Skip to main content

Full text of "The life and compaigns of Hugh, first viscount Gough, field-marshal"

See other formats 


This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project 
to make the world's books discoverable online. 

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject 
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books 
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover. 

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the 
publisher to a library and finally to you. 

Usage guidelines 

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the 
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to 
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying. 

We also ask that you: 

+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for 
personal, non-commercial purposes. 

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine 
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the 
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help. 

+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find 
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it. 

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just 
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other 
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of 
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner 
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe. 

About Google Book Search 

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers 
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web 



at |http : //books . google . com/ 






n, >• 



f 



Mitb tbe autbor'0 CompUmentd. 




'^^'BRAB^^^ 






Q 

7f 




rO 



THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF 

HUGH FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH 

FIELD-MARSHAL 



^VM B18 HZmLP AffORDBD TRB BBIGmBT EZAMPLB 
OF THE mOHHEir QUAUTIBB OF THE BBITIBH 80LDIEB IH 
TRB IfTAinfBMT OF THE GL0BIOU8 BUCCEBBBS WHICH 
BATB ATTEMDKD THE BRITISH ABMT UHDEB HIS OOMHAHB.' 

Th$ IhA$ of WdlingUm. 




HUGH, FIRST VISCOUNT GOUCiH 



:.M Y\n>T Vi- 



«*s 



:KV 



V- ' «-,•• ■. 









THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF 

HUGH FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH 

FIELD-MAESHAL 

BY __,>■ 

ROBERT S/RAIT 

rsuxiw AMD nnoK or vxir ooixaeE, tatroaa 
WITH MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 



IN TWO VOLUMES 
VOL. I 



WESTMINSTER 

ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD 

WHITEHALL GARDENS 

1903 



ozpobd: hobacb babt 
PRnfTBB TO THB wmiBurt 






PREFACE 



More than thirty years have elapsed since the 
death of Field-Marshal Viscount Gough, and more 
than fifty since he commanded, for the last time, 
an army in the field. His services to his coimtry, 
rendered in the Peninsula, in China, and in India, 
give him a claim to remembrance among the 
distinguished soldiers who have added large tracts 
of coimtry to the dominions of the British Crown, 
and, but for one important consideration, a Life of 
Lord Qough would have been published long ere 
now. The delay has been due to the iBci that 
the years of Lord Gough's Indian conmiand were 
marked by a series of controversies with other 
eminent representatives of the British power in 
India, and more especially (as is almost invariable 
in the case of a Commander-in-Chief) with succes- 
sive Qovernors-G^eneraL Viscount Qough himself 
decided that it was inadvisable, in his own lifetime, 
to reveal the differences of opinion that existed 
between the military and the civil authorities, 
and he preferred to permit his whole military 
policy to be misunderstood by the press and the 
public rather than to defend himself by embarking 
upon an embittered personal controversy. This 
attitude was maintained by his family after his 



vi PREFACE 

death, and statements which are demonstrably 
unfair to Lord Gbugh have passed unquestioned, 
in numberless works relating to India, or to mili- 
tary history. After these many years, the time 
seemed to have arrived when the discussion might 
be reopened, without any indiscretion, and the 
present work is an attempt to present at once a 
record of Lord Qough's career, and a vindication 
of his military policy from the charges which are 
most frequently brought against it. 

The fact that these charges, originally unsub- 
stantiated and never proved, have been permitted 
to remain so long unchallenged, explains the dis- 
tinctly controversial character of this book. When, 
in the sununer of 1001, the present Viscount 
Qough placed at my disposal the whole of the 
voluminous correspondence of his Grandfather, my 
first intention was to prepare a simple statement 
of fact, without reference to definite accusations 
against Lord Gough's generalship made by parti- 
cular individuals. This scheme soon proved im- 
possible to carry out, partly because of the difficulty 
involved in establishing the truth of any contro- 
verted statement without reference to the contrary 
view expressed elsewhere, and partly because any 
unwillingness to meet, fi:'eely and fully, the charges 
of those who have subjected Lord Gough's repu- 
tation to the severest censure, might seem to 
amount to an acceptance of the adverse verdict 



"^ 



PREFACE vu 

upon his career. It became, therefore, necessary 
to refer to a number of works on Indian or 
military history, and it was equally necessary 
to deal frankly with the disagreements between 
Lord Qough, Lord Hardinge, and Lord Dalhousie, 
and to place the reader in a position to form a 
clear judgement on the subject. Contradictions 
on points of detail have, as a rule, been rele- 
gated to footnotes, and every effort has been 
made to avoid attaching undue importance to side 
issues; but it must be admitted that the book 
is, throughout the section dealing with India, 
a contribution to a military controversy. It is 
only right that I should add, in this connexion, 
that, while the Viscoimt Gough has afforded me 
every facility in the preparation of this work, 
neither he nor any other member of his family 
has in any way interfered with my freedom of 
action, or influenced the shape which the work has 
taken. The responsibility for every statement made 
and every view expressed in these pages rests solely 
with myself and if I have written a defence of 
the (General whose life I have attempted to tell, 
it is because my materials made sudi a defence the 
only possible form that a biography of Lord Gough 
could take. 

The nature of my subject, connected with so 
many different periods and countries, has led me 
to crave help in many quarters, and it is a pleasant 



\m PREFACE 

duty to acknowledge much indebtedness of various 
kinds. I have to thank the Viscount Gou^ and 
numerous members of the Gough family for 
entrusting to my care many valuable records, and 
for rendering me ever willing aid. I am especially 
indebted to MS. collections left by the late Colonel 
the Hon. G. H. Gough, who had devoted much atten- 
tion to the sul^ect. My debt to him relates more 
particularly to the period of the Peninsular War. 
By the comtesy of the representatives of the late 
Marquis of Dalhousie I have been permitted to quote 
from his correspondence, and I have received help 
fix)m Sir William Lee Warner, whose forthcoming 
biography of Lord Dalhousie will throw additional 
light upon many topics discussed here. Sir Henry 
Lawrence, Bt„ has been good enough to afford me 
access to the manuscripts of his distinguished 
grandfather, and Mrs. Kivington kindly lent me 
some letters of her late father. General Sir John 
Littler. I have had the privilege of consulting 
Hoveral distinguished soldiers who were themselves 
present at one or other of Lord Gough's battles, 
and, in this connexioix, I cannot omit the names 
of General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, KC.S.L, who 
Horvod in the First China War, (General Sir J. Luther 
Vaughan, E.C.B., who fought under General Littler 
at Maharajpore, General Sir James Fraser Tytler, 
K.C.B., who was A.D.C. to Lord Gk)u^ in the First 
Bikh War, and the late General Colin Cookworthy, 




PREFACE ix 

who was in Christie's Troop of Horse Artillery at 
Chillianwalla. Two obligations of this nature are so 
great that they cannot be incidentally mentioned. 
Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines, G.C.B., who 
was Lord Gough's military secretary, has been good 
enough to discuss with me, on many occasions, the 
two Sikh campaigns, and I owe much to his wonderful 
memory which scarcely required the corroboration 
afforded by the Diary which he kept throu^out the 
wars. I have fully availed myself of the generous 
kindness with which he placed his recollections at my 
service; he has saved me from many errors, and 
has explained the real importance of many inci- 
dents which have generally been misunderstood. 
No words of mine can render thanks for such a 
tribute of affection and respect for the memory of 
his Chief. I have been, throughout the preparation 
of the work, in constant communication with 
another sturivor of the Pimjab campaign. General 
Sir Charles Gk)ugh, G.C.B., V.C, the co-author of 
The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars^ a book which is indis- 
pensable for a thorough study of the subject. Sir 
Charles Gbugh's intimate acquaintance with the 
Indian history of the period has been of great value 
to me, and, like Sir Frederick Haines, he has been 
good enough to read the book in proof-sheet. Field- 
Marshal the Viscount Wolseley and Admiral Sir 
Cyprian Bridge, KC.B., Commander-in-Chief on the 
China Station, have honoured me with criticisms 



X PREFACE 

and suggestions on portions of the book: Lord 
Wolseley on the Sikh Wars and Sir Cyprian 
Bridge on the China War. Eren at the cost of 
swelling a list of acknowledgements already very 
large, I must gratefully thank a number of 
personal friends, including Professor York Powell, 
Professor Oman (who read the portion relating to 
the Peninsular War), Mr. H. A. L. Fisher of New 
College, Mr. R P. Dunn-Pattison of Magdalen Col* 
lege, and Mr. John S. C. Bridge of Lincoln's Inn, 
to all of whom I owe helpful criticism of proof- 
sheets. The classification and calendaring of the 
manuscripts on which the work is based, has been 
performed by two of my former pupils, Mr. R O. 
Pidcock and Mr. H. £. Bowman, and by Mr. R W. 
JefFery of Brasenose CoU^e, to the careful labours 
of all of whom is due the completion of the volume 
Mrithin two years. The other friends and colleagues 
whom I have consulted on various points will be 
good enough to believe that my gratitude is none 
the less sincere that it is unrecorded in a Frehce 
which is already so personal that I must plead, 
once more, the nature of my sulgect as my excuse 
for contracting so many obligations. 



BOBEBT S. RAIT. 



New CoLLiQE, Oxford. 
September^ 1903. 



CONTENTS 

VOLUME I 



PAOl 

INTEODUCTORY: Pabentagi AKD Early Life . 1 

BOOK I 

SPAIN : The War ik the Peninsula . . . S7 

1. Talavera and Barrosa 29 

2. Cadiz and Tarifa 62 

8. The Globe of the Caxpaion in Andalusia . 90 

4. YiTTORiA and Niyelle 105 

BOOK n 

IRELAND 127 

1. Public Life, 1814^40 129 

2. Home and Family 146 

BOOK m 

jCHINA 166 

^ 1. Canton 167 

2. Amoy 200 

8. Chusan, Chinhai, and Ninofo . 219 

4. The Chinese and the War .... 241 

6. The Yang-tsb-kiang 266 

6. The Treaty of Nanking .276 

BOOK IV 

INDIA : The Mahrattas and the Sikhs . 296 

Introductory 297 

1. The Gwalior Campaign .... 808 

2. The Army Poucy of Sir Hugh Gough • 842 
8. The Sikhs and the Indian GtovERNMSNT • 858 



xii CONTENTS 



VOLUME II 

BOOK rV {continuedi 

INDIA: The Mahrattas and the Sixhb page 

4. MOODKEE AND FeBOZESHAH .... 1 

5. SOBRAON AND THE END OF THE FiBST SiKH WaB 40 

6. The Results of the Sutlej Caxpaion . 79 

7. The Outbbeak at Multan .... Iftl 

8. The Oovebnment AND THE Cohmandeb-in-Chief 150 

9. The Abmy of the Punjab .... 167 

10. Bamnugoub and the Chenab . 181 

11. ChILLIAN WALLA 811 

12. Multan and the Ibbegulab Wabfabe . 245 

1& OUJERAT 256 

14. Afteb Gujebat 287 

BOOK V 

CLOSING YEAES 815 

1. Domestic Life 817 

2. The Mission to the Cbimea . 888 
8. Conclusion 848 

APPENDICES 

A. Febozbshah: 

Sib Habby Smith's Bepobx .... 865 

B. Chillianwalla : 

Genebal Gilbebt's Befobt .... 871 

Sib Coun Campbell's Befobt . 874 

Genebal Thagkwell's Befobt . 880 

C. LoBD Gough's Fabewell Obdebs to the Abmy 

OF THE Punjab 884 



INDEX 887 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

VOLUME I 

1. Hugh, FiBSfr Visoouht Gough . . Frontispiece 
(From a drawing by Dickinson^ 1851) 

5. Hugh Gough, abt. 26 ... • To face p. S4 

(From a miniature) 

8. Map of Spain akd Pobtugal ... „ 9,9 
(From Mr. Oman's Peninsular War, by arrange- 
ment with the Del^;ateB of the Clarendon Preas) 

4. Plan of thb Battle of Babbosa . . To face p. 64 

6. TOPOGBAPHT OF CaDIZ . • . . ,, 60 

6. Colonel Skebsbtt's Notx to Colonel 

GouGH ,9 81 

7. Topography OF Tabifa .... ,,88 

8. Field-Mabshal Sib Patbick Gbant . . „ 162 

9. Assault on Canton, Mat 26, 1841 . „ 198 

10. Captube of Tinghai .... „ 224 

11. Captube of Chinhai .... „ 280 

12. Chinese Cabigatubbb .... „ 242 

(Reproduced firom Voyages of the Nemesis) 

la Medal stbugk bt the Chinesb „ 247 

14. Captube OF Chapoo .... ,, 266 

16. Captube of Chinxeangfoo ... „ 274 

16. The Fobt of Gwaliob .... „ 814 

(From a pen and ink drawing, 1848) 

17. The State of Gwaliob .... „ 816 

18. Battle OF Mahabajpobe ... „ ^^ 

19. The Punjab and Subbounding Distbicts „ 869 



xiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



VOLUME II 

1. Hugh, Fibst Viscduiit Gouoh FrontUpieee 

(From a pftinting by Sir Francis Grant, P.R A.) 

8. Battle OF MooDKBB .... Tojaoep. 8 

8. Fibli>-MabshalSibFbederickHaineb,O.C.B. ,, 14 
(From a painting by the Hon. John Collier) 

4. Battub OF Febozbbhah .... yy 30 

6. Battle of Sobbaoh .... ,,68 
& Theatre of the Sutlej Campaioe . . „ 78 

7. The Multan Campaign . . * . „ 121 

8. The Cayajuby Skxriobh at BAmruoeuB . „ 188 

9. Battle OF Chilliaewalla ... „ 24S 
IOL Thbatbb of the Puhjab Caxpaioh . „ 270 
IL Battle of Gujebat .... „ 28S 
12. Fbakgeb, Fibst Viboouetbbb Gou<« „ 822 

Acknowledgements are due to General Sir Charles Qoo^ 
for permission to reproduce several maps firom his work, 
The Sikhs and (he Sikh Wars; and to Mr. R P. Dunn- 
Pattison, Lecturer of Magdalen (College, who was good 
eneugh to draw three of the Indian mapa 



INTRODUCTORY 

FABENTAOE ASD EARLY LIFE 



INTRODUCTORY 

PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 

Readers of Diana of the Crosstvays will remember 
that the opening scene of that great book is laid in 
Dublin. ^ In the Assembly Rooms of the capital city 
of the Sister Island there was a public ball, to cele- 
brate the return to Erin of a British hero of Irish 
blood, after his victorious Indian campaign ; a mighty 
struggle splendidly ended/ Mr, Meredith drew 
from the life his portrait of that * fine old warrior, 
tall, straight, grey-haired, martial in his aspect and 
decorations,' for he had seen him after his return 
from the East, old in years, but ^ with his imiform 
and his height and his grey head, like a glorious 
October day just before the brown leaves fedL' The 
^ Lord Larrian ' of Diana was intended to represent 
Hugh, first Viscount Gough, who had added the 
Punjab to the Queen's dominions in India. This 
last achievement was but the culminating point of 
a life spent in the service of the Empire, The old 
soldier who unbuckled his sword after his crowning 
victory of Gujerat, had put on his armour fifty-six 
years before, and during that long period he had 
faced his country's enemies in every quarter of the 
globe. His apprenticeship to the art of war was 
served in South Africa and the West Indies; he 
won his early reputation in Wellington's Peninsular 

I B 



2 INTRODUCTORY [1617 

ai'my; and he commanded in sixteen separate 
actions in China and in India. It is the story of 
this strenuous and devoted life that we propose 
here to telL 

About the middle of the reign of James I, three 
brothers^ Bobert, Francis, and Hugh Gbugh, made 
their way from England to Ireland. They were 
the sons of Hugh Gk)ugh, Hector of All Cannings, 
Wiltshire, and grandsons of John Gk)ugh of Strat- 
ford, in the same county. All three were graduates 
of the University of Oxford, and all alike were in 
holy orders. Their father was also a member of 
that University ; he appears as a clerk of Magdalen 
College in 1560, and he was Bector of Little Cheve- 
rell before being presented to All Cannings in 
1598. He married a lady of Devonshire birth, 
Jane Clifford of Clifford Hall, and, in due course, 
five of their sons were matriculated in the Univer^ 
siiy. The brothers, as was not unusual in those 
days, went up to Oxford in couples ; the two eldest, 
Eobert and William, entered Balliol College in 
1608, aged nineteen and seventeen respectively; 
ten years later, another pair, Francis, aged eighteen, 
and Edward, aged seventeen, became members of 
St Edmund Hall ; and finally, they were followed 
by Hugh, who matriculated from New College in 
1617. The family included at least two other 
children, for Hugh is described as the seventh son ; 
but of the others nothing is known. Of the two 
sons who remained in England, the elder, William, 
left the University without taking a d^ree, and 



1626] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 8 

became steward to the Earl of Warwick; the 
younger, Edward, became successively Eector of 
Great Cheverell, in Wiltshire, and of Over Moigne, 
in Dorset, besides holding, from 1629, the dignity 
of a canon of Salisbury. The founder of the femiily 
fortunes in Ireland was the eldest brother, Bobert 
Gbugh, who became, in 1615, precentor of Limerick 
Cathedral, and in 1628, Archdeacon of Ardfert 
Francis, the most distinguished of the five, left 
St Edmund Hall, before taking his B.A. degree, 
in order to become a clerk of New College, but he 
had returned to the Hall before proceeding to his 
Master's degree in 1618. In the same year, he 
followed his brother to Ireland, and was made 
Chancellor of Limerick Cathedral In 1626, he was 
appointed to the see of Limerick, which he held 
till 1684, when he died, leaving a family of eight 
children. The seventh son, Hugh, the bearer of 
the fEunily name, also found what Anthony k Wood 
describes as ^ a just opportunity of going into Ire- 
land/ and in 1626 he succeeded his brother as 
Chancellor of Limerick, in which cathedral he like- 
wise held a prebends This Wiltshire family of 
(Roughs, who sided with Chiut^h and King in the 
Civil Wars, must be distinguished from another 
branch which produced a distinguished Puritan 
divine and a Cromwellian o£Scer, who was one of 
the regicides. 

^ Oar information about these brothers is derived from 
Foster's Alumni Oxonienses, Clark's Register of the Univer- 
sity qfOa/ard, and Wood's Aihenae Oxonienses. 

B2 



4 INTRODUCTORY [1751- 

Theie is some dubiety ^ as to whether the funily 
of Gough of Woodsdown, ca limerick, to which 
the subject of this memoir belonged, take their 
descent firom Francis Gough, Bishop of Limerick, 
or firom his brother, Hugh; a persistent fiumly 
tradition, which can be traced back to the middle 
of the eighteenth century, asserts that George 
Gough of Woodsdown, who was bom in 1751, was 
seventh in descent fix>m the Bishop. The Goughs 
had, in the interval, remained fEuthful to Ireland, 
and had intermarried with fiunilies who, like them* 

^ The difficalt J arises from a qoestion regmrding the date 
of the death of Hugh Gough, the Bishop's younger brother, 
who, as we have said, succeeded him as Chancellor of Limeridc 
in 1626. A Hugh Gough, Chancellor of Limerick, made his 
will in 1682, and died in 1684. From this Hugh Gough the 
first Viscount was unquestionably descended, and, if he was 
the Chancellor of 1626, then the &mily traces its origin not 
to the Bishop but to his brother. But it seems probable that 
the testator of 1682 and the Chancellor of 1626 are in &ct 
difEerent persons, for, according to Cotton's Fasii, (1) in 1662 
Hugh Gough, Chancellor of Limerick, petitioned to be excused 
part of his duties on the ground of ' great age and infirmity,* 
and (2) in 1670 his office was vacated. It is not likely that 
iuch an office was vacated except by death, and the fact that 
the testator of 1682 leaves his wife sole executrix seems to 
suggest that he was a younger man than the Chancellor who 
was very old in 1662. The &unily tradition is that Hu^ 
Grougfa, the Bishop's brother, died in 1670 at the age of 
seventy -one (a very old age for those days)» and that the 
Hugh Gon^h who died in 1684 was his nephew and successor, 
a son of the Bishop. This tradition is supported by a state- 
ment made by the Ulster King of Arms in 1816 to the effect 
that neither of the Bishop's brothers^ Bobert and Hugh, I^ 




1798] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 6 

selves, were of English birthy but resident in 
Ireland — the Millers of Ballicasey, co. Clare, and 
the Wallers of Castle Waller, co. Tipperary. Ceorge 
Gough of Woodsdown (1751-1886) married, in 
January, 1775, Letitia Bunbury, the daughter of 
/ Thomas Bunbury of Lisnevagh and Moyle, ca 
^9byaa, and their descendants added new and greater 

Srlories to the fr^i/lifinin^l disttinAtiAn ixrhipli ihfk 



ERRATUM. 

Vol. I, p. 5, 1. 7. For 'Clare/ read 'Carlow.' 



taic Kiiimjr id ob xuaauwv .— 

Francis Oongh^ Bishop of Limerick. 

Hugh Oough, Rector of Bathkeale^ and Chancellor of 
Limerick Cathedral, d 1684. 

(George Gongh, Rector of Rathkeale. 

Hugh Gk>nghj of Eilfinning. 

Hugh Gt)tign, of Garrane. 

George Gongh, of Woodsdown. 

George Gongh, of Woodsdown, &ther of F.-M. Viscount 

Gongh. 
^ The Commission is dated August 80, 1768, and is signed 
by George III and Lord Shelbume. 



^ 



"^^ b» fT* » 






"J 






■I? 



i^ 



-SP.S2I- 

BI>flOQ 



















1798] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 7 

had been appointed, in 1756, Comet, and in 1762, 
Captain in a troop of Militia Dragoons). How long 
he remained under Ancrum is not clear ; he makes 
his next appearance on the stage of history at the 
outbreak of the troubles in Ireland in 1798. In 
April of that year he was made Deputy-Governor 
of the city of Limericks A paper of instruc- 
tions sent to him on his appointment to this office 
throws some light on the measures taken by the 
Government to suppress the growing discontent. 
The qualification was a property one; the duties 
consisted in assisting the Mayor in the Militia 
Ballot, and in aiding him ^to enforce the Act 
against such as are subject to it in respect of 
serving.' The document closes with this sentence : 
* Their [the Deputy-Governor's] office, in short, may 
be termed Militia Magistrates ; within their own 
jurisdiction therefore, they are as much favoured as 
any magistrate can be in the Execution of his Duty, 
for if any person should be inclined to Question 
their Acts, the defence is made as easy as possible 
to them ; it cannot be decided on by any other than 
a Limerick Jury, and treble costs are to be given 
against the pariy complaining.' 

A month later, the Deputy-Governor was made 
Captain in an infantry Begiment of Militia ; shortly 
afterwards, he was promoted to a majority, and, in 

^ The family had been continuously resident near Limerick ; 
e. g. the freedom of Limerick was conferred in 1726 on Hugh 
Gongh of Oarrane, the grand&ther of the George Gough of 
whom we are speaking. 



8 INTRODUCTORY [1798 

1797| he became Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
Limerick Regiment. He held this office at the date 
of the rebellion of 1798, and, in July of that year, 
commanded in a small action, of which a record in 
his own handwriting has been preserved A force 
of about 4,000 rebels had gathered in King's County 
and were laying waste the country in the neigh- 
bourhood of Edenderry. Colonel Gough, with 400 
of his own Limerick regiment, thirty dragoons, and 
thirty-five yeomen (cavalry), met them at Johns- 
town, and completely defeated them, capturing 
their leaders. His small force lost two men killed 
and nine wounded. His own horse was hit through 
the neck, and a shot went through both the cocks 
of his hat. His conduct received the enthusiastic 
approbation of one of his commanding officers, and 
it may be said that his success freed King's County 
from the insurgents. 

*This,' he says, *was the second time I saved 
Edenderry from being burned, as, but that day 
month before, I got an express sent over to PhiUips 
Town, where I was quartered and commanded the 
Garrison, that a large Rebel Army had taken posses- 
sion of Lord Harberton's House, and was Encamped 
on his Demesne. I imediately Ordered out my 
division of the Limerick, marched out, and before 
Daylight, Arrived at Lord Harbertons, shot and 
destroyed all their advanced Guard, drove them out 
of the House, and from their camp, killed 14 of 
them, and took all their Stores, which I next day 
carted into Edenderry, and shared to all my Uttle 
party, nineteen Stockings^ a piece. This victory 

^ The booty on the second occasion included two stands of 



1798] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 9 

[i e. the success at Johnstown in July] saved Eden- 
derry a second time being burned I march'd back 
next day, with the blessing of all the inhabitants^ 
who will as long [as] they live remember CoL 
Gough and his gallant Garryaon Boys' — a braver 
or more loyal, or a more divoted set of fellows to 
their Officers never carried Firelocka' 

Gonnaught had taken but little part in the rebel- 
lion itself, but it was the scene of the abortive 
French attempt, made after the suppression of the 
rebela In August, 1798, a French adventurer, by 
name Humbert, landed at EoUala, with about 
a thousand soldiers, trained and disciplined in the 
Bevolutionary wara It is to the lasting credit of 
these invaders that they showed to the Irish Pro- 
testants and Loyalists the most courteous considera- 
tion; and, weary and ill-fed as they were, they 
fought bravely against overwhelming numbers. 
They had expected to be received by a united Irish 
peasantry ; but they found no enthusiasm for their 
cause and were joined by very few recruits. At 
Gastlebar, on August 26^ Humbert easily defeated 
General Lake, whose army, composed of Irish 
militia, made no effort to stand against the charge 

colours and a telescope, which were retained by the Colonel, 
and ' 900 poonds in Cattle, Horses, New Linnen and Spirits,* 
which he shared with his officers and men; a piece of fine 
linen which fell to his lot ' I presented,* he says, * to a veiy 
beantiful Quaker Lady, at whose house I was that night 
BilUted/ 

^ It is an interesting coincidence that this song of Grarry 
Owen is associated with his son's Peninsular exploits. Cf. 
if^, pp. 84-86. 



10 INTRODUCTORY [1798 

of the Frendbu The near approach of ComwaUis, 
with the royal army, rendered Castlebar unsafe for 
the invader, and, on September 4, General Hum- 
bert commenced a swift march towards Sligo, with 
the double intention of awaiting reinforcements 
from France and of gaining Irish recruits in a new 
district. The garrison at Sligo consisted of militia 
troops under Colonel Vereker, whom Colonel Cough 
had succeeded in the command of the Limerick 
regiment, which fdrmed part of the SUgo garrison. 
Vereker seems to have been under the impression 
that only an advance guard of the French was 
approaching the town, and, putting himself at the 
head of 800 men of his old regiment, he marched 
out to meet them, on the morning of September 5. 
He had also with him thirty light dragoons and two 
curricle gima They met Humbert at Colooney, 
five miles from Sligo, and maintained a gallant 
resistance, although the French were many times 
their number. Finally, they were compelled to 
abandon their two guns ; but Humbert had found 
their resistance so formidable that, like Vereker, 
he decided that the enemy must be an advance 
guard, and he gave up his intention of marching 
on Sligo (which really lay at his mercy). From 
Colooney he made his way to Cloone to combine 
with the rebels at Granard, but he was unable to 
take all his artillery with hiTn, At Ballinamuck, 
he found himself surrounded by the armies of 
Lake and Comwallis, and, after some resistance, 
surrendered. 



1798] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 11 

The brevity of the six weeks' campaign in Con- 
naught was largely due to Vereker's defence of 
Sligo, for if the French had reached the mountains, 
the resistance would certainly have been prolonged. 
For his services, Vereker received the thanks of 
Parliament, and medals were conferred upon the 
troops engaged. The casualties of the Limerick 
regiment amoimted to thirty-five, and among the 
wounded was Colonel Gough, who had accompanied 
his gallant 800 at Colooney. The regiment was 
disbanded at the Peace of Amiens in 1801, and the 
historian of Limerick^ has preserved a record of 
the scene when the city welcomed back the warriors 
who had maintained its honour, and when, on the 
lawn in front of Woodsdown, Colonel Cough bade 
farewell to his comrades. 

The funily of Colonel George Gough consisted of 
four sons and two daughters. The eldest, George, 
followed his father's footsteps in the Limerick City 
Mihtia, in which he received a majority in 1797. 
It is probable, though there is no evidence on the 
point, that M^jor Gough served under his father in 
the actions we have just described. He afterwards 
joined the regular forces and served in Egypt and 
in the Peninsular War as a Captain in the 28th Foot. 
He died in 1841. Thomas Bunbury Gough, the 

^ The History of the County and City of Limerick, by the 
Bev. P. FitzGeiald and J. J. McGregor, 18^. Other 
authorities are Maxwell's History of the Rebellion of 1798, 
and Mr. Lecky's History of Ireland in the Eighteenth 
Century. 



12 INTRODUCTORY [1822 

second brother, entered the Church, and attained the 
dignity of Dean of Derry. The name of his son, 
Oeneral Sir John Bloomfield Cough, will meet us 
at a later stage of our narrative; another son, 
Thomas Bunbuiy, rose to the rank of Lieutenant- 
Colonel, and was killed in the attack on the Sedan 
in 1855 ; and the martial fame of the flEunily has, in 
modem times, been worthily maintained by several 
of the Dean's grandchildren, among whom the 
most conspicuous are Ceneral Sir Charles Gough 
and his brother, Ceneral Sir Hugh Cough, who 
received together the Victoria Cross for valoiu: dis- 
played in the Indian Mutiny; while still more 
recent campaigns in South Africa and in Somaliland 
have proved that a later generation is not n^lectfiil 
of its family traditiona The third son of Colonel 
Qeorge Cough of Woodsdown was Migor William 
Gough, of the 68th Regiment, who served in the 
Peninsula and in Canada, and who was drowned off 
Kinsale Head in 1822. Our hero, Hugh Cough, 
was the fourth son. Of the two daughters, the 
elder, Jane, married Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, who 
was killed at Bayonne in 1818, and the younger, 
Elizabeth, married Benjamin Frend, of Boskell, co. 
Limerick. Her son, afterwards Colonel Frend, 
was, hke his cousin Sir J. B. Cough, on the staff 
of his uncle during his Indian campaigns. Mrs. 
Frend was the favomite sister of the future Field- 
Marshal, and to the end of their long lives they 
entertained for each other the most affectionate 
regard. 



^ 



1779] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 18 

Hugh Gk)ugh was bom at Woodsdown, on Novem* 
ber 8, 1779. Of his childhood, there is nothing to 
tell, for nothing is known. Family tradition relates 
that his birth was a disappointment to his parents, 
who had abeady three sons, and who had hoped for 
a daughter ; and that the boy was, in consequence, 
somewhat neglected. He was himself accustomed, 
in later years, to say that his only education con* 
sisted of what he could pick up from listening to 
the tutor who was teaching his two elder brothers. 
The real influence of his childhood was, doubtless, 
the military atmosphere in which he was nurtured, 
and so powerful was its effect that, at the age of 
thirteen, he was already wearing the King's imi- 
form. His earUest appoiatment was in his father's 
militia corps, whence he passed, almost immediately, 
to the Hon. Eobert Ward's corps, in which he was 
gazetted Ensign on August 7, 1794. Two months 
later, he was promoted to a Lieutenancy in the 
119th Foot, a regiment raised imder Colonel Boch* 
ford. He was Adjutant of this regiment at the age 
of fifteen, and there is a tradition that he was 
reported upon as a specially capable officer. 

On June 8, 1795, he was gazetted, by transfer 
from the 119th Foot, to the 2nd Battalion of the 
78th Highlanders, or Eoss-shire Buffs (now known 
as the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders). 

Almost seventy years after he had joined the 
78th Highlanders, the Lieutenant of 1795, now 
a Field-Marshal, had occasion to write to his son- 
in-law, who had been appointed Colonel of the 



14 INTRODUCTORY [1794 

regiment: ^Let me warmly and fix)m the heart 
congratulate you/ he said, *on your obtaining the 
Colonelcy of my own old (and first corps of the Une) 
the Boss-shire BuSb. I made my d^but in them at 
the Cape when but a boy. . • • How these little 
incidents recall our memories to days long passed, 
days of youthful enjoyment, when the participators 
of them have passed away, and we are standing 
in hopeful anticipation of rejoining them never 
to partV 

These sentences, written at a time of deep 
domestic affliction, constitute the only reference to 
Lord Gough's connexion with the Seaforths, and it 
is, therefore, impossible to give any personal details 
of the boy's share in the actions which resulted in 
the capture of Cape Town. It may, however, be of 
some interest to narrate briefly the course of the war, 
and to indicate the part played by the regiment K 

The first conquest of Cape Colony by Great 
Britain was an incident in the Bevolutionary Wars. 
In 1794, the French, having defeated the Duke of 
York near Dunkirk, had Holland in their power, 
forced the Dutch to renounce their allegiance to the 
Prince of Orange and to become the allies of the 
French Bepublic, and, with the warm support of the 
democratic party in Holland, foxmded the Batavian 

1 F.-M. Lord Gougli to Sir Patrick Grant, November 17, 
186S. 

^ Otir knowledge of the circumstances is derived from a 
letter quoted in Colonel Hugh Davidson's excellent History of 
the 78th Highlanders. 



1795] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 15 

Republic. The Dutch fleet was now at the command 
of the French Republic, and if the Dutch colonies 
fell into their hands, the dangers to the British 
government would be greatly increased. Two Dutch 
possessions, in particular, o£fered a serious menace 
to Great Britain — the island of Ceylon, from its 
proximity to oiu: Indian possessions, and the Cape 
of Good Hope, which was on the road to India. 
Expeditions were, therefore, sent to take possession 
of these two colonies in the name of the Stadtholder, 
who had taken refuge in England. 

In the month of Jime, 1795, a British force, 
which included the 2nd Battalion of the 78th High- 
landers, arrived off the Cape, and anchored in 
Simon's Bay. The fleet was imder the command 
of Admiral Elphinstone, and General Craig was in 
charge of the military forcea Their first step was 
to ask for an interview, on board ship, with 
Conmiissioner Sluysken, the Dutch (Jovemor, and 
Colonel Gordon, a Scotsman \ who was in com- 
mand of the Dutch forces. This was declined, and 
the burghers immediately took up a position at 
Muizenburg, about six miles south of Capetown, 
which commanded the road from Simonstown. 
A deputation, which included Colonel Mackenzie of 
the 78th, then landed and proceeded to call upon 
Sluysken, showing him an order from the Prince of 
Orange, to receive the troops of his ally. King 
G^rge. Such a mandate was imconstitutional, and 

^ He was Datcli on his mother's side^ and his &ther had 
been in the Dutch service. 



1< DfTRODUCTORY [1795 

Sfc tiAiMi and his GouneQ miopk&d a policy of pro- 
cffaadnatioBL G^Mial Grmig, in person, explained 
dm the desire of tlie British was simply to protect 
the ColoDT, and that there would be no interference 
with their laws or with any department of their 
government ; but the Council answered that they 
could defend themselTes, and woidd accept of no 
such help. The British commanders therefore 
issued a proclamaticm to the people of the colony, 
setting forth the dangere of French tyranny and the 
benefits of His Migestys protection >. This pro- 
clamation was regarded as an imfriendly act by the 
Dutch Council, who forbade the supply of provisions 
to the fleet and reinforced the garrison at Muizen- 
burg. Gordon was an adherent of the Orange 
party and was disposed to be friendly if he was 
satisfitMl that the British intended only to hold the 
Colony for the Stadtholder ; but the people were, on 
the whole, inclined to democratic views, and they 
welconiod the prospect of hostilities. When it 
became known in the Colony that the French had 
it>8(HH:)ted tlie separate existence of Holland, and 
that tlio States-Oeneral had freed the colonists from 
thoir allegiance to the Stadtholder, this feeling 
iiicrcasod in intensity. 

On July 14, the 78th Begiment (450 strong), 
accompanied by 850 marines, landed and took 
possession of Simonstown, and they were soon 

^^itrengthened by the addition of 800 seamen. 

^ ^ For a full account of this subject cf. Theal*s History of 



1795] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 17 

(General Craig had thus a force of 1,600 men, but he 
was absolutely devoid of field-guns. The Dutch 
had less than a thousand men and eleven pieces of 
artillery, and they occupied a strong position. The 
British leaders found, in their ships of war, a com* 
pensation for their lack of field-guns. On the 
morning of August 7, the vessels in the Bay opened 
a heavy fire upon the Dutch. The effect was so 
great that they were driven from their position, 
but, as the cannonade prevented the near approach 
of the British infantry, the enemy succeeded in 
saving some of their guns. Their two cannon they 
spiked and abandoned. The Dutch infantry and 
artillerymen made a stand on a rocky height, out of 
range of the fire of the ships, and from this they 
were driven by a charge of the 78th, in which one 
of their officers (Captain Hercules Scott) and six 
or seven rank and file were wounded. This was 
Gk)ugh's first experience of hand-to-hand fighting, 
and possibly the first occasion on which he was 
under fire. Next morning, there was a further 
skirmish in which the two Dutch cannon, which 
had been made fit for use by Craig's orders, were 
employed against their former owners. 

The British now repeated their offers, which were 
again declined, and they could take no further steps 
till the arrival of reinforcements. An insignificant 
action took place on September 1, when the Grena- 
diers of the 78th silenced an attacking party of the 
enemy ; but there was no decisive step for another 
fortnight By the middle of the month, the British 



18 INTRODUCTORY [1795 

forces had been increased to between four and five 
thousand men. The Dutch were de£Bnding Wyn- 
beig, on the way to Capetown, and the British 
attacked on September 14. The enemy were badly 
led and hopelessly outnumbered, and they made 
little resistance. Next day, Capetown surrendered, 
and the Colony passed into the hands of the British ; 
to be restored at the Peace of Amiens in 1802, 
recaptured foiu: years later, and finally to pass 
under the British crown by the Treaty of Paris. 

This was Cough's sole action with the 78th High•^ 
landers. An Irish, not a Scottish, regiment, was 
his fitting place, and, in December, 1795, he 
obtained a transfer to the raiment which is most 
generally associated with his name — the 87th Foot 
or the Prince of Wales's Irish Begiment. It con- 
sisted of one battalion, and had been raised two 
years previously, largely through the efforts of its 
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel (afterwards General 
Sir John) Doyle. It had first seen service in the 
Duke of York's campaign in the Netherlands, in 
1784, and had won a slight distinction in that 
unlucky enterprise, by repulsing a cavalry attack at 
Alost. Its next two appearances were not so sue? 
cessfiiL In 1795 it was stationed at Bergen-op- 
Zoom, where the desertion of our Dutch allies to 
the French left it alone in an enem/s country. It 
was forced to capitulate, and almost the whole regi- 
ment became prisoners of war. Its commander did 
not share its fate, as he was in England, recovering 
from a wound received at Alost By his active 



1796] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 19 

interest the empty ranks of the regiment were agam 
filled, and in 1796 it was ordered on an expedition 
to the North Sea, to aid the troops in the fleet 
under Lord Duncan ; but stress of weather pre* 
vented the scheme from being carried into efGact 
Its d^tination was now altered, in consequence of 
an event which startled diplomatic Europe in the 
summer of 1796. On August 19, Spain, which had 
long been weary of the struggle with France, and 
had made peace in the previous year, entered into 
an offensive alliance with the Sepublic against 
Ofeat Britain— an unnatural union which was ere 
long to meet with fitting pimishment. The real 
importance of Spain, like that of Holland, lay in its 
naval power, and, to some extent, in its foreign 
possessions. It was therefore necessary to attack 
the Spanish, as it had proved necessary to attack 
the Dutch, colonies, and, in October, 1796, the 87th 
Raiment sailed for the West Indies. 

At what stage Gk)ugh joined his new regiment is 
not dear. A statement of his services, in his own 
handwriting, dated 1881, mentions that he was 
present at the capture of the Dutch fleet in Sal* 
danha Bay. This squadron arrived at the Cape in 
August; 1796, and General Craig, with a force 
which included the 78th, made a forced march to 
Saldanha Bay to oppose the landing of any Dutch 
troops: a march in which considerable suffering 
was caused by lack of water. There was no fighting, 
for the Dutch fleet was outnumbered by that imder 
Elphinstone, and surrendered without makiqg any 

C2 



20 INTRODUCTORY [17»7 

resistaiiee. It will be remembeied that the inci- 
dent was the occasion of an important lawsuit to 
decide whether the Army could daim a share in 
the spoil, along with the Kavy. It is not absolutel j 
certain that Gk>ugh accompanied the 78th in their 
march, as he had been gazetted to the 87th nearij 
a year before ; the only clearly ascertained fact is 
that he witnessed the surrender. Shortly after- 
wards he proceeded to join the 87th. 

The first engagement in which Gough served 
with his new raiment was the attempt on Porto 
Rico, in the spring of 1797 — not an auspicious com- 
mencement of a connexion which was destined to 
bring honour both to the 87th and to himselt In 
the b^inning of April the fleet sailed from Mar- 
tinique, and, on the 18th day of that month, a 
landing was effected on the island of Porto Rico. 
The troops were under the command of Sir Ralph 
Abercromby, whose intention was to attack the 
capital — San Juan — a fortified town defended by 
some thousands of Spaniards and a body of French 
troops. It was necessary to force a passage over 
a lagoon which was strongly held by the Spaniards, 
and the General soon found that the men under his 
command formed a force quite inadequate for the 
purpose. After some days, he determined to aban- 
don the attempt, and ordered the troops to re- 
embark. He had lost 280 out of his 8,000 men, and 
was satisfied with the conduct of his army, which he 
described as ^patient under labour, regular and 
orderly in their conduct and spirited when an 



1808] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 21 

opportunity to show it occurred ^* Abercromby 
himself was in bad health and returned to England, 
and his departure was followed by a complete cessar 
tion of hostilities in the West Indiea During this 
period, the 87th was in garrison at St. Lucia, where 
it remained till the autumn of 1799. In August of 
that year, an expedition, commanded by General 
Trigge and Admiral Lord Henry Seymour, was sent 
against Dutch Guiana. The force, which included 
the 87th Foot, proceeded to Surinam, but the Dutch 
made only a slight resistance, and soon surrendered 
the town of Paramaribo. From this date, we are 
without any definite knowledge of Gougb's move- 
menta His regiment remained in the West Indies 
till the summer of 1804, but the statement of his 
services, to which we have already referred, shows 
that he did not accompany it. He speaks of his 
service in the West Indies as extending over three 
and a half years, from which we gather that he 
returned home in 1800 ; but there is no trace of his 
doings till June, 1808, when he was promoted to 
a captaincy. His health suffered considerably from 
the climate of the West Indies, and he doubtless 
required some time to recruit. His brother Geoige 
was engaged in the Egyptian campaign of 1801, and 
earned a tribute from Sir John Moore for his ser^ 
vices at the battle of Alexandria ; but we have no 

^ Quoted in the history of the 87th Regiment (Cannon's 
Historical Record of the British Army), 1868. To this book 
I am indebted for an aooonnt of the embodiment and early 
services of the 87th, 



22 INTRODUCTORY [1805 

evidence of (Rough's own presence in any field of 
action between Surinam and the outbreak of the 
war in the Peninsula. 

The peace which was secured by the Treaty of 
Amiens, in March, 1802, came to an end in May of 
the following year. The declaration of war was 
followed by the assembling of Napoleon's army 
for the invasion of England, and the threat was 
answered by the volunteer movement. In addition 
to nearly 200,000 regulars and militia, a force of 
847,000 volunteers was raised in the summer of 
1808. Such a force as this required a large amount 
of training, and we find Captain Gough employed 
on this task, while his regiment was still in garrison 
abroad. In June, 1808, he became Superintending 
Officer of the Army of Defence for the counties of 
Oxford and Buckingham, and he discharged the 
same duties in connexion with the Army Reserve. 
In a letter written many years afterwards^, he 
speaks of having gone to the West Indies in the 
course of this period, and it is possible that he went 
out in 1804 and returned with his regiment, which 
landed at Southampton in September of that year. 
A month later, he accompanied it to Guernsey, and 
was appointed Brigade-Major to the troops serving 
in that island, a post which he held till his succes- 
sion to a migority. This rank he obtained in 
August, 1805, owing to the ^ almost brotherly kind- 
ness ' of a comrade. Major Blakeney, ^ who sold out 

* Lord Gough to Mr. E. Blakeney, October 87, 1869. 



1806] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 28 

earlier than he otherwise would have done, in order 
that I might get his migority K* 

A second battalion of the 87th had been formed 
in the preceding year, as a part of the reinforce- 
ment of the army necessitated by the Napoleonic 
wars. An Act of Parliament, dated July, 1804, 
sanctioned the addition of a 2nd battalion to be 
raised in the comities of Tipperary, Galway, and 
Clare, and to consist of 600 rank and file, a nmnber 
which was successively increased to 800 and 1,000, 
in 1805 and in 1807 respectively. The battalion 
assembled at Frome, Somerset, in the end of 1804, 
and in March, 1805, it sailed from Bristol for Ire- 
land. Gk>ugh joined this 2nd Battalion at some 
period in the year 1805 ; he says, in the statement 
from which this account is drawn, that he remained 
at Guernsey till his appointment to his majority in 
August, and that, thereafter, he served in England, 
Ireland, and Guernsey. We are probably right in 
inferring that, when the 1st Battalion proceeded to 
Portsmouth in November, 1805, M^jor Gough did 
not accompany them, but was attached to the 2nd 
Battalion which was being trained and recruited in 
Ireland. It returned to England in October, 1806 
(when the 1st battalion had sailed for South 
America) and was stationed at Plymouth. Hence- 
forward it is with the 2nd Battalion that the name 
of Gough is connected. 

At Plymouth, Major Gough was fortunate enough 

- ^ Lord Gbugh to Mr. E. Blakenej, October 27, 1859. 



24 INTRODUCTORY [1807 

to meet the lady who was to prove a noble and 
devoted wife through the joys and sorrows of more 
than fifty years. Of their first meeting there is 
a well authenticated story which may bear repeti- 
tion here. The lady, Miss Frances Maria Stephens, 
whose father, Qeneral Edward Stephens, RA^ was 
in garrison at Plymouth, was looking forward to 
a military ball. Before it took place, she told her 
father that she had seen, in a dream, ihe man 
whose wife she was to become, and that he wore 
the green facings of the uniform of the 87th. On 
the night of the ball, she was standing beside her 
father when Migor Gough entered the room, in 
company with two other officers of the 87th. 
< That,' she said, indicating Gough, ^ is ihe man 
I saw in my dream.' They danoed together twice, 
and the meeting proved the b^inning of an 
acquaintance which quickly ripened into court- 
ship. In April, 1807| the r^;iment left Plymouth 
for Guernsey, but, in July, Mtjor Gough returned 
to claim his bride. Their eldest daughter, Letitia, 
was bom in August of the following year, foiur 
months before Major Gough sailed for the Peninsula. 
Meanwhile, the newly-raised battalion had been 
undergoing a course of training under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Doyle and M^jor Gough. It was carefully 
inspected in the month of June, I8O79 ^^^ reported 
fit for active service, to which Napoleon's inter- 
ference in the affairs of Spain promised soon to call 
it In June, 1808, the 87th left Guernsey, and, 
after a period of training at Danbury Camp, em- 



^ 




HUGH GOUGH, AET. 25 



^ 



1808] PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE 25 

barked at Bamsgate. The Colonel-in-Chief at this 
time was Qeneral Sir John Doyle, whose nephew, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Doyle, had been actually 
in command of the battalion, but was now employed 
as a Military Commissioner in Spain. The com* 
mand of the regiment, therefore, devolved upon 
Migor Gough, whose fortunes in the Peninsula we 
proceed to follow. This can be done in consider* 
ably greater detail than has been possible up to the 
present point, both because the sources of informa- 
tion become more abundant, and because the perw 
sonal share of Id^or Gk>ugh in the deeds of his 
regiment now begins to be important. 



■\ 



BOOK I 

SPAIN: THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA 

1. Talavera and Babbosa 

2. Cadiz and Tabifa 

8. The Close of the Campaign in 
Andalusia 

4. VrrTORLA. and Nivelle 



TALAVERA AND BARROSA 

The 'Continental System' by which Napoleon 
attempted to crush the commercial power of Great 
Britain was directly responsible for his first inter- 
feienoe in the affidrs of the Peninsula, for it was 
the hesitation of the Prince Regent to carry out 
the Berlin Decrees that brought about the famous 
decision that 'The House of Braganza has ceased to 
reign,' and the consequent occupation of Lisbon by 
the French under Junot Within a year the 
Spanish House of Bourbon had also been deposed, 
and the (Government of Qeorge HI found that they 
were now in a position to resist Napoleon's schemes 
in Portugal, and in Europe generally, with the 
oo-operation of their old enemies, the Spanish 
nation. With the initial campaign of 1808 we are 
not in any way concerned. It resulted in the 
evacuation of Portugal by Junot and in the super- 
session of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur 
WeUesley, in view of the popular indignation caused 
by the Convention of Cintra. While WeUesley was 
in England, defending his conduct, and Napoleon 
was leading the ^ Grande Arm^ ' to Madrid to re- 
establish his amiable but incompetent brother, 
Joseph, on the Spanish throne. Sir John Moore was 
in command of the British Army in Portugal. He 



80 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1809 

had succeeded in making good his retreat into 
Galicia, and in enticing Napoleon to follow him, 
when the revolt of Austria recalled the Emperor 
from the Peninsula, leaving Marshal Soult to 
prevent, if he could, the escape of the British 
forces by sea from Corunna. The victory of 
Corunna seciured Moore's main object — the loss 
of some months to the French in their conquest of 
Spain ; he had wasted their time in a fruitless 
pursuit, and his own army embarked in safety. 
The death of Moore left Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
whose reputation had emerged unsullied from the 
investigation, the only possible British commander. 
The ministry of the Duke of Portland numbered 
among its members Canning as Foreign Secretary, 
and Castlereagh as Secretary of State for War. 
Divergent as were the characters and ultimately 
the aims of these two statesmen, they were united 
in a common attachment to Wellesley, and in a 
common belief in his powers, and it should be 
recorded to the credit of Castlereagh that, through 
good and evil report, he continued to give a loyal 
support to his generaL 

The battle of Corunna was fought on the 16th of 
January, 1809 ; and about two months later Wellesley 
arrived in Lisbon and advanced against Soult in 
the district of the Douro. Among the 80,000 troops 
which were soon at Wellesle/s disposal for the 
summer campaign was the 2nd Battalion of the 
87th, under the command of Migor Gbugh, acting 
for Lieut-Colonel Charles Doyle, whose services 



1809] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 81 

were required elsewhere. A few months before 
embarking, when he took sole command of the 
battalion at Danbury, he had been compelled to 
employ strong measures to improve its discipline. 
This task had been largely accomplished when the 
battalion sailed in December, 1808, forming part of 
the force which Sherbrooke unsuccessfully attempted 
to land at Cadiz in February, and, owing to the oppo- 
sition of the Spaniards, had to take back to Lisbon, 
where it was disembarked in March. The battalion 
was attached to Tilson's Brigade and it took part in 
Wellesle/s first operations, which, by the passage 
of the Douro and the capture of Oporto (May 12, 
1809), resulted in the expulsion of Soult from 
Portugal For this period of the campaign none of 
Gk>ugh's letters to his wife have been preserved, but 
there is an extant letter addressed to his father 
fix>m Guarda on the 28rd of June, 1809. It gives an 
account of the tiresome and diflBcult march in which 
the battalion was engaged. Unfortimately, it is in 
a very bad state of preservation, and there are 
considerable gaps which can only be filled by 
conjecture : — 

BiBEEOp's Palace, Guabda : June 28r(2, 1809. 

Mt Deab Fatheb, — As I am persuaded you feel 
much interested in the Movements of the 87th 
Bt, I shall detail them to you, as far as my Becol- 
lection will cany me, from our leaving Quimbra. 
In my letter of the 4th May from that town, I believe 
I mentioned to you, that the 5th Bat. of the 60th, 
the 87th, and 88th Eegts., under Migor General 
Tilson, and a Squadron of the 14th and some 



82 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1809 

German Li Dragoons^ under Colonel Talbot, were 
destined to Act with the Portuguese Army, the 
whole under GenL BeresfonL To our Brigade was 
attached a Begt of PortugueeeGrenadiers, and a Begt. 
of Native Cavalry was placed under Colonel Talbot 
The Intention was to have forced the passage of 
the Douro at Lam^, and Attack a French Division 
of 4,000 men that had occupied the strong position 
of Amaranthe under Genls. Labord and L'Ouisson 
[Loison], while the Army, under Sir Arthur, Invaded 
the town of Oporto. We marched on the 6th from 
Quimbra, and crossed the Douro without the [slightest 
trouble] on the 12th, altho' the Enemy occupied 
the liills, which completely commanded the passage. 
The Brigade halted that night at Rigoa [Pero de 
Ragoa]. (The Depot for all the Wine made on the 
North side of the Douro — ^the best in Portugal, and 
whore it is shipped for Oporto, 10 Leagues distant.) 
The next Morning at daylight we marched for 
Amaranthe. Within a League of this once beautiful 
town, wo found the Cavalry and some Portugueeze 
liogts. had halted for u& As it was Eeport^ tiie 
Kuomy wore determined to maintain the position, 
tho H7ih wore honored in being ordered to lead the 
Attack on the town and Bridgd. As we advanced, 
wo had to pass through various villages, which were 
invariably found smoking in their ruins. This so 
onraKod tho Men that it was with di£Sculty tibey 
iMiiild be kept back. I never witnessed so much 
fCnthiiMiasm as was shewn by the Men. The ad- 
vafuso, thoroforo, was a perfect trot. But the British 
Wiiri) doHtinod to be disappointed, as on our arrival 
wo found tho Enemy had fled, and this once Beauti- 
ful Uiwn one undistinguished Ruin. I never was 
a witiuiNM to Nuch a scene of Misery and horror as 
\ti$n» immstiiiHl itMolf. Every house and public 
Idjiidinff of ovory description with the Exception 
//f M Jdinamiory^ tliat covered the passage of the 



1809] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 88 

Bridge, a Chapel and about 5 detached houses, 
were burnt to the ground, with hundreds of its 
late Inhabitants lying dead in the Streets. The 
reason of the hasty Betreat of the French that 
Morning was the Battle of Oporto — if Battle it 
could be called, which took place the preceding 
day. Otherwise, they might have made a very 
desperate stand, as the position was wonderfully 
strong. We left this scene of Misery on the 15th, 
having the Evening before reed. Orders to proceed to 
Chaves by forced Marches. Within a League of the 
town we had to ford the Tarmagar [Tamega]. a small 
Biver in dry Weather. It was the turn of the 87th, 
unfortunately, to be the Bear Begt. of the Golimm 
this day. l^e 60th crossed with the loss of one 
Man. The 88th took so long a time to ford it, that 
when the 87th Grenadiers came to cross, the Biver 
presented a most formidable Appearance. In short, 
the Biver rose so fast, from the dreadful rain of the 
preceding evening, and that Morning, that the Men 
were above their middles in a flooded Mountain 
Biver, in which the current was wonderfully rapid. 
One officer and 14 Privates were carried down by 
the Stream, but were providentially saved by the 
Exertions of the Mounted Officers. Two Companies 
were unable to pass. Here the misfortunes of the 
Brigade commenced. The whole of the Men's Bread, 
which was made of Indian Com, got wet and was 
destroyed. Several thousand Boimds of Ammunition 
were rendred unserviceable, without a possibility of 
replacing it. A Number of Firelocks, Caps and 
Shoes were lost. The Business of crossing the Biver 
took the Brigade 4 hours. The Evening set in with 
a most dreadful fall of Bain, which continued all 
Night and the [next three] days and nights . . . [On 
the first day we] had three leagues, upwards of four- 
teen Miles, to March, altho' we left Amaranthe at 4 
in the Morning. Our Bead lay over almost impas- 
I J> 



84 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1809 

sible Mountams, made more so by the dreadful Bain 
that swelled the Mountain Rivulets into Rivers. 
The Night turned out as Dark as it was possible. 
The Men were obliged to move in Indian files, and 
actually grope their way — no torches being pro- 
vided, and the Bain preventing lighted Straw from 
being of Service. As there was no Boad, many 
Men lost the Column, several fell into pits, ex- 
cavated by the falling of the Waters, Numbers 
lay down in the Biver from fatigue and himger, 
and the greater part of the Brigade lost their 
shoes. At length, after groaping in the dark, totally 
im[con]scious whether we were right or wrong, 
from 8 until 9 o'clock, the Brigade arrived at a 
stragling Village. Some got shelter, others did 
not I was fortunate in meeting an Inhabitant with 
a light, and getting shelter for all of the Begt 
that were able to come up. At 5 Next Morning 
we pursued our March, but without provisions, as 
we only reed, two days' Bread, and one day's Meat, 
the Evening before we left Amaranthe, and the 
Bread was either destroyed in the Biver, or by the 
rain. This day proved as wet as the two preced- 
ing. At 10 o'clock at Night we reached a wretched 
little Village on the Mountains [quite] incapable of 
housing a Company. We pursued our Melancholy 
March at 5 o'clock next Morning, the Men nearly 
fainting with hunger. We, however, most for- 
timately at 12 that day fell in with some cars of 
Bread belonging to a Portuguese Division. GenL 
Tilson immediately pressed it for the Men, which, 
with some Wine, Enabled us to proceed, and we 
that night at 12 o'clock got to Chaves, the most 
Northern firontier town in Portugal, after a forced 
March of three days — ^with only twelve hours' halt — 
over ahnost impassable Moimtains, the men without 
a Shoe to their feet, and some himdreds of the 
Brigade fallen out from fatigue and hunger. The 



1809] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 85 

OfiSoeiB Commanding B^ts. were ordered to As- 
semble Next Morning at 10 o'clock at QenL Bere&* 
ford's, when we were told that the Enemy had fled 
from Oporto, and then were within some Leagues 
of us, tiiat it would be necessary for the Brigade 
to March at 1 o'clock. We, however, did not march 
until three — ^and Even then the Men's Meat was 
uncooked from the lateness of the issue, and not 
a single pair of Shoes could be got in town. We 
slept on the Spanish Mountains that night. The 
next day, when within two miles of the Village of 
Oinco in Spain, the advance came up with a party 
of the Enemy. We were again ordered to lead the 
Attack, and altho' the Men were but the minute 
before apparently incapable of marching a league, 
this news had the power of reanimating them, and 
we past through the Portuguese as if ti^e Men had 
not gone a Mile. The British were here again 
destined to be disappointed, as the En[emy con* 
sisted] mostly of cavalry and fresh. They retreated 
much faster than we could advance. Their exact 
amount could not be ascertained, but Talbot, who 
was within a few hundred yards of them, took them 
to be about 400. They joined Soult a league and 
a half to our left, and the whole proceeded in their 
Betreat, Amounting to 9,000, out of 22,000 he 
brought into Portugal but a short time before. 
Here the pursuit was given up as fruitless, we 
having taken 45 poor wretches. The Brigade was 
nearly anihilated [by the fatigues] on the Bead — 
and I was by far the most fortimate B^t. I had 
[still . . . men. The 88th], out of 700 they joined us 
with, did not bring 150 into . . . part of the OfKcers 
and almost all the Men I brought up, had not a 
[shoe to] their feet, which were actually cut to the 
bone. We halted a day and returned by Chaves to 
Lumago, and from thence hera All our sick, with 
very few exceptions, we picked up on the Boad. 

D2 



86 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1809 

But we have since suffered much from sickness. 
Nine Officers and 47 Men have been Attacked by 
some fever in Lumago, and while in this town 
several have died from the fatigue. I have been 
unfortunate, as I was attacked by a most violent 
fever on my Arrival here, which, with two slight 
Belapses, [kept me idle for a] Month. [Out of this] 
• • • time I kept my bed for a fortnight. I am, how- 
ever, so wonderfiilly recovered that I set off in two 
days to join the Begt. at Castile Branco, 14 leagues 
distant, to which they Marched on the 12th, leaving 
me in bed. I have now, my Dr. Father, given you 
a long, and I apprehend you will consider, a very 
tedious detail of the operations of the British Brigada 
But as there has been some misunderstanding be- 
tween our Qeul. Tilson and the senior Officer, 
Beresford, who, unfortunately, had to report on the 
Conduct of the Brigade, altho* he never saw them — 
which Beport I apprehend from QenL Tilson re- 
signing and going home to England, has not been 
favourable, and may come to a public investigation, 
which I ardently hope may be the case for Tilson's 
sake — I am anxious to put you in possession of all 
our movements. I had flattered myself the Name 
of the 87th Begt. would have appeared in the 
Papers. But the occurrences of the few last weeks 
have fully proved to me that War is but a Lottery, 
and those who least deserve may be those who get 
most Credit. I have not had a line since the 
»thApL 

BeUeve me. My Dr. Father, 

Ever Yours Affectionately, 

H. GOUGH. 

P.S. I imderstand General Tilson's parting 
Orders to the Brigade are very flattering. I shall 
send a Copy to Frances when I get to Castle 
Branco. 



1809] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 87 

In June, the army was formed into Divisions, 
and the battalion was given a place in the 2nd 
Brigade of the Third Division, under Donkin, who 
was appointed to succeed Tilson, now in command 
of a Brigade of Hill's Division. Under Donkin's 
leadership, the 87th accompanied Wellesley's ad- 
vance into Spain, and took a distinguished part in 
the campaign of Talavera. The British army foimd 
their task more difficult on Spanish than on Fortu* 
guese soil, and Wellesley had to secure the co-opera- 
tion of the Spanish general Cuesta, so it was not till 
the end of July that he found himself face to face 
with Marshal Victor near Talavera. 

Into the details of the battle it would be wandering 
too far from our subject to enter, nor is there any 
need to repeat the oftrtold tale. The battle of Talar 
vera was fought on the 28th of July. On the 
preceding evening, an attack was made on the 
Casa de Salinas, a hill on the left of the British 
position. It was, in Napier^s opinion, the key 
to the position, and it was held by Donkin's 
Brigade. The sudden assault of Buffin and Villatte 
took the British by surprise, and the French gained 
for a time the summit of the hilL In the severe 
fighting which followed, Donkin's Brigade were, 
with the help of reinforcements, ultimately able to 
niAittfAin their ground, but not without considerable 
loss. In the action of the following day, Gk>ugh 
was severely woimded by a cannon shot on his right 
side, accompanied with fracture of one of the lower 
rib& Twenty-seven other officers of the battalion 



» WAS IN THE PENINSULA [1810 



n 



abo woanded, and 90 great woe the Iobbs in 
lank and filev tiiat it was sent into garriaoa when 
WeOodqr retreated into PortngaL 'Bedneed w the 
BattalicHi now ie^' wrote Dcnkin to Googh on the 15th 
ai Septonber, ^diie^ bj its loases on that occasion 
[TalaTera^ it m eridently no longer a Corps eflfectire 
for Held opoationa^ and on th» oocasion joa are 
going into Ganiaon. The canse^ therefore, of yoor 
retiring from the Field canieB with it its oonsola- 
tKxu and I tnast that the re-inforeements 70a seem 
to ejcpeec from England will enable joq soon to 
join 118 again.' Donkin to<^ the <^^rtunity of 
conforring the highest praise upon Gongh and his 
me& and two months later, when leaTing for 
FugUm?^ be added to his words of forewell — Permit 
m^ on this occasion* too^ to repeat the assurance of 
thK» high ;3ense I entertain of joor personal exertions 
and Gallantry at TalaTeara. until the moment when 
I was depriTed of jour assistance bj your being 
wounded and taken off the field." The battalion 
was 9ent to Lisbon, wiiere it remained in garrison 
while the Commander^n-Chief (now Viscount Wei* 
liugton of Talavera) was preparing the lines of 
Torres Vedras for the ensuing campaign against 
Massoxia. Gough was with his regiment as late as 
November 26, when he wrote to his wife from 
Lidbon ; but his woimd was giving him considerable 
trouble, and he was allowed a short visit to England, 
in which to recruit The date of this visit is im- 
certain. There is a pause in the correspondence 
November to June, and during part of this 



1810] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 89 

time he must have been at home. In February, 
his regiment was transferred £rom Lisbon to Cadiz, 
and his next letter to Mrs. Gbugh is dated from the 
Isla de Leon on June 8. At Cadiz it was not purely 
garrison work that occupied the attention of the 
troops. The progress of the French operations in 
Andalusia, which Soult had invaded in the beginning 
of 1810, led to a blockade of Cadiz by Marshal 
Victor, which was destined to continue until the 
withdrawal of Soult's army firom Andalusia in the 
autumn of 1812. By the end of the month of 
February, 1810, the French had obtained complete 
possession of Andalusia, with the exceptions of 
Gibraltar and Cadiz, and it was more by good 
fortune than by good management that Cadiz did 
not fall into the hands of Victor in the course of his 
first attempt. Cadiz was saved by the British 
command of the sea, which allowed Wellington to 
throw into the beleaguered town a fresh garrison, 
including the 2nd Battalion of the 87th. 

When General William Stewart arrived at Cadiz 
in February, 1810, the garrison of Cadiz consisted 
of some 8,000 British troops, and about 14,000 
Spaniards, along with a number of Portuguese. 
Stewart's most important service was the recovery 
of a fort called the Matagorda (cf. p. 44) which 
had been unwisely abandoned. In the end of 
March a new commander arrived — General Graham 
(afterwards Lord Lynedoch). He had entered the 
army late in life, and had but little military ex« 
perience. It is interesting to recall the fact that. 




40 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1810 

in boyiiood, he had poaBessed (in common with the 
£sifcher of Sir Charles Napier) no lees distinguished 
a tutor than David Hume. When Graham took 
charge, he found that the defences were in a moat 
miserable condition, and their improvement required 
a oonaideraUe addition to his available forces. Be- 
iuforeoments arrived, and Graham, in spite of some 
difficulties with the Spaniards, carried out an im* 
|Huiant scheme of fortification, interrupted by 
viiUout assaults upon Matagorda. In July, the 
uunilH>rs of the garrison were still further increased 
to 80,(H)0 allied troop& Thus the summer and 
autumn (uiswod, the French unable to capture the 
|)lmH\ but maintaining a strict blockade and render- 
ing it imiHvsihle for the garrison at Cadiz to be 
tituiaft^ritnl to another part of Andalusia. The loss 
of I'Mdix would have been second in importance 
oul>' to that of Gibraltar, and would have made it 
iiu|Himiblo for Uie allies to continue to hold any 
|iart of tlio south-west of Spain. No incident of 
th«) bKHJcailo calls for our attention until we reach 
tho nu^mornblo battle of Barrosa. 

Vnnn the date of the battle of Barrosa (March 5, 
IHI I) onwards, almost to the close of the War, our 
iiifonnation regarding Gough*s personal share in the 
iianifiaigns becomes much more complete, as the 
hittitm of this period have been preserved along 
with various documents, relating to the militaiy 
ofHsrations in which the battalion vras engaged 
We left the 87th at Cadiz, forced to remain inactive, 
while the fate of Southern Europe was depending 



1810] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 41 

upon the success of Wellington's great defence of 
the lines of Torres Vedras. Occasional attempts 
upon French ouiposts at Moguer and Huelva varied 
the monotony of garrison life, but of these Gbugh's 
correspondence says nothing, and the efforts to 
reduce these defences of the main French position 
at Seville were imavailing. In September, 1810, 
a meeting of the Spanish Cortes (the first since 1808) 
was held at Cadiz, and it exercised considerable in« 
fluence upon the course of the War. One of the 
fashionable constitutions of the time was drawn up, 
based upon a democratic principle which would 
have proved impossible of realization in any Euro- 
pean coimtry, and which was peculiarly unsuited 
to the traditions and the circumstances of Spain. 
The resistance to Napoleon had not been merely 
the natural opposition to a gratuitous war of con* 
quest, nor was it merely against the pride of an 
ancient race, with traditions of imperial sway, that 
the French had offended. The shock of the French 
Revolution had come with special force upon a 
haughty nobility, accustomed to receive a deference 
which seemed to be founded upon the immutable 
laws of nature ; upon a cleigy whose influence had 
remained imdisturbed by the religious revolution 
of the sixteenth century ; and upon a people which 
had been wont to render imquestioning obedience 
to its leaders. The principles of the pre-Bevolution 
philosophers had not spread from France into Spain, 
as they had spread into En^and and America. The 
rise of a military despotism, and the overthrow of 



a 



42 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1810 

the ancient constitutions of Europe had increased 
the horror with which the tenets of democracy 
were regarded by the larger portion of the Spanish 
people, and the war was waged against the Bevo- 
lution, and all that the Bevolution stood for, as 
much as against the Emperor and Joseph Bona- 
parte. This national feeling, which had given point 
to the fEunous remark of Sheridan that Napoleon 
had ^yet to learn what it is to combat a nation 
animated by one spirit against him,* was outraged 
by a Cortes which claimed for itself the title of 
yt&JGstjj and allowed to the Brents for the ancient 
monarchy only that of Highness. With an amount 
of folly for which it is difficult to make due allow** 
ance, the Cortes proceeded to outline a number of 
proposals which could not but divide the national 
resistance still further, and along more definite 
lines. An attack upon the privil^es of noble blood 
alienated the aristocracy; a suggested interference 
with the powers and functions of the Inquisition 
made the clergy doubt if things would be worse 
under the rule of the French. The Spanish colonies, 
which had not been backward in contributing aid 
to the mother-coimtry, were treated with a con* 
tempt worthy of the despotic rule of Philip H, and 
the Cortes entered upon a course which finally pro- 
voked the revolt of the colonies, and the serious 
complications which that rebellion involved. From 
the month of September, 1810, Spanish feeling 
ceased to be unanimous, and the sympathy between 
the British and the Spanish peoples, of which this 



1810] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 48 

is the first instance in history, now reached its 
period of decline, as the main aims and objects of 
the allies began to diverge. 

The immediate effect of the meeting of the Cortes 
was a change in tiie personnel of the Spanish denerals. 
Andalusia was placed mider the charge of Manuel 
La Fefia, and he was also entrusted with the com- 
mand of the Spanish forces which guarded the Isla 
de Leon. It had been intended that La Bomana 
should join La Fefia at Cadiz, but at the instance 
of Wellington, he was retained in his conunand in 
the army which was facing Massena, and (General 
Graham was left to concert with La Pefia a scheme 
of defence against the renewed attack upon Cadiz, 
for which the enemy had been busily preparing. 
To appreciate the situation which led up to the 
battle of Barrosa, it will be necessary to give some 
accoimt of the fortifications of Cadiz, and of its 
topography, as far as concerns our story. 

Cadiz is situated upon a small rocky peninsula 
at the end of a narrow isthmus, about five miles 
long, known as the Isthmus of Cadiz. This isthmus 
projects from a flat triangular marsh, broken by a 
central ridge, on which stands the town of Isla. 
Beyond this marsh (the famous Isla de Leon) is the 
Channel of Santi Petri, extending round two sides 
of the triangle formed by the Isla, and separating it 
from the mainland. The French had invested Cadiz 
from the mainland, by means of a chain of forts, 
stretching from the mouth of the river Quadalquivir, 
some twenty miles north of Cadiz, to a point about 



WAR IS THE FEXDkSULA [1810 




^ 



of At Ssfld Peczi The main posi* 
were Ftaato Smtm Maria, at the 
It ae Gtadefatt : Puerto Seal, at the root of 
'3f land ptufuiiiu g; for a distance of four 
che Isdunos of Gidiz ; and Chiclana, 
X xyHut poBciaa afanoec opposite the southern 
3BXia of die 5ansi Petri channel The tongue of 
jsad pnj«iccing &om Paerto Beai is intersected by 
a eanal kzuTwn as che Trocadoo; and at its southern 
<xa«nzfizes^ fKiog the Tathwings were the fort of 
Xacuocda. on the nocdi of the canal, and the 
fixQ&d TjUagt of Troeadero <m the south. To 
die xHxth of Pttfto BeaL the French held the 
ooiKC towns of Boca and San Luear. The defences 
of Cadis coiKKted, in the last resort, of the com* 
mnnkackii bccween the town and the Isthmus, 
whieh would probahlj ha^e rendered the place 
rwUj impregnable had anj of the French attacks 
penetrated so tu. The Isthmus itself was divided 
afawMt at r^t angles, by a creek called the 
Cbriaduzm, at the top of which was an unfurnished 
fort called IWnanda Abatteiy at Puntales, on the 
Isthmus and opposite to the village of Troeadero, 
commanded the approach to the north end of the 
Santi Petri Close to the junction of the Isthmus of 
Gadia with the LsJa de Leon, was the Torre Gbrdo, 
which oflfered another point of vantage for the 
defence. Finally, the Spaniards held the Santi 
Petri Channel, by means of an island at each end. 
The only communication between the Isla de Leon 
and the mainland was by a bridge at Zuazo, which 



1810] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 45 

crossed the Santi Petri at a point near its centre, 
whence a road led directly to the town of Isla and 
thence to Cadiz. This bridge had been broken down, 
and each side had protected itself by a battery on its 
own side of the channel The Spanish command 
of the Santi Petri was, however, more apparent 
than real, because the coast line consisted, on the 
mainland, of a marsh, from one to three miles 
broad, intersected by navigable channels and 
creeks of considerable size. 

On the 81st of October, 1810, the French suc- 
ceeded, by an ingenious stratagem, in adding con* 
siderably to their numbers and resources. Part of 
their available force was at San Lucar, watched by a 
hostile fleet, in spite of which thirty pinnaces and 
gunboats managed to escape, and reached the town 
of Bota, whence they made their way to Puerto Santa 
Maria. So strong was the battery at Puntales that 
they did not risk an attempt to get into the Troca* 
dero canal by sea, but conveyed their ships on rollers 
overland. This accession to the strength of the enemy 
at the Trocadero batteries was intended to threaten 
Puntales, and ultimately to open the Santi Petri to 
the French fleet, thus giving them the command of 
the Isla de Leon, and reducing the allied forces in 
Cadiz to their last line of defence. Beinforcements 
were immediately sent from Gibraltar, and Graham 
devised a scheme for strengthening the defences, 
which the Spaniards were too busy to carry out 
Fortunately, the attack which Soult is supposed to 
have meditated upon the fort of Puntales and the de- 



46 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1810 

fence of the Gortadura, was prevented by the course 
of events in another portion of the area of warfare. 
The strategy of Wellington at Torres V edras led 
Napoleon to send instructions to Soult to go to the 
assistance of Massena, and in the end of December 
he left Cadiz to reduce the fortresses of Olivenza 
and Badajos, as a preliminary to carrying out the 
Emperor^s orders. The French army at Cadiz were 
left under the command of Marshal Victor, and 
General Graham felt himself strong enough to make 
an effort to raise the siege. 

Graham's plan was to combine with the troops 
stationed at Tari£E^ under Lieut-CoL Brown, and 
with a body of Spaniards under Beguines, in an 
attempt upon the rear of the French lines ; but as he 
was prevented, by stress of weather, from either 
canying out his own part of the movement, or 
communicating with the other conunanders, the 
scheme had meanwhile to be abandoned. The re- 
sult was considerable delay in making the great 
effort, and it was not till February 22, that Graham 
actually set sail from Cadiz, and landed at Algesiras, 
ready to resume his operations for a rear attack 
upon the enemy who were threatening Cadiz. * On 
the 24th,' says Gough\ ^we marched to Tarifa, 
where we were joined by six or eight thousand 
Spaniards. We had about 4,000 men. The object 
of the expedition ' he adds, * I hardly know.' The 
British troops imder Graham's command, when the 

^ Letter of Maroh 6, 1811. 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 47 

army left Tarifa, consisted of a detachment, number- 
ing about two hundred, of the 2nd (German Hussars 
under M^or Busch ; about three hundred and fifty 
Eoyal Artillery and Royal Artillery drivers imder 
Major Duncan ; of two brigades, commanded re- 
spectively, by Brigadier-General Dilkes and Colonel 
Wheatley; and of two detached light battalions 
under Lieut-CoL Brown, and Lieut-CoL Barnard. 
The first of the two brigades included the 2nd 
Battalions of the 1st and 8rd Guards, and of the 
Coldstream Guards, with a detachment of the 2nd 
Battalion of the 95th ; the second, the 1st Battalion 
of the 28th and the 2nd Battalions of the 67th and 
87th ; Brown had the flank companies of the 1st 
Battalions of the 9th and 28th Foot ; and of the 2nd 
Battalions of the 82nd and 47th Foot ; while Barnard 
commanded a detachment of the 8rd Battalion of the 
95th Foot, and a company of the Royal Staff Corps. 
Wheatle/s division also contained the flank com* 
panics of the 20th Portuguese. 

Of the Spanish forces, a portion had been left 
under General Zayas, to protect the Isla de Leon, 
and to construct a bridge over the Santi Petri, near 
the castle of the same name. The 7,000 to whom 
Gough refers as joining Graham at Tarifa, werd 
imder the direct command of La Pena, who asserted 
his claim to take chaiige of the whole operation. 
Graham gracefully yielded this point, and the 
march was conmaenced, towards Chiclana, where 
about 11,000 French awaited them. On the 2nd 
of March, La Pena's vanguard took the fort of 



48 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

Casa Vieja, On the 4tli, the army marched out 
of the Casa. The story of how the British force, 
designed to attack the French rear, were them- 
selves attacked in rear, how they coimtermarched, 
and how they defeated the enemy is familiar to all 
who are acquainted with the campaigns in the 
Peninsula, but Major Gbugh's correspondence 
throws some fresh light on the narrative. The 
events which led up to the battle of Barrosa may 
best be described in the words of Graham's 
dispatch : — 

After a night*s march of sixteen hours, we 
arrived, on the morning of the 5th, on the low ridge 
of Barrosa, about four miles to the Southward of the 
Santi Petri river. This height extends inland about 
a mile and a half, continuing on the North the ex- 
tensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great Pine 
Forest skirts tiie plain, and circles round the height 
at some distance, terminating down to Santi Petri ; 
the intermediate space between the north side of 
the height and the Forest being uneven and broken. 

A well-conducted and successful attack on the 
rear of the Enemy's lines near Santi Petri, by the 
vanguard of the Spanish Army under Brigadier- 
General Lardizabal, having opened the communica- 
tion with the Isla de Leon, I received General 
La Pena's directions to move down from the position 
of Barosa to that of the Torre Bermeja, about half- 
way to the Santi Petri river, in order to secure the 
communication across the river, over which a bridge 
had been lately established. This latter position 
occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the 
aea-cli£^ the left falling down to the Alrnanza Creek 
on the edge of the Miursh. A sandy beach gives an 
easy communication between the western points of 
these two positions* 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 49 

On receiving La Pefia's orders, Graham sent out 
cavalry patrols to discover if the enemy were moving 
from their lines at Chiclana. They failed to report 
any such movement, and Graham, about the hour 
of noon, set out through the pinewood in front 
of the height of Barrosa, to effect a jimction with 
La Peila at Bermeja. The idea of a jimction at 
Bermeja did not meet with Graham's approval 
He mentions in his dispatch that he considered 
Barrosa to be the key to the position of Santi 
Petri, and that an attack by the French upon 
the Spaniards at Bermeja would have exposed 
their flank to the British forces on Barrosa. He 
therefore left a rearguard on the top of the hill, 
under Brown. The march to Bermeja was only 
two miles, but before it was completed, Graham 
was informed that the enemy, whom his patrols had 
not succeeded in locating, had emerged from the 
wood and were marching in force over the plain, 
towards the ridge of Barrosa, and were therefore 
threatening his rear. Unwilling to abandon Bar- 
rosa and the small force he had left on the hill, 
Graham immediately gave orders to countermarch, 
in the hope of reinforcing Brown; but before he 
emerged from the wood, Marshal Victor had suc- 
ceeded in driving Brown off, though in good 
order. 

When Graham reached the open plain, the situa* 

tion he had to face was critical and almost desperate. 

The right wing of the enemy, tmder Laval, was 

dose upon him; the left, consisting of Buffin's 
I s 



50 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

men, l&d oa by Yietor hinwrif, were in poflses* 
sion of Barron ; it had proved impoesible, in sach 
intricate ground, to preaerre completo order in his 
own oolumns, 'and,' he adds, * there never was time 
to restore it entirely/ He locked in vain for his 
Spanish allies^ La Pefia, who was responsible for 
the situation, made no attempt to come to the 
assistance of the British, or to retake Barrosay but 
Graham showed no sign of hesitation. To Brown's 
request for orders, he had returned the single word 
*Fi^t,' and in this spirit he determined to act, 
although deprived of the help on which he had 
relied when he began his countermarcL Betreat 
was, indeed, imposstble, for the enemy's right wing 
could have intercepted them by the 8ea4)each, and 
would probably have destroyed the whole force in 
the confusion that must have ensued ' Trusting to 
the known heroism of British troops,' says Graham, 
'regardless of the numbers and position of the 
Enemy, an inmiediato attack was determined 
upon.' 

Graham's plan of battle was well conceived, and 
the trust he placed in his troops was amply justified. 
While the infantry were being formed, the artil- 
lery, under Migor Duncan, opened upon the enemy 
a battery of ten guns. Under cover of these, the 
right wing was formed of the Brigade of Guards, 
Lieut-CoL Brown's flank battalion of the 28th, 
two companies of the 2nd Rifle Corps, and a stray 
portion of the 67th Foot The left was composed of 
Wheatley*8 Brigade, with three stray companies of 



^ 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 51 

the Coldstreams, and Barnard's flank company* 
This accomplished, the advance was resumed, still 
under cover of the artillery, and the right wing 
with Dilkes in command proceeded to the assistance 
6f Brown and the rearguard, who were in action 
with Bu£Sn at the foot of the Barrosa ridge. After 
a fierce and prolonged struggle, they succeeded in 
putting Victor^s force to flight, and remained in 
possession of Barrosa. It is with the left wing that 
we are more immediately concerned. Gbugh and 
the 87th had emeiged from the wood in good order, 
owing to a fortunate accident. A staff officer of 
artillery, while taking a message to another part of 
the field, happened to pass the battalion, and gave 
its commander the information that the enemy 
were close at hand. Qough seized an opportunity of 
withdrawing his regiment to a comparatively open 
space, where he drew it up. On coming out of the 
wood, he took advantage of a chance of deploying, 
and was able to form in line, and to throw out his 
flank in view of the enemy's advance. For some 
time the regiment remained inactive and exposed 
to a galling fire, while Barnard's light troops were 
skirmishing in front. While thus waiting, with 
ordered arms, the 87th lost a m^*or, a captain, two 
lieutenants, and more than fifty men. At last, the 
light troops were withdrawn, and the fortunes of 
the day depended upon one of the hand-to-hand 
encounters which were so frequent at this period.. 
The 87th advanced and proceeded to charge the 8th 
ipVench Begiment. The nature of the fighting is 

E2 



52 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

thus deaeribed by Ooo^ in a letter written to 
his wife, oa the morrow of the battle: — 

We proadly bring with us a trc^y that will 
long record the result of two successive charges, 
against two Begiments, the 8th and the 47th. The 
former came into the field, 1,600 Orenadiers, the 
finest looking men I ever saw, and firom the centre 
of their Column we to<^ their Eagles ^ . • The 



1 The memoin of the Cokmel of the 8th Frendi Regiment 
(Y^o-BoiHBlloa) hsve been pablished in the Bevme des Deuz 
Mamdes, Jolj-Aiigiut, 1891. He rtatn that, just before hk 
regbnent wie A a rged by the 87th, he had ma opporhmitj of 
sbyii^ Genoal Gnhiun. He was not awmre of Graham's 
identity, but he refrained, owing to his Tcnerable appearanee 
and natonl dignity. * Son sang-froid, un grand air de cahne 
et de d%nit^ a^aient arr^ mon bras.' Almost immediatdy 
he WIS himsdf woonded, and it was while he was woonded 
tiat the flTth roated his regiment and captnred the eagle. 
' Lei rertes de mon bataillon, se Toyant sor le point d'etre 
entonres, recniirent, et nne charge Tigonreose, faite, de 
nooyean,parle87* raiment anglais, acheTa de les rompre . • • 
Dans hi demidre charge le porte-aigle da 1* bataillon ayant 
€t6 tne, les Anglais s'^taient empar& de cette aigle. Bien 
des braves se d^ronbent poor la reprendre et trooT^rent ainsi 
nne mort gloriease. Cette aigle co&ta cher anx Anglais, 
beaoooap de lenrs oflBders payirait de leor Tie l^onneor de la 
eonsenrer, mais enfin, eUe lear resta.' Yigo-Roossillon de- 
Sdibes how he sorrendered to an officer, who sared him from 
die attad: of a sergeant ; the latter not perceiring his woonded 
eondition. This incident is probably the origin of the l^end 
that GoQgh decapitated the colonel of a French regiment at 
Barrosa. Writing many years later, with reference to news- 
paper tales. Lord Gongh said, ' I was once the white-headed 
boy who cnt off the head of 4he French Colonel at Baroea^ 
who was at the rery time of his decapitation qnietly amnsing 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 58 

scene in this charge was even distressing to 
my feelings. The Ftench waited until we came 
within about 25 paces of them, before they broke, 
and as they were in column when they did, they 
could not get away. It was therefore a scene of 
most dreadful carnage. I will own to you my 
weakness. As of course I was in firont of the regi- 
ment, therefore in the middle of them, I could not, 
confiused and flying as they were, cut down an one, 
althought I might have twenty, they seemed so 
confounded and so frightened. They made, while 
we were amongst them (about Quarter of an hour), 
little or no opposition. We could have taken or 
destroyed the whole regiment, but at this moment 
the 47th French regiment came down on our right, 
and General Graham, who was, during the whole of 
the action, in the midst of it, pointed them out and 
begged I would call off my men (I will not say 
'Halt' as we were in the midst of the French). 
With the greatest difficulty by almost cutting them 
down, I got the right wing collected, with which we 
charged the 47th, but after firing tmtil we came to 
within about 50 paces of them, they (for us, fortu- 
nately) broke and fled, for had they done their duty, 
fatigued as my men were, at the moment, they must 
have cut us to pieces. We were therefore, after 
they broke, unable to follow them, but took the 
Howitzer attached to them. I have ended this 
glorious action after two and a half hours' roar of 
cannon and Musketry. I was fortunate in losing 
only one officer, four sergeants, and forty-one 
rank and file killed; Migor Maclaine severely, 
Captain Somersall severely, Lts. Barton and Fen- 
neU both severely, six sergeants and 121 rank and 
file, wounded. 

himself at Paris/ He seems to have been in error in imagin- 
ing that Vigo-Broossillon was not on the field — unless, indeed^ 
the myth has a different origin altogether. 



54 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

The charge of the 87th, aided by the three com« 
panies of Guardsi who shared in the honour of the 
onslaught, and supported by the remainder of the 
wing, decided the fate of Laval's troops. No serious 
attempt to rally was made by the French wings, 
and Graham was left in possession of the field \ 

The battle had unquestionably been gained by 
the courage of the British troops, and in spite of 
the culpable negligence of the Spaniards, to whose 
disgraceful conduct Byron alluded in the well* 
known lines: — 

Bear witness, bright Barrosa, thou canst tell 
Whose were the sons that bravely fought and 
fell 

Qraham, however, does fiill justice to such assis- 
tance as the allies actually rendered. The junction 
with Zayas was effected by Lardizabal only after 
some hard fighting ; two Spanish battalions, which 
had been left on the hill, ignoring La Pefla's order 
to retire, returned to strengthen the right wing of 
the British ; and General Whittingham, an English- 
man, in conmiand of the Spanish cavalry, while not 
taking advantage of the opportunity of making a 
flank attack on Buffin, did keep in check a corps of 
infantry and cavalry which endeavoured to turn the 
position of the Barrosa height, by means of the beach 
road. Busdi and his hussars also made a gallant 
charge and routed a squadron of French dragoons. 

^ There is an interesting account of the battle of Barrosa 
in A Bay in the Peninsular War, edited by Julian Storgis. 



/r\ 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 55 

Nothing, indeed, can be urged in extenuation of the 
conduct of La Pefia, He did not inform Oraham of 
his intention to abandon Barrosa, and betake himself, 
by the beach, to Santi Petri ; but even if Graham 
had understood this, it could not palliate La Pefia's 
desertion of his allies when the French attacked. 
Nor did his supineness end here. The British 
troops, which had been under arms for over twenty- 
four hours, were too much exhausted by the 
fighting to be able to follow up their victory with 
an onslaught upon the retreating French army. La 
Pefia, with more than twelve thousand fresh troops, 
maintained his attitude of cowardly inactivity, and 
Oraham could do nothing but withdraw the greater 
portion of his army to the Isla de Leon ^ 

The desertion of La Pena, while it diminished 
the effect of the victory, could not but add to its 

^ Where the account of the hatUe of Barrosa, as given above^ 
differs from the description in Napier's Peninsular War 
(bk. zi. chap. S), it is based upon Gough MSS. and upon 
Oraham's dispatches. Napier seems to have overstated the 
disorder of Oraham's foree^ when he wrote of the troops 
under Wheatley and Dilkes as forming ' two masses, without 
any attention to Foments or brigades.' Some statements 
in Napier's first edition which were clearly erroneous were 
modified in subsequent editions^ in deference to a protest made 
by Oough on the appearance of Napier's book. Napier's 
inaccurate statements, with regard to Barrosa^ and afterwards 
in connexion with the siege of Tari& (cf. pp. 86-86), are 
probably responsible for the error sometimes made of attaching 
the soubriquet, ' Faugh-a-Ballaghs ' (Clear the ways), to the 
88th or the 89th instead of to the 87th Regiment^ to which 
alone it is historically applicable. 



56 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

glory. What might easily have been a disaster of 
great moment had been converted into an over- 
whekning victory. An eagle and six pieces of 
cannon were among the spoils of the day. BuflSn 
vnna a prisoner, and the French loss in killed and 
wounded was very great. When the nev^ of 
Graham's gallant and successful attack, against an 
enemy of such superior numbers and possessed of 
the key of the position, reached Qreat Britain, it 
was received with an enthusiasm which was out of 
proportion to the intrinsic importance of the inci- 
dent, though amply deserved by the heroism of 
Graham and his men. Lord Liverpool, in his 
dispatch to General Graham, gave utterance to the 
public feeling when he wrote :— 

The memoiy of those who conquered and of 
those who fell in the hour of victory upon the 
Hei^t of Barrosa will be ever cherished by the 
British nation, and their names will hold a con^ 
spicuous rank amongst the bravest and worthiest of 
our heroes. 

Hie thanks of both Houses of Puliament were 
conveyed to Genend Graham and his anny, and 
newspaper cofamms overBowed with tributes in 
proeie and vene^ irtiile audiences at the London 
theatxQs smg:— 

Ibey (eU os that Elegies can stare at the sun. 
Whose beams nor annoy nor dismay 'em; 
But Freix^ £a^ ify and Freix^ Game OikdLeDS 

nm. 
From the g^oiy of Geuni (kaham. 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 57 

The 87th had its due share of the gloiy^ as it had 
its share of the fighting. The Eagle which they 
had captured was the first taken in the war, and 
further interest attached to it from the fact that the 
laurel wreath which surmounted it was the gift of 
Napoleon himself, and that Napoleon's confidence 
in the 8th Begiment was so great that, by his special 
orders, the Eagle was not attached to the standard 
in the ordinary way. There was some curiosity 
about it in England, and Qough gave the following 
description of it, in answer to a query of his wife : 
'It is brass, well gilt; the wreath is pure gold. 
The Eagle was on a Poll, something stronger, but 
very similar to the Poll of a sei*geant's halbert It 
is much heavier than the Colours of a regiment, 
and from the weight being all at the top, is very 
unwieldy.' 

Qraham was fully conscious of the importance of 
the two great charges made by the 87th. He 
mentioned them with special conmiendation in his 
dispatch, and wrote to the Colonel, Sir John Doyle : 
'Your Begiment has covered itself with glory. 
Becommend it, and its commander, to their 
illustrious patron, the Prince Begent; too much 
cannot be done for it.' The result of these recom* 
mendations was that the 87th was honoured by the 
Prince Begent with the title of the Prince of Wales's 
Own Irish Begiment; and it was allowed to bear 
' as a Badge of Honour upon the Begimental Colours 
and appointments an Eagle with a Wreath of Laurel 
above the Harp, in addition to the Arms of His 



58 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

Boyal Highnesfiu' Qough had been particularly 
mentioned in Graham's dispatch and 'earnestly 
recommended' for promotion, and he immediately 
received the brevet rank of Lieutenant-GoloneL 
On the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington, 
the brevet rank was, as we shall see, subsequently 
antedated from Barrosa to the date of Wellington's 
dicfpatches relative to the battle of Talavera. This 
is the first instance, in the history of the British 
army, of the conferment of brevet rank upon an 
oflBcer for the conduct of a regiment in action. 

The captured Eagle was conveyed to England, 
and presented to the Prince Begent \ and its arrival 
caused fresh public interest in the Prince's Own^ 
which for the time occupied the position of the 
popular regiment Its health was proposed by 
the Lord Mayor at a Gily of London banquet, at 
which Doyle modestly disclaimed for his regiment 
anything but 'superior good fortune in retaining 
the trophies they had won.' The regimental songs 
of the period are fiill of the new honours conferred 
upon the regiment, and express appropriate devotion 
to the Prince Begent : — 

And life, that's a debt paid to nature by others. 
We brought a fi-ee gift to the Prince we obey*. 

^ The Eagle was placed in the Chapel of Chelsea Hospital, 
where it remained till the 16th April, 186S, when it was 
stolen. The staff was sawn through, and the Eagle removed — 
whether by a patriotic Frenchman or by a thief who thought 
the eagle was made of gold, has never been discovered* 
A facsimile is now in Chelsea Hospital. 

' Some claim to the honcmr ol capturing the Eagle was 



1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 59 

Brilliant as was the victory, the battle of Barrosa 
is more properly r^^arded as an escape from a 
terrible disaster than as an important turning-point 
in a campaign. Graham's intention was, as we have 
pointed out, to raise the siege of Cadiz. Had he been 
enthusiastically or even decently supported by the 
Spaniards, his piupose would probably have been 
accomplished. As it was he inflicted a grave blow, 
physical and moral, upon the French, and saved 
himself and La Pena from a crushing defeat, if not, 
indeed, from a massacre. But the siege of Cadiz 
was renewed; and the main object of Graham's 
bold move had not been attained 

La Pena's misconduct was not confined to 
cowardica He had the effrontery to claim the 
credit of the victory for himself, and an angry 
oontroversy ensued, which rendered it impossible 
for Graham to continue to act with the Spanish 

made by another Corps, and elicited a protest from Ooagh, 
who BBjs : * Ensign Keogh was killed in the act of grasping 
at it, and the French Officer who held it was ran through by 
Seigeant Masterson in the midst of our Officers and men* 
This Sergeant ne^er let it out of his hand until he delivered 
it to me, and afterwards carried it the remainder of the day 
between our Colours.' The claim of the 87th was undeniable^ 
and the slight difficulty that arose was caused by the fact 
that three Companies of the Ouards, under Colonel Jackson, 
charged on the left of the 87th, and in the confusion of the 
onslaught spectators did not distinguish between the different 
Corps. A leaf of the laurel wreath round the neck of the 
Eagle, which was loose when it was captured, was sent by 
Oough to his wife^ and is still preserved, with other relics of 
the campaign^ at Lough Cutra CasUe. 



60 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

commander, and led, ultimately, to the transference 
of his services to another portion of the field. From 
the Cortes, which had appointed La Pefia, and which 
retained him in his command, Graham refused to 
accept any honour. 

So slight had been the effect of the victory of 
Barrosa upon the course of the blockade, that Yictor^s 
operations seem never to have been interrupted. 
On the 24th of March, Qough writes : 'We are all 
getting on here as you might expect The Spaniards 
have all run away, and the bridge over the Santi 
Petri is broken down. There was a most heavy 
Cannonade last night I have not as yet heard 
the result The last one of this sort, when upwards 
of forty shells were thrown into Cadiz, it is now 
ascertained, actually killed a Cat Whether any of 
that species of Spaniard suffered last night, I know 
not' The continued shelling of Cadiz may have 
been alarming to the shipping in the harbour, but 
it did not arrest the flow of spirits among the British 
troops in the Isla, who celebrated the arrival of 
dispatches firom home, dealing with the battle of 
Barrosa, by feasts and merriment ^I was obliged 
to give all the officers a let-off,' says Qough^ 'several 
friends dined with me, and a hundred and four 
bottles of wine were drunk.' The 87th remained 
in the Isla firom the date of Barrosa till the end of 
May, when they were sent into garrison at Cadiz* 
For about six months, the battalion is almost always 

1 Letter of April S4, 1811. 



TOPOGRAPHY OF CADIZ. 




1811] TALAVERA AND BARROSA 61 

in one or other of these two positions. In June we 
find Gbug^ back again in the Isia, in July he is in 
Cadiz, in August there is a slight change to San 
Boque, and so on, until the month of October, when 
a more serious movement fell to his lot. 



n 

CADIZ AND TARIFA 

The six months which intervened between the 
battle of Barrosa and the beginning of the siege 
of Tarifa (the next incident in the war which 
concerns us closely) were full of notable events 
in other regions of the Peninsula. The construc- 
tion of the lines of Torres Yedras, in the winter 
of 1809-10, had, in the ensuing summer, kept 
Massena at bay, and, by the date of Barrosa, had 
resulted in his retreat from Portugal He was 
followed by Wellington, whose army had now re- 
ceived sufficient reinforcements to enable him to 
adopt offensive measures. In May, Wellington 
defeated Massena at Fuentes d'Onoro, and a few 
days later the troops under Beresford were success- 
ful at Albuera. Meanwhile, there fell to the lot 
of the garrison at Cadiz only such domestic incidents 
as relieve the monotony of life in a blockaded town. 
The blockade continued throughout the summer and 
autumn, and not even the defeat of Albuera com- 
pelled Soult to withdraw his troops from Cadiz. 
To the conduct of Soult during the smnmer campaign 
of 181 1, Napier pays a well-deserved tribute ; * When 
unexpectedly assailed by Beresford from the north, 
by the Murcians on the east, by Ballesteros on the 
west, by Graham and La Peila in the south, he 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 63 

foiind means to repel three of thoeie attacks, to 
continue the blockade of Cadiz, and to keep Seville 
tranquil, while he marched against the fourth.' The 
conmiand of the sea, retained by the British, saved 
the blockaded troops from any of the real hardships 
of a siege, and they seem to have suffered chiefly 
from tedium. Gough's correspondence is full of 
the usual gossip of the messroouL ' Beports here,' 
he says, ^are so numerous, and in general so ill* 
founded, that it is in^possible to give credit to 
anything you hear/ When he has a real piece 
pf news to record, it is not always of a pleasant 
nature. * Our revered General,' he writes, on June 
the 29th, * leaves us tomorrow for Portugal, as second 
in command. This distressing piece of news reached 
us the day before yesterday. I inmiediately waited 
on him to say the whole Corps entreated he would 
take a farewell dinner with us. With tears in his 
eyes (I own I could not avoid shedding someX he 
fixed on this day, although he said he had made 
a resolution not to dine out. He has refused every 
other person and Corps. Never did I see such 
universal regret, even the rascally Spaniards seem 
to feel the loss they will have in Graham. He takes 
aU his staff with him. Major General Cooke succeeds.' 
Qough's love for Graham led him to entertain the 
hope of obtaining permission to accompany him to 
Portugal, although he had just received the command 
of a Brigade at Cadiz ; but he had to dismiss the 
idea as quite out of the question while the blockade 
lasted. The weariness of enforced idleness led him 



64 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

to make various plans for the future. The warmth 
of his home affections suggested schemes for obtain- 
ing leave. ^ If nothing is to be done here, and I vow 
I see not the slightest chance of it, I propose in 
November getting nine months leave.' Again he 
thinks he would be better in active work at home 
than idle at Cadiz, and speculates on the chance 
of being made Adjutant-G^eral at Limerick or at 
Athlone. In a letter ^ from Cadiz he gives a descrip- 
tion of his monotonous day. ' I get up at five, walk 
about two miles to the sea to bathe; after returning, 
I have just time to dress for my Parade at eight, 
which I dismiss at ten, breakfast, and read till 
twelve, frx>m which hour to one I give up to the 
interior of the Begiment, at my desk. I now lie 
down for an hour and a half, get up and dress 
for dinner at three. I generally take the first 
allowance, a pint, which, with chatting to, I believe, 
an attached set of brother officers, brings me to five, 
at which hour my horse is at the door, and from 
which I ride until half-past seven. It is by this 
time getting dark. I then devote one hour to con- 
templation, strolling on an eminence near my 
quarters. You may weU conceive where my thoughts 
wander. I transport myself to Plymouth, and 
almost in idea then feel all the joys I should there 
experienca From nine to ten I read, when I look 
round to see everything quiet, and retire to a solitary 
bed — my only wish either to forget I am in it or to 

^ Letter of Augart 9^ 1811. 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 65 

sleep for the purpose of dreaming of all my soul 
holds most dear. In this accoimt of one day and 
night, you nearly perceive how I pass my time/ 
A month later, it is the same story: — 'I wish of 
all things to go to Portugal ... I am sick to death 
of this town. . • • Anything is better than this dull, 
stupid place and way of spending one's time.' 

There was certainly no special reason for loving 
Cadiz or its people. The dispute between Graham 
and the Spanish Government about the responsibility 
for the failure at Barrosa added to the indignation 
felt against La Peila, and reports^ from Cadiz in 
the course of the summer are full of the jealousy 
which subsisted between the allied forces, and of 
the weakness and misrule of the Spanish Begency. 
' The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very 
bad, the press has lately teemed with publications 
filled with reproaches of the English. . . . The Begency 
and Cortes have lost all influence everywhere . . . 
the Spanish generals have been quarrelling.' Six 
weeks before leaving Cadiz, Graham wrote : — ^ The 
government here supported by the Cortes seemed 
to be determined to adhere with blind obstinacy 
and pride to a system that has nearly brought the 
cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington's 
great efforts they are playing Buonaparte's game so 
positively that I despair of any great good.' A report 
written on the last day of July sums up the situar 
tion: — 'Nothing can be more wretched than the 

^ Quoted in Napier (App. to Vol. III). 
I F 



66 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

state of afiGBdrs here ; the regents are held in uniyersal 
contempt, and such is the want of talent, I can 
hardly hope that a change will make any improve- 
ment: the treasury is empty, and no probability 
of the arrival of any money from America, so that 
affiEurs are really in a worse state than they have 
been at any time since the commencement of the 
war/ 

October brought a welcome reiiet After the 
battle of Barrosa, Brown had returned to Tarifa, 
and remained in command of the garrison till the 
end of June, when he left, with the 28th Regiment, 
to join Wellington. He was succeeded by Major 
King, of the 82nd, who, in spite of the complete 
quiet which had persisted through the summer, 
insisted upon the improvement of the defences. In 
the middle of August, some alarm was caused by 
the siege of the neighbouring castle of Alcala by 
a French army, and General Beguines represented 
that Tarifa was the real object of attack. Lieutenant- 
General Campbell prepared a plan for the defence, 
which was carried out under Eling. In the beginning 
of September, the aspect of affairs became more 
threatening. Soult, who seems to have aimed at 
using Tarifa as a ddpdt for the army at Cadiz, 
drove Ballesteros to seek shelter under the guns 
of Gibraltar, but want of provisions caused him 
to withdraw, and Ballesteros escaped. On the 
22nd, the garrison of Alcala surrendered, and 
although Ballesteros won a small victory three 
days later, the British commandant at Tarifa decided 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 67 

that reinforcements must inmiediately be obtained. 
The jealousy of the general in command of the 
Spanish troops (Don Manuel Daban) caused some 
opposition, but the wisdom of Eing^s demand was 
justified when Ballesteros was again driven back 
upon Gibraltar, by the enem/s occupation of San 
Boque. In answer to Eing^s request, it was decided 
to send twelve hundred men to Tarifa, and among 
the troops selected for this purpose was the 2nd 
Battalion of the 87th, whose commander thus de- 
scribes their start: — 

Off Tabifa : Od. IfUh, 1811. 

It seemed the enemy threatened the Spanish 
General Ballesteros, and General Cooke has thou^t 
it advisable to send a force to Tarifa to attract their 
attention to that quarter, thereby to save this last 
hope of the Spanish cause, the aforementioned 
Spanish General. But I believe, indeed I am 
certain, that Colonel Skerrett, of the 47th, who has 
got the conmiand, has likewise the most positive 
orders not to attempt anything o£fensive, and to fall 
back immediately the object will be gained by 
drawing the French force towards the North, 
where we are to act. Indeed, when I mention our 
force, it will prove to you that we have not been 
sent to fight, as it only consists of a light brigade of 
artillery, under Captain Hughes, eight companies of 
the 47th regiment (550) under Migor Broad, eight 
companies of the 87th (525), and one company of 
the 95th imder Capt Jenkins (75)— in all no more 
than 1,200 men. Colonel Skerrett 1st in command 
with Lieutenant Colonel Lord Proby of the guards, 
2nd, your hiunble servant, the next senior officer. 
I cannot tell you the delight this little temporary 
move has given us all, anything for a change to 

F2 



68 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

a soldier. . . . We only got the first intimation of 
such a thing going forward while I was at dinner 
on the 9th, and at ten next morning I marched 
down to the Malle and embarked the whole of the 
men and baggage in three minutes, to the astonish- 
ment of every person present. The Captain-of-the- 
Navy Bruce, who, by the bye, tells me he knows 
you veiy well, said at a public dinner that day, 
before the commanding officers of the other corps, 
that, since he came into the Navy, he never saw 
a regiment embark in the enthusiastic stile the 
87th did, which by the bye was true, as I never saw 
such a set of fellows, it really is a pity that they will 
be disappointed in not meeting the enemy, and will 
you excuse me for adding that I regret it also I If, 
however, that time will arrive, wheiier they succeed 
or otherwise, they will do themselves honomr and 
their Country service. It really is a sin they are 
not in Portugal and not employed in this dirty little 
pedling warfare. Captain Dickson commands the 
naval part of the expedition, who I will forward 
my letters through. You must still continue to 
direct to me at Cadiz; we will be back long ere 
this reaches you. Let me entreat you not to mind 
what you may see in the papers about us, you know 
there is no dependence to be placed on their reports. 
As we will not march more than a league or two 
from Tarifa (which bye the bye you know is a small 
walled town at the entrance of the Straights of Gibral- 
tar) you may always depend on hearing everything 
from me. You know my promise to tell you 
nothing but truth, which I shall be the more deter- 
mined in, from my knowledge that jour good sense 
would convince you that, was I even in what is 
called danger, that a hair of my head cannot fall 
to the groimd without the consent and will of the 
great Disposer of events. . . . We are now beating 
about in the mouth of the Gut of Gibraltar, but as 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 69 

the wind is from the Eastward we shall not arrive 
at all events before tomorrow morning. 

Tabifa: October leth. 

After six days most boisterous passage, we reached 
this place last night and landed this morning — ^with 
the exception of a part of my Lt. Company imder 
Thompson, and half niunber 8 under Waller, who, 
together with our brigade of guns, are missing. We 
cannot conjecture what has become of them. We 
have everything here quiet, but the French about 
8,000, have driven Ballesteros imder the guns of 
Gibraltar, and have taken up their position at Saint 
Boque. There are none in our neighbourhood and 
we have advanced reconnoitring parties to Alge- 
siras. Since we were here last [cf. p. 46] they have 
strengthened this place much, and I much appre- 
hend after the enemy have eaten up all the provi- 
sions of the neighbourhood they will retire. Indeed 
it can be no object for them to remain where they 
are— their stay will, however, protract the time of 
our returning. We have found a British force here 
of 400 men from Gibraltar. 

The general course of events may be gathered 
from the following passages, selected from Colonel 
Gough's letters of the period : — 

Tabifa: 18th [Odoher]. 

We yesterday made a reconnaissance towards 
Algesiras, where we f oimd the enemy had evacuated 
that town and fallen back on their force at Saint 
Boque. We today move a few miles in the other 
direction, to drive back a small division of five or 
six hundred men they have about three leagues 
from this for the piupose of watching our move- 
ments. Or at least I presiune this is our intention. 
I wish Colonel Skerrett would leave the business to 



WAR TS THE FEXIXSULA [1811 



f% Own. Baimm manied man I shall 
Tnhimfifr tins, much as I mar wish little 
of this kind. As I flatter m jaelt tbo' little 
as m J losB would be to otfaen, tbete is one dear 
foBod in England who, aa ahe is ereiTthing to me, 
I am eq[oall J the worid to her. We will therefore 
act, I inname, aa it was said of the King <d France 
who had fifty Uionsand moi, 'marched them up the 
hill and down again.' 

Tabifa: I9tk[0d€ber\ 
We hare been moving up the hill, and down 
again these two days, wtthout doing anything but 
ftiflging the Men. Had we had good information 
yesterday, and a little dash, we could have done 
a Teiy pretty thing. ... Oh ! for a Graham— this 
is the Gountiy for such Characters. . . . 

Tabifa: Htmd [October]. 

I am most happy to announce that the object of 
our expedition is accomplished, and that we only 
now wait the Betum of a vessel from Cadiz to go 
back. The day before yesterday, we marched out 
to a position 15 miles frt>m this, close to 2,000 of 
the Enemy: a plain divided us. We formed and 
offered them Battle, which they declined, and we 
returned that night after a most distressing March. 
The Enemy, on our evacuating the position, took it 
up; but yesterday morning their whole foree retired 
to their former position towards Bonda. ... I will 
own I hardly expected so fortunate a result, from 
the smallness of our force, and other causes. The 
Enemy must have been much deceived, or they 
have had some other motive than dread from us. 

By the end of October, Qough considered that 
their work was done. 'The enemy,' he writes, 
* have evacuated this part of the country. We only 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 71 

await letters from (General Cooke to retum.' But 
he was fated to see considerably more of the ' most 
wretched little village in Europe/ 

Tabifa : November llth, 1811. 

When I sent off my last journal (the 2nd ultimo) 
I then expected we should have been long ere 
this period at Cadiz, but circumstances, principally 
foul winds and the different movements of the 
Spanish Armies in this part of the kingdom, have, 
and probably will, detain us for some time. We 
have had some severe marches to favour the move- 
ments of Ballesteros, who hangs on the rear of the 
enemy before Cadiz. On the sixth we marched 42 
miles and took, without bloodshed, Vejer, a town 
situated on the sunmiit of an almost perpendicular 
moimtain. The enemy had about 250 men who, 
after firing a few long (very long indeed) shots at 
the Spaniards, fell back to Chiclana. Every man 
should have been taken and the reUef that came to 
their assistance (of the same strength) but for the 
stupidity, or any other worse name you may please to 
call it, of the Spanish General (Copons) who com- 
manded. We returned to this town to refresh the 
men two days back« I should have been very sick 
of the whole business, had I not had an opportunity 
of going over on the 1st of November to Tangiers 
for twenty four hours. We were only three hours 
crossing over and five coming back. I was most 
pleasingly undeceived with r^ard to the Moora 
They are an uncommon fine race of men (the ladies 
are not visible), and in my humble opinion deserve 
the name of savages quite as little as the lower 
order of Spaniards, or I will add, my own coimtry- 
men. 

I was very fortunate in seeing everything worth 
seeing in the place. Nothing was ever so cheap as 
are all articles in Tangiers ; my whole days expense 



72 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

was for eating and drinking a dollar and a half, 
including port wine, &c. 

In the middle of November, the enemy un- 
expectedly reappeared, and a fruitless expedition 
followed, of which Qough wrote an account to his 
wife on the 28rd: — 

*Your most kind letter of the 17th October 
reached me most opportunely the 18th . . . after 
being most disappointed the day previous, when we 
had an opportunity of reacting the scene of Barrosa, 
and when, had we had but a Graham, another day 
glorious to the British arms would have taken place. 
We marched from this on the 12th for the purpose 
of making a diversion in favour of Ballesteros, and 
for three days hurried in rear of the enemy before 
Cadiz, one day threatening this, another that, point 
of their defence. On the 17th, when at Vejer, the 
Enemy most imexpectedly made his appearance; 
our look-out was so bad and our reconnoitring so 
infEunous that their Colmnns came within gunshot 
before it was even known they were in the neigh- 
bourhood. I, fortimately, returning from the town 
of Vejer . . . perceived some of the Enemy's dragoons, 
and not having the highest opinion of those with 
whom I was acting, after I gave directions for the 
men to be ready to fall in at a moment's notice, 
proceeded to a hill from which I could perceive any 
body of men advancing. I had nearly reached the 
summit when I saw the enemy on a hill within a 
mile and a half, who had by this time evidently 
made their dispositions of attack and were pushing 
forward with all the French vivacity of Attack. 
Bright was with me. I ordered him down the Hill 
to put the Brigade under arms, while I waited to 
reconnoitre their movements. A few minutes 
decided their evident point of attack. . . . They 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 78 

advanced in three Columns, in all consisting of 
apparently, to me, 2,000 (we have since ascertained 
2,250), three himdred of whom were cavalry, and 2 
field-pieces. We had 1,080 Infantiy, 49 cavalry, and 
4 field-pieces, with good management a veiy strong 
position ; there could not for a moment be a doubt 
of what should be done. On joining the Brigade, 
I foimd myself senior officer. Colonel Skerret and 
Lord Proby being absent. I inunediately proceeded 
to put in execution (or, rather was going, as the 
whole of the men were not imder arms, when I 
joined them) that plan, not of defence, but of attack, 
that appeared from their movements almost certain 
of success (and which the senior officer of Engineers 
has since told me would be the plan he would and 
did advise), but at this moment our Commander 
made his appearance, and ordered me to march. . . . 
We formed on a hill in the rear, imtil the Lt. 
Company which was in the town, and who were 
sharply engaged with the two strongest Colunms, 
but were obUged for want of support to fall back with 
the remainder of the Light Companies, rejoined us. 
Somersal was so hard pushed that he was forced to 
leave all his knapsacks. One Sergeant could not be 
got to fall back, and was taken, and one more wounded. 
The whole Brigade fell back to the position of 
Yacinos that evening, and two days back returned 
to this town. To do Colonel Skerret justice, I 
believe he had orders not to fight superior numbers, 
and Vejer is within a few hours march of the lines 
at Cadiz, where the Enemy have 14,000 men ; but 
if a man does not venting, he will never win. We 
would have beaten them with very little loss, and 
we could then have fallen back. Those who wish 
to vindicate the propriety of not fighting say: 
What object would you have gained ? My answer 
and I think the answer of every British Soldier 
would be : We would have supported the character 



74 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

of the British Arms, which by falling back before 
a force but double our numbers is in a measure 
injured. 

The incident was trivial, but the letter is of some 
interest, not merely as throwing light on the 
character of the writer, but as indicating the courage 
and confidence with which Wellington had inspired 
the British forces in the Peninsula. Gough expected 
to return inmiediately to Cadiz ; but, as will be seen 
from the letter which follows, it was decided to form 
a junction with Ballesteros, and the brigade was 
sent to Gibraltar. The enemy took advantage of 
their absence to menace Tarifa, and the design had 
to be given up. 

Tarifa : December lOft, 1811. 

Your affectionately kind letter of the 8rd November 
I received on the 4th, but so fagged have we been 
since marching, that I really am half dead. Since 
my last we have been at Gibraltar; indeed there 
are few places many leagues from this that we have 
not visited. 

The enemy have again driven Ballesteros under 
the guns of Gibraltar. We marched to Algesiras, 
and crossed over by night for the piupose of attacking 
their position at Saint Bosque together with 5,000 
Spaniards, but that morning Suchet^ joined the 
enemy with 8,000, making in all 12,000, and the 
project was inmiediately given up, as we had but 
a 1,000 British, and the Spaniards were a most 
wretehed rabble. The enemy had menaced this 
place and have marched to Yacinos, twelve miles 
off, 2,800 men and a few pieces of ordnance. Two 

^ This is probably a slip of the pen for Soalt^ as Suchet 
was near Valencia at this tim& 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 75 

days back they pushed forward some men within 
sight of the town which so frightened the natives 
that a sight most melancholy, though ludicrous, 
occurred ; women and children running through the 
streets with as much of their property as they could 
cany for the purpose of emb^urking for Ceuta. But 
on finding the enemy had retired several have again 
come on shore. I am fully persuaded they never 
for a moment seriously thought of attacking this 
place. I am equally certain their object is to detain 
us here until they find an opportunity of attacking 
either Ballesteros or Blake. Ilieir force is so totally 
inadequate even to resisting us in the Field. We 
have been however hourly, day and night, employed 
in strengthening the place, fagging the men and 
officers to death. . . . They must either advance or 
retire in a day or two. 

18th. The Enemy, with the exception of a few 
men, have retired to Vejer, so all apprehension of 
an attack on this place is over for the winter ; indeed 
the weather has been so dreadful that it was impos- 
sible for them to have remained; the inhabitants 
have therefore all again returned to the Town. I 
therefore hope we shall shortly go back. 

The words with which this letter closes should, 
probably, not be taken too seriously as expressing 
the real views of the writer, for the obvious intention 
is to avoid alarming Mrs. Gk>ugh ; but it is, at the 
same time, evident that the next movement of 
the enemy was a surprise to the garrison. On the 
16th, a general order was issued, warning the forces 
that an attack was imminent, and on the 18th there 
was actually a cavalry skirmish. It is not necessary 
to follow the series of skirmishes which followed, 
nor to trace the French manoeuvres in detail, as 



76 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

they drew their lines closer round the town. At 
this stage of the blockade, there could scarcely be 
any doubt as to the real intention of the French, 
and the anonymous 'British Officer in Garrison/ 
who wrote Anecdotes of British and Spanish Heroism 
at Tarifa^ in Spain (Lend, 1812), on which we 
largely rely for details of the fighting, states that 
a French sergeant, captured on the 22nd, reported 
that the French were determined to take the town. 
* TKs a positive order from Napoleon, our emperor, 
that we should do so; and he generally provides 
means adequate to the end' In two letters written 
home, on the 28rd and the 29th, Gough continues to 
hide from his wife the real danger of the situation. 
' The Enemy,' he says, ' finding they can get no good 
of Ballesteros, have given up keeping him under the 
guns of Gibraltar, and have come before us to play 
the same game they have been doing these last two 
years at Cadiz. They yesterday advanced and in- 
vested the town in form, they have brought nothing 
but a few light guns. Their object, I am persuaded, 
is merely to get Ballesteros away from Gibraltar. 
Here they cannot long remain, and even should they, 
it is as good to be shut up in one town as in another. 
I much fear as this is a new thing, they will frighten 
you with newspaper accoimts, as they first did about 
Cadiz.' 

Before these words were written (on the 29th), 
Gough had already taken his part in the momentous 
decision as to the defence of the town, which led 
to one of the most honourable episodes in the 



ry 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 77 

Peninsular War. At this point, it is essential for 
the proper appreciation of the work done by the 
87th, to turn to an account of the situation and 
defences of the fortress of Tarifa. 

Situated ahnost in the centre of the Spanish side 
of the Straits of Gibraltar, Tarifa is naturally a place 
of considerable importance, and has a long histoiy. 
It takes its name from a Saracen soldier, Tarif, and 
its associations with the struggle between the Cross 
and the Crescent are further increased by Hhe 
tower of the Guzmans,' to which we shall have to 
make reference, and which recalls a famous si^[e 
in 1294, when the Spanish governor, Guzman, saved 
Tarifa from the Moors. In later history, Tarifa 
acquired an unenviable reputation as a home of 
pirates, and during the wars between Great Britain 
and Spain, in the eighteenth century, it was the 
scene of numerous privateering attacks upon British 
shipping. At the beginning of the Peninsular War, 
it was thou^t undesirable to attempt to hold Tarifa, 
and the town was in the occasional occupation of 
the enemy, who used it as a base for cattle-snatching 
expeditions. In May, 1809, General Colin Camp- 
bell^, who was in conunand at Gibraltar, sent to 
Tarifa a detachment, which, by subsequent additions, 
grew into the garrison (imder Brown) of which we 
have already spoken in connexion with the battle 
of Barrosa. At the date of the attack which it is 

^ Not the fatnre Lord Clyde, who was at this date a 
lieutenantj and in that capacity fought both at Barrosa and 
at Tarifa. 



78 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

now our duty to relate, the strength of Colonel 
Skerrett's garrison amounted to about 2,500 (in- 
cluding 600 Spanish infantry and 100 horse), and 
the enemy numbered probably about 5,000 men ^ 

Tarifa itself was a small town of about six 
thousand inhabitants. It ¥ras surrounded by a 
narrow wall, too weak to form any defence against 
artillery, but broken by a series of towers, of which 
the most important were the tower and castle of 
the Guzmans, and the Portcullis. These stand at 
opposite ends of the bed of a periodical torrent, 
which bisected the town, passing from east to south- 
west What may, for convenience' sake, be termed 
the Portcullis, stood at the entrance of this bed, and 
consisted of a tower defended by a portcullis and 
by a series of palisades. The tower of the Guzmans 
was at the south-west comer of the town, near the 
egreBQ of the torrent, and the castle of the Guzmans 
to the east of the tower, forming part of the south 
wall of the town. The bed of the torrent, after 
passing out of the town near the south-west comer, 
is continuedi in a westerly direction, to the sea, 
leaving a small neck of land between itself and the 
straits. On the Catalina, a small sandhill on this 
neck of land, was a 12-pounder, covering a short 
causeway which led to the island of Juniana. On 

^ The nombers of the French are very varioosly stated 
(cf . Napier's Appendix on the siege of Tarifa). The number 
we have taken is that given by Wellington in his Dispatch. 
The evidence is conflicting on a number of points in con- 
nexion with the siege. 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 79 

this small island, which extends into the Straits, 
were four 24rpounder8, and some other pieces of 
aridllery, but they were not all mounted in time to 
be of use in the Aeg^. 

On the east and north, the town was conmianded 
by some hills, of which the enemy were in pos- 
session, and which the garrison could not hope to 
hold The plan of the defence, as devised by the 
engineers to whom Campbell had entrusted the 
task, was to concentrate the fighting upon the east 
sida The enemy might be naturally supposed to 
be likely to make an attempt on the east, because 
the hills at that point came nearer to the walls than 
elsewhere. The apparent advantage thus given was 
more than counterbalanced by other considerations. 
In the first place, the ridges themselves made a 
natural glacis at such an angle as to expose the 
assault to the full effect of the fire from the de- 
fenders' musketry. Secondly, the walls and towers 
were stronger at that side, and, at the same time, 
because of the natural features of the town, pre- 
sented an appearance of weakness. The bed of the 
torrent almost bisected the east side of the wall, and 
from the Portcullis there stretched into the town 
a series of houses rising from both sides of the bed 
at an inclined plane. The existence of the torrent 
rendered the inner side of the wall much higher 
than the outer, and the houses formed a barricade 
on each side. If the enemy should succeed in 
effecting an entrance at this point, they would, 
accordingly, find themselves shut up in the bed of 



80 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

the torrent and exposed not merely to fire from the 
houses by which they were enclosed, but also from 
the tower of the Guzmans at the opposite end of 
the town. This tower, further, offered a point for 
the final resistance, and from it the garrison could, 
if necessary, make their way to the island 

The steps taken to induce the French to make 
their attack at this seemingly favourable position 
were, like the scheme itself, the work of Captain 
Smith and his engineers. The western front was 
strengthened so as to produce an appearance of 
great difficulty. Should the enemy make an effort 
there, they would find an outwork in the shape of 
a convent about a hundred yards from the north- 
west angle of the town. To the south were the 
tower of the Guzmans and the Catalina, and in the 
channel were a ship of the line, a frigate, and some 
gunboats. 

The real attack commenced on the 10th of Decem- 
ber, when the enemy took possession of the hills 
surrounding Tarif a. Next day, the garrison made a 
sally and drew the enemy towards the eastern wall 
of the town. Before nightfall the town was closely 
invested, but the enemy had suffered considerably, 
especially from the two 10-inch mortars on the 
island On the 22nd there took place a skirmish 
of considerable importance. A French piquet had 
taken up a position to the west of the town, from 
which it was necessary to dislodge them. A light 
company of the 11th accomplished this, but under 
their leader, Captain Wren, were forced to retire 



Z' 






COLONEL SKERRETTS NOTE TO COUGH 
(C/i ofipastte page) 






1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 81 

by a part of the right wing of the French, which 
advanced dose to the convent. The artillery, not 
only of the garrison, but also of some gunboats in 
the harbour, was directed against them ; but it was 
also desirable to charge them, and Skerrett sent the 
following message to Gough: 'Dear Gough, The 
Enemy have sent a large force in front of the con- 
vent. Be prepared for an attack on that side/ 
The little scrap of paper, torn off a sheet, has been 
preserved through all the years that have intervened 
since the si^ge of Tarifa, and it is reproduced in 
this book, as a relic of a famous si^[e. 

Gough's reply to the note was a chaige with a flank 
company of the 87th, which forced the French to 
abandon their position, and relieved the garrison 
from the danger of allowing a hill on the west of 
the town to pass into the possession of the enemy. 

By the morning of the 24th it was dear that the 
enemy had dedded to attack on the east, as Smith 
had antidpated. At daybreak, they had pushed 
their advance to within 400 yards of the north- 
east tower. But here Colonel Skerrett lost heart 
The enemy greatly outnumbered the men at his 
disposal, and they were determined, at all hazards, 
to storm the town. Neither he nor his conmiander. 
General Cooke, was responsible for the attempt to 
hold the place; the original occupation, and the 
defence, were alike the conception of the governor 
of the neighbouring fortress of Gibraltar. Skerrett 
had always been doubtful of the possibility of hold- 
ing out, and had applied to Cooke for orders. In 



82 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

reply, he received, on the 24th, instructions to em- 
bark his brigade and return to Cadiz. That night 
a council of war was held ; Ciolonel Skerrett strongly 
advocated the abandonment of Tarifa, and found 
some support for his view. It is only due to 
Skerrett to admit that he had considerable ground 
for his hesitation. Wellington, writing after the 
successful defence, remarked: ^We have a right 
to expect that his Migesty's officers and troops will 
perform their duly upon eveiy occasion; but we 
have no right to expect that comparatively a small 
number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, 
commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed 
in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, 
and the walls scarcely cannon-proof The three 
officers who most strongly opposed the withdrawal 
were Smith, King, and Gough. The strength of 
their argument lay in Smith's knowledge of the 
defences, for which he was responsible. ' I do not 
hesitate to declare," he said, ' that I place the utmost 
reliance on the resources of the place, and consider 
them such as ought to make a good and ultimately 
successful defence.' Any compromise, involving 
the defence of the island alone, he regarded as im* 
possible, on the ground that ' till the island is more 
independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly 
defending the town as an outwork.' Gough satisfied 
himself with expressing the opinion that a with* 
drawal ' at the present state of forwardness of the 
Enemy's operations' would be contrary to ^the 
spirit of Lt-Qeneral Campbell's Instructions.' It 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 88 

was finally decided to continue the resistance, ap- 
parently against Skerrett's desire. Part of the 
difficulty doubtless arose from the fact that, while 
Skerrett and his Brigade were acting under the 
instructions of Cooke, the portion of the garrison 
under King, who came from the forces at Gibraltar, 
took their orders from Campbell Cooke, influenced 
probably by Skerrett's reports, remained adverse to 
the continued occupation, while Campbell would 
not hear of withdrawal. 

A few days passed in slight skirmishes, but, on 
the 29th, the French artillery succeeded not only in 
temporarily silencing the 16-pounder on Guzman's 
tower, but in effecting a breach in the wall to the 
right of the Portcullis tower. Skerrett now definitely 
decided to abandon the place and to withdraw his 
brigade, but King communicated the intention to 
Campbell, who ordered the transports to return 
to Gibraltar without taking a single soldier on 
board. Next day, the French General, Laval, sent 
in a summons to surrender, to which Camp Marahal 
Copons returned the following remarkable reply: 
f When you propose to the governor of this fortress 
to admit a capitulation, because the breach will 
shortly be practicable, you certainly do not know 
that I am here. When the breach shall be absolutely 
practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head 
of my troops, to defend it; then we will negotiate. 
... Be pleased not to send any more flags of truce.' 
The Spanish boast about the defence of the breach 
was just as well founded as the confidence of the 



84 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

French in its practicability. They saw a wide 
breach in the wall, but they could not tell that the 
front of the breach was the least practicable part 
Instead of leading them straight into the town, it 
would conduct them, should they succeed in forcing 
it, to a precipitous descent of fourteen feet towards 
a narrow street, defended on three sides, and bar- 
ricaded with iron gratings, taken from the balconies 
of the houses ^ The defence of the breach was 
entrusted, not to Copons, but to Gk>ugh and the 
87th, who flanked it from north to south. A 
company of the 47th under Captain Levesey, were 
posted on the east tower. No attack took place on 
the night of the 80th, but at eight o'clock next 
morning a general advance was made by the 
enemy, and about 2,000 grenadiers moved up to 
the breach. Gough, who had instructed his men 
that 'wherever there is opportunity, the bayonet 
must be used,' drew his sword, and ordered the 
band to strike up an Irish air, 'Garry-Owear' So 
furious was the fire that the enemy, finding the 
breach less practicable than Laval had antici- 
pated, diverted their onslaught to the Portcullis. 
Here, too, Gough and the 87th were ready to 
receive them, and to the music of 'St Patrick's 
Day' prepared to meet the advancing foe. The 
French could not stand the attack of the Faugh-a- 
Ballaghs; their leader fell outside the bars of 
the portcullis, close to where Gough stood in 

^ The streDgth of this barricade was increased by the 
device of taming up eveiy alternate bar of the gratings. 



1811] CADIZ AND TARIFA 85 

person at the head of his men ; and the wounded 
Frenchman gave up his sword to Gough, in token of 
surrender. Gk)ugh received it through the bars of 
the portcullis. The main difficulty now was to 
restrain the impetuosity of the 87tL 'Colonel,' 
pleaded one of the regiment, as his commander for- 
bade him to pursue, ' Colonel, I only want to tache 
'em what it is to attack the aiglers.' But not even 
the appeal to the glories of Barrosa could win the 
desired permission, and he had to be content with 
the hope that ' next time they come, well give them 
Oarrtf-Otoen to glory again.' At this point, a field* 
piece from the north-east tower swept the masses of 
the besiegers, and they were compelled to withdraw 
to their camp, leaving Tarifa to the possession of 
the gallant little band which had defended so well 
the honour of the British arms. 'On our side,' 
wrote Colonel Skerrett, in general orders issued 
that evening, 'all behaved nobly, but the conduct 
of Lieut-Col Gough, and the 87th, whose good 
fortune it was to defend the breach, surpasses all 
praise.' Four days later. General Campbell requested 
Gough and the officers and men of the 87th to 
accept his thanks for ' the eminent services of that 
distinguished corps on this day, . . . when the bravery 
and discipline of the 87th regiment was so con- 
spicuously displayed in the defence of the breach \* 

^ In the first edition of his History of the War in the 
Peninsula, Napier gave the credit of defending the breach at 
Tarifa to the 47th B^^iment^ and referred to the 87Ui as 
occapying the portcolliB tower. In the communication from 



86 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1811 

Lord Proby warmly congratulated the raiment on 
seeing them, 'undertheir truly gallant and able com- 
mander, complete the splendid military reputation 
they have acquired at Barrosa, by gaining fresh 
laurels of a description not recently worn by the 
British Arms, by showing, in a breach opposed to 
the most formidable assaults, the same invincible 
courage with which they carried dismay into the 
Tanks of the enemy/ 

Colonel Oough himself, writing to his wife four 
days after the assault, gave the following description 
of the fighting :— 

Tabifa: January 4<%, 1812. 

My letter concluding on the second will have 
announced the glorious result of a storm, made by 
the enemy the last day of the last (to me most 
fortunate) year, in which your husband and his most 
gallant corps shone most conspicuous. How pro- 

which we have already quoted with reference to the battle of 
Barrosa^ Colonel Gough drew the historian's attention to the 
facts that * the whole of the east wall, in front of which the 
enemies* lines were, and in the centre of which was the 
breach, was entmsted to the 87th, from the commencement 
to the termination of the siege, that the 87th occupied the 
breach as well as the portcullis tower, which was merely 
a small Moorish turret, not capable of holding above twenty 
men and situated within ten paces of the breach.' Napier 
corrected the error in later editions. Gk)ugh also mentions, 
in the same letter, that, 'at the council of war held on the 
S4rth Dea, most, if not all, of the officers in command of 
Begiments and Departments, gave it as their opinion that 
the town should not be evacuated, and subsequently recorded 
their opinion in writing when called on by Colonel Skerrett' 



1812] CADIZ AND TARIFA 87 

ductiye of fortunate events was the last year to me ; 
I can hardly hope that this will, or indeed can, be 
equally so, and we conclusion, if properly stated in 
the Despatches, will add lustre to the British arms 
by the conduct of our Corps ; not a man of any 
other having any share in the defence of the Breach 
which was solely entrusted to me. Indeed such a 
degree of respect are we now in, that I, in fact, 
command, as no one is allowed to interfere with 
any orders or arrangements of mine, not alone with 
r^ard to my own gallant corps, but likewise the 
95th, and the Detachments, together with the whole 
line of defenca The enemy are deserting by hun- 
dreds, and we hoiu'ly expect them to taJ^e them- 
selves gS. I will own I shall not be sorry, as 
everything being left to me, my mind and body are 
night and day on the alert. 

Iabifa: January Sth^ 1818. 

The main body of the enemy took themselves 
off last night, and their rear guard this morning. 
I have been through all their camp and lines and 
Batteries. This glorious result to our labours I will 
own was rather unexpected, the more so as Marshal 
Victor received positive orders from the Emperor 
to take this place, and therefore brought with him 
10,000 men and a heavy battering train of artillery, 
with which he has almost levelled the wall and a 
great part of the town. It fell to the good fortune 
of your husband to be appointed to the command of 
the whole line opposed to the enemy, all arrange- 
ments for the Defences of which were solely left to 
him. Therefore the Breach was defended by the 
Prince's Own in the assault on it by 2,200 picked 
men covered by the fire of all their guns, and 1,200 
men from the lines. The enemy were beaten with 
immense loss, while mine was only two killed, two 
sei^geants two officers and eighteen men wounded — 



88 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

which, at least, proves that my arrangements were not 
bad, and on which I assure you I feel more real pride 
and self congratulation than on any other circum- 
stance in my life. Don't be frightened now when I 
tell you I had rather a narrow escape, which indeed in 
such an hour of all kinds of balls and splinters was 
impossible to be otherwise, a small splinter of shell 
having given me the merest cut in the eyebrow and 
a splinter of a stone rather a nasty cut in the finger. 
Indeed my position in the Breach frequently en- 
veloped me in mortar. I merely teU you this to 
prove that an all gracious power guards the life of 
him dear to so good a Christian. The scene was 
awfully grand; every officer and man seemed to 
outvie one another in acts of heroism, and never 
while life is left me can I forget their expressions 
and looks • • • at seeing me bleed, which from exej> 
tion (being in a great heat) my temple did very 
freely, although at the moment and ever since I 
have scarcely felt I was cut. My finger, from the 
cold, has festered and is annoying, which you will 
not be surprized at when I tell you that since the 
Breach became practicable, now six nights back, 
I have never left the wall, except the night before 
last, when I was totally exhausted. In truth I 
volimteered the defence of the Breach, and I could 
not in honour leave it as the enemy were within 
270 paces of it. My boys were in a large church in 
the rear with their arms in their haiids. Poor 
fellows, they never (nor did an individual) murmur, 
although half were always on the walls in one con- 
tinued poiu* of Bain. From the appearance of the 
Trenches, the Enemy must have been almost swim- 
ming. • • • They have certainly buried 8 more 18- 
pounders and have taken off their light guns. They 
seem from the Quantity of raw meat now about the 
camp to have been in no want of that article. But as 
to Bread, they all say they have had none for 7 days. 
How glorious is all this, after all our grumbling; 




TOPOGRAPHY OF TARIFA 



1812] CADIZ AND TARIFA 89 

never did British courage and discipline overcome 
more di£SciiltieSy a garrison of less than one thousand 
firelocks to drive off with disgrace ten times their 
numbers, from a Town the walls of which were 
breached in 6 hours, and which is commanded from 
all the heights roimd it, in several places within 
50 yards. ... If nothing happens, I propose going 
home in April or May ; Moore says he will come to 
Cadiz certainly, and accompany me. . . . We expect 
to go to Cadiz as soon as vessels come round for us. 
I own I wish it, as I am not a little knocked up, 
and so are my poor fellows. Indeed, I think Sir 
John p3oyle] should get us all to England, as we 
are out now over oiur foil term of duty. Prom what 
I have said about the little scratches I have got, 
I only obey you in telling nothing but the truth. . . . 
So very trifling are they, that I would not put 
myself down wounded. 

The valoiu" displayed by Gough, in the defence of 
Tarifa, was recognized not only, as we shall see, by 
Wellington, but also by the Spanish authorities. 
There was conferred upon him the Grand Cross of 
the Order of Charles III of Spain \ which had been 
instituted in 1771. At the close of the war. Colonel 
Gough was permitted to associate the name of Tarifa 
with his own, by an augmentation of his coat of 
arms, an honour to be described in due course. 

^ There are four classes in the Order, of which the Orand 
Cross is the highest. The badge of the Order is a star of 
eight points, enamelled white^ edged with gold; over the 
two upper points^ the regal crown of Spain, chased in gold; 
on the centre of the star, the image of the Virgin Mary^ 
enamelled in proper colours^ vestments white and blue; on 
the reverse^ the letters C. C. in cipher, with the number three 
in the centre^ and this motto — Virtuti et Merito. 



m 

THE CLOSE OP THE CAMPAIGN IN 
ANDALUSIA 

Prom Tarifo, Gk>tigh and his victorious regiment 
returned to Cadiz in the end of January, being 
somewhat ignominiously driven into Gibraltar on 
the way, owing to the breaking of a cable. At 
Cadiz, they were received with great enthusiasm, 
and Gough was able to report to Doyle and Cooke 
upon the courage and discipline of the Prince's Own. 
The raiment remained at Cadiz till the end of 
ApriL It niunbered at this date 780 'effective 
firelocks, after having lost upwards of 700 men in 
the country.' Its discipline received the highest 
commendations from General Boss, who inspected 
it and gave it a report, which, says Gough, ' will do 
us as much good at the Conunander-in-Chief s office 
as if we had gained another victory.' The report 
was specially welcome, as the raiment was said by 
hostile critics to be weak in discipline, and useful 
only for a wild onslaught in an hour of excitement. 
Its conunander had also at this time the pleasure of 
receiving his medals for Talavera and Barrosa. In 
the end of March, (General Cooke recognized Gough's 
services at Tarifa by appointing him commander of 
that place, and the beginning of May found him 
once again at ' the important fortress,' which, a year 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 91 

before had been Hhe most wretched little village in 
Europe.' At his earnest request, a large proportion 
of the 87th accompanied him back to the scene 
of their triumph* In addition to 470 of his own 
regiment, the garrison numbered 800 of a (German 
battalion and 50 artillery. Tarifa was Colonel 
Gough's first separate command, and the fame of 
the recent siege gave it an added importance, and 
associated it still further with his name. Its 
proximity to Gibraltar, and its position as a British 
garrison in the furthest extremity of Spain, combined 
with the memories of the siege to make Tarifa a 
place which all military men visited as occasion 
offered. Upon the commanding officer there fell, 
accordingly, a considerable burden in the way of 
entertainment, but he was in this way brought into 
contact with men qualified to report to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief upon his capabilities as a soldier. 
In spite of occasional visits and still more occasional 
attacks, life at Tarifa proved not less tedious than at 
Cadiz. 'It is stupid to a degree,' Gbugh writes; 
' still, however, I feel glad I was appointed to the 
Command, for it is an honourable mark of approba- 
tion. ... I shall become quite a philosopher ; this 
situation is quite adapted to contemplation.' 

Among Cough's distmguished visitoro was General 
Cooke, and the visit had a somewhat narrow escape 
of acquiring an imenviable notoriety : — 

The iMPOBTAirr Fortress of Tarifa : May 9&lhj 1812. 

I fear some accoimts may go home on the subject 
of the Enemies' late movements before this place. 



92 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

I will own I at one time expected I should have 
had another dust with thenu Soult came to Yejer, 
and sent on two regiments of in&ntry and cavalry 
to within nine miles of this. I was that day out 
with General Cooke who came to see this place, 
showing him Yacinos, where the enemy most un- 
expectedly arrived three hours after. What a 
glorious kick-up it would have made had they 
taken the whole squad of us I After reconnoitring 
and taking all the cattle they could find, they 
returned to Yejer, where Marshall Soult, after 
treating the municipality with the utmost contempt, 
levied a contribution of 5,000 dollars, threatening, 
if not paid within two hours, he would give up the 
place to plunder, marched off with his booty, taking 
with him all his own men and leaving me in quiet 
possession of my government, which I trust in three 
months more may defy any attempt the enemy may 
make on it. At present I would not much have 
relished an attack. You may set your heart at rest 
on the subject of the siege of Cadiz being raised ; 
even was it, I apprehend they would leave me 
quietly where I am, first as the regiments are 
divided, and secondly as they now see the import* 
ance of this port, almost for the salvation of Spain. 
I was most fortunate in having adopted measures 
which highly pleased (General Cooke, and, what 
is rather more difficult. General Campbell, his 
opponent. Nothing can get on better. I cannot 
avoid mentioning a circumstance that at the moment 
nearly gave me as much satisfaction as I ever before 
derived even from the conduct of my regiment in 
the field of battle. From the enemy's having last 
winter, when before this place, burned all the poor 
people's houses in the neighboiu'hood, and the present 
high price of bread, the lower orders of the people 
in this town are actually starving. My glorious set 
of fellows (for which I shall ever feel truly proud of 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 98 

my country) sent their non-commissioned officers to 
me, to say if it would meet with my approval, to 
subscribe a day's pay per man for the relief of the 
poor of the town. This I declare was never even 
suggested by an officer to them ; it was their spon-' 
taneous good feelings. Fellows like these, fighting 
as they have done, and feeling as they do, what 
is there not to be expected from them? I may 
abolish a Quard Boom, and talk of the Cat of Nine 
Tails as an obsolete term« With such men as those 
you may safely confide your husband, when that 
husband (I feel proud to say it) is almost adored 
by thenL ... I feel determined that no want or 
even wish of my soldiers, while within bounds, 
shall remain unsatisfied. They have better bread 
and meat than any soldiers even in England, I make 
xny Commissary answerable for that. They have, 
*tis true, very severe duty, but they all see the 
necessity of it, and I am persuaded there is not 
a soldier who would wish to see one man less 
mount guard I am also a great favourite as yet 
with the Spaniards. Ballesteros I have no opinion 
of; had I had but two of his Begiments I would 
have taken the whole French advance the other 
day, while he remained looking at them, with an 
Army that ought to have eaten thenu Take my 
word for it, notwithstanding all his lies, that he 
never will do a glorious action. He may be a good 
smuggler \ but he is no General ... I understand 
the Enemy have opened again on Cadiz and the 
forts. You may therefore rejoice that I am not 
there, as every shell came over, always right over 
my head room, which was not Bomb-proof . . . my 
Casa just happened to be in the gangway between 
the Enemies' Battery and the town. I am not a 
little glad you did not know this before. 

^ Ballesteros had, before the war^ been employed in coast- 
gnard work. 



94 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

The incident to which the letter refers occurred 
on the 18th of May, when Marshal Soult suddenly 
appeared at Yejer, and, leaving some sixty men 
outside the town, himself marched towards Tarif a and 
Vacinos, plundering as he went along. He demanded 
a ransom of 100,000 reals, and kept the municipal 
authorities imprisoned until that sum was paid. 
So the summer passed slowly on, with such an 
occasional alarm to enliven the dullness of weeks 
occupied with garrison duty, varied by an evening 
card-party or a weekly picnic under the shade of 
the vineyards. 

The campaign of Soult in Andalusia was, by this 
time, nearly over. The year 1812 marks an im- 
portant stage in the war. The misdeeds of the 
Spanish B^gency had reached a crisis by the begin- 
ning of the year. The discontent of the colonies, 
to which reference has already been made, had 
passed into open rebellion, and the Spanish Gk>vem- 
ment had the e&ontery to employ subsidies, granted 
by their allies for the war in Spain, as a means of 
quelling the colonists. In the month of January a 
new B^ency was proclaimed, but matters remained 
much the same; a new constitution followed in 
March, but without any real improvement in the 
conduct of affairs; and a considerable section of 
the democratic party were in favour of abandoning 
the struggle and making terms with Joseph. From 
this fate the Peninsula was delivered by the success 
of Wellington's operations during the year. On 
Januaiy 19, feU Oiudad Bodrigo, and, on the 6th of 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 95 

April, Badajos, the two most important strongholds in 
the hands of the French on the Spanish-Portuguese 
frontier. Soult, who had failed to reinforce BadigoSy 
returned to the blockade of Cadiz, and Wellington 
meditated an invasion of Andalusia. This design 
he was prevented from carrying out, as Marshal 
Marmont menaced the newly captured fortresses, 
and it was impossible for Wellington to trust their 
defence to the Spanish generals. The scene of the 
summer campaign of 1812 was, therefore, not Anda- 
lusia, but Castile, and there, on the 22nd of July, he 
defeated Marmont in the brilliant action of Salamanca, 
which laid open the way to Madrid. Joseph became 
thoroughly alarmed, and sent instructions to Soult 
to evacuate Andalusia. These orders Soult was 
most unwilling to execute. The fedl of Badajos, 
which rendered practicable a campaign of Welling- 
ton himself in Andalusia, had been a severe blow 
to Soult, and from the fear of such an attack he 
had just been relieved. He now proposed to capture 
Tarifa and Cadiz and to crush Ballesteros, and he 
had inflicted a defeat upon that general when 
Joseph's orders were conveyed to hinu Soult 
urged the king to concentrate his forces in Anda- 
lusia, pointing out that the loss of Madrid was 
not really a matter of first importance, and dwelling 
upon the difficulty of a retreat The allies had 
60,000 men in Andalusia who, on Soult's retire- 
ment, would be available for pursuit, while Welling^ 
ton himself was in front. Joseph's reply was a 
renewal of his order (although he had already 



96 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

deserted Madrid), and the siege of Cadiz was raised 
on the 25th of August. Within six weeks Soult had 
made good his retreat, and effected a junction with 
the other French troops in Valencia, whither Joseph 
had fled from Madrid. Meanwhile, Wellington 
was engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to capture 
Burgos, an important French magasdne in the north 
of Spain. The advance of Souham forced him to 
raise the siege, and he retreated across the Douro, 
pursued by Souham (October 29). Both Souham 
and Wellington were in expectation of reinforce* 
ments ; the French general was awaiting the arrival 
of Joseph from Valencia, while Wellington was in 
daily expectation of a junction with Hill and the 
forces which had been detained in the south by 
the movements of Marshal Soult To the march 
of this force it is now time to turn. 

As early as August 2, Gk>ugh wrote to his wife 
that Soult's abandonment of Andalusia was now 
more than probable. On August 24 he says that 
four companies of the 87th had been sent to join 
Hill, and on September 6 he announces his resigna- 
tion of the command at Tarifa, which had ceased to 
possess any military importance : — 

IsLA DE Leon : Gth September, 1812. 

The late occurrences make the movements of the 
army in Spain so uncertain, particularly that part 
to which I belong, that even General Cooke is quite 
in the dark as to what is to become of us. I gave 
up my command on the 81st August, and marched 
overland here, leaving two companies of the German 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 97 

battalion there. I arrived here on the 4th, and 
I believe shall march for Seville, where the re- 
mainder of the division are, on the 8th. I am 
the only Corps now remaining here, except the 
German battalion who remain behind to take charge 
of the redoubts and stores. We are to remain at 
Seville mitil General Cooke receives orders from 
Lord Wellington; until those arrive, our future 
destiny is quite unsettled. General Cooke has 
taken this movement on himself. I am apt to 
think we shall either join Qeneral Hill or Maitland ; 
I hope the latter. . . . The enemy has entirely 
evacuated this part of the country. I have been 
through several of their works; we were most 
completely deceived as to their strength. They 
might have been all easily carried without much 
loss. In coming from Tanfa, I past near Barrosa, 
but had not time to go over the ground, as I was 
Coiomander-in-Chiel I was then imcertain whether 
General Cooke had left this or not — ^he sets off 
tomorrow. I will own I almost r^fret leaving 
Tarifa. 

Ten dajTS later he was at Seville, and still un« 
certain as to future movements : — 

Seville : September 16th, 1812. 

We arrived at this town yesterday morning, after 
a very pleasant march of some days from the Isle, 
which town we left the day I last wrote you. . . . 
We that night got into Puerto Beal, the principal 
point of defence of the French, as it covered the 
Trocadero. They appeared to have fortified it by 
surrounding it by a dry ditch with Bastiona The 
houses of all such as fled they destroyed. As we 
marched for Xeres before dayl^ht, we could hardly 
distinguish or make observations, but from what 
I could judge it is a wretched town, though rather 



98 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

a strong military position. On the march to Xeres 
on the Sihf three leagues, we past the Guadelete on 
which the Enemy had a very strong post, and 
arrived at eleven o'clock at Xeres, a most beautifully 
situated town, in which is made all the Sherry wine 
sent to England. I was billeted in the same house 
where Marshal Victor had his Headquarters, and 
had the honour of sleeping in his bed I was quite 
pleased with this town ; it is situated on a hill and 
has a most extensive and beautiful view of the 
oountry, which even now is almost a vineyard. 
Soult, when in the lines before Cadiz, had his Head- 
quarters here, and the people seem quite Frenchified; 
indeed they do not conceal their sentiments. My 
landlord, a most gentlemanly and well informed 
man, was of French extraction and had the contract 
for provisions. He, however, was to a d^ree civil 
to me, and gave me a most excellent dinner and 
more real information of the French Generals and 
their military policy than I could otherwise procure. 
I went through his wine stores, supposed the largest 
in Europe ; he has frequently shipped six thousand 
pipes of wine firom them in one year. I was very 
much pleased with them, and the Cathedral, which 
was a very fine building. On the ninth we got to 
Lebrija, five leagues, and on the tenth to Los Cabas; 
these are two small towns without anything par- 
ticular, in which the Enemy generally had a few 
infant^ and cavalry to keep up the communications 
on the Seville road on which they are. On the 11th 
we got to Utrera, where we met the Guards and the 
heavy Brigade of nine-poimders. This, though not 
very large, is considered one of the richest towns in 
the South of Spain ; some of the houses are magni- 
ficent. On the 12th we reached Dos Hermanas 
(two sisters) a small village, and yesterday arrived 
in this Quarter. The road from Isla here is to a 
degree beautiful, however it wants water. The 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 99 

people, particularly in the last village (we having 
been the first red coats tihey ever saw) were to a 
degree civil and seemed delighted, with the excep- 
tion of Puerto Beal and Xeres. This is a very 
magnificent city, formerly the Capital of Spain. 
The public buildings are superb to a degree. The 
Cathedral far surpasses anything I ever saw, but 
I have been so much hurried with Begimental 
duties that I have had veiy little time for observa- 
tion. I was at the Theatre last night and was much 
pleased, the performers seemed better than those at 
Cadiz, except the dancers, but the house is not near 
so good, about the size of the Hay Market, but far more 
beautifuL The streets, however, are uncommonly 
narrow and not at all clean, the houses are very 
irregular. The town appears twice the size of Cadiz. 
The Almeida, or public walk, the Spaniards call one 
of the wonders of the world ; it runs several miles 
along the river Quadalquivre, which is a beautiful 
river and navigable up to the town for small vessels. 
It is to me the most extraordinary thing that ever 
occurred, how the Enemy could have been so 
deceived, as the allies had to cross the Bridge, which 
is a very strong position and the city is walled. 
They had between three and four thousand Infantry 
and two Begiments of Cavalry in town. We had 
now 1,600 British and six thousand Spaniards, which 
one thousand French would have drove before them. 
They knew Skerret was in their neighbourhood and 
his force, and had no idea of his daring to attack 
them. They were all at breakfast when they heard 
that a host of red coats were pouring down the Hills 
close to the Town, our advance were certainly in the 

suburbs when their Qeneral was ^ They 

therefore thought it was Qeneral Hill and fled in the 
most disgraceful confusion, their officers, such as 
collected in the hurry, could not get the men to 

» Word illegible. 
H2 



.:i 



100 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

stand against the red coats. The conduct of the 
inhabitants was enthusiastic, long before the Enemy 
left the town the joy bells in all the Churches began 
ringing, and the stragglers were pelted by the people, 
who ran out and embraced our men ; several cheer- 
ing on the English were actually wounded in the 
Batteries. Yillatte was to have retired in two days 
after, before which he was to have raised a contribu- 
tion that was tantamount to sacking the Town, after 
which the Division that retired from the Lines was 
to have come in and given it the finishing stroke. 
Well therefore might the inhabitants have rejoiced. 
When I see more of the public buildings, I will give 
you, or rather will attempt to give you, some descrip- 
tion of them. • • . General Cooke waits for orders ; 
some say we are to spend the winter here, I think 
not. We have not a Frenchman within 180 miles 
of us. Cooke is here, I dine with him today ; he is 
still as attentive as ever to me. We are in Lord 
Prob/s Brigade, who is not a little proud of us — 
however, I have found the detachment in shocking 
order, but am making every exertion to fit them out. 
I have upwards of seven hundred with me. 

The movement in which Cooke's force was engaged 
was designed to harass Soult's retreat, or, rather to 
reinforce Sir Bowland Hill. But Soult was already 
&r on his road to Valencia, and Cooke hurried for- 
ward to join Hill, with a view to a concentration 
with the Commander-in-Chief, now engaged in the 
siege of Buigos. They marched through a desolate 
and devastated country to Truxillo, which they 
reached on October 14. This advance involved some 
severe marching, and Gk>ugh rejoices in the reputa- 
tion which his regiment was achieving : — 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 101 

Tbxtzillo : Oct. l^h, 181S. 

We have got thus for on our route to join General 
Hill, who is either at Toledo or Aranjuez. This 
town is quite destroyed, I really would not know 
it : my old billet is in ruins. I regret to tell you 
the weather has, I fear, set in for the first rains, 
which generally last a fortnight, which will about 
bring us to the end of our March. My men have 
astonished the Division in marching ; I never saw 
such a set of fellows. I came yesterday seven and 
twenty miles over a most wretched road, and it rain- 
ing all the time, in eight hours and a half, without 
having one man out of his section an inch. The 
Guards saw us come in to their astonishment. 
Skerrett, who was present, cried out *G — d — n 
me, my Brigade, let them look at that Begiment, 
and be ashamed of themselves.' I trust the fellows 
will continue, if they do there will be nothing but 
comfort . . . The day after tomorrow we shall cross 
the Tagus at Almaraz, where we shall see the 
scene of Sir R. Hill's last brilliant affair. ... It is 
here reported that Marquis Wellington has taken 
Burgos and that one or two of his Divisions are on 
their march to join Sir B. Hill : if so, I have some 
hopes stiU of seeing William, which I own I should 
be very glad o£ 

At this point there is a break in Gough's corre- 
spondence. His regiment continued its march to 
join Hill at Aranjuez, and reached him in time to 
take part in the defence of the Puente Larga, a 
bridge near the junction of the Jarama with the 
Henares, and to accompany the retreat from Madrid 
to Salamanca, to join the Commander-in-Chie£ It 
is, for our purpose, unnecessary to describe the 
incidents of the next fortnight, in which neither 



102 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1812 

Wellington's nor Soult's intentions are absolutely 
dear. On the ISth of October, Wellington, having 
failed to bring about a pitched battle, continued his 
retreat, and the army went into winter quarters. 
The general position selected by Wellington for 
this purpose, extended from Plasencia and Coria 
to Lamego, in Portugal The 87th was separated 
fix>m the 4th Division with which it had acted 
since joining Hill, and rejoined the 2nd Brigade of 
the 8rd Division, stationed in Portugal Gk>ugh 
writes from near Lamego in December, but the 
letters which follow speak of changes, and we find 
him, consecutively, at Villa de Ponte, at Adbarros, 
at Quinta de Bobira, and finally, in April, at Vide. 
The retreat from Burgos and Madrid was an inglo- 
rious ending to a year of triumph, and the British 
army was disheartened to the last degree. As 
a natural consequence, its discipline deteriorated. 
The men plundered and mutinied, and, at the small 
combat of the Huebra, at the beginning of the 
retreat, some of the general officers deliberately 
ignored the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and, 
but for Wellington's promptness, might have caused 
a heavy disaster. All through the winter, com- 
plaints continue about the condition of the army, 
and Gbugh attributes the discontent partly to dis- 
appointment and ill-health, and partly to the 
disgraceful outbursts which had followed the cap- 
ture of Ciudad Bodrigo and Badsgos. The general 
discontent had infected the 87th, and Gk>ugh's 
letters are full of illustrations of the difficulties of 



^ 



1812] CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA 108 

that dreadful winter. The buoyant tone of his 
letters changes at the end of November, when he 
describes ^ the miseries of a retreat in winter, and 
the feelings of an officer, commanding, not a fort- 
night back, one of the nicest Corps in the service, 
now reduced to half its nimibers, and that half 
broken-spirited and starved.' A fortnight later, he 
gives a more detailed account of his troubles : — 

FoBT Alcada (five leagues from Lamego) : Dec. 9th, 1812. 

. . . We have at length got into what is called 
Winter Quarters, in a most wretched httle village, 
but I trust as we are very crowded, with the 94th 
Begt. we shall get removed to some other Quarters — 
as nothing can be worse than this. • • . The Batta- 
lion is so cut up from its late march, that it quite 
sickens me to look at them, particularly as the 
means of getting them shortly again into order is 
not within my reach — I mean Money, Necessaries, 
&c. • • • This Battalion having been paid at Seville 
to 24th Oct., while the Army here have only been 
paid to 24th July, they now, when it is required, 
get two months' pay; we get nothing. When 
I reflect on what we were, when we left Seville, 
and what we are, I will own I have scarcely 
heart to undertake a total equipment and reorgani- 
zation of the Battalion. There are difficulties 
attending on 2nd Battalions which scarcely can be 
surmounted on service, and CoL Fulton, from the 
class of men he sent us, has done the Battalion more 
injury than any other officer can ever repair. They 
wUl ever distinguish themselves in the Field, but 
I fear it will be a long time before they can bear 
a review. Want of provisions has also produced 
thieving, which is hard to eradicate, I am sorry to 
say, in an Irishman. 



104 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

The numbers of the corps continued to decrease : 
in the beginning of January it was only 850 
strong; a month later, out of 400 men, 65 were 
in hospitaL ^The army at lai^ are in a very 
shocking way, several Corps not more than my 
strength have two hundred in hospital— I mean 
Eegimental Hospital, the General Hospitals are 
fiilL' The morale of the 87th continued good, 
and the men showed an attachment to their corps 
and to their commander which was very gratifying 
to Gk>ugh's feelings. An imfortunate incident 
occurred in March ; the misconduct of a few men, 
while bringing military stores from Lisbon, brought 
upon the 87th a severe and lai^gely unmerited 
censure from Wellington. It is probable that Wel- 
lington wished to make an example, for insubordi- 
nation was so common that, as Oough remarks, 
^ Gourt-Martials are the order of the day throughout 
the army/ The incident is noteworthy only as it 
contributed to give a general impression of want 
of discipline in the 87th — a charge which Oough 
repudiates by reference to the reports of Generals 
Graham and Cooke, and the other officers imder 
whom it had served. 



IV 
VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 

Wellington spent the winter months in making 
preparations for the campaign of Yittoria. Be- 
inforcements reached him from England, and it is 
estimate that in the spring of 1818 he had nearly 
200y000 troops (British, Spanish, and Portuguese) 
imder his command. He had been, in the preceding 
September, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 
Spanish armies, and, in January, he paid a visit to 
Cadiz to lay his plans before the Cortes. WhUe the 
campaign of 1818 opened with an increase of the 
numbers imder Wellington's control, the forces of 
the enemy had been diminished owing to the 
mortality of the Bussian campaign, but they still 
remained about 80,000 in excess of the allied 
armies. The French were in four divisions ; in the 
north, they held the Tonnes and the Esla ; in the 
north-west, Cafarelli separated the British from 
their fleet in the Bay of Biscay ; while, in the south, 
one division held the Tagus, and another covered 
Madrid. In these circumstances, Wellington deter- 
mined to strike a blow before they were ready, and 
to evade the defences of the Tonnes and the Douro 
by turning the right flank of the enemy. This 
important movement he entrusted to General 



106 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

Graham, the hero of Barrosa. Early m May the 
scheme was arranged, and Graham was instructed 
to cross the Domx>, march through the Tras-os- 
Montes to Zamora, and thence northwards to Yalla- 
dolid. Graham's force included the 8rd Division 
now under Picton« Gough writes on May 14 in 
good spirits; they are on the point of departure, his 
men are in excellent order and spirits, and the rank 
and file now numbers 510. We have no further 
accoimt of his march ; but it can have been no easy 
task to make their way through that wild coimtry. 
While Graham was traversing the Tras-os-Montes, 
Wellington forced back the French from the line of 
the Tormes, and reached a point between Miranda 
de Duero and Tore. Graham's appearance on the 
right bank of the Esla took the French by surprise, 
and they retreated first to Zamora and then to 
Toro, whence the concentration of Wellington's 
army drove them still backwards. From Toro 
Wellington advanced to Yalladolid, in pursuit not 
only of the army which had held the line of the 
Douro, but also of the army of the south, imder 
Joseph, which, fearing that it might be cut o£^ 
was marching with all haste to join the army of 
Portugal Had this concentration taken place 
earlier, Wellington's task in such a coimtry, and 
against so large a nmnber of the enemy, would 
have been something very different from the trium* 
phal march which Gough describes in a letter 
written early in June: — 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 107 

Camp (two leagues in front of Palenoia) : Jwm 9th [1818]. 

• . • We got into Palencia the day before yester- 
day at three o'clock. The Intrusive King reviewed 
the French troops the day previous, and left the 
town at five in the evenings after which they com- 
menced their retreat taking all they could carry o£ 
Their cavalry left the town six hours before we 
came in. Notwithstanding, you would imagine we 
were at peace. I go as reguJarly to bed in sheets as 
I would in Engkmd and with as little prospect of 
being disturbed. I own it is quite a new thing to 
me. . • • Lord Wellington, in passing the Bri^ide 
the other day, on the march, pulled in his horse in 
rear of the Begiment, on which he kept his eyes 
so stedfastly fixed during the quarter of an hour he 
remained in their rear, and the whole time he took 
walking his horse along their flank. I never saw 
so minute an Inspection. When he got to our head 
he again put spurs to his horse and galloped on. 
We were marching in prime order; he said not 
a word. It is said the Enemy are destroying the 
works of Buigos and are determined to retire 
behind the Ebro, so I fear there will be little 
chance for some length of time for us to distinguish 
ourselves. 

The rumour about Buigos, improbable as it seemed, 
turned out to be correct. The French had trusted 
to keeping back the enemy at the Douro, and had 
left the new fortifications of Burgos unfinished, but 
sufficiently high to command the older defences 
which resisted the besi^ers in the preceding year. 
The fortress which had put a limit to Wellington's 
victorious career after Salamanca, feU, therefore, 
into his hands without a struggle, and the French 
continued their retreat to the Ebro. It was decided 



108 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

to hold this strongly, and a detachment was left to 
guard the left flank at Pancorbo, while the line of 
the river was occupied down to Haro. Wellington 
adopted precisely the same device that had served 
him so well at the crossing of the Douro, except 
that he now turned the French position with his 
whole army, instead of with one division. Graham's 
experience among the Tras-os-Montes showed the 
possibility of leading an army and of moving artillery 
through mountainous country, and Wellington de- 
cided to cross the upper waters of the Ebro, and 
to repeat Graham's exploit by marching through 
the moimtains on the borders of Guipuzcoa. On 
June 18, Gough wrote to his wife, relating some of 
the incidents of their rapid march* ^ We crossed the 
Ebro,' he says, ^ at St. Martin, on the 15th, and have 
been making long and distressing marches since, 
through the boldest, most mountainous, and ro- 
mantic country I ever beheld. The Spaniards de- 
serve to lose their country for not having defended 
the passes of the Ebro, and indeed, all the country 
to the North of it I was much disappointed on 
finding that Eiver, this £eu: up, quite a stream. The 
inhabitants either dislike or fear us much, as they 
have forsaken most of the Villages we have past 
through. We have latterly been badly off for bread, 
but our General (Picton) has been indefatigable in 
his exertions. The Seventh Division have been 
with us for some da3rs. I have therefore seen a good 
deal of William, who is quite welL • . • I am happy 
to tell you my Men are getting on capitally — only 



n 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 109 

eight sicky after all my fatigues. The whole army 
are in high order and spirits/ The feeling of 
confidence seems to have been general ^I am san- 
guine/ sa3rs Oough, Hhat this will be the most 
brilliant campaign for the Grand Lord that he 
has ever attempted' 

On the 19th of June, Wellington was encamped 
on the BayaSy facing the French position at Yittoria. 
It is not necessary, in a biography of Lord Gough, 
to do more than give the merest outline of the 
£amous action that followed on the 21st The 
French position was chosen with that lack of mili- 
tary insight which characterized all the movements 
of the well-meaning Joseph. The river Zadora 
turns almost at right angles in fix>nt of Yittoria, and 
the French were drawn up along the river bank, 
presenting a double face to the attack of the allies, 
and covered by a stream crossed by seven bridges 
which they did not attempt to hold. The centre 
and left stretched from the village of Hermandad to 
the heights of Puebla, while the right (the army of 
Portugal) was seven miles distant. Wellington 
divided his army into three columns and arranged 
a simultaneous attack upon the French. Sir Thomas 
Graham was entrusted with the assault upon the 
right wing of the enemy, and Sir Bowland Hill 
with the assault on their left, while the Commander- 
in-Chief took charge of the centre. In spite of some 
scarcely avoidable delay, these movements were 
effectually carried out, and Graham and Hill soon 
menaced the enemy's flanks. Gough, with the rest 



110 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

of the 8rd Division under Picton, formed part of 
Wellington's left centre, and reached the field some- 
what late. Along with the 7th Division, under 
Lord Dalhousie, they took a distinguished part in 
the action, and Gk>ugh, with the STth, made a 
brilliant charge, and captured the village of Her- 
mandad. The French centre began to give way, 
and soon were in fiill retreat, pursued by Ficton 
and Dalhousie, towards Yittoria. Earlier in the 
day Hill had carried La Fuebla, and the gallant 
stand made by Beille and the army of Portugal 
against Graham was rendered useless by the retreat 
of Joseph and the centre, which exposed their left 
and rear. Beille therefore withdrew his forces and 
succeeded in keeping them in good order, so long 
as they were separated from the frightened rout 
of the French centre. This of course could not 
be for long, and the whole French army was soon 
in helpless and hopeless flight In the following 
letter Gk>ugh describes the fight, and refers to 
the enormous amount of spoil which was one of 
the features of the victory. He was himself im- 
wounded, although he had been hit in three 
places : ^ the skin,' he says, ^ not broken.' A 
shot had passed through his coat in two or three 
places, and his horse had been killed under him. 
'The Officers,' he says, 'are surprised I brought 
my men under such a tremendous fire; they 
would be more astonished if they had been 
in it' 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 111 

Camp (before Vittoria) : June ftStnd, 1818. 

My beloved will rejoice to hear that the oppor- 
tunity of distinguishing myself and the Corps 
occurred yesterday, the glorious Twenty-first June. 
The Battdion out-Heroded Herod, its conduct called 
forth the warmest encomimns from Oeneral Colville, 
who witnessed a part of its conduct. After the 
action he said before several officers, *Gough, you 
and your Corps have done wondera' But, by the 
bye, he did not see all, a village having separated 
me from the rest of the Brigade, when I charged 
two heights on which were a numerous Force of 
Artillery, supported by a heavy column of Infantry, 
I should think about two thousand, without a Corps 
to assist us. My good fortune still supports me, as 
I found one of my Sergeants got the Batonner 
(Truncheon) of Marshal Jourdan, who commanded 
the French, carried, I should think by one of his 
staff who was killed. I shall present it tomorrow 
to (j^neral Colville for Lord Wellington. Unfor- 
tunately no officer saw the fellow take it, I should 
therefore fear our action will not appear. ... It is 
a staff about two feet long covered with purple 
velvet, most beautifiilly embroidered with Eagles. 
The young rascal has taken off the two Gold Eagles 
on either end, which he pretends he has lost. I 
cannot express to you my satisfaction at the conduct 
of the Officers and Men, they really have proved 
themselves heroes, which indeed I understand have 
all the other Corps of this Division. We have 
taken innumerable Gims, I should think nearly 
the whole the Enemy had, and the whole of their 
Baggage. Some of my fellows have made fortunes, 
but much less than the old soldiers of other Corps. 
I passed some Hundred carriages, some beautiful, 
all laden with trunks &c. I hear, full of gold. I 
have purchased some plate and a magnificent sword. 

I regret to tell you my loss was enormous, but 



n 



112 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

few when I reflect on the tremendous fire we were 
in for two hours and a half. 

The b&ton was presented by Wellington to the 
Prince Begent who sent him, in return, that of a 
Field-Marshal of the British Army. 

The plimder of Yittoria had its usual sequel in 
the degeneration of discipline, which prevented thb 
allies from using to the fidl the opportunities afforded 
by the complete rout of Joseph's army, and, while 
Wellington began the sieges of Pampeluna and San 
Sebastian, the Emperor sent Soult to reorganize the 
wreck of the armies in Spain. Only one army 
remained in the east of Spain, and the British force 
under Sir John Murray should have kept a check 
upon it and its commander, Suchet. Miuray, how- 
ever, embarked his men, and Wellington's move- 
ments were now threatened by the possibility of an 
advance by Suchet. He therefore undertook only 
the siege of San Sebastian which he could not leave 
in his rear, and blockaded Pampeluna. Gk>ugh and 
the 87th were in the latter portion of the army ; on 
June 80 he writes from halfway between Pampeluna 
and Saragossa, engaged in an attempt to cut off 
General Clausel from France; the attempt was 
unsuccessful, and on July 16 he is again in the 
north, occupied with the blockade of Pampeluna. 
His regiment has behaved well, and he boasts that 
only two of the 87th have fedlen out, while from 
fifty to a hundred of all other corps have dropped by 
the way. Soult had now taken command, and on the 
24th he advanced to the relief of San Sebastian and 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 118 

Pampeluna. The immediate result was the first check 
to the British arms since the retreat fix>m Buigos; 
Soult succeeded in driving out the enemy from the 
passes of Maya and Boncesvalles, and Cole and 
Ficton, who had been in command at BoncesvalleSi 
retreated to Huarte. Gough does not describe this 
retreat in any extant letter, and, when he next 
writesi a week later, the situation had been retrieved 
by Wellington himself. Returning rapidly from 
San Sebastian, when he understood the danger 
arising fix>m Soult's appearance, he surprised Picton's 
force by his sudden arrival, and possibly restrained 
Soult from making an immediate attack. In the 
two battles of Sorauren, fought on July 28 and 80, 
Soult was completely defeated, and driven back over 
the frontier into France. In these the 87th had no 
share of the fighting, but Gough's accoimt of the 
action is interestiug :-^ 

Cahp (one Mile above the Clouds) : August indj 1818. 

We ascended yesterday from Honcesvalles (the 
celebrated) to our present exalted situation, which, 
though much nearer Heaven, partakes nothing 
of wnat we paint to ourselves are the pleasures and 
comforts experienced there. Except bilberries is 
the food of we Inhabitants, I know of no other they 
can possibly procure in tnis wretched region, and 
playmg hide and go seek in the douds— I know 
of no other possible pastime. In short, we are 
encamped on a heath on the summit of the FyreneeS| 
and in a thick mist, but for which we could see 
many leagues into France, from which we are about 
3ix or eight miles — our object to cover the pass of 
BoncesvaQes, which we passed through in our ascent, 

I I 



114 WAK IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

bai which is cxmunanded by this Iftoontain. From 
the pass, which is below the cloud, we had a most 
extended view of France, which appeared just under 
us, and was very inviting. The little Town of 
Boncesvalles, whmh is at the Spanish side of the 
Mountain, just under the pass, and is the most 
beautiful and romantic situate place you can paint 
to your imagination, I quite regretted leaving it 
The Pyrenees are nearly wooded to their summit 
with very fine Beech, and are very grand indeed. 
This pass is that which Soult came lately through 
and which the Fourth Division abandoned, just as 
we came up to them ; both Divioions then fell back 
to Huarte, the village we formerly were quartered 
in, close to Pampeluna, where Sir Thomas Picton 
took up a position, placing us, his own Division, on 
the right of the village, which he conceived the 
most assailable, the Fourth Division on the Left, 
supported by a Brigade of the 2nd and the Spaniards. 
The enemy pressed close after us, and we scarcely 
had got into position when their Columns made their 
appearance, but u^fortunately (perhaps you will 
tnmk otherways) for us, they attacked the Hills on 
which the Fourth Division were posted, leaving 
7,000 Infantry and 2,500 Cavalry in front of us, so 
close that Colonel Duglas'guns frequently fired over 
them — ^a small rivulet only separated us. We every 
moment expected them, but that was not Soult's 
intention. . . . During the night, the Enemy moved 
Columns to his Right, for the purpose of turning our 
left, which he would have done but for the provi- 
dential arrival of the 6th division at the very critical 
moment. These attacks were very formidable as to 
numbers, but as to spirit miserable. This day they 
again attacked the hill twice, and were twice repulsed 
at the point of the Bayonet. Conceive how interest- 
ing thii9 was to us, who could see every part of it 
and close to us. It was quite a show. Early the 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 115 

third morning, the Marquis came up to our hill. 
I was standing with Thoa Picton, who with Sir 
Stapleton Cotton, Generals Colville and Ponsonby/ 
was with us the whole time. He appeared in ihe 
most wonderful good spirits, and shook Sir Thos. 
(who by the bye he has not been hitherto on good 
terms with) most heartily by the hand. It was this 
day supposed that Soult, finding himself foiled on 
the left, would have attacked the Bight We were 
therefore all prepared, but alas no such thing. . . . 
The night passing, at daylight we saw the Enemy 
in full retreat, but supposing it to be manoeuvring 
we did not follow tUl 10 o'clock. Our Division 
then pushed forward, and we were in hopea we 
should have made up for lost time. He kept on 
the hills, and we were on the main road just below 
him, on his flank ... we did not bring him into 
Action, altho' for two leagues we were within half 
a mile of his Columns. I will own I felt much 
disappointed as I think our Division might have 
done much more, had they either pushed in (as they 
latterly did) and got in the Enemy's Bear, or ascended 
the hill and attacked his flank. We however made 
him alter his point of Betreat. The whole business 
was grand to a d^ree and glorious. It is estimated 
that the Enemy's loss has been at least 15,000. He 
brought 45,000 into the country, and there are ni^e 
thousand still straggling amongst these Moimtains. 
The fighting Division \ or the 8rd consisted of 8 com- 
panies of the 60th, 5th, 45th, 74th, 88rd, 87th, 88th, 
and 94th Btns., 9th and 21st Portuguese. We were 
for the first time without fighting and all dis- 
appointed, except the 45th and 74th. . . . Lord 
Wellington is certainly a very great, but he is avery 
fortunate lian. He has now fiilly crippled the 
Enemy, who, between ourselves, had they not made 
some blunders, and had fought like men, would have 

^ The * fighting Diyirion ^ was the local nickname of the 8rd. 

12 



116 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

cripi^ed him. The French peasantry are all in 
arms, and frightened at our being so near neigh- 
bours. Was it left with me, I would at once move 
into Franca It is expected that the Qarrison of 
Pampeluna finding Soult's fsdlure, surrendered the 
day we left it If they have not, they shortly must 
for want of Provisions. St. Sebastian must also 
very shortly foUow. What they will do with us 
then Gk>d knows. 

Soult's retreat into France cut off Suchet from 
any possible co-operation with the rest of the French 
army, and the arrival of Lord William Bentinck to 
replace Murray fr'eed Wellington from any danger 
from the only French army left in Spain. The 
Maya Pass and the Pass of Boncesvalles were again 
held by the British forces, while the siege of San 
Sebastian was renewed with vigour. Gk)ugh was 
stationed in the Maya Pass, whence he writes on 
August 12 : — 

We have been in this Pass two days, together 
with the 6th Division (now under the command of 
General Ciolville). I thought the scenery of Bonces- 
valles grand, but this is infinitely superiof*. From 
our camp we see from twenty to thirty leagues into 
France, studded with Towns and Villages, with a 
inost extensive view of the Bay of Biscay. . • • 
We look over on the French Camp, in which it 
appears they have very few men. It is said they 
have marched some heavy Ciolunms to the Bight 
(their Left). I own I do not think Soult will, from 
the loss of one action, give up a kingdom. I am 
persuaded he will again tiy to raise the siege of 
Pamplona, by pushing through the Maya Pass (to 
the right of Boncesvalles), shewing colunms at the 
same time on our right to keep us here, while 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 117 

Suchet threatens the Right, and perhaps joins him. 
To counterbalance this 50,000 Spaniards join ns, 
5,000 British from England, 2,000 Guards from 
Oporto, and about the same number of the slight 
cases from Vittoria and Pamplona. This will enable 
His Lordship again to set you Englisli all agog . . . 
and I own I think the tune fast approaches. But 
don't be uneasy, if I thought there was any chance 
of this Battalion being much employed, I should not 
have been so very commimicatiye. . • • Tell Edward ^ 
he must not be frightened, that the French will not 
eat his Papa until he gets fatter, which there, does 
not appear much chance of, in these mountains. 

Eight days later, his estimate of Soult's intentions 
has changed. ^ We are still,' he says, ^ in the Maya 
Pass, the enemy in our front are very weak in 
numbers, but in position very favourable. They 
say they hourly expect to hear of a Qeneral Peace ; 
under this conviction they do not even fire on some 
of our Light Troops, who have struggled into France 
to collect vegetables.' 

Meanwhile, San Sebastian and Pamplona were 
still holding out ; the former fell on August 81, and 
the latter exactly two months later. During this 
time, Soult remained on the defensive, holding the 
line from Ainhoue to the coast, while Suchet was 
detained by Bentinck in Catalonia. Gk)ugh's division 
continued to garrison the Maya Pass, and two 
months elapsed before he was again in action. The 
time passed quietly, with an occasional excursion 
into the mountains, a rumour that they were to be 
sent into Gatalonia, and the excitement of the 

^ His son, ct p. ii8. 



118 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1818 

arrival of dispatches. These, indeedi can have 
brought little satisfaction to the 87th, whose services 
at Vittoria received scant recognition. Wellington 
had just made a rule not to name in dispatches 
regimental commanding officers, except those who 
had been killed, as he found that thie opposite 
practice was productive of never^nding jealousies. 
It may be doubted if the decision was a wise one, 
and it must have been somewhat disheartening to the 
colonel of the 87th, for alike at Barrosa, at Tari£E^ and 
even at Vittoria, circmnstances had made Gough, for 
the time, his own commanding officer. He had now 
commanded a battalion longer than probably any 
other officer in the Peninsula; the only French 
b&ton and the first French eagle captured in the 
war had fallen to the 87th, and Wellington himself 
had declared that their courage at Tarifa was greater 
than could reasonably be expected even of British 
soldiers. The disappointment of the dispatches 
was, however, amply atoned for a few weeks later, 
when Wellington himself gave to Gk)ugh a 'full 
and most gratifying explanation ' and an invitation 
to memorialize, through the Commander-in-Chief, 
for a medal for Talavera. While Wellington was 
preparing for the attack upon Soult, and an 
action was imminent, (Rough's thoughts were dis- 
tracted by the news of the death of his little son, 
Edward \ whom he had not seen since his birth, but 

^ The child had been bom on December 9, 1810^ daring 
a second visit home paid by Colonel GK)ugh in the course of 
that year. 



1818] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 119 

of whom his home letters had been fiilL His letter 
of consolation to his wife was written on the 8rd 
of November ; a week later his attention was once 
more diverted by the approach of another important 
action, his last, as it turned out, in the Peninsular 
War. 

In the battle of the Nivelle (November 9^ 1818), 
Gk)ugh and the 87th bore an honourable part The 
French line of defence stretched across twelve miles, 
and the fighting on both sides took place in three 
divisions. On the British right Hill was opposed 
to d'Erlon, in the centre Beresford faced Clausel, 
and Hope commanded our left wing against 
Beille. In the morning, the British carried all 
three positions, and drove the French upon their 
second line of defenca The moral effect of this 
early repulse was very great, and Soidt's army was 
further depressed by the news (unknown to the 
Allies) that Napoleon had suffered his great defeat 
at Leipsic. The British had entered on the struggle 
fiill of confidence, and Wellington's admirable 
strategy was carried out as he wished. By night- 
faHj the French position (^ strong by nature,' says 
Gbugh, ^and made as strong as art can make if) 
was in the hands of the enemy. The 87th, under 
Colville, had been stationed on the right of the 
British centre, dose to Zugaramundi, with the rest 
of the Srd Division. The division was given a 
part in the heavy fighting which took place round 
the village of Sane, in front of which the French 
had constructed two formidable redoubts, and later 



120 WAR IX THE FEXIXSULA [1818 



in the day tfaejr were Beat w^huA the foitifieitioiis 
of Saint P^ In cue of these JctioDs (it is not dear 
which) Goog^ WBB woonded. In m note written 
to hia wife the same erening, he asjna: — 

'Don't be frightpnipd, my dailing Franoes, by 
seeing your old man's name in the list of wounded. 
I got 8 hard rap in the hip, but the bone is not 
touched I however fear it will be some time before 
I will be weUL However, I fuUy did, I trust, my 
duty— one oomfort, I feel I did. I fear I lost most 
severely — ^three other officers wounded are in the 
room with ma' The 87th had fuUy maintained its 
reputation. 'The old Ciorps,' he says, 'behaved as 
USuaL • • • Nothing could withstand the Prince's Own. 
Old C!olville cried out^ " Boyal 87th, Glorious 87th,'' 
and well he mi^t' 

Qough had been removed to hospital at Zugara- 
mundi where he remained till the end of the year. 
His letters to his wife report gradual progress ; by 
the beginning of December he is able to go about 
on crutches, on Christmas Day he entertains a party 
of wounded friends to celebrate the arrival of Col- 
ville's dispatch on the battle, one sentence of which 
runs : — ^ The ll^jor^eneral is happy to communi- 
cate the latest information received from the 
Medical Officers in the rear, that the severe wound 
of lit Colonel Gk)ugh of the 87th, does not threaten 
more than the temporary loss of his very valuable 
services.' It was, of course, a great disappointment 
to bo imable to take his part in the victory of the 
Nivo and Saint Pierre, although it brought some 



1814] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 121 

comfort that the 87th, not being engaged, had not 
entered the field under any other commander. His 
wound progressed slowly. A removal, on a bullock 
conveyance, to a new hospital at Bestoria did not 
help his convalescence, and he saw none of the little 
fighting that remained for the Peninsular forces. 
Wellington remained in winter quarters till the 
middle of February ; on the 27th, he won the battle 
of Orthes, and, a fortnight afterwards, Beresford 
entered Bordeaux. Soult made some further resis- 
tance, but the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon 
put an end to the long struggle. Gbugh writes his 
last Peninsular letter from hospital at Bestoria, on 
February 28th— he hopes to be home in a month. 
Of the precise date of his arrival and of the long 
hoped for meeting there is no record. Among all 
the wanderings in many climes which lay before 
him in the futiure, there was not to be another visit 
to Spain. Long years afterwards, when he had 
attained almost the highest honours for which 
a British soldier may wish, he spent some months, 
in hale and vigorous old age, at Saint Jean de Luz. 
One day he disappeared, taking with him a small 
grandson K His family and the little community, 
who took a pride in their distinguished visitor, 
became alarmed and were going out to search for 
him, when he appeared tired and hatless. 'If I have 
not been again in Spain,' he said, ' at all events, 

^ Now Colonel Hugh Grants C.B., who oommanded^ from 
1891 to 1896^ the regiment in which his grandEather had 
served in the West Indies— the 78th or Seal orth Highlanders. 



122 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1814 

my hat is there, for it blew off at the top of the hill, 
as I looked down upon the soil of the Peninsula,' 
Nearly six years of strenuous work lay 'over the 
hills and far away/ in the treasure-house of memo- 
ries which few living men could share with him. 
He had laid there the foundations of fame and 
fortune, and he had been the almost idolized leader 
of a gallant and devoted Battalion. His com- 
manding officers, and the great Duke himself, had 
expressed the highest appreciation of the achieve^ 
ments of the 87th and their ColoneL ' I should be 
very ungrateful,- Wellington wrote to Sir John 
Doyle, in the summer of 1814, ' if I was not ready 
to apply for promotion for the gallant officers who 
have served under my command, and will forward 
Colonel Gk)u^'s Memorial' BecoUections of the 
Peninsula remained a permanent possession and 
had their influence upon his future career. He had 
seen the strategy of Wellington at Talavera; he 
had taken his share in the brilliant campaign of 
Vittoria, when the difficulties of a dangerous and 
delicate position vanished before the military genius 
pf his Commander ; he had witnessed the sudden 
ftnd dramatic appearance of the Chief as the two 
{trmies faced each other on the Pyrenees, and he 
had borne his part in the almost faultless carrying 
out of the attack upon the extended front along 
the Nivelle. The lessons thus learned bore .fruit 
in China, and in India, where Wellington's own 
early reputation had been won. 
Bewards of a substantial kind were freely be- 



1815] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 128 

stowed by a grateful country upon the soldiers of 
the Peninsula. In August, Gk)ugh was awarded 
a pension of £250 a year, increased in 1816 to 
£800. The medal for Talavera, for which Wel- 
lington had appliedi was duly granted, and the 
Brevet-Bank of lieutenant-Colonel was, on the 
Duke's representation, antedated to the date of his 
Talavera Dispatches. Inl815, the Prince Begent con- 
ferred upon him the honour ci Knighthood, and he 
was permitted to adopt the following augmentation 
of his coat of arms — ^ In Chief, a representation of 
the Fortress of Tari£E^ with the Cross of the Order 
of Charles m pendent ; and as an additional crest, 
An Arm vested in the uniform of the 87th Begi- 
ment, supporting a Banner inscribed with the 
number of the Begiment, and grasping at the same 
time a French Eagle reversed, in commemoration of 
the one taken by that Corps at Barrosa.' 

Colonel Gk)ugh's correspondence from the Penin- 
sula throws considerable light upon the character of 
the ¥rriter. It is impossible to peruse these letters 
without being deeply impressed with the sincerity 
and earnestness of purpose of the soldier who 
penned them, with his devotion to his profession, 
his loyalty to those in authority over him, his 
regard for the happiness of those conunitted to his 
charge, and with the soldierly instinct which led 
his battalion to victory on so many weU-f ought fields. 
But the impression left is not only that of a gal- 
lant and humane soldier. Gk)ugh's deep religious 
spirit, his trust in an all-wise Providence which he 



124 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1815 

believed to have him in special protection, and his 
honourable and unswerving acceptance of all that 
he judged to be the direction of Providence, are 
features that marked his younger days in Spain not 
less than his later campaigns in India. His affec- 
tion for the faith in which he had been niutured 
and for the Church of which he was a member was 
unwavering. But, while he accepted loyally the 
principles of the Church of Ireland, he was 
unusually hberal in his attitude towards the 
religion of the migority of his fellow countrymen. 
His letters breathe a love for Ireland and an 
interest in her welfare, and he regarded the 
religious disabilities as a great menace to a proper 
understanding between the two countries. ^ I wish 
to Gkxl,' he ¥rrites in June, 1812, ^ the Prince had 
declared for Catholic Emancipation. This measure 
in the end he must give way to, and every hour 
injures his popularity.' 

The letters show also the warmth of the writer's 
family affection. He had two brothers serving in 
the Peninsular Army — Captain George Gough of 
the 28th Begiment, and ll^jor William Gough of 
the 68th, who distinguished himself at Salamanca, 
and to whom there are various references in his 
brother's letters. Of them, of his father, and of 
other members of his own family he often 
speaks, and his devoted affection to his wife and 
children is a frequent theme of these numerous 
letters. Such expressions of affection he would not 
himself have regarded as fit matter for the printed 



1815] VITTORIA AND NIVELLE 125 

page, and they have been omitted from the letters 
we have quoted So powerful, however, were these 
emotions that his letters record a not infrequent 
conflict between them and the desire for military 
glory and the love of serving his coimtry. Through 
a laige part of his later life, the separation from his 
wife, which was the cause of this conflict, was* 
avoided by the courage of Lady Gbugh, who ac- 
companied him to India, and whose presence was, 
to a man of his temperament, a source of inspira- 
tion and strength. While in garrison at Tarifa 
and at Cadiz, he made plans for her arrival in 
Spain, but the nature of the operations in which 
the army was engaged prevented their execution, 
and he could receive only letters and such parcels 
of provisions as it was possible to send. To Cadiz 
and Tarifa there came from England a succession 
of hampers whidi relieved Colonel Qough from 
many of even the lesser privations of a state of 
siege, and as long as he was stationed there, there 
was a reasonable probability of such things reaching 
him. Beferences to lump sugar and fish sauce 
read curiously in the circumstances of a beleaguered 
town and remind one how complete was the British 
command of the sea. 

Throughout almost the whole of the War, Gk)ugh's 
health continued excellent, except for his attack of 
fever in June, 1809, and for some inconveniences 
resulting from the wound he received at Talavera. 
In January, 1818, in the course of his wanderings 
while the army was in winter quarters before the 



126 WAR IN THE PENINSULA [1815 

campnign of Yittoiia^ he writes — ' Do not, I pray 
you, entertain so erroneous an opinion as that my 
constitution is broken ; 'tis true I am not as strong 
as I was, but there are very few in this army more 
capable of undergoing fatigne. When I tell you 
I never sit down from breakfast to dinner-hour, 
except to write a letter, you will see my health 
must be good. I haye not had a cold this winter, 
although I have no fireplace in my room, and there 
is not a day that I am not wet in my feet, often all 
over/ This confidence in his own powers of phy- 
sical endurance continued to be characteristic of 
him throughout the whole of his life, and it was 
fully justified by the event. In India, in China, 
and at home, during the long period of rest and 
retirement whidi he was destined to eqjoy, his con- 
stitution remained sound and his frame vigorous, 
and this active and strenuous habit of body must 
receive due weight in any appreciation of his 
military career. 



BOOK II 

IRELAND 

1. PuBUO LiFB, 1814-1840 

2. Home asd Fajoly 



•> 



PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-40 

It is one of the difficulties of the biographer of 
a soldier that the events which it is his duty to 
relate are crowded into a few years of what may 
be a long life. Five years in Spain, two in China, 
and five in India comprise that period of Sir Hugh 
Qough's nine decades of life in which alone he was 
enabled to give to his coimtry the services which 
have rendered his name illustrious, and which 
entitle him to a place and a memorial among 
British soldier& When he sailed for Cadiz, to 
serve under Wellington in the Peninsula, he was 
imder thirty years of age ; when he landed in 
China, to take conmiand of the Expeditionary 
Force, he was over sixty. The years which inter- 
vened between the battle of the Nivelle in 1818 
and the assault upon Canton in 1841 were not all 
spent in retirement. The work of Sir Hugh Gk)ugh 
during this period was worthy to be done and it 
was done worthily; nor can there be any doubt 
that it helped to train and to fit him for high and 
responsible duties in the days to come. But it 
passed away and left little or no record; even if 
record there were, it would claim but slight space 
in this book. The story we have to tell of Indian 
wars will prove sufficient theme for these pages. 

I K 



180 IRELAND [1814 

One cannot write the life of a soldier in garrison, 
and we make no further apology for a rapid sketch 
of nearly thirty years, a mere connecting note to 
transfer our interests from West to East. 

The 2nd Battalion of the 87th Begiment had 
continued to distinguish itself in the Peninsular 
War, even after Colonel Qough*s wound had 
rendered him incapable of leading it into the field. 
It was engaged in several skirmishes with the 
French ; it behaved with distinction, and it suffered 
heavily, in the action at Orthes on February 27, 
1814; and it shared in the victory of Toulouse. 
On the abdication of Napoleon, the Peninsular 
army was broken up, and the battalion marched 
from Toulouse to Pouillac, and disembarked at 
Cork in the end of July. After a month spent 
in Ireland, it went into garrison at Plymouth, 
where it remained till December, 1814. The 
American War of 1812-14 was still in progress, 
and, for a month, the battalion guarded the prisoners 
at Dartmoor. In the end of the year, it was trans- 
ferred to its old quarters at Guernsey, where its 
Colonel, Sir John Doyle, was Governor. It 
remained at Guernsey during the memorable year 
1815, and had no share in the glories of Waterloo. 
On recovering from his wound \ Sir Hugh Gough 
had again taken conmiand, and, on May 25, 1815, 

' The recovery was slow and tedious. On June S4^ 1814^ 
he writes : < I am still on crutches^ when I am able to leave 
my bed^ which is not often the case, as my healthy exclusive 
of the wound, has suffered severely/ 



1817] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 181 

he was gazetted Lieutenant-Coloael, having held 
that brevet rank for six years. 

After the European settlement which followed 
Napoleon's imprisonment in St Helena, there was 
a natural desire to reduce the army establishment, 
the burden of which had pressed heavily on the 
nation during twenty years of warfare. Among 
the corps which it became necessary to sacrifice to 
the desire for economy, was the 2nd Battalion of 
the 87th. It had been removed from Guernsey 
in April, 1816, first to Portsmouth, and then to 
Colchester, and it was from Colchester Barracks, 
on January 24, 1817, that Colonel Gough issued 
his regimental orders on the disbandment of the 
corps. 

' The Princes Oum Irishy* he said, after a recital 
of the deeds of the battalion, 'bled prodigally and 
nobly ; they have sealed their duty to their King 
and country by the sacrifice of nearly two thousand 
of their comrades. ... In parting with the remains 
of that corps, in which Sir Hugh Gough has served 
twenty-two years, at the head of which, and by 
whose valour and discipline, he has obtained those 
marks of distinction with which he has been 
honoured by his Boyal Master, he cannot too 
emphatically express the most heartfelt acknow- 
ledgements and his deep regret. From all classes 
of his officers he has uniformly experienced the 
most cordial and ready support. Their conduct 
in the field, while it csJled for the entire approba^ 
tion of their Commanding Officer, acquired for 
them the best stay to military enterprise and 
military renown, the confidence of their men, and led 
to the accomplishment of their wishes, the Approba^ 

K2 



182 IRELAND [1810 

tion of their Prince, the Honour of their Country, 
and the Character of their Corps. Every non- 
commissioned officer and man is equally entitled 
to the thanks of his Commanding Officer. To all 
he feels greatly indebted, and he begs to assure all, 
that their prosperity as indiyiduals, or as a corps, 
will ever be ilie first wish of his heart, and to 
promote which he will consider no sacrifice or 
exertion too great' 

On Februaiy 1, the battalion was disbanded; 
880 men were transferred to the 1st Battalion, 
which formed part of the Bengal army, so that 
the present regiment, the Boyal Irish Fusiliers, 
is the lineal descendant of the second battalion as 
well as of the first, and its r^imental colours still 
bear the words ^Barrosa' and ^Tarifa' in remem- 
brance of its Peninsular exploits. Sir Hugh Gknigh's 
official connexion with the 87th came to an end in 
1817, but, as we shall see, it was renewed later 
in life, and his memory lives in the traditions ^ and 
the legends of the regiment. 

For more than two years, Sir Hugh remained on 
half-pay, but his services were too distinguished 
to permit of his continuing to be out of active 
employment, and on August 12, 1819, he was 
appointed to the command of the 22nd Begiment, 

^ It is lecoided that a recruit, seeing the picture of Lord 
Gk)ugh^ reproduced as the frontispiece of the second volume of 
the present work, asked who it was. ' That,' said a sergeant, 
' is Lord Gk>ugh^ and that is his fighting coat. After a battle^ 
it was a perfect sight to see him shake the bullets out of that 
coat.* 



1821] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 188 

which had just returned from Mauritius. On the 
same day he was gazetted full ColoneL The 22nd or 
Cheshire Begiment was of much more ancient date 
than the Prince's Own. It had been raised by the 
Duke of Norfolk after the Bevolution of 1689| in 
order to defend the Protestant cause, and it had 
served in the battle of the Boyne, and at the si^e 
of Limerick. In more recent days, it had been 
represented in the small force which accompanied 
Wolfe to the Heights of Abraham, in the skirmish 
on Bunker's Hill, and in the second capture of Cape 
Colony. During the Peninsular War it had been 
stationed in India. For two years after its return, 
the 22nd was in garrison at Noiiliampton, with 
Sir Hugh Gough in command ; but in the autumn 
of 1821, it was called to more active service, not 
by an outbreak of foreign war, but in view of the 
disturbed condition of Ireland. 

The question of Catholic Emancipation seemed 
no nearer settlement in 1821 than it had been 
when Colonel Oough had written from the Peninsula 
deploring the Prince Begent's refusal to give way 
on the subject It had been generally believed that 
the visit of George IV in August, 1821, would prove 
the occasion of granting the boon which had so long 
been craved^ and the disappointment of this ezpecta- 

* Ct Mr. Oregor^s Letter-Bax, edited by Lady Oregoiy, 
(Smithy Elder, 1898), which contains some interesting informa- 
tion regarding the state of Ireland at this period. The Irish 
history of the time remains to be written, and it is difficult to 
find any satisfactory general account of the subject. 



184 IRELAND [1821 

tion was followed by an outburst of agrarian crime, 
an outburst which owed its origin to a combination 
of causes, religious, social, and economic. 

'The results of our rule in Ireland, during the 
fifteen years that followed the Union,' says Judge 
O'Connor Morris \ ' had been, if we speak generally, 
these. A system of severe repression had been 
established, and, for the most part, afifected Catholic 
Ireland ; there had been a large growth of Orangeism 
fftvoiu^ by the state, and stirring the passions of 
the Irish Protestants ; divisions of religion and race 
had probably widened.' These were natural results 
of the rebellion of 1798, and of the identification of 
the Papacy with the French Empire, in the days 
when Napoleon menaced England. The end of the 
war might seem to inaugurate a happier era, but 
that event, in turn, was followed by economic 
troubles which opened fresh sores before the old 
ones had time to heal. During the long struggle 
with Napoleon, the food supply in this country had 
always been a matter of anxiety ; fresh Irish land 
was thrown into cultivation, and the high prices 
which continued during the war sufficed to repay 
the labour of the peasantry. The population 
increased, and taxed to the utmost the resources of 
the good years. When peace came, and prices fell, 
it ceased to be profitable to cultivate large tracts of 
land ; rents and wages shared in the universal 
decline of prosperity ; and the results of this 
economic crisis were complicated by the added 
^ History of Ireland, p. 297. 



1821] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 185 

misfortune of local famines, caused by the failure of 
the harvests in certain districts. It was natural 
that the agrarian troubles which followed should, 
in part, take the form of a resistance to tithes, 
which pressed heavily upon the peasantry. 

With the political causes which led to the forma- 
tion of the Catholic Association we are not here 
concerned ; the main result of the discontent, as 
£eu: as it affects our story, was the revival of the 
outrages of the 'Whiteboys.' During the Irish 
distturbances of the first years of the reign of 
George III a band of semi-organized rebels perpe- 
trated a series of agrarian crimes as a protest against 
enclosures and against tithes ^ They were called 
^Whiteboys' because of the white linen frocks 
which they wore partly as a kind of disguise and 
partly as a badge. Bobbery and arson, outrages on 
cattle, and occasionally murder, were their ordinary 
methods, but they sometimes raised what amounted 
to petty insiurections, in the course of which they 
traversed the country in disciplined bands, attacked 
gaols, and threatened villagea They issued notices 
warning men to comply with their demands, 
adopting a judicial language which gave to them 
some wild and rude appearance of legality. These 
manifestoes were published in the name of a ficti- 
tious leader. Captain Bight, who professed to guide 
their actions. 

The movement which Sir Hugh Gough had to 

^ Lecky*8 History of Ireland in fhe Eighteenth Century, 
vol. ii chap. 8. 



186 ntELAND [1828 

&oe was a recrudesoenoe of Whiteboyism. The 
distuibed dirtrict, the charge of which was en- 
trusted to him, was Buttevant, in county Cork, 
which remained his head quarters from October, 
1821, to October, 1824. Detachments of the 22nd 
were stationed at Mallow, Bantyre, Charleville, 
Newmarket, and Ballydough. The Whiteboys of 
1821 were less numerous than those of sixty years 
before, and they rarely attempted open insurrec* 
tion, preferring secret outrage. Their reputed 
leader was now Captain or Oeneral Bock^, in 
whose name their proclamations were issued. To 
illustrate the nature of the Whiteboy movement, it 
may be well to print an interesting specimen of the 
warnings they issued from time to time : 

Mr. Haines, Tou are hereby Bequired to take 
Notice that the Gatholick Potentates of Europe 
concur^d at the Consistoiy at Bome to Elect me as 
a Despotick to superintend Ireland, and to Distri- 
bute publick Justice with Impartiality to the 
Devided people thereol The laws given down to 
me are Gonsistant thereol 

Therefore it is explicit to you or any person con- 
cerned that in the omission of so Important a duiy 
that I should be accountable at the Temporal Tri- 
bunal of the aforesaid Monarchs and Secondly at that 
Awful Tribunal where the best Constructed fabrica- 

^ A histoiy of this fictitious personage was published in 
1824^ entitied The Memoirs of Captain BoA. It is, in e£Eect, 
a history of agrarian troubles in Ireland, from the reign of 
Henry II to that of Qeorge IV^ but it throws little light upon 
our period. * Captain Book * was in reality, a generic name 
for Whiteboy leaders. 



1828] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 187 

tions of Falsehood will be Developed, and truth 
only shall prevail The aforesaid Consistoral Laws 
being formed at the Constory in Borne it is not 
abstruce to any human being tho inexpert he may 
be that Human and Divine Justice Bequires a Con- 
dign punishment to be inflicted on any person or 
persons who would be so unfortimate as to Violate 
so Holy and profound a systim. You remained 
obstinate in keeping the Farm you hold from Mr. 
Jephson situate at old Two Pot House. But How- 
ever its a matter of indif erence to me now Whether 
you Siurender it or not this year because my incli- 
nation is to settle such offences against the 25th day 
of July Next, I did not know at the same time that 
you had any more Strangers but the Connells, But 
my superintending Magistrates Whose duty it is to 
Indogate What tendancy the People may be devoted 
to thus informs me that y oiu* place is still a receptacle 
for Strangers and that you have a heardsman and 
a Dairy Woman still in two pot House who are 
Strangers Which I require you will dischai^ 
before the 25th Instant. But if you persist I will 
Comit all your Houses to my Unextinguishable 
Flames likewise I will Drench my Sword in the 
Blood and Slaughter of your Cattle. To make a 
short Conclusion I will Inflame the Frantick Jaws 
of Distruction to Champ your Person and Property. 
Therefore Comply and do not Begret your obsti- 
nancy when too late. 

Yonder Green Senate House to the throne of 
State, Ireland. May lOth, 1828. 

General Bock, Governor and Defender 
of the Faith, &c., &c, &c., &c 

This notice was conveyed to the unfortunate Mr. 
Haynes in a manner sufficiently menacing. On the 
night of May 22, two of his cattle, in his farm near 
Two Pot House were hamstrung, and on the horns 



188 IRELAND [1828 

of one of them was fastened this notice. Mr. 
Haynes, who was a prosperous farmer, was wise 
enough to send this threatening letter to Sir Hugh 
Qough, and it is pleasant to note that the list of 
outrages for July and August contains no mention 
of Two Pot House. But if, in this particular in- 
stance, ^forewarned was forearmed/ there was 
no lack of crimes of the nature indicated in 
' General Bock's ' letter. Statements as to a large 
number of these are preserved among Sir Hugh 
Gk)ugh's papers, but they are all of a type only too 
familiar in more recent days, and it would serve no 
useful purpose to repeat the unhappy tale. 

For three years, the suppression of these outrages 
was Sir Hugh's task. The district committed to 
him covered a large portion of county Cork, north 
of the Black Water, and, as the state of the country 
became worse, other regiments, including, at 
different times the 57th and the 42nd Highlanders, 
were included in his command. The only incident 
which resembled an insurrection on a general scale 
took place in January, 1822, when a detachment of 
the 22nd Begiment, consisting of two officers and 
thirty men, defeated a gathering of rebels whose 
numbers were estimated at 8,000, and who were 
meditating an attack on Newmarket. The grateful 
inhabitants presented a silver cup to the officers, in 
recognition of their services. Sir Hugh Gough's 
papers of this period, which have been preserved^ 
relate chiefly to the year 1828 and contain no 
allusion to this skirmish| with which he himself 



1828] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 189 

had no personal connexion. The disorder reached 
its climax in 1828, when the burning of ricks and 
houses, and the hamstringing of cattle were very 
frequent. The number of instances of shooting at 
unpopular persons greatly increased, and one murder 
further stained the record of the year. 

To deal with such a crisis special powers were 
required, and they were freely granted by the 
Government. The Insurrection Act placed the 
country practically under martial law ; the Arms Act 
rendered the possession of arms a serious criminal 
offence and gave the authorities the right of search; 
and the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended ^ 
A regular system of police had been established by 
the Peace Preservation Act in 1814, but Sir Hugh 
mainly depended upon military patrols. The 
disaffected area was divided into districts which 
were regularly patroUed, and the houses of all un- 
popular people and of those who had been warned 
by the Whiteboys were carefully watched. The 
results were not immediate, for it is always easy to 
take advantage of the weak points of such a system, 
and the terror to which the Whiteboys reduced the 
peasantry prevented their calling for aid or making 
any resistance when they were attacked, as it also 

^ It is interestmg to note that^ as recently as 1886, the 
appointment of Sir Hugh Gongh to the disturbed districts of 
county Cork was quoted as a precedent in the House of 
Commons. The occasion was the selection of General Sir 
Bedvers BuUer to perform similar duties in the autumn of 
that year. Cf. the Irish Times, August 24, 1886. 



140 IRELAND [1824 

rendered difficult the task of obtaining evidence 
against suspected persons. At first, the mills of 
law and order * ground slowly/ but, as time went 
on, they ^ ground exceeding smalL' A considerable 
number of the criminals and at least two ^ Captain 
Bocks' were captured and executed; the risk of 
detection and of punishment became greater, and, 
as the people gained confidence in the power of the 
Gk)vemment, it became more easy to identify the 
perpetrators of outrages. By the month of October, 
1824, the district was in a much more normal con- 
dition, and the 22nd Begiment was removed to the 
ease of garrison duty in Dublin. 

The occasion of Sir Hugh's departure was marked 
by a public address expressive of the confidence 
which was reposed in him and acknowledging the 
good effects of his work. More than twelve months 
before, when a rumour of his approaching departure 
was circulated, the magistrates of the baronies of 
Duhallow, Fermoy, Orrery, Eilmore, and Clon- 
gibbon had sent him an address. ' We gratefully 
acknowledge,* they said, * that chiefly through your 
Prudence, Zeal, Activity, and Example, have we 
been enabled hitherto to avert those evils which were 
impending over ua In you. Sir, we have seen 
combined the prudent foresight of the Commander, 
the upright spirit of the Magistrate, the humane 
Heart and courteous Demeanor of the Gtentleman.* 
The mark of esteem now offered was wider and 
more representative. On October 16, 1824, a 
meeting of the noblemen, magistrates, and gentle- 



1824] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 141 

men resident in Sir Hugh Gbugh's district, was 
held at Mallow, under the presidency of the 
Viscount Doneraile, and an address to Sir Hugh 
Qoughy the officerS| non-commissioned officers, and 
men of the 22nd Begiment, was prepared. The 
language of the address is indicative of a depth of 
feeling natural at such a time: — 

On your first appointment to the command of 
this District, you were placed in a situation, arduous 
and critical, a situation which required the most 
active and increasing energy, joined to the most 
cool and deliberate judgement, and never was the 
union of these rare and essential qualifications more 
fiilly and uniformly exemplified, than in your Con- 
duct on every occasion, while every evil passion of 
a misguided and infatuated Population was let loose 
in the Land, while the murderer and incendiary 
were destroying the Lives and Properties of inno- 
cent, unsuspecllug and defenceless Families, while 
social order and security were shaken to their very 
Foundation, your persevering activity and judicious 
Arrangements interposed a Barrier against Mis- 
creant Outrage, and certainly diminished tho' it 
was impossible totally to prevent the commission of 
Grime. 

Officers and men alike had won golden opinions 
in county Cork, and the good wishes of the people 
followed the regiment to Dublin. For two years 
longer it remained in Ireland, stationed at Dublin 
and afterwards at Galway, and during these two 
years Sir Hugh's connexion with it continued. His 
tenure of the command was further distinguished 
by the reintroduction of a system of regimental 



142 IBELAND [1826 

orders of merit \ The praetioe of rewarding good 
conduct while the raiment was not on active service 
had been commenced in 1785, but during the long 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, it had fallen 
into abeyanca To Sir Hugh belongs the credit of 
again adopting it A good conduct badge, repre- 
senting the oak leaves which are still associated 
with the Cheshire regiment, was worked by Lady 
Gough at Northampton in 1820, and it continued to 
be used in the regiment until the establishment of 
a general system of good conduct medals throughout 
the army. 

Sir Hu^ Gough's command of the 22nd Begi- 
ment came to an end in August, 1826 '. The regi- 
ment was broken up into six service and four d^pdt 
companies. The service companies were sent to 
the West Indies, whither Sir Hugh, mainly for 
family reasons, did not wish to accompany them. 
In the Army List for September, 1826, his name 
appears as ' half-pay, unattached.' For eleven years 
he remained without active employment, and it 
seemed as if his military career were over. This 

^ The first example of good conduct badges was set by 
General Studholme Hodgson, Colonel of the 5th R^ment 
(Northumberland Fusiliers), in the year 1767. The Order 
of Merit instituted in the SSnd Foot in 1785 was a similar 
distinction. It is possible that General Hodgson was imi- 
tating the medal given by General Forbes for his expedition 
to the Ohio in 1758, though that was not strictly regimental. 

^ For information regarding the SSnd, cf. the volume 
devoted to its history in Cannon's Historical Becords of the 
British Army. 



1884] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 148 

enforced leisure, in the very prime of life, irked 
his restless spirit, and he made effort after effort to 
obtain some recognition of his claims. His hopes 
were raised when, on July 22, 1880, he was gazetted 
to the rank of Major-General, but he was doomed 
to disappointment, for nothing followed beyond 
a promotion in the Bath on the occasion of the 
coronation of William IV. Sir Thomas Picton had 
urged his claim to the distinction of KC.B. in the 
beginning of January, 1815, as a reward for his 
services at the battle of the Fyreneea The Order 
was at this time in process of reorganization, and 
on its being remodelled. Sir Hugh Gough was made 
a Companion, with the understanding that his 
claim to the second class would be favourably con- 
sidered on his attaining the rank of a general 
officer. This promise was fulfilled in 1881, but the 
Conmiander-in-Chie^ Lord Hill (the Sir Rowland 
Hill of the Peninsula) remained deaf to all applica- 
tions for employment. The most bitter disappoint- 
ment of aU occurred in August, 1884, when the 
Colonelcy of the 87th Begiment became vacant by 
the death of General Sir John Doyle. The hero 
of Tarifa and Barrosa naturally considered that his 
claims could be regarded as second to none, but 
Lord Hill selected for the appointment Majors 
General Sir Thomas BeynelL So crushing was the 
blow that Sir Hugh was with difficulty restrained 
from retiring from the service by selling his regi- 
mental commission. Fortune had been very kind 
to him up to the close of the Peninsular War, and 



144 IRELAND [1887 

the long years of idleness which followed may 
have been his proper share of the evil chances 
of military life, but it was not easy to r^ard cahnly 
this apparent dose of a career which had opened so 
brilliantly. It has seldom happened to a man that 
his life work should be divided between his fourth 
and his seventh decade, and no one could have fore- 
seen that the n^ected General Officer of 1884 
would live to be the conqueror of the Punjab. 

The long period of inaction came xmexpectedlj at 
length to an end in the year 1887, when Sir Hugh 
Gough was invited to accept the command of the 
Mysore Division of the Madras army, with his head 
quarters at Bangalore. Lady Gough determined to 
accompany him to India, and, in the early autumn, 
they sailed in the Minerva CasOe. An incident of the 
journey deserves to be recalled. On their way, the 
ship touched at Mauritius, where Sir Hugh's old regi- 
ment, the 87th, was stationed ; and the enthusiasm 
of his reception impressed itself on the memories 
of all who witnessed the meeting. * He received,* 
wrote a companion of his journey (unconnected 
in any way with him or his family), ^a most 
wonderful ovation £rom the officers and men of his 
old regiment, the fighting 87th. During the time 
the ship lay at the Mauritius, they were in a state 
of wild excitement. The whole regiment followed 
him down to the boat, waded into the water, and 
would even have followed it swimming if they had 
not been sternly ordered back. The headlands 
were lined with them, still cheering, and the last 



1887] PUBLIC LIFE, 1814-1840 145 

we saw of the Mauritius was a bonfire with 
a number of their figures around it^' It was a 
grateful reminiscence of the past, and a prelude 
and inspiration to new service for Queen and 
country. 

Sir Hugh landed at Madras in October, and at 
once proceeded to Bangalore, which continued to 
be his home for three years. A few letters of this 
period remain, but they are concerned with ad- 
ministrative details, and the writer's life differed 
in no respects from that of any other officer com- 
manding a district in India. These three years of 
military life were a valuable experience after his 
civilian years, and they formed a useful preparation 
for a period of renewed service if the call should 
come. We shall find that call after call did come, 
and that to every call there was given a loyal and 
willing response. 

^ Letter from Captain Rutherfoid of the Bengal Artillery, 
written from Assam in 1888. 



n 

HOME AND FAMILY 

When Colonel Gbugh returned from the Penin« 
mila in 1814, his immediate family circle consisted 
of his wife and one childi his daughter Letitia, now 
six years old The little son, who had been bom 
in the course of the war, had died, it wUl be remem* 
bered, some months before his father^s return, so 
that the household was again reduced to the number 
which Colonel Oough had left behind him in 1808: 
During the next few years, more children gathered 
round the family hearth ; a son, G^rge Stephens^ 
bom on January 18, 1816, took the place of the 
dead boy whom his father had just seen, and, er6 
long, three daughters, Oertrude (born October 21, 
1817), Mona (bom Febmary 28, 1819), and France^ 
(bom January 5, 1825), completed the circle, 
which was only once broken during the lifetime 
of the parents. Of the family life at Guernsey 
or Colchester, in Buttevant or Dublin, while the 
children were growing into boyhood and girlhood, 
there is no record. In imdivided families there are 
no letters to remain as permanent memorials of 
domestic affection, of home joys and sorrows. The 
few traces that do exist are instinct with affection, 
and, in the subsequent lives of the members of the 
household, it is possible to discover the fruits of 



1826] HOME AND FAMILY 147 

a wi06 and loving training in childhood. To Sir 
Hugh, in later lifoi it was no slight satisfaction 
to see his children bound together not merely 
by a constant devotion to himself and Lady Qough, 
but also to one anotheri and by the closest and 
most intinutte ties. 

The wandering life which Sir Hugh had led since 
childhood had prevented him from attaching him- 
self to any permanent home, and the absence of 
this was a grief to one of his temperament. His 
associations with his birthplace were now only of 
the past» for his father, Colonel George Oough, had 
left Woodsdown and was resident at Ardsallagb 
in county Tipperary. Shortly before the 22nd 
Begiment was sent to Jamaica, in 1826, Sir Hu^ 
had purchased a lease of the properiy of BathronaUi 
near Clonmel, in the same county, and it continued 
to be his home until his departure for India. His 
reasons for declining to accompany his regiment 
were threefold. The climate of the West Indies 
had, dining his former residence there, proved 
injurious to his health, and, now that so many 
were dependent upon him, he felt that his health 
was, more than ever, a matter of first importance. 
His new estate (the lease of which he had pur- 
chased for his own life and that of his son) had 
claims upon his attention, and, above all, he felt 
that his children were now at the stage when they 
most required a father's care, and he was unwilling 
to leave them for an indefinite period. Such were 
the reasons which convinced him that it was his 

L2 



148 IRELAND [1826*87 

duty to risk his chances of professional advance- 
ment, by going upon half-pay, instead of retaining 
his connexion with the 22nd. 

The duty which had guided his decision brou^t 
its own consolations to lighten the tedium which, 
for eleven years, it involved. He had a real affec- 
tion for Bathronan ; he had entered into negotiations 
for a lease of it, because it had caught the fancy of 
Lady Oough as they passed it in the course of a 
long drive. ' That is where I should like to live,' 
she had said, and subsequent experience confirmed 
this first impression. He enjoyed the opportunity 
of unrestrained and imlimited intercourse with 
those nearest and dearest to him, and he took a 
deep interest in local affairs. As a magistrate of 
the coimties of Cork, Limerick, and Tipperaiy, he 
was imremitting in the performance of his duties, 
and, in some respects, he really continued the work 
that he had done at Buttevant. His first biogra- 
pher^ relates an anecdote of this period which, in the 
dearth of other material, may be worthy of record. 
A farmer, who had been attacked by moonlighters, 
and who had given up to them his gun while it 
was still loaded, applied for compensation. The 
magistrates hesitated to grant his request. Some 
of them took the high ground that he should not 
have yielded without firing his single charge, and 
others pointed out that to do so would almost 

^ A pampUet of some sixty pages, by the Rev. Samuel 
O'Snllivan, was privately printed in 1890. It had been written, 
in Lord Oough's lifetime, for an Irish newspaper. 



1826-87] HOME AND FAMILY 149 

certainly have mvolved the murder of his family 
and himsell The dispute had lasted some time, 
when the hero of Tarifa put an end to all hesitation. 
^ Mr. Chairman/ he said, ^ I beg pardon for inter- 
fering on an occasion like the present, when the 
regularly resident gentry are so much better able to 
form a correct judgement than I should be. But if 
I may presume to give an opinion, I would say 
that, if I were in that farmer's situation I would 
have done just what he did ; and been, moreover, 
very much obliged to the midnight gentlemen for 
letting me off so easily, when such dreadful con- 
sequences might have resulted from refusing to 
comply with their demand. Nor do I think that 
the man who thus made discretion the better part 
of valour, would be one whit less brave than the 
bravest amongst us, on a proper occasion, when his 
courage could be turned to good accoimt.' The 
incident is characteristic of the strong conmion 
sense which had rendered him so capable an ad- 
ministrator at Buttevant. 

The years of Sir Hugh's sojourn in Ireland were 
marked by family sorrows as well as by family 
joys. Ere his return from the Peninsula, both his 
sisters had been married and one widowed, and 
his brothers were winning for themselves distinc- 
tions in the Church and in the Army. Before he 
left Ireland for India, in 1887, he had stood by 
many graves. The first break in his father's family 
occurred in the spring of 1822. His brother. Major 
William Chough, who had been for twenty-three 



150 IRELAND [182d-«6 

years an officer in the 68th Light Infiuitiy and had 
served with distinction in the Peninsula (where he 
was engaged in the battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, 
and Nivelle), was drowned in the wreck of the 
Albion off Einsale Head, on April 22, 1822. His 
regiment had, for some time, been stationed in 
Canada, whence he was returning in the ill-£ated 
Albion. Sir Hugh was resident in county Cork at 
the time, and to him fell the last sad duties of 
identification and interment. Seven years later 
came a fresh grief in the death of his mother, and, 
in 1888, he lost his elder sister, Jane, the widow 
of Colonel Lloyd of the 84th. A year before 
Sir Hugh's appointment to Bangalore, his father 
died (March, 1886), frdl of years. His life had 
stretched from the reign of Qeorge H nearly to 
the end of that of William IV, and it had covered 
the most eventful period of the history of Modem 
Europe. He died at Rathronan, while on a visit 
to his son. 

We shall have another opportunity of referring 
to the domestic life of Sir Hugh Oough, and, 
towards the close of our story oiu: material of this 
kind becomes much more abimdant. It is desirable 
that the already complicated narrative of his cam* 
paigns in China and in India should not be rendered 
more difficult by references to family events, and 
it may therefore be well to mention here the 
marriages of his children, although some of these 
fiall outside the years with which this connecting 
chapter is intended to deal Sir Hu^'s four 



1886^4] HOME AND FAMILY 151 

daughters were all married within eight years. 
The eldest, Letitia, married, in 1886, Mr. Edward 
Supple, who afterwards adopted the name of Collis, 
and, in the following year, her sister, Gertrude, was 
united to Mr. Archibald Arbuthnot, of the great 
Madras house of that name, and a son of Sir 
William Arbuthnot, 1st baronet. Sir Hugh entei^ 
tained for his son-in-law a deep and constant 
respect and affection, and Mr. Arbuthnof s real* 
dence in Madras did not involve a complete sepa* 
ration from Bangalore. The third daughter, Mona, 
was married, in 1840, to lieutenant-Colonel Gregory 
Haines, of the East India Company's service, a son 
of General Gregory Haines, who had distinguished 
himself in the Commissariat of Wellington's Penin* 
sular Army, and was afterwards Commissary* 
General of the Army. Colonel Haines accompanied 
Sir Hugh to China, but was forced to return owing 
to the effect of the climate upon his health. His 
brother Frederick acted as Military Secretary to 
the Commander-in-Chief in the two Punjab cam* 
paigns, served with great distinction in the Crimea, 
and finally became one of Sir Hugh's successors 
in the command of the Indian Army. He is now 
(1908), as Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines, the 
last survivor of the Staff of the Armies of the Sutlcj 
and the Punjab. 

The son-in-law who was brought into closest 
contact with Sir Hugh Gk>ugh was the husband 
of his yoimgest daughter, Frances, who was married, 
on September 17, 1844, to M^jor Patrick Grant^ 



152 IRELAND [1844 

afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, Gbvemor 
of Chelsea Hospital, and, like his father-in-law, 
Qold-Stick-in-Waiting on Queen Victoria. Major 
Qrant was not acquainted with Sir Hugh Oough 
before the latter's appointment to the command 
of the Bengal Army. He had held office in the 
Adjutant - General's Department of the Bengal 
Army imder Sir Hu^'s predecessors, and his first 
meeting with him was in connexion with the 
Qwalior campaign, in which he acted on Sir Hugh's 
ataS. He was immediately attracted by his Chie^ 
and the good understanding was mutual ^ There 
is a real pleasure in working for him,' wrote the 
younger man at an early stage of their acquaint- 
ance, ^he is such a fine manly hearty old fellow, 
and so completely the thorough gentleman in all 
his proceedings and feelings. Nothing can exceed 
the kindness I have, from the very commencement 
of our intercourse, experienced at his hands.' 
Migor Grant had the good fortune of conducting 
Lady Gk)ugh and her daughter from a position of 
some danger at Maharsgpore (cf. p. 887), and in 
the following August he became engaged to Miss 
Frances Oough. After their marriage they con- 
tinued to reside with Sir Hugh and Lady Oough 
until the Chief left India in the beginning of 1850, 
and from 1845 to 1851 Major Orant was Deputy 
A^jutant-Oeneral of the Army. In this capacity 
he rendered important services in both the Sikh 
Wars. His subsequent career was distinguished. 
In 1856 he became Conmiander-in-Chief at Madras, 




^^^:^xsii^ 



( 



/"> 



1846] HOME AND FAMILY 158 

and held the office for five years, except for a short 
period during the Mutiny (between the death of 
General Anson and the arrival of Sir Colin Camp- 
bell) when he acted as Commander-in-Chief at 
Calcutta. From 1861 to 1867 he was resident 
at home, and constantly with his aged father-in- 
law. He was Oovemor of Malta from 1867 to 
1872, and of Chelsea Hospital from 1874 to his 
death in 1895. 

Sir Hugh had long been anxious to number 
among the rapidly increasing ntmiber of his grand- 
children an heir in the direct male line, and he 
frequently urged upon his son the desirability of 
marriage. Qeorge Qough did not share his father^s 
love of a military life ; he accompanied Sir Hugh 
to China (cp. p. 290), but he saw no further active 
service, although he afterwards joined the Qrena- 
dier Guards and attained the rank of Captain. 
In October, 1840, he married Miss Sarah PaUiser, 
daughter of Colonel Wray-Biuy Palliser of Com- 
ragh, but this lady died of fever in Italy in 
August of the following year, leaving no issue. 
Her premature death was a great grief to her 
husband and his family, and it was after this sad 
event that he joined the staff in China. The 
grant of hereditary honours after the China 
War revived Sir Hugh's longing for an heir, 
and he was much gratified when, in the summer 
of 1846, his son married Miss Jane Arbuthnot 
(afterwards Jane, second Viscountess Gough), 
daughter of Mr. Qeorge Arbuthnot of Elderslie, 



154 IBELAND [1887 

Surrey. We ahall see that, before lesniig India, 
Sir Hugh heard of the birth of the long wished for 
grandaon. 

We have wandered far from the date of the 
command at Bangalore, but, as these personages 
will all appear upon our scene befiwe we next take 
up the tale of fiunily life, it will prove convenient 
to the reader to introduce them at this staga 
From these domestic details we now pass to the 
nafratiYe of the military services on which rests 
our hero's title to remembrance. 




BOOK III 

CHINA 

1. Caoton 

2. Amot 

8. Chxjsan, Chinhai, and Ningpo 

4. The Chinese and the Wab 

5. The Yangktse-kiang 

6. The Treaty of Nanking 



CANTON 

The call made by the Indian Government upon 
Sir Hugh Gough was the result of twelve months' 
experience of desultory war£&re in China. Great 
Britain and the Celestial Empire had been on the 
verge of warfare since the beginning of 1889. The 
trouble arose from a series of commercial disputes, 
partly connected with the opium traffic, and partly 
arising out of Chinese demands which seemed 
outrageous to European eyes. Into the causes of 
the first China War we cannot here enter ^; they are 
at once too intricate and too controversial to render 
a brief summary either fair or desirable ; and the 
initial difficulties were in the distance, and almost 
forgotten, by the date of Sir Hugh Gough's arrival 
The first action in the war was fought in November, 
1889; two British frigates defeated a number of 
Chinese war-junks off Chuenpee. No further en- 
counter took place till the summer of the following 
year, when an expedition, under Sir Gordon Bremer, 
appeared off the coast of China. It niunbered fifteen 
men-of-war, with four armed steamers, and twenty- 
five transports carrying some 4,000 soldiera It was 
hoped that this display of force might be sufficient 

^ The reader ib referred to The History of China^ by 
Mr. D. C. Boulger^ for a lacid statement on this point. 



158 CHINA [1840 

to frighten the Chinese into sabmisBion, and Sir 
Gordon Bremer, leaving some ahips at the mouth 
of the Canton river to protect the British inhabitants 
of Canton, proceeded to the island of Chusan, which 
he occupied in the banning of July, 1840. The 
result was br from fulfilling the expectations of 
Ziord Palmerston's Government The Chinese, con- 
fident in their imperial traditions, deflfMsed the small 
number of the barbarians, and were but little im- 
pressed by the prestige of a nation which, after so 
long a delay, sent so slight a force. At home, it 
had even been hoped that a blockade of Canton 
and a naval demonstration would suffice on our 
part, and it was only after our denuinds were con- 
temptuously refused by the Commissioner of the 
Chinese Emperor that a landing was effected. 

This Commissioner, Lin Tsihseu, was one of the 
most notable Chinamen of the nineteenth century. 
Of his personal character, there is every reason to 
speak with respect and admiration ; he was a man 
of considerable ability and of high moral tone ; his 
reputation was unsullied, and his opposition to the 
opium trade sincere and disinterested. Had he 
lived at a time when China was more ready to 
accept Western ideas of commercial intercourse, 
he might have proved a wise and fiEir-sighted states- 
man ; as it was, his lot was cast among Chinamen 
* who only China knew,' and he was fated to be the 
cause of the first serious humiliation which befel the 
Celestial Empire. When the efforts of the Peking 
Government to prohibit the importation of opium 



1840] CANTON 159 

had first btought about conflicts with the foreign 
merchants, Lin was sent (in January, 1889) to take 
charge of the negotiations, or, rather as it appeared 
to him, to convey to the barbarians the commands 
of the Emperor. His preconceived ideas of the 
relative position of China and foreign oountries were 
confirmed by his experi^ice of British diplomacy. 
The British Superintendent of Trade, Captain Elliot, 
was placed in an extremely delicate position; he 
was not strong enough to compel respect for his 
opinions, nor was he a match for the wily Lin. 
Hampered by the pressure of the merchants, 
strengthened by no definite instructions from the 
Home Qovenmient, and well aware that there was 
no British cruiser in Chinese waters, Captain Elliot 
had been worsted in the diplomatic duel It was, 
therefore, not surprising that Sir Cordon Bremer's 
appearance off Canton produced only a Chinese 
proclamation offering rewards for the persons of thd 
barbarians and for the capture of their ships. 

The landing of the British troops on the island of 
Chusan met with a brave but hopeless resistance on 
the part of the people of Tinghai, but it failed t6 
produce much effect upon the authorities of Peking. 
After the lapse of some weeks, Captain Elliot, whO; 
with his relative, Admiral Elliot, had been appointed 
joint Plenipotentiaries, went with some ships to the 
Peiho, and the rest of the fleet commenced to 
blockade Canton, Amoy^ and Ningpo. Lin was 
degraded and a minister of the Emperor, by name 
Eeshen, was appointed to succeed him. Some hopes 



160 CHINA [1840 

of a peaceful settlement were raised, but these soon 
disappeared, and British subjects in China were 
irritated at the long period of inaction. Admiral 
Elliot was in bad health and had to go home, leaving 
Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer in command and 
Captain Elliot as sole Plenipotentiary. No serious 
attempt was made on the two forts which protected 
the entrance to Canton and, worst of aU, the forces 
on the island of Chusan were, in the month of 
October, greatiy reduced by the ravages of disease. 

This (says an eye-witness) had long been fore- 
told. It required no gifted soothsayer to prognosti- 
cate what the results would be, when men were 
placed in tents pitched on low paddy fields, 
surrounded by stagnant water, putrid and stinking 
fix>m quantities of dead animal and vegetable matter. 
Under a sun hotter than that ever experienced in 
India, the men on duty were buckled up to the 
throat in their fiill dress coatees; and in consequence 
of there being so few camp followers, fatigue parties 
of Europeans were daily detailed to carry provisions 
and stores from the ships to the tents, and to per* 
form all menial employments which, experience has 
long taught us, they cannot stand in a tropical 
climate \ 

Such was the situation when Lord Auckland 
addressed Sir Hugh Gough, on November 80, 1840. 

^ Two Tears in China^ by Surgeon McPhenoiii 1848. 
But the Court of Inquiry (cf. p. 168) came to the conclusion 
that even these wet paddy-grounds were preferable to the 
narrow streets and stagnant canals of the town of Tinghai^ 
to which it is sometimes said the troops should have been 
transferred. 



18J0I CATffTON 161 

In offering him tb6 command of the expedition, he 
pointed out how badly the war had been conducted, 
and urged upon him a series of operations along the 
coast of China, largely to punish ports that had been 
guilty of offences against international law. He 
hoped that Sir Hiigh would ask for no fresh troops^ 
for he could spare him only 700 recruits. Sir Hugh 
accepted the biurden thus laid upon him, and at 
once prepared to quit his command at Bangalore 
and to sail for China. By the date of his arrival, 
on March 2, 1841, the situation had been altered 
in several important respects. In the beginning 
of the year, an attack had been made on the fort& 
placed on the islands in the Bocca Tigris, the 
channel connecting the outer with the inner de- 
fences of the Canton river. The outer forts were 
captured on January 7, and this success led to 
a cessation of hostilities, brought about by the 
diplomacy of Eeshen. It was agreed that a 
truce should be made, pending negotiations with 
the authorities at Peking. The British Pleni- 
potentiaiy put forward four main demands — 
the cession of Hong-Eong to Her Majesty, an 
indemnity of six million dollars, direct official 
intercourse, and the re-opening of the trade at 
Canton. Eeshen gained more than time by 
this arrangement, for the preliminary agreement 
involved the evacuation of Chusan. This provi- 
sion was immediately carried into effect, and the 
renmants of the British forces sailed frx>m Chusan^ 
leaving behind them in alien graves about half of 

I X 



1«3 CHINA [1841 

the force which had landed in the preceding July. 
On February 26, 1841, the British took possession 
of Hong-Kong, one of the more northerly of the 
islands in the Canton estuary. The sole result 
of the truce was the transference of the garrison 
from Chusan to Hong-Kong, and, on February 25, 
operations recommenced with an attack on the 
inner forts ^ The day before Sir Hugh's arrival saw 
the complete success of this attack, and when the 
new Ciommander-in-Chief landed at Hong-Kong 
on March 2, he found that only the last defences 
of Canton remained in possession of the Chinese. 
Sir Hugh placed his forces at the disposal of the 
naval commanders, and gave them his hearty co- 
operation in the concluding attacks which, between 
March 8 and March 18, resulted in the complete 
reduction of the Chinese defencea The story of 
these operations, which occupied the first three 
months of the year 1841, is foreign to our purpose. 
They were almost entirely naval in character ; before 

^ A full and most interesting account of the naval opera* 
tions at the mouth of the Canton river will be found in 
Voyages and Services of the ^ Nemesis' from 1840 to 1843, 
by W. D. Bernard (pub. by Colbum, 1844). The Nemesis 
was the first iron steamer which was employed in the southern 
hemisphere ; she had been specially constructed for the navi* 
gation of river canals, and her distinguished services, under 
C!ommander W. H. Hall, possess great importance in the 
early history of the first China war. The United Service 
Journal of May, 1840, contains a description of the con-* 
struction of the vessel, the novelty of which aroused much 
|>ublic interest at the time. 



1841] CANTON 168 

Sir Hugh came, the military officer of highest 
rank at Canton was Major Peath, who served with 
considerable distinction, but who was in conunand 
of a veiy small detachment It was not till Sir Hugh 
arrived that the Chusan garrison, under Major- 
General Burrell, actually reached the Canton river. 
The augmented land forces, under their new leader, 
were most useful in the final assaults, but the real 
work of the Expeditionary Force and of its Com- 
mander-in-Chief did not begin until the city of 
Canton lay at the mercy of the British fleet, which 
controlled the whole of the intricate channels which 
form the mouth of the river. 

The first months of Sir Hugh's residence in China 
brought little but impleasant controversy. Not only 
had he the difficult and delicate task of presiding 
over a Court of Inquiry ^ into the causes of the sick- 
ness at Chusan, but he was also involved in an 
anxious dispute with the Plenipotentiaiy, Captain 
Elliot. The Commander-in-Chief strongly urged 

^ The Court reported that the prevalence of Bickness was 
owing to the climate and the season of the year, and to the 
military duties which proved too exhausting in such circum* 
stances. They found that the food was, if not insufficient in 
quantity, unnutritious in quality, and most unsuited to in- 
valids, and that the number of camp-followers was so small 
that an undue amount of work was performed by the soldiers. 
The proper remedy they held to be the re-embarkation of 
a large portion of the force, but this was not done owing to 
a difficulty about transports, over which the military authorities 
had no controL It is clear that the whole bSsoi was a sad 
muddlew 

X2 



IM CmXA [IMl 

an aedre pc^icj. If the Ghineee did not gire waj 
at onee, he proposed to oeoqij the city of Canton ; 
but opentiona on the eoaat he ecnaidered as merely 
|MiftliTninAfy to a moie impwtant moDonent Feel- 
ing that assaults at so great a distanfift from the 
capital would ineritably fiul to a&et the Chinese 
Gorenmient, he proposed 'to proceed to Amoj, 
there in coi^miction with the nsTsl foroe destroy 
all the works, shipping, &c., and proceed to opera- 
tions up the Tang-tse4dang, ^diich has always been 
my point \* The letter in which these words occur 
was written about a month after Sir Hugh's arriTal, 
and it shows that he had mastered the conditions of 
warfiue in China. Lord Auckland had reconmiended 
to him(c£ p. 161) only attacks on the shipping along 

1 Sir Hogh Googh to Mr. A. Arbathnot, March 81, 1841. 
Mr. Boolger, in his History of China, says, referring to the 
campaign of 184S : — * The instroctions from the new Governor- 
General, Lord Ellenbonnigh, prodaced a still greater effect so 
far as the final result was concerned. Lord EUenborongh 
has been charged with committing some acts of donbtfol 
policy, and with overlooking the practical side in the affairs 
with which he had to deal ; but it should be remembered to 
his credit, that he was the first to detect the futility of opera- 
tions along the coast as a means of bringing the Chinese 
Government to reason, and to suggest that the great water- 
way of the Yang-tse-kiang, completely navigable for warships 
up to the immediate neighbourhood of Nankin, afforded cout 
veniences for effecting the objects which the English Govem<* 
ment wished to secure.* It will be seen from the sentence^ 
quoted in the text and from subsequent references (pp. 90% 
866). that Sir Hugh Gough had resolved upon this movement 
nearly a year before Lord Ellenborough*s appointment. 




1841] CANTON 165 

the coast ; the credit of suggesting a more effective 
project has generally been given to Lord EUen*^ 
borough, but it is clear that the Commander-in-Chief 
had, fix)m the first, made up his mind upon the 
question. Ultimately, he was permitted to carry 
out his intentions ; but a long interval of weari* 
some and futile negotiation had yet to elapse. 

The Treaty of Canton, negotiated in January^ 
1841, had been merely a private arrangement 
between Eeshen and Captain Elliot Although 
Chusan had been evacuated and Hong-Eong occu- 
pied in accordance with its provisions, it had not 
been ratified by the Emperor. Eeshen had promised 
that Canton should be open to foreign trade on 
February 2 ; when he fsdled to fulfil this condition, 
Elliot, instead of taking strong measures, agreed to 
hold a second interview, at which the time for the 
ratification of the treaiy was extended to February 20l 
A second failure was followed by the assault which 
lasted fix>m February 25 to March 1, and which, as 
we have seen, resulted in the capture of the Bogue 
Forts. Next day, Elliot granted another truce ; on 
its expiration, on March 6, another fortnight of hosti* 
lities followed, the decisive effect of which we have 
already described. Captain Elliot was even yet dis* 
posed to trust Chinese assurances and to hope for the 
ratification of his treaiy, and, on March 20, he once 
more assented to a suspension of hostilities. Eeshen, 
whose arrangement with Elliot, and whose eandid 
confession of the inadequacy of Chinese defences 
and armaments^ had alike brought down upon him 



166 CHINA [1841 

the severe displeasure of the Empenir, iiad been 
replaced by three GommissionerSy Tang-Fang, Lung* 
Wan, and Tih-Shan. The first of these met Captain 
Elliot on March 20, and assented to re-opening the 
tea trade at Canton. This was, to some extent, a 
concession, but its effect upon the Chinese was 
lessened by their belief that the barbarians were 
reduced to starvation by the stoppage of the tea 
trade, on which they depended for their living. 
Moreover, the Chinese population were eager to 
dispose of their tea, and a temporary resumption of 
trade enabled them to do so, and gave the Govern- 
ment time for more elaborate preparations. 

The measure of success which had attended his 
negotiations inspired Captain Elliot with the hope 
that further military operations might prove unneces- 
sary. Qough himself never entertained any hope of 
an ultimate settlement without recourse to warfare, 
but he could only submit to the decision of the 
Plenipotentiary, and devote himself to making 
satisfEtctory arrangement for the establishment of 
an adequate garrison at Hong-Kong, the harbour of 
which impressed him as offering great possibilities 
for trade. At this juncture, came the news of the 
death of Sir Sanford Whittinghame, the Conmiander- 
in-Chief at Madras, as whose destined successor 
Sir Hugh Gk>ugh had been generally regarded. 
In informing him of the fact. Lord Auckland 
wrote: — 

I fear I shall have done you a bad turn, by 
naming you to this appointment [Cluna], for the 



1841] CANTON 167 

sudden death of Sir Sanford Whittinghame might 
otherwise have given you for a time an advantageous 
position at Madras, and if the anticipations of Captain 
Elliot should be true, there will be no demand for 
active service in China. It will be for you, with 
reference to a judgement formed on the spot, on 
experience and events, to decide on your future 
course. I must bear a grateful remembrance of the 
readiness with which you complied with my wishes, 
and shall much regret it if such alacriiy should turn 
to your disadvantage. At the same time, I conceive 
that for the arrangement which may be necessary 
either for future service or for the settlement and 
protection of the island of Hong-Eong, your presence 
in the Canton river may be of much importance and 
benefit \ 

Sir Hugh's reply to this conmiunication from the 
Governor-General is not less characteristic of his 
sense of public duty and of the paramoimt import- 
ance of the public interest than another letter, 
written at the conclusion of the China expedition, 
and afterwards read aloud by the Prime Minister to 
the House of Commons '. His actual reply is not 
preserved, but he thus describes it in a letter to his 
wife*: — 

To all this fair address, I have merely said I 
trust His Lordship will do me the justice to believe 
I accepted his offer of this Command with better 
and other motives than that of pecuniary advantages ; 
that while my services may be deemed useful tiiey 

^ Quoted in a letter from Sir Hugh to Lady Gough, 
AprUSl,184L 
« Cf. p. 887 and vol. ii. p. 111. • April 81, 1841^ 



ll» CHINA [1841 

dian be eheerfal and KiJoodj giTiea ; fintaldioii^ 
I mmt ecMifeaB mj pre e cnt posticm is not that 
I eouMwifih ma Mmtuy mm, still I fed I mar 
do 



The diflknltj of ccHipeniiiig with G^ EDiofc 
inTolved more than a mere diffiooiee of opinkm ; 
the Flenipotentiaiy vazied so mneh in his Tiews 
tiiat it was impossible to fdaee an j reliance on his 
expressed intentions. From the outset. Sir Hag|i 
had grasped the weakness of Ckptain EUiofs 
character. He reepected him as an ^wimAIa and 
iMMKNirable man, bat, in his eariiest letter to his 
son4n-law from China, he describes him as * ^iiim- 
sical as a shuttle-cock,' a compariscm which the 
Flenipotentiaiy did not fidl to justify. The Chinese 
showed no signs of coming to tenns, and the 
Emperor^s Commissionera evinced great unwilling- 
ness to enter into nc^tiations at all ; nor, with the 
fete of Eeshen ^ before their eyes, is their attitude 
in any way surprising. In the end of March, 
Sir Hugh Goug^ succeeded in persuading Captain 
Elliot that a series of combined military and naval 
operations should be at once undertaken, and a 
statement of their joint views, signed by both, and 
by Sir Gordon Bremer, was sent forthwith to Lord 
Auckland. Amoy was selected as the first point 
of attack, and preparations were commenced : but 

^ Hii property wb8 forfeited to the Crown, and he himself 
irmt oondemned to death. After tome months the sentence 
was, however, commnted, and he lived to win and lose again 
the Imperial favour. 



r\ 



1841] CANTON 169 

excuses for delay were again discovered by Captain 
Elliot who once more began to entertain a hope of 
avoiding a recourse to arms. This fresh postpone- 
ment of the movement was opposed by Sir Hugh, 
who never wavered in his distrust of the Chinese, 
but Captain Elliot declined to make the necessary 
preparations. A letter to Mr. Archibald Arbuthnot, 
dated April 24, indicates how Sir Hugh's active 
spirit fretted against the long inaction, which 
achieved no good result, delayed operations till the 
hot weather, and gave the enemy time to prepare 
for the conflict : — 

Here we are at the island of Hong-Kong, in the 
most delicious state of uncertainty. Captain Elliot 
has never once come near us, although he promised 
to be down immediately after we arrived. As 
Governor, we really can do nothing without, and, 
between ourselves, I fear we shall do less with 
him. . . • Thank Qod, we have the Chinese to deal 
with ; otherwise, defeat and disgrace must be the 
result I do not know what kind of a place Ben 
Lomond is, but I take it is very like Hong-Eong, 
with the addition that the latter is surrounded by 
the sea. The Island is one succession of precipitous 
hills rising almost perpendicular from the sea ; the 
height is not perhaps very great, say about from 
12 to 15 hundred feet, but they are nearly perpen- 
dicular. I yesterday got to the smnmit, and I never 
was so gratified. The panoramic view of the Canton 
river, with its multiplied Islands and innumerable 
boats, was grand beyond description. From the 
sunmiit, it would appear you could roll a stone to 
either side of the Island. . . . There are about four 
villages, all poor ones, and not 50 acres of cultivated 
land in the whole Island; the niunber of inhabitants 



170 CHINA [1841 

from one to two thousand Twiee that number 
have oome sinoe our arrival, not of the most 
celestial description. The defences for the Island 
would not require much, but to make the roadstead 
secure, it will be necessary to occupy a promontory 
on the mainland^ without which the roadstead will 
not be tenable K This possibly would be the best 
site for a Town, but it will require a large outlay to 
make it a secure post. The Chinese as a military 
nation, looking to them to repel an aggressive 
attack, are very contemptible, but they are neither 
wanting in courage nor bodily strength to make 
them (tespicable as a foe in a defensive system of 
warbie. In short, I conceive the Clunese at 
present a totally unmilitary nation, with capabilities 
of making a very formidable one. . . . Tou are aware 
the trade is open. Captain Elliot only thinks and 
dreams of this, as if ite being so was the sole 
object of the frightful outlay of money expended 
and expending. When I look around me and see 
the number of transporte lying idle, all receiving 
fix>m 12 to 15 thousand rupees each a month, ex- 
clusive of eighteen ships of war, when I look at 
corps reduced from 900 to 400, which will have to 
be replenished at the expense of at least 1000 
rupees each man, and when I feel that we are not 
one inch further in adjusting our differences with 
the Emperor, and are merely permitted to carry on 
a trade under less advantages to our merchants than 
we were two years back, I must naturally feel an 
anxiety for a change of men and measures. What- 
ever may be [the] cause for the war, having entered 

^ This view was strongly opposed by Captain Elliot, and, 
in the end, it was not adopted by the Gh>vemment. But 
subsequent experience proved that Sir Hugh's contention 
was justified, and after the second Chinese War the promontoiy 
of Kowloon was ceded to the British Crown*. 



o' 



1841] CANTON 171 

into it we must get oot faj diffdrent means from 
ihoae hitherto used. In £ftct, the War Party has 
the upper hand in the Celestial Cabinet, and we 
must, as the Chinese term it, squeeze them out by 
proving to the Emperor, by an active continuous 
S3rstem of operations, our power to shake his 
Dynasty. In these southern Provinces, this might 
easily be done, but I doubt whether we are prepared 
to risk so much. I am now entirely engaged in 
preparing the force to proceed, holding Hong-Kong 
as a resource and as a depot and base for future 
operations, and the island of Wang Tung as an 
advance and check in the Canton river. The force, 
weak as it is, will have greatly to be separated. 
However I expect 700 men belonging to the 
regiments here. I expect another European and 
one Native Begiment ; at least I have applied for 
and expressed my decided opinion as to the neces- 
sity of sending them, and I cannot think Lord 
Auckland will withhold them. With this force, 
I will be able to [do] anything, if I can only leave 
Elliot behind, or if I get a man who will think 
more of national honour than of present Trade. 
Had my advice been followed up. Canton would be 
now virtually in our possession, and I have no doubt 
would remain so. As it is, a few merchants have 
alone benefited, while the rest are all at war. Our 
mercantile world here is the reverse of an united 
body ; they are all at loggerheads ; they only agree 
in one thmg, that is, in their abuse of Elliot, who, 
to do him justice, takes the matter very stoically. 
I apprehend our first movement will be Amoy, 
possibly the Tang-tse-kiang the next. God grant 
that we may be able to preserve the health of the 
men. Those who have been at Chusan are fearfully 
cut up. Tou can hardly picture to yourself the 
effects that climate has had on them, particularly 
the 26th, many of whom, without having actual 



^ 



172 CHINA [1841 

disease upon them, are so prostrated that I have 
strong doubt if they ever will rally/ 

It may be readily admitted that Captain Elliot's 
position was no easy one, but his half-hearted 
measures are incapable of defence. The night after 
this letter was written, Captain Elliot made an un- 
expected appearance at Hong^Eong, and, at a con* 
ference held with Sir Hugh, on April 25, he again 
agreed to the proposals which he had adopted a 
month before, and a statement to this effect, signed 
by Elliot and Gk>ugh, was again dispatehed to Lord 
Auckland. May 12 was appointed as the date 
when the expedition should sail for Amoy. But, 
a week later, the Plenipotentiaiy had again altered 
his views. The whole expedition was ready to sail 
when, on May 8, Sir Hugh Gk>ugh was siunmoned 
to Macao, along with Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, 
who was now in command of the naval forces. Sir 
Gk>rdon Bremer having gone to Calcutta to confer 
with the Gk>vemor-GeneraL Various influences, 
naval and mercantile, had been brought to bear 
upon Captain Elliot, and he now suggested that 
the uncertainty of our relations with the Chinese at 
Canton necessitated the retention of the military 
forces there, and that the expedition to Amoy 
should be purely navaL Sir Hugh saw no reason 
to alter the decision at which they had unanimously 
arrived in the end of March, and, again, on April 25 ; 
and he strenuously ' protested against any other than 
a combined mUitaty and naval attack on Amoy as 



1841] CANTON 178 

leading to no beneficial resultSi and paralyzing th^ 
moral effect' which could be expected from a com-^ 
bined movement. In this protest, he wad supported 
by Sir Le Fleming Senhouse ; the Plenipotentiaiy, 
for the time, gave way before these appeals, and 
assured Gk)ugh and Senhouse, that he laid small 
stress on Canton rumours and alarms and only 
wished to ascertain the real sentiments of his col- 
leagues. But, almost immediately, the course of 
events at Canton led him once piore to alter his 
decision, and the expedition to Amoy was in- 
definitely postponed. 

Captain Elliot had continued to hope against 
hope that his scheme of conciliation might yet 
prove successfiiL But, towards the end of April 
^nd in the beginning of May, he was forced to 
admit that the Chinese had no intention of making 
any permanent arrangement Beinforcementa 
poured into Canton ; new artillery began to arrive ; 
the spirit of the people was raised by appeals from 
the Emperor for the utter extermination of the 
whole of the English barbariana The danger of 
the situation was revealed to Captain Elliot by a 
visit which he paid to Canton on May 11. He 
immediately hastened to Hong-Kong, and at a con* 
ference with Sir Hugh Qough, and Sir Le Fleming 
Senhouse, held on May 18, he invited these officers 
to combine in an assault upon Canton, which was 
protected by forts situated upon some heights above 
the city. Almost immediately after his arrival, Sir 
Hugh h^4 suggested the capture, of these heights, 



r> 



174 CHINA [1841 

but he luid grave doubts of the proprieiy of the 
measure at the late period which had been reached. 
* Sickness,' he said, ^ has greatly increased in our 
advanced squadron ; Canton has lost half its popu- 
lation and will probably lose the greater part of 
those when it is known that we are actually going 
up the river, which will take some days ; added to 
which it will necessarily suspend other operations 
in my mind much more likely to be eflfective at the 
present moment K 

Before another week had elapsed it became only 
too clear that, whether or not it would have been 
better to capture CSanton in the end of Mareh, an 
assault must, at all costs, be made upon it in the 
end of May. The Chinese had formed a plot for 
the extermination of the foreign merchants, who 
were taking advantage of the resumption of trade 
at Canton ; they proposed to make a sudden attack 
which would leave the foreign fiictories at their 
merey. On May 20 an official edict was promul- 
gated^ 'in order to calm the feelings of the mer» 
chants and to tranquillize commercial business,' 
which might be disturbed by the militaiy prepara- 
tiona 'It was to be feared,' said the Prefect, in 
this remarkable proclamation, ' that the merehants, 
seeing the gathering of the militaiy hosts, would 
tremble with alarm, not knowing where these 
things would end, being frightened out of their 
wits, so as to abandon their goods and go secretly 

^ Sir Hugh Cough to Lord Auckland, May 14, 1841« 



1841] CANTON 175 

away/ They were, therefore, assured of the protec- 
tion of the goyemment and requested to remain 
in Canton, following their lawful pursuits. The 
issue of this edict, on the very day before the plot 
was to take effect, seems to indicate that the Chinese 
had decided to adopt a device not imknown in more 
recent times; the foreigners were to be attacked 
nominally by the population, while the authorities 
expressed ignorance and even disapprobation of the 
massacre. This impression of the intentions of 
the Gfovemment is confirmed by an unoflScial pro- 
clamation, posted on the walls of Canton, threatening 
the foreigners with annihilation : 'We have solemnly 
sworn your destruction, even though we are stopped 
for the moment by the pacific intentions of our high 
o£Scer&' 

Fortunately, the Plenipotentiary was now 
thoroughly alarmed, and he replied to the Prefect's 
treacherous edict by issuing a notice to the mep* 
chants on the following day (May 21) in which he 
urged all foreigners to leave Canton before night- 
ML This warning was obeyed, and, by the evening, 
the foreign factories were deserted both by the 
merchants and by a party of marines which had 
been stationed there to afford some protection. 
The forces under Sir Hugh Qough were gradually 
making their way up the river ; but, on the night 
of the 21st, only a few vessels were close to the 
town of Canton. On these the Chinese opened an 
attack on the evening of May 21. 

On board the British vessels every precaution 



176 CHINA [1841 

was observedy for it was generally expected that 
the night would not pass undisturbed. About 
eleven o'clock at night some dark objects were 
observed in the water by a sentry of the Modeste. 
These soon proved to be fire-rafts which the Chinese 
had constructed in the hope of setting fire to the 
British fleet; the discovery of their intentions 
forced the enemy to set fire to the rafts sooner 
than they had intended, and the author of The 
Voyages of (he Nemesis mentions that, owing to this 
fortunate accident, their preconcerted plan was 
not carried out, and only ten or a dozen of their 
hundred rafts were actually ignited, and some of 
these drifted to the shore and set fire to the town. 
^ It was a grand spectacle,' he says, ' in the sullen 
darkness of the night, to see these floating masses 
of fire drifting about the river, and showing by 
iheir own reflected light, the panic-stricken parties 
of Chinese, who had charge of them, trying to 
escape towards the shore which few of them were 
destined to reach.' The Chinese themselves de« 
scribed the fedlure of this part of their scheme with 
naive simplicity : — ^ Some of the boldest of our men 
were to hook on combustibles to the enemy's 
shipping, and thus spread destruction throughout 
But this did not succeed, as their vessels opened 
such a fire that it was impossible to get near 
themV 

^ Quoted in China by Sir J. Hart Davis^ vol. i. p. 112. 
A similar attempt made on the night of May S8 was equally 
nnsuccessfoL 



1841] CANTON 177 

In two other respects the intentions of the 
Chinese proved futile. A battery, which (in 
defiance of the terms of the truce) had been erected 
above Canton, opened fire on the fleet, and was 
silenced by the guns of the squadron under Captain 
Herbert, of the CaMiape ; in the morning a party 
was landed to seize and destroy these fortificationa 
No sooner had this been accomplished than the 
never-fEuling Nemesis discovered the storage of 
the Chinese rafts and junks, and, within three 
hours, forty-three war-jimks and thirty-two fire- 
rafts were destroyed ^ All that the Chinese had 
gained was the pillage of the foreign factories, 
which were looted by the mob* 

Combined operations, on a larger scale, could not 
now be delayed ^ A suitable landing-place had 
been discovered during an attack dn the Chinese 
shipping on the morning of May 22 or 28, and 
a reconnaissance was made at this tx)int by Sir 
Hugh Qough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, on 
the 28rd\ Tsingpoo, the spot selected, is in a 

^ Tliis summary of the events of May 21 and 22 is base<l 
on the o£5icial dispatch of Captain H. Le Fleming Senhouse 
and on Mr. Bemard*8 narrative in Hie Voyages of the 
Nemesis, which is by far the best authority for the naval 
history of the war. 

' There is something pathetic in Captain Elliot*s final 
appeal to the mob of Canton to turn out the Commissioners 
and the Imperial troops^ and thus to obtaiii British pro- 
tection for the city, 

' Authorities differ as to whether the landing-place at 
Tsmgpoo was discovered on the 22nd by the Nemesis^ or by 

I H 



178 CHINA [1841 

creek or river about four miles to the west of the 
city of Canton. It runs up to the base of the hills 
under which the city rests and which command 
the whole defences of Canton. Tsingpoo, therefore, 
gave the British conwianders the key of the situar 
tion. The city is covered by these hills along its 
whole northern side, and its north wall stood 
immediately under them. The eastern, western, 
and southern walls were surrounded by suburbs, 
which extended on the south and west ahnost to 
the water ; the foreign factories were in the western 
suburbs. The town itself was divided into the 
old city and the new, by a wall running from east 
to west, parallel to the northern waU. The 'old 
city/ which was the northern part, was much 
laiger than the 'new city,' and it contained the 
official residences and the arsenal Outside the 
city, near the south-east comer of the wall, was 
a fort known as the French Folly and, further 
westwards, almost opposite the centre of the 
southern wall, a similar fort called the Dutch Folly. 
Both these forts conmianded the arsenal, and within 
the city wall itself was a fortified spur of the range 
of northern hilla The city was at the mercy of 
any force which occupied this hill, but the hill 
itself was well within the range of the higher 
smnmits outside the waU. On these summits, 

Commaiider Belcher in a slight action (of similar nature) on 
the morning of the SSrd. The latter is the statement in the 
official dispatches^ bat evidence on the other side is brought 
forward in The Voyages qffhe Nemesis. 



1841] CANTON 179 

the Chinese had constructed four strong forts, 
manned by foriy-two guns; these were directly 
above the city, from which they were separated 
by a ravine outside the city walL 

The naval forces under Sir Le Fleming Senhouse 
niunbered about 8,200 oflScers, seamen, and marines^ ; 
of these, a thousand could be placed at the disposal 
of Sir Hugh Qough, in addition to the land forces, 
which numbered some 2,200. 

A paragraph from Sir Hugh's general orders 
dated on the morning of the 24th, may be quoted 
as evidence of the spirit in which he regarded 
the expedition, for, like most achievements of the 
British army, the first China War has been de* 
scribed by the candid friends of their country as 
barbarous and brutal in its methods: — 

The Chinese sfystem is not one to which the 
British soldier is accustomed, but if the Chinese 
have not bravery and discipline, they have cunning 
and artifice. They have had ample time to prepare, 
and we maybe well assured that their system of 
stratagem vnlL be called into full play on the present 
occasion. But though such a system may be 
effectual against a mob, it must fsdl before the 
steady advance of disciplined soldiers. The M^jor- 
General will only add that Britain has gained as 
much of fEune by her mercy and forbearance, as by 

^ The ships were H.M. ships Blenheim^ WeUesley^ Blonde, 
Sulphur, Hifacinihy Nimrod, Modesie,Pjflade8, Cruiser, Colum^ 
bine, Algerine, CaUiope, Conway, Herald, and AUigator ; the 
schooner Starling, and the steamers Nemesis and Aialania, 
forming the Macao and Whampoa Divisions of the China 
Squadron. 

H 2 



180 CHINA [1841 

the gallantry of her troopa An enemy in arms 
is always a legitimate foe, but the unarmed, or the 
supplicant for mercy, of whatever coimtry or what- 
ever colour, a true British soldier will always 
spare. 

Sir Hugh Gk>ugh and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse 
had been desirous of celebrating the twenty-second 
anniversary of Queen Victoria's birth by the capture 
of Canton, but the difficulty of obtaining craft for 
the conveyance of the troops prevented them from 
doing more than landing on Chinese soil, to the 
sound of the guns which were firing a salute in 
honour of the Queen. At two o'clock on the after- 
noon of the 24th, the troops began to land, provided 
with cooked provisions for two days. Sir Hugh 
had divided his forces into a right and a left 
coliman, the former to attack and hold the foreign 
factories, and the latter to make the main assault 
on the heights above the city. The right colimm 
was imder the conmiand of Migor Pratt, of H.M/s 
26th Begiment, and Sir Hugh in person conmianded 
the left^ 

^ Right column under Major Pratt : H.M/s 26th Regiment 
(numbering 15 ofBicers and 294 rank and file)^ an officer and 
20 rank and file of the Madras Artillery, with one 6-pounder 
and one 6|-inch mortar, and 30 sappers with an officer of 
Engineers. 

Left column under Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, com- 
manding the Expeditionary Force : 1st Brigade, under Major-i 
General Burrell ; Royal Marines, under Captain Ellis ; and 
18th Royal Irish, under Lieut.-Colonel Adams. 2nd Brigade 
(naval), under Captain Bourchier, H.M.S. Blonde; 1st 
naval battalion (Captain Maitland), H.M.S. Wellesley; 2nd 



1841] CANTON 181 

Migor Pratt and the right column found their 
task an easy one. They landed about five o'clock 
in the afternoon, and made their way to the 
factories, which they found deserted, except for 
some imfortunate Americans who had been rash 
enough to remain in Canton on the night of the 
21st, and who, after being subjected to various 
indignities and hardships, were literally planted, 
in chairs, among the ruins of the British and Dutch 
factories^. Major Pratt then took the necessary 
steps to strengthen his post, and prepared to 
bivouac, ready for offensive or defensive action, 
as circimistances might require. 

The left colunm was towed by the Nemesis^ and, 
as the flotilla which followed the steamer was 
composed of about eighty boats, progress was 
necessarily slow for the five miles which separated 
the factories from the place of landing. Tea-cargo 
vessels, and ordinary fishing-boats had been pressed 

naval battalion (Commander Barlow)^ H.M.S. Nimrod. 
Srd Brigade (artillery), under Captain Knowles, B.A. : 
S officers and 88 men of the Royal Artillery under 
Lieut. Spencer; 10 officers and 281 men of the Madras 
Artillery under Capt. Anstruther; sappers and miners under 
Capt. Cotton. 4ih Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Morris, 
49t<h Regiment: H.M.*s 49th R^ment under Major 
Stephens ; 87th Madras Native In&ntry under Capt. Duff; 
and one Company Bengal Volunteers under Capt. Ince. 
Ordnance: four IS-pounder howitzers, four 9-pounder and 
two 6-pounder field-guns^ three &|-inch mortars^ 162 82- 
pounder rockets. 
^ Cf. TheNemeris, vol. iL pp. 14h-28. 



182 CHINA [1841 

into the service along with those which belonged 
to the ships of war ; among the passengers in the 
Nemesis were Sir Hugh Qough, Sir Le Fleming 
Senhouse, and Captain Elliot Darkness was falling 
as the steamer reached H.M.S. Sulphur^ which had 
remained near the landing-place since Sir Hugh's 
reconnaissance of the day before. No opposition 
was offered; but every precaution was observed, 
for Sir Hugh had not anticipated that the enemy 
would throw away such an opportunity. He him- 
self landed first, along with H.M.'s 49th Begiment, 
and he immediately made a reconnaissance to 
some distance. Only a few straggling Chinese 
could be descried, and Sir Hugh, after placing 
piquets, returned to cover the disembarkation of 
the artillery. Throughout the night, this operation 
proceeded, and early in the morning of May 25, the 
whole of the column was ready for the attack. 

No reconnaissance on a large scale had been 
possible, nor could the British general obtain any 
exact information as to the nature of the ground, 
or the number of the enemy ; but he had satisfied 
himself on the 28rd that an attack from this point 
was feasible, if carried out with spirit and discipline. 
The heights were distant from the landing-place 
about three and a half miles; the ground was 
undulating and broken up by rice-fields. The 
infantry advanced from position to position, and 
found themselves unopposed, until they came 
within range of the forta Two of these were 
situated close to the north-west corner of the walls. 



1841] CANTON 188 

and the others were on higher ground some distance 
tostwards and near the centre of the northern wall, 
but at a greater distance from the city than those 
at the north-west On coming within range. Sir 
Hugh placed his men under cover and awaited the 
arrival of the artillery, which could make but slow 
progress over such difficult ground. 

By eight o'clock in the morning, the rocket 
battery and six heavy guns ^ had been brought up 
and a heavy fire was directed upon the two western 
forta After the artillery had played for over an 
hour, the Chinese were observed to collect outside 
the forts*, and Sir Hugh then gave the order to 
advance. He had already made a disposition of 
the troops in echelon of columns, and he now 
ordered the 4th Brigade (consisting of the 49th 
Begiment, supported by the 87th Madras Native 
Infrntiy), under Colonel Morris, to carry a hill on 
the left of the nearest of the two more eastern 
forts. This movement was directed in combination 
with an attack by the 1st Brigade (the 18th Boyal 
Irish and the Boyal Marines) under MigoivGeneral 
Burrell, upon a hill which flanked the approach 
to the fort on which the 49th Begiment were 
moving. Burrell*s advance was intended not only 
to cover the attack of the 49th, but to cut off any 
possibility of communication between the two 
eastern forts. Simultaneously with this onslaught 

^ Two 6|-inch mortars^ two 12-poanders^and two 9-poun(iers. 
' Report of an eye-witness in the Chinese Bqfository for 
July, 1841. 



184 CHINA [1841 

Sir Hugh luid ordered an attack by tbe naval 
brigade upon tbe two western towers. Just as 
this series of combined movements was about to 
commence, the CSonmiander-in-Chief was informed 
that a body of the enemy was threatening his right, 
and he therefore detached the marines from Burrell's 
brigade, and sent them to protect the ri^t flank 
and the rear. 

At half-past nine o'clock Sir Hugh gave the order 
for a general advance. It was carried out under 
cover of tbe British artillery, but in the £gu» of 
a heavy fire from the forts and from the city wall, 
and along a difficult road. The 49th had, perhaps, 
the easier task, and they advanced so rapidly that 
they outdistanced the IStb Boyal Irish and captured 
tbe two eastern forts, while the naval brigade, which 
was exposed throughout its whole advance to a 
galling fire from the north-western rampart, carried 
the western forts. The Chinese behaved with con- 
siderable courage, and in attacking one of the two 
western forts, the seamen had to enter by means 
of scaling-lndders and cut down the enemy. Within 
half an hour all four forts were in the hands of the 
British forces. 

But the day's work was only begun. From the 
city walls came a continuous shower of grape and 
matchlock upon the captured forts, and on the 
north-east of the ciiy wall, upon rising ground, 
the Chinese had entrenched about 4,000 men in 
a strong camp, whence they had from time to time 
harassed the British left, which was stationed near 



1841] CANTON 185 

the eastern forts. About two o'clock in the after- 
noon, this force began to occupy a village on our 
lefty and Sir Hugh sent the 49th to dislodge them. 
This object was effected forthwith, but, an hour 
later, the enemy again showed signs of activity at 
this point, and one of the Chinese generals was 
observed to be urging on his men to attack. Sir 
Hugh therefore decided that the enemy must be 
driven out of this position. The task was not an 
easy one, for the only approach to the encampment 
was across a narrow causeway, and the whole move* 
ment was exposed to a fire in the rear from the 
walls of the city. The European troops were 
selected for the operation, and both the 49th and 
the 18th Boyal Irish were placed (along with one 
company of marines) imder the conmiand of Major- 
General BurrelL The severest losses of the day 
were incurred in crossing this causeway, but the 
troops pressed gallantly into the encampment, and 
drove out the enemy, the camp was destroyed and 
the magazdnes were blown up, while the Chinese 
fled in all directions. Two companies of the Boyal 
Irish led the advance across the causeway, and 
gained the warm approval of Sir Hugh, who himself 
accompanied and witnessed the movement 

Sir Hugh (sa3rs Colonel Armine Moimtain^) 
was always on the alert, alwavs on foot, day and 
night, never thought of himsen in anything ; and 
during the approach to, and halt in front of, the 

^ Memoirs ofCohnel Mountain, p. 186. 



186 CHINA [1841 

heightB, thou^ he was careful to poet the men 
under cover, he was always exposed, eagerly 
reconnoitring the ground, for which he has a capital 
eye. The matchlock balls whizzed over and around 
him, cannon balls ploughed up the paddy fields 
within a few paces of him; he never seemed to 
notice them in the least and never once deviated 
from his erect posture. 

After the destruction of the Chinese encampment 
nothing remained but the final assault on the city 
walla Sir Hugh had been watching all day for 
the moment when he mi^t commence this assault, 
but the last ascent to the forts was so rugged and 
steep that it had proved impossible to bring up, in 
the time, more than a few of the lightest pieces 
of ordnance, and he therefore decided to postpone 
operations till next morning, as he could not for 
a moment entertain the idea of making the assault 
* without this necessary ann.' He occupied the rest 
of the day in a careful reconnaissance of the position, 
while his men rested, overcome with fatigue, and 
with the heat, which was almost intolerable. The 
result of his investigations was a decision to con- 
centrate his attack upon the strong fortified height 
to which we have already referred as being within 
the city walL 

While the Commander-in-Chie^ accompanied by 
Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, was personally superin- 
tending the important operations on the heights, 
his instructions were being carried out in other 
portions of the neighbourhood of Canton. It will 
be remembered that two forts, on the southern side 



1841] CANTON 187 

of the town, commanded a laige part of the area 
within the city walla The military and the naval 
commanders of the expeditionary forces had arranged 
for the seizure of these French and Dutch ' Follies/ 
as they were called. The Dutch fort proved to be 
imdefended, but the French was assaulted and cap- 
tured on the morning of the 26th, when the whole 
of the river defences were in British handa Before 
leaving the landing-place. Sir Hugh had been careful 
to place a rearguard (including detachments of his 
European regiments) to prevent the loss of om: com- 
munications. The precaution was a wise one, for, 
on the afternoon of the 25th, while the British 
forces were engaged on the heights above the town, 
some Chinese troops were seen to leave Canton by 
the western gate and to make their way to the 
landing-place. Sir Hugh at once asked Sir Le 
Fleming Senhouse to dispatch orders to the vessels 
anchored near the spot to render assistance to the 
scaniy rearguard. A sharp action followed, and the 
Chinese were driven back upon the town K 

We return to the main body, encamped on the 
heights above Canton. At ten o'clock in the morn- 
ing of the 26th, the Chinese floated a white flag 
from the city walls, and a message was received to 
the e£fect that the enemy desired peace. Sir Hugh 
refused to treat with any one except the General in 
command of the Chinese troops, but indicated that 
he would suspend hostilities for two hours to enable 

^ The authority for this incident is Voyages of the Nemesis, 
vol. ii. pp. 89--41. 



188 CHINA [1841 

the Chinese General to have an interview with him- 
self and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse. ^I further 
explained/ he says, Hhat Captain Elliot, Her 
Majest/s Plenipotentiary, was with the advanced 
squadron to the south of the city, and that if I did 
not receive a communication from him, or had not 
a satisfactory interview with the General, I should, 
at the termination of the two hours, order the white 
flag to be strucL' Tents were pitched halfway 
between the British camp and the city wall, and the 
Chinese promised that their general would make his 
appearance in an hour and a half \ 

^ The Chinese Grenerals thus described the incident to the 
Emperor : — ' Soldiers on duty at the embrasores reported that 
they had seen the foreigners beckoning with their hands 
towards the city as if they had something to communicate. 
We thereupon immediately ordered the brigadier Heung 
Suyshing to mount the city wall and look. He saw several 
barbarian eyes [i.e. chiefs or heads] pointing to heaven and 
earthy but could not make out what they said. He forthwith 
called a linguist to inquire what they wanted^ when it appears 
they said that '' they begged the great general to come out as 
they had some hardships to complain of to him." Upon this^ 
the commanding officer, Twan Yungf uh, said to them in an 
angry tone: '*How can the great general of the celestial 
dynasty come out to see such as you? He has come here 
by command of the great Emperor, and he knows nothing 
more about you than to fight with you." Upon this, the 
said barbarians took off their hats and made a bow ; then 
they sent away the people who were about them, and casting 
their weapons on the ground, performed an obeisance towards 
the city wsH'— Chinese BepasUory, July, 1841, p. 408. This 
account places the incident on the 27th, but it clearly confuses 
the events of the two days (26th and 27th}. 



1841] CANTON 189 

Sir Hugh waited considerably longer than the 
appointed time, but no general came, and no 
message arrived from Captain Elliot He then 
ordered the white flag to be hauled down and pro- 
ceeded to place his artillery in position. The Chinese 
left their white flag floating on the city wall, and 
made no attempt to interfere with Sir Hugh's 
arrangements for getting up guns and ammunition. 
Bain fell very heavily, and it was clear that hosti- 
lities could not be seriously resinned that night; 
but orders were given for commencing the final 
assault at an early hour on the morning of the 27th. 
The batteries were to open at seven o'clock, and, 
an hour later, fom: columns were to make simul- 
taneous assaults. 

The ground (says Sir Hugh's dispatch) was 
peculiarly favourable for these several attacks, and 
for the effective fire of the covering parties, without 
a chance of injuring the assailants. The heights 
which we occupied are fix)m 90 to 250 paces from 
the city wall, with a precipitous glen intervening. 
On maJdng a lodgment on the walls, each column 
was to communicate with and support that on its 
inner flank, and when united, to make a rush for th^ 
fortified hill within the walls, on which the artillery 
was directed to play from the moment the advance 
was sounded. I directed Captain Knowles to ascer- 
tain, as far as practicable, by the fire of heavy 
rockets and shells, whether it was mined, which 
alone I apprehended — the Chinese usually forming 
their mines so as to make them liable to explosion 
by such meana 

It is needless to go into further detail on. this 



190 CHINA [1841 

well-planned assault, for it was destined ne^er to 
take place. 

At six o'clock on the morning of May 27, the 
white flag was still visible on the walls of Canton. 
Sir Hugh was on the point of sending a messenger 
to indicate to the Chinese that he must decline to 
respect it, when a letter yras brought to him by 
a naval officer, who had been wandering about all 
night trying to find the GeneraL The Chinese, 
knowing that they could make no impression on 
Sir Hugh, had appealed to Her Migest/s Plenipo> 
tentiary, who once more assented to their demands. 
Captain Elliot* s letter ran as follows : — 

To His Excellency Migor-Qeneral Sir Hugh Qough, 
KC.B., and Captain Sir H. Le Fleming Senhouse, 
KC.B., etc. 

H.M.S. HyacifUh, off Canton, 

May 26th, 1841. 10 p.nL 
Gentlemen, 

I have the honour to acquaint you that I am 
in communication with the officers of the Chinese 
Government, concerning the settlement of difficul- 
ties in their province, upon the following oondi* 
tions: — 

1st. The Imperial Commissioner, and all the 
troops, other than those of the province, to 
quit the city within six days, and remove to 
a distance exceeding sixty milea 

2nd. Six millions of dollars to be paid in one 
week for the use of the crown of England — one 
million payable before to-morrow at sunset. 

8rd. British troops to remain in their actual 
positions till the whole sum be paid ; no addi- 



1841] CANTON 191 

tional preparations on either side; but all 
British troops and ships of war to return with* 
out the Bocca Tigris^ as soon as the whole 
be paid. Wang^tong^ also to be evacuated, but 
not to be re-armed by the Chinese goyemment, 
till all the difficulties are adjusted between the 
two govemments. 

4th. The loss occasioned by the burning of the 
Spanish brig, BUbaino^ and all losses occasioned 
by the destruction of the factories to be paid 
within one week. 

For tiie purpose of completing the arrangement, 
I have to request that you will be pleased to sus- 
pend hostilities till noon. 

I have the honour to remain, &c., 

Chakles Eluot, 

Her Migesty's Plenipotentiary. 

On receipt of this communication, Sir Hugh 
Gough and Sir Le Reming Senhouse dispatched 
a strong protest to Captain Elliot, but they had no 
option save to acquiesce in his decision. When it is 
understood that the Chinese had 45,000 troops 
within the city, the terms may seem, at first sight, 
not unreasonable. But it must be recollected that 
Canton was absolutely at Sir Hugh's mercy, from 
the moment he had planted his artillery on the 
heights, and that it was impossible to trust the 
Chinese to remove tiieir 45,000 men to a distance 

^ The Booca Tigris, or Tiger's mouth (commonly called by 
sailors the Bogne}^ is^ it will be remembered, the channel 
connecting the enter with the inner defences of the Canton 
river; Wantong is an island in the Booca Tigxis. 



192 CHINA [1841 

of sixty miles. Nor can the agreement be &irly 
said to have prevented the sack of a rich and 
ancient town ; for Sir Hugh's contemplated attack 
was directed on the fortified hill within the walls, 
and he was confident that, vdth this in his posses- 
sion, he could not only afford to spare Canton, but 
could imdertake practically to prevent his men from 
entering the ciiy proper, by concentrating them on 
this height Still more reprehensible was the con- 
duct of Captain Elliot in concluding such a treaiy 
without consulting the commanding officers of the 
two services, and his utter disregard of military pre^ 
cautions in leaving a small force, with insufficient 
commissariat, and with a long line of commtmica- 
tions, exposed to the attacks of a treacherous and 
undisciplined mob. 

I feel it right to observe (remarked Sir Hugh in 
his reply to Captain Elliot) that, had Your Ex- 
cellency done me the honour to consult with me as 
to the military arrangements you have entered into, 
I should strongly have opposed them as injudicious ; 
placed now as we are, I am bound, therefore, and 
I do it with much regret, to enter my protest against 
the measure. I will only add, my arrangement was 
made, and the guns placed in position for the 
assault ; and that within two hours from this 
moment the fortified height in the Town, and the 
Northern Gate would have been in my possession, 
which would be a much more judicious and safe 
position, and which, if the authorities were sincere 
they could have no reason to object to. 

In a private letter which covered this official com- 
municationi Sir Hugh remarked : — 



o 



1841] CANTON 108 

You have placed us in a mo0t critioal situation. 
Jtfy men of all arms are dreadfully harassed, my 
communications witii the rear continually threatened 
and escorts attacked. My men must suffer dread- 
fully from the necessity of continued watchfulness. 
For however you may put confidence in the Chinese, 
I do not, nor should I be justified in relaxing in the 
least 

Events proved that the caution of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was more than justified. May 27 
and 28 passed without disturbance^ and with no 
further excitement than the conclusion of an agree- 
ment for the evacuation of Canton by the Imperial 
troops, Sir Hugh permitting them, at the request of 
Captain Elliot, to pass out by the north-east gate, 
carrying with them their arms and baggage. An 
encoimter of some importance took place on the 
29tk About noon on that day, Sir Hugh observed, 
about four miles on his rear, a number of irregular 
Chinese troops^ which cofistantiy increased, and 
showed symptoms of attacking the camp. He 
determined to disperse them and inmiediately made 
arrangements to divide his force into an attacking 
and a defending party, for he could not be certain 
that the assailants on the heights were not co^ 
operating with their friends within the town. The 
charge of the camp was committed to Migor-QeneraL 
Burrell, who was instructed to hold every man 
ready, in case a sortie, or other act of treachery, 
should be intended. The attacking force consisted 
of a wing of the 26th, or Cameronians (who had 

been stationed 9I the fEustories on the evening of 
I o 



194 CHINA [1841 

the 24tli, and so had not tiken put m the attack 
on the forts), three eompaniea of the 49th, and the 
87th Madras Kathre In&ntiy. To these Sir Hng^ 
added a raaigoaid, eonaisting of the Bengal Yolim* 
teers and the Boyal Marinew^ instnicting them to 
act as reseire and to be ready to return and meet 
any advance from the town« The enemy in fronts 
who nmnbered about 4,000 men, were posted behind 
an embankment along the bed of a stream ; their 
position was carried by a charge of the CSameronianSy 
supported by the Madras Native Infimtry, who de- 
stroyed a military post and a magazine in their 
progress. In this assault, not a single man was 
lost For about two hours, the British force watched 
the enemy, vdio had retreated to some heights, and 
who were continually increasing in numbers. Sir 
Hugh had foUen back somewhat upon his camp^ 
and this movement seemed to give courage to the 
foe, who again advanced, numbering now between 
7,000 and 8,000. Sir Hugh had ordered an artillery 
oflScer to bring up some rockets ; these were now 
directed upon the CSunese, but with little eflfect, and 
as a very severe thunderstorm was about to break, 
another attack became necessary. Two charges 
were made at this stage ; the Cameronians, under 
Migor Pratt, dispersed a body on the left, and the 
87th N. L, with the Bengal Volunteers \ expelled 

^ The 49ih, the Royal Marines^ and the Bengal Volnnteen 
had been sent back to the camp after the sucoess of the first 
attack; the last-mentioned corps was brought back by the 
General's A«D,C.j Colonel J. B. Oongh^ who had been so 



1841] CANTON 195 

a party of the enemy who had reoccupied the military 
post which had just been destroyed, and then 
cleared the heights in front All these corps 
behaved with gallantry, and their movements were 
completely successfuL The heat had been over^ 
whelming; the Deputy Adjutant-General, M^jor 
Beecher, fell dead on the field before the second 
attack, and many others were affected by the 
merciless rays of the sun. The rain now descended 
with almost inconceivable fruy, turning the wet 
paddy-fields into lakes, and rendering very insecure 
the men's footing on the heights. Still more 
disastrous was the effect of the water on the fire* 
locks; at one point, the 26th could not fire a 
musket, and had ^ repel the enemy by means of 
hand-to-hand fighting. Finally, the enemy re^ 
treated, and Sir Hugh's small force retired to the 
camp. 

The trials of the day were not yet over. In the 
course of the second attack, Captain Dufi^ who was 
in command of the 87th Madras N. L, had been 
forced to detach a company under Lieutenant 
Hadfield, in order to open communications with 
the Cameronians, who were on his left. When the 
order to retire was given, Sir Hugh understood 
Captain Duff to say that this company had rejoined. 
It had not done so, and the fact was not discovered 
until the forces had regained the camp« Captain 



seriously affected by the son that Sir Hugh sent him back. 
Oo heitfing of the second Chinese advance he retomed, 

02 



<A 



196 CHINA [1841 

Duff was at once dispatched, with two companieB of 
marines, armed with percussion locks, to the rescue 
of the lost sepoys. They were found bravely 
defending themselves from immense numbers of 
Chinese who had surrounded them. When they 
ffidled to rejoin their regiment, they had been 
attacked, and, in spite of the fact that the rain 
rendered their firelocks useless, had made their 
way to a mound which offered some possibilities 
of defence. A temporary cessation of the thunder- 
storm permitted them to pour a fire upon the enemy, 
who fell back, and allowed them to commence a 
retreat; but the pitiless rain soon fell again in 
torrents, and their rescuers found them formed 
in a square and surrounded by some thousands of 
Chinese. Two or three volleys from the percussion 
locks of the marines dispersed the enemy, and the 
little band returned home, having added new laurels 
to the glories of the Indian army. They had lost 
only one man killed and one officer and fourteen 
men woimded. 

There was no further disturbance that night, and, 
early in the morning of the 80th, Sir Hugh sent 
a message to the city to the effect that^ should any 
further outbreak occur, he would reconmience hos- 
tilities. In the afternoon, a conference was held 
between Sir Hugh Qough, Captain Elliot, and the 
Chinese general. Just before it b^an, the hills 
which had been the scene of the skirmish of the 
day before, were again seen to be covered with 
Chinese, who were firing in all directions, and 



1841] CANTON 197 

throwing out advance paitiea The conference met 
while the British forces were drawn up ready to 
repel an attack of the enemy. The Chinese 
authorities succeeded in convincing Sir Hugh that 
the hostile demonstrations on the hills were not 
part of any combination directed against him from 
the city, and that the Tartar troops who had been 
permitted to march out of Canton had taken no 
part in the fighting. They explained tibat the 
attacking parties were merely militia who had been 
protecting the villages in the neighboiurhood of 
Canton, and they o£fered to send out a mandarin 
of rank to command them to disperse. An English 
officer, Captain Moore, of the 84th Bengal Native 
Infantry, who was acting as Deputy-Judge- Advocate- 
General, accompanied the mandarin, whose orders 
were obeyed by the crowd. 

The moral of the incident was that Captain Elliot's 
error could only be rectified by the withdrawal of 
the British forces from Canton, as soon as the 
conditions of the agreement had been, to any 
reasonable extent, fulfilled. Within the town, they 
could have remained in safety; on the heights 
outside it, their position must be constantiy in- 
secure. The Chinese had now paid 5,000,000 
dollars and had given security for the sixth million ; 
over 17,000 of the Tartar troops had left Canton, 
and the rest of the 45,000 were prepared to follow. 
In these circumstances, Sir Hugh acceded to Captain 
Elliot's request for an immediate withdrawal, and 
on June i the British flag disappeared from the 



1M CWSJL [isa 

hMo&xst ir/:n» Cux&ul-. ami ^iut -vicie izis e^ 
Uttk^ azui xauaed -iuaz zaxiaoars 37 TTTgnriM 
Tb'^ <iuii^ ^ist irac musayrr '93i£a 

asi^ 1KR zr/; zr^dSL I2. di^ SKczimr if das bt^ 
fjBk iCxT a. tb& VjuI ^'aapabiapff v«% n-sv- kfUgd sid 
aa^'^ifid;;^ irr/z^ied : m. die Wrfr!T:i»h •:^ die SOdi. 
Irr^ w«% kHj^ azid cv^mcj-chziEe v^arsded. Hie 
UXaI in tLfe two dars' fightmg was. cba^bie^ 105 
kUkd aad wcccruied. or fisAsij over dixce per cent. 
fA the wfc^/fe fcn» enoged. 

I duJl be dMOsed twroce Sir Hn^ to his wife*) 
of makh^ uxj mndli of die aiEur. bat those who 
rttdly know the smiatkw under which I hxve been 
pheed will do jasdee to the deTocedneaB of m j 
gallant little bamL It must be ranembered I had 
to land in a country totally unknown, never before 
trorlden by Eurc^^ean foot, unocHisdous of what 
dilRcultie« I might have to encounter, or the 
num\ffsTH I had to oppose. These were enough to 
make caution necessary. Look to facts — the diffi- 
culties of the country as to advance of troops, in any 
otltf^r [order] than that of file, the impossibility of 
a rapid move of artillery, an enemy 45,000 strong 
(or thirty men to one) of regulars, to oppose, besides 
a militia of equal amount, the former posted on 
fortiftixl heights, impregnable to any but European 
soldiers, with a Town in their rear containing 
upwards of one million of inhabitants, who con- 
sidered ^ou as barbarians, strongly fortified, its 
walls bomg, at the point of attack, from 28 to 85 

' The hill on which the army had bivouacked is now known 
bjr the name of Oough. 
> June 6, 1841. 



k 



II 



•ukatii 

;a(te. 
rrit. 
ralBat 
Moade 



MOM 



1841] CANTON 199 

feet. These were obstacles which may not be well 
understood at home. These obstacles were to be, 
and were, overcome by about 1500 bayonets, im- 
supported and without the power of support — I 
might say of retreat, as the only two ships, the 
Sulphur and the Nemesis were both aground the first 
day. I mention not this to enhance this business, 
but I merely mention facts to prove that I am not, 
nor have I been, too lavish of praise. This and this 
alone I care for ; personally, I am indifferent, but 
I own I shall be jealous of the lowering the exertions 
and the devotedness of my noble band. You know 
I am a little of an enthusiast. At Barossa, my 
motto was that spirit of Fitq'ames^, ^Come one, 
come all I this rock shall fly from its firm base as 
soon as L' I have on the present occasion changed 
it into the address of one of our English kings in 
the old French Wars: — *We few, we happy few, 
we band of brothers*.* I look upon every one of 
my fellows in that endearing light ; I am jealous of 
their jGEune, and feel a deep and anxious interest in 
their professional characters, and I hope the feeling 
is reciprocaL . . . Let your anticipations join with 
mine in thankfulness, in deep unaltered gratitude 
to that Being who in my old age enables me to 
serve my coimtiy. 

* The Lady of the Lake, Canto V. 
« Henry F, Act iv. Sc. 8. 



n 

AMOY 

Keably three months were to pass between the 
capture of the forts at Canton and the next openk 
tions in the war, three months which were, in many 
ways, a period of disappointment and disaster for 
the Expeditionary Force in China. Two events of 
ihese dreary weeks gave great personal satisfaction 
to Sir Hugh Gkaigh. A letter received from Lord 
Auckland, on June 18, closed with this sentence : — 
^ I may congratulate you upon having been named 
to the Chief Command at Madras, and I trust that 
you will not repine at being asked to ccmtinue in 
the conduct of your present most important com* 
mand' The chief command at Madras had never 
yet been entrusted to an officer of the rank of Migor- 
General, and Sir Hugh was correspondingly grateful 
for the honour which the (Government proposed to 
confer upon him. There were, of course, objections ; 
apprehensions of the effects on Lady Gough's health 
of ' five years' more residence in such a fiimace as 
Madras' tended to lessen his satisfaction with his 
approaching promotion. No such consideration 
interfered with his appreciation of another distinc- 
tion, the annoimcement of which reached him about 
the same time — his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief 
of the 87th Eegiment. 'My appointment to the 



1841] AMOY 201 

87th comes much more home to my feelings as a 
soldier and a man,' he wrote in reply to the con- 
gratulations of the Commander-in-Chief in India 
(Sir Jasper Nicolls), ^such imsolicited acknowledge- 
ments of Lord Hill's sentiments as to my exertions 
at the head of that dear old Corps in by-gone days, 
make me feel proud of my profession and of its 
head/ 

The pleasure arising from such purely personal 
causes was greatly diminished by the condition of 
the forces in China. The exposure on the heights 
at Canton was followed by a serious outbreak of 
ague and dysentery; at one time, about eleven 
hundred men were on the sick list at Hong-Kong. 
The outbreak lasted through most of the month of 
June, and the navy suflfered more severely than 
Sir Hugh's own forces. The most severe loss was 
that of Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, who died on board 
the Blenheim off Hong-Kong, on Jime 18. In an- 
noimcing the event to Lord Auckland, Sir Hugh 
wrote: — 

The loss of such a man must be deeply felt by 
every individual in this force, military as well as 
navid. For myself, I am imable adequately to 
express how much I lament it, both on public and 
on private grounds. Sir Le Fleming Senhouse 
accompanied me at the assault and capture of the 
heights and forts over Canton, remained with me 
three or four days greatly exposed to alternate sun 
and rain ; on the morning of ^e fourth day he went 
back to the Fleet, and had actually reached the 
base of the heights on his way to rejoin me about 



202 CHINA [1841 

noon on the Ist June, when we met, and he re- 
turned with me on foot to the landingplace, under 
a most powerful sun* He further greatly exerted 
himself in the subsequent embarkation. His death 
is to be attributed to over-exertion. 

The noble and unselfish nature of Sir Le Fleming 
Senhouse made a lasting impression upon Sir Hugh 
Gough, who never ceased to be grateful to him for 
the generous co-operation which he had extended 
at Canton, where his naval arrangements added 
largely to the success of Sir Hugh's plans. Al- 
thou^ in the absence of Sir Gordon Bremer, the 
credit of a purely naval expedition would have feJlen 
to Sir Le Fleming himself, he had strongly opposed 
Captain EUiof s suggestion to this effect, and had 
supported Sir Hugh's protest ^ When his coimtiys 
interests were concerned,' said Sir Hugh, ^ no per^ 
sonal or professional feelings had influence with Sir 
Le Fleming Senhouse.' He was buried, not in the 
newly-acquired territory of Hong-Kong (which was 
meanwhile only in military occupation, as Captain 
Elliot's treaiy had not been ratified), but on Portu- 
guese soil at Macaa 

Sir Gk>rdon Bremer returned on June 18 as Joint- 
Plenipotentiary with Captain Elliot. This joint 
power they continued to hold for two months, but 
their tenure of office was distinguished only by a 
furious typhoon which burst over Hong-Kong to- 
wards the end of July, doing serious damage to the 
hospitals and other buildings which were in course 
of erection* The two Plenipotentiaries were wrecked 



1841] AMOY 208 

in Captain Elliot's cutter, the Louisa^ and had seveiral 
narrow escapes. This is their only claim to dis- 
tinction, beyond that of reopening, about the begin- 
ning of August, trade with Canton. Otherwise^ 
matters remained precisely as they were, and no 
step was taken towards a settlement of the disputes 
which had occasioned the war. The ransom of 
Canton gave the expedition, as Sir Hugh Gough 
complained, something of a buccaneering aspect, 
and the Emperor of China was informed that the 
indenmity represented private debts. The barba« 
rians had begged * the chief general that he would 
implore the great Emperor in their behalf, that he 
would have mercy upon them, and cause their debts 
to be repaid them, and graciously permit them to 
carry on their commerce, when they would imme- 
diately withdraw their ships from the Bocca Tigris, 
and never dare agaia to raise any disturbance.' It 
was further represented that the forts in the Canton 
river might now be restored in such a manner as 
to defy all attacks. ^Commerce is to these said 
foreigners the veiy artery of lifd . . . should they 
ever dare again to give rein to their outrageous 
conduct, we can in a moment stop their commerce 
— this then is a mode of governing them which is 
always in our own hands K* Views like these did 
not augur well for a speedy conclusion of peace. 

Throughout these months, Sir Hugh never ceased 
to urge the wisdom of prosecuting the war : — 

^ Chinese Repository, July, 1841, p. 404. 



S04 CHINA [1841 

The more I see of the Ghineee (he told Lord 
Auckland 'X the more I am impressed with the 
expediency of a continuous system of operations 
on a large scala While going forward, our power 
is felt and respected ; the moment we pause, the 
Chinese falae representations and ingenuity come 
into play. I have before stated to your Lordship^ 
and I beg to repeat the opinion, that the Chinese 
individually are by no means despicable, and that 
iheir militia, as I witnessed on the 80th and 81st 
ICay, showed as much boldness as any irregular 
troops I have ever seen. In short, my Lord, the 
longer we continue the war, the more formidable the 
Chinese will becoma It is for this reason I regret 
our present inaction. 

Sir Hugh also continued to hold that the proper 
course was an expedition up the Yang-tse-kiang, in 
opposition to a suggestion of the Gk>vemor-General 
that the Peiho river would be the scene of operar 
tions: — 

The movement on the Peiho (he said') is 
certainly very attractive, and in sJl probability 
would have the desired effect upon the Court of 
Peking, if the expedition arrived off the river at a 
seasonably early period of the year and after the 
Chinese had been made to feel, at two or three 
intermediate points, the pressure of the war ; but 
I doubt, in the event of the Court refusing to redress 
us, the practicability of any continued movement of 
sufficient strength to approach Peking by the river. 
If I am rightly informed, the Peiho is capable of 
being made perfectly impassable, and there can be 
littie doubt that the Chinese have not been idle. It 

^ Sir Hugh Googh to Lord Auckland, July 1, 1841. 
« Ibid,, ct pp. 164, «6& 



1841] AMOY 205 

would be impossible to make any military demon* 
stration on its marshes to aid a naval armament, 
and any delay in such a climate would entail 
dreadful sickness. This, I think, is self-evident, 
if the war be not ended this year, large re-inforce- 
ments will be absolutely necessary at the earliest 
possible period for the following campaign. I own 
I looked forward at one time to doing much this 
season; even late as we are, much still may be 
effected. The Yang-tse-kiang I have ever considered 
the most vulnerable point of the north. Whether 
or not a healthy location for the winter can be found 
on its banks, is of course imcertain ; but it has ever 
struck me, once established there, the Court of 
Pekin must either by force or by concession get us 
out of that great source for provisioning the Capital, 
and of commercial intercourse with the interior. 



The authorities were still trifling with the idea of 
a purely naval expedition, and Sir Hugh, in arrangr 
ing for acampaign in the North, was much hampered 
both by delay in sending him troopBj and by the 
arrival of raw recruits, many of whom scarcely 
knew how to bear arms. In these circumstances, 
he decided to form a provisional European battalion, 
composed of the recruits and invalids of all the 
corps, and to leave them to garrison Hong-Kong, 
the real defences of which depended upon the navy. 
H.M.'s 55th Bogiment was now on its way from 
India, and on its arrival, he hoped to be able to take 
northwards a force of about 2,250 of all ranks 
(exclusive of artilleryX leaving about half that 
number in garrison. There were also difficulties of 
commissariat and of medical att^endance and hospita) 



206 CHINA [1841 

requisites; in all these respects, the force was 
inadequately provided. Nor was the military equip- 
ment completely satisfisu^ry, 

I felt so much in want of rifles (Sir Hugh com- 
plained to Sir Jasper NicoUs), that I have sul^tuted 
an expedient in the Queen's Corps, by selecting four 
marksmen per Division, most intelligent men and 
best shots. They fall in with the supernumerary 
rank, and skirmish under an officer as Bifles, 
Advancing on the Chinese in a mass is of no use. 
They require to be drawn on, and must appear to 
have a great superiority to receive our effective fire. 

' In spite of all difficulties, and of a renewed out- 
break of sickness among the troops, Sir Hugh was 
ready to go northwards long before he was per- 
mitted to do so. The joint Plenipotentiaries were 
engaged in fresh negotiations with the Chinese, 
who fully appreciated the advantages of dealing 
with Captain Elliot But the patience of the Home 
Government was at length exhausted ; the evacua- 
tion of Chusan was strongly condenmed, and on 
August 10, Sir Henry Pottinger, a distinguished 
officer of long experience in India, who had been 
Besident in Sindh, arrived at Macao as sole Pleni* 
potentiaiy. He was accompanied by Bear-Admiral 
Sir William Parker, who now took charge of the 
naval operations. Captain Elliot and Sir Gordon 
Bremer almost immediately returned to England. 
With Sir William Parker, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the land forces acted in cordial co-operation 
throughout the war. Lord Auckland had thus 



1841] AMOY 207 

instructed the Admiral : — ^Tou ivill determine the 
naval, and Sir Hugh Gough the military, means to 
be employed. The naval officer will take the lead, 
according to accustomed form, whilst the force is 
afloat, though in the government of all that concerns 
the troops, and their employment on shore, the 
military officer in command will be paramoimtV 
This general rule proved sufficient guidance and 
there was rarely any difference of opinion between 
the two Conmianders-in-Chie£ 

The effect of the arrival of Sir Henry Fottinger 
and Sir William Parker was seen, almost imme- 
diately, in the resumption of active operations. 
The Chinese showed no signs of willingness to 
come to terms, and Sir Henry Pottinger was not 
inclined to lay any special stress on the trading 
arrangements at Canton. He declined to receive 
the Prefect of the city, an incident which deeply 
impressed the Chinese, as he wished to impress 
them, with the fact that no local agreement at 
Canton was of any importance, and that the 
Imperial Government must be prepared to enter 
into negotiations for a permanent settlement as to 
the rights of British traders in China* Sir Henry 
immediately resolved to sanction the movement 
northwards, which Sir Hugh had so frequently 
urged, and August 21 was definitely fixed for the 
commencement of the longdeferred expedition to 
Amoy. 

^ Admiral Phillimore's Ltfe of Sir WHliam Parker, vol. ii 
pp. 44a-4. 



SOS CHINA [1841 

The object of this e3q)edition was simply to bring 
the scene of operations nearer Peking, and so to 
force the Goyemment to come to terms. Light 
winds delayed the fleet, but^ on August 25, it 
anchored off Amoy, and a proclamation was sent 
to the Admiral commanding the Chinese naval 
forces, asking him ^to deliver the town and all 
the fortifications of Amoy into the hands of the 
British, to be held for the present by them,' and 
assuring him of the safety of officers and troops, 
and of the town, should he comply with this 
demand The white flag, which was to be the 
signal of compliance, did not appear on the defences, 
and the Commandenhin-Ghief at once made arrange- 
ments for the commencement of hostilitiea It was, 
ot coiurse, incredible that the Chinese would con« 
aider for a moment the suggestion of the Pleni- 
potentiary, for, during the preceding year, large 
sums of money had been expended on the defences 
of Amoy, and they were now so strong that, 
after the capture of the town, it was generally 
believed that, had the batteries been ^manned 
by Europeans no force could have stood before 
themV 

On the morning of the 26th, a reconnaissance 
was made by Sir Hugh Gk>ugh, along with Sir 
William Parker and Sir Henry Pottinger. The 
town of Amoy is built on an island of the same 
name ; the town and harbour lie in the south-west 

' Chinese Hqpositary, voL x. p. 621 (November^ 1811). 



1841] AMOY 209 

comer of the island. In the middle of the ex* 
ten&dye harbour is the island of Kulangsu, which 
commands the town. It is separated £rom Amoy 
by a passage which practically forms another 
harbour, in which lie the vessels that frequent 
the place. The Chinese had carefully employed 
every possibility of defence. ^ Every island,' says 
Sir Hugh's dispatch, ^ every projecting headland, 
from whence guns could bear upon the harbour, 
was occupied and strongly armed.' Immediately 
in front of the outer town of Amoy stood a succes- 
sion of batteries, and fit>m these there extended 
a solid rampart, facing the sea, about a mile in 
length. It was, says an eye-witness, ^well built 
of granite, faced with earth, extending along the 
shore nearly up to the suburbs of the ciiy, and 
designed to conunand the passage to the harbour. 
It presented a line of guns, a full mile in length, 
the embrasures being covered with large slabs of 
stone protected by earth heaped upon them, and 
moimting no less than ninety-six guns ^' The end 
of this rampart was connected by a castellated wall 
with a range of rocky heights running parallel to 
the beach and the rampart, which was thus pro- 
tected fit>m a flanking attack. From imdemeath 
the embrasures the guns could be served without 
fear of retaliation. The entrance which was thus 
protected was only some six himdred yards in 
width, lying between Amoy and Eulangsu. On 

^ The Nemesis, yoL ii. p. 1S8. 
I P 



SIO CHINA [1841 

this latter island there were aereial strong batteiieB^ 
mountiiig altogether aeveniy-fiix guns, and Bome of 
these faced the long stone rampart on the opposite 
side of the strait, thus exposing the assailants to 
a cross fire. 

The problem created by these defences was 
laigely a naval ona Yet the event was to prove 
the futility of a purely naval action, such as had 
been seriously contemplated in the spring: Sir 
William PaiiLer and Sir Bjigfi Gough agreed that 
a simultaneous attack must be made upon the 
fortifications of the two islands of Amoy and 
Kulangsu; that in each case a frontal attack was 
to be made by the navy, vdiile the land forces 
made an attempt to cany the batteries in reverse. 
We shall follow, in the first place, the fortunes of 
the attack on Kulangsu. 

Hostilities commenced at half-past one o'clock on 
August 26. Three frigates, the Blonde (M guns), 
the Druid (44 guns), and the Modeste (18 guns), 
under the command of Captain Bourchier, had 
been entrusted with the assault upon the Kulangsu 
batteries, for, on that side of the channel, the water 
was very shallow ; so shallow that the ships had to 
be carried almost into their own draught, in order 
to obtain an effective range. While a well directed 
naval cannonade was in progress, Sir Hugh's troops 
succeeded in landing in a small bay on the left 
of the easternmost battery. They consisted of 
three companies of the Cameronians, imder Migor 
Johnstone, accompanied by M^jor Ellis with 170 



1841] AMOY 211 

marines ^ Immediately on landing, Uigor Ellis, 
with some of the Marines and Cameronians, attacked 
the batteries on the east; Migor Johnstone, with 
the remainder of the force, which had been some- 
what delayed, crossed the island and met Migor 
Ellis's victorious band on the north side of the 
island, and helped him to dear out the works that 
had not been already abandoned, as Migor Ellis 
made his way down the enemy's lines. By half- 
past three o'clock the island of Eulangsu was in 
the possession of the British forces. 

The fortifications on the island of Amoy pre- 
sented more formidable difficultie& The two line- 
of -battle ships, the WeUesley and the Blenheim (each 
72 guns), were stationed at the extreme end of the 
great rampart, next to the town ; the Pyhdes (18 
guns), the Cruiser (16 guns), the Columbine (16 guns), 
and the Algerine (10 guns), continued the line of 
attack up to the outer entrance of the harbour. 
The spot selected for the landing of the troops was 
at the end of the castellated wall connecting the 
rampart with the fortified heights, and two ships 
were placed below this point, in order to protect 
the disembarkation from the fire of some flanking 
batteries which extended along the sea-coast beyond 
the rampart The naval cannonade was not so 
successful as at Eulangsu ; it helped to silence the 
separate batteries, but made little impression upon 

^ A company of artilleiy which had been detailed to aesist 
Major Johnstone was pkoed on board the Bhndej whence it 
rendered considerable sendee. — Nemesis, voL ii. p. 1S8. 

P2 



> 



SIS CHINA [1841 

the great lamiMui, which was, aoeording to the 
evidenee of the Nemeris^ ^of such rtrength that 
the heavy firing of two line of battle dnps against 
it, at the distance of only four hundred yards, had 
made very little impreaaion; indeed, it might be 
aaid to be ahot-prool' This evidence is confirmed 
by the contemporary Chimem Beforiton/^ which 
says: — 

For four hours did the ships pepper at them with- 
out a moment's cessation. TheWeJkdcgBsABIen^^ 
each fired upwards of 12,000 rounds, to say nothing 
of the frigates, steamers, and small craft Yet the 
works were as perfect when they left off as when 
the^ began, the utmost penetration of the shot being 
16 mches. The camxmade was certainly a splendid 
sight The stream of fire and smoke fimn the sides 
of the lines was terrific It never for a moment 
appeared to slack. From 20 to 80 people were all 
tnat were killed by this enormous expenditure of 
dust and smoke. 

The cannonade had conmienced at 2 p.nL ; it was 
an hour later (owing to difficulties of transport) before 
the 18th and 49th B^giments dis^nbarked at the 
foot of the castellated wall ; the 55th, which had 
just been sent from India, was further detained by 
a storm and could not be landed till next morning. 
The fighting, therefore, devolved xxpon the 18th and 
the 40th, along with some seamen and marines. 
The duty entrusted by Sir Hugh Oough to the ISiih^ 
was to escalade the castellated wall, while the 49th 
were directed to proceed some distance along the 

> Vol ii. p. 188. « NoTembcr, 1841, p. 881. 



1841] AMOY 818 

beach and then to mount the rampart or penetrate 
through the embrasurea There was a gate in the 
wall which Sir Hugh was about to attack, when 
Captain Ball of the Nemesis^ accompanied by a few 
seamen, made a rush on the wall itsell Colonel 
Moimtain, who was in attendance on the Chiei^ now 
allowed two companies of the 18th (originally destined 
merely to cover the attack) to follow the seamen. 
' I went on too/ he says \ ^ clambered over the wall 
with the help of a soldier whom I had helped up 
first, and, taking tvro men, ran down to the gate, 
unbarred it, and opened it for the troops, who were 
advancing.' The 49th were equally successful in 
making their way over the sea-£ace of the rampart, 
and both regiments swept down the lines, clearing 
out the Chinese in front of them. At the end of 
the rampart, near the outskirts of the city, they 
were joined by some marines whom Sir William 
Parker had landed in support. The outworks and 
batteries at both ends of the rampart, had been 
taken by the naval forces, and the 18th and 49th 
Begiments, with the marines, now formed up on the 
heights above the rampart These heights com- 
manded the outer town of Amoy, but ihe inner city 
was protected by another chain of steep rocky hills, 
running transversely to the beach, from the heights 
on which the forces at Sir Hugh's disposal were now 
concentrated. Sir Hugh had determined to fi>rce 
this position, which was held by ihe enemy, and 

^ Colonel Moantain's Memoirs, pp. 198-8. 



tU CHINA [1841 

had ordered the guns to be landed and brought near 
enough to support the advance of his columna In 
-this final attack, Sir Hugh again divided his men, 
instructing the 49th to enter the outer town and 
open a conununication with the shipping, and then to 
proceed to the hills by the road which connected 
them with Amoy. The 18th were ordered to make 
a more direct attack through a precipitous gorge. 
The Chinese made only a slight resistance, and after 
some skirmishing, the troops bivouacked on the 
hills, with Amoy in their power. Next morning, 
amid the panic which prevailed among the inhabi- 
tants, there was no difficulty in obtaining an entrance 
into the town and the citadel for the British troops, 
probably the first Europeans to set foot in the inner 
ciiy. 

It was ahnost immediately decided to hold only 
the island of Kulangsu, and the combined forces 
remained at Amoy only long enough to destroy the 
defences of the town. Five hundred guns, of all 
kinds, had been captured in the course of the attack. 
Sir Hugh had lost nine men wounded, and Sir 
William Parker two men killed and six wounded. 
The Chinese had suffered severely ; some of them 
committed suicide rather than face the shame of 
defeat. The death of one of these was reported to 
the Emperor in terms which described how he 
'rushed on to drive back the assailants as they 
landed, and fell into the water and died.' 

The town of Amoy suffered considerably after the 
assault, but no blame can be fedrly assigned to the 



1841] AMOY 215 

British commanders. In his (General Orders, issued 
before the attack, Sir Hugh Gk)ugh announced that 
any camp-follower found plundering would be im- 
mediately put to death, and that stra^ling from 
their corps would be severely punished. To the 
army generally he addressed this warning : — 

Sir Hugh Gk)ugh will only observe that, as Amoy 
is a principal commercial town, where there was 
once a British factory, it is an object of great national 
importance that no act should occur, that would 
preclude future friendly intercourse. The (lovem- 
ment and the Milita^ must be overcome, and 
public property of every description secured, under 
instructions that will be issued; but private property 
must be held inviolable ; the laws of Gkxl and man 
prohibit private plunder ; and the individual appro- 
priation of the goods of others, which in England 
would be called robbery, deserves no better name in 
China. 

In the General Orders issued on leaving Amoy, 
he was able to express his satisfaction ^ in noticing 
the conduct of the troops on shore, amid temptations 
of no ordinary nature — ^shops on all sides abounding 
with liquor, and houses full of valuable property, 
abandoned in many cases by their owners, and 
already broken open by the populace. A few 
instances of misconduct alone called for the Migor- 
General's disapprobation, and, for the most part, 
sobrieiy and regularity have been maintained.' 
The real causes of what almost amounted to the 
sack of the town were twofold — the presence of 
numberless Chinese robbers and irregular troops 



216 CHINA [1841 

who flocked into the town when it was deserted 
by the proper garrison, and who, when guards were 
placed at the front doors, broke in at the rear ; and 
the unwillingness of Chinese owners of property 
to accept British protection, lest they should be 
accused of treachery and punished by the authorities 
after the town was abandoned by the conquerors. 
In a private letter to Lady Gk>ugh, the Major-Cjeneral 
explains the real reasons of the disgraceful scenes 
which were witnessed. Some sentences may be 
quoted from it because the first China War has been 
so frequently condemned as a species of piracy, that 
it is important to show, from private, as well as 
from public sources, the attitude of the high-souled 
and pure-minded soldier who commanded the Forces, 
and whose own hands were dear of gain \ 

The sight about me now (he says, writing 
from the Citadel of Amoy on September 4) is 
heart-rending. Every house broken open and 
plundered, in most instances by the Chinese robbers, 
of whom there are 20,000 now in the Town, ready 
to sack it the moment we leave. I have had many 
conferences with the respectable Chinese merchants, 
urging them to aid me ^ for it is ten to one when 
I send out parties to protect property, I may be 

^ In namerooB letters home^ Sir Hugh describes the Chinese 
cariosities he has purchased, and the price paid for them. In 
one, he confesses to having plundered a disused pair of ladies* 
shoes, which he sent to show the size of their feet. 

' Sir Hugh asked the merchants to appoint four men whom 
he might place at the gates, in order to distinguish house- 
holders from mere plunderers^ and this they declined to do. 



1841] AMOY 217 

preventing them from taking away their own. The 
moment a house is broken open, what between 
Chinese, soldiers or followers, every article is de- 
stroyed. The wanton waste of valuable property is 
heart-rending, and has quite sickened me of war. 
I have punished to a great extent, both soldiers, 
followers, and Chinese ; some of the latter three or 
four times. . . . For the first two days, the soldiers 
were well in hand, but when they found we were to 
give up the place, and saw the crowds of miscreants 
ready to plunder every house the moment we turned 
our backs, it has been most difficult to restrain them. 

From Amoy, the expedition proceeded northwards 
to attack either Ningpo or Chusan, imless some 
commimication was received from Peking. The 
capture of Amoy made, at first, but small impression 
on the Emperor, for it was represented to him as 
a Chinese victory. His generals admitted the 
seizure of the defences by the British; but the 
governor explained that he had ^ simk one of their 
steamers and five ships of war by our terrible fire, 
but the barbarians returned it, and the south wind 
blew the smoke into our soldiers' eyes, and Amoy 
was thus lost.' Another account represented the 
successful assault upon the Imperial forces as having 
been made, not by the barbarians, but by Chinese 
traitors \ But the acknowledgement of the capture 
served only as a text for a recital of the glories of 
the recapture. The fact of the presence of a British 
garrison on Eulangsu was suppressed, and the 
Emperor was informed how his troops, aided by 

^ Davis's China, yoL i. pp. 169^ 160. 



fit CHIXA 




lint hifiswitti 

aad slam uyarifa <jf 700 wiiifie derxls. azid 
dm 900 bbek derik. It nw dear tiiaB aooie zziore 
€0MgwineiDg pnx4 at Earopeaa wpmnrrtr most jet 
b& gjrea oe the Soa of Heovoi eocild be made to 
imdefsutti tfae real rnnmnn in, wfaichfaB Empire 
waa plaeed 



m 

CHUSAN, CmNHAI, AND NINGPO 

The Expeditionary Force set saU from Amoy on 
September 5, leaving a small force on Eulangsu, 
supported by the Druid^ the Pyhdes, and the Algerine^ 
which remained in the harbour. The original in- 
tention was to proceed at once to the capture of 
Chinhai and Ningpo^ and afterwards to retake the 
island of Chusan. But the fleet was imf ortunate in 
meeting a series of severe storms, which dispersed 
the vessels, and it was not tiU the 25th ^ September 
that the whole squadron was reimited. It was still 
unsafe to approach Chinhai, and the General, the 
Admiral, and Sir Henry Pottinger utilized the period 
of delay to make a reconnaissance of the island of 
Chusan and its capital, Tinghai. The fedl of Chusan 
in the previous year had been a great blow to the 
Chinese, and its abandonment had appeared to them 
as a great victory for the Dragon Throne. They 
had, accordingly, taken elaborate precautions to 
prevent its fedling, a second time, into the hands of 
the barbarians, and the reconnaissance had shown 
that the new defences, now unfinished, would, after 
the lapse of a very brief interval, be more capable of 

^ During tlus interval the Fhiegethon inflicted a severe 
ponishment upon a Chinese village in which two British 
subjects had recently been murdered. 



220 CHINA [1841 

resistance. It was therefore decided, on the sugges- 
tion of the Admiral, to make an immediate attack 
upon Chusan. 

The town of Tinghai is situated in the south-west 
of the island of Chusan. It was a walled town, 
about two miles in circumference, and distant about 
a mile from the shore, from which it was separated 
by swampy paddy-fields or rice-grounds. Along the 
whole face of the harbour ran a raised bank, which 
protected the town from frequent inundations, and 
on this bank the Chinese had been constructing 
a battery since the evacuation of the island by the 
British forcea This battery was but a miserable 
imitation of the great sea wall at Amoy , for it ' had 
been hastily and unscientifically constructed, and 
consisted principally of heaps of mud, of a conical 
shape, raised upon the embankment, with em- 
brasures between them for the guns. These in- 
tervals were so large, measuring generally from ten 
to fifteen feet wide, that it would be impossible for 
the men to stand to their guns. . . . There were 
altogether nearly 270 embrasures, but only about 
80 guns mounted K Towards the east end of this 
fortified wall was the landing place of the town, 
connected with the southern gate by a narrow 
causeway and a canaL Close to the landing place 
rose a steep hill which had been named by the 
British garrison Pagoda HilL The erection of 
defences upon this hill had been conunenced during 

^ The Nemesis, vol. il p. 191. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 221 

our occupation, and the Chinese were now engaged 
in completing the works their enemies had begun. 
Opposite Pagoda Hill were two small islands, one 
of which, Trumball Island, proved most useful as 
a site of a battery for shelling Pagoda Hill, 

On the western side, the valley in which the diy 
lies is enclosed by steep hills which approach the 
walls of the town, and commanding the flank ci 
the battery wall in which the Chinese placed such 
confidence. These heights were known as the 
Forty-Nine Hilla Upon these hills, at the western 
end of the battery wall, the Chinese had fortified 
a camp and were in process of erecting two stone 
forts. It was this point which Sir Hugh Gk)ugh 
selected for landing his troops, and the knowledge 
that these two forts were as yet unarmed decided 
him in favour of an immediate attack. 

Hostilities commenced on the 29th, when the 
Nemesis poured a heavy fire upon the fortified camp 
at the western end of the sea wall and destroyed 
the temporary buildings which the Chinese had 
prepared. A smaU party landed and reconnoitred, 
but a general assault was forbidden by the two 
chiefs. On the same afternoon, a battery was 
thrown up on Trumball Island by a detachment of 
the Artillery, and was completed on the 80th in 
anticipation of an attack on October 1. The scheme 
which Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker 
had adopted was that the ships should protect the 
disembarkation of the troops at the western end of 
the sea wall, and that the batteries should then be 



CHINA [1841 

taken in flank or from the rear. The advanoe, 
compoBed of the Madras Artilleiy, with eight guns, 
fhe Sappers, H.M.'s 18th and 55th Begiments, and 
the rifle company of the Madras Native Volunteers, 
were duly landed, aooompanied by the CSonmiandeiv 
in-Chief himseH The TFeOesIqf, the Cruiser, and 
fhe Columbi$ie were stationed close to the shore and 
soon obtained the precise range of the Chinese, 
whom they prevented from any attempt to interfere 
with the disembariiation. When the men had 
landed, the enemy found opportunities of pouring 
in upon them a fire from matchlocks and gingalls \ 
and Sir Hugh therefore ordered three companies 
of the 55th to advance, while the remainder of the 
force, as they landed, were to move up in support 
The heights on which the enemy were (xisted were 
steep and rugged, and the Chinese behaved with 
much greater courage than at Amoy. They chal- 
lenged the assailants to come on, subjected them 
to a rapid fire, and finally met them with sword 
and spear. The column, under Lt.-Colonel Craigie, 
overcame the opposition, and carried the whole 
range of heights and the encampment, taking, for 
the first time in the war, a stand of Chinese 
colours. 

It was now comparatively easy to deal with the 
long line of batteries extending along the coast 
H.M.'8 18th Begiment and the Artillery had mean- 



^ These long heavy guns were constantly employed by the 
Chinese. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 228 

while been landed, and, while the light guns enfiladed 
the position, Sir Hugh ordered the 18th to push 
forward. Their advance was contested with great 
courage by the Chinese general and a number of 
soldiers, who met the bayonet with the sword. But 
they soon fell before the onslaught of the 18th| 
who followed them down the narrow line of wall, 
inflicting considerable loss, and finally occupied 
the Pagoda Hill at the west end They found 
it empty, for the fire of the battery on Trumball's 
Island, and of the ships, had forced the Chinese to 
evacuate it While this operation was in progress. 
Sir Hugh had directed two companies of the 55th 
to support the 18th and these had been placed by 
Colonel Mountain outside the south gate of the city, 
at once preventing any resistance from the town, 
and intercepting the enemy who were flying from 
the batteries, should they attempt to enter Tinghai 
They were joined at the south gate by the 49th 
regiment, which had just landed. 

The outer defences had now been entirely aban- 
doned, and it remained to effect an entry into the 
town. Captain Anstruther, of the Madras Artillery 
(who had himself experienced an imprisonment at 
the hands of the Chinese), had succeeded in bringing 
the light field-guns to the hills on the north-west, 
which commanded the town. He established a 
rocket-battery there, and opened fire. The Chinese 
had by this time lost hope and courage, and they 
began to escape by the north and east gates. Mean- 
while, Sir Hugh had accompanied an escalading 



224 CHINA [1841 

pariy to these heights; the Madras Sappers had 
brought scaling-ladders. ^I had soon,' says Sir 
Hugh Qough's dispatch, ' the satisfaction of seeing 
the colours of the 55th r^^iment waving on the 
walls of Tinghai, while those of the Boyal Irish 
were plluited on the Pagoda HilL' A hundred 
iron guns, thirfynsdx brass guns, and 540 gingalls 
fell into the hands of the victors, whose total loss 
amounted to two men killed and tweniy-eeven 
wounded. 

No such scenes were witnessed after the capture 
of Tinghai as had distressed Sir Hugh's generous 
spirit at Amoy. The natives were familiar with the 
presence of British soldiers and they remained within 
the town and accepted British protection* Sir 
Henry Pottinger issued a proclamation to the effect 
that Chusan would be retained by the conquerors 
until their demands ^ were not only acceded to, but 
carried into fiill effect \* The loss of the island was 
deeply lamented by the Emperor, but he was in- 
formed that a thousand of the barbarians had been 
killed and their shipping destroyed, and that all 
due measures were being taken for the protection 
of Chinhai, which was the next point of attack. 

The island of Chusan was of little or no value for 
trading purposes, and its recapture was important 
because of its situation near the mouth of the Yang^ 
tse-kiang, and also in view of the moral effect 

^ The author of The Nemesis mentions that our control of 
the island nerer reaUy amounted to more than the possession 
of Tinghai and its suburbs. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 225 

which its evacuaticm had brought about Still moie 
valuable would be the impression caused by the 
capture of C!hinhai and Ningpo, and the consequent 
interference with trade. It was therefore decided 
immediately to attack Chinhai, a seaport at the 
mouth of the Ningpo river^ and twelve miles from 
the large and wealthy city of Ningpo. 

The capture of Chinhai affords a slight variation 
upon the kind of operation which is, we fear, be- 
coming somewhat tedious to the reader. The town 
of Chinhai is situated on the lefb bank of the 
Ningpo river. At its south-west comer, and sepa- 
rated from the city wall only by a narrow gorge, 
rises one of the precipitous rocks which have 
occupied so large a space in our narrative. The 
rock, as usual, was crowned by a large and very 
strong fort or joss-house, which commanded both 
the city and the entrance into the Ningpo river. 
From this point the Chinese had extended across 
the river a series of piles which efficiently prevented 
the entrance of any vessel. Both the fortified rock 
and the city wall were strongly garrisoned ; it was 
estimated that there were about 400 men in the 
joss-house, and 8,000 in the city. The novelty of 
the situation lay in the effective stoppage of the 
passage and in the fact that the main body of the 
Chinese troops was posted on the right or southern 
bank of the river, upon a range of hills which com- 
manded the opposite side. 'All these heights,' 
wrote Sir Hugh in his dispatch, 'were fortified, and 
presented both a sea defence and a military position 



226 CHINA [1841 

of great strength, consisting of a chain of en- 
trenched camps, on all the prominent points 
difficult of approach, from the natural steepness of 
the hills, which had been further scarped in several 
places: field redoubts crowned the summits, and 
hill and ravine bristled with gingalls/ It was 
arranged that the naval forces should undertake the 
conduct of operations on the left bank, and our 
attention must be more particularly directed to the 
military actions on the right bank. 

Westward of the series of heights just described, 
there was a low-lying swamp extending to the 
shore. Across this marsh there were several narrow 
winding causeways, which alone afforded safe 
footing, and the swamp itself was separated frt>ni 
the hills by a deep canal. The canal was bridged 
in two places which were, respectively, about 1,200 
and 1,800 yards from its mouth. An assault on the 
batteries could be carried out only after crossing 
this swamp and the canal, and, in order to do this 
successfully. Sir Hugh divided his forces into two 
coliunns^ The left column, numbering over 

^ Left column : A wing of the 18th B^ment, five com- 
pi^iies of the 55th^ the Rifle Company of the 86th Madras 
N. I., a company of Madras Artillery, and one of Sappers^ 
with four light howitzers and two 5|-inch mortara 

Bight column: The 49th Regiment, detachments of the 
Royal and of the Madras Artillery, and 50 men of the Sappers, 
with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 9-pounder field-guns. 
In Sir Hugh's dispatch, this is called the centre column, the 
right column being that which made the attack on the right 
bank ; but it seems to be an aid towards clearness to keep the 
two attacks quite distinct. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 227 

1,000 meuj was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Craigie, and accompanied by the Major-General in 
person ; the conduct of the right column^ which 
was composed of less than 500 men, was entrusted 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Morria 

At eight o'clock on the morning of October 10, 
the Phlegethon and the Nemesis carried the different 
colunms to the spots selected as their landing* 
places. The left column disembarked at the 
western end of the swamp, nearly a mile from the 
mouth of the canal ; the right, about two hundred 
yards eastward of the canal, and therefore on the 
same side of it as the positions to be attacked. The 
head quarters colunm was intended to turn the 
enemy's right and cut off his retreat, while the 
smaller body diverted their attention by threaten- 
ing a frontal attack, and so prevented them from 
strengthening their right. After landing. Sir Hugh 
Gough and his colunm moved rapidly over a succes- 
sion of steep hills that skirted the swamp, until the 
General could reconnoitre the position and decide 
on the best method of crossing the canaL He 
resolved to subdivide his own colunm, and, accord* 
ingly, directed Colonel Craigie, with the 55th 
Begiment and some sappers and miners, to proceed 
to the more northerly of the two bridges, cross and 
advance on the hills beyond it, thus turning the 
Chinese right. While this division was being 
made, the bridge immediately in front had been 
secured, and when Sir Hugh was ready to cross, 
the right column could be seen, approaching the 

Q2 



228 CHINA [1841 

front of the enemjr's podtioii from the other aide of 
the flat. 

The bridge had not been deetroyedi but the 
Chinese had barricaded it with a single block of 
masonry, which just permitted one soldier to pass 
through at a time. Sir Hugh directed the Biflee to 
pass over in Indian file, while the 18th Begiment 
was assembled to support them at the foot of the 
bridge. This dangerous movement was accom* 
plished not only without loss, but without opposi- 
tion; a body of Chinese troops who occupied 
a redoubt on a height only 150 yards away, 
watched the operations and greeted the foe with 
cheers, but opened no Gie. The Bifles now covered 
the crossing of the 18th, and, when this had been 
done, Colonel Craigie and the 55th were ready to 
attack, and the right colunm had for some time 
been awaiting the signal to advance. It was not 
possible to bring up the guns over such ground in 
time to go into action, but Captain Anstruther had, 
as at Tinghai, brought up a rocket-battery which im« 
mediately opened against the enemy's fortifications. 

The Chinese seem at first to have been aware 
only of the presence of the 18th Begiment and the 
Bifles, who now began to advance, through a deep 
gorge, towards the centre of their encampment. 
Some of them were emboldened to leave their 
lines. They poured in a heavy but ill-directed fire, 
and met the advancing foe with courage and devo- 
tion. But, upon their right, came Colonel Craigie 
and the 55th, and, upon their left, the centre 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 229 

column gallantly led by the 49th, and battery after 
battery had to be abandoned. ^ From 1,200 to 1,500 
of the enemy that had stood longest/ says Sir 
Hugh Gough, ^ were driven down the heights into 
the river, their retreat being cut off by the flank 
movement of the 55th. Many were drowned in 
attempting to swim across to the city, others sought 
concealment on a rock in the stream, and were 
afterwards picked up by the boats of the Queen^ and 
nearly 500 surrendered as prisonera' 

The action on the right bank had commenced 
earlier than the assault upon the Joss-house Hill, 
and Sir Hugh was able to aid the operations on the 
left bank by bringing some of the captured guns to 
bear upon the city and by the never-failing rocket* 
battery. No further aid could be given, as the 
enemy, in their flight, had carried off all boats from 
the right bank ; but little aid was necessary, for 
the fire from the men-of-war was sufficiently 
powerful A little after eleven o'clock, Captain 
Herbert of the Blenheim, who had been commis- 
sioned by Sir Hugh Oough to command the 
attacking party, landed with the seamen, marines, 
a detachment of the Boyal Artillery, and fifty 
sappers (in all, about 700 men). To this little 
band. Admiral Sir William Parker gave the sup- 
port and inspiration of his personal assistance. 
The enemy had already been forced by the fire of 
the ships to abandon some of their guns, and the 
column was thus enabled to make its way up the 
precipitous rock. As they approached the citadel. 



2W CHINA [IMl 

a nt Mg ^iim exflMed and the letiMiiug {Aineae 
woe too mneh akimed to dose the gate. It ms 
seenred and an immediate attadi made upaa tiie 
eitj wall, triiieh waa furaladfd at the aonklFeaBteni 
an^e. Sir William Parker was one of the five- 
moat to mount the walk. The Chinese made no 
further rewatance, and eeeaped by the western gate. 
Chinhai was now at the mercy of the Tictoa. 
It proved to be what Sir Hug^ describes as * one 
great arsenal^ with a cannon foondry and gmt- 
carriage manufactory, together with warlike stores 
of various descriptions.' In the attack on the town 
and citadel, one man was killed by the exfioaon ci 
a magazine ; in the attack conducted by Sir Hugh 
Ooug^ three men were killed and sixteen wounded. 
The discrepancy between the trivial casualties on 
our side and the enormous loss sustained by the 
enemy could not fail to call for conmient at the 
time. An explanation is offered by Colonel Moun- 
tain, a distinguished soldier, whom we have already 
had occasion to mention, who served in the second 
Puigab Campaign, and who died, in 1854, as 
A4jutant-General of H«M.'s forces in India : — 

The report of the great loss on the Chinese side 
and the small loss on ours, upon all occasions, will 
appear strange to people in England, and almost 
incredible. The fact is, their arms are bad, and 
they fire ill, and having stood well for a while, give 
way to our rush, and are then shot like hares in all 
directions. The slaughter of fugitives is unplea- 
sant, but we are such a handful in the face of so 
wide a country and so large a force, that we should 




^" 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 281 

be swept away if we did not read our enemy 
a sharp lesson whenever we come in contact ; but 
our General is very strict about sparing the country, 
and the consequence is that the people remain 
neutraL . . . John Bull proportions merit by loss, 
but I can tell you this, that, if we have done a good 
deal with a few men and trifling loss, it is to be 
attributed in a great degree to the nerve and con- 
fidence with which Sir Hugh Oough has led on his 
men, rushing on the enemy's flank or breaking 
through his centre, and deciding the day before 
many others (even men of name) would have 
ventured to advance. The Chinese are robust 
muscular fellows, and no cowards — ^the Tartars 
desperate; but neither are well commanded nor 
acquainted with European warfare. Having had, 
however, experience of three of them, I am inclined 
to suppose that a Tartar bullet is not a whit softer 
than a French one ^ 

That more British soldiers did not share Colonel 
Mountain's experience of Tartar bullets was largely 
owing to two causes — ^to the excellence of our 
artillery, and to the manner in which the Chinese 
allowed their artillery to be outflanked and so 
rendered useless. To Sir Hugh's wise and constant 
employment of artillery, not less than to the in- 
spiration which guided him to a detection of the 
critical moment for a bold onslaught, must be 
attributed the comparative immunity of his little 
army at Canton, at Amoy, at Tinghai, at Chinhai, 
and in the actions which remain to be described 
before we conclude the history of the Eastern Ex- 
peditionary Force. 

^ Colonel Mountain's Memoirs, pp. 199, 804. 



282 CHINA [1841 

Meanwhile, the victory at Chinhai had placed in 
British hands not only that town, but the much 
more important city of Ningpo. On October 12 
the Admiral made a reconnaissance to discover if 
the river was practicablci and found no appearance 
of opposition whatsoever. A surprise was suspected, 
JEmd, when the forces moved up next day, every 
precaution was observed. But no enemy appearedi 
and no ambuscade had been prepared. So con- 
fidently had the Chinese trusted to the fortifica- 
tions of Chinhai that Ningpo was almost unpro- 
tected. The enemy had resolved on submission, 
and they opened their gates to the invaders. By 
three o'clock in the afternoon, without having fired 
a single shot, Ningpo was in British hands and the 
band of the Boyal Irish were playing ^ Qod save the 
Queen ' upon its walls. 

Had the Expeditionary Force been sufficiently 
large, the most obvious course would have been 
to follow up these successes with an attack on 
Hang-chow, the capital of the province, and to 
proceed to Chapoo and the Tang-tse-kiang. But 
the garrisons at Hong-Kong, at Eulangsu, at 
Tinghai, and at Chinhai had required so large a 
proportion of Sir Hugh's small force that he had 
only about 750 men at his disposal Apart 
altogether from the question of the weather, it 
was clearly impossible to undertake any further 
operation without a considerable reinforcement, 
and there was reason to doubt the expediency of 
a continued occupation of Ningpo. On this subject 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 288 

Sir Hugh differed from the Admiral and Sir Henry 
Potfcinger, who considered it necessary to retain 
the city. Sir Hugh's objection was based on the 
very small garrison at his command, the danger of 
treachery, and the propinquity of GhinhaL He 
pointed out that Chinhai was only twelve miles 
distant, and that its possession involved the com- 
mand of Ningpo; that the presence of his small 
garrison would challenge the Chinese to ^ put into 
operation the stratagem and intrigue which is their 
fftvourite form of war&re,' and that the consequent 
vigilance that would be required would be a severe 
strain on the men. While there was any possibility 
of the opening of negotiations at once he acquiesced 
in the measure, for political reasons, being unwilling 
to lose the moral advantage of the possession of 
Ningpo; but, as it became apparent that a spring 
campaign would be necessary, he urged upon the 
Admiral and the Plenipotentiary the advisability of 
husbanding, as for as possible, the strength of the 
men. Chinhai he regarded as more suitable for 
winter quarters than Ningpo, and it must be held 
at all hazards. Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir William 
Parker did not concur in this view, and Sir Hugh 
found himself compelled to undertake another 
military operation in order to render Ningpo as 
secure as possible. 

Large bodies of Chinese troops were gathering 
in the neighbouring towns, and the General could 
not leave them to choose their own time and 
opportunity of attacking him. He therefore made. 



284 CHINA [1841 

in the end of December, 1841, an expedition to 
Tuyow and l^kee. The movement was success- 
fully carried out, and it effected its purpose of 
spreading consternation in the Fukien province 
and of relieving the pressure on Ningpo. Other- 
wise it possesses little or no importance, as Sir 
Hugh himself told the Govemor-Qeneral, and we 
do not deem it necessary to go into any detailed 
account of what was little more than a recon- 
naissance in force. It is interesting to note that 
Sir Hugh's view as to the retention of Ningpo was 
adopted by Lord Auckland, to whom he had referred 
the question. In a Minute dated February 12, 1842, 
and addressed to Sir Henry Pottinger, the Govemor- 
Oeneral said : — 

I have observed with considerable anxiety the 
protracted detention of the small British force in 
an advanced and hazardous position at Ningpo, and 
should have much preferred that the troops should 
have been concentrated at Chinhai if they could 
have been there placed in undoubted security, or 
otherwise that they should all have been held 
together at Chusan. 

This decision arrived, of course, much too late 
to be of any effect, and we shall see how, before 
it reached China, Sir Hugh's anticipation of a 
treacherous attack at Ningpo had been realized. 
The narrative of that event will find a fitting place 
at the opening of the campaign of 1842 ; mean- 
while, it is necessary to refer to another difference 
of opinion between Sir Hugh and his colleagues. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 285 

The occupation of Ningpo raised a general 
question of policy, which formed the only per- 
manent soiu'ce of disagreement among the three 
leaders of the expedition, and to which we shall 
again have occasion to refer. The whole attitude 
of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary towards the 
Chinese people fundamentally differed from that 
of Sir Hugh Gough. A memorandum from Sir 
Henry Pottinger, addressed to the General and the 
Admiral', places on record that he had looked 
forward with considerable satisfaction to the plun- 
dering of the city, not only as an act of retribution 
for the insults inflicted by its authorities on our 
people who were confined here, but as an example 
and warning to other places/ He admitted that, in 
the circumstances, it would be impossible to give over 
to plunder an unresisting town, and he proposed a 
much milder measure — the seizure of all public 
property and the exaction of a ransom for all 
private property, including merchandise. Sir Hugh 
could never have used language like this. His 
views on this question are expressed most fully 
in a private letter to his son-in-law, written from 
Ningpo in the end of November, while the subject 
was still under discussion : — 

My great object is prospective, and, though 
a poor man, I would much prefer leaving a con- 
viction on the minds of the people that we are not 
only a brave, but a just, a liberal, and a humane 

'^ Printed in the Life qfSir WiUiam Parker, vol.ii. p. 460. 



286 CHINA [1841 

nation, than realizing a laige proportion of prize 
money. My views on this head are not in aooord- 
ance with those of either Sir Henry Pottinger or 
the Admiral They say their instructions are to 
press the Government through the medium of the 
people, so as to make the war unpopular. Now 
this might apply to France, where the people's 
voice must have a strong influence on the acte of 
the Gk>vemment^ but in China it is chimerical. 
The Government care not for the people, and I 
verily believe the most annoying thing you could 
do is to prove to the people by our moderation and 
our justice that our characters were foully belied. 
The great object of the present expedition is to 
prove this, and to obtain, firom such a knowledge, 
future commercial intercourse ; and that can alone 
be obtained by mutual confidence. I have con* 
veyed these my opinions most strongly both to 
the Plenipo. and to the Admiral; there shall at 
least be a record of my views. They, in short, 
wish to seize property found in large stores. The 
moment they open one, the mob will do their 
business in the rest, and, most assuredly, I will not 
disperse my men to pimish one set of robbers for 
the benefit of another set. ... If I can persuade or 
coax the Admiral, I will have my own way, but, 
with two against me, I can only protest We are, 
however, great friends; they aU dine with me 
toHiay — if I could carry my point, I would feed 
them for a month. 

Sir Hugh did not succeed in coaxing the Admiral, 
for Sir William Parker agreed with Sir Henry 
Pottinger that they were bound, by Lord Auckland's 
instructions, to consider private property as a lawful 
prize of war, in opposition to Sir Hugh's contention 
that only public property should be so treated. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 287 

They met on December 6, and ffir Hugh, finding 
himself outvoted, agreed to levy a ransom of ten 
per cent upon all merchandise in store, in addition 
to a duty upon exports and imports. He felt that 
'this species of ransom is much preferable to whole- 
sale subtraction of property' after nearly two 
months' peaceable residence in Ningpo, but he 
protested against the adoption of the principle, and 
he foresaw that the arrangement would prolong the 
occupation of the town. Some influential merchants 
arranged, through a well-known interpreter, by 
name GutzlafiE^ who was in the constant employ* 
ment of the British authorities, that a composition 
of one million dollars should be paid for the ten 
per cent. levy. Postponement after postponement 
occurred, and, in the end of Januaiy, it was found 
necessary to act upon the resolution of December 6. 
By January 81, about 102,000 dollars' worth had 
been shipped. About the same time (whether from 
this cause or from the efforts of Chinese emissaries) 
the people of Ningpo began to lose confidence in 
the pacific intentions of the British ; many shops 
were closed and several of the best houses bricked 
up. Sir Hugh Gk>ugh was confirmed in his own 
views by these incidents, and he wrote to Lord 
Auckland to obtain a decisive interpretation of 
the instructions on which the others based their 
action: — 

I deeply regret the measure, as your Lordship 
will perceive by the copy of my reply to Sir 
William Parker. Our views othenvise so entirely 



288 CHINA [1841 

coincide, and I feel so much respect for his judg- 
ment and good feeling, that I am induced to submit 
these two letters to show that our difference of 
opinion only arises from our different views of your 
Ix>rd8hip's instructions of May 10. I would beg, 
therefore, to be made acquainted with the error or 
correctness of my reading, whichever it may be, 
in order that I may shape my future conduct 
accordingly. • . • The surest means of attaining 
success in the war would be, I conceive, to combine 
energetic measures against the Oovemment with 
just and kind treatment of the people — ^no private 
property should be taken that is not paid for, and 
nothing exacted that the inhabitants are unwilling 
to part with, unless where absolutely required for 
subsistence or shelter of the force K 

The Govemor-Qeneral, who had now been re* 
called, and was awaiting the arrival of his successor, 
Lord EUenboroughy expressed, in one of his last 
formal minutes, his concmrence in the opinion 
of Sir Hugh Gough. ^I should have desired,' he 
said, Hhat no ransom should have been exacted 
upon the property of persons who, making no 
resistance to our original occupation of the city, 
had remained in the avowed charge of such property 
upon the faith of oiu* protection. The remarks in 
my former dispatch of May 10, respecting the 
seizure of valuable private property, had reference 
to the forcible capture of towns*.' In addition 

^ Sir Hugh Gough to Lord Auckland^ Januaiy 20 and 31^ 
1842: 

* Lord Auckland to Sir Henry Pottinger^ February 12^ 
1842. 



1841] CHUSAN, CHINHAI, NINGPO 289 

to this formal reply. Lord Auckland addressed to 
Sir Hugh a private letter, in which he said: 
* I expect my successor to be here in a very few 
days and may hardly have to write to you on 
official subjects again. In taking leave of you, 
I would assure you of my esteem and respect 
Tou have done for us all that the most sanguine 
of those who knew your character could have 
expected, and I heartily wish a continuance of 
success to your honourable career/ 

The new Oovemor-Gteneral adopted the same 
view of the question. *I used/ he wrote to Sir 
Hugh Oough on March 25, 1842, ^as I was authorized 
by Lord Auckland to do, your Excellency's letter 
to him, and I entirely agree with you as to the 
impolicy of the demand for money.' Some stress 
has been laid upon this long-foigotten contro- 
versy, because it brings to light a side of Sir Hugh 
Gough's character — ^his political wisdom, a quality 
for which he has received little credit, but which 
marked the whole period of his services to his 
country in the East, as it had characterized those 
services in L^land. There can be little doubt that 
the policy which he advocated, and which com* 
mended itself to Lord Auckland and to Lord 
Ellenborough, was the wisest and the best-fitted 
to realize our aims in China. The question will 
meet us again six months later, and we shall find 
Sir Hugh's opinion unchanged. It was an opinion 
which was not merely prejudicial to his material 
interests, but which placed him in a difficult and 



240 CHINA [1^1 

delicate position towards his colleagues, whom he 
liked and respected^ but who regarded him as 
accusing them of cruelty and inhumanity. Neither 
Sir Henry Pottinger nor Sir William Parker cotdd 
justly be suspected of any such tendency, for both 
were determined to conduct the war with all 
possible consideration for the innocent victims who 
must suffer through no femlt of their own. It was 
a question of the policy best adapted to bring 
hostilities to a speedy conclusion, and Sir Hu^ 
was convinced that his own view was based not 
upon any sentimental feeling of mercy, but iqx>n 
the most sound and careful consideration of the 
political circumstances in which the war was being 
waged. Had he believed that severe measures 
would affect the Government, and bring about the 
conclusion of peace, he would have advocated severe 
measures, even at the cost of injustice to individuals. 
But justice and wise policy seemed to him to be 
combined in urging the lenient measures he advo- 
cated, and he permitted neither the feeling of 
personal interest (which affected him little) nor 
the consequent alienation from his colleagues (which 
pained him much) to modify the earnestness with 
which he pressed his views upon the Plenipotentiaiy 
and upon the Indian Government. 



THE CHINESE AND THE WAE 

The interval between the active operations of 
the campaign of 1841 and those of the following 
year affords a fitting opportunity of interrupting 
our narrative by a brief statement of the attitude 
of the Chinese Qovemment and people towards 
the war. The Emperor, it will be remembered, 
was still in a condition of pleasant illusion; the 
mandarins found h ready explanation for every 
'unfortunate incident/ and he was prepared to 
receive, at any moment, news of the extermination 
of the rebellious barbarians. 'Bebellious' was no 
figure of speech ; the English had long been duly 
enrolled as tributaries of the Celestial Empire, and 
the events of 1841 appeared to the Coiu*t simply 
as a more than usually dangerous rebellion. The 
people, on the other hand, were gradually realizing 
that the boasted omnipotence of the Tartar Dynasty 
was a delusion, and that the barbarians were not 
only as brave as the Tartar troops, but more power- 
ful, and much more merciful The manners and 
customs of the British surprised and amused them, 
and they began to draw caricatures of British 
sailors and soldiers, of the General and his staS^ 
and of the barbarians generally. We reproduce 



242 CHINA [1842 

on the opposite page two of these caricatureB 
which were found at Ningpo, and which originally 
appeared in the frequently quoted Voyage qf the 
Nemesis. Not less interesting and instructive are 
certain documents which came into the hands 
of Sir Hugh Gk>ugh, and which we print here as 
illustrating, more forcibly than any words of ours, 
the real point of view of the Chinese, 

The first of these is a document which, about 
this time, was addressed to Sir Hugh Gk>ugh uiging 
him to desist from warlike operations, and to 
mibmit to the Emperor. The grounds upon which 
this request is based are characteristic of the simple 
fedth of the Chinese in their own learning and 
civilization and in their great destiny, and the 
rewards they offer for submission — the ennoble- 
ment of Sir Hugh's ancestors and the education 
of his children — are equally illustrative of the 
Chinese habit of mind. 

To the English Minister Gk>ugh. 

A public letter from the Imperial Commanders- 
in-Chief of the Celestial djmasty. 
. We have made ourselves fiilly acquainted with 
the contents of your last dispatch, and consider 
your views very correct, and what you are prac- 
tising is also excellent. But now we beg you to 
listen to us. From the moment the ancestor of 
the Celestial dynasty of Great Purity (the spot- 
less Manchoo Tartar Emperors) destroyed the 
robbers Le and Len, the Chinese empire as 
well as foreigners have submitted to their sway. 
From stupid buffaloes they have become intelligent 
horses. 




TARTAR AND ENGLISH SOLDIERS FIGIITINr. 




ENGLISH FORAGING PARTV 

CHINESE CARICATURES 
'Cf. opposite pagf) 



f 



1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAR 248 

We have taught and instructed the subdued, 
established schools in every district and country 
and sent them teachers. And so it has happened 
that children only three feet high, in the most 
remote comers of the world know the duties which 
a nmiister owes to his prince, and a child to his 
parent. Our o£Scers have made the youths write 
literary essays, opened examinations, and promoted 
the worthy and excellent to o£Sces, or made them 
celebrated military Mandarins and even Ministers 
of State. Their children have been provided for, 
and the Emperor has been so abimdant in his 
kindness as to confer posthumous honours upon 
their ancestry in Hades. 

Thus Cochm China, Siam, Burmah, Japan, Korea, 
and Loochoo have become tributary. All the 
countries to the East and West have become 
obedient to our sway, and the realms of the West 
and North, beyond the Eobi desert, many myriads 
of miles distant, have paid to us homage, appearing 
in Coiu*t before the Emperor, and calling them* 
selves his servants. They were therefore honoured 
with the titles of Kings, and as vassals, the 
Emperor in his great bounty gave them embroidered 
dresses and ofScial caps. fVom remote antiquity 
until now such abundant favours were never 
shown. 

In former times the English likewise appeared 
at court with tribute, and therefore they were 
permitted to have commerce with Canton, and 
to trade in woollens, camlets, calicoes, and watches. 

You have now all on a sudden sneaked into the 
eastern part of Chekeang, and without obeying 
the ancient laws, taken forcible possession of 
a frontier coimtry. The reason of this is^ that 
you did not know, that the Celestial dynasty, with 
the aid of worthies and sages has successAilly for 
several centuries ruled over all who are in the 

B2 



244 CHINA [1842 

central country and foreign part& Did you never 
hear, that towards the East, we conquered Formosa, 
and towards the West the great and formidable 
rebel Jehangir ? Wherever there have been unruly 
villains we have gone to exterminate thewu K 
they were obstinate they were attacked, if sub- 
missive we let them go. Should a great Country 
fear destruction fix)m a small realm? I suppose 
you must have heard of the above facts. 

Our Commander-in-Chief has now appointed 
above 200 0£Scers, to head an army of the best 
troops all clad in armour, amoimting to several 
myriads, amply provided with all necessaries. 
* Still we do not immediately advance to seize 
you, but permit this letter to be sent, that you may 
submit with sincerity, and beseech to surrender 
your army, earnestly supplicating that this offer 
may be accepted. If you then indeed can prevail 
upon your troops to retire, we will on your behalf 
address the Emperor to ask favours for you. 

If you, however, cannot be unanimous in this, and 
will not act in obedience to this mandate, then our 
ofScers will take you alive, and those who do not 
surrender will be beheaded. Those on the contrary, 
however, belonging to the great mass, that come 
over to us, or if any of the black Barbarians tender 
their submission, shall have their rewards according 
to their merit. It will then be at their option 
either to return home or obtain an establishment, 
and on going back, rich presents will be bestowed 
upon them, after having obtained an imperial 
decree to that effect. 

As for yoiu^elf, rich rewards will be showered 
upon you, you will become an object of the highest 
favour, and your name become illustrious. Even 
your posterity will share in this, and will be 
imbued with the literature of the Celestial Empire, 
and having been well versed in Chinese lore, 



1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAR 245 

they may even gain admittance to the Imperial 
College. 

You of com-se are the best judge of the present 
state of affairs, and will look forward to the educa- 
tion of your children. You, like a clever bird, will 
choose the proper tree to perch there, and as 
a shrewd servant select your master and serve 
him. Then indeed you will be worthy of the 
highest praises. 

This present letter has been handed over to the 
high authorities for their perusal and also been 
commimicated in a secret dispatch to the Emperor 
and the Imperial favoiu* will no doubt be awarded 
thereupon. 

As soon as H.M.'s pleasure is known you will 
hear of it. May you prosper in all the ordinary 
business of the city. The man who brought your 
last paper (Linguist Pun) has been rewarded with 
the eighth rank of o£Sce and remains here in our 
employ. His name is on the book of merit, and as 
soon as a vacancy occurs he will be made a Man- 
darin. We are anxiously expecting a speedy 
answer to this letter, and from yoiu* great talente 
anticipate that you will make your choice. 

The remaining documents were found, in March, 
1842, upon the body of a dead Mandarin of high 
rank. They were translated by the interpreter, 
Gutzlaff, and they were found to confirm every 
view which had been adopted by Sir Hugh Gk)ugh. 
The long delays for which Captain Elliot had been 
responsible had affected the Chinese just as Sir 
Hugh had warned Elliot that they would. ^We 
may rest quiet,* says the mandarin, *for how 
dreadful soever the inroads of these robbers, still, 
their long inertness, the want of activity in the 



L 



246 CHINA [1842 

movement of their forces, renders the effects of 
their campaigns nugatory/ Ahnost all the papers 
in this bmidle consisted of reports upon various 
aspects of the struggle and contained the advice of 
the writer as to how to deal with the enemy. One 
and all unite in deploring the effect of British 
lenity upon the people : — 

The mass of the people remain neutral, for these 
rebellious barbarians issue edict after edict to tran- 
quillize them. They do not oppress the villages, 
and we have therefore lost our hold upon the fears 
and hopes of their inhabitants. With our most 
arduous efforts, we have hitherto only prevailed 
upon robbers to join our cause, and these live in 
the eastern villages. Consider, moreover, the 
numerous city guards the barbarians have estab- 
lished, and how cunningly they proceed to manage 
matters, in order to keep the people in their 
interests. The best we can do is to scare the 
people away from the towns, to spread reports of 
our great intentions, to terrify the whole popula- 
tion by threats of extermination, and render all 
within reach of the Barbarians a dreary unin- 
habited waste. I am happy to tell you that we 
have tolerably succeeded in this matter. 

A similar view is expressed in a paper entitled 
Spirit of ttoo late Edicts^ which appears to be a sum- 
mary, by Gutzlaff, of a number of Imperial mani- 
festoes : — 

The High Imperial Commissioners lament the 
indifference with which the people answer their 
summons. There is no alacrity in enlisting, no 
ardour in defending the country. But every one 
looks only to his own affairs. Now the great Em- 




MEDAL STRUCK BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES 
[^Cf. foot not*: on opposite page) 



1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAK 24T 

peror has showered down so many favours upon 
the nation (the edict does not mention of what 
a nature) and still the mass remains regardless of 
the great benefits. A large army is actually ready 
to free the land from the pest of the Barbarian 
robbers and nobody stirs to co-operate. The repre- 
sentatives of H.M.y however, wish to exemplify the 
all-absorbing goodness of the great Monarch, and 
have therefore many hundred peacock feathers in 
store that are to be bestowed upon the warriors 
that will enlist. They have also struck off medals ^ 
as a reward for services, and moreover keep in 
store 100,000 taels of ingots to bestow upon the 
successful competitors for military renown. As it 
is, however, difficult to carry money about one's 
person, they will give in lieu of hard cash promis* 
sory notes upon the treasury and that will be a fiill 
equivalent But the feathers and medals are all 
ready and will be served out forthwith. After 
such incitement to valour, the ministers expect 
a rise of patriotism never yet witnessed under 
Tartar rule. Bewards are held out and specified. 
There are only a very few heads that value 20,000 
taels — as much as the Mandarins will give to any 
fishermen that will take the trouble of capturing 
a line of battleships. The conmion price for Bar* 
barian eyes' heads is only 200 taels, camp followers, 
and the whole tribe of black faces, are valued still 
lower. 
There are, moreover, bitter complaints, that the 

^ A laige quantity of these medals fell into the hands of 
Sir Hugh Oongh, and were converted into a miniatare £ao- 
simile of the Porcelain Tower at Nanking. One of them 
is reproduced in oollotjrpe on the opposite page» It is made 
of very thin silver, and the inscription is simply to the etEeot 
that the medal is presented by the Grovemor, and contains 
no reference to the actual circumstances* 



248 CHINA [1842 

strongest inducements, and the very advance of 
the large exterminating army have not been able 
to rouse the people from their apathy. They even 
did not confide in the protection of the grand army, 
and harboured fears that the Barbarians would dare 
to attack the great host 

The last of these interesting documents brings 
us to the opening of the campaign of 1842, for it 
is connected with the attack upon Ningpo which 
Sir Hugh Gk>ugh had, throughout the winter, 
expected as the inevitable result of its continued 
occupation. The 'grand army/ to which there 
are references in the documents we have just 
quoted, was gathering in the vicinity of the town, 
and several reconnaissances, made in the coiu"se 
of the winter, had discovered to Sir Hugh the 
strength that they represented. He made all pos- 
sible efforts to avoid a surprise, and concentrated his 
men in one quarter of the town, in order that they 
might be ready to support each other in case of 
need. The strictest orders were issued to maintain 
every precaution against a sudden attack, which 
every succeeding week gave fresh reason to expect. 
The actual attempt was made while Sir Hugh, who 
had remained at Ningpo all the winter, was absent 
at Chusan, concerting, with the Plenipotentiary 
and the Admiral, measures for the ensuing cam- 
paign. His departure is announced in the first 
paragraph of the following document, which reveals 
the Chinese plans for the attack : — 

The Barbarian Eye has left the city ; so also two 



1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAK 249 

dteamers ; soldiers have been embarked and gone 
away, and the luggage is also sent to other places*. 
Now, thereforOi is the time for action, and let us 
no longer hesitate. We must attack them in every 
quarter, drive them fix)m every position, cut off 
and harass their retreat, and thus employ the 
ample means at our disposal The rewards held 
out to the brave are too scanty, we must shower 
upon them favoura Let the Emperor himself step 
forward and compensate oiu* heroes for the risk 
they incur. My plan is to act boldly. Our water 
braves must board the steamers and men of war, 
and take them. In the attack upon the English 
robbers the soldiers ought only to use their swords 
and nothing else. The foremost must step forward 
and cut off the heads of the enemy. As soon as 
these are in their possession another file ought to 
advance and do the same ; and thus they must go 
on imtil their army is annihilated. We must 
advance with a strong phalanx to strike terror, we 
must not fight, but kill them outright: let the 
daggers do this work— this is the proper weapon 
for spreading destruction. 

In Ningpo everything is ready to second the 
attempt, and success certain. We have village 
braves that will do battle, but they have carefully 
until now kept out of the way in distant posts in 
order not to mar the plot. With Chinhai it is 
different. For though there are 2,000 water braves 
ready to venture their lives on a single cast, yet 
tides and waves are treacherous. . . . However, we 
shall endeavour to bum their shipping and you 
must advance with a lai^e body of men, and then 
Chinhai will be ours. We know it now for certain 
that Pottinger's son-in-law died of his wounds. As 
he is a youth of twenty-three years of age, his 
untimely fate has spread great panic among the 
robbers. 



250 CHINA [1842 

This statement is dated Mardi 7; on the evening 
of the 10th a simultaneous attack was made upon 
Ningpo and Chinhai. Only a small portion of the 
five-mile circuit of the walls of Ningpo could be 
guarded by the sentries of the small British force^ 
and through the extensive suburbs the enemy 
could make their way, in the darkness, to the 
approaches of the city. The Chinese excelled in 
stratagem, and not a few soldiers — some of them 
hardy mountaineers who had never yet met the 
barbarians— succeeded in making their way into 
the town in disguise. Some warning had been 
given to the garrison by smaU Chinese boys who 
were employed as servants and who were proud 
of their connexion with the strangers, whose drill 
and discipline they were fond of imitating, and 
whose words of command might be heard from 
a group of Chinese urchins just as from the boys 
of a garrison town in England. These boys knew 
of the progress of the army, and they disappeared 
on the 9th, with the warning that the next day 
there would be sounds of matchlock and cannon K 
Additional precautions were, therefore, observed ; 
the o£Scers went their rounds three times that 
night, and the guards of every gate were reinforced. 
Midnight passed without any sign of danger, but 
at four o'clock in the morning simultaneous attacks 
were made, by large bodies of the enemy, upon the 
west and south gates. The west gate was gallantly 

1 Davis's China, voL I p. 228. 




1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAR 251 

held by a detachment of the 18th Royal Irish, who 
met ¥rith ^ Tipperary touches ' every effort of the 
enemy to scale the walls, and kept back the 
assailants mitil they were reinforced from the 
citadel and could take the offensive. A howitzer 
was brought up; the gate was opened, and the 
British sallied forth and inflicted a severe defeat 
upon the enemy, who were crowded together in the 
suburbs, and fell in large numbers. The attadk on 
the south gate was more successful, for the Chinese 
were aided by their confederates within the town ; 
the bolt was drawn, the gate opened, and the 
guards driven back. The enemy entered and 
made their way towards the marketplace, when 
they were met by the 49th Regiment, who were 
supported by two howitzers, and who soon drove 
the Chinese back upon the gate, many of them 
falling in the narrow street. They piusued the 
flying enemy through the suburbs ; no attempt was 
made to rally, but many of the Tartar troops fell 
in their attempt to escape. Thus ended the long 
contemplated attack on Ningpo. 

The simultaneous attack upon Chinhai was 
similar in design, but was less skilfully carried out ; 
it was easily repelled and gave little trouble to the 
garrison. These outbursts determined Sir Hugh 
Gough to make an effort to disperse the ^ Grand 
Army,' which had been sent to rescue Ningpo and 
Chinhai and to exterminate the barbarians. After 
the defeat of its attack upon the towns, the army 
retreated to Fungwah, whence it still menaced 



'> 



252 CHINA [1842 

Kingpa On the approach of the British, led by 
Sir Hugh in person, the enemy retreated over the 
hilk. Pursuit, by so small a force, was out of 
the question, and Sir Hu^ determined to attack 
another laige body of the enemy, near the town of 
Taekee. His army, composed of about one thousand 
men, moved upon l^kee on March 15, and found 
about 8,000 of the enemy posted on the hills above 
the town. Sir Hu^ having discovered that the 
town itself was not strongly occupied, instructed 
the naval brigade to scale the walls, protected by 
the guns, while the 49th Regiment made their way 
along a shallow canal and under the city wall, and 
the 18th Regiment, inarching outside the wall, 
drove off a small outpost of the enemy. The little 
force was reunited near the north gate, only to be 
again divided, in order to turn the Chinese posi* 
tion. The enemy's camps and the summits of the 
hills beyond them were thickly occupied, but Sir 
Hugh at once perceived that their position was 
faulty, the hills on our right commanding their 
left, which, in turn, commanded their right. The 
18th moved upon the enemy's left and, taking a 
steep hill which commanded those on which the 
Chinese were posted, turned their position ; while 
the Naval Brigade and the 49th attacked from two 
different points, the latter regiment led by the 
General in person. Admiral Sir William Parker 
himself accompanied the Naval Brigade. ^ It be- 
came/ says Colonel Mountain, ^a regular chase 
»fter the first brush, during which the Chinese 



1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAR 258 

stood well, and their killed were scattered over the 
country for miles round ^' As usual, the loss of 
the enemy was very great, and that of the British 
forces very smalls This section of the Grand 
Army disappeared like the other and made no 
further attempt at resistance, deserting a strong 
position some miles away, and leaving behind them 
arms and ammunition. 

Sir Hugh returned to Ningpo on March 17. The 
Chinese had failed to capture the towns and their 
great preparations to meet the barbarians had come 
to nought, but much yet remained to be done 
before the objects of the expedition could be 
attained. The people were beginning to undeiv 
stand the futility of the Imperial threats, and the 
weakness of the Imperial armies ; they were also 
learning to appreciate the real character of the 
invaders, in spite of the scenes which inevitably 
followed the British occupation of a Chinese towm 
One of the MSS. &om which we have so often 
quoted in this chapter, remarks on the kindness of 
the British treatment of Chinese wounded. ' The 
doctors,' says the writer (speaking of the attack on 
Ningpo), *were busy in bandaging the wounded 
and most humanely took care of the whole. Now 
this shows that they are not such abandoned 
wretches as you would lead us to believe/ Colonel 

^ Memoirs, p. 198. 

' Three men were killed, seven officers and fifteen men 
wounded. The strategy in this engagement has receiyed 
more praise than any other action in the war. 



254 CHINA [1842 

Mountain relates an incident of the skirmish at 
TEekeej on March 15, which illustrates the temper 
of the soldiers. ' I was ¥rith the ISth^' he says, 
^when a stupid old woman, ¥rith her no-feet and 
lug stick, thought proper to totter across the field, 
Tight in the view of our fire. I called to the men 
not to hurt her, and she not only escaped, but was 
the means of saving several soldiers £rom biting the 
dust, as, £rom fear of hitting her, our people for^ 
bore to fire.' This moderation is the more remark- 
able because, throughout the winter, the Chinese 
had carried on their usual practice of decoying 
British soldiers and sailors and murdering thenu 
Several instances of this had occurred in the 
vicinity of Ningpo as well as elsewhere in China. 

But if the population were beginning to under^ 
stand what the end must be, there was no indicar 
tion that this conviction had been forced upon the 
Government, which still talked boldly of extermina- 
tion. It remained for the leaders to devise a spring 
campaign which would bring the Emperor and his 
advisers to reason. They had already received some 
indications of the approbation of the Home Govern* 
ment, which had been earned by their efforts in 
the preceding summer. Sir William Parker was 
promoted to be a Vice-Admiral in November, 1841, 
and Sir Hugh Gough received the local rank of 
Lieutenant-General in India and in China, and was 
raised to the dignity of a Knight Grand Cross of 
the Order of the Bath. Negotiations were in pro* 
gross for the grant, to the troops engaged at 




1842] THE CHINESE AND THE WAR 255 

Ganton, of a hatta or money payment out of the 
ransom paid for that city. Important reinforce- 
ments had arrived or were on their way to China, 
and it was generally anticipated that the ensuing 
months would witness the dose of what had proved 
to be a protracted and unpopular war. 



THE YANCkTSE-BIANG 

The new Governor-General had told Queen Vic- 
toria that the Expeditionary Force would keep Her 
Migest/s birthday in the Emperoi's Palace at 
Peking, and he took the earliest opportunity of 
urging upon Sir Hugh Gough the adoption of 
measures calculated to bring about the per^ 
formance of this somewhat rash promise. Sir 
Hugh, on his part, while he recognized that Lord 
EUenborough's anticipations were visionary, was 
anxious to recommence active operations; but some 
important questions of military policy had yet to 
be settled. 

Almost the whole of the north-east of China is 
occupied by the great plain which extends &om the 
Great Wall to the junction of the Yang-tse-kiang 
with the Han-kiang. Through this plain has been 
cut the Imperial or Grand Canal which forms, with 
the great rivers, an extensive line of water com- 
munication by which the revenues of all kinds are 
conveyed to Peking. The Canal is intersected by 
the Peiho river and by the Yellow river as well as 
by the Yang-tse-kiang, and an alternative scheme 
of operations was, as the reader will remember, to 
proceed to the Yellow Sea and by the Peiho river 
to Peking itsell We have seen that, from the very 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 257 

beginning of his command in China, Sir Hugh had 
regarded the Yang-tse-kiang as the most vuhierable 
point in the Empire, and he had never ceased to 
iu*ge the necessity of an advance upon that river. 
Delays, for which he was in no sense responsible, 
had rendered it inexpedient to carry out the move- 
ment in the preceding year, for the new Plenipo- 
tentiary and the Admiral arrived too late in the 
season to undertake any operations beyond the 
attacks on Amoy, Chusan, and ChinhaL It will 
be remembered that, in July, 1841, Sir Hugh had 
advised Lord Auckland against a movement on the 
Peiho (cf. p. 204). Later in the year, while Sir 
Hugh Gk>ugh was resident at Ningpo, an important 
communication arrived, in which Lord Auckland 
reverted to his alternative course of an expedition 
to Peking by the Peiho river. The Commander-in- 
Chief agreed to this suggestion, stipulating that he 
should receive certain reinforcements. He still 
preferred his own suggestion of the Yang-tse-kiang, 
but he was ready to adopt the course pointed out 
by the Indian Government, provided they supplied 
him ¥rith an e£Bicient force. The spring of 1842 
found the arrival of reinforcements still in the 
distance, and Sir Hugh, under the impression that 
the movement on Peking had been sanctioned by 
the Home Government, was in some perplexity 
about his duty in the matter. He could not regard 
with equanimity the consequences, to his men, of 
postponing operations till the hot season, and he 
therefore suggested to Sir Heniy Pottinger that 



258 CHINA [1842 

every available man should be Bent to join him 
in the end of March, merely leaving sufficient gar- 
risons for Hong-Kong, Eulangsu, Chusan, and the 
joss-house above Chinhai, and evacuating Kingpo ; 
if necessary, Eulangsu could also be abandoned. 
With the men thus concentrated under his own 
command, he proposed to proceed up the Yang-tse- 
kiang, interrupt the trade of the Imperial Canal, 
and capture Nanking, and then, on the arrival of 
reinforcements, to proceed to the Peiho. This 
plan was formed with the view of combining his 
own scheme of operations with that of the Gk>vem* 
ment, and negotiations with the Plenipotentiary 
were in progress when on March 6 a communica- 
tion arrived &om Lord Ellenborough which altered 
materially the whole situation. 

The Duke of Wellington had, in the preceding 
autmnn, approved of the Yang-tse-kiang project, 
being guided by a memorandum drawn up by 
Lord Colchester when the question of sending 
a land force was under consideration. Lord Col* 
Chester had reported that the Yang-tse-kiang alone 
afforded facilities for the operations, and had 
suggested the island of Einshan as a basis; it 
was, of course, an objection that Kinshan was some 
hundreds of miles from the capital, but the inter- 
ruption of internal commerce and the stoppage of 
tribute both in kind and in money were deemed 
sufficient to affect the Court; and, in any case, 
there seemed no choice. 

But on the receipt of Lord Auckland's suggestion. 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 259 

in the beginning of 1842, the Duke of Wellington 
had an interview with Sir Qeorge Cockbum, who 
informed him of the existence of an anchorage in 
the Gulf of Pechili, near the mouth of the Peiho 
river, and of the possibilitj of the passage of 
steamers and smaller ships-of-war up the river. 
This conversation changed the views of the Duke 
of Wellington, and, while he did not insist upon 
the adoption of this course, he urged it upon Lord 
Ellenborough« The new Govemor^General felt 
that this scheme involved the risk of the loss of 
communication between the army and the fleet, 
for no one could tell what obstructions might 
interfere vnth the coiurse even of the never-failing 
Nemesis; that the long march up the river or an 
exposure to the sun in open boats might be possible 
while the troops were fresh, but that the return 
journey, after two or three months of a Chinese 
summer, would be a matter of great di£Giculty ; and 
that the whole operation involved many chances 
of sudden attack and would ultimately result in 
a conflict with the whole military force of China, 
gathered together to defend the Emperor. The 
Duke, in estimating the depth of water in the 
Peiho river, had forgotten that the river banks 
are higher than the surrounding plain, and that, 
by simply cutting them the Chinese could in- 
definitely reduce the draught of the river. In 
these circumstances. Lord Ellenborough left the 
final decision to the military and naval Commander^ 
in-Chie£ ^I entertain so strong an opinion/ he 

S2 



280 CHINA [1842 

wrote > to Sir Hugh Gough, 'of the extreme danger 
of the proposed adyanoe of the troops entrusted 
to Your Excellency, by the Peiho river, that in 
the event of Your Excellency concurring in that 
opinion and requiring the support of the authority 
with which the letter of Lord Stanley leaves me 
invested, I do not hesitate at once to direct Your 
Excellency not to undertake that operation.' 

Sir Hugh had imagined that Lord Auckland's 
suggestion of the Peiho had already been fiilly 
sanctioned, and it was a welcome surprise to him 
to find that a choice was still open. He had no 
hesitation about the question. His judgement was 
perfectly dear in favour of Lord Ellenborough's 
position and against that of the Duke. The Admiral 
declared himself of the same mind, and it was 
decided that the great attempt should be made on 
the Yang-tse-kiang. It was impossible, at such a 
distance, to obtain Wellington's sanction for this 
departure from his expressed views, and, after 
the course adopted had proved successful beyond 
expectation, Lord Ellenborough informed the Duke 
that he was ^satisfied . • . that, had the army, in 
pursuance of Lord Stanley's instructions, gone to the 
Gulf of Petchelee, it would have been utterly lost, 
and perhaps the fleet too \' If the original concep- 
tion of a movement upon the Yang-tse-kiang cannot 
be ascribed to the Gk)vemor-General, he deserves, 

^ Lord Ellenborough to Sir Hugh Gough, March 25, 184S. 
' Indian Administration of Lord EUenborough^ p. S97. 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 261 

at all eyents, the credit of having supported and 
sanctioned it, in spite of the opinion of an authority 
to which every British soldier was accustomed to 
yield* 

Before the expedition actually proceeded to the 
Yang-tse-kiangy it was necessary, for the safety of 
the small garrisons left in the captured towns, to 
attack a large Chinese force which had been 
assembled near the town of Chapoo, the port of 
Hang-chow, situated in the Han estuary. On May 7 
the British forces afforded their enemy the delight 
of a fresh * victory' by the evacuation of Ningpo\ 
The city of Chinhai was abandoned on the same 
day, but a small number of men were left in the 
joss-house overlooking the city. On the 17th the 
fleet anchored close to the Han estuary, and near 
the city of Chapoo. The currents were very strong 
and very treacherous, and the Chinese relied upon 
the difficulty of landing any considerable force 
frx>m so uncertain a river. On the evening of the 
16th, Sir Hugh Gk>ugh and Sir William Parker 
had made a reconnaissance and agreed upon the 
plan of attack. The city of Chapoo was found to 
be situated on a promontory running from east 
to west, and some five miles in length. It 

^ At Ningpo, Sir Hugh had adopted measures wliieh had 
been impracticable at Amoy^ and had actually oiganized a staff 
of Chinese police to protect private property. But the Chinese 
attack had thrown everything into confusion^ and by the end 
of April, Ningpo was a wildemess. 'When I look at this 
place/ wrote Sir Hugh^ * I am sick of war.* 



262 CHINA [1842 

occupied a position at the western end, protected 
by a series of heights which cover the larger portion 
of the promontory. These hills extended eastwards 
for about three miles, and in them the Chinese 
had prepared several defences, including breast- 
works, earthen redoubts and joss-housea Towards 
the shore they had prepared a series of batteries, 
to resist any attempt to force a landing directly 
opposite the town. The city itself was walled and 
contained a separate cantonment for a large body 
of Tartar troops, who lived apart from the Chinese. 
Sir Hugh Gough's intention was to disembark 
early in the morning of the 18th at the eastern 
end of the promontory, and to turn the heights 
so as to cut off the troops posted there from a 
retreat to the city. The men at his disposal were 
still few in number, for the reinforcements could 
not arrive for another month, and considerations 
of climate rendered it imperative that operations 
should be undertaken as soon as possible. He 
divided his forces into three columns ^ — right, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, the centre (ArtiQery) 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomerie, and the left 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Schoedde, who had distin- 
guished himself in the defence of Ningpo two 

Officers Banks 

1 Bight colomn : 18th Boyal Irish . . 9St 470 

,, 49th Begiment ... 25 426 

„ Sappers «... 1 25 

48 921 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 268 

months earlier. Sir Hugh himself accompanied the 
right column. It landed first, at a point selected 
by the two leaders on the 16thy and occupied, without 
opposition, a height which covered the disembarka- 
tion. To the left column, accompanied by the 
artillery. Sir Hugh assigned the task of moving 
rapidly round the base of the heights, getting in 
rear of the enemy, and cutting their communica- 
tions with Chapoo. This movement was success- 
fully accomplished, while the right wing advanced 
upon the heights themselves, taking, in turn, the 
various defences. The Sepoys maintained the 
communications between the two colunms, and 
simultaneously with these operations, the steamers 
commenced to shell the breastworks which were 
within range. The enemy were completely taken 
by surprise; as usual, they were unprepared for 
anything except a frontal attack. They gave way 
on all sides and took to flight, with the exception 

Centre column : Det. Royal Artillery ^ 
^, Madras Artillery . 

„ Sappers • • • • 

Bifle Co. 86th Madras N. I. . 



s 


85 


8 


164 


S 


74 


8 


100 


15 


878 


87 


521 


16 


874 


1 


S6 



Leffc column : 26th Regiment . 
ff 55th Regiment . 

„ Sappers • • • • 

48 8S0 

The total force of all ranks thus amounted to ft^tStO. 



264 CHINA [1842 

of a body of some 800 Tartar troops who seized 
a small joss-house, and held it with indomitable 
pluck and perseverance. Assault after assault was 
required to capture it, and, when, at last, it feU, 
there were only some fifty survivors, and most of 
these were wounded. A large proportion of the 
British casualties arose from the attack on this joss- 
house, and several lives were lost by rash and 
premature attempts, while the arrival of artillery 
was being awaited \ In the end it was set on fire 
by our rockets and breached by some powder-bags, 
which were placed in position at great risk by 
Captain Pears, the chief Field Engineer. 

While the attack on the joss-house was still in 
progress. Sir Hugh moved with the left wing upon 
the city wall, supported by a number of guns. The 
bridge over the canal outside the wall had been 
broken down, and a little delay was the result, 
but some boats were found, with which the Grena- 
dier company of the 55th, and a number of Sappers, 
crossed over and scaled the wall. The whole 
attack had occupied only four hours; the process 
of disembarkation was completed at eight o'clock 
in the morning, and by noon Sir Hugh was on 
the city walls. He was immediately joined by Sir 
William Parker with marines and seamen, and, 
after each of the gates had been secured, the city 
was occupied. 

The numbers of the Chinese were estimated at 

^ The Nemesis, vol. ii. pp. 8S6-SS8. 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 265 

about 8,000 regulars (including 1,700 Tartars), and 
their losses at from 1,200 to 1,500. The British 
lost, in killed, two o£Bicers and eleven rank and file, 
and, in wounded, six officers and foriy-six rank and 
file. Both the officers who were killed (Colonel 
Tomlinson of the 18th Boyal Irish, and Captain 
Campbell of the 55th Begiment), received their 
wounds in the attack on the joss-house, as also did 
the Deputy-A^jutant-C^eneral, Colonel Mountain, 
whose very severe injuries incapacitated him for 
some weeks, and deprived the Commander-in-Chief 
of his invaluable services. Sir Hugh Gk>ugh did 
not propose to occupy the town longer than was 
necessary for destroying the arsenals and a gun- 
powder manufEictory. Qreat kindness was shown 
towards the population, but many of the inhabit- 
ants of the Tartar city, preferring death to dis- 
honoiur, destroyed their wives and children and 
themselves committed suicide. The proud Tartar 
race, living apart and as conquerors, had only now 
met the barbarians and experienced the ignominy 
of defeat. The Chinese were less scrupulous, and 
gladly availed themselves of the attention of our 
medical officers. It was remarked, indeed, that 
the capture of Chapoo was followed by an entire 
change in the attitude of the people. Cases of 
kidnapping had never been more frequent than in 
the preceding winter, and many prisoners thus taken 
had been tortured and murdered. It seemed at 
one time as if the Chinese regarded these captures 
of single individuals as the only offensive method 



266 CHINA [1842 

which remained for them. But after the capture of 
Chapoo, the General and the Admiral were thanked 
for their humanity by the veteran Elepoo, one of the 
most distinguished and of the most honourable of 
the advisers of Taoukwang, and thereafter the 
Chinese authorities followed th^ practice of civilized 
nations in their treatment of any of the barbarians 
who were unfortunate enough to fall into their 
hands. Sixteen kidnapped soldiers were returned 
by Elepoo to Sir Hugh Gough in recognition of 
his courtesy in releasing the Chinese captured at 
Chapoo. 

Chapoo was held for only a very few days ; its 
arsenals were destroyed, and its ordnance captured, 
but private property was, as fEur as possible, pro- 
tected from the Chinese robbers. On May 27, the 
British evacuated Chapoo, and proceeded round 
the headland into the mouth of the great river 
which they had so long desired to see. The first 
operation in the Yang-tse-kiang was an attack upon 
the small towns of Woosung and Paoushan, situated 
at the mouth of the Woosung river, a tributary of 
the Yang-tse-kiang, on its right bank. The opera- 
tions against Woosung are fiilly detailed in the 
Voyages of the Nemesis j and they belong to naval, not 
to military history. On the night of June 18, the 
fleet reached the anchorage of Woosung, and, next 
day, the (General and the Admiral made a recon- 
naissance, which, although it afforded much valu- 
able information, fedled to establish the practica- 
bility of landing so as to turn the defences. One 



> 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 267 

point alone seemed practicable, and it was agreed 
to examine the locality during the night; should 
they be disappointed in their expectation of 
landing, they must trust to the efforts of the ships- 
of-war to silence the batteries covering the r^ular 
landing-place. They were disappointed, and at six 
o'clock on the morning of June 16, the ships were 
towed in shore in the face of a fire from the 
batteriea When all were in their appointed sta- 
tions. Sir William Parker ordered a cannonade 
which was soon successful in its object. Mean- 
while, the troopships had all run aground, and the 
whole credit of the occupation of the batteries fell 
to the navy. The land forces did not disembark 
till noon, when they marched upon Paoushan only 
to find it deserted by the enemy, whose retreat was 
threatened by the movement of one of Sir Hugh's 
columns. 

The capture of Woosimg threw open the way to 
Shanghai, into which the inhabitants of the district 
were gathering. Shanghai was one of the centres 
of the internal commerce of China, and was con- 
nected by a system of canals with various portions 
of the Empire. An attack upon Shanghai was 
arranged for June 19, and preparations were made 
for the passage of the forces along the fourteen 
miles which separated it from Woosung. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Montgomerie was instructed to 
conduct one column by land, while the remainder 
were towed up the Woosung river. The ships-of-war 
had already disposed of some batteries on the river 



268 CHINA [1842 

banks. The progress of the British troops ¥ras 
practically unopposed, and Colonel Montgomerie, 
who reached the city first, found that it had been 
evacuated on the preceding night. The wealthier 
inhabitants had fled with the troops, but the 
middle classes and most of the shopkeepers re- 
mained and brought poultry and vegetables to sell 
to the invaders. The confidence thus shown in 
British intentions was not misplaced. ' The only 
injury done at Shanghai/ says Sir Hugh Gough's 
dispatch, 'was by the Chinese robbers who had 
commenced their work of depredation before we 
entered it. I issued a very strong edict which, 
before we left, produced, in a great measure the 
desired efTect, and I was enabled to induce many 
of the most respectable Chinese to take charge of 
large establishments (principally pawnbrokers), the 
inhabitants of which had fled, with a promise 
they would protect them from the rabble/ Any 
arrangement of this nature, it will be remembered, 
had been impossible at Amoy, and the change in 
the attitude of the Chinese was one of the most 
hopeful indications of the approaching end of the 
conflict. 

Shanghai was almost inmiediately abandoned, 
for it was now late in the season, and there 
remained much to do. Its military stores were 
destroyed, and a large number of guns (some of 
them brass and of recent manufacture) were cap- 
tured both there and at Woosung. But reinforce- 
ments were arriving, and 170 miles lay between 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 269 

Woosung and the objective point of the campaign 
— the laige and populous city of Nanking, situated 
above the point of intersection of the Imperial Canal 
with the Yang-tse-kiang. Nanking was known to be 
strongly fortified, and it was protected by the town 
of Chinkiangfoo, which commanded the northern 
entrance to the southern portion of the Canal, close 
to the two islands of Einshan and Sungshan (the 
Gk)lden and Silver islands), the former of which 
had originally been selected as the probable basis of 
operations. The large reinforcements which had 
arrived had nearly trebled the available field force, 
besides increasing the various garrisons. They in- 
cluded the 98th B^iment under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), and 
they were accompanied by Major-Qeneral Lord 
Saltoun. 

It required no small skill and courage on the 
part of the Admiral to advance nearly two hundred 
miles up an unknown river, and preparations of 
various kinds occupied some days before a move- 
ment could be made^ 



^ While these preparations were in progress there occnrred 
the question of the treatment of the Chinese people, to which 
reference has already been made. The Plenipotentiary, the 
Oeneral, and the Admiral were agreed that, on the seizure of 
the Canal, all trade northwards, of any kind, must be stopped, 
in order to exert the requisite pressure on Peking. But Sir 
Hugh Oough differed from his colleagues with regard to the 
amount of interference with the trade of the southern coast 
province of Chekiang which was necessary or desirable. They 



270 CHINA [1842 

The expedition set sail on the evening of July 6. 
Ten days were occupied in the passage up the 
river; the ChinesOi who had trusted entirely to the 
defences of Woosung, offered practically no opposi- 
tion, but winds and currents were the cause of 
considerable delay. On the evening of the 16th 
the (General and the Admiral made a reconnais- 
sance of the neighbourhood of Kinshan and Chin- 
kiangfoo; still no opposition was offered, and the 
inhabitants crowded to the shore to gaze at the 
steamer. It was not till the night of the 20th that 
the whole fleet had assembled, and by that time, 
Sir Hugh Gk)ugh and Sir William Parker had 
agreed upon the method of the assault. 

took the view that the floathem province should be sabjected 
to the same reetriotion as the northern. Sir Hugh Gongh 
was opposed to this course. ' I should say/ he wrotej ' that 
the stoppage of supplies which are common and necessary 
articles of food to the lower classes in the Coast Provinces 
will inflict a great amount of suffering without any adequate 
advantage to be obtained. On the contrary^ I conceive that 
the pressure occasioned by such a stoppage might not im- 
probably drive the people into insurrection against the existing 
Ghovemment (which is precisely what we are told not to 
encourage), at the same time that it undoubtedly would create 
a lasting impression of ill-will towards our nation, and that 
repugnance to future commercial intercourse which the Chinese 
Ghoverament so industriously labours to propagate, and which 
it is on our part so essential to counteract.' Sir Hugh Grough 
to the Admiral, June 98, 1842. The speedy conclusion of 
peace rendered the question of little or no practical importance, 
and we mention the subject only because of the light it throws 
on the character of Sir Hugh Gough. 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 271 

The city of Ghinkiangfoo lay in immediate proxi- 
miiy to the Imperial Canal, which flowed beneath 
its western and southern faces, joining the Yang- 
tse-kiang near the western angle of the city wall^ 
and thus serving as a moat On the north and east 
the ciiy rose to a range of heights, and at some 
distance away there was a steep hill connected by 
a narrow ridge with a lower height, both of which 
commanded the northern angle of the city. Oni 
each there was a joss-house. The island of Kin* 
shan lay little more than a thousand yards from 
the entrance of the canal and the western suburb 
of the ciiy. It proved to be a mere rock, not more 
than a few himdred yards in circumference, and 
quite useless for military purposes because com- 
manded from the shore ; but it was employed by 
Sir Hugh as a means of observation. 

The assault was fixed for the morning of July 21, 
and as the capture of Woosung had been a purely 
naval operation, the place of honour was, on this 
occasion, given to the military forces. A con- 
siderable number of Chinese troops had been des- 
cried on the northern hills commanding Ghin- 
kiangfoo, and three encampments were observed 
on the slope of the hills south-west of the city. Sir 
Hugh decided to cut these o£^ while, at the same 
time, an assault was being directed against the 
western waU. For this purpose he divided his 
troops into three brigades, under Migor-Gteneral 
Lord Saltoim, M^or-Gleneral Schoedde, and Major- 
General Bartley respectively; in addition to the 



272 CHINA [184S 

Artillery, under lo^itoiianlrGoloiid Momtgomene \ 
The aecond brigade, under General Schoedde, was 
entrusted with the attack on the north ; the first, 
under Lord Saltoun, with that on the south-western 
encampments ; and the third, under General Bart- 
ley, with the assault on the city walls. 

The first and second brigades landed at daylight 
on the morning of July 21 ; the latter immediately 
commenced its movement on flie heists, while 
the former remained to cover ihe disembaiiuition 
of the guns and of the third brigada Sir Hugh 
then ordered Lord Saltoun to move on the encamp- 
ments with the 98th Begiment, nine companies 
of the Bengal Volunteers, and flie flank companies 
of the 4l8t Madras Native Lifimtry, accompanied 
by three guns and a detachment of Sappers. The 
remaining companies of the Bengal Volunteers 
were sent along a path which led them between 

^ First Brigade^ under Lord Saltoun : S6th Cameronians, 
98th B^gimenti Bengal VolunteerB^ and the flank companies 
of 41st Madras Native InCsntry. 

Second Brigade, under Major-Oenend Schoedde: 55th Regi- 
ment^ 2nd and 6th Madras Native In&ntry, and the rifle 
company of the 86th Madras Native Infantry. 

Third Brigade, under Major-Oenend Bartley : 18th Boyal 
Irish^ 49th Begiment, 14th Madras Native In&ntry. 

The first Brigade numbered 88 oflicers and 2,285 rank and 
file; the second brigade numbered 60 officers and 1,772 rank 
and file ; the third brigade numbered 68 officers and 2,087 
rank and file. 

Artillery, under Colonel Montgomerie : European, 26 officers 
and 818 men ; Native^ 6 officers and 252 men. 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 278 

the encampments and the city and enabled them 

to make an attack upon the enemy's right flank. 

They were unperoeived by the Chinese and had 

the honour of alone commencing the onslaught: 

but they were soon supported by Lord Saltoun, 

who experienced no difficulty in expelling the 

enemy. Meanwhile the third brigade had been 

assembled in front of the wall, along with the 

CameronianSy who had been detached from Lord 

Saltoun. The guns were in position, and Sir Hugh 

decided on forcing the west gate. Powder-bags 

were placed in front of the gate, which was then 

blown in by Captain Pears. A long archway 

appeared in front, through which the troops entered. 

They found themselves in a large outwork, and 

separated by an inner gate from the town. But, 

at this moment, the inner gate was seized by 

General Schoedde, and all further difficuliy, in 

this connexion, was removed. 

General Schoedde had been successful in driving 

the enemy from the northern hills and in destroy-* 

ing their works. He had been further instructed 

to make a feint upon the north and east walls, 

but was given discretionary powers to convert his 

diversion into a real attack, should he deem it 

advisable. For this purpose, detachments of 

artillery and sappers had been added to his brigade. 

He had decided to act upon these powers, had 

escaladed the walls at the north angle, cleared 

the ramparts on the western side, and carried, 

after considerable resistance, the inner gate, where 
I T 



274 CHINA [1842 

he met the pariy which was accompanied by Sir 
Hugh in person. ' 

The heat was now intolerable, and was telling 
on the British force, several of whom died from 
its effects. Sir Hugh was, therefore, anxious to 
place the men imder cover, to await the approach 
of nightfall before continuing the assault. The 
Tartar city was yet imtouched, and its capture 
could be safely postponed: but two operations 
had to be carried through inmiediately. A body 
of Tartar troops had been driven, without the 
possibility of escape, into the western outwork; 
they refused to surrender, and most of them were 
shot down or destroyed in the burning houses. 
It remained to dear the walls and occupy all the 
gates, and General Bartle/s troops, in effecting 
this object, met with considerable resistance from 
about 1,000 Tartars, who had obtained cover under 
some enclosures. Flank attacks from the 48th and 
65th Begiments soon dispersed them, and the 
exhausted men obtained a respite till six o'clock 
in the evening, when parties were pushed into 
the Tartar city. They found that the enemy had, 
as at Woosung, destroyed themselves. The 
General's house had been burned by his own 
orders, and he himself had perished in the fire. 
Sir Hugh's dispatch tells of the horror of the sight — 
' Dead bodies of Tartars in every house we entered, 
principally women and children thrown into 
wells or otherwise mimlered by their own people. 
A great number of those who escaped our fire 



J 



1842] THE YANG-TSE-KIANG 275 

oommitted suicide after destroying their families ; 
the loss of life has been appalling, and it may be said 
that the Manchu race in this city is extinct/ It 
was little wonder that Sir Hugh again wrote home, 
'I am sick at heart of war and its fearful con- 
sequences/ The frightful heat rendered it im- 
possible to take any systematic measures to prevent 
the Chinese robbers from plundering the town, 
and the only redeeming feature of the scene was 
the hope that it would bring about the conclusion 
of the war. 

The British casualties were 144 in all; among 
whom three officers and thirty-one rank and file 
were killed. About a seventh of the casualties 
occurred from the effects of the intense heat of 
the sun. 



T2 



VI 
THE TBEATY OP NANKING 

While the military forces under Sir Hugh Gk)ugh 
were performing their last exploit in China, the 
naval portion of the expedition was engaged in 
effecting the main purpose of the movement in 
the Yang-tse-kiang — the blockade of the Imperial 
Canal. The channel which we have described as 
passing immediately imder the walls of Chinkiang- 
foo was only one of three communications between 
the great river and the southern branch of the 
canal, while the communications with the northern 
branch were so numerous as to form ^ a network of 
watercoiu-ses/ It was, therefore, no easy task to 
carry out the design, but by a skilful employment 
of the ships this object was effected, and, although 
large quantities of supplies had been conveyed to 
Peking before the arrival of the Expeditionary Force, 
yet so large a number of jimks, laden with cargoes 
of all kinds^ were prevented from proceeding up 
the canal, that a considerable impression must have 
been made at Peking. Signs that the Emperor at 
last realized the situation were not wanting when, 
early in August, arrangements were made for the 
advance upon Nanking, the ancient capital of the 
Empire. 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING 277 

The time spent by the troops at Chinkiangfoo, 
short as it was, proved to be disaistrous in its effects. 
The number of dead bodies in the Tartar town 
rendered it impossible to attempt to bury them in 
the intense heat which prevailed, and, although the 
men were quickly withdrawn to the heights above 
the city, the army suffered some losses from cholera 
Apart frx)m the effect of a forward movement upon 
the mind of the Emperor, it was, therefore, advisable 
to proceed without delay to Nanking, and the force 
embarked on July 29, leaving Migor-Gteneral 
Schoedde and a small garrison on the heights 
which commanded both the city and the mouth 
of the canaL The prevalence of contrary winds 
delayed the arrival of the whole expedition till 
August 9, but Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William 
Parker anchored off Nanking some days before, and 
concerted measures for an assault, should the 
Chinese persist in refusing to come to terms. So 
desirous were they of avoiding the scenes of death 
and desolation that they had witnessed at Chin- 
kiangfoo, that they offered to spare the city on 
payment of a ransom. The offer referred to opera* 
tions against the city alone: the war must be 
vigorously prosecuted in other directions until 
the Government sent duly authorized persons to 
discuss terms with Her Majesty's representative. 
The brave Tartar troops within the town were 
ready to die, but unprepared to yield without 
a struggle, and Sir Hugh, therefore, organized a 
demonstration of British superiority in arms. 



278 CHINA [1842 

Nanking was a town of vast area ; its walls are 
said to have been, before the coming of the Tartars, 
some thirty-five miles in circmnferencOy and the 
Chinese were wont to relate with pride (although 
the boast may prove more than the length of the 
walls), how two horsemen, starting at sunrise from 
the same point and galloping in opposite directions 
round the walls, would not meet till sunset. At 
the date of Sir Hugh's attack, the circumference 
was estimated at twenty miles, and the difficulty 
c^ defending such an extent of wall was increased 
by the nature of •the ground and by the fact that 
the city was ccmmianded by hills. More especially 
was'this the case on the eastern side, where Sir Hugh 
at once selected, as a base of operations for his 
artillery, Chungshan, a precipitous mountain over- 
locAing the whole country. ^It was evident,' he 
says in his dispatch, Hhat I could take the city 
whenever I pleased, by threatening it at such 
distant points as to prevent the concentration of 
a large opposing force — the very difficulties of 
approach affording the means of detaching small 
parties with impunity to create diversions— but 
I was well aware that the stand would be made 
in the Tartar city/ An attempt of this kind would 
inevitably end in an assault on the Tartar quarter 
(which, as elsewhere, was separated by a wall from 
the Chinese city), and in the self-destruction of 
numberless Tartar soldiers. The Commander-in- 
Chief therefore resolved to adopt tactics which 
would be of more value as a demonstration, and 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING jlT9 

not less effective should it be necessary to proceed 
to extremities. 

The northern angle of Nanking reached to within 
seven hundred paces of the river, and afforded the 
only opportunity for a conjoint attack* It was, 
accordingly, agreed that the ships should be placed 
in position to attack the north-east comer, while 
Sir Hugh's attack was made upon the three gates 
on the eastern side. His intention was to threaten 
the two flank gates, and to make the real attack 
upon the central or Taiping gate, which was situated 
within a few hundred yards of the base of Chung* 
shan, and to which there was an excellent approach. 
The attacking party would be covered by the con* 
centrated fire of the artillery from the hill, and 
Hhis point forced,' says the dispatch, Hhe Tartar 
city would virtually be taken, as my guns, intro> 
duced by the Taiping gate, could immediately be 
placed upon an eminence, perfectly commanding 
the inner wall and town, at a distance of a few 
hundred yards, whilst the bulk of my force, by a 
rapid advance on the tower in the centre of the 
Chinese city, might cut off the troops defending 
the North and East faces/ 

These plans were destined never to be carried 
out, and we have accordingly described them only 
in outline. ^ Although,' says the historian of Chinai 
* they exhibit the tactical skill of the commander, 
and no officer was more skilful than Sir Hugh 
Gough in drawing up a plan of action, their interest 
and importance have long departed. Suffice it to 



280 CHINA [1842 

say that the battle of Nanking, admirably as it was 
arranged for us as a complete English irictoiy , was 
never fought, and, although the great demonstra- 
tion before this second city of the Empire had 
much to do with the promptitude with which the 
terms of peace were agreed upon and ratified, the 
last operation of the war of 1841-2 was performed 
without the shedding of blood on the one side or 
the other V 

There is evidence of the existence of a ^ peace 
puty* in the councils of the Emperor for some 
time before the conclusion of the war. As early 
as June 1, Elepoo had written to Sir Hugh Gough 
an eloquent letter on the horrora of war, but Elepoo 
had no authority to enter into n^otiationa He 
had been sent, along with the Emperor^s unde, 
Keying, to prosecute the war, and it is doubtful 
if Keying would have approved of n^otiations had 
not the fall of Chapoo brought him to a sense of 
the danger in which the Empire stood. Elepoo's 
letter was, however, useful in affording Sir Heniy 
Pottinger an opportunity of stating, in outline, the 
demands of Her Britannic Majest/s Government, 
and of insisting, in the first place, upon the appoint- 
ment of Chinese plenipotentiaries. Before the 
expeditionary force left Chinkeangfoo, informal 
indications had been given that the Emperor 
desired to make concessions, and the arrival at 
Nanking of an Imperial Commission, including 

» Boulger's Histofy of China, vol. ii. p. 188. 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING 281 

Keying and Elepoo, on August 12, gave fresh 
reason for hope. By that date Sir Hugh was 
ready to strike his great blow, but he withheld his 
hand while the preliminaries were being arranged. 
The Commissioners hesitated to produce the docu- 
ment which conferred upon them powers to con- 
clude peace. They were told that, early on the 
morning of the ISth, the attack would commence. 
All was in readiness, and it seemed as if Chinese 
pride were again to be followed by deplorable 
consequences, when, at midnight on the 14th, they 
promised to produce the aU-important paper. On 
the 17th August, came the long^xpected instruc* 
tions from Sir Henry Pottinger, requesting the 
suspension of hostilities. 

The demands of Her Migest/s Gk>yemment 
included the cession of the island of Hong-Kong, 
the payment of a total indemnity of twenty-one 
million dollars, the opening to foreign trade of 
Canton, Amoy, Foochoofoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai, 
and the establishment of perfect equaUty between 
the Chinese and British representatives in the 
conduct of official correspondence. They also 
included the immediate release of all British 
subjects, and an amnesty for aU Chinamen who 
had acknowledged the invaders. The Emperor 
empowered the Commissioners to signify his 
general adhesion to these conditions, and the actual 
discussion took place in Nanking, while the annar 
ments of Sir Hugh Gk>ugh and Sir William Parker 
were ready, at a moment's notice, to open fire upon 



282 CHINA [1842 

the town. There was, accordinglyy no opportunity 
for trifling, and by August 20, when the Imperial 
Commissioners paid a formal visit to Sir Henry 
Pottinger on board the ComuHdliSj peace was 
no longer doubtfiiL On August 26 Sir Heniy 
Pottinger had a conference with the Commissioners 
within the walls of Nanking, and, on the 29th, the 
treaty was signed on board the ComuHxUiSj in the 
presence of the Plenipotentiary, the General, and 
the Admiral China had given way on all points, 
and there were some suspicions that a new trick 
was contemplated ; but the Treaty was immediately 
ratified by the Emperor. 

The nature of the agreement is, like the character 
of the war itself, foreign to our purpose, but we 
are, perhaps, justified in pointing out that it left 
the opium question precisely where it was. Of the 
twenty-one million dollars which were paid by 
the Chinese, twelve constituted the war indemnity, 
three represented lawful debts owed to British 
subjects, and six were the compensation for the 
stores of opium destroyed at Canton. But the 
claim for compensation was based, not upon the 
legality of the opium trade, but upon the circum- 
stances of its destruction, and Sir Henry Pottinger 
made no effort to secure any official sanction for 
the traffic It might have been wiser if he had 
done so, for the Chinese fsdled to understand the 
attitude of the British Covernment, which while 
making no defence of the opium traders, left their 
suppression entirely to the Chinese Gk>vemment. 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING 288 

It was a course which may have been in accordance 
with Western diplomacy, but it left in the minds 
of the Chinese a constant suspicion of our good 
faith, which produced grave consequences in the 
not distant future. But this is the only respect 
in which the agreement is open to serious criticism. 
The advantages which had been gained in regard 
to commerce were freely shared with other nations, 
without the exertion of any pressure from European 
Governments. The clause which insisted upon 
equality between the agents of Her Britannic 
Majesty and those of the Emperor of China in- 
volved, in the view of at least one impartial 
observer, the real origin of the conflict. At the 
very beginning of hostilities, the great American 
Senator, John Quincy Adams, whose word had 
the combined weight of the opinion of a distin- 
guished jurist and of a statesman who had held 
the highest office in his country's gift, had defended, 
in no doubtful language, the justness of the British 
case. ^The cause of the war,' he said, ^is the 
Kotow I — the arrogant and insupportable preten- 
sions of China that she will hold commercial inter- 
course with the rest of mankind, not upon terms 
of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and 
degrading forms of the relation between lord and 
vassal \* 

No words are required to emphasize the practical 
value of the treaty — the importance of the cession 

^ Quoted in the Chinese BqposUory for 1848, pp. 874-89. 



284 CHINA [1842 

of Hong-Kong and the opening of the Treaiy ports. 
The complete submission of China was the result 
of the complete success with which Sir Hugh Gk>ugh 
and Sir William Parker had prosecuted the war, 
and whatever controvensfy may rage over the opium 
question, there can be none as to the wisdom of the 
policy which had been pursued by the military and 
naval commanders, the effect of whose joint action 
had never been diminished by any difference of 
opinion, and who entertained for each other the 
deepest respect and affection* 

There can be no doubt (said the Duke of Welling^ 
ton, in proposing a vote of thanks, in the House 
of Lords, to the Army and the Navy) that the 
operations of this war were exceedingly difficult 
tattle was known of China except its enormous 
population, its great extent, and its immense 
resources; we knew nothing of the social life of 
that country ; we knew nothing more of its com- 
mimications than a scaniy acquaintance with its 
rivers and canals; and whether their roads ran 
along rivers, or in any other way, nobody in this 
country could give any information, nor could any 
be acquired. We felt, as everybody must have 
felt, that it was absolutely necessary, after so many 
years of negotiation, to carry the war into the heart 
of the country, in order to make an impression on 
a people who had manifested so littie disposition 
to render justice, and to come to reasonable terms 
of peace. The question was as to the mode of doing 
it ; and, considering the complete ignorance which 
we and aU mankind were in with respect to the 
communications of the country, the difficulties, 
natural and artificial, which we had to contend 
with, besides the inmiense distance firom our country 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING 285 

at which the operationB must be carried on-we 
naturally look to the results; and, I must say, 
there is no individual, however sanguine, who could 
have expected such success as has been produced 
by the cordial co-operation of the admiral com* 
manding the fleet and the general commanding the 
army, and (following their example) of the officers 
and men in both services. 

The usual list of rewards and promotions followed 
the China war. Besolutions were passed in both 
Houses of Parliament ; a medal and twelve months^ 
batta were (after considerable correspondence) 
granted both to the military and to the naval forces 
employed. The Admiral was raised to the digniiy 
of G.C.B. That honour had already been conferred 
upon Sir Hugh Gk)ugh after the assault in Canton 
(although it was only after the conclusion of the 
Treaiy that he was invested with it by the Pleni- 
potentiary), and he was made a Baronet of the 
United Kingdom. 

Sir Hugh Gough's services in China were not 
quite over, for he had still to spend some months 
in making the necessary arrangements for canying 
out the provisions of the treaty. As soon as it was 
formally ratified by the Emperor, and the first 
instalment of the indemniiy was paid, the Expedi- 
tionary Force retired from the Yang-tse-kiang and 
from Chinhai, but garrisons were to be retained 
in the islands of Chusan and Eulangsu until the 
indemnity was fully paid, and the Chinese had 
opened the ports to foreign trade. Sir Hugh left 
Nanking in the end of September, and, after spending 



286 CHINA [1842 

fiome time at Chusan and Eulangsu, he reached 
Hong Eong in the end of November. When all 
was ready for his departure, an outburst of violence 
lunong the mob of Canton threatened the safety of 
the British merchants, and, towards the middle 
of December, he foimd it necessary once again to 
proceed up the Canton river. It seemed at first 
a critical moment, but it soon became clear that 
the outbreak was popular and not countenanced 
by the authorities, and Sir Hugh was at liberty 
to return. The merchants were much alarmed 
by the prospect of the disappearance from Canton 
of the Proserpine^ the steamer in which the General 
had come, and Sir Hugh at once offered to leave 
the Proserpine to remain near the factories, and to 
make his own journey in a schooner. < The Com* 
mander-in-Chief of the land forces,' says Colonel 
Mountain \ ^ was two days on board the schooner, 
huddled with nine other officers into a small cabin, 
where the littlest fellow amongst us could not 
stand, and on mighty short commons to boot.' 
On December 20 Sir Hugh sailed troia Hong-Kong 
to Singapore, where he broke up the Expeditionary 
Force, and himself returned to Calcutta. 

The selection of Calcutta instead of Madras for 
his arrival in India was the result of a conmumica- 
tion on the subject of the command at Madras, to 
which, it will be remembered, Sir Hugh Gk>ug^ 
bad been appointed. It so happened that the post 

^ Memoirs, p. 214, 



1842] THE TREATY OF NANKING 287 

of Qovemor of Madras was also vacant, and a 
soldier. Lord Tweeddale, was selected to fill it 
The Government now thought it expedient to unite 
the two commands, and the Commander-in-Chief 
of the British Army, Lord Hill, had the unpleasant 
task of informing the victorious commander of the 
expedition to China that it had been decided that 
he should be deprived of the office to which he had 
been nominated Sir Hugh was not a rich man: 
to a poor yoimger son, as he himself remarked, 
there were attractions ixi Lidia. But it may be 
said of him, without any affectation, that he never 
placed his own claims in opposition to an arrange- 
ment which was clearly beneficial to the public 
service, and the letter in which he expressed his 
acquiescence in the decision of the Government 
is characteristic of his general attitude. We print 
it in fiill, for it was destined to be read to the 
House of Commons by Sir Bobert Peel * : — 

Head Quabtebs, Ship Mariofij off {tanking, 

September 16, 1842. 
Mt Lobd, 

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of 
your Lordship's letter of the 80th of ApriL How* 
ever mortifying it may be to me to find myself 
deprived of the appointment to which I had been 
so graciously nominated, I beg to assure your 
Lordship that I bow, without repining, to any 
measure that may be considered benefioal to the 
interests of my country. To serve that country 
in the higher walks of a profession which I entered 

» Of, vol it p, in. 



288 CHINA [1842 

as a child, I came to India^ and especially to China, 
and I trust your Lordship will believe that, while 
my Sovereign considered my services useful, they 
were, as they ever shall be, freely and, I hope, 
energetically rendered; but when they are no 
longer required, or when the public exigencies in 
such an important portion of our foreign possessions 
as Madras are deemed to dash with my individual 
advantage, I hope I may say that I am one of the 
last men in the army who would not readily sacrifice 
self-interest My gracious Sovereign's unsolicited 
nomination of me to the chief command at Madras 
was received by me with thankfulness ; and when- 
ever, for the furtherance of Her Migest/s service, 
it became expedient to place another in that situa- 
tion, whether in a single or conjoint capacity, 
I should not have wished my private interests to 
stand in the way of the public good. That I feel 
rather disappointed, I cannot deny; but I am not 
the less grateful to my Sovereign for her gracious 
kindness towards me; or the less sincerely and 
warmly thankful to your Lordship for the renewed 
proof of kind consideration which your letter 
conveys. With the earnest and anxious prayer 
that the union of the civil government and military 
command at Madras may fully meet the expecta- 
tions of the Gk)vemment 

I have, &C., 
H. GouoH, Lieutenant-Gteneral, 
Commanding Expeditionary Land Force. 

The Bt Honble. 

General Lord Hill, G.C.B., 
Commanding the Army in Chie^ 
Horse Guards, 
London. 

His private correspondence shows that this high 
tone was not adopted for official letters only, and 



1848J THE TREATY OF NANKING 289 

he was becoming reconciled to the prospect of 
leaving India, although he still entertained some 
expectation of the offer of an appointment of some 
kind when he reached Calcutta. This hope was 
destined to be fulfilled. Sir Hugh reached Gk>yem« 
ment House on February 7, and received, along 
with Lord Ellenborough's letter of congratulation, 
a private intimation that he was to be nominated to 
succeed Sir Jasper NicoUs in the early autumn. 
The position of Gommander-inOhief in India repre* 
sented Sir Hugh's highest ambition, and he could 
rejoice in it for other besides professional reasons, 
for he and Lady Gk>ugh could look forward to 
smnmers spent in cool hiU stations, and it was 
probable that the nature of his work would leave 
him littie time to be spent in the heat of Calcutta. 
An official announcement could not arrive for some 
time, but, meanwhile, he had sufficient to occupy 
his attention in the enthusiasm of his reception at 
Calcutta : — 

Do not be surprised (he writes to Lady Gk)ugh ^) 
to see me walk in upon my head, for in truth 
I am capsized, as you will see. All the feasting 
and flummery I have had here has quite turned my 
head Yesterday was the grand £§te by the inhabi- 
tants of Calcutta. Plain folk as we are cannot 
find ourselves at home, being aU at once jumped up 
to all the honours usually paid to the Governor- 
General in the height of his greatest popularity. 
Upwards of 1,000 people were assembled at the 
Town Hall, Sir Lawrence Peel, Chief Justice, in the 

» Febroaiy 17, 1848. 
I u 



290 CHINA [184i 

Chair, and an excellent Chairman he made. Them 
were four Toasts — ^the Queen, Sir H. Gough, th^ 
conqueror and pacificator of China, Sir Willian: 
Parker, and the Army of Afghanistan — each pro 
posed by complimentary speeches. That touching 
me was the most complimentary and flattering ] 
ever received. I attempted to return thanks, John 
[CoL J. B. Gough] says I did so admirably. I feel 
I did not, for, &o' gratified and flattered, I did no< 
witness those approving faces I could have wished 
and which always made praise so gratefuL . . . 
I am a great favourite vrith the Ladies here. 
Think of one actually asking me to dance last 
night, and think of me being fool enough to comply. 
You see dotage creeps on apace. But I am deter- 
mined not to be old when I get to Bangalore 
amongst those dear ones so loved 

From balls, illuminations, and public dinners, 
Sir Hugh Gk>ugh was glad to escape to that family 
reunion to which he had looked forward through 
his two years in China. His eldest son, Greorge, 
had accompanied him through a portion of the 
campaign, had exhibited personal coiurage worthy oi 
his father^s son, and had been of much assistance 
to the Qeneral, until failure of health forced him 
to return home, as a similar cause had necessi- 
tated the departure from China of Colonel Haines, 
Sir Hugh's son-in-law. His nephew. Colonel J. B. 
Gk>ugh, had also been constantly at his side, and for 
his devoted service and that of Colonel Mountain, 
the old soldier owed and expressed sincere grati- 
tude. He had, therefore, not been quite alone, but 
his letters are full of references to the meeting vdth 



1848] THE TREATY OF NANKING 291 

Lady Qoiigh at Bangalore, and he deplored the 
necessity of remaining to be f§ted at Calcutta, and 
the consequent postponement of his home-coming. 
He was worried, too, by the difficulties which in- 
variably oppress the mind of a successfiil general — 
the recommendations which follow a campaign. 
^Do not for a moment believe,' he writes, ^that 
I shall be annoyed a;t becoming a walking gen- 
tleman ^ Never was there a man would with 
greater ease throw off the pomp and vanities of 
war. God knows there is not much real satisfac- 
tion in attempting to do justice with the whole bent 
of your soul, and to find your task only half 
accomplished' 

Sir Hugh reached Madras on March 6, and found 
numerous letters of congratulation awaiting him, 
and a popular reception which compelled him to 
remain there somewhat longer than he wished. 
'The whole of the inhabitants wishing to give a 
grand Ball and Supper to the China officei's,' he 
wrote, ' I will not forsake my friends in the hout 
of need.' His few days' residence in Madras were 
spent at the house of his son-in-law, Mr. Arbuthnot, 
where he was rejoiced by the company of his 
daughter and of a bevy of grandchildren, about 
whom he writes enthusiastically. On March 18, 
he reached Bangalore and Lady Gough. 

Sir Hugh's intention, on hearing that he was not 
to have the conmiand at Madras, had been to return 

^ This letter was written before Sir Hugh had heard of the 
probability of hit becoming Commander»in«Chie£. 

U2 



292 CHINA [1848 

to England, after spending two months' leave at 
Bangalore, but the receipt of a letter from the 
Oovemor-General had necessitated a change in his 
plans even before the possibility of the command of 
the Bengal army had been suggested On hearing 
of the tumult at Canton in December, 1842, Lord 
EUenborough considered the state of China so 
unsettled that he wrote: 'I should with much 
r^ret see your Excellency leave India for England 
at a period when your services may still be required 
in China, where the knowledge of your presence 
would be worth Battalions in the pacific settlement 
of all unadjusted questions ; and I should hope that 
your Excellency would find it convenient to remain 
at Bangalore, or at some place where the Covem- 
ment can easily communicate with you. If there 
should arise in China a state of afiEairs indicating 
a probable renewal of hostilities, or the expediency 
of making a demonstration of Force, your Excel- 
lency has fiill authority at once to return and to 
resiune your commands' It was impossible to 
refuse such a request, and the private announce- 
ment made on the (General's reaching Calcutta was 
a scarcely more decisive reason for remaining in 
India. A week after his arrival at Bangalore, 
Sir Hugh received a semi-official letter firom the 
Duke of Wellington, confirming Lord EUenborough's 
promise. In making the announcement, the Duke 
of Wellington wrote : — 

^ Lord EUenborough to Sir Hugh Oough, Januftry 20, 184S« 



1848] THE TBJEATY OF NANKING 298 

SnUTFIELDaAYB, 

5th January, 1848. 
Mt deab General, 

As I am writing to you upon other subjects, 
I cannot omit to congratulate you upon the com- 
pleat success of the service in which you have been 
lately employed, so much to your own Honour and 
the publid^ benefit 

It has given me great pleasure to have had it 
in my power to suggest, and that the Government 
should have so readily attended to my suggestion, 
that you should be appointed Conmiander-in-Chief 
in India. 

This is one of the highest, if not the highest 
situation which an officer in Her Majesty's service 
can hold, and I do not doubt that you wiU equally 
as heretofore in other situations perform its duties 
with Honour to your own Character, and to the 
publick Advantage. 

You may rely upon my affording you every 
assistance in my power. 
Believe me, 

Ever yours most faithfully, 

Welunoton* 

Almost inmiediately after receiving this letter, 
Sir Hugh was prostrated by an attack of China 
fever, which rendered essential a change of air. It 
was decided that he should go to the town of 
Mekara, in Coorg, in the southern uplands on the 
borders of Mysore. At Mekara he received, in 
the beginning of May, an official annoimcement of 
his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of all Her 
Majesty's forces serving in the East Indies, with 
the local rank of General He was, at the same 
time, nominated a member of the Gbvemoi^General's 



294 CHINA [1848 

CounciL He was naturallj anxious to proceed at 
once to his command^ and to take up the important 
duties that had fallen to him, but the attacks of 
fever proved persistent and recurrent, and through 
the early summer of 1848 he was condenmed to an 
inactive life at Mekara. It was his last experience 
of leisure for six years to come. 



BOOK IV 

INDIA : THE MAHRATTAS AND THE SIKHS 

Introductoey 
!• The Gwalioe Campaign 
2. The Army Policy op Sir Hugh Gough 
8. The Sikhs and the Indian Government 

4. Moodkee and Ferozeshah 

5. sobraon and the end op the first sikh 

War 

6. The Results of the Sutlej Campaign 

7. The Outbreak at Multan 

8. The Government and the Commander-in- 

Chiep 

9. The Army op the Punjab 

10. Ramnuggub and the Chenab 

11. Chillianwalla 

12. Multan and the Irregular Warfare 

18. GUJERAT 

14. After Gujerat 



INTRODUCTORY 

The story of Sir Hugh Gough's life and work in 
India covers a period of less than seven years, but 
it forms so important an episode in his career that 
we must devote to it many pages. It is with India 
that he is most closely associated, and the event 
which his name most readily recalls to mind is the 
conquest of the Punjab. The years from 1848 to 
1849 are the most strenuous of his strenuous life, 
and they form a great epoch in the history of our 
Indian Empire. They were years of storm and 
stress ; of danger and detraction and of triumph 
and fame ; and they have left a record which bears 
the mark of these vicissitudes. Controversies and 
disputes of many kinds have raged round the names 
of the men who, during these years, brought about 
the extension, and wellnigh the completion, of 
British dominion in India; and with these difficulties 
and controversies our thoughts will be largely oc* 
cupied Two pitfalls await him who would write 
of such things. In his eagerness to place before the 
reader facts and explanations of facts which have 
never seen the light, and the absence of which has 
resulted in an unfEor general estimate of men and of 
events, he may forget what is fair to the memory 
of others, and he is also likely to confuse his readers 
with the superabundance of his material Both 



208 INDIA [1848 

these dangers have been ever before the eyes of the 
present writer, and the attempt to avoid the second 
has been not the least difficult portion of his task. 
Indian history is so intricate, and it is in places so 
familiar, that elucidatory notes seem now inadequate 
and now superfluous. It may, however, be con- 
venient to devote, in the first place, a few paragraphs 
to the constitutional and poUtical condition of India 
in 1848. 

When Sir Hugh Gk>ugh was appointed Com- 
mander-in-Chief in India, that country was still 
governed in accordance with the system of double 
! control established by Pitfs India Act of 1785, 

I subject to modifications made at various times, and 

I especially on the occasion of the renewals of the 

Company's Charter in 1818 and 1888 \ The Court 
of Proprietors had been deprived of its privil^es 
in 1785, and the Government was placed in the 
hands of the Court of Directors and the body of 
Conmiissioners for the Affairs of India, generally 
known as the Board of Control In 1888 the Com- 
pany lost its commercial character, but it remained 
an important factor in administration. Its powers 
were exercised through the Court of Directors, 
which enjoyed a right of patronage extending to all 
Indian appointments ; but nominations to great offices 
such as those of Gk>vemor-General and Conunander- 
in-Chief had to receive the consent of the Crown, 

^ For details on this subject the reader is referred to 
Sir Coortenay Ilbert's historical introduction to his work on 
' The OoYemment of India.' 



1848] INTRODUCTORY 299 

and less important nominations were sanctioned by 
the Board of ControL The duties of this latter body 
were largely performed by its President, who cor- 
responded to a modem Secretary of State for India. 
The Board of Control received all minutes and orders 
of the Court of Directors, had power of approval, dis- 
approval or modification, and so could overrule any 
decision of the Company. In cases where secrecy 
was necessary, the Board of Control communicated, 
not with the Court of Directors, but with three of 
their number who formed a Secret Conmciittee. 

In India, the supreme authority rested with the 
Governor-General, who was also Governor of the 
Presidency of Bengal In normal circmnstances, 
this authority was exercised by the Governor-General 
of India in Council, but, in case of emergency, the 
GovemorOeneral could act without consulting his 
Council, and, when there was a serious difference of 
opinion, could take steps in accordance with his own 
judgement, even in opposition to a migority of the 
Council The office of Govemor^G^eral might also 
be held in conjunction with that of Commander-in- 
Chief. The Council numbered three members, with 
the addition of a fourth for purposes of legislation. 
While the Governor-General in Council exercised 
ultimate control, each of the Presidencies of Bombay 
and Madras had a Governor and Council of its own, 
although these Councils had no independent legis- 
lative authority. More important, for our purpose, 
than the existence of separate Councils was the ar- 
rangement by which each Presidency had a separate 



800 INDIA [1848 

aimj cfystem. The head of the army in the Bengal 
Presidency was always the General Commanding* 
in-Chief in the East Indies ; but only the Bengal 
troops were \mder his immediate direction. The 
'general control' which he possessed over the 
Madras army and the Bombay army was limited not 
merely by the powers which, legally or by military 
etiquette, were exercised by the local Commander^ 
in-Chief, but also by the administrative functions of 
the Governor of the Presidency and his CounciL 
We shall see that this division of authority seriously 
hampered Sir Hugh Gough at an important crisis ; 
it frequently proved most inconvenient, but it was 
not abolished till 1894. 

The political horizon in 1848 was greatly troubled^ 
The years of peace which India had enjoyed under 
Lord William Bentinck had left an tmavoidable 
heritage of unsolved problems for his successor. To 
the difficulties which were forced upon him. Lord 
Auckland added the most troublesome of all — that 
of hostile relations with Afghanistan. In circum- 
stances which it is difficult to regard as necessitating 
such action, he determined to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of that imruly people, and to re- 
instate at Kabul a deposed and exiled Afghan ruler. 
Shah Sigah. In the beginning of 1889, Lord Auck- 
land sent an army to traverse the immense distance 
that separated Afghanistan from British India. It 
was at first successful, and, in the month of 
August, Shah Sigah was restored. A garrison of 
10,000 men was left in Afghanistan, stationed chiefly 



1848] INTRODUCTORY 801 

at Kabul and Kandahar. For two years, Afghan 
discontent smouldered, and the policy of inter- 
vention seemed to be justified. But in November, 
1841, a general insurrection broke out ; the British 
General was old and unfit to cope with the 
situation, and he finally was forced to make peace 
with the enemy and to evacuate Kabul. On its 
way, the Afghans attacked the retreating force, 
and literally cut it to pieces. Of the men 
who left Kabul on the 6th of January, 1842, one 
single survivor reached Jellalabad, where (and at 
Kandahar) a British garrison held out When the 
news reached Agra, a Brigade was sent to relieve 
Jellalabad, but, in spite of nominal aid^ rendered 
by the Maharajah of Lahore, Shore Singh, it was im- 
able to proceed beyond Peshawur. Several months 
elapsed before the disgrace was in any sense re- 
moved, and it was not till the middle of September 
that the British reoccupied KabuL Even when 
a British army was again in possession of the 
country, it was clearly impossible to maintain the 
attitude we had adopted in 1889. The rival can- 
didate for the Throne, Dost Mahommed, was per- 
mitted to return and to take the place of Shah 
Sigah, who had been miu^ered. Lord Ellen- 
borough, who had succeeded Lord Auckland as 
Govemoi>General, was forced to content himself with 
the destruction of some public buildings, with the 
seizure of the gates of the temple at Somnath (which 
had been carried off from India centuries before), 
» Ct infra, pp. 870-1. 



802 INDIA [1848 

and with a triumphal march from Kabul to the 
Sutlejy where a great review was held to impress 
the princes of India with the power of the British 
army, whose invincibility they had begun to doubt 
Respect for the British arms (combined with distrust 
of British intentions) was the result of the next 
important event of Lord EUenborough's reign — the 
quarrel with the Amirs of Smdh which led, in 
Februaiy, 1848, to the defeat of the Beloochee army 
at Meanee, by Sir Charles Napier, and to the an- 
nexation of the province of Sindh. 

Three difficult questions remained to be settled, 
and on them depended the stability of British rule 
in India. Two of these were connected with our 
relations with independent native states. The 
Mahrattas at Gwalior and the Sikhs in the Punjab 
were alike possessed of strong and well disciplined 
forces, armed and trained on European principles 
and by European officers. Alike at Gwalior and at 
Lahore, internal factions threatened the Indian 
Government with a sudden invasion from one or 
both of these armies. The third problem related to 
the condition of the Indian army and the signs of 
insubordination and mutiny which were causing 
grave anxiety to the authoritiea When Sir Hugh 
Gbugh sailed from India, in January, 1850, two 
of these menaces to the preservation of British 
supremacy had disappeared ; the third remained to 
place that supremacy in the greatest peril that the 
British have known in India. To each of them in 
turn we must devote our attention. 



> 



THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 

Magaulat's Essay on Lord Clive has rendered 
familiar the ancient terror of the Mahratta name. 
' The highlands which bordered on the western sear 
coast of India,' he wrote in a memorable paragraph, 
'poured forth ... a race which was long the 
terror of eveiy native power and which, after many 
desperate and doubtful struggles, yielded only to 
the fortune and genius of England. It was under 
the reign of Aurungzebe [1658-1707] that this wild 
dan of plimderers first descended from their moun- 
tains ; and soon after his death, every comer of his 
wide empire learned to tremble at the mighty 
name of the Mahrattas. Many fertile viceroyalties 
were entirely subdued by them. Their dominions 
stretched across the peninsula from sea to sea. 
Mahratta captains reigned at Poonah, at Gwalior, 
in Guzerat^, in Berar, and in Tanjore. Nor did 
they, though they had become great sovereigns, 
therefore cease to be freebooters. . . . Every ri^on 
which was not subject to their rule was wasted by 
their incursiona Wherever their kettledrums were 
heard, the peasant threw his bag of rice on his 

^ Not the fort of Gujerat in the Punjabj the scene of Lord 
Googh'g victory in 1849j but the lai^ province north of 
Bombay. 



804 INDIA [1848 

shoulder, hid his small savings in his girdle, and 
fled with his wife and children to the mountains or 
the jungles, to the milder neighbourhood of the 
hyaena and the tiger. . . • Even the European 
factors trembled for their magazines. Less than 
a himdred years ago ^ it was thought necessary to 
fortify Calcutta against the horsemen of Berar, and 
the name of the Mahratta ditch still preserves the 
memory of the danger/ The genius of Glive and 
Hastings had deprived the Mahrattas of their oppor- 
tunity of succeeding to the dominion of the Great 
Mogul, but the decisive conflict between them and 
the British power was reserved for the b^inning of 
the nineteenth century. In the brilliant campaign 
of 1808, Lake inflicted on the Mahrattas the severe 
defeat of Alighur, and gave Delhi and Agra to the 
British, and by the final victory of Laswari, snatched 
from the enemy all their possessions in Hindostan 
proper \ Further to the south, simultaneously with 
Lake's operations, a still greater soldier was engaged 
in the same task : — 

^ This is he that fox away 
Against the myriads of Assaye 
Clashed with his fiery few and won.* 

Wellington's last blow was struck at Argaon on 
Kovember the 28th, and, ere the dose of this year, 
peace had been made on terms which deprived the 
Mahrattas of the great imperial cities and left the 

^ Macaolay's Eseay on Clive was first published in 1840. 
^ i. e. India north of the Nerbaddaj with the exception of 
the Punjab^ Bengal^ and Behar. 



> 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 805 

British with no independent state between Calcutta 
and the Camatic. Foiirteen years later, in the war 
of 1817-18, the minor Mahratta princes were sub- 
dued, and Sindhia, the Maharajah of Gwalior, would 
probably have shared their fate had not the pressure 
of our armies upon his dominions prevented him 
from entering into the contest. When Daulat Bao 
Sindhia died in 1827, the state of Gwalior extended 
from the Chmnbul to the TaptL But the districts 
actually ruled by the Bigah of Gwalior were scat- 
tered over this great area to such an extent as to 
draw from Bishop Heber the remark that ^not 
even Swabia or the Palatinate can offer a more 
checkered picture of interlaced sovereignties. . . • 
In the heart of this territory which on our English 
maps bears Sindhia's colour, are many extensive dis- 
tricts belonging to Holkar, Ameer Ehfin, the Bajah 
of Kotah, &c., and here scarcely any two villages to* 
gether belong to the same sovereign. Sindhia, how- 
ever, though all this is usually reckoned beyond his 
boundary, has the lion's shared' To control this 
large and scattered kingdom Daulat Bao Sindhia had 
maintained a large army, which had been estimated^ 
as numbering 20,000 infantry, about 15,000 cavalry, 
and 250 guns. His capital, Gwalior, was situated 
between the Chumbul and the Sind ; since it had 
become the royal residence (after the loss of Delhi 
and Agra) a large town had grown up round the 

^ Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of 
India, 18S4-5, by Bishop Heber (1828), voL ii. pp. 68-9. 
' Cf . The Asiatic Jowmal, May, 1840« 
I X 



•> 



806 INDIA [1848 

ancient fort, believed to be impregnable until its 
capture by Popham and Bruce in 1780. Daulat 
Bao Sindhia was succeeded by his kinsman Jankoji, 
who had been adopted by the widow of the late 
Bigah and who remained under her control till 
1888, when, in spite of Lord William Bentinck's 
intervention, he banished her from the Gwalior 
territory. Jankoji was a man of worthless character^ 
and his administration was feeble and extravagant. 
He died unregretted in 1848, leaving no heir. His 
widow, the Bani Tara Bai, following the example 
of her predecessor, adopted a boy nearly related to 
her husband ; she herself was about twelve years of 
age and the new Bigah, Jeeal^'ee Bao Singh, was 
four years younger. The dominions of Gwalior 
were in such close contact with British territories 
and with principalities under British protection 
that Lord EUenborough, on hearing of the death of 
the Maharajah, proceeded to Agra, to watch the 
progress of events ^ The inunediate result was 
satisfactory; the Bani conducted the Government 
in conjunction with a maternal uncle of the late 
Bajah, knovm as the Mama Sahib ; and the Gover- 
nor-General was able to report to the Queen on 
March 21st, that his ^movement to Agra has 
apparently had the desired effect of establishing, 
without contest, a strong government at Gwalior in 
the person of Mama Sahib, who feels that the sup- 
port which has been given to him by the British re- 
presentative has practically given to him the regency. 
^ Lord EUehborougVs Indian Administration, pp. 66-7. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 807 

It is to be hoped that the settlement which has 
been made at Gwalior will ultimately lead to some 
improvement in the condition of that ill-governed 
country ; and immediately to the adoption of deci* 
sive measures for the suppression of plunderers 
upon the frontier \* Three months later, he had to 
describe a very different situation. ' Until the 20th 
of May, everything at Gwalior wore a favourable 
appearance, and the authority of the Begent never 
appeared to have a stronger foundation than the day 
before the intrigue commenced which has ended in 
his downfalL . . . Whatever the cause, her High* 
ness [the Rani] gave her whole support to the 
faction hostile to the Begent K* That faction was 
headed by a minister of the late Bcgah, the Dada 
Ehasjee, and the two rivals are known as the 
Mama and the Dada — Indian names which, for 
once, have the advantage of familiarity, if also some- 
thing of grotesqueness, to European eara The 
Mama had married his niece to the Rajah, and it is 
possible that the Rani feared that he would now 
be strong enough to act without her. She placed at 
the disposal of the Dada fiinds for the payment of 
his rebellious troops. Lord EUenborough did not 
interfere, beyond advising the Mama to retire from 
Gwalior, and promising him personal protection; he 
still hoped that there might be ' no outrage which 
would render necessary the bringing together of 

^ Lord EUenborough* 8 Indian Administration, pp. 72-8. 
' Lord EUenborough to the Queen^ June 8^ 1848^ ibid, 
p. 81. 

X2 



■> 



808 INDIA [1848 

troops for the vindication of the honour of the 
British Govemment' He further ordered the 
British Resident (Lieut-Colonel Spiers) to remove 
from Gwalior to Dholpur, outside Sindhia's terri<» 
tory. The Dada took some steps offensive to the 
Indian Qovemment by replacing, ^ in situations from 
which they had been removed by the late Mahat 
ngah on the representation of the British Besident, 
many persons notorious for their hostility to British 
interests, and for their connexion with plunderers 
upon our frontier \* There had been a considerable 
amoimt of riot and bloodshed at Gwalior, and the 
power of the Dada really depended upon the army, 
from which all European and half-caste officers had 
been dismissed. In these circumstances, Lord 
EUenborough decided, in the middle of August, to 
form at Agra an Army of Observation, numbering 
about 12,000 men, besides artillery ^ The threatening 
aspect of affairs in the Punjab and the encourage- 
ment given to imtrustworthy tributaries, such as 
Holkar, by the successful defiance of the British at 
Gwalior, combined with disturbances on the borders 
to force the Governor-General to take this step, 
*Your Majesty,' he wrote in defending his policy, 
' will readily perceive that the continued existence 
of a hostile Government at Gwalior would be 
inconsistent with the continuance of our permanent 
influence in India, by which alone its peace is pre* 
served. It would be inconsistent with the character 

^ Lord EUenborough's Indian Administration, p. 91. 
2 Ibid p. 98. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 809 

of our Gk>y6mm6nt in a country wherein, more 
than any other, character is strength. Its result 
would be, at no distant time, a combination agamst 
us of chie& and princes impatient of all restraint, 
and humiliated by our supremacy as now exhibited 
to them.' He was well aware of the serious nature 
of the step which he had taken, although he still 
hoped that it would not be 'necessary to move 
a man across the frontier V 

Matters were in this condition when the new 
Commander-in-Chief reached Calcutta in the be* 
ginning of August On his arrival the Gbvemor- 
(General wrote to him thus : ' I am delighted to 
hear that you have arrived. We want you very 
much. You can have but little rest in Calcutta, 
for the state of affairs at Gwalior makes it neces- 
sary that your own Camp should be formed at 
Cawnpore on the 15th of October, and a large 
Camp of Exercise and Observation (if not for 
operations in the field) in the vicinity of Agra by 
the 1st November. If you did not go up then, 
I should be obliged to go myself ^' On the 12th of 
September, Sir Hugh Gk>ugh started from Calcutta. 
Ere he could reach Cawnpore a great danger had 
arisen and had been averted. The Dada threatened 
to send troops into British territory to seize the 
person of the Mama, but he was restrained from 
carrying out his purpose, and peace was maintained. 
The murder of Shore Singh at Lahore, on the 15th of 

^ Lord EUenborougVs Indian AdminMratUmj p. 92. 
' Lord EUenborough to Sir Hugh Gh)iigh^ Angort 8^ 1848. 



'> 



810 INDIA £1848 

September, tamed tbe attenticHi of tbe Govemmeiit 
to the Punjab, and involved the strengthening of 
the troops on the Sutkg frontier. When the 
situation became known to Sir Hugh, who had 
meanwhile been engaged in an inquiry into the 
nature of the localities and the provisions for de- 
fence, he, on the 4th of October, recommended to 
Lord Ellenborough the formation of a second Army 
of Observation to watch the Sutlej frontier (d 
pp. 865 et seq.). This army was, meanwhile, placed 
under the command of Sir Bobert Dick, until some 
change in our relations with Gwalior should set the 
Commander-in-Chief free to take chaige of opera* 
tions in the north-west 

The military problem at Qwalior was no leas 
difficult than the politicaL ' To assemble an army 
in India,' writes Sir Hany Smith, ' requires much 
arrangement and consideration. There are various 
points at which the maintenance of an armed force 
is indispensable ; the extent of country in our 
occupation entails in all concentrations particularly 
long and tedious marehes ; lastly, the season of the 
year must be rigidly attended to, for such is the 
fickleness of disease and its awful ravages, that it 
would need an excess of folly to leave it out of 
account K* Sir Hugh Gk)ugh wished to collect about 
20,000 men for operations against Gwalior. This 
army he proposed not to concentrate at Agra, but 
to divide into two portions, the right wing to 
operate from Agra, and the left (under Sir John 
^ Autobiography of Sir Harry Smithy vol il p. 124 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 811 

Grey) from BundelcuncL 'According to the rules 
of strat^y and correct principles of combination,' 
says Sir Hany Smith, ' this division of the threaten* 
ing or invading forces may with great reason be 
questioned, when we reflect that the army of 
Gwalior consisted of 22,000 veteran troops, and 
for years had been disciplined by European officers 
and well supplied with artillery, and thus an over- 
whelming force might have been precipitated on 
Grey, and his army destroyed, for he was perfectly 
isolated and dependent on his own resources alone. 
This, however,' adds Sir Harry, 'had not escaped 
the observation and due consideration of the Com* 
mander-in-Chief \' This criticism, which Sir Harry 
Smith proceeds to answer, has frequently been 
made upon Sir Hugh Gough's strategy. It is ap- 
plicable only to this extent — that the strength of 
the enemy was not sufficiently appreciated. The 
Commander-in-^Chief was a stranger to the in- 
tricacies of Indian politics, and he was misled by 
the political officers. ' The Politicals,' he says in 
a private letter written after the campaign, ' entirely 
deceived me. I thought I should have a mob with- 
out leaders, with the heads at variance. I found a 
well-disciplined, well-organized army, well led and 
truly gallant'.' But even if the resources of the 
enemy had been accurately known, the knowledge 
would have modified Sir Hugh's scheme in detail 
only. The reasons for his strategy he explained to 

^ AuMnographpy vol il pp. 1S5-6. 

' Sir Hugh Gh)agh to his son^ January 20, 1844. 



4^ ZKIH^ 



"> 




^01917 «IlfiaS9K IflC 11117 IHl 




VX21 -v^uc^K ¥^iiTrHng yatatm 

ir>r^ hic^^ V»i^ of arsaai isen. vso v?oizkl as- 
mff^j \0^X£^ boc^ of &>bbas. a&d zzxake incizr- 
fiff^ik xtO/M r^sT territories '-. 

TTj^im; M&tewM m^y be taken jb the kqr to 
Hif Hof^ OoQgb'f fK'liej in an fais Indian waiSL 
^'/ri^ irir^^ d^^dnre Uow, wiffirieTrt to siti^ the 
i^unuy tioA h^ lud much to kam frcm the Euro- 
p^^a/i in t}j« art of war, and thai, man for man, 
tfi^9 lintinfa nrJdier was the superior of eren the 
Matjmtta m the Sikh ; no prolongation of hostilities 
InUp flHnfitsr<nm seasons, and no long puisuits over 

' Hir If ii(^ Ofmg^ to the Duke of Wdlington, December 
17, iHi». 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 818 

difiScult ground — ^these were the objects which the 
Commander-in-Chief kept always before him. In 
the present instance there were additional reasons 
for the division of the army. Symptoms of rest- 
lessness had been observed in Bundelcund, and in 
the Gwalior possessions in Malwa, and if these 
districts were left in undisturbed communication 
with Gwaliory the result might be a revolt over a 
large area, while the presence of a British force in 
the regions south of Gwalior would be a check upon 
any such tendency* 

A still further danger was involved in any pro- 
longation of hostilities at GwaUor, for it will be 
remembered that at this time our relations with the 
Punjab were most critical, and any weakness or 
hesitation either in the political negotiations or in 
the military measures of the British would have 
exposed the Government to the grave danger of 
a combination of Sikh and Mahratta. The necessi- 
ties of the case, therefore, amply justified the 
decision of the Commander-in-Chief to secure an 
inmiediate result, even at the risk of a division of 
his army which would have been impossible in the 
case of a European enemy. 'As we calculate on 
the power of an enemy/ says Sir Hairy Smith, ' so 
may we estimate what, according to his system of 
operations, he is likely to attempt On this occasion 
it was considered that if the enemy made a descent 
on Grey, his division was of sufScient force to 
defend itself, while our main army would have 
rapidly moved on Gwalior and conquered it without 



■> 



814 INDIA [1848 

a struggle thiou^ the absence of the chief part of 
its army, (for strategy is totally unknown to a native 
army, which usually posts itself on a well-chots»]i 
position and awaits an attack) \' 

The Commander-in-Chief arrived at a decision on 
this important question early in the month of 
October, and he at once proceeded to arrange for 
the composition and movements of the two wings of 
the Army of Exercise. Many incidental difficulties 
arose to interfere with the arrangements he made, 
and, as the autumn advanced, fresh complications 
brought about considerable changes in detail. Un- 
acquainted as he was with the topography of the 
country, he had some difficulty in coming to a con- 
clusion with regard to the precise locality where the 
wings might assemble. Political negotiations moved 
slowly, and military arrangements could not be 
allowed to advance beyond them. But Sir Hugh's 
time was fiilly occupied in directing the formation 
of his own army, in giving orders for the reinforce- 
ments for the Punjab frontier, and in mastering the 
geographical conditions both on the Chumbul and 
on the Sutlej. 

The fort of Gwalior stands upon an isolated rock 
resembling the situation of the Castle of Edinburgh 
or of Stirling. It is of great natural strength and, 
with proper artillery, was capable of considerable 
resistance. The town of Gwalior lay on the east 
side of the fort, with which it communicated by 
means of a stairway, cut in the rock, so gradual that 
^ Autobiography, vol ii. p. 126. 




f 



g 



o 

u. 
o 

& 

o 

U 

s 

H 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 815 

elephants could be made to ascend it The fort had 
already been twice in British possession (in 1779 and 
1808), but had been restored to the Mahangah. The 
town and fort of Gwalior could be approached by the 
British in the two ways to which we have already 
referred. It was situated in the northernmost part of 
Sindhia's scattered dominions, at a distance of about 
sixty-five miles from the city of Agra. The British dis- 
tricts of Agra and Etawah bounded the GwaUor state 
on the north-east ; the protected states of Dholpore and 
B^'putana were coterminous with it on the north-* 
west Along the whole of these frontiers, the boun* 
dary line was the river Chumbul ; the north-eastern 
comer of Gwalior extends almost to the point where 
the united waters of the Chumbul and the Jumna are 
joined by a smaller tributary known as the Sind, 
which separated Gwalior from the British districts 
and protected states of Bundelcund. Further to the 
south, the eastern boundaries were the British 
territories of Saugor and Nerbudda. On the south 
and west, Gwalior was bounded by native states 
more or less under the protection of the Governor^ 
General, but with these we are not directly con- 
cerned. The boundaries which Sir Hugh's Army of 
Exercise was formed to threaten were the Chumbul 
and the Sind ; the right wing of the army, marching 
from Agra, must, in case of necessity, cross the 
Chumbul, and the left wing, assembling in the 
Bundelcund province of Jhansi, would find the Sind 
between it and Gwalior territory. 

Early in November, the Commander-in-Chief inr 



^ 



816 INDIA [1848 

fltituted a series of inquiries into the number and 
locality of the fords on these riyera. He at oaee 
decided that a bridge of boats must be established at 
Dholpore, in order to maintain communications with 
the magazine at Agra ; but he desired that, if possible, 
the actual crossing point of the ri^it wing should 
be nearer that of the left This, however, proved, 
on subsequent investigation, to be impracticable, and 
Sir Hugh had to resolve upon crossing at Dhalpora 
In the b^inning of December, the rig^t wing 
assembled at Agra. It consisted of two regiments 
of European and six of native in&ntiy, one regiment 
of European cavalry and four of native cavalry, with 
horse and field artillery and a battering train. The 
left wing was ordered to assemble in tvFO divisions — 
one at Jhansi and the other at Eoonch ; both to 
hold themselves in readiness to march to a pre- 
arranged position in order to cross the Sind. These 
instructions were given both for the purx)ose of pre- 
venting unnecessaiy marching, and in order to main- 
tain a more complete check upon disaffected districts, 
and the plan had the further advantage of render- 
ing the enemy uncertain from what direction the 
wing was to approach Gwalior. The point finally 
chosen for the passage of the Sind was Chandpore, 
about thirty-eight miles south-east of Gwalior, where 
the ford was, in the dry season, less than two feet 
in depth* Sir Hugh forbade General Grey to divide 
his force when actually crossing. On the junction 
of its two parts. Grey was to take command of the 
whole force. But, meanwhile, all such arrangements 



STATE OF GWALIOR 







1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 817 

were only provisional ; the decision of the Qovemor* 
General remained to be made. 

Lord EUenborough reached Agra on the 11th of 
December. He had come up to the front in the 
hope that his presence would aid in the maintenance 
of peace. The situation at Gwalior had been modi- 
fied, in the b^inning of November, by a coimter- 
revolution, which resulted in the imprisonment of the 
Dada. The Gbvemor-Oeneral hoped that a demons 
stration of the effective power of the British army 
might be sufficient to secure all that he desired at 
Gwaliory and on the day of his arrival, Sir Hugh 
Gough gave directions for the march of the two 
wings upon the Chumbul and the Sind respectively. 
The whole of the right wing was to be at Dholpore 
on the 20th of December, and to be ready to cross 
on the 22nd ; the brigades of the left wing were 
ordered to unite at Chandpore on the same day. It 
seemed at first as if Lord EUenborough's hopes were 
to be realized. The first brigade moved from Agra 
on the 12th, and the presence of the Governor** 
General, together with the alarming military situa< 
tion, brought the Durbar to a sense of its danger. 
Lord EUenborough based his right to interfere upon 
the long-neglected Treaty of Burhampur (1804) , by 
which the British Government agreed to aid the 
Mahangah in maintaining a settled government. 
He was now able to point to the Dada as the cause 
of the recent disorder, and the offending minister 
was unmediately given up by the Durbar. On the 
18th of December, the Dada was a prisoner in the^ 



818 INDIA [1848 

hands of Lord Ellenborough, if«iio was nowapprooeb* 
ing Dholpore. This removed the immediate diffi- 
culty, but the Qovemor-General ocnisidered hinngAlf 
justified in insisting upon the reduction of the 
Gwalior army. ' It is a matter of great moment^* 
he told Queen Victoria, ' to reduce the strengfli of 
the army maintained by the Gwalior State. It has 
long been the real master of the State. It is in 
amount wholly disproportioned to its revenues and 
wants ; and it never can be otherwise than a subject 
of disquietude to have an army of thirty thousand 
men within a few days' march of Agra. The exist- 
ence of an army of such strength in that position 
must very seriously embarrass the disposition of 
troops we might be desirous of making to meet a 
coming danger from the Sutlej \* The late Mahap 
ngah had placed a smaU force of some fourteen 
himdred men under British officers, and Lord 
Ellenborough proposed an increase of this force, 
and asked the consent of the Gwalior Govern- 
ment to the British administration of certain dis- 
tricts whose revenues should be assigned to the 
maintenance of this force. It was intended to select 
the districts bordering on the disturbed frontiers of 
Bundelcimd and Saugor. ' This/ said Lord Ellen- 
borough, ' is no new arrangement. It is only the 
extension of one long established with the ready 
concurrence of the Gwalior State ".' 

The Governor-General was under the impression 

^ Indian Administration of Lord EUenborough, pp. 105-& 
« Ibid. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN did 

that many of the Gwalior chiefis would willingly 
acquiesce in the reduction of the army, but that 
they would require active aid from the British or, 
at least, the support of a British force within their 
territories. With this in view, he took the grave 
responsibility of ordering the advance. Upon the 
wisdom or the justice of this decision, it is un- 
necessary to offer any opinion. Lord Ellenborough 
himself gave the most unqualified assiurance that his 
object was the mamtenance of peace, and that his 
aim was a settlement by mutual agreement, not 
annexation. In order to avoid creating undue 
alarm at GwaUor, he requested the Clonmiander*in» 
Chief to leave behind, at Agra, his battering-train, 
with the exception of ten guns ; but he seems to 
have underestimated the natural effect of the advance 
of two armies, from opposite directions, into the 
Gwalior territory. On the 22nd of December, the 
advanced Brigade of Infantiy crossed the Chumbul 
at Dholpore, and on the 25th, the whole of the 
right wing had assembled near Hingonah, on the 
river Eohari, where the Govemor<}eneral hoped 
to have an interview with the Bani on December 
the 26th. On the 24th, the left wing crossed the 
Sind, and, in accordance with Sir Hugh's orders, 
took up a position clear of the ravines dose to that 
river, and one day's march within the Gwalior 
territory. 

So confident was the Governor-General of the 
maintenance of peace that he invited Sir Hugh 
and Lady Gough to. dine with him at Hingonah 



820 INDIA [1848 

on Christmas Day, and the Gommander-in-CShief 
was, accordingly, accompanied into the enemy^a 
comitry by his wife and his yomigest daughter. 
The wife of Gfeneral Hany Smith was also present 
with her husband. Although no serious resistance 
was now anticipated, all proper precautions were 
taken by the Commander-in-Chief. 'I beg you 
to have a very strict discipline observed,' he wrote 
in his instructions to General Grey, ^to act as 
though you were in the front of an enemy, and 
to be always prepared V A private letter from 
the Deputy Adjutant-General of the army, Mm'or 
Patrick Grant, describes the precautions observed 
in Sir Hugh's own army: 'It may be a mere 
military promenade, but our progreea will be attended 
with every precaution and vigilance necessary in 
xnarching through an enemy's country, and that 
will give it some degree of interests' On the 
20th of December, Sir John Littler wrote in his 
journal ' : ' His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief 
made a reconnaissance militaire yesterday evenings 
He was accompanied by all his Staff together with 
ten Divisional and Brigade Comjnanders. We started 
at half-past three p.m. and went to the Chumbul^ 
which was forded. We did not get back to our 
tents until eight o'clock, after having gone over 

^ Sir Hugh Ooagh to Major-GFenenJ Orey^ November 27» 
1848. 

^ Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Patrick) Grant to 
his mother^ December 18^ 1848. 

' Extracts from the joanial were kindly sent by Sir John 
liittler to the late Hon» Lady Grant 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 821 

a space of twenty miles. Beports in camp,' he adds, 
< that everything is to be settled at Gwalior, but that 
the army will go there to hasten the arrangement/ 

That these hopes were false became known on 
Christmas Day, when the Governor-General heard, 
at Hingonah, that the Bani would not, or, owing 
to the opposition of the troops, could not, go out 
to meet him. War was now inevitable, and, on 
the same day. Sir Hugh sent final instructions to 
General Grey. He desired, if possible, to secure 
the co-operation of the two columns, and indicated 
to Grey the point selected for that purpose. The 
most direct route from Grey's position to Gwalior 
lay through the Antri Ghat, a narrow rocky ravine 
which it was quite evident the Mahrattas would 
defend : Sir Hugh therefore directed General Grey 
to leave this pass on his right and ^ to cut in on the 
high road from Kurwur [in Bhopal] to Gwalior.' 
This road led to a strong hill fort called Himutgarh, 
which stood at the entrance of a narrow pass leading 
to Punniar, and Grey was instructed to leave this 
fort either to his right or to his left, and so make 
his way to Punniar. He was expected to reach 
Punniar on the 80th, by which time he would find 
a reinforcement, consisting of a contingent which 
had been stationed at Sipri to prevent any unrest 
there. These orders were, as we shall see, carried 
out by General Grey, but a movement on the part 
of the enemy prevented any attempt at co-operation, 
and the two wings fought separate battles with 
different bodies of the enemy. 

I Y 



822 INDIA [1848 

We turn our attention first to the right wing, 
under the immediate command of Sir Hugh Gk>ugh. 
The Commander-in-Chief was aware, on the 25th of 
December, that a large force of the enemy, accom- 
panied by guns, had marched out to Dhimela, a 
small town about eleven miles from GwaUor. On 
the 26th, they advanced seven miles further, to the 
strong position of Chonda, on the river Asun. The 
British army remained at Hingonah (six miles 
distant), and Sir Hugh had the Mahratta position 
carefully reconnoitred. He foimd that the enemy 
had wisely chosen their groimd, which was pro- 
tected on both sides by dangerous ravines, but that 
their flank could be turned by a march on a point 
where the Asun bends circuitously. On the evening 
of the 28th of December, Sir Hugh issued his in- 
structions to officers commanding divisions and 
brigades. The difficulty of the ground involved 
the separation of the army into three columns ; not 
only was it necessary to arrange for a speedy passage 
of the Eohari, but the country was very rough and 
intersected by deep ravines, only made practicable 
by the labours of the sappers. The routes for each 
column had been carefully chosen, and an officer 
of the Quartermaster-Oeneral's Department accom- 
panied each column. 

The right column was placed imder the command 
of M^]or-General Sir Joseph ThackwelL It was 
composed of a brigade of cavalry and the Qovemor- 
General's Bodyguard, supported by horse artillery. 
The central column, imder Migor-Gfeneral Valiant, 



\ 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 828 

consisted of a brigade of infantryy and the left, 
of a brigade of cavalry, two of infantry, along with 
horse artillery and two field batteries; the cavalry 
under Brigadier Scott, and the infantry under Migor 
General Dennis and Migor-General Littler K Colonel 
Tennant commanded the artillery. It was the inten* 
tion of Sir Hugh to turn the enemy's left flank with 
CTureton's Cavalry Brigade, co-operating with Valiant's 
infantry, to threaten their right flank with Scott's 
Cavalry Brigade, and to attack their centre with 
Dennis's Division, supported by Littler. 

The left column started half an hour before day- 
break; the centre and right when day dawned. 
So well directed were their movements that, in 
spite of a march over what Sir Harry Smith de- 
scribes as Aground on the banks of rivulets most 
peculiarly intersected by numerous and deep small 
ravines, the pigmy model of a chain of moimtains, 

^ Right Column : Careton^s Cavalry Brigade^ H.M/8 16th 
Lancers, Oovemor-Oeneral's Bodyguard^ Ist B^^ent of 
Light Cavalry^ 4th Irregular Cavalry; sapported by Major 
Lane^B and Major Alexander's troops of horse artillery 
under Brigadier Oowan. The whole under Thackwell. 
Central Column : H.M/s 40th Foot, 2nd and 16th Native 
Grenadiers ; the whole under Valiant Left Column : 8nd 
Division of infantry^ under Dennis; 14th and 81st Native 
In&ntry, and 48rd Light Infantry^ under Brigadier Stacey, 
supported by Captain Browne's Light Field Battery. 8rd 
Division of infantry^ under Littler. H.M/s 99th Foot^ and 
66th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Wright, supported by 
Major Sander's Light Field Battery. Seott^s Brigade of 
Cavalry. 4th and 10th Bengal Light Cavalry^ supported by 
Captain Orant^s troop of horse artillery. 

Y2 



824 INDIA [IMS 

but even more impaBsable/ all three eolnmns arriyed 
in excellent time about a mfle in frcHit dl Maha- 
rajpora, a village a mile and a half nearer them 
than Chonda. The soil was richly cultivated. Now 
it was covered with standing com, now the com 
had been cut and gathered into stacks, and here 
and there the crop had been removed, and the 
ground was soft with recent ploughing. As they 
approached, they found the village strongly occupied 
by the enemy, who opened guns upon them. This 
was no surprise ; Sir Hugh had never doubted that 
the enemy would have to occupy Ifahangpore as 
an outpost, and, in point of feuH;^ Miyor^leneral 
Churchill, the Quartermaster-Oeneral of Her Ma- 
jesty's troops, had been fired at from Maharqpore 
on the previous day. Nor did the preliminary can- 
nonade disconcert the British troops. Most of them, 
in fact, had not come up ; Littler^s Division, which 
had arrived, advanced about 500 yards beyond its ap- 
pointed station at Jowra and so came within distant 
range ; but so distant that the 89th Begiment piled 
arms, and sat down and breakfasted while the firing 
was going on. For an hour before either Valiant 
or the cavalry arrived, the Conmiander-in-Chief 
reconnoitred the position, walking within 800 paces 
of the enemy's sentries, allowing only one of his 
staff to approach him at a time, in order to avoid 
drawing the enemy's fire^ 

^ Many of the details of the battle of Maharajpore are 
derived from private letters written by Sir Hugh Gough to 
his son after the battle. The member of his staff who 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 825 

The result of these investigations was to alter 
considerably Sir Hugh Gk>ugh's plan of attack. * I 
was surprized/ he says, ^and most agreeably surprized 
to see that they had pushed forward, into a plain 
open for all arms, so large a body of their force/ 
His intention, in these circumstances, was to destroy 
the force at Mahangpore, and so to divert the 
fighting, as far as possible, from the strong position 
of Chonda. Accordingly, he gave orders to Littler 
to make a direct attack upon Mahar^jpore, while 
Valiant's Brigade took it in reverse, M^jor-Oeneral 
Dennis's Division acting as a support to both liittler 
and Valiant, along with Thackwell's Cavalry Division, 
which was specially directed to follow up any 
advantage secured by the infantry. When the army 
came up. Sir Hugh at once brought the field-guns 
(thirty in all) into action, to cover the advance of the 
divisions to which they were attached ; and he sent 
orders to Colonel Tennant to bring up four 8-inch 
howitzers. As the enemy had opened fire, it would 
have been disastrous to withdraw, and the artillery 
responded to the enemy's challenge. The work of 
the artillery in the opening of the contest has been 
thus described by an eye-witness : ' Horse Artillery 

accompanied him to xecomioitre (his nephew and A.D.C., 
Captain Frend) was accustomed to relate that Sir Hugh was 
unarmed while making this examination of the ground. For 
further details we are indebted to Oeneral Sir J. Luther 
Yaughan, who was acting A.D.C. to Oeneral Littler at 
Maharajpore, and who has been good enough to lend the 
writer a contemporary account of the battle written by himself 
in a letter to England. 



826 INDIA [IMS 

ecmunaiided by Captain Gnmt, at foil galb^ rode 
directly at the Gwalior Batteiy, opened fire upon it 
with crashing eflEwt, and within the spmoe ci a fiaw 
minutes reduced it to silence. Having done so, 
away again at foil gallop, Captain Grant led his 
battery against one on the left of the former, that 
had meanwhile opened upon us, our infiemtiy 
columns plodding their way, slowly but steadily, 
against its line of fire. Very soon that battery also 
was silenced K* Littler now made his fix>ntal attack. 
When Wright's Brigade (Her Migesty's 89th Foot 
and the 5Gth Native In&ntiy) came within three or 
four himdied yards of the village, the order was 
given to deploy into line. While this was being 
done, a round shot fell among the 50th Native 
In&ntry and killed three men, causing the regiment 
to hang back for a moment This was at once 
perceived by the Chief himself, who rode up and 
said : ' For shame, men ; look at your gallant com- 
rades ' (the 89th). The formation was at once 
completed and both regiments advanced upon the 
enemy's guns. The Mahratta gunners now com- 
menced firing grape, canisteiHshot, and even old horse- 
shoes, anything, in short, that could be crammed 
in; but the brigade persevered, and soon came 
upon the guns, which were about twelve or fifteen 
yards apart and manned by ten or twelve men each. 
With a final rush, they captured them, bayoneting 
the gunners, who stuck nobly to their posts. Behind 

^ RecoUectiofis of Thirty-nine Years in the Army, by 
Sir C. A, Gordon, K.C.B., p. 27. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 827 

the guns stood the Mahratta Infantry, armed with 
matchlock and sword. After the matchlocks had 
been discharged, they engaged in a hand-to-hand con- 
flict. In so sternly contested a field, there could not* 
but be considerable losses, especially in the British 
regiment which led the brigade, but, ere long. 
Valiant made his presence felt on the enemy's left 
and rear, and Scott's Brigade, with Grant's troop of 
horse artillery, operated on their right and dis- 
persed a body of cavalry. Valiant, like Littler, met 
with a determined resistance; the conflict raged 
mercilessly, and very few of the enemy escaped 
from among the defenders of this position. All 
their guns (thirty in number) were captured. So 
quickly was this result achieved that Tennant was 
unable (in spite of two further messages from the 
Chief) to bring up the howitzers. Within half an 
hour after the first shot was fired into Valiant's 
column, the village of Mahangpore was in flames, 
its guns were taken, and the four raiments which 
had defended it were cut to pieces. Difficulties of 
ground made it impossible for Scott's Cavalry to 
prevent some of the enemy from escaping to the 
village of Shirkapore, which lay to the east of 
the direct route from Mahangpore to Chonda. The 
escape of these men necessitated Valiant's crossing 
by the rear of Littler to pursue them, and his 
instructions were, after taking Shirkapore, to attack 
the right of the enemy's position at Chonda, on 
which Littler was ordered to advance. Littler^s 
Infantry Brigade was supported by the 1st B^iment 



INDIA [IMS 

of IJ^At CMnbj and brtlie newei4aSISaig tioop of 
hone artiDeiy imder Giant As thcj Jtyu s ch ed, 
the enem J opened fire, to wfaidi our guns rqdied. 
The poshioQ was earned m before, bj m rush of 
Wright's Brigade, in which the leader of the S9th 
Foot was Tery seT»el j wounded ; a nnmb^r of men 
were killed bj shots from Mahratta sddiere eon* 
eealed hj the stacks of com through which the 
diTisicm was advancing, and it became neoesBaiy to 
leave no stack in the rear without potting the 
ba v<Miet in first The Hahrattas made a last stand 
in defence of a small work of four gons <m their left, 
vdiich was finally carried by Captain Campbell and 
the grenadiars of the 89th. Here the enemy did 
not await the final charge, but took refuge in the ra- 
vines behind their batteries, abandoning their camp. 
Not less severe fighting feU to the lot of Valiant's 
column. Near Slmkapore, Valiant had to take (ta 
the words of the dispatch) * three strong entrenched 
positions, where the enemy defended their guns 
with frantic desperation ; Her M^jest/s 40th Regi- 
ment losing two successive commanding officers 
(Migor Stopford and Captain Coddington, who fell 
wounded at the very muzzles of the guns) and 
capturing four r^^imental standards.' The 40th 
B^iment was supported by the 2nd and the 16th 
Native Grenadiers, and ere long the enemy were 
driven back in headlong flight, having lost all their 
guns and making no attempt to defend the strong 
position afforded by the ravines at Chonda. 

The simultaneous success of Valiant and Littler 




1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 829 

had now resulted in the capture of the whole of 
the Mahratta artillery, and they had been driven 
from every position with enormous loss. Complete 
as was the victory, it would have been even more 
overwhelming, had not Thackwell's Cavalry Brigade, 
which had charged in support of the infantry, as 
occasion offered, been led too far to the right in 
its pursuit of the enemy when they finally broke 
and fled. It was, in consequence, stopped by a 
ravine, which prevented further piuBuit. The Chief 
had ordered this brigade to form up close to Valiant, 
and had they done so, they would have ' been one 
mile clear of any ravine, with a level coimtry in 
their front, and might have swept that countiy 
in line between Mahangpore and Chonda^' The 
error (which was that of a Staff OfScer) was really 
unimportant, for the defeat of the Gwalior army 
was complete. 

Meanwhile, the success of General Grey was 
equally satisfactory. While Grey marched from 
Himutgarh to Punniar, a large body of Mahrattas, 
who had been ready to dispute with him the Antri 
Ghat, made a march parallel to that of Grey himself, 
and when the British army reached Punniar they 
foimd that the enemy had occupied a strong position 
at Mangore, on a neighbouring hilL They opened 
fiire upon his baggage, and Grey sent a force of 
cavalry and horse artillery to defend it. Brigadier 
Harriott, who was in command of the cavalry, 
foimd that the nature of the ground prohibited his 
^ Sir H. Oongh to his son^ November 18^ 1844. 



880 INDIA [1848 

attacking the enemy, and he was forced to letmn 
to Grey, who was preparing to take the offensive. 
Qrey detached Her M^jest/s 8rd Bvdbj and five 
companies of the 89th Native In&ntiy with a com- 
pany of sappers and miners, to take up a position 
on an opposite ridge and attack the enemy. The 
Buffis and sappers charged the enem/s centre and 
captured their guns, while the wing of the 89th 
Native Infantry gained the crest of a hill com- 
manding the enemy's left, and after pouring on 
him a severe fire, charged and carried the battery 
opposed to them. These raiments were well led by 
Colonel Clunie of the Bu& and Brigadier Yates who 
conmianded the 89th Native Infantry, but they were 
exposed to a heavy fire and suffered severely. The 
remainder of Grey's force (Her M^est/s 50th Foot 
and the 50th and 58th Native Infantry) now came up 
and attacked the enemy's left, and put an end to the 
action, totally defeating the Mahrattas and forcing 
them to abandon their guns, 24 in number. The 
losses in General Grey's force were 85 killed and 
182 wounded. 

The Gwalior campaign was of only forty-eight 
hours' duration, for the double victory put an end 
to all resistance. It had been purchased at con- 
siderable cost ; the enemy had shown gall^mtry and 
devotion, and they had great advantages in numbers 
and artillery, and in the nature of the ground. 
The British forces at Maharajpore numbered^ 

^ These figures represent the nambers actually brought into 
the field, and are taken from a letter of the Commander-in- 




1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 881 

4,810 infantry, with 850 artillery and 80 field 
guns, and supported by 1,840 cavalry. The 
British loss was — killed, 6 officers and 100 men; 
wounded, 84 officers and 650 men. Total casual- 
ties, 790 killed and wounded ^ The most serious 
losses were incurred in Valiant's and Littler^s attacks 
upon the batteries at Mahangpore, Shirkapore, and 
Chonda. In Her Migesty's 40th Foot, which played 
so gallant a part at Shirkapore, 24 of all ranks were 
killed, and 160 woimded ; and the casualties of the 
16th Native Grenadiers, which accompanied it, num- 
bered 179. Similarly, Her Majesty's 89th Foot, 
which behaved as nobly imder Littler, lost 80 of all 
ranks killed, and 196 woimded. The stress of the 
fighting fell, as always in Indian warfare of this 
date, upon the European troops. The three native 
regiments which formed Deimis's Division were 
employed only as a reserve, and their total casual- 
ties amoimted to one man killed and six woimded. 
The most distinguished officers killed included 
Major-General Churchill and Colonel Sanders, 

Chief. The full strength of the eight infiuitry regiments 
represented (two European and six Native) was (on paper) 
8^800. This explains the discrepancy between this statement 
and the ordinary estimate of the whole Army of Exercise 
(including both wings) at about SO^OOO men. The &ct that 
these figures include only men actually in the field must be 
kept in mind in any estimate of the proportion of casualties. 

^ A certain amount of the loss was incurred after the 
fighting was over^ f or^ until nightfall^ mines which the enemy 
had made all over the ground occupied by their guns con- 
tinued to explode and seriously wounded many men and some 
officers. 



DTDIA [IMS 

pirWfiC GtSioal Ta^acBC was aBiciel y wwzndBd, 
a£id amriT.gK c2mk s^srrr nqnred woe Geoeal 
Litxitr jfid CoMKi X'Ijebi. wiM> were afterwards 
to p2^ an impcittazx part in die Fink Sikh Wac 

Tb^ army defratrf ac lf a haraj|M c e amoanted, 
aMorimg to Sir Hoeh GootA's ii'iiimii ^ to fooiteen 
ftgimeotft of abxit 800 nnai eadu a total inbntrj 
if0mh of 11^200 men. Four of these legiments de- 
fended the battery at Maharmjpore, three the position 
between that village and Sdikapore, and the remain- 
ing Heven the main positiOD in front of Chooda. Ilfty- 
Hix guns were captured, and it wasealcolated that the 
Mahratta cavahy numbered about 8,000. The pro- 
pTiftion of combotantB waa thus very much greater 
on the Mahratta dde; their guns were also more 
numerous and more powerful, for among the cap- 
tured ordnance were an 18-pounder and two 
l^-priundcr howitzers, and a 12-pounder gun. 

Wlien the news of the victory reached England 
the attention of the coimtry was fiilly occupied 
with the (.*om Law struggles and with the trial of 
O'Connell, and so the announcement of the conquest 
of (iwalior received little popular applause. More 
valuable to the Commander-in-Chief than the 
jiraiso of the newspaper press was the receipt of 
a letter from the Duke of Wellington. It was not 
the custom of the Duke to use many laudatory ex* 
presHions, and Sir Hugh was much gratified by his 
words : * 1 sincerely congratulate you on the Battle 
of MaIiari\jporo. I have perused the details thereof 



^ 



: OF MAHARAJPORE, Dec, a^, 1843, 













i 

I.' 



. .0' 



Aft 






ttt\ MBj.O*n.Utrl*r 






MWA// 



.> 



I ;^ 

iiotoAeHon. i f 
[alurajpore, i %^ 
MJ turn Mftht 

1 

{t&ck oiD many"* 
:overinjr Mjiha- 






-^^. 



%. 



Th^ Dxfi^t'^ ikio^^ Irvsiiti^^Tv 






^1 : 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 888 

with the greatest satisfaction, they are highly credit- 
able to the officers and troops engaged as well as to 
yourself/ Others, who had less authentic informa- 
tion and who gave credence to the wild rumours 
that followed every important Indian action, found 
something to censure in the conduct of the battle. 
Criticism on the battle of Maharxgpore has been 
concerned with three points. In the first place, 
the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief has been 
condenmed on the groimd that the Mahrattas 
might have dealt with his force in detaiL We 
have already seen that Sir Hugh Goiigh was aware 
of this danger, but that he decided that, with such 
an enemy as he had to face, other considerations 
might be allowed to outweigh it. He deemed it 
a risk that might safely be taken, and events 
justified him in that belief. In the second place, 
he was severely censured by English journals, and 
especially by the Spectator for ^ his great rashness in 
sending back the heavy guns and mortars, and 
taking only pop-guns to the field.' The only guns 
which were not taken to the field were those of the 
siege-train. The reader will remember that part 
of that train was left behind at Agra, by desire of 
the Govemor-GbneraL In point of fact, Sir Hugh 
had consulted Colonel Tennant as to the possibility 
of bringing such guns of the battering-train as had 
been brought to Dholpore, into action against the 
entrenched position at Chonda, although they were 
not suited for field engagements. The reply was that 
as these guns had to be placed, in order to traverse 



8M INDIA [1843 

these diffirnk roads, 'on tnTBDmg CKiij^ges, with 
their trmmioDS doC in their proper pliee/ they eould 
not be brou^ into actkn for twentj-foor houraL 
When the action eommeneed it was evident that 
the attack <m Ch(»da would be leas serioos a part 
of the engagonent than had beoi anticipated, and 
the absence of the battering^rsin was not regretted. 
The only guns which might hare done good service 
were the 8-inch howitseis. and the G<»nniander4n- 
Chief spared no exertion to have them brought up, 
but so swift was the action that they airived only 
in time to see the enemy nm. 

It may be asked : Why not delay the action until 
the guns had been brought up? There were two 
reasons why this course was impossible. In the first 
place, the enemy had offered battle, and to withdraw 
the troops would have involved a moral effect that 
could not be discounted in Indian virar&re, and, in 
the second place, it was essential to destroy the 
force at Maharajpore before it could be strengthened 
or supported from Chonda. 'What Lord £31en- 
borough and the non-militaiy set by whom he was 
surrounded wanted to have seen,' wrote Sir Hugh, 
a year later \ * was a Field-day — guns and cavalry, 
with a host of skirmishers to have galloped about, 
to be well peppered by the Mahratta gims, and then 
to have fallen back behind the infantry ; all this time 
enabling the enemy to bring up his support £rom 
Chonda, only a mile and a half distant, and giving 
confidence to the foe. This might have been all 
^ Sir Hugh Oough to his son^ December 81^ 1844. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 885 

very pretty if both parties were to fire blank cartridge, 
but would have been murderous in the face of such 
an artillery. I took the shorter way of at once 
subdividing their force, and if the cavalry had acted 
according to my order, not a man from Maharajpore 
would ever have got to Gwalior ; as it was, within 
half an hour their retreat was completely intercepted 
by Valiant's Brigade/ Why the howitzers did not 
come up, (Sir Hugh mentions in his private letters,) 
was not quite clear, and he was imable to acquit 
Colonel Tennant of all responsibility ^ ; but it would 
have been disastrous to wait for them, and the 
short action which followed, while it involved some 
severe fighting, was in the end, he believed, a great 
economy of life. 

Lastly, it has frequently been said that the army 
was surprised at Maharigpore. The course of our 
narrative will have made it clear that there was 
no surprise in the ordinary sense of the term. We 
have seen that the Commander-in-Chief knew that 
Maharajpore was held by the enemy the day previous 
to the battle, and that he made a personal recon* 
naissance for over half an hour before the action 
commenced. He expected to find it held as an 
outpost, but he had not anticipated that the enemy 
would play into his hands so far as to occupy it in 

^ In a letter to his son. Sir Hugh flays that he had dis- 
covered that the howitzers ivere brought up, but did not open 
fire because they had received no fresh order to do so^ 'as 
if^' says Sir Hugh^ ' I had sent them three staff messages to 
come up and be fired at.' 



886 INDIA [1848 

force. It was this fact, and not the mere oocupatioD 
of the village, that caused the change in his plans, 
a change whose object was to take full advantage d 
the enemy's error in diverting the fighting from 
their strong position at Chonda. To do so involved 
the necessity of precipitating the action, a necessity 
which carried with it some disadvantages ; but this 
precipitation was the result of Sir Hugh Gough s 
personal inspection of the ground, not of an un- 
expected assault by the enemy. The Ck>nunander> 
in-Chief was not surprised at Mahangpore. 

The l^end of a surprise owes its existence to two 
incidents of the battle. Littler^s division, it will be 
remembered, had been drawn up a little beyond the 
point prescribed, and they had been under a harm- 
less fire, just within distant range, while the CShief 
made his reconnaissance. Vague reports of this 
trivial incident gave rise, not unnaturally, to an 
impression of a surprise. In the second place, the 
presence in the field of the Governor-General and 
a party of ladies had a similar effect Lord Ellen- 
borough had been asked by Sir Hugh Gough to take 
up a position in the rear of the reserve battery, 
whence he might watch the fighting. When the 
Commander-in-Chief suddenly altered his plans for 
the battle, he omitted to send fresh information to 
the Governor-General ; the reserve battery was that 
attached to Littler^s force, and, as Littler now made 
the frontal attack, it came at once into action. It 
was suggested to Lord Ellenborough that he should 
retire to a safer position, a suggestion which, as Sir 



\ 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 887 

Henry Durand mentions, originated with a staff 
officer ^ He did so, but found himself exposed to the 
fire of a Mahratta battery, whose gunners observed 
that he was a person of importance. ^ Once in it/ 
says Durand, ^ he thoroughly enjoyed it, and seemed 
utterly regardless as to danger */ From this position 
he could observe the attack of Littler, supported by 
Dennis, upon the battery of Maharq'pore, but that 

^ Dorand's Life of Sir Henry Durand^ voL i. pp. 74-6. 

^ The ladies present (Lady Gough, Mrs. Harry Smithy Miss 
F. GK)ugh^ and Mrs. Curtis, wife of the Commissarj-Oeneral) 
bad a still more exciting experience. Their presence^ mounted 
as they were on elephants, and so towering over the low roofs 
of the village, early attracted the notice of the enemy, and 
they came, almost at once, under fire. With their small escort 
they went to meet the troops as they marched up to Maharaj- 
pore, and kept behind them until they were actually engaged, 
when they looked out for any other regiment coming up, 
and followed them until they also were under fire. Towards 
the close of the day, their elephants, frightened by the 
explosion of a powder-magazine, ran away with them ; and 
their ignorance of the fortunes of the battle added to the 
anxiety of their position. Major Grant was the first to 
reassure them with tidings of victory, and he conducted 
them back to Sir Hugh's camp. The excitement of the day 
was not yet over, for no sooner had they gained a much- 
needed rest in a tent on the ground held by the enemy at the 
beginning of the day, than (just as tea was being prepared) 
they were suddenly seized by British soldiers and carried out. 
Inmiediately afterwards a mine exploded, and the tent was 
blown to pieces. Lord Ellenborough presented each of these 
ladies with a medal conunemorative of the occasion, similar 
in design to that conferred on the troops. This footnote is 
derived from memoranda left by Sir Patrick and Lady Grant 
(the Major Grant and Miss Gough of the story). 

I Z 



888 INDIA [1848 

village prevented his witnessing any other part of 
the fighting. In his (General OrdeiSi issued on the 
5th of January, Lord EUenborough cordially con- 
gratulated the Commander-in-Chief ^ on the success 
of his able combinations/ and offered to him and to 
the army the gratefid thanks of the Government 
and people of India. He announced that the 
Government would present, as a decoration for the 
campaign, an Indian star of bronze made out of the 
captured guns, to be worn with uniforms, and that 
a triumphal monument, bearing the names of all 
who fell, would be erected at Calcutta ^ 

It is necessary to advert here to a statement 
current at the time with regard to the battle ci 
Mahangpore, because it had an important effect upon 
the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and 
the Indian press. It is well known to readers of 
Indian history of the period that one of the great 
difficulties of the Government lay in the lack of 
self-restraint which led officers of the Indian army 
to supply the public with information, accurate or 
inaccurate, which should not have been diwdged. 
One notable instance of this kind called down upon 
a distinguished officer, of high rank, the severest 
censure of the Duke of Wellington. In published 
books, or in commimications to newspapers, English 
or Indian, these statements 'upon good authority' 

^ This monument was also erected out of the gun-metal of 
the captured ordnance. It is interesting to note that the 
next star awarded by the Government of India was for the 
Afghan campaign of 1880. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 889 

brought irresponsible accusations against the enemies 
of the writer, and caused endless vexation and 
annoyance. In India, the objection to these dis- 
closures was still more grave. The native press 
was eager to print any calumny against the Govern- 
menty and, true or fedse, these stories found hundreds 
of believers. There was also a section of the 
English Press in India which boasted of its charity 
towards all races but its own, and which took a 
ghoulish delight in exposing the real or supposed 
injustice or incompetence of the English rulers of 
India. ^The Press in this country,' wrote the 
Gomjnander-in-Chief, ' have a correspondent in every 
Begiment, who panders for the public by abusing 
his superiors. Such is the bilious appetite here that 
they must have either fulsome praise or slanderous 
abuse ; the latter goes down with much the greatest 
gusto, and therefore is that most generally used \* 
Immediately on his arrival in India Sir Hugh Oough 
had made known his determination to enforce 
military discipline by treating such conduct with 
the utmost severity. The first instance to occur 
was connected with this battle of Maharajpore. One 
ofiicer contributed to the Delhi Oazette a statement 
that Sir Hugh's Quartermaster-General (Colonel 
Garden) had misled him with regard to the locality, 
mistaking the position of Mahangpore and Chonda. 
This statement was widely copied and it ultimately 
formed the basis of comments in English papers, 
and of a serious attack upon the Quartermaster* 

^ Sir Hugh Oough to his son, June 9, 1844. 
Z2 



840 INDIA [1848 

General in the Madras United Service Gazette. Sir 
Hugh Gough gave it a most emphatic denial % and 
he dismissed the culprit from a situation in the 
Horse Artillery and placed him in a less important 
one in the Foot Artillery. The Delhi Gazette pub- 
lished a contradiction, which, however, did not 
attain the publicity of the original falsehood. The 
new Commander-in-Chief had thus openly declared 
war on the press, and the press was not slow to take 
up the challenge. For this. Sir Hugh was quite 
prepared, and he treated all such attacks with 
contempt. He did not lack friends who drew his 
attention to these statements, and he used to reply 
that he had not seen them. ^I can afford abuse,' 
he said, ^ but I cannot afford to pay for iV It is 
impossible to avoid a reference to this topic, for 
the hostility of the Indian Press to the Commander- 
in-Chief will be exemplified more than once in 
the course of this narrative, and it requires an 
explanation. 

Two days after the battle, on the 81st of Decem- 
ber, the Bani and the Maharajah arrived in the 
British camp, and Lord Ellenborough declared his 
readiness to enter into negotiations, on the basis of 
the arrangements which he had suggested before 
the fighting began. On the 4th of January, the two 
wings of the army imited in front of Gwalior, and 
on the 18th, the Mahangah agam appeared in camp, 

^ 'The Quartermaster-General did not mislead me. He 
told me most accurately the position both of Maharajpore and 
of Chonda.' Letter to his son^ August 7, 1844. 



1848] THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN 841 

and the treaty was signed. The Gwalior army was, 
by this agreement, reduced to 8,000 infantry with 
12 guns, 200 artillery with 20 guns, and 6,000 
cavalry. The contingent of soldiers under British 
officers was increased to 10,000; the Fort was 
entrusted to them, and measures were taken to 
secure their payment by placing the management 
of the revenue of some frontier districts in British 
handa This contingent subsequently produced the 
most able rebel leader in the Mutiny, Tantia Topi, 
and, under his command, drove Windham back 
upon his own lines near Cawnpore, in November, 
1857- 

The reduction of the army was the main condition 
of the Treaty, and Lord Ellenborough's moderation, 
in demanding no more after the victory than before 
it, was intended to impress native states with the 
pacific character of the intentions of the Govern- 
ment. To carry out the Treaty, a Ciouncil of 
Begency was appointed, which could not be changed 
without the consent of the Govemor-QeneraL At 
the request of the B^ency, six raiments of infantry, 
two of cavalry, and eighteen guns were left by 
Sir Hugh Gough at Gwalior till the middle of 
March. Thus ended the brief Gwalior campaign, 
and thus there disappeared the gravest danger to 
British predominance in India in the fifth decade 
of the nineteenth century — ^the alliance of Mahratta 
and Sikh. 



n 

THE ARMY POLICY OP SIR HUGH GOUQH 

The history of the Indian army before the Mutiny 
has yet to be written. Its origin is usually traced 
to the small force of Sepoys, aided by a body of 
European troops (partially composed of men who 
had been kidnapped in England), who defended 
Madras against the French in 1748 \ The Bengal 
army is later in date ; not until dive had won the 
battle of Plassey with Madras troops did an army of 
Sepoys come into existence at Calcutta. A Bombay 
army foUowedi and all three Presidencies found an 
immediate and rapid increase of their military 
strength necessary for their protection. When 
Sir Hugh Gough took command in 1848, nearly 
a century had elapsed since the fibrst beginnings of 
the Indian Army, and the Company's troops now 
consisted of over 240,000 men', including 159 
regiments of regular infantry, 21 of cavalry, 

^ It is a coriooB coincidence that this little army was 
commanded by the possessor of a name which was to be famous 
in Indian annals^ Major Lawrence. 

> B^ular Infantry (European) . 6^600 



(Native) 
Cavalry (Native) 
Artillery (European) 

„ (Native) 
Sappers and Miners (Native) 
Irregular Corps (Native) • 



184,000 

io;mo 

5,600 

4,600 

2,500 

80,000 



1848] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H.GOUGH d48 

five brigades of hoise artdllery, 14 battalions of 
foot artilleiy, and three raiments of sappers 
and minersy in addition to about 40 corps of 
irregular cavalry and infantry. These figures^ 
represent the numbers of the forces employed by 
the East India Company throughout the three 
Presidencies. But it must not be foigotten that, 
in the words of an Irish member of Parliament, 
^ the red coat of the British soldier is the backbone 
of the Indian army/ As early as 1754 a regiment 
of British infantry (RM.'s 89th Foot) was sent 
to Madras, and it shared in the glories of Plassey. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had 
become usual to maintain nearly thirty regiments 
of regular cavalry and infantry in India, and these 
must be carefidly distinguished from the European 
regiments in the service of the Company. 

These numbers seem large to those who are 
accustomed to think of the men at Wellington's 
disposal in the Peninsula, or of the armies which 
British generals have elsewhere commanded. But 
the Indian army had, after Sir Charles Napier^s 
conquest of Sindh, to protect a territory of about 
1,100,000 square miles, to defend its frontiers, and 
to exercise control over its one hundred millions 

^ The figures are taken from an essay on the ' Military 
Defence of our Indian Empire^ written in 1844 for the 
Calcutta Review by Sir Henry Lawrence, and republished in 
his Essays. From that volume and from Sir G^rge Chesney^s 
Indian Polity much of the information contained in this 
chapter is derived. 



844 INDIA [1848- 

of native populatioiL The dangere of the time were 
twofold^ the necessity of preparing to meet foreign 
aggression, and the uncertain loyalty of the Sepoys 
to their western rulers. The first theme has been 
already treated in connexion with the State of 
Gwalior, and the greater portion of this book 
will be concerned with the Punjab. We do not, 
therefore, propose to say anything here with refer- 
ence to the defence of the Sutlej frontier, reserving 
it for the following chapter. But one somewhat 
more general question of defence may be fitly 
discussed before we proceed to deal with the internal 
discipline of the Indian army. 

The military security of India depended to a large 
extent upon the magazines at Delhi, Agra, and 
Cawnpore, and the position of the Delhi magazine 
had for some time been occupying the attention of 
the Indian Govenunent. The citadel at Delhi was 
occupied by the Mogul, and it was a cardinal object 
of Indian policy not to incur the odiiun of removing 
the Mogul and his family. The magazine was 
situated in the town and was commanded from 
the Palace. The Duke of Wellington, writing to 
Lord EUenborough in September, 1842, expressed 
the opinion that the ^interior wall, surrounding 
the Besidency and the magazine, ought to be 
perfected, so as to render it impregnable as a citadel, 
excepting by regular attacks by good troops well 
supplied with ordnance, ammunition, and the material 
for a sieged' In this way, he hoped that the 

^ Indian Administration of Lord EUenborough, p. 503. 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H. GOUGH 845 

magazine might now command the citadeL The 
suggestion was carefully considered by Lord EUen- 
borough, and it was one of the subjects suggested 
to Sir Hugh Oough on his arrival in India The 
Gwalior campaign delayed further action in the 
matter, but, as soon as it was over, the Commander- 
in-Chief undertook a survey of the whole of our 
frontier defences, excluding the actual line of the 
Sutlej, in order not to rouse suspicion at Lahore. 
On the 22nd of February, 1844, he wrote to the 
Oovemor-Gbneral from Delhi: ^I had a very 
minute inspection of the magazine this morning. 
That it could not be worse placed is quite evident, 
that it cannot be made secure on its present site 
is equally evident, except at an enormous outlay. 
Many subjects of much difficulty will have to be 
weighed before a correct opinion could be given.' 
Five weeks later he stated the conclusion at which 
he had arrived. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough, 
he carefully separated the question from that of a 
possible Sikh incursion. He thought the magazine 
at Delhi insecure, but not because of any danger 
from the Sikhs, and he showed how any such 
movement, even if practicable, would be 'an act 
of madness in the Sikhs— to push forward to Delhi 
leaving in their rear 15,000 men and going to meet at 
or before it 9,000 men.' The Commander-in-Chief 
was, therefore, ^ under no apprehension as to a Sikh 
force destroying Delhi whilst we remain unshackled ; 
but eveiything,' he told Lord Ellenborough S ^is 
^ Sir H. Oough to Lord Ellenborough, March 38, 1844. 



B*6 INDIA [IMS- 



to be apprehended firom the iiMocum 
the tnMgTJtiA in the erent of an j mtenal 
breaka' In these eureumatanoeB, he reeoomiended 
the transference of the magazine from Ddbi to 
Ifeerut and the urn of the Ganges instead of tlie 
Jumna as the great waterway to the nortb-west : — 
'The sale of the present building and groand aft 
Delhi would go far to cover the diffisrenoe of build- 

iflg ft mugnritiA at MAflwit in Ka in Imu of iitf»ngfc>iAnitig 

the present one at Delhi, with the great adTanti^ 
of a great improvement in the water carriage.' The 
Ghmges, of course, does not flow past Meerut, but 
there was an excellent road between that station 
and the nearest point on the river (Gurmuktesar 
Ghat) a distance of thirty miles. The recall of Lord 
Ellenborough in the ensuing summer prevented the 
Government from taking any action, and Sir Hu^ 
Gough pressed the subject upon the attention of the 
new Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge. Longer 
experience of India had led to a change of opinion 
on one point, but Sir Hugh still considered the 
magazine at Delhi to be ^ in a state of fearful in* 
security/ On the 4th of September, 1844, he 
addressed a memorandmn on the subject to the 
GovemorGeneral : ^The insecurity of the Delhi 
magazine, situated within the city, three miles from 
the military cantonment, and defended only by 
a plain brick wall of no strength has been long 
noticed, and measures have from time to time been 
under consideration for rendering it secure against 
any assault which the population, under any cause 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR IJ. GOUGH 847 

of excitementi might be induced to make upon it. 
All the measures yet proposed to attain this desir^ 
able end would, however, be attended with such 
an enormous expense that no steps have yet been 
taken to cany any of them into effect' A more 
complete knowledge of the situation on the Sutlej 
frontier led him to recommend that the magazine 
be placed at Umballa instead of at Meerut He had 
himself pressed upon Lord Ellenborough the wisdom 
of establishing a considerable force at Umballa, and 
his reasons for choosing it as the proper alternative 
to Delhi were based upon his knowledge of the 
exposed situation of Ferozepore and Ludhiana. Both 
Ferozepore and Ludhiana he thought too near the 
frontier for the purpose (c£ pp, 864-6). He con- 
sidered the arrival of Sir Henry Hardinge to be 
a suitable occasion for the change, and he placed 
before him a scheme for the conveyance of stores to 
Umballa. This, he thought, could be accomplished 
without much additional expense, if Meerut and 
similar stations were supplied frx>m Agra or Gawnpore 
instead of frx>m Delhi. The reply of the Governor- 
General to this communication is not among the 
Gough MSS., but it is certain that no step was taken 
towards carrying the scheme into effect. Had a 
commencement been made at once, Umballa would 
have been more useful as a support when the 
Sikh war broke out in the end of the following 
year. 

On the dose of the Sutlej campaign, Sir Henry 
Hardinge prepared a minute on the subject He 



M8 INDIA [IMS- 

jdmittwi doc die - mjamie afc DdOd is in a Teiy 
ohyrrifwiaMp pcwtion, pbced m die nudat of a l«ge 
and popuIooB atr. widioos lAmuair prateetioii,' and 
Iha^a^oa^tohe gnAaOwibobBhbd: He then 
proeceded to diacoBB its auag uB t e d icnftoval to 
UidImILl Coofidem dut no dinger wns to be 
mtiripetfd frooi die Panjdb after *die utter 
annihilarinn of die Seikh annj lor j^greasiTe 
purpoeeay' he eune to the mnrfirann that the 
leesoDs £<»* the cfanee of UmbeDa had disaf^ieazed. 
Ftftnepore and Tjndhiana were now, he said, no 
IcMiger frcmtitt' od-posts^ requizing a sapportj but 
weie themselTeB sappotta fw Lahore, and *as the 
British army is to occupy I^hore lor aenn and a 
half years, the qoestion of building a m^g*"'^ 
protected by a military wwk, in addition to the 
Fort of Fhilour % may be suq^ended for four or five 
years.' This nienx>randam is dated 2nd of February, 
1847, and aldKxigh its hopes of ocmtinued peace 
were to be rudely dispelled within fifteen months, 
there seemed, at the time, no reason to doubt that^ 
as far as the safety of the frontier was conoemed, 
a decision might be deferred for some years. But 

^ The GoTemor-Generml, writing &fter the cesskm of teiri- 
ioTj by the Sikhs (described infim» toI. ii. p. 81), wms aUe 
to suggest m fnngmzine, on British soil, bejond Umbftlla^ as 
a possible fntoie solation. The positions of Ferozepore, 
Lndhiana^ and Umballa are shown in the map of the Ponjab, 
and the reader will find in the next chapter an aocoont of the 
Satlej frontier. 

* Fhiloor was a small fort near the Sntlej, eight miles 
NNW. of Lndhiana. 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H. GOUGH 849 

the Govemor^Jeneral seems to have forgotten that 
the Commander-m-Chiefy in his memorandum of 
September, 1844, had based his application for 
immediate action not merely on the conditions 
upon the frontier, but on the urgent necessity for 
a change from 'this position of fearful insecurity* 
at Delhi itself. The decision of the Governor- 
General was final, and the Commander-in-Chief 
could do no more till the arrival of Lord Dalhousie 
as Hardinge's successor. In the month of June^l848, 
he luged the same course upon Lord Dalhousie, who 
had been impressed by the insecurity of Delhi ; but 
the outbreak of the second Sikh war interrupted the 
discussion of the subject ; and almost immediately 
on the close of the war Lord Gough ceased to be 
Conmiander-in-Chief. He had thus pressed upon 
three Governors-General in succession the extreme 
danger of the magazine at Delhi, a danger which 
had been observed by Lord Auckland and Lord 
Ellenborough before Sir Hugh Gough took command 
in India, and which was fully admitted by both 
Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie. Yet the simple 
remedy he proposed — ^to remove it to Umballa, a 
situation at once more healthy and more convenient — 
was rejected by all three, and when, on the 11th of 
May, 1857, the rebels approached the city of Delhi, 
the historic seat of the Mogul Empire, they found 
that its possession would not only rally round them 
Indian sentiment, but would be of incomparable 
practical advantage. The inhabitants of the city 
rose in revolt against the British garrison. It is true 



850 INDIA [184»- 

abat the noble deed of a British oflficer deprived the 
mutineeiB of part of this advantage by blowing 19 
a portion of the magazina Butitwasonlyaportikmy 
and the rest of the ammunition fell into their hands, 
while the British army was deprived of its proper 
supplies. Soldiers who fought in India in those 
troublous times will bear ample evidence to the 
eflbct which the removal of the magazine to Umballa 
would, in all probability, have produced upon the 
history of the Mutiny. It would not have prevented 
the seizure of Delhi, but it would have made the 
success of the rebek less important and the subse- 
quent siege much less costly. Nearly fourteen years 
had elapsed since Lord Gough had asked Lord Ellen- 
borough to sanction that removal, and nine since 
he had suggested it to Lord Dalhousie. On the 
Commander-in-Chief who was in office from 1848 
to 1849 no responsibility can be said to rest, if the 
Commander-in-Chief who was in office in 1857 found 
his task unnecessarily dangerous and perplexing. 

It has been necessary, in this account of Sir Hugh 
Cough's military views, to anticipate the course of 
events in the Punjab, but the narrative of the Sikh 
wars will gain, correspondingly, in clearness. The 
other questions with which we wish to deal will also 
carry us beyond the period of Lord Ellenborough's 
administration, but it will be well also to remove 
them from our path. These questions are connected 
with the third problem which we mentioned as 
facing the Indian Government in 1848 — the dis- 
cipline and loyalty of the Native Army. Before any 



> 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H.GOUGH 851 

symptoms of disaffection had appeared, Sir Hugh 
Gough had indicated his sense of the necessity of 
improving the Indian Army. Not only was the 
artillery weak, and the proportion of European 
regiments too slight, but the native regiments were 
much in want of capable European officers. The 
custom of employing soldiers for political and other 
civilian service was a measure of economy for the 
Indian Exchequer, but it denuded the native r^- 
ments of officers of standing and experience, ' leaving 
companies to be commanded by mere boys.' An 
additional Captain to each regiment, and a Lieutenant 
to each company, Sir Hugh regarded as the least 
that should be done in 'justice to a very fine army \* 
That this want of European officers had already 
led to deplorable results soon became apparent. 
Throughout the winter of 1848-4 there occurred 
two separate series of mutinies — among Sir Charles 
Napier^s troops in Sindh, and at Ferozepore, on the 
Sutlej frontier. In both these cases there were 
special explanations of the rebellions. In Sindh, 
the pay of the Bengal Sepoys was reduced when 
that province ceased to be a foreign station; at 
Ferozepore, the Sepoys were corrupted by Sikh 
emissaries. But these special explanations could 
not serve to conceal the existence of some real 
ground for alarm, and the Commander-in-Chief 
perceived that the whole subject of the treatment 
of the Sepoy must be considered. 

^ Sir H. Oough to the Earl of Ripon (President of the* 
Board of Control), January 19^ 1844. 




with % 

Jladbacmifi:^ of 
w^^idJkm, k did 

frietMtdp; erea when Sir ClttilflB 
wtmmuA tbt Mikfom of die CoannaiderinCliie^ he 
€^mM 0till npetk of Sir Hogii Goi«h s 'tair and 
hMMMt M ibe dsj/ Tbe fimtiniHi at Fennepore 
$imp inwiAred Sir Hqgli in a eaotrfrreaj^ for Lord 
£IkrjbOTc«|s;ii^ in oooseqnaioe of tfaem, icmoved 
Hir Robert Dick from the command of the troops 
r/n ihi^ tiviU^ frontier^ idiile the OMnmandenn- 
Cliii^ rof^rded the punishment as too aeyere for the 
error r/f judgement which was, in his eyes, Dick's 
mpU3 r/ffence. Any statement of these controversies 
wrnild be long, tedious, and disagreeable, and we 
profK^5 to omit all consideration of them. The 
fKilicy of the Commander-in-Chief was 'punishment 
for ihoHO that resist, reward for those who redeem 
thcjir error by submission '; but absolute submission 
muMt precede any mention of improved treatment. 
In some cases he was forced to take the extrome 
stop of disbanding the regiment. 
The difficulty of Sir Hugh's position was his con« 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H. GOUGH 858 

victioQ that) while 'forbearance would shake the 
discipline of the army, the soldier had some shadow 
of excuse' for his conduct. He was under no 
misapprehension as to the nature of the claims of 
the British Government upon its native troops. In 
a letter to his son, dated June 80, 1844, he stated 
his view that the mercenary character of the native 
army was the key to the whole problem: *They 
look upon us as their conquerors, and only serve us 
from interested motives ; whilst we pay them better 
than our neighbours and treat them justly, they will 
serve ua But if we, as we did in Scinde, strike 
off a great part of their allowance, . . . when at the 
very moment the Sikh army in their immediate 
neighbourhood was receiving 12 Rupees, while ours 
only had, at the most, eight and a half, it was not 
to be wondered at that the Sepoys hesitated. I 
strongly remonstrated against the striking off the 
allowances, before the disaffection took place ; when 
it did, I gave it as my opinion, no concession should 
be made by the Govt, until obedience was mani- 
fested. In neither point did the Govt, uphold 
me. • . . But I am glad to find that the Court of 
Directors has taken my views of the case. They 
disapprove of the retrenchment, and they approve 
of the means I took to put down what, if not very 
delicately handled, might have raised a flame which 
would have shaken discipline to its base/ 

In the summer of 1844, Lord EUenborou^ was 
recalled, and Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in Calcutta 

as his successor. Sir Hugh had not hoped to con« 
I A a 



854 INDIA [1848- 

vert Lord Ellenborough to his views, but he at onoe 
entered into a long series of negotiations with Sir 
Henry Hardinge which resulted in the preparation 
of a new series of Articles of War, which embodied 
a policy on which the Qovemor<}eneral and the 
Commander-in-Chief were agreed. The measures 
of which Sir Hugh approved, related to increase of 
pay, and the restoration to the Sepoy of certaiQ 
privileges of which he had been deprived. He had 
possessed a right of precedence in Civil Courts and 
of submitting petitions on unstamped paper, and he 
had been protected against the summary disposal of 
his property by the Omlah or native establishment 
in Civil Courts (' the most prejudiced and the most 
venal of all native officials,' adds Sir Hugh). The 
gradual removal of these rights, combined with a 
loss of pay, as compared with what the Sepoys 
might receive in native services, seemed to Sir Hugh 
to be legitimate grievances. The division of the 
army into the three Presidencies was also the cause 
of an inequality of treatment which produced discon- 
tent, and Sir Hugh proposed that the Bengal and 
the Bombay Sepoy should be treated alike. In 
some respects he went so far as to claim for the 
Sepoy equal consideration with the British private. 
He suggested to the Governor-General that * a just 
proportion of the European and Sepoy's kits be 
carried free of expense in the field. ... I would 
strongly advocate the placing the Sepoy upon the 
same footing as the European. I do not see upon 
what just groimds one should have a greatcoat 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H.GOUGH 855 

given him free of expense, whilst the other, with 
infinitely smaller pay, should be forced to pay for it' 
The closing sentence of this paragraph reveals a 
liberality of view somewhat surprising in one who 
was not a 'Company's soldier': 'Since the Service 
in Afghanistan, the soldiers of the two services have 
been drawn much closer together, and the more this 
is encouraged the better ^' Holding these opinions, 
it was natural for him to differ from some other 
military authorities in supporting the continuance 
of native officers, deeming it necessary to offer the 
Sepoy some reward for constant loyalty and faithful 
0ervice. 

But while the Commander-in-Chief was prepared 
to make these liberal concessions, he was at once 
firm in suppressing any existing discontent, and 
jeady to take measures to supply the Government 
with more efficient means of stamping out any future 
tendency to mutiny. On this ground he approved 
of the re-introduction ' of corporal punishment. 
Sir Hugh had been educated in this tradition, and 
it was by the lash that he had begun to introduce 
order into the 87th Regiment when he was first 
placed in charge of it He was sensible of the many 
objections to its use, but he believed that the impor- 
tant concessions we have enumerated would render 
it ^ rather a boon than an act of coercion, as it will, 
from the fear of its infliction, deter the evil-disposed 

1 Sir H. Gough to Sir H. Haidinge, April 14^ 1845. 
'. The number of lashes was soon afterwards reduced to 
fifty, but flogging was not abolished till 1881. 

Aa2 



\ 



856 INDIA [1848- 

and bad characters from entering the Service V 
The new Articles erf War which were published in 
1845 embodied most of these suggestions, and Sir 
Hugh Qough was able to congratulate the Governor- 
General ' upon taking ' such just and enlarged views 
on our Militaiy Policy^ views that, when carried into 
effect, will rest on the popularity ci the military 
profession, banish every emlHTO seed of discontent, 
and make the Indian Army as loyal as ihey have 
ever proved themselves brave/ The words may 
have been unduly optimistic; other seeds ci dis- 
content were, ere long, to make their presence felt ; 
but Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough may 
.fairly claim the credit of having pacified the Indian 
Army eighteen months before the Sikhs crossed ihe 
Sutlej. The narrative of the two Puiqab campaigns, 
on which we are about to enter, wiU suffice to »how 
how important for the Indian Empire was the loyalty 
of the native army during the struggles on which 
such grave issues depended ; and that loyalty must 
be largely attributed to the wise statesmanship of 
the Governor-General and the Gommander-in-Chie£ 
It must, at the same time, be remembered, in 
telling the story of the Sikh Wars, that the Indian 
Army of the forties was a very different force from 
the Indian Army of to-day. The Indian Army is 
now composed mainly of the northern races and 
largely of Mohammedans ; different castes and dif- 
ferent religions serve together, and find a bond of 

^ Sir H. Gough to Sir H. Haidinge, April 14, 1846. 
« Ibid. 



1849] ARMY POLICY OF SIR H.GOUGH 857 

union solely in loyalty to the British Government. 
Sixty years ago, the army which Sir Hugh Gough 
commanded consisted chiefly of Bengal Sepoys, in- 
capable of the fatigues which the Goorkhas or the 
Sikhs can readily endure, and representing a type 
rarely found in Lord Eatchener^s Bengal regiments. 
These Bengalese were almost all Brahmins, and the 
difficulty of keeping ceremonial requirements in the 
cooking and eating of food detracted largely from 
their value as a fighting force. Sir Hugh Gough 
cannot be accused of belonging to the kind of 
workman who quarrels with his tools, and it will 
be seen that he trusted and was trusted by his 
native troops, but in estimating the force at his dis- 
posal it is fair to take into account the differences 
between these troops as he knew them and as they 
are to-day. 



m 

THE SIKHS AND THE INDIAN 
GOYEBNMEST 

The rich] j watered region of India known as the 
Punjab is moat frequently deseribed as part of 
a great triangle formed bj the rirer Indus and its 
tributaries. The windings of the Indus shape 
themselyes into two of the sides, and the base is 
provided by the Sutlej. The north-eastern comer 
of this triangle is occupied bj the mountains of 
Kashmir, while, in the north-west, the Punjab terri- 
tory extends across the Indus into the mountains 
that divide India from A%hanifftan, The interior 
of the triangle is intersected by the rivers that make 
the Punjab the land of the five waters \ South of 
the Indus flows the Jhelum, which pours itself into 
the Chenab, the next of the series. Further south- 
wards, the Chenab receives the Bavi, and forms 
a junction with the Sutlej about a hundred miles 
above the point at which the Indus absorbs the 
whole of the waters of the Punjab. Several hun- 
dreds of miles from its union with the Chenab, the 
Sutlej is enlarged by a tributary known as the Beas. 
The lands lying between these rivers are called 
Doabs. Between the Indus and the Jhelum is the 

^ The Jhelum^ Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas. 



18 



U*Ltsii* 



-iir 



utta. 



-^44] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 859 

ind Sagur Doab; between the Jhelum and the 
^henab, the Jetch Doab ; between the Chenab and 
tae Bavi, the Bechna Doab ; between the Bavi and 
be Sutlej, the Bari Doab ; and between the Beas 
fDd the Sutlej, the Jullundur Doab. The scene of 
he First Sikh War is near the junction of the Beas 
ind the Sutlej, the scene of the second is in the 
lorth of the Jetch Doab, between the Jhelum and 
ihe Chenab. An appreciation of the geography of 
he Punjab is impossible without constant reference 
o the map, but comparatively easy with that aid. 
Dhe nature of the land itself may be best illustrated 
ij applying to it the phrase invented by a mediaeval 
ioottish king to describe the 'Elingdom of Fife.' 
Che Doabs are a series of beggars' mantles fringed 
fnth gold. Near the river channels are, as a rule, 
leds of rich alluvial soil, whence twice a year the 
peasant reaps his harvest of maize and sugar-cane or 
Kf cotton and indigo. The interiors are frequently 
rastes of grass and thombush and tamarisk, where, 
it best, the camel and the bufiEalo might find a grazing-^ 
pround or the goatherd eke out a scanty livelihood. 

The inhabitants of this varied country are 
;enerally described as Sikhs, although that term 
X)sse6ses no racial significance. Bacially, the Pun* 
ab has no single definite description; it is inhar 
>ited both by Iranic-speaking Pathans or Afghans 
md by peoples of Aryan ancestry, known as Jats 
tnd Bigputs. The general religious division is of 
ihe ordinary Indian type — Hindu and Mussulman. 
Qie Pathan population are followers of the Prophet, 



860 INDIA [1844 

while the Jats and Bigputs are mamly HindiL The 
religion of the Hindu population has been modified 
in two ways. The creed of Islam has claimed 
a considerable number of Btgput converts, and 
Hinduism itself has become largely associated with 
the Sikh name. The Sikhs, in short, are a religious 
sect, the followers of a fifteenth-century teacher, 
by name Nanuk. His teaching had been that of 
all religious reformers — a reaction against conven* 
tional religious formulas and religious forms fast 
becoming meaningless, and an appeal to the ideal 
of relationship between man and man, and to the 
human conscience as the judge of right and wrong. 
The cry of Micah : ^ He hath showed thee, O man, 
what is good ; and what doth the Lord require of 
thee but to do justly and to love mercy?' was the 
burden of the prophet Nanuk. Such teaching, at 
such an epoch, never returns void to the teacher. 
Nanuk gathered round him a body of ' sons of the 
prophets,' who spread his doctrines and were known 
as Sikhs or Disciples, under the leadership of a Guru 
or Prophet. Time passed, and the followers of 
Nanuk became sons of the sword. A seventeenth- 
century rebellion against the bigoted Mohammedan 
rule of the Moguls led to the formation of the Kti^lgft . 
The religious brotherhood had become the Army of 
the Free, an army which, like that led by Moses of 
old, based its sense of unity upon ceremonial obser- 
vances. The Singhs, or lions, as they were called, 
wore blue garments and took upon themselves the 
vow of the Nazarite. Through many vicissitudes^ 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 861 

and in spite of much evil forfcune, the Khalsa 
continued to exist, and, in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, we can trace its development 
from a loose confederacy of tribes into the compact 
nation with which the Indian Army was to measure 
its strength. By that time, the Mogul dominion 
had been broken, and Afghan influence was predo- 
minant in the Punjab. The famous Sikh leader, 
Banjit Singh, threw off the Afghan yoke, allied him- 
self with the British, and oiganized his great army 
on European models and with the aid of French 
officers. In rapid succession he added to his 
dominions Multan, in the Bari Doab, Kashmir, and 
Peshawur (1818-87). While he ruled the large 
non-Sikh districts of Kashmir and Peshawur, his 
respect for the power of the British prevented him 
from attempting to add to his subjects the Sikh in- 
habitants of the Malwa, the land inunediately south 
of the Sutlej, who were directly under British pro- 
tection and never formed part of the great Sikh State. 
Banjit Singh died in 1889, and his death was 
followed by the usual difficulties that compass an 
Oriental succession. His imbecile son, Kharak 
Singh, reigned for one year. During the first 
part of that period he was under the influence of 
a favourite, and, on the murder of that favourite, the 
chief power passed to the hands of the heir, Nao 
Nihal Singh, son of Kharak Singh. This youth 
ruled till his father's death, supported by the two 
most powerful men of the country, Dhian Singh 
and Gholab Singh, two foreigners whom . Banjit 



862 INDIA [IftM 

Sing^ had made jmnt Bqahs of Jammi^ and wfao^ 
for eonvenienoe' sake, are usiially deacribed as the 
Jammu brothera. On the death of Kharak Singfa, 
the new ICahangah, Nao Nihal, waa immediately 
murdered by the Jammu brothers. This, at leasts 
was the popular belief; all that can be cntainly 
known is that he met with an accident \ and was 
killed He was succeeded by Shir (or as it usually 
occure in our documents, Shore) Sing^ (1840-8X 
a reputed son of the great Ba^jit Sing^ who emr 
ployed Dhian Singh as his chief minister. Shore 
Singh maintained cordial relations with the Indian 
Oovemment, in spite of the two events to which we 
have already referred as shaking general confidence 
in the British. The first of these was the unfor* 
tunate interference of Lord Auckland's goyemment 
in Afghanistan, resulting in the Elabul disaster of 
January, 1842, and in our withdrawal, after we had 
reoccupied Elabul and when British supremacy 
seemed (to oiUBelves) to have been sufficiently vindi* 
cated. While the Indian belief in the invincibility 
of British arms was thus lessened, Indian con* 
fidence in our pacific intentions likewise received a 
shock from our quarrel with Sindh and the annexar 
tion of that country by Sir Oharles Napier. It 
seemed to the Sikhs that we were gradually sur- 
rounding their country, and that the annexation of 

^ The accident was similar to that which caused ihe 
lamented death of Sir Henry Dorand in 1870 ; his elephant 
attempted a passage too low or too narrow for the safety of 
its rider. 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 868 

the Punjab was not far off. Notwithstanding these 
suspicions and the indignation they aroused in the 
Khalsa, Shere Singh maintained the policy of his 
great father. The attitude of the Ehalsa was the 
difficulty of the future, and the danger it represented 
was of a kind which it was difficult for the Indian 
Qovemment to appreciate. The Ehalsa was an 
army constituted on democratic principles. While 
it was organized and drilled in accordance with 
European methods, its officers were the servants of 
elected committees, analogous to the authorities of 
village conmiunities. It did not, however, carry its 
principles of individual action into the sphere of 
military operations. Its instructors received im« 
plicit obedience, and its strange constitution never 
interfered with its appreciation of discipline in the 
field. But to British eyes it seemed an army of 
mutineers, accustomed to treat its officers with con* 
tumely, and little likely to be able to attain cohesion 
and unity in the face of the foe. Our agents 
thoroughly understood the possibility of a military 
revolution ; but they did not always appreciate the 
fact that the Ehalsa was fit for more than civil war. 
In September, 1848, Shere Singh was murdered 
by his minister, Dhian Singh, who was immediately 
assassinated in turn. Finally a boy Dhullp Singh, 
another reputed son of Banjit Singh, became Maha* 
ngah, and his Yi2der was Hira Singh, a son of 
Dhian Singh. This revolution was accomplished 
by Hira Singh, through the help of the Ehalsa, now 
thoroughly anti-British. Hira Singh was thus pre* 



S64 INDIA [ISM 



eluded from obUining Biiftiflh 
ittemptB to check the growing power at the annj, 
BDd hk position was farther eDdiDgerod faj the pl^ 
of the Mahanjah's mother, a joong and hfantifTil 
woman, known as the Bani Jindan, who cwnflpiied 
with her brother Jawahir Sin^ and her pananoiir 
Lai Sin^ against the Yiaer. Both parties had to 
keep, as a main ofageet, the siqiport of the JHu^g^ 
idiich was fiiUy aware of the power it exeneiaed. 
On hearing of the mniders, both Lord EUmboroci^ 
and Sir Hugh Gongh immediately todL steps to 
strengthen the frontier. Its line was snfficientfy 
indicated by the coonie of the Sntlcg, and the sitiia* 
tion will be easUy intelligible after a careful stndf 
of the map. An army marching from Lahore would 
most naturally attempt to cross by a ferry at 
Ferozepore, where we had an open cantonment, and 
where, in the event of an attack, an immediate 
concentration would probably be necessary. Eig^itf 
miles to the east, and ten miles from the banks of 
the river, we held a small fort at Ludhiana. These 
two outposts were within the territory of the Sikh 
states under British protection. Some eighty miles 
from Ludhiana, and about twice that distance from 
Ferozepore, was the military station of Umballa, on 
British soil, and a hundred and thirty miles hathet 
south was the larger station of Meerut. Any massing 
of troops in the north-west could not fail to rouse 
the jealousy of the Sikhs, and might precipitate 
a conflict, but, by good fortune, the relief of the 
troops in Sindh was known to have been orderedi 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 865 

and Sir Hugh at once sent instructions to halt these 
troops on their way to Sindh, and to employ them 
to reinforce the garrisons at Ferozepore, Ludhiana, 
and Umballa. More than this he could not recom- 
mend without further consideration, for he was 
necessarily not yet fully conversant with the circum- 
stances and the locality, but, on the 4th of October, he 
submitted to the Govemor-Gbneral a scheme which 
the latter accepted almost in its entirety. It in- 
volved, as the reader will recollect, the formation 
of two armies, one to watch the progress of affairs 
at GwaHor, and the other to be prepared to resist 
^ Sikh incursion. With the first of these we have 
already dealt ; the arrangements for the latter we 
shall now indicate. SirHughGough proposed to place 
imder the immediate charge of Sir Bobert Dick, as 
his second in conunand, a body of about 16,500 men. 
The frontier outposts of Ferozepore and Ludhiana first 
demanded attention, and the Commander-in-Chief 
decided to increase the garrisons at these stations to 
8,500 men each. Both garrisons included a European 
regunent. Between Ferozepore and Ludhiana he 
suggested placing in camp a Light Cavaby Brigade, 
imder Brigadier Cureton, to maintain communications 
and to repress any signs of restlessness on the part of 
the inhabitants of the protected states. This brigade, 
.which numbered 2,000 men and included the 16th 
Lancers, could support either Ferozepore or Ludhiana 
in case of need, and could be supported from either. 
Jn addition to the cavalry, he stationed on the hiUs 
two British regiments (about 1,500 in all). The 



866 INDIA [1844 

remainder of the force (6,000 men) he placed at 
Umballa, the importance of which, as a reserve, he 
jstrongly emphasized. The support at Umballa in- 
xduded a regiment of European cavahy, two regi* 
ments of European infantry, and horse and foot 
artillery. 

These arrangements were never fully carried into 
effect Hira Singh showed some political ability; 
he understood the difficulties of a conflict ynih the 
British power, and it became clear that he was not 
inclined towards a policy of wanton aggression. 
There remained the danger of his being driven into 
such a policy by the Elhalsa, but he possessed, mean- 
while, the means of paying them and was, therefore, 
capable of resisting, to some extent, any pressure 
the soldiers might put upon the Gk)vemment. The 
immediate danger was soon over, and caution 
demanded that the Sikhs should be given no cause 
for alarm. The suggestion of a cavahy brigade was, 
therefore, abandoned ; forage was a matter of great 
difficulty if the troops were not to approach too near 
to the Sutlej, and the army at Agra was much in 
need of cavahy. Provision was, however, made for 
a pontoon train at Ferozepore ; the fort there and 
also that at Ludhiana were strengthened ; and 
Sir Hugh Gough uiged upon the Govemor<3eneral 
the necessity of increasing barrack accommodation 
at Umballa, and of providing cover for European 
regiments at Ferozepore and Ludhiana. At Feroze^ 
pore, barracks had been in course of erection in 
1842, but the order had been oountennanded by 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 867 

Lord EUenborough, who r^arded Ferozepore ^as 
a position in the air/ Sir Hugh Gough, on the 
contrary, was strongly convinced of its importance ; 
but the improvement in the affairs of the Punjab 
prevented the Qovemor-Gbneral from sanctioning 
his earnestly and frequently expressed wish. 

The Indian Gk)vemment continued to hope against 
hope. Even after the success of Sir Hugh Gk)ugh's 
Gwalior campaign had removed the most threatening 
danger from the situation — an alliance of the Sikhs 
and the Mahrattas — the task remained very formid- 
able. * I am fully aware/ wrote Lord EUenborough 
to the Duke of Wellington, in the b^inning of 1844, 
^ of the great magnitude of the operations in which 
we should embark, if we ever should cross the 
Sutlej. I know it would be of a protracted 
character \* The peril was greatly increased by the 
series of mutinies in the Lidian army at Feroze- 
pore *-, to which we have referred in the preceding 
chapter. Lord EUenborough was so deeply alarmed 
by these outbreaks, close to the Sikh frontier, that 
he considered the example of successful mutiny, 
afforded by the Khalsa, ^more dangerous than would 
be its declared hostility.' Sir Hugh Gough, as we 
have seen, took a less serious view, and promptly 
put an end to the danger by depriving the Sepoys 
of their grievances. 

When Sir Henry Hardinge arrived at Calcutta, 

^ Lord EUenborougKs Indian Administrcdion, p. 425. 
^ These mutinies led to Lord Ellenborough's replacing Sir 
Bobert Dick by Major-GenenJ Walter Gilbert (cf. p. 



868 INDIA [184 

the Ferossepore mutmieB had been sappreaBedy bo 
the state of the Poi^ab oceaHioned the grsTefl 
anxiety. Sir Heniy wdB himself a difltinguiaho 
soldier; he had won a great rqiotation in tfa 
Peninsula and in the Waterloo campaign; sino 
1815 he had seen no fighting, but he had beei 
Secretary of State for War from 1828-^80, am 
again from 1841-4. In 1842 he had refused tb 
appointment now held by Sir Hu^ Gough. Tb 
Commander-in-Chief was rejoiced to welcome hii 
old comrade in arms to India, and he expressed 
great satisfaction at the appointment of a soldier as 
Qovemor-QeneraL The years of Hardinge's rule in 
India were destined to be rendered memorable by a 
great war, but it is not possible to doubt his pacific 
intentions. He was honestly desirous of avoiding 
interference in the Punjab; he had been sent to 
India as a protest against the forward policy of Lord 
EUenborough ; and he was loyally anxious to carry 
out the instructions given him. ' When Lord Ellen- 
borough left Calcutta,' Sir Henry wrote to Sir Hugh 
on August 18, 1844, 'the probability of offensive 
operations in the Punjaub had almost subsided into 
a conviction that the case of necessity compelling 
us to interfere by arms would not arise. On the 
other hand, such is the distracted state of that 
jjj country, with a large army clamouring for pay and 

^1 plunder, that we may be forced to act, and this 

necessity may be unavoidable at a very short notice. 
It is therefore not advisable, however strong the 

(! conviction that the case of necessiiy will never arisCi 

.1 



II 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 869 

to relax in any of our military preparations/ With 
this general view Sir Hugh was in hearty agreement, 
but the more di£Bcult question as to the amount 
of preparation which was advisable remained for 
settlement. 

The military necessities were certainly not to be 
ignored. The strength of the Elhalsa has been 
variously estimated from 40,000 to 100,000; the 
lower of these figures is much below the mark. 
The regulars alone included 85,000 infantry, divided 
into 85 regiments; 15,000 Ghorchurras or cavalry; 
and a force of artillery which could produce 200 
powerful guns. A long period of training under 
such Eiuropean officers as Allard, Ventura, and 
Avitabile had rendered this army an efficient force 
whose strength was not fully realized even by so 
careful and competent an observer as Migor Broad- 
foot, although it was evident that a contest with the 
Sikh army would be no trivial matter. TheGtevemor- 
General was in a somewhat deUcate position. It 
might be essential to aid the Sikh Government 
against its own soldiery, or we might be called upon 
to defend our own fix)ntier. Only one thing was 
certain about either of these events — ^if any such 
necessity were to arise, it would unquestionably be 
sudden. There could be no time for preparation. 
On the other hand, any attempt at preparation on 
the part of the British Government might precipitate 
a conflict which it was Sir Henry's object to avoid. 
Two small incidents increased the perplexities of 

the Governor-General Suchet Singh, an uncle of 
I B b 



»70 IXDIA llt^ 

tike Vizkr. Hin SoziciL bad zzKssad & iv^ah acui 
his ZK^ibew. £z>d nro chkfe ver% sUcnrEid i^:- pn 
tLrwjgii ErnaHh lerriiOTT an libeir mj zo jocn iJ 
reb^l forces. The Ifthcff^ GoramiDBDX vug^ re 
r»ieoDiJ>lT. infjipTULm., sod the bad feeZrrtg iJx 
&jvu9&d reDoer&d the Sikbs Bospadaos of ihe isxe 
tions of the Bnu&h with i^card u* aoKne messiz 
of Suchiet Singh wiudi. oq the sappres^osi of li 
rebellion, was clainted by the Sikh Govemixi^ 
This treasure was left in the Sikh stages an i3 
British side of the Sotlej. and was therefos^ i 
the Govemor^Genezal's diarge. Hiza Sin^ daimc 
the money, and the British authorities declined i 
give it him unlees assured that the widow ci Such 
Binj^ and his brother Gholab Sin^ aoqfoiesoed i 
this demand '. 

In his first letter to the new GoYemorGenera 
Sir Hugh Gough strongly uzged upon him the neoe 
sity for more adequate preparation. 'Whilst 
disozganized Army/ he wrote, \ . . remains on oi 
Frontier, the greater part within four Marches i 
our own Territory, and the Navigation of tl 
boundary river in their hands, eveiy precaution : 
called for — the more especially when that aim 
claims (what they certainly have no possible rigi 
to) the credit of assisting us in getting out of ov 
difficulties in Cabul ; and be assured the whole too 
of the Sikh Durbar and Army has been greatl 
I changed since our unfortunate disaster in thi 

' Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, August li 
1844. 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 871 

country/ Sir Hugh told Sir Henry that he had 
informed Lord Ellenborough, in the preceding 
summer, that a force of 40,000 men would be neces- 
sary for offensive operations against the Sikhs, and 
that he had advocated ^that the Horse Artillery 
should have nine instead of six pounders, that the 
Field Batteries should be Horsed, and that the 
Bullocks should be turned over to two new twelve 
Pounder Batteries, and that a Mountain Train 
should be formed ^' Lord EUenborough had left 
India without giving orders for the execution of 
these arrangements, and Sir Hugh felt that Sir Henry 
might reasonably hesitate to take a step so likely to 
alarm the enemy. ' I am particularly anxious,' he 
wrote, ^ to avoid any military preparations that might 
excite remark.' He therefore suggested a much 
smaller force ^, for purely defensive purposes, which, 

^ The suggested force of 40,000 men was to be composed 
as follows : — 

10 Troops of Horse Artilleiy, 7 Regis, of Light Cavalry, 
10 Field Batteries, 5 R^^. of Irregular Cavalry, 

7 Reserve Companies of Foot 10 Regis, of European In- 

Ariillery, fiiniry, 

8 Companies of Sappers, &c., 28 Regis, of Native In&ntrj, 
8 Regis, of Dragoons, S Rifle Corps. 

* To consist of — 
5 Troops of Horse Ariilleiy, 8 Regis. Light Cavalry, 
S Field Batteries, 5 Regis. European Infantry, 

1 Regi. of Dragoons, 10 Regis. Native Infantry, 

2 Regis. Irr^^ular Cavalry, 2 Companies of Sappers ; 
together with a reserve of — 

8 Troops of Horse Artillery, 1 R^. of Light Cavalry, 
2 Field Batteries, 2 Regis, of European Infsmiry, 

1 Regi. of Dragoons, 5 R^^. of Native Infantry. 

Bb 2 



872 INDIA [IMi 

he cooaidered, would, when coneaitratedy be amplj 
sufficient to drive any inTading Sikh aimj befion 
them^ 

But where were these f^ces to be asBemUed? 
The critical point was deariy Ferooepove, but the 
Sikhs were well aware of the fact, and any additi<Mi 
to our foroe there would be regaided with eztrone 
jealousy. The Commander^in-Cihief proposed to 
place the reserve foroe at Meerut and to strengthen 
the garrisons at Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and UmbaUiL 
The most important change which he advocated 
was the revival of his proposal for the location of 
a regiment of European in&ntry at Ferosepose^ 
which Lord EUenborough had not adopted, in spite of 
repeated and uigent 8oficitation& In an official cooh 
munication, dated August 21, 1844, Sir Hugh warned 
the new Qovemor-General that ^the Brigade at that 
important frontier post is insufficient without a B^- 
ment of Europeans/ and he strongly recommended 
that ^ the Barracks which were commenced there in 
1842, and subsequently countermanded, should now 
be ordered to be completed for the reception of a 
Begiment.' 

Sir Henry Hardinge admitted the expediency, on 
military groimds, of Sir Hugh's demand, but he was 
convinced that political considerations debarred him 
from consenting to the erection of barracks so close 
to the Sikh frontier. On all other points Sir Henry 
expressed himself as anxious to meet the require- 

^ Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Heniy Hardinge, August 26, 
1844. 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 878 

ments of the Gommand6r-in-Ghie£ 'It is with 
regret/ he wrote, 'I abstain from completing the 
Barracks for an Infantry Regiment at Ferozepore, 
but I am so firmly resolved to give the Lahore 
Government no cause for questioning our good faith, 
or by a hostile attitude to justify their alarm, that 
I prefer for a time to suffer the inconvenience ' of 
being imable to accommodate an adequate force. 
He threw out some hope of beginning building 
operations, 'when the Sikh Government are con- 
vinced that our movements of troops in the early 
part of November is merely the annual relief of 
a few European regiments ^' Sir Hugh had to 
accept this decision, merely reminding Sir Henry 
that the five European regiments, which they had 
agreed on as the minimum defensive force, could 
not be concentrated on the frontier within four days, 
without the presence of a regiment at Ferozepore. 
He stated again the number of men essential for 
offensive and defensive operations, and it was at this 
date that he recommended the transference of the 
magazine from Delhi to Umballa, where it would be 
more easily available for frontier operations. A 
large magazine at Umballa would render imneces- 
saiy the small one already existing at Ferozepore, 
but ordnance d^pdts were, he thought, desirable 
both there and at Meerut The close of this 
interesting letter shows that the Conmiander-in- 
Chief had not fallen into the common error of under- 

^ Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, September 8, 
1844. 



874 INDIA [18M 

estimating the strength of the enemj. ^Ibe Sikh 
Artillery/ he writes, * are good ; thej are bzinging 
into the field a much laiger fcMPoe than we are, eren 
as aggressors ; if on the defensire, they will treble 
ours, with much heavier metaL Our advantage 
will, and ever must be Maooeiivre, and the ineKistible 
rush of British Soldiers. Cavalry and Artilleiy,' 
he adds, in words which form either the vindicatioD 
or the ccmdemnation of his whole military policy, 
* are excellent arms in aid, but it is In£uitry alone 
can in India decide the fite of ev^y battled Oursix 
pounders are pop-guns, very wdl and effiBctiTO gainst 
Infantry, but unequal to cope with the heavy Metal 
of the Native States, when outnumbered as we shall 
be. I do not mean by any means to throw a slur 
on our Artillery ; I know them to be almost invari- 
ably the ^lite of the Bengal Army, and that they will 
ever nobly do their duty ; but if we have to go into 
the Punjab, we may look forward to being opposed 
by from 250 to 800 Guns in position, many of them 
of laige Calibre/ The Govemor-Gleneral, in his letter 
of September 8, had estimated our available artillery 
at 8 companies of Eim>pean artillery and 5 Native 
companies, 78 guns in all ; ^ and we have,' he said, 
^ no possibility of using the European portion of it, 
in consequence of the scanty acconmiodation beyond 
Meerut.' 

^ This was also the view of Sir Henry Lawrence. ' Our 
in&ntry/ he says, 'must ever be our mainstay; if it is 
indifferent, the utmost efficiency in other branches will little 
%yBil' {Essays, ^.9S). 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 875 

As the autumn advanced, Sir Hugh took two 
further steps. He placed before the Governor- 
General a plan for maintaining, in constant readi- 
ness, carrii^e for the baggage of the troops which it 
might be necessary suddenly to concentrate upon 
the Sikh frontier ; and he made, in person, accom- 
panied by his staff, an inspection of the protected 
Sikh states and of the line of the river. On the 6th 
of December, the Commander-in-Chief and his staff 
made a careful survey of the situation at Feroze- 
pore^. The visit to Ferozepore afforded another 
opportunity for pressing upon the Governor-General 
the necessity of completing the barracks there. 
* Ferozepore,' he wrote, * is within an hour^s march 
of a river the whole navigation of which is in their 
[the enemy's] hands, and that river is within twenty- 
four hours' march of their capitals' Should the 
Lahore Government be unable to pay their troops, 
a predatory band might at any moment attack the 
town, and Sir Hugh considered that so dangerous a 
military situation outwe^hed the political difficul- 
ties which appealed so strongly to Sir Henry. The 
barracks had been commenced in 1842 ; the walls 
had been so far raised and had stood the exposure 
well; the door-frames had been made; the thatch 
was ready ; and three excellent wells had been simk. 
The Lahore Government could not reasonably com- 

^ This fact is incidentaUy mentioned in a private diaiy, 
kept by Lady Oough. 

' Sir Hugh Oough to Sir Henry Hardinge, December 7, 
1844; Oough MSS. 



876 INDIA [1844 

plain of the completion of buildings so br advanced. 
Following this letter, the Commander-in-Chief sent 
a very careful deecription of the existing position. 
Not only was the garrison, in his opinion, inade- 
quate ; the troop of horse artillery was in want of 
stables ; the magazine was a temporary building, not 
bomb-proof, and situated dose to the conmiissariat 
buildings; and the defences were much in need 
of being strengthened. On the whole. Sir Hugh 
r^arded Ferozepore as a convenient d6p6t for 
Kandahar and Kabul, an advantageous position with 
regard to the navigation of the Sutlej, and, in the 
event of a Sikh war, ^of vast importance as a d^pot' 
As an advanced post on a hostile frontier, he con- 
sidered it ^ essentially faulty, it having no support, 
and there being at present no position of strength 
to which the garrison could retire,' in case of neces- 
sity. He summed up his recommendations thus ^ : — 
^ The removal of the Magazine from Ferozepore, the 
destruction of which would be so great an induce- 
ment to an enemy from the north-west to assail the 
place, the addition of one raiment of European and 
one of Native Infantry . . . with the existing en- 
trenchment in front of the Cantonment and the 
proposed wall round the town, with perhaps a couple 
of Eedoubts at intermediate distances, to keep the 
communication open, would render the place secure, 
and enable the garrison to hold out against any 
force, that could be suddenly brought to attack it, 

^ Quartermaster-General to the Military Secretary^ December 
20, 1844. 



1844] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 877 

for at least a month, and reinforcements from the 
rear could be sent to relieve it in much less time.' 
It is doubtful if, even now, the Governor-General 
would have given definite orders for the resumption 
of building operations, but for a fresh development 
in the situation at Lahore, which occurred before he 
could answer Sir Hugh's conmiimication. But he 
had now no choice, and, writing on the 4th of 
January, 1845, he gave permission to proceed with 
the barracks, to station Her Migest/s 62nd Foot at 
Ferozepore, and to arrange for the acconmiodation 
of two fresh companies of horse artillery and two 
additional raiments of native infantry \ We have 
gone into some detail on the question of Ferozepore, 
because it is important in several ways. It exem- 
plifies the care with which the Conmiander-in-Chief 

^ In his Life of his Father^ the second Yiscount Hardinge 
says : — ' On the 11th of the same month (November, 1844)^ 
confidential orders were sent for the construction of two barracks 
at Firozpur^ to accommodate a regiment of European infantry 
and two batteries of artillery. The two European reg^ents 
at Sabathu and Eassauli were also added to the garrison.' 
With regard to the barracks, Sir Henry Hardinge^ in his 
letter to Sir Hugh Gough^ dated January % 184t5, says :^- 
' During the last three months orders have been given by the 
Military Board to collect the necessary materials for that 
object^ and I have now desired the Military Board to lose no 
time in proceeding with the work, including two troops or 
Companies of Artillery/ The actual work of completing the 
barracks was, therefore, not commenced until January, 1846. 
Only one European regiment was sent to Ferozepore. Both 
measures were owing to the urgent request of the Commander- 
in-Chief. 



878 INDIA [1844 

prepared for the war into which he is sometimeB 
represented as wildly rushing, without any fore- 
thought ; it is an interesting instance of the way in 
which military considerations had frequently to be 
subordinated to political expediency ; and it affords 
a proof of the honesty of purpose which characterized 
all the relations between Sir Henry Hardinge and 
the Lahore Qovemment^ 

The news from Lahore to which we have referred 
hady for some time, been expected by the Gk>yemor- 
General On the 21st of December, 1844, Hira Singh 
was murdered by the soldiery, whose emotions had 
been roused by the Bani His successor as Yizier 
was the Bani's brother, Jawahir Singh. He was 
not installed till the following May, and the months 
of anarchy which intervened were full of anxieiy 
for the British (Government, but Sir Henry Hardinge 
remained strictly on the defensive, and betrayed no 
trace of excitement. ^It is desirable,' he wrote, 
* that nothing should be done by us to indicate that 
the internal affairs of the state of Lahore are matter 
for our concern */ The coolness of the Governor- 
General probably saved the situation, but neither 
he nor the Commander-in-Chief relaxed his watch- 
fulness. The political agent, Migor Broadfoot, gave 

^ This has been generally recognized by historical writers, 
with the exception of Mr. Cunningham^ whose History of 
the Sikhs contains several insinuations which an unprejudiced 
reader cannot but regard as unfair to Sir Henry Hardinge. 

' Oovemor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, January ft, 
1845. 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 879 

such accounts of the anarchy at Lahore that prepara- 
tions to move were unquestionably necessary. Sir 
Hugh remained at Umballa, and appointed Sir John 
Littler to the conmiand at Ferozepore, which had 
just been vacated by Sir Walter Gilbert. Of both 
these officers Sir Hugh and Sir Henry alike held 
the highest opinion. Sir John Littler had been 
reconnnended for immediate promotion by Su* 
Hugh immediately on the arrival of the new 
Governor-General, and in spite of Littler's juniority, 
Sir Henry fully acquiesced in the appointment. 
The next step was the transference to the frontier 
of fifty-six boats which had been built under Lord 
Ellenborough's direction, and of a pontoon train 
originally prepared for Sind. There had been some 
misimderstanding between Sir Hugh and Sir Henry 
with regard to these boats, the Connnander-in-Chief 
thinking that the GbvemorOeneral had counter- 
manded the order as too aggressive; some corre- 
spondence on the subject passed between them, with 
the satisfactory result of the due arrival of the boats. 
War was now very near at hand. Through the 
year 1845, report after report reached the British 
of the incapacity and debauchery of the Lahore 
Government. A rebellion in the summer lessened 
the danger to some extent, but the Sikhs could, in 
any case, scarcely hope to carry out an invasion till 
it became possible to cross the Sutlej, in the end 
of the year. On the 21st of September, the Vizier 
Jawahir Singh was, like his predecessor, put to 
death by an enraged soldiery, but with better cause. 



MO DTDIA [1»4S 

Sex vKia cf Mamikj ania iniflriCBed. and. m tfae 
t < ^. r:n>n u! rf S in i ■! w ■ , Lai SJDtJL tbe 
th^hMid.hteanMt\Bitx. AdtkfGf 

made C>>omiJiiidff-in-Clix£. The KTnlffi v;bs zeaOj 
in pr/vrcr. acid it was Doiorioudj and-Basidi. The 
Court VM not opposed to war ; it is poflsihie thai 
the Baoi and her portj leaDr hoped Ibr a Sikh 
deleat in order to free themselTes of the yoke of 
the KhabaL She knew, m the Khalsa eonld not 
know, how anxiniM the British Goremment was to 
avc«d iKtidlidea, and she may have desired an initial 
defeat, followed by a q>eedy snbmisKion, and resott- 
ing in an increase of the power of the Durbar. 
Many of the Sirdars or chiefis were well aware that 
ultimate defeat was certain, but they oould not 
refuse to fight One, indeed, Gholab Sing^i, the 
second of the Jammu brothers, now sole Bajah of 
Jammu, decided to throw in his lot with the 
enemy, and in the end of Kovember he informed 
the British agent that war was inevitabla 

When matters reached this crisis, the British 
force on the frontier numbered over 80,000 men. 
There were 7,000 efficient troops at Ferozepore, 
5,000 at Ludhiana, 10,000 at Umballa, Eassauli, and 
Subathu, and 9,000 at Meerut^ This force was 

* A t Ferozepore : — European Infantry : H.M/s 68nd Foot ; 
Native Infantry: 12tli, 14th, 27th, SSid, 44th, 64th, and 63rd 
'RegU.; 8th Native Light Cavahy; Srd Native Irr^^ular 
I lorse ; two troops of Horse Artillery and two light batteries of 
six guns each. 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 881 

somewhat lai^er than the strength which Sir Hugh 
Gough had stated to the Governor-General on his 
arrival to be sufficient for purely defensive purposes ; 
but we have seen that his visit to the frontier, in 
the end of 1844, had revealed fresh deficiencies in 
oiu* preparations. We must therefore keep in mind 
the fact that Sir Henry Hardinge, acting on the 
recommendations of Sir Hugh Gough, had very 
materially increased the frontier garrison, in spite 
of the great political difficulties of the situation — 
difficulties which can only be appreciated after a 
careful study of M^or Broadfoot's correspondence K 
Some English newspapers of the time circulated a 
report that neither the Governor-General nor the 
Commander-in-Chief had given sufficient attention 
to the work of preparation for a Sikh invasion. 

AtLudhiana: — European In&ntiy: H.M/s 50th Foot; 
Native Infantry : 11th, 26th, 4Snd, 48t;h, and 78rd Begts. ; 
Native Cavalry ; two troops of Horse Artillery. 

At UmbaUa : — European Infantry : H.M.'s 9th, Slst, and 
80th Foot ; Native Infantry : 16th, 24th, 41st, 46th, and 
47th Reg^.; Cavalry: 8rd Light Dragoons ; Native Cavalry : 
4th and 5th Regts. H.M/s 29th Foot at Kassauli, and 1st 
Bengal Eur. Regt. at Subathu. 

At Meerut: — Cavalry: 9th and 16th Lancers, 8rd Light 
Cavalry ; Infentry : H.M/s 10th Foot (except one company) 
and some regiments of Native In&ntry ; Artillery : 26 guns, 
with sappers and miners. 

^ Broadfoot constantly insists upon the &ctions into which 
the chiefs were divided, and on the supreme importance of 
the Khalsa, e.g. 'AH are so entirely at the mercy of the 
soldiery that a movement among the latter causes all differences 
among the chie& to be forgotten in the common fear ' (Broad- 
foot to Lord EUenborough, April 21, 1844). 



882 INDIA [1845 

The truth is that the position on the Sutlej had 
been the first thought of both alike, and scarcely 
a week passed without correspondence between 
them on this subject. 

The IndianGovemmentwere, then, not unprepared 
for Migor Broadfoot's announcement, that an in- 
vasion was imminent All but the final orders had 
been given, and the whole of the political difiicultj 
which had troubled the Government was involved 
in the issue of these orders. Things had been 
nearly as bad in the beginning of the year, and the 
calm policy of the Govemor-Qeneral had secured 
the maintenance of peace. If now, the troops were 
actually marched to the Sutlej, war was certainly 
inevitable. If the orders were delayed, might 
not peace be preserved? This was the problem 
which faced Sir Henry Hardinge, and it cannot be 
denied that he took too optimistic a view. On 
November 20, M^jor Broadfoot reported to the Ck>m- 
mander-in-Chief that the Sikh plan of campaign 
had been decided, and that from 40,000 to 60,000 
men would be at once sent to the Sutlej. On 
receipt of this intelligence. Sir Hugh Gough, on 
his own responsibility, ordered H.M.'s 9th Lancers 
to move from Meerut to Umballa; two troops 
of Horse Artillery, H.M.'s 16th Lancers, the 8rd 
Kegiment of Light Cavalry, H.M.'s 10th Foot, 
save one company, the corps of Sappers and 
Miners, and all save one of the regiments of Native 
Infantry, to be held in readiness to move from 
Meerut to Kumaul on the shortest notice ; the 8th 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 888 

B^iment of Irregular Cavalry to be prepared to 
move from Hansi to Kumaul, the Sirmoor Battalion 
from Deyrah to Saharunpore, and the 4th Begiment 
of Irregular Cavalry to be brought up from Bareilly 
to Meerut He further asked the Govemor-Qeneral 
to arrange for carriage and supplies, and ordered 
the other corps of all arms in the division to be in 
readiness to move on the shortest notice. Three 
days later, Major Broadfoot had changed his opinion. 
^ The project of marching i^ainst us seemed more 
than ever likely to be set aside/ he told Sir Hugh 
Gough, and| in view of the diminished chance of an 
immediate collision, he suggested that the Com- 
mander-in-Chief should send these orders to the 
GbvemorOeneral, so that ^you will give him the 
option of forwarding or withholding them according 
as the advance of the troops may fall in or not with 
any plans he may have decided on, with reference 
to the Lahore movement \* Sir Hugh believing, that 
there was ^no actual necessity for the movement 
under present circumstances,' accepted the sug- 
gestion, but expressed to Major Broadfoot the hope 
that Sir Henry would not halt the troops, ^as the 
arrangement is good, whatever may be the finale K' 
The Covemor-General, believing that an inva- 
sion in force was improbable, and relying on the 
reports of Sir John Littler and Brigadier Wheeler 

1 Major Broadfoot to Sir Hugh Gough, Nov. 28, 1846. 
Gough MSS. 

' Sir Hugh Oough to Major Broadfoot. Same date. 
Gough MSS. 




SM ISDIA :iMi 

V0 1L»t:m^ Oft ISA 

Li puss cf i 

the; Ovr^STDorOcDenl. daao 
mr>r*r d iuMtfJ Oi K sodb a 

mrMilA afbenrards. ^ 
OD tL« OorenKV-Ocnenl in die Qmmluff Benem\ 
be sttiMirf/Qsij Aar&i with Sir Hemj ilie loll le* 
Kpf/r^4\^Alitj. The writer in tlie QmarteHjf l»uii^ 
MfouMt Sir Heniy Hardinge a series of thMrgea 
iff/mh fj( which were nnfoonded and othefs mach 
ezagg^^rated. Sir Henry was nmeh pertnrbed hj 
ihiH attack, and obtained frofm Sir Hn^ a state- 
ment that their views had coincided. The re- 
riewei^H charge appeared to Sir Heniy to be nothing 
lewi than that he had 'assisted the enemy in his 
sudden Invasion of the Frontier/ and it was natnral 
that his old companion in arms should come to his 
support ; the warmth with which he did so is evidence 
to the generosity of Sir Hugh's nature. But it 
would be unpardonable in a biographer of Sir Hu^ 

^ By the Rev. 6. B. Gleig, the biographer of Wanen 
Ha«tiDgs. 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 885 

Gk>ugh to ignore the fact that, in his private letters 
to his son, written at the time, the Commander- 
in-Chief distinctly mentions differences of opinion. 
Writing £rom Umballa, on the 2nd of December^ he 
says: — 

I moved forward a few Corps as a precau- 
tionary measure, not that I thiiJc they vnH dare 
to cross, but we should be prepared if they did. 
I greatly pressed the re-inforcing Ferozepore with 
another European Begiment, this is the only tan- 
gible point; it is certainly too far from support, 
and altho' I have 7,000 men there, still it is 144 
miles from this, its nearest support. But the G. G. 
is indisposed to the expense of building Barrack 
accommodation. I hope we shall not have to 
regret it. He joined me this morning. I sur- 
pnzed him by having gone out 50 miles to meet 
him, and returned the following night \ I like him 
much, and he appeared ready to place every con- 
fidence in me. But he is very anxious not to fall 
into the error of Lord EUenborough, of making war 
without ample cause for doing so. This may be all 
right politically, but it hampers me, so as to give 
perfect security to all points. He asked me if I in- 
tended to fight the whole Sikh army with the force I 
had here. I said decidedly I would, were they to cross 
and threaten seriously Ferozepore or Ludhiana. 
He said I would be greatly abused in England for 

^ A month earlier^ Sir Hugh had been anxious for an 
interview^ as he wished 'to point out many things' to the 
Oovemor-Oeneral^ but the latter considered it unnecessary^ 
sayings ' I do not think there is any chance, even with the 
caprice of a mutinous army, which need hasten my move- 
ments.' — Sir Hugh Oough to his son, from Simla, November ft, 
1845. 

I GO 





4M mMA :i»fti 

aii*7 »»» aK ««isr: I 

si^HKTft. MC -vSHsns ««gr I 4smad <io 

Ei!^ ^IM ZiT'jr.dM vm&aarj ows- iir 5iH)0 

tiTjoai sacrT«>5i. bos x s Eailammub I vss &> die 

fr'AOL .S> if I sa fcrwd » Saiis 

ryAlr^MX^ek/e^xonkt, li&avifr prspoaeddftecfiBeKoal 

iHiUfAj. I on ukfr lOuOOO men from diis and 

thic LillA. 4>X» <if viDeb vill be EcropaiiaL With 
ind^ A fkine. vitfacGK wvtxsflT for nnr au|HMj g t A 
HLf^fTA t7MO%f I siwald indeed d t Man " ceisiizey 
w^re I V> kc either FeroKporeor Tjndhima be hjid 
|>re»Kd. tttMi pIcMC God I will noc, whatevio' the 
f^4ile at hMne may asr V Two d^ later he eon- 
tirjQM in the flame fitiain. ^Weare^astheGoT^nnor^ 
Ohnend expremeB it, fnajntajning a calm attitude of 
c//nfidenee, perfaape rather too modL But I haTe 
a force of Europeans that will carry anything I 
want But this security leaves us deficient in many 
OHH#;ntial points for brilliantly pushing up any chance 
thhy mav give us, for if they croas, I will <kcidedly 
follow them up— further than many calculate on. 
Htill I think they will give me no opportunity, but 
J am nr/t in possession, nor do I think our politicals 
aro, of the exact force and its details. There has 
}p4i43n a great jealousy of my Quartermaster^eneral's 
I>i$[>artment acquiring what the politicals are so de- 
iu'Uint in, but let the fire once break out in a blaze, 
and I will act for myself, whatever disadvantages 
may l>o occasioned by want of information and a 
fiilHo security. I have just returned fix)m Sir Heiiry*s 

' Mir Ilonry Ilardinge seems to have been eonvinced by 
this ar^monti and to have abandoned all thought of the 
aliortiaiivo |K)licjr of leaving Ferozepore and Ludhiana to their 
faio until a large force could be assembled. 



■> 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 887 

Levee. I dined with him yesterday, and he dines 
with me to-day. • . • I like him much as a gentle* 
manly man. But I think I see he is a politician, 
and wiU make the most of everything. I have been 
amused by finding my suggestions almost verbatim 
sent to me a few days after, as coming at once from 
Government, and asking my opinion of what I 
originated. The only way I can account for it is 
that mine goes in a private letter to Sir Henry ; he, 
I take it, copies it, and sends it to the particular 
department to which it applies, and it then comes 
back in a Memorandum from that Department for my 
opinion. So far, altho' I may not have the credit, 
I find all my views carried — not aUj I regret to say, 
as to the location of troops ; when the Bupees come 
into account I find great difficulty. 

We quote these, and some of the following letters, 
because they illustrate more than the particular point 
at issue. Sir Hugh Gough never offered any defence 
against the numerous attacks made on him at the 
time, and since repeated in numberless textbooks^ 
But at this distance of time, there can be no impro* 
priety in revealing his real position, and, since the 
publication of the Peel correspondence has given to 
the world the Governor-General's censiure of his Com- 
mander-in-Chief, it is only fair that the other side 
should be heard. We desire to speak with all re- 
spect of so distinguished a soldier and administrator 
as Sir Henry Hardinge, to whom India and the 
Empire owe not a little, but, in view of what has 
already been published, it would be idle to attempt 
to ignore the fact that controversies did exist between 
him and Sir Hugh Gough, and it would be unfEtir to 



888 INDIA [1845 

the memory of the latter to leaye tbe questioii 
exactly where it stood. 

On the 2nd of December Sir Hn^ Googh wrote 
to the GoTemor<jeneraIy <>nclnging a request by 
Sir John Littler for an additional European regi- 
ment at Ferozepore. This letter reached the Gover- 
nor-General at Umballa on the Srd*, and on the 5th 
Sir Henry Hardinge sanctioned it in the following 
words : * My view has always been expressed and 
recorded that the simplest plan of overcoming the 
difficulty IS to increase the force [at Ferozepore]. 
I am therefore very glad to have my opinion sup- 
ported by your £xceUenc/s proposal to have a second 
European raiment stationed at Ferozepore.' It is 
unfortunate that the Governor-General did not take 
this action immediately on receipt of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief's letter of the 8rd of December. The 
actual order for the march of H.M.'s 80th Foot to 
Ferozepore was given by the Governor-General in 
a letter dated the 7th of December (after he had left 
Umballa), with the result that the regiment did not 
maroh till the 10th — ^too late to reach Ferozepore 
before it was cut oS. ^I got the consent of the 
Governor-General too late/ wrote Sir Hugh, * as the 
Sikh army were between me and it before they had 
even moved «/ 

^ The dates here differ from those given in Lord Hardinge's 
Life, They are taken from the copy of Lord Hardinge's reply 
to the Quarterly Review, which he sent to Lord Gough. It 
is dated September 8, 1846^ and is initialled by Lord 
Hardinge. 

^ Sir Hugh Gough to his son^ December 18^ 1845. 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 889 

The Govemor-Qeneral, in his memorandum in 
answer to the Quarterly JRevieWy says that he re- 
mained at Umballa till the 6th of December. He 
advanced thence towards the frontier, and, on the 
8th, he was definitely informed by Major Broadfoot 
that the Sikhs would immediately cross the Sutlej 
in force. Sending orders to the Commander-in- 
Chief to meet the emergency, he himself went over, 
at considerable risk, to Ludhiana to examine into 
the strength of the garrison. He considered that 
the Ludhiana troops could be much more usefully 
employed in protecting the grain d6p6t at Bussean 
from a sudden attack by the Sikhs ^, and he gave 

^ The second Lord Harding^^ in his biography of his &ther, 
lays great stress on the importance of this step. ' This move- 
xnent/ he says^ ' was one of the most important in the whole 
campaign. Had Basian been destroyed by any sudden inroad 
of plunderers^ the army would have been delayed by at least 
ten dayS; and Firozpur itself might have been cut off.' He 
.adds in a footnote, ' The Governor-General acted on his own 
responsibility. The Commander-in-Chief had protested against 
the evacuation of Ludhiiina on the score of its exposure to 
hostile attacks.' We are thus given to understand that the 
wisdom of Sir Henry Hardinge saved the army from a dan- 
gerous blunder in one of the most important movements of the 
whole campaign, and did so by acting against the advice of Sir 
Hugh Gough. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief had, in 
pursuance of his policy for strengthening the frontier, insisted 
on the full equipment of Ludhiana. But when the Governor- 
General consulted the Commander-in-Chief on this particular 
question. Sir Hugh Gough replied : 'I should greatly deplore 
the moral effect which the destruction of the Town or Canton- 
ment of Ludhiana would inevitably produce. For, if effected, 
I should dread a similar catastrophe be&lling our other Can- 



o 



890 INDIA [1845 

orders to this effect On December 11th, the Sikhs 
crossed the Sutlej. They hoped to be able to cut 
off Ferozepore from the other British forces, and 
then to deal separately with the Ludhiana and Urn- 
balla troops. The (Governor-General had sent final 
orders to the Commander-in-Chief on the 10th, and, 
on the same day, Sir Hugh (}ough gave orders for 
the cavalry to move on the 11th of December, and for 

tonmentBin the DiTision ; wherefore much miiBt depend in my 
opinion on the amoont of Force which croeaed the Bess and are 
moving in Ludhiana. This I know nothing of. Ab to the 
Fort at Ludhiana, it is untenable against gone of heavy 
calibre. If it alone is to be defended^ 1,600 men are as many 
as it will contain. It is very doabtful whether the worla 
will stand the force of its own gons for any time. Bat sorely 
we most be very deficient in information if we cannot ascer- 
tain the Force moving on it, on which everything depends. 
Should the Enemy not be in imposing Force, eight Companies 
of the 50th Foot, the S6th, 42nd, and 48th Begts., with 
a troop of Horse Artillery might join us, leaving their 
dep6ts . . . with the 11th and 78rd Native Infantry, 
and the remaining troop of Horse Artillery. But again 
I repeat that everything depends upon the force it is likely to 
be assailed by.' The letter closes with the words ' assuming 
that we may withdraw this Force ' ; and in the estimate givoi 
by Sir Hugh of the troops available for marching on Feroze^ 
pore, he includes a total of 8,280 from Ludhiana. Writing 
as he did, on the 11th of December, before the news of the actual 
invasion had reached him, a cautious Commander-in-ChieE 
could scarcely have gone forther than this. Sir Henry 
Hardinge, being on the spot and knowing the circumstances, 
took the somewhat daring step of removing practically the 
whole garrison. The event justified his action : but that 
action was not taken in spite of the protests of the Conh> 
mander-in-Chief* 



1845] SIKHS AND THE GOVERNMENT 891 

the infantry to march on the 12th. Everything was 
in readiness for immediate action. ' I shall remam 
here/ he wrote^, ^ to see the troops march the day 
after to-morrow, and will then push on and join the 
advance. I greatly fear the troops from the hills 
will not get down as soon as you wish.' At the 
same time he sent orders for the reserve at Meerut 
to march up. On the 12th of December, while the 
Govemor-General rode over to Ludhiana, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief started from Umballa ^ and reached 
Bajputa that night; next day he was at Sirhind, and 
on the 14th at Isru. From Ism, he sent a hurried 
order to Sir Charles Napier to get all possible sup- 
port, and advance to co-operate with the main army 
by making a strong demonstration in the Bari 
Doab^ On the 15th, he wrote to his son from 
Lattala: — 

The Sikhs have crossed their whole army, 
and their outposts skirmished with Littler on the 
evening of the 18th. The result we have not heard, 
as the communication is cut ofi^ War, therefore, 
has been proclaimed in a very temperate prodamar 
tion, and the whole of the Sikh property at this side 
of the Sutlej has been confiscated. We delayed too 

^ Sir Hugh Grough to Sir Henry Hardinge, December lOj 
1846; GoughMSS. 

' Not from Simla, as Colonel MaUeson asserts in his 
Decisive Battles of India (p. 879). Sir Hugh had been at 
Umballa for some time. The assertion that the Commander- 
in-Chief was at Simla at such a moment amounts to a serious 
imputation. 

' Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Charles Napier^ December 14, 
1846. 



•A 



892 INDIA [1845 

long moving, and the troops I put in motion being 
in part countennanded has crippled us. However, 
I have ample to cut the Sikhs in pieces, but they 
are not in hand as they should be. But the object 
is great — to support Sir John Littler even at some 
hazard. My fellows are in great spirits. I move 
to-morrow thirty nulea I shall push on so close 
that, if they attack me. Littler wUl fall on their 
rear ; if they attack him, I shall be in the midst of 
ihem. I shall not precipitate an action if they do 
not, but wait for my force moving up within one 
da/s march of me, under Major-General Gilbert 
This, by one day's delay, would give me 10,000 
fighting men, wlulst Littler has at Ferozepore . . . 
7,860 fighting men. . . . The G.-G., is now with me, 
he has placed all at my disposal, and now sees that 
it would have been better had my proposals been 
carried before into effect. This good arises from it, 
that the Sikhs would not have crossed. . . • May God 
in His infinite mercy help and protect me. 

On the 16th December, the Ludhiana force and the 
advance portion of the Umballa force bivouacked at 
Wadni, where some slight resistance was made, and, 
on the 17th,theyadvanced a short distance toCharrak, 
to enable the rest of the Umballa troops to combine. 
On the 18th, the whole force, numbering some 10,000 
men, set out for Moodkee. The whole distance from 
Umballa to Moodkee, about 140 miles, was covered 
in seven days, and over a country where sand and 
jungle alternated with ploughed land, where the 
thick dust obscured the air, and the hot sun beat 
mercilessly upon the parched frame. Food was scarce 
till they reached Wadni, where grain was available, 
and there was neither time nor means to cook