Life and campaigns of Arthur, duke of Wellington ..

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'', ARL (>!•• iM V K .

LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS

OF

ARTHUR,

DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

MARQUESS OF DOURO, DUKE OF CIUDAD RODRIOO,

A GRANPEE OF THE FIRST CLASS IK SPAIK, DUKE OF VITTORIA, COUNT OF VIM' I HA,

MARQUESS OF TORRES VEDRAS, FIELD-MARSHAL IN THE ARMY,

KNIGHT GRAND CROSS OF THE BATH, CONSTABLE OF THE TOWER,

WARDEN OF THE CINOUE PORTS, CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

A KNIGHT OF ALL THE MOST DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN ORDERS, AND

PRINCE OF WATF.RLOO.

BY THE

REV. G. N. WRIGHT, M. A.

AUTHOR or " THE LIFE AND REIGN OF WILLIAM THE FOURTH.

VOL. IL

FISHER, SON. & CO.

NEWGATE STREET, LONDON; RIE ST. HONOR E. PARIS.

CONTENTS OF YOL. II.

CHAP. I.
Reply of Lord Castrereagh to Lord Henry Petty— General Tarlctoii dis-
approves of Sir A. Wellesley's operations at Roleia and Vimeira— Sir A.
Wellesley explains the true origin of the convention of Cintra, and lays the
state of the Peninsula before parliament — Debate on the armistice and con-
vention, continued by Mr. Windham— The Right Hon. Spencer Perceval

Mr. Whitbread, the Hon. Christopher Hely- Hutchinson, and Mr. Secretary
Canning — Lord Henrj' Petty's motion of censure upon ministers, lost— Mr.
Ponsonby calls for an inquiry into the campaign in Spain— Corn-distillery
prohibition bill supported by Sir A. Wellesley — Treaty with Spain— Sir A.
Wellesley resigns the secretariship for Ireland and his seat in parliament-
Accepts the command of the army in Portugal — 1809 . . . P. 1

CHAP. n.

Sir A. Wellesley arrives in the Tagus— His enthusiastic reception by the

Portuguese- Marches against Soult— The Philadclphes— Beresford marches

on the Douro — Hill passes the lake Ovar — Affair at Grijo — Precipitate

retreat of the French across the Douro— Sir A. Wellesley passes the Douro,

and drives Soult out of Oporto — Beresford drives in the French outposts,

and occupies Amarante — Sir A. Wellesley pursues the main body of the

enemy to Braga — Desperate situation of Soult's army ; their escape, after

the severest loss and suffering — Difficulties of Sir A. Wellesley's situation —

.Marches towards the south of Portugal — The passes of Banos and Peralcs

'—Talavera— 1809 P. 48

CHAP. III.
Skirmish at Casa de Salinas — Sir Arthur Wellesley narrowly escapes being
made prisoner — Panic in Cuesta's army — Desperate attack upon the Sierra
de Montalban— Battle of Talavera — The British army in imminent danger,
and the contest doubtful — The battle restored by Sir Arthur Wclle.slcy'6
foresiglit and decision — The French signally defeated, and obliged to recross
the Alberche — Extraordinary march of the reinforcement under Gencnil
Craufurd, and its arrival at the camp of the allies — .Misconduct of the
Spaniards, and cruel punishment inflicted on them by Cuesta— Descent of
Soult by the pass of Banos into the valley of the Tagus— Sir A. Wellc.lcy
marches against the enemy, who had then three corps d'arniec concentrated
at Plasencia — Cuesta inhumanly abandons the British hospital at Talavera to
the enemy, and retires upon Oropesa — Affair at Arzobi.-po — Ingratitude
of Cuesta to the allied army — Sir Arthur refuses to continue in Spain —
Retires across the Tiigus, and takes up a position within the Portuguese
frontier— The Biitish army visited by sickness— I b09. . . P. l."W

CONTENTS.

CHAP. IV,

The British army hutted nearBadajos — The Spaniards, under Eguia, break up
from Dcleytosa, and encamp at Truxillo — Wellington favours religious tolera-
tion— is raised to the peerage — remonstrates with the Junta of Estramadura
upon their insincerity — defeats the stratagem of Lord MacduflF, and the
Marquess de Malpesina — Conspiracy to depose the supreme Junta detected
by the Marquess Wellesley — The Spanish general intercepts Lord Welling-
ton's private letters, and impedes the exchange of French and English
prisoners — Wellington visits Lisbon, and examines into its capabilities of
defence— proceeds to Cadiz, where Marquess Wellesley embarks for Eng-
land— refuses to co-operate with the Spanish army — Affair of Tamanes —
Areizaga defeated at Ocana — Invasion of Andalusia — Fall of Seville — Able
conduct of Albuquerque in succouring Cadiz — British army continue inactive
— Extraordinary ignorance of the character and plans of Lord Wellington
prevails in England — Ungracious conduct of the opposition party in parlia-
ment— The city of London petition parliament against granting a pension to
Lord Wellington — Change in public opinion — Succours sent to Portugal —
The Spaniards unsuccessful — Astorga and Ciudad Rodrigo fall — Affair of the
Coa— Almeida invested.— 1809, 1810. P. 209

CHAP. V.

Investment and fall of Almeida — The allies retire into the valley of the Mondego
— The French forces concentrated at Viseu — Battle of Busaco, and attempt
of Massesna to turn the right of the allies — Wellington continues to fall back
towards Lisbon — The inhabitants desert their homes, and accompany the
troops — Wellington retires behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, and Massena
halts before them — Description of the Lines — The French hospitals at
Coimbra taken by Colonel Trant — Massena falls back on Santarem, and the
British advance — Assembly of the Spanish Cortes — Death of Roraana —
Massena evacuates Portugal, and is pursued by Wellington, who again plants
the British standard on the Portuguese frontiers— 1810, 1811 . P. 369

PLATES.— VOL. IL

1. Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia

2. Strathfieldsaye

3. Marquess of Lansdowne

4. The Right Hon. Spencer Perceval

5. Sir Robert Peel, Bart.

6. The Right Hon. William Huskisson

7. The Earl of Munster

8. General Sir Rufane Donkin

9. The Earl of Liverpool

10. William Wilberforce, Esq.

11. Major- General Sir Henry Torrens

12. The Duke of Richmond

13. Lord Combermere

14. Lines of Torres Vedrab

Page.

Frontispiece

Vignette

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24

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56

. 117

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135

. 232

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319

. 345

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432

•

. 416

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447

LIFE Ai\D CAMPAKi.NS

OK

THE DUKE OF WELLIN(;T()N

CHAP. I.

RePLV op lord CASTLEHEAGII to lord henry PETTV— OENEHAL TARLETON DISAPPnO\ ts
OP sir A. WELLESLEY's operations at ROLEIA and VIMEIRA— sir a. WELLESLEl
EXPLAINS TUE TRUE ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA, AND LAYS THE STATE OF
THE PENINSULA BEFORE PARLIAMENT— DEBATE ON THE ARMISTICE AND CONVENTION
CONTINUED BY MR. WINDHAM— THE RIGHT HON. SPENCER PERCEVAL— MR. WHITDRHAD,
TUE HON.CHRISTOrUEK IIF.LY- Ill'TCHlNSON, AND MR. SECRETARY CANNING — LORD HENRY
PETTY'S MOTION OP CENSURE UPON MINISTERS, LOST— MH. PONSONBY CALLS FOB AN
INQUIRY INTO THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN— CORN-DISTILLERY PROHIBITION BILL tCP-
PORTED BY SIB A. WELLESLEY— TREATY WITH SPAIN — SIR A. WELLESLEY RESIGNS THB
CHIEF-SECRETARYSHIP FOR IRELAND, AND HIS SEAT IN PABLIA.MENT — ACCEPTS THE
COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL — I80U.

By the resolutions moved in the House of Commons on the
twenty-first of February, 1809, Lord Henry Petty had put
the cabinet on it's trial. I'hose resolutions went not merely
to the extent of registering the indignation of the country at
the convention of Cintra, but endeavoured to attach the
entire culpability of that unpopular measure to the ministry.
Lord Petty's eloquent speech certainly substantiated the
charges of ignorance and vacillation against the members of
the cabinet, and a lamentable want of decision in the appoint-
ment of a commander-in-chief over our Peninsular force;
but it was obviously unjust to impute all errors in the prac-
tical detail of his instructions, to the secretary at war; he
had only laid down the general principle of action, leaving
it to the commander-in-chief to carry out his plan of o|)erati<>ns
II. n

2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

conformably, and the armistice and convention being purely
contingencies, provision for them should have been made by
the discretion of the senior officer. Lord Castlereagh was no
more deserving of blame for the misfortune or error of the
armistice, than entitled to praise for the victory of Vimeira.
One arose from the indiscretion, the other from the genius, of
the public servant to whom the conduct of the respective expe-
ditions was entrusted ; and, in fact, the secretary at war might
claim to himself the sole merit of having pushed his private
friend (in whose great talents he had unbounded confidence)
into the temporary command of that army which distinguished
itself at Roleia and Vimeira; while to other members of the
cabinet belonged the misfortune of having superseded him,
through etiquette and influence, and by those very general
officers who were so unlucky as to have facilitated the escape
of the French, in force, from Portugal. However, a public
convenience and advantage resulted from the able attack of
Lord Petty upon ministers : Lord Castlereagh was warned
against the want of that decision in future, for the exercise of
which his gallant friend had ever been so celebrated ; and
public feeling was tranquillized, by the clear statement of the
circumstances that led to the armistice and convention, as well
as by the defence of those concerned in it, which they now heard
from Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his parliamentary character.

When the buzz of approbation, at the eloquent and able
impeachment of his majesty's ministers for incapacity, by
Lord H. Petty, had subsided. Lord Castlereagh arose, and in
an able, collected, and impassioned manner, entered on a
vindication of his conduct and measures. He commenced by
stating, that he had expected an additional inquiry would have
been proposed, under the feeling that the late one had proved
inadequate, and congratulated the House, that although Lord
Petty did not applaud, neither did he condemn the course
adopted by government, nor ask for further investigation.
As to boards of inquiry, he could assure the House that they
had been adopted in the most important periods of our mili-
tary history. Had government pursued another course, and

THE UUKE OF WELLIXGTON. 3

assembled a court-martial, they would have been accused of
adopting a narrow system of concealment as to themselves,
and of having provided for their own safety, by bringing the
officers whom they employed to trial: whereas, they had
chosen a line of proceeding which the ablest opponents of
their measures had not thought it expedient to impeach ; and
although Sir Hew Dalrymple had no objection to submit to a
court-martial, yet the mode adopted by government was one cal-
culated to satisfy individual feelings and public justice, and one
which the opponents of ministers did not arraign. He trusted
the House was then about to decide finally upon the transac-
tion itself, as there was nothing government had more feelingly
at heart, than that the subject should be sifted to the bottom.
Although he feared not to follow his eloquent opponent into
all his general points, he thought he had gone a little too far
in saying, " that all our exertions had failed, all the swords of
our gallant countrymen had been drawn in vain." This was
a cruel retribution to make to all those who had bled for us.
All the consequences of the operations vtere not such as the
country desired, but the failure, he was prepared to prove,
had resulted from causes beyond the power of government to
control. When a government, entrusted with such extensive
means, as he allowed the government, of which he was a
member, had been on the occasion alluded to, could be proved
to have been deficient, or wanting in assiduity or zeal, they
had a heavy responsibility to answer, and a difficult cause to
plead before that country which had confided in them.
Under this admission, he was ready to meet the resolution of
Lord Petty, and had every expectation it would terminate in
the exculpation of his majesty's ministers.

As to sending out expeditions in search of adventures, he
contended, that the expedition despatched to Sweden, and that
in preparation at Cork, were fully as beneficial in their effects
to the country, as those sent to Egypt or the Dardanelles.
At the commencement of the campaign, ministers had a ilis-
posable force of five thousand men, under (General Spencer, at
(Gibraltar; of ten thousand men, at Cork, uiulcr Sir Artlitu-

4 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Wellesley ; and it appeared to them to be more advantageous to
send those forces to the immediate aid of the cause, than to
delay them until additional succours could be provided by
England. The force under Sir J. Moore could not have been
calculated upon immediately, as its getting free of the Baltic
was uncertain ; so that there was no probable chance whatever,
that these corps could be brought speedily to act together on
the same service, still less in one expedition. This army
would, even if concentrated, have amounted only to twenty-
five thousand men, a force certainly inadequate to seize on the
Pyrenees, through which, instead of one pass, there were
forty-three, and where, instead of an army of twenty-five
thousand men, we should have had to contend with a French
force of two hundred thousand men in Spain, and four hundred
thousand in France, according to the calculation of Mr. Pon-
sonb)^ whose aspiring views had suggested this plan of opera-
tion for the British army. The Pyrenean expedition, however,
was ultimately abandoned by the opposition members, as a
forlorn hope, so that it w^ould be only necessary now to prove
w hat was the best mode of employing the remaining disposable
force. Here Lord Castlereasrh introduced, into his elaborate
defence of ministers, an explanation of the circumstance of
having provided transports for four thousand horses in time of
peace, while in the emergency of war a less number was found
in readiness, observing, that he had followed, in this instance,
the general policy of Mr. Pitt, by reducing the number without
destroying the establishment ; and prudence and economy point-
ed out the error of continuing its maintenance at the highest
amount, until required. As the question of " the disposable
force" was narrowed into the employment of Sir A. Wellesley's
force at Cork, and of General Spencer's at Gibraltar, ministers
adopted that plan likely to afford most immediate relief, and
directed Sir Arthur to sail for the Peninsula, first with general
instructions, secondly with particular directions, the result of
information received from Sir C. Cotton. — Lord Castlereagh
has since been accused of having hastened the departure of
Sir Arthur Wellesley from Cork, in order that he might reach

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 5

Spain or Portugal before Sir John ^Nloore's, or any other of our
scattered expeditions, for such was his confictonce in the niiU-
tary genius of his friend, that he felt assured of his beating
the enemy, if he could only find them. It is probable, it is even
natural, to suppose that Lord Castlereagh was desirous of
giving to his gallant friend the chance of striking the first
blow; and he was borne out, by the past history of that brave
officer, in concluding that it would be struck effectually.

Whenever a dispassionate memoir of this unhappy minister
shall be given to the world, how large a debt of gratitude
will be acknowledged by his country, for having promoted,
and at such a moment, the future defender of an empire ; and
to what an amiable quality must that stretch of ministerial
influence, that exertion of ministerial power, be attributed
— an early, unalterable, indissoluble friendship !

Lord Castlereagh next protested against the charge of
inconsistency in having given instructions, almost contrary
in their tendency, to the general officers employed in the
expedition to relieve Spain — and of ignorance, in being unable
to give specific instructions, so as to bind up their generals
by particular mandates, applicable to every possible case.
" However right or advisable such policy may be in particular
cases," said his lordship, " is uncertain ; but if ever there was
a case in which it would have been wrong to fetter the judg-
ment of an officer, it was that in which Sir Arthur WcUesley was
concerned. If the letter addressed to Admiral Purvis spoke
of Spain only, it was because his opinion on that question only
was required for the instruction of Sir Arthur Wollesley, and it
was thought advisable to conceal from the admiral the alter-
native of a descent on Portugal. As to General Spencer's desti-
nation, had he gone to the Tagus rather than to Ca(hz, it
would, in all probability, have attracted the attention of the
enemy, and induced him to concentrate a greater force in tiiat
quarter, to oppose the debarkation of the force under Sir
Arthur Wollesley, than he would otherwise be able to do.

Relying on the sufficiency of his arguments to show that
neither was the expedition an unwise measure, nor the
il. c

6 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

instructions given to the officers contradlctoiy, his lordship
proceeded to convince the House that the equipments had not
been neglected. It was no argument against the equipments,
that an army, just landed, did not advance forthwith in search
of the enemy ; the army had a three months' supply of provi-
sions, exclusive of the transport stores, which amounted to
eight weeks more; but a number of cattle was required,
amounting to about half that of the private men, to convey the
provisions and other necessaries ateng with the army. This
was a point of much consequence in the explanation ; the
number of sumpters required by the Austrian army amounted
precisely to half the number of men, and this proportion
varied with the season. As it was necessary that an army
should land at some distance from the enemy, to obtain time
for forming, and means of advance ; so that distance always
creates a necessity for beasts of burden ; and the greatness of
their proportion to the number or amount of the force, leaves
no alternative to the landing army, but a reliance upon the
country where they are about to act. To such an inconve-
nience must every expedition, furnished and sent out by a
naval power, be subject. It was urged by the opposition party
in that House, that the number of artillery-horses* furnished
to the expedition, was three hundred ; that was incorrect, as
it in fact amounted to seven hundred and seventy-eight. He
confessed, that had Sir Arthur Wellesley's means been more
liberal, there was no doubt his services would have been more
brilliant : but, at the same time, there could hardly be a ques-
tion that he would not have advanced, if he did not think his
means sufficient to the occupying of Lisbon and the forts of
the Tagus. In addition to the possession of certain resources,
prospective assistance was known not to be hr distant, either

* These horses, while attached to the ordnance-department, in Ireland, were
much abused by their drivers, and, upon being reported ill-conditioned, were
put up to public sale. Being then purchased by private agents, who were
made acquainted with their temporary defects, and the probability of restoring
them by kind treatment, they were turned into " a grass yard" for half a year,
and sometimes resold to government for five times the sum given for them at
the sale on Aston's Quay, or in the Lower Castle-yard.

vodk.

TEE RTIlCCs'»^IlESRY-riTZ.\LU;Kia>J'KnT D.C.I.. V. K.S. .M.\l<QlTi:SS OF l.AXSnOWNE

EUSirHESON

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 7

as to time or space. Sir Harry Burravd was acquainted with
the arrival of Sir John Moore's army, and therefore calculated
with certainty, upon an equipment of artillery-horses. " With
respect to the quality and condition of his countrymen, (the
Irish horses,) his lordship contended, that they had not shown
that worthlessness, of which they were now accused, in the
glorious affair of Vimeira. They were very much admired by
the French, and one hundred of them had been actually
selected to pursue the campaign in Spain, through one of the
most fatiguing marches ever made by an army. Farther, it
was a question, whether an army was useless without any
horses at all. In Egypt we had only one hundred and fifty, and
circumstances were similar when Sir Ralph Abercromby was
in Holland ; nor w^ould the ministry be now culpable, unless that
a larger supply of horses had been at first deemed necessary —
that government possessed the means of furnishing that sup-
ply, and had neglected to adopt that course. In General
Wolfe's battle, the picture of which was so universally known
and admired, it might be observed, that the sailors drew the
guns. The Irish horses, although so much abused by Lord
Henry Petty, had done their work well, only thirty-three
having fallen, and of that number thirteen had been killetl.
Neither were the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley retarded
by a deficiency of cavalry ; had he felt a serious want of them,
he would doubtlessly have waited their arrival ; on the con-
trary, they were found fully equal to the enemy, anil under
that impression, their brave, but cautious leader, advanced
towards Lisbon and the Tagus, beating the French, and
driving them before him. Heavy artillery were not reijuired ;
and had they been, the ships of war could have furnished them ;
but the truth was, that no carriages could be borne by such
wretched roads as existed in Portugal. In extensive military
operations, it is hardly possible that the chief cuuunand shall
not change hands. In the Low Countries, (the case was not
cited for imitation,) four such changes had taken place within
the short period of forty-eight hours. Sir Hew Dalrymple might
liave been guilty of an error in judgment; that was, however,
problematical ; but no complaint had e\cr been brought again>t

8 L!I"E AND CAMPAIGNS OF

his propriety, skill, or bravery. Lord Petty held light the conse-
quences that flowed from the campaign in Portugal ; but on
tills point. Lord Castlereagh totally differed from him: hi.s
lordship asked, "Was it nothing, in a short campaign of
three weeks, to have taken })ossession of a country of great
strength ; to have defeated, signally, a veteran army of twenty-
five thousand men : to have liberated a whole country from
the grasp of an enemy ; and to have restored it again to its own
people and to its native government? Did it redound nothing
to the military character and glory of the country, to have
assembled such an army, and to have gained two such victo-
ries ? Was it nothing to have restored Portugal to its legiti-
mate sovereign ? It was but natural to have looked for some
great result from such gratifying efforts ; and equally natural
to conclude, that after a victory, where the public feeling had
broke loose, they should not be easily satisfied : but had the
intelligence of the victory, and of the armistice, arrived toge-
ther, every thinking man would have received it differently ;
there would neither have arisen that extravagant joy, nor
would that great disappointment of the country's too sanguine
hopes have followed."

As to the details of the marine convention, of these govern-
ment approved : they had only given instructions to Sir Charles
Cotton in the extreme case of starvation, he was therefore
left to exercise his own discretion in all contingencies ; but the
conditional surrender of the ships, the ministers regretted.
Here Lord Castlereagh concluded his lengthened, but necessary
explanation of the conduct of ministers, leaving the military
details to be still fully unfolded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, by
expressing his matured and decided conviction, " that the
expedition to Portugal was a wise and expedient measure, and
that the various plans of operations suggested as preferable,
would have been visionary in some cases, and dangerous in
all ; that the object of the expedition was the best that could be
adopted ; the equipment, the most perfect that circumstances
would permit ; the execution as complete as the nature of
the case would allow; nor had any failure resulted, except
what arose fi'om causes which neither the administration nor

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. D

the military officers could control. If the equipment of llio
expedition was maintainable, the result of the operations was
such as at any other time would have satisfied the feelings of
the country. It had expelled the French army, its principal
object — put the Russian fleet into our possession — and released
from a tedious and hazardous blockade, a British squadron of
nine sail of the line. His lordship declared his intention, as
the resolutions of Lord Henry Petty, in his opinion, would
answer no beneficial purpose, of moving the previous question
on the first resolution, and taking the sense of the House on
the second.

The explanation of Lord Castlereagh was followed by an in-
considerate attack, not merely on ministers and their measures,
but upon the military skill of the experienced officer whom his
lordship was instrumental in placing in the command of the
expedition, and whose gallantry, enterprise, and good fortune
had rendered him then, what he ever afterwards continued, an
object of national admiration and respect. This unwise assault
was made by a military man, General Tarleton, who lauded
the clear, comprehensive, and convincing speech with which
Lord Henry Petty opened the debate on the convention of
Cintra, and pronounced a strong condemnation of the defence
set up by the minister at war, whom he bantered as having
wandered over the Pyrenees, and lectured on the qualities of
Irish horses — a mode of treating so solemn a subject, that did
not correspond with the dignity of that House. He then pro-
ceeded to view the question professionally, analyze Sir Arthur
Welleslcy's plan of operations, and descant on its dcfurniity.
In his opinion, an invading army could advance immediately
on its landing ; — when Sir Wilham Howe was sent to New
York, he landed with his cavalry and artillery, after having
been a long time at sea, moved forward the same day, and
shortly after came into action. In reference to the armistice,
he called on parliament to reflect what must have been the
situation of the armies previous to that infatuated mea.surc.
The French were dispirited by defeat, their situation extremely
critical, hazardous, and miscrabk?. They could not have been

10 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

able to cover the extent of ground from Fort St. Julian to
Lisbon, fourteen miles, particularly if they meant to occupy
the former ; and their position at Lisbon was a bad one. He
acknowledged that heavy artillery would have encumbered the
army, and could, if required, be had from the ships;— but it
should be remembered by the favourers of a convention, that
Lisbon and the country around were friendly to us, hostile to
the French, and it was exceedingly unlikely that the Russians
would act against us. He professed himself as entertaining
sentiments of respect individually for the officers composing
the court of inquiry; but that seven men of such known expe-
rience and talent should agree in such a decision, appeared
to him extraordinary. He totally dissented from the opinion
of that court, that the French could have passed the Tagus,
and occupied the fort of Elvas ; the plea was absurd, for the
Tagus was one of the most rapid rivers in the world, and four
miles broad at Lisbon. History often presented useful lessons ;
Lord Cornwallis was shut up in York-Town, with this advan-
tage, that he had not been beaten ; he had to cross a river
only a mile broad, his horse and artillery were on the other
side, his boats were ready in a bay defended from the enemy,
the two points of the crescent which the bay formed were
defended by redoubts, and he had no plunder to carry over ;
the event then was well known ; the French had to cross a river
of four miles in width, they had to carryover their artillery, their
horses, their plunder, and all their baggage; and notwithstand-
ing all these disadvantages, they had obtained from us that
convention which had been so much reprobated, and this was
the result of two brilliant victories — a result which had dis-
gusted Spain and Portugal, and covered England with dis-
grace. Had ministers judgment or moral courage enough to
have left the whole conduct of the campaign in the hands of
Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his opinion the result would have
been very different. It was allowed by the minister, that Sir
Henry Dalrymple was eminently useful in his command at
Gibraltar ; if so, why was he removed, and placed in a situ- .
ation of the greatest perplexity ? It was pleaded that it would

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 11

have been injustice to many oflRcers in the army to have con-
tinued Sir Arthur Wellesley in the command; he thought, if
there was any injustice, it was in the original appointment (.f
that brave sokher, but that, when once chosen, he should have
been continued ; they had precedents in the case of Lord
C'iiatham and General Wolfe, It was from this want of manly
decision, in appointing Sir Arthur Wellesley on\y pro tempore,
in allowing him to expect the arrival, every hour, of a senior
officer, to receive from him the command, that that general
" was roused to do something before he was superseded, and
this induced him to act rather rashly. As the conduct of that
gallant officer was already approved of by the country, he
would abstain from the full developement of his sentiments on
that point, although he thought he could convince that honour-
able officer, that there was something rash in the action of
the seventeenth, and something wrong in that of the twenty-
first." General Tarleton considered that it was indecent to
desire senior officers to consult an inferior on all occasions,
— that the rage for changing the command, evinced by minis-
ters, was deserving of censure — that the parallel introduced
to justify their conduct, was abortive, because the Austrians
did not, in consequence, make a successful campaign ; and
finally, however the genius, fortune, or gallantry of Sir Arthur
Wellesley had succeeded in raising the character of British
arms, the conduct of ministers tended to depress it

The serious statements of Lord Henry Petty, and sarcas-
tic commentaries of General Tarleton, had they been attended
with no other results, proved beneficial by calling forth from
Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his place in parliament, a luminous
explanation of his own operations, and tiie circumstances that
led to the armistice and convention. Lord Castlereagh had
evidently thrown the weight of this part of the ministerial
defence on the gallant general, who was also the most compe-
tent witness; and his lordship trusted not a little to the popu-
larity of that officer, as auxiliary in resisting the acknowledged
talents of the opposition party of that day. The explanation of
General Welleslev, therefore, on this occasion, is not merely

1-2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

associated intimately with his individual character, hut must be
viewed and valued as an historic record of indisputable truth,
and a final judgment on a much-controverted subject. Taking
his opponents in the order of tlieir attack, Sir Arthur commenced
by adverting to the speech of the proposer of the resolutions,
part of whose observations applied to the government, part
to the officers who had the conduct of the expedition. In
his judgment, government were answerable for the plan and
equipment ; for the execution and result, all responsibility
rested with the officers. He had already given it as his
opinion, and he had not departed from it, that the operations
in Spain could only be carried on with any chance of success,
in conjunction with, and by the consent of, the people and
public authorities of that country; and, therefore, it was
necessary to come to a right understanding with the juntas,
before the commencement of the campaign. When he first
communicated with the juntas of Gallicia and Asturias, it was
conceived that the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal
would be a valuable object, not only with a view to the naval
station which this would procure for us, but also with a pros-
pect of supporting the operations in Spain. When he arrived at
Corunna, the junta had just heard of the defeat of their army
at Rio Seco, and he then proposed to them to land his troops,
and co-operate with General Blake in covering the seat of
their government. To this they replied, that they did not
want men: but, that the best service, which could be rendered
to themselves and their cause, would be to expel the lYench
from Portugal. He certainly had received, through Sir
Thomas Dyer, a species of requisition from the junta of the
Asturias, to drive the French from St. Andero ; but the junta
of Gallicia assured him that they had taken effectual mea-
sures, for the accomplishment of that object; that the occu-
pation of that place would be of little moment, as regarded
the possession of the Asturias, the main object of the enemy;
and concluded by again repeating their conviction, that the
cause of Spain, and Portugal, and the liberty of the Peninsula,
would be best consulted by the expulsion of the enemy from

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ]:i

PortugaL 7'here the British army would bofome a hnk
between the northern and southern armies of Spain, which
hitherto had no point of union ; and, in order to demonstrate
their sincerity, and, show what importance they attached to
this service, although threatened by the enemy from two
points, after the defeat of Rio Seco, they sent two thousand
men to Portugal, to assist his operations in that quarter.
The expulsion of the enemy was not, therefore, an imme-
diate British object, but a British object of great consequence
in reference to the future operations in Spain.

With respect to the question of the equipment, government
had received intelligence from Sir C. Cotton, that there were
only four thousand French in Lisbon, the rest having pro-
ceeded to Spain ; and, surely, it could hardly be alleged as a
charge against ministers, that they acted upon the information
of an officer who had been eight months on the station, and
might, therefore, most naturally have been supposed to pos-
sess the best and most accurate knowledge. Under the
impression produced by the communication from Sir C. Cotton,
the ministers acted, and despatched him to the Tagus with
a force and equipments fully equal to the undertaking.
Although other arrangements, and perhaps preferable, might
have been made for the choice of horses, yet a more ample
equipment was not absolutely necessary for the contemplated
operations in the Tagus, nor an equipment such as the
operations he subsequently undertook required. ^\ hen he
embarked at Cork, he was to have proceeded to the coast of
Spain, without any certainty whether he should be allowed
to land at all, or, if he should, where he might land: and it
was, therefore, considered that the horses must sufVer consi-
derably on board, and, consequently, those of an inferior
description were chosen, which, under all the circumstances,
might be best fitted for a service of this nature.

The next point that demanded ex])lanation from Sir A.Wel-
lesley, respected the operations which he himself undertook;
and, although the noble author of the resolutions was silent
on that head, the honourable general who spoke after him,

II. n

14 LIFE AND CAiMPAIGNS OF

adopted a different policy, and rendered it necessary, there-
fore, that he should reply. That speaker asserted, " that he.
Sir A. Wellesley, had been hurried forward by an honourable
ambition, to undertake an operation of considerable risk."
Now, he had stated already, before the board of inquiry, that
he had a larger British force than any which the enemy could
bring into the field against him ; he was, indeed, inferior in
cavalry, but he expected to be joined by some Portuguese troops
of that description, which, together with the British, would form
a respectable corps, though then, no doubt, he might in that
respect, be still inferior to the enemy. But under all these
circumstances he asked, whether General Tarleton himself
would have hesitated, if he had been in his situation, to act as
he had done ? and he assured the honourable general, " that he
would much rather follow his example in the field, than his
advice in the senate." As to the adoption of a line of march
on his landing in Portugal, he preferred that along the coast for
many reasons, some of which were repeatedly submitted to
the government and the country; and, touching his strength
and numbers, he had reason to expect reinforcements under
General Acland, Sir H. Burrard, and Sir J. Moore. But to
demonstrate the satisfaction he felt in the sufficiency of his
own force to execute his object, he did not intend to have
employed the corps under General Acland in the field at all, but
meant to have sent it to besiege Peniche. When Sir H. Burrard
arrived, he. Sir A. Wellesley, had no longer the command, but
he recommended to him a plan of operations for the corps of
Sir J. Moore ; and, if that plan had been adopted, he should not
then have had the mortification to hear Lord H. Petty pro-
pose a resolution, " that the expedition to Portugal had dis-
appointed the hopes and expectations of the nation." That
plan was, that Sir J. INIoore should advance upon Santarem,
with a view to intercept the enemy, as he imagined they
would attempt to cross the Tagus. It was feasible, not
only in his opini on, but in that of all the general officers who
had given eviden ce at the court of inquiry. Sir H. Burrard,
however, thought proper to call that corps to the assistance

THK DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 15

of the army, a circumstance which altered the whole system
of operations. With respect to the change of commanders —
when he left England, Sir Arthur Wellesley did not expect to
be continued in the command, after large reinforcements
should have arrived, to the exclusion of many valuable officers ;
but, at the same time, he did not think that the command
ought to be changed in the middle of expeditions. In the
course of a campaign, the command might be changed without
injury, but these expeditions were not campaigns, they were
only operations : however, as a change in command was
attended with a total alteration in the system, this circumstance
necessarily governed him in his subsequent views. His ori-
ginal plan was to have engaged the enemy as near to Lisbon as
possible, and to have followed up the advantage, which he
undoubtedly expected, with the utmost expedition ; by which
means he would have got to Lisbon nearly as soon as them-
selves, and prevented their crossing the Tagus. His opinion
still was, that if he had been allowed to pursue the enemy
closely after the battle of Vimeira, they would have been
unable to cross the Tagus, He was no party to the question
of the convention, its propriety, or the contrary ; he had
never come forward as the accuser of Sir H. Burrard, but,
having commanded at Vimeira, and holding himself responsible
for that action, he thought his opinion ought to have had
some weight, both on that occasion, and with the court of
inquiry ; especially as that opinion had been supported by all
the general officers whom he had under his command. It had
been stated that his friend. General Spencer, had given a
different opinion ; but, notwithstanding the delicacy and the
caution with which that officer had spoken, yet a close exa-
mination of his evidence, would show that he coincided jior-
fectly in the j)lan of operations proposed by him, ami, in
reply to one question from the court, expressed that coinci-
dence of opinion in the strongest terms, "^rhis was the prin-
ciple upon which he had advanced from Mondego Bay, and
he never could understand how the court of impiiry, wiiich
approved of all he had done up to the close of the battle of

16 1.1 IK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

\'imeira, could have said that those troops which had been
constantly beaten in the field, ought not to be pursued when
beaten, lie would certainly have pushed them so hard after
that battle, if he had retained the command, that it would
have been impossible for them to have crossed the Tagus.
But there was one part of the report of the board, with
respect to the question of advancing after the action of the
twenty- first, to which Sir Arthur YVellesley desired to refer;
it was as follows: — "This very circumstance of a superior
cavalry retarding our advance, would allow the enemy's in-
fantry, without any degree of risk, to continue their retreat
in the most rapid manner, till they should arrive at any given
and advantageous point of rallying and formation : nor did
Sir Arthur Wcllesley, on the seventeenth of August, when
the enemy had not half the cavalry as on the twenty-first, pur-
sue a more inconsiderable and beaten army with any marked
advantage, for he says, (we refer to the Gazette Extraor-
dinary.) 'the enemy retired with the utmost regularity, and
the greatest celerity :' and, notwithstanding the rapid advance
of the British infantry, the want of a sufficient body of cavalry
was the cause of his suffering but little loss on the plain :"
and again in the same despatch, " he (the enemy) succeeded
in effecting his retreat in good order, owing principally to my
want of cavalry." Here the court of inquiry appeared to
consider him. Sir Arthur Wellesley, to be either inconsistent or
incorrect in his statement, a conclusion which he was pre-
pared to show had been injudiciously drawn. 'I'he fact was,
there were two parts of the action of the seventeenth ; the
one in the mountains, the other on the plain. In that part
which took place in the plain, the enemy retired in good
order. After the battle of the twenty-first, they had retired
in great disorder. And it was the good order of the retreat
in the one case, and the disorder in the other, that made all
the difference. Although it might not be proper, without an
adequate force of cavaliy, to })ursue the enemy closely, when
tiiey retired in good order on the seventeenth, it by no means
followed that they ought not to be pursued on the twenty-first.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 17

when they had been completely beaten, and had retired in
great disorder. The disorderly retreat of the enemy on tlie
twenty-first was the ground of his opinion, that thev ought to
be hard pushed : and if they had been vigorously followed up
on that day, Ue ivas satisfied in his own tnind, that then- would
have het'n no reason for concluding the convention which had
given so much offence. With respect to the convention, it
was Sir Arthur Wellesley's opinion, that government was not
justly chargeable with the fault of that measure, because,
had a certain plan of operations been adopted, the reason for
it would never have existed. The necessity for concluding
a convention had been ascribed to the want of artillery, of
horses, of equipments of various kinds, but he felt it due to
fairness to state, that, in considering the propriety of con-
cluding an armistice, and afterwards a convention, those
wants had never been taken into account by him, nor by any
of the officers concerned in the negociation on that subject.
The only question at all connected with the state of tiie
army, in point of equipment, was, the difficulty of sui)plying
it with provisions, when the whole of the troops should have
been collected.

Sir Arthur Wellesley next called the particular attention
of the House to the arguments urged against the armistice
and convention, by the political opponents of the government.
In treating this question dispassionately, the relative position
of the two armies, at the precise time when the armistice
was concluded, was of material consequence. 'J'he French,
after the battle of \'imeira, were allowed to retreat, and take
up a strong position, in which they would have been able to
stop the progress of a superior force for three or four days.
The advancing army, after having been occupied in dislodg-
ing them from that position, would have further to drive
them from two or three other lines, which lay between the
main position and Lisbon. During the whole of this time,
the French would probably have been employeil in j^reju-
rations for the passage of the Tagus, whidi it would have
been almost impossible to prevent. (uMieral Tarloton had

18 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

alluded to the situation of Lord Cornvvallis in the American
war; but Sir Arthur Wellesley assured that House, without
entering into any comparison between General Junot and
Lord Cornwallis, that the circumstances in which they were
placed differed totally. The British general was shut up in
a town, and actually besieged, while the Duke of Abrantes
might be said to have the military possession of the country.
General Tarleton also asked, " how was it possible for the
French to cross a river from four to six miles broad, in such a
situation ?" To this Sir Arthur replied, " that was matter
of opinion ;" and it was the opinion of all the officers who
were there at the time, and of all the members of the board
of inquiry, that it was impossible to prevent them from cross-
ing the Tagus. He had heard that Earl Moira, a high military
authority,* was of opinion, " that if the French had been
driven to cross the Tagus, they would have been reduced to
extreme distress :" to this his plain answer w^as, " in the first
place, that it was the duty of Junot to have suffered that
distress, however severe, rather than have surrendered at dis-
cretion ; and there is no reason to believe that he would not
have done his duty in that respect. But, in the second place,
he did not allow that the French would have been reduced
to this extreme distress. General Loisson had crossed the
Tagus, quelled the insurrection in Alentejo, returned again
across the Tagus, and by these means removed the difficulties
which the French might otherwise have experienced in the
retreat to Elvas." The ablest opponents of government,
however, asserted their conviction that Junot would have sur-
rendered at last: " this was true," said Sir Arthur, " but at
what time of the year?" He spoke confidently, when he
affirmed, that the British army would not be in a condition

'Services of General the Earl nf Moira (afterwards Marquess of Hastings,) K.G., G.C.B.

Ensign 15ih foot - - 7th August, 1771 Major general - - - 12th Oct., 1793

Lieutenant 5th foot - - Cot h Oct., 1773 Lieutenant general - - 1st January 1798

Captain, 63rd foot - - 12th July, 1775 General .... o^ij, Sepl., 1803

Lieut. -colonel by T5revct, 15th June, 1778 Adjutantgen. in America 15th June 17'.I3

Lieut. -colonel lujth foot - 21st March, 1782 Commander-in-cliitf on a

Colonel by Brevet - SndjNov., 17H2 particular .Service . COth Nov. 1793

Colonel e7th fool - - 23rd May, 1801 i Master-gen. of the Ordnance llih Feb., 1806

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON". 19

to reduce the fort of Elvas till the beginning of December,
and then, perhaps, it might have been thought advisable
to grant the French army the same, or nearly the same
terms, as those which were conceded to them in August.
Considering, therefore, the relative situation of the armies at
that period, he did not think it disgraceful to allow the French
to embark ; and the gaining of time w^as important, with a view
to operations in Spain, as the presence of a British army
there would give the Spaniards strength in their own union,
and prevent their being cut off in detail. The high military
authority before alluded to, had said, " that the officers in
command of the expedition, ought to have attended more to
the great advantages which, in the then situation of affairs,
would have resulted, for compelling the enemy to lay down
their arms, and surrender at discretion." But it should l)e
stated in reply to this insinuation, that no such object had
been prescribed in the instructions to the officers commanding
the British forces. It was, undoubtedly, the duty of every
officer to endeavour to obhge a hostile force opposed to him to
lay down their arms ; but the question was, whether, in order
to prosecute that object, they ought to have given up other
material points, in time and circumstances, and abandon the
advantages they had gained.

If it were not disgraceful to have allowed the PVench to
evacuate Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, the convention for
the evacuation of Portugal could not have been disgraceful.
The circumstances of the two cases were certainly different,
as well as the state of Europe ; but the result in both cases,
Sir Arthur considered, unstained by disgrace. The insti-
tution of a court of inquiry, was another topic connected
with the campaign in Portugal and convention of Cintra, to
which he was anxious to advert. He agreed with those who
wished that this might be the last court of the kind that
should ever assemble : nor was it a tribunal before which any
officer would desire to be tried. A general impression had
gone abroad, that this inquiry had been instituted by Lord
Castlereagh, from friendship to him: it was rather hard that

20 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

he should he suhjected to such a reflection, especially, as
if he had been tried by any other mode, he must have been
acquitted ; and, without imputing blame to any individual
member, he protested that the court was a source of injustice,
and on that account it was that he hoped it was the last
board of that kind to which the investigation of the con-
duct of officers would be submitted. As to the letter sent
by his friend Lord Castlereagh, desiring his superior officers
to consult him particularl}-, had he been aware of the exist-
ence of such a document, he should have felt his situation
very uncomfortable. And he now acknowledged, that from
the first hour these officers landed, and even before they dis-
embarked, he perceived that he was not in possession of their
confidence. However, he felt that he had done every thing
he could to forward their objects, although he differed from
them in opinion. There was a wide distinction between military
and civil inferior situations : in a civil office, if the inferior
differed materially from the superior, he ought to resign : but in
a military appointment, it was the duty of the inferior officer
to assist his commander in the mode in which that com-
mander might deem his services most advantageous : if he
thought himself capable of giving advice, and of suggesting
plans, it was his duty to endeavour to carry them into exe-
cution ; but if the commander did not think proper to listen
to his advice or suggestions, it was then his duty to assist his
superior in that way which, to that superior, might appear
most eligible. This was the principle which, in his opinion,
ought to regulate the conduct of military officers. It was a
principle on which he had, on that occasion, as ever before,
acted, and on which he ever would act.

Mr. Windham, who rose to refute the explanations both
of Lord Castlereagh and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, commenced
by stating, that he should be sorry to have it supposed, that
in rising after General Wellesley, he had a wish to do away
any part of the impression which his speech could not fail to
have made. Nothing could be more clear, fair, and manly,
than the manner in which that gallant officer had spoken of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 21

all the persons with whom ho had acted, and of all the
transactions in which he had hoen concerned. He neces-
sarily felt diflrident in delivering any opinion upon suhjects of
which he could know so little, as of military operations: and
was aware that, in adding his testimony to the merits of the
uallant general, he was offering what was of little value.
But he could not, for his own sake, abstain from expressing
how entirely he concurred in opinion with the views and
conduct of Sir Arthur VVellesley, not only in tlujse parts
where his measures might seem to have a voucher in success,
but in those also where his intentions had been unfortunately
over-ruled. Confident judgment on professional subjects fr(»m
persons not professional, was always objectionable ; and the
merit of an officer, ])ossibly, could not be judged but by a
judgment on the merit of his particular measures; yet there
was a certain character of talent and ability, that might be
capable of making itself visible even to persons the most
unlearned, and might show the superiority of one player over
another, even to those who were ignorant of the game. It
was impossible not to discern in the whole style of (ieneral
Wellesley's conduct, those characteristic marks which have,
at all times, and not least in the period of the Peninsular
war, distinguished the successful from the unsuccessful side,
the victor from the vanquished. Sir Arthur Wellesley's state-
ment, though proper for him to make, and satisfactory for his
justification, was no vindication of ministers; whilst it j^^tl-
fied his character, it was the condenuiation of theirs. It was
the glory of a military officer to achieve success under great
disadvantages. There was no credit to be gained from good
fortune, where there were no disadvantages to be encountered,
no difficulties to be overcome. But the boast of an admi-
nistration consists in placing tiieir officers in circumstances
where success shall he. easy, where they cannot choose but
win, and where of consecpience their glory must be lit lie.
The merits of executive officers, and of those win* emplo\
them, move often in this respect in inverse order. W hat is
the boast of the officer, is the reproach of tl.c i.iiui^tt<r: and
li. I-

22 LIKK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the triumph of the minister in preparing an easy victory,
takes from the oflficer his means of distinction. Tiie circum-
stances, therefore, vvhicli enhanced the merit of General Wel-
lesley, constituted the bhmie of the ministers who produced
them. As to the convention, he perfectly coincided in the
opinion of those who disapproved of that measure, and attri-
buted its origin in the first instance to the misconduct of
ministers, however far from blame they might be as to the
mere circumstance itself. Tiie court of inquiry thought that
Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were justified in
declining to pursue the beaten foe: he could not but believe
that Sir Arthur Wellesley was right, and that, if left to him-
self, he would have accomplished all that he said he could.
Upon that point Mr. Windham declared he could hardly
entertain a doubt. Yet the court doubted — the generals
doubted : the doubt originated in the deficiency of cavalry ;
this deficiency led to the refusal of Sir H. Burrard to pursue
the enemy ; from w hich it resulted that, instead of the whole
French army being destroyed or captured by General Wel-
lesley, they were permitted, disgracefully, to retire from the
field of contest. And certainly the ministers were culpable
for not supplying a sufficient cavalry force, which was the
origin of the evil. That the campaign in Portugal disap-
pointed the expectations of the country, no one had the
hardihood to deny : there was a failure to be accounted for,
a ship lost, for which the commander must be tried, whether
blame must ultimately be imputed to him or not. The court
before which the officer was brought was incompetent ; a
court of inquiry should be secret; but ministers perverted
the whole nature of such tribunals, by producing a strange,
anomalous, inconsistent proceeding, never known in the laws
of this country, that could not be made conclusive for any
purpose at once rational and honest; a monstrous production,
unknown to our usages, " an ope)i court of inquiry." He
diffi'red from Sir Arthur Wellesley in his statement that the
convention " had thot become necessary," and also, " that
time was gained thereby;" both these arguments were fal-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 23

l;icious, because, as General Wellesley had proved himself
quite an overmatch for the marshals of Napoleon, bv beatiui^
them under the greatest disadvantages, a fortiori, he could
have beaten them when his means became improved and his
numbers trebled. I lis arguments, therefore, if valid, would
probably sustain the ministerial cause, without detracting from
his own inimitable conduct and example. Sir Arthur, however,
confessed that he had not the confidence of his successors in
tbe command. " This was a natural consecpience of the
rapid supercession, in which general succeeded general, as
wave succeeded wave, rising some of them, as it were, liferallv
out of the sea: assembled uj)on the stage like persons at tlie
end of a comedy, with all the hap[)icst effects of surprise,
some from one j)art of the world, some from another; one
from Syracuse, another from Stockholm, bringing with them
their various vices and prejudices, and marring whatever was
to be done, by their total ignorance of all that had preceded."
Ministers took credit to themselves for having expelled the
French from Portugal, but it was, and would be an ever-
lasting disgrace to their administration, that Junot was allowed
to escape from the grasp of his powerful opponent, and the
nation and its favourite general plundered of their share of
glory. Had Junot been made the captive of a British armv,
what an impression would that circumstance have made upon
our allies, our enemies, ourselves, and upon all Eurojje, as
to the comparative character of French and British troops !
an impression more than equivalent to most of the objects
of the campaign. What had the nation gained at ALiida?
In point of territory, nothing ! in point of acquisition of
any pecuniary value, nothing ! but we had gained glory,
jnilitary glory, and this single circumstance was sufficient to
render the battle of Maida one of the most useful, as well as
most honourable, of any that had ever been fought for the
country. It was the loss of glory, this deplorable neglect of
the opportunity to make an indelible impression upon the
French themselves, and the Spanish natit)n, as to the strik-
ing superiority of the British army, that were most to be

24 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

rogrcttcd in the unfortunate result of the campaign in Por-
tugal. He, Mr. Windham, was convinced, that Sir Arthur
VVellesloy himself would not say that any thing could com-
pensate the loss of so precious an ohject, and such a golden
opportunity ; for this it was that ministers, in his judgment,
stood condemned before their country.

The next member of the administration who contributed
the aid of his talents, to sustain the character of his asso-
ciates against a public impeachment, was the chancellor of
the exchequer.* He considered the proposition of Lord
H. Petty as untenable, and unsu})ported by the eloquent
language of Mr. Windham, whose view of the question fully
justified the measures of the government. It was stated,
" that had Sir Arthur Wellesley followed up his plans, and
pursued an already discomfited enemy, the result would have
been as decisive and glorious as ever marked the progress
of the British arms ;" and it was further stated, " that the
interruption to this happy consequence, was to be found in
the conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard ;"
but, instead of blaming those who were the immediate per-
sons that over-ruled Sir A. Wellesley's plans, the opposition,
turned round unfairl}^, and laid the burden on the shoulders of
ministers, because they had left an excuse to those general
officers, by not having furnished a sufficient cavalry force.
Now, in Mr. Perceval's opinion, since the campaign would
have terminated gloriously for this country, had Sir Arthur
Wellesley's plans been adopted, ministers could not be cul-
pable, because it failed through the timidity or caution of
those general officers who over- ruled him. It was the great
enterprise and superior genius in one commander, which were
not present in the minds of his seniors, that would have
obtained the consummation of his glorious objects; that officer
had never seen or felt the deficiency of cavalry on which the

* Tlie Right Hon. Spencer Pencval, second son of John Earl of Egmont,
in the Irish peerage : this amiable statesman fell by the hand of an assassin,
named Rellingham, on the eleventh of May, 1B12, as he was entering the lobl)y
t>f the House of Connnons.

IKK ttlGHT HOW"."-'' SVEN"CER PERCF.VAL.

C^^-t-^-^^

THE DUKP: of WELLINGTON. 25

opposition dwelt with so much obstinacy, ahhou<i;h they
acknowledge that he could have beaten the French, and
captured their whole army, without further reinforcements, it'
left to pursue his own bold plans. How then could ministers l)e
considered culpable for the result of that day, and it was (hat
result alone which led to the armistice and convention. He, Mr.
Perceval, regretted the admission of the convention, and was
ready to accede to Lord Petty's first proposition, which only
adopted the language of the speech from the throne, and
expressed the sentiments of the country, if it were not followed
by a second, which went to cast a censure upon ministers, they
had not merited. He taunted the opposition with having mis-
taken all the measures of the existing administration, and for-
gotten those of their own : the four thousand tons of shipping
promised by Lord Castlereagh, he asserted, were engaged in
the I^altic, nor was their assistance requisite in an expedition to
the Tagus, (the original destination,) where cavalry were not
deemed necessary. When the late administration promised
assistance to the continental powers, the transports were all
laid up, dismantled, or destroyed ; and that party in the state
which had not sent cavalry to the Tagus, when they had
])ower, would, of course, allow that no necessity now existed
for that species of force. On the question of the sujicrseding
of officers, it ought naturally be presumed, that the party of
which Mr. Windham was a supporter, spoke feelingly on the
point, as that gentleman, when in office, " had emj)K»yed a
junior officer. Brigadier-general Craufurd, to proceeii with
four thousand men, by the antijjodes, to Botany Bay, from
whence they were to sail to Chili, which they were to con-
quer: this done, a line of posts was to be established across
the Andes to Buenos Ayres, to secure the possession of that
settlement. The proposer of such a scheme of contpiest
could hardly, it was supposed, have ever forgotten it." After
a tedious voyage, this officer was recalled, and placed under
the connnand of General Whitelocke at Buenos A\res. It
must, and did lVe(|uently liappon, that a small i'xi)editinii
became increased to a larue armv, in uliieli case, as Sir

26 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Arthur Wellesley had stated to parliament, it was necessary
to change the command, and appoint a senior officer, in order
to retain in the service many excellent officers, who could
not, from the usage in the army, serve under a junior com-
mander. 'Ilie ministers must have lamented, equally with their
political adversaries, the convention ; they lamented that it
had not been demonstrated to the world, beyond the possi-
bility of controversy, that the British army was infinitely
su})erior to the French. But it should not be forgotten in
history, that the character of the British army, under the
command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the course of this brief
campaign, had been established in the mind of every impar-
tial man in Europe, for incomparable discipline, irresistible
valour, and unwearied perseverance. It had also been urged
confidently, that the possession of Portugal was nothing; but
were not the feelings of every Briton interested in the rescue
of our ancient allies from the grasp of an usurper? was it
of no value to have secured the Russian fleet in the Tagus?
The whole world was fixed in attention on the British
government, to see whether they would aid their ancient
allies, or desert the cause of those to whom they were bound
by the long-accustomed ties of friendship and amity. It was
at this momentous interval, when doubt was the language of
every tongue, the expression of every look, that the noble
mover of a vote of censure, would have kept our forces at
home, in inaction, rather than have entrusted a discretionary
power to our generals to act as circumstances might require.
It was also advanced as matter of grave offence, that the
victory of Vimeira was announced in England amidst the
thunder of artillery from the ancient ramparts of the tower ;
" endeavouring," it was asserted, " by noise and clamour, by
a bold and confident show of exultation, to confound the
sense of the country," but the authors of this sarcastic lan-
guage would be obliged to admit, that since the commence-
ment of the French revolution, except in the issue of the
campaign in Egypt, there had been no instance of so signal
a defeat of French objects, as in the expulsion of Juuot's

THK DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 27

army from Portugal. The triumph, therefore, had been suf-
ficient to justify the demonstration of joy manifested by the
firing of guns. The chancellor of the exchequer acknow-
ledged that Sir Arthur Wellesley had expressed what he
thought necessary for his own justification, in a fair and
manly manner, but could not coincide in his opinion upon
the subject of the court of inquiry. A court-martial could
not have been held without injustice to one of the general
officers, against whom a particular charge might have been
instituted, and the officers whom it would have been neces-
sary to examine, were out of the country : a court-martial
had not been demanded, although some inquiry was deemed
necessary, and no objection could be taken to the honour of
the individuals that formed that tribunal. This course of
proceeding also was justified by two precedents in recent
times. To those who instanced the case of General White-
locke, he replied, that there existed no analogy between that
case and the present, because government were in possession
of documents fully sufficient to warrant them in bringing a
distinct charge against that officer.

Mr, Whitbread next rose to address the House : he declared
that, notwithstanding the able speech of Sir Arthur Wellesley,
the lucid harangue of Lord Castlereagh, and the ingenious
remarks of the chancellor of the exchequer, the spirited
charge of Lord Petty was so feebly encountered, as to leave
him in perfect possession of the field. There was, however,
one literary and political warrior* still remaining, who might
yet retrieve the fortunes of the day. Lord Castlereagh i)ro-
fessed to disapprove of the convention, " yet he was acces-
sary to the answer f!:iven to the citizens of London, which the
servants of the crown had put into the mouth of their sove-
reign." " Sir Arthur Wellesley too," in an impressive speech,
" stated, that, had he been left in command, he never would
have entered into a convention, yet, after such an avowal,
he would not support the proposition of Lord II. Petty: and
the chancellor of the exchequer thought the convention was
• The Right Hon. George Cunning.

28 I, IFF, AM) CAMPAIGNS OF

jtistifiod, and, thorofore, would witbliold the confirmation of
the sovereign's opinion by the House of Commons." 'I'hus,
then, said Mr. Whitbread, had the swords of the galhmt
Wellesley, and of his brave companions in arms, been drawn
in vain : not in vain for their own glory and character, but
most ineffectually for the honour, the credit, the glory, the
interests, and the superiority of their country. The public
had before them a great stake, and by whom was it thrown
away? Guilt attached somewhere; and public indignation
had been consequently excited. The court of inquiry decided
that all the general officers were blameless, and zealous, and
firm : yet blame remained. Had Sir Arthur Wellesley been
in the command of a sufficient body of cavalry at Vimeira,
he would have made captive the whole French army, in which
case, the convention would have been unnecessary ; that
he had not done so was, because ministers neglected to
supply the cavalry force which he solicited; wherefore, the
whole, the original sin of the convention of Cintra, belonged
to the ministers alone. The ministers were also unable to
explain away the supersedure of Sir Arthur Wellesley from
the command, " they had not appointed men of extensive
talent and acknowledged genius, too proud to admit in their
breasts a narrow and illiberal jealousy : they had not selected
officers under whom Sir Arthur had previously served, and
who entertained the high and merited opinion of his capacity
and his services." Such were not the palliatives of ministers ;
and the gallant general himself, who, while he defended his
own reputation, was known always to s})are that of others,
stated, " that he had no reason to expect being superseded,
unless a very considei'able increase should take place in the
army." Mr. Whitbread declined passing any opinion upon
the fitness or character of Sir Hew Dalrymple, or Sir Harry
Burrard, but of Sir John Moore, " whose apotheosis had
taken place," he observed, " that throughout the whole of
the heroic army of Britain, there could not be found any
officer with claims to distinguished command, greater than
his : why, therefore, was not he allowed to assume that lead of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 29

which the gallant Wellesley was deprived?" Lord Castle-
reagh had alluded to precedents, to extenuate his incon-
sistency in so frequently changing the command : hut these
were taken from the miserable policy of Austrian military
councils; councils which so often cramped the exertions of
the Archduke Charles ; councils which teemed with treachery,
to whose corrupt and baneful influence prostrated Austria
and enslaved Europe might fairly attribute their forlorn con-
dition ; councils which led to the disastrous, but decisive
victory of Jena, to the recapture of Madrid, and to the exclu-
sion of Great Britain from almost every port of the continent
of Europe, Such were the precedents accumulated by the
British secretary at war. He trusted parliament would
inquire into the causes " by which a gallant army, after
unprecedented efforts of valour, patience, and endurance,
were obliged to terminate a campaign in a victory, from
which, in the words of Sir John Hope, no useful consequence
would follow." Had we imitated the conqueror, rather than
the conquered, we should not then have to lament that so
great a victory had been attended with so little advantage.

Reports had been for some time industriously circulatml
throughout England, and the opposition side of the House of
Commons seemed rather disposed to adopt them, " that Su-
A. Wellesley was totally free from any participation in the con-
vention." Upon this point, Sir Arthur claimed the attention
of the House, only while he referred members to his evidence
before the court of inquiry, and to his letter, dated tlie sixth of
October, 1 808, to his friend Lord Castlereagh ; that letter con-
tained his detailed opinions on the subject, and from those
opinions he never should depart. Here Mr. Wellesley l\)\c
(afterwards Lord Maryborough) rose, for the purpose of assuring
the House, tliat he had no connexion with the paragraphs tiiat
appeared in the public newspapers, relative to the part Ins
gallant relative had taken, or rather refused to take, ni the
convention: being the only member of the Wellesley fanuly at
that time in London, he had been applied to for information
on the subject, but luiifurmly declined affording any, observuig,

II. F

30 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

" that when General Wellesley returned, he would be found
fully capable of vindicating his own character." Mr. Hely-
J lutchinson,* who next addressed the House, complained that a
])arallol had been instituted between the convention of Cintra
and that of Alexandria and Cairo, and felt himself called on, as
one of those who had shared the honours of the campaign in
Egypt, to reject all such comparison as implying disgrace,
for in that light was the armistice of Lisbon viewed by the
whole nation. The association of these conventions by Sir
Arthur Wellesley, gave Mr. Hutchinson more pain than if
that observation had been made by any other member of that
House; yet he gladly declared himself amongst the most
enthusiastic admirers of the brilliant exploits performed by
that brave general and his troops, while in active operation
in the field. Mi-. Hutchinson entered into a minute detail of
the operations of the army in Egypt, the daringly heroic descent
of Sir Ralph Abcrcromby, in the presence of the enemy, upon
the Egyptian shore ; the glorious but lamented fall of the brave
commander of the expedition, and perilous position of the Bri-
tish at that crisis. " Such were the difficulties of that moment,"
said the honourable member " that, were he allowed to have
chosen between the fate of Sir 11. Abercromby, and the situa-
tion of the individual who succeeded to the command, without
hesitation he would have preferred, for his gallant relative, the
death of his lamented friend." Sir John Moore, in a letter to
Lord Hutchinson, thus characterises the war in Egypt at that
momentous period. "I hope you see some prospect of termi-
nating this expedition with success : left to my own mind, I
own it suggests nothing comfortable." This tone of despon-
dence was not congenial to the feelings of Lord Hutchinson,
who persevered in all the meditated movements of his brave
predecessor, even in the most awful responsibility, and at length
obliged Belliard to capitulate ; but, by the terms of that capitu-

• The Honourable Christopher Hely- Hutchinson, brother of General Lord
Hutchinson and of Lord Donougliinore, and son of the provost of Dulilin
University : he served in the campaign in Egypt, and, on his return, was
elected to parliament for the city of Cork.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 31

lation ; all the cavalry and lield-traiu of the enemy were cap-
tured, and their hold of the country so essentially weakened,
that it was scarcely possible, with any succours that they could
expect, for them to recover Egypt. Twelve thousand I'rench
soldiers were escorted to their ships by four thousand five
hundred British, under Sir John ^Nloore ; the inetpiality of
numbers between the escorted and escorting, being the ridi-
cule even of the French army. Menou actually treated
Belliard as a traitor, and as such reported him to his govern-
ment. "In what respect, therefore," demanded Mr. Hutch-
inson, "did the convention of Cairo resemble that of Cintra?
Had not the voice of the empire been as distinct in approving
and admiring the one proceeding, as it had been loud and
unanimous in condemnation of the other ? It was the capture
of Cairo that rescued Egypt from the grasp of French domin-
ation." It is here important to remark, in instituting a compa-
rison between these two conventions, that in Egypt the enemy
was more than double the number of the British, possessed
every military advantage, and, when beaten in the field, retired
behind his strong works ; whereas in Portugal he was inferior
to the British during all periods of the operations, and, at the
signing of the convention, considerably so ; and when beaten
in the field, and almost without a shelter to retire on, he was
permitted to dictate the conditions of an armistice. During
the campaign in Egypt, Europe was in a state of profound
peace ; pending the operations in Portugal, war raged in
Spain ; the French soldier was removed from Egypt, where he
was mischievous to our ally, to France, w here he was harmless :
by the convention of Cintra, an army was released from its
captivity in Portugal, and transported to Spain, where it became
an immediate reinforcement to the enemy : the army of Egypt
were compelled to disgorge their plunder; the army of Portu-
gal carried the treasures of Portugal away with thorn. From
these and other considerations, Mr. Hutchinson was justified
in stating, " that the conventions were made under circum-
stances totally dissimilar, and attended by results the most
opposite;" and as he was himself a brave and ho^o^t partici-

32 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

pator of the glory of that memorable campaign, his testimony
has ever since been deemed conclusive as to the inappropri-
atencss of any comparison. Mr. Hutchinson complained,
that General Wellesley defended the result of the campaign
in Portugal, at the expense, in some degree, of the military
glory of those vi^ho conquered in Egypt ; but his complaint
liad no real foundation, as few public men have ever been
more cautious in abstaining from individual aspersion, or
depreciation of personal merit, than Sir Arthur Wellesley;
nor was the lionour or character of the British amtiy ever
more jealously shielded against calumny, than by that gene-
rous and able advocate. Indeed, Colonel Hutchinson did not
conclude his able professional statement of the discrepancies
that existed between the two conventions, without amending
the implication, which he did by paying a warm tribute of
admiration to the Arthur Wellesley.

The question had now agitated the public mind so long and
so anxiously, that INIr. Secretary Canning rose, to give to the
country his decision also on the painful point. He agreed
with those who saw little or no analogy between this vmpopular
measure and the convention of Cairo ; such comparisons were
as invidious as incorrect ; he wished to see his country rising
continually in character and glory ; the idea of its degeneracy
he could not endure. It was unfair to exclude the Portuguese
government from all participation in the armistice ; it was
wrong to exchange civil prisoners for Spanish troops. In the
other points, Mr. Canning concurred with his brother ministers.
It is here material to observe, that Mr. Canning undertook,
in the name of his colleagues, the responsibility of having
placed Sir Hew Dalrymple in the chief command; thereby
relieving Lord Castlereagh individually from that part of the
charge, and even establishing the fact, that he had concurred
in that officer's appointment, to the manifest prejudice of Sir
Arthur Wellesley's hopes and interests, the state having
required that sacrifice of friendship from him. INIr. Canning
proceeded to eulogize " the spirit, the boldness, the courage,
and the correctness with which Sir A. Wellesley achieved the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 33

victories of Roleia and \'imeira, and regretted that he had
been stopped in his career." But in his defence of Ministers
from the charge of inconsistency, vacillation, and want of
information, he appeared, on this occasion, totally unequal to
himself. His eloquent pleading, was, for this time, disre-
garded. Ministers succeeded in obtaining a majority of
fifty, upon Lord Castlereagh's moving the previous (piestion,
although the first of I^ord Potty's resolutions embodied the
sentiments of every British subject, both within and witiiout
the walls of parliament.

On the 27th of February, in this session, Mr. Ponsonby
brought forward his motion relative to the campaign in Spain,
in which the question of the convention of Cintra was again
debated, the conduct of ministers a second time bitterly cen-
sured, by one of the most powerful oppositions ever associated
in parliament, and the gallantry of Sir A. Wellesley occasion-
ally alluded to, in terms honourable to the impartiality of
those from whose political opinions he was known to dissent.
In this angry debate. General ^^'ellesley took no ])art, but,
soon after its close, was called on, as Irish chief-secretary, to
explain " what necessity could possibly have existed for the
expenditure of forty thousand pounds on telegraphic buildings
in Ireland." Mr. Martin gave it as his opinion, that, from the
cloudy atmosphere of that country, it was ill suited to the
establishment of such a mode of communication, and therefore
it was unwise to be extravagant in the attempt. Sir Arthur
Wellesley replied, that it was contemplated to convey tele-
graphic intelligence from Galway to Dublin, through Athlone,
instead of the former circuitous mode by the line of coast ;
and that, though it might be expensive at first, it wouUi
ultimately prove more economical. This explanation being
considered sulficient, the subject was discontinued. A ques-
tion of much more importance to the interests and happiness of
the people of Ireland was immediately after brought under tiio
notice of the House, by Sir John Newport, wiic moved that
the report upon "the corn-distillery prohibition bill" be
recommitted, for the purpose of introducing a clause extendmg
the prohibition to Ireland. 'I'he debate which followed was

34 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

not marked by any display of knowledge on the particular
question ; on the contrary, it seemed merely to afford an op-
portunity to members on different sides of the House, to
express their unqualified dissent from each other's opinions.
The mover of the resolution affirmed, that if the author of the
bill, Mr. Foster, were desirous to confer a benefit on Ireland,
he would do infinitely more to tranquillize the people, by
comprehending that country under his prohibitory act, than
by all the penal laws on the statute-book." Sir Robert Peel*
expressed his conviction " that if the bill were passed in the
shape it then assumed, the most fatal consequences would
ensue. He wished the two countries might go hand in hand,
and mutually assist each other. The north of England stood
much in need of the produce of Ireland, and, owing to the
depression of manufactures and trade, the people there w-ere
not half fed, so that the oats of Ireland would content them.
Hitherto the manufacturers had conducted themselves with
great prudence and propriety, but whenever they should under-
stand, that a part of that which might be appropriated to their
support, was permitted to be consumed, not in the preserva-
tion, but the destruction of man, they might probably not
remain so well satisfied." This declaration, from a practical
man, who understood and felt for the necessities of the work-
ing classes, was calculated to produce a strong impression on
the House in favour of Sir John Newport's motion. To correct
this evil, and place the question in its true light as regarded
Ireland, Sir A. Weliesley presented himself to the notice of the
members, and assured those interested in this argument, "that
the people of England would not receive a grain of corn less
out of Ireland, if the bill should stand as it then was, than if
the prohibition were extended to the latter country. Grain,
in Ireland, was much more abundant than in the last year, the
price of provisions would show this, for, though comparatively
high in the market of Dublin, it was much lower in Ireland
generally. If he thought that the measure would bear hard

* The first baronet of that name ; he was born at Peel Cross, near Black-
burn, in Lancashiie, and died at Drayton Park, Staffordshire, on the 3rd of
M.iy, 1830, ill the 74th year of liis age.

SIM liOIU-l

AH T

^^^<^3^^^.^,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 35

upon Great Britain, he would unquestionably vote against it ;
but, having given much attention to the subject, and being
satisfied of the contrary, the bill siiould have his cordial sup-
port." This brief statement of Sir Arthur WcUesley, made in
his official capacity, and deduced from diligent and patient
examination into facts, produced a deep impression, and called
forth the talents of Mr. Curwen, an eminent agriculturist, as
well as those of Sir Henry Parnell, who grounded his opposi-
tion to the Irish secretary's views, on the fact, that the non-
extension of the bill to Ireland, was a direct violation of tiie
act of union, and unprecedented in its character since the
passing of that measure. The feeling of the House, however,
was with the opposition ; and the amendment was carried by
a majority, against ministers, of thirty-eight.

In the discharge of his civil duties, Sir Arthur Wellesley
did not confine himself to questions purely Irish, or to those
on the fate of which ministerial majorities depended, but, while
his mind must have been deeply engaged in weigiiing the
foreign fortunes of his country, and eagerly waiting a moment
to throw his sword into the scale, he still took part in every
debate involving a vital or important interest to the nation at
large. An instance of this attention to his country's happi-
ness, appears in his commentary on the mode of selecting
committees in the House, occasioned by Mr. II. Dundas's
motion for a renewal of the committee on the East India
Company's affairs. It is one of those simple, sensible, sulli-
cient speeches peculiarly his own, and a singular instance of
the calmness of his manner in debate. Having been objected
to personally, as ineligible to serve on the committee. Sir A.
Wellesley observed, "that it was rather an odd way of selecting
a committee, to fix upon those persons, who were ignorant of
the business to come before that committee, to the exclusion of
those who were informed upon the subject." Mr. Crecvy had
objected to him in a pointed, he might almost say in a personal
manner, but he appealed to that gentleman himself as to the
line of conduct pursued by him in the course of the proceedings
of the late committee. He begged leave to observe, that it could

3G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

uot be owing to any materiiU difference as to the sincerity of his
views, with respect to East India politics, for he, (Sir Arthur)
had divided with Mr. Creevy on a question of no trifling
importance, that had been before the committee : and he
assured the honourable gentleman, that of this he might be
certain, that whenever the conduct of his noble relation
(Marquis Wellesley) came before that committee, the fullest
and the most rigid inquiry into that conduct should at all
times have his most cordial support. Indeed, he never should
shrink from not only inquiry into that, but into all that
either his noble relative, himself, or the Marquis Cornwallis
had done, even from the year 178-2. That our East India
settlements had been considerably extended, he did not
think to constitute in itself a serious accusation, but he was
fully prepared to prove to the committee, whenever they were
ready to go into it, that the extension of our dominions had
not been owing, as had been presumed, to any aggression on
our part : neither had they been undertaken with any vievr of
ambitious aggrandizement. Whether, and how far, they were
to be followed up, would be a question of a very ditferent
nature. It was certain that war was in no country so expen-
sive as in the East Indies. Since the peace of the Deccan, con-
cluded by him in 1 803, there had not been in that province
the slightest symptom of a tendency to hostilities. ^^ ith
respect to the exposition, he thought that every paper relating
to it ought to be produced. He wished the exposition to
have fair plav, and it should be the intention of the committee
to give the details of all matters of exposition. He could
onlv sav, with respect to the propriety of his own appointment,
that if the House should think proper to add his name to that
committee, he never would oppose any question with respect
to India, and he would, in every respect, discharge his duty
with impartiality, and to the best of his abilities."

ITie decided tone of Sir Arthur's language, his disinclina-
tion to obstruct inquiry by his presence, while he preserved a
fixed resolution to act on the committee if appointed, and his
proper confidence in his own integrity, called up Mr. Creevy

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 37

a second time to say, " that he intended no personal objection
to the gallant general. His opposition was directed against all
persons, generally, filling official situations. Other members,
amongst whom was Mr. Whitbread, argued on the principle of
excluding servants of the crown from seats in committees of
inquiry; but the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley was stron^rlv
and strenuously sustained by Mr. Wilberforce, who contended,
" that although impartiality was not only a desirable but an
indispensable qualification, yet he could not go so far as to
assert, that due information upon any questions to be tried
was inconsistent with impartiality." It was at the close of this
debate, and when the motion was negatived without a division,
that the chancellor of the exchequer (Mr. Spencer Perceval)
moved the order of the day for the House going into a com-
mittee on the corn-distillery prohibition bill already alluded
to. The secretary for Ireland, on this occasion, after Sir John
Newport and other Irish members had urged the extension of
the bill, repeated his conviction, '' that last year there was not
a sufficient quantity of food in Ireland for the demands on
her, but he was of a different opinion as to the period when
he was speaking. It was also his opinion, that if the distillers
were not allowed to go on in their usual course, they would
go on privately, and defraud the revenue of the country." 'Vhe
ministry were ultimately successful in their object, but only
by a majority of three.

Amongst the many measures proposed by Sir Arthur
Wellesley, while secretary for Ireland, that for the improve-
ment of the inland navigation of that country was not the least
important. On the twenty-eighth of March, 180;>, he moved,
pursuant to notice, "that the House do resolve itself into
a committee to consider upon the further extension of
inland navigation in Ireland," and as soon as that form had
been assumed, addressed them to the following effect, '* that
the benefits which had been experienced by the late r\tensinn
of inland navigation in Ireland, in consequence of the a-t of
the Irish parliament, to which he desired to call the attention
of the committee, were so evident and striking to evrry one

II. o

38 LITE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

who was acquainted with the progress of internal improve-
ment in Ireland within the last seven or eight years, that it
was unnecessary for him to expatiate upon it: he would
venture to assert, that no other species of internal improve-
ment, nor any other medium through which public bounty
might be bestowed, could produce such marked and decided
national advantages as had arisen from the operations of the
act to which he had referred. The increase of agriculture in
Ireland, (the prime object of inland navigation,) was a benefit
not merely bestowed on that country in the spirit of hberalitj^,
but a measure of sound and necessary policy for this country
to adopt, and one upon which, if any man could heretofore
have doubted, the present political and commercial state of
Europe and America would furnish sufficient arguments to
bring conviction to his mind. It was an uncontroverted fact,
that the agriculture of Great Britain had not for many years
been equal to the product'on of grain sufficient for her own
consumption ; and that we had, for several years past, most
lavishly and improvidcntly expended millions in improving
and extending the agriculture of foreign and of hostile nations,
by purchasing their corn, while w^e suffered the fertile lands of
Ireland to remain untilled, for want of a cheap and easy con-
veyance of their produce to market. It was also admitted
that the deficiency of capital in Ireland was so great as to
render it impracticable to obtain an extensive inland naviga-
tion, without considerable parliamentary aids : and if he was
founded in those points, the only thing that remained to be
considered was, in what manner, and under what regulations,
these bounties should be administered, and the system which
had proved so beneficial should be further extended? He
professed himself to be unacquainted with the detail of the
business : and indeed the other necessary avocations of any
man holding his oflSce, would render it completely impracti-
cable for him to enter into the inquiries necessary to form
a correct judgment on matters of this nature : and therefore
he conceived himself justified in bringing forward the measure
of continuing the present board of directors of inland naviga-

TilK DUKH OF \Vi;i,l,INCT()N. 30

tion, whose duties it would be to examine and in(iuire into
the different hues of navigation that were already or might
hereafter be proposed for, and to state their opinions on the
respective advantages, in order to guide the judgment of his
majesty's government, as to which of those lines they ought
to recommend to parliament to be carried into execution by
public aid." This appeal in favoiu- of the promotion of public
works in Ireland, delivered in the year LS09, by the substitution
of ' rail-road transport' for navigation, remained precisely appli-
cable to that country, after a lapse of thirty years. It was
highly approved of by Sir John Newport, a man whose life was
devoted to the interest of his native land particularly, without
being in the least degree insensible to the sutierings of the
human race in every climate. To this testimony in favour of
the Irish secretary's plan for the amelioration of the agricultural
interests in Ireland, was added the approbation of Sir II. Par-
nell. Hanged uniformly on the opposite benches to Sir Arthur
Wellesley, and to those with whom he acted, this honour-
able member still felt bound, in fairness, to state '-that he
sincerely rejoiced to find that the right honourable secre-
tary for Ireland, not only agreed with iiini in principle,
but had adduced one of the strongest arguments that could
be urged in favour of the measure, namely, that it w.is a
measure of sound British policy, independent of any advan-
tage that Ireland might, as a distinct member, derive from '\C
Some trilling opposition was given to this valuable j)roposition,
on the ground of the incompetence of the persons composing
the board in Ireland, an objection but too well founded, after
which Sir Arthur Wellesley's motion was carried by n majority
of four to one.

With this parliamentary success. Sir Arthur Wellesley
concluded his labours in the lower house of British rej)re-
sentatives. In the few months that had elaj)sc(l, since the
termination of the court of inquiry, up to this period, his
attendance on parliament was constant and regular, and his
zeal, in all matters tending to alleviate the condition of Ireland
generally, uuremittin:? If the Icniith of bis civil services be

40 l.irE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

taken into consideration, be may truly be said to have been
the most active secretary for Irish affairs that has been
appointed for many years, or in fact since the enactment of
tile union ; having introduced a greater number of Irish bills
in one month, than his successors have done in as many years.
His fostering care of the existing institutions, introduction
of a better constabulary force, extension of privileges to
officers of rank in that country, watchful regard of the agri-
cultural interests, promotion of statistical improvements, estab-
lishment of more economic semaphoric communication from
shore to shore, and his assertion of the claims of Irish militia-
soldiers to the same advantages of enlistment which other
parts of the United Kingdom enjoyed, all these did not interfere
with Sir Arthur Wellesley's active co-operation in saving his
colleagues from the well-aimed blows of an able opposition,
nor prevent him from taking part in the angry debates that
occurred, during the same period, upon the state of India, a
countrv to which he alwavs seemed to turn with the fondest
feelings. Sir Arthur Wellesley has left more numerous and
lasting memorials of his activity, in the discharge of his
civil duties, than any individual who ever fdled the office
of chief-secretary for Ireland, for so limited a period: and
by a reference to the parliamentary debates, which have here
been largely quoted for the purpose, it will appear that he
was, at that period of his life, known and regarded, not merely
as a soldier, but a financier, diplomatist, and statesman, by both
parties in the House of Commons, and that, had he preferred
the life of a mere politician, or civil officer, to that of a soldier,
the path to honour was equally open to his entrance.

It may be remembered, that about this period the king of
England, and Ferdinand the Seventh of Spain, had agreed to
a treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance, the former guaran-
teeing the succession and possession of the crown and empire
to that monarch, who in return engasred never to cede to
France any part of his territories in any part of the world,
and not to make peace with France, except by common con-
sent. To carry out the objects of this league, England begun

THE DUKE OF WELLIXGTOX. 41

to collect her armies from their scattered positions, with a view
to throwing her concentrated forces into the Peninsida, and
boldly opposing the French legions there. Amongst the first
corps despatched to the scene of action, was that under Major-
General Hill, who reached Lumias on the sixth of April,
where Sir John Cradock had fixed his head-quarters.* This
experienced officer did not exhibit any intention of taking
offensive measures, although much pressed by Generals Hill
and Beresford. However, it was ultimately decided that the
combined British and Portuguese army should make a forward
movement, and threaten the enemy's outposts, which were
then between the Vouga and the Douro. From this demon-
stration, it was confidently hoped the evacuation of Oporto by
the enemy would quickly follow, and that Portugal would
soon after be entirely relieved from his presence.

While preparations were actually in progress for the accom-
plishment of this object, intelligence arrived of the appoint-
ment of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the command of the British
army in the Peninsula, by which Sir John Cradock was super-
seded. As Sir John was a much older officer, government
remedied the difficulty that presented itself, by appointing him
governor of Gibraltar, thereby leaving his command open to Sir
Arthur Wellesley without impropriety or injustice. Of this
change in the command, the Earl of Buckinghamshire loudly
complained, as being an ill reward for Sir John's exertions in
collecting the scattered British force, and preparing it for
resistance ; to which it was owing that the determination of
embarking from Lisbon was abandoned. This complaint was
answered by a deprecation, on the part of Lord Liverpool,
against thus trenching upon the prerogative, and virtually
destroying that responsibility which ministers possessed. "• The
measures of General Cradock had certainly obtained the
approbation of the government, and he had actually com-
menced the campaign, when, by an extraordinary effort of the
war-minister of the day, Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed
to the chief command in Portugal. "f

* Marquis of Londonderry's Narrative of the Peninsnlar War. f Ibid.

4'i

LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

« It would ai){)oav that this arrangement was adopted after
a stni"-"le in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular
choice, nor the general princi})le of employing men of talent
without regard to seniority, can be censured : nevertheless. Sir
John Cradock* was used unworthily. A general of his rank
would never have accepted a command on such terms : and it
was neither just nor decent to expose him to an unmerited
mortification." t

• sir Joliii Cradodc, afterwards General Lord Howden, expired at his resi-
dence ill Horet'ord-strect, London, on the 18lh of July, 1839, after he had
attained the age of eighty years, lie was senior Knight Grand Cross of the
Bath, a member of the board of general ollicers, and eolonel of the forty-third
regiment. He served with great di.stinction in various parts of the world. He
commanded a battalion of grenadiers at the taking of the West India Islands ;
was wounded at Martinique ; and was present at St. Lucie, Guadaloupe, and the
siege of I'ort IJonrbon. He was a qiiarter-master-general in Ireland during the
rebellion of 17!)8, and severely wonnded at Ballinahinch, in the action with the
French troops and rebel forces. He commanded a division of the army under
Sir Riilph Abercrotnby in the Egyptian campaign, when he received fiom the
Sultan the imperial order of the crescent of the first class, as an acknowledg-
ment of his services. In 1804 he was appointed commander-in-chief in
India ; and in 1809, commander of the allied armies in Portugal. Upon tiie
apj)ointment of Sir Arthur Wellcsley, he was made, first, governor of Gibraltar,
and subsequently of the Cape of Good Hope. In 1819 he was created Baron
Howden of Grimston and Spaldington, and of Cradock's town in the county
of Kildare, in the peerage of Ireland ; and in 1831 an English peerage was con-
ferred upon him. His lordship, on his promotion to a peerage of the realm,
exchanged the Irish family name of Cradock, by royal license, for that of
Caradoc, its Welsh original. Lord Howden was the only son of Doctor John
Cradock, archbishoj) of Dublin, and was succeeded in his titles and estates by
his only son. Lieutenant-colonel, the Hon. John Hobard Caradoc. As a senator.
General Lord Howden was moderate in bis political opinions, but an advocate
of liberal principles, and uniformly supported the Wiigs in parliament. The
following table presents an accurate statement of

The Services of General Lord Howden, G.C.B. K.C.

Cornet 4th horse - - -
Eusign Coldstream Guards
l.ieut. aii'I Captain, ditto
ftTajor ICih Light Dragoons
Major VM\ foot
Lieut-Colonel ISth foot
(.Colonel by Hrevet
Colonel lOTlh foot

15th Dec. 1777
9ih July, 1779
12th Deo., 1781
Colh June, 1785
10th Sept., 1786
16lh June, 1789
26th Feb., 1795
I6th April, 1795

Colonel half-pay, dillo
Colonel 5Uh foot
Colonel half-pay, ditto
Colonel 71st foot foot
Colonel 43d foot
.Major-general
Lieutenant-general
General - - -

25lh .March, 1798
8th May, 1801
25th June, 18()2
6th August, 180.'?
7th January, 1809
1st January, 1798
1st January, 1805
4th June, 181*

Wore the First Class of the Crescent.

t Napier's Hist. Pen. War.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 43

The contest in the cabinet being brought to a conclu-
sion, by the selection of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that officer,
recollecting the resolutions proposed by Mr. Whitbread, imme-
diately resigned the chief-secretaryship for Ireland, the duties
of which he had performed for three months with so much
benefit to that country, and character to himself, and at the
same time vacated his seat in parliament. Thus disencum-
bered of every civil office, he accepted the important command
of the Peninsular army.

In addition to the desire of aiding her new ally, the Spaniard,
England was urged to still further exertion by the importunities
of the Portuguese regency, to respect her ancient friendship
with that country; and the instructions given to the British
officer in command of the expedition were, "in case he should
find that Lisbon had been evacuated by the British troops, (an
event prevented by the prudence of Sir J. Cradock,) to pro-
ceed to Cadiz, and land the British troops there, if the govern-
ment would admit them into the garrison." ]\Ir. Canning
was aware, as he acknowledged in his letter to Mr. Freire,
of the delicacy of this step, owing to the refusal on a former
occasion, but circumstances had materially changed since that
rejection, and England entertained no resentment in conse-
quence of it. Previous to the departure of Sir Arthur Welles-
ley from England, he drew up a plan for the defence of Portu-
gal, which was submitted to the ministry on the 7th of March,
1809, and very fully unfolds his able views, as to the future
progress of that glorious campaign upon which he was just
about to enter. In this memorandum, minute in every parti-
cular, he gives it as his opinion, that Portugal might be
defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain ;
and meanwhile, that measures, adopted for the defence of
Portugal, would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their
struggle with the French. He was also convinced, that the
Portuguese military establishment, upon the footing of forty
thousand militia and eighty thousand regulars, ought forthwith
to be revived ; and that his majesty ought to employ an army
in Portugal amounting to twenty thousand British troops,

4 t T.IFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

including four thousand cavalry. He had always held, that
even had Spain been conquered, the French would not have
been able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than one
hundred thousand men; and, as long as the contest should
continue in Spain, this force, if it could be put in a state of
activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might
eventually decide the contest. The military establishment of
Portugal could not be revived without extensive pecuniary
assistance and political support from England ; and the only
mode he could perceive, whereby it would be safe, or even
practicable, to give this assistance, or to interfere in a military
way in the concerns of Portugal, was to trust the king's
ambassador at Lisbon to regulate the amount of such sums as
he might think necessary for the support of the military estab-
lishments only, and instruct him to see that the revenues of
Portugal were similarly applied. By the operation of such
powers, that civil officer would possess a complete control
over the measures of the Portuguese government; and, had
such a line of conduct been pursued, we might have expected,
by this time, to have had in the field an efficient Portuguese
army. As it was not possible to adopt these measures at
that time. Sir Arthur concluded, that the military establish-
ments of the Portuguese had made but little progi-ess ; and
in considering the extent of the British force required for the
defence of that country, the small extent of the Portuguese
force, and probability of an early attack by the enemy, must
be considered on the one hand ; and on the other, the con-
tinuance of the contest in Spain, and the probability that a
very large French force will not be disposable in a very short
period of time, for the attack upon Portugal.

In recommending the adoption of these political measures,
and the revival of the Portuguese military establishments, Sir
Arthur Wellesley considered that an expense would be incurred,
in the first year, of one million sterling. But should they suc-
ceed, and the Peninsular war continue, the benefit would be
more than adequate to the expenditure. Under this view of
the question, he conceived that the British force, to be

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 45

employed in Portugal, should not be less than thirty thousand
men, of which number, four or five thousand should be cavalry,
and a large body of artillery would also be requisite, because
the Portuguese were deficient in the two latter branches. It
would be further indispensably necessary that the whole of the
allied army should be placed under the command of British
officers, the staff and the commissariat, in particular, should be
British, and extensive in proportion to the duties to be performed.
As far as the details of these measures were concerned, Gene-
ral Wellesley deemed it expedient that the British army in
Portugal should be reinforced, expeditiously, with three thou-
sand cavalry, and some companies of British riflemen ; that
the complement of ordnance should be made thirty pieces of
cannon, two brigades being of nine pounders, and all completely
horsed ; that twenty pieces of brass (twelve pounders) ordnance
upon travelling-carriages, should be sent to Portugal, with a
view to the occupation of certain positions in that country ;
that a corps of engineers, for an army of sixty thousand men,
should be sent forward, and a corps of artillery for sixty pieces
of artillery.

The British army in Portugal, when Sir Arthur Wellesley
was chosen to the command, was but twenty thousand men,
including cavalry; this he required to be augmented to twenty
thousand, exclusive of that particular force, by the addition
of riflemen and other veteran infantry from the army returned
from Spain, as soon as they should be recovered from their
fatigues, and could be refitted. He further demanded that
thirty thousand stand of arms, clothing, and shoes, for the
Portuguese army, should be forwarded to Lisbon with all con-
venient expedition. It was in the highest degree advisable
that the general and staff-officers should proceed to Portugal,
as soon as the necessary arrangements were made, for Sir
Arthur Wellesley was of opinion, that the moment the public
journals announced the departure of officers for the Peninsuhi,
the French armies in Spain would receive orders to make
their movements towards Portugal, in order to anticipate our
measures for its defence."

II. H

Ail MFF, AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Having submitted this general view of his plan for the defence
of Portufral, a plan built upon experience of past services on
the continent, and originating in foresight of the future,
he hastened to Portsmouth, where the Surveillante frigate,
which had been commissioned for the purpose of conveying
him to Portugal, was in readiness. Detained here for a few
days by adverse winds, he addressed a communication to Don
Domingos de Souza Coutinho, (afterwards Conde de Funchal)
apologizing for not having waited on his excellency before his
departure from London, on the ground, that he considered it
important not to delay his departure one moment after he had
received his instructions from government; he also declared
himself much flattered by his excellency's expressions of gratu-
lation at his appointment to the command in Portugal — promised
to attend to the different subjects mentioned in the ambassador's
letter; and concluded by referring his excellency to Mr.
Secretary Canning, for the accomplishment of his wishes with
respect to the distribution of ammunition and arms amongst
the Portuguese.

On Saturday, the loth of April, 1809, two days subsequent
to the date of the preceding letter, although the wind was
still contrary. Sir Arthur Wellesley and his suite were received
on board, and " set sail," says Lord Londonderry, who was
attached to the staff" as adjutant-general, "with a stiff" breeze
blowing ahead, but we had not proceeded beyond the Isle of
Wight, when an event occurred which had nearly proved fatal
to us. It might be about midnight, or rather later, when the
captain of the Surveillante, (George R. Collier,) burst into
the cabin, entreating us to rise without delay, for that vi^e were
on the eve of shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no
time in leaping from our cots, and mounting to the deck, when
a very awful as well as very alarming spectacle presented
itself. In attempting to clear a shoal which runs out from
St. Catherine's point into the sea, the ship missed stays ; this
occurred again and again, each failure bringing us nearer and
nearer to danger; and now, when we looked abroad, the
breakers were to be seen a stone's throw from the bow. There

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 47

was not an individual amongst us who anticipated any other
result, than that in a few minutes, at the furthest, the vessel
would strike ; but we were deceived. The wind, which had
hitherto been blowing on shore, suddenly changed, and wo
were at once relieved from a situation, than which the whole
progress of our lives had not before brought us into any more
uncomfortable. But it was the only adventure which befell us
by the way. The fair wind, which sprung up at a moment bo
critical, did not desert us during the remainder of our voyage,
and we anchored in the Tagus, after a passage of only six
'days, on the 2*2nd of April^"* In addition to this circumstantial
statement of the peril to which the Surveillante was exposed,
we have the authority of Colonel Gurwood "that the frigate
was very nearly lost in very bad weather at the back of the
Isle of Wight, in the night after quitting Spithead."t These
accounts most probably emanate from the same source, and
the facts detaileil are undoubtedly true, but they augment
the amount of supposed peril much beyond the estimate
of an experienced seaman, on board the Surveillante at
the same time, who asserts, that there was no absolute
danger, and that the only injury sustained on the voyage
was the loss of the topsail during the rough weather of Monday
the 17th. As Sir Arthur Wellesley had been in Christian's
fleet during the celebrated six weeks' storm, the stiff breeze
of the Channel struck no terror to his heart ; his fortune,
too, prevailed as happily on this occasion, and, reaching the
port of Lisbon in safety, after a quick and lively passage, lie
disembarked with his suite, at four in the afternoon of the
day on which the Surveillante cast anchor in the Tagiis.

• Narrative of the ['eninsul-ir Mar. t Despatclies, note to p. "^04, \'o!. iv.

48 I.IFK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

CHAP. II.

Sir a. wei.lesley arrives ly the tagvs— his enthusiastic receptios by the portu-

CtESE— MARCHES AGAINST 60ULT — THE PHILADELPHES — BEBESFORD MARCHES ON THB
DOURO — HILL PASSES THE LAKE OVAR — AKFAIR AT GRIJO — PRECIPITATE RETREAT OP
THE FRENCH ACROSS THE DOURO — SIR A. WKLLESLEY PASSES THE DOURO, AND DRIVES
SOILT OCT OF OPORTO — BERESFORD DRIVES IN THE FRENCH OUTPOSTS, AND OCCUPIES
AMARANTE— SIR A. WELLESLEY PURSUES THE MAIN BODY OF THE ENEMY TO BRAGA —
DESPERATE SITUATION OF SOULT'S ARMY; THEIR ESCAPE, AFTER THE SEVEREST LOSS
AND SUFFERING — DIFFICULTIES OF SIR A. WELLESLEY-'s SITUATION — MARCHES TOWARDS
THE SOUTH OF PORTUGAL — THE PASSESOF BANOS AND PRERALES — TALAVERA — 1S09.

It has been frequently asserted that the Portuguese enter-
tained no sincere regard for the English character, and that
tlie faith and fondness of an ancient amity were, with them,
but empty sounds ; but it is highly improbable that such a con-
clusion could ever have rested on any solid support. "The
connexion between England and Portugal was not an ordinary
one, built on immediate interest, liable to change with the
change of circumstances. These were nations with whom,
during the long struggle with Buonaparte, we were in league
one day, and at war the next, the hostility being without
anger, and the alliance without esteem. Our friendship with
Portugal was, like our enmity to France, founded on some-
thing deeper. From the day when Portugal first became a
kingdom, with the exception of that unfortunate period when
the Philips usurped its crown, England had been its tried and
faithful friend. When Lisbon was conquered from the Moors,
English crusaders assisted at the siege — English archers
contributed to the victory of Aljubarotta, which effected the
first deliverance of Portugal from Castile. An Englishwoman,
a Plantaganet, was the mother of that Prince Henry, whose
name will for ever remain conspicuous in the history of the
world. The Braganzan family, when it recovered its rights,
applied, and not in vain, to its hereditary ally; and when
Lisbon was visited by the tremendous earthquake of 1755,
money was immediately voted by the English parliament, for
the relief of the Portuguese people ; and ships laden with pro-
visions were despatched to tliem in a time of scarcity at home.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 49

These things are not forgotten — if there be a country in the
world where the Enghsh character is understood, and England
is loved as well as respected, it is Portugal. The face of its
rudest mountaineer brightens, when he hears that it is an
Englishman who accosts him : and he tells the traveller that
the English and the Portuguese were always — always friends.*
Yet these past services were, in a moment of irritation, in an
hour of sorrow, forgotten, and the English flag was insulted,
the soldier that fought under it spurned, and saved from violence
and death, at the hands of those whom he had so often protected,
only by measures of the last extremity, the planting of British
artillery in the squares and market-places of the different gar-
risoned tovvns.f That Portugal ought to have retained a

• Southey.
t " At the commencement of the Peninsular struggle, all classes of the Por-
tuguese, according to their means, rich and poor, the clergy and the laity,
the fidalgo and the peasant, expressed an eagerness to save, an eagerness to
honour the British. In these early marches, the villa, the monastery, and the
cottage, were throAvn open at the approach of our troops ; the best apartments,
the neatest cells, the humble but only beds, were all resigned to the march-
worn officers and men witli undisguised cheerfulness. It is witli pain I am
compelled to confess, that the manners of my strange, but well-meaning coun-
trymen, soon wrought a change in the kind dispositions of the people. M'hen
they saw many assume as a rigiit, all which they had awarded from politeness,
and receive their respectful attentions and cordial services, as expressions of
homage due to the courage, wealth, and power of the British nation — when
the simplicity of their manners, tiieir frugality, tlie spareness of their diet, the
peculiarities of their dress, and their religious prejudices, were made the sub-
ject of derision and ridicule — when tliey witnessed scenes of brutal intoxica-
tion, and were occasionally exposed to vulgar insult from uneducated and
overbearing Englishmen, — when all this occurred, they began to examine our
individual titles to their esteem ; they were, after, very soon disenchanted :
and the spirit which we had awakened in them, manifested itself in various
acts of neglect, rudeness, and even resentment. The English aie admired,
not only in Portugal, but over all Europe, as a free, enlightened, and a brave
people, but tliey cannot make themselves beloved ; they are not content with
being great, they must be thought so, and told so. They will not bend, with
good humour, to the customs of other nations, nor will they condescend to
soothe (flatter they never do) the harmless self-love of friendly foreigners.
No : wherever they march or travel, they bear with them a haugiity air of con-
scious superiority, and expect that their customs, habits, and opinions siiould
supersede, or at least suspend, those of all the countries througk which they
pass." — Recollections of the Peninsula.

50 I.U-E AND CAMPAIGNS OF

deep sense of gratitude to the British people, the page of his-
tory amply testifies ; that this feeling was for awhile suspended,
is equally authenticated ; and the fact is confirmed by the
testimony of an eye-witness, whose memoranda aiFord some
explanation of the cause that led to so deplorable an effect

It was during that interregnum of British popularity, and at
the precise moment when a council of British generals had
boldly determined upon retaining Lisbon to the last, that Sir
Arthur Wellesley landed upon the shores of Portugal. Never
was a more certain demonstration afforded of any fact, than
this gallant soldier's arrival gave, of the clear and decided
character which he had acquired on the continent, for courage,
ability, and honour. It was for Sir Arthur Wellesley that
the Portuguese deputies before applied, when Beresford was
fortunately chosen, and sent to discipline their rude hordes :
and now the voice of all Portugal was raised in proclaiming
welcome to the victor of Vimeira, and hailing the only man in
existence whom they could follow, undoubtingly, to the field of
battle. When the native forces of Spain or Portugal were
victorious, it was their constant custom to attribute the suc-
cessful issue to the bravery of the men alone : whenever they
suffered a defeat, the blame was imputed to the general, and
death, invariably, became his portion in such cases. This
infamous policy necessarily destroyed all confidence between
the native commanders and their followers, and was attended
with the worst and most lamentable consequences. It was
a peculiar quality of General Wellesley to be able to inspire
his troops with the firmest confidence ; and instances are not
rare, in the eventful military history of his life, of an inferior
in command, although perhaps an able officer, having made
the best possible disposition to attack or receive the enemy,
yet still unable to convince the soldiers of the security or
their position, when General Wellesley has unexpectedly
arrived, perceived the wavering feeUng of the men, and, with
the rapidity of thought, directed some new movement to be
made : this was followed uniformly by a murmur of approbation,
— evidence of new and boundless confidence in the result of

THE DCKE OF WELLINGTON'. 51

that day : and this, though the Jeast bloody, was perhaps the
most fatal blow struck against the enemy on such occasions.
'1 hat the Portuguese had the same implicit reliance on the
genius and destiny of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was rapidly ennced
by the numerous and extravagant demonstrations of joy
exhibited in ever)- town of Portugal where a spark of freedom
remained unquenched. The streets of even.- large town were
occupied with groups, engaged in calculating upon the fortunes
of Portugal under the command of the invincible British
general ; for three successive nights, every window in Lisbon
shone bright with illuminations in honour of the hero's return
to the field of his glorj-. Spectacles, chiefly allegorical, were
exhibited in the different theatres, in which ^Mars and Victory
were the chief performers ; laurel crowns were distributed
abundantly ; and the fetes in honour of the British chieftain
resembled those scenes with which ancient Spain was once fami-
liar, when chivaln*- was held in high esteem. The public autho-
rities innted Sir Arthur to an entertainment, a compliment
which he respectfully declined ; but he cheerfully accepted the
rank of '• marshal-general of the armies of Portugal," to which
he had with much propriety been nominated by the regency.

The first step taken by Sir Arthur Wellesley, after his
acknowledgments were made to the government and muni-
cipal authorities, was dictated, not merely by a correct view
of his duty, not solely by the etiquette of the service, but by
a considerate feeling for every man in every class of society,
with whom in his long and active public life circumstances
brought him into contact. This was now manifested by the
delicate manner in which he assumed the command. Tlie
day after his arrival, and while the loud vivas of the delighted
Portuguese were borne to his ears bv every breeze that blew,
he calmly, courteously, delicately, addressed Mr. Villiers (Lord
Clarendon) to say that "he thought it best that Beresford
should come to Lisbon, unless inconvenience to the public
service was to be apprehended bv his absence from his corps :'"
he despatched a second letter, on the same day, to General
Beresford, couched in similar laniruaffe, but leaving it at tiiat

52 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

officer's option to come to Lisbon, or wait to receive the new
commander at the head of the Portuguese forces, which,
ahhousih still under that commander's immediate control, were
at the disposal of General Wellesley in his capacity of marshal-
general of Portugal. Beresford was assured, through both
communications, that the business of war could be advanta-
geously transacted for a few days at Lisbon, and in one he
was requested to mention to Sir John Cradock, the invitation
he had received from the Marshal-General. These precau-
tionary acts of kindness did not yet complete the measure of
respect, which Sir Arthur felt due to the rank, conduct, and
character of the gallant officer whom he had been sent to
supersede, for the invitation to Beresford Avas quickly followed
by a letter to Sir John Cradock, in which the new commander-
in-chief informed that officer " of the concurrence of his
opinion with that which his predecessor appeared to enter-
tain, with respect to a further movement northward:" he
next proceeded to speak of the positions of Soult and Victor,
and how far the latter seemed enabled to make an attack on
Portugal, and alluded to the means of defending Lisbon and
the Tagus in such case. These, and other subjects equally
important to the further prosecution of the Peninsular cam-
paign, Sir Arthur expressed an anxious desire to talk over with
Sir John Cradock, in company with General Beresford. If
these various communications, and the manner of them, do
not sufficiently prove that no thoughts ranged higher in the
reflections of the commander-in-chief, than how the feelings
of Sir John Cradock might be most delicately consulted, the
concluding paragraph of his private letter to that general, will
remove every doubt : " It might possibly also (says Sir Arthur)
he more agreeable and convenient to yoxi to see me here, than
at the head of the army ; and if this should be the case, it
would be a most desirable arrangement to meet you here : I
beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only with
a view to your own convenience and wishes." The sincerity
of this courtesy was further established by the tenor of Sir
Arthur's communication to the right honourable J. H. Frere,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 53

then British ambassador at the court of Spain. To this civil
officer it was announced, that Sir Arthur proposed to assume
the command of the army, as soon as he should have commu-
nicated with Sir J. Cradock. This interview, unseen by the
army which the late commander-in-chief had directed with so
much ability and prudence, being terminated, Sir John, on
the seventh of May, went on board the Surveiliante frigate,
which had brought out his successor in the command, and
sailed for Cadiz bay, where he lay until the first of June, on
which day he landed at Gibraltar, and assumed the government
of that impregnable fortress.

The prosecution of the approaching campaign now wholly
engrossed the comprehensive mind of the commander-in-chief.
With his accustomed penetration, he quickly solved the cause
of those perplexities with which Cradock, Beresford, Hill, and
Cuesta were beset — difficulties of no ordinary character; and
while he partially adopted the remedy proposed by Cradock,
formed a new plan of operations, embracing all possible con-
tingencies. When Sir Arthur undertook the command. Sir
J. Cradock was at Leiria, and General Beresford at Thomar,
without any decided intention of moving forward : on the
contrary, they were disposed to await intelligence of Victor's
definite objects. With respect to Soult, he continued in pos-
session of Oporto, having pushed his posts as far only as Ovar,
on the north of the river Vouga. The left of his corps was
engaged in attacking General Silveira, on the Tamaga, with a
view to open the province of Tras os Montes, and acquire for
his army the option of retreating into Spain, should they be
])ressed by the British. General Lapisse who had advanced
from Salamanca, at first threatened an attack on the province
of Beira, but, abandoning that object, marched along the
Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he passed the Tagus,
and effected a junction with the Duke of Belluno, at INIerida,
on the Guadiana. This post had been occupied by Victor
since the fatal affray with the Spaniards under the brave old
warrior Cuesta. His country's admiration of this venerable
patriot-general was substantially attested by the meritorious

II. I

56 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

sufficient time for copying the originals before they were trans-
mitted. This interesting fact is proved by a passage in one of
his letters to Mr. Villiers, dated from head-quarters at Coimbra,
in which Sir Arthur says, " I am obliged to you for your ofier
to procure me assistance to copy my despatches : but 1 have
plenty of that description. The fact is, that, excepting upon
very important occasions, I write my despatches without
making a draft; and those which I sent to you were so written
before I set out in the morning, and I had not time to get them
copied before they were sent, which is the reason why I asked
you to return me copies of them."

Upon leaving England, Sir Arthur Wellesley made a pro-
mise to Mr. Iluskisson, then secretary to the treasury, that
he would immediately communicate the exact state of " the
money-concerns of our army.'' This pledge was redeemed by
an able statement, and one which could not fail of being
satisfactory and intelligible to that great master of finance to
whom it was addressed. " Instead," writes Sir Arthur, " of
£400,000, which we both expected would be found in Portugal,
I find not quite £100,000, and this in Spanish coins, which
could not be circulated in Portugal, excepting at a consider-
able loss, and without revealing to the money-dealers at Lisbon
our want of money, which would have raised the expense of
drawing bills excessively. I have, therefore, sent the Spanish
gold to Cadiz to be exchanged for dollars, and am now here
wdth the whole army, proceeding to attack Soult — with only
£10,000, and monstrous demands upon me." Sir Arthur also
furnished an estimate, to the treasury, of the expenses of the
army, which he calculated at £200,000 per mensem, — showed
the proper mediums through which this sum should be dis-
tributed, namely the deputy paymaster-general, the ambassador,
and the commissary-general, — recommended the transmission
of specie from England, as the best mode of commanding and
keeping down the expense of drawing bills in the money market ;
and concluded by assuring the secretary of his determination
to guard both the honour and the treasure of their common
couptry. General Wellesley coinciding in the opinion of General

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THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'. ^7

Buonaparte, already expressed, as to the absolute necessity of
obtaining intelligence of an enemy's movements, and of main-
taining regular and secure communication between the divi-
sions of the same army, the establishment of a post was, in
consequence, amongst the first objects of his care. OflBcers
were employed, immediately on his arrival at Lisbon, to convey
information all along the frontiers; and Sir Arthur wrote from
Coimbra, on the sixth of May, to request that there might be
a daily post established between that place, Lisbon, and
Abrantes. It will be seen hereafter how perfectly sensible he
was of the importance of this object, and what incalculable
advantages attended his successful exertions to improve the
post-office system of Portugal generally.

In addition to the composition and transmission of so many
despatches in a few short days, a novel and startling subject also
engaged the attention of Sir Arthur Wellesley. A society,
adopting the name of the Philadelphes, had been, some time
before, formed amongst those officers of the French army, who
were either disgusted with the injustice, or wearied with the
continuance, of the Peninsular war ; or who, from that unsteadi-
ness and discontent, which for the last fifty years have created
such agitation in French society, were impatient of imperial re-
straint, and desired nothing more ardently than the restoration
of republicanism. No matter to which of these causes its origin
is attributable, its existence was indisputable, and Jacques
Joseph Oudet, a native of the Jura, who was slain the night
after the battle of Wagram, not, it is asserted, by the Austrian
enemy, but by secret assassins, employed for the dastardly
purpose by his imperial master, was its founder. The cause
of Oudet outlived the author, and discontent spread itself from
the army of the continent through that of the Peninsula, and
murmurings were overheard, yet none were ever found to vio-
late the bond that bound the traitors, or break their premedi-
tated silence and secrecy. In Portugal, the French marshal,
acting on the principles of his employer, a consummate master
in the art of war and government, concealed from his corps the
existence of a continental war; but marshal Beresford, having

58 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

got possession of an intercepted letter from Kellerman, found
a Portuguese, Manuel Francisco Camarinho, bold enough to
carry copies of this document to Oporto, and post them on
the defences of Soult's head-quarters. The secrecy of Soult
vas now met, by thePhiladelphes.in a spirit, perhaps of natural,
although ignoble and unsoldierlike feeling — a resolution to
betray him into the hands of the British. History taught them
that it was improbable a British officer would be a participator
in the guilt and meanness of selling a brave general to his
enemy, and, to evade this difficulty, the conspirators attempted
to give abetter colouring to their crime : this they did by declar-
ing, that they always detested the tyranny of Napoleon, and were
themselves the only restraint upon his extravagant exercise of
power ; that the love of liberty and of legitimate rights was the
fundamental principle of the brotherhood ; and, rather than sub-
mit to the usurpation of the conqueror, that they would restore
the royal line of Bourbon to the throne." To accomplish their
purpose, it is asserted that they first sought a co-operation with
the English, and then looked around for a leader. Ney would
have been the object of their traitorous choice ; but circum-
stances pointed out St. Cyr, as a fitter instrument.

It was in the month of April, 1809, and before the arrival
of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Lisbon, that John Viana, the son
of a Portuguese merchant, presented himself at Thomar, the
head-quarters of ^Marshal Beresford ; he was accompanied by a
French officer, whose object it was to create a disposition, in
the officers of Soult's corps, to revolt, and seize upon Soult
and other principal persons of the army. Having requested that
an English officer should be sent to negociate and arrange with
their deputy, Major Douglas, then a lieutenant-colonel in the
Portuguese service, and subsequently Major-General Sir James
Douglas, K. C. B. in reluctant obedience to the orders of General
Beresford, proceeded to the advanced posts of the French, at
night-time, and there held a conference. The interview was to
have taken place on the lake of Aveiro, but the boats having
passed each other in the dark, Douglas returned to the vil-
lage of Aveiro, where he found Adjutant-Major D'Argenton

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 59

and John Vlana had already arrived. In the conference that
followed, the conspirators dwelt upon the sufferings of the
French army in general, and the extreme distress of the corps
under the Duke of Dalmatia. They protested that discontents
had long prevailed in France on account of the conscription,
which were much increased by a sense of the great injustice
of the measures adopted towards Spain, and the seizure of
the king : that if the English would only press Soult, so as to
oblige him to concentrate his forces in a situation chosen rather
for defence than subsistence, a large proportion of the army was
prepared to revolt, who would immediately seize the general,
as well as all those officers in the interests of Napoleon, and
put an end to the unjust war in the Peninsula. Major Douglas
relieved himself from the unpleasant duty of negociating with
these wretches, who were base enough to violate that tie of
loyalty, that compact of honour, sacred and observed with
fidelity, by all nations, from the infancy of old time, by sending
forward D'Argenton to Lisbon, in order to communicate with
General Beresford personally. There he had an interview,
not only with the Portuguese marshal-general, but with Sir
A. Wellesley also, to whom he represented the ambitious views
of Soult, who, he said, had his thoughts fixed on the vacant
throne of Portugal; and his earnest request was, that the
British commander-in-chief would grant passports to himself,
and two other French officers, to proceed to France. At this
meeting. Sir Arthur declined paying any attention to the com-
munication of D Argenton, whose opinion, as to the best mode
of pressing Soult, had already been adopted, and was in active
progress; but he requested that Admiral Berkeley would grant
the passports which the traitor so urgently begged. When
pressed for the reasons which induced them to hazard an
absence from duty, and exposure to the authorities in France,
the chief conspirator replied, that the officers under whom they
immediately served were participators in the plot, and woulil,
therefore grant leave of absence ; besides, activity was indis-
pensable in communicating with the disaffected at home, as
Napoleon, the moment he received intelligence of the event,
would seize every one on whom the slightest suspicion lighted.

GO LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

The regulations of Soult also, which permitted vessels of all
nations to sail from Oporto, added, at that moment, to their
facilities of escape. — Not only did Sir Arthur decline every
co-operation with the malcontents, but he caused it to be
communicated to their associates in the French army, that
he had only granted the representatives passports to proceed
to France : he cautioned D'Argenton against the risk of car-
rying such documents about his person ; and, in communicat-
ing the extraordinary narrative to Lord Castlereagh, while he
acknowledges that " the successful revolt of a French army
might be attended by the most extensive and important conse-
quences," he adds, in the true spirit of a generous enemy, " but
their defeat or surrender would add much more to the reputa-
tion of his majesty's arms." On the seventh of May, Sir Arthur
had another interview with a deputy from the Philadelphes, at
midnight, on the road between Fornos and Martede, where
they watched each other's countenances by the light of a fire.
Here further and baser plans were proposed by the conspira-
tors; one of which was, to persuade the Portuguese to address
Soult, inviting him to accept the crown of Portugal, and, should
he so far forget his allegiance to the emperor, and fall into the
snare, then the army of Laborde and Loisson would immedi-
ately declare against him, lead the troops back into France,
and release Portugal from the French power. As this plan
included an understanding that Sir Arthur was to urge the
Portuguese to the insidious policy of seducing Soult, by offer-
ing him this great encouragement to treason, it was calmly
but decidedly rejected, as a measure "that would justly disen-
title the British general to the confidence of the Portuguese,
and unworthy of the character of a British soldier." With
respect to the military operations recommended by the deputy,
as they were precisely those which Sir Arthur had previously
decided on, whether the French army was revolutionized or
counter-revolutionized, he determined upon operating against
Soult as soon as ever he should be ready, and he was then
using the utmost activity to become so. Sir Arthur did not
disbelieve the existence of a deep-laid plot for the seizure,
perhaps the assassination, of Soult, but he indignantly rejected

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 61

the addresses of any who dared to think him a fit instrument
in so villanoLis a proceeding. He confidently beUeved that
hatred, jealousy, and weariness of an imperial tyranny had
closely cemented a strong band of malcontents, in the French
army ; but he prudently determined to rely on his own
activity, strength, and genius, in preference to placing con-
fidence in those who were only known to him as traitors.
Unable to shake the firm resolve of the high-minded Briton,
D'Argenton withdrew with the passports given to him by
Admiral Berkeley ; but scarcely had he reached the French
camp, when he was arrested, and brought before the Duke of
Dalmatia. He now, too late, learned the value of General
Wellesley's advice, not to accept of British passports, as they
would probably, at some time or other, appear as witnesses of
his infidelity, and now being found on his person, no further
proof of guilt was required. At first Soult oifered pardon,
if he would disclose the extent of the conspiracy, the depth of
the abyss that gaped to receive the imperialists, and name his
associates in the dark design of throwing their victims into its
depth; but D'Argenton was immovable. So far from holding
out any hopes of compliance with the wishes of the general, he
cautioned him against his perilous position, and reminded him
of the precipice on the brink of which he and his ambitious
views then tottered ; admitted that he had visited the British
quarters at Lisbon and at Coimbra, where he was admitted into
the presence of Sir A. Wellesley and General Beresford ; and
informed Soult that the enemy, thirty thousand strong, would
open the campaign on the banks of the Vouga in less than
eight and forty hours : " Confess then," said D'Argenton, " tlie
injustice of the war in which you are engaged, unite with the
honest British, and march in concert with them, back to your
native land ; and, at the foot of tiie Pyrenees you shall be re-
inforced by sixty thousand men, prepared to combine with you
in the recovery of the liberties of Europe." This mysterious,
startling appeal, averted the fate of the traitor, who was com-
mitted to close confinement, with a view of examining him fur-
ther on a future occasion ; but that opportunity never presented
II. u.

6-2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

itself, D'Argenton having effected his escape during the hasty
movements which the rapid advance of Sir Arthur Wellesley
rendered necessary. This bold man, who had formerly been
one of Soult's aide-dc-camps, and whose desertion was on that
account more base and flagrant, was not the only officer of rank
who souijht and succeeded in holding midnight councils with
the British commander-in-chief; the names of Colonels Lafitte
and Donadieu may also be added to the list of traitors. These
officers are believed to have given Soult all the information they
possessed, relative to the strength and intentions of the British,
but its amount could not have been considerable; for. General
Wellesley, although he believed that they sincerely desired to
betray their commander, never received them by daylight,
never admitted them within the camp-boundaries, and always
heard their propositions with silence and reserve.

A slight deviation from General Wellesley's original plan of
operations, was rendered necessary in consequence of the defeat
of Silveira. Sir Arthur, trusting to that officer for the defence of
the Tamega, intended to have reinforced his little band with
Beresford's and Wilson's corps, which were to have crossed
the Douro at Lamego : this plan would have placed a force of
thirty thousand men between Soult and the Tras os Montes,
by which he would either have been forced to engage under a dis-
advantage, or to retire behind the Minho, a task of extreme dif-
ficulty when closely pressed by the allies, and rendered still
more so by the season of the year. On the fourth of May, how-
ever, intelligence reached the head-quarters at Coimbra, that
Silveira was beaten, his army driven across the Douro to La-
mego, and the bridge of Amarante in possession of the enemy.

Few actions, in which the numbers were so trifling on both
sides, were ever attended with greater effusion of blood. The
Portuguese being driven from the bridge, fell back in disorder
on the town, whither they were followed closely by the
enemy; there they were rallied by Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick,
an English officer; and, entrenching themselves behind the dead
bodies in the street, and occupying the convent of St, Gon^alo,
they poured such a destructive fire upon the enemy, as com-

THE DUKE OF WEr,LINGTO\. 03

pelled them at length to evacuate the town. In tliis desperate
discharge of musketry, Colonel Patrick was mortally wounded ;
and his death, which followed immediately after, left the
Portuguese no sufficient example of bravery in a leader, to
imitate. Confidence forsook them, and energy was, in conse-
quence, abated: it was at this moment that Soult arrived, at the
head of the reinforcement, and, resolving to win tlie bridge at
any price, advanced with such a force as compelled Silveira to
decline the contest, abandon the venerable bridge of Ama-
rante to three of the marshals of Napoleon,* and retire upon
Entre ambos os Rios.

This disaster called for a correspondent change in Sir
Arthur's movements, but did not affect his general design.
Previous to the commencement of offensive measures, the
security of Lisbon had been provided for ; and the designs of
Victor sufficiently guarded against, by disposing along the line
of the Tagus two regiments of British cavalry, two battalions
of infantry, with eight thousand Portuguese regulars. Instruc-

* Antiquaries have maintained that the bridge of Amaiante was tlic work
of Trajan ; but a long-establisiied, and fondly cherished tradition ascribes its
foundation to St. Gonc^alo de Amaraiite, who, fixing his abode there in a her-
mitage, and commiserating the many accidents that befell travellers in passing
the river, resolved on building a bridge. The alms which he received falling
far short of the sum required to pay his workmen, the saint made the sign of
a cross on the water, which drew as many fish to the surface as he had occa-
sion for, while he obtained oil and wine from a rock that was contiguous.
The bridge consists of three arches, the centre one being disproportionately
large, as far as beauty is concerned ; but the saint foresaw the necessity of this
arrangement ; for, many years after its construction, the flood carried down
a huge oak-tree of such size and weight, that, had it struck, it must have
thrown down the bridge : the accident was anticipated by St. Gonralo, who,
rising from his grave, with his staff guided the monstrous tree tiirough the
central arch, and sent it on its journey to the sea. In gratitude, not only for
the construction, but for the miraculous preservation of the bridge, the Portu-
guese pay an annual commemorative visit to (he .shrine of the benevolent saint :
where not the low and solemn accents of prayer f.iU on the travellers' ears,
but joyous notes of song and roelry, music and fire-arms, and every noisy
demonstration of gratitude, which the means of tlie pilgrims supply. On
some occasions, thirty tiioiisand clamorous worshippers have visited the shrine
of Gonc^alo, and tlic quantity of wax-tapers, the usual offering, presented
on a single festival day, has been known lo exceed twcWe hundred weight,
— Svutfiri/'s Hist. Veil. War.

G-k LIl'H AKD CAMPAIGNS OF

tions were given to this body, to occupy the flying bridges of
Villa Velha and Abrantes, while Colonel Mayne, at the head
of the Lusitanian legion, seized the bridge of Alcantara, and,
in case he was unable to hold it against the superior numbers
of the enemy, the commander-in-chief then, reluctantly, con-
sented to his blowing up that noble work of art. The conduct
of the whole plan of operations on the Tagus, which may with
more propriety be called the defence of Lisbon, was entrusted
to Major-General Mackenzie. As this service did not promise
active employment for the British, Sir Arthur directed " that
the assistance of our officers and men should be given, till their
services were otherwise called for, to discipline the Portu-
guese regulars :" a plan for the occupation of their leisure, of
the utmost value, should the main army be employed in the
north of Portugal, until the Tagus became fordable.

To calm the importunities of the brave Cuesta, Sir Arthur
addressed an explanatory letter to his excellency, reminding
him, that " although he had every reliance on the valour, zeal,
and loyalty of the Portuguese, he did not consider them in
such a state of discipline as to confide to their exertions the
safety of Portugal, the object especially committed to his care,"
He opened to the Spanish general his intention of marching
against Soult in the first instance, and, when he should have
succeeded in removing from the north of Portugal the evils
with which it was threatened, of proceeding forthwith, at the
head of twent.y-five thousand men, to the eastern frontiers, in
the neighbourhood of Elvas, and there co-operate with Cuesta
in attacking Victor. It was therefore advisable that General
Cuesta should continue, in conjunction with the corps of
observation on the line of the Tagus, to act strictly on the
defensive, until Sir Arthur should be enabled to come to his
assistance, by which co-operation the destruction of Victor's
army would be rendered certain.

The advance and concentration of the British were silently,
simultaneously, safely progressing : on the first of May the
main body reached Pombal, and on the following day arrived
at Coimbra, where the head-quarters were fixed ; and, in every
town through which the army marched, at every spot where

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. C)

r

a halt was made, the active mind of the commander-in-chief
was engaged in preparing instructions for the direction of
every officer in a detached position, and giving them the benefit
of his great experience, and wisdom, in the minutest matters
of commissariat and other departments.

His despatches almost mark every mile of his march : to the
gallant Mackenzie, who fell afterwards at Talavera, he ad-
dressed a long and able memorandum, from Leiria, on the first
of May, which was followed, a few hours after, by a second,
dated Pombal, where the army halted for the day, and by a
third, on the following morning, directing that officer to destroy
all the boats on the Tagus, or carry them below Salvaterra,
where the river was wide enough to place them out of the reach
of musketry from the opposite bank, on the approach of the
enemy: thus, as nothing was too great or too difficult for the com-
prehensive mind of the British general, so nothing was too mi-
nute or trifling to be undeserving of his attention ; of his labour
he was lavish, at all periods of his life. The entrance of the
allies into Coimbra was hailed vociferously by the inhabitants ;
had they been returning from a field of victory, their reception
could not have worn more of the character of a triumph. The
commander-in-chief was welcomed with millions of vivas, and
the name of Wellesley was pronounced in every house with
praise, confidence, and gratitude. If ever there was a man
wholly indifferent to popular applause, from a devoted resig-
nation to a just and powerful sense of duty, it was the com-
mander-in-chief of the allied army at Coimbra on this day.
Amidst shouts of exultation, the blaze of illuminations, ad-
dresses and congratulation from the higher and more wealthy
classes, he continued, unmoved,* to issue his cautious and well-
digested orders, and give, as he had done at Lisbon, his un-

• " AlFairs were in loo critical a posture to authorize waste of time, even in
the agreeable occupation of giving and receiving compliments ; and Sir Arthur
was not a man to gratify his own vanity at the expense of the public good. Ho
accordingly cutsliort many of tiie dispositions which tlie Portuguese authorities
had made, for the purpose of manifesting their good-will, and set himself, on
the very day of his arrival, to the task of arranging and distributing his army
for immediate operation?." — Marquis of Londoiulirn/s \aituine.

6'6 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

divided thoughts to tho objects of the expedition. It was from
Coimbra that Sir Arthur Wellesley forwarded his acknowledg-
ment of thanks, to the regency, for the honour they had con-
ferred upon him, in the appointment of marshal-general of the
armies of Portugal, and which he communicated through Don
Miguel PereiraForjez, a man of consummate genius, but whose
character was at first misunderstood by the British.

By the disposition of the French army of the north, after
the affair at Amai*ante, their strength was considerably weak-
ened : Laborde proceeded to Oporto ; Loison kept pos-
session of the position from which the enemy had been driven ;
and Mermet advanced to the Vouga — nor could their force
be concentrated, on its centre, in a shorter period than eight
days. Thus scattered and extended, communication became
slow or interrupted. Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley, baffling
the vigilance of the enemy, succeeded, without exciting the
least suspicion even of the proximity of such a powerful enemy,
in uniting his forces at Coimbra on the fifth of May; a
plan which gave him a choice of two lines of operation.*

* The command of the fourteenth, sixteenth, and twentieth regiments of
British cavalry was given to Major-General Cotton. The first battalion of the
Coldstream, the first and third of the Guards, one company of riflemen from the
fifth battalion of the sixtieth regiment, was under Brig.-General H. Campbell.
Major-General Hill was at the head of the first brigade, consisting of the
Buffs, the sixty-sixth, the forty eighth, and one company of the fifth battalion,
sixtieth. Major-General Tilson had the third brigade, composed of five
companies, fifth battalion sixtieth, the eighty-eighth, and first battalion Portu-
guese grenadiers, and the eighty-seventh. The fifth brigade, made up of the
seventh, first battalion tenth Portuguese. The fifty-third and first company
fifth battalion, sixtieth, was headed by Brig.-General A. Campbell. Brig.-
General Cameron commanded the seventh brigade, consisting of the ninth,
second battalion tenth Portuguese, the eighty-third, and one rifle company.
The sixth brigade, consisting of the first battalion detachments, first battalion,
sixteenth I'ortuguese ; and the twenty-ninth w as under the orders of Brig.-
General R. Stewart. The fourth brigade, consisting of the second battalion
detachments, second battalion sixteenth Portuguese, the ninety-seventh, and
a rifle company was headed by Brig.-General Sontag. The second brigade,
made up of the twenty-seventh, forty-fifth, and thirty-first, acted under
Major-General JMackenzie. The Germans were divided into t^'^■o brigades,
under the orders of Brig. -Generals Longthvert and Drieberg, the whole being
commanded by Major-General Murray. Four Major-Generals : namely,
Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord William Bentinck, and Paget, received local rank

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 07

The allied army was formed into three divisions of infantry
and one of cavalry, exclusive of the corps under General
Beresford, Lieutenant-General Paget was appointed to the
command of the first division, which consisted of two brigades
of infantry. The second, made up of three brigades, was
placed under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke ; Major-General
Hill headed the third, composed of two brigades only ; while
the cavalry was to be led by General Payne. The whole
amount of this force did not exceed sixteen thousand men. Of
the two routes which were open from Coimbra, that which led
through Vizeu and Lamego would facilitate the design of
turning the enemy's left, and probably intercept his retreat on
Tras OS Montes ; the other, by the high road to Oporto, would
give an opportunity of falling suddenly, and in superior force,
on the enemy's right, between the Douro and the Vouga. On
the fifth of May, a detachment, consisting of one brigade of
British infantry, one squadron of British cavalry, and a corps
of six thousand Portuguese, infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
moved towards Vizeu, under General Beresford. On the
sixth, the main body, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and includ-
ing Paget's division, advanced by the Oporto road, but halted
on the seventh, to give Beresford time to get forward to the
upper Douro. General Hill's division had taken the Aveiro
route, and all were now cautiously marching towards the
Vouga. To lull suspicion still longer and more securely,
Paget's division was directed to halt on the ninth, and not join
the main army until night, lest they might be seen by the
enemy's advanced guards, their outposts being established
along the Vouga. These decisive and offensive operations
were executed with such rapidity, that Soult remained totally
ignorant of the approach of a new and powerful army, before
the ninth of May, on w hich day Sir Arthur Wellesley addressed
Mr. Frere in language full of that species of determination

as lieut. -generals, that they might severally take the command of such divi-
sions as the general-in-chief saw occasion to consolidate. Brig.-General
Stewart (INIarquess Londonderry) was at the head of the adjutant-general's
departments; and Colonel INIurray, third guards, acted as quarter-mafiter-gen.
Lord Londonderry's Narntlive.

G8 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

which strongly cliaracterises the private letters of Admiral
Nelson to his friends in England. That great man always
stated in simple, candid, unaffected terms, his confidence of
being able to beat any force opposed to him, his resolution of
doing so, and generally concluded by expressing his apprehen-
sion, no matter what their superiority in numbers, that the
enemy might, through dimness of weather, or any accident,
escape his grasp. General Wellesley, in his letter of the ninth
of May, dated Quinta de la Graciosa, almost w-ithin gun-shot
of the enemy, expresses his regret at leaving Victor behind ; his
anxious wish to attack Ney, who was then in Gallicia; his appre-
hension lest Soult might still effect a retreat into Spain ; and
speaking of that general, declares, " I shall omit nothing in
my power to destroy him." There is here a remarkable analogy
to the uniformly confident tone of Nelson's simple letters.
Can such self-trust, such an instinctive feeling of success,
such a total unconsciousness of defeat, or danger, or disappoint-
ment, flow from any other source than a genuine and innate
magnanimity ?

On this day, however, the thunder-bolt burst over the
head of Soult, and all its outpourings fell upon him in an instant.
D'Argenton was arrested; treason had existed, and its bane-
ful influence was then diffused through the ranks of his army
to an extent impossible to ascertain. His forces were scattered
over too wide a field to be speedily concentrated ; and intelli-
gence arrived, every moment, of the approach of the allies,
headed by the victorious Wellesley, the conqueror of Iloleia and
of Vimeira. Completely out-generalled, altogether surprised,
and basely betrayed, Soult presented, nevertheless, a noble
picture of a brave man struggling with misfortune. He
called aloud on those who had not forsaken the emperor, to
assemble under the wings of his eagles. Loison w as despatched
to Mezam-frio and Ilajoa, with orders to retain Amarante even
with the blood of thousands ; and to assist in effecting this
all-important object, Lorge was instructed to evacuate Viana,
and march on Amarante. All the ammunition that could not
be removed he caused to be destroyed, — the guns and mili-
tary stores to be all moved upon the Tamega, and everything

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 69

put in a state of preparation for a retreat through Tras os
Monies.

Although the masterly plan of surrounding the French in
Oporto, and reducing them to the necessity of surrendering, had
been partially interrupted by the failure of the Portuguese at
Amarante, still, so perfect was the design, that no successes,
short of defeating the British in the open field, could extricate
them from the web in which they had unconsciously become
entangled. Every movement was made in silence and in
secret, and none displayed more decisively the absolute coolness
of the British general on the approach of danger, than the little
plan of operations laid down for General Hill, and for the force
under his immediate command. Durin": one of the midnight
interviews, between Sir Arthur and the deputies from the
Philadelphes, it had been casually mentioned by the latter,
that the lake of Ovar, which extended a length of twenty miles
behind their outposts, was left unguarded. This fact did not
escape the attention of the general, although apparently hang-
ing on the conspirators' narration ; and now, in still greater
secrecy, he despatched General Hill, on whose genius, energy,
and courage he could rely, to the shores of that estuary, direct-
ing him to seize all the fishing-boats, and cross the lake. The
appearance of an army in battle-array in the solitude of the
lake of Ovar, at first surprised the hardy fishermen that dwelt
there, but soon, from their local knowledge, comprehending the
wisely laid plan of the British general, conviction flashed
across their minds, which was scarcely more rapid than their
zeal in manning the boats, and their energy in rowing the
troops to the further shore : one brigade was soon debarked,
and a second quickly followed. Hill's movement having suc-
ceeded to the fullest extent, the right of the enemy was virtually
turned. This was effected on the tenth, on which day General
Beresford, who had incorporated Sir Robert Wilson's corps
with his own, and who, it will be remembered, had been ordered
to march by Vizeu upon Lamego, in order to turn Soult's left,
and cut off his retreat on Braga, there fell in with the victori-
ous division of Loisson, on which he inflicted a severe chastise-

II. L

70 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ment, compelled them to abandon the position from which they
had driven the Portuguese, and drove the affrighted French
before him on the road to Amarante.

Sir Arthur Wellesley did not apprehend any deficiency of
gallantry on Beresford's part, but, on the contrary, believed him
to be feelingly awake to every temptation which the least
opportunity of acquiring glory would throw into his onward
path ; and with all that watchfulness of a great and perfect
commander, from the midst of his difficulties, and before he
had heard of the dashing gallantry of the marshal, he thus
addressed him on the eleventh. — " If the French w eaken their
corps about Amarante or Villa Real, attack them, and get
possession of either of those points. But, in doing so, remem-
ber you are a commander-in-chief of an army, and not to be
beaten : therefore do not undertake anything, if you have not
some strong hopes of success."

It was hardly possible for the French army to have escaped
from the grasp of the British, although fortune so frequently
favoured the arms of Napoleon, and the indiscipline of the
Portuguese had hitherto allowed them to obtain easy victories :
for now both wings of the enemy were turned, and the com-
mander-in-chief just about to surprise their advance-guard
under Franceschi, before Soult was roused from the slumber of
security to behold the imminent danger at his threshold. He
quickly formed his resolution, which was to evacuate Oporto,
and retreat through the Tras os Montes, but, if possible, to check
the impetuosity of the British general, whose incomparable
manoeuvres had so begirt him with toils. This, if done at all,
must be at Amarante, and some provision had already been
made in that quarter against an enemy. But had Soult
been able, at any period, to cope with Sir Arthur Wellesley,
he was now completely beaten ; he was in ignorance of the
enemy's proximity, and of course of the various divisions that
were marching down in the radii of a circle, on the centre which
was occupied by a surprised enemy. The British advance-
guard, with General Cotton's division of cavalry, reaching
Andeja, having learned that two regiments of the enemy's

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 71

cavalry, with a small infantry force, and a few guns, were
cantoned at Albergaria Nova, resolved upon surprising them.
To effect this object. Cotton diverged from the track, along with
the cavalry, intending to make a circuit round the village to tlie
right. Paget was to cross the rough ground called the I^ass
of Vouga, where he was to wait for the cavalry — while to
Colonel Trant and his Portuguese, the labour was allotted of
getting the guns over the rugged waste. The darkness of
the night, an error of the guides, and the great difficulties of
the way, delayed and deranged the well-concerted plans of the
British advance. Trant, interrupted in bringing on the guns,
by a deep ravine, which reached from Lake Ovar to Oliveira
de Azamiz, carried on his own artillery only, by the bridge of
Vouga, leaving General Stewart to bring forward the remainder,
which was not accomplished without the loss of many of
the carriages. This delay permitted Trant's corps to get
in advance of Paget's column, and it was morning on the ninth
before the defiles were cleared. Meanwhile, Cotton's guides
losing their way in the darkness of night, the cavalry found
themselves, at sun-rise on the tenth, not in the-rear or flank of
Albergaria, but in front, with the enemy drawn up and ready
to receive them. Franceschi's cavalry, a fine body of men,
were in ready line, his small body of infantry posted in a pine-
wood, on which the flank of his line rested; and his position,
altogether, was well chosen, and sufficiently strong. Cotton
himself, surprised, and not anticipating such a reception, was
indisposed to attack him until the arrival of the main body.
Franceschi displayed the most gallant bearing and military
skill, challenging his enemy, and skirmishing occasionally with
Trant's corps, in total ignorance, however, of the powerful force
that was within an hour's march of him. In this situation were
the opposite parties, when Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived with
Paget's infantry, and having ordered an attack to be made on
the wood, whence the enemy's infantry was immediately
dislodged, the astonished Franceschi fled, but not disorderly,
to Oliveira, and by his coolness and ability succeeded in escap-
ing, without serious loss, from the pursuit of the enemy, to

7'2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Grijo, which he reached at day-break on the following morning,
and united his forces with those of Mermet. In this affair some
prisoners were taken, and a few pieces of cannon, all that the
enemy had brought into the field ; and the conduct of the Portu-
guese ritlemen, students from one of the colleges, was highly
applauded by the commander-in-chief. A miserable scene,
however, was here enacted — calculated to detract from the
dignity of war, and, since such things must be, from the glory
of conquest. The French had disgraced themselves on many
occasions by cruelty to the inhabitants of captured towns, and
too frequently indulged, not merely in plundering, but in a
wanton destruction of such effects as they were unable to re-
move. Nowhere, during the war, were these vicious propensities
more lavishly gratified than in the village and vicinity of the
Albergarias. Here the bodies of the ordenanzas, who had the
misfortune to have fallen into their hands, were found sus-
pended from the trees, with horrible proofs of cruelties inflicted
upon them before death : every house had been broken into,
the furniture burnt, the cattle all slaughtered and left putre-
fying on the field, the wine and liqueurs spilled upon the earth,
and insatiable, yet petty malice, wreaked on those that should
least and last have been its objects. It is to be regretted,
althoufrh the desire of venfreance was almost natural under
such circumstances, that the Portuguese also could not have
been restrained from its exercise; after the retreat of the
French, all the sick, wounded, and prisoners, on whom they
could lay hands, the villagers put to death by the most excru-
ciating tortures.

The allies having thus repulsed the enemy's cavalry, and
driven in their outposts on the tenth, reached Oliveira on the
eleventh of May ; and, at six o'clock on the following morning,
Sir A. Wellesley informed Beresford of his success, made him
acquainted with a report that reinforcements were advancing
to strengthen the enemy; but, so unconscious was he of failure,
at this as well as all periods of peril, that he added in his
despatch, " I hope we shall have finished with Soult before
these can arrive." On the same day coming up with the enemy

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 73

at Grijo, where they were strongly posted on an eminence, their
right flank being covered by a thick wood, their front defended
by the village and some uneven ground. Sir Arthur renewed
his attack ; and the spirits of the men were so high, that nothing
could resist them : the head of the British column was imme-
diately in action, and the sixteenth Portuguese, led on by
Colonel Doyle, quitted the line of march, and in a gallant
style drove the infantry from the wood that covered the
enemy's right. The cavalry, under the honourable Charles
Stewart, did great execution, and the German legion, com-
manded by Major-General Murray, made a movement upon
the enemy's left flank, originally badly placed, which would
have compelled any troops to quit their position, and instantly
turned the enemy. Both flanks being turned, the ruin of the
enemy was inevitable, had they stood their ground ; and fully
sensible of their situation, they began to retire, pressed on by
General Charles Stewart with his cavalry, and continued their
retreat to the heights of Carvalho, where they rallied, and offered
a faint resistance to their pursuers; but the infantry approach-
ing, they turned their backs once more, and fled precipitately
towards the Douro, which they crossed on the night of the
eleventh, and immediately after destroyed the bridge. The
British took advantage of the flight of the enemy, and rested
for the night, but at day-break they were again in motion, and
eager for the fight. To this expectation a difficulty of such
magnitude presented itself, that few military men, whose achieve-
ments are remembered by the historian, ever seem to have
conceived or executed so hardy a design : this was to force
tlie passage of a river one thousand feet wide, deep, rapid, and
enclosed between high and rocky shores, and this in the face
of ten thousand veterans that defended the opposite bank : this
was an enterprise "from which Alexander the Great might
have turned without shame;" but Sir Arthur resolved, if but a
single boat could be obtained, to effect the daring deed.

Soult intended to evacuate Oporto leisurely, and with that
view he proceeded to blow up his magazines, to destroy such
stores as it would be inconvenient to remove, himself inspecting

7-1 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the destruction of the floating bridge ; and he had previously
given orders to collect all the boats together at the city-side of
the river, and place them under the care of a vigilant guard. In
iiTiiorance of the enemy's movements, he still believed that he
was in })ossession of the bridge of Amarante, and, by some
strange infatuation, the marshal became filled with the conviction
that the British would take advantage of their maritime means,
and attempt a landing below the city, near to the embouchure
of the Douro. Upon this belief he acted, and in this fatal error
he was still further confirmed by the report of his own cavalry,
who, having observed Hill's division at Ovar, assured the
marshal that they must have arrived from the ocean, and dis-
embarked there. Precautionary measures were taken accord-
ingly. Soult continued at his head-quarters, which w^ere
between Oporto and the sea; Franceschi was directed to
watch the coast, and give the British such a reception as
would render their debarkation impracticable. Every neces-
sary arrangement for the defence of the river below the city,
being completed, Mermet was ordered to place one brigade at
Valonga, two at Baltar, and to pay attention generally to the
line of the river on his right, securing or destroying every boat
that could be found. To render his retreat still more secure,
Soult despatched orders to Loison, to maintain the position
which he still believed that officer occupied at Mezam-frio and
Pezo da Ragoa, and, having completed his plan of defence,
resolved upon resting one day longer in the enjoyment of his
usurpation, and then retiring in good order and at leisure, while
the British were sailing up the Douro from their congenial
element the ocean.

It was almost noon on the twelfth of March before the clouds
that obscured the reality, from the mental vision of the marshal,
were dispelled, before the mists in which infatuation and error
had wrapped him were dis^sipated, before the veil of enchant-
ment fell off, and disclosed all the perils of his embarrassment.
At that hour the British columns begun to arrive at Villa Nova,
on the opposite bank, and concentrate rapidly, yet secretly, for
the high grounds of the convent still concealed them from obser-

THE DUKK OF WELLINGTON. 75

ration. The British general now felt an intense anxiety relative

to the support of Beresford's operations, the result of which

materially depended upon the main body being able to pass

the Douro. But this was a labour of unexampled difficulty,

one of the boldest conceptions, and most gallantly performed

exploits, to be found not only in the history of the Peninsular

war, but in all military annals to their remotest limits. At

an early hour in the morning, Major-General Murray had

been despatched with a battalion of the German legion, a

squadron of cavalry, and two six-pounder?, to endeavour to

collect boats, and, if j)ossible, also to cross the river at Avintas,

about four miles above the city. This operation could not be

noticed by the enemy, from the graceful sweep which the Douro

makes around the base of the Serra heights, by which the

reach above the town is concealed from view of the city.

Ck)nfiding in the ability and resources of General ]\Iurray
to effect the passage of the river above the city, and cal-
culating upon the bravery of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke
for the acconiplishment of the more arduous passage from
Villa Nova directly across, Sir Arthur ascended the highest
pinnacle of the convent, and, fixing his keen glance upon the
glorious landscape spread out beneath him, while his imper-
turbable mind was intent upon those measures best calculated
to baffle a renowned commander, and sustain his own great
fame, he instantly perceived the advantages which this part of
the river presented, could he only obtain a few boats ; and it
is well known that he had resolved to risk the attempt with
one boat, if one only could have been procured. The convent
of St. Agostinho de Serra stands on the summit of a lofty pro-
montory, that presents a precipitous front to the river ; and, on
an eminence on the opposite bank, is the Seminary, a large
unfinished building, originally designed for the bishop's palace,
the sloping ground in front being enclosed by walls reaching
down to the edge of the water, and the enclosed area being
capable of containing about two battalions : there was no ingress
to the building from the Valonga road, except by one iron gate ;
and the Seminary commanded every object around, witiiout
being itself commanded by any, except one summit about gun-

76 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

shot distance, which was too pointed to be employed as a battery.
Here Sir Arthur resolved to pass : the enclosed area, in front
of the Seminary, would afford some protection to the brave
fellows wdio should be the first to land ; the bend of the river
would effectually conceal the boats in their passage from the view
of the enemy, whose watch was chiefly kept below the town ;
and, when a sufficient number should have crossed, the Semi-
nary would become their citadel. One boat was all that could
at first be procured, the property of a poor barber, who had
eluded the vigilance of the French patrol in the night, and
passed over to the Villa Nova suburb. Colonel Waters dis-
covered the skiff, and, taking with him the prior of Amarante
and the owner of the boat, returned to the city, unmoored, and
brought over with him three large barges, without having
attracted the notice of the sentinels. The next important step
was the establishment of a battery in the garden of the convent,
to protect the walled enclosure where the troops were to land.

When the four boats were ready, and the boatmen of one were
lying on their oars, the commander-in-chief was informed —
to which he calmly replied, " W^ell, let the men cross." A sen-
tence expressive of as perfect confidence in the result, as if an
armed flotilla were ready to convey them. General W' ellesley's
army were strangers to doubt, indiscipline, or delay, and the
irrevocable order to embark was executed by an officer and
twenty-five men of the Buffs, who passed to the other side
under a silent gaze of admiration from their fellow-soldiers,
and the calm but not less anxious watching of their intrepid
commander. In half an hour the little voyage was safely
accomplished, and the remainder of the first battalion, with
Lieutenant-General Paget, w^ere all landed before the enemy
awoke from their inexplicable lethargy. Then suddenly the
beating of drums, sounding of trumpets, firing of rockets and
guns, ringing of bells, and every possible accession to noise,
tumult, and confusion, were called into operation. The enemy
now ran down in numbers, but without order, and, throwing
out clouds of sharp-shooters, furiously attacked the Seminary ;
but the resistance made by the Buffs was suflicient to repulse
them until the arrival of the forty-eighth and sixty-sixth

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 77

regiments, with a Portuguese battalion, to their support.
Soult, now become furious, rushed to the attack with a large
body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, but his efforts were
unattended by better results. In the violence of the last
assault, Paget, who had ascended to the roof of the Seminary,
was wounded by a musket-ball, and obliged to retire, the com-
mand devolving upon INIajor-Gencral Hill. At this crisis,
the French artillery were playing upon the Seminary, and
volleys of musketry, from the still increasing numbers of the
eneni)^, were pouring in upon the enclosure ; while IMurray
did not yet appear on the approach from Avintas. These cir-
cumstances seemed sufficient to demand the personal presence
of Sir Arthur amidst his advanced guard ; but he was dissuaded
by those around him, from attempting the passage of the river
at such a moment, when thousands of pieces would be levelled
at his barge. Yielding to solicitation, he now augmented the
fire from the battery in the convent-garden, which swept the left
wall of the enclosure, and obliged the enemy to confine all
their efforts to the entrance-gate and wall on the Valonga
road. As soon as the citizens understood that the British had
actually arrived, landed on the city-side, and were in strength
also on the farther shore, new hopes arose, a prospect of
delivery was near, and their own exertions were calculated to
accelerate the consummation. While General Hill kept the
enemy very fully employed, the citizens were making signals
to Sherbrooke and the allies on the opposite bank, and, as
soon as they had descended to the shore, pushing off, they
transported the guards and the twenty-ninth by the lower ferry.
These, debouching from the narrow streets, took the enemy in
the rear; while Hill, advancing to the wall of the enclosure, dis-
charged a thick fire of musketry down upon the astonished and
confounded enemy, who now perceived Murray advancing from
Avintas to cut off their retreat : thus surrounded, further
resistance was vain, and, abandoning their ordnance, which
had just been brought out from the city, they fied towards
Valonga, each column receiving, as it passed, the destructive
volleys of the well-trained battalions under Hill. As the
II. M

78 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

enemy fled along, their flank was exposed to the attack of
General Murray's column; but this ofiicer declined acting
upon his own responsibility, and pursued, but too implicitly,
the orders of the commander-in-chief. There were two officers,
however, under his command, who had no apprehension of
consequences when their motives were correct, and who felt
the truth of the maxim, " that political courage is as necessary
as mihtary, in an officer abroad;" these were General Charles
Stewart and Major Hervey, who, with a laudable gallantry,
dashed from the inactive line, pursued, and fell on the enemy's
rear-guard. Too well experienced in both defeat and victory,
they turned, and defended themselves; but the British officers,
being unsupported, and having done enough for glory, returned
to their column, not, however, before General Laborde had
been unhorsed, and General Foy severely wounded : this latter
officer narrowly escaped being made prisoner, in the confusion
and anxiety of his men to resume their retreat. Major Hervey
was wounded severely in this skirmish, but his brave troopers
sustained little or no loss. Thus ended the much-celebrated
achievement, " the passage of the Douro," in which one of the
most complete victories ever obtained, was won from a general
of the highest military reputation, and who had actually fought
himself into the city, from which he was so unexpectedly driven,
with a loss comparatively trifling, and against difficulties such as
have hardly ever been surmounted by any commander. Soult is
accused of inactivity ; and his supineness palliated on the plea
that the Portuguese concealed, or would not afford, information
of the advance of the British, and also that he was surrounded
by traitors. These pretexts, the off'spring of an unnatural pre-
judice in the minds of what may be called an Anglo-Gallican
party, do not deserve any attention. Inactivity is a grievous
fault in a general ; and S'oult's state of ignorance cannot he
justified in opposition to the standing orders of the emperor,
one of which concludes with this aphorism, " In an inhabited
country, the general that is not well instructed, must be
ignorant of his trade."* And, as to the last argument, namely,

• Vide pnge 2,)f), Vol. I.

THE DUKK OF WELLINGTON. 79

that treason was in his camp, this should rather have been an
incentive to activity, and was in itself sufficient to have aroused
the most lethargic disposition. Sir A. Wellesley, however,
in his private letter to the Duke of York, (no longer at the
head of the army.) gives the truest, the simplest, the real expla-
nation of Souk's conduct. " It is," he observes, "almost impos-
sible to say what induced Soult to be so careless about the
boats on the river, particularly near Oporto, or to allow us to
land at all at a point so interesting to him as that we occupied.
I rather believe we ivere too quick for him, and that he had
not time to secure the boats on all the points necessary to
protect the retreat of the troops." It was activity, coupled with
great military daring and ability, that achieved the passage of
the Douro, and it was, from the exercise as well as possession
of such high qualities, that Napoleon, when he heard of the
bold adventure, declared, " Wellesley was a general fully
capable of coping with the very best of his marshals."* Military
men have been found, possessing so much of either discern-
ment, or jealousy, as to censure Sir Arthur for not pursuing
his victory : to this charge it may be answered, generally, that
he was not unused to conquest, and knew, as the day of
Vimeira attested to his countrymen, when to follow a beaten
adversary : but in this instance he thought otherwise, for his
men were fatigued by a march of eighty miles, through the
whole of which length they were engaged in skirmishing with
the enemy: they had just accomplished a hardy, laborious, and
exciting achievement ; they had outmarched their supplies, in
order to come upon the enemy unawares : and, although
General Wellesley did not reproach the inertness of General
Murray, who had performed strictly the orders delivered to
him, yet it is highly probable that, had that general felt him-
self in a situation to have given the flying enemy such a
reception as they expected, and from the fear of which they

• " This was a most brilliant opening of the campaign, and justly regarded
as refletting as niucii credit on the daring and skill of the young IJritisli
general, as it cast a shade on the vigilance and circumspection of the veteran
French marshal." — Ulnl. o/Kitropi' , vol. vii.

80 LIl'I;: AND CAMPAIGNS OF

then sped before him, the greater part of Soult's corps would
have been either taken or destroyed. This, however, is no
more than conjecture ; nor did the commander-in-chief, at any
subsequent period, impute blame to any of his officers; praise
he bestowed upon almost all with a lavish generosity. Perhaps
an additional reason, for declining the immediate pursuit of the
enemy, was the absence of Marshal Beresford, whose precise
situation and circumstances were, at that moment, unknown
to the commander-in-chief, in whose comprehensive mind the
highest degree of boldness was ever associated with the greatest
caution and thoughtfidness for every part and person in the
whole plan of his operations.

It was on the twenty-second of April, that Sir A. Wellesley
landed at Lisbon, when the councils of the nation were waver-
ing as to whether Portugal should be given up to the battalions
of Napoleon, and exposed to the inhumanity and cupidity of his
generals, or, with the assistance of the small British force in
the kingdom, resistance should once more be offered to the
invaders : on the twentieth day from that date, by the genius
and gallantry of one man, Lisbon was restored to the pro-
visional government — the movements of one French army
effectually checked — a march over two hundred miles of
broken, difficult ground, accomplished with a degree of secrecy
that appears incredible — the passage of a broad, deep, and
rapid river, effected by means of only half a dozen boats, in
presence of twenty thousand victorious veterans, led by per-
haps the ablest of Napoleon's marshals—and the second city
in Portugal rescued from his grasp ; with a loss, on the part
of the allies, comparatively insignificant. The Portuguese
had previously held the mihtary talents of Sir A. Wellesley
m the highest esteem ; the passage of the Douro flattered their
judgment, and strengthened still further their confidence in
his ability to recover for them their liberties. Entering Oporto,
the commander-in-chief fixed his head-quarters in the spacious
house which Marshal Soult had quitted only two hours before^
and, along with his suite, sat down to the sumptuous repast
which had been spread for the general of the hostile army —

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 81

an extraordinary illustration of the uncertainty of human
hopes, and a singular instance of the fickleness of fortune in
the affairs of war. As evening approached, the boundless joy
of the citizens was exhibited by demonstrations the loudest
and most conspicuous that they could express or invent.
While the dead bodies of the enemy, stripped and mangled,
obstructed the public ways — while numbers lay stretched upon
the bed of sickness, pain, and death — the Portuguese were
employed in manifesting gratitude to their deliverers by pealing
the church-bells, and by a general illumination tln-oughout the
city; and, hurried along by an extravagant delight in victory,
were about to steep their laurels in the blood of the helpless
victims, whom surprise prevented Soult from removing out of
the hospitals — when the humane proclamation of the British
general, whose watchfulness no circumstance connected with
his duty seemed to escape, especially if humanity claimed his
attention, instantly stopped all further effusion of blood.

This manifesto called, imperatively, on the inhabitants to
be merciful to the wounded and prisoners, and reminded them
that by the laws of war they were entitled to the protection
of the commander-in-chief, a protection tc/iich lie was deter-
mbied to ufford them. It also appealed to the generosity and
bravery of the nation, not to revenge injuries on the enfeebled
instruments of the more powerful enemies who were still in
arms against them. All persons were prohibited from appear-
ing in the streets with arms, and the general threatened
any, who should dare to injure the wounded or the prisoners,
with immediate punishment Colonel Trant was appointed
commandant of the city, until the ])leasure of government
should be known, and the observance of the {iroclamation was
entrusted to him. To secure a regular and sufficient supply
of necessaries for the army, he permitted the corregidor to
remain in office, but cautioned him against the least inatten-
tion to its duties. In addition to compassionate care of the sick
and wounded, which Sir Arthur evinced by the language of
his proclamation, and the means adopted to carry its provisions
into operation, he addressed a letter to Marshal Soult upon

{:?2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the same subject, almost the very moment he entered the city.
" You know," said General Wellesley, " that you have left in
this city a considerable number of sick and wounded, of whom,
you may rest assured, I shall take the greatest care ; nor
j)ermit any one to injure them. But you forgot to leave
medical attendants with them. I have only a sufficient num-
ber for my own army ; and I do not think, in the present
excited state of feeling amongst the inhabitants, that I ought
to trust your poor soldiers to the medical men of this city. I
pray therefore that you will send, forthwith, a number of
attendants sufficient to relieve the wounded prisoners ; and I
promise, that as soon as they have administered relief, they
shall be sent back to you. You have some English officers
and soldiers prisoners, for whom I shall be happy to exchange
an equal number of yours."

On the twelfth, the remainder of the alUed army passed the
Douro, with all their stores, ammunition, and baggage, and,
during the time occupied in crossing, the commander-in-chief
was engaged in writing a despatch to Lord Castlereagh,
detailing, minutely, the ever-memorable event, praising the
gallantry of his officers and men, and deploring the fate that
deprived him of the services of his brave companions, Lieu-
tenant-General Paget, whose arm had been amputated, and
ISIajor Hervey, who had been severely wounded. The total
return of killed, however, amounted only to forty-three; of
wounded, to one hundred and sixty-eight ; and of missing, to
seventeen — while five hundred of the enemy fell in the action,
many were taken prisoners, and fifty-two pieces of ordnance
were captured. Making Captain Stanhope the bearer of this
despatch, which could not fail of being welcome to his country,
he directed him to proceed to England in the Nautilus,
Captain Dench ; and found leisure also to acquaint Beresford
with his successes and situation, in perhaps the briefest de-
scription ever written of a day of battle. " We have taken
some pieces of cannon — many prisoners— killed vast numbers :
the infantry went off towards Valonga and Amarante in the
utmost confusion ; some of the cavalry went the same way.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 83

I am much afraid that we shall not be able to march till the
day after to-morrow. Keep Villa Real, if you can do so safely,
and depend upon my being dose upon the heels of the French^
This is precisely the language calculated to give confidence
to an army, and it was such bold words that inspired the
broken ranks of the Portuguese with perfect reliance on the
genius of the British hero, and with courage to face, once more,
the veteran legions of Gaul. There is another species of
courage, already noticed, which Sir A. Wellesley possessed, to
which the final expulsion of the enemy and the conquest of
France are mainly attributable, that is, " political courage,"
which is just as necessary as personal, to an officer at a distance
from the seat of government, and left either to the exercise of
his own discretion, or to the caprice or ignorance of a civil
agent. Sir John Moore fell a victim to political timidity; his
apprehension of displeasing Lord Castlereagh, who had never
treated him with kindness, was the cause of his attending, so
entirely, to the wishes of the British agents in Spain ; and to
this misfortune, solely, his ruin is attributable, his military
genius and personal bravery having been often tried, and uni-
versally acknowledged. But, in this respect General Wellesley
may be compared with any hero of ancient or modern times ;
historians have established a striking parallel between Scipio
and Wellington, and there are many points of resemblance in
their military lives; modesty and humanity are perhaps the
most obvious : in caution and ingenuity, the British general
is compared to Hannibal ; but the latter, like Moore, became
the victim of political timidity, by submitting to civil autho-
rities, and abandoning the country of the enemy. Ccrsar, it is
true, possessed this species of boldness, but he grossly abused
its acquisition, by refusing obedience to all authority. To
General Wellesley has been reserved the great merit of being
able to guide the judgment of those civil envoys, opposition
to whose authority is disobedience to the sovereign. When
Sir Arthur landed at Lisbon, the British officers, civil and
military, were imable to agree, definitively, upon a plan of
operations : one party approved of advancing boldly against

84 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

tho onoiiiy, another of abandoning Portugal altogether to its
fate, and carrying the British army from the Tagus to the
I'hames. His extensive diplomatic experience, his familiarity
with similar services in India, his knowledge of character, and
his great share of political courage, enabled him to unweave
the web, to cut the knot, to reconcile discrepancies, and to
allay all agitations. The civil officers he addressed in the
mildest and most conciliating language, in many cases com-
plimenting them upon the formation of right judgments,
but, in others, cases of the extremest difficulty, and of vital
importance to the success of his measures, he showed himself
superior not only to the agents with whom he was in con-
nexion, but to all the British general-officers who had preceded
him in Portugal. It formed part of his system to congratulate
himself, in his written despatches, upon enjoying the approval
of those gentlemen as to the measures he v.^as then actually
pursuing : these measures being uniformly successful, and the
envoys in some instances bewildered in their complexity or
extent, forgot whether they had ever formed any opinion on
the subject, and gladly partook of the sunshine that followed
the tempest. Occasionally, however, he opposed the weight
of his own opinion and authority more directly : having
received intelligence, on the ninth of May, from a civil agent,
of the advance of the French corps from Arragon, accom-
panied by a suggestion of a corresponding change in his
plans ; General Wellesley replied, " The intelligence you have
communicated, were it even confirmed, should not induce me
to alter my plans." The agent had not the hardihood to dis-
approve ; and, as the decision ultimately proved correct, the
difference of opinion was not remembered.

The inevitable delay at Oporto being ended. Sir Arthur
prepared to pursue the enemy ; and the manoeuvres of the
British army in this pursuit have been represented by military
men as unequalled in the records of arms. Soult displayed
greater energy than he had been supposed to possess, and
skill that entitled him to wear the honours he had won ; still
he was exceeded in all those high qualities by Wellesley, whose

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 85

mind seemed inexhaustible in the production of expedients,
and in the creation of counteracting operations. — Soult escaped,
but not before Corunna was avenged.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley planned the expedition against
the Duke of Dalmatia, he calculated upon Silveira's being able
to maintain his post on the Tamega until reinforcements could
arrive; which, in addition to the possession of Chaves, would
have cut off the enemy's retreat, with the exception of the route
across the Minho, and even that would have been interrupted,
had the commander-in-chief been otherwise successful. This
plan was necessarily altered by the loss of the bridge of Ama-
rante, and Sir Arthur doubted the ability of the force under
Marshal Beresford to accomplish much more than confining the
enemy on the side of Lamego, and compelling him to retire into
Gallicia by Chaves, rather than by Villa Real into Castile.
Beresford had performed more than was hoped or promised,
in obliging the enemy's posts at Villa Real and Mezam-frio to
fall back; then crossing the Donro, and driving in Loisson's
outposts at the bridge of Amarante, he recovered possession of
the left bank of the Tamega. These successes were obtained
on the twelfth, the same day on which the famous passage of
the Douro was effected, and Soult, surprised amidst his fancied
security ; and so signal and decided were they considered,
that timidity, if not treachery, has more than once been im-
puted to the French general. On the morning of the thir-
teenth, the appalling intelligence of the capture of Oporto
reaching the army of Loisson, that general immediately retired
from Amarante, and, as he evacuated the town, was met by the
advanced guard of Soult's corps : thus strengthened, it is a
matter of surprise that he made no demonstration against the
enemy ; on the contrary, he allowed Beresford to occupy that
important position, and basely, or perhaps treacherously,
abandoned the advancing columns of Soult to the blows of a
powerful antagonist, and marched away to Guimaraens. Soult
relying on the integrity and resources of Loisson, despatched
Colonel Tholose to Amarante, with intelligence of the fall
of Oporto, and the precipitate flight of the French ; and, as lie

U. N

86 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was retreating upon the Tamega, desired Loisson to keep
possession of the bridge at any sacrifice; but this he could
not be persuaded to attempt, and the officer returned, on
the morning of the thirteenth, with the distressing commu-
nication. Soult now rose up to struggle with misfortune ; and
his genius and character never shone more brightly, nor will
any portion of his history be remembered by his countrymen
with more gratitude or admiration. In an instant his reso-
lution was formed; meeting with a Spanish pedlar at Penafiel,
who was acquainted with the by-ways of the district, he took
him for his guide, and, following his footsteps up the steep
sides of the Catalina mountains, crossed over to Pombeira,
and overtook the irresolute Loisson at Guimaraens. As they
crept along under the veil of night, by the course of the
Souza river, they were unexpectedly joined by Lorge's cavalry,
so that thus far, Soult had combated successfully with his
evil genius, and once more attached the disjointed mem-
bers to the main body of the army. Amongst the grievances
with which the French general had to contend, the most
painful were the murmurs of the troops, and the voice of
cowardice : some spoke of the kindness shown to captives by
the generous English, while others demanded a convention
like that of Cintra ; of the latter, Loisson is supposed to have
been the adviser. If such treaties were not agreeable to the
English, the French emperor was much less inclined to peace
or mere)', therefore there was little difficulty in convincing
his followers of the futility of such a hope ; while prompt
and firm measures soon silenced the whispers of disaffection
amonffst the officers. Orders were immediately issued to the
whole army to advance, first taking the precaution to spike
the heavy guns, break up the military chests, and scatter
abroad all, both money and stores, which they were no longer
in a condition to carry with them.

The retreat of the French was so expeditious, and so many
events of the highest consequence had occurred within the
space of forty-eight hours, that it excites no surprise to be
informed, that on the thirteenth, when General Wellesley

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 87

commenced the pursuit of the enemy, by directing Major-
General Murray with the Hanoverian legion, which were in a
condition to march, to move on Valonga, he was unacquainted
with the route which they had taken, with the destruction of
their waggons, abandonment of their artillery, and painfid
sufferings at Penafiel: that he was also uninformed of the
success, or even the precise movements, of General Beresford,
although provided for every possible case of failure or misfor-
tune that could arise in either army. It was the evening of the
day on which Murray marched from Oporto, before intelligence
of Souk's route reached that city, and a probability appeared of
his having marched on Braga. There were two lines of retreat,
by one or other of which Soult must necessarily have moved ;
the first into Gallicia by Ponte Ave, Ponte Lima, and Valen(;a;
the other towards Valladolid by Chaves. As Sir A. Wellesley
had resolved on intercepting the return of the French, and
avenging the shade of Moore, all the necessary orders had been
issued for occupying those lines. Beresford had been instructed
on the thirteenth to move on Chaves, in case the enemy
abandoned Amarante ; but while Murray was pressing forward
after the fugitives towards Penafiel, Beresford, anticipating
the orders of the commander-in-chief, had actually advanced
to Chaves, and sent forward Sylveira to occupy the defiles of
Kuivaens and Melgacjo near to Salamonde ; but the flight of
the enemy was too rapid, and Sylveira arrived too late.
Beresford received also a further conditional instruction, which
was, to push on for Monterrey in the event of the enemy
taking the road to Montealegre.

On the fourteenth the corps of Generals Stewart, Campbell,
and Hill, accompanied by the guards, took the lower road from
Oporto towards Barcellos and Valenc;a, but learning, the evening
of the same day, that Soult was moving on Chaves or Mon-
tealegre, the army was drawn off" from that route, and directed
to the right upon Braga, where they arrived on the fifteenth,
at which date, it should be observed, Murray was atGuimaraens,
Beresford near to Chaves, and the enemy fifteen miles in
advance of Braga. On the sixteenth, having commanded

88 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

General Hill with four brigades to halt at Braga, Sir Arthur
advanced towards Salamonde, and, being joined on the route
by General Murray, came up with the enemy's rear-guard at
that place on the sixteenth.*

Soult, meanwhile, had applied all the energies and resources
of a powerful mind to the relief of the misfortunes which had
befallen his army : aware of the impression which the capture
of his ordnance by the enemy would produce, he boldly anti-
cipated the evil, by destroying them in the face of his army, and
then, without reluctance, rehnquishing a worthless prize. Aban-
doning the road to Braga, he once more betook himself to the
mountain-paths, whither it was impossible to convey heavy guns,
and, making in a direct line for the heights of Carvalho d'Este,
gained an entire day upon his pursuers. Previous to his
arrival at this point, the marshal perceived disorganization
spreading amongst his veterans, and suddenly commanding
a halt, drew up his whole force in order of battle, upon the very
spot where once before they had won a brilliant victory from
the Portuguese. This politic stroke gave a new impulse to
the men, and now gallantly taking the command of the rear
himself in person, and placing Loisson over the advance, he
pushed on to Salamonde. From this he had calculated upon still
having two lines of retreat open to him ; one by Ruivaens, a
second, shorter but more difficult, by the Ponte Nova and Misa-
rella, leading into the Montealegre road. But the Portuguese
had already succeeded in obstructing the former line, by the
destruction of the bridge over the Cavado, on the road to

•

General Sairazin says, "that with a general more experienced, more
active, and more enterprising than Sir Arthur Wellesley, Portugal would have
beheld the scene of Baylen repeated ;" but General Mackinnon, on the con-
trary, observes, "that Sir Arthur's conduct, during this short campaign, gives
him the first rank amongst the British generals of the day." Speaking of one
of the skirmishes on this memorable pursuit, he says, " I was near Sir Arthur,
by his orders, when the attack was about to commence : and if I had never
seen him but at that moment, I could decide upon his being a man of a great
mind." General Mackinnon was capable of forming such a judgment : he
it was in whom England has perhaps lost more than iu any soldier, since Sir
Philip Sydney. — Anon.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 89

Chaves: and a few hardy peasants undertook to check the
retreat of the whole French army by cutting the Ponte Nova,
and resolutely defending the narrow causeway of the Miserella,
a bridle-ridge, over which but two persons, at most, could march
abreast. It was now the approach of night, the situation and
circumstances of the army were not only miserable, but des-
perate ; they were foot-sore, starving, half-naked, without artil-
lery, their ammunition almost wet, the rain having continued
to fall incessantly for eight and forty hours, and the British
army approaching rapidly, as the distant booming of their
well-served guns occasionally informed them. Retreat by
lluivaens being hopeless, Soult resolved on forcing the passage
of the Ponte Nova, and, summoning into his presence Major
Dulong, one of the bravest of his officers, addressed him nearly
as follows, " I have chosen you from the whole army, to seize
the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Select one
hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen : surprise the
guards, and secure the bridge. If you succeed, say so; if
otherwise, your silence will suffice." Amidst the heavy down-
pourings of a thunder-storm, Dulong reached the bridge un-
observed, and, killing the sentinel, passed along the top of
the parapet, which was still standing, and dispersed the Portu-
guese posts that had kept such a careless watch. The gallantry
of Dulong opened the rugged way, for a few miles further on
their harassing march, but there a still greater difficulty pre-
sented itself, and one which seemed to demand the exertion of
still greater enterprise. A deep ravine, that interposed between
two mountains, was spanned by a single arch, called the
Saltador, or leaper, resembling those sublime and picturesque
constructions in Switzerland, in Italy, and in Wales, which
geographers and tourists usually call, "the Devil's bridges." The
arch was still unbroken, but its narrow way was commanded
by Portuguese sharp-shooters, planted like trees amongst
the rocks that dotted the opposite brow, and from tliese
native ramparts, a fire so unerring was aimed at the attenu-
ated passing columns, that many a time the whole bridge's
length of men was seen to fall at once. At last Dulong rushed

90 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

singly over, setting a glorious example of bravery, and was
followed by a number sufficient to take possession of the moun-
tain, and drive away the authors of so much ruin.

While the advanced guard and main-body of Soult's corps
were either struggling for life with the Portuguese peasants,
or trampling each other to death in the gorges of the moun-
tains, or in the still narrower enclosures of a narrow bridge, the
British army came up with the rear, where Soult had gallantly
posted himself, at the village of Salamonde, and where he made
a demonstration of resistance by taking up an exceedingly
strong position. But scarcely had Lieut.-General Sherbrooke
advanced against them with the guards, and turned their left
by the heights, than they abandoned their ground, leaving one
gun and many prisoners behind them. In the enemy's rear
was the Cavado river, and crossed there by two small bridges ;
to these the whole force of the routed army directed their
course, but from the rapid approach of night it was considered
imprudent to pursue them even to that limit. Their fears,
however, acted as destructively upon them as the cannonade,
which had been kept up against objects that were scarcely
visible, and, when morning dawned, the spectacle that pre-
sented itself was such as could not fail to excite commiseration
even in the breasts of their most implacable enemies. The
dark mass on which the guns had played at night-fall now
presented a vast heap of slain, five hundred corpses lay mingled
with the carcasses of as many horses, the bed of the river was
choked with dead, and its banks strewn everywhere with
broken carriages, knapsacks, and plundered property of every
kind. Gold and silver vases, embroidered tapestry, and trea-
sures of various descriptions, were at length unwillingly dis-
gorged, and dropped, like golden fruit, in the path of the
pursuers, to retard their speed. So completely was the road
impeded by the accumulation of dead bodies, shattered
carriages, and abandoned stores, that Sir Arthur Wellesley
was necessitated to turn from the ensanguined field to the
little village of Iluivaens, and halt there during the night of the
sixteenth. On the following day, when the British were about

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 91

to resume the pursuit, Sir Arthur found that the enemy had
fled by a mountahi-path towards Orense, in which it would
be impossible then to overtake or stop him; upon which he
resolved to discontinue the chase, having driven him across the
frontier, and thereby executed the precise orders under which
he sailed from England. In this flight, so similar to the race of
Benevente, Soult lost everything, cannon, ammunition, bag-
gage, and military chest ; and his retreat was, in every respect,
even in weather, a poidant for the retreat of Corunna. " He
left behind him," says the official despatch, " his sick and
wounded, and the road from Penafiel to Montealegre was
strewed with the carcases of horses and mules, and of French
soldiers who were put to death by the peasantry before the
British advanced guard could save them."

This last circumstance was the natural eff'ect of the system
of warfare carried on by the French in that campaign. The
soldiers plundered and murdered the peasantry, and many
were found hanging from the trees on the road-side, who had
been executed for no other reason than not being friendly to
French usurpation : the route of their column in the retreat from
Oporto could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which
they had set fire. It may be regretted for the sake of humanity,
because capturing the general might have brought the war to
an earlier issue — it may be lamented by the infuriated Portu-
guese, who thirsted for their blood — and it caused perhaps
disappointment to the British, that Soult's army was not over-
taken, and compelled to surrender. But the reasons assigned
by the commander-in-chief for not pursuing the enemy across
the frontier, at a subsequent period were better understood ;
and Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was perhaps the only officer
in his army, who felt convinced that it was a more complete
triumph to drive Soult out of Portugal with such losses, " and
so crippled that he could do no harm," than to have accepted
his surrender, and undertaken the provision and securitv of
the French army on tiie Portuguese side of the boundary.
Sir Arthur asserts, in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, that he had
omitted no measure that could intercept the enemy's retreat ;

92 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

and adds, " it is obvious, however, that if an army throws
away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything
which can strengthen it, and enable it to act together as a
body, and abandons all those who are entitled to its protec-
tion, but add to its weight and impede its progress ; it must
be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed,
with any ])rospect of being overtaken, by an army which has
not made the same sacrifices." When the loss of military equip-
ments is taken into account, the sufferings and deaths of his
men, the number of sick abandoned, the disgrace inflicted on
the French name, perhaps it will be acknowledged that the
British general was wise in being content with his triumph.
Soult had invaded Portugal, only eleven weeks before, with
twenty-five thousand men ; he returned with but eighteen
thousand — he brought with him, in his unjust attack upon the
liberties of that country, fifty-eight pieces of artillery, every
one of which he was obliged to abandon. Napoleon always
felt grateful to the marshal for rescuing so many of his best
troops, from the snares which had been so deeply laid to sur-
prise and cut them off. When Sir Arthur Wellesley himself
hesitated in the chase, there the pursuit virtually ended, for
the enchantment of his presence was wanted, and even his
officers seemed to require the light of his countenance to
seeking out the foe. On the eighteenth, Soult escaped from
the guards as well as from Silveira's corps, and, passing the
frontier at Allaritz, on the following day entered the gates of
Orense with a plumeless helm.

Having disposed of Soult as he had originally intended, and
driven the French out of Portugal according to the orders he
had received, he was now informed by Major-General Mac-
kenzie, through a letter of the nineteenth, that Marshal Victor
had broken up on the Guadiana, that he had attacked and car-
ried the bridge of Alcantara on the fourteenth, and advanced
on Castello Branco. That post had been occupied by a small
garrison, consisting of the second battalion of the Lusitanian
legion, and the Idanha a Nova battalion of Portuguese militia,
from the time when the allied army marched to the northward.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 93

Colonel Mayne, who commanded this small force, withstood
the attack of the united corps of Victor and Lapisse for six
hours, and then effected a well-ordered retreat without the
loss of a single gun, hut at a considerable sacrifice of lives,
one hundred and seventy having fallen of the legion alone.
The Portuguese troops generally fought well under Sir Arthur
Wellesley, and it was his opinion, " that no troops could have
behaved better than the Lusitanian legion did at Alcantara ;
and further, that they would have held their post against the
twelve thousand enemies, had the Idanha battalion not given
way." Mayne attempted to blow up the bridge, but failing
in that object, the enemy's cavalry crossed immediately. Sir
Arthur, in a letter to Mr. Frere, seems rather to regret that
Sir 11. Wilson had been withdrawn from the important post of
Alcantara ; but surely the gallantry of Mayne left no cause for
either repentance or reproach, and Sir Arthur himself frequently
acknowledged that the defence was highly meritorious. This
intelligence, however, quickened the movements of the British :
four brigades, which had been left at Braga, were ordered to
return to Oporto ; while the head-quarters were moved in
the same direction. Beresford was advised to form a junction
at Braga, where a conference also might be held ; and Silveira
was left with his Portuguese, to continue the pursuit of Soult.
He could not, however, have followed him hotly, or to the
Spanish borders, for it is known that hunger and fatigue would
have almost annihilated the fugitives, had not the peasantry at
Allaritz mistaken the red coats of the Swiss, for British uniform,
and, under the delusion, brought them wine and refreshments.
Sir Arthur Wellesley now marched to the southward, to
renew active operations by attacking Victor. On his arrival
at Oporto, on the twenty-second, with part of the army, his
mind was there fully employed, his diplomatic genius amply
tested, and his patience severely tried. Remittances had been
promised from England, but they were delayed, and, when they
did reach Lisbon, were encumbered with fiscal technicalities.
" If," said the general, "we are to carry on war in this country,
money must be sent from England ;" and in the same despatch

11. o

94 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

he complained " that lie could not be certain of the subsistence
of the army, unless the Portuguese government would let him
have three or four hundred mules." At this anxious moment,
intelligence reached him of the appointment of the Marquis
Welleslcy, as ambassador-extraordinary to the Spanish govern-
ment, which he did not consider to be a subject of congratulation
to his lordship or his friends. He thought the task that would
devolve on him would be most arduous, and that some time
would elapse before he would become sufficiently " uu courant
lies affaires to be able to form a judgment of its extent." His
next duty was that of providing the traitor D'Argenton, who
had escaped from confinement during the attack on Oporto,
with safe-conduct to England : he gave him a recommendation
to Lord Castlereagh, in which he urged the strength of
D'Argenton's claim on the British government " for such an
allowance as might enable him to live decently in England."
Sir Arthur's influence procured for him both an asylum and a
pension; but, soon after venturing over to France, to bring away
his wife and children, to whom he was ardently attached, he
was apprehended and put to death.

A question of some difficulty next arose, but one of little
moment, any farther than illustrating, as it does most happily,
his character for integrity, and purity of principle, of which it
is so frequently the gratifying duty of Sir A. Wellesley's biogra-
pher to speak. Upon the capture of Oporto, there were several
ships, Danish, Swedish, French, and English, in the harbour,
loaded in some instances with valuable cargoes. Of this pro-
perty, three thousand tons of wine belonged to the English
merchants ; and an immense collection of cotton had been
made there by the French, and placed in charge of the French
consul. The admiral, who lay off the coast, thought that all
property at Oporto should be treated as prize, and that the
army, therefore, were entitled to salvage. To this Sir Arthur
replied, that if entitled to any, he was entitled to all ; but that
Oporto being a Portuguese port, and the British acting there
as auxiliaries to his royal highness, everything taken in Oporto
necessarily belonged to that government, and not to his

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 95

Britannic majesty's. He also argued against the policy of such
a step, as one likely to offend the Portuguese : " however con-
venient it might he to me to share in this benefit myself, I am
very unwilling (said Sir Arthur) to be instrumental in forwarding
such a claim, if it is to have the effect of putting our friends out
of temper with us." Admiral Berkeley and Mr. V'illiers per-
severed for some time longer in endeavouring to alter his view
of this question : to the former he replied by informing him,
" that as his right could only be founded on that of the army,
and would arise from their success in a joint expedition, it
followed, that until the right of the latter could be proved,
which he thought could not be done, the admiral need not
make any application, nor complain of any injustice." In his
letter of the first of June, to Mr. Villiers, he expresses an
anxious desire to end the dispute totally ; observing, " as I am of
opinion that none of us have any claim whatever, if you are of
the same opinion, I think you had better say no more upon
the subject, except to let the government know that there is a
large property in cotton and wines at Oporto." This appeal
to the liberality and generosity of the claimants, appears to
have obtained more respect than that which rested solely
upon justice.

A contemptible, ungrateful, pitiful party, at Oporto, com-
plained to our civil agent of the severity with which they had
been treated by the British commander-in-chief, who had made a
specious display of justice, by qualifying the amount he wrung
from them with the name of loan. The impartiality and gene-
rosity of Sir Arthur Wellesley had long been proverbial, and
the preceding anecdote very fully establishes his title to both ;
the imputations therefore of these mendacious monopolists
were totally devoid of foundation. When Sir Arthur returned to
Oporto from the pursuit of Soult, he was miserably deficient in
money, and his men were without every species of necessary
store: all wanted shoes, and there was not one farthing in the
chest. He asked Murray, privately, whether he thought the
exposure of his distress at Oporto, by borrowing from the senate
or the merchants, would heave a baneful influence upon the

96 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

money market at Lisbon ; and that gentleman conceiving that it
would not, he applied first to the senate, who at once consented
to advance as much as they could spare, and afterwards to
the ivhie comjxniy. This worthless association seemed un-
willing to lend one shilling to the generous soldier, who, with
his sword in his hand, had abandoned a claim to prize-money,
upon a doubt of his title — to an army that had recovered the
whole amount of their property from the clutches of one of
the most iniquitous enemies that ever invaded an unoffending
country. Finding that their penury was precisely measured
by their ingratitude, Sir Arthur turned round, as he was
leaving their board-room, and said, "Consider the statement
I have made, and my application for assistance : if you refuse
to assist me with money, after all I have done for you, the
world, when the story shall be told, will never believe it."
What would have been the language of Napoleon under
similar circumstances ? " And this," says this great and upright
man, when called upon to account for his severity to the good
citizens of Oporto, "is the amount of the durete which has been
put on them, I believe I did shame them into lending us a
sum of money. After all, the sum borrowed at Oporto, for it
was not levied, amounted to ten thousand pounds, and this is
what the government calls ' severe.' I believe that I saved for
them property which will sell for one hundred times that
amount : and had 1 waited to attack Soult till I had received
a sum sufficient to supersede the necessity of this loan, (for
which I may wait the next time my assistance is wanted), the
support of his army would have cost the ivijie cotniiany ten
times the amount."

A subject accompanied by perplexities, and encircled by diffi-
culties, forced itself a second time on the attention of the
commander-in-chief; this was the question of rank between the
English and the English-Portuguese officers. He had always
viewed this point as a subject of extreme delicacy : he thought
that the officers in the two services should rank according to
the dates of their respective commissions, but that English
officers, taking temporary Portuguese commissions, should rank

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 97

in respect to British officers, according to the date of the com
mission which they held in his majesty's service. It was the
practice, when an officer was about to enter into the Portuguese
service, to advance him one step in the king's, as an inducement
to volunteer; upon which he received, in the Portuguese, rank,
still a step higher, and hence the disagreeable anomaly which
engendered so much discontent. The vexation and mental
pain which Sir Arthur felt, at this interruption to the good feeling
that should subsist amongst British officers, he thus powerfully
expressed in a letter to Mr. 'V^ilUers, " I wish to God that
Marshal Bcresford would resign his English lieutenant-gene-
ral's rank. It is inconceivable the embarrassment and ill-
blood it occasions. It does him no good; and if the army was
not most successful, this very circumstance would probably
bring us to a stand-still." Tliis inconvenience can hardly l^e
said to have applied to junior officers, but, as respected general
officers, it operated injuriously to the service. Tilson, Murray,
Kill, and Cotton, were all seniors to Bcresford, although, in
every case of junction or alliance in the field, Bcresford took
precedence, as commander-in-chief of the Portuguese native
forces. Against this collision of rank and precedence. General
Murray appealed to the commander-in-chief, and was in con-
sequence permitted to resign the command of his brigade, and
return to England, Sir Arthur, feeling it "impossible to engage
to any officer, that the troops under his command siiould not
be employed in concert or co-operation with any particular
description of troops." When he accepted General Murray's
resignation, he was fully conscious of the hardship of his
situation. He had never desired to give a definitive opinion
upon this delicate, difficult point, but when called on, in
his official capacity, to act, his decision of character became
strikingly observable. Scarcely had one general-officer been
victimized ])y his just yet unavoidable judgment, when he
remonstrated powerfully and feelingly against the operation of
the law under the ])eculiar circumstances. " We take,'' said Sir
Arthur "a cai)tain from our army, make him a major, and then

DS LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

a Portuguese lieutenant-colonel ; a British lier.tenant, by the
same process, becomes a Portuguese major, and lieutenant-
colonels are made brigadiers over the heads of all the colonels
ai)d senior lieutenant-colonels of the British army serving in
Portugal. This rank, besides, is not permanent, but, on the
contrary, after having commanded their permanent superiors
in the British army, they may return to tlie king's service,
and be themselves commanded by those superiors." Sir Arthur
did not mean to dispute or undervalue the rank of the Portu-
guese commission, which he asserted was on every account
deserving of respect, he only desired that the feelings of the
officers, in the British service, should be consulted for by a
proper arrangement, and a sufficient satisfaction afforded to
their minds. " Men's minds," he observes, " are so consti-
tuted, that when they conceive they are injured, they are not
satisfied until the injury is removed. Dissatisfaction on one
subject begets it on others, and I should have (indeed I may
say 1 have, for the first time) commanded a dissatisfied army."
He therefore prayed that the reasonable ground for dissatis-
faction then existing should be removed, either *' by British
officers entering the Portuguese service, continuing to serve
in the same rank which they held in that of his majesty, or,
if superior rank should be given them in the new service,
whenever they should meet British officers of superior rank,
they should receive their orders."

The preceding were amongst the causes of anxiety to the
commander-in-chief during his short stay at Oporto, but others
mi^htbe added, even more important to the objects of humanity,
and of the expedition generally; perhaps none more pressing,
in the deplorable state of the army during such inclement wea-
ther, and while rapidly traversing such rugged roads, than their
want of shoes. His pressing application for twenty thousand
pairs, and his request that they might, for greater expedition, be
sent by sea from Lisbon, was dated from Oporto, the twenty-
fourth of May; and it was to this laudable desire of obtaining,
by honourable and just means, a sufficient supply of shoes for

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 99

Ill's poor sore-foot men, that Sir Arthur gave to the senate, and
the wine company, that meniorahle opj)ortiinity of distinguish-
ing themsehes hy a display of gratitude and generosity, which
they so memorahly abused.

It may be uniformly observed of all Sir Arthur Wellesley's
decisions, that is, where the sentence of forgiveness or con-
demnation was to emanate from himself solely and exclusively,
that they have ever leaned to the side of mercy. Ilis opinion
on capital punishments was obtained, casually, at an early pe-
riod of his life, during the campaign in India, and the cruelties,
violence, and insubordination of our Peninsular allies taxed his
patience and forgiveness much and many times. A Portuguese
noble, who held the rank of captain in the army, having ab-
sented himself from the field without leave, on his return, by
order of Brigadier-General A. Campbell, was put under arrest.
An appeal being now made to the commander-in-chief, that
humane umpire gave a written judgment, in which he beauti-
fully, yet unconsciously, draws his own great character, and
inadvertently alludes to those claims which a nation has upon
its aristocracy, and, calling the noble culprit's attention to this
example, dismisses him with a hope that the admonition may
not be forgotten. " Point out to him," said the IJritish
chieftain, " that all the exertions of our country, all that the
valour and discipline of British soldiers can effect, will not
save Portugal and secure her independence, unless the people
of Portugal exert themselves in their own cause : tell him it is
jjarticulurly i)iciunhent upon the nohilitij, and persons of
great fortune and station, to set the example of that devotion
to the service of their country, and of that strict attention to
the rules of military discipline and subordination, which can
alone render any exertions useful, and lead to that success
to which all must look foi'ward with anxiety. Say, that 1
hope the lenity with which his fault has been treated now,
will induce him to be more attentive in future : that I ;-liall
expect from him exertions in the cause of his country, patience
tf) bear the hardships of a military life, and submission to the
rules of discipline, in proportion as his rank, station, ami

JOU LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

fortune are superior to those of others of his countrymen in
the service. — You will then release the marquis from his
arrest."

Before the head-quarters broke up from Oporto on the
twenty-fifth, General Wellesley had opened a correspondence
with Cuesta, the obstinacy of whose character had been pre-
viously known to him : he had endeavoured to bring over to his
assistance, in his attempt to conciliate the veteran general, the
brave Marquess de la llomana, and he felt it necessary also
to caution Major-General Mackenzie, who was in Cuesta's
country, against lending too willing an ear to the arguments
and solicitations of the Spanish chief. Mackenzie was directed
to decline affording him any hazardous co-operation, on the
plea, that his instructions and duty forbade him acting beyond
the direct and immediate protection and defence of Portugal.

All things being now arranged, or rather negcciated, for the
advance of the main body of the British, General Wellesley
marched to Quinta de le Mealhada, and from thence to Aveiro,
which he did not reach before the twenty-seventh, owing to the
remissness of the magistrates at Ovar and Aveiro, who failed
in supplying boatmen to transport the troops across the lake.
While he awaited the ferrying over of his horses, he addressed
a communication to Sir J. Cradock, governor of Gibraltar,
enclosing a letter from the secretary of state, directing that offi-
cer to send to Portugal from his garrison, the forty-eighth and
sixty-first regiments : and a second despatch to Vice-Admiral
Berkeley, requesting that he would prepare tonnage for two
thousand men, for that particular service : at the close of this
day, the twenty-seventh. Sir Arthur returned to Coimbra, hav-
ing retraced his triumphant march from Lisbon, and here head-
quarters were established for a few days, for the purpose of
obtaining that rest which fatigue demanded, an ill-provided
commissariat rendered necessary, and daily increasing sickness,
amongst the young and unseasoned men, absolutely required.
At this moment, when neglect, privations, and their natural con-
sequence, disease, began to thin the ranks of the brave British,
intelligence reached head-quarters of the arrival of a reinforce-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 101

ment of five thousand men, ready to share in the dangers as
well as the honours of the war. " We should have felt greater
satisfaction," ohserves Lord Londonderry, " had the numher
of our recruits been doubled, but five thousand British soldiers
were not to be spoken of lightly." Thus relieved by the
dawning of hope that arose from the ocean, and told him that
at home his labours were never forgotten, he applied himself
with all the sagacity of a mind fruitful in expedients, and
practised in the wily ways of diplomatic agency, to bring over
the Spanish general to his views. " Cuesta was brave and
true, but old, without talent, bigoted to his own antiquated
notions, and, with the obstinacy of age, stout in his own
opinions." It was therefore necessary to use the utmost caution
not to offend his pride, or excite his jealousy. l"he efforts of
the general for this purpose, consisted in despatching two confi-
dential officers, Lieut. -Colonels Bourke and Cadogan, to Cuesta's
head-quarters, with a respectful request to be informed of
his excellency's wishes, and directions to pay proper deference
to all his military suggestions. These officers were furnished
with a memorandum of inquiries, to which they were to obtain
from the general satisfactory replies; the tendency of the
questions being to guide and influence the judgment of Cuesta,
and lead him, unconsciously, into the views of the British
commander-in-chief. At the close of the conference, Cuesta
consented to a line of operations, at least not contradictory to
those of the allies. It was from these head-quarters also,
that Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote, on the thirtieth of May, to
Mr. W. Huskisson, secretary to the treasury, laying before
him the distresses of the army, which had been aggravated by
continuance, and by an accumulation of debt. Upwards of
£.'5()(),000 were then due in Portugal, arrears of pay were owing
to the troops; the money sent to Cadiz to be exchanged, had not
been returned ; the trade of Lisbon was unequal to the demand
of two millions per annum in exchange for bills on London, and
the Portuguese merchants were sending their whole ca[)ital to
England, so that money should necessarily come from England,
if the war were to be prosecuted. During the halt at Coimbra,
11. p

102 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

neither money nor slices arrived, and the patience both of the
general and the army was, in consequence, severely put to
the test : but " this great and shameful negligence obtained
frequently throughout the war ; and there can now be but
little doubt that it was attributable rather to the villany of
some, than to the general indolence of all. This fact is dwelt
upon, on this account, that it fettered the illustrious subject
of this memoir on this occasion ; and because he was a man
of great public integrity, and with the strictest notions as to
probity and good faith in all dealings with the inhabitants of
the Peninsula, and in all engagements made with followers;
and desirous, both as their protector and commander, that his
soldiers, for the sake of justice and discipline, should be regu-
larly paid ; it is known to many who served under him, that
the neglect here spoken of weighed often and heavily, through-
out the war, upon his firm and elastic mind."

To such a mind, the disgraceful conduct of his soldiers, who
seemed unable to wait patiently the arrival of money and
necessaries, which, although they might have been thought-
lessly delayed, would assuredly be brought in time, must have
been a source of the most painful suffering. Sir Arthur
expressed more warmly, more vehemently than usual, his
indignation at the many outrages that were committed : "I have,"
said he, " long been of opinion, that a British army could bear
neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of
the truth of this opinion, in the first of its branches, in the
recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have
plundei'ed the country most terribly, which has given me
the greatest concern. They have plundered the people of
their bullocks, among other property ; for what reason I am
sure 1 do not know, except it be to sell them to the people
again. They behave terribly ill. They are a rabble, that
cannot bear success any more than Sir J. Moore's could
bear failure ; but I am endeavouring to tame them." The
measures of Sir Arthur were more effectual than those of the
lamented officer to whom he alluded. He issued a procla-
mation, threatening the severest punishment for robbery

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 103

and violence : he obliged the ministers of the regency to follow
his example, by forbidding the people, in positive terms, from
purchasing any thing from the soldiers of the British army.
Official complaints were also threatened, and the apprehension
of being sent home in disgrace, gave further weight to these
proclamations of the general.

While the British forces were concentrating at Coimbra,
the commander-in-chief resided at Cantahede in the imme-
diate vicinity, and although surrounded by every inconvenience,
difficulty, and distress, without shoes for his men, sufficient
money to pay them, or to liquidate the debts which the army
had contracted with the natives, wiiile the riotous and vicious
were exciting insubordination in his camp, he remained
unshaken as the oak in the forest, as the rock in the ocean ;
and, as the highest elevations in nature are of the hardest
material, so the lofty mind of this great commander seemed
to endure the most violent attacks of misfortune and dis-
appointment without their producing upon it any visible
impression. His firmness, decision, and prudence soon
restored to his army that respect for discipline, which had
lied for a moment; and his despatch from Coimbra of the
thirty-first of May, affords the most convincing demonstration
of the cool and conscious courage of the man, and his utter
insensibility to danger or its approaches. " We are getting
on well, and I hope the government are satisfied with us. I
shall soon be in Spain ; and if Victor does not move across the
Tagus, he will be in as bad a scrape as Soult." Such was the
language of his public despatch, when every officer in the army,
possessed of conduct, character, or right feeling, was pondering
on the ingratitude of England towards a brave army, or regretting
how that army was losing name, and risking its very existence
by violation of discipline, and by licentiousness. On the first and
second of June, Sir Arthur was still at Coimbra, and resolved
uj)on remaining there until he saw the greater part of the army
pass by, "as there were constant difficulties and distresses that
required to be immediately relieved :" and even in this short
space, and while these necessities might be supposoil to have
given him ample occupation, he was endeavouring to form a

104 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

corps of guides, consisting of officers and non-commissioned
officers to act as interpreters between the army and the people
of the country," it^/fo, the general observed, '■^inust slunu the
roads ;" and so minute was his knowledge, even of individuals,
that in his application to Beresford for co-operation in this
design, he names a corporal in the second company of grena-
diers of the thirteenth regiment, Joze Bannas, and begs
that he may be included amongst the men of good character,
capable of speaking French or English, whom he requires to
be sent to him.

On the fifth of June the head-quarters advanced as far as
Pombal, where intelligence reached the general of the arrival
of one hundred horses from England : directions being instantly
given to examine into their fitness for service, it was found
that forage had not been delivered regularly for the horses
and mules attached to the brigades of artillery, that they were,
in consequence, nearly destroyed, and unable to draw the
artillery farther than the Tagus. " The officers of the com-
missariat," says Sir Arthur, in addressing the deputy-com-
missioner-general, " will be responsible in an eminent degree,
if, owing to their want of capacity or management, I should
lose the use of the British artillery," and having thus officially
admonished those, who alone were or would be culpable, he
endeavoured to provide for the serious loss of his own artillery
by requesting " Beresford to have some brigades of Portuguese
force, of that description, ready to join and do duty with the
British army on its entry into Spain." In these perplexities and
failures of the commissariat, the admiral on that station, the
Hon, G. Berkeley, tendered his assistance, and, after the model
of the immortal Nelson — who was just as ready to serve on land
as at sea, and gave his gallant co-operation to soldier and sailor —
expressed his wish to despatch Captain Shepheard, already
known to the reader as commander of the Brazen, to help for-
ward the artillery and equipments from the Tagus to Abrantes.
This thoughtfulness and activity were kindly answered by
stating, " that the commissariat was very bad indeed ; but it
was new, and he hoped would improve." Not too rigid in the
government of his own, his humanity to the soldiers of a

THH DUKK OF Wl^LLINGTOX. JUO

foreign prince, and that prince his enemy, should here be noticed.
Having ordered the French prisoners to be put on board the
transports and sent to England, the words in which that order
was couched establish the excellence of his heart. " You
will understand," says the British hero, "that the prisoners
must not be unreasonably crowded in these ships ; and you
will, therefore, report to me what precise number will remain
at Oporto, after you shall have sent those whom the admiral
may require you to send in the cavalry ships." Thomar next
received the head-quarters of the British, and it was here that
intelligence first reached Sir Arthur of Victor's having broken
up from Caceres, and removed his head-quarters to Truxillo,
a town situated between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

Innumerable reports now poured into the British camp, of
successes and defeats of allies and enemies, originating partly
with the timid amongst the Portuguese and Spaniards, but
more industriously circulated by corrupt members of the
Spanish local juntas. These false lights led Beresford and other
officers into erroneous tracks, where their hopes and their armies
would have sulFered wreck, but the caution of the commander-
in-chief was equal to all dangers, and ultimately saved him-
self and his followers. Reaching Abrantes, he writes to Mr.
V'illiers, that "it was impossible to guess what the French
are doing, accounts are so very contradictory. However, I
shall certainly move eastward as soon as I can.'' In the same
communication, he expresses the utmost anxiety to visit his
noble brother the Marquis Wellesley, who was daily expected
to arrive off Lisbon in the Donegal, Captain Malcolm, and
desires that a messenger should be sent, to acquaint him, the
moment the ship appeared in the offing, that he might hasten
to Lisbon, by the Tagus, and receive him. Circumstances
delayed for a time the meeting of these atfectionate l)ruthor.>s,
and General Wellesley employed every moment of the interval
in the able and active discharge of his difficult duties.

Cuesta persevered in preferring his own plans to those of
the British general, leaving the latter the alternative oi acting
by himself against the concentrated foK-e of the enemy, if

]0C) LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

he did not consent to accede to his visions of easy conquest:
but, by the dihgence and energy of Colonel Bourke, his obsti-
nacy was somewhat softened ; he was persuaded to pause a
little, in expectation of the arrival of the remainder of the
British army from the north, and persuaded, at length, not to
expose himself to certain destruction by provoking Victor,
before Sir Arthur should be in a condition to assist him.
Well-directed flattery is rarely unacceptable, and Cuesta was
not inaccessible to its addresses : the congratulations of the
English general upon the successes of his excellency's country-
men in Arragon, under Blake, probably contributed to second
Bourke's efforts to soothe and soften the haughty disposition
of the Spanish veteran. General Wellesley also endeavoured
to assimilate his plans, as far as possible, to those of his perverse
co-adjutor, and, on the tenth of June, they so far coincided, that
one point of difference alone remained, which was, that Alcan-
tara should not be occupied by a Portuguese, but rather by a
British detachment, which should make a demonstration on the
enemy's flank ; to this Sir Arthur could not assent, having re-
solved on concentrating the British army as much as possible.
The impression, which the brilliant successes and estab-
lished military fame of Sir Arthur Wellesley had produced
upon the British government, was now beginning to be
attended with that implicit confidence in his genius, and for-
tune, which was calculated to lead to the most successful
results. Authority reached head-quarters, at Abrantes, on the
eleventh of June, permitting him " to extend his operations
in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the
Portuguese frontier," which enabled him to propose, and
entertain, new plans of operation in conjunction with Cuesta,
and he, in consequence, directed Colonel Bourke to confer
with General O'Donqju, the adviser of Cuesta, upon the
measures most expedient to be pursued after the combined
armies should have forced Victor to recross the Tagus. At
the same time, his advice, too modestly given on this occasion,
was, " that the two armies ought to keep so near, as to be able
to afford mutual assistance, or form a junction, in case of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 107

necessity: but in other respects to keep separate, for the sake
of subsistence.

Besides permission to enlarge the field of his operations
at discretion, fresh reinforcements were sent out from England,
in addition to General Craufurd's corps, " so that," he observed
in a private correspondence, *' the ball is now at my foot, and I
hope I shall have strength enough to give it a good kick." Still
his operations were retarded for want of money, that high
sense of honour which characterizes his nation, impeding the
movements of the British general, until the debts contracted
in Portugal should all have been liquidated — a sum then
amounting to £200,000. Although his courage could not
have drooped by any reverses or frowns of fortune, yet his
spirits and his temper, however stoical, must have been
severely tested. Elated by the intelligence from England, he
anxiously desired to execute his great movement against
Victor, whom he had always considered the more terrible
enemy to the liberties of Portugal, l)y marching from Abrantes
to Plasencia, seizing the bridge of Almarez, throwing himself
between the French and Spanish armies, and cutting off the
enemy's retreat upon Madrid. This inimitable and all-perfect
plan was objected to by Cuesta, from no other motives than
jealousy of its origin, and a general unmanageableness of temper
and conduct. Sir Arthur expressed his surprise at the vener-
able hero's immoveable pertinacity, in language that strongly
evinced his disappointment. " I can only say," he observed,
"that the obstinacy of this old gentleman is throwing away
the finest opportunity that any army ever had, and that we
shall repent that we did not cut off Victor when we shall haNc
to beat the French upon the Ebro." A pressing connniinica-
tion from Colonel Bourke, however, partially reconciled him
to his wayward fate, and induced him to address Cuesta as
follows, " As I find that your excellency is of opinion that I should
co-operate with you in an attack upon the enemy, between the
Tagus and the Guadiana, according to the plan I had the honour
of submitting-, I shall com[)ly with your excellency's desire, and
shall direct my march upon Badajoz, as soon as I am able to

108 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

move my troops; and not only shall the great body of the British
co-operate with your excellency, but a body of British and
Portuguese, under Marshal Beresford, will move by Plasencia,
on the line which I had before pi'oposed to take with the
British army." Many men, of Sir A. VVellesley's rank, genius, and
power, instead of saving the obstinate old general from ruin,
would have allowed him to fall over the precipice; but he did not
hesitate to sacrifice his own feelings to what appeared to him to
be his line of duty, or of that policy on which the success of the
expedition possibly depended. While Sir Arthur awaited the
supplies necessary for the equipment and advance of his army,
inactivity, the bane of a large force collected at head-quarters,
again engendered misconduct in the troops, which was carried,
in some instances, to such a length, that death, at the hands of
the outraged peasantry, frequently ensued. These unfortunate
and lamentable excesses were duly reported to the commander-
in-chief, who assured the government, " that they might rely on
his exertions to keep the troops in order, and on his employ-
ing all the power which the law had put into his hands, to
punish the guilty." In this emergency, he addressed Colonel,
(afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir llufane) Donkin, calling
on him to inform the commanding officers of two regiments that
were conspicuous for outrage, that if subordination was not
instantly restored, their regiments should be sent into garrison,
reported to his majesty as unfit for service, and sent home in
disgrace. He desired also that Colonel Donkin would have
the men hutted outside the town of Castel Branco, and the
rolls called every hour from sunrise till eight in the evening,
taking care that both officers and soldiers attended. These
severe regulations, enforced with the most exact attention to
the orders of the commander-in-chief, were instrumental in
restoring that good understanding, which had previously existed
between the army and the peasantry, by ensuring an adherence
to subordination on the part of the former.

That the obstinacy of General Cuesta did not originate in
a feeling of conscious rectitude, or a confidence in any superior
abilities which he conceived himself to possess, but in a blind

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 109

and perverse disinclination to be guided by the leader of a
foreign army, will be presently shown ; here it will be sufficient
to observe, that the precise plan which he sternly, stubbornly
rejected, as wholly ina])plicable to the position of the armies,
he will 1)6 seen immediately embracing with avidity, as the
sheet-anchor of his hopes, and the only mode whereby his
army could be saved from certain destruction. Of this incon-
venience Sir Arthur AVellesley complains to Lord Castlereagh.
" My correspondence," he writes, " with General Cuesta has
been a very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as
any gentleman at the head of any army need be. lie would
not alter his position even to ensure the safety of his army,
because he supposed this measure migiit be injurious to him-
self, notwithstanding that tiiis alteration would have been part
of an operation which must have ended in the annihilation of
Victor's army, if he stood our attack. ; or, in his retreat through
the mountains of Arzobispo, with the loss of all his cannon
and baggage, if he went away. I comj)lied because it was
urged that the safety of Cuesta's army depended upon it. The
best of the whole story is, that Cuesta, in a letter of the
twenty-seventh of May, which I did not receive till after I had
written to him to propose my plan of operations, proposed the
same plan to me, with very little alteration.

While Cuesta, bigoted to his own narrow views, continued
to dispute with the general of his allies, Soult was breathing
again in Gallicia; and \'ictor, having heard of Soult's failure,
resigned the strong post at Alcantara, which Mayne inunedi-
ately occupied, and, retracing his steps, took up a central posi-
tion at Torre-mocha, between Alcantara, INIerida, and Truxillo.
Victor was somewhat influenced in this last step by the news
of Mackenzie's activit}-, who had at that moment advanced
to Sobreira FormosiU He had taken the precaution to leave
a garrison in the castle of JNIeridji, while he made that feint
in favour of Soult; and Cuesta, who was ever ainl)itious of
doing something, no matter how insignificant, sent forward a
detachment from Llerena, and invested the place during his
absence; but, on the re-appearance of the enemy, the assaulting

II. Q

110 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OP

party moved off, repassed the Guadiana, and took up a posi-
tion at Zafra.

Cucsta now fixed his head-quarters at Fuente del Maestro,
on the enemy's left flank, and moved his advance to Calemonte
on the Guadiana. Victor was also disturbed by the proximity of
a Spanish force in the valley of the Tagus, whose presence ren-
dered him apprehensive of interruption to his communication
with the other marshals, and with the capital ; and, to guard
against any accident on that quarter, he detached a strong
party from Torre-mocha, to watch the bridge of Almarez.
Sir Arthur Wellesley's original plan for the destruction of
Victor's armv, was to have made a movement through Castello
Branco and Plasencia to the bridge of Almarez, by which the
enemy would have been intercepted ; but he was obliged to
surrender his judgment to the infatuated opinion of his co-adju-
tor, by which Victor was permitted to escape from the snare,
and elude the attack of the combined armies of England, Spain,
and Portugal. The only reparation Cuesta could make was,
to pursue and harass the French; but this he performed so
ineffectually, that, with little inconvenience, Victor marched
on Talavera de la Reyna, resigning to his wrong-headed
pursuer the post of Almarez.

It was now confessed that the British commander-in-chief
either understood the art of war, or at least was correct in his
suspicions as to the movements of the enemy in their late
position ; and an experienced officer has remarked ; " that the
plan rejected was now approved of;" and on the twenty-seventh
of June, Sir A. Wellesley, breaking up from the camp of
Abrantes, commenced his march towards the Spanish frontier,
moving by both banks of the Tagus, and on the first of July,
head-quarters reached Castello Branco : thence their route was
extended through Coria, while a flanking brigade, under
General Ilufane Donkin, explored the country between the
Tagus and Zarza la Major, and on the eighth the British
fixed their head-quarters at Plasencia.

The force w ith which Sir Arthur undertook to relieve Spain
from French intrusion, by uniting with Cuesta on the banks

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ill

of the Tietar, and co-operating with him in an otTonsive
movement on the capital, amounted to twenty-two thousand
effective men, exclusive of the eight thousand left in garrison
at Lisbon. Tlie Spanish force under Cuesta at Ahnarez was
returned at thirty-eight thousand, independent of the twenty-
five thousand worse disciplined men under \'enegas in La
Mancha. In the south of Spain, there existed also an army
of sixty-thousand fighting men. The real strength or true
position of the French corps was unknown to Sir Arthur
Wellesley when he arrived at Plasencia: on his left rose a
bold ridge of mountains that shut out all prospect of Leon and
Castile; but he had not forgotten, that on the other side of
that high chain, twenty thousand French still lingered, broken
in spirit, yet easily exasperated, and ca})able of being ralhed
once more around their standard by the veteran who then
shared in their discomfiture. This knowledge was sufficient
to excite apprehension in a mind so thoughtful and cautious
in providing against chances ; and, as artillery could be con-
veyed by two passes only, those of Peralcs and 13anos, although
Soult had lost all his in the flight to Orense, he directed
Beresford to protect that flank, observe the movements of the
enemy, and defend the Puerto Perales, while he applied to
Cuesta for a force sufficient to guard the pass of Bancs.
This request was granted in a manner ungracious and absurd,
after much remonstrance, and by sending only six hundred
men, and those provided with but twenty rounds of ammuni-
tion per man. It was one of those intuitive measures which
occasionally emanate from great minds, like brilliant corusca-
tions, which dictated the guarding of Perales and Bancs, as
Sir Arthur was ignorant of the presence of fifty thousand
disciplined troops on the other side of the hills, led by Ney
and Soult, just concentrated at Zamora. lie iuid heard that
IVIortier was advancing from Arragon with fifteen thousand
men : the latter intelligence was derived from General Fran-
ceschi, who distinguished himself so much in the pursuit to
Corunna, by his frequent skirmishes with the British hussars,
but was now taken prisoner under the following extraordinary

112 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

circnmstanccs. Soultjin his distresses after 'the race ofOrense/
desi)at('hetl Franeeschi to Madrid, to put the intrusive king
into possession of the real and altered position of affairs in
Portu^i^al, since Sir A. Wellesley had taken the command of
the allies. Refusing any other escort than his aides-de-camp,
Captains Antoine and Bernard, he set out upon his mission ;
but reaching Tordesillas, he turned from his route, to visit his
friend Marshal Mortier, when he was met near the ferry by
a Capuchin friar and ten Spaniards, who immediately made
him their prisoner. The friar conducted his captives across
the mountains, in order to deliver them to the supreme junta
at Seville, and, it was in passing the British head-quarters
at Zarza la Major, that Sir Arthin- had an opportunity of
conversing with the prisoner, and examining into the pur-
j)ort of Soult's despatches, which represented the condition
of his army as deplorable.* Franeeschi, indignant with for-
tune, was frequently heard to ejaculate, " O comme c'est
})itoyable pour un general d'hussars d'etre pris par un Capu-
chin !"

The continued frustration of his wisest plans, by the deter-
mined obstinacy and blindness of Cuesta, decided the British
commander upon seeking a personal interview with him, and
endeavouring, by conciliatory means, to obtain a more cordial

* " Being transferred to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty,
treated liini as if he had been a criminal, instead of a brave soldier, and con-
lined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, ashamed of their
government, endeavoured to effect his escape ; but he perished at the moment
when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of Count
Wathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment; and, in a few
days, by her death, added one more to th§ thousand instances of the strength
of woman's aireclions." — Napier, During the few moments which Franeeschi
passed in Sir A. Wcllesley's presence, he manifested much anxiety that his
wife and family should be informed of his safety, although a captive. A few
days after, the commander-in-chief humanely complied with the unhappy
prisoner's wishes, and wrote to Mr. Flint, saying, " I shall be much obliged
to you, if jou will convey this intelligence to Madame Franeeschi de Somme,
through Holland, according to the accompanying address." Franeeschi was
the prisoner of Spain, so that Sir Arthur's commuuicatiou vvas Avholly uucou
iiecled with any duly, but that of a man of feeling.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 113

co-operation than had hitherto existed between them. For this
purpose, leaving his head-quarters at Plasencia on the tenth
of July, Sir A. Wellesley and Lieutenant-General Stewart pro-
ceeded towards the Spanish camp, near the Col de Mirahete.
As they approached the flying bridge which the Spaniards had
thrown over the Tietar, they were met by an escort of liussars,
belonging to the regiment of Villa Viciosa, well mounted, and
superior in appearance to any other corps in the S{)anish
service. In conducting their visitors towards the bridge of
boats upon the Tagus, the guides lost their v*ay, and the party
did not reach the camp before night-fall. This accident was
a subject of regret to all parties, but particularly to the veteran
Cuesta, whose whole force had been drawn out to receive Sir
Arthur, while himself, though still labouring under the effects
of injuries received in the battle of Medellin, mounted on his
charger, remained nearly four hours at the head of his men,
in momentary expectation of the British hero's arrival. When
the tramp of the horses gave notice of the near approach of his
illustrious visitor, a general discharge of artillery took, place,
and an infinite number of blazing torches were held up ; by
the red and flaring light of which. Sir Arthur was enabled to
behold the entire S])anish line, as he passed with his suite in
review.*

About six thousand cavalry were drawn up in rmik entire^

* Tlie AlKKjuisof Londonderry, who accompanied Sir A.. Wellesley on this
occasion, f^ives tin- fullowinj^ intcrestinjc account of this review l)y torch-light.
" Tiio ed'cct produced by these arrangements was of no ordinary character. As
the torches were held aloft, at moderate intervals from one another, they threw
a red and wavering light over the whole scene, permitting, at the same time, its
minuter j)arts to be here .and there cast into siiade : whilst tiie grim and swarthy
visages of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uniforms, ajtpeared peculiarly
picturesque as often as the Hashes fell upon them. Then there was the frequent
roar of cannon, the shouldering of (irelocks, mingled with the brief word of
command, and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we i)a.-;sed from battalion
to battalion : all these seemed to interest the sense of hearing to the full as
much as the spectacle attracted the sense of sight. Nor was old Cuesta him-
self an oljjcct to be passed by without notice, even at such a moment and
under such circumstances as these. 'I'he old man preceded ns, not so much
bitting on hi:, horse, as held on by two pajjes at the immiui nl hazard of being

114 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ami twenty battalions of infantry, each consisting of eight
hundred men. The remainder of Cuesta's force was employed
in guarding the floating bridge on the Tagus, the passage at
Arzobispo, and the Puerto Banos, Although the individuals
of this irregular army were well-proportioned, handsome,
hardy-looking men, not inferior in manliness of aspect to the
soldiers of any army in Europe, they were miserably deficient
in clothing, accoutrements, and discipline. They had not
been taught to handle their fire-arms properly, and this
awkwardness in the army generally, became more obvious from
the contrast, which was unavoidable, with the Irish brigade,
and some battalions of marines from Cadiz, and the wreck of
those fine grenadier companies that fought so bravely, but
unfortunately, at Medellin, who were entitled to a high military
character. Thus the infantry possessed arms, but were
ignorant how to use them ; the cavalry were tolerably mounted,
but understood notliing of military movements ; the artillery was
numerous, but incapable of being moved with celerity, either
in action or retreat : the generals, like Cuesta himself, were
chosen with reference to seniority alone, and, with the exception
of O'Donoju and Largers, were too aged and infirm for a
military life. Such was the state of discipline, and such the
general who commanded ; such the efficiency of the Spanish
army of co-operation, with which the disciplined ranks of
the British were to associate, and risk the contagious effect of
insubordinate example. How must the calm, clear, well-
regulated mind of their general have shuddered for the con-
sequences : and yet this review was not unattended with its
advantages, as Sir Arthur from it must have gathered a truth
useful to be ascertained in time, namely, that if Spain was to

overthrown whenever a cannon was discharfrerl, or a torch flared out with
peculiar brightness : indeed, his physical debility was so observable, as clearly
to mark his total unfitness for the situation he then held. As to his mental
powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging : inasmuch as he scarcely
uttered five words during the continuance of the review; but his corporeal
inlirniities alone were at variance with all a general's duties, and showed that
he was tit only for the retirement of private life." — ]Sanalire, Vol. I. p. 3S2.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 115

be recovered from the French, it was by British valour alone
that conquest must be effected.

The grand and certainly imposing spectacle of a review
of thirty thousand men by torch-light, being concluded, the
generals alighted at "a wretched hovel," casa del Puerto, and
on entering, Cuesta, who was overpowered by fatigue, retired
to rest until eleven o'clock, when he returned and joined his
guests at supper. His manner being singularly taciturn, he
took but little share in the conversation, and he is represented
as having carried this Moslem habit into his military govern-
ment, which was conducted on a system of silence and terror.
His personal hatred of the French procured for him the most
boundless confidence and regard from the Spanish people, and,
to strengthen this feeling of reliance on his animosity to his
enemies, he invariably hung every traitor to his country that
fell into his hands. The silence of Cuesta was habitual, and
therefore disconnected with want of respect for his guests,
whom he treated with the highest considerations of esteem,
affection, and honour. After breakfast, on the forenoon of the
eleventh, he presented his aged generals, one by one, to Sir
Arthur Wellesley ; but the ceremony took ])lace in perfect
silence, and with the formality of a levee. This further mark of
respect being paid, the general conducted Sir Arthur into an
inner apartment, and there remained in conference for four
hours, during which O'Donoju acted as interpreter, secretarv,
aide-de-camp, in arranging a future plan of operations for
the combined armies. At three o'clock the whole party sat
down to a dinner of at least forty dishes, each of which was
strongly impregnated with garlic and onions, after which
Cuesta retired, according to the fashion of his country, to the
enjoyment of his siesta, while Sir Artluu" and Gen. Stewart
mounted their horses, and visited tiiose regiments, by the un-
equivocal light of day, which they had seen but imperfectly by
the torches' partial glare. On the morning of the twelfth.
Sir Arthur, having first received the embrace of the aged chief-
tain, returned to his camp at Plascncia.*

• The ciipital of Kstroinadura : it is a larj^e town, sralt.d on tlie ri»or
Xcrto, wliicli is here crossed hy two bridj^es, and enclosed by Moorish walls.

116 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

At this conference Sir Arthnr Wellesley proposed that an
attack should he made on the enemy's posts on the Alhcrche,
by the combined forces, then under the command of the British
and Spanish generals; that ten thousand men should be detached
in the direction of Avila, to turn the enemy's right; and that
Venegas, having driven Sebastiani across the Tagus, should
next pass the river at Aranjuez or Fuente Duenas, and threaten
Madrid, then only a few hours' march from him, by the
enemy's left. To these arrangements Cuesta objected, by
insisting on the projected detachment to Avila being drawn
from the British, although much fewer in number than his
own, and consenting to spare only two battalions of infantry
and a small cavalry force, which, in conjunction with the Por-
tuguese brigades under Sir Robert Wilson's command, should
march on Escalona, and communicate with the left of the
British. So far only could Cuesta be induced to accede to
Sir Arthur's plan of operations for the opening of the Spanish
campaign, and his obstinacy has deservedly called down upon his
name the unqualified censure of historians. The effects of his
perverseness are justly regretted ; the cause, however, admits of
extenuation. Cuesta, one of the most upright, loyal, and gal-
lant men that Spain had ever produced, had been imprisoned
by the junta, on suspicion of treason: he did not seek revenge,
but he always gave an unwilling obedience to the orders of
that unjust and corrupt body: to shield themselves from the
power and indignation of the injured soldier, the junta con-
tinually heaped honours upon Blake ; and when the defeat at
Belchite had lowered his high renown, they transferred their
affections to Venegas. Besides these secret machinations, these
unworthy means of depressing the character of one honourable
man, by elevating that of his rival, Cuesta had another enemy
to contend with, more wise, more influential, and more per-
severing ; that was Mr. Frere, who persisted in his importu-

The houses are on so large a scale, that two thousand soldiers found accom-
modation in one of them. The mountains tliat encircle the site of tiie tcnvn
are ofientimos capped with snow, a commodity which is here sold at a high
price, for tiie purpose of cooling lemonade and creams. Chocolate is manufac-
tured here extensively ; and this being also a place of considerable trade, the
army were enabled to procure a fresh supply of shoes.

TIIK UT TlONiii-E (;v.C)HGK F]TZ - C].ARl-:NrK. KATU. OY MUNSTF.R. Jtc &c.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 117

nities to have the Duke of Albuquerque employed in the
immediate vicinity of Cuesta's army, but at the head of an
independent force. These circumstances, in addition to a
temper naturally morose, rendered more so i)y years and
bodily sufferings, are amongst the excuses that may be
pleaded in extenuation of Cuesta's unwillingness to be guided
by the Spanish junta or the British general, and of his having
regarded the recommendations of both with suspicion.

With the approbation of the Spanish junta, it was at length
decided, that the British army should break up from Plascncia
on the seventeenth and eighteenth of July, and form a junction
with the Spanish main body at Oropesa on the twentieth ;
crossing the Tietar,* at the Venta de Bazagona, passing
Talegula and St. Julien, this part of the agreement was
punctually performed. On the following day, Cuesta went
through with his army,t pausing, however, sufficiently long to
review twenty thousand British troops, which w-ere drawn out
for his inspection, and with the fine appearance of whom he
expressed himself highly gratified ; then pushing rapidly for-
ward, he collected almost his entire force at Velada. Beresford
and the Duke del Parque, with nearly twenty thousand men,
guarded the north side of the valley, wholly unconscious of the
powerful force then collected on the other side of the mountains :

• The passage of tlie Tietar was readily accomplished, Captain Tod, of the
Royal Stair Corps, having, in a most ingenious manner, constructed a solid
bridge tiiere, in a few hours, from the materials of an old house, which he
pulled down for the purpose, united with some pines from a neighbouring
wood.

t " On the twenty-first the two commanders dined together; and, in return
for the military spectacle which Cuesta had afforded Sir Arthur, the British
troops were drawn up in the evening for his inspection. The mounting on
horseback, to proceed to the review, showed how ill-litted was Cuesta for the
activity of war. He was lifted on his horse by two grenadiers, while one of
his aides-de-camp was ready on the other side to conduct his right leg over
the horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup! Remarks were whispered at
the moment, that if his mental energy and activity diti not compensate for his
bodily infirmity. Sir Arthur would tind him but an incapable coadjutor.
Cuesta passed along the line fiom left to right, just as night fell, and «e saw
him put comfortably into un anti(|uate(l, square-corm-rcd coach, drawn ly
nine mules, and proceed to his quarters." — Earl of Muusta's ( umpai^ii.
II. R

118 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Cucsta and Sir Arthur had taken up their ])ositions, Vcnegas
and Sir II. \Vilson iiad each undertaken their respective duties,
and all were now in perfect readiness to drive in those divisions
of the enemy, which occupied Talavera, to their position on the
left bank of the Alberche. The means by which Victor obtained
such accurate information of the allies, is still involved in mys-
tery, and the suspicion of treason alone afFords a clue. Aware
of the advance of his enemies, he strengthened his posts at
'J alavera, supported the column opposed to Sir Robert Wilson
at Escalona on the Upper Alberche, recalled his foraging par-
ties, altered in a masterly manner his line of retreat from the
Madrid to the Toledo road, thereby securing his junction with
Sebastiani, removed his artillery from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and
concentrated his infantry behind the Alberche. As the allied
armies were advancing in two columns towards the enemy's
posts at Talavera, Cuesta, moving along the high road,
was the first to come up with their rear-guard. This body,
consisting of two thousand cavalry, under the command of
Latour Maubourg, formed boldly on the table-land of Gamonal,
sustained a heavy cannonade, and actually compelled the Span-
iards, under General Zayas, to deploy into line, and even then
it continued to check their advance. But the British army,
which had taken a road through the mountains nearly parallel
to the Spanish line, beginning to appear, Latour INlaubourg
retired leisurely, and with little loss, behind the Alberche.
This affair will serve to illustrate equally the courage and dis-
cipline of the French, and the folly and indiscipline of our allies
the Spaniards. Several batteries and six thousand horse were
brought against the French general, without producing any
apparent disposition to retreat, until he found that his left was
turned by the first hussars and the twenty-third light dragoons,
under General Anson, and directed by Lieut. -Genei'al Payne,
and by that division of infantry under Major- General Makenzie,
and that his centre was driven in by the Spanish advanced-
guard, under the command of Zayas and the Duke of Albu^
querquo, after he had compelled the silly Spaniards to expose
their real strength. On this occasion the British lost eleven

THE dt'kf: of wi;i.lin(;tox. Hi)

horses, by the enemy's cannonade from their position on the
Alherche, and a three-pound shot was fired, with such good
aim, at Sir A. Wellesley, that it cut off the bough of a tree close
to his head. Sir Arthur's columns were in readiness to attack
the enemy's position on the twenty-third, and a general plan
was agreed on, but when the Brirish were about to march, at
five o'clock in the morning, their sanguine hopes of glory and
conquest were dissipated, by a blast that the keenest perception
could not have foreseen, nor the most delicate frame have been
sensible of its approach ; and this was, that Cuesta and his
staff had not arisen from their slumbers, and that, in short, it
was his determination* not to attack the enemy a/ttil the next
(lai/. This unfortunate decision, for which Sir A. Wellesley
conceived there were good and valid reasons, " it is probable
originated in treachery, but not that of Cuesta, for it is certain
that Victor corresponded with the Spanish general's staff, and
that the discussions of Sir Arthur and Cuesta were known, at
his head-quarters, in twenty-four hours after their occurrence.
Cuesta appeared on former occasions to have been under the
influence of his aides-de-camp and military friends, while he
distrusted both the junta and the British, and at the con-
ferences between the generalissimos, a staff-officer on each side
alone was present. The character of the British nation, if not
of the British soldier, will be accepted by the world in proof
of the unspotted innocence of Sir Arthur's attendant ; the state
of society in Spain at that time, as well as the movements of
Victor, all contribute to stamp the brand of infamy upon the fore-
head of the Spaniard. After the junction of Latour Maubourg

• " The old man (Cuesta) finally objected to liglit tliat^day, allejiin;i,'ainong.st
oilier absurd reasons, that it ^vas Sunday." — Xapicr. " Oll'ering, anionj;
other rccisons, his objection to (iglit on Sunday ! — a strange objection, which
even tlie sound sense of a con\ertc(l chief, in one of tlie ishinds of Polynesia,
not many years ago, forbade him to entertain ; as if a struggle on tiie Sabbath-
day against those who had desecrated the altars of Spain, and stained her
lieartlis with blood, was not a permitted and a sacred duty." — Sheerer. " So
unaccountable was this conduct in Cuesta, that it had been supi)0sed he
scrujjled at liglitiii'„^ uixin a Sunday." — Soulliey. Fnini liie following note, which
is attached (o the original MS., of "a memorandum of operations" contained

120 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

with the Duke of BeUuno, the latter, as if in utter contempt
of his pursuers, remained inactive during the whole of the
twenty-third, although his right and his centre were exposed,
the Alberche in front, being fordable; such timidity could
h ardly have arisen from any other source than a well-founded
knowledge of his enemy's intentions. But, Lord Londonderry,
himself an actor in the scene, and who writes its history in a
style simple, natural, and with the very operations of each day
present to the narrator, says, " For my own part, I thought
the French never entertained the least idea of fighting, pro-
vided they could escape with some credit, and all their plunder.
They kept the ground on the twenty-third to remove their
baggage, and because they conceived the whole British force
could not yet come up, (the Spanish they wholly disregarded);
and they retired the very first opportunity that presented itself
after the accomplishment of their objects." This is a natural
and reasonable explanation of Victor's conduct, but affords no
interpretation of Cuesta's delay, to which Lord Londonderry

in Sir A. Wellesley's despatches, and dated Badajoz, ninth December, it is obvi-
ous, that the preceding statements are incorrect — " All the discussions upon the
subject, and the misrepresentations, show the difKculty of serving the British
public, and the small degree of satisfaction any foreign officer has in co-operat-
ing with the British troops. General Cuesta chose to delay the attack to the
tvv<-nty-fourth, for which delay there were not wanting good and valid reasons:
but no such reasons are conceived, or are allowed to exist. A lie is invented
and circulated, viz. that the twenty-third was Sunday, and then Sir Arthur
Al'ellesley is abused for being the author of the lie. There was, however, a
curious circumstance attending this transaction, which shows the nature of the
war in Spain, and the deticiency of the intelligence by the Spanish general
officers, and that is — that although Sir Arthur Wellesley suspected it on the
evening of the twenty second, and made preparations accordingly, it was not
positively ascertained till the morning of the twenty-third, that the whole
French army was at Casalegas : and yet the videttes of the outposts were
within shot of each other, and the narrow river of the Alberche alone divided
the armies ! ! ! 'J'he French must, in the night of the twenty-third, have
acquired from our army the knowledge of our intended ■dltdck."— Wellington
Uespalckes, Vol. V. From the style of the preceding observations, and the
information they cnnvey, their author is easily identified, and Cuesta's fidelity,
in this instance, at all events, sufficiently arcertained.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 121

acknowledges the preservation of Victor's corps is solely to be
ascribed.

During the afternoon of the twenty-third, a Spanish officer
reported, that the French guns were withdrawn from the
heights beyond the Alberche, and that the enemy appeared
making preparation for retreat- This intelligence induced
Cuesta to lay aside his apathy for a moment, and, shaking off
the lethargy that oppressed him, he entered his coach, drawn
by six horses, and proceeded to the British camp, to express
his readiness to attack the foe on the following morning ; but
scarcely had the preliminary measures of reconnoisance been
commenced, when he threw himself down at the foot of a tree,
and in a few moments was wrapped in sleep. He awoke, how-
ever, like Jove from his slumbers, prepared to hurl his thunder-
bolt with still greater force ; but the golden opportunity was
lost: Victor's army like "hope's feathered ambassadour," had
flitted; the tents, the huts, the standing but deserted camp, as
the picturesque pillars of some olden city, just told that inha-
bitants had once been there. Cuesta appeared surprised at the
retreat of the enemy, — Sir Arthur felt no astonishment, but much
chagrin. Victor probably anticipated the precise feelings of both,
for he had been accurately informed of the intended movements
of the allies, and regulated his accordinijlv. He withdrew
during the night, on the Toledo road, to St. Ollalhi, and moved
thence towards Torrijos, and even farther towards Bargas, in
order to form a junction with Sebastiani. Victor had learned
also of Sir Robert Wilson's arrival at Escalona on the twenty-
third ; and the accuracy of this information enabled him to
save his column, and alter his line of retreat.

Cuesta now presumptuously, and too late, followed the
retreating army, on whose moral or physical strength a
Spanish army could have little prospect of making any impres-
sion ; while Sir Arthur, frustrated in his boldest, best design,
by stupidity, perverseness, bigotry, and fraud, declined further
co-operation : ])lanting a division of infantry at Casalegas, under
General Sherbrooke, to keep up the communication with
Cuesta — another at Cardial, on the Alberche, to maintain free

122 LIFI-: AND CAMPAIGNS OF

iiitcM'course with Sir R. Wilson at Escalona — he halted the
main body of his army at 'J'alavera. Here the situation of
the J3ritish commander was painful in the extreme : he had
crossed the frontier on his own responsibility, but at the
earnest solicitation of the Spanish junta, and that menda-
cious assembly now totally neglected to furnish mules, mode
of transport for the military stores, or necessaries for his
army. He reminded the junta " that he expected to derive
that assistance in provisions and other means, which an army
invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed,
more particularly when it has been sent to the aid of that
country; yet, for two days, the twenty-third and twenty-fourth
of July, while the army was on forced marches, the men had
nothing to eat, although he had engagements from the alcaldes
of villages in the Vera de Plasencia, to furnish his troops with
two hundred and fifty thousand rations before the twenty-
fourth: — that the French were well fed, as the healthy state of
the prisoners that the British took, fully proved ; and the
Spanish army wanted for nothing. While those who did nothing,
and those who inflicted injury, were well provided, it was absurd
to suppose that the British, on whom every thing depended,
should be actually starving." With this misfortune, Sir
Arthur manfully charged himself: " No man," said he, "can
see his army perish by want, without feeling for them ; and
most severely must he feel, who knows that they have been
brought into the country in which they suffer this want, by his
own act, on his own responsibility, and without the orders of
any superior authority." Under these circumstances, Sir
Arthur, as fearless of retreat as of advance, informed Cuesta,
that he considered the engagement entered into with him to
be faithfully accomplished, by the removal of Victor from the
Alberche ; and, if the Spanish general possessed energy enough
to take advantage of the crisis, he Avould be enabled to obtain
possession of the whole course of the Tagus, and establish a
communication with La Manca and Venegas- Not to pasvs
the Alberche until the promised supplies arrived, was the
fixed resolution of General Wellesley; and, to hasten the tardy

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. l'2'S

measures of the alcaldes, and etimulatc the proceedings of
the junta, he talked of returning altogether into Portugal; his
commission from his country, "to rid Portugal of the French,"
being executed in the most entire manner. Cuesta appeared
to regret the inactivity and dishonour of his government, but
in reality he hated and despised them, and, pursuing the
enemy, in the fullest expectation of recovering Madrid un-
aided by the British, he left Sir Arthur to quarrel with the
junta, with a cold assurance of respect for his honour and
ability. Suddenly, however, the junta became more active,
apologized for the supineness of the magistrates, and even dared
to mention truth, fidelity, and honour, as terms with whose
import they were familiar. Supplies at length arrived, but not
before the villany and the falsehood of the junta had received
a check, which threw them back upon their ill-used allies, for
that protection which their own arms were unable to atlord.
It may be remembered, that, by a plan of operations sanc-
tioned by the junta, Venegas was directed to move on Fuente
Duena, and threaten Madrid, and, in fact. Sir Arthur's posi-
tion on the Alberche was held principally with a view to the
protection of that general : but scarcely had the Spanish officer
marched on his destined route, than he received secret instruc-
tions from the junta not to advance on the capital, but, on the
contrary, to remain inactive, with a view to save that corps for
their own objects, while the British were to be exposed and
sacrificed to the clouds of French soldiers that were now
thickening around them : of this last fact, however, the British
were then wholly unconscious. The false movements of
\'enegas were soon noticed by Sebastiani, who, placing two
thousand troops in garrison at Toledo, deceived Venegas,
whom he had been observing closely near JNIadrilcjos, and
effected a junction with Victor's corps. King Joseph also,
who had, on the twenty-second, been informed that the com-
bined armies of his enemies were concentrated at Talavera,
setting out from Madrid with his entire force, three thousand
excepted, who were left in the Bctiro, moved towards Casa-
legas. On his route, he was informed that Sir Hubert W ilson

124 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was at Escalona, with a strong detachment ; which much
increased his fears, and induced Jourdan, who accompanied
him, to repeat the orders given to Marshal SouU, that he
would move on Plasencia by forced marches. Advancing still
further, he was met by couriers, bearing intelligence of Victor's
retrograde movements ; which caused Joseph to alter his line of
march, take the Guadarama for his guide, and follow its course,
by which means he fell in with Victor on the twenty- fifth. The
junction of Joseph's forces with those of the Duke of Belluno,
placed a formidable army, upwards of fifty thousand strong,
with ninety pieces of artillery, behind the river Guadarama.
Joseph, relying both on the numbers and steadiness of the
troops he had collected around him, and justly confiding in the
genius of his general, resolved to act on the offensive, and
accordingl}', on the twenty-sixth, he advanced with that inten-
tion, from Burgos upon Torrijos.

Cuesta hastily, haughtily, heedlessly pursued the French,
expecting to run over or along with them into the streets of
Madrid, nor heard the warning voice of Wellesley, who fore-
saw the danger of such a pursuit, from the total inequality
of discipline and moral force between the contending armies.
The French at first baffled the Spaniards, who followed them
to CevoUa, by the Toledo road, and then by the Madrid road to
El Bravo : but from this place, Cuesta, although he had already
begun to suspect that some latent danger existed, moved on
Torrijos. The objects of Sir Arthur never being impeded by
vanity, folly, or enthusiasm, he had, on the very first com-
mencement of Cuesta's rash pursuit, taken measures for his
ultimate preservation ; and, although he was unable to save him
from exposing himself to the storm, he had prepared an asylum
for him to run into and take shelter, should he be able to reach
it. The position of the British at Casalegas was central with
regard to Talavera, Escalona, and St. Ollalla ; so that Sir
Arthur retained the power of easy communication, both with
Cuesta and Sir Robert Wilson.

The operations of the combined armies had, hitherto, been
conducted successfully, owing to the extreme caution of Sir

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 125

Arthur Wellesley, and the terror of his name, which will be
found henceforth to operate as much for the advantage of
the allies as the ruin of the enemy, yet under the most
entire ignorance of their position, strength, or intentions.
The commanding mind of Napoleon was not limited by the
confines of those kingdoms he was overrunning, but ex-
tended the benefit of its prudent counsel to the heart of the
Peninsula. Accurately informed of the events in Portugal
and Spain, burning with a desire to revenge the disgrace of
Roleia, Vimeira, and Oporto, which he conceived could only
be done with honour to Soult by the destruction of Wellesley,
the emperor wrote from his head-quarters, at Ratisbon, to the
Duke of Dalmatia, then lingering near Zamora, informing him,
that the English general, being perfect master of the art of
war, would operate on the line of the Tagus, would beat each
French corps in detail, and then creep into Lisbon. " In that
case," said the emperor, " fall on his flank and rear, and
crush him." From the perverseness and pride of Cuesta, the
stupid cowardice of the central junta, and the inactivity of the
alcaldes in forwarding supj)lies, had Napoleon himself being
at the head of Soult's corps, the attempt would have been
made ; in which case possibly the result of Waterloo might
have been anticipated, and the lamentable effusion of blood
which followed have been averted. It is true, also, that fate
might have decided the trial otherwise. Soult immediately
communicated the purport of the emperor's despatch to king
Joseph, adding, that he was ignorant of Wellesley's exact
position, but had no doubt he was seeking to form a junction
with Cuesta in order to act along the Tagus. Soult proposed
to the king, to lay siege to Ciudad llodrigo, and menace
Lisbon, in order to bring back the British to the north of
Portugal, and, confiding in the wisdom of his own suggestions,
actually detached Morticr in the direction of the former place.
Weakened by the separation of Mortier's detachment, Soult
directed Marshal Ney to bring up the sixth corps to Zamora ;
but this veteran, bursting with* indignation at Soult's being
placed at the head of the three corps d'armces in the Peninsula,

II. s

126 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

declared that it would be highly imprudent to uncover Leon
and Astorga, and peremptorily refused to obey Soult's orders.
Disturbed by Ney's disobedience, he sent forward a division
of cavalry and infantry to Salamanca, to explore the way ; and
being now, that was on the tenth of July, when the British
were marching on Plasencia, convinced that Wellesley had no
intention of acting north of the Douro, he followed his ad-
vanced guard to Salamanca.

Time had somewhat mitigated the anger of Ney, who was
now persuaded to place himself under Soult's orders, and co-
operate cordially in all his plans. Joseph, who had been as
incredulous of the approach of the British, as they were
ignorant of the concentration of three great corps under as
many able generals, being pressed by Soult to accede to and
support the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, replied, by the advice of
Marshal Jourdan, that he approved most entirely of the able
plans of the Duke of Dalmatia, but was not in a condition to
comply with his demands : he begged that a reinforcement of
ten thousand men might be sent to Bonnet and Kellerman, to
enable them to hold the Asturias, and keep open a line of com-
munication and retreat into France. Against the king's instruc-
tions Soult strongly remonstrated, assuring his intrusive
majesty, " that the war could not be finished by detachments,
and, from his personal experience of the fact, it was only by
large masses they could hope for success against the British."
This much-lauded opinion of the Duke of Dalmatia, was by-
no means novel, nor established by his single example. Admiral
Nelson had long before given his decided judgment upon the
comparative individual value of French and British sailors 5 and
Sir A. Wellesley had actually delivered his written conclusion
to the same effect, during the campaign of 1809. Adopting his
plan of bringing masses of men into the field, "in order that
there might be enough to be killed, enough to be taken prisoners,
and enough to run away," he now drew in Mortier's division
to Salamanca, and thus concentrated in that vicinity a force
of fifty thousand men, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the
passes of Banos and Perales. And such was the strength and

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 1'27

such the situation of the French army on the day that Wel-
lesley passed the I'ietar, in total ignorance of all the enemy's
movements, although he had placed Beresford and Del Parque,
to guard those very passes ; and, as the peasantry were sup-
posed to be favourable to the British, it might naturally have
been expected that they would have given them intimation of
their danger.

Notwithstanding the success of Soult in drawing together,
so secretly, this formidable force, he still felt disinclined to
attack the British lion until all the hunters were assembled,
and he again called on Joseph to advance, saying, " We should
assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side,
fall upon him all together, and crush him." This appeal was
not the dictation of courage or confidence, but, on the contrary,
resembled a cry for help. The conduct of Joseph, on assur-
ance of the real position of the allied army, has already been
mentioned; as well as his junction with \'ictor, and assem-
blage of an army behind the Guadarama, of about the same
strength as that under Soult and Ney. On the morning of
the twenty-sixth, Cuesta, who was either madly or obstinately
brave, and had followed the dangerous phantom too far,
now perceived the precipice to which it had led him, and
endeavoured to retire from its brink : but the demon had
marked his prey too securely, and when the marshal turned
to regain the asylum which his generous ally had provided
for him, he felt the horrible clutch of a mortal foe. The
French suddenly rushing across the Guadarama, fell furiously
upon the Spaniards, drove them out of Torrijos, and followed
closely in their rear to Alcabon. Here Zayas, a brave and
able officer, drew up four thousand infantry, half that number
of horse, and eight guns, and for some time kept Latour
Maubourg with the French cavalry in check ; but, on the
ap])earance of the enemy's infantry, the Sjianiards turned their
backs, and ran towards St. Ollalla. Thither they were pur-
sued with unabated fury, and a dreadful havoc had commenced,
when the Duke of Albuquerque, who had solicited the honour
of leading his division to the support of the vanguard, advanced

128 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

against Maubourg, arrested the sabres of his cavah'y, and
inflicting severe chastisement on Maubourg's division, saved
Zayas from complete rout, and perhaps preserved the whole
army from the deplorable influence of a panic. The fortunate
and gallant interposition of Albuquerque enabled Cuesta to
prepare for, and to execute a retreat towards the Alberche in
better order. At the moment that Zayas was flying before the
French cavalry, Cuesta's artillery and stores lay scattered in the
streets of St. Ollalla, and the ways were actually blocked up
with carts of bread ; the commissaries fled, and the men were
seen everywhere throwing off" their accoutrements, and preparing
to abandon the whole of the military stores to the enemy, if,
by so doing, they might only preserve their lives. This reckless
rabble thus saved from death, and put once more into pos-
session of their property, held on their irregular march for
twenty miles, while Albuquerque had received the enemy
with swords so sharply pointed, that they deemed it imprudent
to renew the attack upon him, until their numbers were
strengthened, and the courage of their defeated troops recovered.
His object being attained, by the safe retreat of the main
body, Albuquerque drew off his cavalry, with whom the
French exhibited no disposition to deal again. The distance
to the British head-quarters was sufficiently great to allow
breathing-time to Maubouvg, and admit also of his overtaking
the rear of the Spaniards, but he was a second time, and in a
similar manner, encountered by a body of British cavalry, under
General Sherbrooke, who sallied from his post at Cazalegas,
and placing himself between the hunters and their prey, saved
the victims from immolation.

Sir Arthur had always viewed the conduct of Cuesta as
presumptuous and rash, and looked for his return every hour
after his departure ; that return, however, would never have
been accomplished, but for the gallantry of Albuquerque, to
whom the general entrusted the smallest authority with the
utmost jealousj', and the check given to the pursuers by General
Sherbrooke, who had been placed in that position by Sir Arthur
Wellesley, to obviate those difficulties which he had foreseen.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 129

The Spaniards now bivouacked on the left bank of the Alberche,
and as the enemy were approaching, the cord of commu-
nication between the alUes was drawn still tighter by the
strong hand that held it, for it was evident the enemy were in
such force, that a battle could not be delayed much longer.
Sir Arthur, therefore, crossing the river, entered Cuesta's
hut, and with much difficulty persuaded him to bring his
army over the river, take up a position on the right of the
British, and co-operate more sincerely and sensibly in future
with his allies. While the Spaniard was yielding to the solici-
tations of Sir Arthur, the French cavalry caught his eye, as
they steadily advanced, and took up the position which Sher-
brooke as calmly abandoned, being recalled to tlie head-
quarters of the British. Cuesta looked around over the barren
plain included between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the liills of
Salinas, and feeling that his position was too weak to be held
against so powerful an enemy, consented to remove his camp,
withdraw from his injudicious bivouac, and, while it was yet
practicable, take up his allotted ground near Talavera, where
Sir Arthur had resolved upon again establishing the supe-
riority of his military genius to that of Napoleon's most fortu-
nate generals. The zeal with which General Wellesley dis-
charged even the collateral branches of his duty, or what he
felt to be such, is very strongly attested by an anecdote related
of his interview with Cuesta on this occasion ; it is said, that
so warmly did the British hero plead tlie cause of his own
army, of Cuesta's, of the Peninsula, in order to bring the
veteran to a sense of his duty, that when he was leaving the
hut, Cuesta turned to his staff, and said, " Well, 1 have con-
sented, but I first made the Englishman go down on his
knees."

130 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

CHAP. III.

^RIUMISH AT CASA DE SALINAS — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY NARROWLY ESCAPES BEING
MADE rRISONER — PANIC IN CUESTA's ARMY — DESPERATE ATTACK UPON THE SIERRA DE
MONTALHAN — BATTLE OF TALAVERA — THE BRITISH ARMY IN IMMINENT DANGER, AND
THE CONTEST DOUBTFUL — THE BATTLE RESTORED BY SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEy's FORE-
SIGHT AND DECISION — THE FRENCH SIGNALLY^ DEFEATED, AND OBLIGED TO RECROSS THE
ALBERCHE — EXTRAORDINARY MARCH OF THE REINFORCEMENT UNDER GENERAL CRAU-
FURD, AND ITS ARRIVAL AT THE CAMP OF THE ALLIES — MISCONDUCT OF THE SPANIARDS,
AND CRUEL PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON THEM BY CUESTA — DESCENT OP SOULT BY THE
PASS OF BANOS INTO THE VALLEY OF THE TAGUS — SIB A. WELLESLEY MARCHES AGAINST
THE ENEMY, WHO HAD THEN THREE CORPS d'ARMEE CONCENTRATED AT PLASENCIA —
CUESTA INHUMANLY ABANDONS THE BRITISH HOSPITAL AT TALAVERA TO THE ENEMY,
AND RETIRES UPON OROPESA — AFFAIR AT ARZOBISPO — INGRATITUDE OF CUESTA TO THE
ALLIED ARMY — SIR ARTHUR REFUSES TO CONTINUE IN SPAIN — RETIRES ACROSS THE
TAGUS, AND TAKES UP A POSITION WITHIN THE PORTUGUESE FRONTIER — THE BRITISH
ARMY VISITED BY' SICKNESS. — 1809.

By virtue of his genius Sir Arthur Wellesley assumed tlie
command of the allied armies, on the twenty-seventh of July,
1809, and proceeded to place his forces in an attitude of
defence, having perceived that the enemy were resolved and
eager to attack him. The position which he considered most
desirahle was in the immediate neighbourhood of Talavera
de la Reyna ; and Cuesta having consented to occupy the
ground allotted to him, Sherbrooke was directed to return
with his corps to its station in the line, while Mackenzie, with
a division of infantry, and a brigade of cavalry, remained as an
advanced post in the wood, on the right of the Alberche, which
covered Sir Arthur's left flank. The position taken up by the
troops on this occasion extended rather more than two miles ;
the ground upon the left, where the British army was sta-
tioned, was open, and commanded by a height forming the
first range of the Sierra de Montalban, on which was placed,
en echelon, a division of infantry under the orders of Major-
General Hill. Beyond the left of the British line, a valley,
watered by the Portina rivulet, a tributary to the Tagus at
Talavera, separated the eminence which Plill occupied from

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 131

the Gata mountains, a range apparently too distant to have
any influence on the expected action, and thence passed along
the ^vhole front of the allied army ; besides which, it was
commanded by the height just mentioned as in the occupation
of the extreme left of the allies. Here the British were placed
in front, exposed to the fire of an enraged and vindictive
enemy; but, as the commander-in-chief was aware that his
countrymen desired the post of honour, he knew they would
not shrink from that of danger. That knowledge of character
displayed in posting his British troops was again exhibited, in
the cautious disposition of his Spanish allies ; and never was
a judgment more prophetic than that which Sir Arthur had
formed, nor a prophecy more entirely fulfilled than his, by the
misconduct and timidity of his allies. The right of the line,
consisting of Spanish troops, was placed in front of the town
of Talavera, extending down to the river Tagus on which
their right flank reposed ; while their left rested on a mound
occupied by a large field-redoubt, and having a brigade of
British light cavalry posted behind. Their front was covered
by ditches, felled trees, mud walls, embankments, various
other obstructions, and by a spacious convent ; while their
rear and left flank were protected by a thick wood, in which
stood a large mansion-house. The high road leading from
the bridge over the Alberche, was commanded by a heavy
battery in front of a church, which was occupied by a body of
Spanish infantry. All the avenues to the town were defended
in a similar manner ; the town was occupied ; and the remainder
of the Spanish infantry formed in two lines, behind the banks
on the road which led, from the town and the right of the
entire line of the allies, to the left of the British. Had the
British general taken the Spaniards under his protection,
with the promise of fighting for them rather than with them,
he could not more faithfully have redeemed his pledge ; for
now the position of the Spaniards was almost impregnable,
their numbers, their disorder, their persons, concealed from
view of the enemy ; they could only be assailed on the left
by cutting down the British, and from the right by forcing a
passage through the fortified streets of Talavera. In the

132 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

event of defeat, no alternative was left to his own soldiers but
captivity or death, while for the Spaniard a retreat was open
through the town of Arzobispo, or through the wood on
Oropesa. " In this position," says Colonel Napier, " they
could not be seriously attacked, nor their disposition be even
seen : and thus one half of the line necessary to be occupied
by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet held
by the worst troops." Sir A. Wellesley only reposed confidence
in the Spaniards appai'ently, or as far as the uncompromising
pride of Cuesta and the success of the expedition compelled him
to do ; and that he both prophesied truly, and regretted the
hard necessity, appears from an observation in his letter of the
eighth of August to the secretary of war, it is : "I hope my
public despatch will justify me from all blame in the eyes of
his majesty's ministers, excepting that of having trusted the
Spanish general in any thing.

Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell was posted on the
British right, touching the left of the allies, and at the spot on
which Sir Arthur had commenced to form a redoubt; the rear
of Campbell's infantry was supported by Cotton's brigade of
dragoons and some Spanish cavalry. Sherbrooke's division
stood on Campbell's left, behind whom Mackenzie, on his com-
ing up, was directed to form a second line ; the German legion
was placed to the left still ; Donkin's division was next in suc-
cession ; and the extreme left, the key of the British position,
was entrusted to the strong hand and stronger heart of General
Hill. Such was the plan, and such the position subsequently
taken up in the eventful battle of the twenty-eighth, when the
British brought into the fiield twenty thousand troops ; Cuesta
was at the head of thirty-five thousand men, forming a rabble
rather than a regular corps; and the combined army possessed
here one hundred pieces of ordnance. To oppose this force,
the braver part of which were raw and inexperienced levies, and
the more numerous totally undisciplined, the enemy had fifty
thousand veterans well armed, equipped, and provided, led by
king Joseph in person, whose judgment was assisted by
that of Marshals Victor, Jourdan, and Sebastiani.

I

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 133

While the main body of the allied army were taking up their
allotted positions, IMaj or- General Mackenzie and Colonel
Rufane Donkin's brigades of infantry remained in advance,
in the woods at Casa Salinas, and supported by a strong
body of cavalry, under Anson and Payne, drawn out upon
the plain between the wood and Talavera. It was about
tvi^o o'clock on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, when
Mackenzie's division, owing to their having kept no patroles
in front, were surprised by the advance of two columns of
the enemy's forces headed by Lapisse and lluflBn, which had
forded the Alberche, pushed gallantly into the wood, and, by
the suddenness of the assault, threw the British brigades, which
consisted of young battalions who had then seen fire for the
first time, into such confusion, that one part actually fired upon
the other ; and the whole were dislodged from their cover in
the wood, and driven into the plain. At this moment every
officer was thrown upon his personal courage, presence of
mind, and just sense of military discipline, to illustrate the duties
of a soldier in the moment of peril ; and never were the expec-
tations of their country more fully responded to. Although
the enemy had actually penetrated between Mackenzie's two
brigades, and a fatal crisis was impending, the officers kept the
men in their new position until Sir Arthur Wellesley, who
had witnessed the affray from the summit of tiie Casa, where he
had been making observations, rode up to them, and by his pre-
sence alone restored the fight. Instantly the stubborn old forty-
fifth and the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, presented a beautiful,
compact, and perfect array ; and coming to the support of the
disconcerted companies, completely checked the enemy's pro-
gress, and covered their companions' steady rcti'eat. This re-
covery was effected principally by the prudence of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, although in his despatch of that date he has given
all the honour to the brave Mackenzie, with whose conduct
"he had particular reason to be satisfied," and never once
mentions the fact of his having personally directed those
movements by which the division was brought oft\ The
omission is the more remarkable in this particular instance,

11. T

134 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

because Sir Arthur was not only present, but narrowly escaped
being made prisoner by the enemy. Having ascended to
the summit of the Casa, he perceived the approach of the
French, saw them fall impetuously on his men, and noticed
that the latter faltered ; this was sufficient ; instantly
descending, he had only time to mount his hoi'se when the
battle was pushed to the Casa, which fell into the hands of the
enemy the next instant after he had escaped from it. " Had
he been taken at that moment, or had Marlborough, a century
before, been recognized and detained when he fell into the
hands of a French partisan on the Meuse, how differently
would the latter days of Napoleon and of Louis the Fourteenth
have closed ! and how different at this hour have been the
condition of England, of Europe, of the world !" The reserved
division now fell back, crossed the plain, passed the Portina
streamlet, and took up their ground — ]Mackenzie in the second
line, in the rear of the guards, and Donkin to the left of the
German legion on the hill, which he found unoccupied, and
which completed the assigned position of the allies.

Animated by this success, v.hich was so far signal, the
British having lost in the affray at Salinas upwards of four
hundred men, Victor advanced across the Alberche, passed
through the plain, took possession of an isolated hill directly
in front of Donkin, and opened a heavy cannonade on
his brigade, then on the British extreme left, and at the
same time made an attempt with his cavalr}', supported by
voltigeurs, to discover the true position of the Spanish
infantry, which the plan of Sir Arthur Wellesley had concealed
from him. Scarcely had the French horsemen shown them-
selves, and a fev/ pistol-shots had just been discharged, to
rouse, as they imagined, the lion that was slumbering or
crouching in his lair, when ten thousand Spaniards, making
one discharge of small arms, broke through the rear ranks,
threw away their arms, and some, actually mounting the artil-
lery-horses, fled away towards Oropesa. Amongst the earliest
fugitives was General O'Donoju, and suspicion even tampers
with Cuesta's fame. The panic, however, although originating

GEITERAX, SIR IMTAXE SriAWE DONKIN, KGB. & G. C. H.

SimVEYOH.GEKERAJ, i)f 'I-RE ORDUAITCE .

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 135

in no explicable cause, was spreading far and wide, when Sir
Arthur Wellesley advanced at the head of a small detachment
from Campbell's division, flanked the main road, encouraged
those Spaniards who stood their ground, to return the enemy's
fire, and drove off the enemy with considerable loss. Cuesta,
recovering from the contagion of a panic, directed the most
active of his cavalry to pursue, head, and turn the fugitives,
in which they were tolerably successful, bringing back several
thousands to their position daring the night ; but, on the day
of the battle of Talavera, the Spanish force, which impeded the
operations of the British army, was six thousand less in number
than it had been when first drawn up. In this scene of
unintelligible, unpardonable cowardice. Colonel Napier says,
" some English officers also diso^raced their uniforms."

As night begun to throw her deepening shades over those
green hills that were soon to be stained with the blood of
thousands, the impetuous enemy pushed along the valley of
the Portina in front of the British line, leaving the affrigiited
Spaniards to the recovery of their courage, ^'ictor having
directed Ruffin and Villatte to attack the heights on the left of
the British position, ami ordered Lapisse to make a diversion
in favour of that movement, by a feigned assault upon the
German legion. Donkin, who then occupied this important
post, received the vigorous charge with a cool and steady
front, not yielding one foot of ground ; but his left was turned
by the still increasing numbers who rushed up the hill, and
passed on without further resistance to the summit, which was
in his rear. This eminence was the position originally destined
to be occupied by General Hill, but, by some accident, he had
not yet taken up his ground, so that Donkin was exposed to
the attack of the enemy in a post which was untenable, unless
the hill behind were also occupied by the British. The courage
of Donkin compensated, for a brief space, for his want of
strength, but now Hill was proceeding to his position, the
value of which all parties were aware of, and was engaged in
giving orders to the colonel of the forty-eighth regiment to
advance, when a ball from the summit passed close by him.

l'3G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Imagining that it must have proceeded from some British
stragglers, idly or wrongly employed, accompanied by Brigade-
Major Fordyce, he rode briskly up to inquire into the cause,
and was soon astonished at finding himself surrounded by the
enemy. Fordyce was instantly put to death, and a grenadier,
who had inflicted a wound upon General Hill's charger, had
eagerly seized his bridle, when the general, striking his spurs
into the sides of his bleeding horse, caused him to plunge
forward, with such violence, that he broke from the grasp of
the Frenchman, and, galloping down the steep, gained in an
instant the ranks of the twenty-ninth. Hill did not fail to
make a quick and profitable use of the liberty he had almost
miraculously recovered, by heading the advancing column,
and returning to the support of Donkin with such vigour and
determination, that the sounds of the death-dealing pieces of
the enemy were in a moment succeeded by the loud shouts of
exultation raised by Hill's division, who had completely dis-
lodfjed the enemv, and driven them down into the ravine in
front of their line. The beaten foe-men fell back upon
Ruffin's columns, that were rapidly coming up to their relietl,
and which would have arrived earlier, but from the difficulty of
finding their way through the ravine ; and now the whole united
force of the French advanced, opening a destructive fire upon
the British left, then rushing rapidly up the hill, renewed the
struggle for the old point of contest. The firing ceased, the
clash of naked steel alone was heard in the stilly silence of the
night ; then burst forth again those glorious cheers, which
British soldiei^s raise so high and heartily in the moment of
victory, and sometimes even at the approach of death, but which
now too surely told the enemy of his defeat. The echoes of
the loud hurrah rang through the valley, tossed from hill to
hill until they reached the Spanish camp, harbingers of hope
to many timid hearts in that great array, while the sounds of
the enemy's musketry in solemn murmurs died away.

This bloody skirmish cost the British about four hundred
men, and it is believed that the loss of the French, during the
twenty-seventh, could not have fallen much short of one thou-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 137

sand. Lapisse had added little to the amount of slain, having

discontinued his feint against the German legion, as soon as he

perceived the total failure of the attack on the British left,

where, falling back across the Portina, the French seemed

willing to rest from their work of death, although it was an

occupation with which that army had long been familiar, while

the allies continued to keep possession of the ground which

their general had chosen for them— but under arms, and ready

for the contest. The disappointments of the preceding day by no

means diminished the hopes of Victor, or checked his desire to

get possession of Hill's position; and, having obtained permission,

from king Joseph to make a third attempt on that point at

daybreak on the following morning, he prepared a plan of attack

under the conduct of Iluffin, Lapisse, and Latour Maubourg.

This last rash effort of \'ictor was strenuously opposed by

Marshal Jourdan, who was of opinion, that the Spaniards were

too securely posted to be affected by any attack or movement of

the French: that the right of the British was protected by the

redoubt between them and the Spanish, by the rugged ground

in the valley that separated the armies, and by their strength

of numbers ; and, that the French having already failed to make

an impression, although many lives had been lost in tho ;■! tempt,

on the left which was the weakest part of the allic' line, he

considered it would he more prudent to wait for Soult's arrival,

partial enterprises leading to no important results.

During the night of the twenty-seventh, while Victor was
plotting the deaths of thousands, friends and enemies, both
armies bivouacked upon the field, the cavalry amongst their
saddled steeds, with bridle-rein in hand, the infantry around
their numerous watch-fires. The return of light on the
morning of the twenty-eighth, was announced by the discharge
of a whole pare of French artillery from the opposite heights,
which swept the British ranks towards the centre and the
right, while three regiments of infantry in columns of batta-
lions, ascending in two divisions on either side of the hill,
and reaching the summit, closed firmly with Hill's brigade.
The struggle was now maintained with an obstinacy, courage,

138 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

and vehemence never exceeded : the heavy guns of the French
committed havoc in the British centre, while the hght ord-
nance of the allies were unable, to make an equivalent reply ;
under cover of the fire, the infantry reached the top of the hill,
but there its fury could no longer be directed ; which left the
British to the free exercise of personal bravery, and of this
high quality they soon gave Victor sufficient proof. The
difficult and broken ground, on the front of the hill, separated
the compact masses of French soldiers as they ascended, and
whenever that occurred, a little band of British heroes advanced,
struggled with the party detached, nor ceased till either was
completely overthrown. So close did the combat at length
become, that the bayonet's sharp point remained sole arbiter
of the day. This weapon in the hands of a Briton uniformly
excites a panic amongst his enemies, and scarcely had the
order been given to charge with bayonets, than the French grena-
diers began to give way ; retiring steadily at first, they still
kept the issue doubtful, but finding the British pushing too
hard, they actually flung themselves over the brow into the
ravine below, where many of them miserably perished. In
the defence of this point, the brigades of Tilson and R. Stewart
signalized themselves particularly : frequently their men stood
waiting, firm as the mountain rock, until the enemy came within
a few paces of them, when they advanced in close phalanx, and
threw them down the hill : and this desperate effort was repeated
until the French declined the contest. The loss of the British
was again considerable, that of the enemy frightful, and had the
commander-in-chief extended his left across the ravine, or had a
body of cavalry been posted on the rivulet on Hill's left, few of
Ruffin's party, that attacked on the morning of the twenty-
eighth, would have returned to their line. Besides Fordyce,
who was killed at General Hill's side in this last affair,
Brigade-Major Gardner fell, and Hill himself was slightly
wounded. In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the
height on which the British left reposed, Sir Arthur determined
upon rectifying his error, in leaving that wing exposed, by
placing in the valley two brigades of British cavalry, supported

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 139

on the rear by the Duke of Albuquerque with a division of
Spanish horse. This movement was answered by a corre-
sponding one on the part of the enemy, who placed a body of
light infantry on the mountain above the British cavalry ; to
which General Wellesley again opposed a division of Spanish
infantry, under Camp-Marshal Bassecourt.

The darkness of the preceding night had interrupted the
conflict for a few short hours, and given to the half-famished
British army, a brief and broken rest : the heat of the mid-day
sun now suspended the battle, allowing three hours only
for the performance of various sad but necessary duties. 1 he
dead were now removed, the ammunition waggons replenished,
the wounded carried into hospital, and the lines re-formed.
King Joseph took advantage of the awful pause, to hold a
council of war, and demand the advice of his Generals Jourdan
and Victor : the former gave it as his opinion, that as Wellesley
had strengthened his left, it was now too late to think of turn-
ing that wing ; his front had always been impregnable, and no
alternative remained but to await the approach of Soult and
the result of his operations. Mctor, on the contrary, declared
that the French would be unwortiiy of the military renown they
enjoyed, if the force under king Joseph should prove unable to
drive General Hill from his position. Josej)h was incapable of
deciding upon the merits of either opinion, and was influenced
only by the apprehension of incurring Napoleon's indignation :
but before his indecision could have worked more ruin, intelli-
gence arrived that Soult could not possibly read) Plasencia
before the fifth of August, while Venegas was actually threat-
ening IMadrid. The capital was the bauble which deluded
his imagination, and the recollection of its pageantry over-
powered his weak mind : he decided therefore upon attacking
the allies, of whose defeat Victor seemed certain, and tlicn
turning back to succour his chief city.

Sir Arthur Wellesley held his council of war alone, on the
highest point of that memorable hill, for the possession of
which so many brave lives had been sacrificed. Here, as he
sat upon the grass, rolling his keen glance along the colunuis of

140 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

tlie enemy, and playing over in forethought tlie hazardous
game of war, Colonel Donkin rode up at full speed to inform
him, '• that it was the Duke of Albuquerque's conviction
Cuesta was betraying the British." This startling intelligence
did not produce any alteration in the direction of Sir Arthur's
gaze ; he never withdrew it from the object of his contemplation,
and, without the slightest change in the expression of his
countenance, replied, " Very well, you may return to your bri-
gade." " Donkin," says Colonel Napier, " returned, filled with
admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetra-
tion of the man : and indeed Sir Arthur's conduct was, through-
out that day, such as became a general upon whose intrepidity
and vigilance the fate of fifty thousand men depended."

While the intrusive king and his veteran officers were
assembled in conclave, and disputing acrimoniously upon the
most effectual and unerring mode of " crushing Wellesley" —
while the single-minded hero sat alone upon the summit of the
blood-stained hill, pondering upon the best means of fi-ustrating
the great enemies of his country, of Europe, of mankind — the
wearied soldiers of both armies straggled down in numbers to
the banks of the Portina rivulet, which went its murmur-
ing course along the bottom of the ravine that separated the
contending armies, and there indulging in the refreshment of
laving both hands and face, and slaking their thirst within a
few feet of each other, these brave foemen held an unconscious,
unpremeditated, honourable truce ; and those hands which had
but one hour before been raised in mortal strife, were
now extended with noble generosity, forgiveness of personal
injuries, and admiration of valour and constancy of purpose,
even in an enemy. These exchanges of national feeling,
these mutual acknowledgments of the highest virtue, passed
in a still and solemn hour. They were accompanied by a
mysterious and inexplicable degree of enjoyment, which the
survivors must have remembered long after the occasion which
gave it birth had died away ; and neither party exhibited a
desire to resume prematurely the sanguinary duty from which
they paused ; but, allegiance or loyalty was not shaken for a

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTOX. 14 1

second, the roll of the drum, the call of the trumpet, tlie roar
of the signal-guns, recalled them from their trance, their delu-
sion, the mist of leisure, almost of happiness, that enveloped
them ; and, without a farewell word, though many were doomed
to meet no more on earth, hastening up the front of the
opposing hills with a rapidity almost inconceivahle, the crowd
that just now filled the banks of the rivulet all alonf? the 'den,
was marshalled under the respective banners of their nations,
prepared to deal death to those, from whom, a few moments
before, they had parted in that apparent spirit which humanity
in vain labours to realize.

A little before two o'clock, Victor's myrmidons being reas-
sembled under the wings of the imperial eagles, the signal to
commence the havoc was given, and Sebastiani with the fourth
corps was distinctly seen by General Wellesley, deacending
the opposite hill at a rapid pace, and, with the usual impetu-
osity of French soldiers, dashing across the rugged ravine
that divided the armies, and, falling upon Campbell's division
with the most tremendous impulse ; and accompanying it with
loud yells indicative of maddened courage, they fairly grapj)led
with an English enemy, to whom tbey had been always
taught to believe themselves superior. The fatal error, how-
ever, was soon disclosed : the French attacked in column, an
arrangement, the viciousness of which Sir Arthur Welleslcy
had often clearly shown to the marshals of Napoleon ; while
the British received them in line,* with strict orders to reserve
their fire until the heads of the enemy's column almost touched

• " Tiiis system of Lord Wellington was opposcil to foreign theories, and
particularly to French practice, who always attacked in column, and deployed
ou the crest of the position, if they ever arrived at it, where the nun were
generally blown, and, from being under lire, necessarily performed this nice
operation under disadvantageous circumstances. The French attacks at
Vlmeira, Talavera, Uusaco, and Sorauren, from acting on this principle, were
defeatefl. The British, in their attacks at Salamanca, N'ittoria, the Nive,
Orthez, and Toulouse, having previously deployed info liiu-, carricil llm
enemy's positions. At Waterloo, also, the wholeof tlie French altai k** wi-re in
column, and they were signally defeated ; the advance of the IJrili.sh infinliy
was in line, and the result we all know." — Observatiuns on tlicO'eneral Or<iers,^c.

U. U

142 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

their front rank; this direction being strictly obeyed, the
instant the French had gained the level of the British Hne, a
close volley was poured into their dense mass, with a degree of
precision that astonished even the veteran legions of Gaul, and,
on attempting to deploy into line, and thereby evade partially
the galling and fatal effects of a repetition, they became
exposed to a furious volley of musketry from Mackenzie's
brigade, that threw them into the utmost consternation. Nothing
could exceed the sudden and ruinous consequences of this
discharge upon the flanks of the French columns ; their accus-
tomed tactics, in which they had been trained to confide, as
emanating from the greatest warrior of the age, proved
unsuited to those of the British army ; the courage of their
enemies was at least equal to their own, and their national
spirit was more rationally founded, therefore less liable to
effervesce and evaporate. Campbell seized on the opportunity
created by Mackenzie's prompt attack upon the enemy's flank,
and, breaking in upon the wavering and shattered military
structure, made frightful havoc amongst its ranks. Encouraged
by this brilliant example of British intrepidity, two regiments
of Spanish infantry, and one of cavalry, now became eager for
the fight, and, impatient of restraint, they boldly advanced
against the exposed flank of the enemy, from their position on
the right, and completed in the most signal manner, the over-
throw which Sherbrooke and Mackenzie had so well begun, by
driving the disorganized masses of men before them down
into the valley, amidst a tempest of bullets from the whole
right wing of the British army. Reaching the bottom of the
hill, they attempted to rally, and finding that Mackenzie did
not pursue, actually made a demonstration of renewing the
attack ; but their hopes were in an instant given to the winds,
by the incessant play of artillery from the redoubt, and the
close, continued, and steady volleys of musketry from the
British lines. The whole French column, like the wounded
gladiator reeling from the stupor of a mortal blow, staggered,
fell, and confessed the victory.

So fiir the British were conspicuously victorious ; and, were

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. J 43

national military prowess to be decided by the attack and
resistance in this instance, the British infantry evinced a
decided superiority : but the destruction of this day was not
confined to the centre of the line : the left was assailed at
the same time by Villatte's division, and llutiin was directed
to renew the attack upon Montalban, the hill of blood,
for which the French had fought with so much desperation,
but in vain, for nearly four and twenty hours : against these
advancing columns, the twenty-third light dragoons and the
first German hussars were ordered to make a charge, and start-
ing at a canter, then increasing their speed with their growing
impetuosity to meet the foe, they rode headlong forward with
such an accelerated velocity, that the greater part of the twenty-
third fell over into a chasm, which, from the rate at which they
were advancing, had not been perceived, and the most frightful
confusion consequently followed. Arentschild, an experienced
officer, who commanded the hussars, foresaw the danger,
reined his steed, and enabled his men to recover the govern-
ment of their horses, calling out, in his imperfect ICnglish,
"I will not kill my young mens;" but Colonel Seymour riding
wildly forward, was followed, as such a noble example generally
is, by his devoted regiment, and in the melee that occurred,
was severely wounded. As the survivors of this dejjlorable
accident arose from the deli, singly or in small groupes, Major
Ponsonby " a hardy soldier," called to the untamed spirits not
to despair, and, collecting the fragments of that once fine regi-
ment, galloped through the very centre of \'illatte's squares
amidst a shower of bullets, and fell upon Strolz's brigade of
French chasseurs with such a shock as to rend that mass in
two, and penetrate completely to the opposite side. Here,
however, the splendid career of this brave Briton, with the
remnant of his regiment, was terminated ; his numbers thinned,
their horses blown, and half terrified by the accident at the
ravine, a body of Polish lancers and Westphalian light-horse,
that now came to \'illatte's relief, rendered the conflict so unequal,
that the shade of the brave twenty-third at length deigned to
withdraw, and to conceal its emaciated form behind tlie Spanish

144 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

division of Bassecourt, leaving in the hands of the enem}-, and
on the field of death, two hundred and seven of their number.
The attack on Hill, who, like the fabled figure of security,
held the key of the British position, altogether failed ; Camp-
bell had been victorious in the other wing, but the centre of
the line was submitted to the severest trial, and there in fact
the battle of Talavera was fought. La])isse's column crossed
the ravine, and, under cover of a battery of heavy guns, to
which the British could make but a faint reply, advanced with
the loud shrill shouts of conquerors, up to the very beards of
Sherbrooke's ranks, in which frightful gaps were broken by the
murderous playing of the battery, which was not more than half
cannon-shot distant. Concealed by the clouds of smoke that
enwrapped his ranks, Sherbrooke withheld his fire until he
saw distinctly the object of his aim, so that when the signal was
given, every musket told, and the debt due to Lapisse's artillery
partly paid : then uttering a loud hurrah, the guards, in the
excitement of the moment, added to the desire of avenffiner the
deaths of their comrades that had fallen around them from the
distant fire, and flushed with their first success, charged instantly
with the bayonet, turned their assailants into flight, pursued
them hotly but inconsiderately down the hill, across the vale,
and up the opposite bank. But Victor was not inattentive to
the operations of his line in any part of its length, and, bringiu"-
up his reserve, he forced Lapisse's division to re-form, turn,
and attack the guards in front, while the cannonade, at a still
shorter distance, assailed one flank, and a body of dragoons
was just about to fall upon the other. The guards now in
turn gave way, and, falling back in great disorder upon their
position, spread the contagion of derangement so far into the
ranks of the German legion, that the British centre appeared to
be irrecoverably broken, and victory seemed uncertain on which
side sl)e would fling the laurel wreath. There are eventful
moments in the life of every great man, but especially of a
general in the field of battle ; it is in a moment that quick
death comes, or certain victory ; and such critical periods, in the
brief career of each distinguished personage, in the histories of all

THE DUKI-: OF WKLI.INGTON. 140

nations, ai-e those which Uke chemical tests have ascertahieil
real character, and established either its purity or baseness.
Sir Arthur Wellesley had foreseen the consequences of the
inconsiderate advance of the guards, and, duly honourins; the
gallantry of his men, instantly provided a remedy for the
disease, and encouragement for bravery. While the moving
masses in the glen below were agitated like the waters of a
turbulent sea, where wind and tide oppose, and the broken
ranks of his brave guards were fighting almost singly for life and
honour, the confusion and uproar were suddenly suspended
by the steady march of the forty-eighth regiment, led on by
Colonel Donellan, which advanced into the very thickest part
of the disorganized mass. Unable to resist the waves of men
that came rolling down the hill and up the vale, Donellan
ordered his veterans to wheel back by companies, and allow the
fugitives to fliow uninterruptedly along, then, when all had passed,
with the accuracy of mechanism, resuming a beautiful line,
displaying proudly a perfect specimen of military discipline,
he fell in this compact array upon the enemy's flank, and plied
them with such a destructive fire, that they were compelled to
desist from pursuit, and endeavour to recover their own posi-
tion. The interposition of the forty-eighth gave the guards
time and opportunity to rally, in whicii they were quickly
imitated by the German legion ; and at the same moment.
Cotton with his light cavalry being brought up from the centre,
at a trot, to attack the other flank, the error of the guards was
repaired, the centre of the allies strengthened, the battle
restored, and ultimately the victory of Talavera won. When
Victor saw the forty-eighth advancing, he understood full well
that the day was lost, for to this masterly, prompt, and decisive
movement, together with the advance of the light dragoons
under Cotton, was Sir Arthur indebted for his success. From
this period the efforts of the enemy slackened, the roaring «if
their artillery faded away, their shouts of victory subsided, the
rolling of their drums was no longer heard, and under the
clouds of smoke that still hung over the field, their columns
drew off, in good order, across the plain in the rear of their

i4() LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

position, auil, passing the Alberche, took up a defensive atti-
tude on the heights of Salinas, on the evening of the twenty-
ninth. The horrors of the day were still further aggravated
by an event which took place immediately after the retirement
of the enemy : while yet the ground was strewn with dead
and dying, that short dry grass and herbage that grew on it
accidentally caught fire, and the sheet of flame spreading all
across the vale from one position to the opposite, grievously
increased the afflictions of the wounded who had not been
removed into the hospital.

According to the return, which may yet be seen in the office
of the minister of war at Paris, the French had 56,122 effective
men engaged in the battle of Talavera, with eighty heavy
guns : the British force opposed to them, and by which the
whole attack was sustained, only amounted to 20,997; and
although they brought one hundred pieces of artillery into the
field, seventy of which belonged to Cuesta, most of them were
too light to be able to make an equivalent reply to the French
cannon. Sir Arthur VVellesley had placed the Spaniards in such
a position that the enemy dared not, or rather could not, attack
them; and these irregular soldiers disgraced themselves by their
timidity, endangered the steadiness of the British by their
scandalous example, and took full advantage of their impreg-
nable position, by remaining entrenched there, with upwards
of thirty-nine thousand men, during one of the most sanguinary
actions that was ever fought. In a contest so violent, so close,
and where the enemy engaged with the most inveterate fury,
stimulated by the recent disgraces which British courage and
discipline had inflicted on them, the loss must naturally have
been great on both sides, particularly on that of the British,
who not amounting to half the number of their enemies,
sustained not only the violence of the first tremendous shock,
but the weight of their continued pressure, until Victory
declared for their side, being rather injured than aided by
their vapouring allies. The Duke of Albuquerque lent the
assistance of his talents and gallantry to the cause of Spain,
and bravely took up a position of danger, which the British

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 147

general assigned him, nor should the steadiness of Bassecourt
be passed silently over. The bold front he showed, the steady
line he maintained, kept the enemy in check, and enabled
Ponsonby's cavalry to find a safe retreat, after the unfortunate
affair of the precipitation of the cavalry into the chasm on
the left of the line. The British numbered amongst the
killed on the field of battle, on the memorable day of
Talavera, Generals Mackenzie and Langworth, thirty-eight
officers, twenty-eight sergeants, seven hundred and eighty-
nine rank and file, and two hundred and eleven horses* — three
generals, Hill, Alexander Campbell, and Henry Campbell,
one hundred and ninety-three officers, one hundred and sixty-
five Serjeants, three thousand five hundred and fifty-three rank
and file, and seventy one horses, wounded : nine officers, fifteen
Serjeants, and six hundred and twenty-nine rank and file,
besides one hundred and fifty-nine horses were missing — and

• Major-General Donald Mackenzie, who fell, covered with glory, on the
field of Talavera, was the representative of an ancient highland family, whose
estates are situated at Suddic, Ross-shirc, in a district usually called the
Black Isle. He commenced his military career, in the marines, under t!ie
auspices and immediate care of his uncle, General Mackenzie, of that corps,
and, for some time previous to the year 1794, performed tiie duly of adjutant
to the Chatham division. Upon the death of his uncle, and succession to the
family estates, he relinquished the marine service, and in the sprinj; of 1701,
became major in the second battalion of the seventy-eighth foot, which had
been raised by Lord Seeporth. Soon after liis joining, both battalions being
consolidated, Mackenzie and his associates were attached to the first battalion,
then at the Cape of Good Hope, whence they proceeded to In<Iia, and tiiere servtd
with distinction under the command of Lieutenant-Gcneral Mackenzie Fraser.
Returning to England in 1801, he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and
first placed on the northern staff as a brigadier, subscqucnlly appoints!
governor of Alderney. replaced again on the northern staff as brigadier-general,
and continued in tliat rank and employment until IHOS, when he was removed,
at his own solicitation, to the command of a brigade in Portugal. General
Mackenzie sat in parliament for Sutherland l)orouglis, and also for the county.
As a soldier lie was cool, steady, yet zealous and l)ol«l, ami most of iiis actions
in the Peninsula are to be styled brilliant rather than merely brave. He was
much beloved by his regiment, the seventy-eightii, and the sincerity of his
friendship, and benignity of his character, catised his fall to be very w idely
lamented. Dying without issue, the Suddie estates, which were considerable,
devolved to a sister, who had been some years before married to Captain I'ott's
of the forty-second regiment.

148 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the precise numbei* put hors de combat, during the two days'
fighting, according to the official return at the war-office,
amounts to 498"2. Sir Arthur Wellesley uniformly denied tiiat
he possessed that inestimable, but uncontrollable quality in a
hero, fortune ; perhaps the victory of '1 alavera supports his
fanciful theory more immediately than any other of iiis hardly-
fought battles. Never was a position more judiciously taken u{),
more care, thought, caution, or firmness, was never displayed by
the most celebrated soldiers of other days; he totally distrusted
the Spaniards, therefore placed them where they need not
fight, yet they must have made a show of strength sufficient to
alarm the enemy : they might actually have ran away, which
they several times attempted, but even this would have hap-
pened without exposing their cowardice to the enemy, or
infecting the British army. Here nothing was left to chance,
yet the Spaniards, without being able to assign subsequently
any pretext, became panic-struck. Sir Arthur made one mis-
take, it is imagined, by not occupying the high ground on his
left early on the morning of the twenty-eighth, more strongly,
and by leaving the passage of the valley below it unguarded — of
this error, if, under the circumstances of his limited numbers,
it was an error — his enemies had powerful means, ample op-
portunity, and took every advantage of both, to turn the
left wing, and seize the little mountain, and it was by hard
fighting alone that they were driven back. There was little
good fortune attendant on the charge of Seymour's horse, but
the general's foresight had provided a retreat for those, whom
any accident might befall in the valley of the Portina, behind
Bassecourt's reserve : there was much misfortune consequent
upon the daring bravery of the guards, who rushed in amongst
the columns of the enemy, confiding chivalrously in individual
spirit and strength ; but to this casualty also the general
applied a remedy, by bringing up the forty-eighth at the precise
and proper moment, by which he conquered both his fortune and
his foes. He, who hitherto owned a charmed hfe, at Talavera
was nearly deprived of the veil of the enchantress, and laid
prostrate amidst the thousands that fell around him : twice his

TITF, DUKK or \VF,M.I\<;T(>\. 1-1!)

coat was perforated l)y bullets; a spent ball struck liiin on tlie
shoulder ; and Captains Bouverie and Burgh were woiuided at
his side. These startling events, being personal, found no
place in his public despatches ; but, in a private letter to his old
friend the Duke of Richmond, dated the day after the l)attle,
he briefly alludes to them, " Almost all my staff are either hit,
or have lost their horses; and Imw I have escaped unhurt, I
cannot tell. I was hit in the shoulder at the end of the action,
but not hurt, and my coat shot thiough." In this instance,
undoubtedly, whatever Wellesley obtained from fortune, was
wrung from her fickle patronage. It was to the resolution
and genius of the general, seconded by the invincible courage
and perfect disci|)line of his men, that the result of the
onslaught at Talavera is to be attributed; fortune, or blind
chance, had no participation in that action. I'he Spaniaids, to
this day, reflect as little as events will permit, upon the conduct
of their troops on that memorable occasicm : tliev claim the
honour of having lost twelve hundred men, but this statement
has never obtained credit, for king Josei)h's guard, which tlid
not exceed ten thousand, being left in the olive-wood to
observe Cuesta's movements, it is well known, never fired a
shot. During the two days' struggle, the loss of the enemy
was much greater than the total injury sustained by the allies —
amounting to eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-four ;
and seventeen pieces of artillery, with two tumbrils and ammuni-
tion complete, fell into the hands of the British; sixteen of the
guns had been taken by General Campbell's division iu the
brilliant affair with the enemy on the British right, the re-
mainder were abandoned on the field. It was iu this battle that
Sir Arthur first introduced the plan of screening his men from
the enemy's fire, iiy directing that they should assume a recum-
bent posture behind the crest of the hill, and advance and deploy
only when the hostile columns approached to attack. The lire
of an enemy double the number of the assailed, would most
probably have thinned the ranks of the latter more widely,
but for this novel precaution. If Wellington's uncompromising
political enemies, if his jealous and unforgiving foreign foes, if
n. X

150 1,1 1- F, AND CAMPAIGNS OF

bigoted clironk-lers of the events of our age, shall still question
to whom the glory of that day belongs, they will find their
refutation registered in the facts, that the French retired and
took up a new position, having left many of their heavy guns
to the British ; that Wellesley's army kept possession of the
hard-fought field, and bivouacked on the very spot for the pos-
session of which the French had sacrificed some thousand
lives — there too the British remained, and receised on the
following day, the forty-third, fifty-second, and ninety-fifth
regiments, a reinforcement three thousand strong, under
General R. Craufurd. As this gallant officer was advancing
to join the main body of the British army, while his men were
in bivouac at IMalpartida de Plasencia, an alarm was created
and widely spread, by the arrival of six thousand Spanish
fugitives, who, either panic-stricken, or never having been
entitled to a better name, or higher confidence, than that of a
mere rabble, plundered the baggage of their own army, and,
escaping from the vengeance of the general, cried out as they
hurried rapidly along like some hateful pestilence, " that the
English were defeated and flying before the French, that
VVellesley was slain, and France again victorious." This painful
intelligence added wings to the energies of brave Craufurd's
brigade, and having first selected about fifty of his men, whose
physical powers he thought would prove unequal to the
herculean labour, which the suspected difficulties of his coun-
trymen imposed upon his noble mind — like the Roman dictator
setting out at midnight to the relief of the legion hemmed in
by the enemy, resolved to surprise the foe at day-break,
and recover national glory, or perish in the attempt — the
devoted British general marched on for six and twenty hours
without cessation, and reached the British camp at Talavera,
at eleven o'clock on the morning of the twenty-ninth, after
" the battle had been lost and won," when the enemy had
totallydisappeared, and blood-stained fields, diminished numbers,
and scenes of death around, too plainly told of that havoc from
which the dastard Sj)aniards had so ingloriously fled. When it
i^ remembered that this was the sultry season of the Spanish

THE Dl'KK OF WFJ.MNGTOX. lol

year, that each soldier carried on liis slioulders a knapsack
weighing nearly sixty j)ounds, and that the oxtraordinarv
distance of sixty-two English miles was accomplished, w ith the;
loss of only seventeen stragglers, in so small a number of
hours, it will perhaps be acknowledged, that this effort has not
been exceeded by that of any other body of infantry during the
Peninsular or other modern I"2uropean wars. An instance of
similar exertion is related of the British cavalry under (General
Lake, in the battle with Ilolkar at Furruckabad.* " Had these
honourable facts reached the knowledge of the historian
Gibbon," observes Colonel Napier, " he would probably have
spared his sneer at the delicacy of modern soldiers."

The battle being over, and the danger departed, like a threat-
ening cloud that had floated away to darken the fields elsewhere,
Cuesta raised his abject head, looked round upon his coward
battalions, recovered his stubborn bearing and ill-sustained
pride, and ordering all the runaways that had been brought back,
to be drawn out before him, he commenced the execution of stern
military law after the manner of consular Rome, whose example
he had the folly and the presumption to imitate, by decimating
the renegade ranks. In this ferocious design he proceeded
until fifty victimsf vvere slaughtered in cokl blood, to appease
the indignation of a capricious tyrant, of whom (ieneral
Wcllesley thus wrote, on the third day after the battle of Tala-
vera, "I certainly should get the better of every thing, if I
could manage General Cuesta: but his temper and disposition
are so bad, that it is impossible.'' The axe, however, which
Cuesta raised to immolate his countrymen, was wrested from

• " Of the victors, the greater part had riihloii seventy miles, durin;; the
preceding twenty-four hours, when tiiey took up their ground after the pur-
suit, besides lighting tiie whole of llolkar's cavalry: an uchi<-vement far
exceeding the boasted celerity of Napoleon's squadrons, and wliieh is pro-
bably unparalleled in modern war." — Hist, of liuropr.

t Sir John Jones says tiuit Cuesta, having lirst separated lifty b> the pro-
cess of decimation, was compelled by the earnest entreaties of Sir Arlhur
M'ellesley to decimate, a second time, the unhappy men on whom the lot Imd
fallen; and tliat six odicers ami thirty men coniprelieiided the lot.il "f ll...«r
I'M'futed on llie oieasion.

152 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

his murderous hand by the humanity of Wellesley, who first
remonstrated, then entreated, and finally ordered the Spaniard
to restrain his unnatural appetite. The arguments used to
dissuade Cuesta from his cruelty were, that as his soldiers were
not distinguished from the peasantry by any uniform dress, de-
sertion was facilitated, because the fugitives could immediately
fall back upon the peasantry, and mingle undiscovered amongst
them : besides, it was found that disgrace operated with the
most salutary results upon the minds of Spaniards, as well as
on those of the British and Portuguese, as Cuesta had himself
witnessed at the battle of Talavera. He had deprived a regi-
ment of one of their pistols, for misconduct at the battle of
Medellin ; but so great was the desire of these men to wipe out
the stain, and be once more counted amongst the brave and
good, that, under the guidance of Albuquerque, Whittingham,
and Bassecourt, they alone of the Spanish army were engaged,
and behaved with so much spirit and discipline, that the pistol
was publicly restored after the battle of Talavera.

To complete the dark portrait of our Spanish allies in the
Peninsula, the deep tint, which their treatment of the sick
and wounded at Talavera introduces, should be observed. The
municipal authorities had given no special orders on the sub-
ject; the inhabitants had mostly withdrawn, having first closed
up their houses; and when the wounded were carried in from the
field of blood, the pavement in the streets and squares was the
only place of rest remaining to them. Those that were left
all night weltering in their blood in the open field, are said to
have recovered more rapidly, and in greater proportions, than
those who were removed into the town, and received somewhat
early under the inhospitable Spaniard's roof. This inhumanity
has been extenuated, on the plea that the French had recently
visited the place, and with their love of plunder, and propensity
to mischief, had destroyed the public buildings, pillaged the
churches, defaced the altars, overturned the tombs, carried
away all private property, and consumed what was useless to
them as fuel. The French soldiers' huts, from which they were
so often and so hastily ejected by the bayonet of the enemy,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 153

were always furnished with so much taste as to become an
object of curiosity to the British. In this camp, with that
frivohty of disposition which detracts from their national
charactei-, a theatre was constructed with materials and
decorations plundered from the towns-people, and their huts
were all thatched with un thrashed corn ; and in all these
wanton violences, these culpable eccentricities, the French
army induced, while the British soldier was under standing
orders not to fell an olive-tree for fuel, shelter, or any other
jiurpose. llie British envoy, Mr. Frere, had always repre-
sented the Spaniard as " enthusiastic in his cause, and viewing
it in the light of a crusade;" but he was a dupe to their false-
hood, and too unsuspecting for the difficult duties his situation
imposed on him.

'I'heir inhumanity and barbarity were not confined to the
passive guilt of neglecting the poor fellows who had received
their wounds in fighting the battles of Spain and Portugal, but
were exercised actively in stripping their dead bodies on the
field, and in stealing British arms, ammunition, clothing, and
money. While engaged in this latter act of infamy, they
occasionally deviated from the plunder of a former friend, to
beat out the brains of some wounded Frenchman, upon whom
they stumbled in their work of spoliation. Sir A. Wellesley
remonstrated instantly with the magistrates, upon the folly of
robbing the British invalids of their arms, because, as many of
them would be likely to recover from their wounds, it would
obviously tend more to the interests of Spain that weapons
should remain with those who possessed both the skill and the
courage to use them ; therefore, restitution of the stolen arms,
independent of its justice, would be contributory to the general
success : with respect to the murder of the wounded French-
men, Sir Arthur Wellesley was too old, too experienced, and
too great a soldier, to remain a moment in doubt as to the
proper remedy for such an evil, and accordingly he placed
sentinels on the battle-field, with orders to fire upon any one
who should be observed inllicting injury upon the French, as
they were his prisoners, and under his protection. 'I'luit

154 Lii-r<: and campaigns of

species of cowardice which originates in the feeUng of self-
preservation in inferior ranks of the animal kingdom, might have
been forgiven by the high-spirited Briton, who sought no light
to guide him but the rays of military glory ; want of discipline
in the ranks would not have excited much surprise, from the
hasty character of the Spanish levies, and the limited time
allowed, by the rapid succession of events, for training and
equipments ; but the inhumanity, ingratitude, and base selfish-
ness exhibited by the Talaverans to their deliverers, is without
a parallel, admits of no extenuation, and made an impression
on the minds of the generous British army as deep and indeli-
ble as if graved on marble, and which can only be effaced
when the tablet is broken. From this hour a new feeling took
root in the British army, engendering contempt, disgust, and
hatred of their allies (distrust had long before attached to them,)
and the miseries of Badajoz and of St. Sebastian must be ascribed
to the recollection of the sorrows, and the sufferings, of the sick
and wounded at Talavera. The army wanted food, and the
cellars of Talavera were full to their summits with com, yet
neither Cuesta nor the magistrates would render the least
assistance to obtain a supply : medical aid was recjuired, owing
to the great number of wounded, this also the authorities
refused ; but with a presumption, which language is unable to
explain otherwise than by attributing it to the rankest folly,
complained aloud of the supineness of Sir Arthur Wellesley, in
not following up the successes of the day by pursuing and
exterminating the enemy. Military writers have referred these
occasional bursts of impudence to an inordinate national vanity;
but they need not have sought a source so remote and inac-
cessible ; personal feeling, self-interest, the wretched, narrow-
minded policy of relieving themselves from the presence of an
army, although a friendly one, were the sole motives which in-
fluenced the despicable inhabitants of Talavera, and of many
other places in Spain, during the Peninsular campaign.

The sad and solemn duty of providing for the wounded, and
interring the slain, being discharged, the active mind of the
commander-in-chief was directed to less painful subjects — the

TIIK T)UKR OF WF, I.I.I Xr;T( ).\. ]',;')

rewarding of the survivors of the fatal day. One of the firat
ohjects of his sohcitude was Major Middlemore, who com-
manded the first battalion of the forty-eitrhth regiment, after
Colonel Donellan was struck down, and \\ hose j)crsonal hravery
tended so much to the final success of tiie action, hy enabling
Sherbrooke's division to re-form — conduct which in Sir Arthur's
judgment demanded promotion. Marshal Beresford's situation
next obtained his anxious attention, a position which was
hourly becoming of more importance to the 15ritish : to him he
recommended stroufjlv the establishment of a good communi-
cation between his army and Romana's on the eastern frontier
of Portugal ; but if this desirable object should be unattainable,
Beresford was then advised to respect the safety of his own
army, and the interests of Portugal solely, leaving Sir Arthur
and Cuesta to the exercise of their own judgment, and reliance
upon their own strength.

Notwithstanding the victory of Talavera, by which the
enemy were much disjnrited, and although the loss sustained
by the British was fully supplied by the arrival of Craufurd's
brigade, such was the state of weakness and destitution, it
may be called, to which his army was exposed by the miscon-
duct and brutality of the Spaniards, that Sir Arthur declined
pursuing the enemy. He could not have formetl this decision
from apprehension of the myriads of Prench soldiers that were
marching down on his flank through the Puerto de Banos,
and ready to cut off his retreat into I'ortugal, because the con-
centration of the three corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, at
Salamanca, was not then known to him, nor had the junta of
Old Castile, which held its sittings at Ciudad llodrigo, the least
suspicion, or any intimation of such a fact. The circumstances
in which his men had been ungratefully loft, by those whom
they had just released from bonilagc, was the sole ground of
the conclusion which Sir Arthur formed, and of the conduct
he thought proper to adopt immediately after the battle of
Talavera. This conduct, however, could not have been pala-
table to tile junta, who were desirous of resigning to the British
the honour, labour, auti expense of driving the enenty out of

156 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Spain ; and to such arrogant allies Sir Arthur's measures
seemed dilatory. The presumption of the junta was exhibited
most audaciously in a letter which they addressed, at this
peculiar crisis, to Sir Arthur, accusing him of having left
Cuesta to pursue the enemy alone, on the last display of con-
summate folly made by that officer — an impeachment which,
the reader is aware, was totally devoid of truth. Sir Arthur
did not condescend to reply to the ungrateful servant of a
more ungrateful countr}^, but addressed the British agent,
Mr. Frere, on the subject, requesting that officer to inform
Don de Garay, that his instructions prohibited him from holding
direct communication with any Spanish minister, and desiring
that all such, in future, should be made through the British
resident at the seat of government, who was the proper, and
the only medium, through which he would receive any. " It
is not a difficult matter," observed General Wellesley, " for a
gentleman in the situation of Don Martin de Garay, to sit
down in his cabinet, and write his ideas of the glory which
would result from driving the French through the Pyrenees :
and I believe there is no man in Spain who has risked so
much, or who has sacrificed so much, to effect that object, as 1
have. But I wish that Don Martin, or the gentlemen of the
junta, before they blame me for not doing more, or impute to
me beforehand the probable consequences of the blunders or
the indiscretion of others, would either come, or send here
some loaves to satisfy the wants of our half-starved army, which,
although they have been engaged for two days, and have
defeated twice their numbers, in the service of Spain, have not
bread to eat. It is positively a fact, that during the last seven
days, the British army have not received one-third of their
provisions, that at this moment there are nearly four thousand
wounded soldiers dying in the hospital in this town, from want
of common assistance and necessaries, which any other country
in the world would have given even to its enemies ; and that
I can get no assistance of any description from the country.
I cannot prevail upon them even to bury their dead carcasses
in the neighbourhood, the stench of which will destroy them-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 157

selves as well as us. I cannot avoid feelinii: lliese circuni-
stances : and the junta must see, that, unless ihey and the
country make a great exertion to support and supply the
armies, to which the invariable attention and the exertion of
every man, and the labour of every beast in the country, ought
to be directed, the bravery of the soldiers, their losses, and
their successes, will only make matters worse, and increase our
embarrassment and distress. I positively will not move, nay,
more, I will disperse my army, till I am supplied with provi-
sions and means of transport as I ought to be." The insidious
slander, the poison of jealousy, the chagrin of disappointed
ambition, which discoloured all emanations from the foimtain
of authority, the junta, were not confined by the shores of the
Peninsula, but, floating over the waves of the Atlantic, were
hailed by the political enemies of the cabinet, by discontented
characters, such as are to be found in every country, and by
the opponents of every measure or movement in which Lord
Castlereagh was a party. Disapprobation of their great captain,
and of the retreat of the army after the battle of 'J alavera,
was publicly expressed, and a virulent faction asked " where
were the durable results from the laurels of that day ?"

It is important to the truth of history that the reader should
here be reminded, that the preceding lucid defence of Sir A.
Wellesley's judgment, in not pursuing the enemy, was written
on the field of battle, not composed at leisure in after-years
to suit the events that simultaneously occurred, although then
unknown to him. As calumny, also, has often been busy with
this great man's fame, and it has more than once been said
" he won no victory at Talavera," it may be well to decide that
point by the testimony, not only of British, but even of Frencii
historians. We are assured by Lord Londonderry, who was
present in the battle, "that the Spaniards were in raptures
with us and our behaviour, and declared, with all the clamour
of their country, that those who spoke of the British as less
capable of fighting by laud than at sea, lied in their throats !"
Jomini says, "this battle at once restored the reputation of
the British arniv. which, during a century had declined, and it

II. Y

158 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was now ascertained that the English infantry could dispute
the palm with the best in Europe." General Sarazzin con-
fessed, that " la sanglante journee de Talavera avait rcpandu
I'effroi dans I'armee Fran9aise et I'on convenait que les Anglais
se battaient tout aussi bien que les Russes." Col. Napier will
not be suspected, even by the French, of expressing an
opinion contrary to the conviction of his mind; and he
writes that " this battle was one of hard, honest fighting, and
the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations to
which they belonged. The English owed much to the general's
dispositions, and something to fortune. The French owed
nothing to their commander ; and when it is considered that
above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully
engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must
be confessed that the latter showed themselves to be truly
formidable soldiers." This eloquent writer here ascribes some
merit to the general, much more to his army, but does not
question the fact of the French having been beaten ; and, in
another place he says, " the moral courage evinced by Sir A.
Wellesley, when, with such a co-adjutor as Cuesta, he accepted
battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition
which finally rendered him master of the field" To these
testimonies, which are free from the remotest suspicion of
partiality, must be added the exclamation of Marshal Soult,
on learning the particulars of this memorable battle, and the
prudence of the English general in deciding upon falling back,
" the English have covered themselves with glory at Talavera,
but had they remained two days longer in their position,
they would all inevitably have been taken prisoners, or de-
stroyed."

" The battle of Talavera, ably directed, bravely fought, and
nohhi ivon"^ was barren of immediate beneficial results, nor
could short-sighted statesmen perceive to what glorious conse-
quences it was the prelude : surromided by difficulties, and ill-
used by his allies, still his gallant soldiers naturally looked
towards him for those orders, in the wisdom of which they

« Sheeier's Mil. IMem.

THK DUKP: of WELLIXGTOxX. 159

would confidently trust. "The mind of our general was, however,
as tve well knew, full of resources ; and, though most of us saw
our embarrassments clearly enough, there was not an individual
in the army who entertained a doubt that his talent and
decision would, in due time, overcome and disperse them."*

On the thirtieth of July, intelUgence reached the allies at
Talavera, that rations had been ordered for a French corps of
ten or twelve thousand men, at Fucnte Uoble, north of the Puerto
de lianos, and for twenty-four thousand at Los Santos near the
same-place, on the road from Alba de Tormas to IJejar. Sir A.
Wellesley, although totally ignorant of the junction of the
French at Salamanca, had taken the precaution to guard the pass
of Banos, before he advanced from Plasencia, by a Spanish
detachment under the Marquess de la Ileyna, and had directed
Beresford to assemble the Portuguese army in the vicinitv of
Ciudad Ilodrigo, with a view to guard the same pass, to protect
the British flank, and to watch the Portuguese frontiers ; still,
so sudden was the intelligence, that it must have embarrassed
the stoutest heart. He entertained some hope, but formed
no certain calculation on it, that the Spanish guard would
check the passage of the enemy through the Puerto ; or, that
the proximity of Beresford would deter Soult from an attempt
so hazardous ; or, lastly, that the defeat of Victor at Tala-
vera might induce him to desist from his purpose. Yet so
slender were his expectations of real resistance by the in-
subordinate troops at the Puerto, that Sir Arthur renewed
his earnest solicitations for a reinforcement of that contempt-
ible party, from the Spanish army ; this Cucsta positivelv
refused to grant, and even urged Sir Arthur Wellesley to send
thither Sir Robert Wilson without delay. As his arguments
were deserving of as little respect as his conduct, and as Sir
Arthur now ])erfectly understood the value of every individual
soldier in the British lines, and, in fact, not knowing tlu'
magnitude of the danger, he considered a Spanish force might
prove equal to the duty, he rejected any rocommendation that
would tend to diminish the number of his heroic little army, or

• Nurrativc of tlie Peninsular ^Var.

160 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

would require him to trust a single British subject to "^the guid-
ance or remote association with Spaniards. As to Sir Robert
Wilson, nothing could have been farther from the intentions of
Sir Arthur Wellesley than to have sacrificed that chivalrous man,
a hero possessed of romantic courage, to the unerring fate of
resisting Soult in the pass of Banos, while the Spaniards either
fled or surrendered ; and, although Wilson was at Talavera,
on the day of the thirtieth, having left his army at Escalona,
Sir Arthur insisted upon his continuing to maintain his commu-
nication with Madrid, in the same effectual manner that he had
hitherto done, leaving Banos to those whose duty and interest
it was, more immediately, to defend it. Accustomed, yet un-
reconciled to the mischievous whimsicality of the Spaniard, Sir
Arthur again, on the thirty-first, renewed his application for
a reinforcement, with a similar effect ; but on the first of
August, assurances having reached Cuesta of Soult's entrance
into Bejar, without "making the Englishman go down on his
knees," he gladly yielded to his solicitations, and on the
following day despatched Bassecourt's division ; but scarcely
had this force lost sight of Talavera, when news was brought
that Soult was actually in Plasencia, with two columns of his
army, that the Marquess de la Reyna had permitted the French
to descend the pass without the interruption of a single shot,
having retired to the bridge of Almarez, and that the battalion
at Bejar had deliberately dispersed.

The flight of his panic-stricken men from their unassailable
trenches, in which Wellesley placed them before the battle of
Talavera, did not alarm Cuesta so seriously as the news
of the total abandonment of the strong mountain-pass by his
countrymen. Boldly and unhesitatingly, he proposed that one
half of the allied army should move to the rear, to oppose the
enem}', while the other half should maintain the post at
Talavera. To this proposition Sir Arthur Wellesley replied,
" that if, by half the army, was to be understood half of each
army, he was ready either to go or stay with the whole British
army, but that he could not divide it." " Choose, then," said
Cuesta, " upon which," conceiving that his army was the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. IGl

most likely to do the business effectually, and without contest,
and also that the preservation of free communication through
Plasencia was of more consequence to the British than to the
Spaniards. Sir Arthur Wellesley preferred marching against
Soulr, and with this decision Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied.

It was on the morning of the third of August, that the allies
bade to each other a short farewell, but, just before the break-
ing up of the British camp, letters were received from Sir
Robert Wilson, stating, that the French had appeared in tlie
direction of Nombella, whither he had withdrawn, having sent
his artillery to St. Roman. This intelligence induced Sir
Arthur to imagine that Victor meditated crossing the Alberche,
falling with all his weight upon Wilson, and then forming a
junction with Soult on the Tietar, a movement that would have
enabled the combined armies of both marshals to move on
Talavera. Previous to his departure from Tulavera, Sir Arthur
waited on General Donoju, pointed out to him the possibility
of such an attack ; and, as the Spaniards would not be likely
to abide the enemy's approach, he obtained a promise from
Donoju, that he would collect all the carts, and remove the
hospital, on the least appearance of danger. The cause of
humanity being regarded, the British army, seventeen thou-
sand strong, marched to Oropesa on the third, at which time
Bassecourt's division was at Centinello, where it was ordered
to await the junction of the allies, in total ignorance of Soult's
numbers, which were supposed not to exceed fifteen thousand
men.

The arrangements of the allies, obtaining of supplies, pro-
per disposal of the wounded, and arrival of the British at
Oropesa, being detailed continuously, it is now necessary to
return to Victor's army, whicii, it has been already stated, had
formed in battle-array on the heights of Salinas after the
battle of Talavera, — to the movements of the corps under
Venegas, who was supposed to be operating on the side of
Madrid, and to the circumstances connected with the sudden
apparition of the combined French armies in the vicinity of
Salamanca. King Joseph's incessant anxiety about the security

162 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

of the capital, which he identified with the virtual possession
of the crown, induced him to fall back on St. Ollalla, on the
night of the twenty-ninth, to despatch a division thence, to
relieve Toledo, and pursue his own march to Illescas, in order
to place himself between Venegas and Madrid. Victor, who
had been left on the Alberche to watch the allies, and fall on
their rear as soon as Soult's movements begun to affect their
position, had his attention drawn to his own safety by the
operations of the little band under Wilson. This officer was
in the neighbourhood of Casalegas during the action of the
twenty-eighth ; but the next day, returning to his former
position at Escalona, he so alarmed Victor, that he retired first
to Maqueda, then to Retamar, and would have continued his
erroneous movement even on Mostoles, if he had not been
stopped by intelligence of the allies having retired from Tala-
vera ; upon which he returned, and took up his old ground on
the Alberche.

While Sir A. Wellesley gave employment to the corps of
Victor — Soult, Ney, and Mortier, having suffered severely in
the northern provinces, were ready to abandon them upon any
plausible pretext. It may be remembered, that Soult fled,
rather than retired, to Lugo, where he had an opportunity of
restoring to liberty a French garrison, whom the townspeople
had imprisoned ; but, having lost all his stores, ammunition,
and guns, he resolved on retiring into Old Castile, and putting
his troops into cantonments on the banks of the Esla, which he
accomplished early in the month of July. Marshal Ney held a
conference with Soult at Lugo, after which he proceeded towards
Vigo, in order to suppress an insurrection at that place, which
had been fomented and prolonged by the sailors belonging to
some English men-of-war off the harbour. On arriving at the
bridge of St. Payo on the Octaven river, he found ten thou-
sand Spaniards ready to dispute his passage ; the bridge, too,
had been cut ; and any attempt to pass lower down, must have
been made in defiance of several gun-boats, filled with resolute
and well-armed English sailors. It only remained, therefore,
to force the bridge, in which he was twice frustrated, — on each

THE DUKI-: OF WELLINGTON. 163

occasion with terrible loss. No laurels were to be gathered
then in Gallicia ; the harvest of glory was over there : Soult
had abandoned him to an enraged peasantry — a harassing mode
of warfare — and a country in which each bridge and pass
supplied the place of a citadel to the enemy, where they were
uniformly found in garrison, and waiting to receive an attack.
Under the influence of disappointment, perhaps anger, he
determined upon evacuating the province of Gallicia, and, in
consequence, retired to Astorga towards the end of July.
Valladolid received the armies of Kellerman and Bonnet, on
the 20th of June, as they marched to the siege of Ciudad
llodrigo ; so that, by an extraordinary, unforeseen, and unin-
tentional combination of circumstances, when Sir A. Wellesley
was meditating an advance on Madrid, four general officers
at the head of nearly forty thousand men, were descendino- to
interrupt his communication with Lisbon,

To these accidental coincidences, another more extraordi-
nary is still to be added ; which is, the profound ignorance of
all parties of the strength or intentions of each other, allies
and adversaries. Victor was frightened by four thousand
men under Wilson, whom he mistook for the advanced guard
of the allies: Joseph was alarmed for the safety of Madrid,
which the junta had treacherously prohibited \'enegas from
marching against : it was the opinion of \'ictor and the king,
that the British force amounted at least to twenty-five tiiou-
sand : Sir A. Wellesley was under a delusion as to Soult's corps,
not conceiving that it exceeded fifteen thousand dispirited
men : and Soult advanced towards the theatre of operations, to
enact whatever part the chance of war might assign him, without
any certain intelligence as to the co-operation of friends, or
strength of enemies. The allies were placed in the midst of
these powerful armies, unconscious of their perilous position,
but with the power of concentrating their entire force, torty-
seven thousand men, in one day's march : the enemy could
not effect a junction in less than three days, but their numbers
amoinUt'd to ninety thousand.

Tluit correct intelligence, the previous want of whith had

164 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

nearly proved fatal to the allied armies, was now no longer
withheld. Information reached Oropesa on the evening of
the third, that the French had advanced from Plasencia to
Navalmoral, and placed ^^themselves between the allies and
the bridge of Almarez, leaving one line of retreat only open
to the allies. To this bridge there were two direct roads, one
from Talavera by Calera, the other from Navalmoral ; each of
them i)assing at a distance of twelve miles fi'om the British
head-quarters at Oropesa, on the fourth. Besides this alarm-
ing news, the truth of which was indisputable, a despatch
from Cuesta arrived only one hour afterwards, apprising Sir
Arthur, that, from intercepted letters addressed to Soult, it
was ascertained that the marshal's army must be considerably
stronger than the allies imagined ; that king Joseph was
returning to the Alberche, with the intention of attacking the
Spanish, and that, from these circumstances, he was induced
to break up from Talavera, and, following the British, again
unite, and present such a force as would insure another victory
in the neighbourhood of Oropesa. As this foolish, perhaps
timid step, resigned the strong and important post of Tala-
vera to the French ; as it would also expose the front and rear
of the allies to the attack of the enemy at the same instant ;
as it cruelly and dishonourably abandoned the hospital,
which Cuesta gave his word that he would protect; and, as
the reasons assigned by Cuesta for his conduct were not
deserving of the least respect, his desertion of his post
arising solely from want of confidence in the Spanish army.
Sir Arthur sent back a remonstrance with the utmost expe-
dition. But the wings of the wind would not have borne it in
time to arrest the flight of Cuesta ; the sick were left to a
protecting providence, " the Almighty helper of the friend-
less ;" — Cuesta's word, like Falstaff' s honour, was but an air-
filled bubble. Talavera was abandoned, and Cuesta on his
march, before the messenger from the British camp arrived.
While Sir Arthur was engaged in perusing the intercepted
letters of the enemy, Soult was similarly occupied in decipher-
ing some English letters that had fallen into his hands ; so

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 105

that one general became acquainted with the difficulties, while
the other learned the advantages, of his position. The result
of this accidental intelligence enabled Soult to take further
and more complete measures for intercepting the retreat of
the allies, by enclosing them between two armies, one exceed-
ing thirty thousand, the other twenty-five thousand in num-
ber, and with this view he detached Mortier to Casatajeda,
to seize the bridge of Almarez, and j)atrol in the direction of
Arzobispo. These movements, with the occupation of Plasen-
cia, completely checked the advance of the British. On their
left the Tagus rolled its rapid stream, and rugged mountains
raised their stern fronts above the right of their line, while the
inglorious abandonment of Talavera by the Spaniards left
their rear exposed to Victor's immediate attacks.

While hesitation shook the army to its centre, and accumu-
lated dangers seemed flowing densely in, as the still closing
waters over the sword that divides them ; while every man of
feeling was moved by the approach of that fate which appeared
inevitable, the British hero, like the surge-beaten rock, alone
remained unmoved, firm, and self-possessed. Viewing with
calmness the approaching wreck of all his hopes, distinctly
seeing that the fruits of all his labours were never to attain
maturity, that the issue of all his toils and labours must be
disappointment, he did not hesitate an instant, or remonstrate
with his destiny upon the lot which he had drawn, but boldly
prepared to meet and to master misfortune. It was now
certain that the corps of Soult and Ney were either united, or
not far distant from each other ; and, as king Joseph, who
believed the British army to be twenty-five thousand strong, con-
sented to attack them, it was plain the I'Vench force that inter-
cepted their march on the bridge of Almarez, must at least have
amounted to thirty thousand. \'ictor would, of course, follow
Cuesta; and, allowing that he left twelve thousand men to watch
Venegas, that he lost ten thousand in the actions of the 27th
and 28th, he would still be able to lead twenty-five thousand
to attack the rear of the allies. From this difficulty the British
general calculated that he could only be extricated by great

II. z

166 LIFI-: AND CAMPAIGNS OF

celerity of movement, and to this his men were very unequal,
not having had their allowance of provisions for several days ;
or, by his defeating the enemy signally in two separate actions,
for failure in either would have left him without a retreat.
Again, on the supposition that Soult and Ney declined fighting
until joined by Victor, defeat was almost certain, as the French
combined force would then exceed fifty thousand men, and the
Spaniards were not to be trusted either in council or in action.
So begirt with toils were the allies, that the French calcu-
lated upon the surrender of the British, and flight or destruc-
tion of the Spaniards ; but Sir Arthur, although reluctantly,
adopted the alternative that still remained, which was to march
instantly to Arzobispo, pass the river at that place, and take
up a position on the other side, before the enemy could seize
the Col de Mirabete, and by that means cut off his communi-
cation with Truxillo and Merida. This defensive plan of
operations is never resorted to by such men as Napoleon,
Marlborough, or Wellesley, but in cases of the last extremity;
and now feeling that the ignorance in which he was kept of
Soult's real and renewed strength, had acted like a chilling
frost in the budding-time of spring, and nipped those blossoms
which gave the fairest promise, he resolved on saving both
armies, and reserving them for some happier opportunity to
bring the enemy to action. Sir Arthur has been occasionally
censured for too bold conduct, for a fearlessness of character
resembling that of the heroic Nelson, and a total unconscious-
ness of danger or defeat. However exposed his character may
be to this impeachment on other occasions, here the application
is inadmissible, his precipitance being now accessory to his cau-
tion, for by it alone he escaped from the combined movements,
from the simultaneous attacks of Marshals Soult, Ney, Mortier,
Kellerman, Victor, Sebastiani, and king Joseph, who had also
drawn five thousand men from Suchet to strengthen this force,
already amounting to ninety thousand men, and which was
within a few hours' march of being concentrated in Estramadura.
Cuesta wished to give Soult battle at Oropesa ; Sir Arthur was
equally satisfied of the rashness of such a project, and the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 1<J7

worthlessness of its originator ; and, disgusted at his obstinacy,
ignorance, and presumption, gave him to understand, that
since he had abandoned the British hospital at Talavera, no
necessity should arise for the formation of another at Oropesa,
he was therefore free to act as his caprice might dictate.
This stern resolve was attended with the most salutary con-
sequences ; Cuesta was unable to reply, and yielded consent,
when he understood that it was looked upon by his allies with
indifference.

The British army halted at Oropesa on the night of the
third of August, and at six o'clock the following morning
begun to move on the bridge of Arzobispo, halting, however,
occasionally to allow the convalescents who had escaped from
Plasencia to get forward, and also to cover the passage of the
stores and of the wounded men from Talavera, who had just then
reached Calera. At mid-day the whole British army crossed
the Tagus, and took up a strong position amongst the rugged
hills on the other side. By this movement they probably escaped
from captivity or death, and the convention of marshals at the
head of ninety thousand men was completely baffled. Scarcely
had the critical moment, the passing of the bridge, elapsed, than
the soldiers, overcome by famine, and maddened by ill-treatment
at the hands of the Spaniards, perceiving a herd of swine
feeding in the woods, ran violently in amongst them, killing
numbers, and in some instances actually cutting steaks off the
animals while yet alive. It was impossible to restrain them,
and although it was an act attended with individual wrong, it
was hardly more than a fair reprisal for public neglect and
national ingratitude. From Arzobispo the army continued its
march towards Deleytosa, General Craufurd being ordered to
advance, and by a forced march gain the Casas del I'uerto on
the Tagus, opposite the bridge of Almarez, lest the enemy
should cross by the ford below that place, and seize the Puerto
de Mirabete. The head-quarters reached Mesa d'Ibor on the
sixth, the head of the column of the army entered Deleytosa
on the following day, and, at the close of the ninth the rear
divisions were also in position there, by which the passage of

168 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the river at Almarez was completely commanded, and an unob-
structed retreat into Portugal secured to the army. The
Spanish army having quitted Talavera at midnight, on the
third reached Oropesa at dawn, and Arzobispo at dark on the
fourth, but Cuesta, doggedly dechning to adopt Sir Arthur's
advice, did not pass the bridge until the fifth ; leaving a rear-
guard on the right bank of the river, which, however, was
immediately driven in by the enemy. Establishing his head-
quarters at Peralada de Garben on the seventh, Cuesta
caused entrenchments to be thrown up, twenty guns to be
placed in battery to rake the bridge, which was also barricaded,
left the Duke of Albuquerque with two divisions of infantry
and one of cavalry to maintain that important post, and with-
drew the main body to Meza d'Ibor, without ascertaining the
fordableness of the river in the neighbourhood of his position,
or informing the British of his precautionary measures and
intended resistance. Meanwhile Victor, taking advantage of
the evacuation of Talavera by the Spaniards, crossed the river
at that place, and advanced within a few leagues of Cuesta ;
while Soult, by watching the particular part of the river where
the Spanish horses were brought to water, discovered a prac-
ticable ford.

The vigilance of their enemies here forms an appalling
contrast to the supineneness of the Spanish character. During
the heat of noon-tide, a moment when most Spaniards retire
into the shade, and indulge in their siesta, Soult thought an
attack upon the bridge most likely to be successful : ordering
Caulincourt's cavalry to pass the river by the ford, which two
swimmers had sounded carefully on the preceding night, the
Spanish battery was taken in the rear, the gunners cut down
in their places, and those that were spared cruelly compelled to
direct them against their countrymen; and such havoc was
committed in a few moments, that the attempt and consumma-
tion may be recorded together. Albuquerque, a brave, loyal, and
able officer, having, after the manner of his country, withdrawn
with his horsemen to some cool shelter, nearly a league from
the river, on the first alarm spurred his proud charger, and

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 16\)

dashed in amongst the destroying enemy with such a shock, and
rode through the ranks of French cavalry displaying so many
examples of personal bravery and physical power, that Soult
is said to have contemplated firing grape-shot at the Spaniards,
through his own men, as the only possible mode of eradicating
them. The necessity for employing this cruel remedy was super-
seded by the arrival of reinforcements ; and the remainder of
Caulincourt's cavalry having passed the river, came to the relief
of their fellow-soldiers : one body of infantry burst the barriers
on the bridge, another forded the river, and the concentrated
efforts of the whole were directed with so much violence against
brave Albuquerque's horse, that they were at length obliged to
give way, abandon their position, relinquish nine pieces of ord-
nance, and resign four hundred of their comrades to captivity.
The miseries of this day were increased by an accident similar
to that which occurred at Talavera on the afternoon of the
twenty-eighth — " the herbage took fire ; the wind spread the
flames far and wide, amongst stubble, dry shrubs, and groves
of ilex and olives : on all sides the cries of the wounded were
heard; and, through the night, muskets which the fugitives
had thrown away, or the lifeless hand had relinquished, went
off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of artillery exploded.''
It was Soult's firm resolve to have pursued the advantages he
had gained, and welcome the returning smiles of fortune, by
marching one body against Guadaloupe and Deleytosa, to dis-
lodge the Spaniards, and with another cross the river at
Almarez, and seize the pass of Mirabete. This plan would
have annihilated the Spaniards, and obliged the British to
make a disastrous retreat. That such must inevitably have
been Cuesta's fate, is plain from the fact, that he had, from
perverseness, and opposition to every suggestion originating
with the British general, neglected to bring over his artillery,
and declined informing that officer of his intended plan of
operations.

On the evening of the ninth, Albuquerque, who was much
attached to the British, reached tiie canq) at Deleytosa, bring-
ing the distressing account of the loss of the bridge, the fall of so

170 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

many of his men, the capture of others, and the offensive demon-
strations still made by Soult. This alarming information brought
Sir A. Wellesley to the quarters of Cuesta on the tenth, where
he found the old general the same morose, haughty, yet helpless
being. Further conference with such a man was vain, and,
adopting the principle that a lunatic or an idiot may be deceived
for his advantage, Sir Arthur, without Cuesta's knowledge, per-
suaded the Spanish staff-officers to have the forty pieces of
cannon that lay on the banks of the Ibor, dragged up the hill by
parties of men, before the French patrol should pass that way.

Having performed this act of kindness, the last ever to be
required at his hands by his obstinate coadjutor, he returned to
Deleytosa, and on the eleventh of August removed his head-
quarters to Jaraicejo, leaving his former position open to the
Spaniards, who took possession of it on the thirteenth. By this
arrangement the ford of Almarez was guarded, and the heights
along the river-side to Arzobispo occupied in strength by the
allies : the occupation of these heights secured the country
behind the Tagus from Toledo to Abrantes, as cannon could not
be introduced anywhere between Almarez and Toledo, and the
river from the former place to Abrantes was impassable by an
army, except at Alconeta and Villa Velha. Indeed, the passage
of the Tagus by the enemy, compactly posted as the allies
were, would have been valueless, because their movements
would necessarily be confined to the narrow sloping space
intercepted between the river and the foot of the mountain-
range. In this well-chosen position (for which, as well as for
an escape almost miraculous from their inveterate pursuers, they
were indebted to the masterly genius of the British commander-
in-chief) the allies now remained.

The command of the Spanish force having at length passed
from the feeble hands of General Cuesta, who was visited by an
attack of paralysis. General Eguia was appointed to^ succeed
him on the twelfth of August, to the unconcealed satisfaction of
every soldier in the British army.* The advocates of Cuesta and

* The retirement of Cuesta has generally been attributed to sudden indisposi-
tion, but that it is really assignable to other motives will appear from the fol-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 171

the junta in that day, and the partisans of Napoleon, accused the
British of having resigned the post of honour^ that is, the defence
of the rear, to the Spaniards, after the battle of Talavera. As
the Spaniards had taken but little part in that action, it would
have been perfectly fair to have employed them after it, when
the British were exhausted and half-starved, but even this was
not the case : the British army was necessarily the left, through-
out these operations, and could not change that disposition
without abandoning the defence of Portugal. Besides which,
all the operations, from the morning of the fourth, were carried
on against the inclination of General Cuesta ; and a retreat
being necessary. Sir Arthur Wellesley could not have made it,
or have forced Cuesta to make it, if the British army had not
begun it. Another circumstance explanatory of this groundless
complaint was, that the bridge of Arzobispo was not reckoned
the pout of /tonour. The Mesa d'Ibor, till the evening of the tifth,
was the point, the loss of which was most to be apprehended.

It was on the fifth that \'ictor first heard of tlie Hight of
Cuesta and his army from Talavera, and forthwith retracing
the ground which Wellesley had obliged him to pass over,
returned to the deserted town on the day following. Upon
the approach of the French, Colonel Mackinnon, who had
charge of the wounded, was sent for by Cuesta, informed of
the intended movements of the Spanish army, and recom-
mended to remove the hospital in the best way he could, and
as soon as he was able. The colonel's previous instructions
were, in case of such necessity, to make for Merida l)y the
bridge of Arzobispo ; but, as Cuesta would only supply him
with seven cars, it was impossible to execute the orders he had
received. No alternative therefore now remained, but to recom-
mend the helpless to the honour and humanity of the enemy;
and Mackinnon, who had at one period resided in France, and

lowing letter of .M- de Garay's to Marquis Wellesley, dated Seville, Aug- 31 :
" I have given an account to the supreme junta of your official note, in which
you i)()int('d (j\it tlie necessity that existed of altering the conimaiid of the
Spanisii army of Estramadiira ; and his majesty commands me to inform you,
that on this day permission was granted to General Cuesta, to go and take the
baths in the kingdom of Granada." — Manjuis ll'ellcslri/'s Despatches,

172 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was in every respect one of the most accomplished officers in
the British army, performed this part of his duty in a manner
which was believed to have obtained, for the wounded, that hu-
mane treatment which they received from the French general.
Assembling all who were able to march, he advanced to Calera,
a village which the enemy had plundered of everything, and
on the following morning was overtaken at Arzobispo, where
forty additional cars were provided, but, from their ill state
of repair, and the badness of the roads, only eleven of them
reached Deleytosa. The Spaniards seemed to consider that
their conduct in deserting the hospital at Talavera was not an
act of sufficient baseness to destroy their fame, and now added
a further claim to the contempt of mankind, by plundering the
little magazines in the different villages through which the
wounded were to be conveyed. To harass the sick men still fur-
ther, reports were circulated by the Spanish deserters, renegades,
and freebooters, that the enemy were advancing against them
in front; upon which Mackinnon drew up his two thousand
invalids, ready to relinquish, in the cause of liberty, the slight
tenure of life they still held, like men of honour only : but this
report was as false as it was cruel, and, pursuing his rugged
road through the wild mountains, he reached Elvas, not only
without any assistance from the magistrates of the country
but in defiance of their dishonourable hostility. Fifteen
hundred wounded British were left in Talavera ; and Sir
Arthur Wellesley said, " he doubted whether, under any cir-
cumstances, it would have been possible, or consistent with
humanity, to have removed anymore of them: besides, judging
from the treatment the wounded who fell into the hands of the
enemy on the twenty-seventh experienced, as well as from the
manner in which he had taken care of their wounded who
became his prisoners, he expected that his poor fellows would
be well treated by the enemy."

The Duke of Belluno entered Talavera without even a
show of resistance on the part of the inhabitants, and
found many of the wounded weltering in their gore on the
bare pavement of the Plaza. With a degree of humanity which

THK DUKK OF WRI-LI NCTUX. 173

did honour even to liis liiirh rank and splendid talent:^, lie
directed that French and Fnghsh sliould be treated without
distinction; and having comphmcnted hi^ brave enemies upon
their knowledge and observance of the laws and the courtesies
of war, remarked, there was yet one subject of which they
appeared to be ignorant, that was, how to deal w ith the Spaniards.
Orders were instantly issued that into every house two wounded
soldiers should be admitted by the owner, one French and one
English, and every care and attention which their case de-
manded bestowed upon them, remembering, however, always to
serve the English soldier first. Through the inhumanity of
the Spaniards, many had expired in the streets before \ ictor's
arrival, and the pavement in various places was clotted with their
blood : the Spaniards were now ordered out with spades and
besoms, to bury the dead and clean the Plaza, " so as to render
it fit for Frenchmen to walk in." A few hours only had elapsed
before the streets of Talavera assumed a character more honour-
able to the inhabitants, more salubrious also, and the demands of
humanity at length, although reluctantly, were complied witli.

The next measure by which \'ictor demonstrated his know-
ledge of the laws of war, and of what was due to the Spanish
character, is unhap[)iiy less honourable to iiis military renown.
Assembling his followers at mid-day in the INaza, he told them
" that they were permitted to pillage the town for three hours,"
and, that. this violence might be committed with that mixture
of sublime and ridiculous which belongs to Frenchmen, the
plunderers were first drawn uj) in line, each man supplied with
a hanmier and saw, and with their knapsacks on their backs,
they filed off, at roll of drum, to the quarters of the town re-
spectively allotted to them. It was during this systematic
robbery, this irresistible mode of pillaging, that the vast maga-
zines of corn were discovered, sufficient, it was supposed, to
maintain the whole of the French army for three months : and
in a lumber-room of a convent, a (piantity of dollars was found,
enough to load a dozen mules. His views of humanity and
justice being comj)leted, \'ictor crossed the Tagus at Talavera
on the seventh, and, advancing towards the position of Cuosta's

II. •_' A

174 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

force, placed an advanced guard at Aldca Xueva, on the left
bank of the Tagus, and looked on the contest of Arzobispo*
from that point.

The humanity of Victor presented a remarkable contrast to
the ferocity of the army under Soult, which, almost at the
same instant, was devastating the country around Plasencia.
There nine villages were laid in ashes by liis troops, who
further disgraced the high character of a veteran soldier by
the commission of high-way robbery. It was in the month of
June that Don Juan Alvarez de Castro, bishop of Coria, then
in his eighty-sixth year, was first marked out for destruction
by the corps under Lapisse. Escaping the first attempt upon
his life, he took refuge at Los Hoyos, where from weakness
and infirmity he was necessitated to remain, and abide the
arrival of Marshal Soult. Wlien the soldiers surrounded the
cottage, where the venerable man lay helplessly upon his
couch, his chaplain and domestics, throwing open the door,
invited them to enter, and partake of such fare as their
master's lodgings afforded : the invitation was accepted, and
having indulged heartily in the recreations of the table, the
ruffians proceeded to plunder the house, and concluded their
infamous performance by dragging the aged bishop fi'om his
bed, and assassinating him in his chamber.

Upon the thirty-first of July a congratulatory letter was
addressed to Sir Arthur Wellesley by Don Martin de Garay,
expressive of the high approbation of the central junta at the
gallantry of the British army, and the commanding genius of
their leader ; and to mark, in the strongest manner, the sin-
cerity of their approval, the despatch was accompanied by a
commission appointing Sir Arthur a captain-general in the
Spanish army, and by a gift of six beautiful Andalusian horses,

» " Of tbis affair," says Sir Artbur W'elleslcy, " tbe Frencb talked more
tban they ougbt. Nothing could behave worse than they did, excepting tbe
Spaniards. They ought to have annihilated the Spanish army, but they were
afraid to follow them, and did not even know that they had taken the greatest
part of tbe cannon ; they had not patrolled the ground, three days afterwards,
when Colonel Waters went to Mortier with a fiag of truce from me."

THK DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 175

which were presented to him in the name of Ferdinand \'llth.
1'hese distinctions, flattering to vanity, prudent as concihatory,
and evincing true gratitude, were received in a manner that
augmented still further the respect of Spain for the individual
worth of the British general. In his reply to De Gary, on
the eighth of August, Sir Arthur acknowledged warmly the
honour done him, both by the appointment, and the present, but,
with the most singularly correct notions of propriety, declined
accepting even the highest rank in any army, until he should
have obtained the permission of his own sovereign, the king
of England : with resi)ect to the pay attached to the Spanish
commission, he thus generously expressed himself, " 1 hope
the government will excuse me, if I decline to become a
burden upon the finances of Spain during this contest for
her independence."

While head-quarters were still at Deleytosa, Sir Arthur was
very fully occupied in writing and receiving desi)atches,
sustaining and repelling false accusations from Cuesta, and
corresponding with his brother the Marquis Wellesley,* wiio
sailed from Portsmouth, in the Donegal, on the twenty-first,
and arrived at Cadiz, on the thirty-first of July, upon a sjiccial
mission. This experienced statesnuin came to sujiersede Mr.
I'rere, an honest but meddling agent, incapable of confining
himself to the legitimate objects of his otlice ; he had actually
endeavoured to have several British officers removed from
their command, upon his private opinion of their insufficiency ;
and the last effort of his expiring duty was the suggestion
of an extensive military project: "the junta, with a refined
irony, truly Spanish, created him Martjuis of Citiitn" but
ostensibly in consideration of his having concluded a treaty of
peace between England and Spain. 'I'o supply the place of
this incapable servant. Lord ^^ ellesley arrived in Spain, and
at Cadiz received honours that miglit, with nuuv justice, have
been paid to iiis illustrious brotiicr. 'i'liese, ahuost triumphal

• lie had been aiipcjiiited iiiiibassador to SiJiiiii in the month ot April, IN' ».
hut 11 sudden and severe indi^|>o^ition prevented liib leaving Kn^-'land h. ' •
tlie date here slated.

nC) LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS Ul'

demonstrations, were continued all the way from Cadiz to
Seville ; but it could scarcely have been possible that a man,
so much accustomed to command, could have viewed such
rejoicings in any other light than as a grateful show of respect
towards the king of England and the British nation, never hav-
ing personally rendered one act of service to the Spanish cause.
Still, however, if the phantom lured him one moment from his
path, he was instantly restored safely to it by the same hand,
and the same head, that so often ministered to his wants in
India, and precautionary letters almost hourly arrived from his
gallant brother, warning him against trusting in the fair exterior
of Spanish promises, reminding him how distantly related
were enthusiasm and sincerity, and expressing his dislike of
pageantry in general. For this brother Sir Arthur had always
evinced the most inviolable affection, and, trembling for his
situation, he thus addressed him from Deleytosa. "You
have undertaken an herculean task : and God knows that
the chances of success are infinitely against you, particularly
since the unfortunate turn affairs have taken in Austria. I
wish I could see you, or could send somebody to you ; but
I cannot go myself, and cannot spare the few, to converse
with whom would be of any use to you : the best thing you
can do, therefore, is to send somebody to me as soon as you
can, if I remain in Spain, which I believe to be almost im-
possible, notwithstanding that 1 see all the consequences of
withdrawing. But a starving army is actually worse than none.
The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. Ihey
plunder even' in the presence of their officers ; the officers are
disconcerted, and are almost as bad as the men ; and with
the army, which a fortnight ago beat double their number,
I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their
strength." This is the briefest of a series of letters, that
poured from the prolific pen of the commander-in-chief on
the arrival of his brother, acquainting him with every par-
ticular in the details of Spanish politics, that could, in the
remotest degree, contribute to prepare his mind for the duties
of his new office. Had his own penetration been unable to

THE DUKK OF WELLINGTON. 177

develope the mystery and insinc-erity of the junta. Sir Arthur's
instructions would have supphed the deficiency, and accordingly
drawing his information from this pure source, he despised
the time-destroying intrigues of that senseless assembly,
asserted boldly the right, which the victorious soldier at the
head of the army possessed, to direct the movements of the groat
body itself, and impressed his views, which were his brother's,
upon the attention of the junta, with a dignity suited to an
ambassador of his Britannic majesty, and which no British
envoy ever has sustained in a manner more honourable to the
nation than the Marquis Wellesley,* whenever his country
required his valuable services as viceroy or diplomatist.

In order to unfold the duplicity, baseness, and inhumanity
of the Spanish character sufficiently to enable the new envoy
to understand and appreciate it, Sir Arthur drew an accurate
picture of the treatment the British had received at their
hands, and the hardships they were enduring at the moment
that Lord Wellesley was conducted with shouts of triumph
into the ancient city of Seville. While the British were left
to subsist upon a short allowance of bread, and a drink of
water, extravagant su])plies passed by the famishing soldiers
towards the Spanish camp: several hundred cavalry horses died
from the want of barley, the only wholesome food for such ani-
mals in the Peninsula, and two hundred of the artillery-horses
also perished. As the Spanish cavalry do not admit mares, Sir
Arthur api)lied for a hundred, to recruit his cavalry : to this he
received no rcj)ly; and after the action of Talavenu when the

' " A man with too many iccakiicsscs to be called great, but of an expuiideH
rMpacity, and a genius at once subtle and inipniou.s." Najjior. Tlie author
of these volinnes has in vain sought for a confirmation of the preceding
charatter, in the long and eventful records of Lord Wellesley's life. — The
IManiuis Willolcy did not mistake the receiition he met at Cadiz and Seville
fov personal respect; on the contrary, in his letter to Mr. Canning of the lllh
of Augu>^t, he ascribes it to " veneration for his majesty's person, respect for
his goveriimeiit, zealous attachment to British alliance, atlectionate gratitu^le
for benefits derived from British generosity, and from the persevering activity,
valour, and skill of his majesty's troop-' and oflicers."— .Uor7«i> Wrllrdn/'*

Di spu/i/its.

178 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

British begged for ninety mules to draw their artillery, Ciiesta
refused their request, although he had some hundreds whose
only employment consisted in pulling empty cars. When
perverse dispositions become entangled in error and absurdity,
they foolishly endeavour to avert censure by impeaching the
injured; and Cuesta, after this model, accused the British
army of intercepting the supplies intended for him, and of
selling the plundered rations to the Spanish soldiers. To
these coarse charges, false and flagitious as they were, Sir
Arthur calmly answered, that *' it was beneath the dignity of
Cuesta's situation and character to notice such reports, or for
him to reply to them."

The purport of these painful communications was made
known, with all possible despatch, to the Marquis Wellesley,
accompanied by pressing solicitations that he would inform the
junta of the true circumstances of the British armj^, and hold
out threats of an immediate evacuation of Spain by the allies,
in the event of supplies being still withheld. On the day
preceding that on which Cuesta was visited by a fit of para-
lysis, Sir Arthur had occasion to retort, bitterly, his accusa-
tions against the British : " I have to inform your excellency,"
observes Sir Arthur, " that as Commissary Richardson was
coming from Truxillo, with bread and barley for the British
army, he was pursued by a body of Spanish cavalry, which
contrived to get from him all the barley : he secured the
bread ; a small part of which, however, the Spanish cavalry
forced him to give up, but for which he made the non-com-
missioned officer sign the receipt which I enclose." This was
almost the last link in the chain of ungrateful correspondence
that passed between these commanders of the allied armies,
Cuesta having resigned his command, without affording either
the promised supplies or an honourable explanation.

Confiding in the penetration of Lord Wellesley, who was
now in full possession of the insincerity of the allies, Sir Arthur
turned anxiously towards Eguia, the successor of Cuesta, invited
him to co-operate warmly, powerfully, and actively with the
British, pointed to the lamentable consequences of his pre-

THE DUKE OF WE 1.1,1 N'GTO\. \79

decessor's bigotry, perverseness, and sloth, and hoped that
a better feeUng would be engendered between the allies, by-
improved management in the Spanish camp. If .Sir Arthur
really calculated upon a happier state of things by a change
in the commander, lie is assuredly open to \'ictor's ciiarue
against the English generally, namely, that they were totally
unacquainted with the best mode of dealing with Spaniards;
for Eguia promised as much as Cuesta, and performed as
little, and, like him, attempted to conceal the blush that
rose with violated honour, by assuming the air of plain, blunt
honesty, and charging the allies with the crimes of which he
himself had been guilty. But the artifice was stale; national
character was duly appreciated by the honest Briton, who nobly
rejected all further approaches to intimacy, and all further
communication with the Spaniard, until compensation should
be made for the outrage committed upon his rank and repu-
tation. It was now that the impression began to acquire
lasting depth, on the clear mind of the English general, of the
necessity of abandoning Spain to her fate, and conducting his
little army back to the frontiers of Portugal, a country which
he had saved from plunder and from conquest, an ancient
ally of Great Britain, and at least a more faithfid friend than
Spain. Of this determination ho apprised Lord Wellesley
in a letter of the twelfth of August, in which he states, that
" the experience of every day shows the absolute necessity that
the British army should withdraw from this country. It is
useless to complain, but we are certainly not treated as friends,
much less as the only prop on which the cause in Spain can
depend." To this inconvenience was to be added the want of
resources in the country, and the extreme difficulty of bringing
forward what were to be found.

Leaving the dispute pending between the British commander-
in-chief and the Spanish junta, touching a regular and reason-
able supply of food, to be paid for by Great Britain, the
position and circumstances of Beresford, Wilson, and N'enegas
demand brief notice and attention. The first of those officers
undertook the protection of the Portuguese frontier, against

180 LIFK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

any force which he conceived the French, concentrated at Pla-
sencia, could possibly bring against him ; but he was cautioned
by Sir Arthur Wellesley against indulgence in an ill-grounded
confidence of the precise strength of the enemy, which he was
convinced much exceeded Beresford's estimate. It was also the
advice of Sir Arthur, that the Portuguese head-quarters should
be fixed at Zarza la Mayor, whether the object of the enemy
were the invasion of Portugal or not. In this position he was
supported by four British battalions, under Generals Catlin,
Craufurd, and Lightburn, posted at Castel Branco; and, from
the fertile character of the surrounding country, the Portu-
guese army would experience little difficulty in drawing ample
supplies of provisions.

Arrangements which resulted from a consultation between the
French marshals, and which shall be noticed presently, caused
Marshal Ney to march from Plasencia on the eleventh of
August, towards the Puerto de Banos, which strong post he
was surprised to find occupied by Sir Robert Wilson, with a
mixed force of Spaniards and Portuguese.

When the victorious British marched from Talavera on the
third of August, to check the advance of Soult through the
Puerto on Plasencia, Sir R. Wilson had been detached upon the
left of the army towards Escalona. He had been put in commu-
nication with Cuesta, who was to have remained at Talavera,
as well as with Cuesta's advanced guard, which had returned
from Talavera on the fourth. Being deserted by the Spaniards,
and persuaded that a retreat was no longer open to him by
Arzobispo, with a promptness and ability for which he has
been much commended by Sir Arthur Welleslc}-, he started
from Vellada on the night of the fourth, and, trusting to his
local knowledge, pushed on for the Venta de San Julian,
and Centinello, crossed the Tietar, and escaped into the
mountains that separate Castile from Estramadura. The
resources of Wilson's mind were inconceivable, his activity
prodigious, and his gallantry the admiration even of his ene-
mies. The rapidity of his movements startled the French,
who were never able to ascertain the real amount of his force.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 1 «S 1

although every movement of the alHes was reported regularly
at their head-quarters. Separated from the British, and ahan-
doned by the Spaniards, the opportunity was as eagerly seized
by the enemy, to surround and destroy him. Villatte pursued
him to Nonibella; Foy lay in wait at Vera de Plasencia; and
detachments were posted to interrupt, and co-operate in
encircling him at Monbeltrnn and Arenas. But his energy
and courage were equal to his difficulties, and enabled him to
burst the toils that were laid for him at X'iandar, to bafHe his
pursuers, escape over the Sierra de Lanes, descend into the
vale of Tormes, and reach Bejar in safety. Intending, judi-
ciously, to effect a junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley, this
bold officer pushed on towards the pass of Banos; and it was
in this attempt that he unexpectedly encountered Key. Every
precaution that time allowed, every advantage that the natu-
ral strength of his position afforded, was improved to the
utmost. Colonel Grant, at the head of two hundred
Spaniards, was placed in front of Aldea Nueva; but the enemy's
voltigeurs and chasseurs, under Lorset, obliged them to give
way. An attempt was next made upon Sir Robert Wilson's
legion, which maintained its ground against treble its nuinliers
for nine hours, when the enemy, getting possession of the
heights on the left, their position was no longer tenable.

Sir Robert retired along the mountain-ridge, leaving the
main road open to the great army. Mistaking his sudden
retirement for abject fear, the French cavalry ventured to
approach him, and call out to surrender, a demand which was
answered by a volley of musketry, that killed the whole ad-
vanced auard. A second partv, rushing forward to aveni^e tlie
deaths of their comrades, nearly surrounded the little Spanish
force; but Wilson cut his way through their ranks, and escaped
with trifling loss. Ney now willingly accepted the free passage
he had earned, and, pursuing his march, reached the line of
the Tormes, where he resigned the command of his corps into
the hands of Marchand, and unattended returned to France.
Wilson halted for two days at Miranda de Castanos, to collect
the stragglers, after which he resumed his march towards the

II. 'J li

182 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

British camp. Military writers say " they cannot comprehend
why Sir Robert Wilson should have ventured to give battle to
the sixth French corps ;" but they should remember, that he
was surprised — that he was never known to fly from danger
— and that loss of life would have been preferred by him to the
loss of liberty or honom*.

It should now be explained how Ney came so suddenly upon
Wilson's legion, of whose strength, when he did engage, he was
also ignorant. On the eleventh of August, the British, who
necessarily formed the left, placed their head-quarters at Jarai-
cejo, the Spaniards theirs at Deleytosa; the former watching
the bridge of Almarez, the latter occupying Meza d'lbor and
Campillo. They were disposed in a compact form, and took
up a central position. The passage of the river would have
been an achievement attended with the utmost risk to the
enemy, and unattended with any ulterior advantage ; the space
between the river, and the ridge occupied by the allies, being
too narrow to admit of any operations.

While the fortunes of the Peninsula were poising in the
scales of fate, king Joseph, vmintentionally, acted as her guar-
dian angel, and interposed his hand to stop the shaft of death.
Soult would have followed up the successes of Arzobispo by
pursuing the Spaniards to Deleytosa, while Ney was ordered to
pass the ford of Almarez and seize the pass of Mirabete ; but
the latter was unable to find out the ford, and the delay that
took place enabled the British to take up the strong position
already described.

At this crisis in the affairs of the Peninsula, when Soult
had conceived several projects for the destruction of the small
British force under Sir Arthur, as well as for another inva-
sion of Portugal from Plasencia, all his efforts were paralyzed
by the folly of king Joseph, who recalled the first corps to the
support of the fourth, then controlling Venegas in La Mancha,
as well as by the refusal of Ney to co-operate in his plans,
whose reasons were approved of by Joseph. The fatigues
and sufferings of the army, the jealousy that existed between
Soult and Ney, the impregnable position of an able general

THE DUKK 01-' WELLINGTON. 183

then commanding the enemy's forces, the arrival of despatches
from the Emperor, dated Schoenhrunn, twenty-ninth of July,
(announcing the victory of Wagram, and forbidding future
operations against Wellesley, until the arrival of re-inforcements
from the continent which recent successes left at his disposal)
in addition to Joseph's childish fondness for the gilded halls
of Aranjuez and Madrid — decided the intruder upon (hspersing
his army. Accordin^^ly, Soult was placed at Plasencia, \'ictor
was relieved at Talavera by the fifth corps under Mortier,
who, imitating the noble example of his predecessor, gene-
rously prohibited the distribution of rations to his own soldiers
until the wounded English in the hospitals were supplied ;
while the sixth corps, marching from Plasencia to quell the
insurrection in Leon and Castile, fomented and sustained by
the Duke del Parque, encountered and defeated Sir 11. Wilson
at the Puerto del Banos. This dispersion of the enemy led
Sir Arthur to conclude that no offensive operations were about
to be undertaken, and that he might rest, and recover strength
in his position at Jaraicejo, while Eguia continued at Deleytosa,
and Venegas was left to operate as circumstances required in
the Sierra Morena. Soult alone ad\ised falling on the British
lion in his den. Jourdan confirmed Joseph in his timidity,
for which he was subsequently dismissed from his office, which
was judiciously conferred upon the very general who had sug-
gested the bolder line of conduct.

After the battle of Talavera, king Joseph marched against
Venegas, who was loitering in the vicinity of Temblique,
having an advanced post at Aranjuez, and a division under
Lacy at Toledo, where he occasionally skirmished witli the
garrison. On the 30th of July intelligence reached X'enegas
of tiie victory of Talavera, at the same moment that Lacy
reported the appearance of a French column marching on
Toledo, and obtained a reinforcement sufficient, in his opinion,
to enable him to keep his ground. 'I'he despatches of Cuesta,
as inconsistent and contradictory as his actions at this time,
bewildered Venegas : one stated that the allies were advancing
on ALidrid ; a second, that Cuesta was just leaving Talavera
for a few hours to destroy Soult, after which he would return

184 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

to com{)lete Victor's ruin ; and a third only proved too plainly
to Venec:as that he was abandoned to a numerous and fierce
enemv, without the remotest chance of relief, and with the
greatest difficulty of effecting a retreat. In this perplexity he
declined entering Madrid, where Sir R. Wilson would have
joined him, and suffered an useless attack to be made on eight
thousand French in Toledo. He next concentrated his force at
Aranjuez, expressed a wish to confine his duty to the defence
of La Mancha, but conceived that he should obey the secret
instructions of the junta, although the necessity for their orders
had then ceased ; and, lastly, it is supposed he would have
hearkened to the absurd proposition of Mr. Frere, who recom-
mended the separation of his force into two divisions, the
one to threaten the communication with France by Arragon,
the other by Morena. The dangerous advice of this meddling
minister was obviated by the celerity of the enemy, who at-
tacked Venegas' advance-guard at the beautiful gardens of Aran-
juez. The coolness of Lacy, gallantry of Giron, and heroism of
Panes, on that occasion, excited the admiration of their country,
and were rewarded by its gratitude. The latter having re-
ceived a mortal wound, exclaimed, " Comrades, I am on my
way to heaven, stand by these guns till death." The govern-
ment desired that the title of Panes should for ever exempt
its owner from the peculiar taxes to which grandees are subject,
and conferred a situation of honour and emolument on his
father. Giron,* who commanded the defence, was created
camp-marshal on the spot. This repulse obliged the enemy
to repass the Xarama, and prepare to attack the Spaniards
from the other side. Venegas called a council of war, stated
his resolution of abandoning the line of the Tagus, his deter-
mination of attacking the enemy on the 12th, after he had
refreshed his troops, whom he would immediately concentrate
at Almonacid, and who were flushed with the pride of recent
victory; but, during this deliberation, his position was reconnoi-
tred, and attacked by Gen. Sebastiani, with a force more than
double that which he supposed the numbers of the enemy
amounted to, although General DesoUes, with the reserve, had
* Afterwards Marquis dc los Aniarillas, and Duke of Aluimado.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'. i85

not yet come up, and he was brought to action on the day he
had proposed to devote to rest. Venegas was by no means taken
by surprise, nor attacked in a position of insufficient security,
but he was ignorant of the enemy's strength. Entrusting the
command of his right wing to V'igodet, the left to Lacy, and
placing Camp-Marshal Castejon with two divisions in the
centre, he awaited the assault of the enemy. The Spaniards
stood stoutly for sometime; and the left, which had been
thrown into disorder, was restored by Venegas, who outflanked
the successful party ; but the contest was too unequal to be
maintained for any length of time, or with the least prospect
of success : the Spaniards fought bravely, but on every little
advautage they were assaulted by fresh troops, arriving in such
multitudes under DesoUes and king Joseph, that at last they
had recourse to the usual remed}-, and, throwing away their
arms, ammunition, and clothing, ran off wildly before the cavalry
of the enemy. The survivors of this day of slaughter continued
their flight to La Carolina, under painful apprehension of being
every moment overtaken, or intercepted, by the French dra-
goons, until they found an asylum in the Sierra Morena : while
the fourth French corps established themselves at Aranjuez, the
first at Toledo, and the intrusive king accomplished his darling
object — a safe return to the palace of ^Madrid. The Spaniards
in this action lost one hundred ammunition waggons, thirty-five
pieces of artillery, and a large number of their body was taken
prisoners. The French assert that the enemy had four thousand
slain, but have not made a return of their own losses on the
occasion, which must have been equal to that of their foes.

The alternations of fortune which occur in tiie game of war
are strikingly illustrated in the history of the Peninsular contest,
even in the short period that elapsed between the first landing
of British auxiliaries in Portugal, and the return of the intruder
to Madrid. Wclleslev must be acknowled^jed to have routed,
and driven the French from Portugal, in his first campaign,
because the convention was a consequence of the victories of
Ivoleia and Vimeira: in the next campaign, the British were
compelled to evacuate the Peninsula, having lost one of their

18G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

best officers on the field of Corunna : Sir Arthur Wellesloy
avenged the death of Moore, by the expulsion of Soult from
Oporto : and now the British were driven beyond the Tagus,
entrenched, it is true, in a position of impregnabilit}', but with-
out sufficient numbers to renew the contest, while the usurper
was entering Madrid in triumph.

Having noticed the situations and circumstances of Beres-
ford, Wilson, and Venegas, the narrative of the British army
may be resumed, and the trying circumstances in which Sir
A. Wellesley was placed be more fully detailed. " He was now
called on, not only to consider every military point as connected
with the army, but every civil arrangement in the Peninsula
was submitted to him : and hence he commenced* that early
practice of universality of reflection and decision, to which, for
reasons in the hands of Providence, he seems especially to
have been designed." The campaign was concluded; the
opportunity that was presented of breaking down the English
power in the Peninsula, and which Soult would have seized,
lost for ever; and this event, to the last hour of his life.
Napoleon bitterly lamented. From this date, one whole month
was passed by the British in undisturbed possession of their
head-quarters at Jaraicejo, but the mind and feelings of the
commander-in-chief were agitated by neglect and insult, not
of enemies, but allies. 'These painful circumstances led to
that lengthened correspondence in which General Wellesley
was at this time engaged with his brother, Cuesta, Eguia,
and the central junta, and which ended only in augmented
disgust of the Spanish character and provisional government.
Before the resignation of Cuesta, that general proposed to
place all the supplies for the allies at Truxillo, whence they
should be distributed in proportion to the respective strength
of each army : but this was a contemptible trick, as the greater
part of the supplies destined for the Spanish army would be
conveyed to them without passing through Truxillo. Besides,
it had been promised when the British entered Spain, that

* Niin-(iHve of the Peninsular War. The noble author seems to have forgotten
Colonel Wellesley's diploniatie services in India, which will, at no distant
period, be more fully appreciated than circumstances have yet admitted of.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 187

provisions should be found gratuitously, or at all events for
payment, without failure on the part of government; which
promise was shamefully violated, the men left without rations,
and the horses to subsist upon whatever forage they could pick
up in the fields, which being of an unwholesome description,
great numbers died in consequence. This unkind treatment
extracted from Sir Arthur a threat that he would retire into
Portugal , but in the mean time such was the opinion he had
formed of the general of the allies, that he concluded his de-
spatch to him, of that date, with a request " that the Spanish
officers sent to Truxillo might be odered not to prevent the
British from obtaining, for payment, salt and other necessaries
which the army were in want of."

The Marquess Wellesley was immediately made acquainted
with the difficulties of his brother's position, as well as with his
determination to fall back upon Portugal, unless his army were
furnished with supplies regularly and reasonably ; and a com-
plaint was also submitted to his excellency, of the detention of
letters passing from the British camp to the British envoys.
Sir Artliur, on the fourteenth of August, assured Eguia of his
earnest desire to enter into amicable concert with him, and of
his having instructed Colonel Waters to proceed to Truxillo, in
the hope of forming such arrangements as were calculated to
re-establish that reciprocity of good feeling between the allied
armies, which the misconduct of Cuesta had extinguished.
The Marquess Wellesley was now actively employed in second-
ing the applications of Sir Arthur for relief, and establi:«hing
the reasonableness of that officer's remonstrances; but the reply
which the junta made was " very unsatisfactory." The same
junta that refused food, wine, and means of trans])ort to the
British, had the effrontery not only to demand their conti-
nuance in Spain, but that INIarshal Beresford might also be
induced to advance to their support. This, General Wellesley
at once rejected, Beresford's being the only disposable force
which Portugal possessed, and all which that country had to
depend on for its defence : the object of collecting that corps
on the Portuguese frontier was not that it might operate in

188 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Castile, but remain to defend that line, and give an appiii to the
British left flank. In the midst of this vexatious correspond-
ence, consisting of impeachments and recriminations, the
general was frequently called on to calm the fears of the junta,
relative to the strength and designs of the enemy ; and, in
reply to his noble brother on this subject, on the fifteenth of
August, says, " I do not think the French are sufficiently strong
to undertake an off'ensive operation ; and it is probable that
things will remain as they are, unless I can strike a blow on the
right of their line, until reinforcements arrive from France."
It was Sir Arthur's opinion that he had the advantage of the
enemy in the defensive attitude he had assumed ; and he pro-
mised, if the arrival of food should enable him to make a for-
ward movement, that he would certainly aim a decisive blow at
his adversary; and with this object in view, he had com-
menced repairing the Puente del Cardinal on the Tagus.

The privations of the British still remaining unremedied, the
cavalry were moved farther to the rear, on Caceres, in order to
procure forage, which had completely failed at Jaraicejo, and
up to the fifteenth of August, but one day's issue of barley had
arrived for the horses. This indispensable movement destroyed
totally his hopes of being able to attack the enemy, and induced
the general to break down rather than restore the Puente del
Cardinal ; besides which, the state of the infantry, who, on the
eighteenth, " had no bread," and the boasted supply in the ma-
gazine at Truxillo not being sufficient for a single day, obliged
^r Arthur, unwillingl)', to carry into execution his meditated
abandonment of his ungrateful allies : but previous to which, he
advised Eguia to send troops to occupy the British outposts on
the Tagus. Eguia replied with drivelling absurdity, by promis-
ing to share with the British the supplies falsely stated to be at
Truxillo, and thus drew forth the inevitable decision of the hero
of Talavera. " Your excellency is mistaken in the conclusion
you have arrived at ; that which obliges me to move into
Portugal is a case of extreme necessity ; viz, that description
of necessity which an army feels when it has been starving
for a month, when it wants every thing, and can get nothing ;

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 18L>

this necessity is so urgent, that I must either move into
Portugal, where I know I shall be supplied, or make up my
mind to lose my army, unless I could be made certain of a
sufficiency of bread and corn for the troops and horses daily.
I hope, therefore, you will occupy the posts on the Tagus this
night ; but my troops shall be withdrawn from them, whether
relieved or not." His declaration to the Mar([ui3 Wellesley
on the condition of his army, his protest against the inhumanity
and baseness of the allies, was still more strong and explicit,
and so decided, that all further coquetry on the part of the
junta and their generals became futile. Sir Arthur stated that
when he moved he would be under the necessity of relinquish-
ing twelve pieces of ordnance : he assured his excellency
most soleninli/, that from the, twenty-second of July, the
horses of the cavalry and artillery had not been allowed their
regular deliveries of barley, and the infantry had not received
ten days' bread. These wei-e the causes that led him to request
that his excellency would give notice to the government of
his determination to retire into Portugal. That government
might possibly have deceived Lord Wellesley by an assurance of
their "having issued orders that the army should be pro-
vided," but they knew perfectly well that there were no inferior
officers to whom such orders could, with a prospect of perform-
ance, be directed. No system, no arrangements, no magazines
had been formed, and fifty thousand men were collected on a
spot which was incapable of affording subsistence to one-fiftii
of that number, nor were there any means of sending to a
distance for supplies to make good the deficiency : starvation,
fatigue, and service had so diminished his number of horses, that
eigiiteen hundred of his cavalry were dismounted, and he had
lost three hundred artillery-horses, entirely from want of food.
It was at this anxious moment, when the resolution
of retreating was irrevocably fixed in the British general's
mind, that Eguia disgraced himself by adding insult to injury,
by expressing a disbelief in Sir Arthur \\'ellesley's written
statements of the wants of his army. " I feel much con-
cerned," replied General Wellesley, "that any thing should
II. 2 c

190 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

have occurred to induce your excellency to express a doubt of
the truth of what I have written to you : however, since you
entertain that doubt, further correspondence is unnecessary,
and accordingly this is the last letter I shall have the honour
of addressing to you." He next proceeded to assure Eguia that
he extended to him, in the fullest manner, the confidence in
his veracity which had been refused to a British general,
and was satisfied of his having issued orders for the supply of
rations : however, as the means were not present, his excel-
lency's orders remained unexecuted. In proof of the truth of
his assertions, Sir Arthur reminded him of his having left part
of his ammunition at Deleytosa, because the Spaniards refused
to lend mules to remove it, and informed him that he would
be obliged to abandon another supply at Jaraicejo, which he
had offered to the Spaniards in preference to blowing it up.

Totally ignorant of the high sense of honour which influ-
ences every man in the British service, a principle that is
usually allowed to pervade the breast of every British mer-
chant, and for which the nation itself ranks high in universal
respect over the globe, the Spaniard had the insolence to
forward a second letter, immediately after the insulting compo-
sition alluded to, calling on the British to assist him in a
combined attack on the enemy. As this was of a public
character, and emanating directly from the junta, Sir Arthur
replied to it at once, by informing him, that the junta and
himself were equally ignorant of the actual situation of the
French army, that Beresford's post was near Salvatera, and
that no permanent benefit could result from offensive opera-
tions until the arrival of Romana. He took occasion again to
reiterate his complaints against the shameful treatment of his
men, and the unblushing effrontery of the provisional govern-
ment. " It is extraordinary," said Sir Arthur, " that the
minister at war, while he proposed new operations, forgot that
we had no food; that our cavalry, from want, are scarcely able
to move from the ground ; that our artillery horses are not
able to draw the guns : but his having omitted to advert to
these circumstances sufficiently accounts for their continued

THE DUKE OF WELMXGTOX. 191

existence.'' An auxiliary in the arts of deception was now
found in Don Louis de Calvo, a member of the junta, whose low
cunning, it was conceived, would enable him to mitigate those
stern feelings of justice, for the possession of which he could
not seriously give Sir Arthur, or any other mortal, credit. In
conversation with Sir Arthur, he insinuated that it was not
want of food that influenced the general's decision, but " motives
of a political or military nature," although he must have per-
ceived that starvation had impaired the health of the army, and
rendered it comparatively inefficient. lie assured the general
that in three days there should be plenty of provisions, and that
in the mean time all the supplies in the magazines at Truxillo
should be left for the support of the British. These reasonings
appearing to be received with some little hesitation by Sir
Arthur, the Spaniard ascended to the climax of folly and false-
hood by protesting that " the British should have everything,
and the Spanish nothing,'' To this it was distinctly replied,
that the same assurances had been received from every Spanish
commissioner, and that each in his turn had disappointed the
army ; that although de Calvo's rank was higher, and his
powers greater than those of his predecessors in office, in a
case so critical as that of a starving army, no confidence could
be reposed in his assurances. As to the accounts of resources
then on the road, the creneral discredited them altogether ; and,
with respect to the contents of the magazine at Truxillo,
Colonel Waters had examined that place the previous night,
and found that De Calvo's statements were false, and that the
magazine was as empty as the promises of a Spaniard. To the
last extravagant undertaking with which De Calvo professed to
encumber his government, for the relief of the British, namely,
giving everything to their allies, and nothing to their own poor
countrymen. Sir Arthur replied, "Its execution is utterly
and entirely impracticable ; it was inconsistent with what had
hitherto been the practice ; and besides, I have in my posses-
sion a letter from yourself, stating that you had ordered to the
IMeza d'Ibor, for the use of the Spanisii army, all the provi-
sions rc([uired for the British camp by Mr. Duwnie, the British

1^2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

commissary, and provided by the town of Guadaloupe and its
neighbourhood. I cannot therefore give credit to any plan
having for its object to give provisions to the British army to
the exclusion of the Spanish. The Spaniards must be fed as
well as the British, otherwise neither will be of use ; so that I
conceive the proposal to have been made to me, only as an
extreme and desperate measure, to induce me to remain in
Spam.

Tlie day before the British army broke up head-quarters at
Jaraicejo, Eguia, in a letter composed of quibbling and serviHty,
attempted to explain away the offence he had offered to the
British commander, by refusing credit to his assertions ; but
his apology came too late. Calvo tried the virtue of flattery,
but this stratagem proved as weak even as the meaner
efforts of his coadjutor: he talked of the Spaniards being
abandoned by those troops who so much sustained their
martial spirit, and who had recently inspired them with so
much confidence by the valour of their conduct in the field
of Talavera. It was in vain that the junta appealed to the
Marquis Wellesley, and supplicated his mediation with the
commander-in-chief; that dignified and accomphshed statesman
had heard, with deep attention, his gallant brother's warning
voice, " Put no confidence in the promises of Spain," and he
confined himself in consequence more strictly to the precise
duties of ambassador, avoiding the least personal responsibility.
In one of the most beautiful diplomatic compositions Lord
Wellesley ever wrote, dated from Seville, twenty-second of
August, he pleads, in language dehcate, respectful, official, the
sinking cause of Spain, and informs Sir Arthur of the alarm
and consternation excited by the near approach of the moment
when he should remove his head-quarters : that De Garay spoke
of the event with the deepest sorrow and terror, declaring that
inevitable and immediate ruin must ensue to the government.
" These expressions," observed the Marquis, "were mixed with
the most cordial sentiments of personal respect and gratitude for
your great and splendid services in the cause of Spain. I foundy
however, that no argument which occurred to me produced

THE DUKE OE WELLINGTON. 103

the effect of diminishing the urgency of his entreaties ; and I
have ascertained that his sensations are in no degree more
powerful than those of the government, and of every description
of the people of Spain within this city and its vicinity. I am
aware these painful occurrences have not been unexpected, in
your view of the consecjuences of your retreat into Portugal,
and that the absolute necessity of the case is the sole cause of
a movement so entirely contrary to your inclination." Con-
scious that no one was capable of affording advice to General
Wellesley under the peculiar circumstances in which he was
placed, the marquis adds, " I am fully sensible not only of the
indeUcacy, but of the inutility, of attempting to offer you any
opinion of mine, in a situation where your own judgment must
be your best guide. I have deemed it my duty to submit to
your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate
plan, and I request your favourable attention to the enclosed
note of M. de Garay : but it would be vain to urge these con-
siderations beyond the extent which they may be approved by
your own judgment. It will be sufficient for me to receive an
early intimation of your opinion, and to be enabled to state it
distinctly to this government, v.hich looks to your decision
on the present occasion, as the final determination of its fate,
and of the existence of the Spanish nation. That declaration, I
am persuaded, will be founded on the same principles of wisdom,
justice, and public sjjirit, \\hich have already obtained for you
the respect, esteem, and confidence of the Spanish nation."

From the tenor of the preceding letter it is obvious. Lord
Wellesley had found that time would be wanting, should he
attempt to fathom the intrigues of the Spanish government,
in order to establish a basis for conclusions from personal
judgment, and he wisely, therefore, relied inijjlicitly on his
brother's guidance. Sir Arthur calculated upon the penetra-
tion of the marquis, and concluded that he would not be long
duped by the acts of the treacherous assembly to whom he
had been deputed, and, without awaiting the ceremony of a
reply, on the twentieth of August, broke up from his position
at Jaraicejo, and the Casas del Puerto, the latter of which

194 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

posts was immediately occupied by the Spaniards, and marched
by Truxillo upon Mevida. Craufurd with the hght brigade
took the road to Valencia through Caceres. The weakness
of his men, want of horses and mules, and the innumerable
inconveniences, which were solely attributable to the cruel
neglect of their allies, so disabled the British troops, that it
was found necessary to halt at Merida. Here the corres-
pondence between Sir Arthur and the junta was renewed,
through the more grateful medium of his noble brother, who
ventured to propose a reunion of the allied armies, and the
occupation of a defensive position behind the Guadiana, in
order to cover Alentejo and defend Seville : he also proposed
to the junta a plan for the future regular supply of provisions
to the British arm}-.* To all these plans Sir Arthur Wellesley
respectfully objected. He did not consider that the British
army was bound or pledged to co-operate for any given period
with the Spaniards; besides, Portugal required his protection
— the line of operations which Spain meditated would with-
draw him from Portugal — and the Spanish army had a second
time behaved so ill, by its shameful flight at Arzobispo, as to
forfeit all claim to the benefit of an alliance upon equal terms.
If these arguments were insufficient, it might be added, that
absolute necessity (want of food) compelled the British to
separate from their faithless allies ; and for these amongst other
reasons, Sir Arthur resolved upon not forming a second junction
of his forces with those of Spain. Lord Wellesley urged the
advantage of combining for the defence of the Guadiana, but
Sir Arthur felt that a weaker army could not defend that
river against a stronger; that the Spaniards were then se-
curely posted on the Tagus, and, should they be withdrawn
from that position to the banks of the Guadiana, they would
be cut off by the enemy before the British could come to
their assistance. It was advisable, therefore, to let the
Spaniards continue in their position, because they could
defend it against numbers, and their retreat from it was
easy ; apart from the British, they could be more easily main-
• Vide Correspondence of Marquis Wellesley, edited by Montgomery Martin.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 195

tained ; they were not to be depended on anywhere, but if
they could not hold that position, they were incapable of
holding any. Separation, therefore, was so far the wiser policy-
But the junta asked, and the ambassador- extraordinary tacitly
seconded their inquiry, " Was there no chance of resuming
offensive operations?" To this Sir Arthur replied, "At present
I see none, and hereafter certainly none." The same chain
of causes, that led to a change of operations from offensive to
defensive, would undoubtedly continue : the French were more
numerous than the Spaniards, and superior to them in disci-
pline and every military quality. The passes of Banos and
Perales should be guarded, to prevent the multitudinous army
of Castile from pouring in upon the rear of the allies; and those
of Guadarama and Avila should be kept, in order to check the
descent of the enemy from Estramadura and La INIancha in
front. The British army could not afford to be still further
exhausted by detachments to defend these passes, and Sir
Arthur was determined never to place reliance on a Spanish
force again in any critical position. Besides, Blake had lost
his army ; llomana was hiding in the fastnesses of the sierras
of Gallicia, without cavalry or artillery ; and Del Parque, a
brave soldier, had but few troops, and was unwilling to employ
them at a distance from Ciudad llodrigo : so that no force
remained capable, or properly disposed to make a diversion in
favour of the allies, in the event of an offensive operation. Tiie
most serious consideration, and that which had the greatest
weight in fixing Sir Arthur \Vellesley's judgment on this point,
" was the constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish
troops before the enemy." " We in England, (he observed,)
never hear of their defeats and flights : but I have heard Spanish
ofTirprs talking of nineteen or twenty actions, of fhc descrip-
tion !)f that at the bridge of Arzobispo, an account of which
has never been published. In the battle of Talavera, in which
the Spanish army, with very trifling exceptions, was not
engaged, whole corps threw down their arms, and ran off, in
7ni/ presence, when they were neither attacked nor threatened
with an attack, but frightened, I believe, by their own fire."

JOG i,iFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

The truth of this statement, so disgraceful to Spain, is suffi-
ciently proved by the conduct of the general who proceeded to
decimate the runaways. When these dastardly soldiers abandon
their ranks, they plunder everything they meet, and, in their
flight from Talavera, pillaged the baggage of the British, who
were at that moment engaged in their country's cause." Sir
Arthur's reasonings convinced the judgment of Lord Wellesley,
who felt still further reconciled to his decision by the promise
which accompanied it, "of not retiring hastily into Portugal,
but that he would remain near enough to the frontier to deter
the enemy from passing the Guadiana, unless he should
come in very large force." By this arrangement the British
army would actually become more efficient, and therefore
more useful to the Spanish government, by hanging on the
enemy's flank, while they were also within reach of provi-
sions and necessary supplies. It was therefore evident that
the Spanish army rested in the most secure position, unaided as
they were by the British ; and to give still further safety to
their lines, Sir Arthur advised that the bridge of boats opposite
to Almarez should be taken up and sent to Badajoz. Before
these reasons for declining future co-operation with the
Spaniards had reached the Marquis Wellesley, his ow^n opinion
had undergone a serious alteration : having furnished a plan
for the future supply of the allied armies, whereby all jealousies
and bickerings might be laid at rest, that foolish body wanted
the wisdom and the caution to reply at a becoming interval of
time, thereby confirming the whole case, which Sir Arthur had
submitted to his brother's opinion, against the general conduct
of that body, and converting suspicion into proof,*

* The following letter from General Hill to Sir Arthur Wellesley laid the
foundation of the charge so often repeated by Sir Artluir, and Marquis
Wellesley : " I beg leave to report to you, that the parties sent out by the officers
of my division yesterday to procure forage, were, in more instances than one,
opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made
known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your excellency's
information. My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road,
in order to get forage for mc ; and after gathering three mule-loads, a party of
Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords

THE DUKE or WELLINGTON. 197

Advancing by forced marches through Truxillo, Meajadas,
MedelHn, and ]\Ierida, upon Badajoz, Sir Arthur there fixed his
head-quarters, upon the third of September, and occupied a
position on the frontiers of Spain and Portugal, which secured
further retreat should it become necessary, protected both coun-
tries, left open the means of advancing, and enabled the army
to subsist with ease, the troops being disposed in cantonments
along the line of the Guadiana. Halting for a few days at
Merida, partly in compliance with the request of Marquis
Wellesley, Sir Arthur had an attack of illness which obliged him
to travel subsequently in a covered carriage, and it was from
this place, and while labouring under a feverish distemper, that
he communicated to LordCastlereagh a summary of past events*
and a plan of operations for the future. He told his lordship,
that " the information he had acquired in the la&t two months
opened his eyes respecting the war in the Peninsula," and
then proceeded to submit such facts as were necessary for the
guidance of the king's ministers. At the date of this despatch
from Merida, twenty-fifth of August, the French force in Spain
amounted to one hundred and twenty-five thousand men»
seventy thousand of whom were cantoned in the vicinity of
the allied armies ; twenty thousand, under St. Cyr, engaged in
the siege of Gerona; fourteen thousand with Sachet in
AiTagon ; and the remainder occupied in maintaining a com-
munication with France. Tiiis force was all disposable for
the field, and did not include the garrisons of Barcelona,
Pampeluna, and some other fortified places. To oppose this
body, the whole of which was in their own country, the Spaniards
had a force of only eighty thousand men, of whom the quality
and composition were more defective than their numbers were
deficient, to continue the contest; and to support this imbccde
array there were twenty-five thousand British and ten thousand

drawn, and oMigcd them to leave the corn tliey }iad collected. My servant*
told inc that the same party lircd two shots towards other British men em-
ployed in getting forage. The assistant commissary of my division likewise
states to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired athy the Spaniards.
Signed U. Hill. Cnmp. 17 August 1800."

II. 2 D

198 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Portuguese ; so that eighteen months after the commencement
of the campaign, the allies were considerahly inferior in num-
bers to the enemy. With respect to the composition of these
armies, the French were well supplied with troops and arms
of the different descriptions required, while several of the
Spanish corps were so ill equipped as to be obliged to remain
in the mountains. With reference to what has been termed the
description of the troops, in that point of comparison the failure
was even more decided than either in the number or composi-
tion. The Spanish cavalry, for example, although well mounted,
were never known to have behaved as soldiers ought in the
presence of an enemy ; " they made no scruple of running
away, and, after an action, were to be found in every village,
and every shady bottom, within fifty miles of the field of battle."
As to the Spanish infantry, it was not possible to calculate
upon any operation with those troops : it was said they had
often behaved well, but Sir Arthur declared " he had never seen
them behave otherwise than ill ;" and it had actually become
customary for them to run away, throwing down their arms,
pulling off their clothing, and often leaving their heavy guns to
the enemy, loaded and unspiked. " This practice," observed
General Wellesley is fatal to everything, excepting a reassembly
of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly perform
the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers." The
Spanish and Portuguese artillery, however, in general merited
the approbation of their officers. " It is extraordinary," says
Sir Arthur, " that when a nation has devoted itself to war,
as the Spanish nation has, by the measures it has adopted in
the last two years, that so little progress has been made in
any one branch of the military profession by any individual,
and that the business of an army should be so little understood.
They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say
they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception
of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature."
Sir Arthur Wellesley attributed much of this deficiency, in
numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, to the Spanish
executive, who fooUshly endeavoured to govern the kingdom,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. J 99

in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and
systems, aided by what is called enthusiasm, which latter was
only an excuse forirregularity, indiscipline, and insubordination.
" People are very apt to believe," he observed, " that enthu-
siasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the
parent of those exertions that nearly conquered the world :
but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that
enthusiasm is the name only, but that force was the instrument,
which brought forward those great resources, under the system
of terror, which first stopped the allies ; and that a persever-
ance in the same system, of applying every individual, and
every description of property, to the service of the army, by
force, has since conquered Europe." This reflection upon the
origin of that power which the French republic had acquired,
was followed by a caution as to the prudence, or utility, of
employing increased strength in support of the cause in Spain.
Sir Arthur doubted whether it would have been more advantage-
ous to the general interests of Europe, had the large expedition
which was sent to the Scheldt, by a different destiny, been
directed towards Spain — as, the greater the army the greater
would be the difficulty of maintaining it, so that, after reaching
Talavera, they must have separated for want of provisions,
and then probably without a battle.

The situation, circumstances, strength, and discipline of
the Portuguese army were the next subjects in importance,
that demanded the attention of Sir Arthur Welleslcy and
the British government. It was always his opinion, that
the mode of applying the services of English officers to the
Portuguese army was erroneous. Peresford ought to have
had the temporary assistance of the ablest officers in the
British army, who should have acted as adjutants to the field-
marshal, without being posted to Portuguese regiments. In
addition to this blunder, rank had been conferred capriciously,
commissions given away in the most arbitrary manner at the
Horse Guards, in consequence of which, the officers from General
Wellesley's army quitted the Portuguese service ; and every
officer who joined from England would also have left, if Sir

200 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Arthur would have allowed it. The Portuguese troops, at this
period, were deserting to an alarming degree, so that none of
the regiments were complete ; and, as the army was at a
distance from the civil government, which furnished levies by
conscription, and the civil authorities were imable to carry the
laws into operation, it followed that Beresford would find it
difficult, if not impossible, to fill up his ranks. " Pay," adds
Sir Arthur, " has been increased ; but I fear the animal is not
of the description to bear up against what is required of him —
and he deserts most terribly."

As the Spaniards were most assuredly incapable of recon-
quering their country from the French, it became an urgent
question — what should be the policy of the commander-in-chief
of the British army? Portugal was exposed, and so easily
entered, the whole country being frontier, that it would be
difficult to prevent the enerny from penetrating : in that case,
the defence of the capital was clearly the wisest measure.
The occupation of Cadiz had long been a favourite object
with certain individuals in the British cabinet, but the force
under Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Peninsula being insufficient,
in his judgment, to occupy both banks of the lower Tagus,
and secure the possession of Lisbon also, he could not spare
a detachment large enough to garrison any town. " If you
occupy Cadiz," said Sir Arthur, " you must lay down Portugal
and take up Spain; you must furnish a garrison of from fifteen
to twenty thousand men; and you must send from England an
army to be employed in the field with the Spaniards, and
make Cadiz your retreat instead of Lisbon." While wasting
want consumed the strength, disappointed feelings cankered the
mind of every soldier in the army, and the ravages of disease
were also added to the frightful amount of calamitous infliction
under which the army laboured while at Merida. A partial sup-
ply of rations reached head-quarters, on the twenty-fifth, for
the men, but no barley for the horses : the troops continued so
unhealthy, that the general now begun to be apprehensive lest
their removal to Elvas, where an hospital was established, would
be attended with considerable difficulty, from want of any

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 201

means of transport. In the midst of all these immediate cares
for the restoration of his brave companions, the general was
enabled to spare some moments for transmitting salutary advice
to Marshal Beresford, and in replying to that active, able,
indefatigable officer, recommending him to remain on the
defensive, and not to co-operate with the Spaniards : leisure
was also found to address Mr. Iluskisson upon the subject of
finance. He congratulated the secretary of the treasury upon
the increased facility of obtaining money for bills at Lisbon,
Cadiz, and Gibraltar, and upon the prospect of being able to
get on without draining England of her specie ; and, having
concluded official matters, he thus communicated to him the
general features of his position in the Peninsula : "I wish that
the eyes of the people of England were as open to the real
state of affairs in Spain as mine are ; I only hope, if they
should not be so now, that they may not purchase the experi-
ence by the loss of an army. We have gained a great and
glorious victory over more than double our numbers, which
has proved to the French that they are not the first military
nation in the world. But the want of common manarrement
in the Spaniards, and of the common assistance which every
country gives to any army, and which this country gives most
plentifully to the French, have deprived us of all the fruits of
it. The Spaniards had neither numbers, efficiency, discipline,
bravery, nor arrangement to carry on the contest ; and if I
could consent to remain in Spain, its burden, and the disgrace
of its failure, would fall upon me."

One of the numerous Wellington despatches, dated Merida,
thirtieth of August, and addressed to Marquis Welleslev,
informed his excellency that the British cabinet a{)provcd of
the retiring of the army upon Portugal, if supplies were not
furnished as they ought by Spain : and also, that a j)art of the
British troops who had marched by Caceres, being ill provided
on that road, had pushed on to the hospitable frontier of
Portugal, by which means his army was separated, and the
divisions at a greater distance than they should be, under any
circumstances, but more particularly under the circumstances

202 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

of the threatened retreat of the Spanish army from their
impregnable position on the Tagus.

Incidents, trivial in comparison with the great event of the
reconquest of two kingdoms, but valuable as illustrating the
peculiar love of justice, which was innate in the great man to
whom those kingdoms looked for their redemption, here claim
admission. The importunities of Lord Wellesley, and decided
measures of Sir Arthur, at length induced the junta to make
some effort to furnish the British soldiers with those necessaries
they required ; among other things, a number of shirts and
sheets were sent to Merida, for hospital use. The persons
who brought them ran away with their mules, lest the British
officers might compel them to remove some of the sick or
wounded; so that it was impossible to ascertain who was
entitled to payment for the supplies. Nine carts also arrived
from Seville, with biscuits for the army, the carts being marked
as intended for the service of the British.

Sir Arthur lost not a moment in applying to the proper
authorities for information, both as to the expense of these
articles, and the persons who were to be paid for them ; and as
he was probably about to take the carts over the frontier with
his wounded men, and employ them in the Portuguese ter-
ritory, if the Spanish government considered that he ought
not to enjoy that advantage, these carts should be returned —
notwithstanding, that if the people of Portugal had behaved
so illiberally, and adopted the same principle, when the
British army entered Spain, they could not have made one
day's march within the Spanish territory. Having relieved his
conscience from the oppressive feeling that injustice might
possibly be attributed to his motives or his actions, he prepared
for the resumption of his march towards Badajoz, with the
intention of consolidating the greater part of his army within
the Spanish frontier, in order to be within easy journeys of
Abrantes, Santai-em, and Lisbon, where his principal maga-
zines were. The junta now offered to confer upon the British
general, the command of a corps of twelve thousand men ; which
he respectfully declined, not conceiving it prudent that a

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 203

single link should remain, by which the British government
might be bound to co-operate with the army of Spain. It is
not improbable that a feeling of disgust toward the Spanish
army generally might have entered into Sir Arthur's reasons
for declining this new command. But while he refused,
absolutely, the command of the Spanish corps, he gave his
opinion in favour of maintaining a strong Spanish force on
the frontier, in the immediate vicinity of his army, as the
British must necessarily be the foundation of any offensive
operation the government might be desirous to undertake, and
the proper place of his army would then be on the left of the
whole, issuing from the frontiers of Portugal. But it was a sus-
picion of General Wellesley's, built upon no weak grounds, that
the junta were not disposed to leave a larger force than twelve
thousand men on the frontier, where a larger body was most
desirable, to obviate the designs of Soult upon Ciudad liodrigo,.
because they considered less of mihtary defence, and military
operations, than of political intrigues and trifling political ob-
jects; because, also, should the army on the frontier be strength-
ened, the junta of Estramadura would insist upon the com-
mand being given to the Duke of Albuquerque, an honest
man and gallant soldier, while the junta of Seville, viewing an
army as an instrument of mischief only, thought that the larger
force would be safer in the hands of Venegas, whom they con-
sidered a pliant, willing minister of their wishes. Sir Arthur
mentions a very characteristic trait, in pointing out Spanish
inconsistency to his brother. As to the Portuguese troops,
whom the Spaniards with so much effrontery required to remain
in Spain or to return with the British, he observed, " I shall no
more allow them, than I shall the British troops, to enter Spain
again, unless I have some solid ground for believing that they
would be supplied as they ought to be ; for these troops were
worse treated than the British by the Spanish civil officers, and
obliged to quit Spain from want of food. It is a curious cir-
cumstance, that the cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused
to allow Beresford's corps to have thirty thousand, out of one
hundred thousand pounds of biscuit, which I had prepared

204 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

there, in case the operations of the army should be directed
to that quarter, and for which the British commissary had paid ;
and they seized the biscuit, on the ground that debts due to the
town of Ciudad Rodrigo, by the British under Sir John Moore,
had not been paid, although one of the objects of the mission
of the same commissary was to settle the accounts, and dis-
charge those debts ; but this same cabildo will call lustily for
assistance, as soon as they shall perceive the intention of the
enemy to attack them."

From Lobon, which he reached on the second of September,
Sir Arthur w'rote to Sir Robert Wilson,* expressing much

• This gallant and distinguished officer is the youngest son of an eminent
historical paintei", Benjamin Wilson, who disputed the palm with Hudson and
Ramsey, the two most popular artists of that day. He was born at bis father's
house in Great Queen-street, London, in the year 1777, and received his edu-
cation at the public schools of Winchester and Westminster, at the latter of
which, an anecdote of his early predilection for the profession of arms is pre-
served. Ha^dng heard that a grand review was to be held at Caesar's camp on
Bagshot-heath, regardless of consequences, he broke away from his form,
hired a pony with all the money he was possessed of, and hastened to the
scene of splendour and delight. From the ability which he displayed at
school, his father designed him for the study of the law, but fate ordered events
othenvise, and in 1793, when but sixteen years of age, he joined the Duke of
York's army in Flanders as a volunteer. His brother-in-law. Colonel Boswell,
was employed and fell in that unfortunate campaign ; and it was to the affection
and generosity of Mrs. Boswell, his sister, that young Wilson was indebted for
the means of pushing his military fortune, as his father had died before he
entered the army. He soon became entitled to a commission, and being made
cornet in the fifteenth dragoons, was one of the six officers who, with one
hundred and seventy dragoons commanded by Major Aylet, attacked and cut
their way through ten thousand Frenchmen, at the siege of Landi'ecy, killing one
thousand two hundred, and taking three pieces of cannon. This act of
heroism saved Francis II. of Germany, from being taken prisoner, and was
rewarded by the emperor with the present of a gold medal to each officer,
and admission into the order of Maria Theresa. On his return to England,
Sir Robert espoused a daughter of Colonel Belford, and niece of Sir Adam
Williamson, and served as aide-de-camp to Major- General St. Jolm, in the
Irish rebellion of 1798. In 1799, he again followed the Duke of York to
Holland; but obtaining a majorit)- in Hompesch's mounted ritiemen, he pro-
ceeded to Egj-pt in 1801. Returning home, he published an account of that
campaign, in which he animadverted severely on the character of Buonaparte ;
this called forth a reply from Sebastiani, and produced so much acrimony, tliat
it has often been imagined Sir Robert's volumes were accessory to the kindling

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 2U5

anxiety for the defence of Ciudad llodrigo, which he considered
it probable Soult would besiege, an event of the most mis-

of that conflaf^nition, which soon after flamed out over Europe. Roworth, the
printer, is su])posed to have been the real cause of the mischief that ensued,
by copying into the work some exaggerated TnrkLsh stories, reflecting upon
the first consul, for it was of these insinuations that Buonaparte com])lained to
British goveninient. That these strictures were untrue, Sir Robert partly
confessed in the year 1815, by stating, that when the;/ were published, he
believed them to be founded on fact. In 1804, he published "an Inquiry
into the present state of the British forces," in which he reprobates the
system of corporal punishment in the army.

For some time subsequent to 1804, he held the situation of ficld-ofliccr in the
western coimties, from which he was again taken into active service, and
assisted at the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. In 180C he acconi])anied
Lord Hutchinson on a secret mission to Russia, and was present in all the
battles fought by the allies, from the engagements at Pultusk to that of Freidland.
Upon the signing of the treaty of Tilsit, he w<is received by the Emj)eror
Alexander with marks of distinguished favoiu". In 181 1 appeared his narrative of
the contest between France and the allied powers, under the title of " An Account
of the Campaigns in Poland in 1806 and 1807, with remarks on the Character
and Composition of the Russian army." In 1808 he was despatched to Portugal,
where he raised the Lusitanian legion, and entitled himself to the warmest
praises of Lord Wellington. He was, however, sent to Russia in 181'2, as British
military correspondent, and was with the allied armies in every action that
took place from that period until the close of the war. At the battle of
Lutzen, he stormed the village of Gross Gorchen, and continued to hold it at
the close of the day. On the establishment of the genenil peace. Sir Robert
visited Paris, and took part in the liberation of Lavalette, for which he was
censured in the general orders issued by the Duke of York, but found supjwrt
<mder this punishment in the testimony of an approving conscience, and the
unanimous applause of Europe. Controversy in literature was a.s much the
lot of Wilson, us contest in the field ; his " Sketch of the Military and
Political Power of Russia" brought upon him a virulent attack from tlie
Quarterly Review to whidi he replied with spirit and ability. The South
American, struggling for liberty, next attracted his attention, and, proceeding
to Colombia, he endeavoured to co-operate with Boli^ar in effecting that
obje^'t ; but he verj' soon abandoned tliis project, iuul, returning to England,
was elected to parliament for the borough of Soutiiwark, when lie su|)|)ortcd
liberal politics, voting for reform and retrenchment. In addition to these
anti-ministerial views, he espoused the cause of Queen Caroline ; and his
«'xertions to prevent the effusion of blood at her funeral, l)oing misrei)rescnte(l.
he was dismis.-^'d from tiie king's service. His ])ccuniary loss aticmling this
liar^li sentence, was remedied by a piiblic subscription amounting to sevenil
thousands. After this uni>leiLsant event, he visited Paris, but was desired by
the police to quit France in three days. In \H'2il, notwithstanding that British
subjects were prohibited from taking any part in the war between France and
II. 2 E

206 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

chievous tendency to the common cause. He wished that
Wilson would maintain his ground as long as he was able,
with a view to obstruct that object of the enemy, and, if he
should fail, then to take up the boats at Villa Velha out of the
river, to secure a passage for the British. On the following
day, September the third, the head-quarters reached Badajoz,*
and continued in that neighbourhood until the middle of
December following. Hitherto the British army had encoun-
tered the best disciplined troops in Europe, and defeated them
gallantly ; they had sustained the most cruel, heartless ill-usage,
yet sunk not under its weight, but Providence (the only
enemy to whom they ever would have yielded) now placed them
under afflictions which human energies were unable to resist.
This was a species of epidemic, supposed to arise from the

Spain, Sir Robert entered the latter country, joined the Constitutionalists, re-
ceived a commission from the Cortes, was wounded at Coninna, and, when his
party was cnished, fled to Lisbon : being refused an asylum there, he proceeded
to Cadiz, where he remained until it surrendered to the French. His conduct in
the Spanish constitutional war, offended the croA\'ned heads of Eiurope ; and
the emperors of Russia and Austria, the kings of Prussia and Portugal, deprived
him of the orders which they had formerly conferred upon him. He now
retiu-ned to his native land, was again chosen to parliament for Southwark in
1826, but, ceasing to support reform, he lost the subsequent election. King
William IV., restored Sir Robert Wilson to his rank in the British service, at
the recommendation of his ministers.

* The following observations are appended to the original MS. of the Wel-
lington despatches. — " There never was a position better calculated than this, for
the purposes of defending Spain and Portugal. The French had, from the end
of August, not less than from seventy to ninety thousand men disposable :
they have since destroyed two armies, which it was thought proper to expose
to their attack : yet they have not been able to advance, or to gain any solid
advantage, beyond that of destroying the Sjjaniards. The fact is, that the
British army had saved Spain and Portugal during this year. The Spaniards
have no army now that is complete, excepting thirteen thousand men under
the Duke of Albuquerque in Estremadura ; and yet nothing can be done by
the French after all their victories. Wliat would have been the relative state
of the two contending parties, if the Spaniards had been tolerably prudent,
and had acted as they were advised to act ? The advantage of the position at
Badajoz was, that the British army was centrically posted, in reference to all
the objects the enemy might have in vdew: and, at any time, by a junction
with a Spanish corps on its right, or a Portuguese or Spanish corps on its left,
it could prevent the enemy from undertaking any thing, excepting with a much
larger force llian they could allot to any one object."

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ^07

malaria of this, unhealthy district. The valley of the Gua-
diana is peculiarly insalubrious in the autumnal months, when
the river ceases to be a stream, and noxious vapours arise from
the detached pools of stagnant water that remain in the deepest
hollows of the torrent's bed. The natives suffer much incon-
venience from this state of the atmosphere, and strangers are
still more susceptible of disease from its effects. The cessation
of the soldier's active habits and circulation of the bile through
the system, was soon attended by intermitting ague and fever.
It was, unfortunately, impossible to procure any regular supply
of wine and spirits for the army generally, and even the hospitals
were but scantily furnished, while numbers of the convalescents
died from want of Peruvian bark ; the number of medical
attendants also was totally insufficient for the lamentably
increasing amount of sick. A second time since the march
from Jaraicejo, the fiery fever fastened on the general himself,
but his excellent constitution and abstemious habits repelled
the insidious enemy after a short struggle of a few days.
Seven thousand patients were prostrate in the hos})itals estab-
lished around Badajoz, of whom two-thirds died ; and the
sands of the Guadiana, like the snow-storms of Russia,
proved more fatal to a brave army, than the swords of their
enemies : so great was the mortality, so malifrnant the cha-
racter of this distemper, that the natives, unwilling to believe
that ordinary causes produced such extensively fatal conse-
quences, ascribed the extensive prevalence of the malady
amongst the army to the eating of unripe fruit, and to a mis-
chievous species of mushroom which grows in the vale. Here,
combating with fate. Sir Arthur Wellesley sat down to watch
over the sick bed of his companions, and while he endeavoured
to soothe their sufferings by his generous feeling and tender
care, gave the best powers of his mind to the consideration of
future |)lans of operation — to the moi^t judicious line of con-
duct for the allies — to the best mode of procuring regular sup-
plies, without relying in any degree on the Spaniards — to the
defence of Portugal — to the ill-fated expedition fitted out by
his country to the shores of Holland — to questions of military

'208 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

manoeuvre, foreign and domestic politics, to the commissariat
and finance, and every subject in which a soldier or a states-
man can be supposed to feel an immediate interest. The
Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford, withdrew simul-
taneously with the British, crossed the frontier, and went into
cantonments.*

* " The Portuguese army would have been ruined, if they had remained
longer in the field. They wanted clothing, and every description of equipment ;
they were raw recruits, detested serving in Spain, where they were ill-treated,
and deserted in large numbers during the short time they were in that country.
There are now good grounds for hope that something will be made of them,"
— Original Note to Memoiandum of Operations, S[c.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 209

CHAP. IV.

The BRITISH ARMY HOTTED NEAR BADAJOZ — THE SPANIARDS, VNDER EGUIA, DUEAKUP
FROM DELEYTOSA, AND ENCAMP AT TRt'XILLO— WELLINGTON FAVOURS RELIGIOUS
TOLERATION — IS RAISED TO THE PEERAGE — REMONSTRATES WITH THE JUNTA OP ESTRE-
MADURA UPON THEIR INSINCERITY — DEFEATS THE STRATAGEM OP LORD MACDUPP, AND

. THE MARQUESS DE M A LPESIN A— CONSPIRACY TO DEPOSE THE SUPREME JUNTA DETECTED
BY THE MARaUIS WELLESLEY — THE SPANISH GENERAL INTERCEPTS LORD WELLING-
TON'S PRIVATE LETTERS, AND IMPEDES THE EXCHANGE OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH
PRISONERS— WELLINGTON VISITS LISBON, AND EXAMINES INTO ITS CAPABILITIES OF
DEFENCE — PROCEEDS TO CADIZ, WHERE MARUUIS WELLESLEY EMBARKS FOR ENGLAND —
REFUSES TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE SPANISH ARMY — AFFAIR OP TAMANES — AREIZAGA
DEFEATED AT OCANA — INVASION OF ANDALUSIA — FALL OF SEVILLE — ABLE CONDUCT OP
. ALBUQUEROUE IN SUCCOURING CADIZ — BUITISH ARMY CONTINUE INACTIVE — EXTRAOR-
DINARY IGNORANCE OF THE CHARACTER AND PLANS OF LORD WELLINGTON PREVAILS IN
ENGLAND — UNGRACIOUS CONDUCT OF THE OPPOSITION PARTY IN PARLIAMENT — THE CITT
OP LONDON PETITION PARLIAMENT AGAINST GRANTING A PENSION TO LORD WELLINGTON
— CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION — SUCCOURS SENT TO PORTUGAL — THE SPANIARDS UNSUC-
CESSFUL IN THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS — ASTORGA AND CIUDAD RODRIGO FALL —
AFFAIR OF THE COA — ALMEIDA INVESTED. — 1809 — 1810.

Insatiable pride, when successful in its object, is often par-
doned, and even so.netimes admired, but unlimited arrogance
has never excited any other feeling than that of decided con-
tempt. Had the presumption of the Spaniards and of the junta
that misruled them, originated in that chivalrous pride that
made them reckless of life, when liberty or honour was the prize
to be fought for, the world might possibly forgive them: but when
the cowardice of the Spanish army, treachery of many Spanish
officers, and intrigues of the Spanish government, are called to
mind, disgust for the national character could alone have been
the result, when the central junta expressed indifference as to
the military opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, pretended to
disregard further British co-operation, and had the folly to
undertake the direction of their own rude levies, and order
them to advance against the enemy. The pettishness, so dis-
graceful to a national assembly, that dictated this rash conduct,
made but little impression upon the great man who now, in
his camp at Badajoz, pondered over the present care and
restoration of his army, the future salvation of the kingdom of
Portugal, and the everlasting glory of lus native land. Regard-

210 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

less of t})pir ill-conceived projects, so long as they did not
endanger the security of his position, or the interests of the
general cause, Sir Arthur gave his whole attention, and the
concentaated energies of his patient and comprehensive mind,
to preparations for the ensuing campaign. In his position at
Badajoz he had many minor difficulties to contend with, which
were all intimately connected with the individual and general
happiness of his men. A retreat is always discouraging to
an army, particularly to one that has been victorious, and
generally affords the men too many opportunities of committing
depredations. The act of violence is to be primarily regretted,
but the insubordination that always ensues, becomes still more
deplorable. The British, although now comfortably hutted*
considered and felt that they were in retreat, and the usual con-
sequences of that impression were the result. The rash move-
ments of the Spaniards, who had broken up from their strong
position at Deleytosa, transferred their head-quarters to Trux-
illo, and despatched the bestpart of their army to La Carolina,
rather increased the disappointment of the British soldier, who
viewed these operations as advancing against the enemy. Sir
Arthur Wellesley remonstrated against the imprudence of their
conduct, and felt the danger to which his position might thereby
be exposed; but the junta affected to disregard his opinion, and
as to the hazardous consequences, himself alone foresaw or
understood them. Inconsistence cannot be more remarkably
illustrated than by the arguments which the junta employed on
this occasion, to shield themselves from the just indignation of
the British and Portuguese : they declared the impossibility of
continuing their head-quarters in the vicinity of Deleytosa,
owing to the exhausted state of the country on the left bank
of the Tagus, although they positively denied the truth of the
same argument, when urged by the British general as the cause
of his retiring from the same position. Another and still more
Hagrant act of baseness and ingratitude, was that of throwing

* The following were the positions occupied by the British near Badajoz in.
the month of September 1809. Badajoz, Merida, Montijo, Puebla de la Cal-
zada, Talavera Real, Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, La Roca, Elvas, Oliven^a,
Villa Vellha.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 211

obstructions in the way of releasing several British officers from
captivity, by an exchange for French officers, whom the
Spaniards had taken on the road from Zamora to ValladoHd,
which they not only opposed by endeavouring to prevent all
communication upon the subject between Soult and Sir Arthur
Wellesley, but by stopping all the messengers sent out by the
British to make inquiries.

During the inactivity of the army in their cantonments at
Badajoz, several questions, of importance to the comfort of the
officers, the soldiers, their wives and children, relating both to
spiritual and temporal matters, were submitted to the decision
of General Wellesley; and his judgments are curious, as exhibit-
ing a clearness of conception upon every variety of subject
that is mixed up in the great assemblage of human wants and
habits, and a most accurate and intimate knowledge of military
laws. Upon the question of the propriety of soldiers attend-
ing Roman Catholic worship, he replied, " The soldiers of the
army have permission to go to mass so far as this — they are
forbidden to go into the churches during the performance of
divine service, imless they go to assist in the performanve of the
service. I could not do more, for, in point of fact, soldiers cannot
attend mass, except in Ireland. The thing now stands exactly
as it ought : any man may go to mass who chooses, and
nobody makes any inquiry about it." The liberality and
toleration here displayed always belonged to Sir Arthur's
character ; he expressed sentiments precisely similar to those
in defendiniT the introduction of Dr. Dui^enan into the Irish
privy-council: in restoring Mr. Gilford to a situation from which
he had been illiberally removed ; and, in inducing General Sir
John Moore to become reconciled to Lord Castlereatrh, and
undertake the command of the army in the Peninsula.
Another difficulty, referred to Sir Arthur for solution, was the
claim of officers" and soldiers' wives and children to rations :
the general decided that their title was good, and he also said
he " saw no ol)jection to the granting of similar allowances
to the wives and children of clerks employed in the service,
provided thev were Britisii born." This was tiic law of the

212 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

case, to which the humanity of the commandei-in-chief
appended this further explanation, " I beg you will understand,
that I am desirous of extending to the wives of the officers and
soldiers every indulgence, to the fullest extent allowed by his
majesty's regulations : but I can suffer no abuse, and every
appearance of abuse must be checked immediately." These
two interesting cases have been selected from a multitude pre-
sented to him for judgment while the head quarters of the
British continued at Badajoz.

While yet the hand of sickness pressed heavily on him, the
cares of his high calling engaged his deep attention ; and, before
the ingratitude of Spain could have been forgotten, a gratifying
communication reached him from his sovereign, whom he had so
faithfully served, but who had not neglected him in his ex-
tremity ; for at this precise moment it was, (the twelfth of
September, 1809,) that the following letter from the Duke of
Portland, then first lord of the treasury, was brought to the
camp at Badajoz : — " My dear Sir Arthur, To congratulate
you upon your victories would be so feebly to express my sense
of your services, that I must indulge, in the first instance, the
gratitude which I feel to be due to you, and request your
acceptance of my best thanks for the credit as well as the
service you have done to your country, which I trust will make
all the impression which it ought to do on the minds of all
descriptions of persons in the kingdom. Nothing could be more
gracious than the king's acceptance of your services, or more
immediate and decisive than his approbation of creating you
a viscount. Long may you enjoy that honour, and be placed,
for the advantage and honour of your country, in those situa-
tions which may enable you to add to your own. London,
22d of August, 1809." To this Sir Arthur replied, by ex-
pressing the gratification he felt at the receipt of his grace's
communication ; his hope that he might not at any future period
prove himself unworthy of it ; and thanked the Duke for having
suggested to his majesty to confer upon him this high reward.
However courtesy demanded, or compliance with etiquette
required that Sir Arthur's letter of thanks should be transmitted

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 213

to the premier, for the suggestion of this manifestation of roval
favour, it was to Lord Castlereagh solely, his early, his intimate,
and admiring friend, that he was indebted on this ocx^asion.
This is clearly proved by Sir Arthur's letter of the same date
to his noble friend, in which he says, " I am very much obliged
to you for your kind letter of the twentieth of August, as well
as for the mark of the king's approbation, which j/ottr fn'emls/tip
for me has induced you to suggest to your colleagues to recom-
mend to the king to confer upon me." Proud, but not vain
of his justly merited reward, richly as he deserved to be
cherished by some few rays of royal favour, he yet declined to
adopt the title, or to employ the signature of nobility, until either
the gazette arrived, or a special notification equivalent to it.
The notification was delivered on the sixteenth of September,
and the first letter he ever signed as a member of the House
of Lords was addressed to Mr. Villiers, afterwards Earl of
Clarendon, to which the following playful postscript was
attached, "This is the first time I have signed my new name.
Would the regency give me leave to have a c/iasse at \'illa
Vicosa?" His indefatisrable exertions for the restoration of
strict discipline, his parental care of every individual attached
to the army, were not suspended for a moment by the acquisi-
tion of his sovereign's marked approbation. A debt of justice
he remembered was due to Major Middlemore, who succeeded
to the command of the forty- eighth at Talavera, after Colonel
Donellan was wounded, and Lord Wellington's reasons for
pressing that officer's claims, deserve to be recorded, " I can-
not," he observes, "avoid again drawing the attention of the
commander ip chief to the claims of Major Middlemore;
the forty-eighth regiment distinguished itself at Talavera,
particularly when the command devolved on Major Middle-

• He was raised to tlie peerage on tlie twenty-sixtli of Aupiist, 1809, by
the titles of Baron Doiiro of Wellesley, and Vi.<count Wellington of Tiilavcra,
and of Wellington in the county of Somerset. The motto of the family was
" Unica viitus ncressaria," Virtue alone is necessary ; for which Lord Wellington
substituted, " Porro nnum nccessarium," Our thing more is necessary. This lat-
ter, however, has been laid aside for the following, " \'irtutis fortuna conicb."
II. 2 F

214 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

more : and I hope that the claims of an officer senior to him,
who is already a brevet lieutenant-colonel, and to whom this
commission can be no object, as he never joins his regiment
or does any duty with this army^ will not be preferred to the
substantial claims of Major Middlemore. I know nothing
of Major Middlemore, excepting as a soldier : and I should
not recommend him, if I did not believe that his promotion
would give general satisfaction, and that he really deserves it."
At this particular moment the ingratitude of the junta mani-
fested itself in a new form : chagrined at the independent and
decided conduct of the British commander-in-chief, they
meanly became the medium of forwarding a memorial, from
the inhabitants of Puebla la Calzada, desiring that the British
army might be removed from the immediate vicinity of their
village. This unjust and ungenerous remonstrance, whether
it ever did actually originate with the villagers, or that their
names had been made use of by the junta to shield themselves
beneath, was not communicated to Sir A. Wellesley directly,
or in that candid mode of transacting business, of which he
had so often but so vainly given an example to the Spaniards,
but was sent by the local government of Estramadura to the
central junta, who forwarded the disgraceful document to the
British ambassador at Seville, by whom its contents were
communicated to the commander in chief. The reply of Sir
Arthur is amongst the few instances in which that officer was
ever known to condescend to the use of sarcasm, as an argu-
ment, although he did not rest his defence upon such a
basis. He reminded the local junta that at their own request
he had so distributed his troops, that the country should not
find it difficult to feed them, and that he should be enabled to
re-assemble them, in case the movements of the enemy should
render it necessary, without any loss of time : he informed
them, that he had chosen La Calzada, as the most proper
quarter for the three battalions which he had placed there,
because there was no wood in the neighbourhood in which

* Afterwards Major- General Middlemore, and governor of St. Helena.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ^15

the troops could find shelter, excepting olive or other fruit-
trees, which he did not wish to destroy : had tiiere been wood
and water, he would have preferred hutting the men in the
wood, as he had done at Talavera Real, and the vicinity of
Badajoz. "It appears, however," observed Sir Arthur, "that the
inhabitants of La Calzada, although with the most patriutic
sentiments, and with the utmost devotion to the cause of their
countri/, complain of the inconvenience they sustain, and they
enumerate also the quantity of provision with which they have
supplied the troops ; but they have forgotten to state that they
are regularly paid for every thing they give. The inhabitants
of this country, and Spaniards in general, have formed a very
errroneous estimate of the nature of the contest in which they
are engaged, if they suppose it can be carried on without
inconvenience to any individual in the country. It not only
must be attended with personal inconvenience, but, unless
every individual in the country shall devote himself, his pro-
perty, and everything he can command, not in words and
professions only, but in fact, to do what government shall
order — there can be no success, and the best combined opera-
tions must fail.'' Having made these observations. General
Wellesley informed the junta that he could not consent to
their request, and that La Calzada must continue to endure
the hardships of which its inhabitants so loudly complained, or
the Spanish nation must suffer what the central junta would
probably deem a greater evil. This contemptible application
being thus disposed of by the adoption of a little irony, and by
a decided refusal to accede to any portion of its objects, he felt,
that as matters had assumed so calm an aspect, he might now
venture to quit the camp at Badajoz for a few days, and make
a visit to Lisbon, " where he wanted to look, about, and decide
finally upon a plan of operations, in case Portugal should be
invaded in the autumn or winter." But, before this leave of
absence was taken or enjoyed, very many communications, and
of the utmost consequence to the commissariat of his own
army, to the peculiar and delicate situation of Heresford, arising
from the anomalous system of employing English otfiee? in ther

216 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Portuguese service, and to the position of imminent danger in
which the Spanish army persisted in placing itself — occupied
his time and exertions.

'J'he movements of the Spanish army during the continuance
of the British at Badajoz, and in fact until the retirement of
the Marquis Wellesley from the Peninsula, have here been
suspended, in order to preserve unbroken the personal narra-
tive of Lord Wellington, his plans for the safety of Portugal,
defence of Lisbon, and valuable correspondence with his noble
brother. On the fifteenth of September he extended the benefit
of his protection to the brave Marquis de la llomana, who,
after all his sufferings and services, was apprehensive of vio-
lence from the central junta ; and, to secure for that gallant
soldier the advantage of at least an impartial trial, although
he had never been guilty of disloyalty, he thus wrote to the
British ambassador : " Your excellency is aware of the con-
nexion between Komana and the people of England : and I
am convinced that if you can prevent the junta from laying
violent hands upon him, at least till they shall have convicted
him upon trial, of evil intentions, you will do a good thing."

The arrogance of the junta, or rather of the military parties
acting under its orders, in obstructing the collection of food
at the different villages, continuing unabated. Lord Wellington
felt it necessary to inform the ambassador of his intention to
remove his men, aUogether, into the Portuguese territory,
which would be attended with the advantage of more perfect
concentration : he had, he considered, separated his force into
too many divisions, and quartered them at distances too far
apart, in order to comply, as far as was possible, with the wishes
of his excellency and of the junta, in not withdrawing totally
from the Spanish territory, but, by his proximity, extending
some encouragement to the Spaniards from whom he had been
obliged to disassociate himself.

About this period the Spanish head-quarters were atTruxillo,
whither they had been removed from ivunt of provisions. In
their case, this plea was accepted ; it was rejected by the junta,
when offered by Lord Wellington. The conduct of the Spanish

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 217

army was so irregular, that their example alone would have
been pernicious to the British ; but, in addition to this evil,
their audacity in obstructing the attainment of supplies from
the villages, obliged his lordship to repeat his remonstrances,
and revi\e his threats of withdrawing, still further, from so
bad a neighbourhood as that of the Spanish head-quarters, and
of retiring totally to the Portuguese side of the frontier. Of the
inefficient, wild, and insubordinate condition, in which the
Spanish force actually existed, Lord Wellington had been
ap])rized by Colonel lloche, even previously to his junction
w ith the army under Cuesta, but never having known a similar
instance, and conceiving it impossible that any government could
have been so extravagantly rash, as to oppose the coimtless and
disciplined numbers of France, with such feeble weapons, he
gave but little attention to Roche's report ; he now, however,
had practical proof of the truth and accuracy of that officer's
statement. The insubordinate state of the allies, as well as
the monstrous amount of the enemy's forces, both which facts
had been carefully concealed from the ambassador, were now
made known to him by the commander-in-chief, who also
expressed his uncertainty as to the enemy's movements; a
point then of some personal interest to him, as the precarious
state of his health absolutely required rest and recreation, in
neither of which he dared to indulge, until he was satisfied
what were the intended operations of the I'rench. Fever had
now for a whole month continued to hang upon him, and he
was desirous of visiting Lisbon for change of air, of scene,
of association of ideas. The operations of Soult gave him
some cause of uneasiness, as that officer continued to concen-
trate all the disposable forces he could control into Placensia,
although that movement might have been occasioned by the
advance of llomana to Ciudad llodrigo.

A circumstance of little import, beyond that of exemplifying
the caution of a man who was always proverbially wary,
occurred at liritish head-quarters on the twentieth of Sep-
tember. The Marquess de Mali)esina and Lord Maalutf arrived
at Badajoz, and being admitted to an interview with Lord

:218 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Wellington, presented a letter from General Eguia, quotino-
one from Don Antonio de Cornel, stating " that the British
amhassador had settled, that a defensive position should be
taken up on the banks of the Guadiana, and desiring his lord-
ship to arrange the positions to be occupied by the troops in
concert with them." His first reason for refusal, marks
the upright, honest, great, and decided character of the man :
without questioning the veracity of the individuals, or the
authenticity of their pretended warrant, he rephed, " I cannot
enter upon such an arrangement, because I do not conceive the
jjositio?i to he a good one" But, Lord Macduff demanding
whether he declined to execute an arrangement settled by the
British ambassador, he proceeded to analyze their commission,
and concluded, rightly, that it was spurious. He therefore dis-
missed these simple emissaries, and even purposely neglected
making their false mission a subject of complaint.

It may frequently have been observed, that Wellington pos-
sessed, among many other qualities that fitted him in an special
manner for the command of an army, a quickness of perception
as to character, and a memory tenacious in the extreme, of per-
sonal appearance, and of what may be termed local accompani-
ments. In some instances he had addressed despatches, contain-
ing directions for carrying into effect some general order, in a
district, every feature and all the distances in which, he
described with the most unerring exactness : on other occa-
sions, he has directed a change in regimental discipline, and
named the corporals and privates whom he wished to be
employed, in the first instance, to lead and instruct the rest,
'ihose that were higher in rank were more easily understood,
or, at all events, afforded more frequent and palpable occasions
for the development of character ; and it is found, from time to
time, that the most faithful portraits of every Spanish officer,
whom the sorrows and the sufferings of his country had raised
to any eminence, were occasionally sketched by him with a
strength that gave the most perfect idea of the originals.
Cuesta's character has been often told. Lord Wellington's
brief commentary on Eguia's plans, " that they were all rank

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTOX. 219

nonsense," and his declining all further correspondence with
that presumptuous officer, unfold sufiiciently his estimate of
the amount of genius and honour in that individual: of Albu-
querque, he writes to his brother — " Although he is prone
by many, among others by Whittingham and Frere, and is
feared by the jimta, you will find him out." He considered
the Marquis de la Romana to be " the best he had seen among
the Spaniards ;" he doubted his talents at the head of an army,
but looked on him as a sensible man, and one who had seen
much of the world.

The correspondence that was conducted between these
illustrious men developes, in the most entire manner, the folly,
rashness, and presumption of the Spanish central government ;
and removes every doubt as to the propriety of marching the
British army over the Spanish border. The people, the
peasantry, the rabble-army of Spain, begun to acknowledge
what they must long before have felt, that their allies had been
grossly deceived by the junta, and treated most unworthily.
Accustomed, in the ill-fought field, to attribute all blame to
their general, by analogy of reasoning, they ascribed every
failure, blunder, and act of impropriety, in matters of policy,
to their executive government. From the highest pinnacle of
hope and confidence, they were frequently cast into the depths of
despair; they now believed that Wellington, and Wellington alone,
could save their country from ruin, and it was of his services tlie
treacherous intriguing junta had deprived them. They admired
the just indignation of the hero, who had retired in pity rather
than anger, and they called for vengeance on the authors of so
much injury to the common cause. The walls of Badajoz
were placarded daily with verses, of little pretension to the
right rules of poesy, but conveying, very intelligibly, the feeling
of the community towards the members of the junta. The
contents of one of those placards accusing the government of
treachery, is well remembered — " Peace between France and
the central junta: — Articles — the Tagus abandoned — the
English disgusted — the army lost — Badajoz sold." Their
wrath, however, was not appeased; the outraged feelings of the

2'20 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

oountry were not assuaged by this anonymous mode of declar-
ing their suspicions; it was necessary still to punish the guilty.
This last project was actually undertaken, and a conspiracy
formed to seize the members of the junta, and transmit ihem
to Manilla.

Judging from the ill-treatment which the British army re-
ceived from that corrupt body, the conspirators calculated upon
the support of Lord Wellington, and, arguing from the declara-
tion of Marquis VVellesley "that Spain had proved untrue to our
alliance," they reckoned upon the ambassador's support also; but
the same moral standard proved inapplicable to both nations,
for the first of these individuals had always maintained so high
a name for honour, justice, and humanity, that no one had the
courage to invite him to become a conspirator ; and those who
had the temerity to build too certainly upon the indignant lan-
guage of the ambassador, experienced his mercy, but forfeited
his respect for ever. Vengeance on the part of the Estramaduran
junta, who conceived themselves betrayed by the junta of Seville,
and a wide-spread feeling of discontent, brought the conspiracy
against the supreme council to maturity ; and, when the fruit
was just about to be plucked and enjoyed, a person called at the
hotel of the British ambassador at Seville, and requested a pri-
vate interview with his excellency. Gaining admission, he had
the boldness to communicate the details of a plan, then prepared
for execution, which was to consist in seizing the persons
forming the supreme junta, then assembled at Seville, and in
appointing a regency instead of the existing government.
Lord VVellesley, understanding that the plot was to be executed
that very day, detained the informant, and proceeded instantly
to the office of M. de Garay, to whom he communicated the
information he had just received. From De Garay's office his
excellency went to the residences of those persons who had
been named to him as participators in the plot, some of whom
were men of the highest rank, and persuaded them to aban-
don a plan fraught with so injurious an example, and with such
perilous consequences. His lordship did not disclose the
names of the conspirators, so that the cruelty which would most

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 221

likely have been perpetrated, was thus obviated, and the
junta rendered more cautious as to future measures for the
government of their unhappy country. The gratitude of the
junta, and perhaps of the chief conspirators, was excessive.
M. de Garay expressed the sentiments of the former in language
highly creditable to his associates and himself, in a letter of the
third of October, addressed to Marquis Wellesley, in which he
observes, "Through the medium of your excellency, the govern-
ment has been informed of the desire of some persons to intro-
duce novelties, by the use of means which are not only repro-
bated by the laws, but which might bring down irreparable
injury on the good cause which both nations defend with so
much glory. And your excellency is so deeply convinced of
this truth, that when you had been informed of those pro-
jects, your communications to the government, and your in-
dividual exertions for frustrating them, have so largely con-
tributed to that end, that the government cannot consider them
with indifference, and omit giving to your excellency, in return
for them, their most express thanks." This grateful language was
accompanied by a desire to present to the marquis the " order of
the golden fleece," which he peremptorily declined, stating "that
he could not accept that high honour from an authority, whose
conduct towards the interests of Spain, and of the alliance, he
could not approve." The supreme junta had, on a previous
occasion, offered to confer a similar honour upon his Britainiic
majesty, George IIL, but their kindness was declined in that
instance also.

This narrow escape of the junta from captivity, perhaps from
death, produced a serious alarm amongst the members of
that body, who now sought to mitigate the hatred which their
misconduct had excited, i)y remitting the heavy imposts which
they had laid upon trading, and by the appointment of com-
missioners to prepare a scheme of temporary government, until
a proper-period for convoking the national cortes should arrive.
The commissioners, who were either members of the junta, or
attached to their party, suggested the formation of a supreme
executive council of five persons, eacfi member of the junta

II, 2 G

222 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

being allowed a scat in rotation ; but tbis scbcme for re-
covering or acquiring popularity was a mere subterfuge, and
did not include any more enlarged or liberal views than the
existing form. Its fallacy w^as detected by llomana, who was
the author of grave accusations against several individuals in
the old council, charging them with undertaking army-con-
tracts, with raising the prices of articles to be purchased by the
treasury, with venality, imperiousness, and difficulty of access.
He proposed, in preference, a council of regency, to consist of
five persons, who were not members of the junta, and recom-
mended the assembling of a new junta altogether ; his council
was to be called " The permanent Deputation of the Realm,"
and was a substitute for the cortes, which he expressed his
anxious desire to call together with as little delay as possible.
In the month of September, the Marquis Wellesley, in reply to
the application of M. de Garay, also recommended the adoption
of a council of regency, resembling in principle the scheme of
liomana, and of which Garay professed his approbation. Al-
though Lord Wellesley's plan was founded upon the basis of
respecting privilege, and involved the ulterior idea of pre-
serving the aristocratic system of Europe, still, as an innova-
tion in revolutionary times, and in the centre of an excited
and armed population, it awoke the caution of Wellington, who,
in his letter to his brother on the subject, thus writes : " I am
very uneasy respecting that part of your note to De Garay,
which recommends the assembling of the cortes, because I fear
they may be worse than anything we have had yet. I
acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular
assembl}'. Even our own ancient one would be quite un-
manageable, and, in these days, would ruin us, if the present
generation had not before its eyes the example of the French
revolution ; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its
guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which,
render safe, and successfully direct its proceedings. But how
will all this work in the cortes, in the state in which Spain
now is?" It has been the constant object of these memoirs to
demonstrate, from practical proofs, that the British hero, from

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON". 223

his earliest years, was possessed of certain qualifications, that
fitted him in an esj)eeial manner for command, and acquired
for him unbounded confidence with those who were subjected to
his control. One of the most valuable amongst many was,
consistence in the formation of opinions, upon grave considera-
tion, and the maintenance of those matured views through
hfe. It has been already shown, while he discharged the
duties of a civil employment in I re hind, that he favoured
universal toleration in matters of religion: the same princij)le
he advocated and acted upon in Spain, in permitting the Catholic
soldiers to attend mass, which was actuallv contrary to law ; and
it will be hereafter shown, that to the unalterable opinion of
this great man, and to this solely, the British Roman Catliolics
are indebted for that act of parliament by which they were finally
emancipated. A second amiable quality, to which the character
of Wellington is clearly entitled, has been frequently alluded to,
that is, his disapprobation of ca})ital punishment, in every case
where such was consistent with good government : he has sus-
pended sentence of death in numerous instances, when a merci-
less tribunal had too hastily decreed it; and, ascending in the
scale of appropriating pimishment to crime, has, on an infinite
numl)er of occasions, insisted upon a revision of sentence br
courts martial, in order to obtain, in the way most salutary to
the ends of justice, a mitigation of too harsh a penalty.

Had \\ ellington never undertaken the \\vi\\ office of prime
minister of England, the possession of those high (pialities which
he has been already shown to have possessed, would never have
been denied to him, and probably no party in the empire would
ever have whispered an ungrateful sentiment againt his fame :
but history proves that even in a private station, when the
agitation of war has subsided, the greatest heroes have not
been able to retain that ])opularity to which their eminent
military services entitled them. Marlborough affords a remark-
able instance in English history — the records of Greece, Home,
and Carthage are replete with others. In this view, tiierefore, to
which all previous illustration leads, Wellington possil)ly con-
sulted his own happiness by continuing a life of the most active
character: he, in fact, never led a private life, and has no

2-24 LIl'I"; AND CAMPAIGNS OF

private history ; his years, and days, and moments have been
devoted, in the most entire manner, to the service of his coun-
try; and his biography must therefore consist of an analysis of
the services of a great pubHc man, and which will unfold a sheet
of light, that extends over and illumines the annals of his
country for upwards of half a century. But, to return to his
letter to Lord Wellesley, expressive of disapprobation at the
assembling of the cortes; this remarkable composition estab-
lishes, in the most distinct manner, his love of order and subor-
dination in the councils of a state, his dislike of change in
such great assemblies, particularly when the country was
agitated by any peculiar political feelings; and the extreme
caution which he considered necessary in all cases of senatorial
reform. It was precisely twenty-three years after, that he
uttered the same unaltered sentiments in the House of Lords,
on which occasion he was accused of adopting new political
views from motives of partisanship ; with how little truth or
justice, this passage in his despatches incontestably proves. But
the investigation of his conduct as a statesman belongs to a
later period of Lord Wellington's life ; and this point is here
alluded to, as one of those links in a lengthened chain of
demonstration, whereby consistence in all his public views and
actions, shall be clearly established. In Wellinorton's deliberate
judgment, and calmly formed opinion; impressed too, and
naturally, with an early admiration of a mixed monarchical
form of government, partial from his inborn temperament to
order, discipline, justice, respect for well-regulated ancient
institutes and vested rights, while he yielded moderately, to
Lord Wellesley's desire to call together the cortes in such peril-
ous times, it was still necessary to qualify his assent by express-
ing a preference for a Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent,
to the wild regime of the cortes. " At all events," said his
lordship, " I wish you would advise the junta empowered to
invoke the cortes, that they should suggest rules for their
proceedings, and secure the freedom of their deliberations ;
as, in case of accidents, they may know that the rock upon
which such a vessel was likely to split, was not unforeseen."
Once more, during the short period of Lord Wellesley's

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 225

diplomatic services in Spain, Lord Wellington felt compelled
to communicate to him an instance of gross misconduct,
scandalous distrust, and the meanest jealousy. Having sent
several flags of truce to the French quarters, relative to the
wounded officers and soldiers, General Eguia was so ill-bred
as to open all Lord Wellington's letters, as well as the
answers of the French general, with the excejjtion of two
that were sealed, and examine their contents. Linwilling to
impede the negociation for an exchange of the wounded men,
by the least expression of his disgust at the vulgar inquisitive-
ness and contemptible suspicion of the Spaniards, he imme-
diately communicated the contents of the sealed letters to Eguia,
and desired that, in future, he would satisfy his curiosity by
breaking the seals of any communication that might pass, by flag
of truce, between the head-quarters of the French and English
armies. However, although the Spanish general expressed
himself perfectly satisfied with Lord Wellington's conduct, he
most unreasonably detained the messenger who brought
General Kellerman's letter, under the pretence of waiting for
Lord Wellington's reply, well knowing that none was required
or intended to be returned. The Marquis of Romana, who
respected national character, and had witnessed too much of
human misery not to understand the blessings of liberty, felt so
deeply for the honour of his country, and the treatment of the
wounded captives, that he immediately communicated to Lord
Welleslov the treacherous conduct of Eguia in detaining Kel-
lerman's messenger, IVL de Turenne. Apprehensive of exciting
any irritation against Eguia, placed as he was, or of creating dis-
gust for the Spanish character in England, by making this
heinous ofience the subject of a despatch, he prudently, and
considerately addressed a private letter to the ambassador,
entreating his kind ofliccs in obtaining the unuttending mes-
senger's release.

Now, as he prepared to visit Lisbon, Lord Wellington in-
creased the number of his messengers, multiplied still more
exceedingly his numerous des])atchcs, upon still more varied
but important subjects, nor did he sufler the smallest claim

226 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

upon his official duties, or private courtesy, to escape its
share of his attention. Having received the king's com-
mands to invest Lieut.-Gen. Sherbrooke with the order of the
Bath, he lost not a moment in acquainting that officer with the
honour his majesty had conferred upon him, and the pleasure
he himself should derive from presenting him with the order be-
fore he left head-quarters for Lisbon ; and he actually postponed
his departin-e some days, to contribute to the gratification of that
gallant soldier, who could not at an earlier moment visit head-
quarters. It was at this period that he learned the intended
departure of Mr. Villicrs, whose sound understanding, and
generosity of character, he had always ardently admired ; and
he thus briefly but feelingly alludes to the change that was about
to take place, in a letter to Marshal Beresford : " I regret the
departure of Villiers much. I^tly brother will do everything in his
power : but we shall miss Villiers often, and pdrticidarlif hi
our inome)its of difficulty. His affection for this meritorious
public servant was also shown in a despatch addressed to
Mr. Villier's himself at the same time, in which he speaks
emphatically of the loss Portugal must necessarily sustain
from his retirement at that critical juncture.

On the seventh of October, Lord Wellington quitted head-
quarters at Badajoz, and reached Lisbon on the tenth : as he
passed along the road, every object, animate and inanimate,
attracted his attention, and found a lasting recordance in his
tenacious memory: some carts belonging to a light dragoon
regiment, that were employed in drawing the luggage of one of
the officers, caught his rapid observation, and became one of
the first subjects of investigation on his arrival at Lisbon, A
more gratifying display to the eye and the mind of one who had
been "nurtured in the camp," presented itself on his entry
into the city — this was, the first dragoons, which he declared to
General Payne to be, perhaps, the finest regiment he had
ever seen. The regiment was strong, in high order, and
the horses in good condition. Many questions, both civil and
military, were again submitted to the decision of the British
commander-in-chief during his short stay at Lisbon, and in some

THE DUKK OF WKI.LIXGTON. 227

instances he interfered for tlie purposes of obliging the courts
martial, at that garrison, to revise improperly-worded sen-
tences which they liad inadvertently passed.

By desire of the regent of Portugal, the memorial of Don
Evaristo Perez de Castro, tlie Spanish envoy at Lisbon, on the
part of the Spanish government, desiring the co-operation of
the Portuguese corps, on the frontiers of Castile, with the
Spanish corps under Albuquerque, was referred to the decision
of Lord Wellington, through the medium of Don ]Miguel
Forjaz, to which his lordship replied as follows: — " From the
numbers and position of the enemy in Castile and Estramadura,
and from the superior discipline, composition, and efficiency of
the troops, comi)ared with those of Spain, I have long been of
opinion, that the operations of the war must necessarily be de-
fensive, on the part of the allies, and that Portugal, at least,
if not Spain, ought to endeavour to avail herself of the period
during which the enemy was likely to leave this country in
tranquillity, to organize, discipline, and equip her army. Those
objects, which are most essential, cannot be accomplished,
unless the troops are kept, for some time longer, in a state of
tranquillity; and I conceive they are much more important to
the cause, not only of Portugal, but of the allies, than success
in any desultory expedition against the French troops stationed
at Salamanca. But success against this corps would not be
certain, even if the Portuguese troops were to co-operate in
the expedition ; and, at all events, if the troops of the allies
should be successful, their success must be confined to the few
days which might ehipse before the French corps would be re-
inforced, when the allied trooi)s must retire, having failed in
their object, having incurred some loss of men, and, above
all, having lost time, which may, and ought to be, usefully
employed in equipping, and in the formation of the troops.
On those grounds, 1 do not recommend to the government of
the kingdom, to give the assistance recpiired on the present
occasion." This explanatory reply not being acceptable to
the Spanish junta, they resolved not to consider it as defini-
tive, and, a second time, directed their resident agent at Lisbon

228 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

to importune the provisional government of Portugal for the
positive and final opinion of Lord Wellington. His ultimatum
was accordingly delivered on the nineteenth of October, in terms
to the following effect ; — " that it was unadvisable to enter upon
any operation with the Portuguese troops at that precise time,
and difficult to state the exact period at which an alteration of
circumstances would take place. Besides this alteration of cir-
cumstances, as referable to the state of the Portuguese troops,
and the position of the enemy in Castile and Estramadura, it
was observable, that other objects should be accomplished, and
other arrangements made, before the Portuguese troops could
enter with propriety upon operations in Spain. It was, in the
first place, desirable that it should have an army with which
it could co-operate, on some defined plan of operation, which
all parties should have the means and will to carry into exe-
cution. Secondly, it was necessary that some means should
be pointed out and fixed, by which the Portuguese troops
should be subsisted in Spain, so that they might not starve, as
they did when they were in that country lately, or be obliged
to retire from want of food. When decided answers (added his
lordship) shall be given upon these points, I have no doubt I
shall be enabled to tell their excellencies, the governors of the
kingdom, that they have an army in a state to be sent into
Spain." This reply concluded the negociation for Portuguese
subsidies to Albuquerque's army, which was left, in conse-
quence, to pursue its wild and improvident measures with
Spanish resources and Spanish courage only.

It was upon the twentieth of October, 1809, and during
Lord Wellington's visit to Lisbon, (ostensibly for rest, recrea-
tion, the repairing of broken health, change of scene, and of
association,) that he first employed the powers of his capacious
mind, applied the whole force of his great military genius, to
baffle the projects of the enemj^, to secure, if not the con-
fines, the capital of Portugal, to prepare, in the possible
event of being overpowered by the number of his enemies, or
overtaken by misfortune, an effectual check to their advance,
should the British army be again compelled to retire to their

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 1229

protecting element, the sea. As retreat was the last subject
he contemplated, so was it the last for which preparation was
made ; not that it was a matter of indifference, or unimpor-
tant, for, an orderly retreat, under pressing circumstances, is a
greater test of military knowledge, than leading an attack
against the enemy. Retreat dispirits, dissatisfies, and there-
fore disorganizes : advance inspires courage, gratifies ambition,
and thereby restores discipline and combination. Looking
around with the eye of the eagle, and possessed of the heart
of the lion, Wellington, alone, unassisted by head or hand of
friend or ally, but drawing his counsels from the vast store-
house of his own great imagination, concluded that Portugal
was defensible, by securing the capital, excluding the enemy
by a chain of fortified posts, and exhausting their resources
by procrastination. Time would come to his assistance;
famine would lend her withering aid in thinning the ranks of
his opponents, and to these two wasting powers, in front of
his projected lines at Torres Vodras, he trusted, for arresting
the career of one hundred thousand ferocious men, for saving
Portugal, and for sealing his own military renown. Having
examined minutely the nature of the ground around IJsbon,
with which he had long before been sufficiently familiar, and
from that well-remembered acquaintance with its facilities,
and peculiar fitness for a place of defence, it was, that he con-
sidered it could be rendered impregnable by a skilful line of
works. These celebrated lines extended from Alliandra on
the Tagus, to Torres Vedras on the ocean. It was at first
intended to have occupied the jdain of Castanheira, but that
idea was abandoned, and the right of the lines, in conse-
(jucnce, thrown back to Alhandra. It is sufficient to notice
in this place, the period when the glorious idea of fortify-
ing the approaches to Lisbon, first flashed upon the mind of
Lord Wellington ; — to call attention to the calm, silent system
of mental operations in which it originated, Colonel Fletcher of
the engineers, whose assistance was indispensable, being the
sole depositary of the secret ; — and, to observe that, seeming to
forget the splendid display of military skill for which he had
II, '2 u

230 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

just laid the foundation, he prepared to leave Lisbon, and retire
to his quarters, without communicating his plans to his brother
officers, or to the government of the country. In his despatch
of this date, he is totally silent on the subject of Torres
Vedras ; and, in apologizing to the marquis Wellesley for not
having attended, with his usual promptness, to that nobleman's
despatches, he merely pleads in excuse, " that he had been pre-
vented by the business he had at Lisbon," but does not allude
to any unusual, new, or extraordinary cause of detention. The
details of the entire plan, to which it will hereafter be requisite to
revert, were communicated to Colonel Fletcher on the twentieth
of October; and the arrangements for embarkation, in the event
of defeat, transmitted to Vice- Admiral Berkeley six days after.
On the twenty-sixth of October, the day before his departure
from Lisbon, Lord Wellington addressed a letter to Colonel
Peacocke, relative to the folly and indiscretion of the young
officers of the British garrison at Lisbon, who displayed a cen-
surable thoughtlessness in their conduct in public: they inter-
rupted the representations at the theatre, by going behind the
scenes, and they walked about on the stage, during the perform-
ances. Although the complaint was urged earnestly by the ma-
nager of the theatre, and by a few officious town-councillors, the
stern warrior felt, that from many of the culprits boyhood's years
had not yet quite flitted ; that the annoyance complained of was
rather attributable to the giddy, heedless frolics of youth, than to
viciousness of intention, or ignorance of the best regulations of
society, and he remonstrated in consequence, more in the lan-
guage of an angry father, than of an uncompromising j udge, " I
cannot conceive," observed his lordship, "for what reason the
officers of the British army should conduct themselves at Lis-
bon in a manner which would not be permitted in their own
country, is contrary to rule and custom in this country, and
is permitted in none where there is any regulation or de-
cency of behaviour ;" then, rising from the language of remon-
strance into that of irresistible authority, he adds, " The su-
perior officers must take measures to prevent a repetition of
the conduct adverted to, and the consequent complaints which

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 231

I have received, or I must take measures which will effectually
prevent the character of the army, and of the British nation,
from suffering by the misconduct of a few." The latter part
of this communication was obviously more than sufficient, for
the offence never was committed again by the individuals com-
plained of. Having concluded his business on this occasion at
Lisbon, Lord Wellington set out from that city on the twenty-
seventh of October, and reached the head-quarters of the
British army, which were still at Badajoz, on the twenty-ninth.
At Estremoz he made a pause to rest his horses on the
twenty-eighth, and from that place addressed a private let-
ter to Lord Burghcrsh, mentioning, casually, that he had
been at Lisbon to settle some business there, but does not
introduce the least notice of the reconnoiscmce he made of the
country in front of that place, the chief object of the correspon-
dence being limited to an act of kindness, generosity, and
humanity. Aware that he addressed an intimate friend, he
unbosomed himself without reserve, and told him that "Fran-
ceschi was confined to the Alhambra, at Granada, by the Span-
iards ; that he wished his friend Burghersh would try to see him,
and tell him that he was endeavouring to prevail on the Spanish
government to consent to his exchange, but, hitherto, without
success. " Give him (said Wellington) whatever money he may
want, and let me know what you give him." Remaining for a
few days at the head- quarters, he left again on the first of
November, and reached Seville on the day following : from
that city he proceeded to Cadiz, " partly to arrange money-
matters with Lord Wellesley, and partly from curiosity to see
that place ; — "however, one good," observed his lordship, " re-
suited from my journey, viz. that the junta have given me an
answer respecting the exchange of Franceschi* and Turcnne, and
have released the officer they held in confinement at Deieyto^a,
go that there is now a hope of getting away some of the
British officers." Leaving his noble brother at Cadiz, (from
which place he embarked for England,) Lord Wellington re-
turned to I3adajoz on the evening of the thirteenth of Novera-

• Vide page 112, vol. II.

232 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ber, and, in an hour after his arrival, wrote to the Earl of Liver-
pool, who had succeeded Lord Castlereagh as secretary for war
and colonies, inclosing cartels of exchange, which contained the
names of French officers, then prisoners in England, whom he
wished to be sent back to the Peninsula.

Having continued the personal narrative of Lord Wellesley's
movements from the establishment of his head-quarters at
Badajoz to the departure of the Marquis Welleslcy from Cadiz
to join the new ministry in England, it will not interrupt, but
rather tend to distinguish and render clearer the simultaneous
operations of the Spanish army during that period, if we return
to the separation of Lord Wellington from that body, and com-
plete the details of the Spanish campaign up to the same date.
It was in the beginning of September that the British fixed their
head-quarters at Badajoz, and became, in consequence, exposed
to the calamitous infliction of the deadly autumn of Estrama-
dura. The junta at first expressed the most miserable appre-
hensions for the fate of Spain on the retirement of the British,
but, recovering their innate arrogance, and relapsing into
their usual weakness, they spoke of the retreat of the enemy,
of their repassing the Pyrenees, and escaping from chastisement
at their hands. It was the same inordinate vanity and extra-
vagant effrontery that prompted them to demand the co-opera-
tion of the Portuguese, which request Wellington peremptorily
denied. About the middle of September, Eguia, transferring
the command of ten thousand men under his orders in Estra-
madura, to the Duke of Albuquerque, advanced with the
remainder of his army towards Venegas' head-quarters: on
the thirty-first he reached La Serena, and immediately after,
uniting with the fugitives whom Venegas succeeded in rally-
ing in La Mancha, these generals found themselves at the
head of fifty thousand men, of which number ten thousand
were cavalry. Romana had retired from the service, and
resigning the command of thirteen thousand men, whom he
led from Gallicia to Ciudad Rodrigo, to the Duke del Parque,
he proceeded to Seville, placed himself under the protection of
the Marquis Wellesley, and contributed the benefit of his

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THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 233

prudent advice to the regeneration of the national government.
Trusting in numbers, Venegas ventured to make a forward
movement ; but the enemy had not been inattentive to the con-
centration of so large a force in La Mancha, and ^'ictor at the
head of thirty thousand men advancing against him, Venegas
thought it advisable to retreat into the Sierra Morena, upon
which the French retired into the valley of the Tagus.

The propositions of Lord Wellesley and the Marquis de la
Homana, coupled with the discovery of the plot to seize the
members of the central junta, obliged that body to assume those
virtues which they never possessed, and suddenly declaring
their admiration of liberal institutions, and their desire to extend
equal rights to all men, they attempted to lull popular appre-
hension by the promise of convening the cortes without delay.
During the months of September and October, fresh levies
continued to be raised in Andalusia and Estramadura, and
equipments were supplied from the English stores that were
accumulated at Seville and Cadiz. Towards the close of
October, the Spanish force, under Bassecourt, in Estramadura,
amounted to ten thousand men : nearly sixty thousand were
employed in covering Seville by the line of La Mancha, and
six thousand acted as a life-guard to the central junta. The
Spanish army of the left was concentrated in the neighbour-
hood of Ciudad Ilodrigo, Del Parque made a movement in
the district of the Sierra de Francia, and Santocildes advanc-
ing from Lugo with two thousand men, threw himself into
Astorga, and menaced the rear of Marchand's corps. A party
of French, detached from the head-quarters to surprise one of
the gates of Astorga, on the ninth of October, that, by acquiring
possession of that place, they might release the sixth corps from
a source of uneasiness, was beaten back to their cantonments
with severe loss. This partial gleam of success encouraged
Ballasteros to descend upon Astorga, cross the Esla, and
assault Zamora, but having completely failed, he turned away
towards Miranda, and, crossing the frontier into Portugal,
formed a junction with Del Parque.

The Duke del Parque, a brave, loyal, and active officer, and
possessing the highest admiration of the British character,

234 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

resolved to distinguish himself with the force which had lately
been placed under his conduct, and undertook offensive opera-
tions against the enemy in Old Castile : sanguine in his objects,
he applied to Lord Wellington, through the Spanish envoy at
Lisbon, for assistance; but his lordship refused any, for rea-
sons and upon grounds already noticed in the communications
that passed between him and his noble brother, the Marquis
Wellesley. In addition to these pleas for declining co-opera-
tion, there were others returned to the governor of Almeida, of
equal or perhaps greater value ; for instance, that " there was
nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing upon the Duque
del Parque's corps, aided perhaps by Beresford's, the whole of
the corps of Ney, Soult, and Kellerman :" so that, had Welling-
ton the inclination, he neither had means, nor could he come
up in time sufficient to prevent the destruction of the Spaniards:
co-operation of the British with Del Parque might lead to some
brilliant actions, but also to some defeats, to the loss of many
valuable soldiers and officers, after which the allies woidd be
again obliged to return to their defensive position which they
ought never to have quitted. Under these circumstances,
Lord Wellington had determined, although he should certainly
endeavour to prevent the enemy from getting possession of
Ciudad Rodrigo, not to assist the Duque del Parque in main-
taining the forward position which he had rashly taken up.
Disappointed, but not daunted, Del Parque moved towards
Ledesma to favour the junction of Balasteros, and on the
sixteenth and seventeenth his advanced guard was at Villa
Vieja in front of San Felices, at which place he collected his
corps on the eighteenth. On the same day the enemy advanced
from Salamanca, and reconnoitred his position, and being
desirous of destroying him before Ballasteros could come up,
immediately fell upon Del Parque's left, at Tamanes, The
duke was well posted, about midway up the front of a moun-
tain, with a force of one thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand
infantry. The former soon retired before the masses of the
enemy's horse, but so promptly and gallantly did Del Parque,
Mendizabel, and Carera bring down both the infantry and the
reserve, that the enemy were forced back, having one of their

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 235

eagles wrested from their grasp, and being obliged to leave
beliind one cannon and several hundred prisoners. Marchand's
alarm was much increased, by the expected arrival of Ballasteros
with a reinforcement ; and this apprehension induced him to
retire without further attempt to recover his cannon, his men,
or his military renown; so that, in a state of no little disorder,
he retreated to Salamanca. Del Parque did not think it prudent
to pursue his victory before the twenty-first, on which day he
was strengthened by Ballasteros' corps at San Felices, whither
he had retired after the affair of 1 "amanes : advancing thence
on Ledesma, he crossed the Tormes on the twenty-third, passed
Salamanca during the night, and attained the heights of San
Cristoval in the rear of that city, at day-break on the twenty -
fourth, confident of being able to cut off Marchand's retreat.
That general, however, had early information of the intentions
of his enemies, and, evacuating the place, he had actually reached
Tor and Zamora behind the Douro, when Del Parque was
entering Salamanca on the twenty-fifth. Intelligence of the
disaster at Taraanes reaching Madrid with the accustomed
velocity of misfortune's messengers, Desolles was immediately
directed to advance to the support of Ney's, or rather Mar-
chand's corps, by way of the Puerto Pico, antl Kcllcrman was
ordered to assume the chief command, and advance upon Sala-
manca from Valladolid. Del Parque hearing of the arrival of re-
inforcements to the French army in Old Castile, for the purpose
of marching on his position, again retired by Alba de Tormes
to Bejar, at the entrance of the Puerto de Banos, where he
fixed his head-quarters on the eighth of November.

It has been previously mentioned, that General Eguia, leav-
ing ten thousand of his corps with Albuquerque in Estramadura,
marched with the remainder into La Mancha, where he effected
a junction with \ enegas, and, taking the chief command, was
inunediately at the head of fifty thousand men. This forward
movement of Eguia, viewed in conjunction with the offensive ope-
rations of Del Parque, induced Marshal Soult to break up from
Placensia on the first of October and advance upon Oropesa, for
Soult felt convinced that all these movements of the Spaniards

236 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

were connected with simultaneous operations on the part of the
British : and a large corps of thirty thousand men, under Victor,
marched into La Mancha at the same time. Upon these
demonstrations the Spaniards retired into the Sierra Morena,
and the French, having understood their real objects, again
.withdrew to the Tagus.

The success of Del Parque at Tamanes was sufficient not only
to revive, but to intoxicate the presumptuous minds of the cen-
tral junta; deaf to the warnings, regardless of the entreaties
of Wellington to spare the blood of their countrymen, by con-
tinuing to act on the defensive, and patiently awaiting that pe-
riod when accurate discipline, just subordination, and sufficient
reinforcements should have so far strengthened their military
body, that they need not dread the recoil of any blow they
should strike, they seemed so giddy in their resolves, that folly
and infatuation were exceeded by their plans. It was now re-
solved upon marching the army of Carolina directly and boldly
upon Madrid, and instructions were prepared for the future
administration of that great city. Romana was too sensible
a man to be chosen to conduct the expedition ; Albuquerque
had not crouched sufficiently before this bloated monster, the
junta; and caprice suggested the removal of Eguia, who had
not offended any part of the provisional government, to make
room for a hot and hasty youth, Areizaga, whom Blake once
complimented for the possession of personal courage in the
battle of Alcanitz. This volatile young man, not the first victim
to presumption in the Spanish war, entered on the arduous
enterprise of recovering Madrid, and driving the French
over the I'yrenees, with as much confidence as his orders
had been delivered to him by his employers. On the third of
November, Areizaga set out upon his fatal folly from Carolina,
with about 50,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and sixty pieces
of artillery, but without one single ingredient necessary to
the character of a successful soldier, or a great man. His
camp resembled a public festival, vaunting and shouts of mirth
rang round the field-huts, but no recollection of misfortune
once crossed the general's placid brow, there was "not a

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 237

word about Charon." The march was conducted as it at first
began, in a stragghng, disorderly, unmihtary manner, and the
raw recruits that swelled the number of his army, committed
such depredations as they went, that the peasantry fled with
their few valuable effects, as if an enemy were approaching.
On the loth, Areizaga reached Dos Barrios, near to Ocana,
and advanced on the same night to attack a squadron of the
enemy's cavalry, drawn up in the plain between Dos Barrios
and the town. Totally ignorant of Sebastiani's force, Areizaga
charged briskly at first; but the French infantry, which had
been concealed behind the party of horse, opening an unex-
pected and close fire ii})on the Spaniards, confidence was
changed into cowardice, and having lost a number slain, two
hundred prisoners, and two pieces of cannon, they regained
their main bod}-, while Sebastiani, content with his conduct, fell
back upon Ocana. The French maintained their position
here until three o'clock in the morning, and when daylight
appeared, retired to Aranjuez, while Areizaga re-established his
head- quarters at Dos Barrios. The scene of the previous
day dispelled the vain illusion by which he mocked himself,
rent the hitherto impervious veil of folly that enwrapped
him, and broke down the unbecoming confidence with which
Areizat];a marched ayainst the most victorious army in the world.
He now began to reflect, as well as to look forward, and in
consequence to doubt and to tremble ; and he lost not a mo-
ment in communicating to the junta the result of his reflec-
tions, and in supplying them with a convincing demonstration
of their insurmountable folly and corruption in the selection of
such a commander for their army. He called on them to fulfil
the promise of support which they had given ; he endeavoured
to correct the fatal error they laboured under as to the bravery
and discipline of a French army, and its comparative value
with reference to the irregular troops of S[)ain ; he did not now
conceive that the reconquest of Madrid was easy, nor the suc-
cess of the campaign certain. It is true Areizaga first deceived
himself, for he must have felt, that had he possessed even
superior abilities, he was without experience in the art of war;
II. 2 I

238 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

this, however, does not justify the junta in having held out
false lights to their general, in having disregarded the honour
of men, and thrown the child of their adoption into the
arena of the amphitheatre, a prey to the trained but hungry
hons. The junta had urged Areizaga forward, assuring him of
the support of Albuquerque, Del Parque, and even of Welling-
ton, although the latter had never heard of the wild plan, the
execution of which they were committing to a heedless boy.
On the receipt of Areizaga's despatches Albuquerque advanced
from Bejar, in order to unite at Talavera with Del Parque's
corps, which had moved into the valley of the Tagus ; and
on the 14th, the Spanish head-quarters were moved to Santa
Cruz la Zarza, with a view to crossing the Tagus at Villa
Maurique, and advancing on the capital from the east. Plere
the Spaniards halted till the 18th, during which time, the
enemy were pouring in from all the surrounding pro-
vinces, and concentrating in such force in their neighbourhood,
as must have rendered the next blow they should strike
final.

As Lord Wellington had declined being a party to the rash
resolves of an unprincipled government, with characteristic
presumption they pretended to despise his advice; they ex-
pressed no desire to communicate any thing to him except their
imprudent orders ; but they were misled by that general's uni-
form respect for authority, into the belief that he would not dis-
obey, when ordered by the supreme junta to co-operate with
their army. Lord Wellington is one of the most remarkable
examples of loyalty, honour, obedience to his government, and
respect for order and discipline, that is to be found amongst the
biographies of the statesmen or heroes, who have adorned the
history of the world. It would not be difficult to prove that he
is amongst the very few men, in universal history, who attained
such an extraordinary elevation, without having ever been
guilty of one abuse of power, or having manifested the remotest
mclination to usurp authoritj-, or release himself from allegi-
ance to his sovereign and his country. It is in this respect that
he is superior to the greatest conquerors of ancient times, who

THI-: DUKE OF WELLINGTON. i^'3J>

enslaved their countries — and of Bubsequcnt ages, who debased
themselves bv degeneracy, when the blasts of war had eeased
to blow. Hut while he set the exam])le of that submission to
disciphne and good government which he exacted from his
followers, in the case of enemies, or allies, he hesitated not an
instant in taking all responsibility u])on himself; and while he
submitted the control of his conduct to the laws of his
country, no foreign power was capable of guiding, restricting,
or influencing the deliberate judgment of his mind, or of
misleading him into an acknowledgment of any claim upon his
services. It has been already noticed that Lord Wellington
disapproved of oifensive operations at this i)recise period,
and, in consequence, totally declined to co-operate, or per-
mit Beresford to unite with the Spanish army. This fact
was treacherously concealed from Areizaga and the other
Spanish generals, until their ruin, which the British general
foresaw, had been lamentably wrought.

It was only on the eighteenth of November, the day preceding
the close of these disastrous operations, that Lord Wellington
was officially informed of the march upon the capital ; yet, that
Areizaga was weak enough to hope for his assistance, is proved
by the application which he made to him on the iGth of Novem-
ber. To Colonel Roche's interrogatory on the subject his lord-
ship replied, " I do not know how Areizaga could think that I
was to co-operate with him: lean co-operate in nothing of which
I have no knowledge, or which is not concerted with me ; but
not only was this plan not concerted with me, (if there was any
plan at all), but the whole system on which it is founded and
proceeds, is known to be directly contrary to my opinion, and the
advice I have already given." The preceding letter shows
not only that Lord Wellington did not purpose taking any
subsequent share in the grand expedition for the recovery of
Madrid; but that he had uniturmlv opposed that wild pro-
ject, and that his advice was disregarded. Now when a
diversion was proposed in favour of Areizaga, there was no great
reason to suppose that the British general could be induced to
associate in the plan, for his written opinion upon this move-
ment— the junction of Albutpierque and Del I'arque — wa*.

240 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

" that when these officers should meet at Talavera, they would
be in precisely the sams situation in relation to the enemy
and to Areizaga, in which the combined armies under CuestA
and himself were in the beginning of August, in relation to
the enemy and to Venegas ; with this difference — that at that
time Venegas could have crossed the Tagus by the ford of
Fuentiduena, which Areizaga could not accomplish ; and the
Duke del Parque had not gained a victory, nor was he half
so strong as the allies were. Lord Wellington now took a
gloomy view of Spanish affairs ; he declared them to be in
a worse situation than he had ever before known them ; that it
was impossible for him to do anything for the relief of the
two generals in the valley of the Tagus, as he had no means of
crossing the river excepting at Arzobispo, and at that period
of the year the road to that place was not practicable for an
army; and if he were to move on Truxillo, the embarrass-
ment thus created from want of provisions, would destroy any
advantage of assistance his proximity might hold out.

While these insane projects of the junta were being executed,
or, more properly, exposed to failure and derision in the weak
hands of an inexperienced officer, information of the advance
of the Spaniards reached the intrusive king at Madrid ; and
no longer leaning on the wavering counsels of Jourdan, who
had been displaced, and his office of major-general conferred
upon Soult, Joseph consequently acted with apparent confi-
dence and decision, and, accompanying Soult and Victor,
marched against the enemy towards Ocana. Areizaga, who
had adapted his courage to an attack upon twenty thou-
sand infantry and five thousand horse, under the able guid-
ance of the Duke of Dalniatia, finding that the veteran had
lost nothing of his impetuosity by age, or familiarity with
similar scenes, and that he would most probably attack him
before he was prepared, drew up his army on the plain of
Ocana, on the morning of the 19th of November. The French
advanced in three columns, with one of which they took pos-
sesion of Ocana ; they next overthrew the Spanish cavalry on
the right of their position ; then broke the infantry of the right
wing, which was thrown into irremediable confusion, upon

TflK DL'KK OF WELLINGTON. 241

which the left wing of the Spaniards took flight without firing
a shot. Thus terminated the hoasted expedition planned by
the supreme junta, in direct opposition to the advice of Lord
Wellington. The French lost one thousand seven hundred
men, the Spaniards five thousand, fifty-five pieces of cannon,
all the stores and clothing, the military chest, three thousand
animals, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand
prisoners. At night-fall the unfortunate instrument of a
treacherous and foolish government reached Temblique, with a
remnant of his army ; and, as the enemy did not pursue beyond
Villarubia, he was permitted to reach La Carolina on the 24th.
One thousand Spanish dragoons under Benaz, who had been
ordered to cover the retreat of the fugitives from the field of
battle, and were placed at Madrilejos for that object, learning
the result of the battle of Ocana, dispersed voluntarily on the
'20th; and up to the 24th only five hundred cavalry of dif-
ferent regiments had assembled at Manzanares, and few of
the defeated army had arrived at La Carolina. The Spanish
force in this battle exceeded fifty thousand, that of the enemy
was only one half the number ; and the disgrace and ruin of the
former were completed after the discharge of only eighteen
hundred cannon-shot. Totally unequal to such a crisis,
Areizaga, at day-break, ascended one of the church towers of
Ocana, behind the centre of his line, where he remained during
the battle, neither giving orders, nor sending succours to his
retreating lines ; and only quitted his observatory when the
enemy approached so near as to endanger his liberty. Besides
the force engaged at Ocana, the Duke of Belluno had passed
the Tagus, and was moving on the right of the Spanish army,
and ten thousand French were posted at Talavera de la Reyna.
Having placed the different divisions of his victorious army in
positions pointed out by his general-in-chief, the intrusive king
returned on the 20th to Madrid.

In compliance with orders received from the supreme junta,
the Duke del Parque moved from Bejar on the 17th of
November, and marched to Alba de Tormes, his advance
posts being at Carpio and Fresno on the 2 1st. At the former

2i'2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

of these places he was attacked on the *23rd, by a large corps
of cavalry and infantry from A^alladolid ; and, although the
Spanish cavalry behaved in the most dastardly manner, the
enemy sutlered a repulse. After this affair the duke moved
forward liis head-quarters to Fresno, but returned again on
the 28th in consequence of orders to that effect from the junta.
The French had by this time, and while Del Par que was
acting with indescision, succeeded in strengthening the army
of Old Castile ; and on the 27th and 28th Kellerman was
enabled to bring the Spaniards to action at Alba de Tormes,
where they suffered grieviously. Continuing their retreat to-
wards the mountains and Ciudad llodrigo, when within two
leagues of Tamanes, on the 29th, the Spaniards observing
thirty French dragoons in the rear, became alarmed, and dis-
persed. No enemy was near, however, to take advantage of
the panic, and, when tlieir fears had subsided, nearly twenty
thousand of the fugitives re-assembled.

While the French were collecting their forces on the Upper
Tagus to oppose Areizaga, in the beginning of November,
Albuquerque had taken possession of the bi-idge of Arzobispo,
but events in Old Castile induced the junta to direct that he
should fall back with his corps upon the Guadiana, and
tliereby abandon the position of the Puerta de Mirabete, on
tlie Tagus, and the Mesa d'lbor, of so much importance
to the province of Estramadura and the south of Portugal,
that so long as it was held, the enemy could not cross the
Tagus to any efficient purpose, between the bridge of Toledo
and \"illa Velha, in Portugal.

The French had succeeded, since the month of April, in
destroying three Spanish armies: Blake's, Areizaga' s, and
Del Parque's ; but the presence of the English, and the severe
checks they had received from them at Oporto and Talavera,
so fettered their movements, tiiat they had been obliged to
evacuate Portugal, Gallicia, South Estramadura, and keep their
forces concentrated in the neighbourhood of Madrid. At the
close of the campaign of 1809, they had destroyed or dispersed
two armies, yet had not broken the energies of the Spaniards,

THE DUKI-: OF WKLLINGTOX. 243

nor extricated themselves from their persevering assaults.
Amongst their most vindictive and successful enemies were
to be numbered, at this period, the Guerillas,* a species of
irregular troops, who inflicted much injury on the French,
while their disconnected character, and active movements
secured them from an equivalent return. They consisted
chiefly of peasants, who, in the ardour of patriotic zeal and
religious fanaticism, having put to death such of the enemy
as fell into their hands on the first retreat of the French
forces, fled to the mountains, on their return, to avoid their re-
sentment, collected in small bands, chose leaders of a daring
courage and ready intelligence, and carried on a partisan war-
fare, without being paid, or dressed in any uniform. They ap-
peared at one time in small numbers, at others one thousand
were assembled together, frequently hanging on the outskirts
of a position, picking ofl" single soldiers, attacking small de-
tachments, foraging parties, and couriers, and intercepting
successfully French communications. "To lead these guerilla
bands, the priest girded up his black robe, and stuck a pistol
in his belt ; the student threw aside his books, and grasped
the sword ; the shepherd forsook his flock ; the husbandman his
home." They contributed to sustain the confidence of the
people in the final success of their arms, and to maintain a
spirit of determined resistance. They fought up to the very
capital, while it was occupied by the enemy ; and every advan-
tage gained by Spanish or English troops was proclaimed, in all
quarters, by these gallant men, with telegraphic rapidity.

The first person who organised a guerilla band, was Juan
Martin Diez, or John Martin, surnamed El Emperiiunlo, from
the darkness of his complexion. This distinguished partisan
officer was a native of the district of ^'alladossa, where he was
born in the year 1778, and the son of an humble peasant. He
had early advanced himself into notice as a lover of freedom,
and a man of intrepidity, by his conduct on the first invasion of
his country's rights by the French ; and, when Spain proclaimed
war against her enemies, he entered the regular army as a private

" Giifiilla is Q (liminiiti\o of gucrra, tlie .Spaiiisli tor trar.

244 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

(Irao-oon. He served in that capacity until the restoration of
peace, when he returned home, married, and resumed his agri-
cultural employments. From these peaceful occupations he was
attracted in the year one thousand eight hundred, by patriotism,
and a love of enterprise, and associating with him, in his plan
of operations, some five or six of his neighbours, on whose cou-
rage and activity he could rely, he commenced hostilities. His
first achievements consisted in killing the French couriers, by
which means he obtained arms, ammunition, and horses; and, as
he lost not a moment in communicating the intelligence of which
his victims had been the bearers, no inquiries were instituted
into the mode of his acquiring it The atrocities perpetrated
by the French at Madrid on the second of May, awoke a
spirit of resentment over the land, and Diez, increasing his
numbers, and extending his operations, destroyed couriers, took
convoys, and harassed every small detachment of the enemy
that he could come up with. In his early exploits, when
his squadron did not amount to a dozen desperados, he neither
gave nor expected quarter, but when he was followed by
forty-eight gallant, active, well-mounted men, he no longer
pursued that barbarous practice. In the month of September,
1809, while the British army, fatigued, sick, and without food,
were obliged to fall back to Badajoz to refresh and procure
supplies from the Portuguese, Diez rode into the district of
Guadalaxara, at the head of one hundred and seventy well-
mounted men, and completely terrified the enemy by his
activity and mode of warfare. This systematic course re-
commended him to the patronage of the commander-in-chief
of the second army, who, fully appreciating his undaunted
bravery, made him a brigadier-general of cavalry. Such
a mode of attacking and destroying the foe was contrary to
the rules of war. The woods and dense forest concealinor
the hand of the assassin, or the darkness of night being the
mask that hid him, goaded the French to madness, and urged
them to try every expedient that ingenuity prompted to sur-
prise and capture their persecutor. But he was fully competent
to cope with treble his own numbers, from the strength and

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 245

vigour of his men, and he was always too accurately informed
of the movements of the enemy, to be attacked unawares. On
one occasion, however, he was overpowered by numbers, and
would, in all probability, have been made prisoner, had he not
literally flung himself over a steep precipice, and eluded pursuit.
When Wellington had driven the French from Spain, and
entered Madrid, like the heroes of old, in joyous triumph, the
guerilla chief attended him, and, soon after, received the
conqueror's order to take the command of a corps of four
thousand eight hundred and fifty men, horse and foot, in the
neighbourhood of Tortosa. Here the glorious, as well as
gratifying, history of this brave man's career closes. Wellington
saved Spain from one species of invasion of rights, only to
leave it a prey to another, and perhaps the most cruel, that was
the admission of Ferdinand, who resumed his reign with the most
arbitrary acts, and by trampling upon every branch of the tree
of liberty that he had the strength or the courage to break off.
Empecinado professed an innate abhorrence of tyranny, and,
even in the drivelling monarch for whose restoration he had
fought, despotism was intolerable. Being proclaimed a traitor,
he laid down his arms, but on the faith of a treaty, resolving to
abandon an ungrateful country to the chains it had forged for
itself. But he had miscalculated much in supposing that Fer-
dinand could be induced to respect treaties, or that he placed
the least value upon plighted faith : he forgot the history of that
abject monarch's early years, when he relied upon the fulfilment
of any contract by him. The treaty was broken as soon as it was
made : the faithful, long, and able services which Diez had ren-
dered to his country, could not atone, in the tyrant's estimation,
for the crime of his devotion to liberty, and, on the nineteenth
of August, 1825, the brave guerilla chief was executed at
Rueda, with circumstances of cruelty disgraceful to the reign of
Ferdinand.

Diez was a man of excellent natural abilities, but quite un-
educated, not being able to write anything more than his own
signature : his manners were coarse, and his temper violent, but
he was partial to the society of educated persons, and always

II '2 K

246 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

gave willing attention to tlieir conversation and advice : with
a magnanimity that characterizes intrinsic worth, he never
hesitated to acknowledge his humhle origin, or the limited
sphere of his information.

There was another guerilla chieftain, with whose name, and
estimable private character, the English nation became more
familiar, than they had any opportunity of being with those of the
noble, but unfortunate, founder of the partisan peasant-army.
This was Don Franisco Espoz y Mina, a native of Navarre,
where he was born at the village of Idozin, two miles from
Pampeluna, in 1781. So much romance was interwoven with
the marvellous exploits of the guerillas, that it was usual to
represent them, like the maid of Orleans, like Rienzi, like
Masaniello, as issuing from the lowly cottage, actuated by an
impulse more than natural, and appointed by some special pro-
vidence to liberate their country, and avenge their brethren
slain ; and ]\Iina was described, amongst others, as born in the
lowliest ranks of rural society. This, however, was not the case,
his family being one of distinction in his native country, and
the ancestorial name associated with the early military history
of Spain. During the French war, his nephew, Don Xavier
Mina, then a student at the university of Saragossa, raised a
guerilla corps, with which he performed several spirited ex-
ploits. Xavier being taken prisoner in March, 1810, the com-
mand of the corps devolved upon Francisco, who soon rendered
his name the terror of the French. Brave, active, indefatigable,
full of resources, and possessed of admirable presence of mind,
he incessantly harassed and wore down the strength of the
enemy, not only in Navarre, but in the neighbouring provinces
of Alava and Arragon. Such was the rapidity of his movements,
that nothing could escape him. The loss sustained by the
French in this distressing kind of warfare was incalculable,
that of the guerilla-band trifling, owing to the accuracy of
their intelligence, which enabled them to separate on the
approach of the enemy, and reunite again in a few hours —
manoeuvres which were performed by signal. It was in vain
that the French poured twenty-five thousand soldiers into

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 247

Navarre, to eradicate the guerilla bands ; Mina resisted the
inundation, and, retaining possession of the province against
the best exertions of the enemy, obtained the sobriquet of
" King of Navarre." His services were acknowledged by the
regency in 1811, when he was raised to the rank of colonel:
in 1812 he was made a brigadier-general, and soon after a
general. In the year 1813 he commanded a force of eleven
thousand infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry,
with which he co-operated in the siege of Pampeluna, and
subsequently recovered Saragossa, Monzon, Tafalla, Jaca, and
other places, and at the moment when the peace was con-
cluded, he was in the act of besieging St. Jean Pied de Port
Hitherto he had fought in the cause of freedom only, but,
on proceeding to Madrid, and being made acquainted with
the basis of Ferdinand's government, he found that he would
henceforth be expected to prop up and defend the most un-
qualified despotism in Europe. This was so contrary to the
feeling, the honour, the true patriotism of the chief, that he
at once addressed himself to his brother officers, told them
of his efforts to obtain from their vicious king a free and
fair constitution, and invited them to combine and extort
from Ferdinand a charter of their rights, as the English barons
of old had done from their monarch at llunnymede. His re-
monstrances would, most probably, have liad the contemplated
effect, and freedom would have dawned on Spain, after a long
dark night of despotism, at the instance of a guerilla chieftain,
had not the influence of the priesthood rendered his labours
abortive.

Retiring from Madrid in disgust, he hastened to those fields
where he had so gallantly struggled for the liberties of his
fallen country, but found that the captain-general of Navarre
had disbanded the local corps; he next proceeded to Pam-
peluna, and having gained over the garrison of that city, was
about to proclaim the constitution there, when his plan was
frustrated by the pusillanimity of some of the officers. No
alternative remained for him but exile, and, retiring into

248 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

France, he sought a safe asylum in the vicinity of the royal
palaces at Paris. There the Spanish envoy, Count de Casa
Flores, discovered him, and persuaded a commissary of police
to arrest him on behalf of the Spanish tyrant. This act of
insolence and injustice was immediately resented by Louis,
who insisted upon the recall of the ignorant envoy, dismissed
the commissary of police, restored Mina to liberty, and con-
ferred upon him a pension of 6,000 francs. For this act of
generosity the Spaniard was not ungrateful, and, on the return
of Napoleon, lie declined holding any intercourse with the ex-
imperial party, joined Louis at Ghent, and returned with him
to Paris. Here he resided privately until the standard of free-
dom was unfurled in the streets of Cadiz, when, hastening back
to his own country, and the king being compelled to accept
the constitution, Mina consented to become captain-general
of Navarre, in the year 182L — The partisans of despotism,
again abetted by the priesthood, assembled in some force in
Catalonia, and, creating a formidable insurrection there, Mina
was ordered to march against them. The cause alone had
nerved his arm, and, attacking the traitors with his wonted
impetuosity, he routed them in several encounters, and drove
them over the Pyrenean frontiers into the French province of
Rousillon. For this success he was promoted to the rank of
lieutenant-general in 1823. His humanity, prudence, and
patriotism acquired for him the universal esteem of the honest
and wise, and he had succeeded in collecting around him a
considerable force to repel the invasion of the French ; but
perceiving that the resistance he could offer would not be
effectual, he generously absolved his comrades from their
allegiance to him, submitted to Marshal Moncey on the 17th
of October, and embarked for London, where he was received
with every token of respect and admiration. When the re-
volution of 1830 excited hopes that were never to be realized
amongst those that were exiled from continental Europe, Mina
again unsheathed his sword in freedom's cause ; but the Spanish
people were not even yet ripe for the reception of indepen-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 249

dence, nor qualified for the trust of self-government, so that
Mina's last efforts were least fortunate, and despotism resumed
her throne more firmly in the Peninsula. The student Xavier,
the nephew of Mina, was detained a prisoner in France until
1814. He was present at Pampeluna, when his uncle made an
unsuccessful attempt to proclaim the constitution, and fled with
him thence to France, from which country he embarked, in 1816,
and sailed for Mexico, to join the insurgents who had risen up
there to shake off the yoke of the mother country : soon after
his arrival, however, he fell into the hands of the Spanish
authorities, and was shot as a traitor, on the eleventh of Nov.
1817.

Mina and Diez were the most distinguished of the guerilla
chiefs,* and more closely associated in operation with the
allied armies than any others of their rude corps; but when the
regular army of Spain were routed, flying, and beaten by the
enemy, the galling fire of the guerillas disgusted the veteran
soldier with the service, taught him that the spirit of freedom
was not extinct in Spain, and that the cause he was engaged
in was cruel, wanton, and unjust. At this period of the war,
when the integrity of civilized England forbade her armies to
sustain themselves by pillage, imperial France entertained no
scruples as to the mode whereby her soldiers were supplied :
the usurper enforced requisitions of jewels and plate from the
churches, convents, and private mansions, for which the
guerilla bands always kept a close watch, and intercepted no
inconsiderable share of the spoils. On one occasion they
fell in with a convoy near Segovia, from which they wrested
no less a prize than eighty quintals of silver. So distressing
had the guerilla warfare become to the French, and so un-
equal to its suppression were all their efforts, that they now

• " The principal chieftains of these partidas were the two Minas and Reno-
vales, in Navurre and Arragon ; Porlier, called also the Marquisetto, and Longa,
in the Asturias and Biscay ; Juan Martin, or El Enipecinado, in New Castile :
Juan Paladea, or El Medico, in La Mancha ; the curate Merino, in Castile ; the
friar Sapia, of Soria; Juan Abril, of Segovia ; the doctor Rovera, in Catalonia ;
Julian Sandicz, near Salamanca; and others, whose names are well remembered
in those districts whore their bold achievements were accomiilished.

250 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

had recourse to the plan of raising up a species of counter-force
in the province of Navarre, which they named 3Iiguelets,* an
appellation always popular amongst the Spaniards. But this
ahuse of the term was rather displeasing to the people, and
the charm that belonged to it was dissolved when the bearer
passed into the service of the usurper. The scheme therefore
fell to the ground, evincing nothing beyond the incapacity and
perplexity of its projectors.

Nearer still to the British head-quarters, and more imme-
diately in the theatre of the campaign of 1809, Julian Sanchez,
the guerilla chieftain, lent the powerful assistance of his partisan-
ship. He raised a company of lancers in the vicinity of Ciudad
Rodrigo, and operated so effectually against Marchand's corps,
on the plains of Castile, that that officer warned the peasantry
against harbouring a guerilla, on pain of death if convicted.
The French general selected eight of the principal sheep-
owners in the district, informed them that a guard should be
placed in their houses, their persons closely watched, and, if
guerilla depredations did not totally subside in eight days
from that notice, the farmer himself should be held responsible.
He declared, also, that alcaldes, lawyers, priests, and surgeons
of every village, should answer with their lives, for the violence
committed in their districts by these predatory bands, and that
he would burn every house which the inhabitants had aban-
doned at the approach of the French. Sanchez answered
this proclamation, in language that became a brave man con-
tending, against a giant's arm, for the happiness, the homes,
the honour of his countrymen, and so incontestable were the

• These people dwelt in the Southern Pyrenees, in Catalonia, and in the
French departments of the Upper and Eastern Pyrenees, on the heights of the
chain of mountains which forms the boundary between Fance and Spain. They
are principally herdsmen, huntsmen, and coal-burners, are warlike, and disposed
to a predatory life. They escort travellers through the mountain-passes, and
for their protection they always expect, and often receive, very liberal compen-
sation. During the war they occasionally descended upon the French territory,
and plundered the peasantry of every thing : they were active partisans, also,
in the cause of Spain, and annoyed the French troops in Catalonia more suc-
cessfully than the regular army of Spain.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ^51

reasons urged in support of any, of every species of warfare by
which the usurper might be out-rooted, that Marchand's cause
was actually weakened in the estimation of the French them-
selves. Sanchez was deterred neither from his military actions,
nor the ground of his operations, by the impudent edict, and more
unwise proceedings of Marchand, but persevered obstinately
in that mode of attack which distressed the enemy to such a
painful extent; and, remaining in the neighbourhood of Ciudad
llodrigo, he co-operated with Sir Robert Wilson in that desul-
tory warfare, hanging on the enemy's rear, and harassing it
continually.

While the armies of Spain were victimized to the folly of
the supreme junta, while every courier that reached Seville was
the messenger of disaster to the Peninsula, while the eagle of
France flapped its wings over the ensanguined fields of sub-
ju"-ated Spain, the British rested in their cantonments at
Badajoz : there they were visited by the return of renovated
strength ; pale disease and death vanished from their huts : food
was supplied in abundance ; warm clothing arrived, which was
peculiarly appropriate at that season of the year ; and the
accustomed cheerfulness of the British soldier was once more
witnessed by their general at his head-quarters.

While the weather continued tempestuous and rainy, and the
hospitals were filled with sick. Lord Wellington was occupied
in his bureau, in communicating with Lord Liverpool upon
the prospects of Spain, the misconduct of its government, and
his own plans for the defence of Portugal, which country he felt
confident could be maintained against the best efforts of Napo-
leon. The junta also received the salutary counsels of the British
warrior, urging them to act on the defensive, to abstain from arro-
gance, and not to meddle with self-confidence, the jjrerogative of
the great, but the bane of the foolish. An undisciplined rabble,
affecting to act under an unpopular imbecile government, are
incapable of resisting the steady impulse of compact and disci-
plined columns; no definite proportion exists between the
respective efficacy of two such armies : they differ as the
process of machinery and manipulation : the one is condensed,
compact, unerring in its movements, not liable to disapj)oint-

252 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ment in its results, and its production is infinitely greater
in quantity ; the other is weakened by being spread over a
boundless space, is irregular and capricious in its internal
conduct, equivocal as to its results, and often attended with
the most unforeseen frustration of its object. The disci-
plined army resembles the volume of water confined within
the enclosure of the aqueduct, contributing without waste
to every purpose of utility and enjoyment; the unorganized
force is like the torrent that bursts from the mountains,
exhausting its strength by expansion, and creating ruin, when
by proper control it might have proved a blessing. The
physical force of Spain wanted the hand of the military
mechanist, the parts of the engine were supplied, but the
jealousy of the junta prohibited their arrangement by a com-
petent and skilful engineer, while they were themselves as un-
able to adapt them, as they would have been ignorant of
their use when put together. When the dark hopes that
hung over his prospects, like clouds in the skies, began to
clear away, when, by the foolish rejection of his advice, Spain
had lost her armies, when the misfortunes of the allies con-
firmed the wisdom of the British commander-in-chief, when
Portugal begun to place unbounded confidence in his genius
and fortune, when the inactivity of the enemy seemed to render
his presence no longer necessary, and to admit of his adopting
measures exclusively relating to the safety of his own army or
the relief of Portugal, Lord Wellington then, and not before,
prepared to break up from Badajoz.*

From this period, his correspondence with Lord Liverpool,
and with the British envoys, was directed to the single point
of the defence of Portugal, and he laboured anxiously to
prepare their minds for such an object. News arrived in the
Peninsula of the establishment of peace between Napoleon and

* " For the sake of health, and diversion of mind, Lord Wellington went out
daily with his fowling-piece upon the plains. He had one day of princely sport
in the royal park of Villa Vicosa, a hunting palace of the sovereigns of Portugal.
Upon this occasion, one wild boar, and twenty-five head of deer, were heaped
upon the sward, as the trophy of the day. He was always gay and good-
humoured with those around him, inspiring others with the confidence he
evidently felt himself." — Military Memoirs, c^c.

THE DUKE Ul" WELLINGTON. 253

Austria, which alarmed England and her allies; but Wellington
stated his deliberate opinion, " that if in consequence of the
peace the enemy's army should be largely reinforced in Spain, by
which the public mind in that country would be so influenced,
that persons now in hostility with France would then submit
to their usurpation, and enable troops that are now employed
only on the defensive, to be engaged in active operations ;
even in that case, he conceived, that until Spain should have
been conquered, and had submitted unconditionally to the
conqueror, the enemy would find it difficult, if 7iot impossible,
to obtain possession of Portugal, provided his Britannic majesty
continued to employ an army in the defence of the country, and
that the improvements in the Portuguese service continued to
be carried to the extent of which they were capable." To
carry out this great object, the value of which Lord Wellington
alone foresaw, the means of attaining which he alone projected,
and the responsibility for the result of which rested upon him-
self solely, he said he should require thirty thousand effective
men, in aid of the whole military force of Portugal, then consist-
ing of three thousand artillery, three thousand cavalrv, thirty-
six thousand infantry, three thousand ca(;adores and the militia.
The expense of maintaining the J5ritish army in Portugal,
which Great Britain herself must defray, would be £1,756,236
per annum, only £508,044 more than it would cost to keep
the same army employed in Great Britain or Ireland. Lord
Wellington felt that the Portuguese were the principals in the
contest, and expressed himself in sanguine terms as to their
resolution and honour, yet he totally despaired of their ability
to resist the enemy, and seeing clearly into futurity as regarded
the great military operations of Europe, recommended to the
British minister — if England withdrew her confidence in his
abilities and experience by ordering the evacuation of Portugal
on the advance of the French — that lie might be permitted to
carry away such of the Portuguese officers and troops as might
be desirous of emigrating, rather than sacrifice so many brave
and useful men, by allowing them to continue a hopeless con-
test for the protection of their country. The want of con-
II. *2 L

'J54 MFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

fidence in Wellington, which an able and popular opposition
party in England created, by insisting upon mixing up his con-
duct and measures with those of the ministers, suggested to
Lord Liverpool the expediency of proposing to his lord-
ship four distinct questions relative to the approaching cam-
paign. But the extraordinary prescience of that great soldier
iiad anticipated the wishes of those who placed implicit
reliance on his military genius, and the purport of the ques-
tions, viz. '^ the possibility of the British keeping possession of
Portugal, after an augmentation of the usurper's army," had
been previously communicated in Lord Wellington's official
despatch, which, however, had not then reached England.
But he again assured the secretary at war, that the enemy had
neither the means nor the intention of attacking Portugal, in
the month of November, 1 809 ; that if they did, they would be
successfully resisted ; and that whenever their reinforcements
should arrive, they would then also be similarly received.

About this period the Spanish junta renewed their attempts to
induce the British army to return, not by honourable, open, con-
duct and arrangement, but by artifice, contemptible stratagem,
and childish manoeuvring: they before pretended to despise the
counsels of Wellington, in order to convince him that the whole
Peninsula did not trust in that infallibility of judgment which
the British and Portuguese armies conceded to him: their next
scheme was to interrupt the sale of provisions to the British
commissaries attached to head-quarters at Badajoz, unless pur-
chased under the authority of an alcalde, or some Spanish officer,
from which it was to be inferred that they could supply the
British army, if Wellington would only solicit them to do so. But
his lordship had long before decided upon a line of conduct
from which such a body as a Spanish junta could not induce
or compel him to diverge, and he lost no time in undeceiving
the junta of Estremadura. "I have already," observed his lord-
ship, " had occasion to explain to you my sentiments on the
subject. Spain is either unable or unwilling to furnish supplies
of provisions and forage, on payment, for the armies that are
defending her: and I shall not risk his majesty's army in a

THi: UUKE Ol' WKLLINGTOX. 255

C(^uiitry so situated, I announce to you my intention, that on
the tirst failure of the necessary supphes, I shall remove my
troops into a country where I know they will be supplied.''
It should also be observed, that it was for the express object
of showing the slight importance they affected to attach to
Wellington's military opinion, that the junta ordered Albu-
querque to abandon his impregnable position near Arzobispo,
which Wellington had chosen, and to fallback into an exposed
and ill-chosen one at Llerena, behind the Guadiana.

That every doubt as to his veracity and determination might
be removed, he addressed a letter to Mr. B. Frere, who acted as
minister plenipotentiary, from the departure of the Marquis
Wellesley until the arrival of his successor, the Hon. Henry
Wellesley, (Lord Cowley), requesting him to assure the junta
that his resolution was unalterably fixed, and that it was his
undeviating maxim to say what he meant. At this moment,
the losses and sufferings of the Spanish were daily augmented :
Lord Wellington expressed sincere and poignant regret at
the total want of principle or ])lan in the Spanish operations,
and prophesied, distinctly, every result that followed. He
accompanied his warnings and advice with expressions of
the utmost concern at his inability to co-operate, or assist
them in their difTiculties, which were partly created by the
folly of their own government; and, with his usual foresight,
he observed, that the blame would be transferred to him
when the misfortunes which he saw approaching, like the tem-
pest-cloud in the horizon, should have burst upon the obsti-
nate, devoted Spanish army : then deliberately reconciling
himself to his hard lot, he remarked, " that he was too much
accustomed to receive blame for the actions of others, to feel
much concern on the subject, and should only endeavour not
to deserve any for his own." Such feelings he seldom ex-
pressed, and never with any real or even apparent irritation;
on the contrary, he excluded sedulously, from all his cor-
respondence, the least disrespectful expression of those with
whom he acted, and wrote uniformly in the bright language
of hope, or the confident tones of victory. This habit was

*2oG LIFE AND CAMPAIGN'S OF

instanced in a long and interesting letter addressed to an old
comrade in his Indian campaign, Colonel Malcolm, describing
the battle of Talavera, and the general prospects of the
Peninsula in consequence of that victory. " The battle,"
he observed, " was certainly the hardest fought of modern
days, and the most glorious in its results to our troops. Each
side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers. Tiie glory of
the action is the only benefit which we have derived from it;
but that is a solid and substantial good, the consequences of
which we have already experienced : for, strange to say, I have
continued, with the little British army, to keep everything in
check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards
had not contrived by their own folly, and against my entrea-
ties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about
a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through
the contest. As it is, however, 1 do not despair, 1 have in
hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate
myself; but I must not shrink from it. I command an unani-
mous army : I draw well with all the authorities of Spain and
Portugal, and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole
world. In such circumstances one may fail, but it would be
dishonourable to shrink from the task."

The time was at length arrived, when the long- threatened
retirement of the British army was to take place ; and, after a
vexatious intercourse with Spain, the visitation of a pestilen-
tial malady, but the acquirement of new laurels, Lord Welling-
ton broke up from his head-quarters at Badajoz, on the
fifteenth of December, 1 809, and after a march, with occasional
halts, of twenty-one days, the army reached the eastern frontiers
of Portugal, where three divisions of infantry, and a regiment
of cavalry, were put into cantonments at Guarda, Pinhel,
Celerico, and Viseu : General Hill's division of infantry was at
Abrantes, and the remainder of the British cavalry, between
Abrantes and Santarem, for convenience of forage and stabling.
Thus the whole allied army was formed into two principal
corps ; one for the defence of the province south of the Tagus,
which consisted of Hill's division of British infantrv, two

THE DUKE OF WELLINCn'ON. 257

brigades of Portuj^uese infantry, one bri<?ade of British and
two of Portuguese cavalry, besides artillery of both services :
the other, composed of three divisions of British and all the
Portuguese infantry, with the British cavalry and Portuguese
artillery. The Portuguese were cantoned to the rear of the
troops with which they were eventually destined to act. The
Lusitanian legion was at Castel Branco, and the militia in the
mountains between the Tagus and the Mondcgo. The ad-
vanced-guard, under General R. Craufurd, took up a position
in front of Almeida, sending patrols as far as Ciudad Kodrigo.
Hill's duty on the south side of the Tagus was to preserve a
communication with Badajoz, and to observe the movements
of the enemy on the side of Alentejo; and this precaution
was the more requisite, because Mortior and Regnior, with
'20,000 men, then threatened the south frontier from Meridii,
and any expectation of their being checked by Romana, who
was at Badajoz, or by the garrison of Klvas was futile ; so
that if the enemy desired to approach Lisbon by that route, the
Spanish army would have been no impediment to their plans.

While the bed of the Tagus was full of water, Hill's posi-
tion at Abrantes was secure ; he occasionally, however, occu-
pied ground at Portalegre, and advanced even to Campo
Major, whenever Romana suspected that the enemy meditated
an attack upon Badajoz. In this manner Hill and Mortier
displayed their experience as tacticians, advancing and reced-
ing like two champions in the areufi, provoking the combat,
but too cautious to strike until an unerring blow could be
planted. In their new quarters, where the air was pure, the
ground hilly and healthy, the army was soon restored to its
buoyancy and cheerfulness, the sick recovered rajjidly, and
strength returned to the already convalescent. Clothes and
provisions were furnished with tolerable regularity, and the
policy of the British general was now more clearly understood,
when the army was seen to progress towards that fine martial,
manly aj)pearance, which they exhibited on those great days
of triumj)h, when the eagles of France took flight before them.
The French army so far out-numbered the British, that ofien-

'2i'jH Lli'H AND CAMPAIGNS OF

sive war against so superior a force would have been the most
presuinj)tuous rashness. The Spanish regular army was almost
annihilated, so that Wellington's fubicui policy, that of giving
time for the refreshing of his own troops, and the re-organiza-
tion of his allies, was the wisest that could have occurred to
the most experienced otticer ; and although at first his inactivity
was borne with ill temper by the opposition party in England,
and by others, who might with more delicacy have suspended
the expression of their opinion npon military matters until a
more convenient season, it was ultimately the salvation of Por-
tugal, of the Peninsula, and of Europe itself.

Intelligence of the precipitate judgment of the common-
council of London now reached head-quarters at Coimbra,
and made a deeper impression on the hero's feelings, than so
ill-conceived and rash a step ought to have done; of this
unkind treatment he thus complained to Lord Liverpool :
"• I see that the common-council have called for an inquiry
into my conduct ; and I think it probable that the king's
answer to their address will be consistent with the approba-
tion he has already expressed of those acts which the gen-
tlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry : in which
case, they will not be pleased. I cannot expect mercy at
their hands, whether 1 succeed or fail; should I fciil, they will
not stop to inquire whether it was owing to my own incapa-
city, to the blameless errors to which we are all liable, to the
faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our means, to
the serious difficulties of our situation, or to the great power
and abilities of our enemy. In any of these cases, I shall
become their victim : but I am not to be alarmed by this
additional risk, and, whatever may be the consequence, I shall
continue to do my best in this country." While he did not
deny to the citizens of London the just exercise of their right
to petition for the removal of real, or even imaginary, grievances,
he felt that in this instance, the origin of the complaint was
corrupt : want of principle, factious motives, were mediately
or immediately connected with this stupid document; and to
show Lord Liverpool that he despised the abstract source

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. '^^^

from which it sprung, he requested " that his lordship would
not send out amongst the officers any that were purty men,
for that the spirit of party must he kept out of the army."
A despatch, dated from \'iseu, sixteenth of January, 1810,
to the honourahle MrA'iliiers, is amongst the most memorable
of Lord Wellington's military memoranda. Having entered
fully into the question of finance, in which he observes, " This
discussion about money, the distress we have felt ever since
my arrival here, must have convinced you that Great Britain
has undertaken a heavier engagement in Portugal than she
has the means of executing," he proceeds — " In its present
state, I own, my arm} is not sufficient for the defence of Por-
tugal: but the troops are recovering their health, reinforce-
ments are expected from England, and, if I can bring thirty
thousand eifective British troops into the field, I will fight a
good battle for the possession of Portugal, and see whether
that country cannot be saved from the general wreck."

Although cirumstances had materially altered since Lord
Wellington applied to the secretary of war for reinforcements
on the fourteenth of November, and those alterations origin-
ated in the total loss of the Spanish armies, still he considered
that they had not fallen so far, that he could not yet defend
Portugal, and restore the future fortunes of the Peninsula, by
the addition of the same number of men for which he had
before ap])lied. " I conceive," said his lordfchip to Mr. \"\\-
liers, " that the honour and interests of the country re(juire
that we should hold our ground here as long as possible ;
and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can ; and
I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders, or
those of the ministers, the responsibility for the failure, by
calling for means which I know they cannot give ; and which,
perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining
our object: nor will I give to the ministers, who are not
strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situations,
an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position, which,
in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country require
they should maintain as long as possible. I think, that if the
Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it ;

200 LIFE AND CAiMPAIGNS OF

if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save
the country : and if from that cause I fail to save it, and am
obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army."
From the cantonments at Viseu, Lord Wellington was occa-
sionally absent, employed in making a reconnoissance towards
Torres Vedras, and actively engaged with Colonel Fletcher,
of the royal engineers, to whom he committed the execution
of his celebrated design for the defence of Lisbon. In these
exertions he was encouraged by the most flattering marks of
distinction from the Portuguese government, who, by a royal
decree, proclaimed on the twenty- third of November, 1809,
and dated from Rio Janeiro, in the month of July of the same
year, appointed Lord Wellington marshal-general of the Portu-
guese army, invited him to a seat in their chief assembly, and
to a participation in all their measures, both military and
financial. That affected distrust, which disgraced the Spanish
authorities, and led to the disparagement of the British gene-
ral, had been forgiven, their misfortunes pleaded strongly for
such an indulgence, and the authority of Wellington again
rose supreme in both countries ; it was in England only, and
chiefly within the walls of parliament, that the language of
detraction and ingratitude were applied to him.

The year 1809 closed in gloom and misfortune upon the
exertions of the undisciplined ranks of Spain, and upon the im-
becile counsels of their rulers, while the labours of Napoleon
were crowned with victory in the central kingdoms of Europe,
which now bowed down beneath the yoke of France. Less
occupied with the active duties of the general, he bestowed
increased attention on his imperial cares; and, amongst the
first occasions of his displeasure was the inactivity of Joseph,
who had permitted Wellington to refresh his exhausted troops,
to recover the confidence of England, of which the opposition
party in parliament indiscreetly attempted to deprive him ; to
strengthen, clothe, arm, and discipline the Portuguese army ; to
obtain reinforcements from England ; and to take up that im-
pregnable defensive position in which he ultimately established
his military renown. Vacillating in every project, Joseph
directed the fourth corps to advance upon Valencia, but almost

THE Dr'K'r; of wklmnt-tox. 2G1

immediately recalled it, on learning tliat an insurrection had
occurred in Navarre, headed by Mina and Rcnovalles ; but
this faint light being soon extinguished by the clouds of troops
that descended on the disturbed province under Suchet, and
being made certain that the British army were cantoned quietly,
and at rest, in the valley of the Mondego, Joseph resolved
upon a serious invasion of Andalusia. Perhaps it was not the
weakest inducement, amongst others, to the invasion of this
province, that it held out "more immediate prospect of pecu-
niary relief," of which the intrusive government then stood in
absolute need. Joseph's troops has not received any pay for
twelve months; his attendants and functionaries were all un-
salaried ; and under such circumstances, the invasion of Por-
tugal promised nought but glory; that of Andalusia, some-
thing of payment. Unequal in conduct as in courage, the
energy which did honour to the Spanish name after the dark
day of Medellin, slumbered too long after the rout at Ocana ;
all high-raised hope had ebbed away, and despair svas diffused
through the whole Andalusian population: the junta did not
now venture to call upon that spirit which pervaded the peo-
ple of Catalonia and Arragon, w hich gave an immortality to the
histories of Saragossa and Gerona, and which shed a redeeming
lustre on the meritorious exertions of the Peninsular armies.
Mean subterfuge for awhile sustained their tottering power :
they caused their gazettes to teem with exaggerated accounts
of the successes that uniformly attended guerilla warfare ; the
triumph of 'I'amanes was magnified into a signal destruction
of the French, even after tlie successfid army had in turn been
routed at Alba de Tormes. The promise of a speedy con-
vocation of the cortes was attended by a short-lived calm ; dur-
ing which, addresses were presented from their own creatures,
congratulating them upon the returning vigour of the national
councils, and the wisdoTn of those measures by which sucii a
happy renovation had been effected. A pompous proclamation
replied to the congratulations of their adherents, calculated to
inspire confidence ; but its artifice was unequal to encounter
the vigilance, suspicion, and knowledge of the junta's enemies,
n. 2 M

2G2 i.iri: and ca.mpaigns of

or to obtain credence in the assurances that Areizajra would
check tiie advance of the enemy beyond the Sierra Morena;
that Del Parque and Albuquerque would fall on their flank, and
that the glory of Baylen would be surpassed. This mendacious
manifesto was given to the people at the moment when the
members of the junta were actually transferring their valuables
to Cadiz, and passing a resolution "that the Isle of l.eon was
the most convenient place for holding their future meetings,"
and passing a formal decree that the junta should assemble
there on the first of February, 1810, for the despatch of busi-
ness. Until that period sliould arrive, there was danger to be
apprehended, not only from the enemy, but from their abused
and discontented countrymen, who now saw, with disgust,
cowardice added to presumption and incapacit3^ To meet
the dreadful consequences, a show of preparation to resist, or
to receive the enemy, was made, by ordering a levy of one
hundred thousand men, and decreeing a loanof half the actual
property of the Andalusiaus. Humbled to the lowest state of
degradation, they now solicited the patronage, the friendship
of Roniana, who had so recently exposed their duplicity,
proclaimed their imbecility, and bearded them in their council-
hall ; but this able soldier peremptorily refused to accept
a trust, fraught with danger only, from masters who, it was
not improbable, were wicked enough to hope for his utter
ruin, even at the sacrifice of a whole army. They next re-
called Blake, the best general in the Spanish service, from
Catalonia, because fortune for a while had ceased to smile
upon him, and transferred his command to O'Donnell, who
was beloved by the army. About the same period it was that
the Conde de Noronha being displaced from the command in
Gallicia, laid open the intrigues of the junta, exposed their
neglect of the army, and advised the formation of a local
government, accessible to every man, and with better feeling
for their wants.

Before their departure to the new seat of government, the
junta thought proper to consummate their career of baseness
by imprisoning Montijo and Francisco Palafox : and they dis-

TIIL DVKli. OF WELLINGTON. '203

played some tact in removing the ablest statesman of their
body, Padre Gil, by sending him on a mission to Sicily. Some
tliere are who persist in attributing the conduct of the junta
to treasonable motives, and ascribing the non-completion of
such a project to the want of a favourable occasion for the
execution of their plans : but the causes already so frequently
assigned seem sufficient to explain the effects, and in the
desperate state of the atfairs of Spain, and when the power
of the enemy seemed irresistible, but one individual was found
in the junta base enough to meditate the desertion of his
country ; this was the infamous Conde de Tilly. It was not
this wretched man's design to sell his country, he only pro-
jected a scheme of [blunder, with which he meant to escape to
Cadiz, there take shipping with his associates, and, forcing his
way through the British scjuadron that lay off the harbour, sail
for Mexico, and abandon his country for ever. Having com-
municated his project to an officer of Castanos' corps, it was
immediately made known to the general, then at Algeziras,
who caused the adventurer to be arrested, and thrown into a
dungeon in one of the castles at Cadiz, where he soon after
closed his disgraceful career in an unlamented deatli.

In ad'Jition to the levy that was ordered, the tax that was
imposed, the confiscation of funds that had been appropriated
to pious uses, and the sale of all vacant encumioidns, the junta
ordered one thousand poniards to be distributed, giving the
sanction of a national government to the crime and the call-
ing of an assassin. A system of deception was followed to the
last : the people were told to confide in Areizaga's strength,
his army being organized and reinforced, and strongly posted
in the Morena: and the junta pointed, dishonestly, to the army
under Albucjuerque as a powerful auxiliary, although his force
was divided, one part being at Don Beneto, a second divi.^ion
at Truxillo, and a third on the Tagus, and the general rendered
totally incapable of affording any assistance to the main army,
from the confused and contradictory orders which were hourly
transmitted to him by the affrighted junta.

Andalusia is protected from the hostile irrupticm of neigh-

•2C)4 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

bouring states by natural barriers; mountains hang over it
on three sides, and the Mediterranean forms its southern
boundary : the French could approach it from the north only,
and then, necessarily, through the defiles in the Sierra Morena,
where a few resolute men might impede the march of thou-
sands. Many mountain- roads facilitate the approach of
travellers to the towns of Andalusia through the Sierra
Morena, of these but three are practicable for carriages ; and,
by one of them, that which passes by Santa Cruz de Mudela*
La Carolina, and Baylen, to Andujar, and called the Despenas
Perros, was not only the strongest position, but also the royal
road from Madrid to Cadiz. All the attention of the Anda-
lusians, and all their military skill, were demanded and put
forth on the occasion ; and, strengthening the defiles of Puerto
del Rey and Despenas Perros by a variety of useless field-
works, Areizaga, dispirited, conscious of his inability, and
without any confidence in the uncontrollable rabble that fol-
lowed him, was ordered to place himself there, while Echeveria
with eight thousand men took up a position a little in his rear.
There have been instances in history of a great army being
checked in its progress by the intrepidity of a few, posted in
an impregnable position, but the defenders in these cases are
found to have been the best disciplined, most gallant and
devoted men, that their country then could boast of. Such
passes as the Despenas Perros, Puerto Banos, and the bridge
of Arzobispo, are tlie keys of valuable acquisitions, and should
never be entrusted to nerveless hands or timid hearts : strength
of position is often deceitful, for numbers, as occurred at
Somosierra, will at length prevail against the most valiant
resistance, by turning the flanks, or continuing the sanguinary
contest until the defenders are brought into a position of
equality. During the first days of the opening year, the
French forces continued to assemble at the foot of the Sierra
Morena, until they numbered sixty thousand fighting men :
the intrusive king was the nominal, but Soult the virtual com-
mander of the expedition, and on the eighteenth of January
Joseph appeared at head-quarters, at Santo Cruz de Mudela ;

THE DUKE OF WELLIxNGTON. 265

Mortier established himself close to the very entrance of the
Despenas Perros, — Sebastiani occupied V^illa Nueva de los
Infantes, with a view to moving upon Jaen ; and Victor was at
Almaden, watching Albucjuerque. Thus Albuquerque's retreat
from Estramadura, and Areizaga's line of defence, were at
once menaced. The twentieth of January was fixed on for a
simultaneous advance along the whole line, and, putting them-
selves in motion, Sebastiani carried the entrenchments one
after another, with some opposition. Desolles made himself
master of the Puerto del Key at a single charge ; and without
firing a shot, the Spanish troops retreated with precipitation
on Navas de Tolosa, where their ancestors triumphed over the
Aloors some six hundred years before : thus concluded the
defence of the Morena, thus vanished the boasted preparations
foiv its protection : such was the demonstration Areizaga
afforded of his ability for command, and such the confirmation
of Romana's prudence in declining to become his successor.

The road being thrown open, Mortier poured through the
narrow pass with his cannon, his cavalry, and the main body
of the army, and reached La Carolina in the evening, where
he was joined by Desolles, who had advanced by the Puerto del
Key. As the army moved along, the following day, to take
possession of Andujar, they passed over the field of Baylen,
where Dupont's coips had disgracefully laid down their arms,
and surrendered to the Spaniards, a stain at length gallantly
obliterated by the triumphant invaders of Andalusia, who fixed
their head- quarters at Andujar, one of the largest cities of
this ancient kingdom, on the second day of the invasion. The
successes of Sebastiani were followed up, after his seizing
La Venta Nueva and Venta Quemada, by his driving the
enemy from a new position which they had taken on the Gua-
dalen, moving on Ubeda, and descending into the vale of the
Guadalquiver. When Albuciucrquc understood his danger he
became alarmed, on account of the presence of the French
patroles at Ilinojosa and Benalcazar, so near to his communi-
cation with Seville, which effectually checked his advance.
The time had therefore arrived for \'ictor to push forward, and,

'J()() LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

following a mountain road by Adamuz, he reached Montoro,
preserving also a communication with Mortier and Sebastiani.
Delay, the maxim of the undecided and the timid soldier, was
one of Joseph's besetting sins, and, contrary to the pressing
solicitations of Soult, he insisted upon despatching Sebastiani
with a strong force, to disperse effectually the powerless rabble
that claimed Areizaga for their general, and, from apprehension
of that force rallying and falling on his rear, he peremptorily
refused to advance from Andujar, until he was assured that
the ruin of the Spaniards was accomplished. It was true that
Areizaga had rallied his men at Jaen, and again presented
a front to the enemy ; but in vain — Sebastiani drove him back
upon Alcala Real, and took Jaen while forty-six pieces of
ordnance stood loaded on the walls. Once more Areizaga led
his timid columns to the attack, calling upon them to remember
the glorious ages of their history, when on that very spot the
eleventh Alonzo, of their ancient kingdom, chastised the
haughty foe : deaf to the arts of persuasion, and broken-
spirited by successive visitations of misfortune, their last resist-
ance was less manly than their first, for upwards of five thou-
sand men threw away their arms upon the first charge of the
enemy, and pursued a rapid flight until they reached Gibraltar.
Their unhappy general, with a mere escort of cavalry, made
his escape into Murcia, and there consigned to the more able
hands of Blake, an office, to the duties of which he had proved
himself so unequal. Perceiving that no impediment was likely
to arise in his march, Sabastiani advanced to Grenada, which he
reached on the twenty-eighth of January ; and, whether it arose
from a vindictive feeling towards the superseded government,
or a sincere disgust for future domestic legislation, or possibly a
desire to conciliate the conquerors, his army was received with
demonstrations of joy by the citizens. Soult halted until he
was satisfied that king Joseph's fears were removed by the
dispersion of Arcizaga's army, and then advanced to Cordova,
which he entered on the twenty-seventh, while detachments from
Victor's corps were pushed on with a view to the occupation,
of Seville. The invasion of Andalusia had fully succeeded ;

I
I'lIM DUKE OF WKLIJNUTOX. '2f>7

in a few days the Spanish boasts and Spanisli forces were dis-
sipated, parties of the enemy's horse scoured the phiins, while
detachments of infantry held the mountain-passes; and the
capitals of two ancient kingdoms were, without resistance, and
after a few days' march from the mountain-barrier of Andalusia,
in the possession of an usurper.

The junta were now astounded by the intelligence that the
pass of Almadan had been forced ; and communicating this fact
to those whom they had so long deceived as to their real situa-
tion, the result may readily be conceived. The humbler classes
rose e)i masse, called aloud for arms, demanded that the town
should be put in a state of defence, and the government deposed
for prevarication and abandonment of duty. Assembling in
the square of St. Francisco, in front of the Alcazar, patroles
were formed, and sent into different quarters of the city : as the
grandees and others of rank had secretly escaped to Cadiz, the
mob forbade all persons henceforth to leave their homes ;
numbers flocked in from the country, to assist in the defence of
the capital, so that upwards of one hundred thousand men were
assembled within the walls, ready to be led to any enterprise,
and wanting only a leader. It was, however, resolved that the
central junta, as a political body, must die ; and the junta of
Seville were therefoie called on to assume the reins of go-
vernment : Montijo and Palifox were set free, and Francisco
Saavedra was solicited to undertake the temporary direction of
public aflfairs. This venerable man, it was supposed, had well
nigh fallen a victim to the atrocity of Godoy, who caused poison
to be administered to him, mixed up with his food, and from the
effects of which he had with difficulty been recovered : but
whether, like another Brutus, he concealed bright faculties
l)cneath the disguise of mental infirmity, that his life might be
spared for the salvation of his country, or whether unl)ounded
respect for the person and character of the man produced the
effect, his elevation to the chief place was instantly followed by
the cessation of anarcliy in the city. The provincial junta being
assembled, a proclamation was issued, inviting all to sujiport a
sincere government, and exhorting all to be trancjuil under their

'268 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

difficulties, as the only mode of a successful extrication. Montijo,
so lately restored to liberty, employed its first moments in col-
lecting the troops that were scattered over the province, and that
faithful public servant, Romana, was restored to the command
of the army from which the junta had removed him, and wheh
they transferred to Del Parque. These popular measures were
calculated to inspire the fullest confidence, and did succeed so
far as to calm the agitation of the people, who all looked to
Romana for the preservation of the city : too good a soldier to
excite hopes that could not possibly be reahzed, that nobleman
escaped from Seville, and made for Badajoz, to resume the
command, and secure the fortress in that city, having extri-
cated himself, not without some danger, from the hands of the
populace, who had stopped his horses at the gates of Seville, to
prevent his leaving the city. Hope took wing as Romana passed
through the portal of Seville ; despair sat on every countenance,
despondence prevailed in every heart : the promises and vaunts
that the Sevillan should rank in military fame with the heroes
of Saragossa and Gerona, were given to the wind. The quays
were at one moment occupied by the equipages of the members
of the junta, and of the public officers, with the necessary docu-
ments and moveables which the government required at Cadiz ;
in the next, all was silent as the tomb : the waters of the
Guadalquivir bore away the cowardly rulers of Andalusia on
their smooth-flowing surface, and it only remained for the be-
trayed to surrender to an enemy, who perhaps would be found
less cruel than on other occasions, since vengeance for obstinate
resistance had not in this instance sharpened their sabres.
This consideration strengthened the hopes of the traitors
within the walls, who now became so numerous, that Saavedra,
and five individuals of the provisionary government, who
remained faithful to Spain, were obliged to separate themselves
from their worthless associates, and, taking the road to Cadiz,
abandoned Seville to its approaching fate. Although there
were seven thousand armed men in the city, and the populace
were eager to defend their liberties, still was there no concert
amongst the higher classes, no master-mind could be found to

THE DUKE OF \VELI,IXGTOX. 2GP

which they could look for encouragement and direction, no
man of influence remained, in whom they could confide, on
whom their affections could rest, or who was equal to the
exigencies of the period. Treason for this time was rewarded
by blind fortune, and the partisans of the usurper admitted
his army within the gates of Seville on the twenty-first of
January, in a manner that precisely resembled the disgraceful
surrender of Madrid. Although it had been frequently urged
upon the attention of the junta, that all military stores in Seville
should be rendered useless on the approach of the enemy in
force, the precaution was neglected, and the spacious cannon-
foundery, with the most extensive arsenal in the kingdom, con-
taining three hundred pieces of brass ordnance, fell an easy
prey to the enemy. On the first of February the degradation
of this ancient city was consummated, and on the second king
Joseph entered it in triumph.

The love of liberty still survived amongst the rural popu-
lation, and was less exposed, at all times, to the insidious arts
of corruption and intrigue, and near to the little town of
Alhama, the intruder met a severe check from the armed bands
of patriots : without any defences better than the old ruined
Moorish walls that encircled their humble homes, they could not
of course afford a lengthened resistance to an army equipped for
every case that occurs in a varied campaign ; so that Sebastiani
stormed, and ultimately took the place. His advance, how-
ever, was still threatened ; but as be had been ordered to
establish himself on the coast of Granada, with the ulterior
object of communicating with Valencia, where Joseph counted
upon the co-operation of secret agents, he was under the
necessity of encountering every opposition. The citizens of
Malaga formed the laudable design of marching against the
invading army, and engaging them in the open field, rather
than await their assault in the midst of their houses and fami-
lies ; and first having deposed and imprisoned their local junta,
then selecting a bold Capuchin friar for their leader, they ad-
vanced to Antequcra. Here everything that undisciplined valoiu-
could do, was attempted ; but the steady resistance of Milhaud,

11. 2 N

270 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Avith the advanced guard of Sebastiani, broke down their ranks
and their spirits, and, flying towards Malaga, they were pur-
sued so closely, that the French and Spaniards entered
Malaga, ptle-mde^ on the fifth of February. In this affair,
highly honourable to the humbler part of the inhabitants, how-
ever equivocal the conduct of their superiors, five hundred
patriots were slain ; and the enemy found in Malaga, one
hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, besides valuable stores ;
and several cellars, filled with the celebrated wine of the dis-
trict, were yielded to the military purveyors of the usurper.

In one fortnight the French overran all Andalusia, the Isle
of Leon and Cadiz excepted ; and it formed part of Soult's plan
of operations to push forward, and obtain possession of that
important place ; and there is no doubt, that if a single
event, one bold, masterly, decisive blow, could have materially
influenced, at that moment, the fate of the Peninsula, that
event was the occupation of Cadiz by the French army. This
is not the first instance in which an apathy and indolence
have been observed in Soult's military character ; for to him
belongs the whole responsibility of the invasion of Andalusia,
as he was not only the chief in command, but the adviser of
king Joseph in all matters both of war and polity. Cadiz
should have been, and there is no reason to imagine it was not,
the main object of the expedition ; and to its possession,
therefore, all minor considerations and conquests should have
been secondary. It will be remembered that Albuquerque
had garrisoned Badajoz, contrary to the express commands
of the central junta, and placed Romana in that fortress, by
which the plans of the enemy, and the operations of the fifth
eorps, against Flstramadura, were completely frustrated. On
the twenty-fourth, the cavalry of Albuquerque were at Ecija,
while Victor's corps had also advanced, and acting with ex-
treme caution for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and
drawing him into the supposition that his main object was to
cover Seville ; but as the French approached, he fell back
to Carmona, in order to keep open a retreat upon Cadiz or
Seville. Albuquerque was acquainted with the fall of the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 271

latter place, perceived that on the preservation of Cadiz
rested the last hope of continuing the war in the south of
Spain, and saw that the enemy's cavalry had taken the road
through Moron to Utrera, which was shorter than that which
he occupied, through Carmona, to the same place, with the
view of surprising Cadiz. A moment's hesitation, an hour's
delay, and Spain was lost: redoubling their wonted energies,
his brave band pushed along the Carmona-road, and reached
Utrera just as the enemy were drawing near, whence he marched,
day and night, with the utmost expedition, by Las Cabezas to
Lebrija, across a marsh that was deemed impracticable at
that season of the year, through Xeres, and, entering Cadiz on
the third of Februar}-, after a forced march of two hundred
and sixty miles, he immediately broke down the bridge of
Zuazo, which spans the canal of Santa Petri, the separation of
the Isle of Leon from the mainland. At Utrera the enemy's
light cavalry came up with the duke's rear, and some skirmish-
ing took place, in which the French produced little effect,
beyond the cutting down a few foot-sore stragglers ; but, from
that point the enemy turning towards Seville, the scouting
parties were called in, and the pursuit given up. The error
was quickly perceived by Soult, but too late to be repaired ; yet,
confiding in his numbers, military equipments, discipline,
genius, and fortune, he pushed forward his object, the reduction
of Cadiz, with unabated certainty of success, although inter-
rupted by a brief delay. Victor was sent in pursuit of Albu-
querque, and reached Chiclana on the fifth, but time had been
lost at IMontoro, Andujar, and Seville, and, during ten days,
the French had marched but one hundred miles ; so that when
Victor arrived at Cadiz, Albuquerque and his eight thousand
men were in possession of the citadel.

The fate of Europe hung upon the energy of a single man :
had the French outstripped the Spaniards in the race, Cadiz
was lost, the Spanish government dissolved, the war in the
Peninsula terminated, and little prospect of Wellington's
boini? able to maintain himself behind his glorious lines,
with a handful of valiant British, against the (•oml)incd armies

272 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

of two such men as Massena and Soult, with the resources of
imperial France to support them. Cadiz was saved by the
abiHtics of Albuqaer^iue, but its possession might easily have
been wrested from nim by the enemy, if the infatuation of
their Andalusian tactics had not spell-bound Victor ; for the
duke's corps was insignificant, ill-j)rovided, exhausted with
fatigue, when the enemy appeared in force on the opposite
bank of the canal ; the municipal authorities were apathetic,
the political absorbed in intrigue and dissensions ; so that it
would hardly have been possible, if attacked with spirit, for
Albuquerque's corps to have defended a line of ten miles
in length against twenty thousand enemies.

The members of the old junta straggled into Cadiz from
Seville, and, now used to command, attempted to resume their
functions; but so completely had they been stripped of all
ensigns of authority, that the magistracy could recognize them
only as so many private individuals, and some of no high repute
for loyalty. Venegas, the governor of Cadiz, to check the
expected assumption of power by this defunct assembly, had
formed, before their arrival, a municipal junta, elected by
ballot, whereby the occurrence of an interregnum was obviated.
This civic board arrogated authority unwisely, and would most
probably have involved the province in intestine broils, by their
hostility to any other constituted government, had not the
persuasion of Jovellanos induced them to submit. The salva-
tion of the countrv rendered the establishment of a reeular
government essential, and the central junta had expired
under circumstances of ignominy : to their revival the whole
kingdom was opposed, and the president and three others of
its members had been seized at Xeres, and thrown into a dun-
geon, as the only stratagem by which their lives could be
saved, whence they were removed to the Isle of Leon by
Castanos. With the brand of culprits, liberated, but without
trial, they could not hope to be again employed in such high
offices, and at the advice of Jovellanos and Mr. B. Frere,
(acting as British envoy until the arrival of Mr. H. Wellesley,)
the old junta were constrained to consent to the appointment

THE DUKK OF WELLINGTON. '-^"^^

of a regency, to be composed of individuals not included in
the late central junta. The municipal council was also per-
suaded to lay down their authority for the peace of their city,
the better government of the country, and to co-operate with
ihe regency for the successful prosecution of the war. These
concessions being obtained, chiefly through the perseverance of
Mr. Frere, the following individuals were chosen of the council
of regency, on the twenty-ninth of January, the Bishop of
Orense, General Castanos, Don F. de Saavedra, Don A. de
Escano, and D. Estevan Fernandez de Leon, to rule with
supreme power until the assemblage of the cortes, to whom the
question was to be submitted of the best form of provisional
government. It should be observed, that accident, intrigue, or
terror, had no share in the selection of the members of the
regency ; they were all persons of the highest honour, largest
share of popularity, and deservedly extensive influence. One,
indeed, was not pleasing to the citizens of Cadiz, Fernandez de
Leon, but he was a man of too high feeling to accept the
honour against the people's will, and, pleading ill-health, his
place was filled by Miguel de Lardizabal, a native of Tlax-
calla, in New Spain.

As to Albuquerque, he was hailed as the deliverer of his
country, and became the idol of the people : unaccustomed to
the display of so much ability in their leaders, they flocked
to his standard with alacrity, and obeyed his orders with
cheerfulness. In the fulness of their gratitude and affection,
/Mbuquerque was declared governor of Cadiz, and, assisted
by the municipal junta, he proceeded to place the Isle of Leon
in a sufficient state of defence. He was soon joined by num-
bers from outside the walls, and his garrison was (juickly
augmented to sixteen thousand men.

From one species of despotism unhappy Spain was now
transferred to another, more powerful, more vindictive. The
coimcil of Castile now resolved upon impeaching the members
of the late central junta, declaring that that body had usurped
the power which they had exercised with so much violence,
that the country never had consented to their employment of
it, and that ambition, selfishness, and cupidity were their pre-

'i74 LllE A\D CAMPAIGNS OF

vailing passions. This unnecessary, even if well-grounded
attack, was sanctioned by the regency, who immediately seized
all the papers of the late assembly, and registered their effects.
Amongst the victims to cabal on this occasion, none excited
or received more public sympathy than the amiable Jovellanos.
He seemed all his life to have been the victim of villains ; but
although his frame was emaciated by seven years' imprison-
ment, at the pleasure of the infamous Godoy, he deemed such
suffering light compared with that to which he was now to be
subjected.

With an inexplicable degree of ingratitude, the regency
suffered this pure patriot, this man of the most unsullied
honour, to be driven from public life, restricted to the confines
of his native province, and placed under the surveillance of
the alcaldes. There are some drafts so mingled with bitter-
ness, that the boldest and most philosophic are unable to quaff
them without sorrow : such was the cup presented to the lips
of their benefactor by the members of the regency — it was a
hard necessity ; he accepted it from their hands, but it tinged
his few remaining years with acerbity. Other unfortunate
members of this devoted body, as innocent as Jovellanos, went
into voluntary exile, selecting the Canary Isles as their future
home, while De Calvo and his wife were arrested, and thrown
into an unwholesome dungeon, without a bed to rest on,
or a change of clothing. This work of wickedness, as dis-
graceful to the pusillanimity of the regency, as to the reputa-
tion of the junta of Castile, was consummated before the first
meeting of the cortes, to whom De Calvo appealed, and, having
obtained a trial, was set at liberty.

The Isle of Leon is of a triangular shape, and se})arated
from the mainland by the canal of Santa Petri, ten miles
in length, three hundred yards broad, and deep enough to
float a seventy -four -gun ship. The bridge of Zuazo, a
Roman structure, and which was destroyed by Albuquerque's
army, was flanked by strong, batteries. Nearly in the cen-
tre of the isle stands the town of Leon, with a population
of forty thousand souls, and a little to the north of this
is the town of St. Carlos. Cadiz is built upon a tongue of

THE DUKE OF WE ISLINGTON. 27 "j

land seven miles in length, and half a mile medium hreadtli,
one side of which is washed by the sea, the bay of Cadiz
flanks the other. Cadiz is only approacliable from the land
by passing along tiiis narrow isthmus; and the expensive
works thrown up to command that pass, when England was
the foe, and Essex the field-marshal, reminded the Spaniard
that he had been taught the art of war equally by the aggres-
sion of both nations. The Spanish admiral, Alava, reluctantly
consented to remove the fleet into the lower harbour, and it was
by Mr. B. Frcre's unceasing exertions, that the hulks, with the
French prisoners, were also moored low er down, under the con-
trol of the English and Spanish ships of war. The ground on
the land quarter was now cleared of every obstruction, and by
the indefatigable exertions of Albuquerque, who superintended
the works, the defences were completed, and the citizens began
to resume their lost confidence. At this period it was that
Victor, ignorant of the state of security in which the isle had
been placed, sent one of his verbose notices to the garrison,
summoning them to surrender : he reminded them of the safe
policy pursued by the inhabitants of Jaen, Seville, and Cor-
dova, w ho received their king w ith loyalty and gladness ; and
he cautioned them against any abuse of tlie arsenals and
fleet, which were the property of his master and theirs. This
vapouring message was promptly replied to, by stating, that
Ferdinand VII. was the rightful sovereign of Spain; tliat the
insinuations of Soult against the honour of the English were
false, and unbecoming on his ])art towards a generous enemy ;
that England was a brave and sensible nation, whose only
object was the establishment of free institutions, and the de-
struction of tyranny wherever it was to be found. In proof of
which, tiie aid received at Cadiz, from the British, had been
solicited by the citizens, who now felt no apprehension from
the presence of an enemy one hundred thousand strong. Tiie
reinforcement here alluded to, as received from the Britisii,
and from which they seemed to have acquired m»ich increased
confidence, had been sent from Lisbon by Lord Wellington
on the fifth of February, upon the earnest application of Mr.

270 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

B. Frerr, dated the thirty-first of January ; it consisted of
the seventy-ninth, ninety-fourth, and second battahon of the
eighty-seventh regiments, with two companies of artillery,
being all the disposable troops then at Lisbon. These were
placed under the command of Major-General the Honourable
W. Stewart, and directed to proceed to Cadiz. To these forces
the regency of Portugal added the twentieth Portuguese regi-
ment, which, with one thousand more that joined them from
Gibraltar, made an auxiliary force of four thousand men ; so
that, including the Anglo-Portuguese troops, the garrison of
Cadiz on the seventeenth of February was upwards of eighteen
thousand strong, the British portion of which was ultimately
placed under the command of Sir Thomas Graham. The
municipal junta at Cadiz, of which Albuquerque was president,
were imaccustomed to the possession of military power, and
wholly ignorant of its management or application : they com-
pelled Albuquerque to be their president, upon the pretence of
gratitude, but it was from vanity, and a desire to strengthen
themselves against the regency, that the compliment originated.
This spirited soldier was conscious of his inability to serve two
masters, and by his leaning towards the superior council of the
nation excited the anger and jealousy of his commercial rulers.
His indefatigable labours continuing, the vengeance of the
city authorities against the man who saved Spain from the
enemy, was suspended, the cortadura was fortified, and
chevaux defrise placed on the beach, to obstruct any attempt
to pass at low water.

While the British were actively employed in forwarding the
defences, the unemployed part of the population came down,
and stood gazing earnestly upon them. Albuquerque, im-
presed with the maxim that no employment is more mischiev-
ous than idleness, advised, that all useless hands should be
either put to the works, or formed into a militia, for mounting
guard at some of the points of importance ; this rational sugges-
tion, however, was not agreeable to the city authorities. He next
appliedfor pay and clothing for his gallant corps, towhich thecity
of Cadiz, he conceived, never could discharge the debt of grati-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 277

tufic it owed; but, with seven hundred pieces of cloth in their
possession, they refused to grant a single suit of clothing.
Tiiis shameful abandonment of their brave countrymen, and
gross ingratitude to their general, is explained by the fact of
the municipal bodv being desirous that the order for clothinir
should emanate from the regency, to wliom they then might
be enabled to sell this very doth, and derive considerable
profit upon it, in. the shape of commission for their trouble.
Albuquercjue petitioned the regency, but was only answered
by their advice to publish the memorial, and excite, by those
means, the compassion of the wealthier citizens. He followed
this fatal advice, published his petition, and obtained liberal
contributions, but kindled a flame of contention amidst the
exasperated municipal authorities, that was only extinguished
by his own ruin. From this moment, the fortunes of Albu-
querque began to ebb, and, while life continued, he was doomed
to suffer from an aching heart. The civic junta accused hiuj
of betraying, unnecessarily, the wants and the weakness of
the Spanish army ; and they had the baseness to reproach
him with having made too precipitate a retreat on C"a(hz,
whereby he was unable to carry barley for the horses along
with him : they asserted, that such a march as he had per-
formed, and contrary to the orders of the supreme juntii, was
not required, and was, in fact, deserving of punishment. I'he
indignation and disappointment of Albuquercpie became in-
6uj)portable ; he turned in agony from the monsters with whom
such false and ungrateful charges originated ; he threw away his
robes of office, as degrading to an honest man, with the melan-
choly exclamation — " And is this the patriotism of the junta
of Cadiz !" Devoted to his country too sincerely to be the
author of internal dissensions at such a moment, he resolved
upon bearing his sorrows with resignation, for the sake of
Spain, and postponing reparation for his injured honour until
a period less perilous to the issue of the greater contest. The
regency showed him every demonstration of respect, regard,
and confidence; but he declined resolutely to continue longi-r
at the head of the army, and being, at his own reqiiest,
II. 2()

278 LllK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

appointed ambassador to England, he left Cadiz immediately
for London. Reaching his destination, he selected a retired
residence at Paddington, where he soon after died of a broken
heart.

Leaving the siege of Cadiz to drag its slow length along —
and resting the British army at Viseu — Mortier at Madrid, hav-
ing been frustrated in his attempt to surprise Badajoz — a brief
summary of the operations in Navarre, Arragon, and Cata-
lonia will unfold before the reader the precise situation of the
war in every part of the Peninsula, at the moment when Lord
Wellington, having triumphed over his secret enemies, and the
powerful efforts of political faction at home, — when having
defeated the foolish measures of the City of London to degrade,
insult, vilify him, (measures bearing a strong analogy to those
of the municipal body of Cadiz to the brave Albuquerque,)
at length obtained the unqualified confidence of the generous
nation he represented abroad, whose interests he understood
better than the most lauded of his contemporaries, and whose
honour he defended in a way that multiplied his own. — The
guerilla chief, Mina the student, kept up the harassing sys-
tem of his companions, and gave a new character to the war
in Navarre. The French were goaded into a frenzied state
by the activity of the guerillas, and endeavoured to surround
and annihilate this little band ; but they saved themselves by
their fleetness, and the rugged rocks of the Pyrenees, and
their pine-clad summits, gave them a safe asylum. Suchet,
who had been the object of Mina's admiration as well as
hostility, wearied with such an inglorious species of warfare,
committed the future pursuit of the guerilla bands to General
Regnier, and withdrew himself to Saragossa, which he pro-
posed making his head-quarters during his meditated hostili-
ties against the province of Arragon.

His successes at Alcaniz and Monzon had so much intoxi-
cated the mind of Blake, that he now projected the visionary
scheme of recovering Saragossa from the enemy. Advancing
towards that renowned city with a genius of no mean cha-
racter, yet unequal to that of his subtle adversary, his designs

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. '279

were anticipated, his progress checked, and, nstead of being in
time to attack, he was obliged to place himself in a posture of
defence. Defeat, dispersion, and loss, were the only results of
the encounter between Suchet and Blake. The Spaniards
gave way, abandoned their standards and artillery, and fled
with precipitation. I*ossessing an advantage over contem-
porary Spanish officers, in possessing the confidence of his men,
Blake succeeded in rallying his irregular forces on the follow ing
day, and having harangued them upon the necessity of obli-
terating the disgrace of their recent flight, he presented once
more a front of battle to the enemy. Never was more courage,
energy, or devotion displayed by a general, than the gallant
Blake exhibited on the ill-omened day of I^elchite; he was
seen wherever a hope of resistance was presented, encouraging
the timid, honouring the brave : but the disease that now
corroded the vital principle of Spanish warfare, had pene-
trated too deeply into the constitution of his army, and he was
again destined to behold his corps panic-struck, flying before the
enemy, and leaving to the name of Spaniard the unenviable
notoriety of being courageous in the character of the assassin
only. With little success, Suchet made an interruption into
Valencia, and reached the suburbs of the capital ; but he did
not consider bis army equal to the assault, and treason was
as yet unknown within the walls; and Villa Campa advancing
with a considerable force, Suchet retired from Valencia to his
quarters at Saragossa.

Saragossa is a name that will long endure, and every loyal
Spaniard will teach his infants to lisp the sound amongst the
narrow stores of incipient language; and when the hour ap-
proaches that all worldly considerations shall determine, himself
will pronounce it amongst the tones that die away upon his
faltering lips. The name is written in characters of blood,
but it claims a veneration, like the letters that were traced by
the unseen hand ; and w henever the hostile trumpet shall sound
on the frontiers of their country, whenever the French eagle
shall be seen flapj^ing his dark wings above the snows of the
Pyrenees, every faint heart will turn towards Saragossa, and

280 LIFE AND CAiMPAIGNS OF

drink in courage with the prospect, and the sword will be new
steeled in the grasp of him w ho truly loves his country, and
has read her eventful history. Turn we now from Arragon,
and Valencia, and Andalusia, where fortune smiled, but falsely,
upon Spain, to the strongholds of Catalonia, and there a second
Sarairossa will be found in the ancient citv of Gerona. A jjar-
rison of less than four thousand men was here placed under
the command of Mariano Alvarez, a man advanced in years,
and of high descent. Twice the enemy sat down before the
walls, without being able to make the slightest impression,
either on the obstinacy of the garrison or defences of the place ;
but when they again appeared, it was resolved that the prize
was never to be relinquished, the game was to be pursued to
death ; neither personal hardships, nor length of time, were to
oppose the reduction of this fortress ; in fact, Gerona must
fall. Great men are created by circumstances, and it is
said that Hannibal taught Scipio ; Scylla studied under Marius;
Pompey and Csesar are know n as rivals ; and it was the am-
bition of Napoleon that called for the exercise of Wellington's
great talents. The French in Spain had given the Spaniards a
lesson in the endurance of privations, the encountering of perils,
and the pursuit of glory ; they taught them how^ to conquer,
and gave them also an example how to die. That Spain
profited by the melancholy precedent, Saragossa proclaimed to
mankind ; and the defence of Gerona is fully entitled to be re-
corded amongst those great and brilliant events in which the
conquered sometimes outshine the conqueror. Taking the
emblem of Christianity for their banner, the garrison and
citizens assembled around it, and, dividing their whole number
into eight companies, assumed the sacred title of crusaders.
As at Saragossa, the women also enrolled themselves in an
association, for the purj)ose of tending the sick and relieving
the wounded, which was denominated the Company of St.
Barbara. These proceedings, which the enemy looked upon
as so many j)roofs of weakness, as common-place testimonies
of Spanish bigotry and fanaticism, have always been found
effeccual in Spain, where that ancient feeling that bound the

THE DUKt: OF WELLINGTON. 281

dcfenclcrs of the cross with such unfailing tenacity in eaiHer
ages, still prevails in all its efiicacy and freshness. In France
it is otherwise ; revolution has so frequently hroken in upon the
sacred institutions of that country, that, while it put fanati-
cism to flight, it unluckily drove some portion of true sanctity
away with it. Romish superstition was assuredly associated
with the measures of defence adopted hy the Geronans, and
one quarter of the city was actually entrusted to the protection
of St. Naxis, the patron saint, to whom the inhahitants credu-
lously ascribed the former repulse of the French from their
walls ; and the joy and enthusiasm with which the citizens
directed themselves to the third defence of their homes, only
proves the indescribal)le tie that binds weak mortals to the
hopes of a future world.

It was on the sixth of May that the French appeared in
force before Gerona, with a view to a blockade, had the jn-u-
dent advice of St. Cyr been adopted ; but this was changed
into a regular siege by the orders of Augereau. A flag of truce
being sent to the besieged, exhorting them not to persevere in
so rash a project, where, however long delayed, misery and
destruction must be the inevitable consefpience of their per-
verseness — Alvarez replied, that " he had left it to his artillery
to speak for him.'' The bombardment accordingly commenced
on ihe thirteenth of July, and, along with it the sullerings of the
inliabitants, which probably were never exceeded upon any
similar occasion in tlie history of modern war. Now the
goterale was beat, which sunnnoned the aged, the infirm, the
young, the helpless, to the cold damp vaults, in which they
imagined that security was to be found ; and as they j)assed into
their gloomy cells, the company of St. 13arbar;i, aniiilst the
falling shells, were seen proceeding to their melancholy duties.
Fvery day, and every night, added new victims to the heaj) of
slain, or increased the number of the wounded in the hospitals,
yet none dared to talk of capitulation: distress of mind, damp
beds, and obstructed circulation of air, induced a destructive
dysentery, and to imbitler sorrow with still greater sulfering, a
bilious fever visited the town in the month of July, and attacked

yB-i I.IFK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

not only the healthy, but even the sick and wounded in the hos-
pitals. The details of the siege of Gerona exceed in heroism
even those of Saragossa. In the month of July the progress
of the besieging army extended to the destruction of the
redoubts which covered the front of Monjoui castle, and to
the establishment of three batteries of heavy ordnance that
were then brought to play with tremendous effect upon as
many sides of the little fortress.

During the unabated fire of the artillery, the Spanish flag fell
from its rest down into a ditch ; upon which Montoro, a Spanish
officer, caused himself to be lowered by ropes in the midst of
a tempest of balls, and, recovering, replanted it upon an angle
of one of the towers. A breach being made practicable for
forty men abreast, an assault was commenced ; but the gal-
lant party who ventured to enter it, found, too late, that
the previous silence of the enemy's guns was in order to save
their ammunition, and reserve their energies, to give them the
more fatal reception ; and, at the close of the day, one thousand
six hundred French soldiers were numbered with the slain.
Convinced that while a round of ammunition, a day's provision,
or one stone upon another, remained, the Geronans would not
surrender, the enemy continued to play with their artillery
upon Monjoui, stationed very many sharp-shooters in guarded
positions to pick down the Spanish sentinels, and, after an-
other month's indefatigable efforts, the guns of Monjoui were
silenced, and the governor was compelled to retire into
Gerona. The heroism of the Geronans had not escaped the
sympathy of their countrymen, and Blake gallantly undertook
to relieve the place : his plan consisted in making a diversion
in their favour, by a false demonstration of battle on the side
opposite to that at which the convoy was to attempt an
entrance. In these bold manoeuvres he so far succeeded, that
the Spaniards, breaking through the enemy's guard, set fire to
their tents, and threw into the town a reinforcement of three
thousand men. Alvarez, with the noblest candour, informed
his new associates of the true and desperate situation of
affairs; warned every man who feared to look calmly upon

THE DUKE or WELLTNCTON. 283

death, against his continuance in the town, as he had
resolved that none should remain who declined to swear, that
they were prepared to bury themselves in the ruins of the works,
rather than surrender to their merciless enemies. As many
as it would have been prudent to detain, readily took the oath
of fidelity ; and Garcia Conde effected his retreat with the re-
mainder, with firmness and honour. The battery of Los Angelos
facilitated ingress and egress, and was therefore as valuable
to one party as it was obnoxious to the other ; against this,
therefore, the combined exertions of the French were directed,
and, after a bloody conflict, the place was carried, and the
garrison inhumanly put to the sword. The French justify
their cruelty in this instance on the plea, that Llander, the
Spanish commandant of the battery, fired upon the otTicer
who had been sent to summon the place ; and besides, some
vengeance, they conceived, remained una])peased for the
fate of their sick and wounded, whom the Catalan guerillas
had put to death. The chief object of their wrath on this
occasion, however, Llander, excapcd from a death that would
have been accompanied with torture, by leaping from one of
the convent windows down into the plain, and flying to
Gerona. The siege still continued with unmitigated resolu-
tion on both sides; each hour was marked by some event of
cruelty, of gallantry, of misery, and the hatred between the
opponents was heightened into frenzy. The French general
began to abandon all hopes of reducing the place by force of
arms, or military operations, and intended to leave his cause
in the merciless hands of famine. The citizens, althougii on
half- rations for some time, relied on Blake's activity, courage,
and abilities, for relief, and kept an anxious look to that quarter
whence succours were expected. At length the watchmen on
the towers descried the approaching convoy, and past suffer-
ings mingled in present joy, which knew no bounds when they
beheld O'Donnell with eight thousand men advancing steadily
against the dense mass of the enemy, bursting through them like
a torrent, firing the tents that stood behind, and pushing on to
the city-gate with one hundred and sixty laden beasts. This,

284 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

however, was the only succour that arrived : in vain the watcli-
nicn strained their eye-halls to discover the approach of fur-
ther assistance; time told the tale, no other convoy ever came.
The French rallied, opposed, and overthrew the second division
of the convoying force, and the Italian band, who gave no quar-
ter, put three thousand of their number to death after the
action. At this period, St. Cyr, who had never shared the
imperial smile, requested permission to resign, upon which the
future conduct of the siege was entrusted to Augereau. The
vigilance and experience of this officer proved unequal to the
enterprise of O'Donncll, who, having brought supplies into the
town, fiivoured by the darkness of night, crept safely out again
with his thousand men, and, nuiking his way past five and
twentv posts of the enemy, several of which he forced with
sword and bayonet, rejoined the main body of his own. army.
O'Donnell's escape was an object of admiration and disappoint-
ment to Augereau, who, much strengthened by reinforcements
and sup])lies from France, detached a party against Hostalricb,
where magazines had been collected by Blake for the relief
of Gerona : the Spaniards at that place behaved with gallantry,
but were totally incapable of making a successful resistance ;
so that Pino, having obtained possession of everything, set
the town on fire, and returned to Gerona.

The fall of Gerona was now approaching, the energies of the
citizens were almost exhausted, and famine, more sharp than
the sword of the enemy's legions, began now to thin the numbers
of the besieged. The loss of the magazines at Hostalricb could
not be remedied, the hopes that its existence engendered were
henceforth dissipated : food had not only decreased in quantity,
but its quality was so much deteriorated, that the health of the
besieged was now alarmingly affected. Still, capitulation was
not mentioned ; the oath of fidelity was nobly observed ; and
when the city surgeon expressed his sorrow at the mournful
aspect of the bills of health, the governor merely observed,
"This document then will record our sorrows, if none shall
survive to recount them." For seven months the thunder of
artillery had rolled around their walls; the sight, the hearing,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 285

the health of the inhabitants were injured by its continuance;
and within the f^pace of a few weeks five hundred of the garri-
son died in the hospital. At this time desertions began to
take place ; and information of want of ammunition reaching
the enemv, their exertions to mount the different breaches
were repeated, and post after post fell into their possession.
The constant distress of mind under which Alvarez laboured
for so many months, now terminating in delirium, he was
pronounced no longer capable of directing the efforts of his
faithful fellow-citizens, and the command was entrusted to
Julian de Bolivar. The master-spirit was now wanting, the
magnanimous hero of Gerona was now a pitied lunatic: the
burden of their sorrows became intolerable, and the word
"capitulation" at last was faintly uttered. The gallantry and
devotion of the Geronans acquired for them the admiration of
their resolute foes, who in the sunken eye and pallid cheek
read the story of their sufferings, and the true power that
subdued them. No atrocities, no outrages, none of those refine-
ments in wickedness that disgraced the name of France at
Saragossa and Medellin, were repeated here. The brave
respected the brave, and the conqueror shared his rations with
the captive. Alvarez recovered his reason sufficiently to learn
his misfortunes, and was removed under an escort to Figueras,
where death speedily released him from captivity.*

Thus ended the campaign of 1809. Gleams of glory shone
occasionally upon the cause of liberty, but clouds still hung
thick and dark in the political horizon : Spain had lost her
armies ; her chief towns were occupied by the enemy ; peace
in the north had released the veterans of Gaul from service
there, and the emperor had ordered large drafts to be made
from their ranks, to reinforce the wearied troops in the Penin-
sula. Cadiz was garrisoned, and fortified, English troops

• It was believed in Catalonia, that Napoleon had sent orders for the exeeu-
tion of Alvarez, in the Plaza of Gerona, Imt that the French feared the conse-
quences of the outrape. His death might naturally have been attributed to
mental agony for sui-h a length of time, and the decay of bodily health which
followed, but for tin- public execution of Santipo l^ass and tlofer, and the
private catastrophe o( C'ajjtain NVriglit and General Pichegru. — Houlhcy.

II. 'J P

280 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

had been cheerfully admitted, but Victor sat down before it
threatening to repeat one of those deplorable scenes, a pro-
tracted siege, which had been too often enacted on the
theatre of the Peninsular war. From Portugal the French
had been expelled, and their efforts on its frontier paralyzed
by the able measures of Lord Wellington, who had adorned
his victorious brow with additional laurels in the memorable
actions at Oporto and Talavera. Whatever had been effected
during the campaign for the cause of the Peninsula, the sword
of Wellington accomplished ; it was the British lion whose
strength and indomitable courage the French apprehended,
and before which the frightened eagles drooped. Cadiz was
held, on hopes that arose from the frontier of Portugal, and on
the faith of Wellington's promised relief : and Lisbon placed
her people, her armies, her treasures, her feelings, at the dis-
posal and conmiand of the British hero.

Wlien the Marquis Wellesley retired from Spain, discon-
tent was so widely diffused through England, that a change in
the administration was inevitable : the calmest politician of that
day perfectly comprehended the value of Lord Wellington's
services, relied on him solely for the preservation of Portugal,
and, as he had communicated both officially and confidentially
with his brother, by personal interviews, and through the medium
of special couriers, and had disclosed his able plans for the con-
tinuance of the war, it was considered in the highest degree
prudent and necessary, if practicable, to associate the Marquis
Wellesley with the re-constructed administration ; his lordship
accepted the invitation ; and one of the first demonstrations he
made of his splendid oratorical powers after his adherence,
was in defence of the military plans, with which he had become
acquainted while in Spain, in repelling the most ungenerous,
ungrateful, and mistaken attack ever made by an opposition
in that house upon a public servant, at all events upon an
absent officer, absent because at the head of an army engaged
in an active campaign.

At the close of the year 1809, the political parties were so
equally balanced, that any unpopular measure, any ui^ toward

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 287

event in our foreign relations, would at once destroy the equi-
poise, and throw the ministers over. The incapacity of the
administration, not of its individual members, was publicly
denounced by the country, and tacitly acknowledged by them-
selves ; and Mr. Canning so seriously disapproved of the
conduct of Lord Castlereagh generally, that he secretly repre-
sented his inaptitude to the Duke of Portland, obtained from
that venerable man a promise that he should be removed, yet
acted with his incapable associate as if no such sentiment had
existed. 'J'he conduct of Mr. Canning admits of no justifi-
cation, it is one amongst the few dark spots upon a splendid
career, and it is not improbable that this hasty and indiscreet
step laid the foundation of an immitigable political hostility,
which pursued his every future measure, exhaled its noxious
breath upon his benevolent efforts for the happiness of his
country, and ceased only when his relentless persecutors were
empowered to say " he is dead— so is our enmity."

Lord Castlereagh was a man of the most insatiable ambi-
tion, extravagant political views, heedless of national embar-
rassments, unalterably devoted to a party, and ready to sustain
the bubble reputation with his life. Perhaps his most last-
ing claim to the gratitude of his country will be found in
his steadv affection for the friend of his youth, in whose sterling
worth he had such an implicit confidence, that he considered him
a safe depository of the highest trust his sovereign could con-
sent to repose in any subject. His vanity, and exorbitant
ideas of English power, induced the secretary at war to equip
and send out an expedition to Holland, as a diversion in
favour of the reigning powers of Europe ; and, although it has
been argued that this, the greatest armament that Enghnid ever
despatched from her shores, was destined to accomplish a wise
and valuable object, yet its failure would be naturally more
deeply felt in proportion to its unaccustomed magnitude. And
this great, costly, ambitious expedition, Mr. Canning ])erniitted
his colleague to ])rojcct, and carry into effect, without one
expression of doubt, or one word of remonstrance. 'I'his remark
applies here to Mr. Canning solely, personally, because. Lord

'288 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Castlereagh liad been warned against the risk of such an expe-
riment by Sir Arthur Wellesley, who did not think it possible that
Lord Chatham could eifect anything more than the destruction
of a few ships and marine stores ; and, in a private letter to the
Duke of Richmond, he observed, " that Lord Chatham could
not make any head on the continent against one army collecting
in his front and another in his rear." The result of the expe-
dition justified, apparently, the wisdom of Mr. Canning's
secret counsels, and he now, in consequence, called on the
premier to perform his duty to the country, and redeem the
pledge he had given to him of removing Lord Castlereagh
from the administration. Such uncandid treatment was met
by Lord Castlereagh as might have been expected; he de-
nounced his colleague " as a man who had violated every
principle of good faith" — and a challenge and duel were the
unavoidable results. This violent proceeding was followed by
the dissolution of the administration, and the imposition of his
majesty's commands upon Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool,
to form a new government. Amongst those who were invited
into the service of his majesty were Earl Grey and Lord
Grenville, whose marked disapprobation of Lord Wellington's
military measures, and whose light estimate of that genius,
which even then all Europe acknowledged, soon after appeared
in their opposition to the grant of a public annuity, in their
anguish at his elevation to the peerage, and their condem-
nation of his gigantic plans for the preservation of Portugal.
Neither of these noblemen, however, could be reconciled to
the principles upon which the new government was based,
and Mr. Perceval turned, in consequence, towards the Marquis
Wellesley, who was just returned from the seat of war, and suc-
ceeded in obtaining his adherence to the ministry. But scarcely
were the new ministers installed in office, when that memorable
attack upon Lord Wellington commenced, memorable for the
celebrity of the individuals engaged in it, for the ingratitude it
displayed, and for the party virulence and factious zeal with
which it was sustained. "The opposition members," says Colonel
Napier, "assailed the general, personally, and with an acrimony

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. i^B9

not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought, his
actions silly, presumptuous, rash ; his campaigns deserving
not of reward, but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal,
cleared Gallicia and Estramadura, and obliged one hundred
thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive, and con-
centrate about Madrid. Lord Grey, opposing his own crude
military notions to the practised skill of Sir Arthur, petu-
lantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera ; that
battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, he would have set
aside w ith respect to the commander, as not w arranting admis-
sion to a peerage, always open to venal orators, and the
passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so
successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of
inspiration than of natural judgment, he would have cast away
as a thing of no worth !"

The new session of parliament was opened by commission ;
and the royal speech, amongst the numerous subjects which it
recapitulated, referred to the " expulsion of the French from
Portugal by his majesty's forces, under Lieutenant-General Vis-
count Wellington, and to the glorious victory obtained by him
at Talavera, which contributed to check the progress of the
French arms in the Peninsula during the late campaign."
This notice of Lord Wellington's services, if unaccompanied
by the imprudent congratulations upon the unfortunate expedi-
tion to Walcheren, might probably have escaped the assaults
of a violent, able, and determined opposition party; but
this calamitous affair gave the inexorable opponents of
Lord Castlereagh's administration, too strong a position, and
furnished them with weapons that could not fail to inflict the
severest blows. The venerable Earl of St. Vincent, whose
heroism had introduced him into the highest assembly in the
realm, appealed to their lordships in a speech full of the boldest
and bitterest reproaches. "When I addressed your lordships,"
said the gallant old sailor, " in the last session, I thought my
age and infirmities would preclude me from ever again pre-
senting myself to your consideration. Put such have been
the untoward and calamitous events which have occurred since

290 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

that period, that I am once more induced, if my strength will
admit, to trouble you with my sentiments on this occasion.
Indeed, we have wonderful, extraordinary men in these days,
who have ingenuity enough to blazon with the finest colours,
to sound whh the trumpet and the drum; in fact, to varnish
over the greatest calamities of the country, and endeavour to
prove that our greatest misfortunes ought to be considared as
our greatest blessings. Such was their course of proceeding
after the disastrous convention of Cintra.* And now, in his
majesty's speech, they have converted another disaster into a
new triumph. They talk of the glorious victory of Talavera,
a victory which led to no advantage, and had all the conse-
quences of a defeat The enemy took prisoners the sick and
wounded, and our own troops were finally obliged to retreat.
I do not mean to condemn the conduct of the officers em-
ployed either in Spain or in Walcheren ; I believe they did
their duty. There is no occasion to wonder at the awful
events which have occurred : they are caused by the weakness,
infatuation, and stupidity of ministers ; we owe all our disasters
and disgraces to the ignorance and incapacity of his majesty's
present administration. But what could the nation expect
from men who came into office under the mask of vile hypo-
cris}', and have maintained their places by imposture and
delusion ? The first instance of their pernicious influence
was their treatment of a country (Denmark) at peace with us ;
in a state of profound peace, they attacked her unprepared,
and brought her into a state of inveterate and open hostility.
This was a foul act; and the day may come when repentance
will be too late. Their next achievement was to send one of
the ablest men who ever commanded an army into the centre
of Spain, unprovided with every requisite for such a danger-
ous march. By his transcendent judgment. Sir John Moore
made one of the ablest retreats ever recorded in the page of

• Sir Arthur Wellesley disapproved of the convention of Cintra, and would
have driven the French out of Portugal, or taken the whole army, had he been
retained in the command of the army. At Talavera he was attacked by the
enemy, and beat them in defending himself.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 291

history; and while lie saved the remnant of his valiant troops,
his own life was sacrificed in the cause of his country. After this
abortive enterprise, another general (Wellington) was sent with
troops into the heart of the Peninsula, under similar circum-
stances : and the glorious victory alluded to in the speech from
the throne, was purchased by the useless expenditure of our
best bluud and treasure." In his extravagant zeal, not even
tempered by accumulated years, to impeach the political
reputation of ministers, and sustain the party with which he
had too plainly identified himself, the brave admiral passed over
the battles of Iloleia, Vimeira, and the celebrated passage of
the Douro, which shed an everlasting light upon those pages
wherein posterity shall register the bright annals of our
age, and dwelt upon those calamities alone with which a wise
Providence, for unknown reasons, had visited our country.
Lord St. Vincent's address, when his firm uncompromising
character in the front of danger, and his great experience of
public life, are considered, assists in showing the strong hold of
partisanship upon the bravest and best of men, and presents to
posterity a salutary caution. The severe censure of the gallant
admiral was followed by a luminous speech from Lord Gren-
ville, who ranged through the wide political field, in which all
Europe may be said to have been then included.

He declared that his heart was full, and he could no longer
refuse to give vent to his feelings. He thought the day must
soon arrive when ministers would have to render an account
of the treasure they had wasted, and the lives they had
sacrificed in useless and unprofitable expeditions. An expe-
dition sailed to Copenhagen, in order to burn a few ships,
destroy the docks, and accomplish some selfish national object :
the dey of Algiers once said, when an English fleet threatened
to bombard the town, that if they would give him half the
cost of the bombs, he would burn the town himself; and
Buonaparte, no doubt, would have delivered up the ships which
we sought to destroy, for half the sum our expedition cost
us. The expedition to Walcheren, however, of which Sir
Arthur Wellet-ley had, from the very origin of the idea, totally

C92 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

disapproved, formed the chief object of his lordship's eloquent
impeachment ; and he entreated the leading members of the
House to separate themselves from the misconduct of ministers.
Lord Grenville instituted a very just and true comparison
between the circumstances in which Moore and Wellington
were placed in Spain. With respect to the force sent into
Spain, said his lordship, ministers seemed resolutely determined
not to profit by experience ; precisely the same errors, the
same faults, were committed, as in the expedition under Sir
John Moore. The want of concert with the Spanish govern-
ment in Sir John Moore's expedition, was equally apparent in
Wellington's. A more glaring instance of analogous errors
exists in the fact, that after the public despatches of Sir David
Baird, stating the inconvenience attending the want of money,
the armies of Lord Wellington on the Peninsula, and Lord
Chatham at Walcheren, were both deficient in this necessary
article of military supply. The same errors pervaded their view
in the fond expectation of a valuable and extended co-operation
of the armed peasantry of Spain. The despatches of Sir John
Moore point out how cruelly he was disappointed in the expecta-
tion held out to him of an active and efficient assistance from the
Spanish forces : precisely the same fatal blunders formed a part
of the plan of the expedition under Lord Wellington, whose
despatches inform us that one Spanish officer had abandoned a
post he promised to defend, and that another Spanish officer
had deserted the sick, the wounded, the position he had under-
taken to maintain, and precipitately followed the English,
The absurdity therefore of ministers' expectations was manifest
even before the fallacy was proved, and all prospect of such
co-operation had been distinctly shown by experience to be
nugatory. This was the delusion to which Moore was sacri-
ficed, but which, to the moment of his expiring in the arms of
victory, was never realized ; and yet the lesson taught by the
fatal catastrophe was so lost upon ministers, that they threw
Wellington into the same arena, and exposed him to the fangs
of the same heartless monster. History, said his lordship, is
pregnant with proof, that an armed population cannot be con-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 293

sidered as a disciplined army : it is not enough that men
should be attached to the cause they are to defend, hut disci-
plined, steady, and obedient to command : having skilful
officers, able to execute the commands they receive, and
capable of judging what commands to give, and at the same
time fit to be trusted. Why then, said his lordship, send out
expeditions, to meet the same failures, and suffer the same
losses, leaving no monuments to their country, but those which
are calculated to excite a just indignation — a deep and un-
availing regret ? Plaving pursued his analysis of ministerial
errors to a considerable length, relatively to the Walchereu
expedition, he concluded by moving an inquiry into the con-
duct of his majesty's ministers. — Lord Harrow by defended the
expedition to Flushing and Antwerp, on the ground that no
object could have been of greater importance than the destruc-
tion of the maritime force of Napoleon ; and, when that object
was first contemplated by ministers, the fairest imaginable
prospects appeared of our being able to effect that purpose.
Unforeseen and uncontrollable obstacles arose, to prevent the
full and final consummation of the great design ; but the demo-
lition of the harbour and arsenal, of which the ruler of France
vaunted so loudly, had been successfully completed. As to
the expedition under Lord Wellington, his strictures upon that
sui)jcct were so imfounded, as to require but a brief re[)ly : the
achievements of that expedition consisted in rescuing Portugal
from the French, in covering the British arms and character
with glory, and in sustaining the efforts of the Spaniards ; in
securing Estramadura and La ^Lincha, delivering Gallicia, and
saving the ships at Ferrol — objects affording sufficient grounds
of triumj)h and congratulation. Lord Moira, (Marquis of
Hastings.) then a member of the opposition, lent the support
of his personal, pojiular influence, to crush the administration :
with his observations, which partisanship alone apjiear to have
dictated, the present subject is unconnected ; it will be sufficient,
therefore, to allude to his professional remarks upon the expe-
dition to Spain and Portugal : and in these he certainly
displayed a clear view of the affairs of the Pcninsuhi, and
II. *_' li

294 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

uttered a prophetic judgment upon the war then carrying on
under Lord Wellington. " His lordship gave it as his opinion,
that the case of Spain afforded the best opportunity of termi-
nating the war with glory, and of shaking, if not overturning,
the power of Buonaparte. Enthusiasm unquestionably did
exist in Spain, and that enthusiasm made Spain a lever, by
which the power of France might be removed from its founda-
tion, an engine that might be put in action with the greatest
force and effect against her." This opinion was, in effect,
identical with the views of Lord Wellington, and every idea it
contains was verified by the events that actually occurred in
rapid succession, until the final abdication of Napoleon. If the
nation have reason to respect the opinion of Lord Moira, as
evincing the deepest penetration into future events, it will on
that account withhold its approbation from Earl Grey, whose
short-sightedness on the same occasion is, if possible, more
remarkable. His lordship said, "he never had been so much
surprised in his life, as he was at the tone assumed in the
speech from the throne, in alluding to what were stated to be
successes achieved at Flushing and in Spain ! When he con-
sidered that for what was called success in Spain, similar
honours had been conferred on Lord Wellington to those
bestowed upon the Duke of Marlborough, he could not help
feeling, at such iinfowided assertions, that indignation in which
he was convinced every English heart would participate. He
saw much to blame in the conduct of Lord Wellington, in a
miUtary point of viae. With regard to the battle of Talavera,
he condemned that uncandid calculation, which represented it
as a victory gained over an enemy double our force, for, when
the Spanish army was taken into the account, the superiority
was greatly on our side." — 7'he progress of events, and the sub-
sequent history of Europe, so fully demonstrate the rashness
of the preceding assertions, that it does not appear necessary
to dwell upon them, but the position which their noble pro-
pounder held amongst British statesmen is excuse sufficient for
still adverting to a few remarkable facts. As to the consequences
of the battle of Talavera, compared with those of the victories

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 295

of Marlborough, even according to Lord Grey's estimate of
the former, no advantage can be claimed for the hero of
Blenheim " the results of the victories in Queen Anne's reign
being rather specious than useful :" — " the nation had been
intoxicated with a childish idea of military glory, and panted
for triumphs, of which they neither saw nor fdt the hene/it : —
" the pleasure of talking of their distant conquests, and extol-
ling the bravery of their friends, was all the return they were
likely to receive from a diminished people and an exhausted
exchequer. The English nation begun to lose its relish for
triumphs, in which itself had no real concern."* Lord Grey's
condemnation of Wellington's conduct, in a military point of
view, finds its just censure in the following passage of INIr.
Windham's speech on the affairs of Portugal, and its contra-
diction in the life of the British hero. "Confident judgment
on professional subjects from persons not professional, was
always objectionable ;"t besides, his lordship's rejection of the
rej)ort of the numbers engaged, being founded upon insuffi-
cient information as to the conduct of the Spaniards, possesses
now no value, and should not, at that period, have been urged
in argument. Lord Grenville's amendment of censure upon
ministers, which the term inquiry virtually implied, was lost by
a majority of fifty-two, and the address consequently carried.

On the same day, in the Commons, the formality of moving
an address to the throne occasioned an animated debate upon
the fallen state of Austria, the dej)lorable result of the Walcheren
expedition, and the events in Spain : but it is only with the last
of these subjects that the character and measures of Lord Wel-
lington are immediately connected, however his opinion might
have been asked, or iiis advice adopted, in the others. — Mr.
Peel who seconded the address, took occasion to allude to the
contest in Spain, in language gratifying to the brave men
engaged in that hazardous contest, and CNincing a clear under-
standing of the peculiar difficulties by which Lord Wellington
must necessarily he surrounded in that unhappy, distracted

" Vide Hij-toiies of England, Biug. Britt., Sec. &e.
t Vide p. 'J I. Vol. II.

296 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

country, and confirnilng, in the most entire manner, the con-
clusions at which Wellini^ton had long before arrived, relative
to the pohtical state of the Peninsula, conchisions then disbe-
lieved in England, but subsequently corroborated by the flow of
events. If, said Mr. Peel, entire success has not attended all
the operations in Spain, it was solefi/ attrihiitdble to the phij-
sical de/iciencies of the countiy. There were evils in the
constitution of that country which made its energies feeble :
but the British name had come pure out of the trials. 'I'he
army of the empire supported the character of superiority
which they had always upheld in the battles of their country.
On the twenty-second of April Lord Wellington took the
command of the British army : in May he drove Soult before
him, rescued Portugal, and advanced into Spain. His advance
was met by the force of France, under the immediate command
of the ])erson who called himself the king of Spain. Jn a
bloody and unequal contest, he established, by one more
brilliant evidence, the comparative bravery of the British
soldier, and earned for his troops the just and well-merited
praise which we have been accustomed to give our armies
when they meet the enemy : that army retreated from the
scene of its triumphs, but there was no shame in a retreat like
theirs. We were still a civilized people ; we had not learnt
to discard our humanity : we had not yet reconciled ourselves
to throwing off the burden of human feelings, that we might
go on light and dexterous to the work of human misery. We
could not adopt the summary expedients of modern war : we
could not involve the wretched peasant in the calamities from
which our own privations may spare him. We could not bring
ourselves to force its bread from the lip of poverty : we could
not feed upon requisition, and calculate our revenue upon
plunder. Our army will not subsist — where the troops of the
enemy will riot. A British force could not glut upon the
wretchedness of a suffering people : a British army could not,
upon entering a plundered town, strip the miserable inhabitants
of the scanty remnant which rapacity itself had left them.
Whatever might be said of the British army in Spain, or of its

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ^5)7

commanders, it had aflbrded to that people a glorious exani})le,
which he hoped in future days would be equalled, but could
never be excelled." — Lord Gower, who moved an amendment
to the address, acknowledged the bravery of our troops, and
the abilities of the generals Moore and Wellington who com-
manded our armies in the Peninsula, but characterized the
conduct of ministers as placing a blind confidence in Spanish
co-operation, to which he ascribed the failure of both cam-
paigns in Spain. He designated Lord Wellesley's mission as
a pompous, abortive embassy, that promised so much, and per-
formed so little; and the retirement from Talavera on Jaraicejo,
he misre])resented as an inevitable and disastrous retreat. — Mr.
Bathurst in defending ministers and supporting the address,
described the battle of Talavera as " placing the valour of our
troops on a height on which it never formerly stood," which
excited the indignation of Mr. Ponsonby so much, that he de-
clared "that engagement to have arisen from the rashness and
pi'csunijitiun of the general, which induced him to risk a con-
test that he was not called to hazard : that the British under
Wellington amounted to thirty-eight thousaml men, yet that
disasters and disgraces were the sole consequences of the cam-
paign of 1809, no matter to whom the errors in which they
originated were attributable." — Lord Castlereagh replied to
this very impassioned speech, by stating, that it was an error to
designate the late campaign as connected with Spain, while in
fact it pertained to the defence of Portugal. That a discre-
tionary power had been entrusted to Lord Wellington, which
he conceived had been most judiciously exercised. Had he
not advanced to Talavera, he must have inevitably disgraced
himself and the British arms. It was incorrect to assert that
he had thirty-eight thousand British in that field of battle, as
it exceeded the true number by eighteen thousand. It was a
subject of regret, in his opinion, that the military character of
the country should be sacrificed to party ])olitics, and he
pointed to the pernicious tendency of such mis-statements.

Amongst the uncompromising foes, not to the government
merely, but to the rising greatness of Wellington, must be

298 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

mentioned General Tarleton : his opinion of the battles of
Holeia and Vimeira had already become matter of history; he
now eagerly seized on the occasion presented by this discus-
sion, to record a second expression of his condemnation of that
officer's military genius. This gallant member declared that
Portugal could not be defended ; that the march to Talavera
was most imprudent ; that it would have been wiser policy
to have sent thirty thousand men into Italy, under the com-
mand of Sir John Stuart, to prevent the army of Eugene
Napoleon (Beauharnais) from joining Buonaparte; but perhaps,
added the general, "this might not have been agreeable to the
Wellesleys." — This ebullition of personality was followed by
one of Mr. Canning's happiest appeals to parliament, in which,
after defending the motives of ministers in sending the expe-
dition to Flushing under Lord Chatham, he thus spoke of
the Spanish campaign, and the brave soldier who conducted it.
" If there was a country in which it was perfectly just to inter-
fere, Spain was that country. There the torch of insurrection
was everywhere lighted, and everywhere burning, and therefore
we exposed the people of that country to no additional danger
by giving them our assistance. We did not pretend to commit
ourselves to the same extent that Spain was committed, it was
always understood that the British army was lent, as a trust
to be restored, not as a loan to be expended. No such question
presented itself, as to this country raising any general con-
federacy against France ; under existing circumstances, that
would be an idle speculation. But if any country was resolved
to make an effort to break its chains, that country became our
ally. It had been said that we should endeavour, primarily, to
effect an internal change in the Spanish people and govern-
ment; but, before you confer a benefit, you cannot go, with the
koran in one hand and a sword in the other, to change the
habits and religion of those you would aid. Such conduct
would excite jealousy not easily allayed. He was not scrupu-
lous as to the means he would employ to thwart the views of
Buonaparte ; he would gladly press a combination of all
nations, and all religions, into a phalanx to oppose him. He

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 299

would unite with the Turk, without requiring him to lay
aside his turban, and take the field with the poor bigoted
Spaniard, without first insisting upon his divesting himself of
his superstition. Spain, with ^11 her faults, deserved assist-
ance of England, and any inquiry which would throw blame
upon the Spaniards for want of co-operation, would be injurious
to our future connection with Spain. He did not wish to speak
against Lord Wellington, when he said the march to Talavera
was his own act. He approved of it, and of the honours be-
stowed upon that officer. We ought not to undervalue the
hero's laurels, even though they were barren. Had valour so
long been admired, and at last lost its value? had we on a
sudden become so enlightened that we could contemplate it
with philosophical apathy ? He knew that moralists might
shudder at the shedding of human blood ; he knew " that reason
frowns at war's unequal game — where thousands bleed to raise
a single name." Yet still was Lord Wellington entitled to the
gratitude of the country, and the glories of Talavera he could
not think purchased so dearly as to be for ever deplored. — The
classic eloquence of Canning was insufficient to protect the fame
of Wellington from the vituperation of the opposition, or pre-
vent Mr. Whitbread from giving utterance to those jejune
views of the Peninsular war, which the genius of the general
refuted. This able supporter of the popular party in parlia-
ment, declared " that, with all his respect for Lord Wellington,
he could not approve of the battle of Talavera ; it had no good
end, it only tended to establish what was never questioned,
the superior valour of our troops. Our victories were held up
as monuments of eternal glory ; he beheld them as so many
gladiatorial exhibitions. Alas ! exclaimed the orator, how
shall we dry up the tears of the orphan, or reimburse the ex-
hausted means of the beggared citizen ? The battle of Vimeira,
followed by a disgraceful convention, had better never have
taken place ; and Talavera, at best, was but an exhibition of rash
confidence and victorious temerity. The ministers had ct)n-
ferred honours upon Sir Arthur Wellcsley, /or whoui, and for
the coinitri/, it ivouid have heen uuuli more houourahlc had

300 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

he never changed his name. His conduct in Spain seemed
the result of infatuation." Mr. Whitbread concluded his
invective against ministers, by asserting " the utter impossibility
of defending Portugal with a force of thirty thousand men,"
and, in fact, by declaring that to be impracticable and false,
which the lines of Torres Vedras will for ever testify to be
practicable and true. — This lengthened debate, ostensibly upon
the affairs of Spain, in which Lord Wellington and his noble
brother acted such conspicuous parts, but, virtually, upon the
incapacity of the ministry, was closed by Mr. Spencer Perceval,
in a speech characterised by mildness and discretion. Having
spoken to the principal points of impeachment against his col-
leagues and himself, he concluded nearly as follows ; " I cannot
avoid expressing my regret at the manner in which Lord Wel-
lington has been attacked in his absence : if such practice
were persisted in, it would damp the ardour and check the
spirit of our officers, for they would go out to fight the battles
of their country, with the melancholy conviction that, however
great their exertions might be, their political adversaries
would, in their absence, seize eagerly upon every little event
that could be construed into a disaster, for the purpose of
wounding their feelings, depreciating their services, and attack-
ing their characters. With respect to the late campaign, it
entailed no disgrace upon our arms ; on the contrary, as the
movements of Sir J. Moore, in 1808, and the battle of Corunna,
had saved the north of Spain that year, so he felt convinced
the expulsion of Soult from Portugal, and the victory of Tala-
vera, had saved the southern provinces in the year following."

Thus ended the first angry debate upon the battle of
Talavera, in which, perhaps, more injustice was done to the
character and services of Wellington, than in any that had
preceded, or ever afterwards took place. So entirely did the
foreign policy of the nation engross the attention of both
houses of parliament, that the investigation of the failure of an
expedition to the Scheldt absorbed three successive months :
the debates upon the battle of Talavera, although prior in
time, treated the Spanish question rather as a source of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 301

annoyance to ministers, than as calling loudly for legislative
interference. The debate on the address having closed with
the defeat of the opposition, that party took occasion to renew
their attack, in the Lords, on the twenty-fifth, that was, after
an interval of only two days. Proceedings were now com-
menced by Earl Grey, who considered it essential, previous to
entering upon a discussion as to a vote of thanks to Lord
Wellington, that it should be shown, by documents produced
to their lordships, whether the advance of Lord Wellington
into Spain was in the exercise of his own discretion, or the
result of ministerial instructions. Several noble lords followed
Lord Grey's example, in calling for the production of the corres-
pondence between the commander-in-chief of our army and the
secretary at war, although some, with whom was Lord Erskine,
confessed that they considered Lord Wellington "an able and
accomplished officer," and Earl Grosvenor acknowledged that
such valour should be rewarded, but not without an inquiry
into the consequences of the late battle. ISIinisters refused to
produce the papers demanded, and defended their conduct by
reference to precedent. Sir J. Stuart received the thanks of
the house for his gallantry at ]\Iaida, although that victory
might be termed a barren laurel, and no question arose as to the
vote of thanks to the officers commanding at Corunna, although
the campaign had been disastrous, and demanded inquiry. —
These arguments were not sufficient to convince the judgment
of Lord Grey, who declared " that it was doubtful whether the
battle of Talavera ended in victory or defeat," and, in conse-
quence, persevered in his motion, which was put, but negatived,
without a division.

The appearance of Lord Bernard at the bar of the House of
Commons, with a report of the address in answer to his majesty's
speech, was the signal for the discharge of renewed peals of in-
vective upon ministers and their measures, in which severe ani-
madversions, upon the conduct of the British hero, were mingled,
wantonly, needlessly, foolishly. — Sir V. Burdett designated the
Spanish campaign as a total failure, but did not accompany
his opinion with uncandid or ungenerous remarks upon the

n. 2 k

30-2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

brave men who were employed in the distressing events of
the Peninsula — Mr. Yorke replied to the previous speaker,
as well as to General I'arleton, an uncompromising detractor
from the fame of Wellington, by regretting that he should
continue to withhold that defence from a brother officer in his
absence, which it would so well become a brother officer to
make : he approved of the advance to Talavera, and thought
there was no part of the illustrious commander's proceedings,
that was not worthy of his exalted reputation. If there was
anything that might admit of the nice investigation of mili-
tary criticism, to which so few in that House could have any
just pretensions, he would select two points, the one, his
seemingly too great reliance on the Spaniards; and the other,
his not securing the pass of Banos, which Sir II. Wilson sub-
sequently held for nine hours against a force ten times his
number. These he considered to be the only points upon
which there could be any doubt. — Sir John Sebright thought
the ministers incapable of guiding the helm of state in the
storm that then assailed the ship ; and, therefore, condemned
every act and result that emanated from their councils. As
to the glorious victory of Talavera, as he ironically called that
battle, there was a glory of the soldier, and a glory of the
general. The glory of the soldier was patience under priva-
tion and fatigue — discipline and courage. This glory had,
indeed, been displayed in all its lustre at Talavera; but
although he admired the great talents of Lord Wellington, he
did not think that he had acted, in the advance into Spain, the
part of a wise general. He heat the French certainly, but he
was compelled to retreat, as if he had been beaten. — The
debate closed with an explanation from General Tarleton,
whose parliamentary conduct had been pointedly alluded to.
The gallant member stated, that the reason of his having
made his former animadvertions on the conduct of the officer
commanding our armies in Spain, was because ministers had
declared that the advance of our army into Spain was purely
his own act ; and secondly, because mbiisters unifonnhj op-
posed inquiri/. He considered that England always showed

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 303

a generous gratitude to her heroes, as in the case of Marl-
borough ; but the merit of WeHington was still equivocal.
He formerly blamed Lord Wellington for the convention of
Cintra, for to him he entirely attributed that disgraceful mea-
sure : and he now blamed him for his rash advance into Spain.
He admitted that the army had gained great glory at Talavera.
Never was there a greater display of intrepidity, fortitude,
patience, and everything which constituted the excellence of
an army. But the conduct of the general was a totally distinct
consideration; and that alone he blamed. General Tarleton
also censured the conduct of Lord Wellington in the battles of
Roleia and Vimeira; and in fact, up to the decisive victory of
Talavera, no act of the British hero had ever received the
meed of his approbation.

Scarcely had twenty-four hours elapsed, when the question
of Lord Wellington's military genius again became the sub-
ject of a stormy debate : on the twenty-sixth of January, Lord
Liverpool rose, to propose a vote of thanks to Viscount Wel-
lington for the skill and ability displayed by him in the
battle of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of July, 1809,
at Talavera. Instructed by the opposition already given to
propositions originating with the ministerial benches, he had
separated, in the framing of his motion, the conduct of the
army, and of the officer commanding it, from every other sub-
ject connected with the campaign ; and confined the vote of
thanks simply to the battle of Talavera. The battle of iSIaida
was alluded to on a former night ; and, perhaps, it afforded a
parallel, as far as being barren of useful results ; but in that in-
stance, the thanks of both houses were cheerfully accorded to
General Stuart for his gallantry in the hour of trial. Lord
Liverpool wished to direct attention, in this case also, to that
action which terminated in a brilliant victory, to the conduct
of the officer, and the army under him. His opinion led him
to the conclusion, that the march of Lord Wellington into
Spain was an undertaking wisely planned, and deliberately
executed. No greater prudence could be manifested than in
the admirable choice of his position at Talavera ; a fact

304 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

acknowledged by the French generals. About twenty thou-
sand J5ritish successfully resisted, and ultimately defeated
fifty thousand French ; of whom ten thousand were slain
upon the field of battle: twenty pieces of artillery and four
standards were the trophies of the triumph of the British
arms on that day. This decisive action arrested the progress
of the enemy, was remarkable for the military skill displayed
throughout, was maintained in a manner conspicuous for
tactical arrangement, characteristic energy of the general,
and pre-eminent valour of the troops. " 1 would impress upon
your minds," said his lordship, " that it is of the last impor-
tance, that such victories as that of Talavera should be re-
warded by every tribute of honour and praise this House can
bestow. If we refuse to reward the gallant deeds of our
army, by every approbation we can bestow, we take from
them every incitement to valour; we deprive them of those
laurels which constitute the soldier's honour and his fame :
which he thirsts after, not only for himself, but, because he
knows they will be handed down with derivative value to his
descendants. It is for this that he devotes his life to his
country's good : and if you refuse such a tribute to the tran-
scendent merit of the survivors, and the glorious memory of the
slain, you will act unjustly to the army, and disrespectfully to
the devotion of those who are dead. Spain considered the
victory of Talavera of the highest importance to her cause,
and conferred such honours on the victor as have seldom been
bestowed for any services. It filled the breasts of that people
with unlimited admiration of the British general." — The Earl
of Suffolk gave his opinion as a professional man, that Lord
Wellington had acted imprudently at Talavera and Vimeira ;
and, therefore, while he would grant the tribute of applause
demanded for the soldiers, he would refuse that reward to
their general on this occasion. — Lord Grosvenor disapproved of
too frequent acknowledgments of military services by the
senate of the country : he had an objection, also, to grant
peerages for naval or military successes ; and therefore dis-
approved of other honours, which had, in so conspicuous a

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 305

manner, been lavished upon Lord Wellington. He was ready
to allow that such heroes as Nelson or Marlborough were
entitled to the highest honours and estates ; but the battle
of Talavera he did not think entitled to any such reward." —
Earl Grey next proceeded to state the grounds of his oppo-
sition to any vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief at the
battle of Talavera: he commenced by repeating his doubt
whether the battle of Talavera was a victory or not ; proceeded
to prove that a victory implied an action, the result of which
was the accomplishment of some object connected with the
fighting of the battle, and that as the object of advancing on
Madrid, or of totally dispersing, or making the enemy prison-
ers, had not been attained, the conflict of Talavera could not
be said to have ended in victory. He denied that Lord
Wellington had displayed any great skill in the dispositions
which he made during the battle ; he thought the position on
the left had not been sufficiently secured, and the charge of the
cavalry injudicious ; he blamed the conduct of Lord Wellington
with respect to the Spanish troops ; he censured him for
trusting to information received from Spaniards solely; he
insinuated that the British army might have been well fed,
and comfortably clothed, by an allusion to the conduct of the
French at Austerlitz and elsewhere, ''who were better pro-
vided in hostile countries than the armies of those countries
themselves, by seizing on the enemy's magazines, and collect-
ing provisions from the peasantry." Notwithstanding this
total and unqualified disapproval of every measure of the
British general, in connection with tlie late campaign, and
upon wiiich deductions he formed his determination to oppose
any vote of thanks to him, Lord Grey concluded his observa-
tions by expressing the reluctance he felt in resisting amotion
of this sort, helievini^, as he did, that Lord /f^el/i/ii^ton was
an able, skilful, active, and oi/er'prising officer.

Lord Grey's impassioned appeal to the House was replied
to, in a speech of much elegance and feeling, by the Marquis
Wellesley. He complimented his noble antagonist upon his
fearless discharge of his public duty, notwithi>tanding the

306 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

painful circumstances which attended it ; he readily acceded to
the character Lord Grey had acquired for a generous nature
and liberal sentiments ; and congratulated him upon his descent
from a person highly distinguished for military talents and
services. But he, too, had a duty, painful in performance, to
vindicate the character and conduct of so near and dear a rela-
tion as a brother — of an ofEcer whose eminent qualities he
had such frequent opportunities of observing, qualities which
were attested by the universal voice of the officers and soldiers
of the armies he had commanded, and of those countries in
whose defence they had been exerted — of Portugal, where he
was almost adored, and where he was invested with power
little less than royal — and of Spain, where he was equally
beloved by the people and the government. The noble mar-
quis demanded a trial of his illustrious brother's merits, upon
public grounds, he endeavoured to disengage himself from
personal feeling, and proceeded to analyze and correct numer-
ous errors into which Lord Grey had fallen, with respect to the
motives and actions of Lord Wellington. He took a complete
review of the campaign of 1809, and set to rest for ever the
unfair, and invidious comparison, that had been so often
attempted between the services and situations of Sir J. Moore
and Lord Wellington, in the Peninsula, by showing, that no
points of resemblance existed between their cases, and that the
two campaigns were essentially different. With regard to the
single, the isolated event, the battle of Talavera, his lordship
contended that that victory had materially contributed to the
main objects of the campaign, by saving the south of Spain from
absolute destruction. It afforded Portugal time to organize
her army, and strengthen her military posts, it enabled the
British army to take up a position where they might derive sup-
plies from Spain at the same time that they drew near to their
own magazines ; it compelled the French army to abandon
offensive operations against our allies; and now Portugal was
placed in such a state of defence, by the breathing-time which
the success of Talavera had obtained for her, that she was
enabled effectually to assist and co-operate with the British

THE DUKE OF WELMXGTON. 307

troops. These were some of the ends attained — and were not
such achievements essential to the object of the expedition ?
and all these advantages were fairly to be ascribed to the skill,
the courage, and the activity which directed the exertions of
Lord Wellington and his army. The Marquis Wellesley's
luminous narrative of the campaign, and of the share his
brother had in its successes, satisfied the majority of the
House ; and the vote of thanks, both to Lord Wellington,
and to the inferior officers, was carried without a division.

On the first of February, Mr. Spencer Perceval brought
forward a motion, in the House of Commons, for a similar
vote to Lord Wellington and the army, for their services at
Talavera. He pursued the same line of argument laid down
for his imitation in the other house, namely, endeavouring to
separate the question of the victory of Talavera from the
general management of the campaign, in order to relieve it
from its ministerial associations. — His motion although prefaced
by no remarks calculated to excite the anger of the opposition,
was immediately followed by an amendment from Lord Milton,
calculated to defeat its object. His lordship entertained a
high opinion of the gallantry of Lord Wellington, but could
not disconnect the battle of Talavera from the general policv
and conduct of the campaign. To him Lord Wellington
appeared like an admiral who first ran his fleet amongst
rocks and shoals, and then evinced great skill and ability
in getting his ships off: he had brought his army into a
critical position, and was obliged to fight his way out of it :
they had voted the thanks of the house to the hero of Vimeira;
but were that vote to be given again, as explained and illus-
trated by the battle of Talavera, he should pause before he
gave it in the same way: he could not consent to a vote of
thanks merely for bravery displayed in the day of battle.
His lordship believed the ambition of Lord Wellington to have
been conspicuous on both occasions ; he seemed to have fought
for a peerage, certainly more with such a view than was con-
sistent with the conduct of a good and prudent commander. —
The voice of Mr. Vernon, in a maiden speech of considerable

.308 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

eloquence, was next raised in support of the opposition ; he
lauded the talents and character of Lord Wellington, admitted
that the country was already indebted to that noble and
gallant soldier for many great and signal services, and that it
might justly look up to him for the performance of still more
eminent achievements hereafter ; but he must for ever con-
demn the temerity which had exposed a British army to the
dreadful alternative of a conflict against a superior force, or
absolute destruction in a precipitate and disastrous retreat.
The exhausted comparison, between Moore and Wellington,
was also pressed into the service of the opposition by Mr.
\'^ernon, who, although ignorant of the facts in the case of
the latter, represented the situation of Sir J. Moore with
clearness, accuracy, and feeling. '* Lord Wellington might
have learned," said the orator, " more discretion from Sir John
Moore's incursion into Spain : he might have derived salutary
information from the recorded opinions of that great and
justly lamented general : he ought to have been prevented
from a precipitate advance into Spain with another British
army, by the example of the disastrous consequences and
unfortunate circumstances of the retreat to Corunna. Lord
Wellington had not the same excuse, nor the same excitement
to penetrate into Spain, because he was invested with large
limits of discretion, and had no officious or impertinent inter-
ference to encounter; he was not goaded on to the certain hazard,
and probable sacrifice of his army, by the intemperate repre-
sentations of a political agent, nor insulted in his own camp
by the presence of a suspicious Frenchman, impudently au-
thorized to control him in the command and disposal of his
army : he had not to contend against the arrogant dictates of
a rash and presumptuous diplomatist, of blind but obtrusive
zeal, seeking, by a display of devotion to the cause of the junta,
to establish a claim to a Spanish marquisate. The campaign of
Sir J. Moore was a melancholy warning of what was to be
expected from penetrating into the heart of Spain. He never
had looked on the situation of Spanish affairs with any very san-
guine hopes ; and when, against the great superiority which

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 309

France possessed in armies, and in able and experienced
officers, tiie resources of Spain were stated to consist in her
loyalty and religion, he feared for her fate. There were some
systems of religion, such as those which inculcate predesti-
nation, that inspire an extraordinary contempt of danger :
but he did not know that such was the character of that sort
of religion to which the Spaniards were bigoted. Neither
did he calculate much upon their loyalty to such a sovereign
as Ferdinand VIL, who had voluntarily thrown himself into the
hands of the enemy, and might be said to have resigned his
crown. If he saw the crown and the altar surrounded with
equal laws, and if he saw the spirit of liberty the animating
principle and bond of union among Spaniaixis, then he should
not despair of that country. He believed that was the princi-
ple which dictated the heroic resistance of Gerona and Sara-
gossa. The exertions which the patriots of Saragossa made
was not without its reward. As long as the Ebro should
traverse the province of Arragon, so long would the immortal
fame of the heroes of Saragossa adorn the history of the
country. He was not, however, an advocate for deserting the
Spaniards altogether ; he would wish to send them everything
we could assist them with except a British army." This pro-
mising display of senatorial eloquence was replied to by Mr.
Montague, who acknowledged the powers of the speaker, but
did not think they had been happily employed. Wellington
must have made an experiment of the honour, the courage,
the resources of the Spaniards by a co-operation, and he had
adopted such plans as were likely to be attended with ultimate
success. If a failure had taken place, in consequence of the
want of energy and unanimity in the Spaniards, such a cir-
cumstance ought not to detract from the glory of Wellington's
achievements, nor dim that lustre which the brilliancy of his
actions had reflected on his military character. The gallant
soldier was not answerable for such failures; he could only
rely on his own skill ; he set a noble example to our allies,
and endeavoured to instil into their hearts that spirit which
could alone enable them to resist the despotism of a tyrant.
II. 2 s

310 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

In the field of Talavera he had performed wonders ; surrounded
by every difficulty, he fought and conquered a French force of
twice the magnitude of his own, and placed the character of
the British arms on a basis of superiority unequalled by all the
world.

This just eulogy upon the abilities of Wellington inflamed
the established enmity of General Tarleton into the most
vehement indignation. He rose with a loud complaint of
having been attacked with the foulest obloquy by both sides
of that house, for the part he had taken with respect to
the vote of thanks for the battle of Vimeira, which, he re-
peated, was founded on a sense of duty, and a love of his pro-
fession. He next proceeded to detract from the character of
his absent brother officer, by an exaggerated mis-statement of
the battle of Talavera, attributing the successful issue of that
contest to the conduct of the Spaniards, and contended that,
on the whole, it was to be considered "a repulse, but not a
defeat of the enemv."

He next came to the account of the action, contained in the
despatches of Lord Wellington, which he designated as vain-
glorious, partial, and incorrect. Vain-glorious, because the
praise given in them to the Spaniards was not adequate to
their services ; and incorrect, because every line contained a
statement, which the circumstances of the case did not bear
out. Talavera had been compared to Agincourt, but there was
no analogy ; for a crown was won by the one, but lost by the
other. He could not permit any comparison to be made be-
tween Wellington and Marlborough ; and, placing his hand
upon his heart, he declared that he could not conscientiously
vote that the thanks of that house should be given to Lord
Wellington. — Lord Castlereagh took a review of the whole
campaign, in order to justify the conduct of the ministers with
whom it originated, and the operations of the general to whom
its conduct had been committed; and concluded a very lumi-
nous account of the victories of our army, by adverting to the
measureless abuse of the commander-in-chief by General
Tarleton. The honourable general had said, that " Welling-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 'il 1

ton fought for a peerage at Talavera." " I assert," said the
minister, " that he fought for it all over the world : it was
not at Talavera alone his fame was established, he had fought
in all quarters, generally opposed by greater numbers, but
uniformly victorious. He did not know how honours could be
more usefully bestowed, than upon such men and such ser-
vices; and so long as the principle upon which he was ad-
vanced was acted upon, there was no likelihood of the peerage
beino: dissrraced. It was true, and fortunate for the country, that
honours were frequently bestowed, during the late and present
wars, for military excellence, but that was rather a proof of the
talents and bravery of the country, than of any debasement of
its honours. While the country lamented the losses inevitable
in war, let the advatages that were derived be also remem-
bered. Let them remember that the army, with its acquired
experience, was worth tenfold what it was before ; and that if
it had failed in some particular object, in no instance had it
been disgraced or defeated. England now appeared before
Europe, not merely as a naval power, but as a military one
also, and recognized as such by an enemy who had experi-
enced our might in our victories, and often when, with inferior
numbers, we beat the best and most experienced of their
troops." The splenetic attack of General Tarleton was dis-
approved by every member of the House ; but there were not
wanting honest, conscientious, and excellent men, who were un-
able to appreciate the merits of the British hero, who saw but
dimly into futurity, and wrecked their fame upon the question of
his perfect knowledge of the position of affairs in Europe at the
close of the year 1809. — Amongst such persons was JNlr.
Whitbread, who, in a lugubrious strain, "could not withhold a
tear when he thought of the fate of so many brave soldiers,
and the (juantity of British blood that had been spilt in a
sacrifice to incapacity and folly.'' It had been stated, that the
principle object of the expedition was the defence of Portugal,
Mr. Wbitbread believed the contrary to be the fact ; he had
listened to comparisons between the British and French com-
manders, but they were not assembled to try Soult, they were

312 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

to try Lord Wellington with respect to his claim upon the
thanks of that house. There were, he confessed, prodigies
of valour displayed by the British ; but even in the famous
charf;:e of the twenty-third regiment of dragoons, he thought
that the general was much to blame. There was almost a
gulf between them and the enemy, when they made the
charge, and many were lost in consequence. Lord Welling-
ton had bravery, had skill upon other occasions ; but that he
should be thanked as a skilful commander for his conduct on
that day, he would deny. He would not agree to give a pre-
mium to rashness. The Spanish cause had become more hope-
less than ever. Neither could he agree that the army had
become stronger since than before its losses; and he regarded
our late continental efforts as calculated to sink the military
character of the country, though they had raised that of the
soldiery, whose gallantry was indisputable." — Generals Crau-
furd and Stewart rose with haste, to vindicate the character of
our hero from unmerited obloquy; and the latter thus con-
cluded the expression of his professional judgment. " As to
Lord Wellington's personal conduct at Talavera, he could only
say, that he was everywhere during the fight, and ahvays in
the hottest part of the action ; and in contributing his appro-
bation of the motion, he only expressed the general feeling
of the army." The penetration of Mr. Windham was too
accute to permit him to be involved, by either party, in giving
an opinion upon the merits of a man whose rising greatness he
had long foreseen, and whose consummate military skill he had ,
valued more highly than he deemed it prudent to express in
parliament; he felt convinced that the fame of Wellington would
make its course to the pinnacle of the temple, as his army would
cut their brilliant way to the highest degree of military re-
nown. It had been substantiated, he conceived, that the
battle of Talavera was a victory ; and why should they prevent
it from operating on their minds as such ? There was no advan-
tage derived from the battle of Corunna, except that the army
were able to save themselves ; and, even had Lord Welling-
ton acted imprudently before the battle, it ought not to retract

THE DUKP: of WELLINGTON. 313

or withdraw the weight of a feather from the victory he had
obtained.

France had generals of great skill, yet they had seldom secured
a battle, that the breaking of a thread might have prevented
them from achieving : the unproductive consequences were
not to be put in competition witii the military glory we had
obtained. If it were asked, would a victory that only acquired
military glory prove advantageous to the country ? He would
answer, yes, if military valour was necessary for national
strength : and he conceived it much more serviceable to the
nation at large than the taking of a sugar island, or a ship at sea.
Some fifteen years before, it was thought on the continent, that
we could do something at sea, but our army was set down at
nought. Our achievements in Kgypt first entitled us to the
name of a military power : the battle of Maida confirmed it :
and he would not resign the glories of Vimeira, Corunna, and
Talavera for a whole archipelago of sugar islands. There never
was a battle fought, perhaps, that was not open to military
criticism ; but who could tell what credit was to be given, what
confidence placed in the critics. jNlr. Windham regretted that
Lord Wellington spoke rather disparagingly of the Spaniards
on the day of the battle at Talavera : their general conduct
subjected them deservedly to the indignation of the British
army, and the contempt of the British hero, whose great exer-
tions were contributed to rescue them from an iniquitous
usurpation : still he was sorry Lord Wellington had spoken
so truly, })erhaps, of their share in the battle, because, however
insignificant it was, they were present, and that presence alone
must necessarily have been beneficial. As in a sea engage-
ment, it could not be contended that the hull of the vessel
had nothing to do with the guns that gained the victory : or like
a spear inflicting a wound, could it be said that the staft' was
of no service? so, with the Spanish army, he considered they
had done all that was required of them — they kept tiieir posi-
tion. If the victory was of no other, it was at least of this
advantage, it showed the allies that a British army waa invin-
cible : in his opinion, the battle of Talavera was a glorious

314 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

victory, and the commander on that perilous occasion was
entitled to every grateful acknowledgment his covnitry could
make him. — Mr. Ponsonby insisted upon recording his dis-
approbation of the conduct, his unqnalified denial of the
genius, of Wellington, and to entreat the government to recall
an officer so incapable of opposing the legions of France ; he
declared that he knew the British were unable to maintain
their ground at Talavera : he thought the victories in Egypt
and at Maida ought to have been sufficient to establish our
mihtary fame, without sending Lord Wellington to hazard
the treasure of the country, and risk the valuable lives of the
soldiers, where no possible good could result from it. Lord
Wellington had not been careful of the duties of a general ; and
while he acknowledged the bravery of the soldiers, and was
ready to accord them the approbation of that House, he con-
sidered the commander undeserving of any praise. Mr.
Ponsonby was an eminent lawer, an able financier, and at one
time held the great seals in Ireland — how gladly he would
have recalled this inadvertent commentary upon the most illus-
trious hero in British history, and have blotted out this record
of partisanship, or even injustice, will readily be conceived by
those who were acquainted with his talents. Had passion for
a moment blinded the distinct perception of an able politician,
who had so inconsiderately slighted the genius of his great
countryman, Mr. Canning's brief but beautiful eulogy on his
services must have painfully awoke him to a sense of error. " Is
this House" said the orator, « about to call the noble exalter
of his country's honour, the wanton waster of her blood ? He
lamented the loss that had taken place in the battle of
Talavera as much as any man, but war is a game that cannot
be played without risk and losses. It had been urged that
the parliament had been too prodigal of their approbation
in recent times. We lived in an age so full of splendid
achievements, that it was feared the spring of honour might
be dried up. This was indeed a source of high exultation,
and one in which he trusted the country would long have to
indulge." Notwithstanding the virulence of party, and the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 315

ability with which this factious conduct was supported, the
majority of the House refused to lend themselves to a measure
of injustice and ingratitude of such magnitude, so that the
thanks were voted to Lord Wellington without even the
clamour of calling for a division.*

On the eighth of February his majesty sent a message to
the House of Commons, recommending the members of that
assembly to make provision for securing to Lord Wellington,
and his two next-succeeding heirs, an annuity of £2000 per
annum ; and on the ninth, the Earl of Liverpool moved the
order of the day for taking into consideration his majesty's
message to the lords, recommending their concurrence in the
grant, to which an address, promising a ready obedience,
was voted, on the understanding, that when the bill came up
from the other House it was to encounter the most determined
opposition of Earl Grey, who not only then voted against the
address, and declared his hostility to the grant, but reminded
the House that " he had entered his opinions on their journals
on the subject of Lord Wellington's services." The question
being left, in the first instance, to the decision of the House of
Commons, from which all such bills of necessity emanate,
became a second time the signal for one of the most animated,
angry, and unworthy debates that ever occupied the members of
our senate. Notwithstanding that the arguments were precisely
analogous to those employed in detracting from Lord Welling-
ton's services and abilities, when the thanks of the House were
proposed, still the opposition adhered, tenaciously, to their
personalities, although the ministers that employed him, not
the soldier that served, was the real object of their assault :
they thirsted for the places and the power held by the former,

• At the same time the thanks of the House were given to General Sir John
Cope Sherbrooke, K.B., Lieutenant- Generals William Payne : Sir Stapleton
Cotton Bart, and Rowland Hill ; Major-Gcneral Christopher Tilson ; Brigadier-
Generals Alexander Campbell, Honourable Frederick Campbell, Robert Stewart,
Honourable Charles Stewart, Alan Cameron, Henrj- Fane, George Anson,
Edward Howorth and the other officers ; for their distinguished exertions on
the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of July, 1809, in the memorable battle
of Talaveni, Mhich terminated in the sitrnal defeat of the forces of the enemy.

316 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

while they, in all probability, were but little ambitious of suc-
ceeding to the duties of Lord Wellington : yet they had the
illibcrality to scandalize the individual whose duties they w^ere
both unwilling and incapable to perform, for the sake of self-
aggrandisement, and accession to political power. The opposi-
tion which the previous motion met with, necessitated the chan-
cellor of the exchequer to case himself in a panoply of defensive
argument, and to produce an incontrovertible and full register
of the services of the British hero : " In estimating," said the
minister, " the claims of Lord Wellington to the distinction
conferred upon him, and the provision proposed to accompany
it, they should consider his past conduct, and derive, from
his former distinguished services, strong accessary grounds of
claim for his present honours and rewards. He presented
himself to his majesty as the soldier who had extended the
glory of the British arms over India — he presented himself
as the conqueror of Soult, the general who had expelled
the French from Portugal, and rescued the inheritance of our
ancient ally from the grasp of the enemy. In short, he pre-
sented himself with such an accumulation of merits — such an
acfffrewate of eminent services — such an unwearied career of
victory and triumph, as obtained for him his sovereign's favour,
his country's gratitude. The minister deprecated idle compari-
sons, although he did not fear them : and as to the amount of
the pension, ,£'200O per annum, it was the same as that granted
to the gallant Lords Lake, Hutchinson, Duncan, Collingwood,
and to Sir Ralph Abercromby; and it was on the strength of
these precedents he rested his defence of the proportion of the
proposed pension. — Notwithstanding the express declaration
of the chancellor of the exchequer, that he purposely abstained
from the invidious occupation of personal comparisons, Mr.
Calcraft rushed into that unpopular and ungracious line of
argument, and undertook to establish the inferiority of Welling-
ton, by the absurd and puerile interrogatory system, " Did the
right honourable gentlemen mean to compare Lord Wellington
with Nelson, and a catalogue of other illustrious heroes who
adorn our annals ? He protested against calling any of Wellmg-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ^17

ton's battles victories, ascribed his elevation to the peerage, and
proposal of granting an annuity, to " ministerial foppery, and
the desire of obtaining the Marquis Wellesley's support in
propping up their administration." — Mr. Calcraft confessed that
he was totally ignorant of Lord Wellington's services in India,
vi'hich, however, he was sure, rewarded themselves, hut he could
not discover any merit in his services in Europe; he was sorry
a title had been conferred upon him, and wished the House to
consider that he had been rewarded beyond his deserts, in the
bestowal of that honour. If ministers wished to provide for
Lord Wellington, they ought to have given him some lucrative
military government, for he felt convinced that in one month's
time, when the fruits of Lord Wellington's campaign would deve-
lope themselves, public opinion would no longer be with the
ministers. Would to God, he exclaimed, the army were at that
moment in England ! for he had been alarmed by the intelli-
gence that Lord Wellington had promised to defend Portugal
with thirty thousand men : if such rash attempt were per-
mitted, the country would have to deplore some such ruinous
and bloody victories as thatof Talavera, and to reconcile them-
selves to the loss of Portugal, and perhaps of the whole British
army in addition. This singularly false prophecy, false in all
save a single sentence, which was, that " Lord Wellington
might in time become an excellent officer," was followed by a
mild and eloquent recommendation of that soldier's claims to
the gratitude of his country, by Mr. Robinson, who reminded
the opposition, " that Lord Wellington, though young in years,
was old in military glory. When posterity, said he, should
peruse the page of history, brightened with the names of Assaye,
Argaum, Roleia, Mmcira, Douro, and Talavera, they must
look for their reward in the honours bestowed on the hero
who led Britons to glorious victory on so many splendid occa-
sions : he repudiated the idea that honours were heaped on
Wellington to buy over the parliamentary support of the
Marquis Wellesley : if there was an individual connected with
the aristocracy who was more anxious than another to confer
honours upon the hero, it was Lord Castlcreagh, and the
11. 2'r

318 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

observations did not then apply to him : he, Mr. Robinson,
considered Lord Wellington an honour to his country, as he
knew that he was the boast of his contemporaries. Lord
Wellington was honoured because he deserved honour, and he
might say of him, as was feelingly said of Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby by Lord Hutchinson, "His name is an honour to his
country — it will meet the applause J his contemporaries, and
be embalmed in the recollections of a grateful posterity." — The
various misrepresentations of W^ellington's operations, made
by the opposition members, were very clearly corrected by
General Craufurd, who, however, indulged in a strain of pane-
gyric that did credit to his excellence of heart, but was not
required on the occasion, for those who intentionally under-
valued the services of Wellington, would not be convinced by any
reasoning, and those who were really ignorant would attach
but little importance to the fervid language of friendship. He
declared, however, " that Lord Wellington had foreseen and
provided for every thing that happened during that arduous
campaign ; that he was adored in every country which had been
the seat of war — and was it only in his own that he should be
refused a reward ? If the question of his great merits were
put to the army, they would, in support of them, almost fall
down and enthusiastically worship him." It was urged by
several members, in the course of this protracted opposition,
that the battle of Talavera was as valuable in its consequences,
as any other that had been fought during the war, and that, as
to the retreat of the British subsequently, in that respect it
was analogous to two of the most memorable victories in
our history, Agincourt and Dettingen. — Entirely convinced of
the splendid talents of Wellington, General Loftus declined
any vindication of his conduct in the late campaign, but came
forward to add the tribute of his admiration of his private
character : " he believed that Lord Wellington was not rich ;
he knew that he had always been one of the most liberal men
in existence, and from which he concluded, that the peerage,
with totally inadequate resources, would be a mere mockery
on the part of his country."

\riua.vir wilberforce. esq.

'^y^^tlO

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 319

Sir Francis Burdett confined his opposition almost exclu-
sively to an attack upon ministers, and, evincinnr as little fore-
sight into coming events as the least able of his coadjutors,
regretted that Lord Wellington had not been made governor
of Portsmouth, or pushed into some other situation, as the
tellership of the exchequer, the salary of which would be an
equivalent for his past services. — The opposition of Mr. Whit-
bread on this occasion was less candid, fair, and liberal than
usual : he recapitulated every argument that had been ad-
vanced, however futile or groundless, against the grant; he
almost contradicted the very opinions he so frequently ex-
pressed on former occasions, of the military skill of Lord Wel-
lington. He denied that the gallant officer was a persecuted
man ; on the contrary, he had been loaded with honours, and
was beloved by the army ; but as he had an opportunity of
accumulating wealth in India, it would be a scandalous pro-
fusion and waste of public money to grant him a pension of
£•2,000 per annum. — Mr, Wellesley Pole felt called upon to
set the House right as to Lord Wellington's circumstances,
and, in so doing, took occasion to mention, that so far from
his gallant brother " having fought for a peerage," that the
honour was altogether unexpected, and never solicited; and
that when the king was advised to raise him to the peerage,
the awkward task of choosing a title, without the least idea of
his brother's wishes on the subject, devolved on him ; with re-
spect to property, Lord Wellington was possessed of £'20,000*
precisely.

The cause of the absent general found amongst its sup-
porters the meek and amiable Wilberforce, who gave the
powerful aid of his clear reasoning powers, unalloyed by the
evil spirit of party, to its defence. He asked the House,

• The manner in which he iicquired this sum was as follows: — At the tak-
ing of Si'ringHi)atam, a grant of £5,000; after tlie Mahratta war, jC*2o,000. ;
£4,000 as Civil Commissioner in the Mysore ; and £'2,(XX) arrears of pay. These
sums, with interest, made .Cl.'),000, which he brought from India. Of these
sums he had expended £3,000 at this period, and had settled £20,000, together
with X'G.'KJO, her own fortune, on the Viscountess Wellington.

3-20 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

whether if Lord WelUngton had devoted the great talents
which it was confessed belonged to him, to the profession of the
bar, or to any other liberal pursuit in society, he would not
have rendered them infinitely more productive than it appeared
he had done by actively employing them in the service of his
country ? Would the country be reconciled to that House, he
demanded, if it acted illiberally towards such a man ? Illibe-
rality in the then state of Europe, would not only be unjust
but impolitic. He had chosen a profession pregnant with
risk, and which led alone to danger and to fame. That fame
he had secured ; but would his country leave him to the enjoy-
ment of that fame, accompanied by want? Would an example
so degrading to national character, injurious to national
interests, calculated to damp the spirit of that army upon
which the country relied for the recovery of peace, be now
presented? He (Mr. Wilberforce) had been informed by
persons who were competent judges, that there was not living
a more perfect soldier than Lord Wellington. That gallant
officer was as forward to share the fatigues, as he was the
dantrers, of the troops under his command. His comprehensive
mind embraced every department of the army ; he was truly
the soldier's friend. He attended to their comforts, he pro-
vided for their necessities, and gained their confidence without
forfeiting the esteem of the officers. — It was the opinion of Mr.
Windham, who was equally independent in that House as the
strenuous advocate for justice, humanity, and truth, who
preceded him, that no one could seriously doubt the merits of
Lord Wellington, or his just claims to the honour that had
been conferred upon him by the king ; and those who wished
to detract from them had nothing to oppose but uncertain
demerit. He did not, however, see the necessity for granting
him a pension. Ungenerous comparisons had been instituted
between the services of Nelson and Wellington ; he would not
follow that improper course, because he did not look upon
comparisons as the true mode of rewarding valorous deeds,
but he had always been of opinion that Nelson had not been
sufficiently rewarded by his country. — Mr. Canning agreed

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 321

with the last speaker, that Nelson deserved a higher lionour
for the victory of the Nile; but he would not degrade llio
honours of Wellington, to meet the scanty portion which the
noble and brave admiral had obtained. Should the flag of
France, which for years had not been able to look that of Eng-
land in the face, by any hazard obtain a partial victory, or
even offer a successful resistance, would Napoleon be blamed
for exalting the admiral who should acquire it to a dukedom,
a principality, or any other transcendent dignity ? Only two
years before, it had been said within the walls of parliament,
that we could never meet France in the field with an army.
The victories of Wellington had disproved this imputation
on our valour and spirit, re-established our military character,
and retrieved the honour of the country, which was before in
disgrace. If the system of bestowing peerages was to be
changed, and the House of Lords peopled only by the succes-
sors to hereditary honours. Lord Wellington certainly would
not be found there : but he would not do that noble body the
injustice to suppose that it was a mere stagnant lake of col-
lected honours, but that it was occasionally to be',refreshed by the
admission oi fresh streams. It was the prerogative of the
crown to confer the honour of a peerage — it should be the
duty of that House to give to honour independence. " If the
war was to be prosecuted," said Mr. Canning, "we have a
proud assurance, in the talents and services of Lord Wellington,
and the bravery of our armies, that we are competent to con-
tend with the enemy on his own element. If peace is to be
established, we shall come out of the war with the conscious-
ness of having obtained, not a partial triumph, but complete
and unqualified glory." With these observations the struggle
concluded ; the House divided, and the motion was carried by
a majority of one hundred and seven.

England, Lord Wellington observed, from her insular posi-
tion, was not a military nation; and, inca])able of looking to
the cool, cautious, prosecution of a ten-years' war, they con-
sidered that the arm of victory was only properly applied when
the beaten enemy were pursued, and either taken or destroyed.

322 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

They had not patience under the continuance of a series of
manoeuvres, the ultimate end of which was known to its authors
solely, and to them the retirement of an army was synonymous
with defeat. When first the British army landed in Portugal,
the people of England looked for nothing but disgrace; they
estimated too highly the character of the French troops, and
they were conscious of the inexperience of their own ; but
when the victories of Wellington had made them acquainted
with success, defeat was no longer tolerable, and despair was
succeeded by confident assurance. Tho convention of Cintra
disappointed the hopes of the nation. The failure of the
Walcheren expedition was an awful public calamity : the
skilful retreat of Sir J. Moore, a brave, experienced, and
popular officer, although the army was saved, did not satisfy,
because it was a retreat ; and from the retirement of the army
after the battle of Talavera, they now argued that a victory
could not have been obtained. In this illogical reasoning they
were injudiciously confirmed by the conduct of one of the most
violent oppositions that ever resisted the movements of our
government : and so deeply was the venom of their virulence
diffused through the capital, already discontented at the
extinction of all hopes of a speedy close to the contest, that
the common-council of the city of London, carried along
with the current, which a party in the House of parliament had
directed against Lord Wellington and his plans for the defence
of Portugal, in the first instance drew up a petition to the
crown, praying for an inquiry into the circumstances of the
late campaign in the Peninsula, and subsequently entreated
the Commons House of Parliament not to grant, to the gallant
defender of his country, a pension which his majesty had
recommended. To those who are familiar with the history of
many nations, it will excite no surprise to find that Wel-
lington's path to fame was much and frequently obstructed,
that injustice and ingratitude had often been his portion in
return for eminent services, and that those very acts of his life
which drew down upon him the heaviest censures he ever
received, are those by which he has immortalized his name,

THE DUKE OE WELLINGTOX. 323

and saved his country. Of this truth a sufficient demonstration
will be afforded by his own able vindication of his lengthened halt
in the vicinity of Badajoz, and of his apparent dilatoriness
previous to his retirement behind the lines of Torres Vedras.
At this period, however, the outcry of party was loud against his
conduct : his former services were forgotten, he was taunted
with every species of mental infirmity, treason excepted, in the
midst of which, both the violent attacks of domestic enemies, and
faitiiful and zealous support of his former friends, he displayed
that firmness and magnanimity which never forsook him, and
saw that the clouds of folly would quickly evaporate, and the
calm light of reason return, and that he, too, in his turn, would
one day win over the uncertain people to his party. The
address of the City to the king being carried up to St. James's
on the fourteenth of December, 1809, experienced a fate which
will be found disclosed in a second petition, which the sheriffs
of London presented at the bar of the House of Commons on
the twenty-sixth of February, 1810, against Lord Welling-
ton's annuity bill.* The first address has not been preserved

• A petition of tlie Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the city of
London, in common-rouiicil assembled, setting forth " That they have observed,
with grief and sorrow, that a bill has been ordered to be brought into the
House for granting a pension of two thousand pounds per annum, for the
term of three lives, to the Right Honourable Lord Viscount Wellington ; and
they beg to represent to the House, that a measure so extraordinary, in the pre-
sent situation of the country, under all tlie afflicting circumstances attending our
army in Spain and Portugal, under the command of that officer, cannot but prove
highly injurious in its consequences, and no less grievous than irritating to the
nation at large ; and that on making these representations to the House, the
petitioners are urged, not nujre from motives of economy and vigilance in the
present period of dinic iilty and distress, than from an anxious desire that when
such marks of national gratitude are bestowed upon any of the gallant de-
fenders of their country, they shall be given in concurrence with the general
sentiments of the nation, and in strict conformity to the claims of the in-
dividual ; and that, entertaining those sentiments, it is their painful duty to
state to the House, that, admitting to the utmost extent the valour of Lord
Wellington, the petitioners do not recognize in his military conduct any claims
to this national remuneration ; and that, in the short period of liis services in
Europe, not amounting to two years, they have seen his gallant efforts in
rortugal lead only to the disgraceful and scandalous convention of Cintra, a
transaction, the sound of which must be ever hateful to British ears, anil which

324 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

in any of the parliamentary papers, because it was never
received by his majesty, but is to be found in the pubUc journals
of that date ; it stated, that, " admitting the valour of Lord

has fixed an indelible stain on the character and honour of the country ; and
that in Spain the petitioners have seen the valour he displayed in repulsing the
French at Talavera, with immense loss of lives, produce no other conse-
quence than his almost immediate and rapid retreat, under the mortifying and
disastrous circumstances of being compelled to leave his sick and wounded
to the care of his enemy : and that, as yet, the petitioners have witnessed no
inquir}' into either of those campaigns ; and they conceive it to be due to
the nation, before its resources shall be thus applied, that the most rigid
inquiry should be made why the valour of its army had been thus so use-
lessly and unprofitably displayed : and that, in addition to the reasons the
petitioners have stated against this lavish grant of the public money to Lord
Wellington, they beg leave to remind the House, that this officerwas employed
in India for several years, in a variety of services, by far the most profitable
that can fall to the lot of a British officer : and that himself and family pos-
sessed for a long period of time, in that quarter of the world, the most
ample means of securing to themselves the most abundant fortunes : and that
since their return to Europe, the family has been in constant possession of the
most lucrative offices and emoluments of the state ; and the petitioners have
seen Lord Wellington himself enjoy the singular advantage of holding one of
the greatest civil offices of the government, whilst he was in the exercise of
his military command in Portugal : and they beg to state to the House, that the
Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Livery of London did agree to petition the king for
a rigid, impartial, and general inquiry into the plans upon which the expeditions
to Spain and Portugal were undertaken, as well as of that to Holland, and
into the conduct of the commanders to whom they were entrusted : and that in
direct violation of these established rights, the Lord Mayor (Thomas Smyth )and
sheriffs, when they attended to deliver the said petition to the king at levee,
were denied a personal audience of his majesty ; that they beg to impress it
on the House that such right was never before questioned or denied, and they
were thereby prevented from laj-ing their just complaints and grievances before
their sovereign : and they conceive it to be a high aggravation of the mis-
conduct of his majesty's unprincipled iiwA incapable advisers, that they have not
only placed a barrier between the king and the people, but on the very face of
these complaints, and in contempt and defiance of public opinion, advised bis
majesty to recommend to parliament the said grant to Lord Wellington ; and
that when the petitioners take all these circumstances into consideration, when
they reflect, too, that the unanimous and grateful feelings of this country have
never been appealed to for any similar remuneration to the family of the ever-
to-be-lamented Sir J. Moore, who, after a long career of military glory, in the
constant performance of his military duties, and receiving only his ordinary pay,
after having shed his blood in almost every battle in which he was engaged, at
length, to the unspeakable loss of his afflicted country, he sacrificed his life in

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 325

Wellington, the petitioners can see no reason why any
recompense should he bestowed on him for his military
contluet. Profiting by no lessons of experience, regardless of
the inference to be drawn from the disgraceful convention of
Cintra, and calamitous retreat of Sir J. Moore, a third army,
well equipped, under the orders of Sir A. Wellesley, was pre-
cipitated into the interior of Spain, with the same ignorance
of the force and movements of the enemv. After an useless
display of British valour, and a frightful carnage, that army,
like the preceding one, was compelled to seek its safety in a
precipitate flight before an enemy, whom, we were told, had
been conquered, abandoning many thousands of our wounded
countrymen into the hands of the French. That calamity,
like the others, has passed without inquiry, and, as if their
long experienced impunity had put the servants of the crown
above the reach of justice, ministers have actually gone the
length of advising your majesty to confer honourable distinc-

its defence : considering all these circumstances, the petitioners submit to tlie
House, that there can be neither reason nor justice in making the proposed
grant to Lord Wellington, and therefore pray that the bill for effecting that
purpose may nol pass into a law." — This petition, which was substantially
false, was, however, so far respected as to be ordered to lie on the table of the
House, and was supported by Mr. Whitbread, who considered " that the objec-
tions to the grant were put in so plain, clear, full, and satisfactory a manner,
as could not fail of making a serious impression upon the mind of every unpre-
judiced man." — Sir John Newport thought it " would have been well if
ministers had rewarded the services of Lord Wellington Ity the sinecure
place of tellership of the exchequer, instead of burdening the countrj' with an
additional weight ; while Sir W. Curtis, an alderman of the city of London,
expressed his unqualified disapprobation of the petition, and voted for the
grant." — The petition to the king for inquiry, and that still more ungracious
one to the Commons, to suspend their bounty, appeared to have originated with
a Mr. Favell, who commented with the utmost severity upon the conduct of
ministers, with whom he was resolved to identify Lord Wellington. It was,
however, strongly supported by the Lord Ahiyor (Smyth), Alderman Combe,
Messrs. Waithman, Quin, Jones, and Mr. Sheriff Wood ; while Sir W. Curtis,
Sir J. Shaw, and .Mr. Sheriff Atkins, who o])i)oscd the petition, were unable to
obtain a hearing. On the twenty-third of February, at a court of common-
council, Mr. \S aitlwnan moved that the petition be presented ; but, notwith-
standing the clamour and violence of his party, the motion was carried by a
majority of seven only.

II. 2 u

326 LIFE Ax\D CAMPAIGNS OF

tions on a general, who has thus exhibited, with equal rashness
and ostentation, nothing but an useless valour." This indis-
creet document, in which the British soldiers are not styled
his majesty's subjects, but the petitioners' countrymen, although
rejected with indignation, was inconsiderately given to the public
papers, from which it was transcribed into the columns of the
3Ioiiiteur journal, " where it now remains among many other
documents which their authors would willingly consign to
oblivion, but which history, looking to the encouragement of
strenuous virtue under unmerited obloquy, in future times,
deems it its first duty to bring prominently to light."

Ungenerous and impolitic as were these attacks upon the
conduct of the general officer at the head of our best disciplined
army, even their personalities failed to produce an effect upon
his mind injurious to the discharge of his duty : when made
acquainted with the character of the debate upon the king's
message respecting himself, and the motions for inquiring
into the expedition to the Scheldt, he thus addressed Lord
Liverpool : " With respect to home politics, I acknowledge
I do not like them ; and I am convinced the government can-
not last. What has passed in parliament respecting me, has
not given me one moment's concern, as far as I am personally
involved ; and, indeed, I rejoice at it, as it has given my
friends an opportunity of setting the public right upon some
points on which they had not been informed, and on others
on which the misrepresentations had driven the truth from

their memories. But I regret that men like Lord , and

others, should carry the spirit of party so far, as to attack an
officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack
from Cobbett and the 3Ioniteur, and should at once blame
him for circumstances and events over which he could have
had no control ; and faults which, if they were committed
at all, were not committed by him." Strictly attentive to
etiquette in all public matters, as he has always been cautious
in private correspondence. Lord Wellington, on the sixth of
March, acknowledged the receipt of the speaker's letter, com-
municating to him the vote of thanks which had passed the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 327

House, on the first of February, but, being couched hi language
so cold and formal, that it rather indicated something of
wounded feeling.

The British army still continued to acquire strength in their
fixed quarters, and, with the approach of spring, felt thankful
for the renewed health, which the milder season, more
wholesome food, and necessary rest, had brought them ; the
works for the defence of Lisbon rapidly progressed ; the com-
mander-in-chief distributed on all sides his salutary counsels,
and repeated his solicitations to his sovereign for succours,
for money, for continued confidence. His requests had never
been denied, if the power actually accompanied the prerogative,
but he had still to endure the mortification of hearing that his
plans were analyzed by the incompetent and bigoted, and
motives imputed to him by the prejudiced and factious.
Meanwhile operations before Cadiz proceeded with an unac-
countable languor, and the apathy of the enemy gave the junta
time sufficient to send for that obstinate, but loyal, old public
servant, Cuesta, and request the assistance of his experience
both in the cabinet, and the operations of defence. But the idea
was absurd; Cuesta was in the winterof his years, he hadenjoyed
but little of life's summer's sun; the misfortunes of his country
had imbittered his existence, and so clouded his farewell hours,
that acerbity and moroseness characterized those years that
should have been marked with resignation and tranquillity.
The point to which Cuesta directed his perverted talents,
during his residence at Cadiz, was a coarse vilification of the
dismembered junta, who replied with much truth and more
spirit, yet were unable to rescue their reputation from the
folly, ingratitude, and injustice of having suspected Albu-
querque, and deprived Koniana of his well-earned command
at Badajoz. Sullen and silent suffering was sustained by the
besieged, but so inconsiderable compared to the privations of
the Saragossans, and to those of the gallant garrison of Gerona,
that even their own historians have not chronicled the events*
In February, however, a tempest drove some Spanish ships on
shore, when the enemy making a rapid descent, took con-

328 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

siderable booty, and not a few prisoners, but the Spaniards
succeeded in setting fire to the vessels that could not be got
off. With this event alone, of any moment, the month of
February passed away. March came, and with it an English
envoy, Mr. H. Wellesley, with ample powers, and a British
general. Sir Thomas Graham, of acknowledged abilities. The
works that had been constructed appeared to those function-
aries totally inadequate, and it was proposed that the British
engineers should proceed to reconstruct, and secure the
defences, on proper principles. There was a little fortalice
called Matajorda, mounting only seven guns, but so situated
that its fire continually galled the enemy in their labours, and
from which they had once before been driven. To retake this
building was a point of honour, and an object of necessity.
About fifty pieces of heavy ordnance were concentrated upon
Matajorda, and its feeble masonry was seen to tremble, and
stone by stone to fall away, leaving the brave little garrison of
one hundred and fifty men exposed to the tempest of balls,
and the sheet of flame that issued from the fiery mouths of
a whole battery of guns. When sixty brave men had been
sacrificed to no purpose, when thirty hours had rolled over the
heads of the survivors in the scorching atmosphere of flame
and fire. General Graham* carried away the remnant of the
garrison, and ordered the bastion to be blown up. This
burst of devotion to their king was succeeded by the same
inactivity that previously characterized the siege : the French
cavalry foraged in the vicinity of Gibraltar, but Sir Colin
Campbell, governor of the rock, sent a detachment to Tarifa,
which succeeded in driving them away. A just providence
now restored fifteen hundred men to that liberty of which they
were dishonestly deprived by the Spaniards : these unhappy
victims were amongst the surrenderors atBaylen, and grounded
their arms on the security of Spanish faith, that they should
be permitted to return to France ; but to the eternal disgrace
of the Spanish government, their plighted word was not

* Afterwards Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B. whom Lord Wellington considered to
be " a most able and active officer," vide, Vol. I. p. 277.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 320

observed, and the prisoners were committed to the hulks at
Cadiz. Here they continued to pine in hopeless misery until
the siege of Cadiz was some months old, when, some of them,
more adventurous than the rest, cut the cables, and let the
hulks drift, with a heavy gale then blowing, to the opposite side
of the harbour : the whole fleet pointed their guns against
the flotilla, and boats were manned, and sent to obstruct their
object ; but in vain, the sea was too rough for a boat to live in,
and the tempest that blew was so swift and so strong, that the
hulks soon grounded, and the captives were set free. In this
state of fluctuating fortune affairs continued, and were likely to
continue ; the number of the English garrison, the quality of
the troops, and the ability of the commander, forming a com-
bination too potent for the best efforts of Victor's army.

The designs of the enemy in the central and northern parts
of Spain had been seen through by Lord Wellington, who en-
deavoured to frustrate them by defensive measures, but exhi-
bited no desire to advance. His army seemed waiting anxiously
around his tent, until he should have concluded the necessary
duties of the bureau, to follow wherever his cautious and ma-
tured plans should direct their steps. To mar the plots laid for
the reduction of Ciudad Uodrigo had all along been a favourite
object of the commander-in-chief, knowing that it was the key
to Portugal at that point, would intercept communication with
the north, control Castile, and prove fatal to the Almeidans : his
future movements therefore, previous to the retirement of the
British behind the celebrated lines, were all made relatively to
the relief of Ciudad Ilodrigo and Almeida.

The invasion of Andalusia was but a part of the grand design
of over-running and subduing the Peninsula, with numerous
corps under experienced generals, and simultaneously. Of those
operations that are more immediately connected with our ob-
jects, perhaps the attack upon Astorga is the most important.
In the month of September, Loison had been repulsed from
that place, with much disgrace, by Santocildesthe governor, who
immediately after commenced the restoration of the massive
old works that surrounded the town, and his hopes of future

330 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

resistance were still further strengthened when he perceived
the value of those modern works, that had been added during
the retreat of Sir John Moore upon Corunna. Junot had
calculated upon the reduction of this little indefensible post,
and, assembling in front of its intirm walls a force of twelve
thousand men, and sixty or seventy heavy guns, commenced
systematic operations. The activity of Santocildes impeded for
upwards, of a moHth, the formation of batteries, but, at day-
break on the twentieth of April, they opened with so much
effect, that a breach was soon made on the north side of the
town : this, however, was instantly filled up again by the walls
of an old house, which the besieged threw down into the open-
ing, by which they were enabled to resume their fire, and to con-
tinue it without any interruption during the night. Junot on
the following day summoned Santocildes to surrender, promis-
inp- humane treatment to the inhabitants, and the most honour-
able terms of capitulation; but the governor remained un-
moved, and the batteries were opened once more. The shells
that were thrown into the town did irremediable mischief, break-
inc^ in the house-tops, and setting fire to the cathedral : in the
midst of the confusion an assault was ordered ; the storming
party rushed up into the breach, which they found stockaded,
and resolutely defended ; but, continuing their desperate attack
under a close fire from both flanks, and from the houses in
front, three hundred men were shot in the breach, before either
advance or retreat could be effected : at this critical moment,
when the destruction of the whole party seemed inevitable, an
opening was found into the ruins, where the party made a
lod foment, and the ammunition of the townsmen being exhaust-
ed, the governor considered further resistance vain. His con-
duct however, entitled him to the most honourable treatment,
and such was the respect in which he was held by Marshall
Junot, for the defence he had made, that he desired his sword
should be returned, adding, "So brave aman should not be with-
out one," and granted the towns-people security of person and
property. Astorga fell, but the Spaniards lost no glory in its
fall, the enemy having two thousand five hundred men killed

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 331

during the short siege, and they would, most likely, have failed
in its reduction but for the want of ammunition in the town.
Content with his conquest Junotmarched away into Old Castile,
where the corps of Ney, Kellerman, Regnicr, and Loisson had
assembled, and where the campaign had actually begun ;
and movements commenced on the Portuguese frontiers. The
advanced posts of the French army, in the early part of the
month of March, were on the Agueda, and the main body on the
Tormes : the British advanced posts were also on the Agueda,
under the command of Brigadier-General R. Craufurd, who
was to observe the enemy's movements between that river and
the Coa, while Lord Wellington was at Viseu. On the night of
the nineteenth of March direct hostilities between the French
and English were resumed, for the first time since the memora-
ble day of Talavera, by an attack on the British post at Barba
del Puerco, which was occupied by four companies of the ninety-
fifth, or rifle brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Beckwith.* Opposite the Barba is the village of San Felices,
and the bridge, that opens a communication between these
places, is the only one upon the river Agueda below Ciudad
Rodrigo : recent heavy falls of rain had swoln the stream so
much that it was now nowhere fordable. The enemy had
collected a brigade of infantry in San Felices, and, under cover
of the darkness, six hundred men advanced to the bridcfe, made
the sentinels prisoners, and were pushing forward, when apicquet
posted amongst the rocks, fired upon them soclosely, that they
were repulsed with the loss of two officers, seven men killed, six
pioneers and thirty firelocks taken: Lieutenant Mason and three
privates were killed on the side of the British ; and the con-
duct of Beckwith, and of the companies under his command,
highly applauded by the commander-in-chief. This slight
affair was magnified by the French into an action of importance,
" in which the English had been routed at the point of the
bayonet." It may not be unnecessary to recapitulate here

• Aftenvanls Lieuteiiunt- General Sir Sydney Beckwith, K.C.B. He was
fiul)sr(|nently appointeil to the cliief command of the forces at Bombay, and died
on that stiition.

332 LIFK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

something of the positions occupied by the British after the fall
of Astorga, the junction of the French corps, the affair of posts
at Barba del Puerco, and the advance of the enemy upon
Ciudad Uodrigo. It will be remembered that General Hill
was placed at Abrantes and Portalegre, to direct a moveable
position, and observe the enemy to the south of the Tagus :
Picton was at Pinhel; divisions were also posted atCelerico, and
Guarda, and Viseu ; and Thomar was occupied by Beresford
and the Portuguese : Almeida, Elvas, and Algarve were gar-
risoned by the Portuguese, and militia of that nation were
stationed in the strong places of Estramadura : the main body
of the British formed the centre of this disposition, while the
allies, now well disciplined, were in the wings, and the whole
force could be concentrated on the centre in a few hours' time.
Pontoon bridges, at Abrantes and Zezere, facilitated the opera-
tions of Hill's division, and communication was maintained
with Castel Branco by means of a flying bridge at Villa Velha.
The British force under Lord Wellington, before the opposition
party in England became conscious of their foolish, and un-
generous, representation of his conduct and services, did not
exceed twenty-five thousand men, and the organized Portu-
guese under Beresford amounted to just thirty thousand. To
oppose which, the enemy had upwards of one hundred thou-
sand effective men, within a few hours' march of his position,
and were actually commencing the invasion of Portugal with
seventy thousand veteran soldiers.

Rumours were afloat, that so vast a force, so many marshals
of the empire, and a prize of so much worth as the throne of
Portugal, were honours too great to be conferred on other than
imperial rank, and that Napoleon was actually hastening from
the subjugation of central Europe, to conquer and enslave the
Peninsula. The jealousies that had so long existed amongst
the French generals gave, to this report, the character of pro-
bability at least, and those who felt that their own chance of pro-
motion was uncertain, envied the great lot to all others, and
secretly wished for the emperor's presence. Whether Napoleon
ever really entertained the thought, whether his recent mar-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 333

riage and cares of his empire diverted him from this object,
is uncertain, but the selection of a commander-in-chief for the
invasion of Portugal strongly proved the opinion he had formed
of the difficulty of the enterprise. His choice now fell upon
Massena, whom he had created Duke of Eslingen, in gratitude
for his saving the French army at Aspern — whom he had raised
to a rank above the other marshals of the empire, and whom he
fondly called " the favourite child of victory." In this general
were united the military governments of Santander, Asturias,
Valladolid, and Salamanca ; three corps d'armce were placed
under his command, and, in the inflated military phraseology
of the imperial school, this force was called " the army of
Portugal." It is not improbable, and cautious historians have
suggested the idea, that Napoleon intended to have rewarded
the long, able, and faithful services of his favourite general with
the throne of the House of Braganza, and, to ensure the con-
quest of that kingdom, had provided him with an army that
would seem to have been invincible from their numbers, dis-
cipline, and valour. It is not extraordinary that the em})eror
should have calculated with so much confidence on success, when
he reflected upon the vast power he had placed in the skilful
hands of Massena, and saw the limited amount of British, incor-
porated with the legions of Portugal, whose prowess he set at
nought : besides, whatever laurels the British general had won,
his own countrymen, publicly, attempted to tearf rom his brow,
whatever fame he had earned for British arms, his fellow-
citizens declared to have been the result of rashness rather
than reason — a sentiment which the French journals gladly
embraced, and published abroad to the world.

This combination of circumstances, leading apparently to the
inevitable conquest of Portugal, involving the destruction, or the
final expulsion, of the British from that kingdom, increased the
fears of the timid in England, and seemed to justify the wanton
attacks of the opposition upon Wellington's military judgment.
In the early part of the year, Lord Wellington had applied for
reinforcements to the secretary at war, and, sustained as lie was
at that period by ministers, his majesty did not hesitate to send

II. 'ix

334 Lur: and campaigns of

a message to the Commons on the sixteenth day of February,
stating his intention of continuing the war in Portugal, and
demanding pecuniary assistance from the House for that
purpose. This message was taken into consideration in the
House of Lords, on the twenty-second of February, at the
instance of the Marquis Wellesley. His lordship stated that
the arrangements recommended proceeded on the general prin-
ciples of the policy which had uniformly guided the conduct
of this country towards Portugal, as well as on that particular
policy which induced England to succour Spain, on the plan
of making the defence of Portugal auxiliary to that of Spain.
In the early part of those transactions which menaced the
independence of Portugal, it was proposed to take ten thou-
sand Portuguese troops into the pay of England, to be
commanded by British officers; at a subsequent period it was
judged expedient to add ten thousand more to that number ;
and finally his majesty thought it prudent to increase the whole
amount to thirty thousand ; the charge for which was estimated
at £930,000 per annum. Such was the general principle,
and such the actual conduct of this country to Portugal.
Now, if it appeared, said Lord Wellesley, that in proportion
to the improvement in their discipline the resistance of the
Portuguese should become more successful ; if their courage
and perseverance became more resolutely displayed ; if, true to
herself, and confident in her own means, Portugal should
show no disposition to crouch to the enemy, or rely entirely
for deliverance on foreign aid, on the principle of our ancient
alliance with that country, England should be prepared to
afford her every aid and encouragement that could contribute
to animate her exertions and uphold her resolution. Recent
occurrences illustrated this policy, and manifested the propriety
of observing its principles. When Napoleon first issued a
declaration threatening the invasion of Portugal, French
influence was predominant in Spain : Portugal possessed no
adequate means of resistance, and it was feared that the
designs of the enemy would be secretly favoured by the conni-
vance of the Spanish government. Yet under these discour-

TiiE DUKE OV WELLINGTON. 335

aging circumstances, Great Britain not only promised her every
aid, but prepared a powerful army to co-operate in her resist-
ance to the enemy : and tiiis policy was supported by Mr. Fox,
a man of transcendent abilities, and by Mr. Windham, whose
talents were perhaps little inferior. 'J'hcre was no reason to
regret the adherence of this country to the policy originally
laid down towards our allies. The defence of Portugal was
now beneficial to Spain, and Portugal was also the most ad-
vantageous military position thatacould be occupied for that
purpose, whence it followed that the occupation of Portugal by
liritish troops was essential to any aid England could hope to
afford to Sj)ain. If England had not changed her foreign
policy, and resolved upon deserting both Spain and Portugal
in this crisis of their fate, the parliament would not be justified
in refusing: the motion then submitted to them. Great
disasters had recently befallen the Spanish cause, and England
heard of them with deep concern : still it was neither politic
nor just to manifest our intentions of abandoning Portugal. To
withdraw our troops from Portugal, at that moment, would
dispirit the country, and induce her to relax her efforts for her
own defence : it would cast over the councils of England, and
the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and comj)lexion of
despair : would tell them that the hour of tiieir fate was
arrived, that all attemj)ts to inspirit or assist were now of no
avail, that they must bow the neck, and submit to the yoke of
a merciless invader. This would be to strew the conqueror's
path with flowers ; to prepare the way for his triumphal march
to the throne of the two kingdoms .

It was the deliberate opinion of Lord Wellesley that the
calamities and disasters which had befallen Spain were not
imj)utable to tlie people, but to the vices of their government :
and tliat it was the imbecility or treachery of that vile and
wretched government, that first opened the breach through
w hich tlie enemy entered into the heart of Spain : that de-
livered into hostile iiands all the strong fortresses of the
country, and betrayed her people, defenceless and unarmed,
into the power of a perfichous foe. If England should pro-

33G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

maturely withdraw her troops from Portugal, or retrace
the grounds upon which she had previously assisted her,
such conduct would justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions,
and Spain in considering her cause as hopeless. His lordship
declared his conviction " that every motive and principle of
good faith, justice, honour, and policy would concur in pointing
out, to the members of that House, the propriety of continuing
to maintain a British army in the Peninsula.

Lord Grenville replied to the eloquent reasonings of Lord
Wellesley in a speech of inordinate length and lugubrious
character. He called attention to those predictions which
had been despised, but nevertheless were all too fatally
fulfilled: his object, he said, was not a mere barren censure of
past errors, but, from the consideration of those errors, to
conjure them to rescue the country from similar calamities, to
pay some regai'd to the valuable lives of their fellow-citizens,
and to ask their lordships whether they were disposed to sit in
that House, day after day, and year after year, spectators of
the wasteful expenditure, and the useless effusion of so much
of the best blood of the country in hopeless, calamitous and
disgraceful efforts. He was persuaded there was not one who
heard him, who, in his conscience, believed, that, even the
sacrijice of the whole of that brave British army ivould secure
the kingdom of Portugal : cuid if he received from any person
an answer in affirmation of that opinion, he should be able to
Judge by that ansiver of the capacity of such a jjerson for the
government of this country, or even for the transaction of
jiublic business in a deliberative assembly. His lordship con-
sidered the enterprise to be utterly impossible ; and he should
be ashamed, he protested, to waste the time of that House, by
dwelling upon the arguments advanced by Lord Wellesley,
for the continuance of our military support to the cause of
the Portuguese. That Portugal could be defended by the
force under Lord Wellington was a thing absolutely impos-
sible ; and therefore it was that Lord Grenville perceived with
regret, that a measure of such, not only questionable, but
defective policy, should have been the first official act of the

THE DVKE OF WELLINGTON. 33 7

Marquis Wellesley. He was aware it might be said, that
Portugal, considered with respect to its geographical advan-
tages, was capable of being effectually defended : he was not
afraid, however, to assert, that against a power possessing the
whole means of Spain, as he supposed the French to do at that
moment, Portugal, so far from being the most defensible, was
the least so of any country in Europe. He could not suppose
that a country so circumstanced, with a population without
spirit, and a. foreign general exercising little short of arbitrary
power within it, was capable of effectual defence ; and he
looked not to the experience of the last seventeen years, the
melancholy events of the last month would show how inefficient
the barrier of a rising ground proves to an invading enemy, in
the improved system of warfare. He had no objection to afford
Portugal pecuniary relief, but he could never consent to the
continuance of the British army in Portugal, because he was
confident, that by so doing it would become exposed to the
same fate as that under Sir John Moore, or Lord Chatham,
and that in the prosecution of an object in which no man could
possibly expect success. — Lord Liverpool answered this prophet
of evil, by designating his opposition as " a dangerous and im-
politic appeal to the passions of the people, displaying to them,
in aggravated colours, the losses, the burdens, they were called
on to support." To the outcry that was raised, of what has been
done for Spain ? he replied, " The British had gained the hearts
and aff\?ctions of the whole population of Spain and Portugal :
an acquisition of which no triumphs, no successes of the enemy
could deprive them. In Portugal there was not a want of
British soldiers left unsupplied: in Spain, such was the deference
and perfect confidence reposed in our minister, that their fleet
was placed under the orders of the H)itish admiral, effects
which a cold, cautious, phelgmatic policy would never have
produced— strong and signal proofs of affection, to which indif-
ference would never have entitled us. So that whatever miijht
be the issue of the Peninsular war, England would always
enjoy the proud satisfaction of having done her duty to her
allies.'' — The Earl of Moira (Marquis of Hastings) censured,

338 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

with niiicli severity, the conduct of his majesty's ministers, par-
ticuhnlv their foreign policy which he designated as betraying
want of judgment, foresight, and vigour ; and their resolution to
defend Portugal, the climax of error, the plan of defence being
impracticable. "Nothing," he contended, "could be gained,
from the attempt, whilst the danger was certain. We should
be allowed to retain Portugal, under our present system, just
so long as Buonaparte thought proper." — Lord Erskine de-
clared, that as to the retention of Portugal, there seemed to
him a sort of predestination in the case, that whenever the
French take any country or any prisoners, they shall have
some of our money also." — It was the opinion of Lord Holland,
that to save Portugal, " a great pkm u'us necessary ; nothing
neutral or narrow, nothing minute, nothing temporary could
enter into the principle of such a plan, but, for this, qualities
were requisite, which no man looked for in the ministry :"' his
lordship forgot to direct his investigation to the vicinity of
Torres Vedras, where a master-mind was then ensao:ed in
designing the "great plan," and in prosecuting those very means
by which results were soon to be obtained, which his lordship's
party called impracticable and impossible. The address, how-
ever, was carried without a division, as LordGrenville's amend-
ment to neutralize its effect had been lost by a majority of thirty.
The opposition had displayed their strength, talents, and
desire of place, the last to a discreditable length, in the debates
upon the campaign of 1809; they now determined to illustrate
the extent to which general delusion may prevail upon the
most important events in history, and to show the difficulties
which Lord Wellington had to encounter abroad, accompanied
by the most heartless and ungrateful discouragement at home.
It was a propitious circumstance, for the future destinies of
Europe, that ministers placed such perfect confidence in
the genius, the mental resources of Wellington, and possessed a
full conviction of the wisdom of his vast projects for the restor-
ation of that balance of })ower amongst the kingdoms of Europe,
which the great military talents of Napoleon had destroyed ;
for, this conviction alone could have supported them, under

THE DUKP: of WELLINGTON. 330

such continued vilification by the pubhc press, and such pain-
ful iinj)eachinent for incapacity, iniheciHty, and want of every
feehng of humanity, by an able and popular opposition in par-
liament. The debate upon the campaign, past and future,
was resumed on the ninth of March, with all the pertinacity
that charactefized it at the beginning, ujjon ^Ir. Spencer Per-
ceval's moving the order of the day for the House going into
a committee of supply, " in order that he might submit a pro-
position for granting £980,000, to be applied in providing for
the defence of Portugal :" traversing the oft-beaten ground of
argument in favour of continuing to fight the French on the
soil of Spain, rather than on the shores of England or Ireland,
he contended, that " as long as there should remain a hope of
success in Spain, it was obviously the best policy of this
country to keep up the spirit of resistance to the French
usurpation in the Spanish nation." By continuing our subsi-
diary force there, the French would be necessitated to keep one
hundred thousand men ready to act against the allies ; by with-
drawing, they would be enabled to overrun all Portugal with
ten thousand men, and be at liberty to direct the difference be-
tween those amounts to conquest elsewliere. As long as Great
Britain did not separate herself from Spain, France would find
it extremely difficult to establish a trancjuil dominion in the
Peninsula : her power there would be limited by the number
of her military posts, and it would retjuire as large an army to
hold these as to make a conquest of Spain. — The sinister fore-
bodings of Sir John Newport were next injudiciously pro-
mulged. He considered that the Spaniards had not been true
to themselves, that Spain was virtually conquered, Cadiz alone
remaining in the j)ossession of the provisional government :
and, if England should persevere in the rash project of training
thirty thousand Portuguese troops, he doubted not that a few
months would see the whole of that body annexed to the mili-
tary force of Napoleon. — Mr. Leslie Foster took an able review
of the state of the Peninsula, touched upon the national
character of the Spaniard, and drew largely from history in sup-
port of his matured opinions. He thought, that theditficulties,

340 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

in which the extraordinary circumstances of Spain had involved
her people, rendered a decision upon their character a matter
of hesitation. To him the affairs of the Peninsula appeared
nothing less than an enigma- which it was no reflection on
any ministry not to have understood : a revolution bursting
out at a period the least expected, exhibiting 'events in its
progress the most singularly contradictory, and pregnant with
results which no man could foresee. While Englishmen boast
that they inherit and exhibit the spirit of their ancestors who
fought under our Henrys and Edwards, it should be remem-
bered that the forefathers of the present Spaniards were
engaged in a contest which is without a parallel in the history
of the world : the expulsion of the Moors, which took place so
late as the reign of our Seventh Henry, was the fruits of seven
centuries of uninterrupted fighting, and of 3,600 battles, in
most of which the Spaniards had been defeated. In the beaten
but persevering Spaniards of these days, Mr. Foster thought we
might venture to trace the descendants of those peculiar war-
riors, as easily as we recognize the sons of the conquerors of
Cressy and of Agincourt in the English who fought at Talavera.
We might trace the same individual fortitude and patience,
the same enthusiastic superstition, the same persevering insen-
sibility of failure, and even the same absolute indifference as to
liberty, constitution, or cortes, that distinguished the conquerers
of the Moors. He defended the unequal courage of the
Spaniards by reference to the national character through
centuries past, as w^ell as by allusion to the prevalence of bad
government, priestcraft, ignorance, and superstition, but denied,
and ingeniously supported his opinions, that our laurels in
Spain were barren. By our diversion in favour of central
Europe, which Lord Wellington's victories effected, the French
have lost in battle, in various countries, two hundred thousand
men, and it would require three hundred thousand still, to conti-
nue the war, and retain their position in the Peninsula : Brazil
and the western possessions of our allies were securely and last-
ingly separated from the enemy : the fleets of the Peninsula had
been rescued from their grasp, and the honour and miUtary

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 341

genius of England had been vindicated. Whenever the British
nation should declare " Fundittis occidinuis, neqiie habel
Fortiuia rei^ressnm" he would acknowledge that the limit had
been reached, and self-preservation called on us to discontinue
the contest. But our beaten allies did not yet despair, then why
should the victorious English ? It would be disgraceful to the
honoured name of Britain, that deserted Portugal should be
able to say, at a future day, " Whence these chains ? If you had
stood firm a little longer, if you had not so soon fainted, we
should not this day be in the power of our enemies." This
gentleman's opinions, clothed in the language of a scholar, and
bearing the impress of an accomplished statesman, were heard
with fixed attention, and are believed to have confirmed many
that hesitated, but they failed in deterring the devoted partisans
of the opposition from accusing the ministers of incapacity, or
from still further recording their own want of judgment,
of impartiality, or candour. Few, however, were so unlucky in
their prophecies as Mr. Banks, who said " it aj)peared to him
quite romantic to expect that a British army of twenty-five
thousand men, even with whatever co-operation Portugal could
give, would be able to maintain a war on the Peninsula, as
principals, against France." Had his evil genius directed him,
he could not have more accurately described as visionary,
romantic, and impossible, the glorious achievements which
Wellington subsequently proved to Europe were possible to
such a mind as his, although inconceivable by faculties that
were more limited. With some little explanation of the mis-
statements that were imputed to biin, in the department of
finance, as regarded the supply of our military chests in Por-
tugal, Mr. Iluskisson supported the motion, which was carried
without a division, the amendment having been rejected by a
large majority.

Thus ended the unwise attempt of the opposition in the
lower House, in the peculiar circumstances of Europe, to dis-
courage the gallant efforts of the only man, to whom, by
common consent, all the enemies of ambitious France looked
for assistance. It is vain to defend the conduct of the opposi-

II. '2 Y

342 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

tion on the ground that the administration was imhecile, or
corru])t ; the extraordinary difficulties in which the genius of
Napoleon had involved this country, did not admit of this mode
of assailing the government: the imputed misconduct of
ministers should not have been mixed up with the brave, and
decidedly successful, achievements of our army : the victories
of our troops should not have been undervalued ; on the con-
trary, it would have become both sides of the House to have
learned from the French government, "/«5 est ab hoste doceri"
at least not to detract from the praise that is so hardly earned
by the soldier in the field of battle, by designating the well-
fought field of Talavera as " a doubtful contest, or a barren
victory". Such men as Lords Grey and Grenville should have
paused, before they lent the sanction of their names, the aid
of their abilities, and the weight of their popularity, to cry
down the glory of our arms, to discolour the verdure of our
laurels, and, by their public resistance to further grants for
the maintenance of the troops abroad, expose to the enemy
the real paucity of our numbers. Fortunately, however, the
mischievous consequences of their incautious declamation
were obviated by the incredulity and suspicion of the emperor
of the French, who falsely imagined that these patriotic noble-
men would never have been guilty of betraying to the enemy
the weakness of their country's arm.s : he therefore looked on
it as an artifice practised for the purpose of delusion, a snare
laid for the deception and the capture of his Peninsular army.
A few days' respite being allowed to ministers by the opposi-
tion, the contest was resumed in the House of Lords by Lord
Grenville on the thirtieth of March, in the same unfair and
injurious spirit: unfair as regarded Lord Wellington, whose
plans were unknown to his political opponents ; injurious, as
exposing to the enemy the weakness of the British army, and
our want of confidence in both the Spanish and Portuguese.
The most remarkable circumstance connected with Lord
Grenville's attack on this occasion was its inconsistency; the
whole tenor of a lengthened address being a crimination of
ministers, for having given publicity to the despatches from

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 343

our envoys in Spain, while every act of the party, with which
he was identified, contributed, in a more mischievous manner,
to the same eifect. — The Marquis Wellesley seized on the
advantage which this injudicious attack afforded : he regretted
the pubhcation of documents bearing personal allusion to the
Spanish generals then engaged in the service of their country ;
but the distrust and the clamour of the opposition compelled
ministers to produce them to the House ; the publication,
therefore, was caused by those who subsequently made their
contents the subject of debate : it was immaterial what reflec-
tions were cast upon the central junta by the papers before
the House, as tha[ body no longer existed ; whatever incon-
venience or evil therefore might follow the publication of these
despatches, the opposition alone were responsible for; and
one advantage would undoubtedly attend it, which was, the
removal of an accumulation of error from the minds of the people
of England, as to the real cause of our victories in the Penin-
sula being apparently barren. — Earl Grey followed in the
same strain of sarcasm, with which he had taunted and pursued
ministers from the commencement of the session, imputing,
however, a larger share of blame, personally, to Lord Welling-
ton, than any other member had the boldness to do : he insinu-
ated that the gallant commander at 'I'alavera was completely
mistaken in attributing \'enegas' movements to the secret
instructions of the junta; the real explanation of his conduct
being referable to his knowledge of the scarcity of provisions
in the French army. His lordship concluded by declaring
that the ministers " had been guilty of a great crime in pro-
ducing the despatches in question, and that Lord Wellesley
had, in consequence, shown himself totally insufficient to dis-
charge the duties of the situation he then filled." It was only
on the sixth day from the utterance of this sentiment, that
the same nobleman, in his place in parliament, called upon the
same minister for the production not only of those papers
received from Spain iitice his accession to oflice, but those
transmitted to his preikcessor also.

In this untoward u anner the goveinnienl of Eughuui pro-

344 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ceeded in its measures of foreign policy : every plan pro-
posed by ministers, in the Upper House, encountered the oppo-
sition of Lords Grey and Grenville, to whose custody the popu-
lar party had confided their cause : in the Commons, the oppo-
sition was more decided, probably, if talent alone were taken
into account; and, without the walls of parliament, the city of
London contributed the weight of their declaration, as repre-
sentatives of the greatest commercial city in the world, to echo
the sentiments of the opposition. This heavy discouragement
merely tested the worth of the great man, whose splendid views
of military glory seemed to acquire greater firmness by pressure,
as solid, and substantial bodies are accustomed to do : his zeal
continued unabated ; he raised his hand in a monitory, not a
menacing manner, against his countrymen : he only prayed a
patient hearing, a favourable construction of his motives : he
pitied their folly, their fatuity ; he felt an inward ability to sur-
mount all obstacles ; he saw the rays of hope shine clearly
through the dark veil of ills that overshadowed Portugal : he
hailed the omen, like the emperor of the East, and fell pros-
trate before his destiny, but rose to conquer. Field operations
were suspended by the British, but mental activity prevailed :
Wellington, Hill, and Beresford exercised the most vigilant
watchfulness, but caution, and prudence, and wisdom could
accomplish no more than these gallant officers had already
performed. They could not resist the vast wave that was
accumulating, and rolling on its majestic volume over the petty
armies of Spain, overwhelming them irresistibly and for ever :
they could not rise against the thunderbolt, and brave its
mighty shock ; the insignificance of their physical strength ren-
dered opposition as vain as that of finite to infinite : it only
remained for them to retire before the approaching deluge into a
secure haven, and allow the surges to expend their fury upon
every object that impeded them : it was the better part of valour
to escape into the mountain-cave, and abide the wrath of the
heavens. The British continued to display a species of passive
courage by keeping within their entrenchments, while the " en-
fant gate de la victoire," led on the chosen bands of the imperial

iuniraved- by T.A.I^eaii.

JvIAJ.K GEN! SIR IlKN'in TORRENS, K.C.U. Ic.

i'lSMFR. SON S: C9 LOITDON, 18*0.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 345

army to the invasion of Portugal and expulsion of the British
from the Peninsula, which Massena pledged himself to aecom-
pUsh within the limitof three hrief months. The first point of
attack to which the new commander-in-chief directed his
efforts was Ciudad Kodrigo, the ancient Lancia, or Mirobrigia,
one of the old frontier, fortified towns, at which the Spanish
army formerly rendezvoued, when the two Peninsular kingdoms
were at war. Upon this point Lord VVeUington had looked
with deep, but silent anxiety, for a length of time, as of the
utmost consequence in retarding the progress of the enemy,
and valuable in consuming their strength by every species of
petty warfare and obstruction. The separation of the immense
French army, which the scarcity of provisions rendered neces-
sary, was observed by Wellington, who augured well to his de-
fensive measures fi-om that inevitable event; and, although
he preserved the most rigid silence upon this subject, on the
actual theatre of war, he disclosed his sentiments fully in the
following despatch addressed to Sir Henry Torrens, then mili-
tary secretary to the commander-in-chief. " The French threaten
us on all points, and are most desirous to get rid of us. But
they threaten upon too many points at a time, to give me much
uneasiness respecting any one in particular, and they shall
not induce me to disconnect my army. 1 am in a situation in
which no mischief can be done to the army, or to any part of
it ; I am prepared for all events : and if 1 am in a scrape, as
appears to be the general belief in England, although certainly
not my own, Fll get out of it.''

Ciudad Rodrigo, or the city of Roderick, was built by
Ferdinand IL as a rampart against Portugal, from the frontiers
of which it is distant about eight miles : when the French ap-
proached in 1810, the works were weak, the ramparts old, and
flanked merely by afew towers mountinglight guns : many points
in thevicinity commanded the town; there were no bomb-proofs;
and the governor was obliged to employ the church as a pow-
der magazine : four convents and numerous gardens in the
suburbs favoured the operations of a besieging army ; the popu-
lation at this period did not exceed five thousand, and the garri-

346 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

son did not even amount to this number. The enemy appeared
before this bicoque, as Lord Wellington designates it in a letter
to his brother, on the twenty-sixth of April, and six thousand
inen encamped on a height called Pedro Toro ; a second divi-
sion arrived on the thirtieth, and on the eleventh of June the
investment was complete ; on the fifteenth the enemy broke
ground before the walls, and opened their fire against them on
the twenty-fourth of June. The perseverance of the British in
maintaining their position so immediately in the vicinity, frus-
trated the designs concocted between Joseph and Massena,
and compelled the latter to assemble fifty-six thousand effec-
tive men, before the ruined ramparts of an almost dispeopled
city, and to place at their head Generals Ney, Junot, and
Montbrun. At the commencement of 1810 Lord Welling-
ton entertained some doubt of the fidelity of the governor,
who was, at his desire, removed, and Don Andrea Perez de
Herrasti, the friend and companion of Mariano Alvarez, ap-
pointed to succeed him. This brave patriot was "a veteran
of fifty years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance,
and courteous manner excited respect, and whose courage,
talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance."
While the investment was proceeding, the French suffered
serious annoyance from the operations of a guerilla-band of
about one hundred lancers, led on by Julian Sanchez. The
sword of this desperate man was sharpened by the atrocities
of his enemies, who, having entered the cottage where he was
born, butchered, without remorse, his father, mother, and sister :
just as the murderous act was accomplished, Sanchez arrived,
slew the French colonel who had ordered his parents to be
assassinated, and, raising the bloody weapon towards the hea-
vens,' pronounced a vow that it should never again be sheathed
until Spain was free. The guns on the town-wall did some
execution, and Ney now found it necessary to shelter his
men more carefully than he had done at first : this was accom-
plished by digging a number of holes, in which sharp-shooters
were placed, to pick down the gunners and sentinels. Upon
the arrival of Massena, who quickly perceived that Ney'smode

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 347

of assault was faulty, the town was summoned to surrender
by a proclamation, in words nearly as follows : " This last
summons is by order of the Prince of Essling, whose honour
and humanity are well known, but who, if the defence be
vainly prolonged, will be compelled to treat the besieged
with all the rigour authorized by the laws of war. If they
ever entertained any hope of succour from the English, they
might now dismiss it altogether, for Wellington would not
have permitted them to be reduced to their then deplorable
state, had he the remotest intention of advancing to their relief.
It only remained for them, therefore, to choose between an
honourable capitulation and the vengeance of a victorious
army.

To this pompous notice, the venerable Herrasti replied as
became so brave a man and loyal soldier : " After forty-nine
years' service, I could not be ignorant of the laws of war and
my own military duties : whenever the fortress is reduced to
such a state as to render capitulation necessary, I will apply
for terms, first securing my honour, which is dearer to me than
life." This noble answer was the signal for the renewal of the
cannonade, wliich was continued, without one hour's cessation,
until the first of July, when the mode of attack was changed,
and the parallels pushed forward to the lesser Tesson. This
step was succeeded by the capture of the nunnery of Santa
Cruz, after a most desperate resistance, by the blowing up of
the counterscarp, and finally by breaching the walls for an
extent of thirty feet at least. The patience with which the
aged governor endured the privations and sufferings of the
siege, reconciled the citizens to their lot, and the example
of Sanchez excited the emulation of the young. Begirt by
such a force, with so small a garrison, his ammunition and
provisions being nearly exhausted, and the town laid open by
a ])racticablc breach in the walls, Herrasti felt that the hour
had arrived at which capitulation became his duty. Before,
however, the reluctant surrender of his power, he called the
brave Sanchez liefore him, told him his country would yet
require his services, and desired him to take his little troop of
lancers, and escape into the open plains. The guerilla-

348 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

chief submitted to the fortune of his country, and, assembling
his followers in the Plaza, he ordered them to prepare for the
expedition. At midnight they sallied from the gate, and, with
a chivalrous spirit, charging a cavalry post, they routed the
party, and took eight prisoners, •' Two women who rode be-
hind their husbands, were armed with pistols; and one of them,
Marta I'raile, saved her husband, by shooting a French dra-
goon who rode up to attack him."

The town was now almost burned down, defence was hope-
less, and the enemy ])ressed on the siege with more activity
and greater sacrifice of lives, every hour. At this crisis in the
siege, three French soldiers, with a degree of enthusiasm
superior still to courage, rushed from the ranks, ascended the
breach, looked over the smoking ruins of the town, and, in the
broad light of day returned to their companions without injury.
A general assault would have succeeded this extravagant act
of bravery, and every soul in Ciudad Kodrigo would, in a few
moments, have been required to appease the fury of a merci-
less multitude, had not the gallant Herrasti hung out the
white flag at the very moment that Ney was commencing the
assault. The oflficer who carried the terms of capitulation first
])resented them to Ney, who declined to receive them, adding,
" it was now too late." He next addressed Massena, who com-
manded him to tell the governor that he granted all that he re-
quired. After the surrender, however, the Marshal disgraced
his high rank by violating his pledge. Herrasti and the
junta were firs imprisoned, and then sent to Salamanca; the
clergy were arrested, and confined in the church of St. Juan ;
a heavy contribution was levied on the town's-people, who
were compelled to labour incessantly at the complete erasure
of the fortifications; it evinced a littleness of mind, to which
it might reasonably have been concluded that the Prince of
Essling was superior, to vaunt so loudly and so long over the
fall of this contemptible fortress ; yet it is certain, that, in his
despatches, he magnified the exploit into one, that valour, and
skill, and fortune such as his, alone could accomplish, and
incorporating, artfully, the meanest falsehoods relative to Wel-
lington's conduct, he endeavoured to exasperate the Spaniards

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 349

against their allies. " The English," said Massena, " deceitfully
promised to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, yet saw it fall before
them ; by which they excited the indignation of the garrison,
and the contempt of all Spain." The Moniteur journal lent
the assistance of its mercenary voice, to swell the unfounded
clamour, stating, in its turgid tones ; " that the cries of the
inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo reached the camp of Wellington,
who, like the crafty Ithacan, found means to close all ears
against them." In England, too, there was a Moniteur-party,
who denied the genius of their illustrious countryman, talked
of his mysterious conduct in quietly permitting the French to
take the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, and, when its fall
was known, they adopted the arguments and language of our
enemies. Upon this declamation of the French marshal, upon
the Moniteur journal, and its admirers in England, the following
extract from Lord Wellington's letter to Lord Liverpool, in
July, 1810, is the best commentary that can be produced
*' Adverting to the nature and position of the place, the defi-
ciency and defects of its works, the advantages the enemy had
in their attack upon it, and the numbers and formidable
equipment by which it was attacked, I consider the defence to
have been most honourable to the governor and the garrison,
and equally creditable to the arms of Spain, with the cele-
brated defence of other places, by which the nation has been
illustrated during the existing contest for its independence."
Nothing could exceed the anxious desire of the British general
to aid the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo ; and the thunder of
the Spanish guns that rolled over the camp of the allies, bore
along with it an evidence of the loyalty, courage, and high
claims of the garrison upon the generosity of the Enghsh ; but
Wellington did not require such awful reminiscents; he did
not deserve the bitter taunts of his countrymen at home, or
the reproaches of the Spaniards of Castille. He had, during
the siege, transferred his head-quarters to Alverea, a village
between Celerico and Almeida, not with any real hope of
succouring the city, but in order to oblige the enemy to collect
in greater force, to gain time, to take advantage of any false
u '2 z

350 LIFE AND CAiMPAIGNS OF

movement of the enemy, watch any large detachment, or seize
any favourable opportunity that the chances of war might create
to strike a sure and a sudden blow. He never intended to risk
the relief of the garrison, " being prevented by the certainty
that the attempt must fail, and that the fall of the place would
involve the irrevocable ruin of the allies." No incident in his
public life marks more strongly the inflexibility of this great
man's character, and under circumstances of no ordinary degree
of perplexity, than his resolute refusal to relieve Ciudad
Rodrigo. He had heard the cries of Herrasti and his gallant
companions unmoved ; he paid no regard to the murmurs of
the British, or clamours of the Portuguese army: llomana
came from Badajoz, having succeeded Del Parque in the com-
mand, to press upon Wellington the humanity of co-operating
with him in some plan for the carrying off the garrison ; but all
his importunities, backed as they were by the personal respect
of Lord Wellington for that gallant officer, were abortive.
Massena perfectly comprehended the sullen obstinancy of
the British commander, who could be overcome neither by
the supplications of friends nor insults of enemies, although he
(lid not hesitate to make a trial of the latter mode : he taunted
him with cowardice, and exclaimed, " that the sails were flap-
ping, and the ships were waiting to bear the heartless British
to their island-home." While he employed this silly artifice to
tempt and to test the decision of the stern warrior, he ex-
ercised his best military talents to decoy him into an advance
movement. But the same deliberate coolness, and absolute
self-possession, which enabled him to endure the sight and the
sounds of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a motionless arm,
contributed to the maintenance of the most watchful caution,
as to the stratagems of the enemy. In any attempt to relieve
this place, the operations should necessarily be carried on
in a country highly advantageous to the French, owing to
their great superiority in cavalry— the British had a duty
to discharge to the Portuguese nation, the exertion of their
best energies in obstructing the invasion of that country
by the French, and it was on Wellington's own responsibility

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 351

that he had advanced into Spain, fought the battle of Talavera,
and enabled the Spaniards to re-organize their shattered
forces ; his able views, and more able execution of them, did
not screen the ministry, who favoured them, from the bitterest
taunts of their parliamentary opponents, and actually drew
down upon himself the disapprobation of a large, influential
and wealthy portion of the British public ; were the question
now, therefore, to be reduced " to the relief of the Spanish
fortress at the risk of the cause of Portugal,'' scarcely an
option remained to the British general, the claims of duty
and loyalty must of necessity precede even those of humanity »
nor can a shadow of doubt exist as to the result of so rash an
effort. Wellington commanded one of the finest armies that
was ever marshalled on the plains of the Peninsula, those plains
that have been for ages famed in battle-story : their worth,
discipline, physical power, and loyalty, had all been tested, and
successfully, against the veteran legions that stormed Ciudad
Rodrigo, and there was no reason, even at that period, to rank
Wellington after Massena, in the scale of illustrious military
men, whom the calamitous age of Napoleon may be said to
have raised up. Under these circumstances, therefore, it may
be asked, why the British preserved their ground so fixedly
during the siege of a place which their general acknowledged to
be of the highest importance to the general cause, and the
fall of which " he always thought would prove a most unfortu-
nate circumstance, and highly injurious to the allies." The
answer is found in the following facts : " the enemy had col-
lected for the siege the sixth and eighth corps of the army in
Spain; the former consisting of 31,611 effectives, including
four thousand eight hundred and fifty-six cavalry : the latter,
consisting of twenty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty- six
effectives, including four thousand seven hundred and sixteen
cavalry, according to returns of those corps, of a very late
period, which had been interupted and communicated to Lord
Wellington. "Under these circumstances" observes, his lord-
ship, however much I have been interested in the fate of
this place, not only on account of its military and political im-

352 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

portanoe, but on account of its brave governor and garrison,
and inhabitants, I have considered it my duty to refrain from
an operation which it is probable would be attended with the
most disastrous consequences." Lord Wellington had also ob-
tained possession of a document showing the " emplacement'^
of the French army in Spain, on the first of June, 1810, from
which it appeared, that their force amounted to two hun-
dred and forty thousand men, exelusive of gendarmes, sa-
peurs, &c. To oppose Massena at the head of sixty thou-
sand chosen men, Wellington could spare but twenty-five thou-
sand, part of whom were Portuguese, untried and raw, for he
had placed twelve thousand with Hill, and eight thousand Por-
tuguese at Thomar ; and his whole disposable force in the Pe-
ninsula did not exceed fifty-six thousand men. With such a
disparity of strength, and on disadvantageous ground, he would
have in\Tited destruction, had he attempted to check the opera-
tions of the besieging army ; content, therefore, to await the
reward of sound judgment and calm precautions, upon which
his far-seeing eye enabled him to calculate with prophetic cer-
tainty, he decided that the time had not arrived when he was
to pluck the laurel from the brow of " the spoiled child of vic-
tory." The historian of the Peninsular war fully comprehended
the difficulty of Wellington's political and military position at
this crisis, and candidly and ably defends the wisdom of his
conduct : " It was not," he observes, "a single campaign, he had
undertaken a terrible war. If he lost but five thousand men,
his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fif-
teen thousand, he must abandon it himself."

Proof can be readily, adduced, from the Wellington corres-
pondence in the early part of 1810, that the British hero viewed
the French political plans for the subjugation of Spain as vision-
ary and unsound, and this opinion had reference to measures
that must have emanated from the emperor himself. On the
eleventh of June, in a letter w^hich has been already quoted, he
thu3 writes, "There is something discordant in all the French
arrangements for Spain: Joseph divides the kingdom into
prefectures, while Napoleon parcels it out into governments :

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 353

Joseph makes a great military expedition into the South of
Spain, and undertakes the siege of Cadiz; while Napoleon
places all the troops, and half the kingdom, under the command of
Massena, and calls it "the army of Portugal." It is impossible
that these measures can be adopted in concert ; and I should
suspect that the impatience of Napoleon's temper will not bear
the delay of the completion of the conquest of Spain ; and that
he is desirous of making one great effort to remove us, by the
means of Massena." From this passage the general principle
on which Wellington acted, in his resistance to the arms of
France, 'may be collected, and his conduct in the instance of
the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, is only a particular case of the
more general rule " delay," which he employed throughout the
compaign of 1810, and for the adoption of which he frequently
assigned his reason. Wellington was of opinion that the
enemy had extended themselves over too great a length and
breadth to be able to make rapid progress in the final subjuga-
tion of the Peninsula, and that they never could hope to ac-
complish that object until they should either have defeated the
British or obliged them to evacuate Portugal. He did not be-
lieve they could carry on the siege of Cadiz in the south, that
of Tarragona or of Tortosa in the east, and that, until the
British were removed, the whole machine of French military ope-
rations would be brought to a stand. The determination and
judgment of Welhngton, in declining to peril the possession of
Portugal upon the hazard of a most unequal contest, has been
fully justified by subsequent events, and approved of by the
ablest military men of the age he lived in : the Spaniards alone
could never be convinced of the expediency, humanity, or wisdom
of looking silently on while the French artillery swept the ram-
parts of a frontier town, and made a brave garrison and heroic
officer their prisoners. From the moment when Ciudad Rodigo
fell, the Spaniards withdrew all their confidence and respect
from the British, declined further co-operation, or even corres-
pondence, and seemed wavering as to the disposal of their future
allegiance, between Joseph and the Junta. This feeling was
80 deeply impressed upon the Castilians, that Lord Wellington

354 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

suspected it rested upon a foundation too deep to be observed
at first sight." " I never expected" said his lordship, " that this
event would have made so deep an impression on the inhabit-
tants of Castile, as it appears to have made ; and I am, there-
fore, apprehensive that the majority of them, with their usual
blind confidence in walls, and in their own prowess, have
lodged their moveable property in the place, and that the
whole is lost. In no other way can I account for the sullen
silence which they have adopted towards us since the place fell.
We have not received a letter from Spain, or the least intelli-
gence for the last ten days ; and the officers who are out on
the flanks of the army tell me, that not only they can get no in-
telligence, but can scarcely get any one to carry their letters."
This anti-British feeling was probably still further extended
by the prudence of Massena, who exchanged the rigorous sys-
tem which the French adopted towards the inhabitants, for one
of a milder and more conciliating description.

The district between the Coa and the Azava, had been held
w ith a degree of obstinate courage, for upwards of three months,
by General R. Craufurd, as it was desirable to keep open the
communication with Almeida, and with the right of the Coa,
as long as possible; but it was not intended by Lord Welling-
ton that any risk should be encountered or any loss sustained
to retain it. His lordship suspected that the enemy would
make an attack on Picton, Craufurd, or both, and had directed
the latter, in such case, to fall back to Vendada, between Freix-
adas and Caralhal, by moonlight on the night of the twenty-fifth
of July, and still further, if he should find that the enemy were
really in great strength. The gallantry, discipline, and fine con-
dition of the light division under Craufurd, and the ability dis-
played by the commander, in skilful manuvering for three
months in presence of the enemy, had excited the approbation
of his brother soldiers, and the admiration even of his enemies.
Flattered by the distinction which he deservedly attained, he
resolved upon performing something worthy of his newly ac-
quired rej)utation. To deceive, decoy, and perhaps cut ofF a
division of the enemy, Craufurd drew out his troops in rank—

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 355

entire, on a rising ground, and sending a party of horse to
the rear to raise a dust, and render a distinct view unattain-
able, he marched his infantry at a slow pace within view of the
French, to make them imagine that the whole British army
was advancing to the relief of Ciudad llodrigo. The spectacle
was not lost upon the French general, who immediately ordered
a recognizance to be made, which brought on the combat of the
Coa, an atfair that reflects much credit on Craufurd's enterprise
and bravery, but nothing on his caution or his judgment. On
the fourth of July, the enemy having collected in force at
Marialva, crossed the Agueda by a ford below the bridge,
galloped towards Gallegos, and, after much skirmishing, obliged
the British to fall back upon Almeida. This latter movement
was performed in the most orderly and beautiful manner, un-
der cover of a troop of German and British hussars with two
pieces of artillery. Occupying the crown of an eminence that
commanded a rivulet by which the Almeida road was crossed,
the covering party watched the movements of the pursuers ;
in a few moments, a column of dragoons was perceived ad-
vancing at a charging pace, and diminishing in frontal breadth
as it neared the bridge, this necessary weakening of the fore-
most ranks was observed, with the most extraordinary rapidity,
by Captain Krauchenberg of the hussars, who rode, with his
gallant Germans, with such impetuosity against the enemy,
that the leaders were hewn down, their successors effectually
checked, and the whole column driven back. The conduct of
this bold officer was much applauded by Lord Wellington in
this affair, as well as that of Cornet Cordeman and of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Elder, at the head of the tiiird battalion of the
Portuguese caqadores, who gave solid proof on this occasion of
the admirable system of military discipline introduced into that
service by the brave, judicious, and indefatigable Beresford.
The enemy, however, were too numerous to be ultimately re-
sisted by the gallant little band opposed to them, and, effecting
the passage of the stream at several other points, pushed their
advance towards Almeida, in front of which Craufurd's division
was posted, having Fort Concepcion between him and the

356 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

enemy. The actions in which Craufurd's division was en-
gaged, were each brilliant, hazardous, and exemplary, but
betrayed too high-reaching an ambition ; they were like so
many vivid flashes, but shed no steady light upon the object.
Finding that the enemy sent marauding parties for three suc-
cessive nights into the neighbouring villages of Barquilla, Ces-
miro and Villa de Puerco, he resolved by a coup de main to
take the whole party prisoners. Forming an ambuscade in a
wood on the banks of the Dos Casas, at sunrise on the eleventh
of July, he advanced, not so much to the right as he had at
first intended, but, as rapidity of movement was so important,
by a shorter route. This, however, proved the more tedious
from the inequality of the ground, and ultimately brought
the party upon a body of infantry, which, in consequence of a
rising ground, and a field of standing corn, was not perceived
until the British were close to them. Krauchenberg immediately
attacked them, but they had formed into a square, and stood
firmly, so that finding he could not penetrate the little phalanx,
of three hundred men, he passed on, leaving them to his left.
At this moment some French dragoons were observed comino-
out of Barquilla, followed, as it was supposed, by a squadron of
their cavalry, and another squadron appeared advancino' on
Barquilla. Mistaking these bodies for the enemy, the atten-
tion of Krauchenberg, and of the sixteenth, was diverted
from the infantry, and they set off, at a charging pace, against the
cavalry, who proved to be all either German or British : how-
ever, the whole party of French dragoons was taken prisoners.
Before these unfortunate blunders were discovered, the four-
teenth had come out of the defile, and Colonel Talbot, charging
the square of infantry without effect, was killed upon the spot,
and Major Herrey with the other squadrons, was directed, by
Colonel Arenstchildt to move to the left, and oppose the cavalry
near Barquilla, which also had been mistaken. By this accident
Craufurd failed in taking the square of infantry, who nobly
earned the freedom they retained, and which they fearlessly
employed in marching in perfect order into Cesmiro. In this
affair Craufurd took two officers and twenty-nine dragoons,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 357

while he had two officers and seven rank and file killed. Cap-
tain Gouache who commanded the French infantry, and who
made such a gallant resistance to our cavalry, was rewarded
with the cross of the Legion of Honour for his brave conduct on
this occasion

The temerity of General Craufurd would have excited the
apprehensions of any other commander-in-chief, but WeUing-
ton, confiding in his own watchful care of every part of his army,
seemed rather disposed to sustain the gallant efforts of the indi-
vidual, as a valuable example to his brother soldiers : scarcely
an hour elapsed, from the eleventh to the twenty-fifth, without
some despatch of a formal character, or memorandum of an
useful one, from his lordship to General Craufurd. He ordered
two battalions to support Craufurd's flanks at the same time
that he said, " he was not desirous of engaging in an affair
beyond the Coa," and requests that he may let him know how
his division was situated as soon as possible, and that he would
reply to his queries by the parte to morrow, or earlier. Re-
ports had been industriously and inviduously circulated, rela-
tive to the conduct of the sixteenth light dragoons in the
brilliant affair of the eleventh, under Craufurd's command :
his lordship, with the assistance, of General Cotton, traced
those calumnies to their ungenerous source, and at once
checked the mischief. His lordship was determined to abide
by Craufurd's report of the conduct of the regiment, and de-
clared, that he believed the ambuscade would have been signally
successful, but for the occurrence of accidents which could
not have been anticipated. His lordship's comments upon the
conduct of the idle and malicious authors of the calumny,
were accompanied by language the most encouraging, and
expressions the most gratifying, to all the brave fellows engaged
in the sharp skirmishes of the eleventh. To caution Craufurd,
however, in a manner at once delicate and decided, Lord
Wellington addressed him in a despatch, on the twenty-fourth,
to the following effect, " I believe I omitted to tell you that I
had lately got the einplareinent of the whole French army, on the
first of June, from which it appears that their force in Spain is

II. li A

358 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men. But I do
not believe they have the means of rehiforcing it much further.
I'his document, together with the returns which I have of the
French corps in our front, gives me a knowledge of the names
of all the principal officers employed with their corps : and any
paper which may fall into your hands, such as a requisition
upon a \^illage, signed by an officer or commissary, would be
of use to mc, as it would serve in some degree to show their
disposition, and w^ould aid other information. 1 have observed
that the French are singularly accurate in preserving the dif-
ferent corps d'armee in the order in which they are first
arranged in line of battle. The corps of Ney, Soult, Mortier,
Victor, and Sebastiani, are at this momentin the same situation,
in respect to each other, that they held before the battle of
Talavera, and Junot's corps has come in and been placed on the
right of the whole. Knowing the names of the officers, the
numbers of the regiments and battalions, and the names of the
commissaries attached to each corp, and the general order in
which they stand in the line, the name of any person making a
requisition in any place, must aid me in forming an opinion of
the disposition of the army. Hill is at Atalaya, but I have no
letter from him this morning. The fourth and sixth ca9adores
will be at Valverde and Aldea Nueva to-morrow, at your dis-
position." This letter was written on the twenty-fourth of July,
and although it breathed not the name of timidity or terror, or
even extreme caution, reminded Craufurd of the monstrous
number of his enemies, of their exact disciphne,and showed him
clearly that he was himself not above taking a lesson of prudence
and accuracy from his enemies, whenever they presented one.
In still further proof of his extraordinary foresight and anxions
desire to avoid an action on the Coa, between Craufurd and the
enemy, on the same day, at three-quarters before three, p. m.
he again wrote, saying, « I think you had better retire upon
Carvalhal, holding Valverde and the heights upon the Coa only
by your piquets, and communicate with the left of the Pinhel
with General Picton. So deeply seated was Craufurd's love of
distinction or glory, or so far had ambition clouded his judgment,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 359

that he could not reconcile himself either to accept the advice, or
even to obey the orders of his superior in command. Hitherto
he had safely affronted a greater power, but forgetting that
his stay beyond the Coa, was a matter of sufferance, not of real
strength, with headstrong ambition he resolved in defiance of
reason, and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on
the right bank. The advance of the enemy obliged the British
to blow up fort Concepcion on the twenty-first, and retire to-
wards Almeida. This Fort had been destroyed by the French
in the campaign of 1808, and repaired afterwards by Lord
Wellington's directions, it was now again left in the situation
in which his lordship found it. On the morning of the twenty-
fourth Craufurd's division was formed in a position badly chosen,
in front of the Coa, having one line of retreat alone open,
namely, by a narrow bridge across the river, about a mile in
his rear. As the rising sun chased away the mists, of the morn-
ins:, it withdrew the cloud that concealed the embattled hosts of
France, and dispelled the illusion with which the British general
deceived himself . twenty-four thousand infantry, four thousand
cavalry with thirty heavy guns, were disclosed in silent pro-
gress towards the Turones, a rivulet running nearly parallel
with the Coa. Still the British might have retired and the lives
of some of the most gallant fellows in the Peninsular army been
spared, for a better purpose than the useless affair of the Coa:
but Craufurd's destiny prevailed, and he withstood the impetuous
attack of Key's close and disciplined columns. The events
of this day have been variously related by the partisans of both
armies, and the jealous and malicious amongst his own com-
panions : the official despatch addressed to the commander-in-
chief by the officer who conducted the engagement, shall be
followed here in preference to any other : it has obtained the
sanction of Wellington's name, first by being addressed to
him, and subsequently by his adoption of its content after
the severest scrutiny. " On the first appearance of the heads
of the enemies columns, the cavalry and brigade of artillery
attached to the division, advanced to support the piquets,
and Captain Boss with four guns was for some time engaged

360 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

with those attached to the enemies cavalry, which were of much
larger caHbre, As the immense superiority of the enemies force
displayed itself, ours fell back gradually towards the fortress, upon
the right of which the infantry of the division was posted, having
its left in some enclosures near the windmill, about eight hundred
yards from the place, and its right to the Coa in a very broken
and extensive position, which it was absolutely necessary to
occupy, in order to cover the passage of the cavalry and artil-
lery through the long defile leading to the bridge : after this
was effected the infantry returned by degrees, and in as good
order as it is possible in ground so extremely intricate : a po-
sition close in front of the bridge was maintained with the
greatest gallantry, though, I am sorry to say with considerable
loss by the forty-third and part of the ninety-fifth regiments.
Towards the evening the firing ceased, and after it was dark I
withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retired to this place."
This brief, modest, and clear statement, dated from Carvalhal,
twenty-fifth of July, 1810, details the condition of Craufurd's
daring experiment upon the enemies patience, and the open-
ing of the approaching campaign between the French and
English. The gallantry and the service of the British artillery,
in defending the bridge, were never exceeded by any division
of either army during the campaign . Upon the first effort to
pass the bridge the enemy w^ere permitted to accomplish
about two-thirds of the length, when the whole section was cut
down as a single man, and the dead and the dying faUing to-
gether filled up the causeway as high as the top of the parapet:
shouts of triumph from the British rent the skies, but produced
no faint heartedness amongst the enemy on whose ears they fell,
for a second column, more numerous than the first, was in a mo-
ment in motion towards the fatal bridge, impelled by the addi-
tion of implacable revenge to their native courage; but the
unerring aim of our trained artillery again swept the plateau,
and the dreadful scene of carnage was repeated with circum-
stances much more appalling than before : a few of the enemy,
who had by a providential interference reached the other side
of the river, would, of necessity have fallen into the hands of the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 361

British whenever the action terminated, to rescue these brave
fellows, the enemy deemed a point of honour, and for this
chivalrous object, attempted the passage of the bridge for the
third time; but the stern loyalty of the British soldiers was
immoveable ; again the dread artillery flashed, and the line of
death was traced to a considerable distance beyond the fatal
defile. At this awful moment, a ])owder magazine blew up in
the French lines, which created some confusion ; one of their
heavy guns was dismantled; and, about four o'clock in the after-
noon, a shower of rain descending, the combatants sullenly
retired from the contest. The French loss on this day is
estimated at one thousand rank and file killed, while on the
side of the British, only eighty-six were killed, one hundred
and ninety-nine wounded, and eighty-nine missing.

Notwithstanding the deplorable slaughter of the enemy,
made by the British artillery at the Bridge, Massena, after
his great master's manner, had the presumption to claim a
victory, and, in his despatches, returned two pieces of artillery
as amongst the spoils of that day. I'he French general had
reason to retain a lasting recollection of the British artillery
in the affair of the Coa, but that indelible impression was made
by the well- served artillery, which thrice overthrew his brave
columns in their attempts on the bridge, not by the two light
pieces which he captured, as they were not British, nor had
they been employed in the action : these guns belonged to the
garrison of Almeida, and the governor had promised to mount
them, either on the tower of the windmill, or on the walls of an
unfinished building, from whence the enemy's cavalry would have
been annoyed : this promise he neglected to perform, and it is
probable that his indolence was a fortunate circumstance, for
such was the confusion, such the mixture of friends and ene-
mies during the whole affair, that had guns been discharged
from the windmill the shot must have killed both parties
indiscriminately. The affair of the Coa should not be closed
without some allusion to the conduct of General Picton, who
had been desired to support Craufurd, but refused ; this refusal
miglit have been attended with the most ruinous results, had

362 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Massena thrown his reserve u))on Craufurd's right flank, by
the bridge of Castle Bom. Picton rode up from Pinhel during
the action, and must, therefore, have perceived the perilous
situation of Craufurd's division, and, that it was not utterly
destroyed by such a manoeuvre as is here alluded to, was the
effect of accident and the chances of war. Colonel Napier
insinuates that Picton's refusal to co-operate, probably ori-
ginated in some personal difference of old standing, or of recent
occurrence, with his brave companion in arms. " Picton and
Craufurd were not formed by nature to act cordially together.
The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion,
caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first, promised
little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes,
quick movements, and fiery temper of the second : nor, indeed,
did thev often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they
had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes.
Roth were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command;
both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission
from inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of
glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were
enterprising and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for
skill in handling troops under fire. This also they had in
common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in
arms, fighting gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of
divisions while living, have since their death, been injudici-
ously spoken of, as rivalling their great leader in war. That
they were officers of rank and pretension is unquestionable,
and Craufurd more so than Picton, because the latter never
had a separate command, and his opportunities were neces-
sarily more circumscribed ; but to compare either to the
Duke of Wellington, displays ignorance of the men, and of
the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the
profound military and political combinations he was conduct-
ing: the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the
Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly
proffered his support."

The result of the affair of the Coa, in some degree changed

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 3G3

the circumstances of the British in that quarter. Lord Wel-
hngton, in his despatches of the twenty-seventh of July, thus
writes to General Hill: — "The loss which we sustained in
the affair at Almeida, the fatigue which the troops, who were
engaged, had undergone, and the badness of the weather,
rendered it impossible, and indeed, it would have been useless
to endeavour to maintain the bridge of Almeida ; and the loss
of the high ground on this side, necessarily occasioned the
loss of our position at Pinhel. I therefore withdrew^ the
troops to this neighbourhood yesterday, and CrauturJ's ad-
vanced guard to Freixedas, keeping only his cavalry posts of
observation in front." The other paragraphs of h.s letter
direct General Hill to maintain his position at Atalaya, till
Cole should have retired from Guarda, and to keep Le Cor's
force upon his left. His Lordship, conceiving it useless, even
if practicable, to prevent the enemy from investing Almeida,
abandoned the idea of securing that place, and the manoeuvres
of Massena were not sufficiently intelligible to the British
general to enable him to conclude whether Almeida was, or
was not, the real object of Massena's designs in that quarter.
In fact. Lord Wellington thought that there was not the
smallest appearance of the enemy's intention to attack Almeida,
on the twenty-seventh of July, but concluded, that as soon as
the French should have got together their forces, they would
make a dash at him, and endeavour to make his retreat as
difficult as possible, and in consequence, his Lordship made
his dispositions accordingly.

At the moment when Wellington was collecting his strength
for the combat, and looking towards the barriers of Portugal
before which the fame of Massena was destined to perish,
while he was calculating upon the surest means of retarding
those operations of the enemy which he was not strong
enough to obstruct, while in short, his clear judgment, and
sound military and political views, told him of the tottering
fabric of Gallic supremacy, he had to encounter the most pain-
ful interruptions from his allies, from his own countrymen, his
professed friends, the very ministers who had hitherto sustained

364 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

liiin in his illustrious career; for now indeed all Europe
thouijht the doom of the Peninsula was sealed, its fate irre-
vocable; and that the genius of no one man in Europe, even with
the powerful means that Wellington possessed, was equal to
oppose the countless numbers of France, led on by the " Child
of Victory'' the favourite Marshal of Napoleon. The disgrace-
ful and ungrateful feeling of distrust, the mean apprehension of
rapidly approaching danger, which appeared in Oporto at this
moment, was excited by letters written by British officers, who
were with the army at Celerico, " Persons who had but little
information or means of forming a judgment on the real situa-
tion of affairs." Of this base conduct his Lordship com-
plained, in a remonstrance addressed to Brigadier-General
Trant, in which he stated, that the inhabitants of Oporto had no
ground for the alarm which they had taken from two fooUsh
letters : and their conduct in creating a want of confidence
amongst the troops on the frontier, might have had the most
disasterous effects on their own interests and the general cause
of the allies. He recommended the citizens to place their
valuable property in security, although he had no reason to be-
lieve that they were in any degree exposed to the rapacity of
the enemy. He requested General Trant to communicate
these his sentiments to the principal citizens, adding " I am
as unwilling to deceive them, and that they should incur any
loss by a blind confidence in me which they could avoid by
early precaution, as I am desirous they should not injure their
own property and the general cause of the allies, by premature
and unfounded alarm." The fears of the Portugeuse, although
nearest to the source of danger, were more easily allayed, than
those of the despondents in England, who had opposed the
policy of Wellington so uninterruptedly from the commence-
ment, and at every step of the campaigns ; so that, from the
eternal repetition of censure ministers begun at length to
believe that there must be some solid foundation for these
arguments, and almost distrusting their own views of Foreign
policy, hesitated as to the limit of that confidence, which they
would, in future, repose in the hero of Vimeira. Every des-

THE DUKE OF WELLNGTON. 3G5

patch, either to the secretary of state, or to any individual in
high place or poUtical power, whom his lordship had occasion
to address, was replete with fresh arguments to demonstrate
the fact of the difficulties of the enemy, which were then invi-
sible to all other eyes, unintelligible to all other minds, and to
prove the numerous chances in favour of the success of his own
colossal plans for the ultimate confusion of the great enemy
of Europe. On the nineteenth of August, his lordship wrote
to the Earl of Liverpool as follows : — " His majesty's govern-
ment will see, in the enclosed copies of intercepted letters, a
description of the difficulties under which the enemy labour,
in consequence of the operations of the guerillas, notwith-
standing the large force, which, there is no doubt whatever, is
employed in Spain : and the whole of the information before
them will probably convince them, as it has me, that the
enemy cannot conquer Spain without employing a force still
larger, and that they cannot increase their forces in the Penin-
sula, even admitting that they possess the military means,
without increasing their pecuniary and other difficulties and
distresses. I beg, also, to call the attention of his majesty's
government to the opinions delivered by those excellent autho-
rities, of the value of Portugal to the allies, of the mischiefs
done to them by its continuance in our possession, and of the
benefit which they expect to derive from depriving us of this
possession. There are other evidences from those same au-
thorities in those papers, of the great interests involved in the
continuance of the contest of the Peninsula, which equally
deserve the attention of his majesty's government: but I wish
to draw their attention to those parts of the correspondence
which relate to the British army and to this country, as con-
firming every opinion that I have ever given tlicni upon this
part of the auhject. It will be unfortunate, if Great Britain
should not possess the means of securing still further the posi-
tion of his majesty's troops in Portugal, so as to ensure the
continuance of the contest in the Peninsula, which it is
evident to me must end favourably for his majesty's interests,
if his armv can be maintained in the field of Portugal."
II. 3 u

;30() LIl'H AND CAMPAIGNS OF

A severe examination of the state of parties in England, will
unfold the cause of Wellington's inactivity more completely
than any general reasoning upon the strength or position of
the combatants, the indiscipline of the allies, or the genius
and fortunes of IMassena. That such an analysis would lead
to the conclusion predicted, may, without entering upon it,
be inferred from Lord Wellington's despatch, at this period,
to the Earl of Liverpool. "The importunity w'ith which I
press the war in this country upon the attention of his ma-
jesty's ministers, will, I hope, plead my excuse for troubling
you for a few moments with my own private feelings upon
this subject. Nothing can be more irksome to me than the
operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it
is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system,
will lose the little reputation I have acquired, and the good
opinion of the people of this country. Nothing, therefore,
could be more desirable to me personally, than that either the
contest should be given up at once, or that it should be con-
tinued with a force, so sufficient, as to render all opposition
hopeless. In either case, the obloquy heaped on me by the
ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those
of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who,
after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons
and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing,
as I do, more than a chance of final success, if we can main-
tain our position in this country, although, probably, none of
a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not
do my duty by the government, if I did not inform them of the
real situation of affairs, and urge them with importunity even
to greater exertion. I acknowledge that it has appeared to
me, till very lately, that the government themselves felt no
confidence in the measures which they were adopting in this
country ; and not an officer has come from England, who has
not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on
his arrival, find the army embarking; and even some have
told me, that this expectation was entertained by some of the
king's ministers. These sentiments are not encouraging ; and

THE DUKE OF AVELLINGTON. 367

I acknowledge that I have been induced to attribute the little
exertion lately made in the cause, to the want of confidence
of the members of the government in the result of the
contest."

When the Spaniards, in the flow of years, had returned to
their calmer reason, their own historian, the Conde de Torreno,
justified and applauded the system of delay and passive co-
operation which Wellington adopted at this time — and, for his
resolute adherence to which, ministers were vilified, and his
military knowledge and judgment impeached. " Wellington
acted as a prudent soldier on that occasion, (the siege of Ciudad
llodrigo,) says Torreno, since to raise the siege, a battle should
have been risked, his forces were not superior to those of
Massena, and the Portuguese not sufficiently disciplined to
manoeuvre efficiently in presence of such a foe, or enter with
confidence the field of battle against such an enemy. Had the
battle been won, it would only have saved Ciudad Rodrigo;
had it been lost, the British would have been destroyed, and
the cause of Spain struck down." But never did a campaign
present a more instructive or interesting lesson in the art of war,
than that of Lord Wellington, from the moment when he
permitted the investment of Almeida by the French, to the
hour when he first occupied the heights of Torres Vedras.
His army, inferior in numbers and composition, could only
hope for success from the cautious measures, able guidance,
wisdom, and genius of their commander. And it is now fully
ascertained, that while the English nation was convulsed
with terror at the appalling picture painted by ignorant and
mischievous politicians, the confidence of the troops in their
general was hourly increasing. The feeling between Wel-
lington and his army was nicely balanced, the reliance was
mutual, for as anxiety, arising from indecision, was never de-
picted in his countenance, whoever turned to it, whatever
might have been the circumstances of the moment, saw safety
there, and felt that all would be right. Even in the retreat to
the lines of Lisbon, when the British ministers were alarmed,
and almost harassed into despair by the worrying attacks

3G8 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

of the opposition, and when even some of the superior officers
at head-quarters had, it was said, caught the unworthy in-
fection, there was an assurance to the soldier, in every act of
WelHngton, that bespoke and imparted a confidence in the
result:* "and it was on the heights of Arruda that one of the
bravest officers in the army, who too soon paid the debt of
hisgaUantry, and did not hve to verify his vision, was heard to
exchiini, 'I see the Pyrenees!' — but it was reahzed to his
surviving comrades: and the British army carried its standard
and its disciphne into the heart of France." *

• Observations on the General Orders of the Duke of Wellington, &c.
piige 39; W ellington's Despatehes, August, 1810; and the Conde de Toneno's
History of the Spanish War.

THE DUK1-: OF WELLINGTON. 369

CHAP. V.

Investment and fall of almeida — the allies retire into the valley of the

MONDEGO — THE PRESCII FORCES CON'CEKTRATED AT VISEU — BATTLE OF BUSACO, AND
attempt of MASSENA to TIRN THE RIGHT OF THE ALLIES — WELLINGTON foXTlNUES TO
FALL BACK TOWARDS LISBON — THE INHABITANTS DESERT THEIR HOMES, AND ACCOM-
PANY THE TROOPS — WELLINGTON RETIRES BEHIND THE LINES OP TORRES VEDRAS,
AND MASSENA HALTS BEFORE THEM — DESCRIPTION OF THE LINES — THE FRENCH HOS-
PITALS AT COIMBRA TAKEN BY COLONEL TRANT — MASSENA FALLS BACK ON SANTAREM,
AND THE BRITISH ADVANCE— ASSEMBLY OF THE SPANISH CORTEZ — DEATH OF ROMANA
— MASSENA EVACUATES PORTIGAL, AND IS PURSUED BY WELLINGTON, WHO PLANTS THE
BRITISH STANDARD ONCE MORE ON THE PORTUGUESE FRONTIERS — 1810 — 1811.

At the close of July and during the first days of August, in the
year 1810, the aspect of the Peninsular war was extraordinary.
Powerful but unnatural efforts were made by the opposition
party, in both houses of Parliament, to depreciate the talents,
and deprecate the military measures of Wellington : while
Massena was aided by all the resources of imperial France;
by the flattering encouragement of the greatest warrior and
statesman that perhaps has ever appeared ; and by the prospect
of succession to a throne, in some part of Europe, for his
services. But the calm philosophic temperament of the
British soldier qualified him for the endurance of disappoint-
ment and adversity, with the same equanimity which he ever
after exhibited, when he in turn became the military idol of
re-conquered Europe ; while the resistance of the British, so
much more gallant and decisive than Massena had anticipated,
so surprised and disheartened that general, that his conduct
was marked by languor and apathy, which can only be refer-
able to personal feelings. Having left Almeida to its fate,
after the affair of the Coa, Lord Wellington withdrew his
posts on that river, on the morning of the twenty-sixth ;
finding, on the next day, that the advanced guard of Kegnier's
corps had come through the Puerto Perales, as far as Navas
Frias, and that the enemy had it in their power to throw their
w hole force upon both flanks of the allied army, and compel

370 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

them to a general action, or to press them in their retreat,
Lord Wellington withdrew the infantry another march to the
rear behind Celerico, in the valley of the Mondego, except the
fourth division, under Major-General Cole, which he left at
Guarda: the whole of the British calvalry was placed at
Freixadas in front, observing the movements of the enemy
upon the Coa. This was the disposition of the British force on
the twenty-eighth, with the exception of the division under
General Hill. The command intrusted to this officer was one
that required an union of discretion and courage. In the
beginning of the year, the second corps had been concen-
trated on the Tagus, and the fourth, under Mortier, had
returned across the Sierra Morena, after the submission of
Andalusia. Hill was placed at the head of a corps of fourteen
thousand men, in Alentejo, the first duty of which was, to
observe the movements of Regnier in Estramadura, on whom
the command of the second corps had devolved, when Mortier
returned to Andalusia. As the hour of invading Portugal
approached, Regnier moved, simultaneously with the forces
under the immediate command of Massena, towards the
frontiers of that kingdom which was to be made the theatre
of war, and on the tenth of July breaking up from Merida,
where he left a few men to keep possession in the name of
the intrusive king, marched on Truxillo and Caceres ; then
advancing rapidly towards the Tagus, he crossed that river at
Almaraz andAlconeta, and, reaching Coria, took up a position
which was the left of the grand army of Portugal. Regnier's acti-
vity is entitled to the highest praise: informed of the strength,
and convinced of the gallantry of Hill's corps, which was on the
eve of forming a junction with that of Romana, he succeeded,
by a well-timed movement, in escaping from the' watchful
attention of the British, and from exposure to certain destruc-
tion. The resolution of his enemy was not to be shaken by
any remediable event, so that, when Regnier's escape was ascer-
tained, Hill's corps was put in motion, and, by a rapid parallel
march, arrived at Castel Branco on the twenty-first of July,
having accomplished the passage of the Tagus at Villa ^'eIha;

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 371

meanwhile, a reinforcement of Portuguese cavalry arrived,
commanded by General Fane, so that Hill, when encamped
at Sarzedas, found himself at the head of sixteen thousand
effective men, with eighteen pieces of ordnance. He kept an
advanced guard at Castel Branco, and posted a Portuguese
brigade at Fundao, under Le Cor, which commanded the
Estrella line of road, and preserved his communication with
Guarda. While Hill was occupied in taking up this judicious
position, the commander-in-chief had continued, by the most
splendid display of military acumen, to second every move-
ment. Fane's troop was not the only aid which he furnished ;
he placed, in addition, a reserve consisting of two thousand
British just arrived at Lisbon, and eight thousand Portuguese
hutted at Thomar, under the command of General Leith, whose
instructions were, either to support Hill, or move towards the
main body of the army, as circumstances should require : but
their position was well chosen, even for passive co-operation, as
it secured the line of the Zezere effectually. At first, Kegnier
made demonstrations towards Salvaterra, but sustained a de-
cided check from the cavalry of the Portuguese: this repulse
seemed for awhile to confound his projects, a circumstance which
contributed, also, to increase the uncertainty of the English
general as to his plans, for he now divided his force, placing
one body at Penamacor, a second at Zarza Major, and a third
on the Tagus, at the embouchure of the Rio del Monte, render-
ing it difficult to conjecture whether he meant to effect a junc-
tion with Massena, tg attack the British encampment at Sarze-
das, or to retire across the Tagus. But Kegnier had no other
object in view, than to cross the Tagus; and having communi-
cated the intelligence to Massena, that general immediately
ordered Ney to cross the Agueda with the sixth corps: and it
was this movement which occasioned the affair of the Coa,
already noticed. After this severe action, it was ascertained that
Loisson had his advanced guard at Pinhel, Kegnier's remaining
in the position already described ; so that it was impossible to
conclude, with any degree of certainty, whether Massena awaited
the junction of Kegnier's corp.s, or purposed marching on the

872 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

district of Coria with all his force, to support him. In any case,
Massena's intended line of march could not possibly have been
discovered by the British. It was while events were thus
balancing, that Lord Wellington took up the position before
described, ready to advance to the reUef of Almeida, should a
real investment afford an opportunity, or to retreat in such
order, and on such positions, as would maintain discipline, and

spare his men.

The judgment of Massena seemed to oscillate, either from an
apprehension of the master-mind to which he was so immedi-
ately opposed; or from ignorance of the topography of that dis-
trict of Portugal and Spain; or possibly his indecision might
have arisen from inconsistent or impracticable instructions from
one or both of his illustrious masters, the Emperor of the
French, or the intrusive King of Spain ; whatever may have
been the cause, his vacillation was extraordinary, his disposi-
tions scattered, and his conduct apparently negligent. As
INlassena possessed the power to strike, it became Wellington's
cautious duty to act as the weaker party, to evade the falUng
weight, and, whenever the strength of the giant should be
expended, or any vital part of his huge body exposed, to take
advantage of each occasion, and inflict a fatal wound. Yielding
to necessity, the British allowed Massena the choice of routes,
and the adoption of manoeuvres, merely keeping an intent obser-
vation on all his movements, and making correspondent ones,
until he should exhibit some decided policy. The labours of
the bureau were once again resumed by the British general,
during the comparative inactivity of the enemy; and the
extent of his information, the variety of his knowledge, and
his extraordinary versatility, were never more conspicuously
displayed, than during the interval that elapsed between the
fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and investment of Almeida. Every
species of military, political, financial, and even private topic,
that arose amongst his army, the Portuguese government, or
the ministers and the despondents in England, was touched
upon at length, and in a style sufficiently luminous to reflect
credit upon the ablest statesmen in those distracted lands.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 373

Having understood that government had sent out Mr. Drum-
mond from England, on a mission to Lisbon and Cadiz, relative
to raising money ; as Lord Wellington had paid the same atten-
tion to this as to every other part of the duty of commander
of a great army, he ridiculed the government measure, assuring
Colonel Gordon, whom he addressed on that occasion, " that
Drummond could do no good, but might do a great deal of mis-
chief; that he attributed his mission to a belief, prevalent at
the treasury, that we had not done our best to procure money ;
in which, he might depend on it, they were mistaken." His
lordship, at the same time, promised to give Drummond all the
assistance and information which he could, until he should find
his mediation mischievous, when, notwithstanding the threats
and taunts of the despondent^, he declared that he " ahuuld
have 110 scruple in sending him to the place whence he cume."
"It was a notion ofVilliers," observed Lord Wellington, " that
more money might be had, at both Cadiz and Lisbon, by in-
creased exertion ; but my answer to that was, that we were nei-
ther pickpockets nor coiners — that we could only get the sums
it was convenient, or for the interest of individuals to transmit
to England, and that I did not see how any increase of exertion
could be followed by an addition to these sums. However, Vil-
liers has been more successful with the ministers at home than
he was with me, and it is to him we owe Mr. Drummond's arri-
val." Such rapid records of his thoughts were thus being daily
registered, for the benefit of his own country, and the I'esuscita-
tion of prostrate Europe, subject to occasional interruptions
from aides-de-camp, who entered his hut at intervals, to an-
nounce the contents of each telegraphic communication, that
passed between the advanced posts of the cavalry at Freixadas,
and Brigadier-General Cox, the governor of Almeida.

On the second of August, his lordship addressed to Lord
Liverpool a lengthened statement of the situation of both ar-
mies, the hopes and prospects of the Peninsular cause, and the
certainty, which he alone perceived and understood, of a suc-
cessful issue to the contest with France, in a manner so con-
densed, perspicuous, and bold, that, had the noble secretary

11. 3c

374 IJFR AND CAMPAIGNS OF

before hesitated as to the ability of the individual to execute
his gigantic designs, this explanation must have removed
his doubts, and inspired him with solid confidence. Leisure
was found on the same date to put Mr. Charles Stuart in
possession of his opinions, which were decided and unalter-
able, with respect to the intriguing fcictions in Portugal, and
at the court of Brazil, and the inconsistencies which their
conduct introduced. " My opinion," says his lordship, " has
been invariably the same, — that government alone can rule
Portugal, which the prince regent has named. I recommend,
therefore, that the Conde de Redondo, and the principal
Souza, and the Dr. Raymondo Nogueira, should now be called
to the recency, for the same reasons that I before recommended
that Redondo should not, without the prince's authority. In
respect to yourself, you can no more accept the office of regent
without the king's consent, than I could that of commander-in-
chief, or marshal-general, without the king's authority." This
salutary advice, and clear exposition of the true nature of
allegiance and loyalty, were followed, on the next day, by a
pointed and powerful dissertation upon the causes of the
unsound policy which pervaded the Portuguese councils. His
lordship, on this occasion, thus writes : " I am not in commu-
nication with the secretary of state for foreign affairs, and I
do not interfere in the political concerns of the government ;
but I should recommend to you to draw Loi'd VVellesley's atten-
tion to the arrangement for the government of Portugal lately
made in the Brazils, and to the principles upon which it has
been made. It is extraordinary, that during the time you and
1 have been working here, to give strength and stability to the
government, and principally to support Don Miguel Forjaz,
as being the best instrument to co-operate with us to carry
en the war, the king's minister in the Brazils should have
promoted a new arrangement of the government, purposely
calculated to destroy the very influence which we had sup-
ported. Then the admission of Don Raymondo Nogueira
into the regency, and the reasons for this admission, are truly
ludicrous. He is said to aid in the destruction of the influence

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 375

of the Secretariat, which we had laboured to establish and
support; and his appointment is to be agreeable to the lower
orders, from amongst whom he is selected ! It is unfortunate
for the people of the Peninsula, that we in England have
always thought proper to give a democratical character to
their proceedings; whereas nothing was ever farther from their
intentions. The principle of all the actions of the good peoj)le
of these countries is anti-gallican, and that alone : all that
they desire is, that they shoidd be saved from the grasp of the
French, and it is a matter of indifference to them by what per-
sons, or by what class of persons, their salvation is effected. In
the abstract, I believe that they would prefer to be governed
by the higher classes, from a feeling that those belonging to
the higher classes have turned their minds more to the business
of government, have more experience and capacity in the
transaction of public business, and are more deserving of their
confidence, as being more likely to save them from the French.
If indeed the Doctor had ever shown any talents as a
political character, there might be some reason for his appoint-
ment ; but as it is, it is absurd and mischievous. That which
we want in Portugal is, that government should be sup})orted
in all its measures in the Brazils ; and that it should acquire
strength and confidence in its own measures, in consequence
of that support. The king's minister in the Brazils might be
highly useful by using his influence for that object. We also
require that there should be some permanence in the authority
of the persons employed to govern this country, and that
men's minds should be diverted from an expectation of change
by every vessel which arrives from the Brazils. Here also
the king's minister in the Brazils can be highly useful to us ;
but I must observe, that it is by the adoption of a line of
conduct directly the reverse of that which he has followed
lately. I hope that my letter to the Prince Regent, written in
April, had not arrived in the Brazils before this arrangement
was made, as nothing can be more inconsistent witl) the prin-
ciples and practice recommended in that let*^cr, than what is
contained in the papers which you transmitted to me."

376 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Having called the attention of Mr. Charles Stuart to the
gross inconsistencies, to the constant abandonment of prin-
ciple, on the part of the advisers of the prince regent, his lord-
ship turned round readily, and addressed himself to evils that
existed in the government of the British army, particularly in
reference to the promotion of officers. The privilege assumed
by Napoleon, of raising brave men from the ranks to elevated
command on the field of battle, was the most potent incen-
tive, the most powerful stimulant to deeds of heroism, that any
conqueror could desire or exert; and, that Wellington felt
acutely the inferiority of his situation in that respect, is
sufficiently clear, notwithstanding the delicacy with which he
touches on the precise point, from the following despatch, of the
fourth of August, to Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens,* in which the
closeness and clearness of the reasoning will tend to prove how
little his mental energies were influenced, how calm and tran-
quil, and even at leisure, the great man felt himself, not-
M'ithstanding the proximity of seventy thousand enemies, led
on by the best generals of Franco. This official communica-
tion commences by refreshing the memory of the military
secretary, as to the promotion of Captain the Hon. H. Paken-
ham, who had been recommended by the lord-lieutenant of
Ireland, and had received a wound at Obidos ; and also by a
reference to Captain Lloyd, whose claims were exactly similar :
his lordship then proceeds, " I have never been able to under-
stand the principle on which the claims of gentlemen of family,
fortune, and influence in the country, to promotion in the army,
fowided on their military conduct, imd character, and services,
should be rejected, while the claims of others, not better founded
on military pretensions, were invariably attended to. It would
be desirable, certainly, that the only claim to promotion should be
military merit ; but this is a degree of perfection to which the
disposal of military patronage has never been, and cannot be,
I believe, brought, in any military establishment. The com-
mander-in-chief must have friends, officers on the staff attached

• Jlilitary Secretary to tlic Com maiider-iii- Chief, and afterwards Major-
Genera] Sir H«iry Toncns, KCB., K C.T.S., Adjutant-General to the Forces.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 377

to him, who will press him to promote their friends and rela-
tions, all doubtless very meritorious, and no man can at all
times resist these applications ; but if there is to be any
influence in the disposal of military patronage, in aid of mili-
tary merit, can there be any in our army, so legitimate as that
of family connexion, fortune, and influence in the country ?
I acknowledge, therefore, that I have been astonished at
seeing Lloyd,* with every claim that an officer can have to
promotion, still a captain ; and others connected with the
officers of the staff", promoted as soon as their time of service had
expired. While writing on this subject, I am also tempted to
communicate to you my opinion upon another branch of it,
namely, the disposal of the patronage of the troops employed
in foreign service. In all services, excepting that of Great
Britain, and in former times in that of Great Britain, the
commander-in-chief of an army employed against the enemy
in the field, had the power of promoting officers, at least to
vacancies occasioned by the service, in the troops under his
own command ; and in foreign services, the principle is carried
so far, as that no person can venture to recommend an officer
for promotion, belonging to an army employed against the
enemy in the field, excepting the commander of that army.
It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service ; and
I believe the greater number of the general officers of the
higher ranks of the present day, were made lieutenant-colonels
by Sir W. Howe, Sir H. Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, General
Burgoyne, and Lord Dorchester, But how is it now? The
form remains still in some degree the same ; that is to say,
my secretary keeps the register of the applications, memorials,
and regimental recommendations — a trouble which, by the bye,
might as well be saved ; but the substance is entirely altered,
and I, who command the largest British army that has been
employed against the enemy for many years, and who have
upon my hands certainly the most extensive and difficult con-
cern that was ever imposed upon any British ofl^icer, have not

* He was aftenvards lientcnant-coloncl of the ninety-fourth, and killed at
the passa>,'c of the Nivelle, on tlie eighteenth of Novenihei, 1813. Lord
Wellington thus speaks of him in his despateh on that occasion : " An officer
who had fieiiucntly distinguished himself, and was of gncat promise."

378 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the power of making even a corporal!!! It is impossible
that this system can last. It will do very well for trifling expe-
ditions and short services, but those who are to superintend the
discipline and to excite and regulate the exertions of the officers
of the army, during a long-continued service, must have the
power of rewarding them by the only mode in which they can
be rewarded, that is, by promotion. It is not known to the
army, and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed of acknow-
ledging the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of
reward which belongs to my situation ; and it is really extra-
ordinary that I have got on so w^ell hitherto w ithout it : but
the day must come, when this system must be altered. I do not
entertain these opinions, and communicate them to you, because
there are any officers attached to me in the service, for whom I
desire promotion. All my aides-de-camp, respecting whom I do
feel an interest, have been promoted in their turn, in their regi-
ments, or are to be promoted for carrying home the accounts
of victories. The only individual respecting whose promotion
I ever interested myself personally, was that of Colin Camp-
bell, which the Duke of York had promised him, in conse-
quence of his having brought home the accounts of two victo-
ries at the same time : and the difficulty which I experienced
in obtaining his promotion, notwithstanding that promise, is
a strong practical proof of the effijcts of the system to which
I have adverted. The consequence of the change of the
system in regard to me, would be only to give me the power
of rewarding the services of those who have exerted, or should
exert themselves zealously in the service, and thus to stimu-
late others to similar exertions. Even admitting that the
system of promotion by seniority, exploded in other armies,
is the best for that of Great Britain, it would still be an
advantage that those who become entitled to it should receive
it immediately, and from the hand of the person who is obliged
to expose them to danger, to enforce discipline, and to call
for their exertions. I would also observe, that this practice
would be entirely consistent with the unvaried usage of the
British navy. I admit that it may be urged with truth, that
a larger view may be taken of the interests of the public, in

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 379

the mode of promoting officers of the army, than I am capable
of taking; and this view may have suggested the expediency
of adopting and adhering to the mode now in use : at the
same time I must say, that the pubhc can have no greater
interest than in the conduct and discipUne of an army em-
ployed against the enemy in the field ; and I am thoroughly
convinced, that whatever may be the result in my hands, a
British army cannot be kept in the field for any length of
time, unless the officers composing it have some hope that
their exertions will certuhdi/ be rewarded with promotion ;
and that to be abroad on service, and to do their duty with
zeal and intelligence, afford prospects of promotion, not
afforded by the mere presence of an officer with his regiment,
and his bearing the king's commission for a certain number
of years. I have been induced to communicate these opinions
to you, from the consideration of the claims of those officers
to which I have drawn your attention at the commencement
of this letter, from a strong conviction of their truth, and not,
I assure you, from any personal interest I feel in the result.
I would not give one pin to have the disposal of every com-
mission in the army."

In this argumentative letter, his lordship marks indirectly,
yet clearly, the great difference between an officer in the ser-
vice of a republic, and in that of a mixed or absolute monarchy ;
he exhil)its, in the most intelligible manner, the amazing in-
feriority of his military situation to that of the marshals of
France in 1810, and to that of Buonaparte in his early cam-
paigns, as regarded the distribution of rewards and infliction
of punishment upon the officers acting under the eye of the
commander-in-chief in the field : and his reasoning? should
have convinced the government he acted under, of the expedi-
ency of relaxing antiquated forms suited to a peace establish-
ment only, in such an eventful ])eriod as the age of Napoleon
and Wellington. While he pleaded the cause of this merito-
rious officer before the highest authorities, and called for the
bestowal of immediate rewards upon the brave and the
exemplary, he was employed with equal activity in punishing

380 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

those disreputable characters who were hourly acquiring for
the British name the disgust and hatred of the Portuguese.
Already had he chid the pusillanimity of some, who, with a most
un-English feeling, trembled at the approach of Massena, and
told too loudly the terrors of their breasts : he was now under
the necessity of cautioning the Germans in our service against
indiscipline and a propensity to plunder, which they occa-
sionally manifested. Frequent complaints having been made
to Lord Wellington of the violence and dishonesty of the
Germans in the British army, who were represented as being
equally cruel and ferocious with their countrymen in the
service of Napoleon, his lordship informed Sir Stapleton
Cotton of the fact, adding, " it has gone so far, that the Orde-
nanzas inquire whether they may kill the Germans in our ser-
vice, as well as in the service of the French, when urged to
resist the enterprises of the latter," The cause of the hatred
towards the Germans in the French service arose from the
fact, that those soldiers were amongst the foremost, in the im-
perial army, to refuse quarter to the Ordenanzas whom they
took in battle, unless they happened to be dressed in regular
military costume, which, in the impoverished state of Portugal,
could not be accomplished, and the laws obliged them to de-
fend their country in every case of invasion. No situation,
therefore, could be more difficult and distressing than that of
the soldiers in the Portuguese militia ; no conduct more inde-
fensible and merciless, than the general orders of Massena to
treat all Ordenanzas taken in coloured clothes, as guerillas,
and give them no quarter. That the French, their declared ene-
mies, should adopt such sanguinary measures, neither appalled
nor surprised the invaded, but that the mercenary Germans,
with whom no national difference existed, whose fellow-coun-
trymen fought on the side of liberty, and who were, perhaps,
themselves constrained to appear under the shelter of the im-
perial eagle's wings, should have stained their hands with cold-
blooded assassination, excited the highest indignation against
the national character, and rendered it still more advisable that
the hussars, in the British army, should use circumspection in

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 381

their intercourse witli the people. Regardless of any such
necessity, they behaved so ill as to exasperate the peasantry,
and make Lord Wellington apprehensive of their being cut off
in detail by the offended natives ; he hastened in consequence
to request, that General Cotton would speak seriously with
Arentschildt on the subject, and point out how unfortunate
it would be, if this conduct, which could be of advantage to
nobody, should deprive his regiment of the reputation they
had acquired. There is," observed his lordship, "no excuse
for a soldier in the service of Great Britain plundering."

This infinite quantity and endless variety of vexatious ques-
tions, seeming to require the immediate application of ])0\verfLil
remedies, did not disturb the calm, gentle, flow of the great
warrior's thoughts : on the contrary, scarcely had he closed
this most peremptory letter relative to the plundering hussars,
when he resumed the labours of the bureau in the cause of
mercy. It was on the eighth of August, and on the eve of great
and important events, that the case of poor Franceschi, who
had been made prisoner by a guerilla party, again occupied
Lord Wellington's most earnest attention. He had remitted
money to him, and received the promises of the Spanish junta,
that he should be exchanged ; but, from a letter which he now
received from the wife of the captive, whose melancholy fate
has been previously noticed, he learned that the general was
still a prisoner, in the Alhambra at Granada, and that the
money had never been transmitted to him. Lord V.'ellington,
on the receipt of Madame Franceschi's letter, wrote to Mr.
Henry Wellesley, urging him anxiously, earnestly, and in a man-
ner that betrayed the most humane and benevolent feelings,
to give the captive the enclosed letter from his wife, together
with one hundred dollars, which he added from his private
purse, and desired that he would press the regency inccssantlv,
to allow him to be exchanged. The capture, captivity, and
story of Fansceschi and his young wife, jiossess a remarkable
interest, and their sufferings and their sorrows entitle them to
some brief notice, even in the eventful and crowded narrative
of the Peninsular wars; but in this memoir, their little history
II. 3 n

382 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

is of infinite value, in admitting a beautiful gleam of heavenly
light to fall upon the portrait of the illustrious hero, and,
by shining partially, it may perhaps eclipse some dark spot on
the canvass. How many acts of harsh, stern, uncompromising
justice, which the censuring world have hastily and heedlessly
condemned, should not his persevering humanity towards these
unhappy lovers have extenuated or obliterated !

Turning from works of mercy, in which few conquerors
seemed to have felt equal pleasure, he next applied himself
to the question of a free trade with the Brazils. Finance, trade,
and political economy had obtained a large share of his atten-
tion from his early years ; but his innate modesty, his total
dislike to make himself or his acquirements the subject of
his conversation or despatches, to the prejudice of the public
business in which he was employed, in addition to his being
incessantly engaged in military services alone, sufficiently
account for the public ignorance of his real character, and
their full confession of his fitness for the duties of the cabinet,
at that period when the country demanded and obtained his
services as a statesman.

The inactivity of the foe now left his lordship at leisure to
indulge in the pursuit of one of his favourite studies, and, in
a letter, of the tenth of August, to his brother Henry, he
challenges and invites a correspondence on the colonial trade
of Portugal : his views of the question are highly interesting,
and prove the amazing activity of his mind : " I hope," says
Lord Wellington," the regency will have firmness to resist the
demands of a free trade with the colonies ; it might answer
in some degree, and might be connected with measures of
finance which would probably give them avery large revenue :
but we have no right, and it is the grossest impolicy in us to
demand it. Great Britain has ruined l^rtugal by her free
trade with the Brazils : not only the customs of Portugal, to
the amount of a million sterling per annum, are lost, but the
fortunes of numerous individuals, who lived by this trade, are
ruined ; and Cadiz will suffer in a similar manner, if this
demand is agreed to. Portugal would now be in a very

THK DUKE OF WELLLNGTON. 383

different situation as an ally, if our trade with the Brazils was
still carried on through Lisbon ; and I woidd only ask, is it
wise, or liberal, or just, to destroy the power and resources,
and absolutely to ruin our allies, in order to put into the
pockets of our merchants the money which before went
into their treasuries, and would be now em])loycd in the
maintenance of military establishments against the common
enemy?" The subjects of Lord Wellington's correspondence
noticed here, are selections from a multitude. that poured with
an amazing rapidity from his pen, and made rather with a
view to illustrate individual character, than from their being
the most serious or valuable questions, in the discussion of
which his lordship was then engaged. The British ministers
have not been noticed, their distrustful communications, nor
the quiet remonstrances of the chieftain endeavouring to win
them over to his aspiring views. The British envoys in Portugal
also contributed to test his lordship's facility in composition,
by their numerous, doleful, and lengthened correspondence
relative to the best means of embarking the troops, as soon as
the British army should be compelled by Massena to evacuate
Portugal. To all these, some painful, others ludicrous, some
public and necessary, others private and undertaken through
benignant feelings, he replied with ease, punctuality, perfect
calmness, and composure : in few, very few instances, and then
in the most delicate and well-chosen language, he exhibited a
high degree of political courage, by rejecting altogether the
counsels of the minister at war, disapproving of his measures,
or threatening, as in the instance of Mr. Drummond, to undo
what the government had done.

While indecision continued to retard the movements of
the enemy, Lord Wellington was obliged to wait upon the
initial oj)erations of Massena, who had a force exceeding one
hundred thousand men, under his command. Some skirmish-
ing occurred in the vicinity of Almeida, but it did not
obstruct the comnumieation with the garrison : Kegnier's
cavalry also sustained a check from the Portuguese troops at
Fundao, on which occasion he lost fifty men : intelligence
arrived at the hcad-cpiarters of successes gained by .Silveira,

384 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

over a detachment from Kellerman's corps, Serras hart
advanced as far as Monteray, to order provisions for ten
thousand men, and Silveira, learning the true amount of his
party, moved on Puebla del Senabria, encountered, and
defeated it : advancing on the following day against a Swiss
regiment in the imperial service, which had the boldness to
molest a Spanish post at Barba de Sanatrice, and succeeded
in putting the Spaniards to flight, he shut up the enemy in the
little town of Senabria for three days, after w hich they were glad
to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to return to their
own country, promising that they would not serve again in
the Peninsular war. This meritorious effort, by which five
hundred men were deducted from the actual numbers of the
enemy in the field, without the loss of one man on the side of
the Portuguese, and with the gratifying reflection of having
borne away an eagle amongst the trophies, was attended with
the happiest consequences, giving the Ordenanzas new courage
in the conflict, and confirming their respect for that discipline,
with the value of which they were unacquainted before the
appointment of Marshal Beresford. Silveira was so elated with
his good fortune, that his ambition would immediately have
taken a higher flight, and he did actually meditate a descent
upon the division under Serras, when the warning voice of
Beresford recalled him from a temptation, which would have
led him into inevitable destruction.

Fortune exhibits more fickleness in war than in any other of
the great games that mortals meddle in ; and the loud shouts of
triumph were suddenly checked by the melancholy tidings of
the losses sustained by the Spaniards in Estramadura : there
Romana, who had been cautioned repeatedly by the British com-
mander not to risk a battle, never to engage such an enemy
as he had to front, unless at an obvious advantage ; had been
informed that the separation of Hill had so weakened the allied
main body, that he must not calculate on reinforcements-
had Campo Mayor granted to him as a place of arms, and
Portugal left open to him as a safe retreat — still could not be
induced to follow Wellington's advice, nor even his earnest
entreaties. Partaking of the sulky sentiments which the fall

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 385

of Ciudad Ilodrigo engendered amongst his countrymen to-
wards the British, he united his forces with those of Ballas-
teros, and, meeting the enemy at Benvenida, he would have
beenobhged to make a total surrender, but for the providential
arrival of Carrera with a large reinforcement of cavalry, who
rescued him from his embarrassment ; not, however, until he
had lost above four hundred killed or taken prisoners. — Lord
Wellington, anticipating his folly, yet desirous to save him from
its consequences, had detached General Madden's brigade, pre-
viously attached to General Leith, to strengthen Romana ; but
before the arrival of Madden, the collision happened, and the
temerity of the Spaniard was chastised by the enemy. An
accident contributed also to save Romana from further loss ;
that was, the sudden approach of eight thousand men, who had
effected a landing near Cadiz, and were advancing under Lascy
against Mortier: the operations of this force made a diversion
salutary to Romana, who was finally enabled to occupy Zafra,
the enemy falling back on the Morena.

One month expired from the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and
about half that time since the affair of the Coa, without any
disclosure being made, or any clue obtained, as to the plans of
Massena: the timid imairined that it was the ma"nitude of the
design, for their more certain ruin, that occasioned the delay;
the brave man acquired renewed confidence from an impres-
sion that the enemy was unable or unwilling to begin the con-
test " But we were headed," observes Lord Londonderry,
" by one who was not behind Massena, either in clearness
of foresight or multiplicity of resources, and we well knew
that he would direct no movement which the circumstances of
the case might not demand." It is justly due to the character
of Wellington, to mention here, that, while he was waiting
upon the movements of Massena, under the circumstances
previously explained, he was also encumbered by every species
of political difficulty that grew out of the serious events
of the times : to him belonged the care and the conduct of
the British garrison in Cadiz, eight thousand strong; and,
although they rendered iiim no assistance, they were uniformly

386 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

enumerated as part of his force; reinforcements had been
promised from HaHfax and Sicily: of these, but one regiment
arrived, while sickness and desertion, those necessary results
of inactivity in an army, thinned his ranks daily: the instruc-
tions received from ministers left it altogether to the general's
discretion as to his future operations, yet cautioned him
continually as to the preservation of the army intrusted to
his care ; the fears of the ministers were imparted to their
despatches and instructions, and, if the alarmists at home were
not in reality apprehensive, their conduct was only the more
flagrant and injurious. To relieve himself from the burden
of the Portuguese minister's advice and co-operation, Lord
Wellingtion literally took the government of that kingdom
upon himself, associating with him in the duty, the British
minister: this completely suppressed the petty intrigues of
that court, but multiplied his lordship's avocations : and
finding, from experience, the valuable results of having placed
jMarshal Beresford over the Portuguese army, he concluded,
by analogy, that the fleet of the allies would be better disci-
plined, and more serviceable, if under the control of a British
admiral ; and in consequence, Admiral Berkeley was advanced
to that high command.

When Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Massena hoped that the frontier
of Portugal was rendered practicable for an invading army, and
too hastily concluded that he had struck such an universal ter-
ror to the hearts of the Portuguese, by his masterly conquest,
that the inhabitants would hasten to grasp his victorious hand,
if extended with the least semblance of friendship or of peace :
thus impressed, he issued one of his verbose proclamations* fi-om

• Proclamalion of Marshnl Massena, issued from Ciudad Rodrigo, (from Southey's
History of the Peninsula War.) '• Inhabitants of Portugal— The Emperor of the
French has put under my orders an army of one hundred and ten thousand men, to
take possession of this country, and to expel the English, your pretended friends.
Against you he has no enmity : on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote
your happiness ; and the first step towards securing it, is to dismiss from the
country those locusts who consume your property, blight your harvests, and
paralyze your efforts. In opposing the emperor, you oppose your true friend : a
friend who has it in his power to render you the happiest people in the world.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 387

the fallen city, inviting the conquered to submit to their
fortunes, and accept a ruler appointed by France. Upon the
fourth of August, Lord Wellington deemed it his duty also
to address the people of Portugal in a public manifesto, to
guard them against the eloquence of the French marshal, and
point out to them their safest, wisest, best line of conduct.
Originally proclaimed in the Portuguese language, all copies
hitherto published were but translations from a translation ;
but the draft, of his lordship's own dictation, having been dis-
covered, the following is taken from that document in the last
edition of his despatches.

Proclanuitiun to the People of Portugal, hi/ Lord J'iscount
TVellbigton, Marshal General, S)C. : — " The time which has
elapsed during which the enemy has remained upon the
frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded, to the Portu-
guese nation, experience of what they are to expect from the
French. The people had remained in some villages, trusting
to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing that by treating
the enemies of their country in a friendly manner, they should

Were it not for the insidious counsels of England, you might now have enjoyed
peace and tranquillity, and have been put in possession of that happiness; you
liave blindly rejected ofTers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have
accepted proposals w hieh will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty has
commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true interests -.
that you would awake to those prospects, m hieh, with your consent, may be
quickly realized : awake so as to distinguis^h between friends and enemies.
The king of England is actuated by selfish and narrow views : the emperor of
the French is governed by universal philanthropy. The English have put arms
into your hands, arms which you know not how to use : I will instruct you.
They are to be the instruments of annihilation to your foes — and who those
foes arc, I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become
your salvation ! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your destruc-
tion ! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British general expect
to oppose the victoriotis legions of the emperor? Already a force is collected
suffiirient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that virtue and
generosity offer ! As friends you may respect us, and be respected in return : as
foes, you must dread us, and in the conflict be subdued. The choice is your
own, either to meet the horrors of a sanguinary war, and see your country
desolated, your villages in flames, your cities plundered ; or to accept an
honourable and happy peace, which will obtain for you every blessing, which
by resistance you would resign for ever."

388 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would
be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and
that their lives would be spared. Vain hopes ! The people
of these devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel
enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered,
their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been
abused, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did
not tempt the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen the
victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises
which were made only to be violated. The Portuguese now
see that they have no remedy for the evils with which they are
threatened, but determined resistance. Resistance, and the
determination to render the enemy's advance into their country
as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way everything
that is valuable, or that can contribute to his subsistence, or
frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies
for the evils with which they are threatened. The army under
my command will protect as large a portion of the country as
will be in their powder : but it is obvious that the people can
save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their
properties only by removing them. The duty, however, which
I owe to his royal highness, the prince regent, and to the
Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and
authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to
make an exertion to themselves from the danger which awaits
them, and to save their country : and I hereby declare, that
all magistrates, or persons in authority, who remain in the
towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the
military officers to retire from them ; and all persons of what-
ever description, who hold any communication with the enemy,
and aid or assist them in any manner, will be considered
traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accord-
ingly." (Signed,) Wellington.

Tliis able document called forth the following public notice from the Prince
of E&sling: —

Proclamation of Afassena subsequent to the 4fh of August.—" The armies of the
great Napoleon are on your frontiers, and going to enter your territory as friends,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 389

Although few foresaw the soUd foundation which this in-
strument laid, for the elevation of British prosperity in the
approaching protracted wars, or the convulsive shake which it
gave, and the deep wound it inflicted, upon the French power
in the Peninsula ; yet its consequences were more fatal to the

not as conquerors. They do not come to make war against you, but to contend
agiiiiist those who have compelled you to make it. Portuguese ! open your
eyes to your interests. What has England done for you, that you should suffer
the presence of her soldiers upon your soil ? She has destroyed your manu-
factures, ruined your commerce, and jniralyzcd your industry, with the sole
hope of introducing into your country articles made in her manufactories, and
to render you her tributaries. What does she do now, that you should embrace
that unjust cause which has raised all the powers of the continent against her?
She deceives you as to the results of a campaign, in which she will not risk any-
thing ; she makes a rampart of your battalions, as if your blood was to be
valued at nought ; she is ready to abandon you whenever it suits her interests:
tnust not the result, therefore, be injurious to you, both by multiplying your
sulferings, and their insatiable ambition ? She sends her ships into your ports
to bring away to her colonies, those of your children who may have escaped
the dangers to which she continues to expose them on the continent. Has not
the conduct of her army before Ciudad Rodrigo sufficiently proved to you what
you are to e.xpect from such allies? Did they not excite the garrison, and the
unfortunate inhabitants of that place, by deceptive promises, and have they fired
a single gun to assist them ? and lately again they have thrown some of their own
forces into Almeida — where a governor was instructed to engage you in a defence
as badly seconded as that of Ciudad Rodrigo? and have they not insulted you
by thus placing in the balance a single Englishman against six thousand of your
nation? Portuguese! do not let yourselves be deceived any longer; the gene-
rous sovereign, whose power, laws, and genius so many people bless, wishes to
secure your prosperity. Place yourselves under his protection, receive his
soldiers as friends, and you will obtain safety for your persons and your pro-
perty. The evils which result from the state of war are already known to
you : you know that they threaten you as to everything that you hold most
dear, your children, your parents, your friends, your fortunes, your political
and private existence. Adopt then a proposition which offers you all the advan-
tages of peace. Rt'muin quirt in your dwellings, devote yourstlves to your domestic
works, and only look upon those as enemies who advise you to a war, in whicli
all the chances are contrary to the happiness of your country. — The Marshal
Prince d'Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal. Masseka."

[Such was the counter-proclamation which the French gcneial caused to be
published, to militate against the designs of Wellington; buth;ippily for Portu-
gal, Spain, and England, these were too deeply laid, too securely treasured in
the hearts of a few, very few, brave and loyal men, to be either seen through
or frustrated by any efforts of the enemy.]

II. 3 i:

35JO 1,1 1'K AND CAMPAIGNS OF

legions of Napoleon, and to his Peninsular projects, than many
defeats in battle would have proved. Here are embodied those
principles upon which Wellington based his plans, the fulcrum
on which he rested a political lever, which was to eradicate and
overthrow that tree, miscalled of liberty, which the imperial
ruler of the French now sought to plant in the Peninsula.
Affairs now began to draw to a crisis ; the great plot seemed
rapidly to thicken; inactivity was no longer possible, as disease
and famine bcsfan to remind the French commander. On the
thirteenth, Wellington, ever wary, wrote to Hill, informing him
that he agreed then completely with Fane's opinion and his,
" that the enemy were about to recross the Tagus. Regnier's
movement to this side," said his lordship, " although ordered by
Napoleon himself, was certainly a false one ; and the sooner a
remedy is applied by recrossing, the better for the enemy. But
if they cross the river, you must cross likewise, and resume your
old position at Portalegre, and replace Le Cor in his : leaving,
however, until you hear further from me, two regiments of
Portuguese cavalry on this side the Tagus, as I have sent Mad-
den's brigade to the Marquess de la Romana." He pi'oceeds
then to supply General Hill with a most specific and minute
statement of the number and description of the troops under the
command of Ilegnier, noticing the precise days on which they
joined that ofHcer, and the quarters whence they marched, and
exhibiting such a display of well-arranged particulars as proved
the possession of a mind so truly military, that early promotion
in the king's service must of necessity have been the lot of such
a man. This interesting document, which the young soldier
will peruse with astonishment, was follow^ed by an admonition
to Hill, in whom he reposed the most implicit confidence, " not
to permit Fane to engage in any affair, unless he had an evident
superiority of numbers."

Before the complete investment of Almeida, Lord Wellington
had still one day to devote to the public affairs of Portugal,
and this was principally occupied in remonstrating with the
government upon their very improper mode of promoting
officers in the Portuguese service. Their system was to

TIIR DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 301

submit a list of names to the prince regent, in the Brazils,
for his sign manual, and then transmit that list to INIarshal
Beresford for his adoption. Lord Wellington, in his ollicial
language, which is always free from personality or offence,
desired that the publication of the promotions, forwarded from
the Brazils, should be either suppressed or suspended, first, be-
cause it was expressly stipulated, when Beresford undertook
the drudgery of disciplining the rude levies of Portugal, that
he should be vested with the sole, unshackled power of confer-
ring rewards and punishments ; therefore the list was a direct
violation of the stipulation entered into with that officer. Se-
condly, he conceived that it would be prejudicial to the interests
of Portugal to suffer officers to acquire promotion through pri-
vate influence and court intrigue, in preference to those who
were entitled to rewards by solid substantial services and real
merit. For these reasons his lordship forbade the promotions
in the list to be completed, and wrote to the prince regent
justifying his conduct in having done so.

General Beresford was at the head of the army of Portugal,
and earned the admiration and respect of that nation ; but
there was such an interval between the British hero and his
many brave officers, in the opinion of the countries of Europe,
in the acknowledgment of the eminent men themselves who
served under him, that they forgot to feel his superiority, as
much as he neglected to press it into notice ; and on every oc-
casion of difficulty, in all their pride of power, and dignity of
office, they submitted their grievances to the commander-in-
chief, asked his assistance to lighten the burden, alleviate
suffering, or throw over them the shelter of his warrior shield.
'J'he protection of Beresford's just rights, his vested powers,
he considered a portion of that parental care, which the hum-
blest soldier in the ranks received from him, and in this in-
stance it was but the carrying out of that just and wise prin-
ciple of military legislation, which he previously impressed
upon the communder-in-chief of the army of Great Britain.
It was an object of the utmost moment to the great plans of
Wellington, by which he calculated upon one day destroying
the dynasty of Najjoleon, to educate, train, officer, and discipline

3^2 LITE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the Portuguese forces in a manner the most perfect, and under
circumstances the most secret. The army of England could
never cope with the multitudinous arrays of France ; on this the
French securely reckoned ; and as to the resistance of the na-
tive Peninsular troops, that never was admitted as an item in
the great account of the expenditure of lives which the conquest
of Spain and Portugal would require. But Wellington resolved
to convert the canaille of Portugal into well-trained bands,
and, by his system of ciinctation, afford them opportunities of
measuring swords with the foe they feared before, until, instead
of insubordinate Ordenanzas, the army of Portugal should be
able to present and maintain a front in the field of battle, which
the Gallic host might assault in vain. This transmutation was
going silently on, under the judicious care of Beresford ; he was
the skilful alchymist, who was to give to the body a new con-
stitution, to the features a more beautiful arrangement. In
the process, the Portuguese were unconscious of the share they
had ; the enemy were in total ignorance of the change ; and the
English nation, who were acquainted with the ceremon}^ mis-
understood its object, and attributed the dilatoriness of their
general to incapacity, timidity, to everything and anything
except the true cause, which was to gain sufficient time to dis-
cipline twenty-five thousand brave Portuguese, so that, when
the French army was beginning to sink under the hardships of
a protracted war in the heart of an enemy's country, the allies
might fall upon them with nearly equal numbers, and not infe-
rior in discipline.

When ^lassena had ascertained with perfect accuracy the
movements of Mortier, he resumed operations in the vicinity of
Almeida ; and it appears that on the same day on which Mortier
occupied Zafra, the sixth corps completed the investment of
Almeida, an event which dissipated the doubts that hung over
ISIassena's measures, and developed his future plans. This
decisive step, after so long a pause, alarmed the inhabitants,
now placed in a lamentable dilemma by the proclamaiions of
the French and English generals ; and on the fifteenth the
country presented an extraordinary spectacle. " The inhabit-
ants in general had (juitted their villages, and the enemy had

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 3i)3

begun to experience some difficulty in procuring subsistence,
they were obliged to send to a considerable distance, so that
their detachments for foraging and other purposes, as well as
their patrols, sustained much annoyance from the Ordenanza,
and from the light detachments of the army. The French at
length broke ground before Almeida on the fifteenth, but
exhibited so little activity, that not a single battery was
constructed before the twenty-eighth. The first batteries
were erected at a considerable distance, beyond the range of
battering cannon ; but the approaches were pushed to the
very foot of the glacis in one place, owing to the faulty con-
struction of the fortification at that point.

Almeida had long been regarded by the Portuguese as a
warrior-pile, that might bid defiance to a host of enemies, and
disregard the thunder and the ravage of a thousand guns,
and in strength it was inferior to Elvas alone, in Portugal.
An old foundation of the Moors, it is celebrated as having
been won from them by the Cid, for Ferrando the Great,
liy the aid of the Almoravides, this fortress was retaken, but
recovered again by Sancho I. of Portugal, in 1190. At the
siege of Talmayda, as it was anciently called, Payo Guterres
distinguished himself so much, that he obtained the title of
O'Almaydam, or The Almayda, and transmitted to his de-
scendants the surname of Almayda. This ancient name is
written with honour, in the histories of Portugal and India,
down to the date here referred to, when its possessor brought
disgrace upon his ancient house, by traitorously serving against
his country in the army of the invader. After successive wars
had deteriorated the strength of this venerable place, important
to Portugal as a frontier fortress, king Diniz rebuilt the city,
and raised the stately castle here, which the proud Emanuel
subsequently repaired.

As soon as the investment of Almeida was seriously com-
menced, the British general immediately crossed the Mondego,
and commenced concentrating the allied armies, j)lacing them
nearly in the same position which they had occupied before the
retrogression. The same combination of circumstances con-
tinuing to operate lierc as at Ciudad Rodrigo, the jmlicy of his

3.94 LIFK AND CAMPAIGNS OF

lordship being sound, it must now necessarily have been analo-
gous, and, unwilling to suffer the enemy to carry on the siege
with the sixth corps only, he brought up the Portuguese, and
returned to his first position at Almeida. This manceuvre
obliged Massena to collect a large force at Almeida, which
greatly increased the difficulty of subsistence, allowed greater
scope for the operations of the guerillas, and better opportuni-
ties of resistance to the Castillians. The Portuguese were now
posted in the rear at Trancoso, Govea, Melho, and Celerico,
the British occupying Pinhel, Freixadas, and Guarda. Delay,
wasting delay, the chief object of Lord Wellington in the
summer of 1810, was accomplishing, by its passive powers, the
ruin of the enemy : Almeida was a place of strength, having a
irarrison of one regular and two militia regiments, a corps of
artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, in all above four thousand
men, under the command of a loyal and resolute British
fTovernor, Brigadier-General Cox. If this place should only
hold out until the rainy season, the situation of the French army
must then be desperate, as all the avenues which Welling-
ton opened to let in ruin upon them, were now fast filling
with the elements of destruction. "The people of Portugal,"
observed his lordship, in writing to Mr. Henry Wellesley, "are
doing that which the Spaniards ought to have done. They
are removing their women and properties out of the enemy's
way, and taking arms in their own defence. The country is
made a desert, and behind almost every stone-wall the French
will meet an enemy. To this add, that they have the English
and Portuguese armies immediately in their front, ready to
take advantage of any fault or weakness. If we cannot relieve
Almeida, it will, I hope, make a stout defence : the governor is
an obstinate fellow, and talks of a siege of ninety days. From
the folly of the French, in being a month before the place
making preparations to attack it, the garrison, which was not
a very good one, has become accustomed to the sight of them,
and have confidence in themselves, and are in good spirits.
The garrison are supplied for at least as long a time as they
talk of holding out, and every day that they hold out is cut
adva)dage to the came." Here once more the principle upon

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTOX. 395

which the mUitary pohcy of WelHngton then was based, is
distinctly and unequivocally stated — "delay," on which he
mainly relied as his best, most faithful, and efficient ally, one
that would ultimately reduce the strength of the enemy to an
equality with that of the British, in which case the courage of
the men and the genius of the general would accomplish the
rest. From the preceding letter it also appears that Lord
Wellington placed much reliance upon the strength of Almeida
and the loyalty of its defenders — in which it will be seen he
was grievously disappointed ; illustrating once more the truth
of his lordship's assertion, that he could not be considered as
possessing that inestimable element in the character of a hero,
"fortune ;" almost every success which he obtained, being the
result of correct calculation, superior and secure plans, advan-
tageous positions, and such other adjuncts as rendered success
almost morally certain. Thrice was he unfortunate at the open-
ing of a new campaign : when delay was his chief object, and he
hoped the resistance of Ciudad Rodrigo would occasion it, that
frontier fortress fell : he had cautioned, nay, entreated Craufurd
not to risk an action with the enemy : yet that brave soldier
could not resist the temptation when the foe appeared, and
the untoward affair of the Coa was the consequence : this latter
disappointment occasioned an alteration in Lord Wellington's
arrangements for the conduct of the approaching campaign ;
the fall of Almeida was a still greater defeat of expectation, as
being so contrary to probabiUty, and so amazingly sudden ; but
W'ellington was not a spoiled child of victory, he had been
disciplined by fortitude, and knew how to endure and under-
stand the frowns of fortune.

On Saturday night, or early on Sunday morning, the -26th.
of August, the enemy opened their fire upon Almeida, and
the batteries played at a long range : some damage was done
to the houses, but the fire was loudly and briskly answered
from the walls until night-fall, when it slackened on both
sides: but scarcely had the thunder of the artillerv rolled
away, when the ground on which the city stood, trembled as in
an earthquake ; the old square keep, in the centre of the town,

396 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

with the adjoining buildings, burst into fragments from which a
pillar of smoke ascended to an immense height, and then slowly
descended upon the ruined city and its desolated ways. Tlie
ancient donjon, being the only bomb-proof in Almeida, was
therefore made the chief powder-magazine, but sufficient cau-
tion had not been observed in securing the doors, and adapting
the entrance for the purpose to which the castle was now to
be employed : just as a supply of ammunition had been carried
out, and placed in a waggon for transport to the walls, a shell
exploded at the open door, and the loose powder having
ignited, the fire communicated to the contents of the magazine,
and an awful explosion was the result. Until the occurrence
of this tremendous accident, the garrison had sustained no loss,
was in the best order and spirits, had no thoughts of surrender,
but expected to hold out for two months at least, as they had up-
wards of three-hundred and fifty thousand rations of bread.

The loss in ammunition, by this accident, must necessarily
have destroyed all hopes of continuing the defence, as the
garrison now possessed only a very small supply of powder
stored in the magazines on the ramparts, with a few made-up
cartridges, and eighty-nine barrels of powder which remained
in the laboratory ; but the destruction of life was still more
to be deplored by a man of such feelings as the governor,
and the ruin of the ramparts left the survivors exposed to the
cruelty of the enemy. The explosion destroyed the whole
town, breached the ramparts, blew all the guns, with the ex-
ception of three, into the ditch, killed or wounded the greater
part of the artillerymen, besides five hundred of the inhabitants,
and the fragments of the buildings that were thrown out by
the fiery eruption, killed fifty of the besiegers in the trenches.
The survivors stood aghast, dismay and pallid fear alike
pervaded the troops and the towns-people ; they were so
paralyzed with the suddenness, and the sound, and the sight of
destruction, that they became incapable of investigating the
cause of the calamity, and they threw themselves down in anger
with Providence, resolved to take no further thought for their
lives or liberties. But there was one stout heart, which

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 397

throbbed as equably as we read that the pulses of those royal
victims did, whom the people's rage, both in France and Eng-
land, sacrificed on the public scaffold to the goddess of their
idolatry — Liberty. Colonel Cox, an English officer, holding the
rank of brigadier-general in the Portuguese service, had been
entrusted with the governorship of Almeida, from experience of
his resolute temperament : apprehensive of an assault, the
moment the enemy should have ascertained the nature and
extent of the calamity, he ordered the rappel to be beaten,
rallied as many as had recovered from the stunning effects of
the explosion, and, rushing to the ramparts, kept up a rapid fire
with the three guns that were left upon the walls. The enemy,
ignorant of the state of the works, continued to throw in
shells as thickly as before, during the night ; but, when the
return of light enabled them to perceive the magnitude of the
mischief, two officers were sent to the gates with proposals
from the Prince of Esslinjj.

That the mode in which the ruin of Almeida was wrought
was purely accidental, no doubt can be entertained, but that
it would soon have fallen by the villany of traitors, few can
disbelieve who read its story. Cox still resolved on gaining
time; no matter what its length, he knew its value to the
cause of Spain ; and being deprived of obtaining a respite of
two months, he reconciled himself to the brief measure of so
many days. Calling the garrison around him, he remonstrated
with them upon their pusillanimity, reminded them that the
loss they had sustained was not inflicted by the enemy, and
should be borne with manly resignation ; that it was still
practicable to hold out for a few days, before which time it was
probable Wellington would come to their relief, or, by some
skilful movement, alarm the enemy, and oblige them to grant
more favourable terms of capitulation ; and should all fail, it was
his intention then to cut his way through the enemy's lines, and
join the allies. But this meritorious display of steadfastness,
like the Lydian stone, only tested the purity of the coin, which
was unluckily found to be base and svorthless. Treason had
existed in Almeida from the commencement of the siege, and the

If. 3 F

39S LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

French emperor often conquered by corruption, in prefer-
ence to risking the chances of a battle : the desertion of Portugal
by the royal family, and the imbecility of the Spanish king,
weakened the bonds of fealty, gave a tinge of popularity to the
intrusion of France, and rendered many dastards venal. Ber-
nardo Costa, the Tenente Key of Almeida, before the batte-
ries opened on the place, appeared to be a faithful servant of
the state ; but, when the shells began to burst around, he con-
cealed himself in one of the bomb-proofs : when the explosion
had thrown all persons into the utmost consternation, this
coward crept from his retreat, and, assuming a new character,
declared " that the place being no longer tenable, it was the
duty of the governor and the garrison to surrender ; and, that if
Cox persisted in rejecting the mild terms offered by the French
general, he would himself hoist the white flag." A supporter
of these arguments presented himself in the person of Jose
Bareiros, chief of the artillery ; a villain who had long held
secret correspondence with the enemy. Governor Cox, finding
that a mutiny actually existed, directed the major of artillery to
proceed to the French quarters, and settle the terms of capitula-
tion ; but that traitor informed the enemy of the exact state of
the place after the explosion, and never returned ! Massena
in consequence rejected the terms proposed by the governor, but
consented to permit the militia to return to their homes, while
the regulai's remained prisoners of war. Entering the town,
the first part of the treaty was artfully executed, having first
exacted a promise that the individuals then set free should not
again take up arms against the French: but the manner in
which Massena fulfilled the second condition, reflects disgrace
upon the general, and dishonour upon the service that re-
tained a man so devoid of principle in a situation of so much
power. He addressed the Portuguese soldiers in the lan-
guage of flattery, conciliation, corruption, and promised to
those men whom he was instructing in treason, the favour of
his imperial master, if they would pass over to his banners.
This disreputable transaction is thus noticed by Lord Welling-
ton, " I am sorry to add, that the whole of the twenty-fourth

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 309

regiment, with the exception of the major, and of the English
officers, have gone into the French service. It is said their
object is to evade captivity, and that as soon as they can find
an opportunity, they mean to desert : this may be well enough
for private soldiers, but it is highly disgraceful to the character
of the officers." His lordship's indignation at the scandal
brought upon the profession of arms by such degeneracy of
morals, was in unison with the sentiments of every officer
under his command. Lord Londonderry expresses the same
feeling upon this occasion, in language creditable to a brave
and generous soldier. "It is hardly necessary to observe that
no one could ever think of placing reliance on men who could
thus set all honourable feeling at defiance. For my own part, I
looked upon the ci-devant garrison of Almeida as a band of
contemptible cowards, or barefaced traitors; and I believe that
the sentiments which I entertained towards them were, with-
out a single exception, those of every man and officer in
the British army." Marshal Beresford also protested against
the meanness of Massena, and the moral delinquency of the
Portuguese officers, whom he declared he would never receive
again into the service of their prince, unless some mitigating
circumstances were found to aid in their restoration. After the
lapse of a few days, the majority of these poor ignorant beings
deserted from the French, and attached themselves to the first
party of their own countrymen they came up with: their desti-
tute condition, their jaded appearance, their mental agonies,
and their solemn asseverations that they had never taken any
oath of fidelity to the cause of France, pleaded not in vain with
their excellent commander, who felt for the ignorance, as well
as for the sufferings they had already undergone, and sus-
pended the punishment he had intended to inflict.

Amongst the arguments adopted to induce the Almeidans
to surrender, was one that was artful, but disreputable to the
ori'^inators : the officers who were sent to summon the town
had instructions to invite the garrison to pass over to the
French army, and to enjoy that treatment and those advantages
which a number of their countrymen were then receiving in that

4U0 LIFE AKD CAMPAIGNS OF

service. In support of this specious fraud, the Marquis
U'Alorna was brought forward, whose protestations were
vehement in seconding the invitation of Massena. But it
should be stated, that no Portuguese troops had ever deserted
in a body to the standard of France; the few that were in that
service had been hurried out of their country by Junot, and
were forcibly detained in France by the emperor. As to
D'Alorna, he was a Portuguese, and a man of much talent, but
little principle : he conceived that his family had always been
treated with severity by the royal family of Portugal, and,
prompted solely by a vindictive feeling, he embraced the op-
portunity of Junot's invasion of Portugal to become a traitor
to his country, not only without personal risk, but even with
expectation of reward for his infamy. Having once committed
himself as an enemy to his father-land, he became a deter-
mined and uncompromising partisan of the French; and it was
in liis power to aid their designs, and to direct the operations of
Junot, being at that period in the situation of governor of Beira,
and having a perfect knowledge of the different parties that
then rent the kingdom by their intrigues, and of all the secret
springs by which they were severally put in motion. His
services, therefore, were highly acceptable to Napoleon, who
looked on his hatred of the reigning family as a security for his
fidelity to himself, and, immediately appointing him a general
of division, he sent him with Massena into Portugal.

The cruelty with which the French had treated the non-resist-
ing villages on the frontier of Beira, had shown the Almeidans
how little faith could be reposed in the proclamations of
Massena, or the promises of his envoys, and D'Alorna was
known as a traitor to the whole army, so that negociation
proved futile ; but, after the destruction of the works by the
accidental explosion, necessity, and the hope of escaping im-
prisonment for life in a distant country, influenced the minds
of the garrison to consent to the terms offered by the enemy.
The militia, according to the stipulations of the treaty, were
to have been spared the humiliation of carrying arms against
their country and their kindred ; but perfidy was one of Mas-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 401

Sena's infirmities, and when he found that there was not an
individual in the three niihtia regiments of Arganil, Trancosco,
and Guarda, who could be induced to violate his allegiance,
he directed that two hundred men and seven officers of each
regiment should be detained, and formed into a corps of
pioneers. Besides this flagrant breach of the articles, the
French were also guilty of the most barbarous inhumanity,
by continuing to fire upon the defenceless town the whole of
the night after it had surrendered; and, although it had all the
appearance of a pitiful punishment, which they sought to
inflict upon the garrison for their refusal to enter the imperial
service, yet French historians assert that it was attributable to
an error in the transmission of orders. Of the renegades who
aided in the fall of Almeida, one alone was reserved for justice,
this was the cowardly De Costa, who was subsequently brought
to trial, and shot as a traitor. One curious fact relative to
the fate of this fortress may be added, as the close of its event-
ful history. The occurrence of the dreadful catastrophe, by
which all hopes of defending the place were dissipated, was
not officially communicated at Britisli head-quarters, until
many hours after the surrender of the place, but Lord Wellinf^-
ton was, nevertheless, in possession of the fact : his lordship
was employed constantly w ith his glass, observing the movements
of the enemy and the progress of the siege, from the summit
of a hill at Mar^al de Chao, and finding that there was a
cessation from hostilities, from one p. m. till nine on Monday
night, when the firing recommenced, and lasted till near two,
and an explosion having been heard at the British advanced
posts, he agam proceeded to make a personal reconnoissance,
wiien he discovered, on the Monday, that the steeple was de-
stroyed, and the houses almost all unroofed: it was not until
after he was sufficiently satisfied of its fate, that official intelli-
gence of its fall reached him.

The surrender of Almeida was as unexpected as it was unwel-
come to the allies : it afforded fresh food to the morbid appe-
tites of the alarmists in England, it added fresh fuel to the flame
of discontent, and dislovaltv was occasionallv observed burstini:

402 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

through the thin veil that covered it: changes had taken place
in the Portuguese government, which consisted in dismissing
troublesome political intriguers, to make way for furious and
revengeful monsters; proscriptions, deaths, and confiscations
were the occurrences of every hour in the capital; and the
despots, grown familiar with power, and encouraged by the para-
graphs of the despondent English press, had the folly and pre-
sumption to demand an explanation, and to express their desire
that the quick and great successes of the army might soon be
able to obliterate the depression caused by the fall of Almeida.
Lord Wellington's reply to this impudent document evinced
his ability to struggle with difficulties, his peculiar fitness for
the possession and administration of power, his firmness,
decision, and political courage. " I have already made known,"
he observed, " to the government of the kingdom, that the fall
of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its
loss, and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress
and afflict the people of the kingdom. It was by no means
my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had,
or had not, been my intention to have succoured the place :
and I now request the permission of the governors of the
kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression
which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not
propose to alter the si/stevi and plan of operations which have
been determined on, after the most serious deliberation, as
most adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and
consequently of Portugal. I request the government to be-
lieve that I am not insensible of the value of their confidence,
as well as of that of the public : as also, that I am highly in-
terested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late
misfortune: but I should forget my duty to my sovereign,
to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should
permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change in
the smallest degree the system and plan of operations which
I have adopted, after mature consideration, and ivhich daily
experience shows to he the only one likely to produce a good
end." This reply, replete with confidence, was an answer

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 403

also to the despondents at home ; it showed clearly that his
lordship did not hesitate to take the whole responsibility of
his confident conduct upon himself, that he shrunk from no
inquiry, but would not disclose what it was not necessary,
perhaps not safe, that the public should be informed of. Fully
aware of the contemptible character of the new government,
he lost not a moment in compelling them to retract the faint
insinuation that the British generals were at least privy to the
proscriptions that were going forward; and he further, through
Mr. Charles Stuart, informed them, that if, by their miserable
intrigues, they interfered in any manner with the appointments
of Marshal Beresford's staff, or with the operations of the
army, he would advise his majesty to withdraw the assistance
which he was then affording to the Portuguese nation.

His lordship's determination to resist the machinations of
this wretched cabinet was warmly and decidedly expressed
in the same despatch, and he thus declares his resolution
as to their total co-operation, on pain of forfeiting the aid
of England in the war. " I purpose," added his lordship,
"to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their con-
sideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese
government refuse, or delay to adopt, the civil and political
arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with
the military operations I am carrying on. The preparatory
measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless
the mills, were suggested by me long ago : and JNIarshal
Beresford did not write to government upon them, till I had
reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I
now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures
may be adopted, not only in the country between the Tagus
and the Mondego, north of Torres Vedras, as originally pro-
posed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of
Portugal ; and that the magistrates and others may be directed
to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so
from the military ofHcers. I have already adopted this mea-
sure with success in this part of the country, and it must be
adopted in others in which it is probable the enemy may

404 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

endeavour to penetrate : and it must be obvious to any person
who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent
with all the other measures, which for the last twelve months
I have recommended to the government, to impede and render
difficult, and, if possible, to prevent the advance into, and
establishment of the enemy's forces in this country. But it
appears that the government have lately discovered that we
are all wrong ; they have become impatient for the defeat of
the enemy, and, in imitation of the central junta, call out for a
battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would
have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call,
and the cause would now have been safe : but now, having the
power in my hands, I tvill not lose the only chance which
remains of savi)ig the cause, by paying the smallest attention
to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I
acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in
the regency, and as I must attribute it to the persons recently
introduced into the government, it affords additional reason
with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall
write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear
any more of this conduct."

Lord Wellington's plans for the ultimate confusion of the
enemies of peace were wholly beyond the limits of the regency's
faculties, and, with few exceptions, very imperfectly compre-
hended by the leading debaters in the British senate. Lord
Moira, at one period, caught a glimpse of the great scheme of
the British hero, but it mocked him like a phantom, and, when
called on again to deliver a military opinion upon the Penin-
sular campaign, the vision had totally fleeted away. To Lord
Holland it appeared requisite " that some great man should
arise, capable of inventing and executing some great plan,
if Portugal were to be saved from French domination;" but
his lordship did not allude either to Wellington or his Fabian
plans ; on the contrary, he put this case as an impossible,
or, at all events, an improbable one — while the saviour of
Portugal was actually at the head of the British army, and
had been twelve months engaged in carrying into operation

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTOxX. 405

this vast design, by which Europe was to be wrested from the
powerful hand of Napoleon. It was absolutely incumbent
upon Lord Wellington to compel the Portuguese to help them-
selves, although, in this instance, his plans for their relief
were certainly most unpalatable. It was a hard necessity
which compelled the poor cottager to forsake his humble
home, and fly for shelter where he might be left in want of
food : it w as a cruel fate, that obliged the proprietor first to
destroy and then abandon his mill and works, in obedience to
military command : but the pages of history will be consulted
in vain for an instance of more consummate judgment, a military
enterprise of more deep or daring character, than that which
Wellington so deliberately planned, and so resolutely exe-
cuted— for the final expulsion of the French army remains
completely without a parallel. The system of destroying by
delay is not novel in the art of war, but with such fearful odds
against him, as the French army in the Peninsula, compared
to the little British force that followed Wellington, no other
general would ever have meditated seriously upon any plan of
resistance. The French habitually taunted the British with
their marine association; but it was to the proximity of the
sea that Wellington felt indebted for his supply of provisions
after he had caused the country to be wasted : when the
regency hesitated to destroy the mills or break the embank-
ments of the water-courses, they forgot that the stream of the
ocean would bring corn to Lisbon, while the enemy were
perishing by famine in the fields. Lord Wellington's remon-
strance upon this point is one of his most severe and
sarcastic public letters, but the time and the circumstances
called for that energy, promptness, and finality.

With the fall of Almeida, all advantage of Wellington's
continuance in that vicinity was superseded ; he, therefore, fell
back to his former position, placing the infantry behind
Celerico, his cavalry at that place, their outposts being at
Alverca, and establishing posts of observation at Guarda and
Trancoso. While these movements were in progress, a similar
accident to that which destroyed Almeida happened at Albu-

II, 3 a

406 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

querque, where the magazine, being struck with lightning, blew
up, and killed above four hundred persons. The enemy begun
now to be stirring in every direction : on the thirtieth of
August they made two attacks on the British pickets, but
were repulsed in both instances; however, in the afternoon of the
same day they obliged Sir Stapleton Cotton to draw his posts
within Freixadas. In these slight affrays. Captain Lygon and
two privates of the royal dragoons were wounded. Regnier,
who continued to make demonstrations in the direction of
Castello Branco, sent out frequent patroles, one of which fall-
ing in with a troop of the thirteenth British, and another of
the fourth Portuguese, belonging to Hill's corps, but under the
command of Captain White, was surprised, and the whole made
prisoners, with the exception of their commander and one man
who were killed. Soon after this affair, Regnier arrived at
Sabugal, upon which Lord Wellington instructed Hill to ob-
serve his further movements, and in case he should march
towards Belmonte, and cross the Zezere, so as to place himself
between that river and the Alva, or, if he should move upon
Guarda, in either case Hill was to move on Thomar by Villa del
Key, where he would find fresh orders awaiting him; but Regnier
hastily turning his line of march upon Zaza Mayor, arrived at
Alcantara, and threw a bridge over the river at that place.

The conduct of Regnier was calculated to continue that
mystery in which the plans of Massena were involved, and to
confuse the British as to the hne by which the enemy intended to
advance into Portugal. The inactivity of Massena was known
to his imperial master, who thus remarked in an intercepted
letter of his to that marshal, " Wellington has only eighteen
thousand men, Hill only six thousand; and it would be ridi-
culous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can
balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but
fall boldly on, after having well observed where the blow may
be struck. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times
as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six
thousand cavalry, and a proportion of guns, between Ciudad
Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest com-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 407

mence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the
positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you
should attack ; but it is certain that the utmost force the
English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be
twenty-eight thousand men.'' This letter is said to have been
dictated by Napoleon, but it does not possess any of the cha-
racter of his mind or his style ; and it is not impossible but it
might have been " a weak invention of the enemy," as the
French marshal had commenced active operations before the
letter was intercepted. If Napoleon was the author of this
weak and useless letter of instructions, he displayed total igno-
rance of every circumstance connected with the designs of the
British : he never hints at the possibility of provisions failing,
makes no allusion to Beresford and his vigorous younsr armv,
and is totally silent as to Torres Vedras. His knowledge of
Wellington's plans for the recovery of Portugal was not more
accurate than that of the secretary of war in England, one of
whose despatches of the same date as Napoleon's instructions
commences with these words, " As it is probable the army
will embark in September," &c.

The British retired still farther, to Gouvea, where head-
quarters were fixed, keeping a watch upon the road from
Sabugal, and preventing any alarm from being created to Hill
by turning his position on the Zezerc ; but this movement
proved ultimately useless, the enemy suddenly drawing off
their whole force to the British left. Massena had been
instructed to make Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo places of
arms, and to enter Portugal by both banks of the Tagus ; but
he confined his operations to the north bank only, and
limited his views to three lines of march, namely, by Viseu,
Celerico, and Bclmonte. So far decided in his plans, Regnier
was called in, and stationed at Guarda : Ney, at INIacal de
Chao : Junot, at Pinhel, threatening the selected Lines, and
betraying Massena's real object, which was to concentrate all
his forces on Viseu, which the traitor Alorna had represented
as the most practicable route, and, pouring down tiience into
the valley of the iSlondego, reach Coimbra before Hill could
possibly have joined the main body of the allies. But

408 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Wellington perceived that the invasion of Portugal was virtually
begun, and, as soon as he ascertained that it was Regnier s
corps that occupied Guarda, he recalled Hill and Leith to
the main body. It is due to the discernment and activity
of General Hill, who had been entrusted with a separate
command, and enjoyed the entire confidence of Lord Welling-
ton, to state, that knowing his commander-in-chief's wishes
and views, he had judiciously anticipated his final orders, and
was on his march to join the main body when the order
to that effect reached him. Wellington now retired behind
the Alva, leaving the light division and the cavalry at
Mortagoa ; Hill had come up on the twenty-first, and although
the enemy had actually reached the Criz at the same time, they
found themselves completely baffled. Pack having destroyed
all the bridiijes. The badness of the roads occasioned much
delay to the French, and the artillery had not reached the
deserted town of Viseu on the nineteenth. Colonel Trant
having surprised a patrole, learned from them that the military
chest and reserve artillery were at hand, followed by Montbrun's
cavalry, and immediately resolved to make an attack upon the
convoy. This bold action was brilliantly performed, nor were
the collected forces of the enemy able to drive Trant away from
Tojal until he had secured about one hundred prisoners. The
check occasioned a delay of two days more to the advance of the
enemy — a circumstance of vital value to the allies. As long as
the enemy remained at Viseu, so long Spencer continued to
guard the road to Oporto with a strong force at Milheada, but,
when Ney repaired the bridges, and crossed over the Criz,
Spencer was called in, the allied force concentrated, and
Wellington resolved upon receiving the enemy in a position of
his own selection on the Sierra de Busaco. There were those
in the allied army who expressed their fears that Massena
would not attack such a formidable position ; to which the
British chief replied, " Well, but if he does, I shall beat him :" and
there were others in the French army, who assured Massena that
the British at last were resolved to give him battle ; to which
he answered, " I cannot persuade myself that Wellington will
risk the loss of his reputation, but if he does— I have him !

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 409

To-morrow we shall effect the conquest of Portugal, and in a
few days I shall drown the leopard !"

Wellington possessed no such extraordinary and unjusti-
fiable ambition as that of encountering sixty or seventy
thousand veterans led by Marshal Massena, with a force only
two-thirds of that amount, and of that force one-half untried
men : but the folly and impatience of the Portuguese, and the
fears of the government in England, and the discontent of the
Spaniards at the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and
the resistance to the execution of his orders to abandon their
homes, which the regency gave, determined him upon making
such a display of military genius and physical force, as would
restore the courage of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and strike
terror into the followers of Massena. With this determination
the warrior took up the impregnable position of Busaco,
where he knew he could give the enemy a fatal reception
without much risk, and deceive the alarmists by appearing
to be at length prepared to bring the tedious contest to a
close. More perfect policy, more consummate skill, were never
exhibited by any general, than ^\ ellington displayed in the
objects and the conduct of the defence at the Sierra de Busaco.
It was singular enough that Lord Wellington's secret plans
were so faithfully concealed by those to whom he had com-
mitted them, that both friends and foes were equally ignorant
of his objects, and both, nearly at the same moment, exclaimed
against his poUcy. While the alcaldes resisted his authority
to destroy the mills, and drive the people towards the capital,
Massena echoed their sentiments, and assured the inhabitants
that their lives and properties would be more secure upon his
honour tlian upon that of the English general, while he
most inhumanly caused all the Ordenanzas that were taken to
be shot as traitors, unless they were clotlied in military uni-
form. On the twenty-fourth of September, Lord Wellington
addressed a remonstrance to the French marshal, on this pain-
ful subject, which must have increased that general's respect
for his antagonist, however uncomfortable to his feelings the
communication itself might have proved. His lordship observed,

410 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

"• You call these men peasants without any uniform, assassins,
hi^hwavmen : I have the honour to assure you that they are
the Ordenanzas of this kingdom, military corps, commanded
by officers paid and appointed by military laws. You appear
to insist that those alone are entitled to the rights of war who
are clad in military costume, yet forget that you yourself have
added to the lustre of the French army at the head of soldiers
who were not dressed in any uniforn. Is a country invaded
by a formidable foe, justified in defending itself by every
possible means ? if so, Portugal is entitled to put its Orde-
nanza in requisition, a body recognized and organized by the
ancient laws of the country. You complain of the treatment
of Colonel Pavetti, a prisoner — your complaint is unfounded,
while you permitted a militia captain's house to be burned,
and his companions shot, because he discharged his duty to
his country. I am sorry that the desertion of their houses by
the Portuguese has occasioned you so much personal incon-
venience ; but it is my duty to oblige those to retire w^ho are
not able to defend themselves, and my orders are the result
of necessity. Those who remember the invasion of Portugal
in 1807, and the usurpation of their government in time of
peace, when there was not an English soldier in the country,
can scarcely believe your declaration that it is with the English
alone you are at war ; and they are unable to reconcile the
conduct of the French soldiers towards their property, their
women, themselves, with the promises of your excellency.
It is not, therefore, surprising that they should voluntarily
abandon their homes, having first burnt or destroyed what
they could not remove ; and I have no regret to express for
the encouragement I have given to commit these acts, except
for the personal inconvenience which it has caused your
excellency. You are misinformed with respect to the militia
that formed part of the garrison of Almeida; before you
complain of the infraction of the capitulation of that place,
you should recollect that you violated the conditions as soon
as they were signed : you promised that the officers and
privates of the militia should be at liberty to return home, yet,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 411

notwithstanding that solemn engagement, you detained a
certain number from each regiment, to form a corps of
pioneers ; the capitulation of Almeida, therefore, is void, and
I have a right to act as I please with respect to it; but I
assure you, at the same time, that there is not one militia-
man of the late Almeida garrison, in my service at this
moment." This interesting letter has been overlooked, by
those especially who admire the policy of France at that
period ; but it possesses an important value to history, as
proving a fact which some have pretended to doubt — the dis-
honour of Massena, and his flagrant violation of the terms
which he granted, on his princely faith, to the brave governor
and garrison of Almeida ; and, in fact, the truth of Pelet's
statement is completely shaken by the contents of the pre-
ceding document.

No uncertainty now existed as to Massena's objects, and
Wellington was prepared to answer every movement of the
enemy, and counteract their ablest designs and operations ;
the marshal desired to pass through Coimbra to the capital, in
order to obtain supplies on the route for his army ; the British
general determined upon preventing him from collecting pro-
visions, upon arresting his progress towards Lisbon, and upon
giving him a foretaste of British courage and discipline, as a
salutary admonition in his meditated advance. It was also in
the highest degree necessary to obtain some delay from pursuit,
for the old, the infirm, the young, the gentle sex, that were
pushing along the narrow rugged way towards Lisbon, and to
inspire the Portuguese nation with renewed confidence in the
British, for the weight of their sorrow obliterated the recollec-
tion of former achievements. Busaco, a name now famed in
history, was the rocky citadel chosen for the consummation of
these ends by the gallant leader of the allies. " The position of
Busaco was secure against artillery, and inaccessible to cavalry.
Here, from tiie lofty ridge of one of their native sierras, Wel-
lington first showed to the I'ortuguese levies the formidable
array of their invaders, and here he allotted to them the easy
task of repulsing, by the side of British soldiers, one of those

4V2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

desperate and hopeless assaults, which his knowledge of the
French character encouraged him to expect. By this master-
stroke of military skill and sound policy, the Portuguese were
inspired with a confidence in him and in themselves, that never
afterwards forsook them."

The Sierra de Alcoba, or Busaco, possesses other claims to
recollection than those which the military judgment of Wel-
liniiton have conferred upon it by selecting its rugged front as
a field of battle. It is a precipitous ridge, extending from the
ISIondego about eight miles in a northern direction, and sub-
siding gently on the west and south into a rich, cultivated
populous country, adorned with villages, monasteries, churches,
and marked with the sinuosities of the rapid Mondego. This
picturesque river insinuates itself between the precipices that
terminate the sierras of Murcella and Busaco, presenting
the boldest and most romantic scenery in the province, and
continuing to possess equal beauty of forms, productions, and
colour, up to the very fountain of the Alva in the range of the
Estrella. The Busaco chain is also continued in a northerly
direction to the Sierra Carramula, which extending north-east,
separates the valley of the INIondego from that of the Douro.
As all the roads to Coimbra from the east lead across this
rnountain-range, which presents a savage aspect towards the
Mondego, they are necessarily inconvenient for the passage of
an army, and advantageous as a point of resistance.

On the loftiest point of the sierra is a table-land, occupied
by a spacious conventual establishment for Barefooted Car-
melites, called a desert, where the advantages of the eremite
and discipline of the coenobite life, are at once enjoyed. The
principal building is surrounded by a dense forest, the whole
domain occupying a crater-formed hollow, about four miles in
circumference. Within the enclosure are chapels and devo-
tional stations, and on the most elevated and conspicuous point
a colossal cross has been erected, the pedestal of which alone
consumed three thousand carts-load of stone. The cells of the
reverend brethren were constructed around the great church,
not at regular intervals, but on the most sheltered and conve-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 413

nient sites; and, to protect the occupant from the effects of the
damp climate, each cell was lined with cork, and that mate-
rial adopted instead of wood wherever it could be introduced.
The only recreation in which the ascetics of Busaco indulged
themselves, was the cultivation of the small gardens attached
to their narrow cells, and in one of which the first cedar-trees
that grew in Portugal were raised. This was an earthly
paradise which man had converted into a purgatory, and
superstition seemed to sanctify his work. Here the British
hero fixed his head-quarters, " and the solitude and the silence
of Busaco were now broken by events, in which its hermits,
dead as they were to the world, might be permitted to partici-
pate in all the agitations of hope and fear." An eye-witness
thus describes the prospect from the convent of Busaco, while
Lord Wellington was the guest of the brethren, immediately
before the battle." My regiment had no sooner piled arms,
than I walked to the verge of the mountain on which we lay,
in the hope that I might discover something of the enemy.
Little, however, was I prepared for the magnificent scene
which burst on my astonished sight. Far as the eye could
stretch, the glittering of steel, and clouds of dust raised by
cavalry and artillery, proclaimed the march of a countless
army ; while immediately below me, at the foot of the pre-
cipitous heights on which I stood, their pickets were already
posted : thousands of them were already halted in their
bivouacks, and column after column arriving in quick
succession, reposed upon the ground allotted to them, and
swelled the black and enormous masses. The numbers of
the enemy were, at the lowest calculation, seventy-five thousand,
and this host formed in three distinct and heavy columns ;
wliile to the rear of their left, at a more considerable distance,
you might see a large encampment of their cavalry, and the
whole country behind them seemed covered with their train,
their ambulance, and their commissariat. This then was the
French army : here lay before me the men who had once, for
nearly two years, kept the whole coast of England in alarm :
who had conquered Italy, overrun Austria, shouted victory on

II. 3 H

414 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the plains of Austerlitz, and humbled in one "day the power,
the pride, and the martial renown of Prussia, on the field of
Jena." The British and Portuguese occupied a line of eight
miles in length, but the great extent of the position at Busaco
rendered it inconvenient as fighting ground, less than sixty-
thousand men being insufficient to occupy it fully, so that any
attempt to turn the British left, by Milheada, must ulti-
mately have succeeded. This Massena neglected, and, im-
pressed with the conviction that Wellington would not stand
his ground, he led his columns against the British posts, which
proved to be as immoveable as the rocks they stood on.

On the twenty-third, the British tavalry being obliged to re-
tire from the campaign country to the height behind Mortagoa,
one division being retained there, the remainder were ordered
to cross the sierra and descend to Milheada, whence Spencer
was recalled, while Picton's division took up a position at
Antonio de Cantara, and the fourth was placed at the convent.
The advanced guard of the enemy crossed the Criz on the
twenty-fifth, took possession of Santa Combadao, and pushed on
to Mortagoa, where Craufurd was strongly posted. Lord Wel-
lington had issued peremptory orders against any partial action,
or any affair of advanced guards, but Ney and Regnier's corps
followed so hotly, that the cavalry skirmishers were actually
exchanging shots, and Craufurd was not likely to endure this
insolence of the enemy much longer; at this critical moment
Lord Wellington suddenly arrived, and, taking the personal
direction, covered the retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-
fifth, the cavalry and horse artillery, and brought off the division
without any loss of importance. In this affair fell Lieutenant
Hoey, an officer of much promise, aide-de-camp to Lord Lon-
donderry, at whose side he was killed by a cannon-shot : and in
this manner, by a series of rapid and beautiful movements, by
a sharp cannonade, and an hour's march, the accident was
rectified, mischief prevented, and the division brought into
its position on the heights.

During the rescue of the division from the risk of ruin, to
which Craufurd's impetuosity had exposed it, Regnier turned

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 415

his route to the left, and took up a position in front of San
Antonio de Cantara, opposite to General Picton's division.
This rock was the key to the pass, and became in consequence
the principal object of Massena's attack, as it was evidently
his intention, in the first instance, to have forced, in preference
to turning the British position. At this moment Ney would
have rushed upon the allies, whose disposition was not yet
complete, and while he was yet beyond the Alva; but Mas-
sena was at Mondego, and, in reply to Ney's aide-de- camps
who brought intelligence of the weakness and confusion of
the allies, desired " that the honour of drowning the leopard
might be reserved for himself upon the morrow." But before
that morrow shone forth, the confusion of the allies had sub-
sided, and a perfect and beautiful chain of positions was formed
on the heights of Busaco ; too distant from each other to render
their ground impregnable, but this defect was unavoidable, and
remedied to a certain extent, by the full command which each
embattled eminence possessed over the intervening ravines, by
which alone the enemy could advance, as well as by the indomit-
able courage of the troops that maintained them. Another
circumstance materially altered the situation of the contending
armies, when Massena did arrive to carry his foolish vaunt
into execution, thatwas, the junction of Hill's corps, which Lord
Wellington moved from its position on the Alva across the
Mondego, on the morning of the twenty-sixth, leaving Le Cor
with a Portuguese brigade on the Sierra da Murcella, to guard
the passage of the Alva, while Brigadier-General Fane, with
the thirteenth light dragoons, and a squadron of Portuguese
cavalry, was stationed in front of that river, to check the cavalry
of the enemy in any attempt from the direction of Mortagoa.

The line of battle was drawn out, the reserved posts
occupied, and the arrangements for an obstinate resistance
complete on the twenty-seventh ; the allied army being thus
disposed — the second division, under General Hill, formed the
extreme right, flanked by the Mondego, guarding the ground
that sloped gently towards the bank of that river, and formed
across the Pena Covaroad: the eminence on Hill's left was

41G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

occupied by General Leith, commanding the fifth division, and
havini: the Lusitanian le^fion in reserve : on Leith's left was the
third division, afterwards so distinguished for its intrepidity,
under the command of one of the bravest officers in the service.
General Picton, and placed decidedly in the post of honour
at Busaco, for it was expected that the enemy would direct
their chief attempts, and employ their entire strength, to force
the passage of San Antonio de Cantara, which Picton was
appointed to defend. About one mile to the left of Picton, and
between the third division and the convent, the first division
under General Sir Brent Spencer was placed, occupying the
highest point of the ridge : Craufurd's light division continued
the line to the extreme left, where General L. Cole, with the
fourth division, terminated the line, their flank being protected
by an almost perpendicular declivity. The British cavalry,
commanded by General Sir Stapleton Cotton, were posted in
the flat country, behind the fourth division, where there was
sufficient space for them to act, and where they effectually
checked all attempts on Coimbra by that route. General
Pack's brigade was formed in advance of the first division ; and
about fifty salient points, along the front of the line and of the
mountain, were occupied by as many pieces of artillery; while
skirmishers were thrown out along the entire front.

On the arrival of Massena with the eighth corps, which took
place on the twenty-sixth at noon, that bold general expressed
his determination to force his way through the enemy ; but
Ney perceiving the increased strength of the position which
Wellington occupied since the arrival of Hill, endeavoured to
dissuade him from such a vain attempt; the prince, how-
ever, trusting in the superiority of his numbers, the quality
of his veterans, and his own fortune, resolved upon carry-
ing the position. During the stilly silence of night, on
the twenty-sixth, while the British, wrapped in their watch-
cloaks, "with the strong surface of the mountain for their bed,
and the sky for their canopy, slept or thought away the time,"
a rustling noise was heard proceeding from the thick woods
that darkened the dells in front, upon which, about two hours

Ir'Funte't hv i.V

(lEN"- STAPI-ETON COTTOiV. VrSCOTNT X- IIAUOX COM HF.UMK UK.. C. C B ftr

•^^^7l^/-l_ ,

THE DUKE OF WELLNGTON. 417

before daybreak, the whole allied army was under arms, and
in battle-array.

Whilst the mists yet hung upon the mountain, and con-
cealed the combatants from each other's view, the impetuous
foe was forming in five dense, dark columns, which were
occasionally discerned from the heights of Busaco, as the
light clouds of morn went and came. To the gallant Ney
three columns were intrusted, with orders to attack the heights
in front of the convent ; while Regnier, with the remaining two,
should fall on the line of the allies about three miles to the
left at San Antonio de Cantara. The latter being the real
object of Massena, the attempt was committed to an elite
corps, consisting of three of the most distinguished regiments
in the imperial service, and commanded by General Merle,
who had earned a high reputation in the field of Austerlitz.
These brave fellows rushed to the attack with a courage that
merited a happier fate, had they been engaged in a more
honourable cause than the enslaving of all Europe. The
pass was defended by the seventy-fourth regiment, two Por-
tuguese battalions, and tw^elve pieces of artillery ; and
although a column of the enemy long persisted, with gallantry
and noble perseverance, they were never able to gain an inch
of ground, and were ultimately compelled to abandon the
attempt in great confusion. During this success, however,
a heavy column penetrated on the left of Picton's position,
close to the hill of Busaco, and, amidst a storm of grape, round
shot, and musketry, actually gained the summit of the hill,
and instantly formed with most beautiful precision : had they
been supported, they would have made a resistance both long
and sanguinary ; but the gallantry of the French only excited
the emulation of the allies, and the forty-fifth British, with
the eighth Portuguese, opposed the hardy veterans with such
resolution, as to check any further advance, until the eighty-
eighth came up to their assistance. The French iiad obtained
possession of a strong rocky point in the middle of Picton's
line, while that general was engaged in directing the defence
of the pass ; but, upon being satisfied that the enemy could

418 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

not effect their object in that place, he rode hastily towards
the rock, where he saw his right driven in, and the enemy
gaining ground. The presence of Picton, seconded by his great
example of the boldest daring, was attended with immediate
success; heading a Portuguese battalion that Lord Wellington
had that moment sent to his assistance, he rallied his men,
returned to the attack with bayonets levelled, and, charging at
a trot, drove the enemy over the cliffs into the ravine below,
with frighful havoc, presenting one of the most awful spectacles
that was exhibited during the campaign. When the enemy
became panic-stricken by the fierce bearing of the muscular
Britons with pointed bayonets, they attempted to fly with
the wildest precipitation ; but owing to the irregularity of the
ground, numbers were thrown down and transfixed by their
foes, " and many literally picked out of the holes in the rocks
by the bayonets of the soldiers." Another attempt was made
by Merle's division to ascend the hill, but this was easily and
bravely repulsed by General Leith, who came up, at the precise
moment, with the first, ninth, ninety-eighth regiments, and, in
an hour after, Hill arrived at this part of the line with a force
which would have rendered all further attempts fatal to the
enemy: after this, Massena abandoned the rash idea of forcino-
the pass of San Antonio de Cantara. The attack on Picton's
division was made in error, Massena conceiving that point to
have been the extreme right of the allied line ; and it was not
until his veterans had reached the summit of the rocky rido^e,
on which they fully thought that victory sat enthroned, that they
discovered the dark columns, which Hill and Leith now led on
to overwhelm, and to complete their destruction. It was im-
mediately after this decisive repulse that Lord Wellington
visited the spot, and, riding up to Hill, who waited in some
expectation of being attacked, said, "If they attempt this
point again, you will give them a volley, and charge bayonets ;
but don't let your people follow them too far down the hill."
" I was particularly struck," says an oflScer in General Hill's
division, "with the style of this order— so decided, so manly,
and breathing ?io doubt as to the repulse of any attack : it

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 419

confirmed confidence. Lord Wellington's simplicity of man-
ner in the delivery of orders, and in command, is quite that
of an able man. Pie had nothiu" of the truncheon about
him : nothing full-mouthed, important, or fussy ; his orders
on the field are all short, quick, clear, and to the purpose."*

After General Picton had made the necessary dispositions
for the reception of the enemy on the night of the '26th, and
personally visited every post, he retired to a convenient spot,
wrapped himself in his cloak, pulled on a coloured night-cap,
of a description which he always wore, and lay down to rest,
having given orders to the proper officers that he should be
called uj)on the least alarm. Overcome by fatigue, and
possessing that command over the senses which is the pre-
rogative of strong minds, he instantly fell asleep. Scarcely
had two hours elapsed, when he was awoke by the firing of
musketry, and, springing from his grassy bed, he put on his
hat, leaped into his saddle, and the next moment was defend-
ing the pass of San Antonio. From this place he hastened to
the rocky eminence where his right was turned, and, having
succeeded in rallying his men, placed Major Smith at their
head, where that officer he was instantly struck down ; turning
round to the Portuguese battalion, that was advancing in the
most perfect martial order, as if glorying in the display of dis-
cipline which the once despised canaille were now enabled,
by the genius and perseverance of Beresford, to present, he
encountered the full flash of every eye, in the steady line, now
silently, but earnestly appealing to him, whether they were
not at length deserving of such a general ? He was not long in
appreciating the feeling, of which a soldier only perhaps is
susceptible, and without a moment's hesitation, putting spurs
to his charger, he dashed forward to the head of the column,
and taking off his hat, with which he pointed to the enemy,
called aloud, " Forward, brave Portuguese." This was the
origin of the electric fire that instantly ran through the heart
of every man in the battalion, and a loud burst of hurras rent
the air: this alone must have proved startling to the enemy,
• Recollections of the Peninsula.

420 LITE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

but when the sky instantly after rang with still louder peals
of laughter at the brave general, (who, when uncovering, exhi-
bited his coloured night-cap,) an effect still more terrific fol-
lowed; then yielding to the pressure, and the courage, and the
high-wrought enthusiasm of the fresh troops that rushed against
them, the enemy replied to the tones of laughter only by the
expiring groans of those who were borne over the steep.*

Simultaneously with the attack on Picton's division, Ney
advanced with two columns, the one under Loisson, the other
under INIermot, against the centre and left of the allied
line. There the ascent was much more difficult, and
Craufurd had taken every advantage of his poisiton, which
circumstances permitted. In front of the convent was a
hollow, large enough to receive and conceal the forty-third
and fifty-second regiments drawn up in line ; and at the distance
of a quarter of a mile behind, on an eminence above the hollow,
and close to the convent walls, the German infantry were
placed, appearing to the enemy to be the only force posted in
that part of the line, while in front of the crater which con-
tained the two regiments, arose a group of rocks, affording an
admirable position for a battery, and where Craufurd planted his
artillery. To impede still earlier the approach of the enemy,
the face of the hill was thickly planted with skirmishers, selected
from the Portuguese caqadores and the British rifle corps .

Against this impregnable position the enemy advanced with
the most gallant daring, and in perfect order, Marchand taking
the main road, Loisson rushing up against the face of the
mountain, while a reserve division remained at the foot of the
sierra. General Simon led on his brigade with the most
dauntless courage, unchecked by a tempest of bullets from the
light troops, or by the more ruinous storm of heavy shot from
the guns, and, apparently, without the slightest slackening of
pace, or derangement of their line, except what was occasioned
by the fire of the allies, the French reached the crest of the
hill in compact array ; then a pause took place, followed by

* Robinson's Life of Sir Thomas Picton, from which also the account here
given of the defence of the pass of San Antonio de Cantara is taken.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 421

a shout of vive I'e/npeieur, and then a rapid advance upon the
British hattery ; at this moment, Craufurd, who, during the
w hole time of the enemy's bold attempt stood u[)on a detached,
projecting rock, to observe tiieir movements, and analyze the
designs of the commander of the division, was heard to scream
aloud, in a sharp shrill tone, the loudest and highest on his
voice, "Charge !" In an instant the two regiments that were
concealed in the hollow rushed out from their retreat, and
falling on the breathless Frenchmen, offered many hundred
lives as a melancholy sacrifice to the ambition of the hero
whose title of usurpation they so fondly followed. The re-
served regiments kept close in their cover until Simon's bri-
gade approached within one hundred yards of their conceal-
ment, when, pouring in a close, well-aimed, and unanswered
volley, then raising a shout both loud and long, and present-
ing, up to the very beards of the enemy, thirteen hundred
naked bayonets, they produced an effect from which the foe
could not recover, and which was followed by a scene of havoc
such as the veterans of Austerlitz had never witnessed before.
" The French, unable to retreat and afraid to resist, were
rolled down the steep like a torrent of hailstones driven before
a powerful wind ; and not the bayonets only, but the very
hands of some our brave fellows became in an instant red with
the blood of the fugitives."

The main body of the allies remained in position, the wings
discharging repeated volleys upon the flying, or rather falling,
fugitives, and many companies would have continued the chase
and the carnage, had not Ney brought forward the reserve divi-
sion, and opened a few heavy guns, from an eminence, to cover
the retreating brigades, which effectually checked pursuit. It was
the wish of Ney to withdraw totally from the contest, but the
wounded feelings of Marchand and Loisson would not permit
them to abandon the ground, while the least glimpse of hope
existed that their lost honour might possibly be recovered. For
sometime, therefore, they maintained a wild and desultory
contest in the hoUowsat the mountain-foot, but the courage, pru-
dence, and pride of Pack and Spencer were equal to tho^e of
II. 3 I

4-2-2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

their adversaries, and fortune now bestowed her smiles upon the
efforts of British bravery. The disappointment which the
French army sustained was general, extending its influence
injuriously to the junior officers. Although Massena had
drawn off his army, a captain with his company, who occupied
a village close under the brow of the hill, laboured under
such a paroxysm of chagrin as to have completely lost his
judgment, and totally neglected the orders of his commanding
officer. Continuing foolishly to stand his ground, General
Craufurd sent an officer to advise him " that it should be his
wish, as it was his duty, to follow his flying countrymen while
circumstances yet permitted, and that humanity alone was the
source of his interference." The irritated soldier desired the
messenger to return, and tell his general, " that he had been
intrusted with the maintenance of that post, and meant to die in
the defence of it." This gasconade was replied to by a discharge
of twelve pieces of artillery, w hich General Craufurd ordered to
play upon the enemy for half an hour, after which a company of
the forty-third entering the village soon dislodged the too
daring occupants.

This may be called the expiring struggle of the French at
Busaco : if an attack on the strong position of Wellington was
justifiable at any period, it must have been before the junction
of Hill and Leith ; but, after that event, it was a rash, extra-
vagant idea, despised by Wellington, and disapproved of by
Ney ; founded in presumption it terminated in results as
injurious to the author, as advantageous to his adversaries.
By the resistance which the allies made on this memorable
occasion, the PVench were confirmed in the belief that the
British soldiers were madly brave, and discovered at the same
instant, that they had so disciplined the allies, that, whether
they were habited in military costume, or otherwise, they were
no longer exposed to the epithet of canaille, but entitled to
be ranked with the bravest and best soldiers in the Pen-
insula. Many of the allies, exhausted by the prolongation
of hope and by the momentary expectation of being led against
the foe, gave way to unworthy suspicions, but Busaco lulled

THE DUKE OF WELLINVrON. 423

all apprehensions as to the clear views of the general, and
increased the growing confidence in Portnguese co-opera-
tion. While IJeresford lauded the conduct of his men in the field
of hattle, and compared their bravery to the brightest periods
of Portuguese history, Wellington added the valuable testi-
mony of his approval, not only of the troops, but of the marshal
himself, to whom the nation was largely indebted for the
introduction of that military discipline, v/hich contributed in
an essential manner to the recovery of the Peninsula: his
praise was not confined to the area of the battle-field, or
addressed to the brave men who had so gloriously profited by
his lessons of subordination, but, with his accustomed magna-
niniity, he represented the services of Beresford, to the secre-
tary at war, with an unexemplcd generosity. " I should not,"
said his lordship, "' do justice to the service, or to my own
feelings, if 1 did not take this opportunity of drawing your
lordship's attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To
him, exclusively, under the Portuguese government, is due the
merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped the
Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of en-
gaging and defeating the enemy." The meritorious exertions
of Beresford were at once acknowledged by his sovereign, who
conferred on him the order of knighthood of the B ath, in
consideration of the discipline exhibited by the troops under
his command at the battle of Busaco. 'J'he prodigies of valour
performed by the veteran troops of Gaul, led only to their
greater destruction and more decided overthrow. General
Graind'orge, and eight thousand men were slain: Generals Foy,
Merle, Maucune, and Loisson wounded, while General Simon*

* Simon being l)roiij,'ht to Kngliind, was permitted to rejiide at Odiliam, on
his parole, Lut, violating his honour, he concealed himself in London, in the
hope of being able to effect his escape. Totally forgetting the high estimate
which a Briton entertains of tlie profession of arms, he condescended to
intrigue with i)tlier French prisoners, who were also on their parole, for the pur-
pose of releasing all those that were base enough to j)artieipate in such a conspi-
racy, liis con<luct being made known to government, a strict search was im-
mediately or.Iered, and Simon and his accom])lices being discovered, in the
kitchen of a house in Pratt-strcct, Camden Town, part were placed in Bride-

424 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was made prisoner by the fifty-second regiment, along with
three colonels, thirty-three officers, and two hundred and fifty
men, making a total, put hors de combat^ of about five thou-
sand : the allies sustained a loss under one thousand three
hundred, which included five hundred and seventy-eight of the
Portuguese corps.* When the din of battle had subsided,
Massena sent a flag of truce, requesting permission to bury
the slain ; but his request was refused by the victors, who per-
formed that melancholy duty themselves. Numbers of the
wounded, whom the enemy abandoned in the field, fell into
the hands of the peasantry, who inflicted upon them the most
shocking and inhuman tortures ; some were rescued from their
merciless grasp by General Craufurd, and lodged in the
great convent of Busaco; but numbers are believed to have
perished in the most infamous manner by the infuriated pea-
santry, who had been deprived of every thing but life in this
unjust war of aggression. The despatches of Lord Wel-
lington particularize those officers of the British army, that
were pre-eminently conspicuous for courage and ability on the
day of Busaco, amongst whom the following were, perhaps, the
most frequently mentioned: — Picton, Craufurd, Leith, Pack,
Mackinnon, and Mac Bean, but these are not selected here
from an impression that they displayed a more gallant bearing
in the hour of danger, than those whose names are of neces-
sity omitted.* To fill up the vacancies created by the loss of
so many excellent officers, ten ensigns' commissions were sent
to the commander-in-chief, to be presented by him to an equal
number of non-commissioned officers who had entitled them-
selves, in the resolute repulse of the enemy, to his approbation.
This was the principle upon which Lord Wellington had
recommended, to the government in England, that rewards

well, and others were sent to the hulks at Chatham, while Simon and a sur-
geon, who was particularly active in the plot, were committed to the Castle
of Dunbarton.

* Amongst the killed were Major Smyth of the forty-fifth, Captain
Uiquhart, and Lieutenant Ousely; Ensign Williams of the seventy-fourth;
Lieutenant Henry Johnston of the eighty-eighth. The total number of officers
killed was eleven, wounded sixty-two, one only was taken prisoner.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 425

should be conferred, promotion granted, in our army: it had been
acted upon by Napoleon, without any reference to the minister
at war in Paris, and was only too long postponed by the
British commander-in-chief at London. This well-timed con-
cession, and prudent deference to his sound military judg-
ment, completely appeased the indignation of Wellington at
the imprudent and unfair distribution of patronage in our
army ; and, on the fourth of October he addressed Lietenant-
Colonel Torrens in language that indicated content, if not
entire satisfaction : " Let us drop the subject of army promo-
tion altogether, for I assvu'e you I feel no interest in it, ex-
cepting with a view to the public good, in which I may be
mistaken ; and I should be sorry that you believed that I dis-
approved of anything you have done in your office. My
opinions went against the system, not the mode of carrying
it on."

The assault upon the British position at Busaco, being
made by Massena's orders, and under his own personal direc-
tion, occasioned the more severe disappointment and chagrin ;
he feared to try the perilous chance again, and failing in force,
he resolved to make trial of stratagem : less haughty than
before his failure, he called a council of war, at which Xey,
llegnier, Junot, and Freirion were present, and communicated
to these experienced generals his intention of abandoning all
further attempt on the position of the allies : the I'ortuguese
traitors, D'Alorna and others, were next consulted as to the
nature of the country beyond the heights, and the most prac-
ticable line of march, whereby the French might be enabled
to turn tlic position which they had failed to force. These
contemptible apostates declared their total ignorance of the
topography of that district, upon which Alasscna ordered Mont-
brun, St. Croix, and Lamotte, to take strong detachments,
and, going in different directions, explore the vicinity perfectly
One of the exploring parties succeeded in making prisoners two
peasants, from wliom, in vain, they endeavoured to obtain the
required information, but, upon being brought before iMassena,
and threatened with torture, they reluctantly told that there

426 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

was a path across the Sierra de Caramula, leading by Boyalva
to Sardao, a village on the great road between Coimbra and
Oporto. As it was impossible to have turned the position of the
allies by the Mondego, since they could cross that river much
sooner than the enemy, and as Massena had already experi-
enced the difficultv, and the uncertaintv, of breakini? through the
pass of Antonio de Cantara, one course alone remained, which
was to turn the left of the allies by the Mortagoa road. To
cover these meditated movements, the enemy set fire to the
woods in the hollows, and renewed the skirmishing with the
British lisht troops with such energVj that a jjeneral ensrao-e-
ment was expected. But the prospect from the lofty summit
of Busaco is most extensive, and from its sudden elevation above
the valley of the Mondego, the occupants of the ground around
the convent could perceive, distinctly, that the movements in
the enemy's camp indicated a new design.*

• " From the ridge in front of our present ground, we could see them far
better than the evening before ; arms, appointments, uniforms, were all dis-
tinguishable. The view of the enemy's camp by night, far exceeded, in
grandeur, its imposing aspect by day. Innumerable and brilliant fires illumin-
ated all the country spread below us : while they yet flamed brightly, the
shadowy figures of men and horses, and the glittering files of arms, were all
visible. Here and there indeed the view was interrupted by a few dark patches
of black fir, which, by a gloomy contrast, heightened the effect of the picture ;
but, long after the flames expired, the red embers still emitted the most
rich and glowing rays, and seemed, like stars, to gem the dark bosom of the
earth, conveying the sublime idea of a firmament spread beneath our feet. It
was long before I could tear myself from the contemplation of this scene.
Earnestly did I gaze on it: deeply did it impress me: and my professional life
may never, perhaps, again present to me any military spectacle more truly
magnificent. Every one was fully persuaded that the morning would bring
with it a general and bloody engagement. Our line was in a constant state of
preparation : the men lay with their accoutrements on, in a regular column
of companies, front and rear-ranks head to head, and every man's firelock by
bis side. As early as three o'clock we were roused, and stood to arms at our
posts, — at half past four the pickets sent word, that the enemy was getting
underarms. The pickets w^re immediately and silently withdrawn, one staff-
officer remaining on the look-out. About five he came quickly up, and, as he
passed the commander of our line, Hill said, "be prepared, they are certainly
coming on : a very heavy column has just advanced to the foot of the position,
and you may expect an attack every moment."— The sun shone forth, but not on
a field of bloo 1. The French columns returned to their ground, and appeared

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 4*27

In the afternoon of the 28tli, the masses of the enemy in
front being sensibly diminished, by a large body of infantry
and cavalry from the left of his centre being moved to the rear,
they were discerned filing off along the Mortagoa road over the
mountains towards Oporto. Lord Wellington was prepared for
this movement, and had previously sent orders, from the Ponte
de Murcella to Colonel Trant, to march with his division of the
Portuguese militia, on Sardao, in order to pre-occupy the moun-
tain pass. L^nfortunately, that officer being desired by Bacellar,
then commanding in the north, to take the circuitous road by
Oporto, thathe might avoid S. Pedro de Sul, which was occupied
by a detachment of the enemy, he did not reach Sardao until
the afternoon of the twenty-eigth, at which time the advanced
guard of the enemy was in possession of the place. Although
Lord Wellington attached some importance toTrant's timely ar-
rival at Sardao, that could only have been his impression on the
afternoon of the twenty-eighth, for, subsequent events demon-
strated the total inability of that officer, with only fifteen
hundred militia, to offer even a shadow of resistance to the
enemy. The activity and gallantry of Colonel Trant cannot
be too highly applauded. Having obeyed the orders of
Pacellar, by which his services were neutralized, he nevertheless
made such gigantic strides, marching one hundred and ninety
miles in nine successive days, and through a difficult country,
in order to reach the field of battle in time sufficient to parti-
cipate in its glory, that he arrived at his destination on the day
appointed, and too late only by a few hours. Perceiving the
altered circumstances of the contending armies, Trant hastened
to the head-quarters at Busaco, explained his own conduct,
and satisfied Lord Wellington of his ardent zeal, indefatigable
exertions, and spirited efforts: then gallantly volunteered to
retrace part of his march, and with his little band throw him-
self into the village of Hoyalva, and defend to the last the pass
of the Sierra de Caramula. This gallant proposal Wellington

throughout the day to busy themselves in hutting; towards evening some of
them were s(>en moviiii,', and at midniglit, it was ascertained that they were all
in motion to turn our \v{'t ." — licroHrrtidns of tliv I'aiinsula.

428 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

could not accept ; such a sacrifice would have been useless ;
and Trant, therefore, returned to his division, but in attempt-
ing to retire beliind the Vouga, he lost one of his patroles,
which was cut off by La Croix at the head of a column
of horse. It has been attributed as a serious error to Mas-
sena, his neglecting to dissipate or destroy Trant's little force,
so as to secure himself from being harassed on his rear, but
its insignificance saved it from his power or cruelty, and the
marshal was intent upon a single object, the occupation of
Lisbon, which he confidently expected to enter while the
British were embarking for their native shores. The enemy
having evacuated the valley of the Mondego for the purpose,
and with the design of turning the left of the allies, Hill
recrossed the Mondego retiring by Espinal upon Thomar,
while the centre and left of the allies defiled during the night
of the twenty-ninth, by Decentecio, Botao, Eiros, upon Mil-
heada ; the guns were conveyed down the convent road, escort-
ed by Craufurd's light division as far as Fornos, whence the
cavalry, which had been stationed in the open country con-
voyed them. Thus on the thirtieth the whole army under the
command of Lord Wellington, with the exception of the ad-
vanced guard, was on the left of the Mondego, by which Mas-
sena's objects "of cutting him oflF from Coimbra, or of forcing
him to a general action on less favourable ground," were com-
pletely frustrated.

In detailing the series of operations by which he succeeded
in resisting the attacks of the enemy, and obviating their
designs, Lord Wellington expressed regret at the failure of
the movement which Trant was expected to have accomplished;
but he still assured the secretary-at-war, that although every
operation had not been happily performed, little injury would
result to the general issue of the contest in consequence ; and
if there were unfortunate events, so were there also compen-
sations- Writing upon the affair of Busaco, he observed,
"I'his movement has afforded me a favourable opportunity
of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this
army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 429

into action with the enemy, for the first time, in an advantageous
situation ; and they have proved that the trouble which has
been taken with them, has not been thrown away, and that
they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British
troops, in this interesting cause, which they afford the best
hopes of serving." The secretary at war received yet greater
consolation, a more valuable relief from apprehension, in the
assurance that, " all operations had been carried on with ease ;
the soldiers had suffered no privations, had undergone no
unnecessary fatigue, there had been no loss of stores, and the
army was in the highest spirits."* The tone of the preceding
despatch was calculated to raise the spirits of the minister,
and place the despondents in a situation of perplexity,
which would have been further increased, had they been able
to peruse the contents of the self-assuring letters which
Wellington addressed, at the same period, to the envoys and
agents in the Peninsula. So much strengthened had he been
by the conduct of the Portuguese at Busaco, that he thus
wrote from Coimbra, on the thirtieth, to Mr. Charles Stuart,
" / (Dii quite certain the French will not get Portugal this
winter, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed ;
and it is probable that they will not succeed even in that
case." Again, on the third of October, he assures his
brother Henry, " we shall make our retreat to the positions
in front of Lisbon without much difficulty, or any loss. My
opinion is, that the French are in a scrape ; they are not
a sufficient army for their purpose, particularly since their
late loss, and that the Portuguese army have behaved so well ;
and they will find their retreat from this country a most
difficult and dangerous operation." There is yet one brief
extract, which must, from its prophetic character, be added
to those confident assurances of ultimate success, which
the defender of Portugal did not hesitate to advance, even
while he was retreating before an army of seventy thousand
veterans : " We make our retreat," observed Lord Wellington,
" with great ease. This day (the fourth of October) we all halt :
• Wellington Despatches, Vol. vi. p. 475.
II. 3 K

430 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

and I have every thing now so clear, that I shall go no further
until I see their movements."

The allies, occupying the shorter line to Coimbra, were
therefore in a situation to perform all movements, and to effect
a safe retreat, with the same order and regularity which had
characterized their retiring on Busaco. Reaching Coimbra
therefore without molestation, the infantry crossed the river
at that place on the thirtieth, while the cavalry were posted
in front of Fornos, to cover the retreat ; here they were
attacked by a large body of the enemy's horse, and driven
through the village in some confusion, but, entering the great
plain, they instantly rallied, drew up in line, and, with six
guns of the horse artillery, awaited the enemy, who did not
exhibit any further intention of attacking them. The rear-guard,
after this affair, withdrew to Coimbra, and crossed the river.
The enemy followed, but made no attempt to harass them
until the passage had been completely effected, when they
pushed into the river, as if with the object of pursuit and
engagement, but they were repulsed with loss by a squadron
of the sixteenth dragoons, after which, discharging their car-
bines across the water, they discontinued further pursuit, and
returned to Coimbra, which was now left completely to their
mercy. What that mercy was may be conjectured from the
flight and the fears of the miserable citizens. On the fourth of
August Lord Wellington had issued his celebrated proclama-
tion, one of the political engines by which he calculated upon
working the ruin of the enemy.* The conditions were difficult
to be complied with, from their absolute severity, as well as
because their object was not perfectly understood ; and the
opposition which the new ministry in Portugal gave to Lord
Wellington, contributed not only to frustrate his great designs,
but to increase considerably the sufferings of the people. The
jealous junta, and the intriguing characters that had been
introduced into the government, would not second the orders
of the British general, although his Portuguese rank entitled
him to their obedience and co-operation ; on the contrary, they

* Videpage376, Vol. ii.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 431

talked of submission to a foreign dictator, and of the inhumanity
of the orders which he would impose upon the people of
Portugal ; and, notwithstanding the penalties which Lord
Wellington annexed to disobedience of his orders, they pro-
hibited the inhabitants of the country, behind the Mondego,
from abandoning their homes or usual occupations ; thus
obeying the proclamation of Massena, in preference to that of
the Marshal-General of Portugal. The richest, the wisest, the
least factious, and the most grateful, reposing a just confidence
in the genius and ability of the British chieftain, had implicitly
conformed to the rigid rules laid down for their preservation,
although they could not understand how that compliance was
to be made subservent to the end.

As soon as it was ascertained that the allies, although
victorious, were still retiring, that the proclamation of Wel-
lington had not originated in timidity, vanity, or ignorance,
but formed part of a great design which he steadfastly pursued
to its consummation, the miserable inhabitants of this splendid
city, and of the glorious plains that encircle it, submitted to
their fate, consented to burst the strongest ties, to abandon
the dearest associations, to leave the scenes of their youth,
and to bid farewell to the homes of their fathers : judging from
impending events, no hope remained that they were ever again
to return to the enjoyment of those feelings and possessions
of which they were by a hard necessity deprived. The wealthy
had fled, but those who could not imagine that their ancient
allies would fulfil to the letter the stern decree of the com-
mander, or that the invading army would be permitted to
penetrate to the walls of their city, still clung fondly to their
homes.

But a cry arose that the French were coming, and had
actually entered their streets; then a scene of confusion —
distraction — terror, was exhibited, incapable of description,
althougii never to be forgotten by those who underwent the pain
of witnessing it. The whole population rushed en masse along
the steep and crooked ways towards the bridge, the only egress
now left open to them, and there, from the contracted dimen-

432 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

sions of the causeway, not half their number being able to pass
in time, those that were disappointed leaped into the shallow
stream, and followed the route of the allies; " when the approach
of the enemy left no choice but to fly, or to risk the punishment
of death and infamy announced in the proclamation, so direful a
scene ensued, that the most hardened of men could not behold
it without emotion. Mothers with children of all ages, the
sick, the old, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were
carried forth, the most part with little hope and less help, to
journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortu-
nately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, (for
their flight was in the vintage season,) and the roads were
firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the most
deplorable manner."* As the fugitives passed the water-gate,
which was the city prison, the horror of the scene was
increased by the screams of the prisoners, who, breaking the
windows, stretched forth their bleedincr arms through the
grating, beseeching their cou.trymen to execute punishment
with their own hands upon those whose crimes had merited
the indignation of their country, rather than leave them to the
barbarity which they expected to experience from such invete-
rate enemies as were then advancmg. The jailor had fled, and,
in the confusion, carried away the keys of the prison-house ;
but British officers have always beer foremost, in every war, in
deeds of valour as well as examples of humanity, and Captain
William Campbell, an officer of the gallant Craufurd's staff,
unable to endure the heart-rending cries of the wretched cul-
prits from their prison-bars, burst open the doors, and set them
all at liberty .f The road beyond the bridge passed between
two precipitous hills at so short a distance from each other,
that the interval was altogether insufficient for the passage of
a wide column of men ; into this narrow defile the fui?itives
passed, and closed so entirely upon the flanks of the moving

• History of the Peninsular War. •

t Dr. Southey says that the screams of the prisoners were heard by Lord
Wellington, who sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, (Duke of Richmond) to
.*et them free, but Campbell had anticipated his benevolent intentions.

TIIK Ut lION'w., cifAULKS LENNOX, DI-RK or KKIIMoND. 1< (;

y^^^^t7-y^.

7x

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 433

column, that the soldiers were wedged up in the hollow, the
artillery impeded in its advance, and the whole became exposed
to imminent danger : fortunately the enemy had no desire to
make a serious attack, their only object seemed to be pushing
on the British, at a leisurely pace, towards the shores of the
ocean. With much difficulty, and some little violence, a pas-
sage was at length opened, and the rear-guard, with a cloud of
fugitives, reached Condeixa at night-fall, a distance of only
eight miles, but which they occupied the day in performing.
The allies passed on through Kedinha and Pombal to Leyria,
which they reached on the third ; during the fourth, the
advanced post arrived at Pombal. . Some depredations having
been committed by the troops in passing through Coimbra,
Condeixa, and Leyiria, Lord Wellington resolved on punishing
the offenders, for the sake of example, and the ends of justice :
at Leyria three men, taken in the act of pillage, were hanged
upon the spot, and whole regiments were forbidden to enter
the villages on the route, in consequence of reports of their
irregularity. In his Indian campaign Wellington observed
the same respect for the property of the natives, in every dis-
trict through which he led his victorious army ; and whenever
a rage for plunder seized a corps, he sent forward a detach-
ment, with orders to halt in front of each village on the line,
and shoot all who attempted to force an entrance until the
army had marched by.* From this just and merciful system
he never departed during his splendid military life ; and now
he wrote from Leyria to Sir Stapleton Cotton, just such an
order as he had frequently issued to his officers in India.
" There is a report that there are some stragglers, Portuguese
as well as English, in the villages on the right and left of the
road, near where you are cantoned, and I shall be obliged to
you if you will send out patroles, and take up all men of this
description, and send them in here as prisoners." But these
acts of insubordination were comparatively few, and the
most flagrant alone were punished with severity. Sacrilege and
murder were not forgiven, but such instances were happily

• Vide p. 80. Vol. i.

434 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

rare. Indeed, Lord Wellington did not represent to the secre-
tary that any indiscipline had arisen ; on the contrary, he stated,
on the fifth of October, " that, with few exceptions, the troops
had continued to conduct themselves with great regularity,
and had suffered no fatigue." But the fact was, that this retro-
grade movement of the allies was one of choice, not necessity ;
and had this peculiarity belonging to it, that it was made by a
victorious army. Lord Wellington did not wish to risk another
action ; Massena had no disposition to challenge or detain
him, after the fatal affair of Busaco ; and the leisurel}', inactive
conduct of the enemy in pursuit, engendered a spirit of insub-
ordination, a degree of confusion, and opportunity for pillage,
amongst the French, that disgraced both general and army, ren-
dering the latter more like a pursued than pursuing force.

Wherever the allies passed, from the moment of the evacua-
tion of Coimbra, their flanks were covered with the miserable
fugitives. The stupidity and indifference of the regency had
totally deceived and misled them, for, had they known that the
French would be permitted to pass the frontier, they would at
once have submitted to the terms of the proclamation. A wit-
ness to those scenes thus feelingly describes the general fea-
ture of the distressing picture. " 1 feel that no powers of
description can convey to the mind of my reader the afflicting
scenes, the cheerless desolation, we daily witnessed on our
march from the Mondego to the Lines. Wherever we moved,
the mandate which enjoined the wretched inhabitants to for-
sake their homes, and to remove or destroy their little propert}^,
had gone before us. The villages were deserted ; the churches,
retreats so often yet so vainly confided in, were empty ; the
mountain-cottages stood open and untenanted; the mills in
the valley, but yesterday so busy, were motionless and silent."

During three whole days the French army was in the
utmost disorder ; and although Massena had strictly prohibited
the commission of any excesses at Coimbra, Junot desired his
men to break into the houses which the owners had deserted :
and here, it is said, provision sufiicient for his army for two
months was discovered, but Massena's improvidence was such.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 435

that he neither directed that they should be stored in case of
need, nor did he insist upon his soldiers abstaining from plun-
der. Active service is the best remedy for insubordination in
an army, and, unable to control the ferocity of his followers
while at rest, he put his heavy column once more in motion
from Coimbra, on the fourth of October. Before his departure
he made the best provision in his power for the sick and wound-
ed, amounting to about five thousand, whom he lodged in the
convent of Santa Clara : besides this great deduction from the
amount of the invading army, an equal number had been put
hors de combat at Busaco, so that the policy of Wellington
was now working, with a terrible certainty, the destruction of the
enemy, ten thousand being now to be subducted. Famine was
also beginning to aid disease and slaughter in the field of battle :
as early as the fifth. Lord Wellington mentions, in his official
communication to Lord Liverpool, " From all accounts which
I have received, the enemy suifer great distress. The inhabit-
ants of the country have fled from their houses universally, car-
rying with them every thing they could take away that could be
deemed useful to the enemy; and the habits of plunder which
have so longbeen encouraged in the enemy's army, prevent them
from deriving any general advantage from the little resources
which the inhabitants may have been obliged to leave behind
them." A gross error which Massena committed in pur-
suing the allies, was his neglecting to keep open a retreat,
or to retain secure communication with his places of arms : his
confidence in the belief that Wellington was only marching to
the sea, the deduction of ten thousand men from his force, his
contempt of the native troops, and his total ignorance of the
fortified position which the British general had, to his immor-
tal renown, prepared for the defence of Lisbon, all combined
to render him indifferent to any operations of either Spaniards
or I'ortugucse in his rear. This was an inexcusable blunder,
a mistake not to be remedied, and which Massena lived to rie-
pent. Scarcely had he evacuated Coimbra, when '1^-ant, an
enterprising officer, whose spirit, gallantry, and judgment were
unequalled, c.illing Miller and Wilson, generals in the army of

43(i LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS 01"

the north, to his assistance, begun to close upon the enemy's
rear, and byhis first movements intercepted their communica-
tion with Almeida. Continuing his dull pursuit, with little
diminution of interval between the main bodies of both armies,
]Massena reached Pombal on the fourtl), where he drove in
the pickets of the allies, and moved with an accelerated pace
on Leyria. The approach to this place was by a road that
intersected, at right angles, a succession of deep ravines. In
one of these, a squadron of British cavalry, commanded by
Captain Cocks, was posted ; and when the head of the enemy's
column came in front of the defile, he charged it with so much
effect, as to check all further advance. The resolution of this
officer succeeded in delaying the enemy, until the arrival of a
troop of artillery, and a brigade of cavalry headed by General
Anson, whose united efforts restrained the enemy so seriousl)',
that the allies were enabled to evacuate Leyria without»any
confusion or inconvenience. The loss of the enemy was by no
means insignificant, and that of the British included nine officers
and forty men. From Leyria the retrogression w^as continued:
Hill's corps proceeded by Thomar and Santarem ; the centre
of the army took the route of Batalha and Rio Major, and the
left by Alcobaca* and Obidos.

Communication with Almeida had been cut off by the
courage and activity of Trant, who would have harassed the

• " The monks of Alcobara performed on this occasion towards the British
officers, their last act of hospitality. Most of them had already departed from
the magnificent and ancient abode, where the greater part of their lives had
been spent peacefully and inoffensively, to seek an asylum where they could ;
the few who remained prepared dinner for their guests in the great hall, and in
the apartments reserved for strangers, after which they brought them the keys,
and desired them to take whatever they liked, for they expected that every
thing would be destroyed by the French. Means were afforded them, through
General Mackinnon's kindness, for securing some things which they could not
otherwise have removed ; and then the most venerable edifice in Portugal for
its antiquity, its history, its literary treasures, and the tombs which it con-
tained, was abandoned to an invader who delighted in defiling whatever was
held sacred, and in destroying whatever a generous enemy, from the impulse
of feeling and the sense of honour, would carefully have preserved." — Southe/s
Histonj of the Peninsular War.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 437

French army daring their route from Coimbra, had his force
been of any considerable amount : he now, however, resolved
upon an act of boldness, an enterprise of the most daring cha-
racter, the success of which must have rested altogether upon
the heroism of the leader; this was, to surprise Coimbra.

The devastated condition of the country to the nortli of
Milheada prevented the timely arrival of Wilson and Millar,
and Trant was aware that delay would be fatal to his design ;
without waiting for their arrival, therefore, he advanced rapidly
towards Coimbra, and, falling in with a detachment of the
enemy at Fornos, he succeeded in capturing the whole, a few
excepted, who fell in offering a gallant resistance. 'Ibis suc-
cess, however encouraging, was not required to stimulate
Trant's followers to the boldest exploits, the heroism of their
leader was the magic spell that nerved their arms. Now, as
he approached the city, he called to him a chosen band of
cavalry, and directing them to dash into the streets, make, at
full gallop, for the bridge at the further end of the town, of which
they were to take possession, and so cut off communication
between the French army and the garrison of Coimbra. 'i'his
exploit was performed as might have been expected from the
soldiers of such an officer ; and, although a volley of musketry
was poured upon them as they flew rapidly past the convent
of Santa Clara, they reached the bridge with little or no loss.
And now the infantry arrived, and returned the fire of the gar-
rison, and of the convalescents, who had undertaken to defend
the hospital, and for one hour the French continued to make
a faint show of resistance, after which they proposed to capitu-
late : Trant, however, neither adopted nor accepted any half-
measures, and assuring them that their instant and discretionary
surrender alone could save them, from either a more honourable
death in fighting to the last, or a fate much less so, and which
he should deplore, at the iiands of the infuriated Portuguese, the
garrison surrendered, and were protected according to the pro-
mise given by Colonel Trant: the unfortunate convalescents held
out too long for the impatience of the citizens, and their hos-
pital being taken by storm, few of them were reserved to perish

n. 3 L

438 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

by tlie slow process of disease in their cells of sickness, being
butchered inhumanly by the rabble. This last act, so disgrace-
ful to the character of the inhabitants, was to be expected, but
cannot on any grounds be palliated : the exertions of Trant in
the cause of humanity, as a generous enemy, were incessant ;
and although partisan writers, who never fail to defame the
British military character in this war, ■whenever the least pre-
tence could be discovered for doing so, have endeavoured to
affix a stigma on this gallant soldier's honour for having per-
mitted this cruel slaughter, it has been proved, by letters of
thanks addressed to him by the French officers of the garrison
who became his prisoners, that his exertions to restrain the
Portuguese were of the most meritorious character. It should
be stated, not in extenuation, but as one of the causes of the
outrage committed upon the prisoners, that, of Trant's militia-
men eight hundred were natives of Coimbra, and, when they
passed through the streets where they saw their doors had
been broken open, their homes pillaged, their wives and
daughters driven to perish in the mountains, or forcibly carried
away by ruthless invaders — these, if palliation be admissible,
form the plea of forgiveness which may be offered in their
defence. Additional, convincing, and honourable testimony to
the humanity of Trant's conduct, and his observance of the laws
of war, is the fact of his having marched the prisoners, four thou-
sand in number, to Oporto, from a conviction of their insecurity
at Coimbra; and he felt it necessary also that he should accom-
pany them in person, otherwise the chances were against their
ever reaching their destination. Millar and Wilson now came
up, to wonder at and imitate the enterprise and bravery of their
co-adjutor, and, fixing their quarters at Coimbra, took posses-
sion of military stores and provisions of considerable value.

As Massena moved along, the acquisitions he had made
fell gradually away, lopped off by the persevering labours of
a spirited and able officer, who tracked his footsteps; — he was
cut off from Almeida first, then Coimbra fell back into the
hands of his enemies, "by an exploit," says Colonel Napier,
•' as daring and hardy as any performed by a partisan officer

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 439

during the war, and which convicted Massena of bad general-
ship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base." Wellington
alone told his true condition, which was, " that Massena pos-
sessed in Portugal only the space his army occupied."

Massena's negligence of all advantages in the rear of his
army was analogous to his inactivity in the pursuit of the
enemy ; he seemed to feel that the latter were unimportant to
his design, and that the allies must of necessity go forward,
and therefore the less loss he sustained in following them, the
greater force would remain for the occupancy of Lisbon.
This inertness allowed some leisure to the commander-in-chief
for attending; to the harassin<? communications received from
the regency; in reply to one of which, he alludes to the extra-
ordinary secrecy with which his measures for the defence of
Lisbon had been conducted, and shows how entirely his own
is the glory of defeating the Prince of Essling. It was on the
sixth of October, at a short distance only from the celebrated
Lines, and when the main body had reached Campo Mayor, that
his lordship thus wrote to Mr. Charles Stuart : " I do not
know what people feel at Lisbon — but we at the army entertain
but little doubt of success. The Bishop and Souza would do
more harm than good in the north, where we are carrying on
operations of great importance. But I hope the letter, which
I enclose, will bring these gentry to their senses, or I shall
certainly carry into execution the threat which it contains.
I believe you and the government do not know ivhere the Lines
are. Those round Lisbon are not those in which I shall
place the army, but those extending from Torres Vedras to
the Tagus. All I shall ask from the government is tranquillity
in Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops ; and as God
Almighty does not give ' the race to the swift or the battle to
the strong,' and I have fought battles enough to know, that
under the best arrangementSy the result of any one is not
certain — I only beg that they will adopt preparatory arrange-
ments to take out of the enemy's way those persons who
would suffer if they were to fall into his hands." This last
paragraph, which is a repetition of his well-known complaint
against fortune, for never granting to him an advantage which

440 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

lie had not secured by his genius, he introduced as a post-
script to a still stronger and more imperative letter which he
wrote to the same civil officer on the following day : " I beg
that you will do me the favour to inform the regency, and
above all the principal Souza, that as his majesty and the prince
regent have intrusted me with the command of their armies,
and exclusively with the conduct of the military operations, I
will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them :
that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make
a stand against the enemy,* and I shall not alter a system
framed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of
theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not :
and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which
they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them,
namely, to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the
food of the army, and of the people, while the troops shall be
engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you
will tell him from me, that I have no satisfaction in transacting
the business of this country since he has been a member of the
government ; tnat being embarked in a course of military opera-
tions, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall
continue to carry them on to their end ; but that no power on
earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one
moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to
resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a

• The most remarkable illustration of Wellington's military prescience
which occurred during his eventful command, was at Busaco. When he
took up his position, saying, " the enemy will attack me here," every officer in
his own army was of a contrary' opinion, believing that it would have been little
less than madness in an enemy to assault a position so completely impregnable ;
it was also the opinion of Massena, that Lord Wellington did not seriously mean
to occupy that abrupt precipice in his front, as a military station, — nor did
Massena intend to have attacked the heights of Busaco when first he perceived
that they were occupied ; so that, while the British generals could not believe
that Massena would attack them, nor Massena himself foresee that he would
be induced to attempt it ; yet, so great a master of human nature was the
British hero, that he calculated upon the imijetuosity of the French national
character alone, when he declared, "that they would make an attack upon him
at Busaco:" the enemy themselves, at the same moment, would have pronounced
this to be false, but they soon after fatally verified his power of prophecy.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 441

member of the government, or to continue at Lisbon. Either
he must quit the country, or I shall ; and should I be obliged
to go, I will take care that the world, in Portugal at least,
and the prince regent, shall be made acquainted with my
reasons. From the letter of the third instant, which I had
received from Don Miguel Forjaz, I had hoped that the
government were satisfied with what I had done, and intended
to do ; and that, instead of endeavouring to render all further
defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at
Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures
to secure the tranquillity of the town. But I suppose, that,
like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weak-
ness ; and that their expressions of approbation, and even
gratitude, were intended to convey censure. 1 request you to
communicate this letter to the regency, and to transmit it to
the secretary of state for foreign affairs."

The determination evinced in this letter was necessary for
the maintenance of his own authority; the asperity was occa-
sioned by the infamous intrigues which these ungrateful mis-
creants conducted, for the removal of Lord Wellington, and
substitution of the Duke of Brunswick. Had their dislike, dis-
approval, or recommendation been overt, they would have had
nothing to dread, or encounter, but the calm reasonings of the
great soldier, in defence of his gigantic plans for the salvation
of their country ; but their opposition was mean, therefore
they were ashamed of it; and managed clandestinely, which
exposed them to deserved insult when discovered. To accom-
plish the disgrace of the only man who had led their wild
levies in disciplined lines against the eneni}', they disobeyed
his orders, and secretly lent themselves to the frustration of
his projects. They delayed the enforcement of the proclama-
tion, by which the sufferings of the people were multiplied,
and the inconvenience sustained by the retiring army very
much augniented ; in addition to the creation of this impedi-
ment to the military operations, the government purposely
neglected to seize the boats at Santarem before tiie arrival of
the enemy, although repeatedly urged by Lord Wellington

442 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

to do so, an event which his lordship said "he considered to
be the greatest misfortune which could happen to the army,
and which might oblige them to change their position, and
take up their second line. "The French,'' said he, "will
either arm these boats, and operate upon Hill's flank, in which
case the strength of Admiral Berkeley's flotilla, and the sup-
port given to it by larger vessels, would become an object
for his consideration ; or, they will use them to form a bridge,
and establish themselves upon the island in the Tagus, across
Hill's right flank ; or, they will use them for a bridge, or other
communication, with Mortier, whom they will have it in their
power to draw to their support, either on this side or on the
other side of the river. In whichever way the boats may be
used, their loss is a serious misfortune, and at all events
the whole of the Alemtejo lies at the mercy of the enemy ! !
The government may congratulate themselves upon this notable
arrangement : they would not adopt in time any one measure
to remove what might be useful or necessary to the enemy ;
they neglected their peculiar business, to occupy themselves
with what did not concern them ; and there is not an arrange-
ment of any description, which depended upon them or their
officers, which has not failed. At this moment the enemy are
living upon grain found close to the Lines, and they grind
it into flour with the mills in our sight, which the government
were repeatedly pressed to order the people to render useless,
and which could have been rendered useless, only by taking
away the sails." Souza and the intriguers would have stabbed
the reputation of the great man in secret, upon whom they
dared not to make an open assault : so that this apparent sub-
mission to his will, and approval of his policy, were the imme-
diate results of his declaration.

As the retrogressive movement continued, some slight skir-
mishes took place between the cavalry that covered the march
and the enemy's advance, at Leyria, Alcoentre, and Quinta de
los Torres. The heavy falls of rain had broken up the roads
much, and were otherwise a serious impediment to the advance
of the cavalry, obliging them to bivouack every night, by which

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 443

much delay was occasioned. On the eighth, however, Sir
Stapleton Cotton reached Alcoentre, and estabhshed his
quarters in the village : he was not long in possession when the
shouts of a rapidly approaching squadron, which had driven in
his pickets at Rio Mayor, and the sounds of an irregular fire
of musketry, told that danger was near, and in a few minutes
the enemy dashed gallantly into the village, and took six pieces
of artillery which they found there. This was but a fleeting
gleam of glory, for a squadron of the tenth, recovering from
their surprise, instantly charged down upon them, sabred num-
bers, drove the survivors through the streets before them, out
into the open country, and recovered the guns.

Irritated by disappointment and defeat, the third regi-
ment of French hussars returned to the attack next morning,
and having displayed the utmost gallantry by their assault
upon the British, withdrew without obtaining any advantage,
but with the loss of many valuable men. While these vain
interruptions continued to be repeated, with consequences
uniformly more fatal to the enemy than the allies, the latter
began, unconsciously, to enter the Lines ; this movement was
made in three great divisions — the central by Sobral, the left by
Torres Vedras, while Hill's corps, which arrived from Thomar
at Villa Franca on the tenth, occupied the right by Alhandra.
" These movements all took place on the eleventh, and on the
following morning every division occupied the ground marked
out for it, and all were in readiness, at a moment's notice, to
assume the posts which they might be required to defend."

General Pack's brigade, and the light division, were exposed
to a surprise at Alemquer, from which the courage and disci-
pline of their men rescued them. Reaching Alemquer on the
ninth, owing to the inclemency of the weather, Craufurd put
his men under shelter, gave no orders as to resuming their
march, posted no guards, sent out no patroles, nor took any
of the usual precautions, although the town lay in a hollow,
and, therefore, peculiarly favourable for any sudden attack
from an enemy. This want of caution alarmed some of the
junior oflicers, and induced them to observe, attentivelv, the

444 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

hill in front ; nor were they long detained on this their volun-
tary watch, before a squadron of dragoons was observed on
the verge of the summit. Soon the alarm was spread, and the
troops in a few moments were under arms, and at their posts.
The position which they occupied, however, was exposed, and
the line of retreat lay through a narrow ancient archway ; and
as the column of the enemy seemed to increase every instant,
Craufurd desired his ranks to break, and to re-form beyond the
archway. This rash order was the prelude to disaster: rushing
at the word of command towards the contracted entrance, like
the devotees on the Ganges when our satellite is at the full,
numbers were crushed and trampled to death in the entrance ;
and the loss of life would have been still more deplorable, had
not the same prudent officers who had kept a careful look-out
upon the enemy, detained the steadiest of the companies in
their ranks, until the first rush of this ill-judged order had ter-
minated as it might.

The enemy perceiving the disorder, galloped through the
high street of the village, and attacked the rear of the
British ; but such was the steadiness of the division, that they
repulsed them with loss, and covered effectually the disorderly
movements of their front. The risk encountered in skirmish-
ing with the enemy's advanced guard was of little comparative
importance, to the difficulties which the affair of Alemquer
had nearly exposed the division. Craufurd was to have marched
by Cadafaes to the position of Aruda, but, being thrown out
by the affair of Alemquer, mistook the road, and the division
moved on Sobral, thus leaving the Lines open to the enemy for
several miles. Of this fact General Hill became informed,
and fearing for the security of the second line, he fell back
upon Alveiria; but learning soon after that his information was
but partially correct, and that the error had been rectified by
a flank march of the division along the foot of the lines to
Aruda, he returned to his position at Alhandra. Massena, still
in utter ignorance of the designs of Wellington, but rendered
cautious by the experience, which this retreat gave him, of the
quality of his forces, preserved a regular interval between both

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 445

armies hymo\ing pari passu with the allies, but when the latter
entered the lines, and came to a stand, his advanced guard was
necessarily brought into contact with the outposts of the British.
A large division of infantry, the advanced guard of the eighth
corps, moved upon Sobral, and dislodged Sir Brent Spencer
from that town, who fell back upon the great redoubt of Sobral.
The despatch which brought to England the account of the
allies having entered the lines, concluded with these memor-
able words, "As I conceive that I have reason to hope for
success, I propose to bring matters to extremities, and to con-
tend for the possession and independence of Portugal in one
of the strongest positions in this part of the country. The
Marquess de la llomana marched to Campo Mayor on the
eighth, to join this army, and share our fortune." It is a remark-
able feature in Lord Wellington's despatches, official letters,
and correspondence with private friends, that while he was in
the midst of difficulties, harassed, almost tortured, by the
wretched, unstable, provisionary governments of Spain and
Portugal, vilified by the despondents at home, and continually
cautioned by ministers against rashly risking the lives of the
British under his control, that, in no one instance does an
expression of doubt, distrust, or failure find its way into his
correspondence. He appears never to have calculated upon
the ])ossibility of defeat ; and this tone, in the delivery of orders,
is known to have produced a most powerful effect.

The party that entered Sobral, surprised at the disappear-
ance of the British on their advance, now hesitated as to the
more advisable route, and, meeting with a peasant, they en-
deavoured to ascertain from him whither the allies had moved.
These interrogatories obtained for the enemy the astounding
truth, of which they had not before the most remote knowledge
or conception, namely, that the British commander-in-chief had
been for several months engaged in fortifying the summits of
a mountain-chain, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to
Torres \'edras on the sea; that tlie allies were now, in full force,
posted on those hciqbts, that their retreat was a mere mockery
of the French. ])crformed by the genius of the British chief; and,

11. 3 M

44() LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

that the French might, from the spot on which this intclhgenee
was communicated, obtain a conjfiruiation of its truth by only
looking towards the heights of Zibreira and Aruda.

Here then, at last, the British Fabius triumphed over his
own ungrateful country — over the favourite general of the great
Napoleon — over the stupid, infatuated governments of Spain
and Portugal — over the bright genius even of his own brave
officers ! When the grateful testimonials, which wondering
nations, in after-times, shall raise to the memory of him who
saved all Europe from the degrading tyranny of a splendid
monarch, but a remorseless conqueror, shall have fallen to
decay, the rude heights of Torres Vedras will yet survive, to
testify the fact, that such things were, and be Wellington's
greatest, best, and most enduring monument. The corps to
which the intelligence of the construction of the Lines was
first communicated, are said to have fallen back some paces,
as one body, upon its announcement. When Massena re-
ceived the appalling news he stood for a while motionless, and
totally confused : the dreadful truth now burst upon him, that
he was unequal to cope with the master-mind of Wellington :
he had been taught, by his imperial master, to despise the
weakness of the allies — but he was not reminded, that the
deficiency of their numbers was amply compensated by the
great talents of their leader.

As he paused and pondered over his fortunes, and analyzed
the movements and manoeuvres of the British, he found that
Welhngton had never fought unless he had the advantage in po-
sition, and that by his military skill he had always been enabled
to choose his ground. This had been his policy at Talavera and
Busaco, on both which occasions the issues proved that his con-
fidence in his troops was not misplaced, and that it was utterly
impossible to dislodge a British army from such positions as the
British general uniformly selected for them. Less prospect,
therefore, of success remained before Torres Vedras ; although
some parts of the lines had been disgarnished of troops, while the
divisions were entering, Massena could not have taken advantage
of it by a sudden attack, because he knew nothing of such en-
trenchments; and, against such natural strength, such perfect

t- Eiuir-Oi-ed M- HKD-'i

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 447

fortification, such indomitable troops, and after the sanguinary
repulse from the brow of Husaco, what hope of success could be
cherished in attacking the allies in their new position? The
eagle essayed to wing its Hight to the heights, but, ere it
flapped its heavy wing, the " leopard" placed his talons on its
back, and pinioned it to the ground. During three days Mas-
sena remained in sullen mood, at first incredulous, then de-
ponding — fortune had deserted him, and proved her inferiority
to virtue. Awaking for a moment from this reverie, he sent
out reconnoitering parties, to ascertain whether any hope of
advancing yet remained. On the I4th, a detachment of infantry,
supported by artillery, attacked a party of the seventy-first
regiment, which was then headed by Colonels Cadogan and
lleynell; but this little band charged them with so much gal-
lantry, that they fled into the town of Sobral. The whole of
the eighth corps d'armee, however, arriving on the evening of
that day, Sir Brent Spencer's division was withdrawn from its
advanced position to Zibreira, about one mile in the rear.
With this brilliant affair, in which Cadogan received a sabre
cut which passed through his Highland bonnet, all attempts at
reconnoissancc terminated. Experience had taught Massena
that the British were not to be subdued by the species of
warfare hitherto attempted, so he now quietly disposed his
three corps d'armee in bivouac.

The celebrated works, improperly denominated " The
Lines of Torres Vedras," consisted of three distinct ranges of
defence, constructed across a tongue of land included be-
tween the Tagus and the ocean, and having Lisbon seated at
its extremity. Of these, the first, which extended forty miles
in length, and obeyed the windings of the mountain-chain, con-
nected Alhandra on the Tagus with the embouchure of the
little river Zizandre; the direct distance between these
points being twenty-nine miles : the second, which preserved
an average interval from the former of about eight miles,
formed a chain of posts from Quintella on the Tagus to
San Lorenzo on the sea; the extent of this line was about
twenty-four miles : and the third, or innermost line, constructed

448 LIl'E AND CAMPAIGNS OF

w it li a view to cover a forced embarkation, was between Passo
trArcos on the Tagus, and the tower of Junquera on the coast.
Within the third, or shortest line, an entrenched camp was
formed, to protect an embarkation still more effectually, if the
allies should be reduced to that extremity, and subjected to
unexpected delay or interruption : this last place of retreat
rested on Fort San Julian, a work of considerable strength,
with lofty ramparts, and deep-cut ditches, which defied all
attempts at escalade ; while provision was made at the rear, for
the defence of the whole army within, and, during embarkation,
by a guard of even limited numbers, if only possessed of reso-
lution.

The first lines of defence were not originally constructed
with any idea of permanent occupation; they were intended
as a place for resting, and rallying, and re-forming, in order that
the allies might move thence with more complete system and
regularity, into their position in the second or principal lines,
and take up their ground there ; but Wellington had contrived
to protract the campaign, by hovering around the besieged
places, and prolonging the operations of the enemy, by affect-
ing to despise the solicitations of Spain and Portugal to put
the issue to the hazard of a battle, and by patiently enduring
the ingratitude of his own countrymen ; thus, while so many of
the summer's suns were setting on Massena inactive, the
defences of the first lines of Torres Vedras were daily acquiring
such strength and perfection, that their author considered them
sufficiently secure for every purpose. The first lines of defence*
consisted of five principal positions. The first on the right
extended from Alliandra to the entrance of the valley of
Calandrix, a distance of five miles. This was a lofty, rugged
ridge, the brow of which, in the only assailable part, had been
scarped to a height of about twenty feet, and thirteen redoubts
were constructed along its length. Here Hill fixed his head-

* Vide Wellington Despatclies, 20th October, 1809; Memorandum for
Lieutenant- Colonel Fletcher, commanding Royal Engineers; also. Memoranda
by Colonel Jones, in Napier's History of the Peninsular War ; the Marquis of
Londonderry's Narrative, vols. i. and ii. ; and Robinson's Life of Sir Thomas
Picton.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 449

quarters, having a force under his command consisting of both
British and I'ortuguese : the Tagus rolled its smooth deep
course at the foot of this fortified hill, and a tlotilla of gun-
boats was moored between the island and the shoie, flanking
the allied position. The second position was of nearly equal
length, and was formed by two projecting hills, between which
lay the town of Aruda. Three redoubts commanded the
ap[)roach ; but the commander-in-chief placed still greater
confidence in the gallantry of Craufurd and his light troops,
to whom the defence was entrusted, than in the strength of
the military works at this particular point. The central
])osition, INIonte Agra^a, was the summit of a conspicuous
eminence, from which every point in the first lines was dis-
tinctly visible. Separated from Aruda on the right by a deep
ravine, and hanging over the valley and village of Zibreira on
the left, the town of Sobral lay at its base in front. The
summit of this great mountain-mass was occupied by one
immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five heavy guns, while
three minor works, with nineteen guns, were clustered around
it. The face of tiie hill was scarped, and all access made imprac-
ticable ; and, as the great battery completely covered Sobral,
the strong castle at that place commanded the great Lisbon
road, rendering approach by that line utterly hopeless. Pack's
brigade, two thousand strong, garrisoned this position ; the
reverse of which was taken up by General Leith and the fifth
division. A rough and well-defined extent of ground between
Zibreira and Torres Vedras, watered by the Zizandre, was at
first left undefended ; but the rains having set in, the river
having swollen and overflowed its banks, it was deemed ad-
visable to make this a position, and here the fresh troops just
arrived from England and from Cadiz were placed, under the
immediate command of Lord Wellington. On the rock of
Secorra a telegrajih was erected, by means of which con-
stant correspondence was maintained with every part of the
I>ines, and the Britieli head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro,
adjacent to the telegraph station. At Torres \'edras, from
which these great works have derived the name by which

450 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

they are lienceforth to be remembered, an immense redoubt,
mounting forty guns, was constructed, and every approach,
liowever insignificant, was guarded by a smaller work ; forts
crowned every eminence from the great redoubt to the sea-
shore, and the Zizandre, which had totally forsaken its banks,
and assumed the dignity of a spacious lake, forbade all attempt
at approach for a length of many miles. Along the foot of
the hills, and in front of the lines, there was a paved road, after
the lioman manner, continued from Alhandra, by Aruda,
Sobral, and Runa, to Torres Vedras. Such were the outer
lines of Torres Vedras, designed by Lord Wellington in
October, 1809, and strengthened much beyond his original
intention by acquirements, natural and artificial, which the
inactivity of the enemy had enabled him to make.

The second lines, where Wellington actually proposed to
plant the British standard, and defend it by British fortitude,
included three grand positions: the first of seven miles in
extent was between Mafra and the embouchure of the San
Lorenzo. This length was occupied by steep and broken
hills, scarped wherever there was necessity, but in general
presenting mural cliffs, broken craggs, and deep ravines. Each
salient point was fortified ; and, to secure the road between
Cintra and Erceira, a secondary post, in the rear, was strongly
secured. The position on the right, in the second lines, was
the immediate vicinity of the Tapada or royal park of Mafra.
The Sierra de Chypre, in front of Mafra, was totally impreg-
nable, being thickly covered with redoubts ; and the defile of
Mafra was guarded by fourteen redoubts constructed with the
best skill and caution of two able British engineers. Bucellas was
the third point of importance in these Lines; between it and the
Tapada rises the huge mass of the Cabe9a or Monte Chique,
blocking up the whole centre of the Lines, and overtopping all
other summits in the Lisbon range ; this vast hill, connected
with Mafra by a series of forts, was further secured by diffi-
cult ground in front, by a stronger range of heights behind,
which were unapproachable by carrying either the Sierra de
Chypre, or the pass of the Cabecja de Monte Chique: but the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 451

works on the latter commanded all approaches, and the
heights themselves were naturally impregnable ; and so
completely secure was the Cabe(;a considered in its own pre-
cipitous strength, that it had not been thought necessary to
apply to art for any further aid, than by destroying one narrow
mule-road. The Sierra de Serves, a cluster of inaccessible rocks,
arose on the right of Hucellas, and filled up a space of two
miles in extent, then, laying aside its rude character, the sur-
face sloped gradually down into the level of Quintella on the
Tagus. It was here that the ingenuity of Colonel Fletcher
was displayed in the most conspicuous manner, by the system
of fortification employed to strengthen this too vulnerable point.
Water-cuts, retrenchments, and numerous redoubts, were
formed ; yet this point remained the most defenceless of the
whole. The first Lines were pierced by five lines of road, one
at Alhandra, two at Sobral, and the same number at Torres
Vedras ; two of these uniting at Cabeqa, reduced the number
that passed the second lines to four, namely at Quintella,
Bucellas, Monte Chiquc, and Mafra. Few positions can be
conceived much stronger by nature, as military defensive
ground, none of equal extent has ever been so securely fortified.
Had the enemy entered the first lines, they would have had to
fight the allies on positions selected for them twelve months
previously by their general, and where defeat would have been
inevitable ; besides, although the first lines might have been
forced, it appears impossible that the second ever could have
been entered. Lord Wellington accomplished more than he
designed ; his object was to bring the enemy inside the first
lines, and there fight them at an incalculable advantage; but he
had so strengthened his defences, that he was enabled to defeat
them without fighting, and to choose, notwithstanding much
personal suffering, the merciful part. The Lines of Torres
\'edras extended fifty miles, included one hundred and fifty
forts, and mounted six hundred pieces of artillery, yet the
movements of the great force, which was employed to man
them, were free and unrestrained, the commander being able,
in the space of a few hours, to concentrate the greater part of
the allies at any given j)oint in his lines. Not so his enemies ;

452 I.IFR AND CAMPAIGNS OF

tlieir movements, on the contrary, were crippled and dis-
jointed ; the huge Monte Junto sent out a lofty ridge, the
liaragueda, that extended nearly to Torres Vedras, and as
this giant stood in the very centre of INIassena's field of ope-
rations, it became absolutely necessary to choose on which side
of the great arm of the mountain he should pitch his camp.
It would have been unwise to have moved his army across
the ridge occasionally, as the ground was difficult, and the
experiment dangerous, the redoubt of Monte Agraca com-
pletely commanding the ridge, whence the British could pour
down upon his flank; so that although delay, accident, cir-
cumstances, had probably saved the army of Massena from
certain death within the first lines of Torres Vedras, outside
of these defences they were not free from insuperable difficul-
ties. Lord Wellington's care for the safety of the Portuguese
extended further than the repulsion of the enemy, or relief
of Lisbon from the intrusion of the French ; he had caused
Peniche, Setuval, and Palmela to be fortified, as places of
refuge for those of the Portuguese who should prefer voluntary
exile to the arbitrary government of some military ruler ; and
he had never contemplated a necessity for deserting Peniche,
on the contrary, he calculated upon retaining that fortress
permanently, under any circumstances.

The separate positions which constituted the three great
Lines, by which the triangular and mountainous area included
between the Tagus and the sea was fortified, being thus rather
minutely described, it will perhaps contribute to the clearer
comprehension of Lord Wellington's vast plan of defence, to
name the officers appointed to the command of each position,
fortress, or redoubt. To the general scholar, or mere student
of history, it may possibly form a subject of little moment to
investigate the reasons why Craufurd was placed at one battery,
or brave Picton directed to hold another, but the military
mind will discover new beauties in the Wellington designs
at Torres N'edras, in an analysis of the characters of the re-
spective general officers ; and the study of their biography
will demonstrate the fact, that the commander-in-chief posted
each individual where Iris peculiar talent would be most

TUE DUKE OF WELLINGTOX. 453

likely to correspond with the peculiar difficulties of each respec-
tive situation. The extreme right of the external line was the
most remote from head-quarters, and the most exposed to the
assaults of the enemy ; there Hill was stationed, who not only
had for some time previously a separate command, but on whose
calm courage the firmest reliance might be placed. On Hill's
left was the division of Craufurd ; this was a situation where
the efforts of science were believed to have been employed in
vain, but where such oft-tried bravery as that of Craufurd
might calculate safely upon arresting the transit of ten times
his own numbers. Pack's brigade was honoured with the
defence of the great redoubt above Sobral ; Sir Brent Spencer
garrisoned tlie heights over Zibreira ; while that loyal and gal-
lant ancient Briton, Picton, watched a deep ravine on Spencer's
left, not unlike in character, and not inferior in importance, to
the defile of San Antonio de Cantara at Busaco, where he first
established his imperisliable name as a splendid example of de-
votion to his country — Picton was the Fluellen of the Georgian
era; Cole's division continued the line of the allies along the
mountain's brow as far as the Lisbon road ; and Campbell's
corps formed the extreme left of the army. The compre-
hensive mind of the British chieftain provided for the general
safety of the natives, by the complete fortification of a super-
ficies of one thousand two hundred and fifty square miles; everv
salient rock or available point in which, was garnished with
ordnance, and garrisoned with troops. The control and arrange-
ment of these means and masses, and the almost sole dictatorship
of Portugal, these, even these extensive duties did not include
the sum of Wellington's arduous labours; but the tide of the
Tagus supported on its heaving waves a numerous fleet, and
his country, draining itself of all resources that could be spared,
had sent to his aid a fine corps of marines ; tiiese new re-
sources he now united in operation with the municipal guards
of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery, and the Kstrema-
duran Ordenauzas in a powerful reserve, covering every square
mile, from the outer lines to the fort of St. Julian, with a
guard of armed men. In addition to this great organized force,

II. 3 N

454 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

Welliiifrton had influence sufficient over the honest and sen-
sible judgment of Romana, to induce him to co-operate in
his plan of operations ; and this brave officer, with a deserved
contempt for the prohibitory mandate of his wretched govern-
ment, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of Oct.
and took up a position behind the Monte Agracja at Exara de
los Cavalleros — thus "not less than one hundred and eighty
thousand fishtins: men received rations within the lines : more
than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely dispo-
sable, and unfettered by the works."

With regard to the security of the works, independent of
the actual strength of the force which Lord WelHngton had
concentrated within them, Lord Londonderry observes, " Li
fortifying a line such as that of Torres Vedras, for the support
of a large army in the field, the ordinary practice is to con-
struct batteries, and other ^9om/5 iVappw^ which shall present
as imposing a front as possible to the attacking force, but shall
remain open and utterly defenceless from the rear. \\\ the
present instance, however, the redoubts thrown up were not
so much field-works, as regular castles, many of which were
capable of containing several hundreds, whilst one required no
fewer than three thousand men to form its garrison. These
were built as if each had been intended to stand a siege of six
weeks, at the most moderate computation : they were placed in
situations which rendered them quite as defensible from one
side as from another ; and they were all, to a certain extent at
least, independent of those near them, and well sheltered from
their lire, should they fall into the hands of the enemy. It was
Lord Wellington's design to garrison these posts chiefly with
the mihtia and least disciplined regiments, whilst he kept the
whole of the British troops, and the elite of the Portuguese,
free and unencumbered, as the circumstances might require.
I cannot," adds his lordship, " proceed further without desiring
to draw the attention of my brother soldiers, in a particular
manner, not only to this point, but to the whole plan of the
campaign ; because I am sure that a British army never partici-
pated in one better adai)ted to instruct it in the art of manceu-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 455

vering on a great scale, nor consequently so well calculated to
make efficient officers of those who shared in it, or are disposed
to take the trouble of studying it as it deserves."*

While Wellington was labouring to deserve success, a com-
bination of circumstances contributed to the consummation of
his vast designs : amongst these, the retirement of Mortier
across the Morena, and the expedition of Soult to press the
siege of Cadiz, were not the least important; they widened the
distance between the French corps simultaneously with Wel-
lington's labours to concentrate the allies. Massena having
recovered from the stupor and reverie that followed the sud-
den disclosure of the designs of his powerful antagonist,
devoted his best energies, and employed all the skill and
experience he possessed, in making a careful reconnoissance.
Alhandra, it was true, he dared not assail, but the defiles of
Aruda and Calandrix invited further inquiry. The passage
of the Calandrix would enable him to turn Hill's left, and pene-
trate, possibly, the second lines, but closer examination dis-
covered that the allies were still busied in strengthening that
point by abattis and redoubts. Towards Aruda, then, he
turned his view, and tried every art to induce Craufurd to de-
clare his real strength, but the genuine courage of that fine sol-
dier enabled him to play with Massena's skirmishers from
Aruda, which he occupied as an advanced post, while his men
were engaged in performing prodigies of labour to secure their
position effectually. The description given of this perform-
ance, in the History of the Peninsular war. is almost incredible,
partaking more of the character of ancient Roman achievements
than of modern warfare. f " Across the ravine on the left a loose
stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised ; and
across the great valley of Aruda a double line of abattis was
drawn : not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of
full-^ruivu oaks (mil clicsnuts, dug up ivith all their roots and
hranrhcs, dragged by main force, for several hundred yards,
and then reset and crossed, so that no human strength could

• Niirrativt' of the Peninsular War, vol. ii. p. 19.
t Colonel Napier's Hi.slory.

430 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to de-
fend this line of trees, were then cast up ; and along the suin-
mits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including
the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in
thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence
could have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand
men." In placing General Craufurd at the weakest point of
the lines. Lord Wellington understood perfectly the character of
the man; and, although he had more than once perilled the
safety of his division, he was not deficient in excellent judgment;
his resources were considerable, his enthusiasm unbounded, his
bravery never exceeded. Thus, the second reconnoisance was
even more discouraging than the first: the vale of the Zizandre
appeared to offer some better opportunity for an attack, being
unguarded in front, but the flanks and rear were fortified so
strongly that it would inevitably prove a valley of death to an
army that was rash enough to enter it.

All his resources were now exhausted, the cup was totally
drained, even hope seemed to have fled from the camp of the
invaders ; Wassena, therefore, resolved upon sitting down
patiently before these fortified mountains, and awaiting the re-
sult of accident, time, or revived energies. Disposing his forces
between Sobral and Villa Franca, in a manner that menaced
the weakest points in the Lines, he allowed the second corps to
observe Alhandra, while the eighth corps was advanced towards
Sobral. In effecting even these neutral arrangements, Mas-
sena had sustained some loss, disgrace, and disappointment.
On the fourteenth, a party of skirmishers attempting to drive
the seventy-first from one of their field-works, were repulsed
with frightful slaughter, and actually deprived of their own
entrenchments. At Villa Franca the enemy sustained another
serious disaster, and lost a gallant officer, St. Croix, who was
killed by the fire from the gun-boats in the Tagus. In one
of these petty affairs. General Stacey received a severe but not
a mortal wound. The war in Portugal was now literally re-
duced to a blockade ; Wellington having taken every possible
means to devastate the country through \\hich he passed,

THE DUKE OE WELLINGTON. 457

resolved to remain in his strong hold until famine should begin
to waste the ranks of the enemy; and Massena was equally
determined never to discontinue the blockade while food of any
kind could be procured for his numerous army. The appalling
truth of the strengthened lines reached him in time sufficient
to halt his sixth corps at Otta, and he now despatched foraging
parties, to collect provisions and form a magazine at Santarem :
but in this, too, he was frustrated by his quick-sighted antago-
nist, who invited the militia and Ordenanza, to move on the
rear of the enemy, and obtained the co-operation also of
Carlos d'Espana in harassing all foragers, and contracting the
enemy's sphere of operations. It will scarcely be credited by
the reader of history in after ages, that the wise and matured
schemes of Napoleon for the invasion of Portugal were frus-
trated, that Massena's manoeuvres were seen through and
counteracted, that the myriads of myrmidons, whom tlie impe-
rial marshals led over the Iberian border, were reduced incre-
dibly in amount, that all these great ends were accomplished by
a man who was reviled by the government of the very country
he was employed in saving, vilified as a military assassin by a
set of men at home possessed of splendid mental acquirements,
but who panted for place so eagerly that they were incapable
of viewing the position of our army with calmness. These in-
triguing politicians, whose oratorical powers have not failed to
shed a lustre on their descendants, would have acted more
honourably for their own memories, had they extended the aid
of their acknowledged talents to relieve, to encourage, their gal-
lant countryman, entangled, as they supposed him to be, in the
complicated maize of an unusual warfare : they would have re-
flected a brighter lustre on their names, by calling up prece-
dents to defend his failures, in case he should have been so
luifortunate as to encounter any ; nor would they have had occa-
sion to blush for the part they had acted, while they were per-
mitted to quote great Chatham as their type. "I will not," said
that statesman, "condemn ministers: they might have instruct-
ed their general wisely, he might have executed his instructions
failhfully and judiciously, and yet he niigiit iiavc miscanicil.

458 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

'I'liore arc many events in war, which the greatest human fore-
sight cannot provide against."

Despairing of success in any attempt upon the Lines, Mas-
sena directed his attention to the opportunity afforded by the
islands in the T'agus, of cutting off the communication between
the capital and the rural districts, and of annoying the righto
the allies. By culpable neglect on the part of the Portuguese,
or rather wilful and perverse resistance to the orders of Wel-
lington by Souza and the Patriarch, the boats were permitted
to remain at Santarem until the arrival of the enemy ; an event
which Lord Wellington "considered to be the greatest misfor-
tune that could have happened to the allies, and which might
possibly have obliged them to change their position and take
up the second line." "The French," observed his lordship, in
his very first despatch from Pero Negro, " will either arm these
boats, and operate upon Hill's right flank, in which case the
strength of the flotilla, and support to be given it by larger
vessels would become an object for serious consideration ; or
they will use them to form a bridge, and establish themselves
upon the islands in the Tagus across Hill's right flank ; or they
will employ them for a bridge or other communication with
Mortier, whom they will have it in their power to draw to their
support either on the left or right side of the river." Pos-
session of the boats facilitated the descent of the French upon
Leyceria, where they discovered a very seasonable supply of
provisions, which ministered for a while to their pressing
necessities, and for which they were indebted solely to the im-
proper conduct of the regency. The renewal of actual annoy-
ance on the part of the Portuguese government, did not dis-
able the British general from pursuing the labours either of
the field or the bureau, and as the enemy seemed dormant after
the affair of the fourteenth, and the death of St. Croix, his
lordship devoted more than his usual portion of time to minor
matters connected with his varied duties. His applications, re-
monstrances, and threats were incessant : he denounced the
regency, demanded a supply of shoes for his men, called the
attention of the envoy to slanderous paragraphs in the English

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 4G9

journals, totally groundless, and tending to bring the office of
commander-in-chief into disrepute ; required an explanation
of the difference in amount between the surgeon's report of sick
in hospital, and the actual number of absentees ; entered at
considerable length into the questions of the exportation of
merinos by the Americans from the Portuguese ports, and
supplied Vice-Admiral Berkeley and Captain Wedekind with
very full instructions as to the quantity of balks, planks, anchors,
cables, cordage, &c. which would be requisite for the construc-
tion of three bridges, which he then contemplated throwing, one
over the Zezere, at Punhete; the others over the Tagus, at Villa
Velhaand Abrantes. "^Phe preceding subjects are not included
in any of the thirteen important and voluminous despatches
written at head-quarters on the twenty-seventh day of October.
The latter expressed his feelings and conclusions as to the
intended movements of the enemy. He assured his brother
Henry that the French could do him no mischief ; on the con-
trary, that an attack on him would necessarily be attended with
the loss of the greatest part of their army ; and s"hould they
remain much longer, they would inevitably starve. '^I'he only
active measures in which the French appeared to be engaged
towards the close of October, were the further collection of
boats, and materials adapted for the construction of a bridge.

Lord Wellington being pressed by the envoy for his opinion
as to what were the enemy's objects, replied, " It is impossi-
ble for me to say positively, whether they will perform this
operation, having first endeavoured to carry the positions occu-
pied by the army, or without making such an attempt : but, ad-
verting to the numbers with which they entered this country,
and to their probable existing force, and to the character and
reputation of the general commanding the arm}', and to the im-
portance of the object to be gained by their forcing our posi-
tion, and the certain loss of character, of time, and of all the
objects of the campaign, by their retreat without attempting to
carry it, I cannot believe that the attempt will not be made,
as soon as the means of passing the 'Pagus, in a retreat, in case
of failure, shall have been prepared.'' 'Po this sju'cimen of

400 LIFR AND CAMPAIGNS OF

close reasoning, his lordship added an admonitory sentence, for
the guidance of the incapable regency, which was, " that the
enemy is constructing this bridge with the sole view of passing
into the Alemtejo." His lordship pressed urgently the ad-
vantage and necessity for evacuating the Alemtejo by the inhabit-
ants ; but his importunities were met by the intrigues of
Souza, who demanded that an officer and troops should be
sent to Almada, and the war in fact waged upon the frontier. To
this absurd proposition he required Mr. Stuart to state, in reply,
" that he considered it unbecoming members of the Portuguese
government to urge him to weaken his army by detachments,
when they were conscious, that owing to the weakness and
pusillanimity of their system of government, nearly two-thirds
of the militia were absent without leave, and the military laws
had not the power of punishing them ; when they knew also,
that during the previous year, in which the works which saved
the country had been constructed, he was never able procure a
tenth part of the number of workmen required, notwithstand-
ing repeated and earnest representations to the regency, and
that the works were consequently not so complete as they ought
to have been." The misconduct of this miserable government
was at length fully understood in England, and Lord Wellesley
now desired his brother's opinion as to the reform most desira-
ble to be introduced for its amelioration: on this point he evinced
the same deliberate, unprejudiced views, and, although it was
hardly possible there could be found a more wretched assemblj',
nor could any body of men be pointed to more deeply stained with
ingratitude, yet the magnanimity of Wellington blotted out the
recollection of their meanness and their crimes, and, giving all
the powers of his great mind to the chief question alone in
which the general safety was involved, declared that it was not
advisable to disturb the government by the removal of any of
its members, with the exception of Principal Souza; that this one
oblation to his oifended feelings would be sufficient, as with
him he was finally resolved to hold no further official inter-
course. "As for the Patriarch," he observed, "he is in my
opinion a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 4GI

and confidence throughout the country, which would increase
if he were removed from office, and he is just the kind of man
to do much mischief if he were not employed. If we should
succeed in removing the Principal, which must be done, I
think the Patriarch will take the warning, and behave better
in future. If Principal Souza does not go to England, or
somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost; the time
we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed
immediately, and the wrong directions given to the deliberation
of the government, is inconceivable." His lordship had also
obliged the intriguers to publish a contradiction of the in-
jurious falsehood that appeared in the Sun newspaper, relative
to the conduct of the British officers in the proscriptions at
Lisbon; but these evasive wretches were only disposed to state
that those brave men"had no share in the proceeding," omitting
to add, " that they had no knowledge of it until it was
executed:'' the matter, however, was taken up, discussed,
sifted, and truth separated from falsehood, in England, by
which means the infamy of one party was established as dis-
tinctly, as the humanity and honour of the other.

And now the twenty-seventh of October arrived, a day marked
by the dictation of a greater number of despatches than his
lordship probably had ever issued on any other single occasion,
in his long military service. He commenced the labours of
the bureau on this memorable day, by recommending the vice-
admiral, Berkeley, to send the French prisoners to England, and
repeated to him his desire to re-establish three l)ridges at the
places already named, in the event of the enemy's retiring, which
he now began to think would take place at no very distant day.
He complained to the British admiral also of Souza's miscon-
duct, and expressed his conviction that the Portuguese
government originated and circulated the calumny, that he had
not only approved, but caused the illegal arrests at Lisbon.
A curious instance of official confusion occurred in the instance
of Colonel Wilson, an active able oflicer. When Lord Wellington
arrived in Portugal, he found him doing duty with the Lusi-
tanian legion, but could not ascertaia by whose leave or

n. 3 o

462 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

autliority. His abilities soon recommended him to Marshal
Beresford and the commander-in-chief; and when orders were
sent to him to join the Royal York Rangers, Lord Wellington
suspended their execution, and assigned such reasons for that
suspension, as proved the amazing perspicuity of his own
judgment in the quick selection of meritorious men, and con-
ferred a reputation on the brave officer, of which ages shall not
be able to despoil him. He afterwards attained the rank of
Major-General in the British army, and was appointed to the
command of the forces in the island of Ceylon.

When the Marquis Romana seceded from Spanish authority,
he relied upon the generosity of the British for the mainte-
nance of his followers; and the English spirit, which had
always influenced the actions of this gallant soldier, formed a
strong bond of union between him and the British chieftain.
Wellington had supplied him with money, shoes, and pro-
visions, on account of the Spanish government, or, more
properly, the Spanish cause ; and of this circumstance he now
deemed it necessary to inform Lord Liverj)ool officially.
Amongst the enclosures contained in the despatches of the same
date, were several intercepted letters addressed to the Prince
of Essling, from which it appeared that the enemy possessed
means of acquiring intelligence in England ; the statements of
the strength of the different divisions of the allies having
undoubtedly been extracted from the weekly statements trans-
mitted to that country. From another letter it appeared that
reinforcements had arrived to the French army at Vittoria,
but not destined to succour the army of Massena. Lord
Wellington expressed his belief that the enemy could not
remain much longer in their position, and his astonishment at
their having continued there so .long. The troops had no
issue of bread from the day of their quitting Almeida, when
biscuit for fifteen days was distributed; but the greater por-
tion of them being unable to carry so much, threw their
allowance away. The distress, therefore, arising from want
of provisions was becoming so oppressive, that Lord Welling-
ton's despatches breathed a confident tone, and painted the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 463

deplorable state, in which the country they were about to
evacuate would be left, and the sufferings to which the in-
habitants of the wasted districts would be subsequently
exposed. He reminded the minister, " that upon former
occasions the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of
London in particular, had stepped forward to assist the
distresses of foreign nations, whether suffering under calami-
ties inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy.
This nation has received the benefit of the charitable dis-
position of his majesty's subjects ; and there never was a case
in which their assistance was required in a greater degree,
whether the sufferings of the people, or their fidelity to the
cause they have espoused, and their attachment to his
majesty's subjects, be considered. I declare that I have
scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal,
even of the lowest order, has had communication with the
enemy, inconsistent with his duty to his own sovereign, or
with the orders he had received. I would, therefore, beg leave
to recommend the unfortunate portion of the inhabitants who
have suffered from the enemy's invasion, to your lordship's
protection ; and I request you to consider of the mode of
recommending them to the benevolent disposition of his
majesty's subjects, at the moment, which I hope may not be
far distant, that the enemy may be under the necessity of
evacuating the country." Nothing could damp the ardour of
Lord Wellington in the cause of humanity; innumerable
instances have already been adduced, when ostentation could
have had no share in the transaction, the sublime feeling of
relieving a fellow-creature being the sole reward : in this case
the strongest incentives to anger, and even vengeance, had
been applied, by the regency, to the mind and the feelings of
the British chieftain, w ithout the slightest effect ; he dis-
criminated between the few that were guilty, and the guiltless
nation: he fell into no confusion as to the criminality of
Souza, when his keen glance rested upon the thousand pallid
countenances that looked to him imploringly for help. He
consigned Sou/a* and his faction to the punishment of a

464 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

conscience wrung by mental agony and disappointment, and
thought alone of those who had been the victims of an unjust
invasion and pretenceless war. After an interval of but two
brief days, the image of Portuguese suffering again presented
itself to his benevolent mind, and found its way into an official
communication addressed to Mr. Charles Stuart, upon various
military topics. "I do not know," observed his lordship,
" whether they sent you open a despatch which I wrote to
Lord Liverpool, to endeavour to prevail upon him to get a
subscription in London for the Portuguese, who have suffered
by the passage of the French through their country. I pro-
pose to have one in the army, and I have no doubt that every
soldier will contribute. But besides this measure, we must
turn our minds, seriously, to the introduction of large quanti-
ties of grain into the country during the winter. I spoke to
Sampayo yesterday upon this point, and told him 1 would
lend myself to the accomplishment of any reasonable plan for
this purpose. I have not much leisure to enter deeply into
the consideration of details ; but I shall be obliged to you if
you will consider the subject, and see what it will be best to
do, and how to do it, to prevent the people of Upper Beira, in
particular, from starving in the winter and spring."

Never checked in the pursuit of glory or humanity by
any of the griefs or disappointments with which the cup of life
is mingled, or its pleasure alloyed, these affecting, generous,
manly appeals to the rich and the noble were urged with the
utmost fervour, while the public journals teemed with the
vilest calumnies against his own honour. The 3Io7iitew\ ever
foremost in falsehood where British character was impeached,
even when unimpeachable, now loudly accused Lord Wellington
of having cruelly deceived Herrasti, the brave governor of
Ciudad Rodrigo, by promises of relief. This charge, re-echoed
by the anti-ministerial journals at home, excited painful feelings
in the hero's bosom for an instant, but, advancing and grappling
with the foe, he soon subdued him, with that power and efficacy
by which truth first chastises, and then annihilates falsehood.
Wellington's defence of his conduct on that momentous occasion,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 465

an occasion which laid the foundation of much and lasting dis-
content amongst the Spaniards generally, was not only full
and sufficient as regarded his personal promises, but retorted
the arguments of the French writers upon their authors.

Time rolled his ceaseless course, yet no decisive move-
ment was made by the main body of the enemy, up to the
twenty- seventh of October, at which date Lord Wellington
thus described the relative positions ot the combatants. " In
my opinion, the enemy ought to retire, for he has no chance
of annoying our position, and delay will only aggravate his
distress, and make his retreat more difficult. I calculate that
a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men v/ould not give him
so good an army as he had at Busaco. He had two thousand
men killed there; Trant took five thousand prisoners at
Coimbra; above one thousand prisoners have gone through
this army, many more have been killed by the peasantry, and in
the skirmishes with our different detachments; and they had
two hundred or three hundred wounded in the affair with our
outposts about Sobral. They cannot have less than four
thousand sick, after the march they have made, the distress
they have suffered, and the weather to which they were ex-
posed. Indeed, the deserters and prisoners tell us that almost
every body is sick. From this statement you will judge of the
diminution of their numbers, and you will see that I have not
much reason to apprehend anything from the cjuinze beaux
hdtdillons which fought at Essling, and which cannot be here
before the middle of November. I do not think I have much
to apprehend even if Mortier should be added to them. How-
ever, we shall see how that will be. We have an excellent
position, which we are improving every day ; and the army is
in good order and spirits, and not sickly. By the last returns
we had four thousand two hundred in hospital, and no serious
disorder. We had eight thousand five hundred sick in the
military returns, but these included convalescents at Belem, of
whom, I hope, under better regulations not to have so many.
I am not quite certain that I ought not to attack the French,
particularly as they have detached Loison cither to look for

466 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

provisions, or to open the road for their retreat ; but I think the
sure game, and that in which I am Hkely to lose fewest men,
the most consistent with my instructions and the intentions of
the king's government, and I therefore prefer to wait the attack.
Besides, although 1 have the advantage of numbers, the
enemy are in a very good position, which I could not turn with
any large force, without laying open my own rear, and the road
to the sea. This is the worst of all these strong countries,
that they afford equally good positions to both sides." While
Wellington soothed the wavering minister of England, by flat-
tering representations of the condition of his troops, and the
strength of his position, he felt most acutely the injuries that
had been done to the cause generally by the intrigues of Souza
and the Patriarch; nor was he totally relieved from doubt as to
the possibility of the enemy maintaining his ground, until some
assistance in men, money, or provisions should arrive.

On the last day of October, Massena appearing as resolute
as before in the continuance of the blockade, Lord Wellington
felt the great injury that had been done to his military repu-
tation by the non-removal of subsistence of every kind from
the ground occupied by the enemy, and, in bitterness of spirit,
thus wrote to the British envoy : " For aught I know to the
contrary, the enemy may be able to maintain their position
till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It
is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from
such obstinacy and folli/." This culpability on the part of
the regency, Lord Wellington still further explained, and more
clearly fixed upon the supineness of the government, in a
despatch of the first of November, in which he observes, " Had
1 not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco, he must have
been in his present situation long before the order for devasta-
tion could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All
this conduct was to be attributed to the same course, a desire
to avoid adopting a measure which, however beneficial to the
real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of
indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium
of the measure upon me, and upon the British government."

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 4G7

The Portuguese minister desired to see the war sustained on
the frontier by the allied army, and expressed surprise that the
measure of abandoning their homes should have been at all
introduced in that part of the kingdom; but his lordship
replied, satisfactorily to those who were sincere in the pursuit
of truth, by reminding the envoy, that "the same measure
was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira; notwith-
standing that the army was in that province, and the means of
transport were required for its service, not a soul remained,
excepting at Coimbra, to which town his personal authority
and influence did not reach, not an article of any description
had been left behind, and all the mills upon the Coa and
Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless.
But there were no discussions then upon the propriety of main-
taining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and
they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly."
His lordship pursued this painful controversy with these
infatuated statesmen in language that became his elevated
situation in that country, his important duties in the eventful
struggle for the recovery of European liberty, and, with as
little indignation and irony as could possibly have been ex-
pected, when the injustice and folly with which he was treated
are remembered, " I may," said Lord Wellington, " have
mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country,
and Principal Souza, and other members of the regency, may
be better judges of the capacity of the troops, and of the opera-
tions to be carried on, than I am. In this case, they should desire
his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the
command of the army. But they cannot douht my zeal for
the cause in w/iic/t tve are engaged ; and they knorv that there
is not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my tnind, that is
not devoted to promote it ; and the records of the government
will shoiu what I have done for them and for their countn/.
If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and
want of confidence in the measures which I adopt, by desiring
that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men, and
faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me, bv all

468 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the means in their power ; and they should neither thwart
them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless
delays and discussions." The chmax of this great man's anger
seemed to have attained its height about this period ; and the
multitude of irritating topics, with which he was tormented,
led to the composition of the following passage, which occurs in
a letter to Major-General Fane, the greatest departui'e from
the usual mild philosophy of his character, to be found in his
correspondence during twenty years of active, arduous, public
service. " My dear Fane, I cannot be answerable for a mad-
man. We sent the orders to the caqadores as stated to you.
This person got hold of them, and you know the consequence.
I wish I had it in my power to give you well-clothed troops, or
to hang those that ought to have given them their clothing.
You must make the best of them, and I will give you full
credit for everything you do." Unimportant to history, this
little burst of passion is valuable to biography ; it answers
Lord Wellington's contemporaries, rivals, enemies, who have so
often and so falsely denied to him the susceptibility of en-
thusiastic feeling, either of anger or affection : that he possessed
the latter abundantly, has been often demonstrated, and the
continuance of the friends of his youth around the path of his
old age, carries with it a memorable conviction of the fact.
Contempt, disappointment, or anger, he appears less seldom to
have expressed ; and the instance here adduced will probably
prove a solitary example, from which, therefore, it cannot be
concluded that he was either subject to, or controlled by, the
impulse of evil passions. Like the lowering clouds of a
gathering storm, which the sunbeams break through and
dissipate, the momentary vexation that brooded over his mind
was put to flight by the arrival of a communication from the King
of England, desiring that Lord Wellington would immediately
proceed to invest Marshal Beresford with the Order of the
Bath. Feelings diametrically opposite in tendency and charac-
ter were displayed in an instant ; and the labours of the bureau
became light and grateful, while his lordship thus addressed
his brave companion in arms: " I rather believe it would be

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. . 469

better to invest you in the mode in which I invested Sir
J. Sherbrooke, in presence of as many officers of the army, and
other individuals, as 1 can collect at a feast"; or, if you prefer
that mode, on a parade of some of the troops." The warmth of
his affection for Marshal Beresford, a warmth that sustained no
abatement, even from the chilness that accompanies the even-
ing of life, was always manifested in the strongest possible man-
ner : it would be vain to say that Wellington did not envy their
well-earned honours to the brave men who shared his fortunes in
the field, and aided him in weaving his laurel wreath, this would
be but a weak, and worthless compliment to his generosity, for he
was not only superior to every feeling of rivalship, envy, or illi-
berality, but he earnestly supplicated the government to confer,
upon every meritorious officer, the highest honours to which his
fortune, courage, or ability had entitled him ; and, in almost
every instance, he exhibited the sincerity of his joy at their
obtaining the honourable reward of their ambition, by becom-
ing the medium through which such marks of distinction were
generally conveyed.

Free from every apprehension as to the operations of the
enemy, and dismissing the angry thoughts to which the igno-
rant suggestions of the regency had given birth, he seemed in-
tent upon the single object of conferring this proud distinction
upon Marshal Beresford, with every circumstance of esteem
and honour. His plan consisted in assembling all the officers
of the army not on duty, all the respectable society at Lisbon
and the vicinity, Admiral Berkeley and the captains of the
squadron in the Tagus, to a feast at Mafra, on the seventh of
November; and, in presence of this elegant and joyous assem-
blage, to perform the ceremony of investiture. The officers of
rank, both naval and military, were entertained at a dinner, after
which there was a grand l)all. The style of his lordship's invi-
tations, even that part which relates to the gentle sex, is quite
a la militaire, stating that he had ordered quarters to be pre-
pared for Lady Emily Berkeley and her family, and, as to the
numerous ladies and gentlemen, with whose names he was un-
ac{|uainted, but whose rank he respected, and in consequence
II. 3 p

470 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

desired the pleasure of their company, he informed them, in
the same mihtary phraseology, "that quarters would be pre-
pared at Mafra for any person who would apply for them to
Captain Kelly, the deputy assistant-quarter-master-general."
How much and sincerely the brave soldier entered into the
spirit of festivity on this occasion, and how entirely dedicated
were his efforts to the happiness and honour of his friend, ap-
pears from his reply to the admiral of the fleet upon his accept-
ance of the invitation to the feast: "I am very much obliged
to you for your kindness to Marshal Beresford and me ; and
I enclose a letter from Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore,
which I hope will provide for you the means of moving what
is necessary for Lady Emily, who, I anxiously hope, will not
sufl^er by her desire to favour us with her company. We shall
appear in our best attire, but I fear that, with many, bad is the
best : and we shall be highly flattered by your company, and
that of the captains of the fleet, whether in full or in frock uni-
forms." What a condensation of graceful compliment, kind
and thougthful consideration, and attention to professional
forms, without the least neglect of all those rational courtesies
that belong to refined society ! The delicacy also with which he
apologizes for many of the brave partners of his fame, whose
uniforms were less gay and glittering than beseemed the ball-
room and the ladies' presence, must not pass unnoticed, nor
the indulgence which he expresses himself prepared to extend
to those of the naval service, who might happen to be similarly
circumstanced. His lordship's plan of operations was too well
laid, to have undergone the slightest risk of failure ; and the
prosperous end was found to correspond with the kind means
employed for its accomplishment.

It was daring the precise days, on which his invitations were
being distributed to the naval and military officers, to join the fes-
tivities at Mafra, that Lord Wellington drew up that celebrated
defence of his past military measures, that extraordinary
comparison of the fulfilment of his prophecies as to the results
of the campaign, that able vindication of his resistance to Por-
tuguese misrule and intriijue, that clear insiffht into the views

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 471

of the enemy, which were sufficient to establish his claim to the
character of a politic statesman, and a cautious general. " Were
all other records of Lord Wellington's genius to be lost, this
remarkable letter would alone suffice to vindicate his great
reputation to posterity."* It is a masterly composition, show-
ing how clearly he read his adversaries' views, and how little
confidence he reposed in the support of that fickle goddess
whom Massena is said to have worshipped with the most entire
devotion. " I wish it was in my power to give your lordshipf
an opinion of the probable course of the enemy's operations,
founded upon the existing state of affairs here, considered in a
military point of view ; but, from what I am about to state to your
lordship, you will observe that it is impossible to form such an
opinion. The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion,
founded originally upon political and financial, rather than mili-
tary considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest
of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived
from the removal of the British army from Portugal: but
I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary
to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castile
had been closed upon us by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo
and Almeida.

" The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portu-
gal, which was, the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula
would have had upon the inhabitants of Spain in general, and
upon those of Cadiz in particular — and the financial object,
which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto —
were the principal motives for the perseverance in the expedi-
tion into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more
pressing even than the former. It is impossible to describe to
your lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French
armies in the Peninsula, All the troops are several months in
arrears of pay ; they are in general very badly clothed ; their
armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of cvorv descrip-

• Napier's History.

t Desiiatch addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, dated from Pero Negro, third
of Nov. I ft 10.

11

472 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

tion : their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether ac
quired individually, or more regularly by the way of requisitioi
and contribution : they receive no money, or scarcely any, from
France ; and they realize but little for their pecuniary contri-
butions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered, that the
expense of the pay, and of the hospitals alone, of the French
army in the Peninsula, amounts to more than the sum stated
in the financial exposi as the whole expense of the entire
French army."

" This state of things has very much weakened, and in some
instances destroyed, the discipline of the army ; and all the
intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation, and corrup-
tion, and misapplication of stores, &c. by all the persons
attached to the army. I have no doubt, therefore, that the
desire to relieve the state of distress, and to remove the conse-
quent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and
Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal.
The expedition not having been founded upon any military
necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every
military principle. We know that Massena could expect no
immediate reinforcements ; and without adverting to the vari-
ous errors which I believe he would acknowledge he had com-
mitted in the course of the service, he has persevered in it,
after he found that he was unable to force the troops opposed
to him when posted in a strong position, and when he knew
that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they
were about to retire ; and that they were likely to be rein-
forced, while his army would be further weakened by sickness,
and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on
their march. He knew that the whole country was against him;
that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which
would immediately operate on his rear ; that at the time of
the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with
Spain ; and that every step he took further in advance, was a
step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which
the retreat would be almost impossible.

*' If the expeilition into Portugal had been founded upon

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 473

military ])rincii)les only, it would have ended at Busaco ; and
I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I expected that Massena
would retire from thence, or at all events would not advance
beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance,
contrary to every military principle ; and therefore, I conclude
that the pressure of financial distress, which was the original
motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and
may operate upon the measures for the present moment. In
this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endea-
vour to maintain his position as long as he can keep alive any
proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties
which induced the emperor to undertake the expedition with-
out any military necessity, would induce him to make every
effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time,
and, therefore, that he will remain some time longer where
he i|.

" Your lordship is already acquainted with the means of
reinforcing him. There is no doubt that, by raising the siege
of Cadiz, and abandoning other unattdinahle objects, Massena
may be reinforced to a considerable extent. Under these cir-
cumstances, / liave frequeiith/ turned over in my mind the
expedienci/ of attachi)ig tlie French army now in mij front,
before it should be joined by its reinforcements ; and, upon the
whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.
I enclose your lordship an account of the number of battalions,
squadrons, &c. which entered Portugal with Massena, and I
cannot believe that they composed an army of less than seventy
thousand men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss,
including sick, since that time, at fifteen thousand men, which
would leave them with fifty-five thousand men, of whom six
thousand or seven thousand are cavalry, at the present moment.
The cfiective strength of the British army, according to the
last return, was twenty-nine thousand infantry, cavalry, and
artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres
Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be
taken into the account : and I enclose a statement of the Por-
tuguese force, according to (he lat^^t returns. Besides this,

474 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

force, the IMarquess de la llomana's corps consists of about five
thousand men, making a total of fifty-eight thousand six hun-
dred and fifteen, of which I could command the services, in
case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which

about* ■ would be cavalry. Besides these

troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry, and
artillery in our positions, but I should deceive myself if I could
expect, and your lordship if I should state, that any advantage
would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation
against the enemy.

" Although the enemy's position is not so strong as that which
we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages ;
one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our
artillery. 1 would also observe, that in every operation of this
description by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can
be made to manoeuvre upon the enemy's flank or rear ; first,
because the enemy show that they are indifferent about their
flanks or rear, or their communications ; and secondly, because
the inevitable consequences of attempting such a manoeuvre
would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our
shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage
to attain his object. We must carry their positions therefore
by main force, and consequently with loss : and, in the course
of the operations, I must draw the army out of their canton-
ments; 1 must expose the troops and horses to the incle-
mencies of the weather at this season of the year ; and must
look to all the consequences of that measure, in increased sick-
ness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition in the
horses.

" I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time which
has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the
French army has been employed against us, there is yet no
other miUtary body in the Peninsula, which is capable of taking,
much less of keeping the field ; and the relief of Cadiz, which
appears to me to be a probable consequence of the state of
affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from

* This hialus occurs in the original.

THK DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 475

that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or diversion,
nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Ciranada, which
would be the consequence of the relief of Cadi/, enable Blake
to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards
Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an
army ; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena's position,
it would become a question whether I should be able to main-
tain my own, in case the enemy should march another army
into this country. But when I observe how small the supe-
riority of numbers is in my favour, and know that the position
will be in favour of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion that
I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of his
majesty's government, in waiting for the result of what is going
on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk. Every day's delay,
at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and
consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have
set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack
it ; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period
will only add to their distress, and increase the difficulties
of their retreat. I have thought it j)roper to make your
lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections upon
this subject, and my present determination, which I hope w ill
be consistent with the wishes of his majesty's government.
Circumstances may change : the enemy's distresses for provi-
sions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may
induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general
attack upon him a measure of positive advantage, in which
case 1 shall alter my determination. But, adverting to the
necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season, if I
should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious,
before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the con-
sequence of losing the services of my men by sickness."

This able, anxious, memorable letter, upon the military and
political circumstances of Portugal, was followed, on the next
day, by a despatch of equal power and perspicuity upon the
assemblage of the cortes, choice of a regent, and provisional
government of Spain. The cares, the duties, the responsibili-

47() LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ties which he had submitted to and undertaken, were of the most
extensive kind and highest importance, too much for a nation to
impose on an individual, yet not too heavy for the strength
and firmness of him upon whom they had providentially fallen.

From the light and playful letters of invitation in which he
bade all welcome to the festive board spread in honour of his
gallant coadjutor, his calm yet thoughtful mind turns with
facility to the consideration of the gravest temporal subjects
that can arise amongst mankind, and exhibits the same degree
of wisdom, discrimination, propriety, and justice, in every sub-
ject to which he had given his attention. He had always
expressed distrust in the provisional governments, or rather
self-elected local parliaments, of Spain, and his confidence was
not obtained for the lately assembled cortes by their initial
measures. In his letter to his brother Henry on this import-
ant subject, Lord Wellington repeats his caution as to the inevi-
tably democratic tendency of all popular assemblies, and sug-
gests, as a balance, the immediate appointment of a regency : in
the choice, however, of a regent, delicacy and difficulty ap-
peared ; and his advice to the cortes was, therefore, " to ap-
point or recognize as regent of the kingdom, with all the regal
authorities, whoever would succeed to the office according to
the law, as applied to the case upon fair analogy."

A very interesting opportunity of comparing Lord Wellington
with himself, and of establishing, conclusively, an uniformity,
equality, and consistency of conduct and principle in every
transaction of his eventful life, a fact, also, to which attention
has been frequently invited, occurred at this period, in the
case of Mr. Ogilvie, a commissariat officer of much ability, and
whom Lord Wellington considered deserving of being placed
over the heads of many who had grown old without experience
in the same service. Colonel Gordon, the commissary-in-chief,
had ventured to remonstrate upon this departure from the
accustomed rule, and urged the propriety of adherence to cus-
toms sanctioned by practice rather than prudence ; but this
was a doctrine of which Wellington never approved, and by the
violation of which England was twice saved from conquest

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 477

within the brief period of some ten short years, in the memor-
able instances of Nelson and himself. " When a man like
Ogilvie,'' said his lordship, " is found out, who is really capable
of being the commissary-general of an army, the rule is a bad
one which prevents his immediate promotion. 1 may be wrong
but 1 have objections to all those rules which prevent the pro-
motion of officers of merit. It is the abuse of the unlimited
power of promotion which ought to be prevented, but the
power itself ought not to be taken away, by regulation, from
the crown, or from those who do the business of the crown. If
this rule be obstinately adhered to in the commissariat, an
army will be lost on some fine day» on account of the total
incapacity of the greater number of the officers, seniors as well
as juniors, to perform any duty except that which they learn in
England, namely, the superintendence of deliveries by a con-
tractor, and to compare his accounts with his vouchers. There
is no power anywhere of rewarding extraordinary services or
conspicuous merit ; and under circumstances which require
unwearied exertion in every branch and department of our mili-
tary system, we appear to be framing regulations to prevent
ourselves from commanding it by the only stimulus — the
honourable reward of promotion : these are my decided opinion?.
They go to the principle of our proceedings, and not to
Ogilvie's case alone. If Kennedy was gone to-morrow, Ogilvie
is, I think, the person most qualified to fill his situation, and
I should then propose that he should be made a commissary-
general. I wish to know whether, in any service in the world,
a man has ever been placed at the head of such a concern as
that which I am conducting, without having the power of
selecting tiie person who shall succeed to fill such an office as
that uhich Kennedy fills; and whether any minister could show
his face to the country, and object ' that such an appointment
is contrary to the regulations.' The regulation, therefore,
must be nugatory, and ought not to be made. As for the gen-
tleman who would succeed Kennedy, according to the regula-
tion, he is quite unfit for the situation, and I could not do
business with him for an hour. This is even a stronger case
II. :Ui

478 T,TFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

than tliat which exists, though, by the bye, that is pretty strong.
Ogilvie, an assistant commissary, is found the most capable in
the whole department of conducting the business of General
Hill's separate corps, and he cannot be made a deputy-com-
missary, because he has not served five years ; and there are
other assistants in the army senior to him, who, although very
good men, and possibly able to do the duty of assistant-com-
missary, are not able to do the duty which Ogilvie performs
well, and for which he was selected, notwithstanding that there
were many deputy-commissaries with the army ! The next
thing to do will be to order that the deputy-commissaries shall
perform those superior duties when there are any with the
army ; and then I hope the gentlemen in London will be so
kind as to be responsible for all that passes here ; and bear
all the abuse and misrepresentation to which he must make
up his mind, who is honoured with the command of the British
troops on a foreign service."

This direct disapproval of rules which, in such a perilous
service, should have been obsolete, this just sarcasm applied to
the heads of the department in England, did not originate in any
desire of acquiring patronage, or any undue partialiry for the
individual Ogilvie, but was based upon one of Lord Wellington's
military maxims, a maxim on which he acted in his earliest
offices and campaigns, a maxim originating in disinterested-
ness and a love of justice, and an indication of the possession
of those great natural abilities, which he so generally acknow-
ledged in others, no matter how humble the possessor.

The enemy's movements now assuming the appearance of an
intention to attack Abrantes, Wellington's military instinct and
prescience enabled him to perceive and provide against their
efforts. Accordingly he directed Major-General Fane to com-
municate to Colonel Lobo, w^ho commanded in that district,
his entire approbation of that officer's general conduct, as a
stimulus to increased exertion in the event of an attack. His
attention was also bestowed on the operations of Don Carlos
de Espana, who had embarked in the cause of his country, and
was offering a gallant resistance to the invader, at the head of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 479

a small corps of twelve hundred Spaniards. Lord Wellington
calls this patriot, in his despatch to General Fane, " avery good
man, and a good officer;" and he directs Marshal Beresford to
place confidence in him as an ally : in this there was, at that
period, little risk, for it was the interest, as well as the in-
clination, of Carlos to be faithful.

Considerable uneasiness began to be perceived in the French
quarters, and demonstrations were made daily, almost hourly,
towards diiferent points. Amongst the prisoners brought in
by one of the patroles was a Portuguese named Masyarenhas,
who was in the French service, and aide-de-camp to Junot. On
his person were found despatches from the Frince of Essling to
the Prince of Wagram, relative to the battle of Busaco, besides
a series of questions to be put to the bearer of the despatches
at Paris, and the answers which he was to give. Masgarenhas
was on his road to the valley of the Mondego, towards the
frontier, in the disguise of a Spanish peasant, and was taken
by the Ordcnanza. This was the second despatch which Mas-
sena had written since his entering Portugal, that had fallen
into Lord Wellington's hands. This renegade, who was a
lieutenant of cavalry in the French army, had deserted his
country with Marshal Junot. Although a manifest traitor,
there was some distinction between the guilt of those who
(juitted Portugal in 1807 or 1808, and those who deserted to
the enemy on Soult's occupation of Oporto. These extenuat-
ing circumstances Lord Wellington was w illing to admit, and
perceiving the sanguinary views of the Portuguese, he at once
appealed to the British minister, sought his co-operation in
suspending the traitoi-'s fate, and deprecated a system of
retaliation to which the execution of Mascarenhas would ffive
rise, and in which the lives of many eminent, honourable, and
valiant men might possibly be forfeited, nor would the retalia-
tion be confined to Portuguese officers. This remonstrance was
necessary, humane, and characteristic : had he not called on
the British government to support his authority, the unfortu-
nate messenger would have been assassinated ; and, in all in-
stances of pardonable crimes, in his own army, I^ord Welling-

480 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

ton was opposed to capital punishniOnt : besides, he did uot
consider an example of this description necessary in Portugal,
as no disposition existed in any class to favour the French
invasion. His lordship, therefore, recommended that Mas9a-
renhas, after trial, should be sent to the Brazils, to be disposed of
as the prince regent should think proper. This sentence, so
consonant to his practice of avoiding the infliction of the ex-
treme penalty of offended laws, his lordship felt himself called
upon to revise, and for this change assigned the following rea-
son to the Earl of Liverpool, on the twelfth of November. " I
think it not very important what they do with Mas9arenhas,
as there is one fact in his case that would justify the putting
him to death, whatever might be the decision on the point re-
ferred to in my despatch of the tenth instant ; and that is, that
being a lieutenant of cavalry in the French service, and aide-de-
camp to Junot, he was taken in the disguise of a Spanish pea-
sant ; and, upon his first examination by the officer who took
him, declared that he was a Spanish peasant. He is, therefore,
liable to be hanged as a spy. I had not seen his examination
when I wrote to you on Saturday, and was not certain of this
fact."

Inactivity leads to habitual idleness, and idleness to profli-
gacy and disruption of the ties of honour and of duty. The
British soldiers, w hose early habits w^ere moral if not religious,
whose instinctive propensity is attachment to their country,
and submission to its laws, even they became infected with the
disease of desertion, and occasioned the most painful feelings
at the loss of national character, to the great man whose bright
star they had so longed followed : at the period when this
deplorable calamity befell our arm}', there was no sickness
amongst them, the number in hospital was below four thou-
sand ; no arrears of pay occurred, no stern laws had been
enacted or enforced ; on the contrary, every indulgence that
could be granted, consistently with their duties, was permit-
ted both to soldiers and officers, by the commander-in-chief;
yet desertion disgraced the army. On the twelfth of Novem-
ber Lord Wellington thus deplores the circumstance in a

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 481

letter to the secretary at war." Your lordship will be con-
cerned to observe the continued, and I am concerned to add,
increasing desertion of British soldiers to the enemy, a crime,
which till within the last few years was almost unknown in our
army. It is difficult to account for the prevalence of this crime,
particularly in this army lately. I'he British soldiers see the
deserters from the enemy coming into their lines daily, all with
a story of the unparalleled distresses which their army are
suffering, and of the loss of all hope of success in the result of
their enterprise : at the same time that they know and feel
that they are suffering neither hardship nor distress ; that there
is not an article of food or clothing which can contribute to their
healtfi or comfort that is not provided for them; that they are
well lodged and taken care of in every respect, and not fatigued
by work or duty; and having every prospect of success." The
deserters from the British ranks were principally Irishmen, in
whom a love of change and a thoughtlessness of disposition ori-
ginated the commission of crime. The description of men
drafted from the Irish militia was bad, they had been infected
with disorderly principles in the disturbances of their own
country ; and they had communicated their love of licentious-
ness, and impatience of restraint, to their fellow-soldiers in the
retreat through the north of Spain in the winter of I80t?^9, in
their subsequent service in the French army, and in their wan-
derings through the country back again into Portugal. The
remedy for this disease, the check to this deplorable crime, was
nearer than the general imagined, and the unfortunate cause of
this disgraceful effect, inactivity, was soon about to be ex-
changed for the ardent pursuit of glory. To the hoRour of the
British army it should be observed, that this was one of the very
few instances in which the crime of desertion disgraced it ; and
as it was the worst, so was it also the last case.

That the desertion from the British army is to be attributed
to individual licentiousness and disregard of honour, to a reck-
lessness and restlessness of character, to wantonness and moral
depravity, and similar causes, rather than to the severity or
incaution of the commander-in-chief, will appear from the fol-

482 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

lowing account of the mode in which the hlockaded army spent
their time, written by one who was a participator in what
he describes, and who is too noble to be duped by art to
a purpose. " Neither the time of our soldiers nor that ot
their chief was, however, wasted in idleness ; the former were
busily employed in the construction of new works, whenever
their erection appeared at all desirable, and in giving addi-
tional solidity to those already thrown up : till the Lines be-
came as perfect a specimen of a fortified position, as it was
possible for nature and art to produce. The latter was inde-
fatigable in his exertions to bring his army into a condition of
general efficiency, and his exertions were too judiciously ap-
plied not to be crowned vvith success. The Portuguese being
now thoroughly amalgamated with the British troops, learned
from them all those lessons, which, in after campaigns, they
turned to an excellent account : and Beresford, to whom the
entire merit of their training is due, was, in consequence, re-
lieved from all further responsibility in field-operations. Every
day brought in its improvement amongst them ; and the gene-
ral was soon rewarded for all his trouble by the conviction that
he might rely upon them almost as perfectly as upon his own
countrymen. Nor was Lord Wellington inattentive to the
comforts, and even luxuries, of his followers. Provisions were
abundant ; there was no want of wine ; and sports and amuse-
ments went on, as if we had not been at the seat of war, but
in England. Officers of all ranks, and in every department,
from the commander-in-chief down to the regimental subaltern,
occasionally enjoyed the field-sports of hunting, shooting, and
fishing. The men, too, had their pastimes, when not employ-
ed on duty ; in a word, seldom has an army occupying ground
in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours of relaxation,
or continued to unite so completely the pleasures of country
life, with the serious business of war. It is probably needless
to add, that so great a show of security in their leader had the
best possible effect upon the temper of the troops ; or that
the morale of the army was sustained, not more by a contem-
\)lation of things as they really were, than by a conviction that

THE DUKE OF WELLIXGTON. 483

they must be going on prosperously, otherwise so much relaxa-
tion could not aboiuid."*

While these scenes of recreation were performing along the
steep brows, and amid the wooded dells, of Torres Vedras,
Monte Junto, and liucellas, distress pervaded the thousands of
refugees, whom the stern commands of the generalissimo had
compelled to take shelter within the lines ; for, the rapidity with
which they were forced to abandon their homes, prevented
them from carrying or transporting supplies, so tliat the desti-
tution in the crowded precincts of Lisbon was most lamentable.
It is not to be concluded, however, that the infirm, or the
impoverished, were abandoned by those whom duty, humanitv,
or religion should actuate in such cases ; on the contrary, as
far as human relief could be administered their sufferings
were alleviated. Government threw open the port of Lisbon
to vessels from Barbary, England, and America; so that a
supply of provisions, and on terms reduced by competition,
was provided, equal to the wants both of the army and tbe
increased population. Besides the influx of commodities and
stores from foreign countries, the fertile provinces of Alemtejo
and Algarve remained unmolested by the hungry hordes of
the enemy, — that district, which the inabitants themselves
call the granary of Portugal, was yet unconquered, and within
their own control. While the military and civil govern-
ments adopted these prudent precautions for the mainte-
nance of the people, the nobility and rich citizens contributed
liberally, bountifully, both by pecuniary means and personal
attention, to mitigate the amount of suffering and distress.
Subscriptions poured into a public treasury, to be employed
in hutting some of the fugitives in the open country outside
the city, in transporting numbers across the Tagus into the
district not yet despoiled by the enemy, and in removing
others to their homes at Coimbra, from which the French had
been driven by the intrepidity of Trant. 1 here was another,
a still more aublime source from wiiicli bounty flowed, and
relief emanated — religion ; and it is assuredly a blessed attri-
• Narrative of the Peninsular War, by tbe Mnrquis of Loiuloiidcrry.

484 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

bate of their national faith, that it enjoins the giving of
ahns, although accompanied with the detractive character of
being a compensation for sin. The members of different
monastic orders were foremost in the work of mercy ; charita-
ble institutions were opened for the distribution of food and
clothing, and administering of medical aid; and magazines
were stored with corn purchased from the ships in the Tagus,
and laid up as with the prospect of a protracted blockade.
- This unremitting attention to the necessities of the fugitives,
soon calmed the agitation attendant upon the irruption of so
many thousand destitute beings within the limits of the Lines,
and a feeling of security not only returned, but brought with it
such a degree of confidence, that at no period were the public
theatres more crowded, or their private and public assemblies
more gay and brilliant, than when the liberties of Portugal
were threatened by an army of seventy thousand men, rendered
desperate by privations, and who lay panting for plunder almost
under the walls of their metropolis. " It was strange to see
such fearless and inconsistent gaiety among people who might,
in the course of a few short hours, be placed at the mercy of
a conqueror: but we are all the creatures of custom, and
short experience will reconcile us to anything. Hence it is
that the inhabitants of Portici sleep tranquilly under the
burning Vesuvius, and mariners sing jovially while rocked
upon the restless waves, in which the starting of a single
plank might ingulf them for ever !"

The security which the allies as well as the inhabitants of
Lisbon seemed to feel, the unrestricted pleasure in which they
appeared to indulge at such a crisis, excited the highest and
most marked indignation in the despondents in England,
whose supporters, attached to the public journals, proclaimed
their disapprobation in terms not to be misunderstood, but not
either to be respected : they confessed their confident belief" that
Lisbon, not Massena, was in danger of famine; he," they assert-
ed, "could drive in upon our lines the population of the surround-
ing country, to increase our difficulties ; and to relieve' his
own, could send his foraging parties into an immense tract of

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 485

country, as yet untouched. England, meantime, must send out
not merely regiment after regiment, but cargo after cargo of
grain throughout the winter ; and what if the bar of the Tagus
should be locked up by adverse winds ? Massena, we might be
sure ; with the talents and prudence universally ascribed to him,
did not act without a confident prospect of success. It had been
said in the gazette, that he possessed only the ground on which
his army stood; this was an er ration, where for "Massena,"
we ouglit to read "Wellington." Our situation in Portugal
would become infinitely more disagreeable than his, even if he
did not bring in his whole force to bear on one, two, or three
points, and by his superior numbers thus concentrated, break the
lines in which Lord Wellington's army was so much drawn
out. He would have the most productive part of the kingdom
open to him : we should have only Lisbon and its vicinity,
with the whole Portus^ucse army to maintain, as well as the
British ; nay, with the whole ]X)pulation of Lisbon, increased by
the fugitives who had taken asylum there, deprived of their
usual resources, and thrown upon us even for daily bread !
What a delicate and irksome part then would our troops have
to support, if they were to pass the winter upon those moun-
tains, possessing no part of Portugal but that in which they
were posted, incessantly harassed by the French in their
front, with a Portuguese army double their own number within
their lines, and a starving metropolis in their rear? The
Trench had obviously the advantage: they could remain in
their positions as long or as short a time as they pleased ; they
could retire, and return at their discretion. They might v.ait
for the reinforcements which their master would draw to their
aid from every quarter of subjected Europe ; they were likely to
accumulate, while the British must in the nature of things
decrease. Massena was in truth master of the game he had to
play. The most disastrous thing that could happen to us,
next to positive defeat, would be the necessity of keeping our
position on those heights for the winter; "and we trust," said
these hopeful directors of public opinion, " wc trust that we
shall not have to incur that calamity ! Lord VN'ellington mnv
u. 3 u

486 LIFR AND CAMPAIGNS OF

re-embark his troops without much molestation, and, rather
than lie should be driven to the necessity of continuing in these
positions for the winter, we confess that we wish he were re-
embarked." This extract is preferred, in this place, to very
many others of similar character, because, having been quoted
by Dr. Southey, in his History of the Peninsular War, a double
assurance of its authenticity is thus supplied. — The new popular
assembly, which assumed the reins of government in Spain, in
imitation of the liberal portion of British' institutions, publicly
permitted freedom of the press, and so closely did their par-
tisans pursue the analogy, that, miitato nomine, they repeated
precisely the same fallacies and falsehoods as applicable to
llomana, which the free press of Britain had uttered of Wel-
ington. It was this unprincipled employment of their privilege
which elicited from Wellington that well-tempered, and con-
siderate remonstrance, in which he universally expressed his
own private, personal opinion of this great national question,
and which he addressed to his brother Henry on the eleventh
of November, 1810, from head-quarters at Pero Negro.

"The Marquess de la Romana," said Lord Wellington, "is
a good deal distressed by the paragraphs in the Cadiz news-
papers respecting his march to this quarter ; and I acknowledge
that neither the public mind in Spain, nor those whose con-
duct is likely to become the subject of these discussions, are
prepared for them. The freedom of the press is, nndouhtedli/,
a benefit, and it is difficult to fix the limits heyond which it
shall not go. But if the benefit consists in the information
which the press conveys to the nation and the world in general,
it appears to be necessary that that information should be
founded in fact, and that discussions upon the conduct of military
operations, and the characters of officers who carry them on,
should be founded on real knowledge of events, of the true
state of affairs, of the character of the troops, and, above all, of
the topography of the country which may be the seat of opera-
tions. I think much mischief is done in England, not only to
vie personally, but to the character of the army, and of the
country, by foolish observations upon what passes here, in all

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 487

the newspapers. But in England we are accustomed to these
calumnies, and to read this nonsense, which, // is to be hoped,
makes no real impression, particularly as the same newspaper
generally contradicts the first statement, or argues against the
first reasoning, in the course of a short time after it has heen
inserted. ]3ut in Spain, a country unaccustomed to these
discussions, in which all, even the best men, are objects of
suspicion, and every measure is considered the result of a
treasonable conspiracy, it is highly dangerous to expose men,
in the situation of the Marquess de la Romana, to this descrip-
tion of calunniy, and unfair statement and sophistical reasoning
upon his conduct. And it is particularly hard upon the in-
dividual, because, in the present situation of affairs in the
Peninsula, neither he, nor his friends, nor the government,
who in this instance have approved of his conduct, can venture
to defend him, because, if they do on real grounds, they must
convey information to the enemy.*

" There is another very forcible objection, in my opinion, to
subjecting officers in the situation of Romana to this descrip-
tion of discussion, and that is, the effect which it may be
expected it will have on the officers and soldiers of the armies
under their command. The Spanish armies, which are neither
fed, nor paid, nor clothed, cannot be kept together by the bonds
of disciphne, as I keep my troops : but the authority of the
general, and the operations of the armies, depend almost
entirely upon the opinion which they entertain of him, and the
confidence they repose in him. Both must be shaken by this
description of discussion ; and I should not be at all surprised
if Romana were to inform me, on some fine day, that the
opinion of his army was against his remaining here, and that
he must go ; as Carrera informed me during the siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo, that notwithstanding his opinion agreed
entirely with mine, and he wished to remain with me during
the campaign, the opinion of his troops would be so much

* Tliis wiis prt'cisely Lord Wellington's (nvn ^ituiUioii while he was t-eiretly
fortilying the heights of Torres Vedras, declining battle, and protriicting the
campaign. In fiict, the entire of this letter is equally applicable to his own case.

488 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

against us, if we did not attempt to relieve the place, that he
should be obliged to separate from me, if it should fall ; and
he actually marched on the evening of the day that the place
surrendered. This fact shows what it is to command troops
held together solely by opinion, and how dangerous those dis-
cussions must be in a country which has only an army of this
description.

" Romana's junction with me in this position was founded
upon two circumstances. First, the impossibility of his re-
maining in Estremadura, if I should be obliged to embark; and
the expediency of his embarking his troops at the same time,
in order to save them for the Spanish nation. Secondly,
upon the expediency of increasing, to the utmost extent that
was practicable, the disposable force which I should collect in
these positions. In respect to the operations proposed for
Komana, in these discussions, on the enemy's rear, we have so
much force in their rear at present, that they have no commu-
nication with Spain, excepting by large corps ; and they have
not attempted such a communication. The addition of the
Marquess de la Romana's corps to the other troops thus em-
ployed, would not have increased their difficulties for subsist-
ence, or have enabled us to press closer on their rear, because
even if Romana could have ventured to place himself on the
right of the Tagus, behiwd the enemy, he could not have ven-
tured to place himself on the right of the Zezere. The enemy
must still have had possession of the country along the right
bank of the Tagus to that river, and they extend no farther
now. But if Roraana had placed himself upon the right of
the upper Tagus by Abrantes, and we had been obliged to
embark, what was to become of his corps ? It must have been
left behind to the mercy of the enemy, or must have made the
best of its way through the mountains, to the Mondego, and
thence to the north of Portugal. In the mean time the want
of its services and assistance in these positions, by its absence
for other objects, in a situation in which it could be of no use,
might be the cause of the loss of the whole, and of the misfor-
tune of our being obliged to withdraw.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 489

"1 have written you this much, in order that you may have
topics, wherewith to remind your friends in the cortes, that they
should not always go full gallop ; they should pull the bit some-
times, or they will destroy the whole fabric which it is their
object to raise, and will lose the confidence of all the wise and
thinking men of Europe."

However disgusted Wellington might have been with the
cortes at Cadiz, however indignant he might have felt towards
the public press in England, or rather that part of it which was
either corrupt or ignorant, his measures or movements did not,
in consequence, sustain a moment's suspension, or the minutest
change. With his mind as intently fixed as his keen glance,
upon the least symptom of animation in the great body of his
enemy, that had so long lain extended before him, he awaited
cautiously the first fair opportunity of pouncing upon his victim ;
nor was Massena insensible to the hazard of his situation, although
it was long before he recovered sufficiently from the effects of
surprise, to be able to act with vigour, or reflect with patience
and caution. While desertion and sickness were rapidly
thinning the ranks of the French, the Lines were acquiring
increased strength. The rear of the French was harassed, the
guerilla bands were hovering around, and the country behind
them was laid waste : the allies had obtained an accession of
strength by tiie arrival of Romana and of troops from Cadiz, and
the ports were thrown open to commercial enterprise, by which
means their supplies became inexhaustible. A council of war
was assembled by the Prince of Essling, at which Ney, Regnier,
Junot, and Montbrun were present, where it was decided, that
application should be made to Napoleon for reinforcements and
advice, and that the army should occupy a central position in
Portugal, until the arrival of one or both. General Foy was
chosen for this dangerous embassy, but his courage and energy
were fully ecpial to the task. In the struggle between Wellington
and Massena to reduce each other by famine, the former liad
eminently succeeded ; the French were necessitated to live by
j)lunder, and at length every place was so completely rified,
that the utmost ingenuity was required to procure any supplies.

490 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

It was the practice of the enemy to plunder systematically,
and tools for spoliation formed as constant a quantity in their
military stores, as arms or clothing. Furnished with such
implements, plundering parties marched in different directions,
under the guidance of their officers. Every article of furni-
ture, in which it was possible that effects of value could be
concealed, was broken into pieces ; every piece of fresh
masonry was pulled down ; and, wherever the earth presented
any appearance of having been recently turned, an examina-
tion was made there to some depth. Taught by their com-
mander-in-chief those principles and that practice which he
subsequently condemned and punished, a number of deserters
from the French ranks formed themselves into a regular corps,
appointed their own officers, and commenced the occupation
of banditti : all those who had previously fled from the army,
readily rallied round the standard of spoliation, and small
parties, sent out to forage, frequently abandoned the more for
the less orderly system of plunder. Sixteen hundred men
were leagued together in this infamous cause, creating little
less uneasiness to the general whom they had abandoned, than
to the inhabitants of the villages — who in some instances gave
them an unexpected repulse. Tw o strong detachments were at
length sent against them by Massena, who caused their leader
to be shot, and received the remainder into the ranks again.

Amon£fst the first cares of Massena, when he sat down be-
fore the Lines of Torres Vedras, was that of collecting all the
boats, that had been left upon the Tagus by the culpable negli-
gence of the regenc)^, w ith a view of crossing the Zezere and the
Tagus. Large supplies of provisions, collected by Montbrun's
cavalry along the right bank of the Tagus, were stored carefully
at Santarem, Barquina, and other depots : rafts were con-
structed, and the few boats they possessed were placed on wheels,
for convenience of transport to such situations as tentation might
require, until a practicable passage was ascertained. These
operations had attracted the watchful eye of the British gene-
ral, and Major-General Fane h:4d been passed over with a
brigade of Portuguese cavalry, several guns, and a howitzer, to

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 491

the left bank of the Tagus, to destroy any boats, or other pre-
parations, which the enemy might be proceeding with near San-
tarem or elsewhere. Fane partially succeeded ; he destroyed
the enemy's incipient flotilla, but his howitzer having been
disabled, and, by some accident, his congreve rockets being
overlooked, he abandoned further effort, and went into canton-
ments opposite to Santarem, a situation admirably calculated
for rendering assistance to the garrison of Abrantes. With
immense labour the French constructed a bridge over the
Zezere, above Punhete, but the flood of that impetuous torrent
almost inuTiediately after carried it away, an event which seemed
only to increase their efforts, and evidence their intentions very
fully, for they not only restored the lost structure, but even built
a second, higher up the stream, at Martinalial. Thus far pre-
pared, Massena began to withdraw his army with the extremest
caution, and by stealth, from before the memorable Lines of
Torres \'edras — a movement more difficult and more hazardous
than his approach to them, being overlooked from the IMonte
Agra(;a. His preparatory operations consisted in sending the
corps of Marshal Ney to Thomar silently, gradually, and in
the most perfect order ; Montbrun was ordered to march upon
Leyria, Loison to Golegao ; while head-quarters were to be
transferred to Torres Novas,

Having decided upon withdrawing from before the Lines,
and having made dispositions for that purpose, which prove
indisputably his military knowledge and ability, on the night
of the fourteenth of November, 1810, the French army took
the first step in their downward career, a step which they never
after retraced or recovered; and from these heights the eagle of
France taking flight, never soared again in spiral path, or
with threatening aspect, over the head of the British lion. On
the fourteenth of November, aided by the darkness of night,
and by a thick mist that clothed the summits and sides of the
mountain, General Clausel withdrew from his jiositionat Sobral;
and the eighth corps passed through the defile of Alem(juer
on the following morning, under cover of a strong rear-guard,
and a body of cavalry posted in front of the heights of Aruda,

4})'J IJFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

and moved on Torres Novas, while the second hroke up
simultaneouly from Alhandra, falling back upon Santarem.
When the clouds that hung over the moving columns of his
enemy had rolled away, and daylight, divested of morning's
thin veil, w^as displayed in all its truth and brilliancy, Welling-
ton perceived that Massena too kept secret councils, and, as
he had been brought into peril most unsuspectingly, by his
adversary, so did he prove himself equal to the achievement of
extricating his army, with perhaps less ability, but equal secrecy
and caution. The slopes of Monte Junto, Torres Vedras,
and Alhandra, so lately occupied by seventy thousand enemies,
were evacuated so silently, that the first information which
reached the allied Lines was derived from their own re-
connoissancc, at early dawn on the fifteenth. Sooner or
later Wellington expected this movement, and he had fre-
quently expressed his surprise that the enemy had held their
position so long, yet such was his astonishment at the rapidity of
their flight, and such his transports at the complete success of
his "reat desisfn for the salvation of Portugal, that he now
appeared in activity to exceed himself, and never were more
stirring compositions written than the orders which he issued to
his general officers when he saw that the French had fled.

At ten o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth, he began to
deliver orders, and continued to pour forth a perfect torrent of
commands, all well digested and obviously preconcerted, to
counteract the movements and operations of the enemy. From
the heights in front of Sobral he wrote first to Craufurd, acquaint-
ing him with the retirement of Massena, and, that Sir Brent
Spencer's division was already feeling its way towards Alem-
quer, and desiring him, in case the enemy " had retired, their
left as well as their right," to cross the river, and feel his way
towards Alemquer also, but by the Aruda road. He requested
that his note might be forwarded to Hill, as he wished him
to feel his way by the road of Villa Franca, and Castanheira,
to Carrageda. These advanced guards were like so many
(nitenncE, put out to learn something certain of the enemy's
intentions, for a report had reached the Lines on the four-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 493

teenth, that a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men was on
its way to join the army of Massena, having reached the
frontier of Upper Beira on the ninth, which rendered the
utmost caution necessary in every movement of the allies.
This brief note gave impulse to the different corps ; the next,
also to Craufurd, commences thus, " I enclose a letter in tri-
plicate, which I wrote to you this morning, and I hope some-
body at Aruda will have opened it, and acted upon it in your
absence. Voic see the eneyny at Villa Nova, I conclude — in the
morning I wish you to feel your way thither, and thence to
Santarem. I shall be up here very early in the morning. A
courier flew to Admiral Berkeley at the same instant, request-
ing " that he would have boats sent up the river immediately,
as far as Alhandra, and there await his further instructions."
In this way " the work went bravely on," nor could any lan-
guage convey a more active picture of the night before a
battle, or give a more animated description of the dreadful note
of preparation, than the following spirited letter addressed to
Major-General Fane, almost at the same instant : few graphic
attempts to convey the idea of rapidity of thought and action,
have ever been more successful : — " The enemy retreated last
night, their outposts were this evening at Villa Nova. They
have all gone to Santarem. Our advanced guard is this night
at Alemquer, they will to-morrow be well on towards Santa-
rem. Hill will be at Villa Nova, Spencer at Alemquer. The
enemy intend either to retire across the Zezere into Spain,
or the Tagus into Spain, or the Zezere to attack Abrantes.
The last is possible, as I last night heard they had a reinforce-
ment at Beira Alta. I have requested the admiral to have
boats broufiht up the Tagus, and I propose to pass over
General Hill's corps to Salvaterra, or at least to be in readi-
ness for that movement as soon as possible. This will enable
me to prevent the success of an attack upon Abrantes, at all
events, and possibly the movement of retreat across the
'IXfTus ; and if they retreat across the Zezere, I shall be able to
annoy tiiom by passing the river at or above Abrantes. You
must, in the first instance, rocket Santarem, if you believe that
II. 3 s

494 LIFi-: AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the boats and materials are still there ; in the next, you must
encourage Lobo, at Abrantes, to hold out, whatever may be the
attack made upon him. If the French could pass the Tagus
between you and him, desire him to get his boats over to the
right of the Tagus, and let Don Carlos de Espana pass over
to Abrantes, and tell him that in this case Abrantes cannot
be attacked. You will, in that case, take care of yourself, by
withdrawing down the river. If you find that they are using
their materials in constructing a bridge over the Zezere, move
your cavalry opposite to Abrantes ; make a great show there ;
throw a bridge over the Tagus, with the exception of three
or four boats on the other side, and have every thing in readi-
ness for a complete bridge for you and Hill to cross, either to
pursue the enemy through Beria Alta, or to oppose him in
his attack upon Abrantes. In this case (of their using their
materials to make a bridge over the Zezere) I think it pro-
bable that you will have your ca9adores5 and rockets, and
artillery still opposite to Santarem ; but if you should have
reason to believe that the whole have been taken from Santa-
rem, or that the design to cross the Zezere is manifest, move
your whole force opposite to Abrantes, and encourage Lobo
and the garrison by all means in your power."

The intentions of the enemy not being sufficiently developed,
the utmost caution was not only prudent, but observed by the
allies. It was suspected that the enemy had fallen back to a
position suitable for the junction of expected reinforcements,
and adapted for the reception of an attack from the allies : it
was conjectured that his design was a ruse, to draw the allies
after his retreating columns, and then suddenly to wheel round,
and, with all his strength, strike one great blow upon the posi-
tion of Torres Vedras. This it has been said was highly
improbable ; but judgment may be arrested on that point by the
recollection, that no general had ever experienced a more vexa-
tious disappointment than Massena, by the construction of the
military works at Torres Vedras — that he too was ready to
exclaim, like the mortified British queen, that the name of that
place, before which his high hopes were prostrated, would be

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 495

found engraven on his heart : his confidence had been increased
immeasurably by tlie smiles of fortune, and the impetuosity of
a French army, rendered the speculation by no means impro-
bable ; and, lastly, an attack on Abrantes might have been his
object. For every practicable or possible design, the British
commander was prepared ; he sent forward bold yet cautious
officers, to track the enemy, and feel the way ; while the main
body of the allies retained its impregnable position within the
Lines : Sir Thomas Williams, and Captain Ceresford were
already resting on their oars on the Tagus, waiting the signal
for passing across the troops to defend the Alemtejos ; and every
movement, in the great military scene that was then enacting, was
within the ken, and under the immediate guidance, of the com-
mander-in-chief. Pursuing their retreat, however, in two
columns, the one taking the line of Rio Mayor, the other of
Santarem, the enemy soon convinced Lord W^ellington, by pass-
ing beyond Alcoentre, that they had no intention of setting all
upon the hazard of the die, by making a last desperate assault
upon Torres Vedras. As they had still the control of two bridges
over the Zezere, they might direct their march towards them,
and cross that river, or turn to their left towards the Mondego.
This uncertainty rendered it advisable to harass the enemy's
rear, before the arrival of their expected reinforcements, and the
light division and the cavalry being sent forward, succeeded in
taking four hundred prisoners:* from these, however, no infor-
mation could be obtained, they were sick and weak men, who
had literally been abandoned to their fate, whose number had
been increased by the addition of a marauding party, that was
acting independently of military control, and committing robbe-
ries in the district through which the enemy had just passed.
Reports had so far imposed upon Fane, that he at first assured

• On this occasion " a remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter,
a sergeant of the sixteenth dragoons ; this man having only live troopers, came
suddenly upon a picket of fifty men, who were cooking. The Frenchmen
ran to their arms, and killed one of the dragoons ; but the rest broke in amongst
them so strongly, that Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made
forty-two captives." — I^'^apier's History,

496 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the commander-in-chief, that Massena was in full flight to the
Spanish border, having left only a rear-guard at Santarem to
cover his retreat. Upon this intelligence. Hill was directed
to cross the Tagus, and move upon Abrantes, to give counte-
nance to the defence of that place, in case the enemy should
attack it : or, if they should retire from Portugal through Lower
Beira, that he might annoy them on their retreat. The pursuit
of the enemy was rather slack; the rains that had fallen, after
the fifteenth, destroyed the roads, and filled the rivulets, so
that had expedition been a vital object to the pursuing army, they
would most probably have been frusti'ated. But, however fortune
may have sported with the fate of the allies, the precaution of
their commander was never baffled by her unkindness ; he
pursued slowly, over broken roads, and in tempestuous weather,
an enemy of whose strength and position he was ignorant :
deceived by false intelligence as to their numbers and objects
at Santarem, and elated, possibly, by the triumphant suc-
cess of his great measure for the relief of Portugal, Welling-
ton yet paused before the new position the rear-guard, as he
was assured, had taken up, and, contrary to Fane's advice, from
his own intuitive perception, and with a wariness never to be
surprised, declined attacking the enemy. One who marched
in the columns of the allies on this day describes that burn-
ing desire, which pervades a pursuing army, and so much aug-
ments the difficulty of restraining them, when an opportunity
of assault occurs. " The day was wet and stormy, and the
roads deep and heavy : but our line of march was all gaiety
and animation. To follow up a retreating army is at all times
amusing ; but when you do so for the first time, your curiosity
and pleasure are almost puerile," This feeling it became the
duty of the commander-in-chief to check, from well-founded
suspicions of the truth of his information, and on the nineteenth
he wrote from Cartaxo to General Hill, desiring that he would
proceed no further than Chamusca, until he found that the
enemy were actually passing the Zezere, after which, he thus
explains his own inaction. " I did not attack Santarem this
morning, as the artillery for the left had missed its way ; and

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 497

I am rather glad that I did not make the attack, as the enemy
have there a very strong post, which we must endeavour to turn ;
or, if they have not retired across the Zezere, or towards the
Alva, they must be too strong for us here. 1 believe, however,
I shall attack them to-morrow." The cause of Fane's mistake
was attributable to an error of Massena's, who had suffered
the eighth corps to be removed to a distance of ten miles at
least from Santarem, so that the second corps might have been
cut off by his adversary. Kegnier perceiving the fault which
the commander-in-chief had committed, hastened to apply a
remedy, and, forwarding his baggage and hospitals with the
utmost rapidity to Golegao, and despatching a squadron to
watch the bridges by which he apprehended the allies would
approach, succeeded in correcting the oversight, and deceiving
Fane into the belief that the whole French army were in full
retreat to the frontier.

Santarem is one of those strong positions which are every-
where to be found in a rugged, water-worn region, conferring
little advantage on the occupying army, inasmuch as the adver-
sary can readily find one of equal strength, and only valuable
as an asylum from which ultimately the army may, by stealth
and in darkness, effect its escape. Massena too late, however,
had been instructed by his enemy in this species of manoeu-
vering, and adopted a remedy which was inapplicable to the
ease: retreat, precipitate retreat, held out the only prospect of
relief to his famishing army, while delay was tantamount to a
lingering but certain death. Besides, as delay was the game of
Wellington, it was therefore infatuation of Massena to imitate
or adopt it.

Borrowing the idea of a strengthened position from the
memorable example of Torres Vedras, the French marshal
resolved on taking up the strong ground of Santarem,* and

•Santarem is a large town fourteen leagues from Lisbon, situated upon an
eminence that overlooks a wide plain, much exposed, as well as the lower part
of the town, in winter, to the inundations of the Tagus. A considerable
part of the ancient walls of its citadel, with the additions of Alphonso V'l ,
still remains in good preservation. In the time of the Romans it was named

498 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

awaiting the result of the fortune of war, for certainly no
definite object was then contemplated, with the exception of the
approach of reinforcements, and he had not at that time received
any communication on the subject from Paris. Like Busaco's
stern front, the mural cliffs of Santarem rise perpendicularly
from the banks of the Tagus ; these form a sort of advanced
works to a range of hills that succeeds and commands the Ponte
Seca, a bridge and narrow causeway, half a mile in length,
crossing the Rio Mayor, and the marsh that extends from
that stream to the foot of the rugged hill, and being the only
approach to Santarem from the Lisbon road. The plain at
the foot of Santarem mountains extending to the Tagus, was a
species of moss, intersected by deep drains, and impassable by
any description of troops ; this constituted the defence of the
enemy's left ; the Rio Mayor, with its two branches now swollen
into one great expanse of water, protected his right ; and those
who were bold enough to assault this position were necessarily
confined to the causeway and Ponte Seca. At this point, which
was so easily defended by military means, abattis were con-
structed, and a battery established on a rising ground that swept
the road from end to end. The inclemency of the season, by
swelling the rivers, had increased the natural strength and
security of this position, — a position, the military value of which
Lord Wellington had long before perceived and pointed out to
his officers ; on the 2 1 st of November, in a letter from Cartaxo,
addressed to Mr. Charles Stuart, he says, " the enemy have
a position stronger than Busaco or Sobral," — and so far back
as the tenth of August, 1808, he thus spoke of the same posi-
tion in a communication with Sir Harry Burrard. "The pos-
sibility that in the present state of affairs, the French corps at
this moment in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional

Scalabis, and also Presidium Julium ; and at later periods became the scene of
frequent combats between the Christians and the Moors, and subsequently the
residence of several of the Portuguese sovereigns. It contains a chapter of the
canons of the order of Avis. Its commercial communications with Lisbon are
very important, and form the chief source of its wealth. The village of Rio
Mayor, which is included witliin its jurisdiction, possesses salt-works, while
Azinheira supplies the sur/ounding country with gun-flints. — Kinseys Portugal.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 499

reason for taking tlie position at Santarem, which I apprised
you in my letter of the eighth I should occupy, if the command
of the army were to remain in my hands, after the reinforce-
ments should arrive : if you should occupy it, you will not only
be in the best situation to support my operations, and to cut
off the retreat of the enemy ; but if any reinforcement of
French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best
situatioti to collect your tvliole force to oppose it."

While the judgment of Massena is complimented, by the
acknowledgment that he perfectly comprehended the impor-
tance and valued the strength of this position, it is obviously
not at the expense of Wellington's military reputation : and,
althougli the position was well chosen, it is a matter of doubt
whether he should have halted, or held it beyond the time re-
quired for resting and restoring his famishing legions. " As a
military body," observed Lord Wellington, '' retreat was the
measure most expedient for them to adopt. By a retreat into
Spain, they would — first, have been able to provide their army
with plenty of food during the winter ; — secondly, they would
have been able to put them into good and quiet cantonments ; —
thirdly, they would have been able to provide their numerous
sick with surgeons and medicines, the whole of which they
had lost ; — fourthly, they would have been able to clothe and
re-equip their troops with shoes, and other necessaries, which
they required — fifthly, they must have been perfectly aware
that even should they be of insufficient strength to hope to
make any impression upon the position of the allies in Por-
tugal, they would experience no difficulty in regaining the
position of Santarem from the frontier — sixthly, they must have
been aware that as long as they remained in the country, its
cultivation would be impeded, and that by remaining they cut
up the roots, the resources which were to enable them to
attack the allies upon a future occasion." These reflections,
added to Fane's communication, confirmed the belief that a
rear-guard, the second corps, remained at Santarem, and in-
duced Lord Welhngton to send Hill across tlie Tagus on the
eighteenth, having taken up his own head-quarters at Cartaxo

500 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

on the preceding day. In this state of hesitation, having the
most entire reliance on the honour and hravery of his officers,
j-et from the prescient attribute of his mind, distrusting in some
instances their penetration, WeUington paused before Santa-
rem, and, hke the Roman Caesar, filled up a moment of inac-
tion by adding a new roll to his military memoirs. This im-
portant passage in his autobiography is as free from egotism
as the commentaries of his great predecessor, and not in-
ferior in perspicuity and clearness of manner. " Having
advanced from the positions," said his lordship, " in which I
was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them
to retire without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice
to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, and the officers of the roval
engineers, to draw your lordship's attention to the ability and
diligence with which they have executed the works by which
these positions have been strengthened, to such a degree as
to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied
army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. The enemy's
army may be reinforced, and they may again induce me to
think it expedient, in the existing state of affairs in the Pen-
insula, to resume these positions ; but I do not believe they
have it in their power to bring such a force against us as to
render the contest a matter of doubt. We are indebted for
these advantages to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher and the
officers of the royal engineers, amongst whom I must parti-
cularly mention Captain Chapman, who has given me great
assistance upon various occasions."

On the twenty-second of November, the movements of the
British towards the right of the position of Santarem, occasion-
ing some jealousy on that flank, the enemy brought up a
large body of troops, from the direction of Torres Novas, and
the rear, which drove in the pickets of Major-General Anson's
and Brigadier-General Pack's brigades at the bridge of Cal-
hariz, where they halted, after which the enemy retired in the
night. This affair confirmed the suspicions of the commander-
in-chief, that the numbers posted in Santarem were consider-
able, and that troops were returning to that position from the

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 5Ul

rear, in fact Massena's whole force was between Santarem and
the Zezere. It was now the determination of the British hero
not to depart from his matured system of tactics; all his suspi-
cions had proved correct; his own judgment alone must hence-
forth, as hitherto, support his fortunes. Slow famine and pale
disease had proved irresistible enemies to the French, who
would now, with more willingness, have encountered the point
of the British bayonet; but the calm-judging warrior, on whose
genius and fortune the fate of Europe hung, was immov-
able from his purpose. " I do not," he observed, " propose
to make any movement by which 1 shall incur the risk of
involving the army in a general action, on ground less advan-
tageous than that which I had fixed upon to bring the contest
to that issue. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties
of their situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune
to the allied army : and I should forward their views by placing
the fate of the campaign on the result of n general action, on
ground chosen by them, instead of on that selected by me ;
I therefore propose to continue the operations of the light troops
on the flanks and rear of the enemy's army, and to confine
them as much as possible, but to engage in no serious aflfair
in this part of the countrj', on ground on which the result can
be at all doubtful."

Influenced therefore by so many considerations, — the state of
the weather, the roads, and rivulets; the concentration of the
enemy in the strongest position in Portugal, the risk attend-
ing any attempt, of having some of his detachments insulated
and cut off"; the inferiority in the description of the allied troops
to those of the enemy ; the spirit and meaning of the instructions
received from the secretary at war, with other arguments, Lord
Wellington did not conceive that he would be justified in any
attempt on the French position ; and, therefore, entrenching his
advanced troops in front of Santarem, between the town of Rio
Mayor and the Tagus, fixing head-quarters at Cartaxo, and the
main body in cantonments at Alcoentre, Alemquer, and \'illa
Franca, keeping open a free and unimpeded communication
with all the roads leading to the Lines, between the Monte Junto
II. 3t

50-2 LllH AND CAMPAIGNS OF

and the Tagus, Torres Vedras continuing to be occupied in
strength sufficient to repulse any assault that might be made
from the north front of the Monte Junto, retreat, secure retreat,
and an impregnable asylum, lay always open to the allies.
The works at Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agra^a were still
further strengthened : from the heights of Almada on the south
side of the river, where Lisbon is commanded, as far as Taffrai,
works were throwni up parallel to the shores of the Tagus ;
the towns of Abrantes, Setuval, and Palmella were provisioned,
and the discipline and organization of the native troops almost
hourly improved. During these anxious moments and move-
ments, the British hero knew that the eyes of all Europe were
directed towards him : and however his dignified manner might
have tended to conceal mental anxiety, his portion of personal
suffering must have been such as magnanimity alone could
sustain. It is known that he slept in his clothes, rose at four
in the morning, and one hour after appeared on horseback in
the field, making a visit to the various posts. His example
infused a martial spirit into those that were not within the con-
trol of martial law; and not only the great fortified camp, but
the city of Lisbon itself began to assume a military character.
The British marines garrisoned Lisbon, the Portuguese garrison
having joined the allied army : Romana had arrived within the
Lines, and Cadiz had sent its contribution of men : sailors and
marines had been landed from the fleet, to work the guns on the
batteries: the banks of the Tagus were flanked by armed
launches, supported by seven British sloops of war, while
redoubts on the south side of the river covered the shipping. The
Peninsula near Aldea Gallega and St. Ubes was fortified by
the double lines already noticed, where three thousand British
seamen were placed at the guns. Hill's corps, which had been
passed across the Tagus in boats at Valada, on the eighteenth
of November, under the superintendence of Admiral Sir T.
Williams and Captain Beresford, remained on the left side of
the river, to obstruct any designs of the enemy upon Alemtejo,
and proceeding to Almeyrim, a small town two miles from the
Tagus, and directly opposite to Santarem, there" took up their

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 503

position,* while retreat to his old ground at Alhandra was
always practicable, floating bridges being in constant readiness
on the Tagixs and its tributaries. Between the two great
divisions of the allies the Tagus rolled its ruflled course,
bearing on its agitated surface a British fleet : this proud
armament, under Admiral Berkeley's command, with all the
ardour of JJritish sailors, was ready to co-operate in every or
in any way by which the cause of their country could be
promoted ; always prepared for action, but equally disposed to
transport the brave troops from side to side of the rapid flood,
as occasion might require or necessity demand, so that, although
the army was divided by the intervening river, the power of
concentration was always retained.

Notwithstanding this grand spectacle of a fortified country,
the whole area between the sea and the Taf?us beinsr a continued

• A niilelrom Alineyrini, embosomed among tress, but commanding a fine view
of the towns and buildings of Upper Santarem, stood a beautiful quinta, in his
happier and innocent days the residence of the Marquis d' Alorna, a nobleman
of Portugal, once a general in her armies, but one who, deceived or corrui)icd by
the French, had lied his country, openly espoused their cause, and had now return-
ed as the guide andcounsellorof their legions. This miserable man was for three
months resident (with Massena's army) in Santarem ; a town in which he had
often, no doubt, been greeted with affection and respect by a smiling and a happy
population, but where his eye now encountered, on every side, the glance of sus-
picion, contempt, or indignation from foreigners, who, notwithstanding their own
bold and hnvless aggressions, may sometimes reverence the patriot who opposes
them, but will ever distrust and despise the very traitor who serves them. The
quinta d' Alorna was at this time occupied by servants who held it for the
crown, and the peasantry represented the marquis as a kind lundlord, a tender
husband and father. VVliat must such a man have felt, when from the wuulow
of his cheerless billet, he looked down upon his family mansion, and knew that
he was banished from it for ever ? I can hardly imagine to myself a situation
more painful ; he must have regarded the quinta as a fearful monument of days
of peace gone by for ever ; as the tomb of his honour and hajipincss, the grave
of all his hopes. " Of all criminals, I look upon the traitor as one whose
punishment in this life is most certain ; for it is a punishment which the smiles
of fortune or of power can neither avert nor soften ; it is a restless poison of
the mind, an ever-aching void in the desolate and lonely heart ; kindred,
friendship, love, all cast from their blessed bosoms the wretch who has be-
trayed his co\intry.''—I{rcollcclio>is of the Pnthisula. To tliis just censure of the
crime ot treason, every honest bosom yields iisscut; but Alorna's apostasy admits
of palliation, vide vol ii. page 400.

.004 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

camp, Torres Vedras retained its pre-eminence as the entrance
to the sanctuary, within which the retreating army or fugitive
people might find an asylum under the most adverse fortune.

Torres Vedras, the Turres fieteres of the Romans, who
fixed a seat of government here, is of insignificant extent, en-
compassing the- summit of a steep hill, crowned by the frag-
ments of an ancient castle. The interior does not correspond
with the idea formed from a distant view, yet it is still the
chief place of a district. The low country in its vicinity is
cultivated, and abounds with orchards and vineyards ; sand-hills
and pine-woods appear on ofie side, grey limestone cliffs with
hanging trees upon the other. Thermal springs gush up at
the foot of the mountains ; and, if industry prevailed here,
bituminous coal might be raised in abundance.*

The position of Santarem is said to have been skilfully
chosen, — but could it have been overlooked by an experienced
general ? It has been shown that Wellington was as familiar
with its military advantages as with those of Torres Vedras ;
and in later years here Don Miguel, the usurper, lay for some
time encamped ; and so far was Massena from having deceived,
surprised, or disappointed the British general by entrenching
himself in this inaccessible spot, that his stratagem had been
foreseen by that able officer, who thus alludes to it in a letter of
the fifteenth of November, addressed to General Fane : ' There
is still a chance that the enemy may take up, and tr?/ to keep^
a position at Santarem, endeavouring to keep his rear open,
and his communication with Ciudad Rodigo across the Zezere.
However, this ought not to alter your measures." Three dis-
tinct lines of defence were to be broken in, before the French
could be assaulted in their citadel, which was itself capable of

* At Torres Vedras there is a fortress of considerable extent on a hill over-
hanging the town, which marks it as having been a place of no little import-
tance during the time of the Moors ; but some vestiges of Roman workman-
ship, which appear among its ruins, establish its claim to higher antiquity.
The eminence on which this fortress is constructed, round a mound, is a
singular feature in the landscape ; unconnected, isolated, it presents the appear-
ance of an artificial mount raised above the plain for the purpose of defence.
Bradford's Narrative and Kinsey's Portugal.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 505

offering resistance ; and Massena's front at least was secure
from attack ; the second corps was spread over the flat country
in the vicinity of Golegao : Loisson's division observing the
Tagus, and maintaining a communication with Punhete, where
they had a strong post ; the eight corps was disposed with its
right at Alcanhete, its centre at Pernes, and its left thrown
back on Torres Novas, the head-quarters of the enemy ;
beyond Alcanhete the cavalry extended itself towards Leiria ;
the reserve, sixth corps, being stationed at Thomar. Massena
spread his army, but securely, over a surface large enough to
furnish him with supplies, and in the country eastward of
Santarem, vegetables, cattle, reaped corn, and maize upon the
stalk, were obtained ; the inhabitants, encouraged by Souza and
the Patriarch, dechning to comply with the proclamation of
Lord Wellington. These trifling supplies ministered to the
wants of the enemy for awhile, and enabled their commander
to continue and complete his plans of securing a communica-
tion with Coimbra, of keeping open a retreat on Spain by
means of his bridges over the Zezere, of commencing offensive
operations on his right, by turning the position of the Monte
Junto, or of attempting the passage of the Tagus on the left
To these specious pretexts for continuing at Santarem, may
be added the still more visionary view which French historians
add, namely, that while Massena held this position, Lisbon
must be considered as in a state of siege, which every day's pro-
traction rendered more and more calamitous. But foreijzn
writers do more justice to the memory of Massena, by attri-
buting his obstinate tenure of Santarem not to his strategic
acquirements, but rather to his political speculation and jud fo-
ment. He was aware that the opposition party in England were
watching any false step of Wellington, as a pica for pouncing
on places of political power; this necessarily rendered that care-
ful general still more cautious, and less willing to hazard the
chances of a battle. Massena might, perhaps ought, to have
attacked the allies, his loss would have been quickly repaired;
if Wellington suffered a repulse, the Lines might have been
entered, Lisbon besieged, the opposition party thereby brought

50G LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

into ofTico, whose first act would have been the withdrawal
of the army from the Peninsula. The state of the king's
health gave new hopes to the opposition, and augmented the
difficulties of Wellington's position: the prince regent had,
from his earliest years, associated with some of the most learned
and accomplished men of his age, who all happened to be of
what was called the liberal party ; it was a natural and reason-
able presumption, that, on his accession to power, he would not
have forsaken the friends of his youth, especially as they were in
the possession of eminent talents. Massena, who was furnished
with accurate information of affairs in England by the opposition
journals, and of the movements of the allied ai-my by spies and
traitors, circulated a report that George III. was dead; the late
Prince of Wales seated on the British throne ; the advocates
of freedom in England become ministers of state — whence he
argued, that he, whom the veteran soldiers of France, led on by
the most fortunate generals of that military nation, were unable
to subdue, would at length be overborne, in an unnatural combat
with his own countrymen, and that his recall might be looked
for every hour. To this prospect of discomfiture, arising from
England, Massena added the expectation that the Patriarch
would so materially obstruct the measures recommended for
the defence of Lisbon, that the British general would either
become disgusted, or rendered unpopvdar with the Portuguese
nation. It was on these, and similar political grounds, that
Massena rested his chief hopes of being ultimately able to enter
Lisbon, and repay, with plunder, the services and the sufferings
of his soldiers. He had still another hope to cling to, should
political speculation prove abortive, — that was, the arrival
of reinforcements, in time sufficient to undertake offensive
operations with some prospect of success. Gardanne, who
had entered Portugal on the fourteenth of November,
acted a culpable part : at first he moved on the frontier, then
returned to Sobreira Formosa, and again resuming his route,
entered Spain. He was accompanied by five thousand men,
and a convoy from Ciudad Rodrigo, and crossing the frontier,
reached Cardegos, only three leagues from the French army.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 507

Harassed by the Ordenanzas in his advance, who retook from
him some prisoners, and followed by Lieutenant-Colonel the
Hon. F. Ponsonby, on a reconnoissance from Abrantes to the
river Codes, who ascertained that the enemy had made very
particular inquiries respecting the position of Hill's corps, and
the means which the allies possessed of crossing the Tagus at
Abrantes ; and, having been falsely informed by their prisoners,
that General Hill was preparing to move against them, they
commenced their march from Cardegos towards the Codes in
the morning ; thence retired about eleven with great precipita-
tion, and continued their retreat in the same manner till they
reached the frontier. They were followed by the Ordenanzas,
who not only did them much mischief, but took a great part of
their baggage; and so much were they harassed by this
irregular corps, that they destroyed all the horses and mules
that could not keep up with them: in short, their march, if it
had been ordered by superior authority, and was connected
with any other arrangements, presented every appearance, and
was attended with all the consequences, of a forced retreat.

The main body of the enemy continued at Santarem, with-
out making any new demonstration, up to the fifteenth of
December, with the exception of sending a detachment of four
regiments towards Coimbra, where they were baffled by the
activity of Trant, who had left BaccUar in possession of that
place. — Still expectations were entertained, hopes fondly
cherished, of aid from the ninth corps under Drouet ; reports
were rife that Massena designed to move on Oporto, that
large reinforcements were advancing ; and the building of
boats at Santarem, to increase the fleet at Punhete and
Barquinha, implied prospective activity on both banks of the
Tagus. The duty of Drouet was inadequately performed,
his connexion with JNIassena lost, a division of his corps,
harassed by the guerillas, and advancing in connexion with
Gardannes, was defeated with loss by Silveira, who immediately
after formed a junction with Miller.* Gardannes pursued his

• Wlicii the disposition was formed for the defenre of Portiip^iil, the troops of
the line, and the British troops, wore brought to the most vulnerable points

508 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

route, however, until he encountered Colonel Ponsonby and
a party of the Ordenanza. On the fifteenth, the reinforce-
ment under Drouet crossed the Coa at Almeida, and moved into
Upper Beira by the roads of Pinhel, Trancoso, Alverca, and
Celerico. I'his was something of a forward movement, but
the whole force, which included Gardanne's division, and the
whole of the ninth corps, did not exceed fifteen thousand men ;
advancing at a tardy pace, they reached Maceira, in the valley
of the Mondego, on the twenty-second, and two days after
arrived at Leiria, from whence their march to join on the right
flank of the army remained unobstructed, Wilson feeling the ne-
cessity of avoiding an encounter with the ninth corps. General
Silveira had retired with his division of troops to Moimenta de
Beira, but Miller, Wilson, and himself were always in readiness
to act across the Mondego upon the flanks and rear of the
enemy. To cover his advance, and keep open a line of retreat,
Drouet had left Claparede at Guarda ; this opportunity tempted
Silveira, a brave but vain soldier, to aspire to new laurels by
cutting off the rear-guard of the enemy. His attempt, which
completely failed at Trancoso, did not deter him from a
second rash assault, which ended more fatally, as well as by his
being driven across the Douro. These failures, by which the road
to Oporto was left unguarded, alarmed Bacellar, and he now
called in his troops, kept them more concentrated, allowing
Wilson to follow, and hang on Claparede's rear. This was
the most brilliant era in the military history of these brave
fellows, whose active and serviceable co-operation received
a check from Providence, by the sudden death of Miller at

between tlie Douro and the Tagus, and to the south of the Tagus. The
northern provinces were entrusted to the northern militia, about fifteen thou-
sand in number, which were the best in Portugal ; and they were distributed into
three divisions, one under General Silveira, another under General Miller, and
a third under Colonel Trant, each division being aided by a body of regular
cavalry and artiller)', and the whole under the command of General Bacellar.
When the enemy's attack upon Portugal was decided between the Douro and
the Tagus, these corps all crossed the Douro, and continued in various com-
munications, but the defence of the northern provinces was the principal
object. — Wellington Despatches, note to Mem. of Operations in 1810.

THE DUKi: 01- WEI.I,L\(/ruX. 601)

Viseu, which no defeat or repulse from the enemy coultl have
exceeded in poignancy of feehng.

In Estremadura, Mendizabel and Ballasteros obtained some
slight advantage over a division of Mortier's corps which was
stationed at Llerena, and obliged it to retire with loss upon
Guadalcanal. Reports reached Lord Wellington, at the same
time, that Mortier had received instructions from Paris to
effect a junction with Massena. No matter what truth the
report conveyed, it afforded an excellent opportunity for urging
the reluctant ministry at home to send out timely aid. " I
have heard," observed Lord Wellington to the Earl of Liver-
pool, "that General Foy has passed through Madrid on his way
to Andalusia with orders for Soult. If this be true, it is pro-
bable that Mortier's corps, or even more troops, are directed
to co-operate with Massena. I do not mind even that reinforce-
ment : but, as I believe you have some regiments of infantry
in readiness to reinforce us, I think you will do well to send
them out."

The ignorance in which Massena and Soult were kept, reci-
procally, as to each other's instructions, designs, or operations,
was extraordinary, and the emperor is supposed to have been
unacquainted with Massena's difficulties until the arrival of
Foy in Paris.* This inconvenience was the natural conse-
quence of the rapacity, and system of pillage, by which the
armies of Portugal and Andalusia were maintained : as they
acted the part of robbers, every man became their natural foe ;
and any messenger attempting to pass between their armies,
lost his despatches, his liberty, and, too often, his life also. On

• General Foy lias published ahistorj' of the Peninsular War, which attracted
much attention amongst his countr}-men, and, on bis arrival in Paris from the
scene of operations, inserted various accounts in the Monitcur relative to the
conduct of his fellow-soldiers and the dispositions of the British army. "In
these statements," observes Lord Londonderry, " I can by no means concur ; for
example, he assured the French public, that whilst multitudes daily came over
from our camp, the crime of desertion was lianlly known in the PVench army :
whereas the returns in my possession distinctly pro\e that we took in no
fewer than seven hundred and thirty-three deserter* in the rourte of three
months."

II. G U

510 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

the twenty-first of December, Lord Wellington thus writes on
this remarkable fact to the secretary at war. "It is certainly
astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this
country so long, and it is an extraordinary instance of what a
French army can do. It is positively a fact, that they brought
no provisions with them, and they have not received even a
letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and
having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I
assure you that I could not maintain one division in the dis-
trict in which they have maintained not less than sixty thou-
sand men, and twenty thousand animals, for more than two
months. This time last year, I was obliged to move the British
cavalry only, from the district they now occupy with their whole
arm}^, because it could not be subsisted, hut they take every-
thing^ mid leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.^'

The French had now retired from Torres Vedras, and par-
tially demonstrated the efficacy of Wellington's system of war-
fare ; Lisbon was unapproachable from any side by an enemy,
but open towards the sea, for the admission of reinforcements
and supplies. The Spaniards began to doubt the invincibility of
the French, and expose their own lives, even too daringly, against
their regular masses. But the long continuance of the war, its
tedious character, the infrequent opportunities of winning new
laurels, tried the temper, and almost the health, of the British
officers, and several of the most meritorious applied for leave
of absence. Foremost on the list was one, the loss of whose
services was much felt and regretted. General Hill had been
placed in a separate command on the left bank of the Tagus,
and Lord Wellington had uniformly relied upon his good
temper and admirable judgment ; length of service, severity of
weather, and an insalubrious situation induced fever and ague,
against which he vainly struggled at his quarters in Chamusca.
Being conveyed to Lisbon, he landed at the square, so weak
that he was unable to walk without assistance, and, supported
by two officers, tottered to a chamber of sickness. Several other
general officers laboured under indisposition, and also pleaded for
relaxation, but their claims and their cases shall be considered

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 511

together, at the period when their number and frequency
seemed to call for public inquiry. The infirmity of General
Hill began to assume an alarming character, Major-General
the Hon. C. Stewart was directed to undertake the command.
This brave soldier, distrusting in some degree the practica-
bility and success of some of the measures entrusted to his
activity, at Hill's departure communicated his feelings to Lord
Wellington, who immediately appointed Sir W. Bercsford to
assume the command of the troops on the left bank, of the
Tagus, until General Hill's health should be sulficiently re-
established to enable him to resume that duty;" but that
event was reserved by Providence for a period much more dis-
tant than the great chieftain had supposed, for General Hill
was obliged to seek for the blessings of invigorated health in
the more variable climate of his native country.

During the months of November and December in the year
1810, the rancour of party in England appeared to have
attained its climax : no assertions were too daring, or in fact too
false, for those who aimed at the possession of political power,
and no demonstrations proved sufficiently convincing, if urged
by those whose crime was the enjoyment of office. As Great
Britain was involved in war, our foreign policy constituted the
most prominent political feature, was the everlasting object at
which all arguments were levelled ; and, as the success of our
arms could alone redeem the measures of ministers, Lord Wel-
lington became the principal, the sole object of vituperation, by
those journals which then supported the opinions of the opposi-
tion. The wise judgment of Lord Wellington, upon that abuse
of the liberty of the press which put the enemy in possession of the
weakness of our army, has been already remarked, but his calm
forbearance, under such repeated personal assaults, by the most
powerful journal of that day in England, deserves to be pointed
out for imitation. When it was the bounden duty of every loyal,
every generous Briton, to have encouraged their gallant country-
man, whom, had he fallen then, they would have immortalized by
their griefs, the opposition affected to disbelieve the contents of
his despatches, of which time has since established the truth and

51-2 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

value; and where even specious reasoning could not be advanced,
they directed the shafts of ridicule. " The narratives of Count
Ugolino," observed the organ of the party, "are trifles to the
gift of starving possessed by Massena and his followers. He
displayed this talent for starving in no common degree at
Genoa, but he has fully demonstrated his powers of abstinence
in Portugal." Again, on the twenty-sixth of November, the fol-
lowing invidious paragraph appeared in the same journal, "The
private advices we have received bring intelligence two days
later than the public despatches, and from these we infer that
the French are not so destitute of provisions as has been re-
presented, and that they are throwing up works in their rear,
apparently for the more convenient occupation of the ground
they possess, during the winter." This intelligence, if ever
received, must necessarily have been derived from the enemy,
for, the fact of the distress which the French endured was
known to every soldier in the allied army : the deserters from
the enemy's ranks conveyed the knowledge.

Had the editor of the celebrated liberal journal, that pleaded
the cause of liberty so loudly, been bought with the gold of the
enemy, like the traitorous orator at Athens, he could not have
espoused the cause of Massena and of France more warmly
ihan the following extracts from his political essays testify. " As
to Lord Wellington's despatches, we feel bound to point out
the palpable absurdities which it would be serviceable to his
fame to refute. We shall most unfeignedly rejoice, if he shall
triumph over iha redoubted Massena ; but with such a general
opposed to him, we cannot take glaring absurdities for proofs of
advantage : nor agree, even at the call of ministers, "to halloo
until we are out of the wood." Another extract goes to con-
tradict, in the most direct manner, an assertion of Wellington,
which time alone could have established or refuted. "The
public now begin to perceive the resources of Massena. He
is no longer confined to the ground his army occupies ; he has
the fertile and untouched province of Beira open to him, and
may now keep his position for the winter." A moment con-
science-stricken, this willing worker of so much mischief, ac-

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 513

knowledges a qiiabn, and thus defends himself against a writer
of less genius, but more integrity. "The ^ Siui' charges us
with exultation in the disastrous aspect of our affairs in Por-
tugal. The imputation is unmerited, for none can feel more
sensibly than we do the predicament into which so many gal-
lant men are brought, by the unwise prosecution of a scheme
inconsistent with our means and our character as a maritime
nation. We have, from the commencement, deplored the ex-
pedition, and feel no pleasure in the verification of our prophe-
cies— all that we now pray for is, that our eyes may at length
be opened to the true policy which we ought to pursue — that
of retrieving our finances, and employing our resources in ob-
jects truly British." The preceding paragraph had just been
given to the public, under the especial patronage of a British
duke, when intelligence arrived of the retreat of Massena, and
advance of Wellington, indisputable evidence of the veracity of
Lord Wellington's unvarnished despatches, upon which the
following was the ingenious, but not ingenuous commentary of
the despondents. "He (Massena) has put himself in an
entrenched position and has drawn the enemy out of theirs ;
he has separated, and consequently weakened, Lord Wellin"'-
ton's army, and the whole may be a feint, to bring the allies to
a battle."*

As the year 1810 waned, the virulence of the anti- Wellington
party seemed rather to acquire additional venom ; the successes
of the hero lashed them to madness, and in a frenzied fit, on the
very last day of the year, the following announcement appeared
in the columns of England's Buonapartist journal. " Lord
Burghersh has arrived with despatches, and we have reason to

• Amongst other evidences of bad taste exhibited by the organ of the opposi-
tion, that of pointing to provincial distinctions and superiority, was not the
least remarkable. Speaking of the ofTicers who distinguished themselves in
this inauspicious campaign, the leading journal of the despondents observed,
" It must be a singular gratification to the natives of Ireland, that among the
officers that have distinguished themselves in Portugal, they reckon among their
countrymen, Lord Wellington, Marshal Bercsford, Sir 13. Si)cnccr, General
Cole, (ieneral Stewart, Lord Aylmer, General Pack, General Cox, Colonels
Pakcnham, Hoarh, Doyle, M'Crcigh, &c.''

014 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

believe that Lord WcU'mgton is noiu convinced of the utter
impriHtkahilitii of the objects of the expedition^ This decla-
ration was the suggestion of the despondents' evil genius, who
was at length disgusted with the wickedness of her disciples, for
just one month before, the same British iEschines had con-
fessed, and published that confession, " that those accounts
of Lord JFellington were written in the implicit belief of
ultimate success." Other journals, imitating the great original,
followed in the same path of private calumny and public mis-
chief, but their reasonings and reputations have sunk in the
stream of history, while the extracts here presented, from the rank
of the parties to whom the authorship belongs, may, and will
doubtless float still nearer to that vast ocean where all that's
worthless shall ultimately perish. With one more remarkable
excerptum from the splenetic attacks of party upon the great-
est hero that Great Britain has ever produced, the domestic
notices of the year 1810 must be concluded ; it is a paragraph
so personal, so pointed, and such a recapitulation of their
special pleading to detract from the individual, that it is inse-
parably associated with the biography of our hero.

" Whether Lord Wellington shall remain in his present
quarters at Cartaxo, or return to his former position at Torres
Vedras, is of little consequence. He will remain inactive at
the one place or the other, until it shall be convenient for the
enemy to renew the campaign ; unless, indeed, it may be
dreamt, that we may even yet look to some fortunate chance
that may turn the tide of affairs in our favour. That there
are men who still flatter themselves with some happy incident
that may trample down the conqueror and tyrant of Europe —
some resurrection of spirit in France itself, or the humbled
countries around it — we have no doubt, for their whole conduct
seems marked by the insanity which trusts to improbable and
miraculous interference. We seem, as a nation, to have shut
our eyes to the just contemplation of the course we are pur-
suing, and to strive only to preserve the delusion in which we
delight. It is afflicting to read in the journals devoted to
ministry, the pains that are taken to inveigh against all

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 515

endeavours to enlighten the public on this subject. The love
of military expeditions, and of creating a military power, has
absorbed in some minds all other passions, and every thing
has been sacrificed to its expression and fatal gratification.
We fear that no warning and no calamity are sufficient to arrest
our career ; though every calm observer is convinced that we
are driving headlong to national ruin."

Of the conduct of political parties in the Peninsula, it will
be necessary to speak more at length at a subsequent period,
when the effects of their measures shall have begun to operate
upon the military policy of Lord Wellington ; here it will be
sufficient to observe, that while the political writers in England
were detracting from Wellington's character as a man of genius,
policy, and wisdom, the supporters of the cortes were endea-
vouring to diminish the actual strength of his army, by abstract-
ing the corps of Komana, and bringing that body of men to
Cadiz. The absurd pomp with which this vapouring senate
was called together, their extravagant and unsupported pre-
tensions, had early excited the contempt of Lord Wellington,
and, too bold to dread their anger, too noble to mystify his
sentiments, he openly expressed his total want of confidence
in that body, and deprecated, at that period, their impolitic
interference in his military measures. The cortes had in-
sidiously attempted to exercise a sovereign authority over
llomana, to control his movements, and bring his corps into
Cadiz as their life-guard. Lord Wellington opposed this
unwise step in a decided and successful manner: his lordship
considered that the measure of calling llomana to Cadiz, was
founded upon domestic, political expediency, rather than upon
military necessity ; and, as he was aware that the soldiers of
that corps, although possessed of strong personal attachment
to their brave general, could not be depended upon in a con-
test between him and the people of Cadiz, or a popular
assembly, he looked upon the experiment as highly dangerous.
It was pretended that the object of calling llomana's corps to
Cadiz, was to silence " les hruileurs" by their presence : but to

510 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF

this Lord Wellington replied, " If it is supposed that the cortes
are doing mischief, (of which I acknowledge that I have long had
no doubt, and am convinced that they have done no good,) the
best mode of providing a remedy for that mischief, is to keep
such men as the Marquess de la Romana, and the Catalonian
O'Donnell, and their armies, clear of the influence of that body,
and of the intrigues which must always prevail, more or less?
at the place in wliich they are assembled. At all events, I am
of opinion that the Marquess de la Romana, and his troops,
can do no good in Cadiz, and that they may be entirely
destroyed there, if they attempt to interfere with the cortes :
and that in the mean time the absence of the marquess from
this part of the Peninsula will be a fatal blow to the cause
of the allies."

When Wellington declared that the withdrawal of Romana
from that part of the Peninsula must prove fatal to the allies,
how dimly did he see into events beyond the grave ! Romana
was soon to be called away from the theatre of this world,
leaving to history another great, ennobled, honourable name,
which his countrymen will do well to imitate, when an
enemy shall carry desolation into her fertile fields. In the
month of January, 181 1, this brave soldier, while in quarters at
Cartaxo, was suddenly seized with spasms in the chest, and,
after a few days of painful suffering, expired on the twenty-
third of that month. That Lord Wellington was sincere in his
expressions, as to the loss the cause would have sustained by
the removal of Romana to Cadiz, is confirmed by his regret at
the death of so gallant a brother soldier. "His loss," said his lord-
ship, " is irreparable under existing circumstances. I know
not how he can be replaced, and we may expect that it will be
followed by the fall of Badajoz." When Mendizabel was
appointed to the vacant command, Lord Wellington seized on
the opportunity thus afforded of relieving his mind from its
weight of anguish, by making that gallant officer a participator in
his feelings. " You will, Sir," writes the hero, " have been made
acquainted with the irreparable loss sustained by the Spanish

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 517

army, by your country, and the world, by the unexpected
death of the Marquess de la Kornana,* after a short illness.
1 have lost a colleague, a friend, and an adviser, with whom
I have lived on the happiest terms of friendship, intimacy, and
confidence ; and / sluiU revere (mil regret his memory to the
last moment of my existence." The affectionate regard which
Lord Wellington entertained for the noble patriot, who had
fallen so unexpectedly into an early grave, was the result of a
long acquaintance with his many virtues ; and he was always
60 fidly impressed with the excellence of Ilomana's character,
that he had repeatedly eulogized him in his public despatches,
and as frequently mentioned him with the warmth of friendship,
in his private communications. The power that inflicted this
loss upon the defender of the liberties of Europe was almighty,
irresistible, omniscient, and the great man bowed before
it with resignation; but against the multitude of obstacles
which the intrigues, jealousies, ingratitude of those who had been

• Don Pedro Caro y Siireda, Marquess de la Romana, was a native of the
island of Majorca, and bom at Pa) main, in 17G2; he was a grandee of Spain
by descent, and by services, grand cross of the royal Spanish order of Charles
tlie third, and captain-general of the Spanish armies. After an education
suitable to his birth, during which he made a rapid progress in languages, and
became intimately acquainted with classics ; euuilous of his father's glory, who
fell in the expedition against the Algerines, in 1775, be commenced a military
life in the marine guards of the royal Spanish navy, in which he served initil the
war that followed the French revolution, having obtained the command of a
frigate. At this time, however, he exchanged into the land-service, and was
api)ointed a colonel in the army of Navarre, then commanded by his uncle.
Lieutenant-general Don Ventura Caro. His eminent abilities soon recom-
mended him to his country, and in 1801 he was made captain-general of
Catalonia, and president of the Audiencia of that province, in which situation
he found many op])ortunities of displaying his extensive learning and souiul
political views. The fame he acquired in tliis office, led to his elevation to
that of director-genenil of engineers, and counsellor at war. When Napoleon
had matured his plan for the usurpation of the Spanish throne, he seduced
Romana from his country, and sent him to the north of Europe; ostensibly in
ail honourable military service, but his real o))ject was the removal of that able
and honest soldier from the vicinity of his unjust aggression upon his country.
From this period the biography of Romana is inseparable from that of the great
man who honoured him with his friendshi]) while living, and \\ ho clierishcd
his memory with the fondest regard, ^'ide p. 127 and 184. vol. i.

II. 3 X

518 LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS, &c:

created free, and whose actions, therefore, were within their
own control, he offered a resistance that has conferred im-
mortahty upon his character, for wisdom, temper, and firmness.
Had he fled from the legions of Massena, dishonour would have
marked his name; had he failed in moral courage to oppose
the intrigues of the cortes, or patiently to endure the taunts
of the despondents, his lot would, if possible, have been more
deplorable; and, had he felt too keenly the privations to which
Providence had subjected him, by the premature fall of his
gallant associate, he would have violated the spirit of that pure
faith which constituted his best inheritance. Equal to the
occasion, he displayed a daring front to the foe ; he heard heed-
lessly, the idle criticism of disappointed statesmen, and main-
tained his equanimity and firmness, until he extorted their
reluctant approbation from one party, while the other became a
fatal illustration of the greatness of his military views. Having
driven Soult from Oporto, with circumstances as honourable to
himself as inglorious to his adversary ; having converted the
wild hordes of Portuguese peasantry into well-trained bands;
having inflicted severe and memorable disgrace upon the arms
of France, in the hard-fought field of Talavera, and shed fresh
lustre over the name of Britain, by a splendid display of
genius and bravery in the defence of Busaco ; having es-
tablished for ever the military reputation of his country, by the
scientific lines of Torres Vedras ; and, lastly, having triumphed
over the most formidable opponent in the civilized world —
opinion, public opinion — by firmly persevering in a deliberate
system of destroying his enemy, he had the gratification of
beholding " the favourite child of victory" hastening back
ingloriously to the Spanish frontier, as the last winter's sun
of the year 1810 shed its fading rays upon the Peninsula.

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON: FISHER, & CO. PRINTEKS.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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