each person may state whether he or she is
engaged on any form of war work, or able and willing
to take up some form of war work, the nature of which
he is apparently expected to suggest. As of the

1 On the shortage in agriculture, see Chapter IX.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 209

87,000 women who enrolled themselves some months
ago on the voluntary register of war workers only about
2000 have been found employment, there seems no
reason for going in search of more female labour. Nor
is there any shortage whatsoever of any save skilled
male workers, and for these it cannot be suggested that
a comprehensive national system of registration is of
the smallest use. It seems probable that the register
scheme was started in the Coalition Cabinet by the
conscriptionists, who thought it would make both
military and industrial conscription easier. Then it
was probably whittled down in the course of Cabinet
discussion to its present ridiculous shape. " Par-
turiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus."

The real problem, as the Government well knows,
is the problem of organising the Labour that is already
in the workshops. In this connection, the solution
which naturally suggests itself to the military and to
the governing-class mind is martial law. We have
already seen a beginning made in this direction with
the notorious Dockers' Battalion of Liverpool, blessed
by capitalists, some Trade Union officials, the Director
of the Liverpool Labour Exchange, and Lord Derby.
It is necessary to say something about this extra-
ordinary body, more especially as Mr. Lloyd George,
on his visit to Liverpool to organise Labour, saw fit
to go out of his way to inspect it, and as there is more
than a hint of imitation of it in the special bodies of
munition workers who have now been enrolled.

The Dockers' Battalion consists entirely of members
of the National Union of Dock Labourers, and no
man can continue to belong to it unless he pays his
Trade Union dues regularly. The President and Vice-
President of the Union are sergeants in the battalion,

p

210 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

and Mr. James Sexton, the General Secretary, has given
it his blessing. Yet there is not the smallest doubt that
it is exceedingly unpopular with the Liverpool dockers.
On April 18 a meeting was held, confined to members
of the Union, at which Lord Derby, Mr. Sexton, and
others were to speak, for the purpose of explaining the
objects of the battalion and clearing away suspicion
with regard to it. In such a meeting, at which only
Trade Unionists were present, not a single speech
could be delivered, so great was the men's suspicion
that the battalion was intended to act as a strike-
breaking body. In the middle of May a docker was
sent to prison for describing a member of the battalion
as a scab, and there have been many similar incidents.
The speech which Lord Derby intended to make
was communicated to the Press.

" What put the idea into my head," he says, " was that
so many dockers were men who would like to be soldiers,
but were prevented by medical reasons or by age from
taking service, though these causes did not prevent them
from being good dockers. I also wanted to prevent any
idea of soldiers being brought in to do the work of the port,
and I thought it would be a good idea to form a number
of companies to do as far as possible anything the Govern-
ment wanted, to wear khaki uniform, and to be entitled
to the medal for service at the end of the war. When I
decided to form them I had to try to avoid two things,
one of which was that there should be no displacement of
any one now in employment, and to disarm any suspicion
that this was a strike battalion. ... In order to avoid it
being in any way a strike-breaking battalion the rule was
made that only Union men should be admitted."

However, on another occasion, as reported in the
Times of April 9, Lord Derby, while asserting that it
was not a strike-breaking battalion, as it would be

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 211

worked " in conformity with Union rules and military
discipline," added that he would not " look on it as a
strike-breaking battalion if it came to be used to do
the work of men who were fighting their own superior
officials and by so doing had been delaying goods going
to the front." In view of the troubled state of the
port, and of Lord Derby's own statements, the Liverpool
dockers seem justified in regarding the battalion as
suspect. If it was not founded for the purpose of
breaking strikes, it might at any rate very easily be
converted to such base uses. Soldiers have already
acted as strike-breakers more than once during the
present war,1 and the Dockers' Battalion, being sub-
ject to military discipline, could clearly be used in the
same way.

The workers are rightly suspicious of every attempt
to introduce martial law into industry. Many of them
remember how Briand crushed the great French
railway strike, and the mere threat of compulsion has
been enough to cause one great Trade Union to ask
the Trade Union Congress to inaugurate a national
campaign against it. The temper of those who favour
compulsion was well exemplified in a letter from Lord
Methuen to the Times in January. Speaking of
compulsory training in South Africa, he adds this
comment :

We worked on Lord Kitchener's admirable Australia

1 On February 19 the Isle of Man authorities used soldiers to
unload a vessel during a strike. At Northampton, members of the
Army Service Corps acted as blacklegs under orders at the end of
February. Territorials were sent back to their old work at Messrs.
Foden's motor-works during a strike in April. Royal Engineers
took the place of joiners on strike at Stobs Camp, near Edinburgh,
in April ; and the Birkenhead gasworks were kept going by soldiers
during a strike of municipal employees.

212 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

scheme in forming the Citizen Army in South Africa.
Little did we anticipate that within three years this force
should have scotched a strike and quelled a rebellion.

The same desire to crush industrial rebellion is
behind the demand for military conscription and the
demand for industrial conscription. The workers
would do well to resist both equally.

It would indeed be madness for the Government to
try to force a system of martial law upon the workers.
If industry is to be organised nationally, it can only
be so organised by and through the great industrial
organisations. The way is open to a full partnership
between the State and the Trade Unions, and there
was at one time a hope that this was the course the
Government intended to follow. The debate early
in May, when the Government introduced into the
House of Commons its Bill establishing a Ministry of
Munitions, was significant. The Bill, in its original
form at least, seemed to sanction the application of
industrial conscription by Order in Council. This
roused so much opposition that the Government
amended the Bill in Committee to rule out that
possibility. This did not of course mean that
the Government could no longer adopt industrial
conscription ; it meant only that it must secure
compulsory powers by special legislation if it desired
them.

The first indications of the Government's policy
were furnished by Mr. Lloyd George's early speeches
as Minister of Munitions, and especially by the second
great Conference with representatives of the Unions l
held on June 10, presumably for the discussion of this

1 For the bodies represented, see the account of the first Con-
ference, p. 182. The miners were again, significantly, absent.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 213

very question. At this Conference Mr. Lloyd George
made the following statement :

They talk about the conscription of labour. I don't
want conscription of labour at all. All I want to do is to
be able to place men where they are most needed to increase
the output of munitions.

The Conference passed a resolution empowering the
National Labour Advisory Committee appointed in
March " to agree to such measures as, without detriment
to the interests of the workers, will ensure an adequate
supply of the necessary munitions for the prosecution
of the war with the greatest vigour."

When Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not want
industrial conscription, he meant, as his later actions
clearly proved, that he knew a trick worth two of that.
He felt that the Trade Union leaders, at any rate in
the munition industries, were safely in his net, and he
proposed to land his fish in the easiest way. Already,
in the Committees set up soon after his appointment
as Minister of Munitions, there were signs that the
Trade Unions were to be conceded as little as possible.
In Manchester, for instance, the Central Committee
consists entirely of business men without any Trade
Union representatives. There is also a Labour Advisory
Committee, consisting of an equal number of repre-
sentatives of employers and employed, to deal with
specifically Labour questions. It seems likely that
the only power that will be possessed by this Committee
will be that of facilitating the abrogation of Trade
Union safeguards.

Even while he posed as deprecating compulsion, Mr.
Lloyd George, in his early speeches as Minister of
Munitions, was always hinting darkly at his powers
under the Defence of the Realm Acts. These Acts

214 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

conferred on the Government practically unlimited
power over the employer. Works can be comman-
deered, and the employer can be ordered to produce
whatever the Government needs, and to put in such
machinery as it commands. The question of com-
pensation is left to be settled privately ; but the
Government's policy so far does not lead to the belief
that it is likely to behave ungenerously to the propertied
interests. Over Labour, the Acts gave the Government
wide, but limited, powers. It could order the worker
to work as it directed, while he remained in employ-
ment ; but there was nothing in the Acts to prevent
him from throwing up his job, either individually Or
in concert with others. That is to say, there was
nothing in the Acts to justify industrial conscription
or to prevent strikes. This was made clear by a
question and answer in the House of Commons on
March 10.

Mr. PONSONBY — One of the results of the Bill would
seem to be that in all works to be taken over by the Govern-
ment the employees would be placed under military law.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE — No, nothing approaching that ;
there is not a single phrase in the Bill which would justify
that suggestion.

During June, the whole position of the worker was
changed by the introduction of the Munitions Bill,
which represented the Government's attempt to
mobilise the nation's industrial resources. Some of
its clauses codified and made compulsory the decisions
of the Treasury Conferences held in March ; but the
measure as a whole went much farther, and made far
greater inroads on the rights and powers of Trade
Unionism. It was, in fact, a highly dangerous measure,
and none the less dangerous because Mr. Lloyd George

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 215

succeeded in persuading many of the Trade Union
leaders to accept it.

The new Minister of Munitions was far too clever
to act without consulting the Trade Union leaders in
advance. As we saw, a series of conferences was held
during June, at which he laid before them his proposals
for meeting the emergency. The National Labour
Advisory Committee, in consultation with him, drew
up proposals, which were incorporated, in the form in
which he accepted them, in the Munitions Bill. These
proposals were put before a full Conference of Trade
Union leaders representing the munition industries,1
and were carried by a majority, though a minority
expressed itself against the provisions making arbitra-
tion compulsory. Presumably in order to stifle public
discussion, and to prevent opposition from gathering
force among the rank and file of the Trade Unions, the
results of this Conference were not made public until
Mr. Lloyd George introduced his Bill, and the Bill
was then rushed through without any adequate dis-
cussion in Parliament. It is scandalous that a measure
vitally affecting the whole position of Labour should
have been hurried through in this fashion at a moment's
notice. It is a scandal that the Government should
have taken this course ; it is still more a scandal that
the Trade Union leaders and the Labour Party should
have acquiesced in it.

The Bill, when it was made public, proved to be
-even worse than had been expected ; nor did the
amendments inserted during its one day in Committee
improve it in any important particular. It is necessary
to criticise its provisions in some detail, since it has
defined anew the whole status of the worker.

1 But not the miners or the cotton operatives.

216 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

First and foremost, it is a measure of compulsory
arbitration. On all kinds of munition work (which is
very widely denned in the Act) strikes and lock-outs
are forbidden, and, failing direct settlement without
stoppage between the parties, disputes must be referred
to arbitration. Such reference may be either to the
Committee on Production, or to a single arbitrator
appointed by the Board of Trade, or to a court of
arbitration representing the two parties with an
" impartial " chairman nominated by the Board of
Trade. If the parties fail to agree on a method of
reference, this, too, is decided by the Board of Trade.

Moreover, compulsory arbitration does not apply
to munition work alone, but also to any difference on
" any other work of any description if this part of this
Act is applied to such a difference by His Majesty by
Proclamation on the ground that in the opinion of His
Majesty it is expedient in the national interest that this
part of this Act should apply thereto." Thus, by mere
proclamation, without any reference to Parliament
being necessary, workers in any industry may be
subjected to compulsory arbitration.

This position is not really modified by an amend-
ment inserted by Mr. Lloyd George in Committee. We
saw that the miners left the first Treasury Conference,
and were not represented at subsequent conferences,
because they refused to accept compulsory arbitration.
While the Munitions Bill was in preparation, they, and
also the cotton operatives, held separate conferences
with the Government, at which attempts were made
to shake their resolution. Nevertheless, thanks largely
to the stand made by Mr. Robert Smillie and Mr.
Vernon Hartshorn on behalf of the miners, both in-
dustries refused to accept the suggestions made. They

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 217

argued that they had already elaborate machinery for
the settlement of disputes, and that the existing methods
would be quite adequate, and far more effective than
the suggested compulsion. In the speech in which he
introduced the Bill, Mr. Lloyd George said that if the
miners refused to come under the Act he would not
force them to do so. At a further meeting, he asked
them for some sort of guarantees against stoppages
during the war.

Whether or no the answer they made was unsatis-
factory, the Bill as it stood after amendment, included
all industries. All the miners and cotton operatives
got was the insertion of the following provision :

If in the case of any industry the Minister of Munitions
is satisfied that effective means exist to secure a settlement
without a stoppage of any difference arising on work other
than munition work, no proclamation shall be made under
this section with respect to such difference.

Thus Mr. Lloyd George saved his face, and preserved
his right, as a last resort, to impose compulsory arbitra-
tion on the miners and cotton operatives ; but he
yielded to the extent of allowing that this should be
done only as a last resort. The miners did gain some-
thing by standing out against his blandishments.1

On the clauses dealing with compulsory arbitration
Mr. Philip Snowden, who showed himself throughout
the one Labour member who was really alive to the
sinister nature of the Bill, moved the following very
important amendment :

In considering any application for an advance of rates or

1 They did not gain much ; for the South Wales miners have
now been scheduled under the Act, in consequence of their refusal
to accept Mr. Runciman's proposals for the settlement of their
dispute (July 16).

218 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

wages the arbitration tribunal should take into account
any increase in the price of necessaries which may have
taken place since the beginning of the war, or since the
previous advance of wages or rates was made.

The passing of this amendment would have remedied
one of the most serious defects in the Government's
Labour policy. Yet Mr. Snowden's amendment was
defeated by 79 votes to n. Even the Labour Party
did not vote for it, apart from the I.L.P. group, though
Mr. J. R. Clynes and Mr. W. C. Anderson spoke for
it. Mr. Lloyd George resisted, and was seconded by
Mr. John Hodge. Thus the Government refused to
allow the arbitrators that guidance which would have
gone far to remove the workers' suspicion of them.
Even Liberal papers, like the Nation and the Manchester
Guardian, expressed their deep regret that this amend-
ment was not accepted. The Government preferred
to maintain its earlier policy, on which comment has
been passed in an earlier chapter.1

The second part of the Act deals with the abrogation
of Trade Union rules and the limitation of capitalist
profits, which go together. In both cases, the Act
applies only to a specially created class of " controlled
establishments."

Any rule, practice, or custom not having the force of law
which tends to restrict production or employment shall
be suspended in the establishment, and if any person incites
or encourages any employer or person employed to comply,
or continue to comply, with such a rule, practice, or custom,
that person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

A special schedule attached to the Act provides
that the abrogation of Trade Union rules shall be for

1 See p. 158.

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 219

the period of the war only, that a record of relaxations
of rule shall be kept (apparently by the employer) and
shall be open to Government inspection, and that the
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled labour shall
not affect the usual rates of wages in the district for
the class of work concerned. Compulsory arbitration
extends to disputes on these questions.

Although the Act gives legislative form to the
Government's promise to use its influence to secure the
restoration of pre-war customs after the war, it does
not appear that these provisions meet the objections
to the abrogation of Trade Union rules raised in an
earlier part of this chapter. The reader is referred
back to what was said there.1

The relaxations covered by the Act apply only to
" controlled establishments," and there is at present
no indication of the number and character of the
establishments it is intended to control. This does not
mean that, where an establishment is not controlled,
there are to be no relaxations of Trade Union rules,
but that such relaxations will be made under the
provisions which existed before the Bill was introduced,
always with the threat that, if relaxations are not
allowed, the Government will proclaim an establishment
to be " controlled."

Limitation of profits under the Act also applies
only to controlled establishments, which are establish-
ments specially proclaimed by Order of the Minister
of Munitions. In such establishments the "standard
profits " are to be ascertained, and war profits are to
be limited to "an amount exceeding by one-fifth the
standard amount of profits." " The standard amount
of profits for any period shall be taken to be the average

1 See pp. 190 ff.

220 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

of the amount of the net profits for the two correspond-
ing periods completed next before the outbreak of
war." Presumably in most cases periods means years.
If this is so, employers are to be limited to a profit
exceeding by one-fifth the profits made during the
greatest boom in British engineering.

This limitation is farcical. The workers are being
compelled to give up trade customs for which they have
been fighting for decades, while the employers are
asked to be content with only 20 per cent clear gain
over and above what they could make on the top of a
trade boom. To say the least of it, Mr. Lloyd George's
application of the doctrine of equal sacrifice seems
" tinged with a certain bias."

In addition, it is far from certain that even this
limitation will be effective. It is no such easy matter
to compute net profits, especially as allowance is to
be made to the employer for new machinery which he
installs to meet the Government's needs. Capitalist
book-keeping will almost certainly prove equal to
cheating the Exchequer of even the small deductions
it proposes to make. There is no effective way of
limiting profits without abolishing them. The only
reasonable course was for the Government to assume
complete control of the munition industries, and to
pay a fixed rate of interest on bona fide capital to all
owners.

Here again, however, the issue is complicated. The
Government has expressly said that this special
limitation of profits in controlled establishments is
independent of any general taxation of war profits
that may be imposed later on. It is doubtful whether
such a tax can be easily imposed so as not to be evaded.
There is no doubt that the Government could take

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 221

over the munition industry, and abolish profiteering
in it altogether.

An essential part of the Bill is the special provision
for the enlistment of voluntary workers. The agree-
ment between the Trade Union leaders and the Govern-
ment included provision for the raising of a voluntary
force of skilled workers, to work at standard rates
under special Government control. This enlistment
was actually begun before the Munitions Bill was
introduced : the Trade Union leaders gave their help ;
the National Labour Advisory Committee issued a
special appeal to skilled workers to enlist ; and within
a fortnight nearly 100,000 were enrolled.

So far as rates of wages are concerned, this special
class of workers is fairly treated. The standard rate
of the district is guaranteed, and where a man is moved
into a district other than his own, he is guaranteed
that his wages shall not be decreased if the district
rate is lower. Special subsistence and travelling
allowances are to be paid where they are needed.
This force of workers is to be absolutely mobile : the
worker binds himself for six months to work wherever
he is wanted in any controlled establishment. At the
end of six months he has the option of re-enlisting.

This, presumably, is Mr. Lloyd George's adaptation
of the " Dockers' Battalion " scheme. It is certainly
less objectionable, inasmuch as the workers are not
subject to military law ; it presents, however, the same
dangers of blacklegging, and it is actually inferior in
that apparently membership of a Trade Union is not
required of the enlisted workman.

In general, the object of the scheme is to attract
men who are now working on work other than war
work. No workman engaged on war contracts is

222 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

accepted. There is a good deal of evidence that
employers who are making a good thing out of private
contracts are offering opposition to the enlistment of
their men. There is even a case in which a man was
discharged by his employer, presumably as a deterrent
to others, for offering his services to the Government.
This is possible, because the Government does not at
once engage the man, but only takes his name and
then pursues enquiries to see if he is suitable and can
be spared from his previous employment.

The enlisted worker, as we have seen, binds himself
for six months. There is a further very dangerous
provision in the Act which applies to all workers on
munitions work in controlled establishments :

A person shall not give employment to a workman
whose last previous employment has been on or in connec-
tion with munitions work in any establishment of a class to
which the provisions of this section are applied by order
of the Minister of Munitions, unless he holds a certificate
from his last employer that he left work with the consent of
his employer or a certificate from the munitions tribunal
that the consent has been unreasonably withheld, or unless
a period of six weeks, or such other period as may be
provided by Order of the Minister of Munitions, as respects
any class of establishment, has elapsed since he left his last
previous employment.

This drastic interference with the liberty of the
subject, though it confers on the employer an almost
infinite power of bullying his workers, whom he can
do out of another job if they rebel, seems to have
passed almost unnoticed.

Lastly, I come to the question of penalties and
tribunals. An employer who locks out his men
contrary to the Act may be fined £5 a day for every
man locked out, while a workman may be fined £5 a

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 223

day for going on strike contrary to the Act. For
failure to comply with any regulation in a controlled
establishment a workman may be fined £3, while other
offences are punishable by a fine of not more than £50.
For all these cases, except that of failure to comply
with regulations in a controlled establishment, a
special Munitions Court is provided, and all cases under
the Act are removed from the ordinary courts.

The enforcement of regulations in controlled estab-
lishments is entrusted to special Munitions Tribunals.
These are to consist of an " impartial " person appointed
by the Minister of Munitions, " sitting with two or
some other even number of assessors, one-half being
chosen by the Minister of Munitions from a panel
constituted by the Minister of Munitions of persons
representing employers, and the other half being so
chosen from a panel constituted by the Minister of
Munitions of persons representing the workmen."
These tribunals have power to fine, and in the event
of the fine not being paid, to cause the employer to
deduct it from wages. Thus the deplorable practice,
begun by the Insurance Act, of giving the employer
power to deduct from wages on behalf of the State, is
carried still farther, and the inferior status of Labour
is emphasised once more by Act of Parliament.

Moreover, the whole machinery of discipline under
the Act is utterly unsatisfactory. As Mr. Duke, a
Conservative lawyer, pointed out in the debate on the
second reading, it would have been far better to entrust
to the Unions themselves the task of looking after their
own members. As it is, they have gained no sort of
recognition from the State. The preliminary negotia-
tions once over, the Unions have been thrust on one
side. The local Munitions Committees are still left

224 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

wholly without defined function, and the men's side
of these Committees is given no power on the ques-
tion of Trade Union rules. Instead, the workers are
handed over to an " impartial " person, and even the
representatives they are allowed appear merely as
assessors before him, and are not elected by the workers,
but nominated by the Minister of Munitions.

Such was the inglorious climax reached at the end
of June by the movement for the organisation of
Labour. The settlement reached with the passage of
the Munitions Act is so unsatisfactory, and shows so
little appreciation of the real problems to be faced,
that it will inevitably break down, if the workers have
a spark of life left in them. Probably in a few months'
time the whole dreary farce will be played over again.
The Government will make a great parade of taking
the workers into its confidence ; the workers will fail
again to use the opportunity when it presents itself.
Either that will happen, or, if the world of Labour
remains undisturbed, its calm will mean not efficiency
but stagnation.

For this lamentable state of affairs the Government
is only partly to blame. The Trade Union leaders
have miserably failed to rise to occasion after occasion.
On both sides there has been a lamentable dearth of
imagination. The Government has tried to give the
Unions as little as possible, when it ought to have
thrust responsibility and power upon them : the
Union leaders have shown no sign that they recognise
their chance of getting at last a foothold in the control
of industry. Only in independent quarters has there
been any sign of a saner spirit. The New Age and
the Herald have pressed for full partnership between
the State and the Unions, and the same cry has

THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR 225

been taken up by Radical journals like the Nation and
the Manchester Guardian, and even by the Conserva-
tives. The Daily Telegraph has pressed for the
abolition of profiteering. The Round Table has urged
the Government to concede rights and responsibilities
to the Trade Unions.

In the Unions themselves, the rank and file have
been given no opportunity of expressing their point
of view. The negotiations have been conducted, or
at least controlled, by persons who seem incapable
of seeing an inch beyond their own noses, and the
malcontents have not had a chance to make themselves
heard. Those Labour leaders who have joined the
Government appear to have lost no time in adopting
the governing-class point of view. Only a few excep-
tions have appeared : Mr. Smillie and Mr. Hartshorn,
on behalf of the miners, have taken up a less subservient
position, and Mr. Philip Snowden has redeemed many
past mistakes by the line he has taken over the Muni-
tions Act. Needless to say, his attempt to be inde-
pendent at once induced the new Labour jacks in office
to attempt to throw discredit upon him.

Practically, then, the outlook could not well be
more gloomy than it is now ; but there is hope even
in the gloom. Independent minds are everywhere
beginning to realise facts which those who are in power
refuse to see. The failure of the Government and the
Trade Union leaders is teaching those who think that
only by granting a responsible share in the control of
industry to the Trade Unions, and by forcing it upon
them if need be, can the workers be persuaded to give
of their best, or production be organised efficiently.
It is useless to set up Committees without giving them
power : there can be no true organisation of Labour

Q

226 THE ORGANISATION OF LABOUR

until the workers cease to be treated merely as an
element in the cost of production, and come to be
treated as so many human beings, possessed of wills,
desires, and sensibilities, who must be humoured
rather than commanded, and given responsibility
rather than the lash. There seems little chance that
those who have the power to carry this policy into
effect will have either the sense or the courage to do so.
Whatever may happen, it will be seen in the future
that this was the only hope of a truly national organisa-
tion of industry.1

1 Since this was written there has been further trouble in the
South Wales coalfield, where the negotiations for a new agreement
and a new wage-standard reached a complete deadlock, owing to
the refusal of the owners to meet the men. The question was
then referred to the Board of Trade ; but the miners refused Mr.
Runciman's very inadequate offer, and came out on strike. The
South Wales area was then proclaimed under the Munitions Act ;
but the miners stood firm, and not only got most of their demands,
but also succeeded in practically smashing the Act on the first
occasion on which it was used. No penalties were exacted under
it, and no attempt was made to apply it to any individual.

CHAPTER VIII

WOMEN AND THE WAR

IT is very difficult, but at the same time very necessary,
for Labour to define its attitude towards the problems
of women's employment that have arisen out of the
war. For the most part these problems are not new,
and, to a limited extent, Labour has had to deal with
them in time of peace ; but the effect of the war has
been greatly to increase their magnitude, and to make
the call for their solution infinitely more urgent. In
every direction the coming of war has had the effect
of speeding up the process of industrial change ; it
has caused tendencies to become far more marked,
and has turned into actualities what seemed only
distant possibilities. This is the case more especially
with regard to women's labour.

For some time, theoretical discussions of the
position of women in industry have been claiming
more and more attention. The feminist movement —
far wider than the suffrage movement and for the
most part seeing in the vote only a symbol of emancipa-
tion— has its industrial no less than its political side.
Its claim is essentially for the removal of barriers — for
the right of free entry into any and every sphere of
activity, irrespective of the difference of sex. " Let

227

228 WOMEN AND THE WAR

woman be given the right of entry," demands the
feminist, " and then let her be judged on the same
terms as man, by her fitness. If she holds her own,
her entry is justified : if not, out she goes again, and
no harm has been done."

In pursuance of this policy of " free entry," the
feminists have seized the opportunity which the war
has afforded them of claiming the right to trades and
professions which have hitherto been open only to
men. Moreover, many of them have declared un-
equivocally that, having achieved an entry, they do
not intend to be again ousted when the war ends.
Many of them are set on the permanent conquest for
woman of new industrial territory.

It is clear that this opens up difficult problems for
the male wage-earner, who may well find his job taken,
or his standard of life threatened, by the competition
of female labour. He is apt to regard woman much
as the Australian regards Chinamen, or as the American
regards East European immigrants, as interlopers,
whose different standard of life renders them not only
dangerous, but also unfair, competitors in the labour
market. And the history of woman in industry gives
some warrant for this attitude.

Last, but not least, there is the point of view of the
community as a whole, which, taking into account the
points of view of both men and women, has to consider
what solution of the problem will conduce to the
greatest good of the mass of the people. In order to
do this, it has to consider the effect of industrial life on
the health and character of the sexes, and the im-
mediate social effect likely to be produced by radical
changes in the class of labour employed in industry.

These three points of view all deserve to be heard

WOMEN AND THE WAR 229

and taken into account. There are, of course, other
points of view which, although the same claim cannot
be made for them, are likely to play an important
part in settling the problem. Chief among these is
the point of view of the employer, who is seeking
always to reduce the cost of production, and therefore
to buy his labour in the cheapest market — the cheapest,
that is, when the efficiency of the labour he buys is
taken into account. How far, we need to know, are
the employers likely to contend for the retention of
women in industry after the war ?

All these questions can only be answered in the
most provisional way, and cannot be answered at all
until we have made a short survey of the facts. Before
we can know how the position of women in industry
is going to be affected by the war in the long run, we
must know roughly how it has been affected so far.
This it is not easy to discover with any accuracy, and
I fear the facts given in this chapter are hardly less
sketchy and incomplete than the conclusions I shall
attempt to draw.

As we have seen, the unemployment of the early
months of the war fell with far greater severity upon
women than upon men. The net contraction in the
total number of women employed in industry amounted
to roughly 190,000 in September, 139,000 in October,
75,000 in December, and 35,000 in February. More-
over, during the five weeks ending on April 16, 1915,
89,577 women and 20,815 girls registered at the Labour
Exchanges, while only 37,607 vacancies for women and
12,215 for girls were notified by employers. Though
women's employment has been growing continually
less bad, there is still a considerable number of women
workers unemployed.

230 WOMEN AND THE WAR

The steps taken to meet this unemployment in the
early days of the war deserve study. Early in August
there was set on foot an organisation called Queen
Mary's Needlework Guild, which was to provide
comforts for the troops by voluntary labour. Atten-
tion was at once called to the fact that, unless great
care was taken, this scheme would only make worse
the severe unemployment already prevailing among
women. As a result of these protests the following
official statement appeared in the papers on August 17 :

The details of the plan which the Queen has had under
contemplation for some days to collect money to finance
schemes of work for women unemployed on account of the
war will be announced in a day or two.

It is the wish of Her Majesty that these schemes should
be devised in consultation with industrial experts and
representatives of working-class women.

There has been evident misunderstanding concerning
the aims of the Queen's Needlework Guild, some people
feeling alarmed at the possibility that the enlistment of the
voluntary aid of women workers would tend to restrict the
employment of other women in dire need of paid work.
Voluntary aid was meant to supplement and not to supplant
paid labour, and one of the Queen's very first cares when the
Guild appeal was decided upon was to avoid the infliction
of any hardship.

The matter has been under earnest consideration ever
since, and the announcement that representatives of work-
ing women will be called into consultation provides a
guarantee that everything possible will be done to safe-
guard the interests of women workers.

In accordance with this scheme the Queen's Work
for Women Fund was started, nominally as a part of
the National Relief Fund, and nominally under the
control of the National Relief Fund Committee. The
money was, however, set aside for the special purpose

WOMEN AND THE WAR 231

of providing work for women, and the control was
left almost entirely in the hands of the Central Com-
mittee for Women's Employment, which was appointed
on August 20. This Committee, of which Lady Crewe
is Chairman and Miss Mary Macarthur Honorary
Secretary, consists of fourteen members, including
five representatives of working women, approved by
the War Emergency : Workers' National Committee.

The Committee at once got to work. In the words of
their own Report, they " realised that it is better that
workers should be self-maintaining than dependent
upon relief, even when that relief is given in the form
of work. . . ." The Committee, in these circumstances,
considered it to be their duty to use such opportunities
as were given to them to increase the number of firms
and workers participating in the supply of Government
requirements, and for this purpose they created a
special Contracts Department, under the direction of
Mr. J. J. Mallon.

This body did very useful work in inducing the
War Office to extend its contracts to firms usually
engaged on other kinds of work, as well as in persuading
firms to adapt themselves to the changed conditions.
Very soon it became necessary to extend this side of
the work, and the Committee itself began to tender for
contracts. It was found that many dressmaking and
needlework firms, themselves too small to secure War
Office contracts, could be helped if the Committee
itself took up a large contract, and then distributed the
work among them. The following is the list of the
chief contracts which the Committee has taken up :

(a) 20,000 cut out Army grey shirts to be made up.
(&) As from October, when the above-mentioned con-
tract expired, 10,000 similar shirts per week. The Com-

232 WOMEN AND THE WAR

mittee in this case became responsible for the cutting as
well as the making of the shirts.

(c) 105,000 flannel body belts for the French and British
Armies.

(d) 2,000,000 pairs of Army grey socks.

With regard to these contracts the Committee
makes the following statements :

(1) The work is only undertaken where the ordinary
trade is fully employed.

(2) The work is undertaken at trade prices and is self-
maintaining. Advances made from the National Relief
Fund in connection with certain contracts are merely
working capital which at the completion of the contract
will be returned in full.

(3) The conditions as to the remuneration of workers
have been (since October last) those usual in women's
trades, that is to say, payment is mainly by piece, and the
limits as to weekly earnings which apply in the Relief
Workrooms are not observed.

In the case of the order for shirts, a time rate of
wages was at first paid, but when the workers had
gained experience, the piece rates ordinary in the trade
were substituted. The workers quickly learnt their
jobs, and, whereas at first 59 workers produced less
than 800 shirts a week, in January 44 workers were
already producing 1400, and the average wage of these
44 exceeded £i. At the start the wages paid had only
slightly exceeded those in the relief workrooms.

The Committee also did something towards the
promotion of new trades ; but it would seem that it
did still more in discouraging mushroom outgrowths
of the campaign for capturing German sweated in-
dustries.

On a larger scale, and more in the public eye, has
been the Committee's relief work. This has been of

WOMEN AND THE WAR 233

two chief types : some relief workrooms have been
organised directly by the Central Committee, while
others have been under Local Relief Committees. In
both types of workroom the first necessity was to
avoid competition with ordinary trade. This was
realised from the beginning by the Central Committee,
but not, according to the Committee's own report,
by local relief committees. The Central Committee
has therefore had to insist, as a condition of making
grants, that the goods made shall neither be offered
for sale, nor distributed gratis to persons possessing
purchasing power. " Difficulty has been experienced
in enforcing this principle, chiefly owing to the desire
of the local committees to make articles for the troops." 1

Insistence has in all cases been laid on the principle
that the work provided in the workrooms should be
educational in character, though it is of course not so
to the same extent as in the special training centres
that have been set up especially in London. It seems
doubtful whether this principle has really been carried
out effectually in many of the workrooms.

One of the most vexed questions with which the
Committee had to deal was that of the wages to be
paid in the workrooms. A scale was fixed in August,
in accordance with which there was to be a minimum
scale of 3d. an hour, and the maximum number of
hours worked was to be 40 per week. A maximum
wage per week of los. was also fixed ; but, in view of
the rise in prices, this was raised to us. 6d. and the
maximum number of hours to 46 late in March.

These rates were in some quarters roundly de-
nounced as sweating, and certain members of the

1 The goods made have as a rule been distributed to necessitous
persons, under the direction of the Relief Committees.

234 WOMEN AND THE WAR

Committee seem to have put up a strong fight against
them. In defence of its action, the Committee points
to the women's rates fixed by the various Trade
Boards, which, they say, " may be taken roughly as
an indication of the lines below which, in the public
interest, wages under any circumstances should not
be allowed to drop." They further point out that
" the lowest minimum so far determined by a Trade
Board for a trade of any magnitude has been 3d."

Certainly, the Committee seems to have fixed the
lowest wage that it could have done, because " it was
felt undesirable to fix wages either so high as to attract
from ordinary employment, or else so low as to fall
below the barest subsistence level." Perhaps the
fault lies less with the Committee than with the
Government and the Trade Boards themselves, which
have done nothing to raise their minima in view of the
increased cost of living.1 Whoever may have been at
fault it is clear that both the rates paid and the maxi-
mum were scandalously low, and Dr. Marion Phillips
and Miss Bondfield were fully justified in their cam-
paign demanding a rise of a halfpenny an hour. They
did not, as we saw, apply to the work done by the
Committee or its sub-contractors for the Government
on commercial terms.

In all cases the Factory Acts have been observed,

1 " In the House of Commons yesterday Mr. W. C. Anderson
(Labour Member for Attercliffe) asked the President of the Board
of Trade whether any steps had been taken to bring before the
various Trade Boards (which fixed legal minima rates of wages at
from 2|d. to 6d. per hour at a time when the cost of living was at
least 20 per cent lower than at present) the question of revising
these rates, affecting virtually 250,000 wage-earners.

" Mr. Runciman said it was for the workers' representatives on
the Trade Boards to raise the question of an increase if they con-
sidered it to be warranted." — Daily Citizen, February 24, 1915.

WOMEN AND THE WAR 235

and the workrooms inspected by the Factory In-
spectors. Measures have been taken to ensure the
speediest possible return of the workers to ordinary
industry, and registration at the Labour Exchanges
has been insisted upon. " Local committees have,
however, been advised that no workers should be
prejudiced by refusal to accept work of an unsuitable
character or at an inadequate rate of wages."

The schemes run by local Relief Committees are,
in the main, on the same lines as those directly under
the Central Committee. In every case it was insisted
that the scheme should be controlled by a special
Women's Employment Sub-Committee, on which
local women's labour organisations were adequately
represented. The control of the scheme was then left
to this sub-committee, which had to make frequent
and full reports to the Central Committee, as a con-
dition of the renewal of grants. Central control was
thus secured.

On the whole, it seems that the result of these
schemes has been beneficial. The women have been
found to adapt themselves readily to new tasks, and a
great deal of training has been given — especially at
the Training Centres — in the various domestic arts.
The whole report issued by the Central Committee is
well worthy of study, and contains many interesting
features into which it is impossible for me to enter.
Up to January 23 it appears that about 9000 workers
had passed through the workrooms, 4908 being still
employed in them at that date. Since then many of
the rooms have been closed, sometimes too precipi-
tately, as trade has improved.

This short survey of relief measures accomplished,
I come to questions which, instead of receding into

236 WOMEN AND THE WAR

the limbo of history, are becoming more and more
acute as the war proceeds. Hitherto, we have been
dealing with the relief of women thrown out of work
by the war : we have now to deal with the incursion of
women into new branches of industry as a result of
the war.

Probably many people have still very little idea of
the extent to which this has already happened. In
fact, the total number of women who have found their
way into new trades is now very large, and shows
every sign of increasing.

All through the early months of the war this process
was going on naturally. Women were moving freely
from industries that were depressed to those that were
busy, and, in the busy trades, many married women
and others who had ceased to be employed were re-
turning to their old occupations. In some cases,
indeed, transference was found to be impossible : of
the cotton weavers who went to Yorkshire in search
of work in the woollen mills, the great majority soon
returned. Housing was too bad, and wages and
conditions of employment too unsatisfactory, to retain
these workers except in one or two centres. In other
cases, where the skill of the women was highly
specialised, it was found unprofitable to turn them on
to other .trades. But, despite these exceptions, on
the whole women passed very freely from one trade
to another.

Nevertheless, there remained in March a consider-
able surplus of unemployed women. At this moment
the Government, acting under various influences,
launched a scheme of national registration, and invited
all women who were " prepared, if needed, to accept
paid work of any kind — industrial, agricultural,

WOMEN AND THE WAR 237

clerical, etc. — to enter themselves upon the Register
of Women for War Service " at the Labour Exchanges.
" The object," it was said, " is to find out what reserve
force of women's labour, trained or untrained, can be
made available if required." Within a fortnight
33,000 women enrolled their names upon this register.1
The Government's action did not pass entirely
without protest. The following resolution was at
once passed by the Workers' National Committee :

That this Workers' National Committee has had under
serious consideration the circular " War Service for Women "
issued by the Board of Trade. The Committee points out
that there are still 60,000 men and boys and 40,000 women
and girls on the live register of the Labour Exchanges for
whom the Board of Trade has so far failed to find situations
or provide training, whilst many thousands more are work-
ing short time. It further points out that the object of the
circular appears to be specially directed to obtain women's
labour in agriculture, and that absolutely no safeguards are
proposed to guarantee good conditions and fair wages. The
Committee is strongly of opinion that in drafting women
into any industries care must be taken to prevent the stereo-
typing of bad conditions and low wages or to endanger
standard conditions where they obtain ; that this should
be secured by a tribunal representative of the organised
wage-earners — men and women ; and that further efforts
should be made to find situations for those persons now on
the register before taking steps to bring in fresh supplies of
female labour.

This resolution was largely prompted by the belief
that the Farmers' Union was behind the War Service
scheme, and was trying to get cheap labour instead of
raising the wages of men on the land.

1 In all about 87,000 women registered. At the end of June,
employment had only been found for 2000 of them, though some
others, who were also registered at the Labour Exchanges, had found
jobs for themselves.

238 WOMEN AND THE WAR

Even more significant is the manifesto issued by
the Women's Freedom League in reply to the Govern-
ment scheme.

The Women's Freedom League are glad to note the tardy
recognition by the Government of the value of women's
work brought before the country in their scheme of war
service for women. We demand from the Government,
however, certain guarantees.

Firstly, that no trained woman employed in men's work
be given less pay than that given to men.

Secondly, that some consideration be given when the
war is over to the women who during the war have carried
on this necessary work.

Thirdly, that in case of training being required proper
maintenance be given to the woman or girl while that
training is going on.

Recognising that the Government's scheme offers a
splendid opportunity for raising the status of women in
industry, we urge that every woman should now resolutely
refuse to undertake any branch of work except for equal
wages with men. By accepting less than this women
would be showing themselves disloyal to one another,
and to the men who are serving their country in the field.
These men should certainly be safeguarded on their return
from any undercutting by women.

Finally, seeing that the Government are now making
a direct appeal to women to come forward and help in the
defence of their country, and that fresh responsibilities
are being thrust upon them — thousands through the loss
of their husband being left to perform the duties of both
father and mother — we feel that this is an opportune
moment for the Government to guarantee that before they
leave office they will bring before the House of Commons
a measure for the political enfranchisement of women.

We urge all suffragists to support us in this demand
now.

At almost the same time the Treasury Conference

WOMEN AND THE WAR 239

between the Government and the Unions arrived at
the first agreement limiting Trade Union rules, and
admitting women to trades from which they had
previously been excluded. In that agreement the
following provision occurred :

The relaxation of existing demarcation restrictions or
admission of semi-skilled or female labour shall not affect
adversely the rates customarily paid for the job.

This, of course, applied only in the case of Govern-
ment work under the agreement. Miss Sylvia Pank-
hurst wrote to ask for further light on the subject,
and received from Mr. Lloyd George this reply :

March 26, 1915.

DEAR Miss PANKHURST — The words which you quote
would guarantee that women undertaking the work of
men would get the same piece-rates as men were receiving
before the date of this agreement. That, of course, means
that if the women turn out the same quantity of work as
men employed on the same job, they will receive exactly
the same pay. — Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

This answer was so obviously inadequate that Miss
Pankhurst at once wrote again. On the point raised
in this second letter the Government seems so far to
have given no guarantee : 1

DEAR MR. LLOYD GEORGE — Many thanks for your
letter with its valuable explanation that women are to
receive the " same piece-work rates as men were receiving
before the date of this agreement." I conclude that the
women will also receive any war bonus and increase of

1 Moreover, early in June the Daily Telegraph printed what
purported to be a private Treasury circular laying down for women
clerks and typists, taken on by the Government to fill vacancies
caused by enlistment, rates of wages far below those paid to male
workers.

240 WOMEN AND THE WAR

wages as a result of the war, which would have been paid
had men been employed. It is important to know also,
whether the same time rates are to apply in the case of
women as those which were paid to men ; because if this
were not the case, employers might merely engage women
to work on time rates to avoid paying the standard rate
to men.

I hope that you will be able to give me a definite answer
on this point, as you will understand how anxious women
are in regard to the matter.

This correspondence, and the manifesto of the
Women's Freedom League, bring us to the heart of
the question. How is the introduction of women's
labour likely to affect standard rates ? And how far
are the women who come in under the National
Register, or any other scheme, likely to act, willingly
or unwillingly, the part of blacklegs ?

We can best estimate the chances by running
through in turn the chief industries in which women's
labour has been, or is likely to be, largely introduced
as a result of the war. I omit agriculture, of which
I shall have to speak separately in the next chapter.

It will be well to begin with the most obvious case —
that of clerical labour. Typing, has, of course, been
a women's trade for some time, and the number of
women clerks has been growing steadily. The effect
of the war has been very greatly to speed up this
process, and especially to increase the small number
of women clerks in commercial houses. On the rail-
ways, the problem of women clerks was already rousing
opposition in the Railway Clerks' Association long
before the war, the men complaining that the women
could only take day work, and that thereby their own
spells of night duty were made more frequent. Here,
too, the effect of the war has been to speed up a process

WOMEN AND THE WAR 241

that had already begun. Women booking-clerks are
still rare ; but women are becoming common in the
head offices of the Companies. The number of women
insurance clerks has also increased.

But in one of the most important branches of
clerical work, the Civil Service, there has been as yet
hardly any change. The Civil Service Commission
recommended greater employment of women ; but,
despite protests, no steps have been taken to put this
into effect. In the postal service alone, which already
employed a very large number of women before the
war, women's labour has extended into new grades.

Lastly, women have at last got a foothold in the
banks, though not yet to any great extent. In this
case, the change seems likely to be permanent : it
is being accompanied by a process of regrading, which
separates off some of the simple and mechanical work
and entrusts this to women paid at a lower rate than
the old bank clerk, whose duties thus become more
specialised. We shall meet this problem of regrading
more than once again in our survey of the various
industries.

One of the biggest openings for women has been
found in the shops. Many of the big provision houses
have taken on women assistants for the first time, and
the great stores, such as Whiteley's and Harrod's, have
increased the proportion of women to men. Women
have been in many cases engaged as doorkeepers and
lift-attendants. Here, again, the development seems
likely to be to a great extent permanent, largely because
it is doubtful whether the men will desire to return
to their old jobs, but also because women's labour is
cheaper. In this connection, it should be noticed that
the National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants,

R

242 WOMEN AND THE WAR

Warehousemen, and Clerks, which includes over 20,000
women among its 90,000 members, refused at its
Annual Conference this year (1915) to demand equal
pay for men and women. In practice, it is, I believe,
raising no objection to the employment of women
where they are paid four-fifths of the men's salary.
The justification given for the difference is that duties
are often to some extent rearranged so that the heavier
work falls on the men ; but it does not appear that the
men have been given increases to compensate them
for this.

Waitresses, too, are being taken on in many hotels
and restaurants in which men used to be employed.
The permanency of this development probably depends
largely on the extent to which foreign waiters return
at the end of the war. The Waiters' Union, far from
raising objection to the employment of women, is
actually training them specially for the work.

So far we have been dealing with occupations which
are only in the wider sense of the word industrial.
These occupations probably still account for a very
large proportion of the women who have taken employ-
ment for the first time.

In industry proper, by far the most important
problems are those connected with engineering and
the metal trades. In engineering proper practically
no women were employed at the beginning of the war.
Right at the start, attempts were made to introduce
them as minders of the simpler machines ; but for the
most part these attempts were successfully resisted by
the workers. Already, however, before the Treasury
Agreement, a certain number of women had found
their way in, and since then the numbers have in-
creased. Even now, women are mainly confined to

WOMEN AND THE WAR 243

subsidiary branches of engineering, such as the manu-
facture of shells, in which they are largely employed
as fillers. The chief change is that they have found
their way into the engineering workshops, and are now
working together with the male operatives, even if
they are engaged in different processes. This has
already given rise to the proposal that women should
be admitted to the Amalgamated Society of Engineers :
this suggestion, which is under discussion as I write,
is almost certain to be rejected.

It is important to remember how large a proportion
of the women employed in engineering works are
engaged in trades that minister directly to the war,
and will be at any rate greatly reduced when it ends.
This fact seems likely to make it more difficult for the
women to hold permanently the ground they have
gained in the present emergency. At the same time,
many women, having been trained to use the simpler
machines for one process, might easily pass on to
another, and therefore difficulties between them and
the men seem almost certain to arise. In engineering
the incursion of women is greatest in the Manchester
and Newcastle districts, and has had less effect in
Sheffield.

In the smaller metal trades women have made much
greater headway, especially in the Birmingham district.
Here women have long been employed to a considerable
extent ; but the war has very greatly increased their
number. Many women have passed from the depressed
jewellery trade to trades ministering to the needs of
the army and navy.

In the woollen industry the effect of the war has
been not so much to open new trades to women as to
call back to work married women and others who had

244 WOMEN AND THE WAR

ceased to be employed. It is improbable that the
majority of these, except in so far as they are or become
widows, will desire to remain after the war.

In the cotton industry, which has been depressed,
there has been as yet little change ; but the agitation
for the reintroduction of women into the spinning
processes is being renewed. Lancashire has for some
time suffered from a shortage of piecers — a shortage
which is natural in view of the lowness of piecers' wages
and of the difficulty of becoming a spinner. The war
has caused a larger proportion of piecers than of
spinners to enlist, and has thus made the shortage
worse. The Spinners' Amalgamation, however, will
certainly resist any attempt to reintroduce women,
who are now only employed as piecers in a few mills,
mostly near Manchester.

In the clothing industry the war has again recalled
retired workers, and many women have passed from
depressed trades to clothing work. It seems probable
that the necessary return of many of these women
to their old occupations will be difficult, as they may
well have lost some of their old skill.

It is impossible to mention in detail all the smaller
industries in which women's labour has been affected
by the war. I pass therefore to the last great group —
the transport industries.

On the railways, though the number of women
employed is still small, the change is highly significant,
and is certain to have very great consequences. I have
already spoken of the railway clerical service ; but
the introduction of women is by no means confined to
this type of work. Several big companies have taken
on women as carriage-cleaners, and here it seems certain
that their cheapness will make them a permanency.

WOMEN AND THE WAR 245

More important still is the coming of women ticket-
collectors on some of the great lines. Here, too, the
work is easily performed by women, and it seems
probable that the number will be greatly increased.
Yet a further development is seen in the new Maida
Vale Underground station, which is staffed entirely
by women, all of whom are apparently being paid
lower wages than men receive for the same work. It
is necessary to point out that the conditions on the
Underground, which is without goods traffic and
where there is practically no porterage, are entirely
different from those on other lines. The development
is therefore not so startling as it sounds ; but it is
startling enough to hear the demand put forward
that the whole Underground service should be staffed
by women, including engine -driving. It is pointed
out that there are plenty of women motor-drivers, and
that Underground motormen need no very special
skill. Though no such far-reaching changes are
probable yet awhile, the Companies have now de-
finitely announced their intention to employ women
permanently in many grades.

The policy of the National Union of Railwaymen
was defined in June by the officials at a demonstra-
tion preceding the Annual Meeting of the Union.
The officials appreciated the fact that in some grades
women's labour had come to stop, and declared that
the Union would insist on the same rates being paid
to women as to men. The Annual Meeting has
since admitted women to the Union ; but, in fact,
where women have been taken on, it seems that
they are everywhere being paid lower rates than
men, even when they are working in the grades for
which the Conciliation Boards have fixed rates of

246 WOMEN AND THE WAR

wages, and although these rates are not explicitly
confined to men.

Perhaps the problem of which most has been heard
during the war is that of women tram-conductors.
The proposal to employ women as conductors was
first mooted by the Edinburgh Tramway Company
in February ; but on this occasion the male workers
successfully resisted the innovation. Subsequently
the proposal was made in many centres, including
Glasgow, London, Liverpool, Newcastle, Salford, and
Brighton. In Glasgow 400 women have been taken
on, and smaller numbers are at work at Salford and
Brighton. At the latter centre the women are being
paid only 4^d. an hour.

An important point is the attitude of the two
Unions catering for tramway workers. Mr. A. Smith,
President of the London and Provincial Licensed
Vehicle Workers' Union, has spoken strongly against
the employment of women in London. " No more
uncongenial work," he said, " or work for which she
is more unfitted, could be given to a woman." The
London tramwaymen are themselves strongly against
the proposal, and at a large meeting demanded per-
mission to withdraw their labour if the suggestion
was pressed. In London, however, there seems no
likelihood of its adoption.

The other Union, the Amalgamated Association of
Tramway and Vehicle Workers, has also clearly defined
its position, and in doing so has rejected the advice
of its Executive. When the proposal was first mooted
for Lancashire, Alderman Jackson, the General Secre-
tary of the Union, was asked his opinion.

" I don't see," he said, " how we, as a union, can raise
any logical objection to women earning their living as

WOMEN AND THE WAR 247

tram-conductors during the period of the war. But there
must be two safeguards. We will insist that women
employed as tram-guards shall receive precisely the same
pay as men. In the second place, we make a condition
that after the war the women must be removed in favour
of the men whose places they have taken. These conditions
being observed, I don't see any objection to women working
in that capacity if they think they can do the work.

" If such a thing came about, the Union would certainly
accept the women as members."

Subsequently the question came up for discussion
at the Annual Conference of the Union. The Executive
proposed that women's labour should not be opposed,
but that safeguards on the lines suggested by Alderman
Jackson should be exacted. The Conference, however,
passed a resolution emphatically protesting against
the employment of women on any terms.

The foregoing is a brief survey of the facts and
tendencies of women's employment as it has been
affected by the war. There are, doubtless, many
important omissions which an exacter knowledge
would supply. But, inadequate and scattered as they
are, these facts form a basis for a certain amount of
generalisation.

Between the Census of 1901 and that of 1911 the
proportion of women to men in all forms of employ-
ment hardly changed. There was a slight increase
in the proportion of women in the professions, and
perhaps a very slight decrease in industry proper.
The only change that was at all marked was in age,
the proportion of young women to older women having
become very much higher. This makes it clear that
a greater number of unmarried women were entering
industry, but that the average duration of industrial
employment was shorter, and that married women

248 WOMEN AND THE WAR

were remaining in industry less than formerly. Hence,
to some extent, the very large reserve of retired women
workers that was found to be available in certain
cases, especially in the woollen industry.

The fact that married women, apart from the pro-
fessions, show a decreasing desire to remain in employ-
ment makes the industrial problem caused by women's
labour in one respect simpler and in another more
difficult. It means, on the one hand, that, if trade is
normal, a large proportion of the women who take
up work in the present emergency will not desire to
remain in industry, and therefore will not compete
with male labour after the war. On the other hand,
it means that women's labour will be difficult to
organise. It is a well-known fact that one of the
things that make it difficult to build up a strong Trade
Union movement among women is that so often women
do not expect to be all their life wage-earners, and
therefore take a more perfunctory interest than men
in the conditions under which they are employed.
The shortness of the working life will clearly intensify
this evil, which makes especially hard the organisation
of women's emergency labour.

Nevertheless, the path of organisation must clearly
be pursued. Even if a large proportion of the women
who are now finding employment do not remain in
industry, enough will assuredly remain seriously to
menace existing conditions and standard rates, unless
great efforts are made to organise them. The sugges-
tion was made in the Federationist that women em-
ployed as war workers should be given a war Trade
Union ticket. In default of some such scheme the
women should join the Union appropriate to their
trade on the ordinary terms, and, where necessary,

WOMEN AND THE WAR 249

the ranks of the Unions should be opened to them
on the same terms as they are now open to men.
It is highly undesirable, in view of the possibility
of future trouble, that women should be organised
in separate Unions of their own. Where this is per-
force the case, there ought at least to be the closest
possible co-operation with the men's Unions.

This point of view was put forward very clearly
at a National Conference of Trade Unions with women
members and other women's Labour bodies, which
was called together on April 17 by the Workers'
National Committee. Miss Macarthur, who presided,
criticised very strongly the Government's National
Register of Women, and also those women's organisa-
tions which had accepted it without demanding safe-
guards. In view of the continued unemployment of
many working women, she regarded the Register as
unnecessary and dangerous. The chief resolution,
which was proposed by Miss Margaret Bondfield, was
as follows :

That this Conference, representing the women's trade
union, Labour, Socialist, Co-operative, suffrage, and
kindred organisations, declares that as it is imperative in
the interests of the highest patriotism that no emergency
action should be allowed unnecessarily to depress the
standard of living of the workers or the standard of working
conditions, adequate safeguards must be laid down for
any necessary transference or substitution of labour, and
it therefore urges :

(a) That all women who register for war service should
immediately join the appropriate trade union for which
they are volunteering service ; and that membership of
such organisation should be the condition of employment
for war service ;

(b) That where a woman is doing the same work as

250 WOMEN AND THE WAR

a man she should receive the same rate of pay, and that
the principle of equal pay for equal work should be rigidly
maintained ;

(c) That in no case should any woman be drafted from
the war register to employment at less than an adequate
living wage, and that the stereotyping of sweated condi-
tions must at all costs be avoided ;

(d) That adequate training with maintenance should
be provided for suitable women whom it is proposed to
place in employment under the foregoing conditions, and
that in choosing candidates for such training preference
should be given, where suitability is equal, to the normal
woman wage-earner now unemployed ;

(e) That in any readjustment of staffs which may have
to be effected after the war priority of employment shall
be given to workmen whose places have been filled by
women.

(/) That the women who are displaced in this way
shall be guaranteed employment.

This very fair-minded resolution represents the
considered view of the women's Labour movement.
It demands equal pay for equal work (a demand which
needs to be supplemented by Miss Sylvia Pankhurst's
demand for equal time-rates as well as equal piece-
rates) ; it claims that all women taken on during the
war should join the appropriate Trade Union ; and it
frankly recognises that, where women take men's
places during the war, the men have a full right to
reinstatement when they return.

No number of resolutions, however, will make the
problem simple. Advocates of equal pay for equal
work are at once met by the fact that, as often as not,
the taking-on of women involves a redistribution of
duties, so that after the change neither the man nor
the woman is doing exactly the work the man was
doing before. The problem in these cases is essentially

WOMEN AND THE WAR 251

the same as that of adjusting standard rates to changed
methods of production in ordinary times, and the
difficulties to which such adjustment has again and
again given rise do not lead to confidence that the
present problem will be easily solved. The acceptance
of four-fifths of the male rate of wages as a satisfactory
standard by the Shop Assistants' Union is a rough
and ready attempt to deal with the difficulty. Clearly
the solution will be infinitely more difficult to find if
men and women are not in the same Unions.

A second reflection which will inevitably occur to
the male wage-earner is that even if, for the period of
the war, women workers secure approximately equal
rates of payment — a very big " if " — this gives no
guarantee that equal rates will be maintained after
the war. As women find themselves displaced by the
men who return, will they not begin to compete in the
labour market by accepting lower wages ? If they do,
no reasonable person doubts that the employers will
buy Labour in the cheapest market. How far such
undercutting takes place will clearly depend in the
main on the extent to which the Trade Unions succeed
in organising women's labour during the war. This,
again, will depend mainly on how hard they try to
organise it. To this question I shall have to return
in my final chapter.

I cannot, however, end the present chapter without
a few more general remarks. The question whether
it is desirable that women should be employed in
industry at all is, to say the least of it, somewhat
academic. They are firmly established in industry,
and are almost as much bound to it by the bondage
of wage-slavery as the male wage-earner. Women's
place in industry will in the long run be decided mainly

252 WOMEN AND THE WAR

by women themselves ; if they desire to remain in
industry no one can say them nay ; if they desire
to leave industry they will do so as soon as an alterna-
tive method of economic independence is offered them.
Till then they cannot leave, even if they would.

This necessity does not make them any the less
dangerous competitors. Though the proportion is
probably growing less, a very large number of em-
ployed women are only partially dependent on the
wages they receive, and the numbers in this position
are augmented at the moment by separation allow-
ances, and will be permanently augmented by widows
in receipt of inadequate pensions from the Government.
How far, it is often asked, does this make them more
dangerous to the maintenance of standard rates ?

The question hardly admits of a simple answer.
The girl who lives at home and only desires to earn her
pocket-money is undoubtedly often willing to accept
scandalously low rates, and so drags down the whole
standard of remuneration in certain trades and districts ;
but it is at least arguable that the woman who possesses
a small income of her own has a keener sense of her
rights than others, and is more inclined to stand out
for reasonable wages. The pensioners, of whose com-
petition some Labour leaders are so fearful, surely
belong in the main to the latter class.

Ultimately, the position of women in industry will
depend on their fitness for industrial life. This, how-
ever, is not the governing principle in the opening of
new trades to women during the present emergency.
Much work is being done by women to-day for which
they are eminently unfitted, and probably more of
such work will be done by them in the near future.
The problem is very real, and the menace to Trade

WOMEN AND THE WAR 253

Union standards and conditions very real also. Prob-
ably there is no adequate solution ; but clearly the
danger can be reduced to the most manageable dimen-
sions by getting the women into the Trade Union
movement. If this is not done while the war lasts,
men and women alike will suffer for it on the declaration
of peace.

CHAPTER IX

CHILD LABOUR — THE FACTORY ACTS

MEN and women are, at least in great measure, re-
sponsible for looking after their own industrial life,
and industrial action and organisation afford the
remedy for most of the evils which beset their working
lives. Even where the State intervenes in industry,
we have given reason for holding that it should,
wherever it can, work through the appropriate in-
dustrial organisations. The child, however, stands in
quite a different position from the adult, and it is
clearly for the State to lay down the terms upon which
he or she shall be allowed to enter the labour market.
For here the question is primarily not industrial, but
educational.

Our national system of education was bad enough
before the war began ; but advantage has been taken
of the war to make it worse. The existence of half
time has long thwarted the endeavours of those who
believe in education, and exemptions from school
attendance were, before the war, given on ridiculously
easy terms. Yet the opportunity has been used to
secure yet further relaxations and exemptions, so that
an even greater number of children than before has
been sent into the labour market before the ridiculously

254

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 255

early school-leaving age to which we still cling. It
is important that the motives behind this policy, and
the dangers attending it, should be widely realised.

Before the war, there were already a quarter of a
million children of school age exempted for employ-
ment in various occupations. About 34,000 children
between twelve and thirteen years of age were em-
ployed as half-timers under the Factory Acts. About
60,000, aged thirteen, were in full-time employment.
About 9000 children under thirteen years old were
employed in agricultural districts ; while about
170,000 of school age were in other forms of full-time
employment. In addition to this quarter of a million,
another 300,000, while in full-time attendance at school,
were employed out of school hours.

The total number of children specially exempted
from school attendance during the war seems, in
comparison with these figures, quite small : up to
the end of January it amounted to only 1591. Be-
tween February and April there were 3811 further
exemptions for agricultural employment alone. Never-
theless the new departures are of great importance,
since unless care is taken, they may well be used as
precedents after the war.

Industrial employment in the narrower sense
accounts for but few exemptions. The great majority
have been made in order to allow of the increased
employment of children in agriculture. Thus, while
9000 children under thirteen were employed in agri-
cultural districts before the war, 3811 were specially
released for rural work between February and April
1915. The full figures, showing the special exemptions
granted both in industry and in agriculture during
those five months, are set out in the following tables

256 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

taken from the Board of Education White Papers on
School Attendance and Employment.

RETURNS OF CHILDREN EXCUSED FROM SCHOOL ATTENDANCE,
SEPTEMBER i, 1914, TO JANUARY 31, 1915, owing to circumstances
connected with the war :

COUNTY AREAS.

Number of Chil-

dren normally
liable to attend
School who have
been allowed to
leave School and
enter Employ-

Number of
Children who
have entered
Agricultural
Employment.

Number of
Children who
have entered
Factory or
Workshop
Employment.

Number of
Children who
have entered
other Employ-
ments.

ment.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Between n and 12

years of age

54

54

Between 12 and 13

years of age

920

i

884

i

4

32

Between 13 and 14

years of age

563

52

449

24

26

i

88

27

Total .

1538

53

1388!

25

30

i

1 20

27

URBAN AREAS.

Number of Chil-

dren normally
liable to attend
School who have
been allowed to
leave School and
enter Employ-

Number of
Children who
have entered
Agricultural
Employment.

Number of
Children who
have entered
Factory or
Workshop
Employment.

Number of
Children who
have entered
other Employ-
ments.

ment.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Boys.

Girls.

Between 1 1 ami 12

Between 12 and 13

years of age

9

4

i

8

4

Between 13 and 14

years of age .

531

224

5

9*

»3

172

148

Total . . .

540 2

2282

6

91

»3

1 80

152

1 The discrepancy of one is accounted for by Berkshire, who furnished no particulars as
to the age of one child exempted.

2 The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that Cardiff furnished no information
as to the nature of the employment of 263 boys and 59 girls, while Middlesborough
furnished no information as to the nature of the employment of 4 girls.

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 257

Thus, in all, over 2000 boys and nearly 300 girls of
school age had been specially exempted from school
attendance by the end of January — that is to say,
before the second agitation for wholesale exemption
set in. The great majority of the boys entered agri-
cultural employment. By the end of April, as we have
seen, the number had reached over 5000 for agriculture
alone.

It is not at first sight apparent why farmers should
have secured this preferential treatment. Scarcity of
labour, we are told, prevails in industry as well as in
agriculture. The answer seems to be, in fact, not that
the farmers' need is great, but that they got in first.

The demand that children should be released from
school for farm work at an even earlier age than the
regulations permit is not new. The farmers, as a
class, have never believed in education, and have
always sought to secure a plentiful supply of boy
labour. This is partly because boy labour is cheap,
but also because, if boys are put on the land early,
they are less likely to get " fantastical notions " into
their heads, and so to become discontented with the
disgraceful conditions of rural labour, and emigrate or
migrate to the towns.

With the coming of the war, the farmers saw their
opportunity, and lost no time in availing themselves
of it. Applications were at once made, on the plea
of scarcity of labour, for the granting of exemptions
to boys. These applications were made to the local
Education authorities, and it became necessary for
the Government and the Board of Education to define
their attitude when local authorities began to write
to headquarters for permission to grant exemptions.

The Government's policy was defined in answers

s

258 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

to questions in the House of Commons during August
1914. The following summary is taken from a report
presented by Miss Susan Lawrence to the Workers'
National Committee :

On August 25 Mr. Charles Bathurst asked Mr. Asquith
whether the Government would enable boys over eleven to
assist farmers during the autumn and winter. Mr. Asquith
replied, " It would appear the matter is well within the
discretion of the local authorities, who have already had
their attention called to it by the Board of Education."

On August 31 Mr. Pease made a more compromising
answer to a question by Sir F. Flannery, who asked that
the Board of Education would issue a notice that boys
who were temporarily engaged in field work would be
excused from attendance and both their parents and
themselves relieved from penalties. Mr. Pease answered
that the Board could not do this, but that " that matter
is one which, I think, can safely be left to the discretion
of local education authorities and magistrates, with whom
the enforcement of the law for school attendance rests."

Though these relaxations were probably intended
by the Government to apply only in extreme cases
and for a limited period of unusual pressure during
the harvest season, they were the signal for a national
campaign by the farming interest, which prevailed
upon many County Councils to grant them the use
of child labour. Between September 1914 and
January 1915 West Sussex released 186 children,
Huntingdonshire 168, Somerset 158, Gloucestershire
125, Bedfordshire 112, West Suffolk 88, Yorkshire
(East Riding) 83, Wiltshire 63, and the Soke of Peter-
borough 58. Many other County Councils released
smaller numbers. These figures are for agricultural
employment alone, but in twelve out of the thirty
counties for which the Board of Education possesses

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 259

figures the exemptions were not confined to agriculture.
In the aggregate, however, 85 per cent of those ex-
empted in these areas took up agricultural employment.1
In most cases the exemptions were not given for any
definite period, and the farmers therefore continued
to use child labour when the period of pressure was
passed. Nor do any satisfactory conditions with
regard to wages seem to have been imposed. Accord-
ing to the Board of Education, " the wages vary
below a maximum of 73. a week," and " the following
reply given by one county may be regarded as fairly
typical " :

2 at 6s., i at 53. 6d., 9 at 55., 5 at 45. 6d., 6 at 45., i at
35. and meals, i at 2s. and meals, i lodged and boarded
no pay. 3 at nil (working for parents).

It is extremely significant that in all cases the
worst offenders are those counties in which rural wages
are lowest. The North of England provides hardly
any exemptions : the underpaid South is the first to
adopt the expedient of still cheaper labour.

The agitation against child labour took some time
to gather force, and did not become important till the

1 Between February and April, 3811 further exemptions were
granted. The counties which offended most during this period
were the following. Of the old offenders West Sussex gave 148
further exemptions, Huntingdonshire 73, Somerset 156, Gloucester-
shire 106, Bedfordshire 203, West Suffolk 64, Yorkshire (East
Riding) 167, Wiltshire 157, and the Soke of Peterborough 48. New
offenders, or counties which had previously granted few exemptions,
were in some cases even worse : Kent released 507, Worcestershire
210, Hertfordshire 177, Essex 132, Notts 125, Oxfordshire 118,
Hampshire 109, Warwickshire 108, Cheshire 99, Northants 94,
East Suffolk 87, and Anglesey 78. Some of these exemptions may
be renewals of old exemptions, in the cases in which these were
originally granted for a limited period. Only in one case has
much use been made of the special powers of exemption under
Robson's Act 1899. This is Holland (Lincolnshire), which has
exempted 63 children in this way.

260 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

Workers' National Committee took the matter up in
earnest in January. About the same time there
began a renewed agitation on the part of the farmers
for still greater relaxations.1 They contended that
enlistment had caused such scarcity of labour that
they could not carry on their work unless children
were released in even greater numbers. On February 4
the matter was again raised in question time in the
House of Commons.

Mr. PEASE said that since the outbreak of war the Board
had been in correspondence with a number of local educa-
tion authorities on the subject of the employment of
children who would not in normal circumstances be exempt
from school attendance. He had no power to suspend
or to authorise local education authorities to suspend the
operation of their by-laws, and consequently an authority
when considering the question of enforcing its by-laws,
had no occasion to apply to him for sanction, though in
some cases they might have done so under a mistaken
impression. The industry in which the employment of
children was contemplated was in most cases agriculture,
in one case the metal industry, and in some cases it was
not specified.

Mr. PETO asked the right honourable gentleman whether
he would take steps to secure the exemption from school
attendance during the currency of the war in all rural
areas of all boys over the age of twelve years who could
show that they can obtain agricultural employment.

Mr. PEASE — It is for the local education authority, in
the first instance, to consider whether in any particular
case there is a reasonable excuse for non-attendance at

1 The farmers also demanded that grants should continue to
be paid to local authorities in respect of children exempted from
school attendance. This, which would have meant that, instead
of losing, the local authority would gain money on every child it
exempted, was wisely refused by Mr. Pease, on behalf of the Govern-
ment, in reply to a question in the House on February 10.

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 261

school, and whether proceedings should be instituted to
enforce compliance with the by-laws. I have no ground
for supposing that the duty of enforcing their own by-laws
is harshly or inconsiderately discharged by local education
authorities, but in my own opinion no case has been made
out or could be made out for the wholesale exemption of
boys over twelve in rural areas, which is suggested by the
honourable member. Such a course would, moreover,
require legislation, which the Government do not propose
to introduce.

This answer, though it showed that the Government
did not intend legislation, by no means satisfied the
opponents of child labour. In effect, it left the matter
in the hands of the County Councils, many of which
are dominated by the farming interest. In Worcester-
shire, for instance, the Education Committee refused
to grant exemptions, but was overruled by the full
County Council.

Was the action of the Board of Education in leaving
matters to the local authorities sound ? And were
the local authorities within their rights in following
the Prime Minister's advice and refraining from
prosecutions ? These points were raised in a letter
sent to the Press by Mr. A. J. Mundella, of the National
Education Association, on February 8. This letter is
worth quoting in part :

It is evident that the farmers and the county councils
are being misled by the Board of Education as regards
the employment of children. Such letters of the Board
as are published are more or less in the following words :
" The Board have no power to give directions overriding
the law with regard to school attendance and the employ-
ment of children, but the local authority is under no
obligation to take proceedings for non-attendance if they
are satisfied that there is a reasonable excuse for non-
attendance " ; and they generally go on to say that they

262 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

are sure the local authority will use this " reasonable
excuse " provision with great discretion. There they
leave the matter, and the farmers at once claim to stretch
this elastic " reasonable excuse " provision so as to cover
every child over eleven or twelve years of age whom they
want to employ.

May I point out that the Board of Education tell only
half the story ? It is true that the law says " unless
there is some reasonable excuse " (section 74, 1870) with
regard to non-attendance at school, but there is no such
proviso with regard to employment. School and work
are two entirely separate things ; and because the Act
of Parliament recognises unspecified excuses for a child's
absence from school (from toothache downwards), it does
not recognise such excuses as justifying the truant school-
boy being employed for wages whilst so absent.

The law as to employment is clear and definite, with
no elastic loopholes ; and any person who employs any
child under fourteen before that child has reached the
standard of attendance or attainment definitely prescribed
by law is liable on summary conviction to a penalty not
exceeding 405. (section 6, 1876). It is the duty of the
local authority to prosecute ; and the statute makes no
provision for an allegation by the defendant employer of
a " reasonable excuse " for his offence. And if the local
authority fail to fulfil their duty " the Board of Education
may, after holding a local enquiry, make such order as
they think necessary or proper for the purpose of com-
pelling the authority to fulfil their duty " (section 16 of
1902) ; and the statute says nothing about " reasonable
excuses " absolving the Board of Education from carrying
out the law.

It is, then, very doubtful whether the special ex-
emptions were legal, but the farmers clearly placed
sufficient reliance in the co-operation of the local
authorities to chance this. At the Annual Meeting
of the National Farmers' Union on February 24
" members were advised to employ suitable boys over

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 263

twelve on farms, with the consent of the parents,
the prevailing impression being that rural education
authorities would not initiate prosecutions."

Before this, on February n, a deputation from
the Workers' National Committee attended on the
President of the Board of Education to discuss the
question. A representative of the National Union
of Teachers then said that his Union had acquiesced
in the employment of children withdrawn from school
only on the understanding that it was a temporary
measure for the harvest period. The Secretary of the
Agricultural Labourers' Union contended that there
was no actual shortage of workers, but that the wages
were so poor that men were diverted to other occupa-
tions. Mr. Pease's reply was in the nature of an
excuse. He admitted that the replies given by himself
and the Prime Minister " had given encouragement
to farmers to believe that the Government would look
rather easily on any exemptions of the children from
school attendances." He said they were naturally
anxious at the beginning of the war to secure recruits
and to get the harvest in as well. " The words we used
applied to a particular emergency, and had been
misconstrued subsequently as applicable to the whole
farming year." He repudiated any intention on the
Government's part to reduce the school-leaving age.
Mr. Pease continued as follows :

It was rather a curious fact that where wages had been
highest there had been shown no tendency on the part of
farmers to demand the help of the children, but where
cheap labour was required the children were withdrawn.
With reference to woman labour Mr. Pease remarked that
the wages offered were practically no more than pocket
money, and the same was true in the case of children.

264 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

The Government were investigating the labour supply,
and a committee of farmers were also co-operating with
the labour exchanges as to the provision of adult labour.

On February 25 a debate on the whole question was
started in the House of Commons by Mr. Keir Hardie.
In this debate Sir Harry Verney, on behalf of the Board
of Agriculture, said that the policy of the Board was
" to encourage the use of every available form of labour
in preference to withdrawing children from school."
The Board suggested as expedients to meet the shortage,
first, the raising of wages, as a means of attracting
back those who had left farm labour for other occupa-
tions. Further, it was suggested that use might be
made of Belgian, and possibly of Dutch and Danish,
labour, and that the Irish labourers, who usually
come to England at certain seasons, might be brought
over earlier. If there was still a shortage, the Board
advised the employment of women. Sir Harry Verney
pointed out that the demand for boy labour came
from those counties in which women did not work in
the fields : he mentioned that in Scotland the pro-
portion of women farm workers to men was 41 per cent,
and in Northumberland 31, whereas in Bedfordshire
it was only 0.5 and in Wiltshire 1.2. This being so,
where, he asked, was the necessity for child labour ?

Mr. Pease, on behalf of the Board of Education,
said that he hoped the result of the debate would be
to deter local authorities from relaxing their regula-
tions. " The Government absolutely declines," he
said, " to introduce legislation, which in their opinion
would be of a retrograde character, by allowing the
exploitation of boy labour."

A second debate on the same subject took place
on March 4, when Mr. Chaplin returned to the charge

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 265

on behalf of the farmers. On this occasion Mr. Asquith
made an entirely meaningless speech, in which he
said that the question of boy labour was " entirely
a question of degree and relative expediency." The
first part of his speech, which was punctuated by
Opposition cheers, seemed to imply a withdrawal of
what Mr. Pease and Sir Harry Verney had said : the
second part was a less satisfactory reafnrmation of the
principles they had laid down. The general result was
that the issue was clouded, and the farmers and local
authorities were encouraged to go on and chance the
consequences.

After these debates, the Board of Agriculture
decided to hold special conferences with the farming
interest, and local conferences were arranged between
the farmers and the Labour Exchanges. The farmers
were also asked to produce locally definite evidence
of the shortage of labour. Representatives of the
Agricultural Labourers' Union and other Unions have
in vain sought admission to these conferences, though
their demand has been backed by the Workers' National
Committee.

So far as it can yet be estimated, the general result
of these enquiries reveals that the permanent shortage
of labour has been greatly exaggerated, and, outside
a few districts, applies only to certain skilled workers
whose places cannot in any case be taken by children.
There is, undoubtedly, a real shortage of extra men
who can be called in for the hay and grain harvests ;
but the Agricultural Labourers' Union seems to be
right in saying that there is no great dearth of ordinary
labourers that could not easily be made up by the
offer of adequate wages. The harvest difficulty has
now largely been met by the Government, which is

266 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

willing to allow soldiers temporary leave to help in
harvest work.

It is important to understand that the raising of
wages, recommended by the Trade Unions from the
beginning as a means of meeting the shortage, has not
been seriously tried. Only in Scotland do the workers
seem to have secured at all adequate advances. In
England there have been a certain number of conces-
sions ; but these have almost always been bitterly
resisted by the farmers, and have been as a rule on a
quite inadequate scale. The farmers, as a class, have
learnt nothing ; they have still refused to recognise
Trade Unionism or to advance wages. On these
grounds the Workers' National Committee has pressed
the Government to legislate for securing a living wage
for rural workers.

The farmers have done their best to keep down
wages ; but there can be no doubt that the war has
meant for them greatly increased profits. This is
not in the main the result of any cornering of wheat,
but of the natural rise in prices due to the scarcity of
imported wheat. For the home-grower it is a well-
known and obvious fact that high prices mean high
profits. The farmers, then, could afford to pay a
reasonable wage ; but they absolutely refuse to do so
while there is a chance of securing cheap labour from
other sources.

These were the considerations that led the Agri-
cultural Labourers' Union to look with suspicion on
the proposal to introduce women's labour. As we
saw in the last chapter, the formation of the National
Register of Women for War Service was widely sus-
pected of being, at least in part, an attempt of the
farmers to get cheap labour. The Trade Union,

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 267

holding that the shortage was caused by low wages,
objected to the labour of women being introduced
till wages had been raised.

An investigation of this subject was conducted by
the Workers' National Committee, which made the
following recommendation :

We are of opinion that until substantial advances in
wages have been offered no proposal to substitute either
child or female labour should be considered.

We, therefore, support the Agricultural Labourers'
Union in their demand for better wages before any other
source of supply is considered.

Should the offer of increased wages fail to draw a
satisfactory response, and the question of women being
transferred to agriculture become an urgent problem —
and the necessity of British farmers being induced to sow
still larger areas with wheat this year indicates its greater
urgency — then it should be clearly laid down that no
women are to be allowed to engage in labour ordinarily
undertaken by men, except at the same rates of pay.

The Workers' National Committee concluded that
the shortage was real, but remediable. Men had been
attracted from farming to the towns, to hut-building
work, etc., and these men would return if better wages
were offered. Enlistments only accounted for about
half the shortage.

The women's bodies generally welcomed the proposal
to reintroduce women into agriculture, in some cases
with more enthusiasm than sense. Housing conditions
in the districts where the shortage is greatest effectually
prevent the introduction of women from outside, and
seriously stand in the way of replacing* those who have
enlisted. Very often no cottages are available, and
it is impossible to turn out the wives and families of
those who have enlisted, though some employers have

268 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

even taken this scandalous course. If women are to
be employed, they must be in the main the women of
the district. As we saw, the proportion of women
employed is lowest where there is the greatest shortage
of men, and therefore there should be a large reserve
of women available in these districts.

We may now try to sum up the position so far as
agriculture is concerned. The Government did almost
irreparable damage in August 1914 by leading farmers
and local authorities to believe that school exemptions
might be given on a large scale and for indefinite
periods. This played its part in preventing the
farmers from raising wages so as to keep men on the
land. Though the Government has since then made
some attempts to retrieve its first mistakes, it is still
allowing many exemptions to go unchallenged, and
the Prime Minister's last speech on the subject was a
renewed encouragement to the farmers.

Moreover, the demand for boy labour is not really
so much an attempt to remedy the shortage of workers
as an attempt to establish a precedent which will hold
good after the war. This point was well emphasised
in a letter from the Bishop of Oxford published in the
Times of March 5 :

The ground of anxiety lies in the consideration that
the existing shortage is not likely to be temporary. In
other words, I do not believe that the young men who have
enlisted for the war are likely to return to the land, under
the old conditions, after the war. I have taken the oppor-
tunity of consulting a number of clergy who know the
lads well. They have all expressed the same opinion.
The lads are already greatly improved by military service
and better feeding. They are greatly pleased with them-
selves. They are tasting what seems to them a more
interesting life than they knew before. Whatever they

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 269

become after the war, they will not return to what they
were. It is therefore not a temporary but a permanent
shortage of labour that has to be met. It must be met, I
believe, by improving wages and conditions so as to attract
labour to the country ; and this improvement had better
be begun at once and on a systematic scale. Also educa-
tion should not be curtailed, but in every way improved
so as to make rural education a better preparation for
rural life. To meet the shortage by withdrawing boys
prematurely from school on a large scale is a disastrously
reactionary measure, which it will be hard to reverse.

There are few signs that the Government, or the
country, is alive to this danger. We might well learn
in this matter from France, where the Minister of
Education has issued to local authorities a circular
containing the following passage :

The existing laws on the attendance of boys at school
must be maintained this year with more strictness than
ever. ... It would be disgraceful to see children robbed
of their education as if the military service of their fathers
had left them only the choice between beggary and pre-
mature wage-labour.

I pass now from agriculture to industrial employ-
ment, which is also covered by the tables given on
p. 256. It will be seen from these tables that, in
county areas, 150 boys and 28 girls were released from
school for non - agricultural employment between
September and January. In urban areas the numbers
were 534 and 228. These figures, small in bulk, are
in a few individual instances, particularly disgraceful.
Cardiff alone released no fewer than 263 boys and 59
girls, Widnes released 86 boys and 58 girls, South
Shields 42 boys and 29 girls, and Gateshead 34 boys
and 22 girls. Thus, these four centres accounted for
593 out of a total number released for all purposes in

270 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

urban areas of 768. No action seems to have been
taken against these urban authorities. The fact that
these exemptions for industrial purposes are confined to
a very few centres, and that they have not been applied
for in the great industrial towns proves that there is no
need for them. Industry as a whole gets on quite well
without them, though there have been in other centres
a good many cases of illegal employment of boys with-
out special exemption. The superintendent of school
attendance officers for Paddington said in February that
650 cases of illegal employment of schoolboys had been
brought to his knowledge since the outbreak of war,
and that 100 summonses had been issued against the
employers.

In fairness to the Government it is necessary to
report the cases in which it has done its best to dis-
courage the employment of children of school age in
industry. On February 4, the day on which the
Government refused legislation to allow the wholesale
employment of children in agriculture, Mr. McKenna,
as Home Secretary, made the following reply to a
question in the House :

As regards the employment of children in agriculture
I have no jurisdiction. As regards their employment in
factories, the only powers which I possess to sanction
their employment otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions of the Factory Act are those conferred by
section 150 of the Act, which authorises the grant of
exemption in cases of public emergency. I have not made
any order under this section modifying the provisions in
the Act as to the employment of children, nor should I
be prepared to make any such order except in an extreme
case, where I was satisfied that this was necessary for the
purpose of accelerating the work being done under an
urgent navy or army contract. No proposals have been

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 271

made to me for the withdrawal of children twelve years
old from school, nor have I received any reports from the
factory inspectors on the subject.

Later in the month the nut and bolt manufacturers
of Darlaston applied to the Staffordshire Education
Committee for permission to employ boys between
thirteen and fourteen years old on naval and military
work. The Committee then asked the Home Office
not to enforce the Elementary Education Act respecting
the employment of children " during the period for
which the Board of Education might consent to the
suspension of the school attendance by-laws." The
Home Office replied that the employment of children
not qualified for exemption from school " could only
be justified in a special case where the Admiralty or
War Office certified that, owing to the shortage of
labour, an important contract for war material was
being unduly delayed." The Admiralty and War
Office, however (who had also been approached by the
Darlaston manufacturers), had not made any recom-
mendations in favour of relaxation, as proposed, either
generally in respect of the Darlaston works engaged
on such contracts or on behalf of any particular firm.
On the contrary, the War Office had deprecated the
employment of the boys in question, except as an
extreme measure. Further, it was pointed out that
the Board of Education had no power to authorise
the suspension of the school attendance by-laws, and
that they would be much averse from any general
relaxation of them. In these circumstances the Home
Secretary regretted that he could not see his way to
comply with the Committee's suggestion.

This action by the Home Office caused the suggestion
to be dropped. It affords an instructive example

272 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

of what might be done if other departments would
bring equal pressure on reactionary local bodies.

I cannot close this chapter, which deals with the
effect of the war upon the more defenceless types of
wage-earners, without saying something of the adminis-
tration of the Factory Acts 1 during the period of war.
On this question it is very difficult to speak, because
no data are yet available, or are likely to become so
until very strong pressure is put on the Government
to produce them. All that is known is that, almost
at the beginning of the war, the Factory Acts were
relaxed in the interest of the munition firms. As to the
extent of the relaxations and the use that has been
made of them there is no reliable information. It
appears, however, that very full use has been made,
and that in some cases firms have exceeded the powers
given to them.

A particularly unpleasant case is that of a firm of
engineers in Leeds. Early in April this firm was
prosecuted by the Home Office for breach of the
Factory Acts. They had obtained relaxations giving
them power to work female employees from 6 A.M. to
8 P.M. on ordinary week days and 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
Saturdays. The summonses were in respect of two

1 Attempts were also made during the early days of the war to
suspend the operation of the Mines Eight Hours Act and to extend
the employment of women in the mines and reduce the age for the
employment of children above or below ground. A special com-
mittee, including miners' representatives, reported on these and
other questions at the end of May. It recommended that there
should be no extension of the employment of women and children,
and that relaxations of the Eight Hours Act should only be made,
if at all, locally by agreement between employers and employed.
It also recommended to all intents and purposes that further enlist-
ment among miners should be prevented. There was already at
the end of February a net shrinkage of 13 J per cent in the numbers
employed.

CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS 273

girls who went to work at 6 o'clock on a Friday morning.
One girl worked for thirty hours at a stretch, the other
for 25! hours. Possibly the second girl would have
gone on longer ; but at this point she met with an
accident. One of the girls was less than eighteen
years old.

The case came up before the Leeds Stipendiary
Magistrate, who dismissed it on grounds of " national
urgency." This did not satisfy the Home Office, which
again brought the case up, this time with the consent
and countenance of the War Office. At this second
trial Mr. Marshall Hall, K.C., for the defence, described
the prosecution as " a piece of fatuous folly, only justi-
fied by supreme ignorance." He said that, instead of
bringing a prosecution, the Home Office " ought to
have struck a special medal " for the girls. " Now,"
he said, " is not the time to talk about Factory Acts."
The magistrate again refused to register a conviction,
merely dealing with the case under the Probation
Act, and calling on the defendants to obey the law.
There seems no reason, in face of his action, for their
doing this.

This case provides an insight into the state
of mind which makes the exploitation of women's
and children's labour such a real danger. Those in
authority have lost their heads completely, and seem
willing to sanction anything, if it is only done in
the name of patriotism. In this particular instance
we have it on the authority of both the Home Office
and the War Office that they disapproved of the action
taken. The Home Office representative at the trial
quoted the Master-General of the Ordnance Depart-
ment as saying that " the extension of hours of labour
does not produce very satisfactory results or increase

T

274 CHILD LABOUR— THE FACTORY ACTS

the supply of munitions of war." In short, the motive
behind attempts to suspend the Factory Acts and the
Education Acts is often not so much patriotism as the
desire to destroy the social legislation that was slowly
built up during the last century. Against such attempts
Labour ought to be always on its guard : if it once
allows the administration of these Acts to be relaxed,
it will be no easy matter to restore even the unsatis-
factory state in which these questions stood before the
war.

CHAPTER X

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

IT is less profitable to ask what will be the position of
Labour after the war than to ask what Labour can do
now to prepare itself for the " outbreak of peace."
Whatever may be the position of industry when the
war ends, whether trade be good or bad, whether
prices be high or low, whether labour be scarce or
plentiful, it is certain that the organised workers will
have many difficult problems to face and that their
power to confront them successfully will depend
largely on their action while the war lasts. It is
therefore of supreme importance that they should not
allow their minds to be so taken up with other things
as to neglect the urgent problems of labour organisa-
tion. All through this book we have been chronicling
new departures that are of fundamental importance
to Labour. We have seen how the State has assumed
a new role in industry, how the Trade Unions have
been almost forced to assume a more responsible
position in the national economy, how invention has
been speeded up, and how old methods of organisation
are breaking down among both employers and em-
ployed. We have now to attempt the difficult task
of estimating Labour's power of adapting itself to the

275

276 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

new situation, and of suggesting the immediate measures
that ought to be taken. We have to pick up the
scattered threads of the preceding chapters and to
attempt roughly to describe the new conditions.

It is patent that much will depend upon the state
of trade at the end of the war. When we remember
how wrong most of the prophets went in estimating
the effect of the war on employment during 1914, we
have every right to be cautious in forecasting the
effects of peace. Already, those who are bold enough
to prophesy differ very widely in their forecasts,
according, in general, as they set out from one or other
of two sets of premises.

The optimists generally reason more or less in this
way. The war has caused, and is causing, an immense
destruction of life and property. The loss of working
lives cannot yet be replaced, and will mean a fall in
the number of producers. The property that has
been destroyed, on the other hand, can and must be
replaced. There will, then, be fewer workers and more
work. This means good trade and no unemployment.

The pessimists, on the other hand, start not from
an estimate of national needs, but from a survey of
available capital. Money, they say, will be dear after
the war : there will be difficulty in obtaining capital
for industrial enterprises because taxation will be
heavy and there will therefore be less saving. What-
ever national needs may be, they hold, therefore, that
trade will be depressed and employment scarce.

The optimists point to the rapid recovery of France
after the war of 1870, and to the rapid restoration of
San Francisco after the great earthquake. The pessi-
mists point to the state of trade in England during the
years immediately succeeding the Napoleonic wars.

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 277

It may be doubted whether any of these parallels
really affords enlightenment.

The balance of the argument seems to incline to a
modified optimism. The last hundred years have
greatly increased the adaptability of the economic
system, and it seems likely that the capital will be
forthcoming for the restoration of the property that
has been destroyed. This can only mean, for the
richer classes at any rate, a reduction of personal
expenditure, and the State will undoubtedly have to
play an important part as financier in setting industry
again on its feet, whatever method it adopts for this
purpose ; but there seems no ground for the pessimistic
assumption that the economic system is so inelastic
that production will fall off just when it is most needed.
The problem will be that of securing adequate saving ;
for the means of reproducing industrial capital under
the present system is that of personal saving by the
investor. Instead of spending his income on what is
immediately consumed, he must, if capital is to be
reproduced, save and invest. If individual saving is
not enough to meet this problem, the State will have
to step in, and, by taxation, save and invest on behalf
of the nation.

Fortunately, this problem is of much less magnitude
in the case of Great Britain than of France or Belgium.
Merchant shipping apart, we have as yet suffered no
great industrial losses, though the stoppage of a great
part of our annual industrial production represents a
very serious capital loss. This, however, will probably
affect overseas investment more than home investment,
and need not, therefore, have a serious effect on employ-
ment at home. For Great Britain the problem is not
so much that industrial capital will have to be replaced

278 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

on a large scale — though this is true — as that industry
will have to undergo an enormous transformation.
The war has diverted production into unfamiliar and
unnatural channels : the problem will be that of
restoring it to the old channels. We shall have, in the
first place, to recover the markets we held before the
war, or to secure others as good, and, in the second
place, to retransform our factories and reorganise our
workers for the production of the munitions of peace.

These two processes will be going on simultaneously,
and both of them will take tune. While, therefore, we
may be optimistic about their ultimate results, we may
with reason be pessimistic about the period of transition.
It seems probable that immediately, or soon, after the
war there will come a slump, at least in some of our
chief industries. How long this slump lasts will depend
mainly on the rapidity with which markets are re-
captured : but, long or short, it will be the period
during which the destiny of Labour will most probably
be decided.

I am here attempting to deal with the future of
trade only in so far as it affects the workers directly,
that is, in relation to the all-important problem of
employment. The danger clearly is that during the
slump after the war the employers will take advantage
of Labour's temporary weakness not only to cut down
wages and secure long agreements unfavourable to
the workers, but also to make an attack, open or veiled,
upon Trade Unionism itself. It is against this that
the workers have to be on their guard.

As we have seen, the great majority of the wage
advances given during the war have taken the form
of bonuses, which hold good only while the peculiar
circumstances created by the war continue to exist. In

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 279

discussing the " war bonus " method, and in particular
the awards of the Government Committee on Produc-
tion, we saw the uncertainty as to the conditions
governing such advances. " War wages, recognised
as due to, and dependent on, the existence of the
abnormal conditions now prevailing in consequence
of the war " might, we saw, mean several things.
Does it mean that, as soon as prices fall, the bonus
automatically ceases ? In this case, Labour may
have to negotiate new agreements when, though prices
are low, trade is bad and there is an over-supply of
workers. If so, will not Labour be compelled to accept
unfavourable terms, and probably be tied down to
them long after trade has recovered? Or does it
mean, as it surely should mean, that the bonus will
continue until industry can be regarded as normal once
again ? It is for this interpretation that the workers
should press now, and the Committee on Production
should be compelled to make its meaning more explicit.

On the other hand, some bonuses are to terminate
six months after the end of the war. This period is
surely far too short to allow of the restoration of
industry to normal conditions. Since the bonus
movement has been allowed to spread, the best course
now is to see that the bonuses are not removed till
Labour is strong enough to confront the employer on
equal terms.

Wages, however, are not the only, or even the most
vital, problem. The danger is that capitalism will
use the " outbreak of peace as a signal for a con-
certed attack on Trade Union rights. The danger of
this was made manifest in our discussion of the relaxa-
tion of Trade Union rules and of the general relations
between Trade Unionism and the Government during

280 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

1915. The employers, in demanding a general abroga-
tion of Union rules, had in mind, there is only too much
reason to believe, the situation after the war no less
than the need for speeding up the production of
munitions.

There are, no doubt, some Trade Union rules which
no reasonable person wishes to see restored. Of such
a nature are some, though by no means all, of the
regulations dealing with the demarcation between
trades. Some of these rules are part and parcel of an
old-fashioned system of craft Unionism which is no
less clogging to production than it is destructive of
effective Trade Union action. The limitation of craft
in many cases urgently needs breaking down, and,
provided this is not done by substituting the lower-
paid for the higher-paid worker, the collapse of many
demarcation rules would be no cause for regret.

This, however, is true only of some rules governing
demarcation between skilled trades, and is not true
at all of the rules preventing unskilled and semi-
skilled workers from doing what is regarded as skilled
work. As we saw in an earlier chapter, disputes
between the skilled and the unskilled are not recog-
nised by the Unions as demarcation disputes ; but
this does not mean that they are not of the greatest
importance. Unless and until not merely one industry,
but all industries, become blackleg-proof, it will be
necessary for the workers in skilled trades to limit the
supply of labour in those trades. If an over-supply of
workers in them is allowed to arise, standard rates
will inevitably fall, and the whole fabric of Trade
Unionism will be menaced. Waterside workers, en-
gineers, textile operatives, and many other classes of
workers are fully alive to this danger, from which

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 281

comes the greater part of the opposition to the with-
drawal of Trade Union rules for the war period.

We have seen that the first need, when rules were
relaxed, was that full guarantees of a reversion to the
previous conditions should be given by the Government
as well as the employers, and we have given reason
for believing that the actual guarantees afforded by
the Munitions Act will prove utterly ineffectual.
What, then, are the Trade Unions to do ?

It may be said that this question shows too much
consideration for the skilled workers and all too little
for the semi-skilled and the unskilled. This is not so.
It is true enough that, up to the present, the Trade
Unions of skilled workers have shown scant sympathy
for the unskilled. Where the skilled man has been the
direct employer of the less skilled, as in spinning, he
has almost uniformly kept his wages down and exploited
him just as the capitalist would have done. Where
both are alike directly employed by the capitalist,
the skilled men have too often shut the less skilled
men out of their Unions, or only admitted them on
impossible terms. Seldom indeed have they done
anything of their own free will to improve the condi-
tions of the less skilled, though in this respect there
has been a marked improvement during the last few
years. The great miners' strike of 1912, for instance,
was in the interests of the lower-paid workers, and a
great miners' movement on behalf of the surfacemen
seemed to be imminent before the war. In the engin-
eering shops, too, where the conservative instinct is
as a rule very strong among the skilled men, there
have been, in certain localities, refreshing examples of
action on behalf of the unskilled. Broadly speaking,
however, it is true that the skilled workers have treated

282 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

the unskilled workers badly. This has led very natur-
ally to a marked spirit of hostility to the skilled in
some of the unskilled labour Unions.

But, despite these facts, it is in the main true that,
if the skilled worker suffers, the unskilled will suffer
also. Skilled rates of wages to a great extent deter-
mine the rates paid to less skilled workers, and, if the
former fall, the latter will be likely to fall with them.
If, then, the unskilled, in their resentment against the
skilled, assist the masters against them, they will in
the long run be prejudicing their own interests. A
permanent relaxation of Trade Union rules, admitting
unskilled workers to work on any skilled job, would
in the end force down the general level of wages, and
hurt all classes of workers alike.

The interests of skilled and unskilled are, then,
really identical, and it is essential that closer co-
operation between them should be secured before the
war ends. Attention has already been drawn to the
apparent breakdown of the many amalgamation
schemes that were being formulated before the war,
and to the need for carrying these through with all the
more vigour because of the war. It would, however,
be Utopian to imagine that amalgamation during the
war is likely to do very much towards solving the
problem. Important as amalgamation is, there is
more immediate hope in other methods of co-operation
between Unions which may, later on, lead to amal-
gamation. In particular, the local Munitions Com-
mittees in the great armament centres will force the
workers, whatever their Unions, to co-operate more
closely, and the considerable possibilities latent in
these Committees will entail common action that may
well pave the way to complete fusion. In these cases

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 283

skilled and unskilled will have to co-operate, and it
is to be hoped that the need of the moment will teach
them so to compose their differences as to realise the
advantages of unity in the future.

There can, however, be no settlement unless the
skilled Unions very greatly modify their outlook.
They must realise that they exist not merely to raise
the wages and better the conditions of the skilled, but
to fight for all the workers in the industry. They
must recognise, far more than they have done in the
past, that all have a common struggle before them,
and they must be prepared to sacrifice their conserva-
tive craft prejudices. Above all, they must recognise the
inevitable tendency of the modern industrial system to
break down the barriers between skilled and unskilled.

This, indeed, is the crux of the whole matter.
For a long time, the process of invention has been
profoundly changing the function of the worker in
production. Where, not so very long ago, there were
a large number of skilled workers and a large number
of almost unskilled labourers, there are now a smaller
proportion of highly skilled and a smaller proportion
of unskilled jobs. There has come into being, between
the skilled and the unskilled, a vast body of semi-
skilled labour, minding machines which take the place
of the skilled worker.

This development the war has accelerated to an
almost incredible extent. In one year, it has done
more to change the methods of production than could
have been accomplished in a decade of peace. When,
therefore, after the war, the attempt is made to restore
the various grades of labour to their old positions, it
will be found that in many cases these positions no
longer exist.

284 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

If, then, the skilled and the unskilled are still
without means of organised co-operation, or if, worse
still, they elect to fight one another for the possession
of the various processes and the right to handle various
tools, the employers will seize their opportunity.
Wherever he thinks it will pay, the employer will
pick the cheapest grade of labour and fight its battle
against the more highly paid grades. And then,
when the skilled Trade Unions are broken, the employer
will turn upon his late allies, and a general reduction
of wages and worsening of conditions will take place.

All this will only happen if the Unions prove them-
selves incapable of rising to the situation that now
confronts them. It is absolutely necessary that,
wherever possible, Unions should amalgamate on
industrial lines : it is no less necessary that the skilled
Unions should open their ranks to semi-skilled and
unskilled workers, and that they should admit these
grades not as inferiors, but on absolutely equal terms.
This does not prevent the laying down, within the
industrial Union, of lines of division between craft and
craft, or the limitation of the supply of labour in any
craft ; but these questions should be settled within one
Union, and not by conflict between rival Unions.

This need for admitting the unskilled workers to
some kind of membership in the skilled Unions applies
no less to those who are called " war workers " than to
those who were in regular employment before the war.
The " war workers " form the most dangerous body
of competitors whose rate-cutting powers the Unions
have to fear. If they are left unorganised, many of
them will inevitably consent to accept employment
below Trade Union rates after the war is over, and,
no less inevitably, many of them will consent to black-

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 285

leg in case of disputes. Somehow or other, they must
become Trade Unionists, and by far the best course
seems to be that of enrolling them as emergency
members in the Unions catering for the class of workers
whose work they are doing. This should not be in
any way prevented by the fact that many of them will
leave the industry when the war ends : it is the reason
for making them emergency, instead of ordinary,
members. The difficulty of defining emergency labour,
great as it is, should not be insuperable.

This argument applies no less to women's labour
than to men's. It is far more dangerous for Labour
to leave the women and the male unskilled workers
unorganised than it is to admit them to the Unions
as emergency members. There is also far less risk of
friction if the women are in the same Union with the
men than if they are compelled, in self-defence, to
organise apart. The women need the men's help in
securing fair rates and conditions ; the men need to
organise the women for fear of being undercut.

A few difficulties have to be faced in the application
of this general principle. A large proportion of the
emergency workers will certainly find their way into
the general labour Unions, in which many of the
unskilled were already enrolled before the war. It
is no less necessary for the general labour Unions to
enrol them as emergency members than it is in the case
of the skilled Unions. This done, the provisional
solution lies in closer co-operation between the skilled
Unions and the general labour Unions.

A second problem arises in the case of Trade
Unionists who, owing to the war, have shifted from
one industry to another. Thus, textile workers of
various kinds are employed in armament factories in

286 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

the North of England and the Midlands, and a good
many compositors are now working in Woolwich
Arsenal. In these cases, doubt is raised whether the
worker should join the Union of his temporary trade,
or keep on with his old Union, or both. The only
safe answer seems to be that, whenever possible, a
special arrangement should be entered into between
the Unions concerned, but that in any case the worker
should join, as an emergency member, the Union of
his temporary trade, maintaining, if possible, member-
ship in his old Union. Special arrangements between
the Unions are very desirable wherever any number
of workers are concerned.

A great Trade Union campaign is needed for the
organisation of emergency workers and all other non-
unionists. Such a campaign is already being attempted
in some industries : the General Union of Textile
Workers, for instance, is doing its best to organise the
non-unionists in the woollen industry. But there is
still ample room for a national campaign, not confined
to any one industry, but aiming at the elimination of
the non-unionist as such. In some industries at any
rate the conditions created by the war are highly
favourable to active Trade Union recruiting. As the
Unions become more obvious responsible partners in
industry, they can offer new inducements to the
non-unionists. Ideally, the best solution would be
the organisation of all emergency workers in one great
Emergency Labour Union under central control ; but,
as there is no chance that this will be done, I have
recommended what seems the second-best course. It
will in any case be necessary to make arrangements for
these emergency Trade Unionists to join the Unions
of the trades which they join after the war. " Once

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 287

a Trade Unionist always a Trade Unionist," must
be the watchword of the movement.

Nevertheless, however successful the Unions may
be in increasing their membership, they will have
difficult problems to face at the end of the war. That
which bulks largest is of course the return to industry
of men now on military service. This will mean, in
a great many cases, the displacement of emergency
workers : in others, the returning soldier will find
himself out of a job, and will become a dangerous
competitor in the labour market.

It is not easy to estimate the real gravity of
this problem. Certainly it is sometimes exaggerated.
Some persons seem to assume that where two million
men have enlisted two million men will return ; but
this is, of course, to take no account of the very heavy
casualties. Many will not return at all, and many
more will return incapacitated for their old jobs.

Of those who return in good health and without
loss of limb, a large proportion will probably be rapidly
absorbed. This, at least, we may expect to be the case
with most of the skilled men, including the very large
body of miners who have enlisted. This will entail a
large displacement of emergency labour, only a part of
which is likely to be absorbed at once into its old
occupations. There will then be left on the labour
market the remainder of the displaced men together
with the able-bodied soldiers who do not return to
their jobs. In the main, it is probable that the pre-
ference of the employer will go to the soldier, and that,
if there remains a large surplus of labour, it will consist
mainly of emergency workers who will only be slowly
absorbed. If these workers have been organised as
Trade Unionists during the war, they will then be

288 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

less likely to undercut standard rates. The risk is,
however, in any case very grave.

It should not be assumed that the surplus will be
anything like as large as the number of displaced
workers. Many of those who are now employed in
industry, especially women, are very unlikely to wish
to retain their employment after the war. Especially
in the woollen industry, many married women have
returned to their old occupations, and most of these
will probably be ready to retire when the war is over.
There are also not a few superannuated workers who
have taken up employment for the war period only.

In addition to all these classes of workers, there
remains the important class of partially disabled
soldiers. These men will probably return in many
cases with inadequate pensions, which they may well
be ready to eke out with insufficient wages. But
though there is a problem here, it is probably not very
grave, and it does not in any case greatly affect the
staple industries. The partially disabled are more
likely to find work in the smaller trades. Here they
may be powerful competitors ; but their competition
will not materially affect the general position, since it
is the strength of the workers in the great industries
that must necessarily determine this.

The gravity of the whole problem of demobilisation
will depend in the main on the policy which the Govern-
ment elects to pursue. If the whole army is discharged
at once when the war is over, for a time at least the
labour market will be seriously overstocked, and the
position of Labour gravely menaced. If, on the other
hand, only those workers who have definite jobs to go
to are discharged immediately, and the rest remain
till they can safely be drafted back into industry,

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 289

the problem will largely disappear — that is, if trade
becomes good within a reasonably short time. If
there is a long spell of general bad trade, nothing can
prevent Trade Unionism from being seriously weakened
and Trade Union rates from being heavily reduced.

Nothing, that is to say, except a change of spirit
in the world of Labour. If the workers who return
from the war return in a spirit of industrial militancy,
there are quite different possibilities. Throughout the
foregoing anticipations, it has been assumed that the
spirit of the workers and of Trade Unionism will remain
roughly the same as it has been in the past, reformist
and pacific, with, at the most, only spasmodic outbreaks
of a more violent character. Is it probable that this
will be the case ?

Mr. Sidney Webb, in a speech delivered to the
Hermes Club, said, apparently with satisfaction, that
the workers would return from military service in a
more disciplined frame of mind, and that one effect of
the war would be to crush the spirit of revolt. It is
very much to be doubted whether he is right. It
seems at least as probable that those who return from
a life spent in the open air will be far more intolerant
of the routine and the petty oppressions of workshop
life, and far readier for some sort of revolt against it.
There is at least a hope that the coming of peace will
herald the coming of a more militant Trade Unionism.

One other remark made by Mr. Webb in the same
speech is worthy of mention. The war, he said, would
result in a very great increase in the industrial power
of the State. This is undoubtedly true, and it is a fact
that Labour would do well to face. The breakdown
of private capitalism under the strain of war has
meant, to a considerable extent, the substitution of

u

290 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

crude and temporary forms of State control over
industry. Doubtless, in many cases the State will
only too readily hand the control back to the private
capitalist ; but the matter will not end there. Where
State control has once been exercised, it can easily
be exercised again ; and it is at least doubtful whether
there will ever be complete restoration of private
enterprise. The railways, for instance, may quite
possibly be permanently nationalised, though pro-
duction will almost certainly pass back into private
control. But, whatever the immediate effects of the
war, State interference, both in Labour disputes and
in the control of industry, will have become far easier,
and the workers will have to be on guard against the
use of the State's power in the interests of capital
and against themselves. Compulsory arbitration is a
danger not lightly to be dismissed.

The gravity of this peril again depends largely on
the action taken by the Trade Unions during the war.
Had they played their cards well, the increase in the
power of the State would have been paralleled by an
increase in the power of Trade Unionism : if the State
would have secured a foothold in the control of
industry, Labour would have done so no less. If the
Unions had used the opportunity afforded them by
the " national organisation of Labour," and if, at the
same time, they had not neglected to strengthen
themselves by eliminating, as far as possible, the non-
unionist and by improving their own organisation, the
war might have set on foot that partnership between
the State and the Unions which alone can afford even
a provisional solution of the industrial problem. But,
now that the Unions have given all and demanded
nothing in return, their reward will be a weakening of

LABOUR AFTER THE WAR 291

power which will set back for decades the whole move-
ment towards industrial freedom. The passing of the
Munitions Act deprives them of their last chance of
retrieving the situation.

There are, it must be confessed, few enough signs
that the workers are alive to the urgency of the problem.
The Trade Union Congress, suspended last year, is
indeed to meet this September ; but it does not seem
that the event is being regarded as of any great im-
portance.1 Yet surely never before has the movement
been confronted with such tremendous issues. Could
this year's Trade Union Congress be a truly repre-
sentative Parliament of Labour, and not merely a
collection of somewhat old and world-weary officials,
there would be a unique chance before it. The Trade
Union movement as a whole has never taken counsel
on the situation created by the war ; but what is
needed is a common policy to be pursued in every
industry and by every Union. Could the Congress be
persuaded to elect a live Committee to investigate all
the problems arising out of the war and to suggest a
policy to a special Congress to be summoned as soon
as possible, Labour might yet equip itself with a
common policy and be in a position to take full ad-
vantage of, or at the worst lose as little as possible by,
the situation after the war. If something of this sort
is not done, it seems only too likely that one Union will
pull one way and one another, and that the movement
will be defeated piecemeal, when unity might have
secured a victory. For nothing is more certain than
that, for Labour, the coming of peace between nations
means the coming of war between classes.

1 The Agenda contains only one group of resolutions of the
slightest interest. These deal with women's labour. No other
vital problem is even touched upon.

292 LABOUR AFTER THE WAR

About the future of the international Labour
movement, I have only this to say. The best chance
of rebuilding it is to keep the national movements
strong. For the moment, the task of Labour in Great
Britain is to maintain its own vitality unimpaired.
If each national movement does that as it should, the
international will soon be rebuilt, and it is reasonable
to hope that the new internationalism of Labour will
have more power and more understanding than the
old.

APPENDIX

THE MUNITIONS ACT

AN Act to make provision for furthering the efficient manu-
facture, transport, and supply of munitions for the present
war, and for purposes incidental thereto.

Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :

PART I

SETTLEMENT OF LABOUR DIFFERENCES

i. (i) If any difference exists or is apprehended between
any employer and persons employed or between any two
or more classes of persons employed, and the difference is
one to which this part of this Act applies, that difference,
if not determined by the parties directly concerned or
their representatives or under existing agreements, may
be reported to the Board of Trade by or on behalf of either
party to the difference, and the decision of the Board of
Trade as to whether a difference has been so reported to
them or not and as to the time at which a difference has
been so reported shall be conclusive for all purposes.

(2) The Board of Trade shall consider any difference
so reported, and take any steps which seem to them ex-
pedient to promote a settlement of the difference, and in

293

294 APPENDIX

any case in which they think fit may refer the matter for
settlement, either in accordance with the provisions of the
first schedule to this Act, or if in their opinion suitable
means for settlement already exist, in pursuance of any
agreement between employers and persons employed for
settlement in accordance with those means.

(3) Where a matter is referred under the last foregoing
sub-section for settlement, otherwise than in accordance
with the provisions of the first schedule to this Act, and
the settlement is in the opinion of the Board of Trade
unduly delayed, the Board may annul the reference, and
substitute therefor a reference in accordance with the
provisions of the said schedule.

(4) The award on any such settlement shall be binding
both on employers and employed, and may be retrospective,
and if any employer or person employed thereafter acts
in contravention of or fails to comply with the award, he
shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

PROHIBITION OF LOCK-OUTS AND STRIKES IN CERTAIN
CASES

2. (i) An employer shall not declare, cause, or take
part in a lock-out, and a person employed shall not take
part in a strike in connection with any difference to which
this part of this Act applies unless the difference has been
reported to the Board of Trade, and twenty-one days have
elapsed since the date of the report and the difference has
not during that time been referred by the Board of Trade
for settlement in accordance with this Act.

(2) If any person acts in contravention of this section
he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

DIFFERENCES TO WHICH PART I. APPLIES

3. The differences to which this part of this Act applies
are differences as to rates of wages, hours of work, or other-
wise as to terms or conditions of or affecting employment
on the manufacture or repair of arms, ammunition, ships,

APPENDIX 295

vehicles, aircraft, or any other articles required for use in
war, or of the metals, machines, or tools required for that
manufacture or repair (in this Act referred to as munitions
work), and also any differences as to rates of wages, hours
of work, or otherwise as to terms or conditions of or affecting
employment on any other work of any description if this
part of this Act is applied to such a difference by His
Majesty by proclamation on the ground that in the opinion
of His Majesty the existence or continuance of the difference
is directly or indirectly prejudicial to the manufacture trans-
port, or supply of munitions of war.

This part of this Act may be so applied to such a differ-
ence at any time, whether a lock-out or strike is in existence
in connection with the difference to which it is applied
or not, provided that if in the case of any industry the
Minister of Munitions is satisfied that effective means exist
to secure the settlement without stoppage of any difference
arising on work other than on munitions work, no proclama-
tion shall be made under this section with respect to any
such difference. When this part of this Act is applied to
any difference concerning work other than munitions
work, the conditions of labour and the remuneration
thereof prevailing before the difference arose shall be
continued until the said difference is settled in accordance
with the provisions of this part of this Act.

4. If the Minister of Munitions considers it expedient
for the purpose of the successful prosecution of the war
that any establishment in which munitions work is carried
on should be subject to the special provisions as to limita-
tion of employers' profits, and control of persons employed,
and other matters contained in this section, he may make
an order declaring that establishment to be a controlled

296 APPENDIX

establishment, and on such order being made the following
provisions shall apply thereto :

(1) Any excess of the net profits of the controlled
establishment over the amount divisible under this Act,
as ascertained in accordance with the provisions of this
Act, shall be paid into the Exchequer.

(2) Any proposal for any change in the rate of wages,
salary, or other emoluments of any class of persons employed
in the establishment, or of any persons engaged in the
management or the direction of the establishment (other
than a change for giving effect to any Government condi-
tions as to fair wages or to any agreement between the
owner of the establishment and the workmen which was
made before the 23rd day of June 1915), shall be sub-
mitted to the Minister of Munitions, who may withhold
his consent, within fourteen days of the date of the sub-
mission, provided that if the Minister of Munitions so
directs, or if the Minister's consent is withheld, and the
persons proposing the change so require, the matter shall
be referred for settlement in accordance with the provisions
of the first schedule to this Act, and the consent of the
arbitration tribunal, if given, shall in that case have the
same effect as the consent of the Minister of Munitions.

If the owner of the establishment, or any contractor,
or sub-contractor employing labour therein, makes any
such change, or attempts to make any such change, with-
out submitting the proposal for the change to the Minister
of Munitions, or when the consent of the Minister has been
withheld, he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

(3) Any rule, practice, or custom not having the force
of law which tends to restrict production or employment
shall be suspended in the establishment, and if any person
induces, or attempts to induce, any other person (whether
any particular person or generally) to comply or continue
to comply with such a rule, practice, or custom, that
person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. If
any question arises, whether any rule, practice, or custom
is a rule, practice, or custom which tends to restrict pro-
duction or employment that question shall be referred to

APPENDIX 297

the Board of Trade, and the Board of Trade shall either
determine the question themselves, or if they think it
expedient, or either party requires it, refer the question
for settlement in accordance with the provisions contained
in the first schedule to this Act. The decision of the
Board of Trade or arbitration tribunal, as the case may
be, shall be conclusive for all purposes.

(4) The owner of the establishment shall be deemed
to have entered into an undertaking to carry out the
provisions set out in the second schedule to this Act, and
any owner, or contractor, or sub-contractor who breaks
or attempts to break such an undertaking shall be guilty
of an offence under this Act.

(5) The employer and every person employed in the
establishment shall comply with any regulations made
applicable to that establishment by the Minister of Muni-
tions with respect to the general ordering of the work in
the establishment with a view to attaining and maintaining
a proper standard of efficiency, and with respect to the
due observance of the rules of the establishment. If the
employer, or any person so employed, acts in contravention
of or fails to comply with any such regulations that person
shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

(6) The owners of an establishment shall have power,
notwithstanding anything in any Act, Order, or deed under
which they are governed, to do all things necessary for
compliance with any provisions of this section, and any
owner of an establishment shall comply with any reason-
able requirements of the Minister of Munitions as to informa-
tion or otherwise made for the purposes of this section,
and if he fails to do so shall be guilty of an offence under
this Act. Where in any establishment munitions work is
carried on in some part of the establishment, but not in
other parts, the Minister of Munitions may, if he considers
that it is practicable to do so, treat any part of the
establishment in which munitions work is not carried on
as a separate establishment, and the provisions of this Act
shall take effect accordingly.

298 APPENDIX

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS AS TO THE LIMITATION
OF THE PROFITS OF A CONTROLLED ESTABLISHMENT

5. (i) The net profits of a controlled establishment
shall be ascertained in accordance with the provisions of
this section and rules made thereunder, and the amount
of profits divisible under this Act shall be taken to be an
amount exceeding by one-fifth the standard amount of
profits.

(2) The standard amount of profits for any period shall
be taken to be the average of the amount of the net profits
for two financial years of the establishment completed next
before the outbreak of the war, or a proportionate part
thereof.

(3) If in any case it appears, or is represented to the
Minister of Munitions, that the net profits or losses of all
or any other establishments belonging to the same owner
should be brought into account, or that the average under
this section affords or may afford an unfair standard of
comparison or affords no standard of comparison, the
Minister may, if he thinks just, allow those net profits or
losses to be brought into account, or substitute for the
average such an amount as the standard amount of profits
as may be agreed upon with the owner of the establishment.
The Minister of Munitions may, if he thinks fit, and shall
if the owner of the establishment so requires, refer the
matter to be determined by a referee or board of referees
appointed or designated by him for the purpose, and the
decision of the referee or board shall be conclusive on the
matter for all purposes.

(4) The Minister of Munitions may make rules for carry-
ing the provisions of this section into effect, and these
rules shall provide for due consideration being given in
carrying out the provisions of this section as respects any
establishment to any special circumstances, such as in-
crease of output, provision of new machinery or plant,
alteration of capital, or other matters which require special
consideration in relation to the particular establishment.

APPENDIX 299

VOLUNTARY UNDERTAKING TO WORK FOR MINISTER
OF MUNITIONS

6. (i) If any workman, in accordance with arrange-
ments made by the Minister of Munitions, with or on
behalf of trade unions, enters into an undertaking with
the Minister of Munitions that he will work at any controlled
establishment to which he may be assigned by the Minister,
and be subject to the penalty imposed by this Act if he
acts in contravention of, or fails to comply with, the under-
taking, that workman shall, if he acts in contravention of
or fails to comply with his undertaking, be guilty of an
offence under this Act.

(2) If any employer dissuades, or attempts to dissuade,
a workman in his employment from entering into an under-
taking under this section, or retains, or offers to retain,
in his employment any workman who has entered into
such an undertaking after he has received notice from the
Minister of Munitions that the workman is to work at some
other establishment, that employer shall be guilty of an
offence under this Act.

PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS WHO
HAVE LEFT WORK IN MUNITION FACTORIES

7. (i) A person shall not give employment to a work-
man who has within the last previous six weeks, or such
other period as may be provided by order of the Minister
of Munitions as respects any class of establishment, been
employed on or in connection with munitions work in any
establishment of a class to which the provisions of this
section are applied by order of the Minister of Munitions
unless he holds a certificate from the employer by whom
he was last so employed that he left work with the consent
of his employer or a certificate from the munitions tribunal
that the consent has been unreasonably withheld.

(2) If any workman or his trade union representative
complains to a munitions tribunal in accordance with

300 APPENDIX

rules made with respect to those tribunals that the consent
of an employer has been unreasonably withheld, that
tribunal may, after examining into the case, if they think
fit, grant a certificate which shall for the purpose of this
section have the same effect as a certificate from the
employer.

(3) If any person gives employment in contravention
of the provisions of this section he shall be guilty of an
offence under this Act.

REGULATIONS AS TO BADGES

8. (i) The Minister of Munitions may make rules
authorising the wearing of badges or other distinctive
marks by persons engaged on munitions work or other
work for war purposes, and as to the issue and return of
any such badges or marks, and may by those rules pro-
hibit the use, wearing, or issue of any such badges or of
any badges or marks indicating or suggesting that any
person is engaged on munitions work or work for war
purposes except as authorised by those rules.

(2) If any person acts in contravention of or fails to
comply with any such rules he shall be guilty of an offence
against this Act.

APPLICATION OF PART II. TO DOCKS USED BY
ADMIRALTY

9. This part of this Act shall apply to any docks used
by the Admiralty for any purposes connected with the
war as it applies to establishments in which munitions
work is carried on, with the substitution in relation to any
such docks or persons employed in any such docks of the
Admiralty for the Minister of Munitions.

APPENDIX 301

PART III

AMENDMENT OF THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM
(AMENDMENT) (No. 2) ACT, 1915

10. The following paragraph shall be substituted for
paragraph (d) set out in Sub-Section (i) of Section i of
the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1915,
and shall be deemed to have been contained in that Act,
namely — (d) To regulate or restrict the carrying on of
any work in any factory, workshop, or other premises, or
the engagement or employment of any workman or all or
any classes of workmen therein, or to remove the plant
therefrom with a view to maintaining or increasing the
production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or
premises, or to regulate and control the supply of metals
and material that may be required for any articles for use
in war.

POWER TO REQUIRE INFORMATION FROM EMPLOYERS

ii. (i) The owner of any establishment in which persons
are employed if so required by the Minister of Munitions
shall give to the Minister such information in such form
and in such manner as the Minister may require as to :

(a) The numbers and classes of persons employed or
likely to be employed in the establishment from time to
time.

(b) The numbers and classes of machines at any such
establishment.

(c) The nature of the work on which any such persons
are employed or any such machines are engaged from
time to time.

(d) Any other matters with respect to which the Minister
may desire information for the purpose of his powers and
duties. And the Minister may arrange with any other
Government Department for the collection of any such
information.

302 APPENDIX

(2) If the owner of any establishment fails to comply
with this section he shall be guilty of an offence under this
Act.

PENALTY FOR FALSE STATEMENTS, ETC.

12. If any employer or the owner of any establishment
or any workman for the purpose of evading any provision
of this Act makes any false statement or representation
or gives any false certificate or furnishes any false informa-
tion he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.

PAYMENT OF MEMBERS OF ARBITRATION AND
MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS, ETC.

13. There shall be paid out of moneys provided by
Parliament to any person, being a member of an arbitra-
tion tribunal, munitions tribunal, or board of referees
under this Act, or being a referee under this Act, and to
any other officers required in connection with any such
tribunal or board, such remuneration and travelling or
other expenses (including compensation for loss of time)
as the Minister of Munitions or Board of Trade, as the
case may be, with the sanction of the Treasury, may deter-
mine.

PENALTIES

14. (i) Any person guilty of an offence under this Act :

(a) Shall, if the offence is a contravention of or failure
to comply with an award, be liable to a fine not exceeding
£5 for each day or part of a day during which the contra-
vention or failure to comply continues, and if the person
guilty of the offence is an employer, for each man in respect
of whom the contravention or failure takes place ; and

(b) Shall, if the offence is a contravention of the pro-
visions of this Act with respect to the prevention of lock-
outs, be liable to a fine not exceeding £5 in respect of each
man locked out for each day or part of a day during which
the contravention continues ; and

APPENDIX 303

(c) Shall, if the offence is a contravention of the pro-
visions of this Act with respect to the prohibition of
strikes, be liable to a fine not exceeding £5 for each day or
part of a day during which the contravention continues ;
and

(d) Shall, if the offence is a contravention of or failure
to comply with any regulations in a controlled establish-
ment or any undertaking given by a workman under Part
II. of this Act, be liable in respect of each offence to a fine
not exceeding £3 ; and

(e) Shall, if the offence is a contravention of or failure
to comply with any other provisions of this Act, be liable
in respect of each offence to a fine not exceeding £50.

(2) A fine for any offence under this Act shall be recover-
able only before the munitions tribunal established for the
purpose under this Act.

MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS

15. (i) The munitions tribunal shall be a person ap-
pointed for the purpose by the Minister of Munitions sitting
with two or some other even number of assessors, one-half
being chosen by the Minister of Munitions from a panel
constituted by the Minister of Munitions of persons repre-
senting employers and the other half being so chosen from
a panel constituted by the Minister of Munitions of persons
representing workmen, and the Minister of Munitions may
constitute two classes of munitions tribunals, the first class
having jurisdiction to deal with all offences and matters
under this Act, the second class having jurisdiction so far
as offences are concerned to deal only with any contraven-
tion of or failure to comply with any regulation made
applicable to a controlled establishment or any under-
taking given by a workman under Part II. of this Act.
The Admiralty shall be substituted for the Minister of
Munitions under this provision as the authority to appoint
and choose members of a munitions tribunal to deal with
offences by persons employed in any docks declared to be
controlled establishments by the Admiralty.

304 APPENDIX

(2) The Minister of Munitions or the Admiralty shall
constitute munitions tribunals as and when occasion
requires.

(3) Rules may be made for regulating the munitions
tribunals or either class of munitions tribunals so far as
relates to offences under this Act by a Secretary of State,
and so far as relates to any other matters which are referred
to them under this Act by the Minister of Munitions, and
rules made by the Secretary of State may apply, with the
necessary modifications, to any of the provisions of the
summary jurisdiction Acts or any provisions applicable
to a court of summary jurisdiction which it appears ex-
pedient to apply, and any provisions so applied shall apply
to munitions tribunals accordingly. In the application of
this provision to Scotland the Secretary for Scotland shall
be substituted for the Secretary of State, and in the applica-
tion of this provision to Ireland the Lord-Lieutenant shall
be substituted for the Secretary of State.

(4) A person employed or workman shall not be im-
prisoned in respect of the non-payment of a fine imposed
by a munitions tribunal for an offence within the juris-
diction of a tribunal of the second class, but that tribunal
may, without prejudice to any other available means of
recovery, make an order requiring such deductions to be
made on account of the fine from the wages of the person
employed or workman as the tribunal think fit, and
requiring the person by whom the wages are paid to
account for any sums deducted in accordance with the
order.

POWER FOR COMPANIES TO CARRY ON MUNITIONS
WORK

16. Any company, association, or body of persons shall
have power, notwithstanding anything contained in any
Act, order, or instrument by or under which it is con-
stituted or regulated, to carry on munitions work during
the present war.

APPENDIX 305

RULES TO BE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT

17. Any rule made under this Act shall be laid before
each House of Parliament forthwith, and if an address is
presented to His Majesty by either House of Parliament
within the next subsequent twenty-one days on which that
House has sat after any such rule is laid before it praying
that the rule may be annulled, His Majesty in Council
may annul the rule, and it shall thenceforth be void but
without prejudice to the validity of anything previously
done thereunder.

18. The Documentary Evidence Act, 1868, as amended
by the Documentary Evidence Act, 1882, shall apply to
the Minister of Munitions in like manner as if that Minister
were mentioned in the first column of the schedule to the
first-mentioned Act and as if that Minister or a Secretary
in the Ministry or any person authorised by the Minister
to act on his behalf were mentioned in the second column
of that schedule and as if the regulations referred to in
those Acts included any document issued by the Minister.

INTERPRETATION

19. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires :
(a) The expression " lock-out " means the closing of a

place of employment or the suspension of work or the
refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number
of persons employed by him in consequence of a dispute,
done with a view to compelling those persons or to aid
another employer in compelling persons employed by him
to accept terms or conditions of or affecting employment.
(6) The expression " strike " means the cessation of
work by a body of persons employed acting in combination
or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common under-
standing of any number of persons employed to continue

X

306 APPENDIX

to work for an employer in consequence of a dispute, done
as a means of compelling their employer or any person or
body of persons employed, or to aid other workmen in
compelling their employer or any person or body of persons
employed, to accept or not to accept terms or conditions
of or affecting employment.

SHORT TITLE AND DURATION

20. (i) This Act may be cited as the Munitions of War
Act, 1915.

(2) This Act shall have effect only so long as the office
of Minister of Munitions and the Ministry of Munitions
exist. Provided that Part I. of this Act shall continue
to apply for a period of twelve months after the conclusion
of the present war to any difference arising in relation to
the performance by the owner of any establishment of his
undertaking to carry out the provisions set out in the
second schedule to this Act notwithstanding that the
office of Minister of Munitions and the Ministry of Munitions
have ceased to exist.

SCHEDULES

SCHEDULE I

i. Any difference, matter, or question to be referred
for settlement in accordance with the provisions of this
schedule shall be referred to one of the three following
arbitration tribunals :

(a) The Committee appointed by the First Lord of the
Treasury known as the Committee on Production ; or

(b) A single arbitrator to be agreed upon by the parties,
or in default of agreement appointed by the Board of Trade ;
or

(c) A Court of Arbitration consisting of an equal number
of persons representing employers and persons represent-

APPENDIX 307

ing workmen, with a chairman appointed by the Board of
Trade.

2. The tribunal to which the reference is made shall
be determined by agreement between the parties to the
difference, or in default of such agreement by the Board
of Trade.

3. The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to any
reference under the provisions of this schedule.

SCHEDULE II

1. Any departure during the war from the practice ruling
in the workshops, shipyards, and other industries prior to
the war shall only be for the period of the war.

2. No change in practice made during the war shall be
allowed to prejudice the position of the workmen in the
owners' employment or of their trade unions in regard to
the resumption and maintenance after the war of any rules
or customs existing prior to the war.

3. In any readjustment of staff which may have to be
effected after the war priority of employment will be given
to workmen in the owners' employment at the beginning
of the war who have been serving with the colours or who
were in the owners' employment when the establishment
became a controlled establishment.

4. Where the custom of a shop is changed during the
war by the introduction of semi-skilled men to perform
work hitherto performed by a class of workmen of higher
skill the time and piece rates paid shall be the usual rates
of the district for that class of work.

5. The relaxation of existing demarcation restrictions
or admission of semi-skilled or female labour shall not affect
adversely the rates customarily paid for the job. In
cases where men who ordinarily do the work are adversely
affected thereby the necessary readjustments shall be made
so that they can maintain their previous earnings.

6. A record of the nature of the departure from the
conditions prevailing when the establishment became a
controlled establishment shall be kept, and shall be open

X2

308 APPENDIX

for inspection by ithe authorised representative of the
Government.

7. Due notice shall be given to the workmen concerned
wherever practicable of any changes of working conditions
which it is desired to introduce as the result of the establish-
ment becoming a controlled establishment, and opportunity
for local consultation with workmen or their representa-
tives shall be given if desired.

8. All differences with workmen engaged on Govern-
ment work arising out of changes so introduced or with
regard to wages or conditions of employment arising out
of the war shall be settled in accordance with this Act
without stoppage of work.

9. Nothing in this schedule (except as provided by the
fourth paragraph thereof) shall prejudice the position of
employers or persons employed after the war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE

MOST of the information in this book is necessarily taken
directly from newspaper files and Trade Union journals.

CHAPTER I

BRAILSFORD, H. N. The War of Steel and Gold. 2s.
HERVE, GUSTAVE. My Country, Right or Wrong. 2s. 6d.
HUMPHREY, A. W. International Socialism and the War.

33. 6d.

WALLING, W. ENGLISH. The Socialists and the War. 6s. 6d.
WARE, FABIAN. The Worker and his Country. 53.
WILLIAMS, R. Uncommon Sense about the War. id.

CHAPTER II

The sources for this chapter are almost all to be found
in the files of the Daily Citizen, Daily Herald, and later
the Herald, Labour Leader, and Justice.

CHAPTER III
BOARD OF TRADE —

Labour Gazette (monthly), id.
(Cd. 7703) Report on the State of Employment in

October 1914. 4|d.
(Cd. 7755) Report on the State of Employment in

December 1914. i|d.
(Cd. 7850) Report on the State of Employment in

February 1915. 2|d.

BOWLEY, A. L. The War and Employment (Oxford
Pamphlet). 2d.

3°9

3io BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPMAN, S. J. The War and the Cotton Trade (Oxford
Pamphlet). 2d.

CHAPTER IV

FABIAN SOCIETY. The War Emergency. Local Citizens'
Committees. Memorandum of Suggestions (Leaflet).

JOINT BOARD. Trade Unions and Unemployment. (Not
for sale.)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD —

(Cd. 7603) Memorandum on the Steps taken for the
Prevention and Relief of Distress due to the War.

(Cd. 7763) Report on the Special Work of the L.G.B.

arising out of the War. 4|d.
NATIONAL RELIEF FUND —

(Cd. 7756) Report on the Administration of the
National Relief Fund up to March 3ist, 1915. 2|d.
WAR EMERGENCY : WORKERS' NATIONAL COMMITTEE —
Minutes of Meetings.
The Workers and the War : A Programme for Labour

(Leaflet).

The War Emergency, id.
Proposals on Military Pensions, etc. id.
WEBB, SIDNEY. The War and the Workers (Fabian
Society), id.

CHAPTER V

BOARD OF TRADE. Labour Gazette (monthly), id.
BOWLEY, A. L. Prices and Earnings in Time of War

(Oxford Pamphlet). 2d.
DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON COAL PRICES. (Cd. 7866)

Causes of the Present Rise in the Retail Price of

Coal. 2d.
WAR EMERGENCY : WORKERS' NATIONAL COMMITTEE.

Memoranda and Recommendations on the Increased

Prices of Wheat and Coal. id.
WOOLF, L. S. Co-operation and the War : Co-operative

Action in National Crises (Women's Co-operative

Guild), id.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 311

CHAPTERS VI. and VII

BOARD OF TRADE. Labour Gazette (monthly), id.
GENERAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS. The Federa-

tionist (monthly). £d.
HOUSE OF COMMONS. (H.C. 220) Report and Statistics of

Bad Time in Shipbuilding, Munitions, and Transport

Areas. 3d.
JONES, J. H. Labour Unrest and the War (Political

Quarterly, May 1915). 3s.
Round Table. The War and Industrial Organisation (article

in issue for June 1915). 2s. 6d.
TRADES UNION CONGRESS. The Industrial Unrest. (Not

for sale.)

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT. (Cd.
7848) Interim Report. 4|d.

FABIAN WOMEN'S GROUP. The War, Women, and Un-
employment. 2d.

CHAPTER IX

BOARD OF EDUCATION —

(Cd. 7881) School Attendance and Employment in

Agriculture (September 1914-February 1915). 3d.

(Cd. 7932) School Attendance and Employment in

Agriculture (September I9i4-April 1915). id.
ORWIN, C. S. The Farmer in War Time (Oxford Pamphlet).

2d.

WORKERS' EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION —
Child Labour and Education, id.
Child Labour in Agriculture, id.

COAL MINING ORGANISATION COMMITTEE. (Cd. 7939)
Report of the Departmental Committee appointed
to inquire into the Conditions prevailing in the Coal
Mining Industry due to the War.

INDEX

Admiralty, 168, 201, 205, 271

Admiralty Dockyard employees, 158, 179,

204

Agricultural Labourers' Union, 263, 265
Agriculture, 77, 255 ff.
Alsace-Lorraine, 58
Amalgamation, 49-51, 282 (.
American Federation of Labour, 52
Anderson, W. C., 30, 218, 234
Appleton, W. A., 51
Arbitration, 151 f., 154 f., 159, 162, iSoff.,

184, 185 ff., 193, 215-18, 219, 290
Armaments, 33

Armaments Committees, i96ff., 213, 223, 282
Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., 174 f.
Ashley, W. J., 133
Askwith, Sir G. R., 151, 155
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 109-11, 130, 162,

201, 258, 263, 265, 268
Austrian Socialists, 15, 22, 23

Banks, women in, 241
Barnes, G. N., 107, 194
Bathurst, C., 258
Bebel, A., 12
Belgian labour, 175, 264
Belgian Socialists, 57-9
Belgium, 6-7, 26, 31, 56, 58
Birmingham, 64, 243
Blacksmiths, Associated, 183
Board of Agriculture, 265
Board of Education, 84, 100, 256 ff., 271
Board of Trade, 123, 164, 166, 216, 237
Boer War, 7

Boilermakers, 78, 156, 183, 197, 203 ff.
Bondfield, Margaret, 234, 249
Bonus. See War Bonus
Boot and Shoe Operatives, 157, 184
Bowerman, C. W., 41, 185
Bowley, A. L., 121
Boy labour, Ch. IX.
Brailsford, H. N., u
Braziers and Sheet Metal Workers, 183
Briand, 211

British Section of the International Social-
ist Bureau, 24, 26, 53
British Socialist Party, 22, 26, 34, 98
Brownlie, J. T., 185, 206
Building industry, 65, 70, 121
Burnley, 66

Cabinet, 37
Cabinet Makers, 183
Ca' canny, 152, 172
Canteens, 206

Card and Blowing Room Operatives, 66,

114, 164 ff.
Cardiff, 256, 269
Carpenters and Joiners, 183
Chaplin, H., 264

Charity Organisation Society, 86, 95
Child labour, Ch. IX.
Civil Service, women in, 241
Class- war, Ch. I., 291
Clyde strike, 59, 136, 147 ff.
Clynes, J. R., 131, 218
Coal-heaving, 206

Coal Mines Organisation Committee, 62
Coal prices, 126-9, I33'S, *37
Coal prices. Government Committee, 133-4
Coalition Ministry, 207, 209
Coleridge, Lord, 163
Committee on Production in Engineering

and Shipbuilding Establishments. See

Production
Conscription, 207, 213
Contracts. See Government contracts
"Controlled establishments," 218 ff.
Co-operation, 136-7
Co-operative Union, 98
Co-operative Wholesale Society, 98
Cosmopolitanism, Ch. I.
Cost of Living. See Prices
Cotton industry, 64, 65-6, 77, 78, 113-14,

121, 164 ff., 236, 244
Cotton Operatives, 216
Crooks, Will, 27, 133

Daily Chronicle i 154

Daily Citizen, 43, 189, 194

Daily Herald, 42, 43

Daily Telegraph, 225, 239

Danish labour, 264

Darlaston, 271

Davis, W. J., 41

Defence of the Realm Acts, 184, 213

Demarcation, 156, 169, 178-9, 187, 194,

280

Demobilisation, 288
Dent, J. J., 133
Derby, Lord, 209 ff.
Development Commission, 82, 100
Displacement of labour after the war, 287 f.
Distress Committees, 89
Dock Labourers, National Union, 209
Dockers' Battalion, 209 ff., 221
Dockers' Union, 144
Drink, 201 ff.
Duke, H., 223
Dutch labour, 264

313

314

INDEX

Earnings, 116-17, 166
Economic pressure in recruiting, 90, 161
Education, 254 f., Ch. IX.
Education in France, 269
Electrical Trades Union, 183
Emergency legislation, 36
Employment, Ch. III., Ch. IV.
Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades

Federation, 183
Engineering Employers' Federation, 147,

169, 170, 173, 175
Engineering industry, 65, 70, 121, 143, 158,

281

Engineering industry, women in, 242 f.
Engineers, Amalgamated Society of, 147 ff. ,

171, 178, 183, 185, 188 f., I94,_i95, 206, 243
Enlistment of skilled workers in Army; 168
Enlistment of skilled workers for munition

work, 221 f.
Equal pay for equal work, 238 ff. , 242, 245 f.,

249 ff.

Evans, A., 41
Eviction, 267
Exemption for school attendance, 255 ff.

Fabian Society, 26, 34, 08, 101
Factory Acts, 234, 272 ff.
Factory Inspectors, 205, 235
Farmers' Union, 237, 262
Federationist, 51, 52, 248
Feeding of school children, 84, 100
Fifeshire coalfield, 64
Flannery, Sir F., 258
Food coupons, 91
Food prices, 38, 59, 81, 99, Ch. V.
French Education Minister, 269
French Socialists, 12, 22, 23, 57-9
Furnishing Trades Association, 183

Gasworkers, 183

Gateshead, 269

General Confederation of Labour, n, 12,

I5, 23> S2, 57
General Federation of Trade Unions, 27,

37, 38-9, 4.4, 5i, 52, 55, 98, 182
General Strike, n, 53 f.
German Socialists, 12, 15, 22, 23, 51
Gibb, Sir G., 155
Goldstone, F. W., 35
Gompers, S., 52
Gosling, H., 41

Government contracts, 106, 231 ff.
Greatorex, Capt., 205
Guarantees, 181-2, 186 ff, 191, 195

Half-timers, 255
Hall, Marshall, 273
Hardie, J. Keir, 25, 26, 53, 54, 57, 264
Hartshorn, V., 216, 225
Hatch, Sir E., 178

Henderson, Rt. Hon. Arthur, 25, 26, 28,
30, 35, 36, 108, no, 132, 185, 188, 202, 207
Herald, 224
Herve. G., 12, 53
Hill, John, 41, 185, 197
Hodge, John, 218
Home Office, 201, 205, 271 f.

Hopwood, Sir F., 155
Hosiery trade, 65
House-rents, 153
Housing, 236, 267

Independent Labour Party, 15, 26, 33, 36,
218

Industrial Commission, 151

Industrial conscription, 150, 208

Industrial Unionism, 283

" Industrial truce," 43 ff., 108

Industry, transformation of, 74, 77-8, 174

Insurance Act, 223

Insurance Act, Part II., 69-70, 96, 109,
111-14, IQ5

" International," The "Old," 10

International Federations, 10, n

International Federation of Trade Unions,
10, u, 37, 38-9, 51-2

International Socialist Bureau, 10, 13, 14,
23, 24, 26, 53, 5?

International Socialist Congress, 10, n, 12-
13, 16-17, 22, 23, 46-7; 53^

International Trade Union Congress, 10, 53

International Transport Workers' Federa-
tion, ii, 52-3

Internationalism, Ch. I., 33-4, 55-6, 292

Irish labour, 264

Iron and steel trades, 64, 65, 121

Iron and Steel Workers, Associated, 183

Ironfounders, 183

Ironmoulders, Associated, 183

Jackson, T. S., 246
Jaures, J., 12, 24
Jellicoe, Sir J., 205
Jenkins, J., 41
Jochade, H., 52
Joint Board, 27, 44-5, 107-11
Jones, J. H., 147
Journal of Commerce, 125
Jowett, F. W., 57

Kitchener, Lord, 211

Labour Advisory Committee, 185, 196, 213,

215

Labour Exchanges, 88, 89, 96, 235, 237, 265
Labour Party, 24, 26, 27, 30, 34-5, 36, 39,

44, 53, 55, 56, 98, 129, 131-2, 173, 201, 202,

215, 218

Labour Party Executive, 28, 32, 34-5, 36
Lace trade, 65, 79
Lansbury, G., 26
Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar, 130
Lawrence, Susan, 258
Leeds, 272 f.
Legien, C., 51
Liquor taxation, 207
Liverpool, 64, 209 f.
Lloyd George, D., 93, 163, 182, 184 f., 188,

189, 195, 200, 201, 207, 209, 212, 213, 214,
215, 2l6, 217, 2l8, 22O, 239

Local Government Board, 82, 87, 88-9, 93,

100, 103
Lock-out, 165

Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, 139
London building lock-out, 44, 138

INDEX

315

London County Council, 160 f.
London tram strike, 154, 160 f.

Macarthur, Mary, 249

MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 7, 27, 30-2, 57

Machine Workers, United, 172, 183

McKenna, R., 270

Mallon, J. J., 231

Manchester, 213, 243, 244

Manchester Guardian, 97, 218, 225

Martial law, 209, 212

Marx, Karl, 10, 20

Matkin, W., 41

Mellor, W., 42

Methuen, Lord, 211

Middleton, J. S., 100

Miners enlisted, 61-2

Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 98,

121, 128, 162 ff., 182, 216 f., 281
Mines, Eight Hours Act, 272
Mines, employment in, 77
Mining Association, 162
Minority Report, 101
Mosses, W., 41, 185, 188
Mundella, A. J., 261
Municipal employees, 160
Munition Tribunals, 221 ff.
Munitions Act, 214 ff., 281, 291
Munitions Committees. See Armaments

Committees
Munitions, Ministry of, 196, 200, 207, 212

Nation, 97, 218, 225

National Amalgamated Union of Labour,

183.

National Education Association, 261
National Guilds, 21, 150, 196
National Register, 208, 240
Nationalisation, 160
Nationality, Ch. I.
New Age, 189, 196, 224
New Statesman, 147
Newcastle, 64, 91, 243
Newcastle Coal Exchange, 64
Newcastle Relief Committee, 91
Non-iesistance, 18
Non-unionists, 169, 286
North- East Coast Armaments Committee,

196 ff.
Nut and bolt trade, 271

Ogden, J. W., 41

Old Age Pensions, 159

Ordnance Department, Master-General of,

273

Overstrain, 116-17
Overtime, 42, 44, 109, 149, 166, 169, 176,

192, 193
Oxford, Bishop of, 268 f.

Painters and Decorators, 183

Painters, Scottish, 183

Pankhurst, Sylvia, 239 f., 250

Parker, J., 35

Parliament, 36

Parliamentary Committee of the Trades

Union Congress, 37, 39-41, 44, 55, 56, 98,

182

Parliamentary Recruiting Campaign, 34-5,
39. 4i, 49

Patternmakers, 183

Pease, J. A., 258, 260, 263, 265

Pensions, 252

Peto, Basil, 260

Phillips, Marion, 234

Piece-rates, 178

Piecers, women as, 244

Plumbers, Operative, 183

Poland, 58

Political Quarterly, 147

Ponsonby, A., 214

Poor Law, 88

Post Office employees, 159

Prevention of unemployment, 86, 91, 123

Prices, 38, 46, 48, 59, 81, 99, Ch. V., 193,
266, 279

Production in Engineering and Shipbuild-
ing Establishments, Committee on, 145,
152 f., 154 ff., 158, 162, 166, 168, 172,
176 ff., 185, 186, 193, 216, 279

Profits, 6, 114, 118, 122, 125-6, 127-9, 135-7,
164 f., 204, 220, 222, 266

Profits, limitation of, 188-9, 218 fF.

Profits, taxation of war, 220

Queen Mary's Needlework Guild, 230
Queen's Work for Women Fund, 94, 230 ff.

Railway Clerks' Association, 240
Railway trucks, pooling of, 122
Railwaymen, N.U., 45, 98, 139, 143-4, M^i

184, 245 f.
Railways' General Managers' Committee,

1.39

Railways, State control, 81, 290
Railways, women on, 244 f.
Recruiting, 31, 34-5, 60 ff.
Relief Committees, 82-98, 100, 102-3, I23>

175, 233
Relief Fund, National, 82, 83, 85, 86, 92,

95, 103-6, 108, no, 230, 232
Relief Fund, National, Trade Unions and,

104-6

Relief Funds, local, 105
Relief of distress, 38, 44, 82-98, 100
Relief Scales, 86, 91, 103-4
Rents, 153
Road Board, 82, 100
Round Table, 225
Runciman, Rt. Hon. W., 132, 185, 188, 189,

217.. 234

Russia, 12, 23, 25, 26, 29, 51, 59
Russian Socialists, 15, 57-9

Samuel, Herbert, 82, 93, 94

Sandbach strike, 175

Scarcity of labour, 74-5

Scientific instrument makers, 172

Scottish agriculture, 264, 266

Scottish mines, 43

Seddon, J. A., 41

Semi-skilled labour, 156, 170 ff., 180 ff.,

187 ff., 192, 195, 208, 219, 280 ff.
Sexton, J., 41, 210
Sheet-metal workers, 183

INDEX

Sheffield, 243

"Shells and Fuses "Agreement, 155 f., 176 f.

Shields, South, 269

Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, 156,
201

Shipbuilding industry, 65, 70, 76, 121, 155 ff.

Shipbuilding Trades Agreement Com-
mittee, 183

Shipowners, 125-6

Shipwrights, 156, 183

Shop assistants, women as, 241

Shop Assistants' Union, 241, 251

Smillie, R., 216, 225

Smith, A., 41, 246

Smith, Frank, 185

Smith, H., 41

Snowden, Philip, 57, 132, 217 f., 225

Social Democrats (German), 12, 15, 22, 23,
51

Socialists (Austrian), 15, 22, 23

Socialists (Belgian), 57-9

Socialists (French), 12, 22, 23, 57-9

Socialists (Russian), 15, 57-9

Soldiers' dependents, 107

Soldiers for harvesting, 266

South Wales Miners' Federation, 105, 163,
164, 217, 226

Speeding-up, 116-17, *93

Spinners' Amalgamation, 165 f., 244

Staffordshire Education Committee, 271

Standard rates, 170, 176, 194, 232, 233 f.,
239 f. , 289

State interference, 48, 80, 289 f.

Steam Engine Makers, 172, 183

Steel Smelters, 183

Stock Exchange, 37

Strike-breaking, 210, 221

Strikes, 44, Ch. VI.

Suffrage movement, 227

Sunday labour, 206

Sweating, 106

Syndicalism, 12, 53, 150

Teachers, National Union, 105, 263

Tennant, H. J., 173

Textile Factory Workers' Association, 98

Textile industries, 65, 121

Textile Workers, General Union, 78, 184,

286

Thorne, Will, a6
Time-keeping, 155, 196, 199, 201 ff.

Times, 189, 210, 211
Tinplate industry, 65

Toolmakers, 172, 183

Trade after the war, 276 f.

Trade Boards, 234

Trade Union rules, 42, 155 f., Ch. VII.,
279 ff.

Trade Unionism, 97; 278 ff., and /aw////.

Trade Unionists in Army and Navy, 60 ff.

Trade Unions, emergency membership, 285

Trade Unions, subsidies to, 97, 107-114

Trades Union Congress, 27, 37, 39-43, 44,
98, 211, 291. See also Parliamentary
Committee

Tramway and Vehicle Workers, 246 f.

Tramways, women on, 246 f.
Transport amalgamation, 50
Transport Workers' Federation, 98, 144,

147, 184

Treasury Agreement, 185 ff., 197, 242
Treasury Conferences, 182 ff., 212 ff., 214 f.,

216, 239

Triple Alliance, 49-50
Typists, 240

Unemployed Workmen Act, 82, 84, 89
Unemployment, Ch. III., Ch. IV., 229 ff.,

236
Unskilled labour, 156, 170 ff., 179, 180 ff.,

187 ff., 195, 208, 219, 280 ff.

Vaillant, E., 54

Vehicle Works, London and Provincial

Licensed, 246
Verney, Sir H., 132, 264, 265

Wages in war time, 115-16, 120-1, Ch. VI.

Waitresses, 242

War and the Workers, 101

War bonus, 143 ff., 153, 156, 160 f., 162,
164 ff. , 278 ft.

War Emergency : Workers' National Com-
mittee, 27-8, 32, 38, 41-2, 45, 60, 81, 86, 92,
97-107, 118, 123-33, 135-6, 237, 249, 258,
260, 263, 265, 266 f.

War of Steel and Gold, 1 1

War Office, 106, 168, 201, 205, 231, 271

Weavers' Amalgamation, 66, 166

Webb, Sidney, 101-2, 289

Widnes, 269

Wilkie, A., 185

Williams,

W"

I'illiams, J. B., 41
Williams, J. E., 41
/illiams, R., 144

Wolsingham Steel Works, 175
Women workers. 65, 67-9, 85, 94, 121, 169,
187, 209, Ch. VIII., 266 f.,273f., 285 ff., 291
Women workers, new trades for, 240 ff.
Women workers, Trade Unionism among,

248 ff., 285 ff.

Women's Advisory Committee, 94
Women's Co-operative Guild, 98
Women's Employment Central Committee,

231 ff.
Women's Employment Sub -Committees,

235

Women's Freedom League, 238, 240
Women's Labour League, 98
Women's National Trade Union Confer-
ence, 249 ff.
Women's Register for War Service, 208,

237, 249, 266

Women's Trade Union League, 98
Women's Training Centres, 102, 235
Women's workrooms, 233 ff.
Woodcutting machinists, 183
Woollen industry, 64, 65, 76, 78, 121, 236,

243 f., 288

Woolwich Arsenal, 206, 286
Worcestershire County Council, 261
Workers' Union, 183
Worlti of I,ai>om , 54

Printed by R. & R. CLAKK, LIMITED, KJiu

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A 000 971 755 4