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THE LEGISLATURE REDISTRICTS ILLINOIS

by GILBERT Y. STEINER and SAMUEL K. GOVE

THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT

and PUBLIC AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN

Published seven times each month by the Univer-
sity of Illinois. Entered as second-class matter
December 11, 1912, at the post office at Urbana,
Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912.
Office of Publication, 207 Administration Build-
ing, Urbana, Illinois.

Volume No. 54
October, 1956
Number 16

THE LEGISLATURE REDISTRICTS ILLINOIS

BY GILBERT Y. STEINER AND SAMUEL K. GOVE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

URBANA, ILLINOIS OCTOBER, 1956

1

FOREWORD

When it became evident that the IlHnois legislature would be redistricted
in the 1955 session, the Institute of Government and Public Affairs was in a
position to follow the activity closely and to contribute to the understanding
of this phase of the political process. Staff members of the Institute, over the
past six years, have worked directly with Illinois legislative commissions
created to study governmental problems and have had unusual opportunities
_„. to observe the work of the General Assembly. The authors have had close
and especially valuable contact with the Illinois legislative process on both a
formal and an informal basis. Professor Gilbert Y. Steiner, from 1951 to
■■ ' 1953, served as research associate with the Municipal Revenue Commission
and is currently a consultant to the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area
Local Government Services Commission. Professor Samuel K. Gove served,
in 1950 and 1951, on the staff of the Commission to Study State Govern-
ment and, in 1953 and 1954, on the research staff of the State Personnel
^ Administration Commission created by the 1953 General Assembly. The au-
^- thors worked with legislative leaders of both parties in seeing the work of
the commissions through the legislative sessions and in aiding in the prepa-
ration of legislation. A first product of their study of the legislature was The
Illinois Legislative Process, published in 1954.

The Institute and the authors gratefully acknowledge comments on pre-
liminary drafts of the manuscript by Senators George E. Drach and William
J. Lynch and by Representatives Arthur Sprague, William E. Pollack, and
Paul Powell. Other members of the General Assembly have made helpful
contributions, as have Messrs. Jack F. Isakoff and Dick Viar of the Illinois
Legislative Council, and Professors Charles Kneier, Phillip Monypenny,
and Charles Hagan of the University of Illinois.

As is the case in all studies published by the Institute, maximum freedom
has been accorded the authors. The views expressed and the conclusions
reached are theirs.

ROYDEN DANGERFIELD, Director

Institute of Government and Public Affairs

\

THE LEGISLATURE REDBSTRICTS ILLINOIS

This is a case study of legislative redistricting, a policy-making situation
in which the group with the most immediate interest in the policy is itself
the formal policy maker. Redistricting legislation is of basic concern to legis-
lators because it is a kind of job specification which can be drawn to the
special advantage or disadvantage of any member. Redistricting can insure
continuity in office or can insure retirement, depending on the terms of the
bill. No other legislation has quite the same direct effect on a legislative
career, and with no other legislation do the demands, the proposals, the ma-
neuvering, and the compromises emanate from within the legislative body
to the same extent. The focus of this study, then, is on the pressures, the
techniques, and the influences that obtain in a legislative situation wherein
the legislative interest itself is predominant.^

The redistricting legislation under consideration here formally originated
in the Illinois House of Representatives on May 24, 1955, but almost all of
its important legislative history took place before that date.^ Some of its
characteristics were fixed by a constitutional amendment proposed by the
1953 General Assembly and ratified in November 1954. That amendment
temporarily resolved the most compelling general problem in Illinois legis-
lative apportionment, i.e., finding a pattern of distribution of legislative

^ For our general analysis of the Illinois legislative process, see Samuel K. Gove
and Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Illinois Legislative Process (Urbana, 1954).

^ House Bill No. 1123, "A Bill for an Act to apportion the State of Illinois into
senatorial and representative districts and to repeal an Act herein named," was
signed by the Governor on June 29, 1955, became law July 1, 1955, and was initially
applicable at the time of filing petitions for the April primary preceding the Novem-
ber 1956 election.

[ 5 ]

seats between the City of Chicago and the remainder of the state. Although
the Constitution of 1870 provided for a decennial redistricting of each house
on a population basis, there had in fact been no redistricting since 1901.
House and Senate districts were congruent, and of the fifty-one of each,
eighteen lay in Chicago, one lay in Cook County outside of Chicago, and
the remaining thirty-two were downstate. With a population about two-fifths
of the state's total, Chicago held about one-third of the seats in the General
Assembly.

Ratification of the amendment did not achieve redistricting. It merely
provided an outline for the General Assembly to fill in in 1955, and con-
tained provisions that practically compelled implementation of the outline.
The outline cut the state into three great pieces, Chicago, Cook County
outside of Chicago, and Illinois' remaining 101 downstate counties. For the
initial redistricting, each geographical unit was assigned a specific number
of members of each chamber. Districting was to be based on a population
standard in the House of Representatives while area was to be the "prime
consideration" in fashioning Senate districts. It was left to the 1955 Gen-
eral Assembly to draw the boundary lines for 59 House districts and for
58 Senate districts. Until 1963, only 23 House seats were to be in Chicago,
7 in Cook County outside of Chicago, and 29 downstate. In redistricting
the House in 1963 and every ten years thereafter, the ceiling on Chicago
would no longer obtain. Of the apparently permanent Senate districts, 18
were to be in Chicago, 6 in Cook County outside of Chicago, and 34 down-
state. If the legislature failed to act in its 1955 regular session, the Governor
was to appoint, from a list of party nominees, a special bipartisan commis-
sion to do the job; if the commission did not succeed in redistricting, all
members of the General Assembly were to run from the state at large in
1956. A similar plan insures that the House will be redistricted in 1963 and
every decade thereafter.

House Bill No. 1123 of the 1955 legislative session could not be treated
as an ordinary piece of legislation. Other bills considered by the General
Assembly can pass or fail, and in the latter event, the issue is at least
temporarily terminated. Under the provisions of the constitutional amend-
ment, however, some kind of reapportionment was self-executing. The legis-
lature was ofTered the first opportunity to deal with the question. If this
opportunity was declined, other means were provided. In short, unlike the
alternatives presented on other issues, the alternatives here did not include
the status quo.

In addition to the elimination of the status quo as an alternative, the
range of legislative activity was further limited by the constitutional directive
assigning blocs of seats to each of the three geographical areas previously
noted. Finally, the population and area bases, for House and Senate re-

[ 6 ]

spectively, were pre-existing limits on legislative activity. Within these limits,
and within the routine requirements of compactness and contiguity, the
legislature was privileged to draw districts. The minimum requirement for
an understanding of the reapportionment legislation in 1955 is an under-
standing of this formal framework for legislative activity.

These were not the sole limits, however. Given only a need to conform
to the requirements spelled out above, innumerable proposals for redistrict-
ing should have been satisfactory. In fact, informal limits on the terms of
the bill also shaped its content. We have hypothesized that the most im-
portant of the informal limits included the following:

1. Individual preservation, the desire of each legislator to be in a "safe"
district.

2. Mutual preservation, the willingness of members to cooperate with
each other in protecting incumbents against potential challengers.

3. Political party preservation, the desire of the leaders of each political
party organization to maximize its strength in the legislature.

4. Bloc preservation, the desire of members of voting blocs — whether
based on geographic, economic, or ideological cohesion — to retain existing
personnel and strength. Such blocs are often bipartisan, and their member-
ship is relatively small.

An obvious distinction between the formal and the informal limits, so
called, lies in the fact that the former were spelled out in the Constitution,
were well known, and were susceptible to enforcement and interpretation
by both the Governor whose signature on a redistricting bill was necessary
and by the courts to which a challenge of the bill could be taken. The in-
formal limits were nowhere written out and were not susceptible to legal
enforcement, but these factors made them no less important. The expla-
nation of the 1955 redistricting legislation lies in the adjustment of the formal
and informal limits to each other. If either type of limit had been the
exclusive criterion, the job would have been routine; if the limits had been
incompatible, the job would have been impossible.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORMAL LIMITS ON LEGISLATIVE ACTION

By 1953, the Illinois constitutional directive for decennial redistricting
had been ignored for forty-two years, the last reapportionment having taken
place in 1901. In this period, there had been both major population in-
creases and major population movements. The 1950 census showed that one
county contained over half of the state's population, but under the 1901
apportionment, this county (Cook) contained only 19 of the state's 51 Sena-
torial districts from each of which one Senator and three Representatives
were elected.^

'The 1950 population of Cook County was 4,508,792; the downstate population
was 4,203,384.

[ 7 ]

Some attempts had been made during the intervening years to effect a
legislative reapp>ortionment. Proposals for statutory change met with no suc-
cess. Any statutory change designed to carry out the constitutional mandate
w^ould have meant sizeable increases in representation for Cook County at
the expense of downstate. Attention focused on changing the rules of ap-
portionment as early as 1922 when a constitutional convention included a
new method of apportionment in a proposed constitution submitted to but
rejected by the voters."* In the period 1922-1952, some twenty resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments to the legislative apportionment article
were introduced and lost in the General Assembly.^

One long-standing obstacle to a new legislative apportionment article was
the restrictive amending procedure set out in the 1870 Constitution. Con-
sequently, a reapportionment formula seemed to depend on a new formula
for amending the Constitution. In this respect, the reapportionment interest
was allied with the proponents of change in the judicial structure and in
the revenue system. The result was a unified interest of considerable strength
directed toward easing the amendment process. In 1950, the so-called
"Gateway" Amendment was ratified as the first amendment to the state's
Constitution in over 40 years. Subsequent to ratification of "Gateway,"
constitutional change became possible with less strength than had thereto-
fore been the case. In the 1951 session of the General Assembly, the first
after adoption of the Gateway Amendment, several proposed amendments
affecting legislative apportionment were introduced. All met with failure,
but it was obvious that there was renewed interest in the problem.

During the period after the adjournment of the 1951 session, and prior
to the convening of the 1953 session, several groups expressed interest in the
problem and conducted studies of possible alternative amendments. The
Governor, like nearly all of his predecessors in this century, included legis-
lative reapportionment as part of his legislative program for the 1953 ses-
sion. Several proposed reapportionment amendments were introduced dur-
ing the session, but it was not clear at the outset which, if any, had
administration sponsorship. Late in the session, the Governor's proposal,
providing for a new method of apportionment, was introduced. Representa-
tion in the House was to be based on population and in the Senate area was
to be "the prime consideration." The amendment spelled out the number
of districts of each House to be assigned to Chicago, to suburban Cook

■* Proposed Constitution of 1922, Section 23. Cook County would have had 19
of 57 Senate districts. The 153 House seats were to be apportioned on a population
basis. Also see Debates of the Constitutional Convention (Springfield, 1922). Most
observers do not attribute the defeat of the proposed constitution to this or any other
single provision.

° Illinois Legislative Council, Reapportionment in Illinois (Springfield, 1952).

[ 8 ]

County, and to downstate. No provision for periodic redrawing of Senate
districts was included, but the House was to be redistricted every ten years.
A self-enacting clause provided for reapportionment by a non-legislative
body if the legislature failed to act.

The passage of the amendment in the House and the Senate has been
described elsewhere,*^ and it is sufficient to mention that it was an unexpected
accomplishment, particularly as it markedly changed the status quo. Mem-
bers were warned of the potential danger to their seats by the House Minor-
ity Leader who characterized the amendment, on the floor of the House,
as "the same thing as an employee signing his resignation." There was
substantial opposition to the proposal in the General Assembly, and it could
not have been passed without extensive logrolling, especially after a House
Democratic conference was held wherein it was explained that it was not
a party measure. Final passage was achieved, however, by comfortable ma-
jorities in Senate and House, although it took a good deal of activity on the
part of the Governor and meant sacrificing bills to create a State Crime
Commission and to submit to local referendum a plan for reorganization
of Chicago's government. The critical Democratic votes in the House were
delivered the second time around, the party leader changing his vote from
"Present" to "Aye" after twenty-four hours of negotiation in Springfield
and Chicago.

After the legislature had completed action on the amendment, an inten-
sive campaign for ratification commenced. The Illinois Committee for Con-
stitutional Revision, a citizen group with headquarters in Chicago that had
pushed the adoption of the Gateway Amendment in 1950, was reactivated
and coordinated the campaign of civic organizations throughout the state
with special concentration, however, in Cook County." This bipartisan
group, including farm, business, and labor organizations, received sizeable
financial contributions and was able to retain a public relations firm and to
employ a staff including a field organizer who worked closely with the in-
fluential Illinois Agricultural Association in the downstate area. The com-
mittee itself, despite its vigorous activity, could not have led a successful
campaign without the assistance of the two political party organizations.
Both parties in their state platforms urged the adoption of the amendment,

" Russell E. Olson, "Illinois Faces Dedistricting," National Municipal Review,
Vol. 43 (July 1954), pp. 343ff. ; John Bartlow Martin, "What Those Legislators Do
to You," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 224 (December 19 and 26, 1953), pp. 30ff.
and 28ff. ; John E. Juergensmeyer, "Reapportionment in Illinois, 1953-1954" (Un-
published Thesis, University of Illinois Department of Political Science, 1955).

' Samuel W. Witwer, Jr., "The 1954 Campaign For the Passage of the Re-
apportionment Amendment to the Illinois Constitution" (Chicago: Illinois Com-
mittee for Constitution Revision, 1954, mimeographed). Mr. Witwer served as chair-
man of the Committee.

[ 9

and party leaders, with some exceptions, actively campaigned for its
ratification.

Throughout the campaign, there was more interest and enthusiasm for
the adoption of the amendment in Cook County than downstate. The four
Chicago newspapers earnestly endorsed the amendment, but most down-
state papers contained their enthusiasm, and some actually opposed the pro-
posal. There was considerable opposition among politicians, but those fight-
ing the amendment never achieved party organization support. Downstate
opposition was led by the Minority (Democratic) Leader of the House of
Representatives who, by so acting, admittedly opposed party policy. Al-
though he traveled extensively to speak against the proposal, the opposition
of most party workers of both parties generally took the form of "sitting out"
the campaign. The Republican Speaker of the House, for example, persist-
ently refused to lend the amendment his endorsement, but at no time did
he indicate outright opposition.

Party discipline was unevenly meted out subsequent to the ratification
of the amendment. The House Minority Leader was not re-elected to that
position, the necessary votes coming from a reluctant but obedient Cook
County Democratic legislative delegation voting as a unit in caucus. The
rationale of the Cook County leadership was that party prestige would suffer
materially if blatant opposition to state party policy was to be ignored and
the rebel returned to a position of influence. The personal popularity of
the retiring leader was such as to make his ouster an impressive demonstra-
tion of the ability of the Chicago Democratic organization to control its
delegation to the General Assembly. On the Republican side, the campaign
made no impression on leadership selection in 1955. Not only was the
Speaker re-elected to that post, but the 1953 Republican Whip, who had
openly opposed the amendment, was promoted in 1955 to the floor leader-
ship. At least part of the reason for the differences in party action lies in
the geographic distribution of party strength. The Democrats are strong
in Chicago, and they are organized cohesively there under the leadership
of the Cook County Central Committee. The Republican strength is down-
state, but there is no comparable tight party organization in that relatively
large area.

LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR REDISTRICTING

The impetus for action on redistricting legislation in 1955 came not
from any external group, public or private, but rather from the activity of
the members of the 1953 session as sustained by the voters in the 1954
referendum. Redistricting was immediately distinguished from other legis-
lation— including "must" legislation, so called — by the absence of a
multitude of groups with packaged proposals and solutions. It was further

[10]

set apart from other legislation by the fact that there was no body of
experience on which to fall back. The Senate Minority Leader summed up
the situation by observing that "Not only do we in the legislature not know
how to go about effecting a redistricting, but nobody active in Illinois poli-
tics today has had experience with an Illinois legislative redistricting."

During the inter-session period, there had been only sporadic efforts, in
or out of the legislature, to undertake even tentative steps toward redistrict-
ing. Although some Chicago leaders had requested research aides to "survey
the reapportionment field," the request was interpreted only to mean famil-
iarization with the necessary documentary material. Neither party officials
nor leaders of other groups diverted their attention from the proposed
amendment to the consideration of particular consequences of the amend-
ment. The concentration of proponents and opponents alike was on the
constitutional referendum; and although it was frequently alleged that "un-
desirables" would be eliminated, only once prior to the 1955 session was the
possible effect of redistricting on any individual legislator publicly high-
lighted. When the amendment was ratified in November 1954, the begin-
ning of the new session was almost at hand.

Legislative leaders themselves had no plan, but some of them at least
were alert to the possible importance of procedure on the final outcome. The
principal spokesman for the Chicago Democratic organization came to the
opening of the session with a resolution reminding everyone that the re-
apportionment amendment had been passed by a bipartisan vote in 1953
and that ratification "was urged on the electors by the platforms adopted
at the 1954 State Conventions of both the Republican and the Democratic
Parties."^ The resolution proposed the creation of a joint committee, half
the members of which would be from each party, "to prepare and recom-
mend to the Senate and to the House of Representatives a bill for an Act
to reapportion and redistrict the State." Formal introduction of the resolu-
tion was deliberately delayed while it circulated among legislative leaders.

Beginning with the informal discussions on this resolution, it became
apparent that redistricting its own members was to be a prerogative of each
house. Negotiations on the resolution were held just before the opening of
the session, and initial agreement, incorporated in the body of the resolu-
tion, was reached on the inclusion of permission for "members of the joint
Committee representing the Senate ... to meet separately to consider
proposals affecting the Senate; and members of the joint Committee repre-
senting the House ... to meet separately to consider proposals affecting
the House." The resolution itself was lost, but no activity occurred in the
course of the session that could be construed as an effort to overturn this

^ Senate Joint Resolution 4, Sixty-ninth Illinois General Assembly, offered Jan-
uary 10, 1955.

early decision to bifurcate the problem. For all practical purposes, two
separate measures were developed, and each chamber was to be asked to
ratify the work of the other.

The implications of this arrangement are important. One advantage of
a bicameral legislature is that it increases the channels of access to the legis-
lature. Public policy, without exception in Illinois, can originate in either
house. Any group seeking the enactment of legislation can decide whether
to press its case initially in the House or in the Senate. The agreement to
make each chamber master of its own districts meant that any external
group with an interest in the redistricting was virtually compelled to make
a frontal attack. Any redistricting proposal had to be offered to the house
involved. The benefit of the legislative beachhead that might otherwise
have been secured by first bringing the proposal through the second cham-
ber was not to be available. In short, this early decision to work as inde-
pendent entities rather than as a single team with a twofold problem had
the immediate effect of reducing the possible influence of external groups
on the terms of the redistricting legislation. This method of operation was
extended and carried to its logical conclusion in the subsequent appointment
of subcommittees in each house. Before considering subcommittee organ-
ization, however, it is appropriate further to consider the first decisions
on procedure that were taken early in the session.

With the inclusion of the authorization for each chamber's members to
meet separately, the Democratic resolution for a joint committee had three
major elements:

1. Separation of House and Senate into distinct units, and the implicit
abdication of each from the work of the other. On this, there was bipartisan
and bicameral agreement.

2. Equal number of members from the Senate and from the House on any
committee concerned with reapportionment. On this, there was no disposition
to be firm, and when the House Speaker indicated that six House members
would not be an adequate number, no opposition was apparent. Committee
size, per se, could not be an issue unless there was to be a joint committee on
which each member had a full vote. Once it was agreed that even if a formal
joint committee was created, the House and the Senate would work independ-
ently, the number of committee members from each chamber was of no
importance.

3. Equal strength for the Democrats on any reapportionment committee
despite the Republican majorities in House and Senate. On this, the Republi-
can leadership was at first in doubt. The close (78-74) party division in the
House made the proposals seem more reasonable in that chamber than in the
Senate where the Republicans held their usual overwhelming majority (32-19).
On the other hand, the Democrats seized the advantage by alleging the failure
to give them equal strength would be to admit that the redistricting would be
used for partisan advantage, a characterization that the majority was seeking

[12]

to avoid. Ultimately, Senate Republicans fell back on the "regular order" as
their line of defense and insisted on using the standing Committee on Ap-
portionment and Elections as the agency for initial construction of Senate re-
districting. This gave the Republicans a 10-6 advantage, the potency of which
was to be vitiated by the subcommittee arrangements established at an initial
meeting of the Apportionment and Elections Committee.

When it became apparent that a single formula would not satisfy both
chambers, the joint committee idea was abandoned. However, a hearing
was subsequently demanded on the resolution in order to permit a Demo-
cratic record of "non-partisan efforts toward reapportionment" to be estab-
lished. At the early legislative stage, it was by no means certain that the
General Assembly would agree on a redistricting bill, and if it became
necessary to appoint a redistricting commission, Democratic strategy re-
quired that no charge of non-cooperation lie against the party.

By the beginning of the second week of the session, it became plain that
agreement would not be reached in support of the joint committee proposal.
Its sponsor thereupon formally introduced his resolution, for the record,
having delayed introduction while there was some hope of agreement which
would have been reflected in bipartisan sponsorship. On that same day,
the House adopted a resolution, offered with bipartisan sponsorship, creat-
ing a special committee of the House to consider only the House apportion-
ment.^ The twelve-member committee, to which were appointed both pro-
ponents and opponents of the reapportionment amendment, was composed
of six members of each party and was to report back to the House by
March 15 — a date less than halfway through the customary six month
legislative session. The desirability of quick action on reapportionment legis-
lation was encouraged by the House Speaker who had said publicly that he
thought nothing significant could be accomplished by the General Assembly
until the reapportionment had been completed. Quick consideration and a
March 15 report were not achieved, however, and although House districts
were pretty well settled by early May, it was late May before there was
sufficient agreement in both chambers so that legislation could be intro-
duced. The Governor did not sign the reapportionment bill until June 29,
two days before the deadline provided in the 1953 constitutional amend-
ment.

The Senate majority leadership rejected the hypothesis that an equi-
partisan group would have to work on reapportionment to guarantee its
success. The reapportionment work was assigned to its standing Committee

° House Resolution 18, Sixty-ninth Illinois General Assembly, offered January
10, 1955.

[13]

on Apportionment and Elections without any extraordinan* action on the
part of the Senate. ^°

Balkanization was implicitly adopted as a technique for getting redis-
tricting lines drawn when the House special committee and Senate standing
committee split themselves into subcommittees. The House committee was
divided into three subcommittees — one to consider Chicago, one for the
Cook County suburbs, and the third for the downstate area. These three
subcommittee assignments coincided with the separate area divisions as set
out in the constitutional amendment. The subcommittees were composed of
four, two, and six members respectively, and each subcommittee had equal
party membership. All the members of each of the subcommittees were
representatives of the area of concern of their subcommittee. The special
problem of Chicago resulted in a further breakdown of that subcommittee
into three groups to cover north, west, and south sides. A House member
who was not a member of the Reapportionment Committee was drafted to
work on the complex problems of Chicago's South Side.

The subcommittee question posed certain difficulties for the Senate
Elections Committee despite the voluntary- withdrawal of one downstate Re-
publican. If subcommittees were created to follow the area divisions estab-
lished in the Constitution and if each subcommittee was composed of mem-
bers residing in the area involved, the Democrats would have a four to one
majority in the Chicago subcommittee, there would be only Republicans
on the Cook County suburbs subcommittee, and the downstate subcommit-
tee would be oversized with eight Republicans and two Democrats. The
alternatives were (1) to ignore residence as a factor in constituting sub-
committees, and to create three five-men subcommittees, each composed of
three Republicans and two Democrats, a solution which would be consist-
ent with the original use of the standing committee, or (2) to drop the
constitutional area divisions as the basis for subcommittee responsibility and
to draw new area divisions which would permit the appointment of sub-
committee personnel who resided in the area assigned to them.

The final decision was to combine these possibilities. Chicago, Cook
County outside of Chicago, and downstate were abandoned as potential
subjects of individual subcommittee study; and in lieu thereof all of Cook
County was assigned to one subcommittee, all of the northern portion of the
stale to a second subcommittee, and all of the southern half of the state
to a third subcommittee. Each subcommittee was composed of three Repub-
lican Senators and two Democratic Senators. Subcommittee No. 1, with
responsibility for all of Cook County — which meant drawing 18 districts

" The assignment to the committee of the job of constructing a bill was unusual.
Standing committees in the Illinois General Assembly normally require a bill to be
before them for consideration. See Gove and Steiner, op. cit., p. 23.

[14]

in Chicago and 6 in the suburbs outside Chicago — was composed of two
Chicago Democrats, one Republican whose district lay entirely in the sub-
urbs, one Republican whose district lay almost completely in the suburbs,
and one "non-resident" Republican from adjacent Lake County. The
northern Illinois group included three Republicans from northern Illinois,
and two Chicago Democrats. The southern Illinois subcommittee was com-
posed of three Republicans and two Democrats, and unlike the other sub-
committees, all members represented districts within the subcommittee's
area of concern. For this reason, the southern group was the only one of
the three to function as a unit.

Instantly upon adjournment of the meeting at which subcommittee ar-
rangements and appointments were concluded, the Cook County subcom-
mittee agreed informally that the two Chicago Democratic members would
assume exclusive responsibility for the Chicago redistricting and that the
two Cook County suburban Republican members would assume exclusive
responsibility for the suburban districting. The majority members of the
northern Illinois subcommittee proposed a unified effort, but the Chicago
Democrats appointed to that subcommittee declined to participate, not out
of a spirit of non-cooperation, but rather out of a lack of interest. "They
asked me to come to a meeting," said one Democratic subcommittee mem-
ber who has been a leader in Chicago Democratic politics for twenty-five
years, "but I told them that there hasn't been a Democratic district in that
area for forty years, so why should I waste my time."

REDISTRICTING BY COMMITTEE

The special House committee of twelve represented only eight per cent
of the House membership, and thus was legitimately concerned about in-
volving enough members to insure a hard core of support for its ultimate
recommendations. Accordingly, the House Reapportionment Committee, by
letter, invited each House member to participate in the construction of his
or her own district by delivering boundary suggestions to the appropriate
subcommittee chairman. Whether this formality encouraged otherwise reti-
cent members to make suggestions is problematical. It did serve to publicize
the subcommittee arrangements and to emphasize the division of responsi-
bility by area.

The Senate committee operated less formally. Almost one-third of the
total membership of the Senate served on the Elections Committee and thus
had formal access to the redistricting activity. The committee sent out no
notices, but repeatedly urged each member of the Senate to discuss pro-
posed maps from the point of view of his district. These announcements
were made in committee meetings, in caucus, and on the floor of the Senate.
Illustrative of the responses is the verbal instruction given by a Chicago

[15]

Senator to a colleague who was en route to the first meeting of the Chicago
subcommittee {i.e., the informal Chicago subcommittee of the formal Cook
County subcommittee), "Do anything within reason, but don't take my
district across the (Chicago) River."

From the beginning, all the legislative committees involved in redistrict-
ing placed primary consideration on people, notably sitting Senators and
Representatives, rather than on abstractions like area, population, contiguity,
or ethnic characteristics. Influential members all agreed that there was no
point in chopping out districts that satisfied the constitutional requirement,
but did not satisfy the members, if it was possible to satisfy both the mem-
bers and the Constitution. There were innumerable combinations that would
satisfy the Constitution, and the more practical approach was to try to
satisfy the members first. The committees were unwilling to make a public
announcement of their interest in preserving the seats of incumbent legisla-
tors, and the House group promptly found itself at odds with some non-
legislative organizations which claimed an interest in reapportionment.

The clash became inevitable when the Illinois Committee for Constitu-
tional Revision publicized, at the very beginning of the legislative session,
a set of "principles of reapportionment" and set aside money to support an
observer to keep the public informed of legislative adherence to these
principles :

1. For the Senate, emphasis should be on area, but natural communities
as well as population should be considered in addition to area.

2. For the House, districts should follow natural community lines rather
than political boundaries, such as wards.

3. In multi-county districts, grouping of counties to encourage domination
by one county should be avoided.

4. A fair method should be devised to decide which Senators would be
assigned even numbered districts (and thus face re-election in 1956), and
which would be assigned odd numbered districts (where the term would run
until 1958).

When the Committee for Constitutional Revision observer appeared at
a House committee meeting, the committee voted unanimously to exclude
him and all others and to go into executive sessions. The committee chair-
man, an original sponsor of the reapportionment amendment, defended
executive sessions with the assertion that they would spare the legislators
"embarrassment" • — almost a public admission of the practical need to con-
sider people first and abstractions second. He said:

That committee [the I.C.C.R.] had nothing to do with drafting the amend-
ment. We're the engineering department. They were only the sales department,
and neither they nor newspaper reporters have a right to hear our family
arguments."

" Chicago Sun-Times, February 6, 1955.

[16]

The tone of the House approach was set by the de facto leader of the
Democratic minority who said on the floor, "I don't think it's up to the
committee on constitutional revision or any newspaper to redistrict the state.
It's up to the legislature, according to the mandate of the people."^- Further
support came from the Chicago Republican who was working on the re-
districting of Chicago's South Side: "[The Committee on Constitutional
Revision is] getting too big for their britches if they think they have a
monopoly on understanding reapportionment."^^

Perhaps the most illuminating, and surely the most accurate evaluation

of the legislative interest came from a House member who was subsequently

to be the architect of the only change in a Senate district achieved over the

initial objection of the Senate subcommittee concerned:

Outsiders shouldn't stick their noses in and tell this committee ho\v to
reapportion the state . . . Any man in this legislature who doesn't fight for
his own district is a particular damn fool. I'm not for too many sitting mem-
bers running against each other if we can work it out."

The furor subsided, and working meetings were thereafter held in secret.

The Senate committee avoided similar problems by confining the bus-
iness of plenary committee meetings almost exclusively to submission and
acceptance of subcommittee reports. The subcommittees worked behind
closed doors from the first. Active disputes were aired not in the committee
room but most frequently in party caucus. Indeed, final acceptance of Chi-
cago Senate districts was secured, for all practical purposes, not in the com-
mittee and not on the floor, but in the Democratic caucus. Here the roll
was finally called on two freshmen Democratic Senators who could not be
accommodated, and here a Negro Senator was accommodated when inade-
quate Negro representation became a major source of trouble.

At no point prior to the publication of tentative maps by Senate and
House committees was there any serious effort by a non-legislative group to
propose a complete scheme of redistricting. This fact was subsequently high-
lighted by some legislators who considered it an acknowledgment by non-
legislative groups of their interest as peripheral and of the legislative interest
as primary. As promptly as one week after the House committee's executive
session fuss, a letter was read to the House from the chairman of the Con-
stitutional Revision Committee denying any intent to do more than
"inform" :

It is our hope that the members of the General Assembly will clearly

recognize our purposes and will not view the information activities, which we

will definitely continue to pursue, as constituting an interference with the

General Assembly or a criticism of its efforts.^""

" Chicago Tribune, February 2, 1955.
" Ibid.

" Chicago Sun-Times, February 6, 1955.
"Chicago Tribune, Febraury 9, 1955.

[17]

The following week, the House committee threw open its doors and
invited organizations and individuals favoring reapportionment to tell their
views on how districts should be established. The meeting was poorly at-
tended and lasted about twenty minutes. Representatives of the Illinois
Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Citizens of Greater Chicago, and the
Independent Voters of Illinois appeared formally. Each was asked by the
Majority Whip and others if his organization had a specific map for dis-
cussion; each said they had none but were interested in following develop-
ments. A representative of the Illinois Association of Supervisors and County
Commissioners, who did not appear at the open meeting, arranged to have
some pencil sketches presented for committee consideration. Spokesmen for
the League of Women Voters and the Women's Church Council of Illinois,
although present, made no official record of their attendance. Neither group
had a map to offer for consideration.

Although the Senate Elections Committee did not especially publicize
any early meetings as a "hearing," there was never any indication that
group spokesmen would be either unwelcome or muzzled at the full com-
mittee sessions. Only once — and then in the matter of a single district —
before the committee met to consider the redistricting bill as actually intro-
duced in the Senate did a non-legislative group make any substantive pres-
entation. Several such groups affirmed explicitly that they considered actual
delineation of districts to be a legislative function. At the hearing on the
bill as introduced, only the representative of the Independent Voters of
Illinois offered a map; and he explained, when questioned, that his group
had not offered the map sooner because it was w-aiting to see what the legis-
lature would suggest. At a Chicago meeting of the Illinois Committee for
Constitutional Revision held midway through the session, its chairman
emphasized to the representatives of the 60 organizations present that the
committee had drawn no maps.

The fact that virtually no non-legislative group offered a proposed map
seems attributable to two things. First, many of these groups came to a
conscious decision that their interest in redistricting simply did not merit
the expenditure of time, talent, and money involved in preparing a specific
plan. Second, there was a tendency to believe that anybody with a map was
espousing a particular interest, and these groups all denied any such intent.
Of course, they later did espouse the interest of one Chicago group over that
of another by urging a change in a Chicago district as proposed by the
House Chicago subcommittee.

One partial redistricting plan was publicized early in the session before
any tentative proposals were oflFered by the legislative committees. This
plan, offered by the Better Government Association, a private, relatively
quiescent civic group in Chicago, covered only Chicago and suburban Cook

[18]

County districts. Although the newspapers reproduced the Association maps,
the proposals never made any impact in Springfield. Indeed, if they had not
been offered before the legislators themselves started making redistricting
news, it appears doubtful that they would have achieved any measure of
publicity.

One Better Government Association map proposed twenty-three House
districts in Chicago with a maximum population variation of 5,500 and
eighteen Senate districts in Chicago with a maximum population variation
of 4,220. In other words, as far as the constitutional mandate regarding
population and area was concerned, the Better Government Association
Senate map was a better House map than the House map itself.^^ In addi-
tion, one proposed suburban House district was discontinuous, and therefore
in violation of the constitutional stipulation that districts be compact and
contiguous. The constitutional requirement that area be a prime considera-
tion in the Senate districts was apparently ignored in the Better Government
version on the unlikely theory that this need not apply to a densely popu-
lated area. In turn, the proposals were eliminated from serious legislative
consideration. A Chicago House member was to inform his colleagues later
in the session that the Better Government Association map was meant only
to be a "starting point."

Downstate maps for both Senate and House were released by the legis-
lative committees concerned on a "trial balloon" basis early in April. No
special stir was created either among members or around the state by their
publication, and the subcommittees involved assumed that no major over-
hauls would be necessary. In order to reduce the total downstate House
representation from 96 to 87, as many as six incumbents were thrown to-
gether in one district, and several new districts had five incumbents. A
minor but protracted dispute did grow out of controversy regarding the
location of a single county which was detached from its existing district
and added to a neighboring House district. An incumbent Representative
from the county in question took a dim view of his future under these con-
ditions and devoted considerable effort to attempts to improve his situation
either by a change in the House districting or by the construction of a Sen-
ate district from which he might make a race for that body. Downstate Sen-
ate districts, increased in number from 32 to 34, had no two sitting Senators
in the same district under the subcommittees' plans. Cook County suburban
districts, increased to provide for six Senators rather than two, and for
twenty-one Representatives rather than five, were easily agreed upon, the

^^ The Better Government Association proposals are discussed in some detail in
David R. Gray, 'The Making of the Illinois Reapportionment Act, 1955" (Unpub-
lished Thesis, University of Illinois, Department of Political Science, 1955).

19]

Democrats having been satisfied that what little strength they hold in the
suburbs was not gerrymandered.

Chicago districts presented a more complex problem. It should be under-
stood that the date established by state statute for holding the Chicago
mayoralty election habitually delays the effective beginning of every second
regular legislative session until after the first week in April. In 1955, the
mayoralty election was particularly hard fought. Legislators serving on both
House and Senate Chicago redistricting subcommittees gave first priority to
precinct, ward, and city political activity related to the election and could
not devote adequate time to the redistricting question.

Beyond the limitations of time and attention, however, the character
of the particular election itself affected the redistricting. It was of con-
siderable importance to each candidate that local precinct and ward organ-
izations function with maximum efficiency and enthusiasm. Proposals for
redistricting would inevitably dissatisfy some members, and a dissatisfied
member would surely appeal to the candidate to exert influence for change.
Because a first principle of the reapportionment committees was to avoid
disturbing sitting members whenever possible, disaffected members could
not have been satisfied without provoking disaffection elsewhere. Disaffec-
tion could show on Election Day. The safest course was to avoid the publi-
cizing of maps until after the election. This was especially important for
the Democratic candidate because as chairman of the Cook County Demo-
cratic Committee, he held a position of considerable influence in the party
organization. The Republican candidate, a recent apostate from the Demo-
cratic party, had no standing with the Republican hierarchy and, if neces-
sary, could have pleaded that his influence was inadequate to cover any
part of the reapportionment situation. With the Democrats in total control
of the Chicago Senate subcommittee and with equal representation on the
Chicago House subcommittee, no problem was involved in postponing the
Chicago work until after April 5. The Mayor-elect could then make any
decisions he was called upon to make without the possibility of discontent
being reflected in stay-at-home votes that might otherwise have been brought
to the polls.

Redistricting proposals for Chicago House districts were released a week
after the election and became the object of intense non-legislative opposi-
tion. The districts in dispute would have divided Chicago's West Side into
three long, narrow "bowling alley" shaped areas and cut the presumably
homogeneous Austin area so that it would have had no certain representa-
tion. The "bowling alley" districts would obviously have been of maximum
advantage to incumbent legislators of the so-called West Side bloc, a biparti-
san group from distinctly over-represented districts whose elimination had
been virtually promised by reapportionment supporters. There seems to be

[20]

no doubt that this map was offered as a "trial balloon," or as one member
of the committee put it, "something which could be tested for reaction
among press, civic groups, and legislators." This plan would have preserved
the seats of a maximum number of incumbents, however, and it is therefore
not surprising that first criticisms came from outside the General Assembly.
Indeed, one legislator who was later to be a leader in revising the map, was
quoted at first as saying that Austin area voters would have a chance to
elect some legislators from the West Side districts. ^^ Both the Governor and
the Mayor of Chicago expressed emphatic disapproval, however.

The ultimate revision of the proposed West Side House districts is the
only illustration of the triumph of non-legislative groups without a deter-
mined legislative spokesman over an expressed legislative preference. The
success of the Illinois Committee for Constitutional Revision and of the
Chicago newspapers in effecting a change cannot be understood, however,
without understanding, first, the long history of the West Side group in
jumping party lines, and second, the need for the new Chicago administra-
tion (inaugurated April 20) to secure a favorable press and civic opinion
in contrast to the unfavorable publicity it had received throughout the cam-
paign. The new mayor was determined to seek extensive permissive taxing
powers for Chicago. Downstate legislative votes for such a program could
only be secured by appropriate logrolling coupled with an opportunity for
downstaters to explain themselves at home by citing some evidence of Chi-
cago "reform."

In short, the "bowling alley" districts were unveiled at a time when the
Chicago political leadership needed both dependability and "respectability."
The Mayor denounced the West Side arrangement — and, incidentally, was
rewarded with his first good press of the year — thereby leaving Chicago
Republicans stranded. The latter organization had been at war with the
West Side group for months. Chicago Republican members of the redistrict-
ing committee hastily came to the support of Austin as deserving representa-
tion of its own. A special meeting of the Chicago subcommittee was held the
last week in April. Two competing plans for revision of the West Side dis-
tricts were offered, one by the House Majority Whip, one by the (Republi-
can) member usually identified as the leader of the West Side bloc. The
latter plan was adopted, both Democratic members of the subcommittee
voting with the West Side man.^^ The revised plan was offered to the House
by its Democratic leader who was himself both a resident of one of the
districts in dispute and a member of the Chicago subcommittee, although
not a member of the West Side bloc.

"Chicago Tribune, April 14, 1955.

" "Minutes of the Chicago Subcommittee Meeting on Reapportionment Pursuant
to House Resolution 18," April 27, 1955, (typewritten).

[21]

The change from the districts as originally proposed has been properly
described as resulting from a "pincers" movement. The West Side legisla-
tive group, lacking a dependable tie to either party because of its historic
willingness to jump party lines, was abandoned despite the fact that its
members were not personally unpopular in the legislature. The current needs
of the Democratic organization in Chicago and the defensive tactics of the
state Republican organization pressed in from opposite sides and changed
the "bowling alleys" into more nearly square units. The Chicago subcom-
mittee itself incorporated the adjustment in its proposal. Despite the dispute,
a bill had not yet been formally drafted.

The fixing of Chicago Senate districts was also preceded by extended
controversy, a controversy in which the Governor of Illinois played much
the same kind of determining role as did the Mayor of Chicago in the
House districting dispute. While the House dispute was still active, the Sen-
ate Chicago subcommittee released its proposal for redistricting the city.
The proposal was plainly drawn to suit the needs and demands of the
seventeen sitting Chicago Democrats. Whereas the Constitution had directed
that area was to be of "prime consideration," the subcommittee offered dis-
tricts ranging from less than six square miles to twenty-three square miles.
It is perhaps significant that the map was made public during a week when
the Democratic leader of the Senate was not in Springfield. As a conse-
quence there was no official party comment on the map, a fact that made it
easier to make subsequent adjustments.

These Chicago "trial balloon" districts represented sitting members' con-
ceptions of a convenient reapportionment. Their conceptions conflicted
sharply with the views of the "outs," and an immediate protest from the
Republican organization greeted the publication of the Chicago map. Among
the vociferous opponents were former Republican Senators whose chances
for a comeback would have been seriously damaged by the proposals ad-
vanced by the Democrats. Although no overt opposition was forthcoming
from members themselves, adoption of the Democratic drafted proposal
posed a threat to the Republican state organization, and Republican leader-
ship reacted accordingly. The Republican Governor promptly denounced
the plan and hinted a veto of a reapportionment bill that retained the fea-
tures of the disputed maps, noting that "It would be futile to sign some-
thing the courts would throw out."^^ He was apparently supported by Chi-
cago's new Democratic Mayor who announced himself in favor of "compact
districts to give equal representation to all areas," a statement generally re-
garded as critical of the Chicago maps originally offered in both houses.

Although the Mayor and the Governor took exception to initial Chicago

"Chicago Tribune, April 20, 1955.

[22]

reapportionment plans in both houses, the Mayor, a Democrat, concentrated
his attack on the West Side gerrymander, where the seats at stake were held
principally by Republicans, while the Governor, a Republican, emphasized
the disparity in size in the projected Senate districts where the seats were
held by Democrats. ^° One Chicago newspaper, noting this editorially, re-
gretted that each had not expanded his objection to cover both situations
but concluded that although they were working "from different political
directions," the two officials could still carry out the intent of the amend-
ment "even if their politics impose certain restraints on their tongues. "^^

The formal Republican answer to the Chicago Senate plan was devel-
oped by two former Republican Senators from Chicago who had been de-
feated in the 1954 election. Their map threw two or more sitting Demo-
cratic Senators into the same district in six cases. Two other sitting
Democrats would face certain defeat in the heavy Republican areas assigned
them. The Democratic stalwart who had been insistent with fellow Demo-
crats that his district not cross the Chicago River would have crossed the
river under the Republican proposal. Senate Republicans, in caucus, adopted
the plan which was promptly characterized as an "atrocity" by the Demo-
cratic leader.

The participation of former members of the Senate on the Republican
side was virtually a matter of necessity. No Republican represented a Chi-
cago district in the Senate in 1955. Consequently, that party's leaders had
no easy access in the Senate either to expert opinion on Democratic pro-
posals or to the development of counter-proposals. Ultimately, not only
were the ex-Senators used, but a Cook County Republican Central Com-
mittee leader came down from Chicago to lend a knowing hand.

When the legislature assembled next after the publication of the Re-
publican map, the Senate Democratic leader immediately threw that cham-
ber into the Illinois version of a filibuster — a demand for strict compli-
ance with the rule requiring the reading of the Journal of the previous legis-
lative day and with the constitutional requirement that bills be read in full.
The extraordinary feature of the "filibuster" was that no bill was before
the Senate or even before the House. It was a filibuster against the terms
of a bill that had not yet been introduced in either chamber, and, in fact,
had not yet been drafted in bill form. Nevertheless, the maneuver was suc-
cessful in making the point that the redistricting would have to conform
to an agreed pattern, that the 31 Republican Senators from outside Chi-
cago would not be permitted to impose a map on the 17 Democratic Sen-
ators from Chicago. Negotiations commenced involving the Senate leaders

Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1955.
Chicago Sun-Times, April 21, 1955.

[23]

of each party and members of the original Cook County subcommittee of
the Elections Committee, thereby ending the arrangement wherein Chicago
had been the exclusive concern of the Chicago (Democratic) members of
the subcommittee.

An initial understanding was reached giving the Republicans four dis-
tricts heavily weighted with Republican voters, establishing three "doubtful"
districts, and retaining eleven "safe" Democratic districts. The major
problem to which the conferees devoted themsleves was how to draw the
lines to achieve this result with minimum damage to Senate colleagues. The
Majority Leader suggested early in the discussions that both parties had
been "selfish" in the first exchange of maps. "The whole trouble was that
they were trying to take care of certain parties on both sides. Now we are
trying to be fair on both sides." The Minority Leader observed a coopera-
tive spirit: "Both Republican and Democratic Senators have evidenced a
spirit of reasonableness to attain a solution."-- Nevertheless, the filibuster
continued — with varying degrees of intensity — throughout the negotiations.

It became evident as these negotiations continued that the major impedi-
ment to a solution was the unwillingness of some of the sitting Democrats
to accept the inevitable and agree to districts that were preponderantly Re-
publican. Ultimately, the Democratic leadership called the roll in caucus
and secured approval for a compromise map over the continued objection
of two freshmen Senators whose new districts would probably elect Republi-
cans at the earliest opportunity. In only two instances, however, was it neces-
sary to place sitting members in the same new district. One of these was by
agreement, and the other was without objection from the members
involved.-^

Republican Senators' opposition to the Democratic proposals consist-
ently was based on the argument that the Democratic plans would not sat-
isfy the constitutional mandate that area be the prime consideration. The
area ratio for Chicago's 18 new Senatorial districts would be 11.9 square
miles. The majority tended to insist that districts below nine square miles
would be impossible to defend and that the consequences of a declaration
of unconstitutionality could not be chanced in order to accommodate a few

"St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1955.

"' Three members were placed in the downtown Loop district. One, for whom
the other two initially announced they would step aside, is senior in years and has
from time to time suffered from illnesses which have kept him away from Springfield.
A second is a young party regular, and the third, a veteran, has expressed interest
in a congressional seat now occupied by an eighty-one year old Democrat. In fact,
it was the third man who was subsequently renominated.

Two freshmen Democrats were thrown together in a district on the Northwest
Side of Chicago. Both were sponsored by very influential members of the Chicago
Democratic organization. Another job could be found for either man without creating
any party problem.

[24]

of the sitting Democrats. Those few Democrats, however, persisted in their
unwilHngness to give in. At one point, one of them defended a district he
would have accepted by arguing that a park district survey showed its total
area to be 7.556 miles rather than the 7.35 miles found by legislative re-
searchers.^"* When the Republicans and the minority Democrats both stood
pat, the Democratic leader pushed each side to its outer limit, appraised the
situation realistically, gave his approval to the Republican outer limit, and
then compelled acceptance of the plan by the Democrats. Plainly the al-
ternatives were a Republican modification of the Democrats' proposals or
no bill at all. The latter result would have created considerable unfavorable
public opinion for the Chicago Democratic organization and the likely loss
of the ambitious program the city was presenting for new revenue.

The Illinois Committee for Constitutional Revision condemned the Chi-
cago Senate map as "gerrymandering and political expediency, [which] fails
to carry out the provision and intent of the Blue Ballot amendment." The
Committee discovered that the map was drawn to "do the least violence to
the incumbent senators."-^ Similar dissatisfaction was expressed by the
Chicago press:

But the Senate map for Chicago, which once set up cannot be changed,
has been drawn with an eye to poHtical advantages for incumbent senators
rather than with consideration for equity and fairness to the voters.^"

The so-called compromise on reapportionment of Chicago Senatorial dis-
tricts is an attempt by the Democrats to obtain two more seats than they are
entitled to under the constitution. . . .

The maneuvering of the Democrats is understandable. The disposition of
the Republican leaders in the legislature to deal with them passes understand-
ing. What they are compromising is not a couple of Senate seats, but the con-
stitutionality of the whole remap plan. This is suicidal."

If the proposed redistricting is adopted, the area of the city with the low-
est educational standards, the area that suffers most from blight and is losing
population to the outskirts, the area of gang politics and syndicate gambling
influence, will be given a disproportionate voice in the affairs of the state for
as far in the future as anyone can see."*

The informal limits on reapportionment were stretched to the extremes,
however, and the formal limits were sufficiently imprecise that civic group
and press complaints that these formal limits were being violated was wasted
effort. Several members still indicated dissatisfaction with the areas assigned
to them by the various subcommittees and committees involved, but the
resolution of the Chicago situation encouraged legislative leaders to believe

"Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1955.
''Chicago Sun-Times, May 20, 1955.
'Ubid., June 6, 1955.
"' Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1955.
''Ibid., May 21, 1955.

[25]

that the redistricting could be forced through as agreed upon in committee.
Consequently, after three months of activity, instructions were issued to pre-
pare a bill for introduction. The problem now became one of determining
whether a majority of members would hold firm long enough to proceed
with enactment of a bill. As it developed, there were rumblings in each
house.

INTRODUCTION AND PASSAGE OF THE BILL

Republican and Democratic leaders agreed that the redistricting legisla-
tion should not be permitted to shuffle through the legislature subject to all
the parliamentary maneuvering that can entrap an ordinary bill. When
agreement on substance was reached, it was deemed important to cut the
formalities to the bone. Accordingly, the way was cleared in a manner
probably unprecedented in Illinois legislative history. While the General
Assembly was in week-end recess, a number was assigned to a bill which
had not yet been introduced and the "bill" was printed. The redistricting
bill was formally introduced on May 24, and House members found printed
copies of the bill on their desks that same morning. Word circulated on the
floor that all amendments would be disposed of on second reading the fol-
lowing day and that House passage was scheduled for the third day. It was
also an open secret that leaders were going to try to beat all amendments
lest the adoption of one change set off a chain reaction that would reopen
too many problem situations. According to one member of the House special
committee :

Our plan is to vote down all amendments. If we open it up for one, every-
body else will want the same consideration. We just can't please everybody.^^

The timetable established by the House leadership prevailed, although
the absence of unanimity became evident at once when objection was made
to advancing the bill to second reading without reference to committee. The
five objectors were overruled by 121 of their colleagues who were in accord
on the desirability of getting to the showdown, although not necessarily in
accord on the particulars of the measure. General debate in Committee of
the Whole, a substitute for reference to a standing committee, consumed
only three and one-half hours. No non-legislators were heard. Members of
the special committee assured the House that every effort had been made
to help sitting members. A few questions were asked, but only a handful of
disaffected members — notably the Negro group — made plain their dis-
satisfaction.

Sixteen amendments were offered to the bill on second reading. Six of
the proposed changes had so little support that their sponsors were content
to let them be lost by voice votes. Of the remaining ten amendments, nine

'"Chicago Daily News, May 24, 1955.

[26]

were defeated, the strength of the proponents varying from 26 to 58 votes,
that of the opponents varying from 91 to 68 votes.

A clear illustration of legislative logrolling is seen in even a superficial
analysis of the votes cast in support of the proposed amendments. The least
strength that was developed for any amendment was 26 votes. These 26 mem-
bers, voting in roll calls on nine proposals to overturn the recommendations
of the special committee, had a total of 234 votes to cast for or against
adoption of the committee plan. In fact, only seven votes of the 234 were
cast in favor of upholding the committee recommendations. In 202 cases
out of the 234 opportunities, this group voted to overrule the committee,
while members did not respond to their names in 25 instances. The cohesion
was substantially unchanged irrespective of the subject of the amendment
and irrespective of the party affiliation of the sponsor. Twenty-one of the 26
dissidents were downstaters. Five came from Chicago districts. Fifteen were
Democrats; eleven. Republicans. The 26 members involved were not com-
mitted to oppose all reapportionment, but they felt themselves adversely
affected by this reapportionment and took a sympathetic interest in each
other's complaints.

Despite the determination of House leaders to oppose any change in the
committee bill, one amendment — involving a Senate district — was adopted
on the House floor. Its sponsor was the House member who had battled for
months in an effort to achieve a change in both House and Senate com-
mittee proposals for his county. After the House stood firmly behind its own
committee's recommendation, rejecting a proposed amendment to the
House districting by 80 to 39, it became receptive to the renewed attempt
to make some alteration in the projected Senate district. The House vote to
adopt the amendment ■ — a watered down version of what its sponsor had
originally urged — was a kind of consolation prize which the House could
well afford to award since no other House member was now involved, and
the sitting Senators concerned had indicated that they held no strong con-
victions on the subject.

The fact that the Negro members of the House were almost solidly
lined up with the minority on all the amendment roll calls presaged ultimate
trouble. Nevertheless, the House beat down, 68-39, an amendment offered
by a Negro member that would have revised the Chicago Senate districting.
The revision would have been advantageous to the city's colored population
which, under the committee proposal, appeared to be held to a single Sen-
ator. The amendment proposed in the House was the first step in reminding
the legislature that Chicago Negro leaders feel that social integration has
not yet been achieved and that the Negro population is insistent on Negro

[27]

representation reasonably proportionate to the total Negro strength in the
community. ^°

There seems to be no question but that the unusual requirement that
area be a "prime consideration" in drawing Senate districts served to turn
public attention away from ethnic and religious considerations. The litera-
ture of the Illinois Committee for Constitutional Revision and that of the
League of Women Voters and the Better Government Association was silent
on the issue of appropriate representation for Chicago's increasing Negro
population. The plethora of editorial advice offered the reapportionment
draftsmen included no suggestions on this point. It would appear that the
problems of meeting the area requirements, meeting reasonable population
requirements, satisfying sitting Senators, and retaining a balance in relative
party strength weighed so heavily that the committee shook off this further
complication.

House passage of the reapportionment bill was easily achieved, 130-15,
on the second day following formal introduction which is the minimum
time allowable under the Illinois Constitution. An attempt on the part of
a discontented member to stall passage by demanding that the bill be read in
full had no eflfect. Negro members generally agreed, in the course of ex-
plaining their votes, that the Chicago Negro population was being unfairly
treated, one member going so far as to allege that the bill provided for "Jim
Crow senatorial districts on the South Side."

Senate activity was more leisurely and more fiery. The reapportionment
bill was formally referred to the Committee on Elections and Apportion-
ment, and the non-legislative objectors were given a chance to be heard.
In succession, spokesmen for the League of Women Voters, the Committee
for Constitutional Revision, the Chicago Board of the National Association

^ Chicago politicians should have been able to anticipate this reaction. In Novem-
ber 1954, the Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission recommended certain
changes in the size and composition of the Chicago City Council — changes which
did not guarantee Negro representation. The Negro member of the Commission dis-
sented, saying, in part:

Despite the great progress of recent years, the Negro still is in an extremely
disadvantageous position in the city. As long as discrimination based on color
persists as rigidly as it does today, the Negro minority feels the need of political
representatives with deep convictions on the principle of equal opportunities for
all citizens. Furthermore, such representatives are expected to express the legiti-
mate aspirations of minority groups.

It is grievous that the issue of minority-group representation should have to
be raised when conscientious efforts are being made here to improve the quality
and procedures of local government. These objections have validity under the
present racial patterns existing in the city of Chicago today. Chicago Home Rule
Commission, Chicago's Government (Chicago, 1954), pp. 74f.

[28]

for the Advancement of Colored People, the Citizens of Greater Chicago,
the Independent Voters of Illinois, and the Chicago City Club appeared to
protest the Chicago Senate redistricting. The League, the Constitutional
Revision Committee, the Citizens of Greater Chicago, the City Club, and
the Independent Voters of Illinois were generally opposed to the obvious
absence of any objective standard in the delineation of these districts. Sen-
ators of both parties closed ranks against the outsiders. The hearing did
not serve to open for reconsideration any decisions made by the committee.

The Negro group continued to view the Chicago districts with consider-
able dismay. Its spokesman at the hearing, a one-time candidate for the
Democratic nomination to the state Senate, argued that whatever the pur-
pose, the actual result of the proposed districting was to segregate Negroes in
such a manner as to cut down from three to one the possible Negro delega-
tion to future Senates. Of even more importance was the fact that the only
sitting Negro Senator from Chicago, spurred on by political leaders of his
race, suddenly refused to hold still. For a twenty-four hour period just
preceding Senate action on the House approved bill, the entire reapportion-
ment was in jeopardy.

The sole practical solution involved a change in the South Side Chicago
Senate districts which would place a sitting white Democratic Senator in a
district predominantly Negro. Any such arrangement, however, necessitated
an informal commitment from Negro political leaders that the white in-
cumbent would not be dumped at the next election. Once an agreement
to that effect — ^ which obviously could not be negotiated in Springfield —
was achieved, peace came back to the Senate side, and most especially to
the worried Democratic leadership. The Negro group came out with two
Senate seats, but one of them was to be somewhat delayed, a circumstance
that protected the sitting white member and protected the Democratic or-
ganization against possible attack as anti-Negro.

Thereafter, nothing remained for the Senate but to disagree with the
House amendment which had changed a Senate district and to pass (48-2)
the House Bill with the changes reflecting the Senate deals. Two Democratic
Senators, who were being sacrificed, cast the only votes against the measure
just as they had been alone in their opposition in the Democratic caucus.

House leaders viewed with alarm the prospect of each chamber adhering
to its position on the single House amendment to the Senate districting. The
chairman of the special House Apportionment Committee moved to concur
in the Senate amendment "in the interests of getting the job done." More-
over, he warned the House that he could not "see any real hope of the

[29]

Senate changing its position," and that the end result would only be "need-
less nervous tension and irritation."''^

Members seemed unwilling to take further direction on the reapportion-
ment issue, however, and refused, 41-69, to agree to the Senate amendment.
The consequence was a brief and surprisingly harmonious conference com-
mittee session which recommended that the Senate recede from its amend-
ment. Although there was some discussion of reopening consideration of a
House district which was not in disagreement, this was not pressed. The con-
ference report was adopted by both houses without excitement.

THE MAKING OF REDISTRICTING POLICY

The redistricting of the Illinois Senate accomplished by the 1955 session
of the General Assembly is probably permanent. There is no constitutional
mandate requiring action within any established period of time, and it is
doubtful that legislators \vill deliberately invite a constitutional challenge
by insisting on effecting a redistricting which they are delighted to avoid
in the first place. House seats, however, according to the constitution, must
be redistricted on the basis of population in 1963 and every ten years there-
after. The importance of any generalizations offered on the basis of this
case study should, therefore, be related to their applicability to future House
redistricting. Although Senate experience is pertinent to developing such
generalizations, another constitutional amendment involving another con-
stellation of forces and new criteria will be required precedent to a Senate
redistricting.

On the House side, the most important elements of the future setting
are likely to be much the same as they were in 1955, and the major change
— to a pure population base without regard to limiting the number of seats
for Chicago and for Cook County as against downstate — is known in ad-
vance. With these things in mind, the following modest judgments are offered
in the form of conclusions to the case study and in the hope that they may
aid in the understanding of policy making in this field:

1. Peripheral groups seeking to maximize their influence over the terms
of redistricting legislation should focus their activities exclusively on con-
tacts with members of the legislature rather than on attempts either to ex-
pand their membership or to achieve a united front with other groups. The
legislative interest is clearly dominant in redistricting policy making. Al-

^' St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 9, 1955. The parliamentary situation was that
the Senate had amended the bill already passed by the House. The Senate amend-
ment restored the districting proposed by the Senate committee and informally agreed
to by the Senate leadership. This districting, incorporated in the House bill as in-
troduced, had been changed on the floor of the House. Consequently, the Senate
amendment really was a return to the original agreement. In this sense, the amend-
ment did not introduce new substantive material.

[30]

though the legislative interest may be subject to minor adjustment — as in
the case of the Chicago West Side districts — it will not be overcome. In
the development of redistricting policy, the legislature does not actively seek
opinion from outside the General Assembly as it does with banking legisla-
tion, with labor legislation, or with farm legislation. Non-legislative groups
tend to be tolerated but are effective only to the extent that an individual
member or members actively champion their cause. This same point may
be expressed another way by saying that no non-legislative group can be-
come dominant in a redistricting issue; consequently, all non-legislative
groups have virtually the same likelihood of influencing the final pattern
because they must all work within the boundaries of the (incumbent) legis-
lative interest.

2. An effective technique for maximizing influence over redistricting
legislation is the preparation and presentation of specific proposals in the
form of maps. The Illinois legislature is accustomed to a multitude of draft
bills being offered by representatives of innumerable groups. A group spokes-
man who had been able to offer a valid map at the outset of the 1955 ses-
sion would have achieved easy access to the policy discussions. The absence
of such maps tended to make the legislative interest virtually exclusive.

3. Influence on redistricting legislation can be maximized by directing
proposals affecting any district or districts to the incumbent legislator or
legislators from the district. Redistricting decisions affecting each cham-ber
are made within the particular house involved, and, as a further refinement,
redistricting decisions affecting particular geographical areas within each
house are made by legislators representing those geographical areas. In the
House and in the Senate, a kind of "to each his own" spirit obtains so that
neither the leaders of the house involved nor the party machinery is as
effective in influencing the districting as are the members from the area.
The ultimate locus of power lies in the subcommittees assigned to different
parts of the state, and this holds true whether the redistricting job is as-
signed to a standing committee or a special committee and whether the full
committee is equi-partisan or controlled by the majority party. In the Illi-
nois House redistricting in 1963, groups supporting particular proposals
will find it most advantageous to concentrate their attention on House mem-
bers (to the virtual exclusion of Senators), and especially on House mem-
bers representing the area involved. No other members have the same rela-
tive control over the terms of redistricting legislation.

4. Redistricting proposals that dislodge a minimum number of sitting
members, irrespective of party, will be favored over proposals that do not
take into account the sitting members. There is no evidence that in the 1955
redistricting either party persisted in an attempt to improve the existing

[31]

legislative strength of the party by a favorable redistricting scheme. On the
other hand, neither party showed any disposition to give up any of its safe
seats or sacrifice any of its sitting members. In short, if it had been possible
to achieve a redistricting that would have satisfied the constitutional man-
date without imperiling the seat of any member, such a plan would have
had virtually unanimous support in the General Assembly. To the extent
that future redistricting plans can approach this goal, to that extent will
they have a minimum of opposition. Neither party nor principle nor region
are more important than a legislator's colleagues.

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