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LETTERS ON INFANTRY

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

LETTERS ON ARTILLERY. Translated by Lieut. -Col.
N. L. Walford, R.A. Crown 8vo, cloth, with six folding
plates, ys. 6d.

"Under an assumed controversial form, these Letters are distinctly
authoritative — as might indeed be expected from such a master of the art ;
and under the heads of apparently discursive dissertations, they collect all
the decisions afforded by hard experience as to the value of current, and in
many cases rather conflicting, theories concerning the true part of artillery
in war." — Saturday Review.

U7iiforin in Size.

LETTERS ON CAVALRY. Translated by Lieut. -Col.
N. L. Walford, R.A. With three folding plates.

LONDON : EDWARD STANFORD ,

26 & 27 CocKSPUR Street, Charing Cross, S.W.

1

LETTERS ON INFANTRY

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PRINCE KRAFT ZU HOHENLOHg:vJNGjSLFINGEN

TRANSLATED BY

LIEUT.-COL. N. L. WALFORD, RA.

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LONDON: EDWARD STANFORD

26 & 27 CocKSPUR Street, Charing Cross, S.W.

1889

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PREFACE

In the original series, as published in Germany, the
following Letters on hifantry formed the second part
of the work, those on Cavalry having been the first,
and those on Artillery the last in order. This suc-
cession having been inverted in the issue of the
translations, we shall not be surprised to find that
some matters connected with Artillery in combina-
tion with Infantry, which have been fully treated in
Letters on Artillery^ are again, but more cursorily,
mentioned in the present volume.

Those who are interested in studying the develop-
ment of the various Arms will find indubitable proof
of the value which is attributed in Germany to the
opinions of the Author, if they compare the prin-
ciples laid down by him in these letters, and in those
on Artillery, with those which govern the new Drill
Regulations for the Infantry and Artillery of the
German Empire.

I beg to again acknowledge the invariable courtesy
and kindness which I have received from the Author
and from Messrs. Mittler, the Publishers.

N. L. W.
London, \6th July 1889.

CONTENTS

LETTER I

CONCERNING THE GOOD QUALITIES AND THE IMPERFECTIONS OF

OUR INFANTRY

German infantry in 1870 — Original numerical superiority — Not the
case later on — Why they were superior to the French — Yet
changes needed — Owing to unnecessary losses — New formations
— The habit of war — Tradition and experience — Peace and
war Pages 1-12

LETTER II

MARCHING AND GYMNASTIC EXERCISES

Character of recruits — System of training of the Guard — Trial and
success — Principles of the system — Results of system — One of the
principal causes of success in war — Difficulties of instruction of
recruits — Difficulties greater in other corps than in the Guard —
Necessity for providing posts for retired N. C. officers — Changes of
regulations needed ....... 13-28

LETTER III

CONCERNING VARIOUS OTHER POINTS CONNECTED WITH THE
TRAINING OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

System of instruction in gymnastics — Necessity for care in elementary
exercises — Very few men fail altogether — System of inspection- —
Use of gymnastics in war — Need for self-confidence — Use of
bayonet exercise — And of exercises with apparatus — Change of
work desirable — Monotony bad — Simplicity also necessary —
Handbook needed giving what soldier must learn . 29-42

viii CONTENTS

LETTER IV

FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER AND THE NEW REGULATIONS

Necessity for individual care — And for open order in battle — Example
from Sedan — 1870 compared with 1866 — Consequent need for
change — Column of attack — Closed company column — Use of
experience — Attack of the Guard on St. Privat — Losses in the
earlier and later battles — Le Bourget — Changes of ist March
1876 ........ Pages 43-54

LETTER V

ARE ANY MORE CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS DESIRABLE ?

Editing bad — Regulations really a compromise — Questions with regard
to the details of various points — Two ranks or three — Two in
1870 — Should be officially laid down — Double formation leads to
waste of time at drill — And useless — Preference for three ranks —
The square — Not needed — Proposal to suppress " Shoulder
arms!" — The " slope " better — Smaller details should be prac-
tised by the company only — Unloading . . . 55~67

LETTER VI

ON COMPANY EXERCISES

Exactness of drill should not be relaxed — But drill should be limited
to what is absolutely necessary — Duties of the officer commanding
a company — Correct execution of movements — Examples of the
effect of pressure on a flank — St. Privat — But the company must
not be divided to make a flank attack — Frontal attack — Handling
of arms — Fire discipline — Examples — Conduct of fire in action —
Swarm volleys — Firing with different sights — Company exercises
to be simple — But always on tactical principles . . 68-So

CONTENTS IX

LETTER VII

THE COMPANY OFFICER

Influence of the company officer — Reasons for it — Examples of it —
Duppel — Paris — Success due to him — Origin of his power for
good — Hard work — Day of a company officer — Musketry — Study
— The captain — The honour of the officer — The jealousy of
others — The poverty of many officers — Their frugality and self-
denial — Admiration of the private soldier — Social position of
officers — The company officer one great cause of success in war.

Pages 81-95

LETTER VIII

BATTALION EXERCISES

Excellent regulations on them — Effect of long-continued peace — Drill
tends to routine — Examples from personal experience — Place of
the battalion commander in action — Too much to the front — Must
be killed if the fight were in earnest — Yet must conduct instruc-
tion— Reasons why the assumption of forward position is unde-
sirable— Example from the Guard at St. Privat — Reasons why
CO. cannot be willing to remain in his proper place — Effects of
such tendency on service — Nervous strength may fail under
stress in the same manner as bodily strength — Experience in war
leads to more care — Yet is limited in its value — Place of officers
at inspections to be such as they would occupy in war . 96-110

LETTER IX

THE INSPECTION OF A BATTALION

Harder to instruct a battalion than a company — Advance in battalion
exercises during the present century — Invention of "Turks" —
Evils of these — More propositions after the war of 1870 — Some
very strange — New edition of the Drill Regulations — The day of
inspection — Faults — Flank attacks — Author's mode of inspecting
— On service principles — Problems — Camps of instruction sug-
gested— Faults of these — Inspection fever . . . 111-126

CONTENTS

V

LETTER X

FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK AND FOR FLANK ATTACKS

Tendency to flank attacks — Reasons for it — Two ways of making
them — Flank attacks on the drill-ground — Attack of a locality —
St, Privat — Sedan — Le Bourget — Successful with little loss —
Villejouan — Attack in the open — Formations . Pages 127-140

LETTER XI

THE ATTACK OVER OPEN AND LEVEL GROUND

Comparative effect of artillery and infantry fire — Best ranges for each
— Excitement of action tells more on infantry than on artillery —
Attack assisted by artillery — Artillery duel — Advance of the
infantry — Artillery push in — St. Privat — Premature bursts —
Artillery to keep up its fire to the last — Formations of infantry for
attack — Infantry should ask the range from artillery — Examples
of the difficulty of judging distances — Infantry not to begin to run
too soon — Not to open fire at too long a range — Or will waste
ammunition — Supply of ammunition — Advance by rushes.

141-157

LETTER XII

THE ADVANCE BY RUSHES — THE REGULATION OF FIRE — AND THE

RENEWAL OF AMMUNITION

The last 550 yards the most difficult of all — Simplest form a charge —
Fire at short ranges — Swarm volleys — Difficult not to return a hot
fire — Two sights not good — Advance by rushes — Unpractical
forms of advance — Small sight to be put up before advancing —
Loss in officers — Reinforcements — The final charge — Attack in
the absence of artillery — Long-range fire — Renewal of ammuni-
tion-— ^Fire discipline — Excitement under fire — Renewal of am-
munition at short ranges impossible — Rules for conduct 01
ammunition carts— Risk of explosion small — Use of ammunition
carts in peace essential — Regulations of no use — Issue of ammuni-
tion must be freed from all formalities — Moment for renewal of
ammunition ........ 1 58- 181

^fv.'lSS

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CONTENTS XI

LETTER XIII

THE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY

Battalion tactical unit — Duties of officer commanding regiment — A
day's work — Candidates for commissions — Regimental duties of
commanding officer — Hard work — Proposal to hand over duties
to officers commanding battalions — Reasons against this sugges-
tion— The regiment in battle — At Vionville — St. Privat — Advis-
able to keep the regiment intact — Colonel only does his duty —
Training of a regiment — Should consist of tactical and not of
parade movements — Against a marked enemy . Pages 182-200

LETTER XIV

BRIGADE EXERCISES

Brigade largest infantiy unit — Artillery attached to it when independ-
ent— Should therefore take part in brigade exercises — Brigade not
to practise parade movements — More useful for the infantry than
even for the artillery — Premature bursts — Combined attack by
infantry and artillery — Reasons why participation of artillery not
specially ordered — Short time available for exercises — Questions
as to the regulations — The regiments should be used by wings and
not by lines — Flank attacks — Schleswig, 1864 — Must be in some
degree by surprise — Several lines of approach must be used.

201-220

LETTER XV

THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE — {a. INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS)

Brigade at the rendezvous — Ordinary principle bad — Pedantry —
Example from war — Waste of time and of the strength of the men
— Proposed plan — Daily inspection — March of a brigade — The
men to be spared as much as possible — Example of the contrary
— Never inspect in war, as it tires the men — Importance of the
preservation of distances — Marching on one side of the road —
Halts for rest — Sunstroke — Recommendations — Faulty marching
— Boots ........ 221-236

Xll CONTENTS

LETTER XVI

THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE — {b. TACTICAL HANDLING)

Position of the commanding officer — Examples of officers leaving their
posts — Effect of such a fault — General must either hand over
command or remain at his post — Exceptions — Rule does not apply
to the leader of a small body — Leaders are always tied down in
war — Brigade in action — Endeavour to outflank — Flanking move-
ment must commence at a distance — Difficulty of combining flank
and front attacks — Examples of errors — The Rothe-Berg — Flank
attacks when on the defensive — Shelter-trenches — Combination of
cavalry with infantry — General inaction of the latter — Should
take advantage of the action of the former — Infantry v. Cavalry —
Square given up — There is now time to change front — But the
infantry should wheel up, not back — Suakim . Pages 237-259

LETTER XVII

THE SPIRIT OF THE INFANTRY

Enthusiasm of Germany in 1870 — But such enthusiasm cannot stand
the stress of war — For this the true soldier spirit is needed —
Signs of this spirit — Infantry selected as the example — As they
suffer most — Excellence of officers — Discipline — Not as of old, by
fear — But by confidence — Obedience to orders — The power of
"duty" — Need for smartness — Attachment of the men to their
officers — Cheerfulness of the men under hardship — Value of praise
— Troops who will not be beaten cannot be beaten — Discipline a
defence against socialism — Enthusiasm shortlived — No militia
can resist an army — The spirit of the offensive — Offence and
defence — The Dannewerk — Paris .... 260-275

INDEX

276

'^<^ OF THE $^

^university:

LETTER I

CONCERNING THE GOOD QUALITIES AND THE
IMPERFECTIONS OF OUR INFANTRY

On reading of the exploits of the German infantry
in the war of 1870-71, one comes to the conclusion,
not only that it is the most perfect infantry which
has yet been seen, but also that no more perfect
infantry can be imagined. What though the
Emperor Napoleon said, after the catastrophe of
Sedan, that the German successes were due to the
Prussian Ulans and the Prussian artillery, while
Bazaine expresses himself in the same sense in his
Episodes. The German cavalry undoubtedly blind-
folded the eyes of the enemy, and secured for its
own army the most perfect freedom of action.
Again the artillery certainly was compelled often,
and with success, to assume the role of its infantry,
when our needle-guns were not as yet able to answer
at long ranges to the French Chassepot. But after
all the infantry have always done the greater part of
the work. Such deeds as the storming of the Geiss-
berg at Weissenburg, of the Rothe-Berg at Spicheren,
of Froschweiler at Worth, the advance of the infantry
almost into the line of the forts at Colombey-

B

LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Nouilly, the stubbornness of the infantry against the
threefold numerical strength of the enemy at Vion-
ville-Mars la Tour (where they finally retained pos-
session of the field), and the storming of St. Privat,
are heroic deeds, of which the honour rests with the
infantry alone. This honour is increased tenfold by
the fact that the weapon of the German infantry was
a poor one compared with that of the French, and
had not nearly the same range as the latter. It
might indeed be objected that the German Staff had
so arranged matters that in all these battles, except
at Vionville-Mars la Tour, they had a numerical
superiority at the decisive point. But nowhere was
this superiority large enough to make up for the
triple range of the enemy's weapons. For the
French Chassepot inflicted sensible losses on us at
2000 paces, while the sighting of the needle-gun did
not permit of its being used with effect beyond 600
paces. Thus our infantry had to cross a space of
1400 paces, suffering ever increasing loss, before it
could defend itself, while in all these battles it
assumed the offensive against prepared, and often
fortified, positions of the enemy.

But in the later campaigns of the war the Ger-
mans very soon ceased to possess this numerical
superiority. The army which was set in movement
against Chalons, and whose operations ended with
the victory of Sedan, was even at that date only
25,000 men stronger than the force (including that
of Vinoy), which MacMahon commanded ; and when
the investment of Paris had begun, and fresh impro-
vised armies were arising all around, the Germans
were as a rule obliged to engage them with a strength

NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY

from one-half to one-third of that of the enemy.
Thus Prince Frederic Charles in the beginning of
January moved with 58,097 infantry and 16,360
horses (having with artillery and pioneers a little
over 80,000 combatants) against Chanzy, whose
army was estimated at 250,000 men. If the situa-
tion of the Germans in France at the beginning of
January 1871 were placed as a theoretical problem
before a competent military critic, who had no know-
ledge of the war of 1870-71, but had been informed
of the relative numbers of the combatants, and also
that the weapon of the French infantry had three
times the range of that of the German, he would ,
consider it as simple madness to attempt to continue
the siege of Paris, and to hold at bay the enormous
relieving armies. But nevertheless this was done,
and with the greatest success, and .was not madness
at all. The victories which the German troops won
everywhere forced from our great taciturn strategist
the exclamation : " What brave troops ! Send them
where you will, they are always victorious ! " Even
if it be taken into consideration that almost all the
enemy's troops were newly raised, and had not yet
learnt to shoot well, yet we on the other hand know
from the experience which we have gained from
many experiments and much practice with long-
range arms, that at the very long distances, up to
1600 metres or 2000 paces, there is not much
difference in the percentage of hits of good and bad <^'
shots, so long as the sight is properly raised ; trained
men cannot reckon on a large percentage at such
long ranges. The full development of the shooting
of single marksmen does not gain its entire value

LETTERS ON INFANTRY

until the time of the decisive fight, when they can
aim at individual men of the enemy, that is to say,
at 450 or 550 yards or less. Now every man of
the huge masses of newly -raised infantry of the
enemy had a long-range rifle, and with it threw
bullets into our ranks ; our infantry had need then
of almost as much energy to hold their ground, and
even to advance, under the long-range fire of these
double and triple masses, as if this fire had been
delivered by trained marksmen.

The more the details of the actions of this war
are studied, the greater will be our admiration of the
deeds of our infantry, though this admiration cannot
excel that which was felt by those who witnessed
them at the time. Thus the question presents itself:
"In what did the superiority of our infantry over
that of the French consist ? " For we cannot with
certainty assert that a German is by nature braver
than a Frenchman. The peculiarities of character
of the two nations certainly differ, but the F'rench
have ever been held to be brave men, and their
superiority over the Germans in making use of the
character of the ground has been always acknow-
ledged in the past. Napoleon I. showed of what
grand deeds the French soldier is capable ; Sebastopol
and Solferino had obtained for the French army of
the second half of our century the reputation of
invincibility, and all those who in 1870 were en-
gaged against the old French army, before it dis-
appeared from the scene, learnt to feel how well and
stoutly they fought.

This question was asked everywhere ; and after
our last war missions from every army streamed into

WHAT WAS WRONG?

Germany, to study our organisation and search for
the causes of this superiority.

It would have been most natural, if our infantry
had believed itself to be at the zenith of all perfec-
tion and had held fixedly to its organisation.

But on the contrary we saw with astonishment
that our infantry felt the necessity of improving itself
in all directions. They were not contented with
demanding an arm, which should possess every
technical improvement, but they also attacked the
existing regulations, as being no longer appropriate.
The most varied proposals were made. Who does
not remember the numerous formations for action,
some marvellous but most of them very good, which
were tried experimentally on the Tempelhof plain
near Berlin ?

The authorities also shared the opinion as to the
necessity for changes in the regulations ; a committee
was assembled to revise them, and on the ist of
March 1876 appeared a revision of the infantry
field-exercise of 1847, ^s a new edition, containing
the changes adopted up to the ist of March 1876.
Wonderful ! It is felt necessary, after such unheard-
of successes, to change the principles of tactics !
Involuntarily the question is asked : " What was
wrong ? Why these changes. What has happened ? "

If we look at the statistical pages of the official
account of the war and compare certain figures, we
shall find : — " The Guard-Corps lost in the battle of
St. Privat 307 officers, 7923 men, and 420 horses,
and at Sedan 25 officers, 424 men, and 190 horses ;
and yet had certainly no smaller share in the success
of the latter battle than it had in that of the former.

LETTERS ON INFANTRY

" The III. army-corps lost in the battle of Vionville-
Mars la Tour 310 officers, 6641 men, and Gjj horses,
while the whole army of Prince Frederic Charles,
four army-corps strong (of which the III. was one),
and including several cavalry divisions, lost from the
4th to the 31st of January 1 87 1, in almost daily
actions, among which was the three days' battle of
Le Mans, 229 officers, 3721 men, and 426 horses,
about one-half of the loss of the III. corps at Vionville.
The X. army-corps, which took an important part in
these battles and actions, lost at Vionville-Mars la
Tour 202 officers, 4945 men, and 365 horses, or
more than the whole losses of the II. army in the
whole of the month of January 1871."

I do not wish to fatigue you with figures, or else
I am in a position to prove the same fact with refer-
ence to every body of troops, namely, that they
suffered colossal losses in the first encounters with
the enemy, and later on obtained equally important
results with smaller proportional loss.

The simple, incontestable, and logical conclusion
is, that some faults must have been committed in the
earlier actions, which led to unnecessary losses, and
which were at a later date avoided, after that the
consequences of them had been painfully realised.
These faults were due to no particular individuals,
and entail no reproach to any one person, for they
were universal and common to all ; they were present
in the system and in the principles followed ; thence
sprang after the war the universal feeling of the need
for a change in these principles and also the numerous
proposals made as to the form of the change.

It is impossible to deny that we were surprised by

NE W FORMA TIONS

the long range of the Chassepot, and at first every- '
where, without foreboding, marched in close columns
into the zone of this fire, in a real belief that we had
plenty of time before we need break up into smaller
units. This we naturally did not do in the next
action. But this was not the only cause of our heavy
losses in the, earlier combats, losses which we were
able to lessen in the later battles.

We, in addition, adopted formations for fighting
in which our loss was less, leaving out of the question
the fact that we avoided by reason of the universal }
and general familiarity with war many losses which
novices must necessarily incur.

After the first great battles, with their excessive
losses, new formations for fight were adopted and
practised. These, based as they were on sad experi-
ence, ianderwent practical proof. I remember a very
remarkable example of this. During an attack on
a village, at a late period of the war, two regiments
seized that part of the edge of the village which had
been allotted to them almost without loss, while two
others again suffered enormous loss. The reason was
that the two last mentioned regiments were com-
manded by officers who had been wounded at St.
Privat, and having rejoined the force only on the
day before this action, had not yet taken any part in .^
the practice of the new formations. They fought in
the old style, as they had been taught, in company
columns, and again suffered colossal losses. Both

these brave men were among the killed.

But the habit of war, the being aguerri, also
diminishes the losses. Any one who does not know
practically what this means imagines (at least, this

8 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

was my case), that the habit of war is synonymous
with hardening, and with indifference to all the toils
and dangers of war. It is altogether the contrary !
Men who, living in a certain amount of ease, comfort,
and effeminacy, have arrived at the age of 20, 30,
40 or 50 years, cannot in a few months so harden
themselves that they can give all this up and expose
themselves to cold, etc., without danger to their health
and life. The habit of war consists in learning to
procure for oneself, without increasing one's baggage
to a degree which could not be permitted, that which
is absolutely necessary, considering one's rank, station,
and habit of life, that is to say, necessities which have
grown to be so in one's earlier days ; in guarding
oneself as much as possible from the effects of bad
weather ; and in avoiding in action all loss which is
not absolutely called for by the object of the fight or
by honour. This is even a duty. For the man who
allows himself to be killed out of carelessness or
bravado, when his death is unnecessary, does a wrong
to his fatherland, which he thus uselessly deprives of
a soldier.

Again we find, if we carefully compare the action
of our infantry at the beginning of, and at the later
periods of, the campaign, certain customs and habits
which led to great loss and which were later on
abandoned. These habits and customs, which are
the result of a long peace, will always take root again,
if attention be not constantly drawn to the fact that
on active service such things cannot be.

It is well worth the trouble to search out, down
to the smallest detail, what constituted these faults,
which were then committed and were later on avoided,

POWER OF TRADITION

and what were the good qualities of our infantry,
which, in spite of these faults and in spite of the
enormously superior arm of the enemy, secured such
grand results.

In making this search 1 shall not be able to
refrain from here and there expressing a wish that
this or the other might be improved. You will
perhaps find it presumptuous that I, a gunner by
profession, should criticise so excellent an infantry
and dare to offer it advice. But criticism of, and
advice to, infantry has been during seven years my
duty as commanding a division. Moreover in the
first year of my command I industriously attended
the recruits' drill ; I was annually present at all
inspections of recruits of an entire brigade, at the
company training of at least three regiments, and at
the battalion training of the whole division. I can
thus, assisted by what I have seen in war (and in-
cluding battles and sieges I have been on 60
different days under the fire of the enemy), form a
confident judgment with regard to infantry, and one
the more impartial and the more unbiassed that it
cannot be clouded by old habits. Far be it from
me to undervalue tradition. Tradition is founded
on old experiences, but he who follows the tradition
knows nothing of these experiences. The great
mass of people continue to do what they have always
done, and ordinary men follow gladly the dear track
of habit. Since, however, the experiences have been
forgotten which formed the basis for the tradition
which every one follows, he who breaks with a
tradition is in danger of destroying one based on
good grounds, and may later on have to renew the

lo LETTERS ON INFANTRY

old experiences in some unpleasant manner, and then
to recall the old tradition, if there be yet time. For
many things it will then be too late, especially for
such as have to do with discipline. And when the
discipline of an infantry is slackened, then, alas !
good-bye to all great successes! I can therefore
only recognise the deep wisdom with which those in
high authority interfere but very slowly and gradually
with whatever is rendered sacred by custom.

But there exist traditions which arise from the
experiences of a time when we fought with quite
other tactics. Line-tactics, in which soldiers were
used only as machines, in which the infantryman
was only food for powder, in which a private was
more afraid of a blow with a stick than he was of a
bullet, these tactics must beget customs and habits
which can in these days bear no good fruit. And
yet, because that time was full of glory, we still have,
at least in a part of the army, not perhaps regulations,
but traditions, with which we might easily dispense.

Again traditions grow out of the conditions which
obtain in peace, when to work up for inspections and
manoeuvres is regarded as the supreme object of effort.
This ought not to be, but so it is, and finds its origin
deep in human nature. The man who is the very
best soldier in the field, if in peace he is constantly
getting into trouble, must arouse in his superiors a
suspicion that he has fallen from his former efficiency,
and is no longer what he was. He also must there-
fore, if he wishes to continue to serve, work up for
inspection, etc. Such traditions we ought to fight
against with all our might ; we must not allow them
to spring up, and when we come across them must

A TRADITION ii

throw them utterly aside, so that at inspections we
may demand before all other things only that which
is truly useful ; but that must be rigid, exact, — as
rigid and exact as possible. It is also the duty of
inspectors to so direct their inspections that it may
be impossible merely to " work up " for them.

I will now relate to you, as an example, one
single tradition, which I .came across when I com-
manded a regiment. I discovered, when I saw the
recruits drilling in ragged clothing, that the batteries
drilled their recruits in the winter in tunics and
trousers which had been condemned and had been
handed over to them as material for repairs. I
forbade this by a regimental order. A captain of a
battery, who had been long on the most intimate
terms with me, said to me confidentially in private :
" You have given me an order which I shall oppose ;
if I obey it and the other captains do not, I shall
wear out my clothing and they will keep theirs new ;
then at the inspection I shall be blamed and they
will be praised. We shall all therefore, when you
are not there to see, drill our recruits in condemned
clothing." " What will you do," said I, " if I have
the clothing unpicked ? " " Then we shall tell the
company tailors to make them up again." " But
suppose," said I, " that I give you only half trousers
and half tunics ? " After thinking a moment he said,
" We should be done there."

This was done. From that time when the bat-
teries wanted to condemn lo tunics and lo pairs ot
trousers as material for repairs, they had to return
these articles into store, and then received from the
quartermaster, one 20 right legs of trousers and 20

12 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

right halves of tunics, another the corresponding left
arms and legs. The appearance of the regiment was
thus much improved.

You will perhaps laugh at such details. But the
grandest and the most beautiful building is composed
of comparatively small and unimportant stones, and
falls altogether to the ground, if these little stones
are not worked and joined with proper care.

In my proposed examination into the good
qualities and the failings of our infantry, I shall
begin quite from the bottom, from the very smallest
stones. If this is likely to weary you, then with-
draw your request that I should write to you on my
opinion of the infantry, and for my part I will cease
to write.

LETTER II

MARCHING AND GYMNASTIC EXERCISES

As you say that you will not be wearied by my
examination into details, I will continue my letters.
But in order not to try your patience too much at
once, I will begin by telling you a tale of an episode
in my life. In the summer of 1864 I received
command of a regiment. In the autumn my first
recruits arrived. The whole barracks were soon full
of such figures as would make you die of laughter,
such that the most exaggerated caricatures of the ^
Fliegende Blatter would give but a faint idea of
them. The awkward fellows, whose neglected
carriage made them look like a set of ill -made
images, tried hard but in vain to stand straight ;
some broad-shouldered yokels still wore their peasants'
clothes, while tunics to fit them were being made,
and tumbled about as they fruitlessly tried to master
the balance step ; some with exceptionally large
heads, which none of the forage caps in store would
fit, still wore, as the cap-maker had not finished his
task, the shabby tall hats in which they arrived ;
these occasionally fell off and rolled across the
barrack square ; the whole motley company blun-

1 The Bavarian Ptinch. — N.L.W.

14 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

dered together over their positions, facings, and
wheelings.

' In the same barracks were quartered two com-
panies of infantry of the Alexander regiment of the
Guard. During the first week after the arrival of
the recruits not a single man of this regiment was
to be seen in the barrack square. At the end of
the week I saw the first of the infantry recruits, and
then only a very small squad, drilling in the square.
They already marched so well, that I thought they
were a detachment of the men of the previous year.
But on asking Captain von W., who commanded
the company, he told me that they were recruits. I
expressed my astonishment He told me quite
openly that he was no less astonished that my
batteries began to drill their recruits on the very
first day, before even they had got their clothing ;
he allowed no man to begin to drill, unless he could
drill. This seemed to me almost as if no one was
allowed to go into the water before he could swim.
But the result spoke so strongly in favour of Captain
von W.'s plan, that at my request he informed me
as to his principle.

He explained to me that every man of the lower
classes uses only one set of muscles in his ordinary
work ; the shoemaker uses one set, the tailor another,
the woodcutter another, and the agricultural labourer
another ; the muscles which are least used tend to
grow feeble from disuse, and this is why newly joined
recruits (in nine cases out of ten) find it hard, and
almost impossible, either to stand or to walk straight.
They may be compelled to do so, but not without
pain, which not unfrequently increases into cramp

INSTRUCTION OF RECRUITS 15

of the muscles, and this, in combination with all the
new and unaccustomed things which the recruit finds
in his new position, in combination also with home-
sickness, leads to despondency and not rarely to
insubordination, crime, and even suicide. For this
reason it has become a tradition in the infantry of
the Guard to instruct the recruits first of all in every
kind of gymnastic exercises, which are carried on
in canvas suits in the barrack room, and which
advance very gradually and without effort from the
easy to the more difficult, until they at length have
command over all their muscles. Since these
exercises are tiring, they are not carried on for too
long together, but are varied by instruction as to
their new life, by showing them their arms, etc., and
especially by encouraging them to ask questions, and
awakening their curiosity, in order that they may gain
confidence in their new position and in their superiors.
The results of these exercises are soon evident in the
development of the neglected muscles, which shows
itself by a natural and more upright bearing and by
a regular step. When this result has been obtained,
they then for the first time receive their uniform,
which the tailor has been fitting in the meanwhile,
and commence their drill. Each man is, according
to his progress, posted from time to time to the
drill-squad,

I asked him whether the infantry of the Guard
had any written instructions with regard to this
practice, which he could lend me. The Captain
answered that all this was simply a tradition which
had gradually grown up, but that he would ask the
officer who was in charge of his recruits to write it

1 6 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

out for me ; it would be very excellent practice for
him, and I should have it after he had himself
corrected it. He did so ; but since there were
many things in it peculiar to the infantry, I asked
two of the Captains of my batteries to work it out
into a regulation fitted for the artillery. I found
that these two officers agreed with me as to its
value, but they were in the minority, for most of the
officers preferred to go on in the old style, saying
that this was all very well for the infantry, but that
artillery had no time for such trifles.

After this system had been worked out, I made
it a regulation for my regiment. At the next spring
foot parade, which then always took place, the King
looked at the regiment with his eagle eye, which
took everything in, and said : " At last I see men
well set up ; I have always been told that the
artillery could not pay attention to this, on account
of their special work, but I now see that it can very
well be done." The march of the men was also
freer and unconstrained than it had been before.
And with all that the soldiers had been less tor-
mented than in previous years.

This success encouraged me to study yet more
closely, so far as my special duty with the artillery
permitted, the administration of the detail of training
as it has developed with time among the infantry of
the Guard. I found such care for the education,
training, instruction, and health of each individual
man as could in few families be improved, while it
was far greater than any man of the lower classes
of the people would ever find in his own family.
The maintenance of discipline was brought into

TREATMENT OF RECRUITS 17

careful connection with instruction in drill, and all
exercises, including the gymnastics, were used to in-
crease both health and discipline, while the natural
tendencies of each individual man were most con-
scientiously taken into account.

In this manner the recruit quickly learns to sub-
ordinate his muscles to his will. At the same time
he learns also to gradually submit his will to the
word of command. In order to secure this it is
only necessary to direct that the exercises, even the
easiest, shall not be carried out except by the word
of command of the instructor. The man being thus
accustomed at the word : " Arms to the rear !" " Arms
to the front !" " Lift your heels !" " Bend your knees !"
etc., to make the required movements, the necessary
muscles act later on unconsciously at the word of com-
mand, just as the human will compels the members
to move, though the man himself does not know that
his will first affects the brain, and that from this
the order travels by a roundabout way through the
nerves to the muscles. The greatest care must be
taken that the recruit is not roughly spoken to or
frightened. If the instructors (officers or N.C. ^
officers) are gentle, the recruit will soon gain con-
fidence. Living in barracks of which the sanitation
is medically cared for, and in cleanliness, such as is
quite unusual in most lower class families, the recruit
has, together with ample and good food, sufficient
exercise of a nature to develop his body, a regular
life, and plenty of sleep ; in short, he enjoys such
entire welfare, that he feels how fortunate is his lot,
and blindly obeys whatever order his superior may
give. Thus is developed the electrifying power of

^^

1 8 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

the word of command. That which in former days
was begotten of the fear of the stick, is now born of
trust, with this difference that its effect is more
lasting. Since in former times when the fear of the
stick vanished, discipHne vanished also. Desertions
are more rare in these days.

Especial care is necessary with regard to the
connection between the exercises and disciplinary
punishment. No recruit, up to the day when he
joins the company for duty, that is to say, until he
is considered to have learnt his elementary drills,
should ever be punished for faults at drill. During
the ten or twelve weeks of the recruits' drill no recruit,
however awkward he may be, should ever be sent i

to extra drill or to punishment drill ; for the day's
work of the recruit is so measured out, that he has
no spare time, his hours being divided between |

drills, exercises, instruction, sleep, eating, etc., as is \

best for the man's health. More drill would so tire
him that his health might suffer in consequence. i

If there are men (and there always are) who join in
such a low condition of mental and bodily develop-
ment, that they cannot keep up with the others,
then the more advanced may be dismissed from their
drill earlier than the allotted time. The Captain is
generally called upon for an explanation whenever
he punishes a recruit during the period of his instruc-
tion, whether it be with a minor punishment or with
arrest. Such a punishment is not generally inflicted

for a failure at drill or for awkwardness, since orders

1
are given that recruits are to be treated with for-
bearance and patience, even when there is reason to
believe that there is some want of will to do right. ,

INDIVIDUAL CARE 19

A recruit is not punished unless there is absolute
proof that the fault was intentionally committed, or
in the case of such faults as are not allowed by law
to go unpunished. The characters of the men vary
very much, and there certainly are some who are
ill-conditioned, who resist every order and all kinds
of obedience, and find pleasure in crime and disorder.
These are not, however, so numerous as is believed.
But if it be once taken for granted that want of will
exists, when in truth it is only want of intelligence
and awkwardness, true ill-will is easily produced.
It is thus better to have too much patience rather
than too little.

When certain companies have acquired especial
skill in the systematic training of their men, and
when they have had luck in the recruits posted to
them, so that they by chance have not received a
single worthless individual, it has happened that
they have in this manner created an excellent
discipline, and have not found it necessary to give
the punishment of arrest during a year or eighteen
months. And these companies are moreover the
best in drill, discipline, and order.

This systematic training of the infantry soldier,
and the care given to each individual man, even in
his musketry course and in his work in the open
country after he has finished his drill as a recruit,
was one of the principal causes of our grand success
in the last great war. The soldier endured all
hardships, not from fear of punishment, but through
confidence in his officers ; he looked upon his toil
as something unavoidable, as his fate, for he knew
that if it had been possible he would have been

20 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Spared it ; he followed his officer in battle out of
sheer trust ; he was not discouraged even when he
found the enemy in superior strength ; he never
suffered from panic, for he knew the value of mutual
support and held to it, not because he was obliged,
but from love for his regiment, in which everything
had always gone well with him.

At a time when the soldier is supplied with an
accurate firearm, and when the well-aimed fire of
individual men must have more result than ill-
aimed volleys ; when the soldier, in order to fire
well and with good effect, must lie comfortably on
the ground instead of standing in a close crowded
line ; when he is, moreover, no longer a mere portion
of a stiff machine, since each man can use his weapon
with intelligence ; when the infantry have ceased to
be only food for powder, and have become a com-
bination of single units working independently, at
such a time the careful training of the individual
soldier must decide the issue of battle.

But the task which year by year falls to the
instructors of recruits is a difficult one. The greater
proportion of the recruits come to the regiment raw
in every respect, bodily, morally, and mentally ; no
inconsiderable number of them have already been in
prison. I have said above that the recruit is as a
rule neither good nor bad ; the greater part of our
nation is, at the age of 20 years, morally and intel-
lectually, at the standard of a child of educated
parents at 10 years old. There are even some
individuals who are below this. I have had
recruits who found great difficulty in pronouncing
the number 34. I asked one of these to count.

TRAINING OF RECRUITS 21

His scale of numbers went up to 11; he had heard
of 1 3 and 1 7, but he did not know what they
meant. This was a German ; the Slavs of our
Fatherland are still more difficult to educate, since
they do not understand German. They are further
accustomed to an almost incredible amount of rough-
ness in their intercourse with their parents and
associates. I remember a recruit who could only
speak Polish, of whom I as a lieutenant had to
undertake the training, and who did not understand
a single word that I said, and stood staring vacantly
before him. I told another of the recruits who
could speak German and Polish, to translate what I
was saying. This fellow went up to him and gave
him at once a tremendous box on the ears. When
I reproved him for this, he met me with the startling
argument : " Oh, you must let me do it. Lieutenant,
he understands much better now." The box on the
ear in their society answered the same purpose as
"Do you hear.^" does in Berlin, or as the touch on
the shoulder which many men use to draw attention
to their words. What patience is required to make
such men understand all that belongs to their duty
in the field, to order, and to discipline, without even
once knocking them down, he only can know whose
forbearance has been thus put to a practical test.
If sometimes an excitable and eager N.C. officer or
lieutenant loses his patience, and has to answer
before an inexorable court-martial for some blow
given by him, looking at things from the point of
view of human nature one can only pity him. When
I therefore read, either in the Press, or in the reports
of the Landtag or Reichstag, similar isolated cases

22 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

angrily quoted as examples of a universal and over-
bearing military despotism, I cannot help wishing
that each of those who so speak, write or vote, might
be compelled by law to serve first for twelve years
as an officer or N.C. officer.

From the moral point of view also many recruits
are as backward as a child of lo years old. Among
many of them no trace can be found of the feeling
of duty, of religious conscience, of patriotism or of
honour, while there is a proportionately small per-
centage of them who have any idea of good or evil.
The great mass only know good from evil from the
fact that the latter is punished. " I will not do this
or that, because if I do I shall be put in prison or in
the House of Correction." Many recruits hear first
of duty, honour, and patriotism from their instructor
after they have joined the army. Many of them,
even from parts of the country where German is
spoken, know nothing of the history of their Father-
land. There is a sort of figure of speech which we
use when some one has said something which every-
body knows : " Yes, old Fritz is dead." By means
of this I discovered that many of my men had never
heard of Frederic the Great. I asked one of them
once and he answered : " Yes, I heard that he had
died yesterday."

It is the more difficult to train such men since
they are mixed with others educated to a higher
moral and mental standard, and these more advanced
and cultured persons must be trained in quite another
manner. It is only wonderful that the patience of
the instructor of recruits does not fail him under this
labour of Sisyphus. The brilliant saying of one of

PARIS, 1 87 1 23

our most talented men : " Our victories were won by
the German schoolmaster," is only partially true.
They might more justly be said to have been won
by our N.C. officers ; but they are instructed by their
officer, and he by his superiors, while the most
advanced among cultured men are trained by pro-
fessors and by learned soldiers. When on the 29th
January 1871 the forts of Paris were surrendered to
us, I happened to be going on duty from Versailles
to St. Denis. I followed the Seine from St. Cloud
to Argenteuil. On both sides of the road the paths
were covered with groups of soldiers drilling singly
and being practised in positions, facings, manual
exercise, etc. They were men of the reserve bat-
talions, who had been sent to the front scarcely
trained ; as soon as the infantry found time they set
to work to complete their instruction. I and the
officer with me could not help laughing, but it was
with joy and pride, for only in the Prussian army
would such things be possible. Of this we were
further convinced by the remarks of the French
inhabitants, who had come from both banks of the
Seine, from Paris and the villages, and were aston-
ished at these doings. They said : " Look at
them, they are drilling still after their victory.
If our fellows had won, they would have spent
the whole day in drinking and amusing themselves.
It is clear enough that we have no chance with
them."

When I say that the training in detail of each
individual man was one of the principal reasons why
our infantry was victorious, I do not by any means
maintain that even this might not be improved (for

24 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

what human institution is altogether perfect), nor
that this manner of training is carried out as well
and wisely in every infantry regiment of the German
army as it is in the infantry of the Guard at Berlin.
When I received the command of a division of
infantry in the provinces I found that the principles
which I have stated above were by no means
universally applied. The gymnastic exercises were
practised more for themselves, because they were
laid down, than as a means of instruction, while the
class of recruits was more difficult to manage, and
the staff of instructors was not so skilled. The big
and already well-shaped men who are sent to the
Guard are naturally more easily trained than the
many rather unshapely recruits who go to the
infantry of the line. Men morally perverted, who
have already committed crimes for which they are
outside the pale of society, are never sent to the
Guard, and thus the infantry of the line has to deal
with thieves and other criminals. Moreover the N.C.
staff of the infantry of the line is not from its social
position so well educated as is that of the Guard,
since the attraction to the capital of the German
Empire is naturally stronger than that to some small
garrison, in which there is no opportunity of acquir-
ing a connection which may be of use for later
advancement. But how desirable it is that the N.C.
officer should be better educated than the recruits
will be evident to every one who realises what
patience, as has been shown above, he must exercise
towards the private soldier, and how superior he
must feel himself to him, not to lose his temper when
he comes across great awkwardness, taking care not

N.C. OFFICERS 25

to mistake the latter for ill-will, until he has made
sure that ill-will does truly lie behind it, which is
indeed often the case.

It is therefore of the greatest importance that the
career of a N.C. officer should be made tempting to
the more educated classes. Much has been done in
that direction already ; their life in the regiment has
been made far more pleasant. But the most im-
portant point, to my mind, is that the State shall
buy up the administration of all lines of railway.
When all the railways, as were the post-houses, are
administered by the State, no one except soldiers
recommended for civil appointments will obtain
employment on the railways, posts, and telegraphs.
Then all those who w^ish to embrace such a career,
and have the necessary education, will be compelled
to serve for the requisite time, and the N.C. officers
will thus be supplied by a class of men so w^ell
educated, that it will be possible to promote them
quicker, while perhaps the qualifying time for civil
employment might be reduced to 10 years, by which
again the supply of well-educated men for N.C.
officers will be increased.

I cannot here refrain from mentioning another
matter. The practice in instruction which a N.C.
officer has as an instructor of recruits is the very best
preparation for the calling of civil schoolmaster. But
never yet has a N.C. officer been made a school-
master ; on the contrary, the candidates for such
appointments have their term of service shortened.
If the civil schoolmasters were selected from dis-
charged N.C. officers only, a still larger number of
educated men would select that career, while the

26 LETTERS ON INFANTR V

teachers of youth, and the youth itself, would gain a
greater sense of order, right, and law.

Do not condemn me, on account of my proposals,
as a reactionary, who wishes to enslave the whole
country under the military power of the soldiery.
Having an army organisation, which is rightly called
T/ie People in Arms, we ought during their child-
hood to train this people, who are to bear arms, to a
sense of order and law, so that they may not some
day, sword in hand, threaten the whole social order
with destruction.

After this digression from my narrative, I will
add that in the division of which I took over the
command, there were great difficulties with regard to
language, since more than half of the recruits were
Poles by birth, and most of these did not understand
German. The sense of risrht and law was even less
developed among them than among the lower classes
of Prussia. Cases not seldom occurred, where men
before they entered the service had committed serious
crimes, such as arson, or where they falsely accused
themselves of similar crimes with the sole and only
object of being transferred to a punishment company,
and of being discharged from the army, so that they
might not in case of war run the chance of being
shot.

For all these reasons the system of individual
instruction did not take such root in these regiments
as in the infantry of the Guard. I did my best to
introduce it gradually ; gradually, since a matter
which called for the zealous help and assistance of
each individual could not be arranged all at once by
a mere order. Indeed an order stood in the way of

OFFICERS 27

any such action, for by regulation the direction of
the detail of the training of the men is the especial
charge of the officers commanding regiments. In
them I found willing assistants ; good results soon
showed themselves. Love of praise and emulation
between the different regiments did the rest. Crime,
punishments, want of discipline and desertions visibly
diminished, and the men had in a i^^N years a freedom
and elegance of step, which compared well with the
painfully stiff pace of the former soldiers.

In such a highly educated and willing body as is
the Prussian corps of officers it is only necessary to
suggest anything, and the efforts of all the junior
officers will certainly help most willingly to complete
it and bring it to perfection. So I found in this
case. The infantry of the Guard had already
abolished the balance step, my officers went further,
and replaced, as a preparation to marching, the slow
march by gymnastic exercises and worked back to
the former from the quick march, just as in the case
of a remount the short trot and the medium trot are
developed from the natural pace. The success was
most visible. Up to that time it had been found
very difficult to teach the small Silesian men to take
such long steps as those required by the regulations,
namely, 100 to 80 metres. It was now found that
the recruits could at the inspections in the barrack
square march 80 metres without difficulty in from
82 to 90 paces ; one company had even taught its
recruits to step metres. The men, being accustomed
to such long paces, had no difficulty at a later date
carrying their packs and moving over uneven ground,
in marching with the regulation pace of four-fifths

'^'

28 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

of a metre, and developed a power of marching
which often on the occasion of the manoeuvres
astonished both the superior officers and the spec-
tators. It is moreover natural that the slow march
with the balance step should tend to shorten a man's
stride, instead of making the recruit stretch his legs,
for when he has to stand for a moment on one foot
with the other extended in front of him, he is obliged
to throw his weight on the rear foot, and this shortens
the pace when the advanced foot comes to the
ground. Again the slow march, with the balance
step, is an unnatural movement, which causes pain
to the recruit in proportion as his muscles are want-
ing in pliancy. It must be quite wrong to begin
with the most difficult practice ; while, when a man
has once learnt to march in quick time, the other
paces are of no use. In former days these two kinds
of marching were practised for choice by such
instructors of recruits as had nothing to think of,
who looked stupidly to their front, mechanically and
slowly repeating: " 21-22." Thus it happened that
a tortured, though willing, recruit, driven to despair
by the pain in his cramped muscles, would throw
his rifle on the ground or at his instructor's head,
and then had to be punished by law for such in-
subordination.

I am afraid that I have already annoyed you too
long with these petty details ! and I will not try
your patience any further to-day, since I propose in
my next letter to examine in the same manner into
some other points connected with instruction, unless
indeed you write to tell me that you are weary of
it all.

LETTER III

CONCERNING VARIOUS OTHER POINTS CONNECTED
WITH THE TRAINING OF THE INDIVIDUAL
SOLDIER

Since you encourage me to continue my remarks
on the details of instruction, I will run the risk of
being wearisome, and pass from the gymnastic
exercises to applied gymnastics, i.e. exercises with
apparatus and the bayonet exercises. Though in
these practices the infantry naturally attach special
importance to matters which are useful to them on
service, such as climbing, jumping over ditches and
the combat with the arnie blanche, yet they do
not lose sight of the necessity of a healthy develop-
ment of all the muscles, and each man derives
a lasting benefit from them in the progressive
strengthening of his body.

But no instructor of gymnastics escapes from one
danger, namely, that of preferring to teach very
advanced practices to some peculiarly skilful pupils,
rather than to endeavour to push on the most awk-
ward and the most clumsy, and to improve them
sufficiently that they may come up to every require-
ment which can be called for in a good infantry
soldier. It is true that at inspections the remarkable

30 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

performances of some individuals attract attention
and gain credit for the instructor, while exercises of
ordinary mediocrity pass unobserved. It is true that
the division into three classes — gymnastics, jumping,
and bayonet — are intended, inasmuch as men of the
same calibre are placed together, to prevent this
danger, but the Captain also, who instructs the whole,
is easily tempted to take the greatest interest in the
exercises of the first of these classes, and to take
only a step-motherly care of the others. Many
captains even take particular pride in showing a very
numerous first class, in which case the performances
of individuals in this class will be of very various
degrees of excellence.

If the lists of the men in hospital be examined,
you will find that a company commanded by such a
captain has a very large number of men admitted
for accidents at gymnastics. For a man who
is passed into a higher class, before he has been
properly instructed in the lower, will attempt things
beyond his power ; for instance, he will fail to
jump high enough and will strike the jumping horse,
or he will come to the ground awkwardly and sprain
his ankle, and so on.

On the other hand, I have seen some companies,
in which even the most awkward and clumsy men
did very satisfactory practice, while but few (two
to six men) figured in the first class, and these were
soldiers who had already been skilled gymnasts when
they joined the regiment. I remember one company,
of which all the men climbed out of the windows of
the barracks, ran a certain distance over all kinds
of obstacles, and finally climbed in again at the

GYMNASTICS 31

windows. In this company there had been no single
accident at gymnastics during the whole year, and
the men looked in good condition, red-cheeked and
jolly. It is true that the Captain was an intimate
friend of, and had served in the same garrison with
the originator (Stocken) of our military gymnastics,
and had learnt from him to accustom the muscles
first to the easier exercises, and not to go on to the
more difficult, until they had gained the necessary
suppleness and elasticity. When this is not seen to,
it may very well happen that the more difficult
practices are clumsily done, while the man hurts
himself in doing them. It cannot be too distinctly
laid down that each man should be able to do the
most elementary and easiest practices with the most
absolute excellence and neatness. He who cannot,
for example, jump standing with due elasticity,
rising off his toes and coming down on his toes with
a slight bend of the knees, though he may have
enormous strength, so that he can jump across or
lengthways over the horse, will nevertheless always
run a risk of landing on his heels and of either
jarring his spine or spraining his ankle. If gym-
nastics are taught and carried out in every detail no
accident can ever happen. But if they are un-
intelligently carried on, accidents will happen, while
the men will lose their confidence and will become
nervous and disinclined for them. But no man
ought ever to be brought into this condition. The
more timid he is by nature, the longer must he be
allowed to gain confidence by doing the easier
exercises, and the more gradually must he be passed
on to the more difficult. I have only met with one

32 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

man in the whole of my service who never could get
over his natural nervousness. Before he had been
drawn as a recruit, his father, a Jew tradesman of my
native town, whom I had known from childhood,
came to me and urgently begged that his son might
be exempted from serving, as he had no courage
and would only bring disgrace upon the regiment.
As the law did not recognise this want as a reason for
exemption, I could not listen to his prayer. At the
gymnastic inspection the company finished by
running a course over the regulation obstacles, of
which the final one was a ditch, which formed a
branch of the river Neisse. Young Hopeful came
at it last. When he got to the take-off he gave a
yell of anguish, threw his rifle with its fixed bayonet
into the water, jumped on all fours and fell like a
frog into the ditch, in which he stood covered with
slime up to the hips. Amid a roar of laughter from
the whole company he waded to the other side.
But such an exhibition as this is very rare. It is
safe to say that every man who is sound in wind and
limb can practise all that is needed for an infantry
soldier.

The superior officer who inspects in gymnastics
can do very much by the manner in which he
inspects. The time that is at the disposal of the in-
spectors is, as a rule, very short, since they prefer to
judge of the different grades of instruction of various
bodies of troops on nearly consecutive days, in
order that they may have a correct standard of
comparison ; besides their journeys from one
garrison to another take up some little time. A
detailed inspection of the drill and musketry gener-

INSPECTIONS 33

ally occupy the morning, and after as hasty a meal
as possible the tired mind in the tired body
turns its attention to the gymnastics. Can we
wonder if the inspector then prefers to see the
remarkable and more entertaining exercises of the
first gymnastic and fencing classes rather than
weary himself with the elementary work of the
lower classes ? But by this the inspector does
harm. That which is inspected will be practised,
and this is the more true as the period of peace
grows longer ; this is in the army the natural conse-
quence of military obedience, and if the superior
officer inspects only the first gymnastic classes, the
regiment will neglect the instruction of the others.
But the training of the latter is the most important,
since it is most necessary to teach every one all that
is needful. Such dexterity as goes beyond this is
only of value as an incitement, an example, which
may rouse less well-endowed men and awaken their
desire of honour, and by no means with the object
of exhibiting magnificent gymnastic performances
before the enemy.

But of what use are gymnastics in war ? Why
should the soldier learn the bayonet exercise when
the fire of rifles is decisive ? Such questions appear
on paper to be reasonable. Yes ; even a practical
infantry officer of high rank, whose authority no one
who knew him would dispute, said to me once, as he
watched the men exercising with bayonets and
padded jackets: "That is all modern rubbish, in
which so much time is spent, that at last the men
do not know how to load their rifles in action."
He was right. For if the men had not sufficient

D

34 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

time to learn how to use their arms properly, because
they did so much gymnastics, it would be better to
do none and not even to learn how to fight with the
bayonet What sportsman has not in the excite-
ment of shooting made a mistake of some kind by
forgetting to cock his gun or to withdraw the safety-
bolt, etc., owing to which the hare has escaped ? It
is only when he has had such practice in shooting
that he carries out mechanically all the needful
manipulation without thinking of it, that he can be
sure of making no such mistakes. Just so the
infantry soldier must be so practised with his arm,
that he makes all the necessary motions correctly,
by instinct and mechanically, even when his nerves
are disturbed by the heat of battle, personal danger,
etc. If the practice of gymnastics prevented
sufficient time being given to such things, they
would be an evil. When I noticed the number of
miss-fires on the part of the enemy on the field of
battle, when I found muzzle -loading rifles loaded
with ten successive cartridges, of which the first was
put in hind before (a proof that the soldier had not
noticed that the first shot had missed fire, and had
therefore kept on putting in fresh cartridges one
over the other), then I saw how right the above-
mentioned infantry officer was, when he said that
the firing exercise should be so well practised that
the soldier, even in battle, could make no mis-
take.

We know also that Napoleon I., who of all great
captains had the greatest experience of war, laid
down as a principle : " The firearm is everything,
the rest nothing." The value of this maxim must

REASONS FOR SYSTEM 35

increase with the improvement of the firearm. But
we do not teach gymnastics in order to show our
jumping or activity before the enemy, but in order
to strengthen the power of the muscles of the men.
With strength grows self-confidence, with self-con-
fidence courage. He who is skilled, knows it ; he
who knows it, presses on. We do not teach the
bayonet exercise in order that the infantry may rush
in on arms of precision with the bayonet alone, as
the Austrians did in 1 864 with great loss, and in
1866 to their ruin, but we wish to teach it in order
that the soldier may not fear a fight with the
bayonet, may feel himself secure so long as he has
his bayonet on his rifle, and may hold the certainty
of victory in his hand. Goltz, in his work The
People in Arms, has brought forward the moral
superiority of the offensive in such an overwhelming
manner, that nothing can be added to what he has
said. But the moral effect that is produced by the
offensive on a large scale, is in small actions the
result of a determination to attack with the bayonet.
He who determines so to attack gains half the
victory, since the enemy seldom waits to receive the
assault. But he who has not made up his mind to
come at last to the bayonet can never win, for he
can have no serious intention to assault. He who
does not know how to use his bayonet will certainly
not be determined to finally attack with it, and thus
he will never make a serious attack.

However true Napoleon's maxim may be, and
though bayonet fights are rare, yet there were some
in the last war. Is a man in this case to use his
rifle as a club ? Ought he to be exposed to the

36 LETTERS ON INFANTRY \

chance of being unarmed as soon as he has knocked
over one enemy, for certainly as a rule the stock will !

break if he clubs his rifle ? After the storming of
the forts at Diippel many rifles were found to be '

without stocks. When Prince Frederic Charles
asked a soldier why he used his butt instead of his
bayonet, the man answered : " I don't know ; when
you get your dander up the thing turns round in {

your hand of itself." This means that, if the man
is more accustomed to strike than to point, he will ;

use his rifle as a club, as soon as excitement over- |

comes him and nature gets the upper hand. There-
fore it is necessary to make the soldier so accustomed
to the bayonet by constant practice in pointing with
that weapon, that it becomes natural to him to
point, and that he will point, when he is excited,
instead of hammering.

When I received my elementary instruction in
military knowledge I was taught that a Frenchman
could by nature beat a German in a bayonet fight.
Involuntarily I formed the idea that in that case
the German would be wise to avoid fighting with
the bayonet against a Frenchman. Some very
sound old officers went so far as to lay down, when
arms of precision were introduced, the principle that
it was right, when threatened with a bayonet charge,
to retire firing from one position to another. Now
that I have seen a few battles and many engage-
ments, I know, that from such action no other effect
can be expected than the loss of the battle.

The principle which was laid down by the most
trusted Austrian infantry tacticians that the only
antidote to arms of precision was the bayonet, cost

BA YONET EXERCISES 37

the brave Austrian infantry nmuch blood in 1864,
and became quite untenable in 1866. He who
should endeavour, without firing a shot, to cross the
whole of the zone which in these days is swept by
infantry fire, would certainly remain a corpse in front
of the enemy's line. But he who, on the other hand,
does not make up his mind at the beginning of an
action to go in at the close of the fire-fight, if the
enemy will not give way, until he can see the whites
of the eyes of the foe, has no intention of making a
real attack and will not be victorious. Yes ; make
the intention to charge home apparent, or it will be
better not to go into action at all. That sort of
thing would remind one of those beautiful strategical
manoeuvres which concealed the appearance of any
intention to give battle, and therefore failed dismally.

I think that I have said enough concerning the
necessity of the bayonet exercises for infantry. I
do not want every soldier to become a skilled fighter
with the bayonet (that we shall never get), but each
man should be able with ease to give a good strong
point, when a point is needed, and should have
obtained confidence that when he does so he will
hit his enemy and kill him. The spiritless " clip-
clap " which we sometimes hear for half an hour
together, by the word of command of some stupid
N.C. officers, is sheer waste of time, and is very like
that stage-fight, of which an old experienced N.C.
officer said to his pupils : '' I give you my word of
honour, you wouldn't pierce a sheet of wet blotting-
paper."

The other practical exercises in gymnastics (the
practices with apparatus) are only of use to give a

38 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

man confidence in himself. Even though infantry
have learnt to jump over wide ditches or to climb
walls, yet this will certainly not decide the victory,
since it is quite a different thing to jump ditches and
climb walls in drill order and in the barrack square,
and to do so after a forced march or a trying
bivouac, with a pack on their backs. Moreover »
troops which are massed to give the decisive blow
will not find such obstacles all along their front.
But the soldier who knows well that he can over-
come all obstacles advances with quite a different
feeling of resolution to him whose inward voice cries
painfully to him : " Can I get over that ditch, or
that hedge, etc?" Besides he who is practised in
systematic gymnastics will jump even the smallest
ditch with greater ease than he who has not learnt
to jump, and who runs a constant risk of spraining
his ankle or straining a sinew. This difference in
efificiency becomes more noticeable when the men are
tired or are carrying their packs.

At the storming of Le Bourget, on the 30th of
October 1870, during the fight at the church, our
grenadiers pressed in through the windows, and
jumped twice the height of a man down into the
nave. Troops who had not learnt to jump could
not do this, even if there were no enemy in the
church.

The individual instruction of recruits is in general
so capitally carried out in our infantry that, if I go
on to speak of everything, you will say to me :
" But what you write about is what I see every day ;
why then should I read it ? " while if you were not
an infantryman all these details would bore you to

CHANGE OF WORK DESIRABLE 39

read. I will not therefore enter into every part of
this most important portion of our training, but will
only speak of some few points, which to judge by
my observation are worth mentioning.

With the infantry of the Guard I often saw whole
companies with their recruits go out in the winter to
practice field exercises, and this only a few weeks
after the recruits had joined, and long before they
had been inspected and had been sent to do duty
with their companies. In the division which I then
commanded I found this practice more rare. When
I had discovered the object of it, I encouraged the
infantry which were under my command to do the
same, and the results showed me the advantage of it.

The man who, during the quarter of a year that
he remains a recruit, sees nothing but the barrack
square and his barrack room, and is employed only
in the most mechanical and elementary exercises,
may easily get into a stolid state of mind and make
no further progress. But if he has an opportunity,
once in the week, either in the morning or in the
afternoon, of going out into the open to learn his
field exercise, he recovers from the monotony of his
elementary training, and gets an approximate idea
of his work as a soldier together with a fresh desire
to fit himself for it. Such excursions into the open
country have as refreshing an effect as have the
trips which a master makes with his scholars, when
he takes the boys out of the close air of the school-
room, and teaches them practical botany. Recruits
can be taken out to these field exercises in winter
as soon as they have been from a fortnight to three
weeks with the colours. They may at first march

40 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

in rear without arms, and may during the exercises
stand in close order to mark the position of the
supports, while the older soldiers act as skirmishers,
patrols, etc. The instructors can then point out to
their notice, almost as if it were a game, all the
different items of the field exercise, which taught
in theory in their hours of instruction would take a
disproportionate time, since that which he can see
has far more interest for any recruit than that which
he has to imagine.

' You will perhaps say that the time available for
the instruction of recruits is already very short, and
that it is impossible to take whole mornings and
afternoons from the elementary exercises. So I
thought at first. But when I inspected the recruits
I asked for the daily return of drills, and found that
the recruits of the very companies who had made
most use of this practice, marched the best at the
inspection and showed an excellent discipline at
drill. This was because they were not made stupid
by doing only recruits' drill. Besides, without the
recruits, no company can carry out such practices in
the winter, since the guard and fatigue duties of the
garrison, in addition to the necessary musketry in-
struction, take too many of the men belonging to
the batches of earlier years, the recruits not being
yet available for garrison duty. For these reasons
a captain cannot get hold of the older men more
than once a week for the purpose of practising the
field exercise.

But this is enough ; and what a capital time of
year it is for these exercises ! The snow and the
frost enable us to go everywhere, and the occupant of

SIMPLICITY NECESSAR V 41

the land cannot claim any damages. It is obvious
how superior to a company ordinarily trained will
be one which has practised its field exercise ten or
twelve times in the winter, at its full strength, during
the recruits quarter of the year.

Another point which I consider of great import-
ance is this : our men have to learn and remember
too many numbers, so many indeed that simple and
untrained heads cannot do it. Only think of the
regulations of the school of musketry with regard to
the height of the sight at different distances. I
think we might simplify this. I do not dispute the
truth of what the school of musketry lays down, but
it is too much for an uneducated man to remember.
I think that it would be sufficient if he knew that
when firing at cavalry at 400 metres and under, he
is only to use the 400 metre sight, and is always to
aim at the feet of the horses ; and that when firing
at targets representing men at ranges under 400
metres, he is to use only the small leaf and should
aim at their feet. Then the soldier has to think
only of the 400 metre sight and the small leaf He
must be taught to follow the command of his officer
(section leader) at ranges above 400 metres. If,
however, he has to do with a target representing the
bust or the head of a man at short ranges, I think
that, rather than burden his memory with a mass of
figures, it would be better, considering how much
practice at targets our men have, to teach him to
judge instinctively how much below the target he
should aim, according as, in proportion to the range,
it is more or less distinctly visible.

On other points also their instruction burdens the

42 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

memory of the soldiers very much ; I think too
much. I beHeve that if the instruction were more
appHed and practical this might be diminished. We
have, it is true, excellent directions for instruction,
but I have never yet seen a handbook which con-
fined itself solely to what the private soldier ought
to know ; this should be divided into what the
recruit has to study, and what the older soldier
must be taught. I do not think that you could do
a greater service to the infantry than by preparing
such a handbook. It would be a long and tiring
task, for you must employ an immense time in trying
to make it very short.

LETTER IV

FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER AND THE NEW

REGULATIONS

In the further training of our infantry, in the
marching drill of single men as well as in the in-
struction of squads and in the manual and firing
exercises, we find the same care given to the training
of each man as an individual as in the first elementary
drill of the recruit. An infantry officer who has
done his duty thus from the beginning and has paid
attention to nothing else, does not recognise the
excellence of this system and its logical development
so well as an officer of another arm who, as I was
myself, has been accustomed to see the foot drills
carried out in masses, and is astonished to see how
quickly these drills can be learnt, when they have
been preceded by a careful training of the individual
soldier. When a man can march well, that is to say
naturally, freely, in an unconstrained manner and
firmly holding himself upright, proudly and with self-
confidence, when the small squads marching at three
paces interval can move straight to their front and
wheel well, then the drill of the complete company
is a mere trifle and can be easily taught.

How rich in results is the training of the individual

44 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

soldier ! This is one answer (I say one of many) to
the question which I asked in my first letter, as to
whence were derived the excellence and the superiority
of our infantry. An important part must be at-
tributed to the instruction of the soldier in fighting
in open order and to his habit even in this of obeying
the orders of his officer. Wherever this training of
our soldiers has been properly made use of, there
our infantry have obtained great success with com-
paratively small loss ; but where the officers have
attached little value to fighting in open order, they
have suffered loss to such a degree that success has
often been doubtful, and failure might even have
occurred if it had not quickly been brought into use.

I have already in my first letter referred to an
action which furnishes a proof how much smaller
were the losses of regiments which attacked in
swarms than of those which advanced in company
columns. Allow me to mention here yet one other
episode of battle which I saw at Sedan.

We were standing in position to the east of
Givonne, fronting to the west, with the village of
Givonne, which was occupied by the rifles and
fusiliers of the Guard, lying in the deep valley of the
Givonne to our front. It was about i P.M. The
enemy's infantry had drawn back from the opposite
edge of the valley of the Givonne as. far as the Bois
de la Garenne, which stood on higher ground. A
few companies of our infantry had made use of this
opportunity to occupy the farther edge of the valley.
One company of the rifles of the Guard had done so
from Givonne in front of my line of artillery, while
in front of the left wing of that line two companies

INF ANTE Y AT SEDAN 45

of the "Franz" regiment, .under Captain von C,
advancing from Haybes, had taken up a similar
position. The last two companies had crowned the
farther edge of the valley, and had got under cover
in a single thin line of skirmishers. The enemy's
artillery fire was as good as silenced.

Suddenly to the south of the Bois de la Garenne
a thick mass of the enemy's infantry rushed out of a
hollow which runs from the wood to the Fond de
Givonne, and charged as hard as they could run on
Haybes, and therefore directly on these two com-
panies. I judged these masses of infantry to amount
to 5000 to 6000 men, and think now that that must
have been about the right number, since, according
to the French account, this must have been the left
wing of Wimpffen's despairing attempt to break out
(Grandchamp's division). The enemy's masses of
infantry, running up in deep columns, fired incessantly
as they ran with their rifles held horizontally at the
hip, and thus covered themselves with a cloud of
smoke. You could distinctly see with a field-glass
how the men loaded and fired as they ran without
raising their rifles to the " present." To the naked
eye the mass looked like a gigantic advancing heap,
blue above (the tunics) gray in the middle (the
smoke), under which the red trousers and the
struggling legs showed with a sort of trembling
movement. Though I gave the order as quickly as
possible to all the batteries of my line of artillery
(90 guns) to open a rapid fire on the enemy's masses
of attack, I could not help feeling very anxious about
the two companies of the " Franz " regiment which
lay on the other side of the valley of the Givonne,

46 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

for if the enemy's masses succeeded in getting to
within 2 00 paces of them, I should not be able to fire
any longer with my guns at the head of the attack,
on account of the danger of hitting our own infantry.

I had reason indeed to be nervous. Though the
shells, striking and bursting in the midst of the thick
masses of men, wrought horrible destruction, and
threw them into confused heaps in which smoke and
dust were mingled with the colours of the uniforms,
while above them men's bodies and limbs were hurled
up into the air by the explosions, the mass still came
on nearer and nearer, for the enemy fought with the
courage of despair. The moment soon came when
I was compelled to order the fire on the head of the
column to cease. This head broke loose from the
mass, and charged in on the companies.

In contrast to the thick smoke which was made
by the rapid fire of the French, no fire could be
seen to proceed from our companies. I turned my
field-glass on them, and then at last saw here and
there the puff of a discharged rifle ; the whole line
of skirmishers lay flat on the ground, their rifles at
their shoulders and their sights on the target.
Captain von C. only, walking up and down as grace-
fully as we often see him at a ball, moved along his
line of skirmishers, and (as he told me afterwards),
exhorted his men to aim quietly and shoot slowly.
But each bullet struck down one of the advancing
enemy ; the number of those who drew near to the
skirmishing line grew less and less ; a few even
reached the line, and there met with their fate at the
muzzles of the rifles, for two of our men lie there
bayoneted through the back from above. But the

SHOCK TACTICS 47

whole attack, which was commenced with such bold-
ness, died away. Only a few survivors turned to fly,
and were shot down by the pursuing fire of the
infantry. The whole mass was destroyed in the
space of ten minutes ! On the other hand, the entire
" Kaiser-Franz " regiment lost during the whole of the
battle of Sedan only 2 officers and 80 men. Of this
loss only a very small proportion was incurred by these
two companies during the short episode which I have
related. So great is the superiority of the well-
aimed, well-directed, and good individual fire of
troops, who have been correctly trained in detail,
over shock tactics in mass-formation ! It is not the
offensive, as such, which has lost all use and value
owing to the system of instruction and the perfection
of firearms, but such shock tactics in mass-formation !
This was already made evident in the war of
1866 by the destruction of the brave Austrian
columns of attack. But the greater part of the
success of the Prussian infantry was to be ascribed
to the superiority of the breech-loader rather than
to the fighting formation, since our infantry also
frequently used closed formations in this war. But
in the example from the battle of Sedan which has
been quoted, a mass-formation was employed by
that force which possessed far the better infantry
arm ; and yet it could not stand against the inferior
weapon, even though the proportion of numbers
was 6000 to 300 ! Granted that the 300 were
supported by an effective fire of artillery, and that
this destroyed half of the column of attack, yet the
odds will be still 3000 to 300, or 10 to i. This
superiority of individual fire on the defensive over

48 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

mass-formations in the offensive must have increased
since the infantry weapon has been yet more im-
proved.

It is easy to understand how hard it is for in-
fantry officers who have grown old and gray in the
service to give up their dear old fighting formations.
But such formations as those of Frederic the Great,
who personally led on to the storm his battalions
deployed in close order with bands playing and
colours flying, halting only at loo paces from the
enemy to fire a volley, are no longer possible in these
days of Gras and Mauser rifles. The movement also,
by which a brigade of 6 battalions, while the first
line of 3 battalions fired volleys in line, sent forward
its second line in columns of attack through the
intervals in order that they might charge in with
the bayonet, is no longer suitable to the present
day. New inventions entail changes, and the old
movements which we have loved pass away like
dreams. We must make up our minds to this.
The much-loved modes of fighting of the knights
of the Middle Ages had at last to be given up, and
no Arnold von Winkelried can now decide a battle
by gathering the enemy's spears against his own
breast, and thus making a breach in the armoured
ranks of the foe.

So also we must acknowledge that the charm
of a well-dressed advancing column of attack (bat-
talion column on the centre companies), as it moved
in step to the tap of the drums, is gone for ever,
since it must lead to the destruction of the assail-
ants. Even the term " column of attack " has been
changed in the last regulations into " column on the

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING 49

centre ; " a proof how entirely we have renounced
any idea of using the old column of attack within
the zone of fire. Even the use of the smaller
company column has been to some extent given up
within the zone of very effective fire. In nine cases
out of ten it will serve only to feed the fighting
lines of skirmishers, and it will but rarely happen that
a closed formed company column will be brought
up into the front fighting line to work out the
decisive struggle. Seldom indeed ; but its effect
will then certainly be decisive. Thus it may be
used by night, when the darkness will diminish the
effect of arms of precision, or if smoke or their own
loss has physically or morally blinded the eyes of
the defenders, or if the ground affords cover to the
advance of company columns which may take the
enemy by surprise. But the essential point of in- j
fantry action will always be the individual action in
the fire-fight, and that infantry will gain a decisive
superiority which has understood how to train each
individual man so that he can make the best pos-
sible use of his rifie, and has learnt to follow the
signs, the orders, and the example of his leaders.
For of what use is an effective fire, if it is not care-
fully directed on the most important point ? The
real difficulty of the training lies in teaching the
men to steadily follow the directions of their leader,
in spite of the (so-called) loose order, and to pre-
serve discipline. This combination of discipline with
individual action was the cause of the superiority of
the German infantry in 1870-71, and will make any
infantry superior to that of the enemy, if the latter
has not attained to the same standard.

E

50 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

This is well known among us even in the highest
ranks, and all the changes which have been made
in the regulations, as shown by the infantry regula-
tions of the 1st of March 1876, point to this end.
We not only see, as I have said above, the old
" column of attack " done away with altogether, and
its place taken by the " column on the centre," to
be used only as a rendezvous formation outside of
the zone of the enemy's fire. The formation in two
ranks (company columns) is in the 14th chapter
expressly laid down as the regular fighting forma-
tion, while the greater part of the regulations deal
with the application of " fighting in open order."

The changes which have been made show that
the highest authorities of our army have used the
experience of a victorious war to carry out improve-
ments, and have thus acknowledged that some
deficiencies did exist. We need not be ashamed
to own this ; we should rather glory in it. Indeed,
if we look closely into the phases of our battles, we
shall acknowledge that our infantry, especially when
they met the enemy for the first time, were exposed
to his fire in columns which were at once too strong
and too deep, and that this was the principal cause
of the heavy losses in the earlier battles. I might
for instance, as an eyewitness, make mention of the
Guard corps, though I saw it only from a distance,
since during the battle of 1 8th of August (Grave-
lotte) I stood in the centre of the line of artillery,
and thus at a considerable interval from the main
infantry fight.

However I need not enter at any length into
the details of the attack of the infantry of the

GUARD AT ST. PRIVAT 51

Guard on St. Privat, since you will already have
read and heard enough about it, and since you know
that the losses of this infantry in front of St. Privat
have been the principal cause of the many pro-
positions and experiments as to how, given that a
force acting on the offensive must cross open ground,
it may best avoid such colossal losses by means of
some other tactical formation.

You can form some idea of the terrible effect of
the fire, when I tell you that a flock of frightened
sheep which burst out from Ste. Marie and galloped
across the front of the Prussian infantry, and which
were perhaps in the dust which they raised mistaken
by the enemy for cavalry, were killed down to the
last sheep. They afforded a most welcome meal at
the bivouac of the Guard corps on the following
day. There are situations in battle in which the
hearts of men are so affected by the sense of danger,
that there is an end of all manoeuvring ; they can
move neither to the right nor the left, and can only
advance or retire. After they had once unexpectedly
come under this fire of the enemy, which they had
undervalued beforehand, only a forward movement
was to be thought of, and the officers, recognising
this, shouted nothing but, " Forward ! Get on ! "
Thus it came about that shock-tactics, which four
years before had failed before our fire, had now
apparently to be used by us. But fighting in ex-
tended order soon developed itself out of the combat
in masses, since the fearful gaps which were caused
by the enemy's bullets destroyed at once the cohesion
of all closed bodies, and broke them up into swarms
which — Honour to the Heroes ! — continued to ad-

52 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

vance, until they arrived so close to the hostile posi-
tion that they were able to answer the fire of the
foe. At this point they received the order to lie
down and to take cover (which was very imperfect)
in the folds of the ground and in the furrows, to
beat down the enemy's fire with bullets, and thus,
with the assistance of the batteries which had pressed
forward with them, to prepare the way for the
storm by a long fire-fight, for the assault could not
be fully carried out until the left wing of the XII.
corps was in a position to assist by a flank attack.

I have not watched the fighting of the infantry
of other bodies of troops with sufficient closeness to
enable me to form a settled opinion with regard to
it, but the proportions of the losses in the earlier
and the later battles give such strong evidence on
this matter, that I am inclined to believe that the
details must in general have been much the same.

The brilliant author of the work The People in
Arms comes, it is true, to another conclusion. He
cites amongst others the instance that the whole of
Werder's army, in the three days' fight on the
Lisaine, lost only as many men as a single regiment
of infantry in the battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour.
From this he concludes that the longer the duration
of a war the more does the energy with which it is
conducted fall off. I must own that, so long as the
war lasted, I noticed no falling off in the eagerness
of our troops to push on. Quite the contrary.
When General von Budritzky, on receiving the order
to storm Le Bourget, on the evening of the 29th of
October, sent in answer the following message to the
general in command : " The first shot shall be fired

CHANGES IN REGULATIONS 53

at 8 A.M. ; at 9 A.M. punctually I shall be in Le
Bourget ; " his infantry did not fail him. They
pushed on with such impetuosity that punctually at
9 o'clock he was able to step over the barricade at
the Northern entrance. But the leaders had become
more careful in the employment of fighting forma-
tions, after they had recognised that those which
had been used up to that time, and which were laid
down in the regulations, were not all suitable for
every emergency. It is certainly not desirable, as a
rule, to depart from the prescriptions of the regula-
tions, but when one sees that the conditions are
different from those upon which the regulations were
founded, it then becomes necessary to do the best
for oneself that one possibly can. But, if the needful
changes have not been made in good time, that is
to say in peace, this knowledge will be bought at
a terrible price. The changes in the regulations
which were made after the war fully recognised this
necessity.

These changes in the regulations, which are laid
down in the new edition of the 1st of March 1876,
have certainly not satisfied all who have thought
over the need for such modifications. It was scarcely
possible that they should do so, since opinions differ
so widely, while the propositions made were so many
and so clever, that some of them may be considered
as more brilliant than practical. But the new regu-
lations were founded upon the whole progress of
long-range weapons. The elasticity of the regula-
tions, the freedom which is permitted to every one
as to the formation to use in any particular case,
the margin which is allowed with regard to the

54 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

intervals between closed bodies of troops and the
firing line, and above all the formal order that the
instructions contained in them are alone to be ob-
served (which forbids the narrowing directions of
other authorities), renders it possible for leaders in
war to select always that which is right, and to adapt
their movements to the ground and to the disposi-
tions of the enemy.

LETTER V

ARE ANY MORE CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS

DESIRABLE ?

You are quite mistaken, if you gather from the close
of my last letter, in which I stated that the new
regulations are founded upon all the improvements
of the new weapons, that I desire no modifications in
them. As you will like to hear what changes I do
wish for, I will tell you at once.

In the first place, the editing of the regulations is
such that it is very difficult to find your way about
in them. The matter might be far better arranged.
It appears to me as if the members of the committee
which edited these regulations of the ist of March
1876, had not always been unanimous, and as if
they had made compromises with each other. I am
confirmed in this opinion by the fact that the regu-
lations of 1876 are not stated to be altogether new,
but are styled, " A new edition of the regulations of
the 25th of February 1847, taking into account all
modifications which have been made up to the ist
of March 1876;" thus the old plan has been re-
tained, while the various changes have been inserted
in their proper places. The consequence of this is
that, before one can get a clear idea as to the real

56 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

intentions of the regulations with regard to the most
decisive and important instructions for battle, these,
have to be collected from various parts, under the
heading of the company, the battalion and the
brigade, and have to be then compared with each
other. This considerably increases the difficulty of
the study of the regulations. It is certainly a matter
for argument, whether this is altogether a misfortune,
since an officer is thus compelled to work up the
regulations carefully if he proposes to master their
spirit ; while since, thank God, it is the case that
the regulations with all their changes and modifica-
tions are the outcome of the experience of the last
century, and not the mere fancy of any particular
moment, it is fortunate if officers are compelled to
really study them hard. But since one has to search
for instructions which are laid down in different parts
of the book, one remains doubtful about many
matters, and this is undesirable, for regulations ought
to leave no room for doubt. They ought to be
accepted as the statement of military dogma, which
is not open to criticism.

I will, for example, show you one doubtful point
by asking you : " Do the regulations permit that a
deployed battalion which is advancing in line to the
attack, with drums beating, shall halt to load, with
the object of firing volleys ? "

Para. 49 contains the directions for the advance
in line with drums beating. But this para, is part
of the loth chapter which, together with the i ith,
I 2th, and 13th chapters, deals only with the forma-
tion in three ranks. The formation for battle is not
considered until the 1 4th chapter, and this formation

QUERIES 57

is expressly stated to be in two ranks. But since in
the 14th, 15 th, and i6th chapters, which refer en-
tirely to the fighting formation, there is no mention
of the advance with drums beating, one is driven to
believe that by the regulations the advance of a
deployed battalion in line is limited to the formation
in three ranks, and that this movement is to be used
only as a test of good drill, and that on the other
hand the advance of a battalion in line for the
purpose of firing volleys is a movement which, owing
to the improvement of the infantry weapon, cannot
possibly occur and ought not to be attempted in
battle, that is to say, within reach of the enemy's
effective fire. After having arrived at this opinion,
we come upon para. '^'^^ which contradicts it at its
very beginning with the words : " The charge with
the bayonet will be carried out by a battalion
advancing in line, etc. etc. ; " though in all that has
gone before there has been no mention of a battalion
advancing in line from the first fighting position.
According to these words the regulations do not
declare it impossible that a battalion may advance
in line in battle. But nothing is laid down as to
" how " this advance is to be made when the forma-
tion is in two ranks, or as to whether the drums are
to follow in rear, or the colours to lead the way.

Allow me to allude to another doubtful point :
" May the word of command : ' Halt, to load ! ' be
given to a battalion advancing in line?" This
word of command is mentioned only in para. 43,
as applicable to a closed detachment which pushes
» forward into the firing line as a support to the
skirmishers of a company. One would think that

58 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

when a battalion advances in line with the object of
opening fire, it would rather be a question of not
losing a second before answering the formidable fire
which will meet it. But there is nothing laid down
in the regulations on this point, and one is left in
doubt as to whether this evolution is generally per-
missible.

I must honestly own that I have never troubled
my head much about this doubt, for I am entirely
convinced that the advance of a battalion in line
within the zone of fire, as also the word of command
to the whole battalion : " Halt, to load ! " can never
take place in war, and that if an officer commanding
a battalion should attempt it, he would find it im-
possible to carry out. But the more such an officer
is convinced of the sacred inviolability of the regula-
tions, the more will he, when drilling his battalion,
be troubled by this doubt, since he cannot tell
whether he ought, must, or should practise such a
movement. If he practises it and his superior officer
does not approve of it, he will be told that he has
not followed the regulations ; if he leaves it alone
and the superior officer asks to see it, his battalion
will be held to be insufficiently drilled. Such a
doubt as this is therefore an evil, since it destroys
all confidence in the regulations ; for this reason the
latter ought to be drawn up more clearly.

Another wish, which I cannot refrain from ex-
pressing, is yet more important. When I consider
that the formation in which our infantry will in future
generally fight at the most decisive moments is a
line of skirmishers, it is in my opinion of no import-
ance whatever whether the closed formation, in

TWO RANKS OR THREE ? 59

which the supports and the columns move, is in two
or in three ranks. I therefore think that we might
return to one single formation for all closed bodies
of infantry. We have now two formations. That
in three ranks is the normal formation ; the regula-
tions themselves call that in two ranks the " fighting
formation." Is it not an anomaly that our normal
formation should not be applicable to battle ? Dur-
ing the whole of the last war no one ever saw
infantry move in any other formation than that in
two ranks, and the first occasion on which I again
saw the infantry in three ranks was at the parade at
Longchamp, after the conclusion of the preliminaries
of peace. How much more simple and intelligible
would the regulations be, if we had only one kind of
formation !

This system of two formations springs from the
time when we used only the men of the third rank
as skirmishers. But since the introduction of the
breech-loader every man is instructed with equal
care in his duty, and as firearms have been so
improved that decisive struggles can be fought out
in open order only, while closed masses can only
exceptionally be moved within the reach of the
enemy's fire, there is now no reason why the fighting
formation should differ in any way from the normal
one.

I desire therefore, above all, that the regulations
shall lay down only one kind of formation, either
that in two ranks or that in three.

I have found that this twofold formation leads
to many inconveniences. It is of no little im-
portance for battle that the division of the company

6o LETTERS ON INFANTRY

into sections, half-sections, and squads shall be
permanent But if a company falls in in three
ranks, and then changes into two, owing to the firing
section being found by the third rank, the entire
hierarchy of the system of command is broken up.
If, on the other hand, the division into squads is
based on the formation in two ranks, then the
normal formation in three ranks is a mere chimera,
or at any rate it ceases to be the normal formation.
During the war one naturally divided the company
into squads, etc., according to the formation in two
ranks, since one always marched, stood, and fought
in that formation.

But even in peace this twofold formation has the
disadvantage, that it uselessly entails the expenditure
of a great deal of time, which is thus lost for instruc-
tion. In the first place, it takes a long while to
make clear to the recruits the elementary fact that
he belongs now to this and now to that section, and
that he has to pay attention to and obey now this
and now that N.C. officer or officer. Moreover, not
a few drill instructors take an especial pride in
taking up formations and in performing evolutions
with the skirmishing sections out, and in then
forming them into the third rank again, and all
this without losing step. The regulations certainly
forbid that this change from one formation to
the other shall in any battalion be made the subject
of an inspection. But the men of " the good old
school," and those zealous persons who take them
as a pattern, practise it enthusiastically at company
drill with every possible complication. You may
hear the words of command given in the following

COMPLICATIONS OF DRILL 6i

order : " Column on the right !" then " Quick March !"
then " Form company column ! " " By sections
wheel!" "Form the third rank!" "Right-about
turn !" " Form company column !" " Quick March !"
" Left turn ! " and then again, " Form the third
rank!" and all sorts of similar ingenious fancies,
which are found only on the drill ground, being the
product of a heated brain, which is itself the con-
sequence of cold feet. When a drill instructor of
this kind did not succeed, by means of the most
extraordinary combinations, in getting his men into
a state of hopeless confusion, his face shone with
the same delight as is felt by the victor in a pitched
battle. When I saw this sort of thing, I could not
help praising the zeal of the drill instructor and the
longsuffering of the men, but neither could I help
asking : " What on earth is the use of it all ?"
I was generally told that its object was to make
the men smart. But some old drill instructors who
had carried out these manoeuvres from their youth
up, while they still retained the conviction that drill
ought to be the means of training men for battle,
have acknowledged that a change of formation made
in step had no effect whatever in making the men
smart. They simply called it " a proof of drill,"
carried out in order to throw dust into people's eyes,
and confessed that it was liable to fail at once, if the
specially drilled flank men of sections were changed
(for example, if the right-hand man of the company
was sick) ; they drilled for the pleasure of drilling.
A great deal of time and trouble was thus wasted
upon a practice which did not in the least improve
the men. But this waste of time would no longer

62 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

take place if we had only one kind of formation.
A far better way to make the men smart at drill is
by often drilling the company as is laid down in
para. 43 of the regulations, without keeping each man
to his one special place in the ranks ; unfortunately
you very seldom see this done.

You ask me for which formation, that in two or
that in three ranks, I should decide if I had the
choice ? No, you do not ask anything of the kind.
You take it as a matter of course that I prefer that
in two ranks. But think a moment ! You are
quite wrong about me. In the first place, I might
say that it appears to me a matter of no importance
whether masses are formed in two or three ranks.
Thus said one of the highest authorities in our army,
when I put this question to him ; he meant to say,
because infantry now fight only in extended order.
But if I must give a decision on this point, I decide
for the formation in three ranks. I think that, even
in skirmishing, the file of three men, who are bound
to hold together and support each other, is better
than the file of two. For if the file consists of two
men, as soon as one is wounded the other is left
alone. There are further other considerations which
are all in favour of the formation in three ranks.
A company formed in two ranks is too long when
it is at war-strength, and this considerably increases
the difficulty of command, if the captain or the
sergeant-major has to give an order to the whole
company. All the other columns (in sections, or
in half- sections) seem to me more handy in the
formation in three ranks, and they can also adapt
themselves better to the ground ; in any case they

THREE RANKS 63

are not so deep, since the section interval is less ;
and the length of the column when marching by-
files is shorter.

I can think of no disadvantages which would
result from this formation. If a closed support or
a whole company found itself in a position to fire
volleys, the formation in three ranks would not in
any way diminish the effect of the volleys. Our
regulations even recognise volley-firing in four ranks.
On the contrary a body of troops formed in three
ranks is more easily controlled than one in two
ranks, and this is of importance when many volleys
have to be fired, and the target and the sight have
therefore to be changed.

But some drill instructor may ask me. How are
we to extend, when a battalion advances in line,
without causing gaps in the line ; for example, at
the word "Extend!" when the leading half-sections
of companies are thrown forward ? With a full
recognition of the evil which might result from this,
I should lay down that a closed battalion which is
advancing, whether in column or in line, should, at
the word " Extend ! " always throw out the two flank
half- sections of the whole battalion, then the two
next, and so on. It is true that the intervals be-
tween two neighbouring battalions advancing in line
will be thus greater than they now are ; but that in
my opinion would matter little, considering the
present range of the infantry weapon, especially if
we take into account that we shall never again see
several closed battalions marching in one line against
an actual enemy ; this will only take place in the
second or third line.

64 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

There are thus many things to be said in favour
of the formation in three ranks ; I do not know
one in favour of that in two. Yet stay ! You
may perhaps say, the Square ! You must be joking !
1 have studied the official accounts of 1866 and
1870-71 with care, and in all the six volumes have
not found a single case mentioned in which Prussian
infantry have formed square, with the exception of
Des Barres' battalion (the ist battalion of the i ith
Grenadier regiment) at Langensalza. All the other
cavalry charges have been repulsed without forming
square. I may therefore well be pardoned for not
having thought of the Square.

Another suggestion which I should offer, if I ever
sat on a committee on the regulations, would be the
suppression of the " Shoulder arms ! " The Austrian
infantry prove to us that it is possible to come from
the " Slope " to the " Present," while sentries might,
as in Austria, salute by presenting instead of by
shouldering arms. The march-past with shouldered
arms should also be given up. If you wonder why
I am an enemy of the system of shouldering arms, I
will ask you to watch recruits at drill and convince
yourself how much time and trouble it takes to teach
the soldier this motion, and how much skill is needed,
that firstly, the butts shall not be too far to the front
and thus spoil the whole appearance of the ranks,
and secondly, that the rifle shall not, owing to the
butts being too far to the rear, overbalance from
the shoulder and lean to the front. Now as to the
march -past with shouldered arms ! Though with
the greatest care and trouble the troops have been
taught a good, free, natural and easy march, we

" SHOULDER ARMS ! " 65

shall find that, owing to the discomfort of carrying
the arms at the shoulder, and owing to the balance
which must be preserved in order that the right
hand may hold the small of the butt and not the
knob of the lock, the step will become shorter, more
constrained, and more tiring ; this will be caused
principally by the tendency of the men to lean back-
wards, in order that the rifles may rest against their
shoulders. Marching with shouldered arms must
therefore be practised hundreds and hundreds of
times before it can become free and natural. What
an immense amount of valuable time, which might
be usefully employed, is lost in this ! Against the
abolition of the " Shoulder " you may perhaps urge
that this motion exercises the muscles and thus
tends to give a smart bearing to the men. I should
certainly be the last to propose to give up any of
the peculiar rigid bearing of our army, since that is
the source of our admirable discipline and is also
the outward expression of obedience. But I think
that just as good a bearing might be obtained with
the " Slope," and I believe that the saving of time
in instruction, time which might then be used for
tactical improvement, would be so great, that it
would be worth while to train a battalion, once as
an experiment, without the " Shoulder Arms ! " while
the others should be drilled as now. If the rigidity
of movement of this battalion fell off, even in the
smallest degree, I should be prepared to let my idea
drop.

With the same object of saving time by abolishing
such things as appear to me to be of no use, I should
lay down that the manual exercise, wheels, and

F

66 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

dressing by the rear should be practised at company
drill only. The regulations already forbid closed
columns to be used for drill or inspection by any
body of troops larger than a company. If only this
prohibition might be extended to the manual exercise,
wheels, and dressing by the rear ! We now not only
see the officer commanding a battalion assiduously
practising the manual exercise and wheels with his
own battalion (which indeed he must do, since it is
so ordered in the regulations), but we even find
brigadiers who have a taste for that sort of thing
making all their 6 battalions do the manual exercise
simultaneously in such a manner that the whole
brigade shall move together. There is nothing
about this in the regulations, and yet you may often
see it done. The officers commanding regiments
and battalions must fully rehearse this with their
commands, in order that all may go smartly. I at
one time thought that it was a proof of a narrow mind,
when I found a brigadier practising this sort of thing,
but I have seen some men do it who were well known
to be intelligent ; when I put to them my constant
and very annoying question : " What is the use of
it ? " I received the answer that it was traditional
and that every brigadier did it. A great deal of
time is thus also put to waste.

But in these days time is money ; and this is
true not only for English tradesmen, but also for the
Prussian army. I think that we take up as much
of our drill season by the manual exercise by the
battalion, by the " Shoulder Arms ! " and by our
double formation in two and three ranks as, adding
it all together, would amount to six weeks in the

UNLOADING ej

year, or at least to six or eight weeks in the three
years of service. How excellently we might employ
this time in moving across country during the
winter when all the fields are covered with snow and
we can therefore go where we like, or in working
with companies in disorder/ or in practising marches,
or in any other similar practical tactical exercises,
for which we now lack time and opportunity.

I may finally be permitted to draw attention to
a slight omission which I have noticed in the detailed
instructions of the regulations. There is in fact no
exact order with regard to the manner of unloading
the rifle. A rifle is frequently fired during unloading.
If the men then have their arms at the " order," the
next man may very probably be hit, as soldiers often
hold their arms slanting while unloading. If they
unload in the ordinary loading position, the front
ranks are in some danger. It is best, as I have
proved with the division which was under my com-
mand, to unload at the " slope."

^ The words used are '■'■ unrangirter Kompagnie." This means
that the men have fallen in promiscuously, and not in their customary
places. — N.L. IV.

LETTER VI

ON COMPANY EXERCISES

You have completely misjudged me, since you have
gathered from the desires which I have expressed
with regard to some modification of the regulations,
that I wish that the exactness and the precision of
the drill should be somewhat relaxed. Quite the
contrary ! When I said that I should wish that the
manual exercise, wheels, etc., should be no longer
practised by battalions, and that these units should
not be inspected in them, I desired so much the
more on this account that everything should be
worked out and studied with even greater care
during the training of the company. It is entirely
because I am anxious that the details of the regula-
tions should be more strictly carried out that I
should like to see these regulations cut down to what
is strictly necessary, so that they might be worked
out and studied as exactly as possible by the very
smallest units, and that thus the elementary portion
of the exercises might reach its climax in the
company, instead of, as at present, in the battalion.
For the manner of fighting which has become
necessary, owing to the improvements in firearms,
allows us no longer to work or to deal with the

COMPANY TRAINING 69

battalion, of which the place is taken by the company,
as we may learn from the plan of any battle and
from the maps in the official account. The company
has thus become the practical tactical unit, though for
the sake of convenience we still reckon by battalions,
for the reason that a company has too little fire
power to last and melts away too quickly in battle.
The careful training of the company should there-
fore be a matter of the greatest solicitude, since the
drill of the battalion goes a little above elementary,
and more or less enters upon the sphere of applied,
tactics.

For this reason I have always maintained that the

drill of a company should occupy itself rather with

the " how " than with the " what," whereas in the

exercise of a battalion the opposite is the case. The

officer commanding a company very rarely finds

himself in war in a position to make great tactical,

and still less strategical, evolutions. His objective,

whether in the offensive or the defensive, is as a rule

very clearly marked out for him. But the struggle,

so far as he can influence it, is decided by Jiozv he

carries out his work, by how his men take advantage

of the ground, how they find cover, how they shoot,

and whether they hit, and how they obey his signals

and orders with regard to advancing, lying down,

aiming, and the nature of fire. The more therefore

that the centre of gravity of the struggle rests upon

the independent action of individuals, the more do

we need discipline, by which I mean that intelligent

obedience which welds this independence of many

individuals into a concentrated whole, and into a real

power. Have we not all quite recently received a

70 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

proof that all the inventions of modern times, breech-
loaders, mitrailleuses, and rifled guns are useless
against that most primitive weapon, the spear, when
no discipline governs their action. I refer to the
annihilation of Baker's troops at Suakim. For we
cannot assert that an Egyptian is a coward by
nature. The armies of Mehemet Ali and of Ibrahim
have proved the contrary in the first half of this
century.

I consider therefore that it is necessary, when
dealing with a unit up to and including a company,
to pay attention only to the correct execution of
such things as are ordered. If the officer command-
ing the company reaches this standard, he will have
sufficiently employed his capability of instructing
and supervising. I cannot, on the other hand, think
it right that scientific tactical evolutions should be
carried out at company drill. But we do see, and
not rarely, fancy movements, which are quite unlike
anything which could possibly happen in actual
battle. For instance, you may see an exercise
carried out which consists in sending one section
against the front of the enemy, while the second
attacks him on one, and the third on the other flank,
until at last he is hemmed in, on the exact pattern
of the battle of Sedan ; but in practice we shall
never find an enemy at once so indolent and so
complaisant. False ideas are thus excited, spring-
ing directly from impossible representations of
fighting during peace. As a man works his company
during peace so will he try to work it, at any rate
the first time, in war. If the result does not come
up to his expectations it is practically a failure. For

FLANK A TTA CKS 7 1

this reason a " Turk," as a complicated manoeuvre
has been nicknamed by some wag, should be banished
from all company exercises, which are carried out
only on the level drill ground or barrack square.

It is quite true that pressure on a flank has now
tenfold power. I have repeatedly seen this in war,
not only on a large scale, as when at Koniggratz
we of the II. army fell upon the flank of the Austrian
line of battle, but also in the case of small bodies.
For example, in the battle of St. Privat we were for
hours engaged in a delaying action of artillery in
front of the enemy's position, which crowned the
heights between St. Privat and Amanvillers. The
enemy had pushed forward some battalions extended
as skirmishers down the slope to their front ; the fire
of these troops caused so much loss to my batteries,
that the General commanding the corps sent me
successively 6 companies as an escort ; these were
for the most part distributed by sections in the
intervals between the batteries, in order to prevent
the enemy's swarms from rushing in against our front,
as our skirmishers had done at Koniggratz in the
attack on the Austrian artillery line between Chlum
and Nedelitz. But the French skirmishers remained
at a distance of from 900 to 1000 paces, and
continued to inflict loss upon us, while our needle-
gun could not hit their scattered individuals. The
brave infantry soldiers of the Augusta regiment
wished over and over again to rush forward, in
order to free us from our troublesome vis -a- vis.
But since I had been ordered to carry on a delaying
fight for a time, and since the infantry who could
advance were fewer in number than the enemy, and

72 LE7 TERS ON INFANTR V

would have masked the batteries by their advance,
so that the latter would have had to cease firing, I
several times stopped this premature valour. Major
von R. then suggested to me that a company might
be pushed forward by a hollow in the ground upon
the enemy's left flank. Since this movement did
not mask my fire, I permitted it to be carried out.
Hardly had this company (Captain von A.'s) opened
fire from the prolongation of the enemy's line of
skirmishers than the whole line rose and retired up
the slope. Now at last we were able to see how
large were the numbers of the hostile infantry who,
hidden in the furrows of the ground, had laid wait
for us in such threatening propinquity. We reckoned
them as being in all 9 battalions, which lay in three
lines one behind the other. Our shells wrought
great destruction among these masses, as they fled
up the slope. Since, by great good luck, the general
advance on St. Privat took place immediately after
this episode my batteries now found the ground open
in front of them, were able to advance at a rapid
pace, and to reach the heights to the right of St.
Privat. Thus the sudden flank fire of one single
company had made 9 of the enemy's battalions fall
back. The effect of such a flank fire is magical,
especially owing to the idea which seizes the enemy
when they are surprised by it, that they are in serious
danger.

' But this effect can be produced only when either
the direction of the advance leads directly against
the enemy's flank, or when folds of the ground, to
which the foe has paid no attention, give an oppor-
tunity for it. In very rare cases will the force

HANDLING THE RIFLE 73

which can carry out such a flanking movement be
less than a company ; while the company which
does carry it out, will as far as it is itself concerned
make a frontal attack. The highest aim for instruc-
tion which a company can select for itself will there-
fore be an exact regulation frontal attack ; at the
most it may add slight changes of front, the rein-
forcement of the fighting line, the withdrawal of
men from that line, good fire discipline, and the most
accurate use of its rifles.

This, as I have said, will give the officer com-
manding a company enough to do, if during the
drill season he drives it thoroughly into his men.
But this need not prevent any captain of a company,
during the manoeuvres or in war, from skilfully
taking advantage of the ground in order, when pos-
sible, to gain the enemy's flank, and from making a
frontal attack with his excellently trained company
upon the flank, rather than against the front of the
foe.

Every infantry officer knows how hard it is to
teach the men to handle their rifles correctly. It is
not sufficient that the soldier should know what he
is to do with his rifle ; no, he must also make use
of this knowledge instinctively without having to
think what he ought to do. I will only remind you
of the need for careful attention to the bolting and
unbolting of the safety apparatus. Just as the
sportsman, befores he fires, without thinking mechan-
ically cocks his gun, so the infantry soldier must,
before Jie fires, mechanically but correctly, slowly
and without a jerk, unbolt the safety lock, and must
again bolt his loaded rifle when the fire has ceased.

74 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

He must be one with his rifle, and must know
whether it is loaded or not without being obliged
to look to see. He must mechanically, and without
having to think, come correctly to the "present,"
and he must be quite unable to pull the trigger in
any other way than slowly and without a jerk.

It is unfortunately a common fault of drill in-
structors, when teaching the handling of arms, to
attach greater importance to the working together,
and to the resounding slap on the butt (to which
every sergeant v/ould like to join an " Eyes left ! "),
than to the skilful use of the rifle in accordance with
the regulations. Even under the very best drill
instructors it is a long time before the correct
handling of his arms becomes second nature to a
soldier. He must practise it hundreds and thousands
of times. But it miLst become second nature to him,
for when the mind of an ordinary man is affected by
the knowledge that his life is in danger, he does
only that which is made natural to him by constant
practice ; it is impossible to expect much at such a
moment from his powers of reflection.

This is also true of fire discipline. I have very
often observed how in battle, in the presence of
danger, fire discipline falls to pieces. Troops which
are not properly instructed do not aim ; they do
not even shoot ; they simply make a noise. Even
before I had ever seen an action, men with experience
of war assured me, that it was a proof of a certain
standard of training in infantry, if in a hot fight
they put their rifles to their shoulders before firing.
During the battle of Koniggratz I witnessed some
most irregular fire which, as the rifles were held

FIRE DISCIPLINE 75

vertical, all went up into the air. I was galloping
on in front of my batteries, in order to select the
next position to which to lead them. When I, ac-
companied by my major, some aides-de-camp,
orderlies, and a trumpeter, reached the heights, I
found myself within about twenty or thirty paces of a
mass of the enemy's infantry of the strength of about
half a battalion ; they had been turned out of Chlum,
which lay on our right, and wanted to get to Nedelist
on our left, and thus found themselves between our
infantry, who had already advanced beyond them,
and my line of artillery. They were as much sur-
prised as we were, and thought that our group of ten
to twelve horsemen were the Staff leading a charge
of cavalry. At least they opened an irregular fire. I
was quite close, and I saw most of the bullets go
straight up into the air. Only one man took aim,
and hit the major's horse in the body as he turned
to retire ; for we few horsemen could not certainly
attack 500 infantry with the sword ; so we hurried
back to our batteries and opened fire on them.

But how far more difficult than even this it is
to teach infantry during the excitement of battle to
attend to words of command and cautions, as to on
which target, with what sight, and with what descrip-
tion of fire they are to act, whether they are to use
volleys or independent fire, and moreover to accustom
them to cease firing when they have expended the
stated number of cartridges in independent fire. But
every one who has seen even only field firing on a
range knows that the effect of our costly infantry
arm is nil unless the words of command and the
cautions which are given be obeyed.

76 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Certainly much has been done to simplify the
use of the rifle. I especially refer to the flat tra-
jectory which, when the enemy is so close that in-
dependent fire alone is possible (since the fight then
rages so hotly), permits of the use of a single sight,
provided that aim is taken at the bottom of the
target, i.e. at the feet of the enemy. But if, as I
have shown above, it implies a certain degree of fire
discipline when the men will even bring their arms
to the " present " before firing, how much more will
be needed before they can be made to aim at the
bottom of the target.

In other respects also the excellent instructions
which are given by the school of musketry demand
an extreme amount of self-restraint from men who
are highly excited by battle.^ Among these I in-
clude the limitation of the number of cartridges and
the periodical cessation of fire when a rapid fire is
ordered, that is to say, when the enemy is within
decisive range. It is asking very much of a man
who is under the enemy's fire, to expect him to
cease fire in return for a certain space of time. I
have under various circumstances experienced with
artillery how difficult it was to make the fire cease,
when this appeared desirable in order to allow the
smoke to disperse, with a view to make observation
possible. A fire which has once commenced gets
easily "out of hand" unless an iron discipline prevails.
How much more difficult must this be in the case of
infantry, where the men firing are so much more
numerous. It is so natural, so human, that the
soldier should find comfort in the noise which his
1 The latest musketry instructions contain decided simplifications.

SWAIiM VOLLEYS 77

rattling rifle makes. The less a man is trained the
more is he inclined to " shoot up his pluck." During
the first campaign in which I took part, I was present
at an unimportant affair of outposts, after which a
lieutenant inspected the pouches of his men. The
older soldiers had fired three, four, or five rounds, but
all the recruits had expended over twenty. If we take
such facts into account some little doubt will steal
into our hearts as to whether the word of command
" Five cartridges rapid fire " can ever be obeyed in
close fighting under 300 yards. This word of com-
mand or warning was not introduced among us until
after the last campaign. It has not yet been actually
tried on active service.

Another kind of fire discipline has been tried by
us since the last war ; namely, that of swarm volleys.
It seems to me, as a gunner, very advantageous to
keep in hand in this way the fire of the infantry,
just as well-fought batteries act with concentrated
strength. This sort of fire proved itself often very
good at the manoeuvres, where the men are allowed
to expend only ten or fifteen -cartridges each, and
where the smaller charge of the blank cartridges makes
less noise. But matters turned out very differently
when it came to the fire of masses in field firing.
The officers then, owing to the greater noise made
by the ball cartridges, had to raise their voices much
more if they hoped to be heard or understood ;
indeed most of them before the end of the practice
were so hoarse that no one could understand a word
they said. It is evident that this will be the case, if
you realise that a section extended as skirmishers
has a greater width of front than a closed company,

78 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

while the lieutenants are on foot, and cannot there-
fore so easily superintend the whole line, as can the
commander of a company or of a battalion who is
mounted.

It is still more doubtful how far it will be possible
to ensure a distinct order, and its execution, to use
two or three different sights, as has been laid down
under certain conditions. For there will very rarely
be sufficient time to see that such orders are correctly
carried out. However, this point is not of such ex-
treme importance, since the use of different sights is
only laid down for long ranges, at which, as a rule,
no fire will be opened. Recourse will be had to
this system only when particularly compact and
deep targets present themselves within the zone of
fire ; for example, when masses are defiling over
bridges. These are exceptional cases, and therefore
not such as decide a battle.

Theoretically accurate as are all these specula-
tions which have been started by the school of
musketry, and useful as they have been in inducing
us to study the nature of our rifle and of our infantry
fire, there is yet some little danger that we may in
time of peace be taught by them to nurse illusions,
whose non-fulfilment at the moment of battle may
have a discouraging effect.

It seems to me that a line of skirmishers which
during a hot fight pays so much attention to the
shrill whistle of the lieutenant, that it ceases firing
for a moment, looks at him, and obeys his sign to
rise and rush on, or his order to fire on another
target or with another sight, proves at once that
it has attained to a high degree of fire discipline.

SIMPLICITY NECESSARY 79

For this reason complicated things should not be
practised too much, but the time should rather be
employed in going over simple things hundreds and
thousands of times, until they have become second
nature to the men and they cannot help doing them.
It is not until then that we can safely count upon
their being carried out before the enemy. Clause-
witz says that everything in war is simple, but that
what is simple is difficult.

But though I wish that the exercises of the
company should be limited to the simplest and
most elementary things, and that all tactical, and
above all strategical, combinations should be for-
bidden, yet I do not deny that it should follow some
tactical idea, and should, as they say, smell of powder
and ball. On the contrary, I should desire that the
officer commanding a company, when once he has
made such progress that the men know how to obey
his word of command, should as often and as long
as possible drill in such a manner that he should
seem always to have an enemy on the ground before
him. He can and should always lessen the tedious-
ness of the march to and from the drill ground by
moving in a fighting formation or with some tactical
idea, and should come on to the drill ground by
some movement which might be carried out in war
in the presence of an enemy. Even when on the
march he will frequently find an opportunity of
carrying out here a short combat of skirmishers, and
there an attack, while the remainder of the march
can be employed in impressing upon the men the
elementary forms of the duties of advanced guards,
patrols, scouts, etc. Time may thus be saved, and

So LETTERS ON INFANTRY

time is money. I gained in my division the very
best results as regards the conduct of field service,
by ordering that no troops were ever to move during
peace, whether it were to the drill ground or on an
actual march, without doing so in fighting formation
and with some distinct tactical plan.

LETTER VII

THE COMPANY OFFICER

The contents of my last letter lead me naturally to
speak of the importance of the inferior officers,
namely, the Captain of the company and the Lieu-
tenant. They are in fact the soul of the whole of
the instruction and execution of infantry duty. This
is certainly the case in the other arms also, but the
very circumstance that, while in the cavalry the
strength of a body of troops is counted by horses,
and in the artillery by guns, in the infantry alone it
is reckoned by men, shows at once that in the latter
arm the human physical element is the only im-
portant one, and that the influence of their leader
on individual men has greater prominence in the
infantry. But this influence, this guidance of
individual minds, is exercised by the Captain and
his Lieutenants, that is to say, by the company
officers. The N.C. officers are merely an aid to
them, carry out what they order, and derive from
them their authority ; while the higher ranks are
too far separated from the men and, owing to the
great number of individuals under them, cannot
possibly know the peculiarities of each. The com-
pany officer alone knows Tom and Harry, or Atkins

G

82 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

and Smith. He has instructed him, praised or
blamed him, and rewarded or punished him. This
is why the soldier confidently follows his officer in
battle, and it is his immediate commander who
electrifies him and makes him do great deeds. Who
has not seen many examples of this in war ?

On Easter Monday 1864, during an outpost
fight in front of the Dlippel forts, when it was in-
tended to attack the enemy in his rifle-pits by night,
and that our troops should occupy the latter, the
companies of the 1 8th and 8th Regiments, as is well
known, pushed on to the front instead of taking
cover, and found themselves at the break of day
close up to the forts (which were proof against a
coup de main), whence they had to retire with
considerable loss. A soldier from Upper Silesia
answered his landlord (who happened to be there as
a Knight of St. John) who had blamed him for
going so far to the front, by saying in broken
German : " But when the Lieutenant runs to the
front, we must run with him."

During a fight in a village in front of Paris a
churchyard on the flank of the village was held by
half a company. The regiment to which it belonged
had up to that time performed wonders in hard
fighting. All the greater therefore was our surprise
when an attack by the enemy cleared the church-
yard, so that we had to recover it by storm. After
the action I spoke to some of the men who had
formed the original garrison of the churchyard, and
asked them why they had abandoned it to the
enemy. They openly said : " We had no officers
left to tell us what to do, and so we went off." The

THE PR USSIAN SUB A L TERN ?>z

enemy's artillery fire had unfortunately at the very
beginning put both officers Jiors de combat ; one
was killed, and the other wounded and senseless.

But enough of examples. Every infantry officer
who has been in action could give you plenty of
them, all showing how in our army the company
officer is the soul of the infantry, that he breathes
his spirit into them, and with what unlimited confi-
dence our men follow their officers. General von
Riichel said even in the last century : " The spirit of
the Prussian army is in its officers," and this maxim
is even more true now, when the fighting masses of
infantry must at the decisive moment break up into
their smallest units, such as can be guided only by
the voice of a Lieutenant ; so much so, that whereas
I in my second letter said that there were good
grounds for asserting that not the Prussian school-
master but the Prussian N.C. officer won our battles,
I am now almost inclined to say that our victories
were due neither to the schoolmaster nor the N.C.
officer, but to the Prussian subaltern. The Lieutenant
is indeed during peace, year out and year in, the
schoolmaster of the men. I have in saying this no
wish to speak in any way slightingly of the work of
the senior officers, and I will here remark beforehand
that my later statements will show that I fully feel
their importance. And even within the limits to
which I shall keep to-day I will blunt the point of
any unfavourable interpretation which the above,
perhaps rather paradoxical, statement may suggest,
by drawing attention to the fact that all senior
officers have at one time been Lieutenants, and that
the Lieutenants hope to be some day senior officers.

84 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

But let US to-day confine ourselves specially to
the Lieutenant, or rather to the company officer
(including the Captain) of infantry, and let us ask
ourselves the question : Whence comes this influence
on the masses which generates marvels of courage,
and is so powerful that they obey his signs in the
greatest danger, even when the dispersion of closed
bodies, which is due to the new mode of fighting,
renders it impossible to watch and control each
individual man ? It arises from the indefatigable
activity of the officer, from his spotless honour, and
from his Spartan self-denial.

There used to be times of peace during which
an officer appeared to have nothing more to do than
to go on guard, to drill in the spring and summer
for a few hours of each day, and to run across
country at the manoeuvres. In those days the
Lieutenant had many nicknames, such as " street-
trotter," some of which the people still keep up.
But when do you now see a Lieutenant strolling up
and down the street? If you see him at all it will
be only at mid-day when he, while the men are at
dinner, is on his way to breakfast at some cafe or
confectioner's (for his dinner hour is 3 or 4 P.M.), or
perhaps on Sunday, when he is paying visits to his
friends. At all other times, from early in the
morning to late in the evening, he is hard at work.

When the sun shows itself above the horizon he
has to look after his men to see that they are clean
and that everything is in order, and also to give
them instruction on such points if they need it.
After that he has to teach and drill each individual
man in various details. Gymnastics and drill, the

MUSKETRY 85

handling of arms and musketry, field service and
interior economy, he has to teach them all, while in
each of them he must be a model to the men, since
they will not learn anything unless the officer knows
it better than they do. In this manner he is hard
at work during the whole day. Any one who only
now and then, as he passes by, glances at the drill
ground, may perhaps think that these simple exercises
can easily be learnt in a few hours. The infantry
officer knows how much trouble and work they need,
and any one who, without prejudice, has read my
earlier letters, will acknowledge it, even though he is
not a soldier, especially when he thinks of how much
time must be given to musketry instruction. A
company fires from 15,000 to 20,000 rounds per
annum at a target, and not a single shot may be
fired unless an officer be present ; he is responsible
for all measures of precaution, and each shot must
be entered under his eyes in the practice report. A
company has rarely more than two officers available
for this duty. What a demand this must make upon
the nerves, the stamina, and the sense of duty of an
officer, for he must never weary and never allow his
attention to wander, while he has to stand for many
hours together in all kinds of weather, in winter as
well as in summer, in snow and frost, as well as in
sweltering heat, and shot after shot, has to watch the
manner in which a man aims, to see that all due
precautions are taken, and that each score is correctly
entered. For if there is the slightest neglect, an
accident may easily happen, and then the responsible
officer will be sent before a court-martial. Moreover,
he often has to carry out this duty against the will,

S6 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

and under the opposition of the civilian population,
and even of the civil authorities. For it has
sometimes happened that the local authorities have
presumed to officially forbid the continuation of
the practice, because some rifle has been by accident
fired up into the air, and the ground behind the butts
is not considered safe. Indeed, the zone of infantry
fire is now very deep. We have had men wounded
in action by chance shots, at a range of 4000 paces
from the enemy's skirmishing line. •

Many people imagine that a Lieutenant is at
leisure when he has completed his work of the
morning and the afternoon, and goes to his dinner
at 4 P.M. On the contrary ! Hardly has he
finished his dinner than he has to give theoretical
instruction to either the N.C. officers or the men.
The soldier in the Fliegender Blatter certainly
says that theoretical instruction is that which is not
practical, but a subaltern laughs at this as a good
joke, all the more heartily that he knows that it is
only exceptionally true. In military matters, this
kind of instruction is absolutely necessary, while it is
not confined to military matters only. Many things
are taught which are of the greatest use to a man
when he leaves the service, while the {^\n men who
join unable to read or write are then taught to do
so. Many men learn more with their regiment than
they did during the whole of their time at school. I
remember when I was a Lieutenant, we had a recruit
whose education had been totally neglected, but who
was otherwise clever enough ; I taught him reading,
writing, and arithmetic, and he became first a
sergeant, and afterwards a paymaster's clerk. The

THE CAPTAIN 87

results obtained by regimental instruction are far
more marked than those of any school, since the
average age of the men is over 20 years, and they
therefore work harder, and understand better the use
of instruction than school children do. For this
reason also they feel more attachment to the in-
structor of their riper years, and are willing to follow
his orders through toil and danger, if only he will
set them the example.

But even this is not all that a subaltern has to
do. In addition to the duties of his profession he
must study that profession itself. He must exercise
himself at gymnastics, he must read, he must speak
at discussions, in addition to attending among the
audience at all regimental meetings, he must send in
memorandums on various subjects, and must take a
part in the tactical war-game. His evenings, after
he has finished the instruction of the men, are three
or four times a week employed in this manner, so
that the remaining evenings only are available for
recreation and for intercourse with his family or his
comrades. The demands made upon the subaltern
officers are increasing to such an extent, that when
one of them succeeds in getting into the War
Academy, he looks upon the time spent there in
earnest and hard study as a relaxation from the
burden of regimental duty.

But of the company officers the Captain is even
harder worked than the subaltern. He shares all
the fatigue of his officers, and while the latter have
to do special duties, he has to go from one to the
other to supervise them, and, in the case of the
inexperienced younger subalterns, to instruct them

88 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

and teach them their work. When he returns home
to his family, or hopes for an hour of rest, his
sergeant-major appears and reports to him, to-day
some crime which he must carefully inquire into,
punish, and enter in the defaulters' book, and to-
morrow some question connected with pay. On
another day he must go to the clothing-store to issue
uniform, or perhaps he has to stop disorderly conduct
in the barrack rooms ; for down to the smallest
detail he is answerable for everything which concerns
his company, and must have everything at his fingers'
end. It has thus become a proverb that the life of
an officer commanding a company is not his own,
since he never has time to enjoy it.

I know very well that the same ranks in the
other arms are quite as hard worked. But the
subaltern of infantry has to run about on foot, while
the cavalry and artillery officer rides, and is thus
saved very great fatigue at drills and manoeuvres.
The former therefore expends far more strength at
his work.

But these exertions and fatigues would not of
themselves alone enable the officer to obtain such an
enormous influence over the mass of his men, if he
did not cling so fast as he does to his stainless
honour, and unless the private soldier knew that he
could entirely trust himself to this spotless honour
of his officer. The soldier recognises that in this
respect the officer is superior to him ; he does not
ask the officer to set him a good example, for he
knows that he will do so, and that to maintain this
honour he will always be to the front in danger ;
thence arises a feeling of attachment, and of the im-

SENSE OF HONOUR 89

possibility of leaving his officer in the lurch, and
thence also that spirit among the men which finds
its expression in " When the Lieutenant runs to the
front, we must run with him." I should have to
write volumes if I wished to state how far the
influence of the sense of honour among the officers
extends in this respect, while to do so to you would
be to carry owls to Athens. The elevated stand-
point which the honour of an officer occupies is the
object of the highest esteem on the part of all
educated civilians, and is the object of the envy of
all those who desire to destroy our existing social
and political institutions. How they rejoice and
shout when, quite as an exception, it happens that
one or another out of the tens of thousands disgraces
himself How full the papers are of it for a long
time, and how vainly do they endeavour to involve
the whole service in the shame. Vainly, I say, for
the service is stainless. It casts out such an individual
from its ranks without any regard to consequences,
and without ever allowing him to return ; and it
gains in position by this openness and disregard of
consequences, since it does not hypocritically display
a mere outward garment of honour, but clearly shows
its inward determination to hold fast to its reputa-
tion.

There can be no better evidence of the spotless
honour of officers as a class than the bitter hatred
of such men as, being themselves destitute of all
honour, wish to destroy everything which the bonds
of the family and the Fatherland have hallowed.
But we ask those who, even though they are not
military men, yet desire the stability of these bonds,

90 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

to give a noble answer. We hear much of the
envy which is felt of the privileged class of officers,
yet every citizen is proud if he can number an
officer among the members of his family, and every
one is glad to receive an officer into his house, while
every place which officers frequent is, from that
fact alone, assumed to be one where a good tone
prevails.

I know very well that as far as regards the
question of honour there is no difference between
officers of infantry and those of the other arms, and
I hope that the latter will not blame me for having
spoken especially of the infantry while touching on
this point. For the officers of infantry are in the
greatest number, and, moreover, they are the best
examples of the third reason upon w^iich the influence
of the officers over the men depends, i.e. in their
Spartan self-denial, while this self-denial, necessitating
great efforts, is an expression of their sense of
honour. There are certainly many officers in the
cavalry who are as frugal as those of the infantry,
but we find as a rule that officers who are well off
prefer the cavalry, and these do not have to exercise
the same self-denial.

On the other hand, the greater number of infantry
officers are poor, sadly poor, and the pay which re-
compenses their ceaseless activity is extremely small,
so small that the greatest statesman of his time
among us spoke, when he was a deputy, of the
" splendid misery " of a subaltern. Even now the
pay of a Lieutenant is so exceedingly scanty, that
any one who does not receive assistance from his
family undergoes the most bitter privations, which

POVERTY OF OFFICERS 91

he endures silently in his quarters, while publicly
he keeps up the position of his rank.

It cannot be denied that many families, when
they allow their sons to select a military career,
contrive by some means to give them assistance in
money as long as they are subalterns. But many
cannot do this. I have known young officers who
joined from the Cadet corps, whose mothers, them-
selves the widows of officers, could once and for all
assist them in their new rank with only the sum of
fifteen shillings and an old coat belonging to their
father ; others I have known, of a good, old, and
noble family, who had not even these fifteen shillings,
and whose sisters counted upon some assistance
from their pay as Lieutenants. Thus it happens
sometimes that an officer who has in the evening
been invited to tea with a family, shows such an
appetite for bread and butter as amuses every one,
while later on, when things are going better with
him, he may, perhaps, own that the reason that he
was so hungry on that evening was that, being very
hard up, he had eaten nothing all that day.
Another again, for his evening meal, will buy ration
bread from his batman, who is much better off than
he is, giving as his reason that it is good for his
health, but reajly because it is the cheapest. It is
scarcely necessary to say that these officers freeze in
their rooms, for they have no money to buy fuel,
and that they do not wear their cloaks in the coldest
weather, because if they did they would wear out
their coats too quickly ; they give out that they
dislike to wear such warm clothes. But if it is a
question of appearing in the streets or on parade, or

92 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

if he has to go into society, then our Spartan is the
best dressed and the gayest of all. Do not tell me
that there are exceptions to this rule, and that there
are officers who, infected with the generally prevailing-
love of pleasure, waste their money, and the property
of their families, and at last come to grief. How
could it be possible but that here and there an
officer should suffer from the prevailing epidemic ?
But the exceptions prove the rule, while the sensa-
tion which such exceptions excite, is the greatest
possible proof that we expect Spartan manners in
our subalterns, and that we find them.

But how does the private soldier feel with regard
to such an officer? He is filled, not with pity, but
with admiration. He hears at once from the batmen^
his comrades, of the circumstances of the officer.
And when he sees that the Lieutenant is compara-
tively poorer and worse paid than he is himself, and
that he can afford himself less enjoyment and fewer
pleasures, but that at the same time he is his master
in knowledge and acquirements, and is a model for
him in danger, how can he help being seized with
emulation ?

Indeed a Lieutenant is very badly paid. A
skilled artisan, whether he be a locksmith, a cabinet-
maker, a turner, or a shoemaker, earns more in a week
than a subaltern, to say nothing of such trades as
require special technical knowledge, and which are
far better paid. Why then is it that our Spartan
does his duty ? Why does he expend the cost of
his elementary instruction, which would fit him for
any other career ; why does he show an extra-
ordinary and unresting activity in peace ; why does

JEALOUSY 93

he give his blood and his hfe in war ; when after all
this he can expect no recompense ? He is influenced
only by his desire for fame and glory, and by the
high position which the spotlessness of his true
honour wins for him in the society of all men.

So long as the rank of an officer holds, even in
the case of Lieutenants, this exceptionally honourable
position, which in spite of his youth gives him the
entry into all circles of society, so long will it retain
its force of attraction for the most cultured classes.
If this position were taken away the very highest
rates of pay would not make good the harm done,
for gold can never take the place of honour. He
who lives only for money and pleasure may say with
Falstaff • " What is honour ? Air ! "

The above-mentioned honourable position which
the rank of officer holds in general society in Ger-
many is naturally a subject of envy to all other
professions, and that rank is therefore, especially
up to within the last 20 years, distasteful to them.
After the attacks which were made upon it had
failed of their effect, an endeavour was made to
turn it into ridicule. This animosity has latterly
much decreased, a change which began after our
victories over the enemy. When I returned to
Berlin after the war of 1866, a well-known man of
business and a genial burgess of Berlin asked me to
explain the following' facts : the burgesses of Berlin
used formerly to think the officers of the Guard
haughty and exclusive gentlemen, and were really
troubled about the return of such victorious warriors.
They gave them, as seemed proper after such
deeds, a grand entertainment, during which they dis-

94 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

covered that they had to do with the most modest
and charming men in the world. I could only say
to the good man that this showed how very far
wrong they had previously been in their estimate
of the officers of the Guard. Another reason for
the cessation of the animosity against the rank of
officer is, in my opinion, to be found in the institu-
tion of officers of the reserve. Owing to the realisa-
tion of universal military service it has become
customary for every educated and honourable man,
if he cannot serve a few years as an active officer,
to endeavour to be at least an officer of the reserve.
How can he feel animosity against a class to which
he himself to a certain extent belongs ? How is
it possible for The People in Arms to hate its
leaders ?

It is certainly true that the typical figure of the
ornamental Lieutenant of the Guard still exists ;
he still twists his sprouting moustache, speaks
through his nose and cannot see without a glass in
his eye. He still appears now and then on the
scene, and make one's sides ache with laughing,
whether or not he wears the lace of the Guard ;
but as a matter of fact he has nearly disappeared.
When here and there he does come to light, as
a sort of excrescence of exaggerated regard for
honour and elegance, experience has taught us that
men like him are exactly those who, in moments of
danger or in the midst of fatigues and hardships,
make it a point of honour to prove themselves good
men and to show well to the front. So, though we
may laugh at the comic side of the man, we must
admire the very extravagance of his feelings.

ONE CAUSE OF SUCCESS 95

Why do I write this to you, who know it as well
as I do ? It is because I feel that, after the attacks
which were made last year even in the Reichstag
against the honour of the army, no one of us should
keep silence if he has any opportunity whatever to
bear witness as to the true state of the matter, and
that we should all give expression to the wish that
this spirit in the army may long be maintained.
I have tried to investigate the causes which have
led to the successes of our infantry, and, as I have
said, I have found that one great cause was the
spirit of the officers as a class, which finds its
expression in their unwearied activity in the dis-
charge of their duty, in their stainless honour, and in
their Spartan self-denial.

LETTER VIII

BATTALION EXERCISES

As in my earlier letters I have discussed the
individual stones which form the foundation of that
magnificent building, our infantry, so will I pass on
to-day to the principal story, the companies combined
into the battalion.

The battalion exercises are divided into two parts,
namely, the elementary movements laid down in the
regulations and the combat. The regulations give
all necessary directions for both. Those concerning
the combat are so elastic, that they adapt themselves
to all circumstances and are not only entirely
sufficient, but could also scarcely be better thought
out, with the object of affording the necessary
guidance, while at the same time they leave free
scope to the individuality of each leader, and fully
develop that independence of the junior officers
which is so needful when fighting in extended order.
Often as I have examined these regulations, I can
still not refrain from astonishment at the spirit
which inspires them, and which gains its full ex-
pression in paras. 112 and 127 ; of these the latter,
it is true, is laid down for the brigade, but it yet
applies equally well to the battalion.

EFFECT OF PEACE 97

And yet we find frequently, and even generally,
that it is especially these most important paragraphs
of the regulations which are not observed during the
exercise of a battalion. On the contrary, as the
lapse of years tends to separate us from our last
experience of war, the exercise of a battalion be-
comes every day more rigid, more of a sealed pattern,
and more based on systematic routine, except indeed
where the influence of the inspecting officers strives
against such rigidity, insisting that the letter shall
be subservient to the spirit, and be ruled by it. But
this is very difficult, for this rigidity and routine are
not products of indolence, but are due entirely to
the exaggerated zeal of the officers commanding
battalions.

In consequence of this, the style and the manner
in which the officer commanding works his battalion,
tends daily, more and more, to differ from anything
which he could by any possibility carry out in action.
While this very fact is caused by his most earnest
endeavour to bring his battalion to the highest pos-
sible standard of perfection.

I will give you some examples in detail, in order
to make good my assertion.

Although on page i 5 2 the regulations expressly
say that when under an effective fire from the enemy,
the employment of a battalion column can be per-
missible only under exceptional circumstances, yet
during the greater part of the exercise of a battalion
we find the extension of the skirmishing line carried
out from battalion column, and we see these skir-
mishers come at once into action, while the battalion,
which is still in column, is standing so close in rear

H

98 , LETTERS ON INFANTRY

of them, that it absolutely must suffer from the same
fire which strikes them. At the very best the flank
companies are sent out, and then an effort is made
to keep to the normal formation by placing the
centre companies exactly in rear of the middle of
the intervals.

We seldom find any use made of the permission
to send out whichever companies, and as many as
you please (a practice which is ordered by para. 1 1 1),
or any advantage taken of the directions of para. 112;
at the best some movements are made at the close of
the drill with the companies in two or three lines,
and then without any effort to represent their em-
ployment in action.

Take again the simple reinforcement of a skir-
mishing line which is firing lying down. According
to the regulations the units are as far as possible to
be kept intact, while the mixture of the skirmishers
of different commands is to be avoided. But when
a fresh section advances in extended order to
reinforce a firing line, most of the men who are lying
down on the position in question at once rise up, and
move left and right to make room for it. Could
such a movement to a flank be possible, if the fight
were so hot as to necessitate the advance of reinforce-
ments ? Would not these skirmishers, who all stand
up and move together to a flank, be certainly
sacrificed to the enemy's bullets? Might not the
sections which are first extended leave from the
beginning an interval between them for the use of
any reinforcements which may become necessary ?
If that were done would they not, on that very
account, be more easily directed as regards the

FAULTS OF COMMAND 99

working of their fire, since they would not be so
much dispersed and would thus be easier to com-
mand ? Would they not also, by keeping together
in groups, have a better chance of finding cover
behind such features as the ground might offer.
This fault is especially common when several bat-
talions are working together as a brigade. In that
case the skirmishers are often ordered to cover the
whole front, and are directed to extend to such an
interval from each other, that the individual men
may be equally distributed along the front of the
whole line of battle. They are thus often at
intervals of 10 paces, while the regulations lay
down 6 paces per file, or 3 paces per man, as the
maximum interval. As if it could do any harm
if at any time there should happen to be an interval
of 200 paces between two extended sections, and as if
an enemy could hope to get through that interval alive!
Again ; how often do we find an officer com-
manding a battalion who is willing to leave it to
the officer in charge of the skirmishers to decide,
according to the intensity of the fight, whether he
shall order independent fire, rapid fire, or .swarm-
volleys, or shall lay down the number of cartridges
to be used ? Or how often do we meet with such
an officer who will permit the companies which are
following in support to take up, according to circum-
stances, the one a column, the other a line formation,
or vice versa ? Will he not always prefer to make
both companies move in the same formation, for the
sake of uniformity and of a good appearance ? But
in action could he be in a position to thus take
command of everything everywhere ?

loo LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Of such routine movements as the regular char-
acter of the drill ground easily tempts us to use, but
which destroy all initiative, I will mention only one.
When a battalion, after it has been broken up to
fight in skirmishing order, sounds the " assembly,"
with a view to form in column on the centre (which
is as a rule done at the termination of the exercises),
it ordinarily fronts towards the end of the drill ground,
since it usually ends by marching past. A battalion
is rarely practised in quickly assembling on a some-
what oblique front, and it gets very confused, and
also expends an unreasonable amount of time, if it
be required to assemble fronting this tree or that
church tower. But it ought to be able to do this
quickly if its training is to prepare it for war ;
otherwise much time will be wasted and the men
will be fatigued if it is ever necessary to adapt the
troops to the ground, for example, to place them
under cover behind an undulation.

There are an endless number of such drill-ground
habits, not to mention little aids and dodges, all
absolutely impracticable in war, which assist in
making the drills correct and smart. Every soldier
knows them, and I will not trouble you by speaking
of them, but will pass on at once to the conduct and
behaviour of the officer commanding the battalion.

At the commencement of the field exercises the
officer commanding the battalion will certainly be
found, mounted, near that one of the skirmishers who
fires the first shot, and who himself must find cover
by lying down. He remains in the skirmishing line
I during the whole fight, and if perhaps he realises
that he really could not fail to be killed there, he

POSITION OF CO. loi

retires at the farthest to some point between the
skirmishers and the nearest support. From this
place he gives words of command and directs signals
to be made. But if any movement, a flank attack,
or a reinforcement, is to be carried out, he is certain
to ride up himself and give orders for everything.
Above all he will be sure to do this if a mistake has
once happened, if an order has not been correctly
delivered, or the wrong description of fire has been
used, or if anything is done contrary to his wish.
He ought to be declared killed hundreds of times
in the space of an hour. He goes to every point,
except just to the very one where he ought to be
during the whole duration of the action (if it were a
real one), that is to say, to that company which he
has told off as his last reserve, and which alone he
should accompany into the foremost fighting line,
unless he wishes prematurely to hand over the com-
mand of the battalion ; this company he never goes
near.

Proceedings like these, arising from life on the
drill ground and totally false to nature, raise very
dangerous illusions in the minds of all those who
have no experience of war. For they think that
things really happen like this in war, and easily lose
their heads when they find that in real work time
and space do not fit in with the ideas which they
have formed from their experience on the drill ground.
And there is more even than this. The men who
have been accustomed to see the Lieutenant-Colonel ^

1 In the original this is the " Herr IMajor"; I have ventured
to translate it as above, in accordance with our system of command.
—N.L. W.

I02 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

well to the front, begin to make remarks if, as soon
as the bullets whistle, he remains in rear with the
reserve company ; the consequence of this is that, at
any rate in the first action in which he takes part,
the field officer must certainly ride where he has been
in the habit of riding, in order to avoid giving occasion
for such remarks.

It is true that a General of high rank and a
participator in the War of Independence once said,
in the year 1850, in a criticism (in which he blamed
such impossible proceedings in his peculiarly biting
manner), that he was confident that the first bullet
would set everything right. But his conviction was
not realised. At the battle of St. Privat the field
officers actually did ride where they had been in the
habit of riding in time of peace, and the consequence
of this was that on the day after the battle only a very
small proportion of the field officers and adjutants of
the whole of the infantry of the Guard were available
for duty. The greater part of them were killed or
wounded. This was very honourable to them, but
was 'not necessary, and was of very serious con-
sequence to the army and the Fatherland.

When one reflects on these matters in the study, it
all appears self-evident, and one wonders how such
unreasonable proceedings can have happened. But
there must have been some reason for their hap-
pening so generally, and if we wish to avoid their
terrible consequences, it is well worth while to
investigate this reason.

These unreasonable proceedings arise, in the first
place, from the fact that the officer commanding a
battalion, when he begins to practise the exercises,

CA USES OF FA UL TS 103

cannot possibly remain at that point which he must
occupy in action, namely, near the company which
he intends to be the last to engage. For he finds
occasion at every moment to go forward to instruct
and correct, and has to ride about here and there,
while even when he tries to go back to his proper
position, something immediately happens in the
fighting line which calls for his presence. He there-
fore prefers to remain in the front. It would
theoretically be better if he let the faults pass, and
delayed his correction and instruction until the
" stand easy," or even till after the exercises were
over. But this is not practicable. He would then
find so much to say that he would have to be
perpetually interrupting the exercises, in order to
lecture his assembled officers for hours together, and
would be sorely tempted to put off all his remarks
until the next morning before they started for the
drill ground ; if he did this he would find at the end
of his speech that the whole of the time available for
drill had flown by, and he would be obliged to let
the men go to their dinners ; I once actually saw
this. Moreover, a few words, at the moment, are
more convincing and instructive than the very best
and longest theoretical dissertation delivered after the
event. Again, if the officer commanding a battalion
is to observe and correct every fault, he must be
near the fighting line. For example, if he remains
near the reserve, he cannot hear faulty orders as to
the description of fire, nor can he see if the men
hold their rifles properly. Thus it comes about that
the officer commanding a battalion is compelled,
during the first days of the exercises, to stand where

I04 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

he could not possibly remain in action ; it so
becomes a habit with him. The only day, therefore,
during which he can himself move as he would in
action, is that of the inspection. But it is asking
very much of any man to require him to give up on
this one day all that has become habitual to him,
and to demand, which is even more, that on this one
occasion he shall adopt a new mechanism of
command of his troops, at the very time when he is
called upon to show how much he has taught them,
and when he must be most desirous that no faults
shall be committed. You may perhaps urge that
the officer commanding a battalion should be
allowed at first, when he is practising elementary
drills, to move about as he likes, but that he should,
during the second half of the training, always, when
practising movements for battle, station himself at
that point where he would be in action. This idea
is excellent, but it is impossible of execution. The
time allotted to battalion exercises is so short, that
the Lieut-Colonel may think himself lucky if he can
work once through all that is in the regulations.
Moreover he cannot divide the days which are
allowed for battalion exercises into two exact halves,
during the former of which he may practise elementary
drills, while the latter may be given up to the practical
application of drill. For if out of the three weeks
which are allotted to battalion exercises, from which
we must deduct Sundays and holidays (as well as
all days taken up by garrison duty, guards, and
fatigues), he can manage to get ten days for drill, he
will have done very well. No officers commanding
battalions who have tried to carry out this plan have

CO. OF THE BATTALION 105

succeeded in getting more than two days for
exercises under service conditions, namely, the day
of the inspection and that which precedes it. From
this it soon came to pass that on the day before the
inspection they attempted only such movements as
they intended to show to the inspector, and the
inspection thus sank to the level of a rehearsed
performance, a kind of military ballet, so that both
days practically lost all value for instruction under
service conditions.

The inclination of battalion commanders to be
everywhere and to do everything themselves will be
increased by the obvious certainty that the inspecting
officer will hold them responsible for every fault. It
is only necessary that he should once or twice say
something like : " Look, Colonel, how the ntJi.
company is formed ! " or, " But the skirmishers of
the X. section are advancing by rushes ; that is quite
wrong ! " and the Lieut.-Colonel will at once begin
to gallop about from one section to another, in order
to be in time to prevent the recurrence of anything
of the sort.

• There are even many commanders of battalions
who, in their exercises under service conditions, hardly
go at all beyond the paras. 77 to 98, and rarely
venture into the 4th chapter of the drill regulations.
What is laid down in the above paras, they carry
out with perfect precision, and the battalion makes
so good an impression, that a few imperfections in
the contents of the 4th chapter are easily forgiven.
But this is a backsliding into stiff drill and the tactics
of masses, such as does not conform to the improve-
ments in firearms, and can only lead to colossal losses.

io6 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

I have often heard " working up for inspection "
bitterly blamed. But if ever any blame was un-
deserved it is this, since the power of a body of
troops is based upon their striving after an object by
the direction of a single will, that is to say, on
obedience and discipline ; not, however, on that rigid
discipline which does only what it is ordered and
waits for the order, but on such as meets the order
half-way and endeavours to ascertain and anticipate
the wishes of its superiors. He therefore who
exerts himself to show his troops at the inspection as
nearly as possible as the superior officer would wish
to see them does no mere eye-service, but practises
exactly that correct obedience which has made our
army great.

I have witnessed very remarkable consequences
of this craving to do everything oneself I have,
I think, already once told you how, during a
reconnaissance fight of a single battalion, the
divisional General, the Brigadier, the Colonel of the
regiment, and the battalion commander were all
present in the foremost line of skirmishers, ac-
companied by their Staffs and even by a reigning
German Prince. Accustomed as they were to do
everything themselves at inspections, and rightly
considering that a battle is the highest form of
inspection, these gentlemen behaved exactly as they
would have done in peace. On another occasion a
division was marching in close order on an enterprise
against the enemy. The divisional General, with
the officers commanding the leading brigade, regiment,
and battalion rode immediately in rear of the extreme
point of the column, and the first man who was

CONSE Q UENCES OF FAULTS 107

wounded was a cavalry orderly who fell from his
horse just behind his General shot in the breast by a
rifle-bullet. In addition to the disproportionate loss
in senior officers, and the consequent uncertainty in
the distribution of command and the conduct of the
action, which such proceedings lead to, they have
other pernicious consequences.

Each individual has only a certain amount of
strength of body and of strength of nerves. If one
uselessly expends one's strength of body before there
is any necessity to do so, one runs some danger of
finding it wanting at the critical moment. It is just
the same with regard to the nerves. No one is
indifferent to danger to life. But the strength of
our nerves carries us through. Generals who press
forward before it is necessary into the foremost line
of battle run some risk of finding their nerves fail
them at the critical moment. This does not arise
from a sudden spasm of fear ; oh no ! Shattered
nerves do not act so straightforwardly as that. They
cunningly creep upon a man in the shape of tactical
and strategical considerations, and prove to him that
all the rules of war command him at this particular
moment to delay his attack, to fall back upon the
defensive, or to break off the action ; or they use
some other beautiful scientific expression. Take, for
example, a General commanding a division who has
been with the .foremost skirmishers from daybreak
till noon, and has heard the bullets whistle for five or
six hours, whilst the battalion of the advanced guard
has been driving in the enemy's outposts, and who
at last finds himself in presence of the enemy's main
position, where the foe is awaiting him in order of

io8 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

battle, being perhaps obliged to stand there because
he is afraid that he will not be able to effect any
farther retreat. A General so placed is easily inclined
to believe that the troops are tired, because he is
weary himself, and that they have done enough,
because he himself has been for six hours under fire ;
while as a matter of fact it is only the leading
battalion which is fatigued. He decides then to put
off the attack until the next day, when the neigh-
bouring divisions may have come up nearer to him ;
so he places outposts and bivouacs his troops, and
the enemy whom he had surprised is thus surprised
again, but this time pleasantly. For he so gains
time to draw off without loss, and escapes the cata-
strophe which threatened him. If this General had
spared himself more personally, if he had not already
been for six hours in the thick of the skirmish, and if
at the very moment when he actually broke off the
fight he had been present with his fresh and intact
main-body, he himself being fresh and not having
yet been under fire, he would have taken quite a
different view of the matter and would have ordered
a general attack. Thus the misplaced and exag-
gerated energy which will insist on looking after
even the smallest things, may be the cause of an
absence of true energy, and courage which is pre-
mature may result in indecision in the conduct of
an action.

Such faulty behaviour of Generals in action ceased
altogether towards the end of our last lengthy cam-
paign. After the war it was also at first given up
on the drill ground. But it has gradually come in
again, and threatens to become more and more

EXPERIENCE IN WAR 109

habitual as the peace lasts longer, not only because
the duties of peace service, which find their full ex-
pression at the inspection, tend to become habits,.
but also because the experience of war diminishes.
A chamber student of the Art of War once said,
amid general laughter : " Experience of war has only
a conditional value." But to a certain extent he
was right. In war each grade in rank gains experi-
ence only for itself and for the grade above it. Thus
an officer commanding a company learns his own
work and that of a battalion commander, but nothing
whatever concerning the direction or the command
of regiments or brigades. The only exception is to
be found in the case of such young officers as have
served on the general or divisional Staff as aides-de-
camp ; they, if they keep their eyes open, see war
from a higher standpoint. But now, after thirteen years
of peace, there has been a good deal of promotion,
and I cannot help hoping, for the sake of the younger
generation, that we may soon have no more battalion
commanders who took part in the last war in the
rank of Captains of companies. But how can a
subaltern, who commanded a section of skirmishers
during the war, have gained any experience to teach
him how he should carry out his work when he is in
command of a battalion ?

If he has now to command a battalion, he will
do it in such a manner as he knows would satisfy an
inspecting General.

Having shown that there is a tendency to work
battalions in a manner which would be impossible in
war, that there is too great a rigidity of formation,
many unreasonable modes of proceeding, and a very

no LETTERS ON INFANTRY

unpractical mechanism of command, the question
arises as to how these evils are to be overcome. For
fear that this letter may grow too long, I will post-
pone the discussion of this question to my next I
will to-day urge only one point, namely, that a strict
rule should be made that all officers, from the highest
to the lowest, should, both at inspections and at
the manoeuvres, be allowed to post themselves in
such positions only as they would be able to occupy
in actual war.

LETTER IX

THE INSPECTION OF A BATTALION

You do me wrong when you accuse me of having
given too much blame with regard to the command
of a battalion and too little with respect to that of
a company ; and when from this fact you draw the
conclusion that I thus assist to exalt the duties of
the younger and junior officers above those of the
officers commanding their battalions, I am compelled
to distinctly deny that I do so. On this subject
you very rightly observe that the battalion com-
manders have themselves formerly been company
officers. Even though I found something to blame
in the customs of our system of battalion instruction,
this has no reference to the battalion commanders
personally, nor can it lower them in the eyes of their
juniors, for they must have been sufficiently intelli-
gent and capable to be selected to command bat-
talions ; otherwise they would have remained Captains.
Moreover, they have a longer experience than the
others.

Again, when I think that I can see some faults
which exist generally, this is only another way of
saying that it is much harder to instruct a battalion
than a company on service principles. The latter

112 LE TTERS ON INFANT R V

certainly calls for more industry, assiduity, time, and
strength, but the training of the former is far more
difficult, even if it be possible to carry it out in the
time available. In order to train a company it is
sufficient if we find, in addition to sound common
sense, such knowledge as is needed in the rank of
Captain, the feeling of honour which all officers
possess, industry, conscientiousness, and a faithful
discharge of duties. But this is not enough for a
battalion commander. He must be skilful in appor-
tioning and making use of the time available. This
requires greater endowments and more natural talent.
Let us see now whether there are not some means
of overcoming the evils of which I have spoken.
The numerous attempts which have been made to
remedy them show that others have recognised their
existence ; or if they have not expressly recognised
them they have at least felt them deeply. Even in
the middle of the present century we gave up the
old fashion of using in the battalion exercises merely
elementary tactical movements in rigid formations,
and of limiting them to wheels, the manual exercise,
column formations, facings, deployments, movements
to the front and oblique movements, of doing very
little skirmishing, and that by whole battalions, and
finally of making the march-past the great criterion
of excellence. Battalion commanders who were
being inspected, were permitted at the close of the
exercises to make movements, such as would be
used in battle, which they had themselves thought
out, and which were not included in the regulations.
This made the field officers pay attention to such
matters, and they often brought forward new and

" TURKS" 113

good ideas. Any one who suggested something of
this kind, even if it was not accepted as altogether
practical, gained at least the credit of being a man
of original mind. This very soon got beyond reason-
able limits. Every one wanted to invent something,
and tried to keep his discovery secret up to the time
of the inspection of his battalion, while after it he
brooded during the whole year over how at the next
he might show something yet more marvellous. The
most extraordinary fancies sometimes appeared, of
which one of the least wonderful was the celebrated
river which was marked out by men posted across
the drill ground, this being perhaps on the top of a
hill. These movements, on account of the disorder
which they always produced, were soon known by
the name of " Turkish Manoeuvres," or for short as
" Turks." The fact that each battalion commander
was permitted to carry out his " Turk " under the
eyes of the inspector tended very much to destroy
the authority of the regulations, since every one
believed that, when he should come into a real action,
he would be allowed, and even that he ought, to
throw over at once all the directions given in the
regulations. The precision of the regulation move-
ments thus tended to decrease, and with this disci-
pline began to get slack. The saying of the old
drill instructor, which had its origin at that time —
" The march-past, gentlemen, is, like painting on
glass, a lost art," — expressed somewhat originally
the recognition of this evil.

After a few years then efforts were made in high
places to repress the increasing tendency to wander
from the regulations and invent new fancies, and it

•I

114 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

was strictly laid down that when "Turks" were
carried out, such movements only were to be made
as were to be found in the regulations.

The use of company columns in combination with
fiehtino; in extended order was from time to time
developed by supplementary orders.

After our experiences in war, especially those of
1870-71, it was permitted, for a certain time, to
bring forward various propositions practically on the
drill ground. These principally endeavoured to find
a solution for the problem, how to advance to the
attack over open ground which was under the fire
of the enemy. The most marvellous formations
again appeared. Sometimes the whole drill ground,
for a length and breadth of 300 paces, might be seen
dotted with files each of two men, and it was im-
possible to help the feeling creeping over one, that
in this case a general " skedaddle " was being elevated
into a system. You might see battalions doubling
until they lost their breath, and even until they
tumbled down, and then begin to fire in such a state
of excitement that there was very good reason to
doubt whether even a single shot could possibly hit
its mark. You might even see thick swarms of
skirmishers firing as they ran, holding their rifles
horizontally at the hip. An enormous mass of litera-
ture full of suggestions turned the heads of such officers
as thought about the matter, until at length they had
no longer any idea as to what they had read in these
pamphlets and what was laid down in the regulations.

The new edition of the drill regulations, on the
1st of March 1876, put an end to this state of un-
certainty.

THE MODIFIED TURK'' 115

The 4th and 5 th chapters of these regulations
are sufficient for all exigencies of war, and (as I
have already mentioned) owing to the elasticity of
their directions, permit the infantry to be led under
all circumstances in accordance with the character
of the action and the nature of the ground.

How shall we now ensure that, during the long
peace, we shall not fall back again into rigidity, and
seek in the sections of the 3d chapter the one chief
aim of our system of instruction ?

I will now speak of the day of inspection. For as
troops are inspected, so will they be drilled. At
least the discipline of our army is still, thank God,
so good that this result is certain.

The inspection of a battalion is in general carried
out by employing a part of the time, after the
parade and the march-past, on the 3d and part on
the 4th chapter of the regulations. As a rule the
inspecting officer states how much of the 3d chapter
he wishes to see, and leaves it to the battalion com-
mander to arrange an action in accordance with the
4th chapter ; he, however, sometimes leaves the selec-
tion from both chapters to the battalion commander.
The consequence of this is that as far as regards the
second part, which is generally called the " fighting
exercise," the battalion commander exerts himself to
show how he thinks that the battalion may best be
handled in action. For this reason he arranges
everything so that not even a single skirmisher shall
move otherwise than as he wishes. He will there-
fore have beforehand divided his fighting exercise
(his modified " Turk ") into distinct phases, and will
have explained it all to his Captains, and will en-

ii6 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

deavour to prevent the smallest variation from his
prearranged plan, for fear lest it may all fall to
pieces. But this previous discussion over each phase
makes the exercise a mere theatrical performance,
which bears less resemblance to the reality in propor-
tion as the officer has little previous knowledge as to
how the later phases would work out in a serious
action, while his endeavours to avert variations
compel the battalion commander to move about into
all sorts of positions where he could not be if the
action were in earnest. Each of these faults destroy
the independence of the junior officers, and each is
thus objectionable, while there is nothing to be said
for either of them, except the fact that by them the
battalion is shown how it is desired that they should
move in action, and that with this object errors and
faults may well be prevented.

The result of this is that the fighting exercises,
when they are left altogether to the battalion com-
mander, frequently extend into scientific tactics and
are even complicated with strategy, so that they,
owing to the slow pace at which infantry can move,
use up the time and the strength of the men to an
excessive extent. This applies especially to the
inclination which is good enough in principle, to
make use of the effect of flank movements. For the
battalion commander will not allow the company
which has been told off to attack the enemy in flank
to make an entirely impossible flank movement
within the reach of the enemy's annihilating fire, and
must therefore detach it outside of this zone, that is
to say, he must, when the drill ground is large
enough, commence his attack at a distance of 2200

FLANK A TTA CKS 1 1 7

yards. The effect of this is that the turning force
has to get over a yet greater distance, while the
advance by rushes and the fire-fight, which must last
some little time, will cause this single movement to
take up at least half an hour.

Moreover the flank attack hardly ever succeeds.
Either it takes place too late after the main attack
has been pressed home, or else it takes place too
soon ; or again one of the two, either the main or
the flank attack, delays the other so long under a
decisive fire from the enemy that its defeat is certain.
For infantry have not the power which cavalry
possess, of making good such differences of time by
an increase of pace. Only one form of attack in
combination with a turning movement can be carried
out at drill without waste of time ; this was the
invention of an old General of high position. He
placed from the first that company which was told
off for the flank movement at right angles to the
skirmishing line of the frontal attack, and made them
move in this formation towards the enemy. Thus
the skirmishers of the turning company marched in
single file, like a flock of geese, in the direction of
the enemy, while near them on the outer flank moved
the company column. How this gentleman could
possibly imagine that an enemy would be kind
enough to allow such a flank movement I cannot
understand, for such foes as I have seen him attack
gave him no reason to suppose that they would be
so good-natured. I certainly in saying this trans-
gress the maxim, de mortiiis nil nisi bonum, but I
wanted to give you at least one proof how far the
imagination may vv^ander, if we forget that saying of

1 1 8 LETTERS ON INFANTR V

Clausewitz which I have already mentioned : " In
war everything is simple, but what is simple is
difficult."

When I commanded a division I made every
exertion to remedy, within my sphere of action,
those evils which I have mentioned, by carefully
carrying out the inspections of battalions. After
some attempts, which failed because the battalion
commanders, owing to their excess of zeal, overshot
the mark, I arrived at a mode of proceeding which
stood every test, as I succeeded in proving during
an experience of seven years. It also showed me
that the battalion commanders were fully capable
of training their battalions correctly, and that they
had been debarred from doing so up to that time
solely by the character of the inspection. I proved
even more than this. I was delighted to find that,
as soon as my intentions were rightly understood,
my own tactical ideas were improved upon by these
officers. This was only natural ; for they had been
longer in the infantry than I, and had experience of
every detail in war either as field officers or as
Captains. I thus learnt from those under my
command. I will therefore tell you my system of
inspecting a battalion, for I consider it to be the
correct solution of the problem. You can try it if
you like, and either adopt or reject it. I merely
give you the result of my experience.

I began my inspection of a battalion, like every-
one else, with a parade and a march-past. I attach
great importance to these, for one can judge from
the parade if the men are well set-up, and from the
march-past if they set down their feet well and

INSPECTION PARADE 119

march without crowding ; and from this whether the
instruction in details has been good. I learnt this
fact by comparing what I observed at the inspections,
both of recruits and companies, with what I noticed
at the march-past. Again, nothing shows so well
the sort of treatment which the men receive as the
look of their faces on parade. This may, it is true,
give a false impression if the men have been without
necessity kept for a long time waiting in the parade
formation, and have thus become tired. In order to
avoid this I used to let the battalions wait for me with
piled arms, and allowed them not to take up their
parade formation until I had arrived. 1 thus also
saw how the duty was carried on. This certainly
expended a little more time, but it saved the troops
for the fighting exercises.

I may remark in anticipation that I also after
each inspection of a battalion required a march-past
in another formation. This I used as a kind of
solemn conclusion and a sort of compliment to the
troops, to whom I then spoke a few words of
encouragement. I should have omitted this last
march-past only in case I had been altogether dis-
pleased with the battalion. But this never happened,
for I everywhere found at least industry and good-
will.

The parade and the march-past also form a good
test as to whether the troops pay sufficient atten-
tion to the regulations.

I used after the first march-past to allow the
battalion commander from half to three-quarters of
an hour (permitting him to use his discretion as to
the distribution and succession of the drills) to dis-

120 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

play some movements from the 3d chapter of the
drill regulations, with the exception of the i6th
section ; this I used not to take until the end, when
I had sufficiently inverted the battalion by means of
the fighting exercises. It was possible to form a
sufficiently good opinion in these three-quarters of
an hour as to whether the regulations had been
thoroughly well drilled into the men, so far as such
movements were concerned as could be carried out by
the word of command of the battalion commander.

After a short rest I passed on to the fighting
exercises.

' These I carried out myself, inasmuch as I set the
battalion commander some simple problems, against
an enemy marked out as a rule by a couple of flags.
In working these out the system of command and of
direction had to be the same as it would have been
in a real action. I allowed no other movements or
words of command than those which are in the
regulations. The Captains were to receive no more
definite instructions before the beginning of the
movement than were necessary to enable them to un-
derstand the supposed case and the meaning of the
flags, or than might have been possible in war. The
battalion commander had to remain in that position
which he would have occupied in a real action. If a
body of troops, who were already engaged so far that
no counter-order could have got to them, did anything
contrary to the original instructions, I allowed no
counter-order to be given to them, but the battalion
commander had to accept the fact and accommodate
his ulterior dispositions to it. The description ot
fire (swarm volleys, the range, fire with two or three

TACTICAL PROBLEMS 121

sights, the orders as to the number of cartridges to
be fired, the pauses in the fire, independent fire or
rapid fire) and the formations (whether in swarms,
in Hne or in column, and what columns) were left to
the junior officers concerned, who alone were re-
sponsible for them, as also for orders to lie down,
to run, etc. ; these also gave opportunity for me to
offer them some hints.

As I set the problems, it was in my power to forbid
all strategy which was impossible on the drill ground.
I could also prevent the waste of too much time on
any single movement, and if one threatened at any
time to take too long, I could cut it short by intro-
ducing some other idea, such as a cavalry charge,
or a change from the offensive to the defensive, etc.
Constant practice and a set routine enabled me, in
cases where I had worked out my scheme carefully
beforehand, to make a battalion solve three or four
problems in from three-quarters of an hour to an hour.
When therefore from three to five battalions were
quartered in the same garrison, from twelve to twenty
different tactical questions could be worked out by
the same field officers and captains, and I thus
gained the opportunity of touching upon every por-
tion of the 4th chapter.

In order to make my meaning clearer I will name
some of these problems as examples.

1. A single battalion directly attacks a certain
object. (In order to save time, sometimes the action
of the first 500 yards was gone through, sometimes
that of the last 500.)

2. A single battalion defends an object. (A
redoubt, shelter-trenches, or a wood.)

122 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

3. A battalion acting as an advanced guard
suddenly surprises the enemy ; or

4. Is surprised by him.

5. The battalion has been sent against the
enemy's flank, and succeeds in surprising him by
getting, in attack formation, within 330 yards of
him.

6. The battalion is fighting on the offensive in
the centre or on the flank of a brigade, in the first
or the second line.

7. The battalion, which forms the last reserve in
the centre of an attack, is coitte que coute to bring
about the decision of a fire-fight which is swaying
backwards and forwards, and to carry on to a general
attack the troops which are already engaged.

8. Reinforcements to the enemy, or a flank
attack from him, oblige the battalion to pass from
the offensive to the defensive or to retire, and vice
versa. ;

These eight cases alone afford more than twenty
combinations which, according to the character of
the drill ground, will offer a very great variety of
exercises.

Yet more variations may be made by interposing
the supposition of a charge by our own or the
enemy's cavalry, or by ruling that the battalion
commander is out of action. I used to order the
latter, either if the battalion commander came at a
wrong moment within the effective range of the
enemy's fire, or if some of his captains were among
the seniors of that rank in the regiment, and I
wished to give them an opportunity of showing that
they were able to command a battalion.

INSPECTIONS 123

The inspection of the exercises of a battalion,
carried out in this manner, lasted about two hours
and a half, and it was possible to inspect at most
only 2 battalions in one day, since one cannot
keep one's attention fixed upon every detail for longer
than this. Of the 1 2 battalions which made up my
division, 5 were in one garrison, 3 in another, 2 in
another, while the others were quartered singly ;
I could thus in nine days (counting a Sunday)
inspect the whole of my battalions. It was im-
possible to enter more closely into the details of the
exercises without prolonging the period of inspection
to the detriment of the time allotted to instruction,
since the afternoons were taken up by the inspection
of other points and in moving from garrison to
garrison.

Astonishment may perhaps be expressed that all
divisional commanders do not inspect after this
fashion, since it has been found to be so practical.
The reason of this is, that they generally prefer to
work their battalions according to the fancy of the
General commanding the Army Corps.

But an officer who commands a whole corps can-
not give so much time to a single battalion. On an
average he can afford only an hour for each battalion,
and he must therefore allow the commander of it to
show it to him himself.

But if I have really written to you a very old
story, and if all divisional commanders inspect their
battalions in the manner which I have described
above, I can then only say that, in the interests of
the army, I am delighted to hear it.

I have often heard the opinion expressed — and

124 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

the same has been said in many pamphlets — that
our system, which finishes the drill season with an
inspection, is in some ways objectionable, since it is
impossible for any one to rightly estimate the value
of a commanding officer or of his command by the
single day or the single hour of inspection, while, if
we hold to the system of inspections, the fate of the
officers concerned depends upon one lucky or unlucky
day. In place of it is suggested the French system
of camps, where the superior officers live with their
subordinates during the whole period of the training,
and are thus able to observe them daily. But this
argument is ill-grounded, for the definite opinion
which one forms of an officer does not depend upon
the one single day of inspection. There are many
opportunities during the entire year of seeing him
work in front of his men, for instance at regimental
and brigade exercises, at field manoeuvres, etc.,
while his character as regards the preservation ol
discipline can be judged by looking at the defaulters'
book ; moreover, one may see how he behaves under
exceptional circumstances ; this is all true, even it
we omit to take into account the fact that a
commander who is confident of himself and of his
men is not dependent upon good or ill luck on the
day of inspection. Again, one's opinion of an officer
is not definitely made up from the experience of a
single year ; he has the opportunity during several
years of removing any unfavourable impression
which may have been formed of him. But if he is
placed in a camp of instruction and has to carry out
every portion of his training, even the least import-
ant, under the eyes of his superiors, and if he thus

CAMPS OF INSTRUCTION 125

feels himself constantly watched and criticised, he
will never gain either independence or self-confidence.
Past masters in any art do not fall from the skies ;
every one makes mistakes at first If he cannot
keep these mistakes to himself and thus learn to
avoid them, but is obliged to feel them as it were
noted against him, he will never acquire any spirit
of initiative. In this respect camps of instruction
after the French system are not preferable to our
system of inspections ; I do not mention other evils,
inseparable from the former, which have made us
hold to our plan of inspections, detachment trainings,
and manoeuvres.

The sort of inspection which I have proposed is
in every way sufficient as a means of forming a well-
grounded opinion on the capacity of a battalion
commander, while, since he knows that he will be
inspected in this manner, it stimulates him to train
his command in such a way that his juniors will
gain their necessary independence in action, while
he himself will get out of the habit of misplaced
(and in war impossible) interference, to which the
practice of elementary drill will naturally have
inclined him. To obtain this end it is necessary
only that the inspecting officer shall carry out his
inspection with ample kindliness, for the uncertainty
in which the ofiicer inspected finds himself as to
which movements will be required of him, the feeling
of being examined, and the influence which the
result of the inspection may have upon his future
and his reputation, produce in many officers a rest-
lessness and an embarrassment which obscure their
clear judgment ; a condition of things which is

126 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

commonly called " inspection fever." It is therefore
necessary to first quiet this inspection fever before
proceeding to form an opinion. A little joke may
often help to effect this. I remember a certain very
excitable field officer, who was nevertheless very
sound and sure, but who at the beginning of an
inspection suffered so much from inspection fever
that he gave the first simple words of command for
the march-past in a trembling voice and all wrong.
I rode up to him and said in a low tone : " Major, I
have so often seen your battalion drill beautifully
under you, that in your place I should feel no fever."
He at first stared at me, then laughed, and from
that moment worked his battalion faultlessly.

LETTER X

FORMATIONS FOR ATTACK AND FOR FLANK

ATTACKS

It still remains for me to discuss some few matters
which I only touched upon in my last letter.

I spoke there of " the tendency, well-founded in -
principle, to develop the effect of flank attacks."

I need not here further discuss the importance of
bringing a pressure upon the enemy's flank, since
every one knows, and it is strongly brought forward
in the regulations, that the defender, since the recent
improvements in firearms, can offer an unconquerable
resistance against an attack which is directed against
his front alone, if only he has sufficient ammunition
and his men aim quietly ; so long at least as he is
not crushed by heavy loss in the front line. But if
it be possible to succeed in taking the enemy in
flank, then the victory is as good as won. The only
question then is. How to take the enemy in flank ?

There are but two ways : surprise, or a pre- ^'
ponderance of force. A surprise can be carried out,
either by assigning different lines of advance to the
troops which are directed against the front and the
flank of the defenders (this I should feel inclined to
call the strategic kind of flank attack), or by skil-

128 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

fully making use of folds of the ground or other
cover, so as to throw a portion of one's force upon
the flank of the foe. But these two kinds of move-
ment against a flank are almost impossible on the
drill ground of a battalion, since it would be very
difficult to find several lines of advance, while a
battalion is too small a body of troops to be divided
in accordance with a strategical idea ; again, the
level drill ground of a battalion seldom affords any
possibility of advancing under cover by making use
of the character of the ground.

The only kind of flank attack which can be
worked out in a natural manner on the drill ground
is thus that which depends upon preponderance ot
strength. We must in that case suppose that the
enemy is much weaker than the battalion, and must
extend our own front much wider than his, in order
to outflank him. As the distance between the
opposing forces is lessened in the course of the
attack, that part of the extended fighting line which
directly meets the enemy will be brought to a halt
by the struggle, while the outflanking wing, which is
not delayed, will continue to advance and will, if it
keeps in contact with the rest of the line of battle,
of itself wheel up to attack the flank. On the other
hand, even if we assume that we have a superiority
in number over the enemy, it will always on the
drill ground appear unnatural to detach parties
against the enemy's flank, since, owing to the short-
ness of the distances at which alone it is possible to
work there, this movement must be carried out under
a most effective fire from the enemy's front.

For this reason I consider that we must banish

FLANK A TTA CKS 1 29

from the drill ground of a battalion every other
method of attacking a flank, except by out-flanking
and by the gradual wheel of the wing which out-
flanks, and must thus put off the strategical method,
and also that of surprise by skilfully making use of
ground, to the period of the field manoeuvres and
the exercises in field service. How can we suppose
a surprise to take place on the drill ground ? Such
a supposition lies too open to the repartee : " But
suppose the enemy refused to be surprised ? " Only
a real enemy, such as we have at the manoeuvres,
can really be surprised, and if he does actually let
himself be surprised, then we may consider the
efl'ect of an attack on his flank as a direct consequence.
Again, the regulations lay down that on the drill
ground all the fighting formations are to be practised
without taking account of the nature of the ground.
If then a battalion commander sends out a company
on the open and level drill ground against the flank
of a supposed or skeleton enemy, he can only make
such a movement appear in any way possible in war,
if he first fully explains to his battalion what is the
character and the position of the particular piece of
ground, which will enable an approach under cover to
surprise the enemy ; but in any case all this will be
utterly unreal.

Another question which I just glanced at was
how, considering the improvement of firearms, one
ought to attack a locality (say a village, a wood, or
a position), over a plain which gives no cover, or over
open rising ground, and also what formations should
be used for this purpose. I have already mentioned
how many people after the last war busied them-

K

I30 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

selves about this question in speech, in writing, and
in experiments at the manoeuvres. But all the
suggestions which have been made have found more
opponents than friends, and we have arrived at no
definite result, though everybody was interested in it,
and above all the Guard Corps, on account of the
enormous losses which it incurred on the bare slope
in front of the position of St. Privat. Even the
regulations do not lay down any distinct instructions
on this point, but only hint in a general sort of way
(para. 127, p. 190) that the effect of the enemy's
fire should be diminished by using the regulation
formations both at- the halt and when in movement,
and order that, as a rule, formations when under
shrapnel or shell fire shall be as shallow as possible,
while, when under the fire of case, they shall be in
small columns of narrow front, and that the men,
especially when under musketry fire, shall lie down.
As regards the manner of using these, the regulations
leave the very greatest liberty to those who have
had experience in war and have thought over such
matters.

One would be certainly justified in saying that,
generally speaking, one would not make a frontal
attack on a position or a village, etc., over open level
ground or up a bare slope. One would occupy the
enemy with artillery fire, and attack at some point
where the ground favoured an approach, or else one
would turn the position. We should always do so,
if we had the choice. But we have not always the
choice. It may very well happen that a body of
infantry, working in combination with other troops
to the right and left of them, who have chanced on

ST. PRIVAT m

more favourable ground, absolutely must advance
over the open. In such a case are they to say, when
they receive the order to advance, that they cannot
do it, i.e. that they do not mean to obey ? The only
question for them is, how are they to advance so as
to diminish as much as possible the effect of the fire
of the enemy ? The regulations give no distinct
instructions on this subject, above all, as to the case
when this open ground is swept simultaneously by
shell, shrapnel, case, and infantry fire.

We must look back upon our war experiences if
we wish to form for ourselves a decided opinion as
to how we should proceed in such cases.

In the battle of St. Privat the infantry of the
Guard Corps, as they advanced to the attack of the
position, moved out of the cover afforded by the
hollow which runs on the West of Ste. Marie from
North to South. Formed as they still were in
^attalion cojumns, they were surprised by a very hot
infantry fire at a range at which up to that time
small arms had been considered to be ineffective.
The infantry certainly continued to advance, but the
fearful losses, which continually increased, loosened
the columns and broke up the system of command,
so that, when the violence of the enemy's fire had
brought the advance to a standstill, the leading
troops of the attack were in s\yarms, which were
lying down at from 500 to 600 paces from the long
wall round the village, and were answering the
enemy's fire. The foremost line of the infantry of
the XII. Army Corps prolonged the front of the
skirmishers of the infantry of the Guard to the left.
Such infantry of the defenders as had been pushed

132 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

forward on the bare slope had drawn back into the
position, and were also, between St. Privat and
Amanvillers, driven from the front crest While part
of the artillery of the attack occupied this crest, the
other batteries advanced closer to the infantry, and
assisted them with their concentrated fire, of which,
at this short range, no shell missed. The left wing
of the XI I. Corps also advanced from Roncourt on
St. Privat, and the assailants were thus almost in a
half-circle around the village.

One of our infantry Generals, who was directing
the combat in the foremost fighting line, remarked
that the fire of the defenders from the loopholed
walls of the gardens which lay around the village
was almost silenced, and turned to his aide-de-camp
with the words : " Now, get on, or we shall never
take the village!" The aides-de-camp were about
to ride off to carry the order in all directions, when
the whole of the foremost skirmishing line, Guard
Corps and XII. Corps, seized with the same idea,
sprang up as if an order had been conveyed by
electricity, and ran in cheering on the village. This
last rush, which captured the long walls about the
village, cost but little loss, since it would seem that
their defenders had retired into the interior of the
place. It was not until we reached the houses of
the village that the fight began again ; it lasted
some time in a hand-to-hand struggle, probably with
the reserves, who were endeavouring to replace those
defenders of the outer garden walls who had fallen
back. This, at least, was as it appeared to me from
my artillery line on the right of St. Privat. I also,
on the morning after the battle, which continued

SEDAN 133

after nightfall, found numbers of our dead and
wounded lying over the whole field, from Ste. Marie
in the direction of St. Privat These signs of the
murderous struggle increased until, at a range of
from 500 to 600 paces, they lay in whole ranks in a ^
half- circle around St. Privat. Very few lay nearer
than this to the village. Some of our comrades of
the infantry judged from this fact that the French
rifles shot too high, and that they had fired over our
soldiers when they got near. But this was not the
real reason. Our infantry had suffered the heaviest
loss in that line, in which they had remained longest
answering the enemy's fire, and had for their last
rush up to the walls skilfully chosen the very
moment at which the fire of the defenders was
almost altogether silenced.

I have already related to you an episode of the
battle of Sedan, which proved how invincible
infantry are against a frontal attack, if they are
unbroken, fire quietly, and have plenty of ammuni-
tion. They must therefore be broken, either by ^^
pressure on the flanks, or by fire, before one enters
within their zone of effective fire.

In the battle of Sedan our attacks were carried
out in accordance with this principle, which we had
learned by experience. That same infantry of the
Guard (though certainly other battalions) which had
made the attack on St. Privat, at Sedan a fortnight
later captured the Bois de la Garenne. I was
standing with 90 guns of the artillery of the Guard
on the edge of the valley to the East of Givonne ;
the line extended as far as opposite to Daigny.
The enemy's artillery fire had been entirely silenced.

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and General von Pape determined to carry the Bois
de la Garenne. He talked, the matter over with me,
and decided that I should continue to fire for a
certain time, and that he, at a fixed hour (we
compared our watches), should advance from Gi-
vonne ; on this I was to cease my fire, which might
else be a source of danger to his infantry. Every-
thing was carried out exactly as we agreed. The
infantry of the Guard (Jagers and Fusiliers) climbed
up the hill, after my 90 guns had brought a
murderous fire to bear upon the wood from a short
range (the distance varied from i 200 to 1600 paces),
and seized the lisiere. They captured more than
10,000 unwounded prisoners. The Fusiliers and
Jagers of the Guard lost in the whole battle of Sedan
only 12 officers and 216 men, and of this loss only
a small proportion was due to the attack on the
wood, for these same troops had already taken
Givonne, and, moreover, after this suffered some loss
in the interior of the wood. In the battle of St.
Privat the infantry of the Guard lost 8000 men.
But this attack on the Bois de la Garenne cannot
altogether be compared with that on St. Privat, since
the deep and steep valley of the Givonne allowed
our men to approach unobserved to within a few
hundred paces of the Bois de la Garenne, while
in front of St. Privat lay a regular glacis which
extended for a mile and more.

I saw another attack on a village which had
more resemblance to that on St. Privat. This was the
storming of Le Bourget on the 30th of October
1870. The column of the left wing (the Alexander
regiment and the Rifles of the Guard), accompanied

LE BOURGET 135

by two batteries, advanced from Le Blanc Mesnil
against the village. The artillery, which at last
stood quite near to the village, prepared the attack.
The artillery and infantry fire drove the defenders
from the edge, and the swarms of skirmishers
reached it almost without loss, especially at the
South end of Le Bourget. Indeed, there was not
much loss, except in the house-to-house fighting
in the village. The attack which the right wing
carried out, between Dugny and Le Blanc Mesnil,
was yet more instructive with reference to the
attack formation, since at this point the infantry
attacked without the assistance of artillery. For the
flank fire which the horse artillery brought to bear
upon the West edge, from their position to the North
of Pont-Iblon, could have produced but little effect
on account of the length of the range. At this
point there were 2 battalions of the " Franz "
regiment who had to attack over 2000 paces of
open ground. The officer commanding this regiment
had already practised it in the attack. In accord-
ance with his practice he sent forward the whole of
the leading line, which consisted of two companies,
in thick swarms of skirmishers, and made them
advance over the open ground in two parts (by
wings) which alternately ran in 300 paces. After
each rush, the whole of the wing which made it,
threw itself down, and found some cover among the
high potatoes ; there they recovered their breath
while the other wing rushed in. As soon as they
arrived within the range of the needle-gun, the wing
which was lying down opened a fire of skirmishers
on that edge of the village which they were attacking.

136 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

I can still remember, as I write, the delight which
we felt as from our position we watched this attack
which had been so carefully thought out, and was so
well carried through. The best of the thing was
that, as the commander of the regiment assured me,
these troops suffered no loss up to the time when
they reached the edge of the village. It was not
until the street fighting began that the regiment
endured the losses which it had to deplore on that
day.

If I imagine myself posted on the edge which
was held by the defenders, I can easily picture to
myself the embarrassment in which the French
skirmishers found themselves as to how to meet
this unwonted formation for attack. As soon as
the leading swarms of the advance were seen they
were, of course, fired on. All at once they disap-
.peared from sight among the potatoes. When and
whether the defenders now observed that another
line of hostile skirmishers was running up is doubtful,
for the smoke of their own rapid fire hung about the
hedges and walls, through loopholes in which they
were firing. Since the communications at the edge
of a village cannot always run in a straight line, it
would be impossible at the exact instant to direct
all the defenders to aim at once at the new enemy,
and when this had at last been done, the latter may
perhaps have completed their stage and may have
disappeared also in the potatoes ; this may not have
been observed owing to the smoke, which may
further have concealed the fact that the first section
had again started to run. The two lines of skir-
mishers thus succeeded in getting so near that the

LE BOURGET 137

fire of the needle-gun became efficient. One of
them then overwhelmed the circuit of the village
with fire, and thus drew the attention and the fire
of the enemy upon itself, which very much facilitated
a fresh advance of the other. It appears to me,
when I consider the matter, quite natural that the
defenders should have been surprised, in spite of the
open ground, and should have been driven from the
edge by our skirmishers as they rushed in with a
cheer. It is certainly true that on that day the troops
of the defenders were not as good as ours, for they
consisted of the marine infantry, infantry pensioners,
gardes mobiles, and franc -tireiirs of the press ; but
later on, in the street fighting, they resisted with
great pertinacity. Moreover, I do not know which
of these bodies of troops was posted at the edge of
the village.

With regard to the formation of the assailants I
must add that the two lines which followed the
skirmishers (the second of these being also formed
in two lines) did so at a quiet pace in rear of the
centre ; they were in line, as far as I could see, but
with intervals between the files, in order not to offer
a compact target to any accidental shots ; they thus
looked like thick skirmishing lines.

Even though the attack on Le Bourget from this
side succeeded without any powerful assistance from
artillery, you will probably own that I am right in
principle when I say that, as a rule, a frontal attack
on such an object over a wide and open space will
not have any prospect of success unless it be sup-
ported by artillery.

With reference to this question I have read an

138 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

account of what seems to me an ideal attack on a
village. It is to be found, briefly related, on page
6 1 of the 1 4th section of the official account (trans-
lation). The " Annual for the Army and Navy," in
the number for March 1872, relates in detail the
arrangements for and the conduct of this action.
According to this, General von Tresckow, in the battle
of Beaugency-Cravant on the lOth December 1870,
finding that Villejouan threatened his right flank,
and that he could not leave it in the hands of the
enemy during the following night, directed first a
heavy fire of artillery upon it. Two batteries were
especially told off to fire on that village, and threw
shells into it for an hour.

Under this fire a part of the defenders appeared
to have drawn back into the interior of the village.
The infantry (the 76th Fusiliers) had orders to ap-
proach the place in such a manner as not to mask
the fire of the guns. They thus advanced without
firing until they were about 200 paces from it ; the
enemy then opened fire. They at once rushed with
a cheer into the village. The few defenders who
had remained at the edge were overwhelmed, but
the greater part of the garrison must have fallen
back, since the battalion in the action, including
street fighting from noon until the evening, lost
only 4 officers and 88 men. The surprise of the
defenders much facilitated the victory of the Fusiliers.

The battalion was formed in two lines. In the
first were the lOth and i ith companies, two sections
of each being extended as a firing line. The 9th
and the 12th companies were in the second line.
The second line followed at first as a half-battalion

ATTACK IN THE OPEN 139

in rear of the centre, but when the first had pene-
trated at the eastern edge, it turned to the right
towards the northern entrance and burst in there.
An attack must in future be, as a rule, made in this
manner ; but since we have now a rifle which will
throw as far as that of the enemy, we shall be able
to combine the effective fire of our skirmishers with
that of the artillery in order to drive away the
defenders from the edge, and we shall thus, even if
the enemy is not sufficiently broken up by the artil-
lery fire, be able to carry out our task with yet
greater certainty.

If the enemy be entirely driven away from the
edge of the village, it is a matter of no importance
in what formation the infantry approach it. But
if the artillery fire does not suffice to destroy or to
drive away the enemy who are posted on the edge,
and if thus the assistance of the infantry becomes
necessary, then we may learn from the success of
the " Franz " regiment in what formation the infantry
can and must advance up to the spot at which they
will themselves commence firing ; this will be a
strong firing line. The supports which follow will
do best if they take up a line formation, and there
is nothing in the regulations which forbids them, if
the infantry fire of the defenders is still very effective,
to open out their files to an interval of the breadth
of a man, in order that they may not offer to stray
bullets a target which cannot be missed. The second
line will certainly be able to follow in a closed
line, so long as it is not necessary to push it forward
to take part in the attack. I propose this formation
for use in the case of bare level ground only. In

I40 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

every instance where the least cover can be found,
that portion of the troops which is moving over the
ground where the cover stands must obviously be
formed in such columns as will enable it to make
full use of its protection.

LETTER XI

THE ATTACK OVER OPEN AND LEVEL GROUND

In order to satisfy your wish, I will endeavour to
present to you a detailed picture of how I consider
the attack of a village over open ground, carried out
by infantry in combination with artillery, should be
worked out. It is, however, always somewhat mis-
leading to attempt to lay down any detailed instruc-
tions for such an enterprise, since in special cases
some modification must invariably be made, while in
exceptional instances all such rules may be altogether
falsified.

In order to do what you wish, it will be necessary
to compare the real effect produced by infantry and
artillery respectively. I must further premise that
the results of target practice in peace may tempt us
to trust great fallacies. For when fighting in earnest
matters take quite another form. In the first place,
the ignorance of the range materially affects the
value of fire, especially as regards infantry at ranges
at which the trajectory of the bullet is above the
height of a man. It is certainly laid down that the
range is to be tested, but even at known ranges and
in peace the observation of infantry fire is very
untrustworthy, while in war it is quite impossible.

142 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

owing to the enemy's smoke. Again, when acting on
the offensive the ranges cannot, as a rule, be known
unless (as was the case at Le Bourget) the locality is
familiar. But even then the effect of the fire is un-
certain, since the force of the powder is different on
wet and dry days. I have known the difference
thus caused to be as much as one-tenth of the range.
The effect of the artillery will not, as a whole, suffer
so much from this fact as will that of the infantry,
for it is much easier to see and observe bursting
shell than bullets, while they afford the best possible
guidance as to how the guns must be worked in
order to compensate for the influence of the weather
on the impulsive force of the powder.

I once succeeded, by making an arrangement
with some artillery who were carrying out their
practice, in giving both arms some idea as to the
proportional effect of the fire of each, at ranges
which for the infantry were long, but which were
unknown to either ; with this object I made the in-
fantry and the artillery carry out their practice from
the same spot at the same targets. A battery of 6
guns fired first at a target representing a company
extended in skirmishing order, and then on one
representing 6 guns. A company of infantry fired
at the same time, at the same targets but in reverse
order. The range was unknown to the troops, and
was between iioo and I200 yards. The elevation
and the description of fire (in the case of the artillery
the nature of projectile also) were left entirely to the
discretion of the Captains. The result was very
striking. The battery obtained 30 times as many
hits on the infantry target, and lOO times as many

INFANTRY v. ARTILLERY 143

on the artillery target as the infantry. Care was
taken, as this is a most important point, that the
time during which the fire continued, the expense
and the total weight of ammunition were the same
for both arms. From this practice I drew the con-
clusion that we should in war commit a fault leading
to a colossal waste of ammunition, by allowing in-
fantry to open fire at from iioo to 1200 yards, if
there were by any chance artillery available for the
desired duty.

* If we suppose a combat of infantry against
artillery, the result will be yet more favourable to
the latter, since the number of rifles will diminish as
it goes on owing to the losses of the infantry, while
the artillery will still have all 6 guns in action, even
though some of the men and horses have fallen.

The result will be quite the other way as soon as
the troops get nearer to the target. The effect of
the fire of artillery does not increase at ranges
shorter than i lOO or 1200 yards, since this is the
distance at which every shot tells and their effect is
annihilating. On the other hand, the effect of the
fire of infantry increases at every step which brings
them nearer to their target.

It follows from what has been said above that
the effect of infantry fire first bears comparison with
that of artillery at a range of 500 yards, and will not
be equal to it before between 330 and 220 yards.

If we take into account the excitement of action
the comparison will be yet more unfavourable for the
infantry, since this excitement will make the hand
shake which holds the rifie, while the gun feels
nothing of it. It is certainly true that this excite-

144 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

ment affects the sight of many a laying number, and
leads also to other mistakes in the service of the
guns. Some batteries which fought very long and
very bravely at the battle of Koniggratz, noticed
that after a long-continued fire their guns shot from
300 to 400 paces too short, and this fact they
attributed to the fouling of the bore by the enormous
expenditure of ammunition. Our experts puzzled
their brains over this fact, for in the trials which had
been made in peace as to the effects of the duration
of fire no such result had been observed ; or, if it
had, it was of so small extent as to be not worth
mention, and had certainly never been so marked.
I strongly suspect that the laying numbers, in the
excitement of the action, did not look to their
tangent scales after each shot, and that these slipped
down owing to the shake given by the discharge.
We noticed no such effect of the fouling of the bore
in my batteries. But I certainly observed in them
also that, when the effect of the enemy's shell
became very severe, the guns were very badly laid
and were even fired without being laid ; and I had
to take very strong measures in order to reintroduce
a quiet and regular service of the guns. This is
possible in the case of artillery, but in the case of
infantry the aiming of the men, especially in a hot
action, is almost entirely beyond control.

The considerations which I have mentioned appear
to me to be the ground on which the regulations, of
the 1st of March 1876, lay down that infantry fire
is not to be permitted at a greater range than 550
yards, except against large targets, such as columns,
etc. If, at a later date, there have been some

ATTACK IN THE OPEN 145

modifications which make the ranges and the nature
of fire to be used dependent upon the rules laid
down in the musketry instructions, this has probably
been caused by the fact that it was considered
desirable to accept in principle the use of longer
ranges as soon as any improvements in firearms
should render this necessary. But up to the present
the improvement in the range and accuracy of rifles
has not been so great as to necessitate any change
in principle. I do not, therefore, think that I shall
be wrong if I lay down the range at which infantry,
which is supported by artillery, should open fire
against the edge of the village as not normally
more than 550 yards. It is, moreover, very desir-
able that the infantry should not open fire too soon,
for if they do there will be some danger that they
will find themselves without cartridges at the most
critical moment.

In speaking of such an attack as I am now about
to describe, it must always be supposed that the
defender will equally be supported by artillery. In
that case the combat will, and must begin by a duel
between the artillery of the attack and that of the
defence. When the former has succeeded in over-
coming the latter, which will take place at longer
ranges than those of which we have been speaking,
it will then first turn its fire against the edge of the
village w^hich is to be attacked, and will certainly, in
order to produce the greatest possible effect upon it,
advance as near to it as it can, that is to say, as near
as the range of the enemy's infantry fire will permit.
The effect of the latter may, judging by the present
position of technical improvements, be considered to

L

146 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

be almost nil at 1700 yards. The artillery will,
therefore, select a position at from 1700 to 2200
yards from the enemy for the purpose of firing on
the edge of the village.

In the meantime the infantry will have advanced
to within 550 yards of the village, carefully avoiding
any chance of masking the fire of the artillery,
in order that the latter may cover their advance ;
^t 550 yards the attacking line of skirmishers
will combine their fire with that of the artillery.
Then under cover of the infantry the guns will be
pushed in to the decisive and annihilating range
of from 1 100 to 1200 yards. If the artillery
consists of more than one battery, it will accompany
the infantry up to the last moment of the attack,
advancing by echelons, so that half of it will always
be in action as the other half moves, in order that
the fire on the edge of the village may be un-
remitting.

Are you astonished that I, a gunner, should
suggest that the artillery should push in to within
1 100 or 1200 yards of a village which is occupied
by infantry, especially in these days when shrapnel
are effective at 3300 yards, and the effect of fire is
already murderous at 2200 yards? But I recom-
mend this close approach, not only as a gunner, but
more especially as an infantry man. In the first
place, the observation and correction of fire is very
difficult at 2200 yards, and at this range the effect
of fire is always somewhat uncertain. For this
reason every gunner must wish to be able to get in
closer. So much for the gunner. But the infantry
man will desire that the artillery shall support his

A R TILLER V WITH INFANTR V 1 47

attack up to the moment of his final charge. But
this the artillery cannot do if it remains at a range
of 2200 yards. For at such a range it is difficult,
when the combatants approach each other, to tell
friends from foes. In this case, badly aimed shell
or premature shrapnel may injure our own infantry.
The artillery must, therefore, cease firing when their
own infantry is within 550 yards of the object of
attack. Instead of doing so it would be better that
they should advance. At a range of 1 100 or 1200
yards they can go on firing confidently until the
infantry make their last rush, for at such a short
distance they can be so sure of their shots that they
can avoid any possible accident. It is, besides, not
very encouraging to the infantry, that their artillery
should remain at a distance of a mile from the
enemy, while they themselves go in until they can
see the whites of their eyes. There is something
very encouraging and comforting to the infantry
when, at such critical moments, they hear their own
guns thundering close at hand. Only those who
have heard the cheers, with which, at such moments,
the infantry receive the batteries, can fully form an
opinion as to the moral influence which artillery fire
exercises on its own infantry.

You will perhaps object that artillery can no
longer advance to within 11 00 or 1200 yards of a
village which is occupied by an enemy, since the
infantry, strong in their confidence in their new rifle,
would at such a range destroy the batteries ; I have
indeed myself just advised that the first position
taken up against the village should be beyond the
reach of a rifle. But I can state from experience

148 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

that infantry fire at these ranges is not annihilating.
The old soldier's song is quite right when it says, " It
is not every bullet which hits," and is fully confirmed,
if we compare the number of killed and wounded
with that of the bullets fired. I stood with my
batteries in position before St. Privat from 2 P.M. to
5 P.M., while in front of us at a range of from 900
to 1000 paces swarms of infantry lay in the ridges of
the fields ; the foremost line consisted of 3 battalions,
and the second and third were of about the same
strength ; all three lines fired at our batteries alone.
We certainly suffered very considerable loss, but
during the whole three hours not one of our guns
ceased its fire for a single moment on account of the
fire of the infantry. When it did happen that a gun
was for a time silenced, this was due to the artillery
fire which broke up a wheel or some other thing.
And when, between 5 and 6 o'clock, we had to go
forward with the infantry, only 3 guns out of 84 had
to remain behind for a time because they needed
some repair. All other damage had been repaired
in position under the infantry fire. Again the losses
caused by infantry fire will always be considerably
diminished if the enemy's infantry be under a heavy
fire from our skirmishers ; they will then be compelled
to turn their fire principally upon the latter. For
this reason I advised that the batteries should be
kept beyond the effective range of the enemy's
infantry fire until we are in a position to reply
vigorously with the fire of our own infantry.

The war of 1870-71 has entirely done away with
the old prejudice that artillery must avoid the zone
of infantry fire. I cannot see at all why gunners

PREMATURE BURSTS 149

should be less exposed to danger than infantry.
Moreover, as a matter of fact, they never are so
much exposed as the latter. If you count the
number of men on a front of 120 paces, which is
what a battery occupies, you will see that the
skirmishers of a strong firing line stand much closer,
and thus suffer more loss than the gunners. But
those bullets of the enemy which hit the guns,
limbers, horses, etc., and which count as hits at peace
practice, inflict no loss on the men and do not affect
their morale. For this reason artillery also can, if it
be necessary, expose themselves to infantry fire.

Why then do I not rather propose that the
artillery should go in with the infantry to close
fighting at a range of 550 yards? I do not do so
owing to the fact that it is not always possible to
avoid the necessity that artillery must fire over their
own infantry. This can be done without danger if
the latter stand under the highest point of the
trajectory of the shell, but is impossible if they are
just in front of the guns or are within 100 paces of
their muzzles. In spite of every improvement of
our materiel it will now and then happen that a shell
bursts in the bore and acts as case-shot. When we
were bombarding Montmedy I stood straight in front
of my field batteries, at a distance of from 800 to
900 paces. Several shell broke up, and I saw the
splinters strike about 200 paces from us. At a
distance of 660 yards one is therefore safe from any
accident. It is thus desirable, for the sake of the
infantry, that the artillery should remain 660 yards
in rear of that point where the former will halt for
some time for the purpose of opening fire.

I50 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

When the artillery occupies a position at a range
of iioo or 1200 yards from the enemy there is no
need for them to cease firing when the last rush takes
place ; if they did so they would indeed by their
silence inform the enemy's reserves in the interior of
the village that a new phase of the fight was com-
mencing. On the contrary they can, when the fore-
most line of their infantry charges in with a cheer,
throw one or two salvos of shrapnel with the greatest
ease into the centre of the village, and thus annoy
the reserves, without running any danger of hitting
friend as well as foe, since our men cannot penetrate
so far until after some little time. It is indeed of
the greatest importance that the artillery should
continue to fire until the assault on the edge of the
village has succeeded ; unless it does so there is
some risk that the whole of the preparation by fire
will be of no use. We certainly had the luck at
Sedan to take the Bois de la Garenne, though we
ceased firing before the infantry advanced. But
later on I met with a case where an attack on a
village failed, though we had kept up such a hot fire
on the edge that the defenders had moved off to the
flanks and had hidden themselves. The artillery
then ceased firing, having been ordered not to fire
over their own troops ; after this the infantry
advanced. They found all the defenders back again
at their posts. The attack failed three consecutive
times. You must excuse my not mentioning the
date of this action, since to do so would be tanta-
mount to holding the commander up to blame, which
I should be sorry to do, as in spite of this I valued
him greatly.

INFANTR V A TTA CK 151

So much for the support which infantry, when
attacking a village, has a right to expect from artillery.
The former must, however, take care that it does not
in its approach mask the latter and interrupt its
fire.

• We will now discuss the special duty of the
infantry. I think that, if the ground is open (and
we have taken it for granted that it will be necessary
to pass over open and level ground), they must
extend for attack before they pass the position of
the artillery, which the latter will have selected at
between 1700 and 2200 yards from the village.
They will extend strong swarms of skirmishers (at
least two sections per company), and the supports
will follow these in line with open intervals. The
second line will follow in the same formation as the
supports, for I assume that the enemy's artillery has
been silenced. It is scarcely necessary to say that
the supports of the first line and the companies of
the second line will not op-en out their files until they
come within reach of chance shots from the edge held
by the enemy. It would moreover be advantageous
to arrange that the companies of the second line
should overlap the flanks of the first. I need not
perhaps have mentioned this, as the regulations
prescribe it. But I find that, as a rule, the very
opposite is done, especially when a single battalion
is engaged, for the battalions are very much inclined
to adopt the type given in paras. 85 and 87 of the
regulations, and to push forward their flank com-
panies, leaving the centre companies to follow in rear
of the centre, where they form a butt for the enemy's
bullets.

152 LE TTERS ON INFANTR V

It should also be laid down that, as is permitted
by the regulations, if the artillery has found room on
one flank of the infantry (say, the inner flank), the
supports and the companies of the second line should
follow in echelon on the outer flank ; for the artillery
by its fire secures the inner flank of the line from
surprise, and further has more effect upon that part
of the edge of the village which stands opposite to
the inner flank than it has on the other, so that the
assailant will need greater strength on the outer
flank.

With regard to the distance of the supports and
the second line from the skirmishers, the regulations
merely mention the subject ; but they order that it
shall be modified according to the nature of the
ground, and lay down that it shall be greater in
open ground, while they give it as desirable that it
should be as small as possible whenever it is practi-
cable to make use of cover. Since I am now speak-
ing of an advance over quite open country, we can
take it that the distances should be as great as
possible. If they be taken at 220 yards the supports,
if they are echeloned outwards, can fire volleys
directly on the flank of any attack which is directed
against the flank of the skirmishing line. If we
hold to this distance then, when the skirmishers
commence firing at 550 yards, the supports will be
at 770, and the companies of the second line at 990
yards from the enemy, and there, if they lie down,
will not be exposed to very serious loss.

It cannot be too distinctly laid down — though it
will seldom be done in peace, and will thus generally
be» neglected in war, from want of habit — that the

JUDGING THE RANGE 153

infantry, as they pass by their artillery which is in
action, should inquire from them what they have
found the range to be. For much as we may
practise judging distance, we shall be very much
deceived by varying light and weather, while it is
only natural that men should judge the enemy who
is firing at them to be nearer than he is. I must
here tell you of some errors which I, and not I alone,
have made. When at Koniggratz, after passing the
Trotinka, I led my batteries through Jericek into
their first position, and rode to the front to select it,
the officer commanding the brigade and the officers
commanding batteries, as we looked over the table-
land, agreed with me that the range to the Austrian
guns which were firing from the now historical wooded
hill in rear of Horenowes was 2500 paces. The
first shell which we fired taught us that the range
was much greater than this, and when after the
fourth shell we found that we scarcely reached the
enemy with an elevation of 4000 paces, I advanced
half this distance to the next undulation. Artillery
can more easily correct their fire than can infantry,
since, as I have already remarked, it is almost im-
possible for the latter, when firing at long ranges, to
observe the fall of their bullets, if the enemy is firing
in return.

Errors occur in the other direction also, especially
when an expanse of snow between us and the enemy
blinds our eyes. During a slight reconnaissance action
near Niibel, on the morning of the lOth February
1864, I, with a small group of ten to twelve horse-
men, stood for a long time in front of a house, on
the wall of which bullets kept on striking above

154 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

our heads; these were fired at us from a clump of
trees by a flanking party of three men of the enemy.
We wondered at the range of the Danish rifles, for
after talking it over we judged the range at 800
paces. When the enemy had been driven out we
had the distance paced. It was 240 paces. The
enemy must have made a similar mistake, for he shot
steadily too high. It is evident that such errors
must make the whole of our fire ineffective, for it can
have no other result than to increase the confidence
of the enemy. But when one has once obtained
data, founded upon reality, by which to check one's
own moral condition and the effects of light, one
seldom makes much of an error in the unconscious
and instinctive comparison of other ranges. All
attempts to get over this difficulty by means of
range-finders have up to the present time been foiled
by the excitement of action and the rapid changes in
the circumstances of a combat. The fire of artillery
continues to be the best and the quickest range-finder,
and this is the more true, since it, as I have before
said, takes practically into account the varying influ-
ence of the weather on the power of the powder.

If the fire of the artillery has been sufficiently
strongly worked against the edge of the village, I
do not think that the chain of skirmishers need run
until they arrive at the first offensive position, at a
range of 550 yards, from which they intend to open
fire. It is a question whether the defenders of the
edge will not be so occupied in getting cover from
the shrapnel bullets and splinters of shell which will
be falling on them, that they will fail altogether to
notice the approach of the skirmishers ; and even il

INFANTR V AD VANCE 155

they do see them, how many of the defenders will
have the courage to put their heads out from under
cover for the purpose of firing. It is even possible
— and it was the case at Villejouan — that the assail-
ants may get much nearer than 550 yards to the
village without firing a shot. This they naturally
must, and will, do if it is in any way possible. They
must be warned beforehand with regard to this point,
for when once they are engaged, none of the superior
officers have any more power over the skirmishers.
This is then the duty of officers who lead them. It
must be urged upon them that under all circum-
stances they are not to run, except under the most
urgent necessity, since running heats the blood, and
therefore affects the shooting. I do not ask too
much from a firing line, when I say that they should
advance at a quiet pace, even when they are under
fire, always supposing that this fire is not too deadly.
In the battle of Fridericia on the 8th of March
1 864, I saw our skirmishers advance over marshy
ground. The enemy's infantry bullets, fired at a
long range, fell among them. They looked astonished,
judged the distance, laughed, shook their heads, and
quietly continued to advance slowly over the heavy
ground, which made it impossible to run. If it can
be so managed, the men should not be allowed to
run, until they begin the final charge with the
bayonet. In any case, if the attack is supported by
artillery, it must be absolutely forbidden that the
infantry fire shall commence at a greater range than
550 yards; otherwise ammunition will fail when it
comes to close fighting. For it is surprising how
fast troops fire away all their cartridges, while any

156 LE TTERS ON INFANTR Y

renewal of ammunition, in a combat in open ground,
is not to be counted upon under any circumstances,
from the moment when the infantry fight begins at
550 yards up to the final hand-to-hand struggle.

All the suggestions which have been made with
respect to the supply of ammunition are impracti-
cable at this phase of the action. They may work
when the fire is at long ranges, during pauses in the
action, or when the troops are on the defensive.
Thus, in the fight which I have mentioned at Ville-
jouan, the troops were supplied with fresh ammuni-
tion by the ammunition wagons after the village had
been taken, and when the companies were fighting
on the defensive against the attacking masses of the
enemy. Thus also, at Beaune la Rolande, the men
carried up cartridges to the defenders of the place in
their helmets. But if a firing line, which is attacking
over open ground, runs short of cartridges at a dis-
tance of 100 or 200 yards from the enemy, any
renewal of ammunition is for the moment impossible.
No ammunition cart can reach them, no man laden
with a bag of cartridges can get up to them. And
even if some man had the pluck to attempt it, and
the luck to get through, of what use would 500
cartridges be to a company ? They would give about
three shots per man ; and besides, how are they to
be distributed ?

If the firing line notices from their first position
that they have obtained some success against the
enemy (which will be shown either by the diminution
or the cessation of his fire), they may advance
towards the edge of the village, either in one body,
charging over the whole or only the latter part of

THE FINAL ATTACK 157

the distance, or by rushes with pauses, during which
they will open fire anew, while these rushes may
either be made by the whole line, or by successive
fractions, of which one will fire as the other advances.
The choice as to which of these plans is to be em-
ployed will depend upon the degree of steadiness of
the enemy's fire. This fire must in any case, if the
attack is to succeed, be much weakened and shaken,
if not altogether silenced, before the advance takes
place.

LETTER XII

THE ADVANCE BY RUSHES ; THE REGULATION OF
. FIRE ; AND THE RENEWAL OF AMMUNITION

I WAS prepared for your reproach, that I had in my
last letter treated too summarily both the last phase
of the attack on a village and of the renewal of
ammunition, while I had passed over in silence the
case in which the infantry attack was not supported
by artillery. But you must not suppose that I wish
to avoid these important questions. On the contrary,
I propose to devote a special letter to them, since my
last was, even as it was, far too long.

The operation of getting over the last 550 yards
before the actual penetration into the village is, in-
disputably, the most difficult of the whole attack.
The simplest form in which this task can be carried
'out is to shout : " Rise ! Charge ! Charge ! Hurrah !"
while the officer who gives these words of command
rushes on in front. If he reaches the village, he has
performed a heroic act ; if he does not reach it, he
remains on the field of honour and has given his
blood. This is very fine, and at least preserves the
holiest thing he has, his honour. Moreover, it is in
accordance with the nature of the human heart, and
with the moral condition of men, who have suffered

THE FINAL CHARGE 159

severe losses in a long fire-fight, and who long for
some end to this crisis. They know that they are
just as certain to be killed if they get up and run
away, as if they charge in, and that in the latter
case they will at least be able to avenge their fallen
comrades. But experience teaches us that when
this decision is made at the wrong time it is not
successful, and that such attacks lead to the destruc-
tion of the assailant, for example, the French attacks
at Sedan (of which I can speak as an eyewitness),
and the numerous attacks on Beaune la Rolande.
Moreover, a charge over 550 yards so wearies the
strength of the men, that they arrive almost powerless
at the edge of the village, and need a certain amount
of time to recover their breath before they can be
of any use in a hand-to-hand fight. So long a
charge is justifiable only in the case when you can
see that the edge is as good as abandoned, and when
you may hope to be able to make use of this favour-
able moment to occupy it. Under other circum-
stances this moment must be brought about by the
effect of our fire.

What sort of fire should be used at 550 yards ? is
a question which has received very different answers.
There was a time when, at exercises and manoeuvres,
swarm volleys were preferred ; and these were often
fired with tw^o sights.^ In war, I think, the voice of
the Lieutenant, which will have already been much
tried, will soon give way, and I should therefore
reserve swarm volleys for moments when masses of
the enemy are seen ; for example, supports, advanc-

1 " Mit zwei Visiren." This expression means that half of the unit
fire with (say) the 400 yards sight and half with 450. — N.L. W.

i6o LETTERS ON INFANTRY

ing through the street of a village, or along the
edge. The officer will then commence by stopping
the fire of his men by means of his shrill whistle,
thus attracting their attention, and will after this be
able to give the word for a swarm volley.^ But the
moments in action which afford any opportunity for
this are rare and short, and if in other cases, that is
to say as a rule, it is possible to order the number
of cartridges to be used, and to see that order strictly
observed, we may be very well pleased with our fire
discipline. For when once the fight has grown hot,
it requires immense self-command not to return fire,
when a man is being fired at, especially when he has
already been firing. A soldier who was reproved
for not having obeyed the order to cease firing,
excused himself by saying : " Sir, that fellow over
there shot at you ; I was obliged to give him one."
But if the officers wish to observe the effect of the
fire, and to be able to see whether the enemy holding
the edge of the village is giving way, they must
insist upon such pauses in the fire, since the smoke
which lies before a rapidly firing line of skirmishers
sometimes limits the view to an extraordinary degree.
I do not hold with using two sights when firing on
the edge of a village at 550 yards. It diminishes
the effect by a half, and has but a very doubtful
value against the enemy in the interior of the village.

1 If indeed it be possible to stop independent fire at such short
ranges by means of the whistle, and to have recourse to swarm volleys.
If this be not possible when fighting at ranges under 550 yards, swarm
volleys must be altogether abandoned, and we must be well satisfied if
the officer commanding the section succeeds, by means of his whistle,
in attracting the attention of the skirmishers, and in directing it, by a
motion of his sword, to the masses which have just appeared.

AD VANCE BY R USHES 1 6 1

The plan might be used against an enemy advancing
over open ground and formed in several lines, though
it will always be very difficult, if the fire is hot, to
control the fire at this range, and to see that the
various men use the sights which have been ordered ;
especially since the word of command itself is a very
long one and is easily misunderstood in the noise of
battle. If care has been taken to obtain beforehand
from the artillery some information as to the range
which they have found, no very great mistakes can
be made in a range of 400 or 500 yards, while the
edge of the village is kept better under fire if only
one sight be used.

If the fire from the edge of the village ceases
partially or altogether, or if it is considerably
weakened, the men will rise at the word of the
officer, in order to run in. If the enemy has not
given way altogether for the moment, and if his
men are only for a while thinking more of cover
than of the effect of their fire, this fire will soon
become more lively again, and the officer will be
compelled to order his skirmishers to lie down and
reopen fire, in order to complete the moral and
physical destruction of the enemy. From this results
the advance by rushes (para. 102 of the regulations) ;
since it is often unavoidable, the regulations have
adopted it and ordered it to be practised. Many
curious ideas have prevailed at one time or another
with regard to this advance by rushes. The system
that a part of the firing line shall remain lying down,
and shall keep up a fire on the enemy, is entirely
correct. But when, in peace exercises, the battalion
commander is heard to give the order "The ist

1 62 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

company will rush ! " and " The 4th company will
rush ! " we are compelled to acknowledge that in
this case a system is carried out which would be
impossible in war, since the battalion commander
cannot ride so close to the fighting line that the
latter can hear his voice, while, if the skirmishers are
accustomed to wait for this word of command, they
may in a real action wait a long time for it. The
only thing that the battalion commanders can do
with reference to this matter, is to instruct their
companies, as they extend, and before they come
into the zone of effective fire, from which flank the
advance by rushes is to be carried out. But even
this cannot always be laid down beforehand.

I have seen still more unpractical advances by
rushes practised. I have seen the firing line divided
into three parts, of which first one, then the second,
and at last the third ran forward. This is opposed
to the moral impulse of good troops ; since when
a part of the skirmishers has taken up its position
near to the enemy and has opened fire, honour and
comradeship compel all the other skirmishers to hurry
up to them, in order to share their danger shoulder
to shoulder and to fight with them. The moment
when the echelon, which has gone first to the front,
opens its fire, is the most favourable for all the
others to gain ground quickly, since the enemy will
at this moment direct all his rifles at those skir-
mishers who have the first advanced.

One experiment which I have seen made is yet
more unpracticable than the above ; a firing line
was divided into a still greater number of fractions,
and (supposing them for the sake of clearness to be

THE SMALL SLGHT 163

numbered) the even and the odd sections advanced
alternately by rushes, so that they really advanced
en ecJiiqiiier ; in this case the centre swarms of
the fraction which at first lay down, found their
field of fire so narrowed on both sides by their
comrades who had run forward, that they could do
little or nothing. For this reason, at the peace
exercises which were carried out in my command,
I never allowed a firing line, which was advancing
by rushes against a single object, to be divided into
more than two echelons.

It is very important that the officers of the firing
line, before they order the first rush at a range of
from 440 to 550 yards, shall have the small sight
put up. For they may with certainty count upon
being able at the first rush to reach the zone of the
small sight ; especially since at a range of about
440 yards, when the target cannot be clearly seen,
the men in battle almost always shoot too high,
more so than at shorter ranges. From the above-
mentioned point the fight will become hotter, and
the men will be very likely to neglect to alter their
sights. If the men are already accustomed to aim
at the bottom of the target (that is to say, at the
feet of the enemy), the height of a man will still be
within the trajectory when using the small sight ;
moreover, the whole of the remainder of the attack
can be carried out with this sight. It is possible,
if the skirmishers be well instructed and if the
advance by rushes in echelon be well carried out,
that the troops may reach the boundary of the
village without very great loss ; whether it be, as
was the case with the " Franz " regiment at Le

i64 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Bourget on the 30th of October, that the enemy
is deceived and confused by the change of targets ;
or if, as at Villejouan, the fire directed on him is
so intolerable that he does not defend the edge of
the village energetically.

But we must always be prepared to anticipate
a stout resistance by the enemy. If this does take
place we shall find, as I have said above, that the
rush of the skirmishers will be checked by the
enemy's fire ; its length will thus be limited not by
the will of the leaders but by the hostile fire ; the
attacking skirmishers " will not be able to get on
any farther," will lie down, and will recommence
firing. Why cannot they get on any farther ?
Certainly not because they will all be killed ; but
because they will have lost their leaders by fire.
For the officers, who always rise first and run on in
front, will naturally be selected by the defenders as
their principal target. I would remind you of the
answer of the men which I have already mentioned :
" We had no officers left to tell us what to do." In
all the battles of the last war the loss in officers was
out of all proportion to that in men. The infantry
are proud of this, and have every right to be so.
No infantry at the beginning of the war had more
than 3 officers per company, and the maximum
which a regiment of 3000 men had, including field
officers, was thus about 50. There were thus 60
men to each officer. But it appears by the table of
losses that there were never more than 30, and often
20 or less, men hit to each officer. The loss in
^\ officers was thus at least double, and often three
times, the loss in men. But it is impossible to

THE FIRING 11 NE 165

expect a line of skirmishers who have no officer
left, -to carry out their original instructions and to
rush on. They will remain lying down and firing.
The attack will thus come to a standstill, and the
rush will have been stopped by the fire of the enemy.
There is now no other means of bringing about
a farther advance or a renewed rush than by
throwing into the line fresh strength which shall
carry on with it the former combatants. This fresh
strength comes first from the supports of the first
line, and then from the companies of the second
line, as these are pushed forward into the fighting
line. It will then be possible to direct these com-
panies, as they rush on, in accordance with the circum-
stances of the action ; whereas, from the moment
when the skirmishing line opened fire at 550 yards
up to that when the attack came to a standstill, it
really governed the movements of the battalion. In
this respect there is a most marked difference be-
tween battle and exercises on the drill ground.
For on the latter the skirmishing lines conform, to
the movements of the companies and the battalion,
whilst in the former the companies and the battalion
will modify their movements according to the success
or failure of the firing line. No regulations can in
any way correct the want of reality of peace exercises
in this respect, for it is impossible to prescribe
that the leading section of skirmishers shall govern
the movements of the battalion. But it must be
distinctly understood that this difference does exist,
so that on the drill ground, when the firing lines
have been extended and are firing, the battalions
and companies may not make movements which.

1 66 >• LETTERS ON INFANTRY

though they may be entirely in accordance with the
directions of the regulations, will still lead to an
unreal, compHcated, and even impossible system of
handling the firing line.

The battalion commander, if the edge of the
village has not already been captured, must use his
last company to give the final impulse to the rush,
to the charge, and to the assault. When this last
company has once been engaged, there is nothing
more to be done than to give the word : " Charge !
Charge ! Hurrah ! " It is of no use then to de-
liberate as to whether the first rush was begun too
soon, or whether the companies might not have been
better employed a little more to the right or a little
more to the left, or whether a better point of attack
might not have been chosen. At that moment every
change of formation and every movement to a flank
will cost only more time and more lives. The
quicker the decision is brought about, the less will
be the cost of the victory.

With regard to the question as to how such an
attack is to be carried out, when we are not in a posi-
tion to support it with artillery, I must first answer
that in that case, if one expects to succeed, the
assailant must be far more superior to the defender,
either in the number or in the excellence of his
troops, than when the attack is carried on in com-
bination with artillery. For you will agree with me
that, looking at an action from the point of view of
theory, we must take it for granted that the assailant
is the superior ; otherwise he would not be the assail-
ant but the defender.

If then it be not possible to get near to the

FIRE AT LONG RANGES 167

village by surprise — and this we assume, since we
are carrying on the attack over entirely open ground
— there remains nothing else to do but to replace
the artillery fire at from 1 100 to 1200 yards by the
fire of infantry. It is obvious that this lack of
artillery can be remedied in such a manner only at
the cost of an enormous expenditure of ammunition,
since the percentage of hits at these ranges is, as we
all know, exceedingly small, while we shall be obliged
to fire with two or three different sights, in order to
cover even half of the 440 yards which forms the
zone of elTective shrapnel. We shall endeavour to
make good the immense expenditure of ammunition
which is the consequence of this, by supplying the
troops which are firing at such ranges as early as
possible with fresh ammunition, before they are
allowed to go farther to the front. At this point, at
1 100 or 1200 yards from the enemy, it will still be
possible to bring up the ammunition carts. But the
distribution of the ammunition will take some time,
while the advance of the assailants ought to take
place under the cover of this infantry which is firing
at long ranges. For this reason I think that, for the
first fire on the village at long ranges (i 100 to 1200
yards), that portion of the infantry should be used
which it is intended to employ as a last reserve when
the fighting becomes close. This portion ought to
continue firing until the first line of attack, which
will advance on its flank (in the same manner as
the " Franz " regiment at Le Bourget), has got so
close to the village that it can open an effective fire
at short range. It will then fill up with ammunition,
and follow as the reserve of the attack, which will

1 68 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

now be divided into two echelons which, firing con-
tinuously, will advance by rushes.

Excuse me if I now lay down in detail the
manner in which, in my opinion, a battalion ought
to be worked in such a case as this.

The first company extends, advances to within
1 100 or 1200 yards of thq village (if it be possible
it will go as close as from 900 to 1000 yards), and
opens fire with several different sights. On its left
the 2d and 3d companies will advance side by
side, in strong skirmishing lines, each in two parts
moving in echelon, just as the front line of the
" Franz " regiment did at Le Bourget. Their firing
line will lie down at a range of 550 yards from the
enemy and will open fire. This will take them a
quarter of an hour, for as they move alternately they
will take twice the time that they would have taken
had they moved without halting; again the ist
company, having been sent forward at first, will have
opened fire before the other companies were up in
line with it. The small percentage of hits must be
compensated for by a great expenditure of ammuni-
tion ; therefore the volleys must follow quickly after
each other. Volleys may certainly be used at this
stage, since the noise of battle will not yet be too
great, while the company need not be extended at
very wide intervals, since it is not yet within the
zone of very effective fire. As soon as the 2d and
3d companies commence firing at 550 yards, the ist
will form a loose line, and will fill up with ammuni-
tion from the battalion carts which will be brought
up; for we may assume that it will have fired 50
rounds per man. The battalion at this moment is

RENEWAL OF AMMUNITION 169

formed as follows ; the 2d and 3d companies have
their skirmishers at about 550 yards from the village,
their supports are about 200 yards farther to the
rear, while the 4th company, which will be formed
in a loose line overlapping the left, will be 200 yards
yet farther to the rear (say at 900 to looo yards
from the enemy), and the ist company at a range of
1200 yards will be replacing their ammunition.
The development of the farther action of the attack
starts from this formation. If I were called upon
to state how great a force of an enemy of equal value
I should expect to overcome by an attack so con-
ducted, I should be compelled to own that I think it
very doubtful if the attack would succeed in the case
where the defenders were half as strong as the
assailants. It would certainly be better, with these
odds, to contain him with one company which
should act defensively from under cover along his
front, while the three others should act against his
flank or try to turn it. But this is not the question
here, for we are considering what should be the
formation for a frontal attack, when the enemy must
be attacked in front over open ground.

The punctual replacement of ammunition is one
of the most difficult problems in war. Of what use
are the most skilful strategical manoeuvres, or even
heroically brave troops, if the latter find themselves
at the most critical moment defenceless before the
enemy? I have myself once, in the war of 1866,
undergone the bitter experience of finding myself
without ammunition at the decisive moment. Other
lines of artillery were in this respect, during the same
campaign, worse off even than I. For this reason I

1 70 LE TTERS ON INFANTR V

have given my whole attention to the question as to
how in war the fighting troops are to be continually
kept supplied with ammunition. When, in the years
1870-71, my position imposed upon me the duty of
providing for this supply to an Army Corps, I worked
out in practice the result of my reflections, and
succeeded, though with great toil and difficulty
(which were, however, lightened by the unwearying
activity of the personnel of the branch), in so secur-
ing the supply of ammunition, that in that corps no
single body of troops was ever unprovided. It is
true that at both wars the expenditure of ammuni-
tion by our infantry was but small ; in the whole
war of 1866 it averaged only from 5 to 1 1 cartridges
per man. In the war of 1870-71, when I sent the
whole of my five artillery ammunition columns back
empty to the rear, I had at the most to send a
couple of infantry ammunition wagons with them.
My experience was thus confined to the supply of
artillery ammunition. But the general principles are
the same for both, and can be applied to infantry
also ; moreover, we must make up our minds clearly,
and in good time, that in the future we also shall
expend a far greater quantity of infantry ammunition,
since we fire now at longer ranges.

The fact that we in 1866 expended but little
infantry ammunition was due to the superiority ol
our rifle, which quickly decided the infantry fights.
In 1870-71 our rifle did not throw half so far as
that of the enemy, and our artillery had to fulfil
many purposes which, on the side of the enemy, were
entrusted to the infantry. In future wars, in which
our rifles will have as long a range as those of the

SUPPL V OF AMMUNITION 1 7 1

foe, we may consider that our expenditure of infantry
cartridges will, under similar circumstances, be at
least double what it then was. But these circum-
stances will be modified by the fact that a standing
fire-fight will often take place at long ranges, and
that the lines which will be under cover on both
sides, will even at short ranges take longer to break
up the enemy, before they can advance to the
decisive attack with the bayonet ; while the victory
will often fall to that side which has the last cartridge
in its pouch. Though we in 1870-71 never suffered
from want of infantry cartridges yet, on the other
hand, our enemy often felt this want, being able to
commence firing at longer ranges than we. When I
established myself with my batteries on the height
to the right of St. Privat, the enemy gave me time
to take up a firm position before he began to make
an attempt to drive me back by an offensive move-
ment from Amanvillers. An aide-de-camp of
General Ladmirault told me some years later that he
was sent by his General to two infantry regiments,
immediately after I had appeared on the height, with
an order that they should take my batteries at once.
But neither of these regiments had any cartridges
left. The aide-de-camp had to ride back and to
bring up other troops ; but in the meantime we had
made out our position, had found our range to various
points, and had increased our line of guns, so that
when the attack at last took place these troops were
dispersed by our shell fire. It is not possible, since
authentic information on the point is wanting, to say
how often the French ran short of ammunition. It
is certain that Bazaine made this his excuse for not

172 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

having continued his attacks on the 17th of August.
Many other cases of indecision on the part of that
army, which has always been incHned to adopt the
offensive, may have been due to this cause.

Many people have considered that the enormous
expenditure of cartridges on the part of the French,
and the frequent want of ammunition consequently
experienced by them, were due to their faulty fire
discipline, which is often the cause of such waste ;
and it cannot be denied that they did waste am-
munition. We heard before the war how, judging
by experiments on their practice grounds and at the
camp of Chalons, their rifle gave a destructive effect
at I 100 yards, while they were practised in firing at
the double, and with the rifle at the hip, a system
which we proved at Sedan to be almost entirely in-
efficient. A good fire discipline can set certain
bounds to the waste of ammunition. But do not let
us expect too much from it !

Fire discipline can prevent the fire from begin-
ning too soon and at too long ranges. It can also,
if fire be ordered or permitted to commence at very
long ranges, keep in hand the amount of ammunition
expended. It will especially be able to do this
when it is possible to fire swarm volleys, and thus as
it were to give the order to fire each cartridge. But
when once the fighting lines have got so close to
each other that each individual skirmisher can see
his enemy aiming at him, when the losses begin to
get heavy, and when certain sections have lost their
leaders (and their successors have not at once drawn
attention to themselves by words of command), then,
at first in these sections but soon along the whole

ECONOMY OF AMMUNITION 173

front, a hot fire begins to " roll," as those men say
who have experienced it. Then all directions with
regard to economy in ammunition cease, since no
word of command can be heard above the noise of
battle. To use a technical expression " individual
fire has it all its own way." I do not wish to say
anything against the self-sacrificing courage of our
excellent individual infantry soldiers, but there are
always some among them who are but too glad to
keep up their pluck by a noise ; for no one wants to
be killed, and most men feel the need of silencing
the fear of death by a shock of some other kind,
such as a great noise. At times when it would be
premature to charge in with a cheer, this uproar will
continue, in order that the excitement created by it
may compensate for the chilling effect of the fear of
death. It is also due to the rage and desire of
vengeance, which battle excites, when we see our
friends fall or feel the smart of a wound. I could
name to you a certain Colonel who was grazed by a
bullet, which so enraged him that he seized the rifle
and cartridges of a wounded soldier, and refused to
go back to the dressing station until he had " knocked
over three of those scoundrels " who had dared to
injure him ; he succeeded in doing so, but was
eventually carried back with three wounds. More-
over, when the fire -fight is in full swing, when
" independent fire has it all its own way," every
cartridge that can be fired will be fired, and it is no
longer possible to provide for economy of ammuni-
tion. This is a factor which must be taken into
account, for, whether we interfere or not, its influence
is irresistible. Even in the case of artillery it is very

174 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

difficult to keep the fire regularly in hand when the
fight grows hot, while in the case of that arm it is
far easier to pay attention to every shot, since no
single man can work the gun according to his fancy.
In the infantry, when once the fire of skirmishers
has grown hot, it is no longer possible to exercise
any influence over it.

But under such conditions when acting on the offen-
sive, especially in open ground, a renewal of ammuni-
tion is, as I have said above, absolutely impossible.

If, therefore, we do not wish to be exposed to
the risk of seeing our offensive fail for lack of
ammunition, we must seek for some other means of
preventing the expenditure of it from being excessive.
The only way in which this can be managed is by
taking care that the attack is not commenced until
the enemy has been obviously broken by the fire of
our artillery, and that the attack is then carried out
in such strength, and with such a decisive use of the
supports, and eventually of the second line, that,
owing to the application of these two principles, the
time during which the infantry must keep up the fire-
fight shall be cut as short as possible. But this will
be possible only when the attack is properly thought
out, and when, as at Villejouan, the combined action
of the two Arms has been previously concerted.
Troops which, under exceptional circumstances, have
been compelled to open fire at long ranges (i lOO to
1200 yards), must be at once supplied with fresh
cartridges as they stand in the firing line, even when
they have expended but a very small portion of
their store, before they are allowed to advance
nearer to the enemy. Again, all pauses in the

AMMUNITION CARTS 175

action at short ranges must be taken advantage of
for the renewal of ammunition, and it must be
estabhshed as a principle that every effort must
accordingly be made to complete each man's
cartridges to the full number of the equipment,
since we can never tell what demands the next
moment may make upon him. For this reason we
should not even wait for a complete pause in the
action, but should make use of any time when the
enemy is firing from long ranges only. The fight
at Villejouan offers a good example of this. After
our Fusiliers had captured the place, the enemy
pushed on in large masses, with a view to recapture
it. The Fusiliers were in the act of renewing their
ammunition, and the horses of the ammunition carts
were shot, which proves that there was no real
pause in the action.

According to my opinion, the principles which
are in vogue with us (for as far as I know there are
no exact orders as to the conduct of the ammuni-
tion carts), tend to leave them too far out of the
action. We are too anxious to keep them out of
fire, just as in former years the lines of ammunition
wagons of the artillery were left too far to the rear.
What does it matter if now and then a wagon does
blow up? It is, in any case, better that this should
happen than that the troops should be abandoned
to the enemy without ammunition. If a couple of
horses are killed, it is no great matter. They can
be replaced after the action ; at the moment we
shall merely be delighted that we have plenty of
ammunition. The horses of the ammunition carts
of the 76th Fusiliers at Villejouan were but a small

176 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

price to pay for such a result. We often hear the
most terrible stories told as to how fearful it is when
a wagon blows up, and how we must, therefore, avoid
bringing ammunition wagons and carts under fire.
I know from experience that the danger is not so
very great, and that an explosion is not such an
awful thing after all. All my batteries at St. Privat,
at the order of Colonel Scherbening, placed their
first line of wagons in the firing line beside the
batteries, in order that they might replace every shot
fired. They stood there under artillery fire during
the whole afternoon until night came on, and were
from 2 to 5.30 P.M. under the enemy's infantry fire
also, at a range of from 1000 to iioo paces. Not
a single wagon blew up during that day, though
here and there a limber exploded. One went up
exactly at the moment when an officer was looking
into it to arrange something. He staggered back,
and for three days had a headache and was deaf;
but he is now serving on the General Staff. When
I hear the story told that, during the cannonade at
Valmy in 1792, the whole of the French army under
Dumouriez fell into disorder because two ammuni-
tion wagons blew up, I simply do not believe it.
One shrapnel or one common shell, falling directly
into a column, will cause three times as much loss as
an ammunition wagon which blows up.

A suggestion has been made to me, with a view
to prevent the premature want of ammunition by
infantry on the offensive. It is proposed that each
man shall, before the commencement of the attack,
place a certain number (about 10 each) of extra
cartridges in the pocket of his tunic. This idea is

PEACE MANOEUVRES 177

certainly good and practical when there is sufficient
time to carry it out, for example, in the case of an
attack, such as that on St. Privat, which is arranged
a long time beforehand. But in actions, such as
Spicheren and Worth, which have more the character
of accidental meetings, either time will be wanting
or valuable time would be lost by making use of
favourable moments.

There is another circumstance which injuriously
affects the punctual renewal of ammunition, namely,
the fact that the troops are not accustomed to think
about it. An ammunition cart is rarely attached to
infantry at peace manoeuvres, since the whole of the
ammunition which is expended during their entire
duration can be easily carried by the soldier. Horses
of the train were at one time allowed to the VI.
Corps, which were intended to be used for the pur-
pose of practising the conduct of ammunition carts
in action. It was then very easy to see how rarely
in peace any one thought of the ammunition carts.
I had continually to make observations with regard to
this, since the troops looked upon these empty and
clumsy carriages, which were always in their way, as
only useless encumbrances ; they never gave them
their orders in time, so that one might be certain
that, if a battalion which was provided with ammuni-
tion carts, had to fall back in action, the latter would
march in rear of it, and thus between their own
troops and the enemy. The idea then struck me to
fill the ammunition carts at the manoeuvres with the
breakfast of the battalion, and to mark the moment
for the renewal of ammunition by the time for break-
fast, for I was certain that in that case the whole

N

178 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

battalion would have their eyes on the wagon,
especially if it were laid down that the enemy, if he
captured such a wagon, should be allowed to eat the
breakfast. Unfortunately this idea would not work
in with the existing regulations, according to which the
Commissariat looked after the subsistence of the troops.

It would at any rate be very desirable and useful
if it were made possible to give ammunition carts to
the battalions at all manoeuvres, so that the battalion
commanders might thus become accustomed to pay
attention in time to their guidance and to take into
consideration the renewal of cartridges. There are
no other means of teaching them to daily and hourly
think of and remember their carts, since no general
regulations are of any use. The special situation
varies in each individual case. But every battalion
commander must be filled with the strongest desire
to replace at once all ammunition expended, even
though the amount be small, in order that the men may
as far as possible always have their pouch and pack
ammunition complete, and that the cartridges in the
ammunition carts may be expended before those which
are carried by the men. It was only by a similar
principle to this that I avoided in 1870-71 a want of
ammunition by the artillery ; I made them use first
the ammunition in the wagons before they were
allowed to touch the limbers ; the guns had thus
their limbers always full for use at critical moments.

I have said that general regulations are of no use
in this matter. I will go further than that. General
orders also are of no use, unless the very greatest care
is taken to ensure their execution. I seem to hear
you say : " Then the devil must be in it." I can assure

LOSS AT ST. PRIVAT 179

you that he is in it, and gets very good fun out of it.
It is of no use at all to say : " The most distinct
orders were given on the subject ; why have the
battalions not obeyed them ? " What is the use of
a reproof of this kind ? The battalions have suffered
losses, the comm'anders who have not obeyed these
special orders are dead, and this is the real reason
why those orders have been neglected.

Allow me to tell you something about this matter.
Before we left Berlin the General commanding the
corps, at my suggestion — for I had charge of securing
the supply of ammunition — ordered that in every
action the commander of the artillery should inform
the divisions as to the position of the ammunition
columns, and that after the battle the divisional
commanders should report to the corps commander
that the battalions were completed with ammunition,
or if not why not. At the battle of St. Privat I
informed the divisions that the infantry ammuni-
tion columns were at Batilly, and that the ammunition
carts might be filled up at that place. On the next
morning not one single report was sent in. I rode
about through the bivouacs and found that but very
few Majors and Adjutants of those who had read the
order were still present ; most of them had fallen !
It was impossible to blame any one. I rode from one
battalion to another and myself provided for the re-
newal of the ammunition, since the ensigns and young
Lieutenants who were on that day in comniand of
many of the battalions, could not be held responsible
for the neglect of the order; for this reason I also made
no report of the omission to the corps commander.

I should wish to draw attention to one point

i8o LETTERS ON INFANTRY

which I have learnt from experience. The regula-
tion of the renewal of ammunition, and the course of
procedure to be followed to carry it out, must be
freed from all red-tape, formalities, and complicated
accounts. Troops which are fighting do not like to
have to do much writing or arithmetic. They
always abominate vouchers and receipts on Army
Form F. The man who risks his life for honour
and duty feels himself at liberty to dispense with
vouchers, since he may perhaps in the next half-hour
close his accounts with his blood. If a body of
troops cannot account for 10,000 cartridges, what
does it matter; they must merely return 10,000
extra cartridges as expended. Who is likely to
make away with cartridges in war ? What would
he do with them ? In such a case then the audit of
the expenditure by double entry must be given up.
After that, in my earlier campaigns, I had discovered
how troublesome was the useless labour which was
imposed upon the troops by the periodical returns
of ammunition, and had formed the opinion that
it simply delayed the renewal of ammunition
without ensuring any real control of the ex-
penditure, if (following the regulations) receipts
had to be sent to the columns before the latter
would issue the ammunition, I added the following
instructions to the above-mentioned order of the
corps commander : — " Every soldier of the corps who
comes to the columns during an action with an
ammunition cart or wagon shall be supplied with
what he requires, and receipts on the proper forms
shall be kept ready with the columns, which shall be
filled up, according to the statement of the man,

SUPPL Y OF AMMUNITION i8i

with the number of the company, battalion, and
regiment for whom the ammunition is drawn ; this
shall be signed by the soldier at the column, or if he
cannot write shall be marked with three crosses." I
put aside the idea that such munificence might result
in some waste of ammunition by the thought, that it
would be better to lose 10,000 cartridges by an error
in the accounts, than by some pedantry of book-
keeping to permit even a single company to suffer
from a want of ammunition. But even this arrange-
ment was not sufficient in all cases during the last
war as regarded the artillery ; and in future the
infantry will require as large a supply as the former.
It was sometimes necessary in action to break up
the ammunition columns and to bring up their dis-
persed wagons into the firing line.

This is how it must be done. The troops which
are engaged must be made to replace in time the
ammunition which they use, and they must do so as
best they can. But those who bring up the ammuni-
tion outside of the zone of fire must consider it as
their most sacred duty to assist in their supply, and
spontaneously to carry forward ammunition to the
troops to which they belong, if at any time the latter
have need of it ; and this they must do without any
orders, for the officer commanding the troops has no
time in the stress of fight to call them up, nor has
he any means of sending orders. Above all, after
any hot struggle, or after a fierce attack, when
the roar of battle, which has been gradually swelling,
ceases suddenly in a moment, every leader of the
ammunition which is following in rear must strive to
get forward in order to come up with his troops.

LETTER XIII

THE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY^

I HAVE in my last letter spoken of every possible
condition of an ;. infantry combat with reference to
the battalion. This is quite natural, since the
battalion is still the nominal tactical unit. We
always reckon by battalions. And though, owing
to the development of the fire-fight and the increased
importance of the individual man in it, and also
owing to the necessity for care in details and for
the direction of each individual man, the company
frequently plays the part of a tactical unit, yet it
can never by itself carry through a contest of any
importance, which will always require the combined
action of several companies.

For this reason I have laid before you my
principles of infantry tactics with regard especially
to the battalion, and I have thus, when I ask you to
pass with me on to the next highest stage of our
building, not very much remaining to say with
respect to the regiment.

The regulations appear, by their stepmotherly
treatment of the battalions combined into the

1 It must be remembered that the Prussian infantry regiment con-
sists of 3 battalions. — N.L. W.

COMMANDING OFFICER 183

regiment, to consider the officer commanding the
regiment as, tactically speaking, superfluous. For
after the 3d and 4th chapters have treated of the
battalion, the 5 th passes on at once to the brigade.

But we know well, and I need not begin by im-
pressing on you, the important part which the officer
commanding a regiment of infantry plays. If we
consider the amount of his duty we shall realise what
a gap would exist if he ceased to be. He has to
supervise the whole of the training of the troops in
detail, and is responsible for it. He looks after
the supply of officers, and sees to their training for
duty, their education, and their moral character. He
controls and supervises the supply of N.C. officers
to all the twelve companies, not one of which can
accept a one-year volunteer unless the Colonel has
first seen him, and has approved of him. He directs
the selection of the tactical principles which are to
be observed during the exercises, and is responsible
for it. Moreover, he has entire direction of the pay
and clothing, and has charge of everything connected
with barracks and quarters and with the subsistence
of the men, while finally he has the heavy and im-
portant duty of attending to punishments and minor
jurisdiction. This is also the case in the other arms,
but the number of men is far larger in an infantry
regiment, and thus the amount of work of this kind
which has to be done there is much greater. There
is a vast difference in looking after each individual
man among 700 and among i 800 or 1900. Thus the
demands on the energy and zeal of a Colonel are often
so great, that we may be inclined to doubt whether the
strength of any individual can suffice to meet them.

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But why do I begin by writing to you of these
matters ? I well remember the time when you held
this position, and opened all your heart to me. Do
you remember how you at that period described to
me one of your days, and that one on which you
proposed to take some rest? — The doctor had
ordered you, as you had a chill, to remain a little
longer in bed in the morning, in order to await the
effect of a sudorific. — You had for this purpose
selected the day before the company inspections, so
that you might be quite well on that day. At the
same time you had intended to use this so-called
day of rest for working off a quantity of writing
which had to be got through. The Paymaster was
to arrive at lO A.M. with a number of questions
relating to administration, which were to be followed
at 1 1 A.M. by the assembly of the pay-committee,
since it was pay-day ; after that the officers charged
with provost duties had to be seen, since there were
at that time an unusual number of cases which
required investigation. When at 7 A.M. you lay
perspiring freely, you received news of a serious case
of breach of discipline which had taken place in the
barracks, and which could not be rapidly or properly
settled without the immediate personal presence of
the officer commanding the regiment. You dressed
yourself quickly and set out in that inhospitable
spring weather, when hail, rain, and sunshine follow
each other during successive half-hours. Your per-
spiration was checked, and you shivered instead.
The affair in question kept you for several hours in
the barrack square. At last you returned home.
The Paymaster was already waiting. You were so

A DAY'S WORK 185

hurried that you could only work off the most
pressing matters, and you then had to attend the
committee, after which you had to see the provost
officers. You found that there were some cases of
a very complicated nature, upon which it was difficult
to decide at the moment. You decided therefore to
read through the documents connected with them
when alone and undisturbed, and to compare the
opinions of the provost officers with the rules and
orders as to punishments. You therefore, between
I and 2 P.M., dismissed these officers after having
worked with them for several hours, and gave the
order that no one else was to be admitted on business.
Comfortably wrapped in your dressing-gown you
stretched yourself out on your sofa before the fire
and had just attacked the first paper, when the
Adjutant insisted on being admitted, since he brought
a report which admitted of no delay. This was
indeed the fact ! An officer had shot himself under
such peculiar circumstances, that it was absolutely
necessary that you should go at once to the spot.
You might certainly have sent the senior field officer,
after having given him the necessary instructions.
You might indeed have done this at 7 A.M. But a
man who has any sense of military duty does not
like to leave such important matters to any one else,
since he is himself responsible. You were not on
the sick-list, you had not handed over the command
of the regiment ; so you went, and you were quite
right to go. You had again to work for some hours
in a varying temperature, and on matters moreover
of the most worrying description. I happened by
accident to meet you on your way, and was witness

1 86 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

of the scenes which took place, of the investigation
of the circumstances by the legal authorities, of the
despair of the wife of the unfortunate suicide, and
heard the wild words which the doting father
addressed to his son's corpse.

After everything that had to be done was settled
you returned to your house. It was late in the
afternoon before you could get back to your work,
and you had not completed it when night fell. You
even had to put off to another day some important
correspondence with regard to the admission of two
officers into the regiment, which you were obliged to
write with your own hand. And this was a day of
rest for you ! If the saying, " There is no rest but
in the grave " is true of any one, it is especially so
of the officer commanding a regiment. It was no
wonder that you suffered after this from a serious
cold on the lungs.

It is certainly true that the officer commanding a
regiment has in his command itself the means to
lighten his work ; he has an Adjutant and clerks, and
can in addition employ other officers. But any one
who thinks that he has therefore no need to write
himself has never commanded a regiment. Every-
thing which has reference to the reports on officers
and on candidates for that rank, always most trouble-
some and disagreeable affairs, which must be invariably
treated with the greatest tact, and which must remain
buried in the breast of the officer commanding a
regiment (since no one else must ever know anything
about them), he is obliged to write with his own
hand. Did you not tell me that during the time
that you commanded a regiment you selected 60

CANDIDATES FOR COMMISSIONS 187

candidates for officers and rejected 240 ? I know
well what an enormous amount of correspondence
may take place about even a single one of such
candidates. I know also how careful one has to be
in the expressions used, so that the letters may not
be misunderstood and may not produce a false
impression, especially when one is compelled to
reject a candidate. However, you have not suffered
so much from this as I have. When I commanded
the regiment of field artillery of the Guard, the father
or the guardian of some young fellow, whom I had
refused to accept as a candidate, never failed to
accuse me first to the brigade commander of the
place, then to the inspector, then to the inspector-
general, and at last to the field-marshal himself ; the
complaint used to be sent to me for my " reasons
in writing," and though I was always fortunate
enough to obtain their sanction to my decision, yet,
nevertheless, I had always all the trouble about it.
And the very importance of such matters makes
these formalities especially trying to the nerves.

Moreover, the officer commanding a regiment, in
addition to his principal duty of working his command
on correct tactical principles and of looking after the
military, technical, and moral training of his regiment,
should also be a lawyer, in order that he may in
every case rightly administer military law, and should
further be a master of accounts, so that he may
always be able to exercise control over the Pay-
master, and may not find himself suddenly placed in
the most awkward of all predicaments owing to a
deficit in his treasure-chest ; while he must in addition
know something about tailoring and shoemaking, in

1 88 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

order that he may be able to properly look after
the clothing of his men from head to foot. And of
all these that of which he knows least will give him
the greatest trouble during his period of service.

How then can he keep up the freshness of thought
which he requires in order to think out interesting
and instructive exercises for his officers, to be well
prepared and confident as to his tactics for the
manoeuvres, and to carry them through with the
necessary energy, and also to perform his social duties
to his officers and their families, to show himself
always pleasant and agreeable to them, to share their
pleasures and to direct their conduct ?

When I had the honour to command a regiment
of artillery it consisted, according to the then organ-
isation, of I 5 batteries, and contained about as many
men as an infantry regiment does now, and perhaps
a few more officers. The amount of the daily im-
portant and pressing business was so great, that
every evening my head felt like a totally exhausted
well, which yields only mud in place of water. I
can therefore quite understand why it is that so few
officers commanding regiments progress with the
times, even in military matters only, especially if
they are married, and desire, though they be free
from any home cares, to devote at least a few
hours of the day to their families, in order to ensure
that they may attain a proper position in the world.
Only a few exceptionally gifted natures are capable
of keeping themselves up to the mark by reading
the most important works on military science, and
of advancing their own knowledge so as to remain
in touch with the progress of the Art of War. If

BATTALION OR REGIMENT! 189

the commander of a regiment desires to conscien-
tiously discharge the duties of his command, there
can be no question for him of any advance in general
knowledge, or of any enjoyment of the fine arts.

I have often thought, with regard to this subject,
whether it would not be better if the extent of the
work of the commander of a regiment were to be
diminished by handing over his functions altogether
to the commanders of battalions, and by giving up
entirely the status of a commander of a regiment,
or, to put it in other words, if the commander of a
battalion were given the position of the commander
of a regiment, an acting field officer being added to
the establishment There would not thus be any
increase in the number of field officers, for we have
already six of them in an infantry regiment ; the
commander of the regiment, the three commanders
of battalions, one acting field officer, and the so-called
thirteenth Captain. The regulations, since they say
scarcely anything about the drill or the fighting of
an infantry regiment, appear to smooth the way
for such an organisation. In case of war there
would be one field officer available per battalion of
the line who might take over the command of a
landwehr battalion, of a reserve battalion, or of a bat-
talion of newly formed troops, if such should be raised.

But the more I have thought over the suggestion
of such an organisation and its consequences, the
more am I convinced that it would have more draw-
backs than advantages. The then commander of a
regiment, who would have only four companies under
his command, would not be so overworked as is the
present. That is true. But this would be the only

I90 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

advantage. Everything else tells against the plan.
The body of officers would be too small to have
any variety in it. We should seldom find in it all
the various capacities for the discharge of duties,
from which we must select for the several functions
required. The bond of comradeship, which is the
foundation of good feeling, might be too easily dis-
solved by the differences between individual person-
alities, and the versatility, which now by means of
earnest discourse and cheerful companionship at
scientific or social meetings increases the unity of
the young officers and makes their lives pleasant,
would then be lost ; a general apathy would arise,
and the young officer would soon grow accustomed
to spend his spare evenings as a matter of course in
beer-houses, if indeed he did not fall into bad com-
pany or take to gambling. You will not, I hope,
oppose to this statement the fact that the Jager
and Pioneer battalions have a single independent
body of officers. I am convinced that the officers of
these corps feel most painfully that the small number
of comrades in their regiment is a misfortune.

However, important as this point is, it cannot
be the main consideration which should decide the
selection of a military organisation. The main
point is, and will always be, the combat, the battle,
to which the body of troops owes its existence. Let
us ask then from military history whether the com-
mander of a regiment of infantry has been tactically
a superfluity or a necessity in the battles of the last
war. The fact that in the battle of St. Privat the
whole of the commanders of regiments of the in-
fantry of the Guard, with the exception of one, were

VIONVILLE 191

either killed or wounded, is at least a proof that
these officers displayed great activity in the struggle.
If we look at the plans of battles which are added
to the official account, we shall be able to form a
general idea of the consequences of the activity and
zone of influence of this rank, since on them the
positions of single companies are marked, so far at
least as could be done after comparing the various
reports. We shall see there that, as soon as the
troops became engaged, the companies and even the
different battalions became mixed, but that as a rule
the regiments preserved their unity ; this is a proof
that the troops fought by regiments, and that thus
the regimental command played a necessary and
important part in battle.

What most impresses me is, that it was in general
possible to preserve this unit of command up to the
last in the battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour. Even
at 5 P-M., after the swaying backwards and forwards
of a very hot struggle against an enormous numerical
superiority, we find (see the map ^) the greater part
of the companies of one and the same regiment
fighting shoulder to shoulder, and we can almost
everywhere venture to mark on the map ^ with a
needle the point, where the commander of the regi-
ment who directed this struggle and held the com-
panies together, must have stood. Let us begin
from the left flank of the foremost line of battle ; we
find first the 38th infantry brigade, shattered by
their costly attack, falling back before a superior
enemy ; but what is left of them is moving by regi-
ments side by side. It is true that in the Tronville

1 In the Official Account of the War of 1870.

192 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

copses the 2 battalions which were present of the
79th Regiment have, owing to the fact that they are
fighting in a wood, become so far divided, that at
this moment a general direction by the regimental
command appears difficult. The 1 7th Regiment
therefore, advancing into action in close order with
all three of its battalions, pushes itself in like a
wedge between the companies of the 79th. We can
exactly see on the map ^ how this regiment in close
order must have served the dispersed companies of
the other regiment as a support, on which they might
as it were lean. To the North-East of Vionville we
find again 8 companies of the 20th Regiment col-
lected in a united defence (the 2d battalion has been
sent back with the 24th Regiment to Tronville in
reserve), while next to the 20th Regiment, and sup-
ported by them, the 35 th Regiment is engaged, and
rests upon the i 2th Regiment, which is in Flavigny,
having left a few companies behind it in Vionville.
But the 1 2th Regiment is fighting in one line, the
3 battalions side by side with the Fusilier battalion
on the left flank, separated from the others only
by sufficient space to ensure that the great line of
artillery shall not be masked. Farther to the right
we find half-brigades fighting as a whole. This fact
alone speaks volumes as to the necessity for the
existence of the regimental command.

In the battle of Gravelotte and St. Privat we find,
during the very hottest moment of the struggle (see
the map ^ of the position at 7 P.M.), almost all the
regiments of that great army fighting side by side in
compact masses ; at the farm of St. Hubert alone

1 In the Official Account of the War of 1870,

THE REGIMENT IN WAR 193

are there crowded together 43 companies belonging
to 8 different regiments. This appears to have been
the only point in the grand decisive battle at which
the regimental command was broken up and lost.

So far as I can follow the system of command in
the Guard Corps in the war of 1870-71 — and, being
on the General Staff, I had an opportunity of
knowing every order and every decision — the regi-
ments were treated as distinct units ; but, neverthe-
less, it was permitted to detach a battalion here
and there, so that a regiment sometimes consisted of
but 2 battalions. It was considered preferable to
break up brigades and to form, if it could not be
otherwise arranged, improvised brigades, as for
example at the storming of Le Bourget, where the
centre column was formed of the " Elizabeth " and
" Augusta " regiments under the supreme command
of Count Kanitz, though these two regiments did not
ordinarily belong to the same brigade. Even at the
time of the mobilisation many regiments were taken
from their own brigades and were used to make up
other brigades. Thus we find a Silesian regiment
forming part of the IX. Corps, etc.

Although the regulations pass over altogether the
exercises of a regiment, and speak of the brigade
next after the battalion, yet they only in appearance
thus assume the greater importance of the brigade,
and also only in appearance thus pave the way for
the abolition of the regimental command. I might
even assert that the new regulations as a matter of
fact lay more stress upon the importance of the
commanders of regiments than do those of 1847,
since they attach great value to the employment of

O

194 LETTERS ON INFANTRY \

regiments by wings in the same line, a formation '
which was laid down before 1870. So long as the
two regiments of the same brigade could only be
used in two lines, one in rear of the other, the
extension of front, which is the consequence of the
development of the fire-fight, must, if by any chance
the second line is ordered to advance to support the
first, injuriously affect the cohesion of the two lines
(which are separate regiments), and thus also the j
importance of their commanders ; whereas, when the |
regiments are employed side by side, they remain still I
united, even when the second line is pushed forward. I

A mere glance at the plans of the battles will \
show us where the regiments stood side by side and
where they were in rear of each other when fighting '
in brigade. The 38th Brigade fought by wings in
the battle of Vionville, as also did the 20th, 35th,
and 1 2th Regiments. On the other hand, the 17th
Regiment advanced in one line in rear of the 79th,
and broke up the latter into two parts.

You may perhaps ask me what that can matter,
since they performed their task and the Tronville I
copses were in the end captured. It is true that on
this occasion it does not seem to have mattered
much ; but as a rule a regiment of 3 battalions
fights better than 3 battalions of different regi-
ments who happened to be formed together and i
intermixed. Men are but men, and in many of |
them the instinct of self-preservation is strong.
Such men will be ashamed to " funk " if they are
fighting among men whom they know ; but if they
happen to be among soldiers wearing a different
uniform, and whom they do not know, the desire to

THE REGIMENT IN WAR 195

keep out of danger grows stronger in them. If we
wish to gain an insight into the truth of things, we
must take men as they are, and not as they are
made to appear by a poetical imagination. It is
true that there are heroes, and they exist in all
classes of society. We may even say, to the honour
of the human race, that they are not altogether rare.
I have seen many of them. But the great mass of
men are not heroic, and they have to be led up to
deeds of heroism and directed in danger.

But you must excuse me if I do not offer you
any proof of my statement that an entire regiment
of 3 battalions fights better than 3 single bat-
talions of different regiments. I cannot give you
any examples, for to do so would be to put my foot
into a wasp's nest, since I should raise a storm of
abuse if I should assert that the A Regiment fought
better in the battle of O than the 3 battalions of
the X, Y, and Z Regiments did in the action at P.
I cannot do it, even if you oppose to my statement
the fact that the isolated, and as it were dispersed,
companies of the 79th Regiment displayed the
greatest heroism in the Tronville copses at Vionville,
since the 2d company at the North -West end and
the 6th at the East end of this wood held out to the
last in a most exposed position, and though you
may say that this example proves the contrary of
that which I assert. What I said is true, and if you
do not agree with me I cannot help it. These two
companies simply fill me with admiration, greater in
proportion as they were distant from their comrades.

From what I have said I have come to the
conclusion that we should be glad that our regiments

196 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

consist of 3 battalions, and that we should be
wrong to copy the organisation of those armies in
which the regiment is identical with the battalion.
The disadvantage that the mental and bodily
strength of perhaps half of the commanders of
regiments is so absorbed by their duty, that they are
ruined by it and become unfit for further service,
must be made the best of These officers have in
peace sacrificed themselves wholly for their King
and Fatherland, just as they would have been ready
to give their lives in war. They must strike the
years during which they have commanded their
regiments out of their life, since they could then live
only in and for the regiment. Their highest reward
lies in the consciousness that they have been one with
their regiment ; and the tears which a commander
sheds when he leaves his regiment afford the very
strongest possible proof how dear this time has been
to him, in spite of all his labour, his unremitting
care, and all the wear and tear of his nerves. As
for those young officers who grumble about the
touchiness, or even about the real bad temper, and
the impatience and snappish manner of their Colonel,
I should like to relate to them all the pin -pricks and
annoyances which their commander has daily and
hourly to endure, and I should further like to advise
them not to judge their Colonel and to deal very
charitably with him, for a time will come when they
will themselves know what it is to be the com-
mander of a large regiment.

With respect to the exercises and movements ot
a regiment, I have nothing to say against the
principles clearly expressed in the 19th and 20th

TRAINING OF A REGIMENT 197

chapters of the regulations ; they are founded on the
experience of many years, have been well thought
out, and apply not only to a brigade but also to any
body of infantry which consists of more than one
battalion, I have also in general found that these
principles have been thoroughly understood and
practically worked out. The various formations and
movements which a regiment can thus use are so
extremely numerous, that it is always very difficult
to go once through them all in the short time (8
working days) which is allowed for the exercise of
the entire regiment ; any idea of working them up
to perfection must therefore be abandoned. If the
officer commanding a regiment insists upon the
execution of a movement, and repeats it several
times when it is not correctly carried out, he runs a
great risk of finding his time fail him, and of having
to leave some portion of his immense programme
altogether untouched ; for the movements of infantry
are slow and take up a great deal of time. For
this reason it would be very advantageous if the time
allowed for the exercises of the regiment could be
increased. But this is not possible unless the other
periods, which are quite as important, be diminished.
All that the officer commanding a regiment can
do is to take care that the elementary movements
are properly carried out during the battalion exercises,
so that he need give the least possible attention to
them. This applies especially to the march past,
which he should certainly see carried out in all the
different formations at least once during the course
of the drill season, but of which he should carefully
avoid the too frequent repetition. If he immediately

198 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

repeats a march past, because it has not been perfect,
he may be quite certain that it will be even worse
the next time. He must be satisfied with mentioning
the mistakes made, and with perhaps repeating it on
another day. For if he repeats it at once, the atten-
tion of that person alone who made the mistake will
be on the alert ; while the others will grow weary
with the repetition, and will, being weary, be more
likely to make errors. This is also true of all other
movements. The movements of a mass of infantry
of the size of a regiment are, moreover, so lengthy
and wearisome, that any repetition must be tiring it
it takes place on the same day. And nothing so
entirely does away with all the use of the exercises
as a feeling of weariness among the officers and men.

Again the officer commanding a regiment should
make only such movements (parade drills excepted)
as would be really of use in action. It will not
always be necessary to carry out the actual combat.
Movements of the reserve, or of the second or third
lines, are also battle movements. He must think
out some tactical situation to suit each movement
and each evolution, and every soldier of his regiment
must be able to appreciate and understand this
tactical situation. If this be not done the exercises
will be objectless. They cannot be made instructive
if they are carried out merely for the sake of carrying
them out.

I have known officers commanding infantry regi-
ments who, fully recognising this fact, did nothing
but manoeuvre their regiments during the regimental
exercises. These officers went too far in the other
direction ; for an infantry regiment cannot manoeuvre

TRAINING OF A REGIMENT 199

independently without any combination with the
other arms. It is sufficient if, in the limited time
which is allowed for the exercises, the officer com-
manding works once through each of the simple
formations for battle which are given in the regula-
tions. In order to get through even this limited
amount in the drill season, he must have his plan
made beforehand for every day, if he wishes to be
able to work at least once through each problem.

There have been cases (but, thank God, they are
rare) where an officer commanding a regiment, with
the object of " doing well " at the inspection, has
practised the same movements day after day, and has
finally on the day of inspection produced his theatri-
cal entertainment, which, however, has sometimes
turned out worse than any improvised exercises.
You will, I am sure, agree with me, that such a
proceeding is merely a waste of time of the worst
description, and is an ample proof that such a
commander is not fit for his position.

The larger the mass of troops which is being
exercised, the more distinctly is the representation
of the combat seen to be unreal, since we then have
to suppose so many things, especially the enemy,
and thus so much has to be left to the imagination.
If in this case the fancy of the commander is not in
complete harmony with that of his subordinates, the
most utter confusion will arise, together with faults
which can teach nothing to any one as regards real
work, for the reason that such faults could not be
committed in war where a visible enemy stands
before us. But it is exactly these faults which take
up the greatest amount of time. In order to avoid

200 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

them I have always distinctly laid down that in all
exercises which suppose a combat, whether carried
out by a battalion or by a regiment, the enemy's
front shall be marked by flags, even though these
flags be few in number. This facilitates all move-
ments, and makes the whole of the exercises intelli-
gible.

I am afraid that I have written you a terribly
dull letter on this occasion. It would certainly be
more interesting and amusing if I were to attack
and blame all that is now laid down and were to
propose something new, even though the advantage
of this novelty could not be proved ; it is always
dull to merely say that what is is good and needs no
change. But when I begin I must say what I think,
and defend that which I believe to be right, even
though I run some risk of being wearisome. If I
have been so, put this letter into the fire, and imagine
that you have never received it.

LETTER XIV

BRIGADE EXERCISES

The brigade is the largest body of infantry which
practises exercises in peace without the participation
of the other arms. It is not desirable that in war
an infantry brigade alone, that is to say, not in com-
bination with the other arms, should be told off for
any duty or be otherwise employed. When a brigade
is used in a pitched battle either as the reserve or as
the main body of a division, the officer commanding
will not, as a rule, have artillery or cavalry directly
under his command, but he must in every way act
in harmony with the action of at least that artillery
which supports his attack. But when an infantry
brigade is detached or acts independently, artillery
and some cavalry will always be attached to it.
Indeed, according to our normal organisation, some
artillery, and generally more than one battery, is
attached to the infantry brigade which is told off to
form the advanced guard of an Army Corps. During
the last war no infantry brigade was ever detached
without artillery, and we even find that when an
infantry brigade of one Army Corps was sent to
support another corps, as for instance Knappstadt's
brigade of the Guard at St Privat, which was sent

202 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

to the IX. Army Corps, that in that case also artillery
was attached to it, though on this occasion the whole
of the artillery of the IX. Corps was already in action.
With regard to this point it appears to me very
desirable that in peace also no infantry brigade
should ever carry out any exercises without being
accompanied by artillery. It does not appear to me
to be so necessary that any cavalry should take part
in the strictly infantry exercises, since during an
infantry fight the cavalry will, for the greater part of
the time, merely reconnoitre, while their reports can
just as well be supposed to be delivered, since the
enemy himself is either imaginary or marked only
with flags. The moments when cavalry will take
part in an infantry fight by charging are rare. The
squadron attached to an infantry brigade would
therefore remain inactive during the greater part of
the time spent in exercises, and would lose many
days which would be valuable for its own instruction.

The question is very different as regards the
artillery. That arm is in use during the whole of the
fighting exercises of an infantry brigade ; it even
comes into action earlier than the infantry, and keeps
up its fire later, since it shoots farther than the latter ;
it can thus continue its own training during the
whole time of the exercises of the infantry brigade,
and can even carry it out better than if it were alone,
for the infantry offers it a tangible object for which
to fight, such as in its own isolated exercises it has
to suppose.

I seem to hear you say that on similar grounds
an infantry regiment ought not to perform its exer-
cises without artillery, since when a regiment is told

ARTILLERY WITH A BRIGADE 203

off as the advanced guard of a division some artillery
will always be attached to it. I quite agree that it
would be sometimes an excellent thing if an infantry
regiment might receive a battery for use at its fight-
ing exercises, and when both arms lie in the same
garrison it often happens that the commander of an
infantry regiment asks for and receives a battery, if
the artillery have any time to spare for such a pur-
pose. But a regiment does not need artillery for all
its exercises. It has to parade and march past, it
has to practise the advance in line and elementary
evolutions in masses, it must carry out the long
movements which are conducted out of step, the
opening out and closing of intervals, the movements
in different lines with or without the deployment ot
the company columns, etc., of which artillery, if
attached to it, would be simply spectators, and would,
moreover, waste their own time for instruction. It is
quite different in the case of a brigade. I consider that
all exercises of a brigade which do not represent some
possible situation in an action are altogether useless.
With respect to parade movements a brigade need
never practise them. For if the regiments can parade
well, then, granted that the entire brigade may once
be inspected on parade, it will be necessary only to
practise the bands together, in order that the drums
may keep good time and not spoil the parade. This
opinion of mine seems to be borne out by the manner
in which our highest authorities inspect brigades.
Since they, as a rule, neglect the parade and march
past, and usually form them up for fighting exercises.
There are certainly some commanders of brigades
who even delight in practising their entire brigades in

204 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

the manual exercise. To do this well requires a mere
knack, which consists in battalion and regimental
commanders giving exactly simultaneous words of
command. There is nothing about this in the
regulations ; it is indeed merely something to look
at, without tactical value, and therefore a waste of
time, which is so much the more to be deprecated as
there are seldom more than four days available for
the brigade exercises. Moreover, practising the man-
ual exercise in brigade injures discipline, since the
brigade commander cannot attend to every motion
of every man, while the junior officers dare not do
anything or even look after their own men. The
men, therefore, in the rear rank do the exercise badly,
since they know that they will not be noticed. Exhibi-
tions of this kind must be altogether forbidden, for they
form a far too wide interpretation of the sense of
the first sentence of the 1 9th chapter of the regulations.
^ All the movements laid down in that chapter for
the exercise of a brigade can be very well thought
out and executed if it be supposed that an enemy is
present ; and the action of artillery will be then very
necessary to occupy the enemy, to stop him, and to
draw his attention from the brigade, so that the
latter may carry out its movements correctly. But
in this case it is very difficult for the artillery to
select at once the best point for its position, from
which it can work as long as possible, without
hindering the movements of the brigade, and in such
a manner as to support it up to the last moment.
All this must be practised if it is to be rightly
carried out. Let us take as an example a simple
change of front of a brigade, and let us think what

ARTILLERY WITH A BRIGADE 205

would be the best position for the battery to take up,
in order to quickly open fire upon the enemy whose
appearance has been the cause of this change of
front. The position must be so selected that the
brigade during and after the change of front may not
serve as a butt for the shell fired at the battery, and
that the brigade, after it has changed front, shall be
able to advance against the new enemy without
masking the fire of the battery. This position, to
which the battery must hurry by the shortest way,
will vary according to whether the brigade makes a
change of front through a half or a quarter circle.
It is also a matter for consideration how far the
artillery should be to the front and how far to the
flank of the new line, so that they may assist the
approaching struggle of the brigade for as long as
possible, but without placing themselves at such a
distance from the infantry as will expose them to the
chance of an unforeseen attack. This position will,
in any case, if the ground permits, be in front and to
the flank of the inner wing of the brigade as it
stands after the change of front. This is quite
certain. But to find this position quickly is a matter
of skill — and of practice. The artillery must there-
fore have opportunities to practise it.

But it is not only for the sake of the artillery
that practice in this matter is desirable. The
infantry still more need practice in acting in harmony
with their artillery. For when the artillery have
once come into action and have opened fire, it is not
wise to disturb them on account of the infantry, or
to order a change of position. For the artillery
have then to a certain extent become stable.

2o6 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

Artillery which have taken up a specified position,
have ranged themselves there, and know the
different distances to various points, must not be
compelled to unnecessarily change their position,
since in a new position a certain amount of time is
always lost, while the artillery are ranging themselves
and developing the full effect of which they are
capable. Again, it is very difficult for the infantry
who are advancing from their original position
against the enemy, and who naturally have their
attention principally fixed upon that enemy, to pay
attention to their own artillery in order not to mask
their fire ; for they must thus watch at once the
enemy who threatens them and the artillery which
they have passed. In this case also skill and
practice are required in order to move the infantry
from the proper position in the right direction. If
any mistake has been made in this matter at first,
it is difficult to repair it, owing to the slowness
with which infantry move ; while the time which
will be required for such a change will entail
very considerable loss. In theory we can lay down
that, when the firing lines threaten to mask the
artillery, the latter shall send word to the
infantry to incline away from them. This is easily
said, and in manoeuvres is easily done. But if you
once try in battle to ride forward from the flank of
the artillery line which is in action, up to the line of
skirmishers which is also fighting, you will acknow-
ledge that it can seldom be possible to do so.

I have, it is true, seen it once done, when the then
Lieutenant von Roon, in a reconnoitring action at
Satrup on the i oth February 1864, rode forward

EXPERIENCES . 207

from the guns to the skirmishers. The hail of bullets
which fell around him on the snow showed clearly
how seldom such an effort could succeed. I was at
St. Privat twice compelled to recall some skir-
mishers who had prematurely pressed forward, be-
cause they masked my batteries, and I there learned
experience by the music which whistled in my ears
to such an extent that I was astonished to find my-
self coming back unhurt. My horse was not so
fortunate. I have indeed heard that Lieutenant von
Esbeck, of the Hussars of the Guard, twice in this
same battle rode along the line of skirmishers with
orders and reports, and this in his red uniform and on
a white horse. But the fact that on this day by far
the greater part of the field officers and adjutants of
the infantry of the Guard were either killed or
wounded, proves that Lieutenant von Esbeck must
have had as much luck as pluck. It will, as a rule,
j)e necessary to give up any idea of sending many
orders to a skirmishing line which is firing on the
enemy and is under fire itself It must receive its
instructions before it is sent forward ; it can after
that be influenced only by signals, or by being
pushed on by means of reinforcements. Think then
what you demand from a skirmishing line, which is
now under fire and is lying down and firing in
return, when you ask it to rise and to move to a
flank, in order to give a free field of fire to the
artillery. Half of the men would be killed while
making such a flank movement.

It is thus absolutely necessary that the infantry
be practised and skilled in advancing past their
artillery and against the enemy without masking the

2o8 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

former. Though I have said on an earlier page that
infantry can stand at a certain distance in front of
their artillery, even when the latter are firing, and
though under certain circumstances it is impossible to
avoid firing over our own infantry ; yet, as I have also
written before, infantry which are lying down in front
of their own artillery run a considerable risk. The very
occasion when I held back the skirmishers at St.
Privat proved this to me beyond doubt. For I had
hardly succeeded in recalling the infantry, and had
just allowed the batteries to continue their fire, when
a shell burst in the bore, broke up like a case-shot,
and must have struck the rear of the skirmishing
section. Nothing disturbs troops more than to
receive fire from their own troops in rear. This I
have found many times to be the case. I do not be-
lieve that any inventions or any advance in technical
science will ever render it quite impossible for a shell
to break up, at least now and then, in the bore. L
have noticed that these accidents take place only on
very dry and hot days (at St. Privat, Sedan, and
above all at Montmedy), but on such days they are not
uncommon, especially when the cannonade has lasted
for some time. They never happened on wet days
or in winter. I have therefore come to the con-
clusion that on hot days the residue of the powder
dries quickly, hardens into a sort of crust, and breaks
up the shell. No change of pattern can affect this.
I have not taken into account carelessness on the
part of the gun-numbers, for when once the shell has
been fired this is covered by an impenetrable veil ot
secrecy.

Other circumstances again plead in favour of

A R TILLER Y WITH INF ANT R V 209

attaching artillery to infantry as often as possible,
and whenever it can be managed, for every brigade
exercise. I have already mentioned in a former
letter how important it is that the infantry, as they
pass by the artillery in their advance, should inquire
the range from the latter, who will have carefully
found it, and how a really effective fire from the
infantry depends upon this. But this must be made
habitual at the exercises, and must be considered as
a matter of course ; it will otherwise be neglected at
the manoeuvres, owing to the great hurry which
usually exists there, and will then be certainly
neglected in war also.

You will have seen from one of my former letters
(the iith) how I consider that infantry and artillery
can best work together in the future. After the
artillery of the attack has got the upper hand of
that of the defence in the artillery duel at the longer
ranges, the infantry advances in the formation for
attack, while the assailant's artillery moves in two
echelons, to within about 2200 yards of the object
of attack. Under cover of the fire of this artillery
the infantry advance, without firing, until the fore-
most line of skirmishers is, if possible, from 440 to
550 yards from the object of attack; they there
establish themselves and open fire. The moment
has now come when the artillery, under cover of the
infantry fire, and advancing in echelon (if indeed
they have not done so already), may push on in com-
pany with their infantry to within iioo or 1200
yards, with the object, in combination with the fire
of the latter, of so beating down the enemy that a
farther advance and the final assault may become

P

2IO LETTERS ON INFANTRY

possible to the infantry. But a system of this kind,
implying as it does a mutual understanding and
perfect machinery, must be constantly practised ;
otherwise it cannot succeed before the enemy. And
it must, moreover, be practised on the exercise ground,
so that the principles of it may be ingrained in the
minds of those who take a part in it ; for at the
manceuvres the conditions of ground cause so many
modifications of this system that it will, owing to
these variations, be no longer possible to recognise
general principles.

Since from what I have said it follows that it is
necessary, or at least that it would be useful, to
attach artillery to the infantry for their brigade
exercises, you may perhaps say that you do not
understand why the annual orders issued by the
Ministry of War do not apportion some artillery to
the infantry brigades for the majority of the days of
exercise. But the orders of the Ministry of War
must be general in their character, and must apply
to all brigades. Now the exercise ground of many
infantry brigades is so far distant from the nearest
artillery garrison that the batteries, if they are also
to complete their own special artillery training,
cannot arrive in time for the first days of exercise.
But this need not prevent an infantry brigade, in the
case where artillery is quartered in the same garrison,
from making an arrangement with that artillery, that
on each day of exercise at least one battery shall
accommodate its training to that of the infantry,
and shall work in combination with them. When I
commanded a division, I found that, although I had
no artillery permanently under my command, that

BRIGADE EXERCISES 211

arm always met my wishes half-way. Nor do I
think that such a proceeding would controvert the
intentions of the Ministry of War, even if it were
ordered that, as a rule, no artillery was to take part
in the exercises of infantry brigades ; for such general
orders are issued only with the object of diminishing
the cost of the training, and are thus, in the case
where a battery can without any expense take part
in the brigade exercises, not opposed to such a
proceeding. It may be urged, on the other hand,
that a brigade of infantry must practise elementary
movements, such as deployments, opening out into
two lines of battle, movements in the assembly
formation, etc., for which artillery are not needed.
But might not the artillery perfectly well be used to
occupy the enemy while these movements are going
on ? Or in the case of movements in the assembly
formation, these might be practised during the first
half-hour of the exercises, while the battery might be
called up after they were finished.

With reference to the arrangement of the exercises
of a brigade, this is always a very difficult matter,
and a well thought-out plan is necessary, if all the
combinations which are suggested in the 19th and
20th chapters of the regulations are to be got
through even once only and that superficially ; for
rarely are more than four days available for the
brigade exercises. For this reason, when I com-
manded a division, I was particularly pleased with
an order of the General commanding the Army
Corps which laid down that the day of the inspection
of the brigade was not to be used for any special
display, but was to be simply a day of training like

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the other three, during which the inspecting officer
merely looked on, and was thus able to form an
opinion with regard to the progress of the brigade.
In this manner the day of inspection was not lost as
a day of instruction, but was employed, according as
it fell on the first or the last day of the exercises, for
the purpose of carrying out some portion of the
programme which had been arranged for the whole
time of the training. In this way only was it possible
to at least glance at each portion of this vast field for
exertion. But more cannot be done ; for a mass of
the size of a brigade must give up any idea of per-
fecting everything by repeated practice, as a company
can. It must suffice if the commander makes it
understood what are his wishes with regard to each
situation, whether it be by fully working out some
case of a combat, or by investigating the causes of
any faults or misunderstandings which may have
taken place, and by deducing the lessons to be
derived from them. In this manner every situation
can be worked out in accordance with the regulations,
and can be made full of instruction.

Is this always done ? I will not answer this
question, but will instead ask you a number of other
questions.

Do we find that at brig'ade exercises and at
manoeuvres the rule contained in the 4th and 5 th
notes of para. 107 of the regulations is always
observed ; this lays down that care must be taken,
when acting on the defensive, to give timely support
to the first line, which is at some distance and in
open order, and further forbids that, as a rule,
advanced posts should be occupied if it is intended

QUESTIOA'S 213

to defend them only for a time ? Do we not find
that, instead of this, an advanced hne is generally
pushed forward with orders to retire " when neces-
sary " ; this would, if fighting in earnest, be almost
annihilated, while its retreat must in any case be
detrimental to the morale of the main line ?

Would it not really be of advantage to all brigades .
if, in accordance with para. 115, the battalions now
and then took up some other position than that
which they generally occupy ? Do we not hold too
pedantically to the directions of the regulations,
according to which the Fusilier battalions stand on
the right in brigades which have odd numbers, and
on the left in the even ? This direction, which now
merely tends to improve the appearance of a massed
division, had its origin in the days when the Fusilier
battalions underwent a special course of instruction,
and were especially employed for fighting in open
order.

Is not the case of an indecisive attack (p. 174),
as a rule, impossible to work out by mere regulation
movements, and is not an attempt too often made to
so work it out ?

Are the attacks of columns generally carried out
in company column, or, in opposition to the spirit of
the regulations, for preference in battalion columns
on the centre ?

Is the employment of regiments by wings in one
line (para. 127, p. 187) always made an "especial"
matter for practice?

Is the second line (pp. 189, 190) generally used
more as a reserve and so held back, especially
when the first line has furnished an advanced line ;

214 LE TTERS ON INF ANTE Y

or do not we usually find that a preference is given
to advancing a brigade in accordance with paras.
119 and 120, in such a manner that the regiment
in first line sends forward the flank companies of
battalions as an advanced line, and follows them
with the centre companies as a main body, while the
second regiment, in second line, formed by whole
battalions at deploying interval, moves at battalion
distance from the first line ?

Is a change of lines (as laid down on p. 190)
avoided as far as possible during the fighting ex-
ercises ?

Is the second line, in accordance with the instruc-
tions given on the same page, brought into action on
the flank of the first, and not pushed through it ?

Or do we not generally see the second line
systematically pushed through the intervals of the
first ; and this even though it be in battalion columns
on the centre ?

Is every effort (in accordance with p. 192)
always made to spare the strength of the men, and
are all lengthy movements always properly made
out of step at quarter-section distance ; and are
" Order arms ! " and " Stand at ease ! " always given
when it is possible to do so ?

Is the march to and from the exercise ground
(p. 192) always carried out with an advanced and
rear guard when the brigade marches as a whole ;
is this march thus used as a part of the training, or
do we not generally see the brigades, as they march
to their exercise grounds, move without any tactical
idea and without any thought as to instruction, and
thus lose so much time and trouble ?

REGIMENTS BY WINGS 215

I could give you a favourable answer to these
questions so far as concerned the brigades which
formed part of the division under my command. I
cannot offer an opinion as to the other brigades of
the army.

I have already mentioned the formation of the
regiments of a brigade by wings in one line, and
must warn you that this was a hobby which I was
delighted to mount. I am only sorry that the
regulations do not lay this down as the regular
formation, using that of lines of regiments only
under exceptional circumstances. I have already
mentioned how advantageous this employment of
regiments by wings is, since when this is used the
regiments, if the rear line is pushed up to support
the other, are not mixed together, and do not lose
their cohesion as single regiments. It is a fact that
in most of the battles of the last war more regiments
fought side by side, that is to say, by wings, then one
in rear of the other, that is to say, in lines.

The formation of regiments in lines, which in
former days was the rule without exception, is still
liable to be used when a brigade deploys for action
from the march. The leading battalion comes upon
an enemy, of whom as yet nothing is known, and
gradually, widening its front, presses on into the
fight ; it is supported by the 2 battalions which
follow it. The inclination to develop as great an
amount of fire as possible and to work against the
flanks of the enemy leads to an extension in a
fighting line which is far too thin, and to a tendency
to detach companies, both of which weaken the front ;
nothing else will then be possible except to strengthen

2 1 6 LE TTERS ON INF A NTR V

this thin front, and to deploy the next regiment as a
second line. But this is always an evil which again
is nearly always the result of a fault. For one has
either been surprised by the enemy (which implies
that the cavalry have not reconnoitred well), or one
has committed oneself too hastily to a general
engagement, without making proper dispositions, and
is now obliged to employ the battalions one by one
as they come up. It has sometimes not been pos-
sible to rightly reconnoitre the enemy, since the
character of the ground has prevented a recon-
naissance, and one can thus only gradually learn his
increasing strength as more troops are brought up
into action. In this case no fault has been committed,
but the evil remains the same. The most striking
example of this point is the mixture of the regiments
at the battle of Spicheren. We find there at the last in
the Gifert forest nearly 40 companies mixed together,
belonging to 5 different regiments, and to 3 different
Army Corps. Of one regiment (the 74th) we find
parts scattered along the whole front of 3 miles,
both on the extreme right flank in the Stiring forest
and also on the extreme left in the Gifert forest. It
is well known how in this battle the direction of the
combat was rendered difficult by the mixture of
bodies of troops, and we should avoid this wherever
we can.

In almost every case where the troops were em-
ployed in action according to a prearranged plan,
and especially when they could be ordered to advance
into battle from their assembly formation, the
formation of regiments by wings was used. But I
think that this must also be possible, as a rule, when

SCHLESIVIG, 1864 217

a brigade is compelled to go into action directly
from the formation for march ; it is only necessary
to make such a use the rule at the exercises. For
if the necessity arises of reinforcing the leading
battalion, which is engaged with the enemy, with
the second, since the resistance of the foe has been
found to be more stubborn than was at first expected,
we shall be able in most cases during the combat of
this battalion, which must last for some little time,
to decide as to whether there can be any question of
the employment of the entire brigade. The leading
battalion can then be supported with the next, but
with orders to at first carry on a delaying action and
not to engage themselves too closely. The third
battalion can be placed in reserve and, under cover
of the delaying action, the last 3 battalions can
be formed in two lines on the flank of the first three ;
when this deployment is completed, and not until
then, this second regiment can be brought up into
line with the first, and the combat thus brought to a
decisive end.

If this be made the custom at peace exercises, the
separate advance of battalions will become rarer in
war, and consequently the mixture of bodies of
troops belonging to different regiments will also
become rarer.

I have mentioned that the endeavour to act on
the enemy's flanks leads to an excessive extension
of the first line. This endeavour is entirely justified.
The first fight which I saw in the open field — that
before Schleswig on the 3d February 1864 — was a
striking example of this.

Gondrecourt's Austrian brigade attacked the

2i8 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

enemy in front with unsurpassable courage, and
stormed Ober-Selk and the Konigsberg. But it left
behind it an enormous number of killed and wounded.
Two battalions were sent against the village of
Jagel, and extended in front of it in a costly fire-fight,
which made but a slow advance, especially after
Colonel Benedek had likewise been carried to the
rear badly wounded. The assailants with great
exertion succeeded in penetrating into Jagel, just as
a company of the " Augusta " regiment, which moved
by another road, appeared on the enemy's flank.
This worked like a charm. The enemy was afraid
of being surrounded, and abandoned both the village
and the copses with a great loss in killed, wounded,
and prisoners ; for the company had surprised them
with a rapid fire on their right flank, and, taking
advantage of the confusion of the foe, rushed in on
the village. Only one man of the company was
wounded, and that on the finger. A few days later
the " Belgian " regiment of the other Austrian brigade,
in combination with the 9th Jager battalion, stormed
the position of Oeversee, which was very strong
in front. The Austrian battalions again suffered
enormous losses, especially at the point where they
advanced over the frozen lake against the wooded
heights. It is doubtful whether, in spite of their
lion-hearted bravery, they would have been successful,
had not two companies of the Jagers pressed upon
the enemy's right flank, and had not his left flank
been also threatened by 2 battalions of the infantry
regiment of Hesse which followed ; he then aban-
doned his position, and retired.

But it must be clearly understood that such a

FLANK A TTA CKS 2 1 9

flank attack can, as a rule, succeed only when a
second line of approach is available, or when a force
can be detached while still out of sight and beyond
the fire of the enemy. For unless it works by sur-
prise it will lose half its power. If neither of these
plans is possible, we can then only endeavour to
outflank the enemy, by extending our front until it is
longer than his, and by finally wheeling round the
overlapping wing upon the flank of the foe. But
troops which endeavour to turn a flank by a flank
march made within sight of the enemy and within
reach of his fire, will be themselves outflanked during
the movement by the enemy's front, and will pro-
bably be put out of action. I have already mentioned
this under the head of the " Combat of the battalion,"
and I must beg of you to excuse this repetition. But
I have so often seen complicated flank movements
made in peace within reach of the enemy's fire, that
I cannot consider it superfluous to continually repeat
the valuable truth, that flanking movements must be
carried out in such a manner that the enemy shall
not at once discover them, and shall have no time
to make dispositions against them, in a word, so that
the enemy shall be surprised by them.

If we examine examples from history where
flanking movements have obtained decisive success,
we shall find that they have always been the result
of the use of several lines of approach, or of the
early detachment of troops at such a distance from
the enemy as allowed them to make use of more
than one line of advance. I may mention, as ex-
amples on a large scale, the outflanking of the
Austrian position at Wagram by Davoust, the

220 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

outflanking of Benedek's position before Koniggratz
by the II. Army, and the turning of the French
position at St. Privat, by the XI I. (Saxon) Army
Corps. But I should prefer to speak of the action of
smaller masses of the strength of brigades, where the
flanking blow was delivered by battalions or by even
smaller bodies. In the before-mentioned fight at
Jagel, on the 3d of February 1864, the company of
the " Augusta " regiment which fell upon the Danish
flank came up by the line of approach of the Guard
division. In the combat at Oeversee, on the 6th of
February 1864, the two companies of Jagers who
brought about the decision of the fight around the
wood, were detached as far back as Frorup ; the 2
battalions of the Hessian infantry were similarly
detached in the bottom of the Treene ravine. But
I will not weary you with any more examples. I
should, on the contrary, prefer to assert as a fact that
the detaching of infantry, for the purpose of turning
the enemy's flank, has never been attempted in war,
when the detachment so used would have been com-
pelled to carry out its flank march under the eyes,
and at the same time under the fire, of the foe ; I
beg of you, if you disagree with this statement of
mine, to quote to me even one single example from
modern military history of such a proceeding.

Yet we very often see movements of this kind
made during the brigade exercises. Ought we not
rather to forbid them, and to employ the valuable
time of the exercises in more natural movements,
and such as could be carried out in war ?

LETTER XV

THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE
A. — Internal Arrano^emcjtts

'ib

I HAVE proposed to myself to-day to give you my
ideas with respect to the command of an infantry
brigade, as this matter has presented itself to me in
the course of my service, but I do not intend to offer
what I write as being by any means a complete com-
pendium of the subject. There is no need for such a
treatise. Scherf has laid down the theory of the com-
mand of troops with sufficient completeness and clear-
ness, as has also Bronsart in his book The Duties of
the General Staff. No fresh instruction need be given
beyond what is contained in these excellent works
and in the new and practical drill regulations, all of
these being founded upon the experience gained
during the last war. I desire to concern myself with
small, very small, matters only, and thus to inquire
into individual questions in detail, so that where I
meet with items of which the consequences have been
frequently hurtful, I may point out how I consider
that such consequences may be avoided. You may,
if you please, think me a pedant to attach importance
to such trifles. I am sure that every man of know-
ledge will agree with you, especially such as have

222 LE TTERS ON INFANTR V

concerned themselves principally with strategy, with
Clausewitz, and with the larger operations of war.
But small causes produce great effects. With this :
ad 7'cin. ,

When a brigade collects at a rendezvous, whether
it be as a part of a larger body of troops or for the
purpose of action by itself alone, you may be certain,
if you follow the movements of the very smallest
bodies of troops, that 99 times out of 100 the
companies assemble first in their cantonments.
Each company remains there on its parade for a
quarter of an hour, and then marches to the rendez-
vous of the battalion, which may perhaps have been
distributed over several villages. The rendezvous of
the battalion is sometimes fixed according to the
position of the quarters of the officer commanding,
and not at all on the principle of sparing the men a
circuitous road, and therefore (according to the direction
of the march) at the spot where the leading company
is quartered. It may thus happen that a company
has to march a mile to the rear in order, after waiting
for a quarter of an hour at the battalion rendezvous,
to return back through its cantonments to the rendez-
vous of the next higher unit. It may consider itself
fortunate if another special place of rendezvous has
not been settled for the regiment, and if the battalions
are permitted to march directly to the rendezvous of
the brigade. The tendency which the leaders of the
various units show to join the next higher unit at
the head of their united troops, is the natural con-
sequence of a laudable effort after order, for which
each commander feels himself responsible. But this
tendency may be overdone. It is easy to see what

BRIGADE RENDEZVOUS 223

an amount of unnecessary road may, under certain
circumstances, be traversed with this object, and how
much the strength of the men may thus be expended
without any object.

If you think that I exaggerate, go and see some
of the companies, and you will notice that things are
even now carried on much in the same way as in
former times, when a peace which had endured for
years seemed to have made us forget that we ought
in peace to prepare ourselves for war. If you should
say that such pedantry can obtain only in peace, and
that it has its good side with reference to the pre-
servation of order, while it would fall to the ground
of itself in war, I must remind you how, in the war
between the kingdom of A. and the empire of B., a
certain Colonel G. received an order to move as
quickly as possible in pursuit of the enemy, whom
the cavalry reported to have retired during the night ;
that he drew in his outposts, and first concentrated
his regiment on the rearmost battalion, which was
cantoned 4 miles in rear of the outposts ; he then
gave the word, '' Out markers ! " dressed his troops,
and at last marched off in column of sections. As
men are taught and are accustomed to do in peace,
so at first they will act in war.

But if by chance you fancy that anything of this
sort would be impossible with us, come and accom-
pany me to the rendezvous of a brigade, but let us
get there soon enough to be before the first soldier.
If fortune favours us, you shall witness and observe
a useless expenditure of time and strength pushed to
an extreme ; this will be caused by the existence of
different rendezvous for the companies, battalions,

224 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

regiments, and brigades, by the uncertainty whether
the men may be permitted to take off their packs, or
whether they shall only pile arms, or whether again
they ought to wait with ordered arms until some
instructions are received, by the constant change of
formation at the rendezvous, and by the frequent
repetition of the (except for the last time) unnecessary
word " Out markers ! " by all these much time will
be lost, and much of the strength of the men will be
expended, which might have been employed in
practice which would be useful in war, in marches
and in the combat. Under favourable circumstances
twenty minutes will be employed in this sort of thing ;
under unfavourable ones, especially if the first align-
ment be not well taken up, from half an hour to an
hour may be lost ; and beyond this the exertions of
the troops will have been wasted.

From the time when I commenced to command
infantry it was the constant object of my study how
to avoid these evils and this waste of time without
injuring military exactness and order, which are the
basis of all discipline. An officer who commanded
a brigade under me (I acknowledge this, for I do
not wish to deck myself with other people's feathers)
showed me how to do it, and after this I made the
whole division conform to his plan. He laid it
down once for all that, whenever he ordered his
brigade to rendezvous at any spot, that battalion
which should first have its colour company upon the
ground, should be the directing battalion for the
whole rendezvous parade. In order that the brigade
might be properly formed up, he ordered that the
first battalion which came up was to find its correct

BRIGADE RENDEZVOUS 225

position, and was responsible for having done so.
Each of the other battahons, as it came on the
ground, had to take up its position by that of the
first battahon, and had to dress on it. No battahon
was permitted to wait with ordered arms, but each
of them, as soon as it had taken up its position, had
to pile arms, take off packs and stand easy, pending
the receipt of further orders. The colours alone had
to remain at attention until all the battalions had
taken up their position.

Let us take an example : the line of front and
the position of the right flank have been fixed upon
by the Brigadier, and the left flank battalion of the
second line is the first to arrive upon the spot. The
Adjutant of this battalion, galloping on in front, has
to measure by paces, either of himself or of his horse,
the distance from the front and the right flank at
which the colours of the left flank battalion of the
second line should stand. The battalion then, when
it comes up, marches directly to this point, takes up
its dressing, piles arms, takes off packs, and stands
easy. All the other battalions have then to take up
their dressing on the colours of the left flank of the
second line, during which there is no need to disturb
the " stand easy " of the battalion which first arrived.

When the officer commanding a brigade, after all
the troops have come up, gives the word " Stand to
your arms ! " the brigade will be found posted
according to regulations, provided that the colours
have been properly placed. For I assume that you
know perfectly well that the regulations forbid our
paying any attention to the dressing of the lines of
sections of the different battalions, and merely lay down

Q

226 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

that each battalion is to be properly dressed within
itself.

Under this system the battalion which arrived first
upon the ground was spared the necessity of waiting for
half an hour or more with packs on ; but nothing
tires troops more than standing about with packs on.
The men would rather be marching for an equal time.

If both these systems be taken together ; the
one, which forbids the useless prescription of a
separate rendezvous for each unit, company, battalion,
regiment, and brigade ; and the other, which directs
that the men are not to be kept in the ranks while they
are waiting at the brigade rendezvous ; they will some-
times cause as great a saving of exertion as will be
equivalent to a march of 4 miles. It is thus possible
to march an additional 4 miles in the day with troops
which have been thus spared. Under certain circum-
stances this may decide a battle. Do you still think
me a pedant ? Small causes produce great effects.

You may perhaps blame me as objecting to the
inspection before marching off, since it is absolutely
necessary, for the preservation of due order, that
every soldier shall be inspected by some superior
on each morning. I consider this inspection to be
undoubtedly necessary. But once in the day is
sufficient. If it is made at the place of assembly
in the cantonments, whether they be those of a
company, a battalion, or of 6 companies, etc., before
the men first march off, it will be quite enough.
But to carry it out every day, for every unit and in
each rendezvous would be an unmitigated evil. In
war even the daily inspection by a corporal must fall
through on many days owing to the want of time.

MARCH OF A BRIGADE 227

In order to ensure that the brigades practised
themselves in sparing the strength of the troops in
the way which I had laid down, I arranged my
inspections of them in such a manner, that I arrived
at the place of rendezvous before the first soldier got
there, and personally attended to the system under
which the mass of troops was assembled.

Let us now follow the movements of a brigade
when it marches off from the rendezvous. The
officer commanding the brigade frequently orders
the whole to put on their packs and to unpile arms.
When an infantry battalion at war strength marches
off in sections, it has a length of about (not quite)
five minutes' march. Given that a brigade consists
of 6 battalions, the last battalion has to wait twenty-
five minutes with its packs on before it joins the
column ; this again causes quite unnecessary fatigue. It
is so simple and obvious that the men will be spared
trouble, if no battalion puts on its packs until that
which marches in front of it moves off. And yet
this simple plan is often neglected, and that only on
account of a laudable desire to do everything exactly
in order. This desire cannot be pushed too far as
regards small bodies of troops (such as companies),
but ought not in the case of larger masses to be
over-indulged at the cost of the strength of the men.
If you think that nothing so unpractical as what I
have mentioned above would ever be done, I will
give you one example of such a case. I once had a
division assembled at the place of rendezvous, and
proposed to make a march of 4 miles under the
conditions of war, and to end with manoeuvres in
attack against a marked enemy. After having given

228 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

out my dispositions I allowed the advanced guard to
march off, and the exercises began. The day was
hot. When the regiment which was marching at
the tail of the column, as a reserve, was ordered to
make the decisive assault, it was so exhausted by
the heat and its exertions, that it had to rest for
awhile before the closing act of the manoeuvre could
be carried out. Being astonished how a march of
only 4 miles could so entirely exhaust a regiment, I
inquired the reason, and learnt that the officer
commanding had ordered the men to put on their
packs and stand to their arms at the very moment
when the advanced guard marched off, and this
though the order of march laid down that his
regiment was to be at the tail of the column.
Naturally the regiment had thus to stand still in the
burning sun for over an hour, and that without any
necessity, whereas it might have employed this time
in getting water from the village where it was and
in allowing the men to drink. Do not tell me that
such folly as this is rare. When the consequences of
it have been once seen, then every one is wise after
the event. And indeed the officer commanding this
regiment was one of the most intelligent officers in
the army. But he was new at his work, young,
ambitious, and wished to always show his troops in
good order and as smart as possible.

I had on that day collected the division at a
rendezvous, and I did the same on every day that
my division manoeuvred, in order to have an oppor-
tunity of seeing the troops and of speaking to them.
I should not do this in war, even if the whole
division were bivouacked in one spot and had only

VALUE OF DISTANCES 229

to move out of its bivouac, for in that case the
regiment which marched last would be disturbed from
its rest an hour too soon. I should prefer to give
out the order of march and, if the troops were
cantoned at wide intervals, to name the point where
the brigades, etc., were to join the column. But an
infantry brigade which has to march as a whole (for
instance, the brigade which forms the main body of
a division) cannot allow its individual battalions to
join the line of march from their cantonments at
different points, since some oversight might too
easily be made, and this, increasing and growing in im-
portance, might not improbably result in the confusion
of the whole operation. Thus a brigade which is to
move as a whole must have a distinct rendezvous.

If we accompany the troops on their march, we
shall first notice the importance of the distances
which the battalions and companies have to preserve
from those which march in front of them. I have
already said that an infantry battalion has a depth
of five minutes' march. You may perhaps wonder
at this, since a battalion of 1000 men in line is 300
paces in length, and must, whether it be moving in
column of sections or in files, be still 300 paces in
length. But in war it always marches with the
skirmishing sections separate, and therefore in two
ranks, and thus the depth of the column of march in
sections is 4 5 o paces. It is of the very greatest import-
ance, when marching in time of war, to leave intervals
between not only the battalions but also the companies,
in order that small checks may not exercise an ever-
increasing effect on the troops in rear, and in order
that air may circulate betv/een the thick masses of

230 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

men. Any one who has ever made a march of this
kind (that is to say, every infantry soldier, or, in other
words, some millions of men in Germany) knows
how disagreeable, tiring, and fatiguing these checks
are on the march, when at every moment each man,
enveloped in thick dust, and with his nose jammed
against the pack of the man in front of him, has
perpetually to halt, not knowing either whether it is
worth while to order his arms ; even though the
w^ord " Order arms ! " be given, he must still at the
command " Slope arms!" take up his rifle again and
march on.

There is a well-known principle according to
which troops must occupy only one side of the road,
leaving the other free for orderlies, Staff-officers,
Adjutants, and men going in the opposite direction.
This keeping to one side of the road is often very
trying to the troops, above all to infantry who
cannot on this account always choose the most
convenient part of the road to march on, especially
when, as on a paved road, the middle is the best
part, or, when the road being wet, the best of it may
lie first on one side and then on the other. For this
reason no general order is so often disobeyed as this,
and the very greatest attention is required from the
senior officers to ensure obedience to it. In order
to ease the much-tried infantry soldiers, and in order
to reconcile some amount of comfort for the men
with this order to keep to one side of the road, the
II. Army, in the war of 1866, ordered that infantry
should always march on the windward side, while Staff-
officers, Adjutants, and especially orderlies should ride
to leeward, so that the men might not suffer from

RULES FOR MARCHING 231

their dust. This system was uncommonly successful,
but only in cases when the wind blew decidedly
from one side of the direction of the march. When
the wind was oblique to that direction, so that, owing
to the winding of the road, the dust blew at one time
to the right and at another to the left of the road,
this order could not be carried out ; since the troops
did not dare to change from one side of the
road to the other, for if they did so they entirely
cut off all communication at the spot where they
crossed the road. I was once a witness of a scene
of the most awful confusion, which arose from
such a change from one side of the road to the
other.

The halts for rest during the march are of yet
greater importance. It is rightly laid down in our
army with the utmost strictness that no force of
infantry shall pile arms on a road, for, if this be done,
all communication by that road will be stopped.
Any one who, like myself when I was an Adjutant,
has once had to ride by infantry halted in such a
manner, will have plenty to say about it. Com-
manding officers who obey this regulation and are
also fond of good order, therefore make their troops,
at each halt during a march, form up in a rendezvous
formation before they allow them to pile arms. An
immense amount of time is lost by this proceeding,
and much of men's strength is uselessly expended.
It is sufficient, when the halt is short, if the men, as
they stand in column, turn to the right and left and
pile arms by the side of the road ; in the case of a
longer halt the battalions can always deploy singly.
If the men are to cook during the halt, it will be

232 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

better to deploy by regiments, in order to cook the
common meal and to rest.

Of all measures with respect to sparing the
strength of the men the most important, as regards
the infantry, are those which have reference to the
avoidance of sunstroke. There is nothing more
terrible, as nothing is so sudden or more awful in its
appearance, than an instantaneous sunstroke. It acts
with the most astonishing rapidity. You may
perhaps notice that the men look a little too red,
and you ask them whether they are not tired or hot,
and if they want a rest. This is the very worst
thing you can do, for you are certain to get a
deceptive answer. The more the brain is heated by
the temperature, the greater is the spirit of the men.
One of them answers, with an air of nervous courage:
" Oh, we are all right ! " and they all agree, since
none of them wish to appear weaker than the others.
A few minutes later a man falls, and instinctively
pushes his head into a bush by the road, in order to
find some shade there out of the burning rays of the
sun. Two of his comrades are ordered to take him
up, but they fall by him. All the men see this, and
in an instant all their former courage changes to an
opposite feeling. A general panic seizes them, and
terror affects their limbs, for nothing to a private
soldier seems more terrible than an invisible enemy.
Then ten, fifteen, or perhaps twenty men all fall
together, some from fear, others from giddiness, and
others again from exhaustion intensified by fear. At
such moments one feels oneself without resource,
since there is no one to carry those who most need
help out of that dangerous place. For the last shock

SUNSTROKE 233

always comes at some definite point, either a ravine
in which there is not a breath of air, or a turn of
the road upon which the sun beats with special
vehemence. Every one who comes to the spot is
seized with faintness, as by a demon.

We must not let it go as far as this.

The doctors recommend many things as good
against sunstroke. But they are not all practicable.
You should therefore employ the cool hours of the
evening and morning for the march, and rest during
the hot hours in the middle of the day. But when
large masses of troops have to march on the same
road, individual detachments have no choice with
respect to the hour of their march ; the road is
covered with troops day and night, and each body of
men must use the hours which are told off to it
Moreover, on the day before the march, when the
orders for it have to be drawn up, we cannot tell
what the weather will be. I remember one occasion
when, at the time that the orders were issued on the
day before the exercises, the weather was so cold
that the men were directed to wear their cloth
trousers. On the next day it suddenly became very
hot and damp. The principal point upon which the
doctors lay stress, is to let the men drink as often as
they can get water. They further direct that on very
hot days the collar and the upper buttons of the tunic
shall be unfastened, and that the men shall be allowed
to take more rest than would appear to be necessary
on account of their fatigue. It is, moreover, important
to march with greater intervals between the companies,
and finally to keep a careful watch upon the look of
the men. Every one knows that men who feel the

234 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

heat grow red and perspire freely. But these signs
are no proof of sunstroke. But when the redness of
face of many of the men takes a bluer and darker
colour, it is then full time to take the column off the
road and to pile arms, in order that the men may
rest and get water to drink, for this dark blue colour,
which is accompanied with perspiration, will be
succeeded by a stoppage of the latter, while the skin
will become perfectly dry and of a pale brown. The
appearance of these signs of sunstroke upon some of
the men show, as a rule, that it is then too late to
make any arrangements of which the execution will
require a certain amount of time. I can only repeat
that there is but one thing to be done when the
temperature renders sunstroke probable ; that is, " to
halt frequently and to drink water."

I have now occupied your time long enough with
elementary details, which are not after the taste of
tacticians and strategists of genius. But they also
have much to do with the conduct of troops, and
ought to be learnt and carried out. For what is the
use of the most skilful dispositions, if the troops are
incapable of reaching their enemy, or do so with
only half their strength, or in a condition which
renders them unfit to fight. We beat our enemy
quite as much with the legs as with the rifles of our
infantry. How will it be if we take all the strength
out of those legs by making faulty arrangements for
the conduct of the march ? I could name to you a
Colonel of a regiment of infantry — but I will not do
so as on that same day he died a hero's death — who,
in order to arrive in time to give assistance at the
battle of Vionville, marched his regiment in close

BOOTS 235

order, while he continually cried : " Forward !
Forward ! Come what may ! " and who left
numberless exhausted men behind him on his way.
The assistance which he brought would have been
far more valuable, if he had arrived half an hour
later but with double the number of rifles. He
would neither allow the men to halt nor to drink
water. On the other hand, the Guard Corps marched
early in the morning on the following day from the
road Dieulouard-Bernecourt-St. Mihiel to the north-
ward in stifling heat ; but it took sufficient time to
allow the men to occasionally take off their packs,
moved by five different parallel roads, kept wide
intervals, and halted frequently. It thus by 10 A.M.
reached Hageville without any loss by stragglers,
and was there ready, if Bazaine had on the 17th
ordered his intact reserves to make an attack, to
assist the Army Corps which had fought on the pre-
ceding day.

You will ask me perhaps why I do not hold
forth with the same zeal concerning the boots of the
infantry, and you are quite right to ask. I should
certainly have a great deal to say about the subject,
if that exceedingly important matter had not in
these latter days been so fully discussed from every
side that there is nothing more to add, and if it were
not that I consider our infantry boots to be very
good. There is only one point concerning this
question of boots to which I should like to invite
your attention. At the beginning of a great war
the men have to travel for days together by railway.
During this time their feet swell. Moreover, the
men, when they are called out, receive new boots

236 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

which have been in store for a long time and have
become hard. On leaving the railway they have,
as a rule, to make long marches. For this reason
many men suffer from being footsore and be-
come stragglers, unless indeed a short halt be very
frequently made and the boots be then inspected.

In order to offer you some compensation for
writing of these apparently wearisome matters, I will,
in my next letter, speak only of the applied tactics
of infantry.

LETTER XVI

THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE

B. — Tactical Handling

When a large mass of troops has been called into
action in war or at the manoeuvres, the local position
of its commanding officer is of the greatest im-
portance to it. You know already that the form of
the orders for the day and for the marching and
fighting dispositions of each Army Corps, as issued
by the General Staff, always contains information,
either at the beginning or at the end, as to where
the officer commanding is to be found. There was
a standing order in the II. Army, in the war of
1866, that each officer commanding a regiment was
always to march at the head of his command. The
officer commanding a brigade must also, equally
with the corps and the divisional commander, let the
troops know the position in which he will ride or
stand. But this is not sufficient ; he must in
addition remain in this position, and must on no
account leave it, without at least placing some
officer there who may give information as to where
he has gone. It may very well happen, it must
indeed happen every day, that the officer com-
manding finds its suddenly necessary to ride here or

238 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

there. He hears fighting going on on his right or
on his left, and wishes to get to some hill which
offers a good view and lies away from the road, in
order to see what is taking place. Or there is
perhaps a hill from which he wishes to choose his
ground, or he may desire to go to it in person in
order to see if it offers a good position for his
troops ; or among the troops in front or in rear of
him he may notice some irregularity, which he
wishes to check ; ^ in short, for some reason or
other, he spurs his horse and rides off, his staff
following him without knowing where he is going.
He perhaps at first wishes merely to ride a few
hundred paces off the road to some height, from
which he can get a good view, but when there he
finds his attention attracted to another point, and he
rides on farther without any one thinking of sending
information as to his movements to the spot which
has been before named as his position.

Something of this sort so often happens, that it
is well worth while to draw attention to the fact.
Since, when it does happen, the officer in question
breaks off, as it were, one of the most important
teeth of the train of wheels which makes up the
mechanism of command, and may think himself
very lucky if the machine does not stop altogether.
I spoke to you in my Lettci's on Cavalry of a case
where the officer commanding a division rode

1 It is of the very greatest importance that he should exercise
a control over the correct observance of the directions for the march
and see that the order of march is carried out according to the
instructions given ; he must also keep his eye upon the troops, and
ride quickly in person to any point where his presence appears to be
needed.

ERRORS 239

forward to reconnoitre, and was unable to find his
division, nor it him, during the whole of a day of
battle. I was at one time in charge of the outposts
at some manoeuvres, and my superior officer had on
the previous day stated in his orders that up to 7.30
he would remain in his cantonments, 9 miles in
rear of my position. To that point I sent at
daybreak some report with reference to the enemy.
The officer who carried the report, having a good
horse, took only three-quarters of an hour to do the
distance ; but my superior officer had already started
at 7 o'clock. The officer now set to work to look
for him, and found him an hour later far to the front,
in the outpost line, and about 2000 paces from my
position. The unfortunate young officer had ridden
his best horse almost to death, and yet, after the
hour of his departure and of the receipt of the
report had been compared, he was greeted with the
words : " You don't seem to care much about riding
fast, since it takes you an hour and threequarters
to ride 2000 paces." Moreover, the report con-
cerning the enemy arrived too late to be of any use.
It happened at some other manoeuvres that the
General commanding a combined infantry brigade
left his place in the column of march, in order to
see whether a position which lay on his right was
defensible. In the meantime a report came in from
his cavalry about the enemy. He could not be
found ; the officer who brought the report hunted
about in the direction in which the General had
ridden. By bad luck the latter was an exceedingly
good rider and had a most excellent English half-
bred horse, so that it was impossible to catch him

240 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

up. The brigade kept on marching to the front,
though the report, if he had received it, would have
compelled the General to take up the position in
question. The brigade in column of march thus
came directly upon the enemy, who surrounded it,
and the General hurried up only in time to take
charge of a fight which was going very much
against him. After the fight he received the
report.

We often read in military history how some order
or some report failed to reach the spot to which it
was sent. This happens even more frequently than we
know, since the fact is mentioned only when it has
had serious consequences. Seldom, I may almost
say never, are we told that the fault lay with the
person to whom the report was addressed, and yet
it is certainly quite as often his fault as that of the
bearer of the message. The blame is generally laid
on misplaced zeal. The higher the rank of the
leader the more slow and deliberate should he be in
abandoning that position where both his superiors
and his inferiors expect to find him, however good a
horseman he may know himself to be. The officer
commanding our corps in the war of 1870-71 re-
mained always with the greatest steadfastness at
that point or at that place in the column which had
been given out to the troops as his position. If he
left it in order to reconnoitre, the Chief of the Staff
remained in his place with full power to issue orders
in his name if necessary ; but as a rule it was the
latter who was sent forward to reconnoitre. Our
General had had experience in the same position in
the war of 1866. It thus came about that no officer

EXAMPLES FROM WAR 241

carrying a report had ever to seek long for him in
any battle or combat ; no misunderstanding ever
happened, while during the whole of the war the
mechanism of command of the Guard Corps moved
like clockwork and left nothing to be desired. Of
course what I have said does not apply to moments
when there was danger in delay ; for example, when
the attack on St. Privat threatened to make no
farther advance, while the losses were becoming
terribly heavy, the General in command of the corps
pushed forward into the foremost fighting line and
gave his orders from thence.

Such exceptions do not invalidate the rule. No
one would reproach Prince Frederic Charles with the
fact that on the 1 6th of August he left his head-
quarters at Pont a Mousson, to which all reports were
ordered to be sent, and arrived in half an hour at
the battlefield of Vionville- Mars -la -Tour (which
was 9 miles away), though only two of the six
corps under his command were engaged there. No
one will blame General von Francois for having
placed himself at the decisive moment at the head
of the 9th company of the 39th, and for having
bought with his life the secure possession of the
Rothe Berg, even though he thus for the moment
left the 27th brigade without a commander. But in
these cases the situation was not an ordinary one.
Moreover General von Frangois, with respect to his
personal position, did exactly what, in my opinion,
he should have done even in a prearranged combat,
for he did not leave the place from which he issued
his orders to his brigade until his last reserve went
forward into action ; he fell at the head of his last

R

242 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

company, for all the rest had been already thrown
into the fight.

The leader of a smaller body of troops can
perfectly well ride about within the limits of his
command, since the latter is not so extensive but
that he may be easily found from any point in his
part of the action. This is the case with respect
to the officer commanding either a company or
a battalion. The officer commanding a regiment
should be obviously a little slower to move. But
the officer commanding a brigade should, as a rule,
leave his chosen point or his place in the column of
march only under the following conditions : — That he
either leaves some one posted or riding in his place
who may give information concerning his movements,
or that he gives over the command during his absence
to the senior regimental commander who is present
with the column. He must also remain in one
position when the brigade goes into action, and has
no right whatever to expose himself prematurely
with the leading company, since he thus unnecessarily
endangers the unity of direction of the brigade. He
may certainly be sometimes compelled to expose
himself at first in order to rightly estimate his
position, to reconnoitre, and to make his dispositions.
When the last reserves of his brigade go forward
into the struggle, then, but not till then, his proper
place is generally in the foremost line.

It might appear as if a rule of this kind tied
down too much the personal movements of the
leaders. But this will always be the case in war ;
even the officers in supreme command have no
personal liberty. During one of our campaigns I

BRIGADE IN ACTION 243

reported my arrival at my appointed position to the
officer who was in supreme command over me ;
he was standing on a hill. We could see and hear
a hot fight going on to the right and left of us
at a distance of more than 4 miles. " I am in a
very uncomfortable position," said the General.
" One of my Army Corps is engaged on my right,
and another on my left. To-day's battle is a
decisive one for the army, and I am compelled to
stay here doing nothing except smoke one pipe
after another, since I have ordered all reports to be
brought to this hill, and, if I leave it, I shall bring
confusion into the entire direction of the army."

When the brigade passes from the march to
offensive action the Brigadier will endeavour, as soon
as the leading battalion meets with a stout resistance,
to surround the enemy and to outflank him. We
can recognise an effort in this direction in every
fight during the last war. As soon as we have, even
if only half, made out the nature of the enemy's
position, we ought at once to detach troops towards
his flank. But, as I have said before, this detach-
ment can be of use only if it be made so far back,
that the troops which are directed against the hostile
flank can carry out their movement beyond the
reach of the fire or the zone of action of the enemy,
and thus to a certain extent by using another line
of approach. Thus we find, in the example which
I have quoted already of the fight at Oeversee on
the 6th of February 1864, that the two companies
of Austrian Jagers turned off the road to the left as
far back as Frorup, in order to strike the enemy's

244 LE TTERS ON INF A NTR Y

right flank ; while the 2 battalions of Hessian
infantry wheeled to the right in the neighbourhood
of the Treene brook. If in such cases the nature of
the ground affords no cover in the neighbourhood
of the enemy's position, the troops which are told off
for the outflanking movement must prepare their
blow a long way in rear. Thus we see how, at
the beginning of the battle of Spicheren, the 2d
battalion of the 74th Regiment, which had already
advanced on the right flank from Deutschmiihle to
Drahtzug, was reinforced by the 3d battalion of the
39th Regiment (3 companies) from Repperts Berg,
with the object of threatening the left flank of the
enemy's position on the Rothe Berg, though the
latter was still 2 miles away. (See the Official
Account) Since the distance to be passed over by
the troops which are sent against the enemy's flank
will tend to grow greater, owing to the increased
range of rifles, these troops will get more and more
out of the direct control of their Brigadier. The
greater the circuit which they will have to make, the
more will they be separated from their General,
while the difficulty of ensuring their punctual entrance
into action and a satisfactory effect of their fire
will be so much the more increased, as infantry have
not the same power as cavalry of shortening a
distance by adopting a more rapid pace. (The
French newspapers at the time of the Crimean war
certainly reported that this or that brigade, or even
division, went for miles at the pas gymnastiqiie ;
I simply do not believe it, and every infantry man
will share my opinion.) The troops which are to
execute the turning movement will thus be left to

FLANK A TTA CKS 245

themselves ; while those who are to attack in front
will be very much puzzled as to the moment at
which they ought to push in their main attack. If
it takes place too soon, it may be beaten back before
the turning force is engaged ; if it begins too late,
the outflanking troops are in danger of being cut off
by the enemy, and of — excuse the vulgar expression
— running into the jaws of the foe.

The difficulty of bringing a flank attack into
action at the right moment is therefore very great
even in peace manoeuvres. I have indeed been
present at manoeuvres without an enemy (that is to
say with a marked enemy who could be moved as
one pleased), where I have found such an attack im-
possible. The turning troops lost their direction,
and mistook one hill for another, since the ground
when seen from a flank looked quite different ; and
then some misunderstandings arose ; in short, the
whole thing came to grief In war the object to be
outflanked is certainly better pointed out by the
very nature of the contest than is the case in peace
manoeuvres against an invisible enemy, but in war
we suffer from uncertainty and doubt of quite another
kind. Moreover, in peace it does not very much
matter if a movement does fail once ; since, as
General von Schreckenstein used to say : " Errando
discimus." But even in manoeuvres without an
enemy such a failure is unpleasant, since the officer
who carries out the manoeuvres wants to see his
subordinates work out the movements according to,
and not contrary to, his will. After I had in p7'axi
had some very unpleasant lessons in this respect, I
and my subordinates drew up the following system

246 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

for enabling a flanking movement by infantry to come
into action at the right moment.

At manoeuvres without an enemy, or when the
enemy is only a marked one, the leader, after he has
instructed and detached the troops which are told off
to make the turning movement, must carry on the
frontal attack in such a manner that the enemy's
front shall for the time be merely occupied by
a delaying fight, while the force with which it is
intended to make the real attack is temporarily held
back. The leader should then go as quickly as
possible to the troops which have been sent against
the flank, in order personally to lead them to the
spot whence they are to attack. When they have
been formed up in accordance with his intentions
and are ready to advance, and when also he has
ordered the advance to begin, he will return quickly
to the front and lead the main attack. (General von
Frangois acted thus at Spicheren — see the Official
Account, — for he rode up first to the right wing and
made his dispositions there, after which he handed
over the command of that wing to Colonel von
Pannwitz and returned to the Rothe Berg.) If it
is impossible for the leader to ride thus backwards
and forwards, he must at least place himself on that
wing of either the front or the flank attack which is
nearest to the other. If his troops have learnt to
carry out the flank attack according to his wishes,
he may take it for granted that the turning troops
will come into action properly without his personal
supervision, for in manoeuvres against an enemy, or
in war, it is not always possible for him to leave his
main body of attack, and he must therefore generally

EXAMPLES OF ERRORS 247

remain with the frontal attack. But he must leave
a mounted officer with the turning troops whose
only duty it will be to gallop to him and report
when these troops have reached some named point.
The leader himself must remain on that flank of
the frontal attack which lies next to the out-flanking
troops.

You may perhaps think that it would be possible
to judge, by the noise of the combat, whether the
out-flanking troops have advanced so far that the
time has come for energetic action on the part of
the frontal attack. But nothing is so deceptive as
the noise of battle. It has sometimes happened that
nothing whatever has been heard of a not very
distant combat, in cases where it took place to lee-
ward or in a ravine. When we were before Paris
24-pr. shells used to fall among us from St. Denis,
without our troops hearing anything of the explosion.
Among mountains one may be deceived by the echo
as to the direction from which a sound comes, while
even on level ground one's hearing may be cheated.
I still remember very well an occasion when we
were exercising on level ground, and when I mistook
the fire of some troops which were on my right front
for the commencement of the action of the turning
party, for which I had been waiting, and thus
altogether spoilt a part of the manoeuvres. But
why do I write to you about this? Were not you
yourself present in 1866 at the celebrated alarm of
the " Woylach," ^ when the beating and the shaking

1 A "Woylach" is a woollen cloth which, when folded in eight, is
used by the Hungarians as a cover for the saddle. (Note of the French
Translator. )

248 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

of the "Woylachs" in a narrow valley re-echoed
back in such a deceptive manner, that it sounded
like a hot fire of infantry in rear of the bivouac, and
spread trouble and fear far and wide among the
train? In a similar manner, at. some manoeuvres in
slightly undulating ground in Alsace during heavy
rain, we all thought that a hot fight had suddenly
begun behind a hill on our flank ; so much so that
a party of men was at once sent in that direction.
But there was nothing to be seen. The fight was
taking place 3 miles away, where another brigade
was practising detachment exercises.

But every one knows that if there is to be good
hope of a favourable result, the attacks on the front
and flank must work together in harmony. The
enemy's front must be first occupied by a delaying
action, in order to hold his attention until the flank-
ing troops can begin their work, otherwise the foe
will soon observe and crush the movement which
threatens him. But as soon as the effect of the flank
attack begins to be felt, the enemy must be pressed
in front also with all our force, for he will be very
sensitive about his flank, and would otherwise be
able to move troops from his front to cover it. It
has happened that the flank attack has so absorbed
the enemy, that the frontal attack has finally suc-
ceeded in giving the decisive blow. The most
remarkable example of this kind is the storming of
the Rothe Berg in the battle of Spicheren. This
position, from which the enemy kept up a murderous
fire from successive rows of trenches over the ground
in front, which was open to his view for a mile,
appeared from the front so impregnable that we

THE ROTHE BERG 249

began by pressing upon both flanks. The advance
was made on the right by Drahtzug, and on the
left by Tief-Weiher. The two attacks seemed at
first to make some progress, but they were unable to
press forward beyond the Southern edge of the
Pfaffenwald and the Gifert Wald, while on the right
wing the fight swayed backwards and forwards in
the Stiring Copses. Even after i P.M. the direct
attack of the Rothe Berg was considered to be im-
possible. " Some attempts made by a few daring
men were defeated." (See the Official Account.) But
about 3 P.M. the attention of the enemy had been
more attracted to the right, and the Fusilier battalion
of the 74th Regiment, followed by a company of the
39th, climbed the rocky heights and surprised the
enemy's Chasseurs in their shelter trenches, though
two hours before these troops had seen them advance
over the low ground in their front. The battle was
practically decided by the storming and occupation
of the Rothe Berg, since though the enemy afterwards
made some advance into the Gifert Wald, his attacks
had no longer any staying power ; at Stiring Wendel
the fight continued to fluctuate until 6 P.M. But the
bastion of the Rothe Berg continued always in our
possession.

But such well-timed action in front and flank will
be always very difficult to arrange. It requires the
possession of a tactical eye, which can form a correct
judgment as to the enemy and the ground ; it requires
great personal activity on the part of the officer
commanding the brigade ; and it requires above all a
calmness of iron, which will not allow itself to be
carried away, or to be induced to attack hurriedly or

250 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

before the time, but which understands how to wait
patiently for the right moment. Even with all these
it is still possible that some unforeseen event, some
accident, or some misunderstanding may ruin the effect
of the turning movement. Critics will, of course,
after the event express their wonder, and say : " But
why was not the flank attack made against such or
such a point ? " " La critique est aisee, mais I'art
est difficile."

" It seems comparatively an easy matter to strike
the flank of an enemy when you are in possession
of a favourable defensive position, with your reserves
echelonned in rear of your flanks, so that they can
by a direct advance from these points surprise and
outflank any turning movement of the enemy ; or
can, in case the foe may make a frontal attack only,
push forward and, wheeling in on his flanks, strike a
blow at them at the moment when the struggle is at
its hottest. The element of surprise which no flank
attack can dispense with, is in this case more easily
obtained, since a defensive position is generally
selected on the crest of a height which conceals
everything lying behind it. Our combats in our
positions around Metz and Paris offer many examples
of such sudden outflanking movements made from a
defensive position. But the best example is the
counter-attack of the French infantry from Aman-
villers against the artillery of our IX. Corps (see the
Official Account) in the battle of the i8th of
August 1870.

In order to carry out such counter-attacks with
the greatest possible effect, we must, when we take

SHELTER TRENCHES 251

Up a position, occupy the front with as thin a line
of infantry as possible, and must echelon as large
reserves as possible in rear of each flank. Since we
are now able to throw up shelter trenches with the
spades of the infantry in a shorter time than was
formerly the case, we shall in most cases be able to
spare yet more men from the front, and these we
shall hand over to the reserve. But in connection
with shelter trenches there is one point which I must
mention, for it has frequently annoyed me very much
at the manoeuvres. I do not know why it is, but,
great as is the objection of the German soldier to
making trenches in the ground and to occupying a
defensive position, and infinitely as he prefers to be let
go in action and to strike a direct blow, when once
shelter trenches have been made they exercise a
marvellous attraction. How often at the manoeuvres
do we see a rush made into the shelter trenches, so
that they get quite filled up, and the men at last lie
so close together in them — even if they do not lie
one on the top of the other — that each of them
prevents the other from firing. Moreover, the trench
is often so narrow and so shallow that the cover
which it affords is a mere illusion, and at least the
feet of the men stick up in rear and serve as a sort
of butt for the bullets which miss their heads. Un-
less it be insisted on that the shelter trenches shall
be made sufficiently wide and deep, the men get an
entirely false idea as to their value. The same is
the case when too many men are crowded into the
trenches.

Again, I must admit that many false notions arise
from peace manoeuvres, for the reason that there are

252 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

then no losses in action, and there is ahvays a
temptation to crowd up the shelter trenches along
the front, as soon as it becomes necessary to make
use of the supports at the moment of the crisis ; but
these supports, in a real action, would be employed
in replacing the casualties which occur, and in
keeping up, in spite of such losses, the full power of
fire of the shelter trenches. For in real work the
enemy's bullets will take very good care that our
lines are not too crowded. We must, nevertheless,
never permit ourselves in peace to be tempted to
over-fill the shelter trenches with skirmishers, and if
we want to show that the supports have been pushed
in, we should only allow them to come up and fire
one volley, after which they should fall back again.
When I picture to myself a well conducted fire-fight
carried on from a shelter trench, I think that each
man (having his pack on the ground by his side, so
that he may use the cartridges out of it) must
occupy 2 paces of front, if he is to be comfortable
and to be able to shoot his best. No shelter trench
ought to have more than one man to every 2
paces. Thus 500 men will occupy a front of 1000
paces, and a battalion therefore, at full war strength,
will be sufficient for from 800 to 1000 paces of
shelter trench, for which it will supply the firing line
and the necessary supports immediately in rear. I
therefore think that if a brigade is to occupy a line
of shelter trenches from 1600 to 2000 paces in
length (about a mile), I should divide this line into
two halves, occupy each half with one battalion
(taking one from each regiment), and should echelon
the other two battalions of each regiment in rear of

INFANTR Y v. CA VALR V 253

either wing, as a reserve, placing them so that they
overlapped the flanks.

Since I am now in the humour for criticising, I

will mention a matter which has struck me at all

manoeuvres, and not there only, but also often in

war. I have already told you, when I wrote to you

on cavalry, that we generally find, when cavalry take

part in an infantry combat by making a charge, that

the infantry, as soon as they are no longer able to

continue to fire, watch the cavalry charge, with all

sympathy and good wishes no doubt, but without

doing anything at all themselves ; instead of this

they should, of course, make use of the moment

when the enemy is no longer firing at them to rush

to the front and gain as much ground as possible ;

they should even, if it be in any way possible, lighten

the task of their own cavalry by firing on the foe at

the very shortest ranges. A sort of feeling of ease

and freedom from care comes over the infantry at

such a moment ; they watch the drama which is

being played before their eyes with wonder and

curiosity ; it is just as if the brother infantryman

said to his brother cavalryman : " It's your turn

now, Bill ! " I have, at various different times at

the manoeuvres, worked out charges of this kind

against a marked enemy. Although I had mentioned

beforehand that it was my express intention to afford

the infantry an opportunity of practising combined

action with such a charge of cavalry, I had every

time to ride up or send to them in order to make

them get forward at the favourable moment.

This want of energy in action, which is utterly

254 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

foreign to the nature of our infantry, arose simply
from the fact that they were not accustomed to work
like this, and had indeed never yet so worked. They
had not had sufficient practice in attacking a common
object in combination with cavalry.

The action of infantry which suddenly assist
cavalry in their charge with a rapid fire at a short
range has a most powerful effect, especially against
hostile cavalry, since it cannot fail to take them by
surprise. In order to judge of this it is only
necessary to read the description of the cavalry
combats at the battle of Koniggratz, as they are
related in the Official Account ; you will there see
what influence the advanced detachments of Prussian
infantry which, for the most part, pushed on inde-
pendently, exercised on the result of the grand
cavalry combat. This was especially noticeable at
the points where the masses of brave Austrian
cavalry gained an advantage, for their charges broke
up before the unexpected rapid fire, which struck
them from Stresetitz and Langenhof; even the
scattered skirmishing sections under Lieutenants
Daum and Oldenburg, which had advanced as far
as the sheep-farm at Langenhof, were of great
weight in the balance ; until at length the Prussian
cavalry regiments, as they gradually came up, became
numerous enough to drive back the Austrian cavalry
altogether.

I see you smile at this, and seem to hear you say
that I have now exactly shown that there was no
such want of energy on the part of the infantry
during the cavalry charges as that which I have just
been blaming. As regards this one case you are

INFANTRY y. CAVALRY 255

certainly right But has this been done everywhere
and always ? I must beg of you to excuse my not
giving you examples from actual war which might
tend to throw blame on some one. I do not feel
justified in doing so. A cavalry combat sways back-
wards and forwards, and its result is always uncertain.
Quickly as it may gain ground, it may lose it again
with equal rapidity. The victory of cavalry obtains
its first real hold when the infantry have come up ;
they give a provisional certainty of occupation, until
the artillery comes into position on the captured
ground, and with its bass voice sets the final seal of
possession. Both these Arms, the infantry in the
first line, must therefore lose no time in making good
the success of the cavalry.

As a rider to my remarks on the action of
infantry in battle in combination with cavalry, it may
be well to say now a few words as to the action of
infantry against cavalry. I might simply refer you
to the behaviour of our infantry in the campaigns of
1866, 1 870-71, since in them they were ever vic-
torious. They there acquired the conviction that
infantry, which has no fear of its foe, is invincible by
cavalry, and they have afforded a practical proof that
this is the case without reference to the formation in
which the infantry may be. Numberless episodes
from the battles of Gitschin, Koniggratz, Worth, and'
Sedan, show plainly that this is a fact ; these I need
not recall to you. You may perhaps smile again at
this, and may draw my attention to the fact that, in
my Letters on Cavalry, I asserted that that Arm might
still be successful against infantry, and that they were

256 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

not to be blamed, even if they charged intact infantry.
But, my dear friend, you must remember that Prussian,
that is to say German, cavalry will never be called upon
to charge Prussian, that is to say German, infantry.
What I said was certainly not altogether scientific, nor
very general in its application. But I am not writing a
theoretical abstract work ; I am chattering to you about
certain individual cases, as Prussian and German officers
talk among themselves over various special matters.

Since the war of 1866 a custom has grown up
among our infantry of no longer forming square
against hostile cavalry. This system was laid down
for the whole army, by an order of the day, directly
after the first success of the battalions of the Body-
Guard regiment at Gitschin, where standing in line
they repulsed the most resolute charges of the enemy's
cavalry. I believe that during the whole of the war
of 1870-71 no case occurred where German infantry
formed square to resist cavalry, if we except the band
of the 5 th battalion of Jagers at the battle of Sedan,
as is exactly represented in the panorama in the
Alexanderplatz at Berlin.

I consider that the real cause of this circumstance
is the fact that, owing to the great range of the
present infantry rifle, the cavalry has to make a very
long round, if it proposes to get on the flank of a
line of infantry, and that thus the infantry line has
sufficient time to change its front and to meet the
charge in the new direction. We find that lines of
skirmishers have remained lying down when charged
by cavalry and have fired on the latter ; even when
the charge passed over them they were not destroyed,
nor did they indeed suffer very severe loss, since horses,

CHANGE OF FRONT 257

as a rule, avoid treading on a living body and do
their best to jump it ; as soon as the charge had
passed, the skirmishers fired on the rear of the
cavalry, as they (at Vionville and Sedan) rushed on
against the closed companies which waited in line
to receive them. As early as 1866 skirmishers very
often remained lying down when cavalry charged
them. It has been related to me, with reference to
the cavalry charges which were received by the 2d
and 3d companies of the 21st Regiment in front of
the wood of Sadowa, that the firing line, as they lay,
repulsed every charge, and that only one man was
wounded by the cavalry, and he, while he was
endeavouring to fall back on the supports. But in
order that they may act like this the infantry in the
first line must be well instructed, must never lose
their presence of mind, and must have confidence in
their rifles. We now generally see lines of infantry
and swarms of skirmishers, when they hear on the
exercise ground the call, " Prepare for cavalry ! "
change front in the direction from which the cavalry
are supposed to be coming, and commence either a
rapid fire or volleys with the 400 yards' sight.

I have on such occasions frequently noticed that
a part of the line wheels back in order to take up
the same fighting front as the remainder. But I
think, especially in the case of firing lines, which must
carry out such movements at the double, that this
manner of changing front is very objectionable, since
the troops which so change front turn their backs
upon the enemy, and must as it were run away from
him. There is nothing more demoralising than to
turn one's back upon the enemy, especially when the

S

258 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

latter consists of cavalry, and is riding after one.
The heart of man is so fashioned that certain things
have a great effect upon it. It is one of the most
objectionable peculiarities of forming square, that in
order to do so the men have to run before the
cavalry ; for every soldier begins to think that he is
lost unless he runs as quickly as he can. We have
very recently read how the Egyptian troops at
Suakim, though they had been supplied with the
best rifles, allowed themselves, when once they had
begun to run before the enemy, to be shamefully
spitted by savages who were armed only with spears.
All this arises from the fact that men, as they run
away, cannot see what the enemy is doing. It is
quite another thing when one runs to meet the enemy.
Moreover, when infantry run to meet cavalry, the
latter are impressed and the horses have a tendency
to shy. For this reason I have always insisted that
the changes of front which are necessary should
always be made towards the enemy's cavalry, even
though here and there the result was that, instead of
a straight line, I had a broken one, or one formed in
echelons.

It appears to me that our infantry, as they are
now constituted, might ^\n^ up the square altogether.
But an inferior infantry — whether it be that, owing
to the newness of their formation, they have not
sufficient cohesion, or if for the same reason they are
not sufficiently skilled in shooting and are thus want-
ing in confidence in their rifles — may very possibly
be compelled in the future to revert to the square
formation.

We have indeed during the last few weeks seen

SUA KIM 259

the English moved at Suakim in large squares, though
fighting with savages who were miserably armed.
The bare correspondence in the newspapers does not
enable us to judge as to the grounds on which this
principle was adopted, and we cannot, therefore, give
an opinion as to whether it is, or is not, to be
commended.

LETTER XVII

THE SPIRIT OF THE INFANTRY

The brigade is the largest body of infantry which
carries out purely regulation exercises without any
combination with the other arms. It is also the
largest body of infantry which is likely to be used in
war under one undivided command without being
combined with any other arm. For this reason I
propose to close my talk about infantry, which I
began with the mention of the very smallest units,
with the infantry brigade, though I know that I have
not said all that there is to say with respect to this
the most important of all the arms. But I only
wanted to tell you what was in my mind, and what
has suggested itself to me in the course of my time,
and had no intention to write about any tiresome
scientific theories. This is the reason why I have
so often tormented you with special and apparently
small details, but such as I consider to be important,
since what is the use of the best constructed instru-
ment if it is not made of good material, or what is
the use of the most beautiful sword, if it is not
sharpened, or if its edge has become dull with rust ?
\^ But of what use also is the sharpest and best

made sword, if the arm which guides it does not

THE SOLDIER SPIRIT 261

know how to strike properly, and is not resolute to
strike ? In the same manner, what is the use of the
best organisation for infantry if they are not inspired
with the proper spirit ? I mean a real spirit, a true
soldier spirit, not a mere passing enthusiasm.

The true soldier spirit is a very different thing ^
from the enthusiasm which is evolved by the cause
of a war. It is certainly a beautiful and stirring
thing, this enthusiasm, when it seizes on a whole
people. It leads to grand resolutions, and inclines a
whole nation to make great sacrifices. How often
have we all, long before 1870, envied our fathers
their experience of the enthusiasm of 1 8 1 3, and have
hoped ourselves to live in such a time ; and who does
not remember with emotion the noble enthusiasm
which set all Germany in motion when, in the year
1870, our dearest possessions were threatened by a
sudden danger! How instantly then, on the banks
of the Rhine as well as on those of the Memel, did
every school and every singing club, as if seized by
some marvellous spell, break out into a song which
had up to then been totally unknown, " Die Wacht
am Rhein ! " How the whole German people rose
like one man, and crowded around their princes who
had themselves but one object ; to defend the Father-
land ! How many societies assembled together and
collected enormous sums to help the warriors and the
wounded ! Look how the discharged men of the
Landzuekr and the reservists refused to wait for the
order for mobilisation, but in many cases joined the
colours before they were summoned to them ! How
the Reichstag with one voice (except certain great
financiers, whose covetous hearts clung to the Bourse

262 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

at Paris) agreed to everything which the governments
of the North-German Confederation demanded for
the expenses of the war, and, instead of debating
about the amount asked, answered with an enthusi-
astic hurrah ! This was true enthusiasm ; and it
bore good fruit, for it did great and grand things,
and was a strong support to the governments.

But such enthusiasm as this could not last during
the whole of the war in the case of those who had
to carry that war through. When dreary and fatigu-
ing journeys by rail, which lasted twice and three
times twenty-four hours, shook up their bodies ; when,
immediately after these almost sleepless nights, forced
marches in closely crowded columns and in stifling
heat utterly tired out their strength ; when the days
came, in which the masses of men lying closely
together on the plateau near Metz could not find a
drop of spring water to drink, and had to content
themselves for cooking with the evil-smelling water
of the brooks which were running dry owing to the
long drought, so that, to my knowledge, a soldier
vainly offered another a mark for a cup of such
water ; when also, during the battle, thousands and
thousands of the enemy's bullets, fired at unheard-of
ranges, fell around the exhausted and weary men
who had found no time to eat during the whole
day ; when the as yet unknown mitrailleuse savagely
growled ; then their enthusiasm died out, then the
ardour, which had been aroused by this holy fire,
cooled down, and changed into a cold calculation
and a quiet determination, or even into that desire
of self-preservation which is natural to every man.
Then not enthusiasm, but the spirit which filled the

THE INFANTRY 263

troops held the balance between all these contending
elements ; that spirit which outlasts all fatigues,
privations, and dangers, which inspires men's hearts
and is one with their life, and which holds its
empire over the body so long as there is life in it.

How can you recognise this spirit, how does it
show itself outwardly ? Look at our infantry of
the years 1870-71, and you will know what this
spirit is.

" Why the infantry and not the other arms ? "
you ask. I know well that the other arms were
inspired with the same spirit as the infantry, but
their spirit is not so sorely tried with deadly weari-
ness as is that of the infantry, and they have com-
pensations, such as being mounted or belonging to
a special arm, which are denied to the modest in-
fantry soldier, who feels himself to be but an atom
of a huge mass, and knows that he has been con-
temptuously nicknamed "Stubble-hopper" and "Food
for powder." Moreover, the proper soldier spirit is
far more necessary in the case of infantry than for
the other arms. A skilled cavalry leader can gain
great success with very moderate cavalry, as Murat
entirely understood, for he knew how to make his
cavalry charge in mass at the right time and in the
right direction. In the artillery a few trustworthy
men with each gun are sufficient, while those who
are less trustworthy can at least do their duty.
But in the infantry every man must be inspired with
the true spirit, and each man who is not so inspired
is a source of weakness to the whole.

We have heard that "The spirit of the Prussian
Army lies in its officers." Certainly ! It is they

1

264 LETTERS ON INFANTRY \

who in the unwearying fulfilment of their duty have
trained the private soldier in peace, who out of a
clumsy labourer or artisan have made a practised
soldier who knows how to handle his arms, and who
have taught the raw and half-educated spirit of the
private soldier a sense of duty, honour, and fidelity
to King and Fatherland. It is they who in peace
set a good example by their Spartan self-denial, by
their unresting energy, by their feeling of honour,
and by their close bond of comradeship. It is they
who surpass the men in skill in all exercises, and
who in battle lead the way in danger, paying three-
fold more than the others of the debt of blood ; and
this is true of all, from the General down to the
junior subaltern. General von Francois, after he
had carried through one of the most heroic of all
deeds, the storming of the Rothe Berg at Spicheren,
said, as he lay dying pierced with five bullets :
" Death on the battlefield is a beautiful thing."
General von Raven in 1864 said, shortly before his
death : " It was time that a Prussian General should
once more die for his King." In like manner have
hundreds and thousands of officers of all ranks fallen,
envied by their comrades for their grand fate, and
affording a brilliant example to their men.

But was this example needed ? Would our men
not have fought well if the officers had not sacrificed
themselves in a double or treble proportion ? Has
any one ever heard any such cry issue from the ranks
of our infantry as : " Les epaulettes en avant .? "
Never ! I certainly said above that the troops did
not fight so well when they were without officers,
but that arose only from the fact that the men, in

VALUE OF OFFICERS 265

their quality as soldiers, feel themselves to be the
handiwork and the creation of their officers, and are
accustomed to carry out their will. This feeling
found expression in the speech which I have already
mentioned : " We had no officers left to tell us what
to do, so we went away." In other respects the spirit
of the men is the same as that of the officers. They
are inoculated with it by the officers, and it has taken
deep root in them. " When the Lieutenant runs
in, we must run in too," says the soldier. This,
though in a somewhat uncultivated form, is an ex-
pression of the same spirit as inspires the officers
when they carry out absolutely any order which
they may have received, with intelligence certainly
and with tactical knowledge but without wishing to
criticise the order, for the very reason that it is an
order. This spirit is the full expression of confidence
and of discipline.

Neither of these can be separated from the other ; H
for the discipline in our army is no longer that ot /
the last century, when a celebrated authority laid it v
down as a principle that the soldier should be made
to fear the lash more than a bullet. It is no longer
founded only upon fear of punishment, but springs
principally from the soldier's confidence in his
superiors. It is certainly the fact that many a
soldier, as I have mentioned in an earlier letter,
joins his regiment with such raw and childish ideas
regarding what constitutes right, duty, and honour,
that he judges of what is wrong only by the degree
of punishment which it entails — such a soldier must
be given a correct idea of the difference between
right and wrong, and this knowledge must be instilled

266 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

into him by means of a kind but firm system. There
are also some incorrigible individuals who sorely
try the patience of their superiors, and on whose
account it is to be regretted that corporal punishment
has been abolished ; but, thank Heaven, these are
but rare exceptions ; all the remainder accept gladly
the instruction which is given them during their
three years of service with the colours ; while the
conviction which they acquire, that their superiors
are unwearying in their efforts for their mental and
bodily good, attracts their confidence, and thus
cements that bond of union which makes it appear
impossible to the private soldier to do anything
without his officer. It is quite right that in war, in
battle, the soldier should be accustomed to see his
officer go before him into danger. But there have
been instances when the soldier could not endure
that his officer should expose himself, and when he
has entreated him to remain under cover, since he,
the soldier, could carry out the whole business by
himself I could give you many such instances
which occurred at the outposts before Paris ; I even
knew a case when the soldiers were exceedingly
angry with a General because he placed himself in
the foremost line at the beginning of the fight, and
was one of the first in the ranks of the stormers.
They said one to another that with them there was
no need for Generals to place themselves in the fore-
most rank ; they would do their duty without being
driven to it by any such example ; that that gray
old officer with his white hair and beard had better
stay in rear until the last of his troops came on ;
what would become of them all if he was shot at

THE CALL OF DUTY 267

the beginning of the action, and there was no one left
to give the proper orders ?

Each soldier takes it for granted that any such ^
orders will be the best possible. No one ever heard
any argument about this, or any fault-finding. Such
orders as came were accepted simply as fate. " Such
is the order," was always a magic word in our army.
And even though half of the men fell in carrying it
out, yet the other half executed it to the uttermost.
This spirit enabled our Headquarter Staff to move
the troops as if they were chessmen. It has never
happened with us, though often with other armies,
that the troops have failed to reach the point to
which they had been ordered to march. It was
ordered ; therefore it was done. You might some-
times see a powerful N.C. officer carrying two rifles,
so that some tired young soldier by his side might
be able to complete the march ; and officers were to
be seen helping to carry the rifles of their men.
The officers were, of course, a brilliant pattern to
their men in the discharge of their duty. I have
known young officers who, having been sent out after
the day's march to carry some order, were on the road
during the whole night, and came back on the following
morning to the headquarters of the corps just as they
were about to march off They were so tired, that at
every short halt during the march they fell asleep in
broad daylight, slipping off" their horses on to some
stubble-field. But when their turn came round, and
they were sent off again with an order, they at once
became wide-awake and went off with their message.
They never made any mistake. I could name to
you a certain Staff which I by chance happened to

268 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

join just as it, in the evening after a very hard day,
took possession of a deserted house. Their suppHes
had not come up, and not an atom of bread or meat
could be found in the house — nothing but raw eggs
and a great quantity of champagne. Hungry and
thirsty as they were they fell upon what there was,
and even the most temperate became utterly drunk.
In the middle of the night there was an alarm, and
orders came for a farther advance. These orders
had to be worked out with the map, various
directions had to be given, and the orderly officers
^ had to ride off. They all became sober at once ; no
mistake was made in the orders, no directions were
incorrectly given, and nothing was forgotten or
omitted. The word " Duty " has a magic effect ; it
sobers, it animates, it electrifies.

But in order to keep up this spirit it is necessary
that, as in our Army, the firmest discipline be pre-
served. Not such discipline as is founded on dread of
very severe punishments, or even of the lash, but that
discipline which has its basis in habit, which regards
all orders as sacred, and which carries out even the
smallest details with all possible care ; and, moreover,
that strict discipline of drill which makes the most
absolute correctness in each movement a matter of
custom, which measures with a scale of tenths of an
inch the exact distance between the pouch and the rifle
when held at the " Present," and that often derided
" gaiter-button " smartness, which is enraged when
even one button of the tunic is left open. It is this
which accustoms the soldier to obedience, and which
must be especially impressed upon the infantry, since
they will be, for the most part, broken up into the

DISCIPLINE 269

very smallest fractions at the most decisive moments.
Napoleon III. says at the end of his book, The
Causes of the Capitidation of Sedan, that the Prussian
successes were founded on respect for the govern-
ment, obedience to the laws, and the fact that the
military and patriotic spirit overmastered all interests
and opinions; and a French officer, who in 1871
surrendered to us the fort of Issy, said when he saw
an N.C. officer deliver a report in a very smart
soldier-like manner: "Ah, je vois bien pourquoi nous
sommes vaincus ; c'est par votre discipline. Un de
nos soldats, en faisant son rapport, vous aurait fourre
sa main sous le nez."

On the other hand, the care which the officers
take of their men, and the example which they set
in bearing hardships, and in danger, bring about an
attachment of the soldiers to their officers which
shows itself in a thousand touching ways. Not only
does the soldier stand by his officer in battle and in
danger, but when the officer, tired to death, en-
deavours to get some rest, then the men, as far as
they can, look after him as a loving mother looks
after her child. Any Lieutenant of infantry could
give you more examples of this fact than I, since in
our campaigns I have been, owing to my employ-
ment, too much divided from the men. But I have
myself experienced this kindness — after the battle
of St. Privat, and on many other occasions.

But not only had the men a close affection for
their superiors, but they had the greatest confidence
in them, as was plainly shown during the last war ;
it was indeed so great that they not only felt sure
that every order given was correct and necessary,

270 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

but were further convinced that victory was absolutely
certain. This confidence showed itself even in the
year 1870, when the LandweJir and the reservists
rejoined the colours, and found comic expression in
the words used by a man of the Landwehr, as he
showed his mobilisation order to his wife : " Look !
we have got to go and win some more victories."
This confidence continued even during all the hard-
ships of the entire war. When all the lines of march
had to be changed, at the news of the movement of
MacMahon on our right flank, and when the most
extraordinary exertions were demanded of the men,
so that thousands and thousands fell down exhausted
on the road, there was never any complaint ; the
soldier took everything with a laugh. I heard a
man say at that time : " Before the battle of the i 8th
we used to say, ' Change front by army corps ! '
Now we say, ' Change front by armies ! ' ' Forward !
only let us get at them ! ' "

The spirit of our troops showed itself in the fact
that they never considered themselves beaten. I once
came across an infantry regiment immediately after
an attack which had not been successful. You will
excuse my not mentioning the name of the regiment
or of the action, for I should not like to annoy brave
men. The commander had led them for the first
time under fire, and was, with his men, very down-
cast ; above all, they were afraid of the blame of
their superiors. One of the latter said to me : " Their
wings are drooping a little ; I'll make them hold
their heads up." He then galloped to the regiment
and shouted in a loud voice : " Bravo, Colonel ! Bravo,
Grenadiers ! That was a grand deed ! The regiment

VALUE OF PRAISE 271

went farther forward to the front than any. It was
not your fault that the attack failed. This is a glorious
day in the history of the regiment ! " All their heads
went up at once, and it was no longer a defeated
regiment. It had only lost so many officers and men ;
the remainder fought again with their old courage,
and very soon gave proof of their invincibility.
Troops who will not own themselves beaten can-
not be beaten. They may lose men, they may be
reduced in number, they may even be annihilated ;
but they can never be beaten ! If our infantry after
their colossal losses at Vionville-Mars-la-Tour, which
reduced them to half (some regiments even to a third)
of their strength, had considered themselves beaten,
we should have had no right to reproach them. But
they never thought they were beaten, and therefore
kept on attacking until dark. Thus it was that
they were indeed victorious. This is the effect of
the true soldier spirit.

This spirit which is the result of a discipline
founded upon confidence and carefully preserved,
showed itself long ago, in the days when the agita-
tion of many minds, urged on by inward restlessness,
endangered all which up to then had been held to be
right and law, so that the very foundations of the
organisation of society appeared to totter. Every
one who was alive in the year i 848 will remember
how it was the spirit of the army which saved the
organisation of our society from ruin. Then was
discipline of real value ; that discipline which has
no fear for itself, but holds that what is ordered
must be carried out. A grenadier of the King's
regiment was enticed away by some riotous agitators,

272 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

was made drunk with beer and brandy, and was
called upon, under threat of death if he refused, to
swear that he would not fire on the insurgents ; he
gave the required oath, but with the reservation :
" This is how it is ; if I get the order to fire, I must
fire." And so felt the whole army.

Thus this spirit is our best defence against the
destructive efforts of Socialism. So long as this
spirit is, by means of the three years' training of
each individual, rooted in the mind of every man
who is able to bear arms ; so long as the whole
nation receives this training which bears more lasting
fruit than all their previous education, so long will
the foundations of the order of our country remain
unshaken, let the rage of those who employ murder,
fire, and dynamite as the means to their end do what
it will.

But in order to attain this position it is necessary
to train each man individually ; which is exactly
what our infantry have so capitally carried out. The
mere drilling of the whole mass is no longer suffi-
cient. This drill, in which men are only machines,
did very good work, it is true, in the last century.
But since " Independent fire has had it all its own
way," and every man fights independently up to a
certain point, the mechanical movement of closed
bodies of troops can no longer be the goal of our
efforts ; it could not be given up in those days, when
men deserted one by one if by any chance the camp
was not surrounded with guards and sentries. In
the same manner the lash would be useless against
temptations by insurgents, if each individual soldier
was liable to such temptations. Nothing but the

ENTHUSIASM 273

long continued education of the whole nation in war
and discipline can do any good. The leaders of the
revolutionary party know this well, and for this
reason they, under all sorts of pretexts, press for a
shorter term of service than three years, and for the
conversion of the army into a militia.

Enthusiasm may lead a militia to do great deeds.
But enthusiasm is but burning straw unless the true
soldier spirit be present ; it flares for a short time but
goes out at once, as soon as it is chilled by the reality
of war with its hardships and dangers. We had a
good example of this in the second half of our last
great war. The enthusiasm which Gambetta suc-
ceeded in arousing in the French nation called
armies from the ground with the stamp of its foot,
but they could not stand against the well-disciplined
German troops, filled as these were with the true
soldier spirit, even though the French were often in
threefold strength.

To this true soldier spirit belongs also the spirit
of the offensive which our General Staff accepted as
the principle for the conduct of the whole war, and
which was soon acknowledged by every man to be

right.

It has certainly been said that the offensive is the
form of action of the strongest, but that the defensive
is the strongest form of action. It is besides appar-
ently certain that he who, as he lies under cover,
fires upon his assailant, will gain the victory more
easily than he who is compelled to advance under
the well-aimed fire of the defender. But the offensive
enables the assailant to bring a numerical superiority
to the point where he desires to possess it, and he

T

274 LETTERS ON INFANTRY

who assumes the offensive can surprise, while he who
falls back on the defensive can only be surprised.
But surprise itself doubles the strength of the force
which surprises. And the moral impulse peculiar to
the offensive has even more effect than surprise. He
who goes forward to the attack feels that he is the
better man ; he who holds back on the defensive
knows that he is weak. This feeling of superiority
on the one hand, and of weakness on the other,
extends through every man in the army. The
defender is day by day sorely troubled, and asks :
" Will the enemy come this way : or will he come
that way?" he thus lessens the courage of his troops,
as well as their bodily strength. For he must always
keep them in complete readiness for battle, while the
assailant can rest and take his ease up to the moment
which he has selected for the attack. Thus the
defenders of the Dannewerk, in the year 1864, kept
their troops under arms within their fortifications,
day and night, through frost and snow, while we
quietly lay in villages close in front of the walls of
the Dannewerk, until their troops had been broken by
their hardships and sufferings to such an extent, that
it was found advisable to abandon the fortress with-
out a struggle. In the same manner the French
armies bivouacked, before the sorties, in order of
battle between the forts of Paris, and lost hundreds
of men by frost ; while our troops lay at night in
the villages, cooking, eating, and sleeping, and held
their position during the day only.

But whither am I wandering ! I meant only to
write to you about practical matters concerning the
infantry, and now I am losing myself in an abstract

275

le defensive,
an end, and
' digression,
ay, on page
to keep up
id this fact

^:

INDEX

Alsace, manoeuvres in, 248.
Amanvillers, 71, 132, 171, 250.
Ammunition cannot be supplied at
the final rush, 156, 174.
carts, neglect of, in peace manoe-
uvres, 177, 178,
infantry, in 1866, 170.
in 1870-71, 171, 172.
renewal of, 158, 167, 168, 169,
170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178,
179, 180, 181.
Argenteuil, 23.

Army and Navy Annual, 138.
Artillery, distance of, from its own
infantry, 149, 152.
fire, why it varies in action,

144.
comparison with infantry, 142,

153-
under infantry fire, 148, 149.
why it may come within infantry
fire, 149.
Attack on village, ideal, 138, 139.
Austrians, in 1866, destruction of,
47.

Batilly, 179.

Battalion, commanding officer's
place in a, 242.

difficulty of training a, 112.

inspection of a, iii.

march-past, 197,
Battalion exercises, 96.

inspection of, 112, 113, 115.

position of officer in, 100, loi.

102, 103, 104, 105.
too rigid in peace, 97,
109.

105,

Battle, a, highest form of inspection,
106.
and drill exercises, differences

between, 165, 206,
noise of, not always heard,

247,
plan reports, 191, 192, 194.
Battles, position of officers in, 106,

107, 108, 109, no.
Bayonet drill, 33, 35, 36.

fighting, 35, 36, 37.
Bazaine's Episodes, i.

lack of ammunition, 171, 172.
Beaugency-Cravant, battle of, 138,
Beaune la Rolande, 156, 159.
Benedek, Colonel, 218, 220.
Berhn, 24, 256.
Bois de la Garenne, 44, 45, 133,

134, ISO-
Brigade, commanding officer's place
in a, 237, 238, 239, 240,
241, 242, 243.
exercises, 201, 202, 203, 204,
210, 211, 212, 213, 214,
216.
how to assemble battalions of a,

224, 225, 226, 228, 229.
how to march from a rendez-
vous, 227, 228.
internal arrangements, 221, 222,
rendezvous, 222, 223, 224.
tactical handling of, 237.
Brigades should be exercised with
their artillery, 202, 203, 204, 205,
207, 209, 210, 211.
Bronsart's Duties of the General

Staff, 221.
Budritzky, General von, 52.

INDEX

277

Camps, French system of, 124, 125.
Captains, duties of, 87, 88.
Cavalry, supported by infantry, 253,

254. 255.
Chalons, 2, 172.
Chanzy, 3.
Chlum, 71, 75.
Clausewitz's opinion of war, 79,

118, 222.
Colombey-Nouilly, i.
" Column on the centre," 48, 50.
Columns, battalion, 97, 100.

former and present use of, 48,

49. SO-
Company, training a, 112.

exercises, 68.

instruction, best, 73.

Crimean War, the, 244.

Daigny, 133.
Daum, Lieutenant, 254.
Des Barres' battalion, 64.
Deutschmiihle, 244.
Drahtzug, 244, 249.
Drill, company and battalion, 68,
69.

flank attack at, 128, 129.

flank movements at, 116, 117.

recruits, 18, 19, 20.
Dugny, 135.
Diippel, fight at, 36, 82.

Egyptian soldiers, 70.

Enemy at drill exercise should be

marked by flags, 200, 202.
Esbeck, Lieutenant von, 207.

Firearms, loading of, 33, 34,
Fire discipline, 74, 75, 76, ^j , 78,

172, 173, 174.
Flank attacks, 217, 218, 219, 220,
243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248,
249, 250.
fire, value of, 71, 72, 73.
Flavigny, 192.

Formation, advantage of three ranks,
62, 63, 64.
square, seldom used, 64.
Formations, peace and war, 59, 60,

61.
Franfois, General von, 241, 246, 264.

Frederic the Great, 22, 48.

Charles, Prince, 3, 6, 36, 241.
Fridericia, battle of, 155.
Frorup, 220, 243.
Froschweiler, storming of, i.

Gambetta, 273.

Geissberg, storming of the, i.

German drilling, 23.

officers, good character of, 93,
94.

officers, small pay of, 90, 91,
92.
Gifert forest, 216, 249.
Gitschin, battle, 255, 256.
Givonne, river, 44.

valley, 44, 45, 134.

village, 44, 133.
Goltz's The People in Arms, 26, 35,

52, 94-
Gondrecourt's Austrian brigade,

217.
Gravelotte, battle of, Guards at, 50,

192.
Gymnastics, appHed, 29, 30, 31,

37. 38.
inspectors of, 32, 33.
necessity of, for recruits, 14, 15,

16, 17, 33- 35-

Halts, how to arrange, 231, 232,

235-
Haybes, 45.
Horenowes, 153.

Individual firing, advantage of, 47.
Infantry, Austrian, 36, 37.

boots of the, 235, 236.

German, i, 2.

German compared with French,

4. 7-
German, in the provinces, 24.
how to form in attacking a village,

139-

importance of captains in, 81,
82, 83, 84, 87, 88.

importance of lieutenants in, 83,
84.

improvement of German, 5.

invincible against a frontal at-
tack, 133.

278

INDEX

Infantry, loss of ofificers in the, 164.

losses of German, 5, 6,

must not mask their own ar-
tillery, 207, 208.

necessity of discipline of, 10, 19,
69, 70, 106.

of the Guard, 14, 16.

order of, in attacking a village,

151, 152, 156, 157.
Prussian, in 1866, 47.

reason of success of German, 19,

20, 23, 44, 49, 95.
should ask their artillery the

range in passing, 153, 161,

209.
should not fire too soon, 156,

172, 174.
true soldier spirit of, 261, 262,

263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268,

269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275.
Infantry and artillery, real effect

compared of, 141, 142, 143.
against cavalry, 255, 256, 257,

258.
attack supported by artillery,

145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151,

152, 153-

attack unsupported by artillery,

166, 167, 168, 169.
colonel's duties, 183, 184, 185,

186, 187, 188, 191.
columns, cause of loss of, 50.
fire, difificulty of getting range of,

141, 142, 152, 153, 154.
fire, range of effective, 143, 144,

14s, 146.
fire tested against artillery fire at

same targets, 142, 143.
fire, why it varies in action, 143.
fire, zone of, 86.
officers, efficiency of, 264, 265,

267, 269.
regiments of three battalions,

advantage of, 194, 195.
Inspection, battalion problems given

at, 121, 122.
of battalions, iii.
" fever," 126.
working up for, 105, 106.
Intervals in line of march, necessity
of, 229, 230, 233.

Jagel, village, 218, 220.
Jericek, 153.

Knappstadts' brigade, 201.
Koniggratz, battle of, 71, 144, 153,

220, 254, 255.
Konigsberg, hill, 218.
Kraft, Prince, his Letters on Cavalry,
238, 239, 255.
his inspection of battalion exer-
cises, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122,
123, 125.
his method of marching to the

drill ground, 80.
his system of battalion inspection,
118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
125.
his war experience, 9.

Ladmirault, General, 171.

Langenhof, 254.

Langensalza, 64.

Le Blanc Mesnil, 135.

Le Bourget, storming of, 38, 52,

53, 134, 13s, 136, 137, 142, 163,

164, 167, 168, 193,
Le Mans, battle of, 6.
Level ground, attack over, 141,

145, 146, 151, 154, 15s, 156,

157, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166,

167, 168, 169, 174.
Lieutenants, duties of, 84, 85, 86,

87.
Lisaine, river, 52.
Longchamp, 59.
Long-range weapons, 53.

MacMahon, General, 2, 270.
Marching, rules for the road in,
230, 231.
drill, 43.
step, 27, 28.
Mass-attack at Givonne, French, 45,

46, 47.
Memel, river, 261.
Metz, 250, 262.
Montm^dy, 149, 208.
Murat, 263.

Napoleon I. , 4, 34.
III., I, 269.

INDEX

279

Nedelitz, 71, 75.
Nubel, 153.

Ober-Selk, 218.

Oeversee, 218, 2^3.

Offensive and defensive action, 273,

274. 275-
Oldenburg, Lieutenant, 254.

Open ground, advance over, 114,

129, 130, 131, 133, 13s, 136,

137, 139-
attack over, 141, 145, 146, 151,

154. 155- 156, 157. 159. 163,
164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,
174.
Open order, fighting in, 43, 44.

Pannwitz, Colonel von, 246.
Pape, General von, 134.
Parade movements, 203, 204.
Paris, siege of, 2, 23, 82, 247, 250,

266, 274.
Pfaffen forest, 249.
Pont-Iblon, 135.
Pont-a-Mousson, 241.
Powder, why its force varies, 142,

154-

Raven, General von, 264.
Recruits, field exercise of, 39, 40,
41.

firing drill, 41, 42.

German, 20, 21, 22.

individual training of, 26, 27,

29, 30. 38, 43-
Polish, 26.
Silesian, 27.
Regimental exercises, 198, 199.
Regiment, commanding officer's

place in a, 242.
Regiments in lines, fighting by, 215,
216, 217.
by wings, formation of, 215,
216.
Regulations, changes in, 53, 55.
how carried out, 97, 98, 99,

100.
points of doubt in, 56, 57, 58,

59. 67.
Repperts Berg, hill, 244.
Rhine, river, 261.

Rifles, handling, 73, 74.
Roncourt, 132.
Roon, Lieutenant von, 206.
Rothe-Berg, storming of the, i, 241,

246, 248, 249, 264,
Riichel, General von, 83.
Rushes, advance by, 158, 161, 162,

163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 253.

Sadowa, 257.
St. Cloud, 23.
St. Denis, 23.
St. Hubert, farm, 192.
St. Privat, storming of, 2, 5, 7, 72,
102, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134,
148, 171, 176, 177, 179, 190,
192, 201, 207, 208, 220, 241,
269.
cause of loss at, 51, 71.
losses of German infantry of the
Guards at, 134.
Ste. Marie, fight at, 51, 52, 131.
Satrup, 206.

Scherbening, Colonel, 176.
Scherf's theory of the command of

troops, 221.
Schleswig, fight at, 217.
Schreckenstein, General von, 245.
Sebastopol, 4.
Sedan, i, 2, 5, 44, 47, 133, 150,

159. 172, 208, 255, 256, 257.
Seine, river, 23.

Shells bursting in bore, cause of, 208.
Shelter-trenches in manoeuvres, 251,

252, 253.
Shouldering arms, disadvantage of,

64, 65, 67.
Skirmishers, orders to, 206, 207.

when to rush, 162, 163.
Skirmishing line, how to reinforce,

97. 98.
Solferino, 4.
Spicheren, battle, i, 177, 216, 244,

246, 248, 264.
Square, objection against forming,

258.
Stiring forest, 216, 249.
Stocken, the originator of military

gymnastics, 31.
Stresetitz, 254.
Suakim, 70, 258, 259.

28o

INDEX

Sunstroke, effect of, 232, 233, 234.

how to avoid, 233, 234.
Swarm volleys, 159, 160, 172.

Tief-Weiher, 249.

Traditions, abuse of, 10, 11.

Treene ravine, 220, 244.

Tresckow, General von, 138.

Tronville, 191, 194, 195.

Trotinka, river, 153.

"Turk" manoeuvre, 71 113, 114,

115-

Valmy, 176,

Versailles, 23.

Villejouan, 138. 155, 156, 164, 174,

175.

Vinoy, General, 2.

Vionville- Mars -la -Tour, 2, 6, 52,

191, 192, 194, 195, 234, 241,

257, 271.

Wagram, battle, 219.

War, enthusiasm in, 261, 262, 273.
how experience is gained in, 109,
regulations for exigencies of,

IIS-
the habit of, 7, 8.
Weissenburg, i.

Werder's army, small loss of, 52.
Wimpffen, General, 45.
Winkelried, Arnold von, 48.
Worth, battle, i, 177, 255.
" Woylach " alarm, 248.

^^

O

.<^

THE END

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