The league of nations; a practical suggestion

HE LEAGUE
F NATIONS

RACTICAL SUGGESTION

By Lt.-Gen. the Rt. Hon.

J. C. SMUTS, P.C.

My reflections have convinced me that the ordinary
iiception ol the League of Nations is not a fruitful
ie, nor is it the right one, and that a radical trans-
riuation of it is necessary. If the League is ever to
5 a success it will have to occupy a much greater
>sition, and perform many other functions besides
ose ordinarily assigned to it. Peace and War are
sultaiits of many complex forces, and those forces
ill have to be gripped at an earlier stage of their
•owth, if peace is to be effectively maintained. To
table it to do so, the League will have to occupy the
•eat position which has been rendered vacant by the
istruction of so many of the old European Empires,
id the passing away of the old European order. The
iague should be put into the very forefront of the
•ogramme of the Peace Conference, and be made
e point of departure for the solution of many of
e grave problems with which it will be confronted."

)DER AND STOUGHTON

ON TORONTO NEW YORK

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS

A PRACTICAL
SUGGESTION

v

BY

LIEUT.-GEN.THE RT.HON. J,C. SMUTS, p,c.

SEEN .?V

HODDER AND STOUGHTON

LONDON TORONTO NEW YORK
UCMXVHJ

TA

FOREWORD

ALTHOUGH I have had to give the subject of the
League of Nations a good deal of consideration, this
short sketch of it has been hastily written at the last
moment, and amid other pressing duties, in view of
the early meeting of the Peace Conference. My
object in writing it has been threefold.

In the first place, I wish to help in the formation
of public opinion on what will undoubtedly be the
most important and far-reaching of all the matters
which the Conference will have to consider.

In the second place, the discussion of the League
of Nations has proceeded far too much on general
or academic lines ; and this, combined with the
inherent difficulties of the subject, has helped to
create the impression which is unhappily prevalent,
that the League is not really a matter of practical
politics. To combat this impression I have drawn
in rough outline what appears to me a practical,
workable scheme.

In the third place, my reflections have convinced
me that the ordinary conception of the League of
Nations is not a fruitful one nor is it the right one,
and that a radical transformation of it is necessary.
If the League is ever to be a success, it will have to
occupy a much greater position and perform many
other functions besides those ordinarily assigned to

vi FOREWORD

it. Peace and War are resultants ol many complex
forces, and those forces will have to be gripped at
an earlier stage of their growth if peace is to be
effectively maintained. To enable it to do so, the
League will have to occupy the great position which
has been rendered vacant by the destruction of so
many of the old European Empires and the passing
away of the old European order. And the League
should be put into the very forefront of the pro-
gramme of the Peace Conference, and be made the
point of departure for the solution of many of the
grave problems with which it will be confronted.

To my mind the world is ripe for the greatest step
forward ever made in the government of man.
And I hope this brief account of the League will
assist the public to realise how great an advance is
possible to-day as a direct result of the immeasurable
sacrifices of this war.

If that advance is not made, this war will, from
the most essential point of view, have been fought
in vain. And greater calamities will follow.

J. C. S.

1 6th December, 1918;

A.— THE POSITION AND POWERS OF THE
LEAGUE

DURING this war a great deal of attention has been
given to the idea of a League of Nations as a means
of preventing future wars. The discussion of the
subject has proceeded almost entirely from that one
point of view, and as most people are rather sceptical
of the possibility of preventing wars altogether the
League has only too often been looked upon as
Utopian, as an impracticable ideal not likely to be
realised while human nature remains what it is.
Quite recently the practice of the Allies in controlling
and rationing food, shipping, coal, munitions, etc.,
for common purposes through the machinery of
Inter-Allied Councils has led to the idea that in
future a League of Nations might be similarly used
for the common economic needs of the nations
belonging to the League — at any rate for the con-
trol of articles of food or raw materials or transport
in respect of which there will be a shortage. In
other words the economic functions of the League
would not be confined to the prevention of wars or
the punishment of an unauthorised belligerent, but
would be extended to the domain of ordinary peace-

8 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ful intercourse between the members of the League.
And it was especially argued that during the period
of economic reconstruction following the war, when
there would be a shortage of several essential articles,
the League would be the proper authority for ration-
ing States in respect of such articles. That, gener-
ally speaking, was the utmost extent to which the
idea of the League of Nations was thought to be
applicable.

An attempt will be made in this sketch to give an
essential extension to the functions of the League ;
indeed to look upon the League from a very different
point of view, to view it not only as a possible means
for preventing future wars, but much more as a great
organ jfjhe^ordinarv peaceful life^TciviEsatiori. as
the foundation of the new international system which
will be erected on the ruins of this war, and as the
starting- point from which the peace arrangements
of the forthcoming Conference should be made.
Such an orientation of the idea seems to me necessary
ii the League is to become a permanent part of our
international machinery. *tt is not sufficient for the
League merely to be a sort of dens ex machina, called
in in very grave emergencies when the spectre of war
appears ; if it is to last, it must be much more. It
must become part and parcel of the common inter-
national life of States, it must be an ever visible,
living, working organ of the polity of civilisation. It
must function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful
intercourse of States that it becomes irresistible in
their disputes ; its peace activity must be the
foundation and guarantee of its war power. How
would it be possible to build the League so closely
into the fabric of our international system ?

POSITION AND POWERS 9

I would put the position broadly as follows : The
process of civilisation has always been towards the
League of Nations. The grouping or fusion of
tribes into a national State is not a case in point.
\ But the political movement has often gone beyond
\that. The national State has too often been the
Exception Nations in their march to power tend
\o pass the purely national bounds ; hence arise the
^mpires which embrace various nations, sometimes
related in blood and institutions, sometimes again
different in race and hostile in temperament. In a
rudimentary way all such composite Empires of the
past were leagues of nations, keeping the peace
among the constituent nations, but unfortunately
doing so not on the basis of freedom but of repression.
Usually one dominant nation in the group overcame,
coerced, and kept the rest under. The principle of
nationality became over- strained and over-developed,
and nourished itself by exploiting other weaker
nationalities Nationality over-grown became Im-
perialism, and the Empire led a troubled existence
on the rain of the freedom of its constituent nations.
That was the evil of the system ; but with however
much friction and oppression the peace was usually
kept among the nations falling* within the Empire.
These empires have all broken down, and to-day
the British Commonwealth of Nations remains the
only embryo league of nations because it is based
on the true principles of national freedom and
political decentralisation.

Such was the political system of modern Europe
right up to the early decades of the twentieth century.
The nations of Continental Europe were mostly
grouped into certain Empires which were small

B

io THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

leagues of nations, keeping the peace among their
constituents and incidentally robbing them of their
liberties. Leaving aside France and Italy as national
States, Russia, Austria, and Turkey were composite
Empires, embracing the most heterogeneous races
and peoples, while the German Empire was pre-
dominantly national with certain minor accretions
from other races. The war has wrought a funda-
mental change and re-cast the political map oi
Europe. Three of these Empires have already
disappeared, while Germany, even if she survives
the storms of the coming days, will certainly lose
her subject races of non-German blood.

The attempt to form empires or leagues of nations
on the basis of inequality and the bondage and
oppression of the smaller national units has failed,
and the work has to be done all over again on a new
basis and an enormous scale. The vast elemental
forces liberated by this war, even more than the
war itself, have been responsible for this great
change. In the place of the great Empires we find
the map of Europe now dotted with small nations,
embryo states, derelict territories. Europe has
been reduced to its originaljatoms. For the moment
its political structure, the costly result of so many
centuries of effort, has disappeared. But that
state of affairs must be looked upon as temporary.
The creative process in the political movement of
humanity cannot be paralysed ; the materials lie
ready for a new reconstructive task, to which, let
us hope, the courage and genius of Western civilisa-
tion will prove equal. Adapting the great ' lines
of Browning, one may describe Europe as lapsing
to

POSITION AND POWERS n

i

" That sad, obscure, anarchic state
Where God unmakes but to re-make the world
He else made first in vain, which must not be."

The question is, what new political form shall be
given to these elements of our European civilisation ?
On the answer to that question depends the future
of Europe and of the world. My broad contention
is that the smaller, embryonic, unsuccessful leagues
of nations have been swept away, not to leave an
empty house for national individualism or anarchy,
but for a larger and better League of Nations.
Europe is being liquidated, and the League of Nations
must be the heir to this great estate. The peoples
left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria,
and Turkey are mostly untrained politically ; many
of them are either incapable of or deficient in power
of self-government ; they are mostly destitute and
will require much nursing towards economic and
political independence. If there is going to be a
scramble among the victors for this loot, the future
of Europe must indeed be despaired of. The appli-
cation of the spoils system at this most solemn junc-
ture in the history of the world, a repartition of
Europe at a moment when Europe is bleeding at
every pore as a result of partitions less than half a
century old, would indeed be incorrigible madness
on the part of rulers, and enough to drive the torn
and broken peoples of the world to that despair of
the State which is the motive power behind Russian
Bolshevism. Surely the only statesmanlike course
is to make the League of Nations the reversionary
in the broadest sense of these Empires. In this
debacle of the old Europe the League of Nations is
no longer an outsider or stranger, but the natural

12 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

master of the house. It becomes naturally and
obviously the solvent for a problem which no other
means will solve.

As a programme for the forthcoming Peace Con-
ference I would therefore begin by making two
recommendations :

(1) That in the vast multiplicity of territorial,
economic and other problems with which the
Conference will find itself confronted it should
look upon the setting up of a League of Nations
as its primary and basic task, and as supplying
the necessary organ by means of which most of
those problems can find their only stable solu-
tion. Indeed, the Conference should regard
itself a? the first or preliminary meeting of the
League, intended to work out its organisation,
functions, and programme.

(2) That, so far at any rate as the peoples
and territories formerly belonging to Russia,
Austria-Hungary and Turkey are concerned,
the League of Nations should be considered as
the reversionary in the most general sense and
as clothed with the right of ultimate disposal
in accordance with certain fundamental prin-
ciples. Reversion to the League of Nations
should be substituted for any policy of national
annexation.

What are these fundamental principles which
must guide the League in its territorial policy as the
general heir or successor of the defunct Empires t
They have been summed up for the last two years
in the general formula of " No annexations, and the
self-determination of nations." There is no* doubt

POSITION AND^POWERS 13

that behind them is a profound feeling throughout
the masses of the Europeon peoples, and any viola-
tion of them will meet with stern retribution. It
is^for the statesmen of Europe to give political form
and expression to this deep feeling. I know that
these statesmen will be confronted in their colossal
task with conflicting considerations. On the one
hand they will be greatly tempted to use their unique
opportunity for the aggrandisement of their own
peoples and countries. Have they not fought and
suffered on an unparalleled scale ? And 'must they
quixotically throw away the fruits of victory now
that the great opportunity has come ? They are
now in the position to mould the world closer to
their heart's desire ; why miss the chance which
may never come again in history ? That is the
voice of the Tempter pointing to a fair prospect.
On the other hand that prospect lies beyond a very
deep abyss,, and only the most callous and foolhardy
political gambler will be prepared for the jump.
The horrors and sufferings of this war have produced
a temper in the peoples which must be reckoned with
as the fundamental fact of the political situation in
Europe to-day. The feeling of grief, bitterness, dis-
illusion, despair goes very deep ; even in the vic-
torious Entente countries that feeling goes much*
deeper than the more superficial feeling of joy at the
final result. How could it be otherwise ? The pro-
longed horror through which all have passed is a far
more real, abiding and fundamental experience than
the momentary joy at the end. What has recon-
ciled our Entente peoples to the burdens they were
enduring ? It was their consciousness of right and
their vague hope of a better, fairer world to come

14 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

which would justify their sacrifices. But if that
prospect is rudely blotted out ; if the peace really
comes, not in the settlement of universal human
principles and the dawning of a better order, but in
a return of the old policy of grab and greed and par-
titions, then the bitterness of the disillusion would
indeed be complete. Our victory would then
become bitterer than Dead Sea fruit. The German
battle-front collapsed all the more readily before Foch
because the scandalous Brest- Litovsk Treaty had
thoroughly disillusioned and demoralised the German
home-front. Let Entente statesmen beware of
similarly wounding the spirit of their peoples by a
peace which gives the final death-blow to their hopes
of a better world. For the common people in all
lands this war has, however vaguely and dimly,
been a war of ideals, a spiritual war. Let not that
faith be shattered at the peace. Let the peace be
founded in human ideals, in principles of freedom
and equality, and in institutions which will for the
future guarantee those principles against wanton
assault. Only such a peace would be statesmanlike
and assure lasting victory. Any other might open
the fountains of the deep and overwhelm victor and
vanquished alike in the coming flood.

So far I have referred only to territories and
peoples split off from Russia, Austria and Turkey.
The case of Germany stands on a different footing
which is clearly distinguishable in principle. In
the first place, if Alsace-Lorraine is annexed to
France, that would be a case of disannexation, as it
has been put ; that is to say, it is a case of restoring
to France what was violently and wrongfully taken
from her in 1871, against the protests not only of

POSITION AND POWERS 15

France, but of the population of Alsace-Lorraine
speaking through their elected representatives. It
is a restitutio in integmm on moral and legal grounds,
and only in a secondary or consequential sense a
territorial annexation. Its restitution to France
would therefore satisfy, instead of violating, the
moral sense of the world.

In the second place, the German colonies in the
Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who
not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to
whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas
of political self-determination in the European sense.
They might be consulted as to whether they want
their German masters back, but the result would be
so much a foregone conclusion that the consultation
would be quite superfluous. The disposal of these
Colonies should be decided on the principles which
President Wilson has laid down in the fifth of his
celebrated Fourteen Points. It is admitted that,
like Alsace-Lorraine, this is a special case falling
outside the scope of the principles applicable to the
European and Asiatic communities we are here dis-
cussing. For these reasons I restrict the following
general recommendation to the peoples and terri-
tories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria and
Turkey :

(3) These principles are : firstly, that there
shall be no annexation of any of these territories
to any of the victorious Powers, and secondly,
that in the future government of these terri-
tories and peoples the rule of self-determination,
or the consent of the governed to their form of
government, shall be fairly and reasonably
applied.

16 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

When these territories and peoples come to be
considered individually it will be found that their
conditions for self-determination, autonomy, or self-
government vary very considerably. Take, in the
first place, the cases of Finland, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Jugo-Slavia as instances. They will
probably be found sufficiently capable of statehood
to be recognised as independent States of the usual
type from the beginning. Take again, in the second
place, the Transcaucasian or Transcaspian provinces
of Russia. It will probably be found that they are
as yet deficient in the qualities of statehood and that,
whereas they are perhaps capable of internal auton-
omy, they will in one Degree or another require the
guiding hand of some external authority to steady
their administration. In all these cases the peoples
concerned are perhaps sufficiently homogeneous and
developed to govern themselves subject to some
degree or other of external assistance and control.
This will probably be found to be the case also ot
Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, Lebanon and Syria.
Although I mention these ex-Turkish territories
together as/capable of autonomy but not of complete
statehood, it must be clearly understood that there
is a great deal of variation among them in this
respect. At the one end a territory may be found
barely capable of autonomy, at the other end the
approach to complete statehood is very close.
Mesopotamia would probably be a case of the former
kind ; Syria of the latter.

In the third place, there will be found cases where,

• owing chiefly to the heterogeneous character of the

population and their incapacity for administrative

co-operation, autonomy in any real sense would be

POSITION AND POWERS 17

out of the question, and the administration would
have to be undertaken to a very large extent by
some external authority. This would be the case,
at any rate for some time to come, in Palestine,
where the administrative co-operation of the Jewish
minority and Arab majority would not be forth-
coming ; and in the Armenian Vilayets, where
Armenian, Turkish and Kurdish populations co-
exist in historic enmity, and even the policing of the
country would have to be undertaken by some
external authority.

In all the above and similar cases where the
assistance and control of an external authority is
necessary to supplement the local autonomy of the
territories in question, that external authority should
be the League of Nations in accordance with the
second proposition above. No State should make
use of the helpless or weak condition of any of these
territories in order to exploit them for its own pur-
poses or acquire rights over them in the manner
which has hitherto been a fruitful source of trouble
and war. This may be summed up in the following
recommendation :

(4) That any authority, control, or admini-
stration which may be necessary in respect of
these territories and peoples, other than their
own self-determined autonomy, shall be the
exclusive function of and shall be vested in the
League of Nations and exercised by or on behalf
of it.

How is the League to provide this authority or
administration ? It will itself be a conference con-
sisting of representatives of States. Any authority

i8 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

or administration directly exercised by it will,
therefore, be of a joint internatibnal character.

Now, joint international administration, in so far
as it has been applied to territories or peoples, has
been found wanting wherever it has been tried. It
has worked fairly well in international business
arrangements of a limited scope, such as postal
arrangements, the Danube Commission, and similar
cases. But in those few cases where it has been
tried in respect of peoples or territories it has not
been a success. The administering personnel taken
from different nations do not work smoothly or
loyally together ; the inhabitants of the territory
administered are either confused, or, if they are
sufficiently developed, make use of these differences
by playing one set of nationals off against the other.
In any case the result is paralysis tempered by
intrigue. It may be safely asserted that if the
League of Nations attempts too soon to administer1
any people or territory directly through an inter-
national personnel, it will run a very serious risk of
discrediting itself. It will have to gain much more,
experience in its novel functions and will have to
train big staffs to look at things from a large human
instead of a national point of view ; it will have to
train its officials taken from various nationalities to
work loyally together irrespective of their national
interests ; it will have to do these and many other
things before it could successfully undertake a task
requiring fundamental unity of aims, methods, and
spirit, such as the administration of an undeveloped
or partly developed people. The League may make
experiments in some more or less favourable cases
in order to gain experience, but further I would not

POSITION AND POWERS 19

advise it to go at the beginning. The only successful
administration of undeveloped or subject peoples
has been carried on by States with long experience for
the purpose and staffs whose training and singleness
of mind fit them for so difficult and special a task.
If serious mistakes are to be prevented and the
League is to avoid discrediting itself before public
opinion, it will have to begin its novel administrative
task by making use of the administrative organisa-
tion cf individual States for the purpose. That is to
say, where an autonomous people or territory re-
quires a measure of administrative assistance, advice
or control, the League should as a rule meet the case
not by the direct appointment of international
officials but by nominating a particular State to act
for and on behalf of it in the matter, so that, subject
to the supervision and ultimate control of the
League, the appointment of the necessary officials
and the carrying on of the necessary administration
should be done by this mandatary State.

Here, too, the principle of self-determination
should be applied as far as possible. No mandatary
State ought to be appointed by the League in respect
of a people or territory without the consultation of
the latter in such ways as the League may consider
fair and reasonable. It will be for such people or
territory not only to determine generally on the
form of its internal self-government, but also on the
State from which it will receive such external assist-
ance as may be necessary in its government. The
Republic of Georgia, for instance, wiH as an auto-
nomous State not only settle on its own form of
government, but will also indicate to the League from
what outside sources it wants additional assistance,

20 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and the League will see in how far it is possible to
comply with its wishes. In no case ought it to
thrust on Georgia or any other territory the outside
help of any mandatary unwelcome to it. It is
possible that Georgia may after a trial of some
mandatary become dissatisfied with the latter for
reasons which the League may consider good and
sufficient, and in such a case it may consider the
appointment of some more suitable mandatary if
one could be found.

In practice it will probably happen that in most
cases the mandatary State in respect of any people
or territory will be chosen by the latter on historic
grounds. In the case of most peoples not yet
risen to complete statehood there is some Power
which has in the past taken an active interest in their
affairs and development. Where such interest has
been not merely of a selfish character, old ties of
acquaintance or friendship will largely determine
the new connection under the regime of the League.
Where, on the other hand, the Power has rendered
itself obnoxious or odious by its behaviour in the
past it could scarcely expect to be nominated as the
mandatary State. In such cases, too, the only safe
and sound principle for the League to hold on to is
that of the self-determination of the autonomous
State.

There will however be cases, such as Palestine
and Armenia, where for reasons above referred to
an autonomous regime cannot be adopted at the
start, and where the consultation of the country
on the question of its mandatary State is therefore
not formally possible. Even in such cases the
League will, as far as possible, follow the trend of

POSITION AND POWERS 21

popular wishes, and not attempt to foist on the
population an unwelcome mandatary.

I sum up this discussion in the following recom-
mendation :

(5) That it shall be lawful for the League of
Nations to delegate its authority, control, or
administration in respect of" any people or
territory to some other State whom it may
appoint as its agent or mandatary, but that
wherever possible the agent or mandatary so
appointed shall be nominated or approved by
the autonomous people or territory.

The delegation of certain powers to the mandatary
State must not, however, be looked upon as in any
way impairing the ultimate authority and control
of the League, or as conferring on the mandatary
general powers of interference over the affairs of
the territory affected. For this purpose it is im-
portant that in each such case of mandate the League
should issue a special Act or Charter, clearly setting
forth the policy which the mandatary will have to
follow in that territory. This policy must neces-
sarily vary from case to case, according to the
development, administrative or police capacity, and
homogeneous character of the people concerned.
The mandatary .State should look upon its position
as a great trust and honour, not as an office of
profit or a position of private advantage for it or
its nationals. And in case of any flagrant and
prolonged abuse of this trust the population con-
cerned should be able to appeal for redress to the
League, who should in a proper case assert its
authority to the full, even to the extent of removing

22 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the mandate, and entrusting it to some other State,
if necessary. No pegging-out of claims should be
allowed under the guise of the mandate. And by
keeping in touch with the affairs of the territories
concerned through proper liaison, the League should
satisfy itself that its mandates are being carried
out fairly and properly. It might also call for
periodic reports from the mandatary State. I
therefore make the following recommendation :

(6) That the degree of authority, control, or
administration exercised by the mandatary
State shall in each case be laid down by the
League in a special Act or Charter, which shall
reserve to it complete power of ultimate con-
trol and supervision, as well as the right of
appeal to it from the territory or people affected
against any gross breach of the mandate by
the mandatary State.

It must be part of this suggested scheme of
mandatary control that the mandatary shall in no
case adopt an economic or military policy which
will lead to its special national advantage. In fact,
for all territories which are not completely inde-
pendent States the policy of the open door, or equal
economic opportunity for all, must be laid down.
In this way a fruitful source of rivalry and friction
between the Powers will be removed. Provision
must also be made that no military forces shall be
formed or trained in such territories beyond what
the League should lay down as necessary for pur-
poses of internal police. This will prevent the
mandatary State from trying to augment its military
resources from the manhood of the territory affected.

POSITION AND POWERS 23

And in respect of all such territories the League
must be responsible, directly or through the manda-
tary, for the maintenance of external peace. I sum
up as follows :

(7) That the mandatary State shall in each
case be bound to maintain the policy of the
open door, or equal economic opportunity for
all, and shall form no military forces beyond
the standard laid down by the League for pur-
poses of internal police.

In fact, I would be prepared to go further, and
to submit for consideration that this non-military
policy should be applied to all independent States
arising from the break-up of the old European
system. If we are deliberately deciding in favour
of a peaceful regime for the future, it seems to me
a fair proposition that all newly-arising States shall
conform to the new order of ideas, and shall agree,
as a condition of their recognition and admission
into the League of Nations, to raise no military
forces and collect no armaments beyond what the
League may lay down as reasonable in their case.
The result will be that militarism will be scotched
ab initio in the case of all new States, and a vast
impetus will be given to the peace movement all
over the world. In such case it will also be much
easier for the older States and Powers to adopt a
policy of disarmament and reduction of military
forces, and the new peaceful policy will become
identified with the very constitution of the new
order oi things. Practically all the independent
States arising from the decomposition of Russia,
Austria, Turkey, and, perhaps, even Germany,

24 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

will then have to adopt the new policy, and thereby
help to entrench peace in the new political system
of Europe. It is an idea which seems to me well
worthy of our consideration, as more likely to
preserve peace than more ambitious measures
adopted to keep well-armed and militarily equipped
States from coming to blows. I therefore recommend :

(8) That no new State arising from the old
Empires be recognised or admitted into the
League unless on condition that its military
forces and armaments shall conform to a
standard laid down by the League in respect
of it from time to time.

I have said that the Acts or Charters by which
mandataries will be appointed should be given by
the League of Nations. It must, however,. be borne
in mind that all the original arrangements of this
kind may have to be made by the Peace Conference
before the League of Nations is formally constituted.
It will, therefore, in all probability be necessary for
the Conference itself to issue these first Acts, doing
so in its capacity as the preliminary or preparatory
session of the League of Nations. And, in general,
it may be found necessary for the Conference, as
the first session of the League, to lay down the
general principles or lines on which the peace settle-
ments are to be effected, and to leave the working
out of the details, not to another Peace Conference,
but to the League of Nations. In this way the
continuity between the Conference and the League
will be duly marked.

So far, I have been discussing the cases of terri-
tories which will probably require some degree of

POSITION AND POWERS 25

internal administrative assistance or control, which
it would be difficult for the League to supply at
the beginning, and which would have to be made
good from the resources of the existing States or
Powers. There remains another more general prob-
lem to consider. Many of the States which will
arise from the break-up of the Empires will be
able to look after their own affairs as new inde-
pendent States, and will not require any adminis-
trative assistance or control. Any questions arising
out of their origin and existence will be dealt with
by the League itself without delegation to individual
Powers. A gigantic task will thereby be imposed
on the League as the successor of the Empires.
The animosities and rivalries among the independent
Balkan States in the past, which kept that pot
boiling, and occasionally boiling over, will serve to
remind us that there is the risk of a similar state
of affairs arising on a much larger scale in the new
Europe, covered as it will be with small independent
States. In the past the Empires kept the peace
among their rival nationalities ; the League will
have to keep the peace among the new States
formed from these nationalities. That will impose
a task of constant and vigilant supervision on it.
The nationalities of Europe are, in many cases,
animated by historic hostility to one another, the
tendency will be for them to fly at one another's
throats on very slight provocation, and we have
had sad experience of the danger of a general con-
flagration which arises from these local outbursts.
It is important to bear in mind that but for the
active control of «1^ League, the danger of future
wars will be actually greater, because of the multi-

C

26 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tudinous discordant States now arisen or arising.
In this and many other respects the League will
have a very real role to play as the successor to
the Empires. It will have to deal in advance with
all the numerous sources of trouble and friction
which will continue to exist among the small inde-
pendent nations. Without unnecessary or undue
interference in their internal affairs, it will have to
watch over their relation? inter se, and any internal
conditions or situations which will directly affect
those relations. I therefore make the following
recommendation -

(9) That, as the successor to the Empires, the
League of Nations will directly and without
power of delegation watch over the relations
inter se of the new independent States arising
from the break-up of those Empires, and
will regard as a very special task the duty of
conciliating and composing differences between
them with a view to the maintenance of good
order and general peace.

It is not improbable that this supervision of the
new European States will impose the heaviest task
of all on the League of Nations, at any rate for this
generation. But it will have to be performed
efficiently, as there is little doubt that the old historic
feuds surviving among the European nationalities
may easily become a fruitful source of future danger.
If the League is ever to be a reality, it will have to
succeed in this great task. And it will succeed, if
it takes itself seriously and looks upon itself, not as
a merely nominal, but as a real live active heir to
the former Empires, and is determined to discharge

POSITION AND POWERS 27

the duties of the great beneficent position which has
devolved upon it as supreme guardian of the peace
interests of humanity.

I have now made a general sketch of the functions
which will devolve upon the League of Nations in its
capacity as the successor to the defunct Empires,
and of the general lines on which it may have to
proceed in dealing with the great territorial questions
which must arise from the break-up of those Empires.
These functions are quite apart from the more diffi-
cult question of the maintenance of future world-
peace, and seem to me to flow quite naturally and
inevitably out of the situation of Europe at the end
of the war. An organisation like the League of
Nations is imperatively needed to deal with that
situation. Europe requires a liquidator or trustee
of the bankrupt estate, and only a body like the
League could adequately perform that gigantic task.

I am very conscious of the grave defects of the
programme for a League of Nations here sketched.
But my object is not to produce a complete scheme.
That would be a vain and impossible task. My
object is to sketch a scheme which will be workable
in practice and which, while preventing a scramble* •
among the Powers for loot, will not be so far in
advance of the existing political practice of Europe '
as to make cautious statesmen reject it at once.
\ My object further is to base that scheme on the
recognition of the principles which I consider vital.
A modest beginning on the right basis and on the
right principles will enable the future to give full
development of form and substance to the whole
system. The vital principles are : the principle
of nationality involving the ideas of political free-

28 THE LEAGUE OF 'NATIONS

dom and equality ; the principle of autonomy,
which is the principle of nationality extended to
peoples not yet capable of complete independent
statehood ; the principle of political decentralisa.-
tion, which will prevent the powerful nationality
from swallowing the weak autonomy as has so
often happened in the now defunct European
Empires ; and finally an institution like the League
of Nations, which will give stability to that decentral-
isation and thereby guarantee the weak against the
strong. The only compromise I make, and make
partly to conciliate the great Powers and partly in
view of the administrative inexperience of the
League at the beginning, is the concession that,
subject to the authority and control of the League,
which I mean to be real and effective, suitable
Powers may be appointed to act as mandataries of
the League in the more backward peoples and areas.
That compromise will, I hope, prove to be only a
temporary expedient.

Any one who is conversant with the political con-
ditions of the areas affected by the war will be able
to form some approximate picture of how this
system of a League of Nations will work in practice.
The European Empires will all have disappeared ;
Germany will have become a truly federal demo-
cratic State from which the non-German subject
peoples will have been disannexed and reunited to
their parent peoples. New sovereign States, such
as Finland, Poland, Bohemia and Greater Serbia, will
have arisen under the segis of the League. A large
number of autonomous States will have arisen, no
longer oppressed by their neighbours, but befriended,
advised, and assisted in varying degree by individual

POSITION AND POWERS 29

great States. A smaller number of areas will be
directly administered by some or other of the Powers.
Over all would be the League as a real live con-
trolling authority, seeing that its mandates or
charters are fairly carried out, that there is no oppres-
sion of small racial minorities in the larger autonomies
or administrations, and that the guarantee of the
open economic door and of a peaceful policy in all
less developed areas gives no reason for bitterness
or rivalry among the great States. I believe such a
system is workable, and in its working will remove
the most fruitful sources of war and thus in itself
prove a guarantee of world-peace, apart from special
measures taken to that end.

It was stated above that the British Empire was
the nearest approach to the League of Nations. It
would be interesting to compare the functions here
ascribed to the League to the working arrangements
of the British Empire. In the first place, in both
cases the ultimate authority of common action is a
conference of the principal constituent States. In
the British Empire the common policy is laid down
at conferences of the Imperial Cabinet, representing
the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India,
while executive action is taken by the individual
Governments of the Empire. In the second place,
the minor constituents of the Empire, consisting of
Crown Colonies, Protectorates and Territories, are
not represented directly at the Imperial Cabinet,
but are administered or looked after by the indi-
vidual principal constituent States referred to, just
as it is here proposed that the Powers should under
the League look after the autonomous undeveloped
territories. In the third place, the economic policy

30 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of the open door and the non-military police policy
here advocated for these autonomous or undeveloped
territories are in vogue in the analogous British Crown
Colonies, Protectorates and Territories. It is there-
fore clear that the broad features of the two systems
would closely resemble each other. And it is sug-
gested that where the British Empire has been so
eminently successful as a political system, the
League, working on somewhat similar lines, could
not fail to achieve a reasonable measure of success.
The principal difference between the two would be
that whereas peace in the British Empire is ensured
by a common allegiance, in the League it would have
to be elaborately provided for by special arrange-
ments.

B.— THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE

So far I have not yet referred to any functions and
powers of the League of Nations in respect of the old
established States or Powers. I have been con-
cerned with it solely from the point of view of the
defunct European Empires. I have advocated the
view that the League should occupy the vacant
place left by the disappearance of those Empires.
The greatest opportunity in history would be met
by the greatest step forward in the government of
man. On the debris of the old dead world would be
built at once the enduring Temple of future world-
government. The new creative peace world would
come to us, not as a fleeting visitant from some other
clime, but out of the very ruins of our own dead past.
In that way the most exalted position and the most
responsible and beneficent functions would be

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 31

entrusted to the new organ of world-government.
Its position and its powers would be assured. And
there would be a reasonable chance that it would
carry out its almost superhuman task of maintaining
world peace. The only question is whether it would
work, whether it would be successful in its function-
ing. And that would depend largely on the con-
stitution given to it. I therefore pass on to consider
the Constitution of the League.

Now in discussing a problem like the Constitution
of the League of Nations we must be careful not to
set too much store on past precedents. Our problem
is gigantic and entirely novel ; its solution will
depend, not so much on following precedents never
meant for such a novel and complex situation, but
in boldly facing that situation and, if need be, creat-
ing a new precedent to meet it. The grand success
of the British Empire depends not on its having
followed any constitutional precedent of the past
but on having met a new situation in history with a
new creation in law ; and as a matter of fact the
new constitutional system grew empirically and
oibanically out of the practical necessities of the
colonial situation. So it will have to be here. And
above all let us avoid cut-and- dried schemes meant
as a complete, definitive, and final solution of our
problem. Let us remember that we are only asked
to make a beginning, so long as that beginning is in
the right direction ; that great works are not made
but grow ; and that our Constitution should avoid
all rigidity, should be elastic and capable of growth,
expansion, and adaptation to the needs which the
new organ of government will have to meet in the
orocess of the years. Above all it must be practical

32 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and be so devised as to be a real working organ of
government.

And from this point of view let us proceed at once
to discard the idea of a super-State which is in the
minds of some people. No new super-sovereign is
wanted in the new world now arising. States will
here be controlled not by compulsion from above
but by consent from below. Government by con-
sent of the governed is our formula. The old
Empires were ruined by their theories of sovereignty,
which meant centralisation, absorption and de-
nationalisation of the weaker national constituents
of the population. The great League of Nations,
like the lesser league already existing in the British
Empire, will have to avoid the old legal concepts of
Imperialism in the new world of Freedom. We
shall likewise have to abandon all ideas of federation
or confederation as inapplicable to the case, and not
likely to be agreed to by any of the existing Sovereign
States. We are inevitably driven to the Conference
system now in vogue in the constitutional practice
of the British Empire, although it will necessarily
have to be applied with very considerable modifies,
tions to the complex world conditions obtaining
under the League.

But while we avoid the super-sovereign at the one
end, we must be equally careful to avoid the mere
ineffective debating society at the other end. The
new situation does not call for a new talking shop.
We want an instrument of government which, how-
ever much talk is put into it at the one end, will
grind out decisions at the other end. We want a
League which will be real, practical, effective as a
system of world-government. The scheme which I

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 33

'have seen and which brings representatives of all the
independent States of the world together in one
conference to discuss the most thorny of all subjects j j
and requires that their decisions to be binding must ;
be unanimous is from that point of view not worth!/
discussion. It means that there never will be any
decision issuing from the League ; that nobody will
take the League seriously ; that it will not even
serve as camouflage ; that it will soon be dead and
buried, leaving the world worse than it found it.

In endeavouring to find a workable constitution
for the League let us, even at the risk of appearing
pedantic, begin at the beginning. Government, like
thought or mathematics or physical science, rests on
certain fundamental unalterable forms, categories,
or laws, which any successful scheme must conform
to. The division of government into legislation,
administration and justice is fundamental in this
sense, and should be adhered to by us in devising
this new system of world-government. And we
proceed to consider what special forms our Legisla-
ture, Administration, and Judicature will take under
a system where the constituents will not be citizens
but States.

We are, in the first place, called upon to decide
what we mean by equality in the new system. Will
the United States of America count for as much and
the same as Guatemala ? The question is crucial.

The League will include a few great Powers, a
larger number of medium or intermediate States,
and a very large number of small States. If in the
councils of the League they are all to count and
vote as of equal value, the few Powers may be at
the mercy of the great majority of small States, It

34 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

is quite certain that no great Power will willingly
run such a risk by entering a League in which all
have equal voting power. Will Great Britain be
prepared to put her Fleet at the mercy of a majority
vote of all the other States who are members of the
\ League ? The question need only be put to see
*what the answer must necessarily be. The League
is therefore in this dilemma, that if its votes have
I. to be unanimous, the League will be unworkable ;
^and if they are decided by a majority, the great
1 Powers will not enter it ; and yet if they keep out
i of it they wreck the whole scheme. Clearly neither
t unanimity nor mere majority will do. Neither will
it do to assess and assign different values to the
States who are members of the League. If Guate-
mala counts as one, what value shall be given to the
United States of America ? Will it be 5, or 10,
or 100, or 1,000 ? Will the valuation proceed on
the basis of wealth or population or territory ? And
if either of the last two bases is adopted, what about
the Powers who have millions of barbarian subjects,
or millions of square miles of desert territory ? On
the^ basis of population China may be the most
influential member of the League ; on the basis of
wealth the U.S.A. will have first place ; while on the
basis of territory the British Empire will easily rank
first. But clearly there is no good reason to be
assigned in favour of any basis of valuation, and the
principle of values will not help us at all. We
therefore proceed to look for some other solution of
our difficulty.

The general outlines of the scheme to be adopted
seem fairly clear. There will have to be a General
Conference or congress of all the constituent States,

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 35

which will partake of the character of a Parliament,
in which public debates of general international
interest will take place. In this body all the States
may be considered equal and should vote as States,
whatever the number of representatives a State
may, subject to the rules of the Conference, have
delegated to that body. Besides trie Conference
there will have to be a small body called the Council
of the League, which will be the executive and.,
carry on the ordinary administration of the League*
The functions of the General Conference will have
to be carefully chosen so as to make it a useful body
and to prevent it from being looked upon, on the
one hand as a futile debating society, and on the
other as a dangerous body whose debates are likely
to inflame the slumbering passions of the national
populations. I would suggest that the initiative for
the work of the Conference should be left as much
as possible to the Council. That work will consist
mostly of the following : (a) General resolutions
submitted by the Council for discussion in the
Conference which, when passed, will have the effect
of recommendations to the national Parliaments,
and have no binding legislative character ; (b) gen-
eral measures or codes of an international character
dealing with questions like disarmament or world-
fceace or rules of international law which have been
adopted by the Council and which they desire to
have publicly discussed in the Conference before
being passed on for the approval of the national
governments ; (c) discussion of the reports of the
various international administrative committees or
commissions working under the Council to be
referred to later. It will be noticed that in all

36 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

cases the resolutions of the Conference will only
have the force of recommendations. Even so,
however, the Conference may be a most useful body
and may become a most powerful and influential
factor in moulding international public opinion.
The League will never be a great success until
there is formed as its main support a powerful
international public opinion. With that public^
opinion behind it, it may go confidently forward
with its great tasks ; deprived of that support all
its power for good will be neutralised and nullified.
It is therefore essential that it should create a
favourable international atmosphere for its work,
that an organised public opinion should be formed
in favour of the League and its activities. The en-
lightened public all over the world will have to be
taught to think internationally, to look at public
affairs, not merely from the sectional national point
of view, but also from a broad human international
point of view. And the debates periodically taking
place in the General Conference might well become
of immense importance in this great task of forming
and educating a strong body of international opinion
behind and in support of the League and its work.
For the first time in history people will hear great
subjects discussed on an international platform,
and the narrow national influence of the local
Parliament and still more the local press will gradu-
ally be neutralised, and a broader opinion and spirit
will be fostered.

The representation of the States on such a Con-
ference should be viewed largely from this point of
view of favourably influencing and educating public
opinion in all constituent countries. The Powers

CONSTITUTION OF THE :< AGUE 39

should not grudge strong representat* League
smaller States as in any case the resolutions^
only be in the nature of recommendations to i
national Parliaments. Both the Governments an
Parliaments of the States might send delegates, and
perhaps even, parties could be represented by the
selection of members on the principle of proportional
representation.

The resolutions to be brought up for discussion in
the Conference should be carefully selected by the
Council on the principle of avoiding those contentious
issues on which national passions are easily inflamed.
If wisely guided, both in the choice of subjects for
discussion, and by the participation of great inter-
national statesmen in the debates, I see no reason
why this Conference may not become a really useful
organ of the League, especially in its educative
influence on public opinion.

The real work of the League will, however, be done
by its Council whose constitution and powers ought
therefore to be very carefully considered. This
Council would have to be a comparatively small
body, as it is not possible to have executive action
taken and most difficult contentious administrative
work done through a large body. How is its member-
ship to be fixed ?

In the first place, the great Powers will have to be
permanent members of it. Thus the British Empire,
France, Italy, the U.S.A. and Japan will be per-
manent members, to whom Germany will be added
as soon as she has a stable democratic Government.
To these permanent members I would suggest that
four additional members be added in rotation from
two panels, one panel comprising the important

36 THLEAGUE OF NATIONS

,. , Powers below the rank of great Powers,
- as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Central Russia,

;land, Greater Serbia, etc., and the other panel
Comprising all the minor States who are members
of the League. Each panel will provide two mem-
bers, who will be selected from it in rotation ac-
cording to rules to be laid down in the first instance
by the permanent members, who will also fix the
two original panels. The Council will therefore
have nine or ten members according as Germany is
or is not a stable democratic great Power in future.

The advantage of this constitution is that the
great Powers obtain a majority — although only a
bare majority — representation on the Council and
could not therefore complain that their interests
run the risk of being swamped by the multiplicity
of small States. On the other hand the intermediate
and minor States receive a very substantial repre-
sentation on the League, and could not complain
that they are at the mercy of the great Powers.

It is also well worthy of consideration whether
permanent representation should not be given to
large groups of small States formed for the purpose.
Thus all the important States of South America
might desire to form a group for purposes of repre-
sentation on the Council. Or a similar group might
be formed by all the Balkan and South Slav States,
or another by the small States of Northern Europe.
The group would always have a representative on
the Council, but the representation would go in
rotation among a panel of important members of
the group to be settled by the Council. The size
of the Council would then become somewhat larger,
but the advantages of such group representation

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 39

may in the long run further the ends of the League
very much, and the groups might become useful
for other purposes besides representation. The
subject of such groups could be discussed by the
General Conference and settled subject to the con-
currence of the Council. As a further safeguard for
the great Powers and small States alike, it might
be laid down that no resolution of the Council will
be valid if a minority of three or more members
vote against it ; in other words, more than a two-
thirds majority will be required to pass any reso-
lution in the Council. This limitation will prevent
the Council from passing a resolution against which
there is a strong feeling while it will not, I hope,
substantially impair the working efficiency of the
Council. Should a step considered necessary by
the majority be vetoed by a minority of three or
more, nothing will be left but for the Powers to
negotiate among themselves in regard to the removal
of the deadlock, and with a certain amount of good-
will a way out will generally be found.

The Powers represented on the Council should
send to it representatives of the highest standing
and authority. These representatives should be the
Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries, who, how-
ever, should have the right of appointing locum
tenentes. The constitution of the Council is that
of a conference of governments, each preserving /
its own independence and responsible for its own
people. As far as possible the working arrange-
ments should follow the practice so successfully
inaugurated at the Versailles Conferences of Prime
Ministers in connection with the Supreme War
Council. And for the successful working of the

40 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Council government representatives of the highest
standing and authority will be necessary. On really
important occasions either the Prime Ministers or
the Foreign Secretaries should, whenever possible,
attend personally. And, in any case, they should
attend one annual meeting at which there should
be a free and frank interchange of views and a
review of the general policies of the Council. It
should also be the invariable practice to call in to
consultation any State not represented on the
Council whose interests are directly affected by
any decision proposed to be taken by the Council.
If the most important leaders in the Governments
of the Powers attend the sittings of the Council as
often as possible, and proper consultation of others
interested takes place, the Council cannot fail to
command the highest prestige and authority, and
to become the Executive Committee of the whole
bod}? of Sovereign States in their international
relations and activities. The more confidence it
commands, the less will be the inclination among
the Powers to enter into private intrigues or under-
standings apart from the regular machinery of the
Council, and the smoother will become the working
of the new system of world-government.

It would be most important to secure as much
publicity for the work of the Council as possible,
and to this end it would be advisable to issue official
statements of its proceedings and resolutions, and
any other information which is not of a confidential
nature. Secret diplomacy should as much as
possible be avoided, as one of the causes of wars.
The publication of the voting in the Council on
matters involving the peace of the world might

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 41

operate as a most salutary check on the clandestine
ambitions of statesmen, and might, by exposing their
game before the world, assist to mobilise public
opinion even in their own countries against them.

In its business arrangements the Council will
follow largely the precedent of the Versailles Council
of Prime Ministers. It will institute a permanent
Secretariat and Staff:, which will keep the minutes
and records of the Council, conduct all correspond-
ence of the Council, and make all necessary ar-
rangements in the intervals between the meetings
of the Council. It will create the machinery neces-
sary to carry out the functions which have been
assigned to the League in Section A. Joint Com-
mittees will have to study the conditions in those
countries which are committed to the charge of
the League as successor to the defunct Empires.
Close liaison will have to be maintained with the
Foreign Offices of all the constituent countries, as
well as with the mandatary States who act for the
League in controlled or administered areas. Without
any undue or irritating interference in the affairs
of States, the Council will have to keep in touch
with developing conditions in all countries under
its charge, and to be in a position from first-hand
information to make up its mind on those matters
which require executive action by the League. It
will have to pay special regard to those situations all
over the world which may develop differences and
troubles of a serious character between States. In fact,
the Head Office organisation will have to be like that
of a General Staff which studies and watches closely
all conditions anywhere developing which might call
for action or counsel on the part of the League.

D

42 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

International administrative bodies, now perform-
ing international functions in accordance with treaty
arrangements, should in future be placed under
the management and control of the Council. Such
subjects as : Post, telegraphs, and cables (including
wireless telegraphy) ; air traffic ; extradition ; copy-
right, patents, and trade marks ; trade and sanitary
regulations ; statistics ; weights anol measures ;
monetary matters ; navigation of rivers ; private
international laws ; liquor traffic ; slave trade ;
fisheries ; white slave traffic — all these have been
dealt with by Conferences in the past, but they can
in future be better dealt with by the League, and
its permanent Staff should make and control the
necessary administrative arrangements.

After peace there will be a new and most im-
portant group of matters calling for the study or
control of the permanent Staff. Thus the due
execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaty
will have to be carefully watched. New conditions
of free transit by land, water, and air will become
necessary, and require regulation and control by
the League. Again, President Wilson has raised
the two far-reaching issues of the Freedom of the
Seas and the establishment of equality of trade
conditions by the removal of economic barriers
between members of the League. These are matters
of the most complex character and ramifying deep
into the existing systems of law and trade. If
assented to by the other Powers their assent could
at the most be only to the general principles. Both
subjects will require the most careful study and
detailed consideration, especially in their applica-
tion to the circumstances of various countries.

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 43

No body could be better fitted for this investigation
by its authority and the resources for study which
it will command than the permanent Staff of the
Council. Then, again, there is the vast subject of
industrial conditions, involving international labour
conditions, which will call for expert inquiry and
statesmanlike handling by the League. All these
thorny subjects will call for the appointment of
expert committees or commissions on the Staff of
the League which could prepare the material for
a final expression of opinion by the League.

Let no one be alarmed at this formidable list of
first-class difficulties which I am lavishly scattering
in the path of the League. All these matters, and
many more, are rapidly, unavoidably becoming
subjects for international handling. Questions of
industry, trade, finance, labour, transit and com-
munications, and many others, are bursting through
the national bounds and are clamouring for inter-
national solution. Water-tight compartments and
partition walls between the nations and the con-
tinents have been knocked through, and the new
situation calls for world-government. If the League
of Nations refuses to function, some other machinery
will have to be created to deal with the new problems
which transcend all national limits. The task is
there ; all that is required is a carefully thought out
form of government by which that task could be
undertaken. It is a unique problem, both in its
magnitude and in the benefits for the world which a
successful solution will secure. We can only pro-
ceed tentatively and hope for very partial success.
In that spirit the above scheme is suggested.

So far I have dealt with the first two branches

44 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of the constitution of the League — the General Con-
ference and the Council. There remains for con-
sideration the third branch or Judicature. It will,
however, be found more convenient to deal with
that topic in the next section in connection with
the preservation of future world-peace.

I would sum up the arguments of this section in
the following recommendations as to the Constitu-
tion and functions of the League :

(10) The Constitution of the League will be
that of a permanent Conference between the
Governments of the constituent States for the
purpose of joint international action in certain
denned respects, and will not derogate from the
independence of those States. It will consist
of a General Conference, a Council, and Courts
of Arbitration and Conciliation.

(n) The General Conference, in which all
constituent States will have equal voting power,
will meet periodically to discuss matters sub-
mitted to it by the Council. These matters
will be general measures of international law or
arrangements or general proposals for limitation
of armaments or for securing world-peace, or any
other general resolutions, the discussion of
which by the Conference is desired by the
Council before they are forwarded for the
approval of the constituent Governments. Any
resolutions passed by the Conference will have
the effect of recommendations to the national
Governments and Parliaments.

(12) The Council will be the executive com-
mittee of the League, and will consist of the

CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE 45

Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries or other
authoritative representatives of the Great
Powers, together with the representatives drawn
in rotation from two panels of the Middle
Powers and the Minor States respectively, in
such a way that the Great Powers have a bare
majority. A minority of three or more can
veto any action or resolution of the Council.

(13) The Council will meet periodically, and
will, in addition, hold an annual meeting of
Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries for .
general interchange of views, and for a review
of the general policies of the League. It witt
appoint a permanent Secretariat and Staff, and
will appoint joint committees for the study and
co-ordination of the international questions with
which the Council deals, or questions likely to
lead to international disputes. It will also
take the necessary steps for keeping up proper
liaison, not only with the Foreign Offices of
the constituent Governments, but also with
the authorities acting on behalf of the League
in various parts of the world.

(14) Its functions will be :

(a) To take executive action or control
in regard to the matters set forth in Section
A or under any international arrangements
or conventions ;

(b) To administer and control any"prop-
erty of an international character, such as
international waterways, rivers, straits,
railways, fortifications, air stations, &c.

(c) To formulate for the approval of the
Governments general measures of inter-

46 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

national law, or arrangements for limita-
tion of armaments or promotion of world-
peace.

(Its remaining functions in regard to
world-peace are dealt with in the following
Section C.)

C.— THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE

WE come now to that part of our subject which has
received most consideration and discussion during
the war. The stupendous character of this tragedy
has forced to the front, as the most important and
vital issue before the civilised world, the question
whether an end cannot be made to war, whether the
resources of civilisation are not adequate to the
prevention of similar calamities overwhelming and
perhaps finally engulfing mankind in future. A
great literature has sprung up round this question,
and in this section I do not propose to do more than
summarising what seems to me sound and fruitful
in this literature, and especially in emphasising
certain points of view which appear to me to be of
capital importance.

Now it seems to me that some people expect too
much from the new machinery of international
Arbitration and Conciliation which emerges as the
chief proposal for preventing future wars. War is
a symptom of deep-seated evils : it is a disease or
growth out of social and political conditions. While
these conditions remain unaltered, it is vain to expect
any good from new institutions superimposed on
those conditions. Hence it is that I have argued

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 47

all through this discussion for an inner transforma-
tion of international conditions and institutions.
If the League of Nations merely meant sorae new
wheel to the coach, I do not think the addition worth
making, nor do I think the vehicle would cany us
any farther. The League must be such as to mean
much more than new Councils to provide for Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation in future troubles. The new
institution of peace must not be something addi-
tional, something external, superimposed on the
pre-existing structure. It must be an organic
change ; it must be woven into the very texture of
our political system. The new motif of peace must
in future operate internally, constantly, inevitably
from the very heart of our political organisation,
and must, so to speak, flow from the nature of things
political. Then, and not till then, will the impulse to
war atrophy and shrivel up, and war itself stand
stripped in all its horrible nakedness, and lose all
the association of romance, all the atmosphere of
honour, which has proved so intoxicating and irre-
sistible in the past. That is why I am pleading for
a more fundamental conception of the League, for a
League whose task will not be to stem the on-coming
tide with a broom, but for one which will prevent
the tide from flowing at all. I hope I have shown
the way to such a conception of the League ; and if
at this unique juncture in the fortunes of Christen-
dom that conception, or something similar, could be
translated into a real living institution, this war,
with all its untold miseries for the world, will not
have been in vain. I believe this war has ripened
public opinion for a far-reaching change. As has
been well said in an official survey of this subject ;

48 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

" The experience of the present war has brought all
thinking people to see that the intricate development of
commercial and financial relations between all the States
of tb.e world has given to all nations a common life, and
that war between any two Great Powers produces reactions
me/re widespread and violent than anything realised before
ttoe present conflict. No war has hitherto involved so
many countries at once ; inflicted so many casualties
upon combatants or losses on civilians ; caused such
devastation of land and destruction of property ; imposed
such comprehensive hardship on the world at large. Such
limitations of space, time, and destructive energies as
once restricted the evils of war have been swept away ;
and the magnitude of our present calamity may be ex-
pected to provoke a corresponding effort to avert its
repetition and aggravation, all the more as this war has
shown that there is no real palliative short of prevention.
Schemes to civilise warfare, to mitigate its cruelty, to
restrict its effect, have failed to achieve their purpose, even
where they were not deliberately set aside, and the un-
bounded possibilities of modern science have been enlisted
frankly on the side of force and might, uninfluenced by
any consideration of the moral law. The position of
neutrals has been only less unhappy than that of belliger-
ents ; never before has it been so difficult for them to
maintain their neutrality or to eke out a bare subsistence
amid the universal shortage which war has created. Nor
is there the old and somewhat cold comfort that war
affects only a group of nations, a single continent, or one
hemisphere. Even the Old and the New World have
become one, and the United States of America have been
constrained to intervene in a European quarrel for the
sake of the peace of mankind. These conditions have
brought home the actual realities and horrors of war to
men and women outnumbering many times those personally
affected by military or naval campaigns of former years."

The psychological and political effects of this
tragedy have been very far-reaching. The spirits
of nations have broken under this accumulated

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 49

strain. The old institutions on which militarism
and autocracy flourished lie crumbled in the dust ;
a great wave of advanced Democracy is sweeping
blindly over Europe ; and the deepest longing has
taken possession of the great masses of the people
that this horror shall never be repeated. The
psychological and moral conditions are ripe for a
great change. The moment has come for one of the
great creative acts of history.

The question is : Can we plant the institutions of
peace in the very heart of the European political
system ? I have already suggested in section A
that the anti-militarist regime should be applied,
not only in autonomous territories in future coming
under the jurisdiction of the League, but also in all
new States arising in Europe and claiming admission
into the League. But ought we not to go further
and apply the system of peace also to the already
existing States and to the great Powers ?

Three proposals have been put forward for general
disarmament and have already received a great deal
of public attention. They are ; —

(a) The abolition of Conscription and of
Conscript armies.

(b) The limitation of armaments ; and

(c) The nationalisation of munitions produc-
tion.

All three points bristle with difficulties. Let us
take them in order.

If conscription or compulsory military service is
abolished in the Peace Treaty what will be the
defensive system of States in future ? Will it be

50 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

voluntaryism ? And will any limit be fixed to the
volunteer armies which the States will be allowed
to raise ? Or will the new system be a militia
on the Swiss model, which gives the population
primary military training without creating a great
military machine that could be suddenly and unex-
pectedly used for offensive purposes ? All these
points involve a great deal of complexity and diffi-
culty in detail ; and it is quite clear that no ciit-and-
dried formulae could be adopted or applied in practice
And yet those difficulties ought not to deter the
Peace Conference from giving the subject the most
earnest and anxious consideration. I would go so
far as to say that while the Great Powers are allowed
to raise conscript armies without hindrance or limit,
it would be vain to expect the lasting preservation
of world- peace If the instrument is ready for use
the occasion will arrive and the men will arise to use
it. I look upon conscription as the taproot of
militarism ; unless that is cut, all our labours will
eventually be in vain.

In addition to that danger there is the question of
expense to consider. The destruction of capital and
the impoverishment of Europe during fhe war has
been immense ; the burdens of taxation which the
peoples will have to bear in respect of all this dead-
weight debt will be such as to leave little margin for
expenditure on necessary schemes of social better-
ment. If this small margin has to be encroached
upon in order to provide the funds required for
raising, equipping, and maintaining huge conscript
forces, the situation will become intolerable ; people
simply will not stand it, and the menace of the great
anti-State movement now finding expression jn

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 51

Bolshevism will become as great a danger as war
itself.

In view of this double danger, I would plead most
earnestly for the abolition of conscription at the
Peace Conference. Let the drunkard sign the
pledge, even if we have to look round for some other
less dangerous narcotic to soothe him in his troubles.
For I admit that it will not be prudent to leave
States without the necessary means of self-defence
against both internal and external dangers which
may threaten their existence. These, however,
are matters of detail to be most carefully inquired
into and regulated by the League.

In most countries a simple militia system on a scale
of numbers and service agreed upon by the League
will probably be the best alternative. By periodical
reports from the States in regard to the working of
the new system, as well as direct liaison between the
Permanent Staff of the League and the military
departments of the States, the Council of the League
could satisfy itself that all goes well and take the
necessary precautions against any abuses or evasions
which may be disclosed. As the Council will repre-
sent the States themselves, it is sure to keep a jealous
eye on all military developments.

In some countries, however, a voluntary system
will be- most in accord with past practice and tradi-
tions as well as with the geographical situation.
This will probably be the case of the United States
of America and certainly of Great Britain, for whose
overseas possessions an army recruited on a volunr
tary long-term basis is essential. In the Dominions
different systems prevail and will no doubt continue
to prevail. Thus Canada and India follow the

52 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

voluntary system, while the other Dominions have
a compulsory militia system on the Swiss model.
In these cases, too, the Council of the League will
after due inquiry lay down the scale of the defensive
system, and will in doing so have to be partly guided
by the consideration that, with due regard to all the
circumstances, the voluntary standing army author-
ised by it will have no greater offensive power for
the purpose of foreign aggression than the militia
authorised in other cases. Nice questions will arise
and no doubt give ample employment to the gentle-
men on the Permanent Staff ; but I see nothing
inherently insoluble in the problems presented, so
long as States are bona fide willing to make the new
system workable.

Of the three proposals for disarmament, the
abolition of conscription is by far the most important,
and it is also the one behind which there will be
the greatest volume of public opinion. The feelings
against war engendered by the casualties and miseries
of this war will tell most strongly in favour of this
fundamental reform ; and if carried it will set free
a mass of productive labour for purposes of recon-
struction, which otherwise would have gone to waste
in camps and barracks. It is the most important,
the most far-reaching in its effects on the peace
regime, and the one probably most easy to carry in
view of popular feeling. I hope, therefore, that
every effort will be made at the Peace Conference
to have it adopted in the Peace Treaty.

Coming now to the second proposal, viz. : the
limitation of armaments, I frankly admit that it
presents very grave difficulties as a general principle.
Two conundrums are at once presented :

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 53

(a) What are armaments ; and

(b) On what principle can one weapon of
destruction be valued as against another of a
different kind ?

Both questions are at first sight unanswerable. The
weapons of war are no longer limited in range and
use as in former wars. It is practically impossible,
after our experience of this war, to say what things
could be excluded from the list of armaments in the
broad sense. The war was fought throughout and
ultimately won, not only by the usual military
weapons in the narrower sense, but by the whole
economic, industrial, and financial systems of the
belligerent Powers. Food, shipping, metals and raw
materials, credit, transport, industries and factories
of all kinds played just as important a part as guns,
rifles, aeroplanes, tanks, explosives and gas, war-
ships and submarines.

Even if a compromise is suggested here, and the
list of armaments selected for limitation is confined
to direct instruments of war such as those last
enumerated, then the second question arises how
one instrument is to be valued against another ?
How is an aeroplane valued as against a tank, a
Zeppelin against a submarine, a machine gun against
a field gun, or a Stokes gun, or a can of poison gas ?
Unless a whole system of comparative values is
settled, the armaments of one State may exceed in
striking power those fixed for another State of equal
military standing. And new inventions may at any
moment upset the apple cart with all its precious
table of values. Is there any way out of these
perplexities ? In despair of finding a general solu-

54 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tion for our question, it may be that the Peace
Conference or the League is driven to consider
partial remedies, such as the limitation of the
use of the submarine and aerial bombing, the
prohibition of poison gas and disease germs, and
similar abominations. Such reforms will not, how-
ever, touch the main issues, which is not the human-
ising of war, but the general limitation of armaments
• with a view to rendering war difficult, and, in the
end, impossible.

The only suggestion I can make is that, if Con-
scription is abolished and militia or volunteer forces
authorised for the future defence of States, the
scale of direct armament and equipment on a fair
basis for such forces should be determined after the
inquiry by the Council, and that, once such scale
is determined, it should not be exceeded by any
State without permission of the Council. The effect
will be that a State, say, with an authorised army
of 100,000 men will not be allowed to have guns and
machine guns and other direct war weapons for an
army of 500,000, and so be in a position, by rapid
expansion of its army after the outbreak of war, to
arm and equip the expanded army to the full.
Such a provision seems almost a necessary corollary
to the abolition of Conscription and the limitation of
volunteer or militia forces to definite numbers. Nor
does it appear impracticable. Limitation of arma-
ments in this narrower sense is eminently a subject
for the experts of the League to thrash out, and it
ought not to be beyond their powers to produce a
workable scheme for such limitation.

The nationalisation of armament factories has
been advocated, on the ground that as long as the

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 55

production of munitions of war remains a private
commercial undertaking, huge vested interests grow
up around it which influence public opinion through
the Press and otherwise in the direction of war.
There is no doubt that the influence of Krupps has
been harmful to the great peace interests of the
world, and, in a less degree, the same could prob-
ably be said of most other similar undertakings.
.The very success of that sort of business depends on
the stimulation of the war atmosphere among the
peoples. The Press, influenced by the large profits
and advertising enterprise of the armament firms,
whip up public opinion on every imaginable occa-
sion ; small foreign incidents are written up and
magnified into grave international situations affect-
ing the pacific relations of States ; and the war
temperature is artificially raised and kept up.-

This proposal is, in my opinion, a sound one, and
should be adopted by the Conference or the League.
Of course, difficulties have been urged against it.
Where are the small States, who are dependent
for supplies on the private munition factories in the
countries of the Great Powers, going to get their
armaments in future ? I am not much impressed with
this sort of argument. To keep up the high tem-
perature of the war atmosphere over the world for
the sake of indulging the small Balkan and other
States in their special form of sport will not appeal
to the great democracies of the world. It will
materially assist the peace policy of the League to
cut oH the supply of arms and munitions from these
small States, whose little fits of temper are too
costly to the world, and whose security could be
more safely entrusted to the League.

56 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In order to enable the Council of the League to
keep in touch with the production and movements
of arms and munitions, the Council should have full
rights of inspection of all such national factories,
and should, besides, be furnished periodically with
returns of the imports and exports of arms and
munitions into and from the territories of the mem-
bers of the League.

It must "be borne in mind that, even with this
information before it, the Council will not be in posses-
sion of the full facts. The important question re-
mains, how soon other private factories engaged in
other industries could be converted to the produc-
tion of munitions, and to what extent the official
or State production could thus be increased ? I am .
afraid that, unless inquisitorial powers are given to
the League, it could not follow up this important
aspect of the matter. In all its calculations, how-
ever, the Council will have to bear in mind that
there is this vast reserve capacity of production in
the background, a capacity which will be specially
great for the next decade because of the great
number of munition factories which will now be
converted to other uses, and could, in case of neces-
sity, be reconverted to the production of munitions.
This discussion may be summed up in the following
three recommendations :

(15) That all the States represented at the
Peace Conference shall agree to the abolition
of Conscription or compulsory military service ;
and that their future defence forces shall con-
sist of militia or volunteers, whose numbers and
training shall, after expert inquiry, be fixed by
the Council of the League.

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 57

(16) That while the limitation of armaments
in the general sense is impracticable, the Council
of the League shall determine what direct
military equipment and armament is fair and
reasonable in respect of the scale of forces laid
down under paragraph (15), and that the limits
fixed by the Council shall not be exceeded
without its permission.

(17) That all factories for the manufacture
of direct weapons of war shall be nationalised
and their production shall be subject to the
inspection of the officers of the Council ; and
that the Council shall be furnished periodically
with returns of imports and exports of munitions
of war into or from the territories of its mem-
bers, and as far as possible into or from other
countries.

I now proceed to deal briefly with the specific
proposals which have been put forward for the
purpose of preventing international disputes from
developing into wars. The actual scope of most of
these proposals is not to prevent wars altogether,
but the more limited one of compelling disputants
not to go to war before their dispute has been in-
quired into and either decided or reported upon by
an impartial outside authority. This is the furthest
limit that most writers have been prepared to go.
As long as members of the League submit their dis-
putes for inquiry and report or recommendation or
decision by some outside authority, their obligation
to the League will be satisfied, and thereafter they
will be free to take any action they like, and even to
go to war.

This may appear a weak position to take up ; and

E

58 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

yet it is not deemed expedient to go farther. The
utmost that it seems possible to achieve in the
present conditions of international opinion and prac-
tice is to provide for a breathing space before the
disputants are free to go to war ; to create a binding
moratorium or period of delay, during which the
parties to the dispute agree not to proceed to ex-
tremes but to await the results of the inquiry or
hearing to which their case has been referred. The
general opinion is that States will not be prepared
to bind themselves further ; and even if they do, the
risk of their breaking their engagement is so great
as to make the engagement not worth while and
indeed positively dangerous. The common view is
that, if such a period of deliberation and delay is
established, there will be time for extreme war
passions to cool down, and for public opinion to be
aroused and organised on the side of peace. And in
view of the enormous force which public opinion
would exert in such a case, the general expectation
is that it will prove effective, and that the delay, and
the opportunity thus given for further reflection and
the expression of public opinion, will in most cases
prevent the parties from going to war. Thus,
although the engagement of the disputants is only
to delay action pending the inquiry into or hearing
of their case and the issue of a decision or report,
the actual effect of the delay will in most cases be
more far-reaching, and the threatened war may be
prevented altogether.

The moratorium must extend not only for the
period of the inquiry and until a decision or report
has been rendered, but for a reasonable time after
such rendering, in order that the disputants may

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 59

have an opportunity to consider whether compliance
with it is possible. This will also give the Council
an opportunity for a final effort to secure the adhesion
of the disputants to the decision or report. What
is a reasonable time for this purpose is a matter
of detail which could be left to be settled by the
League.

I have assumed that the Council will in any case
be able to render a report or make recommendations
about the dispute. But as a minority of three or
more may veto any resolution of the Council,- the
possibility has to be faced that in exceptional
cases the Council, in spite of all its efforts, may be
unable to make a report or recommendation. How-
ever regrettable this may be, the delay would have
given time for the passions of the disputants to cool
and thus have served a useful purpose.

Should States be forbidden to make warlike pre-
parations during the moratorium ? On the whole
the answer should be in the negative, not only
because it is practically impossible to say what war-
like preparations are, but also because it may con-
ceivably be in the interest of the innocent party,
whose military preparations are behindhand, to use
the interval of the moratorium to improve his defences
and thus give his aggressive opponent additional
food for reflection and caution.

While it is free to a State to go to war after the
report or recommendation of the League has been
given, it would be monstrous to permit this as
against a State which obeys and carries out the
recommendation of the League. If such a State is
notwithstanding attacked by an unscrupulous
opponent, the latter should be dealt with by the

6o THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

League, which could not possibly sit still and have
its authority so flagrantly flouted. To sum up this
discussion I make the following recommendation :

(18) That the Peace Treaty shall provide that
the members of the League bind themselves
jointly and severally not to go to war with one
another —

(a) without previously submitting the
matter in dispute to arbitration, or to
inquiry by the Council of the League ;
and

(b) until there has been an award, or a
report by the Council ; and

(c) not even then, as against a member
which complies with the award, or with
the recommendation (if any) made by the
Council in its report.

What are the penalties incurred by any party
which breaks this covenant to observe the mora-
torium ? This is the most important question of
all in regard to the preservation of world-peace.
Without an effective sanction for the keeping of the
moratorium the League will remain a pious aspiration
or a dead letter. The forces of public opinion which
would be mobilised during the moratorium will in
most cases be strong enough to restrain the parties
from going to war, but to achieve that object the
opportunity of a moratorium must be guaranteed
with all the force which is behind the League.
The breaker of the moratorium and generally of the
covenant in paragraph (18) should therefore become
ipso facto at war with all the other members of the
League, great and small alike, which will sever all

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 61

relations of trade and finance with the law-breaker,
and prohibit all intercourse with its subjects, and
also prevent as far as possible all commercial and
financial intercourse between the subjects of the
law-breaker and those of any other State, whether a
member of the League or not. No declaration of
war should be necessary, as the state of war arises
automatically on the law-breaker proceeding to
hostilities, and the boycott follows automatically
from the obligation of the League without further
resolutions or formalities on the part of the
League.

The effect of such a complete automatic trade and
financial boycott will necessarily be enormous. The
experience of this war has shown how such a boycott,
effectively maintained chiefly through sea power,
has in the end availed to break completely the most
powerful military Power that the world has ever
seen ; and the lesson is not likely to be lost on future
intending evildoers. It is because of this power of
l the economic and financial weapons that many
writers are of opinion that the obligation for action
by members of the League should not go beyond the
use of these weapons. My view, however, is that
they will not be enough if unsupported by military
and naval action. A powerful military State may
think that a sudden military blow will achieve its
object in spite of boycotts, provided that no greater
military reaction from the rest of the League need be
feared. This fear may under certain circumstances
be a more effective deterrent than even the boycott ;
and I do not think the League is likely to prove a
success unless in the last resort the maintenance of
the moratorium is guaranteed by force. The obliga-

62 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tion on the members of the League to use force for
this purpose should therefore be absolute, but the
amount of the force and the contribution from the
members should be left to the recommendation of
the Council to the respective Governments in each
case. It will probably be found convenient, and
even advisable, to absolve the small members
of the League from the duty of contributing
military and naval forces and to be satisfied with
their participation in the boycott. The obligation
to take these measures of force should be joint and
several, so that while all the members are bound to
act, one or more who are better prepared for action
or in greater danger than the rest may proceed
ahead of the others.

In order to secure world-peace I would pile up the
dangers and risks in front of an intending breaker of
the moratorium. Should the rigours of maritime
warfare be mitigated at the peace and a measure of
freedom be restored to the seas in the direction con-
tended for by President Wilson, I would advocate
the power of full revival of all these rigours as
against such a law-breaker. Not only the right of
visit and search, but also of complete naval blockade
should be exercisable against such a State. And the
question requires careful consideration whether such
a State should be accorded the status of legalised
war, and whether it should not be outlawed and
treated as the common criminal that it is. This
would be a matter for the experts of the League to
consider more fully in all its bearings. But in any
case I would advocate a provision that any breaker
of the moratorium should after the resulting war be
subject to perpetual disarmament, that its forces

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 63

should be reduced to a minimum basis, and that it
should be subjected to a peaceful regime in the same
way as new independent States recognised after this
war in accordance with paragraph (8). The prospect
of what will in effect be a permanent degradation and
reduction ur status as a Power will probably act as
a strong deterrent to the intending evildoer. I
therefore recommend :

(19) That the Peace Treaty shall provide
that if any member of the League breaks its
covenant under paragraph (18), it shall ipso
facto become at war with all the other members
of the League, which shall subject it to com-
plete economic and financial boycott, including
the severance of all trade and financial relations
and the prohibition of all intercourse between
their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-
breaking State, and the prevention, as far as
possible, of the subjects of the covenant-breaking
State from having any commercial or financial
intercourse with the subjects of any other
State, whether a member of the League or not.
While all members of the League are obliged
to take the above measures, it is left to the
Council to recommend what effective naval or
military force the members shall contribute,
and, if advisable, to absolve the smaller members
of the League from making such contribution.

The covenant-breaking State shall after the
restoration of peace be subject to perpetual
disarmament and to the peaceful regime estab-
lished for new States under paragraph (8).
The actual treatment of the matter in dispute
during the moratorium depends upon the classifica-

64 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tion of disputes into the two classes of justiciable
and other disputes. Justiciable disputes are those
which concern matters of fact or law which are
capable of a legal or judicial handling. They in-
volve mostly the interpretation of treaties or some
other question of international law ; or questions
of fact, such as the situation of boundaries, or the
amount of damage done by any breach of the law.
The inquiry into such questions is exactly the
province of courts of law, and disputes of this kind
can therefore conveniently be referred to courts
or abitration tribunals of a judicial character, if
they cannot be otherwise disposed of by negotiation.
This treatment of international disputes has met
with remarkable success in recent years, and has
thus served to nip many a threatened war in the
bud. Indeed, it may be said that the reference of
justiciable cases to the decision of arbitral
tribunals has become the common international
practice. And the award of such tribunals has
in almost all cases been carried out by the States
against whom the decision was given, the exceptions
being mostly confined to cases where the tribunal
was accused of having exceeded its jurisdiction or
admitted wrong evidence, or of other mistakes in
procedure.

The real difficulty with regard to arbitration
tribunals is to secure impartial arbitrators. The
proposal has been made to create a permanent inter-
national tribunal or court, to which ali justiciable
cases may be referred by the Council of the League.
But the objection to this is that, as the judges on
such a tribunal will be nationals of States, a State
who appears as a litigant before the tribunal may feel

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 65

aggrieved because a national of the opposing State
may happen to be sitting in the case, and may be
suspected of bias. On the whole, the most work-
able procedure seems to be to' have a panel of
arbitrators, to be prepared periodically by the
Council of the League, from which the litigants will
select their respective arbitrators, and that if the
arbitrators cannot agree as to the umpire, the
nomination of the latter from the panel shall be
left to the Council, or to some other impartial
authority indicated by the Council for the purpose.
I recommend :

(20) That the Peace Treaty shall further
provide that if a dispute should arise between
any members of the League as to the inter-
pretation of a treaty, or as to any question of
international law, or as to any fact which if
established would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to any damage
alleged and the nature and measure of the
reparation to be made therefor, and if such
dispute cannot be settled by negotiation, the
members bind themselves to submit the dispute
to arbitration and to carry out any award or
decision which may be rendered.

It may, however, be that the circumstances of
the dispute are not of a justiciable nature. It may
be that the Council of the League, when they are
appealed to to intervene in the matter, may be
unable to decide whether it is a proper case for
reference to an arbitration tribunal, or the minority
may veto the appointment of an umpire about
whom there cannot be an agreement otherwise, or

66 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

for some reason or other a reference to arbi-
tration may prove impracticable. In fact, we are
here in the region of the most dangerous and in-
tractable causes of war, where passions run high,
not only among the disputants but also their partisans
among other States. The issues are generally vague
and intangible, and spring from special grounds
of national psychology. They involve large ques-
tions of policy, of so-called vital interests, and of
national honour. It is round these issues and
questions that national and international passions
gather like storm-clouds, until the thunder of war
alone can clear the air again. They cannot be
disposed of on judicial lines, and require entirely
different treatment. They do, indeed, require care-
ful inquiry into facts and allegations by the Council
and its expert committees ; but, above all, they
require that tactful diplomatic negotiation and
conciliation between the disputants which great
statesmen know best how to bring to bear on deli-
cate and dangerous situations. Unlike arbitration
on definite issues of fact or law, the object in these
cases is not to arrive at a definite decision, but to
mediate between the parties with a view to an
amicable or peaceful settlement of the dispute ; and
if that fails, then to prepare recommendations and
statements which will inform and guide public
opinion correctly as to the dispute and so enable
it to mobilise its forces on the side of peace.

In all such cases, it ought to be free to either
party to the dispute to appeal to the Council of the
League to take the matter of the dispute into
consideration. In threatening cases it ought to
be free to the Council to intervene in the dispute

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 67

on its own motion, without waiting for an appli-
cation by one or other of the disputants. If applied
to by one of the disputants the Council will forth-
with give notice of the application to the other
disputant, and proceed to make the necessary
arrangements for the hearing of the dispute. It
may appoint expert committees to inquire into
allegations of fact or law, the determination of
which may assist in the settlement of the dispute.
It should be the duty of all members of the League
to place at the disposal of the Council, or any
committee appointed by it, to the fullest extent
compatible with their interests, the information in
their possession which bears upon the dispute. The
functions of the Council in connection with the
dispute shall be two-fold : Firstly, to ascertain the
facts with regard to the dispute, and to make
recommendations based on the merits of the case,
and calculated to ensure a just and lasting settle-
ment ; and, secondly, to mediate and conciliate
between the disputants with a view to inducing
them to accept such recommendations.

The recommendations arrived at by the Council
will not have the force of decisions, and it will be
free to either disputant to refuse to accept them
and to go to war. It is even possible that the
minority in the Council is large enough to prevent
any recommendations from being arrived at at all.
If either party threatens to go to war in spite of the
recommendations of the Council, the latter will
publish its recommendations in order to inform and
guide public opinion in regard to the issues of the
dispute. If, again, the Council fails to agree on
any recommendations it will be even more necessary

68 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

to place the public in a position to judge impartially
of the questions at issue. In such a case it ought
to be free both to the majority and the minority
on the Council to publish statements of their views
of the dispute and the recommendations they
favoured but failed to pass in the Council ; and the
publication of such statements should not be re-
garded as an unfriendly act by either of the dis-
putants. The publication of these statements may,
however, lead to such a crystallisation of public
opinion that even at the eleventh hour the parties
are restrained from going to war. I therefore
recommend :

(21) That if on any ground it proves im-
practicable to refer such dispute to arbitration,
either party to the dispute may apply to the
Council to take the matter of the dispute into
consideration. The Council shall give notice of
the application to the other party, and make
the necessary arrangements for the hearing of
the dispute. The Council shall ascertain the
facts with regard to the dispute and make
recommendations based on the merits, and
calculated to secure a just and lasting settle-
ment. Other members of the League shall
place at the disposal of the Council all informa-
tion in their possession which bears on the
dispute. The Council shall do its utmost by
mediation and conciliation to induce the dis-
putants to agree to a peaceful settlement. The
recommendations shall be addressed to the
disputants and shall not have the force of
decisions. If either party threatens to go to
war in spite of the recommendations, the Council

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 69

shall publish its recommendations. If the
Council fails to arrive at recommendations,
both the majority and the minority on the
Council may publish statements of the re-
spective recommendations they favour, and
such publication shall not be regarded as an
unfriendy act by either of the disputants.

There remains for final consideration the case of
a dispute in which one or both of the disputants
happen to be outside the League. The treatment
of such a dispute, however, will follow the lines
above laid down. If one of the disputants is a
member of the League it may apply to the Council
either for arbitration or a hearing, as the case may
be. The Council may then call on the outside
State to submit its case ; if it does so, the matter
will proceed in accordance with the foregoing
recommendations. If it fails to submit its case, the
Council may proceed to inquire into the dispute
e% parte, and make recommendations in the same
way as if both parties were present. If the dis-
putant which is a member of the League is attacked
during the moratorium or notwithstanding its com-
pliance with the recommendations of the Council
by the outside State, the situation arising will be
the same as if the attack had been made by a member
of the League, in the same circumstances, that is
to say, the members of the League will become
ipso facto at war with the outside State, against
which the economic and financial boycott will be
set in operation, and the Council will proceed to
organise the necessary military and naval forces.

In the case of a dispute between States, neither

70 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of which is a member of the League, any of the
members may bring the matter before the Council
with a view to the Council using its good offices to
prevent war.

Any State which is not an original member of
the League may apply to the Council for admission.
The Council will give the application favourable
consideration, and decide whether it should be
granted, and whether it is necessary to impose any
terms.

I have now come to the end of this short sketch
of the League of Nations. Whatever its imper-
fections, I hope it has shown that the project is
not only workable, but necessary as an organ of
the new world order now arising. If the future
peace of the world is to be maintained, it will
not be sufficient merely to erect an institution
for the purpose of settling international disputes
after they have arisen ; it will be necessary to devise
an instrument of government which will deal with
the causes and sources of disputes. The need is
there, and the end of the great war has brought an
, unequalled opportunity for dealing with it. For not
only are men's minds prepared for the new peaceful
order, but the sweeping away of the Imperial
systems of Europe leaves the space vacant which
the new institution must occupy. The need, political
and psychological, is imperative ; the opportunity
is unique ; and only the blindness of statesmen
could now prevent the coming of the new institution,
which will, more than anything else, reconcile the
peoples to the sufferings they have endured in this
war. It will be the only fitting monument to our
heroic dead. It will be the great response to the

THE LEAGUE AND WORLD-PEACE 71

age-long cry from the human heart for " Peace on
earth, Goodwill among men." It will nobly embody
and express the universal spirit which must heal
the deep, self-inflicted wounds of humanity. And
it must be the wise regulator, the steadying influ-
ence in the forward movement now set going among
the nations of the earth.

For there is no doubt that mankind is once more
on the move. The very foundations have been
shaken and loosened, and things are again fluid.
The tents have been struck, and the great caravan
of humanity is once more on the march. Vast
social and industrial changes are coming, perhaps
upheavals which may, in their magnitude and
effects, be comparable to war Itself. A steadying,
controlling, regulating influence will be required to
give stability to progress, and to remove that wasteful
friction which has dissipated so much social force
in the past, and in this war more than ever before.
These great functions could only be adequately
fulfilled by the League of Nations. Responding to
such vital needs and coming at such a unique
opportunity in history, it may well be destined to
mark a new era in the Government of Man, and
become to the peoples the guarantee of Peace, to
the workers of all races the great International,
and to all the embodiment and living expression of
the moral and spiritual unity of the human race.

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