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LIFE OF

General George Gordon Meade

LIFE OF

General George Gordon Meade

COMMANDER OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Richard Meade Bache

ILLUSTRATED WITH PORTRAITS AND MAPS

Veritas, visft et morft; falsa, festinatione et incertis valescunt. — ^TAarus.

PHILADELPHIA

HENRY T. COATES & CO.
1897

lo, i ■ /,ZfZ. I^f A

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PREFACE.

It should be obvious that I cannot fitly portray General
Meade's character and work without evidencing that I
knew him personally, and without so speaking. The duty
assigned me would be additionally difficult if I should not
only be hampered by a supposed necessity of circumlocu-
tion in referring to him, but in referring to other sources of
my knowledge. I therefore purpose, in the reader's interest
as much as in my own, to avoid these difficulties by direct-
ness of statement upon the basis of what is for the most
part extant evidence. The explanatory background might
form the subject of voluminous notes, or would by its intro-
duction in the main text serve to dam the current of the
narrative ; but being in either case equally objectionable,
both of these alternatives are rejected in favor of the one
here described and adopted. At the same time it is incum-
bent upon me to declare explicitly of General Meade, as
one of the sources of my knowledge, that whatever I have
to say regarding his civil life is derived from my own
observation and family knowledge, but that, as to his mili-
tary life, as circumscribed by the limits of the Civil War, I
have no information whatever as given by him to me per-
sonally. General Meade is therefore not to be held respon-
sible for the opinions here expressed with reference to the

(iii)

iv PREFACK

events of the war, except in so far as his acts made him re-
sponsible, rightly or wrongly, for my own conclusions. I
do not remember ever having asked him a question about
the war, or his ever having volunteered to speak of it, or
having spoken of it to me. My action was brought about
by my observation, that every quid nunc seemed disposed
to bore him with questions about military matters, and by
the fact that I felt great regard for the rest to which I
thought him entitled after the troublous associations of the
times. Doubtless, I could have learned much from him,
had I so desired, for he was always frankly expansive in
his talks with me, and often, after his death, I regretted that
I had not sometimes taken opportunities to learn much that
would have been interesting. But when, in the course of
time, I came to be confronted with the duty of writing a
memoir of him, I rejoiced that there was nothing in my
possession of testimony of his to me, regarding his relation
to the war, to be drawn upon for my work. Thus both he
and I have escaped suspicion of the introduction of at least
direct bias in what I have said.

It becomes necessary for me, for self-protection, in writing
this memoir, to include a statement without which I should
place myself in a false position, through omitting mention of
action over which I had no control. When, some years ago,
I wrote the article, " George Gordon Meade and Family,"
for Appleton*s Cyclopaedia, an interpolation, unauthorized
by me, was made in it regarding the battle of Gettysburg,
including the statement that General Meade had neglected
to occupy Little Round Top. As I was not in any way re-

PREFACE. V

sponsible for this interpolation, I repudiated it as soon as it
came to my knowledge, upon which the Messrs. Appleton
promised that in future editions of the Cyclopaedia my name
as the author of the article should be omitted. I have
therefore since then regarded the matter as finally closed,
and here make mention of it only for the imperative reason
assigned.

Lest a doubt may arise in the minds of some persons as
to whether recollections which revert to seven years of age
are trustworthy, it should be remarked that that depends
upon idiosyncrasy. Records show that, in certain cases,
accurate memory of events of a simple order has reached
three or four years anterior to the period mentioned. I
know a person who, when a boy of five years of age, was
carried one night to a window, whence he was shown the
aurora-borealis, which, in after years, he declared, amid the
jeers of his companions, to have been pink. He grew up,
however, to learn from scientific statistics that his percep-
tion had not been at fault, for the aurora of the date cor-
responding with his age at that time is noted as pink. I
shall not therefore shrink, when I could add to this mention
of the early recollections of John Stuart Mill and others,
from speaking Math confidence of things which first ap-
peared upon my mental horizon at seven years of age.

I was, for two years of the war, through surveying for
defensive works, and engagement in some cognate matters,
associated with military operations ; have been intimately
connected in and outside of my family with men of both
branches of the military service ; and have also been some-

VI PREPACK

what of a student all my life of military afiairs. These ex-
periences constitute in sum the modest claim that I make
to be able to speak with some authority in a memoir which
is necessarily military.

As some readers may, I know, ask themselves why, al-
though General Meade was not present at the first battle of
Bull Run, an account of it is introduced in this work (for
the question has already been propounded by a person who
knew of what the manuscript consisted), I may be per-
mitted here to anticipate any similar enquiry. Regarding
completeness in this case from an historic point of view, one
must, to secure it, put oneself in the position of the general
reader, of individuals of new adult generations, and of the
present generation of youth, to perceive with these how
imperfect would be their grasp of the sequence of events
concerned, if an account of the first battle of Bull Run
were omitted from a history of the great conflict of the
Civil War. The War in the East of the United States
may be truly regarded as one great drama, to which the
simultaneous action in the West stands in a more or less
subsidiary relation. To omit the first great scene of its
campaigns, whether or not it should be regarded as an epi-
sode of a part, or of the whole, of the gigantic struggle,
because, with one exception, the principal actor in them had
not up to that time appeared upon the boards, would be a
violation of dramatic proprieties. The omission of the first
great battle of any war would be a serious blemish in an
account of it, and in this case peculiarly so, for the result
of the first battle of Bull Run which, in the day of its occur-

PREFACE. vii

rence, was naturally looked upon as an unmitigated disaster,
ought now clearly to be recognized as having been a bless-
ing in disguise. The preliminary movements and the battle
itself conclusively proved for the first time to the North the
determination and momentarily military superiority of the
South. Had victory in that first contest been with the
North, it could but have had the evil effect of increasing a
confidence there which needed dissipating by comprehen-
sion of the fact that the South was in deadly earnest, backed
by military ability and perfect faith in success, and that the
struggle upon which it had entered with the North was in-
tended to be A outrance. The result of the battle did, as
nothing else could have accomplished it, arouse to that
knowledge, although with lingering inappreciation of the
degree of force needed to meet the emergency ; and this it
was that first braced the intention of the North adequately,
even if still imperfectly as to means devised, to meet with
equal determination the danger with which the life of the
nation was menaced. Lastly, I may say, there is a sub-
sidiary, but important reason why an account of the first
battle of Bull Run should be here presented, as related not
less to the whole war than to its vicissitudes in the East. It
is because this account puts the responsibility for the loss
of the battle where it belongs, where justice proclaims that
it shall be placed, and not where it is, even at this late day,
popularly laid.

No one, as a contemporary, can hope to write for con-
temporaries the history of even a single operation of any
contemporaneous war without running counter to both

VIII PREFACR

prejudices and well-grounded opinions as to many pomts.
I therefore do not expect to escape the fate of any one who
has attempted or ever shall attempt a task similar to mine.
All that any honest historian has, under such circumstances,
the right to deprecate, in the interest of arrival at truth, is
uninstructed commentary, or else imputation of ulterior
motives in his work. So far as his personal interest is con-
cerned, however, he can afford to bear the latter slight tem-
porary infliction, in the light of knowledge of the prevalence
of the practice of Dodson and Fogg, when there is no case,
to abuse the plaintiff; but the other interest is eternal. The
address made in the following pages is to minds capable of
sitting in judgment on a reopened case, or rather upon one
which has never been really tried, and back of that appeal,
in the interests of justice, lies another, to the final decision
in the affairs of* men, constituted by the verdict, be it of
few or many individuals, of the supreme court of posterity.
That an author should be deemed sometimes mistaken is
easy for him to bear, in the universal recognition that it is
human to err, especially as he can take to his own soul the
same flattering unction with reference to diflference of opinion
between his readers and himself. This condition is but in
the nature of things, and places all differences of opinion
and sentiment on an equal footing of fairness. I hope, with
the aid of advocates, and of adversaries as well, whose
agency, if taken aright, is not generally appreciated, event-
ually to be able to divest this volume of minor errors, which
not even the most painstaking care in any work has ever
been able entirely to avoid and finally to leave it, as nearly

PREFACE, IX

letter-perfect as may be, as a legacy to the cause of histor-
ical truth.

While no one but myself is responsible for any of the
opinions expressed in the course of this work, I am much
pleased to learn from my friend, Judge Craig Biddle, of
Philadelphia, that the portion of the chapter on Bull Run
relating to General Patterson, of which he made critical ex-
amination, is correct in its statement of the difficulties under
which General Patterson labored ; and as Judge Biddle was
a member of his staff at the time, his opinion in the matter
ought to have great weight. Another chapter, that enti-
tled, "The Change of Base and Attempted Surprise of
Petersburg," has been examined by my friend, John C.
Ropes, Esq., of Boston, who, omitting verification of minute
details (to do whicl\ I would not have had him take the
trouble, being very sure of them myself), writes me that
my account of the affair is, from his standpoint, strictly ac-
curate.

The necessity of modifying excellent battle-maps of the
Government by the sketches herewith presented arose from
the circumstance that they, being on a much larger scale
than the sketches, and additionally, represented in colors, a
photographic reduction of the untouched originals would,
through diminution in size and photographic color-limita-
tions, have rendered many of their conventional signs im-
perceptible. Moreover, as elevation of ground in many of
the aforesaid maps is represented solely by what are called
contour lines (horizontal lines representing equal differences
(rf* elevation), and the effect as thus given is unintelligible to

X PREPACK

the general reader, elevation has in such cases been here
shown by what is technically called ha^huring, by a shading
made with due regard to steepness of slope, giving an effect
familiar to every one.

That the reader will not find some stereotyped beliefs
here repeated has at least the advantage of the assurance
thereby afforded, that what is due the public has been set
down, that what is here presented has been penned with
freedom from undue influence of preoccupation of the field,
whatever such matter may be as to &cts or conclusions,
whether resting, as they will be variously deemed by the
lingering generation, on weak or on solid foundation.

Philadelphia, Pa., August 2. 1897.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGB

Genealogy of the Meade Family, and residence of Richard

Worsam Meade in Spain i ^

CHAPTER II.

Return of the family of Richard Worsam Meade from Spain to
America, 7

CHAPTER III.
Lieutenant George Gordon Meade in the Mexican War, . • 13

CHAPTER IV.

Cause of the Civil War and respective advantages of the bel«
ligerents 16

CHAPTER V.
Truths and popular errors about the War 29

CHAPTER VI.

The Missouri Compromise. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Mr.
Lincoln, who succeeds Mr. Buchanan in the Presidency of
the United States, calls for a levy of seventy-five thousand
men after the bombardment of Fort Sumter. General Pat-
terson's prescience of what later events confirmed. A
Southern army impends near Washington, south of the Po-
tomac. A Northern army gathers north of that river. The
first battle of Bull Run, otherwise called the battle of Ma-
nassas. Defeat of the Federal troops. The phenomenon of
panic. Disorderly retreat of the Federal army on Washing.

(xi)

xil CONTENTS.

PAOB

ton. Call by Congress for five hundred thousand volunteers.
The summoning of General George B. McClellan to the com-
mand of the troops in the field near Washington. Demon-
stration that it was not General Patterson's, but General
Scott's fault, that General McDowell, in command of the
Federal army south of the Potomac, had not been reinforced
before the battle of Bull Run, 38

CHAPTER VII.

Washington fortified by General Barnard. Description of the re-
gion between Washington and Richmond, Va. Review of
the principal successes of the Federal arms in other parts of
the United States. Plans for the advance of the Army of the
Potomac on Richmond. McClellan appointed gencral-in-
chief of all the armies of the United States. Enemy retires
from Centreville, near Washington. Army of the Potomac
transported by way of the Chesapeake to the Peninsula on
which Richmond stands. Siege of Yorktown. Evacuation
of Yorktown. Pursuit of the retreating enemy. Battle of
Williamsburg. Army of the Potomac makes a partial invest-
ment of Richmond on the east. General Johnston takes ad-
vantage of a fiood on the Chickahominy, which separates
McClellan*s two wings, to attack the left. Battle of Fair
Oaks. Command of the Confederate army devolves upon
General Robert E. Lee, Johnston having been wounded on
the first day of battle. Alarm at the progress of the Confed-
erate general, Stonewall Jackson, towards Washington,
causes the recall of General McDowell's column, which had
been intended to join General McClellan, while Jackson
eludes the troops sent from that column against him, and
successfully joins forces with Lee in time for the next battle
near Richmond. Exaggeration of the numbers of the
enemy. General Meade joins the army, . . •74

CHAPTER VIII.

McClellan prepares to attack the enemy's position opposite his
left wing. Is seized with false apprehensions as to the ene-
my's numerical superiority. Jackson arriving, reinforces Lee,
and the enemy's attack falls on the right of the Union army
straddled across the Chickahominy, whilst the left remains
almost inert. The first assault of the Confederates falls on

• ••

CfONTBl^TS. Xkll

PAGB

McClellan's lines at Beaver Dam Creek, and results in the
battle of Mechanics ville. General Meade commands a bri-^
gade of the Pennsylvania Reserves in this quarter of the
field. Night falls with the attack of the Confederates a failure.
During the night the troops at Beaver Dam Creek retire along
the Chickahominy to Gaines's MilL Next day the battle of
Gaines's Mill takes place, and the whole right wing of the
Union army retreats across the Chickahominy at night. Next
day the retreat of the whole army begins in earnest. The
action of Allen's Farm, near Savage's Station. The vari-
ously named battle of Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads,
New Market Cross Roads, Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's
Farm, where there was fighting along an extended line.
General Meade is badly wounded defending the position of ^
New Market Cross Roads, and is conveyed to Philadelphia.
Federal victory at Malvern Hill. The Union army retires to
Harrison's Landing, on the James River. The President
visits the army at Harrison's Landing. General Halleck,
now commander-in-chief, visits the army. A council of war
at Harrison's Landing recommends the withdrawal of the
army from the Peninsula. The withdrawal is taking place
when General Meade, recovered, rejoins the army, . 105

CHAPTER IX.

The Army of Virginia, under General Pope, is north of the Rap-
idan. The intention is to reinforce it by the Army of the
Potomac, brought by water from the Peninsula. The battle
of Cedar Mountain. Lee arrives and begins to press Pope
backward across the Rappahannock. General J. £. B.
Stuart, with his cavalry, makes havoc within Pope's lines.
Next day the first reinforcement from the Army of the Poto-
mac arrives, the Pennsylvania Reserves, Meade commanding
his old brigade. Jackson, with his corps, makes a circuit
around the right flank of Pope's army, and gains a position
far to the rear, at Bristoe Station. Engagement at Bristoe
Station. The second battle of Bull Run. General Meade's ^
effective work in holding his line at a critical moment of the
retreat Battle of Chantilly. Itinerary of General Meade.
Comparison between the elements respectively composing
the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Vir-
ginia, . . 145

xiv CONTENTS.

PAOB

CHAPTER X.

The Army of Virginia, combined with a portion of the Army of
the Potomac, retreats behind the fortifications south of, dien
across, the Potomac. Lee crosses the Potomac above Wash-
ington and begins an invasion of the North. Capture of
Harper's Ferry by the Confederates. The battle of South
Mountain, in which General Meade, with General Reynolds's ' '
division of Pennsylvania Reserves, distinguishes himself, . 173

CHAPTER XI.

Advance of the Federal army from South Mountain to the An-
tietam. Battle of the Antietam, where General Meade again ■""
distinguishes himself. Lee retreats across the Potomac.
Harper's Ferry and surrounding positions reoccupied by the
Federals. The President of the United States visits the Army
of the Potomac. Upon the President's return to Washington
McClellan is ordered to cross the Potomac in pursuit of Lee.
After considerable delay, he crosses and marches towards
Culpeper. Is relieved from the command of the army and
(^neral Bumside appointed in his stead, .... 200

CHAPTER XII.

Bumside assumes command of the Army of the Potomac. It ad-
vances on Fredericksburg. Delay takes place in the attempt
to cross the Rappahannock there. Battle of Fredericksburg.
Meade attacks the right flank of the enemy with impetuosity.
Is repulsed with slaughter. Bumside falls into hopeless con-
fusion of mind. The battle ends with the victory of the Con-
federates at all points. The so-called Mud Campaign, . . 220

CHAPTER XIII.

General Hooker put in command of the Army of the Potomac.
He conceives and executes an admirable plan of campaign,
which takes the enemy completely by surprise and places
him at Hooker's mercy, but becomes suddenly ]>aralyzed in
mind under the weight of responsibility. Hooker retires by
night across the Rappahannock. Sedgwick's corps. Hook-
er's left wing, also retires across the river, .... 249

COJifTENTSL XV

PAOB

CHAPTER XIV.

Lee advances through the Shenandoah Valley for the invasion of
the North. Hooker desires to attack the isolated corps of
General A. P. Hill, but is forbidden from Washington to do
so. The advance of Lee northward is continued. Lee
crosses the Potomac above Washington. Hooker crosses it
below him and advances on Frederickp Maryland. Hooker
and Halleck disagree about Harper's Ferry, Hooker recom-
mending its evacuation, Halleck refusing to evacuate it.
Hooker asks to be relieved of the command of the army.
His request is granted, 280

CHAPTER XV.

Meade is appointed to the command of the army at Frederick, "
Maryland. He directs his army from Frederick northward.
Buford's cavalry and the First and Eleventh Corps become
engaged at Gettysburg. Meade sends Hancock to report as
to fitness of the field there for battle. Meade orders all the
troops to Gettysburg. Account of the fight that takes place
there before General Meade reaches the field, . . . 290

CHAPTER XVI.

Sickles withdraws fi'om the position assigned him on the left on
the field of Gettysburg. General Meade sends reinforcements
to endangered left wing, goes personally to its assistance,
leads troops into action. The battle on the left rages until
nightfall. Its result for a long time doubtful. The enemy
takes advantage, to make a lodgment there, of reinforce-
ments having been sent from the extreme right of the lines.
Council of war that night decides that the battle shall be
fought out on the ground occupied, 317

CHAPTER XVII.

Opening action on the third day of battle. Pickett's famous
charge, with which the battle ends. The losses on both sides
during the three days* conflict, 339

CHAPTER XVIII.

Lee retreats through the mountain passes in his rear. Meade fol-
lows by the route east of the mountains, passing through them

XVI CONTENTS.

PAGB

further south. Meade finds Lee strongly entrenched near
Williamsport His corps-commanders are not sanguine of
success in attacking the position. He concludes to essay the
storming of the position, but upon advancing, finds that the
enemy has g^one. General Meade follows the enemy and
takes position on the Rappahannock, near Warrenton. Lee,
marching by way of the Shenandoah Valley, takes position
opposite Meade, between the Rappahannock and the Rap-
idan, 354

CHAPTER XIX.

Skirmishes occur south of the Rappahannock. Meade, begin-
ning a more serious movement, it is countermanded from
Washington. Lee sets his army in motion by the left flank
to drive Meade out of his position, at Culpeper, south of the
Rappahannock. Meade is forced to retire, but by forced
marches thwarts Lee's intention of getting in his rear. The
fight at Cedar Run. The engagement at Bristoe Station.
The retirement of Lee. The skirmish of Buckland Mills.
Meade advances as Lee retires, until he reaches the Rappa-
hannock, where Lee holds with works across that stream.
Meade plans to surprise Lee by marching suddenly by the
left flank on Fredericksburg, but Halleck overrules him.
Meade captures Lee's works astride the Rappahannock, and
compels him to abandon his positions immediately south of
that river. Meade being now again between the Rappahan-
nock and the Rapidan, takes Lee by surprise by crossing the
Rapidan and reaching his right flank. His plan proves abor-
tive through the dilatoriness of a general. Meade retires to
his former position and Lee resumes his former position.
Campaign ends with a demonstration by the army, as a di-
version in favor of an operation of General Butler's near
Richmond, 363

CHAPTER XX.

General Grant is appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies
of the United States, and makes his headquarters with the
Army of the Potomac. He orders a midnight advance to-
wards the Rapidan. Pushes forward the next day by a short —
march into the Wilderness. Lee is on the alert, and con-
fronts the Army of the Potomac early in the morning. A

CONTENTS. xvii

PAGB

battle begins and continues with varying fortunes. On the
next day the battle is renewed. Reinforcements for both sides
having arrived, the conflict becomes hotter and hotter. Grant
directs General Meade to move by the left flank to Spottsyl-
vania Court House. Sheridan fails to clear the front of the
advancing infantry. The enemy appears in force at Spott-
sylvania before General Warren reaches there. Sheridan
goes off on a raid towards Richmond. The Army of the Po-
tomac comes into position around Lee*s lines. A portion of
the Second Corps passes around Lee's left flank, but is re-
called. Generals Wright and Warren assault the enemy's
works in front and are repulsed. Hancock renews the attack,
supported by Warren, but fruitlessly. Farther to the left
General Upton has success, but is finally obliged to relin-
quish his hold of a captured line. The next day is spent
in preparing to capture the salient of the enemy's works.
The assault of the salient takes place early. The lines there
are carried and held. The enemy shuts off the salient by
a line of works. Bumside's attack is ineffective save as
a diversion. Troops of the Army of the Potomac march
and countermarch, seeking a weak point in the enemy's de-
fences. The army marches by the left flank, masked by the
left in position, to Hanover Junction. Approaching the North
Anna, Lee's troops are discovered coming into position behind
that stream. The Army of the Potomac crosses on the right
and left of Lee*s lines ; on the right with no opposition until
the southern bank is reached, on the left, with considerable.
Grant orders the retirement of the army to the north side of
the river. It marches towards the southeast, and crosses the
Pamunkey at and in the vicinity of Hanovertown, . . 401

CHAPTER XXI.
Co-operative movements in different quarters, far and near, . 437

CHAPTER XXII.

The battles near the Totopotomoy. Bethesda Church and Cold
Harbor. Sheridan goes on a cavalry raid towards Char-
lottesville. The Army of the Potomac moves out of its en-
trenchments to make a change of base by crossing the James
River. Just before it starts General Butler makes an attempt
to capture Petersburg, 444

.^f

• ••

xviii CfONTENTSL

PAOB

CHAPTER XXIII.

The march of the Army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy
to James River. The crossing of that stream, and march to-
wards Petersburg. Grant intends to capture Petersburg by a
amp de main, but omitting to inform Meade or Hancock
of the project, it fails. The lines of Petersburg are vigorously
attacked on three successive days, 456

CHAPTER XXIV.

The various corps come into position for the siege of Petersburg.
The enemy makes a sally while the operation is proceeding.
Sheridan's cavalry operations north of the James still going
on. Cavalry expedition under General Wilson, south of the
Appomattox, before Sheridan rejoins the army. He returns
by a devious path to the lines of the army, shattered by loss
of men and material. Sheridan returns to the south bank of
the James too late to make a diversion in his favor, . . 47 1

CHAPTER XXV.

The autumnal siege of Petersburg. Investment of Richmond
and Petersburg proceeds. Attack on the enemy's lines north
of the James, near Richmond, whilst preparations go forward
to spring a mine under the enemy's works at Petersburg.
The latter enterprise fails. Lee despatches General Early to
threaten Washington. Grant detaches troops to safeguard
that city. Sheridan placed in command of the forces in the
Shenandoah Valley, to put a stop to Early's threatening
Washington. To prevent Lee's sending more troops to op-
pose Sheridan, Grant orders attacks near Petersburg. The
enterprise north of the James fails, but that south of it suc-
ceeds. Check of the Second Corps at Reams*s Station.
North of the James some works are captured. South of the
Appomattox, infantry and cavalry make a movement and
gain and maintain a foothold for the extension of the line of
investment of Petersburg. Meade makes a narrow escape
of his life from a shell. The first attempt to capture the Pe-
tersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. Hancock bids farewell
to the Second Corps and goes north to recruit veterans.
General A. A. Humphreys succeeds him in command, . .481

CONTENTS. xix

PASS

CHAPTER XXVI.

The winter's siege of Petersburg. Butler's unauthorized command
of the fhiidess expedition against Fort Fisher, N. C. General
Terry, in conmiand of the second one, succeeds. Destruc*
don of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad for forty miles.
A slight engagement with the enemy while making a recon-
noissance in force. Extension of the lines of the Army of
the Potomac towards the left. Sheridan rejoins the army
with his cavalry, having rid the Valley of the Shenandoah
of Early, and reduced him to harmlessness. Sheridan's in-
timate relations with Grant. Sheridan's return to the Army
of the Potomac coincides with a visit of the President to
General Grant, and with General Sherman's arrival on the
following day for the purpose of concerting military move-
ments. Movements outside of the zone of those of the Army
of the Potomac. Lee foresees the doom of Richmond and
Petersburg, and makes preparations for evacuating them and
successfully retreating. The Army of the Potomac stands
ready to defeat his intention, 506

•

CHAPTER XXVII.

A strong force, under General Gordon, makes a sortie from Pe-
tersburg and captures a portion of the lines of contravalla-
tion there. The officers on the Federal side soon retrieve
their loss with gains, which they secure permanendy. The
Army of the Potomac, holding its lines in front of Petersburg
with sufficient troops, moves by the left flank, and after a
check to Sheridan between Five Forks and Dinwiddie Court
House, makes a final break everywhere through the enemy's
positions and starts Lee on his long contemplated retreat.
Petersburg assaulted and occupied. The two armies are put
rapidly ^n route, the Army of Northern Virginia striving to
escape to Danville or Lynchburg, the Army of the Potomac
to frustrate its intention by intercepting the retreat in either
direction. Skirmish at Deep Creek. Battle of Sailor's
Creek. Humphreys crosses the Appomattox at High Bridge,
detaches Barlow to follow a column of the enemy along the
railroad, and himself pushes towards the stage road on the
right, where he brings the enemy to bay. Grant, availing
himself of this detention, sends a note to Lee demanding
the surrender of his army. Lee replies. A regular corres-

CONTENTS.

PAGB

pondence between them ensues. Grant makes a detour to
Appomattox Court House. He does not, in consequence,
receive Lee*s last letter in time to conclude hostilities at the
earliest possible moment Meade prevents unnecessary
slaughter by assuming the responsibility of allowing a brief
truce. The Confederate army, after an attempt to break
through the Federal lines between Appomattox Court House
and Lynchburg, is surrendered by Lee. General Meade is
not present at the formality of the surrender,

521

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Movements preparatory to the disbandment of the Federal ar-
mies. The assassination of President Lincoln. His obse-
quies. The evil effects of President Johnson's policy. The
final review of the armies of Meade and Sherman in Wash-
ington, 551

CHAPTER XXIX.

Recollections of General Meade from young manhood until
death ; from lieutenant to general. His service in the Mexi-
can War. Takes the field as brigadier-general in the Civil
War. His sudden death. Burial at Laurel Hill, Philadel-
phia. The neglect to which, partly through accidental,
partly through designed influences, his eminent services have
been consigned, 556

Appendix.

575

ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND PLANS.

PAGB

^ Heroic Statue of General Meade on the Battle Field of Gettys-
burg, . Frontispiece

' Plan of the Battle Field at Bull Run, July 21st, 1861, . . . 46

- Map of the Battle Grounds in the Vicinity of Richmond, Va., . 90

^ Map of the Field Operations of the Army of Virginia during the

Months of July and August, 1862, 144

' Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gen. John

Pope. Position of Troops on the Night of August 27th, 1862, 1 58

" Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gcn. John

Pope. Position of Troops at Sunset, August 28th, 1862, . 160

* Map of Operations of the Army of Virginia under Maj.-Gen. John
Pope. Battle Field of Manassas, Va., Close of Action, Au-
gust 29th, 1862, 162

" Map of the Battle Fields of Harper's Ferry and Sharpsbiu-g, with
Position of Troops, Routes of Army, etc., September 13th to
17th, 1862 200

' Map of the Battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862, 220

, Map of the Field Operations of the Army of the Potomac under
Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker in the Battles with the Army of
General Lee, near Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, be-
tween April 27th and May 7th, 1863, 248

" Map of Portions of the Military Departments of Washington,

Pennsylvania, Annapolis, and Northeastern Virginia, . . 282

' Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg — First Day, . . . 290

> Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg — Second Day, . . .314

Headquarters of General Meade at Gettysburg, .... 320

(xxi)

xxii ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND FLANS.

PAGB

Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg— Third Day, . . .336

Headquarters of General Lee at Gettysburg, . • • . 352

Sketch Showing Positions of Union and Rebel Forces on Novem-
ber 30th, 1863, in the Vicinity of Mine Run, . . 384

Map of the Battle Field of the Wilderness, Va., .... 400

Map of the Battle Field of Spottsylvania Court House, Va., . 420

Map of the Battle Field of North Anna, Va 432

Map of the Battle Field of Totopotomoy, Va., .... 436

Map of the Battle Fields of the Totopotomoy and Bethesda
Church, Va 446

Map of the Battle Field of Cold Harbor, Va., .... 452

Map of the Battle Grounds in the Vicinity of Richmond, Va., . 458

Map of Petersburg, Va., 482

Portrait of General Meade, after a Mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, 522

Portrait of General Meade, after an Engraving by J. C. Buttre,
from a Photog^ph by Brady, 566

GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER I.

GENEALOGY OF THE MEADE FAMILY.
(residence of RICHARD WORSAM MEADE IN SPAIN.)

It is a great satisfaction, at this period of sudden Ameri-
can interest in genealogies, to be able to state that General
Meade is not known to be descended from William the Con-
queror. He sprang, on the paternal side, from the loins of a
race which gave England her Wellington and France some
of her most distinguished soldiers, and on the maternal side
from a family of recognized worth and social position. In
a word, he came of a martial race, and of families of gentle-
men and gentlewomen. Without going back, therefore, to
citation of the records of the Old World well known to the
family, suffice it to begin the detailed portion of the gene-
alogy of George Gordon Meade with the history of his
progenitors in America. General Fitzhugh Lee, in his
memoir of General Robert E. Lee, in speaking casually of
General Meade's father in connection with General Robert
E. Lee's father, ** Light-horse Harry," inadvertently uses an
unqualified term well calculated to mislead regarding Mr.
Richard Worsam Meade's position. He says, ** Meade's
father served as a private soldier in the Pennsylvania troops
to suppress the * Whisky Insurrection ' in western Penn-

1 (1)

2 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

sylvania, and therefore was under General Lee's father, who
commanded the force raised • for the purpose." Now, the
** Whisky Insurrection" being an episode in the early history
of Pennsylvania, productive in that and some contiguous
States of results similar to those in the later history of the
United States, in Labor Riots, including disturbances in
mining districts, to suppress which men of all ranks in vari-
ous communities lent a hand, the term " private " may be,
and is, in this case, misleading. Employment in such a
field of action affords no more criterion of a man's social
position than would his serving voluntarily, or in response
to a summons, on ^ posse cotnitatus, which, in fact, the troops
referred to really represented on a large scale.

George Gordon Meade was bom in Cadiz, Spain, on the
31st of December, 1815. His father, Richard Worsam
Meade, was an American citizen residing there in pursuit of
mercantile affairs, and incidentally acting as Naval Agent
of the United States. General Meade was therefore doubly
an American citizen, if such a thing could be, being a child
of an American citizen, and bom under the flag of the United
States as represented in foreign parts. Thus the absurdity
of the discussions which sometimes appeared in the news-
papers as to his eligibility to the presidency of the United
States becomes apparent.

Beginning with Colonial times, Robert Meade was the
great-grandfather of George Gordon Meade. The exact
date of his coming to the United States from Ireland, his
native land, is not known, but the records show him to have
been living, in 1732, in the city of Philadelphia, having in
all probability arrived there from Barbados, where he had
relatives, with which island, when he was settled in business
in Philadelphia, he had mercantile transactions. He was an
influential citizen and zealous Catholic, and being also a
man of means, his presence in the city at that time was

QENEALOQ Y OF THE MEADE FAMIL Y. 3

Opportune for the community, for with influence and fortune
he contributed largely to the erection of the chapel which
first occupied the site on which now stands St. Joseph's
Church. Dying in Philadelphia, in 1754, when just returned
from a voyage to the West Indies, his wife having previously
died, his will bequeathed his property to his three children,
Garrett, George, and Catharine, and named his brother-in-
law, George Stritch, of Barbados, executor.

The bequests of the will, which are our only guide toward
determining what other, besides business, relations he had
with the West Indies, prove not only that he had property
in Barbados, but imply that his brother-in-law, Stritch, lived
there, and, moreover, that his own children were there at
the time of his decease. Only a few years afterwards the
children were certainly settled in Philadelphia, the two sons
as merchants, under the firm-name of ** Garrett and George
Meade." The records show that they occupied a promi-
nent position in the mercantile world of Philadelphia, and,
being among the signers of the Non-Importation Resolutions
of 1765, that they were public-spirited citizens. Catharine,
the daughter of Robert Meade, married, in 1761, a talented
young man named Thomas Fitzsimons, who achieved
distinction in state and national affairs. George, in 1 768,
married Henrietta Constantia Worsam, who was a daughter
of the Hon. Richard Worsam, of his Britannic Majesty's
Council, in the island of Barbados, who died, in 1 766, while
on a visit to Philadelphia. Thomas Fitzsimons entered
into partnership with George Meade (Garrett Meade having
probably died), under the firm-style of " George Meade
and Co."

George Meade spent all his life in Philadelphia, taking an
acGve part in municipal affairs. An ardent patriot, his sym-
pathies were with the struggling Colonies, and we find his
firm, in 1780, subscribing the enormous sum, for that time,

4 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

of two thousand pounds sterling towards supplies for the
suffering army of Washington. He assisted towards the
building of St. Mary's Catholic Church, of which he was
trustee and member, his wife being equally attached to the
church known in those days solely as the Church of Eng-
land. Both he and his partner were among the charter-
members of the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Pat-
rick, on whose rolls appear the names of Washington and
those of numbers of other distinguished men of the time.

George Meade had five sons and five daughters. Two of
the five daughters married brothers, Thomas and John Ket-
land. The third daughter married William Hustler, whose
descendants still live at Acklam Hall, Middleboro' on Tees,
Yorkshire, England. With the exception of Richard Wor-
sam Meade, the remaining children, seven in number, died
unmarried.

Richard Worsam Meade, after having passed through a
thorough preliminary training, was taken into his father's
counting-house, in the course of which engagement he was
sent by his father on voyages to the West Indies ; and in
179s, when he was a youth of only seventeen years of age,
he was despatched as supercargo on one of his father's ves-
sels sailing for Europe, extending his tour through England
and France, and returning to America in 1 796. At the age
of twenty-two, after having spent three years on his own
account in business in the West Indies, he had achieved a
competence and returned to the United States. There he
married, in 1780, Margaret Coates Butler, daughter of An-
thony Butler, of Perth Amboy, New Jersey.

He resumed business in Philadelphia, and additionally
endeavored to extricate his father from business embarrass-
ments into which he had fallen through having entered
with other capitalists of Philadelphia into extensive pur-
chases of lands in various parts of the country, with the

QENEALOQT OF THE MEADE FAMILY. 5

expectation that they would be rapidly taken up by settlers.
His father, broken in health, and suffering with increasing
infirmity from ^e, finally yielded up to the struggle, and,
with the fullest confidence of his creditors, the son took
charge of the affairs as assignee. It was, however, in con-
nection with his own business affairs, that soon thereafter he
took his course towards Spain. Finding, incidentally to his
visit to that country, what he regarded as an excellent op-
portunity, he established a business house in Cadiz, and, in
1804, his wife and the two children who had been bom to
them by that time joined him there.

His father, George Meade, died in 1808. The widow,
with her only surviving daughter, visited England only a
few years after his death. She had not been without her
trials in life. Her father, being an Englishman of station,
had long delayed her marriage with George Meade, well
known for his patriotic devotion to the Colonies, and now,
after the loss of many of her children, and finally of her
husband, she found herself bereft of most of what life had
held dear to her, on the shores of her native, now almost a
foreign land to her. After being subjected to various de-
lays in returning to America, she died near Edgebarton,
Berkshire, England, at the age of nearly eighty years.
Her son, Richard Worsam Meade, continued to live in
Spain for seventeen years. In 1 806 he was appointed Naval
Agent for the United States for the port of Cadiz. He was
enabled, through his large mercantile connections, to enter
into numerous contracts for supplies to the Government of
Spain during the stormy period of the Peninsular War, and
thus to contribute to the success of the Spanish cause. Im-
poverished as Spain became on account of the drain upon
her resources caused by the war, she fell greatly into debt
to Mr. Meade for supplies furnished in her time of need.
Spain formally recognized, however, through the action of

GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

the Supreme Junta, organized for the defense of Cadiz, and
afterwards through the Cortes, its great indebtedness to
him, the Cortes wishing to confer upon him the citizensKp
of the country ; but Mr. Meade publicly declined to accept
it, expressing himself as appreciative of the honor, but as
preferring to remain an American citizen.

During his residence in Spain the house of Mr. Meade
had become a place of great resort, to which visitors were
attracted by the courtliness of his manners, the charm of
his wife, and the entourage generally of his private and offi-
cial life. He lived luxuriously in the midst of the best
social advantages, even gathering a choice collection of pict-
ures which eventually formed one of the first private col-
lections in the United States. His family had increased,
since his arrival in the country, by eight children, one of
whom, bom in Cadiz, on the 31st of December, 181 5, as
has already been mentioned, was George Gordon Meade,
the subject of this memoir.

RETURN OF THE MEADE FAMILY FROM SPAIN.

CHAPTER 11.

RETURN OF THE MEADE FAMILY FROM SPAIN.

At the end of the war between France and Spain, which
eventuated in the return of Ferdinand VII. to the throne
from which he had been driven by Napoleon, everything
was in confusion in the country. Mr. Meade was anxious
to receive payment for the supplies with which he had fur-
nished the Government, so as to be able to return with his
family to America, but as if the delay in this matter were
not enough to try his patience, he had additionally to bear
the consequences of a complication grown out of his having
been appointed assignee of an English mercantile firm
established in Cadiz. At that time England, through her
close alliance with Spain, representing their joint resistance
to the Napoleonic invasion of the country, was all-powerful
with the Spanish Government. Through this paramount
influence the arrest of Mr. Meade was brought about in
connection with his action as assignee of the English mer-
cantile firm in Cadiz, notwithstanding that he had in the
administration of its affairs strictly conformed to legal in-
structions. In consequence, although he had the freedom
of the grounds and the privilege of seeing his family, he
was, until liberated at the instance of the Court of Spain
through the intervention of the United States Minister, held
prisoner for nearly two years in Santa Catalina, the fort
situated on the lefl in entering the Bay of Cadiz, near Puerto
de Santa Maria (St. Mary's Port).

Spain, finding it impossible, in the straitened condition of
her finances, to settle her indebtedness to Mr. Meade, he

8 GEXEMJLL GEORGE GOMDOy MEADE

concluded to remain in the country, to supervise in peisoo
his large business inteierstN comprocniszng with this evil
turn of fortune by sending his wife and chikiren in ad^-ance
to America, three of the children having alread>' preceded
them to Philadelphia. Soon aftenrards the ** Treaty of
Florida ** between the United States and Spain ha\'ing been
signed, by which treat}* the United States was fdedged to
pay all the just daims of Americans against Spain, in con-
sideration of the cession of Florida to the United States, a
satisfactor>' solution of Mr. Meade's ditiicu!t>* seemed to be
pro\identially reached, and accordingly, in 1820, three >-ears
after the departure of his &mily, he rejoined it in Philadel-
I^ia, and after lining there a >'ear. remo^-ed with it to
Washington, where he expected to be best able to fomi-ard
the claim which had been transferred by %>ain to his own
country, and ^ixh his own consent. But, as the e\'ent
proved, he had much better ha\'e waited for Spain's re-
cuperation in her finances, for although prosecuted zeal-
ously by Mr. Meade, and after his demise by his i»idow,
and although on one occasion passing both Houses of Con-
gress, but not at the same session, and acknowledged to
be just by all the legal talent which has examined the claim,
it still remains unpaid, whilst Florida, to the ultimate inch
of her shores, is the undisputed territory of the United
States. The outcome of Mr. Meade's pursuit of justice in
the country to which he had returned, his native land, u-as
that, harassed by long suspense and repeated disaf^joint-
mcnts, his health was affected, and he died in Washington
on June 25th, 1828, at fifty years of age.

It became necessary for the widow, under the circum-
stances of her diminished fortune and numerous family, to
live with an economy to which she had never been ac-
customed. Accordingly, as one means toward it, George
Gordon Meade was withdrawn from the boarding-school

RETURN OF THE MEADE FAMIL Y FROM SPAIN. 9

where he was, at Mt. Airy, near Philadelphia, and became
a pupil in Washington, at a school kept by Mr. Salmon P.
Chase, afterwards Secretary of the Treasury under Mr.
Lincoln's first Administration. Thence he went for a while
to a boarding-school at Mt. Hope, Baltimore. The tastes
of the youth were inclined towards a colleg^iate education,
which his mother also &vored, but the change in the finan-
cial affairs of the family rendering another course desirable,
she sought for him an appointment to the Military Academy
at West Point. The first application failed, the second suc-
ceeded, and during the interval of waiting, George continued
at the school at Mt. Hope, and in the summer of 183 1 he
was appointed to the cadetship which had been promised
him. At the Academy he remained during the usual
routine course of books and physical training, not particu-
larly high in his stand, nor, on the other hand, particularly
low. Nothing is more fallacious, however, than judgment
of mental powers and character at an early age, for the
reason that some persons have the capacity of indefinite
mental growth, and others seem even to retrograde.

George had never intended to remain in the army after
his graduation, but merely to serve in it sufficiently long to
warrant his resigning, as having afforded an equivalent for
his education ; so we find him, at the end of the second
year of the military course, feeling that the routine is very
monotonous. Still he kept on, and passed through the
whole four years of the course, and then, securing the cus-
tomary leave of three months after graduation, he went
during that time on the survey of the Long Island Railroad.
His health was delicate at this period, his constitution fds
from confirmed, and some of his friends were very anxious
that he should not be exposed to the malarious atmosphere
of Florida, where his regiment was stationed, and they even
went the length of advising him to resign his position in the

lO GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

anny. He determined, however, to give the climate at least
a fair trial, and as, at that juncture, luckily for him, his
brother-in-law. Commodore Alexander James Dallas, in
charge of the West India Squadron, invited him to take
passage to his post on the flagship of the squadron, he
started for Florida under the most favorable auspices. After
a short detour among the West Indies the ship touched at
Havana, and there the intelligence of Dade's Massacre
awaited it, and Commodore Dallas, proceeding at once
towards the seat of war, and taking measures with refer-
ence to the Indian outbreak, was able incidentally to land
Lieutenant Meade at Tampa Bay, where his company was
stationed. This was the beginning of the Seminole War.

The campaign was conducted by General Winfield Scott.
The column with which Lieutenant Meade marched was
commanded by Colonel William Lindsay. Lieutenant
Meade was not destined, however, to remain long on duty
in this campaign. As had been apprehended, his delicate
constitution was unequal to the stress put upon it by the
climate of the interior of southern Florida, where the In-
dians lurked in the Everglades and other fastnesses, and he
was seized with a low fever which rendered him unfit for
the contemplated duty of active pursuit of the enemy. So
he was ordered to deport to the North Fork of the Cana-
dian River, Arkansas, a party of Seminoles, who were to
be there settled as a measure for the pacification of Florida.
This duty performed, he reported in person, under orders,
to Washington, where, in July, he was assigned to duty at
the Watertown Arsenal, Mass., but did not long remain
there, for, towards the close of 1836, he resigned his com-
mission in the army.

He accepted a position at once as assistant-engineer in
the construction of the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia Rail-
road, of which his brother-in-law. Major James D. Graham,

RETURN OF THE MEADE FAMILY FROM SPAIN. 1 1

U. S. A., was chief engineer. This took him to Pensacola,
Florida, where he was engaged until nearly the middle of
July, 1837, when a survey at the mouth of the Sabine
River, the boundary line between the United States and
Texas, being needed by the War Department, he was
recommended to and selected by the Department as a
competent person to execute the work. After this survey,
which related to the navigability of the waters at the mouth
of the Sabine River, he went, as principal assistant-engineer,
with Captain Andrew Talcott, U. S. A., who was to make a
survey at the mouths of the Mississippi River, with reference
to improving the navigation there, his employment on this
duty, including office work, lasting from November, 1837,
until the early part of 1839. ^^ '840 Lieutenant Meade
was employed as one of the assistants to the joint commis-
sion appointed to establish the boundary line between the
United States and Texas, and, after the completion of the
work, he returned to Washington, where, in August, he was
appointed by the Secretary of War one of the civil-assistants
on the survey of the Northeastern Boundary, the line be-
tween the territory of the United States and that of Great
Britain.

In the society of Washington, Lieutenant Meade was ac-
customed to meet the family of the Hon. John Sergeant, to
whose eldest daughter, Margaretta, he became engaged, and
the young couple were married on the 31st of December,
1840, at the house of Mr. Sergeant, in Philadelphia, Lieu-
tenant Meade continuing to hold his position as civil-assist-
ant on the survey of the Northeastern Boundary. This new
responsibility, however, coming upon him after his experi-
ences of various employments in civil-engineering, all of
which had lasted but a short time, induced him to try to
procure reinstatement in the army, and, this aim proving
successful, he was, in 1842, appointed second-lieutenant in
the Corps of Topographical Engineers, continuing, however.

12 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADE

as assistant-engineer in the survey of the Northeastern
Boundary until near the end of 1843, when he was ordered
to report to the office of Topographical Engineers, in Phila-
delphia, where his duties, under Major Hartman Bache,
became those of the designing and construction of light-
houses.

He had been fulfilling this assignment to duty for some-
what over a year and a half, when, in August, 1845, ^^ ^'
cdved orders to report for service at Aransas Bay, Texas,
with the military force organized with reference to the
troubles growing out of the disputed boundary between the
United States and Mexico ; a force which was at first an army
of observation, but which became converted into one of in-
vasion, General Zachary Taylor, soon thereafter to become
President of the United States, commanding the American
troops at the designated point. Lieutenant Meade was at
this time thirty years of age. His constitution had wonder-
fully hardened between this and the time we found him un-
able to support the exposure of campaigning in the Seminole
War. His appearance had entirely changed within that
period. The dandy phase of his existence, mentioned in the
concluding chapter of this work, had sloughed away in the
rude contact of men and affairs in different climes on the
frontier of the country. He was now simply a well-dressed
man, but nothing more than that ; mindful of the axiom of
Lord Chesterfield, never to be the first to adopt a fashion,
nor the last to leave it ; always particular in his attire, except
in the field, where he was singularly indifferent to dress ; a
statement which the statue of him in bronze, in the Phila-
delphia Park, confirms, where the artist has sacrificed to the
literalness of the brief moment the spirit that should endure
through time. His manner was alert, and indicative of
quickness of apprehension and fertility of resource, and his
manners were those of a man gifted by nature, and by
education adapted to shine in society.

LIEUTENANT MEADE IN THE MEXICAN WAR 1 3

CHAPTER III.

UEUTENANT MEADE IN THE MEXICAN WAR.

An extended account of the Mexican War, do &r as it
relates to General Meade, would not seem to be imperative
in a brief history of his military career, in view of the fact
that he was then only a lieutenant in the army, and that the
bearing of his presence in its military operations was there-
fore proportionally limited. The account of that episode
of his life is therefore confined to the moderate limits of
this chapter.

General Meade, a lieutenant of Topographical Engineers
in 1845, ^ corps merged during the Civil War in that of the
Engineers, arrived at Corpus Christi on September 14, 1845,
having been assigned to the staff of General Zachary Taylor,
who was in chief command of the American forces then
assembling as an army of occupation on the Mexican frontier.
Passing through the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la
Palma, he finally marched with General Taylor to Monterey,
assisting there in reconnoissances of that portion of the
enemy's position which was assailed by General Worth.
General Worth said, in his official report of the operations
here, " Annexed is an accurate sketch of the theatre of
operations, for which I am indebted, as in many other
respects, to the intelligent zeal and gallantry of Lieutenant
Meade, Engineers."

Marching beyond Monterey to Saltillo, on November
13th, General Taylor made dispositions in advance of
Monterey, sending General Quitman to Victoria. Under
General Taylor Lieutenant Meade made, in connection with

14 GENERAL QEOROE GORDON MEADE

the new operations, reconnoissances of the passes of the
Agua Nueva, and under General Quitman, of the passes of
the Tula.» But, at this point of time, a sudden change took
place in affairs. General Taylor, upon returning to Monterey,
finding that the whole character of his operations had to
be changed, General Winfield Scott having arrived on the
coast in supreme command, and having ordered many of
General Taylor's troops to join him in the projected capture
of Vera Cruz and of the city of Mexico. Lieutenant Meade
had, at that moment, reached Victoria with the colunm
under General Quitman. Marching thence, under the com-
mand of General Patterson, for Tampico, on the coast, he
was there about to take ship for Vera Cruz, when, on the
23d of February, 1846, the battle of Buena Vista was
fought by General Taylor.

On the 9th of March General Scott's army began debark-
ing near Vera Cruz, and on the following day invested the
town, which lies at the water's edge ; a walled town, sup-
ported in its defensive capacity by the Castle of San Juan
d'Ulloa, a short distance off, seaward. Lieutenant Meade
assisted his immediate chief. Major William Tumbull, in
the survey of the lines of contravallation, and helped in the
designing of the naval battery. After a severe bombard-
ment lasting several days, a parley was sounded from the
town, resulting, after some negotiation, in its surrender.
Here Lieutenant Meade's duty with the army terminated.
He had been in the field nearly two years, had shared in
three battles and this siege, and the officers of his branch
of the service were present in sufficient numbers for the
needs of the army of General Scott. Consequently General
Scott relieved him from duty in a complimentary order, in
which he said that Lieutenant Meade ** was much distin-
guished in the field since 1845." Here, then, we will with
the reader leave General Scott and his gallant little army on

LIEUTENANT MEADE IN THE MEXICAN WAR. 1 5

the eve of their triumphant march to and capture of the city
of Mexico. Lieutenant Meade's departure from the army
must, we have reason to believe, have been coupled with
his regret that his duties had not been with the line rather
than with the staff, for we find him, at the beginning of the
Civil War, evidently resolved that it should then be other-
wise. We meet him at that time, fourteen years afterwards,
as a general of brigade, and so often in the forefront of
battle, in that rank and in that of corps-commander, that
the marvel is he was not killed outright instead of wounded
before the Civil War was two years old.

l6 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RESPECTIVE ADVAN-
TAGES OF THE BELUGERENTS.

The essential diflerence between the ancient and modem
way of regarding great movements among mankind lies in
difference of view as to the propubive forces at work, the
ancients believing that they obeyed a blind destiny, repre-
sented chiefly by some powerful human leadership, whereas
the wiser modems have come to look for and find directive
cause for such phenomena in race, climate, geographical
distribution, clashing material interests, and a multitude of
other agencies in that which compels men to change and to
collision with their fellow men. Ancient history, in a word,
regards the mass of men as mere ciphers, which give value
to an inexplicable range of activities, while modem history
regards them as subject to and moving amid these, under
law ; the people, more than their rulers, the source of grand
movements ; the ruler but the product of surrounding root
and soil. Hence Macaulay was wise when he introduced
into his History of England an account of the people as the
main source of the events which he proceeds to describe.
The peoples of the same and of contiguous countries, more
than a Greek Chorus, bearing as they do the chief part in
the drama, serve, however, in formal history, that purpose
also. Otherwise, to mental vision, the principal actors
would go mopping and mowing and gibbering over the
stage of life, as inane as dancers without music look to one
whose ears are closed.

It is with a very simple fragment of history with which

THB CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAK 1/

we have to deal, and yet, to this day, simple as it is, it is
sometimes misunderstood. It was represented, even in an
English work published about the time of the Civil War,
that the Southerners were fighting only for their independ-
ence. To account for fighting for independence, however,
some rational cause must be assigned and proved to exist.
That there was no just cause for secession, leading to fight-
ing for independence, is amply shown in the demonstration
of Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, a man of distinguished
ability, who afterwards became the Vice-President of the
Southern Confederacy. The real cause of secession was
not the presence of slavery in the Southern States and its
absence in the Northern ones, but the fact that the differ-
ence between them in that respect had gradually had the
effect of making two peoples of different interests in social
and governmental development. There was, at the begin-
ning of the Civil War, no general feeling in the North
against the institution of slavery, save as an abstract propo-
sition ; none such as would have made any great sacrifice
for its abolishment. It was only as the war proceeded that
the feeling in the North grew stronger and stronger against
it as the cause back of the estrangement between the two
parts of the country. The South, as represented especially
by new generations, is now, in retrospection, grateful that
it did not achieve a success which would have blighted the
magnificent future of the country ; and in this feeling even
the majority of those there who bore the heat and burden
of the day profoundly share. The South can now afford
to admit, the fever-fit of passion being past, that it was not,
even by the conceded right of revolution, justified in its
action, when, having held the power of the general Govern-
ment for many years, having been assured by Congress that
whatever was lacking in protection of its rights should be

given, having entered into and been defeated in a general

1 8 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

election in which it had put forward its own candidates, it
took that time, of all times, to declare its independence.

The theory upon which the Southern States attempted to
secede ignored the law of development upon which all
society proceeds, and they made no attempt to reconcile
their practice with their theory. Men claimed that they
primarily owed allegiance to their States, secondarily
to the United States. Yet thousands of men whose States
refused to secede took up arms against the United States.
States which had deliberately placed themselves on the side
of the United States were invaded with the intention of forc-
ing them to secede. Even when in arms against the United
States, Southerners frequently appealed to the Constitution
which, by the act of war, they had repudiated. But to re-
vert to the theory of secession, pure and simple, — leaving
aside minor inconsistencies, of which men under stress of
circumstances must always be guilty, — ^if the theory of seces-
sion had been true in the nature of things, then, obviously,
the Southern Confederacy, once successfully formed, could
not deny the right of secession to any one or any num-
ber of the composing States. Suppose, then, because it
has no seaboard, that Arkansas should have seceded from
the triumphant Confederacy. It would, of course, by pre-
scription, have possessed as full autonomy as that of the re-
maining States of the Bund, could coin money, levy war,
and exercise all other rights of sovereignty. But suppose
that it should have declared war abroad, how could a
foreign enemy get at it? The absurdities which the
contemplation of a multitude of sovereign States, without
marked geographical boundaries, which have lived for
nearly a century together the common life of a nation,
coupled with the right of secession at any time, exhibit to
us, are infinite. The whole movement leading to secession
ignored the fundamental law of growth, yet this, beyond

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 19

written constitutions or aught else of formal agreement in
treaties or otherwise, by which men seek to bind themselves
and others, controls all that they do and all that they can
become throughout the lapsing ages.

At the beginning of the strife between the two parts of
the country there were, besides these fundamental ones,
minor errors, of which Southerners had not the slightest
suspicion. The most flag^nt of these at the beginning
was the prevalent belief in the South that the North would
not act with anything like continuous determination. Of
course the Southern leaders knew better ; for subsequent
memoirs and biographies of many of them show plainly
that they had no such delusions as those by which the
majority of Southerners were possessed. Another of these
crude notions was that Northerners were destitute of cour-
age, as compared with Southerners, three Northerners to
one Southerner being the usual proportion allowed to es-
tablish equality. When, however, troops from the North
met troops from the South, of similar experience in the
field, it was not found that there was any essential difference
between them in the display of courage. At the very first,
at the battle of Bull Run, there was some apparent differ-
ence ; but this arose from the circumstance that the senti-
ment of the North did not correspond in intensity with that
of the South. It had no animosity, whereas the South was
in deadly earnest. While there is undoubtedly a difference
in individual and racial courage, still, back of all courage,
and especially in gross, as in armies, lies the force of habit.
As for difference of race between the North and South,
both represent mixed races. By the physiological law by
which repetition dulk sensibility, expressed by Byron as to
ttus particular region of sensibility discussed, when he says
that in a duel, after one or two shots, the ear becomes
'' more Irish and less nice," habit declares itself paramount

20 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

in producing indifference in all varieties of danger. Long
before the war ended there was nothing to choose between
Northerners and Southerners in fighting capacity. That
implies that there was something to choose between them
at the beginning. The reason for part of this difference
ought to be obvious to everyone ; part has more than once
been noted, in discussions on the war, but the chief reason
seems to have escaped attention. Men often moult the
memories of what they once knew to exist as unconsciously
as they change the plumage of their opinions. The inhab-
itants of the Northern States had not, at the beginning of
the war, the same outdoor habits of exercise as they have
now. It was almost impossible to find, for long distances
along the northeastern coast of the United States, a horse
tolerable for riding ; and if that were secured, it might be
difficult to find a saddle. Southerners almost universally
had ridden on horseback from their earliest youth. Hence
for a long time their cavalry excelled, gentlemen of the
South regarding that branch as of especial distinction as com-
pared with the other arms of the service, being imbued by
tradition with the notions associated with the cavalier. Not
only was there in the North at that time a singular absence
of athletic exercises, but the people there generally were
not addicted to field-sports. In fact, throughout a large
portion of New England a man who kept a gun and a dog
was looked upon pretty much as Dr. Johnson regarded one
who wore a cane. Just the opposite condition of things
prevailed in the South. One could hardly find a man at
any age who was not devoted to hunting in some form or
other. Now, it ought to be evident that shooting of every
kind, especially that which compels a man to walk over all
sorts of surface, through swamp, through woods, through
brush, through briar, constitutes the best sort of exercise ;
that which, in the open air, makes exertion recreation,

THE CA USE OF THE CIVIL WAR 21

trains the eye and ear, steadies the hand, strengthens the
limbSy and confers vigor obtained in wholesome contact with
mother-earth. Nor was this all that was obtained by life
in the South, as compared with the then existing life in the
North. The Southerner's gun became to him a part of
himself; he had become as automatic with it as if it had
been a member of his body. The Northerner had, as a
general rule, to learn to shoot as shooting is practised in
the expanse of nature. Except as a member of a small
class, and then only as a marksman at a target, the North-
erner knew little about shooting. The general population
knew nothing. The Northerner was therefore at first at a
great disadvantage as compared with the Southerner, a dis-
advantage which he had to overcome in the field. But
beyond this difference, brought about by the difference in
habits between the two parts of the country, lay a subtle
difference originating in the same manner. One may well
despair of ever being able to see in what way the chase or
hunting of any kind, even that of the most ferocious beasts,
can be likened to war, and to be in any way, as it is said to
be, a good preparation for it, unless it be conceded that,
out of the practice of hunting grows that intimate acquaint-
ance with the face of nature which one acquires in hunting.
Nature has, to one who comes closest to it, a physiognomy
from greatest to minutest details, and he who has wandered
through its recesses becomes gifted with an insight such
that, given but a part, he sets, with greater clearness than
unpractised men, what may be to the eye concealed beyond.
This is the acquired faculty which, doubtless, in a primitive
stage of existence, all men possessed, the faculty which
Southern troops brought with them into their masses during
the war, and which necessarily at first told in their favor
when they confronted men who were without it, amidst all
sorts of eccentricities of ground in wood and hill and

22 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

swamp and swale. They brought with them the faculty
which the Indian practices to perfection in his fastnesses,
even to the point of protective color ; the faculty which,
through bitter experience at first, the Northern troops grad-
ually acquired, in imitation of the Southerners, who, with
their facile lines, flowed into the sinuosities of the wooded
battle-field, the efficiency of the unit as a woodsman con-
tributing to that of the line of battle which it went to form.
Back of these causes making for the efficiency of Southern
troops at the beginning of the war was a potent one, which
enabled the Confederacy to put forth to greater advantage
than could the United States, whatever strength it possessed,
not only at the beginning of the war but throughout its
whole duration. This lay in the superiority of the South
for waging war, growing out of its political and social life,
habits, and traditions. There the theory and the practice of
equality were as wide asunder as the poles. There, from
the earliest times, the possession of large landed properties
by the educated class, and the political and social weight
inuring to their owners from the consolidated vote which
they enjoyed as masters of the black tillers of the soil,
made them not only tend to the study of national politics
and the acquisition of office (making them paramount in
the councils of the nation), but set them apart among their
own people as a distinctively ruling class. Upon the sur-
face, so strictly were drawn the lines between white and
black, all white men stood upon an apparently equal political
footing, and with equal social capacity. As a matter of fact,
however, there existed in the South a dominant, educated
class, recognized ungrudgingly by the commonalty as the
gentlemen — ^lords of the soil. And j ust because the difference
was so palpable between the two estates, and their inter-
dependence so great, there was between the members of
the dominant class and the general white population of the

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR. 23

sturdy yeomen of the country a real comradeship, tempered
with respect, which was not to be seen, because it did not
exist in the North. Between the two classes there was,
as there always must be in any community when differences
are not arbitrary, but real, no feeling between the respec-
tive ranks in the community but one of mutual liking and
respect. To the men of a class which had been from time
out of mind justly regarded in peace as their superiors, the
rank and file of the South naturally looked up for direction
and followed loyally in war. Can any one, in reflecting on
this political and social condition of the South of that time,
fail to see that, for purposes of war, it offered a great
advantage over the political and social condition of the
North ? In the North there was no leadership of a class ;
even the class of gentlemen was not known outside of its
own bounds ; a multitude of great little men were ever
momentarily rising like bubbles to the surface, only to dis-
appear ; mere wealth played a part in public affairs which
would have been impossible in the South.

The moral and physical advantages in the conflict were
for a while in favor of the South. The existence of the
condition of slavery, save as the mediate cause of dissen-
sion between the two parts of the country, had, as already
intimated, little to do with the conflict. Some of the
foremost men of the South had, from the beginning of the
Government, declared against the injustice of slavery. The
possibility of its territorial extension, that was all, had come
to an end, whether the South should succeed or fail.
Men's views of things are independent of what is founded
in eternal justice uncomplicated with human difliculties.
We have to consider the point of view. We have to con-
sider the obscuration by self-interest. In the question
asked by Festus of St. Paul, "What is truth?" is touched
and summed up the everlasting possibilities of difference in

GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

the opinions and sentiments of men even as to those things
which they have most deeply pondered. Both North and
South fought in support of their beliefs ; both suffered for
them ; each ardently prayed that the righteous cause (its
own) might prevail. Thus, so far as the abstract question
of right was concerned, the two sides were on an equal
footing for all acquirement of the strength that the sense
of justice can convey. With regard, however, to the posses-
sion of strength on lower moral planes than the highest, it
may be with reason claimed that the South had at first an
advantage over the North. Growing directly out of the
political and social organization of the South, came, at the
very initiation of the war, a singular advantage to the Con-
federacy. It put the direction of affairs at once into the
hands of a trained military oligarchy. Mr. Davis had had
experience in military affairs, and besides having been
Secretary of War of the United States, had always been
associated with military men. It would not be to the pur-
pose to call attention, in contradiction of the inference from
this, to the fact that Mr. Davis had very serious limitations
to his usefulness. The advantage of the South in having
possessed him grows out of the implied contrast between
him and Mr. Lincoln as occupants of opposing presidential
chairs, in presence of the sudden flaming out of war. Fine
as Mr. Lincoln's touch was as to political men and affairs,
the absence of it in military affairs was keenly felt at first.
It is almost impossible to conceive that any one could have
thought it judicious to let General Scott remain as long as
he did, with his infirmities, at the head of military affairs in
one of the greatest crises of the world's history. Mr.
Lincoln must, however, be largely exonerated from blame
for having retained McClellan so long as he did, for the
American people were in that under a delusion which re-
sembled a hypnotic condition. We can, however, plead in

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR. 2$

excuse for these mistakes, that time was needed within
which to distinguish and to select from the mass the best
leaders, but to nothing save defect of military capacity can
be ascribed some of Mr. Lincoln's essays in suggesting,
modifying, or controlling certain operations of the war.

In many most unfortunate respects the position of Wash-
ington and the character of its population bore heavily for
the Southern and against the Northern cause. Washington
was, in affiliation, much more a Southern than a Northern
city, and, in consequence, the enemy was, through one
means or another, from the beginning to the end of the war,
possessed of much better information as to the movements
in that capital than was the North of what was done or con-
templated in Richmond. The presence, too, of Washington
on the very borderland of war has been frequently men-
tioned as a serious disadvantage in the prosecution of the
war, and it was. The United States, as an established
government, could not afford, as was said at the time,
to swap queens with the enemy. But besides that, there
was in the topographical relation of Washington to Rich-
mond another serious embarrassment, which seems to have
escaped mention. From Washington to the Slue Ridge it
is only half as far as it is from Richmond to the Blue Ridge,
so that when the enemy, in his numerous raids, marched
down the Shenandoah Valley to demonstrate on or cross
the fords of the Potomac, he approached nearer and nearer,
as he marched north, to the chief towns of Maryland and
Pennsylvania and to the capital at Washington, masked in
his movements and protected by a mountain range during
the whole time of this approach. Thus the enemy could,
as he more than once did, appear suddenly in a new field
of operations close to the capital, and profoundly influence,
not only there but elsewhere, the current of military events.
Add to these advantages possessed by the Confederates in

26 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

Virginia the additional one, that the moment the Army of
the Potomac advanced toward Richmond it found itself
penetrating a hostile country where every scrap of informa-
tion to the enemy's advantage reached him, and every scrap
that might benefit the invading army was concealed. Add
to this, again, the fact that the scouts of the enemy, having
a greater knowledge of the country than that possessed
by those of their adversary, were able to make their way
through hostile lines in a manner truly marvellous on occa-
sions.

It would appear at the first blush, as is proved by the
fact that persons who have not examined minutely into the
matter believe it without hesitation, that the South was, from
beginning to end of the war, morally and physically, in
everything, greatly overmatched. That it was, in the long
run, overmatched, is undeniable, as the event proves. The
question raised here, however, is as to the degree to which
it was overmatched, and as to the degree there is a very
general misapprehension. Territorially the United States
was represented by twenty-two States, as arrayed against
eleven States of the Southern Confederacy. Twenty-two
million freemen and half a million slaves apparently adhered
to the Northern cause, as against five and a half million
freemen and three and a half million slaves apparently ad-
hering to the Southern cause. But, on the other hand, it
should be remembered that, in addition to the signal advan-
tages which have been recited in favor of the South, the
sentiment of the Union was numerically insignificant there
after secession was once fairly entered upon, as compared
with the sentiment in the North which opposed the prose-
cution of the war, and numerically increased as the war
went on. And, additionally, it should be remembered that
the slaves of the South were able to perform the tillage of
the ground, and thereby release eveiy able-bodied white

THE CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 27

man for military service ; whereas, for the tillage of the soil
of the North there was no such class of laborers working
from the earliest to the latest age, and its multifarious in-
dustries required the presence of skilled labor, while at the
same time there was nothing in the South to correspond
with such industrial occupations. The greatest disadvan-
tage under which the South labored was that its ports were
blockaded, and that it had scarcely the semblance of a navy.
This meant that it was largely cut off from the importation
of munitions of war and other things, and that the blockade
could not be raised except by the intervention of foreign
powers. Its inconsiderable wealth, too, as compared with
that of the North, and the almost boundless credit of the
latter, was a source of relative weakness to the South.

If the reader will carefully scan all these various elements
with relation to each other, and will strike the balance, he
will see that, although the North preponderated in strength
over the South, yet that the difference between them was
not so great as is frequently imagined. He will see that
the South had just as much faith in the justice of its cause
as the North had in the justice of its cause, and, therefore,
that so far as moral force is derived from the contemplation
of doing right, the contestants were equal. But he will also
see that, at the beginning, there were certain minor moral
advantages possessed in larger degree by the South than by
the North. It is only by recognizing the fact, that any one
can account for its desperate prolongation of the struggle.
What the dynamic value of these minor elements of strength
may have amounted to, no man can say. The statement
sometimes made that the moral is to the physical as five to
two is an absurdity, the two things being incommensurable.
All these questions will be of especial interest to the future
historian who, in his calm analysis of events, will test them
in the crucible of world-experience with solvents of a vast

28 GENERAL QEOROE GORDON MEADE.

array of collated (acts. They begin to approach this his-
torical interest even at this early day, when, reconciliation
having followed strife, men have had opportunity to revise
the experiences which, owing to the rapidity of modem
events, seem to belong to quite a remote past. What now
presents itself to the reason and imagination as most inter-
esting is, that the event of the war was one which, with the
greater enlightenment that time has wrought, has long been
a subject of thankfulness among the people of a united
country.

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS AROUT THE WAR, 29

CHAPTER V.

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR.

No more prejudicial error entered into the conduct of
military afiairs in the North than the popular notion that
a military education necessarily makes the great com-
mander. The ideal soldier, the strategos of the ancients,
the general of modem times, is bom as truly as the poet
is bom, not made. A military education does but give the
training which brings forth to the best advantage natural
powers. There are, and always have been, but two mili-
tary schools in the world, that of actual war, and that of
the academy, for the teaching of the theory and practice of
war ; but neither of these can create a soldier of any grade
intrinsically beyond that of the rank and file of an army.
The reason of this is not far to seek, if one come to realize
two fundamental facts, that genius or talent for war, like
any other special manifestation of mind, cannot be created
or supplanted by any amount of technical acquirement ;
and, additionally, that back of the intellect requisite to con-
stitute a great commander, and the very foundation with-
out which his gifts are unavailing, is character, the sort of
mind which, in the midst of the mutability of affairs, keeps
its equal poise. Who can doubt that, even if Napoleon
had had no military education whatever, he would have
been, except perhaps Massena, the first of France's strate-
gists fitted for the field. The popular ignorance in the
North on this subject rose far beyond the bounds of ordi-
nary popular limitations, pervading the sphere even of men
of military training, some of whom had modesty conson-

30 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADR

ant with their just estimate of their powers, but some of
whom exaggerated those powers to their own minds, or
else came to think, as was extremely natural, that they
must have the talents which were attributed to them by
others. Even in the immediate realm of the occupants of
the highest civil executive positions of the Government,
there was not any previous association with military men,
technical education, or aught else that could have put them
in touch with military demands. Moreover, as has been
previously remarked, it was unfortunate for Washington to
be situated where it was, near the theatre of the most im-
portant military operations. There is another aspect of the
same circumstance, which was not less objectionable. It
was as unfortunate for the Army of the Potomac to be so
near Washington as it was for Washington to be so near the
army. In consequence of this, petty interference with the
army, and with lesser forces posted in the vicinity of the
city, went on from the beginning to the end of the war.
Congress took an amateur hand in its operations, the hotel
corridors of the city became the greenroom and the coulisses
of the awful drama which was being enacted only a few
miles away and over the whole United States. Blatant
military orators there declaimed of the progress or retarda-
tions of events, with which they had naught to do but by
their presence at the front .Scheming for rank and place
and assignment, speculating in gold and bonds, money-
seeking amidst the throes of the nation, went on apace.
Virtue and vice, patriotism and selfishness, were blended in
apparently inextricable confusion ; but only apparently, sad
as that was, for amidst the chaos patriotism stood firmly,
and shaking off at last all crawling things, brought the
nation, through dearly bought experience, to a triumphant
issue.

It will be well here, as we are about to enter upon a

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR. 31

description of more extensive military movements than
those connected with the Mexican War, to define what are
meant by the terms strategy, tactics, and logistics. "Logis-
tics" relates simply to the science of moving armies, which
necessarily includes any means of movement, in marching
and conrniissary, or any other land of locomotion. *' Stra-
tegy " is sometimes distinguished from "tactics " by repre-
senting the former as related to movements made out of
sight of the enemy, and the latter as made within his sight.
But this definition is positively incorrect, for a strategical
movement may, on occasions, be made within sight of the
enemy and a tactical movement beyond it ; that is to say, if
*' within sight " is to be construed as meaning within the
range of sight, and this is what is intended by the expression
" within sight." For instance, supposing two armies to be
drawn up, facing each other, and so near that, at any point
in either line, the opposing one is clearly seen, and that, by
means of a sunken road in the rear, a large body of the troops
of one of these lines is subtracted and placed, unknown to the
opposite side, on either flank of the line to which the troops
belong. That would, according to the current definition,
be a tactical movement ; and yet, according to the intrinsic
diflerence between strategical and tactical movements, it
would be strategical. To take a converse case, supposing
that, after two opposing lines are drawn up as just described,
and in plain sight of each other, a false appearance is inten-
tionally presented, as Caesar once created it by dressing up
teamsters and camp-followers as legionary soldiers, and thus
making the enemy think that a powerful military body was
marching off" from camp. Sheridan employed, partly within
and partly beyond sight, a similar strategical stratagem
at Deep Bottom, on James River, when he made cavalry
march by night over a pontoon-bridge muffled with hay,
marching the men back on foot on the following morning,

32 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

with the intention of leading the enemy to believe that re-
inforcements of infantry were arriving from the south side
of the river. These were strategical movements, and yet,
according to the common definition, they were tactical,
because they were made not only within the range of sight,
but within actual sight of the enemy. Therefore it is plain
that the distinction which is really to be drawn between
strategical and tactical movements, as representing their
true differences, has sometimes no relation to whether the
operation is performed within sight, within the range of
sight, or beyond sight. The real difference between them,
related to space and time, whether much or little of either,
consists in the fact that, whereas strategy either deceives or
anticipates the enemy to his disadvantage by acts relating
to prospective or present battle, and secures or interferes
with combinations leading to the best concentration for
prospective battle, tactics are confined, without intermedia-
tion, to the best concentration during battle. Strategy as
well as tactics therefore enter into the actual collision on the
battle-field.

Strategy, acting over a large zone of operations may force
an adversary to fight a battle in a place tactically disadvan-
tageous. This, at bottom, reverts to the advantage inher-
ent in skill of concentration for prospective battle ; success-
ful concentration sometimes involving tactically, as to place,
as well as strategically, as to time, a disadvantage to the
adversary in position. It thus becomes evident, from all
that has been said, that strategy may occur beyond the hori-
zon of the zone of operations, or near the field of battle,
or, lastly, at the very place of and amid the operations
in the heat of battle, while tactics are confined to the
time and place of actual battle. Tactics, however, has a
range beyond this, when the body of men called an army
is not in action. In advancing it has an advance-guard.

TRUTHS AND POPULAB ERROBS ABOUT THE WAB. 33

and if possible, flanking columns of cavalry. In retiring it
has a rear-guard. In camp it has a cordon of outposts and
pickets. All these conditions relate to tactics.

The few fundamental principles of the art of war are
immutable, like all other principles. But as, in the course
of time, weapons, commissariat, transportation, and a thou-
sand other things have changed, so both strategy and tac-
tics have had to change to conform in practice to the other
changes. It is therefore not in principles, but in detaib of
practice, that change has affected, and must, for the same
reason, always continue to modify practice in the art of
war. For example, as to strategy in the time of Napoleon
and Jomini, neither of these nor any other general of that
period coulcl have imagined that soon there would be an
electric telegraph. None of them countenanced the con-
centration of armies from widely-separated bases, on exte-
rior lines. But since then it has been done successfully by
means of the facility which the telegraph affords, and will
be done on occasions for all the future. Besides this use
of the telegraph, it has been adopted on the field of battle
Itself, as in the Wilderness, at Petersburg, and many other
places during the Civil War. Take, on the other hand, a
case in tactics. Even so recently as the time of the Cri-
mean War, as Kinglake, the chief historian of the war mi-
nutely relates, the Russians, at the battle of the Alma, pre-
served the antiquated, solid masses of infantry against the
thin lines of the English, with the consequence that they
were mowed down like grain ripe for the husbandman.
Since then artillery and small-arms, having enormously im-
proved in range and effectiveness, in consequence a forma-
tion closer than the thin English line at the Alma has
been discarded. Infantry lines succeed each other, the
formation is more open than formerly ; it is only cavalry,

which, owing to its speed, is capable of acting in masses.

34 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

Yielding to the pressure of necessity, both French and
Germans, on the fields of the Franco-Prussian War,
fought in loose infantry formation, compelled to this
difference in tactics solely by the change from the old
to the new forms of weapons. In fine, whether we go
back to the campaigns of Hannibal, who maintained him-
self for fifteen years in Italy against the whole Roman
power, or bring our glance down to the most fearfully con-
centrated struggle of historical times, in the Franco-Prussian
War, and include that mighty one, over a larger space and
longer time, our own Civil War, it will be found that the
fundamental principles of the art of war are few and immu-
table, but that the practice of it varies and must vary with
the ages. Hence it follows that only by the study of the
campaigns of the great masters of the art of war of all times
can one know what constitutes, at a given point of time, the
true practice of the art.

The popular notion, at the beginning of the Civil War,
as to what constitutes the best common soldier was nearly
as erroneous as the popular notion of what constitutes the
general. Even drill and discipline were confounded in the
popular mind. This country had inherited from the Prus-
sians of Frederick the Great's time the starched warrior,
who could scarcely move on dress parade for his girting
collar and hands held stiffly at his sides ; and the difference
between campaigning and dress-parade was hardly appreci-
ated in a long period of piping peace. France was the first
nation in modem times which let soldiers march as nature
prompts, with the swinging gait of a walk, where a disen-
gaged arm served its due function of helping swift propul-
sion. The experience of war, however, soon did away with
all martinet tendency, so that men of the East and the
West and the South at last marched like the veterans that
they were, with such glorious pomp and circumstance of

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR. 35

war as stiffiiess left, with much other impedimenta^ far
behind.

It is regrettable that, in this country, even military men
have sometimes, through pride in the particular arm of the
service in which they excelled, or in which they had per-
haps most shone, unduly exalted its value as compared
with the same arm abroad. The most notable instance,
probably, of this kind on record, is that in which General
Sheridan, when a guest at the headquarters of the Prus-
sians, in 1870, wrote a letter, which was published in a
newspaper in the United States, in which he made com-
parison between the German cavalry and the American
cavalry of the Civil War. Now, every military man knows
that the cavalry of Europe and America cannot be likened
to each other, because some of their spheres of action being
different, difference in their organization has become impera-
tive. The ordinary battle-fields of Europe are different
from most of the battle-fields during our Civil War. The
cavalry of Europe, which were generalized in Sheridan's
account merely as cavalry, consist of light and heavy
cavalry, whereas the American consisted of light cavalry
only, serving generally as dragoons ; that is, armed with the
carbine as well as sabre, and able to fight afoot or on horse-
back. But whether light or heavy, regarding it on both
continents simply as cavalry, its action is different on the
two continents, because of the general difference in the char-
acteristics of the battle-fields, those of Europe being gener-
ally on open ground. The American cavalry served effi-
ciently in scouting parties, in guarding the front and flanks
of armies on the march, or in making raids, sometimes of
the proportions of invasions, into the enemy's country.
But where could this cavalry have acted as Blucher's did
in the rout of Waterloo, or as the cavalry on both sides at
Vionville, in the Franco-Prussian War, where, moving in

36 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

great masses, the French and Germans alternately made
furious charges on infantry, and but for the modem repeat-
ing fire-arms, would have swept it ofTthe field.

Very diflTerently from Sheridan, a German of military
experience, Major J. Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engi-
neers, speaks of the distinctiveness of cavalry for different
kinds of service, cavalry fitted for the fields of Europe, and
cavalry fitted for Virginia and neighboring soil. He served
with the Army of Northern Virginia for months, and con-
sidered the Southern far superior to the Northern cavalry,
as indeed it was at first ; yet in speaking of this cavalry,
so well adapted in his opinion, as it was in that of all good
observers, to its special service, he does not confound it in
description, as Sheridan does, with cavalry of another sort,
adapted to a different kind of service. He remarks :

" Through its minute instruction in the duties of elementary tac-
tics, through the rapid execution of evolutions which have become
matter of habit, and through the certainty of rapid concentration in
all the new forms of combination, even in reversed order, the Ger-
man cavalry is far superior to the Southern cavalry, notwithstanding
the fact that the latter is composed of men who have been horsemen
from their earliest youth, whom, except when wounded, I never saw
fall from the saddle."*

After describing the various requirements of German
cavalry-drill, he adds :

" Where could the Southerners have found the time and the means
for instruction in these preparations and exercises ?'* etc.

The underlying fact of Sheridan's undue exaltation of the
Federal as compared with the German cavalry was that it
was in the line of his habitual practice never to blench from

* I quote from the French translation of Major Scheibert's work,
made by Captain J. Boneque, of the Third Regiment of French Engi-
neers, not having the original in German at hand.

TRUTHS AND POPULAR ERRORS ABOUT THE WAR. 37

claiming more than the merit in whatever he was concerned.
As he claimed that the Federal cavalry had never effected
much until he was given command of it, which statement
flies in the face of historical facts, he thereby necessarily
implied that the best of all the Federal cavalry-commanders
was himself, a statement disputed, and still open to dispute.
But, as he so believed, or at least so affected to believe, the
natural consequence of the first affirmation, supported by
his habitual practice of claiming everything, was that the
cavalry which he commanded, after he had commanded it,
was rated by him as the best on earth.

That which made General Meade so good a general in
the field was that he possessed that poise of character which
has been noted as the foundation of all great military achieve-
ment. But, besides this, he had never ceased to study the
art of war through recurring European conflicts. The
peace of thirteen years that intervened between the end of
the Mexican and the beginning of the Civil War found him
studious of everything that related to the methods of civi-
lized warfare, so that when the Civil War broke out in
America he came to his task fitted in every way for its
demands. During these apparently fallow years he had
done the only thing which will enable a military man at
any time to be equal to taking a g^eat part in war. He had
continued to study mutations in the practice of the art of
war. He well knew that, although its principles are im-
mutable, its modifications are not to be covered save by
the whole range of the inventions and changes derived from
the never-ceasing activities of mankind.

38 GENERAL QEOEQE OOEDON MEADE

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN, OTHERWISE CALLED THE

BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

The great political mistake that the South made, astute
as it was in governmental affairs, was in pressing to a suc-
cessful issue, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which thus
became an Act of Congress. The Missouri Compromise,
entered into as long before as the year 1820, had admitted
the State of Missouri as a slave State into the Union, but
with the express agreement that thenceforth slavery should
not be permitted north of latitude 36° 30' within the bounds
of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the land which the
United States had bought of France. By the repeal, in
1850, of the Act of Congress through which this arrange-
ment had been made binding without reference to time, it
was believed that, as the status of freedom had been inci-
dentally settled by the fact that the Mexican territory had
not recognized slavery, a quietus had been put on the dan-
gerous pro-slavery and anti-slavery agitation in the struggle
of the South for the maintenance of its political supremacy,
or at least equality ; that a reconciliation of conflicting in-
terests and final pacification of the country had been effected.
But, by the action of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the whole
political aspect of things changed for the worst. As the
Compromise of 1850 had repealed the Missouri Compro-
mise, so the Kansas-Nebraska Act had the effect of repeal-
ing the Compromise of 1850, and unsettled the whole ques-
tion. The Kansas-Nebraska Act recognized the right of

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 39

the people of a Territory to make the final determination as
to whether or not the resultant State should be free or
slave. It naturally followed, as the opinions and senti-
ments of the inhabitants of a Territory, existing as a pro-
spective State, would determine whether or not, at the time
of admission to the Union, a Territory should, as a State,
be free or slave, that a contest should ensue between the
existing settlers of a Territory ; and moreover, that the new
conditions introduced by the repeal of the Compromise of
1850 should lead to the colonization of Territories north of
36° 30' by settlers intending to determine their free or slave
status with reference to their ultimate recognition as States.
The Territory of Kansas, being just on the western border
of Missouri, became, therefore, at once the scene of intestine
confusion, freedom of elections being interfered with and
forays made into the Territory, so that civic affairs there
were kept in the greatest turmoil.

The repeal of the Compromise of 1850 was but affording
a cause and a great arena for strife to thousands of com-
batants inspired by sentiments impossible to reconcile re-
garding the future of the prospective State, as individually
concerned and as influentially affecting the fortunes of the
whole country. This political situation, resulting from
what was called "squatter-sovereignty," which term signi-
fied, as already indicated, that they who could arrive and
maintain themselves in greatest numbers would be they who
would eventually remain masters of the field in the contest
between freedom and slavery, was that which led imme-
diately to an acerbity never before reached between the
North and South ; this, and the feeling on the one side that
the Fugitive Slave Law was no more than due recognition
of the rights of the South, while, on the other side, it was
r^arded as imposing upon the North a duty which, con-
sidering its sentiments, was revolting. Thus the two parts

40 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

of the country approached nearer and nearer to strife. The
little cloud, of which few took any note in 1850, became
larger and larger until it overshadowed the inhabitants of
the whole land, who, for the most part, were still uncon-
scious of its portent when the ominous calm set in before
the long pent-up storm, before the thunder pealed and light-
nings flashed in war. This calm was the period of pause,
when Southern Senators and Representatives and Cabinet
officers, as their States passed ordinances of secession,
gradually took their leave and shook the dust of Washing-
ton from their feet ; when commissioners, accredited from
the Southern States, appeared in Washington to treat with
the United States as with a foreign power, the basis of con-
ference being what it was impossible for the nation to grant
as a preliminary, the recognition of the Confederacy ; when
Fort Sumter, manned by a few men under Major Robert
Anderson, stood beleaguered in the midst of Charleston
harbor by the batteries built around it by an unmolested
enemy. Still the North temporized, and protested that
there was no reason for this display of force ag^ainst it ; that
it merely asserted its right to its territory, to its forts, its
custom-houses, and its light-houses ; but further than the
implication contained therein, that it would repel force by
force, all that was done by the North was in the line of
conciliation. To no purpose. Suddenly the stillness was
broken by a sound that showed that the storm had broken
loose at last. The besiegers had fired on Sumter. Then
the North roused itself from its partial incredulity as from
slumber, and the stand then taken by secession found its
grave in four years* time, after a frightful struggle, in the
surrender at Appomattox Court House.

On the 1 2th of April, 1 86 1 , the bombardment of Fort
Sumter had beg^n, and it had ended on the 13th. Suc-
cessful resistance was impossible against the batteries of the

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 4I

enemy established at their leisure on the shores surrounding
the work. The besieged were only a handful, inadequately
provisioned, because the enemy had let no stores reach
them, and occupying a partially dismantled work. Mr.
Lincoln at once called for a levy of seventy-five thous-
and men, for three months, apportioned according to
their respective populations among the different States
which recognized the central Government. The spirit of
conciliation still continued to pervade all he said and did,
even in this crisis of active hostility to the Government.
He did not recognize directly or by implication that it could
be possible that States were actually warring against the
Government He treated the situation as if it represented
merely the turbulence of an insurrection which would soon
subside with due amount of judicious management. But,
in meeting the emergency in this admirable manner, he made
one capital mistake of far-reaching consequences. He fixed
the term of the troops demanded by the levy at only three
months' service. It would be vain to say that no man could
have foreseen at the time when Mr. Lincoln called for three
months' troops, that the emergency which demanded any
could possibly last over three months. Many men did
not, probably the majority did not ; but many did. The
First Massachusetts Regiment and the Second Massachu-
setts Regiment went in for the war. General Patterson, of
Philadelphia, so fully realized the inadequacy of a three
months' term to cover the exigencies presented by the mili-
tary situation, that he induced Governor Curtin, of Penn-
sylvania, to raise regiments additional to the quota assigned
to Pennsylvania, an act disapproved by the War Depart-
ment, so far as may be indicated by its non-acceptance of
them. And yet it fell to the lot of those very repudiated
regiments, which formed the celebrated Pennsylvania Re-
serves, to be the most immediate resource for the defence

42 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADR

of Washington after the defeat at Bull Run. The cases
cited will suffice for instances of outspoken appreciation of
the situation, and doubtless there were many others, even
although the form taken by some of them may not have
been exactly the same.* The term of three months was
not long enough for the men, although largely militia, to
acquire the drill and discipline necessary to make good
soldiers. The testimony given before the Congressional
G>mmittee on the Conduct of the War showed that the
regiments at Bull Run had been brigaded only for the
march. The very same thing also happened about th^ time
of the battle of Bull Run, that happened in the Mexican
War, when men were disbanding and dispersing at the end
of their term of service, at a time when their presence was
most urgently needed. This contingency Mr. Lincoln evi-
dently did not see, nor did Mr. Seward either, the Secretary
of State, whose view was most roseate as to the small time
needed to bring about pacification. Yet to accept troops
for any term, however long, it was not necessary to depart
from the language which Mr. Lincoln used out of regard

* General Patterson's prime agency in this matter, in having made
to Governor Curtin the first suggestion of an additional levy for Penn-
sylvania, has been recently disputed. But, if anything in the world
would seem to be clear, as establishing the existence of an occurrence,
it is the coincidence between the letter of April 25, 1861, from General
Patterson (the authenticity of which is undisputed), requesting the
Governor to call out an additional twenty-five regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry, with the expression in the Governor's Message of
1862, where he says, " Men more than sufficient in number to form
some ten Regiments of the Reserve Corps had, previous to the 1 5th
of May, been accepted by me in pursuance of a call upon me (after-
wards rescinded) for twenty-five regiments, and were then already
assembled and subject to my control Most of these men volunteered
for the Reserve Corps, and were immediately organized." It was not
through the subsequent action of General Patterson, but through that
of the Government, that the call was rescinded.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 43

for the susceptibilities of the people. The euphemism in
which he indulged, in his political adroitness and kindness
of hearty would have covered any duration of strife just as
completely as though he had used the word ** war."

A skirmish at the village of Falling Waters, on the Poto-
mac, just below Williamsport, took place on July 2d, be-
tween the force under General Patterson and that under
General Thomas J. Jackson, the latter falling back towards
Winchester. But no battle, except the engagements of
Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, in the western part of
Virginia, won, on July nth and 13th, by General George
B. McClellan, had taken place at this time in the East.
The district mentioned, which was part and parcel of Vir-
ginia, became, on June 20, 1863, by the will of its people
and the formal acceptance of the United States, the State
of West Virginia. In Missouri, in the West, a battle had
taken place. Between the date of the firing on Fort Sum-
ter, April 1 2th, and that of the battle of Bull Run, July
2 1 St, the troops had been distributed in and near Fort Mon-
roe, near Baltimore and Washington, and along the fords
of the Potomac. On May 24th they had occupied Arling-
ton Heights, which dominate the city of Washington from
beyond the Potomac ; while at Manassas, with pickets
thrown out beyond Centreville towards Washington, the
enemy silently impended as, in Bulwer's "Zanoni," the
Shape, with horrid possibilities of harm, brooded as the
Dweller of the Threshold.

A Confederate army, under General P. G. T. Beauregard,
the capturer of Fort Sumter, in occupying Manassas (the
point where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running
from Alexandria to Richmond, meets the Manassas Gap
Railroad after it has passed through Strasburg, Front
Royal, and Manassas Gap, and thence to Manassas Junction)
held a strategic point of great importance. A Confederate

44 GENERAL QEOROE GORDON MEADE

army, under General Joseph E. Johnston, occupied the
town of Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley, some forty-
five miles distant from Manassas Junction. From where
Johnston was, however, in Winchester, points along the
aforesaid railroad leading through Strasburg, Front Royal,
and other towns, were within a day's march of Beaure-
gard's position. Consequently Johnston could at any time
within a few hours reinforce Beauregard, or, conversely,
Beauregard could reinforce him within the same time.
General Patterson, with a force of not much over ten thou-
sand Federal troops, was ordered by General Scott to
detain Johnston at Winchester, so that he could not rein-
force Beauregard. But the position he was ordered to
remain in for the purpose of holding Johnston rendered it
physically impossible that he could have any influence
whatsoever over Johnston's movements, for whereas John-
ston had, by means of the railroad described, ample facility
for reinforcing Beauregard or being reinforced by him.
General Patterson was obliged by his orders, despite the
fact that he had pointed out to General Scott where his
true strategical position was, to remain in the front of John-
ston, by way, forsooth, of keeping him from going in the
opposite direction, towards Ids utiobstructed rear^ towards
Beauregard's position.

There never was a simpler strategical problem presented
than the one which offered itself to the military authorities
at Washington. Supposing that Johnston should attempt
to reinforce Beauregard, Patterson should have been where
he could simultaneously join the Union Army near Ma-
nassas, and jointly with it oppose both Beauregard and
Johnston. If Beauregard had reinforced Johnston, there
would have been no recourse for Patterson but to make a
rapid retreat to Williamsport The event fell out in the
very opposite way, but oo|JflflHHM|ttenon was power-

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 45

less even to modify its course, as will now be shown. It
will appear, as we proceed, that General Patterson's presence
at the Battle of Bull Run became, on account of the orders
which he received, absolutely impossible. Why, then, the
defeat of Bull Run should have been attributed to the
absence of Patterson's troops there is a mystery not to be
solved except by reverting to a very prevalent practice in
mundane affairs. The battle was lost, there was no deny-
ing that, but the cause of its loss must be accounted for so
as to save the susceptibilities of those in fault. Les absents
ont taujours tort ; therefore General Patterson was respon-
sible for the defeat. This is not the place for presenting
at length a special plea for any man, and it may be said,
too, that history has in a measure set this matter right, but
this circumstance is so intimately interwoven with the his-
tory of the battle of Bull Run, that it cannot be allowed to
appear as an incident of the defeat in the minds of persons
not disabused of the entire falsity of the charges against
General Patterson. To repeat, it was as impossible for
General Patterson to have reached, under his orders, the
field of battle, as if he had had his forces in the moon.
But the full demonstration of this, as a part of the history
of the war in the East, may properly be postponed until we
have deak with the incidents of the battle itself

Under pressure of public opinion, and against the first
judgment of General Scott, the Administration was induced
to countenance an order to General Irvin McDowell, the
commander of the Federal forces on Arlington Heights, to
advance, on the i6th of July, against the enemy posted
at Manassas Junction. If General McDowell had been able
to attack Beauregard on the i8th, he would have found
him without any but trifling reinforcements, without a single
man from Johnston's column at Winchester ; but the faulty
organization of his troops delayed active operations, and by

46 GENERAL OEORGE OOBDON MEADE

the time he was ready to attack Beauregard, Johnston had
joined him in force.

McDowell brought up at Centreville on the 19th, and
remained there on that and the next day. In front of him,
to the southwest, running, with many sinuosities, in a north-
west and southeast direction, and emptying into the Occo-
quan, was the stream called Bull Run, distant at its nearest
points from two and a half to three miles. Behind it lay
the enemy's main body, his left flank covering the turnpike
going to Warrenton, towards the southwest, and his right
flank, the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, at
the point, Manassas Junction, about five miles in the rear.
Bull Run, at ordinary stages of water, is fordable at several
places along its length, and is crossed by a stone bridge
on the continuation of the turnpike from Warrenton to
Fairfax Court House, on the way to Alexandria.

The two forces opposed to each other at the battle of
Bull Run did not difler in numbers by more than about one
thousand men, the advantage being on the side of the
Federals. The organization on both sides was as defective
as may be imagined from the fact that on both sides they
consisted of raw levies. The highest officers on both sides
were men of good military knowledge, some of great
capacity, as the future showed, but none of them of any
experience in the handling of large bodies of troops, so that
they were equal in that respect. The Confederates were
superior to the Federals from the fact of their greater men-
tal preparedness, for they had long contemplated this very
shock of arms, and with their overweening sense of supe-
riority and long-harbored resentment from a sense of wrong,
which had been fostered by the ruling class of the South,
they welcomed it with a certain martial ardor. They were
superior, too, in the use of fire-arms through their individual
practice. They were, as a body, decidedly more trust-

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THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 47

worthy than the troops, as a body, on the Federal side, for
it came out finally, in the testimony before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War, that, on the Federal side, the
men were often superior to their officers, cases occurring
where officers had even deserted their men on the field.
And the worst element of all on the Federal side was that
constituted by a regiment of so-called Fire Zouaves, of
whom, before the fight, regular officers had expressed them-
selves as utterly distrustful, because, on the march, they had
proved themselves to be mere marauders and without any
military discipline whatever. All history has shown that
military bodies formed of those who in time of peace belong
to a reckless class have no stomach for that sort of a fight
in which is involved a question of principle, even if it be no
higher than loyalty from man to man in the presence of dan-
ger. A real army being that kind of combination which is
represented by the highest organism, — interpenetrated from
the brain, the general, down to the lowest fibre, the common
soldier, with intermediate ganglia, the officers, — unless the
whole structure be co-ordinated, its parts cannot perform
their functions because they cannot be efficient save through
the central control and intermediate direction actuating
the mass. From this, the true point of view, neither army
was worthy .of the name,' as compared with thoroughly or-
ganized forces, and judged by this criterion it ought to be
clearly seen that the Federal army was not so trustworthy
as that of the Confederates, in which, generally, there was
the solidarity derived from better personnel in the minor
commands.

Johnston began to join Beauregard on the 19th of July,
his last troops coming up in time for the battle of the 20th.
Both sides were eager for battle. On the morning of the
2 1 St Beauregard contemplated turning the Federal left Bank
at Centreville, three miles off, by passing over the lower

48 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

fords of Bull Run. At the same time the main body of
McDowell's troops, leaving reserves at Centreville, was on
the march for the ford of Bull Run, near Sudley Springs,
about five miles away, with the purpose of crossing at the
ford and marching down the right bank of Bull Run, while
another force marched directly to make a junction with the
first, by the stone bridge over Bull Run, on the line of the
Warrenton turnpike, the whole movement being concerted
with the purpose of falling on the Confederate left flank.
If the order from General Beauregard had not miscarried,
in which he had directed General R. S. Ewell to take the
lead in crossing the lower fords of Bull Run, the field pre-
sented would have been Beauregard marching to Centreville
and intercepting McDowell's communications with Wash-
ington, while McDowell had put his main force behind Bull
Run. How preposterous it is, then, in view of this, for cer-
tain writers, from the Federal standpoint, to have deplored
that, through defective marching orders and the confusion
and delay attendant thereon, McDowell's advance had been
delayed three hours, for, as remarked, if Beauregard had
been able to carry out his intention, the Federal communi-
cations would have been seized while McDowell was pass-
ing to what had been Beauregard's rear. Beauregard had
instructed Ewell to begin his march at 7.30 a.m. General
Ewell did not receive the order, so the whole right wing of
Beauregard's army remained deadlocked, as Ewell's cross-
ing was to be the signal for the general movement. It was
on account of this detention that, at 10.30 a.m., Beauregard
and Johnston became apprised that the Federals were advan-
cing on their left flank. Now, if the Federals had really lost
three hours, the time at which they were fairly en route must
have been about 7.30 a.m., or, in other words, at about the
same time that Beauregard had expected starting with his
right wing in the oj^site direction. Had this contretemps

TEE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 49

actually taken place, as certainly would have happened but
for the miscarriage of the order to Ewell, we should have
had on the field a repetition of the situation in which
Prince Eugene and Turenne once found themselves. Al-
though Johnston, by right of seniority of rank, had, by the
fact of his coming, superseded Beauregard, he relinquished
the immediate command of the troops to Beauregard, whose
battle Bull Run undoubtedly was, and as such was univer-
sally recognized. What happened when the cloud of dust
towards the north was perceived by the Confederates await-
ing the beginning of the movement ordered from their own
right, proving that their attack was anticipated by one on
their left, ought to be obvious. Orders were sent at once
to the lower fords for reinforcements from the troops wait-
ing there, and Beauregard and Johnston at once rode rapidly
towards their left flank, four miles away, reaching there, of
course, after the engagement had begun. The extreme left
flank was held by General N. G. Evans with a portion of a
brigade, covering the stone bridge crossing the Warrenton
turnpike. As soon, however, as he had found that Federal
troops were approaching in force on his left flank, he had at
once retreated to a commanding position to his left and rear,
leaving only a small force of observation at the bridge, and
at the same time had despatched to the right the news of
the advance of the enemy on his flank. He had previously
seen movements of that portion of the Federal troops which
had appeared on the Warrenton turnpike, but had become
satisfied that they portended no immediate advance, and as he
was guarding the stone bridge, obstructed by abattis, and the
fords in its vicinity, he held on there until he had observed
the advance on his flank, which it was impossible for him
alone to resist. Colonel A. E. Bumside, who was in com-
mand of the brigade at the head of McDowell's column,

attacked Evans in the position which he had taken up to

so GENERAL QEOROE GORDON MEADE

the left and rear of the stone bridge. Why it was that he
was not able with his larger force, with arriving accessions,
to dislodge Evans in the course of an hour, before re-
inforcements arrived for him, does not appear on the sur&ce.
Perhaps Bumside may have felt that, from the character
of some of his troops, they were more than ordinarily to be
shielded from harm. Certain it is that, at a moment when
he had not lost a dozen men in killed and wounded, he ex-
citedly charged an aide of General Andrew Porter's to tell
him that he was being cut to pieces.

Finally, General Bernard E. Bee, with his brigade, and
some additional troops belonging to Colonel F. S. Bartow's
brigade, reinforced Evans and enabled him for a while longer
to hold his ground. But the brigades of the Federal col-
umn, gradually arriving and deploying, overlapped this force
on both flanks and compelled it to retreat in great disorder
to the southward, across the Warrenton turnpike, and take
position on the Henry House hill. This Henry House
hill, as it is usually called — for it is sometimes called the
Henry House plateau — is a great plateau, with sides sloping
in all directions. It is bounded around the northern sweep
of its base by a little tributary of Bull Run, called Young's
Branch, around the eastern sweep of its base by the same
tributary, and around the western sweep of its base by the
roaS from Sudley Ford to Manassas. The retreating Con-
federates took position on and formed their line across this
plateau-like hill. Here General Jackson, coming from the
right flank of Beauregard's forces, had reached a position,
and was able to aflbrd by his presence and the steadiness
of his brigade strong moral support to the discomfited
Confederates. Here it was that Jackson, through his bri-
gade, earned the celebrated sobriquet conferred upon it by
the casual remark of Bee, that the brigade stood like a
stone wall. It was fortunate for the Confederates that

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 5 1

there were present at this juncture troops that stood imper-
turbably amidst the confusion of their routed men, rushing
pell-mell to take up a position on the hill.

There had been in the main praiseworthy earnestness in
the conduct of the troops which had finally dislodged and
driven the Confederates upon the Henry House hill. But
in this very first part of the battle became apparent what
was perfectly manifest before its close, that the successful
handling of large bodies of troops in attack must be pre-
ceded by much previous drill. To disengage the regiments
coming up successively in McDowell's column and bring
them into action took, from a military point of view, en-
tirely too much time. The situation was now this : The
Federals occupied the ground in front of the Confederate
line on the Henry House hill, which line, therefore, of
course &ced north. Colonel Wm. T. Sherman, command-
ing one of the brigades of General Daniel Tyler, had
crossed Bull Run at Red House Ford, just above the stone
bridge, and had combined his forces with McDowell's in the
final advance which had driven the enemy south of the
Warrenton turnpike. General Tyler, commanding in per-
son another brigade of his division, crossed at the same
place, but after making only a slight attack on the enemy
at the Robinson House, — a house on the northeastern side
of the Henry House hill, — marched to the south along
Young's Branch, and was not heard from again during the
battle. To this unfortunate occurrence must also be added,
that Bumside's brigade had most inopportunely been al-
lowed to rest and refresh itself. To march away after firing
a few shots, or to rest and refresh in an emergency like this,
when the enemy is sure soon to receive reinforcements from
his unattacked wing, is an introduced condition likely to
lead, as it did in this case, to need of much longer rest and
refreshment. Here were two brigades neutralized at one

52 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADE.

of the most critical parts of the day, the only rational con-
clusion to be drawn from the fact being that there was at
the time an impression in some quarters that the affair en-
gaged in was somewhat of the nature of a picnic.

At this time, about 2 p.m., when McDowell made his
attack on the Henry House hill, he had only four brigades
in hand — Colonel Wm. T, Sherman's, Colonel William B.
Franklin's, Colonel Andrew Porter's and Colonel Orland

B. Wilcox's, two batteries of regular artillery, and a com-
pany of regular cavalry. The pioneers of General Robert

C. Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, were clearing
away the abattis at the stone bridge, so as to permit the
brigade to cross Bull Run, the rest of Tyler's division hav-
ing crossed at Red House Ford. The brigade of Colonel
Oliver O. Howard, of Colonel Samuel P. Heintzleman's
divison, had not reached the field by the circuitous route
from Centreville around by the way of Sudley Springs.
The brigade of Bumside, and that of Tyler — ^which, in the
presence of his superior officer. Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes
only nominally commanded — have been accounted for.
Therefore, at the moment when McDowell concluded to
attack the hill, he determined to do it with only two-thirds
of the force close at hand. It would not have done
to await the coming of Howard, but there is no reason why,
when he was advancing, Burnside and Tyler should not
have been summoned to follow, or to try to outflank the
enemy. Tyler's brigade was nearly intact, and the men of
Bumside's were merely fatigued, not exhausted, and could
at least have rested in reserve.

The first great mistake of the day was in not overwhelm-
ing Evans at once. This was the second, to be followed
soon by a greater than both of the preceding. The gen-
eral in command ought to have seen that, as 'it was 2 p.m.
and he was pushing the enemy toward the south, he was

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 53

pushing him towards reinforcements that must be on the
way and on the eve of arrival, and therefore, that if the
enemy was to be finally routed, it were well that the
attempt were made quickly to put him to flight. The
Confederates, doubtless appreciating the situation, fell
back to the southern and eastern edge of the plateau,
which was thickly wooded there. Here, under shelter,
their sharpshooters began to come disastrously into play,
and they could retreat, and under cover reform and advance
at their pleasure. This was the point of time when the
third and final g^eat mistake of the day was made, and all
the more remarkable a one because regulars committed
portions of it. McDowell ordered forward, near the Henry
House, the two batteries of regular artillery. It is some-
times as dangerous to pursue when one fleeth, as it is to flee
when no one pursueth. It is not good military practice
to advance artillery within musketry range of woods held
in force by the enemy, or to any position unsupported by
reliable infantry. The pieces, in this case, began to advance
before the infantry to support them had arrived, and when
the infantry selected for this purpose had been pushed for-
ward, it proved to be the only thoroughly worthless regi-
ment in the army, the regiment of New York Fire Zouaves.
So incredible was the order to Captain Charles Griffin, that
he at first remonstrated with the chief of artillery, Major
William F. Barry, who seemed to think it imperative,
and so Griffin and Captain James B. Ricketts promptly
obeyed it, and placed themselves where their presence
meant almost certain destruction in the face of an enterpris-
ing enemy. The enem/s sharpshooters in the woods began
to disable the batteries by picking off* their men, the Fire
Zouaves were routed by a charge of cavalry whose men
they ought to have destroyed, for the enemy had only two
companies of horse ; and, finally, a regiment of the enemy,

54 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

emerging from the east toward the left, was mistaken by
the chief of artillery for supports arriving, when it, coming
within range, poured into the batteries so deadly a volley
that they were rendered completely useless. The final
possession of the batteries became the object upon which
the energies of the combatants were concentrated, and the
enemy was repubed into the sheltering woods. Too late
in the contest Howard's brigade, which had come up, took
a share in it.

Here General McDowell ought to have seen that, with
the force which he had at his disposal at the moment it
was impossible to win the battle. It would seem to have
been perfectly feasible, if the movement had been ordered
in time, for Bumside's and Tyler's brigades to turn the
enemy's position. The enemy had as much as their forces
engaged could encounter, as proved by the fact of his
taking shelter in the woods. If two brigades, under General
Kirby Smith and Colonel J. A. Elarly, which now arrived
as reinforcements to the enemy, changed the fortunes of the
day, it is presumable that two Federal brigades, which
were not utilized to any great extent, would, had they been
put into a timely turning movement, have routed the enemy
before he was reinforced.

The battle was a drawn one when the Confederates re-
ceived the reinforcement of the brigades under Kirby Smith
and Elarly. They fell in on the left of the Confederate line,
and overlapped the right of McDowell's. Then the Federal
troops began to move simultaneously towards the rear.
There was no appearance at first of rout. That episode
in the retreat occurred later. The troops for a while took
their way gradually towards the rear, and reached the open
plain from which they had ascended the Henry House hill,
and then pursued their course back to Centreville by the
Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley Springs road. Their

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 55

organization was for a time fairly well preserved. When,
however, those retreating by the Warrenton turnpike reached
the bridge over Cub Run, a tributary of Bull Run, and
came under the fire of a battery which the Confederates
had brought to bear on it, panic manifested itself. The
panic, like all other panics, was unnecessary. Panic is
either a fear entirely groundless, or else with grounds that
ought to be inadequate to produce the loss of self-posses-
sion. On the northern side of Bull Run were bodies of
troops with morale undisturbed. The smaller one of these,
imder Colonel Israel B. Richardson, had guarded Black-
bum's Ford. Troops from it repulsed the enemy in an at-
tempt to cross McLean's Ford. The larger force, under
Colonel Dixon S. Miles, was nearer Centreville. The two
bodies, constituting the reserve mentioned, of three brigades,
became the rear-guard of McDowell's retreating army.
Between Centreville and Washington two brigades had
guarded the communications. Some portions of the army,
under good officers, maintained their organizations, while
others poured continuously, as a mere mob, towards Wash-
ington, and the next day thronged the streets of the city
and filled it with the tales of their wonderful experiences.
There was, however, really no disgfrace attachable to most
of the troops. They had been called upon to do more
than lay in the power of their recent organization and often
faulty leading. General Johnston himself warned his own
people against vainglory in consequence of the event of the
battle, calling their attention to the fact that the task which
had been set the Federal troops to perform, in marching
and attacking, was a far more difficult one than that which
they themselves had executed in standing on their defense.
The mistakes connected with the battle at this place may
be summarized as follows : It may be said that, as Centre-
ville is a strong position, and as raw troops are better fitted

56 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

for defensive than for offensive movements, it was an error
not to wait at Centreville for two or three days, and give
the enemy a chance to attack, which course, it seems, he
intended to pursue. There, too, McDowell's reserves
would have been available for the time of actual conflict.
They were available only for covering the retreat under the
circumstances under which the battle actually took place.
It is not apparent, as has been charged, judging from meas-
urement on the large-scale map furnished by McDowell to
accompany his official report of the battle, that his troops,
although mainly raw, were called upon to make a march
unduly long, by the Sudley Springs road, before they
encountered the enemy. The day was extremely warm,
but it must be considered, also, that they started early in
the morning, and that the longest distance marched by any
body before it reached the first part of the battle-field
was nine miles. An exaggerated idea of the number of
troops opposed to them, at the first onslaught on Evans,
the most common of the misapprehensions at the beginning
of the war, led to wary measures, when Evans could have
been crushed, and, in turn, the supports arriving for him
could have been brushed away. Assault on the Henry
House hill was injudicious with the small force with which
it was attempted, without the support of the two brigades
on the ground that were not utilized. The advance of the
artillery to the place to which it was ordered was an opera-
tion that is indefensible. Persistence in the attack, when it
ought to have been clearly seen that, on account of the
woods in which the enemy had taken refuge it was impos-
sible without a turning force to dislodge him, was the final
error, ensuring reinforcement to the enemy and probable dis-
orderly retreat to the Federals, if not actual rout. If a re-
verse comes to men, even those inured to war, who are tired
and hungry, it comes with cumulative force. Thousands of

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. $7

the men were true to duty, as proved by the steadfast way in
which they at first moved from the field. They began the
movement because they had simultaneously perceived the
impossibility of achieving success. If they had been unable
to drive the enemy from his wooded defences, how could
they hope to do it when he was reinforced by two brigades
on his left, outflanking their right ? The efforts of their
officers, and there were more good ones than worthless,
could not counteract that conviction in the men, which they,
too, must have shared, even whilst they strove to keep the
men in hand and prevent them from retreating.

Not until the moment when the men were relatively safe
did panic overtake them. This phenomenon of panic,
although one so extraordinary, is nevertheless one which
seems never to have been examined critically as to its
cause. Putting aside the special case under observation,
including all the elements in it of novelty, hunger, and
fatigue, and looking at the phenomenon of panic, with the
evidence before us as to the main conditions attending it,
contributory ones apart, let us see whether the rationale
of it cannot be reached. In the first place it is observ-
able that panic was much more prevalent among the
ancients than it is among the modems, so much more,
indeed, that even the most advanced of the ancients could
account for it only by supposing that it was due to super-
natural agency. The voice of the god Pan was supposed
to inspire terror on the battle-field. The Athenians be-
lieved, at the battle of Marathon, that the rout of the Per-
sians was ascribable to the terrible voice of this god. In
the second place, those who, in modem times, are most liable
to panic are the ignorant and uneducated. Here is an ap-
parent anomaly ; the highest general intellectual develop-
ment of the centuries and the lowest are found in the same
category of weakness. But the anomaly is seen to be only

$8 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADE

apparent when it is considered that, in the realm of imagina-
tion, the Greeks were savages, when looked at from the
educated modem point of view. One of the chief effects
of modem education is to train the imagination, and bring
it under entire subjection to the intellect. So, in fine, those
persons it was, and is, who, having untrained imaginations,
are most prone to panic, which may be defined shortly as
unreasonable fear.

This being premised as to the sole condition of suscep-
tibility, it remains to specify the conditions under which
panic chiefly manifests itself. It may be produced in an in-
stant among masses of mankind, before they have time to
think, by an alarm of fire in a crowded building, or by the
belief that an overloaded balcony is breaking down with or
upon them. But this is not the particular variety of panic
with which we have to do here. We are speaking of panic
in armies, and under circumstances where there is plenty of
time to think. Let us, then, as throwing light upon the
cause, observe when panic takes place in great armies or in
smaller bodies of men composing armies. It might be sup-
posed that, if ever there were a time when a body of troops
would have been seized with panic, it was when the younger
Cyrus, leading an army against his brother Artaxerxes, was
killed in battle, and then the principal officers, invited to a
conference, treacherously murdered. But no ; under Xen-
ophon chiefly they pushed their way back through the
Persian Empire to the Bosporus. In some of their first
encounters with the Arabs the French were killed to a man
without a thought of escape. In our Indian wars the same
thing has often occurred. The steamship ** San Francisco,"
with seven hundred troops aboard, went down in the
Atlantic, losing two hundred and forty of their number,
and so conducting themselves as to elicit from the War
Department a complimentary order. It will be found that.

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 59

in all cases, the phenomenon called panic reverts to a
physiological peculiarity belonging to the constitution of
mankind. Through that peculiarity man is capable of sup-
porting any degree of danger with unblenching courage if
the nervous system gradually inures itself to stress, but he
cannot bear with equanimity any sudden revulsion of feel-
ing. People in grief have been known to die from the
shock of a sudden access of joy. After a victory of Napo-
leon's, some artillery and troops were drawn up in a village
by night, the enemy being in full retreat, when a tumbril
came rumbling through the streets, and instantly the vic-
torious French, imagining that the enemy was upon them,
fled in the wildest panic towards the rear.

It is thus apparent that panic takes place in armies only
when there is a revulsion of feeling from the hope or belief
that victory will be or is achieved. At Bull Run, novelty,
fatigue, and hunger were merely accessory to the creation
of that kind of revulsion. Another point is still to be noted.
The officer is not so much subject to panic, if at all, as the
common soldier is. That is entirely true, comparing mass
with mass. We say that the viarale of officers is superior
to that of common soldiers, but that does not explain any-
thing ; it merely states a fact. The reason of the difference
is that, by the very circumstance of his ordinarily higher
education, the officer has, as compared with the common
soldier, a trained imagination, not given to vain fears, imag-
inary fears, fears which control action in spite of the reason,
and his sense of responsibility and capacity for meeting re-
sponsibility are immensely increased. The ideal officer is so
imbued with the sense of responsibility, the imperious claim
of duty, it has become so much a habit of mind, that it
excludes alarm that cannot be controlled by reason and its
cause met with the faculties of mind and body undisturbed.
These are the attributes, and thus derived, which the ideal

6o GENERAL QEOEGE QORDON MEADR

officer possesses in such full and overflowing measure as to
be able to share them in critical moments with the average
soldier of the ranks.

About eighteen thousand men on each side took part
in the battle, the losses on each in killed and wounded
amounting to nearly t\vo thousand. Bee was killed on the
Henry House hill. On the map of the ground which
Beauregard presented to the dty of New Orleans the spot
where he fell is indicated. "Stonewall" Jackson was
wounded, and so was Kirby Smith. On the Federal side
Hunter and Heintzelman, both commanders of divisions,
were woimded. The statistics of losses bear out the state-
ment that, so far as mere fighting was concerned, the troops
did well for men not inured to war.

The panic increasing rather than decreasing as the troops
neared safety, all attempts to rally them at Centreville were
in vain. Supported by the rear-guard of the three brigades
which had been posted on the hither side of Bull Run, the
troops poured in an unceasing stream of disorganization
towards Washington. As day dawned, the next morning,
on the banks of the Potomac, a solitary horseman might
have been descried, as Mr. G. P. R. James, the novelist,
used to say, approaching the western end of Long Bridge,
where, so he told me, there was not even a corporal's guard
on duty. It was a young officer of the Federal army,
bearer of despatches to General Scott, doubtless sounding
a warning note lest the enemy might capture the city un-
awares.

On that same day, the day after the battle, the spirit of
the North rose to fever-heat. The House of Representa-
tives passed a bill for the enlistment of five hundred thou-
sand volunteers for the war. General George B. McClellan
was summoned to Washington to take command, under
General Scott, of the troops in and around the Capital. It

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 6l

was realized now that General Scott was too infirm for
the duties of the position, even of command of the opera-
tions there, let alone command of the armies of the United
States, which latter position, however, he continued nomi-
nally to hold until November i, 1861. He was, in fact,
an invalid, borne down by weight of years and by ill-
health. For his own sake and that of the people, the bur-
den of any chief command should not have been placed
upon him. At the beginning of the war General Scott's
first choice had been General Robert E. Lee, but he thought
that his duty lay with his native State, Virginia. It is not
by any means a wild supposition that, if General Lee, with
his military genius, had come, through General Scott (as
would have been inevitable, had he cast his lot differently),
into the chief command of the Union armies, the Confed-
eracy would have been dealt at the beginning such stunning
blows as to have caused its collapse at once. But the fates
ordered it otherwise. The valiant Army of the Potomac
was doomed, headless for a long time, to hold in check the
fierce energies of a force directed by a hand so capable
that it might fitly be described, as a character of Dumas'
styled one of the first swordsmen of France, as une lame
vivante. Considering all things, the Army of the Potomac
was a marvel in fortitude. Nothing but the undaunted
Roman legions, defeated time and again by Hannibal, can
parallel its morale^ maintained steadfastly until it fell under
worthy leadership. Even the Continental armies, amidst
the promiscuous blows of Napoleon, had occasionally some
respite ; but to the Army of the Potomac there was for a
long time none.

It only remains now to dispel a popular error by showing
that it was put out of the power of General Patterson to
save the day at Bull Run, if the day could have been saved.

62 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADE.

General Patterson demanded at once a court of inquiry, and
could not get it, upon the plea that, as he had been honor-
ably discharged, that was recognition of the value of his
services. He did not think so, especially as public prints in
various parts of the country represented him to be a brother-
in-law of General Johnston's (which was not the fact) and a
secret friend of the Southern cause. He spoke to the
President, who gave him five hours of his precious time,
and became satisfied, from an examination of his orders, of
the injustice that was being done him. He applied to Con-
gress, Congress in turn applying to the War Department for
the papers of the case. The War Department declined to
furnish them, on the ground of the interests of the public
service. So General Patterson had to suffer obloquy in
many quarters until the end of the war, when he brought
out a pamphlet containing the official record and everything
else appertaining to his case, proving that it was not he, but
General Scott, who had been responsible for that for which
he had to bear censure. But so difficult is it to suppress
the echoes of many-tongued rumor, that even at this late
day there is not one man in a hundred who does not believe
that, but for General Patterson's default, the battle of Bull
Run would not have been lost to the Union cause. It is,
therefore, my purpose to show conclusively, as a part of
the history of the battle, and in justice to the man who
was so wronged, that the public impression was entirely
erroneous regarding General Patterson.

General Patterson, to begin with, has been spoken of in
connection with the battle as a man of seventy years of age,
and also as a man who had had no military education, thus
by implication attributing to him disabilities which did not
exist. General Patterson was a very able man in mind, and
of so robust a constitution of body that, at nearly ninety
years of age, he continued vigorous, and at seventy he

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 63

was not really older than the average healthy man of fifty.
He had been educated in the best of military schools, that
from which some of the greatest captains of all time have
been graduated — the school of actual war. He had been
an officer in the War of 181 2, and he had served with great
credit in the Mexican War, in 1846. With him, in the cam-
paign near Washington, were some of the ablest officers of
the army, with whom General Scott instructed him to confer,
and with whom he did confer, they coinciding with him
entirely as to what he did. But now, as the object here is
not to prove that high military authorities agreed with him,
but to show that he was controlled at every turn, and then
censured for not doing what had been rendered impossible,
we must follow the course of events from the period when
Patterson took command of the troops which were to
occupy the Shenandoah Valley for the purpose of detaining
Johnston in Winchester so that he could not reinforce
Beauregard.

In a letter of instructions from General Scott to General
Patterson, dated June 8, 186 1, he tells him that he approves
of the projected expedition against Harper's Ferry, but adds
that there must be no reverse, and then goes on to say that,
he had just ordered Bumside's Rhode Island regiment of
in&ntry, with its battery, to join him ; also that he is to be
reinforced by a company of the Fourth Artillery, which,
however, may not reach him in time. Towards the end of
the letter General Scott refers again to its being indispensa-
ble that there shall be no reverse, because that would result
in engendering high hopes in the enemy. He concluded
his letter by reiterating the same idea that he had twice
before expressed about a reverse, in the following words :
"Take your measures, therefore, circumspectly; make a
good use of your engineers and other experienced staff-
officers and generals, and attempt nothing without a clear

64 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADR

prospect of success, as you will find the enemy strongly
posted and not inferior to you in numbers."

Johnston retreated from Harper's Ferry and fell back
towards Bunker Hill. Patterson pushed his forces across
the Potomac to pursue, but when his column was actually
astride of the river he received a telegram from General
Scott which read as follows : ** What movement, if any, in
pursuit of the enemy, do you propose to make consequent
on the evacuation of Harper's Ferry ? If no pursuit, and
I recommend none, specifically, send to me at once all the
regular troops, horse and foot, with you, and the Rhode
Island regiment."

In reply to this telegram General Patterson begged to be
allowed to keep the regulars, and to be allowed to transfer
his base from Williamsport to Harper's Ferry, and to open
and maintain communication east and west along the Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad, and to hold at Harper's Ferry,
Martinsburg, and Charlestown strong forces ; securely ad-
vancing, as the troops are prepared, portions of them towards
Winchester, and thence towards Woodstock, and thus cut
off the enemy's communication with the west.

General Scott objected to this plan that, if a detachment
were sent towards Winchester it would, if strong enough,
drive the enemy away from Winchester and Strasburg,
to Manassas Junction and greater concentration, and if the
detachment were not strong enough, it would be lost. The
telegram concluded by saying that the regulars with Pat-
terson were most needed in Washington, and by directing
him to send them and the Rhode Island regiment as fast as
disengaged.

General Scott telegraphed again, on the 17th of June:
" We are pressed here. Send the troops I have twice called
for, without delay." This order left General Patterson with-
out a single piece of artillery and with only one troop of

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 6$

cavalry. The Hon. John Sherman, at that time on General
Patterson's staff, wrote him the following August : " The
great error of General Scott undoubtedly was that he gave
way to a ceaseless apprehension that Washington was to be
attacked before the meeting of Congress, and therefore
weakened you when you were advancing. No subsequent
movement could repair that error."

On the 2 1st of June General Patterson, by request, sent
by telegraph to General Scott a plan of operations. This,
abbreviated, is as follows : To occupy Maryland Heights
(which is the key of Harper's Ferry) ; to cross the Potomac
with horse, foot, and artillery near Point of Rocks ; to make
a junction with Colonel Charles P. Stone at Leesburg. Ob-
serve, that where Patterson wanted to go was to Leesburg,
whence he could have gone by rail to Alexandria, and
thence nearly to Centreville, in a shorter time than John-
ston, at Winchester, could go thence to Manassas Junction,
because Johnston would have had a long day's march before
he could strike from Winchester the line of the Manassas
Gap Railroad. It will appear, as we proceed, that General
Patterson was not allowed to go to Leesburg, but was kept
on the front of Johnston almost up to the last moment.

On June 23d General Patterson was at Hagerstown, still
recommending that Maryland Heights be occupied and a
supporting force left in the valley, the whole command to
be about twenty-five hundred men.

On June 25th General Scott telegraphed to Patterson to
" Remain in front of the enemy while he continued in force
between Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in supe-
rior or equal force you may cross and attack him. If the
enemy should retire upon his resources at Winchester, it is
not enjoined that you should pursue him to that distance
from your base of operations without a well-grounded con-
fidence in your continued superiority. Your attention is

66 GENERAL OEOBOB GORDON MEADS.

invited to a secondary object, a combined operation on
Leesburg, between a portion of your troops and the column
of Colonel Stone at, and probably above, the Point of
Rocks, to hold that village. The enemy has reinforced
Leesburg to sixteen hundred men, and may increase the
number. Inquire."

General Patterson very pertinently remarked in his vin-
dication, written in 1865: "Yet the commander-in-chief,
who had, on the 25 th, given me permission to offer battle,
' if superior or equal in force ; on the 27th, when he knew
I had but six guns and no mode of moving them, tele-
graphs : * I had expected your crossing the river to-day in
pursuit of the enemy.' "

In response to this General Patterson wrote to the adju-
tant-general of the army a reply which is so long that it
must be condensed to the principal points. General Patter-
son said that the telegram received implied that orders had
been sent to cross and attack the enemy ; but if such orders
had been sent, he had not received them. He then spoke
of the force of the enemy as estimated at fifteen thousand
men and twenty-five pieces of artillery and nearly one
thousand cavalry, and said that he himself had only about
ten thousand volunteer infantry and six hundred and fifty
cavalry and artillery, chiefly recruits. He goes on to say
that the artillery horses are untrained and without harness ;
that he had frequently requested to have batteries sent, but
had received none ; that he had not enough cavalry or
artillery to defend the fords of the Potomac between Har-
per's Ferry and Hancock. He concluded by saying:
*' While I will not, on my own responsibility, attack with-
out artillery and superior force, I will do so cheerfully and
promptly if the general-in-chief will give me an explicit
order to that effect."

On the 29th of June the harness for General Patterson's

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 67

single battery arrived. On the 30th a reconnoissance in
force was made and his troops were concentrated at Wil-
liamsport. On the 2d of July he crossed the Potomac with
less than eleven thousand men and with one battery of six
smooth-bore guns. After crossing, and just beyond Falling
Waters, the advance of the enemy, under "Stonewall"
Jackson, three thousand five hundred strong, with cayalry
and artillery, was met, and was driven back for several
miles with some loss. On July 3d the troops entered
Martinsburg, and there had to await supplies and the arrival
of the command of Colonel Stone. The means of trans-
portation were entirely inadequate, nothing being furnished
by orders from headquarters in Washington, the only reli-
ance being upon the deputy quartermaster-general attached
to the column.

Upon the arrival of Colonel Stone's force General Patter-
son issued, on July 8th, an order for an advance on Win-
chester; countermanded at midnight, as the men under
Colonel Stone had arrived footsore and weary. On the fol-
lowing morning, the 9th, General Patterson having come to
know that some of his chief officers were of the same
opinion which he had entertained from the first, that they
were on a false line of advance, called a conference of the
following officers: General William H. Keim, General
George Cadwalader, Colonel J. J. Abercrombie, Colonel
George H. Thomas, General James S. Negley, Colonel
Charles P. Stone, Captain James H. Simpson, Captain
Amos Beckwith, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Grossman.
These represented seven officers of the regular army and
three officers of volunteers.

General Patterson, mindful of the injunction of General
Scott, that he should consult with his principal officers and
run no risk of sustaining a reverse, submitted to these all
the orders he had received and a general statement sum-

68 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

marizing his views of the military situation. The verdict of
the conference was that the line on which the troops were
advancing was false and dangerous, that instead of their
threatening the enemy, the enemy was threatening them,
and that they ought to move to Charlestown. Charlestown
is within a march of Leesburg. From Leesburg the army
could have reinforced McDowell more quickly than Johns-
ton could have reinforced Beauregard, and from Charles-
town could have reinforced McDowell just as quickly as
Johnston could have reinforced Beauregard. The opinion
of the best informed officers was that Johnston had fallen
back from Martinsburg to lure Patterson dangerously on.

General Patterson's largest force assembled at Martins-
burg was about eighteen thousand men. When he had
marched thence he had, as remaining available troops, after
leaving a garrison there and deducting for the sick and
train-guards, about thirteen thousand effectives. After the
conference General Patterson wrote to General Scott, say-
ing that he had proposed to move to Charlestown ; ** from
which point," he added, ** I can more easily strike Win-
chester, march to Leesburg when necessary, open commu-
nication to a depot to be established at Harper's Ferry, and
occupy the main avenue of supply to the enemy." At
Charlestown he would have been within easy supporting
distance of McDowell, as has been shown. He had sug-
gested that before unavailingly.

General Patterson went on to say, in his letter to General
Scott : " General Sanford informs me by letter that he has
for me a letter from you. I hope it will inform me when
you will put your column [McDowell's] in motion against

Manassas, and when you wish me to strike If the

notice does not come in any other way, I wish you would
indicate the day by telegraph thus : Let me Jtear from you
on ."

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 69

Affairs seemed to be at last drawing to a well-concerted
crisis when, on July 1 3th, General Scott said, in the course
of a telegram, dated on the 12th : ** Go where you propose

in your letter of the 9th instant Let me hear from

you on Tuesday. ^^ Now, Tuesday was the i6th day of
July, and General Scott's telegram, therefore, gave per-
mission to move to Charlestown, and announced that
McDowell's attack on the enemy at Manassas would take
place on the i6th of July^ and that, on that day. General
Patterson would be expected to co-operate with McDowell
by attacking Johnston. On the 1 3th General Scott wired
General Patterson : " I telegraphed you yesterday, if not
strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make
demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Win-
chester ; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas and it
be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via
Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg," etc. This enlarged the per-
mitted scope of co-operation specifically. General Patter-
son might, at his discretion, attack Johnston or might
reinforce McDowell, depending upon circumstances men-
tioned.

General Patterson and his advisers did not consider the
army strong enough to beat Johnston behind the entrench-
ments of Winchester. Therefore Patterson was constrained
by his orders to adopt the other alternative, of making
demonstrations against Winchester. But, as General Patter-
son very properly observes in his vindication, making dem-
onstrations against Winchester placed him in a position
which incapacitated him from changing his base suddenly,
or, in other words, from being able, in case of the desirability
arising for him to reinforce McDowell, to do so ; besides
rendering it likely that demonstrations on Winchester would
have the effect of driving Johnston away just when it was
most dangerous that he should join Beauregard, when he.

70 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

Patterson, from the position of making demonstrations,
could not follow him in time.

General Patterson made a demonstration on Winchester
on the 1 6th of July ^ the day announced by General Scott as
that of McDowell's attack on Beauregard. He marched
from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill and encountered the ad-
vance of the enemy, which consisted of cavalry. He sent
a message from that place to General Scott, that the whole
road to Winchester was obstructed, and that he would
move the next day to Charlestown. He reported the term
of the three months* men with him to be nearly expired,
and that they were unwilling to remain beyond it He
added that if General Scott should desire it, he would,
after leaving enough troops for the security of Harper's
Ferry, advance with the remainder via Leesburg, provided
that the forces under Johnston did not remain at Winchester
after the success which he anticipated from McDowell. Of
course, as that was the i6th on which he was speaking to
General Scott, he supposed that the battle at Manassas was
in progress.

On the 1 7th General Patterson was in Charlestown asking
of General Scott if he shall do what he had suggested —
send troops to occupy Harper's Ferry, and, under conditions
previously mentioned, advance to Leesburg. On the 1 8th he
was also in telegraphic communication with General Scott

The reader will now perceive that, as Patterson, at
Charlestown, was only one day's march from Leesburg,
and the first of Johnston's reinforcements to Beauregard
did not reach him before the evening of the 19th, and the
last of them not before the day itself of the battle, the 21st,
there was still time for Patterson to reinforce McDowell.

The attack on the enemy at Manassas had been unavoid-
ably deferred. General Scott telegraphed General Patter-
son, on the 17th, " McDowell's first day's work has driven

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 71

the enemy beyond Fair&x Court House. The Junction
will probably be carried to-morrow."

On the 1 8th General 5)COtt was in possession of the fact
that Patterson had made his demonstration on the i6th,
and that he was then in Charlestown. On the 1 8th he
learned from Patterson, by telegram, that the enemy had
not left Winchester, that the demonstration on the place,
on the 1 6th, had effected that.

It is time now to draw conclusions, after a brief summa-
tion of the facts. Scott appointed the /d/A 0/ July as the
day for the demonstration on Winchester. It was made
by Patterson on that day. The enemy was known at that
time not to have reinforced Beauregard. The battle at
Manassas did not take place on the i6th, as expected, but
was postponed, according to General Scott, to the 18 th. At
Charlestown, on the i8th^ three days before the battle^ twelve
hours before any reinforcements whatever left Winchester for
Manassas^ General Patterson telegpraphed General Scott
that, from the condition of his force from anticipated dis-
bandment, he considered an attack on Winchester hazard-
ous, but concluded with the words, "shall I attack?"

There was not only no answer to this, but General Patter-
son was left in entire ignorance of General McDowell's
movements. So it is as clear as day that, even as late cls
the i8th. General Scott could either have ordered Patterson
to attack Winchester or to reinforce McDowell by the way
of Leesburg.

Finally, General Patterson, tied as his hands were for
personal endeavor, did what he could by sending, on the
20th, the following despatch to the assistant-adjutant-general:
" With a portion of his force Johnston left Winchester by
the road to Millwood, on the afternoon of the i8th, his
whole force thirty-two thousand five hundred." General
Scott, in his comments upon Patterson's statement, sub-

72 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

mitted to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said,
" Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to call
off the troops from that attack [McDowell's] , and, besides,
though opposed to the movement at first, we had all be-
come animated and sanguine of success ; and it is not true
that I was urged by anybody in authority to stop attack,
which was commenced as early, I think, as the i8th of
July."

It was either too late, or it was not too late, " to call off
the troops." The frame of mind in which the authorities
at Washington found themselves cannot qualify the possi-
bility of calling off the troops. The frame of mind in
which those authorities did find themselves doubtless brought
it about that, on the i8th^ Patterson was neither told to at-
tack Winchester nor to reinforce McDowell by the way of
Leesburg. And it does look very much,* indeed, as if that
frame of mind had prevented calling off the troops. Had
the battle terminated otherwise than as it did. General Pat-
terson's action, which really represented the views of some
of the best officers of the army, would have been regarded
as highly commendable. Yet despite the sufficient facts
that were presented to it, the Committee on the Conduct
of the War said in their report, that ** the principal cause of
the defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson
to hold the forces of Johnston in the Valley of the Shenan-
doah." However, although General Patterson, failing in
being allowed a court of inquiry, had to wait until 1865 for
vindication, he had the solace of many testimonials from
men of the highest military talent, justifying him in his
course in every respect, and recognizing that, in obedience
to his orders, the result could not have been other than
it was.

Owing to the fact of the changes that took place in the
names of the main armies contending on the eastern coast

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 73

of the United States, they having been in one instance even
interchanged, it becomes necessary to mention here formally
what these names on the respective sides were and what
they finally became. Beauregard's army was called the
Army of the Potomac, and Johnston's the Army of the
Shenandoah, while McDowell's army was not popularly
known by any distinctive name. In the next campaign,
that of the Peninsula, under General George B. McClellan,
which campaign we are now about to consider, the Federal
army was known as the Army of the Potomac, and the
Confederate one as the Army of Northern Virginia, In
the immediately following campaign, that of the second
battle of Bull Run, some of the troops of the Army of the
Potomac reinforced a Federal army under General John
Pope, known as the Army of Virginia, which fought a
number of battles with the Army of Northern Virginia.
Finally the Federal army continued to retain the name of
the Army of the Potomac, and the Confederate army to re-
tain that of the Army of Northern Virginia, and they thus
remained named and known until the end of the war.

74 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

CHAPTER VII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN ^THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN AND

THE BATTLES OF WILUAMSBURG AND FAIR OAKS.

General McClellan assumed command of the Army
of the Potomac on July 27, 1861. He at once began, and
he continued in the most energetic way, the organization of
an army worthy of the name and of the dire need of the
Republic. Simultaneously the defensive works of Wash-
ington, planned and executed by General J. G. Barnard,
chief-engineer of the army, were carried as an enceinte
around Washington, from a point on its western bank,
touching the Potomac at Hunting Creek, just south of
Alexandria, in a curve to the northward of the city, to
where the line rested on the eastern branch of the Potomac,
just above Bladensburg, a stretch altogether of some thirty-
two miles. Here McClellan was in his element, both
through the particular constitution of his mind and his pre-
vious military training. He worked smoothly and expe-
ditiously within the groove of routine, with a special knowl-
edge pf the particular branch of routine with which he had
to do. He had, in the Mexican War, seen service which
had redounded to his credit. Nothing there, however, had
made him especially conspicuous among the brave and
brilliant group of young officers who served under Scott
and Taylor, but he had subsequently been selected as one
of a small band of Uite^ only three in number, of whom
Major Richard Delafield and Major Alfred Mordecai were
the other two, to visit Europe during the Crimean War, and

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 7$

there study the most approved methods and appliances of
war. This distinction had so crowned him, as with an
aureole, through the years between that event and the
breaking out of the Civil War, that even in the minds of
American military men he was thought of as the peer of
Lee. Natural bent of mind, therefore, and special training,
and accruing confidence from recognition of his powers,
had peculiarly fitted him for the creation and organization
of an army. We have the authority of Napoleon for be-
lieving that this is no light task when there are no existing
cadres to be filled up, and, therefore, we should award to
McClellan full measure of praise for his accomplishment in
giving to the Army of the Potomac that soul and body
with which it afterwards bore itself so heroically in all times
of trial, whether of victory or defeat.

It is not anticipating to say here what is already so
plainly written on the scroll of history, that with all this
military aptitude in McClellan, there was still conjoined
with it such defects in that part of character upon which
great military achievement principally depends, that they
neutralized his other efficiency. Contrasting what he de-
clared, when he said that he would make the conflict short,
sharp, and decisive, with the progress and conclusion of
aflairs of which he had control, their outcome was lament-
able. Say that he was unduly interfered with at times,
and any one must grant it ; but it would only be fair to
add, that if he had not been interfered with at other times,
the turn of events would have been disastrous. That he
should, despite his shortcoming as a general fitted for the
great emergency in which the nation found itself, have pos-
sessed for a long time the implicit faith of the army and of
the whole country, is a thing for which the following pages
among others ought to show that it is impossible wholly
to account. No doubt a winning personality, when he

76 GENERAL OBOBOB GORDON MEADE.

chose to reveal it, might account in some measure for the
admiration which he excited ; and the &ct that he was
essentially the creator of the admirable organization which
he led might also account in some measure for the glamour
which he exercised. But when, as the &ct is, proof after
proof was afforded of his incompetency for large command,
the rank and file of the army in wrathful, disciplined silence,
saw him relieved, this passes all comprehension, unless we
believe that the habit of the average human mind is so con-
firmed in the retention of belief in the line of what is some-
times denominated consistency, but is the very opposite,
that it is incapable of changing its opinion even upon the
most conclusive evidence. The intensity of this indignation
may, however, be justly attributed to the fact that the man
by whom McClellan was relieved, and who superseded him
in command of that faithful army, was not to be spoken of
in the same breath with McClellan in any capacity in which
mind and acquirement are concerned.

The preceding are merely general conclusions. Let us
therefore consider the special ones in the light of which the
following pages are to be read in considering whatever ver-
dict the reader may conscientiously feel disposed to render
to his own mind. One of the fundamental traits of a general
McClellan had in a high degree. It cannot without quali-
fication be said, in describing it, that he was not unduly
elated by success nor discouraged by disaster, because he
achieved no great success, his victories in West Virginia
being gained with overwhelming forces. But when we
come to consider that he was not appalled by disaster, it
seems to be a legitimate conclusion that he would have
preserved a balanced mind in military success. One of the
greatest of his defects made it possible that he could imagine
himself, as a general in the field, to have anything to do with
questions of national polity. Yet, acting as independently

THE PENUmULAE CAMPAIGN. TJ

as the ambitious Napoleon when he served under the Direc-
tory, it was not long before he gave the President of the
United States in the most unequivocal manner to under-
stand that, with respect to slavery, he regarded himself as
the conserver of the Constitution as well as the commander
of the Army of the Potomac. General John C. Fremont
and General David Hunter took action in the very opposite
direction, in favor of the manumission of slaves, but without
any allied direction to the civil authorities. All erred ; for
as military men, in command of armies, they had nothing
to do with the determination of a status which it was the
province of the civil authorities to settle. McClellan always
inordinately magnified the forces of the enemy and minim-
ized his own. Brocken-spectres of gigantic hosts moved
to the eye of his imagination along the heights of Rich-
mond and overflowed on to tHe swamps of the Chicka-
hominy, easily transported thence to the field of Antietam.
Yet, although he always clamored for reinforcements, he
never fought his army as a whole, after making all due
allowance for reserves. But greatest of his military defects
was his organic deficiency in appreciation of the value of
time. Of the fleeting moment of which Napoleon speaks,
the moment which, lost, is never to be regained, he seemed
to have no conception. Everything must, to his mind, be
done decently and in order. There was always some small
item necessary to completeness, when readiness should
beckon on the way to victory. The defect is one of the
commonest among mankind, and absolutely fatal to good
generalship. Against an army led by Lee, whose enterprise
was bounded only by the possible, it would have been fatal
to McClellan, but for the vast resources lying back of his
unintermittent slowness. Indeed, it almost seemed as if he
believed, with Immanuel Kant, that there is no such thing
as the passage of time, that time is always present, and that

78 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEAJDK

we picture it to ourselves as passing only because we see
the decay of things.

War is like any other game in turning upon the balance of
exchanges. But it is different from other g^ames in this, that
the exchanges bear to the untutored mind the character of
unwarrantable sacrifices, whereas, to the military mind,
they are so directly related to passing and final events, that
they are recognized as oflen economical in men, treasure,
and material. Whatever nation goes to war upon the plan
of protecting itself at every point invites and encounters
defeat. How many men and millions of treasure were
sacrificed during the war by frittering away the resources
of the Government in mere gifts out of hand to the enemy !
The tendency everywhere, at the beginning of the war, and
continued long afterwards, was towards the morcellement of
the forces of the United States, whether with reference to
the zone of military operations or the terrain of the actual
shock of battle. Both civil and military authorities were
guilty of this, but the palm of all misdoing must be awarded
to the civil authorities, when they consented to give to
Butler and Banks thousands of soldiers with whom to play
" boom-a-laddies !"

The theatre of operations in which the Army of the Po-
tomac was to act was necessarily the area bounded on the
east by the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay, and on the
west by the eastern boundary of the Shenandoah Valley,
the Blue Ridge. It b easy enough to form a general mental
map of the area described. Imagine a line very nearly
one hundred miles long drawn south from Washington to
Richmond, for they differ in longitude by only about twenty
miles. Now assuming that base, by way of orienting our-
selves, lay off in imagination from it courses that represent
the eastern water-front of Virginia. Starting from Wash-
ington, the general course of the Potomac is south for

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 79

about forty miles, then a little north of east for about fifteen
miles, and then southeast for about fifty miles, to its mouth,
where it enters Chesapeake Bay, whence the shore of Chesa-
peake Bay runs about south to the mouth of the James
River, on which, northwest, lies the city of Richmond, be-
tween the James and a branch of it called the Chickahominy .
If the reader can see, in imagination, these courses with refer-
ence to the imaginary north and south line between Washing-
ton and Richmond, he will perceive that the part of Virginia
circumscribed by them on the east makes a large, blunt
protrusion towards the east above and below Richmond.
The principal streams intersecting this all trend, in a general
way, from northwest towards southeast, and are, in order,
beginning at the north, the Rappahannock (branch Rapi-
dan), and the York (branches Mattapony and Pamunkey).
Of the Pamunkey, the branches are the North Anna and
the South Anna. Lastly comes the James (branches Chick-
ahominy and Appomattox). These streams divide the area
described into a number of peninsulas, having numerous
intermediate streams and low swampy bottoms ; the penin-
sula, /or excellence, with which we shall shortly be concerned
in connection with the approaching campaign, being that
between the York and the James Rivers, terminated by
Fort Monroe, from which point to Richmond it is seventy-
two miles, whereas from Washington to Richmond it is
about ninety-five miles.

It would take too much space here to discuss all of the
various Federal successes in military operations that took
place between the campaign of Bull Run and that of the
Peninsula. On the 29th of August the works at Hatteras
Inlet, in North Carolina, were captured by General B. F.
Butler and Commodore Silas H. Stringham. General Rose-
crans closed the campaign in West Virginia, on the loth of
September, by winning the battle of Carnifex Ferry. The

8o GENERAL QEORQE OORDON MEADK

Federals encountered a terrible disaster at Ball's BluiT on
October 2 2d, when the troops, through mismanagement,
were routed with great slaughter. Near Dranesville, how-
ever, a few miles from Washington, there was, on December
20th, an affair favorable to the Federal arms, in which the
Pennsylvania Reserves were alone engaged. On the 8th
of Januarj" General A. E. Bumside, assisted by the navy,
captured Roanoke Island, in North Carolina, and on the
14th of March took Newbem. On the 19th of January
General George H. Thomas won the battle of Logan's
Cross Roads, in Kentucky. On the 6th of February Gen-
eral U. S. Grant and Commodore Andrew H. Foote, in the
department under Halleck, captured Fort Henry. On the
1 6th of February Grant captured Fort Donelson, with
thousands of prisoners, the first very great success of the
Union arms. I saw throngs of them in Indianapolis, a
sturdy, buttemut-hued crowd, in which the component unit
knew as much of the destructive retrograde metamorphosis
in which he was assisting as does the grain of powder in
the tamped mine that is to rend the earth asunder. On the
8th of March concluded the battle of Pea Ridge, in Arkan-
sas, won, after a long and hard contest of two days, by
General Samuel R. Curtis. On the 6th and 7th of April
Grant won the battle of Shiloh, the forces of Buell reaching
him just in time to save the second day. On the 24th of
April Commodore David Glasgow Farragut passed the forts
near the mouth of the Mississippi, and the next day cap-
tured and put General Butler in possession of the city of
New Orleans. By this success the Mississippi was now
open, except at Vicksburg and thereabouts, from its source
to its mouth. The successes of the Federals had vastly
preponderated over those of the Confederates.

Three plans were mooted and discussed in Washington,
whether to advance thence on Richmond by crossing the

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 8 1

Potomac and taking the way of Manassas ; or thence, by
means of transports, adopting Urbanna as a base, a place on
the right bank of the Mattapony River, near its mouth ; or,
using transports as before, to march to Richmond from Fort
Monroe. At Fort Monroe the army would be seventy-two
miles from Richmond, but from Urbanna would be only
about forty from it Nothing was finally decided upon until
shortly before the time to take action, the President and the
Secretary of War on the one hand and McClellan on the
other falling farther and farther apart in mutual confidence.
Confidence having been impaired, their relations with each
other proceeded, as usual, from bad to worse, with the in-
evitable commission of faults on both sides. Finally
McClellan was given the choice in the spring of adopting
the Manassas line of operations or the line of operations
from Fort Monroe. Strange to say; he selected the latter,
although at the time he had no true basis of confidence, by
his own demonstration, or positive assurance from the navy,
that there was not grave danger to transport-service for the
troops from the "Merrimac," otherwise called the "Virginia."
This was a frigate which had been captured, with the Gos-
port Navy Yard, by the Confederates, and which had de-
stroyed or neutralized all adversaries in Hampton Roads,
near Fort Monroe, until the Monitor, the first craft of her
kind, appearing the very next day, March the loth, had
just held its own with the new sea-monster, sheathed, in
pent-house form, with railroad-iron, the result of another
encounter with which no one could with certainty predict.

It is impossible to decide which of the two, the Adminis-
tration or McClellan, was more in the wrong than the other
in the aggregate of contentions which led up to destroyed
confidence between them. McClellan's last act, however,
when leaving Washington with his army, in the spring

of 1862, is not defensible. The number of men needed to

82 GENERAL QEORQB QORDOR MEADK

make Washington secure had been authoritatively estimated
at forty thousand, and he himself had indicated to the Ad-
ministration that he would leave thirty-five ; but as, upon
his departure, it was discovered that he had included in the
count of garrison troops which he claimed could easily be
recalled to Washington from the vicinity, it being deemed
that he had indulged in a subterfuge, the unfortunate rela-
tions which had previously existed between him and the
Administration became still more strained. The Adminis-
tration had been unwise in expecting important operations
to be undertaken before the spring of 1862, that is, before
the orgjanization of the Army of the Potomac was perfected,
but it had been perfectly reasonable in expecting McClellan
to do what he did not do, in raising the blockade of the
lower Potomac, maintained by the batteries of the enemy
where the channel of the river approaches the Virginia
shore. On the other hand, McClellan had, from the very
beginning, shown a disposition to act on his own judgment
and responsibility, as if he had been clothed with dictatorial
powers. When, however, probably as a rebuff, he was not,
as he should have been, allowed to appoint his own corps-
commanders, a most injudicious step was taken by the Ad-
ministration, to which, doubtless, it was prompted by all
that had gone before in the form of inharmonious combina-
tion of the civil and military authorities. It has been sur-
mised by some persons that, if McClellan had had the ap-
pointment of these corps-commanders, the issue of the
Peninsular campaign would have been very different from
what it was. But nothing derived from examination of the
general conduct of the corps-commanders who were actu-
ally appointed, or in that of the sequence of events on the
Peninsula, can lead to the slightest suspicion that the final
result would have been essentially changed had McClellan
been allowed to make these appointments. What appears

TBE PENmSULAB CAMPAIGN. 83

throughout his military career as a commander in the Civil
War is his inability to appreciate at a glance any military
situation whatsoever, and to act with corresponding vigor.
That he, a man not by any means destitute of energy, quite
the contrary, never acted quickly in any situation, is proof
positive that he wholly lacked the intuition, the inspiration
of military genius or talent. He was, from first to last, in
his operations, the receiver, not the giver of surprises. The
enemy praised him highly, but it is a truism that, in mili-
tary operations, the praise of an enemy cannot be accepted
as of value until the war engaged in is over. In the most
positive, the highest faculty of the general, McClellan was
wholly lacking; in the initiative derived from intuition,
present in victory or defeat, as closely allied as the light-
ning's flash and the thunder's roar, and capable, if the
enemy gives the opportunity, or chance throws it in the
way, to turn to success a tide of disaster that has set in,
not less than to marshall battalions in an overflowing, re-
sistless advance.

On November i, 1861, General McClellan had been
made commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.
In that capacity the interests under his immediate eye largely
blinded him to what was beyond its range. General Don
Carlos Buell, a man never appreciated at his full worth,
perhaps because, like St. Paul, he was, in relation to opera-
tions in the West, born out of due time, made excellent
suggestions to McClellan for a plan of campaign in Kentucky
and Tennessee, but they were not appreciated by either
General McClellan or Mr. Lincoln, and remained unadopted
at the time. Now McClellan, in going to the Peninsula,
went without other duties than those of commander of the
Army of the Potomac, for, on March the i ith, he had been
relieved of those of general -in-chief of all the armies. Before
the assumption of the same duties by General Henry W.

84 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

Halleck, who had exercised the largest command of any in
the West, and under whom Grant had served, Mr. Lincoln
assumed control of the general conduct of military affairs.

In March, 1862, the enemy had suddenly evacuated the
position of Centreville and retired upon the Rapidan. This
move was probably made in anticipation of McClellan's,
about which, the enemy, doubtless, had sources of informa-
tion, and was intended by the enemy, no matter where
McClellan went, whether by Manassas, Urbanna, or Fort
Monroe, to make sure of being in a strategic position with
reference to Richmond. Washington was, from the begin-
ning to the end of the war, a whispering gallery, of which
the receiving end was in Richmond. When the enemy had
evacuated Centreville, McClellan marched his army to the
position, and then immediately withdrawing it, began to
send it by transports to the Peninsula. He himself arrived
at Fort Monroe on April 2d. A force of nearly sixty
thousand men had already arrived there. On the 3d
marching orders were issued, and on the 4th the troops set
out along the Peninsula towards Richmond.

General McClellan was met at the outset of the campaign
with difficulties for which he deemed himself in no wise
responsible. He found that the navy would not guarantee
to try to neutralize the "Merrimac" and to capture Yorktown
too, and he complained of the absence of accurate topo-
g^phical knowledge of the country. It was, however, a
pure assumption, on his part, that the navy would capture
Yorktown, and as for absence of accurate topographical
knowledge of the country, to whom but to himself should
he have looked to see that it had been obtained? If
nothing more had been done than to order a competent
purveyor of bull-frogs for the market to make a reconnois-
sance of the swampy part of the country from Fort Monroe
to Richmond, he would at least have learned what he did

THE PENINSULAB CAMPAIGN. 8$

not know, that a shallow stream called Warwick River runs
nearly across the Peninsula, from the James River towards
the south of Yorktown, on the York River. On the sth of
April the troops, formed in two columns, brought up ag^ainst
the defensive lines of the enemy formed in part by this
stream ; the right column near Yorktown and the left oppo-
site Lee's Mills, on the road across the Warwick to Wil-
liamsburg in advance. General McClellan made no attempt
to take the enemy unawares, but deemed that it was neces-
sary, first of all, to make elaborate reconnoissances. He
assumed that the line, consisting of inundations from dams,
redoubts, and epaulements, was too strong to capture by
assault or lodgment beyond it. It is true, however, that
he imagined that the force defending it was very large ;
whereas it was at first extremely meagre, General John Bank-
head Magruder having for the whole extensive line only
about eleven or twelve thousand troops. General Benjamin
Huger held Norfolk, near the mouth of the James, with about
eight thousand. McClellan's conclusion led, of course, to the
final conclusion that a siege was necessary, and for this he had
some justification in the fact that his chief-engineer. General
Barnard, agreed with him, although after the campaign he
had changed his opinion. This conclusion was adhered to,
although, on the i6th of April, the Third Vermont Regi-
ment broke through the river line at one point, and main-
tained itself for two hours with reinforcements of only
about five hundred men from the Fourth and Sixth Ver-
mont Regiments. So McClellan had sat down to make a
regular investment and siege, while the enemy received
constant reinforcements, and Johnston, at last, with his
army of fifty thousand men, arrived from the Rapidan to
resist the march of McClellan as soon as Yorktown and the
defensive line resting on it were reduced. On April 20th
fire was opened on Yorktown wharf for the purpose of

86 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

destroying it as a landing facility to the enemy, and prepara«
tions being nearly completed for the bombardment, Ma-
gruder evacuated the town on the night of the 3d ; show-
ing that he had had good sources of information, for it was
expected by McClellan that everything would be ready
on the 5th to dislodge him. Magruder had given a sigh
of relief when he had seen McClellan deliberately sit down
before his lines to make a regular siege ; showing how well
he appreciated his weakness to resist assault at the begin-
ning, in view of the fact of his extended lines and the ap-
pearance before them of an army of certainly sixty thousand
men. The enemy had had a month, of which he had availed
himself, not only to bring up his main army, but to strengthen
the fortifications of Richmond. So, in the first operations,
from the sth of April to the 4th of May, when the Federal
troops entered Yorktown, just a month, the advantages had
all remained with the enemy. Could the line have been
forced without undue sacrifice for the gain ? There is the
best reason for so believing upon the evidence now extant
from both Federal and Confederate sources. It is, how-
ever, the sphere of great generalship to divine the unknown,
or to solve by trial the problem of the undivinable.

The enemy having evacuated his lines in the night of the
3d of May, General McClellan, on the 4th, promptly
ordered cavalry and horse-artillery to pursue him on the
roads towards Williamsburg. General Edwin V. Sumner
was in command of this portion of the advance, and Gen-
eral Philip Kearny's division and General Joseph Hooker's
division, of General Samuel P. Heintzelman's corps, and
General William F. Smith's, General Darius N. Couch's
and General Silas Casey's divisions, of Keyes's corps, were
ordered forward in support of Sumner. The troops which
they were pursuing from the lines near and at Yorktown
were fifly-three thousand in number, under the command

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 87

of General Joseph E. Johnston, only slight skirmishing
with the rear-guard taking place until the lines before Wil-
liamsburg were reached.

Elarly on the following morning Hooker attacked Fort
Magruder, about a mile from Williamsburg, the most for-
midable of the enemy's line of defences, which reached
across the Peninsula from the James to Queen's Creek, on
the York. About three or four o'clock in the afternoon
Kearny arrived and relieved Hooker by continuing the at-
tack with his division, which had been so spirited that John-
ston had been obliged to recall some of his troops who had
continued their march. Sumner had been ordered to take
command of all of the troops until the arrival of McClellan ;
but McClellan did not arrive. The resistance met with was
much more severe than had been expected or need have
been encountered, for all that the enemy was essaying to do
was to gain time for his orderly retreat. As the event
proved, the general-commanding should have been at the
front. The function there to be exercised was very much
more important than attending to what any one on his staff
could have supervised, if supervision were indeed needed —
the embarkation of General William B. Franklin's com-
mand, which was to go to a place on the right bank of the
Pamunkey, opposite West Point, so as to take in reverse
any defences which might have been prepared higher up on
the Peninsula.

The losses at Williamsburg on the Federal were much
greater than those on the Confederate side, and, as already
indicated, were sustained for an inadequate purpose. The
sole redeeming feature of the operation, except the admira-
ble conduct of the troops everywhere, was the brilliant move
of General W. S. Hancock, who, under orders, crossed Cub
Dam Creek, on the right, with five regiments of Smith's divis-
ion, and occupied a redoubt conmianding the mill-bridge

88 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

across the creek. Here he remained unsupported for a long
while, all the troops not being yet up ; but although lacking
reinforcements to enable him to hold his position and gain the
left and rear of General James Longstreet's division, he still
tenaciously held on to the ground in the hope that he would
finally be able to advance and accomplish his purpose.
He was waiting, however, in vain, when the enemy, recog-
nizing the dangerousness of the lodgment which he had
made, marched a column against him, led by Generals
Jubal Early and D. H. Hill. By this time Hancock, hold-
ing the first, had occupied another redoubt nearer to Wil-
liamsbui^, and was threatening two others. Seeing, at a
glance, with his consummate grasp of a tactical situation,
that it would be impossible, without reinforcements, to hold
on to his captures, he fell back for a space from his most
advanced position, and there halting, as the enemy threat-
ened his right flank, he delivered his fire and charged with
the bayonet, wounding Hill and throwing his troops into
disorder; when Elarly, seeking to restore the battle, was
compelled to beat a hasty retreat Not until the aflair was
over did reinforcements, under General Smith, reach the
ground ; but they were too late to be available for a re-
newed advance on the enemy, who, having gained the time
needed, continued his retreat towards Richmond. Here
began and was conspicuously exhibited that strange fact of
the absence of control of the battle-field by the command-
ing-general which continued to manifest itself throughout
the Peninsular campaign. As no one has ever been able
to attribute to him want of personal courage, the indisputa-
ble fact remains to be accounted for only by the ascription
to him of a psychical trait of incapacity to see things in
their relative importance as to event and time. If his
corps-commanders were not those whom he would have
chosen, all the more need was there that he should

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 89

have been at the front. Not only was he not at the
front, but he had been detained of his own free will from
being there by an affair so trivial that, if there had beea
no question of battle, it was beneath his official dignity to
give it personal attention. General McClellan did not arrive
upon the field until between four and five o'clock in the
afternoon, when everything was virtually over. The next
morning the army of Johnston continued its retreat towards
Richmond.

While these operations were going on before Williams-
burg, the divisions of Franklin's command were embarking
at Yorktown for the point on the right bank of the Pamunkey
opposite West Point, and by the i6th the divisions of Frank-
lin, Smith, and Porter had reached the place at the White
House where they established a depot of supplies. The expe-
dition effected nothing more of moment, Franklin, soon after
landing, merely repulsing an attack of General William H. C.
Whiting, for as, on the 7th, Johnston's army had been con-
centrated at Barhamsville, only a few miles south of West
Point, all chance of a turning movement was at an end.
McClellan had ceased at Williamsburg all forward move-
ment that could by the most strained construction of the
meaning of the word be deemed pursuit, for in the follow-
ing ten days the enemy moved only between thirty and
forty miles to his point of concentration at Barhamsville.
While the Confederate army was at Barhamsville, where
it remained five days, all that McClellan did was to send
out from Williamsburg reconnoissances and a force of
cavalry, artillery, and infantry to open up communication
with Franklin, beginning his forward movement on the 8th
of May, and advancing his headquarters on the loth nine-
teen miles beyond Williamsburg. On the 19th the troops
which had gone by land, and those which had gone by
water up the York, reunited at the White House, on the

go GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEAJDK

Pamunkey. This was to be the depot of supplies for the army
when it should be in position before Richmond. Here
passes the Richmond and York River Railroad, which, begin-
ning at West Point, at the end of York River, and between its
branches (the Mattapony and Pamunkey), runs to Richmond.
A reorganization of the army was effected at the White
House. The Second Corps, under Sumner, was to consist
of the divisions of Richardson and Sedg^ck. The Third
Corps, under Heintzelman, was to consist of the divisions of
Hooker and Kearny. The Fourth Corps, under General
Erasmus D. Keyes, was to consist of the divisions of General
Darius N. Couch and General Silas Casey. The Fifth
Corps, under Fitz-John Porter, was to consist of his own
division, under General George W. Morrill, and that of
General George Sykes (regulars). The Sixth Corps, under
Franklin, was to consist of his own division, under General
Henry W. Slocum, and that of Smith. The last two corps
were organizations authorized by the President. These
changes effected, headquarters, with Franklin's command
and Porter's corps, marched to Tunstall Station, five miles
from the White House, on the 19th of May, and on the 20th
Casey's division forded the Chickahominy near Bottom's
Bridge, which had been destroyed, occupied the high ground
beyond, and began to rebuild the bridge. On the 21st the
advance guard had reached New Bridge, eight miles further
up the Chickahominy than Bottom's Bridge. On the 24th
the village of Mechanicsville, north of the Chickahominy,
four miles above New Bridge, was captured, but the bridge
between it and Richmond was destroyed by the enemy.
On that day also the left wing of the army secured a posi-
tion south of the Chickahominy, at Seven Pines and Fair
Oaks Station, across the Williamsburg road and near the
Richmond and York River Railroad. The advance had
been exceedingly slow.

THE PENUHSULAR CAMPAIGN. 9 1

However, the army was at last tolerably near the final
position which it was to occupy. To understand its posi-
tion in a rude, diagrammatical way, it will be necessary to
conceive of the lay of the land from the following descrip-
tion. Imagine, then, the James River to run, neglecting
numerous bends, in a straight line from southeast to north-
west, and Richmond to lie north of the northwestward pro-
jection of that line. Now, again, imagine the Chickahominy
to be a stream with broad swampy bottom on each side,
covered with dense foliage, running from its mouth, about
thirty-five miles below Richmond, for about seven miles
nearly at right-angles to the line of the James, and then
gradually sweeping around and running parallel with it, so
that, as it proceeds, it runs about four miles back of Rich-
mond. These being the main features of the country to be
memorized, require added to them one which, although
very subordinate from certain points of view, played a very
important part in some of the military operations which we
are about to consider. White Oak Swamp, so-called, is in
reality a creek, which, starting south at about right-angles
from the Chickahominy, about twelve miles from Rich-
mond, then turns and runs parallel to the Chickahominy for
about eight miles, distant about four, and degenerates into
a veritable swamp, after having begun at its mouth in some-
what similar condition.

If the preceding description of locality has been under-
stood, the final position of the army will be realized when it
is stated that the left flank of its left wing rested on White
Oak Swamp, near a place called Swamp Ford, the left wing
passing thence, to the right, in advance of Seven Pines and
Fair Oaks Station, by the former of which runs the direct
road from Richmond to Williamsburg ; and thence, beyond
Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York River Rail-
road, finally resting its right flank on the Chickahominy, near

4 .

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 9 1

92 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

to a farm called Golding's, and just behind a small branch
of the Chickahominy. The right wing partly consisted of
the Pennsylvania Reserves. These lay to the north of the
Chickahominy, their left flank resting on that stream, four
miles above where the right flank of the left wing rested on
the other side of the Chickahominy, and behind the strong
line of Beaver Dam Creek, a north branch of the Chicka-
hominy. In front of this branch strong detachments watched
Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville Bridge, then destroyed,
which cross the Chickahominy from Richmond to Me-
chanicsville. Between the left and right wings troops were
stationed along the north side of the Chickahominy, cover-
ing the bridge-heads and the communications with the
White House. Both wings, of course, were finally pro-
tected by entrenchments, the line along Beaver Dam Creek
being naturally very much stronger than that south of the
Chickahominy.

From the nature of the ground, and from the fact that
the entrenchments of the enemy south of the Chicka-
hominy were well thrown forward, the position of the Fed-
eral army could not help being vicious ; but the terrain and
the other conditions mentioned admitted of no better dispo-
sition of the troops. The mistake made, as the sequel
showed, and due foresight ought to have prevented, was in
having the troops north and south of the Chickahominy
most unequally distributed, and not sure of facility of mutual
reinforcement. Bridges connecting the two wings in places
beyond the enemy's fire were soon finished, but in a country
like that in which operations were being conducted, where
nature had plainly, in the aspect of the ground, given her
testimony and set her seal on the physical conditions which
had endured for centuries, infallibly proclaiming that in
these creeks, in times of heavy rains, a freshet would send

over the normal banks across the low

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 93

bottoms, it was blindness itself not to see that only trestle,
not pontoon bridges, could be depended upon to connect
the dissevered wings of the army, dissevered not only by
the Chickahominy and outlying bottoms, but by an interval
of four miles between the line of troops south of the Chicka-
hominy, and the second line constituted by troops north of it.

If the reader now has the map^ of the ground in his
mind's eye, he will see that the left wing stretched across
the opening of the loop made by the White Oak Swamp
Creek with the course of the Chickahominy, and that, on
the other side of the Chickahominy, four miles in advance,
was the right wing, behind Beaver Dam Creek, connected
with the left by troops posted on the north side of the line
of the Chickahominy. On the north side of the Chicka-
hominy, between it and the Pamunkey, running parallel
with the Chickahominy, roads lead towards the southeast,
to the White House and Tunstall Station, and other roads
cross them, passing to the south over the Chickahominy and
White Oak Swamp Creek. South of the Chickahominy
roads lead in a southeast direction, either directly to Wil-
liamsburg or by a roundabout course in that direction,
crossing the Chickahominy on the first reach that it makes
on leaving the James. Transverse roads, the continuation
of the transverse roads north of the Chickahominy and
White Oak Swamp, lead towards the south, meeting the
shore of the James at Malvern Hill, Haxall's Landing, and
Harrison's Landing, to become famous in the final opera-
tions of the campaign.

The position of the army which led to the enemy's at-
tack upon the left wing, which attack developed into the
battles of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, was, beginning at the
extreme right, north of the Chickahominy, composed of
the corps of Porter, Sumner, and Franklin, while the left
wing, south of the Chickahominy, was composed of the

94 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

corps of Keyes and Heintzelman. Bottom's Bridge was
five miles away in the rear, . entirely unavailable for rein-
forcing one wing by troops from the other. There were
only two other bridges at that time, and these opposite
the position of Sumner, occupying the centre, north of
the Chickahominy, none for the right wing, four miles in
advance of the left one. The position on the north side of
the Chickahominy was stronger than that on the south.
The troops there could be dislodged only by a turning
movement of the most resolute sort, such as Jackson after-
wards executed with overwhelming forces. Yet here were
three corps in position at the stronger point and only two
at the weaker, and the facilities of communication were, at
best, inadequate. But the facilities for reinforcement, such
as they were, suddenly became alarmingly less. On the
afternoon and in the evening of May 30th came one of
those drenching rains that make watermen look to the fast-
ening of their floating property, and even to the security of
their more stable property by streams. Had a man but
heard of it, and not heard the sizzle and rush of the down-
pour, that alone would seem capable of setting him to think-
ing. The swollen Chickahominy began to glide faster
within its banks, bearing whatever debris lay in its path ;
began to rise above its banks and call attention to its over-
wrought condition. The sun of the next morning rose on
the placidity of the commanding-general, while the torrent
still rose and rushed wildly along. The signal of heavy
rain, which had passed unheeded in the Federal camps, had,
however, sent a thrill of joy through those of the Confed-
erates. Here was the opportunity, heaven-sent, as Jackson
would have deemed it (and as Lee doubtless did, although
he was not yet in chief command), to overwhelm the Fed-
eral forces in detail, the very waters of the sacred soil rising
to sweep from its face the rash invader.

THE PENUHSULAB CAMPAIGN. 9 1

96 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

with the aid of reinforcements. Here Casey found in time
of direst need some entrenchments which had been made
before the advance of the lines of the left wing, and was
able, with partially sheltered forces, to call a halt to the
enemy.

The fortunes of war were not, however, wholly on the
side of the Confederates, notwithstanding that the Federals
had so completely opened the doors to them in the enemy's
favor. Just as the intended attack on the left flank proved
an entire failure, through Huger's not coming up to time,
so also the intended attack on the right proved nearly
abortive through long delay. These two occurrences saved
at least Casey from annihilation, for, possibly. Couch might
have escaped. There was, however, another element that
entered into the situation, which saved the Federals from
disaster. Sunmer, on the left bank of the Chickahominy,
the brave Sumner, no general, but one of the noblest of
soldiers, was chafing when he heard the cannon, and like
the war-horse, pricking up his ears at the sound of the bat-
tle afar ofT, when he received orders to prepare to march.
Without, however, awaiting in camp further orders, he
marched his corps for the bridges, which still held precari-
ously to the banks of the Chickahominy, their component
parts grinding away on themselves and loosening in the
stream, the approaches all flooded and mired in the sticky
mud of the Chickahominy. Here he impatiently awaited
final orders, but no orders came. There, across the stream,
his brothers-in-arms, as he well knew, must be engaged in
a desperate struggle against the greater part of the Con-
federate army. At last patience had had its perfect work
when, at 2.30 p.m, he was obliged to stand the strain no
longer, orders arrived, and Sumner marched his men to-
wards the treacherous, surging foothold of the two spans
that united in some sort the banks of the Chickahominy,

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 97

kept in position for only a brief space of time by the sheer
weight of the troops, who, half-wading, passed through the
current, horses dragging guns across, some of which set-
tled in the quagmire of the opposite shore, mingled with
the corduroy approaches of the bridge. One bridge failed
after the passage of a brigade, the other still held faintly to
its moorings, weighted with the hastening masses of men,
and at last the gallant Second Corps stood on the Chicka-
hominy's southern bank. The rescue by Sumner came not
a moment too soon. When the long delayed attack on the
right was made. General Couch, who had been holding on
there, had finally been obliged to recede, on account of the
threatening attitude of General G. W. Smith, under the im-
mediate direction of Johnston, to envelope his right. Fall-
ing back to a position about half a mile in the rear, so as
still to be somewhat on Casey's right flank, he there made
a stand against the enemy, anxiously expecting reinforce-
ments from the other side of the Chickahominy by the way
of the bridge in his rear.

Sedgwick led Sumner's advance and soon caught sight
of Couch in an attitude of expectancy, waiting to see in
which direction to deploy his four regiments and his bat-
tery, the enemy before whom he had fallen back from the
Chickahominy not having yet reappeared on his front or
flanks. But, as Couch caught sight of Sedgwick, he de-
ployed his men, and one of Sedgwick's regiments was in-
stantly sent to his right, while the remainder of Sumner's
column still marched swiftly forward through the woods to
take position on the field. Hardly had the first dispositions
been made when the pursuing lines of the Confederates
issued from the woods in front into the open. A battery,
under Lieutenant Edward Kirby, joined on Couch's right
the battery of Captain James Brady. Sumner's regiments

poured out of the woods on their side and ranged them-

98 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADR

selves in support of the batteries, on the right and left of
Couch's flanks, the batteries thus occupying the centre of the
whole new line. The Confederates must have been aston-
ished at this sudden apparition. To no generalship was its
suddenness ascribable, but simply to the prompt action of stal-
wart old Sumner that Couch's little force was not demolished.
A Confederate brigade, seeking to enter between Couch and
Keyes, paused, the general line of the Confederates rapidly
took shape, but the whole situation had changed. The
enemy precipitated a strong attack against the Federal right-
centre, varied by fitful charges on the batteries. Later the
conflict concentrated itself on the right, to which position
two pieces of artillery were shifted from the centre. The
position of the Confederates was largely masked by the
woods which they occupied, and from which they made re-
peated and desperate charges on the guns. On both centre
and right flank, however, their attacks were successfully re-
pulsed, and then Sumner began to take the offensive. Com-
mitting the right wing to Sedgwick, the centre to Couch, and
himself taking command of the left, he charged with five
regiments on the Confederate right, which had already been
severely handled, and sent it in retreat, leaving wounded
behind and losing many prisoners. The fighting ceased at
nightfall, with the partial retreat, near Fair Oaks, of the
Confederates who had attacked there, whose loss had been
very severe.

General McClellan did not, from first to last, appear upon
the scene, but contented himself with directing Heintzelman
to cross the Chickahominy and in person report to him.
During the evening and night Hooker's and Kearny's divis-
ions, of Heintzelman's corps, and Richardson's division, of
Sumner's corps, were all up, and the rest of Sumner's artil-
lery had been brought to the front at Fair Oaks. The
remaining front of the old formation was now at Fair Oaks.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 99

Behind that, and considerably to the rear, were, with rein-
forcements, the troops of Casey, which had been driven
along the Williamsburg road. These two lines were con-
nected by a third line. The whole formed a line roughly
resembling the letter U. The left leg of such a misshapen
letter would represent the formidable force at Fair Oaks,
facing west, the right leg, the line facing east, held by Casey
and reinforcements, and the connecting link, the troops,
facing south, establishing communication between the two
other lines.

General Johnston had been wounded, and the command
of the Confederate army had devolved upon Lee, but, evi-
dently, the sudden change of affairs, wrought by the dis-
ablement of Johnston, had brought doubt and confusion
into the counsels of the enemy. Early in the morning of
the next day, June ist, the battle recommenced, but it has
always been uncertain which side began it. General
McClellan's orders had been simply to hold the position.
It is credibly supposed that a mere change in the disposition
of some Federal troops by crossing the railroad track to
take position slightly in advance of the Richmond and York
River Railroad, gave the impression to the enemy that an
attack was contemplated. The fighting lasted less than
three hours, but while it did last it was very severe, the part
of the line engaged being the centre and left wing. Colonel
Samuel K. Zook's regiment, Richardson's division, with the
brigades of General William H. French and General
Thomas F. Meagher, belonging to it, and Hooker's divis-
ion, with two New Jersey regiments, were very sharply en-
gaged. Hooker in person leading General Sickles's brigade
and the New Jersey regiments into action. Here Howard
received the wound from which he lost his arm, retiring
from the field when struck, after having turned over his
command to Colonel Francis C. Barlow, with orders to hold

lOO GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

the advanced position gained. It was a musketty battle,
scarcely any artillery was used. After the fighting was
over, General McClellan arrived on the field, all that he
had contributed to the battle having been his order of the
preceding night to hold the position. It is very naturally
called by the Confederates the battle of Seven Pines, and
by the Federals the battle of Fair Oaks, because the Con-
federates were victorious at Seven Pines and the Federals at
Fair Oaks. It was effectively, however, the same battle.

General McClellan had scarcely arrived before Yorktown
when he received a despatch from the President notifying
him that the force of General McDowell, on the upper Po-
tomac, amounting to about forty thousand men, was de-
tached from his command. This order of the President's
had been prompted by the discovery that General McClel-
lan had not carried out the terms of the arrangement, by
which he was to leave Washington safe from attack by a
garrison of at least thirty-five thousand troops. McDowell's
corps finally advanced from Washington, and in the latter
part of April took position at Falmouth and opposite Fred-
ericksburg. McDowell was anxious to move from this po-
sition towards Richmond, and endeavor to join McClellan,
but he was not at first permitted to make the attempt. He
was in May, however, when reinforced by General James
Shields's division, of General N. P. Banks's corps, then in
the Shenandoah Valley, ordered by the President to advance
by the route towards Richmond, and to join McClellan. The
first part of his advance left Fredericksburg on May 24. In
concert with this movement from Fredericksburg the Presi-
dent had caused McClellan to execute one northward. Gen-
eral Fitz-John Porter had been sent by McClellan to Hanover
Court House, north of Richmond, had met the enemy there,
and had defeated him, but at the very time when the corre-
sponding advance to the southward by McDowell had

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN lOI

reached within eight miles of the Court House, it was coun-
termanded, and the troops that had made it retired as they
had come. Almost immediately after the advance in force
from Fredericksburg had been authorized by the President,
who was in person on the ground, and had agreed that it
should take place on the 26th, and he had just returned to
Washington, McDowell received news that General " Stone-
wall " Jackson was marching down the Valley of the Shen-
andoah. This had changed the whole aspect of affairs, caused
the recall of McDowell's advance, and led to a train of con-
sequences not to be stated in a breath. McClellan had not
pressed the Confederates sufficiently hard at Richmond, ^
they had been able to spare the force marching down the Val-
ley. This stroke accomplished several objects, of which not
the least was the detention of McDowell's troops for the pur-
suit of Jackson. In vain did McDowell attempt to show,
what was the fact, that he was not in a position from which
he could successfully intercept the retreat of Jackson ; he was
compelled by the President's orders to make the attempt.
As, in meteorological disturbances, one may combine with or
may neutralize another, and even numerous conflicting or
conspiring tendencies may set the whole atmosphere in doubt-
ful array for days or weeks, so here, the little war-cloud rep-
resented by the march of Jackson was destined to throw into
confusion the whole of the Federal plans of campaign and
continue in well-defined consequences up to the close of the
battle of Antietam. On the 9th of June, however, while
McDowell's force was still in pursuit of Jackson, the
First and Second Brigades of Pennsylvania Reserves were
sent aboard transports near Fredericksburg, and proceeded
to join McClellan on the Peninsula. General Meade, in
command of the Second Brigade, having been detained by
official business at Fredericksburg, followed on the 1 2th of
June.

I02 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

Landing after nightfall, on the nth of June, at the White
House, on the right bank of the Pamunkey, the First and
Second Brigades of the Reserves bivouacked only a few
miles off, at Tunstall's Station, where they were just in time
to oSer eflective opposition to the cavalry of General J. E.
B. Stuart, who at this point of time was engaged in mak-
ing the first of the great raids around the rear of an
army, in which particular kind of feat several generab on
both sides became distinguished,^ but none so &mous as
Stuart. The Third Brigade of the Reserves did not reach
the White House until the 14th of June. Upon its arrival
the Division was, as has already been mentioned, posted on
the extreme right, at Beaver Dam Creek, under the com-
mand of General Fitz-John Porter.

There is little room to doubt that, had McClellan pressed
the enemy after the battle of Fair Oaks, he might, with his
right in advance, across the Chickahominy, have been able
to capture Richmond. He himself seemed to think, judg-
ing from his representations to the President, that it would
have been necessary to march troops on the right around,
by the way of Bottom's Bridge, to join the left, and that that
plan was not feasible, as indeed it was not. It is hard to
understand, however, that an enterprising general could not
have taken Richmond under the circumstances. Such a
one, it would seem, could have crossed the Chickahominy
from the right flank, with the troops already north of the
stream. Almost the whole of the Confederate army in Rich-
mond had attacked the left wing of McClellan, and yet it had
failed in its intention, while two Federal corps which had
not fired a shot were close up to Richmond on the north
bank of the Chickahominy. The enemy had on the ground
then only the most moderate resources in troops which had
not been engaged. It is interesting to note at this point
how much depends upon the mental attitude of a general

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 103

of an anny. Whilst guarding themselves ag^nst under-
rating an enemy, it has been the practice of military men
of the highest stamp to exalt in the minds of their troops
their own resources. But while from the headquarters of
the Army of the Potomac the sombre views of its chief as
to the enormous strength of the enemy pervaded the camps,
and the population of Richmond was panic-stricken at the
result of the battle of Fair Oaks, there was found no such
weakness in Lee. Reinforcements were summoned from
all quarters, Richmond's narrow escape became the en-
trance upon its final safety, and the golden opportunity of
its capture was lost.

The battles in which the Pennsylvania Reserves are about
to share were shaped by Jackson's march down the Shenan-
doah Valley. Owing to that came the diversion of McDow-
ell's command. Widespread panic pervaded the Valley of
the Shenandoah and the country beyond as Jackson took
his way north. Milroy was driven off with little trouble.
The Hon. N. P. Banks, formerly Speaker of the House of
Representatives, major-general of volunteers by the grace
of folly, was in the latter part of May hustled out of
Strasburg and driven through Winchester, bringing up all
distraught at Williamsport, whence, a year before, he had
started on a triumphal march up the Valley. Jackson had
not minded a bit his ruling, or being out of order, or the
ghosts of the gavel and mace of authority which he had
once wielded in person or by proxy. He had just lifted
him up, as Hercules once raised Antaeus, and set him down
hard at Williamsport. After Banks's defeat the transforma-
tion scene presented two small armies, respectively under
Fremont and McDowell, in pursuit of the agile and wily
Jackson, who, after various vicissitudes, devious courses,
engagements, advances and retreats, took up the fateful
march towards Richmond with which this account now has

I04

GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

to do. Heaped up consequences, in confusion worse con-
founded, growing out of inertness at one, and activity at the
other end of directly related hostile lines, bring that re-
doubtable march southward until it passes the right flank
of the devoted Pennsylvania Reserves before Richmond,
and halts only before the fiery storm from land and water
at Malvern Hill.

TEE SEVJEN DATST BATTLES.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

By the 24th of June everything was deemed ready by Gene-
ral McCIellan for a forward movement, several bridges having
been thrown across the Chickahominy, reinforcements hav-
ing arrived and all other preparations having been made, and
on the 25th the picket-line of the left wing advanced from
the now well -fortified entrenchments resting on their right
near Golding's Farm near the Chickahominy. The eng^e-
ment that ensued was regarded by McCIellan as successful,
and he telegraphed the Secretary of War that he had fully
gained his point : General Lee denied it. This point was
the alleged gain of ground by picket-advance, enabling him
with advantage to attack in force on the 26th or the 27th
of June. The next day, the 2Sth, however, came a change
over the spirit of his dream, in which one can clearly per-
ceive the influence of his constitutional infirmity of purpose.
Although, on the 24th, he had been inclined to believe, upon
the testimony of a deserter, that Jackson was approaching
from the direction of Gordonsville, he betrayed no particular
apprehension, but carried out the plan for the picket-advance
of the next day, and as we have seen, contemplated supple-
menting that by an attack in force on the following day or
on the next day but one. But when, on the 2Sth, he learned
through some "contrabands" (slaves manumitted by the
fact of war), that Jackson was aj^roachtng with thirty thou-
sand men (which ought not to have occasioned surprise,
considering his late performances in the Shenandoah Valley),
he telegraphed at once to the Secretary of War, " I incline

Io6 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The
rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including
Jackson and Beauregard I regret my great inferi-
ority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible
for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the neces-
sity of reinforcements I will do all that a general

can do with the splendid army I have the honor to com-
mand, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can
at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of
the action, which will probably occur to-morrow or within
a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be
thrown on my shoulders, it must rest where it belongs."
The night of the 25 th Jackson was at Ashland.

When the " Merrimac" had been destroyed, on the 1 1 th of
May, General Huger evacuating Norfolk on the loth, it was
open to General McClellan to do what he would have done at
first if the "Merrimac" had not existed, — to make the James,
instead of the Pamunkey, his base of operations. Whether
or not he would finally have done so, but for the impending
onslaught of Lee, is a question that cannot be positively de-
termined, but the weight of evidence in favor of supposing
that he would not have done so preponderates over that in
favor of supposing that he would, unmolested, have changed
his base. On the one hand, we have reason to believe that
he would have done so, because the James had been recog-
nized by him as being, but for the presence of the " Merri-
mac," preferable to the Pamunkey for a line of communica-
tion and depot of supplies. But, on the other hand, stands
the fact that, when first notified of the impending attack by
the enemy, he concluded to hold on to the Pamunkey, and
it was only when some hours had elapsed that he concluded
to change his base. It would, therefore, seem that if, when
he could have made the change without pressure, he did
not conclude to make it, and then, the pressure seeming to

TEOE SEVEN DA TS* BATTLES. lO/

become greater, he concluded to make it, that he would not
eventually have made it if by some chance the pressure
had been suddenly removed. The fact that the change was
determined upon only when there could be no question that
the enemy was about to attack in force, therefore points to
the belief that the expression, " change of base," was only
a euphemism used to cover the word "retreat;" and this
view of probability is confirmed by the circumstance that,
when the change of base had been successfully crowned by
a victory in the last battle which secured it, the command-
ing-general, although superior in numbers and equipment
to the enemy, and supported by the belief of some of his
officers in their superiority to the enemy, settled quietly
down into a purely defensive attitude, in a position which,
from the use of the expression, " change of base," was
rightly regarded as one properly belonging to an army act-
ing on the offensive, not on the defensive. It seems toler-
ably clear, therefore, in the light of the sequence of events
just narrated, that McClellan's greatest military defect is
admirably covered by Napoleon's characterization of the
kind of infirmity of mind which finds in submitting to ex-
traneous action escape from the pain of resolution required
for self-prompted action ; inspired by the false idea that re-
sponsibility for consequences inheres less in a negative than
in a positive attitude of will. Speaking of generals who
thus evade what seem to their own minds a greater, to ac-
cept a less responsibility, he says : " They take up a position,
make their dispositions, meditate on combinations, but there
begins their indecision, and nothing is more difficult, and
yet nothing more precious, than to be able to make up one's
mind."

General McClellan had nearly one hundred and fifteen
thousand infantry, with admirable artillery. Lee had eighty-
five to ninety thousand infantry, including Jackson's and

I08 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

Other reinforcements, and his artilleiy at the time was not
believed to be equal to that of the Federal army. Much
of the ground was, from its nature, not adapted to cavalry ;
there was not a large amount of that arm on either side,
and such as there was bore a very small part in the follow-
ing seven days' battles.

The reader will remember that, on the south side of the
Chickahominy, facing west, the lines of McClellan's left
wing passed in front of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and
rested finally at Golding's Farm, near the Chickahominy,
and that his right wing, also facing west, was at Beaver
Dam Creek, on the north side of the Chickahominy, and
about four miles above the general line of the left wing.
The Richmond and York River Railroad, passing over a
bridge near Bottom's Bridge, in the rear of the Federal
left wing, went thence past Savage's Station in the rear, and
struck about the middle of the entrenchments of the left
wing, whence it passed on, unavailably to the Federals, to-
wards Richmond. In consequence, at one of the ensuing
battles, the enemy was enabled to bring a piece of railroad-
artillery to bear upon the Federal line of battle.

It follows, from the description of the ground, that if
the enemy should attack the right wing, and the intention
of the commanding-general were to retreat to a point on
the James southeast of him, the right wing must become
the rearguard of the whole army, and so remain until both
wings were concentrated on the south bank of the Chicka-
hominy. The enemy did attack on the right, and therefore
the Federal retreat to Malvern Hill having been previously
decided upon, it took place as indicated. It was a well-
planned and well-executed retreat, and but for the absence
of chief leadership on the field might have been made per-
fect ; but this will incidentally appear in the course of the
following sketch of the Seven Days' Battles.

THE SEVEN DA YS* BA TTLES. 109

On the 26th of June the enemy began to drive in the
pickets and forward posts along the line of Beaver Dam
Creek. About twenty-five thousand infantry in all repre-
sented the troops defending a stretch of the Chickahominy
and Beaver Dam Creek, the natural and artificial strength
of which position made that number of troops, of such good
quality, ample for the duty assigned to them for the first day.
The whole position of the right wing is defined by saying
that it began on the Chickahominy below New Bridge,
passed along parallel to the Chickahominy until it reached
Beaver Dam Creek, and thence turned at about right-angles
along the creek ; that part of the line runmng parallel to the
Chickahominy from about New Bridge to the creek being held
by Morrill's and Sykes's divisions of the Fifth Corps, and that
along the creek by Reynolds's and Seymour's brigades of
the Pennsylvania Reserves, attached to that corps ; Meade's
brigade being held in reserve on the left-rear of the Beaver
Dam Creek line. Beyond the Beaver Dam Creek line, towards
the right front, lay the village of Mechanicsville, and beyond,
towards the left, and much further away, showed the spires of
Richmond. On the very front, beyond Beaver Dam Creek,
was Meadow Bridge, and close to it a bridge of the Virginia
Central Railroad, and not far from them Mechanicsville
Bridge, the turnpike bridge from Richmond to Mechanics-
ville. In consequence of the lay of the land and the po-
sition held with reference to it by General McCall, the com-
mander of the Pennsylvania Reserves, the brunt of the day's
fighting would necessarily fall upon his troops on Beaver Dam
Creek, of which Reynolds's were on the right, Seymour's on
the left, and, as been said, Meade's in reserve, on the left-rear.

The outposts of both cavalry and infantry were soon
driven in. One company of infantry was for a while cut
off from the line of Beaver Dam Creek. Another, being
also intercepted during the first encounters of advance-

I lO GENERAL QEOBOE QOBDON MEADR

guards, was permanently cut ofT, and after hiding for three
days without food in the swamp, was forced to come out
and surrender. The resistance of the outposts had been
strenuous enough, and, about 2.30 p.m., they were with-
drawn behind the entrenchments east of Beaver Dam Creek.
The skirmishers had all fallen back behind the entrench-
ments, when, about 3 p.m., the enemy, no longer opposed
in his advance on the west of the creek, and consisting of
A. P. Hill's division and Colonel Thomas R. R. Cobb's so-
called Legion, appeared before the Federal lines, while a
large body of Jackson's infantry continued its march far away
to the right Jackson himself, however, was present, with
at least some of his artillery, and General McCall says, in
his official report of the battle, that General Lee in person
commanded. The enemy's skirmishers came rapidly for-
ward, and under cover of artillery-fire attacked from right
to left, the attack being particularly heavy on the right
Both artillery and musketry-fire then concentrated from the
right-centre to the left flank. Throughout, however, the
Confederates were mowed down by hundreds, leaving the
remainder no choice but to seek the refuge which they
found in the wooded swamp below.

The two previous attacks having failed, the enemy, later
in the day, attempted the left, held by Seymour's brigade.
Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the Confeder-
ates advanced along the mill-road leading across the creek
at Ellerson's Mill, but the move having been anticipated by
General McCall, the line had been reinforced there ; still
more troops were sent to the point, and the Confederates
made no greater progress there than they had made else-
where. The action lasted from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m., with the re-
sult that the attacking force, although &r outnumbering the
attacked, for the Confederate divisions were, at their full
complement, always much larger than the Federal ones,

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES. 1 1 1

had been frustrated at every point, and had suffered heavy
losses. Even had the brigade of General Lawrence O'B.
Branch, whose arrival they had hoped for, come up, there
would not have been any change in the final result, for the
Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves, under General
Meade, remained unengaged, and besides, there were the
two divisions of the Fifth Corps, which had taken a
scarcely appreciable part in the battle. It was, as has been
indicated, imperatively necessary to hold the ground for
the purpose of covering the retreat of the army. The
Pennsylvania Reserves and the Fifth Corps were therefore
temporarily occupying it with a resistance which, as we
shall see, will gradually make it assume the appearance, as
well as represent the reality, of a rearguard to the forces
preparing to move towards the James. Towards the close
of the engagement reinforcements from the Fifth Corps
arrived, but the light was waning, and in consequence they
scarcely participated in the closing scene. Thus ended
the battle of Mechanicsville, with very great loss to the
enemy, and relatively very little to the Federals. The
Pennsylvania Reserves were engaged in cleaning their
arms in readiness for the contest which no one doubted
would be resumed on the following day, the 27th of June,
when orders from Fitz-John Porter reached General McCall
before daybreak to (all back to Gaines's Mill. To the rear,
about three miles and a half from Beaver Dam Creek,
another creek from the north watershed of the Chicka-
hominy, having the same general direction as Beaver Dam
Creek, a little west of north, runs into the Chickahominy.
This is Powhite Creek, and on it, some distance from its
mouth, is Gaines's Mill. The Reserves withdrew from
Beaver Dam Creek about daylight, and retired towards the
new position at Gaines's Mill, skirmishing with the enemy
as they retreated in perfect order.

1 12 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

In the new position at Gaines's Mill the left of the line of
battle to be formed was on an elevation near Watts's house,
from which rise the ground sloped down to the westward
towards Powhite Creek, curved around thence towards the
north by New Cold Harbor, and thence ran to a rise on the
extreme right, on which was a house known as McGee's.
The line in this position formed the arc of a circle of
which the left end of the chord rested on the summit
of the acclivity which falls gradually into the valley of
Powhite Creek, and the right end on a summit at the
McGee house. Morrill's division, of the Fifth Corps, which
was the only corps north of the Chickahominy on the
morning of the 27th of June, was on the left flank near
Watts's house, and Sykes's division of the same corps con-
tinued the line to the right, troops from each division being
held in reserve. The main line of reserves was formed of
McCall's division, because it had been so heavily engaged
on the previous day ; Meade's brigade being posted on the
left and Reynolds's on the right, while Seymour's was held
in reserve to it. General Philip St. George Cooke, with
flfteen companies of cavalry, regular and volunteer, was in
observation on the left flank, near the Chickahominy. The
open space in the fall of the land towards the creek was
commanded by artillery on the south side of the Chicka-
hominy, as well as by artillery on the north side of it, and
the artillery of the rear commanded the valley of the
Chickahominy for some distance. The artillery was posted
in the usual way, at intervals around the front. As the line
of battle backed the Chickahominy, the bridges in the imme-
diate rear were covered. Discussions have gone on up to
the present day regarding the number of troops on each
side here engaged. It will be impossible, on account of
their voluminousness, to enter into a review of these. It
therefore becomes necessary to give the conclusion of the

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES. II3

writer. This is, that the Confederates at first attacked with
about twelve thousand men, and eventually with at least
fifty thousand, and had sixty thousand north of the Chicka-
hominy ; and that the Federals had at first less than
twenty-five thousand, gradually reinforced to about thirty-
three thousand, but not effectively, because the reinforce-
ments did not arrive until the line at Gaines's Mill had been
broken and borne back by sheer force of numbers of the
enemy.

The Confederates were unusually slow in coming into
position. It was not until noon that they appeared, and
not until i p.m. that there was an attack by A. P. Hill, who
was outnumbered and made no progress. Joined by Long-
street about 2.30 P.M., the attack was violently resumed.
When, finally, all the Confederate forces were up, they out-
numbered the Federals, even when reinforced, nearly two
to one. On their right was Longstreet's division, then
Whiting's, then t^vo brigades of Jackson's, then Ewell's,
then two other brigades of Jackson's, then A. P. Hill's
division, and lastly, D. H. Hill's division occupied their
left. It was impossible for the Fifth Corps and the Penn-
sylvania Reserves finally to withstand the rush of these
masses when General Lee ordered a general advance of his
lines. Every available reserve was used, brought up and dis-
tributed in any direction where the Federal line seemed to
waver. Then was seen to advantage that divine fury in
combat, with which Homer gifts his heroes, when General
Meade ubiquitously coursed the field, exhorting and lead-
ing the regiments he brought up to steady the faltering
and failing ranks. It would, however, have been in vain
that he and other officers strove strenuously to stem the
adverse tide of battle, if reinforcements asked for, at what time
is matter of dispute, had not arrived after 6 p.m. in the crisis

of the fight. They consisted of General Henry W. Slocum's

1 14 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

division, of the Sixth Corps, which arrived just as the last
of the Pennsylvania Reserves had been used to strengthen
the lines. General John Newton's brigade of the division
was led by regiments to the right of General Charles Griffin,
of Morrill's division, and to the left of Sykes's division,.
Tyler's brigade soon following it, and relieving regiments
out of ammunition. Finally Colonel Joseph J. Bartlett's
brigade, of Slocum's division, was put in on the right of the
hard-pressed Sykes. Near this part of the field Reynolds
had stemmed the tide in a measure by his energetic succor
of weakened points. General Fitz-John Porter in his report
called the attention of the commanding-general to the
meritorious conduct of various officers on the field, among
whom he speaks of "brigade-commanders Reynolds,
Meade, and Seymour, who successfully led their regiments
into the thickest of the fight to support and relieve their
exhausted commands."

A most untoward event took place near the close of the
engagement. General Philip St. George Cooke had been
stationed on the left-rear in observation in the valley of the
Chickahominy, with instructions to keep below the summit
and act only on the bottom-land, but had, through a mis-
understanding, charged on the enemy while emerging from
the woods on the left, in consequence of which so destruc-
tive a fire was poured into the cavalry that, despite the
efforts of their riders, horses dashed through the batteries
in their rear, spreading consternation among the gunners,
who, thinking that they were charged by the enemy, left
some pieces on the field. At this moment, however, as
Fitz-John Porter narrates in his account of the battle, the
brigades of General William H. French and General Mea-
gher, of the Second Corps, arrived ; and although they
were too late to join in the battle, the enemy having ceased
his attack, they were useful in restoring confidence and as*

THE SEVEN DA KS? BATTLES. 1 1 $

sisting to hold the lines while the troops retreated that night
with all their material and supplies to the south side of the
Chickahominy. The Federal losses on this field were very
severe, and those of the Confederates were great One
would never suspect, however, from General Porter's ac-
count, that a defeat had been sustained by him. But it was
a defeat which, considering the odds against him, was more
honorable than many a victory. With timely and somewhat
greater reinforcement, it might have been a victory. The
end, however, had come with defeat. Duane's bridge and
Woodbury's bridge had been captured by the enemy, but
Alexander's bridge had been held, and under cover of the
night and the front presented towards the enemy by the
two brigades of the Second Corps, the troops which had
been engaged marched over to the south side of the Chick-
ahominy, and the rearguard following, the bridge was de-
stroyed. General Reynolds, getting separated from his
command, was, with his assistant-adjutant-general, captured
during the retreat.

The Fifth Corps, the Pennsylvania Reserves, and the rein-
forcements which had come to their succor, having been safely
withdrawn on the night of the 27th of June to the south side
of the Chickahominy, where all the troops of the Federal
army then were, it will now be well to consider what was do-
ing on that side of the stream during the 27th, when the bat-
tle of Gaines's Mill was being fought north of the river. The
entrenched and otherwise fortified line in front of Richmond,
on the south side of the Chickahominy, reached, as has
been more than once mentioned, from the front of Seven
Pines and the front of Fair Oaks, on its right, to Golding's
Farm, on the Chickahominy. It had been held, on the
27th, in order from left to right, by Couch's division of the
Fourth Corps, Kearny's and Hooker's divisions of the
Third Corps, Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions of

1 16 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

the Second Corps, and Smith's and Slocum's divisions of the
Sixth Corps. Slocum's division, of the Sixth Corps, consist-
ing of two brigades, and, later, French's and Meagher's brig-
ades, of the Second Corps, had been withdrawn, as we have
seen, on the 27th, to reinforce Porter. At the same time
some other troops had been sent over from the left to the
right of the line of the left wing to stiffen up Smith's posi-
tion, on account of the division of Slocum having been
withdrawn thence. On the morning of the 27th the Con-
federates, by way of making a diversion in favor of Lee
fighting at Gaines's Mill, had opened fire on Franklin's
position, near Golding's, and towards dark had advanced in-
fantry, which led to a slight engagement The movement
was so palpably a diversion, with the sounds of desperate
battle on the other side of the Chickahominy, that it
should not have prevented the sending of more timely
reinforcements to Porter. In the night, after the battle of
Gaines's Mill, Slocum's division returned to the right and
joined there Smith's, the other division of the Sixth Corps,
and the brig^adcs of French and Meagher rejoined the Second
Corps at Fair Oaks.

On the next day, the 28th, Franklin, on the right at Gold-
ing's, had, about mid-day, a slight infantry engagement. In
this quite a large number of Confederate prisoners were cap-
tured. On the same day General Keyes, of the Fourth
Corps, occupied the positions necessary to control the cross-
ings of White Oak Swamp, to secure the continued safe
retreat of the army, McClellan being now ready to make
his second move in the plan of taking up a new base on the
James, the one on the Pamunkey having been relinquished
by the retreat across the Chickahominy after the battle of
Gaines's Mill. The large herd of commissary cattle was put
in motion towards the James. Porter's corps, accompanied
by the Pennsylvania Reserves, crossed White Oak Swamp,

THE SEVEN DATS* BATTLES, 11/

and on the 29th took up positions to cover the Charles
City Road, leading from Richmond to Long Bridge across
the Chickahominy. Early on the 29th Sumner's corps and
Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division in due course fol-
lowed the previous advances towards James River, and took
up a line with its left resting on the entrenchments in rear
of the main line of entrenchments which had proved so
serviceable on the day of the disaster at Seven Pines, and
thence passed around Savage Station, on the Richmond
and York River Railroad, while Slocum's division was held
there in reserve. The locality and approaches about Sav-
age's Station made it certain that it would be necessary to
stand off the enemy at that point, although it was not, as
will later appear, the most critical one of all in the line of
retreat.

The defeat at Gaines's Mill having taken place on the
27th, and the operations on the 28th, just described, having
proceeded on the south side of the Chickahominy, where
Magruder had been occupying his lines with a force of
twenty-five thousand men in face of the enormously greater
one of McClellan, it behooves us now to inquire into what
Lee and Jackson were doing on the 28th of June with the
sixty thousand men they had north of the Chickahominy,
less the heavy losses they had incurred in the battles of
Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill. Through a misappre-
hension of Lee's, the day of the 28th was lost to him, a gain
to McClellan of inestimable value. Lee very naturally im-
agined that McClellan was retreating down the Peninsula to
the southeast, by the way in which he had advanced to
Richmond ; but when cavalry had scoured the country
around the left bank of the Chickahominy to its mouth, and
had found no sign there of infantry, of course he knew at
once that McClellan was retreating to the James inside of
the loop formed by the Chickahominy with reference to

1 1 8 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

the course of James River. Time having been seriously
lost to him, it remained to recover it in a measure by super-
lative exertions, which partially inured, through the fatigue
of the Confederate troops, to the benefit of McClellan.

The misty morning of the 29th of June had stood the
Federal troops in good stead when they had fallen back
from the entrenchments, and the five divisions took the po-
sition already described at Savage's Station, to protect at
that point the retreat of the army towards the James. But
when the mist lifted, about eight o'clock, Magruder came to
know that the line in front of him had been evacuated, and
at once set off in hot pursuit of the retreating reai^uard. In
the course of an hour he appeared before the front of the
Second Corps, at Savage's Station, and without delay ad-
vanced over the ground of Allen's Farm, from which the
following action takes its name, his attack falling at first on
French's brigade. Three several times he advanced, only to
be thrice repulsed, falling back at his third experience to de-
sist from his attempt. Sumner, who, by all accounts, always
seemed, through the doggedness of his resolution, to wish
to continue a fight once begun, without regard to the gen-
eral disposition of the field, was at last induced by Franklin
to fall back nearer to Savage's Station, and there make his
line continuous with that of Smith's division of Franklin's
corps. Concurrent testimony fixes the fact that, early in the
afternoon, Heintzelman marched his corps off the field, in
continuation of the line of retreat. The excuse he subse-
quently gave for this action was that the troops were so
crowded on the ground as to make it desirable that he
should vacate it with his command. The consequences, at
any rate, of his action were most unfortunate, not that dis-
aster resulted from his absence, but that, with his presence,
might have been achieved a great success. The position,
notwithstanding his withdrawal, had to be held. The first

THE SEVEN DA YS* BATTLES. 1 19

aiTair with the enemy had occurred before eleven o'clock ;
something much more serious was to be expected before
sundown, and it came.

About 4 P.M. the enemy again advanced. From what
troops the Federals had on the ground they had to spare
those necessary to fill the void left by the withdrawal of
Heintzelman. The action began. Suddenly, the "Land
Monitor," as the Confederates called it, a great gun mounted
on an ironclad car, appeared, coming down the railroad
track from Richmond, and fired its huge shot into the
Federal lines. The troops held their own, however, and
something more, for at the very last, about sundown, their
lines were advanced, and Magruder was driven from the
field. A great sense of relief was experienced, for with the
absence of Heintzelman and the imminence of Jackson's
appearance from the other side of the Chickahominy, the
day had been an anxious one. By the early morning light
of the 30th the bridge near Savage's Station, over the little
stream on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, was
destroyed by the last brigade that crossed, and the com-
mands of Sumner and Franklin continued on the road in
that direction.

It is desirable now that we should resume the considera-
tion of the position and movements of the various bodies
of Lee's troops. On the 28th, when General Lee had been
uncertain about McClellan's designs, he had sent Ewell's
division down the Chickahominy after the cavalry reconnois-
sance, and it had halted in observation at Bottom's Bridge.
Being recalled as soon as Lee ascertained that McClellan
was not retreating in that direction, A. P. Hill and Long-
street crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, heading
then around White Oak Swamp, on the northern side of
which Huger, as well as Magruder, then was. Three roads
running southeast, the Charles River, the Central, and the

I20 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

Newmarket, the last passing so near the James as to be
called also the Shore Road, led to the flank of McClel-
lan's army. These were pursued by Lx)ngstreet, A. P.
Hill, Magruder, and Huger. Magruder, as we have seen,
had, on the morning and afternoon of the 29th, attacked the
Federal rearguard at Savage's Station. Jackson, on the
north side of the Chickahominy, had not been able to get
across to aid him, because he was engaged in rebuilding
Grapevine Bridge, just below Alexander's Bridge.

While these movements were going on among the Con-
federates, Slocum relieved Keyes, who had been guarding
the bridge of the crossing of White Oak Swamp, Keyes, as
soon as relieved, taking up the line of march in retreat, and
assuming a position on the following day below the bridge
on Turkey Creek, which runs for a considerable distance
around and quite close to the base of Malvern Hill. By
five o'clock in the morning of June 30th the Federal army
had all crossed White Oak Swamp, and the bridge there
was at once destroyed. To General Franklin was assigned
the duty of barring the passage of the swamp at that main
critical point.

There were now two very dangerous, if not seriously
vulnerable points in the line of the retreat — ^the crossing at
White Oak Swamp, which it would certainly not be long
before Jackson would attack, and the position between it
and Malvern Hill, on the stretch between Charles River
Cross Roads and New Market Cross Roads, ufK>n which
the Confederate troops, led by Lee in person, were pouring
down from the direction of Richmond. The occupation of
the crossing at White Oak Swamp protected the rear, and
the occupation of the salient stretch of road between Charles
City Cross Roads and New Market Cross Roads, of which
the position of New Market Cross Roads was the most
salient of all, protected the trains finding their way towards

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES 121

Malvern Hill. There was, from the nature of the ground,
great defensive strength for holding the crossing at White
Oak Swamp ; but at Charles City Cross Roads and New
Market Cross Roads, no more for defensive than for offen-
sive purposes, the character of the ground there rendering
a combat virtually one of a fair field and no favor.

An army marching by the flank within sight, or within
striking distance of the enemy, is in an exceedingly danger-
ous situation, as armies so placed have often found to their
cost. It is true that, under certain conditions of ground,
roads, and formation of troops, the flank can be converted
almost instantly into a line of battle. But these conditions
did not exist here, with poor roads, and trains interspersed
with regular and reserve artillery and supplies, with troops
escorting them. The general position of the army and the
trains so marching by the flank was from the crossing at
White Oak Swamp, where General Franklin held the ground
on the hither bank, to the western side of Malvern Hill, on
the shore of the James, the goal for which all this move-
ment was striving, where, if it could be reached, safety
would lie, from the fact of the occupation of a commanding
position, and the additional one that the Federal gunboats
lying in the river could sweep with their guns the lower
land occupied by an army advancing upon the position.

It has already been mentioned, so as to include the inci-
dent asT to time and place appropriately in the narrative, that
the Pennsylvania Reserves had, early in the afternoon of
the 29th, passed over White Oak Swamp, and had taken up
a defensive position across the Charles City Road. As,
however, we have reached the moment when we are more
particularly concerned with the movements of the Pennsyl-
vania Reserves than with any other body of troops, be-
cause General Meade commanded a brigade in tliem, it is
proper now to follow their march in detail from the begin-

122 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

ning of their retreat to the time when, by a most extraor^
dinary chance, they found themselves, after having passed
through as severe an ordeal of battle as that to which any
other division of the army had been subjected, left in the
focus of fire under which their ranks melted away to the
point of annihilation.

The reader will remember that, just as the James puts
off towards the north a stream called the Chickahominy,
which forms with the James a great loop towards the north-
west, so also the Chickahominy puts off, towards the south,
an interior creek, called White Oak Swamp Creek, with
which the course of the Chickahominy forms a small loop
between the James and the Chickahominy. It is within this
smaller loop that the retreat towards the James had been
taking place, the main (Ubouchi from which was by the
crossing of White Oak Swamp Bridge. Heintzelman used
and then destroyed the bridge above, near Brackett's Ford,
on the morning after he had marched away from Savage's
Station and left Sumner and Franklin there in the lurch.
Inside of this loop made by the courses of the Chicka-
hominy and White Oak Swamp Creek are roads running
towards the fords, but those which the army chiefly followed
converged on that which ran to the bridge over White Oak
Swamp. Off to the north of Savage's Station, near the
banks of the Chickahominy, was a place called Trent's
Farm. Savage's Station is, as the reader will remeniber, on
the Richmond and York River Railroad. It was from
Trent's Farm that the Pennsylvania Reserves began their
march in retreat.

At Trent's Farm McClellan had had his headquarters.
On the 28th he left them and went forward to Savage's Sta-
tion. After the retreat from Gaines's Mill, on the night of
the 27th of June, followed by the destruction of Alexander's
Bridge, to prevent the pursuit of the enemy, the Fifth Corps,

THE SEVEN DA YST BATTLES. 1 2$

to which the Pennsylvania Reserves were still temporarily
attached, had bivouacked on the hills on the southern
side of the Chickahominy, at Trent's Farm. Here the
reserve-artillery, one hundred guns, under General Hunt,
was committed to the custody of the Pennsylvania Re-
serves as an escort, and not long after dark of the
28th the Division took up the line of retreat towards the
James. The night was rainy, and the troops plodded for-
ward through the gloom towards Savage's Station. Between
one and two o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 29th,
the head of the long column reached the Station. Here
there was a glimpse of McClellan giving his last instructions
before he went still further forward. The Pennsylvania Re-
serves here had a brief rest, and later in the morning pushed
on before the first action of that day, at Allen's Farm, had
begun. At the Station a trying ordeal had awaited them,
for there they had found many wounded, had learned that
communication with the depot at the White House had
ceased, and that most of those in the field-hospitals must
&11 into the hands of the enemy. Such among the wounded
whom they could make shift to aid in various ways, and patch
up so as to brave the attempt to take to the road, they set to
work to aid in the attempt to accompany the retreating col-
umn. The column, guarding the reserve-artillery, set out
again on the march, and in the early afternoon of the 29th
crossed the bridge over White Oak Swamp, where, as was
mentioned in due order in connection with the movements of
other troops. General McCall deployed his force across the
Charles River Road, one of the roads leading from Rich-
mond down on the flank of the retreating army. Here the
division relinquished the charge of the reserve-artillery, and
at 5 P.M. moved forward, under orders, towards the James
River.

We are on the eve of reaching the fortuitous circumstance

124 GENERAL OEOBQE OORDON MEADE.

which brought it about that the overtaxed Pennsylvania Re-
serves bore the brunt of a battle equal in severity to that of
Gaines's Mill. The point for which General Fitz-John
Porter's corps was aiming was for a highway called the
Quaker Road, turning off in the direction of Malvern Hill.
It is now the night of the 29th of June. Keyes has arrived
at Malvern Hill. Heintzelman is not far off. Porter and
McCall are moving toward New Market Cross Roads.
Counting still from the left, the troops are strung along in a
position to be able to make some sort of face, if need be,
towards the roads leading from the direction of Richmond.
Slocum is at Charles City Cross Roads. Franklin is at
White Oak Swamp crossing, on the extreme right. The
line is a very ragged one, and so far Providence, upon
which Lee and Jackson invariably count for their side, has
been decidedly adverse to them. Lee lost the whole of the
28th by following a false direction of manoeuvre. On the
29th Jackson could not get across the Chickahominy, be-
cause Grapevine Bridge was gone. Then, on the 30th,
when he had got across by rebuilding the bridge, he found
Franklin barring the passage of White Oak Swamp, with
the thoroughfare of the bridge in front of him destroyed.
There is a current anecdote in regard to the late period of
Jackson's arrival which seems incredible, that he was
fagged out and asleep, and that his staff would not wake
him. It is told of Frederick the Great, that he once instruc-
ted a page to wake him early on the following morning, and
that the page, essaying to perform his duty by the exceed-
ingly cross king, carried out his orders despite all resist-
ance, winning the wider-awake commendation of his sover-
eign. So Jackson would have felt, and so his subordinates
must have known, if there had been any question of waking
him, and therefore we may well discard the story as apoch-
ryphal.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES. 12$

Late at night General Meade, riding in advance with an
officer of Porter's staff and a guide, expressed his convic-
tion that they had passed beyond the Quaker Road. Halt-
ing his brigade, he rode forward and discovered that the
road for which the guide had been making was a disused
track, impracticable for the passage of troops. Reporting
the ascertained fact to General McCall, he in turn commu-
nicated it to General Porter, who, not giving entire credence
to the discovery, directed McCall to bivouac where he was,
and himself proceeded with the Fifth Corps, when, ascer-
taining the fact which he had previously doubted, he coun-
termarched his troops, reached the road where the whole
column should have turned off, and continued his march
towards Malvern Hill.

The consequences of the order which the Pennsylvania
Reserves had received were momentous. As they involve
the details of the severe battle in which they were engaged
on the morrow, it is pertinent here to ask three questions,
rather than to interpolate them between the accounts of
those active operations, ist. If General Porter did not re-
gard the Pennsylvania Reserves, and he subsequently said
that he did not, as any longer attached to the Fifth Corps,
how could he have so thought, since they had been so
assigned and not relieved from that duty? 2nd. If the
Pennsylvania Reserves were no longer attached to the
Fifth corps, how could he have directed General McCall
to remain all night where they had paused? The next
question concerns not Porter's, but McClellan's action.
3rd. If only by the merest chance the Pennsylvania Re-
serves were left where they were, with what, early in the
morning of the 30th, could he have filled the gap left by
their absence? As New Market Cross Roads was the
salient and centre of the army, it will become plain that,
but for the accidental presence there of the Pennsylvania

1 26 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADK

Reserves, with such aid as they had from the presence
of troops right and left, the army would have been cut
asunder.

Left in this unexpected manner on the way to Malvern
Hill, at New Market Cross Roads, General McCall took in
the full significance of the situation, and pushed out the
First Brigade of the Reserves about a mile towards the
west, to act as an outpost during the night. When, in the
early morning, the brigade was withdrawn and the Reserves
had broken their fast. General McCall, in obedience to or-
ders from headquarters, formed his men in line of battle on
both sides of the New Market Road. The Second Brigade,
commanded by General Meade, formed his right, the Third
Brigade, commanded by General Seymour, his left wing.
The First Brigade, commanded in the absence of General
Reynolds, taken prisoner, by Colonel Seneca G. Simmons,
was posted on Meade's left, in the centre, with its line some-
what withdrawn rearward. The Third Brigade, Seymour's,
thus formed Simmons's left, the line in which it was drawn
up, advanced on the left flank, being nearly at right-angles to
the line of Simmons's brigade. The disposition was faulty on
the left, inasmuch as it assumed the occurrence of what did
not take place, that the Confederates would make their first
advance from the direction of the Central Road, whereas, in
attacking the left, they diverged from that road, and coming
through the woods, struck Seymour in flank. Lieutenant
Alanson M. Randol's battery, Battery E, First Artillery, was
posted on the right. Captain Cooper's and Captain Kerns'
batteries occupied the centre, and two New York German
batteries, of the artillery-reserve, which had reported to
McCall only on the previous evening, occupied the left.
Continuing the line to the right was Kearny's division, of
the Third Corps ; while, to the left, was Hooker's division
of the same corps. It is plain that, if divisions and bri^

THE SEVEN LA YS* BA TTLES. 1 2/

gades form short sides of a polygon around an arc repre-
senting a line of battle, if the right or left flank of one
fraction is thrown outside of the general line of curvature
of the arc, it destroys the proper relation of support between
it and the next fraction to the right or left, the two being
then neither in continuation of the general line nor in cor-
rect echelon with each other. This formation, however, rep-
resented the line of battle at the salient New Market Cross
Roads* position. Only one other point requires mention.
General Meade's brigade was weak. A regiment of its four
component regiments had been surrounded and partially
captured at the battle of Gaines's Mill, only two of its com-
panies having been able to preserve their organization and
join their comrades there in line of battle. The force, there-
fore, which General Meade, on the morning of the 30th,
could dispose of, was, instead of four regiments, two regi-
ments and two companies.

Here, at the point of the field which was bound to be-
come the most critical of all, because, as has been men-
tioned, it was not only central with reference to roads, but
not strong from the nature of the ground, the Pennsylvania
Reserves found themselves in the very vortex of danger.
Should the enemy fairly break through their lines, the wings
of the army would be taken in reverse. Such was the mili-
tary situation, with the commander-in-chief of the army far
away. Napoleon says that battle is joined, then comes a
mingling of the elements of strife, of which the outcome is
unpredictable, then, as with a spark, the atmosphere clears,
the battle is won. The spark he refers to is the flash of
the commander's inspiration at the moment opportune to
act with a final exercise of will. If councils of war do not
fight, as is popularly said without due qualification, they
certainly tend to differences of opinion, which Tomini thinks
are even intensified by the intelligence of their component

I2S OENERAL OSonOE QOM>ON MEADR

parts. If this be a broad truth applying to deliberate ac-
tion in calmness of surroundings, it must certainly also be
true of men of the best capacity, when acting without a
supreme head, amidst the noise and confusion of battle.
War is, as Jomini well observes, a passionate drama. It is
not too much to assume that, if the commander-in-chief
had been present on the very ground of New Market Cross
Roads when the lines there were taken up, the faulty dispo-
sitions would have been rectified long before the enemy
struck them late in the day. The extreme left of the Penn-
sylvania Reserves would not have been allowed to remain,
as it had been posted, so entirely in the air as to invite and
be unable to advantage to repel attack.

It is now the morning of the 30th of June. By daylight
the troops and trains were all over the crossing of White
Oak Swamp, and the bridge there had been destroyed.
There is now to be fighting all along the line from that
point to Malvern Hill. The battle has been variously called
the battle of Glendale, the battle of Charles City Cross
Roads, the battle of New Market Cross Roads, and also
the battle of Frazier's Farm and the battle of Nelson's
Farm. Glendale is certainly the prettiest name, but as New
Market Cross Roads was where the battle was most intense,
that point would seem to be entitled to the bestowal of its
name on the occurrence.

On the right, at the crossing of White Oak Swamp, was
Franklin, with Smith's division of the Sixth Corps, Rich-
ardson's division of the Second Corps, two brigades of
Sedgwick's division of that corps, and Naglee's brigade of
the Fourth Corps. Further to the left, at Glendale, was
Slocum's division of the Sixth Corps ; further still to the
left, at New Market Cross Roads, was McCall's division of
the Pennsylvania Reserves, reduced by casualties from ten
thousand to about six thousand men. En echelon with that

THE SEVEN DATS* BATTLES 129

division were Kearny's and Hooker's divisions of Heintzel-
man's corps, the Third, Kearny to the right-rear and Hooker
\o the left-rear. On the extreme left flank were the corps
of Keyes and Fitz-John Porter, the Fourth and the Fifth.
The remaining brigade of the Second Corps, Bums's, the
others being with Franklin, was drawn up to the left of
Heintzelman. Thus, on the extreme left, was a force un-
necessarily strong in numbers, for Malvern Hill had begun
to be occupied by artillery, and the Fourth and Fifth Corps,
with only slight detachments from the Fourth, were posted
along a line not only so covered, but, from the nature of
the ground, one upon which the vehemence of the approach-
ing attack was not likely to fall ; and thus, in consequence,
the centre at New Market Cross Roads was proportionately
weak.

The attack on the left by General Henry A. Wise and
General Theophilus H. Holmes was so trifling as not to war-
rant anything more than the mere mention of it. Perhaps
they took in at a glance the strength of the position and
the number of troops posted there. At any rate, they
were shelled away by a few discharges from Malvern
Hill and the gunboats, without coming into collision with
infantry. At the other end of the line, however, the ex-
treme right, Franklin was enabled to do great service in re-
pulsing the attempt of Jackson to rebuild the bridge at
White Oak Swamp crossing. Between ten and eleven
o'clock in the morning Jackson had arrived in front of Frank-
lin, having come by way of Savage's Station. This was the
falsest move Lee had made if he knew the ground ; for the
thirty thousand troops which Jackson is believed to have
had with him were, in consequence, as good as interned for
the day, Jackson's attempt to restore the bridge here, or
otherwise to cross the stream, being frustrated at every turn

by the skilled and vigorous resistance of Franklin. The

1 30 QENBRAL QEORQE OORDOK MEADK

thunders of the artillery combat there had long resounded
along the lines when Huger made a feeble attack on Slocum,
which was easily repulsed with artillery. But then, about
the same time, 3 p.m., came the serious attack on the Fed-
eral centre which was to resolve itself into a death-grapple
for the rest of the day. It struck the Pennsylvania Re-
serves, drawn up as already described, Meade on the right,
Seymour on the left, Simmons in reserve in the centre.
The pickets had been gradually driven in for a half hour
before that time, but the main attack did not come until
about 3 P.M.

Two regiments of the enemy, one on the right-centre and
one on the left, and supported by artillery fire, advanced to
feel the position, but were at once repulsed. The next
attack by the enemy, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, was in
greater force, upon the left flank of the Reserves. This
attempt was foiled by refusing the left sufficiently to face in
that direction, and reinforcing it by two regiments from the
reserve under Colonel Simmons. The enemy, however,
did not desist from his intention in that quarter, but per-
sistently pursued it for over an hour with artillery and
musketry-fire and advances, repelled only by the utmost
vigilance and gallantry. In command of the troops which
he had brought over from the Third Brigade, Colonel
Simmons here fell mortally wounded while withstanding
these attacks. Although the attack on the left flank was
at this particular point of time more serious than any other
on the field, yet the enemy was at the same moment able
to afford enough troops to assault the centre of the Reserves,
with the evident intention of capturing the two batteries
there. Here too, however, his attempt to gain any decided
advantage was frustrated ; but meanwhile the left wing gave
way under continued and heavy pressure, some of its troops
fighting for the rest of the day with the right of Hooker.

THE SEVEN DA YS' BATTLES. ^ 1 3 1

The enemy perceived at last that it would be by no ordi-
nary measures that the lines of General McCall would be
broken. Such a one was planned and executed with num-
bers and determination so great as to bear all before it. A
lai^e body of the enemy, adopting the wedge formation,
charged at a trail-arms across the field directly upon Ran-
dol's fine battery on the right. Here General Meade was to
be seen as they came on, animating his men by word and
gesture with that exalted courage which could take the
form suited for the occasion, from the blaze of eagerness
that rouses the common soldier to his intensest action, to
the aspect of coolness which puts the seal on confidence of
success. General McCall himself galloped to the spot and
lent his own encouraging presence to the crisis which had
arrived beyond all doubt. A few yards of space and
seconds of time were well employed in the most murderous
discharge which they could bring to bear on the enemy,
and then the madding torrent of Confederate soldiers swept
forward, the guns were captured and overturned, and
all was in an instant inextricable confusion on the spot.
General Meade badly wounded, his young aide, James
Hamilton Kuhn killed, while General McCall and his offi-
cers still desperately endeavored to hold the position where
the artillery lay disabled on the ground, the left wing being
mainly gone, and the centre holding on with the utmost
difficulty for the few minutes before it too was driven back.
The right and centre, however, despite the fact that the
troops had been so overmatched in number and lacking in
support, were not routed. The lines had been forced at
last to yield after five hours of fighting to the overmastering
force sui^ng against them. The left had been swept back
by the torrent, but the centre was still holding its ground
when the deluge broke on Randol's battery on the right,
the centre abo losing Cooper's battery in the final events

132 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

of the field. As for the German batteries on the left, they
did not belong to the Division, and represented the only
portion of the lines which did not nobly uphold its reputa-
tion. General McCall reorganized such fragments of his
force as he could bring readily to bear, and placed them in
position near where the enemy had for a moment carried
everything before him, only to recede without daring to
attempt the withdrawal of the pieces which had cost both
contestants so dearly. The Reserves had been decimated.
General McCall was so destitute of staff or other officers
that he had to advance almost alone to reconnoitre in the
dark the situation just in front of his position, and, in
consequence, he had not gone more than a few yards when
he was captured by the enemy.

The Division was now almost destitute of officers of every
grade. Meade was wounded. Simmons was dead. McCall
was a prisoner. Reynolds was a prisoner. Only Seymour,
of the Third Brig^ade, remained of the chief officers.
Whether or not the Pennsylvania Reserves fought bravely
on that day ought to appear from the list of casualties
which will be given in due time and place. Whether or not
they were fought skillfully, no one ought to doubt, from
consideration of the facts already mentioned, and from the
names of their commanders.

The fight of the Pennsylvania Reserves at New Market
Cross Roads has thus far been treated of as an isolated oc-
currence of the battle-field, a condition which at the first
blush would seem impossible. And yet that treatment rep-
resents as to them the most accurate statement of facts.
In a certain loose, wholly untrue sense, the Pennsylvania
Reserves were reinforced, because, had there not been other
troops fighting to the right and to the left of them, the force
which the enemy precipitated on their lines would have been
even greater than it was. But, in the true sense, to be rein-

THE SEVEN DAYS* BATTLES. 1 33

forced means to be lent aid when the body of troops need-
ing reinforcement, however badly injured, still preserves in
the main its integrity of form and capacity of inflicting injury
or making resistance, not when it is utterly spent by hours
of labor and on the point of disintegration. But such
reinforcement was not given to the Pennsylvania Reserves.
Two hours of hard fighting passed, and no succor came.
Their left wing was dislodged, and still no succor came. Time
passed, and both right and centre, long hard-pressed, were
forced to recede, the centre still clinging to the ground ; and
even then in broken condition they held, night fallen, back
of their former lines, the enemy so exhausted as to be
unable to carry off the assaulted guns, glad to have a respite
from the contest.

Yet, despite these facts, the brilliant action of the Penn-
sylvania Reserves on that day was for a long time unknown,
and even apparently authentic statements made that they had
been reinforced, and had not worthily upheld their former
reputation. The facts are, however, as here stated, as to
the vigor of their resistance to the powerful assaults of the
enemy, more concentrated than elsewhere along the lines
attacked, and as to their not having received any rein-
forcement from the beginning to the end of the contest. It
was once supposed that a brigade which reinforced Kearny,
on the right-rear of the Reserves, had gone to them.
When the contest was over, and when the Reserves had
partly fallen back and partly been driven back, Burns's and
Dana's brigades of Sedgwick's division, of the Second Corps,
led by Sumner in person, were called from the right and
advanced. The Twentieth Massachusetts Regiment was
especially conspicuous in this movement, passing over the
ground which had been occupied by the left of the Reserves,
where some of their scattered troops rallied to its standard,
doing excellent service in presenting a renewed bold front

134 GENERAL OEOBOB GORDON MEADK

to the enemy ; but this was not reinforcement to the Re-
serves ; it was isolated action, after an accomplished fact, the
day after the fair. Heintzelman, who was a half mile in the
rear, and, as one can judge from his own account, saw
nothing, and knew but little more of the ordeal through
which the Reserves had passed, presumed to make unfavor-
able statements in his report to McClellan, which McClellan
naturally adopted in his general report.

The final all-inclusive fact is that, through neglect, the
Pennsylvania Reserves fought from 3 p.m. until dark with-
out having received, from the beginning to the end of the
conflict, the slightest reinforcement ; that but for their
strenuous resistance at the most critical point on the flank
of the Federal army, it would have been cut in two, seeing
that the troops, imperfectly en echelon with them on the
right- and left-rear had as much as they could contend with,
Kearny, on their right, receiving reinforcements ; and
that had the Reserves not been so steadfast as they were,
Kearny, Hooker, and the rest, to the right and left, would
have encountered more than they could resist. The breakers
of the attack on the flank at New Market Cross Roads beat
fiercely along the line held by the Pennsylvania Reserves
and Kearny, dying away gradually beyond until they
roared afresh in the contest on the extreme right between
Jackson and Franklin. The use to which the Pennsylvania
Reserves were put differed from that of a forlorn hope only
in that they resisted instead of made attack ; in essentials
their action and their fate were the same.

Greneral Meade had been struck simultaneously in the
-arm and in the side, the former a trifling, the latter a danger-
ous wound. Received at first into the field-hospital, he was
thence transported to Haxall's Landing, on the James River,
just below Malvern Hill. The next day he was placed on
a hospital-transport and sent to Baltimore, where he was

TEE SEVEN DAYS* BATTLES. 1 35

met by his wife and one of his sons, and placed aboard one
of the small steamers that ply between Baltimore and Phila-
delphia by the route of the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal,
connecting Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, arriving on the
morning of July 4th in Philadelphia, where he was met at
the wharf by other members of his family and by friends,
and thence escorted home.

The Federal lines, from the crossing of White Oak
Swamp to Malvern Hill, remained intact when the sun went
down on the evening of the 30th of June. As soon as
darkness had fairly fallen over the scene, Franklin quietly
withdrew and continued the retreat, following the rear of
the train ahead on the road to Malvern Hill and Haxall's
Landing, and Heintzelman and Sumner, as in order men-
tioned, fell in behind him in the same direction.

By early night General McClellan had learned that Frank-
lin was retiring, and sent orders to Sumner and Heintzelman
to follow him. General Seymour, then in command of the
Pennsylvania Reserves, withdrew his troops about the same
time. Later in the night McClellan joined Greneral Fitz-
John Porter on Malvern Hill, and learned from him the
history of the day's encounters, when he returned to
Haxairs Landing, committing to Generals Barnard and
A. A. Humphreys, of his staff, the duty of posting the
troops on Malvern Hill as they might arrive. Assisted by
other officers, these two engaged in reconnoissance of the
ground before daylight of the following morning.

Malvern Hill is a plateau over a mile long by three-
quarters of a mile in width, comparatively, for that coun-
try, free of timber, and affording favorable slopes for
artillery-fire, and ravines for infantry positions. On the left
of the general position which the enemy would first en-
counter in coming from the direction in which his army lay,
was stationed Fitz-John Porter's corps, the Fifth, with

136 GENERAL QEOBGE GORDON MEADE.

Sykes's division on the left, and MorriU's on the right, the
artillery distributed, and the reserve-artillery and siege-guns
massed behind on the summit of the plateau. Next, to the
right, came Couch's division, of General Keyes's corps, the
Fourth. Next, Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions, of
Sumner's corps, the Second. Next, Smith's and Slocum's
divisions of Franklin's corps, the Sixth. Then the re-
maining division of Keyes' corps, the Fourth. The line
extended in a semi-circle, the line of the James representing
the diameter. The Pennsylvania Reserves were stationed
back of Fitz-John Porter's corps and Couch's division, in
reserve, a just recognition of the severity of the service
which they had performed. The days being long at that
season of the year, the enemy soon began to make
his appearance from his matutinal start on the ist of July.
But although he was visible on the ground, nothing of mo-
ment occurred until 2 p.m., when a large body of troops
appeared a long distance off to the right. Nothing came
of that, however, and another long pause ensued, during
which, doubtless, he was reconnoitering, when, about 3
P.M., artillery opened on the left-centre, followed by a spir-
ited infantry attack, repulsed with signal success by Morrill
and Couch. There came then an apparent lull in the
enemy's activity, during time probably employed in making
dispositions of troops out of sight. At six o'clock the first
determined attack began, the enemy concentrating a tre-
mendous artillery-fire on Morrill and Couch. Huger, Ma-
gruder, and D. H. Hill were the assailants in the struggle
which now began. They pushed column after column of
attack by brigades against the part of the line assaulted ;
but all in vain, for the Federal troops unflinchingly main-
tained their position, while delivering withering volleys upon
the advancing troops. Meagher's, Caldwell's, and Sickles's
brigades, coming up at different times, reinforced the points

THE SEVEN DA YS* BA TTLES. 1 37

attacked, until finally there were nine brigades in all on the
Federal side engaged in the action. The contest was fiercely
waged, the gunboats on the James joining in with huge
shells sent hurtling into the recesses of the woods or into
the open where the enemy's ranks or formation of any kind
occupied ground of vantage for assault, until at last endur-
ance failed, and, with ranks battered and broken, he recoiled
from the field of the greatest disaster that he was for a long
time to suffer, night falling, and the shells from the gun-
boats and the artillery on the hill describing their fiery
arcs to burst in destructive explosions over the retreating
army. The last occurrence, that by night, has been denied
by at least one writer on the Federal side, but there is the
highest Confederate authority to vouch for its truth, and
the Confederates were in a position to know.

During the night McClellan continued his retreat to
Harrison's Landing, why, in reason, has never been made
apparent in view of the facts that he himself declared that
the battle had ended with his victory. The Federal artillery
had proved itself to be superior to the Confederate, and the
infantry quite its equal, and many officers of high reputation
deemed it shameful to retreat after such a success. He
alleged, however, that there could be security of supplies
only at Harrison's Landing, and therefore that the army
must perforce retire to that place. Other generals thought,
as they had thought before Jackson's arrival, and some even
after it, that a strong push would carry the army into Rich-
mond ; that with the gunboats on the James, it was not
necessary to give up the position of Malvern Hill, that the
morale of the army was concerned in its retention and making
no further backward step. Which side was right is one of
those questions which will remain forever unsettled.

To Harrison's Landing, a few miles below Malvern Hill,
the army retreated, there entrenching, and there General

138 GENERAL GEOBQE GORDON MEADE

McClellan seemed satisfied to remain indefinitely, unless
prodigies could be performed in his favor in making him
numerically far stronger than the enemy. He had, as we
have seen, represented in a despatch to the President that
the enemy was two hundred thousand strong. To the
Comte de Paris he said about the same time, as the Comte
narrates in his history of the war, that the enemy was one
hundred and sixty thousand strong. As the enemy was
certainly less than ninety thousand strong at the time referred
to, while he, at the same time, was at least one hundred
and six thousand strong, he had therefore fought in the
Seven Days' Battles, at the lesser of his estimates, an addi-
tion to the forces of the enemy of about seventy thousand
men in buckram ; and if he were sincere in his despatch
to the President, he may perhaps, in accordance with his
greater estimate, have fought on those days about one
hundred and ten thousand men in buckram. No general
ever won battles on these terms. Although it is extremely
unsafe to assert that a thing is not, to affirm a negative, as
the phrase goes, because so many apparently incredible
things exist, it would hardly be hazardous to say that one
may defy all military history to show a single other case
where a general so exaggerated on all occasions, as General
McClellan did, the numbers of his adversaries.

Except for a cannonading, about midnight of the 31st of
July, upon the entrenched position of the Army of the
Potomac, from the southern side of the James, an attack dis-
tinguished by its ineffectiveness, and except for a slight attack
by McClellan on Malvern Hill, to be described later, per-
fect quiet settled down upon the army after the battle of
Malvern Hill. The losses on the Federal side had been
very great, but not so great as those on the Confederate
side. The sum-total of the losses in the Army of the
Potomac for the Seven Days' Battles were fifteen thousand

THE SEVEN DA YS* BA TTLE& 1 39

eight hundred and thirty-nine men. The Fifth Corps,
together with the Pennsylvania Reserves, lost seven thou-
sand six hundred and one, and of that number the Reserves
three thousand one hundred and eighty-seven, the loss of
the Pennsylvania Reserves exceeding the loss of any divis-
ion of the army but that of the First Division of the Fifth
Corps, which lost sixty-five men more than the Reserves.
The Reserves, a mere division, lost more men than were
lost by any entire corps except the Fifth, which included
the aforesaid First Division ; and as the loss of the Penn-
sylvania Reserves was only a Httle over four hundred at
Mechanicsville, although that of the enemy was very great,
the Division must have lost over two thousand five hundred
men in the two battles of Gaines's Mill and New Market
Cross Roads. As, at Gaines's Mill, the Division was at first
held in reserve, the reader is in a position to judge whether
or not it did its duty at New Market Cross Roads.

General McClellan was now in his element of deliberate
preparation, — reminiscent, and forecasting. Having ample
time on his hands, in the attitude of expectancy in which
he had placed himself, his thoughts were largely engaged
in diplomacy, and on prospective strategy and tactics with
large reinforcements. From this coign of vantage he wrote
to the President, on July 7th, a long and extremely indis-
creet letter, in which he instructed him in a matter of
statesmanship in which the President finally proved him-
self to the whole world a consummate master. The breach
between the Administration and the general became too
wide to be filled. What chief representative of a people
ever did or possibly could keep terms with a general who
wrote to him in a pedagogic strain? Think, too, for a
moment, of the mental calibre of Lincoln as compared
with that of McClellan, of his realization and recognition
at every turn, by every possible sign, of the fact that all

I40 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

power under our form of government is derived from the
people. Think of his scrupulous exercise of authority
within the well-defined limits of the fundamental law of the
land, knowing with superb forecast that problems beyond
any man's solving would work themselves out with patience
and time, and then compare with this the narrowness of one
who wrote to him, as his superior in moral and intellectual
force, utterly inappreciative of the feet that a new order is
to come from the old, and the noblest attitude is waiting,
and who complacently indited advice to one of the greatest
men of the age.

On the 8th of July the President in person visited the
army. General McClellan says, in his memoirs : " Mr.
Lincoln visited me at Harrison's Bar. I handed him my-
self, on board of the steamer on which he came, the letter
of July 7, 1 862. He read it in my presence, but made no
comments upon it, merely saying, when he had finished it,
that he was obliged to me for it, or words to that effect. I
do not think that he alluded further to it during his visit, or
at any time after that." If any one with a knowledge of
the relation between civil and military authority, and with
appreciation of the situation at that time, will dispassionately
read this letter, which in manuscript must have occupied
several pages, he will not be surprised at Mr. Lincoln's
silence. Mr. Lincoln was a man of the keenest sense of
humor, allowance to whose play sometimes lightened as
heavy a burden as man ever bore ; and he was also a thinker
and writer of g^eat force, who was soon to produce a few
effortless lines that will be immortal. He had had presented
to him by his chief commanding-general, not a mere frag-
ment of composition, in taste similar to specimens previously
received from the same source, but pages of implied instruc-
tions, evidencing a benighted state of mind. He was withal
a man full of pity, and he may well have murmured to him-

THE SEVEN DA YS* BATTLES. I4I

self, "and common is the commonplace, and vacant chaff
well meant for grain." He said, however, nothing, but that
he thanked the general, and did not allude further to the
subject Nothing could have been more generous, but evi-
dently the general did not appreciate it, because he could
not, from his point of view, realize the gravity of the offence,
or that he had committed any, regarding himself as playing
the part of guide, philosopher, and friend.

On the 25th of July General Halleck, who had been
created general-in-chief of all the armies of the United
States, and had established his headquarters in Washing-
ton, also visited the army. A council of commanders
was called, and the general opinion expressed by it
iavored the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula.
On the 30th of July General Halleck sent to General
McClellan an order to press the enemy in the direction of
Richmond, so as to ascertain his movements. It becomes
very evident from McClellan's papers of this time, that he
apprehended the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula,
and even his own supersedure. In pursuance of Halleck's
instructions, Hooker, by way of clearing the passage
towards Richmond, was ordered to dislodge some of the
enemy from Malvern Hill, which task he accomplished.
McClellan also occupied Coggins* Point, on the south
side of the James opposite Harrison's Landing, for the
purpose of preventing any future attempt, like that on
the night of the 31st of July, to bombard the camps. He
seemed to cling to the hope that something might occur to
change the suspected intention of withdrawing the army
from the Peninsula, but with very serious doubt if anything
would avail to change it. His anxiety to remain is very
conspicuously shown in a despatch of August 5th to his
chief-of-staff. General Marcy, whom he informs of the
success of Hooker, requesting him to send a despatch to

142 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

Halleck, saying how he (McClellan) hated to give up the
position, and that if he could have reinforcements he would
be successful.

The die, however, was cast, for on the 4th of August Mc-
Clellan received an order from Halleck, dated the 30th of
July, to withdraw the army to Acquia Creek. It will be
impossible to enter here into a discussion of the cross-pur-
poses exhibited by the ensuing correspondence between
Halleck and McClellan. It would seem, however, that a
good general idea of the greater or less expedition that
followed the order to withdraw may be condensed into the
statement that, whereas General Halleck did General
McClellan wrong in construing the expression in his de-
spatch of the 1 6th, " movement has commenced by land and
water," as if it meant that the movement had just begun,
instead of, as was the fact, that it was entering on its final
stage, yet that, on the other hand. General McClellan was
not so expeditious at the very first as he might have been,
for no man is, who, while formally obeying an order, tries
to have it rescinded, as happened in this case.

The campaign had been badly conducted from beginning
to end. A base of operations does not mean merely a depot
of supplies. A base of operations means a line, or points
of support on a line, to the rear of the front of operations,
to cover the security of supply, including the contingency
of the enforced retreat of an army. When an army bases
itself on a river, it must not only have bridges, but either
tetes de pontf or strong forts, preferably astride the river.
The campaign included at the beginning a false position,
because the force of McDowell at Fredericksburg was sup-
posed to be there to join eventually the force of McClellan's
right wing reaching out to it from the north side of the
Chickahominy. Therefore McClellan's force had to be partly
north of the Chickahominy. But while accepting this sup-

rfi^OM

THE SEVEN DA YS* BATTLES, 143

posititiously temporary drawback, it did not follow that when
the army of McClellan was placed astride of the Chicka-
hominy, the larger body of troops should have been placed
north of that stream, in the stronger position, the imme-
diate consequence of which was the disaster at Seven Pines.
The army should, moreover, according to the best ancient
and modem practice in war, have been supported as to its
base, without which a base is only a name, by the completion
of the HU de pont at Bottom's Bridge, and by tetes de pant
on the upper Chickahominy, and besides, the line from the
White House to Bottom's Bridge, beginning at the White
House, should have been strongly held by detached works.
Taking things as they actually were, with the vicious
first dispositions, the capture of Richmond should have been
attempted while the battle of Fair Oaks was proceeding.
Again, McClellan should either have caused the whole force
north of the Chickahominy to retire south of it during the
night of the 26th of June, destroying the bridges behind it,
and thus have avoided fighting the battle of Gaines's Mill,
or else he should, on the 27th, have heavily supported the
troops fighting that battle. General McClellan should have
been present in person near New Market Cross Roads, to
see to the disposition of the troops, because it was the most
critical point of the field. A general-in-chief should not
leave so much as he did to his lieutenants, who, however
competent, represent so many different minds and views and
wills, and successful generalship, however much it may
draw from accessories, is conditioned, as a finality, upon the
action of one supreme thought and will. That he was not
permitted to advance on Richmond again, when he so
earnestly requested it, is ground for great rejoicing, for ex-
perience points to the probability that the Federal and Con-
federate sides would in very deed have " swapped queens."
Whether or not, in consideration of the loss of morale by

144 GENERAL OEORGE GORDON MEADE

the Federal troops, and its corresponding gain by the Con-
federates, an advance on Richmond just after the battle of
Malvern Hill would have been successful, must remain
somewhat problematical. The relative gain and loss of
such imponderable matter as tnorale remains unknown, save
by the test of actual trial.

The enemy, on his part, made three grievous mistakes, to
his cost, one in assaulting the position at Beaver Dam Creek,
when it needed only to be turned, as it was the next day ;
another in Jackson's action leading to his losing so much
time as he did in rebuilding a bridge across the Chick-
ahominy, when it ought to have been known that, even with
that accomplished, he would not be able to force the cross-
ing at White Oak Swamp ; and finally, the mistake of at-
tacking Malvern Hill from a direction in which it was im-
pregnable, as held by troops supported by the fire of the
gunboats in the James.

Whilst General McClellan's army was in process of re-
moval from the Peninsula, General Meade, having recovered
from the serious wound which he had received at New Mar-
ket Cross Roads, took steamer from Baltimore for Harrison's
Landing. There he found everything in confusion incident
to the transportation of the army to the Potomac. Generals
McCall and Reynolds had by exchange been released from
the Richmond prison, but had not yet been able to rejoin the
army, in consequence of which he found General Seymour
in command of the Division of the Pennsylvania Reserves,
about taking ship with it for Falmouth, near Fredericksburg.
It started on the night of the 1 5th of August. General
Meade, therefore, finding no immediate need existing for
his presence, went to Washington, via Baltimore, remaining
there for a day or two, when, hearing of the arrival of the
Division at Falmouth, he proceeded there by rail, and thus
rejoined the army.

THE ARMY OF VIBOINIA. I45

CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

It was on June 26, 1862, as will be remembered, that
the action at Mechanicsville, on the Peninsula, was brought
about by Jackson's and other forces of Lee's turning the
right flank of the Army of the Potomac, an event fol-
lowed at once by the retreat of the army during a period
known as the Seven Days' Battles, resulting in a change
of base from the Pamunkey to the James, where the
army, in its final stand at Malvern Hill, reinforced by the
fire of the Federal gunboats on the James, repulsed the
enemy, and then took refuge at Harrison's Landing, where
it was insured from further molestation by the continued
presence of gunboats, by entrenchments, and by the occu-
pation of commanding positions for artillery in the vicinity.
By a coincidence, it was on the very same day that General
Pope was appointed to the command near Washington of
the previously disunited forces of that vicinity, which had
been under McDowell, Fremont, and Banks, among which
Jackson had just made such havoc, and which, when con-
centrated, were to be known as the Army of Virginia, Fre-
mont resigning because he would not serve under his
junior in rank. General Pope, and Sigel taking command of
his corps.

It will therefore be perceived, when we remember that

the first day's serious contest of the forces of the Army of

Virginia, the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a direct

consequence of McClellan's retreat on the Peninsula, did

146 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

not take place until August 9th, that, after making all due
allowance for uncertainty as to whether the Army of the
Potomac should be removed from the Peninsula, or should
be reinforced and retained there, the postponement of the
decision until July 30th entailed great risks to the forces
under General Pope's command. Had the Army of the
Potomac lain between Richmond and Washington, or had
it been engaged in threatening Richmond, the case would
have been different ; but where it was, and inert as it was, at
Harrison's Landing, it was, by the &ct of the occupation of
that position, and by that attitude, temporarily neutralized.
Except for one diversion at the last moment before its re-
moval from the Peninsula, when it made a partial advance
to Malvern Hill, nothing was done to relieve the stress on
Pope, whereas, so superior was the Confederate to the Fed-
eral initiative, that, secure of McClellan's inactivity, Jackson
with his corps was, on the 9th of August, advancing south
of Culpeper Court House in the movement which was to
culminate in the battle of Cedar Mountain. Nor did this
extraordinary inactivity on the part of the Federal authori-
ties in Washington, who were equally remiss with McClel-
lan, cease even when at last the troops of the Army of the
Potomac were ordered away from the Peninsula en masse,
and some of them had reached Acquia Creek and Alexan-
dria, as the official correspondence ensuing between General
Halleck and General McClellan, with relation to pushing
forward troops, fully exemplifies. First of all, McClellan
had not been sufficiently zealous as to the removal of the
army. Then Halleck's thoughts, upon the arrival of
McClellan, were so bent on the defence of Washington, as
if succor to Pope had nothing to do with its safety, that he
actually permitted transportation to be devoted to routine
work, and cavalry, of which there was sore need for recon-
noissance towards the front, to be sent scouting on the

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 147

upper Potomac. When emergency pointed to the front, he
did not attempt heartily to push there two corps which, even
without artillery, might have saved the day at the second
battle of Bull Run, hampering McClellan with despatches
which tied his hands for effective action. Transportation of
the regular sort he certainly could have supplied from Wash-
ington, or have extemporized it. On his side, McClellan
had been instructed, while on the Peninsula, to make ample
provision of ammunition for the landing troops, and had
even replied that he could supply Pope's whole army, yet,
when the time arrived for final action, he answered Halleck's
urgency for it by saying that he did not know the calibres
of Pope's guns. Halleck, although knowing the confusion
of affairs at Alexandria, instead of appearing on the scene,
only a few miles from Washington, alleged the pressure of
office duties by way of apology for not going. Halleck
was, therefore, guilty of the action which imposes responsi-
bility without conferring corresponding powers, embarrass-
ing McClellan in every way by neglect of promptness of
reply and the contradictoriness of his instructions. With-
out danger to the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Vir-
ginia might have been reinforced more largely than it was.
At the last moment, when affairs for the Army of Virginia
were at their most critical point, Halleck was found wholly
wanting in the emergency, proving conclusively that he had
not that order of executive ability which is fitted for great
command. Well might von Moltke have remarked, if this
case of military management had come under his notice, as
he is reported to have said, under a misapprehension of the
whole tenor of the war, that he took no interest in its
military operations, as they were merely the conflicts of
armed mobs.

Of all this General Pope had a right to complain, but he
had no right to complain of the want of confidence which

148 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

pervaded the minds of his subordinates, for even if there
had been no prepossession against him, he began his
assumption of the command of the Army of Virginia with
declarations which of themselves were sufficient to create it,
by most unmilitary addresses to the army, and kept it alive
by his unskilfulness in the field. It was not the mere in-
vidious comparisons that he made in his first address to the
army, between the armies of the East and the West, that
destroyed confidence in him ; it was the fact that a general
presenting himself to his army professed to scorn some of
the most important military practices, maintenance of strong
positions and lines of retreat and bases of supplies, recog-
nized by the greatest captains of ancient and modem times.
He little realized, although he should have done so, that he
was to meet veterans who were the flower of the Confed-
erate troops, and under extraordinary leadership, that he
was to have an experience to which, as Sancho Panza would
have said, all he had seen at Island No. 10 on the Missis-
sippi, where he had signalized himself, was tarts and cheese-
cakes.

In the first part of his operations General Pope made
some excellent dispositions of his troops and excellent
movements. For certain mistakes at the beginning he was
not responsible. It was not by his wish, but by General
Halleck's orders, that General Rufus King's division of
McDoweirs corps was kept at Fredericksburg for the in-
adequate purpose of guarding, in such an emergency as
that presented by the advance of Lee on Pope, the com-
munication through Falmouth with Acquia Creek, and
thus protecting Government property. Banks was ordered
from the Shenandoah Valley, and was stationed at Little
Washington, while Sigel was also ordered from the Valley,
and occupied Sperryville to the left of Banks, and General
James B. Rickett's division, of McDowell's corps, was ad-

THE ARMY OF VIBOINIA. I49

vanced from Manassas Junction to Waterloo Bridge at
the Rappahannock. McDowell, as is thus seen, was
already on the ground with two of his divisions, Franklin's
being still with McClellan. Pope's force was near the
Rappahannock, with its right near the Blue Ridge, and its
communications with Washington open, defended at the
Rappahannock in his rear. It was from these positions,
after making certain reorganizations preliminary to the
anticipated movements of the army, which at first was to be
directed on Richmond, when the unwelcome tidings of
McClellan's retreat came even before it had assembled, that
Pope made his first movements to check the advance of
Jackson. He had entered upon active operations by trying
to break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the Orange
and Alexandria Railroad. It was through no fault of his
that, while the first attempt under King from Fredericks-
burg succeeded, the latter failed, for General John P.
Hatch, in charge of it, reached his destination only to find
the ground held by the enemy in force, because he had
not, as directed, employed only cavalry for the expedition.
Hatch had found on the ground the vanguard of the Con-
federate army, consisting of two divisions, under Generals
R. S. Ewell and C. S. Winder, Jackson in person com-
manding, who, just before the end of July, was joined by
the third division of his corps under General A. P. Hill.

The campaign was fairly opened now by a renewed, and
this time strong demonstration on Gordonsville, and on the
7th of August Jackson began the general advance which
led to the battle of Cedar Mountain, not as contemplated
by either side, but as it took place. Whether General
Pope did or did not intend the action to take place through
Banks attacking Jackson in his advance can never be
known from that completeness of evidence which con-
stitutes proof positive to most persons. The only instruc-

ISO GENERAL GEOBQE GORDON MEADK

tions in writing extant in the matter are ones which purport
to be a statement of Pope's intentions, made at Banks's
request by Pope's inspector-general, who dictated them to
Banks's chief-of-stafT. But it is very evident that this fil-
tering process may have introduced error. Pope might
have said one thing, his emissary might have modified it,
and the transcriber might have modified that version again.
If two changes are thus shown to be possible, assuming
that Pope himself did not make a mistake as to what he
directed, a certain one of those two is the more likely to
have been the one actually made. Experience shows that
a person making a verbal repetition is more likely to make
a mistake than he is who merely transcribes what he believes
to be dictated. Therefore, so far as circumstantial evidence
goes, one must believe that Banks received an order in the
words of the paper which was eventually produced in his
justification. This paper, dictated by Colonel Marshall to
Banks's chief-of-stafT, dated 9.45 a.m., August 9, 1862,
reads : '* General Banks to move to the front immediately,
assume command of the forces in the front, deploy his skir-
mishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately
as he approaches, and be reinforced from here."

General Pope denied that he had sent such an order,
which, if Banks received such a one, proves how strong it
is in his favor. It has just been said that that was the
written order which Banks did receive. It has been con-
tended that the words, " deploy his skirmishers if the enemy
advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches,"
only mean, "attack him with the skirmishers." Pope, how-
ever, as proved by his denial of sending such an order, ad-
mitted by implication that that was not the meaning of the
order produced, as he read in the light of military usage.
Although, in modem practice, skirmishers are sometimes
pushed forward in tolerably dense array, their further ad-

THE ARMY OF raGlSIA. 151

vance is not generally represented by what is known as
attack betn^-een two forces. As the wording of the sup-
posititious order stands, it clearly means that skinnishers
are to be pushed forward, and that mo\*enient follo\^*ed in due
course by line of battle. Military construction of the words
pro\'es that the attack, as specified by them, \%*as to be by
the main force of Banks. The dictated order, being what
it was, however derived, plainly instructed him to attack the
enemy with his whole force, instead of merely tr>'ing to hold
the position which had been assigned to him. Unfortu-
nately, however, for the justification of Banks through the
evidence on the face of the written order mentioned, it is
proved from other evidence, that General Pope did not
intend Banks to attack with his small force, and that if
General Pope really did use the expression imputed to
him, Banks must have nevertheless known, from other in-
structions and from a variety of circumstances, that he was
violating a previous thorough understanding as to action.
But, apparently carried away by the idea that he might unex-
pectedly achieve a great victory, which would have the effect
of obliterating remembrance of his miserable conduct of op-
erations in the Shenandoah Valley, where he had had ample
time to retire to advantage before being struck by Jackson,
and would crown him with the laurels which he had so
vainly longed for, amidst which anticipated glory all fear of
charge of disobedience of orders disappeared, Banks pre-
cipitated his heroic little force into an unequal conflict with
thrice their number, led by one of the first soldiers of the
age. Without entering into an elaborate discussion of the
evidence to substantiate the view here expressed, a few facts
are conclusive as to the foundation which it has in fact.
Banks was put into a strong position, selected long in ad-
vance, which he recognized at the moment when he was
placed there as the position which he was to maintain. Yet

^ ^

■ \

* •

1«

{••

THE ARMY OF VIBQINIA. I45

CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

It will therefore be perceived, when we remember that

the first day's serious contest of the forces of the Army of

Virginia, the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a direct

consequence of McClellan's retreat on the Peninsula, did

146 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

not take place until August 9th, that, after making all due
allowance for uncertainty as to whether the Army of the
Potomac should be removed from the Peninsula, or should
be reinforced and retained there, the postponement of the
decision until July 30th entailed great risks to the forces
under General Pope's command. Had the Army of the
Potomac lain between Richmond and Washington, or had
it been engaged in threatening Richmond, the case would
have been different ; but where it was, and inert as it was, at
Harrison's Landing, it was, by the fact of the occupation of
that position, and by that attitude, temporarily neutralized.
Except for one diversion at the last moment before its re-
moval from the Peninsula, when it made a partial advance
to Malvern Hill, nothing was done to relieve the stress on
Pope, whereas, so superior was the Confederate to the Fed-
eral initiative, that, secure of McClellan's inactivity, Jackson
with his corps was, on the 9th of August, advancing south
of Culpeper Court House in the movement which was to
culminate in the battle of Cedar Mountain. Nor did this
extraordinary inactivity on the part of the Federal authori-
ties in Washington, who were equally remiss with McClel-
lan, cease even when at last the troops of the Army of the
Potomac were ordered away from the Peninsula en masse,
and some of them had reached Acquia Creek and Alexan-
dria, as the official correspondence ensuing between General
Halleck and General McClellan, with relation to pushing
forward troops, fully exemplifies. First of all, McClellan
had not been sufficiently zealous as to the removal of the
army. Then Halleck's thoughts, upon the arrival of
McClellan, were so bent on the defence of Washington, as
if succor to Pope had nothing to do with its safety, that he
actually permitted transportation to be devoted to routine
work, and cavalry, of which there was sore need for recon-
noissance towards the front, to be sent scouting on the

THE ARMY OF VJBGINIA. 147

upper Potomac. When emergency pointed to the front, he
did not attempt heartily to push there two corps which, even
without artillery, might have saved the day at the second
battle of Bull Run, hampering McCIellan with despatches
which tied his hands for effective action. Transportation of
the regular sort he certainly could have supplied from Wash-
ington, or have extemporized it. On his side, McCIellan
had been instructed, while on the Peninsula, to make ample
provision of ammunition for the landing troops, and had
even replied that he could supply Pope's whole army, yet,
when the time arrived for final action, he answered Halleck's
urgency for it by saying that he did not know the calibres
of Pope's guns. Halleck, although knowing the confusion
of affairs at Alexandria, instead of appearing on the scene,
only a few miles from Washington, alleged the pressure of
office duties by way of apology for not going. Halleck
was, therefore, guilty of the action which imposes responsi-
bility without conferring corresponding powers, embarrass-
ing McCIellan in every way by neglect of promptness of
reply and the contradictoriness of his instructions. With-
out danger to the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Vir-
ginia might have been reinforced more largely than it was.
At the last moment, when affairs for the Army of Virginia
were at their most critical point, Halleck was found wholly
wanting in the emergency, proving conclusively that he had
not that order of executive ability which is fitted for great
command. Well might von Moltke have remarked, if this
case of military management had come under his notice, as
he is reported to have said, under a misapprehension of the
whole tenor of the war, that he took no interest in its
military operations, as they were merely the conflicts of
armed mobs.

Of all this General Pope had a right to complain, but he
had no right to complain of the want of confidence which

148 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADE.

In the first part of his operations General Pope made
some excellent dispositions of his troops and excellent
movements. For certain mistakes at the beginning he was
not responsible. It was not by his wish, but by General
Halleck's orders, that General Rufus King's division of
McDowell's corps was kept at Fredericksburg for the in-
adequate purpose of guarding, in such an emergency as
that presented by the advance of Lee on Pope, the com-
munication through Falmouth with Acquia Creek, and
thus protecting Government property. Banks was ordered
from the Shenandoah Valley, and was stationed at Little
Washington, while Sigel was also ordered from the Valley,
and occupied Sperryville to the left of Banks, and General
James B. Rickett's division, of McDowell's corps, was ad-

THE ARMY OF VIBQINL/L. 149

1 50 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

tions in writing extant in the matter are ones which purport
to be a statement of Pope's intentions, made at Banks's
request by Pope's inspector-general, who dictated them to
Banks's chief-of-staff. But it is very evident that this fil-
tering process may have introduced error. Pope might
have said one thing, his emissary might have modified it,
and the transcriber might have modified that version again.
If two changes are thus shown to be possible, assuming
that Pope himself did not make a mistake as to what he
directed, a certain one of those two is the more likely to
have been the one actually made. Experience shows that
a person making a verbal repetition is more likely to make
a mistake than he is who merely transcribes what he believes
to be dictated. Therefore, so far as circumstantial evidence
goes, one must believe that Banks received an order in the
words of the paper which was eventually produced in his
justification. This paper, dictated by Colonel Marshall to
Banks's chief-of-staflT, dated 9.45 a.m., August 9, 1862,
reads : " General Banks to move to the front immediately,
assume command of the forces in the front, deploy his skir-
mishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately
as he approaches, and be reinforced from here."

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 5 1

vance is not generally represented by what is known as
attack between two forces. As the wording of the sup-
posititious order stands, it clearly means that skirmishers
are to be pushed forward, and that movement followed in due
course by line of battle. Military construction of the words
proves that the attack, as specified by them, was to be by
the main force of Banks. The dictated order, being what
it was, however derived, plainly instructed him to attack the
enemy with his whole force, instead of merely trying to hold
the position which had been assigned to him. Unfortu-
nately, however, for the justification of Banks through the
evidence on the face of the written order mentioned, it is
proved from other evidence, that General Pope did not
intend Banks to attack with his small force, and that if
General Pope really did use the expression imputed to
him. Banks must have nevertheless known, from other in-
structions and from a variety of circumstances, that he was
violating a previous thorough understanding as to action.
But, apparently carried away by the idea that he might unex-
pectedly achieve a great victory, which would have the effect
of obliterating remembrance of his miserable conduct of op-
erations in the Shenandoah Valley, where he had had ample
time to retire to advantage before being struck by Jackson,
and would crown him with the laurels which he had so
vainly longed for, amidst which anticipated glory all fear of
charge of disobedience of orders disappeared. Banks pre-
cipitated his heroic little force into an unequal conflict with
thrice their number, led by one of the first soldiers of the
age. Without entering into an elaborate discussion of the
evidence to substantiate the view here expressed, a few facts
are conclusive as to the foundation which it has in fact
Banks was put into a strong position, selected long in ad-
vance, which he recognized at the moment when he was
placed there as the position which he was to maintain. Yet

1 5 2 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

he deliberately made an advance which relinquished the
whole of it, except where General George H. Gordon had
been on the right, in reserve, and finally he ordered desul-
tory charges, without even full knowledge of his own side
of the field or the positions of his troops, and he did not
send for reinforcements when he saw that battle had
seriously begun, although he knew, for he had passed them
on the march, that the division of Ricketts, numbering eight
thousand men, was only about three miles off in his rear,
and that Pope might have some of Sigel's troops, then on
the march. Flagrantly, he did not send for reinforcements,
although he had been told that they would be forthcoming,
and there is no other conclusion tenable then that he did
not wish to have them, because he was so ignorant of what
he was about to encounter, and underrated it so utterly that
he thought he could gain a victory in which there would
be no one else to share. As it fell out, less than eight
thousand troops attacked over twenty thousand, under the
experienced Jackson, and, although badly defeated, rendered
such an account of themselves as is memorable in the his-
tory of the war ; but there is nothing in that circumstance
more than palliation of the evil encountered in their being
led to slaughter through the ig^norance, disobedience, and
vanity of their commander.

The centre of Pope's forces was at Culpeper, so that the
position of Banks near the Blue Ridge had been his extreme
right, and that of King, at Fredericksburg, his extreme lefl.
As will be remembered, Sigel was just to the lefl of Banks,
and what has just been said as to the dispositions at the
battle of Cedar Mountain incidentally shows that Sigel
had been ordered forward when Banks had gone to the
front, and that Ricketts had come up from Waterloo
Bridge, twenty miles in the rear of Culpeper. The disposi-
tions of Pope at the beginning of the campaign, even in-

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 53

eluding those preliminary to directly opposing Jackson's
advance, were strategetically and tactically correct. He had
been able to damage the communications of the enemy, and
his intention to defeat Jackson's first advance would have
succeeded but for the failure of Sigel to arrive in time,
through a most impotent delay in advancing, while he was
unnecessarily asking, when there was a direct and fine road
before him, by what road he should march. Even putting
that drawback out of question. Pope would have succeeded
in checking Jackson without disastrous loss had Banks but
obeyed the spirit of his instructions. At the time, however,
when Pope at a disadvantage thus met Jackson, and suc-
ceeded in checking the advance with more serious loss to him-
self than to the enemy, Jackson falling back, as he did, only
to gather more strength, he should at once have retreated
behind the line of the Rappahannock, retiring thence on
pressure to Centreville. Where he was now advanced,
towards the line of the Rapidan, he was in a position where
he ran, with his inadequate force, the risk of being twice
flanked before he could reach Centreville, whereas, behind
the line of the Rappahannock, the possibility of being flanked
was reduced to once, against which, with due vigilance, he
ought to have been able to guard. Driven to extremities,
it was only on the line at Manassas and Centreville, be-
tween Washington and Alexandria on the one hand, and
the Bull Run Mountains on the other, that he could make
sure of his communications. Failing in the open field, he
could, at the worst, fall back, as he was finally compelled
to, behind the defences of Washington. What he had to
meet with all circumspection, with an imperfectly organized
army, under a new commander, was the thoroughly organ-
ized Army of Northern Virginia under leaders who had
learned to wield it at will, under a mind which even at that
early day had given evidence of a high order of military talent.

154 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE,

In one respect, however, Pope difTered as fatefully in char-
acter in one direction as McClellan in another. Where
McClellan, looking at his distant enemy, viewed him mag-
nified manifold and portentous in strength. Pope's self-
consciousness mirrored everything diminutively by contrast
with his own sense of power. Pope fondly believed that the
enemy about to press finally upon him was not so formidable
that his retreat towards his prospective reinforcements and
the maintenance of his communications could be seriously
endangered. The reinforcements from the Army of the
Potomac, which he was prospectively to receive, he flattered
himself were as good as in hand, and that he could count
upon them to look out for his rear at Manassas. It seems
never to have occurred to him that no general of repute had
ever before based his plans upon contingencies of the nature
of hopes, rather than of beliefs warranted by circumstances.
It is not upon the hazard of such dies that great command-
ers tempt the fortunes of war. Perhaps not even Pope
would have done so, but for the fajct that he had declared
in his address to the army that he had always been used
to seeing the backs of his enemies, and had he not thereby
morally burnt his ships behind him ? As it was, he fell
back, but not in the best manner, not at his own option, but
under the initiative of Lee, when he allowed to slip into the
hands of Lee his own control of the question, and when he
was occupying a position which there was no object, unless
from bravado, in pretending with his small force to main-
tain.

General Pope ordered up King's division, which had been
guarding Fredericksburg, and Jackson, knowing of the con-
centration of the forces which Pope then had in hand, re-
treated in the night of the i ith of August to the Rapidan,
General Pope advancing in correspondence with that move-
ment, and on the I2th picketing that river. It was at this

THE ARMY OF VIRQINIA. 155

point of time, however, or shortly thereafter, that Pope, to
avoid Lee*s initiative, should have withdrawn to the Rappa-
hannock. He knew then to his cost that Jackson was not
far distant, and was soon to be heavily reinforced, that the
removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula
having been determined upon, was in progress, and that
reinforcements were on their way to him. Generals Hal-
leck and Pope should have seen that, with Pope's then rela-
tively small force, he ought not to be occupying longer than
absolutely necessary a line near the Rapidan. Nothing
further could be accomplished near the Rapidan, the enemy
then being in ample force to defend his communications and
too strong to attack. The division of King, as has been
mentioned, had been withdrawn from Fredericksburg and
had joined Pope. There was absolutely no reason for
Pope's remaining longer near the Rapidan, but every reason
against it. But the fatal idea expressed in his address to
his troops, that they should discard such notions as lines
of retreat and bases of supplies, and that the strongest
position is one from which to advance upon the enemy,
seemed to dominate him to his destruction. Pope was at
the Rapidan with a military chip on his shoulder, to dare
the consequences, not deeming them more serious than such
as he could adequately meet.

Lee was soon on the ground. By a lucky capture, how-
ever, on the i6th of August, of a letter of Lee's, Pope be-
came apprised that he was about to advance, and, leaving
his cavalry in observation, began a retreat across the Rap-
pahannock with his infantry. Lee kept away towards
Pope's left, so as to come in between any possible rein-
forcements that might be arriving for Pope from the direc-
tion of Fredericksburg. He attempted to capture the
bridge on Pope's left over the Rappahannock at Rappahan-
nock Station, but it was burnt by the retreating forces.

156 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

Then he endeavored to turn Pope's right at Warrenton.
Pope was at last where he should have retreated almost
immediately after the battle of Cedar Mountain, occupying
a better position than on the Rapidan. General Jesse L.
Reno had brought up reinforcements on the 14th of August,
marching by the way of Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahan-
nock, from Falmouth with two divisions, eight thousand
men of the Ninth Corps, just arrived from North Carolina.
None had yet arrived from the Army of the Potomac. In
the right position at last, on the 20th of August, Pope
made on the Rappahannock some judicious dispositions to
protect his new line, but with a neglect of what might soon
be going on in his rear that led to woeful consequences.
The enemy, after vainly endeavoring to cross the river just
above or below Rappahannock Station, and finding it im-
practicable, attempted to turn the Federal right between
ten and fifteen miles above that point At this juncture
General Pope had reason to believe, from communications
made to him from Washington, that he would soon have
large reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. But
he had no right to confide the protection of his rear to a
hope. His force was insufficient to protect the whole line
upon which the enemy was operating with a larger one,
threatening him with it in front while it endeavored to push
around his right flank. Sigel, on the right flank, perceived
this, and suggested that he fall back for the sake of greater
concentration and for the protection of the railroad. But,
collating all the material at hand to afford a basis for judg-
ment, it would seem that at this point of time Pope was
balancing in his mind very different plans of conduct, one
of which was certainly as grandiose in conception as it
would have proved abortive and disastrous in attempted ex-
ecution. That plan was to cross the river and attack the
enemy in the act of marching up the Rappahannock.

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 57

The attempt to turn the Federal left flank from the
position on the southern bank of the Rappahannock having
been seen to be of doubtful expediency, on account of a
freshet rendering the fords of the Rappahannock impassa-
ble, the burning by Pope of the railroad bridge over the
river, and the difficulties experienced, through the rise of
water, in attempting to cross the river above, caused Lee
suddenly to change his plan from that of attempting to
cross there at Waterloo Bridge, and to try an experiment
which would have been hazardous, but for the fact of the
unskilfulness of the general by whom he was opposed.
Pope, after moving to the right, had established his head-
quarters on the Warrenton turnpike, the main road leading
to Alexandria, from which place, or from Acquia Creek,
his expected reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac
were to arrive. The first of these had reached him on the
23d of August, from Falmouth, near Fredericksburg, — ^the
Pennsylvania Reserves, under General Reynolds, in which
General Meade commanded the same brigade as that with
which he had set out in the war, and which he had just led
on the Peninsula. The Division was at once assigned to
General McDowell. General Fitz-John Porter, with his
divisions, under Morrill and Sykes, joined Pope, by way of
Acquia Creek, on the 26th of August.

On the night of the 2 2d General J. E. B. Stuart started
from Lee's army, and passing around Pope's, with be-
tween one and two thousand troopers, reached Catlett's
Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, working
the usual havoc effected by light-cavalry raids reaching the
rear of a hostile army, and captured important papers of
Pope's. Escaping essentially by the same route as that by
which he had come, Stuart rejoined Lee near Waterloo
Bridge, and it is at this point of time that Lee altered his
intention of attempting to turn Pope's right near Warrenton.

158 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

He now converted his previous intention into a feint that
deceived Pope. Maintaining, as he had done for some time,
an artillery fire and show of force along the Rappahannock,
Lee laid out his plans for a coup at Manassas. On the
morning of the 25th of August appeared a cloud of dust
slowly sweeping over a great space and extending towards
the northwestward. It was known that Jackson occupied
the enemy's left, it was known what a man of enterprise
Jackson was, he had given many and only recently con-
vincing evidences of it, and it was believed that it was Jack-
son's corps moving towards the north under that cloudy
canopy of dust. It would be incredible, if the fact were not
historical, that Pope thought this movement of infantry
might mean either a raid into the Shenandoah Valley or a
continued attempt on his right flank above Warrenton.
The conclusion to be reached under the circumstances was
the one which Pope thought least probable, its possibility
being in his estimation countervailed by the assumption
that ample reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac
would arrive in time to protect his rear. And thus we see
constantly in Pope at this juncture the great military defect
which metamorphoses hope into belief

Jackson, under Lee's orders, had, however, done just the
thing which Lee, with knowledge of Jackson and Pope,
would be likely to attempt, just the thing which Jackson was
capable of executing, and therefore just that which Pope
should have expected him to try to accomplish from the
tempting positions in which the armies stood with relation
to each other, under the circumstances of his having been
thwarted in endeavoring to turn the Federal right flank
on the Rappahannock. Jackson had marched off" on the
25th of August, from where he was on Lee's left flank,
and making from Jefferson a circuit around the right of the
Army of Virginia, passing Amissville and Orleans, had

THE ARMY OF VIBGINIA. 159

reached Salem by night. Thence, the next day, passing
through White Plains, he debouched from the Bull Run
Mountains through Thoroughfare Gap, and found himself
on the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad and in full posses-
sion of the Federal communications with Washington, the
first knowledge of his presence there coming to the front
when he was at Bristoe Station, on Broad Run, an affluent
of Cedar- Run, which flows into the Potomac. Pope's
failure to fall back almost at once when that cloud of dust
appeared on his right led to manifold consequences, in
which he was forced to retire by the stress put upon him
in the rear, groping for the position of Jackson during the
precious interval when Longstreet had not reinforced him,
and when his corps might have been shattered by skilfully
disposed superior forces, and perhaps overwhelmed. On
the 26th of August Pope, as his orders and the terms in
which they are expressed testify, was in the utmost bewilder-
ment, and his mental condition was aggravated by messages
from Halleck which embarrassed instead of assisting him.
He still thought that his danger was on his front, and
especially at Warrenton, and as he still held firmly at the
town, he also maintained his extension to the left which he
had combined with his concentration at Warrenton. And
not only was the general-commanding distraught, but his
troops were fagged out with useless marching and counter-
marching, what cavalry he had was well-nigh spent, and
the slight confidence in him that had existed had departed
at the spectacle of irresolution of which so many might be
victims.

Stuart, with his cavalry, had started from near Waterloo
before daylight, on the morning of the 26th of August,
just when Jackson was about to begin his second day's
march. That allowed ample time for cavalry to overtake
infantry. In the evening, after dark, Lee, with Longstreet's

l6o GENERAL QBORQE QOBDON MEADE

corps, crossed the Rappahannock at Hinton's Mills, six
miles above Waterloo, and followed Jackson's line of march,
while General D. H. Hill left distant Hanover Junction with
a division, to concentrate his force with the other columns.
Thus was the whole of Lee's army on the march towards
or in Pope's rear that night, Jackson, with twenty-five
thousand men, being at Bristoe Station. The prescribed
limits of this memoir do not permit of describing all that im-
mediately ensued during the recoil of the Federal army, or
the devastation at Manassas. New dispositions having been
hastily made on the following day, the 27th, the army &ced
to the right-about, and Hooker, who had arrived on the
25th from Alexandria, now marching from Warrenton Junc-
tion, defeated Jackson's rear-guard, under Ewell, at Bristoe
Station. Simultaneously with Hooker's, ensued the general
movement towards the rear. Pope had directed a strong
force on Gainesville, subsequently relinquishing the position,
thus opening the gate near Thorough&re Gap through
which Longstreet could join forces with Jackson. But for
McDowell's sending Ricketts's division to check Long-
street beyond Thoroughfare Gap itself, Lee would have
passed through absolutely without opposition. Then fol-
lowed in swift succession the battle of Gainesville, on the
28th, in the course of the £adse move in full force from
Gainesville to Manassas, and then the two days' battles of
the Second Bull Run, on successive days ; both of them,
with only the difference of tactical changes, taking place on
essentially the same ground, the first being fought with the
troops of Jackson in a position which, the next day, became
Lee's left wing, and the second being the final contest of
the second day.

At Groveton,- at dawn of the 29th of August, Jackson
was occupying a slightly curved line, about two miles long,
of mixed bank and excavation of an unfinished railroad.

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THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, l6l

Jackson's old division held the right of this, under General
W. E. Starke, and Ewell's division, under General A. R.
Lawton, the centre ; the two previous commanders of these
divisions, General W. B. Taliaferro and General R. E.
Ewell having been wounded the evening before while on
the march from Gainesville, in which the brigades of Gibbon
and Doubleday on the Federal side, and the divisions of
Taliaferro and the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, on the
Confederate side, opened the series of contests by the severe
engagement known as the battle of Gainesville. Jackson's
left wing was constituted by the division of A. P. Hill. The
position of Jackson was masked to a great extent by woods
occupied by the Confederate skirmish line. On the Fed-
eral right, in its advance on the enemy, was the division of
General Carl Schurz, on his left General R. H. Milroy's
brigade, on his left Greneral R. C. Schenck's division, and on
his left General John F. Reynolds's division, in which Gen-
eral Meade commanded the Second Brigade. Schurz was on
one side of a turnpike running about west-southwest, and
Schenck and Reynolds on his left, on the other side of the
turnpike, the Warrenton turnpike, which leads to Alex-
andria. Reynolds attempting, according to orders, to turn
the enemy's right by advancing Meade's brigade, he was
obliged to recall him, owing to the Confederate counter-
movement on the Federal right, necessitating the withdrawal
of a brigade sent to Milroy by Schenck, who had been sup-
porting Reynolds's movement. The troops were not nu-
merous enough to cover a line of two miles in length oppo-
site to the enemy's sheltered position formed by the partly
rampart, partly excavated line of the unfinished railroad.
Notwithstanding that fact, one signal success crowned the
efforts of the Federal troops that morning, in the assault by
General A. Schimmelpfennig upon and retention of a part

of the enemy's railroad entrenchment until 2 p.m., when his

l62 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

division was relieved by fresh troops. When the Federal
line slightly retired after its severe onslaughts on the enemy,
the feeling was that, considering the smallness of the attack-
ing force, and the strength of the enemy's position, the
troops had accomplished all that was possible. Everything
to some looked hopeful, for they believed reinforcements
were on the march to join them ; but thinking men must
have gravely reflected, knowing that, so far, only Jackson's
forces were in front of them, that as he had been long alone
on the ground in the rear, reinforcements for him could not
be far distant, and such men must have marvelled that they
had not yet been heard from on the field. Of course, no one
could have then known that the corps of Fitz-John Porter,
left by McDowell with orders so vague that Porter could
not do better than remain where he was, in a position
where he was able merely to distract some force from the
enemy during the afternoon, would not be able to aid by
direct attack.

The Federal force which had been engaged in the morn-
ing had consisted chiefly of Schenck's, Schurz's, and Mil-
roy's troops, under Sigel's immediate command. Although
Reynolds's division, the Pennsylvania Reserves, had, on the
Peninsula, been attached, under Porter, to the Fifth Corps,
we now find it marching with its fellow-divisions of the
First, known as those of King and Ricketts, the former of
which, on account of King's illness, is now under Hatch.
Before midday Heintzelman, with the divisions of Kearny
and Hooker, reinforced General Pope, and so also did Gen-
eral J. L. Reno, with his two divisions of the Ninth Corps.

General Pope thought that the time during the early part
of the afternoon would be well devoted, while McDowell
and Porter were coming, to a rest for the troops which
had been actively engaged. He fondly imagined they
would strike Jackson on his right flank and rear. But

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 63

McDowell, acting under a modified joint-order which he
and Porter had received from Pope, had neutralized
Porter by leaving him and his troops with a vague
direction ; and expectant of further instructions, Porter
could do nothing but await developments. Confident
that the attack on Jackson's right flank and rear was on
the eve of opening, General Pope ordered Heintzelman to
attack Jackson with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny.
Hooker charged the centre of the enemy's line ; but un-
fortunately, the attacks intended to be simultaneous were
not. That of Hooker, after carrying a portion of the rail-
road entrenchment of Jackson, and reaching the line of the
enemy's reserves, failed for want of support in due time ;
while that of Kearny following it, and supported by the
division of Stevens, although it was vigorous, and found
the enemy so shattered by the previous onslaught that
Jackson's left wing, but for timely reinforcement, would
have been routed, could not maintain itself unsupported.
About this critical time McDowell arrived with King's
division, Ricketts's being still on the march. Hatch, in
command of Kling's division, King having been taken ill,
was ordered at once to advance with the division on the right
of Jackson, upon the presumption that these fresh troops
would force Jackson to retreat. But instead of meeting
Jackson's troops in his front, the climax of all that had
gone before was reached, for he encountered those of Long-
street. Hatch was met by a portion of General J. B.
Hood's brigade and a brigade under Colonel E. M. Law, a
severe engagement immediately following, lasting from
about half past six in the afternoon until after seven o'clock.
Longstreet pressed forward his reinforcements, compelling
Hatch to retire. Then night came on and preparations for
the morrow. Longstreet's advance had been on the field
since noon of the day. Thus the fortunes of war had

l64 GENERAL QEOEQE GORDON MEADK

turned, or rather, they had been trifled with, for fickle as
Fortune is, she is not so foolish a jade as would be indicated
by charging all these consequences to her.

At this juncture the proper move to make would have
been to £adl back during the night behind Bull Run, a move
which could have been made with perfect ease to a position
only between two and three miles in the rear. The ad-
vantage would have been three-fold — ^the avoidance of the
entrenched line of Jackson, the gain of the protective line
of a stream, and the respite of a day during which reinforce-
ments might have come up, as they finally did, just too late.
But the tenacity of Pope did not even permit him to think
of retreating. He had no conception of the philosophy em-
bodied in the common phrase, ** reader pour micux sautcr^
He actually thought, as his despatch to General Halleck
shows, that he had gained a victory, and laid out his plans
for cutting off the enemy's retreat on the following day.

The battle of the following day was, as has been noted,
fought on essentially the same ground as that of the day
before. The Confederates arranged their line of battle con-
formably to the conditions introduced by the struggle of the
day before and to their plan of operations for the present one.
Lee's forces were now all up, except, of course, those march-
ing from distant Hanover Junction, the division of General
R. H. Anderson having reached the ground the preceding
night, the 29th of August. Lee in person had been present
since the morning of that day, since the time when the ad-
vance of Longstreet had arrived. Yet Pope continued to
be fully persuaded, from the movements of the enemy, that
he was preparing to make his escape, and had issued an
order for pursuit But while preparations were making on
the plan of an advance which was to cut off and pursue the
enemy, suddenly, on the Federal left, it was discovered by
Reynolds that, so far from the enemy's being in the posi-

THE ARMY OF VIBQINIA. 1 65

tion from which he was by orders to be driven, he was
quietly stealing around in force, under cover of the woods,
south of the Warrenton turnpike, on the left flank of the
Federal troops. In consequence, that portion of the forma-
tion which had been made to sweep supposititiously every-
thing before it, north and south of the turnpike (Porter on the
right, then Hatch, and then Reynolds, on the left), had to be
modified at once, from the necessity imposed upon Reynolds
of facing to the left, to meet the imminent danger of being
enveloped on his flank. So much for the situation on the
Federal left flank is sufficient for the present to be said.
The right wing, beginning at the right of Porter, who had
escaped from his position of the day before, like that of a
ship " in irons," able at first to turn in no definite way, was
composed of the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, supported
by the division of Ricketts. Reno was also there, and part
of Sigel's troops and Sykes's regulars.

Porter, on the right, about four o'clock in the afternoon,
attacked the position of Jackson with the brigades of Gen-
eral James Barnes and General Daniel Butteriield, of Gen-
eral G. W. Morrill's division. Hatch attacked the same
line, further to the right. Sykes's regulars on the right were
fortunately held in reserve, for later in the day their fresh-
ness was all needed. Both attacks were splendidly made
and pressed Jackson home, but he had a terrible advantage
in position. Despite that, however, he sent to Lee for re-
inforcements, who, in turn, ordered Longstreet to send them.
Longstreet, however, recognized, from the relation of his
point of the field to that occupied by Jackson, that rein-
forcements of the kind which he was ordered to despatch
were not necessary. It is rare, indeed, on any hilly g^round
of various accidents of surface, that some point cannot
be found (indeed impossible on any but a right-line of de-
fence) which will enfilade with its guns placed there a long

l66 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE,

stretch of entrenchment of its own side. Where Longstreet
was, on the Confederate right, there were numerous tops of
hills on which it was advantageous for that purpose to plant
artillery, and he had stationed some guns most favorably to
sweep Jackson's front. Consequently, Longstreet answered
substantially, that he would bring all requisite succor to
Jackson with his g^ns. But for these g^ns, in the position
which they occupied, the Federal attack on the enemy's left
wing would have been successful.

It was Lee's knowledge that the Federal right was beat-
ing itself in vain against the impregnable barrier of Jack-
son's position, that withheld him for a while from making
an attack on the Federal left, which could have had but the
effect of bring^ing on a contest in that part of the field before
his formation there was fully completed.

Pope's main attack on the right was the only serious one
there, some of Hooker's troops merely demonstrating
against and driving away the enemy on the extreme
right flank. As for Kearny and Ricketts, who were, on
Pope's theory of Jackson's intended retreat, and according
to his plans to attack on Jackson's extreme left flank, on the
Haymarket road (a road running nearly parallel with the
Warrenton turnpike), they were withdrawn to the south of
the turnpike, to meet the enemy's movement on the Federal
left, dispositions for making which Lee had been perfecting
while the Federal right was furiously engaged in assaulting
Jackson. The situation was now complicated by an order
from Pope to Reynolds, on the left flank, to reinforce Por-
ter, near the centre, opposite Jackson. Now, as has been
shown, attacking Jackson entailed a useless sacrifice of life,
and he had proved it. It was too critical a moment on the
Federal left to withdraw troops from it, even for the pur-
pose of holding Jackson in check, if he should advance as
a diversion for Lee's attempt on the left. The consequences

THE ABMT OF VmOINIA. 167

would be immediate and far-reaching. To countervail them
in a measure, Sykes let Colonel G. K. Warren march with
his brigade to the left, to supply the place of the troops
which Reynolds had been ordered to withdraw and had
withdrawn thence to reinforce Porter.

At last the Confederates, having completed their forma-
tion-on the Federal left, while demonstration and assault had
been going on against Jackson's safe position, and while the
greater part of the Federal force was north of the Warren-
ton turnpike, Longstreet's line, massed for assault, revealed
itself pressing forward from south of the turnpike on the
Federal left, from the woods already mentioned as towards
the southward. There was still some time for preparation
for the Army of Virginia to meet this movement. Although
Longstreet was rapidly approaching, nearly at right-angles
to the turnpike, on the left flank of the Federal army,
with five divisions, — those of Anderson, Evans, Kemper,
Jones, and Wilcox, — in columns stretching from opposite
Groveton to opposite a road east of it leading to Sudley
Springs, a road running north and south between Bald
Hill and the Henry House hill, two eminences about a
mile apart, on the left flank of the Federal army, there
was still some precious time available to organize a strong
defence along the line of the Warrenton turnpike and
on the two hills south of it, an imaginary line between
which hills runs parallel with the turnpike. The Federal
field-batteries swarmed to the newly-created front, and with
infantry supports held the ground near the turnpike. Sigel's
corps, which had not been engaged, occupied Bald Hill, on
which two brigades of Ricketts's division were also posted,
under General Zealous B. Tower. Upon the other emi-
nence, the Henry House hill, were directed, first, the two
brigades of Reynolds, and then the two brigades of Sykes*s
regulars, the former commanded by Meade and General

l68 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

Seymour, and the latter by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert C.
Buchanan.

Jackson, partially relieved of the pressure upon him,
had begun to advance from north of the turnpike, in
concert with Longstreet on his right, but vras held in check
by Reno and Heintzelman. The enemy was unable to
dislodge the forces on the general line dominated by the
two naturally strong twin positions of Bald Hill and the
Henry House hill, first assaulting the former, with such
ill success that Hood had to await reinforcements.
Here fell several men of note among the killed and
wounded. The attack on the Henry House hill vras
equally severe, but was repulsed with success even greater
than that which had attended the attack on Bald Hill. The
loss on both sides was very great Finally, the continual
reinforcements by the enemy of the troops attacking Bald
Hill compelled its relinquishment. But not so with the
Henry House hill. The key to the whole position, the key
to the whole situation, lay in the remaining paint d*appui^
the Henry House hill, the very hill which had figured so
prominently in the first battle of Bull Run. Sykes, with
his regulars; Seymour and Meade, with their brigades ;
Lieutenant-Colonels William Chapman and Buchanan, with
all the troops that could be hastily gathered for its defence,
were assembled there. Mass and assault and strive as the
enemy would, he made but little progress against a desper-
ation of defence which every officer present knew to mean,
as a consequence of its failure, the rout of the Army of Vir-
ginia. As the event proved, this key of the position re-
mained at nightfall in the hands of the Federal army, and
it was, in consequence, enabled quietly to make a retreat
behind Bull Run.

It can hardly be doubted that, if Halleck and McClellan
had not proved unequal to the emergency, the corps of

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 69

General E. V. Sumner and that of General W. B. Frank-
lin,— the Second and Sixth, — ^would have reached General
Pope before the 30th of August, the day of the last bat-
tle, instead of reaching him the day afterwards. It can
therefore also hardly be doubted that, as those two corps
consisted together of about twenty thousand men, the scale
would have been turned by their presence in General Pope's
fevor. If, however, it must be repeated. Pope had only
fallen back behind Bull Run to the position at Centreville,
instead of fighting on the 30th of August, Sumner and
Franklin would still have been in time, despite the dilatori-
ness of Halleck and McClellan, to compel Lee*s retreat or
to be the added means of defeating him.

The Army of Virginia nearing Centreville, after having
crossed Bull Run, the indefatigable Jackson was the next
day started by Lee for Sudley Ford, on the upper part of
Bull Run, on the right of the Army of Virginia, and struck
opposite to it one of the main roads that lead to Alexan-
dria, the Little River turnpike. Marching for Fairfax
Court House, while Pope's trains were still making for Cen-
treville by the Warrenton turnpike, and seeking to pass the
point of intersection of the two roads, he found himself con-
fronted about dark by heavy masses of troops with which
he had been engaged the day before, and which had been
advanced to prevent the retreat from being intercepted, and
the battle of Chantilly began amidst a tremendous thunder-
storm. Here his usual good fortune deserted him, and,
after losing heavily in killed and wounded, he was brought
to a stand, night preventing both sides from taking in the
precise situation of affairs. Before morning Longstreet
reached the ground, the Confederate plan having been to
break up the communications with Washington by flanking
the Federal right. As the best possible course to pursue
under the circumstances, it was resolved by the authorities

I/O GENERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADE.

in Washington to call the troops within the defences of the
city, and they were accordingly so disposed of on the 2d
of September. Besides serious losses in rank and file at
Chantilly, two officers of exceptional merit were there killed
on the Federal side, Stevens and Kearny. It is grievous
to contemplate the necessity of omitting in this memoir
all that pure justice would, if untramelled by material bonds,
award in mention of merit and sacrifice ; but as a hundred
such books as the one here contemplated would not suffice
to fulfil the wish, it must meet the fate which lies beyond
the bounds of the possible. It need hardly be said, more-
over, that this work is for a single purpose, to which all else
should be subordinated. General Meade did not appear
more conspicuously on these particular fields than did many
another officer, not so much so as some other officers, and
yet all that precedes and is yet to follow chiefly relates, and
should relate, to the trace which his presence makes as an
episode, great and small, of the war, in a memoir which
professes to be devoted to him.

On August 2 1st, at lo p.m.. General Meade had left Fal-
mouth with his brigade as part of the division of Reynolds,
and had marched thence towards Bamett's Ford on the Rap-
pahannock, making but slight progress on account of the
darkness of the night and uncertainty as to the road. Con-
tinuing the march on the following day, the command reached
Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Rail-
road, on the 23 d, bivouacking for the n^ht near Warrenton.
On the 28th the brigade, while on the march, took some
slight part in what finally drifted into the action at Gaines-
ville. On the 29th it was formed in line of battle on the
left of Sigel, and joined in the battle at Groveton. On
the 30th, the day of the second battle of Bull Run, the
brigade advanced along the Warrenton turnpike in line of

THE ARMY OF VIRQINU. I/I

battle, occupying a ridge in advance, until withdrawn by
orders of the general-commanding to the ridge behind it,
from which it had advanced in the morning. About 3 p.m.
of that day, Reynolds, under orders from Pope, moved
almost entirely across the field of battle, from the south to
the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, to reinforce
Porter, which his division had no sooner done than it was
ordered to march back to the plateau of the Henry House,
on account of the pressure of the enemy on the Federal
left. There Meade's brigade, in conjunction with Seymour's,
deployed in line of battle, and charged down the slope of
the Henry House ridge towards the Sudley Springs road,
driving before it such portions of the Confederates as had
advanced beyond that road, and finally taking position in
the road and holding it at that point until relieved by
Sykes's regulars under Buchanan. General Meade says, in
his official report, with relation to this part of the action,
that " it is due to the Pennsylvania Reserves to say, that
this charge and maintenance of this position was made at a
most critical period of the day."

It was at this critical period of the day, when, if the Penn-
sylvania Reserves had not repulsed the enemy and com-
pelled him to take shelter temporarily in the woods, the
enemy might, as General Meade says, have gained the
Henry House ridge, which, as General Meade adds,
" might have materially altered the fortune of the day ;'*
that Buchanan's brigade of regulars came up, none too
quickly, to reinforce them. McDowell was accused by
General R. H. Milroy of refusing to send reinforcements.
McDowell claimed, in justification, that in the excite-
ment Milroy had lost his head, or, as he expressed it,
" was in a frenzy,'* and made no communication of the sort
upon which he would have been justified in sending him re-
inforcements. And, McDowell went on to say, before the

172 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

court of inquiry in which the case was tried, " whilst in
doubt for the moment, in view of the circumstances, as to
the course to be taken, I received a clear and definite
message from that intelligent, as well as gallant officer,
General Meade, on which I knew I could rely, and imme-
diately sent the reinforcements forward.*'

The fact is most moderately stated by General Meade
when he said that but for the Pennsylvania Reserves, at
this critical juncture, the fortunes of the day might have
been materially altered. The advance of the enemy was
very confident, and the ensuing conflict very hot. Here
" Old Baldy," the horse which bore the General through
many a fight, received one of his wounds. The worst of the
disasters of the campaign were now over. Lee's army as
well as Pope's had suffered severely. Pope's had lacked
that strategic and tactical mastery, and that subtle bond
between chief and troops which make them, as has been
already remarked, like a single organism of the highest
type, in which the directive intelligence permeates the body
to parts of the lowest rank. The Army of Virginia, like the
leviathan attacked by the skilful swordsmen of the sea, had
fruitlessly floundered without direction, and had finally sunk
into unknown depths out of the sight of men. But only so
in appearance, only so as to visible presence, for soon, with
parts restored and reincorporated, it issued forth as the
Army of the Potomac, not invincible, but with honor untar-
nished, and, as ever, amid all scenes of disaster, in spirit un-
subdued.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 173

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

The various phases of mental tone which General McClel-
lan exhibited to credible witnesses who were actors with him
in the drama of the war, and perhaps, still more, the record
which he himself has left in writing, in the form of despatches,
private letters, and other documents, show him to have been
a man without the poise that is capable of directing to great
deeds. At first, amidst the universal acceptance of him on
credit by the North, as possessing all the attributes needed
for success in command of the armies of the United States,
his mental attitude was arrogant. Put to the actual test of
war, and suspicions of his shortcomings for his task begin-
ning to invade the sober common sense of the people, not to
be in the long run deceived as to what concerns them nearly,
some abatement of this arrogance became perceptible,
although he still had so false a view of his relations as a
military man to the civil power, that he could reconcile him-
self to writing to the President a letter unprecedented in its
assumption of ability to counsel in a sphere the threshold
of which he should not have touched. There was, at this
time, however, more moderation observable than had been
exhibited previously. He no longer exactly admonished,
but rather deprecated the conduct of affairs. At this point
of time he scarcely doubted that his army would be with-
drawn from the Peninsula, and he feared, from news that
he had lately received, that he would be superseded. When
the army had been withdrawn, and he had reached Alexan-

1/4 GENERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADK

dria, he evidently thought for some time that his occupation
had gone, and he entered upon a new mood, unknown to him
before, in which he answered a despatch from the Presi-
dent— " Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all
in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my
orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey
whatever orders you give," etc.

This moderate frame of mind soon ceased, however, as
the following brief account, cited from his own memoirs,
proves. According to them he went out on the road towards
the front to meet the retreating troops of Pope, under an
order from the President to command the fortifications and
the troops for the defence of Washington. He meets pretty
soon a regiment of cavalry, marching by twos, with Pope
and McDowell and their staffs "sandwiched," he says,
between them. " Pope," he remarks, " had evidently not
troubled his head in the slightest about the movements of
his army in retreat, and had early preceded the jtroops,
leaving them to get out of the scrape as best they could."
A former suggestion of McClellan's in writing, that Pope
should be allowed to get out of his "scrape" as best he
could, had been justly the subject of a good deal of animad-
version, and yet he here repeats it with gusto. In saying
what he does as to the retreat, he fails to see the comparison
which he has conjured up, for he too attended to the last of
his own retreat in a casual way. The likeness between the
two cases is not perfect, however, for there was no such ur-
gency of the enemy in Pope's case as in his own. " Pope and
McDowell," he goes on to say, " asked my permission to go
to Washington, to which I assented, remarking at the same
time that / [italicized] was going to the artillery- firing. * ' Evi-
dently some kind power had never conferred upon him the
"giftie," for here he did not perceive the difference in their
iavor, the difference, when there was really no great danger,.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 175

bebveen a man fresh and diboTmaire, and two battle-worn
men seeking some repose. Why, at that very moment the
troops were retiring into the fortifications on the opposite
side of the Potomac from Washington, under orders which
General Halleck had sent, and which McClellan himself
had repeated as to the different corps with reference to their
respective dispositions on the ground ! Nothing, therefore,
could be more disingenuous than this statement, nor more
unkind than the way in which it gloats over the misfortunes
of Pope and McDowell.

The horn of McClellan was now again evidently exalted
to the highest pitch. All was to his mind changed. The
President had orally requested him to take command of the
defences and of the troops for the defence of Washington,
and he, having consented, had followed the action by a
formal order to that effect, which, by the way, was after-
wards modified to the form of transmission by the War
Department. Why the President should have " requested,"
instead of ** ordered,*' McClellan does not state. Nor does
McClellan state why he thought it proper to take credit to
himself for acceding to the President's request without mak-
ing any conditions. His feeling is explicable only on the
supposition that he had now again resumed the mental
attitude which had suffered eclipse for a moment, only to
reappear under the circumstances of his renewed conviction
of his indispensability. When he reached the point of highest
self-satisfaction, however, was yet to come, as he reveals in
his memoirs, when, as he says, although not reappointed to
the command of the army, and although knowing that he
would fight with a halter around his neck, he yet, because
the path of duty was clear, left his card at the White House,
the War Office, and Secretary Seward's house, with P. P. C.
written on it, and marched with the army. The path of
duty, it would seem, might have been otherwise followed

{

1/6 GEyERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADR

with greater propriety. The state of aflfairs was all wrong, if
the circumstances which General McClellan describes could
be. Accepting them, however, exactly as reported by him-
self, the point remains as before, simply with regard to his
relation to events, as limned by his own hand, from his modest
reply at Alexandria, through his meeting with Pope and
McDowell, through his self-gratulation at having made no
conditions with the President, through his final leave-taking
of P. P. C. ; and it is not pleasant to reflect that such things
under the administration of a great government could be.

The truth, without gloss, is that he was right in thinking
that he was at the time indispensable to the Administration.
The Administration had nowhere else to turn to obtain a
general who could properly supersede him. The winnow-
ing process, at enormous cost of blood and treasure, had
not gone on long enough to reveal to the Administration
the men who were finally to conduct affairs to a successful
issue. Mr. Lincoln had no knowledge of military affairs.
Strange to say, Halleck, too, fell as to them far below the
standard which his natural parts and training would seem to
have indicated as reached by him. What might be called
Halleck's civil administration of his military department in
the West was excellent, but whether he came to devise
military operations at a distance, or himself personally took
charge of them in the field, he appeared in the full inca-
pacity of his character. Moreover, one of the chief ele-
ments of chieftainship in any sphere being recognition and
employment of signal talent within that sphere, he proved
himself wanting in original perception of it. He did all he
could in the West to suppress Grant, and he was at first
completely deceived by Pope, who deceived scarcely any-
body else among military men. The &ult in him lay in
defect of character. He was a ponderous-minded, ease-
loving man, oppressed with a sense of his greatness, vadl-

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. I//

lating, and utterly unfit for the direction of military affairs
in the urgency of field-operations.

McClellan was doubly proved right in thinking that he
was indispensable, because, in addition to the President's
having nowhere else to look to replace him, he still had
the confidence of the rank and file of the army, although
some of the higher oflRcers had lost it, and thinking men
among civilians who had closely watched the progress of
events were sorely disappointed in him. As for his having
left Washington in command of the army with a halter
around his neck, should he lose in the approaching contest,
that is the most vapid statement, unworthy of a man of
ordinary intelligence. The very memoirs in which are
printed those lines gave his correspondence with the War
Department as the army was marching to battle ; it is also
necessarily part of the public records, and it constitutes,
however acquired, the fullest recognition of his command.

The Army of Virginia ceased to exist save by incarna-
tion with the Army of the Potomac. Pope had written
Halleck, on September 5th, " I have just received an order
from General McClellan to have my command in readiness
to march with three days' rations, and further details of the
march. What is my command, and where is it ? McClel-
lan has scattered it about in all directions, and has not in-
formed me of the position of a single regiment. Am I to
take the field, and under McClellan's orders ?" To which
Halleck replied, on September 5th, "The armies of the
Potomac and Virginia being consolidated, you will report
for orders to the Secretary of War." The Army of the
Potomac, revived, with dismembered limbs restored, re-
mained within the defensive works of Washington, or within
supporting distance, while the enemy, victorious over Pope,
waited expectantly on the Virginia side of the Potomac for

the longed-for opportunity of administering to it a final blow.

178 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

In many respects McClellan is seen to better advantage
in the ensuing campaign than in any of his previous opera-
tions with the Army of the Potomac. He is still, however,
overmastered by his constitutional slowness and caution.
He remarks, in the part of his memoirs relating to this cam-
paign, that he had known Lee in Mexico, and that he was
a man, pitted against whom it behooved one to be very
wary. But he could not see, — the man sitting in judg-
ment upon matter of his own subjectivity, — he could not
judge correctly, of himself or of Lee's view with regard to
him, which, of necessity, would shape in a measure Lee*s
action. Doubtless he seemed to himself in that campaign
as indulging in a celerity, all the way through it, that bor-
dered on rashness. So erroneously guided, it would not
occur to him that, Lee having also known him, Lee's point
of view might be very different about him from his own.
Still, if McClellan could not rise above the defects inhe-
rent in his organization, he did now seem to act for the
first time as if spurred on by better appreciation than before
of the difficulty of the task committed to him. He now
appears more than before en evidence in the midst of things,
directly controlling them to a greater extent than before,
although not with the masterful mind of a great general.
It should be remembered, however, that as to the first part
of these operations he was hampered by Halleck. Halleck
himself, the slowest of the slow in field operations, as those
which he had personally conducted in the West prove,
kept nagging at McClellan through despatches from Wash-
ington, cautioning him against letting the enemy slip in
between him and Washington, across the upper fords of the
Potomac, or leading him so far away from the city, before
he could know that Lee's forces were really massed to in-
vade Maryland, and his apparent movement not a mere
feint, that the dty might be captured by attack from the

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 1/9

direction of Arlington Heights across the Potomac. Yet,
afterwards, in despite of the despatches proving this con-
clusively, Halleck testified before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War that his action had not been that de-
scribed. It undoubtedly was, as any one may see from
examination of those despatches, and with knowledge of
the existing situation. So much less speed than requisite
in the first advance as would otherwise be properly ascrib-
able to McClellan may therefore be justly charged to the
action of Halleck. From that time on, however, to the end
of the campaign, with the exception of the episode of the
battle of South Mountain, the dilatoriness with which it was
conducted belongs wholly to McClellan, and under circum-
stances, too, where, if he could have sat in consultation with
Lee, he could not have been better prepared to act with the
utmost precision and celerity. Had he so acted, the folly
committed by Halleck in attempting to hold Harper's
Ferry without properly defending it, after it was known
that the enemy was in Maryland, might have been more
than counterbalanced by an overwhelming defeat adminis-
tered to Lee.

As the result of the whole campaign turned upon the
attempted retention of Harper's Ferry, it becomes necessary
here to discuss the bearing which its topographical situation
had upon all the operations, inclusive of the battle of
Antietam. Harper's Ferry was called the key of the
Shenandoah Valley, but it became a key in the possession
of the enemy from the time when the enemy got on the
wrong side of the door, or, in other words, from the time
when the position was turned by the enemy's invasion of
Maryland, because it was indefensible, or rather undefended
from that direction. This will easily be comprehended
from the following description. The Blue Ridge trends
about northeast. As it comes from the south it strikes the

l8o GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

Potomac three or four miles above the place whence it
departs from the other side of the Potomac as it still pro-
ceeds northeast The two lines, although virtually forming
the same ridge, are not continuous, but parallel. The two
parts of the same main ridge are therefore, as divided by
the Potomac, en iclulon with each other. South of the
Potomac the ridge is known as the Blue Ridge, while north
of the Potomac it is known as the Blue Ridge or the South
Mountain. The particular line which we have now, how-
ever, immediately to consider (for the other relates to pros-
pective operations) is the straight one formed by the Blue
Ridge as it strikes the Potomac, coming from the south,
and its development beyond for a few miles in the same
straight line, north of the Potomac, in a minor ridge called
Elk Ridge. It is through these straight and moderately
lofty ridges, formed by the Blue Mountains and Elk Ridge,
that the Shenandoah, having joined its stream with the
Potomac's, they together burst their way, and thence flow
onward with commingled waters. Within the area, making
a tongue of high land, formed by the confluence of the
Potomac and the Shenandoah, lies the post and village of
Harper's Ferry. It therefore lies just west of the ridge con-
stituted by the line of the Blue Ridge and its continuation
as Elk Ridge north of the Potomac. High as it is, it is,
however, completely dominated by the summit where the
Blue Ridge abuts on the Potomac, known as Loudon
Heights, and still more completely by the summit where
Elk Ridge abuts on the Potomac, called Maryland Heights,
while to the westward of it, without the intervention of a
stream, is a long spur called Bolivar Heights, parallel with
the aforesaid ridges, which heights also dominate the posi-
tion, and which, although slightly fortified, could avail
little against investment from that side, and nothing if
Loudon and. Maryland Heights were held by the enemy.

THE BATTLE OF 80 UTH MO UNTAIN. l8 1

By three nearly equiangular lines of attack, comprising
the circle, Harper's Ferry was liable to capture ; two, by
plunging fire from Loudon and Maryland Heights, and
one by regular approaches from the west ; under the condi-
tion that the enemy, in the undefended state of Maryland
Heights, had turned the position by entering Maryland by
crossing the Potomac immediately above the post. The
lion-ant, one of the fiercest and most voracious of all living
insects, makes a circular hole with sloping sides, and invites
his prey to slide into it and be demolished, as it invariably
is ; but then he is sure that his enemy will put himself
within his grasp ; but here, at Harper's Ferry, in civilized
warfare, this case of necessity was reversed, and the garri-
son was placed in a hole just where the enemy would have
put it, and could have no option but to surrender at dis-
cretion.

General McClellan strongly represented to Halleck that
Harper's Ferry should be evacuated. The post was not
tenable without the occupation of Maryland Heights in
force, and besides, its evacuation would contribute several
thousand men to the active army. It was in vain that this
representation was made. General Halleck directed Colonel
Dixon S. Miles, the commander of the post, to hold it.
Thus far Halleck was responsible, and perhaps beyond, for
he neglected to order Miles how to hold it, and Miles unfor-
tunately construed his instructions almost literally, as mean-
ing occupation of the very ground called Harper's Ferry.
Lee had been so sure that the post would be evacuated,
that he took it for granted it had been, and his army
was massed in Maryland before he found out that it had
been neither evacuated nor properly put in a posture of
defence, and he then set vigorously to work about reaping
the fruit of his adversary's folly. The swift-footed Achilles
of his army, Jackson, taking his own three divisions, A. P.

1 82 QENEBAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

Hill's, Starke's, and Lawton's, and those of Lafayette Mc-
Laws and Richard H. Anderson, passed rapidly to the rear
by forced marches. Jackson personally, with A. P. Hill,
crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, the garrison at Mar-
tinsburg retreating before him into Harper's Ferry, and
invested the post from the west, while McLaws, with
Anderson, held Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Gap, just
south of it, and occupied Maryland Heights, General J. G.
Walker conducting two brigades across the Potomac below
Harper's Ferry and occupying Loudon Heights. Thus
they held the post completely in their power unless it were
quickly relieved.

McClellan advanced north on three main and two sub-
sidiary roads from Washington towards Frederick, with his
corps spread out within easy supporting distances of one
another, covering Washington and Baltimore. His right
rested at first on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and his
left, strongly picketed by cavalry, was thrown out to guard
the fords between his left flank and Washington, lest the
enemy should interpose by crossing the Potomac between
him and the city. The right wing, consisting of the First
Corps and the Ninth Corps, was commanded by General
Bumside ; the centre, consisting of the Second Corps and
the Twelfth Corps, was commanded by General Sumner ;
and the left wing, consisting only of the Sixth Corps, was
commanded by General Franklin. The division of Couch,
of the Second Corps, which finally joined Franklin, was on
the extreme left flank. It will be remembered by the
reader that two of the corps of the old Army of the Po-
tomac, the Second and the Sixth, had not reached Pope in
time for the series of battles in which he had lately been
eng^aged.

It is true, as alleged, that the reorganization of the army
had to be partially accomplished during the march, but, on

THE BA TTLE OF SO UTH MO UNTAIN. 1 83

the other hand, it ought to be remembered at the same time
that, when the final collision occurred between the armies,
Lee had less than forty thousand men, and McClellan had
over eighty thousand. That, with this enormous prepon-
derance of force in his favor, the result of the final battle
should have been what it was, with such able officers for
the most part, and with such brave troops as McClellan
had, must be ascribed to poor generalship, and the justness
of this conclusion will be fully borne out by consideration
of the sequence of events.

On the 1 2th of September the advance of the right wing
entered Frederick, after a skirmish with the cavalry rear-
guard of Lee's army, and on the 1 3th the whole right wing
and centre reached that town. There, on the night of the
1 3th, the main body remained halted, Franklin well off to
the left at Buckeystown, and General Couch further still, at
Licksville, near where the Monocacy enters the Potomac,
while General Jesse L. Reno was heading for Middletown, and
General Alfred Pleasanton's cavalry had about noon dis-
lodged Stuart from the pass he was holding in the Catoctin
Range, the range east of and parallel to South Mountain,
west of which range lies Middletown. The general direc-
tion of the army marching on Frederick from Washington
was north of northeast. The direction of its continued line
of advance, after leaving Frederick, is indicated by saying
that, in taking a slight left-wheel, it was brought parallel
with the line of South Mountain, through which are the
passes by which it had to continue its further manoeuvres.

McClellan had reached Frederick to have put in his pos-
session, through the most extraordinary good fortune, a
piece of information to which allusion has previously been
made as such that it was equivalent to his having been in
counsel with Lee himself. It comes within that class to
which Hirtius, in his account of Caesar's conduct of the

1 84 GENERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADE.

Alexandrian War, refers in the passage in which he says,
" The nature of the ground giving a great advantage, con-
tributed to by the favor of the immortal gods, who, enter-
ing as they do into all warlike events, especially do so in
those for which no possible calculation can be made." He
refers to an incident where the enemy had, to the astonish-
ment of Caesar, blindly surrendered all the advantage he had
had in position, Caesar instantly taking«advantage of the mis-
take and putting him to utter rout. On the afternoon of the
13th, a private of Indiana volunteers discovered in or near
Frederick, for the locality is disputed, a paper enclosing
three segars. But the paper was no ordinary wrapper ; it
was a copy of an order to General D. H. Hill, which re-
vealed Lee's designs through a general order giving his new
plan of campaign. Its presence, as found, has been satisfac-
torily explained from Confederate sources of information by
the statement that Hill received, and had still in his pos-
session, the same order from Jackson, sent to him under the
impression that Hill still belonged to his command, whereas
the lost and found order was from Lee's own headquarters,
sent to Hill as being directly under Lee's command, and
how lost will probably never be known. The lost order
reached McClellan immediately, and infused new life into
the whole movement of advance. In the hands of a com-
mander of the first class the knowledge conveyed by the
order would have been tantamount to overwhelming the
Confederate army, but in McClellan's it only modified
somewhat the current of events. The advance had
reached Frederick only to learn that Lee had begun
to evacuate it two days before, and had retired westward
over the mountains. The reason of this sudden retro-
grade movement, and at least temporary abandonment by
Lee of his plan of invading Maryland, and possibly Penn-
sylvania, had turned upon his having suddenly become

THE BATTLE OF SO UTH MO UNTAIN. 1 85

aware of the fact that Harper's Ferry had not been evacu-
ated. The general order, now in the hands of McClellan,
represented in all necessary details the plan of campaign by
which Lee had modified his original plan of invasion.

Lee's original plan of campaign is well condensed in the
following passages quoted from his official report of the
operations at South Mountain and Antietam : —

" It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in
order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy
to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our
communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of
our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-fields.
Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army
into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond
through the Shenandoah Valley, and by threatening Pennsylva-
nia induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of
supplies.**

He goes on to speak, as follows, of the modification of the
plan brought about by the Federal neglect to evacuate the
positions on his line of communication :

"It had been supposed that the advance upon Fredericktown
[Frederick] would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Har-
per's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the
Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the
enemy from those positions before concentrating the army west [east]
of the mountains. To accomplish this with the least delay. General
Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg,
and after driving the enemy from that place to move down the south
side of the Potomac upon Harper's Ferry," etc.

Lee would not, if it were avoidable, run the risk of leav-
ing Harper's Ferry, garrisoned by several thousand men,
in the rear of an advance by which his line of supply by
the Shenandoah Valley would be flanked ; and he could,
while preventing that, incidentally make prisoners of the
garrison of Harper's Ferry, simply by taking a post invit-

1 86 GENERAL GEOBGE GORDON MEADE,

ing easy capture. So he had at once begun to carry out
the plan, the success of which has already been strongly
implied by the description of the positions in which the
present narrative has left Jackson and his lieutenants.

Lee was not astonished at the sudden conversion of
what one of his staff afterwards wrote of as ** the snail-like
slowness *' of the pursuit into a rapid movement towards
South Mountain. Before daylight of the 14th a zealous
partisan of the Southern cause, who had learned of the
finding of the lost order, had made his way to the cavalry
rear-guard of Lee, under J. E. B. Stuart, and the intelli-
gence that he brought was forwarded to Lee. Before that
time, however, Lee had been informed by Stuart of the
vigorous manner in which McClellan was pushing forward
towards South Mountain from Frederick. He ordered
Longstreet, with whom he was near Hagerstown, to rein-
force D. H. Hill at Boonsboro*, west of Turner's Gap of
South Mountain. All that the knowledge of McClellan's
being in possession of the lost order advantaged Lee was
in making him aware that now, if ever, McClellan would
display energy. There had, however, been brought from
that into the situation great difference in McClellan's favor,
in the knowledge of just how many divisions Lee had with
him and how many were absent at Harper's Ferry. But that
knowledge, which would have been of immense value to an
active general, proved to be of no use to him. The mere
fact of the siege had been known long before the finding of
the order, from the firing heard in the direction of Harper's
Ferry, to which McClellan was responding, to let the garri-
son know that he was approaching. Manoeuvres and encoun-
ters occurred as the result of the present and pending dispo-
sitions of the troops of the respective armies, almost exactly
the same as though Lee had not written General Order No.
191, and McClellan therefore could not have it in his pos-

THE BA TTLE OF SO UTH MO UNTAIK. 1 8/

session. The important, outstanding, unknown quantity
was the amount of speed that McClellan would exhibit, and
for at least a few hours fear as to this must have made Lee
very uneasy, with his knowledge of the power that McClel-
lan had in his hands through an extraordinary incident in
war. With Lee were now only the two divisions of Long-
street near Hagerstown, under General John B. Hood and
General Jones, and the division of D. H. Hill, with some
of Stuart's cavalry. With only three divisions with him,
and five away beyond supporting distance, more than half
his army, the enemy had suddenly become alert and vigor-
ous. The tables had been fairly turned. While he had
awaited the return of Jackson, he had moved with Long-
street's two divisions towards Hagerstown, and D. H. Hill,
with his division and a force of cavalry, had been left to hold
Boonsboro*, west of Turner's Gap. Lee had not expected
to be obliged to defend Turner's Gap against McClellan.
Hill's force had been left at Boonsboro', in charge of the
reserve-artillery and some of the trains, merely to guard
against the escape of the garrison from Harper's Ferry in
that direction. The moment, however, that Lee, in the
night of the 13th, learned that McClellan was approaching
the South Mountain Range with unwonted rapidity, he had
ordered back Longstreet's two divisions from Hagerstown
to reinforce Hill. If some hours could not be gained be-
fore McClellan should debouch to the westward of the pass,
Lee would be hopelessly cut off from Jackson investing
Harper's Ferry.

As the progress of the campaign continues to hinge on
the incidents of the siege of Harper's Ferry, involving the
absence of a large part of Lee's army, it is unavoidable to
treat first of events relating to the attack on and attempted
relief of the post. Halleck had had the fatuity to withhold
from McClellan until the 1 2th of September control of the

1 88 GENERAL GEOBQE QOBDON MEADK

garrison of the post. When, too late, he did authorize
it, McClellan's left wing had advanced so far that the best
chance to relieve the post was through Crampton's Gap,
five miles in the rear of Maryland Heights. Even suppos-
ing, however, that McCIellan could earlier have directed
Franklin on the position by the road close to the left shore
of the Potomac, it would have been impossible on those
steep banks to deploy his force, and the position would have
put him out of all proper relation to the main body of the
army. The true plan to relieve Harper's Ferry, as the case
both now and just before stood, in an emergency which
ought not to have been allowed to arise, was the one which
McCIellan was prosecuting, by pushing Franklin through
Crampton's Gap, whence he could descend into Pleasant
Valley, between South Mountain and Elk Ridge, on which
was Maryland Heights, occupied by the enemy, whom he
might be able to dislodge.

Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Gap, just south of it,
through the latter of which passes McLaws and Anderson
had entered Pleasant Valley, were held by detachments
from their troops, afterwards reinforced, consisting in sum
of the brigades of Cobb, William Mahone, and P. J. Semmes.
McLaws had, on the 13th, summarily put an end to the
occupation of Maryland Heights by the two thousand
troops sent there by Colonel Miles, which troops, having
no confidence in their ability to hold their ground against
two Confederate divisions, had made only a brief resistance,
and had spiked their guns and tumbled them down the
mountain-side, McLaws hauling some of his guns up the
steep and occupying the deserted position, looking down
from his eyrie on an extended scene below, across the
Potomac and Shenandoah, where his allies were about to
take position, and the enemy's works were within easy
cannon-range, and almost under plunging musketry-fire.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 189

The question pending is a nice one. Franklin bespeaks
the attention of the enemy, now reinforced, at Crampton's
and Brownsville Gaps, only five miles up Pleasant Valley.
Will Harper's Ferry surrender before Franklin can break
through the passes ? If he can break through them before
that can happen, is he strong enough to prevent two divis-
ions of the enemy from still holding Maryland Heights and
assisting in the capture of Harper's Ferry ? Or, supposing
that he is not strong enough for that, is he strong enough
to thwart them, after the post is captured, in attempting to
join Lee by marching directly northward through Pleasant
Valley ? McLaws well knew, and speedily he must have
signalled the fact to Jackson, Hill, and Walker, on Bolivar
and Loudon Heights, that the enemy was trying to break
through the gaps in his rear. That meant to them that,
for some inexplicable reason, McClellan's whole force was
abreast of the passes along South Mountain, and that Lee
and they were all in jeopardy. Soon Jackson learned
it by couriers from Lee himself. Would Harper's Ferry
surrender in time to enable the besiegers to rejoin Lee
before McClellan would confront him ? If they should
raise the siege at once and march forthwith to join Lee,
then all their labors would have been in vain. If they
could consummate their design within a few hours, then by
forced marches they could concentrate, but not before
McClellan did. But, succeed or fail, their march could not
be postponed more than a very few hours, or their army
would be fatally divided, because Lee's fraction of it would
be destroyed.

This was the situation. The chief element entering into
it was time, the importance of which Lee and Jackson so
thoroughly appreciated, the importance of which they
seemed also to have been able to infuse into all who came
under their command. This same element was that which

190 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

McClellan least regarded. Preparation he dealt with as if
with an isolated fact having little or no relation to time, not
seeming to feel that, inasmuch as in war an adversary is
concerned, all preparation concerns not time in general, but
that special interval of time which is utilizable by the enemy
as well as by one's self; that in opposing armies success in
preparation is simply relative, and that to seek beyond a
certain point to be ready is to confer upon the enemy,
through incidental consumption of time, the preponderance
of advantage. Had Jackson been pitted against Lee, in-
stead of fighting on his side, he would not have stayed an
hour at Harper's Ferry after he knew that Lee, in McClel-
lan's place, had reached the eastern slopes of South Moun-
tain ; but knowing that they had to deal with McClellan,
and he pitted directly against Lee, he held on for a few
hours longer, during which he heard from Lee, instead of
having marched away with his divisions by night.

The reader cannot fail, after the minute description given,
to have in his mind's eye the topography of Harper's Ferry,
the positions of Jackson's troops with reference to it, and
the position of McClellan's left wing, under Franklin, with
reference to them. But there has not yet been presented
the wherewithal to enable him to orient himself with rela-
tion to the whole zone of operations in which the move-
ments of the two armies are taking place. From Harper's
Ferry, then, as the point of departure, imagine the Potomac
to have, except as to its slight but abrupt windings, a north-
westwardly course, and the range of South Mountain to be
distant from it at the river only about five miles, but at a
point eleven miles up the river to be distant from it about
nine miles, which would make, as in fact it does, the general
direction of the range north-northeast It is near this point
on the range, eleven miles off from the Potomac in a north-
northeast direction, and nine in an east direction, that Lee

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. I9I

in person is holding the passes of Turner's and Fox's Gaps,
which McClellan is about to assault.

It is the 14th of September. Jackson has been gone
from Lee four days. He had started on the loth, and had
expected to capture Harper's Ferry on the morning of the
13th. His troops are in the position described with refer-
ence to Harper's Ferry. Franklin is in the position de-
scribed with reference to Jackson, or, more precisely, with
reference to Jackson's lieutenant, McLaws. But Franklin
alone is not breasting the eastern side of South Mountain.
McClellan's advance is at Fox's and Turner's Gaps, about
six miles above Crampton's Gap. If McClellan break
through, he will have only seven miles from the western
base of the mountains to march to reach Antietam Creek,
an affluent of the Potomac, circling around in the same
general direction, behind which Lee will take refuge to con-
centrate his forces. Jackson's divisions, each depending
upon its particular position, will have to march from twelve
to fifteen miles to rejoin Lee ; unless in one case, the one
that Franklin cannot bar the way to McLaws seeking to
march directly north to a junction with Lee by the way of
Pleasant Valley.

By the morning of the 14th, the Ninth Corps, under
General Reno, and by the afternoon, the First Corps, under
the command of General Hooker, both nominally under
the command of General Bumside, respectively arrived at
the base of South Mountain. The Ninth Corps brought
up opposite Fox's Gap, a minor pass, and the First Corps
to the right of Turner's Gap, the main pass, about a mile
north of Fox's Gap. Reno, arriving on the left, dislodged
the Confederates under D. H. Hill from the first ridge at
Fox's Gap, but could not at first proceed beyond. The
pass to the right, however, was the more important one of
the two, on account of the roads leading through it. The

19^ QENEkAL QEOBOB OOBDON MEADR

range of South Mountain here attains an elevation of a
thousand feet. The pass called Turner's Gap sinks into
it to the depth of four hundred feet on the main, or National
Road, which leads directly, in an almost undeviating line,
from Frederick on the east to Boonsboro' on the west of
the mountains. At the east base of South Mountain
the old Hagerstown Road, departing from the National
Road, s\vings around a mile or so to the right and re-enters
the National Road at right-angles, between two elongated
tops of the mountain-range, at the summit of Turner's Gap.
Whatever force adequate to hold it captures the high rugged
top on the east of the depression through which this road
reaches at right-angles the summit of the Gap, commands
the Gap, by commanding not only the National Road, but
the old Hagerstown Road where it runs north and south
through the depression.

To the right of the pass, dominated by the easternmost
top described, and partially by the way of the old Hagers-
town Road, before it circles around into the aforesaid depres-
sion, the efforts of the Pennsylvania Reserves, of Hooker's
corps, were therefore directed, first to a short spur on the
hither side of the top, and then through the dip in the land
there by which the top is connected with the general level
of the mountain-range to the north, while Hatch's division,
of the same corps, aligned on the lower ground to the
south of the dip in the land, advanced simultaneously to
capture the top, securing which, all the ground to the south-
ward in the Gap, where the National Road runs, and the
ground to the westw^d, where the old Hagerstown Road
joins it in the valley beyond the top, will be untenable by the
enemy. In the afternoon, accordingly, when Hooker had ar-
rived, he swept around to the right of the Gap to assault this
position to the north of it. General Meade was, by right
of seniority, in command of the Division of Pennsylvania

THE BA TTLE OF SO UTH MO UNTAIN. I93

Reserves, of Hooker's corps, Genera] McCall not having re-
turned to the field after the Peninsular campaign, and Gen-
eral Reynolds having been detailed, at the request of
Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, to organize the militia
which the Governor had called out under the name of
emergency troops. General Meade pushed Seymour out
on the right. His own line prolonged that of Seymour
towards the left. He gives great credit to Seymour, in his
report, for the admirable manner in which he manoeuvred his
brigade in outflanking the enemy. Hatch's division, of the
First Corps, prolonged General Meade's line to the left, and
the division of Ricketts, of the Corps, was held in reserve.

By this time Longstreet had reinforced Hill. General
Meade pressed forward and up the rugged slopes with his
division. Hatch, on his left, maintaining the line there. He
captured the spur, and then, with a brief pause, advanced
to the assault of the commanding top, which was the key
to the position. After a sharp engagement the forces found
themselves completely masters of the ground assailed.
General Meade had, at the hottest part of the engagement,
sent to Hooker for reinforcements, and General Abram
Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts's division, had been sent to
him, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the
distance to be gone over, did not reach him in time for
more than one regiment to open fire when darkness set in
for the night. A most grievous loss to the army in the bril-
liant action of South Mountain, in which, although the
Federals outnumbered the Confederates two to one, the
latter had the advantage of position, was in the death, at
Fox's Gap, of General Reno, who commanded a division
in the Ninth Corps. On the side of the Confederates, they
had especially to mourn the loss of General Samuel Gar-
land, who had been opposed to Reno at Fox's Gap. In

an article by D. H. Hill, which appeared in the Century

194 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

Magazine for May, 1868, he speaks with soldierly admir-
ation of the splendid appearance and bearing of Meade's
and Hatch's troops. Of Meade personally he says, '' Meade
was one of our most dreaded foes ; he was always in deadly
earnest, and he eschewed all trifling. He had under him
brigade-conmianders, officers, and soldiers, worthy of his
leadership."

It has been stated by Mr. William Swinton that, if
McClellan had shown the energy which Jackson had ex-
hibited in marching to Harper's Ferry, the passes of South
Mountain might have been occupied in the evening of
the 13th of September, and the time spent in forcing
them in the engagement of the 14th thereby saved. This
would have been impossible, as would appear from exami-
nation of the conditions existing when the order was found
on the 1 3th. Pleasonton was farthest in advance towards
Turner's Gap, but J. E. B. Stuart was contesting every inch
of the way with him through the Catoctin Range. Reno,
with infantry, was well up towards Middletown, but the
main body of the army was eleven miles distant from the
base of South Mountain, and D. H. Hill soon took posi-
tion in the gaps on McClellan's line of march, with his
reserves in Boonsboro'. If Hill alone managed, as he did,
the following day, to resist for hours the first assault at
Fox's Gap, it is not apparent how he could have failed,
even with his small division of five or six thousand men, to
hold in check a fragmentary force brought upon the scene
when night was falling. Franklin, it is true, might have
been ordered to make a night march on Crampton's Gap
and assault there early in the morning of the 14th, instead
of only being ordered, as he was, to march for that point
in the morning, the consequence of which was that he was
not able to make his way through the pass until the after-
noon, and descending into Pleasant Valley, push the enemy

THE BATTLE OF SO UTH MO UNTAIN. I95

before night put a stop to active operations. But even if
he had been able to descend into Pleasant Valley in the
morning of the 14th, he could not have relieved Harper's
Ferry by dislodging McLaws. McLaws was so strong and
confident with his and Anderson's divisions, that, leaving
one regiment on Maryland Heights to support his artillery
there, and stationing two brigades on each of the roads, one
to the north and one to the east, leading from Harper's
Ferry, he, during the night of the 14th, threw in advance
across Pleasant Valley his remaining six brigades in so for-
midable an array that Franklin, as he says in his report to
McClellan, did not consider it prudent to attack him. It
stands to reason that, if Franklin could not attack him in
the valley, drawn up as he was, he could not have dislodged
him from Maryland Heights.

It becomes imperative now sedulously to condense what
remains to be said within the rigid limits of this sketch, as
regards the culmination of operations along the South
Mountain Range, involving, on the Federal right, efforts to
pass the range and drive Lee out of the north end of
Pleasant Valley, and on the left to relieve Harper's Ferry ;
and correspondingly, involving efforts by the Confederate
left to hold the gaps opposite to it, so that Jackson should
have time to receive the surrender of Harper's Ferry and
join forces with Lee, while, six miles away, the Confederate
right is partly engaged, through McLaws, in standing off
Franklin's intended interference with the siege.

It has been mentioned that, by nightfall of the 14th, the
position at Turner's Gap had been rendered untenable to
the enemy, through the Federal occupation of the key-point
to the right. Reno had also, in a renewed attack at Fox's
Gap, that in which he lost his life, proved successful there.
Both sides continued at nightfall to hold ground at the
ga^, but while the enemy still occupied the National Road,

196 GENERAL QEOBGE GORDON MEADE

passing through the more important gap, Turner's, the
Federal forces had obtained lodgment beyond both flanks
of the enemy, and Gibbon, who, with a brigade, had ad-
vanced in the centre along the National Road, threatened
the defenders of the pass in front. The position would by
daylight be no longer tenable, and so, about the middle of
the night, the enemy began the evacuation of the place, and
by morning had passed down beyond the west base of the
mountain-range, having been perfectly safe under cover of
darkness. Franklin had, the day before, broken through
Crampton*s and Brownsville Gaps and dispersed the troops
defending them, although they had been reinforced by Mc-
Laws. Therefore his alone, of the three columns assaulting
the passes in the South Mountain Range had, on the 14th,
gained a foothold in Pleasant Valley. But, by the morning
of the 1 5th, it having been discovered that the enemy had
evacuated Turner's and Fox's Gaps, the advanced columns
of the main Federal army also soon debouched into the
valley beyond.

Harper's Ferry was, however, not relieved. It fell by
surrender, with the loss of between eleven and twelve
thousand men, and with that of arms and munitions of war.
Assailed from Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights, with
its position at Bolivar Heights turned, with batteries of the
enemy stationed at enfilading points, and columns at the
last moment preparing for assault, it was perfectly helpless.
Only thirteen hundred men, cavalry, part of the force that
had been driven by Jackson out of Martinsburg, of the
whole number of troops at the post, escaped. They crossed
the Potomac on the bridge just below the post, and moving
close under Maryland Heights, unperceived by McLaws,
made their way into Maryland and successfully evaded the
columns of the enemy.

Had the whole force originally at Harper's Ferry been

THE BATTLE OF SOUTff MOUXTAm. l<yj

removed, whh ample artillery, to Maryland Heights, they
could not have been captured by the enemy, nor, of course,
would Haiper'3 Ferry have been tenable by him. Had
McClellan's suggestion been adopted to evacuate the post
and let the troops join him, it would have been captured,
but the troops would not have been lost, and might have
done good service. Had Colonel Ford, to whom was
committed, with two thousand troops, the defence of Mary-
land Heights, made a more vigorous defence than he did,
perhaps the Heights would not have been taken, and
then, if he had had sufficient artillery. Harper's Ferry
would not have been captured. A court of inquiry was
held, which dismissed Colonel Ford and censured the con-
duct of affairs, in which the chief instrument in the field
was the dead commandant of the post, Colonel Miles,
among very few casualties ; although, it should be said in
passing, that the censure reflects not at all on the de-
fence when it had reached the last stage, for holding out
longer, when Hill was advancing to the assault, would have
been useless sacrifice of life. The decisions cannot be re-
garded as having represented the purest justice, for the man
who was chiefly responsible for the disaster was General
Halleck, who remained unscathed.

At eight o'clock, on the morning of the 1 5th of Sep-
tember, the scene presented near Harper's Ferry was
McLaws's six brigades drawn up in line of battle across
Pleasant Valley, confronting Franklin, and barring his ad-
vance towards Maryland Heights. On Maryland Heights
McLaws's batteries, supported by the regiment which he
had left there, were bombarding Harper's Ferry. From
Loudon Heights came a convergent fire, and from the bat-
teries placed by Hill, under Jackson's orders, the fire helped
towards perfecting the periphery of the circle. A. P. Hill's
troops were forming for an assault that could not by any

198 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

possibility prove under the circumstances a failure. Then a
white flag from the works in Harper's Ferry appeared, the
fire of the Confederates was stopped as soon as possible,
the last of it killing Colonel Miles, and at 8.30 a.m. the post
surrendered.

Jackson at once left Hill to attend to details, and he him-
self, with two of his divisions, marched rapidly away to join
Lee. McLaws, retiring from Franklin's front, instead of
trying to break through his line to join Lee by the way of
Pleasant Valley, crossed the bridge at Harper's Ferry to the
south side of the Potomac, and also took up the line of
march to join Lee. Later, Franklin marched directly
northward up Pleasant Valley to join McClellan, leaving
Couch to occupy Maryland Heights ; for what purpose it
is difficult to imagine, the stable door being open and the
horse gone, and as, upon a single battalion, as says Napo-
leon, may depend the fate of a battle.

The order of the day on Lee's side is concentration, and
the order of the day is the same on McClellan's. But
whereas the order of the day on Lee's side is concentration
with direct reference to imminent battle, it has, on McClel-
lan's side, no relation to imminent battle. All the advan-
tage gained by McClellan through the Confederate miscal-
culation by two days of the time requisite to capture
Harper's Ferry, all the advantage of his knowledge of Lee's
immediate presence with less than half his army, is to be
lavishly handed over to his adversary. He has Lee's own
plan of campaign in his possession, knows just how his divi-
sions are separated, should know the strength of an average
Confederate division, and should know how depleted the
ranks of Lee must be from the late battles and straggling.
Notwithstanding, he estimates the somewhat less than forty
thousand troops of the enemy at nearly a hundred thousand,
and although he knows that there are only three infantry

THE BATTLE OF 80 UTH MO UNTAIN. 199

divisions of the enemy, besides cavalry, in front of him, he
thinks he must proceed with great caution. He has seven
miles to march, and it is two days before he regularly joins
battle across a stream spanned by four bridges. We may
well say of such liberality to an adversary, as was said by
General Pelissier of the charge of the Light Brigade, ** C'esf
magfdfique^ tnais ce n* est pas la guerre** Nothing can equal
it but the generosity of the English and the French at
Fontenoy, each of whom insisted that the other should fire
first.

200 GENERAL QEOEQE GORDON MEADE

CHAPTER XL

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM.

By the morning of the 1 5th of September the two corps
of Sumner, the Second and the Twelfth, had closed up on
the east side of South Mountain with the two corps of
Bumside, the First and the Ninth, the last two occupying
the range where they had fought on the day before, at
Fox's and Turner's Gaps. The pickets of Bumside's corps
pushed forward at daylight and found that the enemy had
gone. The four corps therefore descended unopposed into
Pleasant Valley, near the town of Boonsboro', from which
the pass is sometimes called Boonsboro' Gap, the Confed-
erates naming the action there the battle of Boonsboro',
while the Federals name it the battle of South Moun-
tain.

It ought not to be doubted that, with mobility equal to
that of European armies of the first class, as witnessed in
many wars, with only from seven to eight miles, or, at
farthest, in case of detours, ten miles to march, and with
the enormous disproportion of numbers between the Fed-
eral and Confederate forces present, McClellan could, by
a forced march at daylight from the passes of South
Mountain, have been able, despite the shortness of the
autumnal day, to put the small force of Lee behind the
Antietam to utter rout. But mobility in arpiies lies far less
in the locomotive powers of the men than in the will of the
commander. As the head is, so is the body destined to
prevail or suffer. There is no truer saying of Napoleon's

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 201

than thaty in the conduct of war, there is not so much need
of men as of a man.

From seven to eight miles in a straight line, to reach the
stream called the Antietam, was the distance which McClel-
Ian had to march after debouching between eight and nine
o'clock in the morning from the South Mountain Range.
The army was in the north end of Pleasant Valley, beyond
which, towards the west, continuing beyond the town of
Boonsboro', is the valley of the Antietam, confined between
the line on the one side where Elk Ridge coming from the
south has dwindled away to a lower height, and that, on
the other side, defined by the low ranges of hills beyond
Antietam Creek. Beyond the Antietam, which is crossed
by four bridges, and had, at the low stage of water then
prevailing, several fords, is the Potomac, about two miles
ofT, with Lee's line of retreat to the left, at the town of
Shepherdstown on its right or farther bank. The course
of the river and the creek, about two miles apart, are about
the same, slightly east of north, and in the loop formed by
creek and river, about midway between the two, lies the
town of Sharpsburg, after which the Confederates named
the approaching battle, the Federals calling it the battle of
Antietam. Resting his right on a sharp westerly bend of
the Antietam, Lee's line of battle at first passed in front
of the town of Sharpsburg along the range of hills border-
ing its west bank, his left stretching away backward in a
long curve to the Potomac.

The force which McClellan had in hand was his whole
army, except the corps of Franklin, the division of Couch,
both now at Crampton's Gap, and the division of General
Andrew A. Humphreys, left at Frederick. McClellan's
full force on leaving Washington was eighty-five thousand
men. Allowing for those absent with Franklin and Hum-
phreys, and for stragglers, he could not have had in hand

a02 GENERAL QEOBQE QOBDON MEADE.

less than sixty thousand men when he debouched from
the South Mountain Range, while Lee's three divisions
of infantry with him did not number more than seventeen
thousand men. It would seem that he ought to have
crushed Lee's army before the sun set that night. But
what person of experience has not seen in life those who are
stimulated by some extraordinary circumstance or outside
personal pressure, and who have under that stress seemed
to act with resolution, and then, that being spent, have im-
mediately relapsed into their veritable selves, nothing being
more persistent than character ? So McClellan exhibited
for a brief moment some appreciation of the great reward
held out to adequate endeavor, but just at the moment
when it needed but stretching forth to grasp it, he fell back
into the full sway of his plodding circumspection, and let
all that fortune offered escape him.

Fitzhugh Lee continuously resisted with his small cavalry
conmiand the advance of McClellan all the way from Boons-
boro' to the Antietam. But it ought to have taken ten
times the force he was able to muster seriously to delay the
advance of sixty thousand men over a distance of between
seven and eight miles. Meanwhile Lee, knowing his adver-
sary much better than his adversary knew him, quietly took
up his position behind the Antietam, and by the time that
McClellan reached it, the day was too far spent for active
operations.

If, however, it was necessary to pursue so slowly on the
1 5th as to bring it about that active operations must be post-
poned until the following day, would the most procrastinat-
ing general of whom we know, except McClellan, have
postponed them for still another day? What reconnois-
sances and dispositions of troops could compensate for those
which the enemy was making on the other side of the
Antietam, and for the accessions of troops which he would

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 903

receive through McClellan's delay ? All this benefit, out of
all proportion to that which McClellan could receive by
delay, the enemy continued to enjoy throughout nearly the
whole of the i6th of September. Reconnoissances and
posting of troops and artillery, which might have been made
merely incidental, continued on the east of the Antietam,
while McClellan must have known that Lee's absent divis-
ions were rapidly joining him from Harper's Ferry. The
two divisions of Jackson joined him on the i6th, and also
the two brigades of Walker, but the divisions of McLaws,
Anderson, and A. P. Hill could not get up for service on
that day, but did for the next, the day of battle.

Two of the greatest errors had been committed, that
involved, on the 1 5th, in a tardy pursuit and no attack on
the enemy, and that involved, on the i6th, in spending
nearly the whole day in making reconnoissances and post-
ing batteries and troops ; and these two were crowned, on
the afternoon of the i6th, by sending a small force over the
Antietam, late in the day, to attack the enemy's left flank.
Yet, if there is anything thoroughly accepted and practised
in war, it is the avoidance, unless it be intended for a feint
(and that is not a movement of the kind here referred to),
of beginning a movement so late in the day that it cannot
be continued, for the very obvious reason that it notifies the
enemy of what is intended, and enables him during the
night to make his preparations against it.

By the morning of the 1 7th General McClellan had sur-
rendered all the advantage of taking the initiative at the
point of time of Lee's greatest weakness, only one small
division of Lee's still remaining to come up. He had,
moreover, by sending a small force across the Antietam on
the preceding afternoon, put Lee on his guard at that point,
and under these cumulative circumstances of mismanage-
ment he finally laid out his plan of battle by confiding it in

a04 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

chief part to a man of whose efficiency he had the most
profound and well-grounded distrust, confiding to him one
of the most delicate operations of the field, that of the exe-
cution of a movement upon which the success of the plan
largely, if not wholly, depended.

McClellan, referring to incidents just before and after the
battle of South Mountain, speaks thus in his memoirs of
Bumside : —

" About the time I started, Reno sent back desiring that a division
might be sent to the rear of the pass. I sent the order to Hooker to
move at once (Bumside had nothing to do with this),*' etc. Again,
" Bumside never came as near the battle as my position. Yet it was
his command that was in action.** Continuing, in another place, he
says, " I at once gave orders for the positions of the bivouacs, mass-
ing the army so that it could be handled as required. I ordered Bum-
side to the left. He grumbled that his troops were fatigued, but I
started him off anyhow.'*

If McClellan had, as he hereby implies that he had, such
distrust of Burnside, and he had known him, as he else-
where says, for a long while, it is astounding that he put
him, as he did, with reference to the impending battle, in
a position higher, because one calling for great judgment,
than that which any other of his corps-commanders en-
joyed. The plan of battle was, using McClellan's own
words in his memoirs, ** to attack the enemy's lefl with the
corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's,
and, if necessary, by Franklin's ; and as soon as matters
looked favorably there, to move the corps of Bumside
against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running
to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried the
position, to press along the crest to our right ; and when-
ever either of these flank movements should be successful,
to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable."

Hooker was ordered, about 2 p.m., on the i6th, to attack

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. I05

the enemy's left wing by crossing the Antietam at Bridge
No. I and the ford below it. But an order given so late in
the day made it impossible for the attack to be made long
before evening. General Mansfield was ordered to cross at
the same place during the night, and be ready to support
Hooker the next morning, and General Sumner was ordered
to hold his corps in readiness to cross by morning. Sumner
was given command of the right wing so constituted. Por-
ter, newly arrived with the Fifth Corps, consisting at the
moment of only two divisions, but strong in artillery, occu-
pied the centre. Bumside, on the east side of the Antietam,
with the Ninth Corps, occupied a position down the stream
near Bridge No. 3.

The immediate consequence of the manoeuvre of sending
Hooker across the Antietam on the afternoon of the i6th
was that the Third Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves came
into a very sharp engagement, extending to some of the
other troops of the corps, with the final result that they
were obliged to lie all night on their arms in the closest
proximity to the enemy. On the following morning the
engagement was hotly renewed between the enemy and
Hooker. The Twelfth Corps, under Mansfield, soon came
up to support Hooker. Hooker was wounded and obliged
to leave the field, turning over the command of his corps
to General Meade, General Seymour taking command of
the Division of Pennsylvania Reserves. The head of Sum-
ner's column reached the ground about nine o'clock. Gen-
eral Meade, relieved by the arrival of the corps of Generals
Mansfield and Sumner from the pressure put upon him
alone by the enemy, withdrew the shattered First Corps
to the ridge to the rear of where the engagement was taking
place on the left-centre and -wing of the enemy. Why had
not Sumner been ordered to cross the Antietam during the
night, as Mansfield had been ? There is no apparent reason

ao6 GENERAL QEQBQE GORDON MEADE

for it, except in the dominating love of McClellan for par-
celling everything out in fractions of men and time. The
whole attack was extraordinarily ill-conducted and inef-
fective. It was not even being carried out according to its
defects, but with heightened defects. Hooker had been
nearly fought out before Mansfield entered on the scene.
Mansfield was nearly fought out before Sumner arrived.
And when Sumner arrived, Sedgwick's, of his three di-
visions, was led into unsupported and misdirected action by
Sunmer himself, with the consequence that it was decimated,
and French's and Richardson's went into action without per-
fect simultaneity, and with a space between them of which
the enemy took advantage.

It seems at first sight incredible that such troops as these,
however faulty the way in which they were brought on
the field, should, against a force so numerically inferior as
that of Lee, fare so badly as they did. It would be in-
credible but for one thing not yet mentioned, that, owing
to the inertness on McClellan's left, Lee had been stripping
his right to such an extent that a formidable move against
it would have swept it from the field. General McClellan
says in his memoirs :

" The troops of General Bumside held the left of the line opposite
Bridge No. 3. The attack on the right was to have been supported by
an attack on the left Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of
the 1 6th, General Bumside' s corps was moved forward and to the left,
and took up a position nearer the bridge.*'

General McClellan further says :

" Elarly on the morning of the 17th I ordered General Bumside to
form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in
front and to await further orders.

" At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson,
Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession
of the heights beyond, and to advance along the crest upon Sharps-
hmg and its rear.

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. TOJ

" After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I despatched
an aide to ascertain what had been done. The aide returned with the
information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him
back with an order to General Bumside to assault the bridge and
carry it at all hazards. The aide returned to me a second time with
the report that the bridge was still in possession of the enemy. Where-
upon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector-general, to deliver to
General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops with-
out a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the
point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with
General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly.

" After these three hours* delay the bridge was carried at one o'clock
by a brilliant charge of the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Penn-
sylvania volunteers. Other troops were then over, and the opposite
bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond.

** A halt was then made by General Burnside' s advance until 3 p.m.,
upon hearing of which I directed one of my aides. Colonel Key, to in-
form General Bumside that I desired him to push forward his troops
with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's position on the heights ;

that the movement was vital to our success He replied that

he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery
of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon this report I immediately
sent Colonel Key to General Bumside with orders to advance at once,

if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry the heights

The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the
guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops
even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly
dark, and strong reinforcements just then reaching the enemy from
Harper's Ferry, attacked General Bumside' s troops on their left flank,
and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge.

" If this important movement had been consummated two hours
earlier, a position would have been secured from which our batteries
might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned
their right and rear. Our victory might thus have been made more
decisive.

" The ground held by Bumside beyond the bridge was so strong
that he ought to have repulsed the attack and held his own. He
never crossed the bridge in person."

There is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of
this account of McClellan's. There is only one particular
in it, and that merely nominal, which seems to be in error.

208 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

Bumside did cross the bridge, but only formally, and soon
returned. It seems that he was not pleased at McClellan's
dividing his command by sending the First Corps to the
right and leaving only the Ninth Corps to him. However
that may be, whatever his motive, he took a very inert part
in the battle, leaving the conduct of the Ninth Corps to
General Jacob D. Cox, who was, of course, hampered by
his formal presence and nominal command. The truth of
the statement just made is partially confirmed by certain
extant letters of Colonel Sackett's, and one may say also,
confirmed by Bumside's subsequent career. But while
condemning Bumside, the circumstances do by no means
exonerate General McClellan. He had long known Burn-
side. His own testimony about what passed before the
battle shows that he had no faith in Burnside. Yet he left
to Bumside's execution the most delicate and important
duty of the day. The chief responsibility for the failure to
make the battle an unqualified victory lay not only in Mc-
Clellan's assigning to Bumside so important a duty, but in
his own instructions for the attack on the enemy's left wing.
There, too, is to be observed remissness without which it
might have been possible to win the battle, despite the in-
efficiency of Bumside, and with proper agency substituted
for his, to make victory certain. Had McClellan, at dawn
of day on the 17th of September, thrown three corps across
the Antietam, on the right, and had he, on the left, given
to either Hooker or Porter the performance of the task
assigned to Bumside, it would have been all up with the
army of Lee. We know, through Confederate sources,
that only five hundred men held Bridge No. 3, and that the
whole force on Lee's right was two thousand five hundred
men. The reinforcements which McClellan mentions as
reaching Lee's right late in the aflemoon were only the
two thousand men of A. P. Hill's division, which had been

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 209

left at Harper's Ferry by Jackson to attend to the details
of the surrender of that place.

Before noon General Franklin, with the Sixth Corps,
arrived on the field with two divisions. Smith's and Slocum's,
having, as already mentioned, left Couch with his division
to occupy temporarily Maryland Heights. Couch was,
however, countermarched before he arrived there, but did
not reach the battle-field in time. Franklin had brought
up Smith with his division, and had supported Sedgwick
after his disaster by making disposition on Sedgwick's left
of both of its brigades. Slocum's division of the same corps,
the Sixth, was posted between eleven and twelve o'clock on
the right, and stretching away from right to left were then
Slocum's, Sedgwick's, Smith's, French's, and Richardson's
divisions, formed and ready to advance, when Sumner, who
had been shocked at the recent slaughter, placed his interdict
on the movement, and the conflict ceased about one o'clock,
with artillery-firing in fitful outbreaks along the lines. Who
can doubt that if McClcIlan had ordered an advance instead
of accepting Sumner's judgment, Lee's army would have
been crushed by the terrible odds against it ? Some of the
best officers on the Federal side thought so then, and all Con-
federate testimony since confirms the justness of their view.
We know now that the Confederates had been fought out
to the point of demoralization on their left-centre and -wing,
and that Lee had not another man to send from his right
Suppose, then, that Bumside had pushed Lee's right vigor-
ously, as he ought to have been doing, Franklin's attack
on the left could not have failed. It may well be doubted
if, at that period of the battle, even without the co-operation
of Bumside, an attack on the left of the enemy would have
&iled. Had the two attacks been simultaneous, or nearly
so, and had the enemy been driven back, Porter's corps

on the centre would have advanced and completed his

3IO GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

discomfiture. This corps had not been quite idle during
the action on McClellan's right Its powerful artillery had
swept the hills on the other side of the Antietam, and
battalions had passed over the stream and encountered and
driven back skirmishers of Lee's centre. Pleasanton's
cavalry was supported on the west side of the stream by
Sykes's regulars. Porter's corps also sent some reinforce-
ments to Sumner, which, however, did not come into action.
By the end of the battle Lee's whole line had somewhat
retracted and fallen back of its original position. The battle
may be summed up, so far as McClellan was concerned,
by saying that the whole army was not fought, and that
that portion of it which was fought, was fought by small
fractions, in violation of all tactical principles. It was truly
not men that the Federals lacked, but a man, and he was
on the other side.

It may, indeed, upon evidence be regarded as certain
that if the attack had been resumed on the enemy's left on
the afternoon of the 1 7th, the army of Lee would have been
badly defeated. Whether or not, if it had been resumed
on the 1 8th, the same thing would have come to pass, as
some persons have thought, may well be doubted. Num-
bers of stragglers, some shoeless, and others footsore from
late marches over flinty roads, had rejoined Lee's forces.
His army during this feat of arms had gained rather than
lost ntorale, as proved by the way in which A. P. Hill
audaciously repulsed the corps of Porter attempting to
harass his retreat McClellan wrote and spoke of the result
of the action as a great victory, remarking in one place, in
a letter, that " those in whose judgment I rely tell me that
I fought the battle splendidly, and that it was a masterpiece
of art." No man ever penned greater testimony to his
blindness to his own shortcomings. Whether we consider
the vast numbers relatively to those of the enemy of which

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTLETAM. 2 1 1

he could dispose, or the actual dispositions he made of them
in time and space, or the lack of judgment he showed in
choosing instruments for carrying out his designs, he stands
condemned as a general utterly wanting in skill.

It was a terribly bloody day, the bloodiest single day of
any in the annals of the Civil War, the losses on each side
being between fourteen and fifteen thousand. It was fought
on the Confederate side by a master of tactics, on the Fed-
eral side by an inept apprentice to the art of war. It freed
Maryland from invasion, but at undue expense. Would
that the scale upon which this work is framed permitted
mention of the details of the battle, in which Generals
Mansfield, Richardson, and many other noble officers were
killed on the Federal side, and General Hancock appeared
more conspicuously than before on the scene, replacing
Richardson, borne from the field with three wounds !
Would that it permitted mention of the way in which the
rank and file bore themselves with courage and constancy
in opposition to a heroism on the other side which it wrings
the heart to think was spent in a mistaken cause ! Else-
where the reader must look for these details of battle, in
default of the possibility of including them here. Glancing
for a moment, as in duty bound, to the particular subject of
this memoir, the reader will observe that, amidst the chances
and vicissitudes of war, just as Hancock during the battle
was transferred from his brigade of the Sixth Corps to the
command of Richardson's division of the Second, so also
General Meade, through similar recognition of his deserts
and adequacy in time of need, came rapidly to the front. It
was, indeed, through the veriest chance that. General Rey-
noldsy having been detailed for other duty. General Meade
found himself ift command of the Division of Pennsylvania
Reserves at the beginning of the battle ; but it was by order
of General McClellan that he assumed command of the

212 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

First Corps, and, as was believed at the time, at the urgent
request of General Hooker, when wounded. In this action
General Meade was struck in the right side by a spent
grape-shot, which, fortunately, had not velocity enough to
penetrate the body, but made merely a severe contusion.
His aide. Lieutenant William Riddle, was slightly wounded
in the hand. His favorite horse, " Baldy," was shot through
the neck, but recovered. This same horse, it may be re-
membered, had been wounded at the Second Bull Run.
Another horse, which the General rode at the battle of An-
tietam, was shot in the flank. At the battle of New Market
Cross Roads, on the Peninsula, the horse of the General
was wounded.

Couch's division, of the Second Corps, came up on the
morning of the /i 8th, and on the same morning General
Andrew A. Humphrey's division, of the Fifth Corps, arrived
from Frederick. In the night of that day Lee retreated into
Vii^inia by the way of the ford in his rear over the Potomac
at Shepherdstown. The renewal of the battle, therefore,
contemplated to take place on the 19th, did not occur. On
the morning of the 19th a detachment from the Fifth Corps
attempted to harass the enemy's rearguard, and met with
some slight success. On the following day, however, a
reconnoissance in force by the Fifth Corps being made, with
a large number of troops, it resulted in serious Federal loss,
although not so serious as represented by A. P. Hill, who
repelled it. Lee gradually retired to the vicinity of Mar-
tinsburg, with communications open to Winchester and else-
where towards the south, employing his army in destroying
the railroad which would make McClellan's line of supply
in an advance on Richftiond, and in the mean time he re-
cruited it there in numbers, and by rest and supplies from
the fertile region of Shenandoah Valley.

On the 20th of September Maryland Heights were re-

THE BA TTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 2 1 3

occupied, by Federal troops, and on the 2 2d Harper's
Ferry also was reoccupied by them. General Lee's posi-
tion was in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Winchester,
in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan, as he admitted to
Halleck, did not feel confident enough to cross with his
main body to the south side of the Potomac. He therefore
confined himself to posting bodies of troops at Williams-
port, Downsville, and Bakersville to watch and guard the
passages by which Lee might seek to re-enter Maryland.
He meanwhile strongly represented to Halleck the necessity
of his being reinforced, and the destitution of his army in
clothing. Doubtless much improvement in the way of sup-
plies could have been desired, but if the condition of the
Army of the Potomac was needy, that of the Army of
Northern Virginia was beggarly, its soldiers being so desti-
tute as to look like a swarm of tatterdemalions. ** The
Lord bless your dirty, ragged souls," is said to have been
the fervid greeting, by a female sympathizer, to a band of
them as they passed through Frederick. In fact, not to put
too fine a point on it, they were so miserably clad, fed, and so
overworked, had become, through continuous hard march-
ing and fighting, so divested of the pomp and glorious cir-
cumstance of war, that with their presentation of themselves
in Maryland disappeared almost the last vestige of romance
with which their reputation had endowed them. * In vain
they vociferously sang, while tramping to their self-appointed
task of liberation, ** Maryland, my Maryland." The apos-
trophized sleeping Genius of the State did not rouse herself
to make even a languid response. Alas, that there should
be no pure rationality nor sentiment among men, but that
they should be so carnal that a cause should suffer because
it is habited in rags ! Yet, never was there a better illustra-
tion than that afforded by these men of the truth of Napo-
leon's dictum, that poverty is the best school of the soldier.

214 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

Two congratulatory despatches reached McCIellan re-
garding the battle of South Mountain, — one from the Presi-
dent and one from General Scott. Nothing of the same
sort was vouchsafed him regarding the battle of Antietam.
On the 2 1 St of September he wrote that he had not heard a
word from the President, the Secretary of War, or Halleck,
about that battle. No doubt the result had set them all
seriously to thinking. They knew that here, at least, was
none of the disparity of force which McCIellan had pre-
viously alleged to exist. They knew that here were none
of the difficulties of ground of which McCIellan had had
to complain in his own chosen field of the Peninsula. They
were silent, therefore, about the battle ; but dissatisfaction
pierced through the tenor of Halleck's despatches, of the
character of which McCIellan complained to him, and doubt-
less with some reason, for Halleck was an inconsiderate and
tactless man ; and by that strange law of nature which the
most casual observer has noted, that unfortunate attributes
mirrored in another are strangely diss^eeable to the ob-
server, he found particularly heinous in McCIellan those
military defects which were also peculiarly his own.

Maryland Heights, Bolivar Heights, and Loudon Heights
were fortified by McCIellan to guard against a repetition
of the mishap of the capture of Harper's Ferry. The
army meanwhile settled into a quiescent state, awaiting re-
organization and supplies. McClellan's reasons against the
resumption of active operations at once were not only the
need of reorganization and of renewed supplies, but the ex-
istence of a low stage of water in the Potomac. A rise in
the water would be desirable, lest the enemy should renew
hu( invasion of Maryland, while he himself hardly felt
Mn^xe enough to venture upon putting the Potomac at his
Kwk by Classing it, lest there might be a sudden rise in its

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 21$

On the 1st of October the President visited the army and
remained with it for some time, going over the recent bat-
tle-fields under the escort of McClellan. McClellan did
not neglect the opportunity of trying to impress upon the
President what he called "a conservative course." He
doubtless referred by this expression to the fact that the
President had, on the 2 2d of September, issued a prelimi-
nary proclamation of emancipation to slaves. Mr. Lincoln
had tried in vain to bring about some gradual solution of
the matter. He had tried to induce the border States to
concert with Congress measures for compensated emancipa-
tion. His own position on the subject had been clearly
defined by him in a letter to Horace Greeley, of the New
York Tribune^ in which he had said : —

" My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save
or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any
slave, I would do it ; if I could do it by freeing all the slaves, I would
do it ; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone,
I would also do that.*'

He saw now that the logical necessity of the edict for the
manumission of the slaves of the South could not, as a war
measure, be much longer postponed. The South had drawn
the sword and flung away the scabbard. It had declared,
through the second officer in rank of its, government, that
the comer-stone thereof was slavery. It was not fitting
that the sword so drawn, for the object so declared, should
longer possess to any degree the shield of the Constitution
of the United States. There was no idea back of the ac-
tion, as was falsely charged in the heat of passion, that such
a proclamation, whether provisory or final, would promote
servile insurrection. The slaves were known to be too
docile to admit of such a supposition, and every man of
sound judgment knew that, even if that were possible to the

2l6 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

thought of the slaves themselves, it would be impossible
in deed with the whole white population of the South in
arms.

Regarding this visit of the President to the camp, Mc-
Clellan records that it was entirely satisfactory to him, that
he had Mr. Lincoln's assurance that he could move at his
own chosen time. On the 7th of October, however, after
the President had returned to Washington, McClellan re-
ceived a telegfram from Halleck, showing that, unless Mc-
Clellan had not been mistaken in it, a wondrous change
had taken place in the President's mind. Halleck tele-
graphed that, by order of the President, McClellan was
directed to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy
or drive him south, that the army must move while the
roads continued good, that if McClellan should move east
of the Blue Ridge, covering Washington, he could be rein-
forced by thirty thousand men, but that if he should move by
the way of the Shenandoah Valley, he could not have more
than from ten to twelve thousand men. On the 9th of
October Stuart crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry,
above Williamsport, with about fifteen hundred cavalry and
a battery of horse-artillery, captured Chambersburg, there
destroyed a large amount of public property, and made
good his escape across the Potomac near the mouth of the
Monocacy.

McClellan was determined not to move until he deemed
himself ready. Therefore it was not until the 26th of October
that he began to cross the Potomac. By this time the rail-
road bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry had been
rebuilt, and nearby two pontoons spanned the Potomac and
one the Shenandoah. Lee's army had been rapidly recruited,
so that, by the 20th of October, it amounted to sixty-seven
thousand eight hundred and five officers and men of all
arms. As early as the 20th of September, three days after

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTIETAM. 21/

the battle of Antietam, the Army of the Potomac, with
reinforcements, had slightly more than covered its losses,
and numbered eighty-five thousand nine hundred and thirty
men of all arms.

McClellan's plan for the approaching campaign was to
march southward towards Richmond, east of the Blue
Ridge, masking in succession the passes through it, repair-
ing the railroad destroyed by Lee, and if Lee should remain
in the Shenandoah Valley, and if opportunity should offer,
to slip through and attack him at a disadvantage. If he
should divide his forces, and opportunity should offer to
interpose between the fractions, the Army of the Potomac
would avail itself of the chances which might offer them-
selves. Afterwards, when Lee left Jackson in the Shenan-
doah Valley and passed around McClellan with Longstreet,
heading him off at'Culpeper, McClellan thought that his
opportunity had come. But, on November 7th, while his
army was on the march to Warrenton, he was suddenly
relieved of its command by an order of the 5th from the
President. The time selected for relieving him was not
well chosen in the interest of the cause at stake, in that of
personal consideration, or in that of respect for the sentiment
of the rank and file of the army. That he should have
been displaced there ought to be no question from what has
here preceded, but with battle far from imminent, the Ad-
ministration would have done better for the morale of the
army and all other proprieties concerned, had it waited at
least until the advance was over.

To class McClellan, as Swinton does, with Wallenstein,
who met creditably the greatest general of his age, Gustavus
Adolphus, with the finest infantry of Europe of that time, is
to exalt him to a rank far above his deserts. When we
say that he was an honest, and therefore a well-meaning
man, and a man of fair ability for the ordinary walks of

2l8 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADR

life, we have said all that is in truthfulness due him. Jomini
once took pains to answer the stricture of a military cntic
upon his position, that war is a passionate drama, not an
exact science. His answer substantially was, that war is not
an exact science, because it is complicated by differences of
intellect, character, passion, materials, accidents, and all
that enters into the diversity observable among men and
among their possessions and surroundings. The stricture
of his critic is, however, much more easily disposed of than
by his admission, which is not true, that war is not an exact
science. It is astonishing that such a writer as Jomini did
not see that the facts of observation do not need^any su!
&llacy to reconcile them. The precise truth is that the
science of war is exact, but that the art of war i^ compli-
cated by all that belongs to human diversity. We have an
illustrative case of the truth of this in General McClellan.
He understood the science of war, but his defects of char-
acter made it impossible that he could practice successfully
the art of war.

The measure of McClellan's mind lies in his military per-
formances with great resources, and not less in the output
of his written and oral speech. His blindness to the rela-
tions and to the eternal fitness of things, in spheres both
military and civil, is proved by the history of his service as a
general and in that of his conduct in politics, to which he
betook himself. His career as a general has been here
sufficiently discussed, and therefore it only remains to cite
as evidence of his incapacity for civil affairs of magnitude,
that he should have allowed himself to become a candidate
for the Presidency of the United States upon the platform
which contained the humiliating declaration that the war
was a failure. There is a difference between the view that
the conduct of the war was a failure, and that the war in
itself was a failure. To affirm even the first would have

THE BATTLE OF THE ANTLETAM. 219

been indelicate for a man to whom part of its failure might
be attributed, but to affirm the second was to repudiate the
very principles for which the people of the North had striven
as strenuously as the people of the South were striving
to maintain their opposites ; and enunciated at the time
chosen for their denial, when the dawn of the future was
lighting up the whole land, was a confession of dwelling in
Cimmerian darkness. Happily the people saw with the
utmost clearness the implications of the candidacy which
was offered on the one side, as contrasted with those which
were offered by the candidacy of the other, and they rose
with intelligence and irresistible might to uphold common
sense and justice in a political victory which may well give
joy to the hearts of the men of the North and of the South
who believe in the capacity of themselves and their fellow-
citizens for self-government.

. ^

TEE BA TTLE OF FREDERICK8B URQ. 22 1

be as blind as he to his inadequacy. He had created a
splendid army, but he was unequal to the high generalship
indispensable to so great a command.

Time, in due course, worked its slow wonders, and when
the moment came, two years afterwards, when the same
general invoked the voice of people and army to acclaim
him President of the United States, it was still ; while for
his opponent it waked the echoes from the Atlantic to the
Pacific shores. But even the wiser who witnessed the fare-
well of McClellan to his army in the field, when he rode
down their enthusiastic ranks, although astounded at the
fatuity exhibited, could not but feel a responsive thrill of
sympathy at the display of such devotion. Time, the curer
of all things, the assuager of pain, the kindly minister to
pleasure, has since then passed on and left but a memory
of those days behind. Shorn of the sting of their humili-
ation and hopelessness, they bring now no acute pain, but
leave us fancy-free in sentiment and mind to judge in the
calm of the philosophic mood.

General Burnside was a very inconsiderable man. If
greatness may be said to have been thrust upon McClellan,
willing to receive it, and fully a believer in the justness of
the award, we can say of Burnside that, reluctant to accept
it, it was not only thrust upon him, but he was knocked
down with it, and hammered with it into partial insensibility
of the absurdity of its being attributed to him. When the
poor man awakened on the morning of the 8th of Novem-
ber, he found that he had not been dreaming, but that there
was a conspiracy to make him famous. He protested, as
he had done before, that the Government had made a mis-
take, that he was not the person whom it took him for, that
he was entirely unfit for the command of the Army of the
Potomac. What, however, could he, seemingly to himself,
do under the circumstances, the verdict in his favor by the

222 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

militaiy authorities in Washington being so uninfluenced
and confident. If he were sane, he could not, he doubtless
flattered himself, reach any other conclusion than that he
must have underrated himself The opposite conclusion
would have savored of presumption to hold his moderate
opinion of himself against that of the whole world, at least
that of the special world in which he was living for the
time. So it came about that he may have seemed to him-
self obliged to be conceited so as to avoid seeming con-
ceited, and after a formal resistance he settled down into
the duties of commander of the Army of the Potomac.

It is not positively known to this day what were the in-
fluences which brought about his appointment. It has been
said that Mr. Lincoln was pleased with him personally, and
with his military bearing, and that had had weight. The in-
spiring motive at bottom for making a new appointment was
to get rid of General McClellan, but why, of all men in the
Army of the Potomac, Bumside should have been pitched
upon as his successor is a mystery, and yet we must believe
thatthe President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck
were all essentially agreed as to this unfortunate move. All
the more extraordinary was it, because it occurred so soon
after the battle of Antietam, the significance of Bumside's
participation in which ought to have been known. Bumside
was universally acknowledged to be a good fellow, a very
taking character in the world for piping times of peace, and
one without whom it could ill dispense. But if any one
can cite a case in history where the constitution of mind of
the good fellow proved fitted for stirring times in either
peace or war, the historian would like to make a note of it
as conducive to the interests of his studies of great events.
The fact is, according to the moderate lights shed on the
present page, that the character of the good fellow, pure
and simple, is entirely exclusive of greatness and frequently

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 223

of common ability. It is, however, in the capacity of a good
fellow, and no general at all, that Bumside passed his ac-
tive military career, inclusive of the battle of Fredericks-
burg.

We are back on the ground at the Rappahannock, over
which General Pope fought, and from which he was driven
during a succession of battles to the defences of Washing-
ton on Arlington Heights. As was mentioned, the army
was, on the 7th of November, on the march for its final
positions near Warrenton, to cover the line of the Rappa-
hannock. When the removal of General McClellan took
place, and he turned the command over to Bumside, the
orders for the concentration of the army which he had
issued were continued in force by Bumside until the final
halt on the 9th, McClellan departing from the army on the
following day.

At this time, on the 9th, the positions of the respective
armies may be briefly stated as follows : The main body of
the Army of the Potomac was at and near Warrenton. The
Sixth Corps was six miles to the rear, at New Baltimore. The
Eleventh Corps was three or four miles further to the rear,
near Gainesville. Sickles's division, of the Third Corps, was
picketing the railroad from Manassas Junction to Warrenton
Junction. The Ninth Corps was a few miles to the right, at
Waterloo, near the fords of the upper Rappahannock. The
cavalry was patrolling the country to the south of the Rap-
pahannock and watching the fords below. The Confederate
forces were widely separated. Longstreet had headed Mc-
Clellan off at Culpeper, about twenty miles from Warrenton,
and was there with his corps. A division of Jackson's corps
had come across the Blue Ridge, but his other divisions, on
account of the abundance of supplies to be drawn thence,
still remained in the Shenandoah Valley, distributed along
the line between Winchester and Strasburg. Lee's two main

224 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

bodies were thus two marches apart, but he had no fear
for them in confronting the general whom he had to oppose.
McClellan had contemplated taking advantage of the division
of Lee's forces, but that any such attempt would have &iled
under his leadership we have seen good reason to believe.
We shall see, as we progress, how consummately Lee
proved to be the master of the situation from beginning
to end.

On the 1 0th of November took place the grand cere-
monial of McClellan's farewell in person to the army, when
he passed on horseback along the lines of troops cheering
enthusiastically in his honor. And then he departed, leav-
ing a general sadness behind him, the morale of the army
seriously impaired, not only by his loss, but by lack of con-
fidence in his successor, a man greatly bis inferior in attri-
butes, both as man and soldier. Upon the altar of its
country patriotism was still to offer up rich sacrifices to the
demiurge of blind gropings for the way of victory.

Bumside, upon assuming command on the loth of Nov-
ember, found himself under the necessity of adopting at
once a plan of campaign. He was decidedly averse to at-
tempting to avail himself of the separation of Lee's two
corps, and as for the road to Richmond by the way of
Orange Court House, well to the west of the Potomac, it
offered too precarious a line of supply for the army. So he
proposed adopting the line from Fredericksbui^ to Rich-
mond ; which was a good selection, for, from Acquia Creek,
to be constituted a great depot of supplies, it is only ten
miles to Fredericksburg, on a line represented by a railroad
easily restored after the damage done to it by the enemy,
and additionally, there are the ordinary roads through the
country. From Fredericksburg, assuming that he could
cross the Rappahannock there, he thought that he might
be able to anticipate the Confederate army by two marches.

THE BATTLE OF FREDEBICK8BUBQ. 225

and accompanied by a large wagon train, carrying several
days' provisions, might be able, unopposed, to reach the
heights back of Fredericksburg, whence he could take the
direct road to Richmond and encounter the Confederate
army to advantage when he was brought to bay. That he
should have thought that he might steal two marches on
Lee, or indeed any march at all, shows how little Bumside
knew his man. But, otherwise, the plan was rational. It
was rational to think that, with his largely superior forces,
he would be able to cross the Rappahannock and first en-
counter the Confederate army to advantage beyond the
heights back of Fredericksburg. How, assisted at first by
the inefficiency of Halleck, and then, left to his own devices,
the plan in execution proved wholly abortive, will appear in
the sequel.

Bumside's plan of campaign was received in Washington
on the I ith of November. Halleck did not approve of it,
and so he went to Warrenton, and there, on the 1 2th and
13th, discussed it with Bumside. It was finally agreed that
the decision should rest with the President. Halleck returned
to Washington, and on the 14th telegraphed Bumside that
the President had approved of his plan.

A new organization of the corps of the army, begun by
McClellan, was completed by Bumside. The army was
now comprised in what were called grand divisions. The
Right Grand Division consisted of the Second and Ninth
Corps, under General Sumner. The Centre Grand Division
consisted of the Third and Fifth Corps, under General
Hooker. The Left Grand Division consisted of the First
and Sixth Corps, under General Franklin.

The Right Grand Division marched at dawn of the 1 5th,

and on the 17th reached Falmouth, on the north side

of the Rappahannock, just above Fredericksburg. The

Centre and Left Grand Divisions, preceded by the cavalry,

226 GENERAL QBORQB GORDON MEADR

began their march on the 17th. On the i8th the Left
Grand Division reached Stafford Court House, eight miles
to the northeast of Fredericksbui^. On the 19th the Centre
Grand Division reached Hartwood, eight miles to the north-
west of Fredericksbui^.

Now presented itself an insurmountable obstacle, for
which Halleck seems to have been entirely responsible. It
had been agreed upon between him and Bumside that the
pontoons for crossing the Rappahannock should be expe-
dited from Washington, but they did not arrive until the
25th, the excuse for the delay being that it had been ex-
pected that Bumside would send an officer to receive and
conduct them to the front. But if anything can be clear,
it is that Halleck, having promised to expedite them, it was
not implied in the arrangement that Bumside had any
further agency in the matter. Not until eight days after
Sumner had arrived at the proposed point of crossing did
the pontoons arrive, and it need hardly be said that Lee
had not been idle in the mean time. Sumner proposed to
cross by some fords with the Right Grand Division, but
Bumside vetoed this proposition. He was right The
danger was not from the small garrison on the other side
of the river, somewhat reinforced by troops from Long-
street about the time Sumner reached Fredericksburg, but
from a possible sudden rise of the river from rain. If that
had occurred when Sumner was south of the stream, he
might have been cut off so long from succor that he might
have been overwhelmed by the gradually concentrating
forces of Lee.

Having now established the Army of the Potomac at its
projected point of crossing the Rappahannock near Fred-
ericksbui^, with its cavalry now toward the rear, guarding
the fords over that river as it curved backward toward the
north, we must examine what Lee has been doing while

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSB UBO. 22/

these operations were proceeding. There was no march
stolen upon him. He possessed sources of information in
the country, in his scouts, and in his cavalry, far superior
to those enjoyed by Bumside. Through these quiet
sources of information he had learned enough to justify
him, as we have seen, in sending some of Longstreet's
corps to reinforce the garrison at Fredericksburg. Through
a reconnoissance in force in the vicinity of Warrenton he
had gained through his cavalry information sufficient to
induce him to send the remainder of Longstreet's corps to
Fredericksburg. Thus, three days after Sunmer's arrival
at the Rappahannock near Falmouth, Longstreet's whole
corps had crossed its main branch, the Rapidan, had
marched along its southern bank to the Rappahannock,
and was concentrated at Fredericksburg, while the Army
of the Potomac waited helplessly on the opposite shore for
pontoons. Lee was making his moves as deliberately and
calmly as if he had been playing a game of chess. He
now first said to the Army of the Potomac, " check." Had
the Army of the Potomac been able by any chance to cross
the stream, Lee would have been obliged to sidle off
towards the west until he was joined by Jackson moving
towards him from further west, Jackson being now east of
the Blue Ridge. As things stood, he could afford to stay
where he was, on ground of his own choice, quite as much
as it was eventually to be Bumside's, and with more reason
for his choice. What with the natural difficulties of the
ground, and resistance to the attempt at crossing the Rappa-
hannock, Lee evidently thought that Burnside might not be
able to cross for some time to come. There would be plenty
of time for himself and Jackson reciprocally to approach
each other, or, without his stirring, for Jackson to join him.
The Army of the Potomac, without pontoons, and with
the Rappahannock risen above the stage at which it had

228 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

been found, was necessarily stalled until they were received
on the 25th of November. In all probability Lee knew
from Washington more about their arrival than Bumside
did. Bumside, naturally confiding in Halleck, awaited
them, but Lee, who had excellent spies in Washington, was
doubtless apprised as to when he might expect them.
Otherwise, the coincidence is remarkable, that Jackson,
who had been quietly resting near Orange Court House,
thirty-five miles from Fredericksburg, beg^, on the 26th
of November, to move thence towards Fredericksburg.

Bumside, having received his pontoons, was all ready to
cross the Rappahannock, but having incurred a delay of
many days, his readiness was unavailing, for Lee's army
was holding the line of the Rappahannock, the fords on the
Rappahannock, the Rapidan also being well guarded, and
the carrying out of the original plan, which would have
been so feasible just after Sumner's arrival, now seemed to
need serious revision. The situation naturally gave Bum-
side pause. It was not at all the one which he had con-
templated meeting. Exactly what it was he did not know,
not knowing the exact disposition of the enemy's forces, but
he at least knew that it was very different from that contem-
plated, and so the last part of November and a portion of
December passed away, a period which was not neglected
by the Confederates for the proper defence of the town of
Fredericksburg and the Heights beyond.

It seems to be an almost universal weakness in those who
engage in a contest to magniiy their own difficulties and
to minimize those of their adversaries. In accordance with
this tendency, Confederates have often said that the posi-
tion at Fredericksbui^ was not a particularly strong one
either by nature or by art. Nature remains the same there
as it was on the day when the battle was fought, and one
who should visit the spot now can see at a glance that the

THE BATTLE OF FBEDERICKSBUBO. 229

frontage of the Heights near the river, with a superior ridge
in the rear, making an adequate position for reserves, or for
rendering untenable the outer and inferior ridge, that the
general concavity of the iace of the Heights with its re-
entering angles, that the almost level and bare surface of
the plain between the Heights and the river, constitute a
position of enormous advantage to a defending force, and
corresponding disadvantage to one assaulting. And as for
the artificial defences constructed there just previously to
the battle of Fredericksburg, although it should be confessed
that they did not occupy the ground nearly so strongly
as it was afterwards elaborated for defence, the defences at
that time were a great addition to the strength of the posi-
tion, and through the fact of their conformity to the nature
of the ground, made it truly formidable. The position,
taking it as a whole, considering it with reference to the
relatively less exposure of the defenders than that of the
attackers, was as strong as that afterwards held by the Fed-
eral army at Gettysburg.

Bumside's first offensive move was down the Rappahan-
nock opposite to Skinker's Neck, where there were good fa-
cilities for crossing the river. But Lee anticipated this move
by sending a heavy force, which fortified and remained there,
and on the 5th of December Stuart's horse-artillery drove off
some Federal gunboats which attempted to pass by there to
Fredericksburg. The dispositions of Lee's forces at this
time, before his final concentration took place on the Heights
of Fredericksburg, were wide apart. The main body of
his troops occupied the Heights back of the town, with re-
serves, consisting of A. P. Hill's division, at Guinea's Sta-
tion, a few miles in the rear, while the two divisions of D,
H. Hill and Early were posted from ten to twelve miles
below, on the south side of the Rappahannock, and W. H.
F. Lee's brigade of cavalry further still, beyond Skinker's

230 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADR

Neck. Colonel Thomas L. Rosser*s and General Wade
Hampton's brigades of cavalry guarded the fords of the
Rappahannock and Rapidan above, on Lee*s left. A. P.
Hill was so placed at Guinea's Station, in the rear of the
main body, that he could by a single march readily rein-
force either it or the extreme right near Skinker's Neck.

As one glances south from Stafford Heights, north of the
Rappahannock, occupied by Bumside's army, at an eleva-
tion of one hundred and fifty feet above the river, he over-
looks the town of Fredericksbui^ and the plain on the other
side of the river, terminated by the ridge somewhat parallel
to the river, on which Lee's army was finally to be concen-
trated. The general elevation of Stafford Heights is so
much greater than that of the ridge south of the river, that
artillery posted there had the artillery of the Confederates
at a great disadvantage ; so much so that many of the Con-
federate batteries along the ridge had to be protected by
being sunk in gun-pits.

At Stafford Heights the river Rappahannock runs in an
eroded channel of steep and moderately high banks, and
Fredericksburg comes down to the edge of the southern
bluff so made. The ridge on the south side of the river
passes, on the right, as seen from the Heights, about a mile
back of the bluff, parallel with the river ; but as it proceeds,
curves away towards the southeast, to a point about two and
a half miles from the river, where it reaches its g^reatest
concavity, trending thence towards the Rappahannock.
Marye's Hill, back of Fredericksburg, is the salient between
this straight line and this curve. The range of which it is
a part varies from forty to ninety feet in height (Telegraph
Hill, now called Lee's Hill,being the highest point, where Lee
stood during the battle), and gradually falls away in height
towards the southeast, to Prospect Hill, a height of forty feet.

The position rested its left on the Rappahannock, at Tay-

THE BA TTLE OF FREDERICKSB UBQ. 23 1

lor's Hill, fifty feet high, and its right on a deep, wooded
ravine, in which flows Massaponax Creek, an affluent of the
Rappahannock, which meets the ridge nearly at right-
angles. Back of the Rappahannock runs, parallel with that
river, a small stream known as the Mill Sluice. This is a
branch of Hazel Run, a stream which flows from between
Marye's and Telegraph Hills, making between those sum-
mits on the range a decidedly re-entering angle.

It is, in the interest of the general reader, not desirable
to proceed much further in topographical description. The
rest will therefore be confined to a few additional necessary
details. A stream called Deep Run flows directly from the
range into the Rappahannock, entering there only a short
distance below the mouth of Hazel Run. The plain on
which the range described rests is the main terrace of the
Rappahannock at this point. On it, midway between the
river and the range of hills, and somewhat parallel with both,
is a road called the Old Stage Road, which, forking near the
line of the Massaponax, goes with one branch to Richmond
and the other to Port Royal. Back of this road, and nearly
parallel to it, is the railroad to Richmond. On the range
the directions of the roads are too diverse to be made clear
by verbal description. Suffice it to say, therefore, that they
run both along the range and across it. An additional one
was cut by Lee through the woods for the purpose of facili-
tating communication to and fro along his lines. The posi-
tion was somewhat bare from the centre to the left, but
heavily wooded from the centre to the right

The position was, as must be evident to any one, tactically
very strong. It was also, however, what is not known to
every one, strategically weak. It ought to be evident that
as, for the purpose of protecting a line of communications,
an army should be either athwart or parallel to it, the worst
possible position for it to occupy is when stationed on the

232 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

prolongation of the line of its communications. But the latter
was the exact situation of Lee's army, and it was unavoid-
able. The best generals, as a choice between evils, have
been obliged to accept that disposition of their troops, and
upon it has turned many a disaster.

Bumside knew that a large detachment from Lee's army
was lying at and in the vicinity of Skinker's Neck, distant
from it by twelve miles, and more, as to some parts of the
force. He does not seem, however, to have known of A.
P. Hill's position at Guinea's Station, in Lee's rear. He
could not cross the Rappahannock at Skinker's Neck, that
had been essayed. He seems not to have sufficiently con-
sidered the feasibility of turning Lee's position by the upper
fords, which were practicable, and although guarded, could
have been captured. He assumed that he could take Lee
by surprise by a rapid movement, attack him in front, and
defeat him before he could be reinforced from below on the
river. Of all surprises, however, this proved to be the very
slowest

Before daylight of the i ith of December some of the
pontanUrs of the Army of the Potomac began to fit up their
boats for throwing bridges across the stream in front of
Fredericksbui^, while others engaged in the same operation
just below the mouth of Deep Run, at a place less liable
to serious interference with the work by the enemy. Six
bridges in all were to be laid, three in front of Fredericks-
burg, and three in the place below.

The signal guns from the Army of Northern Vii^nia an-
nounced to the Confederates that the enemy was in move-
ment Lee had not been deceived by the renewed demon-
stration at Skinker's Neck, any more than he had been in that
on Culpeper, when Bumside, instead of going there, had rap-
idly marched to the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg.
Longstreef s troops were all astir, inarching towards their

THE BA TTLE OF FREDERICK8B UBG. 233

designated positions, as if they had merely been resting on
their arms, and had been suddenly ordered to fall into
ranks. Lee wished nothing better than that Bumside
should cross. He had seventy-eight thousand troops
occupying a strong position, against one hundred and '
thirteen thousand troops that would have no position at all,
and in addition to that, would have a river at their backs.
He had no cause for the slightest apprehension. The
resistance he was about to make to the crossing was not
because he wished to prevent it, but simply to gain time for
perfecting his own concentration, while incidentally doing
the enemy as much damage as possible. He still kept
Jackson where he was to guard against the turning of the
demonstration at Skinker's Neck into a real attack.

The Federal army enjoyed only one advantage, if that
can be called such which only helped to pave the way to
disaster. A heavy fog hung densely over the river vale, as
fogs so incline, and spread over the landscape beyond. In
consequence, the enemy could not at first obstruct the
Federal operations by artillery fire. The enemy, occupy-
ing Fredericksburg in large numbers, and crowning the
range beyond, waited for the fog to lift. Houses along the
river-bank at Fredericksburg had been crenelled, and rifle-
trenches had been run along the bank. All that the Con-
federates wished for now was light. Gradually, as one of
the bridges advanced from the northern to the southern
shore, its end, with the ponUmiers working upon it, appeared
ghostlike through the mist, and the Confederate riflemen
picked the men off with unerring aim. Searched by Federal
in&ntry- and artillery-fire, directed on the face of the town,
the sheltered Confederates still held their own, and made it
impossible to construct the bridge opposite the town.
Lee again called " check," but he saw the game far beyond,
to the inevitable checkmate.

234 GENERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADE.

The Federal artillery was now concentrated on Freder-
icksbui^, all unavailingly. Men sheltered in holes, cran-
nies, and drains do not suffer much from the indiscriminate
fire upon a town. The fire was a wild and useless expendi-
ture of force. There was only one way in which the thing
was to be done, a method universally practised under simi-
lar circumstances in civilized warfare, unless it so happens
that, at the site of the intended crossing, the stream makes
so sharp a bend towards the attacking force that the tongue
of land so produced on the enemy's side of the river can
be scoured by the protective fire of the force seeking to
cross. Caesar, in a desperate strait, near the east coast of
Spain, shut in between the Cinga and Sicoris, two affluents
of the modem Ebro, had his siege of Ilerda, the modem
Lerida, brought to a sudden stop by a freshet which carried
away his bridges. Constructing pontoons at a point beyond
the observation of the enemy, he threw troops across the
Sicoris, and soon made himself master of the situation by
thus restoring his communications for supplies and reinforce-
ments. With pontoons all ready to his hand, Bumside did
not do what Caesar had done two thousand years before.

At last General Hunt, chief of artillery, after several
hours had been fruitlessly spent in trying to complete the
system of upper bridges, suggested that advantage be taken
of the lull, though not cessation, of the enemy's rifle-fire,
to throw a force across the river in pontoons ; and after all
the waste of time and life that had preceded, four regiments
were thus thrown over the river and the bridges soon after-
wards finished. The bridges below, where Franklin was to
cross, were completed with comparatively very little diffi-
culty. It was evident, however, that all idea of obtaining
an advantage through taking the enemy by surprise must
be relinquished. By one o'clock in the aftemoon Franklin,
on the left, had completed his three bridges near Deep Run,

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 235

but it was half-past four before the three bridges opposite
Fredericksburg were ready. Franklin crossed some of his
troops over the river on the left. The town of Fredericks-
burg had been evacuated after the contest with the troops
which had captured the rifle-pits. Bumside has been blamed
because he did not cross all his troops during the rest of
the day and the following night, with the purpose of assault-
ing the enemy early in the following morning. This stric-
ture is not just. The day was a December one, short. All
hope that the enemy would not concentrate before morning
should have gone from his mind. His troops could deploy
by daylight to better advantage than by night, and still leave
of the next day ample time in which to fight a battle. The
irremediable mistake had been made in not having thrown
all the pontoons across by one o'clock in the afternoon.
Then there would have been time to fight a battle before
the enemy was fully concentrated, or at least to make all
the dispositions for the morrow.

The next day, the 1 2th of December, was again foggy in
the early part of the morning. The Right Grand Division,
under Sumner, crossed the river by the three upper bridges,
and the Left Grand Division, under Franklin, crossed the
remainder of its troops by the three lower bridges. The
Centre Grand Division, under Hooker, remained nominally
on the north bank of the Rappahannock, but, in fact, many
of its troops were, from first to last, parcelled out between
the two other Grand Divisions. Sumner's Grand Division
stretched away from Fredericksburg to the right, and also
to the left, until it joined the right of Franklin's Grand
Division. The left of Franklin's was held en potence (that
is, refused at about right-angles) by a strong force, the left
of which touched the river. This was to guard against or
to repel a flank attack by the enemy.

Longstreet was on Lee's left, Anderson's division touch-

236 GENERAL GEOBQE GORDON MEADR

ing the river, while the divisions of McLaws, Pickett, and
Hood continued the line towards the right. Ransom sup-
ported batteries on Marye's Hill. At the foot of this
summit lay Cobb's brigade, of McLaws*s division, and the
Twenty-fourth North Carolina Regiment. They were
protected by a stone wall which had been reinforced by
earth on the outer side and prolonged towards the north-
west by a shelter-trench and corresponding parapet, rifle-
pits being constructed on the side of the range at sufficiently
great elevation above to enable their occupants to fire over
the heads of the defenders below. Small earth-works on
Marye's Hill and to the right and left of it were manned
by the Washington Artillery, supported by four battalions
drawn from different commands. Next came Jackson's
corps. Hood came first. A. P. Hill was posted between
Hood's right and Hamilton Crossing, the point where Lee's
military road and another intersect a road to Richmond
which turns off" from the Old Stage Road. His first line
consisted of Pender, Lane, and Archer, drawn up on the
edge of the woods. The Thirty-fifth and Fortieth Virginia
Regiments, with artillery, were on the right of Thomas's
brigade and Gregg's. The Twenty-second and Forty-
seventh Virginia Regiments formed A. P. Hill's reserves.
In the second line there were Elarly's and Taliaferro's divis-
ions, with D. H. Hill's division in reserve. Stuart, with
two brigades of cavalry and his horse-artillery, was on
Jackson's extreme right, closing in the ground to the ravine
of Massaponax Creek. It Is to be observed that Lee's forces
were massed on his right flank to an enormous strength.
It was known to Bumside that this was tactically and strate-
gically Lee's weak flank, the one, therefore, to receive the
main attack, the one, therefore, where the greatest number
of troops ought to be and would be found ; and yet the plan
which he finally adopted with reference to it was puerile.

THE BATTLE OF FREDEBICK8BURQ. 237

Time seemed to be no more an object to Bumside than
it had been to McClellan. Day was waning on the 12th,
and still Bumside was uncertain what to do. In the after-
noon FrankHn advised attacking the enemy's right, the
next morning early, with thirty thousand men, and the
manner in which Bumside left him implied that he would
adopt that plan, marching over the river during the night
some additional troops from Hooker's corps, and sending
his orders in writing immediately. The night, however,
passed, and no order, no additional troops reached Frank-
lin. It would give a false impression to say that Bumside
had lost his head ; he never had any. To do something
safe, that could not hurt him very much, if it failed of its
object, is the policy of all weak generals, and therefore was
his. He did not seem to see, as a French officer says, in his
military text-book, that a general to succeed must be ready,
" de se bien battre*^ A determined policy, whether for re-
treat or battle, is the only course that fits in with war. Halt-
ing decisions that make " ' I dare not ' wait upon * I would,' "
are the most merciless expedients, the most bloody in con-
sequences. Thirty thousand men hurled at dawn on the
right flank of Lee, which presented no special difficulties of
ground, as his left did, would have won the battle ; at least
that plan afforded the only chance of winning it The un-
expected would in itself have lent itself to victory. Even
the calm Lee, the steadfast Longstreet, the impetuous
Jackson might in that event have thought that their time
had come. Instead of that plan, what one did Bumside
adopt ? At half-past seven of the morning of the 13th of
December orders reached Sumner on the right and Frank-
lin on the left for each to attack \vith a division. A division !
Bumside says that his idea was to tum the enemy's right
flank, and obtain a position from which to move along the
rear of the crest of the range of hills occupied by him.

338 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADR

Gaining this point, he intended to push Sumner on the right
against the enemy in his front, and at least capture his
artillery if he attempted to retreat

General Franklin had on the left the First and Sixth
Corps, one division of the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the
Third Corps, and Bayard's cavalry. The part of Bumside's
orders which applied only to Franklin was somewhs^ confus-
ing to him. The particular parts of the orders, that he was
to send in at least a division^ supported^ and that Sumner was
to attack with a division or marey were perfectly clear, but
the general drift of the orders applying to Franklin was such
as to confirm him in the belief that he must hold his main
force well in hand, implying, of course, his preparedness for
a move not mentioned. Despatches passed through the
following hours which prove that Bumside was satisfied at
the time with what Franklin did. He expressed his dis-
satisfaction with it only after his fiiilure, and then he charged
Franklin with not obeying orders. There is no other way
in which the question as to whether Franklin did or did not
obey orders can be answered than by adopting the French
form of speech for similar cases. "Oia et non** " Yes and
noy He did, and he did not. Up to a certain point of
time he did implicitly obey them. Beyond that point, the
orders becoming even more than before ambiguous in mean-
ing, and the situation on the left evidently not what Bumside
imagined it to be, — supposing that he had a correct view of
anything, — Franklin, anxious, and restive under the infliction
of the muddle produced by his chief's incapacity, adopted a
course which might, from one point of view, be deemed
disobedience of orders, but from the standpoint here, one
that should be r^^arded as lying within the discretionary
power of any general so terribly placed as Franklin was to
decide in which direction duty lay.

General Reynolds had returned to the army. His corps,

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 239

the First, was selected to furnish the division to make the
assault on the left. This was General Meade's division of
the Pennsylvania Reserves, supported on the right by Gib-
bon's division, and on the left by Doubleday's. The for-
mation of the Division being completed with the First
Brigade and the Third Brigade, the Second Brigade in sup-
port, it marched half a mile down the Rappahannock, and
turning sharply to the right, pushed for the railroad defences
at the base of the range of hills held by the enemy. The
point for which it was pushing was not on the extreme left
of the Confederates, as was soon proved by its being halted
by a sharp artillery fire to the left and rear, which necessi-
tated placing Doubleday*s brigade en potence^ and his ad-
vancing against the enemy in that quarter. After some in-
terchange of artillery-fire with the attacking force on the
left, the Division resumed its forward movement.

Meade's First Brigade drove the enemy from the railroad
entrenchment and advanced up the slope beyond, driving
back two brigades of the enemy in great confusion. The
Third Brigade, less fortunate, failed to reach a point quite so
advanced, and the Second Brigade was still less successful
than it. The First Brigade having thus penetrated fer into
the enemy's lines, and being unsupported on account of the
mishaps with which the two other brigades had met, had
expended its force, and could not but recoil before the
masses concentrating against it, so great that they threw it
and the two other brigades into disorder, and pursued them
retreating down the slopes and across the railroad ; not in
rout, however, but maintaining their organization as well as
could be expected after the severe losses they had sustained.
The task that had been assigned Meade's division, of only
four thousand five hundred men, was too great for it
to accomplish. It is wonderful that it achieved so much
against the masses against which it was thrown, the First

ZAP GENERAL GEORQE GORDON MEADE

Brigade so effectually piercing the enemy's lines that, as
General Meade expressed it in his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, he found himself in
the presence of the enemy's reserves. Coming down be-
yond the railroad, rallying his men, when he had reached a
quiet spot he took off his hat, and in his cool, soldierly
way, merely remarked that it was pretty hot up there,
showing to Franklin two holes from bullets that had barely
cleared his head. He had had a horse wounded under him.
His aide-de-camp. Captain Arthur Dehon, had been killed.
General Conrad Feger Jackson, commander of the Third
Brigade, had also been killed, and Colonel William T. Sin-
clair, commander of the First Brigade, had been wounded.
In a few minutes he had lost nearly forty per cent of his
division. Yet his assault had not been made without serious
loss to the enemy.

The miserable plan of Bumside had borne for the left the
fruit which might have been, and was by some officers ex-
pected. The Confederates in great numbers precipitated
themselves down the slopes and beyond the railroad embank-
ment, in pursuit of the rash division of General Meade and
Gibbon's division seeking to bring it off the field. Gibbon's
division itself being considerably shattered. The remainder
of the First Corps deployed, Bimey's division of the Second 3 -
Corps coming up to aid in stemming the tide of the enemy
while the Pennsylvania Reserves were being withdrawn by
General Meade to the river, there to reorganize and rest.

We are now coming into plainer and plainer sight of a
phenomenon which is common to all events where a man
of no mental poise is in command. Failing through the
weakness of his tentative method, he grows desperate, and
becomes more daring than the boldest of mankind. In a
whirl of emotion, through which pierce the promptings of
insanity, Bumside will soon prove that he has entirely lost

TBS BATTLE OF FBEDERICKSBVBO. 34I

his balance. He had, strictly speaking, no plan. Such
fr^mentary ideas as he had in his mind, jostling each other
in terrible confusion, out of which chaos appeared on the
sur&ce only the desperate desire to do something, the feel-
ing that by doing something he might happen upon some-
thii^ fortunate, could gain no victory over the possessor
of the calm eyes that watched from the heights overlooking
his resolute infantry, sheltered there in front of the devoted
troops to be thrown recklessly against a wall of fire.

Bumside says that he gave the final order for the attack
on the right after the attack on the left had been made.
But telegrams which passed from left to right prove that he
knew, when he ordered the attack on the right, that
although the advance on the left was in progress, the attack
there had not been made, but on the contrary, that the
advance there towards attack had been checked. But, all
the same, in violation of his written order of the day, he
ordered the attack on the r^ht. This was about eleven
o'clock in the morning.

To do justice to this attack, in so far as the gallantry and
persistence of the troops are concerned, would take many
more pages than can be devoted to the description here.
In praise of the exhibition of these qualities on that field,
both right and left, no panegyric can be too strong. In
condemnation of the generalship which made the sacrifice
possible, no denunciation can be too severe. It may be
questioned whether, if the assault had l>een made with
double the number of troops who executed it, it could have
been successful against the defences at the base of Marye's
Hill, consisting of the stone wall reinforced with earth, the
continuation of it in the shelter-trench and corresponding
parapet, the rifle-pits in the side of the hill above, and the
artillery crowning the ridge back of them. And yet the
devoted soldiers of the Army of the Potomac advanced

242 GENERAL QBORQE GORDON MEADR

time and again against the driving metal storm, on an open
plain, at the behest of frightful incapacity for war. It is the
commonest of beliefs that it is only the bad who do harm
in this world. One may well question, however, if some
of the good do not do as much. Against the bad the world
is on its guard, and some of them are in jail, but among the
good there is, through the law of distribution of qualities,
so much stupidity, that large numbers of them are ever
unobstructedly working sincerely towards the perdition of
every cause with which they have to do.

The artillery along Stafford Heights ceased firing.
French's division of the Second Corps, with Hancock's
division of the same corps in support, was the only force at
first detailed for the momentous assault on the right " The
cry is still, — ^they come !" The enemy had them under full
artillery-fire even as they passed in places through the
streets of Fredericksburg, and Longstreet said afterwards
that, when they were on the plain, he could see, at the dis-
tance of a mile, the g^ps made in their ranks by the guns
on the ridge. It was with this force that Bumside was first
to essay to follow the main roads leading out of the town,
running parallel with each other, about three hundred yards
s^rt, until they diverge, one to the right, going to Orange
G>urt House, the other to the left, to form what is known
as the Telegraph Road. It was at this place of diver-
gence that the force also was by orders supposed to sepa-
rate and diverge in opposite directions for the purpose of
capturing the sunmiit on the right, Marye's Hill, and the
summit on the left, Telegraph, or Lee's Hill. Skirmishers
are at the front, and the two divisions are marching to their
doom. They reach the Mill Sluice, the planking over one
of the bridges crossing it gone ; and as if that were the
most natural thing in the world, they teeter in part as best
they can over the stringers of the bridge. Finally, by the

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 243

time they reach within striking distance of the enemy's
works, they have been so decimated as to be unfit to under-
take the task for which they set forth. The order came to
storm the works. The men were being mowed down in
ranks. Howard is ordered up to support Hancock, to
check the paralysis that is seizing the lines. The two
divisions advance only to be shattered and sent in full
retreat after having reached within a hundred yards or less
of the stone wall and shelter-trench. All vivacity of attack
was over for the moment at half-past two o'clock in the
afternoon. First French and Hancock, later Howard, lead-
ing the third and last division of the Second Corps, and
later still Samuel D. Sturgis, of the Ninth Corps, had come
into action unavailingly. It should have shown Bumside
that it was impossible to carry the enemy's lines at that
point, but desperation had now fully seized his soul.
He was verging nearer and nearer to the impotence of
despair.

Getty's division, of the Ninth Corps, came into the fight
Whipple's division, of the Third Corps, merely guarded
Howard's right while he was making his attack, and was
not engaged to any great extent. To a greater extent Col-
onel Samuel S. Carroll's brigade, of Whipple's division,
was engaged, suffering considerable loss. He supported
Sturgis. Griffin's division, of the Fifth Corps, also sup-
ported Sturgis, and met with very heavy loss. Sykes's
division of regulars, although in reserve, lost a good
many men.

The Second Corps and its supports had been pretty well
fought out when Humphreys received his orders at half-
past two o'clock to cross the river and support the assault
Advancing with one of his brigades, and ordering the other
forward from the rear, he was soon at the front. At first
the men began to answer the enemy's fire with fire, but

244 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

Humphreys saw at once that this could never succeed, but
that they must use the bayonet. He therefore at once
charged with the bayonet, with the result that the formation
of his two brigades was broken before they had gone many
yards. Retiring to the rear, they were then reformed for
a renewed and more determined charge. In the first ad-
vance he had observed hundreds of men lying on the
ground under the shelter of a roll in the surface, and was
apprehensive that their presence would impede his move-
ment, but he could hardly have anticipated what occurred.
By what motive inspired, no one can say, but these men
tried to frustrate the attempt of the line to advance, either
by persuasion or main force. In consequence, Humphreys
had much difficulty in passing through and over them, and
the momentum of his charg^e was considerably diminished
by their presence and resistance. As in previous efTorts,
this, too, came to naught General Humphreys had one
horse killed under him and another wounded, and the at-
tempt to take the wall was a complete failure. In fact, the
place was impregnable, held as it was by a line of sheltered
infantry as dense as efTective firing would permit, and rein-
forced by fire from the rifle-pits ranging above and back of
it along the face of the hills. Here ought to have been
made no attack beyond a strong demonstration. Surely
Bumside could not have substantiated his claim that this
was not a real attack, when at 2.2$ p.m. he renewed an
order to Franklin to attack the heights in front of him.
The order was so obscurely worded that Franklin could
not decide if it were intended to instruct him to attack at a
single point or to attack along his whole front.

Here is where the question, long discussed, enters, as to
whether or not Franklin disobeyed orders. Doubt had
arisen as to what were the orders. Was Franklin to do
one thing or the other of two things possible under the

THE BA TTLE OF FREDERICKSB UBO. 245

orders, so as, hit or miss, technically to obey orders ? To
sit in fair judgment upon Franklin's conclusion we must,
first of all, place ourselves in the position of holding wetl
in mind what had preceded during the day, and what were
the conditions existing at the time of the receipt of the
orders. Franklin must have had, from the morning's ex-
perience, the full conviction that Bumside had no grasp of
anything that, by rational coherence of parts, could be
called a plan, his actions and his obscurity of speech having
proved it. In consequence of Bumside's inadequate move
of the morning, the left wing ha^ been more or less seri-
ously engaged. There were decided signs of the intention
of the enemy to make a counter-attack there. Either pos-
sible attack prescribed by Bumside seemed to have no
probability of success against the large force of Jackson, de-
veloped by the preceding assault on the left ; and then, too,
the time remaining of the short day would be small after
all the dispositions were made for any attack. Franklin
knew Bumside ; he knew the situation on the left better
than Bumside did ; he thought, as he subsequently testified,
that Buraside's orders were so framed that they gfave him
some discretionary power. He decided not to attack. So
deciding, he probably saved the left wing from another and
greater repulse than the one which had been previously ex-
perienced. Lee had finally said, " Checkmate."

General Longstreet says, in his work entitled " From
Manassas to Appomattox," in speaking of the carnage that
took place in the right attack (at the sunken road running
along the base of the Heights from the road which is the
extension of Hanover Street in Fredericksburg to the point
where it cuts Telegraph Road before the latter climbs east-
wardly along the Heights to Telegraph, or Lee's Hill) : —
"A series of braver, more desperate charges than those
hurled against the troops in the sunken road was never

246 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

known, and the piles and cross-fMles of dead marked a field
such as I never saw before or since."

"The curtain of night fell sadly over the scene of immense
losses on the Federal side in killed and wounded, as com-
pared with those sufl&red on the Confederate side. Under
cover of that pall the wounded were withdrawn from be-
tween the lines, and the dead as far as possible were buried.
The next day the army stood to arms. Bumside had con-
ceived an heroic plan. This was in person, on the right, to
lead his old corps, the Ninth, to the assault What better
mettle had the Ninth Corps than the First, the Second, and
the others, or he than Humphreys, Hancock, and the rest?
Was this ravening for more slaughter, or was it vainglorious
vaporing ? It was the last despairing cry of temporary in-
sanity. His chief officers gradually brought him to reason,
and on the night of the 1 5th, shrouded by storm and dark-
ness, the army skilfully withdrew across the pontoon-
bridges to the north side of the Rappahannock. So ended-
one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Had Lee, in turn,
attacked, he would have met with an equally signal
repulse, the railroad embankment forming an admirable
parapet, and the artillery of Stafford Heights completely
dominating the range of hills from which he must have
made an offensive movement.

On the 30th of December Bumside received a despatch
from the President forbidding him to make the movement
against Lee by the passage of the Rappahannock below
Fredericksburg, which he had been informed was in pro-
gress, or indeed to make any movement at all unless it
should first receive his approval. The explanation of this
action of the President's Bumside soon leamed to his chagrin
from a visit which he immediately made to Washington.
Generals in the army had taken pains, afler the battle of
Fredericksburg, to convey to the President their disbelief

THE BA TTLE OF FREDERICESB UBQ. 247

in Burnside's ability to command the army. He then laid
out another plan of campaign by way of retrieving his great
failure. This was to cross the Rappahannock above Fred-
ericksburg. The movement, long in preparation, began on
the 19th of January, 1863. How it would have prospered,
had it continued, no one can say, but it was stopped by
heavy rains. These produced such a condition of the roads,
that the wheels of the artillery and of the wagons were often
embedded to the hubs, and soldiers were covered with a
coat of slime. So the movement came to an end amid
laughter and jeers, for the Army of the Potomac never lost
heart, and this passed into history under the name of the
Mud March. Bumside's command had begun with a
tragedy and it ended with a farce.

Much ill-merited sympathy and false sentiment have
been lavished upon Burnside for the manly way in which
he took upon himself the blame for the disaster at Fred-
ericksburg. But who should be' allowed to expiate by
expressions of regret the fault that sacrificed fifteen thous-
and men ? The mantle of charity is broad enough to
cover that among the multitude of sins over which it is
cast, but there is a great gulf between the forgiveness
that may be granted to frailty, and acceptance of the
wrongdoer's deep regrets as full quittance for his deed.
The responsibility for the consequences that ensued from
the appointment of Burnside as commanding-general must
be apportioned between the Administration and Bum-
side. The Administration was to blame for appointing
him, and he for accepting the appointment. He could not
be held blameless for that, unless he had first positively
declined to accept the appointment, and then accepted it
only in obedience to express and positive orders, which, as
a soldier, he would be bound not to disobey. This he did
not do, but weakly yielded after demurring. To him,

248 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

therefore, belongs the greater share of &ult, for whereas
the Administration acted in ignorance of his incompetency,
he knew it well, and ought not to have thought that he
had relieved himself from responsibility by confessing his
unfitness to command.

THE BATILE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLK 249

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The bitterness of the chalice that the North constantly
drained was from time to time mitigated by the welcome
draught of successes in the West and Southwest. From
the first it was not intended, for want of space, to make
special mention of these ; nor is it now, but only occasion-
ally to record, as illustrated here, remarkable events having
bearing on the war, lest the Army of the Potomac should
appear as if occupying a world of its own, having no rela-
tion to the rest.

On the 6th and 7th of April, 1 862, Grant won the battle
of Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, in Tennessee, through
the timely arrival of Buell's army to his assistance. Hal-
leck, however, then taking command of those forces in the
field, made progress so slow towards Corinth, in Mississippi,
moving fifteen miles in six weeks, that the enemy availed
himself of the ample time placed at his disposal to evacuate
the place with all his material, and leave only the husks of
victory behind. Yet Halleck was the general who, from
Washington, subsequently told McCIellan that his men did
not march enough for exercise. Such military critics may
well be likened to the literary ones said to be recruited from
the ranks of unsuccessful authors. His generalship, how-
ever, had not, as we have seen, prevented Halleck from
being called to Washington as general-in-chief of the armies
of the United States.

On the 1st of January, 1863, Mr. Lincoln issued his
Proclamation of Emancipation.

250 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADR

Bumside, upon paying a visit to Washington to demand
the carrying out of very high-handed measures which he
had devised against recalcitrant officers of his army, who
had been disgusted at his conduct of the Fredericksburg
campaigpi, found that the pressure against him was too
strong to be resisted, and accordingly, resigning his com-
mand, was replaced by his most conspicuous opponent.
General Hooker.

A word here in passing is but just to the tone of the
army at that time, because it was the subject then of much
animadversion. It is admitted on all sides that it was far
from that representing the highest morale. The incident
just described is one of the evidences of the fact. But a
moment's reflection ought to show that, to have expected
the army to be other than it was, was to expect the impos-
sible. Whence, in a word, it may be asked, is the morale
of an army derived, or, more properly speaking, in what
does it consist but in the integration in all its parts of
a self-consciousness and general life so blended in every
fibre as to make of it a single unit of being ? But here
there had been no prime generative force at work, equal to
producing the highest morale^ for a representative of the
highest life in military intellect had been absent Wonder-
ful, indeed, in view of this, it is that this army had bravely
toiled on for months in bivouac, in march, in battle. To
feel well commanded, not to be called upon to sacrifice in
vain, gives of itself to the soldier calmness and content.
To have the hope, or better still, faith in victory, grown out
of experience of the past, gives him additionally the buoy-
ancy with which he more willingly supports fresh hardships
and seeks new laurels. In the moral world, neither more
nor less than in the physical, naught can stand without
prop or foundation. But to feel, as every ill-commanded
soldier does in his inmost heart, that all his fortitude and

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLR 2$ I

courage are in vain, dampens his spirits and impairs the
fnarale of both officers and men. To expect of a soldier
under these circumstances the highest emprise of which he
is capable, would be as foolish as to imagine that the virtue
of a saint could be resplendent without the hope of salva-
tion. It is always ample service in the minds of those who
do not strive and suffer and bear the heat and burden of
the day, to "hang hissing at the nobler men below;** but
for those who are filled with a sense of duty that knows no
fulfilment of it save in action, they may perform it well,
though they may, as was said of the army at this time,
" growl,** since, after all, the men had the final limitation of
being human. History can show no army which preserved
its morale better under the most disheartening circum-
stances, and none with a sublimer faith that there must be
a brighter future for it beyond the shadows of the present,
through which it long marched to uninterrupted disaster.

General Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the
Potomac, was a man of considerable ability, but not of
thoroughly well-balanced character. He had long and
deservedly been known as a very daring officer in action,
earning thereby the sobriquet of " Fighting Joe.** The
special love of personal combat is, however, a demerit in a
general commanding a large army, because it is prejudi-
cial to combined movements on a large scale. Beyond the
capacity, therefore, fitted for the command of a corps. Hooker
did not range, and even this capacity was, of course, subject
to the limitation just referred to as affecting large concerted
movements. He bore, too, the reputation which continued
to attach to his subsequent military career, of tendency to
insubordination, a trait which was the parent of the inde-
pendent spirit and way in which he loved to fight. He
came distinctly within the category of men capable in
ordinary affairs and emergencies. He had withal a cer-

252 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

tain geniality of disposition which made him engaging. His
personality, in sum, might be said to be composed chiefly
of an overweening sense of his own ability, great physical
courage, democratic manners, gasconading temperament,
and considerable powers of organization and execution.

How the best of these last attributes can be reconciled with
the extraordinary event about to be recounted, every one
must decide for himself, as in all other things, on evidence.
Both to avoid interrupting the narrative about to be entered
upon, and to account as it proceeds for the irrationality of
the final event alluded to, it is best here to dispose of the
subject of Hooker's condition when the battle of Chancel-
lorsville was fought. At the time of the occurrence many
persons thought that Hooker's failure was attributable to
intoxication. Everything, however, that can be gleaned
from eye-witnesses and from other sources of information
goes to show that this supposition was entirely erroneous.
The very fact of the mental condition of Hooker having
been for several days under the eyes of officers of the high-
est rank, without their imagining him to have been under
the influence of stimulants, goes of itself to show that he
could not be charged with intoxication. All the evidence
obtainable points in the very opposite direction, to the effect
of extreme abstinence adopted suddenly. The explanation
of this is that Hooker had been in the habit of what
abstemious men would call drinking too much, but that,
on the eve of active operations, feeling the great responsi-
bility of his position, he had suddenly adopted the opposite
regimen. That, up to the moment of joining battle, he
was perfectly clear in intellect, is proved by the admirable
plan for it which he devised, and carried into execution, too,
until the ground was reached, when all was changed and
catastrophe entered on the scene. It was only at the
moment of joining battle that he exhibited a sudden and

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0B8VILLE, 2$ 3

Strange inhibition of his mental powers, as if he had been
hypnotized. There is only one way to account for this
physiological fact. This is that, on account of the stress
experienced in his system by the sudden change of habit
adopted, the excitement of immediately impending battle,
unexpectedly forced upon him by the enemy, so over-
wrought his nerves, that he was seized with a species of
panic ; not that which sometimes prompts a private soldier
to run away, but one which is producible in any one when,
in an abnormal neurotic condition, supreme exaltation of
spirits is suddenly met by the perception of an impending
terrible weight of responsibility. Previously in these pages
I have, as I believe, given a rational explanation of the
genesis of panic, as an uncontrollable revulsion of feeling
from a condition of over-confidence. In a man like Hooker,
physically, and in good bodily condition, probably morally
courageous, panic would not assume the form of seeking
to run away from danger, but that of an inhibition of the
play of the intellectual faculty, and abeyance of the express
control of will for determinate and far-reaching ends. We
enter in this case on the joint domain of physiology
and psychology, and in its light we may clearly read that
Hooker was thrown (through surexcitation of his nervous
system, supervening upon abnormal physical conditions
produced by radical change in alcoholic habits, and in face
of the unexpectedness of Lee's advancing from his entrench-
ments to fight, instead of retreating) into a temporary
paralysis of his mental faculties, representing panic, but
with a manifestation of it which, being rare, is at present not
even scientifically recognized.

With the abortive movement, under Bumside, called in
derision the Mud March, which took place on the 20th of
January, 1863, active operations of the Army of the Po-
tomac had come to an end for the winter. The period of

254 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

mental and bodily rest and refreshment that ensued until
the following spring had been well earned, and had had the
effect of completely restoring the morale of the army and
making it eager for action long before the season became iH
for operations. During the winter it was largely recruited,
cadres filled up, military exercises practised, and everything
done to perfect its organization in men and material. The
old form of Grand Divisions was discontinued by Hooker,
and the corps remained as they had been constituted and
entitled previously to their combination. They were the
First Corps, under General Reynolds, the Second Corpus,
under General Couch, the Third Corps, under General
Sickles, the Fifth Corps, under General Meade, the Sixth
Corps, under General Sedgwick, the Eleventh Corps, under
General Howard, and the Twelfth Corps, under General
Slocum, — seven corps in all, — ^numbering one hundred and
twenty thousand men. The army of Lee was numerically
far inferior to the Army of the Potomac, numbering, accord-
ing to official returns at the time of the battle of Chancel-
lorsville, only about fifty-five thousand men. The cause of
this diminution in its numbers was that Longstreet, with two
divisions, had been detached from the army, and was engaged
in military operations and collection of supplies near Suffolk,
south of the James River. Lee's army was posted south
of the Rappahannock and its main branch, the Rapidan,
from Port Royal, on the east, to United States' Ford on the
west, opposite to the Federal army on the north bank of the.
Rappahannock. There was in the Army of the Potomac
during the whole winter only one trifling movement in Feb-
ruary; Stoneman's cavalry, supported on the 25th by a
division of the Second Corps, being concerned in one near
Berea Church.

Here it becomes, as usual, necessary, in beginning the
description of a new series of operations, to give a brief

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS VILLE. 255

topographical sketch of the lay of the land in which they
were conducted. To do this without a large-scale map, and
so that they may be at the same time clearly present to the
imagination, it becomes necessary to generalize details.
For example, inasmuch as both the Rappahannock and the
Rapidan have bends, we must simplify the idea of their
courses by regarding them, either as forming straight lines,
or as determined with reference to straight lines. From
Fredericksburg as a centre, therefore, it may be said that,
barring its sinuosities, the Rappahannock runs east for about
eighteen miles to Port Royal, on its south bank, except
where a great northward bend in it, a little west of Port
Royal, is made by Skinker's Neck. Starting again from
the same centre, it runs, always excepting its bends, west
for about ten miles, from Fredericksburg to where the
Rapidan puts off from it, thence running about six miles
northwest, to Kelly's Ford, the Rapidan running west
to Ely's and Germanna Fords. The termini on the west
of the approaching operations were at these three fords,
and the terminus on the east, at Port Conway, opposite Port
Royal. Going up the Rappahannock and Rapidan the dis-
tances of the important fords, measured in straight lines
from Fredericksburg are, in round numbers, Banks's Ford,
five miles ; United States' Ford, seven miles above that ;
Ely's Ford, nine miles above that ; and Germanna Ford,
six miles above Ely's, the two latter on the Rapidan.

The opening of the new campaign began on April i6th
with a cavalry combat between General William W. Averell
and the enemy at Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock,
0|^site Ely's Ford, to the south, on the Rapidan. The
movement that led to this was a reconnoissance to ascertain
how the fords there were guarded. The main body of
cavalry, under Stoneman, was finally sent across the fords
higher up, near Warrenton, and then to make a wide circuit

256 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

thence between the enemy and Richmond, destroying his
communications and supplies.

The plan which Hooker had formed was admirable.
The ill success that attended the operations was not on
account of the imperfection of the plan, but because it was
not carried out. It was &ulty only in one point, the send-
ing of Stoneman's fine body of cavalry off on a raid. This
was based upon the pure assumption that Lee would retreat
instead of fight, and by sending off nearly all his cavalry
Hooker divested himself of one of the important agencies
to bring about Lee's retreat, or to harass it if it were once
begun. Otherwise the plan was unexceptionable, and even
with the drawback of Stoneman's absence, it would have
succeeded if it had been executed. The experience of Lee
on the Lower Rappahannock, in resisting the repeated
efforts of the Federals to capture and hold that line near
Fredericksburg, had led him to make it impregnable to
direct attack from Port Royal to United States' Ford.
Below Port Royal, where his right rested on the Rappa-
hannock, the river was too wide to render practicable the
crossing of the Army of the Potomac in face of a force resist-
ing ; and beyond United States* Ford, where his left rested,
he held a cavalry force and videttes at the fords. Never-
theless, by a very skilful movement. Hooker succeeded in
making a lodgment on Lee's left flank, and had the tactical
skill exhibited been equal to the strategical, the movement
would have been crowned with complete success. Never
before, except at Antietam, was the Army of Northern
Virginia placed in such a strait, never was it afterwards
until its surrender. Yet this rare chance of the war to inflict
upon it at the height of its power a crushing defeat was
lost forever.

Hooker had more than twice as many troops as Lee had,
and Lee's army was not concentrated. So Hooker could

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLR 2^7

afTord to operate on exterior lines. The idea of the ground
concerned in Hooker's advance might be still further
simplified by saying that, if one should hold horizontally
where Hooker's army lay, the butt of a pole towards the
east, supporting on the other end, towards the west, two
broadly branching tines, he would present a rude represen-
tation of the ground as divided north and south by the
Rappahannock and the Rapidan. The position of Port
Conway and Port Royal would be represented by the butt
of the pole, Fredericksburg by a point two-thirds from the
butt to the junction of the tines, Banks's Ford by a point a
little beyond that town. United States' Ford by a point just
short of the junction of the tines, the northwest one of which
would be the Rappahannock, on which is Kelly's Ford,
and the west one the Rapidan, on which are Ely's and Ger-
manna Fords. There are other fords, but the ones men-
tioned are the most prominent in the pending operations.

It should now be apparent that, in the position of Hooker's
army, he would be obliged, in order to turn Lee's left flank,
to cross both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and
march along the south bank of the Rapidan until the same
shore developed into the south bank of the Rappahannock.
He could not cross directly over United States' Ford, for
there Lee's left rested. But if he could turn the position
in the manner described, he would then eventually uncover
United States' Ford, and any body of troops remaining on the
north bank of the Rappahannock could join forces with him
by that ford. Further, if he could continue to advance to-
wards the east, and reach a point three and a half miles in the
rear of Fredericksburg, he would uncover Banks's Ford, and
troops could reach him by that ford from the north bank of
the Rappahannock, or, if his left wing could capture Freder-
icksburg, it could reach him directly from that place. The

success of the plan primarily hung upon making a success-

258 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

ful lodgment on Lee*s left with a force sufficient to advance
to the rear of Fredericksburg against any resistance that
Lee could offer. That achieved, Hooker's last reinforce-
ments could reach him by Banks's Ford, or from Fredericks-
burg, and he would have more than double Lee*s force on
the flank of his communications with Richmond and across
the line of his communications with Orange Court House.

There is no reason to doubt that the advance and lodg-
ment of Hooker on Lee's left flank was wholly unexpected
by Lee. Lee's army was entrenched, and the circuit by
which Hooker could reach his left flank was long and diffi-
cult, over the two rivers, the Rappahannock and Rapidan.
Nevertheless, Hooker's strategy succeeded. On the 21st
of April Doubleday's division, of the First Corps, made a
feint of crossing the Rappahannock at Port Conway, oppo-
site to Port Royal. On the 27tli of April the Fifth, Elev-
enth, and Twelfth Corps marched to Kelly's Ford, on the
Rappahannock, twenty-seven miles off to the right, and
passing over that stream, during the night and the next
morning, the Eleventh and Twelfth finally crossed the
Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and the Fifth at Ely's Ford,
thus placing General Meade in the advance along the south
banks of the Rapidan and Rappahannock. In due time,
after this movement had begun, the First, Third, and Sixth
Corps, and Gibbon's division of the Second Corps, marched,
and before daylight of the 29th four pontoon bridges were
thrown across the Rappahannock a few miles below Fred-
ericksburg, and just after daylight, one opposite Fredericks-
burg. This force, constituting the left wing, was under the
command of Sedgwick. Hooker in person, with the two
remaining divisions of the Second Corps, crossed the Rappa-
hannock at United States' Ford, as soon as the turning oper-
ation on the right of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps
was completed. This was on the 30th, and the plan had so

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLK 259

fiu* succeeded perfectly. Sedgwick was in front of and
threatening the Heights back of Fredericksburg, and the
First, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, with the two divisions
of the Second, had been massed near Chancellorsville.
Moreover, Sedgwick had been informed of the lodgment
on the right, and had detached the Third Corps, which, on
the morning of the ist of May, crossed the Rappahannock
at United States Ford and joined Hooker, making his force
now four corps and two divisions, while Sedgwick still
threatened Fredericksburg with two corps and one division.
Lee was between the upper and the nether millstones.
What was needed now was but a Blucher to say " For-
warts^ But Hooker did not say it. The paresis which
was to assail him in deadlier and deadlier form made him
hesitate. From having been so highly elated at the success
of the first steps of his plan as to be able to write, in a
preliminary order, " The enemy must either ignominiously
fly, or come out from his defences and give us battle on our
own ground, where certain destruction awaits him," his
arrogance had departed, and he awaited instead of seeking
the arbitrament of battle. What a fall was that in spirit,
represented by his declaration that Lee*s army was now
"the legitimate possession of the Army of the Potomac,"
contrasted with the reluctance with which within a few hours
he marched towards Fredericksburg. His temporary and
immoderate exaltation of spirits is to be noted in connec-
tion with their sudden collapse, in the light of the theory
which has been presented as to the liability to revulsion of
feeling in feeble natures, or in strong ones in abnormal con-
ditions, under such circumstances. Evenly poised character
is not susceptible to such influence, it is incapable of the most
transient megalomania ; but from nature or temporary dis-
ease, or both, the character may not be, or may cease to be,
well poised, and so conditioned it is liable to opposite states

26o OENEBAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

of extreme exaltation and depression. In the fundamental
characteristic of Hooker's mind, vain-gloriousness, stimulated
by nervous disorder superinduced by sudden change of habits,
lay the match that was to explode his justly high anticipations
of success. How different the exaltation of a man like Gen-
eral Meade. Although of imagination "all compact," with
him it was imagination in leash, trained to do the bidding of
its master, he not its slave ; bom in him, schooled in life,
speaking in restrained terms its highest hopes and sternest
resolves, because they were bounded by the determination
to do his duty, from which nothing could make him blench.
He greeted Slocum as he met him upon his arrival from
Germanna Ford with the words, " This is splendid, Slocum ;
hurrah for old Joe ; we are on Lee's flank and he does not
know it. You take the plank road towards Fredericksburg
and ril take the pike, or vice versa, as you may prefer, and
we will get out of this wilderness." But his anticipations
were at once dampened by the reply of Slocum, who said,
" My orders are to assume command on arriving at this
point, and to take up a line of battle here, and not to move
further forward without orders." Hooker's heart had begun
to fail him, therefore, just as he had reached the field. This
was the first sig^ of what soon assumed an acute form of
imbecility.

Chancellorsville consisted of a single house and grounds.
Three main roads lead from it towards the east, Fredericks-
burg ; — the Plank, Old Turnpike, and Shore Roads. About
midway between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg the
Plank and Old Turnpike Roads, afler having run parallel
with each other for some four miles, unite near Tabernacle
and Zoar Churches, making a single main road thence to
Fredericksburg. Lx>oking towards Fredericksburg from
the point of Chancellorsville, where all three roads unite,
the Plank Road is towards the right, the Old Turn-

THE BATTLE OF CHANCBLL0R8VILLR 261

pike in the centre, and the Shore Road towards the left.
All intersecting at Chancelloisville, theie is westward thence
for two miles only a single main track, at which distance
the Flank Road and the Old Turnpike are resumed, and
diverging for a short distance again, continue to pursue
a westerly course in a some^diat parallel direction. The
whole system, excepting for some distance back of Fred-
ericksburg, passes through the tract known as the Wilder-
ness. Departing from these main roads, subsidiary ones
pass northward, by which Scott's Dam, near and below
United States' Ford, and Ely's and Germanna Fords are
reached, and, of course, many of these same cross-roads
pass beyond the east- and west-main tracks towards the
south, and intermediate roads in various directions form a
network of connections over the country. The country is
diversified by various creeks running into the Rappahannock
and Rapidan, among which, further west, is Mine Run, a
southern branch of the Rapidan, celebrated in a future cam-
paign conducted by General Meade.

Spurred on, no doubt, by the manifest expectations of
the officers around him, Hooker at last advanced towards
Fredericksburg. Slocum, on the right, marched along the
Plank Road, Sykes's division, of the Fifth Corps, supported
by Hancock's division, of the Second Corps, marched in the
centre along the Old Turnpike, while Meade, with the two
divisions of his corps, Humphreys' and Griffin's, marched
along the River Road. Sickles, with the Third Corps, now
across United States Ford, was closing up in the rear.
The troops, soon opposed by the enemy, drove him at first,
and reached a position about three miles in advance, and
about six miles from Fredericksburg, on the ridge that
runs there at right-angles to the trend of the roads which
they had been pursuing. Jt was on open ground, where
the artillery could have free play, a position such that the

262 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADE

army could not have expected better. Banks's Ford had
been uncovered by General Meade's advance, and by this,
if Sedgwick could not capture Fredericksburg, he could
easily rejoin the main army by the route of the bridges
below. But to the astonishment of all in the advance,
orders came from the commanding-general to retire to the
first position occupied, the lines which the army had left,
the thickets of the Wilderness. Deprecatory messages
were sent to the rear, and a slight modification of orders
was received, but of no moment, for the retrograde move-
ment had begun, and the enemy had already taken advan-
tage of the falling back of Slocum to try to interpose
between the right and centre of the lines. The King of
France had marched up the hill and was now marching
down again. " My God," General Meade is authentically
said to have cried, when he found himself among a group
of general officers on the lower ground for which the com-
manding position they had occupied had been relinquished,
" if we can't hold the top of a hill, we certainly can't hold
the bottom of it."

The army retired to the first lines which had been occu-
pied by the orders of Hooker, the enemy pressing all the
time on its rear. Hooker had now, so he said, got the
enemy where he wanted him. If so, why had he advanced ?
The enemy was equally satisfied, but with more reason. He
occupied a commanding position, from which he had direct
and enfilading fire on the lower ground occupied by the
Army of the Potomac, which, by its retirement, had sacri-
ficed its superiority in artillery. Banks's Ford had been sur-
rendered, and Sedgwick could not now join the main army,
save by a long detour, or else by running the risk of being
intercepted by Lee, if marching directly for junction with
Hooker. The army was worse off than if it had had no
head. Lee had left Early, with some nine thousand men.

THE BATTLE OF CHAN0ELL0B8VILLE. 26^

to defend the Heights of Fredericksburg, while he was
throwing the rest of his force upon Hooker. It had at first
been Hooker's theory that Lee would not fight, but would
incontinently retreat. In that he had offended against the
practice of the wisest generals, who consider in advance all
the contingencies which they can summon up to mind, so
that they may be able best to meet any exigency that may
arise. When he found Lee's columns charging him a
outrance, the rapidly approaching crisis of his disorder
seized him in the form of dismay, to which his speech and
inconsequent actions and his looks bore ample testimony.
He was neutralized. In seeking shelter in the Wilderness
he had acted with the simple, primitive, animal impulse of
the hunted creature to seek safety by recoil and conceal-
ment from danger and attack.

The army fell back and took up the general position rep-
resented by its centre being in advance of Chancellorsville,
whence its departing lines covered the single two-mile-long
track uniting the eastern and western points of divergence
of the Plank and Old Turnpike roads, and those points
themselves, the left wing being sharply deflected to the
Rappahannock at Scott's Dam. More precisely, the morn-
ing of the 2d of May found the lines of the army adjusted
as follows : The Fifth Corps had its left on Scott's Dam,
and its front west of Mineral Spring Run, covering United
States' Ford. On the right of that came French's division
of the Second Corps, with its right extending towards the,
Plank Road. Some distance in advance of that division
was the other present division of the Second Corps, with its
right beyond the Plank Road. As viewed from the east,
one division of the Second Corps partially masked the
other. From the advanced division of the Second Corps
the lines suddenly took a westerly, from their previously
southerly direction. At the point of divergence there the

264 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADK

left of the Twelfth Corps touched Hancock's right, and its
line swept out to the south far beyond the Plank Road, en-
closing the so-called Chancellorsville plateau and beyond,
continued in its sweep by the Third Corps, whose line fell
backward towards the Plank Road, nearing which it was
joined by the left of the Eleventh Corps, which enclosed,
on the south, the east and west trend of the Plank Road,
ending finally in a weak crotchet The line consisted to-
wards the east of a number of weak angles, the right of
Hancock's position being the apex of a salient. The First
Corps was on the march from Sedgwick to cross the Rap-
pahannock at United States' Ford, leaving Sedgwick still
oiie corps, the Sixth, and one division of the Second Corps.
Hooker was now in a purely defensive attitude, if such a
passive condition be compatible with defence. To await
just what an enemy may choose to do never can be effect-
ively defensive. If Hooker had no plans, Lee was fertile in
them, and he was now about to carry out one which he never
would have attempted in the face of an adversary who was
skilful and audacious. Even at this late day the plan is often
ascribed to Jackson, although Lee himself has given the
most positive testimony that it was his. Jackson, however,
was the man, and possibly the only man, who could have
carried it out successfully, and without him Lee probably
would not have attempted it. Hooker's cavalry was away.
It had not been able until the 29th of April to get across
the upper fords of the Rappahannock. It was now engaged
in a raid in Lee's rear, which was to effect nothing of impor-
tance, and which, even if it could have accomplished more,
could have done nothing commensurate with what it could
have contributed under the most ordinary circumstances by
its presence with the army, to say nothing of what it could
have effected now, under the extraordinary circumstances
that its presence could have controlled. Jackson, under

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE 26$

Lee's orders, had taken a circuitous route, masked by
cavalry, towards the right flank of the Army of the Potomac,
and although attacked in the right rear-flank by Sickles with
a portion of his force, still held on with his design in &ce
of an enemy apparently bent on believing that he was wit-
nessing a retreat.

There is an aura of battle as there is of epilepsy. Amidst
the sound of axes felling forest trees, of metal clashing and
sight of rising parapets, amidst the indescribable hum of
thousands of muffled voices dominated by words of com-
mand, there is no time for any experience but the thought
of preparation for battle. But when the men rest from their
labors and stand to arms, as did those engulfed in this leafy
wilderness, ready for action, and hours pass, and nothing
such as they expect ensues, a strange, weird sensation takes
possession of them, such as in mediaeval times must have
been felt by the inhabitants of those lonely tracts in which
were-wolves were supposed to course and witches to be
abroad by night. The mixed feeling with which deadly com-
bat is awaited, sensation neither of pleasure nor of pain, but
strangely blended, must revert for its explanation to the
ever-present, but not always imminent, unsolved mystery
of life and death, to which the mind on such occasions
reaches forth for solution, craving only that the tension
shall be soon relieved by action. Not until that comes does
any one feel the joy of battle. So these men now waited
with tense expectancy of something, of the mysterious un-
known. And yet there were very many there who knew
that the right flank of the Army of the Potomac was in the
air, that Lee's favorite blow was by a long and rapid march
to the enemy's rear, and that Jackson's was the arm which
had never failed him yet.

Striking the Brock Road at last, which crosses both the
Plank Road and the Old Turnpike, Jackson turned slowly

266 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

to the right along the Old Turnpike. A. P. Hill's division
moved at first in line of battle along the ground north of
the Old Turnpike, marching east in support of the deployed
divisions of Rodes and Colston, in the order mentioned,
but afterwards in column along the Old Turnpike Road.
Jackson at length reached a position from which he securely
reconnoitered the ground occupied by the Eleventh Corps,
as in the German folk-lore the ritter-giants sometimes
looked down from their strongholds on the land tilled by
the frugal husbandmen ploughing for their benefit below.
Then he directed the leading divisions still further to the
rear, until he could see the left flank of Hooker's army in
reverse. Suddenly he burst with fury into the astonished
camp. As by a whirlwind the whole right flank was
doubled up. Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck, with his brigade
of the Eleventh Corps, which had formed the crotchet on
the right, vainly attempting to hold his ground. Artillery,
horses, soldiers, the right of the Eleventh Corps, struck on
end, were put to precipitate flight. Let not the flattering
unction which has so frequently been taken to the soul
about this aflair be still considered saving. Less than one-
half of the Eleventh Corps was German, but all were dis-
lodged, and some were in rout. Any men so fallen upon
in flank would have been at irretrievable disadvantage.
Being routed was not the fault of the men, but of the gener-
alship which permitted them to be there without cavalry on
that wing, or in default of cavalry, without suflicient pickets
and grand-guards thrown out to the intersection of the
Brock Road with the Old Turnpike. Until the Franco-
Prussian War the " Dutchman " represented one of the dis-
tinctively comic elements of American life. It was amusing
to observe how even the words in which English, not Ger-
man, had made change, were charged up against him as if
he were guilty in mispronouncing English. Even if, as

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLK 267

reported, some of the Germans cried, as they rushed to the
rear, **Alles ist verlaren ; wo ist der ponton ?*' they were not
the only ones who weaponless and hatless tore through the
steady ranks to the left.

Those ranks to the left were not in the least bit shaken.
The moment that the sound and sights of Jackson's attack
manifested themselves, Lee had pushed an assault as hard
as possible on the right-centre. He had been awaiting with
only two divisions on that front. All the time, until between
five and six in the afternoon, the period before which Jackson
could not make his flank attack, Hooker had been facing
only these two divisions on his front. Lee had meanwhile
been making feints here and there along the lines to dis-
tract Hooker's attention from his real design. It is almost
needless to say that the event would have been very differ-
ent had Hooker attacked then instead of remaining entirely
on the defensive. Now, in the midst of the turmoil caused
by Jackson's successful onslaught on Hooker's right, Lee
fiercely launched into a diversion in its favor. Hancock's lines,
forming a salient, first received the brunt of his efforts in
that direction, but he, bravely supported by Colonel Nelson
A. Miles, and the troops to the right and left of him, foiled
the enemy. Part of the divisions of Williams and Geary,
of the Twelfth Corps, which had been advanced to the sup-
port of the Third Corps, were resuming their places in line
during the progress of the catastrophe which had begun on
the right. Bimey's and Whipple's divisions, of the Third
Corps, were absent from their lines, engaged in harassing the
right rear of Jackson's column, which had been believed to
be in retreat. Berry's division, of the Third Corps, which
had been in reserve at Chancellorsville, was ordered to the
right by Hooker to try to stem the Confederate tide running
from the direction of Jackson. Sykes's division, of the
Fifth Corps, Hays's brigade, of the Second Corps, artillery

268 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

posted by Generals Meade, Warren, Captain Best, chief of
artillery of the Twelfth Corps, Captain Osbom, chief of
Berry's artillery, and halted fragments of the Eleventh
Corps, formed a line of battle facing west. Sickles's ad-
vance, consisting of Bimey's and Whipple's divisions of the
Third Corps, and his reinforcements of Barlow's brigade of
the Eleventh Corps, and Williamson's brigade of the Twelfth
Corps, and Pleasanton's cavalry, now cut off from the main
army, attacked Jackson's advance on its right flank. These
troops of Sickles's were now completely isolated, as will be
seen they must have been, if one considers that they had
been harassing the right rear-flank of Jackson's force march-
ing towards the right, and that Jackson had passed around
the right flank of the Federal army and driven it towards
its left flank. Pleasanton directed the artillery, and Sickles
the infantry, in working effectively towards checking the
advance of Jackson by attacking his exposed right flank
marching now in an exactly retrograde course. General
Meade, who has been already casually mentioned in con-
nection with the measures taken to repulse the enemy, had
not, as may well be imagined, remained an idle auditor of
the sounds on the right. Realizing what had occurred, he
had summoned his staff*, mounted his horse, and taking
Sykes's division of the Fifth Corps, then facing to the east,
and marching westward, he threw it, facing west, on the ridge
commanding the junction of the Ely's Ford Road with the
road between Chancellorsville and Ely's Ford which leads
to United States' Ford. Here he formed line of battle,
heading off* stragglers from the Eleventh Corps, and order-
ing Captain Weed, his chief of artillery, afterwards General
Weed, killed at Gettysburg, to mount on it some fifty or
sixty pieces of artillery, which, being effected, there was
presented along that portion of the lines an obstacle in-
superable to the enemy's advance.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLK 269

During the night the First Corps, under Reynolds, ar-
rived from Sedgwick, and formed on Meade's right behind
Big Hunting Run. The details of the new dispositions would
be too voluminous for introduction here. It must suffice to
say that the attack on the right wing reaped all the more
success because troops from the Twelfth Corps had been
advanced to support Sickles, and that the gap which had
necessarily been thereby left in the general lines was reached
by Jackson's troops before those which had advanced to
Stckles's support could fairly resume their positions, and
that, in sum, the right centre having been patched in a frag-
mentary way, the right wing, now sharply refused to the
right, towards the Rapidan (for the lines now embraced
the confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan),
was occupied by the Twelfth Corps, Berry's division of the
Third, Sykes's division of the Fifth Corps, later in the
night, by the First Corps, and additionally during the
night by troops from the left. In the night and on the
morning of the following day the remainder of the Fifth
Corps came over from the left to the right. Sickles having
established communication between his outlying and the in-
lying lines of the army, was authorized by Hooker to make
a night attack on the enemy, in which he was supported by
Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps and Berry's of the
Third. Aided by moonlight, the attack, finely executed,
regained possession of the eastern portion of the breast-
works that had been occupied by the Eleventh Corps, and
necessarily of the Plank Road in that quarter.

The shades of evening were coming on apace when Jack-
son had gone beyond his lines peering into the darkness to
ascertain how his advance could be best continued, when,
as he was returning, he and his staff were mistaken for
Federal troops, and received a volley by which he was mor-
tally wounded. Borne to the rear, the command finally

lyo GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

devolved on Stuart, instead of upon A. P. Hill, on ac-
count of Hill's being wounded in Sickles's night-attack, and
of Stuart's having more intimate knowledge than he of the
country, through his preliminary reconnoissances of it and
movement concerted with Jackson. Jackson was an irrep-
arable loss to the Confederate army. He is one, whether
as a man or general, entitled to respect, on account of his
genius and daring, and in despite of the narrowness of his
views as a fanatic.

The next morning, Sunday, the 3d of May, was the
greatest day of battle. The lines of the army were now
markedly different from those held at first, the distribu-
tion of the corps even more so. The left flank consisted
of the Eleventh Corps, resting its left at Scott's Dam, on
the Rappahannock, and enclosing United States* Ford. To
the right of it, in extension of the southward general line,
was Hancock's division of the Second Corps, &ced, as at
first, east across the angle between the Shore and Old
Turnpike and Plank Roads. French's division, at first
partially to the rear of Hancock's division had been sent
to the right. On the right flank of Hancock, the point
of junction -of the left wing with the narrow front, Geary's
division of the Twelfth Corps covered the Plank Road,
making with Williams's division of the same corps, to its
right, an acute angle just at the front. Beyond these lines
was the Third Corps, partly facing west, and partly towards
the front, occupying there a summit called Hazel Grove.
French's division of the Second Corps faced west across
the Plank Road. Beyond that point were in succession the
Fifth and the First Corps, covering the Road to Ely's Ford
towards the northwest, and its junction with the road to
United States' Ford, towards the northeast.

Hooker was incapable of fighting a g^reat battle, whatever
the numbers and dispositions of troops might have been.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 2/1

His mind was open only to the halting and half measures
to which irresolution is always given. The day opened
ominously by his relinquishing the summit of Hazel Grove,
a bare top capable of a strong defence, and tactically an
important position. When evacuaced it was at once oc-
cupied by the enemy, and crowned with artillery that was
destined to carry havoc into the Federal ranks. Lee in
person was in command of the Confederate troops on his
right, Stuart on his left. The battle again opened at day-
break. Stuart, advancing from the left, engaged Berry's
division of the Third Corps and French's division of the
Second Corps. He charged repeatedly with untiring ardor,
bringing up towards the accomplishment of his purpose his
very last reserves, while to the Federal side came no succor
beyond that of a single brigade from the Fifth Corps to the
support of French. Hooker had no command of the field.
A part of the army was, as usual, fighting it out without a
supreme head.

If the reader has received from the description of the
positions of the Federal army a clear idea of the field, he
must perceive that, by only a slight shift to the right, Stuart
could strike at the same time the left of the Third Corps
and the right of the Twelfth. As he was working with the
purpose of joining hands with Lee, that happened at the
point of time when he had been brought to a stand on his
left. Further around the Twelfth Corps, on its front and
on its left, where Hancock at right angles to it on its left-
rear looked eastward, the enemy had been making vigorous
demonstrations to prevent the reinforcement of the line
engaged on the right with Stuart, but for hours without
coming to close quarters. Miles, under the immediate eye
of Couch and Hancock, vigorously defended the rifle-pits
along their front.

Between nine and ten o'clock the enemy, who had thus

272 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

felt the Federal lines all around the front, and thus measured
his strength with what was opposed, or likely to be opposed
to his force, gathered himself together for a final assault
His artillery perfectly commanded the position, and with it
he opened an unceasing direct and enfilading fire that
swept the plateau of Chancellorsville. In vain Hooker
was s^pealed to for reinforcements, in vain was even am-
munition applied for; nothing moved At last he was
disabled by a blow from a pillar of the Chancellor House,
against which he was leaning when it was struck by a can-
non-ball, and upon his recovery from the insensibility that
ensued for half an hour, he soon turned over the conmiand
to General Couch, with instructions to retire to a previously
determined upon position. This lay about a mile back of
the front then occupied by the army, its right flank resting
on the Rapidan, protected by Big Hunting Run, and its left
flank, as before, enclosing Beaver Dam and United States'
Ford.

This occurrence of the battle, immediately following the
accident to Hooker at the Chancellor House, seemed for
a while to bring home to him, now that some physical dis-
ability had been added to his previous mental incapacity,
that he was unfit, for the time at least, to command the
army. Major (now Colonel) James C. Biddle, of General
Meade's staff", writes me as follows : " Soon after Hooker
was stunned, he came over to the place where General
Meade was, on the new front which he had established the
evening before on the occasion of Jackson's advance, and
ordering a tent pitched there, had a conference with General
Meade. In my presence General Meade urged that he be
allowed to attack, saying that his troops were in fine con-
dition and spirits, and that he had reason to think that he
would meet with success. General Meade said this more
than once, but General Hooker positively refused to accede

THE BATTLE OF CHANCEL LOBS VILLR 273

to his proposition, insisting that he should remain on the
defensive where he was, at the junction of the Ely's Ford
and the United States' Ford roads. While this colloquy
was proceeding, General Couch, coming to see General
Hooker, entered the tent, and shortly afterwards issued
therefrom, directing Hooker's staff to report to him, as the
command of the army had been turned over to him by the
commanding-general. Thereupon the staff hastily entered
the tent, with the result that General Hooker almost imme-
diately appeared and informed General Couch that he was
laboring under a misapprehension, that he had not meant to
commit the command of the army to him, but had merely
meant him to consult General Meade, and to do what to
General Meade seemed most advisable. Thereupon Couch
rode away, evidently disgusted."

Soon after Hooker gave the order to retire, the most ter-
rible part of the day ensued. The enemy fell recklessly
on the narrow front before him, many of the troops on
which had been for some time without ammunition. The
Confederates, now joined as to their right and left wings,
swept resistlessly forward. The Federal centre and right-
centre were dislodged and the troops borne back, but not
in rout. The last left of the field was the rearguard of
Hancock's division, back to back, looking east and west,
and parts of other commands. A battery of the First
Corps, two batteries of the Fourth United States Artillery,
General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, and other
organized bodies, also held on to the advanced ground
as long as possible, in order to give the forces in re-
treat time to retire without confusion to the new lines.
The two corps constituting the right wing, the First and
Fifth Corps, had not come into action at all, either as
organizations or in the form of reinforcements for the

front by detachments, having been withheld from assist-

274 GENERAL QEOBOE OORDON MEADE

ing their comrades either by men or ammunition, with
the sole exception of one brigade from the Fifth Corps,
already mentioned. This was Hooker's battle of Chancel-
lorsville. How those true men, good soldiers, Meade and
Reynolds, must have chafed during the weary hours when
they were held in bondage by their incompetent chief, all
who knew them must have been well aware. How galling
it must have been to them at last to be called upon to beat
a retreat with over thirty thousand men who had not fired
a shot !

Lee did not press the retiring forces as vigorously as he
might have done, for something suddenly supervened. He
learned that Sedgwick had captured the Heights back of
Fredericksburg and was marching towards the battle-field.
We must therefore revert to the movements of what had
been Hooker's left wing, now reduced by the withdrawal
of the First Corps to only one corps and one division. It
was near the middle of the night preceding the battle which
has just been described, the night of the 2d of May, that
Sedgwick received orders to storm the Heights of Freder-
icksburg and join Hooker by the way of the south bank of
the Rappahannock. A most dangerous operation, it will
be seen, had been committed to him. The Heights were
those from which Bumside had been bloodily repulsed, and
the march which he was instructed to make was directly
towards Lee's army. Early the next morning, Sunday, the
• 3d of May, Sedgwick set his command in motion. Left and
right and front in succession, after occupying Fredericks-
burg, he tried to attack to advantage the enemy's position
on the Heights. Finally a line of battle and two columns,
profiting by the experience of the battle of Fredericksburg,
were formed back of the town, and charged without firing,
capturing the enemy's stone wall and rifle-pits at the base
of Marye's Hill, the storming column taking the crest be-

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLK 275

yond. Simultaneously, a division on the left captured the
crest further to the south, and the enemy was sent in full
retreat, with the loss of numerous prisoners and guns.
Sedgwick then set out on the march towards Chancellors-
ville, distant from the Heights nine miles.

If Sedgwick could reach Hooker at this juncture, the
Army of the Potomac in full force would be on Lee's line
of communication with Grordonsville, and on the flank of
his line of communication with Richmond ; that is on, or
on the flank of, his only lines of communication. Counting
with reason on the supineness of Hooker, Lee, however,
had held his hand in the midst of the furious battle which
he was delivering against the nearest portions of Hooker's
forces, fought as an army totally without ensemble^ and de-
tached several brigades to join Early, which, with the con-
siderable force Early already had, and a Confederate brigade
which had been holding Banks's Ford, he judged sufficient
either to check or to crush Sedgwick's command. The
two grand detachments met at Salem Heights about four
o'clock in the afternoon, between Fredericksburg and Chan-
cellorsville. After a partial success, Sedgwick was pushed
back. He was now in a critical situation, with a large force
between him and Hooker's army, while Banks's Ford, on
his right, might, in case of disaster, be successfully occupied
and held by the enemy ; and in an attempt in that case to
retrace his march, his force might equally be compromised.
The narrative must leave him where he is holding the
ground at sunset, and return to the main army at Chancel-
lorsville.

The 4th of May was a Sabbath with General Hooker, he
had done all the fighting he apparently intended to do on
Sunday, the 3d. There was only a skirmish on the front
of the Twelfth Corps, in which General Whipple, of the
Third Corps, was killed. By retreating, Hooker had gfiven

2/6 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

up the roads by which Sedgwick could reach him by the
south bank of the Rappahannock. The api)eal of the guns
of Sedgwick, now unable to cope with additional forces,
under McLaws and Anderson, sent against him by Lee,
had no power to move the dazed general. He was no bet-
ter and no worse than he had been before he had been
knocked down by the concussion at the Chancellor House.
His malady had preceded that event. Sedgwick was in a des-
perate situation, confronted by superior forces and Early in
his rear on the recaptured heights of Fredericksburg. No
help came from Hooker, and the day of the 4th came to an
end, with only a skirmish in front of his lines, amid the sound
of Sedgwick's guns plainly audible, Hooker himself lying
safely within his new lines. He had ordered Sedgwick to
join him by the south bank of the Rappahannock, yet he
had relinquished to the enemy the only roads by which this
order could be obeyed if Lee opposed the march and he
did not aid it, and, as the sequel will show, he did not aid
it Judgfing the case simply on moral, as distinguished from
purely military grounds, and taking the circumstances as
what they became, wholly unmodified by Hooker, it may
truly be said that he left Sedgwick to his fate. But, can it
be thought that Hooker was then amenable to moral laws ?
Probably not, for the Hooker who nominally fought the
battle of Chancellorsville was not the Hooker of old,
but, by some strange fatality, another man, who, through
, changed manner and appearance, bore to him some shadowy
resemblance.

Colonel Biddle gfives me, with reference to some of the
last incidents before the Army of the Potomac crossed the
Rappahannock, some information which proves that, to
the very last, it was without a competent head. It was, in
the night of the 4th, decided in council of war to withdraw
in the night of the Sth of May, by crossing the river in the

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0B8VILLR 277

immediate rear, a plan which probably would not have been
voted for by certain officers who formally approved it, but
for the fact that they knew all further effort and sacrifice
under Hooker's leadership would be in vain. Colonel Bid-
die says that it was while this withdrawal was taking place,
in the night of the 5 th, that the officer of engineers in
charge of the pontoons reported to General Meade that
they were in danger of being carried away by the increas-
ing freshet. General Meade's reply, according to Colonel
Biddle, was, "Why do you not report this to General
Hooker? it is not my affair." The response of the officer
of engineers was that General Hooker could not be found.
Shortly afler this occurrence during the night. Generals
Couch, Reynolds, and Sickles, Colonel Biddle says, came
to General Meade's quarters to confer with him as to
what should be done. General Meade thereupon di-
rected Colonel Biddle to cross the river by the pontoon-
bridge at United States' Ford, find General Hooker, and
ask for orders. The storm was threatening the pontoons
at the ford, but some artillery was passing, and Colonel
Biddle easily reached the other bank of the river. Here
he found Hooker with his staff asleep on the floor of a
house on the northern bluff of the stream, and awakening
General Daniel Butterfield, he informed him of the situation.
Buttei field's reply was that the order of retreat was to be
obeyed. Returning to General Meade, Colonel Biddle,
upon reporting the result of his mission, was ordered by
the General to summon his staff, and to communicate to
General Reynolds the state of affairs. Reynolds, found
occupying a tent with General James S. Wadsworth, was
awakened, and replied to General Meade's message, "Say to
General Meade that some one should be waked up to take
command of this army." The fact was that there was a
brief space of time when some of the general officers hoped

2/8 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

that the Rappahannock would rise so as to make it abso-
lutely impossible to cross, in which event Couch, being then
by seniority in command, there would be an opportunity
to try conclusions with the enemy under more favorable
auspices than those under which it had previously fought.
Colonel Biddle, upon returning to General Meade, found
that the retreat was being pushed by orders from Couch.
About daylight of the 6th, the artillery having preceded it
during the night, the army as a mass could be seen assem-
bled on the south bank of the river, the appearance of its
organization leaving much to be desired, with the exception
of that of the First and Fifth Corps, which, as the reader
will remember, had not, with the exception of one*brigade
from the Fifth, been in action. During the 5th Warren and
Comstock, of the engineers, had traced an interior en-
trenched line, about three miles long, which General Meade
held with the rearguard, as the rest of the army was retiring
over the river. As General Meade rode up to Reynolds
as the retreat was proceeding, Reynolds advanced to meet
him, saying, " General, I will support you. If there is any
fighting to be done, we will do it together."

The main army safely crossed. The afternoon of the 4th
Sedgrwick had been surrounded and so severely attacked
by McLaws and Anderson, in addition to the troops which
he had already been engaging, that he had been glad by
night to make good his retreat over Banks's Ford.

Hooker should have been relieved at once. He recovered
his normal health, he recovered with it his old arrogance,
demanding from the military authorities at Washington that
they should make some recognition of the merit of the
army. But it is hard to dissever an army from its chief,
impossible in official orders to recognize their duality. He
found only condenmation for Sedgwick, the one who, as
an independent conmiander, had had the opportunity to

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 279

distinguish himself, and he had not neglected it. The one
bright spot in the operations at Chancellorsville, regarding
them as a whole, is the part which Sedgwick there played.
Hooker, who had declared that he held the enemy on ground
of his own choice, found out that he had failed because
there was not room enough to fight ; as if, where there is
room enough for one side to fight, there is not room enough
for the other, and as if there is not room enough to fight
where there is enough to run away. It always seems puerile
to discuss the self-evident, but among the smaller ills of life
is the task set by unreason to have the self-evident demon-
strated. Falsification often masquerades under the name of
charity, but in history it certainly can have no claim to place.
At any time Hooker would have been unequal to the com-
mand of a large army in the critical event of battle, and when
he commanded in that event the Army of the Potomac, he
was not entirely in his right mind. The army was worthy
of all praise for its conduct, doubly so for its conduct under
the most trying circumstances, such as an army never before
experienced, and possibly never will again. What Hooker
might have been able to do under different conditions of
mind and body, we can never know. We can never know
about the affair in general aught but that which the mili-
tary authorities should have known at the beginning, that
Hooker was by constitution of character, apart from his
military capacity, whatever that may have been, unequal to
so great a command as that which he confidently and exult-
antly undertook.

28o GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER XIV.

FROM CHANCELLORSVILLE TO GETTYSBURG.

The rank and file of the army did not suffer demoraliza-
tion through the failure of Chancellorsville. They were
indignant that the army, although it had not been fought,
had been obliged to bear the stig^ma of having been dis-
gracefully defeated. Naturally, the relation of the higher
officers to the aflair was different. They too felt indigna-
tion at what had occurred, but additionally, their superior
position brought greater responsibility and greater power to
control events. It would be to expect more than human
beings are capable of, more than in high-spirited and capable
officers would be duty, to imagine that they should not
wish and endeavor to make it impossible for the future that
the army should be helplessly offered to the blows of the
enemy. The losses that the enemy had sustained might,
it is true, equal their own, but losses in killed and wounded
do not alone settle the question of victory, for the victors
sometimes sustain the greater losses in these. Lee had not
only caused the army, half-fought, to retreat, but while the
two forces had remained arrayed against each other, had
dictated the whole course of events as though toying with
his opponent. Hooker, in relative repose, actually let his
adversary play his own game. Two whole corps, and
parts still intact of a third, had been either idle spectators
or auditors of battle. The sting of this disgrace naturally
made officers of high rank freely communicate to each other
their fears for a future under Hooker's command. Hooker,
on his side, must have known of the general sentiment

FROM CHANCELLOBSVILLE TO QETTYSBUBQ. 281

against him, for he took the honorable course of paving the
way for free expression of opinion to the President as to
the conduct of affairs.

It could not have escaped the attentive reader, in connec-
tion with the episode of recrossing the Rappahannock, nar-
rated in the last chaper, that General Meade was highly
regarded by other corps-commanders besides Reynolds,
between whom and himself there was the warmest friend-
ship. That the inference is correct is clearly shown by an
occurrence that took place soon after the battle of Chancel-
lorsville. Reynolds and Couch were successively sounded
by the authorities in Washington as to whether or not they
would be willing to accept the command of the army, and we
know now more than General Meade himself for a long time
did, that they both declined it, and recommended him as the
fittest man for the place. In addition to the feeling which
any officer would have under the circumstances, that his
succession would be to a command in which there had
been three conspicuous failures, there was the much-to-be-
dreaded military administration of affairs at Washington,
represented chiefly by the position of Halleck as general-
in-chief of all the armies of the United States. •It is no
wonder that, under these circumstances, even such men as
Reynolds and Couch should have shrunk from accepting
the command of the army, even if they both had not had
the conviction that Meade was the man for the place. If
Couch, moreover, was not willing, even although senior
corps-commander of the army, to accept the command of
it, he Wcis not even able to bear the anticipation of being
again found amidst active operations under the command
of Hooker, and therefore, alarmed at a demonstration across
the Rappahannock which Hooker was making with the
Sixth Corps, he requested to be relieved from the command
of the Second Corps, and on the loth of June bade it faux-

282 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

well, and proceeded to take charge of the newly created
Department of the Susquehanna, succeeded in command
of the Corps by General Hancock.

Lee's forces had been largely increased by the return
of the two divisions of Longstreet which had been south of
Richmond, and by the addition of troops levied by conscrip-
tion, while at the same time Hooker's had been diminished
by the expiration of the short terms of service of certain
levies. There was no longer between the two armies the
disparity in numbers which had existed at Chancellorsville.
Hooker's army was reduced to about eighty-five thousand
men, including cavalry, and that of Lee increased to an
amount very slightly over that number. Under these cir-
cumstances, to which must be added the low condition of
Lee's commissariat, the need of an effective invasion to
replenish it, and the prevalent desire of the South to make
an invasion as a political stroke which might have the
effect of causing the recognition of the independence of
the Confederacy by foreign powers, involving the breaking
of the blockade and the triumph of the Southern cause,
the authorities at Richmond resolved upon an irruption
into the North under what they deemed more favorable
conditions than those under which it had been previously
attempted.

Hooker, through floating reports in Southern newspai)ers,
had suspected this design, and was on the alert to discover
the beginning of any movement. On the 3d of June, 1863,
Hood's and McLaws's divisions, of Longstreet's corps,
marched from different positions to concentrate at Culpeper,
off to Hooker's right, about midway between the Rapidan
and Rappahannock, while the corps of A. P. Hill continued
to occupy the lines south of the Rappahannock. The move-
ment could not, however, be so completely disguised that
Hooker should remain in entire ignorance that something

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FROM CHANCELL0B8VILLE TO QETT78BUBQ. 283

projected was going forward. It was in consequence of this
that, on the 6th of June, the Sixth Corps made a recon-
noissance in force across the Rappahannock, the movement
already referred to in connection with the final resolution
of Couch to depart before worse should come of Hooker's
manoeuvres.

Hooker's manoeuvre, however, was perfectly correct,
but Couch did not feel assured as to what it would lead.
No positive information was gained by making it, for A.
P. Hill presented a solid front, and the march of Hood
and McLaws continued uninterruptedly to Culpeper with-
out Hooker's being any the wiser. Accident, however,
revealed what design had failed to ferret out. The
knowledge that Stuart's cavalry was at Culpeper induced
Hooker to send the whole of his cavalry force, now under
General Alfred Pleasanton, to dislodge it from that point.
In consequence, a long and spirited cavalry engagement
occurred, characterized by many changes of fortune expe-
rienced by the combatants. The main outcome of the action,
however, known as the cavalry engagement at Brandy Sta-
tion, proved doubly advantageous for the Federal side,
inasmuch as, incidentally to its being the first cavalry fight
in which the Federal had proved itself able to cope with
the Confederate horsemen, it revealed the presence of the
infantry advance of Lee.

It was imagined that Lee would take the same line of
advance that he had adopted against Pope, but he did not
He would not have dared to take the one that he followed
but for the fact that, on this occasion, he underestimated his
opponent, or else knew that the supreme authority in Wash-
ington would not let him carry out his plans. While
Hooker, naturally supposing that Lee would adopt the safe
line of advance, was manoeuvring to guard it, Lee, still
keeping A. P. Hill behind the Rappahannock and Long-

284 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

street at Culpeper, had sent Ewell, with his corps, through
Chester Gap, in the Blue Ridge, whence, marching north
through the Shenandoah Valley, he, in rivalry of the former
wonderful speed of Jackson, and with Jackson's old corps,
arrived before Winchester in the evening of the 1 3th of
June. It was a most daring operation in which Lee had
engaged, if anything can be called daring attempted against
the obtuseness of Halleck. Hooker was nominally in
command of the army, Halleck was the drag attached to
all its operations. Hooker had anticipated the possibility
that this situation might arise in case that Lee should beg^
an invasion, and had prepared to meet it by requesting that
he be allowed, in the event of its occurrence, to fall on the
i^lated force in the rear with the whole army. This had
been positively prohibited by Halleck. In the specified
eventuality, what all military teaching schools men to do,
Halleck, as general-in-chief of the armies of the United
States, had forbidden and presumably had induced the
President also to forbid. There remained for Hooker now
only one rational move. The one discarded would have
caused Ewell's recall. The one that had to be adopted was
to fall back along the line with which the reader became
acquainted during the recital of the operations under Pope,
the line through Warrenton to Manassas ; this, with the ob-
ject of covering Washington while awaiting there Lee's
further initiative. Lee's first purpose was gained. A. P.
Hill, relieved of the presence of the Army of the Potomac
near his front, was at liberty to take up the line of advance,
and he joined Longstreet at Culpeper.

While these movements were taking place east of the Blue
Ridge, west of it, in the Shenandoah Valley, Ewell was
having full swing towards the execution of Lee's ultimate
designs. Before this campaign, the Confederate army had
been reorganized by being thrown into three corps ifarmee,

FROM CHANCELLOBSVILLE TO QETTTSBUBQ. 285

SO that the three corps of which it was now composed,
A. P. Hiirs, Long^street's, and Ewell's, each formed a little
army of about twenty-five thousand men, with all three
arms complete, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, capable of
operating to advantage alone, or when concentrated with
the others, acting as a single grand army. Never before
had the Army of Northern Virgfinia been so well equipped
and so elated. To itself it seemed equal to any enterprise,
and it may well be questioned whether it ever again attained
to such a pitch of moral and physical force. The reader
may easily imagine that, under these circumstances, Ewell
had an easy task to make himself master of the ill-guarded
Valley of Virgfinia.

It has been mentioned that Ewell arrived before Win-
chester on the evening of the 13 th of June. Cutting off
telegraphic communication by his cavalry, he drove Mil-
roy, with whom the reader made some slight acquaintance
at the second battle of Bull Run, behind the defences of
Winchester. Milroy, with his small force of about five
thousand men, was wholly unequal to holding the place
against one so great as Ewell brought against it, or of
making a spirited defence of it, and attempted to withdraw
his troops on the night of the 14th of June, but being un-
able to make good his retreat, lost during the running fight
that ensued nearly the whole of them as prisoners. The
small garrison at Berryville was cs^tured, and the garrison
at Harper's Ferry had to be withdrawn to Maryland Heights,
just across the Potomac, the topography around which place
has been here elaborately described in connection with Jack-
son's capture of Harper's Ferry on the occasion of the battle
of the Antietam. By these operations Lee became possessed
of the debouchure from the Valley of the Shenandoah proper
into the valley as continued north of the Potomac ; for it
would be absurd to suppose that, with the respective forces.

286 GENERAL QEOBGE GORDON MEADR

as now distributed, Lee would not be able to force the
passage of the Potomac above Washington.

The two corps of A. P. Hill and Longfstreet being at
Culpeper, and the corps of Ewell near Winchester, Lee's
next move on the military chess-board was to advance
Longstreet, with Stuart's cavalry, along the east side of the
Blue Ridge, to hold Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, leading to
the Shenandoah Valley, while that of A. P. Hill, marching
through the g^ps in his rear, continued down the valley to
Winchester, protected in flank by the disposition of the corps
of Longfstreet. Hooker was powerless to do anything but
to await developments, whilst he made excellent dispositions
and felt for the position of the enemy, in order to ascertain
his progress without compromising any portion of his own
forces or uncovering Washington. On the 17th of June,
beyond Aldie's Gap, in the Bull Run Range, just east of
and parallel to the Blue Ridge, a cavalry engagement took
place which enabled Pleasanton, in following it up on the
20th and 2 1 St, to learn something of the dispositions of the
enemy further westward.

Lee, who was with Longfstreet's corps, the First, passed
through the Blue Ridge, and on the i8th of June was at
Berryville, just east of Winchester, where he made his final
preparations for crossing the Potomac. He left to the dis-
cretion of Stuart, who commanded his main body of cavalry,
where to cross the river, after his duty of still holding the
passes of the Blue Ridge had ceased with the advance of
the army of Northern Virginia over the Potomac. Ewell's
corps, the Second, crossed on the 23d of June, and A. P.
Hill's, the Third, on the 24th, while Lee himself crossed
with Longstreet on the 25th. Small bodies of cavalry, how-
ever, had already, under Jenkins and Imboden, preceded
the advance of the in&ntry, and were then engaged in the
work of railroad destruction and the collection of supplies.

FROM CHANCELLOBSVILLE TO GETT78BUB0. 287

Hooker had not been taken unawares. He had advanced
correspondingly, and had possessed himself of the fords in
the vicinity of Leesburg, over which he began his advance
in a parallel line to Lee's direction, — towards Frederick.
We are again brought to the consideration of the peculiar
conformation of the country, noticed in a former chapter,
with reference to the singular advantage it afforded to the
invader from the south. What might be called the Shenan-
doah Valley coulisses of the theatre in which war was now
being waged, continuing north of the Potomac as Cum-
berland Valley, converge more and more towards Wash-
ingrton and the seats of the densest population, so that the
Southern actors in the drama could with impunity arrange
and play their parts ending with the last act of battle, and
with a mountain-curtain which, if not needful for victory,
would go far towards securing safety in defeat. So far, the
advantage is with Lee, in the characteristics of the country,
and in his having the initiative in advancing. There is one
disadvantage, however, under which he will continue to
labor for several days. Stuart makes a mistake in his calcu-
lations, and crosses the Potomac befow instead of above the
Army of the Potomac, whose interposing columns cut him
off from all communication with Lee until after Gettsyburg
has been reached.

The Army of the Potomac crossed the river on the 26th
and 27th of June. Therefore, excluding question of cavalry,
the Army of Northern Virginia, counting Ewell's advance,
had the advantage of it by from three to four days in time.
On the 28th the Army of the Potomac was concentrated at
Frederick. Hooker's manoeuvres now evidently indicated
at least a demonstration on Lee's rear, by throwing a force
through the main gap at South Mountain, the same for the
possession of which the battle of that name, previously de-
scribed, took place. His plans were brought to a sudden

288 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

•

termination, however, by an event wholly unexpected by the
army. Halleck was on this occasion, as he continued to
be to the end of the war, the chief one of the impedimenta
of the army. As the garrison of ten thousand men, which,
under General French had evacuated the post of Harper's
Ferry, upon the advance of Lee, remained in occupation of
Maryland Heights, where it could have no influence what-
ever on the current of events. Hooker had requested that it
might be ordered to reinforce him, and this Halleck refused
to allow. The discussion led to acrimonious feeling pn
both sides, which resulted in Hooker's being relieved of the
command of the army at a time when, so far as the conduct
of the campaign up to the present was concerned, he mer-
ited nothing less than the fullest recognition and praise. Still,
the occurrence may be regarded now as a fortunate ending
of the controversy. But that is, as after the event, judgfing
easily. Only such a man as Halleck, timid and irresolute,
could have been blind to the danger of the experiment,
for in emergencies timidity and rashness often go hand-in-
hand. What is, however, most conspicuously censurable
in this proceeding is the motive which to all appearance
brought about Hooker's fall, and the injudiciousness dis-
played in the choice of time for his removal, which ought
to have taken place weeks before it occurred. Hooker,
harassed as he had been by Halleck's recent interference
with his plans, and piqued to the quick by the continued
disregard with which his recommendations were treated by
a man deciding at his ease in Washington, while he had the
pressure of the field, asked to be relieved of the command
of the army. It is questionable, judging by the character
of Hooker, and by the circumstance that an engagement
was known to be imminent, if Hooker was sincere in his
request, if he really thought that it would be granted, if he
did not rather imagine that in the emergency his self-

FROM CHANCELL0B8VILLE TO GETT7SBUBQ. 289

assertion would be respected and tolerated. However that
may be, his request was actually granted, and he was re-
lieved of the command in the night of the 27th of June,
and General Meade appointed to it. Both parties were
obviously in the wrong, Hooker in proffering his resigna-
tion and Halleck in accepting it, but Halleck the more
grievously. The crying injustice of the thing as it actually
occurred was in the advantage taken of Hooker's act to
relieve him when his course had been meritorious, instead
of having relieved him when he had by signal failure justified
that extreme measure. The circumstance forms one of the
incontrovertible proofs of the unfitness of Halleck for the
general administration of military affairs. Not only with
reference to personal consideration is what has been adduced
against the untimeliness of the removal irrefutable, but with
reference to the situation of the army on the eve of battle,
the removal, as unprecedented under such circumstances,
and as involving the g^vest risks, rendered the act of Hal-
leck wholly unjustifiable.

290 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

The field of Gettysburg was, from the nature of things,
not to either hostile commander a pre-elected ground on
which to join battle, but was forced upon both by condi-
tions which neither could anticipate, but which each, seek-
ing to control, could at best but modify. Only to one
whose superlative knowledge included that of every dispo-
sition of troops, and that of every order emanating from the
headquarters of both armies, would it have been possible to
predict where the final collision would take place. Armies
so situated, and groping for each other, may be likened to
huge predatory creatures which put forth their tentacles in
all directions, and when they find the nucleus of their prey,
where the greatest force resides, concentratedly move to
and attack from the point of greatest vantage. The general
reader would not be interested in the itinerary of marches
representing this first condition of things in both armies. It
will therefore suffice to describe here incidentally, in due
order of time, their respective positions just before their
final concentration.

On the 28th of June the extreme left of the Army of the
Potomac was at Middletown. On the morning of the 29th
General Meade set the whole of his force in motion towards
the north, to make, as he expressed it, the enemy loose his
hold on the Susquehanna, for at that time Ewell had reached
York and Carlisle, and was about to capture Harrisburg by
crossing the bridge at that place, when he was recalled by

THE BATTLE- ,

THE FIRST DAY OF GETTYSBUEO. 29 1

Lee. Early, of Ewell's column, attempted to capture the
bridge below, at Wrightsville, when it was burned by the
opposing troops, and he, too, retraced his steps towards
Lee. Lee, with Longstreet and Hill, at Chambersburg, had
been contemplating junction with Ewell towards the east,
when he was forced to concentrate elsewhere by the feet
that the rapid advance of Meade threatened his communica-
tions .with Ewell. Spreading out his different corps, fan-
shaped, from west to east, Meade was approaching by forced
marches. General A. L. Long, Military Secretary to Lee,
says in his memoirs of that general : " The rapid advance
of General Meade was unexpected, and exhibited a celerity
that hitherto had not been displayed by the Federal army.
A speedy concentration of the Confederate army was now
necessary. Before dawn on the morning of the 29th orders
were despatched requiring the immediate junction of the
army, and on the 30th the Confederate forces were in mo-
tion towards Gettysburg. At the same time General Meade
was pressing forward for that place." Pressing forward to-
wards that place he certainly was, but in the sense that he
had determined on that place for battle, he was not pressing
forward "for" that place. At the time General Meade
thought that he might be obliged to fight on the line of
Pipe Creek, and had taken his measures accordingly, and
General Lee had not the slightest idea as to where he would
be forced to fight. Gettysburg was simply a strategfic point
of great value on account of the important roads converg-
ing there, but whether it would prove in the view of either
commander to be tactically well adapted to battle neither
commander knew, for neither intimately knew the character
of the ground.

Buford, with his cavalry, was, as early as the 29th of
June, guarding the northern approaches to the town of Get-
tysburg. On the 30th Pettigrew's brigade, Heth's division,

292 GENERAL QEORQE QORDON MEADE

of Hill's corps, was advancing on the town from the north,
intending to levy a contribution of shoes from the inhab-
itants, when it found the roads in possession of Buford,
and withdrawing, planned for the next day the descent
in force which led to the battle of Gettysburg. Hill was
only about seven miles off and Ewell only about nine when
they bivouacked on the night of the 30th of June preceding
the fateful encounter of the morning of the ist of July.
Ewell, recalled by orders from the direction of Harrisburg,
was arriving on the field by the roads from the north and
northeast, while Hill, having issued from Cashtown Pass, in
the South Mountain Range, Lee accompanying Longstreet
in the rear, was arriving by the roads leading from the
northwest into Gettysburg.

Reynolds, in command of the left wing of the Army of
the Potomac, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh
Corps, of which he had with him, on the morning of the
1st of July, the First and Eleventh, heard, just after nine
o'clock, as he was advancing towards Gettysburg from his
bivouac of the previous night, the horse-ardllery of Buford
in action, and pushing hastily forward, while he sent orders
to Howard to follow rapidly, he reached the field of battle
about ten o'clock. Buford was engaged northwest of Get-
tysburg across the Chambersburg turnpike, in the valley
of Willoughby Run, over which the turnpike passes at
right-angles. Reynolds had hardly formed his line. Wads-
worth coming first into action, when most unhappily he was
killed by the bullet of a sharpshooter, and the army had
sustained a loss which it is impossible to measure, so great
was his military skill and force of leadership.

Reynolds had entered into Buford's action about ten
o'clock, and had but just begun to make his dispositions
when he was stricken down. Doubleday succeeded him in
command, and so remained until the arrival of Howard in

THE FIRST DA Y OF QETTT8BUBG. 293

advance of his corps, the Eleventh, when Doubleday, being
thus ranked, relinquished the command to him. The
Eleventh Corps arrived about noon south of Gettysburg,
but did not get fairly into position on the north of it until
after one o'clock in the afternoon. Schurz's and Barlow's
divisions were the Third and First, Schurz in immediate
command of the right, General Schimmelfenning taking his
division, and General Doubleday commanding on the left
of that part of the field. Von Steinwehr's division, the
Second, coming up about two o'clock, was stationed to the
rear, south of the town, on Cemetery Hill. Therefore it
was, that from ten in the morning until after one o'clock in
the afternoon, the First Corps alone, with Buford's cavalry,
had borne the brunt of the enemy's attempted advance
across the valley of Willoughby Run, and had forced Hill
to pause and await the arrival of Ewell from the northeast-
ward. During this lull in the battle, Schurz's and Barlow's
divisions were coming into position on the right of the First
Corps. Ewell's troops began to arrive about half-past two
o'clock, and almost immediately attacking the line of the
Eleventh Corps, hopelessly routed it. Schurz's and Bar-
low's divisions of the Eleventh Corps, having taken position
on the right of the First Corps, the whole line thus enclosed
the roads radiating north like the spokes of a half-wheel
from the hub of Gettysburg. But Ewell's corps, arriving
by the Carlisle, Harrisburg, and York roads, from north
towards northeast, secured also the signal advantage of the
occupation of the eminence, Oak Hill, between the Carlisle
and the Mummasburg Road, a position which commanded
the whole field and enfiladed part of it.

Scant justice has been done the Eleventh Corps as to the
engagement of the first day of Gettysburg. It, as a corps,
was far from equal to the First Corps, but the popular
belief that the relative firmness of its stand on that field

294 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

wholly gauges their relative excellence is erroneous. The
dif]krence in the stand has generally been ascribed solely to
difference in the quality of their respective troops, and to
the Eleventh Corps' having extended its right too fer,
thereby permitting a g^p to exist between its left and the
right of the First Corps, of which the enemy took advantage
to disrupt the line and take the right-rear of the First
Corps in reverse. Now, although as a corps the Eleventh
was far inferior to the First, the result of the collision of the
first day, irrespective of the numerical superiority of the
enemy, is not attributable to the cause assigned. The gap
between the left of the Eleventh and the right of the First
Corps was not caused by the undue extension of the
Eleventh Corps to the right The right could not have
been placed otherwise than where it was, on and along
Rock Creek.

The line occupied by the First Corps, in the valley and
on the rise back of Willoughby Run, on McPherson's
Ridge (a lower parallel ridge just west of Seminary Ridge),
and towards the right, on the extension of Seminary
Ridge, where it falls off to rise again and merge in the
Heights of Oak Hill Ridge (on which Oak Hill, by the way,
is not a separate hill, but a mere hump in the general
range), is in places wooded and &irly strong against
in&ntry attack. On the contrary, the line which the
Eleventh Corps was forced to occupy with reference to
the advance of the enemy from the north and northeast,
and as nearly as possible in conformity with the position of
the First Corps on its left, has no strength whatever as
derived from the nature of the ground, being on a low, ill-
defined roll in the sur&ce, only a few feet above Rock
Creek, and perfectly open in every direction. Besides, in
saying that these are the essentially different characteristics
of the position of the First Corps as contrasted with that of

THE FIRST DA T OF QETTYSB UBG. 29S

the Eleventh, all is not included that is to the purpose. It
is the interdependence of two or more positions, as consti-
tuting the excellence or the absence of it for a line of battle
in its entirety, that is determinative of the relative staunch*
ness of its defenders. A line of battle embracing the
periphery of the ground described cannot assimilate the
occupancy of its parts. The conditions here are such that
the ground on the right, as compared with that on the left,
is absolutely untenable against the advance of an equal
adversary, and the line of the left thereby rendered unten*
able ; its derived weakness from the right being intensified
by the fact that it is partially enfiladed by an enemy occupy-
ing Oak Hill with artillery. Owing to the nature of the
ground the strength of the whole field was involved. The
right of the First Corps was perched up on the ridge where
it is cut by the Mummasburg Road, while the left of the
Third Division of the Eleventh Corps occupied the ground
many feet below it, without the possibility of junction with
it, save at the sacrifice of relinquishing for itself and the
First Division of the corps, on its right, both direction and
the trifling elevation of ground it already possessed. The
position brought it about also, that the Eleventh, more
largely than the First Corps, flooded the streets of Gettys-
burg upon the retceat of both bodies, which retreat ought to
have been a foregone conclusion, in view of the weakness of
the position and the numerical superiority of the enemy. If
the Union infantry there present had been the best drilled,
disciplined, and officered troops in the world, and every
man as brave as Julius Caesar, it would have been impos-
sible for them finally to maintain themselves against even
infantry attack, involving necessarily, with the relatively few
troops in hand, the right and the left-rear of the Eleventh
Corps and the right-rear of the First, or if that could be
put out of question, to maintain themselves against a general

296 GENERAL QEOBQE OOBDON MEADR

attack, after the enemy had fully deployed and occupied
Oak Hill with artillery. The lines of the First and Eleventh
G>rps were, in fact, and, of necessity, disposed rectangularly,
with the angle towards the north, while the enemy enveloped
them by the full angle of one hundred and eighty degrees,
and this circumstance was aggravated by the great numerical
inferiority of the Union forces and the inferiority of the
grround they held for both infantry and artillery; conditions
which formed in the aggregate disadvantages inordinately
more than sufficient to compel the abandonment of the
field.

What with the signal advantage acquired by the enemy,
through his occupation of Oak Hill, on one of the lines
by which he was approaching from the north, resulting in
a commanding artillery fire, the inherent weakness of the
grround as a whole for a line of battle, and the inadequate
number of troops for closing up the centre, the enemy
finally advanced through the opening between the right of
the First Corps and the left of the Third Division of the
Eleventh, while, despite the reinforcement of Coster's bri-
gade, of the Second Division, sent by Howard from Ceme-
tery Hill to the right-rear of the First, the enemy also out-
flanked the right of the line of battle, and the troops fell
back to Cemetery Ridge, through and beyond the town.
The major portion of the Eleventh Corps retired in confu-
sion through the streets of Gettysburg, in which some of
the right of the First Corps also became entangled, fugitives
from the former continuing their career along the Baltimore
turnpike, beyond the town, towards the southeast. The
centre and left of the First Corps retreated to Seminary
Ridge, where for a while they prevented the enemy from
advancing in that direction, after that marching across to
the opposite heights of Cemetery Ridge. The reverse was
decided. The action, favorably begun, and for a long time

THE FIRST DA Y OF OETTYSB UBQ. 297

sustained, chiefly through the excellence and good handling
of the First Corps and Buford's force, had terminated in
disaster, involving the loss, all-told, of nearly ten thousand
men to the Federal army, of whom nearly five thousand,
chiefly those entangled in the streets of Gettysburg, had
been made prisoners. These great losses were only partly
compensated for by the considerable ones which had been
inflicted on the enemy in killed and wounded and very many
prisoners, the number of the last, however, being much
below those secured by the enemy.

It was about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon when
the two corps which had been engaged found themselves in
full retreat. Suddenly an actor arrived on the scene who
changed chaos into order, and out of despair brought hope.
How he came there so opportunely, as if descended from
the clouds, was because General Meade had chosen him as
the man of all men fitted to represent him on the ground.
It is the attribute of littleness either not to recognize or to
ignore superior qualities, and of greatness to perceive them
at a glance and put them to the highest service. General
Meade had always been outspoken in his admiration for
Hancock's soldierly qualities, even to mention of his mar-
tial bearing, which he had always witnessed with unqualified
delight. Here then were the men come together, as never
more conspicuously happened, best fitted for achievement
of a purpose, both without hesitation, and both gifted with
indomitable energy for accomplishment. In vain was Meade
reminded at noon, when he had heard of the collision that
had taken place at Gettysburg, and he was giving Hancock
instructions to take command on the field, that Howard
was Hancock's senior. The President had, in Meade's
case, knowing that he could rely on his judgment and jus-
tice, swept away the cobwebs of the rules of precedence by
seniority. This was no time to trifle with the outcome of

298 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

events. Better that one man or that many should suffer
than that a cause should be imperilled. Hancock was
Meade's ideal for the mission on which he was bent. He
could not go, and so he sent another self. His order to
Hancock was dated at ten minutes past one o'clock, of the
the 1st of July, and read as follows : —

" The Major-General Commanding has just been informed that
General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs
that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon ;
that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of
the truth of General Reynolds's death, you assume command of the
corps there assembled, namely, the Eleventh, First, and Third at
Enunettsburg. If you think the ground and position there a better
one on which to fight a battle, under existing circumstances, you will
so advise the General, and he will order all the troops up. You know
the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them,
has gone out to see General Reynolds.*'

The following postscript, dated five minutes later, was
added: —

" Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are re-
ported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your
column ready to move.**

The phrase, in the orders to Hancock, " If you think the
ground and position there [at Gettysburg] a better one on
which to fight a battle," etc., needs explanation. What
question was there of other ground ? There was the ques-
tion of the line of Pipe Creek. The reference was to
that locality. Careful reconnoissances had been made of
the ground.

General Meade had been in close consultation with
Hancock, at Taneytown, under shelter of a tent Hancock
had learned briefly, from the terse speech which General
Meade had at conmiand, the whole bearing of the question

THE FIBST DA Y OF GETTTSB UBG. 299

of a choice under the drcumstances between Pipe Creek
and Gettysbui^, and when he left that tent with his written
orders, and getting into an ambulance was driven rapidly
towards the field of battle, studying the map of the country
meanwhile, he was prepared, as he mounted his led horse,
a few miles from Gettysburg, to act with the promptness
which characterized him. As he rode up on Cemetery Hill
the scene that met his gaze was very well calculated to make
him feel that the emergency would tax all his energy.
Hancock says in his report that he arrived on the field
about three o'clock, but there is better evidence than that as
to the time of his arrival from Hancock himself. His first
written despatch from the field to General Meade is dated
5.25 P.M., and in it he says that he arrived about an hour
before. Now, an officer writing from the field, time being
an all-important element in war, looks at his watch. I shall,
therefore, with reason state that Hancock probably arrived
on the field about half-past four. Upon the fixing of the
time necessarily depends what he could and what he could
not have seen. The time mentioned in his report is in-
compatible with the generalized account of what he says he
saw upon his arrival. Rectifying the time, we discover,
independently of his account, through the medium of our
knowledge of the periods at which the Eleventh Corps and
the First Corps were respectively overtaken by disaster, and
of our knowledge of the period of the occupation of Ceme-
tery Ridge, that what he must have seen as to its detaib
was Steinwehr's division in position on Cemetery Hill, and
such other troops of the Eleventh Corps as it had been pos-
sible to collect as they came swarming from the town, half-
halting, half-retreating along the Baltimore Turnpike ; while
the centre and left of the First Corps, not having been fin-
ally dislodged from their positions northwest of Gettysburg
until about four o'clock, what he saw off to the left of the

300 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

town were organized bodies of that corps retreating in a
comparatively orderly manner over Seminary Ridge, while
Buford*s cavalry was gathering on the plain in front, to form
the rearguard to them in their march towards Cemetery
Ridge. Soon Buford's cavalry presented the prettiest sight,
than which war never afforded finer, drawn up in columns
of massed battalions, midway in the valley between the
ridges occupied by the respective forces, defiantly holding
the Confederates back from their audacious appearance of
an intention to advance, after the organized remnant of the
First Corps had passed beyond Seminary towards Cemetery
Ridge. The Confederates of Hill's corps occupied Semi-
nary Ridge, as the First Corps in its retreat relinquished it,
and Eweirs corps stretched around to the right, to take
possession of Culp's Hill, a high knob in the right-rear of
the position on Cemetery Hill ; to which point, upon a
threatening movement of the enemy in that direction, some-
what later, Hancock despatched Wadsworth's division of
the First Corps.

It was under these discouraging circumstances that Han-
cock rode on the field, bringing with him the prestige of his
name and deeds, and of his noble presence riding down the
lines with centaur-like ease, fit, if ever man was, to witch
the world with noble horsemanship. Drawing rein, he held
around him a headquarters, to which officers coming sought
orders to meet the crisis, and then moved on again for
colloquy or command. As by a subtle shock, a force in-
ducing other forces to array themselves and work a daily
wonder, diffused matter takes on definite form, so Hancock
riding upon the field caused mind and matter in mysterious
combination to reassume their potent sway, and their units,
resolving themselves under natural laws into thought and
endeavor, crystallized once more into the military form and
spirit which it had needed only his presence to evoke. As

THE FIRST DA T OF OETTYSB UBQ. 301

by the wand of Prospero, a mightier, in moral force, had
waved over the scene, and bade hearts be still, and hope
rise again that seemed to have gone forever. So when
Hancock, strenuously aided by Howard and Warren, chief-
engineer of the army, by Buford and other officers of all
ranks, had stopped the crowd of fugitives along the road to
the rear, and received the broken regiments of the First and
Eleventh Corps, still crowding on from Gettysburg, and
had formed his lines to cover the ground until reinforce-
ments should come, and Lee arriving, soon mounted the
opposite crest of Seminary Ridge, there was in front of him
an imposing Federal line of battle.

Ewell stated, in conversation with General Meade, after
the war, that he had had twenty thousand men in hand,
with whom he could have occupied Gulp's Hill, but that
he was restrained from so doing by a repeated order from
Lee to act on the defensive. Colonel Taylor, however, of
Lee's staff, says explicitly that he carried a message from
Lee to Ewell, when the former had observed the retreat,
saying that it was only necessary "to press those people "
to secure possession of the northern Heights. Certain it is
that if, at the point of time mentioned, Ewell had occupied
Gulp's Hill with a force of even ten thousand men, the
Federal troops would have been obliged to evacuate the
ground to the south of it, the prospective battle-field of the
Union side.

In contemplation of the perfection of General Meade's
dispositions, as illustrated by his successive orders, on official
record, it is from one point of view amusing, and from
another sad, to reflect that the popular notion, proved by
thousands of discussions, is that the particular site called
Gettysburg was the inevitable, foreordained spot on which
the contest should take place, under penalty of its non-
acceptance or abandonment being regarded as sacrilegious.

302 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADE

The event of concentration of the Union forces at Gettys-
bui^, and at no other place, hinged upon two uncontrollable
circumstances, — the impossibility of knowing in advance of
final concentration exactly where the enemy's forces lay,
and the impossibility of conveying a change of orders in-
stantaneously upon the receipt of additional intelligence of
his movements. Had General Meade either known earlier
by a few hours where the scattered forces of the enemy
were converging, or not knowing it, had the circular or the
order which he sent Reynolds last had time to reach him,
the great battle would not have taken place at Gettysbui^,
and, if on the line of Pipe Creek, would have taken place to
much better advantage for concentration. The hands of both
Meade and Lee were forced by events. It was out of their
power to prevent the battle from taking place at Gettysburg.
Reynolds did not receive the order which would have caused
him to fall back on the line provisorily adopted by General
Meade as the best, and the line which was strategically the
best to assume, and so the battle took place in a good tactical,
but a bad strategical position for the Union forces, because it
could easily have been flanked on the south and its evacua-
tion compelled. It took place on ground impossible for
either leader to avoid, — for Lee, because he had no time to
dally with prolonged manoeuvres, or mind to take great
risks, for Meade, because his forces had been so engaged
that withdrawal of them would have been attended with
certain loss of morale. The whole case is really stated in
a brief note of Meade's to Hancock and Doubleday, dated
6 P.M. of the I St of July, when he was still at Taneytown,
in which note he says, " It seems to me that we have so
concentrated that a battle at Gettysburg is now forced on
us." The die was cast Earlier in the day of the ist of
July a circular to the corps-commanders had been issued in
which, from information of the enemy's dispositions, Rey-

THE FIBST DA Y OF QETTTSB UBO. 303

nolds was ordered to fall back from Gettysburg towards
Tane)^own and Westminster. It was impossible to ascer-
tain just where the enemy was concentrating. The several
corps of the Army of the Potomac had to be held where
they could meet to the best advantage any possible point
of concentration of the enemy. Later in the day of July
1st a special order was despatched to Reynolds, showing
that intelligence received indicated possible concentration of
the enemy at Gettysburg, towards which Reynolds was
marching. The order ends with the words : — " The move-
ment of your corps on Gettysburg was ordered before
positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Har-
risburg and concentration was received.*' At 12.30 p.m.
of the 1st, General Meade, referring to this missive to
Reynolds, sent an order to Hancock, in which he said, " In
view of the advance of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell on
Gettysburg, and the possible failure of Reynolds to receive
the orders to withdraw his command by the route to Taney-
town, thus leaving the front of our position open, proceed
with your troops out on the direct road to Gettysburg from
Tane)^own. When you find that General Reynolds is cov-
ering that road (instead of withdrawing by Emmettsburg,
which it is feared that he may do), you will withdraw to
Frizzellburg, as directed in the circular of directions for
positions issued this morning." These and other similar
instructions simply meant that, since the previous orders of
march had been issued. General Meade had received infor-
mation of the enemy's dispositions such as to render it de-
sirable for him to fall back from Gettysburg, in view of the
fact of the superior concentration of the enemy at that mo-
ment near that point, so that he himself could concentrate to
better advantage further to the southward ; and that he feared
that Reynolds, without the knowledge which he himself pos-
sessed, would enter into an engagement from which it would

304 GENERAL GEOBQE OOBDON MEADE

be impossible for him to withdraw. That happened. What
General Meade had learned of the positions of the marching
corps of the enemy, at the time when he so acted, was that
the enemy would concentrate somewhere on the line joining
York, passing to the north of Gettysburg to Mummasburg,
thence to Chambersburg. He perceived that without the
precaution he finally took, the enemy might, as actually
occurred, concentrate to relatively better advantage. The
course which he wisely took looked to the adoption of an
appreciably parallel line to that just indicated as the one on
which the enemy seemed to be moving ; a line a few miles
south of Gettysburg, from Manchester to Middlebui^, in the
general direction of Pipe Creek, where his right would be at
Parr's Ridge, his left near the Monocacy, of which Pipe Creek
is an easterly branch, his depot of supplies and his best line
of communication at Westminster, in his rear ; on which
line his army could assemble without the exhaustion and
numerical loss entailed by forced marches, where he would
not only lie between the enemy and Baltimore and Wash-
ington, but on the flank of the enemy's line of communi-
cation with the Valley of Virginia, and in a position offering
the alternatives of offence and defence from which to choose
upon the final revelation of the intentions of the enemy, in-
cluding the most advantageous position for his interception
in case of his retreat without offering battle. The circular
to the corps-commanders, however, expressly states that he
might be obliged to assume the offensive from his present
positions, as, in (act, proved to be the case. About noon of
the 1st of July he knew that what he had apprehended, and
worse, had taken place, that battle had been joined, and that
General Reynolds was either dying or dead from a wound.
Then he also knew that the die was finally cast, without pos-
sibility of reversal for the field of Gettysburg, unless tacti-
cally unfit for occupation, and thence came the sequence of

THE FIRST DA Y OF QETTTSB UBQ. 305

events in which Hancock was ordered to the field and the
end came with victory. But, as stated at the beginning, the
determination of the battle-ground as that at Gettysburg
hung on two fundamental &cts, — unavoidable ignorance, at
the time when Reynolds moved forward towards Gettysburg,
of the exact dispositions of the enemy, and after the receipt
of fuller intelligence, lack of time for the new orders to
reach his hands.

The Confederate army had had in its immediately pre-
ceding dispositions the facility of earlier concentration than
that of which it had availed itself, in advance though it was
of that of the Army of the Potomac with reference to the
position of Gettysburg. Nothing could have been more
favorable to it than that widely separated localities and
positions of troops, uncalculated and incalculable by Lee
as related to sudden concentration at that point, should con-
spire, as they did, in his favor to that end. By an accident
of accidents it was brought about, that from northeast to
northwest Lee's troops in great force began to pour almost
simultaneously towards the town through roads represent-
ing a funnel emptying towards the north of Gettysburg.
The Confederate army, as things eventuated, thus obtained,
as a finality, the advantage of earlier, therefore, at first, of
fuller concentration than the Federal one, only Pickett's
division and Law's brigade, of Hood's division, remaining to
reach the field on the morning of the 2d of July.

If things had fallen out otherwise than as they did, it
would imply omniscience on the part of both of the generals
commanding on this field. Reviewing the matter now, it is
plainly seen that Gettysburg was not the best possible
strategic position for the advancing Union army to assume,
and that its occupation and the occupation of the opposing
ridge by the enemy were the final resultant of able combina-
tions by the opposing generals into which the unknown to

306 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE

both largely entered. Both strategically and tactically Lee
fought at a disadvantage, because, in both spheres, his
situation was susceptible of betterment Meade fought
strategically to a disadvantage, for the reasons already
assigned, and tactically to advantage, only because the
enemy did not have time or wish to run the risk of relin-
quishing his lines of retreat through the mountains, in at-
tempting to flank him out of his position. This is only
reaffirming the wisdom of General Meade's course in select-
ing in advance the line of Pipe Creek as the probable scene
of the conflict, and issuing the circular which indicated
probable concentration there. If the enemy had been able
to occupy Gulp's Hill on the afternoon of the ist of July,
or, on the 2d, Lee had moved by the right flank across the
roads to the south of the Gettysburg position, Meade would,
in either case, have found the position untenable. In the
first case he would have been driven out of it by reverse
fire, and in the second, he would have been cut ofi* from his
base at Baltimore and Washington, between which and the
enemy he was bound to lie.

Had Reynolds received the order, which, in connec-
tion with the preceding circular, would have shown him
that the true strategical position, as determined by the
latest intelligence, was to the south of Gettysburg, and
he did not, he would have ordered Buford's force, al-
ready engaged north of Gettysburg, to withdraw, instead
of supporting it with infantry. Had he, in default of the
receipt of the new orders, been aware of what it was im-
possible for him to know, for lack of time to learn it, the utter
weakness of the position north of Gettysburg against an
enemy advancing on the roads converging there and occupy-
ing Oak Hill with artillery, he had too good a knowledge of
the positions of the advancing corps of the Union army, and
was too good a soldier to attempt to make an irrevocable

ri^h^tei

THE FIRST DA Y OF GETTYSBUBO. 307

stand there. He would have diseng^aged Buford and retired
by the open roads towards the south. But not having re-
ceived the orders, not knowing all that time has disclosed,
he was forced, upon the basis of the premises at his dis-
posal, to decide exactly as he did, and Meade and Han-
cock, in turn, were, upon the premises respectively before
them, forced to decide as they did. The fact is, glorious
as is the name of Gettysbui^, which is entirely beside the
question, that through the inscrutable fortunes of war, a
battle was fought at a point not strategically the best for
the Union army, and tactically admirable only because the
enemy allowed the army unobstructedly to occupy it by
default of movement to his right ; the first step in occu-
pation leading to the unavoidable defeat and losses of
the first day. Such, as well illustrated here, is the large
part that chance plays in war, and all that the greatest of
generals can do is to meet at the instant the emergencies
which blended design and chance present to him for counter-
action. As in this, one of the attributes of great general-
ship. General Meade was always equal to the situation, he
accepted the inevitable, and Gettysburg became the battle-
field that for the first time staggered the Confederate power.
Hancock arrived on the field, he says, at three o'clock
in the afternoon, but as has been shown, at about half-past
four o'clock. In an hour he had effected a wonderful
transformation. At that time he despatched an aide to
General Meade to inform him of the situation, and that the
position was held. Later on he sent another aide with a
written despatch to him. Just as Hancock's final disposi-
tions had been made, a portion of Geary's division, of the
Twelfth Corps, arrived, which Hancock ordered to the left,
along the line to and inclusive of Little Round Top. As
the main battle of the second day turned upon the abandon-
ment of this position by General Sickles, it becomes neces-

308 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

sary here to fix beyond the peradventure of a doubt the
incidents connected with the occupation of it. Hancock
says, in his report, " I ordered the division [Geary's] to the
high ground to the right of and near Round Top Mountain,
commanding the Gettysburg and Emmettsburg Road as
well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown Road, to our rear."
In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, he says, ** I directed General Geary, whose division
belonged to the Twelfth Corps, (its commander, General
Slocum, not then having arrived,) to take possession of the
high ground towards Round Top." Further on, in the
same testimony, he says : " The next morning [the 2d] ,
some time after daylight, I again reported to General Meade,
at Gettysburg, and assumed the command of my own corps
after it arrived. I was placed on the line connecting Ceme-
tery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, how-
ever, not extending to Round Top, probably only half way.
General Sickles was directed [the context shows, directed
by General Meade] to connect with my left and the Round
Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Ceme-
tery Hill (which was held by General Howard) to Round
Top Mountain." In his official report, speaking of the
morning of the 2d of July, in connection with his account
of his dispositions of his own troops, the Second Corps,
upon their arrival on the field. General Hancock says :
"The troops were soon placed in position, the right
resting near the Emmettsburg Road, to the west of Ceme-
tery Hill, connecting there on the right with the Eleventh
Corps and on the left with the Third Corps, the line of
battle extending along the crest from the left of Cemetery
Hill to Round Top Mountain, the ground being less elevated,
as near Round Top." So, the line of the Third Corps was,
to Hancock's eye, extended, at least in a general way, from
his left to Little Round Top.

THE FIRST DA T OF GETTYSBUBO. 309

General Geary's report states that, " By his [Hancock's]
direction, upon this threatening emergency [on the after-
noon of the 1st] I took up a position on the extreme left
of the line of battle, as the enemy was reported to be at-
tempting to flank it, and cavalry were already skirmishing
in front of that position." He adds, "At 5 p.m. this move-
ment was consummated, and my line extended at that time
from about half a mile west of the Baltimore turnpike
to .... a range of hills south and west of the town,
which I occupied with two regiments of the First Brigade.
These hills I regarded as of the utmost importance, since
their possession by the enemy would give him an opportu-
nity of enfilading our entire left wing and centre with a fire
which could not fail to dislodge us from our position. This
line was held by the First and Third Brigades." Further
on Geary says : *' At 5 a.m. on the 2d, having been relieved
by the Third Corps," etc.

Colonel Charles Candy, commanding the First Brigade,
referred to by Geary above, says in his report, '* Near about
dark [of the ist] was ordered to throw forward two regi-
ments to the left, and occupy a high range of hills over-
looking the surrounding country, and watch for any at-
tempted advance of the enemy on the left of the army.
This order was executed, and the Fifth Ohio and One
Hundred and Forty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers occu-
pied the above position during the night of July ist."

General Meade himself, in his testimony before the Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War, made a statement re-
garding the position which he had ordered Sickles to occupy
on the morning of the 2d of July, in which this passage
occurs : " directing him to form his corps in line of battle
on the left of the Second Corps, commanded by General
Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms that
his right was to rest upon Hancock's left, and his left was

3IO GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

to extend to the Round Top Mountain, plainly visible, if it
was practicable to occupy it"

No evidence was ever offered in a court-of-law more con-
clusive than this, that General Sickles's position was clearly
defined, and the ground itself is extant to prove that the line,
as thus defined upon it, is unmistakable. The obviousness
of the necessity of occupying the position described is vivid-
ly brought before the mind by an incident which Major Veale,
of Geary's staff, has recounted to me. He says that when
he, in company with General Geary, approached Hancock on
the field, he was standing all alone, and that Geary, riding
up and introducing himself, Hancock almost immediately
said, substantially in these words, indicating the Round Tops
by a gesture : " General, that hill is the key-point of this
position. Unless the army holds that point it will have to
fall back to the line of Pipe Creek. In the absence of Gen-
eral Slocum I take the responsibility of ordering you to
occupy that position."

There was in existence, then, to a certain g^oup of men,
a line of determinate position and fixed termini on the field
of Gettysburg, — to Meade, Hancock, Geary, Candy, all of
whom before and after the battle labored under the hallu-
cination, or possessed true perception, that such a line ex-
ists in nature. Now, as the same hallucination does not
beset different individuals at the same time, we may conclude
that the perception of these men was not at fault And to
the testimony already cited as to the topographically evi-
dential character of the line mentioned, may be added that
of Bimey and Humphreys, commanding the two divisions
of the Third Corps, under General Sickles, both of whom
describe a line in bearing and length and topographical
limitation as a line which they actually occupied, which line
corresponds in description with that of a position defined by
Meade, Hancock, and Geary, the last of whom even speaks

THE FIBST DAY OF OETTYSBUBO. 31I

of having personally occupied it. The fact that a line is
described by so many persons in the same language would
seem to indicate that it is identically the same line. It
would also seem to have been fixed as the same by the
statement of General Newton, when he remarked that the
Federal troops had been " hammered into a good position,"
since the position to which he refers coincides with the pre-
vious descriptions, as they, in turn, agree with a character-
istic feature of the field. All these men seem to have per-
ceived a line which constitutes one and the same position,
and yet General Sickles alone was found, with battle impend-
ing, and explicit instructions to guide him, unable to recognize
it, and stating that his predecessor, Geary, had had no posi-
tion, Geary's message to him, his sight, his orders, and
everything else to the contrary notwithstanding.

Well aware am I that I have introduced here a surplusage
of evidence to prove a fact, but I have been constrained to
take that course because, to this day, there are persons to
whom the demonstration is satisfactorily made, that the
ridge along the Emmettsburg Road represents a better
position than that of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops.
But even if it does, which is here conclusively disproved,
such a statement in this connection is wide of the point as
to whether or not General Sickles knew the position which
it was intended he should occupy.

Between five and six o'clock Slocum in person arrived
by the way of the Baltimore turnpike. His own mission
having been accomplished, Hancock turned over to him, as
the senior officer on the field, the command of the assembled
forces, and rode off towards General Meade's headquarters.
Meeting the Second Corps, his own, a short distance from
the field, he ordered it to remain in that position to guard
against an attack on the left at Gettysburg, and then con-
tinued onward to make his report in person to the com-

312 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

manding-general. Just after dark two brigades of the Third
Corps, under General Bimey, reached the field General
Humphreys, with his two brigades of the corps, having
been misdirected by an aide of General Sickles's, did not
arrive until between one and two o'clock in the morning of
the 2d. The two remaining brigades of this corps of only
two divisions did not arrive until ten o'clock in the morning
of the 2d. The Fifth Corps, off to the left, about twenty
miles, could, by a determined night march, reach the field
early the next morning. The Sixth Corps was at Man-
chester, off to the left, over thirty miles by march. Its
arrival could not be hoped for until later on the morrow,
even with the unrelenting forced march which it was sure
to make under a man like Sedgwick.

Hancock did not get back to Taneytown until about ten
o'clock at night, just as Meade was preparing to depart for
what he now regarded as the front, having, previously to
Hancock's arrival, come to the conclusion to fight at Get-
tysburg, and having already expedited orders to the outly-
ing corps to concentrate there. After a brief colloquy with
Hancock, Meade rode rapidly towards the field, stopping
only for a moment to order Gibbon, in position with the
Second Corps, where Hancock had stationed it, three miles
distant on the Federal left flank, to march by daylight for
the Heights of Gettysburg.

Before resuming the account of the battle, a few points
must be here disposed of at the expense of an unavoidable
digression, for the reader must remember that, at bot-
tom, this work represents a sketch of the life of General
Meade, and that whereas, were I writing a mere history, I
should have to dwell only on the facts that constitute the
surface of things, I must here conduct the reader behind
the scenes, if he would learn what vitally concerns the
military reputation of the subject of this memoir. One of

THE FIBST DA Y OF QETTYSBUBQ. 3 1 3

these points relates to a cloud of misrepresentations intended
to show, to the disparagement of General Meade, that he
did not intend to fight at Gettysburg, as if that, of itself,
were of any significance whatever. Every military man
knows that no general can, in the midst of strategic move-
ments, determine positively where he shall fight. The
reason for this ought, indeed, to be self-evident. His ad-
versary's movements complicate the question as the locality
of battle. Lee, for instance, was able, through no default
of Meade's, to concentrate a little earlier than he ; but sup-
pose that Lee had had the advantage of twelve hours more
than he actually gained, the impending battle could not
have been fought at Gettysburg. Suppose that, on the
contrary, Meade had had the advantage of twelve hours
more than he could obtain, as the event turned out, the battle
would have been fought at least near, and if at Gettysbui^,
without the episode of the first day, and consequently with-
out that of the second. It is an inevitable conclusion from
facts, that Meade, at Taneytown, could not, for two reasons,
know if, whatever he might desire, he would be able to
fight at Gettysburg. First, in the natural order, is the
fact that he could not know if the defence of the advance
had been sufficient to enable him to occupy the ground in
time ; and second, if that were conceded, if the ground he
could secure would be tactically well adapted for his line
of battle. Consequently, when he despatched Hancock to
the front, the resolution of these two points was involved in
that mission, to determine if the ground were fit, and if the
stand were sufficient to enable the other corps to reach the
field. Had Hancock not made from the field a favorable
report, and had he not given General Meade reason to
believe that the ground could be held long enough for
support to arrive, General Meade would have been forced
to concentrate further to the south, and to order the falling

314 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

back of the force at Gettysburg to Pipe Creek. In short,
there was not, and there could not well be, and ought not
to have been, in a general so situated as Meade was at
Taneytown, any predilection for a place to fight, except such
as events determine upon as that in which he can fight to
the best advantage.

Another point intimately connected with the one just dis-
cussed is involved in the repeated statement that Hancock,
not Meade, chose the battle-field. That such a statement
should have received any measure of even popular credence
is a severe reflection upon the military knowledge of the
country, inasmuch as a general is not supposed to be able
to see everything for himself, and his staff) his engineers,
his cavalry, his pickets, his videttes, are all supposed to be
among the multitudinous eyes at his service, to which
might be added, his couriers and telegraphic messages
from distant parts. In the history of no other command-
ing-general but Meade can be found any intimation that
he has had no part in doing that towards which a sub-
ordinate had lent his aid. General Hancock was a bom
corps-commander. As such he had the instinct of the
capabilities of ground and troops with reference to a given
field. He was despatched by General Meade to decide, as
has already been said, two questions which were very simple
to him. In his testimony before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, General Meade inadvertently says in
one place, that he thinks it was after Hancock's return from
the field, and report to him personally, that he sent out
orders for the convergence of the rest of the troops upon
the position at Gettysburg. But this statement was a lapse
in memory, for he subsequently says, in the course of the
same testimony, that he had issued orders for concentration
before the return of Hancock, and Hancock himself says
that he found the orders to concentrate had preceded his

THE FIBST DA Y OF QETTYSB UBG. 3 1 S

arrival, as in fact the time noted on the orders also clearly
shows. But, what if General Meade's orders to concentrate
had followed, instead of preceded, Hancock's personal re-
appearance at Taneytown ? Hancock's function was simply
investigation and report ; Meade's, decision upon the basis
of investig^ation and report. General Meade was evidently
so well satisfied with the report from the field that he acted
at once, before his emissary had had time to return.

As to another point connected with the battle of Gettys-
burg, an interested attempt has been made to detract from
the merit of General Meade by means of the allegation that,
after having reached the ground, he showed immediate in-
tention of retreating, as evidenced by a provisory order
which he directed to be framed regarding the positions of
troops and roads in all directions. Yet it can be shown
conclusively, as he himself testified before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War, and as numerous officers present
on the field have testified, that if he intended to retreat, he
was at the same time doing things wholly incompatible with
that intention, planning attacks, ordering up trains, artillery,
etc. Every capable general, in undertaking a pitched battle,
obtains all the knowledge possible of his surroundings, the
position of his troops, of roads to the rear, of roads in ad-
vance, so that he may be able to fight to the best advantage,
to pursue, or to retreat, as the fortunes of war may deter-
mine. The alleged instructions, upon which was based the
figment of an order, were nothing but ones to cover any
usual contingency.

Lastly, there has been an attempt to fix upon General
Meade, through the citation of proceedings of a council
of war, on the 2d of July, the charge of desire to retreat,
although the condition of things at that time, and the
testimony procurable as to the actual proceedings of the
council, give no warrant for such a belief, while, on the

3i6

GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

contrary, animus that would be fully equal to encouraging
such a belief is clearly demonstrable. With this summary
of the groundless aspersions to which General Meade has
been from time to time assailed, I return with the greatest
relief and pleasure to the main thread of the narrative.

When General Meade reached Gettysburg night had long
fallen on the scene. Along the opposing crests prepara-
tions were making for the conflict of the next day. Weary
men were resting on the field, and others pressing onward
towards it through the moonlit gloom. In the stillness of
midnight of the ist of July General Meade rode up the
Taneytown Road on to East Cemetery Hill. After receiving
reports from various officers, he rode off with General Hunt,
viewing the lines while Hunt was posting artillery. About
daylight of the 2d of July he established his headquarters
in a house just back of the centre of the army.

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTYSBUBG. 3 17

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SECOND DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

It unfortunately happens that the majority of the world
imagine that they know much that they have not studied,
and that a small but active minority often act as bell-wethers
to the innocent following flock. Things have come to be
traditional about the battle of Gettysburg which are entirely
false. They who have for the most part furnished these
myths will, however, in the course of nature soon pass
away, and with them the need of anything but the unvar-
nished truth as nearly as it may be reached by human im-
perfection. We are studying a battle in which, not we
alone, but future generations of the earth will take interest
The world, as time goes on, and more and more as it lapses,
will find it full of interest. The time will come when the
battle shall stand in the minds of men as among the greatest,
as representing an epoch in the continuous civilization of
the world. Then, in that day, when students of govern-
ment and of war scan the data from which they will reach
their conclusions, there will be no question in their minds
as to whether or not General Meade proposed to retreat
from Gettysburg, none whatever as to the field being his
own deliberate choice, none that Sickles was wholly un-
justifiable in taking up the position along the Emmettsburg
Road, none that Little Round Top was made secure by
Hancock and finally by Meade, none that it was by no ac-
cident by which it was seized by Warren when relinquished
by Sickles. The ascription of these and other events to
the category of accident, or to the wrong person, will be

3 1 8 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

rejected. They were the outcome, either direct or indirect,
of Meade*s action, and unless the world should be prepared
to say what it never yet has declared, that a general must
personally do everything himself, under penality of forfeiting
all credit for the event of battle, Meade will be safe in the
future for the glory of Gettysburg. Nor should any one
suppose, and parrot-like repeat, that the history of this and
other great events of the same time is likely to renew the
unreliableness of much past history. It is not so, for in
these modem days the whole world, from land's end to
land's end, is one vast library of information in the literature
of letters, magazines, books, newspapers, and public records
innumerable. The day will come, is in fact rapidly ap-
proaching, when it will be impossible to distort the history
of the men and the events of our civil war, even false wit-
ness lending itself to analysis for the furtherance of the
truth that will be patent in the distant, but not far distant
future, even if the beginning of its term should be rated at
a hundred years. Under the lead of &lse teaching, and
with the sublime assurance of ignorance, writers who have
evidently never set a squadron in the field, or studied the
military art from the writings of its masters, have made all
sorts of comments on the battle of Gettysburg. These will
be part of the task of the future to consign to the limbo of
the forgotten among the transient curiosities of literature.
Imbued as I am with the deepest feith in this beneficent
future, it will become manifest, as we proceed, that my in-
tention is not to write from the point of view that General
Meade, like the kings of old, could do no wrong, for it is
fully admitted in one place, and intended to be implied
throughout, that, as Turenne once said, when he confessed
to having made a military mistake, that the general who
has not made one has not been long engaged in war. The
fixed purpose here is, however, incidentally to correct pre-

THE SECOND DA T OF QETTT8B UBQ. 3 19

valent error, as indispensable to giving a true impression
of the character, ability, and principal lifework of the sub-
ject of this memoir.

The enemy contemplated attack on the morning of the 2d,
on the right and on the left. The Federal army contem-
plated making a right attack. Its left was guarded as well as
concentration at the moment of its intended right attack per-
mitted. That is, its left was believed to be properly guarded,
for who could have known that Sickles would not occupy
his designated post ? The right attack, for which troops had
been massed, was about to be delivered, when further rec-
onnoissance decided against it. Then the masses on the
right were lessened by detachments sent towards the left.
The intention to make an attack on the right had been re-
linquished about 10 A.M., upon the report of Warren and
Slocum as to the result of the reconnoissance of the ground
there. Between 3 and 4 p.m. General Meade, after having
ordered the Fifth Corps to march to the left, and passed
with Warren and other officers in that direction, saw there
to his astonishment that Sickles was no longer in the posi-
tion assigned him, but that he had advanced his line of
battle to the subordinate ridge previously described, where
it lay exposed to attack on both of its flanlcs completely in
the air. Hence the battle that ensued was on Sickles's
plan, not on General Meade's, and all that remained for
General Meade to do was what he did, to accept the situa-
tion, to meet what there was no time to rectify, to retrieve
what might be possible of the free gift that Sickles had
made to disaster. There can be no doubt that Sickles re-
ceived, on the morning of the 2d of July, the order to
occupy the line in continuation of that held to the left by
Hancock, the line occupied by Geary before he was with-
drawn to the right preparatory to the attack intended at first
to be made from that direction. It was shown in the last

320 OENERAL OBOBQE GORDON MEADR

chapter that Hancock had ordered Geary to extend the line
of battle from his left to and inclusive of the Round Tops,
that Geary had, in obedience to that order, taken up a line ;
and as Hancock also testifies that General Meade ordered
Sickles, on the morning of the 2d, to hold the line that
Geary had occupied, it is clear that he knew where it was
intended to station him ; and as Hancock, who testifies as to
his having been in position, was close by, that he, in the first
instance, must, at least in a general way, have taken up the
position defined by orders. Soon after six o'clock in the
morning of the next day, the 2d of July, Captain (now
Colonel) Meade,* of the commanding-general's staff, carried
from him a communication to Sickles, notifying him of the
locality of headquarters, inquiring if his troops were yet in
position, and if he had anything of moment to report
Upon Captain Meade's arrival on the ground and ascertain-
ment that General Sickles was resting after his night march,
he transmitted the communication to him through the me-
dium of Captain Randolph, of his staff, receiving in reply
the information that General Sickles was doubtful where to
go. This response evidently made General Meade anxious,
for upon the return of his aide with it, he despatched him
forthwith to Sickles to impress upon him the urgency of
getting his troops at once into position. It was about seven
o'clock when, in reply to this second message of the com-
manding-general, General Sickles, then about to mount,
surrounded by his staff, already in the saddle, said, with ref-
erence to the renewal of the commanding-general's orders
as to the position to be taken, that he was then moving into
position. About eleven o'clock General Sickles presented
himself at headquarters, and the commanding-general there

* Deceased since these lines were indited, which had been verified
by Colonel Meade in the form of the written statement herein given
regarding his connection as aide-de-camp with this ai&ir.

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTTSB UBQ. 32 1

told him that he was to occupy, and pointed out in the dis-
tance the position in which Hancock had placed Geary on
the preceding evening. To this Sickles said that, as far as
he could make out, Geary had had no decided position.
With General Meade's final word to him, that he was at
liberty to occupy in his own manner the ground designated,
within the general scope of his instructions. Sickles de-
parted, the commanding- general allowing Hunt to accom-
pany him to examine the ground to the left and select
positions for artillery.

General Meade learned, after the war, from Geary, a cir-
cumstance which points to Sickles's having from the first
intended not to occupy the position designated, for Gen-
eral Geary then told General Meade that, when he re-
ceived the order notifying him that he would be relieved
by the Third Corps, he sent an aide to Greneral Sickles to
communicate to him information as to the great importance
of Round Top, and to request that he would send a member
of his staff to view the ground and occupy it with troops.
Nothing, however, he said, came of his action but a reply
from General Sickles that the matter would be attended to
in due time, when, after waiting as long as he could on the
ground, in the hope that he should see the arrival of offi-
cers or troops, he was obliged to leave it in fulfilment of his
own instructions from General Meade.

Greneral Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Po-
tomac, gives, in one of his articles in the Century Magazine^
and in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, a circumstantial account of what occurred be-
fore, at the time of, and after Greneral Meade's instructing
him to examine the ground to the left. The gist of this,
coupled with General Meade*s own account to that Com-
mittee, is, that upon his returning to headquarters from an

inspection of the lines for general artillery purposes, he

322 OBlfE&AL 6E0EQE GORDON MEADE

found Sickles there about eleven o'clock. General Sickles
had expressed to General Meade his belief that Geary had
had, in effect, no position, a view which ignored the infor-
mation which Geary had already sent him. In consequence
of this statement. General Meade instructed Hunt to go with
General Sickles and examine ground to the left suggested
by him as adapted to artillery positions, which ground
Sickles had been authorized to take up within the scope of
his previous general instructions ; Hunt's delegated duty, as
defined by words, being restricted to choice of artillery po-
sitions on General Sickles's alleged superior front. It is
evident, however, that although, so far as words addressed
to Hunt are concerned. General Meade commissioned him
to accompany General Sickles with reference only to the
selection of artillery positions, and nothing else, yet, as
he so acted upon the basis of the immediately preceding
statement of General Sickles to him, that Geary had had no
position, meaning, as he had further declared, that Geary's
troops had been merely massed, and had occupied no de-
terminate battle-line. General Meade virtually commissioned
General Hunt to inspect the ground which General Sickles
had been proposing to occupy, not strictly with reference
to artillery positions, but to its capabilities ascertainable
through examination for artillery positions as the medium
through which its advantages and disadvantages for a line
of battle could be judged. General Meade must have
thought, having seen the place only by moonlight, that the
ground which General Sickles had been proposing to take
up within the scope of his instructions was represented by
protuberances on the general line from Cemetery Hill to
Little Round Top, but there are none such.*

* General Meade, in speaking of General Sickles's visit to him at
his headquarters, says, in the course of a communication well known

THE SECOND DA Y OF GETT7SBUBQ. 323

General Meade therefore naturally supposed that General
Sickles's troops would remain in essentially the same posi-
tion as that in which they then were, the position which
Hancock says in his report they then were, which was,
refinements of posting apart, substantially in the position
from the left of the Second Corps to Little Round Top.
General Meade had given Greneral Sickles no authority to
make any radical change in their position, but, on the con-
trary, had warned him against exceeding the scope of his
general instructions. General Hunt gave him no author-
ity to that end, as delegated by General Meade ; he pos-
sessed none such. On the contrary, he says, in his account
of the battle, that he ascertained on the ground that the line
proposed by General Sickles to him (necessitating, like any
other, connection with the left of the Second Corps and with
Little Round Top) would be unduly extended, and whilst
recognizing some advantages, more than counterbalanced
by disadvantages stated, including the paramount objection
that there were not enough troops in the Third Corps to
occupy it, his last words to General Sickles, in reply to a
question from him if he should occupy it, were, " not on
my authority ; I will report to General Meade for his in-
structions." This he. did, and General Meade took no
further action, in the legitimate fulness of confidence that
his repeated instructions would not be transcended. Never-
theless, Sickles eventually advanced and occupied the po-
sition on the Emmettsburg Road and the crest to the left,
while Hancock, with his keen eye in tactics, that was not
to be deceived by military display, observing and admiring
the spectacle of the advance of the Third Corps, remarked
that it would soon be coming back.

as the Benedict Letter : " There it was I told him his right was to be
Hancock's left ; his left on Round Top, which I pointed out"

324 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADR

Aside from the question just discussed, looking at the
matter simply from the tactical point of view, the place to
which the advance had been made naturally belongs to the
enemy's occupation, unless an army holding the position
on Cemetery Ridge in opposition to an army on Seminary
Ridge has two-fifths more troops than it This advantage
over Lee Meade's assembled army did not enjoy, and
the number of troops in hand, on the morning of the 2d
of July, were meagre even for the defence of the shorter
line of the field from Gulp's Hill to the Round Tops. The
enemy's acquisition of the outer position occupied by Gen-
eral Sickles is objectionable, it is true, because that condition
circumscribes the opposing army on Gemetery Ridge to the
occupation of a line at the southern part of the field from
which it is difficult to assume the offensive. But, as the
ground and the forces stood, the line adopted by General
Meade was correct, and the holding of the ground at Devil's
Den and beyond to the right was then proper only for skir-
mishers and artillery easily withdrawn. To employ a homely
comparison, perfectly illustrative, however, of tactical neces-
sities, we may in conclusion justly say, in printer's parlance,
that on any extended battle-field but a desert plain the lean
must be taken with the fat.

It happens that the lines of an imaginary cross of the
usual proportions, with their intersection centred in the
heart of Gettysburg, and staff about five miles long, rang-
ing north and south, make excellent lines and datum-points
for la)dng down the battle-field. The area above the arms
of the cross includes the battle-field of the ist of July, and
also the debouchure of all the roads, northwest, north, and
northeast, by which the Confederates reached the ground,
while the staff below the arms represents the direction
of a line just back of the Federal position along Ceme-
tery Ridge, and the foot a point not hx in the rear of the

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTTSBUBQ. 325

twin summits of Round Top and Little Round Top, with
which Cemetery Ridge ends at the south. The staff of
the cross, from the arms to the foot, therefore nearly re-
presents the north and south line of the Federal position,
as it looked west ; but it also looked north, and that part of
the position can be defined in the following manner with
reference to the same figure. A fifth of the way down the
staff from the arms is Cemetery Hill, where Cemetery Ridge
is high. Thence the ridge swings around to the northeast,
and thence to the southeast, forming one long curve towards
the north for the distance of half a mile, at the end of which
occurs its highest point, Culp's Hill, just before the ridge
there ends in a lower top, whence the land slopes down-
ward to Rock Creek, a stream which runs nearly south,
along the east side of the infantry battle-field. It thus
appears that the Federal position, without regard to its
orientation, is best represented as to its general shape, as
it often has been, by saying that it was curved like a fish-
hook. From the orientation here given, the shank of the
hook is seen to run from the south, just west of the lower
part of the staff of the imaginary cross, to about tw()-thirds
of a mile short of its cross-piece, and then to bend around
gradually through a northward curve to its barb at Culp's
Hill, southeast. The roads which, coming from the south,
traverse the ground in centre, front, and rear of the posi-
tion, converge at the southern outskirts of Gettysburg.
Coinciding with the lower part of the staff of the cross is
the Taneytown Road, therefore running north and south,
just back of the general line of the north and south position
of the army. Off to the east of the Taneytown Road, at
an angle with it, or with the south, of forty degrees, is the
Baltimore Turnpike. Off to the west of the Taneytown
Road, at an angle with it, or with the south, of thirty-five
degrees, is the Emmettsburg Road.

326 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

The position first occupied by the Confederate army
opposite, on Seminary Ridge, averaged about a mile in dis-
tance from the general Federal position, and was represented
by a reversed curve, approximately the line of beauty. Tak-
ing it from the Seminary, on the ridge, about half a mile off
from the centre, on the western arm of the cross, it curved
slightly eastward towards the Federal position, until its mini-
mum distance from that was only about three-quarters of a
mile, from which point it curved inward slightly until opposite
to the Round Tops, distant a trifle over a mile most of the
way, its slight concavity in its southern part corresponding to
a slight concavity there in the Federal position. At Gettys-
burg itself, in the plain below, there was necessarily a break
in the continuity of the Confederate line, and so the force
brought against Meade's extreme right, around the curve
from Cemetery Hill to Culp*s Hill, lay under the dis-
advantage of indifferent facility of concerted action with
Lee's left on Seminary Ridge.

One feature of the topography still remains to be de-
scribed, an important, although subsidiary one, for upon it
hung the character of the main battle of the second day.
The Emmettsburg Road, running, as before described, to
the outskirts of Gettysburg, at an angle of about thirty-
five degrees west of south, necessarily runs transversely
across the valley between the two ridges occupied by the
opposing armies. This would have been a circumstance
of little moment, but for the fact that the position of the
road is determined by the existence of the low ridge along
which it runs, and that General Sickles, seduced by the
appearance of the ground to his eye, saw fit to occupy that
ridge, and extend his line along it, instead of extending it in
the continuation of the general line of the army along Ceme-
tery Ridge. From j ust south of Gettysburg, and abutting on
Cemetery Ridge at Cemetery Hill, imagine running thence

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTTSB UBG. 327

the subordinate ridge on which the Emmettsburg Road
passes southward, diagonally across the valley between
Cemetery and Seminary Ridges, until it reaches a point
making an obtuse angle, open towards Cemetery Ridge.
Now, if a perpendicular to our base line on Cemetery Ridge
be dropped from the apex of the aforesaid obtuse angle, it
would pass half a mile to the north of Little Round Top.
This outer angle thus fixed with reference to Cemetery Hill
and Little Round Top, the western angle of the subordinate
ridge running diagonally across the valley, the apex of
Sickles's line, the salient of the celebrated Peach Orchard,
is thus shown to be nearly three-quarters of a mile beyond
the true line of an army occupying the general position of
Cemetery Ridge, the position of the supposed observer on
the base line being slightly east of the true line of battle. To
the outer point, thus determined in position, the transverse
ridge on which the Emmettsburg Road is situated gradu-
ally increases in height as it runs southwest from Gettys-
burg. Thence it turns towards the southeast, making at
the Peach Orchard an angle of one hundred and fifteen
degrees with the line of the ridge running towards Ceme-
tery Hill, and continuing on the other line for two-thirds
a mile, ends on the escarpment of the gulch separating it
from the bases of Little Round Top and Round Top, between
which and it flows Plum Run proper, a branch of which flows
through a swale to the westward, the two streams thus
enclosing in their fork a portion of the ridge, traditionally
known as the Devil's Den, from the tumultuous wildness*
of its rocky and wooded scenery, a name rendered by the
events of the day forevermore appropriate.

By the construction employed has thus been defined with
great minuteness the position of the lines of the Army of
the Potomac, because, without it, the sequel could not pos-
sibly be understood, whereas, with both map and descrip-

338 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADR

tion, it cannot fail to be clear to every reader. Standing
at the point determined by the perpendicular erected on
the base opposite the apex of the Peach Orchard, that is,
half a mile north of Little Round Top, and only a little
back of where General Sickles's line should have been, we
should have seen, if there had been no interfering woods,
Sickles*s corps drawn up around the angle of one hundred
and fifteen degrees on the ridge described, the troops at
the Peach Orchard, three-quarters of a mile off, thrust in
the iace of the enemy. Inasmuch, moreover, as the ridge
which determined the direction of his right departs from
Cemetery Ridge just back of the outskirts of Gettysburg,
and ends beyond its obtuse angle abruptly at the escarp-
ment on Plum Run, leaving a gulch between it and the
Round Tops, and the only troops at Sickles's disposal for
hol<jing the ground were those of the Third Corps, it fol-
lowed that his right flank was completely in the air, and
that his left flank, also in the air, brought up on the steep,
rocky slope of the Devil's Den, while the angle at which
the troops were compelled to defend the position was not
only one that could be enfiladed on both sides, but one that
ensured to the enemy, should he break through on either
wing, the ability to take in reverse the remaining wing. Thus
was the left flank blindly stationed when General Meade,
who had with reason supposed that Sickles's corps was in
line with Hancock's, rode to that part of the field from the
right before four o'clock in the afternoon, and discovered at
a glance the situation and the impossibility of rectifying it in
time by a retrograde movement. Several hundred yards
intervened between Hancock's left and Sickles's right, on the
Emmettsburg Road. Sickles's right guarded nothing but
the ground on which it stood, and that imperfectly, his left
inviting attack in reverse by the broad avenue of the gulch
beyond, and his centre forming the double target of two

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTYSBUBO. 329

lines that could be enfiladed, and to complete the dis-
advantage at which the army had been placed, this faulty
formation ranged from two-thirds to three-quarters of a
mile in advance of its general position.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d
of July the weary Sixth Corps had begun to appear on the
left from its long march of over thirty miles. The Fifth and
Twelfth Corps were on the right, the extreme right at Culp*s
Hill being held by the Twelfth. On the left of these corps,
on Cemetery Hill, was the Eleventh Corps, supported by
the First. General Hancock's lines were drawn up on its
left, on Cemetery Ridge, where it runs nearly north and
south, and on the left of his line had been the Third Corps,
until the moment when it had been advanced by Sickles to
the Emmettsburg Road. Lying as Geary's front and flanks
had at first lain, with left near the north base of Little
Round Top, and on Little Round Top itself, he had had a
firm hold on the position, while Sickles's lesser hold, from
partial occupation of the ground, he had by his advance
entirely relinquished. Beginning at Cemetery Hill, at the
north, the ground droops and then rises gradually as it
nears the northern base of Little Round Top, whence it
rises abruptly into the massive protuberances constituting
the twin tops.

General Meade rode down with his staff on to the
ground back of the line where Sickles's troops were ar-
rayed, and despatching Warren at once towards the left to
look out for the security of the Round Tops with what
troops he could muster for the purpose, listened to Sickles's
reasons for having taken up the position occupied.* Two

♦ Warren says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Con-
duct of the War, " I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what
is called Bald Top.*' [Little Round Top.] Yet it has even been
committed to monumental bronze, on the battle-field itself, to tell,

330 GENERAL QEQBQE GORDON MEADE

divisions of the Fifth Corps were arriving under the or-
ders previously mentioned. They were now hastened into
position. Soon Caldwell's division of the Second Corps
was ordered to the left. Later in the day Robinson's
and Doubleday's divisions, of the First Corps, then under
General Newton, reinforced the left-centre, and still later in
the day General Williams marched from the right to sustain
the left with the First Division of the Twelfth Corps, under
Ruger, Lockwood's brigade of that division, however, being
the only portion of it that became engaged. Whilst Gen-
erals Meade and Sickles were still in conference. General
Meade telling Sickles that it was too late to retire as he
had proposed, but that everything must be done to support
him, the attack burst in fury on their immediate front.
What followed would in all its details require a whole
volume for adequate description of the sudden battle pre-
cipitated by the enemy's advance. Only a summary, there-
fore, can be presented of the conflict which ensued. Com-
manding-general of the army. General Meade continued to
exercise that function, besides leading troops into action to
inspire them, and riding in all directions on the field in one

that through Warren's wonderful coup d'ani, this important position
was secured. There cannot be a particle of merit ascribable to any
one for looking to its occupation at that moment. It was certain, with
the Third Corps thrown far in advance, that the enemy would ap-
pear in front of Little Round Top with his right flank, and that his
lines of battle must be advancing on it at the very time General Meade
spoke. This was what Warren actually saw when he reached the
summit The success of this is what he frustrated by his energetic
action. It is lamentable that there should have been an attempt to
base in any measure the military reputation of so fine a soldier, so in-
intelligent, brave, and skilled as Warren, upon the statement that to
his trained perception was due the holding of the position, when any
intelligent boy would have seen that it must be instantly secured or
the field lost, and when it was only his admirable seizure and reten-
tion of it that redounds to his credit.

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTYSBURQ. 33 1

of those crises which partially merge the chief in the simple
fighter ; such as sees a general, however exalted, as lately
saw Reynolds, as saw Napoleon on the bridge of Areola,
and Caesar, snatching a legionary soldier's shield, and
entering into a hand-to-hand conflict, reduced to the
necessity of coming at all hazards to the front of battle.
The ground between the position in which Sickles's troops
had been and the true position of the lines of the army
became an arena of strife. To attempt to follow it here in
all its varying incidents would, as I have said, be impossible.
The account of the struggle must be confined to its general
features.

Sickles's right was the division of Humphreys, and
Graham's brigade, of Bimey's division, and on the other
side of the angle at the Peach Orchard were Bimey's two
other brigades, under Ward and De Trobriand. The
troops occupying the right of Lee*s army consisted of
Longstreet*s corps, formed of Hood's and McLaws's divis-
ions, and on the left of Longstreet's corps was Hill's. The
troops of these two corps which became actually engaged
were Hood's and McLaws's, of Longstreet's corps, and
Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, on the left of McLaws.
The first attack was made by Hood's division (under one
of his brigade-commanders, Law, Hood having been dis-
abled) on the line to the left of the angle at the Peach
Orchard. At the same time Hood's division pushed troops
around his right, through the gulch between the Devil's
Den and the Round Tops, and along the slopes of those
great hills. There was no cavalry on the left. It had been
there up to noon, in the form of Buford's three brigades,
but General Pleasanton, the commander of the cavalry
corps, had, with singular misjudg^ent, considering his
usual conduct of his special operations, failed to keep
Buford's troopers until they could be replaced by an equiv-

332 GENERAL QEOBQE QOBDON MEADR

alent force, and they had been allowed to depart for West-
minster for the purpose of refitting after his late exhausting
service. About one o'clock General Meade had learned
that his left flank had been entirely denuded of cavalry at a
time when, as he knew, a crisis, through his own action or
that of the enemy, was certainly approaching in that quarter
of the field. Buford being then beyond recall, a single
r^ment of cavalry, drawn from Gregg, on the right, was
the only mounted force available during the afternoon and
night of the 2d and the morning of the 3d for picketing
the left of the army. Kilpatrick did not reach the right-
rear of the enemy until i p.m. of the 3d, with Famsworth's
brigade, and Merritt, who had marched from Emmettsburg
at noon of the same day, came in on his left at 3 p.m. At
5.30 P.M., they together then made a desperate onslaught on
the enemy. It is not too much to surmise that, if the two
brigades of Buford, or their equivalent, had, on the 2d,
continued in position on the left, the enemy's preparatory
movements there on that day would have been so retarded
as to have at least modified the eventual pitched battle in that
quarter of the field, even if unable to alter essentially its
character.

General Meade withdrew from Hancock's left Caldwell's
division, of the Second Corps, and put it in on Sickles's
left. The two divisions of the Fifth Corps which had been
moving towards the left had now arrived. Warren had
reached Little Round Top. Here he seized a regiment of
Weed's brigade, of Ayres's division, of the Fifth Corps,
followed soon by the rest of its brigade, and secured, after
a desperate struggle with the enemy swarming up its sides,
that one of the important twin heights, while Vincent's
brigade, of Barnes's division, of the Fifth Corps, was put
in by Sykes between the Round Tops. The remainder of
the two divisions of the Fifth Corps which had come on the

THE SECOND DA Y OF QETTYSBURG. 333

ground, Ayres's and Barnes's, thus each minus a brigade,
reinforced the left of Sickles's line. Later, when the whole
line had been driven back to its true position, Ayres's divis-
ion reinforced its brigade on Little Round Top. The re-
maining division of the Fifth Corps, the Pennsylvania
Reserves, did not reach the battle-ground in time to share
in more than the very last of the conflict before the firm
re-establishment of the lines of the left of the army.

Humphreys' line, on the right of the Third Corps, had
been demonstrated against at first, but had for some time
remained unattacked, so that he had even been able to send
a brigade to the left upon the approaching crisis of the con-
test. The attack developed along the enemy's lines from
his right to his left, including Hood's, McLaws's, and An-
derson's divisions. The end was that the centre of Sickles's
line, at the Peach Orchard, was burst through, and his two
wings, as represented originally by Humphreys on the right
and Birney on the left, supported eventually by a division
of the Second Corps and the two divisions of the Fifth,
were driven back, fighting hard. To meet the condition of
the Federal troops on the left having been driven back for
some distance, Humphreys, on their right, still holding on
to the Emmettsburg Road with his right, while severely
attacked, pivoted on that, while striving to swing his left
flank backward towards Cemetery Ridge. Into this vortex
of fire and smoke was now launched reinforcement after
reinforcement by General Meade. Sickles had been borne
from the field grievously wounded, and Birney now com-
manded his corps. The ground was contested with varying
success, but to the general disadvantage of the Federal side,
owing to the directions of the respective lines of attack and
defence as largely determined by the nature of the ground.
No immediate advantage could accrue from tenaciously
holding the ground, but it was indispensable to do so for

334 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

the ultimate one of forming meanwhile a proper line further
to the rear. When Sickles was wounded and Bimey suc-
ceeded him in command of the Third Corps, General Meade
superseded him in the command of it by Hancock. No
ordinary crisis had been reached at that point of time in the
desperation of the struggle for victory. Hancock turned
over the command of the Second Corps to Gibbon, and
personally led Willard's brigade, of Hays's division, of the
Second Corps, to the relief of Bimey. Troops were sent
by Gibbon to fill in the open space between Humphreys'
right and the left of the Second Corps. General Meade,
on the ground further to the left, led into action some of
the reinforcements arriving under his orders from Gulp's
Hill, consisting of Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth
Corps and troops of the First. He advanced with the
former, and rode at the head of the latter in their chaise
across the field of battle, scatheless through all the turmoil,
in which he was so near harm that his faithful old horse,
"Baldy," was shot under him, the same horse that was
wounded five or six times during the war, and yet lived to
follow his master to the grave.

The maintenance at one time of the terribly endangered
lines on the left turned upon the establishment by General
Hunt, chief of artillery, of a massed line of guns on the
slight ridge along Plum Run, intermediate between the one
on which the Emmettsburg Road runs and the lines of
Cemetery Ridge, to the accomplishment of securing which
position for the security of the lines still further to the rear,
deficient in infantry, the Ninth Massachusetts Battery lent
itself with noble devotion. In the most dangerous crisis
of the fight, when the infantry of Humphreys and the artil-
lery which had been advanced were struggling against the
incoming wave of the enemy rushing over the ground to-
wards Cemetery Ridge, Bigelow, the captain of the battery.

THE SECOND DAY OF QETTY8BUBQ. 335

which had been fighting with prolonges fixed, was ordered
by his chief, McGilvery, to hold to the last gasp his position
near the Trostle house, in order to gain time for the other
batteries, swarming in advance of the threatened point,
to take position along Plum Run Ridge. Sternly Bigelow
fulfilled his trust, while the batteries in quick evolution fell
into massed line in his rear, until twenty-five pieces com-
manded and swept the ground to the relief of the disorgan-
ized troops and the retention of artillery left standing on
the field, finally bringing off his guns, after a hand-to-hand
fight, many of his command killed, himself, with others,
severely wounded, and with the loss of eighty horses.

For a long while the ground within this hard-fought
arena presented the spectacle of lines of troops at various
angles charging, retreating, and recharging in determined
me/ee, and no one would have dared at the moment to pre-
dict the issue of the conflict. At length the frantic efforts
of the enemy died out from sheer exhaustion. The last
Federal reinforcements came from the right. The Sixth
Corps had previously, as already mentioned, arrived from
its long march. Troops from various commands advanced
and pushed the enemy back. The Pennsylvania Reserves
had come up, and McCandless's brigade of that division
had been directed in a charge by Crawford. Fisher's
brigade of that division was sent to Big Round Top. The
lines of the Army of the Potomac to and through both
Round Tops were now occupied and victoriously held.
The expenditure had been frightful, computed by General
Meade himself as representing sixty-six per cent, of the loss
in the whole battle of three days, and with the result of his
line being driven back to the position from which it should
not have advanced. Even Humphreys must on this occa-
sion have had his fill of fighting, as he was seen coolly de-
ploying on the ground below, where he lost half of his

336 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

division, and where, if one could have seen his expression,
he would doubtless have observed it lighted up as usual
with the serene satisfaction which he reserved for battle,
and which could be interpreted by no other words than,
" Is not this delightful ?" Little Round Top, the scene of
the most dramatic episode of the battle ; the Peach Orchard,
of the hurly-burly following the rupture of Sickles's line ;
the Wheat Field, of many a desperate charge and repulse ;
and the Devil's Den, of the guerilla warfare of thousands
of begrimed gnomes fighting among the ragged rocks and
dark woods, had become immortal.

The severity of the contest had required so great rein-
forcements from the right, in the troops of the Twelfth Corps,
that the lines there had been stripped almost to the utmost
possible denudation. An early morning attack by the Con-
federates under Ewell had been planned to carry those lines,
no doubt delayed by General Meade's evident intention in
the morning to attack at that point. Here operated against
Ewell the lay of the land previously mentioned, rendering
it difficult to combine movements which included troops in
Gettysburg and those around the sweep of the lines from
Cemetery Hill to Gulp's Hill. At last, however, when the
fighting was subsiding on the left wing, Ewell's attack fell
on the right. The brigades of Steuart, Jones, Williams,
and Nicholls, of Johnson's division, and those of Hoke and
Hays, of Elarly's division, supported by that of Gordon, and
the rest of Ewell's Corps, assaulted from left to right on
the lines from Gulp's Hill to Cemetery Hill. It had been
intended that Rodes's division also, of Ewell's corps, should
participate in the assault, but as his line extended through
the town towards the west, his right resting on the road
thence to Fairfield, it so happened that, when he had with-
drawn his troops from the streets and changed direction,
his advance, which had been intended to be simultaneous

"■s«

••■ lu

THE SECOND DAY OF 0ETT78BUBG. 337

with Early's, had proceeded no further than driving in
the Federal skirmishers when the assault of Early on
his left had taken place and been repulsed. On the
Federal line at Cemetery Hill, held by the Eleventh
Corps, the enemy achieved a temporary success, but owing
to the timely arrival of Carroll's brigade, of the Second
Corps, sent to its assistance by Hancock, they were pre-
cipitately driven out of a portion of the entrenchments
which they had captured. On the right of the position, op-
posed to Johnson, the enemy had made a lodgment in some
entrenchments which had been evacuated by troops of the
Twelfth Corps, drawn thence during the afternoon as rein-
forcements for the left wing of the army. Here Greene's
brigade of that corps bore a distinguished part in thwarting
a greater success of the enemy, who at nightfall still main-
tained himself in the extreme works on the right, the
possession of which endangered the hold of the Army of
the Potomac on the Baltimore Turnpike, and thus threat-
ened its rear.

That night a memorable council of war met at General
Meade's headquarters, which determined unanimously to
fight it out at Gettysburg as representing an admirable posi-
tion. After General Meade's death it was attempted to use
this incident to his disadvantage. Why he called a council
should be evident. He had, by the night of the 2d of July,
been only five days in command of the army. An army,
including its leader, being in constitution what it has been
described to be, he would be presumptuous indeed who, in
command for only five days, and nearly half of the time in
the midst of a battle, would not seek the opinion of his
corps-commanders. Within a few days thereafter, General
Meade held another council, but still at a time when he had
been in command only sixteen days. After Gettysburg he
knew himself to be in command of an army which had as

338 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE

much confidence in him as he in it, and never called a coun-
cil again. It was in the interest of his corps-commanders, in
his own, in that of the cause they all represented, at a time
when he could not know that his individuality was welded
with the mighty instrument of which he was a part, that he
and they should meet, and the morale of all be confirmed
by personal conference, thence communicated in assurance
by a thousand paths to the rank and file which had proved
so worthy of confidence. The subsequent inimically re-
ported statement, that he had wished to retreat, was finally
set at rest by a pamphlet, issued after long forbearance by
his son, Colonel George Meade, in which the point as to
whether or not General Meade had desired to retreat from
Gettysburg is conclusively settled in the negative. Circum-
stances will lead the historian to believe that the accusation
rests upon the basis of uneasiness from extraneous causes
in the minds of his defamers.

THE THIRD DAY OF QETTY8BUBG. 339

CHAPTER XVII.

THE THIRD DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

The enemy, as has been said, remained in possession at
night of the works on the right which had been occupied
by some of the Twelfth Corps, captured as the result of
withdrawing a large force thence to the dangerously assailed
left flank of the army. During the night of the 2d General
Meade therefore massed a heavy force of artillery and
infantry near the works, with the view to their recapture as
soon as daylight should appear. Johnson's division, with
three brigades of Early's, both of Ewell's corps, had, in the
evening and night of the 2d, hugged and advanced up the
hillsides around the sweep from Culp's Hill to the outskirts
of Gettysburg, opening the attack on their left, where they
finally made lodgment in the lines, thinly defended on ac-
count of the withdrawal of the troops mentioned ; while
the immediately succeeding attack, more to their right, at
Cemetery Hill, under Early, was made by Hoke's brigade
and by Hays's, the redoubtable " Louisiana Tigers," whose
prowess, as believed by themselves, nothing could with-
stand. These troops had managed, under cover of the
straggling outskirts of the town, to carry one of the Eleventh
Corps' batteries, whence they were ejected by Carroll's
brigade, of the Second Corps, which, as the reader will
remember, had been opportunely despatched by Hancock
from his lines for the reinforcement of the sorely pressed
right of the general position.

We have now reached the morning of the 3d of July.
General Meade took the initiative, which Ewell had intended

340 GENERAL GEORQE QOBDON MEADE.

to take. The sun, rising on a cloudless day, saw the en-
gagement renewed on the right with a furious cannonade.
Here, on this part of the field, the Twelfth Corps had in
force resumed its position on the right, the Eleventh, as
before, was on its left, with Wadsworth's division of the
First Corps between them, the same division which, on the
first day, had prevented Ewell from occupying Culp's Hill.
Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps had come over from the
left, and was now ready for action on the right. The divis-
ion of Geary, of the Twelfth Corps, and the brigade of
Shaler, of the Sixth Corps, were hotly engaged from dawn
for several hours, supported by Ruger's division, of the
Twelfth Corps, and Wadsworth's division, of the First.
The works which had been lost on the previous evening
were finally abandoned by the enemy retiring before an ad-
vance of the Twelfth Corps, the action on this part of the
field being final. For several hours there was no more
fighting in any part of it, except that of a skirmish opposite
the lines of the Second Corps, resulting in the capture of a
bam, the possession of which by the enemy's skirmishers
as a shelter had long been annoying.

General Lee is authentically reported to have said at
Chambersburg that he expected to reach the field with a
little over seventy thousand men. He probably reached it
with numbers between seventy and seventy-five thousand
of all arms. The Federal army on the field probably num-
^ bered ninety thousand of all arms. The exact numbers on
either side can never be known. Owing to forced marches
on both sides, the number of stragglers whose strength gave
out before reaching the field was large. It may safely be
assumed that General Lee's force was not much over seventy
thousand men, nor General Meade's much over ninety thou-
sand, unless one counts as belonging to the latter General
French's eight thousand men from Harper's Ferry, which

THE THIRD DAT OF OETTTSBUBO. 34I

troops had been ordered to report to General Meade, al-
though previously refused to General Hooker. General
Meade ordered them forward, but besides occupying a
mountain pass further south, and destroying Lee's pontoon-
bridges over the Potomac, and finally reaching Frederick,
French's operations had no connection with those of the
Army of the Potomac. The forces arrayed against each
other were probably of the numbers, or at least relative pro-
portions mentioned. General Meade's own estimate of his
numbers, as given in his testimony before the Committee on
the conduct of the War, is unquestionably too large.

The Federal loss on the first day of battle had been very
much greater than that of the Confederates, and on the
second day in excess of the Confederate loss, so that from
the beginning up to the end of the second day, there had
been a tendency to numerical equalization. The third day
of battle, however, was destined to change the relation of
loss. It is not to the question of relative loss, however,
that attention is being drawn at the present moment, save
as that question bears upon one vehemently discussed to the
present day, as to whether or not Longstreet obeyed orders.
We have, on the one side, a preponderance of verbal testi-
mony going to show that he did not He certainly seems
to have been dilatory in coming into position and attacking
on the second day. The space requisite for the examina-
tion of that question, however, would be too great to devote
to it here. As to his equally discussed action on the third
day, we may properly consider it, as not involving the same
objection. If the statements of Longstreet's opponents are
correct, they are damaging to the military reputation of
Lee. That Longstreet was ordered to assault the left-centre
of the Army of the Potomac with the whole of his corps,
supported by half of Hill's, and if need were, by the whole
of it, seems incredible as an order emanating from General

342 QENEEAL OEORQE GORDON MEADR

Lee. Longstreet claims, on his side, that those were not
his orders, and a dispassionate view of the situation of both
armies at the point of time under discussion would seem to
show that they could not have been.

It is in this connection that the question of previous
losses, involving the relative numbers of the two armies on
the third day of battle becomes especially interesting. Lee
could not have had at the beginning of the third day more
than fifty-five thousand infantry. If, therefore, Longstreet
was ordered to attack with his own, and, if necessary, the
whole of Hill's corps, he was ordered to contemplate the
desperate feat of attacking with nearly forty thousand men,
or two-thirds of Lee's army, constituting the whole Confed-
erate line of two corps, Longstreet's and Hill's, from opposite
the Round Tops to Gettysburg. These were, by the alleged
orders, to be troops engaged or else supporting. When,
therefore, we are, on the one hand, asked to accept the evi-
dence of those who testify against Longstreet, and on the
other, to believe the evidence of Longstreet himself, rein-
forced by the unlikelihood of Lee's having contemplated
such a plan of battle as that mentioned, one is forced to de-
cide in favor of the supposition that Longstreet did not
receive such orders. There may, of course, be a middle
term, unknown, representing exactly neither the statement
of one side nor that of the other.

The approach of columns of infantry for a distance of
two-thirds of a mile over open country, subject to a cross-
fire of artillery and final opposition by firm infantry, is a
problem almost as difficult of solution as that presented by
the proposition. If an irresistible force meet an immovable
body, what must be the effect ? Mere mass of men in an
assaulting column is not sufficient. Too great mass frus-
trates the end in view. The French columns at Waterloo
are believed to have been too dense. And, at Waterloo,

THE THIRD DAY OF GETTT8BUBG. 343

the range of effective infantry-fire was not equal to that at
Gettysburg, as, at Gettysburg, it was not equal to that of
the Franco-Prussian War. To combine mass to the degree
which ensures momentum, with openness of disposition,
ensuring ease of deployment and support, looking to
reaching the enemy in an assault with the minimum of loss
from artillery and small-arms, was the heretofore insoluble
problem, now solved by the enormous increase in the effi-
ciency of the small-arm. It may be safely predicted that
never again can storming columns of any formation pass
over two-thirds of a mile of open ground and come in con-
tact with opposing lines of good infantry. It is not possible
to conceive that, even at Gettysburg, had the enemy increased
the density of his column and supports, there would have
been more than a mere protrusion into the lines of the Army
of the Potomac. A more compact array than the one em-
ployed would have been even more en prise to the artillery
and infantry of the opposing lines.

The case presented against Longstreet is, therefore, un-
intentionally presented against Lee. If Long^street's orders
were in very deed those which have sometimes been alleged,
then he was called upon by Lee to do the very thing which
has just been described, and which it has been indicated
would have been futile. May it not also be pertinently
asked in addition, whether, if such a charging array, over
such a distance, be not of more than doubtful expediency,
how can one reconcile with it, in this particular case, the
withdrawal of force capable of protecting the right wing of
Lee in presence of the whole lefl wing of the Army of the
Potomac. Whether or not Longstreet obeyed orders, he
apparently did all that could have been done. If that be
so, it is inconceivable that Lee could have ordered more.

The Confederates were during a long silence preparing
for their final blow. By one o'clock in the afternoon their

344 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE.

artillery was planted on the long line that they occupied
around the Federal position. It amounted to nearly one
hundred and fifty pieces, as officially stated by General
W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of North-
em Virginia. On the shorter Federal line were only about
eighty pieces, according to General Hunt. Along Cemetery
Ridge were forty-one guns of McGilvery's batteries. On
the right of them was Hazard's artillery of the Second
Corps. In front of Ziegler's Grove, to the right of the
clump of trees which was the directrix of the impending
charge of the enemy, were, from right to left, Woodruff's,
Arnold's, Cushing's, Brown's, and Rorty's batteries. In
front of that celebrated clump, brought up later from the
artillery-reserve, were Fitzhugh's, Cowan's, and Parsons'.
Besides these and a few others, some guns on Cemetery
Hill, to the right-rear, bore tolerably well towards the
front. Far off to the left, the summit of Little Round Top
was crowned with Rittenhouse's, late Hazlett's, six rifle-
guns.

The din and destruction of the cannonade were tremen-
dous. For two reasons the destruction was greater on the
Federal side, despite the superior quality of its artillery.
The Confederates had nearly twice as many pieces in battery,
because the lay of the land admitted of this advantage, and
the ground in rear of Cemetery Ridge sloped gently down-
ward towards Rock Creek, along which declivity the shot
ricocheting, soon clearing it of ambulances, waggons, am-
munition trains, etc., stampeding them to the rear. Great,
however, as was the destruction, it bore, as always, no reas-
onable proportion to the noise. Of the Alps and Jura
Ranges in a thunder-storm, Byron says, peak answered
peak, but here ridge poured towards ridge sheets of fire
from flashing guns with ceaseless roar. Yet, because the
angle subtended by the height of a man at the distance of

THE THIRD DAY OF QETTY8BUB0. 345

a mile is very small, and the infantry of the Army of the
Potomac presented even a smaller one, in the men crouch-
ing or lying down at their posts, the destruction, as com-
pared with the apparent danger, was disproportionately
small. It was in artillery and artillery-horses that the
destruction was greatest, guns on the lines being dismounted
and artillery-horses killed by hundreds, while towards the
rear, down the slope to Rock Creek, some of the caissons
of the reserve-artillery exploding, a safer resting-place was
sought General Hunt, chief-of-artillery of the Army of
the Potomac, afterwards jocularly remarked to General
Long, a former pupil of his, who on that day directed the
enemy's artillery, that he had scattered his fire too much.
The Army of the Potomac, however, was tolerably satisfied
that it was no better. The enemy was not chargeable with
having erred in the case of General Meade's headquarters.
It happening to be in range of the point destined for infantry
assault, the enemy's artillery poured shot and shell upon
the house so suddenly and profusely, that seventeen horses
were killed within the enclosure before the General and his
staff could vacate the premises and seek refuge where head-
quarters work could proceed to better advantage. The
first choice of a spot for this purpose proving faulty, they
all mounted and rode off to the hill-top on the southeast,
where were the headquarters of General Slocum.

After nearly two hours of this terrific cannonade. Gen-
eral Hunt ordered a cessation of the fire along Cemetery
Ridge, just as an order from General Meade to the same
purport was on its way to him, the object of both being to
meet the infantry attack which must now come from some
quarter unknown, but somewhere along the lines. where
they approached each other nearest. The Confederate fire
for a short time increased in severity, and soon the assault-
ing columns were seen deploying near the edge of the

346 GENERAL GEOBGE GORDON MEADE

woods opposite the centre of the Army of the Potomac,
the point for which they will aim being the left-centre, and
the beacon, the clump of trees about to become historical.
Pickett's assaulting force was about fifteen thousand strong,
Pickett's division, of five thousand, composed entirely of
Virginia troops, had freshly arrived on the field, and had
had sufficient time to rest. Longstreet held his two other
divisions. Hood's and McLaws's, to cover his right flank,
which Federal cavalry, Famsworth's and Merritt's brigades,
under Kilpatrick, were attacking, and infantry skirmishers
feeling. The main column of attack was composed of
Gamett's and Kemper's brigades, with Armistead's brigade
in supporting distance. The immediate flanks of this main
column were guarded on the right by Wilcox's brigade, of
Hill's corps, and on the left, by Heth's division, of Hill's
corps, commanded on that day by Pettigrew.

The troops of the Army of the Potomac witnessed pas-
sively, in admiration, the magnificent spectacle of the advance
of Pickett's division with its supporting flankers, reserving
even their artillery-fire for a while. Soon, however, the
artillery began to play upon them, the Eighth Ohio Regi-
ment in picket-advance, and ofTto the right, falling back to
avoid being overrun. The torrent poured from ridge to
ridge, broken into streams. From front and right and far
away Little Round Top on the left, the artillery played
upon the advancing colunms, torn through in places and
closing up with swirling motion and d^Ms tossed in air,
like little waves in the tide-rip of waters adversely beset by
some strong wind. The gfaps in the lines were closed as
soon as made, and the march was continued as relentlessly
as ever% The Federal artillery redoubled and then some-
what slackened its fire, some of the guns lacking long range
ammunition towards the end. General Hunt says that,
had his instructions been implicitly obeyed, the attacking

THE THIRD DAT OF 0ETTY8BVBQ. 347

column would not have reached the Federal lines. The
assaulting column, however, is nearing the infantry, which
is reserving its fire. Stannard*s Vermont brigade, of the
Third Division, of the First Corps, in advance to the left,
now pours a rapid fire into the right flank of the advancing
troops. The battle-field is covered with smoke rolling like
fog over the landscape, amidst which Wilcox's brigade
loses its bearings and drifts away from Pickett and halts.
The artillery-fire from the left to which the advancing
column is subjected is terrible, so crushing that the troops
instinctively shrink from it and oblique to their left. The
enemy is advancing artillery with his infantry, but, through
an accident, not so many pieces as he had intended to move
forward with. The mass comes on undauntedly, despite
the searching fire to which it is subjected, and the lines of
hostile infantry are not far apart when Gibbon's and Hays's
divisions, of the Second Corps, pour into it volley after vol-
ley of musketry. Only once in their swift course had the
enemy's lines halted within range and delivered fire along
their extended front.

Under the sudden attack of Gibbon and Hays, Heth's
division, on the enemy's left, led by Pettigrew, goes almost
to pieces, Hays's division capturing two thousand prisoners.
That fire disposes of the left flanking support of the enemy,
and the right one, under Wilcox, remains halted. Unsup-
ported, Pickett's division, or rather what remains of its three
brigades, charges, with some remnants from Pettigrew's
men, up the crest of Cemetery Ridge, striking, true to its
aim, taken two-thirds of a mile away, the left-centre of the
Army of the Potomac. No escarpment is here up which to
toil, dividing effort between climbing and fighting while
breasting an adverse height. Here is where the ridge has
swept downward from Cemetery Hill to a gentle slope on
which the combatants are virtually on the same level. Well

34S GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

and truly had Lee's skilled eye chosen the point of his
enemy's lines most easy of assault. Kaleidoscopic are now
the changes that take place within a few minutes. The
brunt of the assault falls on the Sixty-ninth and Seventy-
first Pennsylvania Regiments, of Webb's Philadelphia bri-
gade, of the Second Division of the Second Corps, drawn
up behind an extemporized entrenchment, and the Seventy-
second Pennsylvania Regiment of the same brigade, drawn
up a short distance in their rear. The two regiments in ad-
vance fire their parting shots and retire to the second line,
where they are reformed, and Hancock, hastily withdrawing
troops from his left, sends reinforcements to the threatened
point, while Stannard's brigade, on Hancock's left, changing
front to the right, attacks the charging column on its right
flank. The head of the column, led by Armistead in per-
son, has nevertheless crowned with its standards the line
from which the two Pennsylvania regiments had retired upon
their reserves. Hancock and Gibbon have been badly
wounded, the field is all alive with aides careering over it
bearing orders from officers and from the commanding-
general himself pressing towards the front Gushing and
Rorty and Woodruff and others are dead by their guns, or
mortally wounded. But I forbear special mention in a mere
sketch of a scene like this.

There can be no doubtful victory here. From front and
flank the Federal troops advance and sweep the field with a
besom of destruction. The Confederates are spent with
their desperate effort, and now, their three brigade-com-
manders either killed or dangerously wounded, are lost.
In an instant the late embattled but now harmless surge
rushes up with its last billow and eddies around General
Meade and his staff, while the receding vestiges of flotsam
and jetsam are borne backward with the reflux setting to-
wards Seminary Ridge. As the main wave of the Confed-

THE THIRD DAY OF 0ETTY8BUBG. 349

erate attack thus broke and recoiled from the living rampart
along Cemetery Ridge, the minor current of Wilcox's sup-
porting column on its right, which had held an uncertain
course under the dun war-cloud until it had halted, sud-
denly became reanimated, and resumed too late its onward
movement. It was greeted with a storm of shot from the
front, and Stannard's brigade, wheeling to the left, just as it
had previously wheeled to the right, fired into its flank,
whereupon it drifted afield with the general wreck setting
towards Seminary Ridge. The Eighth Ohio Regiment and
Stannard's brigade captured numerous prisoners from it.
Of all that gallant array which had so bravely set forth but
a few minutes before to anticipated victory, only about a
third returned safely to their lines. Their repulse, however,
was not accomplished without loss to the other side. Many
officers of high rank, besides Hancock and Gibbon, were
either killed or wounded, while the losses in the rank and
file in killed and wounded were considerable.

General Meade has often been censured for not having
ordered a countercharge. The assumption that this could
have succeeded is generally also coupled with the notion
that the movement could have been effected over the same
ground over which Pickett's advance had been made.
Nothing can betray greater ignorance of the situation which
existed at that point of time in the ranks at and imme-
diately to the right and left of the point where the charge
had fallen most heavily. Confusion must be held as always
existent, as it has always heretofore been known in expe-
rience to have existed under similar circumstances. In such
a collision as that which has just been described, the anvil,
although it suffers less than the hammer, still shares in its
disintegration. The ranks which had repelled attack re-
quired time for restoration to their effectiveness. But even
had they on the instant recovered their effectiveness, Lee

350 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

was amply prepared for a counter-assault over the same
ground as that over which the assault had taken place.
The troops forming Pickett's advance were independent of
the lines in their rear, leaving no gap there. Those lines
were intact, and could be plainly seen advancing to cover
their return when the remnants of Pickett's force were re-
treating in confusion. And besides, there was the artillery
of the enemy still in position ready to concentrate its fire on
any advancing column. Only when, as has happened, a
powerful body of heavy cavalry, heretofore unengaged, has
been able to act instantly and seize the moment of a trained
army's temporary discomfiture, has it ever been possible to
make a counter-assault over nearly the same ground as the
one over which an assault by infantry has been made and
repulsed. Confederate officers within that portion of the
lines from which Pickett's charge proceeded have testified
that an attempt by Meade to make a counter-assault over
the same ground over which Pickett had passed would have
been followed by as signal a repulse as that which the Army
of the Potomac had just inflicted. The testimony of such
witnesses, if any is to be considered, must be held good. It
remains, then, to consider the alternative of attacking else-
where. The reconnoissance of the 2d had shown that the
ground opposite the right, at and near Culp*s Hill, was not a
favorable one from which to make an assault. The ground
on the left might perhaps admit of it. It is not even gener-
ally known that that was attempted. The repulse of the
enemy on the left-centre of the army had scarcely been made
certain when General Meade rode rapidly to the left and or-
dered an advance. The ground there, however, as has already
been incidentally noted, is not favorable for the offensive of
an army occupying the lines prescribed by Cemetery Ridge
for the general and inevitable position of an army occupying
the ground east of the valley. The enemy was occupying

THE THIRD DA Y OF QETTY8B UBQ. 35 1

with powerful artillery the ridge from which Sickles had
been driven, and with infantry well closed up towards the
new position of the Army of the Potomac on its left.
McCandless's brigade, of Crawford's division of Pennsyl-
vania Reserves, of the Fifth Corps, and Nevin's brigade,
of the Third Division, of the Sixth Corps, advanced and
pushed the enemy to some advantage, as he happened to be
slightly withdrawing to strengthen his position there. The
case, as I view it now, and believe that it will in the future
be regarded, was one of deadlock, in which it was impos-
sible at the moment, without undue risk, unhesitatingly to
attempt to advance. The ability of the Army of the Po-
tomac to assume a sure offensive had been distinctively im-
paired by the terrible losses of the second day, growing out
of the then unfortunate advance of the lines on the left
beyond their true position. The situation after Pickett's
charge was such that hazards assumed in ordinary battles
were not to be assumed here. Why Austria did not avenge
Sadowa when the Franco- Prussian war subsequently came,
no one but a few diplomats knew until Lord John Russell
wrote his memoirs. We know now, and had reason to
suspect then, that had the day at Gettysburg been lost to
the Union cause, European recognition of the independence
of the Confederacy and all that that implies would have
immediately followed.

While this momentous charge on the left-centre of the
Army of the Potomac was being made and repulsed, Stuart's
cavalry, on the right-rear, was making strong efforts to
break through the Federal cavalry under General David
McM. Gregg. If Stuart had succeeded, the reserve-artillery
and ammunition and supply-train of the Army of the
Potomac would have been at his mercy, for even the reserve-
artillery and munitions had, on account of the furious artil-
lery fire on the front, been retired to a point on the Baltimore

352 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADK

Turnpike, well to the rear. Besides, Stuart's success would
have directly contributed towards that of Pickett's infantry
charge. Under Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton and
Chambliss and Jenkins, brigade-commanders, represented
the powerful Confederate force of cavalry on the right-rear.
Gregg met the enemy's four brigades with three, led by J.
B. Mcintosh, J. Irvin Gregg, and by Custer, of Kilpatrick's
division." Only two of the Federal brigades, however, were in
strenuous action. Randol's and Pennington's batteries were
present, the fight beginning with artillery and ending with
charging. At one point of time Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton
emerged in strong force from a wood, and charged with the
sabre, in the full belief, which the Confederates cherished
until late, that the Federal cavalry would not stand before
cold steel. But on this, and on the recent occasions at Bev-
erly Ford and Brandy Station, and also at Aldie, Middleburg,
and Upperville, the Federal cavalry proved that its training
had had its effect, and that, from being at first unable to cope
with that of the Confederates, it was able to meet it on equal
terms. Hampton was severely wounded, and the fight died
out without the enemy's being able to effect his purpose.
But for the circumstance that prescribed limits do not admit
of presenting the details of this cavalry action, it could be
here shown that solely because it was eclipsed to popular
interest by the main events of the day, has its meritorious-
ness never been generally known, and that, but for its
skilled and gallant conduct under General Gregg, the issue
might have been serious, nay, in the event reversed, fatal
to the Army of the Potomac, had Pickett's charge also been
at the same time successful.

On the left of the Army of the Potomac had continued
to be stationed, from the afternoon of the 3d of July, Fams-
worth's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, and
Merritt's brigade, of Buford's division. These two brigades

•"I
'It. -^

THE THIRD DAY OF QETTTSBUEQ. 353

gallantly attacked the right flank of the enemy's infantry.
Here was a lamentable occurrence in the decimation of the
troopers that Famsworth led, and in his own death.
Through a quixotic order of Kilpatrick's, Famsworth made
a hopeless charge, plainly visible from the summit of Little
Round Top. Surrounded by the enemy's infantry, the
troopers pursued their way among stone walls, working
what destruction they could, until a mere handful of them
regained their own lines.

Victory for the first time in any great battle perched on
the standards of the Army of the Potomac. By official
record the loss of the Army of the Potomac in killed,
wounded, and missing, was twenty-three thousand and
forty-nine, and that of the Army of Northern Virginia,
twenty thousand, four hundred and fifty-one. Discrepan-
cies in the official returns of the latter army, however,
and other allied facts, lead to the belief that the losses of
that army as there given do not represent the correct sum-
total. Swinton, who is generally temperate in his state-
ments, places the probable Confederate loss at thirty thou-
sand, and all the evidence at hand justifies belief in the
correctness of that estimate.

If, as the poet says, **Freedom shrieked as Kosciusko fell,"
she must have drawn a deep sigh of relief as the sun went
down upon that field. African slavery was but a portion,
gfreat as that was, of the contents of victory there for progress.
** We cannot consecrate this ground," said Lincoln, as he
delivered his beautiful address before the multitude soon
afterwards assembled there to do its perished heroes honor.
No, nor priest nor prelate nor gorgeous ceremony can add
to the simple dignity and pathos of the memories which there
and elsewhere the battle-fields of the nation awaken wher-
ever nature left undisturbed murmurs in every brook and

sighing breeze amid the graves the requiem of the dead.

354 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

General Lee had been driven by fate to fight, and to
fight just as he did fight the battle of Gettysburg. The
Confederate victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellors-
ville, following closely on the heels of others, had so elated
the officers and soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia,
that if they did not feel positive contempt for the Army of
the Potomac, they certainly had a feeling akin to it, in the
belief that it was no match for the Army of Northern Vir-
ginia. Lee was constrained by this sentiment to fight a
pitched battle whenever he might meet his enemy in force.
He was constrained to fight in the particular locality of
Gettysburg, because the strategical movements of both
armies had led up to that consummation, and to both the
tactical requirements of ground seemed to be sufficiently
fulfilled. Moreover, Lee was forced to fight without delay.
He had no time to manoeuvre, because he had no means
of renewing his supplies of food and ammunition. Meade,
on the contrary, could afford to delay, because he could
obtain ample supplies of both. Lee was therefore obliged
to fight at once an offensive battle, and Meade was enabled
to fight a defensive one.

If Lee had not been so &r from his base, and with his
communications interrupted, he would doubtless have tried
to manoeuvre Meade out of his position by extending his
right towards the Baltimore Turnpike, thus seeking to
intercept the communications of the Army of the Potomac
with its base. Now, having fought under the conditions

FBOM QETTY8BURQ TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 355

imposed upon him, he was defeated. The battle had gone
irretrievably against him. Safety in retreat had to be sought.
So, having withdrawn his left wing through Gettysburg, he
at once threw a hne of entrenchments in front of his army
on Seminary Ridge, sharply refused to the right and rest-
ing on Marsh Creek, of which Willoughby Run is an afflu-
ent, and on the left continued the entrenchments across
the Chambersburg Turnpike and the Mummasburg Road,
leading to the nearest passes through South Mountain.
Here, safely retired, the work of burying the dead and suc-
coring the wounded proceeded during the 4th of July, his
retreat taking place on the night of the 4th. On the
Federal side the same sad task was performed on the 4th
and part of the 5th. On the 7th came to the marching
army the joyful tidings from the West, that, on the 4th,
Grant had captured Vicksburg and its ^garrison of thirty
thousand men, and that the Mississippi was then open from
its sources to its mouth, except at Port Hudson, which, on
July 9th, surrendered to General Banks.

It has been much discussed whether General Meade
should not have followed the enemy through the passes
of South Mountain opposite Gettysburg instead of doing
what he did, in following the enemy's line of retreat in a
parallel direction along the east side of the range. The
alternative which has been discarded always seems to
have extraordinary fascination for the average human
mind, so easy is it to demonstrate success of the thing not
tried. General Meade evidently contemplated adopting the
course of a direct pursuit, but for good and sufficient rea-
sons, which will now appear, discarded it. General Lee
retreated in the night of the 4th of July, leaving numbers
of his wounded. Early on the 5th General Meade de-
spatched with cavalry the strongest corps in the army, the
Sixth (which as a corps had not been engaged), in pursuit

356 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

of the enemy. His combinations were perfect to meet the
conditions. Lee, retreating with his main body through
the Fairfield Pass, midway between Gettysburg and Hagers-
town, and partly by the Cashtown Pass, opposite Gettys-
burg, Buford was despatched to Williamsport on the
Potomac, to head off and attack the enemy's trains arriving ;
Kilpatrick, through Monterey Pass, south of the Fairfield
Pass, to come upon the trains while in transit. Cavalry,
of Gregg's division, harassed the enemy through Cashtown
Pass. The Sixth Corps with cavalry marched for Fairfield
Pass to attack the enemy. On the morning of the 6th
Sedgwick reported that he could engage the enemy at Fair-
field Pass, upon receiving which intelligence Meade arrested
one portion of the flank movement in progress by holding
the First and Third Corps in hand to support the Sixth in
case of an engagement of the latter at Fairfield Pass.
Sedgwick's final report that afternoon showed plainly, how-
ever, that great delay in pursuit would be entailed by a
battle at Fairfield Pass, and therefore, on the 7th, General
Meade adopted the flank route through Frederick and the
Hamburg and High Knob Passes in the Catoctin Moun-
tains, much delayed in the latter by torrents of rain on the
7th and 8th. There had also been pouring rain in the
night of the 3d and on the 4th, impeding movements from
the beginning.

Swinton thinks that General Meade adopted a wrong
course, but it will soon become apparent that his view is
not tenable. He says, in his " Campaigns of the Army of
the Potomac,"

" The principles already laid down as those that should guide criti-
cism on McClellan*s conduct after Antietam apply with equal and
even greater force to Meade*s conduct after Gettysburg. That an army
that had moved so far from its base as that of Lee ; that had crossed
the frontier ; that had been defeated in a great battle of three days*

FROM QETTYSBUBQ TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 357

duration, in which it had suffered immense loss ; that then sought
safety in flight only to find itself barred at the frontier by the rise of
the Potomac (as though Providence fought with the Union army),
should have been destroyed or hopelessly crippled, appears indis-
putable.**

That the ordinary observer, entirely unread in military
matters, should so think and speak unhesitatingly, would
not be strange, for such a one always so thinks and
speaks, but that Swinton should have so declared awakens
surprise. He knew that defeat does not always end in
rout, that after it retreat cannot always be prevented ; and
moreover, was generally as capable as any man of seeing
the existence or the absence of parallelism in conditions.
Let us examine into the correctness of his view in the par-
ticular case under consideration. Had he reflected that,
even if the Army of the Potomac had followed the Army
of Northern Virginia directly into Cumberland Valley,
it would have had to do only with a rearguard, and that
while the rearguard was delaying its advance, Lee would
have gained all the time he needed with the main body to
take up the position near Williamsport that he adopted ?
Humphreys, who was chief-of-staflT after the battle of Get-
tysburg, says in his little volume, ** Gettysburg to the
Rapidan " (it is best here to give his exact language),

*• Possibly a prompt, vigorous, direct pursuit by the whole army on
the morning of the 5th of July, by the Cashtown and Fairfield Passes,
would have brought on a general engagement before the Army of
Northern Virginia had taken up the position covering the crossing-
places of the Potomac; but probably it could not have reached
Hagerstown before the evening of the 7th, and Lee would have had
the few hours needed to make his entrenchments too strong for suc-
cessful attack.'*

" Possibly," according to General Humphreys, such a
movement would have succeeded, but " probably ** it would

358 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON ME ADR

not. The adoption of either route, therefore, would find
the enemy sufficiently entrenched, and so far as that point
is concerned, expediency is balanced. But there were
reasons why the route by the east of the mountains was
much more desirable than the other. Supplies in shoes
and other articles needed reached the army much more
easily by that route than they could have done by the
other. And all the while the Army of the Potomac was
advancing down the east side of the mountains, and finally
turning and crossing them, it was interposing between Bal-
timore and Washington and the enemy, so that even a raid
by the enemy would have been impossible.

The conditions existing after Gettysburg therefore do not
exhibit parallelism with those after the battle of the Antie-
tam, both on account of the circumstances just mentioned,
and on account of another with which this summary will be
concluded. Lee*s army had sufTered defeat and great losses
at Gettysburg, but could muster then far more troops than
those with which it had fought the battle of the Antietam.
Regular armies are not generally destroyed. It is the rarest
of all things for fine modem armies to be routed. Lee's
army was crippled, but not so badly crippled as not to
have been able to fight another tremendous pitched battle.
Where McClellan was afler the battle of the Antietam, both
he and the enemy were on the west side of South Moun-
tain. Where General Meade was afler the battle of Gettys-
burg, he was, upon the retreat of the enemy through the
mountains, under obligation to interpose between him and
the zone east of them.

These reasons must have been paramount in determining
General Meade's choice of the line of march which he adopted,
together with the encompassing consideration recognized as
belonging to the art of war among civilized nations, in la
politique inilitaire. Hence he was prudent to the end. He

FROM QETTYSBUEQ TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 359

had Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville behind him, and
other defeats in which he had shared without being respon-
sible for them. It was his duty to see to it, that what had
been secured should be retained, unmarred by the slightest
reverse, leaving, if need were, for a future time, on the
enemy's soil, far from the nation's Capital, the final arbitra-
ment of war. When Lee's army was met on the 1 2th of
July entrenched in front of Williamsport, we find Meade
anxious to attack on the following day, but dissuaded there-
from by the lack of confidence among his corps-commanders
as to possible success. He learned this through a meeting
of them to which he submitted certain information upon the
basis of which he requested their opinions. It was found
that they had no faith in the success of any plan of attack
(based upon the meagre reconnoissance so far possible to ob-
tain) against the enemy holding the position where he was en-
trenched. General Meade, therefore, for a moment prudently
waited, for if they who are to act think they must fail, one of
the first elements of success is absent. Whether, when,
despite this, upon renewed consideration, Meade decided to
attack on the 14th, he might have succeeded, no one can now
positively determine, whatever he may be inclined to think,
but examination of the enemy's position, after he had aban-
doned it, made it extremely doubtful that the attack would
have met with success. Humphreys says that it would
have failed. In harassing the enemy's retreat from the be-
ginning, capturing prisoners, waggons, and other trophies,
Meade had apparently accomplished all that was possible.

Lee retreated over the Potomac on the night of the 1 3th
of July, having partly recovered and partly rebuilt a pon-
toon bridge that had been damaged by General French
before the arrival of the Army of Northern Virginia at the
river, and utilized both this and the ford near Williamsport
Meade promptly followed by crossing the river at Berlin

360 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

and at Harper's Ferry, and by marching on Lee's left flank,
prevented him from entering Loudon Valley by the passes
through the Blue Ridge, hemming him in the Shenandoah
Valley, as he himself successively took possession of the
passes as he marched south on a parallel line with the
enemy, the mountain barrier between them. On the 23d
of July, the Second, Third, and Fifth Corps, — ^the Third,
under General French, leading, — ^passed through Chester
Gap, near Manassas Gap, to advance on Front Royal and
attack the Confederate flank as it presented itself in the
southward march along the Shenandoah Valley. The Gap,
occupied in some force by the enemy, was captured, but
through the want of enterprise and slowness of French, the
operation which, under higher leadership might have been
brilliantly successful, came to naught. Thus continuing to
march south, with the intervention of the mountain-barrier
between them, Lee finally effected his passage across it,
and took up a position near Gulpeper, General Meade's
orders from Washington not to proceed beyond the Rappa-
hannock, but to take up a position of observation there,
enabling Lee to concentrate just within the fork made by
that river and the Rapidan.

As an illustration of the kind of administration in Wash-
ington with which the army had to contend, and as a side-
light on the character of Halleck, it should not escape men-
tion in a memoir of General Meade, that at the moment
when the first great victory in the East had been won, and
when one should suppose that every loyal voice would be
inclined to shout paeans in token of gratitude to the army,
Halleck sent a despatch to General Meade, saying that the
President was very much dissatisfied that the Confederate
army had escaped. In consequence, General Meade very
properly requested to be relieved at once from the command
of the army. Thereupon Halleck represented, in reply to

FROM QETTYSBUBQ TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 361

his request, that he had intended his despatch only as a
stimulus. Halleck's idea as to what would be likely to
prove stimulating to a high-minded man was on a par with
his general military administration of aflairs. It is ques-
tionable if the kind-hearted President ever made the obser-
vation in the sense in which it was conveyed in the de-
spatch to General Meade. Perhs^s Mr. Lincoln said " dis-
appointed/' of which the bearing is very different. General
Hallecky in a subsequent despatch, changed the word to
"disappointment." Doubtless every loyal man in the
North was disappointed that the remainder of the Con-
federate army had not been made prisoners of war, so far
do wishes exceed the hard and fast lines of possibilities,
and Mr. Lincoln may have remarked, as General Meade
himself might have said, that he regretted that more could
not have been accomplished. But, between a personal aspira-
tion and an official despatch conveying the same expression,
there is a whole heaven. The same absence of sensibility
seemed to be in the very texture of Halleck's mind. When
the Army of the Potomac advanced, after its arrival at the
Rappahannock, and drove Lee beyond the Rapidan, as will
be described in the next chapter. General Meade sent
Colonel Biddle, of his staff) to General Halleck, with de-
spatches informing him of the movement, and requesting
that he might be allowed to continue it. Unfortunately for
the Colonel, his zeal outran his discretion in dealing with a
man like Halleck, for deeming his mission of sufficient
importance to make it his duty to have the General awak-
ened in the middle of the night to receive the message which
had been brought, the General expressed himself as much
incensed. Halleck was, in fact, a sort of magnified Depart-
ment clerk, with the least possible tincture of military high-
mindedness. Dearly he loved routine, and routine coupled
with personal ease, although he was quite regardless of that

362 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

of others. One may safely challenge history to show such
another ill-timed message as the despatch sent by him to
the victor of Gettysburg, or another general-in-chief of the
armies of a great country who would have been angered
because he was presented in the middle of the night with
intelligence that the advance of a grand army awaited his
decision as to further attack on the enemy. The bearer of
despatches took back with him an order which preceded
the withdrawal of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and the
relinquishment of the advance of the Army of the Potomac.

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBG. 363

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER GETTYSBURG.

This campaign has been called a campaign of manoeu-
vres, and it was truly that ; but in so characterizing it there
should be no stigma implied for either of the combatants.
Lee showed his usual address, and if for a brief moment
Meade made a mistake, it was at once rectified. There is
here no intention of making a misty moonlight portrait of
General Meade, as ill-defined in outline and little lifelike as
some authors paint that of Washington and other heroes,
who were human, but frankly to concede that which seems
to be true. That Meade did make a mistake in this cam-
paign is here admitted. It is, however, the only material one
discoverable, if one may venture so to say^ during his long
command of the Army of the Potomac. In excuse for it
there is nothing which so completely covers the ground as
the reply of Marshal Turenne, of which a fragment has
been previously quoted in English. When asked how it
had happened that he lost the battle of Marienthal, he said,
**Par ma/aute, inais quand un homme n'a pas fait desfautes
a la guerre, il ne Fa pas fait langtempsy General Grant,
afler he had made his headquarters with the Army of the
Potomac, wrote Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, " When I
came here I thought General Sherman the greatest soldier
of the army ; now that I have come to know Meade, I
doubt/* It will later appear that General Grant by his
action subsequently implied that he had changed this opin-
ion, but this narrative will include facts such as prove that
the ulterior motive of his not awarding to Meade, with Sher-

364 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

man, the highest military honors, was the sway of the un-
controlled favoritism which was the weak point of his char-
acter.

The campaign, upon an account of which we are now
entering, does not captivate the popular imagination, be-
cause, with that, nothing succeeds but the most palpable
success. Sheridan, riding up to the front after the restora-
tion of the battle of Cedar Creek, and aiding in restoring
what was already virtually restored, is fascinating to that
sort of fancy which dearly loves a coup de tfieatre. Napo-
leon seems glorious at Lodi, Areola, Austerlitz, Marengo,
but who hears people generally speak of the time when, in
1 8 14, he made head with a force of a hundred thousand
men against the allies girdling the frontier, marching on
Paris with four hundred thousand, when he turned, rending
them, turning again only to rend ? He did not succeed,
that is all, but went into exile, and so one of the greatest
of his marvellous exploits suffers from partial oblivion.
That campaign of manoeuvres from the Rapidan to Centre-
ville and back again was what represented holding Lee in
check while forces drawn from both armies were warring
elsewhere ; and more than holding Lee in check, for, but for
the lamentable failure of a subordinate general to fulfil his
part in the advance of Meade at Mine Run, Lee would proba-
bly have been there defeated. Meade, making head against
Lee in this campaign, enabled Grant to put the final touch
in the West to that "separate military renown," which he
tells us in his memoirs he desired also as the guerdon of
Sherman and Sheridan, but which he denied to Meade, at
the expense of placing himself with the Army of the Po-
tomac, where he himself admits that he should not have
been, by acknowledging that his place as general-in-chief of
the armies of the United States was in Washington. Gen-
eral Meade's campaign of manoeuvres made the victory of

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER GETTYSBURG. 365

Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge possible, made
possible the advent of Grant to the general-in-chie&hip of
the armies of the United States and the final successful ad-
vance on Richmond.

For a while, as mentioned towards the end of the last
chapter, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of
Northern Virginia lay in observation, confronting each
other, the Army of the Potomac north of the Rappahan-
nock, and the Army of Northern Virginia just south of it,
within the fork made by the junction of the Rapidan with
that river. The Army of the Potomac now suffered some
depletion from the detail of a force to New York, to sup-
press the riots there brought about by the drafl to recruit
the armies, and by the expiration of the terms of service of
certain regiments. Both armies lay harmlessly for some
time within their respective lines, engaged in the operation
of refitting and recuperation of an organization which no
other equals in wear and tear. On the ist of August this
quiet was somewhat broken by a cavalry expedition sent by
General Meade across the Rappahannock on reconnoissance
to Brandy Station, followed by some infantry in support
On the 31st there was a little flurry in the advance of some
infantry to the fords of the Rappahannock, preceded by
cavalry on the lookout for gunboats reported to have en-
tered the river. Gradually more serious operations were
drawing nigh. On the 1 2th of September General Meade
learned that Longstreet's corps, with the exception of the di-
vision of Pickett, had been sent to oppose General Rosecrans,
commanding the Army of the Cumberland, in the West. In
consequence, the Second Corps of the Army of the Poto-
mac, with the cavalry of the army, was pushed across the
Rappahannock on the next day, and pursued the enemy
over the Rapidan, not particularly loth to go, as Lee, with
his diminished force, found there a stronger line. The

366 GENERAL QEbBOE GORDON MEADK

Army of the Potomac then, in turn, occupied the positions
about Culpeper which the enemy had abandoned, advancing
the Second and Sixth Corps to near the Orange and Alexan-
dria Railroad crossing of the Rapidan. Meade, attempting
to bring about an engagement, had sent his cavalry under
Buford on a reconnoissance up the Rapidan, and was* about
to follow the movement with a march by the right flank
across the river when it was stopped by an order from
Washington for the detachment of the Eleventh and Twelfth
Corps for the reinforcement of General Rosecrans. This
made any projected movement impossible, and placed the
army again in a position of masterly inactivity.

The sending away to the West of two whole corps of
Meade's army necessarily paralyzed it for active operations.
The period of waiting that ensued was, however, followed
by the accession of reinforcements in the form of new levies,
and finally by the return of some troops in the East. This
tedious period in the life of an army at last began to look
to the rudest soldier as if it must soon disappear. Just
when General Meade was initiating a renewal of the coun-
termanded march on the enemy by the right flank, a
despatch of Lee's, read by Meade's signal-service, showed
that the enemy himself was about to move. This sim-
ple, but significant despatch directed Fitzhugh Lee to draw
three days* rations of hard-tack and bacon. Three days'
rations to a commander of cavalry could mean nothing less
, than a considerable movement. The despatch thus inter-
cepted on the 7th of October, in its passage through the
air, of course placed General Meade on the alert. Nothing
could be done, however, until the coming movement of the
enemy should be more developed. He might contemplate
making an attack on the army where it was posted near
Culpeper, or interposing between it and Washington, or an
advance through the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER 0ETTY8BUBG. 367

Valley, or lastly, the abandonment of the line of the Rapi-
dan by retirement on Richmond.

On the 8th Confederate cavalry began to move around the
Federal right. Far away to the right the main body of the
Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Rapidan on the fol-
lowing day, some force being left south of it for the purpose
of concealing the movement. On the loth Stuart's cavalry
attacked Meade's advanced posts at James City, and the
First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were ordered back from the
Rapidan, where they had been advanced to cover the con-
tingency that the enemy was retiring on Richmond ; and
Lee's intentions being now in a measure revealed, the army
was put in position at Culpeper, but not for long. Before
daylight of the morning of the 1 2th the whole Federal
army, with its trains in advance, was set in motion to cross
the Rappahannock, and by the afternoon had crossed and
taken position there. Lee approached Culpeper on the nth
at a distance of between five and ten miles, only to find that
Meade had anticipated his intention of flanking him, and
that the Army of the Potomac was so far advanced towards
the Rappahannock that he could do nothing but halt his
infantry and despatch Stuart to harass the rear of the retir-
ing columns, covered by Pleasanton and Sykes as a rear-
guard. The next day, the 12th, he advanced towards
Warrenton. Having failed at his first attempt to outflank
Meade, he determined to make a new one by taking the
direction of Warrenton, and trying again to intercept him.
So far only cavalry engagements accompanying the move-
ments had taken place.

Now entered one of those incidents which so influence
the events of war. Buford had been ordered, when, the in-
tentions of the enemy being unknown, they were thought
possibly to be to abandon the line of the Rapidan and &11
back upon Richmond, to make a reconnoissance on the

368 GENERAL GEOEOE GORDON MEADE.

Rapidan, had crossed it on the lOth, at Germanna Ford,
and had moved thence to Morton's Ford. At the latter
ford he had found Fitzhugh Lee with cavalry supported by
infantry, and had had an encounter with him there, and
later on with him at Stevensburg, finally joining Pleasanton
at Brandy Station, where they together, on the loth, met
Stuart. It was the ascertained fact of the presence of infantry
with Fitzhugh Lee on the Rapidan that now turned plans
all awry. The commanders of the rearguard of the Army
of the Potomac became possessed with the idea that the
infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia was at Culpeper,
whereas, in point of &ct, Lee had on the 1 2th left Culpeper.
Meade was, through circumstances which he could not
control, largely in the dark as to the position of Lee's
forces. Gregg, who had been sent with his cavalry to
watch the roads leading to Warrenton and those leading to
the gaps of the Blue Ridge, had been prevented from com-
municating with him by the interposition of the enemy's
cavalry. Sykes, commanding the infantry of the rear-
guard, and Pleasanton, commanding its cavalry, were firmly
fixed in the idea that the main body of the enemy was at
Culpeper. Meade, who was desirous of giving Lee battle,
although not upon the terms of seeking him when he might
be really marching elsewhere, brought the movement toward
Warrenton to a stop, and sent the Second, Fiflh, and Sixth
Corps, with Buford's cavalry, back towards Culpeper to bring
on an engagement. Herein lies the error to which allusion
was made in the first part of this chapter. It was not abso-
lutely certain that Lee's army was at Culpeper. Buford's
discovery did not warrant that explicit belief. Under these
circumstances the proper course to take would have been
to let the army remain where it was for a few hours, until
positive knowledge could be obtained of Lee's disposi-
tions. If Lee's army proved to be at Culpeper, a few

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTY8BURQ, 369

hours would have made no diflference in advancing on it,
for he would not have come there to retreat But the con-
fidence of the generals of his rearguard was so great as to
Lee's being near Culpeper, that General Meade was led to
countermarch the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, with
Buford's cavalry, towards Brandy Station, with the result
of ascertaining positively that Lee was not at Culpeper.

At ten o'clock in the night of the 12th a despatch arrived
from Gregg, that Lee's army was crossing the Rappahan-
nock at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. The pickets of
the Third Corps, which had remained with the First on the
Rappahannock, began to be driven in, and the whole army,
that part which had remained in position, and that which
had been countermarched, began a race with Lee's army
for the goal of Centreville Heights. Humphreys, chief of
Meade's staff, says, in his " Gettysburg to the Rapidan,"
that on the evening of the 13th, when the Army of the
Potomac was once more concentrated, the question of what
should next be done was the subject of long examination
and discussion between them. As we know now, neither
Meade nor Lee knew exactly the position of the other.
They were both striving to pursue the same general line
towards Centreville Heights, in a territory about seven
miles wide, bounded on the west side by the Warrenton
Turnpike, and on the east by the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. The plan of halting on Broad Run, near Milford,
was discussed by General Meade and his chief-of-staff, but
discarded. Humphreys says in a note, in " Gettysburg to
the Rapidan," that it would have been fortunate for Meade
if he had adopted it, that both leaders would then have had
what they sought, — a general engagement. It may, as
matters turned out, be regarded as unfortunate that this did
not happen, but from all the data then in his possession.

General Meade decided upon what was the wiser course.

370 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

The relative positions of the armies in this race for the
possession of Centreville Heights led incidentally to the
battle of Bristoe Station, an action so brilliant on the part
of the Second Corps, under the leadership of Warren, who
now commanded it in the absence of Hancock, gravely
wounded at Gettysburg, that it has elicited even the out-
spoken admiration of the officers who were engaged in it
on the other side. Humphreys says that, had General
Meade known the position of Lee's infantry on the night
of the 1 3th, and been correctly informed before midday of
the 14th, of the character of Hill's movements, he could
have assembled the army near Bristoe Station, and have
attacked Hill before Ewell arrived there. In other words,
instead of being encountered only by the Second Corps
as a rearguard. Hill's corps would have been met there
by the whole concentrated Army of the Potomac. All
this, however, being totally unknown to Meade in the
night of the 1 3th, when he was discussing with his chief-of-
staff the various aspects of the situation, the conclusion
reached was the right one as derived from the premises of
then existing knowledge. On his side Lee also was acting
under a false impression of the dispositions of the army of
Meade.

The forces of General Meade were retiring towards
Centreville Heights in the order of the First, Sixth, Third,
Fifth, and Second Corps, although not by exactly the same
routes. The Second Corps was therefore the rearguard.
On the morning of the 14th of October, the Third, Fifth,
and Second were moving along the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. Their order of march is particularized because,
in being noted by the reader, it will make clear what is to
follow. Before, however, we reach the morning of the
14th, it is necessary to mention the general situation of the
evening before, leading to the complications of the following

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBG. 371

day. When the weary troops of the rearguard bivouacked
on the night of the 1 3th, it was with no suspicion that, to
meet the conditions existing, more was required that night
than the usual pickets, or the next morning, more than the
usual flankers. Yet the situation was different, and almost
unprecedented, for Stuart had been hemmed in by inter-
posing columns of marching and now reposing infantry,
and lay all night with his cavalry in the woods, without a
bivouac fire, and awaiting anxiously the dawn, but mean-
while sending a message to Ewell describing his situation ;
and so he passed the long, anxious night, uncertain what
the morrow would bring forth.

We are in imagination retiring northeast with General
Meade towards Centreville, the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad running in that general direction at this point,
and are with the rearguard, the Second Corps. The road
which it had pursued towards Cedar Run from Warrenton
Junction brought it to the place where it bivouacked on the
night of the 1 3th, nearly at that stream. At dawn, on the
morning of the 14th, all the troops were astir to cross
Cedar Run at the ford a short distance ahead, which had
been impracticable the evening before from occupation of
the crossing by the Third Corps. The route which the
Third Corps had taken after crossing the stream lay in the
same general direction as that which the Corps had been
pursuing, but the one which the Second Corps was to take
to the right, to reach the railroad at Catlett's Station, was at
right-angles to it from their common point of departure.
As the Second Corps crossed Cedar Run, it threw Cald-
well's division ahead to the left on the road which the Third
Corps had pursued, which division occupied a bare ridge
on the right of the road, to guard against the possible ad-
vent of the enemy in that direction, which was the rear with
reference to the now divergent line of march of the Second

372 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

Corps, while Hays's division turned sharply towards the
right, on the right-angular extension of the road towards
Catlett's Station.

The troops, safely across Cedar Run, began to prepare
breakfast, when suddenly Caldwell, to the new rear, was as-
sailed with a shower of shells from the direction of Catlett's
Station, the very road by which he was to march towards the
railroad. This was Stuart's artillery, brought to bear upon
the division of Caldwell, perfectly secure in its own estima-
tion in occupying the strong position held towards the new
rear, and, to cap the climax, Stuart's guns became the signal
for Ewell to press forward with his infantry simultaneously
on that point. But, just as Caldwell had been perfectly una-
ware that Stuart's or any other hostile force could be occupy-
ing ground towards Catlett's Station, so Stuart was unaware,
as he soon learned to his cost, of the fact that Hays's or
any other Federal division was between him and Caldwell.
Hays formed and pushed forward his line of battle, flanked
by cavalry, towards Catlett's Station, and Stuart was soon
in full retreat, after having thus fallen through accident into
one of the most dangerous of situations, and having extri-
cated himself from it by a rare combination of caution and
audacity. In the other direction, Caldwell, acting as rear-
guard, held Ewell at bay, while the rest of the Second
Corps pushed on for Catlett's Station, Ewell finally releas-
ing Caldwell by continuing his march towards Greenwich
on the same road that the Third Corps had taken on the
previous evening.

No incident of the war contains so many strange elements
as those combined in the night preceding the battle of Bris-
toe Station ; the corps of the two contending armies en-
shrouded in darkness, ignorant of their relative positions,
reposing near each other while awaiting another struggle
for mastery ; the adventurous cavalry-leader, Stuart, lying

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER GETTTSBUBG. 3/3

perdu in the woods beyond overlapping in&ntry ; the com-
mander of the Federal forces near by in slumber recupera-
tive of his fatigues. The conflict of the early morning caps
the climax, when Stuart suddenly appears in a position
which, although single, was both front or rear ; front, if
considered with reference to the temporary line of march
of the Second Corps, rear, if considered with reference to
the general direction towards Centreville ; while Ewell
presses on from the direction which was either front or rear,
depending upon the same considerations. The day will
come when, in the lapse of time, " the light which never
shone on land or sea " will illumine this episode and pas-
sage of arms with all the charm that perspective lends to
historical romance.

Without a map, or puzzling over the matter, the reader
cannot possibly see, without some explanation, how the Sec-
ond Corps could be retiring on Centreville and yet be march-
ing towards Catlett's Station, in a direction at right-angles
to the direct line of march northward of the Third Corps.
The explanation of the fact is, however, simple. The vari-
ous corps pursued, as is usual, different routes, in order to
avoid encumbering a single one, and to effect proper dispo-
sitions with reference to the possible movements of the
enemy. The road which the Third Corps had pursued was
towards Centreville, by the way of the detour of Greenwich,
and the somewhat opposite direction of it, which the Sec-
ond Corps pursued, is at right-angles with reference to it
only until Catlett's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad, is reached, when the line of the railroad itself,
which from that point was to be followed by the Corps, runs
almost directly towards Centreville. Thus it came to pass
that, when the enemy, under Ewell, attacked the Second
Corps as it was about, for a short distance, to take the sharp
turn to the right to Catlett's Station, Ewell's iniantry may

374 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

be said to have been in its rear, and Stuart's cavalry on its
front, as previously stated. But, with relation to the whole
field of retirement of the army from the Rappahannock to
Centreville, the hostile forces were partially on each other's
flanks, perforce of the fact that the Army of the Potomac
was striving to reach Centreville, and Lee, acting from the
rear, was endeavoring to interrupt the march of its last
two or three corps. So placed, with the advance of Lee
projecting somewhat beyond the rear of Meade, and with
converging roads, collision between the forces became in-
evitable along the general line of retirement of the Army
of the Potomac from the Rappahannock towards Centre-
ville. When the Second Corps had reached Catlett's Sta-
tion, it headed directly along the railroad, going northeast,
towards Centreville, the Fifth Corps having &llen in ahead
of it, and the Third Corps ahead of that, the order, result-
ing from the different routes taken, making, as before, the
Second Corps the rearguard.

The Second Corps, having reached Catlett's Station, turned,
as indicated, sharply to its left along the line of the railroad
running northeast. While on the road from the point where
it had diverged from the direction taken on the preceding
night by the Third Corps, Warren received from Hum-
phreys, General Meade's chief-of-staff, information that he
might be attacked by the enemy at Bristoe Station, a few
miles in advance, who might direct a column from Gaines-
ville, on the left, to that point. The same despatch informed
him that Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, the next in
advance, would remain at Bristoe Station until he had ar-
rived there. The dispositions towards the rear of the Army
of the Potomac and those of the advance of the Army of
Northern Virginia may be easily imagined as slightly over-
lapping each other. The Third, Fifth, and Second Corps,
in the order mentioned, were heading northeast on the line

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTYSBURQ. 3/5

of railroad. The Third Corps was not to advance further
towards Centreville until the heads of column of the Fifth
Corps were arriving, and, in turn, the Fifth Corps was not
to follow its march until it saw the heads of column of the
Second Corps arriving. Thus the three corps towards the
rear of the Army of the Potomac were by orders to remain
within supporting distance of each other. Ewell's corps,
of the Army of Northern Virginia, had, as we have seen,
converged on the rearguard of the Second Corps before it
had turned off to the right for Catlett's Station, and that
corps had now resumed its direct march towards Bristoe
Station.. Hill's corps will previously converge from the left
on Bristoe Station.

The troops of Warren were fatigued. They had under-
gone unusual stress from constant marching and the recent
encounter, which had looked at first as if they were sur-
rounded. They were plodding wearily along towards Bris-
toe Station, and had nearly arrived there when a heavy dis-
charge of artillery was heard ahead, for which fact there was
no other apparent solution than that the Fifth Corps was en-
gaged with the enemy. The men started on the best resem-
blance to the double-quick that they could muster, as Warren
put spurs to his horse, and, followed by his staff, dashed ahead
towards Bristoe Station. Crossing Kettle Run, a branch
of Broad Run, running close beside it on the south, Warren
found himself in the open, and took in at a glance the main
facts of the field, that the enemy had been firing at the re-
tiring columns of the FifUi Corps, probably under the im-
pression that it was the rearguard, and that he had to
rectify promptly dispositions of his own troops which had
been made. Sykes seems to have become so possessed
with the idea that he must hasten forward at all hazards
towards Centreville as to have been oblivious of the neces-
sity imposed upon him by orders to wait for the arrival of

3/6 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADE.

the Second Corps. He was a sturdy, but not particularly
bright officer, and what took place happened just because
he had that peculiar persistency which is at the mercy of a
single thought.

Webb's division, of the Second Corps, is marching along
the left of the railroad, and Hays's division on the right.
Webb, approaching the enemy posted near Bristoe Station,
whose attention was directed towards the Fifth Corps,
crosses to the right of the railroad. The enemy now
concentrates his whole attention on the heads of column
of the arriving Second Corps. Before Warren reached
the advanced troops. Colonel Morgan, inspector-general
of the corps, had begun to make disposition of them on
the ridge back of the railroad. Warren saw and recti-
fied the mistake that had been made in the relinquish-
ment to the enemy of the earthwork formed by the
line of railroad in cut and embankment. Instantly the
whole force was ordered forward and rapidly took position
while the enemy was advancing to capture the same line.
In between Broad Run and Kettle Run, behind the railroad
embankment, and in the shallow cut, the troops rapidly
formed from right to left as they arrived on the ground,
the action not delayed a moment for the arrival of those
still pressing onward from the rear. The final dispositions
of the Second Corps were the divisions of Webb, Hays,
and Caldwell, from right to left. Back of the right were
Ricketts's guns on the ridge. Back of the centre were
Arnold's guns. Miles's brigade was stationed in support
between the batteries. Gregg's cavalry, which had been
actively engaged during the day in skirmishing with Ewell's
advance, was off to the left. Hill's corps, on the other side
of the railroad, confronted the Second Corps, outnumber-
ing it more than two to one. Anderson's division was on
the right, and Heth's division on the left, while Wilcox's

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTYSBVRQ. m

division was in reserve in the rear. Ewell had given the
right of way to Hill, but there was no saying how soon he
might not be marching on to the field of battle through
the more difficult track of by-roads which he had taken.
The suddenness with which the Second Corps captured
the railroad saved the day. It was all as sudden as if
the combatants had dropped from the skies. General
Francis A. Walker, then assistant-adjutant-general of the
Corps, who was present, gives a graphic description of
the early part of the battle. He says, "Already they
[the enemy] have reached Dodd*s house, near the track,
without halting or breaking, and still they come on.
Warren, Webb, and Hays, with their staffs, among whom
are conspicuous Mitchell, Bingham, and Haskell, gallop up
and down along the track, encouraging the men with cheers
mingled with imprecations, — which, let us hope, the troops
hear, and the recording angel judiciously does not."

Urgent despatches were sent after Sykes, now too far away
to be of any assistance by countermarching, unless to assist
in bringing off the Second Corps in case it should meet with
disaster. Measuring his military tact by a line or two of a
despatch of his to Warren, saying that if Lee's army were on
his left, two corps would be but little better than one, we can
readily understand that it was only superior orders that finally
countermarched him. We may believe that, even if he had
learned (and saying, as he did, that he did not, we may
rely upon it that he did not hear the sound of cannonad-
ing) that Warren was attacked, he would not have returned
of his own motion. The action in which Warren was en-
gaged was severe. The Second Corps, with two of its
brigades absent, numbered only eight thousand men. The
losses of the Confederates were heavy, however, compared
with those of the Second Corps. As evening was approach-
ing the advance of Ewell began to enter the action on the

3/8 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

left. Night, however, came on without Lee's uniting corps
making any concerted attack. Under cover of the dark-
ness the Second Corps, enjoined to the most scrupulous
silence in its movements, quietly resumed the line of its
march, and crossing Broad Run, moved forward towards
Centreville. It had covered itself with glory, and its com-
mander had won a national reputation.

It now became evident that Lee relinquished the ope-
ration which had resulted in the battle of Bristoe Station,
giving up all hope of reaching Centreville before the arrival
of the Army of the Potomac there. He virtually stopped
his advance at Bristoe Station, sending merely heavy de-
tachments as far as Bull Run, behind which Centreville, as
regarded from the south, is situated. What Lee had at-
tempted had been anticipated and amply provided against
by the orders of General Meade, but his orders had not
been carried out. Their intent had been defeated by the
kind of thing against which even the gods contend in vain.
General Meade was undoubtedly, from the first, aiming to
occupy the heights at Centreville. Humphreys says that
he had reluctantly come to that conclusion. If, however,
Sykes had not moved forward when he inopportunely so
did, thereby causing the Third Corps, ahead of him, to
move forward, both corps, returning immediately to Bristoe
Station, would have been followed by General Meade's
orders to the First and Sixth Corps also to countermarch.
This is stated by the remark of Humphreys, speaking of the
action at Bristoe Station, in his " Gettysburg to the Rapi-
dan." " As soon," he says, " as General Meade received
intelligence of the enemy's appearance at Bristoe, and that
the Fifth and Third Corps were not in connection with the
Second, those corps were ordered back to its support. It
was too late, however, to concentrate the whole army there
in time for a general engagement"

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER 0ETT7SBUB0. 379

General Humphreys thinks that there was an error com-
mitted antecedently to the countermarch towards Culpeper,
for he says, in his " Gettysburg to the Rapidan/' that "the
Army of the Potomac should have remained quiet, or have
been concentrated at or near its central point, Culpeper
Court House, except such parts of it as were necessary to
make the enemy show his hand." But, apparently, the
enemy had shown his hand. That upon which General
Meade must have based his action seems conclusive. He
had not heard from his cavalry on the Rappahannock on
his right rear. He knew that no movement was taking
place on his left. He had also ascertained that the move-
ment going on was not towards Richmond. This, in sum,
seems positively determinative of the question whether or
not Lee's movement was on his right flank. These bases
seem all-suffident to determine the action which General
Meade took. The confirmation of the justness of his de-
cision lies in the fact that Lee appeared near Culpeper only
a few hours after the Army of the Potomac had retired to
the Rappahannock. Had Meade lingered at Culpeper for
final developments, Lee would to a certainty have secured
the advance. Therefore it would appear from evidence
both before and after the event, that General Meade's re-
tirement was timely, and that it did not constitute an error
antecedent to that made when, after having secured the
advance to the Rappahannock, General Meade made a par-
tial countermarch, under the belief that the commanders of
his rearguard of cavalry and infantry could not well be
mistaken in thinking that the main body of the enemy was
near Culpeper.

We must now pass cursorily over the operations which
took place between the time when the Army of the Poto-
mac reached the Heights of Centreville and General Lee
relinquished his attempt to outflank it, and the time when,

38o GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

on the banks of the Rappahannock, the next serious en-
gagement occurred. On the 15th of October the army
rested in quiet, but for some skirmishing along Bull Run
with the advance of Lee. The main body of his troops re-
mained in the rear in accordance with the enforced change
in his plans. On the following day a heavy rain set in, Bull
Run booming with such a high stage of water that its fords
became impracticable. On the 19th the army began its
return march southward in columns directed to GainesvUle
on the right and Bristoe Station on the left. During this
period cavalry combats ensued, in which the enemy ob-
tained the advantage, his cavalry being twice as numerous
as that possessed by the Federal army. In a combat that
took place near Buckland Mills, where Broad Run crosses
the Warrenton Turnpike, the enemy facetiously termed the
finale of the encounter the Buckland Races. Lee while
retreating availed himself of the opportunity in passing over
the ground to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad
from Bristoe to Rappahannock Station on the Rappahan-
nock.

Continuing to advance, General Meade, on the 2ist of
October, came into position athwart the country from the
vicinity of Warrenton, on his right, across the railroad, on
his left. From this position he proposed to Halleck to
make a rapid march by the left flank, occupy the Heights
of Fredericksburg, thereby seize a short line of communica-
tion with his new base, and necessarily cause the falling back
of Lee. As Lee was entirely off his guard at the time, not
for a moment imagining that the Army of the Potomac
would, late in the season, adopt measures so vigorous, and
as the movement could hardly have failed of success, in view
of the fact of Lee's position being in the fork of the Ra[^-
hannock and Rapidan, Halleck of course disapproved of the
movement. Compelled to adopt some other plan of ad-

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTT8BURQ. 381

vance, General Meade, on the 7th of November, moved
towards the Rappahannock, and an engagement ensued in
which General Lee was taken completely by surprise, and
defeated with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and pris-
oners. Lee was on the south side of the Rappahannock,
Meade on the north side. Lee's army was disposed with
Ewell's corps on the right and Hill's on the left, crossing
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Just above the rail-
road bridge at Rappahannock Station he had a pontoon-
bridge across the river, protected on the south side of the
river by lines of earthworks, and on the north side of it by
a titf de pont with defensive wings running along the ridge
and lower bank of the river. He was thus what is mili-
tarily called h cheval across the river, that is, astride of it,
in a position threatening any attempt by Meade to divide
his forces for a flank attack by a march either to the right or
left. The Army of the Potomac, constituted as two col-
umns, one composed of the First, Second, and Third Corps,
under General French, and the other of the Fifth and Sixth
Corps, under General Sedgwick, was encamped in the
vicinity of Warrenton. Both columns marched at daylight
of the 7th of October down the Rappahannock, Sedgwick
to Rappahannock Station and French to Kelly's Ford, five
miles below. General Meade had ordered Sedgwick to
come into position opposite the enemy's works protecting the
pontoon-bridge near Rappahannock Station, capture them,
and then cross the pontoon-bridge and capture those on the
south side of the river, and thence advance on Brandy Sta-
tion in concert with General French ; while General French
had been ordered to pass over Kelly's Ford, capture the
enemy's works opposite, assist the direct advance of Sedg-
wick across the river by pushing for the enemy's rear, and
then, when the whole preliminary movement had been suc-
cessful, advance with Sedgwick upoa Brandy Station. The

382 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

cavalry was to cross the Rap^xthannock beyond both flanks
of the Confederate army.

French's column arrived at Kelly's Ford about the same
time that Sedgwick's arrived at Rappahannock Station,
about noon, and he threw a brigade across the river before
the enemy, who had been quite taken by surprise, could
offer very serious resistance, captured some earthworks,
pushed the other troops rapidly across, began building a
pontoon-bridge, and cai!tie into position. Lee, on his side,
reinforced there Johnson's division of Ewell's corps with
Rodes's division, and night fell with the opposing forces
drawn up against each other, Johnson and Rodes forming
a line resting with its left on the Rappahannock, and with
its right on a stream called Mountain Creek. This Mount-
ain Creek, sometimes called Mountain Run, an east and
west branch of the Rappahannock on its west side, must not
be confounded with the Mountain Run which is a southern
branch of the Rapidan. Lee was perfectly certain at this
time that Meade's movement would prove an entire failure.
The task that Sedgwick confronted in an attempt to capture
the tiu de pant and lines of related works and a pontoon-
bridge stretching to the south side of the Rappahannock,
by which reinforcements to the enemy could come, was
naturally not so easy as that assigned to French. The
skirmishing and feeling the enemy's position was accom-
plished rapidly, and the Sixth Corps, on the right, and the
Fifth, on the left, closed in on the works and pounded away
at them with artillery until dark, without making any sensible
impression upon them. Lee, meanwhile, had drawn troops
from his centre nearer to the south bank of the river. Ander-
son's division advanced to it, and Early's was brought close
to the pontoon-bridge, while Hoke's brigade was detached
from it and despatched across the bridge to reinforce the
troops under Hays in the ttte de pont and entrenchments.

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBO. 383

Lee felt just as certain of holding his own here as in the
position opposite Kelly's Ford, for here as well as there
night fell and no definite result had been reached by Meade.
Nevertheless, the conclusion was delusive, for then ensued a
coup de fftain which has not its superior in the history of
the war.

It was after dusk, but from right and left the artillery-fire
of Sedgwick poured scathingly by well-known ranges into
the enemy's works, while amidst the dimness of the fitful
illumination General Russell, in temporary command of the
First Division of the Sixth Corps, conducted the assault
with the Second and Third Brigades led by Colonels Upton
and Ellmaker. The works, defended by as many men as
those who assaulted, were carried, with the loss to the
enemy of artillery, small-arms, many killed and wounded,
and numerous prisoners. The enemy had been so com-
pletely taken by surprise that at first those on the other
side of the river could not credit the statement of the event.
Holding the southern end of the bridge in force, they soon
learned the whole truth of the disaster; that Hoke's brigade,
commanded that day by Colonel Godwin, had been cut off,
that Colonel Ellmaker was in possession of the northern
end of the bridge, and that the few who had escaped over
it represented all that would be recovered of the force which
had defended the northern bank of the river. The bridge was
immediately fired by the Confederates, and so consumed as to
prevent any attempt on the part of General Meade to cross
the river at that point. This serious encounter caused Gene-
ral Lee to loosen his hold on the Rappahannock. Instead
of attempting to push French back from the lodgment which
he had made on his right, and running the risk of Sedgwick's
speedy reinforcement of the column there, when he would
have been obliged to fight a pitched battle, Lee began his
retreat during the night to a position near the mouth of

384 GENERAL GEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

Mountain Creek, but afterwards continued it to the en-
trenchments which he had previously occupied along the
southern bank of the Rapidan.

The following morning, the 8th of October, opened with
so dense a fog that Sedgwick could not at first discover
whether or not the enemy was still in position opposite to
him on the south bank of the Rappahannock. A column
to the left moved up from Kelly's Ford, five miles below,
on the opposite side of the Rappahannock, to clear Sedg-
wick's front by holding the southern bank of the river
while he was engaged in constructing a pontoon-bridge
across it. The Fifth Corps moved before daylight and
crossed at Kelly's Ford, leaving only the Sixth Corps in
position at Rappahannock Station, on the north side of
the river. The railroad bridge there being destroyed, a
pontoon-bridge had to be laid to supply its absence. The
pontoon-bridge was finished by the time that the sun had
in the early morning dispersed the fog that had lain densely
over the river-bottom. The Federal army, now released,
swept forward towards Brandy Station, and took up a posi-
tion from Willford's Creek, on Hazel River, to the right,
to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, to the left, Lee
lying perdu opposite to it behind the woods and hills south
of the Rapidan. Thus the two armies found themselves
once again in substantially the same positions which they
had occupied at the beginning of their late active campaign,
in the fruits of which the Confederates had nothing to equal
in comparison with the brilliant affairs of Bristoe and Rappa-
hannock Stations, and the increased prestige of the Federal
commander and his army.

During the time when the region between Centreville
and the Rappahannock had been reoccupied by General
Meade, the repairing of the railroad destroyed by the enemy
had been pushed forward vigorously, and had now reached

. t

I-

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER GETTYSBURG, 385

completion, thus making the army in its present position
secure as to its supplies. The supervening condition of
security and ease by no means, however, satisfied the ever-
active and enterprising mind of General Meade, always
anxious, if the balance inclined to chance of success, to take
the initiative, but constantly hampered by the sluggish
Halleck, whose military views and plans would have best
fitted in with the years of Methuselah and an unmilitary
people of some bygone age. The plan of action which
General Meade now adopted, known as the Mine Run
Campaign, had in it all possible elements of success. Had
not one of the instruments with which it was to be carried
out proved wholly unequal to the enterprise, it would in
all human probability have succeeded. It is true that the
plan could not have involved, as intended, a surprise, for it
was not easy to surprise Lee. It was, however, sufHciently
of the nature of a surprise to make it impossible that Lee
could concentrate to advantage ; that is to say, the plan, if
it had been executed in accordance with design, involved a
severe blow which, despite Lee's seeing it to be inevitable,
it would have been impossible completely to ward oflT.

The army of Lee lay seemingly secure in its position
south of the Rapidan, from a little beyond Bamett's Ford,
on his left, to a little beyond Morton's Ford, on his right, a
stretch of some eighteen miles. Above and below his con-
tinuous entrenchments along the Rapidan, conmianding the
fords there, other fords were well watched by his cavalry.
From Bamett's Ford above, to Morton's Ford below, the
Rapidan runs, with but slight windings in its course, about
northeast, and for some distance below Morton's Ford a
little south of east, its course thus making at the latter
point an obtuse angle looking north. On its course below
Morton's Ford, about five miles below the Ford, the Rapi-
dan is entered from the south by two small affluents having

386 GENERAL OEORQE QOBDON MEADK

their mouths close together. The westernmost one, called
Mountain Run, runs nearly parallel with the trend of the
Rapidan from Morton's Ford to Bamett's Ford. The east-
ernmost one, called Mine Run, running ofT nearly at right-
angles to the Rapidan, forks about three miles from its
mouth, the eastern, main stream constituting Mine Run pro-
per, and its western branch. Black Walnut Run. Availing
himself of this conformation of country, Lee had made his
lines run, as indicated, from above Bamett*s Ford to below
Morton's Ford, and they thus swept across Mountain Run,
whence they flexed abruptly so as to pass for ^ome distance
along the west side of Mine Run, trending there south.
When active operations began, this latter line did not extend
much, if at all, beyond Bartlett's Mill on Mine Run, but, as
will be seen, it was rapidly* increased towards the south as
emergency arose. About four miles below Bamett's Ford
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the Rapidan,
and about four miles below that point is Robertson's Ford,
five miles above Raccoon Ford, which, in turn, is three miles
above Morton's Ford.

In the relative positions of the Army of the Potomac and
the Army of Northern Virginia Lee's left flank was twice
as far away as his right flank was from the centre of the
Army of the Potomac. Therefore, although he was stronger
on his right than on his left, his right, not being absolutely
impregnable, gave the best opening for attack, making it not
only probable but certain, that the attack would be success-
ful if orders were duly obeyed. The conditions being those
already described, involving the impossibility of Lee's rein-
forcing his right with his left within the time requisite for
the Army of the Potomac to assail his right, success for the
latter army was certain, if its movements were executed in
a demonstrably practicable interval of time. The Army of
the Potomac failed, however, to secure the advantage in time

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTYSBUBO. 387

which it had with reason counted upon, but not through
remissness on the part of its chief. Greater pains were
never taken by any general to ensure the success of a
movement, through having his subordinates equal to their
appointed tasks. But, alas, men can no more rise above
their level than can water above its level ; every existing
thing has its appointed range ! As of old, so now, so for
all time must endure the law that no one by taking thought
can add one cubit to his stature, whence certainly no one
else can add to it. We have it on the indisputable authority
of General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, that General Meade
had all the corps-commanders summoned to his headquar-
ters, where, with maps distributed, each received his orders
for the contemplated march, and he even adds that General
French received explicit instructions that, when he reached
on the line of his advance a house known as Morris's, where
there is a fork in the road, he was to take the left-hand
turning. This it is well to say incidentally, leaving what
remains to add to the time when we in imagination shall
reach the same fork in the road. Whatever General
Humphreys says is as conclusive as to fact as anything can
humanly be. His was a mind conspicuously gifted with just
perception, in the luminous play of whose facets one scarcely
ever fails to find the pure gleam of central truth as it might
be viewed from various standpoints.

Hiirs corps occupied Lee's entrenchments from Bamett's
Ford to Robertson's Ford, below the railroad, and Ewell's
corps, then under Early, from Robertson's Ford to Morton's
Ford and beyond, and thence across the country, as pre-
viously described, as far as Bartlett's Mill. General Meade's
plan of operations as finally adopted, after slight variations,
was to advance as follows : The Third, followed by the
Sixth Corps, was to cross the Rapidan at Jacobs' Ford,
about five miles below Morton's Ford, and push ahead to

388 OEinSRAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE,

Robertson's Tavern, a place called by the Confederates
Locust Grove. This was General French's column, and, as
already mentioned, he had been instructed to take the left-
hand fork of the road upon reaching Morris's house. The
object of these instructions was to avoid the danger which
he would incur, through taking the right-hand fork, of
being struck in flank while marching, and of being thus
prevented from reaching Robertson's Tavern in time. The
First and Fifth Corps were to cross the Rapidan at Culpeper
Mine Ford, five miles below Jacobs' Ford, and march thence
to Parker's store, which would bring them on to the ground
four miles east of Robertson's store, within easy march of
that place. The Second Corps was to cross the Rapidan by
itself at Germanna Ford, a ford between Jacobs' and Cul-
peper Mine Fords. The cavalry in part guarded the trains
and the fords, and in part covered the left flank of the ad-
vance.

The march began early on the morning of the 26th of
November. Lee soon learned of it from his signal-stations
and from his cavalry, but nothing could have frustrated the
initiative of the Army of the Potomac but the ensuing delay
of General French. Some loss of time was incurred through
the inexcusable fact that pontoons were deficient in number,
the recurrence of which, or entire absence of them, during
the war was one of its constant surprises. Difliculdes were
also encountered in the ascent by artillery of the high and
steep banks south of the Rapidan. Other difliculties were
met as they arose, war being the science of overcoming dif-
ficulties existent and suddenly brought into existence ; but
all those mentioned may be incidental to any campaig^ning.
The one which French introduced is incidental only to an
incapacity marvellous in a corps-commander, so gross that
it led to his being relieved from duty with the army.
All other obstacles were surmounted, but this was insuper-

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBO. 389

able. It led to the loss of a great success for the Federal
arms.

The minor obstacles to progress in the march brought it
about that, when night fell, none of the troops had reached
the place of rendezvous. The next morning, the 27th, the
movement was resumed with every prospect still favorable.
It had been intended and so ordered that the First, Second,
Third, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, the army, in short, in order
duly announced, should close up on New Verdiersville and
Old Verdiersville, cavalry moving in advance. The Third
and Sixth Corps, however, remained stationary, and the whole
army was brought to a stand, so &r as its initiative was con-
cerned, as completely as though it had been stuck in the mud«
Meanwhile Lee's troops, off on his left, miles away, were
availing themselves of the opportunity to present themselves
in force along the threatened line of Mine Run. Lee, with
his usual vigilance, had been on the alert, and now, with
his usual promptitude and determination, was about to
attack.

At ten o'clock in the morning, near Robertson's Tavern,
the first collision between the two hostile forces took place.
The head of the Second Corps, under General Warren, met
the head of Ewell's corps. The enemy were so well per-
suaded of the relatively greater strength of the Federal po-
sition that, after the first encounter, he awaited reinforce-
ments. But, as it happened, the reinforcements expected
had been met and brought to a halt by the unexpected
firing of the Third Corps upon them while on the march,
the Third Corps having been halted by its commander near
the forks of the road by Morris's house ; in doubt, despite
his instructions, whether he should take there the right-
hand or the left-hand branch of the road, and notwith-
standing that General Prince, one of his division-com-
manders, insisted upon it that the left branch was the proper

390 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE,

one to take. Had French, however, taken either imme-
diately upon his arrival at the point, he would have passed
through without contact with the enemy, but taking neither,
he had not only neutralized his own corps, but also the
Sixth Corps in his rear, brought to a stand by his h^lt

Despatches now began to be sent to French to hasten
him forward with the Third Corps, and to instruct Sedg-
wick, commanding the Sixth, to push forward, closed-up
with him, and to march by any route to the left by which
they could reach the position of the Second Corps. No
general-commanding was ever placed in a more trying situ-
ation than this, victory within his grasp if two corps had
but continued en route. Victory is not to be compelled,
and therefore failure amid the clash of arms is philosophi-
cally borne by the greatest generals, but failure through in-
action of forces directed with consummate forecast on a
certain point, and these, not like those of Grouchy, miles
away, but those upon which the commander feels that he
can almost lay his hand, is intolerable. Had French con-
tinued to advance when he reached Morris's house, Ewell's
corps would have been met by the Second, Third, and Sixth
Corps, instead of by the Second Corps alone, and would
have been overwhelmed. But the missing of this single
opportunity does not represent the full extent of French's
insufficiency for the occasion. The &tal error of halting at
Morris's house went on in ever-widening circles of included
events, compassing in sum the failure of the main design of
General Meade. French got into a small battle of his own,
and hope that at first was high, that things might be at least
in a measure righted, grew fainter and fainter as the day
wore on, until by nightfall it had died away. At last, be-
tween eleven and twelve o'clock, noon, a despatch was re-
ceived by General Meade from French, mentioning where
his head of colunm was, and saying that he was waiting for

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBG, 39 1

the Second Corps. It is said that General Meade was by
this time fuming. What wonder if he were ! This de-
spatch had been sent by French a little after nine o'clock,
before he had reached Morris's house, where he was, as he
continued to be, blocking the road of the Sixth Corps,
which had not been even able to start. The obvious an-
swer was sent, that he had not been ordered to wait for the
Second Corps anywhere, that it was at Robertson's Tavern
where he was awaited. The despatch ended with a summons
to push rapidly forward to that place. Just before two
o'clock in the afternoon another despatch, written just be-
fore twelve, reached General Meade from French, saying
that the enemy was attacking him on his right. There was
now no help for it but to let him remain and fight. Accord-
ingly, General Meade despatched to him to attack the
enemy, but to connect his left with the Second Corps, at
Robertson's Tavern, that being the object of his being
allowed to attack. The action on French's front became
more vigorous, the Sixth Corps supporting the Third
with two divisions, which, however, were used by French
only as reserves. Outnumbering the enemy vastly, French
remained wholly on the defensive, without fully availing
himself of the presence of the Sixth Corps. The situation
was this. French, with two corps, confronted only one
division of the enemy, while Warren, to his left, with only
a single corps, confronted two divisions of the enemy.
Naturally General Meade could not advance Warren against
these, and French was entirely beyond his control. In the
mean while, during the afternoon, the First Corps, under
Newton, had reached Parker's store, in the rear of Robert-
son's Tavern, and the Fifth Corps, under Sykes, New Hope
Church, on the left of Robertson's Tavern ; the First Corps
being finally ordered to Robertson's Tavern, arriving there
by nightfall. During the afternoon the enemy, finding that

392 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE,

the Second Corps was disposed to be unaggressive, made
an attack with sldrmishers upon it, resulting in the feint
of a counter-attack by Warren, in which the enemy was
repulsed with some slight loss. French was now regarded
as so hopelessly stalled that during the afternoon orders
were sent to the Sixth Corps, still in his rear, to move for-
ward to Robertson's Tavern, and for the Third Corps to
follow by night.

This sketch of the operations up to this point is now suffi-
ciently complete, in conformity with the rest of this work,
as to make it only requisite to add, that on Meade's left,
Hill's corps having now advanced in full force from Lee's
former extreme left on the Rapidan, had reached the line
of the upper part of Mine Run on the afternoon of the 27th,
where some of it came into contact at New Hope Church
with the Fifth Corps and cavalry of the Army of the Poto-
mac before that corps was ordered to Robertson's Tavern.
Hill then formed on the right of Ewell's corps, and the
enemy was then in position along the west side of Mine
Run. This military situation on both sides naturally con-
cludes the first chapter of the operations at Mine Run.
What was done could not be undone. It might be possible,
however, for General Meade still to retrieve, through a
different channel, the failure which had taken place, and
for which he was in nowise responsible. That he evidently
thought so, is proved by his promptly executed subsequent
movements, through which it is seen that he pertinaciously
clung to the hope that success might still reward a final
effort.

It must not be foi^otten by the reader that it was said
that the line of Lee's entrenchments along the Rapidan
did not at first pass much further south than Bartlett's
Mill, on Mine Run, but that, from the arrival of the
Confederates on the ground, they began to extend the

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER OETTYSBUBG. 393

line along the west side of Mine Run. Necessity, the
practical character of the American, and the nature of
the soil in Virginia, had all conspired towards working
a certain change in the methods of fighting in the op-
posing armies. The individual soldier, and the soldiers
collectively, now fell as naturally to entrenching against
infantry for the needs of a few minutes, or for those of a
protracted encounter, as if they had belonged to that class
in nature of burrowing creatures which, either for predatory
or defensive purposes, takes to mother-earth for aid, whether
on dry land or on the bottom of pond or sea. The Con-
federates now had a night before them, a night to be devoted
freely to the purpose of defence, incapable of producing a
palace with a roc's egg in the centre of the dome, but serv-
ing every purpose as a citadel of life. In consequence,
when at daylight, on the morning of the 28th, the Army
of the Potomac advanced in line of battle with the First,
Second, and Sixth Corps in front, and the Third and Fifth
in reserve, Lee had a new line of entrenchments thrown up
for a long distance on the ridge of the west side of Mine
Run. This formidable line stretched away right and left,
strengthened by abattis, and held by infantry and artillery.
No troops could live through the gust of fire that would,
if Meade advanced, sweep from the western crest of the
hills beyond Mine Run across the little valley through
which flows its stream. The force of the enemy was smaller
than that of the Army of the Potomac, although that fact
was not then known, but as the defenders of entrenchments,
his actual force more than equalized superiority of opposing
numbers. Brought to a halt here by insuperable diflicul-
ties, Meade did not relinquish his intention to obtain some
success commensurate with the efforts that had already
been made. Rightly judgfing that the enemy's entrench-
ments could not extend indefinitely to the left, he despatched

394 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

Warren, with the Second Corps, with a portion of the Sixth,
and some cavalry, to make a night march to the left, and
on the morning of the 29th, endeavor to find a point where,
by a turning movement, he could with advantage attack,
while the commanders of the other corps were ordered to
reconnoitre during the 29th the lines immediately in front
of them, and seek to discover some weak point for assault
As the result of this quest, Newton and Sykes, of the First
and Fifth Corps, reported unfavorably to success on their
fronts, while a favorable report, afterwards changed, was
made as to its front by the Third Corps. Wright's division,
of the Sixth Corps, on the right, and the Second Corps,
which, with a portion of the Sixth, had penetrated to the
left, opposite the head of Mine Run, reported favorably.
Two divisions of the Third Corps were finally added by
night-march to Warren's turning colunm on the left,
which, upon the bsisis of his enthusiastic report, was ordered
to assault the enemy's line the next morning, while, on the
right, the Fifth and Sixth Corps were to assault, and the
First Corps, with the third division of the Third Corps, in
the centre, were to make strong demonstrations, to be
converted into real attacks in case that either the attack on
the right or that on the left should prove successful. It
must not be supposed that the line was unbroken. Warren
was off some distance to the left. General Meade, secure in
his position, confident in the stanchness of his troops, and in
the ability of the left to sustain itself, until, if it were needed,
reinforced, had had the enterprise to detach Warren so far
as to weaken the centre of his general line of battle. War-
ren was, however, not so far off as represented by a singular
mistake of General Humphreys, who states the distance as
five miles, whereas the whole line of battle from right to
left was only a little over six miles. However, Warren
being somewhat off to the left, special dispositions had to

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER 0ETTY8BUBQ. 395

be made to recognize that fact. These, in general terms,
consisted, while thinning the centre, of leaving it strongly
supported with artillery.

During the night of the 29th the several corps adjusted
their positions with reference to the contemplated assault,
the initiation of which was to be the advance of Warren, pre-
ceded by artillery-fire along the lines for an hour from the
right and centre, when the Fifth and Sixth Corps, on the
right, were to assault, and the First and Third Corps, on
the centre, to convert a feint of advancing into a real at-
tack, if circumstances permitted. The weather had been
frightfully cold, followed by a rain-storm in the night of the
28th. The suffering of the troops from cold was intense,
especially those on the left, intensified by the necessity of
latterly dispensing with camp-fires, which would have
revealed their exact position to the enemy. Men were
frozen to death on their posts, and morning dawned upon
troops with determination to do or die, but with the despera-
tion of hopelessness. On the stroke of eight o'clock in the
morning the skirmishers of the First and Third Corps
darted across Mine Run, repulsing the enemy's. From the
right towards the left the cannonading of the enemy's lines
began and continued with uninterrupted roar. The time
of one hour, allotted for its duration, had nearly elapsed.
Suddenly the whole plan of battle collapsed, and with it,
shortly, the battle itself. Sedgwick was in the act of pre-
paring to assault on the right with the Fifth and Sixth
Corps, when a staff-officer from Warren reached General
Meade in fiery haste, and reported that Warren judged the
enemy's entrenchments opposite the left to be impregnable.
The enemy had pushed off to his right along his line,
with reserves in rear, and during day and night a line of
earthworks had mantled the hillsides in front of Warren's
contemplated line of advance. There was barely time, ten

396 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE,

minutes, to countermand Sedgwick's assault on the right,
and thus ended the second chapter of the military history
of Mine Run.

General Meade went through the form of going to the
left and scanning the ground there, but he would have been
fatuous indeed, had he, in the teeth of a decision based
upon reconnoissance, concluded blindly to make the assault
on the left. Had Warren decided in favor of that course,
had Meade decided in favor of it, they would have gained
a little cheap fame, but neither was a man to attempt a
stroke reckless of its cost and an undue risk of its failure,
war being a game of destruction in which relatively less
cost must be considered. Warren did his duty in declining
to justify by his decision the risk of assault, Meade did his
by accepting the morally inevitable. He had gone as far
to secure victory as any general could in conscience go.
Grant never went further in hazardous enterprises than
Meade had ventured to secure success upon this field.
There is something still to be added, to give a correct view
of this episode. The whole plan of battle was based upon
Warren's confidence in success on the left. Sharing his
confidence, from his report, Meade increased his force in
the night of the 29th, so that it in sum amounted to between
twenty-five and twenty-six thousand men. Assuming then,
as we have a right to do, what General Meade himself did
not dispute, that on the morning of the 30th the enemy had
become too strong to be attacked, there still remains an
undiscussed condition, involved in the question why War-
ren should have been so confident as to a matter subject to
such sudden collapse. General Meade states very mildly
in his official report what relates to this portion of the fail-
ure at Mine Run, where he says, " but for the unfortunate
error of judgment of Major-General Warren," his [General
Meade's] first plan of attack, in three columns, would prob-

THE CAMFAIQN AFTER OETTYSBURQ. 397

ably have been successful, or at least would have been tried.
French, here at Mine Run, failed him lamentably ; and al-
though Warren did not belong to the same class of men, as
Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, and other places attest, yet he
had not that forecasting mind which is equal to judgment be-
yond immediate emergency. Rare is the gift in any one ; it
is that of the highest military order of mind. To have the
slow pulse of Napoleon, combined with the brain in which
instant impression of present and future are blended in future
probability, is a military type which is a single product of
the centuries. Warren's hopes at Mine Run overclouded
his judgment, and, after the failure of French, neutralized
the last chance in the attempted operation by ignoring the
possibility of just what occurred in a night by the Confed-
erates' making the position on their right impregnable.

Lee had been preparing in the night of the ist of De-
cember for a stroke on the left of Warren, but the whole
of Meade's army, retiring across the Rapidan that same
night, involved the intention, as well as any other project
which the Confederate commander may have had, in the
limbo of things unaccomplished. The enemy made some
attempts to harass the rear of the retiring columns, but it
was not effective. The cavalry of the army, having well
executed its duty to the left of the army in position, and by
watching the fords, now concluded it by covering Meade's
left flank and rear as his columns retired towards the river.
If General Meade had been allowed to take his own course
at this point of time, he would have fallen back to Fred-
ericksburg, just in his rear, instead of recrossing the Rap-
idan, but the timorous Halleck would have none of it. He
could not for a moment think of letting the army take up a
position anywhere a few miles off on the Confederate flank.
It must lie right across the track to Washington of the lion
Lee. Yet, had the army then been allowed to fall back

398 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

upon Fredericksburg, the campaign that opened in the
spring would have been spared the dreadful sacrifices of the
Wilderness.

The Army of the Potomac, once ag^n across the Rap-
idan, and the Army of Northern Virginia back in its old
position along the river, both similarly affected in operations
by the season of the year, sought in the repose of their
hutted winter-quarters renovation through rest, the arrival
of new levies, of wounded men returning well, and the re-
turn of comrades who had been detached on military ser-
vice. General Meade, however, although he naturally kept
his ulterior purposes closely within his own breast, had not
relinquished the idea that it might be possible to take Lee
at a disadvantage some time during the winter, owing to the
circumstance that the necessities of subsisting Lee's army
and placing it in good quarters would require long intervals
between the cantonments of its different parts. This inten-
tion was, however, defeated by instructions from Washing-
ton, ordering an operation which inevitably drew the atten-
tion of the enemy to the feasibility of the very project
contemplated by General Meade. During General Meade's
absence for a few days on leave, and when Sedgwick was in
command of the army, Halleck supported a request of
General B. F. Butler's, then near Fort Monroe, to make, on
the 6th of February, a strong demonstration against the
Confederate army in support of an attempt by Butler to
capture Richmond with a mixed force of cavalry and in-
fantry. The demonstration was accordingly made with
great spirit ; indeed in one place with such exceeding vigor,
through a misapprehension, that the attack became real,
and so successful as to prove that the plan that General
Meade had entertained would, but for this imprudent diver-
sion, have had fair prospects of success. But the enter-
prise, in the interest of which the demonstration had been

THE CAMPAIGN AFTER QETTY8BURQ. 399

made, proved entirely unsuccessful. Butler despatched the
troops mentioned, to the number of about six thousand,
under General Isaac J. Wistar, upon the contemplated
expedition, intended to release Union prisoners, but the
enemy, forewarned through a deserter, was on the alert,
had concentrated troops in advance of the menaced point,
and the expedition entirely failed. The success of the
demonstration by the Army of the Potomac had, how-
ever, been so great that the enemy was fully apprised
that he had better be on his guard ag^nst a serious en-
terprise.

The winter comprised, by express order of the Govern-
ment, a cavalry raid towards Richmond, with the view of
disseminating Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, and
including an attempt to capture the city by a coup de main
and release the Union prisoners there. Through the inef-
ficiency of General Kilpatrick, under whose command the
expedition was, it proved unfruitful ; and not only that, but
it was associated with an accusation by the enemy against
Colonel Dahlgren, commanding a body of horse, involving
alleged violation of the code of civilized warfare. This led
to an interchange of letters between Meade and Lee, in
which General Meade disavowed all privity of his own
or of the Government's in the alleged action of Colonel
Dahlgren. As, however, Dahlgren had paid the penalty
of death at the hands of the enemy, in the course of a skir-
mish, it was not possible to bring to the test of trial the
charge made against him, which, despite its fair seeming,
those who knew him best affirm to this day must have been
susceptible of exculpating explanation. This movement of
Kilpatrick's was supported by a strong demonstration on
the left by the Army of the Potomac, and with this episode
ended the active operations of the army for the winter. To
both armies flocked, during the remainder of the season.

400 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

visitors distinguished and undistinguished of both sexes.
Such cheerfulness as can pervade the inhabitants of huts in
wintry weather prevailed. The morale of the army left
nothing to be desired, waiting with its wonted stanchness
for the renewal with spring of active operations.

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THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETQ 4OI

CHAPTER XX.

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, SPOTTSYLVANIA,

AND THE NORTH ANNA.

A GREAT change suddenly came over the Army of the
Potomac. A new star had risen in the western firma-
ment, before whose lustre in the zenith the light of others
was to pale. Fortune had so willed it, that the army,
although diminished in numbers since Gettysburg, yet,
having held in check the army of Lee, and even taken
against it the offensive, had been the means of indirectly
assisting towards Grant's gathering new laurels at Chatta-
nooga. Now, when he appeared on the eastern theatre of
war, the army had been increased to almost unprecedented
force in numbers and material of war, all ready to the con-
queror's hand. On the 26th of February, 1863, the grade
of lieutenant-general had been created and Grant appointed
to the place. On the 8th he arrived in Washington from the
West, and the next day received his commission. The day
afterwards he had a conference with General Meade at
Brandy Station. Going back immediately thereafter to the
West for final understanding with General Sherman as to
plans of campaign, he returned to Washington on the 23d
of March, whence he went almost at once to the field at
Culpeper, and there established his headquarters. It is
therefore in place here to mention incidentally, that he had
expressly stated that, as being in command of all the armies
in the field, his proper place was in Washington. Although,
it is true, his presence on the hither side of the Rapidan

made no essential difference at first, yet, when he thence

402 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

entered upon and continued to direct on the ground the
campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg, destined to last
a year, his departure from the line of conduct which he
had laid down as the duty of the commanding-general of
all the armies to follow was absolute, and led, especially
in the Valley of Virginia, to the very consequences which
his originally announced intention had been intended to
preclude.

There were other consequences that followed this reversal
of intention on the part of Grant. But for his immediate
presence, the army would have emerged from the conflict,
from the battle of the Wilderness to that of Cold Harbor,
in far greater strength than was possible under his tactics,
in which, had he been the mighty Thor himself, his weapon
would have shattered on the steel of the opposing front of
war. He persisted too long in the continuous attrition and
hammering which he declared in advance to be his system
of encountering the Army of Northern Virginia. Still
another consequence of his determination to have his head-
quarters with the Army of the Potomac lay in a divided
command, lessening the value of administration represented
by a single centre of authority which, in all activities, is
the condition of the highest degree of efficiency. It led
also, on account of Grant's tendency to favoritism, to detri-
ment to the service, through that propensity which, will-
ingly or unwillingly, allows well- or ill-placed affections to
be enslaved. The same consequences, it might be urged,
the tendency being conceded, would have manifested them-
selves, had he established his headquarters in Washington.
This is undeniable, but it should be remembered that the
field, the immediate scene of critical events, introduces
dangers from such indulgence far exceeding those possible
to incur in cabinet direction of affairs ; and in this case, as
will in due time appear, they did not fail to manifest them-

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 403

selves as working injury to the military service, and there-
fore to the cause which it sustained.

General Meade had seized an opportunity at his first
interview with General Grant to say to him that if he would
prefer another man for his position, not to hesitate for
a moment in expressing his wish to that effect Grant,
however, knew too well the value of General Meade to
relieve him from duty as the commander of the army. But
the situation thereby accepted led to consequences of far-
reaching import, probably contemplated by neither at the
time. One has already been noted as a result, in the im-
perfect co-ordination of orders. It was told by an officer
of undoubted veracity that when, in the middle of the night,
he once carried a written order to Warren, he began to
swear as he read it, when, glancing at the signature, he
resumed his calm, as he remarked, " I might have known
it was from Grant." The position of General Meade, as
commander of the army, with General Grant's headquarters
near him in the field was anomalous, and led for him per-
sonally to many trying situations. If any signal success
attended the operations, it was almost invariably set down
to the credit of Grant, but if any check or disaster, to the
disparagement of Meade. I well remember one affair
near Petersburg, directed in person by General Meade, as
to which the papers had laudatory accounts of General
Grant's presence on the field, when, as I afterwards learned,
he was far away from the scene of action. Taking it
altogether, there never was in history, so far as I am aware,
any case so detrimental as Grant's presence in the field with
the real commander of the army, except that of a king, or
a prince of the blood, who was formerly often there, as an
inspiring influence, or from military aspirations, and from
whatever motive, generally a hindrance instead of a help to
military operations. The actual case seems most like that

404 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

of Blucher, whose chief function was enterprise, a function
not to be despised, but one which by itself ts dangerous in
the extreme, and which with him was tempered by the
knowledge of an accomplished staff.

The winter had passed with the Army of the Potomac
in cantonments. The scheme of Butler, approved in Wash-
ington, and the consequent diversion by the Army of the
Potomac to assist the raid made on the Peninsula towards
Richmond, precluded, as had been anticipated in the army,
any real advance by it over the Rapidan before the opening
of the spring. Recruiting, drilling, and reviewing went on
apace on both sides during this season of enforced cessa-
tion from hostilities. It was not surprising that, at this
p<nnt of time, on the eve of so vast an enterprise as the
advance towards Richmond, it should have been deemed
desirable to divide the Army of the Potomac into three
corps of infantry. That had for a long time been the or-
ganization of the Army of Northern Virginia; and in some
respects the military administration of the armies of the
South had been superior to that of those of the North, nota-
bly in the case of filling up regiments on the basis of their
original cadres, instead of raising entirely new regiments, and
in that of always apportioning rank suitably to command.
General Meade once said to me, when a boy, and we saun-
tering along together and discussing things in general, that
there was not an officer in the country who could creditably
. march twenty thousand men into a certain designated place
and get them out again. But with changed experience he
had long known that a hundred thousand men had been
repeatedly marched into and out of most intricate ways,
and now, under Grant's orders, he was about to direct the
march of a hundred and fifteen thousand men across the
Rapidan into the Wilderness, from which he, under Hooker,
had been obliged with other corps-commanders to beat an

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETa 405

inglorious retreat. The die was cast in favor of the con-
solidation of the infantry of the army into three corps, and
amid much heart-burning the intention was consummated.
Meade's recommendation to that efiect had been made on
March 4th to the War Department. The First Corps was
incorporated in the Fifth Corps. Two divisions of the
Third Corps were incorporated in the Second Corps. A
third division, lately attached to the Third Corps, was in-
corporated in the Sixth Corps. Thus the infantry of the
Army of the Potomac was made to consist of the Second
Corps, the Fifth Corps, and the Sixth Corps. These were
respectively commanded, as in the order named, by Han-
cock, Warren, and Sedgwick. The cavalry, consisting of
three divisions, was under Sheridan. The chief-of-staff
was Humphreys, the chief-engineer. Major Duane, the
chief-of-artillery. Hunt, and the chief-quarter-master, In-
galls. The corps of Burnside, the Ninth, returned from
Knoxville, East Tennessee, had since recruited its num-
bers at Annapolis, and had now reached the Rappahan-
nock, via Washington, making the whole force of all
arms available for Grant's advance about a hundred and
fifteen thousand men, while Lee's, at the greatest possible
estimate, did not exceed sixty-two thousand. At the out-
set, the troops of Burnside, although acting in line of battle
with it, formed no part of the Army of the Potomac, but
this preposterous arrangement, leading to great confusion,
as should have been anticipated, was rectified within a few
days by the consolidation of the forces. Out of the depths
of my memory here rises a trivial incident connected indis-
solubly with the pending advance. Happening to be in
Philadelphia at the time, I was passing the house of Mr.
Adolph E. Borie, afterwards Secretary of the Navy under
Grant, when he drew me mysteriously aside, to be out of
earshot of the passers, and whispered, ** Grant is starting

406 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

for Richmond with two hundred thousand men." I imagine
that I was among the earliest who had the news. General
Grant and Mr. Borie afterwards became intimate, and to the
house of the latter the General sometimes came as a lion, but,
as became him then, "roared as gently as a sucking-dove."

To attempt to discuss here the strategy of the campaign
now about to open, comparing one possible mode of pro-
cedure with another, would take &r more space than is at
my disposal, and would perhaps tax &r more than warrant-
able the patience of the reader. Briefly, then, I will essay
to give an idea of the plan actually adopted, and to indicate
what it seemed to Grant to prescribe. The expression that
Grant uses in his memoirs, as purporting to give an idea of
the military situation, that Sherman represented the right
flank, the Army of the Potomac the centre, and Butler, on
the James, the left flank, is an illustration of the most
strained character.

That, having adopted the line of overland advance from
Washington to Richmond, Grant should make it by the
right flank of Lee, instead of by the left, was entirely a
matter of necessity, seeing that it could not possibly be
made by Lee's left, because by that route the army could
not have been supplied. When Grant finally found himself
south of the James, he was unable to compel the evacuation
of Richmond and Petersbui^ by the single stroke of destroy-
ing their lines of supply or of capturing them by assault He
had to resort to g^dual encroachment on the lines of supply
to Petersburg and Richmond by the extension of his left
flank, until worn out by siege, loss by desertion, and abate-
ment of the warlike spirit of the South, the remnant of the
grand Army of Northern Virginia was forced to succumb to
the inevitable. Grant had so overweening a confidence in his
persistence to overcome obstacles, so full a conviction in his
belief that the Army of the Potomac had never been fought

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 407

to its uttermost, so g^at confidence, growing out of its nu-
merical superiority to that of the enemy, that he went into
the last campaign of the war with the fullest belief that
Lee's army would be irretrievably crippled on the line of
march from the Rapidan to Richmond. The event told
another tale, and what is mostly to be deplored as that
which might have been otherwise, is the loss of life
that might have been avoided if the lessons that were
learned at last through sacrifice had not been needed to
instruct.

The positions of the opposing armies have been suffi-
ciently indicated by the descriptions in the last chapter.
The advance by the left was determined upon. Lee's
entrenchments, on his right, now stretched along Mine
Run from Bartlett's Mill, and thence to the source of the
stream near Antioch Church, south of the plank road from
Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. His headquarters
were at Orange Court House. Grant was now in supreme
authority. He gave instructions to General Meade to sup-
ply the details. Grant's will was now law, on the field and
in Washington. He could now address the great Halleck,
his former commander in the West, who had behaved most
unjustly to him, as " chief-of-stafl"." All things now bent
to the will of Grant, all but the Army of Northern Virginia.

The line of march by the right of Lee, turning his flank,
was superbly executed. But it is a disputed question to
this day, whether Grant should not have pushed forward or
to the right before making his first halt, thus by either
course clearing the Wilderness. The reader will observe
that the army is marching between the line of Mine Run
on the west and Chancellorsville on the east, in the heart
of the Wilderness. Robertson's Tavern, which was at the
front in the Mine Run advance, is now to the right of the
advance, and Chancellorsville, where the fiasco of Hooker

408 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

occurred, a short distance off to the left. That the halt
was made where it was called is easily accounted for. The
reason assigned was that the main body must not move too
far in advance of the trains and Burnside's position in com-
ing up with his corps from the Rappahannock and isolatedly
crossing the Rapidan ; but it would seem from all the evi-
dence at hand, that the chief predisposing influence towards
halting where the halt actually took place was that Grant
did not think that Lee could arrive in time to attack the
army there. Had Grant realized that the army would be so
attacked, in a place so unfitted as the Wilderness for battle,
on ground with which the enemy was more familiar than
was the Army of the Potomac, we may well believe that in
a choice, were it only regarded as one between two evils,
the risk, if any there were, to the trains and to Burnside's
isolated corps, would have been accepted, and the main
body of the army would, before a halt was ordered, have
been allowed to emerge from the Wilderness.

Let us, for the sake of economizing space, especially as the
army has once before in this narrative crossed the Rapidan at
this point, imagine it to have crossed, and to be situated as
the following description will indicate. The three infantry
corps, after starting at midnight of the 3d of May, from
their cantonments of the winter, and after crossing three
fords of the Rapidan on five pontoon -bridges, the Fifth,
under Warren, on the right, followed by the Sixth, under
Sedgwick, found themselves on the south side of the Rapi-
dan, each column preceded by a heavy body of cavalry,
and long before night in bivouac at the end of their march.
The Second Corps, on the left, had arrived, at i p.m., first
at its destination on the ground of Chancellorsville, the FifUi
Corps, at 2 P.M., at its destination, on the right, at Wilder-
ness Tavern, while the Sixth Corps, in the rear of the FifUi,
had halted not far from Germanna Ford, where it had crossed

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC. 409

the river, in order to prevent the enemy from swooping into
the rear and making a descent in flank upon the trains. But
as the trains, excepting the fighting-trains with the respec-
tive corps, were crossing at Culpeper Ford and Ely's Ford,
several miles below, and Grant was on the right flank of
Lee's army, which stretched miles away to the west, and
could not have begun to move until daylight had revealed
the march of the Army of the Potomac, and as, on the 4th,
Bumside's corps was advancing rapidly from beyond the
Rappahannock towards Germanna Ford, and besides, the
trains were covered by cavalry, and had with them a special
grand detachment from each corps, and therefore could be
successfully assailed by no very large body of the enemy, if
indeed any could be spared to reach them, it would seem
that this precaution, which led to the army's not extricating
itself that day from the Wilderness, and therefore to all the
consequences that flowed therefrom, was most unwise ; that
it was most unwise not to have advanced four or five miles
further with the army, towards Mine Run or towards Spott-
sylvania, so as to clear the Wilderness.

In the early morning of the 5 th of May the army resumed
its march, Warren on the right, Hancock on the left:
Sedgwick was still in the rear of Warren. The line on
which they were was from Wilderness Tavern to Chancel-
lorsville. Beyond, to the right, where Robertson's Tavern
is, is the western edge of the Wilderness ; beyond, to the
left, where Chancellorsville is, is the eastern edge of the
Wilderness. Its southern edge reaches down to the Rapi-
dan. It was intended that, on the day mentioned, the
Fifth Corps should march towards Parker's Store, and the
Second towards Shady Grove Church. The growth amidst
which the Fifth and Sixth were to march was a stunted
one of mixed character, with thickets of brush almost im-
pervious to the sight in places, and occasional small swamps

4IO GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADR

along the streams among the hills. The region was inter^
sected by a few main roads, and numerous tracks ran their
devious course of communication among them, all much
better known to the enemy than to the Federal army.
Acquaintance with such is especially useful for attack and
defence in so blind a region as that in which the army now
found itself. Hancock off to the left, was not only on the
eastern outskirts of the Wilderness, but in his advance came
upon more and more open country as he proceeded. An
idea of the relations of the main roads to one another is
indispensable to an understanding of the tactics of the battle
about to be fought, called the battle of the Wilderness.
From Lee's position towards the west, where his entrenched
line had lain northeast by east and southwest by west,
fronting north, come the two main roads, the Orange Turn-
pike, on the north, and the Orange Plank, Road, to the
south of it, running from southwest by west to northeast
by east, at varying distances from each other, until they
unite for a short distance at Chancellorsville, to diverge
again as they proceed eastward to Fredericksburg. The
crossing of the Orange Plank Road by the Brock Road
takes place nearly at right-angles, and the Brock Road is
the most direct one to Spottyslvania Court House, towards
which the Second Corps was marching by that road.

Lee, when apprised of the movement of the Army of
the Potomac, had left his lines lying east and west along
the Rapidan, and with Grant on what had been his right
flank, was about to present his front athwart the two main
roads running east and west, forcing Grant to face to the
west before continuing his march. But, so dense, so almost
impenetrable to sight and ordinary sound was the mixed
growth of trees and underbrush, that when, on the morning
of the 5th of May, the Army of the Potomac found itself
checked a mile or so from its bivouac of the night before.

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 4II

neither Grant nor Meade thought that he had in face of him
an enemy in great force. Warren opened the battle, or
rather, more strictly speaking, the enemy anticipated him in
opening it. As he was marching by a wood-road towards
Parker's Store, he pushed Griffin's division, on his right,
along the Orange Turnpike, to guard his flank. But neither
colunm had proceeded far when it encountered the enemy,
— ^the heads of Ewell's and Hill's corps coming eastward
along the Orange Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road,
Ewell following the former. Hill the latter direction. Griffin
on the right, on the Turnpike, having been reinforced, and
the advance on the left, towards the Plank Road, having been
withdrawn, a vigorous attack was made by Griffin, which
drove Ewell from his position to take up one slightly to the
rear of it. All this time, however, Ewell's troops were
gradually arriving on the ground, and he in turn took the
offensive, and somewhat disrupted Warren's right flank.
An advance by Warren on his left resulted unfortunately,
the denseness of the woods and underbrush there prevent-
ing co-operation among the different bodies of troops.
Warren fell back to a line slightly to the rear. The Sixth
Corps was not yet up, and it became very evident at this
time that, but for the apprehension of danger leading to its
retention towards the Rapidan, the advance would not have
been thus summarily checked and the field of the Wilder-
ness have been decreed upon as the scene of a pitched bat-
tle. Despite the adverse popular notion, nothing is better for
proof than certain kinds of circumstantial evidence. Nothing
can better demonstrate the fact that Grant did not expect to
fight a pitched battle where he found himself, than the cir-
cumstance that, on the far away left, Hancock was march-
ing, under orders, ten miles in advance.

Upon the abrupt check to the advance of the Fifth Corps,
Hancock was recalled from the point that he had reached

412 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

beyond Todd's Tavern, and ordered to take up the position
along the Brock Road where, as just mentioned, it intersects
the Orange Plank Road. But, as the reader will remem-
ber. Hill's corps was advancing along that road towards
this same intersection. As it was one of the few artificial
strategic points of the region, this complicated the situation
so much that General Meade despatched a division of the
Sixth Corps, under Getty, to occupy the point in advance
of Hancock's possible arrival. But for that the enemy must
have secured the point, and thus have interposed between
the right and left wings of the army. The enemy did in
fact attack Getty vigorously, but he stoutly held his position
until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the head
of the Second Corps appeared and formed in double line of
battle along the Brock Road to and beyond its intersection
with the Orange Plank Road. All became safe in that
quarter of the field, and Hancock was at once ordered to
assume the offensive. Getty led off, and Hancock soon
followed in repeated assaults upon the almost imperceptible
lines of the enemy, sheltered in the umbrageous fastnesses
of the field. None but a sportsman or a naturalist can re-
alize the value of protective color in such a place. Any
one, however, who belonged to the Army of the Potomac
soon realized the difference between the gleam through
bushes from blue ranks and those of the neutral tint of the
Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate soldiers lay
concealed on the dull ground amid the leafage, like ele-
mental creatures of the earth, earthy, faintly appearing, if
at all, and disappearing, undistinguishable from the face of
nature. So desperate was the resistance of the Confed-
erates on the left, and so fatal to all skilled tactical move-
ment was the entanglement of the woods and underbrush
on Hancock's front, that a heavy column under Wadsworth
having been ordered from the Fifth Corps, on the right, to

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 413

advance and feel for the left flank of Hill, reached its desti-
nation with the greatest difficulty only by nightfall, and
therefore not in time to assist in the desperate efforts Han-
cock had been making to push back the enemy's line. This
circumstance of Wadsworth's penetrating with difficulty to
the left flank of Hill shows incidentally that the lines of
Ewell and Hill were not continuous, and the same thing was
also true of the lines of Warren and Hancock. With some
hard fighting on the right, in the afternoon, the battle there,
as well as on the left, ended for the day. Two battles
had in fact been fought side by side, having from begin-
ning to end but little influence on each other, the division
and brigade led by Wadsworth from the right having failed
to influence the action on the left. The advantage had been
with Hancock and Getty against Hill, when night was fall-
ing on the field. When darkness impenetrable had finally
set in, the combatants remained in the positions in which
they then found themselves.

From Gordonsville, nearly thirty miles to the soilthwest,
Longstreet had had to move for junction with Lee. From
beyond the Rappahannock, — at the farthest point, Manassas
Junction, over forty miles distant, Bumside had had to
move for junction with Grant. As soon, on the 4th, as
the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were fairly across the
Rapidan, the Ninth Corps, some of whose divisions were
already en route, was telegraphed to expedite its march.
Bumside and Longstreet reached the ground about the
same time, Bumside rather in advance, his nearest troops
having reached Brandy Station, but as will shortly be per-
ceived, Longstreet's immediate impress on events eclipsed
the movements of Bumside on the ground. As a result
of the day's fighting the corps of Hill had been disrupted,
and good observers were of the opinion that, with an
hour or two more of daylight, he would have been driven

414 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

from the field. But, as has been mentioned, night fell
and he had not been, and although Bumside was coming
up, Longstreet, too, was coming. The plan for the next
day's battle was for the Sixth, Fifth, and Second Corps,
in the order from right to left, to attack the enemy on
their fronts at five o'clock in the morning, while Bumside
now near the field, was ordered to fill with two divis-
ions and one in reserve the gap between the Fifth and
Second Corps, and to attack simultaneously with them.
Here were two great armies in which, when finally drawn
up against each other, with lines in a stretch of over five
miles, the troops could only at rare intervals be seen.

In the early morning of the 6th of May the enemy slightly
anticipated by his attack that which had been intended by
Grant for the renewal of the battle. Out of the thicket of
mixed dwarf-timber of scrub-oak, clustered pine, and under-
brush, Lee made an attack from his extreme left on the
extreme right of the Sixth Corps, an effort easily repulsed
by the' advance that met it, for it was only a feint, Lee's
real design being to overwhelm Grant's left flank, towards
the accomplishment of which but one thing seemed to him
needed — ^the arrival in force of Longstreet. The attack by
Lee on the right was followed almost immediately by War-
ren's and Hancock's attacking along their front. In con-
sequence, the attack which Lee had purposed making had
to be postponed, until what remained of Hill's corps should
have arrived and Longstreet should have appeared, for he
had not anticipated the vigor of Hancock's onslaught.
Hancock had advanced his two right divisions, amply sup-
ported, while the troops led by Wadsworth, which had lain
all night on Hill's former left flank (no longer existing,
because the enemy's lines were now continuous) swept
partly across the front of the Second Corps. Hill's troops
gave way in every direction, and poured pell-mell towards

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 415

the rear for over a mile. They were being pursued by
Hancock, when suddenly the tide of battle was reversed
through two conspiring causes, — a halt necessary to rectify
the confusion produced among the victorious troops by
their passage through the dense growth of trees and bushes,
and the arrival on the field of the heads of Longstreet*s
colunms.

Thenceforth, to the end of the day, no field ever better
illustrated the immense share that chance bears in every
battle. Had there not been on the Federal side every
reason to believe that Longstreet would attempt to come
in on the left flank, as in fact he was first ordered to attempt,
and had begun to attempt ; had there not been a misunder-
standing between Hancock and Gibbon, through which the
division of Barlow was withheld at a critical juncture ; had
it not happened that, owing to this, the enemy was able to
avail himself of the cut of an unfinished railroad from which
his masked advance pushed forward at that juncture on a
naked flank, all would have gone well for the Federal side.
If, on the other hand, Longstreet had not been dangerously
wounded by his own troops and borne from the field at
that same critical juncture, his success must have been
much greater than it was, although by no means so great
as he at one time thought possible, and indeed certain.

Longstreet had been marching under orders to attack
Hancock's left and rear, when the pressure to which Hill
was being gradually more and more heavily subjected
caused his march to be reversed, and he arrived on the
right of Hill in time to save him from final rout. Han-
cock could not, of course, have ascertained the fact of
Longstreet's recall. On the contrary, warnings that he
had received from headquarters as to the direction of Long-
street's march towards the left, coupled with deceptive
sights and sounds from that quarter, contributed to assure

4l6 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

him that the attack upon him was to come thence. Con-
sequently, he clung with his extreme left to the Brock
Road, and the advance of his divisions on his right made
a short flank. Despite this, there would have been no dan-
ger of his being successfully assailed, if only Hill were to be
reckoned with, but in addition to the fact that Longstreet
had been recalled to succor Hill, Barlow's division had, as
Hancock said he had told Gibbon to order it, not been ad-
vanced on the left. Otherwise, even with Lx)ngstreet*s enter-
ing on the scene, what happened would not have occurred.
Gibbon said that he did not receive the order mentioned,
and this being added in justice to him, let us &11 back on
the most important facts in this connection, that the rail-
road cut was there, Barlow's division was not, and that
the enemy took advantage of the weak point in the Union
line.

All the troops that had advanced so gallantly and suc-
cessfully early in the morning began to feel the combined
weight of Hill's and Longstreet's pressure. By eleven
o'clock Bumside had been able to do nothing on Hancock's
immediate right to relieve that pressure. A division of the
Ninth Corps had, however, been early sent to Hancock,
and later, other detachments were made to him from the
Fifth and Sixth Corps. But, owing to the fact that Bar-
low's division was not in position on the left, and the exist-
ence of the cut of the unfinished railroad (running about par-
allel with the Orange Plank Road, and after a curve, about
parallel with the Brock Road), four brigades of the enemy
marched by the right flank to the railroad cut, and there
forming and facing northwardly, rolled up the advanced line
of Hancock on the left, the whole line falling back in the
best order it could preserve to its original position along the
Brock Road. Now fortune as suddenly turned the balance
against the Confederate side, as it had at first thrown its in-

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETa 417

fluence in favor of that side. Longstreet was seriously
wounded by his own men, and a welcome respite was
afforded for restoration of order along the left wing of the
Federal army. During this pause, which lasted four hours,
the brigade of the Ninth Corps which has been mentioned
as stationed with Hancock, cleared his whole front from left
to right without any molestation from the enemy. Rein-
forcements from the right reached Hancock, and he was
prepared to renew the conflict. The enemy also had made
ample preparations for its renewal.

Hancock was to attack at six o'clock in the evening,
when at half-past four the enemy's attack opened. The
movements of Bumside, on Hancock's right, were expected
to afford some relief from the pressure upon him, but did
not produce an appreciable effect on the action that followed.
By five o'clock in the afternoon a portion of Hancock's line
had given way. It was fighting under great disadvantage,
the woods in its front, and even the breastworks of logs
were afire, sending their heat and smoke drifting into the
faces of the men. For a few minutes parts of the breast-
works were occupied by the enemy, who was, however, soon
brushed away and the line restored.* The enemy was
finally driven back from Hancock's front, which remained

* Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Chamberlin, in his History of the
1 50th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, says that Hancock ac-
knowledged that he had made a mistake in his report in ascribing to
Carroll's brigade, of his own corps, the recapture of that portion of
his line which the enemy had invaded ; and that the troops which,
under Hancock's orders, restored the line were the renmants of Roy
Stone's brigade, conunanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Irvin, of the 149th
Pennsylvania (Roy Stone having been hurt by a fall from his horse),
and Rice's brigade, commanded by Colonel Hoffmann, of the 56th
Pennsylvania, both of Wadsworth's division, of the Fifth Corps. This
is substantially what is stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Chamberlin, ex-
cept that he inadvertently assigns Rice's brigade to Robinson's
division instead of to Wadsworth's.

41 8 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

thenceforth unassailed ; but owing to the lateness of the
hour and lack of sufficient ammunition, Hancock was not
able to advance in his turn. While he, however, remained
unengaged for the rest of the day, the right of the Sixth
Corps, on the extreme right, had been attacked by Generals
Gordon, Johnston, and Pegram, who achieved a partial suc-
cess there, driving back some brigades and making numer-
ous prisoners.

The losses on both sides in the battle of two days' dura-
tion had been very heavy, and in one place horrible, owing
to the incidental burning to death of wounded men lying
in front of the Second Corps when the woods there took
fire. The loss on the Federal side in killed, wounded, and
missing was about fifteen thousand, while that on the Con-
federate side was about eight thousand. Many gallant,
meritorious, and distinguished officers of both sides here
surrendered up their lives in this jungle, which had been
for two days swept by the scythe of death in forms con-
cealed and unusual on a field of battle, but common on
this field, on which bushes and trees and dense thickets
sputtered, or volleyed, or crashed, with the dropping, the
concerted, or the blended storm of musketry, amid which
lines of troops on both sides jostled each other in efibrts to
advance or fall back, smothered in a tangled wilderness, to
which not even fire was lacking to increase the mysterious
horrors.

Were it attempted here to follow the intricacies of the
events now following one another in rapid succession, this
campaign alone would require for its description more
than the space allotted to the whole work. It is there-
fore necessary to omit such mention of details as concern
the enemy's cavalry hovering around the left, and with-
drawn upon the approach of the cavalry of Sheridan. One
incident, however, connected with the renewed advance.

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC. 4I9

cannot be omitted in a memoir relating to General Meade,
because it represents the appearance of the cloud that, at
first, no bigger than a man's hand, gradually overshadowed
his career. Sheridan, before the campaign had begun, had
intimated to General Meade that he ought to be allowed to
act independently with the cavalry, to which General Meade
had properly responded that he thought otherwise. Badeau
tells the story, and Sheridan himself tells it in his memoirs,
adding the commentary, ominous in the light of subsequent
events, that he knew General Meade would be compelled
sooner or later to change his mind. If the reader will, be-
fore passing final judgment on the merits of the case, take
the pains to collate what Grant, Sheridan, Badeau, Hum-
phreys, Major Carswell McClellan, and what orders on the
field all exhibit, he will find that, with reference to the ad-
vance which now took place, Sheridan and his advocates
have misstated the facts; that Sheridan did not properly
clear the front of the advancing army, and moreover, that
he tried to impute the blame which was his own to General
Meade. He will find that, when the infantry had come up
at last, and General Meade had expressed his opinion of
occurrences very plainly to Sheridan, that, within an hour
or two, Sheridan received orders, suggested by himself, for
an enterprise against the enemy's cavalry. The meaning of
this move was in the line of intention to give Sheridan inde-
pendent command, an event the coming of which he had so
significantly predicted. And if the reader will still further
critically pursue the course of events through the accounts
of those who were making history at that time, and through
official documents, he will reach the conviction that this
episode mentioned was the first sign of a favoritism on the
part of Grant which culminated in Sheridan's elevation to
the highest rank in the army. He will, if he pursue his
studies still further into the intricacies of the events then

420 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADK

shaping or formed, see Grant and Sheridan painted by them-
selves as to traits here indicated. Those who come after
us will read one day the statement of the historian, when he
says that the worst feature of Grant's character was &vor-
itism at the expense of justice, and one of the worst features
of Sheridan's, the recklessness with which he pursued his
own personal aggrandizement at the expense of his devoted
friend and the forfeiture of claim to fair dealing. The fact
becomes more and more apparent from the Wilderness to
Appomattox. It receives after the war its final testimony
and seal in the overslaughing of General Meade in behalf
of Sheridan.

Possessed of the seven-league boots of the historian, we
may omit description of the logistics of the route to Spottsyl-
vania Court House. It having become apparent to Grant
that even the most continuous hammering could not dis-
lodge the enemy from his position in the fastnesses of the
Wilderness, the movement of the army by the left flank to
Spottsylvania Court House, towards the southeast, was
begun by the trains early in the afternoon of the 7th of
May, followed by the three corps just after dark. The
Fifth Corps moved directly for the place by the Brock
Road, while the two other corps marched by different
routes. The object in view in the direct march of Warren
was to surprise and occupy the position. A pleasant little
fiction here appears in most of the accounts of this event,
which, as so strange, one could wish were true. It is that,
growing out of the uncomfortableness of Longstreet's
corps in woods afire, the march on Spottsylvania of his
corps, then under the command of General Anderson, was
begun earlier than had been contemplated, and thus it, by
the merest chance, came to pass that Anderson intercepted
the Fifth Corps at that point. The fact is that Anderson
did start much earlier than had been at first intended, but

• ■

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JSi-

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THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 42 1

that Lee, after having ordered him to march at daybreak,
sent a special messenger to him to instruct him to march
at once, in consequence of which he started at eleven
o'clock at night Thus it came about that when the head
of Warren's corps, arriving by the Brock Road, was near-
ing Spottsylvania, Anderson's troops, who had had a less
distance to march, and along an unobstructed way, were
coming into position at Spottsylvania. Warren had been
delayed by the cavalry of Fitzhugh Lee, which, had Sheri-
dan done his duty, would not have impeded the way.
Sheridan had, in fact, cleared the region in advance of hostile
cavalry, on the immediate route of the advancing Fifth
Corps, but had then fallen back and bivouacked near Todd's
Tavern, letting the enemy again occupy the zone in front
of the advancing columns. Sheridan himself was not on
the ground when General Meade arrived at midnight at
Todd's Tavern, and General Meade was obliged, in default
of his presence, to issue orders to the cavalry. Nevertheless,
Sheridan has attempted to prove that General Meade's action,
conflicting with his own orders, injuriously affected the
cavalry movements, when the official and other records
clearly show that General Meade's action was strictly in
conformity with the situation at the time when he arrived
at Todd's Tavern, and that the way which should have
been kept open by Sheridan was obstructed. At the very
time when Sheridan's orders were issued he had allowed
every avenue of approach to Spottsylvania to be blocked
by his own and by the enemy's cavalry. Sheridan had
declared to General Meade, on the occasion when he
claimed independence for the movement of the cavalry, as
most conducive to military success, that advancing infantry
should look out for their own fronts, and what he did not
do on this occasion, with twelve thousand mounted men to
the enemy's eight thousand, was strictly in accordance with

422 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

this unmilitary dictum. Yet in the face of this occurrence
there are to be found eulogists of Sheridan who claim for
him unwonted appreciation of the most effective employ-
ment in combination of the respective military arms.

Grant and Meade both arrived at Todd's Tavern, five
miles from Spottsylvania, about midnight of the 7th of May.
By daylight the head of Warren's column appeared to the
westward of that point, where Merritt's cavalry had begun
to clear the way for the further advance to Spottsylvania.
From this point to Spottsylvania the road was barricaded
at intervals and held by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, so that it
was impossible to make rapid progress along it even with
the aid of the infantry, soon brought into requisition for the
purpose. Meanwhile Anderson was establishing himself
firmly in position at Spottsylvania. Upon the Brock Road,
and another deviating from it as a fork and rejoining it
nearer Spottsylvania, Warren advanced, and finally, after
the usual vicissitudes entailed by pushing through scattered
woods, reached about noon a position which he entrenched,
the Sixth Corps beginning to support him.

Here, with the ever-present need of condensation, must
be rejected any temptation to give further details of march'
by which the corps on both sides found themselves in the
position which they finally occupied. Merely mentioning
that the Second Corps arrived at Todd's Tavern about nine
in the morning, where it halted and temporarily entrenched,
and omitting entirely the route of march of the Army of
Northern Virginia towards the same battle-field, let us,
now that the Federal army is virtually on the field, con-
sider its movements covered by a description of the lines
finally assumed by the troops of both sides. The gen-
eral reader imagines that lines of entrenchment are en-
tirely determinable by the lay of the land, and this is true
when two armies are not actively opposing each other in

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETa 423

the occupation of ground. When, however, they are so
engaged, the lay of the land is only one of the two chief
factors in the determination of the eventual conformation of
temporary military lines. The other is the relative strength
of the physical and moral forces on each side under the
direction imparted to them by commands. Lx>oked at
merely as a matter of physics, the contour of any general
lines of two armies striving for the occupation of a given
terrain, is simply the resultant of forces acting against
each other upon eccentricities of surface. The final en-
trenchments of the Confederates produced by conformation
of ground and mutual opposition of forces at Spottsylvania
brought it about that their lines bore a rude resemblance
to the fore part of a monster-turtle, with rugged, angular
head protruding towards the north. At the point where,
on its right, the carapace ended, the river Po flows. At
the end of what one might conformably imagine as the outer
edge of an immense left fore-flipper, the left touched on the
same stream. The colossal head, amidst woods, a mile
long by half a mile wide, was eventually crossed at the
neck by a formidable line of entrenchments. The left flank
was eventually made to cross the Po and to extend some
distance beyond.

Conformably to this contour of the enemy's works, War-
ren took position on the right, Sedgwick on his left, and
Bumside on Sedgfwick's left, while later, Hancock, who had
been for a while retained at Todd's Tavern, lest Lee should
make an attempt on the Federal rear, came up and took
position to the right of Warren, Hancock thus holding the
right flank and Bumside the left. It was well that General
Meade had taken the precaution of retaining Hancock for
a while near Todd's Tavern, for Hill's corps, at that moment
commanded by Early, directed on Spottsylvania by Lee,
came upon Hancock's troops thrown out to the west, and

424 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADE

recoiled further to the right. The army having assumed
on the 9th its general position, without any regular en-
gagement, and without having incurred in the mean time,
on the 9th, any serious loss but that in the death of
General Sedgwick, a victim of sharpshooting, a move-
ment was made in the afternoon which, according to mili-
tary rules, was wrong. Those rules prescribe that no
important move shall take place so near sundown that it
cannot be prosecuted. Barlow's division, of the Second
Corps, was pushed across the Po, around the extreme left
flank of the enemy, followed by Bimey's and Gibbon's
divisions. Three pontoon-bridges were laid to establish
communication with the hither bank, and night fell with the
troops successfully advancing. But as they could not further
advance by night over the ground between the Po and a
branch of it called Glady's Run, the enemy had all that
time in which to prepare to meet the manoeuvre on the
morrow. The manoeuvre, continued the next day, still
seemed to have good prospect of success, despite the fact
that the enemy was ready to meet it, and Hancock was
preparing to carry by storm a bridge over the Po, leading
fairly to the rear of the enemy's lines, when he received
orders to withdraw his force, because two of his divisions
would be needed at five o'clock in the afternoon to join in
with an attack from the centre on the enemy's front. The
withdrawal of two of the divisions over the Po led to a
vigorous attack on the remaining one, under Barlow, but
his retirement was executed with the most beautiful precis-
ion, the first troops across commanding the river with their
artillery, the last repulsing with slaughter the enemy arriv-
ing in force, and finally passing in their march to the river
through woods that had caught afire as the result of the
combat. It was a gallant feat of arms, hard to relinquish
with this hasty mention of the skilfulness, endurance, and

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC. 425

coolness with which it was accomplished. As gallant deeds
were done elsewhere before the day's battle came to an end,
but single combat and all that is analogous to it has a
peculiar charm for the imagination.

At eleven o'clock a reconnoissance in force had been
made at the point opposite Warren by two brigades of the
Second Corps and two of the Fifth, and now an assault in
far greater force of the same position was contemplated for
five o'clock in the afternoon. One cannot but* think, how-
ever, that if Grant and Meade had conmianded a bird's-eye
view of the whole field they would, instead of withdrawing
the three divisions of Hancock from the turning movement
of the enemy's left, have reinforced them and made them
execute the main attack, while a comparatively feeble one
was made on the front. The point that Hancock had gained
took the enemy's left flank completely in reverse. But on
the extended field, densely covered with woods in places,
no extended view and exact knowledge could be obtained
of what was taking place beyond the immediate range of
vision and through aides despatched in every direction. It
is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that neither general
then realized what a sacrifice the recall of Hancock in-
volved. The general aspect of the field, possible to obtain
only from a bird's-eye view or a map, was formed of the
enemy's lines passing over hill and dale, through bush and
brake, over the cleared land of farms, broken by streams,
half-concealed, half-revealed in the varied landscape, the
Union lines sweeping hither and yon around the huge cit-
adel formed by nature and art.

The time originally appointed for the attack from the
centre was, upon a favorable report from Warren, anticipated
by orders at half-past three from General Meade to attack
at once. Hancock had been ordered to return to the right
to take charge of the extrication of Barlow's division from

426 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

its dangerous position on the other side of the Po. By four
o'clock Warren and Wright, now commanding the Sixth
Corps in Sedgwick's place, were in the full tide of assault on
the enemy's works, situated behind a dense growth of low
timber, passing which, amid artillery and musketry fire, they
reached open ground in front of entrenchments, only to be
met by a withering fire under which they reeled and par-
tially recoiled, some few of the troops reaching the abattis
of the works, but all finally falling back into the woods,
decimated and defeated. The repulse was so complete that
it is wonderful that the attempt there was repeated, but it
was. At seven o'clock Hancock renewed the attack with
two divisions of the Second Corps, the Fifth supporting, but
with the result of proving again that the enemy's lines at
that point were impregnable.

Off to the left of the Fifth, where the Sixth Corps was
stationed. General Wright thought that he had discovered
a place where an assault might be successful. This
extended from the sharp point of the salient, the beak,
as it were, of the turtle-head formation there (the so-called
east angle of the salient, although it would much more
properly be called the northern angle) to the so-called
west angle, a very obtuse and therefore ill-defined one.
Upton was selected to make the attack with two brigades
and four regiments of the Sixth Corps. Further to the
left, Mott, of the Second Corps, temporarily assigned
to Wright's command, was ordered to make a simultane-
ous attack with that of Upton upon the north angle of
the salient. Upton's assault, made about six o'clock in
the evening, was perfectly successful. Artillery fire,
brought to bear to enfilade the enemy's line on the west
front of the salient, preceded his charge, which resulted in
his capturing the works before him and a second line be-
yond them ; but Mott did not arrive to his assistance, and

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS^ ETa 427

reinforcements for the enemy being poured in, Upton, after
clinging desperately to his prize until ordered to retire,
loosened his hold upon it, bringing back prisoners and
colors. The loss of the Union side was, however, twice
that on the Confederate side. It would appear that the
failure of Mott to come to the support of Upton was owing
to his troops being obliged to form in the open, whereby
the enemy's attention being concentrated upon them, they
were prevented by artillery-fire from organizing for attack,
whereas the success of Upton, apart from the gallantry of
his troops, was owing to his preparation and forward move-
ment being masked by the forest.

The nth of May was passed in preparation for a deter-
mined onslaught on the enemy's works at the salient.
Ewell's corps was stationed in this salient of a mile long by
half a mile broad, or half a square mile in area, the out-
skirts of which were densely covered with trees. The
enemy rendered it impossible to make a minute reconnois-
sance of the ground opposite the apex, that from which
Mott had vainly attempted to assault. Two-thirds of a mile
to the north of the salient, in the darkness of night, the
troops of the Second Corps formed, partly in a clear stretch
of land, from four to five hundred yards wide, and partly in
the woods on the right of the aforesaid clear ground, which
made a long, slight curve to the eastward before the view
opened to the head of the salient. With vanishing fog and
lingering darkness of night still brooding over the land-
scape, the charge was sounded in muffled tones by the first
dawn of day. Rushing forward, some in swift movement
over open ground, some plunging over obstacles of sur&ce
and through trees hindering and breaking up the lines and
masses of the assaulting columns, those in the open stretch
of land, pushing around the curve of the woods on the
right, suddenly came into full view of the salient, when,

428 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

giving a joyous cheer, and breaking into the double-quick,
all sped forward amid a flank fire from the enemy's skir-
mishers, and tearing away the abattis in front of the earth-
works, captured and crowned with their colors the parapet
along both sides of the apex of the salient The troops
had captured a mile of the salient, overlapping the so-called
east and west angles (the north and west angles). Many
of the enemy were killed or wounded by bullet or bayonet,
and four thousand prisoners, several pieces of artillery, and
numerous stands of small arms were the prizes of the vic-
tors.

Hancock ordered up his reserves. Confusion reigned in
the victorious ranks. Broken up and irregularly massed,
owing to their struggle over the ground in their advance,
and carried away by enthusiasm, they had precipitated them-
selves without formation into the salient and swept away
before them the troops of the enemy which offered resist-
ance. The Confederate general, Gordon, however, reformed
his troops behind the incipient line of earthworks which
then crossed the neck of the salient, about a mile from its
apex, and then, advancing in good order, pushed back the
Union masses which were surging towards the south.
General Meade, learning from Hancock that he had obtained
a foothold in the salient, ordered Wright, commanding the
Sixth Corps, to send in two divisions on Hancock's right,
where he relieved the troops of the Second Corps along
that line, and although soon wounded, remained in com-
mand of his troops. The situation was now extraordinary.
The enemy rallying, and reinforced from their lines to the
south, had pushed forward compactly into the salient, and
sweeping it clear of the besiegers, recaptured a portion of
his entrenchments, while a portion remained held by both
besiegers and besieged, face to face, within a few yards of
each other, engaged in places in hand to hand conflict At

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETa 429

the west angle of the salient the most desperate and dead-
liest close fighting of the war took place.

The artillery of Hancock poured a rapid fire from the
north into the woods amidst the traversed works of the
enemy. Close up, some of his guns, shotted with canister,
were brought to the very parapet at the north and west
angles of the salient. The adversaries clung tenaciously to
each other through the long hours of the 1 2th of May, the
embracing lines writhing like fiery serpents in smoke-covered
contortions. From the right of the Sixth Corps to the left
of the Second endured through those long hours a strife
that beggars description, where woods were killed outright
by sheets of artillery and musketry fire tearing through
their trunks and branches, and men bayonetted men over
the breastworks or dragged them over as prisoners. No
such long, determined, and desperate conflict is known to
history since the use of improved deadly weapons. To
complete the wretchedness of the scene, nature contributed
by a cold, drenching rain a raw atmosphere, despite which
the strife went on with ardor unquenchable. It was, in
fact, a combat of which the German word for battle,
"scA/ach/," gives a far better idea than any other term.
Here was nothing of glamour, but unmitigated slaughter, a
golgotha without a vestige of the ordinary pomp and cir-
cumstance of glorious war. And so it endured through
those long hours of the spring day, now falling in intensity,
now rising into furious gusts of destruction, until night
closing in on the scene diminished the capacity to destroy
and wholly obscured the sights of havoc. It was not,
however, until long after midnight that the struggle finally
ceased, the enemy withdrawing behind his improvised line
of entrenchments across the neck of the salient, and thus
excluding the whole of its area from the rest of his entrench-
ments.

430 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

Early in the morning, simultaneously with the advance
of the Second Corps, Bumside had attacked on the left,
had had a partial success, and had then been pushed out
of the entrenchments which he had captured. Subsequent
efforts to make a lodgment proved fruitless, Bumside's
troops and the enemy's alternately advancing and retiring.
Bumside succeeded in connecting with the left of the Second
Corps, but his operations were effective only in occupying
the enemy's attention upon his own front. On the right,
early in the morning, Warren had opened on the enemy
with his artillery, and a little after nine o'clock he had,
under orders to that effect, assaulted the line in front of
him, but unsuccessfully. Thereupon he had been ordered
to send troops to reinforce Wright, which duly arrived in
their assigned position.

When, on the morning of the 2d, the enemy was dis-
covered by Hancock and Wright to have relinquished his
occupation of the salient, and to have retired to the line of
new works across its neck, an advance was made along the
salient towards the south, resulting in the abandonment of
any attempt to drive him from his strong position. He was
now stronger than when in possession of the salient

A movement by the left flank, to attack the enemy's ex-
treme right, was now determined upon by Grant Hence-
forth, until the end of the siege, for it was essentially that,
the troops marched and countermarched enormous distances
around the enemy's lines, over ground sparsely provided
with roads, deep with mud from recent rain, and under cumu-
lative difficulties leading almost to exhaustion. Several
days were now passed in warily approaching nearer and
nearer to the enemy's right by lines of contravallation. It
was becoming more and more apparent that the position
of Lee's army was impregnable. Troops were finally sent
with great secrecy from the left towards the right, to make

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC. 43 1

an attack on the works across the salient, upon the suppo-
sition that they might be taken by surprise. But an attack
there, on the 1 8th of May, by the Second and Sixth Corps,
seconded by the Fifth and Ninth, soon brought the convic-
tion that all idea of success from further assault there must
be relinquished. The attack was so gallantly made by the
Second and Sixth Corps as to prove that it would be madness
to attempt to prosecute it. It was made, too, in the face of
surroundings which daunt many a man who fears neither
wounds nor death. Over the ground of their late victory,
in which Lee had lost ten thousand men in killed, wounded,
and prisoners, lay remains of their brothers-in-arms in state
so changed as to be abhorrent to the sight.

From the 13 th to the 17th of May the time had been
fruitlessly spent in marching and countermarching and ad-
vancing works on the left, and now this bold essay of the
1 8th of May had proved entirely futile. Grant meanwhile
had concluded that the only resource left was to flank the
enemy out of his position by a march past his right. The
enemy, perceiving movements off to his right which indi-
cated that Grant was withdrawing his army for a further
march towards the south, Ewell was despatched by a cir-
cuitous route to his left, now about to become the rear of
Grant's position with relation to his retiring columns. Here
a very lively encounter took place with troops that were
there in position, assisted by reinforcements sent by General
Meade, and others consisting of troops which happened to
be on their way to join the army.

We must leave this field to find time for the description
of others, with only the baldest account of the marches to-
wards the south. In the night of the 20th of May Han-
cock led the van with the Second Corps, marching by the
way of Bowling Green, on the Richmond and Fredericks-
burg Railroad, where he crossed the Mattapony and en-

432 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE

trenched. The army in its renewed movements is marching
now nearly due south. The march and assumed isolated
position of Hancock was a bait thrown out to Lee. It was
imagined that he might be led to attack the Second Corps,
in which case the other troops would be brought up in time
to support Hancock, and a battle on open ground (for the
country was becoming more open now) might be precip-
itated before the Confederates would have time to entrench.
But Lee did not take the bait ; perhaps, in the midst of his
own plans, did not perceive it. Hancock being secure in
position, the other corps marched in the same general direc-
tion. On the 2 2d Lee's army, too, was in motion, marching
towards Hanover Junction, where the two railroads passing
south to Richmond meet, engaged in interposing again be^
tween the Federal army and Richmond. Nearly concen-
trated there on the 2 2d, he awaited Grant's final move-
ments. About noon of the 23 d, as the leading Federal
column approached the north bank of the North Anna,
could be seen the heads of column of the enemy begin-
ning to take position on the southern bank. The position
finally assumed by Lee proved to be a most remarkable
one. At this point the Virginia Central Railroad meets the
Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad at Hanover Junc-
tion, at an angle of about seventy degrees. Northward
of the Virginia Central, varying from one to two miles,
and, excepting bends, somewhat parallel to it, lies the stretch
of the North Anna with which we are here concerned.
Here the river has a sharp bend in it towards the south,
bringing it at that point only a little over a mile from the
Virginia Central, with a stretch of river there, straight for
nearly a mile. Lee was therefore able to throw his left
wing, refused, to the southwest, so as to rest on Little
River, three miles in his rear, and his right wing, gradually-
more and more refused as the Army of the Potomac ad-

MAP

BATTU;hfi(.I

ohth'ann

Ui,

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETa 433

vanced, so as to cover Hanover Junction and a river-road,
called the Telegraph Road, leading towards his lines, while
his centre formed a short front of about three-quarters of a
mile in length on the south bank of the straight stretch of
the river. We have seen from the experience at Chancel-
lorsville how vicious a narrow front with sharply refused
wings is for the disposition of an army, how vicious it
proved, even with entrenchments, to Lee at Spottsylvania,
but this case of a narrow front was entirely exceptional, in-
troducing difficulties for the attacking side and eliminating
them from that of the attacked. As Lee's narrow front
rested for three-quarters of a mile on the very river bank
opposite the enemy, he had there a citadel, with a river for
a wet ditch, thrust into the feice of the enemy, making com-
bination between the two wings of the attacking force im-
possible, save at the expense of twice crossing the river in
front of him, and thus neutralizing any concerted action
between those wings.

Warren led the right column, and reached the North
Anna at Jericho Ford, four miles west of the point where,
about two miles north of Hanover Junction, the Richmond
and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses it. Hancock, who led
the left column, reached the river at the point of its inter-
section by the railroad, and also at the point where the
Telegraph Road crosses the river at Chesterfield Bridge,
about a half mile further west than that of the railroad-
crossing. Warren's column passed the river, partly by
fording, partly by pontoon, and advanced unmolested, the
enemy's preparations being at that place still incomplete.
Hancock, on the contrary, had to capture some works
which defended Chesterfield Bridge, which was handsomely
done by assault. Warren, however, although crossing un-
molested, had a severe engagement after he had begun to

advance, whereas Hancock, after the resistance overcome at

434 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

the bridge, ascertained the next morning that the enemy
had swung back his right, and then advanced without heavy
f^rhting and took position opposite Lee's right wing, with
which, on the 24th, he had a spirited engagement

The Sixth Corps, coming up the next morning, followed
the lead of Warren, but all attempts of the troops on the
right to join hands with those on the left were frustrated by
the enemy's occupation of the river bank along the short front
already described. On the 24th Bumside, with the Ninth
Corps, attempted the passage of the river at Ox Ford, between
the place where were Warren and the Sixth Corps, on the
right, and Hancock with the Second Corps, on the left,but was
obliged to desist from the attempt, finally sending a division
to co-operate with Warren in a movement to break through
the enemy's line along the southern river-bank, so as to
connect with Hancock. It was useless. Lee was exactly
in the position to defy attack from across the river, because
the short front there could not be directly engaged in fiice ;
and to defy attack from the same side of the river, because
either of his refused wings could readily reinforce the other.
Why proceed further in description of the situation ? It
was a deadlock. There was no help for it but to retire from
a position which could not have been foreseen. Accord-
ingly, after closing in somewhat on Lee*s left wing, and
finding the enemy strongly entrenched there with traversed
works, the withdrawal of the army from a most dangerous
position was skilfully effected. Even Grant had b^^un to
see the desperate character of assaults on earthworks
manned by troops of such mettle as those of the Army of
Northern Virginia. Napoleon lays great stress upoo the
neglect, up to a certain period in European war, of simple
entrenchments ; but unless all signs fail. Grant had never
read Napoleon's military comments attentively, certainly not
as to this particular. Humphreys, in one place, puts die

THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, ETC 435

efficiency of such works as numerically equivalent to
more than a third increase of troops, and in another, to
more than quadrupling them, a statement, doubtless, inad-
vertent

Moving by night, the Army of the Potomac had, by day-
light of the 27th of May, r^ained the northern bank of
the North Anna. Southeast was the direction of the re-
newed line of march. A division of the Sixth Corps, fol-
lowed by the rest of the Sixth Corps, and then by the Sec-
ond, both preceded by two divisions of General Sheridan's
cavalry, and followed by one division of it as rearguard,
while the Fifth and Ninth followed roads further to the
left, represents the first order of march adopted for the
renewed advance. Now the aim of the advancing army is
to cross the Pamunkey. We have passed going south the
western branches of the Mattapony, the Ny and Po, the Ta
and the Mat. As the army, having crossed and re-crossed
the North Anna, is now about to cross the Pamunkey,
which is formed by the confluence of the North Anna
and the South Anna, it is evident that it is sidling off
towards the southeast between the Mattapony and the Pa-
munkey.

The cavalry, preceding the advanced division of the Sixth
Corps, arrived in the morning of the 27th of May at Han-
overtown, crossed the Pamunkey there and uncovered the
fords in the vicinity. Before noon of the 28th the Fifth
Corps crossed at the same place. Soon after noon of the
28th the Second Corps and two divisions of the Sixth
crossed the river four miles above Hanovertown. The Ninth
Corps crossed at Hanovertown, but not until the middle of
the night of the 28th. Lee having been moving on paral-
lel lines with Grant, was now again athwart his path on the
roads to Richmond. Here occurred battles along Totopot-
omoy Creek and at Cold Harbor, the account of which

436 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

will be postponed while following for a moment the course
of closely-related simultaneous events, traced in outline in
the next chapter ; events which had either the effect of in-
fluencing from a distance the fortunes of the past battle-
fields and the approaching one, or of bringing personally
upon the present scene actors who have not before ap-
peared.

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CO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS. 437

CHAPTER XXI.

CO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS.

According to prearrangement, the armies of Banks in the
Southwest, of Sherman in the Middle States, of Sigel in the
Valley of the Shenandoah, and of Butler on the James, had
started with the Army of the Potomac at virtually the same
time, the 4th of May, generally at exactly the same time.
No extended reference to Banks's and Sherman's armies is
permissible here, but the operations of Sigel's and Butler's
armies, being intimately related to those of the Army of
the Potomac, must at this point receive notice. Butler's
force, called the Army of the James, consisted of the Tenth
and Eighteenth Corps, respectively commanded by Generals
Q. A. Gilmore and Wm. F. Smith, commonly known as
" Baldy " Smith, and of a cavalry corps, commanded by
General A. V. Kautz. Why these men, or indeed any
military men, should have been under the immediate com-
mand of General B. F. Butler is explicable only by the &ct
of Butler's political influence, and that political influence,
irrespective of individual merit, is the funeral pyre of modem
society, upon which is sacrificed at intervals the highest in-
terests of nations.

Under orders, Butler concentrated his in&ntry at York-
town and Gloucester, on the York River, as a feint of going
up that river to join Grant's army moving south. In the
night of the 4th of May, the same day that the Army of
the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, Butler's troops slipped
down the York River on transports, and under escort of a
naval force, under Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, passed into and

438 GENERAL OEOBOE QORDON USADR

up the James River, and landed near, but chiefly at Ber-
muda Hundred, a narrow neck of land between the James
and Appomattox Rivers. Here Butler was joined by a few
other troops from the Peninsula between the James and the
York. On the morning of the 6th Kautz, starting from
Suffolk, towards the south, with the cavalry, made for the
nearest line of railroad south of Petersburg, with the view
of preventing the passage of troops through that place for
the reinforcement of Richmond, and of severing one of the
sources of supply of the enemy, and the in&ntry at Ber-
muda Hundred advanced to a point a few miles beyond the
area described between the James and the Appomattox,
and took up a position there. At this time the approaches
to Richmond were only feebly held, but Beauregard, who
had been ordered to take command of the place, was rap-
idly approaching with troops from the South. The precious
time for that purpose, if it were possible to effect the capture
of Richmond, was wasted through Butler's military incapa-
city. The naval vessels on the James found it impossible to
ascend the stream so as to co-operate in the attack by assail-
ing the principal river-defences south of Richmond. Butler
rejected a plan proposed to him of crossing the Appomat-
tox and capturing Petersburg, only about eight miles dis-
tant. The end virtually came when, time having been lost
in futile movements, Beauregard took the initiative, when
Butler had advanced with his right near to Drewry's Bluff"
on the James. After a severe engagement Butler was forced
to retreat into the little peninsula previously described as at
Bermuda Hundred, where he remained bottled up and
corked, as was said at the time, in substantially the same
words, by General Barnard, in his report of the situation to
Grant. Even this lame and impotent conclusion to the first
operations of Butler, which accomplished little but some
railroad destruction, might have been a great deal worse.

CfO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS. 439

for it seems hardly doubtful that, had General Whiting, of
the Confederates, fulfilled his part of the plan of battle
directed at Drewry's Bluff against Butler, the Army of the
James would have suffered a severe defeat. As it was, with
the incubus of Butler in command, the Army of the James
did all that could legitimately have been expected of it,
General Smith especially signalizing himself by ready per-
ception of the situation and adoption of means to meet it.
It was on the i6th of May that the battle of Drewry's
Bluff took place. On the following day Beauregard fol-
lowed Butler's retreat, and entrenching lines in front of the
narrow area corresponding to the neck of the bottle to
which General Barnard had likened the little peninsula,
there held Butler's forces neutralized, so far as direct influ-
ence on the capture of Richmond or Petersburg was con-
cerned. Here Butler was left to ferment for many days,
never reaching the ripeness of knowledge, however, that he
was not a bom general.

The principal colunm moving from the direction of Wash-
ington was commanded in person by Sigel, and passed up
the Shenandoah Valley. To the west of it General Couch
had a colunm in West Virginia operating near the line of
communication by the East Tennessee and Virginia Rail-
road. That of Sigel principally interests us as having inti-
mate relations with the advance of the Army of the Potomac.
Both columns moved on May ist, and Sigel's was defeated
at Newmarket, on the 1 5th, leading to great alarm in Wash-
ington. When finally Grant had been communicated with,
after the delay caused by his presence with the Army of
the Potomac, and he was able to take action, he relieved
Sigel from command of the Army of the Shenandoah and
gave it to General Hunter, who, being ordered to capture
Lynchburg, if possible, met the enemy, weakened by a
detachment to Lee, on the 5th of June, and badly defeated

440 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

him. On the 8th of June Hunter was joined by a cav-
alry force under Generals Crook and Averell, and moved
on Lynchburg. Here, in the position clearly shown by the
Confederate maps of the defences of Lynchburg, and at the
disadvantage of the enemy's having received heavy rein-
forcements from Lee, then in Richmond, he was obliged,
on the 19th of June, to abandon the project of the capture
of Lynchburg, and to retire by a line further to the west,
to avoid having his retreat towards Washington cut off by
the enemy. Almost destitute of supplies, a stock of which
in his rear had been so imperfectly guarded as to permit its
destruction or removal by the enemy, he struggled through
the rugged country through which he was obliged to take
his course north, and for the second time within a brief
interval of time the line towards Washington was uncovered
and the whole country north put in a state of alarm. The
valley through which Hunter had advanced now lying
open to invasion, Early, who had brought up part of the
reinforcements to Lynchburg which had caused Hunter's
retreat, soon began his celebrated raid on Washington,
necessitating the sending of the Sixth Corps by water from
the Army of the Potomac, then across the James, to the
relief of Washington from the impending attack. This, and
the opportune arrival there at the same time of two divisions
of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans, ensured the
safety of the city when, on the 12th of July, the enemy was
about to assault its works. The incidents of Elarly's inva-
sion, the defeat of General Wallace on the Monocacy, and
other details, would make too long a story for these pages.
It should, however, be mentioned in conclusion, that Hunter
had done all that was possible with the means at his com-
mand. The cause of his ill-success lay in the expectation
of the Lieutenant-General, conveyed to General Hunter,
that he would advance as far as Lynchburg, at which place

CO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS. 441

became demonstrated dangers which ought in conception
to have been so manifest as not to have been incurred.
The latter part of this account, the reader will perceive, of
course anticipates in time the events as related to our main
narrative.

Having thus disposed of the expeditionary columns within
a short range of the Army of the Potomac, it remains to
speak last of the raid of General Sheridan, which was begun
simultaneously with the opening of the battle of Spottsyl-
vania Court House. Like Cervantes, in one modest respect,
I despatched one of the characters of my tale, and brought
him back again without the slightest apology to the reader.
The explanation is that I should not have been justifiable
in interrupting the torrent of events from the Wilderness
onward to Cold Harbor, to introduce a swirl of the agita-
tion tending elsewhere. The cavalry under Sheridan was
composed of three divisions, commanded by Generals
Gregg, Merritt (Torbert's division), and Wilson. They were
intended to accomplish, if possible, the defeat of the enemy's
cavalry, the capture of Richmond by surprise, and com-
munication with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. Stuart was
on the alert, and permitting Sheridan, almost unmolested,
except by harassing his flank and rear, to pursue his route,
he gathered his main body of cavalry in advance for a deter-
mined stand. Sheridan passed over the North Anna, and after
repelling a slight attack upon him at Beaver Dam Station, on
the Virginia Central Railroad, he engaged in destroying tracks
and rolling stock. Again, at Ashland Station, Sheridan en-
gaged in similar work of destruction on the Fredericksburg
Railroad, so that Stuart had ample time to concentrate his
forces near Yellow Tavern, about five miles north of Rich-
mond. Here Sheridan, continuing his march, after doing all
possible damage at his last halting-place, found Stuart in posi-
tion. The result of the encounter, in which Stuart's force was

442 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

very much smaller than Sheridan's, and in which Stuart
was killed, was the defeat of the Confederates and the open-
ing of the way to Richmond. But the main works there
proved upon reconnoissance too strong to capture, and so
Sheridan, after taking a portion of the outer ones, and find-
ing it impossible to reach Butler by passing between Rich-
mond and the Chickahominy, turned back towards the Chick-
ahominy. Merritt (temporarily commanding Torbert's divis-
ion) passed it, after repairing Meadow Bridge, near the cross-
ing of the stream by the Virginia Central Railroad. Wilson's
and Gregg's divisions tried to cross it about two miles below,
near Mechanicsville Bridge, where the direct road from Rich-
mond to Mechanicsville crosses it, but being opposed by the
enemy, had to cross it above that point, after having thrown
off the attacks of the enemy. Once more in the open, free
from assailants, Sheridan took his way along the north side
of the Chickahominy to Bottom's Bridge, where he crossed
it, and on the 14th reached Haxall's Landing, on the north-
em side of the James, just opposite to Butler's position of
Bermuda Hundred, on the south side, where he received
supplies, remained three days, and then returned towards
the Army of the Potomac. This he did by repairing the
bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House and cross-
ing there, thus placing that stream between him and any
possible attack from the Confederate army, for it must be
remembered that he could not know what had taken place
since his departure from Spottsylvania Court-House. The
White House was now about to be once more the base of
supplies of the Army of the Potomac. Masked by the
Pamunkey, Sheridan rejoined the army at Chesterfield Sta-
tion, on the 24th of May, and in pursuance of the constant
effort at railroad destruction, almost at once Wilson's divis-
ion was thrown out on Lee's left flank, to work that sort
of havoc, and as a feint, to delude Lee into the belief that

CO-OPERATIVE COLUMNS. 443

the new line of advance of the Army of the Potomac would
be by its right flank instead of by its left, and therefore in a
different direction from the one upon which Grant had re-
solved. The reader will now understand how the main
body of cavalry, under Sheridan, — Gregg's and Torbert's
divisions,— came, on May 27th, to be leading the advance
of the army, and Wilson's division to be guarding the rear
on the way from the North Anna across the Pamunkey to
Totopotomoy Creek.

444 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLES OF BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR.

We left the Army of the Potomac just after it had
crossed to the south side of the Pamunkey. The Pamun-
key and the Mattapony, as has been mentioned, form,
from their point of junction, the York River. South of the
Pamunkey, about thirteen miles above that junction, is the
White House, the depot of supplies during the Peninsular
Campaign, which, now that the Army of the Potomac has
advanced from the North Anna to within a march of it,
again serves that purpose.

The Pamunkey, just back of where the major part of
the Army of the Potomac had crossed it, lies in a south-
easterly direction. Flowing into it near there, with their
mouths six miles apart, are, in the order from north to
south. Crump's Creek and Totopotomoy Creek, lying in a
general way in a southwesterly direction, enriched through
their courses and at their heads by numerous affluents
and corresponding swampy bottoms. About four and a
half miles down the Pamunkey from the mouth of Totopot-
omoy Creek is the mouth of Matadequin Creek, the general
course of which, being about west, its head-waters approach
near to those of the Totopotomoy, with the same character-
istics of numerous affluents and swampy bottoms. Further
south than these three streams, running southeasterly in its
upper course, and therefore parallel there to the Pamunkey,
is the Chickahominy, flowing into the James River, and
passing in its upper course between the Army of the Poto-
mac and Richmond, and lying, when the army was in its

BETHE8DA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR. 44$

final position, five miles beyond its centre, to the southwest.
On the north side it has numerous affluents with swampy
bottoms. These, flowing in a general way from north to
south, have their headwaters in direction athwart the course
of the Matadequin. Consequently, the whole country in
which the two armies are now operating is seamed with
swamp-confined watercourses running in various directions
and preventing uniform advance of hostile lines and ease of
movement within each from flank to flank. Just to the
westward of this intricate formation of ground lies the Vir-
ginia Central Railroad, running north from Richmond to
Hanover Court House, distant fifteen miles.

When, about noon of the 28th of May, the Second,
Fifth, and Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac found
themselves across the Pamunkey, they drew up in a posi-
tion about two miles south of it. The right of the Sixth
Corps rested beyond Crump's Creek, enclosing the road to
Hanover Court-House ; the Second Corps, forming the cen-
tre, lay from northwest to southeast, with its left in the rear
of Hawes's Shop, and the Fifth Corps continued the general
line until its left reached the point where the Old Church
Road to Hawes's Shop crosses the Totopotomoy. The
Ninth Corps, as previously mentioned, did not get across
the Pamunkey until midnight. Wilson, with a division of
cavalry, was on the north side of the Pamunkey, protecting
the transit of the trains. Sheridan, with two divisions of
cavalry, was off to the left front. No one knew, from ocu-
lar demonstration, the exact position 'of the enemy. All
that had been seen of him since leaving the North Anna was
a brigade of his cavalry, which had had a slight encounter
with the advance of the Army of the Potomac crossing the
Pamunkey. But there are in war demonstrations other
than ocular ones which determine the general position of
an enemy. The direction of Richmond from the position

446 GENERAL QEOROE GORDON MEADK

of the Army of the Potomac, and the direction of the roads
leading thereto, coupled with the nature of the ground, de-
termined the general position in which Lee's line of battle
must eventually be. The problem to be solved was to as-
certain, at the least expenditure, its exact position. On the
28th Sheridan had been ordered to move two of his divis-
ions of cavalry beyond Hawes's Shop towards Richmond.
He had not advanced far when he encountered the main
body of the enemy's cavalry, under Hampton and Fitzhugh
Lee, and held the place after a hard fight lasting until dark,
before which time he was reinforced by two brigades of
Torbert's division of cavalry, in the rear at Crump's Creek,
rendering the tenure of the position secure.

There is a simple plan by which to bring the respective
positions of the hostile armies to the apprehension of the
reader. Let him picture to himself that the Totopotomoy
runs south of east from near Atlee's Station, on the Vir-
ginia Central Railroad, for about five miles, and there bends
and runs thence north of east to its mouth at the Pamunkey,
and that the Chickahominy, at a point about five miles
south of this upper reach of the Totopotomoy, runs about
parallel with that reach. Now, if these directions and dis-
tances are clearly held in mind, it will be seen that the pro-
duction of the enemy's line of battle from left to right along
the upper and southeast reach of the Totopotomoy would,
after leaving the lower, northeast reach, beyond the bend
of the stream, bring up a few miles off on the northern
bank of the Chickahominy. And it will be equally apparent
that, as all the roads north of the Chickahominy leading to
Richmond from the northeast are intersected about at right-
angles by the line described, that that was necessarily the
line of defence adopted by the enemy. The line of the
enemy therefore faced northeast, and the line of the Army
of the Potomac must have faced southwest. The two, rep-

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BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR. 447

•

resenting attack and defence, simply shifted along from
northwest to southeast.

On the morning of the 29th of May the infantry of the
Army of the Potomac moved m the following manner, —
the Sixth Corps, on the right, in the direction of Hanover
Court House, whither it marched to feel for the enemy
on that flank, finding nothing but small bodies of cavalry
hovering around; the Second Corps, to the left of the
Sixth, closing in on the Totopotomoy ; the Fifth, to the
left of the Second, crossing the Totopotomoy and advan-
cing along the Shady Grove Church Road. The Ninth
Corps was held in reserve between the Second and Fifth.
The order for the next day, the 30th, was for Wright to try
to outflank the left of the enemy ; for Hancock, on his
left, to co-operate with Wright ; for Bumside, on Hancock's
left, to push forward on his front ; and for Warren, on his
left, across the Totopotomoy, to continue to advance along
the Shady Grove Church Road. The Sixth Corps became
tangled up in the swamps of the head of Crump's Creek, and
could not arrive in time to carry out its part of the programme
with the Second ; the Second had considerable success on
its front, but without being able to disrupt the enemy's
line ; the Ninth crossed the Totopotomoy at the expense of
some heavy skirmishing ; and the Fifth, coming up in front
of Bethesda Church, had a severe engagement, which grew
in intensity as the day went on, the left of the corps, in the
afternoon, being overlapped by the pivoting of the enemy's
right flank across the head of Beaver Dam Creek, notable as
the one which, near its mouth, on the Chickahominy, had
witnessed the first of the series of battles that ended with
McClellan's withdrawal from the Peninsula. The brunt of
the preliminary battle had thus to be borne by Warren, the
nature of the ground rendering it impossible for Hancock, the
most available on his right, to come directly to his assistance.

44^ GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE

An attempt, however, was made to relieve him indirectly,
through orders from General Meade to Hancock, who put
Barlow in on his own front. It will be perceived that the
positions of the two armies will shift to the left as viewed
from the Army of the Potomac. Wilson's division of cavalry
was on the right Hank of the army near the head of Crump's
Creek, engaged in covering that flank, and preparing for
railroad destruction, including the demolition of the rail-
road bridges over the South Anna. Sheridan, with two
divisions of cavalry, held on the left, watching the roads
beyond Hawes's Shop to Richmond. At Matadequin
Creek, where it is crossed by the road to Cold Harbor, he
dislodged cavalry of the enemy posted there.

Other actors for the coming drama, to whom allusion
was made in the last chapter, are approaching the scene of
conflict by landing near the White House. Before leaving
Spottsylvania Court House, Grant had ordered Butler to
keep as many troops as might be necessary to hold his
lines at Bermuda Hundred, and to send the remainder to
reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Lee had acted simi-
larly with regard to stripping the lines opposing those at
Bermuda Hundred, and the two hostile contingents had
joined, or were in the act of joining, their respective sides
on the Totopotomoy. As the enemy's contingent had first
left the position at Bermuda Hundred, its troops had gradu-
ally reached the battle-ground, while those destined for the
Army of the Potomac were just beginning to appear, as it
were, in the distance. These, consisting of four divisions
of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, about sixteen thousand
strong under the command of General William F. Smith,
came by water from Bermuda Hundred, down the James
and up the York and the Pamunkey, on the bank of which
last stream they had landed by the 31st of May near the
White House.

BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR 449

It was undoubtedly only through General Grant's action
that this contingent could be ordered from the Army of the
James to join the Army of the Potomac. But its further
movement ought to have been under the immediate direc-
tion of General Meade. It is unfortunately, however, an
almost irresistible tendency in any but the most philosophic
minds to enter abruptly into a train of events which others
are conducting. The propensity is well illustrated by the
proverbial soup, to which each person passing through the
kitchen contributes a pinch of salt. The result, in this
instance, of Grant's taking immediate direction of Smith's
movement was that he was ordered to march, instead of,
to Cold Harbor, for a wrong place, to Newcastle Ferry, on
the Pamunkey, near the mouth of the Totopotomoy, seve-
ral miles back of the lines of the Army of the Potomac as
they were expected to lie, and did lie, on the ist of June.
In consequence, after a long, hot day- and night-march, on
the 31st of May, Smith's column reached Newcastle Ferry,
only to march the next morning for Cold Harbor, his troops
reaching there unfit, through heat and fatigue, for the im-
mediate action desired, which had to be postponed until a
later hour.

On the 31st of May the two armies were in close con-
tact, but largely debarred from action by the line of the
upper reach of the Totopotomoy. The infantry of the Army
of the Potomac was kept, with skirmishers in advance,
pressed up against the enemy, but made no general attack
anywhere, as it was now perceived that, if it were possible
to break through the opposing lines, it would be necessary
to move from right to left some of the force then along the
upper reach of the Totopotomoy. The day was therefore
passed by the infantry in skirmishing and making feints of
attack. The cavalry was, on the contrary, very active

during the day ; Sheridan, on the left front, capturing and

450 GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADK

holding the enemy's position at Old Cold Harbor, finally
relinquishing it under heavy pressure, and then, by orders
from General Meade to hold it to the last extremity, making
a successful stand there.

Sheridan's holding Old Cold Harbor was the turning-
point in the preliminary tactical movements of the Army
of the Potomac. It was soon able to extend towards the
left, with its line between Old Cold Harbor and New Cold
Harbor, stretching thence southeast to the Chickahominy.
The Sixth Corps was, during the night of the 31st, marched
to the left, Sheridan meanwhile holding on with difficulty
against the force brought to bear against him on the morn-
ing of the 1st of June. The Sixth Corps, however, began to
arrive between nine and ten o'clock, and relieved the cavalry
for other duty on the left flank. Wilson's cavalry division,
on the right, had an engagement near Hanover Court House,
and destroyed the two railroad bridges over the South Anna.
In the course of the morning Smith came up from Newcastle,
and was posted on the right of the Sixth Corps, Warren being
on his right. The enemy, upon observing the coming up
of the Sixth Corps to take position on Grant's extreme left,
pushed Longstreet further to the right. The two armies
are now effectively closed in on each other. The line of
the upper Totopotomoy is no longer the scene of the main
threats and attacks. The focus of the combat is to be at
Cold Harbor, covering some of the most direct roads to
Richmond and the Chickahominy. From left to right the
corps now lie in the order of the Sixth, the four divisions
of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, the Fifth, the Ninth,
and the Second. The final battle contemplated for the morn-
ing of the 2d of June had to be delayed until the after-
noon, partially on account of the necessity of affording an
interval of rest for Smith's jaded troops. Meanwhile, at
six o'clock in the evening of the ist the action began by an

BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR. 45 1

attack from the front of the Sixth Corps and that of the
Tenth and Eighteenth Corps. From the left of the Sixth
Corps to the right of Smith the following was the order
of the troops for the designated attack. The Sixth Corps,
— Getty's division, Russell's division, Ricketts's division.
Smith's troops, — Devens's division, Brooks's division, Mar-
tindale's division. The whole of Ricketts's division, in the
centre, the right of Russell's and of Getty's, Devens's, and
part of Brooks's, came into fierce contact with the enemy,
Martindale's division, on the right, and Neill's brigade, on
the left, being refused, and holding the roads in those places.
The result of the fighting was the loss of two thousand men
within a brief space of time, and the gain of portions of the
advanced line of the enemy. Ricketts's and part of Rus-
sell's division captured the enemy's second line on their
front, but were finally driven out of it. The troops en-
trenched on the ground which they had gained. With only
the force present on the left, no further progress could be
made, and the struggle will intensify more and more to-
wards the left. The Second Corps was ordered to make
a night march from the right, and the Sixth and the three
other corps on the left, to attack early the next morning
while the Second was coming up on the left of the Sixth.
After a heavy night march over difficult ground Hancock
arrived early in the morning of the 2d of June with his
troops very weary. Smith's troops, too, had not com-
pletely recovered from their fatigue, having gone into battle
still wayworn. Besides, the vicissitudes of their march had
resulted in their being deficient in ammunition. The attack
was therefore postponed until five o'clock in the afternoon.
Without going into the minutiae of the new dispositions
on the left, let it be stated in general terms that the Army
of the Potomac was now resting with its left on the Chicka-
hominy, lying in the following order from left to right, —

452 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

the Second Corps, the Sixth, parts of the Tenth and
Eighteenth, the Fifth, and the Ninth ; the Fifth holding a
line about three miles in length, so covered in parts by
swamps that it was difficult there to attack or be attacked.
The enemy continued, conformably with the opposite move-
ments, to draw down reinforcements from his left to his
right. The attack was again postponed. Instead of its
taking place at five o'clock in the afternoon, it was
ordered for half-past four on the morning of the next day,
the 3d. This was necessitated by various causes, the great
heat, the fatigue from the late night marches, and the
general inadequacy of general preparation for the previ-
ously appointed time of five o'clock in the afternoon of the
2d. Nothing therefore took place on the 2d of June more
serious than skirmishing along the lines, except that the
enemy, conceiving that the right might have been unduly
weakened, made an attempt upon it, resulting in some suc-
cess, as it unfortunately found Warren and Burnside, on
the extreme right, in the act of making a change ordered,
by which Warren was, by extending his left, to close up on
Smith, and Burnside was to mass his corps in reserve in the
rear of Warren's right.

The coming battle is popularly believed to have been one
in which there was a simultaneous assault all along the line,
but this was in places impossible. What in a general way
took place remains to be recounted. It was almost precisely
on the stroke of half-past four in the morning of the 3d, the
appointed time, when the cavalry on the left quiescent, the
cavalry on the enemy's right-rear active, that the infantry
between, over a stretch of six miles, attacked wherever the
enemy's lines were approachable. The army, free to ap-
proach the enemy from any position, barring Warren's and
Bumside's, and represented by the Second and Sixth Corps,
and the divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth, advanced

.•r.

BETHESDA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR. 453

simultaneously, captured many of the enemy's rifle-pits
amidst a storm of direct- and cross-artillery fire, and over-
running them, rushed forward to within a short distance of his
main entrenchments, where the fire became so scathing that
the troops, not being able to proceed farther, sought every
accident of ground for shelter, and began, with whatever
implement happened to be at hand, to throw up some slight
cover of earth. Although all the troops behaved with
exemplary gallantry, suffering during the unusually short
period during which the fighting lasted, a loss of four thou-
sand men in killed and wounded, the only serious lodgment
in the enemy's works was made by Barlow's division of
the Second Corps, which, happening to strike a salient of
the enemy's main line, carried it. But unfortunately, his
supporting second line did not arrive in time to confirm his
hold, and he was swept out of the works by the enemy's
reinforcements at that point, which rendered the position
thereafter secure. Another portion of the enemy's entrench-
ments was captured, but had to be relinquished, as in the
case cited, through failure to support in time the first as-
sault. The hopelessness of further attack under the condi-
tions of the terrible direct-fire, and also cross-fire coming
from the right of Smith, and searching the lines of the Sixth
Corps as well as those of his command, and even reaching
the left of the Second Corps, having become apparent, the
respective corps-commanders were directed to hold the
ground gained, and to proceed by regular approaches.

While this was happening on the left of the army, Bum-
side, on the right, captured rifle-pits along the line in front
of him, which had been stripped by Lee to reinforce his
right ; and he was, at one o'clock, about to move finally
upon the enemy when the order suspending attack reached
him. Warren, on Bumside's left, had acted in concert with
Bumside, both being engaged with Early, temporarily com-

454 GENERAL GEOBGE GORDON MEADR

manding EwelPs corps. Warren's corps, however, being
strung out in a thin line, and having in front of it unfavor-
able ground, could take the offensive to so little advantage
that Bimey's division of the Second Corps had been sent to
hold his lefl, when the order suspending further attack ar-
rived. With a slight attack by the enemy, about dark, on
a portion of the Sixth Corps, the battle of the 3d ended.

This represents, omitting minute details, the battle of the
3d of June at Cold Harbor. The total loss on the Union
side in pitched battle on the ist and 3d of June was very
nearly ten thousand, of which the greatest was sustained by
the Second and Sixth Corps and the divisions of the Tenth
and Eighteenth. The total loss afler crossing the Pamunkey
was very nearly thirteen thousand. The loss on the side
of the Confederates has never been ascertained. It was
probably not more than a fifth of these numbers.

On the 6th and 7th of June Lee took the offensive against
the right flank and rear of the army. But the attempts
failed, the enemy in his turn experiencing the difficulty of
making long advances through a country cut up by numer-
ous streams with their bordering swamps. Grant resolved,
despite the suggestion of Halleck to invest Richmond on
the north side, to carry out his original project of shifting
as an eventuality from the north to the south side of the
James. How he could have done otherwise is not apparent,
seeing, as we have observed, that he could not force Lee's
lines defending the ground leading to the north side of
Richmond. On the 9th and loth of June the preliminary
steps for the withdrawal of the army were taken, and it
began to retire in the night of the 1 2th and move towards
the James. Before this took place, however, Sheridan had
marched. On the 7th of June he had moved north of
Richmond on a pathway of railroad destruction, instructed
to join Hunter at Charlottesville, northwest of Richmond,

BETHE8DA CHURCH AND COLD HARBOR. 455

who was expected by that time to have captured Lynch-
burg, a little south of west from Richmond, and after
having destroyed valuable war-material there, to be in a
position where, reinforced by Sheridan, they would be able
together to combine their forces and join the Army of the
Potomac. But, as we have already seen in the chapter on
co-operative movements, things had fallen out differently
from expectations. Another movement besides Sheridan's
had been initiated about the same time. On the 9th of June,
while comparative repose reigned in the Army of the Poto-
mac and that of its adversary, an expedition of infantry and
cavalry started from the lines of Bermuda Hundred, seeking
to capture Petersburg by surprise. The attempt was un-
successful. General Beauregard, in command of the lines
of Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred, sent reinforcements
to the town, and the affair ended like a mere reconnoissance
in force.

456 GENERAL QEOBQE QOBDON MEADE

CHAPTER XXIII.

CHANGE OF BASE AND ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG.

That, from the movements which were to a certain de-
gree under his observation, General Lee should not have
known that they indicated crossing the James, is not extra-
ordinary. The visible movements were precisely those
which would have been made, had they been intended, after
the army's crossing the Chickahominy, to culminate in an
advance on Richmond from the southeast, over the Charles
River, Central, and New Market Roads. When, on the
morning of the 1 3th of June, Lee had learned that the
Army of the Potomac had retired from his front, he had to
meet what was apparent, but falsely so, by the counter-
move of marching a portion of his army towards a position
where his right would rest near Malvern Hill, his centre at
Riddle's Shop, and his left on the White Oak Swamp, and
there await the initiative of the enemy in a direct advance
towards Richmond. The extraordinary feature of the event
is, not that Lee did not penetrate Grant's design, but that
the eventuality which was now taking form had been kept
throughout the whole campaign secret.

It behooves us now to examine what the Army of the
Potomac was doing when, on the morning of the 1 3th of
June, Lee discovered that it had retired from his front. It
was engaged in an operation, in strategy well conceived, and
in tactics admirably executed, — the crossing of the James.
Unhappily, an incidental project of Grant's failed through
his own remissness. Yet, despite this, two distinguished
writers on the war have been found to lavish praise upon

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 457

him for his strategy here, oblivious of the fact that they
had not forgotten to note the serious lapse through which
his incidental plan of taking Petersburg by surprise sig-
nally failed. But, just as the strength of a fortification is
its weakest point, so also is the strength of a plan its weakest
point. The operation intended by Grant may be regarded
as he, in fact, regarded it at the time, as a single one ; but
so imperfectly was it executed as to one portion, that it re-
mained virtually two operations, of which only one suc-
ceeded. The march of the army and the crossing of the
river were unexceptionable. They could not have been
otherwise with such a master of logistics as Meade, with
such a chief-of-staff as Humphreys, with such corps and
division-commanders as those of which the army was pos-
sessed. But, first of all. Grant's instructions to Warren had
to be corrected, or things would have gone terribly amiss,
and then his omitting to communicate to Meade his project
of surprising Petersburg rendered that part of his design
abortive. Honor to him to whom honor is^ due, but not
beyond the honor that is -due.

Had the Army of the Potomac attempted to cross the
Chickahominy just below its left flank at Cold Harbor, it
would have become almost immediately engaged with the
enemy while its movement was in process of execution.
Moreover, upon getting across the Chickahominy, it would
have become tangled up in the region between the Chicka-
hominy and its parallel affluent, the White Oak Swamp.
It would finally have been in precisely the same position
as McClellan's, marching over precisely the same lines
over which McClellan made his retreat to Malvern Hill.
But Grant had advantages far superior to those enjoyed by
McClellan. He had a veteran army, and the whole of it
was concentrated north of the Chickahominy. Having the
start of a whole night, the trains, strongly guarded, wend-

458 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

ing their way in the rear from the White House towards
two crossings of the Chickahominy, Coles's Ferry, ten miles
from its mouth, and Windsor Shades, eight miles above the
Ferry, the Second and Fifth Corps pushed for Long Bridge,
four miles below where the White Oak Swamp empties
into the Chickahominy, and there, upon a pontoon-bridge,
crossed that stream. The Fifth, turning to the right after
crossing the bridge, and marching west along the Long
Bridge Road, halted in line of battle short of Riddle's Shop,
with its right resting on White Oak Swamp, in the rear of
the road passing it by White Oak Bridge, lest the enemy
should attack to advantage by passing over the swamp by
that bridge. The Fifth Corps, thus posted across the roads
leading to Richmond, masked all that was going on below
on the Chickahominy and the James.

At Jones's Bridge, three miles below the place where the
Second and Fifth Corps crossed the Chickahominy, the
Sixth and Ninth crossed it. The Second, crossing at Long
Bridge, and tjie Sixth and Ninth at Jones's Bridge, these
three corps then marched south, going by roads in the
general direction of Charles City Court House. The ren-
dezvous was on the James, at Wilcox's Landing, where a
pontoon-bridge was to be laid across the river to a nar-
row projection of land called Windmill Point. In all this
manoeuvre the trains, several miles in the rear, masked
by the Fifth Corps and the marching columns, eventually
found themselves assembled with the army two or three
miles below Harrison's Landing, and ten miles below
Malvern Hill, both famous in the Peninsular Campaign.
The division of cavalry remaining with the army actively
performed its duties during this operation. In the rear
there were going on desperately forced marches, while
Warren, with the Fifth Corps, at the front, was the shield
behind which the manoeuvre proceeded. When Warren,

J- 'J/

<■

•• *■«_■■«■■

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 459

preceded by Wilson's cavalry, had, on the morning of the
1 3th taken his designated position to cover the passage of
the other corps over the Chickahominy, he pushed out
some force on the three main roads leading from his posi-
tion to Richmond, on which he had some skirmishing with
the enemy. His mission being fulfilled by night, he fell
back a short distance, and the next day marched towards
Wilcox's Landing, reaching there on the 14th at midday.
The cavalry, however, was left in observation for a little
while longer near the lines vacated. The Second >Corps
reached Wilcox's Landing on the afternoon of the 1 3th,
but the Sixth and Ninth Corps did not reach there until
the 14th. In the middle of the night of the 14th, under
cover of the guns of the naval vessels and position taken
by the Sixth Corps, Wilson's cavalry, and the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Corps of infantry began to cross the
pontoon-bridge of over two thousand feet in length that
spanned the James, kept from swaying by being made fast
to craft anchored above and below in the stream ; and
about the same time in the night of the i6th had safely
made the transit of the river with all their artillery, muni-
tions, and trains. The Second Corps, forming an element
in Grant's unrevealed project to capture Petersburg by a
coup de main^ having collected all the available boats, had
crossed the James early on the morning of the 1 5th, under
orders from General Meade to wait where it landed, at Wind-
mill Point, until rations were received from General Butler,
now near by on the lines of Bermuda Hundred, after having
received which, the corps would march for Petersburg.
Hancock knew nothing beyond this of what was expected
of him, Meade knew nothing of Grant's intentions. Grant
had to neither communicated his particular design. The
consequence was, that Hancock, having waited in vain for
the rations, began to move forward at half-past ten in the

460 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

morning, but feeling no ui^ency for what seemed merely to
contemplate his taking up a position in front of Petersburg.
The Ninth Corps went first over the pontoon-bridge. The
Fifth Corps next passed over, partly ferrying its troops
across the river. The Sixth Corps retained the position in
which it had been placed to cover the movement. That
accomplished, two of its divisions were transported by water
to the lines of Bermuda Hundred for service there.

The wheel within the wheel which did not move smooth-
ly in ti>ie beautiful operation of changing the army's base
by crossing the James failed entirely through General
Grant. Twice, in close succession, he misconceived a par-
ticular situation. Had Warren, after crossing the Chick-
ahominy, taken up the position as ordered by Grant, he
would have been in a bad way, for his corps would have
been open to attack in the rear. Fortunately, Grant's orders
were so altered at Meade's headquarters that they fitted in
with the tactical requirements of the case. In the case of
Grant's other remissness, the account of which we are now
approaching, there was no opportunity afforded for the
avoidance of its consequences, because Grant left the com-
manding-general of the army completely in the dark as to
his ulterior purpose. Space does not admit here of intro-
ducing passages from the despatches, reports, and state-
ments bearing upon the subject, but if the reader will
carefully examine official matter relating to it, and the
statements of Meade, Humphreys, Hancock, William F.
Smith, Francis A. Walker, and Carswell McClellan, he will
reach a conclusion only too sadly confirmed by the evasion
of Grant himself and his accredited historian, Badeau,
through all of which is unmistakably to be seen that the
truth about this particular af!air lying at the bottom of a
well would receive no illumination from them by which the
obscurity around it might be dispelled. It would be ap-

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 461

parent to any candid mind, from examination of the official
and private record of the event, that Grant bungled the
matter of his intended surprise of Petersburg. He had
sent back General Smith, as he had come, to Bermuda Hun-
dred. Smith was ordered to report there in person to
Butler, and with all the force available to march upon and
capture Petersburg. Grant personally went, on the 14th,
to Bermuda Hundred, and there, in conference with Butler,
the capture of Petersburg was preconcerted ; and through
General Meade he ordered that the Second Corps, as soon
as furnished by Butler with rations, should march from
Windmill Point, halting between City Point and Petersburg.
But he failed to take either General Meade or General
Hancock into confidence as to his design involving Han-
cock's agency. The first that Hancock knew of it was
when he was nearing Petersburg, through an order from
Grant to hasten forward, and a message from Smith in
action. Consequently, the whole plan fell through, and so
conscious and unwilling to bear the burden of his own de-
reliction was Grant, that years afterwards, General Meade
then dead, he did not in his memoirs scruple to ignore what
he must long before have been satisfied was true, that he
had omitted to communicate to the commanding-general
the purpose he had had in view in Hancock's march.

While the operations just described, beginning with the
withdrawal of the army from Cold Harbor, were in pro-
gress, General Smith moved, under orders, from the White
House back to Bermuda Hundred by the same route as that
by which he had come. Smith's expressed conclusion, upon
the basis of the fact alleged by him, that Lee's order to re-
inforce Petersburg was issued before Grant had conceived
the idea of taking it by surprise (and therefore, necessarily,
before Grant's order to capture the place was given) is, of
course, intended to show that Lee must have anticipated

462 GENERAL QEOROE OOEDON MEADE

Grant in actually getting troops to the ground. But, from
these premises, it cannot be established as a &ct that the
appearance of the troops themselves preceded the arrival
of those under Smith. The difference of time in the issu-
ance of orders by the respective commanders evidently
produced, supposing that it existed, no material difference
on the ground as to the condition there upon Smith's ar-
rival. The circumstances influencing the final event lie
entirely outside of this consideration. The brief time of
the transit of Smith's troops speaks for itself If an officer,
in the night of the 1 2th, marched several thousand troops
from the position at Cold Harbor to the White House, and
there, despite the delay arising from defective transportation,
shipped them on transports down the Pamunkey and York
and up the James to Bermuda Hundred, and was marching
thence for Petersburg at five o'clock in the morning of the
15th, and that, also, despite the fact that the general to
whom he had by orders reported delayed giving him his
final instructions, which had been entrusted to him for com-
munication, he was not dilatory. This being what General
Smith did, it is difBcult to see how his preceding his troops,
which he states would have been an advantage secured, if he
had known of greater urgency than he reckoned on, would
have been really an advantage. In preceding the troops
he would have relinquished that force which a principal
always infuses into an operation conducted under his
own eye.

The failure to capture Petersburg did not hinge upon any
or all of these incidents, including the fact, assuming it to
be a fact, that Grant's order was issued later or carried out
later than Lee's. General Smith, leaving artillery and i/«-
peditnenta at Tunstall's Station, on the York River Rail-
road, to be taken along by troops marching towards the
James, embarked his own at the White House, and reached

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 463

Bermuda Hundred by the evening of the 14th. Marching
thence at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th, with
about ten thousand infantry, accompanied by some cavalry,
under Kautz, he crossed the pontoon-bridge over the Ap-
pomattox below Port Walthall, and directed his march
towards Petersburg, about eight miles distant towards the
south. The works to be attacked encircled the town at
the distance of about two miles, thus shortening the march
by that amount. He came very soon in contact with the
enemy on the route itself, and, reaching Petersburg, found
the enemy in position there with both direct and oblique
fire of heavy artillery. The number of infantry occupying
the works was unknown. With the frightful experience of
recent attacks on entrenchments without previous thorough
reconnoissances of the ground. Smith personally made a
careful one as a preliminary to advancing, for not only was
the number of infantry holding the works unknown, but the
artillery-fire from them was searching. Here began to cul-
minate the series of mishaps which, with Grant's design not
to communicate, or neglect to communicate, his plans to
General Meade, led to- the miscarriage of the enterprise.
The days, however, were long, and there would still per-
haps be time between the completion of the reconnoissance
and night to capture the works if it were at all practicable.
But when, at five o'clock in the afternoon, Smith directed
the fire of his artillery to be concentrated on a salient of
the enemy's line, intending to assault the works with a
cloud of skirmishers, it was suddenly discovered that the
artillery-horses had, without orders, been sent to water, and
his plan was thereby partially vrrecked. It was, in conse-
quence, not until nearly seven o'clock that his artillery,
having opened on the designated point, his skirmish-line
began to advance. Two redans, called respectively No. 5
and No. 6, were captured by the advance of the heavy

464 GENERAL QEOEQE QOBDON MEADK

skirmish-line, whereupon the centre of the line of battle,
commanded by General Brooks, carried and held the
enemy's entrenchments on its front Brooks, holding on
here to what he had gained. General Martindale, on his
right, and General Hinks, on his left, kept on advancing.
Hinks captured five redans opposite to him, but Martindale
was brought up all-standing by an impassable ditch. There
remained then, on the right, near the Appomattox, four
redans with their entrenchments uncaptured, and those to
the left beyond Redan No. 11, uncaptured, leaving alto-
gether an interval of about a mile and a half of the enemy's
works held by General Smith by the time the fighting ceased,
at nearly nine o'clock at night.

Smith thought, and naturally, that under the circum-
stances, it were best to let well alone, and not to tempt
fortune by an advance to capture the bridges over the river,
Petersburg lying on the south side of the Appomattox.
Let us take the principal circumstances into consideration
with which he had to deal. He had finally captured a mile
and a half of the enemy's line. He had heard, hours
before, that reinforcements for the enemy were crossing the
James at Drewry's Bluff, between Richmond and Peters-
burg. He had learned, about four o'clock in the after-
noon, from Grant himself, that Hancock was approaching.
Humphreys says that it is probable that an immediate ad-
vance by Smith, when the enemy's salient was occupied, or
at nine o'clock at night, when an assault could have been
supported by two divisions of the Second Corps, would
have resulted in the capture of Petersburg. But Hum-
phreys did not positively say, for no man knew better than
he the unfairness of positive conclusions after the fact, pre-
viously represented by supposititious elements, that Smith
and Hancock did amiss in reaching the conclusions at which
one separately, and then the two in conjunction, arrived.

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 465

upon the basis of facts then known. He merely stated, with
his usual judicial calm, his conclusion as to a probable con-
sequence of action under imaginary conditions.

Had Hancock been simply ordered to march at dawn for
Petersburg, without halt, and without being informed of the
purpose for which he was required there, it would not have
mattered that General Meade or he was ignorant of the
purpose of the march. But General Meade and General
Hancock were equally in the dark. Neither was informed
of Grant's intentions, and the order for the march was as
previously represented. Hancock would otherwise have
been at Petersburg by noon, and his troops, together with
those of Smith, would have captured the town. It was
about four o'clock in the afternoon when Smith learned by
despatch from Grant that Hancock was only four miles in
his rear. He sent instantly to Hancock to request him to
hasten forward. The officer bearing the message reached
Hancock at half-past five o'clock, just after he had received
a message from Grant ordering him to hasten forward to
the support of Smith. This was the first intimation that
Hancock had received of what was intended. He at once
sent Colonel Morgan, inspector-general of the Second
Corps, ahead, to notify Smith of his coming. This message
Smith received just after six o'clock. At half-past six
o'clock, the head of Hancock's column, Bimey's division
of the Second Corps, had come up on the left-rear of
Smith's line.

It was not until eleven o'clock that Hancock's troops, at
Smith's request, on the prudential ground that some of
Smith's troops were not veterans, relieved the men occupy-
ing the captured part of the line. The troops of Hancock
that might have taken position on the left of Smith for the
renewal of immediate attack, were not ordered to do so,

because, as is believed, of the difficulty and danger of

466 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

occupying unknown ground by night Considering, then,
that Smith had sent a despatch to Hancock before he
reached the ground, asking him to come up quickly and
take position on his left, and this upon the basis of Grant's
despatch to himself, and that Hancock came rapidly for-
ward upon the basis of a despatch directly received from
Grant, the whole pointing unmistakably to action upon
Hancock's arrival, and that upon his arrival and meeting
at half-past nine o'clock with Smith, he, although per-
force of his seniority, the commanding-general, did not
give any order or make any suggestion looking towards
attack, or even attempt to come into position on Smith's
left, but, on the contrary, readily acceded to Smith's
request to relieve his troops on the captured line, it would
seem that Hancock's action constituted tacit approval of
waiting for the morning's light to attack, for which no one
can assert that Smith was in any wise responsible, unless
he should have the hardihood to declare that, after what
had gone before. Smith should have urged Hancock to
attack, notwithstanding that all that was said and done by
him clearly indicated that he did not feel imperatively called
upon by circumstances to prosecute the attack immediately.
By midnight a despatch arrived from Grant saying that the
enemy was reinforcing the town.

Hancock, ranking Smith, was from the iact of his arrival
on the field the commanding-general. He might have
waived his rank, as he is reported by Grant to have done,
but General Smith says positively that he did not A side-
light is thrown on this subject by General Walker in his
history of the Second Corps, where he speaks of the physi-
cal condition of Hancock at that time, when he was begin-
ning to suffer exquisite pain from the wound received at
Gettysburg beginning to reopen. The fact of Hancock's
relieving Smith's troops at his request, and making no pro-

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETEBSBUBQ. 467

position to renew hostilities, therefore admits of the con-
sideration of two alternatives. Either Hancock's action
was controlled in a wrong direction by temporary physical
disability, or else, despite his condition, was the tadt ex-
pression of good judgment in the premises. In either
case, however, his action constitutes full absolution to
General Smith for his cessation of hostilities at the time.
Whether or not Hancock was right cannot enter into
the question of Smith's action, for Smith was, upon the
appearance of Hancock, no longer the conmianding-general.
Whatever value, however, the circumstances recited may
be judged to have with reference to the failure to capture
Petersburg, they were all trivial compared with the share
borne in it by Grant, because they would have been non-
existent, had Grant not committed the egregious error of
not communicating to his immediate subordinates his design
of capturing Petersbui^ by a coup de main. The case has
the aspect of his having wished to signalize himself by a
master-stroke of strategy, of his not having forgotten to
communicate to General Meade his intentions, but of his
having purposely withheld from him information which
should have been imparted.

The events narrated took place on the day and in the
night of the 1 5th of June, while the main body of the army
was coming up in the rear, two divisions of the Sixth Corps
going to Bermuda Hundred, the Ninth Corps nearing its
position on the left of the Second at ten o'clock on the
1 6th, followed by the Fifth Corps coming up in the rear by
the morning of the 17th. The enemy, from the evening of
the 1 5th, had been sending reinforcements from Bermuda
Hundred, and before daylight of the next day General Lee
in person was, with Pickett's division, on his way to the Ber-
muda Hundred lines ; but it was not until the 17th that he
was finally disabused of his idea that the whole of the Army

468 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

of the Potomac had not crossed the James. Beauregard
g^dually stripped his lines at Bermuda Hundred for the
purpose of reinforcing Petersburg, so that at last they were
so slightly held that an attack upon them had a temporary
success, soon lost through the incompetence of Butler. As
one of the preliminaries of the approaching siege of Peters-
bui^, the movements here are, however, so subordinate to
those, that we can well afford to pass them by with this casual
mention and return to the main contest at Petersburg. The
attack on the left was long delayed on the morning of the
1 6th, through causes which doubtless revert to Hancock's
increasing disability from his old wound. The assault re-
sulted in the capture of Redan No. 1 2, the next on the left
of the ones which had been captured the evening before by
Smith's troops. General Meade having arrived, ordered an
assault for six o'clock in the afternoon. The line of battle
was formed by the Second Corps in the centre, with two
brigades of the Eighteenth Corps on the right, and two
brigades of the Ninth on the left. This attack resulted in
taking Redan No. 4, on the right, the next on the right of
those captured the day before by Smith, and in taking
Redans Nos. 13 and 14, on the left of the one captured by
Hancock's morning assault. This ended the fighting* for
the day, in which both Union and Confederate armies
suffered severely. At daylight on the 17th General Pot-
ter's division, of the Ninth Corps, took by surprise and
captured the defences near the building known as the Shand
House. Later in the day several gallant assaults were made
by General Willcox, Ninth Corps, General Barlow, Second
Corps, General Crawford, Fifth Corps, and Colonel Gould,
Ninth Corps, commanding Ledlie's division ; and advances
to close quarters, which were maintained, were made on the
left by Generals Gibbon and Bimey, of the Second Corps.
But the enemy continued to hold from Redan No. i to

ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF PETERSBURG. 469

Redan No. 3, all inclusive, and thence by a withdrawn
line of entrenchments, along the west side of Harrison's
Creek, to his redans and entrenchments on the Petersburg
and Norfolk Railroad. The besiegers were seeking to
girdle Petersburg, but so far they had not obtained a foot-
hold beyond the eastern side of it. Their positions will be
understood from the statement that the Appomattox, flow-
ing east and west just north of the town, the efforts of the
besiegers, on the east of it, were directed to investing it as
an eventuality on the south and west, as well as on the east,
by resting their right on the river below, and their left on
the river above. The enemy's line was intact, however,
from the river below to Redan No. 3, and from Redan No.
1 5 to the river above. The fighting over for the 1 7th, Gen-
eral Meade ordered an assault for daylight of the 1 8th by
the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Corps. General Hancock had
now become temporarily incapacitated for duty by the re-
opening of his wound, and the command of the Second
Corps devolved on General Bimey.

The advance, on the morning of the i8th, discovered
that the enemy had fallen back upon an interior line which
he was entrenching, difficult of approach in places on ac-
count of interlying ravines, including the deep cut through
which the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad passes south,
and obstructions beyond, consisting of slashings and abat-
tis. The attacks could not, on account of the difficulties
of the ground, be exactly simultaneous, but took place
without much difference between them. By the time that
the various corps were able to make them effective, the
enemy had been heavily reinforced. In one sense they did
not succeed, for the assaults did not result in capturing the
enemy's new line of entrenchments, but in another they
were successful, for the ground gained by the advance was
tenaciously held, and as Humphreys observes, "The two

.&.i.^a^H«>

470 GENERAL OEOBQE GORDON MEADE

opposing lines in this part of the ground remained substan-
tially the same in position to the close of the war." The
losses on the Union side, from the beginning to the end of
the assaults on the enemy's lines, reached ten thousand.
Those on the enemy's side have never been known, the
policy of the Confederates having been to conceal losses ;
but there is no reason to doubt, from the accounts of ob-
servers on the field, that they were very great The regu-
lar investment and siege of Petersburg now began, a ^ege
characterized by many engagements, and lasting over so
long a period, that the most cursory account of it demands
its formal initiation in a special chapter.*

* Following the events narrated, General Smith, from having been
apparently high in Grant's favor, fell suddenly and unaccountably
from that estate. It would have been singular if he or any one else
had then been able to reach a rational conclusion as to the change
among the many possible explanations of it which then offered them-
selves for choice. But it is remarkable that now, in the light with
which documents and the evidence in General Smith's own book,
"From Chattanooga to Petersburg/* have flooded the subject, he
should have failed to discover at least one cause of the animus to which
he owed his unfortunate experience, although he says that, at the very
time referred to, Grant had charged him with having, by his strictures
on Meade, whipped him over Meade's shoulders. If Grant were able
to conceive so great a dislike as he exhibited for Warren, merely be-
cause of Warren's objectionable habit of making suggestions to
modify the plans of his superiors, it is easy to understand what deep
offence he must have received at remarks which, however uninten-
tionally, struck at the very root of his own procedures. He had a
personal purpose to serve in re-exalting, after having taken steps to
dispose of Buder, who had great political influence, and another in
withdrawing his favor from General Smith ; and deeply politic and
quiedy vindictive as he could on occasions be, he was able, in thb
case, to subserve his ends by a Machiavelian combination, which in-
cluded his resentment and personal interests (then perilously at stake
from the popular feeling about the army's losses), under the most con-
venient cloak lent by circumstances as adventitious as it is possible to
imagine.

PRELIMINARY TO THE SLBQR 4/1

CHAPTER XXIV.

PREUMINARY TO THE SIEGE.

As, before the Army of the Potomac can settle down
to its attempt to invest Petersbui^, the loose threads pro-
duced by the interaction of the contending forces have to
be gathered in, so too must the historian of events relating
to them attend to a description of these before the regular
narrative of the siege can begin.

Immediately following the last heavy fighting on the i8th
of June, in the vain attempt to carry the defences of Peters-
burg by assault, the two sides, as already mentioned,
remained to the end of the siege in substantially the same
positions on the right of the field as that in which they had
found themselves when those severe conflicts had ceased.
In the evening of the 19th the two divisions of the three
composing the Sixth Corps, which had been sent to Bur-
muda Hundred on the occasion when they had crossed the
James, rejoined the Army of the Potomac. On the 20th
the various corps of the army were posted, counting from
right to left, in the following order, — the Eighteenth, Sixth,
Second, Ninth, and Fifth. On the following day the Second
and Sixth were withdrawn from between the Eighteenth
and Ninth, the Eighteenth and Ninth closing in together
their left and right flanks respectively, while the Second
marched to the left and took position there in the general
line of development to the west, and the Sixth was ordered
to take position, nearly at right-angles to it, facing the
Petersbui^ and Weldon Railroad, distant then from the
left-extension of the Army of the Potomac by about three

472 GENERAL QEOEQE GORDON MEADE

miles. This movement constituted the first attempt at ex-
tension of the left flank towards the west. It implies that
the right was already strong enough in its temporary works
to admit of being stripped in a measure of troops for their
projection towards the left. That was the general pro-
cedure to the end of the siege, looking to the capture of
the enemy's sources of supplies in his railroads. The im-
mediate objective on this occasion was the Petersburg and
Weldon Railroad. But so little was known at this time of
the enemy's capacity of resistance, that it was hoped by
General Meade that the first attempt to extend the line
towards the left might result in reaching the Appomattox
above Petersburg. In point of fact, however, the lines of
contravallation never reached near that point. This was
the critical one for the enemy. As the attacking lines
passed on the south of Petersburg from east to west,
threatening the railroads from Richmond and Petersburg
towards the west and south, they were held off by the
enemy with most strenuous exertions, as the prime con-
dition of his being able to sustain the siege for any length
of time.

The Second Corps came into position on the left of the
Fifth during the day of the 2ist of June, the Sixth Corps, on
the left-rear of the Second Corps, during the night. During
the day a division of the Second Corps made a reconnois-
sance in force towards the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad.
The enemy had a sig^nal advantage at this period over the
Army of the Potomac, from the fact that he necessarily had
perfect knowledge of the country, which, being heavily
wooded, was dangerous to a hostile force attempting to
penetrate it. On the 2 2d of June the Second Corps, rest-
ing its right on the left of the Fifth, swung forward its left,
to close in towards the enemy's works, at the same time
that the Sixth, nearly at right-angles to it, was moving

PRELIMINABY TO THE 8IEQE. 473

towards the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, when, owing
to the difficulty, on account of the wooded character of the
country, of keeping up knowledge of the intervening space
between the left of the Second and the right of the Sixth,
and also on account of the left of the Second not being
sufficiently on its guard against a counter-movement by the
enemy, the Confederate general, A. P. Hill, bore down into
the open space between the two corps with three divisions,
and attacking the right of the Sixth Corps with one division,
he launched the other two on the left-rear of the Second
Corps. This, from left to right, was represented by the
divisions of Barlow, Mott, and Gibbon, the last being next
to the left of the Fifth Corps. Barlow's division, naturally
the first struck, recoiled towards the position which it had
held before the corps was pivoted on its right, losing a
great many prisoners. Mott, having time to take in the
situation, fell back to better advantage, and therefore with
smaller loss. Gibbon's division, whose flank was thus left
naked to the enemy's advance towards its left-rear, suf-
fered the greatest loss in prisoners. The enemy retired
with his spoils, and the Second Corps did not regain its
advanced position until the next morning. The line was
then finally made secure by the right of the Sixth Corps,
facing the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, joining the left
flank of the Second Corps, facing Petersburg. The refused
part of the line was now about a mile and a half from the
railroad. But the railroad still remained in the enemy's
possession, and so continued for some time, as General
Wilson who had, on the 22d, been sent on a cavalry raid,
found to his cost in attempting at its enforced conclusion
to return to the Army of the Potomac across that route.

The reader will remember that, in the chapter on co-
operative columns, it was mentioned that, on the 7th of
June, Sheridan had gone on an expedition to destroy the

474 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

enemy's railroad communications north of Richmond, and,
if possible, to join Hunter at Charlottesville, and uniting
forces with him, to return to the Army of the Potomac ;
but that he was unable to do so, Hunter having perforce
beaten a retreat from Lynchbui^ north by the way of the
Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah Valley open to
an advance by Early, which he soon made on Washington ;
an advance which would have resulted in the capture of the
city on the I2th of July, but for the opportune sending and
arrival there of two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and that of
a part of the Nineteenth, just come by sea from New Orleans.
The order of precedence, growing out of priority of date in
the initiation of the respective enterprises undertaken re-
quires us to take up at this point the further movements of
Sheridan until he rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

General Sheridan, with two of his three divisions of cav-
alry, having left the army at Cold Harbor, on the 7th of
June, with ample subsistence and a pontoon-train, proceeded
along the north bank of the North Anna, his intended des-
tination being Charlottesville, and his mission the destruc-
tion of the Central Virginia and the Richmond and Fred-
ericksburg Railroads and return with the army of General
Hunter. On the evening of the loth ha crossed the North
Anna at Trevylian Station, on the Central Virginia Railroad,
Generals Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee only a few miles dis-
tant from him with their cavalry, one towards the northwest
and the other towards the east. On the morning of the
nth severe encounters between the respective forces, with
varying success, took place, the final advantage remaining
with Sheridan. Learning by night the futility of trying to
join forces with Hunter, Sheridan concluded to return to
the Army of the Potomac by the way of Spottsylvania and
the White House. Incidentally to so doing, he effected, on
the 1 2th, considerable railroad destruction, and his advance

PRELIMINARY TO THE SIEGE 47 S

had an engagement near Mallory's Ford, on the North
Anna, at which place, finding the enemy strongly posted,
he recrossed the river that night at Carpenter's Ford and
marched for the White House, Hampton following him up
on the south side of the river. Sheridan reached the White
House on the 21st, and relinquishing it as a depot of sup-
plies, the Army of the Potomac being long since across the
James, he marched on the following day, with a large train
and his whole force, intending to cross the James on the
pontoon-bridge opposite Butler at Bermuda Hundred ; an
operation in accordance with original orders, but one which
had become impossible of success in a situation, certainly
unanticipated, where Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were op*
posing him with all their cavalry, and against infantry which
could readily have reinforced them from Richmond. He
crossed the Chickahominy at Jones's Bridge, the same place
at which the Sixth and Ninth Corps had lately passed over
that stream, and kept on, with the purpose of crossing the
James, towards Charles City Court House, when his flank-
ing column, under General Gregg, was en route attacked, on
the 24th, by Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, who drove it
after a severe fight back nearly to the Court House. This
column, being now united with that which had escorted the
train, Sheridan could then hold Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee
in check, and so, cavalry and train moving further down
the James, to Douthat's Landing, were, on the 25th, trans-
ported across the river at Mingen's Ferry.

It proved very unfortunate that Sheridan, although
Grant, not he, seems to have been to blame, had not con-
tinued to give Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee full employment
on the north side of the James ; for on the 2 2d General
Wilson, in command of Sheridan's third division of cavalry,
had been sent from the Army of the Potomac to destroy the
railroad communications of the enemy to the west and the

4/6 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

southwest of Petersburg, and Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee,
being now released by Sheridan's withdrawal over the
James, were able to concentrate their attention upon Wilson.
General Meade had foreseen this eventuality, and had tried
to impress upon Grant the importance of Sheridan's having
full scope to detain Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee on the
north side of the James. All he could now do he did, by
ordering Sheridan to the left flank of the Army of the Po-
tomac, to aid Wilson in any possible embarrassment in his
return. This mention brings us to the situation in which
Wilson actually found himself in the progress of his foray.
Just before daylight of the 2 2d of June General Wilson
had, under orders, moved with his division of cavalry, to
strike for a point fifty miles away to the west, at Burkesville
Junction, where the Richmond and Danville Railroad and
the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad intersect. The
instructions to Wilson contemplated the destruction of rail-
roads. As the names of the railroads mentioned, and the
fact of their intersection at Burkesville indicate, the destruc-
tion of them about that point would sever communication
west between Richmond and Petersburg, with Lynchburg on
the one hand, and with the southwest on the other, the only
remaining southern communicating line in the hands of the
Confederates being then the Petersburg and Weldon Rail-
road, running due south, and very close to the left flank of
the Army of the Potomac ; so close that there was reason
to believe when Wilson started on his raid, that it would
soon be captured and permanently held. Wilson, striking
the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad some fourteen or
fifteen miles out from Petersburg, destroyed most of the
track as far as Burkesville, and then turning south along
the Richmond and Danville Railroad, destroyed it as far as
Staunton River. Arriving there, Wilson's column found its
passage barred at the bridge.

PRELIMINARY TO THE SIEOE. 477

Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee having, on the 25th, been
relieved from the necessity of further occupation of the
Peninsula below Richmond by the transfer of Sheridan's
column to the south side of the James, had been ordered
by General Lee to cross the James at Drewry's BluiT, and
were now on the track of Wilson, preceded by the cavalry
division of General W. H. F. Lee, with whom Wilson had
had an engagement before he reached Staunton River. Cut
off, through the enemy's holding the bridge across Staun-
ton River, from passing further south, Wilson started, in
the night of the 27th, and marched northeastwardly, cross-
ing the Meherrin and Nottoway Rivers, reaching a point,
by midday of the 28th, about twenty-five miles southwest
of Petersburg, and about eleven miles northwest of Jarratt
Depot, which is on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad.
At the beginning of his raid, Wilson had crossed this
north and south railroad near Petersburg, at Reams's Sta-
tion, which he had destroyed, and he then had had, with
the rest of the army, every reason to believe that the
railroad would come into possession of the army before his
return, but, as the reader has seen, it had not. So believ-
ing, however, and learning that there was only a small
force ahead of him at Stony Creek Depot, the next one
below Reams's Station, he started from the point where he
crossed the Nottoway, at Double Bridges, on the direct
road to Prince George Court House, which runs along the
railroad two miles to the west of Stony Creek Depot,
before reaching which Court House he would, if suc-
cessful in taking that route, be well in the rear of the
Army of the Potomac. But, in advance of him along the
railroad to Petersburg, the enemy was preparing the warm
reception which he received. Hampton's and one of W.
H. F. Lee's cavalry divisions were at Stony Creek Depot ;
Fitzhugh Lee^ with a cavalry division^ and additionally, Gen-

k^.

4/8 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE.

eral Mahone, with infantry and artillery, were at Reams's
Station. Wilson, ignorant of the dangers ahead, had to
run the gantlet with what remained of his original force of
five thousand five hundred cavalrymen. Arriving opposite
Stony Creek Depot, he was attacked by Hampton and W.
H. F. Lee, the engagement lasting until after dark. He
then attempted to withdraw from the route previously fol-
lowed towards the northeast, and making a slight detour to-
wards the north by the way of the west, reach and proceed
along the Halifax Road, which runs for the most part of
the way here close to the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad,
directly towards Petersburg. Failing to get well clear of
the enemy before daylight, he was rapidly followed up, and
an engagement ensued, Hampton endeavoring to intercept
him on the Halifax Road. Wilson's cavalry had been and
continued to be acting in two bodies, one led by himself,
the other by General Kautz. Wilson passed before Hamp-
ton could arrive at the place to head him ofT. Kautz, strik-
ing the railroad at Reams's Station, very near the enemy's
left flank, entrenched and despatched an aide with an
escort to General Meade, to inform him of the situation.
Wilson coming up, the cavalry was now concentrated, but
in the presence of a force of infantry, so it now became nec-
essary to take prompt measures for extrication. Destroying
all his impedimenta^ of which he had had originally very
little, Wilson began to retire south by the way of the Halifax
Road to the Double Bridges over the Nottoway, from which
he had advanced, hoping that then, by a detour first east
and then north, he could finally reach the rear of the Army
of the Potomac. At noon the retrograde movement beg^n,
the two bodies of cavalry being led by their respective com-
manders. But the enemy had crowded in closely on the
position of the command of Wilson, and the enemy's infantry,
suiq>orted by cavalry, attacked in flank and reverse, and

PRELIMINARY TO THE 8IE0R 479

threw the rear of the retreating force into confusion. Kautz,
finding himself cut off from Wilson on the Halifax Road,
made a break over the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad,
past the enemy's left, and successfully reached the Army
of the Potomac after nightfall. The enemy pursued Wilson,
with cavalry and artillery, until he reached Stony Creek,
but there halted. Between ten and eleven o'clock at night
Wilson crossed the Nottoway, as he had come, and marched
to the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad at Jarratt's Depot,
At daybreak of the 30th he marched eastward across the
railroad, and recrossed the Nottoway at Peters's Bridge,
thirteen miles east of the railroad. At this point he was
only a little ovier two miles west of the Jerusalem Plank
Road, running directly north to the rear of the Army
of the Potomac. But, to have pursued the line of this
road, running near the eastern side of the Petersburg and
Weldon Railroad, would have entailed the risk of being
again intercepted on his way to the army ; so he held
towards the northeast for fifteen miles, crossing the Peters-
burg and Norfolk Railroad, and by evening crossed the
Blackwater at Blunt's Bridge, four miles beyond it, repair-
ing the bridge for, and destroying it after his passage, the
enemy's cavalry pursuit having been resumed and con-
tinued. From this point, twenty miles southeast of the
Army of the Potomac, he was easily able to rejoin it.
Sheridan, not reaching the army before the 27th, was, of
course, powerless to relieve Wilson. Meade had heard
nothing from Wilson since his departure on the 2 2d, until
the aide sent by Kautz reached him on the morning of the
29th. Infantry, despatched at once to Reams's Station, of
course found neither of the forces lately contending there.
Thus ended two raids, individually well conducted, but not
sufficiently concerted with reference to each other as to
have given legitimate prospect of results commensurate with

48o

GENERAL GEOBQE OOBDON MEADE.

the magnitude of the undertakings. Their defect resulted
from not carrying out the requirement ui^ed upon General
Grant by Meade, represented by his proposed retention of
Sheridan on the north bank of the James while the opera-
tions of Wilson were proceeding south of that river.

THE A UTUMNAL SIEOE OF PETEB8B UBQ. 48 1

CHAPTER XXV.

THE AUTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

We have at last reached the beginning of the formal in-
vestment of Petersburg. And here, on that account, it be-
comes necessary to give the reader some general notion of
the lay of the land involved in the operations, for they in-
cluded not only the ground immediately about Petersburg,
but that along a front extending to and beyond the eastern
face of Richmond. The reader will, therefore, as a pre-
liminary, picture to himself that Petersburg is about fourteen
miles south of Richmond, and so nearly due south that it
may, for convenience, be here regarded as due south of it.
Having this north and south line as our guide, with Rich-
mond at the top and Petersburg fourteen miles distant at
the bottom, it will be easy to develop therefrom an accurate
conception of the horizontal relations of the ground. Its
vertical character is so varied that nothing but an elaborate
map could afford a correct idea of the surface as to eleva-
tion. Basing our orientation upon the north and south
line between Richmond and Petersburg and the termini
of it as constituted by those two places, imagine that the
James, flowing from west to east, close to the southern
side of Richmond, thence runs due south for a third
of the distance between it and Petersburg, and thence, as
an offset from the north and south line, at two-thirds of
the way from Richmond to Petersburg, bends towards the
east five or six miles, making, with the previous reaches
of the river, and with the lower straight reach towards

Petersburg, of the Appomattox, from near its mouth, a

482 GENERAL OEOBOE OOBDON MEADK

blunt little peninsula with two teat-like projections formed
by sharp bends of the James. This blunt little peninsula
east of the north and south line between Richmond and
Petersburg is Bermuda Hundred. Running north and
south across its western and narrowest width, as thus formed
by the confluence of the James and the Appomattox, were
Butler's fortifications, and opposite, and just to the west of
them, the enemy's, which were continuous, in double lines,
all the way north, after crossing the James, to and around
Richmond, and all the .way south, after crossing the Appo-
mattox, to Petersburg, encircling it from the east, where
they rested on the Appomattox, to the west, where they
again rested on the river above the town. Southeast of the
centre of Bermuda Hundred is situated City Point, on the
southern side of the entrance of the Appomattox into the
James. This place was the depot of supplies for the Army
of the Potomac, and from it ran the military railroad con-
structed back of the lines of the army. At City Point were
also General Grant's permanent headquarters.

This premised, it remains only to add that the coming
operations of battle and siege were so stupendous, and
lasted, in one form or another, over so many months of un-
tiring activity, that it would be a mere pretence to profess to
give here more than an account of the main features of the
conflict, mere pictures seen by flashlight, in which the
reader must fill in the dark spaces from other works, or
from the resources of his own imagination.

The army was for a while no longer the imposing force
that it had been when it set out from the Rapidan, nor any-
thing like it. Its losses had been so frightful in officers and
men that, depleted in numbers, and worn out with constant
labors and vigils by day and night, it was neither physically
nor morally for a time more than a semblance of what it
had been. It had, however, this advantage over that of the

PETERSBURG

-ftOLtter, ity Jt.JMeaeie Bach.*.

THE A UTUMNAL SIEQE OF PETEBSB UEG. 483

enemy, that it had back of it relatively greater resources in
men, subsistence, and material of war, and was buoyed up
by constant faith in eventual success, whereas the enemy's
impoverishment began to be manifest, and his loss of pris-
tine confidence in ultimate triumph had sensibly diminished.
General Meade's order of the 9th of July inaugurated the
vigorous construction of siege-batteries, redoubts, and cor-
responding lines of entrenchments with rifle-pits, the begin-
ning of. an investing cordon, from right to lefl, with which
the lines of the besiegers finally bristled.

The next important movement to that by which the left
flank was somewhat advanced is known as that of the Pe-
tersburg Mine. If the reader has before him in imagination
the general topography of the region, he will see that, from
the area about City Point, south of the Appomattox, to the
area north of the James, in the direction of the eastern side
of Richmond, passing back of Butler's entrenchments on
the blunt little peninsula forming Bermuda Hundred, it is a
straight course, and therefore, that it needed only pontoon-
bridges in the direction of this line, over the Appomattox
and the James, to enable any force from the Army of the
Potomac, or from the Army of the James, masked at first by
the entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, to be thrown north
of the James, miles away on the enemy's left, and make
either a demonstration or a real attack there at pleasure.
Pontoon-bridges had been placed in the direction of this line
as it passed over both rivers, maintained on the Appomat-
tox by works on the left of Butler's lines, and on the
James, by a tite de pont and other works. The operation
about to be described depended, as well as some succeeding
ones, upon the facility which these bridges afforded of at-
tacking the enemy's left remotely and unexpectedly in space
and time.

While forts were building and siege-guns were being

484 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

placed in position close up to Petersburg, and the invest-
ment from the 9th of July proceeded by bombardment and
regular approaches, the Army of the Potomac undertook
the duplex operation of making an attack on the enemy
both north and south of the James. The Second Corps
was to pass over the Appomattox and the James by the
pontoon-bridges previously described as to their locality,
accompanied by two divisions of cavalry, and on their way
be joined by cavalry and infantry from the Army of the
James. The cavalry was to march, supported by the
infantry, in case the cavalry succeeded in making some
progress at the front near Richmond, while, somewhat
later, a mine was to be sprung south of the Appomattox,
opposite Bumside's entrenchments in front of Petersburg.
It was hoped that reinforcements of the enemy, drawn oflT
to meet the demonstration towards Richmond, would render
the lines opposite Bumside very vulnerable. The attack on
the left of the enemy was, however, to be real. On the
afternoon of the 26th of July the movement back of But-
ler's lines to the north bank of the James took place, and
by the early morning of the 27th the infantry and cavalry
were across the river. Here occurred a stubborn fight,
chiefly cavalry against the enemy's infantry, near Bailey's
Creek, in which the troops were represented by the infantry
of General Hancock, of the Second Corps, now returned to
duty in command of it, and the cavalry of General Sheri-
dan, both of the Army of the Potomac, with the infantry
of General Foster and the cavalry of General Kautz, both
of the Army of the James. The attempt at this point did
not succeed, and that portion of the original plan which
had contemplated Sheridan's destroying railroads north of
Richmond was relinquished by his withdrawal thence for
service on the front of Petersburg. The only thing that
was distinctly gained was in having caused the enemy to

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETEB8BUBG. 485

Strip his lines in front of Bumside to send reinforcements to
the north of the James. This gain of weakly-held lines
south of the Appomattox, which would, under some circum-
stances, have resulted in the capture of Petersburg, proved,
however, of no avail in face of the oft-demonstrated incom-
petency of Bumside. Notwithstanding that all military
teaching lays stress upon the necessity of providing means
of egress for sallies from an entrenched camp, Bumside
neglected to take the most ordinary precautions to that end,
made a poor selection of officers to conduct the assault,
and was in default (down to the smallest details of what he
had been elaborately directed to do, much of which it might
have been supposed that any military man would have done
without any instructions whatever. The mine, after some
delay in its explosion, caused by an imperfect fuse, was
finally sprung. The ridge back of a large crater formed by
the explosion at the point where one of the enemy's works
had been, could, under competent leadership, have been
taken half a dozen times during the interval available for
the assault through the initial paralysis and gradual recov-
ery from disconcertment of the enemy. But the main
storming column was entangled in its own works, two of
its commanders remained sheltered in bomb-proois, and the
main attack being paralyzed, the contemplated attacks by
the supporting corps on the right and left shared its fate.

Amidst the disorganization produced by absence of ade-
quate preparation and supreme and delegated control, the
enemy, slowly recovering from his inertness, began to pour
a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into the space where
the breach had been made in his lines, which he did to
singular advantage, because it had formed a re-entrant in
them ; and driving back the isolated bodies of troops which
had penetrated beyond the crater, resumed possession of
the front which he had occupied. The troops, huddled

486 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

together in the crater, into which many of them had headed
as if drawn by an irresistible lodestone that swerved them
from their course, attempted in squads to regain their own
lines, but were for the greater part taken by the enemy.
The Army of the Potomac suffered the loss in this assault of
over four thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. Thus,
through the ineptness of one man, disaster came upon a
multitude. All had been provided for a success that should
have been certain, but the failure of Bumside to execute his
portion of the plan involved all the rest of it in ruin, the
supporting forces right and left being debarred from their
legitimate functions. If the main torrent would not flow,
but remained partially dammed at its source, it could have
no effect but in heaping up to dangerous reflux. With such
instructions as Bumside had had, with such ample time for
preparation, both sufficient for a tyro, direful £ulure was
the portion of the army in an enterprise which had promised
the happiest results. Individual heroism went for naught.
The devotion of men by groups, in disbanded efforts, is,
under these conditions, in vain. Here a capable man had
been needed to prepare, a capable man to execute. Both
faculties were normally absent in the single man to whom
the task had fallen by the accident of his position in front
of the lines of Petersburg. Grant testified before the Com-
mittee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, that General
Meade's orders could not have been improved upon, and
that if they had been obeyed, Petersburg would have been
captured on this occasion. Bumside was relieved from duty
with the Army of the Potomac.

It was with the object of forcing Grant to release his
pressure on Richmond and Petersburg, that Lee had de-
spatched Early down the Shenandoah Valley to threaten
and, if possible, to capture Washington. It was also to
meet this demonstration, that Grant sent a division of the

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETEBSB UBG. 487

Sixth Corps, which arrived on the 8th of July, just in time
to make, with the troops of General Wallace, a partial stand
in an action on the Monocacy. The other two divisions
of the Sixth Corps were despatched, in the night of the 9th
of July, to Washington itself, and at the same time the
Nineteenth Corps, just arrived by sea from New Orleans,
via Hampton Roads, the troops not yet disembarked, were
forwarded to the same destination. As already mentioned
in another connection, they arrived in time to forestall the
designs of the enemy upon Washington, but the Sixth
Corps, through the exigency of guaranteeing with other
troops the Valley of the Shenandoah from further invasion,
and also the integrity of the Capital, was not for a long
while able to return to the Army of the Potomac.

The next vigorous operation of the Army of the Poto-
mac, inspired in a measure by the situation in the Valley
of the Shenandoah, where the Sixth Corps was detained,
began on the 1 3th of August. It, ais well as the preceding
one, was a duplex movement. The preceding one had
been just north of the James, combined with one opposite
the centre of the Army of the Potomac, south of the
Appomattox. This one was north of the James, and also
beyond the left of the Army of the Potomac, south of the
Appomattox. Just as Lee had, by sending Early to ope-
rate against Washington, sought to lessen the pressure
of Grant on Richmond and Petersburg, so now, Grant in-
stituted vigorous measures to avail himself of the weakness
of the enemy in his front through his having sent reinforce-
ments to Early in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and to
prevent the sending of any more to increase the stress on
Sheridan, who had been put in command of the Sixth and
Nineteenth Corps there, with cavalry, to hold Early finally
in check from his advances on Washington.

Making a feint to send troops away by water, in the night

488 OENERAh OBOROB GORDON MEADB.

of the 13th of August, as if they were destined for Wash
ington. Grant sent them up the James to the same point a
that at which they had previously crossed by pontoons, .
place called Deep Bottom, where they, with cavalry am
artillery moving from Bermuda Hundred, landed near th'
mouth of Bailey's Creek ; a creek running northerly am
crossing three of the main roads to Richmond. The plai
of operations aimed at securing the position at Chaflin'
Bluff, opposite Drewry's, by advancing along the road
leading towards Chaffin's Bluff and Richmond, and turning
the enemy's position at the Bluff. But a combination ol
causes led to the failure of this particular attempt Thi
enemy was in stronger force there than had been expected
and more strongly posted, the difficulties of the groun<
were greater, and at one point the troops did not show thei
wonted spirit. The operation, however, as a whole, was no
a failure, save as not securing some of the results antici
pated. Activity on both sides continued during the i6th
By that time, however, it had become apparent that thi
lines of the enemy were too strong to be broken. On th<
1 8th there was a last outburst of the engagement that ha<
been sporadically going on since the landing of the troops
The Second Corps, under Hancock, a part of the Tenth
now under Bimey, relieved from his command of a divisioi
of the Second, and Gregg's division of cavalry, were thi
troops which had particifjated in the movement. In thi
night of the 20th they were withdrawn.

The movement on the left, which formed the comple
ment to the one just described, began before daylight 01
the 18th by the march of the Fifth Corps, under Warren
accompanied by cavalry, in an attempt to capture and finall;
hold the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which opemtioi
had been postponed by the sending away of the Sixth Corps
followed by the contraction of the left flank of the army

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETEB8B UBG. 489

Warren took position on the railroad, and leaving a division
at the point where he had struck it, he advanced towards
Petersburg. At two o'clock in the afternoon an attack was
made upon his left and repulsed. Lee having learned what
was going forward, despatched heavy reinforcements from his
lines north of the James to the threatened point. Similarly,
during the morning of the 19th, General Meade sent three
divisions of the Ninth Corps to reinforce Warren. In the
afternoon the line of skirmishers which Warren had estab-
lished to connect his right with the left flank of the army
on the Jerusalem Plank Road was broken through, and the
enemy, concealed by the woods, swept down along his
right-rear, and made at the same time an attack on Ayres,
on his left. The partial disaster on his right was, however,
soon repaired by the admirable address of Warren, and the
ground regained, the enemy in his turn suffering from the
confusion into which his troops were thrown by an attack
in the wooded ground. Nevertheless, Warren finding him-
self too much enveloped in woods to feel sure of not being
attacked again to disadvantage in a place with which the
enemy was more familiar than he, withdrew, on the 20th,
over a mile, to more open ground, where he established his
line of battle and entrenched. Lee availed himself of this
cessation of hostilities to reinforce his lines still more
strongly, and on the morning of the 21st Warren was
attacked in his chosen position, but repulsed the enemy at
every point. This contest finally ended Lee's endeavor to
resist the capture of the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad
on the line«of extension of the left flank of the Army of the
Potomac, an extension by a distance of three miles thus
secured for it by the advance of Warren.

The holding of a single point on the railroad below Pe-
tersburg not being, however, sufficient to prevent the enemy
from still utilizing tlie road as a line of supply from the

490

GEyERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADE.

south, seeing that he could supplement it as far as it re-
mained in his possession by the ordinary highways to the
west of it, its destruction as far as Rowanty Creek was de-
termined upon. Below that the enemy could, it is true,
still employ it up to Stony Creek Depot, in conjunction with
the common country roads, but only at the expense of wag-
goning supplies for about thirty miles to Petersburg. Ac-
cordingly, on the 22d of August, MJles's division, of the
Second Corps, and Gregg's division of cavalry were sent to
destroy the railroad to Rowanty Creek from Warren's posi-
tion at the Globe Tavern, on the line of the railroad, a little
over three miles from Petersbui^. On the 24th Gibbon's
division of the same corps marched to Rcams's Station,
Mott's division of the corps being left in the entrenchments
before Petersburg until it was sent to reinforce Hancock.
By the afternoon of the 24th the track had been destroyed
to a point three miles south of the Station, leaving still be-
tween five and six miles of it to be destroyed. Here the
two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry took position
in and outside of the temporary works which had been
constructed by the troops which had in June marched to
the relief of the cavalry of Wilson when he was in such
straits. These ill-constructed entrenchments covered a sec-
tion of the railroad on its west side with a long parallel
face, beyond which both of the lines of entrenchments con-
nected with that front ran east for some distance beyond it,
open in that direction. With the railroad running north
and south, in alternate cut and embankment, higher in the
latter than the parallel line of entrenchments on its west side,
with the two easterly returns parallel to each other, and
onlyabout seven hundred yards apart, and liable to enfilading
and reverse fire, the enemy could not have devised defences
better suited to the purpose of having his opponents at dis-
advantage. If there ever were a case coming well within

THE A UTUMNAL 8IEQE OF PETEB8B UBG. 49 1

the device of Lieutenant John Derby (John Phcenix, by
nom de plutne) of the erstwhile Corps of Topographical En-
gineers, by which the enemy was to be allowed, through a
peculiar plan of fortifications, to capture them, and in so
doing become the sure prize of the ousted garrison, con-
verted into besiegers, this was the one. Of all the adverse
conditions on this ground, now so well known, General
Meade was not aware. He doubtless thought that, with
the eight thousand infantry of so stanch a corps as the
Second, and the two thousand cavalry which Hancock had
with him, he could easily baffle any force which Lee could
afford to send against him to prevent the destruction of the
railroad.

Early on the 25th a reconnoissance revealed that the
enemy in some strength was present, but in what strength
was not known, and the work of railroad destruction was
resumed. This had not proceeded long when the enemy's
force began to develop towards the south, and his resist-
ance to further progress finally to assume so formidable an
aspect as to cause the recall of the advanced troops and
concentration at Reams's Station. His attacks became more
and more persistent by skirmishers and by lines of battle.
The first very serious one, rapidly followed by another, did
not, however, take place until two o'clock in the afternoon.
They were so brisk as to prove to the besieged that the
contest would grow in intensity as the day went on, and
they were, after an interval, followed by one more deter-
mined. The point selected by the enemy for his repeated
assaults was the northwest angle of the work, formed by
the north and south entrenchments parallel with the rail-
road and the northern one of the two east and west returns.
Just after five o'clock came a furious assault, opening with ar-
tillery, whose fire, direct, enfilading, and reverse, searched the
interior of the work. A heavy infantry column of the enemy

49^ GENERAL QEOBGE GORDON MEADK

came forward with impetuosity, and launched itself upon
the point where the attacks had previously been concen-
trated. Unhappily, even the redoubtable Second Corps had
suffered from the stress to which the whole army had been
put for several months in its herculean labors of march and
contest night and day. With many of its bravest and best
officers and men killed or disabled, the remainder fagged
out with incessant toil and danger, its ranks filled up with
inexperienced recruits, it had become for a while no longer
the steadfast phalanx that had fronted the enemy on many
a stricken field. Amidst many standing nobly to their
arms for a last shot as the enemy surged into the work, the
organization as a whole broke to flinders, some portions,
heavily recruited with new soldiers, halting dazed by the
suddenness of the event that had befallen them, only to be
made prisoners before they had recovered from their stupor.
But all was not over yet, and it remained for the enemy in
his turn to be beaten back. The ever-ready Miles planted
a line formed of some of the veteran Sixty-first New York
Regiment, and what happened then is what has often hap-
pened since time immemorial when there has been a quick
mind to conceive and a daring spirit to execute in war. He
swept backward the enemy, who had lost the elan of attack,
and recaptured a battery. Joined by Hancock in person,
on the outside of the northern line of entrenchments, and
gathering strength from squads of men rallying as reinforce-
ments, they pushed forward on the flank of the enemy.
While this was going on beyond the north return of the en-
trenchments, the enemy's infantry and dismounted cavalry-
men were charging through the woods on the left return of
the entrenchments, where was still in position, but ineffect-
ively, the remains of Gibbon's division. Despite every ex-
ertion of their officers, the troops there did not respond to
the demand of the emergency, and had it not been for the

THE AUTUMNAL SIEQE OF PETEBSBUBQ. 493

dismounted cavalrymen of Gregg's division, who were sta-
tioned in prolongation of the southern return of the en-
trenchmentSy and enfiladed with their fire the lines of the
enemy advancing there, it might have been all over with
the broken command of Hancock. A fragmentary line of
infantry, with a little artillery, maintained itself athwart the
work, parallel to the railroad and extending beyond the
northern return. Upon this slender line rested the hope
of a final stand for the command. The best that it could
expect was to hold the enemy in check until night fell and
Willcox's division, of the Ninth Corps, and Mott's divis-
ion, of the Second, marching by the Jerusalem Plank
Road, should arrive and enable it safely to beat a retreat
or to renew the contest. Reinforcements came, but too
late for either a renewal of the contest or for covering re-
treat. The troops on both sides were withdrawn at night
from the field, en route for their different destinations, as
opposing each other in the lines about Petersburg. It
should be added that, in sending reinforcements from War-
ren's corps to Hancock by the Jerusalem Plank Road, a
longer distance than that by the Halifax Road, which runs
here just west of the railroad, and therefore direct from the
place which was Warren's position. General Meade was
actuated by the same consideration expressed in one of
Hancock's despatches to him, that the enemy might, on
this direct road, interpose between the reinforcements sent
to him by that route and the position of Warren on the
railroad at the Globe Tavern. Hancock himself, as his
despatches prove, did not at first realize to the full the
danger of his situation. Humphreys says that the con-
dition of Hancock's command, through the fact of the
presence in it of raw recruits lately received was not known,
or else reinforcements would have been sent to him early in
the morning. General Meade, knowing how keenly Han-

494 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

cock must feel this experience, the first in which the Second
Corps had been worsted in battle, losing both men and ma-
terial, wrote him a most sympathetic persoAal letter, which
is fortunately on official record.

The next operation of magnitude was a demonstration
south of the Appomattox and a real attack north of the
James, although, as it turned out, the demonstration proved
quite fruitful. The last extensive movements had taken
place near the end of August The season was now rap-
idly approaching when the weather would prevent the pos-
sibility of rapid movements on the soil of Virginia, softened
into pasty mud by autumnal and winter rains. It was,
therefore, imperative that the Army of the Potomac should
make quickly supreme efforts towards that end which it was
seeking in the siege, or else active field-operations of mag-
nitude would go over until the next spring. In the night
of the 28th of September General E. O. C. Ord, now com-
manding the Eighteenth Corps, and General Bimey, now
commanding the Tenth, both of the Army of the James,
crossed the James River, Ord at Varina, two miles above
Deep Bottom, Bimey at Deep Bottom, followed by the cav-
alry of General Kautz, of the Army of the James. Ord
marched along the Varina Road, parallel with the first
stretch of the river above where he landed, and Bimey, on
his right, along the New Market and Central Roads, the
cavalry on the latter. Early in the moming of the 29th
Ord came in front of Fort Harrison and its entrench-
ments, about a mile and a quarter from the enemy's posi-
tion on Chaffin's Bluff. Less than a mile away to the
north of Fort Harrison lay Fort Gilmer. Double lines of
entrenchments swept towards the James on the enemy's
right and towards the Chickahominy on his left Without
loss of time Ord pushed forward towards Fort Harrison and
captured the work and two smaller ones, despite its being

THE A UTUMNAL 8IEQE OF PETEB8BUEQ. 495

suddenly reinforced, and occupied the entrenchments for
some distance right and left of it, failing only in securing a
terminal work of the line on the river bluff, consisting of a
redan protected by the fire of the enemy's gunboats on the
James and that of a battery in the rear, which would have
made it untenable even if the work were occupied. Ord
was at this moment so severely wounded that the command
of his corps temporarily devolved on General Charles A.
Heckman, who, advancing at that time on Fort Gilmer,
was repulsed with heavy loss. While this was taking place
on the left, Bimey, advancing on the New Market and
Central Roads, in a somewhat parallel line, off on the right,
had captured the enemy's outer line of entrenchments.
General Grant now arrived on the ground and ordered a
simultaneous advance. Connection having been established
between the two infismtry corps, and between Bimey's corps
and the cavalry, on his right, a spirited but ineffective as-
sault was made about three o'clock on Fort Gilmer and
supporting works by a division of white and a brigade
of colored troops. The colored troops, as to whose fitness
for soldiers great doubts were widely expressed in those
days, extorted admiration from all quarters by the intre-
pidity with which they mounted to <he assault of Fort Gil-
mer. The night, and part of the next day, the 30th, were
spent in securing the foothold gained at Fort Harrison, by
entrenching in the rear of the Federal command. General
Weitzel replaced General Ord in command of the Eight-
eenth Corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon of that day
the enemy vigorously took the offensive, trying to regain
possession of Fort Harrison. Thrice the assault was made
by ten brigades with the greatest determination, but each
time it was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy by the
garrison of the fort and the outlying Federal troops.

Simultaneously with this real and serious attack on the

4g6 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADK

north side of the James had been proceedii^ the demon-
stration south of the Appomattox. Grant had ordered that
an attack on the extreme left should be made. General
Warren, conmianding the Fifth Corps, and General Parke,
now commanding the Ninth, took two divisions of their re-
spective corps for the execution of the operation contem-
plated. First parading before the enemy an intention to
march to the left, so as to prevent him from heavily rein-
forcing north of the James, they were, if opportunity oftered,
really to try to extend to the left and hold the extreme posi-
tion g^ned, or to assault Petersbui^ itself. Waiting, accord-
ing to orders, through the 29th, so as to aUow the enemy to
send away as many troops as he dared to withdraw towards
his left, Warren and Parke marched on the morning of the
30th to their left, Meade in person directing this operation,
while Grant in person was directing the one north of the
James.

Between the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which
runs virtually north and south just below Petersbui^, and
the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad (called also the
South Side Railroad), which runs in a general direction
south of west from Petersburg, that is to say, in the angle
so formed, converge from the southwest towards Peters-
burg several important roads, which, as such, will be men-
tioned here. Counting from the east, there is the Halifax
Road, running here close to the west side of the Petersbui^
and Weldon Railroad ; the Vaughan Road, converging upon
that, by entering it about a mile north of the Globe Tavern ;
the Squirrel Level Road, running with various bends di-
rectly towards the west side of Petersburg ; the Boydton
Plank Road, similarly running with various bends to the
west side of Petersburg ; the Cox Road, winding to and fro
over the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad. To intro-
duce here the mention of more would but obscure instead

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETEBSBUBQ. 497

of rendering the description clearer. The Confederate en-
trenchments, well in advance of the southwest front of
Petersburg, swept around in a slightly concave line from a
third of a mile to a mile in front of the Boydton Plank
Road, and rested their right on Hatcher's Run, a creek
trending northwest, which passes the Boydton Plank Road
at Burgess's Mill. There was also near Petersburg a par-
tial line of entrenchments, somewhat parallel with the main
ones, and connected with them, lying along the Squirrel
Level Road.

The point of attack in this movement was the junction,
off on Warren's left, at the Globe Tavern, of the Squirrel
Level Road and a road called the Poplar Springs Church
Road, at Peebles* Farm. The cavalry, under Gregg, was
to move on the left of the two corps. If Warren and Parke
should succeed in capturing the entrenchments in the
locality described, they were to advance towards the Peters-
burg and Lynchburg Railroad, passing the Boydton Plank
Road. General Warren marched directly for the junction
of the roads at Peebles' Farm, and Ayres on the right and
Griffin on the left stormed the redoubt there and the ec-
centric line of entrenchments described, Parke coming up
on the left and supporting the movement. Parke now
advanced his divisions, Potter on the right, Willcox on the
left, towards the enemy's main entrenchments intervening
between him and the Boydton Plank Road. Meanwhile
the enemy advanced a line of battle a third of a mile in
front of his main line of entrenchments, and when the
two divisions of Parke, coming in sight of it, still con-
tinued to advance, they were attacked and thrown back in
some confusion, until Griffin's division, which Parke had
expected would support his right, coming up into line, the
enemy was brought to a stand. The final result was that
Parke held the ground, and on the following day, the ist

49^ GENERAL OEOBGE QOEDON MEADK

of October, Meade sent as reinforcements Mott's division,
of the Second Corps, which, arriving in the afternoon, took
pasition on the left of Parke. Upon this Parke advanced,
and managed after a brisk engagement to establish himself
about a mile from the enemy's main line of entrenchments,
from which point the entrenchments of the Army of the
Potomac were made continuous with those near the Globe
Tavern on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. The
Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad had not been reached,
it is seen, nor had even the intervening main line of the
enemy's entrenchments been broken, but, nevertheless, a
distinct gain had been made in extension of the Federal en-
trenchments towards the west. This last, however, was des-
tined to be the ultimate one in precisely that direction until
the very end, for Lee was able for months thereafter to hold
off the Army of the Potomac from further progress towards
the west ; its line of entrenchments stretching, from the
point last secured, in a southwest, instead of in a west direc-
tion. Lee must needs defend to the last extremity the
Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, for the capture of
that would mean the fall of Richmond and Petersburg.
In the battle near Peebles' Farm General Meade made one
of the narrowest of the many hairbreadth escapes of his life.
While conversing with a group of officers, the enemy got
the range of the party, and sent a shell at it, so well directed
that it passed through their midst, grazing the leg of one
of General Meade's topboots, and passing beyond, buried
itself in the ground without bursting.

A few days later, on the 7th of October, there was a fight
north of the James. Kautz, of whom mention was previ-
ously made as having command of the cavalry there in
connection with the attacks on Forts Harrison and Gilmer,
was holding on the right of the infantry detached from the
Army of the James to that side of the river. Early on that

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETEESB UBO. 499

morning he was attacked on his centre and right by a heavy
infantry force and some cavalry, and was obliged to beat a
rapid retreat with the loss of some of his artillery. He
managed, however, to extricate himself by marching across
the country from the Central Road, where he had been
posted, to the New Market Road, and coming in behind
the Tenth Corps, which, moving simultaneously to his
relief, had a brush on its right with the enemy. Active
operations in this locality ceased on the 1 3th of October
with a reconnoissance in force ordered by Butler, when an
unsuccessful assault by Colonel Pond's brigade of Ames's
division, of the Tenth Corps, was made on the enemy's
entrenchments.

With an attempt to capture the Petersburg and Lynch-
burg Railroad the campaign closed for the autumn. Gen-
eral Humphreys, the highest authority as to these move-
ments, says that, at the time, the best information obtainable
indicated that, the Confederate entrenchments rested their
right on Hatcher's Run, about a mile and a quarter in ad-
vance of the place where the Boydton Plank Road crosses
the Run near Burgess's Mill. He says that at Burgess's
Mill there were infantry parapets and emplacements for
artillery, but no line of entrenchments nor any further up
the Run. Here I cannot do better than quote, as follows,
from Humphreys himself as to the plan of the pending
movement. He says :

"The general plan of the contemplated movement was to leave suf-
ficient force in the redoubts [that is, on the immediate front of Peters-
burg] to hold them, and with from thirty thousand to thirty-five thous-
and effective force of infantry, a due proportion of artillery, and Gregg*s
division of cavalry, about three thousand strong, to move to our left.
Hancock, with Gregg on his left, to cross Hatcher's Run by the
Vaughan Road [two miles below where the enemy's entrenchments
abutted on the run], move to the Boydton Plank Road past Dabney*s
Mill, thence by the White Oak Road to its intersection with the CLu-

500 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

borne Road, recross Hatcher's Run near there (two miles above Bur-
gess's Mill), and then march to the South Side Railroad [the Peters-
burg and Lynchburg Railroad], striking it at a point about three miles
east of Sutherland Station [coming from the Globe Tavern, and there-
abouts, this force would thus make a circuit of a semi-circumference,
and lodgment to the rear of the enemy's entrenchments]. General
Parke, with the Ninth Corps, was first to endeavor to surprise the in-
complete entrenchments near Hatcher's Run at daylight (it was
thought they were thinly held), but fiaiiling in that, to remain con-
fronting them while the Second and Fifth Corps moved to turn their
right.

" General Warren, with the Fifth Corps, was to move to the vicinity
of Armstrong's Mill [on Hatcher's Run, about a mile below the right
of the enemy's entrenchments abutting on the run], support General
Parke, and, if his attack was successful, to follow it up, moving on the
left of the Ninth Corps. If General Parke did not break the enemy's
line, General Warren was to cross Hatcher's Run, and endeavor to
turn the enemy's right by recrossing the run above the Boydton plank-
road bridge [Burgess's mill bridge], keeping on the right of Hancock
and, being over the stream, to open the Burgess's mill bridge.**

The three corps named, and Gregg's division of cavalry,
assigned to the work, moved before daylight of the 27th
of October. The Fifth and Ninth Corps, under Warren
and Parke, advanced, as prearranged, upon. the enemy's
entrenchments, while the Second Corps, under Hancock,
was making its way off to the left to cross Hatcher's Run
and afterwards move towards the north. Here General
Humphreys may properly be called on to speak again,
especially as he was on the ground with the advance. He
remarks that,

" Being on the ground, and satisfied that an assault here [on the
entrenchments where they abutted on the run] should not be made,
and having learnt from a despatch from General Hancock that he had
crossed Hatcher's Run, and consequently that the Dabney mill road
was clear for General Warren's troops to follow, and considering it
important that a portion, at least, of his command should cross, and
conununicate with Hancock as soon as possible, I directed him at nine
o'clock to cross some of them at once at Armstrong's mill, and com-

THE A XJTUMNAL SIEQE OF PETEBSBUBQ. $01

municate with General Hancock. I then rode to meet General
Meade and General Grant, who were coming out, and inform them
of the condition of afEairs, and of the directions I had given General
Warren.

" After some consultation when General Grant and General Meade
got upon the ground, General Warren was directed to send a division
across Hatcher's Run, place its right flank on the stream, move up it
supporting Hancock (the Dabney mill road was but a mile from the
run), and upon arriving opposite the right of the enemy's entrench-
ments, which Griffin was fronting, to attack it in flank, and endeavor
to drive the enemy from the line, and open the way for the rest of the
Fifth Corps and for the Ninth Corps. Crawford's division was
assigned to this duty, as it was nearest at hand. Griffin, with Ayres
supporting, was left on the north side of the run, Ayres sending his
Maryland brigade to join Crawford. General Parke's corps set about
entrenching in their front and back to our works."

The military situation was then this. On the north side
of Hatcher's Run, which trends here northwest, and in
front of the enemy's entrenchments threatened on the right,
and resting nearly at right-angles to the Run, the Fifth and
Ninth Corps had been brought to a stand, because it was
deemed that the enemy was too strong there to be assaulted.
The Second Corps, after overcoming at daylight some resist-
ance in crossing the Run at the Vaughan Road crossing, had
pursued a road (the Dabney Mill Road) somewhat parallel
to and up the Run, and about a mile distant from it, and
there striking the Boydton Plank Road, running northeast,
had reached the Run again. Consequently the Second
Corps, on the one hand, and the Fifth and Ninth Corps, on
the other, were in rear and front of the enemy's entrench-
ments, but with the stream between them.

The troops of Crawford, readily passing south over
Hatcher's Run from their position in front of the enemy's
entrenchments, now rested their right flank upon the
Run and ascended it towards the Second Corps on the
Boydton Plank Road near Burgess's Mill. Thus they

502 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

were in a position to comb out thoroughly the whole
wooded area in advance of them up to that road. But one
side proposes, and the other side, sometimes aided by un-
foreseen material circumstances, has something to do with
disposing. The ground in front of Crawford was densely
wooded, and crossed in places by affluents of Hatcher's
Run. It was between twelve and one o'clock when Craw-
ford was marching two of his brigades with their right on
the Run, and one brigade in reserve, towards Burgess's
Mill. A branch of the Run, mistaken for the main stream,
caused the troops to swerve for a while from their true
course, and additionally, the perennial difficulty of keeping
troops advancing through the woods in true alig^nment was
encountered. Added to these difficulties were those created
by the enemy in slashings of trees, inundations from the
damming of the main stream, and opposition by skirmishers.
On account of the difficulties of the ground Crawford did
not reach the point opposite the enemy's entrenchments
on the other side of the Run until four o'clock in the after-
noon. There was still a mile of pathless forest ahead of
him before he could reach the Boydton Plank Road where
it crosses the stream at Burgess's Mill, where Hancock was.
The Second Corps, with the cavalry, had reached the Boyd-
ton Road crossing of the Run about one o'clock. The
Corps occupied the ground south of Burgess's Mill, and
engaged with artillery the enemy posted on its front and
left, on an east and west road called the White Oak Road.
Egan's division drove some scattered troops of the enemy
across the Run at Burgess's Mill, beyond which the
enemy was in force. Mott's division advanced towards
the White Oak Road. At this point of time Hancock
leceived orders from General Meade to pause in his ad-
vance. Hancock then posted De Trobriand's brigade
fronting towards the Claiborne Road, a north and south

THE A UTUMNAL SIEGE OF PETERSBURO. 503

road which crosses the Run two miles above the Burgess
Mill crossing. Egan's division was posted across the
Boydton Plank Road where it is entered by the White
Oak Road, two of his brigades on the right of the road,
and one on the left ; and when Major Henry H. Bingham,
of Hancock's staff, reported Crawford as being only three-
quarters of a mile off on the right, Hancock sought to con-
nect with him by extending his right by two regiments.
Upon hearing the report of Major Bingham, Generals Grant
and Meade, who had come up, left directions with Hancock
merely to hold his ground. It had become evident that
the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, still six miles
away at the nearest point, could not be reached that day,
for at that time of year the days were short. Hancock had
therefore been ordered to maintain his ground for the night,
and to retire on the following morning by the route by
which he had advanced. But as to the details of his retire-
ment the enemy was to have something to say. Hancock,
left to his own devices to make himself as secure as pos-
sible, deemed it best to capture and hold the ridge just
beyond the Run, at Burgess's Mill. His line faced north-
west on the left, and north on the centre, whence it trended
off towards the east. De Trobriand's brigade was on the
left of the Boydton Plank Road, with Kerwin's brigade of
dismounted cavalry on his left, both &cing towards the
bridge at the Claiborne Road crossing of the Run. On the
right of the Boydton Plank Road, on a ridge, was Metcalfs
section of a battery, supported by Pierce's brigade, facing
towards the Run. Egan, supported by McAllister's brigade,
was ordered to capture the bridge at Burgess's Mill and
the ridge beyond the Run. Crawford was not up nor likely
to be. At four o'clock Egan's division was storming the
bridge at Burgess's Mill.

The danger that had been impending for some time.

504

GENERAL OEOBOE GORDON MEADE.

through the fact that there had been no connection y
made by Crawford with the position of Hancock, now su
denly took form. Mahone's Confederate division havi
crossed the Run between Hancock and Crawford, burst o
of the woods on the rear of Metcalf 's section of artillery ai
its supporting brigade, which had furnished the two rej
ments that had been drawn towards the right. The batte
had bareiy time to discharge its pieces three or four tim
when it was overrun, while the brigade, essaying to chanj
front to the rear, was driven back to the Boydton Plai
Road before it could reform. But this success, as so ft
quently happens in war, was short-lived, and served b
more completely to bring about the discomfiture of tl
enemy. Had Egan been so far advanced as to have alreac
pushed his troops beyond the bridge, and to have reached \}
ridge beyond it, instead of being, as he was, only in the fi
tide of success in the enterprise, he would not have bei
in position to retrieve the day ; but being just where he w
at the bridge, and realizing from the direction of the sigh
and sounds of battle, exactly what had happened, he di
engaged himself at once, before orders on the way fro
Hancock reached him. and reversing his course, precip
tated his troops on the naked flank of Mahone's divisio
while some of the troops on the left of the Boydton Plat
Road simultaneously bore down upon it, driving it in ro
from the field. While this attack and repulse were occu
ring, the enemy's cavalry, under Hampton, had been pres
ing Hancock's left and rear, a move successfully met t
the cavalry of Gregg.

The next day, the 28th, the troops withdrew witho
molestation. General Humphreys justly observes that tl
mistake in the operations was in not ordering the who
Fifth Corps, as originally contemplated in the plan, to folia
the Second at once along the Dabney Mill Road, and thi

THE A UTUMNAL SIEQE OF PETER8BURQ. 505

having two-thirds, instead of one-third, of the strength of
the force at the point which would necessarily be that of
greatest opposition.

During the advance there had been a partial assault by
Miles, of the Second Corps, on the lines at Petersburg, cap-
turing a redoubt and some prisoners. As his division be-
longed to the Second Corps, it is but just to mention the
incident here as relating to a moment when the Second
Corps chiefly was engaged.

It was deemed best for the Second Corps to retire, be-
cause, through expenditure, its stock of ammunition was
dangerously low, and because there were no means of im-
mediately replenishing it. It therefore withdrew from its
position on the 28th of October, and thus ended for a time
open-field campaigning, marching and countermarching to
turn the enemy's flanks. Now came perforce, not by any
means a season of repose, but one free of extensive march-
ing from place to place.

On the 26th of November Hancock bade farewell to
the Second Corps, going North on the special mission of
recruiting for service in the spring a corps of veterans. He
was succeeded by General Humphreys, well worthy as a
soldier of being the successor to such a one as Hancock,
and intellectually his superior.

506 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADK

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE winter's siege OF PETERSBURG.

The lines held by the Confederates at the beginning of
the winter of 1 864-5 reached from their right, resting on
the north side of Hatcher's Run, about a mile and a half
above the Vaughan Road crossing of the Run, and about a
mile below Burgess's Mill, on the Boydton Plank Road
crossing of the Run, to and around the south of Petersburg,
and then north, in front of Bermuda Hundred (crossing
the Appomattox and the James), and were thence pro-
longed until their left rested on White Oak Swamp. That
long, eccentric curve, varying constantly in direction, north-
east, east, and north, had also an oflTset covering the west
• of Petersburg. The general line, in its final swing towards
the north, fulfilled the purpose of covering the town on the
east, and in fact was there at its strongest. The fortified line,
divergent from that of the entrenchments towards the west,
covered the west of the town. The lines of the Army of
the Potomac during the winter were shorter than those of
the Confederates, for the attempt at outflanking the enemy
having ceased for a while, there was no object in extending
them towards either right or left. Even the Confederates,
who, as being on the defensive, had to keep sedulous
guard on their flanks, had merely troops in observation on
the extreme ends of their entrenchments. They, however,
during the winter, made, in anticipation of the renewal of
active movements, very important additions to the works
on their right. Whereas, as we have now seen, their en-
trenchments originally reached on the right only to Hatch-
er's Run, they were finally extended across and up the

THE WINTERS 8IEQE OF PETEBSBUBG. $0/

Run. Turning from the point where they had stopped on
the north side of Hatcher's Run, about a mile below Bur-
gess's Mill, they were made to pass west, by detached works
and entrenchments, along the south side of the Run, so as
to cover a portion of the east-and-west White Oak Road to
the north-and-south Claiborne Road, and passing beyond
the latter, towards the north, to cover it additionally, until,
by their circuit, they rested again on Hatcher's Run.

The organization of the forces operating against Rich-
mond and Petersburg underwent in December various
changes, of which only the principal ones can be noted
here. General Butler made his unauthorized attack on
Fort Fisher in North Carolina, the consequence of which to
him personally was that he was relieved from duty with the
Army of the James. He had been instructed by Grant to
send General Terry to capture Fort Fisher, but had sup-
pressed knowledge of that part of the order, and had gone
personally in command to the scene of operations, making
there an exhibition of incompetency of which there could
be no doubt. General Terry was, in January, despatched to
the place, and captured the fort there which had controlled
the entrance to Cape Fear River in the interests of the Con-
federacy. Two of the corps of the Army of the James with
which the reader has become acquainted in the course of
this memoir, the Tenth and the Eighteenth, were dis-
banded, and out of them, with an addition drawn from the
Ninth Corps, of the Army of the Potomac, two new corps,
the Twenty-fourth, of white, and the Twenty-fifth, of col-
ored troops, were formed. During the first half of De-
cember the Sixth Corps gradually returned by detachments
from the Shenandoah Valley, which had been so devastated
by orders of Grant to Sheridan, that it no longer afforded a
convenient granary for the enterprises of die eflemy in ad-
vancing towards Washington.

So8 GENERAL QSORQS GORDON MEADK

The Petersburg and Weldon Railroad was destroyed
towards the south for forty miles. This virtually neutralized
it as a source of supply for the Confederate army. But as
it was now known that the Confederates began to be in
g^eat straits for provisions, this perhaps had its share in
originating the report that they hauled rations by wag-
goning from Meherrin River, the point to which the rail-
road had been destroyed, all the way to Petersburg, and
this in turn led to the first engagement that took place
after active operations in the autumn. The Boydton
Plank Road, previously mentioned as running from the
southwest towards Petersburg, starts for that place from
Dinwiddie Court House, which is about nine miles south
of west from Reams's Station on the Petersburg and Wel-
don Railroad. Gregg, of the cavalry, pushed out on the
road, on the 5th of February, 1865, from Reams's Station,
under orders to patrol the road and intercept any trains of
supplies that he might find on it. The Fifth Corps, under
Warren, took position midway between Hatcher's Run and
Dinwiddie Court House. The Second Corps, under Humph-
reys, was ordered to take position at the Vaughan Road
crossing of Hatcher's Run, and the Armstrong Mill cross-
ing, about a mile above, to the right of Warren, and in
connection, so as to support him. Humphreys was there-
fore east of the entrenchments of the enemy where they
rested their right on the stream, and at Armstrong's Mill,
where he had posted a division north of Hatcher's Run,
within a thousand yards of the new ones.

The enemy's movements at the latter place being suspi-
cious, Humphreys reinforced it, and received an additional
division from General Meade. Humphreys' prescience had
not been at fault, the enemy attacked there and was repulsed.
Two more divisions were sent by General Meade during the
night, but the enemy had finally desisted from his attack.

THE WINTERS SIEQE OF PETEBSBUBO. 509

Gregg, with the cavalry, towards Dinwiddie Court House,
ascertained that the Boydton Plank Road was not nearly so
much used by the enemy for waggoning as had been re-
ported. In the afternoon of the following day, the 6th, War-
ren, in making reconnoissances in force along the Vaughan
and Dabney Mill Roads (the latter at right-angles to the
Vaughan), with Gregg towards the south, had a sharp
engagement, in which he at first pressed back the force
opposing him, when the enemy, heavily reinforced, in turn
drove him back, but was finally checked.

In anticipation of the time when, with the spring, more
active campaigning would take place, when it would be
necessary to begin movements from the extreme left of the
Army of the Potomac, its entrenchments were extended
until the left rested at the Vaughan Road crossing of
Hatcher*s Run, opposite the point where the enemy's had
formerly terminated. Thus, in these operations, the winter
wore away, the major part of the fighting taking place in
the immediate vicinity of the lines about Petersburg, where
they were only a short distance from those of the enemy,
in one place only about a hundred and fifty yards.

On the 26th of March General Sheridan with his cavalry
rejoined the Army of the Potomac. The reader will doubt-
less remember that, in August, General Sheridan had been
placed by Grant in command of the Army of the Shenan-
doah, to resist, and if possible to destroy Early's constantly
invading army. During his absence from the Army of the
Potomac, the character of the operations had not required a
large body of cavalry. Sheridan's connection with the later
history of the Army of the Potomac was so close, and the
bearing which his operations, although away from it, had
upon it was so intimate, that it is necessary here to devote a
few lines to the significance to that army of his absence in the
Valley of the Shenandoah. In response to a very marked.

5 10 GENERAL QEORQE OORDON MEADE

although mildly expressed, remonstrance from Mr. Lincoln
to General Grant, regarding the confusion incidental to
his attempting from the position at City Point to control
events in the Shenandoah Valley, when his orders had to
filter through the official changes of Halleck, Grant pre-
cipitately left the army for the scene of disorder needing
his presence. The remonstrance to which allusion is here
made is embodied in the following telegram from Mr. Lin-
coln :

OPFXCS U. 8. MXLITABT TSLBGKAPH,
WaB DKPABTimfT,

Cypher, 6 r jc. Washhioton, D. C, Angnit S, 1864.

Lt.-General Grant,

CrrY Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, " I want Sheridan put
in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put him-
self south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the
enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right,
as to how our forces should move. But please look over the de-
spatches you may have received from here, even since you made that
order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of
any one here, of " putting our army south of the enemy," or of " fol-
lowing him to the death," in any direction. I repeat to you it will
neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and
hour, and force it. A. Lincoln.

The occasion was that shortly succeeding Hunter's having
been obliged to retreat from Lynchburg by the Kanawha
Valley, when Early had advanced, retired, and again ad-
vanced across the Potomac. Chambersburg, in Pennsyl-
vania, had been fired on the 30th of July, and Hunter's
troops, after a mountainous circuit, had just appeared on
the Monocacy, and headship of a very different kind from
Halleck's was imperatively needed. Grant acted at once
with the promptness which always characterized him when
nothing personal stood in the way, and here something
personal beckoned him on. Here three things conspired

THE WINTERS 8IEQE OF PETEB8BUBG. $ ' '

to make him bend his energies to the accomplishment of a
single purpose ; his own future quietude in the place of
his predilection with the Army of the Potomac ; the oppor-
tunity, long-desired, which he afterwards characterized by
the expression that he had given Sheridan, as he also gave
Sherman, an opportunity to acquire a separate military
renown ; and lastly, the final holding of the Valley, the pre-
vious military administration of which had begun seriously
to reflect upon his own management. If one imperfectly
acquainted with these events be inclined to think that Gen-
eral Grant's own account of his action here indicates that
he at first contemplated Hunter's remaining in command
of the Army of the Shenandoah, the answer is, that his
account of it obviously intends to make it so appear, but as
obviously does not succeed in convincing any careful reader
that the case exhibits anything but questionable finesse for
the purpose sought and accomplished. The easiest of all
ways for authority to secure a desired resignation is through
exhibited indifference to or tacit approval of its being ten-
dered. One word from Grant, when he suggested to Hun-
ter his relinquishing field-operations in the Shenandoah
Valley, and when Hunter replied deprecatingly with refer-
ence to representing even the headquarters of the Depart-
ment, on account of Halleck's want of confidence in him,
would, from the man who himself had no confidence in
Halleck, have sufficed ; the one word, that Hunter should
have his support, the support which he gave Sheridan and
which made him independent of any one but Grant himself.
But, to tell Hunter, as Grant says he told him, with his
orders for the field in hand, immediately on entering upon
the subject, that he had better make his headquarters in
Baltimore or elsewhere, and relinquish the command in the
field to Sheridan, was as clear a case of confessing to the
wish to shelve a subordinate as any that can possibly be

5 1 2 GENERAL QEOROE OORDON MEADE.

cited. As a matter of fact Hunter's displacement, as will
now appear, had been resolved upon and settled some dzys
previously, and General Grant's aim now was simply to
make it appear that Hunter receded of his own free, unin-
fluenced, will.

Sheridan's account, in his memoirs, of his taking com-
mand of the Army of the Shenandoah diflers from Grant's
account in his memoirs. In Grant's account the displace-
ment of Hunter to that end is presented as if it had been a
happy afterthought of his at the instant on the ground. In
Sheridan's account, on the contrary, it appears as a precon-
certed arrangement between Grant and himself* To begin
at the beginning, the idea of Sheridan's appointment, as

* Grant says, in his memoirs : — " I then [on August 5th, at Monoc-
acy] wrote out General Hunter's instructions. I told him [orally of
course, there is no such thing in the instructions] that Sheridan was
in Washington, and still another division was on its way ; and sug-
gested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any
point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,
and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general
replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He
said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for
the position he was in, that he thought somebody else ought to be
there** .... [then follows a compliment to Hunter's patriotism, as
shown by his self-abnegation]. Resuming, Grant adds : — ** I told
him, ' very well, then,* and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him
there," .... etc. Sheridan, speaking in his memoirs of the same
occurrence, says : — '* On the 31st of July General Grant selected me
as this commander [commander of the Army of the Shenandoah],
and in obedience to his telegraphic summons, I repaired to his head-
quarters at City Point. In the interview that followed, he detailed to
me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, telling me that I was
to command in the field the troops that were to operate against Elarly,
but that General Hunter, who was at the head of the geographical
department, would be continued in his position, for the reason that the
Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or consolidate the dif-
ferent districts,** .... etc

THE WINTERS SIEGE OF PETEBSB UBQ. 5 1 3

Mr. Lincoln's telegram just quoted shows, originated with
General Grant, not with the War Department or with Mr.
Lincoln. Sheridan says that he was summoned to City
Point on the 31st of July, went there, and it was then and
there understood with General Grant that he wished him to
have command in the field of the Army of the Shenandoah.
Grant's despatch to the War Department, August ist, fol-
lowed this. Mr. Lincoln's telegram in cipher, August 3d,
followed that. Grant, in his official report, says that, on
the 2d of August, he ordered Sheridan to report in person
to Halleck in Washington. Yet we find Grant, on August
5th, delivering to Hunter instructions clearly implying his
command in the field of the Army of the Shenandoah, and
coincidently placing him in a position well calculated to
force him to deprecate his acceptance of it and even of the
charge of remote headquarters. This happened just before
Sheridan's appointment, which was made on the 7th of
August. Grant, in his memoirs, puts the occurrence as if
among things unexpected, as if he had merely availed him-
self of a suggestion from Hunter in answer to a suggestion
from himself. Sheridan, in his memoirs, puts it still more
widely from the fact, as if Hunter had made the sugges-
tion of his own entirely unprompted motion. " Hunter,"
he says, '' had asked that day [August 6th] to be wholly
relieved."

It had previously been understood from General Grant by
General Meade and General Hancock, that the former was
to have command of the Army of the Shenandoah and the
latter of the Army of the Potomac, and neither ever knew
why there had been a change in the apparent intention. It
was some time in July that General Meade had been in-
formed by General Grant that he was to have command
of the Department of the Shenandoah. In the light of this

review, primarily based upon original documents and co-

5 14 QENEBAL OEOBQB OOMDON MEADR

incidences of dates with events, it is, however, to be plainly
seen that every consideration yielded to placing Sheridan
where he might be able to achieve A "separate military
renown/' General Grant, it must be admitted, had a per-
fect right, and it was strictly his duty as general-in-chief
of all the armies of the United States, to place men as he
thought for the best. The point here indicated is that in
this instance the method was beneath the dignity of a
general-in-chief. As to any change in his intentions with
reference to Generals Meade and Hancock, common cour-
tesy called for explanation. If, however, due courtesy be
not extended, no one can demand it in any relation of life,
its omission being simply a reflection upon the social train-
ing of one who abstains from extending it ; but straightfor-
ward dealing between superior and inferior in rank, as well
as in equal relations, is of far higher moral obligation.

Sheridan's appointment to the command of the recently
created Middle Military Division was dated August 7th, 1 864.
General Grant says that he gave him about thirty thous-
and infantry and eight thousand cavalry. He had soon,
however, fifty-four thousand troops of all arms, and except
during one short period, always largely outnumbered the
enemy. He defeated Early at the battle of the Oj)equon, on
September 14th, 1864, at the battle of Fisher's Hill, on Sep-
tember 22d ; at the battle of Cedar Creek, on October 19th.
In this last battle, about which the most has been popularly
made, many military men were of the opinion at the time,
and still are, that even if Sheridan had not come upon the
field, arriving from Washington by the way of Winchester,
the event would have been essentially the same, Wright
having everything well in hand again at the moment of
Sheridan's advent. Yet the inspiration of the Federal
troops, through the presence of Sheridan, after having been
surprised by an early morning attack, and driven back a

THE WINTERS SIEQE OF PETEBSB URO. $ I $

long distance, and now advancing under his leadership, is
not to be left out of account in the retrieval of the day.
Nor ought it to be left out of account, in summing up
events, that great numbers of the Confederates, convinced
that the rout of the Union forces was final, had remained in
the rear plundering the captured camps. Had this not
taken place, final success for the Union arms would have
been problematical. As it fell out, however, it was a signal
victory for the Union side, in securing which, under most
adverse circumstances, many officers shared. Meade, al-
ways more generous to Sheridan than he to Meade, wrote
Grant : — **To achieve such results, after having met the re-
verse he describes, is one of the most brilliant feats of the
war.*'-

On February 27th, 1865, Sheridan moved up the Valley of
the Shenandoah with his cavalry, and defeating a small force
under Early, at Waynesboro', destroyed the railroad around
there, crossed the Blue Ridge, going towards Richmond,
destroying the James River Canal for some distance in that
direction, and passing around to the north of Richmond,
he continued on to Ashland, where he brushed aside some
opposition in force, and finally reached supplies at the
White House, collected there for his needs, and thence, on
the 26th of March, rejoined the Army of the Potomac.
There was one blot upon his escutcheon and on Grant's in
Sheridan's late military achievements in the Shenandoah
Valley. If Marshall Turenne, as long before as 1674 had
awakened the horror and protest of Europe by laying waste
the Palatinate, the progress of humanity in two hundred
years ought to have witnessed amelioration in hostile prac-
tices, instead of a renewal of an obsolete form of warfare.
There can be no excuse now for the consumption or destruc-
tion in time of war of anything but that which has relation
to the immediate needs of the armed victors or to the im-

5 1 6 GENERAL QEOEOE GORDON MEADE

mediate detriment of the armed vanquished. To destroy
crops, bams, mills, instruments of husbandry, in one indis-
criminate ruin, as possibly helpful to the enemy, is inhuman
from the present standpoint of civilization. The Govern-
ment approved the devastation, but within the limits of the
rules of civilized warfare. Sheridan executed some of it
with barbaric ruthlessness.*

As there has not been up to the present point, and will
not be in the rest of this memoir, any other opportunity so

* General Grant : August 26di. — " Do all the damage to railroads
and crops that you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and
negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another
year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste."
General Sheridan ; September 9th. — " My cavalry drove the pickets
of Breckenridge*s corps from Opequon Creek, burned four flouring
mills, and captured," etc. October ist — " I have devastated the Valley
from Staunton to Mount Crawford, and will continue,** etc. Octobo'
7th. — " I have destroyed over two thousand bams, filled with wheat,
hay, and farming implements ; over seventy mills, filled with flour
and wheat ; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head
of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops, not less than three
thousand sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and
Little Fort Valley, as well as the main valley. A large number of
horses have been obtained, a proper estimate of which I cannot now
make. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered
beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act all the
houses within an area of five miles were burned,** etc. October i ith.
— " I have given you but a faint idea of the cleaning out of the stock,
forage, wheat, provisions, etc., in the Valley," etc. Later on. cast of
the Blue Ridge, in Loudon County, the previous devastation (made
in the Valley of Virginia, west of the Blue Ridge, on the plea of destroy-
ing subsistence for Early's army) was continued, on the plea of de-
stroying subsistence for Mosby's independent cavalry command, and
making the surrounding inhabitants suffer, coupled with the following
expression from Sheridan of righteous indignation. November 26th.
— ** I will soon commence on Loudon County, and let them know
there is a God in Israel,** etc. It was ascertained long afterwards
that Lieutenant Meigs had not been murdered, but had been killed
by a member of a scouting party of the enemy.

THE WINTERS 8IE0E OF PETEBSBUBO. $ 1 7

appropriate as this for defining the relations between Grant
and Sheridan, which had so injurious an effect on the public
career of General Meade, it needs no apology, but merely
this explanation, for here casting a side-glance at them. It
cannot be supposed that the mere fact of Grant and Sheri-
dan's having originally belonged to the Fourth Infantry
gave them any sentiment for each other. It would seem
that the cause of the sentiment must be sought for in those
inscrutable psychical depths which declare for affinity of
being. The obvious line of demarcation, however, to be
drawn for love or liking when they coincide with either
public or private affairs excludes the vice of favoritism, a
vice which has sapped the happiness of families and wrecked
the strength of empires. How egregiously this defect of
character was manifested by Grant with reference to Sheri-
dan appears in a multitude of forms. In his memoirs he
says, ''As a soldier there is no man living greater than
Sheridan. He belongs to the very first rank of captains,
not only of our army, but of the world. I rank him with
Napoleon and Frederick and the greatest commanders of
history." It would be hard to find a single phrase con-
taining more errors than this. To say that, as a soldier, no
man living is greater than Sheridan, implies that there may
be at least one man living as great as a soldier, a proposi-
tion coinciding with the statement in the second sentence,
that he belongs to the first rank of captains of the then
present world, but conflicting with the statement in the
third sentence ; for, except von Moltke, the captains living
at the time when Grant was writing could not justly be
compared with the great captains of history. Besides, to
speak of ranking Sheridan with Napoleon and Frederick
and the great captains of history implies that Napoleon
and Frederick do not belong to the class of historical cap-
tains. One should suppose, moreover, that if a military man

5 1 8 GENERAL GEOROE GORDON MEADE.

had wished to speak of warriors on the same plane with
Napoleon, he would have been constrained to mention Han-
nibal and Caesar. But it is the fate of indiscriminate eulogy
to fall into all sorts of contradictions : they are here only
emphasized by the narrowness of Grant's world-view.
Sheridan was, in fact, an excellent cavalry officer and an
excellent infantry officer, but not superior in merit to per-
haps a dozen men that might be mentioned as belonging to
those branches of the military service of the United States
and the Confederates States during the Civil War. His
own field operations, his own enunciation already mentioned
as preceding the Wilderness Campaign, his raid immedi-
ately following that, subsequent raids compared with those
of other officers, his letters on military matters from Europe,
his self-confessed tendency to insubordination, his whole
military career, considering the large means always placed
at his disposal, the revelations of his personal memoirs, do
not mark him out as the prodigy in war, confusedly de-
scribed by Grant, and stamped by him subsequently as
such by the gift of the lieutenant-generalcy of the Army of
the United States. Grant, in reviewing the character and
capabilities and service of those who had fought under him
did not do it from the point of view of the stem virtue which
did not love Caesar less, but Rome more. With all his
great and admirable qualities, he had not the love of truth
for its and his own sake which is the very core of loftiness
of soul. He had, moreover, the art of suppression so much
at command, he was so defl in the stroke of his chisel in
producing a life-like efTect, that it takes a connoisseur to
discern that the product sometimes stands on feet of clay.

Sheridan's arrival at City Point on the 26th of March
found there the President of the United States. On the
next day General Sherman arrived from Goldsboro', North
Carolina, whence he had come by sea for conference with

THE WINTERS SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 5 1 9

Grant as to the final movements for closing the campaign.
Sherman's personality and movements, however, having
only the most remote relation to a memoir of General
Meade, the briefest mention of his operations with reference
to those of the Army of the Potomac will suffice here.

Following the practice heretofore pursued in these pages
of noting important occurrences outside of the zone of op-
erations of the Army of the Potomac, mention of some of
the most striking events beyond it is here continued. On
the 17th of July, 1864, Mr. Jefferson Davis had committed
the folly of displacing General Joseph E. Johnston and put-
ting General Hood in command of the army opposing
Sherman besieging Atlanta, Georgia. Admiral Farragut
captured Mobile Bay, Alabama, on the 5th of August,
1864. On September ist Sherman occupied Atlanta, while
Hood marched away to his rear only to be grievously de-
feated by Thomas at Nashville, Tennessee. On November
16, 1864, Sherman started from Atlanta on his celebrated
March to the Sea. Reaching it, he captured, in co-opera-
tion with the navy, the city of Savannah, Georgia, on the
22d of December, 1864. In January, 1865, Johnston was
restored to the command of the army opposing Sherman.
On February i, 1865, Sherman began to move north to
join Grant and Meade before Petersburg. On February
22d, 1865, General Schofield captured Wilmington, North
Carolina. As Sherman marched north the ghosts of seces-
sion flitted away before his progress, and desolation reigned
in their places. Columbia, South Carolina, was evacuated
and fired on February, the 17th, by which side is not set-
tled to this day. Charleston, South Carolina, which had
previously suffered from bombardment, was evacuated on
the 1 8th. And now, towards the end of March, as men-
tioned above, Sherman was with the Army of the Potomac,
arranging plans for the co-operation of his forces with it in

520

OENEBAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

the endeavor to hem Lee in on every side. As the event
proved, however, Sherman's army was able to take no part
in the final events ending with the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virgfinia.

The toils were &st closing in on that devoted army. Lee,
as was suspected at the time, and as we now know, fully
appreciated the situation, and made preparations to meet it
and to avoid the final calamity. He was only awaiting the
time when the roads would be fit for retreat, when he in-
tended to cut loose from the leaguer which he had so long
endured and march for the open country towards the south
and west, where haply he might make junction with John-
ston vainly attempting to stem the tide of Sherman's inva-
sion sweeping up along the coast. To enable him to do
this to the best advantage, it would be necessary to make
such a heavy onslaught on Grant's right as would cause
him to recoil from the strong lodgment on his left, and
this he soon essayed with the greatest audacity. Grant,
too, was waiting only for better roads to enable him to
move to advantage around the right of Lee's entrench-
ments. He had appointed the 29th of March for the essay,
and with his usual resoluteness of purpose kept faith with
himself

THE END OF THE WAE, 52I

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE END OF THE WAR.

On the 25th of March, 1865, the Ninth Corps, under
General Parke, was resting its right on the Appomattox, cast
of Petersburg, occupying an entrenched line of seven miles
in length terminating at Fort Howard, at the Jerusalem
Plank Road, about a mile east of the Petersburg and
Weldon Railroad. On its left was the Sixth Corps, occu-
pying a salient of the general line, at Fort Fisher. On the
left of that, resting its left on Hatcher's Run, was the Second
Corps. In the rear of the Second Corps was, in reserve,
the Fifth. The army, it will be seen, had concentrated to-
wards the left, and this gave Lee his apparent opportunity
to gain free passage for his retreat, so he furiously delivered
the first stroke towards that end. Withdrawing nearly half
his force from outlying entrenchments, he concentrated it
on the east of Petersburg, where the lines were so scant a
distance apart that an active armed man could scour across
the space betNveen them in less than a minute. Here, before
the dawn of the 25th, the pioneers of Gordon, the general
in command of the contemplated assault, aided by an order
permitting Confederate deserters to bring their arms with
them to the picket-posts, captured some of them, and pushing
forward to clear away the abattis and other obstructions from
the opposing lines, were closely followed by the columns
assaulting Fort Stedman and its outlying redoubts. Gen-
eral Meade happened to be at City Point at the time, and
was communicated with as soon as the telegraph wires, cut
by the enemy's skirmishers, were restored, but Parke proved

522 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

equal to the emergency. Batteries Nos. 9 and 10, about
half a mile apart, on the right of Fort Stedman, Fort Sted-
man itself, and Batteries Nos. 1 1 and 1 2, close together,
near the left of Fort Stedman, were assaulted by the enemy,
who captured Battery No. 10 and Batteries Nos. 11 and
12, and also Fort Stedman itself In the almost pitchy
darkness reigning at first over the field, General Parke
promptly withdrew Willcox's troops, on the right, near the
Appomattox, to recapture the part of the line taken, sup-
ported by the reserves under Hartranft, and by the artillery,
under Tidball, on the ridge in the rear. The enemy, march-
ing right and left to capture other works, was repulsed.
Day dawning, artillery was concentrated on the captured
fort and supplementary works, and soon Batteries Nos. 1 1
and 1 2 were retaken, and soon after that Fort Stedman and
Battery No. 10. The troops of the enemy, largely unable
to return, on account of the artillery- and musketry-fire
that searched the open space between the hostile lines, were
captured in droves, although many also lost their lives or
were wounded in trying to escape. By eight o'clock the
affair here was over.

This assault on the right had its reflex action on the left.
Humphreys says that General Meade, as soon as the tele-
graph worked, sent orders to Warren and Wright to sup-
port Parke. Of himself Humphreys says that he got the
Second Corps under arms, telegraphed General Meade and
Parke, whom Meade had by telegraph put in command of
the field, advanced upon the enemy in his immediate front,
and captured and retained the picket-entrenchments there.
As a matter of fact he did not wait for a reply, but put his
corps in at once without hesitation. I happened to see him
a few days afterwards, and asked him, when referring to the
event, whether the noise on his right admitted of any doubt
in his mind as to what was occurring, and he replied, " not

THE END OF THE WAR 523

a particle/* or words to that effect. Wright similarly ad-
vanced on his front, to the right of Humphreys, and also
captured the enemy's entrenched picket-line there, but, like
Humphreys, could make no impression on the works in the
rear of it. Humphreys remarks as to this advance, that
the capture of the enemy's advanced line at this point was
what enabled the Sixth Corps, on the 2d of April, to cany
the enemy's main line along that front.

The maturely prearranged final movement on the enemy's
right flank began on the 29th of March. The entrenchments
of the Second Corps, on the left, were to be held by two
divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, a division of colored
troops, of the Twenty-fifth Corps, and a cavalry division,
all of the Army of the James, under the command of
General Ord, while the Second marched out of them by the
Vaughan Road to the south side of Hatcher's Run, and the
Fifth Corps, passing beyond to the west, was to form a line
southwestwardly, facing at an angle the enemy's previously
described winter extension of his entrenchments towards
the west. Sheridan, with between thirteen and fourteen
thousand cavalry, was to push for Dinwiddie Court House,
several miles to the southwest of the positions occupied by
the Second and Fifth Corps. About midday the Fifth
Corps, in swinging forward its left up the Quaker Road, a
branch to the south of the Boydton Plank Road, brushed
away a force of the enemy's, wholly unable to cope with it

It is impossible for the reader, without examination of a
map on a large scale, to obtain here a precise idea of the
ground involved in the present movement The sketch ac-
companying this volume will sufficiently serve the purpose
of following the movements understandingly. Such slight
indication as a verbal description may afford, is, however,
not to be neglected. The first plan for the movement
looked to the cavalry's cutting off Lee's lines of supply and

524 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE

retreat. The first point of attack was to be the nearest
vulnerable one, the Petersburg and L3nichburg Railroad,
running there south of west from Petersburg, and beyond
that, the Richmond and Danville Railroad, running south-
west from Richmond and crossing the other at Burkesville
Junction. The White Oak Road, running east and west,
is four or five miles south of the Petersburg and Lynch-
burg Railroad at the point here in question. Five miles
south of the White Oak Road is Dinwiddie Court House,
at the apex of an angle, open towards the north, formed by
the Boydton Plank Road and the road leading from the
Court House to Five Forks, on the extension of the White
Oak Road to the west. General Parke, with the Ninth Corps,
now holding from the extreme right of the Army of the
Potomac to Fort Sedgwick, on the Jerusalem Plank Road,
was at the proper time to extend his flank to the left, to
hold the line to be vacated by the Sixth Corps when ready
to move from its entrenchments. The enemy was now con-
centrating on his right to meet these movements. During
the 29th the plan of operations was modified. Sheridan's
orders to make for the railroads at once was countermanded,
and he was instructed to get on the enemy's right-rear.
Heavy rain on the night of the 29th delayed movements of
artillery and trains while the roads were being corduroyed.
On the 30th Sheridan was advancing from Dinwiddie Court
House towards the enemy's entrenchments at Five Forks.
The whole line was pivoting on its right, — ^the Second Corps,
the right, the Fiflh Corps, the centre, Sheridan's cavalry,
the left, — ^from a line drawn southwest to a line drawn east
and west. The Second and Fiflh Corps were in position
on the night of the 30th, on the left of the enemy's entrench-
ments, with the intention of capturing and holding the
White Oak Road there, which operation, if successful,
would cut oflf communication between the enemy at this

TBE END OF THE WAR. 525

point and his force holding the entrenchments at Five
Forks, four miles off to the left. During the day Sheridan
had made a considerable advance towards Five Forks,
opposed only by cavalry, the enemy's infantry not arriving
there in force until nightfall.

On the morning of the 31st the enemy marched out of
his works to attack Warren on his left flank, just as he was
advancing with a reconnoissance in force. Humphreys,
on his right, detached Miles with two brigades, which
attacked the enemy on his left flank, and followed him up
with two other brigades of Miles's, the enemy in his turn
retreating, as Warren's advance also had been obliged to do.
Further to the right, at the Boydton Plank Road crossing
of Hatcher's Run, unsuccessful attempts were made by the
Second Corps to carry the enemy's works there. Between
two and three o'clock the Fifth Corps, now well in hand,
renewed its attempt to take possession of the White Oak
Road on its front. In this it proved successful, driving the
enemy into his entrenchments. In the mean while the
enemy was slowly pressing Sheridan back towards Din-
widdie Court House from the direction of Five Forks.
The enemy had both cavalry and infantry, but Sheridan
only cavalry. Here Grant says that Sheridan displayed
great generalship. So far, however, as can be discerned at
this day, the generalship consisted of nothing more nor less
than that frequently exhibited by himself and other cavalry
leaders during the war, when they advanced or stubbornly
held a position, or slowly beat a retreat with the aid of dis-
mounted cavalrymen. The cavalry was a fine body of
troops, finely officered, from the commanding-general down,
but as there was no special opportunity for the display of
anything more than the tactical skill which was amply pos-
sessed by Sheridan and his subordinates, one may be per-
mitted to doubt if there was on the occasion display of great

526 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADK

generalship. Bodies of Sheridan's cavalry attempted to
hold on his left the crossings of a creek called Chamberlain's
Run, but were finally dislodged, and had to reach Sheridan
by the detour of the Boydton Plank Road. When night
fell Sheridan was neutralized at Dinwiddie Court House,
with the enemy's infantry, flanked by cavalry, between him
and Five Forks, in a line extending between two and three
miles across his course towards Five Forks. General Meade
at once sent orders to relieve him by pushing infantry along
the Boydton Plank Road to the Court House. Unfortun-
ately, however, the nearest infantry, Warren's, was stopped
at Gravelly Run, from the circumstance that the bridge over
the stream on the line of the Boydton Plank Road had been
destroyed. Warren, to insure the safety of his left and rear,
endangered by the advanced position of the enemy towards
the Court House, was ordered to fall back to the Boydton
Plank Road, and Humphreys to swing back his left to ac-
cord with Warren's change of position.

Here arose an embarrassment, growing out of difficulty
of communication among commanders and Warren's using
his own judgment instead of obeying an order of General
Meade's. Had Warren acted as finally directed by Meade,
he would have come well into the rear of Pickett, who was
commanding the Confederate troops, and would have been
in a position to relieve Sheridan at once, and to damage
the enemy retiring towards Five Forks. *As it was, the
merest accident had the effect of causing the enemy's un-
molested withdrawal to Five Forks. Bartlett's brigade, of
the Fifth Corps, which, as a partaker in the movement of
the Fifth Corps by which it was swung back by Meade's
orders to the Boydton Plank Road, had fallen back from
the White Oak Road to a place just off the direct line from
Five Forks to the Court House, and was taken by the
enemy to be the advance of the Fifth Corps, causing the

THE END OF THE WAR. 527

immediate withdrawal of Pickett. The infantry sent by
Warren arrived at the Court House early the next morning,
long after the enemy had retired during the night towards
Five Forks.

It seems, from all the evidence attainable, that Sheridan
made a false estimate of the position of the eastern return
of the enemy's works along the White Oak Road at Five
Forks, when he, on the afternoon of the following day, the
1st of April, assaulted them, and that his instructions to
Warren, based upon that misconception, misled Warren in
making dispositions ensuring that his advancing line should
strike the eastern return of the works in the manner pre-
scribed by the orders of Sheridan. The cavalry, under
Custer and Devin, were to attack on the left of the in&ntry,
and under Mackenzie, of the Army of the James, to make a
circuit from a point far away to the right, so as to come in
on the enemy's left-rear. The infantry was to advance to-
wards the eastern return of the enemy's works, and parallel
with the White Oak Road, and pivot on its left, so as to face
the return, striking it with the right-centre, in such a man-
ner that the left would necessarily be in the position to
attack the works in front, and the line to the right, the
eastern return of the enemy's entrenchments. But as the
eastern return had been supposed to be much further to
the east than it proved to be, the advance went wild of the
position to be attacked. That the position of the return was
much further to the west than had been estimated became
for the first time known when the advancing infantry line
received on its left the fire of the enemy. The anticipated
primary condition being non-existent, and the advance con-
tinuing at first blindly to push forward upon the false theory
upon which the line of battle had been formed, Warren
plunged into the woods on the right, pushing hither and
thither to bring the right, pivoting on the left, quickly into

528 GENERAL QEOBOE GORDON MEADE.

position. One of the charges which Sheridan afterwards pre-
ferred against Warren was that he did not see him on the
field. He did not see Warren because he was well-nigh
ubiquitous on the right, seeking to rectify the direction of the
lines there which had entered the woods. The confusion
entailed by the disadvantage at which Warren's line was
taken through its having advanced upon a false idea of
locality, for which he was not at all responsible, was soon
rectified. Crawford's division, on the extreme right, swung
around into the left-rear of the enemy. Griffin's, on his
left, also swung around on the enemy's left-rear, while
Ayres's division, coming up in face of the return, carried it
by assault. The enemy was completely enveloped in front
and on his left flank by cavalry and infantry, and partially
in the rear by infantry. Right through the middle of the
White Oak Road entrenchments ran a north and south
road, called the Ford Road, and right and left of this, other
roads pursued the same direction, all crossing Hatcher's
Run, which flowed here about a mile and a half in the rear,
parallel with the White Oak Road. Hemmed in in the
manner described, with but slight means of egress, the
enemy's shrift was short, but he behaved with heroism.
Forming a line north and south, instead of his former line
east and west, he made a bold stand against the oncoming
flood. The Fifth Corps coming up, and checked for a mo-
ment by the opposing array, halted in line, when Warren,
mounted, seized a flag, and dashing to the front, led his
troops against the enemy's last stout resistance, and as-
sisted on the left by Custer's cavalry, swept him from the
field.

This is the stirring story as I believe the truth war-
rants that, without exaggeration, it shall be told, and not
without its painful sequel. A few minutes thereafter War-
ren was relieved by Sheridan from the command of his

THE END OF THE WAR 529

corps. The ground of action was negative. He had
thought Warren indifferent in preparation for the action.
He did not catch sight of him during the action. He acted
under a provisory order from Grant, unsolicited^ as he
afterwards said. Grant had conceived a great dislike for
Warren, and this he had evidently communicated to Sheri-
dan, whom circumstances had doubtless conspired to preju-
dice in the same direction, and who, from his constitution
of mind and training was utterly incapable of understanding
a man like Warren. General Meade knew perfectly well
Warren's limitations, his tendency to try to amend the plans
of his superiors, but they were not such as to warrant plac-
ing in the power of any one, as Grant did, a concealed
weapon that might be unscrupulously used. Grant himself
subsequently expressed regret that the thing had happened,
but so indifferent did he prove as to the occurrence that,
through his subsequent two terms of the Presidency, he
allowed Warren vainly to appeal for trial of his case, using
his influence to that end only after he had ceased to hold
the office of Chief-Magistrate. In his writings he proves
how lightly the affair rested in his mind, for in one place
he speaks of Warren's being relieved before, and in another,
after the battle. If any offence had been committed before
the battle, such action as Sheridan's would have had some
semblance of justification, for Warren had been clearly wrong
in his failure, under orders, of the night before. Even then,
however, the fact would not have justified the sentence as
within Sheridan's province to impose, but solely as within
Grant's. But even admitting, for the sake of argument, ade-
quate dereliction before the battle for the punishment de-
creed, the sentence passed, without trial or permitted explan-
ation, would have been most unjust in view of any man's
rights, but especially so in those additionally derived from

Warren's previous valuable and brilliant services. Passed

530 GENERAL GEOROE GORDON MEADK

and executed after the battle in which Warren had so signal-
ized himself, it looked as if antagonism between men of dif-
ferent mould, awakened long previously by the course of
events, had at last found vent in Sheridan, that he indulged
in the opportunity to injure for antecedent as well as present
sources of dissatisfaction in the unfortunate outcome of an
enterprise for which he. if any one, not Warren, was re-
sponsible. At any rate, by whatever motive Sheridan was
actuated, nothing can extenuate the award to Warren for
his untiring zeal in his country's cause, of being stricken
down by his temporary chief on the field which he had
largely helped to win, and being sent into the retirement of
a blighted career.

Sheridan and Griffin, the latter now in command of the
Fifth Corps, were in full possession of the field at Five
Forks ; but lest the enemy should strip his lines farther to
the east, along the White Oak Road, and concentrating
troops near Five Forks, finally repulse Sheridan, Grant
ordered the Second Corps, off to the right, to press the
enemy on its front that very night. Artillery on both sides
opened there heavily. Humphreys sought for a weak
point in the enemy's line, but finding none, under orders
sent Miles's division to the left to reinforce Sheridan.
These operations represent what was passing on the left of
the Army of the Potomac during the night of the ist of
April. The enemy had received a fatal thrust, but his lines
of retreat were still intact. The plan for the immediately
pending movement was for Sheridan, with his cavalry and
the Fifth Corps, to sweep northward, cutting the Petersburg
and Lynchburg Railroad. The Twenty-fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Corps, in order from left to right, were to assault the
works on their respective fronts. In the course of the 2d
of April, the Fifth Corps, after some preliminary fighting
near the White Oak Road, reached a point west of Suther-

THE END OF THE WAR. 53I

land Station on the Petersburg and Lynchburg Raikx>ad,
Sheridan's cavalry off in the same direction. Humphreys was
still held for a while, on the 2dy by orders to that effect, in
the position which he occupied. In Parke's position, with his
right resting on the Appomattox, opposite the eastern and
southern defences of Petersburg, he had bombarded them
nearly all of the night of the ist, resuming the fire early on
the morning of the 2d. Here he captured some important
works, but an interior line of the enemy's proved impervi-
ous. On his left, the Sixth Corps, which operated with the
advantage previously noted of being in possession of the
enemy's outer entrenchments, attacked the inner ones, op-
posite the Lead Works, southwest of Petersburg, capturing
the whole line on that front. The Sixth then swept down
the enemy's line to the left towards Hatcher's Run. Near-
ing the Run it met the Twenty-fourth Corps, which had had
success on its front, and was then advancing towards Peters-
burg, when the Sixth faced about, and marching right and
left of the Twenty-fourth, pursued the same direction. In-
formed, at six o'clock in the morning of the 2d, by General
Meade, of the success of Parke and Wright on their fronts,
Humphreys advanced the Second Corps to the attack of
the enemy in front of his position and carried everything
before him. Orders again reached Humphreys from Gen-
eral Meade instructing him to close up with the other troops
marching towards the west of Petersburg. His advanced
division, under Miles, came upon the enemy at Sutherland
Station. Leaving Miles 'there, Humphreys continued with
his two other divisions towards Petersburg. At Sutherland
Station, after a contest of varying fortunes. Miles managed to
dislodge the enemy from his position, when the enemy beat
a retreat thence, partly over the Appomattox, and partly up
that stream towards the Richmond and Danville Railroad.
The Sixth, the Twenty-fourth, and two divisions of the

532 GENERAL OEOBGE GORDON MEADK

Second Corps were marching towards the western defences
of Petersburg, one division of the Second being counter-
marched to reinforce Miles if it should prove necessary.
The two main defences on the west side of Petersburg were
Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth, which were captured after
gallant assaults, and the enemy's line of works in that quar-
ter fell into the hands of the besiegers. The fiat had gone
forth that Petersburg must be evacuated, of which Mr. Jef-
ferson Davis had received notice while at church on that
fateful Sunday morning of the 2d of April. Preparations
were hastily completed for the retreat, and at dark the Con-
federate troops began to file out on the roads, from Rich-
mond and from Petersbui^, leading to Amelia Court House,
just south of the Appomattox, on the prospective line of
retreat to Danville. The unrelenting retreat and pursuit
were beginning. When, on the morning of the 3d of April,
the troops in front of Petersbui^ could discern objects by
the early morning's light, the place was found to be evac-
uated.

We are here again brought to consider, if we would form
any clear idea of subsequent events, the general lay of the
land over a far larger surface than any with which we
have had to do with reference to previous tactical move-
ments. We are now about to follow in imagination a rapid
advance of seventy-five miles in retreat and pursuit, but
longer in fact, because the march could not be made in a
straight line. As previously mentioned, Richmond and Pe-
tersburg lie about fourteen miles apart on a virtually north
and south line. From Richmond, the Richmond and Dan-
ville Railroad runs about southwest. From Petersbui^,
the Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad runs first a little
south of west, then a little north of west, then northwest,
and then west. The two railroads intersect at Burkesville
Junction, about forty-five miles west of Petersburg. The

THE END OF THE WAR. 533

Appomattox, passing to the west, close to the north side
of Petersbui^y makes a considerable sweep to the north
and west, the bend terminating just east of a place called
Farmville, northwest by a few miles of Burkesville Junction.
Here, just east of Farmville, the Petersburg and Lynchburg
Railroad, passing over the Appomattox, and bending around
north and then southwest, repasses it at the town, which
is on its south bank, and thence takes a westerly course to
Lynchburg, through Appomattox Court House, the upper
trend of the river meandering along just north of this last
stretch of the railroad. The shortest line of retreat for Lee's
forces converging from Richmond and Petersburg upon his
only two possible lines of retreat, to Danville or to Lynch-
burg, was at Amelia Court House, on the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, just south of the north loop of the Ap-
pomattox previously described. There, accordingly, they
converged, in the hope of being able to make their escape
in the direction of the road to Danville, and thus to form
a junction with the army of General Joseph E. Johnston
confronting Sherman near there. How this intention was
frustrated by the vigorous pursuit of the Army of the Poto-
mac will now appear.

Only two lines of retreat being open to the enemy, the
plan of pursuit was, of course, based upon that knowledge.
Sheridan, with his cavalry, the Fifth Corps following him
up, was to feel and attack the enemy constantly during
his advance upon the point of convergence of the two rail-
roads. The Second and Sixth, corps-commanders Humph-
reys and Wright, under the immediate leadership of General
Meade, marched towards Amelia Court House ; the corps-
commander of the Ninth, Parke, kept hold of the Petersburg
and Lynchburg Railroad, to bcLr, at the railroad junction at
Burkesville, Lee*s passage across it by the Danville route.
The two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, and the divis-

534 GENERAL GEOBOE GORDON MEADR

ion of the Twenty-fifth, will be accounted for later. The first
severe encounter, following skirmishing, took place near
Deep Creek, an east and west affluent of the Appomattox.
Here Fitzhugh Lee was towards dark attacked in a strong
position by Sheridan, the Fifth Corps nearest, followed by
the Second and Sixth Corps, approaching rapidly from the
rear. Sheridan, on the 4th, reaching Jetersville, on the
Richmond and Danville Railroad, was informed that Lee
was already concentrated at Amelia Court House. It was
a false report, but Grant and Meade, not doubting its cor-
rectness, made every efibrt to reach the advanced position
of the Fifth Corps with the Second and the Sixth, but were
twice detained by Sheridan's cavalry coming in from the
right upon their line of advance, being obliged to give it
precedence. Sheridan, in his memoirs, speaks of their
slowness in coming up, but with his usual disingenuous-
ness omits to mention this cause of their retardation. The
enemy's concentration at Amelia Court House was really
not effected before the Sth.

On the Sth Lee's advance from Amelia Court House
towards Jetersville began, but hearing that Sheridan, sup-
ported by infantry, held the place, he sheered off to his
right from the general line which he had been pursuing
along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and sought
by a night-march to pass the three corps marching under
Meade, the Fifth having now joined the Second and Sixth.
With a considerable body of troops under Longstreet, Lee,
by daylight of the 6th, reached a point near Rice's Sta-
tion, beyond Jetersville ; but Anderson was still on the
road, followed by Ewell, at Amelia Sulphur Springs, be-
tween six and seven miles from Amelia Court House, with
Gordon acting as rearguard. The vanguard of these troops
was somewhat ahead of the main bodies of troops in direct
pursuit, and this difference in position was slightly increased

THE END OF THE WAB. 535

by the first movement of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Corps on the morning of the 6th, under the conviction that
Lee was still in position at Amelia Court House. On the
morning of the 6th these three corps, under Meade, facing
northeast, began in fact to march away from the enemy,
when Humphreys, on the left, discovered lines of the enemy's
infantry moving westward, and the signal officers of General
Meade brought word that they were perceptible far beyond,
moving in the same general direction. General Meade
ordered the troops at once to face about and march in pur-
suit of the retiring columns of the enemy. With reference
to the point of destination where the future determined it to
be, at Appomattox Court House, the Twenty-fourth Corps
was nearly up even with the van of Lee's army in space, and
a little more than even in time, for it had reached Burkesville
Junction, a few miles southeast of Rice's Station, in the
middle of the night of the 5th, whereas Lee did not reach
Rice's Station until early on the following morning. From
this position, at the Junction, it was intended that Ord,
in command of the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth
Corps, a division of the Twenty-fifUi, and some cavalry,
should destroy the bridges over the Appomattox. Besides
the bridges at Farmville, there were, below them, the rail-
road bridge, called the High Bridge, and a common bridge
near it. Should Ord destroy these bridges before the enemy
could reach them, Lee's line of retreat to Lynchburg would
be cut off, and he was already estopped from taking the
road towards Danville by Ord's presence at the railroad
junction at Burkesville. But, as we have seen, Lee's ad-
vance reached Rice's Station early in the morning of the
6th, and the cavalry and infantry which Ord despatched to
destroy the bridges could not accomplish their mission, the
small body of cavalry coming unawares upon Lee's advance
and meeting a most unhappy fate in its gallant attempt to

536 GENERAL OEORQE QOBDON MEADK

resist overwhelming odds. The final event of Lee's escape
or surrender still lingered in doubt, for the bridges, so for,
all remained intact.

The Second G>rps, on the morning of the 6th, apprised
by what was seen taking place in plain sight, soon con-
firmed by General Meade's orders, pushed, by wading
over Flat Creek, after the rear of the Confederates, they
having destroyed the bridges after passing. The Fifth
Corps was ordered by General Meade to move on the right
of the Second, and the Sixth to keep to the line of the rail-
road through Jetersville, which would bring it on the left
of the Second. The Second Corps, after wadii^ Flat
Creek, came up soon with the enemy's reai^uard under
Gordon, moving forward after it as the enemy continued
retreating. While Humphreys was thus pressing with in-
fantry the enemy's rearguard, Sheridan was striving to cut
in on the enemy's line of march at Deatonsville, but here
he found himself thwarted in his intention, having struck it
opposite Anderson with Ewell coming up just in his rear.
Nevertheless, hereabouts Sheridan accomplished in one
place considerable destruction of the enemy's trains. The
first serious engagement of infantry took place when the
Second Corps pursued Gordon for several miles, leaving an
immense amount of material behind him, making finally
some stand at Perkinson's Mills, at a crossing of Sailor's
Creek, an affluent of the Appomattox. The capture here
by the Second Corps of flags, arms, and other trophies was
large. While this was taking place in the centre, the Fifth
Corps on the right had found no enemy to oppose its ad-
vance, while the Sixth Corps, passing through Jetersville,
and closing up just to the left of the Second, was apprised
by the cavalry that the enemy was in position ahead, and
turning off by the left fork of the road of which the Second
Corps had taken the right one, soon formed line of battle.

THB END OF THE WAR 537

The enemy proved to be Anderson and Ewell without
artillery. The Sixth Corps rapidly advanced, and came
into position and assaulted, while Sheridan charged the
enemy on his right and left flanks. Ewell, being partially
enveloped in the rear by cavalry, and soon in front and on
right and left and partially in rear by infantry, surrendered
the renmants of his corps, which had, counting stragglers
lost on the march, been virtually annihilated, while the loss
sustained by Anderson also was very great. The loss of the
enemy in both commands, including prisoners, amounted to
six thousand. In other contests during the day he had lost
two thousand. It had become evident that he would not
be able to bear much longer the successive drains on his
resources in men and material. These last contests de-
scribed constituted the battle of Sailor's Creek.

Lee, with Longstreet, had halted all day near Rice's
Station, \'ainly waiting for the sorely harassed corps of An-
derson, Ewell, and Gordon, encumbered in their movements
by the trains in their charge. Night of the 6th coming on
after Humphreys had driven the corps of Grordon over
Sailor's Creek, and the country in advance of the Second
Corps being unknown, he was, although he crossed the
creek at once, obliged to wait for the morning of the 7th
before he was able to proceed. The Sixth Corps, on the
contrary, ofi* slightly to the left, on more favorable ground,
was able after the engagement to advance two miles further
towards Rice's Station.

In the night of the 6th the advance of Lee, under Long-
street, marched from Rice's Station for Farmville, and
crossed the Appomattox on the bridges there, and on the
morning of the 7th began to string out on the stage-road
towards Appomattox Court House. Fitzhugh Lee's cav-
alry marched with Longstreet, leaving a detachment on
guard near Farmville. Early on the 7th the rearguard,

538 GENERAL QEOBQE OORDON MEADK

under Gordon, crossed the Appomattox below Farmville
by the two bridges previously described. Sheridan's cav-
alry was off on the extreme left, south of the Petersburg
and Lynchburg Railroad, marching with, and in advance of,
the Fifth Corps, the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth,
and the single division of the Twenty-fifth, to confine the
enemy to the direction towards Lynchburg. General Meade
had ordered the Fifth Corps to Prince Edward Court House,
to the southwest of Farmville, just south of the Petersbui^
and Lynchburg Railroad, to add to the force of in&ntry
marching west on that line towards Appomattox Court
House. The two divisions of the Twenty-fourth Corps,
followed by Wright, with the Sixth Corps, at first marched
directly towards Farmville. But the enemy, after securing
his passage there, burned the bridges behind him. Only
High Bridge, and the other near it, below Farmville, where
Longstreet and Gordon eventually crossed, remained for
crossing the Appomattox.

Had it not been for the promptness of Humphreys and
Barlow, and the remissness of the enemy, Lee's army would
now have made good its retreat to Lynchburg. The Second
Corps, however, having been marching since early morning
of the 7th from Sailor's Creek, came on the ground near
High Bridge and the waggon bridge below Farmville, be-
yond which could be seen, on the opposite side of the Appo-
mattox, the enemy marching away without having made pro-
per provision for the destruction of the two bridges. Al-
though the enemy now made an attempt to fire them, he was
too late to repair his oversight. Barlow seized them and drove
off their sparse defenders, and the Second Corps began at
once to cross the river. A division of the enemy was seen
drawn up on the high ground beyond the river, while a col-
umn also was seen threading its way along the railroad. The
enemy's attitude of opposition, however, soon changed, and

THE END OF THE WAR 539

the halted division withdrew towards the west It was a
weighty question which Humphreys now had presented for
his decision, — the conclusion as to the direction in which
the main body of the enemy had marched. He wisely con-
cluded to cover the contingency of his making a mistake
by despatching Barlow's division to follow the enemy's
troops marching along the railroad, while he, with his two
other divisions, pushed to the right for the stage-road run-
ning some distance north of the river through Appomattox
Court House.

Barlow pursued the enemy along the railroad, while
Humphreys marched away towards the right in his design
of striking the stage-road to Appomattox Court House.
By the burning of the bridges at Farmville itself, the Sixth
and Twenty-fourth Corps were now cut off from the Second
on the other side of the Appomattox. It was impracticable
to ford the stream at Farmville with infantry, and the
bridges below could be reached only by a long detour.
Just after noon Humphreys found his surmise to have been
correct, as he caught up with Lee's retreating column in
position on the stage-road and the plank-road to Appomat-
tox Court House. General Meade, not knowing that the
Sixth and Twenty-fourth Corps had been cut off from the
Second by the burning of the bridges at Farmville, ordered
them to the support of Humphreys. Barlow had pushed
so far ahead along the line of the railroad, inflicting consid-
erable damage on the enemy, that he could not possibly
join Humphreys before nightfall. The best that could be
done Humphreys did, pressing the enemy closely and mag-
nifying by the activity of their movements the deficiency in
the number of his troops. The infantry action was carried
on on both sides with spirit. Humphrey's aggressive atti-
tude had the desired effect of compelling Lee to lose time
by keeping his force deployed. Cavalry, under Crook,

540 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

forded the river at Farmville to reinforce Humphreys, but
was driven back with loss. The situation at this critical
period of the retreat and pursuit cannot be better expressed
than in the words of Humphreys describing it :

** By the detention until night at this place, General Lee lost inval-
uable time, which he could not regain by night-marching, lost the
supplies awaiting him at Appomattox Station [near the Court House
Humphreys means, there is another Appomattox Station near Rich-
mond], and g^ve time to Sheridan with his cavalry, and Ord with the
Fifth and Twenty-fourth Corps, to post themselves across his path
at Appomattox Court House. If no infantry had crossed the Appo-
mattox on the 7th, he could have reached New Store that night, Ap-
pomattox Station on the afternoon of the 8th, obtsuned the rations
there, and moved that evening towards Lynchburg. A march the
next day, the 9th, would have brought him to Lynchburg. Ord*s two
infantry corps did not reach Appomattox Court House until ten o'clock
in the morning of the 9th of April."

Grant, learning that the enemy had been brought to a
stand, lost no time in demanding of Lee the capitulation of
his army. It was about half-past eight o'clock in the even-
ing of the 7th, just after the fight just described was over,
when Humphreys received, he says, a letter from Grant, to
be delivered to Lee. A truce for an hour being declared,
to facilitate negotiations between the commanders of the
respective armies, in about an hour Lee's reply was re-
ceived and transmitted to Grant through Humphreys' lines.
Grant's missive had stated that, in view of the obvious use-
lessness of prolonging resistance on the part of the Army
of Northern Virginia, and in the interest of sparing further
effusion of blood, he called upon Lee to surrender. Lee's
reply included the usual diplomatic fence, coinciding in prin-
ciple with Grant's declaration of desire to avoid useless
effusion of blood, and deprecating the conclusion as to the
hopelessness of further resistance, but tacitly conceding it
by asking information as to the terms to be offered for sur-

THE END OF THE WAM. 54I

render. So ended for the moment the interchange of pro-
tocols.*

On the following morning, the 8th, Humphreys straining
every nerve on the march after Lee, who had, of course,
decamped during the night, received for transmission to Lee
Grant's rejoinder to his reply. It was sent through Fitz-
hugh Lee's cavalry, then acting as the enemy's rearguard,
and the reply to it was received at nightfall, during a halt of
the Second Corps near New Store, about midway between
High Bridge and Appomattox Court House. Grant's second
letter had specified the terms of surrender to be disqualifica-
tion for again taking up arms against the United States, and
expressed his willingness to meet Lee personally, or to desig-
nate officers to meet others appointed by Lee, who would
jointly settle upon the terms of surrender. Lee's reply to
this was distinctly a recession from his former obvious inten-
tion to surrender. He indulged still more manifestly than
before in diplomatic fence when he told Grant that he had not
intended to accede to the proposition to surrender, but merely
to ask for the terms proposed in their bearing on peace ; which
was by implication a direct contradiction of the whole pro-
ceeding and of the express terms of a portion of the language
used in it. Lee concluded by remarking that, to be frank,
he did not think that the emergency had arisen to call for
the surrender of his army. This again was qualified by the
expression of his willingness to meet Grant on the following
day between the picket-lines of the two armies, in the in-
terest of ascertaining how far Grant's proposal might affect
the forces under his command and the restoration of peace.
Surely, if he saw no reason why he should surrender, any

* See Appendix for the full text of the letters leading up to and ac-
companying the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. The
last two of the series were interchanged at their meeting, in the per-
tonal presence of Generals Grant and Lee.

542 GENERAL QEOEGE GORDON MEADK

proposals that Grant might have to make would be purpose-
less. Generals Grant and Meade received this last note
about midnight of the 8th of April, at Curdsville, where
they had halted for the night. At that same time of night
Humphreys, who had been instructed from headquarters to
keep on the march, found his men, in attempting it, he says,
dropping out of the ranks from sheer exhaustion from
fatigue and hunger, the supply-train of the corps not reach-
ing it until the following morning.

With the next morning, the 9th, came Grant's continua-
tion of the correspondence with Lee, in a letter which, as
before, reached Lee promptly through Humphrejrs* lines.
Lee as promptly replied, transmitting his letter through the
same channel of communication between the moving col-
umns in retreat and pursuit. In this letter of Grant's he
simply states that he has not authority to treat of peace,
but merely of the surrender of the armed force opposing
him, and he speaks of the desirability of saving further
loss of life and additionally of property, emphasizing the
sentiment in the last line of his letter by an aspiration
that the " difficulties ** may come to an end without the
loss of an additional life. Lee's reply was briefly that he
had received Grant's letter on the picket-line, whither he
had gone to meet him with reference to the surrender of
his army, and that he now requested an interview in con-
formity with the offer to that effect in Grant's letter imme-
diately preceding the one just received.

Everything was in the most perfect train for the accom-
plishment of what should have been sought with the single-
mindedness which Grant in his correspondence had ex-
pressed himself as entertaining, — the ending of the contest
without the loss of another life or further sacrifice of prop-
erty. Humphreys, with the Second Corps, was within three
or four miles of the enemy's rearguard, the Sixth Corps

THE END OF THE WAR. 543

(which had managed to get across the Appomattox, in the
night of the 7th, only by bridging the river) was closing up
on the Second, not far to the rear. Ord's infantry, — the Fifth
Corps, the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth, the division
of the Twenty-fifth, — was, thanks to the retardation of the
enemy by Humphreys, gaining the time necessary to pass
around to the left and come into position athwart Lee's line
of retreat at Appomattox Court House, on the road to Lynch-
burg. Nothing more dramatic in the annals of warfare has
taken place than the scenes of the surrender at Appomattox
Court House. Even as one of the chief actors in the drama,
Lee, sat dictating the last-mentioned reply to Grant's last
communication, in which he expressed his regret at not hav-
ing, as he had expected, met Grant at the picket-lines, the
fanfares of Sheridan's cavalry were blaring in his front, and
the sound of artillery-firing there reached his ears, confirm-
ing the tidings that he had already received that he was sur-
rounded. The whole of the scenes occurring from this time
onward to the signing of the terms of surrender have been
described by so many eye-witnesses, and therefore from so
many points of view, and are despite the fact so accordant,
that we may place implicit faith in their truthfulness.

Lee had mentally advanced as far as circumstances had
permitted him towards a solution of what Grant had in one
of his letters called the existing " difficulties." In express-
ing his regret that he had not met Grant, as he had ex-
pected, he did but express by circumlocution his belief that
nothing remained but their meeting to bring about a solution
of the difficulties. How came it about, then, that Grant,
who had so warmly expressed his desire to put a stop to
further effiision of blood and the destruction of property,
was not so for advanced toward those ends as was Lee, who
had assented to their desirability. Within striking distance
from his own moving headquarters to those of the enemy,

544 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEABK

Grant had suddenly left the line by which he had hereto-
fore so successfully corresponded with his adversary towards
a speedy understanding which was to be the end of the war.
The implacable foe of his better self, favoritism, led him
abruptly to quit the direct line of pursuit of the enemy, on
which he could soonest arrive at an accommodation with
Lee, and strive to reach the position of Sheridan, in order
that through his lines the final act leading to the surrender
should take place. Grant, without awaiting the reply to
his last letter to Lee, had suddenly left the advance near
New Store, and had struck off by a circuitous route to the
left to reach Sheridan at Appomattox Court House. He
had left the rear of the Second Corps through which he had
heretofore successfully carried on his correspondence with
Lee, and had taken the devious route to Lee's rear, which
would be sure seriously to delay his receipt of Lee's reply
to his last communication. By going to the rear of Lee he
had put himself out of touch with the Second Corps, whose
commander he had nevertheless instructed to continue his
pursuit with unabated energy.

It was nearly midday before an aide, riding with fiery
haste, was able to hand Grant the reply of Lee for which
he had not waited. Then the best thing that he could do
was to continue to push forward towards Sheridan, although
the instructions to Humphreys to pursue the enemy relent-
lessly still remained unrescinded. Reaching Sheridan,
Grant's reply was soon transmitted to Lee through his lines.
This note stated that he had not received Lee's communica-
tion until 1 1.50 A.M., and that he would push forward from
the point which he had now reached in passing to the left
from the stage-road, and would meet Lee wherever he
might wish the interview to take place. General Humph-
reys who, being the man that he was, and in the advance
as he then was, is the highest authority extant as to this

THE END OF THE WAR 545

affair, says that had Grant remained on the route of the
Second and Sixth Corps, the surrender would have taken
place before midday. But, as we have seen, he did not,
and therefore soon arose what the most ordinary unblinded
perspicacity would have foreseen, the danger of a calamity
which, in any other case, Grant's prescience would have put
beyond the bounds of possibility. About half-past ten
o'clock in the morning of the 9th of April the Second
Corps, followed closely by the Sixth, began to overtake
the troops of Lee, famished for want of rations, and weary
with continuous marching and conflict. Lee, knowing how
close inevitable surrender was at hand, sent twice with a
flag of truce requesting Humphreys not to press him, be-
cause negotiations for surrender were proceeding. But, as
has been noted, Grant had not recalled his orders to make
no abatement in the strenuousness of the pursuit, and Hum-
phreys was a soldier, with whom the orders of his superior
allowed of no qualification by himself. So he declined to be
guided by the representation which he had every reason to
believe to be true, from the character of Lee, and from
what he personally knew of the correspondence that had
been going forward. He had been expressly instructed that
this correspondence was in no wise to interfere with the
military movements then proceeding, so he was obliged to
decline all overtures from the enemy for a temporary cessa-
tion of hostilities. Grant was miles away, and Humphreys
had been left to his own resources. The situation was a pain-
ful one,, but Humphreys in his decision abided by his duty.
At eleven o'clock, Longstreet, having concluded to make
a stand, entrenched just as the Second Corps was approach-
ing Appomattox Court House. The Second Corps at once
deployed, the Sixth deploying on its right. At this most
critical juncture, General Meade arrived on the ground just

as the two corps were about to assault Longstreet's lines,

546 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

and thus happened to be averted the most frightful, because
the most needless bloodshed. General Meade had, it
seems, read Lee's letter of that morning before forward-
ing it to Grant, and had, of course, seen at once 'from its
terms that there could be no question that Lee intended to
surrender. He at once sent through Humphreys' lines a
letter to Lee, granting a cessation of hostilities for the ar-
rangement of preliminaries to surrender, and also sent a de-
spatch to Grant notifying him of the action that he had taken.
During the night of the 8th, Ord's infantry, the Fifth Corps,
under Griflfin, which had halted to rest at Prince Edward
Court House, and the two divisions of the Twenty-fourth
Corps, under Gibbon, the single division of the Twenty-fifth
Corps, under Bimey, with Sheridan's cavalry, were making
their way south of the Appomattox and the Petersburg and
Lynchburg Railroad. Previously cavalry had been pushed,
as we have seen, to the right. It had also been pushed
to the left front, towards Prince Edward Court House, to
ensure Lee's being confined to the Lynchburg route. Now
the situation was different, Lee being on the Lynchburg
route, and the aim being to head him off at Appomattox
Court House. Accordingly the cavalry assembled early on
the following morning, the 9th, west of the Court House,
right on Lee's only remaining line of retreat to Lynchbui^.
Ord's infantry, however, could not get there until nearly
eleven o'clock. The Ninth Corps, under General Parke,
had, on the 3d, followed the march of the Sixth Corps from
Petersburg, and thenceforth, until the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia, at which it was not present,
had been engaged in scouting and picketing north of the
Petersburg and Lynchburg Railroad, extending all the way
along the railroad from Sutherland Station to Farmville,
thus commanding all egress of any fraction of the enemy's
forces along that line in a southward direction.

THE END OF THE WAIL S47

When Lee sat at nine o'clock on the morning of the
9th dictating to Colonel Marshall of his staff the despatch
of which we know, in which he expressed his regret at not
having already met Grant, and his wish to meet him as soon
as possible, he had learned that escape was almost beyond
the bounds of possibility. Even in the midst of his dicta-
tion an officer hurriedly delivered to him a private message
which doubtless confirmed the conclusion which had already
been reached that morning in a conference with his gen-
erals, that surrender was inevitable. The cavalry of Fitz-
hugh Lee, no longer acting as rearguard, was now in ad-
vance, halted beyond Appomattox Court House. It had
been drawn up early in the morning to try to force a pas-
sage through Sheridan's cavalry in opposing line of battle,
while behind it had filed out on the road to Lynchburg,
and taken position, the advance-guard of Lee's infantry.
At the point of time when Lee's cavalry and infantry began
to move forward, there was still hope among his veterans
that a passage might be forced, as it certainly would have
been, had the sequel proved that the gathering war-cloud
would have nothing to contend with but the cavalry of
Sheridan barring its burst towards Lynchburg. But time
had been passing, and the infantry of the Army of the Po-
tomac and of the James had been forcing its march around
the left of Appomattox Court House. When the moment
of serious collision had arrived in the attempted advance of
the enemy's cavalry and infantry to break through the op-
posing lines, the encircling cordon of Sheridan's cavalry
parted, like curtains drawn asunder, and revealed the lines
of infantry in its rear. It was the last scene in the military
drama which we have been witnessing as it drew near its
(UnoiiffunL

In the afternoon of the 9th of April, in a little house,
historic and memorable evermore. Grant and Lee met, and

548 GENERAL OEOROE GORDON MEADK

agreed upon and signed terms honorable to both, — simply
the accordance of the honors of war in return for the pledge
no longer to bear arms against the United States. Grant
acted with great delicacy towards General Lee, who said
afterwards that, although it was customary to receive and
immediately restore the tendered sword, Grant had not
touched his. One thing only was lacking to the spectacle
in the last scene of the nation's salvation. The man who
had won the greatest battle of the war, who, since then, had
commanded the army by which it was won, through two
years of almost continuous battle and siege, was not present,
and was not invited nor intended to be present at the sur-
render of the opposing army by its great chief Happily,
however, for his peace of mind, he had served but in the
cause of justice in his country's time of direst need for
higher recog^tion than that within the power of man to
give. Some twenty-eight thousand men, the mere remnant
of the Army of Northern Virginia, were on the rolls as
surrendered. As that army ceased to exist, the Confed-
eracy, as though freed from a magic spell, crumbled to
fragments and toppled from its base, not without a cloud of
dust, obscuring for a time clearness of vision, but with a
mighty subsidence that, echoing and re-echoing to the ends
of the earth, witnessed to a fall so mighty that all men
knew it to be final. As in Samson's riddle, however, " out
of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came
sweetness."

That the mental wounds of the war time would heal had
long been evinced by the way in which the soldiers of the
opposing armies had fraternized on many an occasion. Now,
on this last field on which they had met in enmity could be
seen, despite harrowing memories, even then a gleam of
the future that was in store for a united people. On that
last field not only were the hungry fed from the public sup-

THE END OF THE WAR $49

plies, but the haversacks of the private soldiers were freely
opened for the relief of their late antagonists. On the fol-
lowing day Generals Grant and Lee had an interview on
horseback between the lines of the armies. General Meade,
on the following day, paid a visit of courtesy to General
Lee, and officers of the Army of the Potomac freely ex-
tended their sympathy to their late foes. If bitterness still
for a long while lingered, it was least to be found among
those who had met each other in battle. No words of
praise were ever finer than those with which Humphreys
concludes his volume on the campaign : — '' It has not seemed
to me," he says, " necessary to attempt a eulogy upon the
Army of the Potomac or the Army of Northern Virginia."
He would be callous indeed who could not feel for Lee in
this, his hour of trial, in this supreme moment of his life,
when the shackles forged for him by his aiTections, which
he could not rend, dropped from the man with the last
stern demand of duty as greatest champion of a causeless
cause in the frenzy of a people. Who should forget in
his favor, that throughout all those days when he had
shown most conspicuously in the eyes of men, he had not,
like most successful generals, as Tacitus says, become inso-
lent with success, but had never failed in gentle courtesy to
his officers, in boundless tenderness to his men, in humanity
to all, and in word and deed had proved himself the rarest
type of soldier and gentleman !

Strictly speaking, the terms in full which Grant accorded
General Lee were so liberal as to transcend the military pre-
rogative, and thereby to trench upon the civil power. The
theory of rebellion had, without formal disclaimer, gradu-
ally merged, through many acts, into recognition of the
status of revolution, the right of which is recognized.
Under either theory, however. Grant's terms were beyond
the military authority ; but they were doubtless derived as

550 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

to their spirit from knowledge of Mr. Lincoln's general
views, and perhaps from his direct instructions immediately
before the retreat of the enemy began. At any rate, con-
firmed as they were by universal acclaim, they stand justified
in a generosity which should remain graven in memory as
a monument to the magnanimity of a victorious general, a
great government, and an enlightened people.

Behind them, on the 3d of April, the troops of the hostile
armies, marching westward, left Richmond in flames.
Forgetting that there is no prudent conflagration, the
enemy had set fire to warehouses to destroy his valuable
stores of cotton and tobacco. The Confederate troops fired
the city, the Federal ones extinguished the flames. Before
dawn on the day of the evacuation of Petersburg and Rich-
mond, while one of the armies was begrinning its retreat and
the other was still in position awaiting day, reverberations had
rolled along the hills in response to the explosion of one
of the enemy's magazines and his war-vessels lying in the
James. It was the first positive evidence that the long siege
was over. The President had, in anticipation of the great
event, remained near Petersburg, aboard the steamer on
which he had come from Washington a few days before.
Under Warren, lefl in charge of the troops remaining near
Petersburg, the town was occupied early in the morning of
the 3d of April, the President and Grant shortly afterwards
entering it. Richmond, off to the right, was, later in the
morning of the 3d, formally surrendered to General Weitzel,
of the Twenty-fifth Corps, of the Army of the James. The
President entered the city late on the following day. The
flag of the United States was hoisted on the Capitol as the
token of victory, but more truly, as in fullest sense, the
harbinger of peace.

FINAL SCENES. 55 1

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FINAL SCENES.

Immediately after the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia, the Army of the Potomac was concentrated by
General Meade at Burkesville Junction. Sherman learning,
on the nth of April, of the surrender at Appomattox
Court House, made a truce with Johnston, who surrendered
on the 26th. As soon as certain preliminaries, growing
out of the repudiation by the United States of the terms
which Sherman had made with the enemy, were adjusted,
his army marched northward and encamped near Richmond.
Sheridan, first despatched with his cavalry and the Sixth
Corps, to join Sherman, returned at once through the
removal of that necessity by the surrender of Johnston.
He was then sent with troops to Texas, where some show
of armed force still remained, but soon surrendered; and
after that, to Texas again, in observation of the French occu-
pation of Mexico, which ended in 1 867 with the execution of
Maximilian of Austria. Long before many of these events
had had time to take place, and indeed within a few days,
came a national calamity well calculated to shatter the faith
of those who believe in a special providence rather than in
God's working by larger and more inclusive law. The
joybells had scarcely ceased ringing throughout the land,
when, on the 14th of April, the man of all men best fitted
for restoring harmony among the dismembered States and
mutual love among their citizens in a reunited people was
stricken down by a madman whose degenerate brain saw
glory for himself and salvation for the Southern cause in

552 GENERAL QEOBQE QOBDON ME ADR

an act which was the heaviest misfortune it experienced
and one which met the universal execration of mankind.
The President, the Vice-President, the officers of the Cabi-
net were by the plot to be assassinated, and Grant, too,
might have been included in its attempted execution, but
for the chance that he was absent from the play to which
he had been invited to accompany the President. The plot
fiuled with all but the loftiest mark that drew the lightning.
Lincoln, the wretched man whose wayworn path had had
for the last four years no pleasant turning but in occa-
sional indulgence in the quaint humor with which he had
relieved his gloom, whose wan &ce and bent form had
touched every generous heart, whose whole soul was more
than ever bent on charity and love for all men, now, in one
of the brief moments which a hard fate had decreed, seated
peacefully at a play, in the relaxation which he so sorely
needed, in the plenitude of his goodness, of wisdom bom
in him and ripened by experience, of his enormous power
for good for a whole people, was done to death by the hands
of an assassin. It is almost too pitiful to contemplate, this
ending of a life so noble, at such a time, by such a hand, a
country dwarfed in an instant by one caitiff stroke.

The dark catafalque took its way through the cities
through which Lincoln had passed to his inauguration as
President of the United States, bearing his remains to
Springfield, Illinois, pausing a few hours in each place,
where they lay in state, if that can be so called which
brought a mourning people to pay its tribute of affection
at his bier. Ho/Bu day celebrated the victory of which he
had paid the penalty in death. The people little recked of
victory but as swallowed up in peace, and now saddened,
withdrawn into themselves in grief, took in the terrible les-
son of national life, of which what they witnessed was the
last seal and covenant with which it remained with them for

FINAL SCENES. 553

the future to abide. Through Philadelphia, where in the
early morning of Washington's Birthday, the 2 2d of Feb-
ruary, 1 86 1, Lincoln had with his own hands raised the
national fl% on Independence Hall, saying in his address
delivered there, in the shadow of sudden death which even
then brooded over him, that he would rather be assassinated
than prove false to his duty to the country, towards the
same spot, sanctified as the birthplace of the Republic, his
remains now passed to lie in state on their way to their final
home.

The reins had fallen from Lincoln's nerveless grasp into
the hands of one in whom few felt entire confidence, and,
as time was to prove, one who deserved the least. Passion-
ately partisan, he seemed to be little fitted for leadership in
the political regeneration of the nation. His conduct of af-
fairs at first recognized only the North as having national
rights; nothing was too severe for the South in zeal to
make treason odious. When, however, through place and
power, he came to know that he could shift his position for
personal advant^e, his stalwart virtue vanished as by the
touch of an enchanter's wand. It may well be believed
that the political pendulum thus hanging and swinging
made the varying time of world-history presented ill accord
with the view of correctness of the sober common sense of
the people. Congress then made its mistake by impeaching
the President, and as the people foresaw the action came to
naught But all this erratic conduct of affairs was fraught
with serious consequences to the country in the disorders
engendered in the South, enduring through the first term
of the following Administration. Evils had grown apace,
through the immutable law that wrong multiplies wrong in
ever-increasing ratio, and strange, apart from mere mob im-
pulse, were some of the products of those times, now happily
almost buried in the ocean of oblivion.

554 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADK

Not until the 24th and 25 th of May did the armies of
Meade and Sherman, marching on two successive days
through the streets of Washington, in the grand final re-
view, present to the nation in that pageant, and in their mar-
vellously quiet return to the arts of peace, the last visible
token that the war was over and abiding peace had beg^n
to reign. The war ended. General Meade virtually disap-
peared from public affairs, save in so far as his able civil and
military administration of the departments committed to his
care are concerned, and the occasional discussion of his
nomination for the Presidency of the United States. He
had no political affiliations, however ; he never had had any.
It was not in his nature or in his training to care aught for
these, to seek by extraneous means to buttress or to in-
crease his fortunes. The measure with which justice had
been meted out to him was different from that with which
it had been meted out to many others. Sherman impris-
oned a correspondent of " The New York Herald " on a
boat in the Mississippi, that paper declared him insane, and
there the matter ended. General Meade punished a corre-
spondent of "The Philadelphia Inquirer," and a number of
papers made a compact never to mention his name favorably
in their despatches, and this for an act which Grant himself
approved. Grant concedes in his memoirs that he, with his
headquarters at City Point, had shut General Meade off from
the full recognition which he would otherwise have received
from the country as the commander of the Army of the
Potomac. Remaining at City Point, and thus overshadow-
ing General Meade, he was also absent from the place
where, by his own confession, he should have been as com-
mander of all of the armies of the United States, and yet
under these conditions where, if ever, noblesse oblige, he
sent many a despatch from City Point in which the actual
commander of the Army of the Potomac received not the

FINAL SCENES. 555

slightest mention. General Meade knew something of
Spanish, and may have met the proverb, " Uno tiene lafama^
y otro carda la lana''* At any rate he thoroughly knew
life and its grim teachings. He pursued the even tenor of
his way, bending to no power but obedience to his supe-
riors in authority and to his conscience. Devoted to his
military tasks in every rank, wise in his civil administration
of affairs, happy in his domestic relations, cheerful in his
social ones, silent in the face of the indignity put upon
him by the appointment of another to the rank which he
should have held, he repined at nothing, sought no favor,
inspired by the noblest of all convictions, that he had
always done his duty, and perhaps, let us trust, harbored
the thought that, when he had passed away, due credit
might in the distant future be accorded him by the people
whom he had loyally served for the longest time, and
victoriously, as the commander of the noble Army of the
Potomac.

* " One gets the credit, while another cards the wool."

556 GENERAL QEOBQE GORDON MEADE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

GENERAL MEADE'S PERSONALITY.

There are three interesting aspects of eminent men,
without knowledge of all of which their portraiture is felt
to be incomplete. These are their relations to family, to
the society in which they move, and to the public, whether
the last of these be confined to a community, to a nation,
or embrace the whole outlying world. And contemplating
the inconsistencies exhibited by human beings, knowing, as
history and daily life prove, that conduct in one of the
spheres of action mentioned may be entirely incongruous
with one or both of the others, it is inevitable that the world
should feel that it does not fully know a man as he is
rounded off by nature and education unless it knows him
in all the aspects in which are included his dealings with his
fellow-men.

My first recollection of General Meade was when he was
a young man who, as a second-lieutenant, had lately re-
signed from the army, and was acting as the escort of a
party from Philadelphia to Washington, of which I was a
member at seven years of age. When they stopped at Bal-
timore, as was always the case in those days, prior to being
hauled in the cars hitched to horses through the streets of
the town, they stopped for dinner at a hotel near the station,
Lieutenant Meade commissioning me to go to the office and
order luncheon to be brought up on trays to the parlor, in-
cluding a glass of ale for each of the party. Pondering as
I went down stairs that he had omitted me, and probably
intentionally, in the order for ale, and anticipating Bismarck

GENERAL MEADE'S PERSONALITY. 557

by many years in the audacity which he showed in produc-
ing segars in the presence of the Austrian commissioners,
as an assertion of equality with them, I added to the order
for ale a glass for myself Reappearing in the parlor with
the waiter and the whole jingling paraphernalia of the lunch-
eon, I remember well the young lieutenant's surprise at
finding that I had asserted my dignity so promptly, and had
I been a little older I should doubtless have seen that quiz-
zical twinkle in his eyes which I came to know so well in
later years, as he settled the unities of the drama by drink-
ing the extra ale himself

In these pictures of the past main facts stand out in
bold relief, while unimportant details are buried in oblivion.
In consequence, the next picture that presents itself to me
is at breakfast in Washington, the next morning, with Lieu-
tenant Meade seated at table at his mother's right hand.
In travelling he had evidently been in some ordinary attire,
for his dress had not struck me one way or another, but
now, young as I wbs, and used as I was to see iashionably-
dressed people in Philadelphia, I was struck at once with
his costume and general appearance. He wore his hair
down to the nape of his neck, as was the fashion of the
day, and for long afterwards, and that being the fashion, did
not of course attract my attention ; but what did attract
and fix it was the new experience to me of a man with long
ringlets, looking as to his head like a cavalier of the time
of Charles I. He was, in a word, a dandy, to which what
I had seen of the same order of being in Philadelphia was
only the faintest approach. Without being particularly
good-looking in face and figure, he was tall and slender and
graceful, with an air of the highest breeding. But beyond
all this there was something which engaged my attention,
and but for which I should doubtless, from my rude, boy-
ish point of view, have regarded him with contempt, as a

558 GENERAL QEOBQE OOBDON MEADK

young man of twenty-two who had curls. That circum-
stance was his demeanor to his mother. As I have said,
he sat at his mother's right at breakfast, and then, and
whenever he occupied that place, his air of tenderness to
her Mras so blended with indescribable deference and cour-
tesy, that had she been a queen-mother, instead of the
widow of a citizen of a democratic-republic, her son could
not have shown her more princely respect. Not unused as
I was to see courtesy in the family life of the society in
which I moved, this I recognized as beyond anything that
I had ever witnessed, nor have I to this day ever again
seen its like ; and such as it was when I first saw it, it
endured to the day of his mother's death. The curtain
then rose to me upon other scenes. Lieutenant Meade de-
parting, and I remaining for several months at school in
Washington.

Flitting about the country from north to south, during
several years of civil-engineering and surveying, during
which time I had been recalled to Philadelphia, Lieutenant
Meade again rose prominently before my mind through his
marriage, in 1 840, with Margaretta, the eldest daughter of
the Hon. John Sergeant, distinguished in many public and
private capacities. Shortly thereafter he re-entered the
army, and was assigned to duty with my father. Major
Hartman Bache, his brother-in-law, which had the effect
for some time of throwing the families much together.
Elstablishing his home in Philadelphia, he naturally felt that
he was settled for some time at least, when the Mexican
War occurred. I can see him now, as the news that he
was ordered to Mexico was broken to him as gently as pos-
sible by his immediate chief, and he could not avoid show-
ing that it was far from agreeable to him, for he had not
been settled in Philadelphia quite two years, and the war
with Mexico was not one, I imagine, that could have awak-

GENERAL MEADE'S FEBSONALITY. 559

ened his enthusiasm. How he actually regarded it, always
remained unknown to me. It was his habit to avoid dis-
cussion of the disagreeable and self-evident, unless things
touched him to the quick, and here was a case concerning
him as a soldier, and he was every inch a soldier, and
must not repine, and he did not, but after a momentary
sadness cheerfully went to his appointed duty, and did it
well.

I^or some time after his return to his quiet home and
domestic habits, the chief fruit of his absence being a brevet
for service, making him a first-lieutenant, he led a relatively
secluded life, so far as general society was concerned. He
was in that interim which generally comes to married men
of the world, when society holds forth no special induce-
ment to frequent it much until the time arrives, as it did in
due course with him, when children grown-up are to be in-
troduced into its precincts. It was at this period, fallow to
Lieutenant Meade, except for the performance of routine
duties and pleasant reading and study, that at seventeen
years of age, I was able, in intimate association with him,
to rise for the first time to some real appreciation of the
man. In his modest house there was a little room dignified
by the name of study, in which there was a wood-fire, or
in which one could be quickly kindled, as I often found out
by actual experience. In front of this, during a leisure hour
of winter, he loved to sit and tissoner^ in French fashion, or
what is rarer still, to let a friend do it. In that genial glow
it was, that he fought over his battles of the Mexican War
with me. But, so far as he seemed to appear in the operations,
he might as well have been at home ; and yet I know from
the terms of his brevet, and from the testimony of brother-
officers, that he was not an idle spectator of the battle-fields
of the war. He had the gift of clear statement, and I can
remember well now how a certain gun was placed at the

56o GENERAL QBOBQE GORDON MEADE

battle of Resaca de la Palma at a critical juncture of the
fight. Nor were the events of the previous Seminole War
forgotten, although he was, through the breaking down of
his health, debarred from continuing with his command
until the end of the campaign. These are pleasant memo-
ries of flickering firelight, interspersed with those of dis-
cussions, in which we covered topics of peace as well as of
war; occurrences in connection with the survey of the north-
eastern boundary of the United States, on which he had
served ; matters of civil-engineering in which the future was
to bring him much further experience ; the complications of
Europe, what not. He was an excellent raconteur. He
had the rare, inestimable gift, of ignoring the irrelevant, of
treating his subject with sprightliness, and of maintaining
its parts in due proportion. As I discovered later in life,
when ability to appreciate was conjoined with some knowl-
edge of the world, he was an excellent talker, who,
although fond of argument, reserved it for proper occa-
sions, and in general conversation touched his subject
lightly, with trifles that relished because they were not ex-
panded. Moreover, a rare trait, he never impended vain-
gloriously over youth, but encouraged its frankness to speak
without offence, if only what it said were honest. His
thrust was keen, if he thought a lesson needed, but he
always took a riposte with as good humor as he made the
assault. To poke fun at people on account of some peculi-
arity was a favorite amusement of his ; but alway3 executed
genially ; but again, and this is the rarest of traits, he stood
treatment of the same kind without a shade of resentment,
and as though he positively enjoyed it. Let it be under-
stood, however, that reference is here made to intercourse
with his intimates, for he would have been a very rash
man who should have presumed to come within those
invisible., but impenetrable lines with which, at varying

GENERAL HEADERS PERSONALITY. 561

distances for the world at large, the personality of a gentle-
man is girt about. It is to be regretted that the man sitting
by that fire, which we have left for a moment of brief dis-
cursiveness as to his character, did not, as general, write
some memoir of the greater military affairs in which he
was engaged in later years. But perhaps that is a selfish
wish ; he rests well, and his chiefest laurels are yet to come.
An occurrence of about that time threw (to me) so
much light upon his kindness of heart and his indifference
to discomfort, when duty was concerned, that I introduce
it here in illustration of those features of his character. The
light-house on the Brandywine Shoal, at the mouth of Dela-
ware Bay was to be built. It had been planned in the office
to which Lieutenant Meade was now again attached, and
he naturally formed one of the party of officers who went
down the Bay on the schooner " Alexander Mitchell," to
fix upon the site of the light-house on the long shoal there,
and to establish the platform from which the screw-piles to
support the structure were to be driven. It was an event
in those comparatively quiet days. The screw-pile had
been invented by the Englishman, Alexander Mitchell, and
this time was the first occasion on which it was to be used
in this country. With the operations ensuing within the
next week we have naught to do, these preliminary state-
ments having been made simply for the purpose of account-
ing for the circumstance that, at the end of that time. Lieu-
tenant Meade found himself with two other persons, of
whom I was one, on his return to Philadelphia in a collier.
I had had no previous notion that anything in the world
could be so dirty, nor that any such discomfort could exist
in the midst of civilization. Even the cabin of the vessel
was ground-in with dirt, not by any means impalpable, for
it felt gritty. Dinner announced, the three passengers

sat down to table. The cloth was beyond anything that

562 GENERAL OEORQE GORDON MEADE.

could have been conceived of in the way of a palimpsest
record of departed meals. The chief dish was one of
execrably boiled rice, flanked by a small piece of salt-pork,
and without a condiment to use by way of disguise for the
food. Not a sign, however, did Lieutenant Meade, deli-
cately as he was nurtured, give, that he was not dining
sumptuously, although he was free to make it in the absence
of the captain, who did not preside at table, and of the
grimy cook, whose duties ended with the delivery of the
repast. Worse still, he ate with avidity the soggy rice and
rusty pork before him, and laughed merrily at my dis-
comfiture, predicting that the future would bring its lesson
of resignation to even this condition of the cuisine. Here
was a man who, at his own table, was ever on the lookout
for tidbits to share with an appreciative g^est, and now he
was eating a mess fit for a savage, and apparently relishing
it. Strange as it may seem to say, it must be recognized
as a soldierly accomplishment. That night I saw him in
another and a very different role. Our fellow-passenger
fell ill. It is trying enough to be ill anywhere, and to nurse
anywhere, but to be ill or to nurse in the cabin of a collier,
illuminated with a single miserable candle, is wretchedness
itself. Lieutenant Meade, however, at once set to work
as the cheerful attendant of our fellow-traveller, as sympa-
thetic and helpful as though he had possessed nothing but
feminine accomplishments.

Within this period the house of Lieutenant Meade had
long been a centre of enjoyment to both great and small,
particularly to the youth of the day with whose fathers and
mothers his family were intimate. His own children had
been growing apace, and his kith and kin gathered more
and more about him. There were occasions when music
was the attraction of the evening, and the concerted pieces
of his musical wife, on the piano, led by the first violinist

GENERAL MEADE'S PEBSONALITT. 563

of Philadelphia society, gifted even when compared with
professional musicians of the first rank, brought responsive
silence for the enjoyment of the time. But there were
other evenings entirely different, in which battles-royal with
boxing-gloves and sofa-pillows took the place of music, and
the shouts of the victors and vanquished, and the cry of the
hostess in alarm for her household gods of bric-a-brac, filled
the rooms but lately devoted to the strains of Beethoven or
Spohr, and Lieutenant Meade, as one of the most boyish
of the noisy gathering, called for truce only when he
thought it would otherwise soon be demanded by the neigh-
bors. The capacity for fun is undoubtedly one of the signs
of a healthy mind. When enjoyment of wit and humor
and innocent ebullitions of spirits ceases, we may be sure
that decadence has set in, and this capacity of enjoyment
Lieutenant Meade did not to his latest day outlive.

A few more years passed, and we departed in different
directions, to see each other in future only at infrequent in-
tervals. On one of these occasions in which we casually
met, it was at Key West, where Lieutenant Meade (now
Captain) was on his way to inspect a light-house which he
was building on Sand Key, a few miles beyond, and the
southernmost point of the United States. He took me
over there one night in his vessel, and we spent the next
day there together and alone, except for the workmen.
Then came his charge of the Lake Survey, and invitation
to me by detail to supervise the topographical branch of the
work, which proposition fell through, as such things often
do in the course of that official routine which is known as
red-tape. And then there was a very long period during
which we saw very little of each other. Going from north

to south, and south to north, I heard the extremists of
the North, under its sectional appellation, speak of their
black brethren, and those of the South, similarly under the

564 GENERAL OEOEQE GORDON MEADE

sectional view of things, speak of the same beings as ones
who had been saved from savagery, christianized, and
otherwise much blessed through the beneficence of slavery.
Observing, however, that some of the hardest taskmasters
were Northern men, and having some knowledge of where
manumission had taken place, and where it had not, and
that the beneficence of slavery held most obvious relation
to the cultivation of cotton, which the laborer did not own,
and that much of the philanthropy extant was attributable
to living under different conditions, I came early to the con-
clusion that, if for a brief space, the Northerner could live
in the South, and the Southerner in the North, the views of
each would be essentially modified. I regarded the matter
as impossible to be argued about from two so different
standpoints as those occupied by North and South, where
on both sides passions and ignorance formed the chief basis,
and with the thoughtlessness, or perhaps the sublime indif-
ference of youth, awaited a gradual self-cure of the body
politic by a sort of vis medicatrix natura^ little suspecting
that, below the quiet crust on which the dwellings of the
country rested, were fires which, after portents dire, were to
burst forth and ravage the land. I had heard, long before,
in a casual visit to Washington, the oratory of Webster,
Clay, Calhoun, and Benton on the question of the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise, and many a time afterwards
the mutterings of discontent ; but yet, not until within a
year of the occurrence of actual war, had I imagined, amidst
the factitious serenity of the time, that it was possible.

Captain Meade, always conservative, both by nature and
training, and indifferent, as most army officers of the time
were, to many of the movements of politics, probably had
no more idea than the majority of his fellow-citizens that a
woful time betided. When the war broke out he was at
Detroit, in charge of the Lake Survey, where he had been

GENERAL MEADE* 8 PEBSONAMTY. 565

stationed for some time. All officers of the regular army
must have then been anxious as to the position which would
be assigned to them in view of the prevalence of a new sort of
rank called "political general.'' What he may have feared
in this direction I never ascertained amid the rapidly shifting
scenes of the times. What I heard him say, however, among
a group of friends, was that he would not give up his cap-
taincy in the corps of Topographical Engineers merely for
the command of a regiment. The regular army had been
very small in numbers, and now, although the resignations
from it had been comparatively few, still, as the originally
small numbers of officers had thereby been reduced in num-
bers, every one of those remaining had a right to think that
he would take precedence of civilians, especially if he had
had actual experience in military operations. It must have
been in June, 1861, when I met him in Philadelphia, and
heard him casually make the remark mentioned. If that
be so, he must have been either on his way to or return
from Washington, where, in the latter part of June, he went
to see if he could not get some increased rank in the new
regiments of the regular army, then being organized for
active operations. He was promised in Washington that
something, not specified, should be done, and thereupon re-
turned to Detroit. Time sped on while he heard nothing,
until the first battle of Bull Run took place, when he was
offered the colonelcy of the First Michigan Volunteers, and
determined, if need were, to accept it, even at the expense
of resignation from the Topographical Engineers. Early
in August, however, while absent at Lake Superior on his
special duty, orders arrived for him to repair to Washington
and take command of one of the new companies of topo*
graphical engineers, just authorized by law. Hardly, how-
ever, had he reached Detroit, on his return from Lake
Superior, and when he was preparing to go to Washington

566 GENERAL OEOEQE GORDON MEADE.

to undertake the designated duty, when he received his ap-
pointment as brigadier-general of volunteers, dated Aug.
31st, 1 86 1, with directions to report to General George B.
McClellan. Sending in his last report on the Lake Survey,
dated Aug. 31st, he went through at once to Washington,
without stopping in Philadelphia, and proceeded to organize
and drill his brigade^ the Second, of the Division of General
George A. McCall, Pennsylvania Reserves, then stationed
at Tenallytown, Maryland.

Again our paths in life separated, General Meade going
to his duty with the Army of the Potomac, and I to St.
Louis, from which place I did not return for eighteen
months, hearing then first of the battle of Gettysburg, or
rather of some battle in progress, nameless then, from the
refugees who flocked into the cars as far off from the scene
as Pittsburg. As the narrative of the preceding pages
covers General Meade's rise from brigadier-general of vol-
unteers to major-general in the regular army during these
troublous times, no mention of any detail of it has any
proper place here, and so we will in imagination pass on to
the time when, the war having ended, he was first stationed
in Philadelphia, in charge of the military division of the At-
lantic ; afterwards, with some changes in the definition of its
boundaries, officially known as the Department of the
East ; whence he was ordered for a time, during the unset-
tled condition of civic affairs, while the reconstruction of the
government of Southern States was going on, to the com-
mand of the Third Military Division, headquarters in At-
lanta, Georgia ; whence again he returned, and finally, to
his former command of the Division of the Atlantic.

Here, relieved, for the first time for years, from the strain
of grave responsibilities, the careworn lines of his face, and
the extreme spareness of his figure, records of many a
tented field, departed, and once more he entered into the

(ZcCto ff, /f't'^^^-i'lJ-

GENERAL MEADE* S PERSONALITY. 567

gayeties of society, and in response to the wishes of his
fellow-citizens took part in forwarding municipal improve-
ment. And thus, after the turbulence of his later life, his
days seemed to glide pleasantly along in the enjoyment of
well-earned repose, filled with agreeable duties and pleasur-
able relaxation, until we find him, at the height of health
and enjoyment of life, so suddenly called away, that it
seemed at first incredible. Only two weeks before he died
he had called at the house of his brother-in-law, mentioned
as his former chief in engineering duty, and expressed to
me great surprise when I.told him that I thought the patient
very ill. He then asked if it would be unwise to see him,
to which I replied that, on the contrary, I thought that a
visit from him would be beneficial. Accordingly, as I had
anticipated, his visit had a cheering effect, but not to the ex-
tent of making the patient believe that he would recover ;
for he plainly told General Meade that he knew his time
had come. Most tenderly General Meade tried to dislodge
this fixed idea, until, feeling that he should take his de-
parture, he rose, and bending over his old friend, they
kissed each other in what proved within a few hours to be
a final farewell ; and thus were severed the bonds of mutual
pleasure and pain which had joined them all their lives.
So near then was General Meade's own unexpected end,
that his last official act was the announcement by letter
of this death of his brother-officer to the War Depart-
ment.

And now we reach the period at which, within a few da)rs
of the occurrence which has just been recounted, he was
suddenly called upon to leave all that he held most dear on
earth, and when he was to so master his spirit that, with a
perfectly clear mind, he treated dying as loftily as he had
treated life. A singular fatality had brought it about that,
although I sometimes saw nothing of him for long years.

568 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE

I seemed to be always present at critical junctures, and was
now. Within a few days after the event just recorded, I
met him at his headquarters, about eleven o'clock in the
morning of the day in which he was stricken, when he was
never in better spirits. At about three o'clock in the after-
noon I met a person who told me that he had been taken
home desperately ill. Not long after we had parted, and
when he had gone out with a party of friends, he had been
seized with double-pneumonia,.promoted by his old wound,
had sent for his son, Geoi^e, and later, had given all his
instructions for what he regarded. as the inevitable event,
with a surety of knowledge in which the dying often excel
in judgment the most skillful physician. To the usual well-
meant remonstrances s^ainst thinking himself desperately
ill, he replied, in effect, that he knew better, that there was
no time to lose, for he had his final instructions and wishes
to communicate. He was right, for, as the event proved,
he had not many hours to live. The funeral services took
place at St. Mark's Church, and the procession passed
through the streets of Philadelphia to Fairmount, whence
his remains were borne on a steam-barge on the Schuylkill,
on whose banks the crash of regimental musketry and the
dirges from bands resounded as the boat slowly passed on
its way to Laurel Hill. The clods loudly fell on the coffin,
and the last thing that I remember is the face of General
Sheridan looking into the grave, while General Humphreys
stood for a moment aside to await his turn of paying his
last respects to the dead, whom he had dearly loved in
life.

Necessarily few as are these outlines, they fairly repre-
sent the man. A few more strokes to complete the sketch,
and then the portraiture will be sufficiently complete. We
have thus far seen General Meade as son, relation, and
genial friend and acquaintance and companion, as a domestic

GENERAL MEADE'S PEBSONALITT. 569

husband and a cheerful father, sharing with his children
even in the frolicsomeness of youth. It remains to show
that, in other spheres of life, he was equally estimable. His
sentiments towards his brothers and sisters were always
tender. Dependents were always sure, that they could secure
the full measure of sympathy and aid from him which they
deserved, and he was able, with justice to others, to bestow.
For enemies he had no time or heart for more than casual
condemnation, and the severest weapon that he used was
ridicule. His savoirfcdre was included in so comprehensive
a condition of savair vivre, that his decisions on matters of
social propriety bore the stamp of infallibility. Liberal in
his views, far beyond the average officer of the army, ready,
at a moment's notice, to accord praise where he deemed it
due, he would boldly face prejudice at a moment's notice,
and speak out his mind frankly in the interest of truth. I
remember well an incident illustrative of this, which oc-
curred during a conversation at his headquarters in Phila-
delphia a few years after the war was over. An army offi-
cer said to him, as nearly as I can recollect, in the following
words : — ** You know, after all. General, that none but offi-
cers of the regular army amounted to anything in the war."
To this General Meade promptly replied, saying that he
could not coincide with that opinion, and added, " What do
you say to Terry?" mentioning others whose names I have
forgotten. And this he did with such a burst of interest
and overwhelming statement of fact, that the officer of whom
I spoke was fairly silenced. If General Meade had a fault,
it was in the excess of his ardor of truth-telling ; that is,
regarding the practice from a politic point of view. In con-
sequence, he would often, in scorn of the danger, when the
case was one of chivalric demand for the truth in the cause
of justice, run all risks of having his words injuriously re-
peated. From the worldly point of view, he was often im-

570 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADE

prudent in outspokenness to his interlocutors, in both forget-
fulness and defiance of the &ct, that the great majority of
men like unpleasant truths to be considerably diluted. As,
moreover, some of the world is basely, as well as some of it
imprudently constituted, he was therefore often the victim of
mention of what should never have been repeated. At best
it is impossible, even with good intentions, to repeat remarks
not intended for the general ear. They lack the interpre-
tation of the tone of voice, the expression of face, and the
whole setting in which they are uttered, and not least, the
stimulus which drew them forth. In speaking, however,
of this fiery advocacy of the truth to which General Meade
was addicted, it would be unfair not to couple Mrith it that,
if he allowed himself free scope to speak his mind, he was
equally liberal to the man who opposed him Mrith an
opinion which clashed with his. I have known but few
men who had, equally with him, the power to cast aside
for the moment all prepossession and argue a case afresh,
as if it had just arisen, simply upon the evidence and its
merits.

He was as open as the day in all that belonged of right
to the knowledge of others, and dark as night when the
repository of what it was proper to conceal. He was not
disposed to jump to conclusions, despite the quickness of
his perceptions and the general ardor of his temperament
On the contrary, he was accustomed, from his earliest
youth, to weigh carefully the arguments on each side of a
question which was to lead to an important conclusion,
and to cast the balance deliberately. But when once he
had cast the balance, it could not be changed, except
upon new evidence ; and so, whether he were acting in a
civil or a military capacity, he was never vacillating, never
tortured as some men of infirm minds are, who only need
to make a decision and take a course, to be assailed Mrith

GENERAL MEADE'S PERSONALITY. 571

doubts, and to wish it were other than it is, and if reversed,
to feel in the same uncertainty.

The most stupid charge that was ever made against Gen-
eral Meade was that there were occasions during the war
when, although he was a religious man, he had been known
to swear as terribly as the army in Flanders. It is difficult
to discuss this accusation with the gravity which, from its
frequent repetition, has been evidently supposed to be its
due. But, as it has been so treated, the duty is imposed
of treating it here with equal seriousness. The degree of
obliquity of the act depends upon the motive and the
occasion. Any man would rather be sworn at than prayed
for by his enemy, and his sanctimonious enemy some-
times takes advantage of knowledge of the fact. I never
heard General Meade swear, which proves at least, that
he was not covered, as the Scriptures say, with swearing
as with a garment. Therefore, his swearing must have
occurred only on occasions. Why, then, when we know
that men under stress may and do swear, that the Old
Guard swore at Waterloo, that Washington and Jackson
and many others on occasions swore, should the offense
have been so heinous in General Meade, especially when
driven by excitement, and when that excitement grew out
of intense leadership in battle ? In such a tide an oath that
drives the energies of men together for concentrated effort
is, as much as prayer, bom of the sense of duty seeking to
achieve its end. When General Meade broke his sword
to fragments by striking with its flat the renegade soldier
falling back when his comrades were sweeping forward in
a charge on the enemy's position, the action was only a
form of concentration of purpose. There are times for all
things, and this was not one for prayer. What we should
see under either manifestation, prayer or oath, is the
heart's desire for victory, while the banner floats towards

5/3 GENERAL QEOBGB GORDON MEADK

the front, or maintains its hold upon the stricken field
The same man, all vehemence in battle, was as calm as a
priest when, one night on the Chesapeake, the boat on
which he was, run into by another in the dark, and thought
to be sinking, he passed around among the passengers
with helpful words. The same man who could rage like a
lion on the field, and lead his men impetuously to storm an
embattled line, was cool in council, and could have sat as
calmly as the dying Bayard at the rout of Rebec, at the
second battle near Marig^no, with his sword thrust into
the ground, so that his eyes could rest for the last time on
its cross and upon the advance of the victorious enemy.

Good horses, as the English say, go in all forms. Even
good men are moved to action, and in action, simply ac-
cording to their constitution. In all my acquaintance with
General Meade, where I lay under the disadvantage with
him of being his junior in years, and for a long time his
inferior in experience of life, I encountered in him but one
ebullition of temper, and that slight, and it was he who
afterwards sought that it should be forgotten. It ought to
be evident, then, from this fact, and from others similar of
which I know, that, although it is here freely conceded that
he was irascible on occasions, the defect in that direction
could not have been egregious. Not only is this so, but
any vent which his irascibility might unreasonably make,
was always coupled with regret and cordial desire, if he
had been wrong, to make amends. Such explosion in him,
great or small, had generally no arriire pensie back of it,
but was simply temperamental. Not differing in degree
from that of which many men are constantly guilty, prom-
inence has been given to this trait by the d\stitvction of Gen-
eral Meade, and by the ulterior motives ^^ ^^^"^^1^^^*^^^
bringing it into the most exaggerated^ ^^^^^^^"^"^^ ^ ^.
have been almost lost to view frorl^ ^^v^ ^^^^ o^ ^'^'^

GENERAL MEADE'S PERSONALITT. 573

cence in action and memory, and from observation of the
generosity of nature with which he recognized its existence,
strove to master it, and earnestly sought to repair its con-
sequences. He did not even require to be met half way
towards restoration of pleasant relations, but was ever ready
for it by word or deed or delicate ignoring of the past.
Indeed, such was the real kindness and unsuspiciousness
of his nature, that he was led on occasions to trust men
unworthy of his confidence, so fearlessly did he bear his
heart upon his sleeve for daws to peck at.

We have now glanced at the career of Greneral Meade
from early manhood until the day of his death, some of the
military details of which are to be found in the preceding
pages. He must have come fully to realize the truth of the
dictum of Caesar ; — ** As in ordinary affairs, so too in war,
chance is potent."* Chance bore a large share in both his
military and his civil life, and still bears a share in the
neglect to which his memory has been partially consigned,
until now, when there are signs of the breaking light which
will not only rescue it from that partial oblivion, but will
raise him in the estimation of posterity to the rank which
he deserves as one of the saviors of his country. His was
a symmetrical character, fitted for social life, the cabinet,
and for active engagement in the most stirring of civil and
military events. The way in which he viewed and met
every crisis could not be better typified than by the quaint
old-French motto of the coat-of-arms of his family, —
ToujouRS Prest.

* Multum quum in omnibus rebus ^ turn in rt militari potest farfuna,
— Casar, de Bello Galiico,

APPENDIX.

THE LETTERS THAT PASSED BETWEEN GENERALS GRANT AND
LEE PRECEDING, THE LAST TWO ACCOMPANYING, THE SUR-
RENDER AT APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.

No. I.

Antn. 7, 1865.

General: The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of fUrther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty
to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood,
by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States
Army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. Grant,

General R. E. Lbr. Lieutenant- General.

No. 2.

April 7, 186s.

General: I have received your note of this date. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

R. E. Lei,

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. Genend.

No. 3.

Afkii. 8, 1865.

General: Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date,
asking the condition on which I will accept die surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say that peace
being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon,

675

5/6 GENERAL QEORQE GORDON MEADR

namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified
for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States
until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers
to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon
which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. Grant,
General R. E. Lei. LieutenaQt-General.

No. 4.

AruL 8» 186$.

General : I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine
of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be
frank, I do not think the emerg^ency has arisen to call for the surrender
of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object
of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.
I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of
Northern Virginia, but as £su- as your proposal may affect the Con-
federate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration
of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 a.m. to-morrow on
the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two
armies.

R. E. Lee,

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General.

No. S.

Apul 9, 1865.

General : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority
to treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for 10 a.m.
to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however. General, that I
am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North
entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had
are well understood.

By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most
desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of mil-
lions of property not yet destroyed.

Seriously hoping that our difficulties may be settled without the loss
of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.

U. S. Grant,

General R. E. Lee. Lieatenant-GenermL

APPEKDIX. S77

No. 6.

Geiural : I received yo«ir note of Uiis morning on the picket line
whither I had come to meet yoa, and ascertain definitely what terms
were embraced in your proposal of yesterday, with reference to the
surrender of this sirmy. I now ask an interxnew in accordance with
the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

Ljedtenakt-General U. Sw Grant. General.

Na 7.

Getural R, E Lee, Commanding C, S. A, :

Your note of this date is but this moment, 1 1.50 A.M. recei\*ed. In
consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynch>
burg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am, at this writing,
about four miles west of Walker*s Church, and will push forward to
the front, for the purpose of meeting you.

Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take
place will meet me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. Grant,

Lieutentnt-General.

No. 8.

Appomattox Coukt Houib, Va.
Apkil 9, 189s.

General : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of
the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all the offi-
cers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an
officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer
or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual
paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United
States until properly exchanged ; and each company or regimental
commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The
arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and
turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This
will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor the private hones
or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so

578 GENERAL GEORGE GORDON MEADE.

long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they
may reside.

U. S. Grant,
General R. E. Lee. Lieutenant-General.

No. 9.

haaoquartbxs asmt of nokthbkn vlbgiria.

April 9, 1865.

Genial: I received your letter of this date, containing the terms
of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by
you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your
letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate
the proper officers to carry the stipulation into effect

R. E. Lee,

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General.

INDEX.

Aberctombie, Brig.-Gen. John J.;

AcKiam ±iui, «.

Acqaift Creek, 142, 146, 148, 167,

224.
Act of

Alabama, 619.

Alabanift, Floridti and Georgia Bail-
road. 10.

Aldie'a Gap, 286, 352.

Alexande/a Bridge, 116, 120, 122.

Alexandria, 43, 46, 6B, 74, I4fi, 147,
153, 167, ISO, 161, 169, 173,
178.

Amelia Court House, 632, 6:

America, 4, 6, 7, ,

American cavalrr, 36.

Ames, Brevet Haj.-Gen. Adelbert,
49S.

AmiaBville, 158.

Amnest}', proclamation of, 3t>0.

Anderwn, Ljent.-Gen. Bichard U.,
161, 167, 182, 188, 196, 203,
236, Z76, 278, 331, 333, 876,
382, 420, 421-422,634,686,687.

AnnapoliB, W5.

Ante

^ 103.

AntieUm, 77, 101, 179, 186, 200,

201, 212, 214, 217, 220, 222,

266, 286, 866, 368.

itietttm Creek "" "

206,208,21

Amiocb Charch, 407.

Appomattoi Coait House, 40, 420,
633, 635, 637, 638, 639, 640,
641, 643, 544, 616, 646, 517,
S61.

Appomattox River, 70, 438, 443,
464, 469, 472, 481, 482, 483,
484, 486, 487, 494, 496, 606,
621, 622, 631, 632, 538, 634,
635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 64a
643, 546.

Appomattoi Station, 540.

Arabs, 5.4.

Amuas Bay, 12.

Arcber, Bng.-Gen. James J., 236.

Areola, 331, 364.

Arkansas, 10, 80.

Arlington Heights, 43.46, 179, 223.

Armislead, Brig. -Gen. Lewis A.,

[53

287, 344, 3.13; sm', 357; 869',
366, 367, 368, 374, 876, 886,
398, 402, 404, 406, 407, 412,
422, 434, 520, 640, 541 Dote-
646, SIR, 549, 651.

Army of the Cumborland, 866.

Army of Hie James, 437, 439, 449,
483, 484, 404, 498, 607, 628(
627, 637, 660.

Army of the Fotomac, 26, 29, SO,
Bl, 7.^-75, 77, 79, 8% 83, 103,
138, 145-147, 154-188, 17% 177,
J78, 182, 213, 217, 220-228,
226, 227, 'ii-Z, 241, 247, 249,-
2.51, 253, 254, 2.50, 262, 266,
275, 276, 279, 284, 287, 200,
2B2, 303, 30.'i. 321, 827, SS.\
337, 341, .'M3. 345-347, 860-
;i61. 367.358, 361-370,374, 876,
373-381, 38a, ;!88, 892, 898,
3m, 399, 401, 402, 404-406,
40R-410, 41 2, 433, 4315, 487, 439,
440-461, 4.1.5-157, 468, 471-
470, 48Z-4S4, 486, 487, 489,
494, 408, 606, 607, 500, 611,
613, 616, 619, 624, 530, 638,
64?, 649, 661, 654, 666, S«6.

(679)

580

INDEX.

Army of the Shenandoah, 73, 439,

609, 611-613.
Army of Virginia, 78, 145, 147, 148,

168, 167-169, 172, 177.
Arnold, Capt. W. A., 344, 376.
Artazerxes, 58.
Ashby's Gap, 286.
Ashland, 106, 615.
Ashland Station, 441.
Athenians, 67.
Atlanta, 619, 666.
Atlantic Oceuetn, 58.
Atlee's Station, 446.
Aosterlitz, 364.
Austria, 361, 651.
Averell, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William

W., 256, 440.
Ay res. Brevet Maj.-Oen. Bomeyn

B., 332, 333, 489, 497, 601,

528.

Bache, Brevet Brig. -Gen. Hartman,

12, 668.
Badeau, Brig. -Gen. Adam, 419, 460.
Bailey's Creek, 484, 488.
Bakers ville, 213.
Bald Hill, 167, 168.
Bald Top, 329, note.
"Baldy,*' 172,212,334.
Ball's Blufit, 80.
Baltimore, 9, 43, 134. 144, 182, 185,

304, oOd, 358, 511, 555.
Baltimore Turnpike, 290, 299, 309,

311, 325, 33/. 351, 354.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 64,

182.
Banks, Maj.-Gen. Nathaniel P., 78,

103, 145, 148-153, 355, 437.
Banks's Ford, 256, 257, 258, 262,

275, 278.
Barbados, 2, 3.
Barhamsville, 89.
Barlow, Maj.-Gen. Francis C, 99,

268, 293, 415, 416, 424, 425,

448, 453, 468, 473, 538, 539.
Barnard, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John

G., 74, 85, 135, 438, 439.
Barnes, Brevet Maj.-Gen. James,

165, 332, 333.
Bamett's Ford, 170, 385, 386, 387.
Barrv, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William

t., 58.
Bartlett, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Joseph

J., 114, 526.

Bardett'B MilL 386, 387, 392, 407.

Barlow, Col. Francis S., 60.

Battle-fields, 36.

Bay of Cadiz, 7.

Bayard, Chevalier, 672.

Bayard, Brig.^en. George D., 238.

Beauregard, Gen. Peter G. T., 43-

49, 60, 68-71, 73, 106, 438, 439,

466,468.
Beaver Dam, 272.
Beaver Dam Creek, 92, 93, 102, 108-

111, 144, 447.
Beaver Dam Station, 441.
Beckwith, Brevet Brig. -Gen. Amos,

67.
Bee, Brig. -Gen. Bernard £., 50.
Beethoven. Ludwig van, 56.3.
Benton, Thomas IL, 664.
Berea Church, 254.
Berlin. 359.
Bermuda Hundred, 438, 441, 442,

448, 456, 459-463, 467, 468, 471,

476, 482, 485, 488, 606.
Berry, Maj.-Gen. Hiram G., 267-

269, 271.
Berryville, 286, 286.
Best, Capt, 268.
Bethesda Church, 447.
Beverly Ford, 352.
Biddle. Col. James C, 272, 276-

278, 361.
Big Hunting Bun, 269, 272.
Bigelow, Capt. John, 334, 3a5.
Bingham, Brig.-(ien. Henry H.,

377,503.
Bimey, Maj.-Gen. David B , 240,

267, 268, 310, 312, 331, 333,

334, 424, 454, 465, 468, 469,

488, 494, 495, 546.
Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 556.
Black Walnut Run. 386.
Blackburn's Ford, 55.
Black water River, 479.
Bladensburg, 74.
Blucher, Field Marshal von, 35,

259, 404.
Blue Mountains, 180.
Blue Ridge, 25, 78, 149, 152, 179,

180, 185, 216, 217, 223, 227,

284, 286, 360, 366, 368, 615,

516 note.
Blunt's Bridge, 479.
Bolivar Heights, 180, 189, 196,

214.

INDEX.

581

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 7, 29, 33, 59,

61, 76, 77, 107, 127, 198, 200,

213, 331, 364, 397, 434, 517, 518.
Boonsboro', 186, 187, 192, 194, 200-

202.
Boonsboro' G»Pi 200.
Bone. Adolph K, 405, 406.
Bosphorust '')8.
Bottom's Bridge, 90,94,95, 102, 108,

119, 143,442.
Bowling Green, 431.
Boydton Plank Road, 496, 497, 499,

501-504, 506, 508, 509, 523-526.
Boydton Plank Koad Bridge, 500.
Brackett*8 Ford, 122.
Brady, Capt. James, 97.
Branch, Brig. -Gen. Lawrence (yB.,

11).
Brandy Station, 283, 352, 365, 369,

381, 384, 401, 413.
Brandy wine Shosd, 561.
Breckenridge, Maj.-Gen. John C,

516 note.
Bristoe Station, 159, 160, 370, 372,

374-376, 378, 380, 384, 397.
Broad Run, 159, 369, 375, 376, 378,

380.
Brock Road, 265, 266, 410, 412, 416,

420-422L
Brooks, Brig.-Gen. William T. HL,

451, 464.
Brown, Brevet-Maj. Theodore F.,

344.
Brownsville Gap, 182, 188, 189, 196.
Buchanan, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Robert

C, 168, 171.
Bnckeystown, 183.
Bnckland Mills, 380.
<*Buckland Races." 380.
Buell, Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos, 80, 83,

249.
Buena Vista, 14.
Buford, Maj.-Gen. John, 291-293,

297, 300, 301, 306, 307, 331, 332,

3o2, 356, 36^-369.
BuU Run, 19, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48-

52, 55, 59-62, 79, 164, 168-170,

378, 380, 565.
Bull Run, 2d, 73, 147, 160,212,285.
Bull Run Mountains, 153, 159, 286.
Bunker Hill, 64, 70.
Burgess's MiU, 497, 499, 501-503,

506,507.
Buigeas^g Mill Bridge, 600.

Burkesville Junction, 476, 524, 682,

533,535,551.
Bum^ Brig. Gen. WUUam W., 129,

Bumside, Maj. G^n. Ambrose £.,
49-52, 64, 63, 80, 182, 191, 200,
204-209, 220-229, 232-238, 240-
247, 250, 253, 274, 4l»5, 408, 409,
413,414, 416, 417, 423,430,434,
447, 452, 453, 484-486.

Buschbeck, Col. Adolphus, 266.

Butler, Anthony, 4.

Butler, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F., 78-
80, 398, 399, 404, 406, 437-439,
441, 442, 448, 459, 461,468, 470
note, 475, 482-484, 499, 507.

Butler, Margaret Coates, 4.

Butterfield, Maj.-Gen. Daniel, 166,
277.

Byron, Lord, 19, 344.

Cadiz, 2, 5, 6, 7.

Cadwalader, Maj.-Gen. George, 67.

Csesar, Caius Julius, 31, 183, 184,

234,295,331,518,573.
Caldwell, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John

C, 136, 330, 332, 371, 372,376.
Calhoun, John C, 564.
Canadian River, 10.
Candy, Brevet Brig.-Gen. Charles,

309, 310.
Cape Fear River, 507.
Carlisle, 290.
Carlisle Road, 293.
Camifex Ferry, 79.
Carpenter's Ford, 475.
Carrick's Ford, 43.
Carroll, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Samuel

S., 243. 337, 339, 417 note.
Casey, Maj.-Gen. Silas, 86, 90, 95,

96 97 99.
Cashtown Pass, 292, 356, 357.
Catlett's Station, 157, 371-375.
Catoctin Range, 183, 194, 356.
Cedar Creek, 364, 514.
Cedar Mountain, 145, 146, 149, 152,

156.
Cedar Run, 159, 371, 372.
Cemetery Hill, 293, 296, 299, 300,

308, 322, 325-327, 329, 336,

337, 339, 344, 347.
Cemetery Ridge, 296, 299, 300, 311,

324-329, 333, 334, 344, 345,

847, 349, 350.

582

INDEX.

Central Boad, 119, 126, 456, 494,

495 499.
CentreviUe, 43, 46-48, 62, 54-56,

60, 65, 84, 153, 169, 364, 371,

373-375, 378, 384.
CentreviUe Heights, 369, 370, 378,

379.
Cervantes, 441.
Chaffin's BlufiP, 488, 494.
Cliamberlain's Run, 526.
Chamberlin, Lieut. -Col. Thomas,

417-note.
Chambliss, Brig. -Gen. John R, 352.
Chambersbni^, 216, 291, 304, 340,

510.
Chambereburg Turnpike, 292, 355.
Chancellor House, 272, 276.
Cbancellorsville. 252, 254, 259, 260,

263, 264, 267, 268, 272, 274-

276, 279-282, 354, 859, 407-

410, 433.
Chantilly, 169, 170.
Chapman, Lieut -Col. William, 168.
Charles 1^ 557.
Charles City Court House, 458,

475.
Charles City Cross Roads, 120, 121,

124, 128.
Charles City Road, 117, 121.
Charles River Cross Roods, 120.
Charles River Road, 119, 123, 456.
Charleston Harbor, 40.
Charlestown, 64, 68-71.
Charlottesville, 454, 474.
Chase, Salmon P., 9.
Chattanooga, 401.
Chesapeake Bay, 78, 79, 135, 572.
Chester Gap, 284, 360.
Chesterfield, Lord, 12.
Chesterfield Bridge, 433.
Chesterfield Station, 442.
Chickahominy River, 77, 79, 90-98,

102, 105, 108, 109, 111, 112,

115-117, 119, 120, 122-124, 142-

144, 442, 444, 446, 447, 450,

451, 456-460, 475, 494.
Church of England, 4.
Cinga River, 234.
Citv Point, 461, 482, 483, 510, 512

' note-513, 518, 521, 554.
Civil War, 13, 17, 33-35, 37, 75, 83,

518.
Claiborne Road, 500, 502, 503, 507.
Clay Henry, 564.

Cobb, Brig.-Gen. Thomas R. R.,

110, 1%, 286.
Coggin's Point, 141.
CoM Harbor, 402, 435, 441, 448-

450, 454, 457, 461, 462, 474.
Coles Ferry, 458.
Colored Troops. 495.
Coh»ton. Briff.-Gen. R R, 266.
Columbia, 519.
Compromise of 1850, 38, 39.
Comstock, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Cyrus

B., 278.
Comte de Paris, 138.
Confederacy, 40, 282, 351, 507.
Confederate States. 518.
Congress, 215, 553.
Congressional Committee on the

Conduct of the War, 42, 47, 72,

179, 240, 308, 309, 314, 315.

821, 329 note-341, 486.
Constitution, 18, 77, 215.
Cooke, Brovet Maj.-Gen. Philip St.

G., 112, 114.
Cooper, Capt James H., 126, 131.
Corinth. 249.

Corps of En^neers, see Topographi-
cal Engineers, Corps of.
Corpus Christi, 13.
Cortes, 6.

Coster, Col. Charles R, 296.
Couch, Maj.-G^n. Darius N., 86, 90,

95-98, 115, 136, 182, 183, 198,

201, 209, 212, 254, 271-273, 277,

278, 281, 283. 439.
Cowan, Capt. Anarow, 344.
Cox, Brig.-Gen. Jacob D., 208.
Cox Road, 496.
Crampton's Gap, 182, 188, 189, 191,

194, 196, 201.
Crawford, Brevet Maj. -Gen. Samuel

W. , 335, 351, 468, 501-504, 528.
Crimean War, 33.

Crook, Maj.-Gen. G^ige, 440, 539.
Crossman, Lieut. -Col. H., 67.
Crump's Creek, 444-448.
Cub Dam Creek, 87.
Cub Run, 55.
Culp's Hill, 300, 301, 306, 324-526,

329, 334, 336, 339, 340, 850.
Culpeper, 217, 223, 232, 282-284,

286, 360, 366-369, 379, 401.
Culpeper Court House, 146, 152, 379.
Culpeper Ford, 409.
Culpeper Mine Ford, 388.

INDEX.

583

Cumberland, 512 note.
Cumberland Valley, 287, 357.
CuidsTille, 542.
Curtin, Andrew O., 41, 193.
Curtis, Maj.-Oen. Samuel K., 80.
Cushinff, I^eut Alonzo H., 344, 348.
Custer, Brevet Maj.-Gen., 352, 527,

528.
Cyrus, 58.

Dabney Mill Boad, 500, 501, 504,

509.
Dabney's Mill, 499.
Dade's Massacre, 10.
Dahlgren, Col. Ulric, 399.
Dallas, Commodore Alexander J.,

10.
Dana, Maj.-Gen. Napoleon J. T.,

133.
Danville, 532, 533, 535.
Davis, Jefferson, 24, 519, 532.
Dayton, 516 note.
Deatonsville, 536.
Deep Bottom, 31, 488, 494.
Deep Creek, 534.
Deep Run, 231, ^2, 234.
Dehon, Capt. Arthur, 240.
Delafield, Briff.-Gen. Richard, 74.
Delaware ana Chesapeake Canal,

135.
Delaware Bay, 135, 561.
Department of the East, 566.
Department of the Shenandoah, 513.
Department of the Susquehanna,

282.
Derby, Lieut. John, 491.
DeTrobriand, Brevet Maj.-Oen.

Philippi R, 331, 502, 503.
Detroit, 564, 565.
Devens, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles,

451.
DeviPs Den, 324, 327, 328, 331, 336.
Devin, Brevet Maj.-Qen. Thomas

C, 527.
Dinwiddle Court House, 503, 509,

523 527.
Directory, 77.

Division of the Atlantic, 566.
Dodd's House, 377.
Double Bridges, 477,478.
Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. Abner, 161,

239, 258, 292, 293, 302, 329.
Donthot's Landing, 475.
Bownsyille, 213.

Draft Riots, 865.

Dranesville, 80.

Drewry's Bluff, 438, 439, 464, 477,

488.
Duane. Brevet Brig.-Gen., 405.
Duane's Bridge, 115.
Dumas, Alexander. 61.
Duryea, Brevet Maj.-Gen Abram,

19a

Early, Lieut. -Gen. Jubal A., 54,88,
229, 236, 262, 275, 276, 291,
336, 337, 339, 382, 387, 423,
440, 453, 474, 486, 487, 509, 510,
512 note-514, 515, 516 note.

East Cemetery Hill, 316.

East Tennessee and Virginia Rail-
road, 439.

Ebro River, 234.

Edgebarton, 5.

Egan, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Thomas
W.. 502-504.

Elk Ridge, 180, 188, 201.

Ellerson^i Mill, 110.

Ellmaker, Col. Peter C, 383.

Ely's Ford, 255, 257, 258, 261, 268,
270, 273, 409.

Ely's Ford Road, 268.

Emmettsburg, 298, 303, 323, 332.

Emmettsburg Road, 308, 311, 317,
325-329, 333, 334.

England, 4, 5, 7.

English, 33, 199, 572.

Europe, 4, 35, 36, 515, 518, 560.

European Cavalry, 35.

European Infantry, 217.

European War, 434.

Evans, Brig.-Gen. Nathan G., 49,
60, 52, 56, 167.

Everehules, 10.

Ewell, Lieut -Gen. Richard S., 48,
49, 113. 119, 149, 160, 161, 284-
287, 290-293, 300, 301, 303,
336, 839, 340, 370-373, 375-
377, 381, 382, 387, 389, 390,
392, 411, 413, 427, 431, 454,
534, 536, 537.

Fair Oaks Station, 90, 91, 93, 95,
98-100, 102, 103, 108, 115, 116,
143.

Fairfax Court House, 46, 71, 169.

Fairfield, 336.

Fairfield Pass, 356, 357.

684

INDEX.

Fairmount Park, 12, 668.

Falling Waters, 53, 67.

Falmoath, 100, 144, 148, 156, 157.

170 225 227.
Farmville, 533, 535, 537-540, 546.
Farnsworth, Brig. -Gen. Elon J.,

332, 346, 352, 353.
Farragut, Bear Adm. David Q., 80,

519.
Federal Cavalry, 37.
Ferdinand VIL, 7.
Festus, PorcitxB, 23.
Fiie-Zouavea, 47, 53.
Fisher, CoL, 335.
Fisher^s Hill, 514.
Fitzhagh, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles

L., 344.
Fitzsimons, Thomas, 3.
Five Forks, 524r^27, 530.
Flanders, 571.
Flat Cieek, 536.
Florida, 8, 9, 10.
Fontenoy, 199.

Foote, Rear- Adm. Andrew H., 80.
Ford, Col. Thomas H., 197.
Ford Road, 528.
Fort Donalson, 80.
Fort Fisher, 507, 621.
Fort Gilmer, 494, 495, 498.
Fort Gregg, 632.
Fort Harrison, 494, 495, 498.
Fort Henry, 80.
Fort Howard, 621.
Fort Magruder, 87.
Fort ^lonroe, 43, 79, 81, 84, 398.
Fort Sedgwick, 524.
Fort Stedman, 521, 522.
Fort Siiinter, 40, 43.
Fort Whitworth, 632.
Foster, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Rohert S ,

484
Fox's Gap, 191, 193-196, 200.
France, 1, 4, 7, 29, 34, 38, 61.
Franco-Prussian War, 34, 35, 266,

343, 361.
Franklin, Maj.-Gen. William B.,

62, 87, 89, 90, 93, 116, 118-122,

124, 12S 129, 134-136, 149,169,

182, 183, 188-191, 194-198, 201,

204, 209, 225, 234, 235, 237,

238, 240, 244, 245.
Fraziers Farm, 128.
Frederick, 182-186, 192, 201, 212,

213, 287, 341, 366.

Frederick the Great, 34, 124, 517.

Fredericksburg, 100. 101, 142, 144,
148, 149, 152, 154, 166u 157,
22a-235, 242, 245-247, 250, 255-
263, 274, 275, 354, 359, 380,
397. 398, 407, 410.

Fredericksboig Railroad, 44L

Fredericktown, 185.

Fremont, Maj.-Oen. John C, 77,
103, 145.

French, Maj.-Gen. William H., 99,
114, 116, 118, 206, 200, 242.
243, 263, 270, 271, 288, 340, 341,
859, 360, 381-383, 387, 388, 390-
392 397.

French, 34, 36, 58, 59, 199, 342.

French Occapation of Mexico, 551 .

Frizzellburg, 303.

Front Royta, 43, 44, 360.

Fugitive Slave Law, 39.

Gaines's Mill, 111-113, 115-117,

122, 124, 126, 139, 143.
GainesviUe, 160, 161, 170, 223, 374,

380.
Gku'land, Brig. -Gen. Samuel, Jr.,

193.
Gamett, Brig. -Gen. Richard R,

346.
Geary, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John W.,

267, 270, 273, 307-311, 319-

322, 329, 340.
Georgia, 619, 566.
German Batteries, 126, 132.
German Cavalry, 35, 36.
Germanna Ford, 255, 257, 258, 260,

261, 368, 388, 408, 409.
Germans, 34, 36, 266, 267.
Getty, Brevet Maj. -Gen. George W.

243, 412, 413, 451.
Gettvsburg, i!29, 287, 290-293, 295-

299, 301-308, 310-318, 324-

328, 3^^-339, 342, 343, 351,

354-368, 362, 370, 397, 401,

466, 566.
Gibbon, Maj.-Gen. John, 161, 196,

i;39, 240, 268, 1^98, 312, 334,

347-349, 416, 416, 424, 468,

473, 490, 492, 546.
Gilmore, Maj.-Gen. Quincy A., 437.
Gladv's Run, 424.
Glendale, 128.
Globe Tavern, 490, 493, 496, 498.

500.

INDEX.

685

Gloncester, 437.

Oodwin, Brig.-Oen. A. C, 383.

Golding»8 Farm, 92, 105, 108, 115,
116.

Ooldsboio', 618.

Oordon, Brevet Maj.-Qen. George
H., 162.

Gordon, Lieat-Gen. John R, 336,
418, 428, 621, 634, 536-638.

Gordonsville, 105, 149, 276, 413.

Grosport Navy Yard, 81.

Gould, Major John M., 468.

Graham, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Charles
K., 331.

Graham, Major James D., 10.

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., 80, 84, 176,
249, 356, 363-365, 396, 401-411,
413, 414, 419, 420, 422, 425,
430-482, 434, 435, 437-440, 442,
448-450, 464, 456, 467, 459-
467, 470 note-475, 476, 480, 482,
486-488. 496, 496, 601, 503,
607, 609-.515, 516 note, 617-
620, 626, 529, 530, 634, 640-
660, 552, r54.

Grapevine Bridge, 120, 124.

Gravelly Run, o26.

Great Britain, 11.

Greek Chorus, 16.

Greeks, 68.

Greeley, Horace, 215.

Greene, Brevet Maj.-Gen. George
S., 337.

Greenwich, 372, 373.

Greg^, Brevet Maj.-Gen. David
McN., 236, 332, 351, 352, 366,
368, 369, 376, 441-443, 476,
488, 490, 493, 497, 499, 600,
504, 508, 509.

Gregg, Brevet Maj.-Gen. J. Irvin,
352.

Griffin, Maj.-Gen. Charles, 63, 114,
243, 261, 411, 497, 601, 628,
630, 636.

Groachy, Marquis de, 390.

Groveton, 160, 167, 170.

Guinea's Station, 229, 230, 232.

Gustavus, Adolphus, 217.

Hagerstown, 65, 186, 187, 356, 357.
Hagerstown Road, 192.
Halifax Road, 478, 479, 493, 496.
Halleck, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., 80,
84, 141, 142, 146-148, 156, 169,

Halleck — Ccmiinued,

164, 168, 169, 176-179, 181, 187,
197, 213, 214, 216, 222, 226-
227, 249, 281, 284, 288, 289,
360, 361, 380, 385, 397, 398,
407, 464, 610, 611, 512 note-
513.

Hamburg Pass, 356.

Hamilton Crossing, 236.

Hampton, Lieut -Gen. Wade, 230,
352, 440, 474-478, 504.

Hampton Roads, 81, 487.

Hancock, 66.

Hancock, Maj. Gen. Winfield S.,
87, 88, 211, 242, 243, 246, 261,
264, 267, 270, 271, 273, 282,
297-303, 305, 307-315, 317,
819-321, 323, 328, 329, 332, 334,
837, 339, 348, 349, 370, 405,
409-418, 423-426, 428-434, 447,
448, 461,459-461, 464-469, 484,
488, 490-493, 499-606, 613, 514.

Hannibal, 34, 61, 618.

Hanover Court House, 100, 101,
445, 447, 450.

Hanover Junction, 160, 164, 432,
433.

Hanover Street, 246.

Hanovertown, 435.

Harper*s Ferry, 63-66, 68, 70, 179-
182, 185-191, 194-198, 203,
207, 209, 213, 214, 216, 286,
288, 340, 360.

Harrisburg, 290, l92, 303.

Harrisburg Road, 293.

Harrisonburg, 616 note.

Harrison's Bar, 140.

Harrison's Creek, 469.

Harrison's Landing, 93, 137, 141,
141-146.468.

Hartranft, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John
F., 522.

Hartwood, 226.

Haskell, Capt., 377.

Hatch, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John P.,
162, 163, 165, 192, 193, 194.

Hatcher's Run, 497, 499^04, 606-
609, 521, 523, 626, 628, 631.

HatteraB Inlet, 79.

Havana, 10.

Hawes's Shop, 446, 446, 448.

Haxairs Landing, 93, 134, 136,
442.

Hay market Road, 166.

586

INDEX.

Hays, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alexander,
267, 334, 336, 339, 346, 372,

376, 377, 382.

Hazard, Brevet Brig.-€^n. John G.,
344.

Hazel Grove, 270, 271.

Hazel River, 384.

Hazel Run, 231.

Hazlett, Lieat. Charles R, 344.

Heckman, Brig. -Gen. Charles A.,
495.

Heintzelman, Maj.-Gen. Saninel P.,
62, 60, 86, 90, 94, 95, 98, 117-
119, 121, 124, 129, 134, 135,
162, 163, 168.

Henry House, 53, 171.

Henry House Hill, 50, 51, 54, 56,
167, 168.

Henry House Plateau, 50, 60.

Hercules^ 103.

Heth, Maj.-Gen. Henry, 291, 346,
847, 376.

High Bridge, 535, 538, 511.

High Knob Pass, 356.

Hill, Lieut -Gen. Ambroise P., 110,
113, 119, 120, 130, 149, 161,
181, 182, 197, 203, 208, 210,
212, 229, 230, 232, 236, 266,
270, 282--J86, 291-293, 300, 303,
331, 341, 342, 346, 370, 375-

377, 381, 387, 392, 411-416,
423 473.

Hill, Lieut. -Gen. Daniel H, 88, 95,
113, 136, 160, 184, 186, 187,
189, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198,
229, 236.

Hinks, Brevet Maj.-Gen. £dward
W. 464.

Hinton's Mills, 160.

Hirtius, Aulus, 183.

Hofmann. Brevet Brig. -Gen. J.
William, 417 note.

Hoke, Maj.-Gen. Robert R, 336,
339, 382, 383.

Holmes, Lieut -Gen. Theophilus
H, 129.

Homer, 113.

Hood, Gen. John B., 163, 168, 187,
236, 282, 283, 305, 331, 333,
316, 519.

Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Joseph, 86, 87,
90, 98, 99, 115, 126, 129, 130,
134, 141, 160, 162, 163, 165,
166, 191-193, 204-206, 208,

Hooker— C(m<miiecL

212, 225, 235, 237, 250-254,
256-264, 266, 267, 269-284,
286-289, 341, 404, 407.

House of Representatives, 60.

Howard, Maj.-Gen. Oliver O., 52,
54, 99, 243, 254, 292, 296, 297,

Huger, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin, 85, )^,
96, 106, 119, 120, 130, 136.

Humphreys, Maj.-Gen. Ajidrew A.,
135, 201, 212, 243, 244, 246, 261,
310, 312, 331, 33a-335, 357,
359, 369, 370, 374, 378, 379,
387, 394, 405, 419, 434, 457,
460, 464, 469, 493, 499, 500,
504, 505, 508, 522, 523, 525,
526, 530, 531, 533, 535-546.
549, 568.

Hunt, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Henry J.,
123, 234, 316, 321-^3, 334,
344-346,405.

Hunter, Maj.-Gen. David, 60, 77,
439, 440, 454, 474^ 510-513.

Hunting Creek, 74.

Hustler, William, 4.

Ilerda, 234.

Illinois, 552.

Imboden. Brig.-Gen. John D., 286.

Independence Hall, 553.

Indianapolis, 80.

Indians, 10

Indian Wars, 58.

Ingalls, Brevet Maj.-Gen. RufusL

405.
Ireland^ 2.

Irvin, Lieut.-Col. John, 417 note.
Italy, 34.

Jackson, Andrew, 571.

Jackson, Brig.-Gen. Conrad Feger,
240.

Jackson, Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J.,
** Stonewall,*' 43, 50, 60,67, 94,
101, 103, 105-107, 110, 113,
117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 129,
134, 137, 144-146, 149, 151-
155, 158, 159, 161-169, 181,
182, 184-187, 189-191, 194-
198, 203, 209, 217, 223, 227,
228, 233, 236, 237, 245, 264-
270, 272, 28 », 285.

Jacob's Ford, 387, 388.

Jamea, O. P. B., SO.

James Biver, 31, 79, S6, 87, 01, 93,
106, 108, 111, 116-llS, 120,
121, 123, 134, 136-138, HI,
144, 145, 264, 406, 4S7, 433,
440, 442, 444, 448, 454, 456,
468-460, 462, 464, 468, 471,
476-477, 480-48y, 487-4S9,
494-496, 498, 506, 560.

Jamea River Canal, 615.

JamU't Depot, 477, 479.

Jefferson, 158.

Jenkins, Brig-.Gen. Albert G., 286,
352.

Jenisalem Hank Road, 479, 489,
493 621, 624.

Jetenville, 534, 536.

Johnaon, Andrew, 652, 563.

Johnson, Samuel, 20.

Johnaton, Gen. JoHepb E., 44-49,
56, 02-66, 68-73, 86. 87, 89, 97,
99, 336, 337, 339, 382, 418,519,
633,651.

Jomini, Baroa Henri, 33, 127, 128,
218.

Jones, Haj.Oen. Itavid R., 167,
187, 336.

Jones'a Brid^ 46& 476.

Jura Houulains, 344.

Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 38.
Kanawha Vallev, 474, 510.
Kant, Immanuel, 77.
Kauti, Brevet Maj.-Oen. Augtut

v., 437, 438, 463, 478, 479,

484, 494, 498.
Kearny, Mai..Oen. Philip, 86, 87,

90, 95, 98, 116, 126, 129, 133,

134.162, 163, 166, 166, 170.
Keim, Brig, Gen. WiUiam H., 67.
Kelly's Ford, 156, 255, 267, 268,

381-384.

r, Mai.-Gen. James L., 167,

346.

Kentucky, 80, 83.
Kerns (%t. Abu-k, 126.
Eerwin, CapL, 503.
Ketland, John, 4.
Ketland, Thomas, 4
EetUe Knn, 375, 376.
Key, CapL, 207.
Key West, 563.

Keys, Mal.-Qen. Etamnne D., 68,

86, SO, 94, 95, 98, 116, 120, 124,

129, 136.
Key's Ferry 69.
Kllpatrick, Maj..Gen. Jndson, 332,

346, 362, 3fe, 35'1, 399.
King, Brig.-Gen. Rutno, 14S, 149,

162, 164, 156, 162, 163.
Kinglake, Alexander W., 33.
Kiriiy, Brig.-Oen. Edmund, 97.
Knoiville, 405.
Kosciusko, ThaddeiiB, 353.
Kuha, LieuL James Hamilton, 131.

lake Superior, 665.

Lake Survey, 563, 664, 666.

Lane, Brig..Gen. James H , 236.

Laurel Hill, 668.

law, Mai-Gen. E. Mclver, 163,
306, 331.

lAWton, Brig.-Gen. Alexander R.,
161, 181.

Lead Works, 531.

Ledlie, Btis. Oen. James B., 468.

Lee, Maj.-Gen. Fitzbugh, 1, 202,
362, 366, 868, 42t, 422, 446,
474-477, 634, 537, 541, 547.

lee, " Light Horse Harry," 1.

Lee, Gen. Robert E.. 1, 2, 61, 75,
77, 94, 99, 103, 106-107, 110,
113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 124,
129, 145, 148, 154, 156, 157-
160, 164-166, 169, 172, 178,
179, 181, 183-187, 189, 190,
191, 196, 198, 200-203, 206,
208-210, 212, 213, 216, 217,
223-233, 236-237, 246, 246,263,
254, 256-280, 262-266, 267.271,
272, 274-276, 282-288, 291,292,
301, 302, :iii.5, :!Oti, 313.324, 328,
331, 340-.'J43.3-!7, 349,364-370,
373. 377, 378 -389, 392. 393, 397-
399, 401,405-410, 413, 414, 421,
423, 430-4H4, 43U, 440, 442, 446,
448, 463, '!54, 456, 461, 462, 467,
477, 486, 4H7, 483, 491, 520, 621,
623, 633-549.

Lee, Rear-Adm. Samuel P., 437.

Lee, Mfli.-Gen. William H. F., 229,
477, 478.

Lee's Hiil, 230, 242, 246.

Lee's Mills, 85.

Leeaburg. 65, 66, 68-72, 287.

Urida, 234.

588

INDEX.

Licksville. 183.

Lincoln, Abraham, 9, 24, 25. 41,42,
62, 77, 81, 83, 84, 100-102. 138-
140, 173-177. 214-217, 222,225.
246, 249. 281, 284, 297. 353, 360.
361, 510. 513, 518, 550, 552, 553.

Lindsay, Col. William, 10.

Little Fort Valley, 516 note.

Little River, 432.

Little River Turnpike, 169.

Little Roand Top Mountain, 307,
308, 311, 317, 320, 822-329,330
note-331-333, 335, 336, 342,
344, 346, 353.

Little Washin^n, 148.

Lockwood, Bng.-Gen. Henry H.,
330,334.

Locust Grove, 388.

Lodi. 364.

Logan's Cross Roads, 80.

Logistics, 31.

Long, Brig.-Qen. Armistead L.,
291 316.

Long Bridge^ 60, 117, 458.

Long Bridge Road, 458.

Long Island Railroad, 9.

Longstreet, Lieut -Gen. James, 88,
95, 113. 119, 120, 130, 159, 160,
163-169, 186, 187, 193, 217, 223,
226, 227, 232, 236, 237, 242, 246,
264, 282-286, 291, 292, 331.
341-343, 346, 365, 413-417,
420. 450. r)34, 537, 538, 546.

Lookout Mountain, 365.

Loudon County, 516, note.

Loudon Heights, 180-182, 189, 196,
197 214.

Loudon Valley, 360.

Louisiana Purchase, 38.

*' Louisiana Tigers," 339.

Luray Valley, 616, note.

Lynchburg, 439, 440, 456, 474, 476,
510, 533, 535, 538, 540, 546, i
547. I

McAllister. Brevet Maj.-Gen. Rob-
ert, 503.

Macaulay, Thomas B., 16.

McCall, Brig. -Gen. George A., 109- :
112, 123-126, 128, 130, 131, ,
132, 144, 193, 666.

McCandless, Col. William, 336, 351.

McClellan, Lieut. -Col. Carswell, ,
419, 460. J

McClellan, Maj.-Gen. George R,
24, 43, 60, 73-76, 81-87, 89, 96,
98-102, 106-108, 11^120, 122,
123, 125, 134, 136, 137-144,
146, 147, 149, 153, 168, 169,
173-179, 181-191, 194, 196,
197, Ijfe, 200-204, 206-218,
220-226, 237, 249, 356, 358,
447, 467, 566.

McCoy's Ferry, 216.

McDowell, Maj.-Gen. Inrin, 45, 46,
48, 49, 51-56, 68-73> 100, 101,
103, 142, 145, 148, 149, 157,
160, 162, 163, 171, 174^176.

McGee*s House, 112.

McGilvery, Lieut -CoL Freeman,
335, 344.

Mcintosh, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John
R, 362.

MacKemde, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Ron-
ald, 527.

McLaws, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette, 182,
188, 189, 191, 195, 19^198,
203, 236, 276, 278, 282, 2S3»
881, 333, 346.

McLean's Ford. 55.

McPherson's Ridge, 294.

Magruder, Maj.-Gen. John R, 85,
86, 117-120, 13i>.

Mahone, Maj.-Gen. William, 188,
478, 504.

Malvern HiU, 93, 104, 108, 120.
121, 124-126, 12^^, 129, 134,

135, 137, 138, 141, 144-146,
456_458.

Mallory's Ford, 476.

Manassas, 38, 43, 44, 50, 6S-71, 81,

84, 163, 164, 158, 160, 284.
Manassas Gap, 360.
Manassas Gap Railroad, 43, 65, 169.
Manassas Junction. 43-46, 64. 66.

149. 223, 413.
Manchester, 304, 312.
Mansfield, Maj.-CTen. Joseph K. F.,

204-206, 2a.
Marathon, 67.
March to the Sea, 519.
Marcv, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Randolph

fi., 141.
Marengo, 364.
Marienthal, 363.
Marignano, 572.
Marsh Creek, 355.
Marshall, Lieut -Col. Charles, 547.

Hftnhall, Brevet Haj.-Oeii. E. O,,

lea

Mutindiile, Brevet Uaj.-Oen. John
H., 451, 404.

Hutinsburg, M, 67, 68, TO, 162,
1S5, 19d, 212, 213.

Haije's Hill, WO, 231, 236, 241,
242,274.

Maryland, 25, 178, 179, 181, 184,
185, 211,213, 214,666.

Marjland Heights, 65, 180-182,
18S, 189, l»j~lgs, 209, 212,
214, 286, 288.

Massachnsetu, 10.

Massaponu River, 231, 236.

MoDB^na, 29.

Mat River, 436.

Matadequin Creek, 444, 446, 448.

Hattapony River, 79, 81, 90, 431,
435, 444.

HaxiiuiliaD, Ferdinand Joseph, 551.

Meade, Cathariike, 3.

Meade, Garrett, 3.

Meade, Garrett and Geoi^, 3.

Meade, George, 3, 4, 6.

Meade, George & Co., 3.

Meade, Col. George, 820, 338, 668.

Meade, Mai.-Gea. George G,, 1, 2,
6, 8-l^ 87, 101, IW, 111-114,
121, 12.5-127, 130-132, 134,
144, 167, 161, 167, 168, 170-
172, 192-194, 205, 211, 212,
239, 241, 254, 25S, 260-262,
268, 289, 272-274, 277, 278,
281, 28U-291, 297-299, 301-
804, 306-324, 326, 328-330,
83J-341, 345, 348, 350, 354-
366, 358-361, 363-371, 373,
378-386, 387, 390-399, 4U1, 403,
406, 407, 411, 412, 419-423,
423, 425, 428. 431, 418-450,
467, 459-461, 463, 466, 467-4S9,
470note-472, 476, 478^80, 483,
486, 489, 491, 493, 496, 498,
501-503, 608, 513-.116. 617,
521. 622, 5:'6, 6-i9, 531, 633-
636, 638, 639, 542, 545, 546, 649,
661, 664-659, 581-664, 666-673.

Uesde, Richard Woraam, 1, 2. 4
6, 7.

Meade, Robert, 2.

Meadow Bridge, 92, 109^ 442.

Meagher, Bng.-Uei). Thomas F.,
99, 114, 116, 136.

MecbanicsTiUe, 90, 92, 109, 111,

117, 139, lib, 442.
Mechanicaville Britke, 9% 109, 442.
MeherriD River, 47^ 608.
Meigs, Lieut John R., 616 note.
"Merritaac," 81, 84, 106.
Merritt, Maj.-Qen. Wesley, .332,

346, 362, 422, 441, 442.
Metcalf, Lieut. Richard, 503, 504.
Methuselnh, 305.
Mexican War, 13, 31, 37, 42, 63,

74, 558, 669.
Mexico, 12, 178, 551, 558.
Meiico, City of, 15.
Middleburg, 304, 362.
Middle MiiitsiT Division, 514.
Middtetovn, 183, 194, 290.
Miles, Col. Dixon 8., 55, 181, 188,

Miles, ilaj..«en. Nelson A., 267,

271, 376, 490, 492, 605, 525,

530-532.
Military Academy, 9.
Milford, 369.
Mill Sluice, 231, 242.
Millwood, 71.
Milrov, Ma;.-Gen. Robert H., 103,

161, 162, 171, 286.
Mine Run, 261, 364, 386, 386, 389,

392-3J4, V.m, 397, 407, 409.
Mineral Siiring Run, 263.
Min^n's Ferry, 475.
Missionary Ridge, 365,
Missiaalppi, 249.
Mississippi Rirer, 11, 80, 148, 356,

554.
Miaaouri, 38, 39, 43.
Missouri Compromise, 38, 664.
Mitchell, Alexander, 56L
Mitchell, Capt., 377.
Mobile Bav, 619.
Moltke, Count von, 147, 517.
" Monitor," 8L
Monocacy River, 183, 216, 304, 440,

487, 510, 612 note.
Monlerey, 11
Monte re;r I'ass, 366.
Mordecai, Maj. Alfred, 74.
Morgan, Bng,-6ea. Charles H.,

376, 465.
Morrill, Mai.-Oen. G«orM W., 90,

109, 112,114, lS6t 167, 16Bl

590

INDEX.

lomas

Mosby, GoL John 8., 516 note.
Mott, Maj.-Gen. Oenhon, 426, 427,

473, 490, 493, 498, 502.
Moantain Creek, 882, 384.
Mountain Bon, 882, 386.
Mount Airy, 9.
Mount Crawford, 516 note.
Mount Hope, 9.
Mud March, 247, 253.
Mummasburg, 304.
Mummasburg Boad, 293, 295, 355.

Naglee, Brig.-G^n. Henry M., 128.

Napoleon, see Bonaparte.

Na8hville,519.

National Boad, 192, 195, 196.

Ne^ley, Maj.-Gen. James P^ 67.

Neill, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Thorn

H., 451.
Nelson's Farm, 128.
Nevin, Col. David J., 851.
New Baltimore, 223.
Newbem, 80.
New Bridge, 90, 109, 119.
Newcastle, 450.
Newcastle Ferry, 449.
New Cold Harbor, 112, 450.
New England, 20.
New Hope Church, 391, 392.
New Jersey, 4.
Newmarket, 439.
New Market Boad, 120, 126, 456,

494 495 499.
New Market Cro^ Boads, 120, 121,

124, 125-129, 132, 134^ 139,

143, 144, 212.
New Orleans, 60, 80, 440, 474, 487.
New Store, 540, 541, 544
Newton, Brevet Maj.-Gen. John,

114, 311, 330, 391, 394.
New Verdiersville, 389.
New York Biots, 365.
NichoUs, Brig. -Gen. Francis T.,

336.
Non-Importation Besolutions, 3.
Norfolk, 85, 106.
North Anna Biver, 79, 432, 433,

435, 441, 443-445, 474, 475.
North Carolina, 156, 507, 518.
Northeastern Boundary, 11, 12.
Northern Cavalry, 36.
North Fork, 10.
Nottoway Biver, 477-479.
Ny Biver, 435.

Oak HiU, 293, 295, 296, 306.

Oak Hill Bidge, 294.

Ocooqaan, 46.

Old Church Boad, 445

Old Cold Harbor, 450.

Old Guard, 571.

Old Stage Boad, 231, 236.

Old TnmpikeKoad, 260, 261, 263»

265, 266, 270.
0]dVerdieravUle,S89.
Opequon Creek, 514, 516 note.
Orange and Alexandria Bailroad,

&, 46, 149, 157, 170, 866, .^69,

870, 371, 373, 380, 381, 386.
Orange Court House, 224, 228, 242,

^8 407.
Orange Pbink Boad, 410-412, 416.
Orange Turnpike, 410, 411.
Ord, Maj.-Gen. Edwaid O. C, 494,

495, 523, 535, 540, l;43, 546.
Orleans, 15&

Osbom, Brcvet CoL Thomas W. , 268.
Ox Ford, 484.

Palatinate, 515.

Palo Alto, 18.

Pamunkey Biver, 79, 87, 89, 90, 93,

102, 106, 116, 145, 43^), 442-

446, 448, 449, 454, 462.
Pan, 57.
Panic, 55, 57.
Paris, 864.
Parke, Maj.-Gen. John G., 49^-498,

500, 501, 521, 522, 524, 531,

533,546.
Parker's Store, 388, 391, 409, 411.
Parr's Bidge, 304.
Panons, firevet-Maj. Charles C,

344.
Patterson, Maj.-Gen. Bobert, 14, 41,

43-45, 61-72.
Peach Orchaid, 327, 328, 331, 333,

336.
Pea Bidge, 80.
Peebles' Farm, 497, 498.
Pegram, Maj.-Gen. John, 418.
P^lissier, G^n. A. J. J., 199.
Pender, Maj.-Gen. WQliam D., 236.
Pendleton, Brig. -Gen. William N.,

344.
Peninsula, 73, 79, 82-85, 87, 101,

117, 141, 144-147, 156, 157,

162, 173, 212, 21i 220, 404,

438, 447, 477.

INDEX.

591

Peninsular Gampaign, 193, 444, 458.

Peninsular War, 5.

Pennington, Brevet Brig. -Gen.
Alexander C. M., 352.

Pennsylvania, 1, 2, 25, 41, 134, 185,
193, 510.

Pennsylvania Beserves, 41, 80, 92,
101-104, 109, 111, 113-116,
121-128, 130, 132-134, 136, 139,
144, 157, 162, 171, 172, 192,

193, 205, 211, 239, 240, 333,
335, 351, 566.

Pensacola, 11.

Perkinson's Mills, 536.

Persian Empire, 58.

Persians, 57.

Perth Amboy, 4.

Peters' s Bridge, 479.

Petersburg, 33, 402, 403, 406, 438,
439, 465, 457, 459, 460-465,
467-473, 476-478, 481, 482,
484-487, 489, 490, 493, 496-
499, 505-509, 519, 521, 524,
531-533, 546, 550.

Petersburg and Lynchburg Bail-
road, 476, 496-^00, 503, 524,
530-533, 538, 546.

Petersburg and Norfolk Bailroad,
469, 479.

Petersburg and Weldon Bailroad,
471-473, 476-479, 488, 489,
496, 498, 508, 521.

Petersburg Mine, 483.

Pettigrew, Brig.-Gkn. J. Johnston,
291 346 347.

Philadeiphia^ 2, ^ 4, 8, 11, 41, 135,
405, 553, 55^-558, 561, 563,
565, 566, 568, 5(39.

Pickett, Maj.-Gen. George E, 236,

305, 346, 347, 34^-352, 365,
467, 526, 527.

Pierce, Col. L B., 503.

Pipe Creek, 291, 298, 299, 302, 304,

306, 310, 314.
Pittsburg, 566.
Pittsburg Landing, 249.

Plank Boad, 260, 261, 263-265, 269,

270, 411.
Pleasanton, Maj.-Gen. Alfred, 183,

194, 210, 268, 283, 286, 331,
367,368.

Pleasant Valley, 188, 189, 191, 194-

198, 200, 20L
Plum Bon, 327, 328, 334.

Plum Bun Bidge, 335.

Po Biver, 423, 424, 426, 435.

Point of Bocks, 65, 66.

Pond, Capt., 499.

Pope, Maj.-Gen. John, 73, 14&-160,
162-164, 166, 169, 171, 172,
174-177, 182, 223. 283, 284.

Poplar Springs Chureh Boad, 497.

Port Conway, 255, 257, 268.

Porter, Brig. -Gen. Andrew, 50, 52.

Porter, Maj.-Gen. Fitz-John, 89,
90, 93, 100, 102, 111, 114-116,
124, 125, 129, 135, 136, 157,
162, 163, 165-167, 171, 205,
208-210.

Port Hudson, 355.

Port Boyal, 231, 254-258.

Port Walthall, 463.

Potomac Biver, 43, 60, 65-67, 74,
78, 81, 82, 100, 14i 147, 159,
175, 177-183, 185, 188, 190,
191, 196, 198, 201, 212-214,
216, 220, 224, 285-287, 341,
356, 357, 359, 510. 512 note.

Potter, Maj.-Gen. Bobert B., 468,
497.

Powhite Creek. Ill, 112.

Prince Edwara Court House, 538,
546.

Prince Eugene, 49.

Prince George Court House, 477.

Prince, Brig. -Gen. Henry, 389.

Proclamation of Emancipation, 249.

Prospect Hill, 230.

Prospero, 301.

Prussians, 34, 35.

Puerto de Santa Maria, 7.

Quaker Boad, 124, 125, 523.

Queen's Creek, 87.

Quitman, Maj.-Gen. John A., 13, 14.

Baccoon Ford, 386.

Bandol, Brevet Brig. -Gen. Alanson
M., 126, 131, SS2.

Bandolph, Capt. George E, 320.

Bansom, Maj.-Gen. Bobert, Jr., 236.

Bapidan Biver, 79, 84, 153-156,
227, 228, 230, 254, 255, 257,
258, 261, 269, 272, 282, 360,
361, 364-368, 380, 384-388,
392, 397, 398. 401, 402, 404,
407-411, 418. 437, 482.

BamM^hamiock Biyer, 79, 149, 153,

iu_

692 aOBX.

iUppahannock River — OanHmied. Boukoke IiUnd, 80.

155-15R, 160, 170, 22S-232, 23S, Robertson'a Ford, SSa, 387.

239, 246, 247, 264-269, 261, Robertson's Store, 38S.

263, 2Gt, 289, 270, 274, 276, Robert*)n'e Tnirenj, 388. 389, 391,

278, 281-^283, 380, 361, 36S, 392, 407, 409.

367, 369, 374, 3;»-384, 406, Robioeon, Brevet Haj.-Qen. Joho

4U8, 409, 4ia C. 330, 417 note

Rappahannock Station, l&S, 166, Bobinaon Hoote. 61-

380-382, 384. Rock Creek. 2M, 325, 344, 3J5.

BeamB's SUtion, 477-479, 490,491, Rodea, Hai.-Oen. Robert E., 266,

608. 336, 382.

Bebec, 572. Boman Power, 34

Rectoratown, 220. Rome, 618.

Red HoDse Ford, 51, 62. Rortj.Capt Jamea McK., 344, 348.

Beno, Maj.-Oen. Jesse L., 166, 162, Boeecrans, Maj.-Oen. William P.,

165, 168, 188, 191, 193-196, 204. 79, 365, 366.

Be«ftca de la Palma, 13, 660. Roeaer, Maj.-Oeii. Thomas L., 230.

Bernolds, Maj.-Gen. John F., 109, Bound Top, 308.310, 311, 320. 321,

112, 114, 116, 126, 132, 144, 324-329, 331, 332, 335. 342.

167, 161, 162, 164-167, 170, Rowaoty Creek, 490.

171, 193, 211, 238, 264, 269, Bager, Brevet Haj.-Gen. Thomas

274, 277, 278, 281, 292, 29S, H., 330,34a

302-306, 331. Rtueell, Brevet Hai..Oeti. David
Bice, Brig.-Gen., James G, 417, a. A., 383, 461.

RW.SiBiinn fi.1i fi.ifi 637. Rassell, Lord John, 361.

56, 90, 93, 99, 115, 128, 136, 206, Sabine River, 11.

209, 211. Sackett, Brevet Maj..Oea. Deloe B.,
Richmond, 25, 26, 43, 77-81, 84,86, 207, 208.

88-92, lOO, 102-104, 108, 109, Sadowa, 351.

116, 117, 119, 120, 123,124, Sailor's Creek, 636-^38.

137, 141, 143, 144, 140, 149. Sainl Joseph's Church, 3.

186, 212, 217, 224, 22.^, 231, Sl Louie, 666.

236, 255, 268, 282, .105, 367, Saint Mark's Church, 668.

879, 399, 404, 406, 4i 7, 432, Saint Mary's Catholic Church, 4.

435, 438-442, 444-146, 448, Saint Paut 23, 83.

450, 454-466, 45S, 459, 4fi4, Salem, 159.

472, 474-477, 4al-i84, 486- Salem Heights, 276.

488, 498, 607, 515, 624, 632, Saltillo, 13.

633, 640, 660, 651. Samaon, 548.

Bichmond and Danville Bailroad Sand Kev, 663.

476, 524, 631-634. Sanfoid, Gen., 68.

Bichmond and Fredericksburg Rail- "San Francisco," 68.

road. 431-433, 474. San Juan d'Ulloa, 14.

Richmond and York Biver B&il SanU Carolina, 7.

rood, 90, 91, 99. 108, 117, 1-J2. Savage's Station, 96, 108, 117-120,
Bickctt^ Brevet Maj.-Gen. James rJ2, 123, 129.

B.,53, 148, 152, 180, 162, 163, Savannah, 619.

166-167, 193, 376, 451. Scheibert, Maj. J., 36.

Biddle. Maj. William. 212 Schenck, Maj.-Gen. Robert C..52,
Riddle's Shop, 45<<. 161, 162.

RiltenhonHe,Capt.BenjaminF.,344 Schimmelpfennig, Brig-Gen. Alex-
River Road, 261. ander, 161, SS3.

Schuylkill, 668.

Scott's Dmd, 261, 263 270.

Scott, Brevet Lient.-Qen. Winfieid,
10, 14, 24, 44, 46, 60-65, 67-
71, 74, 214.

Secesaion, 18, 40.

Sedgwick, Haj. 0«n John, 90, 07,
m, 115, 128, 138, 136, 206, 209,
264, 26S. 269, 262, S64, 269,
274-276, 278, 279, SI2, 368,
3S1-384, 390, 394, 396. 398,
40i, 408, 409, 423, 424, 426.

Seminal? Ridge, 294, 296, 800, 301,
32 1. 320, 327, 348, 349, S66.

BemiDoles, 10.

Beminolc War, 10, 12,660.

Senunes, Brig -Oen Paul J., ISS.

Sergeant, Hon. John, 11, 668.

Sergeant, Margaretta, 11, 668.

Seven DsTs' Battlea, 108. 138, 146,

Seven Pines, 90, 91, 93, 95, 100, 108,
115, 117, 143.

Seward, William H., 42, 176.

SeTmonr, Brevet Maj.-Oen. Truman,
109, 110, 112, 114. 1211, 130,
132, 135, 144, 168, 171, 193, 205.

Shad/ Grove Church, 101).

Shady Grove Church Road, 447,

Bhaler. Brevet Maj.-Gea. Alexan-
der, 340.

Shand House. 468.

Shenandoah Vallej. 25, 44, li^, 72,
78, 101, Iffil, 105, 149, 151,168,
179, 185, 2l2, 213, 216, 217,
223, 284-287, 360, Stifi. 437,
439, 474, 480, 487, 607, 610,
611, 615, 516 note.

SbepherdBtowD, 201, 212.

Bheridan, Gen. Philip H.. 36, 36,
364, 406, 413-^22. 435, 441-
443, 445, 446, 448-^60, 464,
465, 473-477, 479, 480, 484,
487, 607, 609-618, 523-526, 62»-
631, 538, e.'M. 636-638, 640,
643, 544, 646, 647. 661, 668.

Rheiman. Hon. John. 65.

Sherman, Gen. William T , 61, 62,
363, 364, 401, 406. 437, 511,
618-630,633.651.654.

Shiloh, 80, 249.

Shore Boad, 120. 260, 281, 270.

Sickiei, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E., 99,
136, 223, 254, 261, 264, 268-
270, 277, 307-312, 317, 819-
82i 326-334, 336, 361.

Sicoris Biver, 234.

Sigel, Hai.-Gen. Fnni, 145, 148,
152, 153, 166, 162, 166, 167,
437, 439.
mmona. Col. Seneca G., 126, 130,

132.
mpson. Brevet Brig.-Geo. Jame*
H., 67.

Sinclair, Col. WiUiam T., 240.

Bkinke^B Neck, 229, 230, 232, 233,
255.

Slocum, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., 90,
113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 128,
130, 136, 209, 2"i4, 260-202,
308, 310, 311, 319, 345.

Smith, Gen. Edmund Kirby, 64, 60;

Smith, Maj.-Gen. Guslavua D., 95,
97.

Smith, Maj.-Gen. William F., S6-
90, llfr-118, 128, 136, 209. 437,
439, 448-453, 460-168, 470

Snicker's Gap, 286.

Society of the Friendlr Sons of St

Patrick, 4.
South Anns River, 79, 435, 448,

450.
South Carolina, 519.
Southern Cavalry, 36.
Sonthem Confederacr, 18, 20, 34,

26.
South Moontain, 179, ISO, 1S3, 186,

186, 188-194, 300, 204, 214,

287, 356, 368.
South Mountain Range, 187, 190,

192, 195, 196, 201, 2iD2, 292.
South Side Railroad, 496, 600.
Spain, 2, 3, 6-8, 234.
Sperryville, 148.
Spohr, Louis, 563.
SpottBylvania, 409, 420-423, 433,

474.
Spottsylvania Coart Honse, 410,

420, 441, 442, 448. *

Springfield, 552.
■'Sijuatter Sovereignly," 39.
Squirrel Level Road, 496, 497.
Stafford Court Home, 226.

594

INDEX.

Stafford Heights, 230, 242, 24(>, 246,

274,276.
Stannard, Brevet Ma}.-Qeii. (George

J., 847-349.
Stanton, Edwin M., 863.
Staunton, 516 note.
Ktaanton River, 476, 477.
Starke, Brig. -Gen. William E., 161,

181.
Steinwehr, Brig.^en. Adolph von,

293, *i99.
StepheoK. Alexander H., 17.
Steuart, Brig. -Gen. George H., 336.
Stevens, Maj.-G«n. Isaac L, 163,

170.
Stone, Brig. -Gen. Charles P., 65-67.
Stone, Brevet Brig. -Gen. Boy, 417

note.
Stoneman, Maj.-Gen. George, 254-

256.
Stony Creek, 479.
Stony Creek Depot, 477, 478, 490.
Strasburg, 48, 44, 64, 103, 223.
Strategy, 31, 32.

Stringham, Bear-Adm. Silas H., 79.
Stritch, G^., a
Stuart, Lieut -Gen. James R B.,

102, 157, 159, 183, 186, 187,

194, 216, 229, 236, 270, 271,

283, 286, 287, 351, 352, 367,

371-374, 441, 442.
Sturgis, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Samuel

D., 243.
Sudley Ford, 50, 169.
Sudley Springs, 48, 52, 167.
Sudley Springs Road, 54, 56, 171.
Suffolk, 254, 438.
Sulphur Springs, 369.
Sumner, Maj.-Gfen. Edwin V., 86,

9.), 93-98, 117-119, 122, 133,

13o, 136, 169, 182, 2(K), 204-206,

209, 210, 225-228, 235, 237,

238.
Supreme Junta, 6.
Susquehanna River, 290.
Sutherland Station, 500, 531, 546.
Swamp Ford, 91.
Swinton, William, 194, 217, 353,

356, 357.
Sykes, Maj.-Gen. George, 90, 109,

112, 114, 136, 157, 165, 167,

168, 171, 210, 243, 261, 267-

269, 332, 367, 368, 374, 375,

377, 378, 391, 893.

Ta River, 435.

Tabernacle Chnrcb, 260.

Tacitos, Caius Cornelius, 549.

Tactics, 31, 32.

Taloott, C^ Andrew, 11.

Taliaferro, Brig. -Gen. William R.

161, 236.
Tampa Bay, 10.
Tampico, 14

Taneytown, 298, 302, 803, 812-315.
Taney town Road^ 3l>8, 316, 325.
Taylor's Hill, 231.
Taylor, Maj. Walter H., 301.
Taylor, Maj.-Gen. Zachary, 1^14,

74.
Telegraph HUl, 230, 231, 242, 245.
Telegraph Road, 242, 245, 433.
Tenialytown, 566.
Tennessee, 83, 249, 405, 519.
Terry, Maj.-Gen. Alfred H., 507,

Texas, 11, 551.

Thomas, Maj.-Gen. George H., 67,

80, 236, 519.
Thor, 402.

Thoroughfare Gap, 159, 160.
Tidball, Brevet Maj. Gen. John C,

622.
Todd's Tavern, 412, 421-423.
Topographical Engineers, Corps

of, 11-13, 565.
Torbert, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alfred

T., 441-443, 446.
Totopotomoy Creek, 4:^, 443-450.
Tower, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Zealous

B., 167.
Treaty of Florida, 8.
Trent's Farm, 122, 12a
Trevylian Station, 474.
Trimble, Maj.-Gen. Isaac R, 161.
Trostle House, 335.
Tunstall Station, 90, 93, 102, 462.
Tiirenne, Marshal, 49, 318, 515.
Turkey Creek, 120.
Turnbull, Maj. WiUiam, 14
Turner's Gap, 186, 187, 191, 192,

194-196, 200.
Tyler, Brig. -Gen. Daniel, 51, 52, 54,

114

Union, 26, 38, 215.

United States, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 18, 20,
21-26, 29, 30, 34, 38, 40, 43, 73,
78, 83, 141, 173, 849, 2d4, 364,

Unil«d

36fi, 618, 641, 648, 650-552,

660,503.
United Shit«a' Ford, 264-269, 2S1,

263, 2M, 268, 270, 272, 278.

277.
Upperville, 352.
Upton, Brevet Haj.-Qen. fknorj,

383, 426, 427.

Vallej of ViTginU, 285, 801, 402,

516 Dote.
Vsrina, 494.
Vsrias Road, 494.
VaaghMi Road, 490, 499, SOI, 606,

608,509,62a
Vcale, Major, 310.
Ven Cru^ 14.
Vermont Benmentc, 85.
Vicksbur^, m, 355.
VictorU, 13.

Vincent, Brig. -Geo Strong, 332.
VioDTille, 36.
Virginia, 26, 36, 43, 78, 79, 62, 177,

212, 393, 494.
"Virginia," 81.
Virginia Central Bailroail, 109, 149,

43^, 441, 442, 445, 446, 474.

Wadsworth, Brevet Msj.-Gen.

James S., 277, 292, 300, 340,

412-414, 417 note.
Walker, Brevet Brig. -Geo. Francis

A., 377, 460, 466.
Walker, M^j.-Oen. John G., 182,

WsIImc^ Haj.-Gen. Lew., 440, 487.

WollenRlein, Coant of, 217.

War of 181^ 63.

Word, Brevet Mai. -Gen William
T., 331.

Warren, Mai. -Gen. Gonvemeur K.,
167, 268, 278, 298, 301, 317,
319, 329, 330 nole-332, 370,
374-377, 389, 391, 39:^ 394-
397, 403, 405, 408, 409, 411,
413, 414, 420-423, 426, 426,
430, 433, 434, 447, 450, 462,
453, 457, 468, 460, 470 nole-
488-490, 493, 496, 497, 600,
601, 508, 609, 622, 626-630,
660.

OUO, OOM, OOl.

Warrenton Junction, 160, 223, 371.

Warrenlon Turnpike, 48-61, 84,
55, 157, 161, 165-167, 169-
171, 369, 380.

Warwick River, 86.

Wnshington Artillery, 236.

Washington. D. C, fl-ll, 26, 29, 80,
40, 42-44, 48, 65, 60, 63-66, 67,
72, 74, 78-82, 84, 100, 101, 141,
144-147, 149, 153, 156, 169,
169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178,
182, 185, 201, 216, 222, 223,
225, 2a6, 228, 246, 24fl, 'OO,
278, 281, 283, 284, '.'Sfr-SaS,
304, 306, 358-360, 3S4, 366,
397, 398, 401, 402, 404-^07, 439,
440, 474, 486-438, 507, 612
nole-613, 614, 650, 654, 656-
658,664-566.

Waahington, Gen. George, 4, 363,
571.

Wsterioo, .t6, 3i2, 571.

Waterloo, Va., 159, 160, 223, 369.

Walerloo Bridge, 149, 162, 167.

Watertown Arsenal, 10.

Waltfl's House, 112.

WayneBboro', 515.

Webb, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Alexan-
der S., 348, 376, 377.

Webster, Daniel, 564.

Weed, Brig. -Gen. Stephen H., 268,

Weitiel, Maj.-Oen. Godfrey, 495,

650.
Wellington, Duke of, 1.
West India Squadron, 10.
West Indies. 3, 4, 10.
Westminster, 303, 304, 332.
West Point, 9.
West Point, Va., 87, 89, 90.
West Virwnia, 43, 76, 7B, 439.
Wheal Field, 336.
Whipple, Maj.-Gen. Amiel, 2(3,

267, 268, 276.
Whisky Insarrection, 1, 2.
White House, 89, 90, 92, 93, 102,

123, 143, 442, 444, 448, 458,

461,462, 474,476, 615.
White Oak Bridge, 468.
White Oak Road, 499, 602, 603,

507, 524-528, 630

596

INDEX.

White Oak Swan&p, 91, 98, 95, 116,

119-124, 128, 129, 136, 144,

456-458 506.
Wh'te Oak Swamp Bridge, 119, 122.
White Oak Swamp Creek, 93, 122.
White Phiins, 159.
Whiting, Maj.-Gen. William H.

C, 89, 113, 439.
Wiloox. Maj.-Gen. Oadmns M.,

167, 846, 847, 849. 876.
Wiloox, Maj.-Gen. Orland B., 468,

493, 497, 522.
Wilcox's Landing, 468, 459.
WUdemesa, 33, 261-263, 398, 402,

404, 407-411, 420, 441, 518.
Wilderness Tavem, 408, 409.
Willard, Col. George L., 334.
William the Conqueror, 1.
Williams, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Al-

pheos S., 267, 269, 270, 830.
WilUama Bng.Gen. John S., 336.
Williamsbarg, 85-89, 91, 93.
Williamsbarg Koad, 90, 96, 99.
Williamson, Capt, 268.
Williamsport, &, 44, 64, 67, 103,

182, 213, 216, 356, 357, 359.
Willford's Creek, 884.
Willonghby Run, 29^294, 355.
Wilmington, 619.
Wilson, Maj.-Gen. James H., 206,

441-443, 446, 448, 450, 459,

473, 475-480, 490.
Winchester, 43-46, 63-66, 67-72,

103, 212, 213, 223, 284-286, 614.

Winder, Brig.-Gen. Cliarles &, 149.
Windmill Point, 458, 459, 461.
Windsor Shades, 458.
Wise, Brig.-Gen. Henry A., 129.
Wistar, Brig.-Gen. Isaac J., 399.
Woodbury's Bridge, 1 15.
Woodruff, Lieut George A., 344,

848.
Woodstock 64.

Worsam, Henrietta Constantia, 3.
Worsam, Hon. Richard, 3.
Worth, Brevet Maj.-Gen. William

J., la
Wright, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G., 894^

426, 428, 430, 447, 514, 522,

528^ 631, 633, 538.
WrightsvUle, 291.

Xenophon, 58.

Yellow Tavern, 441.

York, 290, 804.

York River, 79, 85, 87, 89, 90, 437,

438, 444, 448, 462.
York River Railmd, 462.
York Road, 293.
Yorktown, 84-86, 89, 100, 437.
Young's Branch, 60, 61.

Zicgler's Grove, 344.
Zoar Church, 260.
2kx>k, Brevet Maj. -Gren. Samuel K. ,
99.

STANDARD HISTORIES

it It

it tt

HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

By the Comte de Paris. Translated with the approval of
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THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. By the Comte
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