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Columbia  ©ntoer^itp 
intljeCttpofitetcrk 

THE  LIBRARIES 


LIFE  OF   NAPOLEON 


VOLUME    IV. 


LIFE 


»      M-RUARY 

•.'OKK 

NAPOLEON. 


By     BARON     JOMINI, 

GE.NEBAL-IN-CIIIEF     AND     AID-DE-CAMP     TO     THE     EMPEBOB     OF     RUSSIA. 


"Je  fus  ambitieux;  tout  homme  l'est,  sans  doute; 
Mais  jamais  roi,  pontife,  ou  chef,  ou  citoyen, 
Ne  conçut  un  projet  aussi  grand  que  ie  mien.:' 

Voltaiee,  Mahomet. 


TRANSLATED    FROM    THE    FRENCH. 


^VITH      NOTES, 


By   H.  W.  HALLECK,  LL.D., 

major-general  united  states  army; 

author  of  "  elements  of  military  art  and   science  ;"  *  international  law, 

and  tiie  laws  of  war,"  ac,  ac. 


EN   FOUR   VOLUMES.— WITH   AN   ATLAS. 
VOL.     IV, 


NEW  YORK  : 
D .   VAN   NOSTRAND,  192   BROADWA  Y. 

LONDON:     TRUBNER     &     CO. 


1  8  G  4, 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1SG4,  by 

D.    VAN    NOSTEAND, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 

District  of  New   York. 


92-A//C 


Electrotyped  by  Kjiitu  &  McPougal,  82  &  ^4  Lteekman-street. 
Printed  by  C.  A.   Alvosd,  15  Vandewater-street. 


CONTENTS. 

VOL.    IV. 


CHAPTER     XVIII.—  Con  tinned 
CAMPAIGN    OF    1812    IN    RUSSIA. 

FROM   THE   EVACUATION   OF   MOSCOW   TO   EXD    OF   CAMPAIGN. 

p 

Napoleon  finally  determines  to  retreat — Attack  on  Murat — Departure 
from  Moscow — Retreat  on  Borowsk — Position  of  the  two  Armies — 
Battle  of  Wiasma — Approach  of  Winter — Conspiracy  of  Mallet  ami 
Lahorie — Disaster  of  Krasnoi — Desperate  Efforts  of  Ney — New  Diffi- 
culties of  the  Retreat — March  of  Kutusof  on  Elvira — Projects  of  the 
Russians — Battle  of  the  Beresina — Remarks  on  this  Passage — Contin- 
uation of  the  Retreat — Napoleon  departs  for  Paris — Motives  of  this 
Departure — General  Causes  of  the  Failure  of  this  Campaign — Continua- 
tion of  the  Retreat  under  Murat — He  resigns  the  Command  to  Eugene 
— Final  Refuge  of  the  Army  behind  the  Elbe — Summary  of  the  Cam- 
paign of  1812  in  Spain — The  English  destroy  the  Bridge  of  Almaraz 
— Capture  of  Salamanca — Wellington  enters  Madrid — His  unsuccessful 
Siege  of  Badajos — He  retires  into  Portugal — Operations  in  the  East  of 
"jpain — Conclusion 


CHAPTER    XIX. 
SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813. 

FROM   THE   DECLARATION"    OF   WAR   BY   PRUSSIA   TO    THE    GENERAL    COALITION 

General  State  of  Europe — Mission  of  Bubna — Amicable  Protestations  of 
Austria — Napoleon's  Preparations  fur  a  new  Campaign — Eugene  behind 
the  Elbe — Prussia  declares  against  Napoleon — March  of  the  Allies  on 


13963 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

TAGB 

the  Elbe — They  enter  Saxony — Negotiations  with  Austria — She  declares 
an  armed  Mediation — Napoleon  rejoins  his  Army — He  advances  on  the 
Saale — Organization  of  his  Army — Levy  in  Mass  in  Prussia — Movements 
of  the  Allies — Position  of  their  Armies — Napoleon  effects  his  Junction 
with  Eugene — He  directs  his  March  on  Leipsic — Project  of  the  Allies — 
Battle  of  Lutzen — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Pursuit  of  the  Allies  on 
Dresden — Eugene  sent  to  organize  an  Army  in  Italy — New  Negotia- 
tions— Another  Mission  of  Bubna — Napoleon  accepts  the  Proposition  of 
a  Congress — Caulaincourt's  Proposition  to  Russia — Napoleon  repairs  to 
Bautzen — Fortified  Position  of  the  Allies — Ney's  March  to  turn  this 
Position — Combats  of  Weissig  and  '  Konigswarth — Ney  debouches  on 
Klix — Battle  of  Bautzen — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Nesselrode's  Reply 
to  the  Overtures  of  Caulaincourt — Combats  of  Reichenbach  and  Haynau 
— The  Allies  throw  themselves  on  Schweidnitz — Armistice  of  Neumark 
— Combat  of  Luckau — Treaty  with  Denmark — Third  Mission  of  Bubna 
— Negotiations  of  the  Allies  at  Reichenbach — Metternich  at  Dresden — 
His  Interview  with  Napoleon — Envoys  to  the  Congress  of  Prague — 
Napoleon  meets  his  Empress  at  Mayenco — Military  Projects  of  the  Allies 
—Negotiations  at  Prague — Summary  of  Operations  in  Spain — Battle  of 
Victoria — Suchet's  Operations  in  the  East  of  Spain 05 


CHAPTER     XX. 

AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF    1813. 

FROM   THE    RENEWAL   OF   HOSTILITIES   TO   THE   RETREAT    ON"    THE   RHINE 

Renewal  of  Hostilities — Immense  Efforts  of  the  Coalition — Organization  of 
the  Allied  forces — Organization  of  the  French  Army — Relative  Position 
of  the  opposing  Forces — Different  Combinations  of  the  Theatre  of  War 
— Preliminary  Movements — Plan  of  Operations — Napoleon  marches 
against  Blucher — His  Instructions  to  Macdonald — The  Command  of  the 
Allied  Forces — March  of  the  Allies  on  Dresden — Their  singular  Disposi- 
tions for  Attack — Napoleon's  Project  to  cut  them  off  at  Konigstein — 
Battle  of  Dresden — The  Allies  retreat — Operations  of  Vandamme  near 
Konigstein — His  Disaster  at  Culm — Oudinot  defeated  at  Gros-Beeren — 
Macdonald's  Disaster  at  the  Katzbach — Napoleon  marches  to  his  Assis- 
tance— Ney's  defeat  at  Dennewitz — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Remarks 
on  Napoleon's  Plan  of  Campaign — His  Demonstrations  on  Bohemia — 
Third  Attempt  against  Blucher— New  Hans  of  the  Allies — They  assume 
the  Offensive — Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher  and  Bernadotte — 
Napoleon's  Project  of  Manceuvering  against  Berlin — It  is  defeated  by  the 
Defection  of  Bavaria — The  Allies  concentrate  on  Leipsic — Singular  Pro- 
ject of  Schwartzeuberg — First  Day  of  Leipsic — Napoleon   proposes  an 


CONTENTS.  ix 

PAGE 

Armistice  which  is  refused — The  Allies  receive  Reinforcements — Second 
Day  of  Leipsic — Third  Day  of  Leipsic — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Napo- 
leon retreats  on  Erfurth — Pursuit  of  the  Allies — Departure  of  Murat 

Threatening  March  of  the  Bavarians — Their  Defeat  at  Hanau — The 
French  retire  behind  the  Rhine — Capitulation  of  Dresden — Operations 
before  Hamburg — Capitulation  of  Dantzic — Siege  and  Blockade  of  the 
other  Fortresses — Operations  of  Eugene  in  Italy — Soult's  Operations  in 
Spain 132 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

CAMPAIGN     OF     1814. 

FROM  THE  RETREAT  ON  THE  RHINE  TO  TnE  ABDICATION  OF  FONTAINEBLEAU. 

General  State  of  France — Change  of  the  French  Ministry — Propositions  of 
the  Allies — Dissolution  of  the  Chamber — Preparations  for  Defense — 
Negotiations  for  the  Restoration  of  Ferdinand — Situation  of  Affairs  in 
Italy — Extraordinary  Efforts  of  the  Coalition — They  resolve  to  invade 
France — Their  Motives  of  Action — They  pass  the  Rhine — Napoleon 
marches  against  them — He  attacks  Blucher — First  Combat  of  Brienne — 
Battle  of  Brienne — Congress  of  Chatillon — Faults  of  Blucher — Position 
of  the  two  Armies — Combat  of  Champ- Aubert — Combat  of  Montmirail 
— Affair  of  Chateau-Thierry — Defeat  of  Blucher  at  Vauchamps  and  Etoges 
— He  rallies  his  Army  at  Chalons — Movement  of  the  Allies  on  Nogent — 
Napoleon  flies  to  the  Seine — Slow  March  of  Schwartzenberg — Combat 
of  Nangis — Combat  of  Montreau — Schwartzenberg  evacuates  Troyes — 
Operations  of  Eugene  and  Augereau — Proposal  of  an  Armistice — New 
Disposition  of  the  Allied  Forces — Blucher  marches  on  Meaux — Opera- 
tions of  Mortier  and  Marmont — Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher — 
Blucher  repasses  the  Aisne — Battle  of  Craone — Ultimatum  of  Chatillon 
rejected — Battle  of  Laon — Affair  of  Reims — Schwartzenberg  on  the 
Aube — His  Vanguard  crosses  the  Seine — The  Empress  and  Regency 
retire  to  Blois — Napoleon  moves  against  the  grand  Allied  Army — 
Battle  of  Arcis — Remarks  on  Napoleon's  Position — Success  of  the  Allies 
in  the  South — New  Project  of  Manoeuvring  on  the  Enemy's  Rear — 
Operations  of  Blucher — The  Marshals  are  separated  from  Napoleon — 
Alexander  decides  to  march  on  Paris — Efforts  of  Napoleon  to  communi- 
cate with  his  Marshals — The  latter  retire  on  Paris — Difficulties  of  Napo- 
leon's Situation — He  flies  to  the  Defense  of  the  Capital — Battle  of  Paris 
— Situation  of  France — Want  of  Public  Spirit  in  Paris — Conduct  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia — Intrigues  of  the  Factions — Abdication  of  Fontaine- 
bleau— Battle  of  Toulouse — Napoleon  retires  to  Elba — Evacuation  of 
Italy — Concluding  Remarks 231 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    XXII, 

CAMPAIGN     OF     1315. 
FROM   NAPOLEON'S   RETURN   FROM   ELBA  TO   HIS  EXILE   TO   ST.    HELENA. 

PAGE 

Napoleon  at  Elba— Division  of  Parties  in  France — Course  pursued  by 
Louis  XVIII. — Different  Forms  of  Government — Defects  of  the  Charter 
of  Louis  XVIII. — Errors  in  its  Administration — Napoleon's  Reasons 
for  returning  to  France — His  Departure  from  Elba — His  Reception  in 
France  and  March  on  Lyons — The  Bourbons  prepare  for  Defense — 
Decrees  of  Lyons — Ney  declares  for  the  Emperor — Napoleon  resumes 
his  Authority  as  Emperor — Composition  of  his  Ministry — His  Position 
towards  Europe — General  Coalition  against  him — Declaration  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna — Operations  of  the  Duke  d'Angoulême  in  the  South 
of  France — Troubles  in  La  Vendée — Affairs  of  Naples — Preparations  to 
repel  Aggression  upon  France — Motives  of  Napoleon's  defensive  Atti- 
tude— He  refuses  to  adopt  revolutionary  Measures — The  Champ  de  Mai 
— Opening  of  the  Chambers — Their  Addresses — Dogmatic  Controversies 
of  the  Deputies — Napoleon's  Reply — Military  Preparations  of  Napoleon 
— Preparations  of  the  Allies — Napoleon's  general  Plan  of  Campaign — 
He  joins  his  Army — Plan  of  Operations — Opening  of  the  Campaign — 
Passage  of  the  Sambre,  June  15th — Measures  of  the  Allies — Decisive 
Movement  prescribed  to  Ney — He  delays  its  Execution — His  Delay  in 
•narching  on  Quatre-Bras — Reconnoissance  of  the  Position  of  the  Prus 
siaus — Dispositions  for  forcing  their  Position — Battle  of  Ligny — Ney 
repulsed  at  Quatre-Bras— Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Morning  of  the  Sev- 
enteenth— Grouchy  sent  in  Pursuit  of  the  Prussians — The  Reserves  and 
Left  Wing  march  against  the  English — Commencement  of  the  Battle  of 
Waterloo — First  Appearance  of  the  Prussians — Napoleon  hastens  the 
Attack  on  the  English — Ney's  first  Attack  on  the  Centre — Attack  of 
the  Left  on  Hougomont — Ney's  second  Attack — Bulow  debouches  on 
Planchenois— General  Charge  of  the  French  Cavalry— Arrival  of  Blucher 
and  Bulow— Wellington's  Dispositions— Defeat  of  the  French  Right- 
Last  Efforts  and  Rout  of  the  French  Army — Operations  of  Grouchy — 
Manoeuvres  of  the  Allies— The  French  retreat  on  Avesnes— Napoleon's 
Return  to  Pans — Military  Resources  of  France — Conspiracies  of  Napo- 
leon's Adversaries — Dispositions  of  the  Populace — Napoleon's  second 
Abdication — He  retires  from  France — He  is  exiled  to  St.  Helena — His 


Death. 


308 


LIST    OF    MAPS 


TO    ILLUSTRATE 

JOMINI'S    LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON. 

VOL.     IV. 

34.  BATTLE  OF  MALO-JAROSLAYflTZ,  24th  October.  1812. 

35.  BATTLE  OF   KRASNOI,  16th,  17th  and  18th  November,  1812. 

36.  PASSAGE  OF  THE  BERESINA,  26th,  27th  and  28th  November,  1812. 

37.  BATTLE  OF  LUTZEN,   2d  May,  1813. 

38.  BATTLE  OF  BAUTZEN,   20th  and  21st  May,  1813. 

39.  BATTLE  OF  DRESDEN,   26th  and  27th  August,  1813. 

40.  BATTLE  OF  CULM,  29th  August,  1813. 

4L  BATTLE  OF  THE  KATZBACH,   26th  August,  1813. 

42.  BATTLE  OF  DENNEWITZ,  6th  September,  1813. 

43.  BATTLE  OF  LEIPSIC,  16th,  17th,  18th  and  19th  October,  1813.   (Sheet  1.) 

44.  BATTLE  OF  LEIPSIC,  16th,  17th,  18th  and  19th  October,  1813,    (Sheet  2.) 

45.  BATTLE  OF  HANAU,  30th  October,  1813. 

4G.  MAP    OF    PARTS    OF    FRANCE    AND    BELGIUM,   to   illustrate  the 
Campaigns  of  1814-15. 

47.  BATTLE  OF  LA  ROTHIÈRE,  1st  February,  1814. 

48.  BATTLES  OF  CHAMPAUBERT    AND  VAUCHAMPS,   10th  and   14th 
February.  1814 

49.  BATTLE  OF  MONTMIRAIL,  11th  February,  1814 

50.  BATTLE  OF  CRAONE,  7th  March,  1814. 
61.  BATTLE  OF  LAON,  9th  March,  1814. 

52.  BATTLE  OF  ORTHES,  27th  February,  1814. 

53.  BATTLE  OF  TOULOUSE,  10th  April,  1814. 

54.  BATTLE  OF  FÈRE  CHAMPENOISE,  25th  March,  1814. 

55.  PARIS  AND  ITS    ENVIRONS,    to  illustrate  the  Battle  of  Paris,   30th 
March,  1814. 

56.  BATTLE  OF  LIGHT,  16th  June,  1815. 

57.  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS,  16th  June,  1815. 

58.  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO,    18th  June,   1815,   Sheet  1,   Morning  of  the 
Battle. 

59.  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO,  18th  June,  1815,  Sheet  2,  Crisis  of  the  Battle. 

60.  BATTLE  OF  WAVRE.  18th  and  19th  June,  1815. 


CHAPTER    XVIII*. 

CAMPAIGN    OF     18  12    IN    RUSSIA. 

Part  II. — Retreat  fboîi  Moscow. 

Napoleon  finally  determines  to  retreat — Attack  on  Murat — Departure  from 
Moscow — Retreat  on  Borowsk — Position  of  the  two  Armies — Battle  of 
Wiasnia — Approach  of  "Winter — Conspiracy  of  Mallet  and  Lahorie — Disaster 
of  Krasnoi — Desperato  Efforts  of  Ney — New  Difficulties  of  the  Retreat — 
March  of  Kutusof  on  Elvira — Projects  of  the  Russians — Battle  of  the  Bere- 
sina — Remarks  on  this  Passage — Continuation  of  the  Retreat — Napoleon 
departs  for  Paris — Motives  of  this  Departure — General  Causes  of  the 'Failure 
of  this  Campaign — Continuation  of  the  Retreat  under  Murat — He  resigns 
the  Command  to  Eugene — Final  Refuge  of  the  Army  behind  the  Elbe — 
Summary  of  the  Campaign  of  1812  in  Spain — The  English  destroy  the 
Bridge  of  Almaraz — Capture  of  Salamanca — Wellington  enters  Madrid — His 
unsuccessful  Siege  of  Badajos — He  retires  into  Portugal — Operations  in  the 
East  of  Spain —  Conclusion. 

Napoleon  finally  determines  to  retreat.— The  time  neces- 
sary for  a  reply  from  St.  Petersburg  to  my  overtures  having 
passed,  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  did  not  desire  peace. 
As  our  occupation  of  the  salient  point  of  Moscow  had  not 
produced  the  desired  effect,  and  as  the  winter-season  was 
rapidly  advancing,  it  was  now  absolutely  necessary  to  regain 
the  line  of  the  Borysthenese,  in  order  to  cover  our  communi- 
cations. It  was  impossible  to  pass  the  winter  amid  the  ruins 
of  Moscow.  On  the  thirteenth  of  October  there  was  a  light 
fall  of  snow.  This  was  a  powerful  spur  in  hastening  our 
departure.  I  hoped  to  be  in  motion  by  the  twentieth  of 
October.  On  the  fifteenth  the  hospitals  were  evacuated,  the 
sick  being  sent  to  Smolensko.  The  snow  of  the  thirteenth 
was  followed  by  fine  weather. 

*  Continued  from  Vol.  HI. 


U  L  I  F  E     O  F     N  A  POLEON.  [On.  XVIII. 

Attack  on  Murat. — On  the  eighteenth  of  October  Ney's 
corps  entered  Moscow  preparatory  to  beginning  the  retreat, 
and  while  I  was  passing  it  in  review  the  news  came  that 
Murat  was  exposed  to  a  total  defeat  :  a  heavy  cannonade 
had  been  heard  all  the  morning,  and  the  alarm  had  already 
reached  Moscow.  In  fact,  the  Russians,  certain  that  Murat 
was  not  in  sufficient  force  to  resist  their  entire  army,  had 
conceived  a  project  to  destroy  him.  It  had  been  verbally 
agreed  to  avoid  a  war  of  outposts,  until  an  answer  to  my 
proposition  could  be  received  ;  but  Kutusof  had  rejected 
every  proposal  for  an  armistice,  saying  that  he  had  no  author- 
ity to  make  one.  Murat  was  over-confident  and  off  his 
guard,  and  our  soldiers,  unaccustomed  to  a  repose  which 
they  regarded  as  a  forerunner  of  peace,  did  not  think  there 
was  any  danger  of  their  being  troubled.  Benningsen,  at  the 
head  of  two-thirds  of  the  Russian  army,  thought  to  carry 
away  our  van-guard  at  AVinkowo.  The  false  direction  of 
one  of  his  columns  accelerated  his  attack,  and  prevented  the 
success  of  his  plan.  Nevertheless  Murat  was  compelled  to 
yield  to  superior  forces,  and,  although  he  escaped  a  total 
defeat,  we  lost  considerable  baggage,  several  cannon,  and 
many  brave  men. 

Departure  from  Moscow.— I  left  Moscow  on  the  nine- 
teenth of  October,  while  Lauriston  went  to  seek  the  expected 
reply  from  St.  Petersburg  :  Murat,  at  the  same  time,  denied 
by  the  left  to  disengage  himself  from  the  presence  of  the 
enemy.  I,  at  first,  took  the  road  to  Taroutina,  but,  at 
Troitzkoje,  I  inclined  to  the  right  by  the  road  to  Kalouga  in 
order  to  reach  Borousk  and  Malojaroslawetz  before  Kutusof 
could  be  informed  of  my  intention.  If  we  should  gain  this 
last  city  before  him,  nothing  could  prevent  our  reaching, 
if  not  Kalouga,  at  least  Joucknow,  to  take  the  road  to 
Elnia. 

We  left  Moscow  with  a  train  equal  to  the  army  of  Darius. 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     0  F     R  U  S  S  I  A  .  15 

My  forces  numbered  about  eighty  thousand  combatants,  and 
some  fifteen  thousand  convalescents  ;  we  had  some  six  hun- 
dred pieces  of  cannon,  and  two  thousand  carriages  for  the 
artillery.  To  diminish  my  train  as  much  as  possible  I  had 
preserved  only  such  of  my  lighter  bridge  equipages  as  might 
be  necessary  in  urgent  cases.  As  we  could  not  rely  upon 
regular  distributions,  each  company  formed  an  equipage  of 
two  or  three  carts  for  the  transportation  of  such  provisions 
as  it  had  collected  from  the  ruins  of  Moscow,  and  from  the 
surrounding  villages.  To  these  equipages  were  added  those 
in  which,  under  the  pretext  of  carrying  provisions,  they  con- 
cealed the  illicit  booty  which  the  soldiers,  and  even  the  offi- 
cers, had  found  in  the  deserted  cellars  and  stores  of  Moscow. 
In  order  the  better  to  conceal  this  booty,  they  pretended 
that  these  carts  contained  clothing,  &c.}  to  protect  them 
from  the  cold.  The  officers  not  serving  with  troops  had  also 
each  their  cart  or  britscha  for  the  same  purposes,  and  under 
the  same  pretext.  There  were  almost  as  many  wagons  as 
combatants  :  never  did  a  modern  army  present  such  a  spec- 
tacle ;  and  it  was  with  such  impedimenta  that  we  were  about 
to  make  the  most  delicate  and  difficult  retreat  ever  under- 
taken by  an  army.* 

I  was  forced  to  tolerate  these  abuses,  as  they  were  almost 
our  only  resource.  Our  train  diminished  daily,  and  the 
wagons  emptied  of  their  provisions  served  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  our  sick  and  wounded,  or  for  barricades  against  the 
enemy's  light  troops.     Our  numerous  body  of  horses  con- 

*  The  people  who  accompanied  the  army  in  its  retreat  from  Moscow  were 
mainly  Jews,  Germans,  and  Italians  who  had  remained  there,  rotwithstanding 
the  orders  of  the  Russian  authorities  for  its  entire  abandonment  on  the  ap- 
proach of  the  French.  Knowing  that,  for  this  disobedience,  they  would  be 
given  up  to  the  barbarity  of  the  Cossacks,  on  the  return  of  the  Russians,  they 
were  obliged  to  join  the  French  in  order  to  save  their  owu  lives.  A  large 
portion  of  these  families,  however,  were  murdered  by  the  Cossacks,  or  perished 
from  cold  and  hunger,  during  the  retreat.  It  is  estimated  that  sixty  thousand 
perished  in  this  way. 


16  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XV ILL 

sunned  all  the  forage  on  the  way,  and  gradually  diminished 
for  the  want  of  food.  The  traces  which  we  left  behind  us 
attested  that  great  enterprises  perish  from  the  very  greatness 
of 'the  preparations  required  for  their  success. 

Mortier  remained  at  Moscow  with  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men.  He  was  to  cover  our  communications  till  our  march 
w.as  well  begun,  and  then  to  blow  up  the  Kremlin,  destroy 
the  public  buildings,  and  evacuate  the  place.*  He  was  to 
rally  the  remains  of  Junot's  troops  at  Mojaisk,  and  follow 
my  army  on  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 

Retreat  on  Borowsk. —  Although  I  had  determined  to 
fallow  the  route  to  Borowsk,  I  first  marched  on  the  old  road 
to  Kalouga,  in  order  to  deceive  the  Russians,  and  enable  the 
king  of  Naples  to  collect  his  scattered  troops.  On  the  twen- 
tieth, the  viceroy,  who  formed  my  van-guard  turned  to  the 
right  in  order  to  reach,  at  Bykassowo,  the  road  from  Bo- 
rowsk on  Malojaroslawetz,  which,  on  the  twenty-third,  was 
occupied  by  our  troops.  I  was  exceedingly  impatient  to 
reach  Borowsk  where  I  could  learn  whether  Kutusof  had 
got  wind  of  our  departure,  and  had  taken  any  measures  to 


*  The  task  assigned  to  Mortier  was  a  most  difficult  one,  and  few  of  his  friends 
ever  expected  to  see  him  again.  Napoleon  embraced  him  in  taking  leave,  and 
said  to  him  frankly,  yet  sadly  :  "  I  rely  on  your  good  fortune.  Still,  in  war, 
we  must  sometimes  make  part  of  a  sacrifice."  In  addition  to  his  danger  from 
hosts  of  the  enemy  who  surrounded  him,  he  had  to  destroy  an  immense  amount 
of  military  munitions  left  behind.  Thousands  of  barrels  of  powder  were  col- 
lected in  the  vaults,  and  halls  and  appartments  of  the  Kremlin.  On  abandon- 
ing the  place  a  slow  match  was  attached  to  this  mine.  "  The  Cossacks,  eager 
for  plunder,  rushed  within  the  deserted  halls.  Suddenly  the  majestic  fabric 
was  raised  into  the  air.  The  earth  shook  under  the  fret  of  Mortier.  The  ex- 
plosion, in  most  appalling  thunder  peal,  startled  the  army  in  its  midnight 
bivouac.  From  the  darkened  and  sulphurous  skies  there  was  rained  down 
upou  the  city  a  horrible  shower  of  fragments  of  timber,  rocks,  shattered 
weapons,  heavy  pieces  of  artillery,  and  mangled  bodies."  It  should  be  re- 
marked that  while  preparing  to  destroy  these  magazines,  Mortier  and  his  divi- 
sion was  hotly  pressed  by  the  enemy  around  the  Kremlin,  and  a  single  spark 
from  his  own  or  the  enemy's  fire,  must  have  destroyed  him  and  all  his  men. 
His  success  was  couplet:,  but  almost  miraculous. 


Oh.  XVIIL]  INVASION      OF     RUSSIA.  17 

intercept  our  march  on  Kalouga.  Hero  also  I  was  to  Le 
joined  by  Murat,  and  from  hero  I  proposed  to  push  forward 
Eugene  in  the  direction  of  Malojaroslawetz.  Our  future 
safety  depended  upon  our  reaching  this  point  before  Kutu- 
sof,  which,  if  he  had  not  heard  of  our  departure,  was  still 
possible,  although  three  days  had  been  spent  in  insignificant 
movements  by  which  we  had  gained  only  ten  leagues  on  our 
line  of  march.  The  twenty-third  I  departed  on  a  gallop  for 
Borowsk,  which  place  Eugene  had  occupied  the  night  before, 
and  where  Murat  had  already  arrived.  Nothing  being  per- 
ceived of  the  enemy  except  reconnoitering  parties  on  the 


possible.  We  now  had  every  reason  to  think  that  we  should 
reach,  without  obstacle,  the  new  road  from  Smolensko  by 
Elnia  (Jelnia). 

Bell uno  had  been  ordered  to  occupy  that  place  by  the  divi- 
sion of  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  which  consisted  of  about  ten 
thousand  men  of  the  provisional  regiments,  or  recruits,  des- 
tined for  the  different  regiments  of  the  army.  I  also  directed 
the  governor  of  Wiasma  to  send  a  movable  column  of  three  or 
four  thousand  men  with  estafettes  in  the  direction  of  this 
new  road. 

The  numerous  parties  of  the  enemy  on  the  left  denoted 
some  important  movement.  At  Borowsk  I  learned  that 
Mortier,  with  powder  found  in  the  mines  of  the  Kremlin, 
had  blown  up  a  part  of  its  buildings,  and  especially  its 
arsenal,  and  on  the  twenty-third,  had  taken  the  road  to 
Mojaisk,  carrying  with  him  General  Winizingerode,  who 
had  ventured  alone  with  his  aide-de-camp  into  the  streets 
of  Moscow.  I  hardly  thought  that  Kutusof  could  debouch 
in  time  on  Borowsk  :  but  Eugene,  who  did  not  understand 
my  projects,  and  who  was  occupied  with  the  enemy  on  his 
left,  advanced  too  slowly  ;  he  did  not  fear  an  engagement, 

VOL.    IV. 2. 


18  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

Lut  thought  that  I  might  be  attacked,  and  if  so,  that  it 
would  be  necessary  for  him  to  return  to  take  part  in  the 
engagement. 

But  one  of  those  fortuitous  events,  which  seemed  connected 
with  this  fatal  campaign,  now  defeated  my  designs.  Kutu- 
so f,  hearing  of  Eugene's  march  on  Borowsk,  but  not  sup- 
posing that  we  were  retreating,  had  projected  a  plan  to  strike 
the  fourth  corps-d'armée,  as  he  had  Murat.  Doctorof,  with 
twenty-five  thousand  men  was  directed  to  accomplish  this 
object.  On  approaching  Borowsk  he  encountered  our  army, 
but  supposed  it  nothing  more  than  Eugene's  corps.  The 
partisan  Seslavin,  getting  wind,  of  our  approach,  informed 
Doctorof  of  it,  but  that  general  was  incredulous.  The  bold 
Cossack,  piqued  at  his  report  not  being  believed,  advanced 
even  to  the  gates  of  Borowsk,  and  captured  an  officer  of  the 
Young  Guard,  who  confirmed  his  story.  Doctorof  s  chief  of 
staff  hastened  to  Taroutina,  to  announce  to  Kutusof  that  I 
had  left  Moscow,  and  that  all  my  army  was  on  the  road  to 
Kalouga:  at  the  same  time,  the  corps  which  had  been  sent 
to  surprise  Borowsk,  directed  its  march  on  Malojaroslawetz. 
This  fortuitous  incident  produced  the  most  grave  conse- 
quences ;  for  the  Russian  army,  which  would  have  remained 
quiet  at  Taroutina,  had  it  not  been  for  this  accidental  receipt 
of  the  important  news  of  my  retreat,  raised  their  camp  on 
the  twenty-fourth,  and  also  directed  their  march  on  Maloja- 
roslawetz. On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth,  Doctorof 
reached  that  city,  and  expelled  our  detachment;  but  tie 
viceroy  soon  arrived  with  his  whole  corps,  and  retook  the 
place.  An  obstinate  combat  followed,  and  continued  all 
day.  The  viceroy  sustained  himself  with  glory  against  a 
superior  force.  The  Russian  corps,  which  successively  ar- 
rived, continually  reënforced  the  engaged  troops.  Seven 
times  was  the  burning  city  taken  and  retaken  ;.  but  its  ruins 
finally  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  viceroy.     \Ve  lost  the 


Oil.   XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  19 

brave  Delzons,  and  Pino  and  two  of  Eugene's  aides  were 
woumled.  Toward  night  my  army  also  reached  Malojarosla- 
wetz.  Davoust  sustained  Eugene  with  two  divisions  which 
established  themselves  on  the  flanks  of  the  fourth  corps,  so 
as  to  enable  it  to  maintain  its  position. 

We  were  now  masters  of  this  city,  or  rather  of  a  funeral 
pile  covered  with  dead  ;  but  we  were  none  the  further 
advanced  towards  the  accomplishment  of  our  object.  Ku- 
tusof  had  taken  position  at  some  distance  and  still  barred 
our  passage.  To  force  this  barrier  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  give  battle  to  an  army  which  had  already  established 
itself  on  the  very  communication  which  we  wished  to  open  ; 
or  to  give  battle  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  a  lateral  retreat. 
But  such  a  course  seemed  to  me  the  less  prudent,  as  it  was 
not  indispensable,  the  road  to  Wereya  being  still  open  in  our 
rear.  The  chance  appearing  to  me  too  hazardous,  I  re- 
nounced the  project  of  piercing  my  way  to  Kalouga,  and 
decided  to  regain  the  road  to  Wiasma, — the  only  way  which 
was  now  open  to  me.  During  the  twenty-fifth,  the  two 
armies  remained  in  position,  almost  within  cannon  range  of 
each  other.  But,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  I  took  the  road  to 
Borowsk. 

Every  thing  in  this  retreat  seemed  to  be  at  the  caprice  of 
fortuue  ;  for,  at  the  very  moment  that  I  renounced  the 
intention  of  piercing  the  enemy's  lines,  Kutusof,  on  his  side, 
fearing  to  risk  a  general  battle,  ordered  a  retrograde  move- 
ment. I  was  soon  informed  of  this,  but  persisted  in  my 
resolution,  which  was  certainly  a  fault.  I  had  a  consultation 
with  my  officers,  and  all,  even  to  the  stoic  Mouton,  were  of 
the  opinion  that  it  was  necessary  to  regain  the  Niémen  by 
the  shortest  and  least  difficult  rcut.  Thus,  instead  of  taking 
the  direct  road  to  Medyn  and  Joucknow  on  Elnia,  driving 
before  us  the  cavalry  which  still  barred  the  way,  I  returned 
by  Wereya  on  Mojaisk. 


20  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVIII. 

Respective  Position  of  the  two  Armies.— Our  chances  of 
a  retreat  were  now  most  unfavorable,  as  may  readily  seen  by 
examining  the  respective  position  of  the  parties.  The  Rus- 
sian  army  reached  Taroutina  with  sixty  thousand  old  soldiers 
and  twenty  thousand  irregular  troops  ;  but  while  there,  it 
had  been  reënforced  to  ninety  thousand  regular  soldiers  and 
thirty  thousand  militia  and  Cossacks.  The  Cossack  cavalry, 
though  unfit  for  battles,  is  intelligent,  enterprising,  and  inde- 
fatigable. There  are  no  European  horses,  nor  even  Russian, 
that  can  rival  those  of  the  Don,  in  enduring  fatigue  and  pri- 
vations ;  and,  in  our  present  situation,  this  militia  was  even 
more  useful  to  the  enemy  than  the  elite  regiments  of  the 
guard. 

Our  line  of  retreat  now  lay  on  a  single  isolated  road  ; 
while  the  enemy's  army  had  a  road,  even  shorter  than  ours, 
that  led  obliquely  on  Wiasma,  Smolensko,  Krasnoi,  and 
Kopys.  We  had  now  not  more  than  fifteen  thousand  horse, 
and  at  the  end  of  two  weeks  not  over  five  thousand,  with 
which  to  make  reconnoisances  in  front,  and  to  protect  our 
flanks  and  immense  parks.  My  infantry  numbered  from 
sixty  to  sixty-five  thousand  brave  men  ;  but  what  could  they 
do  against  an  enemy  who,  by  the  lateral  direction  of  his  line 
of  operations,  could  select  his  time  and  attack  us  in  the  most 
critical  position,  either  in  front  or  rear  ?  If  we  had  taken 
the  road  to  Elnia,  the  enemy  would  have  followed  us  only  in 
rear,  and  we  should  not  have  been  exposed  to  parallel 
attacks  on  our  line  of  retreat,  thus  daily  compromising  our 
safety. 

Having  regained  the  great  road  to  Smolensko,  I  continued 
to  follow  it.  Our  only  object  now  was  to  escape  as  soon  as 
possible  across  this  desolated  country.  To  avoid  inconve- 
nience in  the  march,  I  divided  my  army  into  four  corps,  which 
followed  each  other  at  about  half  a  day's  distance.  I  began 
the  march  with  my  guards  ;  then  came  successively  the  corps 


CH.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  21 

of  Ney,  the  Viceroy,  and   Davoust.     The  latter  formed  the 
rear-guard. 

Kutusof  sent,  in  pursuit  of  us,  his  Cossacks  and  an 
advanced  guard  of  twenty-five  thousand  men,  under  the 
orders  of  General  Miloradowitsch,  who  overtook  our  rear- 
guard on  the  first  of  November,  near  Gjath.  The  main 
body  of  the  Eussian  army  marched  directly  on  Wiasma, 
with  the  intention  of  cutting  off  our  retreat.  We,  however, 
reached  that  city  before  the  Russians.  I  passed  through  the 
city,  directing  Ney  to  await  there  the  arrival  of  the  Viceroy 
and  Davoust,  who  might  otherwise  be  cut  off.  The  event 
justified  the  necessity  of  this  precaution. 

Battle  of  Wiasma.— On  the  third  day  of  November  Milo- 
radowitsch executed  very  skillfully  a  forced  march  parallel 
to  the  great  roads,  and  debouched  on  that  road  between 
Wiasma  and  Federowskoe.  The  viceroy  had  already  reached 
Wiasma,  but  Davoust  had  not  yet  passed  Federowskoe. 
The  circumstance  was  critical  ;  but  the  viceroy  accomplished 
everything  by  the  vigor  of  his  resolution.  He  immediately 
turned  back  and  assailed  the  Russians,  who,  hemmed  in  on 
the  other  side  by  the  troops  of  Davoust,  were  obliged  to  de- 
camp in  haste,  and  open  a  passage  to  those  in  rear.  My 
two  corps  now  fell  back  on  Wiasma  closely  followed  by  the 
Russians  who  had  received  a  reënforcement. 

Seeing  us  in  retreat,  the  enemy  redoubled  his  energy,  and 
drove  our  rear-guard  from  Wiasma  and  across  the  river  of 
that  name.  This  affair,  which  we  might  regard  as  a  victory, 
since  we  repelled  and  defeated  the  enemy,  cost  us  about  five 
thousand  men  hors  de  combat.  It  might,  however,  have 
had  disastrous  consequences  for  us,  if  the  main  body  of  the 
Russian  army,  which  had  already  reached  the  road  from 
Wiasma  to  Joucknow,  had  acted  with  decision  ;  but  Kutu- 
sof, who  feared  to  engage  in  a  general  battle,  had  stopped  at 
Bykowo,  three  leagues  from  Wiasma,  and  sent  forward  only 


22  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON 


[Cii.  XVIII. 


a,  heavy  detachment  of  cavalry.  This  was  held  in  check 
during  the  battle  by  the  corps  of  Ney.  The  operations  of 
Kutusof  on  this  occasion  have  been  criticised. 

In  a  tactical  point  of  view  they  were  certainly  faulty,  for 
if  his  sixty  thousand  men  encamped  at  Bykowo,  had  driven 
Ney  from  Wiasma,  he  would  have  destroyed  the  half  of  my 
army  :  but  on  the  other  hand,  as  he  was  certain  of  our  re- 
treat to  the  Niémen,  he  deemed  it  more  safe  not  to  risk  a 
battle,  but  rather  to  build  for  us  a  bridge  of  gold  ! 

Approach  of  Winter. —  Having  escaped  this  imminent 
danger  my  army  continued  its  retreat  on  Smolensko.  Our 
march  was  becoming  every  day  more  difficult  ;  the  provi- 
sions which  we  brought  from  Moscow  were  exhausted  ; 
our  horses  were  dying  from  starvation  ;  this  forced  us  to 
leave  much  of  our  artillery  :  winter  now  succeeded  to 
an  extraordinarily  fine  autumn.  Ney  who  now  commanded 
the  rear-guard  complained  of  the  disorder  which  was  daily 
increasing  among  our  men.  My  eagles,  formerly  the  emblem 
of  triumph,  had  now  become  to  our  faithful  soldiers  only  a 
talisman  for  privation  and  suffering.  Death  seemed  the 
inevitable  fate  of  those  who  still  pressed  around  them  with 
courageous  resignation. 

Conspiracy  of  Mallet  and  Lahoric.— Fate  seemed  resolved 
now  to  heap  upon  me  every  misfortune.  As  if  those  which 
had  arrayed  themselves  before  our  eyes  here,  were  not  suffi- 
cient, it  prepared  in  France  the  overthrow  of  my  throne  by 
a  simple  state's-prisoner  !  On  the  sixth  of  November, 
within  a  day's  march  of  Smolensko,  I  heard  of  the  conspiracy 
of  Generals  Mallet  and  Lahorie, — the  most  singular,  perhaps, 
in  the  history  of  the  world. 

General  Mallet,  more  renowned  for  his  exploits  of  gallantry 
than  for  his  feats  of  arms,  was  an  ardent  demagogue  ;  but 
not  a  partisan  of  the  Bourbons  as  some  have  since  pretended. 
His  conduct  had  compelled  me  (tor  the  last  four  years)  to 


Ch.  XVIII.J  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  23 

shut  him  up  in  prison.     He  had  afterwards  been  transferred, 

on  account  of  ill  health  to  a  maison  de  santé,  where  he  was 
on  parole.  Here  this  ardent  adventurer  conceived  the  bold 
project  of  overthrowing  my  government.  He  had  heard  of 
our  arrival  in  Moscow,  and  of  the  burning  of  that  city. 
Foreseeing  the  result  of  the  campaign  or  thinking  that  I 
would  be  so  much  occupied  at  eight  hundred  leagues  from 
Paris  as  not  to  be  able  to  check  his  designs,  he  escaped  on 
the  night  of  the  twenty-third  and  twenty- fourth  of  October, 
presented  himself  at  the  barracks,  announced  my  death,  and, 
supplied  with  a  forged  order  from  the  staff  of  the  place,  he 
demanded  a  detachment  in  the  name  of  the  provisional 
government  which  had  just  assumed  the  reins  of  state.  At 
the  head  of  his  troop  he  flew  to  the  Conciergerie,  and  released 
General  Lahorie,  former  aid-de-camp  of  Moreau  ;  this  offi- 
cer with  a  detachment  of  a  hundred  men,  marched  to  the 
house  of  the  minister  Savary,  arrested  him  and  sent  him  to 
prison  in  his  own  place,  while  he  installed  himself  as  minister 
in  the  place  of  Savary.  Mallet  had  gone  to  the  residence  of 
General  Hullin,  commandant  of  Paris,  whom  he  hoped  also 
to  replace.  Finding  him  more  disposed  to  resistance,  Mallet 
fired  a  pistol  at  him  and  wounded  him  ;  but  Colonel  La- 
borde,  having  recognised  Mallet  as  an  escaped  prisoner,  seized 
hold  of  him,  and  struggled  with  him  till  the  guard  could 
secure  his  person.  The  troops  now  saw  that  they  had  been 
deceived,  and  returning  to  the  office  of  police,  they  seized 
Lahorie  just  as  he  was  being  measured  for  a  minister's  coat, 
and  carried  him  back  to  the  Conciergerie. 

The  senate,  called  together  by  the  archchancellor,  met 
just  in  time  to  learn  the  arrest  of  these  insane  conspirators, 
who,  on  being  tried  by  a  military  commission,  received  the 
reward  due  to  their  rash  attempt. 

If  this  movement  had  been  delayed  till  the  news  of  our 
disastrous  retreat  had  reached  Paris,  the  result  might  have 


24  L  I  F  E      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cil.   XVIII. 

been  different.  We  should  not  have  escaped  so  cheaply,  if, 
taking-  example  from  Prince  Edward,  a  Bourbon  prince  had 
landed  at  Havre  at  the  same  time  that  they  installed  a  pro- 
visional government  at  Paris.  I  communicated  this  news 
only  to  a  small  number  of  my  officers,  and  I  was  convinced, 
from  the  effect  which  it  produced  on  them,  that  the  fragile 
nature  of  my  power  astonished  them  more  than  the  misfor- 
tunes that  were  hanging  over  us. 

Renewed  Disasters  in  the  Retreat.— On  the  seventh  of 
November,  the  cold  began  to  be  more  serious,  and  developed 
with  frightful  rapidity  the  germs  of  dissolution  which  had 
already  appeared  at  Wiasma.  We  had  left  Moscow  with 
more  than  ninety  thousand  men  ;  but  not  half  this  number 
was  under  arms  at  Dorogobuje.  We  now  had  only  two 
marches  to  make  before  reaching  Smolensko  ;  we  were  about 
to  receive  the  hand-mills  Avhich  had  been  sent  from  Paris, 
and  for  the  want  of  which  our  soldiers  had  been  obliged  to 
live  on  boiled  rye.  I  hoped  to  find  here  provisions  and  a 
sufficient  shelter  to  enable  us  to  reestablish  order.  The  divi- 
sion of  Baraguay-d'Hilliers,  coming  from  France  with  reen- 
forcements  for  the  regiments,  had  been  cantoned  on  the  road 
to  Elnia  which  we  were  about  to  reach.  The  sight  of  these 
soldiers,  in  order  and  in  discipline,  would  be  calculated  to 
produce  a  beneficial  influence  upon  our  veterans.  I  more- 
over trusted  to  the  firmness  of  Ney  to  have  time  to  effect 
the  reorganization  of  the  army.  But  a  crowd  of  circum- 
stances combined  to  destroy  these  frail  combinations  and 
deceitful  hopes. 

Flank  March  of  Kutusof  on  Elnia. — Kutusof  had  left  to 
his  Cossacks  the  care  of  pursuing  us,  while  he  himself,  with 
the  main  body  of  his  army,  marched  parallel  to  the  great 
road  by  Elnia.  This  plan  was  the  more  advisable  on  his  part, 
as  it  took  his  army  over  a  more  fertile  country  while,  at  the 
uime  time,  it  threatened  my  line  of  retreat,  and  forced  me  to 


Cil.   XVIII.  J  INVASION    OP    RUSSIA,  25 

hasten  my  march  without  giving  my  troops  any  repose.  His 
vanguard  thus  fell  upon  Liakowo  in  the  midst  of  the  divi- 
sion of  Baraguay-d'Hilliers,  and  carried  off  Augercau's 
brigade,  after  an  insignificant  comhat. 

I  arrived  at  Smolensko  on  the  ninth,  and  the  remainder 
of  my  army  on  the  thirteenth.  We  had  looked  upon  this 
place  as  the  Land  of  Promise,  and  as  the  termination  of  all 
our  misfortunes.  But  how  greatly  were  we  deceived.  This 
city,  which  in  the  summer  had  appeared  to  us  so  charming, 
and  whose  environs,  especially  on  the  south  side,  seemed  so 
rich  and  prolific  in  grain,  now  presented  only  deserted  houses 
filled  with  the  sick  and  dying,  and  destitute  of  magazines  ! 
The  presence  of  Belluno's  corps  for  two  months  in  the  vicin- 
ity, the  garrison  of  the  place,  the  fifteen  thousand  sick  and 
wounded,  and  the  passing  troops,  had  consumed  sixty  thou- 
sand rations  per  day, — an  immense  supply,  sufficient  for  my 
whole  army  of  Italy,  hut  which  had  here  been  consumed  as 
fast  as  it  arrived.  Thus,  instead  of  the  supplies  which  I  had 
expected,  I  found  at  Smolensko  only  scenes  of  desolation. 
My  army  arrived  in  disorganized  bands  ;  three  days  of  severe 
cold  weather,  though  in  no  way  extraordinary,  had  sufficed 
to  break  up,  in  a  great  degree,  our  organization,  and  to  cause 
us  to  abandon  nearly  two  hundred  pieces  of  artillery. 

On  leaving  Dorogobuje,  the  viceroy's  corps  took  the  road 
to  Doukowchina  which  he  had  followed  in  our  advance,  but 
in  a  very  different  attitude.  Closely  pursued  by  the  five 
thousand  horse  of  Platof,  he  found  himself  closed  in  on  the 
Vop,  a  stream  scarcely  perceptible  in  the  summer,  but  now 
so  swollen  by  the  rains  as  to  be  fordable  only  in  certain 
places.  The  bridges  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  steep 
banks  of  the  river  were  now  covered  with  snow  and  ice. 
After  numerous  efforts  Eugene  succeeded  in  crossing  with  a 
few  pieces  and  his  infantry,  who  were  obliged  to  ford  the 
stream  with   the  water  up  to  their  shoulders  ;  but  the  artil- 


26  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Cil.  XVIII. 

lery  and  baggage  were  lost.     The  half  famished  remains  of 
this  corps  reached  Smolensko  at  the  same  time  with  the  rear- 
guard of  Ney. 
Plan  of  the  Russians  to  cut  off  Napoleon's  Retreat.  —  I 

was  greatly  relieved  by  the  arrival  of  these  two  corps,  but 
still  there  was  the  most  urgent  necessity  for  an  immediate 
march.  The  enemy  now  exhibited  as  much  activity  as  auda- 
city, and  almost  everywhere  gained  an  ascendency  over  my 
lieutenants. 

Wittgenstein,  cooperating  with  the  corps  of  Steinheil  to 
cut  off  St.  Cyr's  retreat  on  the  Dwina  had  attacked  him  at 
Polotsk  ;  St.  Cyr  and  Wrede  had  repelled  his  attaek,  it  is 
true,  but  not  finding  themselves  in  condition  to  sustain  a 
second  assault,  they  abandoned  Polotsk  and  fell  back  on 
Czeivya.  Wittgenstein  had  followed  in  pursuit  as  far  as 
Zcasnicki  on  the  Oula.  This  circumstance  had  forced  Victor 
to  leave  Smolensko  in  order  to  rally  the  wrecks  of  Oudinot  ; 
the  two  marshals  had  established  themselves  at  Czereya,  in 
order  to  hold  Wittgenstein  in  check  ;  his  army,  reënforced 
by  the  militia  of  St.  Petersburg  and  the  troops  of  Finland, 
now  numbered  not  less  than  seventy-five  battalions  and 
thirty-eight  squadrons,  without  including  the  Cossacks. 
Tschighagof  had  also  taken  the  offensive  on  Minsk  and  the 
Bug,  with  one  hundred  and  two  battalions  and  one  hundred 
and  sixteen  squadrons. 

The  corps  of  Schwartzenberg  and  Pteynier,  seeing  them- 
selves opposed  by  superior  numbers,  after  the  junetion  of 
Tormassof  and  the  army  of  Moldavia,  instead  of  adopting 
Minsk  as  the  pivot  of  their  operations,  recrossed  the  Bug  and 
based  themselves  on  Warsaw,  thus  renouncing  all  coopera- 
tion with  my  army.  In  consequence  of  this  grave  error, 
Admiral  Tschighagof  left  Sacken  to  observe  the  Austrians,  and 
prepared  to  advance  with  the  rest  of  the  army  of  Moldavia 
on  Minsk,  where  he  could  cooperate  with  Wittgenstein  so  as 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  27 

to  establish  a  formidable  mass  on  our  rear.  On  the  other 
.side  the  grand  Russian  army,  already  established  en  the 
road  to  Poslaw,  was  ready  to  intercept  the  route  to  Mistislaw 
and  menace  that  to  Krasnoi. 

Napoleon  retreats  on  Krasnoi.— It  was  now  necessary 
to  hasten  our  retreat  before  this  last  hope  should  be  closed 
against  us.  I  left  Smolensko  with  my  guards  on  the  four- 
teenth. The  viceroy,  Davoust,  and  Ney  followed  at  the 
distance  of  a  day's  march.  The  latter  reënforced  by  the 
fresh  troops  of  the  garrison  of  Smolensko  blew  up  the  wails 
of  that  city,  and  departed,  as  my  rear-guard,  on  the  seven- 
teenth. This  march,  with  columns  in  echelons,  at  a  con- 
siderable distance,  and  across  a  desolate  country  where  no 
subsistence  could  be  procured,  has  been  the  subject  of  criti- 
cism ;  and  I  must  confess  that  a  retreat  by  wings,  in  three 
columns,  by  parallel  roads,  would  have  been  more  advan- 
tageous. If  I  had  foreseen  the  event  of  Krasnoi,  I  should 
have  descended  the  Dnieper  by  the  right  bank  by  Katana  as 
far  as  Doubrowna  or  Orcza,  thus  placing  that  river  between 
my  army  and  the  enemy.  It  is  certain  that  this  resolution 
would  have  saved  us  many  cruel  losses.  But,  as  our  maps 
of  the  country  were  defective,  and  we  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  practicable  roads  in  that  direction,  I  could 
not  venture  upon  such  an  uncertainty. 

We  had  already  sustained  immense  losses  ;  our  artillery 
was  reduced  one  half,  and  our  cavalry  entirely  ruined.  Even 
the  horses  which  had  survived  the  effects  of  hunger  and 
fatigue,  were  not  properly  shod  for  the  ice,  and  there  was  no 
iron  in  the  country  to  supply  this  deficiency.  From  Wiasma 
to  Orcza  there  are  numerous  little  hills,  and  the  streams  had 
cut  for  themselves  deep  beds.  These  steep  slopes  of  the  road 
were  so  covered  with  ice  that  our  horses  could  not  draw  our 
pieces  and  caissons  ;  our  men  were  continually  obliged  to 
assist  in  moving  these  loads,  and  every  day  a  large  number 


28  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

of  carriages  were  abandoned  in  the  road.  The  pen  of  history 
can  never  fully  describe  the  misfortunes  of  this  retreat  ;  the 
horrors  suffered  by  our  army  exceed  the  most  exaggerated 
stories  of  fiction. 

Battle  of  Krasnoi. — It  was  now  scarcely  possible  that  we 
could  reach  Krasnoi  without  encountering  the  enemy.  In 
fact,  the  advanced  guard  of  Miloradowitsch  appeared,  on  the 
fifteenth,  between  that  city  and  Korytnia.  I  reached  Kras- 
noi with  the  main  body  of  my  guards  ;  but  the  rear  of  the 
column  had  to  sustain  an  unequal  combat.  The  next  day 
the  viceroy  found  Miloradowitsch  in  a  position  commanding 
the  great  road,  and  closing  the  passage.  He  attempted  to 
cut  his  way,  sword  in  hand,  but  failed.  The  enemy  thinking 
him  lost  beyond  hope,  summoned  him  to  surrender.  But  the 
viceroy  was  not  a  man  to  be  easily  discouraged  :  while  h  te 
rear-guard  amused  the  Russians  with  demonstrations  of  an 
attack  on  the  great  road,  he  escaped  with  the  main  body 
between  that  road  and  the  Borysthenese.  He  reached  Kras- 
noi in  the  night,  if  not  without  loss,  at  least  with  glory,  for 
he  had  saved  the  greater  part  of  his  corps.  On  the  same 
day,  the  sixteenth,  Kutusof  also  arrived  before  Krasnoi, 
and  established  himself  within  a  short  distance  of  the  city 
on  the  road  to  Roslaw. 

My  situation  was  now  critical.  Davoust  and  Ney  were 
still  in  rear,  and  if  I  suspended  my  retreat  till  they  came  up, 
the  enemy  might  prolong  himself  by  the  left,  and  easily 
intercept  our  only  line  of  communication.  But  it  seemed  a 
hard  extremity  to  abandon  the  half  of  my  army  to  the  Rus- 
sians. I  therefore  determined  to  brave  the  danger,  and  wait 
at  Krasnoi,  at  least  till  the  arrival  of  Davoust.  But  to 
remain  here  inactive  would  only  embolden  the  enemy  ;  I 
therefore  resolved  to  act  on  the  offensive.  On  the  morning 
of  the  seventeenth  I  caused  the  village  of  Ouwarowo  to  be 
assailed  by  Mortier,  and  marched  there  myself  at  the  head  of 


Cil.   XV1IL]  INVASION     OF       RUSSIA.  29 

the  Old  Guard.  The  combat  was  continued  with  varied 
success  until  the  arrival  of  the  first  corps.  Kutusof.  fearing 
the  result  of  a  general  battle,  and  trusting  to  cold  and  hun- 
ger to  effect  the  destruction  of  my  army,  had  directed  Milo- 
radowitsch  not  to  compromise  himself  for  the  sake  of  opposing 
the  march  of  Davoust.  This  general,  menaced  with  an 
attack,  fell  back  on  the  right  of  the  army,  and  did  not  again 
reach  the  great  road,  till  the  troops  of  the  marshal  had  en- 
tirely passed.  The  Russian  van-guard  now  made  a  vigorous 
attack  upon  our  left,  while  Kutusof  detached  the  greater 
part  of  his  army  to  turn  Krasnoi,  to  debouch  on  the  road 
between  that  city  and  Liady,  to  turn  our  right,  and  thus 
entirely  cut  us  off.  On  learning  the  march  of  this  column, 
I  felt  that  I  had  not  a  moment  to  lose,  and  ordered  an 
instant  retreat.  Our  rear-guard  experienced  a  considerable 
loss,  but  the  main  body  of  the  army  was  saved.  We  passed 
the  night  at  Liady,  and  the  next  day  continued  our  retreat 
on  Doubrowna  and  Orcza. 

I  think  I  acquired  some  glory  in  this  affair  of  Krasnoi. 
Perhaps  my  march  in  echelons  on  a  single  road  may  be  criti- 
cised ;  but  the  impartial  historian  will  say  with  what  resolu- 
tion I  disengaged  successively  the  corps  of  Lavoust  and 
Eugene.  Marching  on  foot  through  the  snow,  and  support- 
ing myself  with  a  cane  while  crawling  up  the  slippery  slopes 
of  the  road,  I  myself  directed  the  columns  which  drove  back 
the  enemy. 

Happy  would  I  have  been,  if  like  the  Emperor  Julian,  1 
had  here  encountered  death,  which  I  desired  !  But  since 
the  invention  of  gunpowder  there  are  no  combats  hand  to 
hand,  as  in  antiquity,  with  the  sword  and  buckler  of  the 
Romans  ;  and  I  found  no  Parthian  to  terminate  my  career. 

Desperate  Efforts  of  Key. — I  had  taken  the  road  to  Orcza, 
with  the  deepest  regret  at  the  necessity  of  abandoning  jSVy 
in  order  to  save  the  rest  of  the  army  ;  he  seemed  lost  beyond 


30  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XVIIL 

hope.  But  to  our  utter  astonishment  this  brave  general  suc- 
ceeded in  saving  his  eagles  and  the  élite  of  his  corps.  On 
reaching  Krasnoi  on  the  evening  of  the  eighteenth,  he  found 
the  Russian  array  established  in  a  position  commanding  the 
great  road  ;  after  admirable  but  unsuccessful  efforts  to  dis- 
lodge the  enemy,  he  found  himself  completely  cut  off.  But 
taking  council  from  his  own  courage  alone,  he  put  himself  in 
march  with  about  three  thousand  men  on  Gousinoe,  where  he 
crossed  the  Borysthenese  on  recently  formed  ice.  The  first 
battalion  succeeded  in  reaching  the  right  bank,  but  the  ice 
broke  with  those  in  rear,  and  many  were  drowned.  The 
remainder  of  this  corps  and  the  stragglers  from  the  rest  of 
the  army,  finding  no  chance  of  retreat,  were  compelled  to 
surrender.  Ney  had  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  only  to 
fall  into  the  midst  of  the  Cossacks  of  Platof.  The  enemy 
had  a  good  battery  of  artillery,  while  Ney  had  not  a  single 
cannon,  nor  a  single  cavalry  soldier.  His  soldiers  were  des- 
titute of  munitions  and  could  scarcely  discharge  their  fire- 
arms ;  but  having  recourse  only  to  their  own  valor  and  their 
bayonets,  they  finally  succeeded,  after  some  severe  combats, 
in  joining  us  at  Orcza,  on  the  night  of  the  twentieth  and 
twenty-first.  My  joy  was  so  much  the  greater  as  I  had 
regarded  them  as  lost.  Ney  was  saluted  by  the  whole  army, 
as  the  most  intrepid  of  its  chiefs. 

New  DiiuSciilties  to  be  Encountered.— The  affairs  of  Kras- 
noi had  cost  me  one-half  of  my  combatants,  and  I  now  had 
to  devise  means  for  saving  the  remainder,  which  was  no  easy 
matter.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  renounce  the  sys- 
tem of  echelons  on  single  roads,  for  a  march  by  parallel 
columns  ;  but  how  could  we  expect  to  do  this  with  two 
thirds  of  our  soldiers  reduced  to  a  disorderly  mob  ?  More- 
over, the  roads  from  Orcza  to  Wilna  were  intercepted  by 
Wittgenstein,  and  Admiral  Tschighagof  might  advance  on 
the  line  of  the  Beresina,  so  as  to  close  the  roads  from  Orcza 


Cu.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  31 

to  Minsk.  On  leaving  Smolensko,  I  had  ordered  Oudinot  to 
place  himself  at  Bohr,  so  as  to  reconnoitre  the  road  to  Minsk, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  had  directed  Victor  to  try  what 
resistance  Wittgenstein  was  likely  to  oppose  to  our  inarch 
on  Wilna.  On  the  fourteenth,  Victor  attacked  the  Rus- 
sians at  Czasniki,  hut,  finding  them  solidly  based  on  the 
Oula,  lie  returned  to  Czereya. 

At  Doubrowna  I  learned  that  Tschighagof  had  advanced 
on  Minsk,  while  the  garrison  of  that  place  had  fallen  back 
on  Borisof  ;  and  it  was  to  be  feared  that  Dombrowsky,  who 
was  blockading  Bobrouisk  had  not  been  able  to  gain  the  tête- 
de-pont  of  the  Beresina.  I  hesitated  at  Orcza  what  course  to 
pursue.  Should  I  advance  against  Tschighagof  with  all  my 
remaining  forces,  or  direct  my  march  against  Wittgenstein 
so  as  to  form  a  junction  with  Belluno  ?  If  I  advanced  in 
the  direction  of  Polotsk,  might  not  Kutusof  unite  with  the 
army  of  Moldavia  and  anticipate,  me  at  Wilna  ? 

Hoping  still,  by  forced  marches,  to  anticipate  the  admiral 
on  the  Beresina,  I  gave  my  troops  but  a  single  day's  repose 
at  Orcza,  and.  on  the  twenty-first,  I  resumed  our  march  on 
Cokrano.  Oudinot's  corps  was  now  to  form  the  van-guard, 
and  that  of  Victor  the  rear-guard.  I  reached  Tolocsin  on 
the  twenty-second,  and  Bohr  the  next  day.  I  here  found  it 
was  necessary  to  open  a  passage  sword  in  hand,  as  the  Rus- 
sians had  anticipated  us  on  the  Beresina.  The  admiral  had 
entered  Minsk  on  the  seventeenth,  and  on  the  twenty-first 
his  advanced  guard  attacked  and  carried  the  intrenchments 
of  the  tttc-dc-pont  of  Borisow  before  Dombrowski,  who  had 
just  arrived  from  Boronisk,  had  been  able  to  establish  him- 
self. The  next  day  the  admiral  passed  the  Beresina.  His 
advanced  guard  at  Bohr  was  defeated  and  completely  routed 
on  the  twenty-third  by  Oudinot's  corps.  The  admiral  had 
merely  time  to  repass  the  Beresina,  and  destroy  the  bridge 
of  Borisow. 


32  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch   XYJIL 

This  success  was  therefore  useless,  and  my  position  more 
critical  than  ever.  I  called  to  me  a  general-  officer  who  had 
indicated  the  existence  of  a  direct  road  from  Jemhin  to  Mu- 
lodeschno  ;  I  imparted  to  him  my  embarrassment  and  my 
projects.  Reasoning  on  the  principles  of  war,  I  thought  to 
fall,  as  at  Castiglione  and  Ratisbon,  on  the  armies  that  an- 
noyed me  the  most.  I  thought  to  unite  my  guard  and 
remaining  forces  to  Belluno's  corps,  and,  with  these  fifty 
thousand  men,  to  attack  Wittgenstein,  drive  him  back  on 
the  Dwina,  form  a  junction  with  Macdonald,  and  retake  the 
road  to  Wilna.  This  general  objected  that  this  manœuvre, 
perfectly  correct  under  any  other  circumstances,  would  now 
be  accompanied  with  numerous  inconveniences.  It  was 
objected  : 

1st.  That  the  country  of  Lepel  and  the  upper  Beresina 
was  covered  with  marshes,  the  dikes  of  which  Wittgenstein, 
with  his  one  hundred  and  fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  could  defend 
till  Kutusof  came  to  his  assistance  ; 

2d.  That  the  destitute  condition  of  our  army  would  not 
permit  us  to  delay  the  retreat  ; 

3d.  That,  by  taking  the  direction  of  the  Dwina,  we  should 
expose  ourselves  to  be  attacked  in  rear  by  the  united  forces 
of  Kutusof  and  the  admiral,  before  we  could  finish  with 
Wittgenstein  ; 

4th.  That,  as  the  road  to  Minsk  was  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  it  would  be  more  prudent  to  take  the  road  from 
Jembin  on  Molodeschno,  for,  if  we  found  that  closed,  we 
could  then  take  the  passage  of  Vileika.  Both  of  these  roads, 
and  especially  that  from  Jembin,  passed  through  a  fertile 
country  which  had  not  yet  been  laid  waste. 

But  these  peremptory  reasons  were  not  sufficient  to  deter 
me  from  my  plan  ;  I  still  adhered  to  a  manœuvre  which 
might  procure  us  glorious  results,  and  rescue  us  from  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.     I  called  another  general  who  had  been 


Ch.   XTin.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA,  33 

sent  the  day  before  by  Belluno,  and  who  might  have  more 
positive  information  respecting  the  positions  of  Wittgenstein. 
His  opinions  only  tended  to  confirm  those  of  the  other  officer 
and,  urged  by  the  advice  of  Murat  and  Eugene,  I  finally 
relinquished  my  project.  I,  therefore,  left  on  the  twenty- 
fourth,  for  Lochnitsa,  and,  on  the  twenty -fifth,  collected  all 
my  forces  at  Borisow,  except  Victor's  corps.  This  last,  pur- 
sued by  Wittgenstein,  also  moved  on  Lochnitsa,  instead  of 
taking  the  road  to  Baran  so  as  to  cover  our  march. 

Passage  of  the  Bcresiua.— Never  had  my  situation  been  so 
desperate  as  now.  Hemmed  in  on  the  right  and  left,  and  in 
rear,  by  superior  forces,  I  found  myself  arrested  in  front  bv 
a  river  difficult  to  cross,  ami  defended  by  an  entire  army. 
And  it  was  with  soldiers  half  dead  with  hunger  and  cold  that 
I  now  had  to  overcome  obstacles  that  would  have  frightened 
the  best  organized  army  in  the  world.  Fortune  seemed 
resolved  to  heap  upon  us  every  possible  calamity  during  this 
fatal  retreat.  The  cold,  so  severe  on  our  arrival  at  Smo- 
lensko  as  to  close  the  Dnieper,  suddenly  moderated  after  mv 
arrival  at  Krasnoi  ;  a  thaw  of  two  days  broke  the  ice,  and 
the  Beresina  was  much  swollen.  This  was  a  double  mis- 
fortune. If  the  river  had  been  frozen  sufficiently  to  enable 
us  to  pass  with  cannon,  we  should  have  crossed  in  twenty- 
four  hours  in  sufficient  force  to  crush  Tschighagof,  without 
even  the  trouble  of  building  a  bridge. 

This  river,  on  the  contrary,  was  now  greatly  swollen  and 
filled  with  large  masses  of  floating  ice,  so  as  to  render  the 
construction  of  our  bridges  not  only  difficult,  but  almost  im- 
possible. But,  as  I  could  not  command  the  elements,  it  was 
necessary  to  take  my  part  and  redouble  my  efforts  to  over- 
come the  immense  obstacles  which  both  nature  and  the 
enemy  opposed  to  my  passage. 

The  forces  which   I  had  brought  from  Moscow  did  not 
exceed  fifteen  thousand  combatants  including  the  guards,  and 
VoL.  iv. — .'). 


34  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XVTIT. 

the  corps  of  Belluno  and  Oudinot  amounted  only  to  about 
the  same  number.  In  our  front  disputing  tins  difficult  pas- 
sage, was  Tschigbagof  with  twenty-eight  thousand  men  ;  on 
our  right  Wittgenstein  and  Steinheil  with  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men,  and  on  our  left  Kutusof  with  fifty  thousand.  I 
felt  that  I  could  effect  this  passage  only  by  a  surprise  ;  and 
to  do  this  it  was  important  to  make  demonstrations  on 
several  poiu  ts  in  order  to  deceive  the  vigilance  of  the  enemy. 
Oudinot  displayed  the  heads  of  his  columns  in  the  direction 
of  Oucholoda,  toward  the  Lower  Beresina,  while  the  other 
detachments  in  silence  ascended  the  river  toward  Wesselowo. 
These  demonstrations  produced  the  desired  result  ;  the  ad- 
miral prolonged  himself  by  his  right  toward  the  road  to 
Igoumen.  We  profited  without  delay  by  the  false  move- 
ment to  effect  the  jmssage  above  Borisow.  On  the  night  of 
the  twenty-fifth  and  twenty-sixth,  we  moved  from  Borisow 
to  Studenka,  where  we  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty- 
sixth.  General  Aubry  had  constructed  a  bridge  of  poor 
materials  for  infantry,  while  General  Eble,  with  the  sappers 
and  pontoniers,  erected  a  trestle  bridge,  for  the  passage  of  all 
arms.  This  bridge,  eighty  toises  in  length,  was  constructed 
with  admirable  rapidity  by  our  brave  sappers,  who  precipi- 
tated themselves  into  the  water  up  to  their  shoulders,  not- 
withstanding the  severe  cold  and  the  enormous  masses  of  ice 
that  floated  in  the  Beresina.  One-half  of  these  intrepid 
men  perished  in  their  devoted  efforts  to  save  the  army. 
Nothing  could  diminish  their  ardor.  The  vanguard  of 
General  Tschoplitz  hastened  to  oppose  itself  to  our  projects  ; 
as  this  might  prevent  the  construction  of  the  bridge,  the 
cavalry  of  Corbineau  swam  the  river  writh  their  horses,  and 
were  supported  by  a  battalion  of  sharp-shooters,  who  crossed 
on  a  raft.  The  enemy  was  repelled,  but  he  soon  succeeded 
in  reestablishing  himself  so  as  to  command  the  debouch. 
As  soon  as  the  bridge  of  plank  was  finished,  Oudinot'»  infan- 


Or.  XYIIT.]  INVASION     OF    RUSSIA.  35 

try  crossed  over  and  drove  Tschoplitz  to  Strakow,  a  league 
from  Borisow  ;  being  reënforced  by  Pahlen  at  this  place,  he 
resumed  the  offensive.  But  Oudinot,  taking  advantage  of  a 
piece  of  woods,  succeeded  in  maintaining  his  position.  Our 
brave  soldiers  seemed  convinced  of  the  importance  of  this 
combat,  and  every  one  redoubled  his  energy  ;  Frenchmen, 
Poles,  Swiss,  Croates,  covered  themselves  with  glory,  and  the 
enemy  was  held  in  check  the  whole  evening.  Thus  far  every- 
thing had  gone  for  the  best  ;  but  it  was  still  necessary  to  secure 
the  road  from  Jembin,  which  crossed  a  marsh,  over  which 
was  a  kind  of  dyke  with  three  bridges  of  one  hundred  toises 
each.  If  the  enemy  shoul  1  destroy  these,  the  ice  not  being 
sufficiently  strong  to  supply  their  place,  all  would  be  lost. 
Oudinot  was  ordered  to  send  in  haste  a  detachment,  which 
fortunately  arrived  there  in  time  to  secure  the  road.  In  the 
meantime  the  remainder  of  our  broken  troops  and  the  corps 
of  Belluno,  approached  Studzianka.  Ney  crossed  in  the 
night  with  the  Poles  and  a  division  of  the  Young  Guard, 
amounting  in  all  to  not  more  than  twenty-five  hundred  men  ; 
he  was  to  unite  with  Oudinot,  and  he  put  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  few  forces  which  we  could  oppose  to  Tschighagof. 
I  crossed  with  my  head-quarters  after,  noon,  and  the  passage 
continued  a  part  of  the  night  and  all  day  of  the  twenty- 
seventh.  It  could  only  be  effected  slowly,  the  trestle  bridges 
having  broken  twice,  on  account  of  the  muddy  bed  of  the 
stream  and  the  masses  of  floating  ice.  Tschighagof  thus 
gained  time  to  return  to  Borisow  with  the  two  divisions 
which  he  had  taken  in  the  direction  of  Ouscha  ;  but,  instead 
of  marching  directly  against  Oudinot,  he  remained  opposite 
Borisow,  and  sought  to  communicate  with  Wittgenstein. 
Belluno's  corps  had  left  that  city  in  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
sixth  and  twenty-seventh,  to  inarch  to  Studzianka  leaving 
Parthouneaux's  division  to  ^uard  Borisow  until  noon,   as 


36  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cit.  XVIII. 

much  to  draw  the  attention  of  Tschighagof  as   to  afford  a 
momentary  check  to  Wittgenstein. 

This  detachment  was  unfortunate  ;  hardly  had  the  division 
returned  to  Borisow  when  it  was  announced  that  it  was  cut 
off.  As  soon  as  Parthouneaux  learned  that  Wittgenstein 
had  established  himself  at  Staro-Borisow  between  him  and 
Belluno,  he  attempted  to  effect  his  escape.  There  are  two 
roads  leading  from  Borisow  to  Studzianka,  one  of  which  was 
closed  by  Wittgenstein,  while  the  other  was  still  open.  Un- 
fortunately, Parthouneaux  took  the  one  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  Ignorant  of  the  enemy's  force,  he  attacked  him  with 
bravery  ;  but,  after  useless  efforts,  ho  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Cossacks  and  was  taken  prisoner.  The  next  morning  his 
division,  numbering  about  three  thousand  men,  besides  some 
four  thousand  stragglers  from  other  corps,  surrendered  to  the 
enemy.  A  battalion  which  at  the  same  time  took  the  other 
road,  succeeded  in  effecting  its  escape.  The  taking  of  Bori- 
sow enabled  Tschighagof  to  establish  a  bateau-bridge  so  as 
to  communicate  with  Wittgenstein  ;  he  was  now  reënforced 
by  Jermolof  and  Platof. 

The  enemy  combined,  for  the  twenty-eighth,  a  simul- 
taneous effort  on  the  two  banks  of  the  river,  and  the  result 
was  calculated  to  decide  the  fate  of  our  army.  Wittgen- 
stein prepared  to  attack  Belluno  by  the  left  bank,  while  the 
admiral  marched  at  the  head  of  his  divisions  on  Stakhow. 
We  anticipated  him  by  attacking  his  advanced  guard, 
which  we  drove  back  on  Stakhow,  notwitstanding  a  glorious 
resistance.  Ney  threw  a  division  of  Dournerc's  cuirassiers 
into  the  woods  which  Avere  occupied  by  the  Kussian  chas- 
seurs ;  they  made  great  havoc  in  the  enemy's  ranks  and 
captured  between  twelve  and  fifteen  hundred  prisoners. 
The  enemy  was  driven  back,  but,  after  a  bloody  combat 
which  continued  till  after  ten  o'clock  at  night,  they  succeeded 
in  holding  Stakhow.     The  brave   Generals   Zayonschek  and 


Cil.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  37 

Legrand  were  wounded  and  the  remains  of  the  second  corps 
fell,  covered  with  the  laurels  which  they  had  won  within  the 
last  two  days. 

In  the  mean  time  Victor  had  made  a  no  less  glorious  resist- 
ance against  the  attack  of  Wittgenstein.  He  first  bravely 
disputed,  with  only  seven  or  eight  thousand  men,  the  heights 
which  border  the  avenues  of  Studzianka,  but  finding  that  he 
was  likely  to  be  surrounded,  he  concentrated  his  forces  near 
the  bridges.  The  Russians  now  crown  the  heights  with  their 
batteries  and  pour  in  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  multitude  of  sick 
and  wounded  and  stragglers,  and  the  innumerable  quantity 
of  carriages  which  had  collected  here  for  the  purpose  of  cross- 
ing the  river.  This  confused  mass  of  men,  horses  and 
wagons,  rush  with  such  impetuosity  to  the  bridges,  that 
three-quarters  of  them  are  either  trampled  under  foot  or 
precipitated  into  the  river. 

The  piercing  cries  of  these  wretched  beings,  as  they  are 
thrust  forward  to  inevitable  death  by  their  own  countrymen, 
in  their  haste  to  escape  the  murderous  fire  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  ;  the  horrible  aspect  of  the  thousand  women  who 
have  followed  in  the  train  of  the  army,  as  they  are  trampled 
under  foot  by  the  flying  columns,  or  driven  into  the  river,  or 
mutilated  by  the  enemy's  artillery  ;  caissons  and  shells  explod- 
ing in  the  midst  of  this  straggling  mass  ;  the  bed  of  the 
Beresina  covered  with  the  wrecks  of  broken  carriages  and  the 
bodies  of  the  dead  ;  all  together  formed  a  scene  of  desolation 
without  parallel  in  the  annals  of  history  ! 

The  firmness  of  Belluno  saved  the  remains  of  this  multi- 
tude, by  affording  them  time  to  escape  by  the  bridges  ;  but 
they  had  the  greatest  possible  difficulty  in  opening  a  passage 
through  the  broken  carriages,  and  the  dead  bodies  of  men 
and  horses.  The  cannonade  continued  till  night,  and  it  was 
not  till  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth,  that  Belluno  passed 


38  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

the  Beresina  with  three  thousand  men  who  remained  to  burn 
the  bridges. 

Remarks  on  this  Passage— Had  it  not  been  for  the  mis- 
fortune of  Parthouneaux,  we  might  have  prided  ourselves  on 
this  famous  passage.  It  was  a  fine  spectacle  to  see  eight  or 
nine  thousand  men,  under  Ney  and  Oudinot,  repelling  the 
three  divisions  of  Tschighagof,  while  on  the  other  side,  Bel- 
luno's  eight  thousand  men  were  gloriously  contending  against 
the  efforts  of  Wittgenstein.  And  in  what  a  situation  did 
our  soldiers  sustain  this  desperate  combat  ?  A  prey  to 
famine  and  cold,  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  six  hundred 
leagues  from  their  country,  without  hope  of  escape  from 
destruction,  destitute  of  munitions,  and  seeing  nothing  but 
disorder  around  them,  they  nevertheless  fought  and  died  like 
heroes  !  The  Kussians,  on  the  contrary,  inured  to  the 
climate,  well  furnished  with  supplies,  fighting  for  their  own 
firesides,  encouraged  by  success  far  surpassing  their  hopes, 
with  a  large  army  ready  to  sustain  them  ;  having  a  numerous 
cavalry,  and  well-served  artillery  ;  in  a  word,  certain  that 
success  would  secure  for  them  rich  trophies,  fought  under 
advantages  immensely  superior  to  ours. 

But  it  must  be  confessed  that  these  advantages  were  in 
some  degree  counterbalanced  by  several  fortuitous  circum- 
stances. In  the  first  place,  through  a  misunderstanding,  one 
half  of  Wittgenstein's  corps  remained  in  rear,  so  that  that 
general  could  not  act  upon  Belluno  with  the  desired  vigor. 
Again,  the  numerous  stragglers  in  the  train  of  our  army, 
though  useless  as  combatants,  deceived  the  enemy  respecting 
our  numbers,  and  made  him  more  cautious  in  his  operations. 
Moreover  Tschighagof,  being  a  sailor  by  profession,  was  not 
accustomed  to  military  operations  on  land,  and  his  cavalry 
could  not  act  with  advantage  in  the  woods,  while  the  same 
obstacle  assisted  in  covering  our  infantry,  and  concealing 
their  numbers.     But  it  must  not  be  supposed  from  these 


OH.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF     RUSSIA.  3(J 

remarks,  that  I  wish  in  the  slightest  degree,  to  depreciate 
the  glory  won  on  that  memorable  occasion.  I  merely  wish 
to  present  a  true  picture  of  the  relative  circumstances,  in 
order  that  posterity  may  do  justice  to  all.  With  resrject  to 
the  circumspection  of  Kutusof  which  has  been  so  much 
criticized,  it  is  certain  that  if  he  had  acted  with  more  celerity 
and  audacity,  he  would  have  overtaken  us.  But  it  must  be 
remembered  that,  like  most  of  the  Russian  generals,  he 
overestimated  our  numbers,  and  was  compelled  by  political 
considerations  to  spare  the  remains  of  his  army.  It  was 
important  that  Russia  should  be  able,  on  her  return  to  the 
Niémen,  to  exhibit  a  considerable  force  in  order  to  detach 
Prussia  and  Austria  from  our  alliance. 

Continuation  of  the  Retreat. — But  let  us  return  to  the 
remains  of  my  army.  The  sad  victory  which  we  had  just 
gained  was  glorious,  but  it  did  not  ameliorate  our  situation  ; 
it  did  not  avert,  but  merely  retarded  our  ruin.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  continue  our  retreat,  although  the  exhausted  condi- 
tion of  our  troops  rendered  them  incapable  of  any  longer 
enduring  the  fatigues  and  privations  to  which  they  were 
exposed.  To  crown  our  misfortunes  the  cold,  which  had 
moderated  for  some  days  before,  now  set  in  with  redoubled 
severity  ;  and  the  enemy,  piqued  at  having  allowed  us  to 
escape  at  the  Beresina,  pursued  us  with  renewed  energy. 
Our  march  from  Jembin  to  Smorgoni  completed  the  dissolu- 
tion of  our  army. 

Napoleon  departs  for  Paris. — I  was  deeply  affected  by 
the  disasters  of  my  troops  ;  but  I  felt  that,  as  a  sovereign,  I 
was  bound  to  act  for  the  salvation  of  the  entire  nation,  rather 
than  for  the  few.  I  could  do  nothing  more  for  this  army  ; 
but  the  interest  and  destinies  of  a  great  people  reposed  on 
me  ;  my  duty  to  this  people  now  required  that  I  should 
return  to  France,  and  organise  the  means  of  repairing  this 
great  disaster.     I,  therefore,  at  Molodesclmo,  on  the  fifth  of 


40  LIFE     0  F     N  APOLBOK,  [Cil.   XV 1 1 1. 

December,  gave  the  command  of  llie  remains  of  my  army  to 
the  king  of  Naples,  and  set  out  for  Paris. 

3Iotivcs  of  this  Measure. — My  detractors  have  loudly  de- 
claimed against  this  departure.  If  I  had  been  the  grandson 
of  Louis  XIV.,  and  my  natural  successor  had  been  in  France, 
ready  to  mount  t lie  throne,  I  should  not  have  hesitated  to 
share  the  fortunes  of  my  companions  in  arms  ;  for  my 
presence  in  France  would  not  have  been  necessary  to  save 
the  empire.  Bat  what  could  I  do  with  thirty  thousand  half 
starved  and  half  frozen  men,  six  hundred  leagues  from  their 
own  country,  fighting  against  all  Germany,  and  with  a 
Russian  army  in  their  rear  ?  Ought  I  to  augment  the 
trophies  of  the  enemy  by  my  own  capture,  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  remaining  with  an  army  which  must  necessarily 
pass  "beneath  the  Caudine  forks  ?  I  left  with  only  two  offi- 
cers, and  returned  three  months  after  with  three  hundred 
thousand  men,  of  which  there  existed  only  the  skeleton 
when  I  first  put  foot  on  the  French  territory.  This  fact 
alone  should  forever  silence  the  critics  who  make  war  only 
in  the  salons  of  the  capital.  Who  besides  myself  could  have 
raised  this  army,  and  organised  a  new  train  of  six  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery,  which  appeared  triumphant  in  the  fields 
of  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  ? 

General  Causes  of  tSic  Disasters  of  this  Campaign. — But 
before  passing  to  the  discussion  of  this  memorable  resurrec- 
tion, let  us  review  the  principal  causes  of  the  failure  of  my 
expedition  into  Russia.  Some  of  my  partisans  have  attri- 
buted the  ill-success  of  the  campaign  entirely  to  the  prema- 
ture and  excessively  cold  weather  ;  this  is  not  true.  The 
cold  weather  did  not  begin  till  the  seventh  of  November,  and 
was  not  excessive,  for,  until  our  arrival  at  Krasnoi  it  varied 
from  3°  to  8°,  and  after  the  twentieth,  it  continued  to  thaw 
till  our  arrival  on  the  Beresina.  There  was  no  time  when 
the  ice  on  the  Dnieper  would  bear  infantry.     This  cold  did 


Ch.  XVTLL]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  41 

not  exceed  that  of  the  Eylau  campaign,  but  then  we  were  in 
a  country  abundantly  supplied  with  resources,  whereas,  in 
1812,  there  were  no  means  of  supplying  our  most  pressing 
wants.  Our  numerous  columns  became  disorganised,  and  it 
required  a  week's  halt  in  some  intrenched  camp  well  stored 
with  magazines  to  enable  us  to  recruit  our  men  and  reorgan- 
ise our  regiments.  We  expected  to  find  such  a  camp  at 
Smolensko,  but  failing  in  this,  our  only  other  asylum  was  on 
the  Vistula,  and  our  army  was  destroyed  before  it  could 
reach  it.  The  cold  was  quite  supportable  previous  to  our 
arrival  on  the  Beresina,  and  then  we  had  left  only  fifty  thou- 
sand combatants  out  of  the  three  hundred  thousand  which  I 
had  led  to  the  banks  of  the  Dwina  and  to  Moscow.  The 
true  causes  of  this  catastrophe  were  : — 

1st.  I  did  not  intend  in  commencing  the  war  to  advance 
further  than  Smolensko,  the  first  campaign  ;  but  the  diffi- 
culty of  procuring  supplies  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand men  in  that  devastated  and  sparsely  populated  country  ; 
and  more  especially  the  erroneous  statements  of  Murat  that 
he  had  cut  up  the  Eussian  army  on  the  Lonja,  induced  me 
to  advance  too  far  into  the  interior. 

2d.  I  hoped  to  fight  a  decisive  battle  between  Wilna  and 
the  Dwina,  but  was  unable  to  bring  the  enemy  to  a  general 
action.  If  I  could  have  found  another  Austerlitz  or  Fried- 
land  in  the  plains  of  Lithuania,  all  Europe  would  have  been 
subject  to  my  power. 

3d.  Jerome  neglected  to  profit  by  a  favorable  opportunity 
to  destroy  Bagration. 

4th.  The  Poles  of  YvTolhynia  and  Podolia,  did  not  second 
my  projects  with  the  ardor  I  expected.  If  the  corps  of  Po- 
niatowski  had  been  sent  into  these  provinces  instead  of  the 
Austrians,  a  better  result  would  probably  have  been  pro- 
duced. 

5th.  Lithuania,  from  the  failure  of  the  crops  the  previous 


42  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII 

year  and  the  requisitions  of  the  Russians,  did  not  afford  us 
the  resources  I  anticipated.  I  neglected  no  means  to  repair 
the  evil,  and  ordered  hand-mills  from  Paris  to  grind  the  rye 
which  we  found  in  the  country  ;  hut  they  arrived  too  late  to 
be  of  any  great  use. 

6th.  The  cattle  which  I  had  purchased  in  Poland  and 
Galicia  did  not  reach  us  in  time,  and  moreover,  were  insuffi- 
cient to  supply  our  wants.  And  the  immense  magazines 
which  I  had  collected  at  Dantzic  could  not  be  transported  to 
Smolensko  in  sufficient  quantities  for  the  support  of  such  an 
immense  army.  I  had  organised  thirty-four  battalions  of 
the  train,  each  battalion  conducting  one  hundred  and  fifty 
four-horse  wagons.  Twenty  of  these  battalions  followed  my 
army,  making  a  provision  train  of  twelve  thousand  horses, 
carrying  four  millions  of  rations.  But  this  was  merely 
sufficient  for  fifteen  days  ;  whereas  it  required  four  times 
this  number  for  regular  distributions,  inasmuch  as  my  depots 
were  twenty-five  days'  march  in  rear  of  the  army.  The  con- 
voys required  fifty  days  to  go  and  return.  To  obviate  this 
difficulty,  I  ordered  boats  from  France  to  transport  m}-  mag- 
azines up  the  Is  iemen  and  the  Wilia  ;  and  where  the  water 
was  too  shallow  in  the  latter  stream  for  navigation,  I  directed 
rafts  to  be  constructed.  What  more  could  I  do  ?  Great 
enterprises  into  distant  countries,  says  Montesquieu,  perish 
from  the  very  extent  of  the  preparation  required  to  secure 
their  success. 

7th.  I  remained  two  weeks  at  Wilna,  whereas  I  ought,  by 
the  first  of  July,  to  have  pushed  on  against  the  main  army  to 
Gloubokoe  and  Polotsk,  or  to  have  directed  my  march  on 
Minsk  against  Bagration.  Had  I  profited  by  the  false  direc- 
tion of  the  principal  army  of  the  enemy  toward  Drissa,  to 
turn  their  left  and  throw  them  back  upon  the  Baltic,  the 
destruction  of  their  army  would  have  been  certain.  But  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  provisions,  and  the  fear  that  Bagra- 


Cil.  XVIII.]  INVASION"     OF    RUSSIA.  43 

tion  might  defile  on  my  rear  in  order  to  regain  Drissa,  in- 
duced me  to  make  the  halt  at  Wilna,  which  eventually  cost 
us  dearly. 

8th.  Murat  failed  to  do  any  thing  with  his  thirty  thousand 
horse  to  harass  and  cut  up  the  enemy  in  his  retreat. 

9th.  At  Borodino  we  were  ignorant  of  the  existence  of 
Touckzof's  corps  toward  Oustitza,  which  modified  the  effect 
of  the  first  plan  of  attack.  We  failed  to  throw  a  sufficient 
mass  against  the  enemy's  left,  hy  the  old  road  to  Smolensko, 
and,  for  reasons  already  given,  my  reserve  did  not  come  into 
action  at  the  most  opportune  moment. 

10th.  It  was  unfortunate  that  I  did  not  pursue  the  enemy 
still  further  than  Moscow  ;  it  was  a  choice  of  evils,  it  is  true, 
hut  perhaps  he  would  have  accepted  battle  at  Taroutina,  and, 
if  victorious,  I  would  have  been  master  of  the  rich  provinces 
of  Kalouga  ;  if  the  enemy  had  continued  his  retreat  to  the 
Wolga,  I  should  have  had  a  more  favorable  line  of  retreat 
by  Roslaw.  But  the  fear  of  penetrating  further  into  the 
enemy's  country  induced  me  to  halt  at  Moscow. 

11th.  We  had  no  good  maps  of  the  country,  and  knew 
not  the  position  of  the  practicable  roads  ;  while  the  enemy 
profited  by  his  superior  knowledge  in  this  respect. 

12th.  Turkey  signed  the  treaty  of  peace  at  the  moment 
when  I  expected  her  to  renew  the  war  with  vigor  ;  and  Ber- 
nadotte  at  the  same  time  deserted  my  cause,  and  allied  him- 
self with  the  Russians.  This  double  incident  changed  the 
chances  of  the  war.  Sebastiani  or  Andreossi  should  have 
been  sent  to  Constantinople,  six  months  sooner,  with  money, 
to  induce  the  divan  to  continue  the  war  with  Russia. 

13th.  The  enemy  had  greatly  improved  in  the  art  of  war. 
After  the  camp  of  Drissa  his  operations  were  conducted  with 
skill  ;  and  the  concentration  of  his  forces  on  the  Beresina, 
ordered  by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  was  one  of  the  finest 
military  movements  of  the  age. 


44  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XVIII. 

14th.  I  committed  a  capital  fault  in  not  uniting  the  corps 
of  Macdonald,  Oudinot,  St.  Cyr,  and  Victor  under  a  single 
chief,  possessing  vigor  and  skill.  These  hundred  thousand 
men  united,  might  have  destroyed  Wittgenstein,  and  secured 
my  line  of  retreat. 

15th.  Finally,  I  was  deceived  in  the  military  character  of 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  as  well  as  in  the  efforts  of  the  Rus- 
sian  nation  to  sustain  him. 

Some  writers,  instead  of  looking  at  the  natural  causes  of 
our  disasters,  have  preferred  to  attribute  them  to  super- 
natural means,  like  the  manna  of  the  desert,  and  the  closing 
of  the  waters  of  the  Red  Sea.  These  writers  can  see  no  fault 
in  my  operations,  and  no  merit  in  those  of  our  adversaries. 
Never  have  they  rendered  me  a  worse  service  than  in  de- 
preciating the  actions  of  my  opponents  ;  they  thus  tarnish 
my  own  glory  and  that  of  the  French  army,  for  that  glory 
consists  in  having  surmounted  unforeseen  obstacles.  The 
Russians  certainly  effected  a  retreat  of  three  hundred  leagues 
without  having  their  army  cut  to  pieces,  and  without  leaving 
us  any  trophies.  Barclay  and  Bagration,  after  being  separated 
by  a  hostile  force  of  three  hundred  thousand  men,  again 
effected  their  junction  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  :  Wittgen- 
stein, though  opposed  by  three  marshals  with  a  force  twice 
his  own,  maintained  a  threatening  attitude  during  the  whole 
campaign  ;  and  the  army,  defeated  at  Borodino,  was  again 
in  condition  to  dispute  our  passage  at  Krasnoi  : — how  could 
all  this  have  happened  if  my  enemies  did  nothing  but  com- 
mit faults  ?  Again,  how  could  men  possessing  no  talents  or 
merit  collect  their  scattered  forces,  and  concentrate  them 
with  troops  from  Finland  and  the  Pruth,  late  in  the  autumn, 
on  the  Beresina,  to  dispute  the  passage  of  that  river  ?  Un- 
doubtedly they  were  favored  by  a  thousand  advantageous 
circumstances,  but  it  would  be  unjust  to  refuse  them  the 
praise  which  they  deserve. 


»'ii.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  45 

Undoubtedly  the  Russians  committed  some  great  errors, 
especially  in  the  first  period  of  the  campaign  ;  their  primitive 
position,  their  direction  on  Drissa,  and  their  retreat  from 
Smolensko,  are  the  most  prominent.  It  is  true  also  that 
Kutusof  might  have  done  more,  for,  in  his  place,  I  certainly 
should  not  have  failed  to  destroy  the  army  that  left  Moscow; 
but  his  circumspection  did  not  prevent  his  making  skillful 
manoeuvres  ;  these  manœuvres  were  the  result  of  the  instruc- 
tions of  Alexander  or  of  his  staff,  and  it  would  be  unjust  to 
say  that  they  were  Avithout  merit.  It  is  ridiculous  to  say 
that  our  disasters  were  in  no  way  due  to  the  Russians  :  it  is 
true  that  they  were  not  the  result  of  any  great  victories 
gained  ;  but  in  the  second  period  of  this  campaign,  the  gen- 
erals, the  army,  the  government,  and  the  nation,  all  did 
their  duty. 

But  if  my  admirers  have  been  unjust  towards  my  rivals, 
my  personal  enemies  have  not  been  less  so  towards  me.  My 
conduct  in  this  campaign  was  not  below  the  renown  which  I 
had  previously  gained.  I  did  not  venture  into  an  inhospi- 
table country  Avithout  due  preparation.  But  the  immense 
distance  to  be  passed  over,  and  the  enormous  preparations 
required  to  support  so  large  an  army,  all  turned  against  me. 
My  forces  were  prudently  disposed  of  in  echelons,  and  no 
point  Avas  needlessly  exposed  ;  if  I  ventured  much,  it  was 
only  after  having  taken  every  precaution  which  human  fore- 
sight could  suggest  to  secure  the  success  of  my  operations. 
But  let  us  return  from  this  digression,  and  conclude  the 
operations  of  my  lieutenants  after  my  return  to  Paris. 

Continuation  of  the  Retreat  under  Murat.— In  leaving 
Molodeschino  I  resigned  the  command  of  my  army  to  Murat, 
giving  him  Berthier  as  his  chief  of  staff,  (major-general). 
The  former,  of  a  rash  and  chivalric  character,  had  not  any 
more  than  the  other  the  will  of  iron  suited  to  such  difficult 
circumstances.     My  departure  became  the  signal  of  new  dis- 


46  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIIT. 

asters,  still  more  terrible  than  any  which  preceded  them. 
The  cold  increased  to  thirty  degrees,  and  even  the  birds  fell 
dead  to  the  earth  !  In  the  three  marches  from  Smorgoni  to 
Wilna  more  than  twenty  thousand  men  fell  by  the  way-side; 
and  the  remainder,  half  dead  with  cold  and  hunger,  threw 
themselves  into  Wilna  like  a  troop  of  madmen.  This 
flourishing  city  contained  immense  resources  ;  a  part  of  our 
magazines  had  been  brought  here  from  Kônigsberg,  and  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  had  collected  here  supplies  from  all  Lithua- 
nia ;  but  the  disorder  was  so  great  that  it  was  impossible  to 
make  regular  issues  ;  a  part  was  given  up  to  pillage,  and  the 
remainder  left,  untouched,  to  the  enemy.  Wittgenstein  and 
Tschighagof  pressed  close  on  our  rear,  while  Kutusof  fol- 
lowed within  two  days'  march.  The  division  of  Loison, 
which  had  opened  the  passage,  and  was  echeloned  on  the 
road,  now  formed  the  rear-guard.  The  intrepid  Ney  who 
had  successively  commanded  the  whole  army,  was  still 
charged  with  sustaining  here  the  shock  of  the  enemy.  Al- 
though composed  of  fresh  and  robust  soldiers,  Loison's  divi- 
sion lost,  in  these  three  days,  two-thirds  of  the  men  present, 
and  there  were  scarcely  five  thousand  men  left  before  Wilna 
to  oppose  the  Russians.  Ney  fought  with  resignation  and 
courage,  but  his  feeble  force  could  not  prevent  the  enemy's 
partisans  from  penetrating  into  the  suburbs  of  the  city. 
Sixty  thousand  half-famished  men  had  quartered  themselves 
in  the  hospitals,  magazines,  and  private  dwellings  ;  by  feed- 
ing on  heavy  half-baked  bread  they  had  contracted  diseases 
not  less  fatal  than  the  severe  cold.  In  two  days  Wilna  was 
but  one  vast  lazaretto.  Those  who  could  drag  themselves 
along,  left  at  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon. 

Two  leagues  from  Wilna  is  the  mountain  of  Ponary 
whose  steep  and  icy  slope  became,  for  our  horses  and  the 
remains  of  our  artillery  and  baggage- train,  a  true  barrier  of 
iron.     All   our   remaining   carriages  were  here  abandoned  ; 


Ch.   XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  47 

our  treasure  was  divided  among  our  soldiers  who,  loaded 
down  with  gold,  half-famished  with  hunger  and  half-dead 
with  cold,  took  in  mournful  despair  the  road  to  Kowno. 
The  Emperor  Alexander,  having  returned  to  his  army  in 
order  to  gather  the  fruits  of  his  plan  of  campaign,  entered 
Wilna  amid  scenes  of  desolation  exceeding  even  the  romantic 
description  of  fiction.  He  halted  here  to  afford  succor  to 
the  twenty  thousand  dying  men  who  filled  the  city,  and  to 
provide  for  the  wants  of  his  own  army  which  now  began  to 
suffer  as  much  as  ours.  His  columns  continued  the  pursuit 
on  Kowno. 

The  severe  cold  had  closed  the  Niémen  so  that  it  could  be 
readily  crossed  with  artillery.  This  circumstance,  which 
would  have  been  so  favorable  to  us  on  the  Beresina,  now 
became  fatal  to  our  army,  which  had  scarcely  six  thousand 
men  capable  of  firing  a  gun.  The  Cossacks  reached  the 
Niémen  at  the  same  time  with  the  wreck  of  our  forces,  and 
threatened  the  debouches  of  the  bridge.  Each  one  sought 
for  himself  an  issue  ;  some  took  to  the  woods  of  Wilkowisk, 
and  the  road  to  Warsaw,  while  the  greater  number,  with 
Murat  and  his  head-quarters,  took  the  road  to  Kônigsberg  ; 
Ney,  who  had  been  left  in  the  city  with  a  rear-guard  of  only 
five  hundred  combatants,  found  on  evacuating  the  town,  that 
the  enemy  were  in  possession  of  the  bridge  across  the  Niémen. 
Valiant  as  Achilles,  and  strong  as  Ajax  and  Diomede,  this 
hero  seized  a  musket,  and  throwing  himself  upon  the  enemy 
with  forty  brave  men,  cut  his  way  through  the  ranks  of  his 
astonished  foes.* 


*  Abbott  thus  describes  Key's  final  retreat,  and  crossing  of  the  Niémen  : 
"  On  the  twelfth  of  December,  the  French  arrived  at  Kowno,  upon  the  banks 
of  the  Niémen.  On  the  thirteenth,  they  crossed  the  bridge,  but  about  thirty 
thousand  in  number.  The  '  Old  Guard'  was  now  reduced  to  three  hundred 
men.  They  still  marched  proudly,  preserving,  even  unto  death,  their  martial 
and  indomitable  air.  The  heroic  Ney,  through  miracles  of  suffering  and  valor, 
had  covered  the  rear  through  this  awful  retreat.     The  march  from  Viasma  to 


48  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [On.  XVIII. 

M ura t  has  been  reproached  for  having  taken  the  road  to 
old  Prussia  and  thus  exposing  himself  to  be  thrown  into  thé 
sea  ;  but  the  hope  of  being  reënforced  by  the  garrison  of 

the  Niémen  had  occupied  thirty-seven  days  and  nights.  During  this  time,  four 
rear-guards  had  melted  away  uuder  his  command. 

"Receiving  four  or  five  thousand  men,  the  number  would  soon  be  reduced 
to  two  thousand,  then  to  one  thousand,  then  to  five  hundred,  and  finally  to 
fifty  or  sixty.  He  would  then  obtain  a  fresh  supply  to  be  strewn  in  death 
along  the  road.  Even  more  perished  from  fatigue  and  the  cold  than  from  the 
bullets  of  the  enemy. 

'•  In  the  following  way  he  conducted  the  retreat.  Each  afternoon,  at  about 
five  o'clock,  he  selected  some  commanding  position,  and  stopped  the  advance 
of  the  Russians.  His  soldiers  then,  for  a  few  hours,  obtained  such  food  and 
rest  as  was  possible  under  such  circumstances. 

"At  ten  o'clock  he  again  resumed,  under  cover  of  night,  his  retreat.  At 
daybreak,  which  was  about  seven  o'clock,  he  again  took  position,  and  rested 
until  ten  o'clock.  By  this  time  the  enemy  usually  made  Lis  appearance.  Cau- 
tiously retiring,  Ney  fought  them  back  all  day  long,  making  as  much  progress 
as  he  could,  until  five  o'clock  in  the  evening,  when  he  again  took  position. 

"  In  order  to  retard  the  advance  of  the  Cossacks,  powder  and  shells  were 
placed  in  the  wagons  which  it  was  found  necessary  to  abandon,  and  a  long 
lighted  fuse  attached.  The  Cossacks,  observing  the  smoke,  dared  not  approach 
until  after  the  explosion.  Thus,  for  more  than  a  month,  by  night  and  by  day. 
Ney  struggled  along  against  blinding  storms  of  snow  and  freezing  gales,  with 
his  ranks  ploughed  by  the  shot  and  shells  of  the  enemy. 

'•  At  Kowno,  Marshal  Ney  collected  seven  hundred  fresh  troops,  and  plant- 
ing a  battery  of  twenty-four  pieces  of  cannon,  beat  back  the  enemy  during  the 
whole  day,  while  the  army  was  defiling  across  the  bridge.  As  these  troops 
melted  away  before  the  fire  of  the  foe,  he  se.zcd  a  musket,  and  with  difficulty 
rallied  thirty  men  to  stand  by  his  side.  At  last,  having  seen  every  man  safely 
across  the  river,  he  slowly  retired,  proudly  facing  the  foe. 

"  The  bullets  flew  thickly  around  him  ;  still,  he  disdained  to  turn  his  back 
upon  the  foe  or  to  quicken  his  pace.  Deliberately  walking  backward,  he  fired 
the  last  bullet  at  the  advancing  Russians,  and  threw  his  gun  into  the  stream. 
He  was  the  last  of  the  '  Grand  Army'  who  left  the  Russian  territory. 

"  General  Dumas  was  seated  in  the  house  of  a  French  physician,  on  the  Ger- 
man side  of  the  river,  when  a  man  entered,  enveloped  in  a  large  cloak.  His 
beard  was  long  and  matted,  his  emaciated  visage  was  blackened  with  gun- 
powder, his  whiskers  were  singed  by  fire,  but  his  eyes  beamed  with  the  lustre 
of  an  indomitable  mind. 

"'At  last  I  am  here,' slid  he,  as  he  threw  himself  into  a  chair.  'What, 
General  Dumas,  do  you  not  know  me?' 

'•  '  No,'  was  the  reply;   •  who  are  you  ?' 

"  '  I  am  the  rear-guard  of  the  Grand  Army,  Marshal  Ney.  I  have  fired  the 
last  musket-shot  on  the  bridge  of  Kowuo,  I  have  thrown  into  the  Niémen  the 
last  of  our  arms,  and  I  have  walked  hither   as  you  see  mo,  across  the  forest.'" 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  49 

Kônigsberg,  and  of  getting  supplies  in  that  rich  country,  and 
the  idea  of  basing  himself  on  Dantzic,  are  the  excuses  which 
he  gave  in  justification  of  his  resolution. 

Including  the  Prussian  contingent,  Macdonald  had  still 
twenty-four  thousand  men.  In  my  march  on  the  Beresina  I 
had  employed  every  means  in  my  power  to  send  him  orders 
to  move  on  Wilna  and  Kowno  ;  but  Wittgenstein,  after  the 
passage  of  the  Beresina,  had  forced  him  to  take  the  road  to 
Kônigsberg. 

Being  abandoned  on  his  march  by  the  Prussian  corps  of 
York,  and  his  right  wing  being  turned,  Macdonald  was  for- 
tunate in  gaining  Kônigsberg  with  the  Polish  division, 
which  he  afterwards  directed  on  Dantzic  to  reënforce  the 
garrison. 

Murat,  after  having  also  directed  the  division  of  Heudelet 
on  Dantzic,  cantoned  twenty  thousand  men  behind  the 
Vistula,  his  right  on  Thorn,  and  his  left  in  the  direction  of 
Elbing.  But  the  defection  of  the  Prussians  rendered  the 
position  untenable,  and  exposed  our  communications  :  the 
enemy  had  only  to  present  himself  on  our  right  flank,  in 
order  to  throw  these  wrecks  on  Dantzic.  In  fact,  the  Rus- 
sians attacked  Eugene's  head-quarters  at  Marienwerder,  and, 
through  the  negligence  of  the  out-posts,  succeeded  in  pene- 
trating into  the  place.  The  alarm  was  given,  and  Eugene 
at  the  head  of  a  few  brave  men,  opened  a  passage  ;  but  more 
than  a  thousand  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  extreme  left  of  our  cantonments  retired  into  Dantzic, 
while  the  right,  composed  of  Bavarians,  entered  Thorn  : 
fifteen  thousand  men  directed  their  march  on  Posen,  forming 
echelons  on  the  road.  The  Russians  satisfied  themselves 
with  Bromberg  and  Elbing. 

Continuation  of  the  Retreat  under  Eugene.— Seeing  that 
there  was  no  further  hope  of  effecting  the  reorganization  of 
the  army,  and  convinced  of  the  defection  of  Prussia,  Murat 


50  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

resolved  to  return  to  his  kingdom,  without  waiting  for  my 
permission.  He  left  Posen  on  the  seventeenth  of  January, 
in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  the  viceroy,  who  represented 
to  him  the  irregularity  of  his  conduct  both  as  a  marshal  of 
France  and  as  my  lieutenant.  Blinded  by  the  hope  of  pre- 
serving his  throne,  he  departed  under  the  name  of  one  of  his 
aids-de-camp,  and  left  to  Eugene  the  care  of  continuing  the 
retreat. 

The  viceroy  remained  ten  days  at  Posen  to  restore  more 
order  to  his  columns  ;  and  the  Russians,  arrested  by  the  for- 
tifications of  Thorn  and  Dantzic,  also  halted  behind  the 
Vistula.  Rapp,  who  commanded  at  Dantzic,  had  collected 
an  army  of  more  than  thirty  thousand  men,  but  at  least  ten 
thousand  of  these  were  invalids.  Nevertheless,  it  was  a  con- 
siderable army,  and  I  hoped  that,  under  the  protection  of 
these  formidable  ramparts,  it  would  afford  occupation  for  the 
enemy.  But  it  was  unable  to  take  the  field,  and  did  not 
equal  my  expectations. 

The  Russians  waited  for  the  opening  of  navigation  to 
besiege  the  place,  causing  it  to  be  observed,  first  by  General 
Lewis,  and  afterwards  by  the  duke  of  Wurtemberg.  General 
Barclay  was  left  before  Thorn,  with  two  divisions  of 
grenadiers,  and  a  siege-park,  afterwards  organized  by  the 
Prussians,  enabled  them  to  form  a  regular  attack. 

The  defection  of  General  York  was  soon  followed  by  a 
convention  which  neutralized  the  Austrian  corps  of  Schwart- 
zenberg.  This  marshal,  in  leaving  to  Tschichagof  the  field 
free  to  march  on  the  Beresina,  had  entitled  himself  to  the 
gratitude  of  our  enemies  :  he  had  fallen  back  on  Warsaw, 
and  stipulated  with  the  Russian  generals  an  armistice, 
which,  it  is  true,  enabled  Reynier  to  retire,  but  which,  at 
the  same  time,  neutralized  the  Austrian  army,  and  permitted 
the  enemy  to  pursue  us  to  the  last  extremity. 

Kutusof,  not  trusting  to  the  continuance  of  this  neutral- 


CH.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  51 

ity,  left  Saeken  to  observe  him  ;  but  lie  had  sufficient  troops 
besides  this  to  destroy  the  wrecks  of  the  forces  of  the  viceroy, 
who  redoubled  his  efforts  to  find  some  place  of  refuge. 

Twenty  thousand  French  and  their  allies,  mutilated  by 
the  frost,  and  fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men  still  capable 
of  bearing  arms,  pursued  by  an  army  of  sixty  thousand  active 
men,  inured  to  the  climate,  thus  dragged  themselves  along 
from  Wilna  to  the  Oder,  through  a  hostile  population. 

His  Army  finally  takes  Refuge  behind  the  Elbe.— This 
sad,  but  glorious,  retreat  is  a  phenomenon  in  history  ;  and 
one  hardly  knows  at  which  to  be  most  astonished, — the  great 
disasters  which  befell  our  army,  or  the  final  return  of  the 
viceroy  to  the  Elbe.  Except  a  warm  engagement  near  Ka- 
lisch  between  Reynier's  corps  and  the  Russians,  there  were  no 
further  military  events  worthy  of  notice.  The  arrival  on  the 
Oder  of  fifteen  thousaud  fresh  troops  from  Italy,  under  Gen- 
eral Grenier,  enabled  Eugene  to  retire  in  good  order  behind 
the  Elbe.     A  new  campaign  was  now  about  to  open. 

But  diplomatists  were  in  the  mean  time  coolly  discussing 
the  best  means  of  profiting  by  my  disasters  in  the  North  ; 
and,  as  if  to  give  them  additional  hopes,  fortune  had  been 
but  little  less  fatal  to  my  armies  in  Spain  than  on  the  banks 
of  the  Beresina.*  We  will  give  a  brief  summary  of  our 
affairs  in  the  Peninsula. 


*  "Many  attempts,"  says  Thiers,  "have  been  made  to  reckon  up  the  losses 
suffered  by  France  and  her  allies  in  this  Russian  expedition,  and  although  such 
a  calculation  is  as  impossible  as  terrible,  some  idea  of  the  truth  may,  neverthe- 
less, be  attained.  The  total  force  of  the  army,  intended  to  act  from  the  Rhine 
to  the  Niémen  consisted  of  six  hundred  and  'twelve  thousand  men  (with  the 
Austriaus,  six  hundred  and  forty  eight  thousand),  and  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  horses.  Of  these  five  hundred  and  thirty  three  thousand  had  passed 
the  Niémen,  of  whom  there  remained,  under  the  Prince  Schwartzenberg  and 
Reynier,  about  forty  thousand  Austrians  and  Saxons,  fifteen  thousand  Prus- 
sians and  Poles  under  Marshal  Macdonald,  and  some  isolated  troops,  numbering 
about  thirty  or  forty  thousand. 

"Of  the  remaining  four  hundred  and  thirty-eight  thousand,  about  one  hun- 
dred thousand  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the   Russians:   and.  according  to 


52  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

Summary  of  the  Campaign  in  Spain.— While  my  troops 
were  triumphant  at  Tarragona  and  Valencia,  the  Cortes  of 
Cadiz  were  planning  the  basis  of  their  constitutional  edifice. 
The  liberals  or  communeros,  were  in  the  majority,  and  they 
excelled  even  the  extravagance  of  our  constitutent  assembly. 
Their  intentions  were  no  doubt  pure,  for  they  imitated  revo- 
lutionary France  even  to  excluding  the  members  of  their 
constitutent  assembly  from  the  first  elections  to  the  legisla- 
tive body.  Nevertheless,  their  principles  were  not  pleasing 
either  to  the  grandees  or  the  high  clergy  ;  and  the  opposition 
of  the  latter  was  the  more  decided  as  the  Cortes,  following 
my  example,  had  ventured  to  strike  at  the  abuses  of  the 
Church.  Joseph  had  made  pacific  overtures  to  the  Cortes, 
and  the  disasters  of  Tarragona  and  Valencia  had  somewhat 
shaken  their  courage  ;  the  more  reasonable  of  the  Spaniards 
began  to  reflect,  that,  if  England  should  deliver  their  country, 
they  would  become  still  more  dependent  on  the  cabinet  of 
London,  than  Godoy  had  ever  been  on  that  of  France.  They, 
therefore,  thought  that  they  might  obtain  a  preferable  result 

this  calculation,  therefore,  about  three  hundred  and  forty  thousand  would  have 
perished  :  but  this  happily  was  not  the  case,  for  a  certain  number  of  men  who 
had  deserted  their  ranks  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign,  had  gradually 
rejoined  their  country  across  Poland  and  Germany.  Nevertheless  it  can  be 
no  exaggeration  to  say,  that  in  the  course  of  the  campaign  about  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men  fell  beneath  the  enemy's  fire  and  the  severity  of  cold  and 
want." 

M.  Laurent  de  FArdèche,  Vol.  II.,  p.  166,  estimates  the  loss  of  the  French 
army  during  the  Russian  campaign  at  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men, 
more  than  sixty  thousand  horses,  a  thousand  cannon,  and  nearly  twenty  thou- 
sand wagons  aud  carriages.  He  also  says  that,  including  the  population  of  the 
abandoned  cities,  who  perished  for  want  of  food  and  shelter,  the  loss  of  the 
Russians  must  have  far  exceeded  that  of  the  invaders. 

Large  numbers  of  women  and  children,  when  driven  from  their  homes  by 
their  own  countrymen  or  the  Cossacks,  in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  lay  waste  the  country  as  fast  as  the  French  advanced,  perished,  in 
the  fields  and  forests,  from  hunger,  fatigue,  and  exposure.  In  some  places  the 
road-sides  and  plains  were  covered  with  the  unburied  dead  of  the  Russian 
inhabitants.  Had  their  own  government  permitted  these  people  to  remain  in 
their  homes,  very  few  of  them  would  have  been  molested  by  the  French. 


Ch.  XVIIL]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  53 

by  treating  with  my  brother,  and  thus  become  the  arbiters 
of  their  own  future.  Joseph  offered  to  recognize  their  con- 
stitution with  certain  indicated  modifications,  and  they  de- 
cided to  send  deputies  to  Madrid  to  treat  on  these  bases  ; 
and  these  deputies  were  actually  on  their  way,  when  the  dis- 
astrous battle  of  Salamanca  entirely  changed  the  face  of 
affairs. 

The  English  had  redoubled  their  efforts  during  this  cam- 
paign, the  retreat  of  Massena  and  the  success  of  Wellington 
and  Beresford  serving  as  a  stimulus  to  incite  them. 

They  recruited  in  Germany  from  the  prisoners  of  war,  and 
even  from  the  malefactors  ;  anything  seemed  good  enough 
to  oppose  us. 

In  making  this  statement  I  must  not  be  accused  of  under- 
valuing their  army,  for  their  own  parliamentary  debates 
prove  that  they  sought  criminals  in  the  bottom  of  the  prisons 
to  incorporate  them  in  the  regiments  employed  in  the  Penin- 
sula. 

The  taking  of  Ciudad-Kodrigo  and  Badajos,  as  glorious 
for  Wellington  as  discreditable  to  the  two  generals  who  per- 
mitted these  disasters  to  take  place,  began  to  show  the  extent 
of  our  danger.  It  was  thought  that  the  English  general, 
able  in  a  war  of  positions,  but  wanting  enterprise  in  an  open 
country,  had  taken  these  posts  only  the  better  to  secure  his 
line  of  defense  in  Portugal.  They  expected  that  he  would 
now  trouble  our  two  armies  in  Estremadura,  but  they  did 
not  attach  to  these  events  the  importance  which  they 
deserved. 

On  the  approach  of  the  war  in  Eussia,  I  had  recalled  all 
my  guard  from  Spain,  as  well  as  the  legions  of  the  Vistula 
and  several  skeletons  of  dragoon  regiments,  destined  to  form 
lancers  ;  I  had,  moreover,  withdrawn  many  men  of  the  élite 
to  complete  the  Old  Guard,  and  dissolved  what  has  been 
called  the  "  Army  of  the  North."     Nevertheless,  our  forces 


54  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVI il. 

in  the  west  and  south  amounted  to  one  hundred  and  thirty 
thousand  men  ;  Soult  had  forty-five  thousand  in  Andalusia  ; 
and  Marmont  nearly  as  many  toward  Salamanca.  Souhani 
guarded  old  Castile  with  twelve  thousand  men  ;  Joseph,  with 
his  guard  and  the  army  of  the  centre,  held  La  Mancha,  the 
banks  of  the  Tagus,  and  Madrid.  Independently  of  these 
forces,  divisions  of  occupation  were  stationed  in  Navarre,  in 
the  Asturias,  in  Leon,  and  in  Biscay.  On  deciding  to  march 
against  Kussia,  I  at  first  had  the  intention  of  concentrating 
all  my  forces  behind  the  Ebro  ;  but  the  important  successes 
of  Suchet  in  the  kingdom  of  Valencia  and  the  destruction 
of  Blake's  army,  animating  our  hopes  in  the  Peninsula, 
caused  me  to  change  my  plan  and  to  persist  in  guarding 
Andalusia. 

Wellington's  Anglo-Portuguese  army  had  been  increased 
to  more  than  seventy-five  thousand  men,  and  the  Cortes  had 
finally  given  him  the  general  command  of  the  Spanish  army 
of  sixty  thousand  men.  Moreover,  the  natural  advantages 
of  his  position  were  very  great.  Our  line  of  operations,  ex- 
tending from  Bayonne  to  Cadiz,  was  more  than  two  hundred 
leagues  in  depth.  Portugal  was  like  an  impenetrable  for- 
tress, placed  on  the  flank  and  centre  of  this  line,  while  the 
fortifications  of  Ciudad-Bodrigo  and  Badajos  served  as  ad- 
vanced works  to  the  main  bulwark.  Wellington,  departing 
from  such  a  base,  was  certain  to  act  with  advantage  against 
an  enemy  who  was  obliged  to  occupy  a  whole  kingdom  and 
to  secure  himself  against  a  multitude  of  Spaniards,  little 
formidable  in  line,  but  continually  harassing  our  posts  with 
indefatigable  activity.  As  it  was  impossible,  on  account  of 
the  guerrillas,  to  form  any  system  of  regular  magazines,  the 
French  could  not  remain  long  together  in  large  masses,  and, 
their  positions  being  greatly  extended  in  order  to  cover  their 
supplies  and  their  line  of  retreat,  they  were  exposed  to  attack 
on  every  side. 


Ch.  xviil]  invasion   or    Russia.  55 

Wellington  saw  the  advantage  of  his  position,  and  at  last 
took  tlie  offensive.  He  had  three  plans  from  which  to 
choose  :  first,  to  move  to  the  right  on  Soult  ;  second,  to 
debouch  at  the  centre  on  Madrid  ;  third,  to  operate  at  the 
left  on  Marmont.  By  operating  at  the  south  Wellington 
would  draw  there  the  principal  masses  of  the  French,  and 
only  the  more  completely  effect  the  invasion  of  Spain.  But 
in  going  to  the  north  he  would  draw  Soult  in  that  direction. 
and  thus  deliver  over  the  south  of  Spain  to  the  junta  of 
Cadiz.  If  the  French  should  commit  the  error  of  attempt- 
ing to  guard  Seville  instead  of  going  to  the  support  of  Mar- 
mont, then  the  latter  would  be  defeated,  and,  as  the  line  of 
retreat  on  Bayonne  lay  in  that  direction,  a  victory  on  the 
Douro  would  be  certain  to  cause  the  evacuation  of  half  of 
the  Peninsula,  and  even  of  the  capital.  This  was  too  evident 
to  escape  my  penetration  ;  but  deceived  in  the  character  of 
their  chief,  I  hoped  that  the  English  would  not  venture  to 
commit  their  troops  far  from  Portugal.  I,  however,  gave  a 
carte  blanche  to  Joseph  and  Jourdan,  who  thought,  like  my- 
self, that  they  could  face  the  danger. 

The  English  destroy  the  Bridge  of  the  Tagus  at  Almaraz.— 
Conformably  to  his  plan  of  operations,  Wellington  debouched 
from  Portugal  in  the  month  of  May.  In  order  to  retain 
Suehet  in  the  east  and  prevent  reënforcements  from  being 
sent  to  Joseph,  Wellington  requested  the  landing  of  ten 
thousand  English  and  six  thousand  auxiliaries  from  Minorca 
on  the  coast  of  Catalonia.  The  general  wisely  commenced 
\\\i  operations  by  destroying  the  great  bridge  of  Almaraz 
across  the  Tagus,  in  order  to  cut  off  all  communication 
between  the  armies  of  Soult  and  Marmont.  This  bridge 
was  not  only  secured  by  a  well-constructed  tête-de-pont,  but 
also  by  the  little  fort  of  Mirvales  which  closed  the  gorges 
through  which  passes  the  road  to  Truxillo.  Hill  succeeded 
in   turning  this  fort  by  ascending  the  rocks  of  Manaderos 


56  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XVIII. 

with  all  the  necessary  implements  for  an  escalade.  The  offi- 
cer who  commanded  the  foreign  battalion  in  the  tête-de-j^ont, 
allowed  himself  to  be  surprised  on  the  eighteenth  of  May, 
and  the  detachment  which  guarded  a  part  of  the  works  on 
the  right  bank  basely  fled  ;  its  chief  was  condemned  to  death, 
but  the  evil  wras  without  remedy.  After  this  important 
coiqj-de-main,  Hill  returned  to  Badajos.  Soult  and  Mar- 
mont  each  sent  divisions  to  sustain  the  place,  but  the  bridge 
and  great  depot  of  munitions  had  been  destroyed,  and,  as 
the  enemy  had  also  disappeared,  our  troops  returned  to  their 
respective  quarters. 

Taking  of  Salamanca.— Wellington,  having  completed  his 
preparations,  crossed  the  Tormes  at  a  ford,  on  the  seven- 
teenth of  June,  invested  Salamanca  and  established  himself 
in  observation  at  San  Christoval.  Marmont,  having  col- 
lected his  forces,  presented  himself  there  on  the  twentieth, 
but  not  venturing  to  attack  the  enemy,  he  retired  again  after 
two  days'  manoeuvering,  and  asked  for  reënforcements  from 
Joseph,  and  from  General  Caffarelli,  who  was  commanding 
in  Castile.  The  three  small  forts  constructed  to  cover  Sala- 
manca, being  warmly  battered,  surrendered  on  the  twenty- 
fourth,  Marmont  then  fell  back  on  the  Douro  between  Toro 
and  Tordesillas,  where  he  was  joined  by  Bonnet's  division 
from  the  Asturias  ;  his  force  now  numbered  between  forty- 
two  and  furty-five  thousand.  Wellington  followed  him  with 
at  least  an  equal  army.  Joseph,  indecisive  like  all  mediocre 
men,  first  'declared  that  he  could  not  detach  any  reënforce- 
ment  from  Madrid,  and  that  the  marshal  must  do  all  he 
could  to  sustain  himself.  Caffarelli  also  replied  that  he  was 
hard  pressed  by  the  insurgents  of  Navarre  and  the  Asturias. 
The  marshal,  judging  that  it  was  necessary  at  whatsoever  cost 
to  drive  the  enemy  back  into  Portugal,  resolved  to  take  the 
offensive  as  soon  as  he  was  joined  by  Bonnet's  division. 
After  making  new  demonstrations  on  Toro,  he  fell  back  to 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  57 

the  left  on  Tordesillas,  passed  the  Douro,  and  advanced 
against  the  extreme  right  of  the  English. 

After  some  manœuvres  intended  to  deceive  his  adversary, 
Marmont  collected  the  mass  of  his  forces  behind  the  hills  of 
the  Arapiles,  and  resolved  to  drive  the  English  from  these 
heights,  from  which  place  he  hoped  to  operate  with  advan- 
tage on  their  right,  if  they  remained  in  position,  or  to  cut 
them  up  if  they  attempted  to  retreat. 

General  Maucune  had  orders  to  carry  this  post  with  the 
advanced  guard.  This  valiant  soldier  executed  his  task  with 
audacity,  but  afterward  advanced  with  too  much  precipitancy 
into  the  plain  beyond.  Marmont  ascended  the  eminence  to 
ascertain  the  state  of  affairs,  and  just  as  he  saw  the  enemy, 
instead  of  retreating,  making  preparations  to  assail  with  ad- 
vantage, his  arm  wras  broken  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell.  It 
was  now  necessary  to  sustain  this  division,  and  to  attack  the 
second  hill  opposite  the  enemy's  centre.  The  battle  was 
thus  begun  in  a  disadvantageous  situation.  The  wounded 
marshal  resigned  the  command  to  Clausel,  but  all  the  expe- 
rience of  this  brave  general  could  not  remedy  an  affair  so  im- 
properly begun.  Maucune  was  separated  from  the  rest  of 
the  line  by  half  a  league,  and  Wellington  moved  one  Spanish 
and  four  English  divisions  and  all  his  cavalry  on  the  point 
where  we  were  'most  exposed  to  his  attacks.  Imitating  the 
example  of  Frederick  at  Rosbach,  or  rather  mine  at  Auster- 
litz,  he  waited  till  our  left  was  well  separated,  then  ordered 
Beresford  to  attack  the  heights  of  Arapiles,  and  directed,  by 
an  oblique  march,  the  half  of  his  army  on  the  extreme  left. 
Taken  in  front  and  flank  this  wing  was  thrown  on  the  centre 
which  evacuated  the  Arapiles  in  pretty  good  order,  but  was 
finally  involved  in  the  defeat  of  the  left. 

Foy,  who  commanded  our  right,  thought  to  assist  the 
centre  by  a  lateral  movement,  but  was  assailed  by  the 
enemy's  left  and   reserve,  and   succeeded   with  difficulty  in 


58  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Oh.  XVIII. 

covering  the  retreat.  This  defeat  which  cost  us  eight  or 
nine  thousand  men  hors-de-combat,  was  calculated  to  decide 
the  fate  of  Spain.  The  consequences  were  the  more  to  bo 
deplored  as  they  destroyed  the  hope  of  effecting  an  arrange- 
ment with  the  Cortes,  or  of  securing  the  pacification  of  the 
Peninsula.  I  was  the  more  displeased  with  this  result,  as 
Joseph  had  changed  his  mind  in  relation  to  reën-forcing 
Marmont,  and  marched  with  his  guard,  his  reserve  and  part 
of  Caffarelli's  troops  on  Segovia  to  rejoin  the  army  of 
Portugal. 

This  circumstance  prejudiced  me  against  this  imprudent 
marshal,  as  it  seemed  that  he  had  compromised  our  safety 
on  account  of  his  jealousy  and  the  desire  to  decide  the  ques- 
tion before  the  approach  of  my  brother.  But  as  it  was  not 
absolutely  certain  that  he  knew  of  the  vicinity  of  the  king,  I 
only  replaced  him  in  the  command,  and  directed  that  he 
should  not  even  be  informed  of  this  until  the  recovery  of  his 
wounds.  I  had  an  old  affection  for  my  companion  in  arms  ; 
he  and  Junot  had  been  the  first  of  my  aids-de-camp.  The 
loss  of  Spain  is,  however,  to  be  dated  from  this  catastrophe, 
and  posterity  will  decide  whether  it  was  the  fault  of  Joseph 
or  of  Marmont. 

Wellington  enters  Madrid.— The  military  results  of  this 
campaign  were,  for  us,  as  unfortunate  as  its  political  con- 
sequences. The  broken  army  of  Marmont  retired  to  Burgos  ; 
Clausel  did  not  even  deem  it  prudent  to  hold  Valladolid,  for 
fear  of  being  obliged  to  accept  a  new  battle.  Wellington, 
getting  possession  of  that  city  on  the  thirtieth  of  July, 
caused  the  army  of  Portugal  to  be  observed  by  two  divisions, 
and  on  the  fifth  of  August  inarched  on  Madrid  by  Segovia. 
Joseph,  on  hearing  the  loss  of  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  and 
not  being  able  to  unite  with  Clausel  without  danger,  retired 
by  Gruadarama  on  Madrid,  evacuated  that  capital  after  hav- 
ing thrown  his  baggage  in  the  Eetiro,  and  fell  back  with  the 


OH.  XVIII.]  INVASION      OF    RUSSIA.  59 

army  of  the  centre  behind  the  Tagus,  and  urged  Soult  to 
send  him  twenty  thousand  men  from  Andalusia.  This  un- 
fortunate army  of  the  south  caused  all  our  embarrassments, 
and,  nevertheless,  was  the  resource  to  which  it  was  always 
necessary  to  resort.  As  Soult  could  not,  without  com- 
promising his  army,  send  half  of  it  to  the  king,  he  proposed 
to  Joseph  to  fall  back  on  him,  to  hold  Andalusia,  and  give 
me  time  to  send  reënforcements  into  the  north  of  Spain  to 
drive  out  the  English.  This  project  would  have  been  good, 
if  I  had  been  tranquil  at  Paris  ;  but  as  I  was  then  in  Mos- 
cow, it  was  therefore  exceedingly  objectionable. 

Joseph,  listening  to  better  advice  than  that  of  Soult, 
ordered  him  to  abandon  Andalusia,  and  join  him  at  Valen- 
cia, where  he  retired  with  the  troops  of  Count  d'Erlon. 
Hardly  had  he  left  his  capital  when  the  English  general 
entered  there  in  triumph  (August  12th).  The  intoxication 
with  which  he  was  received  soon  gave  place  to  very  different 
feelings,  when  it  was  known  that  he  had  levied  a  contribu- 
tion on  that  city  of  ten  millions  ! 

The  Retiro  had  been  fortified  for  the  last  two  years,  to 
serve  as  a  depot  :  its  enceinte  was  a  double  line  ;  the  first 
line  was  too  extended,  and  required  too  many  forces  for  its 
defense  ;  the  second  was  too  confined,  and  its  garrison  was 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  besiegers.  The  garrison  being  too 
weak  to  defend  the  first  line,  Wellington  carried  it  at  the 
first  onset  ;  he  then  bombarded  the  second,  which  was  sur- 
rendered by  the  commandant  a  few  hours  after,  with  censur- 
able precipitation.  They  captured  here  one  hundred  and 
eighty  pieces  of  cannon  and  rich  stores. 

Wellington  has  been  blamed  for  going  to  Madrid  for  a 
triumph  instead  of  pursuing  the  wrecks  of  Marmont's  corps. 
It  is  very  certain  that  a  second  victory  over  Clausel  would 
have  driven  his  army  to  the  Pyrenees,  and  have  greatly  em- 
barrassed Soult  and  Joseph  in  the  south      But  the  English 


60  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

o-eneral  relied  much  upon  the  moral  effect  which  the  taking 
of  the  capital  would  produce  upon  the  already  flagging 
courage  of  the  Spaniards. 

On  the  reiterated  orders  of  the  king,  Soult  determined  to 
sacrifice  the  immense  works  which  his  army  had  erected 
around  Cadiz,  and,  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  August,  took  the 
road  to  Grenada  and  Lorca  on  Yecla,  after  having  effected, 
at  Huesca,  his  junction  with  the  corps  of  Count  d'Erlon  ;  he 
conferred  with  Joseph  and  Suchet  at  Almanza,  and  then 
immediately  directed  himself  on  the  Tagus  by  the  road  from 
Alicante  to  Madrid.  Ballesteros,  who  had  fought  against 
him  with  so  much  constancy  during  the  whole  summer,  did 
not  trouble  his  retreat  which  he  might  have  done,  either  by 
operating  on  the  flanks,  or  by  the  direct  road  from  the  Sierra 
Morena  to  Madrid.  It  appears  that  he  had  been  ordered 
into  La  Mancha  to  act  under  the  orders  of  Wellington  ;  but 
his  pride  revolted  at  serving  under  another,  and  he  preferred 
to  let  our  columns  escape  unmolested.  The  Cortes  broke 
him  of  his  command,  and  banished  him  to  Ceuta. 

Wellington's  unsuccessful  Siege  of  Burgos.— In  the  mean 
time  Wellington  had  left  Madrid  to  return  to  the  north 
against  Clausel,  who  had  just  resumed  the  offensive  against 
the  divisions  left  in  observation  near  Burgos,  and  had  already 
advanced  on  the  Douro  to  disengage  Toro  and  Zamora. 
Wellington  left  General  Hill,  with  three  Anglo-Portuguese 
divisions,  to  guard  Madrid,  and  marched  anew  against  Bur- 
gos at  the  head  of  four  divisions  and  the  Spanish  army  of 
Galicia.  General  Souham  (to  whom  Clausel,  who  was  sick 
with  his  wound,  had  given  the  command),  fell  back  on 
Briviesca,  a  formidable  position  on  the  principal  spur  of  the 
Pyrenees  which  covers  the  left  bank  of  the  Ebro.  The 
English  general,  though  destitute  of  his  park  of  heavy  artil- 
lery, determined  to  attack  the  castle  of  Burgos,  hoping  that 
what  could   not   be  effected  by  his  large   field-pieces  and 


CH.  XVIII.]  INVASION     OF     RUSSIA.  61 

howitzers,  could  be  accomplished  by  subterranean  warfare, 
and  sapping  the  foot  of  the  walls  with  his  miners. 

General  Dubreton,  who  commanded  the  garrison,  was  a 
man  of  head  and  heart.  He  executed  many  sorties  with 
success,  on  the  trenches  ;  nevertheless  the  breaches  were 
finally  made  practicable,  and  the  assault  given  ;  but  it  com- 
pletely failed.  Our  great  depots  were  in  a  kind  of  intrenched 
camp  between  the  castle  and  the  old  donjon.  Wellington 
now  redoubled  his  efforts,  giving  a  new  assault  on  the  eighth 
of  October,  but  with  the  same  ill-success  as  before  :  and 
finally,  on  the  twenty-second,  he  raised  the  siege  after  a  loss 
of  thirty  days  and  three  thousand  men. 

He  retires  into  Portugal.  —  Two  circumstances  decided 
Wellington  to  retreat.  First  the  approach  of  Souham  to 
El  Olmo,  his  army  being  reënforced  by  General  Caffarelli 
with  two  divisions  of  infantry,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry. 
The  second  was  the  march  of  Soult  on  Aranjuez  and  Madrid, 
threatening  to  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat  by  Portugal.  The 
English  army  immediately  retired  behind  the  Douro,  but  not 
without  considerable  losses  in  the  combats  which  its  rear- 
guard had  to  sustain  against  our  light  cavalry  and  the  divi- 
sions of  Foy  and  Maucune,  especially  at  Celada,  Villadrigo, 
and  Villa-Muriel.  Wellington,  after  blowing  up  the  fine 
bridges  of  Zamora,  Toro,  and  Tordesillas,  regained  Sala- 
manca. 

Joseph  and  Soult.  after  driving  Hill  from  Madrid,  also 
took  the  road  to  Salamanca,  and  on  the  tenth  of  November 
our  three  armies  united  on  the  Tormes.  They  still  num- 
bered eighty  thousand  foot-soldiers  and  ten  thousand  horse. 
Although  worn  out  with  a  fatiguing  and  ill-directed  war,  the 
idea  of  avenging  the  defeat  of  Salamanca  had  revived  their 
enthusiasm  ;  and  the  soldiers  loudly  demanded  to  be  led 
against  the  enemy.  Soult,  to  whom  the  king  had  given  the 
command,  wished  to  profit  by  this  feeling  to  act  on  Welling- 


62  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

ton's  line  of  retreat  ;  but  he  was  delayed  by  the  difficulty 
of  crossing  the  Alba,  and  the  English  general,  taking  advan- 
tage of  a  terrible  rain  and  fog,  effected  his  retreat  towards 
Ciudad-Rodrigo. 

Wellington  was  now  driven  back  to  the  position  from 
which  he  had  started  ;  but  his  operations  had  resulted  in  the 
deliverance  of  all  the  south  of  Spain  ; — Grenada,  Seville, 
Andalusia,  Cadiz,  and  Alicante  ;  and  he  had  acquired  a 
marked  ascendency  over  my  generals.  This  campaign, 
although  slow  and  measured,  did  honor  to  Wellington.  The 
choice  of  his  strategic  direction  was  wise,  and  his  tactical 
dispositions,  skillful.  Nevertheless  it  must  be  confessed 
that,  with  an  army  of  seventy-five  thousand  men  assisted  by 
ten  millions  of  Spaniards  and  Portuguese,  full  of  fervor  for 
their  cause,  and  with  only  a  fraction  of  our  own  force  to 
oppose  him,  he  was  bound  to  accomplish  some  important 
results.  The  thirty  days  lost  at  Burgos  certainly  militate 
against  him  ;  and  he  has  been  justly  blamed  for  giving 
Clausel  time  to  reform  the  army  which  had  been  defeated  at 
Salamanca. 

Secondary  Operations  in  Catatonia,  &c— In  the  east  the 
war  does  not  offer  "the  same  interest  as  in  the  former  cam- 
paigns. General  Suchet,  satisfied  with  the  taking  of  Valen- 
cia and  Peniscola,  and  annoyed  by  the  unfortunate  expedi- 
tion of  Montbmn,  rested  on  his  laurels.  General  Decaen, 
with  Lamarque  and  Maurice  Mathieu,  kept  up  an  active 
contest  with  the  Catalonians  who,  under  Lascy,  threatened 
at  the  same  time  Tarragona,  Barcelona,  Gerona,  and  Tortosa. 
The  distance  of  Suchet's  troops  had  revived  the  war-like 
ardor  of  the  intrepid  mountaineers  of  Monserrat,  Manresa, 
Reuss  and  Vicque.  Maurice  Mathieu  encountered  Lascy,  on 
the  twenty-third  of  January,  on  the  heights  of  Alta-Fulla, 
routed  his  army,  captured  all  his  artillery,  and  took  near 
two  thousand  prisoners.     Decaen  carried  the  mountain  of 


Ch.  XVIII.]  INVASION    OF    RUSSIA.  G3 

Olot,  drove  Sarsfield  on   Centelles,  and  explored  the  whole 
country  to  Barcelona. 

But  these  successes  did  not  destroy  the  activity  of  the 
insurgent  parties  in  Catalonia,  and  it  was  only  with  the 
greatest  care  on  our  side  that  Ave  could  maintain  Barcelona, 
and  keep  its  garrison  supplied  with  provisions.  After  com- 
pleting the  organization  of  Valencia,  Suchet  made  a  recon- 
noissance  of  Alicante.  Joseph  O'Donnel  had  organized  a 
corps  of  eight  or  nine  thousand  men  to  cover  the  environs  of 
the  city,  and  Suchet  was  soon  convinced  that  the  place  was 
too  strong  to  be  taken  without  a  regular  attack.  At  this 
epoch  the  English  made  known  their  intention  of  landing 
ten  or  twelve  thousand  Anglo-Sicilians  under  General  Mait- 
land  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Spain.  On  hearing  this  I 
united  the  corps  of  Catalonia,  Aragon,  and  Valencia  under 
the  orders  of  Suchet.  While  the  English  squadron  was 
making  demonstrations  at  the  mouth  of  the  Xucar,  O'Don- 
nel thought  to  surprise  and  destroy  General  Delort  at  Cas- 
tella  (July  22d).  This  intrepid  officer,  without  fearing 
the  enemy's  numbers,  and  taking  advantage  of  an  injudicious 
movement  of  the  Spanish  cavalry,  threw  himself  on  his 
adversaries  with  the  twenty-fourth  dragoons  and  his  cuiras- 
siers, captured  their  artillery,  sabred  and  dispersed  their 
infantry,  and  returned  with  more  prisoners  than  he  himself 
had  soldiers.  This  brilliant  exploit  of  eighteen  hundred 
Frenchmen  against  nine  thousand  Spaniards  crowned  the 
expedition  of  Suchet.  The  Irish  General  Elliot  succeeded 
O'Donnel  in  the  command,  but  was  not  more  fortunate  than 
his  predecessor.  Not  venturing  to  land  in  the  midst  of  our 
troops,  Maitland  debarked  near  Alicante,  and  again  threatened 
Castella. 

Suchet  was  at  this  time  obliged  to  shelter  the  columns  of 
Joseph,  who  returned  from  Madrid  with  the  burlesque  cor- 
tège of  a  fugitive  court.     The  contrast  between  the  army  of 


64  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XVIII. 

Aragon,  well-clothed  and  equipped,  and  the  army  of  the 
centre,  undisciplined,  destitute  of  everything,  and  serving  as 
a  mere  escort  to  the  thousand  carriages  of  the  grandees  of 
Spain  who  shared  the  fortunes  of  the  king,  formed  a  picture 
worthy  the  pencil  of  Calot.  As  soon  as  he  could  get  rid  of 
this  embarrassment,  Suchet  resolved  to  again  menace  Ali- 
cante. Maitland,  on  his  side,  sought  to  get  possession  of 
Denia  ;  but  Duncan's  brigade  was  repulsed,  and  Suchet,  to 
threaten  the  enemy  in  his  position,  pushed  forward  Harispe's 
division  even  under  the  cannon  of  Alicante. 

In  the  mean  time  the  war  in  Catalonia  continued  without 
material  change.  The  bands  of  Eroles,  Milans,  Kovira,  and 
Sarsfield,  distinguished  themselves  by  their  boldness  and 
activity,  and  our  convoys  had  great  difficulty  in  getting  sup- 
plies into  Barcelona.  It  required  all  the  talents  of  Decaen, 
Lamarque,  and  Maurice-Mathieu,  and  all  the  constancy, 
bravery,  and  resignation  of  their  soldiers,  to  drive  Lascy  from 
Vicque.  The  bands  of  Aragonese,  although  less  enterprising 
than  the  Catalonians,  continued  to  harass  the  division  which 
had  been  left  to  guard  that  province. 

Conclusion. — The  news  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  and 
the  terrible  bulletin  that  announced  my  return  to  Paris,  was 
calculated  to  precipitate  the  ruin  of  our  affairs  in  Spain,  and 
revive  the  confidence  and  enthusiasm  of  our  enemies.  In 
fact,  the  disas-ters  of  the  Russian  expedition  destroyed  the 
morale  of  our  army  which  was  more  fatigued  by  the  char- 
acter of  the  war  than  discouraged  by  the  chances  and  perils 
of  battle. 

But  it  is  time  to  close  this  brief  outline  of  the  campaign 
of  1812  in  Spain,  and  return  to  the  dispositions  which  I 
made  to  save  France  from  the  dangers  that  threatened  her 
on  all  sides. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF    1813. 

General  State  of  Europe — Mission  of  Bubna — Amicable  Protestations  of  Aus- 
tria— Napoleon's  Preparations  for  a  new  Campaign — Eugene  behind  the  Elbe 
— Prussia  declares  against  Napoleon — March  of  the  Allies  on  the  Elbe — They 
enter  Saxony — Negotiations  with  Austria — She  declares  an  armed  Media- 
tion— Napoleon  rejoins  his  Army — He  advances  on  the  Saale — Organization 
of  his  Army — Levy  in  Mass  in  Prussia — Movements  of  the  Allies — Position 
of  their  Armies- -Napoleon  effects  his  Junction  with  Eugene — He  directs 
his  March  on  Leipsic — Project  of  the  Allies — Battle  of  Lutzen — Remarks  on 
this  Battle — Pursuit  of  the  Allies  on  Dresden — Eugene  sent  to  organize  an 
Army  in  Italy — New  Negotiations — Another  Mission  of  Bubna — Napoleon 
accepts  the  Proposition  of  a  Congress — Caulaincourt's  Proposition  to  Rus- 
sia— Napoleon  repairs  to  Bautzen — Fortified  Position  of  the  Allies — Ney's 
March  to  turn  this  Position — Combats  of  "Weissig  and  Konigswarth — Ney 
debouches  on  Klix — Battle  of  Bautzen — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Nessel- 
rode's  Reply  to  the  Overtures  of  Caul'aincourt — Combats  of  Reichenbach  and 
Haynau — The  Allies  throw  themselves  on  Schweidnitz — Armistice  of  Neu- 
mark — Combat  of  Luckau — Treaty  with  Denmark — Third  Mission  of  Bubna 
— Negotiations  of  the  Allies  at  Reichenbach — Metternich  at  Dresden — His 
Interview  with  Napoleon — Envoys  to  the  Congress  of  Prague — Napoleon 
meets  his  Empress  at  Mayence — Military  Projects  of  the  Allies — Negotia- 
tions at  Prague — Summary  of  Operations  in  Spain — Battle  of  Victoria — 
Suchet's  Operations  in  the  East  of  Spain. 

General  State  of  Europe. — Europe  was  not  less  astonished 
at  my  reverses  that  it  had  been  at  my  successes.  I  had  just 
lost  that  army  which  had  been  the  terror  of  the  world  ;  and 
my  enemies  might  now  hope  to  conquer  the  remainder,  for  the 
relative  proportion  of  forces  was  changed.  I  was  not  to  be 
deceived  respecting  the  sentiments  which  now  agitated  Eu- 
rope, for  I  foresaw  that,  the  first  moment  of  surprise  being 
passed,  I  should  find  against  me  a  formidable  league,  of  which 

I  now  only  heard  the  smothered  cries  of  joy. 
vol.  iv. — 5. 


66  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

Mission  of  Bubna.— The  moment  of  defeat  is  certainly  an 
unfavorable  time  for  concluding  a  treaty  of  peace.  Austria, 
however,  hoping  to  derive  greater  advantages  from  her  alliance 
with  me  than  from  any  which  she  could  form  with  my 
enemies,  interposed  to  mediate  a  peace. 

General  Bubna  was  sent  to  me,  on  the  part  of  that  court, 
to  assure  me  of  its  benevolent  dispositions.  In  his  officiai 
language  Bubna  spoke  only  of  the  good  offices  of  the  cabinet 
of  Vienna  for  the  reëstablishment  of  peace,  and  was  most 
prodigal  in  his  protestations  and  assurances  of  the  wish  of 
his  government  for  the  maintenance  of  our  alliance.  But  in 
the  salons,  and  m  private  conversations,  he  let  it  be  under- 
stood, that,  as  a  return  for  these  dispositions,  his  government 
expected  the  retrocession  of  some  of  its  provinces,  and  par- 
ticularly of  Illyria.  This  desire  was  perfectly  natural,  and 
I  should  not  have  hesitated  to  gratify  it,  if  I  had  known  pre- 
cisely what  my  father-in-law  wished  ;  that  is,  what  he  was 
disposed  to  do  for  me,  and  what  price  he  set  upon  this  assist- 
ance. We  were  reciprocally  distrusting  each  other  for  want 
of  a  frank  and  open  explanation.  It  was  evident  that  Aus- 
tria would  profit  by  her  situation  to  recover  a  part  of  her 
lost  power  ;  but  to  attain  this  object  by  honorable  means,  it 
was  essential  that  she  should  not  hesitate  to  declare  herself. 
Her  situation,  however,  was  somewhat  embarrassing,  for  she 
had  only  a  single  alternative  ;  she  had  either  to  maintain  our 
alliance  and  seek  to  obtain  from  me  concessions  sufficiently 
important  to  reestablish  the  equilibrium  between  us,  or 
to  break  the  alliance  and  declare  herself  in  favor  of  my 
enemies. 

The  first  of  these  seemed  the  most  advisable  course  to  pur- 
sue, although  it  was  no  easy  matter  to  dictate  conditions  to 
one  of  my  character,  and,  moreover,  my  father-in-law  could 
not,  with  very  good  grace,  say  to  me  :  I  am  your  ally,  and 
you  must  give  me  your  provinces.     Austria,  therefore,  pre~ 


Ch.  XIX]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  67 

ferred  to  show  how  necessary  she  was  to  me,  and  thus  induce 
me  to  explain  what  I  would  be  disposed  to  do  for  her.  I, 
on  the  contrary,  wished  to  gain  time,  being  persuaded  that 
under  any  circumstances  I  could  make  better  terms  after 
gaining  a  battle.  I  formed  a  just  estimate  of  my  resources 
and  felt  confident  that,  in  two  or  three  months,  I  could  beat 
the  enemy  and  drive  him  behind  the  Vistula,  thus  regaining 
my  European  preponderance. 

The  second  plan  was  not  less  embarrassing  for  Austria 
than  the  other  ;  for,  if  my  preponderance  had  appeared  ex- 
cessive and  threatening,  there  were  also  equal  reasons  for  fear, 
if  that  preponderance  should  pass  entirely  into  the  hands  of 
Russia.  Moreover,  an  ally  is  not  to  be  instantly  converted 
into  a  public  enemy  ;  time  and  the  formalities  of  negotia- 
tions are  required  to  accomplish  this. 

Under  all  the  circumstances,  I  determined  not  to  volun- 
tarily offer  myself  to  be  despoiled,  but  to  wait  till  I  could 
ascertain  the  exact  intentions  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  ;  in 
the  mean  time  seeking  to  obtain  from  Austria  some  formal 
declaration  respecting  the  continuance  of  our  alliance.  As 
Bubna  only  spoke  of  the  desire  of  his  master  to  intercede 
for  peace,  I  reiterated  to  him  all  the  assurances  which  he 
could  desire,  and  confirmed  them  by  my  direct  correspondence 
with  my  father-in-law.  The  reports  which  reached  me  from 
Vienna  were,  however,  daily  becoming  more  alarming.  Lord 
Walpole,  the  secret  envoy  of  England,  promised,  it  was  said, 
to  Austria  ten  millions  of  pounds  sterling,  Illyria,  and  even 
the  kingdom  of  Italy,  if  she  would  declare  against  me. 
Thus  a  power,  which  had  not  a  single  battalion  to  dispose 
of,  was  generously  offering  to  give  away  vast  provinces  on 
the  continent,  to  which  not  the  shadow  of  a  title  had  yet  been 
acquired. 

Amicable  Protostations  of  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna.— Never- 
theless, the  protestations  of  Metternich  were  so  positive  that 


68  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

I  was  for  a  time  deceived.  I  saw  in  his  proffer  of  good  offi- 
ces only  a  sincere  desire  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  interpose 
between  the  contending  parties,  and  thus  increase  her  own 
importance.  How  could  I  fail  to  believe  a  minister  who 
said  to  mine  on  the  fourteenth  of  February,  u  that  my  alli- 
ance with  Russia  was  an  alliance  of  war,  imposed  by  victory, 
and  ought  from  its  nature  to  be  dissolved  ;  but  on  the  con- 
trary that  the  alliance  with  Austria  reposed  on  the  most 
permanent  interests  ;  that  Austria  had  herself  voluntarily 
sought  this  alliance,  and  that  if  she  now  had  it  to  make  over 
again  she  would  make  it  upon  precisely  the  same  basis  ;  that 
if  it  did  not  already  exist,  she  herself  would  now  solicit  it, 
for  a  half  century  had  demonstrated  the  advantages  of  the 
one  precisely  similar  which  had  been  negotiated  by  Prince 
Kaunitz  in  1756." 

Nor  did  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  confine  itself  to  these  pro- 
testations ;  it  announced,  the  middle  of  March,  that  Prince 
Schwartzenberg,  as  chief  of  the  auxiliary  corps,  was  coming 
to  Paris  to  receive  my  orders  ;  and  Metternich  spoke  of 
bringing  one  hundred  thousand,  instead  of  thirty  thousand 
men,  into  the  field,  if  the  enemy  should  still  refuse  to  make 
peace.  The  letter  announcing  the  return  of  Schwartzenberg 
was  certainly  remarkable  : 

"  His  presence  at  Paris  has,  under  the  circumstances, been 
deemed  necessary  by  the  Emperor  of  Austria  for  the  recip- 
rocal interests  of  the  two  courts.  As  an  embassador  and 
chief  of  the  auxiliary  corps  he  will  be  of  service  to  Napoleon, 
in  the  negotiations,  if  they  are  commenced,  or  in  receiving 
his  orders  for  the  coming  campaign,  if,  contrary  to  the  dearest 
wishes  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
continue  the  war.'' 

At  the  same  time  M.  de  Floret  communicated,  by  the 
orders  of  his  court,  the  overtures  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna 
to  England  and  Russia  ;  and  also  the  views  of  the  Emperor 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  69 

of  Austria  on  the  events  that  were  transpiring  in  Prussia. 
"  The  personal  sentiments,"  said  to  be,  "  of  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  are  most  strongly  opposed  to  measures  like  those 
resorted  to  by  Prussia.  Ho  blamed,  in  the  strongest  terms, 
such  defection  ;  his  sentiments  were  most  unequivocally  in 
favor  of  continuing  the  alliance  ;  and  his  zeal  was  both 
strongly  and  truly  in  favor  of  peace, — a  peace  less  necessary 
for  France  than  for  Austria  herself.  Such  were  the  declara- 
tions of  the  agents  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna.  It  had  ex- 
plained its  views  in  the  same  way,  it  was  said,  at  Berlin,  at 
Wilna,  and  at  London.  "  Their  course  of  conduct  was 
purely  Austrian,  and  they  wished  to  place  France  in  lier 
true  attitude,  which  was  not  to  fear  the  continuance  of  the 
war,  nor  to  oppose  the  negotiation  of  peace." 

My  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  however,  distrusted  these 
fine  protestations,  and  proposed  to  me  to  restore  Ferdinand 
to  Spain,  and  the  Pope  to  Rome. 

It  was  thought  that  by  this  means  I  might  voluntarily 
accomplish  what  Europe  would  perhaps  sooner  or  later  im- 
pose by  force  ;  and,  moreover,  that  I  might  in  this  way 
obtain  an  additional  force  of  one  hundred  thousand  men  to 
assist  me  in  Germany,  and  thus  show  to  Europe  that  I  re- 
nounced both  Spain  and  Rome,  the  better  to  maintain  my 
ascendency  in  the  north.  I  consented  to  the  restoration  of 
the  Pope,  and  went  myself  to  Fontainebleau,  under  the  pre- 
text of  a  hunting  party.  I  saw  the  Pontiff,  and  frankly  pro- 
posed to  him  to  forget  our  spiritual  and  temporal  quarrels, 
offering  him  the  restoration  of  Rome,  provided  he  would 
maintain  the  independence  of  the  Gallican  Church.  A  new 
concordat  was  signed  to  this  effect  on  the  twenty-fifth  of 
January.  But  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand  was  a  different 
matter.  The  new  retreat  of  Wellington  into  Portugal,  not- 
withstanding the  victory  of  Salamanca,  gave  me  hopes  of 
still  maintaining  our  power  in  the  Peninsula.     I  preferred  to 


70  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XIX. 

risk  my  throne,  rather  than  to  surrender  the  maritime  inter- 
ests of  France.  They  could  not  regard  the  restoration  of  the 
Pope  as  the  resuit  of  fear,  for  I  could  have  nothing  to  appre- 
hend from  that  quarter  ;  hut  the  return  of  Ferdinand  might 
give  my  enemies  an  exaggerated  idea  of  our  embarrassments. 

Energetic  Preparations  for  a  new  Campaign.— During 
the  interval  of  these  negotiations,  I  was  making  every  pre- 
paration to  resume  an  imposing  attitude  on  the  Oder.  The 
disasters  of  Moscow,  instead  of  discouraging  me,  had  anima- 
ted me  with  new  ardor  ;  I  felt  equal  to  the  exigency  of  the 
occasion,  and  France  shared  my  confidence  and  my  energy 
Never  did  a  people  present  a  more  noble  and  lofty  character. 
Instead  of  mourning  over  our  losses,  we  thought  only  of  the 
means  of  repairing  them  ;  in  three  months  I  accomplished 
my  object.  This  fact  alone  is  sufficient  to  confound  the 
declamations  of  those  intriguers  who  triumph  only  in  the  dis- 
asters of  their  country.  France,  it  is  true,  showed  herself 
great  in  misfortune  ;  but  if  there  was  in  the  whole  of  my 
career  a  single  moment  which  merits  the  admiration  of  pos- 
terity, it  was  this,  beyond  all  doubt. 

In  less  than  three  months,  more  than  six  hundred  pieces 
of  cannon  and  two  thousand  caissons  were  on  the  road  to 
the  Elbe  ;  the  cohorts  of  the  first  ban  were  formed  into  regi- 
ments of  the  line  ;  the  number  of  these  regiments  was  in- 
creased to  one  hundred  and  fifty  by  the  creation  of  twenty 
new  cadres  ;  the  newly  levied  conscripts  filled  up  the  old 
cadres.  The  depots  of  the  regiments  in  Spain  were  com- 
pleted and  organized  as  provisional  ;  the  cadres  of  one  hun- 
dred battalions  were  drawn,  for  this  purpose,  from  the  army 
in  Spain,  their  soldiers  being  all  transferred  to  the  battalions 
which  remained  with  that  army.  I  increased  the  number  of 
the  regiments  of  the  Young  Guard  to  sixteen,  so  as  to  incite 
among  the  conscripts  a  rivalry  to  get  into  these  corps  ;  which 
then  passed  as  the  elite  of  my  army,  but  which   in  reality 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  71 

were  inferior  to  the  ordinary  regiments  of  the  camp  at  Bou- 
logne. The)''  were  not  wanting  in  courage,  but  in  the  habit 
of  enduring  fatigues,  privations,  and  dangers  ;  in  a  word, 
they  wanted,  the  force  of  discipline  and  experience. 

The  personnel  of  the  artillery  was  reorganized  by  means 
of  the  companies  of  cannoneers,  which  had  been  attached  to 
each  cohort  of  the  bans  :  seventy  of  these  companies  were 
sent  into  Germany.  I  had  six  fine  regiments  of  well- 
disciplined  marine-artillerists  ;  these  were  withdrawn  from 
the  ports,  and  also  sent  into  Germany.  These  brave  men 
did  not  object  to  the  loss  of  their  prerogatives,  while  I 
directed  them  to  act  as  infantry. 

A  small  number  of  these  companies,  however,  were  re- 
quired to  complete  the  artillery  of  the  guard.  The  reorganiza- 
tion of  cavalry  was  more  difficult.  I,  however,  remounted, 
in  Hanover,  the  squadrons  which  had  lost  their  horses  in 
Russia  ;  I  levied  a  part  of  the  postillions,  and  the  sons  of 
postmasters,  and  of  the  mounted  guards  of  the  forests  ;  I 
also  formed  guards  of  honor  in  order  to  stimulate  the  proud 
and  warlike  youth  of  the  country.  The  gensdarmerie  also 
offered  me  a  resource  ;  two  thousand  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  of  this  corps  d'élite  left  their  resi- 
dences to  aid  me  in  forming  the  cadres  of  our  young  cavalry. 
The  order,  regularity,  and  activity  which  marked  the  fusion 
of  all  these  heterogeneous  elements  constitute,  perhaps,  the 
most  remarkable  trait  of  my  administration. 

I  thus  re-appeared,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  as 
formidable  as  ever,  at  least  in  numbers.  The  enemy  was 
surprised  at  the  sudden  return  of  our  eagles.  The  army 
which  I  commanded,  and  especially  the  cavalry,  was  less 
warlike  than  that  of  Boulogne  ;  but  the  heritage  of  glory 
gave  it  confidence,  and  I  led  it  to  the  field  against  the  enemy 
without  hesitation. 

I  had  a  great  task  before  me  :  it  was  necessary  to  reëstab- 


72  LIFE      Oï      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

lish  our  military  ascendency,  and  to  resume  a  contest  which 
had  been  so  near  its  termination.  I  still  held  Italy,  Holland, 
and  most  of  the  fortified  places  of  Germany.  The  army  of 
Spain,  though  defeated  at  Salamanca,  had  soon  regained  its 
supremacy  by  the  concentration  of  its  forces  ;  it  had  again 
confined  Wellington  to  Portugal,  and  with  the  exception  of 
Andalusia  and  Galicia,  still  occupied  nearly  all  the  penin- 
sula. A  reënforcement  of  thirty  thousand  conscripts  ought 
to  enable  it  to  maintain  its  position.  I  had,  therefore,  lost 
but  little  ground  ;  it  was  only  the  prestige  of  my  invincibil- 
ity that  was  gone  :  it  still  required  well-combined  efforts  on 
the  part  of  my  enemies  to  overthrow  me,  and  these  efforts 
might  fail  for  want  of  union.  England,  however,  redoubled 
her  activity,  and  Prussia  was  preparing  to  make  war  en 
masse.  The  levies  ordered  by  Russia  in  1812  were  collecting 
from  all  quarters  into  Poland  to  complete  the  organization 
of  her  army.  Austria,  convinced  that  the  moment  for  pro- 
nouncing was  approaching,  armed  herself  with  all  possible 
activity.  The  princes  of  the  Confederation,  compelled  by 
their  own  weakness  to  follow  the  strongest  party,  marched 
with  hesitation  under  my  flag.  But  my  declared  enemies, 
and  doubtful  allies  caused  me  less  inquietude  than  the  secret 
societies  which  were  formed  for  the  overthrow  of  my  power. 
These  societies  were  organized  in  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and 
Wesphalia,  while  agents  of  the  coalition  were  preaching  a 
crusade  against  me  in  every  part  of  Germany. 

Eugene  behind  the  Elbe. — While  I  was  preparing  my 
forces  for  a  new  contest,  Eugene  completed  his  long  and 
difficult  march  from  the  Vistula  to  the  banks  of  the  Elbe. 
Prince  Schwartzenberg  in  consequence  of  the  convention  with 
the  Russian  generals,  had  left  General  Frimont  to  march 
back  his  corps  into  Austrian  Galicia.  Poniatowski,  by  a 
subsequent  convention,  had  retired  without  arms  across  the 
Austrian  territory  to  rejoin  me  on  the  Elbe.     Eugene,  al- 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  73 

though  reënforced  by  Grenier,  had  been  obliged  to  garrison 
the  places  of  the  Oder,  and  brought  for  the  defense  of  the 
Elbe  only  twenty  thousand  men,  exclusive  of  the  Saxons  who 
were  destined  for  the  garrison  of  Torgau. 

Prussia  declares  against  Napoleon.— Prussia,  after  having 
disapproved  the  defection  of  York,  sent  to  me,  first,  Prince 
Hatzfeld,  and  then  General  Krusemarck,  to  claim  the  reim- 
bursement of  the  ninety  millions  of  francs  which  she  said  we 
owed  her  for  supplies  furnished  to  our  army.  If  I  had  had 
to  deal  only  with  Frederick-William,  I  should  have  retained 
him  in  my  alliance  by  restoring  a  part  of  his  lost  provinces, 
and  by  paying  him  the  money  which  he  claimed  :  but  I 
knew  that  he  would  be  induced  by  the  feelings  of  the  army 
and  of  the  nation  to  declare  against  me  :  in  fact,  his  cabinet 
was  even  then  negotiating  with  Russia.  I  thought  it  useless 
to  deceive  Krusemarck,  and  told  him  plainly  that  I  was  not 
disposed  to  supply  arms  to  my  enemies.  The  Prussian  gov- 
ernment now  no  longer  concealed  its  hostility  :  a  treaty  of 
alliance  was  signed  with  Russia,  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 
February,  at  Kalisch,  and  the  two  sovereigns  soon  after  met 
at  Breslau  to  concert  their  political  and  military  operations. 
Russia  promised  to  bring  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  into  the  field,  and  Prussia  eighty  thousand  as  a  mini- 
mum, and  double  that  number  if  circumstances  permitted. 
It  was  agreed  to  make  an  appeal  to  the  people  and  princes 
of  Germany,  and  to  strip  of  their  territories  all  those  who 
did  not  join  in  the  coalition.  A  committee  was  formed,  first, 
under  the  presidency  of  Kotschubey,  and  afterward  of  Stein, 
for  inciting  and  directing  the  levée  en  masse.  It  is  also  said 
that  a  secret  convention  was  signed,  near  the  close  of  March, 
stipulating  for  the  assistance  of  Austria. 

March  of  the  Allies  on  the  Elbe.— The  Russian  army, 
having  passed  the  Oder  and  the  Rohr,  moved  its  head- 
quarters   to    Bunzlau,    where    Kutusof,    already   aged    and 


74  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

broken  down  by  the  fatigues  of  the  campaign,  died  of  an 
epidemic  fever  which  prevailed  in  the  army,  and  also  in  the 
countries  through  which  they  passed.  Count  Wittgenstein 
succeeded  him  in  the  command,  and  directed  a  part  of  his 
army  with  Blucher  on  Dresden,  and  the  remainder,  with  the 
corps  of  Buluw,  Kleist,  and  York,  by  Frankfort  on  Berlin. 
Eugene,  finding  himself  unable  to  defend  the  Spree  against 
the  united  armies  of  Prussia  and  Kussia,  fell  back  from 
Copenick  on  Wittenberg,  and  Augereau,  who  had  at  Berlin 
only  a  few  conscripts,  evacuated  that  capital  on  the  approach 
of  the  allies,  and  followed  the  retreat  of  the  army  behind  the 
Elbe. 

Eugene,  informed  of  the  reënforcements  which  were  ap- 
proaching, thought  to  defend  the  line  of  that  river  ;  Belluno, 
with  two  new  divisions  which  afterward  formed  the  second 
corps-d'armée  on  the  Saale,  covered  the  space  between 
Magdebourg  and  the  confluence  of  that  river.  Davoust, 
with  a  part  of  the  eleventh  corps,  defended  the  interval 
between  Torgau  and  Dessau  ;  while  Reynier  was  to  secure 
Dresden  with  Durutte's  division  and  the  wrecks  of  the 
Saxons  and  Bavarians.  As  it  was  less  important  to  guard 
this  line  than  to  assemble  the  scattered  forces,  I  directed  him 
to  concentrate  toward  Magdebourg.  Davoust  and  Reynier, 
after  some  difficulty  with  the  citizens  who  opposed  the 
blowing  up  of  some  of  the  arches  of  the  bridge  of  Dresden, 
left  the  Saxons  at  Torgau,  and  descended  the  river  with 
their  few  remaining  troops.  I  had  also  directed  on  Magde- 
bourg the  regiments  of  infantry  formed  by  the  cohorts  of  the 
first  ban.  This  reënforcement  of  twenty-four  thousand  men, 
under  the  orders  of  Lauriston,  increased  the  number  of  com- 
batants in  the  vicinity  of  the  city  to  fifty  thousand.  Van- 
damme  went  to  command  a  corps-d'armée  formed  of  the 
cohorts  in  the  departments  of  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and 
the  Weser. 


On.  XIX.]  SPRING     C  A  M  P  A  I  N     OF     1813.  75 

The  Allies  enter  Saxony.— The  enemy  continued  to  ad- 
vance with  excessive  confidence  ;  Count  Wittgenstein  and 
the  Prussians,  under  Bulow,  entered  Berlin  :  the  first,  leav- 
ing Count  Woronzof  to  mask  Magdebourg,  passed  the  Elbe 
in  the  environs  of  Dessau  ;  and  Bluchcr,  with  the  corps  of 
Silesia  and  that  of  Miloradowitsch,  debouched  by  Dresden. 
At  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  columns,  the  king  of  Saxony 
left  for  Ratisbon  ;  but  afterwards,  on  the  invitation  of  Aus- 
tria, returned  to  Prague,  where  he  was  at  the  same  time  more 
secure  and  nearer  to  his  states.  The  cabinet  of  Vienna  was 
making  every  effort  to  enclose  this  prince  in  her  toils  :  it 
sought  to  induce  him  to  unite  his  destinies  with  those  of 
Austria,  with  the  hope  of  acting  the  mediator.  Such  a  step 
was  directly  opposed  to  our  treaties,  and  to  the  statutes  of 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  consequently  could  not 
be  approved  by  the  principles  of  morality.  A  model  of 
virtue  and  loyalty,  this  prince  at  first  resisted  all  those  in- 
sinuations :  but  finally,  drawn  on  by  the  hope  of  contributing 
to  the  general  pacification,  and  of  saving  his  country  from 
the  disasters  of  war,  he  declared  that  he  would  follow  in 
every  respect  the  course  which  Austria  might  pursue.  Such 
was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Germany  when  I  was  prepared 
to  resume  the  contest,  and  to  take  the  initiative  in  the  new 
campaign. 

Continuation  of  Negotiations  with  Austria.— In  the  mean 
time  Austria  continued  to  speak  of  peace,  reproving  the 
defection  of  others,  and  protesting  her  fidelity  to  the  alliance 
of  1812. 

If  she  negotiated  with  Russia  and  England,  it  was,  she 
,said,  only  for  us  and  with  us  ;  and  she  communicated  to  me 
all  her  correspondence.  Nevertheless,  the  news  from  Vienna 
was  very  different  from  these  fine  official  protestations. 
Public  opinion  at  Vienna  was  the  same  as  at  Berlin.  All 
official  notes  were  of  the  most  pacific  character  ;  but  con- 


76  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

fidential  overtures  indicated  other  and  different  intentions. 
They  manifested  the  wish  that  I  should  renounce  the  pro- 
tectorate of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  also  my 
projects  respecting  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw.  But  the  cabinet 
did  not  present  these  as  its  own  conditions,  but  as  those 
expected  by  the  allies.  It  protested  its  own  disinterested- 
ness, but  let  me  understand  that  it  expected  the  restitution 
of  Illyria.  I  determined  a  little  late,  and,  perhaps,  too 
indirectly,  to  sound  the  views  of  the  Austrian  cabinet,  by 
authorizing  the  Duke  of  Bassano  to  hold  out  the  offer  of 
Silesia  ;  so  as  to  see  whether  Austria  placed  her  hopes  else- 
where than  in  the  results  of  a  cooperation  with  France. 
Silesia  had  been  taken  from  Austria  by  Frederick  the  Great  ; 
it  was  a  valuable  province  ;  and  as  Prussia  had  declared 
against  me,  it  would  be  necessary  to  punish  her  severely. 
But  instead  of  being  satisfied  with  this  acquisition,  the  cabi- 
net of  Vienna  manifested  the  most  opposite  views  by  laying 
down  as  a  principle  that  Prussia  was  to  be  reconstructed  in 
proportions  even  greater  than  in  1806. 

As  the  correspondence  of  my  ambassador  at  Vienna,  Count 
Otto,  seemed  too  much  in  the  views  of  Austria,  I  thought  it 
prudent  to  replace  him  with  M.  Narbonne,  a  shrewd  courtier, 
capable  of  penetrating  the  mysteries  of  that  cabinet.  His 
reports  soon  confirmed  my  fears.  The  Prince  of  Schwartzen- 
berg,  announced  for  more  than  a  month,  did  not  arrive  ;  and 
it  was  evident  that  Austria  merely  wished  to  gain  time  to 
increase  her  forces.  She  expended  her  paper-money,  regard- 
less of  the  depreciation  produced  by  large  issues,  provided  it 
furnished  her  with  battalions. 

As  I  was  about  to  join  my  army,  I  took  leave  of  Bubna, 
charging  him  with  a  letter  to  my  father-in-law,  in  which  I 
repeated  what  I  desired  to  do  for  peace,  and  the  means  which 
seemed  best  calculated  to  lead  to  negotiations.  My  position 
was  so  delicate  that  I  could  not  do  anything  abruptly.     If  I 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  77 

provoked  Austria  to  formal  declarations  which  proved  un- 
favorable, I  would  thus  accelerate  the  crisis  which  I  wished 
to  avoid.  I  was  preparing  to  strike  decisive  blows  in  Ger- 
many, blows  calculated  to  secure  her  fidelity,  and  procure 
me  an  honorable  peace,  independent  of  her  arbitration. 

Schwartzcnberg  finally  reached  Paris  just  as  I  was  leaving 
to  join  my  army.  I  merely  asked  him  if  the  Austrian  contin- 
gent was  still  at  my  disposal.  On  receiving  his  affirmative  an- 
swer, I  left  him  to  complete  his  negotiations  with  the  Duke 
of  Bassano.  My  minister  used  all  his  diplomacy  to  draw  the 
Austrian  negotiator  further  towards  an  alliance  than  the 
other  desired.  But  the  object  on  both  sides  was  to  gain 
time,  and  all  the  negotiations  of  Bubna,  Floret,  and  Schwart- 
zenberg,  tended  only  to  that  object.  And  so  long  as  Austria 
remained  in  her  present  line  of  conduct,  it  was  not  good 
policy  for  us  to  push  matters,  for  I  felt  assured  that  a  vic- 
tory in  Saxony  would  retain  her  under  my  flag. 

Austria  declares  an  armed  Mediation. — The  negotiations 
of  Narbonne  at  Vienna  finally  drew  from  Austria  the  avowal 
that  she  intended  to  offer  an  armed  mediation,  that  is,  to 
make  herself  the  arbiter  of  peace.  Schwartzenberg  soon  re- 
ceived new  instructions.  In  a  note  as  long  as  it  was  obscure, 
in  which  he  spoke  with  affectation  of  the  Jacobin  ferment 
which  threatened  the  stability  of  thrones,  of  the  disinter- 
estedness of  the  emperor  for  his  monarchy,  and  of  his  soli- 
citude for  the  general  repose,  he  let  it  be  understood  that,  in 
order  to  obtain  new  sacrifices  from  the  Austrian  people,  his 
master  could  not  announce  a  formal  intention  of  uniting  his 
forces  to  those  of  France,  but  that  he  wished  merely  to  show 
himself  in  arms  in  order  to  obtain  peace.  But  notwith- 
standing its  general  ambiguity,  this  note  contained  some 
protestations  very  amicable  for  France  ;  for  it  avowed  the 
partiality  of  Austria  for  its,  as  ive  sincerely  desired  peace. 
Quieted  by  these  new  assurances,  we  thought  that  Austria 


78  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch    XIX. 

really  intended  to  act  the  part  of  a  friend,  when  the  fit  occa- 
sion should  arrive.  However,  Metternich  and  even  the  em- 
peror himself,  in  their  conferences  with  Narbonne,  advanced 
a  little  farther.  They  spoke  already  of  the  independence  of 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  the  dissolution  of  the  Duchy 
of  Warsaw,  the  restitution  of  Illyria,  the  reconstruction  of 
the  Prussian  monarchy,  as  conditions  which  would  be  de- 
manded by  our  enemies,  and  which  it  would  be  difficult  for 
a  mediator  to  refuse.  This  new  state  of  things  gave  rise  to 
two  questions  :  would  Austria  break  our  alliance,  by  declar- 
ing herself  the  mediating  power  ?  would  she  leave  me  her 
contingent  ?  On  the  first  point  Metternich  did  not  fail  to 
make  the  most  positive  assurances:  "The  alliance,"  he 
said,  "  continued  ;  Austria  would  instantly  contract  it,  if  it 
did  not  already  exist  ;  she  would  persist  in  it  ;  and  would 
change  in  no  respect  its  conditions.  This  alliance  was  based 
on  interests  too  identical,  too  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things 
and  too  invariable  in  their  character,  to  be  influenced  by 
either  reverses  or  successes."  With  respect  to  the  contingent, 
he  said,  that,  in  order  to  preserve  the  appearance  of  impar- 
tiality, the  cabinet  of  Vienna  could  take  no  active  part  in 
the  war  ;  it  was  enough  for  her  to  be  secretly  inclined  in 
our  favor,  without  having  its  mediation  rejected  by  my  ene- 
mies on  account  of  her  furnishing  me  with  troops. 

Napoleon  returns  to  his  Army.— During  these  discussions, 
I  left  Paris  to  rejoin  my  army.  As  my  enemies  were  not 
yet  prepared  I  wished  to  profit  by  the  occasion  to  resume  the 
offensive  and  recover  our  glory.  The  Russian  army  which 
had  pursued  us  to  the  Elbe  was  broken  by  the  winter  cam- 
paign. Having  left  some  corps  before  Dantzic,  Thorn,  Mod- 
lin,  Zamosc,  and  Custrin,  and  another  to  occupy  Poland 
and  follow  Poniatowski,  it  now  scarcely  numbered  sixty 
thousand  combatants.  For  the  moment,  Prussia  could  not 
unite  with  it   more  than    fifty  thousand  combatants.     By 


Cii.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  79 

uniting  the  cohorts  of  the  first  ban,  which  I  had  very  for- 
tunately organized  in  1812,  and  amalgamating  a  levy  of  one 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  conscripts  with  the  remains 
of  my  army  which  had  returned  from  Russia,  we  could  count 
on  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and  concentrate 
them  on  the  enemy  before  he  could  collect  an  equal  number. 
I  resolved  to  profit  by  this  circumstance.  My  enemies  have 
not  failed  to  attribute  this  to  personal  ambition,  and  to 
accuse  me  of  having  lost  this  opportunity  to  restore  the 
peace  of  the  continent  !  Was  it  more  j^roper  for  me  to  now 
submit  to  the  yoke  and  implore  the  good-will  and  support 
of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna,  or  to  first  beat  the  enemy  while 
still  inferior  in  numbers,  to  finish  my  armaments,  and  then 
subscribe  to  an  honorable  and  advantageous  peace  ? 

He  advances  on  the  Saale.  —  On  the  twenty-fifth  of 
April,  I  arrived  at  Erfurt  h,  where  I  found  my  guard  reor- 
ganized. Ney's  corps  assembled  at  Weimar  numbered  forty- 
eight  thousand  ;  Marmont's  corps  at  G-otha,  numbered  not 
less  than  twenty-five  thousand  ;  Bertrand,  who  commanded 
about  the  same  number  from  Italy  and  Wurtembourg,  was 
already  at  Saalfeld,  and  Oudinot,  with  as  many  at  Cobourg. 
I  was  thus  again  at  the  head  of  one  hundred  and  forty  thou- 
sand men,  exclusive  of  the  viceroy,  who,  with  forty  thousand 
combatants,  was  under  the  cannon  of  Magdebourg,  and  of 
Belluno  and  Davoust  on  the  Lower  Elbe.  Independently  of 
these  forces,  Augereau  was  directed  to  organize  at  Wurz- 
burg  a  small  army  for  the  three-fold  purpose  of  imposing  on 
Austria,  observing  Bohemia,  and  maintaining  Bavaria.  I 
had  as  yet  only  eight  or  ten  thousand  cavalry,  those  who  had 
escaped  on  foot  from  Russia  were  waiting  in  different  parts 
of  Germany  for  their  horses.  But  this  arm  is  far  less  im- 
portant in  gaining  a  victory,  than  in  deriving  the  full  advan- 
tage from  success.  I  had  sufficient  means  for  opening  the 
campaign,  especially  as  the  chances  were  in  our  favor,  and 


80  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XIX. 

as  the  enemy  exposed  himself  to  our  blows.      I  therefore,  did 
not  hesitate. 

Organization  of  the  French  Array.  —  My  army  was  at 
this  time  organized  into  twelve  corps  : 

1st  corps,  Vandamme. 3  divisions, 

2d  '•  BeUuno. 2  i: 

3d  "  Xjj. 5 

4th  "  Bertrand 3 

5th  "  Lauriston, 3  " 

Gth  "  Marmont, 3  " 

7th  '■  The  Saxons,  at  Torgau, 

8th  "  Poniatowski, 

9th  "  fhe  Bavarians, 

10th  ''  Rapp,  at  Dantzic, 

11th  '■  Micdonald. 3  divisions, 

1 2th  '•  Oudiitot, 3  " 

Augereau's  army  at  Wurtzburg  was  composed  of  five  divi- 
sions of  infantry  ;  its  battalions  arrived  in  June  and  July. 

Levy  in  Mass  in  Prussia.— No  sooner  had  the  king  of 
Prussia  pronounced  for  the  enemy  than  his  council  took  every 
measure  in  their  power  to  incite  the  people  of  Germany 
against  us.  The  ordinances  of  April  21st,  directing  a  levée 
en  masse,  promised  to  make  every  city  a  Saragossa,  and 
every  village  a  funeral  pile.  The  good  Saxons,  Silesians, 
and  Westphalians,  were  to  transform  themselves  into  fero- 
cious Aragonese  :  liberty  could  not  be  too  dearly  purchased  ! 
They  go  still  farther,  and  proclaim  equality  /  Old  honors 
have  been  effaced  by  the  disgrace  of  bearing  a  foreign  yoke  ! 
The  new  genealogical  trees  are  to  date  from  1812,  and  no 
one  is  to  hold  public  office  who  has  not  served  one  year  in 
the  War  of  Independence  !  It  must  be  confessed  that  these 
measures  were  not  calculated  to  favor  the  permanent  inter- 
ests of  sovereigns,  however  advantageously  they  might  assist 
the  accomplishment  of  their  temporary  objects.  A  civilized 
people  is  not  easily  satisfied  with  the  mere  hopes  of  an  ideal 
liberty.  The  desire  to  crush  my  power  made  the  sovereigns 
forget  the  danger  of  exciting  popular  passions. 


Ci.  XIX.]  s  I' Kl  Xi;     CAMPAIGN    Oï1    1813.  81 

Movements  of  the  Allies. —  But  cas  these  proclamations 
produced  little  effect,  without  the  support  of  the  bayonet. 
the  allies  resolved  to  j>n.ss  -the  Elbe,  and  spread,  with  im- 
petuosity, over  the  country  between  that  river  and  the  Rhine. 
Tettenborn  entered  Hamburg  at  the  head  of  a  few  hundred 
Cossacks,  without  opposition  ;  Westphalia  and  Hanover., 
more  exasperated  than  in  1800,  were  only  waiting  for  the 
signal  to  rise  ;  and  Denmark  on  being  summoned  declared 
against  us.  It  was  important  to  prevent  the  fatal  conse- 
quences of  these  irruptions.  Pushing  rapidly  on  Hamburg 
the  corps  of  Yandamme,  formed  of  the  garrisons  and  depots 
of  the  Lower  Rhine,  I  sent  Marshal  Davoust  to  command  in 
that  important  part  of  the  theatre  of  war. 

Position  of  their  Armies.— On  the  other  side,  the  army  of 
Wittgenstein  marched  on  the  Saale  with  the  same  assurance 
which  had  proved  so  fatal  to  the  Prussians  in  1806.  This 
general  had  just  been  placed,  by  the  sovereigns,  at  the  head 
of  the  combined  forces.  He  was  with  thirty  thousand  men 
between  Dessau  and  Halle.  Blucher  had  collected  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  at  Altenbourg  ;  and  Miloradowitsch  was 
at  Chemnitz,  with  fifteen  thousand  Russians.  The  Russo- 
Prussian  reserves  were  advancing  from  Dresden  on  L-ipsic  ; 
the  corps  of  Bulow  and  Woronzof  were  masking  Magde- 
bourg,  and  covering  Berlin  against  the  viceroy.  The  diverg- 
ent direction  of  all  these  corps  showed  that  the  enemy 
arranged  his  operations  more  with  reference  to  giving  force 
to  his  proclamations,  than  to  opposing  a  formidable  army. 

Napoleon  effects  his  Junction  with  the  Viceroy.— As  it 
was  important  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  viceroy,  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  I  resolved  to  advance  immediately.  I 
arrived  at  Naumbourg  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  April,  and, 
the  next  day,  Ney  entered  Weissenfels,  after  driving  back  the 
Russian  van-guard  of  cavalry  ;  Marmont  reached  Kôsen, 
aud  Bertrand,   Dornbourg  ;    Oudinot   had   not   yet    passed 

vol.  iv. — 6. 


82  LIFE    OP     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

Saalfeld  ;  but  the  viceroy,  after  having  ascended  the  left 
bank  of  the  Saale,  arrived  at  Mersebourg.  Count  Wittgen- 
stein marched  parallel  with  Eugene  on  the  right  of  the  Saale 
and  the  Elster,  and  concentrated  his  forces  on  Leipsic  ; 
Blucher  filed  by  his  right,  and  marched  on  Borna  ;  while 
Miloradowitsch  and  the  reserves  advanced  in  the  direction  of 
A 1  ten  bourg. 

Xapekon  directs  his  Forces  on  Leipsic. — Having  secured 
my  junction  with  the  viceroy,  I  resolved  to  march  on  Leipsic, 
with  the  intention  of  attacking  the  enemy  wherever  I  should 
meet  him.  My  affairs  required  a  victory,  and  my  superiority 
in  numbers  now  gave  me  promise  of  success.  On  the  first 
of  May  the  Eussian  advance-guard,  which  we  encountered 
at  the  defile  at  Ripach  between  Weissenfels  and  Lutzen,  was 
thrown  on  Pegau,  after  an  engagement  which,  except  for  the 
death  of  Marshal  Bessières,  was  unimportant.  This  veteran 
and  faithful  general  was  here  killed  by  a  musket-ball  :  a  sad 
end  for  an  old  warrior  who  had  survived  so  many  battles,  to 
die  in  a  petty  skirmish  of  a  1  car-guard.* 

*  Thiers  thus  describes  Bessières'  death: 

"  At  daybreak  Marshal  Key's  troops  advanced  upon  the  vast  Lutzen  plain, 
formed  in  squares,  which  were  accompanied  by  artillery,  and  preceded  by 
numerous  tirailleurs.  Arriving  at  the  brink  of  a  long  and  deep  ravine,  called 
the  Ripach  Ravine,  from  the  name  of  a  village  which  it  traversed,  the  squares 
broke  for  the  purpose  of  passing  it,  and  when  it  had  been  crossed,  reformed 
and  continued  their  advance.  The  division  Souharn  held  the  foremost  place  ; 
marching  with  an  excellent  bearing,  and  had  just  deployed,  when  Marshal 
Bessières,  who  usually  commanded  the  cavalry  of  the  guard,  and  should  not 
consequently  have  been  where  he  now  was,  advanced  a  little  to  the  right,  for 
the  purpose  of  being  better  able  to  observe  the  enemy's  movements,  and  sud- 
denly fell  dead,  struck  by  a  bullet  in  the  breast. 

'It  was  tbo  second  time,  alas!  that  this  brave  man  had  been  hit  on  the 
battle-field  by  Napoleon's  side,  the  first  time  being  at  Wagram,  where  a  bullet 
had  struck  him,  but  only  caused  a  contusion.  His  death  on  the  present  occa- 
sion caused,  in  spite  of  the  general  confidence,  a  painful  foreboding  in  more 
than  one  heart. 

"He  was  a  valiant  man,  of  a  lively  Gascon  temperament,  but  possessed  of  a 
fine  intellect,  and  of  a  courage  which  frequently  led  him  to  express  to  Napo- 
leon useful  truths  both  impressively  aud  opportunely.     Napoleon  loved  and 


Cil.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  83 

My  army  was  now  in  echelons  from  Naumbourg  to  Leij)sic. 
Lauriston's  corps  and  the  army  of  the  viceroy  formed  the 
head,  between  Leipsic  and  Marckranstedt  ;  Eugene  and  the 
corps  of  Macdonald  occupied  the  latter  of  these  towns  ;  my 
guards  and  head-quarters  were  established  at  Lutzen,  which 
was  covered  on  the  side  towards  Pegau  by  Ney's  corps  ; 
Marmont  arrived  at  Poserna,  and  Berthier  was  in  march  for 
the  same  point  ;  Oudinot,  still  further  in  rear,  marched  from 
Jena  to  Naumbourg.  On  the  morning  of  the  second  of  May, 
the  viceroy  continued  his  movement  on  Leipsic.  I  wished 
to  follow  at  his  right  on  Marckranstedt.  Impatient  to  learn 
whether  the  enemy  would  abandon'  to  us  the  important  stra- 
tegic point  of  Leipsic,  the  centre  of  all  the  great  communica- 
tions of  northern  Germany,  I  set  out  with  my  guard  to 
ascertain  whether  any  opposition  would  be  made  :  the 
enemy,  however,  was  preparing  to  surprise  me  on  another 
side. 

Project  of  the  Allies. — The  allies,  recovering  from  the  ex- 
cessive confidence  inspired  by  the  reports  of  their  couriers, 
now  saw  that  mere  demonstrations,  by  the  head  of  their 
columns,  were  not  sufficient  to  drive  us  from  Germany. 
They  heard  with  astonishment  of  my  return  on  the  Saale 
with  a  powerful  army,  but,  considering  the  reports  of  my 
strength  to  be  exaggerated,  they  still  hoped,  by  concentrat- 
ing their  own  masses,  to  beat  in  detail  our  hastily  levied 
conscripts,   who  were  now  assembling  by  twenty  different 

esteemed  him,  and  felt  a  sincere  pang  of  sorrow  at  his  loss;  but  then  ex- 
claiming. '  Death  comes  nigh  us  !'  pushed  forward  to  watch  the  march  of  his 
young  soldiers,  and  experienced  in  the  spectacle  a  satisfaction  equal  to  that 
felt  by  Ney  two  days  before  ;  beholding  his  conscripts  repelling  again  and  again 
the  repeated  charges  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  strewing  the  ground  before 
them  with  three  or  four  hundred  killed  and  wounded  foemen. 

"  The  troops  halted  at  Lutzen.  and  Xapoleon  went  to  visit  the  monument  of 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  who  had  been  struck  down  on  this  plain,  as  Epaminondas, 
in  the  bosom  of  victory,  and  gave  orders  that  a  monument  should  also  be  flaised 
to  the  memory  of  the  Duke  of  Istria,  killed  on  the  same  ground." 


84  LITE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

routes  ;  it  was  not  supposed  that  these  forces  could  contend 
with  the  old  Lands  of  Russia  and  the  troops  of  the  elite 
which  Prussia  had  reorganized  within  the  last  six  years. 
Supposing  the  corps  of  Ney,  Marmont,  and  Mortier,  much 
less  than  they  really  were,  the  allies  resolved  to  attack  them 
on  the  march,  so  as  to  prevent  their  junction.  This  project 
seemed  the  more  admissible  for  the  allies,  as  they  hoped  by 
it  to  draw  over  to  their  side  Saxony,  which  was  disposed  to 
abandon  our  cause.  The  king,  it  is  true,  retired  at  the  ap- 
proach of  the  allies,  but  the  people,  acted  on  by  the  emis- 
saries of  the  Tugenhund,  were  uncertain,  and  might  carry 
over  their  sovereign  in  spite  of  himself.  Already  a  tacit 
convention  had  neutralized  the  Saxon  corps  of  General 
Thielmann  under  the  cannon  of  Torgau,  and  the  enemy  was 
negotiating  with  Prague  to  obtain  its  adhesion  to  the  coa- 
lition. 

Stimulated  by  these  powerful  motives,  and  deceived  re- 
specting the  numbers  of  our  troops,  the  allied  sovereigns  re- 
solved to  take  the  offensive  and  manoeuvre  against  my  ex- 
treme right.  "With  this  object  Wittgenstein  had  left  only  a 
corps  of  five  thousand  men  to  defend  Leipsic,  and  had  uni- 
ted between  Zwenkau  and  Pegau  a  mass  of  seventy  thousand 
men,  composed  of  his  own  army,  the  corps  of  Blucher,  and 
the  allied  reserves.  With  this  mass  he  resolved  to  pass  the 
Elster  and  march  on  Lutzen,  so  as  to  assail  in  rear  my  army 
which  he  supposed  to  have  filed  on  Leipsic.  Miloradowich 
directed  himself  on  Zeits  to  cover  the  flank  and  communica- 
tions of  the  allies  during  their  operations  beyond  the  Elster. 

Battle  of  Lutzen. — It  was  extremely  important  for  us  to 
sustain  ourselves  at  Lutzen,  as  the  possession  of  that  place 
by  the  enemy  would  enable  him  to  cut  my  army  in  two. 
Wittgenstein  debouched  on  that  city  on  the  morning  of  the 
second,  but  instead  of  finding  here  my  extreme  right,  he  en- 
countered  the  centre   of  my  army.     This  manœuvre  of  the 


[Cil.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN    OF     1313.  85 

enemy,  although  it  foiled  in  its  object,  was  certainly  worthy 
of  praise  ;  so  little  was  I  expecting  to  be  assailed  on  this 
side,  that  I  had  taken  with  me  Marshal  Ney,  leaving  his 
corps  without  its  chief.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say  what 
would  have  been  the  result  if  the  enemy  had  made  good  use 
of  his  twelve  thousand  superb  cavalry,  for  Ney  had  not  six 
hundred  horse  with  which  to  oppose  them.  While  Wint- 
zingerode  paraded  his  squadrons  before  Tournau,  and  the 
Prussians  were  losing  time  in  forming,  Ney's  troops  ran  to 
arms  ;  the  four  French  divisions  were  in  echelons  in  the 
villages  which  covered  Lutzen  on  the  side  toward  Pegau  and 
Zwenkau.  The  fifth,  composed  of  German  troops,  covered 
their  left.  The  first  division  composed  entirely  of  conscripts, 
eighteen  years  of  age,  was  attacked  at  eleven  o'clock,  and, 
seconded  by  the  division  of  Girard,  sustained  the  combat 
with  glory.  The  troops  being  arranged  in  echelons,  the 
attacks  were  successive  and  partial,  which  was  favorable  for 
our  new  troops.  The  Prussian  brigades  of  Klux  and  Ziethen 
advanced  on  Goeschen  ;  that  of  Roder  served  as  a  reserve  ; 
Dulfs'  cavalry  was  directed  on  Starsiedel,  with  the  hope  of 
turning  the  columns  of  Ney.  York's  corps  and  the  Russian 
division  of  Berg  formed  the  second  line.  The  Russian  corps 
of  Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg  was  in  column  of  march 
to  the  left,  where  the  cavalry  of  Wintzingerode  deployed. 
There  was  no  unity  of  action  in  this  first  effort;  Souham 
ànd  Girard,  after  having  disputed  Gros-Goeschen  and 
Raima,  were  forced  to  fall  back  on  Klein-Goeschen,  which 
Souham  also  abandoned. 

At  the  sound  of  this  violent  attack  Ney  left  me  to  fly  to 
the  head  of  his  troops  ;  I  also  returned  to  Lutzen  with  my 
guard,  and  directed  Eugene  to  renounce  his  march  on  Leipsic 
and  join  the  contest.  Officers  were  also  sent  to  Marmont, 
directing  him  to  hasten  into  line  on  the  right  of  Ney,  and  to 
Bertrand  directing  him  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  flank. 


86  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Oh.  XIX. 

Ney,  having  reached  his  corps  about  noon,  assembled  his 
divisions,  and  threw  those  of  Souham,  Girard  and  Brenier 
on  Klein-Goeschen,  thus  dislodging  the  Prussians.  This 
vigorous  blow  retards  the  operations  of  the  allies  and  gives 
time  for  the  corps  of  the  right  and  left  to  come  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  centre.  Marmont,  having  reached  the  field  dur- 
ing this  interval,  prolongs  the  right  of  the  army  which  the 
enemy  sought  to  gain,  and  debouches  toward  Starsiedel, 
without  troubling  himself  with  the  numerous  cavalry  which 
Wintzingerode  deployed  in  the  fields  of  Kobson,  or  that  of 
the  Prussians  which  afterward  formed  between  this  first  vil- 
lage and  Kahna.  These  squadrons  finally  advanced  to  the 
charge  ;  the  divisions  of  Campans  and  Bonnet,  formed  in 
squares,  repel  them  ;  they  several  times  renew  the  attack. 
but  our  brave  regiments  oppose  an  impenetrable  front  ;  a 
single  battalion  is  broken  by  the  Russian  cavalry. 

But  this  first  reinforcement  has  not  yet  restored  the  equi- 
librium in  our  favor  ;  for  Blucher  has  at  the  same  time 
ordered  York's  corps  and  the  Bussian  division  of  Berg  to 
enter  into  the  first  line  and  retake  the  villages  of  Raima  and 
Klein-Goeschen  which  Ney  had  just  gained.  The  shock 
now  becomes  more  general  and  more  serious.  Ney  is  forced 
to  fall  back  behind  Kaya,  which  he  defends  with  all  the 
vigor  of  which  he  is  capable.  The  enemy  throws  himself 
with  impetuosity  on  this  village  ;  twice  is  Ney  driven  out  ; 
and  a  final  effort  of  Berg's  division  secures  its  momentary 
possession  to  the  allies.  Our  young  soldiers  surpass  my 
hopes  in  this  obstinate  contest  ;  but,  more  brave  than  ex- 
perienced, they  suffer  severe  losses.  I  arrive  at  this  point 
the  moment  when  Ney  is  preparing  a  final  effort  to  regain 
Kaya  with  the  division  of  Ricard.  I  order  Count  Lobau  to 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  this  troop,  while  the  marshal 
conducted  his  other  divisions  to  assist  him.  This  movement 
is  executed  with   the  rapidity  of  lightning  ;    Count  Lobau 


Ch.  XIX.]  STRING   CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  87 

penetrates  into  Kaya  with  that  steadiness  for  which  he  is  so 
distinguished  ;  he  is  warmly  supported  by  the  divisions  of 
Brenier,  Girard  and  the  remains  of  Souham  which  Ney 
leads  back  to  victory.  A  terrible  combat  is  engaged  between 
this  village  and  Klein-Goeschen  where  the  enemy  debouched 
with  all  his  united  means.  Girard  and  Brenier  fall  like 
heroes  at  the  head  of  their  young  soldiers,  whom  they  persist 
in  leading  to  the  fight,  although  severely  wounded.  Girard 
cries  to  his  men  :  "  Soldiers  this  is  the  daij  for  France  ; 
let  us  avenge  the  defeat  of  Moscoio  or  die." 

The  enemy  now  felt  that  victory  would  escape  liiin  unless 
Blucher  was  more  effectively  sustained.  For  this  purpose 
Wittgenstein  moved  from  the  left  to  the  right  the  corps  of 
Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg  which  had  at  first  marched 
in  the  opposite  direction.  One  of  these  divisions  debouched 
from  Eisdorf  beyond  the  Flosgraben,  and  pushed  the  division 
of  Marchand  ;  the  other  reènforced  Berg  at  Klein-Goes- 
-  chen  ;  this  village  was  again  carried,  and  Ney  for  a  third 
time  driven  behind  Kaya.  The  arrival  of  the  grenadier 
corps  and  the  Kussian  guard  which  the  allied  sovereigns 
were  awaiting  with  impatience,  might  decide  the  battle 
against  us.  The  moment  was  decisive  ;  I  threw  on  Kaya 
the  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard  which  returned  and 
debouched  from  Lutzen,  followed  by  the  Old  Guard  and 
all  my  cavalry.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  to  Klein- 
Goeschen. 

Here  a  new  scene  is  developed.  Seeing  the  inutility  of 
his  efforts  against  the  centre,  Wittgenstein  prepared  to  strike 
on  the  left  of  Ney  ;  the  corps  of  grenadiers  under  the  orders 
of  Konownitzin,  had  just  arrived  on  the  field  of  battle  ;  its 
two  divisions  debouched  by  Eisdorf  and  Gros-Gocschen. 
This  movement  which  might  have  been  decisive  if  all  my 
troops  had  been  engaged,  did  not  have  the  success  which  the 
allies  expected  ;  I  had  taken  measures  to  provide  for  this 


88  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

event.  Eugene  had  received  the  orders  of  which  I  have 
already  spoken  ;  but  seeing  Lauriston's  columns  engaged  in 
the  faubourgs  of  Leipsic,  and  thinking  he  ought  to  leave 
them  to  occupy  that  city,  he  hastened  to  Macdonald's  corps 
and  directed  it  on  Kitzen.  The  arrival  of  these  three  fresh 
divisions  decided  everything  ;  the  victory  was  no  longer 
doubtful.  Konownitzin  and  the  Prince  of  Wurtemberg 
vainly  sought  to  defend  the  village  of  Eisdorf  ;  being  at- 
tacked on  all  sides  they  were  forced  to  abandon  it.  The 
allies  now  saw  their  right  turned,  while  Ney  and  Mar  mont 
pressed  them  in  front  towards  Goeschen,  and  Lauriston, 
master  of  Leipsic,  prepared  to  push  Kleist  in  the  direction 
of  Connewitz,  and  Bertrand,  debouching  at  the  opposite 
extremity,  at  the  head  of  Morand's  division,  turned  the  left 
of  the  allies  by  Gosserau  and  Pobles.  Seeing  the  danger  of 
their  position,  they  now  abandoned  the  four  burnt  villages 
and  fell  back  behind  Gros-Goeschen  where  the  arrival  of 
the  Russian  guards  enabled  them  to  maintain  their  position. 

Darkness  even  did  not  terminate  the  battle.  The  scouts 
of  Marmont  advanced  in  the  dusk  beyond  Starsiedel,  and 
gave  the  alarm  to  the  Prussians.  A  night  combat  ensued  in 
which  the  enemy  was  at  first  repulsed.  Blucher  then  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  his  reserve  of  cavalry  and  executed  a 
rash  charge.  Some  squadrons  penetrated  between  our  lines,  and 
our  troops,  being  unprepared  for  the  attack  fell  into  disorder  ; 
this  was  still  further  increased  by  a  hourra  of  the  Cossacks 
on  the  ambulances  in  rear  of  our  line.  But  this  attack  was 
attended  by  no  serious  consequences  ;  our  troops  soon  recov- 
ered from  their  surprise  and  made  Blucher  pay  dearly  for  his 
isolated  and  ill -conceived  enterprise  ;  his  squadrons  did  not 
regain  their  line  without  considerable  loss. 

Remarks  on  this  Battle— The  day  had  been  bloody  with- 
out being  decisive.  Ney's  corps  alone  had  lost  twelve  thou- 
sand men  and  five  hundred  officers  lwrs-de-combaf,  and  we 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  89 

had  gained  neither  trophies  nor  results.  The  number  of  men 
wounded  in  the  hand  was  so  great  that  our  young  conscripts 
were  accused  of  self  mutilation  in  order  to  avoid  the  fatigues 
of  the  war.  Perhaps  this  resulted  from  their  being  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  use  of  weapons.  The  accusation  was,  neverthe- 
less, of  sufficient  importance  to  merit  an  examination. 

This  battle,  having  been  unforeseen,  had  produced  no  im- 
portant results.  I  therefore  determined  to  renew  it  the  next 
day  in  order  to  complete  the  defeat  of  the  enemy,  if  he  com- 
mitted the  fault  of  remaining  on  the  left  of  the  Elster.  To 
obtain  still  greater  results,  I  ordered  Lauriston,  who  had 
entered  Leipsic  during  the  battle  and  driven  Kleist  on 
Wurtzen,  to  leave  only  a  detachment  in  the  city  and  with 
the  mass  of  his  corps  to  march  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
Elster,  so  as  to  threaten  the  enemy's  bridges. 

But  Wittgenstein,  having  already  perceived  the  danger  of 
his  position,  profited  by  the  night  to  recross  the  river.  The 
following  day  the  allied  army  continued  its  retreat  in  two 
columns  on  Dresden  and  Meissen  ;  Wittgenstein  with  the 
Russians  took  the  road  to  Altenbourg  and  Chemnitz  ;  I 
caused  him  to  be  pursued  by  Bertrand  and  Oudinot.  Blucher 
took  the  direct  road  to  Colditz  ;  I  myself  followed  him  with 
Marmont,  the  guard,  and  the  corps  of  Macdonald,  com- 
manded by  the  viceroy.  Ney,  with  the  third  and  fifth  corps, 
took  the  road  to  Leipsic  on  Torgau,  from  which  place  he  was 
to  act  in  concert  with  the  Duke  of  Belluno  who  was  leading 
the  second  corps  from  Magdebourg  on  Wittemberg.  Davoust 
and  Vandamme  at  the  head  of  the  first  corps  again  entered 
Hamburg. 

Pursuit  of  the  Allies  on  Dresden.— Although  the  pursuit 
was  made  with  activity,  yet,  for  want  of  cavalry  we  obtained 
no  results.  We  overtook  the  rear-guard  of  Blucher  on  the 
Mulde  where  it  was  much  cut  up  ;  but  the  fresh  corps  of 
Miloradowitsch  appeared  to  cover  the  retreat,  and  conducted 


90  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Co.  XIX. 

itself  with  that  cool  bravery  and  steadiness  so  characteristic 
of  the  Kussian  army,  and  which  results  from  their  fine  mili- 
tary institutions  and  severe  discipline.  The  viceroy  engaged 
in  three  successive  combats,  at  Elsdorf,  Nossen  and  Wils- 
druf  ;  he  pushed  the  enemy,  but  did  not  succeed  in  cutting 
him  up.  The  Russians  recrossed  the  Elbe  on  the  seventh, 
at  Dresden,  and  the  Prussians  at  Meissen.  Finally,  on  the 
eighth  of  May,  we  arrived  before  the  capital  of  Saxony  ; 
Miloradowitsch  blew  up  the  bridges,  burned  the  magazines, 
and  prepared  to  defend  the  new  town  which  is  situated  on 
the  right  of  the  Elbe.  I  made  a  reconnoisance  of  the  ad- 
vantageous heights  of  Priesnitz  ;  a  bridge  of  boats  was 
thrown  across  here  under  the  protection  of  eighty  pieces  of 
the  guard,  and  two  battalions  of  voltigeurs  crossed  on  rafts. 
As  at  Essling,  a  sudden  rise  of  the  Elbe  threatened  the 
security  of  our  bridges  ;  but  the  army  had  not  yet  passed  ; 
and  even  if  they  had  commenced  the  passage,  the  enemy 
wrould  not  have  been  prepared  to  attack  us.  Our  troops,  in 
their  impatience,  used  long  beams  to  build  over  the  two  arches 
of  the  stone  bridge  which  had  been  blown  up  by  the  enemy  ; 
finally  the  approach  of  night  decided  the  Russian  general  to 
begin  his  retreat.  Dresden  was  now  in  our  possession,  and 
its  magistrates  came  out  to  meet  me.  I  reproached  them  for 
the  conduct  of  the  inhabitants  in  Eugene's  retreat,  and  on 
the  approach  of  the  enemies  of  their  sovereign,  and  pardoned 
them  only  on  condition  of  their  sending  a  deputation  to  their 
king  to  solicit  his  return. 

The  information  which  reached  me  after  I  entered  this 
capital  was  far  from  agreeable  :  On  the  one  hand,  I  learned 
that  General  Thielmann,  the  governor  of  Torgau,  had  been 
several  times  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  allies,  and  Ney 
informed  me  that  he  refused  to  open  the  gates  of  the  place 
to  my  troops.  This  revelation  indicated  the  use  which  Aus- 
tria expected   to  make  of  her  influence  and  her  mediation  ; 


Cii.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  91 

this  state  of  uncertainty  could  not  continue.  I  therefore 
immediately  detached  my  aid-de-camp,  Montesquiou  to 
Prague  ;  he  was  the  bearer  of  dispatches  demanding  to  know 
of  the  King  of  Saxony,  if  he  was  still  a  member  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Bhine,  and  what  treaty  had  released  him 
from  the  engagements  which  he  had  contracted.  This  brave 
and  loyal  prince  answered  by  coming  himself  to  Dresden  on 
the  twelfth  of  May,  having  previously  forwarded  a  formal 
order  to  receive  us  at  Torgau.  Thielmann,  being  enraged 
against  us,  abandoned  his  sovereign  and  passed  into  the  ser- 
vice of  Kussia.  The  Saxon  troops,  again  placed  under  the 
orders  of  Beynier,  formed,  with  Durutte's  division,  the 
seventh  corps-d'armée.  Nevertheless,  this  difficulty  lost  us 
five  days  in  the  pursuit,  and  Nov  did  not  cross  the  Elbe  at 
Torgau  till  the  thirteenth. 

Eugene  seat  to  organize  an  Army  in  Italy. — The  political 
horizon  began  to  lower  in  the  direction  of  Austria:  I,  there- 
fore, resolved  to  send  Eugene  into  Italy  where  he  might  be 
more  useful  to  me  in  case  of  a  rupture.  The  most  pressing 
orders  had  been  sent  there  to  replace  the  French  troops  which 
had  been  withdrawn,  and  to  form  again  the  Italian  army, 
which  the  cruel  losses  in  Catalonia  and  Russia  had  almost 
destroyed. 

Negotiations  between  Bassano  and  Schwartzenberg.  — 
While  1  was  thus  inarching  to  new  victories,  I  had  left  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  and  Schwartzenberg  at  Paris  to  discuss  our 
reciprocal  interests.  Although  my  minister  had  the  same 
confidence  as  myself  in  the  success  of  our  military  operations, 
and  although  he  would  have  preferred  to  discuss  directly  the 
question  of  peace,  yet  under  the  circumstances  his  mission 
was  naturally  limited  to  ascertaining  the  intentions  of 
Schwartzenberg,  without  making  any  offers  himself,  at  least 
not  until  after  the  first  events  of  the  campaign.  It  was  im- 
portant to  ascertain  what  were  the  intentions  of  my  enemies, 


92  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

and  what  the  limits  assigned  by  Austria  to  the  sacrifices 
required  of  me  ;  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  any  formal 
declaration  which  might  be  immediately  changed  by  the 
results  of  a  victory.  As  Bassano  and  Schwartzenberg  had 
been  negotiators  of  my  family-alliance,  an  intimacy  had 
sprung  up  between  them  favorable  for  a  frank  explanation. 
In  one  of  their  conferences  in  which  Bassano  sought  to  ascer- 
tain the  influence  which  my  marriage  might  exercise  on 
Austria,  Schwartzenberg  replied  that  policy  had  concluded 
that  marriage,  and  that  policy  might  break  it  again.  It 
was  evident  from  this  that  the  considerations  of  kindred 
were,  in  Austria,  to  be  made  subordinate  to  the  interests  of 
the  cabinet.  Bassano  pretended  not  to  notice  the  remark, 
and  turned  the  conversation  to  matters  of  less  importance. 
He  immediately  informed  me  of  the  fears  which  this  con- 
ference had  excited  in  his  mind,  concealing,  however,  the 
threatening  words,  lest  the  anger  excited  in  me  by  them 
might  interfere  with  the  negotiations.  "  It  is  necessary,"  he 
wrote  to  me,  "to  hasten  the  treaty  with  Austria,  and  to 
profit  by  her  present  hesitation  to  draw  more  closely  the  ties 
of  blood  and  policy  which  now  connect  the  two  powers." 
A  few  days  afterwards  Prince  Schwartzenberg  communicated 
dispatches  from  London,  in  which  Baron  Weissenberg  an- 
nounced the  ill-success  of  his  overtures.  "  Austria,"  said 
he,  "  is  very  far  from  submitting  the  peace  of  the  cabinet  to 
the  caprices  of  England.  The  zeal  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna 
will  not  diminish,  and  she  will  soon  take  a  very  peremptory 
step  towards  the  allied  powers  to  bring  them  to  final  ex- 
planations." The  mission  of  Prince  Schwartzenberg  closed 
with  these  new  assurances.  He  had  just  left  Paris  when  the 
renewal  of  hostilities  was  followed  by  the  battle  of  Lutzen. 

IVew  Mission  of  Budna.— On  arriving  at  Dresden  I  learned 
the  departure  of  Schwartzenberg,  and  the  opinions  formed 
from  these  conferences  by  my  minister  respecting  the  ques- 


en.  xix.]        s  ri:  i  ni;    campaign    of  i8is.  93 

tion  of  a  general  peace.  Great  events  were  now  to  be 
decided  :  it  was  natural  to  hope  that  my  victory  at  Lutzen 
would  reestablish  my  relations  with  Austria.  Unfortunately 
the  results  of  this  victory  were  not  sufficiently  decisive  to 
influence  Austria  as  was  desired.  Metternich,  informed  at 
the  same  time  of  the  too  frank  explanations  of  Schwartzen- 
berg  and  of  my  victory  at  Lutzen,  felt  that  he  was  about  to 
be  compromised  ;  he  trembled  lest  I  might  profit  by  the 
occasion  to  have  a  reconciliation  with  Kussia.  The  conse- 
quences might  thus  become  still  more  important  than  the 
battle  itself.  It  was  not  impossible  but  that  I  might  have 
a  frank  understanding  with  the  Emperor  Alexander,  as  at 
Tilsit  ;  I  flattered  myself  that  I  would  have  found  him  dis- 
posed to  a  reconciliation,  if  I  sacrificed  to  him  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw.  The  wily  diplomat  hastened  to  send  to  him  Count 
Stadion,  and  to  dispatch  to  me  by  Budna  a  letter  from  my 
father-in-law.  The  same  protestations  as  before  were  here 
renewed,  in  nearly  the  same  terms.  The  mediator,  wrote  the 
emperor,  is  your  sincere  friend  :  it  is  important  to  place  on 
an  immovable  basis  your  dynasty,  whose  existence  is  nolo 
inseparably  connected  with  that  of  his  own. 

In  the  absence  of  the  Duke  of  Bassano,  I  directed  Caulain- 
court  to  confer  with  this  envoy,  whose  language  differed  a 
little  from  that  of  his  sovereign.  Budna  confessed  that  the 
alliance  was  suspended  at  least  in  some  of  its  articles,  but 
when  pressed  to  specify  what  these  were,  he  pretended  that 
on  this  point  he  had  no  precise  instructions.  There  was 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  first  of  the  articles  referred 
to  was  that  of  the  guarantee  of  the  territories.  In  that  case 
it  was  important  to  know  what  changes  were  expected  in  the 
state  of  things  guaranteed  in  March,  1812.  Although  Budna 
had  no  instructions  on  this  subject,  it  was  understood  from 
him  that  Austria  hoped  for  Illyria,  a  part  of  Galicia,  and 
the  Innviertel  ;  and  that  the  allies  required  the  dissolution 


94  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cil   XIX. 

of  the  Confederation  of  the  Bhine,  and  of  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw.  These  were  rather  given  to  be  understood  than 
positively  asserted  ;  they,  however,  were  only  a  repetition  of 
what  had  already  been  said  to  M.  de  Narbonne  at  Vienna. 
Austria  proposed  a  congress  for  explaining  herself  more  cate- 
gorically. Coming  to  me,  as  they  did,  immediately  after  my 
brilliant  victory,  these  ambiguous  and  exacting  propositions 
wounded  my  feelings,  and  in  a  moment  of  displeasure  I 
remarked  that  "  if  Budna  annoyed  me  with  such  pretensions, 
I  would  treat  at  any  price  with  Russia,  and  then  have  an 
explanation  with  these  Austrians  !"  These  words  were 
foolishly  repeated  by  my  imprudent  admirers,  and,  coming 
to  the  ears  of  my  father-in-law,  were  calculated  to  prejudice 
him  against  me,  and  to  favor  the  inclinations  of  his  cabinet 
in  favor  of  my  enemies. 

Proposition  for  a  Congress  accepted. — The  reports  which 
reached  me  from  all  directions  were  of  a  nature  to  destroy 
my  last  illusions.  With  an  extraordinary  refinement  of 
address,  Austria  sought  to  paralyze  my  allies.  "  She  ap- 
peared in  Denmark,  in  Saxony,  in  Bavaria,  in  Wurtemberg, 
and  even  at  Naples,  as  a  friend  of  France,  who  only  wished 
for  peace  ;  she  negotiated  ivith  them  to  discontinue  their 
military  preparations,  as  being  both  ruinous  and,  useless, 
for,  if  I  consented  to  treat,  she  was  ready  to  put  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand,  men  in  the  scales  in  my  favor  !" 

During  the  few  days  which  had  just  passed,  events  were 
pressing  beyond  the  Elbe,  where  the  enemy  were  concentrat- 
ing at  two  days'  march  from  my  head-quarters  ;  I  left  for 
Bautzen  to  cut  the  knot,  so  artistically  formed  by  Austria. 
However,  without  rejecting  anything,  I  answered  Budna  : 
"Austria  can,  if  she  pleases,  renounce  the  alliance  ;  I  shall 
not  be  wounded  by  it  ;  I  fear  nothing  so  much  as  half-way 
measures,  the  common  resource  of  irresolution  and  weakness  ; 
I  accept  the  proposition  to  assemble  a  congress  at  Prague, 


Cu.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  95 

ami  if  the  other  powers  accept  it,  I  am  willing  to  facilitate 
a  treaty  of  peace  by  concluding  an  armistice." 

Bubna  transmitted  my  proposition  directly  to  Stadion  at 
the  head-quarters  of  the  allied  sovereigns,  and,  in  his  letter, 
In  did  justice  to  the  pacific  dispositions  which  I  manifested, 
notwithstanding  my  victorious  attitude.  On  my  part,  I 
wrote  to  my  father-in-law  to  renew  the  sentiments  which  I 
felt  towards  him  ;  hut  I  declared  that,  as  a  good  French- 
man, I  would  rather  die,  arms  in  hand,  them  to  subscribe  to 
conditions  presented  at  the  point  of  the  sword.  I  was  ready 
to  negotiate,  but  not  to  receive  the  law. 

Caulaincourt's  Propitious  to  Russia.— Buhna  left  for 
Vienna  with  these  assurances.  On  my  side,  I  wished  to 
profit  by  the  occasion  which  the  proposition  of  an  armistice 
presented,  to  send  Ciulaincourt  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  ; 
he  received  the  order  on  the  eighteenth  of  May.  I  preferred  to 
give  the  advantages  of  peace  to  a  noble  and  chivalric  enemy, 
rather  than  to  these  traders  in  mediation,  who  subjected 
everything  to  selfish  calculation,  and  coolly  counted  the  price 
of  defection.  The  instructions  which  I  gave  to  Caulaincourt, 
dated  at  Hartha,  May  19th,  sufficiently  attest  the  sentiment 
which  animated  me.  They  contain  these  words  :  "  His 
Majesty  does  not  reject  the  possibility  that  new  circumstances 
and  new  combinations  may  induce  him  to  return  to  his  sys- 
tem with  Austria  ;  but,  in  the  present  situation  of  affairs, 
such  is  not  his  thought.  His  intention  is  to  negotiate  with 
Russia  a  peace  which  may  be  glorious  for  that  power,  and 
which  may  pay  Austria  the  price  of  her  bad  faith,  and  the 
political  fault  she  has  committed  against  the  alliance  of 
1812,  by  drawing  together  Russia  and  France.  If  the  con- 
vention made  for  Poland,  after  the  peace  of  Vienna,  had 
been  accepted,  with  some  changes  in  the  terms,  there  would 
have  been  no  bitterness,  and  no  war.  The  Emperor  Alexan- 
der will  readily  reply  to  these  arguments  by  referring  to  the 


96  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

radical  vice  of  the  existence  of  the  Duchy  in  respect  to 
Russia  ;  which  will  naturally  lead,  after  much  mystery  and 
reserve,  to  the  following  proposition,  of  which  the  secret  will 
be  previously  asked  of  him,  in  case  he  should  not  accept  it  : 

"  To  limit  the  existence  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
to  the  Oder,  drawing  a  line  from  Glogau  to  Bohemia  :  this 
will  give  to  Westphalia  an  increase  of  one  million  five  hun- 
dred thousand  souls.  Prussia  will  have  in  compensation  the 
Duchy  of  Warsaw  with  the  territory  of  Dantzic,  except  a 
small  arrondissement  for  Oldenbourg  ;  Prussia  will  then 
acquire  four  or  five  millions  of  inhabitants,  Dantzic,  Thorn, 
Modlin,  and  all  the  Vistula.  She  will  become  complete,  and 
will  form,  for  Russia,  a  new  frontier  which  will  cover  her, 
and  form  for  her  a  great  security,  inasmuch  as  Prussia, 
having  her  capital  near  to  her,  will  be  in  her  system.  France 
and  Russia  will  be  separated  by  three  hundred  leagues,  with 
a  respectable  power  between  them.  The  king  of  Prussia, 
having  his  capital  at  Warsaw,  Konigsberg,  or  Dantzic,  will 
be  in  the  Russian  system.  Thus  France  and  Russia,  having 
nothing  more  to  fear  from  each  other,  will  easily  place  them- 
selves in  such  relations  as  naturally  to  produce  a  close 
alliance.''' 

It  was  also  stated  in  these  instructions  : 

"It  is  useless  to  revert  to  the  stipulations  of  Tilsit,  which 
were  directed  against  England  only  ;  whereas  now  the  ques- 
tion is  for  a  general  peace,  and  the  Emperor  Alexander  will 
sooner  or  later  feel  the  necessity  of  adopting  a  proper  system 
for  causing  his  flag  to  be  respected." 

Napoleon  £oes  to  Bautzen.— Caulaincourt  repaired  to  the 
advanced  posts  and  waited,  the  nineteenth,  for  an  answer  to 
his  request  for  a  safe-guard  to  the  head-quarters  of  the  allied 
sovereigns.  In  the  meantime  I  did  not  sleep  on  vague  hopes; 
military  operations  were  continued  ;  the  moment  of  an  in- 
evitable and  decisive   shock  was  approaching.     My  masses 


CH.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  97 

were  in  motion  ;  it  was  necessary  that  the  armistice  should 
be  agreed  upon  on  the  twentieth,  or  that  the  arena  should 
be  left  open  for  new  combats  ;  and,  to  give  more  weight  to 
my  propositions,  I  flew  to  the  point  where  my  glory  and 
interest  called  me. 

After  the  passage  of  the  Elbe  there  was  some  uncertainty 
about  the  enemy's  movements  :  the  public  rumor  announced 
that  the  Prussian  army  had  descended  the  river  to  join  Bu- 
low's  corps  which  covered  Berlin,  thus  separating  from  the 
Russians  who  were  said  to  bo  fortifying  themselves  at 
Bautzen.  The  fact  was  that  the-  whole  allied  army  was 
occupying  the  superb  positions  around  that  city,  when  the 
arrival  of  some  recnforcements,  among  which  were  two  divi- 
sions of  grenadiers  which  returned  from  the  siege  of  Thorn, 
under  the  orders  of  Barclay  de  Tolly,  seemed  to  encourage 
them  to  receive  a  new  battle.  I  caused  them  to  be  observed 
by  the  corps  of  Bertrand,  Marmont,  Macdonald,  and  Oudi- 
not.  I  was  expecting,  on  my  side,  some  fine  divisions  of 
cuirassiers  and  light  cavalry,  reorganized  by  Latour-Mau- 
bourg,  and  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard.  When  these 
troops  had  joined  me,  I  went,  on  the  twentieth,  before  Baut- 
zen. No  reply  to  Caulaincourt's  application  for  a  safe-guard 
had  reached  the  out-posts  ;  it  was  therefore  necessary  to 
resort  to  the  chance  of  arms,  which  of  all  others  I  feared 
the  least. 

Fortified  Position  of  the  Allies.— The  allies  had  profited 
by  the  ten  days'  repose  to  surround  their  camp  with  field- 
works.  Their  principal  position  was  located  on  the  famous 
mountains  of  Klein-Bautzen  and  Kreckwitz,  which  had 
served  as  a  refuge  for  Frederic  the  Great  after  the  sur- 
prise of  Hochkirch,  and  where,  by  the  strength  of  his  posi- 
tion, he  had  braved  the  superior  army  of  the  victorious 
Daun.  It  is  true  that  the  Austrian  marshal  came  from  the 
direction  of  Goerlitz,  and  we  came  from  the  opposite  direc- 

VOL.   IV. — 7. 


98  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XIX. 

tien  by  Dresden.  The  left,  supported  on  the  great  chain  of 
the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  was  but  little  exposed  to  an 
attack  ;  the  right,  established  behind  the  lakes  of  Malch- 
witz,  was  difficult  of  access  ;  but  by  turning  it  at  a  greater 
distance  toward  Bergern,  it  might  be  taken  in  reverse.  How- 
ever strong  it  might  be  on  the  front  and  flanks,  this  position 
offered  two  grave  inconveniences  :  it  had  only  one  line  of 
retreat,  by  Wurschen  and  Hochkirch,  on  Raichenbach  ;  and 
as  its  line  of  battle  rested  on  the  neutral  frontier  toward  its 
extreme  left,  it  was  clear  that  we  should  cut  off  the  enemy's 
retreat,  if  we  could  gain  the  least  success  at  the  opposite 
wing.  The  army  of  Wittgenstein  was  charged  with  the 
defense  of  the  left,  from  Baschutz  and  Nieder-Kayna  to  the 
mountains  near  Kunitz  ;  that  of  Blucher  held  the  right, 
from  Malchwitz  to  Kreckwitz  ;  the  centre  and  reserves  were 
between  Litten  and  Baschutz. 

Ney's  March  to  turn  their  Position.— It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  Ney  had  debouched  from  Torgau  with  the  ten 
infantry  divisions  of  the  third,  fifth  and  seventh  corps.  If 
the  report  of  the  separation  of  the  enemy's  armies  were  con- 
firmed, I  should  have  left  him  in  the  interval  between  them, 
and  should  have  assisted  him  by  a  movement  to  the  left, 
throwing  myself  on  the  right  of  the  Russians.  In  every 
state  of  the  case,  I  thought  it  best  to  place  under  the  orders 
of  this  marshal  the  second  corps  commanded  by  Belluno, 
and  to  prescribe  to  him  a  demonstration  on  Berlin,  causing 
him  to  be  sustained  by  the  corps  of  Reynier,  who  would 
advance  toward  Dahme  (Sayda).  The  marshal  was  to 
remain  with  the  third  corps  on  the  great  road  from  Luckau 
to  Lubben,  and  to  detach  only  Lauriston  from  his  right  on 
Hoyerswerda,  in  order  to  reënforce  me  toward  Bautzen. 
Ney,  attaching  too  much  importance  to  the  movement  on 
Berlin,  was  about  to  go  there  in  person  ;  he  was,  fortunately, 
prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  news  received  from  Lubben, 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  99 

which  announced  the  arrival  of  Barclay  in  the  direction  of 
Bautzen.  As  soon  as  I  learned  the  concentration  of  the 
enemy's  forces  on  this  last  point,  I  wished  to  prolong  Ney 
toward  Kalhau  and  Spremberg.  This  movement  was  good 
to  force  the  enemy  from  his  position  without  battle,  but  it 
was  not  sufficiently  concentric  to  gain  great  results.  Ney  fell 
back,  on  the  seventeenth,  from  Kalhau  on  Senftenberg  ;  he 
was  advised  to  direct  Belluno  and  Sebastiani  on  Spremberg, 
to  complete  the  manœuvre  for  seizing  the  only  line  of  retreat 
of  the  allies.  This  movement  was  not  executed,  either 
because  Ney  feared  to  isolate  this  corps  too  much  or  that 
Belluno  would  march  too  slowly  to  arrive  in  time. 

The  conqueror  of  Elchingen  then  advanced  in  procession, 
from  the  eighteenth,  with  the  third  corps  in  the  woods  of 
Senftenberg,  preceded  by  Lauriston,  and  followed  by  Reynier 
and  Belluno.  Our  communications  had  been  troubled  by 
the  partisans  of  Lutzow  ;  many  of  my  orders  had  been  inter- 
cepted. Duplicates  were  sent  by  messengers,  to  direct  a 
movement  which  he  had  been  making  for  two  days. 

Combats  of  Wcissig  and  Konigswartha.  —  The  ground 
between  the  Spree  and  the  Schwarz-Elster  is  cut  up  by  great 
marshy  forests  ;  it  is  a  turf-bog  where  it  is  not  possible  to 
travel  in  the  autumn  or  spring  except  by  two  narrow  roads. 
Lauriston,  detached  after  the  passage  of  Torgau,  had 
marched,  with  slow  and  measured  steps,  by  Dobrilugk  ;  his 
baggage  obstructed  the  roads.  Ney  arrived,  on  the  nine- 
teenth, at  the  middle  of  his  columns  at  Hoyerswerda,  and 
directed  them  on  Weissig  to  flank  his  march  and  open  the 
road  of  Konigswartha,  which  he  had  followed  with  the  third 
and  seventh  corps.  At  the  report  of  his  approach,  the  allies, 
ignorant  of  his  force  and  thinking,  undoubtedly,  that  they 
had  to  deal  only  with  the  corps  of  Lauriston,  conceived  the  pro- 
ject of  fighting  him  separately,  and  for  that  purpose  detached 
against  him  General  Barclay  with  his  corps  and  that  of  York. 


100  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

Informed,  on  my  side,  of  the  arrival  of  Ney  at  the  en- 
virons of  Hoyerswerda,  I  pushed,  on  the  nineteenth,  an 
Italian  division  of  Bertrand's  corps  on  Kônigswartha,  in 
order  to  secure  the  junction.  This  incident  gave  place  to  a 
double  engagement.  Barclay,  marching  to  Kônigswartha, 
fell  upon  the  Italian  division,  which  was  not  on  its  guard, 
although  bivouacked  in  the  middle  of  the  woods  ;  it  was 
surprised  and  dispersed  with  the  loss  of  all  its  cannon  and 
two  thousand  prisoners.  This  took  place  within  a  league  of 
Ney's  advanced  guard  ;  Kellerman,  who  commanded  this 
vanguard,  hastened  to  save  the  wrecks  of  the  Italians,  and 
Barclay  fell  back  at  his  approach.  York  had  not  been  so 
fortunate  ;  his  column  encountered  the  centre  corps  of  Lau- 
riston,  and  was  defeated  with  a  loss  of  near  five  thousand 
Prussians.  Maison's  division  gained  the  honors  of  the 
victory. 

Xey  debouches  on  Klix.— These  incidents  had  no  in- 
fluence on  the  great  question  ;  the  loss  was  nearly  equal  on 
both  sides,  and  the  allies  rejoined  their  army.  On  the 
twentieth,  Ney  debouched  at  Kônigswartha  on  Leichnam  and 
Klix.  In  order  to  give  the  allies  no  opportunity  to  molest 
him,  and  at  the  same  time  to  drive  them  from  all  the  ad- 
vanced positions  which  covered  their  camp,  I  ordered  an 
attack  upon  the  city  of  Bautzen  and  the  heights  occupied  by 
the  left  of  the  Kussians.  Oudinot  and  Macdonald  carried 
Dobershau  and  Strehla,  then  advanced  to  Binewitz  and  Au- 
ritz.  My  right  and  centre  passed  the  Spree,  carried  the  city 
of  Bautzen,  and  dislodged  the  enemy  from  the  heights  of 
Nieder-Kayna  and  Nadelwitz  which  covered  the  front  of  the 
intrenched  camp.  My  manœuvre  accomplished  its  object  ; 
the  allies  reënforced  Miloradowitsch  in  the  mountains,  and 
Ney  concentrated  the  third  and  fifth  corps  behind  Klix, 
ready  to  strike,  the  next  day,  a  blow  not  inferior  to  either 
Ratisbon  or  Friedland  in  the  importance  of  its  results. 


Cil.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     18  13.  101 

Battle  of  Bautzen. — On  the  twenty-first  of  May,  at  the 
break  of  day,  the  battle  was  commenced  throughout  the 
whole  line.  We  renewed  against  the  left  of  the  allies  the 
demonstration  of  the  previous  day.  Oudinot  wished  to  pierce 
by  Kunitz  on  Rachlau  ;  but  Miloradowitsch  drove  him 
beyond  Binowitz  ;  I  ordered  Macdonald  to  sustain  him  ;  my 
centre  is  deployed  to  impose  on  the  enemy,  but  not  to  engage 
him.  Ney  crosses  the  Spree  at  Klix,  places  Maison's  divi- 
sion as  flankers  behind  the  lake  of  Malschwitz,  pushes  the 
two  other  divisions  of  Lauriston  on  Gottainelde,  and  con- 
ducts the  entire  third  corps  on  the  wind-mill  of  Glein  ; 
these  forces  afterwards  direct  their  march  on  the  spires  of 
Hoclikirch*  and  the  seventh  corps,  which  was  expected 
about  one  o'clock,  was  to  act  as  their  reserve.  Lauriston 
was  to  march  by  Baruth,  and  Belgern  in  the  same  direction. 

This  manœuvre  was  perfect  and  ought  to  have  produced 
incalculable  results  ;  but  several  unfortunate  circumstances 
marred  its  success.  I  had  expected,  rather  late,  to  give  Ney 
instructions  as  to  the  part  which  he  was  to  play  in  this 
battle.  But  these  instructions  did  not  reach  him  in  time, 
and  were  of  rather  too  general  a  character.  At  eight  o'clock 
in  the  morning  I  had  written  him  a  pencil  note  giving  him 
only  a  laconic  order  to  be,  by  eleven  o'clock,  at  the  village  of 
Preititz,  and  to  attack  the  enemy's  right.  The  officer  who 
carried  this  note  made  a  long  detour  by  Klix  in  the  hopes  of 
finding  the  marshal  there  ;  at  ten  o'clock  he  arrived  on  the 
heights  of  Glein  which  Ney  had  just  taken  possession  of, 
much  sooner  than  I  had  expected. 

Thus  far  all  was  well  :  for  the  directions  assigned  to  the 
columns  of  our  left  on  the  spires  of  Hochkirchen  accomplished 
the  same  object  as  my  order  to  march  on  Preititz.  It  was 
now  only  ten  o'clock  :  Preititz  being  only  eight  or  nine  hun- 

*  The  credit  of  this  manœuvre  is  claimed  by  Jomini,  who  was  at  this  time 
acting  as  Ney's  chief  of  staff. 


102  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

dred  toises  from  the  heights  of  Grlein,  Ney  was  unwilling  to 
accelerate  the  attack  by  an  hour.  He  waited  for  Reynier's 
corps,  and  lost  three-quarters  of  an  hour  in  forming  his 
troops  :  he  then  only  advanced  Souham  on  Preititz,  leaving 
his  three  other  divisions  at  the  distance  of  half  a  league,  and 
the  third  at  the  distance  of  a  league.  Souham,  penetrating 
the  village  without  support  at  the  moment  when  Blucher 
detached  Kleist  to  reënforce  Barclay,  fell  into  the  midst  of 
these  two  corps,  and  suffered  severely  without  producing  any 
result  :  his  division  fell  back  in  disorder.  Ney  caused  him 
to  be  sustained  by  his  batteries  of  reserve  and  the  division  of 
Delmas.  Finally,  near  one  o'clock,  hearing  the  approach  of 
Reynier's  columns  which  appeared  in  rear  of  Klix,  the  mar- 
shal sent  three  of  his  divisions  on  Preititz.  Lauriston,  who 
had  been  engaged  towards  Gottamelde  at  the  head  of  two 
divisions  of  infantry  against  a  feeble  detachment  of  three 
thousand  men  under  General  Tschaplitz,  affirmed  that  he 
was  opposed  by  superior  forces,  and  advanced  with  great 
caution  over  the  ploughed  ground  that  separated  him  from 
the  village  of  Baruth.  Men  and  precious  time  were  thus 
lost  by  unreasonable  delay.  If  Key  had  operated  with  deci- 
sion, as  at  Friedland,  he  would  have  arrived  about  noon  in 
rear  of  the  enemy's  line  on  the  road  to  Wurschen,  between 
Belgern  and  Purschwitz  ;  and  no  one  can  calculate  the  im- 
mense results  of  a  movement  like  that  which  Blucher  exe- 
cuted against  us  at  Waterloo. 

Success,  however,  was  only  postponed,  for  there  was  stilî 
time  at  one  o'clock  to  obtain  great  results.  But  unfor- 
tunately Ney  did  not  appreciate  his  position.  As  he  pene- 
trated Preititz,  Blucher,  who  found  himself  assailed  in  rear, 
caused  some  battalions  to  descend  from  the  heights  of  Klein- 
Bautzen  with  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  These  cannon, 
firing  against  the  flank  of  the  marshal's  columns,  made  him 
forget  the  direction  of  Hochkirch  which  he  had  indicated  in 


OH.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  103 


the  morning  ;  and  instead  of  debouching  in  front  on  the  road 
to  Wurschen,  he  directed  the  head  of  his  column  to  the 
right,  and  climbed  the  hills  in  rear  of  Klein-Bautzen,  a  posi- 
tion which,  it  is  true,  commanded  the  whole  field  of  battle, 
but  which  deviated  entirely  from  the  manœuvre  which  had 
been  directed  in  order  to  get  possession  of  the  enemy's  line 
of  retreat.  The  appearance  of  twenty  of  the  enemy's  squad- 
rons in  the  plain  between  Preititz  and  Purschwitz  contri- 
buted to  induce  Ney  to  adopt  this  unfortunate  movement. 
He  had  only  six  feeble  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  feared  to 
expose  himself  in  the  plain  while  Blucher  occupied  the 
heights  in  his  rear. 

While  this  was  passing  at  the  decisive  point  of  the  battle. 
I  brought  into  action  the  corps  which  were  to  assail  the 
enemy's  front.  Oudinot,  at  the  extreme  right,  continued  to 
fight  with  ardor  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains  of  Bohemia, 
against  Miloradowitsch  and  Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg  ; 
Macdonald  seconded  him  and  maintained  the  combat  toward 
Biuowitz  and  Eabitz.  Marmont  and  the  Duke  of  Treviso 
held  in  check  the  enemy's  centre  and  reserves  on  the  heights 
between  Kreckwitz,  Baschutz,  and  Jenkwitz.  At  twelve 
o'clock  Ney's  cannon  announced  that  the  moment  had  come 
for  striking  at  the  centre.  Soult,  at  the  head  of  the  corps 
of  Bertrand,  threw  himself  from  Baschutz  on  the  heights  of 
Kreckwitz  where  he  assailed  Blucher  in  front,  at  the  moment 
when  the  latter  had  weakened  his  forces  in  order  to  defend 
Preititz.  The  Duke  of  Bagusa,  placed  before  the  Eussian 
intrenchments  of  Baschutz,  first  battered  them  with  hi? 
artillery  and  then  prepared  for  an  assault.  My  Young  Guard 
and  eight  thousand  horse  of  Latour-Maubourg  waited  in  the 
ravine  of  Nadelwitz  for  me  to  give  them  the  signal  for  vic- 
tory. Blucher,  reënforced  by  York  was  threatening  to  repel 
Bertrand,  when  I  threw  this  reserve  of  the  elite  on  Litten. 
Blucher  being  thus  turned  on  the  left  by  Treviso  and  Latour- 


104  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

Maubourg,  threatened  in  reverse  by  Ney,  and  assailed  in 
front  by  Soult,  saw  the  impossibility  of  resisting  these  con- 
centric attacks  and  retired  beyond  Burschwitz,  like  a  lion 
pursued  by  audacious  hunters.  Marmont  then  penetrated 
toward  Baschutz,  which  the  Kussians  could  no  longer  defend 
without  exposing  themselves  to  be  cut  off. 

Ney,  advancing  at  the  same  instant  from  Preititz  on  the 
hills  of  Klein-Bautzen  found  not  a  single  enemy  to  oppose, 
but  saw  them  defile  by  a  road  to  which  he  had  been  much 
nearer  than  they  were  only  two  hours  before.  This  marshal 
had  begun  the  battle  in  rear  of  the  allies'  camp,  and  ended 
it  almost  in  rear  of  the  columns  of  our  centre  ! 

The  retreat  of  the  Prussians  was  protected  by  Barclay, 
who,  defeated  on  the  heights  of  Glein,  instead  of  changing 
front  to  form  a  crotchet  en  potence,  prepared  to  place  himself 
in  echelons  more  distant  on  the  heights  of  Belgern,  and  thus 
covered  the  avenue  of  Wurschen  against  Lauriston  and  Rey- 
nier.  The  latter  had  not  reached  the  field  of  battle  till  near 
three  o'clock  ;  he  formed  himself  in  the  plain  of  Cannewitz, 
and  at  four  o'clock  engaged  in  a  warm  cannonade  against 
Barclay.  Ney  supported  him  with  the  third  corps  ;  Lauris- 
ton joined  his  left,  by  forming  opposite  Rackel.  At  dark 
Barclay  put  himself  in  retreat,  and  the  Saxons  entered  pell- 
mell  with  his  rear-guard  into  Wurschen. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Russian  left  had  fought  bravely  at 
the  foot  of  the  mountains  against  the  corps  of  Oudinot  and 
Macdonald  ;  as  soon  as  we  were  masters  of  Purschwitz  and 
Litten  I  ordered  Marmont  to  move  from  the  centre  to  the 
right  so  as  to  take  that  wing;  in  reverse  and  cut  it  off  from 
the  road  to  Hochkirch.  But  it  was  too  late  ;  the  enemy  had 
begun  his  retreat  and  for  want  of  cavalry  our  troops  could 
not  reach  the  road  in  time.  Night  terminated  the  combat 
here  as  at  Wurschen. 

Remarks  on  this  Battle. — In  tracing  out  the  movements 


On.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN     OF    1813.  105 

of  the  different  masses  on  the  field  of  battle,  we  see  that 
Ney  and  Lauriston,  with  eight  divisions,  contended  with 
Kleist  and  Barclay  who  had  only  twenty  thousand  men  ; 
they  ought  to  have  destroyed  them,  whereas  they  allowed 
them  to  destroy  the  division  of  Souham. 

If  Ney  had  executed  the  precise  order  which  had  been 
given  to  him  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  had  dis- 
played one-half  the  energy  which  he  exhibited  at  Friedland, 
Elchingen,Moskowa,  and  numerous  other  occasions,  the  enemy 
would  have  lost  the  greater  part  of  his  army  and  all  his  ma- 
terials ;  the  allies  could  never  have  saved  their  left  wing  and 
their  cavalry.  Austria  after  such  a  victory  would  have 
ranged  herself  under  my  banners,  which  I  would  have  again 
carried  victorious  to  the  Niémen. 

The  fate  of  my  empire  thus  depended  upon  the  faulty 
movement  of  the  most  valiant  of  my  generals  ;  it  is  just, 
however,  that  I  should  take  my  own  share  of  the  blame. 
After  the  left  wing  under  Ney  was  on  the  decisive  point  of 
the  battle,  I  should  have  moved  there  myself  with  a  part  of 
the  Old  Guard  and  my  reserve  of  cavalry,  or  at  least  have 
sent  to  the  marshal  a  more  detailed  order  than  the  brief  pen- 
cil note  simply  directing  him  to  march  on  Preititz.  I  should 
also  have  instructed  him  to  oblique  to  the  left  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Drehsa,  which  was  the  same  as  that  of  the  spire  of 
Hochkirch.  It  is  true  that  I  had  indicated  to  him  this 
point  of  Drehsa  in  my  dispatch  of  the  eighteenth,  but  then 
he  was  too  far  from  the  field  of  battle. 

If  Latour-Maubourg's  cavalry,  debouching  in  the  morning 
from  Nieder-Gurch  by  Malschwitz,  had  been  directed  to  second 
Ney  at  Preititz,  no  doubt  we  would  have  captured  Blucher's 
infantry,  and  I  should  now  be  on  the  throne.  But  as  it  was, 
we  took  no  prisoners  and  found  on  the  field  only  a  few  dis- 
mounted cannon  ;  we  had  again  sacrificed  twenty  thousand 
men  without  any  important  result. 


106  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

Reply  to  the  Overtures  of  Caulaincourt.— The  next  day 
after  the  battle  we  received  Nesselrode's  reply  to  the  over- 
tures of  Caulaincourt  ;  the  letter  was  dated  the  twentieth 
and  accompanied  by  a  note  dated  the  twenty-first.  The 
Emperor  Alexander,  already  allied  with  Austria,  refused  to 
receive  any  proposals  not  coming  through  that  power.  It 
was  natural  to  infer  from  tins  that  these  powers  were  already 
intimately  connected.  This  refusal  of  the  Emperor  of  Rus- 
sia was  dictated  by  a  praiseworthy  but  exaggerated  loyalty  ; 
he  refused  to  become  the  arbiter  of  the  peace  of  Europe  for 
allies  who  wrere  far  from  grateful. 

€ouibats  of  Reichenbach  and  Haynau. — The  next  day  I 
pursued  the  allies,  and  rudely  assailed  their  rear-guard  which 
had  taken  position  near  Reichenbach.  The  enemy  stood 
firm  :  impatient  at  the  opposition,  I  myself  repaired  to  the 
vanguard  to  animate  it  with  my  presence  :  the  enemy  fled  ; 
but  I  paid  dearly  for  the  advantage.  A  spent  ball  killed 
both  Marshal  Duroc  and  General  Kirgener  of  the  engineers, 
who  were  in  my  rear  ;  Bruyère,  one  of  my  old  soldiers  of 
Italy,  had  fallen  only  a  few  hours  before.  Duroc  was  a  man 
dear  to  my  heart,  and  his  loss  greatly  affected  me.* 

*  The  following  is  Thiers'  account  of  Duroc's  death: 

"  After  the  cavalry  engagement  which  had  thus  taken  place  on  the  plain. 
General  Reynier  with  the  Saxon  infantry  occupied  the  Reichenbach  height?, 
and  Napoleon,  considering  that  sufficient  had  been  now  effected  for  this  day, 
gave  orders  that  his  tent  should  bo  pitched  on  the  ground  the  troops  then 
occupied. 

"  As  he  was  alighting  from  his  horse  there  arose  a  cry,  '  Kirgener  is  dead!' 
On  hearing  these  words  Napoleon  exclaimed,  '  Fortune  nous  en  veut  bien  au- 
jourd'hui I'  But  to  the  first  cry  immediately  succeeded  a  second,  '  Duroc  is 
dead!'  'Impossible  !'  said  Napoleon,  'I  have  just  been  speaking  to  him.  It 
was,  however,  not  only  possible,  but  the  actual  fact.  A  bullet,  which  had 
struck  a  tree  close  to  Napoleon,  had,  in  its  rebound,  slain  successively  General 
Kirgener,  an  excellent  engineer  officer,  and  then  Duroc,  himself,  the  grand- 
marshal  of  the  palace. 

"  Duroc,  a  few  minutes  before  his  death,  overcome  by  a  singular  feeling  of 
sadness,  had  said  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  '  My  friend,  do  you  observe  the  em- 
peror?    After  a  series  of  misfortunes  he  is  now  victorious,  and  should  profit 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  107 

A  few  hours  after,  a  still  warmer  combat  took  place  at 
Haynau.  Profiting  by  my  want  of  cavalry  to  reconnoitre 
our  line  of  march,  Blucher  laid  an  ambuscade  for  Ney,  who 
advanced  with  haste  at  the  head  of  the  fifth  corps,  and 
crossed  the  valley  of  Weisse,  without  exploring  the  heights 
beyond.  The  infantry  of  Lauriston,  while  about  to  establish 
their  bivouacs,  were  suddenly  assailed  by  three  thousand 
horse  ;  Maison  and  Puthod  formed  squares  ;  but  the  cavalry 
had  time  to  sabre  a  battalion  which  was  in  advance  of  the 
others,  and  to  capture  several  pieces  of  artillery.     Lauriston 

by  the  teachings  of  misfortune  ....  But  see  1  he  is  still  the  same,  still 
as  insatiable  as  ever  for  war  ....  The  end  of  all  this  cannot  possibly 
be  a  happy  one.'  He  had  received  a  cruel  wound  in  his  entrails,  and  there 
could  be  no  hope  that  he  could  survive  it.  Napoleon  hastened  to  him,  took 
him  by  the  hand,  called  him  his  friend,  and  spoke  to  him  of  a  future  life,  where 
at  length  they  might  find  rest  ;  uttering  these  words  with  a  feeling  of  remorse 
which  he  did  not  acknowledge,  but  which  thrilled  the  inmost  recesses  of 
his  heart. 

"Duroc  thanked  him  with  emotion  for  these  testimonies  of  regard,  confided 
to  his  care  his  only  daughter,  and  expressed  a  hope  that  his  master  might  live 
to  vanquish  the  enemies  of  France,  and  then  to  enjoy  repose  in  the  midst  of 
that  peace  of  which  the  world  had  so  much  need.  'As  for  myself,' he  con- 
tinued, '  I  have  lived  as  an  honorable  man  should  live  ;  I  die  as  a  soldier  should 
die.  I  have  nothing  to  reproach  myself  with.  Let  me  again  recommend  my 
daughter  to  your  care.'  And  then,  as  Napoleon  remained  beside  him,  holding 
his  hands,  and  seeming  overwhelmed  with  serious  reflections,  he  added,  '  Go, 
sire,  go  ;  this  spectacle  is  too  painful  for  you.'  And  Napoleon  left  him,  saying, 
'  Adieu,  my  friend.     We  shall  meet  again,  and  perhaps  soon  .     .     .1" 

':It  has  been  asserted  that  these  words  uttered  by  Duroc,  '  I  have  nothing 
to  reproach  myself  with,' were  an  allusion  to  some  unjust  reproaches  made 
against  him  by  Napoleon,  who  in  his  moments  of  excitement  did  not  spare 
even  the  men  whom  he  esteemed  the  most.  But  he  rendered  full  justice  to 
his  grand-marshal,  who  was  the  second  sincere  and  truly  devoted  friend  whom 
he  had  lost  during  the  space  of  twenty  days. 

"Napoleon  was.  indeed,  profoundly  moved  by  his  loss. 

'•Leaving  the  cottage  in  which  the  dying  Duroc  had  been  placed,  ho  went 
to  sit  down  upon  some  fascines  near  the  advanced  posts  ;  and  there  remained, 
overpowered  with  grief,  his  hands  lying  listlessly  on  his  knees,  his  eyes  wet 
with  tears,  deaf  to  the  fire  of  the  tirailleurs,  unconscious  of  the  caresses  of  a 
dog  belonging  to  one  of  the  regiments  of  the  guard,  which  frequently  ran  beside 
his  horse,  and  now  stood  before  him  licking  his  hands.  Such,  and  so  change- 
able is  human  nature  I  So  contradictory  in  its  various  aspects  ;  so  incapable 
of  being  judged  by  any  but  God  alone." 


108  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

drew  upon  himself  this  loss  by  placing  his  cavalry  (twelve 
hundred  horse)  on  his  left  flank,  instead  of  pushing  it  in 
advance  of  his  position  to  reconnoitre  the  roads. 
The  Allies  throw  themselves  on  Schweidnitz.— The  allies 

had  continued  their  retreat  by  Lauban,  Lôwenberg,  and 
Goldberg  ;  I  supposed  they  would  repass  the  Oder,  but  they 
left  the  road  to  Breslau  at  Goldberg,  and  directed  themselves 
by  Jauer  and  Striegau  on  Schweidnitz.  This  change  of  their  , 
line  of  operations  gave  me  some  uneasiness  :  to  allow  them- 
selves to  be  cut  off  from  the  Oder  and  Poland,  and  to  throw 
themselves  against  the  mountains  of  Glatz,  was,  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  a  fault  so  manifest  in  a  military  point  of  view 
that  it  could  only  be  accounted  for  on  grounds  of  political 
policy,  by  supposing  that  the  allies  were  already  certain  of 
the  accession  of  Austria  to  the  coalition  ;  but  I  did  not  be- 
lieve that  the  affair  was  as  yet  so  far  advanced. 

Armistice  of  Neumark.  —  The  allies  now  proposed  an 
armistice  which  I  accepted  for  the  three-fold  purpose  of  not 
offending  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  by  a  refusal,  of  enabling 
myself  to  ascertain  more  clearly  the  intrigues  of  Austria,  and 
of  seeking  to  effect  a  new  understanding  with  the  Emperor 
Alexander. 

This  armistice  is  perhaps  the  greatest  fault  of  my  life. 
By  consenting  to  it,  I  probably  lost  the  only  remaining  op- 
portunity to  restore  my  former  power.  By  thus  yielding  to 
the  intercession  of  Austria,  I  had  inspired  her  with  con- 
fidence in  her  own  strength,  and  thus  hastened  her  decision 
against  me.  If,  on  the  contrary,  I  had  continued  hostilities, 
my  firmness  would  have  imposed  on  her  ;  the  Russo-Prussian 
army,  turned  by  its  right,  overpowered  by  my  superiority, 
and  thrown  back  into  the  mountains  of  Glatz,  would  there 
have  found  its  Caudine  Forks,  while  Austria,  intimidated  by 
my  success,  would  not  have  ventured  to  offer  the  allies  a  free 
passage  through  her  states.     I  would  have  become   again 


CH.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1S13.  109 

master  of  Europe,  dictating  peace  as  a  conqueror.  Even 
admitting  that  Austria  had  resolved  to  permit  the  entrance 
of  the  allied  troops  into  her  territory,  my  position  would  not 
have  been  worse  than  it  was  in  the  month  of  September  ; 
for,  if  my  army  recruited  one  hundred  thousand  men  during 
the  armistice,  that  of  the  enemy  received  more  than  double 
that  number,  exclusive  of  those  which  Austria  organized 
'during  the  interval. 

Combat  of  Luckau.  —  At  the  moment  of  signing  this 
armistice  Marshal  Oudinot  sustained  a  slight  check  at 
Luckau.  I  had  directed  him  on  that  city,  after  the  battle 
of  Bautzen,  to  attack  Bulow's  corps  which  had  followed  the 
march  of  Belluno  when  he  left  Wittenberg  to  join  Ney,  and 
thus  threatened  our  line  of  operations.  Bulow  was  stronger 
than  we  supposed,  and  the  Duke  of  Reggio  did  not  succeed 
in  his  mission,  which,  however,  was  rendered  useless  by  the 
armistice. 

Treaty  with  Denmark.— On  returning  to  Dresden,  on  the 
tenth  of  June,  I  found  there  an  envoy  from  the  king  of 
Denmark,  who  had  left  Copenhagen  after  the  battle  of 
Lutzen  to  form  a  still  closer  alliance.  Never  was  a  treaty 
more  easily  concluded  :  we  had  the  same  interests  and  the 
same  enemies.  An  English  squadron  was  before  his  capital, 
and  had  summoned  the  king  to  cede  Norway  to  Bernadotte  ; 
what  other  part  could  Denmark  take  than  to  throw  herself 
into  our  arms  ?  The  Duke  of  Bassano  soon  concluded  with 
that  power  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance. 

Third  Mission  of  Bubna. — The  course  pursued  by  Austria 
was  very  different  :  Bubna  also  returned  to  Dresden,  but 
bringing  neither  the  powers  nor  the  instructions  which  he 
had  sought  at  Vienna.  He  announced  that  England  had 
rejected  all  the  insinuations  of  Weissenberg  ;  that  she  had 
found  even  the  conditions  of  Luneville  too  favorable  to 
France.     Austria  then  announced  that  she  had  proposed  at 


110  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

London  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Luneville  !  Bubna  seemed 
to  forget  the  proposition  of  a  congress  ;  he  affirmed  that 
Austria,  having  a  schedule  of  the  pretensions  of  Russia  and 
Prussia,  now  wished  to  know  what  concessions  I  would 
make.  Thus  showing  that  the  negotiations  in  a  congress 
was  to  be  carried  on  through  the  intermediation  of  Austria, 
who  would  then  have  at  her  mercy  all  the  other  continental 
powers.  Astonished  at  this  new  pretension,  I  directed  the 
Duke  of  Bassano  to  address  a  note  directly  to  Metternich,  to 
ask  for  formal  explanations. 

Aegotiations  of  the  Allies  at  Reichcnbach. — The  emperor 
of  Austria  had  just  established  his  court  at  Gitschin.  The 
Emperor  Alexander  and  the  king  of  Prussia  were  at  Reichen- 
bach  and  Peterswalde  :  they  had  assigned  a  rendezvous  for 
Bernadotte  at  Trachenberg,  for  forming  a  plan  of  operations. 
This  prince-royal  of  Sweden,  although  allied  for  a  year  past 
to  Russia  and  England,  had  not  deemed  it  proper  to  take  an 
active  part  in  the  war  of  1812.  But  as  they  now  promised 
him  Norway  in  exchange  for  Finland,  which  had  been  ceded 
to  Russia  in  1809,  and  as  the  English  had  undertaken  to 
put  him  in  possession  of  that  kingdom,  he  had  agreed  to 
bring  twenty-five  thousand  Swedes  on  the  Elbe,  and  had  just 
landed  at  Stralsund. 

It  was  at  the  head-quarters  of  Reichenbach  that  the  allied 
powers  bound  themselves  by  new  engagements  through  the 
intervention  of  England.  Russia  promised  to  bring  into  the 
field  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  soldiers,  exclusive  of 
her  garrisons  ;  Prussia,  one-half  that  number  ;  while  Eng- 
land was  to  furnish  subsidies  :  neither  of  the  contracting 
powers  was  to  treat  separately. 

Count  Stadion  transmitted  these  negotiations  to  the  cabi- 
net of  Vienna,  which  authorized  him  to  accede  to  them,  if  I 
should  reject  the  ultimatum  which  would  be  proposed  to  me. 
By  a  formal  convention  of  the  twenty-seventh  of  June  the 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  Ill 

allies  agreed  to  the  mediation  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna, 
having  previously  stipulated  the  conditions  which  should  be 
imposed  on  me.  Thus  Austria,  who  was  boasting  of  her 
partiality  for  me,  had  actually  acceded  to  the  coalition 
against  me,  previous  to  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  ! 

Metternich  repairs  to  Dresden. — Under  these  circum- 
stances Metternich  deemed  it  best  to  come  himself  to  Dres- 
den to  try  his  diplomatic  talent  in  making  the  formal 
explanations  which  I  had  demanded  :  he  protested  his  mode- 
ration and  his  love  of  peace.  I  well  knew  what  his  interests 
were  in  carrying  on  the  war  ;  but  even  if  there  had  been  any 
means  left  for  attaching  him  to  our  alliance,  I  must  confess 
that  I  did  not  adopt  those  most  likely  to  accomplish  that 
object.  Supposing  myself  in  the  place  of  the  cabinet  of 
Vienna,  would  I  have  neglected  to  profit  by  the  only  oppor- 
tunity which  had  occurred  during  the  last  fifteen  years  for 
recovering,  by  a  single  stroke  of  the  pen,  what  had  been  lost 
in  ten  unsuccessful  campaigns  ?  under  such  circumstances 
would  it  not  have  been  politic  in  me  to  offer  Austria  advan- 
tages sufficient  to  retain  her  in  my  alliance  ? 

The  question  is  difficult  to  decide.  To  offer  her  great 
concessions  on  my  part  might  seem  a  pusillanimous  act,  and 
inspire  her  with  contempt  for  my  weakness.  The  demands 
which  the  cabinet  afterwards  addressed  to  me  through 
Bubna,  were  transmitted  as  the  conditions  of  Russia  and 
Prussia  ;  they  seemed  to  me  exaggerated.  I  exhibited 
anger,  and  my  threats  were  repeated  ;  and  it  is  probable  that 
these  influenced  her  ulterior  conduct. 

The  exact  epoch  at  which  Austria  entered  into  formal 
engagements  with  the  allies  is  not  yet  known.  There,  how- 
ever, is  good  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  even  previous  to 
the  battle  of  Lutzen  ;  for  the  king  of  Prussia  gives  this  to 
be  understood  in  his  proclamation  to  his  people  on  the  eighth 
of  May.     Upon  this  date  will  depend  the  judgment  of  pos- 


112  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

terity  respecting  her  conduct  and  mine.  It  was  plain  that  I 
sought  to  leave  her  in  the  position  agreed  upon  by  our  reci- 
procal treaties  ;  and  even  admitting  that  it  would  have  been 
more  skillful  on  my  part  to  have  offered  her  great  advantages 
in  the  month  of  January,  it  must,  at  least,  be  confessed  that 
I  did  not  fail  in  any  of  my  engagements  by  seeking  to  con- 
quer and  to  make  peace  without  recurring  to  her  mediation. 
My  object  and  my  means  were  equally  legitimate. 

His  Interview  with  Napoleon. — My  interview  with  Met- 
ternich  at  Dresden  completed  the  breach  with  the  cabinet  of 
Vienna.  After  some  discussion  on  the  interest  of  different 
parties  and  on  that  of  Austria  to  remain  in  my  alliance,  this 
cunning  diplomatist  enumerated  the  concessions  which  the 
allies  required,  and  to  which  I  must  subscribe,  if  I  wished 
Austria  to  declare  in  my  favor.  He  required  not  only  the 
surrender  of  Illyria,  but  also  that  of  Poland,  of  a  part  of 
Germany  and  Italy,  the  restoration  of  the  Pope  to  Koine, 
the  independence  of  Spain,  Holland,  and  the  Confederation 
of  the  Khine  ! 

What  impression  ought  it  to  make  upon  a  victorious  sol- 
dier to  require  him  to  surrender,  without  drawing  his  sword, 
all  the  territory  which  he  had  won  in  ten  campaigns  and  a 
hundred  battles  ?  I  must,  indeed,  have  fallen  in  the  esti- 
mation of  those  who  could  propose  to  me  to  abandon  coun- 
tries which  the  allies  could  not  even  threaten  ;  countries 
which  were  separated  from  them  by  a  powerful  and  victorious 
army  and  by  numerous  formidable  fortresses  !  To  make 
such  propositions  to  me,  they  must  have  supposed  me  more 
base  than  the  senate  of  Carthage  !  My  feelings  of  insulted 
honor  as  a  man,  got  the  better  of  my  cooler  calculations  as  a 
statesman,  and  I  replied  to  Metternich  in  terms  well  calcula- 
ted to  make  him  my  mortal  enemy.  In  this  I  was  wrong. 
I  should  have  sought  to  separate  the  Austrian  interest  from 
those  of  Kussia  and  Prussia,  and  instead  of  asking  Metier- 


Cil  XIX.] 


SPRING     CAMP  AIN     OF     1813.  113 


nicli  how  much  England  had  given  him  for  making  such 
propositions  to  me,  I  should  have  told  him  that  Austria  had 
two  interests  to  consult,  and  that  I  was  ready  to  satisfy 
both  ;— that  it  was  for  her  interest  that  we  should  remain 
the  arbiters  of  the  continent,  and  that  he  had  only  to  enu- 
merate the  measures  which  he  deemed  Lest  calculated  to 
secure  this  ohject.  Perhaps  the  moment  for  doing  this  had 
already  passed  ;  nevertheless,  by  making  the  attempt,  I 
should  have  performed  my  duty  to  my  throne  and  to  France. 
On  the  contrary,  by  this  exhibition  of  my  indignation,  I 
destroyed  the  only  remaining  hope  of  a  pacific  arrangement. 
Metternich  retired,  convinced  that  war,  though  only  -partially 
successfid,  ivould  restore  to  Austria  her  lost  power,  and  that 
this  was  his  only  means  of  saving  his  honor  and  serving  his 
master.  But,  although  war  was  now  fully  decided  on,  Aus- 
tria still  wished  to  gain  time,  either  to  complete  her  prepa- 
rations or  to  determine  the  bases  of  her  arrangement  with  the 
coalition.  A  congress  at  Prague  was,  therefore,  agreed  upon, 
and  the  armistice  extended  to  the  tenth  of  August. 

At  the  moment  that  Metternich  was  leaving  Dresden,  I 
received  the  news  of  Joseph's  defeat  at  Vittoria.  This  in- 
creased the  embarrassment  of  my  position,  and  if  England 
had  been  included  in  the  proposed  treaty  I  might  have  ac- 
cepted the  conditions  offered  ;  but  to  close  this  war  with  all 
the  difficulties  of  my  maritime  quarrel  still  on  my  hands, 
was  too  important  a  step  to  be  hastily  taken. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  my  threat  to  make  peace  with 
Russia  had  been  reported  to  Austria.  This  inconsiderate  but 
laudable  frankness,  joined  to  my  angry  remarks  to  Metter- 
nich, embroiled  me  with  Austria,  and  perhaps  cost  me  my 
crown.  In  1803,  my  warmth  to  Wentworth  contributed  to 
involve  me  in  the  war  with  England.  The  head  of  a  state 
should  treat  all  foreign  ministers  with  cool  reserve,  and  nego- 
tiate with  them  only  through  the  medium  of  adroit  and 
vol.  iv. — 8. 


114  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch   XIX. 

skillful  agents.  They  should  never  he  admitted  to  his  inti- 
macy. The  abrupt  frankness  of  a  soldier  is  not  well  suited 
to  affairs  of  diplomacy. 

Napoleon's  Envoys  to  the  Congress  cf  Prague.— Hoping 
that  the  congress  of  Prague  might  afford  me  means  of  ex- 
plaining myself  at  the  same  tima  to  Russia,  Prussia  and 
Austria,  I  sent  there  the  Duke  of  Vicenza  and  Narbonne. 
In  taking  leave  of  the  former,  I  explained  my  feelings  at  the 
equivocal  conduct  of  Austria  ;  I  announced  to  him  that  I 
regarded  it  as  an  indignity  to  reward  her  by  giving  her  all 
the  advantages  of  the  peace  ;  that  I  should  prefer  to  see 
Russia  profit  by  it,  as  she  had  purchased  these  advantages 
by  her  heroic  devotion,  the  ravage  of  her  provinces,  and  the 
loss  of  Moscow  ;  in  a  word,  I  repeated  the  instructions  which 
I  had  given  to  him  when  intrusted  with  a  mission  to  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  previous  to  the  battle  of  Bautzen. 

Arrival  of  the  Empress  Maria  Louisa  at  Majencc.— The 
court  of  Austria  had  returned  from  Gitschin  to  the  chateau 
of  Frewald  near  Prague  ;  I  had  left  for  Mayence  where  the 
empress  then  was,  and  where  I  had  called  together  some  of 
my  ministers  to  consult  upon  the  measures  to  be  taken  for 
the  interior  of  France  on  the  probable  resumption  of  hostili- 
ties. The  minister  of  finance  had  come  to  receive  the  keys 
to  my  treasury  of  reserve  in  the  vaults  of  Marsan,  forty  mil- 
lions of  which  were  now  appropriated  to  the  most  urgent 
expenses  required  in  preparation  for  another  campaign. 

Some  have  thought  that  this  interview  with  the  empress 
was  had  for  the  purpose  of  dictating  to  lier  measures  calcu- 
lated to  influence  the  resolutions  of  the  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria. This  is  erroneous.  It  is  true  that  I  dictated  to  her  a 
letter  to  her  father,  for  I  saw  no  wrong  in  inciting  in  him 
favorable  sentiments  toward  us  ;  but  to  imagine  that  I 
reposed  the  destinies  of  my  empire  on  such  means  is  too 
absurd.     The  empress  took  no  part  in  state  affairs,  and  1 


Ch.   XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  115 

knew  too  well  the  character  of  the  Austrian  cabinet  to  sup- 
pose that  such  a  measure  could  be  decisive. 

Military  Projects  of  the  Allies.— Before  going  to  Mayence, 
I  was  informed  of  the  military  and  diplomatic  council  at 
Trachenberg,  where,  since  the  ninth  of  July,  the  allies  had 
been  discussing  a  plan  of  operatipns.  Austria  had  designa- 
ted General  Waquant  as  her  commissioner  in  this  council  of 
sovereigns  ;  and  young  Count  Latour  was  to  assist  in  ar- 
ranging the  plan  of  campaign  in  the  name  of  that  power. 
Some  wished  to  form  three  armies  of  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  each  ;  the  first  under  Bernadotte  and  composed  of 
Russians,  Prussians,  and  Swedes,  was  to  operate  at  the  north 
with  Berlin  as  a  centre,  and  to  attack  Hamburg  ;  the  second 
under  Blucher  in  Silesia,  to  advance  by  Lusace  on  Dresden  ; 
while  the  Austrians  reënforced  by  fifty  thousand  Russians 
and  Prussians,  were  to  operate  on  Dresden  by  Bohemia. 
The.  Emperor  Alexander  and  his  generals  were  in  favor  of 
drawing  Blucher's  army  into  Bohemia,  in  order  to  cover 
Prague  and  the  line  of  operations,  while  the  grand  army 
acted  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe.  This  course  was  more 
wise,  more  skillful,  and  more  in  accordance  with  military 
principles.  But  it  was  opposed  by  Austria,  because  she  was 
unwilling  to  see  two  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  foreigners 
in  Bohemia,  and  by  Prussia,  who  wished  to  cover  Silesia  and 
to  have  the  means  of  sustaining  Bernadotte  in  case  Berlin 
should  be  threatened.  The  plan  of  three  armies  was  adopted, 
leaving  that  of  Blucher  on  the  Oder  ;  but  the  Emperor 
Alexander  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  reenforcing  the  grand 
army  at  the  expense  of  those  of  a  secondary  character,  and 
it  was  agreed  that  one  hundred  thousand  Russo-Prnssians 
should  move  from  Silesia  into  Bohemia,  under  the  orders  of 
Barclay  de  Tolly,  to  act  in  concert  with  the  same  number  of 
Austrians  by  Freyburg  and  Toplitz  on  Dresden. 

In  order  to  avoid  reverses  on  secondary  points,  they  de- 


116  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

cided  that  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  shoidd  never  accept  bat- 
tle when  I  moved  against  them,  but  that  they  should  resume 
the  offensive  as  soon  as  I  moved  to  other  points.  This  well- 
conceived  plan  failed  to  accomplish  its  object,  on  account  of 
its  faulty  execution,  and  the  vigor  of  my  first  operations. 
If  I  had  then  known  the  tenor  of  their  plan,  I  should  not 
have  exhausted  myself  in  vain  pursuits  of  Blucher,  but  have 
taken,  from  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  the  most  certain 
means  of  striking  decisive  blows  wherever  it  suited  me. 

Negotiations  at  Prague. — In  the  mean  time  the  negotia- 
tions made  very  little  progress  at  Prague.  The  choice  of 
ministers  to  treat  with  the  Duke  of  Vicenza  was  unfortunate. 
Russia  had  sent  M.  Anstett,  a  Frenchman  by  birth,  and  my 
personal  enemy  ;  the  laws  of  the  empire  prohibited  any 
treaty  with  him.  The  commissioners  appointed  to  sign  the 
armistice  of  Neuraark  had  no  power  to  extend  it.  All  the 
month  of  July  was  thus  consumed  in  preliminary  discussion. 
The  armistice  was  finally  extended  to  the  tenth  of  August, 
which  left  hardly  two  weeks  in  which  to  arrange  the  most 
complicated  interests  of  all  Europe.  Moreover,  difficulties 
arose  about  conducting  the  negotiations,  whether  in  open 
council,  or  through  a  mediator,  or  by  written  notes.  Each 
one  sought  to  show  his  diplomatic  knowledge  by  discussing 
the  forms  followed  by  the  congress  of  Teschen  and  of  Utrecht, 
and  no  progress  was  made.  Austria  wished  every  thing  to 
be  dene  by  written  notes,  through  her,  as  the  mediator. 
This  made  her  the  arbiter  of  peace,  and  prevented  all  ar- 
rangement between  France  and  the  other  powers.  Nothing 
could  justify  such  a  pretension  ;  moreover,  Metternich  had 
said  at  Dresden  that  Austria  had  no  intention  of  making 
herself  the  arbiter.  My  negotiator  could  not  yield  to  such 
unexpected  demands  ;  and  Metternich  well  knew  that  I  was 
at  Mayence,  and  that  no  new  instructions  could  be  received 
from  me  much  before  the  expiration  of  the  armistice.     I  had 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  117 

supposed  that  the  negotiations  would  commence  by  the 
twenty-sixth  of  July,  and  that  five  or  six  days  would  be 
required  for  the  discussion  of  the  conditions  of  peace.  That 
time  was  sufficient  for  my  journey  to  Mayence.  What  was 
my  surprise  to  learn  on  my  return  that  my  plenipotentiaries 
had  not  exchanged  a  single  word  with  MM.  Anstett  and 
Humboldt,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Eussia  and  Prussia  !  A 
blind  man  could  have  seen  that  no  negotiations  were  possible 
under  such  circumstances.  I  now  had  but  one  course  to 
pursue,  and  I  adopted  it  without  hesitation.  This  was,  not 
to  open  these  negotiations  at  all,  as  they  had  not  been  com- 
menced, but  to  demand  directly  of  the  mediator  what  were 
the  conditions  necessary  for  concluding  peace.  As  Caulain- 
court  was  no  longer  a  plenipotentiary  in  the  congress,  I 
directed  him,  on  the  sixth  of  August,  to  address  that  ques- 
tion to  Metternich,  who  replied  on  the  seventh.  He  de- 
manded the  restitution  of  Illyria,  the  reconstruction  of  Prus- 
sia with  her  frontier  on  the  Elbe  ;  the  surrender  of  the 
Duchy  of  Warsaw,  to  be  partitioned  out  to  Eussia,  Prussia 
and  Austria  ;  the  renunciation  of  the  Protectorate  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Ehine  ;  the  guarantee  of  all  the 
powers,  great  and  small,  and  that  none  should  be  changed 
without  a  general  consent  ;  the  independence  of  Holland  ; 
and  the  independence  of  Spain  under  Ferdinand  VII.  ;  the 
publicity  and  execution  of  the  last  article  were  to  be  post- 
poned till  the  conclusion  of  a  maritime  peace,  provided  that 
this  should  be  calculated  to  facilitate  that  object. 

There  was  nothing  new  in  these  sacrifices,  except  that  they 
were  now  put  in  the  shape  of  positive  demands.  I  could 
not  persuade  myself  that  the  allies  did  not  wish  to  trace 
around  me  the  circle  of  Popilius,  and  that  all  their  negotia- 
tions consisted  in  dictating  positive  conditions  to  be  signed 
by  me  without  modification  ;  in  a  word,  that  it  was  pro- 
posed to  force  me  to  comply  with  the  exaggerated  preten- 


118  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

sions  of  Metternich.  From  these  harsh  conditions  I  turned 
my  thoughts  to  the  fine  field  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder, 
all  the  keys  of  which  I  now  held  in  my  power,  and  was 
daily  augmenting  their  value  by  constructing  vast  intrenched 
camps  at  Dresden,  and  Pirna,  and  a  tête-de-pont  at  Konig- 
stein.  My  confidence  was  increased  by  the  success  of  the 
new  levies  in  France,  and  the  assurances  of  attachment  sent 
through  the  prince  of  Neufchatel  by  the  king  of  Bavaria. 
Although  desirous  of  peace,  which  was  much  needed  by  his 
people,  the  brave  and  loyal  Maximilian  swore  that  he  would 
lose  his  life  rather  than  desert  my  alliance. 

There  were  a  thousand  other  circumstances  which  seemed 
to  ensure  me  a  victory,  and  which  inclined  me  to  reject  con- 
ditions so  harshly  imposed. 

At  Presbourg,  Tilsit,  and  Schônbrunn,  time  was  allowed 
for  negotiation,  although  interests  less  general  were  discussed, 
and  sacrifices  less  important  were  required.  When  Austria 
yielded  me  the  Tyrol,  I  was  master  of  her  capital  and  vic- 
torious at  Austerlitz.  When  she  ceded  me  Illyria,  I  was 
master  of  Vienna  and  victorious  at  Wagram.  When  I  im- 
posed on  Prussia  the  cession  of  her  provinces,  I  was  not  only 
master  of  Berlin,  but  also  of  Konigsberg  and  Prussia.  In 
making  these  treaties  with  defeated  Austria,  two  whole 
months  were  allowed  for  negotiation  ;  but  now,  this  power 
wished  to  impose,  without  discussion,  conditions  much  more 
harsh,  upon  a  general  who  had  just  gained  two  glorious  vic- 
tories !  It  is  customary  for  a  state  which  has  lost  ten  pro- 
vinces in  a  war  to  sacrifice  one-half  of  these,  in  order  to 
obtain  peace  and  sr.ve  the  remainder  ;  but  it  would  be  a  new 
thing  for  a  state  which  had  lost  only  Poland,  to  sacrifice 
Germany,  Holland,  and  the  half  of  Italy,  and  her  own 
dignity  !  I  had  before  declared  to  ray  father-in-law  that  I 
never  would  submit  to  conditions  dictated  by  the  sword,  and 
I  now  could  not,  without  dishonor,  subscribe  to  these  pro- 


Ch.  XIX.]  STRING    CAMPAIGN     CF     1813.  119 

positions.  I  therefore  spent  the  ninth  in  weighing  these  con- 
ditions and  the  consequences  of  rejecting  them.  If  they 
could  he  modified,  I  might  agree  to  them  without  dishonor, 
for  they  would  no  longer  have  the  appearance  of  an  imposed 
■ultimatum.  This  desire  might  have  sprung  from  self-love, 
but  the  feeling  was  natural  and  laudable,  springing  as  it  did 
from  a  sense  of  honor.  I,  therefore,  wrote  to  the  Duke  of 
Vicenza,  on  the  night  of  the  ninth  and  tenth,  that  I  would 
accept  the  ultimatum,  with  the  reservation  of  Trieste  and  the 
guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  Denmark.  The  reservation  of 
Trieste  may  seem  a  small  affair  to  be  weighed  against  a  ques- 
tion of  peace,  but  on  account  of  its  maritime  importance,  and 
for  the  reasons  above  given,  I  determined  to  make  it.  The 
article  concerning  Denmark  was  an  act  of  loyalty,  but  should 
have  been  sooner  mentioned,  if  intended  to  be  insisted  on. 

Perhaps,  however,  the  delay  was  of  little  importance  ;  for 
if  they  wished  peace,  the  treaty  could  be  signed  as  well 
during  the  ten  days'  notice  of  the  renewal  of  hostilities,  as- 
before  the  denunciation  of  the  armistice.  The  allies  thought 
differently,  and  as  my  reply  did  not  reach  them  till  the 
eleventh,  Austria  declared  the  negotiation  broken  ;  the  Rus- 
sian and  Prussian  ministers  decamped  in  the  greatest  haste, 
and  notice  was  immediately  given  of  the  cessation  of  the 
armistice.  These  facts  prove  incontestably  that  the  allies 
preferred  war  to  peace.  It  must  be  confessed  that  in  this, 
as  the  events  proved,  they  consulted  their  own  interest  ;  but 
it  would  be  unjust  to  charge  me  with  the  consequences  of 
the  rupture. 

I,  however,  was  still  ignorant  of  the  formal  decision  of  the 
allies,  ami  their  departure  from  Prague,  when  Bubna  left 
Dresden  to  join  his  court  at  Gitschin.  My  minister  advised 
me  not  to  compromise  peace  by  any  concealments.  Yielding 
to  his  solicitations  I  authorized  him  to  see  Bubna,  and  to 
give  him  the  formal  assurance  that  I  would  accept  all  which 


120  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XIX. 

was  desired  by  the  cabinet  of  Vienna.  Vain  hope  !  The 
demon  of  discord  had  prevailed.  The  allies  had  already 
entered  Bohemia,  and  their  numerous  columns  were  ap- 
proaching Dresden. 

Narbonne,  being  forced  to  leave  Bohemia,  returned  to 
Dresden  to  render  an  account  of  the  sad  result  of  his  negotia- 
tion. Caulaincourt,  who  had  a  private  mission,  remained 
some  days  for  my  final  orders.  He  received  these  orders  to 
accept  all  the  conditions  of  Austria.  But  the  cabinet  of 
Vienna  now  replied  that  it  was  too  late,  the  commissioners 
having  left.  This  was  a  mere  pretext,  for  if  Austria,  as  the 
arbiter,  considered  these  conditions  just  and  suitable  for  the 
general  interest  of  Europe,  she  could  easily  transmit  them  to 
the  other  parties  who  were  interested  in  them.  The  Emperor 
Francis  had  a  rendezvous  with  the  Emperor  Alexander  at 
Gitschin,  on  the  fourteenth,  and  did  not  hesitate  to  declare 
that  he  was  resolved  to  run  all  the  chances  of  the  war  :  a 
profession  which  left  nothing  to  be  added,  for  no  one  could 
misinterpret  it. 

In  thus  waiting  till  the  last  moment  before  subscribing  to 
the  harsh  conditions  of  the  allies,  I  had  supposed  that,  if  the 
armistice  should  be  denounced,  the  congress  would  continue 
till  the  resumption  of  hostilities,  if  not  during  the  war. 
Those  of  Westphalia  and  Utrecht  had  lasted  several  years, 
during  which  the  military  operations  were  continued.  The 
dissolution  of  the  congress  and  the  sudden  departure  of  the 
plenipotentiaries  characterize,  better  than  I  could,  the  resolu- 
tion of  my  enemies.  I  have  been  reproached  for  this  meas- 
ure, but  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  this  rupture  was  less 
my  work  than  that  of  a  coalition,  who  were  anxious  to  divide 
my  spoils. 

Such  are  the  true  points  from  which  we  must  view  this 
important  epoch,  which  decided  the  fate  of  my  Empire  and 
of  Europe.    A  Mazarin  or  a  Ximenes,  remembering  the  fable 


Cil.  XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  121 

of  the  oak  and  the  reed,  would  have  bent  before  the  storm  in 
the  hope  of  rising  again,  more  strong  than  ever,  when  it  had 
past.  But  self-respect,  or  rather  the  honor  of  the  victorious 
captain  prevailed  over  the  cool  deliberations  of  the  states- 
man. What  general  in  my  place  would  have  taken  a  dif- 
ferent course  ? 

But  we  must  render  unto  Caesar  the  things  which  are 
Caesar's,  and  the  event  proved  that,  if  the  conduct  of  Austria 
was  base,  it  was  nevertheless  conformable  to  her  temporary 
interests.  Afterwards,  at  Frankfort  and  Chatillon,  the  same 
can  not  be  said  for  her.  Before  that  time  it  was  for  me  to 
parry  the  blow  ;  and  if  I  did  not,  it  would  be  unjust  to  im- 
pute it  either  to  an  excess  of  presumption  or  a  want  of 
sagacity  ;  I  was  deceived  by  the  promises  of  Bubna  and 
Schwartzenberg,  and  by  the  insignificant  results  of  my  first 
victories.  The  world  will  never  agree  respecting  this  nego- 
tiation ;  some  will  accuse  Metternich  of  felony,  while  those 
whom  he  benefited  will  praise  him  to  the  skies.  By  an  im- 
partial writer,  the  matter  may  be  summed  up  as  follows  : 

In  the  month  of  January,  Austria  wished  to  jtrofit  by  her 
advantageous  situation  to  regain  her  lost  territories  ;  but  she 
feared  to  ask  these  openly.  As  it  was  sufficient  for  my  pur- 
poses that  this  power  remained  neutral  in  the  eai'ly  part  of 
the  campaign,  I  did  not  hasten  to  retain  her  in  my  alliance, 
by  restitutions  which  could  only  be  made  at  my  own  ex- 
pense. As  her  indirect  overtures  through  her  ministers  at 
Paris  and  Vienna  had  not  accomplished  what  she  desired 
previous  to  the  battle  of  Lutzen,  she  now  sought  to  obtain 
it  by  concert  with  my  enemies.  But  still  preferring  to 
acquire  provinces  by  treaty  rather  than  by  incurring  the 
chances  of  war,  she  hoped  to  enrich  herself  with  my  spoils, 
through  her  character  of  mediator  :  when  she  distrusted  the 
results  of  this  calculation  she  determined  to  risk  the  chance 
of  arms  ;  for  she  had  much  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose. 


122  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX 

The  difference  in  the  language  of  the  Austrian  cabinet  at 
the  two  epochs  will  be  regarded  by  some  as  a  violation  of 
good  faith  :  it  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  the  first 
declarations  of  Austria  ma}7  have  been  honorable,  and  made 
to  see  what  effect  her  insinuations  might  produce  ;  she  may 
be  reproached  for  not  explaining  herself  more  openly,  but 
she  may  say  in  excuse  that  she  was  deterred  from  doing  so 
by  the  fear  of  irritating  me.  Some  writers,  in  their  desire  to 
enhance  my  glory  and  good  faith,  have  overlooked  the  cor- 
respondence of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna,  or  have  given  it  only 
in  a  mutilated  state.  In  this  it  is  plainly  shown  that,  after 
the  month  of  April,  Metternich  and  the  emperor  gave  M. 
Xarbonne  to  understand  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  restore 
Illyria,  renounce  the  Protectorate  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  and  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  and  finally  the  restoration 
of  the  Prussian  monarchy.  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that 
Austria  did  not  dissemble  that  she  would  go  to  war,  if  I 
should  not  accept  her  conditions  as  the  mediating  power.  I 
am  far  from  excusing  the  conduct  of  the  Austrian  cabinet, 
especially  in  her  attempts  to  seduce  my  allies,  and,  while 
pretending  friendship,  to  hedge  me  about  with  difficulties. 

This  conduct  on  her  part  is  the  more  inexcusable  as  she 
had  every  reason  to  pursue  a  course  of  policy  frank  and 
open,  and  at  the  same  time  loyal  and  strong.  Instead  of 
sounding  me  by  the  mission  of  Bubna,  Schwartzenberg,  and 
Metternich,  she  had  only  to  say  :  "The  alliance  of  1756  was 
calculated  to  make  France  and  Austria  the  arbiters  of  the 
continent  ;  the  alliance  of  1810  and  of  1812,  had  the  same 
object.  This  also  is  what  now  is  desired.  But  you  have 
reduced  us  to  a  secondary  part  by  destroying  our  influence 
abroad,  and  by  taking  from  us  our  finest  provinces,  and  our 
only  port.  It  is  just  that  we  should  profit  by  the  present 
occasion  to  regain  them  ;  unless  we  do  so  our  alliance  will 
be  odious  to  our  people.     Therefore  restore  to  us  the  frontiers 


Ch.  XIX.]  SI1  KIN  G     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  123 

of  1805,  and  the  Tyrol,  and  renounce  the  Confederation  of 
the  Rhine.  Holland  may  remain  in  your  possession  until  a 
maritime  peace  is  made.  You  can  retain  Italy,  and  settle 
the  question  of  Spain  and  of  England  without  our  inter- 
ference. Join  us  in  treating,  without  delay,  with  Kussiaand 
Prussia,  on  just  and  moderate  terms  ;  let  us  amicably  arrange 
the  question  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  ;  since  the  disaster  of 
Moscow  this  can  only  be  an  apple  of  discord,  without  the 
slightest  advantage  to  you.  Austria  will  then  bring  two 
hundred  thousand  men  into  the  field  to  sustain  your  cause, 
and  dictate  these  conditions  to  your  enemies  :  then  we  will 
always  be  your  allies." 

I  should  have  immediately  subscribed  to  such  conditions, 
for  I  should  have  seen  in  them  the  good  faith  and  real  inter- 
est of  Austria  ;  and  even  if  I  had  not  consented  to  these 
sacrifices,  Austria  could  then  have  attacked  me  openly  and 
honorably,  proving  to  Europe  that  my  ambition  had  forced 
her  into  the  war.  My  position  in  this  affair  was  less  com- 
plicated than  hers,  and  my  conduct  was  indisputably  more 
frank.  To  maintain  our  treaties,  and  thus  paralyze  the 
action  of  that  power,  while  I  planted  my  victorious  eagles  on 
the  Niémen, — such  was  my  object.  I  should  have  accom- 
plished it,  without  violating  any  of  my  engagements,  if  the 
victory  of  Bautzen  had  equaled  my  expectations.  But  I 
failed,  by  gaining  only  a  half  victory,  and  my  conduct 
seemed  rash  and  even  audacious.  If  the  movement  of  the 
left  wing  had  been  conducted  conformably  to  the  order  given 
by  Xey's  chief  of  staff  in  the  morning.  I  would  still  have 
been  master  of  Europe.  Thus  the  destinies  of  nations  often 
depend  upon  the  most  insignificant  incidents.  But  it  is 
time  to  quit  the  diplomatic  arena,  and  return  to  military 
events.  Before,  however,  we  continue  our  relation  of  the 
operations  of  the  armies  in  Saxony,  we  will  hastily  review 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  Spain. 


124  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

Summary  of  Operations  in  Spain. — Wellington,  after  hav- 
ing obtained,  in  1812,  the  liberation  of  Andalusia  by  his 
manœuvres  on  theDouro,  and  the  bold  occupation  of  Madrid, 
had  been  forced  to  raise  the  siege  of  Burgos,  before  the  united 
arms  of  Soult  and  Joseph.  He  had  taken  up  his  winter- 
quarters  about  Ciudad-Rodrigo,  and  profited  by  it  to  re- 
enforce  his  corps.  His  army,  in  the  spring  of  1813,  was 
composed  of  seventy-five  thousand  Anglo-Hanoverians  and 
Portuguese.  The  Cortes  of  Spain  conferred  on  him  the 
command  of  all  their  forces,  and  took  measures  to  place  a 
corps  of  fifty  thousand  Spaniards  at  his  immediate  disposi- 
tion, in  the  west  and  north.  The  evacuation  of  Andalusia, 
Grenada,  Galicia,  Estremadura,  La  Mancha,  and  the  Asturias, 
enabled  the  Cortes  to  double  their  levies,  and  they  neglected 
nothing  to  incite  ardor  and  patriotism  in  the  hearts  of  the 
Spaniards. 

Our  forces  in  this  part  of  the  theatre  of  war  amounted  to 
about  ninety  thousand  men.  Besides  these,  Suehet  had 
from  thirty-five  to  forty  thousand  men  in  the  east.  Two 
divisions  of  dragoons,  and  twelve  thousand  of  the  best  troops, 
had  been  drawn  from  the  Peninsula  to  the  army  in  Saxony. 
Soult  also  had  rejoined  me  just  before  the  battle  of  Bautzen. 
The  regiments  in  Spain  were  very  weak  ;  climate,  battles, 
guerilla  bands,  assassinations,  &c,  had  cost  us  many  men, 
and  my  immediate  wants  in  Saxony  had  compelled  me  to 
draw  there,  in  provisional  regiments,  the  recruits  intended 
for  the  army  in  Spain.  To  disguise  our  real  weakness,  we 
preserved  the  names  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  the  army  of 
the  south,  the  army  of  the  centre,  and  the  army  of  the  north, 
for  skeleton  corps  not  numbering  more  than  fifteen  or  sixteen 
thousand  men.  Eeille  commanded  the  army  of  Portugal, 
Drouet,  that  of  the  centre,  Gazan,  that  of  the  south,  and 
Clausel,  that  of  the  north.  Joseph's  guard,  which  was 
reduced    to   three   thousand   Frenchmen,    and    a   thousand 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  125 

Spaniards,  with  a  feeble  Spanish  division,  formed  the 
reserve. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  after  the  union  of  our  three 
armies  on  the  Tormes,  Joseph  had  returned  to  Madrid,  where 
he  hoped  to  maintain  himself  by  supporting  his  right  on  the 
Douro,  and  his  left  on  the  Tagus  towards  Toledo.  In  a 
military  jxnnt  of  view  such  a  position  was  not  defensible  ; 
but  such  is  the  unfortunate  alternative  of  an  army  which 
has,  at  the  same  time,  to  resist  organized  masses,  and  to 
keep  in  subjection  an  insurgent  population.  To  subsist  their 
forces  in  a  country  which  is  destitute  of  the  means  of  trans- 
portation or  of  navigation,  extension  was  necessary  ;  whereas, 
to  fight  the  opposing  forces,  concentration  was  equally  essen- 
tial. The  Anglo-Portuguese  army  had  greatly  the  advan- 
tage in  this  respect,  as  they  could  receive  provisions  from 
Lisbon  and  Oporto  by  the  Douro,  which  was  navigable  to 
near  Miranda,  and  by  numerous  brigades  of  mules  which 
carried  provisions  for  a  distance  of  three  hundred  miles. 
This  enabled  them  to  act  against  us  with  united  forces 
whenever  they  pleased. 

Having  completed  his  preparations  for  resuming  the  offen- 
sive by  the  end  of  May,  Wellington  deemed  the  decisive 
point  to  be  the  right  of  the  French  on  the  Douro.  By 
obtaining  a  success  here,  he  threatened  our  only  line  of 
retreat,  and  a  victory  like  that  of  Salamanca  would  throw 
us  back  on  the  Pyrenees.  The  evacuation  of  the  south  had 
enabled  the  Junta  to  raise  troops,  and  assemble  a  consider- 
able Spanish  corps  on  the  Tagus  which  threatened  our  left 
and  the  capital.  The  army  of  Galicia  and  the  Asturias 
might  take  the  right  in  reverse,  and  advance  by  Bilboa  to 
the  defiles  of  Tolosa.  Wellington,  favored  by  these  two 
demonstrations,  resolved  to  pass  the  Douro,  the  middle  of 
May,  near  Lamega,  to  fall  on  Zamora,  and  thus  turn  all 
Joseph's  system  of  defense.     After  having  succeeded  in  this 


126  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XIX. 

first  operation,  the  English  general  concentrated  his  forces  at 
TorOj  and  continued  his  march  towards  Palencia. 

Joseph  now,  for  the  first  time,  renounced  the  defense  of 
Madrid  and  collected  his  forces  at  Burgos.  The  increasing 
efforts  of  the  Anglo-Spaniards,  the  sad  effects  of  our  disasters 
in  Eussia,  and  the  necessity  of  seeking  the  security  of  the 
army  rather  than  the  preservation  of  a  useless  capital,  justi- 
fied this  resolution  ;  hut  it  was  now  necessary  to  instantly 
take  the  initiative  against  the  enemy,  or  to  retire.  Joseph 
prefered  to  remain  on  the  defensive.  But  the  new  demon- 
strations of  the  enemy  soon  forced  him  to  blow  up  the  fort 
of  Burgos  and  to  retire  into  the  plains  of  Vittoria. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  worse  place  for  a  battle, 
under  the  circumstances  in  which  Joseph  was  situated.  The 
gulf  of  Biscay  closes  the  frontier  of  France  and  Spain  into 
a  kind  of  gorge  between  Bayonne  and  St.  Jean-Pied-de-Port. 
There  is  but  a  single  road  on  the  west  of  the  Pyrenees,  which 
runs  from  Madrid  to  Bayonne.  There  is  another  road  prac- 
ticable for  cannon,  from  Vittoria  to  Pampeluna  ;  whence  it 
runs  on  one  side  to  the  Col-de-Maya,  and  on  the  other,  to 
St.  Jean-Pied-de-Port,  by  the  valley  of  Eoncevaux,  cele- 
brated under  Charlemagne  by  the  famous  retreat  of  Eoland. 
To  take  a  position  parallel  to  a  road  would  enable  the  enemy 
to  occupy  a  corresponding  line,  and  by  the  least  effort  of  his 
left  against  our  right,  to  intercept  our  communications.  If 
we  add  to  this  that  the  basin  of  Vittoria  is  surrounded  by 
commanding  mountains,  precisely  in  the  prolongation  of  the 
English  left,  and  in  the  direction  of  their  approach,  it  will 
be  seen  how  ill-suited  it  was  for  our  army.  It  was  necessary 
either  to  take  the  initiative  and  to  attack  the  enemy  where- 
ever  he  might  be  found,  or  to  retire  upon  the  Pyrenees. 
The  latter  was  certainly  the  wisest  plan  ;  for  a  victory  which, 
before  1812,  would  have  been  decisive,  would  now  be  of  little 
importance. 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  127 

Battle  of  littoria. — Joseph's  left,  under  Clausel,  remained 
at  Logrono  to  cover  the  important  road  to  Pampeluna.  A 
flying  corps  was  sent  to  Bilboa  under  Foy,  to  cover  the 
debouch  from  that  city  on  St.  Sebastian.  These  two  detach- 
ments were  the  necessary  consequence  of  giving  battle  in  a 
defensive  position.  In  any  other  country  than  Spain,  it 
would  have  been  preferable  to  renounce  the  road  to  Bayonne, 
to  retire  parallel  to  the  Ebro  to  Saragossa,  so  as  to  join 
Sachet  and  fall  on  Wellington  when  separated  some  one 
hundred  and  fifty  leagues  from  his  vessels  and  his  depots. 
The  national  guards  of  the  south  and  some  battalions  of  the 
line  would  have  been  sufficient  to  watch  the  Bidassoa  and 
guard  the  place  of  Bayonne  ;  and  the  English  general  would 
not  have  ventured  to  enter  the  Pyrenees  with  one  hundred 
thousand  Frenchmen  in  his  rear.  This  manoeuvre  had  the 
assent  of  the  best  generals  in  the  army  ;  but  Joseph  and 
Marshal  Jourdan  thought  that  the  spirit  of  the  Catalonians 
and  Aragonese  rendered  this  strategic  line  unsafe.  If  it  was 
necessary  to  base  themselves  on  Bayonne,  they  ought  to  have 
avoided  a  battle,  or  at  least  to  have  received  it  on  the  heights 
of  S.ilinas.  Jourdan,  it  is  said,  formed  this  project,  but  was 
overruled  by  the  others,  who  feared  the  embarrassment  of 
Joseph's  impedimenta,  and  who  wished  to  dispute  the  pos- 
session of  Castile.  Joseph's  camp  resembled  that  of  Darius  ; 
he  was  encumbered  with  the  families  and  baggage  of  the 
unfortunate  Spaniards  who  had  taken  office  under  him.  A 
part  was  sent  away  the  evening  before  the  battle  to  Tolosa, 
under  the  escort  of  Maucune's  division  of  the  army  of  Portu- 
gal ;  nevertheless,  there  still  remained  much  more  than  the 
situation  of  our  affairs  justified. 

The  allies  passed  the  Ebro  on  the  fifteenth  of  June.  On 
the  twenty-first  they  presented  themselves  before  Joseph's 
corps-de-bataille,  which  was  posted  parallel  to  Zadorra  and 
the  road.     There  was  sufficient  time  during  these  five  days  to 


128  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cn.   XIX. 

adopt  a  course  suited  to  the  circumstances,  Lut  they  did 
nothing.  The  battle  which  decided  the  fate  of  the  Penin- 
sula took  place  on  the  twenty-first  of  June.  It  was  more 
disastrous  than  bloody.  The  left  and  centre  were  driven 
back  on  Vittoria  by  Hill  and  Beresford,  who  attacked  them 
concentrically  toward  Ariniz  and  the  bridge  of  Mamorio, 
penetrated  the  interval  between  them,  and  thus  forced  them 
into  a  precipitate  retreat.  The  right  wing,  after  having  sus- 
tained a  vigorous  combat  against  General  Graham  at  Go- 
marra  Mayor,  near  the  great  road  to  Bayonne,  suffered  them- 
selves to  be  defeated  after  hearing  the  loss  of  Vittoria.  An 
English  division,  turning  the  right  wing,  succeeded  in  gain- 
ing the  road  before  our  troops  ;  the  alarm  immediately  spread, 
and  each  one  hastened  to  gain,  in  disorder,  the  road  to  Pam- 
peluna,  the  only  one  remaining  by  which  they  could  reach 
the  Pyrenees.  The  entire  column  of  equipages  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  conqueror  ;  cannon,  baggage,  caissons,  in  a 
word,  every  thing  was  abandoned,  and  Joseph  arrived  at 
Bayonne  in  a  worse  plight  than  I  reached  the  Beresina.  A 
ïnost  scandalous  disorder  blasted  all  the  laurels  of  the  army 
of  Spain,  caused  only  by  a  panic  terror,  like  that  of  the 
Austrians  at  Marengo. 

Joseph  merited  many  reproaches  for  his  military  conduct 
in  this  affair  ;  but  not  those  which  have  been  made  by  his 
detractors.  The  fault  was  not  so  much  in  the  disposal  of 
his  troops,  as  in  his  giving  battle  at  all  in  this  position.  He 
should  have  taken  the  offensive  ;  or  if  not,  have  received 
battle  in  the  defensive  position  of  Salinas. 

The  news  of  this  disaster  made  me  regret  that  I  did  not 
evacuate  Spain  on  my  return  from  Moscow.  This  would 
have  enabled  me  to  assemble  one  hundred  thousand  veteran 
troops  behind  the  Khine.  The  Spaniards  would  never  have 
crossed  the  Pyrenees,  had  I  abandoned  the  country  to  Fer- 
dinand ;  and  Wellington  would  not,  with  Lis  English  forces 


Cil.   XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  129 

alone,  have  attempted  the  invasion  of  France.  His  theatre 
of  operations  would  probably  have  been  transferred  to  Hol- 
land or  elsewhere. 

Operations  of  Suchet.— In  the  east  of  Spain  fortune  was 
more  favorable.  Dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of  General 
Maitland,  the  English  had  replaced  him  with  Murray,  a 
chief  of  staff  of  much  merit.  He  arrived  at  Alicante  with 
orders  to  take  the  offensive  so  as  to  favor  the  projects  of  Wel- 
lington against  the  line  of  the  Douro.  During  the  winter 
the  allies  had  reorganized  and  reënforced  the  Spanish  army 
of  Elliot.  In  the  month  of  April,  1813,  Murray  took  posi- 
tion at  Castella,  with  twenty  thousand  Anglo- Sicilians  and 
Spaniards,  and  detached  some  corps  to  Villena.  Between 
the  twentieth  and  twenty-second  of  April,  Suchet,  by  a  rapid 
march,  enveloped  a  battalion  at  Villena,  defeated  Elliot's 
corps  at  Yecla,  and  the  English  vanguard  in  the  defile  of 
Biar.  This  success  brought  him  before  Murray's  position  at 
Castalla,  which  he  immediately  resolved  to  attack.  But  as 
he  failed  to  carry  it,  Murray  made  an  attack  in  his  turn,  but 
was  arrested  by  our  artillery  in  the  defile.  Our  army  re- 
turned to  Valencia  Avith  its  prisoners,  but  did  not  long  remain 
inactive.  Not  venturing  an  attack  on  our  intrenchments, 
Murray  decided  to  evacuate  the  east  and  seek  to  operate  on 
our  communications. 

He  reëmbarked  his  troops,  and  his  fleet  passed  Valencia  on 
the  first  of  June.  He  again  debarked  his  troops  at  Salo, 
where  he  got  possession  of  Fort  San  Felipe  de  Balaguer,  and 
began  an  attack  on  Tarragona.  Twenty-eight  heavy  cannon 
were  landed  for  this  purpose. 

Hearing  of  this  danger,  Marshal  Suchet  immediately  moved 

by  Perdillo,  and  in  three  forced  marches  with  his  infantry 

arrived  in  sight  of  Fort  Balaguer  ;  the  English  fleet  defended 

the  shore  and  commanded  with  their  guns  the  high  road. 

Making  a  détour  through  the  mountains  to  avoid  their  fire, 
vol.  rv. — 9. 


130  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XIX. 

Suchet  carried  a  column  of  infantry  in'  sight  of  Tarragona, 
at  the  moment  when  General  Maurice  Mathieu,  from  Barce- 
lona, approached  on  the  other  side.  Seeing  his  danger,  Mur- 
ray now  blew  up  Fort  Balaguer,  abandoned  his  heavy  artil- 
lery, reërnbarked  his  troops,  and  resigned  the  command  to 
Lord  Bentinck,  who  returned  to  Alicante.  In  the  mean  time 
the  Spanish  army  of  Alicante,  under  the  Duke  del  Parque, 
attacked  Generals  Harispe  and  Habert  on  the  Xucar,  but 
was  defeated      Suchet  returned  to  Valencia  in  triumph. 

But  hardly  had  he  arrived  there,  when  he  received  news 
of  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  and  orders  to  approach  the  fron- 
tiers of  France.  The  evacuation  of  Valencia  commenced  on 
the  fifth  of  July.  The  retreat  of  this  army  was  accompanied 
by  the  sincere  regrets  of  a  large  number  of  the  inhabitants. 
Good  officers  with  well  provisioned  garrisons  were  left  at 
Denia,  Peniscola,  and  Saguntum  ;  the  last  of  these  places 
contained  six  months'  supplies  for  the  whole  army.  Tortosa, 
Tarragona,  Lerida,  Mequinenza,  and  Monzon,  were  also  pro- 
vided for.  More  than  twenty  thousand  men  were  thus  sacri- 
ficed to  the  vain  hope  of  still  holding  the  Peninsula,  when 
their  presence  on  the  Rhine,  and  in  Champagne,  a  few  months 
later,  might  have  saved  France.  Suchet  was  not  to  blame 
for  this  disposition  ;  he  had  received  positive  orders.  Our 
victory  at  Bautzen  was  known  to  him  ;  as  also  the  meeting 
of  the  congress  of  Prague  ;  but  he  knew  nothing  of  the 
defection  of  Austria,  and  hoped  soon  to  receive  orders  to 
return  to  Valencia. 

On  reaching  Barcelona,  Suchet  united  with  his  own  the 
army  of  Catalonia  under  General  Decaen.  Together  they 
occupied  the  line  of  the  Llobregat  which  they  retained  fur 
several  months.  In  the  early  part  of  August,  General  Ben- 
tinck threatened  Tarragona.  The  French  army  crossed  the 
Col  de  Santa  Christiana  and  offered  him  battle,  which  he 
refused  and  retired  toward  Cambrils  and  the  C;>1  de  Balaguer 


Ch.  XIX.]  SPRING    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  131 

Suchet  now  blew  up  the  fortifications  of  Tarragona  and 
removed  the  garrison  to  Barcelona.  The  enemy  afterward 
established  himself  at  Villa-Franca  and  the  Col  de  Ordal. 
The  latter  place  was  attacked  by  the  marshal  on  the  night 
of  the  thirteenth  of  September,  and  carried,  after  an  obstinate 
defense.  We  captured  three  field-pieces  and  three  or  four 
hundred  men.  The  twenty-seventh  English  regiment  of 
the  line  perished  almost  to  a  man.  The  next  day  our  army 
reached  Villa-Franca.  General  Bentinck  prepared  to  retire 
on  Tarragona,  but  our  cavalry  greatly  harassed  his  retreat. 

This  victory  secured  us  quiet  cantonments  between  the 
Llobregat  and  Barcelona,  and  the  winter  passed  away  with- 
out any  remarkable  event,  or  any  thing  to  disturb  our  forces, 
except  the  sad  news  of  our  disasters  in  Saxony.  Our  skir- 
mishes with  the  Catalonians  were  regarded  only  as  an  every- 
day affair  ;  they  had  become  a  matter  of  habit,  and  a  daily 
routine. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF    1813. 

FROM  THE  CONGRESS  OF  PRAGUE,  TO  THE  RETREAT  BEHIND  THE  RHIXE. 

Renewal  of  Hostilities — Immense  Efforts  of  the  Coalition — Organization  of  the 
Allied  forces— Organization  of  the  French  Army — Relative  Position  of  the 
opposing  Forces — Different  Combinations  of  the  Theatre  of  War — Prelimin- 
ary Movements — Plan  of  Operations — Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher — 
His  Instructions  to  Macdonald — The  Command  of  the  Allied  Forces — March 
of  the  Allies  on  Dresden — Their  singular  Dispositions  for  Attack — Napoleon's 
Project  to  cut  them  off  at  Konigstein — Battle  of  Dresden — The  Allies  retreat 
— Operations  of  Vandamme  near  Konigstein — His  Disaster  at  Culm — Ou- 
dinot  defeated  at  Gros-Beeren — Macdonald's  Disaster  at  the  Katzbach — 
Napoleon  marches  to  his  Assistance — Xey's  defeat  at  Dennewitz — Remarks 
on  this  Battle — Remarks  on  Napoleon's  Plan  of  Campaign — His  Demonstra- 
tions on  Bohemia— Third  Attempt  against  Blucher — New  Plans  of  the  Allies 
— They  assume  the  Offensive — Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher  and  Ber- 
nadette— Napoleon's  Project  of  Manoeuvering  against  Berlin — It  is  defeated 
by  the  Defection  of  Bavaria — The  Allies  concentrate  on  Leipsic — Singular 
Project  of  Schwartzenberg — First  Day  of  Leipsic — Napoleon  proposes  an 
Armistice  which  is  refused — The  Allies  receive  Reenforcements — Second  Day 
of  Leipsic — Third  Day  of  Leipsic — Remarks  on  this  Battle — Napoleon 
retreats  on  Erfurth — Pursuit  of  the  Allies — Departure  of  Murat — Threaten- 
ing March  of  the  Bavarians — Their  Defeat  at  Hanau — The  French  retire 
behind  the  Rhine — Capitulation  of  Dresden — Operations  before  Hamburg — 
Capitulation  of  Dantzic — Siege  and  Blockade  of  the  other  Fortresses — Oper- 
ations of  Eugene  in  Italy — Soult's  Operations  in  Spain. 

Renewal  of  Hostilities. — Although  the  overthrow  of  my 
brother's  throne  had  no  immediate  influence  on  the  military 
operations  in  Germany,  nevertheless,  it  greatly  complicated 
my  affairs.  I  had  always  supposed  that  I  could  at  any  time 
draw  fifty  thousand  men  from  beyond  the  Pyrenees  to  the 
Elbe  ;  but  the  unfortunate  defeat  of  Vittoria  not  only  des- 
troyed these  hopes,  but  on  the  contrary  caused  me  alarm  for 


l'ii.  XX]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  133 

the  safety  of  my  own  territory.  These  events  probably  had 
their  influence  in  the  negotiations  of  Prague,  and  contributed 
to  their  unfortunate  issue.  Some  future  statesman  may 
think  that  this  failure,  by  destroying  all  further  hopes  of 
success  in  the  Peninsula  and  drawing  all  my  efforts  to  the  con- 
tinent, should  have  been  an  additional  inducement  for  Austria 
to  unite  with  me  ;  but  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  thought  differ- 
ently, and  only  rejoiced  at  the  increase  of  my  embarrassment 
and  the  probability  of  my  fall.  The  congress  of  Prague 
having  been  dissolved  on  the  tenth  of  August,  as  has  already 
been  said,  the  armistice  expired  on  the  fifteenth  and  hostili- 
ties recommenced  the  next  day. 

Immense  Efforts  of  the  Coalition.— The  efforts  of  the 
coalition  were  almost  incredible  ;  I  regarded  the  accounts  of 
them  which  reached  me  as  ridiculously  exaggerated.  Prussia 
alone  had  put  in  the  line  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand 
men,  of  which  thirty-two  thousand  were  cavalry.  I  had 
never  thought  her  forces  one-half  that  number.  The  Rus- 
sians, besides  the  corps  of  Sacken  and  Langeron,  received 
near  one  hundred  thousand  veterans  from  the  hospitals  and 
recruits  from  the  depots  ;  they  were  the  remainder  of  the 
levies  of  1812,  who,  on  account  of  their  distance  from  the 
theatre  of  war,  had  not  been  able  to  arrive  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  campaign  of  1812.  The  whole  number  of  the 
troops  of  the  first  line  put  in  motion  against  me,  amounted 
to  six  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  with  eighteen  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon,  all  included.  The  reserves  and  garrisons 
amounted  to  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand,  making  a 
grand  total  of  eight  hundred  and  ten0  thousand  men  against 

*  This  number  must  be  intended  to  represent  the  strength  of  the  allied  forces 
at  the  renewal  of  hostilities,  for  in  September,  as  is  stated  immediately  after, 
they  numbered  eight  hundred  and  eighty-nine  thousand  three  hundred  and 
twenty  men,  and  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  sixty-six  pieces  of  artillery. 
and  in  December,  their  force  was  increased  to  one  million  one  hundred  thou- 
sand men. 


134 


LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON 


[Ch.  XX. 


me,  in  the  north  and  in  Italy,  exclusive  of  the  English, 
Spaniards,  Portuguese,  and  Sicilians,  in  the  Peninsula.  It 
is  true  that  some  of  these  were  militia  and  irregular  troops  ; 
but  if  they  did  not  serve  in  the  line,  they  did  us  still  more 
injury  by  their  partisan  warfare. 

The  English  aided  these  efforts  by  subsidies  and  sup- 
plies of  arms  and  artillery  ;  they  sent  to  Prussia,  and  to  the 
Prince  of  Sweden,  field-batteries  and  men  to  manage  them, 
several  companies  of  Congreve-rocketeers,  and  a  siege- 
equipage  which  served  in  the  attack  of  Glogau.  They  also 
carried  four  hundred  thousand  muskets,  and  one  hundred 
thousand  sabres  to  the  continent,  to  assist  in  the  armament 
of  Germany. 

Organization  of  the  Allied  Forces.— The  following  table 
exhibits  the  detailed  organization  of  the  allied  armies  in 
September,  1813  : 


Armies  and 
Siege-Corps. 

Nations. 

Corps. 

<  -. 

b  z 

S 

H  r 

<3 

f 

Russians 

Prussians 

Russians 

Austrians 

Russians 

Prussians 

Wittgenstein 

39 
41 

36 

44 

4 
12 
16 

23,000        00 

P>arclav < 

6,000  ;    — 
36,000  |  250 
108,500  |  438 

I 

Constantine 

Lichtenstein 

53     |     SO 

133     |  100 

( 

4     1     18 
7     1     18 

12 

Schwartzenberg  -I 

Colloredo 

24 
21 
21 
24 
20 

12 
12 
12 
18 
36 

4S 
4S 

4S 

48 

I 

Hesse-Hombourg. 

I     42 

121*  |  126 

1.-:",*0m  ;   '-'.-.> 

r 

24 
49 
20 
40 

20 
14 
26 
44 

11 

8 
4 

16.200 
20.000 
13,800 

37.700 

60 

Blucher -j 

Langeron 

St.  Priest 

York 

156 
36 
104 

132     |  104 

?3 

96.700  |   356 

*  Previous  to  the  battle  of  Dresden  the  Austrians  had  but  one  hundred  and 
twelve  battalions  ;  they  here  lost  ten  which  were  replaced  by  nineteen  others, 
making  one  hundred  and  twenty-one  battalions.  In  addition  to  this  number 
they  had  thirty-four  battalions  in  garrison  at  Prague,  Theresien-Stadt,  and 
-Stadt. 


I 'n.   XX.]  AUTUMN      CAMPAIGN     OF    1813 


135 


A i:\iiks  AND 
Siege-Corps. 

Nations. 

COKPS. 

H 

CO  *> 

il 

OQ 

1 

B  > 
t-  M 

{ 

Rernadotte < 

Russians 

Swedes 

Wintzingerode 

Woronzof 

Walmoden 

11 
8 
35 
37 

40 

8 
24 
32 
33 
45 

8 
13 

4 

4 

9,100 
12,250 
24,010 

'.  8,500 
41,300 

:  s,! 

56 
56 
62 

1 

Prussians 

Russians 

104 
56 

I 

Tauenzien 

186 

194 

29 

im,oi;ii 

387 

14 
1 29 
30 

25 
25 
17 

9 

2 

16,600 
26,500 
17,000 

33 

P.piiniiiL'sen 1 

Paskiewitz 

1  120 

73 

67 

11 

.lu.iiini 

198 

£-3    fDantzic. 

|u  J  Stettin  . . . 
;l  1  Custrin... 
&£  Glogau.., 
o5    l  Zamosa.. , 


Russ.  and  Pruss.    Duke  of  Wurtem- 

I      berg 

Plotz 

"  Hinricks 

"  I  Rosen 

Russians ■ — 


70 

17 

8 

35.000 

SO 

19 

4 

— 

35,000 

25 

10 

2 

— 

14,600 

8 

44 

4 

— . 

8,000 

30 

21 

5 

:: 

29,000 

36 

1 64    I     32     I     11     I  122,2^0  |   1 79 


The  Kussians  employed  in  these  sieges  were  militia,  except 
at  Dantzic,  where  there  were  four  battalions  of  the  old 
regiments,  and  the  militia  of  St.  Petersburg,  who  had  fought 
gloriously  during  the  war. 

Becapitulation  of  these  Forces. 

Men.  Artillery 

Grand  army  in  Bohemia  (Barclay  and  Schwartzenberg)  239,360  696 

Army  of  Blucher 96,700  356 

Army  of  Bernadotte 154,060  .387 

Army  ofBenningsen 60,000  108 

Austrians  and  Bavarians  under  General  Wrede 55,000  120 

Army  of  General  Hill  in  Italy 50,000  120 

Siege-corps "  102,200  179 

Reserve  of  Landwehr  in  the  interior  of  Austria 60,000  — 

Prussian  reserve  and  garrisons 32,000  — 

Reserve  under  Prince  Labauof 40,000  — 

Total  889,320  1,966 

If  we  add  to  this  number  one  hundred  and  forty-five  thou- 
sand  regulars,    and   one  hundred   and   forty-five    thousand 


*  TValmoden's  corps  was  composed  of  Russians,    Germans,    Swedes   and 

English. 


136 


LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON 


[Ch.  XX. 


Landwehr  raised  by  the  Germanic  Confederation  in  the 
month  of  December,  we  have  a  grand  total  of  more  than 
one  million  one  hundred  thousand  men,  armed  against  France, 
exclusive  of  the  forces  in  the  Peninsula. 

Organization  of  the  French  Army. — I  also  had  profited 
by  the  armistice  to  reënforce  my  army  in  Germany,  and,  by 
almost  inconceivable  activity  on  my  own  part,  and  that  of 
my  officers,  we  had  increased  its  numbers  to  near  four  hun- 
dred thousand,  and  the  artillery  to  one  thousand  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  pieces.     It  was  organized  as  follows  : 


Infantry.     1st  corps  under  Yandamme, 


Cavalry. 


2d 

3d 

4th 

5th 

6th 

7  th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

11th 

12th 

13  th 

14th 

1st 

2d 

3th 

4th 


Victor, 3 

Ney  (afterwards  Souham)  5 

Bertrand, 3 

Lauriston, 3 

Marmont. 3 

Reynier, 3 

Poniatowski, 2 

Augereau,   2 

Rapp,  at  Dantzic, 

Macdonald, 3 

Oudinot. 3 

Davoust. 3 

St.  Cyr,    ..  3 

Latour-Maubourg 4 

Sebastiani, 3 

Arrighi, 4 

Kellennan  Jr., 3 


Relative  Positions  of  the  opposing  Forces.— The  respec- 
tive forces  were  distributed  as  follows  :  on  my  right,  twenty- 
five  thousand  Bavarians,  assembled  at  Munich,  were  in  obser- 
vation before  an  army  of  nearly  equal  force  which  Austria  had 
collected  in  the  environs  of  Lintz.  They  were  sustained,  or 
rather  restrained,  by  a  corps  of  twenty  thousand  men  which 
Augereau  had  assembled  in  the  environs  of  Wurtzburg  and 
Bamberg.  On  my  left,  Davoust  occupied  Hamburg  and 
Lubeck  with  thirty  thousand  French  and  Danes,  forming  the 
thirteenth  corps.     He  had  before  him    the  corps  of  Wal- 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  137 

moden,  of  equal  force.  Bernadotte,  Prince-Royal  of  Sweden, 
commanded,  in  the  environs  of  Berlin,  an  army  of  some 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  Russians,  Swedes,  and  Prus- 
sians ;  I  opposed  to  him  Oudinot,  who  with  seventy  thou- 
sand men,  placed  himself  at  Dahme  on  the  road  from  Torgau 
to  Berlin.  My  grand  army  of  two  hundred  and  thirty  thou- 
sand men  were  cantoned  from  Dresden  to  Liegnitz  ;  it  was 
composed  of  eleven  corps  of  infantry,  and  four  of  cavalry, 
including  the  forces  under  Oudinot.  Murat,  having  returned 
from  Naples  after  my  victory  at  Bautzen  in  order  to  obtain, 
by  his  devotion,  pardon  for  his  conduct  in  the  retreat  from 
Russia,  was  charged  with  the  command  of  the  reserve.  The 
Russo-Prussian  army  of  two  hundred  thousand  combatants 
was  in  the  environs  of  Schweidnitz,  and  one  hundred  and 
thirty  thousand  Austrians  had  united  in  Bohemia. 

I  have  been  reproached  for  having  employed  Davoust  with 
thirty  thousand  men  at  Hamburg.  This  position,  they  say, 
had  no  connection  with  the  great  question  to  be  decided  on 
the  Elbe  ;  the  strength  of  my  position  depended  upon  the 
right  and  not  the  left,  and  the  enemy  could  not  throw  him- 
self upon  Hamburg,  so  long  as  I  was  victorious  between 
Magdebourg  and  Dresden.  All  this  is  true  ;  but  then  the 
English  might  have  thrown  ten  thousand  men,  arms  and 
money  into  the  north  of  Germany,  have  raised  Hanover  and 
Westphalia,  and,  by  uniting  with  Walmoden,  have  brought 
sixty  thousand  men  on  my  rear,  and  even  drawn  Denmark 
after  them.  The  position  of  Davoust  freed  me  from  this 
apprehension  and,  moreover,  gave  occupation  to  an  equal 
number  of  the  enemy.  If  ever  a  detachment  was  indispensa- 
ble and  useful,  this  one  was. 

Different  Combinations  of  the  Theatre  of  War.— The  new 
theatre  upon  which  we  were  about  to  Avage  so  terrible  a  war, 
was  different  from  those  which  preceded  it.     In  examining 


138  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

its  various  combinations  I  found  four  systems  from  which  to 
choose. 

The  first  was  to  make  the  Elbe  the  pivot  of  all  my  move- 
ments ;  I  held  all  the  fortified  points,  Kônigstein,  Dresden, 
Torgau  ;  Wittemberg,  and  Magdebourg  made  me  master  of 
the  course  of  this  river,  as  Stettin,  Glogau  and  Custrin  com- 
manded the  Oder.  I  was  certain  of  having  bridges  for  man- 
œuvering  at  my  pleasure  between  the  two  rivers,  with  great 
advantage  against  the  enemy  who  did  not  possess  a  single 
fortified  passage.  My  position,  it  is  true,  was  taken  in  re- 
verse by  Bohemia  ;  but  if  the  enemy  wished  to  manoeuvre 
by  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe  against  Saxony,  I  could  para- 
lyze all  who  remained  on  the  right  bank,  and  throw  myself 
in  mass  on  those  debouching  from  Bohemia.  Thanks  to  the 
situation  of  the  little  fort  of  Kônigstein,  I  could  even  operate 
in  my  turn  against  the  communications  of  the  enemy,  if  he 
should  descend  the  Elbe  to  Dresden.  I  might  even  allow  the 
mass  of  the  allied  forces  to  break  their  heads  against  my 
barrier  of  the  Elbe,  while  I  threw  myself  alternately  on  the 
armies  of  the  north  and  of  Silesia.  In  either  case,  the  tac- 
tical advantage  was  on  my  side. 

The  second  system  was  to  profit  by  the  places  of  Magde- 
bourg, Torgau  and  Goerlitz  on  Yung-Bunzlau  or  Prague,  to 
take  in  reverse  the  grand  army  of  the  sovereigns  which  was 
moving  on  the  Eger.  This  would  have  entirely  changed  my 
line  of  operations  and  have  based  me  on  the  Danube  and 
Bavaria.  The  success  of  this  plan  would  have  produced  im- 
mense results  ;  but,  in  case  of  reverse,  all  my  defenses  on  the 
Elbe  and  my  depots  would  have  been  abandoned  to  them- 
selves ;  it  is  true  that  they  were  well  provided  and  might 
have  held  out  for  some  months.  In  order  to  execute  this 
grand  operation,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  draw  my 
army  of  Silesia  into  Bohemia,  and  leave  to  Oudinot  the  care 
of  throwing  good  garrisons  in  Torgau  and  Dresden  to  form 


I  il.   XX.]  AUTUMN     C  A  M  P  A  I  (  i  X     OF     1813.  139 

my  mar  guard  on  Zittau.  The  union  of  three  hundred  thou- 
sand Frenchmen  in  Bohemia  in  the  plains  of  Yung-Bunzlau 
would  have  greatly  embarrassed  the  sovereigns,  for,  by  beat- 
ing their  principal  army  near  Laun,  it  would  have  been 
thrown  back  near  Egra  on  the  Boehmerwald  or  on  the 
Voightland,  and  been  cut  off  from  its  base,  from  Blncher, 
and  from  Bernadotte  ;  finally,  its  magazines,  collected  at 
great  expense,  would,  have  amply  provided  us  with  provisions. 
It  can  not  be  denied  that  this  plan  was  manifestly  superior 
to  either  of  the  others.  It  may  be  said,  perhaps,  that  its 
execution  required  a  knowledge  of  the  march  decided  on  by 
the  sovereigns  at  Trachenberg,  and  which  I  did  not  know  till 
the  sixteenth  ;  but  that  was  of  little  importance.  Whether 
I  found  Schwartzenberg  with  one  hundred  thousand  Aus- 
trians,  or  encountered  the  grand  allied  army,  I  would  become 
master  of  the  southern  side  of  the  theatre  of  war  and  drive 
the  enemy  to  the  other  side  where  the  advantages  were 
already  in  my  favor.  Nevertheless,  this  manoeuvre  had  the 
inconvenience  of  requiring,  at  its  commencement,  a  retro- 
grade movement  of  the  army  of  Macdonald  before  the  army 
of  Silesia  which  would  have  pursued  and  perhaps  have  cut 
up  the  French  marshal.  However,  Macdonald  had  the  ad- 
vantage of  disputing  in  his  retreat  the  defile  from  Lauban  to 
Keichenberg,  ground  favorable  for  defense.  The  want  of 
practicable  roads  was  the  greatest  obstacle  to  the  adoption 
of  this  system  ;  for  we  had,  in  order  to  execute  it,  only  the 
road  from  Rombourg  and  Gabel,  and  that  from  Lauban  on 
Keichenberg. 

The  third  system  was  to  face  toward  the  western  frontiers 
of  Bohemia,  by  placing  my  left  near  Dresden  and  extending 
my  line  in  the  direction  of  Zwichau  and  Plauen,  abandoning 
all  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe.  Although  the  advocate  of 
defensive  war  would  give  this  the  preference,  it  did  not 
at  all  suit  me.     I  should  have  been  destitute  of  common 


140  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Oh.  XX. 

sense  to  abandon  voluntarily  all  the  advantages  of  the  Elbe 
and  enable  three  allied  armies  to  unite,  when  I  could  divide 
their  efforts.  My  left,  abandoned  at  Dresden,  would  have 
had  to  contend  alone  against  these  three  armies  ;  or,  if  I 
had  wished  to  bring  the  rest  of  my  forces  to  its  assistance  I 
should  necessarily  have  been  obliged  to  change  my  front,  in 
order  to  place  myself  in  battle  on  the  Elbe.  This  would 
have  been  war  without  reason  and  without  results. 

The  fourth  system  was  to  evacuate  Germany  and  establish 
myself  behind  the  Rhine  ;  several  of  my  generals,  who  did 
not  comprehend  my  position,  were  inclined  to  adopt  this 
plan.  It  was  an  absurd  idea.  There  was  no  necessity  for 
such  a  measure  ;  it  would  have  been  better  to  subscribe  at 
once  to  all  the  sacrifices  imposed  by  the  coalition.  Such  a 
course  would  have  been  more  honorable  and  more  advanta- 
geous than  to  retire  of  my  own  accord,  and  draw  upon  the 
frontiers  of  France  all  Europe  in  arms,  without  putting  an 
end  to  the  war.  To  retire  behind  the  Rhine  would  have 
been  to  surrender  the  Confederation,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and 
Holland.  Moreover,  what  could  we  have  done  with  only 
four  hundred  thousand  men  to  defend  the  whole  line  from 
Amsterdam  to  Bale  ?  It  would  have  required  half  of  this 
force  to  garrison  the  fortifications,  and  we  would  have  had 
only  two  hundred  thousand  men  in  the  field  to  fight  six 
hundred  thousand  allies  who  assailed  us  in  Saxony  and  Fran- 
conia.  Here  we  might  at  least  oppose  to  them  all  our  forces 
and  preserve  our  own  territory  untouched.  Instead  of  throw- 
ing one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  into  our  fortresses 
and  ruining  the  soil  of  France,  we  could  here  keep  these 
forces  active,  augment  their  numbers  still  further  by  the  con- 
tingents of  the  Confederation,  and  carry  on  the  war  at  the 
expense  of  others. 

Preliminary  Movements. — Every  thing  being  arranged  for 
the  new  campaign  I  left  Dresden  on  the  fifteenth,  and  went 


CET.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  141 

to  Zittau.*  The  hostilities  were  not  to  begin  till  the  six- 
teenth, but  the  allies  put  themselves  in  motion  on  the  twelfth, 
to  execute  the  plan  which  had  been  agreed  upon  at  Trachen- 
berg.  Barclay,  with  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
filing  by  his  left,  crossed  Bohemia.  His  junction  with  the 
Austrians  formed  a  mass  of  two  hundred  and  twenty  thou- 
sand men,  destined  to  march  on  Dresden  by  the  left  bank  of 

*  The  following  note,  put  by  Jomini  in  the  mouth  of  Napoleon,  contains 
the  substance  of  Napoleon's  own  dictations  at  St.  Helena,  as  given  in  his  Me- 
moirs by  Montholon  and  Gourgaud. 

"  On  arriving  at  Bautzen  I  learned  that  General  Jomini,  chief  of  Marshal 
Ney's  staff,  had  gone  over  to  the  Russian  army.  Although  this  event  has  been 
generally  misjudged  by  the  historians  of  the  campaign,  it  was,  nevertheless,  of 
a  nature  to  greatly  annoy  me.  Jomini  was  a  susceptible  man,  violent,  self- 
willed,  but  too  frank  to  conduct  any  premeditated  intrigue.  Many  circum- 
stances contributed  to  induce  him  to  take  this  step.  He  was  a  Swiss.  Con- 
stantly maltreated  by  the  Prince  of  Neufchatel,  he  had  already,  in  1810,  wished 
to  enter  the  Russian  service  where  he  had  been  in  fact  offered  the  rank  of 
general  in  the  suite  of  the  Emperor  Alexander.  He  had  asked  for  his  dis- 
charge, but  I  had  refused  it.  After  having  recently  distinguished  himself  at 
Bautzen,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  preceding  chapter,  he  was  arrested  on  the 
charge  of  not  having  sent,  in  time,  certain  returns  and  information  which  he 
could  not  obtain,  and  under  this  futile  pretext  he  was  published  to  the  army  in 
an  order  of  tho  day  as  guilty  of  neglect  of  duty.  Twice  during  the  armistice, 
Ney  had  proposed  him  for  the  grade  of  general  of  division  to  which  ho  had 
just  claims  for  recent  and  important  services.  Numerous  promotions  had  been 
made  in  his  corps-d'armée  ;  he  alone  was  excepted,  and  instead  of  being  re- 
compensed, was  subjected  to  unmerited  punishment.  Exasperated  at  such 
injustice,  and  certain,  from  what  had  occurred  in  1810,  that  I  would  not  accept 
his  resignation,  he  determined  to  join  a  prince  who  promised  him  a  distin- 
guished reception,  and  whose  magnanimity  has  been  greatly  extolled. 

"  However  violent  this  step,  the  attenuating  circumstances  which  accom- 
panied it  render  it  excusable.  It  was  the  result  of  a  very  natural  feeling, — 
that  of  submitting  to  no  humiliation.  This  officer  was  not  a  Frenchman,  and 
was  bound  to  our  flag  by  no  feelings  of  patriotism,  the  only  feelings  which  can 
enable  one  to  submit  to  ill-treatment. 

"  Some  ill-informed  writers  have  attributed  to  this  event  the  retreat  of  our 
troops  behind  the  Bober,  by  accusing  Jomini  of  having  communicated  my 
plans  to  the  enemy.  He  was  incapable  of  such  an  act  ;  moreover,  he  did  not 
know  my  plan,  for  it  could  not  have  been  communicated  to  him  till  after  tho 
renewal  of  hostilities.  Others  have  attributed  Blucher's  attack  to  information 
given  him  by  Jomini  ;  this  is  equally  false  ;  Blucher  entered  the  neutral  ter- 
ritory on  the  twelfth  of  August,  whereas  Jomini  did  not  leave  for  Prague  till 
the  fourteenth,  and  had  previously  had  no  communication  with  the  Prussian 


142  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

the  Elbe.  Blucher,  left  in  Silesia  with  about  one  hundred 
thousand  men,  inundated  the  neutral  territory,  took  posses- 
sion  of  Breslau,  and  advanced  on  the  Katzbach.  My  corps 
in  Silesia  were  obliged  to  raise  their  cantonments  in  haste,  and 
retire  behind  the  Bober.  Until  now,  I  had  believed  that  the 
Eussian  and  Prussian  masses,  forming  the  general  centre  of 
the  allies  in  Silesia,  would  advance  on  the  Buber,  and  that 
the  Austrians  would  attack  me  in  flank  with  one  hundred 
thousand  men.  All  my  dispositions  were  made  to  observe, 
with  eighty  thousand  men  each  of  the  masses  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  throw  myself  with  a  suitable  reënforcement  upon 
either,  as  occasion  required. 

Plan  of  Operations.— I  had  pushed  Poniatowski,  the 
seventeenth  of  August,  on  Gabel,  to  ascertain  what  was  pass- 
ing in  Bohemia  :  we  there  learned  at  the  same  time  the  march 
of  the  sovereigns  and  the  grand  army  on  Bohemia,  and  the 
retreat  of  my  army  of  Silesia.  These  two  events  left  me  no 
further  doubt  as  to  the  part  I  was  to  take.  As  Blucher  was 
coming  against  the  mass  of  my  forces,  it  was  necessary  to 
begin  by  getting  rid  of  him.  It  has  been  thought  that  I 
would  have  done  better  to  push  forward  on  Yung-Bunzlau, 
so  as  to  fall  on  the  grand  army  of  the  sovereigns.  Perhaps 
I  should  have  done  so,  if  there  had  been  time  ;  but  as  the 
armies  of  Oudinot  and  Macdonald  had  not  been  prepared  for 
such   an  enterprise,  I   thought  it  more  safe  to  fall  at  once  on 

general.  He  proved,  besides,  that  so  far  from  compromising  Ney,  ho  himself 
had  taken,  in  spite  of  the  marshal,  every  precaution  to  cover  his  camps,  order- 
ing, on  his  own  authority,  the  light  cavalry  of  General  Beurmann  to  Liegnitz 
to  place  it  in  advance  of  the  Katzbach.  This  fact  alone  attests  that  Jomini 
was  a  slave  to  his  duty,  and  that  in  taking  this  desperate  step  he  had  obeyed 
his  head,  rather  than  his  heart.  His  loss  was  a  serious  one  ;  for,  of  all  my 
officers,  he  best  understood  my  system  of  war,  and  had  rendered  me  important 
services  at  Ulm,  at  Jena,  in  Poland,  at  Eylau,  in  Spain,  at  the  Beresina,  and  at 
Bautzen." 

The  different  views  taken  of  Jomini's  conduct  by  his  friends  and  his  enemies 
are  briefly  stated  in  the  biographical  sketch  of  the  author  at  the  beginning  of 
the  first  volume  of  this  translation. 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  143 

Blucher,  leaving  the  grand  question  to  be  afterward  decided. 
Although  my  information  announced  that  the  sovereigns  were 
advancing  on  Bohemia,  yet  there  was  nothing  to  indicate 
whether  they  would  cross  the  Elbe,  or  place  themselves  at 
Gabel,  Leypa  and  Reichenberg  ;  in  the  last  supposition,  the 
attack  on  Prague  would  be  only  a  front  attack. 

Napoleon  marches  against  Blucker. — Having  resolved  to 
march  into  Silesia,  I  left  St.  Cyr  to  guard  Dresden  ;  Van- 
damme  and  Poniatowski  remained  in  echelons  on  the  road  to 
Gabel  ;  Belluno  remained  at  Zittau  to  sustain  them  ;  these 
last  three  corps  were  to  mask  my  rear  and  cover  my  com- 
munications with  the  Elbe.  I  advanced  into  Silesia  at  the 
head  of  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men.  Mortier, 
Marmont,  the  guards,  and  Murat's  cavalry,  followed  the 
corps  of  Ney,  Lauriston,  and  Macdonald.  We  passed  the 
Bober  on  the  twenty-first.  Unfortunately  for  us,  Blucher 
refused  battle,  as  had  been  agreed  upon  at  Trachenberg.  If 
I  had  known  this  intention,  I  should  have  changed  my  plan, 
and  not  have  hesitated  to  march  on  Prague.  Blucher  fell 
back  on  Jauer.  I  could  not  follow  him  without  compromis- 
ing the  safety  of  Dresden,  threatened  as  it  was  by  the  grand 
army  of  the  allies  ;  this  point  was  the  more  important  as  it 
was  to  serve  as  the  pivot  of  all  my  operations,  and  to  enable 
me  to  act  at  pleasure  upon  either  side  of  the  Elbe. 

Instructions  to  Macdonald.— I  left  Macdonald  in  Silesia 
with  eighty  thousand  men,  and  with  the  remaining  sixty 
thousand  took  the  road  to  Lusace  ;  and,  after  marching  one 
hundred  and  twenty  leagues  with  my  best  troops,  returned 
to  the  place  from  which  I  started,  without  having  accom- 
plished any  object.  I  had  given  Macdonald  detailed  instruc- 
tions which  should  have  avoided  the  disasters  which  he  ex- 
perienced. On  the  twenty-third  of  August,  at  my  departure 
from  Lowenberg,  I  directed  Berthier  to  write  to  him  : 
"  That  in  the  present  state  of  our  troops  we  could  do  noth- 


144  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Qh.   XX. 

ing  better  than  to  march  against  the  enemy,  as  soon  as  he 
should  take  the  offensive  ;  in  that  case,  the  allies  would  un- 
doubtedly move  on  several  points  at  the  same  time  ;  that  Mac- 
donald,  on  the  contrary,  should  concentrate  his  force  on  a 
single  point,  so  as  to  debouch  against  them  and  immediately 
take  the  initiative.  He  was  informed  of  my  project  of  de- 
bouching from  Zittau  on  Prague,  in  case  the  enemy  did  not 
seriously  threaten  the  intrenched  camp  of  Dresden,  or  of 
debouching  by  that  camp,  if  the  enemy  presented  himself 
before  it  with  the  mass  of  his  forces.  In  case  he  should  be 
attacked  by  superior  numbers,  to  fall  back  behind  the  Quiess, 
hold  Goerlitz,  and  keep  open  his  communications  with  me, 
so  as  to  form  a  junction  in  case  of  need.  If  he  should  be 
pressed,  and  I  in  full  operation,  he  would,  at  the  worst,  re- 
tire on  the  intrenched  camp  of  Dresden,  while  my  first  care 
would  be  to  keep  up  our  communications  with  him." 

Never  did  I  take  more  wise  precautions,  and  never  were 
they  worse  understood  or  worse  executed.  Having  returned 
to  my  army,  on  the  twenty-fourth  of  August,  between  Goer- 
litz and  Zittau,  I  hesitated  whether  or  not  I  should  debouch 
on  Prague  ;  but  the  fears  manifested  by  St.  Cyr  for  the  fate 
of  Dresden  decided  me  :  I  directed  myself  on  Stolpe,  the 
twenty-fifth,  and  very  soon  had  cause  to  applaud  this  resolu- 
tion, when  I  learned  that  Oudinot  had  been  beaten,  on  the 
twenty-third,  in  a  partial  engagement  at  Gross-Beeren  near 
Berlin.  Having  decided  to  operate  on  the  communications 
of  the  grand  allied  army,  I  left  Poniatowski  alone  to  guard 
the  defiles  of  Gabel,  and  assembled  my  masses  between  Stolpe 
and  Lohman  ;  but  before  relating  these  operations  let  us  look 
for  a  moment  at  what  the  enemy  was  doing. 

The  Command  of  the  allied  Forces. — The  allied  sovereigns, 
at  the  head  of  their  grand  army,  had,  on  the  twenty-first, 
crossed  the  mountains  which  separate  Bohemia  from  Saxony, 
and  advanced  on  Dresden.     This  movement,  very  well  con- 


Oh.  XX.J  A  U  T  U  M  N     C  A  M  PAIGN     OF     18  13.  14") 

ceived,  was  very  badly  executed.  The  information  which  I 
had  received  proved  to  me  the  advantage  which  I  possessed 
over  my  adversaries  in  the  unity  of  command  and  combina- 
tions. Never  had  an  army  so  many  chiefs.  Lonis  XIV. 
had  conducted  war  with  his  ministers,  his  courtiers,  and  the 
envoys  of  his  allies  ;  but  in  fact  Louvois  and  Turenne  had 
directed  everything.  The  Emperor  Alexander  seemed  the 
natural  chief  of  the  new  league  ;  king  more  distant  from 
France  than  the  others,  he  seemed  the  most  disinterested  of 
the  monarchs.  It  is  said  that  the  chief  command  was  offered 
to  him,  but  that,  distrusting  his  own  abilities,  he  had 
modestly  declined  it,  and  that  it  was  then  decided  to  confer 
the  command  on  one  of  the  secondary  generals,  directed  by 
the  council  of  sovereigns.  Alexander  had  even  the  generosity 
to  divide  his  own  army,  and  to  distribute  his  troops  among 
those  of  Bernadotte,  Blucher,  and  Schwartzenberg. 

It  is  said,  that  afterwards,  stimulated  by  Moreau  and  Jo- 
mini,  the  emperor  of  Eussia  offered  to  charge  himself  with 
the  responsibility  which  he  had  at  first  declined,  but  that  the 
emperor  of  Austria,  appreciating  the  advantage  which  that 
commaud  would  give  him,  refused  his  assent.  The  Prince 
of  Schwartzenberg  was,  therefore,  invested  with  the  title  of 
generalissimo.  This  brave  soldier  was  not  a  man  capable  of 
directing  so  complicated  a  machine  ;  on  the  other  hand,  he 
was  of  a  modest,  yielding  character,  in  a  word,  more  fitted 
to  obey  than  to  command.  Thus  the  appointment  would 
not  have  been  so  objectionable,  if  they  had  given  him  a 
skillful  major-general  (chief  of  staff)  and  a  couple  of  aides- 
major-generals  (subordinate  officers  of  staff)  capable  of  form- 
ing under  him  good  plans  of  operation  ;  but  this  they 
neglected  to  do.  General  Eadetski  was  a  good  lieutenant- 
general,  and  young  Count  Latour  an  officer  of  great  promise; 
but  neither  had  the  experience  necessary  for  such  a  com- 
mand.    To  these  were  added  General  Languenau,  a  Saxon 

vol.  iv. — 10. 


146  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

officer  who  owed  to  me  his  advancement,  and  who,  at  the 
epoch  of  the  battle  of  Lutzen,  had  rejoined  the  Austrian 
array.  He  had  never  done  anything  to  justify  my  confidence. 
He  had  more  talent  for  intrigue  than  military  ability  ;  some 
verbose  memoirs  secured  for  him  the  favor  of  Prince  Met- 
ternich. 

It  must  not  be  inferred,  however,  from  this  whimsical 
selection  of  officers,  that  Austria  had  no  good  ones,  or  that 
her  army  was  bad  because  it  had  been  often  defeated.  That 
her  troops  should  be  imperfect,  after  twenty  years  of  reverses, 
was  natural,  and  that  her  generals  should  lose  their  confi- 
dence, was  still  more  natural  ;  however,  both  exhibited  great 
firmness  in  their  reverses,  and  the  good  qualities  of  Wurra- 
ser's  soldiers  proved  what  was  to  be  expected  of  an  Austrian 
army  when  ably  commanded.  The  staff  was  well-instructed 
in  all  the  accessary  branches,  as  topography,  fortification, 
tactics  of  detail,  &c.  But  the  habit  of  the  Aulic  Council  of 
directing  everything  themselves,  and  of  selecting  court- 
favorites  for  commands,  caused  many  misfortunes.  Why 
was  it  that  in  a  country  that  producvd  Prince  Charles,  Kray, 
Laudon,  and  Lichtenstein,  more  competent  persons  could  not 
be  found  to  direct  their  military  operations,  than  those 
charged  with  those  important  duties  in  1813  ?  Why  was  it 
that  Metternich  could  not  find  some  more  skillful  person  to 
direct  his  armies,  or  at  least  more  able  staff-officers  as  ad- 
visers to  the  Prince  of  Schwartzenberg  ? 

As  it  was,  the  Aulic  committee  of  the  campaign  had  the 
important  task  of  preparing  and  issuing  all  orders,  after  first 
submitting  them  to  the  sovereigns  who  formed  a  kind  of 
council  of  revision.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  the  King  of 
Prussia,  Lord  Cathcart  (the  English  Ambassador),  Lowen- 
hielm  (the  Swedish  Ambassador),  Prince  Wolkonsky,  Gen- 
erals Moreau,  Barclay,  Diebitsch,  Toll,  Jomini,  and  Knese- 
beck,  discussed  the   projected  operations.     As  they  had  to 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  147 

give  their  opinions  on  the  crude  plans  cf  the  others,  this 
council  led  to  interminable  debates.  Either  because  Schwart- 
zenberg  wished  to  free  himself  from  such  leading  strings,  or 
because  he  found  it  impossible  to  wait  for  these  long  discus- 
sions before  combining  his  operations,  his  orders  were  often 
sent  to  the  different  corps  without  being  first  submitted  to 
the  sovereigns  for  their  approval  ;  and  it  was  soon  found 
that  the  formation  of  plans  of  operation  for  the  army  was  left 
to  men  who  were  jitterly  ignorant  of  the  duty.  Several  gen- 
erals who  were  capable  of  appreciating  the  sad  results  of  such 
a  state  of  things,  now  urged  the  league  to  choose  an  Aga- 
memnon, and  intrust  to  him  their  destinies.  There  being 
no  monarch  suited  for  this  office,  they  proposed  the  Arch- 
duke Charles,  who  had  given  proof  of  his  capacity  :  but 
private  interests  defeated  this  object.  It  was  therefore  ne- 
cessary that  the  Emperor  Alexander  should  act  as  a  kind  of 
mediator,  and  by  his  moderation  and  address  have  the 
indirect  control  of  affairs,  and,  at  least,  avoid  great  evils,  if 
he  could  not  accomplish  great  objects. 

March  of  the  Allies  on  Dresden. — My  march  on  Silesia 
had  been  made  almost  in  musket-shot  of  the  Austrian  fron- 
tier, which  was  well-guarded  by  custom-house  officers,  game- 
keepers, forest-guards,  &c.,  yet,  strange  to  say,  Schwartzen- 
berg  knew  nothing  of  it.  He  descended  on  Marienberg  and 
Pirna  by  a  slow  march,  supposing  me  still  at  Dresden,  when 
I  was  at  the  distance  of  sixty  leagues.  St.  Cyr  threw  him- 
self into  that  city  with  the  resolution  to  defend  it  to  the 
uttermost,  so  that  I  might  have  time  to  come  to  his  assist- 
ance. The  allies  seconded  his  plans  admirably  by  the  slow- 
ness of  their  march.  They  passed,  the  mountains  on  the 
twenty-first  of  August,  but  it  was  not  till  the  evening  of  the 
twenty-fifth  that  their  right  under  Barclay  appeared  before 
Dresden,  after  beating  Clapai-ède  at  Pirna,  and  leaving 
Ostermann  in  observation  near  Konigstein.     The  Austrians, 


148  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XX. 

who  were  amusing  themselves  at  a  grand  review  in  the  plains 
of  Laun,  and  pushing  their  left  to  the  environs  of  Egra, 
combined  their  movements  so  badly  that  they  could  not 
arrive  till  two  days  after  the  Russo-Prussian  army,  which 
had  debouched  from  the  mountains  of  Glatz. 

On  learning  at  Gabel,  on  the  seventeenth,  this  movement 
of  the  allies  on  the  Elbe,  I  foresaw  this  attempt  against 
Dresden,  but  was  not  at  all  embarrassed  by  it,  for  I  knew 
that  the  place  could  not  well  be  carried  by  an  assault,  and 
that  I  was  more  advantageously  situated  than  they  were,  for 
manoeuvring  on  their  communications.  Their  first  plan  had 
been  to  march  on  Leipsic,  where  Bernadotte  would  join 
them,  by  passing  the  Elbe  at  Dessau.  If  they  had  followed 
this  project,  and  I  had  gained  a  great  battle,  their  destruc- 
tion would  have  been  almost  certain.  By  drawing  to  mc 
the  army  of  Oudinot,  I  should  have  had  two  hundred  thou- 
sand men  ;  and  by  passing  the  Elbe  at  Dresden  on  their 
rear,  I  should  have  got  possession  of  their  magazines,  and 
their  line  of  operations  on  Bohemia  ;  I  Avould  have  attacked 
them  at  Leipsic  with  the  advantage  of  having  in  my  power 
all  the  fortified  debouches  of  the  Elbe  ;  I  would  also  have 
held  the  issues  of  that  river,  of  the  Oder,  arid  of  Bohemia, 
so  that  the  allies,  if  beaten,  would  have  been  thrown  back 
on  the  Baltic,  without  the  ability  of  regaining  Austria. 

The  king  of  Saxony,  under  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the 
inconvenience  of  living  in  a  fortified  capital,  had,  since  181<>. 
begun  to  demolish  the  defenses  of  the  old  city.  But  during 
the  armistice  I  had  employed  numerous  workmen  in  rebuild- 
ing them  :  the  dismantled  fronts  had  been  made  sufficiently 
strong  to  resist  an  assault,  and  the  rich  exterior  faubourgs 
were  covered  by  an  enceinte  of  thirteen  redoubts,  of  which 
eight  were  on  the  right,  and  five  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Elbe.  These  were  not  strong  enough  to  resist  a  siege, 
nor  even  an   assault,  if  defended    by  only  an   ordinary  gar- 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     18  13.  149 

rison  ;  but  defended  by  au  entire  army,  the  post  was  ini- 
pïegnable. 

The  allies  had  two  courses  to  pursue  :'lst,  to  debouch  by 
Peters  walde,  Altenberg,  and  Marienberg  ;  to  occupy  the 
heights  of  Dippodiswalde  with  their  right  reën forced  towards 
Gieshubel,  and  to  there  await  my  attack  ;  2d,  to  march 
rapidly  against  Dresden  with  several  thousand  fascines  and 
scaling-ladders,  and,  if  I  was  not  found  there  with  the  mass 
of  my  forces,  to  attempt  against  the  faubourgs  and  old  town 
what  Bernadotte  and  Soult  had  done  at  Lubeck  :  they 
might  have  been  repelled  with  the  loss  of  several  thousand 
men  ;  but  as  the  result  of  the  campaign  depended  upon  the 
success  of  this  operation,  it  was  well  worth  the  attempt. 
As  soon  as  my  presence  at  Dresden  announced  that  the  mass 
of  my  forces  was  opposed  to  them,  the  question  was  changed, 
and  the  allies  ought  then  to  have  held  themselves  in  the 
imposing  position  between  Gieshubel  and  Dippodiswalde. 
This  place  would  have  been  to  me  what  Taroutina  was  in 
1812.  Placed  on  my  line  of  operation,  they  might  have 
continually  inundated  it  with  partisans,  and  nothing  but  a 
decisive  battle  could  have  rid  me  of  such  troublesome  neigh- 
bors. If  beaten,  the  allies  could  have  escaped  behind  the 
Eger  ;  if  conquerors,  they  would  have  driven  me  back  into 
Dresden,  where,  under  such  circumstances,  my  position 
would  have  been  far  from  secure.  I  should  have  been 
obliged  to  adopt  the  course  which  I  pursued  in  October, — 
to  file  on  Leipsic.  But  the  Austrians,  who  were  ignorant 
of  my  being  on  the  Katzbach,  the  twenty-first  of  August, 
did  not  yet  know,  on  the  twenty-fifth,  that  I  had  returned 
to  Stolpe.  In  fact  they  had  received  only  a  few  hours  before 
the  dispatches  of  Blucher,  saying  that  I  was  hotly  pressing 
him  near  Goldberg.  How  then  was  it  possible  that  I  could 
be  on  the  Elbe  the  next  day  with  the  same  troops  ! 

At  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the   twenty-fifth  the 


150  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

allied  sovereigns  had  assembled  on  the  heights  of  Roeknitz 
before  Dresden,  to  decide  upon  the  disposition  of  their 
forces.  Two  divisions  of  St.  Cyr  were  in  advance  of  the 
city,  deployed  between  the  Gros-Garten  and  the  road  to 
Dippodiswalde,  with  their  rear  supported  on  the  intrenched 
camp.  A  Russian  general  proposed  to  attack,  citing  in  sup- 
port of  this  opinion  our  operation  against  Blucher  at  Lubeck. 
A  vigorous  coup-dc-main  might  have  decided  the  campaign. 
by  rendering  the  allies  masters  of  my  base  of  operations. 

All  the  allies  who  had  passed  through  Dresden  some 
months  before,  knew  that  this  old  town  had  been  partly  dis- 
mantled, and  that  I  had  only  been  able  to  secure  the  place 
by  field-works.  On  the  supposition  that  I  was  still  in  Silesia, 
there  was  no  reason  to  hesitate  :  they  must  either  risk  an 
attack,  or  form  in  battle-array  between  Gieshubel  and  Dip- 
podiswalde. They  determined  upon  the  former  :  the  attempt 
could  cost  nothing,  and  never  was  there  a  project  with  more 
powerful  motives  for  its  adoption.  But  Schwartzenberg 
wished  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  his  Austrians,  who  were 
marching  from  Marienberg  by  horrible  roads,  instead  of 
taking  the  great  road,  or  at  least  that  which  runs  directly 
from  Sayda  to  Dresden.  He  therefore  postponed  the  attack 
till  four  o'clock  P.  M.  on  the  twenty-sixth.  This  was  a 
great  error,  because  the  hundred  thousand  Russians  and 
Prussians  under  Barclay  were  sufficient  for  a  coup-de^main 
against  three  divisions.  Numbers  here  were  of  no  conse- 
quence, but  time  was  everything.  It  was  not  in  contending 
with  me  that  they  could  lose  thirty  hours  with  impunity. 

Their  singular  Dispositions  for  Attack.—  To  this  mistake 
they  added  another  still  greater  in  their  manner  of  attack. 
The  plan  prepared  by  Schwartzenberg  fell  into  my  hands 
among  the  baggage  which  was  captured.  It  was  a  chef- 
d'œuvre  of  its  kind  ;  it  ran  thus  :  a  general  reconnaissance 
will  be  attempted  on  the  place  of  Dresden  ;  the  army  will 


On.   XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPA1X     OF     1813.  151 

advance  in  five  columns  which  will  endeavor  to  carry  the 
works,  and  to  penetrate  into  the  city  ! Can  any- 
thing more  incoherent  be  imagined  !  lie  either  wished  to 
reconnoitre,  or  to  make  an  assault  ;  in  the  first  case,  why 
place  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men  in  mass  around 
a  place,  and  make  them  fight  ?  If,  instead  of  a  simple  recon- 
noissance,  he  designed  an  assault,  why  not  prescribe  the  pre- 
cautions and  preparations  for  such  an  attempt  ?  Mack 
has  been  greatly  decried,  but  he  never  imagined  anything 
like  this  1 

Project  to  cut  off  the  Allies  at  Koenigstein.— As  has  al-' 
ready  been  said,  I  had  returned  to  Stolpe,  on  the  twenty- 
fifth,  by  a  remarkable  forced  march.  My  project  was  at  first 
to  debouch  with  one  hundred  thousand  men  by  Koenigstein 
and  Pima  on  the  enemy's  rear  ;  I  informed  the  Duke  of 
Bassano  of  this  at  Dresden,  by  the  following  letter  which  I 
addressed  to  him  from  Goerlitz,  on  the  twenty -fourth  of 
August  : 

"  It  is  my  intention  to  march  to  Stolpe.  My  army  will 
be  assembled  there  to-morrow  ;  I  shall  pass  the  twenty-sixth 
there,  in  making  preparations,  and  in  rallying  my  columns. 
Ou  the  night  of  the  twenty-sixth,  I  shall  move  my  columns 
by  Koenigstein,  and  at  day-break  on  the  twenty-seventh,  I 
will  establish  myself  in  the  camp  of  Pirna  with  one  hundred 
thousand  men.  By  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  I  will 
commence  an  attack  on  Hollendorf,  and  by  noon  will  ta 
master  of  the  place.  I  will  then  put  myself  in  a  command- 
ing position  on  that  communication.  I  will  make  myself 
master  of  Pirna,  and  have  pontoons  ready  to  establish  two 
bridges  at  that  place,  if  necessary.  If  the  enemy  has  taken 
for  his  line  of  operation  the  road  from  Peterswalde  to  Dres- 
den, I  will  be  found  on  his  rear  with  all  my  army  united 
against  his,  which  he  cannot  rally  in  less  than  four  or  five 
hours.     If  he  has  taken  his  line  of  operations  by  the  road  to 


152  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

Komotaw,  Dresden  will  be  relieved  ;  I  shall  then  be  in  Bo- 
hemia, nearer  Prague  than  the  enemy,  and  will  march  there. 
Marshal  St.  Cyr  will  follow  the  enemy  as  soon  as  he  appears 
disconcerted. 

"  1  will  mask  my  movement  by  covering  the  bank  of  the 
Elbe  with  thirty  thousand  cavalry  and  light  artillery,  so  that 
the  enemy,  seeing  all  the  shore  occupied,  will  think  my  army 
about  Dresden  !  Such  is  my  project.  It  may,  however,  be 
modified  by  the  operations  of  the  enemy.  I  suppose  that 
when  I  shall  undertake  my  attack,  Dresden  will  not  be  so 
assailed  that  she  can  not  hold  out  for  twenty-four  hours. 

"  You  may  impart  to  the  King  of  Saxony  alone  my  pro- 
jects, and  say  to  him  that  if  the  enemy  press  Dresden,  it  may 
be  more  convenient  for  him  to  take  a  country  house  on  the 
right  bank.  Send  none  but  very  vague  news  to  Paris,  giving 
it  to  be  understood  that  they  will  hear  at  the  same  time  my 
victory  over  the  army  of  Silesia,  the  capture  of  Berlin,  and 
of  other  even  Is  still  more  important.  Write  to  Erfurth, 
Munich,  and  Wurtzbourg  in  cypher.  The  letter  to  Wurtz- 
bourg  will  be  imparted  to  the  Duke  of  Castiglione.  Write 
to  General  Margaron  that  if  he  is  pressed  at  Leij>sic,  he 
ought  to  retire  on  Torgau.  See  the  director  of  the  estafette, 
and  have  it  pass  through  Leipsic  and  Torgau. 

"  If  Marshal  St.  Cyr  has  sufficient  force  to  defend  Dres- 
den, and  should  not  be  pressed,  let  him  send  out  to  meet 
General  Yandammc,  so  that  the  latter  may  take  position 
with  his  divisions  at  Xeustadt,  seeing  that  any  retrograde 
movement  may  be  disadvantageous." 

The  success  of  this  enterprise  would  have  produced  im- 
mense results.  I  should  have  cut  off  the  allies'  line  of  re- 
treat ;  and,  in  case  of  reverse,  I  could  have  taken  refuge 
under  the  fort  of  Koenigstein  and  the  camp  of  Pirna,  where 
I  could  recross  the  Elbe  in  security  ;  these  têtes-de-pemt  were 
of  incalculable  importance  to  me.     But  information  which  I 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  153 

received  from  St.  Cyr  made  mc  fear  that  a  strong  attempt 
might  be  made  to  carry  Dresden,  and  as  the  force  of  the 
enemy  was  rumored  to  be  two  hundred  thousand  men,  I  sent 
Gourgaud  to  reconnoitre  St.  Cyr's  position  ;  he  returned  in 
haste,  and  assured  me  that  the  enemy  were  strong  enough  to 
carry  the  city,  if  they  attacked  it  with  vigor.  I,  therefore, 
concluded  my  projected  manoeuvre  would  be  too  adventurous, 
and  preferred  to  march  directly  on  Dresden  so  as  to  deboucli 
from  there,  throwing  Vandamme  on  the  decisive  point  of 
the  road  to  Peterswalde.  Under  the  circumstances  I  did  not 
repent  having  formed  this  resolution  ;  but  God  alone  knows 
what  would  have  been  the  result,  if  I  had  executed  the  plan 
which  I  dictated  at  Stolpe  on  the  twenty-fifth.  I  could 
have  drawn  Poniatowski  toward  me,  and  have  placed  one 
hundred  and 'thirty  thousand  men  on  the  only  communica- 
tion of  the  allies  !  On  the  other  hand,  my  troops  were 
young  and  without  experience,  and  I  had  but  few  old  cavalry. 
The  allies  had  a  more  numerous  force,  were  better  organized, 
and  numbered  at  least  forty  thousand  experienced  cavalry. 
Moreover,  time  was  wanting  to  rally  the  armies  of  Mac- 
donald  and  Oudinot,  from  which  I  would  have  been  separa- 
ted, had  I  been  defeated.  The  last  of  these  two  marshals 
had  just  experienced  a  check  at  Gros-Beeren,  of  little  im- 
portance in  itself,  but  calculated  to  effect  the  morale  of  the 
contending  forces.  All  these  motives  combined  to  induce  me 
to  ehange  my  project,  and  to  march  on  Dresden  the  morning 
of  the  twenty-seventh. 

Battle  of  Dresden,  August  26th  and  27th.— I  thought 
that  at  the  sight  of  my  columns  which  descended  the  Elbe 
and  commanded  the  right  of  Wittgenstein,  the  allies  would 
renounce  their  project  of  attacking  the  city.  The  head  of 
my  columns  entered  the  town  at  two  o'clock,  and  to  my 
great  astonishment,  at  precisely  four  o'clock,  one  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men  assailed  the  works.     I  have  since 


154  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XX. 

learned  that  this  assault  was  made  through  an  inconceivable 
misunderstanding.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  learning  my 
return  from  the  reports  of  my  cannon,  nu\v  pronounced  it 
ridiculous  to  make  the  projected  attack  ;  all  agreed  in  this 
opinion,  and  Schwartzenberg  started  to  revoke  the  orders. 
It  was  now  one  o'clock,  and  there  was  plenty  of  time  to  give 
the  counter-order.  It  required  no  new  dispositions,  merely 
a  verbal  direction  to  the  principal  officers  countermanding 
the  attack  ;  but  no  direction  was  given.  It  is  not  pretended 
that  it  was  forgotten,  but  that  the  objections  of  Radetzki 
and  Languerau  prevented  its  being  sent.  The  responsibility 
of  this  neglect  is  to  be  divided  between  the  generalissimo  and 
those  who  composed  his  staff. 

The  enemy's  columns  assaulted  the  works  with  great  im- 
petuosity ;  those  of  Colloredo  and  Lichtenstein  penetrated 
into  the  city.  The  Russians  and  Prussians  formed  a  lodg- 
ment in  Gros-Garten  and  Strieseu  ;  at  the  left,  Bianchi  got 
possession  of  Lobela  and  the  houses  near  the  gate  of  Frey- 
berg  ;  Giulay  and  Metzko  pushed  on  nearly  to  Friedrichstadt. 
St.  Cyr  had  taken  care  to  draw  in  the  divisions  which  had 
been  deployed  on  the  twenty-fifth  ;  so  that  columns  of  at- 
tack were  ready  to  debouch  as  soon  as  the  fire  of  the  in- 
trenchments  had  staggered  the  enemy.  He  was  everywhere 
repulsed.  Ney  debouched  at  the  head  of  two  divisions  of 
the  Young  Guard  and  drove  back  the  left  of  the  Austrians 
on  Lobela  ;  two  other  divisions  made  a  sortie  by  the  gate  of 
Pinar  and  repulsed  Kleist  ;  St.  Cyr,  at  the  centre,  drove  back 
Chasteller  and  Colloredo.  During  the  night  I  was  rejoined 
by  the  remainder  of  my  troops  from  Silesia,  and  now  found 
myself  at  the  head  of  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  men, 
independent  of  the  corps  of  Vandamme  ;  but  the  allies  had 
one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men  besides  those  against 
Vandamme.  Nevertheless,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  attack  them  ; 
I  required  a  complete  victory  to  clear  my  communications. 


Ch.  XX.]  A  U  T  U  M  N     CAMPAIGN     OF     181  3  .  155 

On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh,  wc  debouched  from 
Dresden,  while  Vandamme  took  the  enemy  in  reverse  by 
Koenigstein.  The  allied  army,  drawn  up  in  a  semi-circle 
before  Dresden,  supported  its  right  on  the  Elbe,  its  centre  on 
the  heights  of  Roekniz  ;  but  its  left  was  paralyzed  by  being 
placed  beyond  the  defile  of  Tharandt,  which  it  could  not 
cross.  Under  the  pretext  of  facilitating  its  junction, 
Schwartzenberg  had  insisted,  against  all  advice,  in  placing 
three  Austrian  divisions  beyond  this  precipice.  This  exposed 
them  without  necessity.  It  is  true  that  it  was  advantageous 
to  seize  it  ;  but  Klenau  was  there  already  ;  there  was  no 
objection  to  his  remaining  at  a  distance,  and  it  would  even 
have  been  better  if  he  had  been  left  at  Freyberg,  instead  of 
drawing  him  to  Dresden,  since  the  first  of  these  points  was 
two  days'  march  nearer  my  base  of  operations,  and  from  it 
he  could  have  anticipated  me  if  I  had  decided  to  regain  the 
Saal. 

In  profiting  by  this  error,  I  accomplished  the  double  object 
of  overthrowing  their  isolated  divisions,  and  opening  my  own 
communication.  I  therefore  threw  the  King  of  Naples 
against  them  with  the  cavalry  of  Latour-Maubourg  and  the 
corj)s  of  Belluno.  A  very  warm  combat  was  engaged  be- 
tween Lobela  and  Corbitz.  The  weather  was  frightful,  tor- 
rents of  rain  had  been  falling  since  midnight  ;  the  few  Aus- 
trian cavalry  could  not  resist  our  cuirassiers  ;  and  the 
infantry,  soaked  with  rain  and  not  being  able  to  fire  their 
pieces,  were  broken  at  the  centre  near  Corbitz.  Giulay  hav- 
ing been  driven  into  the  defile  of  Tharandt  near  Potschapel, 
Murat  attacked  the  three  brigades  of  the  extreme  right  under 
Metzko,  which,  being  isolated,  turned,  and  defeated,  laid 
down  their  arms,  after  useless  efforts  to  escape.  More  than 
ten  thousand  prisoners  were  the  fruit  of  this  brilliant  feat  of 
arms.  In  the  mean  time  the  left  of  Belluno  established 
itself  in  the  village  of  Plauen,  which  constitutes  the  key  of 


156  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XX 

the  defile  of  Tharandt,  and  the  only  point  by  which  it  was 
possible  to  succor  the  three  comproniitted  divisions. 

Marmont  and  St.  Cyr,  supporting  themselves  on  the  in- 
trenched camp,  had  limited  their  operations  to  cannonading 
the  enemy  and  repelling  the  charges  of  the  Austrians  and 
Prussians  ;  the  latter  had  made  a  lodgment  in  the  Gros- 
Garten  and  rested  on  the  village  of  Strehlen,  which  Kleist 
had  at  first  been  ordered  to  evacuate,  and  which  he  had 
afterward  vainly  attempted  to  recapture.  The  enormous 
masses  of  the  allies  at  the  centre  on  the  heights  of  Roeknitz, 
did  not  allow  us  to  undertake  any  thing  on  that  point.  I, 
however,  caused  it  to  be  cannonaded  by  the  artillery  of  the 
guard  and  that  of  the  Duke  of  Ragusa.  It  was  here  that 
Moreau  had  his  legs  carried  away  by  a  French  ball.  This 
general,  who  had  been  deemed,  by  my  enemies,  capable  of 
balancing  my  fortune,  had  returned  from  America  to  enter 
the  Russian  service.  He  soon  perceived  his  error  ;  for  the 
Austrians  allowed  him  no  part  in  the  command.  He  died 
the  next  day  at  Laun,  worthy  perhaps  of  a  better  fate.* 

On  our  left,  Ney,  having  united  four  divisions  of  the 
Young  Guard  between  Gros-Garten  and  the  Elbe,  debouched 
from  Gruna  against  Wittgenstein.  It  was  now  the  more 
easy  to  push  on  to  Reich,  as  the  allies  had  determined  during 
the  night  to  concentrate  on  the  heights  of  Leubnitz,  and  to 

*  The  following  remarks  are  copied  from  Thiers  : 

'■Whilst  these  events  were  taking  place  on  the  allies'  left,  a  strange  accident 
occurred'at  the  centre,  where  Napoleon  was  exchanging  a  vigorous  cannonade 
with  the  Austrians,  and  where  he  himself  directed  the  operations  of  his  bat- 
teries in  the  very  thickest  of  the  fire.  At  the  same  time,  the  emperor  was  at  a 
23oint  exactly  opposite,  at  Rackwltz,  accompanied  by  General  Moreau,  who  see- 
ing the  danger  of  his  position,  advised  him  to  withdraw  somewhat  further 
back.  This  advice  had  barely  been  given,  and  was  on  the  very  point  of  being 
executed,  when  a  bullet  from  the  batteries  of  which  Napoleon  was  personally 
directing  the  fire,  struck  the  general  on  his  legs,  and  hurled  him  and  his  horse 
to  the  ground.  A  strange  stroke  of  fortune,  this  !  which  made  the  instrument 
of  his  death,  a  ball  from  a  French  cannon,  fired,  as  it  were,  by  Napoleon's  own 
hand." 


Cit.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  J 57 

abandon  the  valley  of  the  Elbe  so  as  to  fall  on  our  flank  it' 
we  ventured  to  engage  ourselves  there.  The  Russian  general, 
Roth,  nevertheless,  made  a  glorious  defense  of  the  villages 
of  Seidnitz  and  G-ros-Dobritz,  and  regained  in  good  order 
the  right  of  Wittgenstein  behind  Reich. 

In  the  meantime  Kleist,  Miloradowitch,  the  reserve  of  the 
Grand-duke  Constantine,  Colloredo,  and  the  reserve  of  the 
Prince  of  Hesse-Homburg,  had  scarcely  been  engaged.  The 
half  of  their  masses  accumulated  on  the  centre  might  have 
attacked  Ney  hy  Strehlen,  and  have  defeated  him  while  ex- 
tended too  much  to  the  left  so  as  to  form  a  line  parallel  to 
the  Elbe.  The  project  was  approved  hy  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, and  the  masses  of  Kleist  and  Miloradowitch  were 
actually  disposed  for  the  purpose  of  striking  this  hlow. 
Barclay  was  at  the  same  time  to  descend  from  Leubnitz  with 
the  reserve  and  Gortschakof  s  corps  ;  but  lie  failed  to  give 
the  signal  for  the  others  to  act,  and  the  thing  was  not  at- 
tempted. If  the  movement  had  been  executed  with  vigor 
and  ensemble,  it  might  have  balanced  the  defeat  of  Giulay 
on  the  left. 

The  Austrians  have  only  to  attribute  to  their  own  chiefs 
this  bloody  defeat.  Not  satisfied  with  recommending  to 
their  left  to  hold  all  the  space  between  Plauen  and  Priesnitz 
even  to  the  Elbe,  which  was  absurd,  they  attached  to  it  only 
one  division  of  cavalry,  while  the  reserve  of  the  Prince  of 
Hesse-Homburg  was  concentrated  on  the  centre  and  uselessly 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  our  artillery,  from  which  it  suffered  as 
great  losses  as  if  it  had  been  engaged.  The  ground  here  was 
unfavorable  for  the  manoeuvring  of  cavalry,  and  the  Russian 
and  Prussian  horse  would  have  been  abundantly  sufficient 
for  the  object  in  view,  whereas  three  divisions  of  the  Austrian 
cuirassiers  on  the  left  flank,  might  have  decided  the  battle 
and  saved  their  infantry. 

The  Allies  determine  to  retreat,— It  was  now  five  o'clock, 


158  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

and  beginning  to  grow  dark  ;  the  rain  wag  increasing,  and 
the  troops  on  both  sides  were  drenched.  The  allies,  or  rather 
a  majority  of  them,  informed  at  the  same  time  of  the  disas- 
ter of  their  left  and  of  the  passage  of  Vandamme  at  Koe- 
nigstein,  were  inclined  to  retreat.  The  Emperor  of  Russia 
was  not  pleased  with  the  plan,  and  the  King  of  Prussia  was 
unwilling  to  hear  it  spoken  of  ;  but  the  Austrians  declared 
that  they  had  brought  with  them  only  half-supplies  for  their 
artillery,  and  had  but  a  few  more  rounds  to  fire  ;  that  their 
parks  of  provisions  had  been  unable  to  follow  them  through  the 
narrow  roads  of  the  mountains  ;  in  a  word,  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  regain  Bohemia  in  order  to  prevent  the  dissolution 
of  their  army.  Notwithstanding  the  constant  opposition  of 
the  King  of  Prussia,  they  decided  upon  a  retreat  ;  two  gen- 
erals charged  with  drawing  up  the  order  of  it,  soon  returned 
with  a  burlesque  disposition  for  a  retreat  behind  the  Eger  in 
five  columns,  each  of  which  had  its  daily  march  marked  out 
in  regular  stages  as  in  time  of  peace  and  without  any  refer- 
ence to  what  might  occur  to  the  other  columns  !  Such  com- 
binations excited  the  ire  of  the  enlightened  critics,  but  time 
was  pressing,  and  if  they  were  to  retire  that  night,  not  a 
moment  was  to  be  lost.  The  plan  was,  therefore,  assented 
to  through  disgust  rather  than  conviction.  As  a  chef -oV  ouvre 
of  absurdity  in  this  disposition,  they  feared  to  take,  at  the 
right,  the  good  road  to  Pirna,  because  Vandamme  occupied 
it  with  twenty-five  thousand  men,  although  there  was  no 
river  or  other  obstacle  to  cross  ;  Barclay,  Kleist,  and  the 
Russian  reserve  might  have  taken  this  road  without  any 
great  inconvenience.  Vandamme,  hemmed  in  between  them 
and  Ostermann's  corps  would  have  been  happy  to  effect  his 
own  escape.  They  directed  Barclay  and  Kleist  by  Dohna 
on  G-ieshubel  ;  Klenau  by  Freyberg  and  Marienberg  ;  the 
Austrians  by  Altenberg  and  Zinwald.  This  ill-planned 
order  was  still  farther  aggravated  by  Barclay,  who,  fearing 


'  'h.  XX.]  A  U  ï  U  MX     C  A  M  P  A  I  G  N     OF     18  1  3  .  159 

to  find  the  passage  barred  at  Peterswalde  or  Dohna,  threw 
himself  with  the  Russians  on  the  road  to  Dippodiswalde  and 
Altenberg,  where  they  became  frightfully  jammed  in  with  the 
Austrians.  This  resolution  was  the  more  to  be  regretted  as 
Ostermann,  although  left  alone,  succeeded  in  effecting  a  pas- 
sage ;  and  Barclay  with  fifty  thousand  men  more  could  have 
found  very  little  difficulty  in  doing  the  same  thing. 

The  enemy  lost  much  of  their  artillery  and  thirty  thousand 
men  hors-dc-combat,  including  the  ten  thousand  Austrians 
of  the  left  wing  who  were  taken  prisoners.  The  trophies 
gained  in  the  pursuit  were  scarcely  less  :  we  captured  in  the 
defiles  two  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  and  caissons,  a  thou- 
sand waggons,  and  a  multitude  of  wounded  and  stragglers. 
This  was  one  of  the  most  glorious  victories  I  ever  gained. 
We  were  but  one  to  their  two,  nevertheless  the  victory  was 
not  for  a  moment  doubtful  at  the  points  where  I  struck.  It 
was  the  only  battle  where  I  operated  at  the  same  time  on 
both  wings;  the  position  of  Dresden  at  the  centre  enabled 
me  to  do  so  without  danger.  This  circumstance  was  the 
more  fortunate  for  me,  as  the  principal  communications  of 
the  allies  were  on  the  wings,  and  by  getting  possession  of 
these  I  forced  them  to  retreat  in  disorder  through  the  defiles 
of  the  mountains. 

Operations  of  Yandainmc  near  Koenigstein. — The  same 
day  on  which  we  gained  these  important  successes,  Van- 
damme,  crossing  the  Elbe  at  Koenigstein  with  thirty  thou- 
sand men,  forced  Count  Ostermann,  who  masked  this  fort 
with  the  division  of  the  old  Russian  guards  and  the  corps  of 
Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg,  to  retire,  which  he  did  by 
taking  the  road  to  Pirna,  either  because  his  right  was  turned 
or  because  he  had  been  ordered  to  fall  back  in  that  direction. 
On  the  twenty-eighth  of  August  he  was  forced,  by  the  retro- 
grade movement  of  the  allies,  to  take  the  road  to  Peters- 
walde.      Vandamme,  having  already  turned   him,   cut    the 


160  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

road,  first  at  Griesbubel,  and  then  at  Hôellendorf.  The 
Russian  general  was  compelled  to  cut  his  way  out,  and  our 
young  soldiers,  being  obliged  to  defend  too  long  a  line,  and 
assailed  by  veterans  of  the  old  guard,  were  driven  back. 
Ostermann  bivouacked  at  Peterswalde  where  he  rallied  his 
forces,  and  the  next  day  defended  the  ground,  foot  by  foot, 
with  exemplary  firmness  as  far  as  Culm  :  even  one  of  his 
brigades  which  bad  been  cut  off  succeeded  in  rejoining  him. 
I  had  foreseen  the  advantage  which  was  to  be  derived  from 
Vandamme's  position  iu  case  we  were  victorious  at  Dresden. 
I  had  ordered  him  to  descend  from  the  mountains,  and  push 
rapidly  on  Toeplitz,  with  the  promise  of  his  being  sustained. 
If  this  movement  had  succeeded,  it  would  have  destroyed  the 
greater  part  of  the  allies  who  were  still  engaged  in  retreat  iu 
the  defiles  of  Altenberg.     But  fortune  decided  otherwise. 

Disaster  of  Vandaiume  at  Culm.  —  Ostermann  and  his 
troops  also  seeing  the  importance  of  the  point  of  Toeplitz, 
fought  on  the  twenty-ninth  with  an  intrepidity  above  all 
praise,  and  finally  succeeded  in  maintaining  themselves  be- 
hind Culm,  notwithstanding  the  reiterated  efforts  of  our 
troops.  Towards  evening  they  began  to  receive  reënforce- 
ments  which  restored  the  equilibrium  of  the  contending 
forces  :  the  Grand-Duke  Cmstantine  carried  there  a  part  of 
the  Russian  reserve.  This  first  contrariety  was  followed  by 
a  circumstance  much  more  deplorable,  which  caused  the 
ruin  of  Vandamme.  No  sooner  was  victory  declared  in  our 
favor  in  the  plains  of  Colditz  and  Dresden,  than  I  devised 
the  means  of  profiting  by  it.  The  king  of  Naples  and  Bel- 
luuo  followed  the  enemy  on  Sayda  ;  Ragusa  had  taken  the 
road  to  Altenberg  ;  St.  Cyr  debouched  on  Dohna,  Maxen, 
and  Liebenau  ;  Mortier,  with  the  Young  Guard,  took  the 
road  to  Pirna  ;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,  I 
started  with  my  head-quarters  for  that  city.  I  was  to  leave 
there  on  the   twenty-ninth  to   follow   Vandamme  :    but  a 


CH.  XX.]  A  U  T  U  M  X     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813  1G1 

fatality  which  seemed  to  attach  itself  to  all  my  enterprises, 
did  not  permit  me  to  complete  the  movement.  Having  been 
exposed  for  fifteen  hours  on  the  twenty-seventh  to  a  violent 
rain,  I  was  seized  the  next  day  during  my  march  to  Pirna 
with  so  violent  a  fever  as  to  compel  me  to  return  abruptly  to 
Dresden.  I  had  the  project  of  joining  the  army  of  Oudinot 
with  fifty  thousand  men,  and  taking  possession  of  Berlin  ; 
this  motive  caused  me  to  renounce  the  movement  on  Bohe- 
mia. I,  at  first,  had  reason  to  applaud  this  resolution  ;  for, 
on  returning  to  Dresden,  I  heard  of  Macdonald's  bloody  de- 
feat on  the  Katzbach.  The  reënforcements  intended  to  sus- 
tain Yandamme  were  then  stopt  at  Pirna  :  but  unfortunately 
he  was  not  informed  of  this.  Berthier  probably  neglected  to 
take  the  proper  means  to  communicate  the  information  to 
him,     The  circumstances  have  never  been  explained.* 

The  allies  descended  with  one  hundred  thousand  men  into 
the  valley  on  the  morning  of  the  thirtieth,  convinced  that 
their  safety  depended  upon  the  overthrow  of  Yandamme.  A 
man  less  audacious  would  not  have  waited  the  attack,  but 
would  have  effected  his  escape  during  the  night  or  at  break 
of  day.  But  expecting  my  arrival  he  resolved  to  maintain 
his  position.  Although  turned  on  the  right  and  left,  and 
assailed  in  front,  he  still  refused  to  retreat,  it  being  an- 
nounced that  a  column  was  finally  seen  debouching  on  the 
mountains  towards  Hollendorf.  But  the  joy  caused  by  this 
news  was  of  short  duration  ;  it  was  soon  found  that  this 
column,  instead  of  being  one  of  mine,  was  the  Prussian 
corps  of  Kleist,  which  the  Emperor  Alexander  had  ordered 
to  descend  on  the  flank  of  the  French  towards  Kraupen,  and 

*  Jomini,  in  a  long  note,  contradicts  the  assertion  of  Fain  that  Yandamme 
descended  from  the  mountains  without  orders.  It  appears  that  this  order 
was  given,  and  that  Napoleon  at  first  made  his  dispositions  to  sustain  him  ; 
but  when  his  illness  forced  him  to  return  to  Dresden,  ho  either  forgot  to 
give  counter-directions  to  Vandamme,  or  Berthier  neglected  to  send  the 
orde'-. 

VOL.   IV. — 11. 


162  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

which  had  taken  the  main  road,  instead  of  the  path  by  the 
old  castle,  then  encumbered  with  equipages.  The  cavalry 
of  Vandamme  threw  itself  on  the  first  troops  of  Kleist  and 
cut  their  way  through  :  twelve  thousand  infantry  had  the 
good  fortune  to  follow  them,  and  to  regain  the  army  through 
the  woods.  All  the  others,  and  Yandamme  himself,  being 
surrounded,  fought  with  desperation,  but  were  taken  in  arms. 
This  combat  cost  us  at  least  fifteen  thousand  men  and  sixty 
pieces  of  artillery. 

This  defeat,  so  unexpected,  was  a  double  misfortune,  for 
it  might  be  imputed  to  a  manifest  forgetfulness  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  war.  These  principles  required  a  hot  pursuit  of  a 
beaten  and  broken  army.  On  this  depended  the  success  of 
the  war  ;  all  else  was  only  accessory.  If  I  had  left  Pirna  to 
succor  Macdonald,  the  resolution  would  have  been  excusable; 
but  I  did  not  then  know  of  his  defeat.  If  I  had  returned  to 
Dresden  for  no  other  object  than  to  prepare  to  march  on 
Berlin,  it  would  undoubtedly  have  been  one  of  the  gravest 
faults  of  my  life.  It  is  true  that  the  consequences  would 
have  been  less  serious  if  Berthier  had  recalled  Vandamme. 
Although  this  accident  was  not  the  result  of  my  own  in- 
tended dispositions,  nevertheless,  it  not  only  prevented  me 
from  profiting  by  my  victory,  but  also  became  the  first  cause 
of  the  defeat  of  my  lieutenant.* 


*  The  following  is  Thiers'  account  of  this  battle  : 

'•  Such  was  the  unfortunate  affair  at  Culm,  which  cost  us  five  or  six  thou- 
sand meu  killed  or  wounded,  seven  thousand  prisoners,  forty-eight  pieces  of 
cannon,  and  two  generals,  and  which,  whilst  costing  the  allies  some  six 
thousand  men,  relieved  them  from  their  position  of  defeat,  reinspired  them 
with  the  hope  of  victory,  and  effaced  from  their  minds  the  remembrance  of 
the  disasters  they  had  suffered  on  the  twenty-sixth  and  twenty -seventh  of 
August. 

"  Where  can  we  look  for  the  cause  of  this  singular  catastrophe  ?  Shall  we 
attribute  it  to  Yandamme,  saying  that  he  ventured  too  much  ?  Or  to  Mortier 
and  St.  Cyr,  complaining  that  they  failed  to  afford  him  timely  succor?  or  to 
Napoleon,  on  the  ground  that  he  trusted  too  much  to  the  favorable  progress 


in.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     18  13.  1G3 

Oudinot  defeated  at  Gross-Beeren.— It  was  the  more  to 
be  regretted  as  it  tended  to  encourage  the  allied  army  at  the 
moment  of  our  misfortunes  in  Silesia  and  Brandenburg.     I 

of  affairs  ?  or  shall  we  rather  regard  it  as  the  legitimate  consequence  of  the 
military  skill  displayed  by  the  generals  of  the  allied  armies? 

••  The  facta  above  narrated  almost  of  themselves  sufficiently  answer  these 
questions,  and  account  for  one  of  the  greatest  reverses  of  fortune  of  which 
the  pages  of  history  retain  any  record. 

"Vandamme,  whose  many  faults  were  counterbalanced  by  many  fino  qual- 
ities, is  certainly  not  blâmable  for  the  unfortunate  results  of  these  days;  for  if, 
after  having  wisely  established  himself  at  Culm,  it  was  General  Kleist  instead 
of  Marshal  Mortier  who  appeared  in  his  rear,  this  was  an  extraordinary  acci- 
dent, to  hold  him  responsible  for  which  would  be  a  crying  injustice.  During 
the  catastrophe  which  followed,  Vandamme  preserved  all  his  presence  of  mind, 
and  took  the  only  resolution  which  offered  a  chance  of  escape,  namely,  that  of 
retracing  his  steps,  and  passing  through  the  midst  of  the  Prussian  troops. 

"  He  is  not  fairly  open  to  reproach,  and  the  supposition  that  he  lost  himself, 
in  a  too  eager  pursuit  of  that  marshal's  baton  which,  far  more  than  others,  he 
deserve  I  for  military  services  already  performed,  is  a  calumny  upon  a  man 
whose  misfortunes  render  him  an  object  for  pity  rather  than  blame. 

"If  it  be  admitted,  however,  that  Vandamme  is  not  to  bo  blamed,  having 
been  unfortunate  only  in  the  fact  that  a  Prussian  corps  appeared  m  Ins  rear  in- 
stead of  the  French  one  which  he  expected,  what  are  we  to  say  of  the  French 
generals  who  might  havo  supported  him,  and  more  particularly  of  Marshals 
Mortier  and  St.  Cyr,  the  only  ones  posted  within  reach  of  Culm?  Marshal 
Morti  ir,  established  at  Pirna,  liable  to  be  dispatched  thence  either  to  Dresden, 
on  the  one  hand,  or  to  Toeplitz  on  the  other,  might  certainly,  had  he  acted 
with  more  self-relianco  and  vigilance,  have  hastened  up  to  Vandamme's  aid  ; 
but  it  was,  at  the  same  time,  perfectly  natural  that,  in  the  strict  fulfilment  of 
the  orders  he  had  received,  he  should  await  in  complete  immobility  the  ex- 
pression of  Napoleon's  will  ;  and  with  respect  to  the  precise  order  given  to  him 
to  aid  Vandamme  with  two  divisions,  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  this  order 
did  not  reach  him  until  the  catastrophe  had  already  taken  place. 

"  It  would  be  well  if  we  could  say  as  much  with  respect  to  Marshal  St.  Cyr  ; 
but  the  fact  is  that,  that  directed  as  he  was  to  keep  constantly  on  the  track  of 
K  '>rps,  he  should  never  havo  lost  sight  of  him  for  an  instant,  and  had 

he  fulfilled  this  positive  duty  the  necessary  result  would  have  been,  that 
when  Kleist's  corps  fell  upon  Vandamme,  it  would  itself  have  been  attacked 
by  a  French  corps  in  the  rear,  and  would  probably  have  been  itself  broken  and 
routed  instead  of  helping  to  break  and  rout  the  army  of  Vandamme. 

'■Bat  unfortunately  Marshal  St.  Cyr,  never  zealous  for  the  success  of  any 
operations  but  those  with  the  execution  of  which  he  was  himself  directly 
charged,  and  ever  inclined  rather  to  seek  difficulties  than  to  seek  to  overcome 
them,  employed  the  twenty-eighth  in  moving  to  Maxen,  and  on  the  following 
day,  the  twenty-ninth,  only  advanced  to  Reinhard's  Grimme,  thus  making  a 
movement  of  no  more  than  a  league  and  a  half  on  the  very  day  when  it  was 


164  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

have  already  said  that  Oudinot  was  left  to  fight  at  Gross- 
Beeren  ;  this  marshal  who  commanded  about  sixty-five 
thousand  men,  had  received  orders   to  take  the   initiative 

important  that  the  enemy  should  be  pursued  with  the  utmost  vigor,  and 
allowed  Kleist  to  disappear  from  before  him,  and  fall  upon  Vandamme's  rear, 
whilst  he  employed  himself  in  inquiring  of  the  staff  whether  he  should  not  fol- 
low Marmont  on  the  Altenberg  route. 

"  On  the  following  day,  the  thirtieth,  when  he  received  the  order  directing 
him  to  endeavor  to  effect  a  junction  with  Yandamme  by  the  lateral  route,  he 
at  length  aroused  himself,  and  by  the  road  which  led  Kleist  upon  Vandamme's 
rear,  and  which  should  have  conducted  himself  upon  Kleist's  rear,  arrived  just 
in  time  to  hear  the  cannon  which  announced  our  disaster.  As  for  Marshal 
Marmont.  he  pushed  the  enemy  as  vigorously  as  he  could,  and  engaged  in 
several  skirmishes  which  resulted  to  his  advantage,  but  he  was  too  far  from 
Vandamme  to  be  able  to  move  up  to  his  support.  Posted  decidedly  on  the 
right,  he  could  not  attempt  to  cross  the  mountains  in  advance  of  St.  Oyr  with- 
out exposing  himself  to  falling  alone  amidst  a  crowd  of  enemies;  and  the  cata- 
strophe is  not  therefore,  to  be  attributed  to  any  error  of  his. 

'•  With  respect  to  Murat,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  was  impossible  that  he 
should  have  had  any  share  in  the  deplorable  event,  which  took  place  at  Culm, 
since  he  and  his  squadrons  were  traversing  at  the  time  the  great  Freyburg 
route. 

"Of  the  persons  who  may  be  considered  the  responsible  actors  in  this 
catastrophe,  it  remains,  finally,  to  speak  of  Xapoleon  himself,  who,  by  sedu- 
lously following  his  lieutenants,  might  have  made  them  converge  towards  a 
common  point,  and  by  his  presence  would  certainly  have  obtained  what  he 
hoped  and  expected.  But  he  was  turned  aside,  on  the  twenty-eighth,  from  this 
duty,  by  the  news  which  reached  him  from  the  neighborhood  of  Lowenberg 
and  Berlin,  and  also,  it  must  be  added,  by  the  confidence  he  felt  that  the 
orders  he  had  given  were  of  themselves  sufficient  to  secure  the  results  he 
desired.  Ever  recurring  to  past  experiences,  Xapoleon  believed  that  he 
had  done  sufficient  to  render  him  certain  of  obtaining  the  most  splendid 
triumphs. 

"But  unfortunately  times  were  changed,  and  to  have  accomplished  the 
destruction  of  the  grand  army  of  Bohemia  would  have  required,  at  least,  Xapo- 
leon's  incessant  superintendence  of  the  execution  of  his  designs.  But  now. 
distracted  as  he  was  by  the  passionate  desire  of  obtaining  all  results  at  once, 
Berlin  and  Dantzic  were  as  much  means  of  leading  him  into  error  as  Moscow 
had  been  during  the  previous  year.  Indeed,  that  he  might  strike  a  serious 
blow  at  Prussia  and  Germany,  at  Berlin,  and  be  able  to  boast  that  his  power 
extended  from  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum  to  the  Vistula,  he  had  entertained  the 
idea  from  the  very  commencement  of  this  campaign  of  sending  one  of  his  corps 
to  the  Prussian  capital,  and  keeping  a  garrison  at  Dantzic  ;  and  for  the  sake  of 
these  objects  he  had.  as  we  have  seen,  allowed  an  error  to  creep  into  the  finely 
conceived  plan  he  had  formed  for  the  conduct  of  the  campaign,  giving  an  ex- 
cessive extent  to  the  circle  of  operations,  the  central  point  of  which  was  to  be 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  165 

against  Bernadotte,  to  seek  to  beat  him,  and  get  possession 
of  Berlin.  In  order  to  second  him  in  this  enterprise  General 
Gerard  had  organized  a  flying  corps  of  the  best  troops  from 

at  Dresden,  placing  Macdonald  at  Lowenberg,  instead  of  at  Bautzen,  and 
sending  Oudinot  against  Berlin  instead  of  establishing  him  at  Wittenberg. 
And  as  the  same  cause  continued  to  produce  the  same  effects,  he  was  anxious, 
on  learning  the  misfortune  which  had  happened  to  Macdonald,  to  succor  him 
as  soon  as  possible  ;  and  being  also  anxious  to  lead  in  person  Oudinot's  army 
to  Berlin,  he  turned  from  Pirna  and  Culm,  where  he  ought  to  have  been  with 
his  guard,  and  neglected  to  achieve  victories,  the  consequences  of  which  would 
have  been  of  the  utmost  advantage  to  him,  for  the  purpose  of  running  after 
others,  and  thus  exposed  himself  to  the  danger  of  losing  everything  from  an 
over-anxiety  to  obtain  everything  at  once. 

"But  for  this  catastrophe  at  Culm  alone  must  he  be  blamed,  for  in  the  de- 
tails of  the  several  manoeuvres  he  had  committed  no  fault.  And  at  the  same 
time  it  must  be  observed  that  the  actual  results  were  but  little  due  to  the 
merits  of  his  enemies  ;  a  sentiment  of  despair  rather  than  calculation  having 
led  them  to  carry  into  execution  a  combination  which  had  the  most  unexpected 
and  important  consequences,  and  which  was  certainly  due,  not  to  the  skill  of 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  to  whom  its  merit  has  been  attributed,  but  to  the 
determination  of  the  Prussian  troops  either  to  cut  their  way  out  of  their 
perilous  position  or  perish  in  the  attempt. 

"  "We  must  look,  then,  not  so  much  to  the  military  skill  of  the  allies,  al- 
though they  were  far  from  being  deficient  in  this,  as  to  the  passionate  spirit  of 
patriotism  which  inspired  them,  and  which  rendered  them  comparatively  indif- 
ferent to  defeat,  for  the  cause  of  their  seizing  with  such  promptitude  the  op- 
portunity offered  them  at  Culm. 

"  Another  important  moral  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  these  great  events  is, 
that  care  should  ever  be  taken  not  to  drive  men  to  despair,  since  to  do  this  is 
to  endow  them  with  a  supernatural  strength  which  may  enable  them  to  over- 
throw the  best  calculations,  and  to  frustrate  the  plans  of  the  most  consummate 
skill.  The  allies  who,  when  they  abandoned  the  battle-field  of  Dresden,  re- 
garded themselves  as  completely  vanquished,  and  sadly  questioned  whether,  in 
attempting  to  vanquish  Napoleon,  they  had  not  undertaken  an  enterprise 
against  destiny  itself,  suddenly,  at  the  spectacle  of  the  defeat  and  capture  of 
Vandamme,  regarded  themselves  as  being  once  more  in  an  excellent  posi- 
tion, and  believed  that  the  balance  of  fortune  between  themselves  and  Napo- 
leon was  at  least  in  equilibrium. 

"  It  is  true  that  the  two  days'  fighting  at  Dresden,  and  the  pursuit  during 
the  twenty-eighth  and  twenty-ninth,  had  cost  them  in  killed,  wounded,  or 
prisoners,  some  forty  thousand  men,  whilst  the  defeat  of  Vandamme  had,  at 
the  most,  cost  us  no  more  than  twelve  thousand. 

"  But,  nevertheless,  the  result  was  that  a  feeling  of  confidence  had  re-entered 
their  hearts,  and  they  resolved  to  close  with  Napoleon  at  every  opportunity, 
and  leave  him  not  a  moment  in  repose.  For  the  allies,  not  to  be  vanquished 
was  almost  to  be  victorious  ;  whilst  for    Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  to  have 


166  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XX. 

the  garrisons  of  Magdebourg  and  Wittenberg.  He  was  to 
debouch  from  the  first  of  these  places  with  six  thousand  men 
under  General  Lanusse,  to  act,  in  concert  with  Dornbrowski's 
division  from  Wittenberg,  on  the  right  flank  of  the  allies. 
Davoust  on  his  side  had  received  orders  to  ascend  the  Elbe 
and  the  Havel.  This  union  ^f  one  hundred  thousand  men 
in  the  environs  of  Berlin  seemed  well  calculated  to  secure  to 
us  immense  results,  both  in  a  military  and  political  point  of 
view.  I  supposed  that  Bernadotte  had  but  eighty  thousand 
men,  including  Walmoden's  corps,,  which  was  opposed  to 
Davoust  towards  Hamburg.  There  remained,  therefore, 
according  to  my  calculation,  only  about  fifty  thousand  com- 
batants with  Bernadotte  ;  and  Oudinot,  superior  in  numbers, 
had  only  to  gain  one  battle  to  accomplish  his  task.  Unfor- 
tunately the  enemy  was  much  stronger  than  we  supposed. 
Oudinot,  after  making  some  detachments  of  flankers  and 
escorts,  advanced  with  sixty  thousand  men  on  Trebbin  and 
Berlin.  Bernadotte,  after  making  a  feint  of  manoeuvring 
against  his  left  flank,  took  the  position  of  Kuhlsdorf  with 
ninety  thousand  men  (of  which  twenty  thousand  were  good 
cavalry),  without  counting  the  light  corps  of  Generals  Hirsch- 
feld  near  Brandenburg,  and  that  of  Wobeser  near  Baruth. 
The  left  of  the  army  under  Tauenzien,  was  supported 
on  the  lake  of  Rangsdorf  ;  the  centre  under  Bulow,  held 
the  road  to  Berlin  ;  the  Bussians  and  Swedes  were  on  the 
right. 

On  the  twenty-second  of  August,  Oudinot  passed  the 
defile  of  Thyrow,  after  a  warm  combat  against  the  advanced 
guard  of  Bulow.  On  the  twenty-third,  our  army  advanced 
in  three  columns  ;  Bertrand  and  the  fourth  corps  at  the  right 
on  Johnsdorf  ;  Beynier,  with  the  Saxons,  at  the  centre,  by 

failed  to  annihilate  his  adversaries  was  to  have  done  nothing-.  On  such 
extreme  and  almost  impossible  conditions  had  he  based  bis  hopes,  of 
safety." 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  167 

the  great  road  ;  Oudinot  and  the  twelfth  corps,  by  the  road 
to  Trebbin  on  Ahrensdorf.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say  what 
the  marshal  intended  by  thus  engaging  his  forces  on  ground 
cut  up  by  woods  and  marshes,  and  without  a  single  cross- 
road by  which  he  could  unite  his  columns  ;  he  himself 
marching  in  rear  of  his  left  ?  No  preparations  were  made 
for  a  battle,  and  undoubtedly  Oudinot  did  not  expect  one. 
Bertrand,  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  first  encountered 
near  Blankenfelde  the  corps  of  Tauenzien,  who  made  a  good 
defense  of  the  debouch  from  the  woods  by  means  of  that 
village.  The  combat  was  an  obstinate  one,  and  without 
result.  It  was  already  terminated  when  Key  nier,  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  attacked,  near  Gross- Beeren,  the 
advanced  guard  of  Bulow  which  he  dislodged.  He  was  pre- 
paring to  establish  his  bivouacs  there,  without  thinking  of 
the  possibility  of  an  attack,  when  Bulow  fell  upon  him  at 
the  head  of  thirty-five  thousand  Prussians  with  one  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery.  Notwitstanding  all  that  could  be  done  by 
the  Saxons  and  Durutte's  division,  they  were  forced  to  yield 
to  so  great  a  superiority  ;  they  effected  their  escape  by  favor 
of  the  w7oods,  with  the  loss  of  three  thousand  men  hors-de- 
combat.  At  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  Generals  Guilleminot 
and  Fournier,  who  formed  the  head  of  the  column  of  the 
twelfth  corps,  marched  in  all  haste  toward  Neu-Beeren  ;  they 
arrived  at  nightfall  in  time  to  j)rotect  the  retreat,  but  too 
late  to  reestablish  the  battle.  The  cavalry  of  General  Four- 
nier, in  deploying  at  the  left  of  this  hamlet,  was  charged  in 
flank  by  the  enemy  whom  they  had  hardly  perceived.  A 
part  of  our  squadrons,  driving  before  them  the  Prussian 
platoons,  advanced  into  the  \Asan  in  sight  of  Hennersdorf 
when  the  enemy  pursued  them  and  drove  them  back  more 
rapidly  than  they  had  advanced  ;  they  were  very  fortunate 
in  effecting  their  escape. 

Oudinot,  on  arriving  at  Wittskof,  learned  the  defeat  of  his 


168  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cll.  XX. 

centre  and  ordered  a  retreat  on  Wittenberg.  Bernadotte 
committed  the  fault  of  allowing  him  to  quietly  take  up  his 
position,  when  his  own  vast  superiority  in  number,  and  his 
formidable  cavalry,  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  seriously  cut 
him  up  during  his  retreat. 

The  first  consequence  of  this  check  was  the  loss  of  Gerard's 
division  which  made  a  sortie  from  Magdebourg,  and,  while 
advancing  alone  in  the  midst  of  an  army  of  one  hundred 
thousand  men,  fell  a  certain  prey  to  the  enemy.  General 
Hirschfeld,  with  the  Cossacks  of  Czermischef,  attacked  him 
in  front  of  Belzig,  and  forced  him  to  retire  again  into  Mag- 
debourg with  a  loss  of  one  thousand  two  hundred  prisoners  ; 
it  was  fortunate  that  his  whole  command  was  not  taken. 
Gerard  himself  was  seriously  wounded. 

Although  these  two  checks  were  unfortunate,  there  was 
nothing  in  them  alarming  ;  their  worst  result  was  to  en- 
courage the  newly  levied  Prussian  militia.  But  to  the  faults 
committed  in  the  battle,  Oudinot  added  that  of  falling  back 
on  Wittenberg  and  thus  increased  his  distance  from  Luckau 
and  Bautzen,  which  was  the  only  suitable  direction  for  act- 
ing in  concert  with  me.  I,  therefore,  sent  Marshal  Ney  to 
take  command  of  this  army,  informing  him  that  I  would 
immediately  follow  him  at  the  head  of  my  guard,  two  corps- 
d' armée,  and  my  reserve  of  cavalry.  I  hoped,  by  means  of 
these  powerful  reënforcements,  to  push  Bernadotte  hard,  and 
to  get  possession  of  Berlin,  which  would  have  produced  a 
powerful  influence  on  the  public  opinion  of  Germany  and  of 
all  Europe.  As  I  hoped  that  Macdonald  would,  on  his  side, 
push  Blucher  on  Breslau,  my  two  secondary  armies  would 
thus  find  themselves  in  a  good  situation,  my  base  would  be 
enlarged,  and  I  might  return  to  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  the 
grand  allied  army  in  Bohemia.  But  the  sad  disaster  to  my 
army  in  Silesia  three  days  after,  decided  it  otherwise. 

Macdonald's  Disaster  at  the  Katzbach.— Itwillberemem- 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF    1813.  169 

bered  that  I  gave  minute  instructions  to  Macdonald  on  leav- 
ing Loewenberg.  He  was  to  profit  by  our  joint  superiority 
over  Blucher,  but  it  was  recommended  to  him  to  allow  the 
latter  to  come  to  him,  then  to  take  the  initiative  and  fall  on 
Blucher  with  all  his  corps  united  on  a  single  point.  Instead 
of  waiting  for  the  Prussian  general  to  manifest  his  projects, 
Macdonald  imagined,  from  false  reports  which  he  had  re- 
ceived, that  he  had  only  to  present  himself  to  induce  the 
enemy  to  retreat,  and  to  gather  the  laurels  of  victory.  He 
was  severely  punished  for  his  excess  of  confidence.  As  the 
first  of  a  series  of  unfortunate  events,  I  had  ordered  Ney  to 
follow  me  to  Dresden,  and  the  marshal,  supposing  that  he 
was  to  march  with  the  third  corps,  had  conducted  it  to 
Bunzlau  ;  but  learning  here  that  I  only  wanted  him  per- 
sonally and  not  his  troops,  he  sent  them  back  to  the  Katz- 
bach,  fatigued  and  worn  out  by  this  long  and  harassing 
march.  Macdonald,  still  persuaded  that  he  had  only  to  ad- 
vance to  make  Blucher  fly  before  him,  ordered,  for  the 
twenty-sixth  of  August,  the  passage  of  the  Katzbach  and 
the  Wuthcnde-Neisse,  then  directed  his  three  corps-d'armée 
in  five  columns  from  Schoenau  to  Liegnitz,  on  a  front  of 
from  eight  to  ten  leagues  ; — a  strange  manner  of  applying 
the  principles  which  I  had  marked  out  for  him  in  my  instruc- 
tions !  In  vain  did  Sebastiani  represent  to  him  the  impru- 
dence of  engaging  himself  in  the  coupe-gorge  of  Grain,  with- 
out first  reconnoitering  the  enemy,  who  was  reported  to  be 
concentrated  on  the  opposite  plateau.  The  marshal  obstin- 
ately persisted  in  believing  that  Blucher  was  in  full  retreat 
on  Breslau  ;  Lauriston  directed,  by  his  order,  one  division  by 
Schoenau  in  the  mountains,  while  the  other  two  moved  to 
the  right  against  Langeron  toward  Hennesdorf.  Macdonald 
himself  advanced  toward  the  mouth  of  the  Wuthende-Neisse, 
and  debouched  on  Weinberg  at  the  head  of  the  eleventh 
corps,  while  that  of  Sebastiani  was  to  arrive  by  Crain  on  the 


170  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XX. 

same  point.  Souham,  on  the  contrary,  had  instructions  to 
direct  himself  on  the  left  by  Liegnitz  at  the  distance  of  three 
leagues,  to  pass  the  Katzbach  and  fall  on  the  enemy's  right  ; 
a  movement  too  extended,  and  which  was  to  deprive  him, 
during  the  whole  battle,  of  the  cooperation  of  that  corps  ;  it 
was  the  more  to  be  regretted  as  there  was  an  excellent  ford 
at  Schmoechwitz,  very  near  the  field  of  battle. 

By  a  new  fatality,  Blucher,  who  had  broken  his  line  in 
order  to  cross  the  river  and  resume  the  offensive,  now  learned, 
on  reaching  the  heights  of  Trebelwitz  and  Betzhof,  that  our 
troops  were  making  the  passage  ;  his  columns  were  already 
formed  for  an  attack  ;  from  the  plateau  of  Weinberg  he  dis- 
covered all  that  passed  in  our  ranks  and  counted  our  bat- 
talions and  squadrons  as  they  debouched.  In  order  to  «en- 
gage them  to  better  advantage,  he  directed  the  advanced 
guard  of  York  which  formed  his  centre,  to  fall  back.  Thus 
every  circumstance  corresponded  with  the  nature  of  the 
ground  and  combined  to  secure  to  Blucher  immense  advan- 
tages. As  soon  as  the  favorable  moment  had  arrived,  the 
signal  was  given.  Hardly  had  the  columns  of  the  eleventh 
corps  crowned  the  heights  between  Janowitz  and  Weinberg, 
and  the  light  cavalry  of  Sebastiani  formed  toward  Eichholz, 
when  the  enemy  fell  upon  them  from  every  direction.  Our 
right  rested  on  the  deep  ravine  of  the  Neisse,  but  the  left 
was  without  support  ;  it  was  here  that  the  Russians  directed 
their  efforts.  Their  cavalry  under  Wassiltschekof,  assails 
and  turns  ours  between  Kleintintz  and  Eichholz.  Sacken 
debouches  from  this  last  village  with  his  infantry.  The 
Prussians  under  York,  who  have  drawn  us  forward,  now  face 
about  and  fall  upon  our  line,  which  is  soon  driven  back  upon 
the  deep  ravine  intended  to  cover  its  right.  Our  cavalry, 
attacked  by  superior  numbers,  falls  back  on  the  infantry  or 
disperses  to  the  left  ;  all  are  now  driven  pell-mell  into  the 
gulf  of  the  Wuthende-Neisse,  a  dangerous  torrent  which,  in 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  171 

time  of  flood,  becomes,  as  its  name  indicates,  truly  furious.* 
The  disorder  is  so  great  that  Sebastiani,  not  being  able  to 
regain  Kroitsch  where  he  has  left  his  cuirassiers,  descends  this 
torrent  to  its  junction  with  the  Katzbach  where  the  remount 
of  his  squadrons  are  saved  as  if  by  miracle.  To  increase 
the  evil,  Souham,  hearing  the  cannonade,  renounces  his 
march  on  Liegnitz  and  falls  back  with  the  third  corps  on 
Kroitsch,  too  soon  for  the  combat.  The  cuirassiers,  which 
Sebastiani  has  left  there  in  reserve,  in  ascending  to  the  plateau 
encumber  the  passage  which  is  now  completely  obstructed  by 
the  flying  soldiers  and  the  trains.  On  any  other  ground, 
this  concentric  manoeuvre  of  Souham  would  have  repaired 
everything,  but  in  such  a  gulf  it  only  tended  to  increase 
the  confusion.  Every  effort  to  ascend  this  steep  hill,  crowned 
as  it  is  by  a  superior  and  victorious  enemy,  proves  disastrous. 
General  Tarayre  proposes  to  conduct  two  divisions  by 
Schmoechwitz  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  ;  they  cross  the 
Katzbach  at  night-fall  ;  but  Sacken  and  Wassiltschekof, 
having  already  rid  themselves  of  Macdonald,  march  to  meet 
them  and  drive  them  back  to  the  left  bank  ;  this  tardy  move- 
ment only  serves  to  compromise  them. 

During  this  horrible  mêlée  Lauriston  fights,  with  doubtful 
success,  the  corps  of  Langeron  about  the  village  of  Henners- 
dorf  ;  the  enemy,  superior  in  numbers,  is  near  making  him 
experience  the  same  fate  as  the  centre  ;  for,  in  addition  to 
his  inferiority,  Lauriston  is  deprived  of  one  of  his  divisions 
by  extending  it  too  far  in  the  mountains  toward  Schoenau. 
For  us  the  decisive  point  of  battle  was  at  Hennersdorf  ;  here 
the  ground  rose  in  an  insensible  glacis  to  the  plateau  of 
Weinberg.  If  Macdonald,  faithful  to  my  instructions,  had 
directed  the  cavalry  of  Sebastiani  and  the  eleventh  corps  to 
sustain  Lauriston,  and  had  left  Souham  the  care  of  debouch- 

*   Wuthende,  signifies  furious. 


172  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

ing  by  Nieder-Crain  or  Schrnoechwitz,  the  battle  would  pro- 
bably have  been  won  by  bringing  two-thirds  of  our  force 
upon  the  decisive  point.  Blucher,  cut  off  from  Bohemia, 
would  have  been  driven  back  on  Breslau. 

Every  thing  seemed  to  conspire  against  us  in  this  unfor- 
tunate battle.  The  flood-gates  of  the  heavens  seemed 
opened,  and  it  rained  in  perfect  torrents,  flooding  the  streams 
which  flow  from  the  mountains  of  Riesengebirg.  The  Neisse 
carried  away  all  its  bridges,  and  the  affluents  of  the  Bober  so 
increased  that  stream  as  to  render  it  a  formidable  obstacle. 
Macdonald,  being  forced  to  hasten  his  retreat,  now  saw  that  all 
the  elements  had  combined  to  render  it  disastrous.  Lauriston 
had  difficulty  in  reaching  Goldberg,  hotly  pursued  by  the  corps 
of  Langeron.  He  did  not  even  venture  to  remain  in  this 
city  long  enough  to  rally  the  division  of  Puthod,  which  he 
had  left  compromitted  in  the  mountains.  The  floods  had 
only  spared  the  bridge  of  Benzlow  on  the  Bober  ;  it  was 
necessary  to  reach  this  in  all  haste,  abandoning  to  the  con- 
queror eighty  pieces  of  artillery,  the  baggage,  and  several 
thousand  prisoners.  To  increase  our  misfortune,  Puthod's 
division,  which  had  taken  the  right  slope  of  the  mountains, 
now  found  itself  so  engaged  that  it  had  not  time  to  reach  the 
main  body,  and  the  bridges  in  their  rear  were  carried  away 
by  the  flood.  Not  being  able  to  pass  at  Hirschberg  they 
descended  again  opposite  Loewenberg,  but  were  no  more  for- 
tunate here.  These  delays  enabled  Langeron  to  surround 
them  with  twenty-five  thousand  men.  They  now  saw  no 
means  of  safety  but  in  cutting  a  passage,  sword  in  hand,  on 
Bunzlau  ;  but  being  soon  surrounded  on  the  heights  of  Plag- 
witz  and  forced  back  upon  the  torrent,  they  laid  down  their 
arms,  after  losing  a  large  number  killed  in  the  battle  or 
drowned  in  attempting  to  cross  the  Bober,  which  can  ordin- 
arily be  passed  without  difficulty. 

Macdonald  returned  behind  the  Queiss  after  having  lost 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  173 

twenty  thousand  men,  the  half  of  his  artillery  and  a  large 
part  of  his  train.  His  troops,  greatly  discouraged  and  inca- 
pable of  resistance,  called  loudly  for  reënforcements  and  for 
my  presence  to  avenge  their  defeat.  The  marshal  himself, 
not  knowing  what  to  do,  begged  that  I  would  come  in  person 
to  his  assistance.  I  had  hoped  that  he  would  hold  out  for 
some  days  at  Goerlitz  ;  but  on  the  third  of  September,  I 
learned  that  he  had  fallen  back  on  Bautzen  in  frightful 
disorder. 

Napoleon  marches  to  Macdonald's  Assistance.— It  was, 
therefore,  necessary  that  I  should  renounce  going  to  sustain 
Ney  against  Berlin,  and  hasten  to  Macdonald's  assistance. 
On  the  third  of  September,  I  left  Dresden  with  the  corps 
which  I  had  brought  with  me  from  Silesia,  and  the  next  day 
I  joined,  at  Hochkirch,  the  army  of  Macdonald,  who  was 
preparing  to  continue  the  retreat  on  Bautzen.  I  faced  it 
about  and  immediately  made  it  advance  ;  but  Blucher  had 
the  prudence  to  avoid  an  engagement  and  repassed  the  Neisse 
and  the  Queiss.  I  did  not  deem  it  proper  to  pursue  him  ;  as 
I  stilL  intended  to  march  to  the  north  in  order  to  assist  Ney. 
I,  therefore,  contented  myself  with  restoring  order  and 
courage  to  Macdonald's  army,  and  reënforcing  it  with  the 
corps  of  Poniatowski,  which  was  in  observation  in  the  en- 
virons of  Zittau.  I  directed  Marmont's  corps  on  Hoyers- 
werda,  and,  on  the  sixth,  returned  in  person  to  Dresden. 
The  advanced  guards  of  the  grand  allied  army  had  crossed 
the  mountains  and  now  threatened  to  march  on  Pirna  and 
Dresden.  I  deemed  it  necessary,  in  preference  to  everything 
else,  to  profit  by  the  present  occasion  to  wash  out  the  affront 
of  Culm  and  to  bring  down  the  presumption  of  that  army. 
The  sixty  thousand  men  which  I  had  left  on  the  left  of  the 
Elbe  being  united  in  the  camp  of  Dohna,  I  rejoined  them 
there  on  the  eighth,  with  my  guards.  The  enemy  fought  in 
retreat  ;    we  pursued  him  to  the  mountains  and  occupied 


174  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XX. 

their  summits.  But,  on  the  other  side,  Blucher  had  resumed 
the  offensive  and  advanced  to  Bautzen,  and  Ney  had  suffered 
a  bloody  defeat  at  Dennewitz. 

Key's  Defeat  at  Dennewitz.— It  is  an  inconvenience  inher- 
ent to  vast  theatres  of  war,  that  the  general-in-chief  can  not 
be  present  every  where  ;  my  lieutenants,  very  good  under 
my  own  eyes,  were  wanting  in  judgment  and  self-confidence 
when  left  to  themselves.  I  experienced  a  sad  proof  of  this 
during  the  present  campaign  ;  all  those  whom  I  placed  at 
the  head  of  our  secondary  armies,  proved  themselves  unequal 
to  their  command. 

On  the  second  of  September,  my  instructions  to  Ney  from 
Dresden  were  as  follows  :  "  We  have  just  received  news  of 
the  Duke  of  Reggio,  who  has  deemed  it  proper  to  place  him- 
self beyond  Wittenberg.  The  result  of  this  untimely  move- 
ment is  that  the  corps  of  General  Tauenzien  and  a  strong 
body  of  Cossacks  have  gone  in  the  direction  of  Luckau  and 
Bautzen,  and  threaten  the  communications  of  the  Duke  of 
of  Tarentum.  It  is  truly  difficult  for  any  one  to  have  less 
head  than  the  Duke  of  Reggio. 

"  All  here  are  in  motion  for  Hoyerswerda,  where  the  em- 
peror will  have  his  head-quarters  on  the  fourth.  It  is  neces- 
sary for  you  to  march  on  the  fourth,  to  be  at  Baruth  on  the 
sixth.  The  emperor  will  have,  on  the  sixth,  a  corps  at 
Luckau  to  form  a  junction.  At  Baruth  you  will  be  only 
three  days'  march  from  Berlin.  Your  communication  with 
the  emperor  will  be  established,  and  the  attack  of  Berlin 
may  take  place  on  the  ninth  or  tenth.  All  this  cloud  of 
Cossacks  and  this  mass  of  poor  infantry  of  the  landwehr 
will  fall  back  on  Berlin  from  every  direction,  as  soon  as  your 
march  becomes  decided.  You  will  see  the  necessity  of  ma- 
noeuvring rapidly  in  order  to  profit  by  the  disorder  of  the 
grand  army  in  Bohemia,  which  may  otherwise  make  some 
movements  when  it  learns  the  departure  of  the  emperor. 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTU  M  N    C  A  M  PAKiN    OF     1813.  175 

"  The  Duke  of  Reggio  did  not  know  how  to  attack  the 
enemy  ;  and  he  had  the  simplicity  to  expose  one  of  his  corps 
separately.  If  he  had  attacked  the  enemy  properly  he  would 
have  been  every  where  victorious. 

"  Give  us  positive  information  of  your  march." 
These  instructions  are  perhaps  a  little  too  absolute,  and 
less  wise  than  those  given  to  Macdonald  :  it  is,  however,  al- 
ways understood  that  an  order  addressed  to  a  commanding 
general  of  an  army  at  a  distance  is  to  be  taken  in  its  spirit, 
and  not  literally  ;  it  must  bo  subordinate  to  the  position  of 
the  enemy.  The  slight  advantage  which  the  allies  had  gained 
over  Oudinot  confirmed  my  opinion  of  their  inferiority,  and 
induced  me  to  believe  that  the  defeat  of  the  seventh  corps  at 
Gross-Beeren  resulted  from  neglecting  the  rules  of  war.  I 
also  attached  too  little  importance  to  the  Kussian  militia, 
for  I  did  not  know  their  numbers.  I  had  directed  Ney  to 
advance  on  Baruth,  and  this  marshal,  proud  of  our  recent 
victory  at  Dresden,  did  not  take  suitable  precautions  to  avoid 
a  battle,  or  at  least  to  be  prepared  for  it.  As  I  intended  to 
sustain  him  in  marching  by  Grossenhain  on  Luckau  with 
fifty  thousand  men,  in  order  to  turn  the  army  of  Bornadotte, 
and  throw  it  on  the  Elbe  and  Magdebourg,  it  was  essential 
for  Ney  to  base  himself  by  Dahme  on  Torgau,  without 
troubling  himself  about  the  road  to  Wittenberg.  After 
having  driven  back  the  advanced  guard  of  Tauenzien  at 
Zahne  and  Seyda,  he  directed  himself  on  Juterbogk.  The 
fourth  corps  at  the  left  advanced  to  Naundorf,  the  seventh 
at  the  centre  to  Tolmsdorf,  the  twelfth  at  the  right  to 
Seyda. 

They  were  to  break  their  line  on  the  sixth  at  eight  o'clock 
in  the  morning  to  pass  Juterbogk.  From  the  dispositions 
of  Ney  it  would  be  impossible  to  imagine  the  object  which 
he  proposed  to  attain.  He  himself  marched  with  the  fourth 
corps  by  Dennewitz,  where  he  arrived  at  ten  o'clock  in  the 


176  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX 

morning,  and  encountered  the  corps  of  Tauenzien.  Reynier, 
with  the  centre,  advanced  by  the  road  to  Rohrbeck  ;  Oudinot 
and  the  twelfth  corps  had  orders  to  march  on  Oehna,  and 
wait  till  the  seventh  had  filed  past.  Ney  pretends  that  he 
wished  to  refuse  his  left  ;  but  there  is  nothing  in  his  disposi- 
tions to  indicate  this,  for  he  made  it  his  turning  and  acting 
wing.  He  ought  to  have  known  that  Bernadotte  was  on  the 
great  road  from  Wittenberg  to  Berlin  by  Potsdam,  and  that 
in  this  movement  he  would  expose  his  left  flank  :  no 
measures,  however,  were  taken  to  prepare  for  an  attack  in 
that  direction.  If  Ney  was  ignorant  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion, it  was  an  inexcusable  fault,  for  he  had  occupied  it 
ever  since  the  combat  of  Gross-Beeren,  that  is,  for  the  last 
twelve  days. 

The  marshal,  debouching  at  ten  o'clock  from  Dennewitz, 
engaged  the  fifteen  thousand  Prussians  of  Tauenzien  :  the 
fourth  corps  succeeded  in  getting  possession  of  the  first 
heights  in  rear  of  the  wind-mill  ;  but  Tauenzien  having  been 
ree'nforced  by  the  left  of  Bulow,  Morand's  division  was 
turned,  and  the  corps  forced  to  refuse  its  left  in  order  to 
pivot  on  Rohrbeck.  Reynier,  leaving  later  than  he  ought, 
finally  arrived  at  Dennewitz  ;  they  could  think  no  longer  of 
the  disposition  of  the  morning,  but  were  obliged  to  sustain 
the  left  of  the  fourth  corps,  threatened  as  it  was  by  a  superior 
enemy.  It  was  now  noon,  and  the  twelfth  corps  had  not 
even  reached  Oehna.  The  allied  army,  profiting  by  the  in- 
formation of  the  night  before,  made  a  natural  movement  to 
close  up  to  the  left;  Bulow,  placed  with  thirty-eight  thousand 
Prussians  near  Kaltenborn,  advanced  to  the  assistance  of 
Tauenzien  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  sound  of  the  cannon. 
Bernadotte,  placed  at  Rabenstein,  a  distance  of  eight  leagues, 
with  seventy  battalions  and  eighty  squadrons  of  Russians 
and  Swedes,  united  them  first  at  Lobessen,  and  then  ad- 
vanced in  second  line  towards  Eckmonsdorf  and  Talichau  ; 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  177 

he  arrived  there  at  three  o'clock.  It  has  been  shown  that 
Ney  defiled  with  the  fourth  corps  before  the  front  of  the 
Prussian  army  without  knowing  it,  or  suspecting  the  threaten- 
ing storm  that  was  about  to  fall  on  his  left  flank.  Reynier 
was  to  carry,  in  all  haste,  Durutte's  division  in  the  direction 
of  Nieder-Gersdorf  to  support  Morand's  division  ;  as  the 
enemy  showed  himself  in  force  towards  Gehlsdorf,  the  Saxons 
were  obliged  to  form  a  crochet  in  order  to  face  in  that  direc- 
tion. General  Thuinen  assailed  Durutte's  division  at  Gers- 
dorf  ;  Bulow  turned  upon  the  Saxons,  and  a  serious  contest 
took  place  on  this  point. 

Oudinot,  at  the  head  of  the  twelfth  corps,  which  was  then 
marching  towards  Oehna  at  our  extreme  right,  received  or- 
ders to  approach  Dennewitz.  Hearing  the  violent  cannonade 
in  the  direction  of  Gehlsdorf,  he  marched  towards  that  point. 
The  enemy  had  already  driven  the  Saxons  from  that  village, 
when  Guilleminot's  division  fortunately  debouched,  and 
restored  our  affairs.  These  two  corps  now  vigorously  re- 
pelled the  attack  of  Bulow,  and  recaptured  Gehlsdorf  ;  the 
victory  was  doubtful,  and,  although  Bernadotte  had  not  yet 
engaged  his  Russians  and  Swedes,  it  might  still  be  decided 
in  our  favor,  or  at  least  remain  undecided.  But  Durutte's 
division,  assailed  at  Nieder-Gersdorf  by  thirteen  thousand 
Prussians  of  Bulow's  corps,  was  driven  back  beyond  Denne- 
witz, notwithstanding  the  most  obstinate  resistance.  Ney, 
threatened  by  this  attack  on  his  left  at  the  same  time  that 
Tauenzien  forced  Morand  at  the  wind-mil],  now  drew  back 
the  fourth  corps  towards  Rohrbeck.  Durutte's  retreat  leav- 
ing the  centre  unsupported,  and  Bertrand  exposed  beyond 
the  marshy  ravine  of  Agerbach,  Ney,  who  had  not  failed  to 
perceive  the  danger  of  this  state  of  things,  reiterated  his 
order  to  Oudinot  to  come  and  second  him  between  Denne- 
witz and  Rohrbeck.  This  movement,  if  it  had  been  punc- 
tually executed,  would  have  accelerated  his  destruction  ;  for 
vol.  iv. — 12. 


178  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX 

at  the  moment  when  he  was  stripping  his  left  of  its  means 
of  defense,  Bernadotte  was  advancing  at  the  head  of  forty- 
thousand  Russians  and  Swedes  to  assist  Bulow  on  the  same 
ground  which  Oudinot  was  ordered  to  leave.  Guilleminot's 
left  was  threatened  at  the  same  instant  by  BorsteFs  brigade 
and  four  thousand  horse,  which  turned  the  army  hy  See- 
hausen.  The  Saxons,  being  left  exposed  to  the  blows  of 
Bulow,  were  broken  in  their  turn  and  driven  back  on  Oehna. 
Guilleminot's  division,  being  forced  to  engage  itself,  required 
support,  and  all  the  tenth  corps  thus  entered  into  action 
without  being  able  to  reach  its  destination.  The  Prussians, 
who  had  driven  back  Durutte,  now  passed  the  stream  be- 
tween Dennewitz  and  Rohrbeck,  and  thus  completed  the 
defeat  of  the  centre,  at  the  same  time  that  the  cavalry  pressed 
in  the  left.  Ney  vainly  attempted  to  reestablish  his  affairs 
by  throwing  the  cavalry  of  Arrighi  in  the  gap  left  by  the 
enemy.  Clouds  of  dust,  driven  by  the  wind  into  our  faces, 
prevented  us  from  making  any  dispositions,  and  for  a  time 
completely  concealed  the  enemy  from  our  view  ;  besides,  the 
allies  had  superior  squadrons  to  oppose  to  his  centre,  and 
more  than  four  thousand  horse  turned  his  right.  As  Oudi- 
not found  it  impossible  to  assist  the  fourth  corps,  all  the 
points  were  forced  to  yield.  Key  could  now  do  no  better 
than  to  take  the  road  to  Dahme  ;  Oudinot  took  the  road  to 
Schweidnitz  and  Annabourg  ;  a  part  of  the  seventh  corps 
accompanied  the  twelfth,  and  the  remainder  took  the  road 
to  Hertzberg. 

Here,  as  at  Gross-Beeren,  Bulow  deserved  all  the  honor  of 
the  victory.  The  only  thing  done  by  Bernadotte  was  to  draw 
up  a  pompous  bulletin  complimenting  those  who,  like  him- 
self, had  been  idle  spectators  of  the  event. 

Remarks  on  this  Battle.— The  causes  of  this  defeat  have 
been  much  discussed  ;  each  one  attributed  them  to  others, 
whereas  all  were  in  some  measure  involved.     Ney  was  here 


Cir.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  179 

attacked  while  on  the  march,  and  when  he  least  expected  it  ; 
as  was  the  case  with  Oudinot  at  Gross-Beeren.  His  right 
wing  fought  on  the  left  and  his  left  wing  on  the  right — dis- 
positions which  plainly  prove  that  the  battle  was  entirely 
unexpected.  There  is  a  merit  in  gaining  an  unexpected  bat- 
tle ;  but  here  nothing  was  done  to  accomplish  that  result. 
Every  thing  goes  to  show  that  Ney  mistook  the  secondary 
for  the  principal,  in  attaching  himself  exclusively  to  Tauen- 
zien's  corps  which  covered  Juterbogk.  His  own  report,  in- 
stead of  throwing  light  on  his  combinations,  renders  them 
still  more  incomprehensible  ;  he  wished,  he  said,  to  refuse 
his  left,  and  yet  he  inarched  at  its  head  and  made  it  his 
advanced  guard.  He  wished  to  manoeuvre  ;  and  yet  every 
thing  indicates  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tions. Ney's  intellect  shone  only  in  the  midst  of  a  battle, 
when  the  balls  were  flying  round  him  ;  there,  his  coup-d'œil, 
his  coolness,  and  his  vigor,  were  incomparable  ;  but  he  was 
unable  to  combine  his  operations  in  the  silence  of  the  cabinet, 
while  studying  his  maps.  At  the  time  when  armies  were 
encamped  in  each  other's  presence,  Ney  would  have  been  the 
greatest  fighting  general  of  his  age,  for  he  could  then  always 
see  his  enemy  before  him  ;  but  in  our  times,  when  complica- 
ted movements  are  prepared  in  the  cabinet,  he  was  liable  to 
fail,  and  he  gave  a  sad  proof  of  this  at  Dennewitz.  The 
'instructions  which  I  gave  him  were  not  the  best  I  must  con- 
fess, but  then  he  was  on  the  spot  and  should  have  remedied 
any  defects.  His  army  returned  in  frightful  disorder  under 
the  guns  of  Torgau  ;  it  had  lost  fifteen  thousand  men  killed, 
wounded,  prisoners  and  stragglers.  This  defeat  was  a  fit 
companion  to  that  of  the  Katzbach. 

To  defend  the  glory  of  this  valiant  warrior,  some  have 
pretended  that  Oudinot  and  Beynier  did  not  obey  him  with 
zeal  and  the  necessary  punctuality.  It  is  true  that  there  was 
delay  and  a  want  of  unity  in  the  movements  ;  but  his  orders 


180  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

were  far  from  clear.  Oudinot  arrived  too  late,  because  lie 
had  been  directed  to  wait  till  the  seventh  corps  had  filed  past 
him.  Admitting  that  he  had  arrived  sooner,  it  proves  noth- 
ing, for  if  Ney  had  beaten  Tauenzien  at  Dennewitz,  still  the 
left  would  have  been  none  the  less  exposed  to  all  the  efforts 
of  Bulow  and  the  Eusso- Swedish  corps.  When  Gruilleminot 
was  engaged  at  Gehlsdorf,  Key  sent  reiterated  orders  to 
Oudinot  to  fly  to  the  support  of  Bertrand  ;  if  he  had  liter- 
ally obeyed  these  orders,  there  would  have  been  no  doubt  of 
the  cause  of  the  defeat,  for  the  decisive  point  of  the  action 
was  precisely  that  from  which  Ney  called  the  twelfth  corps. 
This  order  was  one  of  the  most  unfortunate  circumstances 
of  the  day,  and,  joined  to  the  want  of  unity  in  the  attacks 
made  between  ten  and  two  o'clock,  caused  the  loss  of  a  battle 
which  could  only  have  been  gained  by  well-combined  manoeu- 
vres, and  a  concert  of  action  in  their  execution.  It  has  been 
insinuated  that  the  Saxons  failed  in  their  duty  ;  it  is  true 
that  their  disorder  was  complete  ;  but  without  the  assistance 
of  the  twelfth  corps,  how  was  it  possible  for  them  to  hold 
out  against  at  least  fifteen  thousand  men  in  the  first  line  and 
as  many  more  in  the  second  ?  The  circumstance  which 
compelled  me  to  suspend  my  march  on  Luckau  was  certainly 
very  unfortunate  ;  but  it  had  no  influence  whatever  on  Ney's 
reverses.  I  had  immediately  sent  an  officer  to  inform  him 
of  it,  on  the  evening  of  the  third,  promising,  nevertheless, 
that  I  would  come  to  join  him  as  soon  as  I  could  get  rid  of 
Blucher.  Even  if  he  had  not  received  this  message  in  time, 
it  would  have  made  no  difference  ;  for  I  could  not  have 
reached  Dahme  till  the  seventh,  and  he  would,  nevertheless, 
have  been  beaten  on  the  sixth,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
dispositions  which  he  made. 

Remarks  on  Napoleon's  Plan  of  Campaign.— I  have  des- 
cribed at  considerable  length  these  three  disasters  of  Gross- 
Beeren,  the  Katzbach,  and  Dennewitz,  because  they  had   a 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  181 

notable  influence  on  the  results  of  the  campaign.  These 
multiplied  checks  have  induced  some  to  doubt  the  wisdom 
of  my  plan  and  the  solidity  of  the  principles  on  •which  it 
was  based.  Nothing  is  more  unjust.  If  I  had  had  troops 
more  warlike  and  more  accustomed  to  the  fatigues  of  a  cam- 
paign, and  a  greater  number  of  good  cavalry,  I  should  have 
succeeded.  A  plan  based  on  the  alternate  employment  of  a 
superior  mass  on  the  decisive  point,  requires  that  the  second- 
ary armies  which  remain  on  the  defensive  should  be  so  or- 
ganized as  to  fight  in  retreat  and  prevent  the  enemy  from 
cutting  them  up  ;  but  to  do  this  requires  good  cavalry,  espe- 
cially if  your  infantry  is  inexperienced.  To  judge  whether 
the  system  of  central  lines  is  defective,  it  is  important  to 
establish  a  parity  of  means,  that  is  to  know  what  I  could 
have  done  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Katzbach  with  the 
veteran  armies  and  the  eighty  thousand  horses  of  the  allies. 

I  do  not  deny,  however,  that  the  system  of  central  lines 
may  be  more  advantageous  with  one  hundred  thousand  men 
against  three  corps  of  thirty-three  thousand  each,  than  with 
a  mass  of  four  hundred  thousand  against  three  armies  of 
one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  each.  In  the  first  place, 
it  is  so  difficult  to  subsist  a  large  force  when  concentrated  in 
a  narrow  space  ;  then  again  it  is  easier  to  manœuvre  against 
fractions  of  thirty  thousand  men,  and  to  give  them  mortal 
blows,  than  it  is  against  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand 
combatants.  The  greater  the  masses  the  more  the  efforts  of 
genius  are  subjected  to  the  caprice  of  accident,  and  the 
greater  the  reaction  of  secondary  events.  Nevertheless,  in 
this  case  it  was  not  the  system  that  failed,  but  the  measures 
for  its  execution.  Could  I  anticipate  that  Macdonald  would 
expose  himself  to  so  sanguinary  a  reverse,  by  acting  contrary 
to  my  instructions  ?  It  would  perhaps  have  been  better  if 
I  had  caused  him  to  retire  behind  the  Queiss,  till  after  the 
result  of  the  battle  of  Dresden.     The  same  may  be  remarked 


182  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

of  the  operations  of  Oudinot  and  Ney  against  Bernadotte. 
I  had  no  reason  to  anticipate  their  disasters.  It,  however, 
would  have  been  better,  if,  while  striking  on  the  decisive 
point  with  the  troops  under  my  own  command,  I  had  merely- 
placed  my  secondary  armies  in  observation  on  the  defensive. 
If  I  deviated  from  these  maxims  it  was  with  the  hope  of 
diminishing  the  unfavorable  chances  which  resulted  from  my 
inferiority  in  numbers,  by  everywhere  taking  the  initiative  ; 
and  the  ill-success  of  the  campaign  probably  resulted  from 
an  excess  of  confidence  in  the  application  of  a  rule  so  incon- 
testable. The  result  would  have  been  different  if  I  could 
have  been  everywhere  myself,  for  I  could  easily  have  remedied, 
by  good  manoeuvres,  any  local  and  temporary  inferiority. 
Frederic  triumphed  at  Leuthen  against  triple  numbers  ;  and 
why  could  not  Macdonald,  at  the  Katzbach,  with  eighty 
thousand  men,  have  contended  with  ninety-five  thousand  ? 
In  fact,  what  was  mainly  wanting  to  me  in  this  campaign 
was  two  good  lieutenants,  who  understood  strategic  war  :  I 
was  certain  of  nothing  where  I  could  not  be  in  person.  If  I 
ever  had  reason  to  feel  the  faulty  system  of  my  staff  organiza- 
tion, it  was  in  these  memorable  operations.  I,  of  course, 
could  not  expect  of  my  lieutenants  all  that  I  myself  could 
have  done  :  that  was  impossible.  Arbiter  of  the  reputations 
of  my  officers  as  a  great  captain,  and  master  of  their  fortunes 
as  a  sovereign,  I  held  in  my  hands  the  two  most  powerful 
motives  which  influence  the  actions  of  men  ;  as  soon  as  I 
appeared  on  any  point,  confidence,  enthusiasm,  ambition, 
fear, — all  the  passions  were  united  around  me,  and  I  acted 
on  my  subordinates,  making  them  perform  prodigies.  My 
lieutenants,  on  the  contrary,  everywhere  encountered  rival- 
ries and  distrust  ;  with  equal  talent,  they,  therefore,  could 
not  have  equaled  me  in  their  operations  ;  and,  for  a  still 
stronger  reason,  when  the  disparity  of  character  and  genius 
was  greater  than  that  of  the  means  of  action.     Nevertheless, 


Cil.  XX.J  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  183 

if  the  commanders  of  my  secondary  armies  had  understood 
strategic  wax,  the  campaign  would  certainly  have  taken  a 
very  different  turn.  Their  faults  rendered  my  position  more 
critical  every  day.  My  armies  were  visibly  melting  away.  I 
foresaw  the  time  when  it  would  be  impossible  to  any  longer 
sustain  my  defensive  position.  My  marches  on  the  Elbe, 
fatiguing  as  they  were  to  our  troops,  produced  no  result, 
except  to  favor  our  enemies  who  were  interested  in  tem- 
porizing, inasmuch  as  they  were  expecting  considerable  re- 
enforcements.  General  Benningsen,  who  had  organized  at 
Warsaw  an  army  of  sixty  thousand  Russians,  was  rapidly 
approaching  the  theatre  of  war. 

Demonstrations  on  Bohemia.— Under  these  circumstances 
it  was  necessary  to  change  the  line  of  operations,  drawing 
myself  from  the  centre  in  order  to  operate  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  allies  ;  but  the  theatre  of  war,  admirably  suited  for 
my  first  system,  became  more  advantageous  to  my  enemies 
as  soon  as  I  left  the  Elbe  to  approach  the  Saale.  It  only 
remained  for  me  to  try  the  offensive,  at  least  to  attempt  to 
impose  on  the  enemy.  The  vanguard  of  the  grand  army  of 
the  allies  had  again  passed  the  mountains,  and  debouched 
in  the  plain  of  Pirna  ;  I  marched,  against  it  with  forty  thou- 
sand men.  On  the  fifteenth  of  September  we  reoccupied 
Peterswalde,  and  the  next  day  we  dislodged  the  enemy  from 
Hollendorf.  On  the  seventeenth  I  made  a  feint  of  descend- 
ing into  the  valley  of  Toeplitz  ;  but  my  advanced  guard, 
which  had  marched  on  Culm,  being  assailed  in  front  and 
flank  by  forces  infinitely  superior,  was  driven  back  with  con- 
siderable loss.  Seeing  that  the  enemy  was  prepared  to 
receive  us,  I  renounced  my  enterprise,  and  returned  on 
Dresden. 

Third  Attempt  against  Blneher,— Not  being  able  to  do 
anything  against  the  grand  army,  I  hoped  to  take  my  revenge 
on  Blucher,  whom  I  knew  to  be  weakened  by  a  large  body 


184  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

detached  on  Camentz.  On  the  twenty-second  I  repaired  to 
the  army  of  Macdonald,  and  pushed  it  forward  on  Bautzen. 
After  having  crossed  the  forest  of  Goedau,  we  found  our- 
selves, on  the  twenty-third  of  September,  in  the  presence  of 
Blucher's  army,  which  occupied  the  position  of  Bautzen, 
while  the  corps  which  had  been  directed  on  Camentz,  being 
now  on  its  return,  threatened  our  left  and  our  communica- 
tions with  Dresden.  A  battle  under  such  circumstances  and 
against  superior  forces  might  produce  the  most  disagreeable 
results.  Being  obliged  to  renounce  all  offensive  projects,  I 
felt  the  necessity  of  contracting  the  circle  of  my  defense.  I 
returned  with  the  army  of  Macdonald  into  the  position  of 
Weissig,  within  two  leagues  of  Dresden. 

New  Plans  of  the  Allies. — While  I  was  thus  seeking  to 
find  an  opportunity  to  strike  some  important  blow,  the 
sovereigns  and  the  grand  army  remained  at  Toeplitz,  waiting 
the  arrival  of  Benningsen  who  had  now  crossed  the  Oder. 
Those  who  understood  military  operations,  and  appreciated 
the  geographical  jjosition  of  Bohemia,  advised  that  this  new 
army  be  left  to  cover  Silesia,  and  that  Blucher  should  file 
by  his  left  on  Bohemia,  so  as  to  join  the  grand  army,  and, 
supporting  his  right  wing  near  Koenigstein,  debouch  again 
on  my  communications  with  three  hundred  thousand  men. 
The  sovereigns  approved  this  plan,  and  the  order  was  issued. 
But  Blucher  was  unwilling  to  act  under  Schwartzenberg, 
and  preferred  remaining  on  the  opposite  side  to  unite  with 
Barnadotte.  His  pretext  was  that  if  the  latter  should  be 
left  alone  before  Berlin,  that  capital  would  be  compromised  ; 
he  thought  it  better  to  send  Benningsen  into  Bohemia. 
This  arrangement  amounted  to  about  the  same  thing;  it 
was  of  little  consequence  whether  Blucher  or  Benningsen  was 
sent  into  Bohemia  ;  the  essential  thing  was  to  reënforce  the 
decisive  point  against  Dresden.  The  sovereigns  approved 
this  movement,  leaving  an  open  field  for  the  ardor  of  Blucher, 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  185 

his  staff  and  his  army.  From  this  time  forward  all  the 
chances  of  the  campaign  turned  against  me  ;  I  had  no  op- 
portunities to  apply  my  system  of  war,  for  there  was  no 
longer  any  proportion  between  our  means. 

They  assume  the  Offensive.— Benningsen  arrived  at  Toep- 
litz  near  the  end  of  September.  The  allies  were  merely 
waiting  for  his  arrival  to  assume  the  offensive.  Blucher 
filed  by  his  right  and  marched  by  Elsterwerda  and  Hirtz- 
berg  on  Elster  where  they  passed  the  Elbe  the  thirtieth  of 
October,  after  having  defeated  General  Bertrand,  who,  with 
eighteen  thousand  men,  opposed  the  irruption  of  the  allies  on 
the  left  of  the  river.  In  the  mean  time  the  Prince  Royal  of 
Sweden  (Bernadotte)  also  crossed  the  Elbe  at  Acken  and 
Roslau  ;  and  the  grand  army  of  the  allies,  which  Benning- 
sen  had  replaced  in  the  valley  of  Toeplitz  debouched  by 
Sebastiansberg  on  Chemnitz. 

Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher  and  Bernadotte.  —  It 
was  now  evidently  the  intention  of  the  allies  to  establish 
themselves  in  mass  on  my  rear  in  order  to  cut  off  my  retreat. 
My  only  chance  was  to  throw  myself  between  their  armies 
and  endeavor  to  fight  them  in  detail.  I  first  resolved  to 
march  against  Blucher.  As  I  still  hoped  to  preserve  the  line 
of  the  Elbe  I  left  St.  Cyr  at  Dresden  with  twenty-seven 
thousand  men,  and  detached  the  King  of  Naples  to  Frey- 
burg  with  fifty  thousand  ;  these  two  corps  were  to  hold  the 
enemy  in  check  on  the  side  toward  Bohemia.  With  the 
remainder  of  my  forces  I  marched  on  Eilenbourg,  where,  on 
the  ninth,  I  rallied  Ney's  army,  which  increased  my  force  to 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  combatants.*     I  sup- 

*  Napoleon's  army  had  at  this  time  received  a  new  organization  in  conse- 
quence of  the  losses  sustained  by  several  of  his  corps.  The  twelfth  corps, 
(Oudinot)  had  been  incorporated  with  the  fourth.  The  third,  (Ney's  old  corps, 
afterward  Souham's)  had  been  reduced  to  three  divisions  ;  Albert's  division  had 
reenforced  MacdonakTs  corps  (the  eleventh)  after  the  battle  of  the  Katzbach, 
and  Marchand's  division  had  reënforced  Reynier's  corps  (the  seventh)  after  the 
disaster  of  Dennewitz. 


186  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

posed  Blucber  at  Duben,  and  the  Prince  of  Sweden  at  Zoer- 
big  ;  I  learned  too  late  that  Sacken,  who  was  at  Mockrena, 
bad  been  separated  from  the  army  of  Silesia.  Had  I  known 
this  in  time  I  would  have  pursued  and  destroyed  him.  But 
be  again  joined  Blucber  by  a  rapid  march,  which  did  him 
great  credit.  All  my  attention  was  turned  in  (he  direction 
of  Dessau  and  Duben  ;  if  I  had  gained  a  decisive  battle  by 
destroying  the  bridge  of  Eoslau  and  seizing  that  of  Wurtem- 
bonrg,  I  would  have  destroyed  that  army.  The  first  condi- 
tion of  success  was  that  Murât  should  be  ready  to  join  me 
without  allowing  himself  to  be  cut  up  by  the  enemy.  I 
recommended  to  the  Prince  of  Neufchatel,  at  four  o'clock 
P.  M.,  of  the  tenth  of  October,  to  communicate  to  him  my 
project,  addressing  to  the  former  the  following  instructions  : 
"  You  will  write  to  the  King  of  Naples  that  I  have  received 
bis  letter  ;  that  I  have  raised  the  blockade  of  Wittenberg  ; 
that  I  have  separated  Sacken's  corps  from  the  corps  of  Lan- 
gcron  and  York  ;  that  I  have  ordered  the  Duke  of  Padua  to 
send  every  thing  that  can  embarrass  his  movements  to  Eulen- 
bourg  and  to  Wittenberg  ;  that  the  Duke  of  Castiglione  is 
at  Lutzen  or  Leipsic  this  evening  ;  that  the  Duke  of  Padua, 
having  got  rid  of  all  that  he  can  send  away,  will  have  at  least 
fifteen  thousand  men,  which,  united  with  the  Duke  of  Cas- 
tiglione, will  be  to  the  king  a  reënforcement  of  thirty  thou- 
sand ;  that  one  of  the  two  following  events  will  happen  ; 
that  I  will  attack  the  enemy  to-morrow  and  beat  him  ;  or 
that,  if  he  retires,  I  will  burn  his  bridges,  by  marching  on 
the  right  bank.  Therefore  the  King  of  Naples  ought  to  ma- 
nœuvre to  preserve  Leipsic,  and  give  me  time  to  fight  the  army 
of  Silesia  ;  but  if  he  is  obliged  to  leave  Leipsic  he  ought  to 
direct  every  thing  on  the  Mulde  ;  that  the  bridges  of  Eulen- 
bourg  and  Duben  are  guarded  ;  that  my  instruction  in  this 
case  is  to  pass  to  the  right  of  the  Elbe  and  manoeuvre 
between  Magdebourg  and  Dresden,  debouching  by  one  of  my 


Cil.  XX.]  A  U  I  U  M N     CAMPAIGN     OF    1813.  187 

four  places  to  surprise  the  enemy.      The  King  of  Naples 
ought  to  manœuvre  accordingly,  etc." 

It  was  important  that  St.  Cyr  should  ho  informed  at  Dres- 
den of  the  new  direction  which  I  intended  giving  to  my  oper- 
ations. Berthier  received  orders  to  write  to  him  in  cypher, 
"  that  I  was  at  Wittenberg,  of  which  place  I  had  raised  the 
blockade  ;  that  the  army  of  Silesia  was  retreating  in  all 
directions,  on  the  left  hank  ;  that  to-morrow  I  should  oblige 
him  to  give  battle,  or  to  lose  the  bridges  of  Dessau  and 
War  ten  burg  ;  that  perhaps  I  should  then  decide  to  pass  to 
the  right  bank  with  all  my  army  ;  that  it  was  by  the  right 
bank  that  I  should  move  on  Dresden." 

I  founded  great  hopes  on  the  success  of  this  plan,  which 
might  improve  our  affairs.  I,  in  consequence,  ordered  Ney 
to  push  one  corps  from  Wittenberg  on  both  sides  of  the  Elbe 
to  Roslau,  and  another  from  Duben  in  the  direction  of  Des- 
sau, in  the  hopes  of  beating  the  enemy  at  the  moment  that 
I  carried  the  bridge.  But  Blucher,  being  informed  of  his 
danger,  agreed  with  Bernadette  to  renounce  his  line  of  oper- 
ations, to  throw  himself  behind  the  Saale,  and  filed  rapidly 
to  the  right  on  Zoerbig  where  the  two  armies  effected  a  junc- 
tion. On  the  eleventh,  they  combined  their  flank  movement 
by  the  right  and  gained  Halle,  where  they  passed  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Saale.  This  timely  movement  destroyed  the 
finest  opportunity  that  I  had  during  the  campaign  ;  my  best 
combined  projects  failed  ;  my  star  was  falling. 

Project  of  nianœuTring  ou  the  Rigîit  of  the  Elbe.— See- 
ing my  operation  fail  from  unforeseen  accidents,  I  now  formed 
one  of  the  boldest  projects  of  my  whole  life.  Blucher  and 
Bernadotte  having  escaped  me,  it  was  probable  that  the 
grand  allied  army  would  extend  itself  to  the  left  to  connect 
with  them.  By  remaining  between  these  masses,  I  no  longer 
had  sufficient  space  for  operating,  nor  the  means  for  striking 
decisive  blows.    I  should  run  the  risk  of  a  sanguinary  reverse  ; 


188  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

on  the  contrary,  the  places  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder  would 
permit  me  to  make  myself  master  of  the  country  which  the 
allies  had  left  to  throw  themselves  into  Saxony.  I  would  be 
established  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  while  they  would 
concentrate  in  the  plains  of  Leipsic.  I  would  get  possession 
of  Berlin,  and  destroy  the  corps  which  they  had  left  before 
Magdebourg,  Torgau,  Dresden,  Glogau,  Custrin  and  Stettin. 
Having  no  more  bridges  on  the  Elbe,  they  could  do  nothing 
against  me,  except  by  a  forced  passage  of  the  river.  I  would 
make  Prussia  support  the  weight  of  the  war,  and  thus  pro- 
long the  contest. 

The  strategic  theatre  of  the  war  on  which  we  were  now  to 
decide  the  destinies  of  Europe  was  nearly  a  square  :  the 
Elbe  and  the  Oder  formed  two  sides  of  which  I  was  master. 
The  Baltic  which  corresponds  to  the  third  side,  was  alike  an 
obstacle  to  both  ;  by  manoeuvring  so  as  to  get  possession  of 
the  fourth  side,  I  would  place  the  enemy  between  two  lines 
of  fortifications,  the  sea,  and  my  army  ;  I  would  have  no 
further  need  of  secondary  armies  :  a  single  victory  like  that 
of  Dresden  would  be  sufficient  to  annihilate  the  enemy  ;  and 
at  the  head  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  I  felt 
certain  of  gaining  it. 

This  plan  appeared  too  adventurous  to  my  marshals,  who 
desired  to  fall  back  behind  the  Rhine  ;  they,  therefore, 
pressed  me  to  renounce  it.  I  hesitated  all  the  day  of  the 
twenty-second.  I  confess  that  this  plan  required  more  ex- 
perienced soldiers  than  those  which  I  then  had,  and  above 
all  more  cavalry.  I  required  abundant  supplies  for  my  gar- 
risons, and  it  was  important  to  have  allies  in  Westphalia 
and  Bavaria,  upon  whom  I  could  depend.  If  Germany  had 
been  as  well  disposed  towards  me  as  Poland,  the  chances  of 
success  would  have  been  more  favorable.  But  with  five 
hundred  thousand  allies  between  me  and  the  Rhine,  and 
Germany  insurgent,  the  chances  were  complicated.   1  might, 


Oh.  XX.J  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  189 

however,  have  opened  a  road  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe,  or  if 
the  allies  pursued  me  on  Berlin,  I  might  rally  on  me  the 
garrisons  of  the  fortifications,  and  throw  myself  into  Bohe- 
mia. With  my  old  soldiers  of  Areola,  of  Rivoli,  and  of 
Austerlitz,  I  should  not  have  hesitated  to  adopt  this  plan. 
But  now  my  situation  was  different.  As  an  emperor  I 
feared  to  undertake  what  as  a  general  I  should  have  unhesi- 
tatingly adopted. 

The  Defection  of  Bavaria  renders  it  impracticable. — 
The  news  of  the  defection  of  Bavaria,  which  we  received  the 
same  day,  contributed  not  a  little  to  shake  my  resolution. 
Since  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  this  country  had 
been  acted  upon  by  the  suggestions  of  the  Tugendbund  and 
Austria.  The  king  was  sincerely  attached  to  France,  in 
whose  service  he  had  passed  a  part  of  his  youth  ;  he  was  full 
of  loyalty  and  gratitude  for  what  I  had  done  for  him  ;  but 
he  was  too  good-natured,  and  too  easily  influenced.  A 
strong  party  pretended  that  Bavaria  had  lost  in  independence 
what  she  had  gained  in  territory,  and  that  the  elector  was 
more  a  king  in  1804,  than  Maximilian  Joseph,  first  sovereign 
of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  They  painted  me  to  him 
as  insatiable  of  blood  and  power.  They  offered,  on  the  one 
side,  to  guarantee  to  Bavaria  the  preservation  of  her  terri- 
tory, and  the  establishment  of  her  independence,  if  she  would 
pronounce  against  me  ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  threatened 
her  with  invasion  and  the  partition  of  her  territory,  if 
she  took  up  arms  against  the  coalition.  Wrede,  the  ambi- 
tious "Wrede,  permitted  himself  to  be  seduced  by  this  party, 
and  soon  became  its  principal  leader.  The  presence  of 
Augereau's  little  army  towards  Wurtzbourg,  my  first  success, 
and  the  openly  manifested  sentiments  of  the  king,  had,  for  a 
time,  imposed  on  che  partisans  of  Austria.  Maximilian  had 
not  left  me  ignorant  of  the  intrigues  of  this  party  in  his 
kingdom,  nor  of  his  own  desire  to  remain  faithful  ;  and  after 


190  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

what  he  had  written  to  the  Prince  of  N.eufchatel  in  July,  I 
could  not  anticipate  the  possibility  of  his  disaffection.  His 
letter  was  dated  Nymphenbourg,  July  26th,  1813  ;  it  runs 
as  follows  : 

"  I  profit,  my  dear  Prince,  by  M.  de  Fonteville  to  inform 
you  of  my  return  ;  I  received  yesterday,  by  two  different  con- 
veyances, the  news  that  seven  thousand  Austrians  have  arrived 
at  Elferdingen  ;  that  they  are  fortifying  themselves  ;  that 
twenty-five  thousand  men  are  to  arrive  at  Lintz  ;  and  that 
in  all  there  will  be  seventy  thousand  men  between  Wels  and 
my  frontiers.  I  immediately  sent  one  of  my  aids-de-camp 
to  learn  exactly  the  state  of  things.  As  soon  as  I  receive 
his  report  I  will  send  it  to  you  by  an  estafette.  This  ought, 
however,  to  show  you  how  much  I  need  troops  to  guard  my 
frontiers,  and  to  prevent  in  time  of  war  the  Tyrolese  and  the 
Voralberg  from  penetrating  to  the  heart  of  my  states  ,  .  .  . 
I  have  not  yet  seen  M.  de  Fonteville  ;  I  expect  him  here  in 
half  an  hour.  I  will  give  him  all  the  information  he  may 
desire.  My  attachment  for  the  Emperor  and  for  the  cause 
of  France  has  never  varied  for  an  instant.  You  may, 
therefore,  be  certain  that  I  will  do  all  in  my  power  to  satisfy 
the  desires  of  his  imperial  majesty.  I  only  ask  that  he  will 
not  lose  sight  of  the  interests  of  my  kingdom,  and  that  ho 
will  come  to  my  assistance  in  case  of  a  war  with  Austria. 
However  great  the  efforts  "which  I  may  make,  it  will  not  be 
possible  for  me  alone  to  resist  for  a  long  time,  if  the  enemy 
attempt,  with  a  corps  of  sixty  thousand  men,  the  passage  of 
the  Inn,  I  not  being  able  to  count  on  the  Tyrol.  Wrede  is 
indefatigable.  His  corps-d' armée  does  wonders.  I  expect 
to  review  them  in  a  few  days  ;  would  that  it  were  twice  as 
strong  !  ....  Be  so  kind  as  to  present  my  homage  to  the 
Emperor  :  tell  him  that  I  am  more  attached  to  him  than 
ever,  and  that  if  I  do  not  make  great  efforts,  it  is  because 
the  moral  and  physical  means  are  wanting.     Old  Bavaria  is 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  191 

sound  ;  also  the  circle  of  the  upper  Danube  ;  a  part  of  the 
circle  of  the  Hier,  the  country  of  Anspach,  and  the  greater 
part  of  Salzbourg.  The  Tyrol  and  the  Bamberg,  where 
there  are  many  members  of  the  old  noblesse,  Passau  and 
Bayreuth,  are  partly  unsound.  It  might  be  well  that  they 
should  leave,  and  that  I  should  countenance  their  departure. 
The  entire  loss  of  trade,  and  the  wants  that  are  the  natural 
result  of  Avar,  are  the  causes  of  this  state  of  feeling.  You 
see,  my  dear  friend,  that  I  have  nothing  to  conceal  from  you, 
I  am  sure  you  will  not  abuse  my  confidence.  I  have  just 
been  in  Baden,  and  have  crossed  Wurtemberg  ;  the  general 
cry  is  peace.  If  it  is  made,  all  will  be  well,  and  I  promise 
that  in  less  than  two  years  the  general  feeling  will  become 
as  favorable  as  can  be  desired,  and  that  it  will  remain  so.  I 
am  long  and  prosy,  my  dear  nephew  ;  but  it  is  a  month 
since  I  wrote  to  you.     Adieu,  I  embrace  you. 

"Max.  Joseph." 

The  defeats  of  the  Katzbach  and  Dennewitz  had  forced 
me  to  call  Augereau's  corps  into  Saxony,  and  it  was  impos- 
sible fur  the  king  and  his  minister,  Montgelas,  to  resist  the 
torrent  ;  the  leaders  of  the  party  carried  their  point  even  in 
opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  king.  A  treaty  of  alliance 
was  signed  with  Austria  at  Ried,  and  Bavaria  acceded  to  the 
coalition.  As  the  loss  of  so  necessary  an  ally  greatly  dimin- 
ished my  chances  of  success,  I  renounced  my  project  of 
manoeuvring  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  the  success  of 
which  depended  upon  my  being  able  to  throw  myself  in  mass 
by  Magdebourg  on  Westphalia,  or  by  Dresden  into  Bohemia, 
basing  myself  on  Bavaria.  Having  no  longer  this  alternative 
left,  it  would  have  been  absurd  to  lead  a  French  army  be- 
tween the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  leaving  in  its  rear  an  army 
already  double  its  numbers,  and  which  the  defection  of  Ba- 


192  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

varia  would  infallibly  increase  by  all  the  population  to  the 
Rhine. 

March  on  Leipsic— After  renouncing  this  project  it  was 
dangerous  to  remain  at  Duben,  and  I  was  soon  recalled  in  the 
direction  of  Leipsic,  which  place  the  grand  army  of  the  allies 
was  approaching,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  Murat  to 
retard  its  march.  In  operating  against  Blucher  I  had  hoped 
to  conceal  my  movements  for  some  days  so  as  to  have  time 
to  defeat  and  drive  him  into  the  Elbe  and  then  return  upon 
the  grand  army.  If  this  army  itself  had  not  had  the  inten- 
tion of  taking  the  offensive  my  calculation  would  have  been 
crowned  with  success  ;  unfortunately,  the  allies,  being 
stronger  than  I  supposed,  had  resolved  to  debouch  into 
Saxony  even  before  knowing  what  course  I  intended  to  pur- 
sue. This  incident  and  Blucher's  march  on  Halle,  deranged 
every  thing.  The  advanced  guards  of  the  allies  had  already 
reached  Borna  and  Pegau.  I  saw  that  all  the  forces  of  the 
allies  were  to  unite  on  my  rear.  But  it  gave  me  no  uneasi- 
ness ;  I  hoped  that  the  movement  of  Reynier  on  Roslau, 
and  of  Ney  on  Dessau,  inspiring  Bernadotte  and  Blucher 
with  serious  fears  for  Berlin,  would  decide  them  to  return  in 
all  haste  by  Balbi  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  which 
would  have  again  separated  them  from  the  grand  army.  In 
fact  the  news  of  these  movements  alarmed  the  Prince  of 
Sweden,  who,  on  the  thirteenth,  fell  back  to  Coethen  ;  but 
Blucher  held  firm  at  Halle,  and  did  not  leave  that  place  till 
he  moved  on  Leipsic,  after  hearing  of  my  return  toward  that 
city.  It  must  be  said  in  favor  of  the  Prussians  and  Russians 
that  they  manoeuvred  well  during  this  autumn  campaign. 
The  country  people  and  the  Cossacks  informed  them  of  all 
my  movements,  and  they  acted  with  promptitude. 

The  grand  allied  army  was  now  nearly  under  the  walls  of 
Leipsic.  It  was  very  important  for  me  not  to  be  anticipated 
in  my  movements  on  this  centre  of  all  the  communications 


Cil.  XX.J  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1  S  1 3  .  193 

of  the  country.  I  resolved  to  unite  all  my  forces  ;  knowing 
that  some  decisive  blows  were  to  be  given  here,  I  neglected  no 
means  of  augmenting  my  strength  by  drawing  in  my  detach- 
ments. I  had  already  drawn  to  Leipsic  fifteen  thousand  men 
of  the  little  army  assembled  under  the  orders  of  Augereau  at 
Wurtzbourg  ;  they  arrived  there  on  the  thirteenth  of  October, 
with  a  division  of  dragoons  from  Spain.  In  the  present  state 
of  affairs,  I  could  have  desired  to  draw  my  troops  from  Dres- 
den and  Hambourg,  for  I  felt  that  if  I  was  not  victorious, 
their  loss  would  be  inevitable,  unless  St.  Cyr  and  Davoust 
should  get  timely  notice  and  be  skillful  enough  to  effect  their 
junction  with  Lemarrois  and  Narbonne,  so  as,  in  concert,  to 
open  a  passage.  I  sent  them  orders  to  that  effect,  but  they 
were  intercepted. 

The  Allies  concentrate  about  Leipsic. — I  left  Duben  on 
the  fourteenth,  and  arrived  at  Leipsic  on  the  fifteenth  ;  it 
was  well  that  I  did  so  ;  for  Murât,  n  >t  being  able  to  contend 
against  such  a  mass,  had  fallen  back  in  good  order  on  Leip- 
sic ;  but  he  had  terminated  this  honorable  retreat  by  a  grave 
fault.  He  was  in  position  on  the  twelfth,  in  rear  of  the 
defile  of  Magdeborn  (the  Gozelbach),  the  right  toward  Cros- 
tewitz  and  the  left  at  Stormthal.  He  there  received  my  let- 
ter from  Duben  which  informed  him  of  the  change  in  my 
plan  of  operations  and  of  my  immediate  return  to  Leipsic. 
He  assured  me  that  he  would  hold  Lt  ipsic  and  a  position  in 
advance  till  the  fourteenth,  and  threw  up  some  intrench- 
ments  to  cover  the  position  which  he  occupied.  Marmont  had 
received  orders  to  join  him  and  ought  to  have  been  at  Leipsic 
on  the  thirteenth.  Murat  was  still  further  reënforced  by  Au- 
gereau's  two  divisions  and  some  fine  cavalry.  He  thus  had 
with  him  five  corps-d'armée  and  a  numerous  cavalry.  Never- 
theless, fearing  to  compromise  so  considerable  a  part  of  my 
army  in  a  general  engagement,  and  being  full  of  the  idea 
that  I  would  first  strike  at  the  north  of  Leipsic  against  the 
vol.  iv. — 13. 


194  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

combined  armies,  lie  suddenly  determined  to  cross  the  Partha 
and  to  hold  Leipsic  only  as  a  tête-de-pont  ;  the  order  which 
I  had  already  sent  to  Marmont  to  turn  back  and  observe  the 
road  to  Halle  at  Spenditz,  confirmed  the  King  of  Naples  in 
this  idea.  His  retreat  was  already  begun  on  the  thirteenth, 
when  one  of  my  officers  informed  him  that  I  would  be  at 
Leipsic  the  next  day  ;  he  arrested  his  movement  near  Liebert- 
Wolkowitz,  after  having  yielded  to  the  allies  the  important 
defiles  of  Groebern  and  Goehren  ;  a  circumstance  which  pro- 
duced the  most  vexatious  consequences. 

Menaced  on  the  fourteenth  by  the  allies,  Murat  felt  the 
necessity  of  repairing  his  fault.  Encouraged  still  further  by 
the  information  that  I  would  arrive  in  the  course  of  the  day, 
he  made  a  vigorous  stand  at  Liebert-Wolkowitz,  and  threw 
himself  between  Wachau  and  Magdeborn  on  the  numerous 
cavalry  of  Barclay  who  was  closely  pressing  him.  Our  dra- 
goons, who  had  just  returned  from  Spain,  burning  to  distin- 
guish themselves,  performed  wonders.  Notwithstanding  the 
talents  and  bravery  of  Pahlen,  and  the  charges  of  a  part  of 
the  Eussian  reserves,  we  Avere  on  the  point  of  gaining  the 
victory,  when  a  charge  of  Prussian  cuirassiers  on  our  scat- 
tered and  harassed  soldiers  restored  the  combat  in  the  enemy's 
favor. 

It  being  urgent  to  scatter  the  tempest  which  was  gather- 
ing against  us  from  all  points  of  the  horizon,  I  had  accelera- 
ted, as  much  as  was  in  my  power,  the  return  of  the  force 
engaged  between  Duben  and  Dessau.  It  would  have  been 
advantageous  to  give  battle  on  the  fifteenth  ;  but  the  thing 
was  physically  impossible  ;  the  mass  of  my  forces  were  still 
too  far  off.  Bertrand  and  the  Young  Guard  arrived  in  the 
night  of  the  fourteenth,  toward  Euterisch  ;  Macdonald 
passed  Duben  ;  Souham,  with  the  third  corps,  did  not  arrive 
till  midnight  ;  he  was  obliged  the  next  day  to  take  the  road 
to  Eulenbourg  in  order  to  avoid  the  blocking  up  of  the  road. 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF    1313.  195 

Seeing  here  that  the  bridge  was  burned,  he  ascended  the 
Mulde  to  find  a  passage,  and  on  the  night  of  the  fifteenth, 
only  reached  Rothenhalm  on  the  road  to  Leipsic.  Key- 
nier'fl  corps  which  had  descended  the  Elbe  to  Roslau,  at- 
tempted to  reestablish  the  batteau-bridge  of  Bernadotte,  so 
as  to  return  directly,  but  the  difficulty  and  slowness  of  the 
operation  forced  him  to  fall  back  on  Wittenberg  which  re- 
tarded him  by  two  days'  march.  All  these  incidents  forced 
me  to  defer  my  attack  till  the  sixteenth. 

The  sovereigns,  on  their  side,  being  informed  of  my  return 
to  Leipsic,  and  fearing  that  I  might  overthrow  Blucher,  de- 
termined to  attack  me  the  same  day.  Proud  of  their  success 
on  the  fourteenth,  they  deemed  it  advisable  not  to  wait  the 
arrival  of  Benningsen  and  Colloredo  who  could  not  enter  the 
line  before  the  seventeenth,  for  fear  that  I  might  have  leisure 
in  the  interval  to  strike  at  the  army  of  Silesia.  It  was, 
therefore,  resolved  to  attack  me  on  the  sixteenth,  not  so 
much  with  the  hope  of  gaining  a  decisive  victory  as  to  gain 
time  for  the  arrival  of  all  the  forces  of  the  coalition  on  the 
field  of  battle  where  was  to  be  decided  the  fate  of  the  civil- 
ized world. 

Singular  Project  ©f  Schwartzenberg.— Schwartzenberg  at 
first  had  the  singular  idea  of  throwing  his  reserve  and  the 
mass  of  his  army  into  the  cul-de-sac  between  the  Pleisse  and 
the  Elster,  from  which  he  could  debouch  only  by  a  narrow 
bridge  in  the  middle  of  my  army  ;  while,  the  right,  under  the 
orders  of  Barclay,  composed  of  the  corps  of  Kleist,  Witt- 
genstein, and  Klenau,  would  advance  between  Liebert- 
Wolkowitz,  and  the  Pleisse.  If  this  arrangement  had  been 
followed  the  total  defeat  of  the  grand  allied  army  would 
have  been  certain.  But  the  Emperor  Alexander,  after  hav- 
ing vainly  demonstrated  to  Schwartzenberg  the  foolishness 
of  his  project,  positively  declared  that  his  troops  and  those 
of  the  King  of  Prussia  should  remain  on  the  right  of  the 


196  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON  [Cil.  XX. 

Pleisse.  Thus  the  grenadiers,  the  guards,  and  the  reserves, 
— thirty-five  thousand  men  of  the  elite,  were  retained  at  the 
decisive  point  by  the  firmness  of  the  Emperor  Alexander. 
The  Austrian  generalissimo  persisted,  on  his  side,  in  carrying 
his  own  forces  into  the  cul-de-sac  of  Connewitz.  Griulay's 
corps  was  still  detached  by  Zwenkau  to  turn  Leipsic  and  get 
possession  of  the  great  road  to  Lindenau.  This  position  of 
the  allies  was  too  extended  ;  Blucher  and  Bernadette  being 
then  at  Halle,  it  would  perhaps  have  been  better  for  the 
grand  army  to  direct  itself  on  Zeitz,  so  as  to  establish  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  on  my  communications. 
Benningsen  should  have  been  directed  from  Coldiz  on  Alten- 
bourg,  to  cover  the  road  to  Bohemia  during  this  movement. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  just  to  agree,  that,  as  the  march  of  Blu- 
cher and  Bernadotte  on  the  Saale  was  not  the  consequence  of 
a  plan  concerted  with  the  sovereigns,  and  as  the  latter  had 
at  Altenbourg  only  a  vague  notion  of  what  the  two  armies 
of  the  north  were  doing,  they  could  not  form  any  plan  of 
operations  on  such  data.  It  was,  therefore,  natural  that 
they  should  adopt  the  plan  of  marching  directly  against  me, 
at  the  same  time  seeking  to  trouble  my  line  of  retreat.  For 
this  purpose  it  was  agreed  that  the  grand  army  of  Bohemia 
should  advance  on  Leipsic  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Pleisse, 
carrying  on  my  communications  only  the  force  necessary  to 
get  possession  of  the  defiles  and  arrest  the  heads  of  my 
columns  in  retreat.  Griulay's  corps  was  sufficient  for  this  ; 
but  it  would  have  been  well  to  give  it  three  or  four  thousand 
more  horse,  for  the  allies  had  plenty  of  cavalry.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  allied  troops  should  then  have  followed  the 
main  army,  throwing  only  a  light  division  into  the  space 
between  Botha  and  Zwenkau,  in  order  to  keep  up  the  com- 
municaîion  with  Giulay  ;  to  place  forty  thousand  men  in 
this  funnel  was  a  ridiculous  idea. 
First  Day  of  Leipsic,  October  16th.— I  did  not  at  first  per- 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813  197 

ceive  the  exact  bearing  of  the  allies'  movement  ;  but  I  felt 
that  whatever  course  they  might  take,  a  vigorous  effort  on 
Wachau  could  alone  gain  me  the  victory.  I  had  given  to 
Ney  the  command  of  all  the  forces  north  of  Leipsic,  i.  e.,  the 
corps  of  Bertrand,  Marmont,  Souham.  There  was  every 
reason  to  suppose  that  Blucher,  filing  from  Halle  by  his 
right,  would  come  to  attack  us  by  the  road  to  Mersebourg, 
in  order  the  better  to  connect  himself  with  the  grand  army. 
Nevertheless  it  was  possible  that  he  would  carry  his  right  on. 
Leipsic  by  Skeuditz,  and  it,  therefore,  became  necessary  for 
me  to  prepare  for  either  case.  My  first  project  had  been  to 
draw  to  me  two  of  Ney's  corps  near  Wachau,  in  order  there 
to  strike  the  necessary  blow  for  restoring  our  affairs  ;  the 
third  corps,  arriving  from  Duben,  would  relieve  Marmont 
toward  Moeckern,  where  he  had  observed  a  position  very 
favorable  for  resisting  a  superior  force,  and  where  he  had 
thrown  up  some  intrenchments  to  strengthen  it.  If  this  first 
disposition  had  been  executed  I  should  have  had  forty  thou- 
sand more  men  at  Wachau,  and  the  army  of  Bohemia  would 
have  been  exposed  to  a  defeat  the  more  complete  as  Schwart- 
zenberg  accumulated  fault  upon  fault.  But  while  the  allies 
were  preparing  to  attack  me  only  partially,  fortune  opposed 
me  by  a  series  of  accidents  which  deranged  all  my  plans. 

I  had  expected  that  the  duke  of  Padua  would  be  suffi- 
cient with  seven  or  eight  thousand  men  for  the  defense  of 
Leipsic  :  on  the  approach  of  Griulay's  entire  corps,  threaten- 
ing the  passage  of  Lindenau  (the  only  one  which  remained  in 
case  of  retreat),  Ney  thought  he  ought  to  direct  Bertrand 
there  ;  and  at  six  o'clock  this  general  was  already  in  motion 
on  Liebert-Wolkwitz.  Marmont,  on  his  side,  had  not  yet 
been  relieved  by  the  third  corps,  when,  being  delayed,  as  has 
been  said,  at  the  passage  of  the  Mulde,  he  was  informed  of 
the  approach  of  Blucher's  advanced  guard.  His  situation 
was  critical  :    to  retire  without   fiditins   would   draw  the 


198  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

enemy  on  Leipsic,  and  prevent  Marmont  from  assisting  me 
at  Wachau.  He  prepared  to  hold  on  between  Moeckern  and 
Euterisch,  so  as  not  to  lose  Leipsic.  Ney,  thinking  that  this 
marshal  was  already  acquainted  with  the  localities,  and  that 
it  would  be  as  well  to  leave  him  on  this  point,  resolved  to 
replace  him  towards  Wachau  by  the  three  divisions  of 
the  third  corps  which  were  to  arrive  at  two  o'clock.  The 
result  of  these  different  contrarieties  was  that  the  forty  thou- 
sand which  I  expected  to  reënforce  me  in  order  to  assail  th> 
army  of  Bohemia,  did  not  arrive. 

If  the  victory  had  been  certain,  Ney  might  have  thrown 
only  one  division  of  Bertrand  at  Lindenau,  and  the  other  on 
the  northern  faubourg  of  Leipsic,  while  Marmont  and  the 
third  corps  marched  to  Wachau  ;  it  is  probable  that  Giulay 
and  Blucher  would  not  have  been  ready  to  make  a  serious 
attack  on  Leipsic  on  the  sixteenth.  Reënforced  in  time  by 
Marmont  and  Souham,  I  might  have  turned  the  right  of  the 
allies,  and  have  thrown  Barclay  into  the  Pleisse,  while 
Schwartzenberg  so  foolishly  shut  himself  up  in  the  cul-de-sac 
of  Connewitz  ;  I  would  have  collected  immense  trophies,, 
and,  pursuing  the  enemy  to  Zeitz,  I  would  have  opened  a 
new  line  of  retreat  on  Naumbourg,  without  troubling  myself 
about  Blucher's  temporary  occupation  of  Leipsic.  But  in 
truth  this  disposition  would  only  have  given  me  another 
victory,  without,  however,  destroying  or  disabling  my  enemy; 
for  Blucher  and  Bernadette  united  could  have  followed  in 
my  rear,  while  Schwartzeuberg,  reënforced  by  Benningsen 
and  Colloredo  with  sixty  thousand  men,  would  still  have  had 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  combatants  to  oppose  me. 
I  should  still  have  been  in  the  midst  of  two  hundred  and 
forty  thousand  enemies.  The  parks  of  my  army,  united  at 
Eulenbourg,  as  well  as  Bevnier's  corps  which  was  on  the 
march  to  that  city,  would  have  been  cut  off,  and  forced  to 
throw  themselves  on  Torgau.     It  would  be  difficult  to  decide 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1  8  1  3  .  199 

what  change  in  the  respective  situation  of  the  parties  a  more 
complete  victory  at  Wachau  would  have  produced.  "What 
combinations  could  affect  an  enemy  who  in  a  single  day 
received  reinforcements  of  one  hundred  thousand  men?  It 
was  the  disorganization  which  such  a  defeat  would  have  j>ro- 
duced  at  the  head-quarters  of  Schwartzenberg  which  alone 
could  rescue  me,  and  prove  whether  the  abandonment  of 
Leipsic  by  Marmont  had  been  a  prudent  measure.  In  the 
uncertainty  of  the  event,  it  would  have  been  playing  a 
hazardous  game. 

The  battle  began  on  the  sixteenth  of  October,  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  that  is,  two  hours  sooner  than  I 
desired.  I  had  intended  to  take  the  initiative,  but  the  enemy 
first  attacked  us.  Klenau  on  the  right  debouched  in  force 
by  the  woods  of  the  university  on  Liebert-Wolkwitz  and  the 
Kohlberg.  Wittgenstein  moved  on  Wachau,  and  Kleist  on 
Mark-Kleeberg.  This  first  effort  was  sustained  by  Murat's 
forces.  Lauriston  vigorously  defended  Liebert-Wolkwitz  ; 
Belluno  repulsed  the  enemy's  attempts  on  Wachau  ;  but 
Poniatowski  had  to  abandon  Mark-Kleeberg  for  a  moment 
to  the  Prussians.  I  had  just  arrived  from  Keudnitz,  near 
Liebert-Wolkwitz  ;  the  Young  and  Old  Guards  followed  me; 
but  they  had  not  yet  debouched  on  my  right.  The  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  made  it  necessary  for  me  to  change  my 
dispositions.  I  sent  Augereau  from  my  left  to  the  right,  to 
sustain  Poniatowski.  Two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard, 
under  Mortier,  manoeuvred  at  the  left  of  Lauriston  against 
the  right  of  Klenau  ;  the  other  two,  under  Oudinot,  marched 
to  the  support  of  Belluno  at  Wachau.  A  line  mass  of 
cavalry  established  itself  as  a  third  line  in  rear  of  the  centre  ; 
and  my  reserve  of  artillery,  placed,  along  the  front,  opened 
its  fire  upon  the  enemy.  A  heavy  cannonade  followed  along 
the  line,  and  the  combat  continued  till  near  noon,  with 
varied  success.     Klenau  was  repulsed  by  Mortier  and  Lau- 


200  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch   XX. 

riston.  Poniatowski,  sustained  by  Augereau,  recaptured 
Mark-Kleeberg.  At  the  centre  Oudinot  and  Belluno  drove 
back  Wittgenstein  on  Stoermthal  and  Gossa. 

In  the  meantime  Schwartzenberg  presented  himself  in 
person  with  the  main  body  of  the  Austrians  at  the  defiles  of 
Connewitz  and  Doelitz,  where  he  could  not  debouch.  Lefol's 
division  defended  the  first,  and  Sémélé's  division  from  Au- 
gereau's  corps  covered  the  second. 

Standing  on  the  heights  of  Meysdorf  I  was  still  full  of 
hope  ;  every  thing  authorized  me  to  expect  a  decisive  victory; 
for  Macdonald  was  finally  debouching  from  Halzhausen, 
while  Key  informed  me  from  Euterisch,  at  half  past  ten 
o'clock,  that  Marmont  was  about  marching  to  join  me,  and 
that  even  the  third  corps  might  follow  him  if  Blucher  should 
not  appear  in  force  on  the  road  to  Halle  ;  finally,  Bertrand's 
corps,  which  had  bivouacked  between  Euterisch  and  Leipsic, 
would  be  sufficient  to  guard  the  town,  and  drive  Giulay  from 
Lindenau.  I  immediately  make  dispositions  to  act  more 
vigorously  on  the  offensive,  and  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  I 
order  Latour-Maubourg  to  carry  the  positions  of  the  Russian 
corps  at  the  right  and  left  of  Gossa,  and  direct  Victor  and 
Lauriston  to  sustain  him.  The  most  brilliant  success  crowns 
this  double  charge,  although  Latour-Maubourg  lias  his  leg 
carried  away  by  a  ball,  and  a  part  of  his  corps  somewhat 
thrown  into  confusion  by  this  accident.  Nevertheless  Borde- 
soult's  division  of  cuirassiers  supplies  its  place;  they  throw 
themselves  on  the  left  of  Prince  Eugene  of  Wurtemberg, 
carry  a  battery,  charge  upon  the  battalions,  overthrow  the 
division  of  light  cavalry  of  the  guard  which  makes  a  flank- 
movement  against  them,  and  push  on  to  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander. This  prince  immediately  engages  the  Cossacks  of  the 
elite,  who  served  him  as  an  escort.  In  a  moment  the  batte- 
ries of  the  reserve  of  the  guard  are  unmasked,  Barclay's 
cavalry  hastens  to  the  threatened  point,  and  as  the  wound 


OH.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  201 

of  Latour-Maubourg  prevents  him  from  making  suitable 
arrangements  for  sustaining  the  charge  of  our  cuirassiers,  it 
does  not  produce  the  result  which  I  expected  :  the  enemy 
even  resumes  the  offensive  on  Gossa,  and  our  squadrons  re- 
form in  rear,  at  the  moment  when  our  infantry  is  advancing 
to  occupy  the  conquered  ground. 

Schwartzenberg,  deaf,  until  ten  o'clock,  to  all  the  repre- 
sentations of  the  Kussian  officers,  had  finally  become  con- 
vinced of  the  exposed  condition  of  his  right  and  that  it  was 
necessary  to  return  to  its  assistance.  All  the  efforts  of  Mer- 
feldt  to  debouch  from  Doelitz  having  been  unsuccessful,  the 
prince  then  decided  to  return  by  Baschewitz  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Pleisse,  which,  for  his  own  glory,  he  should 
never  have  left  ;  he  brought  back  with  him  two  divisions  of 
cuirassiers  and  two  divisions  of  grenadiers  of  the  Prince  of 
Hesse-Hombourg.  This  resolution,  although  very  tardy, 
had  its  effect.  The  divisions  of  Austrian  cuirassiers  passed 
the  Pleisse  at  a  ford,  and  debouched  from  Groebern,  at  the 
moment  when  Ivleist  was  warmly  pressed.  They  fell  be- 
tween Augereau's  corps  and  the  cavalry,  overthrew  the  lat- 
ter, and  pushed  on  to  the  Young  Guard,  at  the  very  moment 
when  Latour-Maubourg  was  effecting  so  much  against  the 
guard  of  the  sovereigns  on  the  heights  of  Gossa. 

This  charge  of  the  enemy,  which  penetrated  almost  to  me, 
gave  me  some  uneasiness  ;  on  the  other  side  the  sound  of 
cannon  was  heard  at  the  north  of  Ljipsic  ;  Marmont,  so  far 
from  being  able  to  second  me,  was  himself  strongly  engaged. 
The  divisions  of  Russian  grenadiers  had  just  given  renewed 
strength  to  the  centre  of  the  allies  ;  the  earth  seemed  to  be 
covered  with  enemy's  battalions,  in  proportion  as  we  ex- 
tended our  horizon.  I  did  not  venture  to  sustain  the  gap 
between  Latour-Maubourg  and  Belluno  with  my  Old  Guard, 
and  all  the  remainder  of  my  forces  was  already  engaged. 
Macdonald  was  engaged  with  Klenau  whom  he  had  driven 


202  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

far  enough.  The  fine  cavalry  from  Spain  which  sustained 
him  had  been  paralyzed  by  the  wound  of  General  Pajol  who 
commanded  it.  This  state  of  things  left  me  slight  hopes  of 
gaining  a  decisive  victoiy.  The  Russians,  rallied  at  Gossa, 
held  there  with  savage  obstinacy  ;  the  arrival  of  the  guards 
and  Austrian  grenadiers  who  debouched  on  the  right  of  the 
Pleissc,  in  returning  toward  Crostewitz,  had  changed  the 
chances  of  victory.  Our  first  success  was  glorious,  but  it 
had  not  changed  the  situation  of  affairs.  It  was  important 
to  obtain  other  results  before  the  close  of  the  day.  This 
motive  induced  me  to  attempt  toward  six  o'clock  a  final 
effort.  I  was  jireparing  for  a  decisive  attack  on  Stoermthal 
and  Groebern,  when  my  attention  was  drawn  to  the  rear 
of  my  right  where  the  enemy  had  just  passed  the  Pleissc. 
Schwartzenberg,  not  wishing  to  give  up  his  project  of  passing 
at  Doelitz,  and  thinking  that  the  arrival  of  the  Austrian 
grenadiers  at  Mark-Kleeberg  would  facilitate  the  passage  of 
Merfeldt,  had  directed  him  to  renew  his  attempts.  Five  or 
six  Austrian  battalions,  having  gained  possession  of  Doe- 
litz, now  sought  to  debouch,  followed  by  the  whole  corps- 
d'armêe.  Sémélé's  exhausted  division  could  no  longer  resist 
them.  I  threw  against  them  the  Old  Guard  under  General 
Curial,  the  only  troops  which  remained  disposable.  Ponia- 
towski  also  sent  there  his  reserve  ;  in  an  instant  the  head  of 
Merfeldt's  column  was  surrounded  and  captured  ;  he  himself 
was  made  prisoner  with:  a  thousand  men  ;  the  remainder 
were  driven  into  the  Pleisse.  The  arrival  of  Brayer's  divi- 
sion of  the  third  corps  completed  the  security  of  this  point. 
However,  the  concentration  of  so  many  forces  between  Klu- 
berg  and  the  farm  of  Auenheim  enabled  the  enemy  to  take 
Oudinot  obliquely  ;  and  our  centre  instead  of  continuing  its 
progress,  deemed  itself  fortunate  in  maintaining  its  position 
against  the  masses  which  were  opposed  to  it.  Night  scarcely 
terminated  the  protracted  carnage. 


Cn.  XX.]  AUTUMN    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  203 

Our  affairs  at  the  north  of  Leipsic  had  not  been  so  success- 
ful. Maruaont  had  just  received  orders  to  join  me,  when 
Blucher,  anxious  only  for  a  fight,  appeared  in  pursuit  and 
forced  him  into  an  engagement  ;  although  this  prevented  him 
from  arriving  on  the  point  where  I  expected  to  decide  the 
combat,  it  would  not  have  been  so  important  if  the  divisions 
of  the  third  corps,  which  were  to  relieve  him  had  arrived  in 
time  ;  they  could  either  have  taken  his  place,  or  have  fought 
at  his  side.  They,  however,  did  not  make  their  appearance, 
till  very  late,  toward  Schoenfeld,  and  Ney,  who  wished  to 
leave  the  defense  of  Lindenthal  to  Marmont,  carried  the 
third  corps  to  the  right  and  left  of  Wachau  when  the  battle 
was  about  terminated.  Marmont,  left  to  himself,  had  too 
strong  a  party  against  him.  To  increase  the  misfortune, 
Delmas's  division,  which  was  returning  by  the  road  from 
Duben  with  the  artillery  of  the  third  corps,  would  have  been 
compromised  if  the  enemy  had  known  how  to  profit  by  his 
superiority.  Dombrowski's  division  which  was  to  hold  Wet- 
teritz  until  his  arrival,  sustained  the  efforts  of  Langeron's 
corps,  but  could  not  preserve  the  village.  Fortunately,  the 
enemy's  patrols  mistook  Delmas's  long  column  for  a  consider- 
able corps,  and  were  thus  imposed  upon.  This  general  arrived 
at  Wetteritz  in  the  night,  greatly  harassed  but  without  any 
important  losses.  Ney,  on  being  informed  of  Marmont's 
check  and  of  the  danger  of  Delmas,  was  obliged  to  fall  back 
in  order  to  favor  the  retreat  of  Delmas,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  sixth  corps.  If  the  seven  divisions  of  Ney,  Marmont, 
and  Dombrowski  had  been  united,  Blucher  would  no  doubt 
have  been  beaten  ;  but  as  the  third  corps  lost  the  whole  day 
in  marches  and  countermarches,  it  was  impossible  for  Mar- 
mont's twenty  thousand  men  to  contend  with  sixty  thousand. 
His  troops,  nevertheless,  defended  with  rare  valor  the  village 
of  Moeckern,  where  our  soldiers  of  the  marine  covered  them- 
selves with  glory.     They  were  driven  back  on  Eutritsch  and 


204  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

Gohlis  with  the  loss  of  twenty  pieces  of  artillery  and  four 
thousand  men  hors-de-combat.  An  additional  park  of  thirty 
pieces  was  captured  in  the  night  bivouac  by  the  Cossacks. 

This  check  was  the  more  unfortunate  for  us,  as  it  was 
important  to  preserve  the  possession  of  Taucha  on  account 
of  Reynier's  corps,  which  was  returning  from  Wittenberg  by 
Eulenbourg.  The  fine  defense  of  the  sixth  corps,  and  the 
return  of  the  divisions  of  the  third  corps  during  the  night, 
enabled  us  to  accomplish  this  object. 

Napoleon  proposes  an  Armistice,  which  is  refused.— 
It  was  truly  unfortunate  for  us  that  we  had  not  gained  a 
decisive  victory  on  the  sixteenth.  Although  the  last  reports 
from  St.  Cyr  made  me  doubt  the  near  arrival  of  Benningsen, 
I  knew  that  the  Prince  of  Sweden  would  soon  join  Blucher. 
I  would  then  be  obliged  to  evacuate  Leipsic,  or  to  fight  a 
new  battle  with  all  the  chances  against  me.  I  was  well 
aware  that  the  loss  of  this  city  would  render  our  position 
very  precarious  ;  with  the  few  men  that  remained  I  could 
only  hope  to  defend,  foot  by  foot,  the  space  that  separated 
me  from  the  Rhine  ;  and  as  the  loss  of  a  battle  could  pro- 
duce no  other  consequence,  I  determined  to  accept  it.  I, 
however,  hesitated  whether  I  should  receive  it  before  Leipsic 
or  behind  the  Saale  :  my  bad  fortune  prevailed.  Neverthe- 
less, before  coming  to  blows  again,  I  resolved  to  attempt  to 
open  negotiations.  On  the  seventeenth  I  sent  to  the  allies 
General  Merfeldt  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  the  day 
before,  with  proposals  for  an  armistice,  and  the  evacuation 
of  all  the  places  of  the  Vistula,  and  the  Oder  ;  and  even 
those  of  the  Elbe.  Under  the  pretext  of  referring  the  matter 
to  the  emperor  of  Austria,  Schwartzenberg  did  not  reply  ; 
and  the  allies,  being  reënforced  in  the  evening  by  more  than 
one  hundred  thousand  men,  resolved  to  crush  me  on  the 
morning  of  the  eighteenth.  I,  however,  did  not  sleep  in  the 
hope  of  a  favorable  answer  ;  I  waited  for  Eeynier's  corps  and 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813  205 

my  bead-quarters  which  were  to  join  me  from  Eulenbourg 
on  the  evening  of  the  seventeenth.  If  I  should  receive  no 
satisfactory  answer  to  Merfeldt's  mission  during  the  day,  it 
was  my  intention  to  draw  in  my  lines  towards  Leipsic  during 
the  night  so  as  to  retreat  on  the  eighteenth.  This  delay  was 
the  more  unfortunate  as  Giulay  had  just  fallen  back  on 
Zwenkau,  and  nothing  opposed  my  commencing  the  re- 
treat on  the  seventeenth,  immediately  after  the  arrival  of 
Reynier. 

In  fact,  Sell  war  tzenberg,  like  all  pusillanimous  generals, 
continually  went  from  one  extreme  to  another.  Not  content 
with  being  reënforced  by  two  entire  armies,  he  thought  to 
draw  Giulay  into  the  narrow  space  between  the  Pleisse  and 
the  Elbe,  in  order  to  replace  there  the  Austrian  troops  which 
had  been  withdrawn  on  the  sixteenth  to  reënforce  the  centre 
at  Wachau  ;  this  measure,  which  opened  to  me  the  road  to 
Erfurt,  was  without  justification  ;  for  after  the  arrival  of  a 
reinforcement  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  it  would  have 
been  much  better  to  reënforce  Giulay's  corps,  which  was 
admirably  placed  for  operating  on  our  communications.  I 
thus  permitted  to  escape  the  only  occasion  which  offered  for 
effecting  a  safe  retreat.  I  was  influenced  by  the  fear  that 
this  premature  retreat  might  prevent  the  conclusion  of  the 
proposed  armistice,  and  by  the  good  augury  for  Merfeldt's 
mission  which  I  derived  from  the  absolute  calm  which 
reigned  in  the  allied  army.  I  was  deceived  :  the  allies  were 
only  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  all  their  forces  for  a  general 
attack. 

The  Allies  re-enforced  by  Bernadotte,  Benningsen,  and 
Collorcdo. — Bernadotte  approached  by  the  road  to  Lands- 
berg  ;  Benningsen,  after  leaving  twenty  thousand  men  before 
Dresden,  marched  with  forty  thousand  men  by  Colditz  on 
Leipsic  ;  finally,  Colloredo  also  rejoined  the  grand  army  with 
two  Austrian  divisions  ;  all  these  corps  arrived  on  the  even- 


206  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

ing  of  the  seventeenth.  This  gave  the  allies  an  additional 
force  of  near  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men.  Seeing 
on  the  night  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth,  that  Mer- 
feldt  did  not  return,  I  began  to  feel  uneasy,  and  made  pre- 
liminary dispositions  for  the  evacuation  of  Leipsic  ;  but  the 
material  was  so  considerable,  and  the  defiles  so  long  and 
numerous,  that  it  required  twenty-four  hours  to  effect  it 
with  order  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  However,  as  I  had, 
at  Wagram,  in  twelve  hours  in  the  night,  constructed  six 
bridges,  and  deployed  an  army  on  the  Marchfeld,  I  hoped  to 
succeed  here.  I,  therefore,  resolved  to  maintain  a  firm 
attitude  on  the  eighteenth,  in  order  to  approach  Leipsic  in 
the  evening  :   but  the  enemy  did  not  give  me  time. 

Second  Day  of  Leipsic,  October  18th,— The  great  battle 
which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  Europe  took  place  on  the 
eighteenth  of  October.  While  still  waiting  for  Merfeldt's 
reply,  I  was  informed  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  columns 
on  all  sides.  I  had  but  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men 
to  oppose  three  hundred  thousand.  To  avoid  being  turned 
I  placed  my  army  in  a  semi-civcular  position  with  the  wings 
resting  on  the  Pleisse  and  the  Partha.  Bertrand's  corps 
remained  at  the  left  of  the  Elster  to  defend  the  road  to 
Naumbourg.  The  enemy  attacked  us  on  all  the  points  of 
this  semi-circle.  The  first  positions  of  Holzhausen  and 
Wachau  were  disputed  only  to  give  time  to  take  a  definitive 
position  towards  Probsthayde  and  Stoetteritz.  Here  was 
fought  the  real  battle  of  the  giants. 

This  second  battle  of  Leipsic,  although  the  most  important 
of  the  age  in  its  results,  offers  but  little  of  interest  in  its 
relation  to  the  military  art.  Three  hundred  thousand  allies, 
crowded  in  a  semi -circle  of  three  or  four  leagues,  offered  no 
weak  point  ;  however  much  I  might  manœuvre,  I  was  cer- 
tain to  find  an  impenetrable  line,  equally  strong  throughout. 
The  battles  of  Fleurus,  Friedland,  and  Essling  are  the  only 


Cir.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  207 

battles  in  our  lust  wars  that  bear  any  resemblance  to  it.  In 
all  three,  it  was  an  army  attacked  by  concentric  columns, 
with  a  river  in  its  rear.  In  the  first,  Jourdan  was  placed 
like  myself  in  a  semi-circle,  with  the  Sambre  behind  him  ; 
but  he  was  attacked  with  equal  forces,  and  Cobourg  occupied 
a  line  of  ten  leagues  with  less  than  eighty  thousand  men,  so 
that  it  was  not  difficult  to  make  a  successful  effort  against 
any  point  of  this  too  extended  line.  At  Friedland  the  Rus- 
sians, too  much  concentrated  around  the  city,  with  the  Allé 
behind  them,  were  assailed  by  my  four  corps-d' armée  in  a 
circular  and  well-sustained  line  :  their  front  being  separated 
by  a  stream  and  a  lake,  enabled  me  to  break  their  left  separ- 
ately, which  exposed  their  right  to  inevitable  destruction. 
But  I  had  none  of  these  favorable  chances  in  the  second 
battle  of  Leipsic.  The  only  hope  of  victory  which  remained, 
was  in  the  isolation  of  Blucher  and  Bernadotte  on  the  right 
of  the  Partha,  which  enabled  me  to  paralyze  them  the  whole 
clay  by  a  weak  corps  of  observation.  But  even  this  hope 
was  not  of  long  duration.  These  ninety  thousand  men,  leav- 
ing Sacken's  corps  to  attack  the  gate  of  Halle,  passed  the 
river  in  the  morning  between  Taucha  and  Schoenfeld,  and 
assailed  Key.  There  was  now  no  means  of  supplying  by 
good  combinations  my  inferiority  in  numbers  and  material  : 
it  had  become  a  butchery  with  no  other  object  than  to  await 
the  approach  of  night,  in  order  to  commence  our  retreat. 

Notwithstanding  our  extreme  inferiority  in  numbers,  and 
the  defection  of  the  Saxon  and  Wurtemberg  troops,  who  in 
the  middle  of  the  battle  turned  their  arms  against  us,  my 
army  sustained  itself  admirably.  I  was  myself  surprised  at 
the  bravery  and  devotion  of  my  young  soldiers  ;  a  thousand 
pieces  of  cannon  carried  death  into  their  ranks  without 
breaking  them  ;  yet  these  were  the  same  soldiers  who  had 
fought  at  the  Katzbach  and  Dennewitz  !  Why  this 
difference  ? 


208  LIFE     OF     NATO  LEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

At  break  of  day  we  begin  our  movement  of  concentration, 
at  the  moment  when  the  enemy's  masses  are  preparing  to 
assail  us  on  all  sides.  Belluno  and  Lauriston  leave  Wachau 
to  take  position,  the  first  to  the  west  of  Probsthayde,  and 
the  second  to  the  left  of  that  village  in  the  direction  of 
Stoetteritz.  They  are  followed  foot  by  foot  by  the  enemy, 
who  assails  their  rear-guard,  but  without  cutting  it  up. 
Poniatowski  places  himself  to  their  right  ;  Augereau  closes 
the  line  between  Loessnig  and  Connewitz.  Oudinot,  with 
two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard,  serves  as  a  reserve  to  this 
right  wing.  I  place  myself  at  the  centre  behind  Belluno  at 
a  quarter  of  a  league  from  Probsthayde,  with  Mortier's 
Young  Guard,  the  Old  Guard  of  Curial,  and  the  reserve  of 
cavalry.  Macdonald,  who  has  yielded  Holzhausen  to  the 
masses  of  Klenau  and  Benningsen,  draws  in  the  eleventh 
corps  and  Sebastiani's  cavalry  from  Stoetteritz  and  Molkan, 
to  connect  with  Lauriston.  Ney  commanded  the  left,  which 
extended  from  Paunsdorf  to  Schoenfeld.  Our  line  formed  a 
kind  of  obtuse  angle  with  the  vertex  at  Probsthayde. 

Blucher,  leaving  Sacken  to  assail  the  faubourg  of  Leipsic 
on  the  side  of  Gohlis  and  the  intrenchments  of  the  gate  of 
Halle,  attacks  Schoenfeld  with  the  Bussian  corps  of  Lan- 
geron  and  St.  Priest.  Bernadotte  assails  Sellerhausen  with 
Bulow  and  the  Swedes.  General  Benningsen  attacks  Pauns- 
dorf by  his  right  and  Zweinaundorf  by  his  left,  seconded 
by  Klenau's  corps.  Kleist  and  Wittgenstein's  corps,  fol- 
lowed by  the  reserves,  advance  from  Wachau  on  Probsthayde. 
The  Austrians  of  Colloredo  and  Bianchi  close  the  line  to  the 
Pleisse  toward  Connewitz.  The  interval  between  these  two 
rivers  was  at  this  time  abandoned  to  a  light  division  ;  and 
Giulay  receives  orders,  although  too  late,  to  carry  himself 
again  on  Zwenkau  so  as  to  threaten  the  great  road  to  Lutzen. 

The  enemy's  masses  employed  a  part  of  the  morning  in 
taking    their    positions.       Toward    noon    the    engagement 

/ 


Ch.  XX]  AUTUMN     C'A  MT  Al  ON     OF     1  S  1  ?, .  209 

becomes  general  ;  Colloredo,  Bianchi,  and  the  Prince  of 
Hesse-Hoinbourg  attack  our  right  along  the  Pleisse.  The 
weak  divisions  of  Augereau  and  Poniatowski  heroically 
defend  the  approaches  to  Loessnig  and  Connewitz.  At  the 
point  of  }Tielding  to  an  overwhelming  superiority,  they  are 
sustained  by  Oudinot's  two  divisions  of  the  Young  Guard, 
which  restores  the  combat  and  enables  them  to  maintain 
themselves  with  great  firmness  in  these  two  villages  and  the 
broken  ground  that  separates  them  from  the  Pleisse.  At 
the  centre  the  allied  sovereigns  seem  to  wish  to  strike  a  deci- 
sive blow  on  the  salient  point  of  our  line  at  Probsthayde  ; 
on  this  point  the  army  of  Bohemia  directs  its  efforts.  Witt- 
genstein and  Kleist,  sustained  by  the  Russian  reserves,  throw 
themselves  with  audacity  on  this  village.  Fortunately  I  had 
foreseen  this  ;  in  addition  to  the  corps  of  Belluno  and  Lau- 
riston,  I  had  assembled  on  this  point  the  Old  Guard,  Mor- 
tier's  Young  Guard,  and  two  corps  of  cavalry  under  the 
King  of  Naples.  I  also  brought  into  line  Drouet's  artillery 
of  reserve.  The  enemy  advanced  in  very  deep  columns 
because  the  space  becomes  narrower  as  they  apjoroach,  and 
there  is  no  room  to  deploy.  The  movement  is  effected  with 
such  rapidity  that  only  a  part  of  the  artillery  can  follow. 
Prince  Augustus  of  Prussia  forms  the  head  of  Kleist's 
column  :  Prince  Gortschakof  sustains  him,  and  also  the  rest 
of  Wittgenstein's  corps.  Their  first  battalions  have  already 
reached  Probsthayde,  when  the  second  and  third  corps  charge 
them  with  vigor  and  drive  them  back.  Exposed  to  the  fire 
of  the  sharp-shooters  who  occupy  the  gardens  and  the  village, 
and  the  one  hundred  pieces  of  cannon  which  pour  grape  into 
their  ranks,  and  menaced  by  our  columns,  they  halt  in  the 
space  which  separates  the  lines,  and  reply  with  a  murderous 
cannonade  which  is  continued  till  dark.  Further  to  the  left, 
Kleist  and  Benningsen  concentrate  their  march  on  Holzhau- 
sen  and  Zweinaundorf,  from  which  they  afterward  debouch 
vol.  iv. — 14. 


•,210  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

against  the  heights  of  Stoetteritz  and  Molkau,  defended  by 
Macdonàld  and  the  cavalry  of  Sébastian!  ;  these  troops 
maintain  themselves  in  their  position  with  the  same  success 
as  on  the  right. 

My  left  wing,  under  the  orders  of  Ney,  was  not  so  for- 
tunate as  the  centre.  Blucher  and  Bernadotte,  having  passed 
the  Partha  at  Taucha  with  ninety  thousand  men,  directed 
themselves  on  Schoenfeld  and  Paunsdorf,  where  they  con- 
nected with  the  corps  of  Benningsen.  This  last  village  was 
occupied  by  the  Saxons  under  Reynier.  Marmont  guarded 
the  space  from  there  to  Schoenfeld  ;  Souham,  with  the  third 
corps,  served  as  a  reserve.  Marmont  defends  with  much 
vigor  the  approaches  and  the  village  of  Schoenfeld  against 
Langeron.  Reynier,  menaced  by  Bubna  at  the  right  and  by 
Bulow  at  the  left,  retires  on  Sellerhausen.  Ney,  who  sees  all 
the  danger  of  a  retrograde  movement,  runs  to  the  threatened 
places  and  brings  Durutte's  division  on  Paunsdorf.  The 
Saxons,  being  left  to  themselves,  advance  toward  the  enemy  ; 
this  movement  is  at  first  attributed  to  an  excess  of  audacity  ; 
but  all  at  once  their  artillery  is  turned  against  us,  and  our 
brave  and  astonished  troops  witness  the  most  odious  defec- 
tion ever  recorded  in  the  pages  of  history.  Reynier,  being 
now  reduced  to  only  the  single  division  of  Durutte,  threat- 
ened on  the  right  by  Bubna  and  on  the  left  by  Bulow,  is  for- 
tunate in  finding  a  refuge  at  Sellerhausen.  Marshal  Nêy 
sustains  him  with  Delrnas's  division  ;  Marmont  draws  in  his 
right  to  maintain  himself  in  line,  and  continues  to  defend 
Schoenfeld  with  his  left.  The  combat  is  continued  with  ani- 
mosity on  this  part  of  the  line  ;  and  it  is  not  difficult  for 
Bulow's  corps,  seconded  by  Bubna,  the  Saxons,  and  the 
Swedes,  to  penetrate  to  Sellerhausen,  notwithstanding  the 
defense  of  the  handful  of  brave  men  under  Durutte  and 
Del  mas.  Ney's  right  is  thus  forced  back  in  the  direction  of 
Reudnitz.     Being  informed  at  Probsthayde  of  the  defection 


CH.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  211 

of  my  allies  and  the  retreat  of  the  seventh  corps,  and  fully  ap- 
preciating the  evil  results  of  permitting  the  enemy  to  penetrate 
to  the  faubourg  of  Leipsic,  I  fly  with  the  cuirassiers  of  Nan- 
souty  on  the  threatened  point,  I  find  Ney  occupied  in  ral- 
lying his  right  near  Strassenhoeuser.  He  throws  himself  on 
Bulow,  whom  I  attack  in  flank  with  the  cuirassiers  of  Nan- 
souty  from  the  direction  of  Moelkou,  and  drive  back  the 
head  of  his  column  on  Sellerhauscn.  Being  now  more  safe 
on  this  point,  I  return  to  my  centre,  which  requires  all  my 
care.  The  combat  near  Strassenhoeuser  degenerates  into  a 
murderous  cannonade,  as  at  Probsthayde.  Bernadotte  brings 
on  this  point  the  Saxon  and  Swedish  artillery,  and  the  En- 
glish rocket  batteries,  with  wdiich  he  overwhelms  the  brave 
soldiers  of  Delmas  and  Durutte  ;  the  first  of  these  two 
generals,  the  intrepid  and  republican  Delmas,  falls  under 
this  murderous  fire  ;  his  troops,  again  forced  to  yield  to  an 
overwhelming  superiority,  return  to  Strassenhoeuser. 

But  if  the  enemy's  artillery  had  a  superiority  over  that 
of  Delmas,  ours  had  an  equal  advantage  at  Probsthayde  over 
the  deep  masses  of  the  enemy,  who  obstinately  refused  to 
retire.  In  vain  did  some  of  the  Russian  generals,  certain 
that  we  would  be  obliged  to  retreat  on  the  nineteenth,  pro- 
pose to  stop  this  useless  carnage,  and  to  carry  the  reserves  of 
cavalry  and  Giulay's  corps  on  the  road  to  Lutzen.  This 
advice  shared  the  fate  of  most  other  advice  of  the  same 
character,  and  was  not  followed.  The  allies,  like  Kutusof 
at  Krasnoe,  were  satisfied  with  a  half  success  which  rendered 
certain  our  retreat  beyond  the  Rhine.  They,  however,  with- 
drew some  of  their  masses,  after  leaving  them  for  a  loivj  time 
uselessly  exposed  to  our  fire. 

Blucher  and  Langeron  had  not  encountered  less  obstacles 
in  attacking  Schoenfeld,  which  was  defended  with  great  valor 
by  Lagrange,  Campans  and  Frederick  ;  it  was  many  times 
lost  and  retaken.     These  troops  of  Marmont,  weakened  by 


212  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

the  battle  of  the  sixteenth,  and  by  this  bloody  contest,  were 
on  the  point  of  yielding,  in  spite  of  the  most  glorious  efforts. 
Carnpans  was  wounded  ;  Frederick  killed  ;  Marmont  saw  his 
chief  of  staff  and  his  aids-de-carnp  fall  by  his  side  ;  a  few 
moments  longer  and  the  sixth  corps  would  have  been  des- 
stroyed,  when  Ney  threw  upon  the  enemy  the  two  divisions 
of  the  third  corps,  which  had  remained  in  reserve.  Schoen- 
feld,  lost  and  taken  for  the  seventh  time,  remained  in  our 
possession,  when  the  retrograde  movements  of  the  right  and 
the  approach  of  Langeron's  reserve  induced  Ney  to  retire  his 
left  to  within  pistol  shot  of  that  village. 

At  the  north  of  Leipsic,  the  corps  of  Sacken  and  York 
had  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  carry  the  faubourg  of 
Halle,  which  had  been  secured  from  a  coup-de-main,  and 
defended  by  Dombrowski's  division  and  the  cavalry  of  the 
Duke  of  Padua.  In  the  direction  of  Lindenau,  Bertrand, 
having  received  reënforcements,  easily  drove  away  Lichten- 
stein's  division  of  Giulay's  corps  and  opened  the  road  to 
Weissenfels. 

It  will  be  seen  by  this  narrative  that  we  lost  very  little 
ground  on  the  left,  while  the  rest  of  the  line  maintained  its 
position,  and  none  of  our  corps  were  broken,  thanks  to  the 
little  use  which  the  enemy  made  of  his  cavalry.  This  was 
much  for  glory  ;  but  it  could  have  no  influence  on  the  success 
of  the  campaign  ;  for,  in  the  desperate  situation  of  our 
affairs,  a  half-success  was  equivalent  to  a  defeat. 

Third  Day  of  Leipsic,  October  19ih.— The  battle,  being 
continued  till  after  dark,  and  the  troops  being  worn  out  with 
fatigue  and  hunger,  it  was  very  difficult  to  effect  a  retreat  in 
the  night.  To  accomplish  this  with  convenience  required 
seventeen  secondary  bridges  on  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster. 
The  equipages  should  have  filed  on  the  eighteenth,  under  the 
protection  of  Ber fraud's  corps  :  on  the  contrary  they  were 
left  heaped  up  between  the  army  and  Leipsic  ;  not  only  had 


Ch.   XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  213 

Berthier  done  nothing  himself  to  prepare  for  this  retreat, 
but  he  had  countermanded  all  the  prudent  measures  taken 
by  his  staff  officers,  lest  the  preparations  for  retreat  might 
discourage  our  troops.  Nor  had  the  chief  of  engineers  sup- 
plied the  necessary  means  for  bridges  ;  his  park,  it  is  true, 
had  been  left  with  the  heavy  equipages  of  the  head-quarters 
at  Eulenbourg  ;  but  there  were  sappers  in  the  second  corps^ 
d'armée,  and  tools  and  carpenters  in  the  city  of  Leipsic.  I 
had  ordered  three  supplementary  bridges  to  be  thrown  across 
the  Pleisse  ;  but  this  order,  given  in  haste  and  a  little  too 
late,  was  not  well  executed.  The  bridges  were  badly  con- 
structed and  gave  way.  In  fact,  every  thing  in  the  army 
now  seemed  to  depend  on  me  alone  ;  it  was  necessary  for  me 
to  attend  to  every  thing. 

We  had  crossed  the  Danube  in  eight  hours  at  Wagram 
at  night  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  ;  but  it 
was  on  six  fine  bridges,  where  each  corps  had  its  debouch 
arranged  beforehand,  and  where  the  baggage  did  not  pass 
till  long  after  the  army.  In  retreat,  through  the  streets  of  a 
city,  by  a  single  narrow  bridge,  the  operation  is  very  dif- 
ferent ;  and  there  necessarily  resulted  great  confusion  and 
crowding  :  the  cowardly  always  push  first,  and  two  or  three 
broken  wagons  are  sufficient  to  stop  everything  in  such  a 
narrow  defile.     All  these  evils  happened  to  us. 

The  break  of  day  on  the  nineteenth  found  us  in  all  the 
frightful  embarrassments  of  a  retreat.  We  were  obliged  to 
receive  still  another  battle  in  order  to  effect  it.  The  troops 
were  ranged  around  the  enceinte  of  the  faubourgs  which  had 
previously  been  barricaded  ;  they  might  easily  be  defended 
for  twenty-four  hours,  if  our  troops  should  fight  as  at  Dres- 
den. We  would  thus  gain  time  for  the  withdrawal  of  our 
forces,  each  corps  passing  successively  from  the  combat  into 
the  line  of  retreat.  Tactically  speaking,  our  position  was 
not  bad,  fur  Leipsic  might  be  considered  as  a  tête-de-pont 


214  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

covering  the  defile.  There,  however,  was  a  lack  of  bridges 
to  accelerate  the  retreat,  and  prevent  accidents.  There  were 
required  two  bridges  above,  and  two  below  the  main  road, 
covered  with  redans,  connecting  with  the  passage  of  Lin- 
denau  ;  and  roads  to  these  bridges  should  have  been  opened 
through  the  gardens.  But  we  had  returned  from  Duben 
only  on  the  fifteenth  ;  we  had  hoped  to  gain  a  battle  on  the 
sixteenth  ;  and  on  the  seventeenth  had  counted  on  an 
armistice  ;  so  that  the  necessary  precautions  for  accelerating 
and  securing  a  retreat  had  been  neglected.  The  blame  of 
this  must  rest  on  my  major-general  and  the  chief  of  engi- 
neers, rather  than  on  me.  I  had  passed  the  night  in  dictat- 
ing such  orders  as  were  rendered  necessary  by  our  retreat 
upon  the  frontiers  of  France  ;  I  wrote  to  the  council  of  the 
Eegency,  to  Mayence,  to  Strasbourg,  and  to  the  whole  line 
of  the  Rhine  ;  to  the  lower  Elbe,  to  Italy,  to  Spain,  to 
Dantzic,  to  the  Oder,  to  Dresden,  to  Torgau.  I  thought  of 
all  the  great  combinations  which  would  be  required  in 
future  :  it  was  for  Berthier,  my  chief  of  staff,  to  attend  to 
the  remainder.  As  soon  as  it  was  day,  I  went  to  see  the 
kino1  of  Saxony,  to  advise  him  to  trust  his  fate  to  the  generos- 
ity of  the  kings  who  had  recognized  him,  but  reminding  him 
that  France  had  always  been  a  better  ally  to  the  house  of 
Saxony  than  either  Austria  or  Prussia. 

On  leaving  the  king,  I  saw  the  horrible  jam  in  all  the 
streets  of  Leipsic,  and  moved  towards  the  defile.  The  battle 
was  continued  along  the  whole  circumference  at  any  attempt 
made  by  the  corps-d'armée  to  retire  on  the  faubourgs  of 
Leipsic.  At  the  north,  Sacken  and  Langeron  attacked 
Pfaffendorf  which  was  defended  by  Durutte  ;  Woronzof  and 
Bulow  attacked  the  gates  of  Grimma  and  Hinterthor  which 
were  defended  by  Marmont  and  Ricard.  At  the  south, 
Schwartzenberg  pressed  the  Poles  along  the  Pleisse  ;  Barclay 
pushed  Macdonald  and  Lauriston  coming  from  Probsthayde 


Cu.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  215 

by  Strassenlioeuser.  It  was  impossible  for  me  to  direct  any 
movement.  At  nine  o'clock  I  went  to  the  gate  of  Ranstedt 
where  the  crowd  and  jam  were  frightful  ;  I  returned  by  the 
boulevards  to  gain  the  bridge.  Belluno  and  Mortier  had 
passed  the  defile  ;  Souham  and  Marmont  followed.  Lau- 
riston  had  formed  his  troops  to  pass  in  his  turn. 

But  the  successive  evacuation  weakened  our  lines,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  enemy's  columns  became  more  animated,  and 
approached  nearer  to  the  city  of  Leipsic.  They  had  already 
forced  an  entrance  into  the  faubourgs,  and  had  gained  the 
western  part  of  the  boulevard  which  separates  them  from  the 
old  enceinte  :  the  Badois  had  abandoned  to  them  the  gate  of 
St.  Peter,  thus  opening  an  access  to  the  city,  through  which 
several  columns  of  the  allies  precipitated  themselves.  The 
three  cor ps-d' armée  which  had  remained  for  its  defense  had 
no  other  course  than  to  gain  in  haste  the  great  road,  and  to 
defend  themselves  on  the  right  and  left  by  means  of  the 
houses  of  the  faubourg  of  Ranstedt. 

They  succeeded  in  throwing  themselves  into  this  space  ; 
but  the  immense  parks  and  equipages  blocked  up  all  the  pas- 
sages. Nevertheless  the  mass  would  have  been  gradually 
retired,  had  not  the  officer  who  was  designated  to  destroy 
the  bridges  after  the  passage  confided  the  important  charge 
of  blowing  up  the  bridge  of  the  mill  on  the  great  arm  of  the 
Els  ter,  to  a  simple  corporal  of  sappers.  Langeron,  following 
the  boulevards  from  the  north,  extended  himself  in  a  parallel 
line  to  the  west,  and  in  order  to  gain  our  lines  of  retreat,  his 
tirailleurs,  being  deployed  in  the  gardens,  succeeded  in  pene- 
trating to  the  bridge.  The  corporal,  on  seeing  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  and  thinking  that  only  a  few  of  our  troops 
remained  behind,  put  fire  to  the  mines,  and  blew  up  the  only 
means  of  retreat  left  to  our  rear-guard.  These  troops  were 
now  without  hope.  The  boldest  threw  themselves  into  the 
Elster,  and  attempted    to  swim  across  ;    Macdonald  saved 


216  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

himself,  but  Poniatowslu  was  drowned.*  A  few  thousand 
effected  their  escape  ;  hut  near  fifteen  thousand,  hemmed 
in  by  the  enemy's  masses,  were  obliged   to   lay  down  their 

*  The  terrible  losses  sustained  by  the  French  in  this  evacuation  of  Leipsic 
shows  the  immense  importance  of  having  with  such  large  armies  a  sufficient 
number  of  properly  instructed  engineer  officers  and  engineer  troops  for  the 
management  of  mines  and  pontoon  bridges.  The  Russian  campaign  had  de- 
stroyed the  best  part  of  this  corps,  and  there  had  not  been  time  to  instruct 
others.    The  following  is  Thiers'  account  of  this  catastrophe  : 

"But  whilst  this  terrible  evacuation  of  Leipsic  was  thus  taking  place,  a  sud- 
den catastrophe  which  might  have  been  but  too  clearly  foreseen,  spread  despair 
among  the  ranks  of  those  who  for  the  common  safety  had  been  intrusted  with 
the  defense  of  the  Leipsic  faubourgs.  Colonel  Montfort.  of  the  engineers,  had 
been  ordered  to  prepare  a  mine  under  the  first  arch  of  the  bridge,  along  which 
our  troops  were  now  effecting  their  retreat,  and  he  had,  accordingly,  done  so, 
and  had  posted  at  the  spot  some  sappers  with  a  corporal,  who  awaited,  match 
in  hand,  the  signal  to  fire  the  train.  In  the  meantime,  Colonel  Montfort,  in  a 
state  of  the  most  anxious  doubt  as  to  what  ho  ought  to  do,  expecting  every 
moment  to  see  the  enemy  debouch  pêle-mêle  with  our  soldiers,  and  unable  to 
obtain  any  accurate  information  with  respect  to  the  several  corps  still  in  the 
rear,  determined  to  proceed  to  Lindenau,  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  further 
instructions  from  Napoleon's  own  mouth,  and  set  out  towards  the  other  end  of 
the  bridge,  having  first  directed  the  co.-poral  of  sappers  to  fire  the  mine  only  in 
case  he  should  see  the  enemy  approaching. 

'•  Whilst  Colonel  Montfort  was  struggling  in  the  midst  of  the  mass  which 
encumbered  the  bridge,  unable  either  to  advance  or  recede,  some  of  Blucher's 
troops,  in  pursuit  of  the  remnant  of  Reynier's  corps,  appearing  close  to  the 
bridge  pêle-mêle  with  the  soldiers  of  the  seventh  corps,  occasioned  cries  of 
'  Fire  the  mine  !  fire  the  mine  I'  and  the  corporal,  believing  that  the  right  mo- 
ment had  come,  applied  the  match,  and  thus  iu  a  moment  condemned  twenty 
thousand  of  our  troops,  who  were  still  in  the  Leipsic  faubourgs,  either  to  per- 
ish, or  to  become  the  prisoners  of  an  enemy  whom  the  feelings  of  exasperation 
with  which  this  war  was  conducted,  had  rendered  inhuman. 

"  Believing  that  they  had  been  betrayed,  these  men  uttered  shouts  of  indig- 
nation, and,  swayed  by  the  impulses  of  despair,  now  rushed  upon  the  enemy, 
and  now  threw  themselves  into  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster,  and  endeavored  to 
cross  them  by  swimming. 

"  Poniatowski,  who  had  been  raised  to  the  rank  of  marshal  by  Napoleon  on 
the  preceding  evening,  plunged  with  his  horse  into  the  Elster,  and  reached  the 
other  sidr-,  but  there,  weakened  by  many  wounds,  and  unable  to  climb  the 
steep  bank,  disappeared  beneath  the  waters,  buried  in  bis  glory  beneath  the 
ruins  of  our  country  and  his  own. 

"  Macdonald,  making  a  similar  attempt,  was  saved,  but  Reynier  and  Lau- 
riston.  surrounded  by  the  enemy's  troops  before  they  had  time  to  escape,  were 
taken  and  carried  before  the  allied  sovereigns,  when  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
recognizing  Lauriston  as  the  wise  embassador  who  had  endeavored  to  prevent 


Ch.   XX]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  217 

arms,  and  surrender  at  discretion.  Lauriston,  Reynier, 
Prince  Emile  of  Hesse,  and  some  twenty  other  general  offi- 
cers were  taken  prisoners  ;  and  the  enemy  captured  an  im- 
mense booty  in  baggage,  military  stores,  etc. 

I  was  with  the  guard  behind  the  last  bridge  of  Lindenau 
when  the  bridge  of  the  Elster  was  blown  up  ;  I  formed  it  in 
line  of  battle,  and  stationed  its  batteries.  We  now  found 
ourselves  charged  with  protecting  the  retreat  of  the  wrecks 
of  the  army  to  the  Saale  ;  and  we  fortunately  succeeded  in 
our  object,  although  hemmed  in  by  York  on  the  side  of  Frey- 
burg,  and  by  Giulay  on  the  side  of  Kosen.  The  most 
admirable  order  reigned  in  the  entire  passage  of  Weissenfels, 
where  the  staff-officers  had  redoubled  their  precautions,  as  if 
to  repair  their  unpardonable  neglect  at  Leipsic. 

Remarks  on  this  Battle.— The  disaster  of  the  bridge  of 
Elster  and  the  disorder  in  the  retreat  of  the  nineteenth  of 
October,  have  been  adduced  by  my  detractors,  writh  the 
retreat  from  Eussia  and  the  disasters  of  Waterloo,  to  prove 
that  I  lost  my  judgment  in  reverses  ;  they  have  even  pre- 
tended that  I  myself  remained  at  the  bridge  with  the  match 
in  hand  ! 

I  have  but  two  things  with  which  to  reproach  myself  at 

the  war  of  1812,  took  him  by  the  hand,  and  had  both  him  and  his  companion 
treated  with  the  utmost  courtesy  ; — a  courtesy  which  he  was  far  from  display- 
ing towards  the  unfortunate  king  of  Saxony,  who  thrice  during  the  morning 
sent  officers  to  request  an  interview,  which  was  refused,  the  only  reply  to  his 
solicitations  being,  that  he,  the  king  of  Saxony,  had  been  taken  with  arms  in 
his  hands,  and  was,  therefore,  a  prisoner  of  war  ;  that  the  allied  sovereigns 
would  decide  upon  his  fate,  and  would  inform  him  of  their  decision. 

'•In  the  meantime,  the  broken  ranks  of  the  French  army  were  continuing 
their  retreat  across  the  numerous  arms  of  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster,  leaving 
twenty  thousand  of  their  soldiers  either  prisoners,  or  dying  in  the  streets  of 
Leipsic,  or  drowned  in  the  blood-stained  waters  of  the  Pleisse  and  the  Elster. 

"  This  last  of  the  four  disastrous  days  of  Leipsic  raised  the  loss  of  the  French 
army  in  killed,  wounded,  or  prisoners,  to  the  number  of  sixty  thousand  men. 

"  The  enemy  had  lost  an  equal  number  in  action,  but  their  wounded  had 
received  all  the  grateful  care  that  German  patriotism  could  lavish  on  them, 
whilst  ours  had  met  with,  alas  !  how  different  a  treatment." 


218  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

Leipsic.  The  first,  in  not  having  sent  all  our  parks  to  Lin- 
denau  on  the  night  of  the  seventeenth,  and  combined  iny 
battle  on  the  eighteenth,  so  as  to  retreat  during  the  night. 
The  reason  was  that  I  still  had  some  hopes  of  gaining  the 
battle,  and  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  the  measures  of  evacu- 
ation. The  second,  in  not  having  given  a  better  organization 
to  my  staff,  so  as  to  provide,  without  express  orders,  for  all 
such  details.  But  this  fault  goes  further  back,  and,  as  has 
already  been  remarked,  resulted  from  a  defective  organization 
of  my  army. 

It  must,  however,  be  confessed  that  when  I  renounced  at 
Duben  my  march  on  Berlin  to  return  to  the  plains  of  Leip- 
sic, I  ought  to  have  regarded  that  place  as  our  only  anchor 
of  safety.  I  should  have  said  to  myself,  if  I  gain  the  great 
battle  between  the  Pleisse  and  the  Partha,  I  have  no  need 
of  defensive  measures  ;  but  if  I  lose  it,  it  is  necessary  to 
provide  for  securing  my  retreat  against  the  attacks  of  a 
superior  force.  Engineers,  sappers  and  pontoniers,  should 
have  been  employed  from  the  fifteenth,  in  constructing  a  sys- 
tem of  field-works  connecting  Lindenau  with  the  faubourgs 
of  Eaustedt,  and  covering  three  or  four  bridges  on  which 
all  the  troops,  the  parks  and  the  baggage  could  have  passed 
without  difficulty  at  any  hour  of  the  day  or  night. 

IVapoleon  retreats  on  Erfurth,— We  continued  our  re- 
treat without  delay  to  Erfurth,  where  we  arrived  on  the 
twenty-third  of  October.  The  combats  of  Leipsic  had  cost 
me  fifty  thousand  men,  including  the  unfortunate  loss  of  our 
rear-guard.  With  my  remaining  forces  it  was  impossible  to 
sustain  myself  beyond  the  Bhine.  I,  therefore,  on  the 
twenty-fifth  resumed  my  march  to  pass  that  river. 

Pursuit  of  the  Allies.— The  allies,  satisfied  with  a  victory 
far  surpassing  their  hopes,  remained  two  or  three  days  at 
Leipsic  to  determine  upon  their  future  plan  of  operations. 
Klenau  was  detached  on  Dresden  ;  Bernadotte  and  Benning- 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  219 

sen  on  Hamburg  ;  Blucher  was  to  pursue  me,  turning  Er- 
furth  to  the  north  and  to  redescend  on  Gotha  ;  Bubna  fol- 
lowed me  in  rear  by  Naumbourg.  The  grand  army  of  the 
sovereigns  threw  itself  to  the  south  in  the  forest  of  Thurin- 
gen,  to  take  a  parallel  Hue  of  march.  A  cloud  of  partisans 
annoyed  our  retreat  on  all  sides.  It  was,  however,  effected 
at  first  without  any  remarkable  event  except  the  combat  of 
Kosen  where  General  Giulay  was  sharply  repulsed  by  the 
fourth  corps. 

Departure  of  the  King  of  Naples.— Murat  left  me  at  Er- 
furth  to  return  to  Naples.  He  had  received  overtures  from 
Austria,  promising  to  interest  herself  in  the  preservation  of 
his  throne,  if,  like  Bernadotte,  he  would  join  the  coalition. 
Metternich,  by  a  refinement  of  revenge,  applied  all  his 
address  in  sowing  defection  even  in  the  ranks  of  my  own 
family.  The  insinuation  which  failed  with  the  virtuous 
King  of  Saxony,  succeeded  with  Joachim.  He  made  a  mys- 
tery of  these  propositions,  and  excused  his  return  to  Naples 
on  the  pretended  necessity  of  preparations  for  the  defense 
of  his  kingdom.  I,  nevertheless,  saw  his  object,  for  he  had 
excited  my  distrust  ever  since  his  departure  from  Posen.  I 
could  easily  have  detained  him,  but  I  feared  it  might  enable 
the  English  to  effect  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand.  Certain 
of  the  influence  of  my  sister  over  her  husband,  I  first  repre- 
sented to  him  the  inevitable  fall  of  his  throne,  if  I  should 
be  compelled  to  yield,  and  then  took  my  leave  of  him  with 
deep  emotion.  I  felt  a  sad  presentiment  of  the  fate  which 
awaited  him. 

Threatening  March  of  the  Bavarians.— I  learned  at  Er- 
furth  that  the  Bavarians,  having  united  with  the  Austrians, 
were  already  in  full  march  on  Wurtzbourg  to  intercept  our 
retreat.  Although  I  had  known  for  the  last  ten  days  the 
treaty  of  alliance  concluded  at  Ried,  I  did  not  expect  so 
prompt  an  aggression  on  their  part.     But  as  soon  as  the 


220  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

alliance  was  ratified,  the  Austrian  and  Bavarian  armies  min- 
gled their  ranks,  and  marched  against  me.  Perhaps  I  might 
have  retained  Bavaria  by  sending  the  divisions  of  Augereau 
to  Ratisbon  and  Straubing  ;  the  king  would  then  have  been 
obliged  to  unite  his  army  with  mine  ;  and  these  eight  divi- 
sions of  infantry,  forming  with  the  cavalry  near  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  might  have  invaded  Bohemia  at  the  moment  of 
the  victory  of  Dresden  ;  this  powerful  diversion  would  have 
decided  me  to  manœuvre  on  Prague  by  the  right  of  Schwart- 
zenberg,  instead  of  uselessly  marching,  first  on  the  Bober, 
then  on  Duben,  and  then  in  the  mountains  of  Toeplitz. 

By  this  union  of  the  Bavarians  and  Austrians,  the  coali- 
tion had  gained  a  new  army  of  fifty-eight  thousand  men,  of 
which  Wrede  took  the  command.  On  the  fifteenth  of  Oc- 
tober, he  left  Braunau,  passed  the  Danube  at  Donawerth  on 
the  nineteenth,  and  reached  Wurtzbourg  on  the  twenty- 
fourth.  On  the  twenty-seventh,  he  encamped  at  Aschaffen- 
bourg,  where  he  detached  ten  thousand  Bavarians  on  Frank- 
fort, and  with  the  remainder  of  his  army  established  himself  at 
Hanau  on  the  twenty-ninth,  barring  to  us  the  passage  of  the 
Mayne  ;  it  was  a  parody  of  the  Beresina. 

I  was  sensibly  affected  by  this  defection  ;  it  was  the  most 
unjust  of  all  ;  for  I  had  heaped  benefits  on  Bavaria.  The 
Protectorate  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  was  no  more 
an  imposition  than  her  vassalage  to  the  Austrian  Empire  ; 
and  if  she  deemed  it  odious,  she  had  only  to  substitute  for  it 
a  simple  defensive  alliance.  Her  alliance  with  France  was  a 
natural  one,  and  had  existed  ages  before.  In  remembering 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  Bavarians  in  1805  and  at  Abensberg, 
and  the  devotion  which  they  showed  in  the  glorious  campaign 
of  1809,  my  heart  swelled  with  emotion.  .  .  .  And  were 
these  the  same  men  !  I  did  not  accuse  the  army,  but  the 
intrigues  of  courtiers,  the  facile  and  debonair  character  of 
the  king,  and  the  ambition  of  Wrede.     In  fact,  the   Bava- 


CH.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  221 

rians  had  sacrificed  me  for  their  own  preservation  ;  Maurice 
of  Saxony  did  still  worse  toward  Charles  V.  ;  but  there 
was  something  more  noble  in  his  opposing  a  victorious 
monarch.  I  should  have  said  nothing,  if  Wrede  had  simply 
joined  the  enemy  without  thinking  to  cut  off  my  retreat.  I 
expected  that  he  would  annoy  my  flank  and  rear  ;  but  I  did 
not  suppose  he  would  have  the  presumption  to  put  me  in 
irons  ! 

We  followed  without  obstruction  the  road  from  Erfurth 
by  Gotha,  Fulda,  and  Schluchtern.  At  this  last  place  I  first 
heard  of  Wrede's  audacious  manœuvre.  We  had  no  time  to 
hesitate.  It  was  necessary  to  cut  our  way  through  these  new 
enemies  before  the  arrival  of  those  in  our  rear.  Blucher, 
leaving  the  road  to  Eisenach,  had  gone  north  by  Hersefeld 
towards  the  sources  of  the  Nidda  to  fall  on  my  left  flank  ; 
Bubna  followed  me  in  rear,  and  the  grand  army  was  gaining 
my  right  by  the  mountains  of  Franconia.  Eaising  myself  to 
a  level  with  the  threatened  danger,  I  was  far  from  losing 
courage  ;  I  inarched  briskly  on  Hanau. 

Their  Defeat  at  llanau.— We  had  still  eighty  thousand 
disposable  men,  exclusive  of  twenty-five  thousand  wounded 
and  stragglers  ;  but  they  formed  a  long  procession  extending 
to  Fulda  :  I  had  but  twenty  thousand  in  hand.  Wrede 
numbered  fifty  thousand.  He  placed  himself  audaciously, 
or  rather  imprudently,  at  the  debouch  of  the  forest  of  Lamboi, 
resting  on  the  Kinzig.  We  attacked  him  on  the  thirtieth. 
While  my  tirailleurs,  deployed  in  the  forest,  held  in  check 
the  enemy's  right  and  centre,  my  cavalry  pierced  their  left 
and  threw  it  partly  into  the  Kinzig.  With  the  assistance 
of  the  Cossacks  who  preceded  Blucher's  march  towards 
Bergen,  half  of  this  broken  wing  regained  Hanover,  the  rest 
were  drowned  or  taken  prisoners.  Wrede,  seeing  the  danger 
of  his  position,  manoeuvred  by  his  right  to  change  his  front, 
and  secure  his  retreat  on  AschafFenbourg.     My  Old  Guard 


222  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [cH.  XX. 

under  Friant  drove  him  back.  If  I  had  had  the  corps  of  Ber- 
trand, Ney,  and  Marmont  about  me,  the  Bavarian  army- 
would  have  been  completely  destroyed  ;  I  would  have  thrown 
it  into  the  Mayne,  by  cutting  off  that  road.  But  we  had  no 
time  to  lose  ;  it  was  necessary  to  file  on  Frankfort  im- 
mediately, for  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg  might  arrive  at 
any  moment.  Our  columns  marched  all  night  in  order  to 
reach  that  city. 

But  as  my  rear-guard  of  fourteen  thousand  men  had  not 
yet  arrived  at  the  height  of  Hanau,  I  left  Marmont  to  hold 
this  point,  advising  him  to  take  the  offensive  in  order  to  be 
more  certain  of  his  object.  He  accordingly  attacked  and 
carried  the  city  of  Hanau  on  the  morning  of  the  thirty-first, 
forced  the  bridge  of  Lamboi  on  the  Kinzig,  and  drove  back 
the  enemy's  right,  thus  gaining  time  for  the  arrival  of  the 
rear-guard.  Now  retreating  in  his  turn,  he  left  Bertrand  to 
guard  Hanau  till  all  had  passed.  Wrede,  wishing  to  wash 
out  his  defeat,  again  took  the  offensive,  and  penetrated  into 
Hanau,  where  he  was  repulsed  and  seriously  wounded.  The 
Bavarian  corps  occupying  Frankfort  did  not  venture  to  await 
our  arrival,  but  recrossed  the  Mayne,  and  destroyed  the 
bridge. 

The  French  retire  behind  the  Rhine.— On  the  second  of 
November  1  arrived  at  Mayence,  and  my  army  there  crossed 
the  Bhine.  Guilleminot  who  brought  up  the  rear,  attempted 
to  hold  the  heights  of  Hochheim,  and  was  attacked  by  the 
Austrians  with  quadruple  forces  ;  but  he  had  the  good  for- 
tune to  reach  Cassel  without  suffering  as  much  loss  as  might 
have  been  expected 

Our  long  retreat  from  Leipsic  was  not  without  disorder  : 
fatigue  and  hunger  carried  off  many  of  our  troops,  who  also 
suffered  much  from  a  nervous  epidemic  fever.  To  old  France 
this  retreat  was  scarcely  less  fatal  than  that  from  Russia. 
Our  losses  for  the  last  two  years  had  been  so  great  that  the 


Cil.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN    OF     1813  223 

nation  was  in  consternation  ;  and  if  the  allies  had  pursued 
their  march,  they  might  have  entered  Paris  with  our  rear- 
guard. But  the  aspect  of  the  military  frontiers  of  France 
intimidated  them.  They  wished  to  raise  militia  to  blockade 
these  fortresses  before  again  engaging  on  a  soil  rich  with  the 
blood  of  the  soldiers  of  the  first  coalition. 

Capitulation  of  Dresden.  —  Before  attempting  anything 
further,  the  allies  first  occupied  themselves  in  collecting  the 
fruit  of  their  great  victory.  The  most  important  of  all  was 
the  capitulation  of  Dresden,  where  I  had  unfortunately  left 
twenty-five  thousand  men  under  St.  Cyr.  This  great  detach- 
ment has  been  the  subject  of  much  criticism.  Certainly,  if 
I  had  had  no  other  object  than  the  defense  of-  Dresden,  it 
would  have  been  exceedingly  foolish.  But  the  object  was  to 
assist  Murat  in  keeping  the  field  as  long  as  possible,  in  order 
to  occupy  the  army  of  Bohemia,  while  I  marched  on  Duben 
to  crush  Blucher.  I  expected  to  return  by  the  right  bank 
of  the  Elbe,  after  having  captured  Berlin.  I  have  already 
shown  what  combination  of  circumstances  forced  me  to  re- 
nounce this  project.  I  then,  on  the  fourteenth  of  October, 
sent  officers  to  St.  Cyr  directing  him  to  descend  the  Elbe, 
and  unite  with  the  greater  part  of  the  garrisons  of  Torgau 
and  Magdebourg.  But  none  of  them  reached  their  destina- 
tion. After  the  loss  of  Leipsic  his  fate  was  fixed.  I  hoped, 
however,  that  he  would  himself  file  on  Torgau,  draw  to  him 
some  reënforcements  from  Wittenberg  and  Magdebourg,  and 
unite  with  Davoust.  The  allies  had  left  before  Dresden  only 
one  good  division  and  the  Russian  militia  of  Count  Tolstoy. 
He  would  undoubtedly  have  succeeded  if  he  had  undertaken 
it  in  time.  But  after  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  the  allies  sent 
Klenau  at  the  head  of  twenty-five  thousand  Austrians  to  re- 
enforce  the  blockading  corps. 

As  his  magazines  were  getting  low,  and  our  affairs  seemed 
lost  in  Germany,  St.  Cyr  agreed  with  the  enemy  to  surrender 


224  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

the  place  on  condition  of  a  free  passage  for  the  garrison,  which 
was  afterward  to  be  exchanged.  The  capitulation  was  agreed 
upon,  and  the  troops  had  left  the  place,  when  the  allied  sov- 
ereigns disapproved  of  the  arrangement  and  ordered  his 
columns  to  return.  But  in  the  mean  time  the  enemy  had 
occupied  the  place  and  ascertained  all  its  means  of  sustain- 
ing a  siege.  He,  therefore,  preferred  to  surrender  as  prisoners 
of  war  and  throw  upon  the  allies  the  odium  of  a  violated 
capitulation.  In  this  he  was  wrong.  He  should  have  re- 
mained in  the  place  and  required  Klenau  to  furnish  him  with 
provisions  till  the  return  of  the  courier  with  the  approbation 
of  the  allied  sovereigns. 

Operations  before  Hamburg.— On  the  other  side  the  army 
of  Bernadotte  was  broken  up  ;  Tauenzein's  corps  was  block- 
ading Wittenberg  ;  Bulow  was  detached  into  Westphalia 
and  the  confines  of  Holland  ;  and  a  part  of  the  Russian 
troops  under  Wintzingerode  took  the  same  direction.  Ber- 
nadotte united  his  Swedes  with  Benningsen's  corps,  and 
marched  on  the  Lower  Elbe  to  join  Walmoden,  detach  Den- 
mark, and  capture  Hamburg.  Davoust,  in  concert  with  ten 
thousand  Danes  had  kept  the  field  in  this  vicinity  with  suc- 
cess. The  Danes  soon  signed  a  peace  ;  but  that  brave  nation 
who  had  gathered  nothing  but  thorns  from  our  alliance,  did 
not  imitate  the  example  of  those  who  had  reaped  all  the 
advantages  ;  they  limited  themselves  to  a  wise  and  honorable 
neutrality.  Davoust,  being  left  alone,  prepared  for  a  vigor- 
ous defense.  The  duties  of  a  valiant  governor  who  prefers 
to  bury  himself  under  the  ruins  of  a  city  intrusted  to  his 
sword,  rather  than  to  surrender  it,  do  not  accord  with  the 
interests  of  the  citizens  ;  Davoust  has  left  at  Hamburg  a 
name  abhorred  ;  and  the  extent  of  this  hatred  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  measure  of  the  praise  actually  due  to  him. 
To  blockade  and  besiege  a  city  like  Hamburg,  with  Haar- 
bourg  and  the  islands,  when  it  is  defended  by  twenty-five 


Ch.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1813.  225 

thousand  brave  men  and  well  provisioned,  is  no  small  task. 
Bernadotte  and  Benningsen  spent  five  months  without  mak- 
ing much  progress.  Davoust  defended  the  approaches  with 
activity,  and  fought  on  the  outside  as  long  as  he  could.  The 
place  held  out  till  after  my  abdication  at  Fontainebleau. 

Capitulation  of  Dantzic— Eapp  was  not  quite  so  fortun- 
ate ;  he  braved  there  for  a  year  the  attacks  of  the  Duke  of 
Wurtemberg.  The  means  of  the  besiegers  were  not  in  pro- 
portion to  the  importance  of  the  place  and  the  strength  of 
the  garrison.  The  whole  force  there  was  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men,  of  which  five  or  six  thousand  were  not  capable  of 
doing  service  ;  three  or  four  thousand  were  equivocal  Nea- 
politans ;  the  Polish  division  of  Granjean  and  that  of  Heu- 
delet.  After  a  blockade  of  six  months,  they  attempted  a 
siege,  which  would  have  been  a  long  one,  if  the  garrison  had 
not  capitulated  for  want  of  munitions  and  medicines.  Kapp 
had  the  same  fate  as  St.  Cyr.  He  at  first  obtained  a  free 
sortie,  which  was  not  sanctioned.  They,  however,  had  re- 
served this  sanction.  Kapp  had  no  other  course  than  to  sur- 
render himself  a  prisoner  of  war. 

Siege  and  Blockade  of  the  other  Places.— The  Eussians 
blockaded  Wittenberg  where  General  Lapoype  made  a  very 
fine  defense  till  1814.  Tauenzein's  corps,  with  the  Saxons 
who  had  joined  the  Eussians,  blockaded  Torgau.  This  was 
followed  by  a  simulacrum  of  a  siege  and  a  bombardment. 
The  garrison  was  embarrassed  with  a  mass  of  wounded  men 
and  equipages,  which  had  taken  refuge  there  at  the  battle  of 
Leipsic  ;  moreover,  the  troops  had  suffered  greatly  from  the 
ravages  of  an  epidemic  fever.  Narbonne  who  commanded 
the  place  was  killed  by  a  fall  from  his  horse.  He  was  suc- 
ceeded by  General  Dutailles,  having  under  him  Brun  de 
Villeret.  The  garrison,  reduced  to  half  its  numbers  and 
destitute  of  provisions,  capitulated.  Stettin,  Modlin,  Za- 
mosc,  and  the  citadel  of  Erfurth,  also  surrendered  during  the 

VOL.   IV. — 15. 


226  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

month  of  December,  after  having  accomplished  all  that 
could  be  hoped  from  resignation  and  devotion.  Glogau  held 
out  till  the  end  of  the  war.  Magdebourg,  being  defended  by 
a  strong  garrison,  was  only  blockaded,  at  first  by  Benningsen 
and  then  by  the  Russian  militia.  Custrin,  defended  by  Fornier- 
d'Albe,  was  only  invested  ;  its  position  on  an  island  of  the 
Oder,  rendered  it  as  difficult  of  attack  as  it  was  easy  of 
blockade.  Moreover,  the  Prussians  did  not  wish  to  destroy 
their  places,  being  certain  that  intime  they  would  be  reduced 
by  famine.  For  this  reason  the  siege  of  Glogau  was  changed 
to  a  blockade,  and  the  two  places  held  out  beyond  all  expec- 
tation, the  first  to  the  seventh  of  March,  and  the  second  to 
the  tenth  of  April.  This  was  the  more  honorable  for  Glogau, 
as  of  the  five  thousand  men  which  formed  its  garrison,  the 
governor  was  obliged  to  dismiss  one-half,  which  was  com- 
posed of  German,  Spanish  and  Illyrian  troops,  and  he  had 
to  guard,  with  the  few  that  remained,  an  enciente  on  both 
banks  of  the  Oder. 

Operations  of  Eugene  in  Italy.— In  Italy  there  was  noth- 
ing of  a  decisive  character.  The  viceroy,  who  had  been  sent 
there  after  the  battle  of  Lutzen,  organized  an  army  of  forty- 
five  thousand  French  and  Italians.  I  hoped  at  one  time  to 
send  Augereau  to  the  valley  of  the  Danube  to  act  with  the 
Bavarian  army  and  Eugene  against  the  gates  of  Vienna. 
This  union  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men  would 
have  greatly  embarrassed  Austria.  But  the  intrigues  which 
paralyzed  Bavaria  from  the  commencement  of  the  campaign, 
forced  me  to  renounce  this  project.  The  Austrians,  being 
thus  relieved  from  danger  from  the  Inn  and  the  Tyrol,  sent 
General  Hiller  against  Eugene  with  a  superior  force,  which 
was  assisted  by  the  violent  inhabitants  of  the  Tyrol  and  the 
Illyrian  Croats.  The  viceroy  occupied  with  the  main  body 
of  his  forces  the  famous  passes  of  Tarvis  and  Laybach,  while 
a  detachment  guarded  the  vallev  of  the  Adi^e  to  Prunecken. 


Cn.  XX.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF    1813.  227 

Hiller,  repulsed  at  Villach  and  Kraimbourg,  had  some  suc- 
cess near  Fiurne  ;  but  the  viceroy  having  carried  there  Pino's 
division,  General  Nugent  was  beaten  like  his  chief.  On 
being  reënfôrced,  Hiller  passed  the  Drave  on  the  nineteenth 
of  September,  and  gained  some  advantages  over  the  divisions 
of  Verdier  and  Gratien.  The  viceroy  maintained  himself  at 
Tarvis.  The  middle  of  October  the  Austrian  general,  cer- 
tain of  the  accession  of  Bavaria,  ascended  the  Drave  with 
his  main  body  on  Prunecken  to  join  his  right  in  the  valley 
of  the  Adige  and  carry  the  theatre  of  war  by  Trente  on 
Verona  ;  the  left  alone  remained  in  the  Friol.  This  move- 
ment was  well  conceived.  The  viceroy,  being  no  longer  able 
to  hold  in  the  mountains,  fell  back  at  first  behind  the  Isonzo, 
then  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Brenta,  of  which  he  destroyed 
the  bridges. 

Eugene  might  have  fallen  with  all  his  forces  on  the  left  of 
the  Austrians,  and  gained  their  rear  by  the  Drave,  as  I  had 
done  against  Wurmser  by  the  gorges  of  the  Brenta  ;  he  had 
the  additional  advantage  of  possessing  Mantua.  But  to 
attempt  such  enterprises  required  an  impetuous  character 
and  reliable  troops,  which  Eugene  had  not.  Weakened  by 
the  garrisons  of  Mantua  and  Venice,  and  the  defection  of  Ba- 
varia having  opened  the  Tyrol  to  our  enemies,  he  deemed  it 
more  wise  to  fall  back  on  the  Adige  about  Verona. 

Hiller,  not  daring  to  debouch  on  his  rear  by  forcing  Rivoli, 
filed  by  the  gorges  of  the  Brenta,  in  order  to  join  his  left 
and  to  advance  toward  Vicenza.  New  contests  took  place  in 
the  so  often  disputed  position  of  Caldiero.  It  was  carried 
by  the  Austrians,  for  all  the  advantages  of  this  celebrated 
post  are  against  Verona  and  in  favor  of  troops  debouching 
from  Vicenza.  General  Nugent  blockaded  Venice  in  concert 
with  an  English  division,  and  got  possession  by  water  of  the 
port  of  Ferrara.  Istria,  Dalmatia,  Illyria,  the  Tyrol,  and 
the  States  of  Venice,  fell  into  the  power  of  the  enemy  in 


228  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XX 

consequence  of  the  battle  of  Leipsic  and  the  unfortunate 
resolution  of  the  court  of  Munich.  The  cabinet  of  Vienna, 
having  decided  upon  the  reconquest  of  Italy,  sent  there 
Marshal  Bellegarde  with  a  reënforcement  of  twenty-five 
thousand  men  under  Klenau.  Immediately  after  the  fall  of 
Dresden,  this  corps  filed  by  Bavaria  and  the  Tyrol  on  the 
Adige.     "We  will  describe  their  operations  hereafter. 

Soult's  Operations  in  Spain. — In  Spain  our  affairs  were 
not  more  favorable.  In  order  to  give  vigor  to  the  army  of 
Joseph,  I  had  determined  to  recall  him  to  Paris  and  give  the 
general  command  to  Soult,  I  ought  to  have  done  this  in 
1811.  But  although  this  resolution  was  rather  too  late,  I 
still  hoped  that  the  marshal  would  be  able  at  least  to  check 
the  success  of  the  British  arms  on  the  Pyrenees.  He  im- 
mediately resolved  to  advance  to  the  assistance  of  Pampe- 
luna.  The  project  was  well  imagined  ;  but  the  difficulty 
of  the  country  and  the  situation  of  the  respective  parties 
rendered  its  success  very  difficult,  if  not  problematical. 

Soult  descended  from  the  Pyrenees  by  his  left  with  forty 
thousand  men  in  two  columns,  by  Boncevaux  and  Maya. 
He  himself  marched  by  the  first  of  these  roads  on  Pampe- 
luna,  hoping  to  deliver  the  place  and  then  turn  against  the 
centre  of  the  allies.  This  manœuvre  was  good  ;  but  the 
asperity  of  the  mountains,  the  length  of  the  march,  and  the 
obstinate  defense  of  the  English  right  under  General  Picton, 
gave  time  for  Wellington  to  approach  with  the  main  body. 
Keënforced  by  the  Spanish  troops  from  the  siege  of  Pampe- 
luna,  he  held  Soult  in  check,  while  two  English  divisions 
under  Hill  and  Dalhousie  turned  his  right  at  the  foot  of  the 
Col-d'Arrais,  and  threatened  his  communications  by  Lanz. 
Soult  supported  himself  in  his  turn  near  Ostitz  to  rally  on 
Drouet.  This  manœuvre  has  been  the  subject  of  ridiculous 
criticism.  If  he  had  permitted  his  right  to  be  forced  and 
turned  between  Ostitz  and  Lanz,  he  would  have  suffered  the 


Ch.  XX.]  À  U  T  U  M  N    CAMPAIGN    OF     1813.  229 

same  fate  as  Joseph  at  Vittoria.  He  thought  it  prudent  not 
to  risk  a  general  battle  in  a  country  so  difficult,  where,  in 
fact,  he  had  every  thing  to  lose  and  little  to  gain.  The  ene- 
mies of  the  national  glory  of  France  have  reproached  me  for 
having  been  too  audacious,  and  attempt  to  criminate  Soult 
for  not  having  been  more  so  !  In  fact,  his  movement,  con- 
ceived on  excellent  principles,  would  have  been  more  success- 
ful, if  the  road  from  Roncevaux  had  been  better,  and  his 
first  marches  had  been  conducted  with  more  activity,  preci- 
sion, and  vigor  ;  but  as  soon  as  the  enemy  had  time  to  col- 
lect superior  forces,  writh  the  advantage  of  ground  and  roads, 
the  chances  were  against  him.  It  must  also  be  observed  that, 
by  turning  the  English  right,  he  would  have  thrown  Welling- 
ton back  upon  the  sea  :  what  wTould  have  caused  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  continental  army,  would  on  the  contrary  have  been  a 
means  of  security  to  him.  Soult  returned  to  his  positions 
after  three  successful  combats,  in  which  the  enemy  lost  six  or 
seven  thousand  men,  while  his  own  loss  was  much  less. 

The  English  general  now  warmly  pushed  the  siege  of  St. 
Sebastian,  which  place  had  already  been  unsuccessfully  as- 
saulted by  General  Graham.  The  regular  attack  was  re- 
newed the  twenty-eighth  of  August,  with  forty-five  pieces 
of  ordnance,  a  part  of  which  were  sixty-eight  pound  car- 
ronades  :  the  breach  was  made  practicable,  and  a  second 
assault  given  on  the  thirty-first  ;  it  was  more  bloody  than 
the  first,  and  would  also  have  failed,  had  not  an  explosion 
inside  forced  the  garrison  to  retire  to  the  castle.  Welling- 
ton lost  his  two  highest  officers  of  engineers  and  three  thou- 
sand men,  and  the  English  soiled  their  laurels  by  the  excesses 
committed  upon  a  friendly  and  allied  city. 

Soult  made  some  efforts  to  succor  this  place,  and  passed 
the  Bidassoa  near  the  mountain  of  Haya  and  opposite  St. 
Martial  ;  but  he  found  the  enemy  too  strongly  posted.  The 
Spaniards  especially  distinguished  themselves  in  the  defense 


230  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XX. 

of  St.  Martial,  where  they  rivaled  the  best  English  troops  ; — 
the  miraculous  effect  of  the  influence  on  the  valor  of  an 
army  of  a  single  chief  who  merits  the  full  confidence  of  the 
soldier  !  After  an  engagement  of  some  hours  the  three 
French  columns  recrossed  the  Bidassoa.  The  castle  of  St. 
Sebastian,  being  bombarded  with  heavy  mortar  batteries  on 
the  ninth  of  September,  capitulated.  The  allies  found  here 
one  thousand  two  hundred  men  and  five  hundred  wounded  ; 
the  siege  had  cost  them  four  thousand. 

Wellington,  reënforced  by  his  siege  corps  and  a  number  of 
Spanish  troops,  resolved  to  possess  himself  of  the  central 
and  salient  position  of  the  Rhune,  which  took  in  reverse  all 
the  upper  valley  of  the  Nivelle  and  the  great  road  from  St. 
Jean-de-Luz  to  Bayonne  ;  its  possession  was  calculated  to 
secure  from  all  surprise  his  right,  which  was  posted  at  the 
Col-de-Maya,  and  could  descend  at  will  on  Bayonne  ;  he 
caused  this  post  to  be  attacked  by  three  strong  Spanish 
columns  and  an  English  division.  Soult,  being  greatly 
weakened  by  detachments,  made  but  little  defense  of  this 
advanced  post,  and  concentrated  his  forces  behind  the  Ni- 
velle. Pampeluna  fell  a  few  days  after,  for  want  of  pro- 
visions. 

Nothing  remarkable  occurred  in  the  east  of  Spain.  Su- 
chet  continued  to  maintain  his  position  in  advance  of  Bar- 
celona, without  being  seriously  troubled  by  the  enemy.  He 
was  waiting  with  impatience  for  orders  to  resume  the  offen- 
sive, and  disengage  the  twenty  thousand  men  whom  he  had 
unfortunately  left  to  garrison  the  places  in  the  interior.  But 
the  battle  of  Leipsic  and  the  retreat  behind  the  Rhine  de- 
stroyed these  vain  hopes,  and  soon  forced  me  to  ask  from  him 
reënforcements  for  the  defense  of  the  Rhone. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 

CAMPAIGN    OF    1814. 

FROM   THE   IXVASIOX   OF   FRANCE,    TO    THE   EXILE   OF    NAPOLEON   TO  ELBA. 

General  State  of  France — Change  of  the  French  Ministry — Propositions  of 
the  Allies — Dissolution  of  the  Chamber — Preparations  for  Defense — Nego- 
tiations for  the  Restoration  of  Ferdinand — Situation  of  Affairs  in  Italy — 
Extraordinary  Efforts  of  the  Coalition — They  resolve  to  invade  France — 
Their  Motives  of  Action — They  pass  the  Rhine — Xapoleon  marches  against 
them — He  attacks  Blucher — First  Combat  of  Brienne — Battle  of  Brienne — 
Congress  of  Chatillon — Faults  of  Blucher — Position  of  the  two  Armies — 
Combat  of  Champ- Aubert — Combat  of  Montmirail — Affair  of  Chateau- 
Thierry — Defeat  of  Blucher  at  Vauchamps  and  Etoges — He  rallies  his 
Army  at  Chalons — Movement  of  the  Allies  on  Nogent — Napoleon  flies  to 
the  Seine — Slow  March  of  Schwartzenberg — Combat  of  Nangis — Combat 
ofMontereau — Schwartzenberg  evacuates  Troj*es — Operations  of  Eugene 
and  Augereau — Proposal  of  an  Armistice — New  Disposition  of  the  Allied 
Forces — Blucher  marches  on  Meaux — Operations  of  Mortier  and  Marmont — 
Napoleon  marches  against  Blucher — Blucher  repasses  the  Aisne — Battle  of 
Craone — Ultimatum  of  Chatillon  rejected — Battle  of  Laon — Affair  of  Reims 
— Schwartzenberg  on  the  Aube — His  Vanguard  crosses  the  Seine — The  Em- 
press and  Regency  retire  to  Blois — Napoleon  moves  against  the  grand 
Allied  Army — Battle  of  Arcis — Remarks  on  Napoleon's  Position — Success 
of  the  Allies  in  the  South— New  Project  of  Manoeuvring  on  the  Enemy's 
Rear — Operations  of  Blucher — The  Marshals  are  separated  from  Napoleon — 
Alexander  decides  to  march  on  Paris — Efforts  of  Napoleon  to  communicate 
with  his  Marshals— The  latter  retire  on  Paris — Difficulties  of  Napoleon's 
Situation— He  flies  to  the  Defense  of  the  Capital— Battle  of  Paris— Situation 
of  France — Want  of  Public  Spirit  in  Paris — Conduct  of  the  Emperor  of 
Russia — Intrigues  of  the  Factions — Abdication  of  Fontainebleau— Battle 
of  Toulouse — Napoleon  retires  to  Elba — Evacuation  of  Italy — Concluding 
Remarks. 

General  State  of  France. — Notwithstanding  our  disasters 
on  the  Pyrenees,  on  the  Adige,  and  on  the  Rhine,  I  still 
hoped  to  be  able  to  defend,  for  a  long  time,  the  French  soil. 
It  is  true  that  efforts  to  maintain  ourselves  on  the  Elbe,  after 


232  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXL 

the  battle  of  Bautzen,  had  drawn  from  the  interior  of  France 
every  one  capable  of  carrying  a  musket.  I  therefore  had  but 
few  resources  left.  It  was  necessary  to  garrison  our  frontier 
places,  but  this  was  not  a  time  when  citizens,  making  it  a 
point  of  honor  and  of  duty  to  defend  their  ramparts,  require 
only  a  good  leader  and  a  few  soldiers  to  assist  them.  Un- 
fortunately, our  troops,  in  returning  to  France,  had  .brought 
with  them  a  fatal  typhus  fever  which  made  cruel  ravages  in 
our  ranks.  Mayence  was  filled  with  the  sick,  and  the  con- 
tagion had  (  xtended  even  to  Strasburg,  and  the  people  on 
both  sides  of  the  river  were  affected  ;  and  even  the  soldiers 
who  escaped  the  fever,  suffered  a  lassitude  and  loss  of 
strength.  This  army  presented  a  very  different  spectacle 
from  that  which  passed  the  Rhine  in  1805  to  oppose  Mack. 

But  what  troubled  me  most  was  the  general  lukewarmness 
of  public  spirit  in  the  interior.  If  I  found  France  firm  and 
resigned  on  my  return  from  Moscow,  I  found  her  equally 
wavering  and  distrustful  on  my  return  from  Leipsic.  The 
reverses  of  Vittoria  and  Leipsic,  and  the  approach  of  the 
masses  of  the  coalition,  had  intimidated  some,  and  revived 
the  treasonable  hopes  of  others.  Intriguers,  ever  active  in 
times  of  public  danger,  were  exerting  every  means  to  over- 
throw my  power,  while  others,  who  had  lost  their  fortunes 
and  privileges  in  the  Revolution,  forgot  that  they  owed  to  me 
the  preservation  of  their  lives,  and  the  restitution  of  a  part 
of  their  property.  They  desired  the  triumph  of  the  coalition, 
in  hopes  of  regaining  some  ruined  castles  and  portions  of 
unalienated  forests,  or  of  living  more  at  their  ease  in  the 
restoration  of  feudal  domination.  Royalist  committees  were 
formed  throughout  the  west  of  France  and  at  Bordeaux. 
Perfidy  and  treason  to  the  interests  of  France,  were  organized 
in  the  very  salons  of  the  capital,  and  spread  from  there  in 
Landes  and  in  the  Boccage. 

Change  of  Ministry.— Measuring  the  extent  of  the  danger, 


Cil.  XXT.]  CAMPAIGN     OF    1814.  233 

I  had  convoked  the  legislative  body,  in  the  hope  that  it 
would  assist  me  with  all  the  power  of  the  laws.  Being  in- 
formed that  Talleyrand's  party  had  incited  public  opinion 
against  the  Duke  of  Bassano,  whom  they  accused  of  being 
one  of  the  principal  instigators  of  the  war,  I  determined  to 
sacrifice  my  own  affections,  and  remove  this  faithful  servant 
from  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs,  and  put  Caulaincourt  in 
his  place.  In  this  choice  I  was  influenced  by  several  mo- 
tives :  in  the  first  place  the  Duke  of  Yicenza  had  always 
opposed  the  war  with  Russia  ;  and,  on  account  of  the  esteem 
in  which  he  was  held  by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  he  might 
now  facilitate  negotiations.  No  one  knew  better  than  I  did, 
the  unfounded  character  of  the  reports  made  against  Maret, 
and  I  could  not  have  given  a  stronger  proof  of  my  desire  for 
peace  than  in  displacing  him  from  office.  Caulaincourt  was 
at  the  same  time  made  minister  of  foreign  relations  and 
plenipotentiary. 

Propositions  of  the  Allies.— The  coalition  had  just  made 
some  overtures  by  M.  de  St.  Aignan,  my  envoy  to  Weymar, 
who,  in  passing  at  Frankfort,  had  had  a  conference  with 
Metternich,  Nesselrocle,  and  Aberdeen.  The  first  offered  to 
treat,  leaving  us  the  line  of  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the 
Pyrenees.  I  was  ready  to  accept  these  conditions  for  myself 
and  for  France,  but  I  wished  at  least  to  discuss  what  was  to 
be  done  with  Italy  and  Holland,  which  were  still  in  our  pos- 
session. To  an  empire  like  France,  it  was  imposing  on  her 
the  lowest  of  humiliations  to  refuse  to  treat  with  her  respect- 
ing the  fate  of  her  nearest  neighbors  and  allies. 

Dissolution  of  the  Chamber.— The  legislative  body  did  not 
answer  my  expectations.  Instead  of  feeling  that,  in  the  face 
of  three  hundred  thousand  allies,  it  was  the  first  duty  of 
every  patriot  to  assist,  with  every  means  in  his  power,  in  the 
defense  of  his  threatened  soil,  they  sought  to  discuss  com- 
plaints against  me,  and  to  organize  an  untimely  opposition. 


234  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

At  the  opening  of  the  chamber  I  had  sent  them  a  frank  and 
unreserved  communication  on  the  state  of  affairs  ;  presenting 
to  them  a  sincere  exposition  of  our  dangers,  and  of  the  hopes 
which  still  remained  of  peace.  I  had  even  laid  before  a  joint 
committee  of  the  senate  and  legislative  body,  all  my  diplo- 
matic correspondence,  showing  what  I  had  offered  the  allied 
powers  in  order  to  obtain  peace.  Instead  of  responding  to 
this  confidence  by  providing  the  means  of  carrying  on  the 
negotiations,  or  of  sustaining  the  national  dignity  and  inde- 
pendence, the  deputies  charged  with  presenting  to  me  the 
address  of  the  chamber,  spoke  only  of  future  guarantees  of 
the  public  liberty,  and  the  exercise  of  political  rights! 
These  words  would  have  been  honorable  when  I  was  vic- 
torious, but  now,  when  all  were  bound  to  unite  to  save  the 
state,  they  were  of  a  factious  character,  tending  to  excite  a 
schism  in  the  government.  I  had  but  one  of  two  courses  to 
pursue  :  to  yield  to  the  factions,  or  to  dissolve  the  legislative 
body.  If  I  yielded,  my  throne  was  overthrown,  my  author- 
ity disputed,  and  France  lost.  The  legislative  body  was  dis- 
solved, and  I  had  recourse  to  the  senate  to  give  legality  to 
the  measures  necessary  for  the  safety  of  all.  This  was  un- 
fortunate, as  it  gave  to  my  enemies  a  pretext  for  representing 
me  to  France  as  a  despot,  who  no  longer  disguised  his  tyranny 
under  rich  harvests  of  laurels,  and  who  was  bringing  all 
Europe  upon  France  by  the  cruelty  of  his  ambition.  Those 
who  thus  excited  discord  under  such  circumstances  are  already 
judged.  They  connived  with  the  conspirators  who  sought 
the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons.  These  fervent  apostles  of 
liberty  were  more  desirous  of  power  than  of  the  welfare  of 
the  state. 

Preparations  for  Defense. — Notwithstanding  these  con- 
trarieties, I  applied  all  my  activity  in  reorganizing  my  little 
army.  For  the  last  twenty  years  our  fortresses  had  neither 
been  armed  nor  repaired,  for  they  had  not  been  threatened, 


Cn.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  235 

and  it  now  required  the  greatest  efforts  to  place  tliem  in  a 
state  of  defense.  Neglecting  all  places  of  a  secondary  char- 
acter, I  directed  ray  attention  to  the  most  important  points. 
All  our  resources  had  been  employed  in  reorganizing  our 
array  at  Lutzen  ;  and  we  now  required  one  hundred  millions 
of  francs,  and  two  hundred  thousand  men  to  render  our 
frontiers  secure.  If  I  had  had  a  more  provident  ministry, 
and  the  nation  had  not  been  already  impoverished,  there 
would  have  been  time  enough  to  provide  for  the  public  secur- 
ity after  the  declaration  of  Austria.  But  the  ministry  could 
not  venture  upon  such  a  measure  after  my  disapproval  of  the 
levy  of  Fouché  in  1809,  and,  moreover,  France  was  not  dis- 
posed for  a  levy  en  masse.  I  confess,  nevertheless,  that  I 
ought  to  have  organized  the  national  guards  immediately 
after  the  armistice  of  July  ;  this  would  have  given  me  the 
means  of  garrisoning  our  fortresses,  and,  in  case  of  reverse, 
would  have  enabled  my  army  to  keep  the  field.  This  organi- 
zation had  been  decreed  in  1805,  and  had  partially  been 
made  on  two  occasions  since  ;  but  as  the  war  had  always 
been  carried  on  beyond  the  frontiers  of  France,  this  measure 
had  not  received  the  extension  of  which  it  was  suscepti- 
ble. I  remembered  the  thirteenth  Vendémiaire,  and  desired 
to  postpone  the  arming  of  the  multitude  as  long  as 
possible. 

Some  writers  have  asserted  that  the  only  remaining  means 
of  saving  France,  was  a  grand  national  movement  ;  but 
that  the  loss  of  public  liberty  rendered  the  French  indif- 
ferent to  my  fate.  History  will  decide  upon  the  truth  of 
these  assertions  ;  it  will  ask  of  these  great  apostles  of  ideal 
liberty,  whether  the  people  ought  not  to  regard  the  indepen- 
dence of  their  soil  as  the  first  of  their  liberties  ;  and  if,  in 
order  to  permit  the  declaimers  of  the  tribune  to  censure  the 
acts  of  the  administration,  it  was  necessary  to  admit  foreign 
phalanxes  into  the  heart  of  the  state  ;  and  to  receive  the 


236  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

laws  of  the  Pandours,  in  order  to  have  the  pleasure  of  dictat- 
ing to  their  own  government  !  Woe  to  the  people  who 
become  the  dupes  of  such  aberrations  !  Deceived  by  the 
results  of  the  grand  movement  of  1793,  of  which  they  under- 
stood neither  the  cause  nor  the  effects,  these  gentlemen  sup- 
pose a  tribune  and  public  journals  the  only  requisite  to  make 
a  nation  rise  en  masse  against  the  enemy  !  Let  them  exam- 
ine the  archives  of  the  war-office,  and  then  say  how  many 
volunteers  went  to  the  frontier,  from  the  flight  of  Dumouriez 
in  April,  1792,  to  the  taking  of  Valenciennes  at  the  end  of 
July?  .  .  .  Not  one  !  The  law  of  the  requisition  furnished 
only  between  eighty  and  ninety  thousand  men,  instead  of 
three  hundred  thousand  ;  and  it  required  the  law  of  the 
fifth  of  September,  that  is,  terror,  the  guillotine,  and  all  the 
attirail  of  the  revolutionary  army,  to  raise  five  hundred 
thousand  men,  ill-armed  and  ill-equipped.  Perhaps  it  may 
be  asked,  what  was  the  liberty  which  these  brave  men  were 
asked  to  defend  ? 

With  wise  people,  public  liberty  consists  of  equality  before 
the  law,  freedom  of  the  press,  the  right  to  vote  on  taxes  and 
military  levies,  and  individual  freedom,  where  this  does  not 
tend  to  the  overthrow  of  public  order.  All  these  rights 
were  respected  by  the  institutions  which  I  created  and  by  the 
acts  of  my  administration.  A  committee  of  the  Senate  was 
directed  to  see  that  no  arbitrary  arrests  were  made  by  the 
police  ;  and  if  this  committee  neglected  their  duty,  it  was 
their  own  fault,  for  that  was  the  object  for  which  it  was  in- 
stituted. I  caused  the  arrest  of  some  fifty  bad  characters, 
mostly  military  demagogues,  who  wished  to  play  the  part  of 
Brutus,  by  boasting  in  public  that  they  would  treat  me  like 
Cœsar  !  I  shut  up  in  the  state  prisons  some  fifty  turbulent 
characters  of  different  parties,  who  were  attempting  to  raise 
insurrections,  and  some  twenty  priests  who  sought  to  subject 
France  to  the  ultramontane  yoke.     With  the  exception  of 


Ch.  XXL  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  237 

these  individuals,  not  a  Frenchman  who  respected  the  laws 
was  deprived  of  the  enjoyment  of  his  liberty. 

I  had  preferred  having  the  laws  before  the  legislative  body 
discussed  by  known  and  distinguished  orators,  in  order  to 
save  France  from  the  dangers  of  the  tribune,  after  the  com- 
motions which  had  divided  the  French  people  into  two 
nations.  In  doing  this  I  rendered  a  service  to  the  state  ; 
they  have  since  seen  the  evils  caused  by  a  tribune  occupied 
by  unworthy  or  unknown  orators.  The  vote  by  black  and 
white  balls,  after  the  exposition  of  the  motives  of  the  pro- 
posed laws,  was  the  most  suitable  mode  of  avoiding  the  re- 
turn of  anarchy  or  a  dictatorship.  In  times  of  public  tran- 
quillity I  should  have  been  charmed  at  opening  a  field  for  the 
oratorical  talent  which  distinguishes  the  French  magistracy. 

Negotiations  for  the  Restoration  of  Ferdinand.— I  have 
been  reproached  with  too  much  indecision  in  my  course  to- 
ward Spain.  It  is  certain  that  if  I  had  sent  back  Ferdinand 
immediately  after  my  return  from  Leipsic,  and  at  the  same 
time  had  recalled  Suchet  into  Languedoc,  I  would  have  had 
disposable  on  the  Rhone  thirty  or  forty  thousand  men  of  the 
old  bands  by  the  middle  of  February,  instead  of  leaving 
them  to  be  invested  in  the  fortifications  of  Catalonia.  The 
propitious  moment  for  effecting  this  restoration  had  passed  ; 
I  have  already  remarked  that  I  had  refused  to  do  it,  at  the 
beginning  of  1813,  on  my  return  from  Russia  and  previous 
to  the  battle  of  Vittoria,  on  account  of  the  excess  of  my 
confidence  in  my  resources,  and  from  the  fear  of  drawing 
Europe  upon  me  by  unveiling  my  weakness.  But  I  ought 
certainly  to  have  done  it  as  soon  as  the  rupture  of  the  nego- 
tiations of  Prague,  the  defeat  of  Joseph,  and  the  defection 
of  Austria,  placed  the  grand  question  of  the  empire  of  the 
civilized  world  in  the  fields  of  Saxony  and  the  mountains  of 
Bohemia.  Suchet  might  then  have  withdrawn  all  his  garri- 
sons which  were  uselessly  compromitted  in  the  fortifications 


238  LIFE     OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

of  Spain  and  have  appeared  on  the  Ehine  with  forty  thou- 
sand old  troops.  The  half  of  Soult's  army  would  have  been 
sufficient  to  guard  the  chain  of  the  Pyrenees. 

On  my  return  from  Leipsic,  I  no  longer  hesitated  on  the 
course  to  be  pursued  ;  negotiations  were  immediately  begun 
with  the  Duke  of  San  Carlos,  and  a  treaty  signed  at  Valen- 
çay  on  the  eleventh  of  December.  But  it  would  not  do  to 
restore  Ferdinand,  except;  upon  conditions  which  would  be 
recognized  by  Spain,  and  would  be  calculated  to  maté  him 
my  friend.  Even  Francis  I.  could  not  force  the  fulfillment 
of  the  treaty  signed  with  Charles  V.  at  Madrid  ;  and  there 
was  nothing  to  prove  that  Ferdinand  would  not  act  in  the 
same  way  toward  me.  I  would  have  accepted,  whatever  he 
desired,  if  I  had  been  assured  that  the  Spaniards  would  cease 
their  hostilities  and  separate  from  the  English  ;  but  if  Wel- 
lington remained  in  arms  on  the  Pyrenees,  this  return  of  the 
king  would  only  add  strength  to  my  enemies,  by  placing  Fer- 
dinand at  the  side  of  the  Duke  d'Àngoulême  at  the  English 
head-quarters.  The  party  which  conspired  against  me,  and 
especially  Talleyrand,  resorted  to  a  thousand  intrigues  to 
retard  this  restoration  and  to  intervene  in  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty,  in  order  to  destroy  the  prestige  of  my  supe- 
riority. Caulaincourt  himself  was  a  dupe  to  these  intrigues. 
Too  much  accustomed  to  persevere  in  my  enterprises,  I  the 
more  easily  gave  an  ear  to  these  perfidious  insinuations,  and 
thus  postponed  a  measure  which  I  adopted  when  too  late.  I 
merely  asked  of  Soult  two  divisions  from  his  army,  to  be 
directed  on  the  Seine,  and  ten  thousand  men  of  Suchet  to 
be  directed  toward  Lyons. 

Situation  of  Affairs  in  Italy.— I  had  less  hesitation  in  my 
course  with  Italy.  I  ordered  Eugene  to  purchase,  at  the 
expense  of  Osoppo  and  Palma-Nova,  an  armistice  of  some 
days  with  Bellegarde,  and  to  profit  by  it  to  echelon  his  army 
on  Cremona  and  Milan,  and  then  file  by  the  Alps  on  Geneva. 


Ch.   XXI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  239 

I  calculated  that,  being  master  of  Alessandria  and  Mantua, 
I  could  in  a  few  days  plant  my  eagles  on  the  Adige,  if  we 
obtained  a  decisive  success  in  France.  But  to  this  success 
the  cooperation  of  Eugene  was  necessary.  In  order  to  give 
more  efficacy  to  this  plan,  Augereau  was  to  form  a  corps  of 
twenty-five  thousand  men  at  Lyons,  of  which  the  ten  thou- 
sand soldiers  of  the  élite  from  the  army  of  Catalonia  would 
form  the  nucleus.  The  union  of  these  forces  and  Eugene, 
would  enable  me  to  recapture  Switzerland,  and  thus  throw 
sixty  thousand  men  on  the  communications  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  operate  in  concert  with  this  mass,  augmented  by  all 
the  insurgent  population  of  the  Franche-Comté,  Alsace,  and 
Lorraine.  I  hoped  that  Bellegarde,  blinded  by  the  tempo- 
rary conquest  of  Lombardy,  would  have  sufficient  occupation 
in  investing  Mantua  and  Alessandria,  without  thinking  of 
following  Eugene  beyond  the  Alps.  But  nothing  of  all  this 
was  done  ;  some  have  attempted  to  attribute  this  to  Eugene 
and  his  wife  ;  the  accusation  is  false.  Reflecting  afterwards 
that  even  the  French  regiments  of  his  army  were  recruited 
from  the  Piedmontese,  Tuscan,  and  Roman  conscripts,  who 
would  abandon  their  colors  in  crossing  the  Alps,  I  left  it 
optional  with  him  to  remain  in  Italy,  if  he  could  maintain 
himself  on  the  Mincio,  or  if  he  feared  to  draw  after  him  an- 
other victorious  army  on  France.  He  preferred  to  remain 
and  fight  it  out  on  the  Adige,  which  he  did  with  glory, 
honor,  and  loyalty. 

It  will  be  seen  from  these  dispositions  that  I  appreciated 
the  immensity  of  the  task  which  I  had  to  perform,  but  that 
I  was  not  intimidated  by  the  responsibility.  If  I  had  fortifi- 
cations to  guard,  the  allies  had  also  to  blockade  Hamburg, 
Magdebourg,  Stettin,  Torgau,  Wittenberg,  Custrin,  and 
Glogau  ;  if  they  passed  the  Rhine  they  would  be  obliged  to 
invest  Mavence  and  Strasbourg,  which  alone  required  an 
army.     Making  deductions  of  so  many  detachments,  I  cal- 


240  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.   XXI. 

culated  that  the  enemy  would  not  have  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men  to  advance  to  the  Moselle.  Here  Metz 
and  Thionville  would  require  new  corps  for  blockades.  Not 
more  than  one  hundred  thousand  allies  could  reach  the 
Marne.  I  hoped  in  the  course  of  a  month  to  organize  as 
large  a  force.  But  one  hundred  thousand  Frenchmen  fight- 
ing for  their  altars  and  firesides,  under  my  direction,  ought 
in  a  short  time  to  clear  the  country  ;  and  if  the  viceroy  had 
debouched  by  Geneva,  the  coalition  would  have  paid  dearly 
for  their  temerity  in  invading  France. 

Extraordinary  Efforts  of  the  Coalition.— But  Europe  had 
learned  from  us,  from  Spain,  and  from  Eussia,  not  to  spare 
any  sacrifice.  The  Confederation  of  the  Khine  turned  against 
me  all  the  energy  which  I  had  impressed  on  it.  Its  contin- 
gent of  troops  of  the  line  was  fixed  at  one  hundred  and  forty- 
five  thousand  men,  including  the  Bavarians  and  Wurtem- 
bergers  already  in  the  army  ;  and  as  many  landwehrs.  If 
we  deduct  from  these  the  forty-eight  thousand  Bavarians  and 
Wurtembergxrs,  already  with  the  enemy,  there  will  be  left 
more  than  two  hundred  thousand  enemies  which  I  had  not 
expected. 

The  militia  were  left  to  blockade  our  garrisons,  while  the 
armed  masses  of  Europe  penetrated  into  France  ;  they  were 
more  numerous  than  I  supposed.  If  to  the  eight  hundred 
and  ten  thousand  men  which  we  have  before  enumerated  we 
add  the  two  hundred  thousand  Germans,  and  the  fifty  thou- 
sand Bussiaiis  of  Lubanof,  we  have  a  total  of  One  million, 
one  hundred  and  fifty -two  thousand  men  thrown  against  me, 
between  August  and  September  ! 

The  Allies  resolve  to  invade  France. — In  the  meantime 
the  overtures  of  the  coalition  made  through  St.  Aignan  had 
not  produced  the  immediate  result  which  I  had  hoped.  To 
choose  a  new  minister,  and  to  arrange  his  instructions  respect- 
ing Italy  and  Holland,  had  occasioned  a  delay  of  some  fifteen 


Cil.   XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  241 

du\ \s,  during  which  the  allies  changed  their  resolution,  and 
pre  pared  to  invade  France,  without  waiting  for  a  final  an- 
swer to  their  propositions. 

Their  Motives  of  Action.— But  this  was  not  strange,  if 
we  reflect  upon  their  divergence  of  interests  on  approaching 
our  frontiers.  For  whom  and  for  what  were  they  now  to  fight? 
Could  Austria's  wishes  be  the  same  as  those  of  Russia  ?  or 
could  Russia  consent  to  all  that  England  desired  ?  The  em- 
peror of  Austria  wished  to  offer  me  the  line  of  the  Rhine  ;  hut 
as  soon  as  the  question  of  Italy  was  discussed,  the  cabinet 
of  Vienna  feared  they  might  lose  their  coveted  prey.  The 
allies  had  agreed  not  to  treat  s  parately.  England  had  shown 
that  Belgium  and  Antwerp  interested  her  more  than  a  con- 
tinental monarchy  ;  her  plenipotentiaries  protested  against 
the  offer  made  to  St.  Aignan  ;  and  the  minister  Castlereagh 
immediately  departed  from  London  to  assist  in  the  dissection 
of  my  empire.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  wished  to  come  to 
Paris  to  return  my  visit  to  Moscow,  and  to  aid  in  the  con- 
quest of  Antwerp,  in  order  to  obtain  Warsaw.  Austria 
espoused  the  maritime  interests  of  England,  because  the  pre- 
servation of  my  maritime  establishments  was  of  little  im- 
portance to  her  ,  she  consented  to  conquer  Antwerp  in  order 
to  be  certain  of  regaining  Milan  and  of  retaining  Venice  ! 

The  invasion,  however,  had  some  opponents  who  feared 
the  infku  ,ue  ot  <  ir  fortifications  and  our  national  energy, 
and  who  saw  the  divergence  in  the  political  interests  of  the 
allies.  The  question  was  decided  in  the  affirmative  through 
the  iufluence  of  a  committee  of  intriguers  in  France,  who 
encouraged  the  ruin  of  their  country  in  order  to  satisfy  per- 
sonal ambition,  and  who  sent  secret  agents  to  Frankfort  to 
inform  the  allies  of  the  facility  of  pushing  on  to  Paris.  In 
the  mean  time  another  committee  of  Bernese  oligarchs  came 
to  offer  the  Swiss  territory  to  serve  as  a  bridge  over  the 
Rhine  ;  for  the  Austrians,  as  usual,  sought  a  distant  passage 

VOL.   IV. — 16. 


242  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXL 

when  they  could  have  made  one  almost  anywhere.  The 
invasion  was  the»  resolved  upon.* 

The  Allies  pass  the  Rhine.— Being  aware  that  my  Con- 
tinental System  had  incited  the  opposition  of  the  merchants 
of  Amsterdam,  and  that  many  of  our  fortresses  in  Holland 
were  deprived  of  all  means  of  defense,  the  allies  detached  the 
corps  of  Bulow  and  Benkcndorf  against  Holland.  They 
took  possession  of  all  the  country  to  the  Waal  without  oppo- 
sition, and  Nimeguen  and  even  Grave  opened  their  gates, 
without  making  any  defense. 

Blucher  passed  the  Rhine  near  Mayence,  and  leaving  a 
corps  at  that  place  advanced  on  Nancy.  Wittgenstein  passed 
at  Brisach  and  crossed  the  Vosge  mountains  ;  but  they 
were  met  on  the  way  by  a  crowd  of  armed  country  people 
who  were  prepared  to  dispute  the  invasion  of  their  soil.  In 
vain  did  the  enemy  pronounce  death  upon  all  villagers  taken 
in  arms,  and  burn  to  ashes  every  French  village  which  at- 
tempted resistance  :  the  plains  of  Alsace  and  the  valleys  of 
the  Vosges  threw  out  bands  of  laborers  who  made  the  isola- 
ted detachments  of  the  armies  of  Prussia  and  Austria  pay 
dearly  for  the  excesses  which  they  committed.  They  alone 
for  a  time  suspended  the  march  of  the  enemy.  The  inhabi- 
tants of  Champagne  and  Franche-Comte  followed  their  ex- 
ample ;  the  people  of  Burgundy  rose  in  their  turn,  and  for 
some  days  I  ventured  to  hope  that  love  of  country  would  do, 
in  1814,  as  much  as  the  system  of  terror  in  1793. 


*  Jomini  denies  the  charge  made  against  him  of  having  advised  the  inva- 
sion of  his  own  country — Switzerland.  He  says  he  used  every  means  in  his 
power  to  prevent  that  invasion,  by  obtaining  a  promise  from  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  that  country  ;  but  that  this  promise  was 
broken  by  Austria  on  the  solicitations  of  the  Bernese  oligarchs.  Jomini  also 
advised  against  the  invasion  of  France  in  1813,  as  contrary  to  the  future  in- 
terest of  Russia,  inasmuch  as  it  would  give  to  the  English  too  great  a  prepon- 
derance, by  depriving  France  of  the  means  of  opposing  them.  If  the  march 
on  Paris  was  a  memorable  triumph,  its  fruits,  he  says,  have  been  far  from  satis- 
factory.    His  opinions  are  fully  sustained  by  reliable  authorities. 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  243 

Schwartzenberg  had  invaded  Switzerland,  pushing  three 
columns  on  Geneva,  in  order  to  seize  the  road  of  Siinplon 
and  decide  the  evacuation  of  Italy.  The  grand  allied  army 
profited  by  the  violation  of  the  Swiss  territory  to  cross  Bale, 
and  advance  on  Bêfort  and  Vesoul.  In  conformity  to  my 
orders,  our  corps  yielded  to  the  enormous  superiority  of  the 
enemy,  to  concentrate  toward  Chalons.  The  first  engagement 
took  place  at  Langres,  where  my  Old  Guard  sustained  a  com- 
bat in  order  to  give  us  a  few  days'  repose. 

Now  began  that  ever  memorable  campaign  which  gives 
immortality  to  the  handful  of  brave  men  who  did  not  des- 
pair of  their  country.  Their  confidence  animated  mine  ; 
witnessing  their  patriotism,  their  devotion  to  my  person, 
their  valor,  was  I  culpable  in  supposing  that  nothing  was 
impossible  for  such  soldiers  ? 

Napoleon  takes  the  Field  against  them. — The  enemy  was 
now  within  a  few  leagues  of  Paris.  Notwithstanding  the 
insufficiency  of  my  means,  it  was  necessary  to  do  every  thing 
in  my  power  to  prevent  their  arrival.  On  the  twenty-fifth 
of  January,  after  having  assembled  the  chiefs  of  the  National 
Guard  of  Paris,  and  received  from  them  the  oath  of  fidelity, 
I  left  the  capital  for  Chalons.  I  had  again  confided  the 
regency  to  the  Empress  Maria  Louisa,  and  given  the  title  of 
Lieutenant  of  the  Empire  to  my  brother  Joseph,  who  was  to 
preside  in  the  council.  On  my  departure  I  bid  adieu  to  my 
wrife  and  son.  .  .  .  My  heart  was  bursting  with  emotion. 
.  .  .  A  sad  presentiment  agitated  me.  ...  I  was 
bidding  them  an  eternal  farewell  ! 

The  allied  sovereigns,  with  their  grand  army  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  men,  were  advancing  from  Langres  on 
Chaumont  ;  Blucher  with  about  fifty  thousand  men,  had  passed 
Nancy  and  directed  his  march  towards  Joinville  and  St. 
Dizier  on  the  Marne.  I  had,  to  oppose  these  masses,  only 
about  seventy  thousand  men  still  scattered  along  an  exten- 


244  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

sive  line.  Mortier,  with  fifteen  thousand  men,  formed  the 
right  at  Troyes  ;  at  the  centre  between  Chalons  and  Vitry, 
Ney,  Victor,  and  Marmont,  had  collected  about  forty-five 
thousand  men  ;  finally,  Macdonald  with  nine  thousand  men 
coming  from  Namur,  had  passed  Mézières  and  was  approach- 
ing Bethel. 

He  attacks  Blucher.— I  knew  that  the  allies  were  ad- 
vancing imprudently  in  separate  corps  ;  but  as  this  usually 
happens  in  war,  I  had  no  exact  data  as  to  the  precise  posi- 
tions of  these  corps  or  their  strength.  I  knew,  however,  that 
by  pushing  rapidly  with  my  centre  from  Vitry  by  St.  Dizier 
and  Joinville,  en  Chaumont,  I  would  succeed  in  placing  my- 
self between  the  army  of  Blucher  and  the  grand  allied  army, 
and  attack  them  before  they  could  unite  their  forces  On 
the  twenty-seventh  of  January  we  marched  on  St.  Dizier. 
This  city  was  occupied  by  the  Russian  cavalry  of  Blucher's 
army,  which  was  readily  withdrawn.  I  here  learned  that 
Blucher  with  twenty-six  thousand  Russians  had  passed  the 
Marne  at  Joinville,  and  already  filed  on  Brienne,  directing 
himself  towards  Troyes  ;  but  that  General  York  with 
twenty  thousand  Prussians  was  still  at  St.  Mihiel  on  the 
Meuse.  We  had  thus  cut  in  two  the  army  of  Silesia.  I 
resolved  to  profit  immediately  by  this  circumstance  to  fall  on 
Blucher  before  he  could  be  joined  by  the  grand  allied  army, 
which  was  in  march  from  Chaumont  on  Bar-sur-Aube. 

First  Combat  of  Brienne.  —  On  the  twenty-eighth  we 
reached  Montierender  ;  the  twenty-ninth  we  marched  on 
Brienne.  Blucher  was  preparing  to  leave  this  city,  to  march 
on  Troyes,  and  General  Sacken  with  a  corps  of  eighteen 
thousand  men,  already  occupied  Lesmont.  Unfortunately 
an  officer  whom  I  had  sent  to  Mortier  with  orders  to  approach 
me,  was  taken  by  a  party  of  the  enemy  ;  from  his  dispatches 
Blucher  learned  that  I  was  about  to  debouch  on  his  rear  ; 
he  recalled  Sacken's  corps  in  all  haste.     My  infantry  whose 


OH.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  245 

march  was  greatly  retarded  by  the  bad  condition  of  the  roads 
which  are  here  almost  impracticable  in  the  winter,  did  not 
arrive  before  Brienne  till  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
Blucher,  reënforced  by  the  Russian  cavalry  of  the  grand 
army,  had  collected  there  about  twenty-eight  thousand  men. 
We  attacked  him,  The  Russians  defended  themselves  at 
Brienne  with  obstinacy  in  order  to  cover  the  movement  of 
their  park  on  Lesmont.  We  carried  the  citadel,  but  the 
enemy  held  the  city.  This  combat  cost  each  party  about 
three  thousand  men,  without  leading  to  any  result.  In  the 
night  Blucher  retired,  not  by  the  road  by  which  he  came, 
but  in  the  direction  of  Bar-sur-Aube,  through  which  the 
grand  army  of  the  allies  was  to  pass. 

On  the  thirtieth  I  moved  in  advance.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
covered  the  retreat  of  the  army  of  Silesia,  which  occupied 
the  position  of  Trannes.  I  established  mine  in  that  of 
Rothicre.  Prince  Schwartzenberg,  who  commanded  the 
grand  army,  transferred  his  head-quarters  to  Bar-sur-Aube. 
The  greater  part  of  his  army  concentrated  on  that  place  ; 
but  the  corps  of  Wittgenstein  and  Wrede,  making  about 
forty  thousand  men,  were  thrown  on  Joinville,  in  order  to 
secure  the  communication  with  York's  corps,  which  arrived 
the  same  day  at  St.  Dizier. 

Battle  of  Brienne.— Being  informed  that  Blucher  was 
already  in  a  position  to  be  sustained  by  the  grand  army  of 
the  sovereigns,  I  did  not  venture  to  attack  him  at  Trannes, 
for  fear  of  encountering  very  superior  forces.  On  the  other 
side,  it  was  important  to  unite  with  Mortier,  so  as  to  cover 
the  road  to  Paris  ;  and  as  the  bridge  of  Lesmont  had  been 
destroyed,  it  was  necessary  to  hold  for  twenty-four  hours  at 
Brienne  in  order  to  restore  it.  This  was  the  only  road 
which  we  could  take,  inasmuch  as  there  was  no  direct  road 
from  Lesmont  to  Arcis,  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Aube.  It 
was  therefore  necessary  at  any  price  to  gain  one  day,  to  march 


246  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXL 

to  Troyes,  rally  there  Mortier  and  Macdonald,  and  wait  to 
see  more  clearly  the  projects  of  the  enemy.  I  hoped  that 
they  would  jjass  the  following  day  in  uniting  their  forces, 
and  combining  an  attack  which  would  have  given  us  time  to 
effect  my  projects.  I  thought  that,  with  the  desire  to  profit 
by  then-  superiority,  they  would  make  wide  movements  on 
my  flanks,  and  enable  me  to  fight  them  in  detail.  But  un- 
fortunately they  had  resolved  at  Chaumont  to  concentrate 
their  masses,  and  give  me  battle,  on  the  first  of  February. 

The  attack  was  begun  at  noon  ;  my  army  sustained  it 
admirably.  On  the  right  Gérard  heroically  disputed  the 
bridge  of  Dienville  with  the  Austrians  of  Giulay  ;  at  the 
centre,  Sacken  threw  himself  with  impetuosity  on  Rothière 
which  was  defended  by  the  Young  Guard  under  Duhesme  ; 
our  cavalry  under  Colbert,  Pire,  and  Guyot,  charged  most 
admirably  upon  the  masses  of  the  Russian  infantry  ;  it  was 
on  the  point  of  breaking  them,  when  Wassiltschikoff  attacked 
and  drove  it  back.  Vainly  did  Nansouty  and  Grouchy  pre- 
sent themselves  on  their  flanks  ;  it  was  too  late  i  Sacken's 
infantry,  emboldened  by  the  success  of  the  cavalry,  attacked 
and  carried  Rothière.  A  good  part  of  Duhesme's  division 
and  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy. 

But,  notwithstanding  this  check,  I  should  still  have  had 
hopes  of  victory,  if  Wrede  had  not  debouched  at  the  same 
instant  from  the  woods  of  Soudaine,  at  the  head  of  twenty- 
five  thousand  Austro-Bavarians,  who  threatened  to  crush  our 
left.  I  went  in  person  with  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  one  of 
infantry,  and  a  battery,  but  this  feeble  reenfoicement  did 
not  prevent  Marmont's  being  driven  from  the  heights  of 
Marvilliers.  I  now  resolved  upon  a  retreat,  but  as  it  was 
necessary  to  gain  time,, I  threw  Oudinot,  with  a  division  of 
the  Young  Guard  on  Rothière,  and  charged  Grouchy  to 
second  Belluno  on  the  heights  of  La  Giberie.    Unfortunately 


Ch.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  247 

the  enemy  was  too  strong  ;  General  Rotherbourg,  penetrating 
to  the  middle  of  Rothière,  was  received  there  by  Sacken  and 
Blucher  in  person,  who  repelled  him  while  the  Russian  gre- 
nadiers were  near  surrounding  him.  On  the  other  side  the 
Prince  of  Wurtemberg,  also  reënforced  by  two  Russian  divi- 
sions, had  just  carried  the  heights  of  La  Giberie,  driven  back 
Belluno  beyond  Petit-Mesnil,  and  effected  his  junction  with 
Wrede.  Our  danger  was  imminent  ;  but  night  rescued  us 
from  embarrassment  :  the  order  for  a  retreat  was  given  at 
eight  o'clock,  and  executed  in  good  order  by  means  of  the 
artillery  of  the  guard  which  burned  Rothière.  We  fell  back 
on  Brienno  and  Lesmont,  abandoning  fifty-four  pieces  of 
cannon,  and  three  thousand  prisoners  ;  we  lost,  besides,  four 
thousand  killed  and  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  was 
not  less  than  six  thousand  men. 

This  check  at  the  beginning  of  operations  in  France,  was 
the  more  to  be  regretted  as  it  discouraged  our  own  troops  and 
raised  the  hopes  of  our  foreign  and  domestic  enemies.  I, 
however,  could  not  reproach  myself  for  it,  as  the  loss  of  the 
bridge  of  Lesmont  and  the  want  of  a  road  from  Brienne  on 
Arcis  left  me  no  option  but  to  fight.  The  next  day  I  crossed 
the  Aube  at  Lesmont  and  continued  my  retreat  on  Troyes. 
The  Duke  of  Ragusa,  left  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river 
to  favor  our  retreat,  soon  found  himself  surrounded  by 
twenty-five  thousand  Bavarians.  It  required  extraordinary 
coolness  and  intrepidity  to  effect  his  escape  ;  but  this  mar- 
shal was  equal  to  his  task.  At  the  head  of  his  division  he 
threw  himself  on  the  enemy,  repulsed  them,  and,  conqueror 
of  the  Bavarians,  crossed  the  village  of  Rusnay,  which 
opened  to  him  a  road  to  Arcis  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Aube. 
Broken  by  this  check,  the  enemy  no  longer  thought  of  pur- 
suit, which  might  easily  have  been  continued  as  on  the  very 
night  of  the  battle  they  had  a  heavy  corps  on  the  left  of  the 
river.     On  the  third,  we  reached  Troyes  without  loss.     Never- 


248  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XXI. 

theless  our  affairs  appeared  desperate,  since  in  engaging  the 
greater  part  of  my  disposable  forces  I  had  not  been  able  to 
gain  a  victory  over  a  half  of  the  allied  army  ;  for  a  stronger 
reason,  could  I  hope  for  any  greater  success  when  they  should 
unite  all  their  forces  ?  I,  however,  felt  it  our  duty  to  defend 
the  territory  of  France,  foot  by  foot,  and  to  the  last  drop  of 
our  blood.  In  such  a  disadvantageous  contest,  it  was  neces- 
sary, like  Francis  I.,  to  resign  ourselves  to  the  loss  of  every 
thing  save  honor.  But  I  still  had  great  hopes  on  the  arrival 
of  Eugene's  army  at  Geneva,  the  levy  of  the  National 
Guards,  and  the  troops  of  the  elite  from  the  army  of  Spain. 
Congress  of  (  hatillon. — The  overtures  made  to  St.  Aignan 
finally  led  to  a  congress  at  Chatillon  on  the  Seine.  Lord 
Castlereagh  landed  in  Holland,  and,  having  first  assisted 
in  reënstalling  the  Prince  of  Orange,  joined  the  head- 
quarters of  the  allied  sovereigns  at  Langres.  He  there  im- 
mediately made  known  the  pretensions  of  England,  and  on 
his  complaints  the  allies  withdrew  their  offer  of  the  limits 
of  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  in  which  Ant- 
werp was  included.  The  representatives  of  the  four  great 
powers  figured  in  this  congress.  Stadion  represented  Aus- 
tria, and  Count  Razumousky  represented  Russia.  Both  were 
my  sworn  enemies.  The  latter,  for  a  long  time  disconnected 
from  public  affairs,  hated  me  with  the  most  bitter  animosity. 
Having  taken  part  in  producing  the  coalition  of  1805,  he 
had  been  severely  handled  in  the  articles  of  the  Moniteur, 
which  had  excited  his  rancor.  Moreover,  he  regarded  me 
only  as  the  conqueror  of  Friedland  and  Austerlitz,  whom  it 
was  now  necessary  to  humiliate.  The  interest  of  the  Rus- 
sian Empire  was  not  his  only  motive  of  action.  It  is  unfor- 
tunate Avhen  the  destinies  of  nations  are  intrusted  to  men 
of  violent  personal  animosities  ;  however  great  their  merit, 
their  judgment  is  false.  Russia  only  wished  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw.     Prussia,  her  old  possessions,  or  an  equivalent  of 


Ch.  XXI] 


CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  249 


five  millions  of  inhabitants  ;  Austria  desired  Italy.  I  could 
agree  to  these  sacrifices  ;  it  was  also  necessary  to  satisfy 
England  ;  but  without  Antwerp  she  regarded  peace  as  dis- 
advantageous to  her.  I  had  then  to  resign  the  provinces 
which  I  had  received  from  the  Directory  and  dishonor  my 
reign,  or  resolve  to  conquer  or  die. 

The  first  overture  to  Caulaincourt,  who  represented  me  at 
Chatillon,  was  that  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  return  to  the 
limits  of  1792.  This  entirely  changed  the  negotiation,  for 
my  instructions  to  him  had  been  based  on  the  propositions 
of  Frankfort.  The  battle  of  Brienne  and  the  arrival  of  the 
English  minister  had  thus  overthrown  every  thing.  My 
minister  asked  for  new  instructions.  He  also  asked  of  the 
allies  to  know  what  division  was  to  be  made  of  my  spoils. 

These  new  pretensions  showed  that  I  had  nothing  to  hope 
from  a  congress  which  seemed  more  disposed  to  judge  me, 
than  to  negotiate  with  me.  I  had,  therefore,  to  trust  only 
in  my  sword,  and  my  affairs  were  daily  becoming  worse.  In 
Italy  Murat  had  thrown  off  the  mask  and  decided  against 
me,  thus  endangering  the  position  of  the  viceroy.  In  Bel- 
gium, where  General  Maison  had  taken  the  command  of  a 
small  corps  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men,  Billow's  corps 
and  Graham's  English  division  had  made  preparations  for  the 
siege  of  Antwerp  ;  Carnot  commanded  there,  and  the  means 
at  his  disposal  made  me  confident  of  a  good  defense.  But 
the  allied  forces  were  accumulating  with  frightful  rapidity. 
The  Duke  of  Weymar  was  marching  toward  Belgium  with 
anew  corps  of  twenty-six  thousand  German  confederates; 
this  would  enable  the  allies  to  withdraw  Billow's  corps  to 
reenforce  the  army  of  Blucher.  There  was  not  a  moment 
to  be  lost  ;  Europe  in  arms  was  pressing  on  me  with  all  her 
force.  Nevertheless,  as  I  was  expecting  two  divisions  of 
good  troops  from  the  army  of  Spain,  and  some  hastily 
°  mnized  battalions  of  National  Guards,  I  determined  to 


ortr; 


250  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

gain  time.  I  communicated  to  my  council  the  humiliating 
conditions  of  the  allies.  All,  with  the  exception  of  Count 
Cessac  (Lacuée),  were  of  opinion  that  I  should  atc.pt  them 
in  order  to  save  France.  The  history  of  Carthage  ought  to 
have  taught  these  pusillanimous  councillors  that  a  state  is 
not  to  be  saved  by  humiliating  itself  before  implacable  con- 
querors. I  gave  Caulaincourt  carte-blanche  to  subscribe  to 
all  the  sacrifices.  I  recommended  to  him  to  separate  the 
question  of  Belgium  from  that  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 
In  authorizing  him  to  yield  Belgium  first,  it  was  evident 
that  on  the  first  European  war  this  province  would  return  to 
us  in  a  few  days.  At  the  worst,  if  they  insisted  on  this 
double  sacrifice,  he  could  sign  it,  and  as  the  power  of  con- 
firming the  treaty  rested  in  me,  I  could  refuse  its  ratification, 
or  elude  its  execution  ;  for  I  could  never  consent  to  save 
my  throne  at  the  expense  of  honor. 

Faults  of  Bluclicr. — In  the  mean  time,  having  united  with 
Mortier,  I  resolved  to  profit  by  the  nature  of  the  country 
behind  Troyes  to  arrest,  at  least  for  a  few  days,  the  progress 
of  the  allies  ;  but  a  report  received  from  Macdonald  opened 
a  new  field  for  my  hopes,  and  induced  me  to  adopt  other 
measures 

After  the  battle  of  Rothière,  if  the  allies  had  followed  in 
mass  the  road  to  Paris  by  Troyes,  they  might  have  reached 
the  gates  of  the  capital.  This  was  the  opinion  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  ;  but  the  allied  generals  wished  to  ma- 
nœuvre :  Schwartzenberg  with  the  grand  army  crossed  the 
Aube,  and  marched  with  slow  and  uncertain  steps  on  Troyes, 
to  act  in  the  basin  of  the  Seine.  Blucher  was  to  operate  in 
the  valley  of  the  Marne  by  Epernay,  Dormons,  Chateau- 
Thierry,  and  La  Ferté-sous-Jouarre  ;  and  the  glory  of  pre- 
ceding his  colleague  to  Paris,  drew  him  into  a  series  of  false 
movements.  I  received  this  information  on  the  evening  of 
the  fifth,  and  immediately  resolved  to    take  advantage  of 


Cil.  XXL]  «    A  M  F  A  I  G  N     OF     18  14.  251 

these  faults.  I  retired  to  Nogent  where  I  could  fall  upon 
the  left  flank  of  Blucher,  if  he  continued  to  march  alone  on 
Meaux. 

Position  of  the  two  Armies. — I  left  Troyes  on  the  sixth, 
and  passed  the  Seine  at  Nogent  on  the  seventh.  Blucher 
continued  to  extend  himself  along  the  Marne,  threatening 
Meaux.  I  saw  that  the  moment  had  arrived  to  attack  him  : 
I  left  twenty  thousand  men  with  Oudinot  and  Victor  to  de- 
fend the  course  of  the  Seine,  and  the  reads  from  Troyes  to 
Paris,  against  the  enterprises  of  the  grand  allied  army,  and 
with  the  remaining  twenty-live  thousand  marched,  on  the 
ninth,  from  Nogent  to  Sezanne  ;  on  the  tenth,  I  advanced 
on  Champ-Aubert.  Blucher  had  the  gallantry  to  second  my 
designs,  by  dividing  his  forces.  Sacken  with  fifteen  thousand 
Russians  had  already  reached  La  Ferté-sous-Jouarre  ;  York 
with  twenty-thousand  Prussians  was  in  march  on  Chateau- 
Thierry  ;  Champ-Aubert  was  occupied  by  the  Bussian  divi- 
sion of  Olsowzief,  composed  of  five  thousand  infantry  ; 
finally  the  Prussian  marshal  himself  was  yet  at  Frère- 
Champenoise  with  the  Prussian  corps  of  Kleist,  and  the 
Kussian  corps  of  Kapzewicz,  who  had  just  joined  his  army, 
forming  here  a  total  of  twenty  thousand  men.  Thus  this 
army  of  sixty  thousand  combatants  could  oppose  to  my  blows 
only  isolated  divisions. 

Combat  ©f  Champ-Aubert.  —  General  Olsowzief  was  the 
first  attaeked  ;  the  combat  commenced  about  nine  o'clock  in 
the  morning.  The  Russians,  although  destitute  of  cavalry, 
defended  their  position  for  the  whole  day  with  valor  ;  but, 
being  overwhelmed  by  superior  numbers  and  surrounded, 
they  were  entirely  destroyed.  Olsowzief  himself  was  captured, 
with  three  thousand  men  and  twenty  pieces  of  artillery. 
Fifteen  hundred  Russians  were  killed.  This  affair,  although 
important  in  itself  as  our  first  success,  became  still  more  so 
in  its  consequences.     Our  position  at  Champ-Aubert  cut  the 


252  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

army  of  Silesia  in  two,  and  Sacken's  corps  was  greatly  com- 
promised. Not  wishing  to  give  him  time  to  escape,  I  im- 
mediately marched  against  him.  Leaving  Marmont  at 
Etoges  to  hold  Blucher  in  check  with  eight  or  nine  thousand 
men,  I  moved  on  the  eleventh  with  the  remainder  of  my 
forces  from  Champ-Aubert  to  Montmirail. 

Combat  of  Montmirail.— I  arrived  here  at  ten  o'clock  in 
the  morning.  Blucher,  seeing,  when  too  late,  the  necessity 
of  concentration,  had  ordered  Sacken  and  York  to  fall  back 
on  Montmirail.  These  two  generals  deemed  it  their  duty  to 
execute  this  order  ;  but  Sacken  had  hardly  reached  Vieux- 
Maisons  when  he  learned  that  we  had  anticipated  him  at 
Montmirail.  On  the  other  side,  York  informed  him  that, 
being  delayed  by  the  bad  state  of  the  roads,  he  could  not 
reach  that  place  before  the  close  of  the  day.  It  would  have 
now  been  prudent  for  the  Russian  general  to  file  by  his  left 
to  fall  back  on  Chateau-Thierry,  where  the  Prussians  had 
guarded  a  bridge  over  the  Marne  ;  but  Sacken  deemed  it  his 
duty  to  obey  the  orders  of  his  general,  and  to  cut  his  way 
sword  in  hand  by  attacking  us  in  the  position  which  we  oc- 
cupied in  advance  of  the  city,  a  little  above  the  branching  of 
the  streets  to  Chateau-Thierry  and  La  Ferté.  The  affair 
was  warm,  and  our  victory  complete.  Night  alone  prevented 
the  entire  destruction  of  the  enemy.  As  it  was  he  lost 
twenty-six  pieces  of  cannon,  and  four  thousand  men  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners. 

Affair  of  Chateau-Thierry. — The  next  day,  reënforced  by 
fifteen  hundred  horse,  we  pursued  him  to  Chateau-Thierry, 
where  he  repassed  the  Marne  in  great  disorder.  The  rear- 
guard of  York,  which  was  partly  deployed  on  the  road  to  this 
city,  was  pierced  by  the  cavalry  of  Nansouty  and  thrown 
into  the  Marne.  This  affair  cost  the  allies  at  least  three 
thousand  men.  On  the  thirteenth,  we  passed  the  Marne  at 
Chateau-Thierry.     The  enemy  had  continued  their  retreat  on 


Cil  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  253 

the  road  to  Soissons.     Mortier  pursued  them  with  a  corps  of 
four  or  five  thousand  men  on  Kocourt. 
Defeat    of  Bluchcr   at  Vaux-Champs    and  Etoges.  —  To 

complete  the  defeat  of  the  army  of  Silesia,  I  now  had  only 
to  crush  the  corps  of  Kleist  and  Kapzewicz.  Blucher  ad- 
mirably seconded  my  plans.  The  Prussian  marshal,  distin- 
guished for  his  operations  in  Silesia  and  Saxony,  seemed 
blinded  by  hatred  and  presumption.  Not  comprehending  my 
manœuvre,  he  had  remained  for  forty-eighty  hours  with  his 
arms  folded  at  Vertus,  where  he  had  gone  from  Frère-Cham- 
penoise on  the  morning  of  the  eleventh.  On  the  thirteenth, 
he  marched  in  the  direction  of  Montmirail.  Marmont,  being 
too  weak  to  seriously  engage  him,  fell  back  to  Vaux-Champs. 
I  saw  with  pleasure  Blucher  running  blindly  into  my  snare. 
Leaving  Mortier  at  Kocourt  to  observe  the  remains  of  Sacken 
and  York,  I  left  Chateau-Thierry,  with  the  remainder  of  my 
guard  and  the  cavalry  of  Grouchy,  for  Montmirail,  where  I 
arrived  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  fourteenth.  I 
here  met  Martnont  and  immediately  ordered  him  to  take  the 
offensive  against  the  enemy  who  had  advanced  to  Vaux- 
Champs.  We  carried  this  village.  Blucher,  seeing  himself 
attacked  when  he  thought  himself  in  pursuit,  ordered  a  re- 
treat ;  it  was  honorable  but  disastrous  for  the  enemy.  His 
columns,  warmly  pressed  in  rear  and  turned  by  the  cavalry 
of  Grouchy,  experienced  immense  losses  on  their  retrograde 
inarch  on  Etoges.  This  battle  cost  him  an  additional  loss 
of  ten  colors,  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery,  and  about  eight  thou- 
sand men  hors-de-combat  or  prisoners. 

He  rallies  his  Army  on  Chalons.— Blucher  retired  on 
Chalons,  where  he  was  joined  by  the  corps  of  Sacken  and 
York,  who  made  a  long  detour  by  Rheims.  The  army  of 
Silesia  found  itself  weakened  by  the  loss  of  twenty  thousand 
men  ;  but  a  reënforcement  which  it  received  at  Chalons  again 
increased  its  numbers    to  forty-five    thousand   combatants. 


254  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

On  the  other  side,  the  arrival  of  Wintzingerode's  corps,  which 
had  finally  got  possession  of  Soissons  by  a  coup-de-main, 
was  calculated  to  lend  him  powerful  aid.  Notwithstand- 
ing this,  the  disorder  was  so  great  in  his  army  when  it  reached 
Chalons  that,  if  I  had  pushed  it  warmly,  I  should  have  an- 
nihilated it.  But  the  danger  of  the  capital  called  me  in 
another  direction.  This  was  unfortunate,  for  in  war  as  in 
smithery,  it  is  necessary  to  strike  while  the  iron  is  hot. 

Movement  of  the  Allies  on  IVogent.— While  I  was  thus 
occupied  on  the  Marne,  Paris  was  threatened  on  the  side  of 
the  Seine.  The  marshals  whom  I  had  left  on  the  roads  from 
Troyes  to  Paris  were  too  weak  to  arrest  the  grand  army 
of  the  allies,  if  it  acted  together  and  with  vigor  ;  hut 
Schwartzenberg  was  tied  down  by  the  instructions  of  his 
cabinet  which  had  ordered  him  not  to  pass  the  Seine.  My 
father-in-law  pretended  to  wish  to  spare  the  territory  of  his 
son-in-law,  and  to  be  willing  to  preserve  for  him  the  monarchy 
of  Louis  XIV.,  minus  Lorraine  and  Alsace.  All  military 
dispositions  were  made  subordinate  to  the  political  ther- 
mometer of  the  congress  of  Chatillon.  The  enemy  had  oc- 
cupied Troyes  on  the  seventh  ;  he  did  not  leave  there  till 
the  tenth,  and  then  advanced  eccentrically  on  Nogent,  Sens, 
and  Auxerre.  The  Wurtembergers  got  possession  of  Sens  on 
the  eleventh.  G-enerals  Wittgenstein  and  Wrede  were  less 
fortunate  before  Nogent  ;  the  detachment  left  in  this  city 
by  Marshal  Victor,  defended  it  with  intrepidity.  Despairing 
of  being  able  to  force  this  post,  the  enemy's  generals  deter- 
mined to  turn  it.  On  the  twelfth,  Wittgenstein  remained 
before  Nogent  while  Wrede  pushed  on  to  Bray,  which  place 
he  carried  without  opposition,  the  National  Guards  who  were 
stationed  there  having  fled  without  firing  a  shot  !  The  loss 
of  Bray  forced  Bourmont  to  evacuate  Nogent,  Oudinot  and 
Victor  attempted  to  oppose  the  progress  of  the  allies  across 
the  Seine,  but  seeing  it  impossible,  they  fell  back  by  Nangis 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  255 

ou  Guignes  behind  the  Teres,  where  they  were  reënforced,  on 
the  fifteenth,  by  some  detachments  from  the  army  of  Spain 
and  by  the  corps  of  Macdonald,  which  the  victory  of  Mont- 
mirail  had  rendered  disposable. 

Napoleon  flies  to  the  Seine  to  save  Paris.— Paris  in  the 
mean  time  was  in  alarm  ;  they  sent  me  courier  after  courier 
pressing  me  to  come  to  their  assistance.  I  was  now  ready  to 
do  so,  as  the  army  of  Silesia,  thrown  back  on  Chalons  gave 
me  no  more  inquietude.  I  left  Marmont  with  ten  thou- 
sand men  at  Etoges  to  observe  Blucher,  and  Grouchy  with 
three  thousand  horse  at  Ferté-sous-Jouarre  to  serve  as  a  re- 
serve to  Marmont  and  Mortier.  With  the  remainder  of  my 
guard  I  left  Montmirail  on  the  fifteenth,  and  directed  myself 
by  Meaux  on  Guignes.  The  cavalry  marched  night  and  day 
and  the  infantry  traveled  en-poste.  In  this  way  we  made 
three  leagues  in  thirty-six  hours  and  reached  Guignes  on  the 
sixteenth,  where  we  found  the  army  of  the  marshals,  which 
again  gave  me  a  force  of  thirty  thousand  combatants.  I 
should  have  had  less  distance  to  march,  if  I  had  fallen  by 
Sezanne  on  Nogent  or  Provins,  supporting  the  marshals  on 
this  city  in  order  to  gain  the  right  flank  of  Schwartzenberg 
and  throw  his  line  on  Montereau,  instead  of  establishing 
myself  on  his  front  ;  but  the  difficulty  was  to  secure  a  junc- 
tion with  the  three  corps  established  behind  the  Yères,  (Vic- 
tor, Macdonald  and  Oudinot)  ;  and,  bringing  with  me  only 
the  guard  under  the  orders  of  Ney,  it  was  necessary  to  begin 
by  securing  the  means  of  attacking  a  superior  army  without 
compromising  my  troops  in  an  isolated  movement. 

Slow  March  of  Schwartzenberg.— Prince  Schwartzenberg, 
hearing  of  Blucher's  multiplied  defeats,  did  not  deem  it  his 
duty  to  cross  the  Seine  with  all  his  for^s  ;  he  was  content 
to  throw  on  the  right  of  the  river  the  corps  of  the  Prince  of 
Wurtemberg,  of  Wrede,  and  of  Wittgenstein,  which  estab- 
lished themselves  at  Montereau,   Donemarie,  and  Provins. 


256  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

Count  Pahlen,  with  the  vanguard  of  Wittgenstein,  pushed 
on  to  Mormant. 

Combat  of  \angis. — Convinced  that  it  was  only  by  extreme 
activity  that  I  could  compensate  for  my  inferiority  in  num- 
bers, I  took  the  offensive  on  the  seventeenth,  directing  all 
my  forces  on  Mormant.  The  advanced  guard  of  Pahlen, 
being  unexpectedly  attacked,  was  almost  all  captured  ;  the 
allies  put  themselves  in  retreat.  Oudinot  pursued  them  on 
Provins,  Macdonald  on  Donemarie.  Victor,  being  charged 
with  gaining  Montereau,  encountered  on  the  road  a  Bavarian 
division  which  he  defeated  ;  but  this  prevented  him  from 
reaching  Montereau  the  same  day.  The  enemy  lost  three 
thousand  men,  and  fourteen  pieces  of  cannon.  This  eccentric 
pursuit  was  a  fault  ;  I  ought  to  have  thrown  all  my  forces 
on  Provins  or  on  Bray. 

Combat  of  3Iontorcau. — On  the  eighteenth  we  continued 
to  advance  to  the  Seine.  Wittgenstein  repassed  the  river  at 
Nogent,  and  Wrede  at  Bray  ;  but  the  Prince  of  Wurtem- 
berg, fettered  by  the  ill-conceived  instructions  of  Schwartzen- 
berg,  had  the  temerity  to  accept  an  engagement  before 
Montereau  with  the  second  corps.  The  position,  covered  by 
a  numerous  artillery,  was  good  so  long  as  they  remained  firm, 
but  passing  a  coup-gorge  in  the  rear,  it  was  really  a  danger- 
ous one.  Victor  attacked  it  first  without  success  ;  but  Gen- 
eral Gérard  carried  himself  there  with  his  reserve  which  was 
composed  of  peasants  ;  I  gave  him  the  command,  and  he 
threw  all  into' the  defile  :  I  hastened  to  the  place  with  some 
squadrons  which  completed  the  victory.  Montereau  and  the 
bridge  were1  carried  by  a  charge,  and  the  Wurtembergers 
driven  to  Marolles  with  the  loss  of  six  thousand  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  AVe  lost  .two  thousand  and  five 
hundred  men,  and  the  brave  General  Chateau,  an  officer  of 
great  hope  ;  he  was  the  son-in-law  of  the  Duke  of  Belluno, 
and  his  chief  of  staff. 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  14.  257 

Schwartzenberg  evacuates  Troyes.—  These  checks  dis- 
couraged the  allies,  and  Schwartzenberg  retired  on  Troyes, 
soliciting  Blucher  to  fly  to  his  assistance.  I  passed  the  Seine 
on  the  nineteenth  at  Montereau,  and  the  following  days 
marched  on  Troyes.  On  the  twenty-second  we  arrived  before 
that  city.  The  grand  army  of  the  allies,  concentrated  at 
Troyes,  occupied  both  banks  of  the  Seine.  Blucher  coming 
from  Chalons  by  Arcis,  was  at  Méry,  and  in  immediate  con- 
nection with  Schwartzenberg.  This  junction  is  the  best 
proof  that  I  had  lost  a  part  of  my  advantage  in  .throwing 
myself  on  the  left  of  the  grand  army.  I  should  have  pro- 
duced greater  results,  and  at  least  have  had  less  ground  to 
march  over  to  turn  and  break  its  right  :  an  operation  which 
would  have  prevented  any  junction  with  Blucher.  Be  that 
as  it  may,  I  expected  that  the  allies  would  profit  by  the 
union  of  such  large  forces  to  offer  me  a  decisive  battle.  I 
was  resolved  to  accept  it,  for  we  could  not  retreat  without 
drawing  the  enemy  on  the  capital  ;  but  to  my  great  astonish- 
ment they  did  nothing,  and  continued  their  retreat.  The 
events  which  had  taken  place  in  the  south  had  redoubled  the 
fears  of  Schwartzenberg,  as  they  singularly  opposed  the 
views  of  his  master  on  Italy. 

These  successes  had  revived  my  hopes,  less  by  their  posi- 
tive results,  than  by  the  expectation  that  they  would  electrify 
France,  and  that  a  national  movement  Avould  lead  to  the 
expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  our  territory.  I  only  required 
fifty  thousand  National  Guards  to  assist  me  in  forcing  the 
allies  back  into  Germany  ;  but  these  fifty  thousand  men 
were  not  raised  !  In  my  present  victorious  attitude  the 
propositions  made  to  Caulaincourt  could  not  be  accepted. 
I  feared  that  he  might  use  the  unlimited  powers  which  I  had 
given  him  at  the  instance  of  my  counselors,  to  accept  these 
propositions  ;  but  fortunately  he  was  in  no  haste  to  consum- 
mate my  humiliation.     These  j)owers  were  now  withdrawn. 

vol.  iv. — 17. 


258  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

Some  men,  very  little  versed  in  the  diplomatic  affairs  of 
Europe,  have  accused  him  of  having  neglected  these  ten  days, 
during  which  he  had  a  carte-blanche  :  nothing  can  he  more 
unjust.  In  doing  this  he  might  have  saved  my  crown,  hut 
France  would  have  gained  nothing  ;  instead  of  a  brilliant 
monarchy  she  would  have  heen  only  an  ahased  empire.  I 
felt  grateful  to  him  for  sparing  my  glory  hy  declining  to  sign 
any  such  propositions.  At  the  moment  when  I  withdrew 
his  powers,  he  was  required  hy  the  allies  to  submit  a  counter 
project,  if  he  did  not  accept  that  which  was  presented  to 
him  as  the  Bine  qua  non  of  the  coalition.  This  gave  place  to 
new  delays,  at  which  I  was  not  displeased  ;  for  I  hoped 
everything  from  time,  not  thinking  that  every  day  would 
draw  closer  the  "bonds  of  an  alliance  justly  regarded  as  mon- 
strous. But  before  stating  what  took  place  at  the  diplomatic 
head-quarters  of  the  sovereigns,  I  will  briefly  describe  the 
events  which  had  occurred  in  the  south. 

Operations  of  Eugene  and  Augcrcau. — The  defection  of 
Murat  for  a  moment  exalted  the  hopes  of  the  cabinet  of 
Vienna  ;  but  the  slowness  of  his  advance  on  the  Po  to 
operate  in  concert  with  Marshal  Bellegarde,  the  mystery 
which  covered  his  march,  the  relations  maintained  with  the 
viceroy,  made  them  suspect  the  fidelity  of  this  new  ally.  On 
the  other  side,  it  was  evident  that  the  king  of  Naples  delayed 
only  to  declare  in  favor  of  the  successful  party  ;  and  on  the 
news  of  my  first  reverse  in  France  Eugene  would  be  assailed 
on  all  sides.  The  Austrians  had  already  pushed  detachments 
from  Geneva  on  the  communication  of  the  Simplon.  A 
storm  was  threatening  Piedmont  and  Upper  Italy.  The 
English  were  preparing  for  a  descent  at  Leghorn  to  join 
Murat.  The  viceroy,  though  surrounded  by  enemies,  did  not 
lose  his  courage  :  his  first  care  was  to  evacuate  the  line  of 
the  Adige  in  order  to  concentrate  his  defense  on  the  Mincio, 
with  Mantua  as  his  point  of  support.    Bellegarde,  attributing 


Cn.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  259 

this  retreat  to  fears  inspired  by  Mu  rat's  approach  to  his  com- 
munications, thought  to  profit  by  the  circumstance  to  fall 
upon  the  viceroy,  and  made  every  preparation  to  pass  the 
Mincio  near  Pozzolo  on  the  seventh  of  February.  Eugene, 
anticipating  this  manœuvre,  had  reénforced  his  right  at 
Goito,  and  carried  his  guard,  reserve,  and  head-quarters  to 
Mantua,  from  which  he  debouched  skillfully  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  Austrians,  and  drove  it  back  to  Valeggio.  His  numer- 
ical weakness  prevented  him  from  taking  full  advantage  of 
this  victory  ;  but  he  so  imposed  on  Bellegarde  that  that 
marshal,  forced  to  return  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Mincio, 
only  made  a  feeble  attempt  to  pass  it,  when  he  knew  that 
one-third  of  the  viceroy's  army  had  been  detached  to  Parma 
against  Murat.  The  Austrian  general,  repulsed  in  this 
attempt,  and  in  his  ill-combined  manoeuvre  by  the  mountains 
of  Gavardo,  remained  on  the  defensive. 

At  this  epoch,  although  rather  late  to  effect  the  diversion 
which  I  had  ordered  on  Geneva,  it  was  still  possible  to  obtain 
important  results.  Augereau  had  organized  at  Lyons  a 
corps,  composed  principally  of  the  veterans  drawn  from  Ca- 
talonia. He  was  to  advance  on  Geneva,  raise  Switzerland, 
reestablish  the  communication  of  the  Simplon,  join  the  divi- 
sions which  Eugene  was  to  bring  from  Italy,  and  advance 
with  that  prince  toward  the  upper  Jura,  in  order  to  act  in 
Burgundy  in  concert  with  me.  Augereau  did  in  part  march 
on  Geneva,  but  in  detachments,  and  occupied  himself  for 
ten  days  with  mere  accessories  ;  and  the  defection  of  Murat 
having  prevented  the  army  of  Italy  from  joining  him,  the 
allied  sovereigns  had  time  to  detach  against  him  considerable 
forces.  With  one  half  of  the  energy  and  activity  which  he 
had  shown  at  Castiglione,  he  might  have  overthrown  Bubna, 
and  organized  our  partisans  in  Switzerland  ;  and  God  only 
knows  what  would  have  been  the  result. 

Negotiations  at  Lusigny.— These  events  had  caused  no  lit- 


2G0  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXL 

tie  sensation  at  the  Austrian  head-quarters,  which  were 
already  considerably  shaken  by  my  success  on  the  Seine. 
The  allies,  now  become  more  yielding,  had  proposed  to  me 
an  armistice  which  was  negotiated  at  Lusigny.  It  was  quite 
natural  that  my  father-in-law  should  seek  to  direct  the  nego- 
tiations at  Chatillon.  By  depriving  me  of  Italy  and  secur- 
ing to  himself  my  influence  in  Germany,  he  would  have  no 
more  points  of  difficulty  with  me,  and  could  make  a  display 
of  his  generosity.  In  order  the  better  to  accomplish  his  pur- 
poses, Metternich  exposed  in  a  council  the  equivocal  situa- 
tion in  which  the  allies  were  placed  by  these  reverses  on  the 
Marne  and  the  Seine,  by  the  spirit  manifested  in  the  pro- 
vinces which  they  occupied,  and  by  the  unexpected  appear- 
ance of  Augereau's  corps  toward  Geneva.  His  object  was 
too  evident  to  be  mistaken.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  dis- 
gusted at  the  manner  in  which  they  carried  on  the  war,  hesi- 
tated whether  he  should  not  unite  his  guards  and  Wittgen- 
stein's corps  to  Blucher's  army,  and  carry  on  his  operations 
in  a  more  military  manner.  As  I  have  already  said,  this 
prince  was  anxious  to  go  to  Paris  in  order  to  return  my  visit 
to  Moscow  ;  he  was  excited  against  me,  and  had  sworn  my 
destruction.  The  choice  which  he  made  of  Count  Eazu- 
mowsky,  to  represent  him  at  Chatillon,  was  the  best  possible 
proof  that  he  had  no  intention  of  treating  with  me. 

On  the  other  hand  it  appeared  to  him  just  that  the  acquis- 
ition of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  should  indemnify  his  empire 
for  the  great  efforts  which  it  had  made  ;  and  to  obtain  this 
it  was  necessary  to  give  Italy  to  Austria,  a  suitable  indem- 
nity to  Prussia,  and  Antwerp  to  the  English  ;  but  to  accom- 
plish this  object  it  was  necessary  to  reduce  me  to  the  last 
extremity.  It  was  only  the  fear  that  the  Austrians  would 
formally  separate  from  the  coalition  that  prevented  Alexander 
from  uniting  with  Blucher  and  marching  on  Paris.  But  to 
remedy  all  the  past  evils,  it  was  decided  that  the  grand  army 


CH.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  261 

should  remain  on  the  defensive  at  the  centre,  and  carry  the 
Austrian  reserve  and  the  new  corps-d'armée  of  the  Germanic 
Confederation  on  the  Rhine,  while  Blucher,  reënforced  by 
the  corps  of  Wiutzingerode  and  Bulow,  should  operate  with 
one  hundred  thousand  men  in  the  valley  of  the  Marne. 
They  flattered  themselves  by  this  mezzo-termino  to  neutralize 
the  influence  that  state  policy  had  had  on  the  direction  of 
military  operations,  and  to  strike  decisive  blows  with  Blu- 
cher's  army,  which  would  be  under  the  more  immediate  direc- 
tion of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  King  of  Prussia. 
The  conditions  proposed  at  the  armistice  of  Lusigny  not 
being  acceptable,  it  was  necessary  to  resort  again  to  the 
sword. 

New  Disposition  of  the  Allied  Forces. — In  accordance  with 
the  system  agreed  upon  at  Vandceuvre,  the  grand  army  fell 
back  to  Chaumont  ;  and  Blucher  prepared  to  advance  on 
Meaux.  We  have  just  seen  that  he  was  to  be  reënforced  by 
the  troops  of  the  old  army  of  Bernadotte.  Wintzingerode 
had  just  been  joined  by  Woronzof's  corps  ;  and  Bnlow  had 
been  relieved  in  Belgium  by  the  twenty-five  thousand  newly 
organized  troops  of  the  Germanic  Confederation,  under  the 
orders  of  the  Duke  of  Weymar.  Finally,  Count  St.  Priest 
was  in  march  from  the  Rhine  toward  the  Ardennes. 

Blucher  marches  on  Meaux. — Without  waiting  for  all 
his  reinforcements  the  Prussian  marshal  put  himself  in  mo- 
tion to  march  a  second  time  on  Meaux,  with  the  hope  of 
driving  Marmont  to  the  Marne,  and  of  advancing  on  Paris 
by  the  right  bank  of  that  river.  On  the  twenty-fourth  of 
February,  he  passed  the  Aube  at  Baudemont  and  advanced 
on  Sezanne  where  Marmont  was  encamped.  The  latter,  in 
order  not  to  expose  himself  to  be  cut  up,  retreated  on  Ferté- 
sous-Jouarre,  where,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  he  united  with 
Mortier  who  had  maintained  his  position  between  Soissons 
and  Chateau-Thierry,   against  the  new  corps  of  the  allies 


262  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

■which  had  invaded  France  from  the  north.  That  of  Wint- 
zingerode  was  in  the  environs  of  Reims,  and  Bulow  had  just 
arrived  at  Laon. 

Operations  of  Mortier  and  IHarnionL—  The  marshals  at 
Ferté-sous-Jouarre,  weakened  by  the  garrison  which  they 
had  been  obliged  to  throw  into  Soissons,  had  not  over  twelve 
thousand  combatants  of  all  arms.  Hoping  to  destroy  this 
handful  of  men,  Blucher  pushed  from  Eebais  on  Ferté-sous- 
Jouarre  the  corps  of  York  and  Kleist  to  occupy  Marmont 
and  Mortier,  while  the  Russian  corps  belonging  to  his  army 
marched  on  Meaux  so  as  to  turn  their  right  and  cut  them  off 
from  Paris.  Fortunately,  the  marshals  saw  the  projects  of 
the  enemy.  On  the  twenty-seventh,  they  moved  from  Ferté- 
sous-Jouarre  to  Meaux.  They  arrived  there  very  apropos; 
Sacken's  advanced  guard  was  already  in  possession  of  the 
faubourg  at  the  left  of  the  Marne,  and  was  about  to  pene- 
trate into  the  city.  The  presence  of  our  troops  defeated  his 
projects.  Blucher,  seeing  himself  anticipated  at  Meaux,  re- 
solved to  operate  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Marne.  He  with- 
drew the  Russian  corps  to  Ferté-sous-Jouarre  where  he 
passed  the  Marne  with  the  mass  of  his  army  and  directed  his 
march  on  Lizy,  leaving  only  York's  corps  on  the  left  bank  to 
cover  his  rear.  The  marshals,  again  divining  his  projects, 
prolonged  their  forces  by  their  left  to  bar  the  passage,  bor- 
dering the  right  bank  of  the  Ourcq.  On  the  twenty-eighth, 
they  marched  from  Meaux  on  Lizy.  The  corps  of  Kleist, 
forming  Blucher's  advanced  guard,  was  already  beyond  the 
Ourcq  ;  but  as  the  other  corps  of  the  army  of  Silesia  were 
not  in  position  to  sustain  him,  he  did  not  venture  to  engage 
alone,  and  fell  back  on  Fullaines,  after  destroying  the  bridge 
of  Lizy.  Thus  Blucher  saw  all  his  projects  foiled  ;  while  on 
the  other  side,  I  was  preparing  to  force  him  to  give  up  the 
offensive  and  to  think  only  of  his  own  security. 

Napoleon  marches  against   Blncher.— I  reentered  Troyes 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  263 

on  the  twenty-fourth  ;  the  grand  army  of  the  allies  retired 
with  so  much  precipitation  that  I  could  not  pursue  them 
without  compromising  the  capital  which  was  now  seriously 
threatened  by  Blucher.  I,  therefore,  only  sent  Marshal 
Macdonald  in  pursuit  with  thirty-five  thousand  men,  while, 
with  the  remaining  twenty-five  thousand,  I  resolved  to  give 
the  Prussian  marshal  another  lesson  of  prudence  by  ma- 
noeuvring on  his  rear.  I  left  Troyes  the  twenty-seventh, 
and  passing  the  Aube  at  Arcis,  arrived  at  Herbisse.  The 
next  day  I  continued  my  march  by  Frère-Champenoise  and 
Sezanne  to  Esternay.  Blucher,  checked  in  front  by  Marmont 
and  Mortier,  and  threatened  in  rear  by  my  army  whose  num- 
bers were  greatly  exaggerated,  found  himself  very  much  em- 
barrassed. Thinking,  however,  to  profit  by  the  first  day  of 
March  to  defeat  the  marshals,  he  ordered  Sacken  to  make 
demonstrations  towards  Lizy,  while  the  corps  of  York  and 
Kaptsewicz  passed  the  Ourcy  at  Crouy  to  turn  their  left  ; 
but  the  bridge  of  Crouy  being  destroyed  in  time,  the  whole 
ended  in  an  attempt  by  the  Eussians  to  force  a  passage  at 
Gèvres,  which  was  easily  defeated  by  Marmont.  The  same 
day,  towards  evening,  I  arrived  at  Ferté-sous-Jouarre  with 
the  head  of  my  column.  We  immediately  commenced  the 
construction  of  a  bridge  across  the  Marne.  During  the  night 
the  marshals  were  reënforced  by  six  thousand  men  sent  by 
my  brother  from  Paris. 

He  forces  Blucher  to  repass  the  Aisne.— Blucher  now 
saw  the  necessity  of  a  retreat  :  but  this  was  no  easy  matter. 
I  was  in  position  to  intercept  the  roads  to  Chalons  and 
Eeims.  The  only  one  which  remained  open  was  that  to 
Soissons  ;  but  that  city,  abandoned  by  Wintzingerode  in 
consequence  of  my  success  at  Montmirail,  had  been  again 
occupied  by  our  troops,  and  placed  in  a  better  state  of 
defense.  However,  there  whs  no  alternative.  On  the  second 
of  March,  the  army  of  Silesia  marched  on  Soissons,  where 


264  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch  XXT. 

Blucher  had  directed  Bulow  and  Wintzingerode  to  unite 
with  liis  army.  Marmont  and  Mortier  pursued  him  on  the 
road  to  Soissons,  hotly  pressing  his  rear-guard  ;  while  I 
manoeuvred  on  his  left  to  prevent  him  from  throwing  him- 
self on  Keims. 

On  the  third  I  passed  the  Marne,  and  on  the  fourth  ar- 
rived at  Fismes.  I  had  now  strong  hopes  of  destroying  the 
army  of  Silesia,  which  having  no  permanent  bridge  on  the 
Aisne,  would  be  thrown  upon  that  river,  and  exposed  to  in- 
fallible ruin.  Unfortunately  Soissons  was  commanded  by 
General  Moreau,  an  imbecile  ;  not  appreciating  the  impor- 
tance of  his  post  which  was  surrounded  by  Bulow  and  Wint- 
zingerode, he  thought  he  was  doing  wonders  in  obtaining  the 
liberty  of  his  garrison,  and  consented  to  capitulate  on  the 
third,  without  having  exhausted  his  means  of  defense,  and  at 
the  very  moment  when  a  distant  cannonade  announced  to 
him  the  importance  of  holding  out.  Blucher,  fortunate  in 
escaping  such  imminent  peril,  passed  the  Aisne  in  the  night 
of  the  third  and  fourth,  and  established  himself  on  the  right 
bank  of  this  river,  between  Soissons  and  Craone.  On  the 
fifth,  Mortier  and  Marmont  attacked  Soissons  ;  but  that 
city,  defended  by  a  garrison  of  eight  thousand  Bussians,  re- 
sisted with  success.  The  loss  of  Soissons  deranged  my  plan  : 
I  nevertheless  determined  to  continue  to  manoeuvre  against 
the  enemy's  left,  with  the  hope  of  cutting  him  off  from  Laon, 
and  of  throwing  him  into  the  angle  formed  by  the  Aisne  and 
the  Oise.  On  the  sixth,  we  moved  in  mass  on  Berry-au- 
Bac,  where  I  crossed  the  Aisne,  and  pushed  on  to  Corbeny. 

Battle  of  Craone. — I  had  thus  succeeded  in  gaining  the 
left  of  the  enemy.  It  was  now  important  to  attack  him 
before  he  could  change  his  position.  I  resolved  to  make  the 
attack  instantly,  although  I  had  not  yet  been  joined  by  Mar- 
in on  t'-'s  corps,  which  constituted  my  rear-guard.  Accord- 
ing on  the  seventh  we  debouched  from  Craone  against  the 


( 'ii.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  265 

position  which  the  enemy  occupied  in  rear  of  this  town 
between  Ailles  and  Yassognes.  I  had  with  me  only  twenty- 
eight  or  thirty  thousand  men,  while  Blucher  had  three  times 
as  many  ;  but  he  had  engaged  the  greater  part  of  his  forces 
in  a  wide  and  ill-combined  movement  to  the  left  of  the 
Lette,  with  the  intention  of  turning  my  right.  It  resulted 
from  this  that  we  had  only  to  deal  with  the  Russian  corps 
of  Sacken  and  Woronzof,  which  the  Prussian  marshal  had 
left  between  th3  Aisne  and  the  Lette  to  serve  as  a  pivot  for 
the  movement  of  his  army.  Moreover  the  infantry  of  Sacken 
had  received  orders  to  retire,  and  the  cavalry  alone  remained 
to  protect  the  retreat  of  Woronzof.  The  latter,  holding  the 
most  secure  point  of  the  plateau,  chose  to  fight  in  a  post 
where  we  could  neither  manoeuvre  nor  bring  our  forces  into 
action,  and  accordingly  awaited  us  under  the  protection  of  a 
formidable  artillery.  His  corps  showed  much  tenacity  in  the 
defense  of  the  strong  position  which  he  occupied.  The  com- 
bat was  terrible.  As  "Woronzof  had  his  flanks  protected  by 
deep  ravines,  we  could  attack  him  only  in  front.  He  was 
on  the  point  of  being  pierced,  when  Sacken's  cavalry,  thrown 
forward  at  the  opportune  moment,  restored  the  equilibrium. 
It  was  only  by  redoubling  their  efforts,  like  Ney,  that  our 
young  soldiers  (who  had  been  organized  only  fifteen  days) 
succeeded  in  forcing  the  Russians  to  fall  back  on  Chavignon 
where  they  were  rejoined  by  the  garrison  of  Soissons.  We 
pursued  them  to  Filain  ;  the  victory  was  ours  ;  but  our  loss 
made  it  a  clear  one.  On  both  sides  there  was  a  loss  of  more 
than  six  thousand  men  hors-de-combat.  This  was  little  for 
the  allies,  but  much  for  us.  Victor  and  Grouchy  were 
seriously  wounded. 

Ultimatum  of  Chatillon  rejected.— It  was  in  the  midst  of 
the  bloody  and  useless  trophies  of  this  battle  that  I  received 
the  news  of  the  unfavorable  issue  of  the  negotiations  of 
Chatillon.     Instead   of  being  disunited  by  my  success,  the 


266  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

allies  had  drawn  closer  the  bonds  of  their  union  by  a  treaty 
signed  at  Chaumont,  on  the  first  of  March.  They  bound 
themselves  not  to  treat  separately,  and  to  redouble  their 
efforts  to  carry  on  the  war.  In  order  to  provide  for  the  ex- 
penses of  this  war  they  issued  in  common  a  paper  circulation 
under  the  guarantee  of  England.  Thus,  Europe  lavished 
not  only  iron,  soldiers,  and  gold,  but  all  the  resources  of  her 
credit,  to  crush  that  France  who  opposed  to  her  only  my 
genius,  my  activity,  and  the  heroic  devotion  of  a  handful 
of  brave  men.  The  nation  pressed  down  under  the  weight 
of  my  reverses,  succumbed  to  the  efforts  of  enemies  to  whom 
they  had  previously  given  an  example  of  energy,  devotion 
and  patriotism. 

Strengthened  by  this  new  alliance,  the  sovereigns  had 
maintained  their  original  pretensions  without  being  troubled 
by  my  successes.  They  knew  that  victory  would  finally  de- 
stroy my  feeble  resources,  and  that  I  must  succumb  sooner 
or  later.  But  I  could  not  believe  that  they  would  not 
eventually  abate  their  demands.  The  attitude  which  they 
hael  assumed  in  consequence  of  my  last  victories,  their  de- 
inanel  for  an  armistice  which  they  had  several  times  before 
refused,  the  expected  arrival  of  Augereau  in  Switzerland, — 
all  these  circumstances  militated  in  my  favor.  I  had  already 
seen  them,  in  consequence  of  my  first  victory,  retreat  on  the 
Khine,  accusing  each  other  of  being  the  cause  of  the  reverses 
which  resulted  only  from  the  bad  direction  given  to  their 
masses  by  a  tortuous  policy.  After  this,  how  coulel  I  accept 
what  the  allies  improperly  called  the  limits  of  1792  ?  I 
would  have  asked  nothing  more,  if  they  had  given  me  the 
monarchy  of  Louis  XVI.  ;  for,  as  I  have  already  had  occa- 
sion to  say,  at  no  epoch  of  my  greatest  power  was  my  rela- 
tive situation  as  advantageous  as  that  of  France  at  the  end 
of  the  American  war.  It  was  to  deceive  France  and  Europe, 
to  publish  that  I  refused  the  same  territory  which  excited 


Cil.  XXI.]  C  A  M  l'AION     OF     18  14.  2C7 

the  pride  of  Louis  XVI.,  and  the  envy  of  the  civilized 
world.  All  was  changed  since  1792  ;  and  if  these  conditions 
had  appeared  to  me  intolerable  in  1805,  when  Spain  and 
Holland  were  yet  in  our  alliance,  under  what  aspect  ought  I 
to  regard  them  when  these  countries,  in  the  hands  of  our 
enemies,  were  to  augment  with  all  their  strength  and  re- 
sources, the  fearful  preponderance  of  England  ?  The  France 
of  1792,  without  the  family  alliance  of  Austria,  Naples,- and 
Spain,  without  the  alliance  of  Tippo-Saeb,  without  its  navy 
and  its  colonies,  was  to  the  England  of  1814,  not  one-quarter 
what  the  France  of  Louis  XVI.,  was  to  the  England  of  1792. 
It  was  not  the  same  on  the  continent  ;  for  France  had  lost 
all  her  ancient  allies  ;  Poland,  who  had  formally  sought  her 
kings  in  the  family  of  ours,  was  partitioned  out,  and  her 
weight  now  cast  into  the  balance  of  our  new  enemies.  Isolated 
in  the  midst  of  Europe  and  hemmed  in  on  all  sides,  France 
would  be  but  the  shadow  of  her  former  greatness.  It  was 
evident  to  those  most  blind,  that,  even  with  the  limits  of  the 
Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  she  would  be  not  only 
below  the  relative  state  of  Campo-Formio,  but  still  much 
below  her  relative  grandeur  after  the  sad  termination  of  the 
Seven  Years  War.  Indignant  at  such  harsh  conditions,  I 
ordered  Caulaincourt  to  reply  by  a  counter  project  equally 
exaggerated.  Thenceforth,  there  was  not  the  least  hope  of 
an  understanding.  In  order  to  cut  the  Grordian  knot,  I  de- 
termined to  again  attack  Blucher. 

Battle  of  Laon. — On  the  eighth  of  March,  the  Prussian 
marshal  had  assembled  all  his  army  at  Laon  ;  it  numbered 
about  one  hundred  thousand  men.  I  had  but  thirty-five 
thousand  combatants,  even  including  Marmont's  corps.  But 
we  were  in  a  situation  not  to  count  our  enemies.  If  I  did 
not  attack,  the  allies  would  take  the  initiative  ;  it  was  better 
to  profit  by  the  temporary  moral  effect  of  our  victory  at 
Craone,  in  attacking  the  enemy,  than  to  lose  that  effect  by 


268  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ciï.  XXI. 

allowing  him  to  attack  us.  I  advanced  toward  Laon  by  the 
road  to  Soissons  ;  Marmont  directed  himself  by  that  of 
Bery-au-Bac.  On  the  ninth,  I  attacked  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion :  the  combat  continued  all  day  without  any  thing  deci- 
sive. The  allies  preserved  their  position  ;  and  we  maintained 
ours  in  the  villages  before  their  front.  Blucher,  having  had 
time  to  reconnoitre  the  state  of  our  forces,  determined  to 
make  a  night  attack  upon  Marmont,  who  had  not  yet  effected 
his  junction  with  me.  The  corps  of  York  and  Kleist  de- 
bouched from  Athies  and  marched  against  him.  The  mar- 
shal's troops  thinking  only  of  repose,  were  completely  sur- 
prised ;  they  fled  to  Bery-au-Bac,  leaving  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  two  thousand  five  hundred  prisoners  and  forty 
pieces  of  artillery.  Being  deprived  by  this  disaster  of  the 
cooperation  of  Marmont,  I  had  only  twenty  thousand  men 
left  ;  I  nevertheless  determined  to  make  the  most  of  a  bad 
game.  I  calculated  that  the  enemy,  in  order  to  secure  the 
defeat  of  Marmont,  had  probably  moved  the  mass  of  his 
forces  on  his  left  leaving  Laon  but  feebly  secured.  He  had 
in  fact  directed  toward  Bery-au-Bac  about  sixty  thousand 
men,  but  near  forty  thousand  yet  remained  at  Laon,  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  repel  our  reiterated  efforts,  on  the  tenth,  to 
force  their  position.  However,  we  thereby  gained  time  for 
Marmont  to  secure  his  retreat,  for  Blucher,  alarmed  at  our 
obstinacy,  ordered  back  on  Laon  the  corps  which  had  filed 
on  Bery-au-Bac.  This  new  concentration  of  all  the  enemy's 
forces,  left  us  not  the  least  chance  of  success.  By  attempt- 
ing any  longer,  with  my  little  army,  to  resist  the  quadruple 
forces  of  the  allies,  I  would  risk  being  enveloped.  On  the 
eleventh,  I  fell  back  on  Soissons  where  I  repassed  the  Aisne  ; 
Marmont  fell  back  from  Bery-au-Bac  to  Fismes.  Some  re- 
enforcements  received  from  the  depots  again  increased  the 
total  force  of  my  army  to  thirty-five  thousand  men.* 

*  The  following  comments  ou  Marinont's  conduct  on  this  occasion  are  copied 
from  Thiers  : 


CH.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  269 

Affair  of  Reims. — Success  was  now  absolutely  necessary 
to  remove  the  bad  impression  of  my  retreat  from  Laon. 
Fortune,  or  rather   the  fault  of  the   Russian  general,  soon 

"Marmont,  unprotected  at  the  village  of  Athies,  in  the  midst  of  the  plain, 
awaited  Napoleon's  instructions,  which  he  had  sent  Colonel  Fabrier,  at  the 
head  of  five  hundred  men,  to  learn.  Was  it  well  of  Marmont  to  remain  sta- 
tionary, or  ought  he  not  rather,  after  having  during  the  day  caught  a  sight  of 
the  immense  masses  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  to  have  taken  up  a  position  for  the 
night  in  the  rear,  towards  Festieux  for  example,  a  kind  of  little  hillock  by 
which  he  had  debouched  into  the  plain,  and  where  he  would  have  been  in  per- 
fect safety.  But  the  mistaken  fear  of  abandoning  the  spot  he  had  conquered 
in  the  afternoon,  restrained  him,  and  deterred  him  from  making  the  retrograde 
movement  that  prudence  would  have  suggested.  What  was  still  less  excu- 
sable, as  he  did  remain  amidst  hordes  of  enemies,  was  the  not  multiplying 
precautions  against  a  night  attack. 

'•  With  a  characteristic  thoughtlessness  that  detracted  from  his  good  qual- 
ities, Marmont  deputed  to  his  lieutenants  the  duty  of  providing  for  the  common 
safety.  The  latter  allowed  the  young  tired  soldiers  to  scatter  themselves  in 
the  neighboring  farms  ;  they  did  not  even  think  of  protecting  the  battery  of 
forty  pieces  that  had  cannonaded  Athies  with  so  much  success.  Tt  was  young 
marine-gunners,  little  accustomed  to  land  service,  that  tended  these  cannon, 
and  they  had  not  taken  the  precaution  to  limber  up  their  guns,  so  that  they 
might  be  able  to  remove  them  at  the  first  appearance  of  danger. 

"  Everybody,  commander  and  officers,  trusted  to  the  darkness  of  night, 
of  which  they  ought,  on  the  contrary,  to  have  entertained  the  deepest  dis- 
trust. 

"There  were,  alas!  only  too  many  reasons  for  distrusting  this  fatal  night, 
for  Blucher,  as  soon  as  he  heard  Marmont's  cannon,  believed  that  the  attack 
by  the  Reims  route  was  the  true  attack,  and  that  the  other,  which  had  occu- 
pied the  day  on  the  Soissons  route,  was  only  a  feint.  He  consequently  decided 
to  bring  down  the  mass  of  his  army  on  the  Reims  route.  He  immediately  put 
into  motion  Sacken  and  Langeron,  who  had  remained  in  reserve  behind  Laon. 
They  had  orders  to  make  a  circuitous  march  round  the  city,  and  join  Kleist 
and  York;  Blucher,  besides,  sent  part  of  his  cavalry,  which  on  that  side 
could  not  fail  to  be  useful. 

"The  day  was  far  advanced  when  this  movement  was  terminated;  still  the 
Prussian  general  was  not  willing  to  bind  himself  to  preparatory  arrangements, 
and  conceived  the  design  of  profiting  by  the  darkness  to  effect  a  night  surprise 
by  leading  on  his  cavalry  en  masse. 

"  Towards  midnight  in  fact,  when  Marmont's  soldiers  least  expected  it,  a 
mass  of  horsemen  dashed  upon  them,  uttering  terrific  cries.  Old  soldiers  ac- 
customed to  the  vicissitudes  of  war  would  have  been  less  surprised,  and  sooner 
rallied  :  but  a  sudden  panic  spread  through  the  ranks  of  this  young  infantry, 
that  took  flight  in  every  direction.  The  artillerymen,  who  had  not  thought  of 
arranging  their  pieces  so  that  they  might  be  easily  removed,  fled  without 
thinking  of  them.     The  enemy,  amid  the  darkness,  become   mixed  with  us, 


270  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

furnished  me  an  occasion.  Count  St.  Priest,  who  com- 
manded a  new  corps  of  twelve  thousand  men  belonging  to 
the  army  of  Silesia,  had  arrived  at  Chalons,  from  whence  he 

and  make  part  of  the  tumult;  while  their  horsed  artillery  pursue  us,  firing 
grape,  at  the  risk  of  killing  Prussians  as  well  as  French. 

"  All  hurry  on  in  indescribable  disorder,  not  knowing  what  to  do,  and  Mar- 
mont  is  carried  away  at  the  same  pace  as  the  rest.  Fortunately  the  sixth 
corps,  which  formed  the  nucleus  of  Marmont's  troops,  recover  a  little  of  their 
sang-froid,  and  stop  at  the  heights  of  Festieux,  where  it  would  have  been  so 
easy  to  find  a  secure  position  during  the  night.  The  enemy,  not  daring  to 
advance  farther,  suspend  the  pursuit,  and  our  soldiers,  delivered  from  their 
presence,  rally  at  length  from  their  disorder. 

"  This  accident,  one  of  the  most  vexatious  that  could  befall  a  general,  parti- 
cularly on  account  of  the  consequences  it  involved,  cost  us  materially  only 
some  pieces  of  cannon,  two  or  three  hundred  men  put  liors-de-combat,  and  about 
a  thousand  prisoners  ;  the  greater  number  of  whom  returned  next  day  ;  but 
our  enterprise,  already  so  difficult  and  complicated,  was  defeated.  On  learning 
during  the  night  this  deplorable  skirmish,  Napoleon  gave  way  to  the  most 
violent  anger  against  Marshal  Marmont  ;  but  giving  away  to  anger  would  not 
repair  the  mischief,  and  he  immediately  began  to  think  what  was  best  to  be 
done.  To  give  up  the  attack  and  retire  would  be  to  commence  a  retreat  that 
must  lead  to  the  ruin  of  France  and  his  own. 

"  To  attack,  when  the  movement  confided  to  Marmont  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible, and  when  he  could  be  confronted  by  masses  of  the  enemy  assembled 
between  Laon  and  the  Soissons  chaussée,  to  attack  under  such  circumstances 
would  have  been  rash.     Either  coursa  seemed  to  lead  to  destruction. 

"Listening  only  to  the  promptings  of  his  own  energetic  soul,  Napoleon 
determined  to  make  a  desperate  attempt  on  Laon,  and  see  whether  chance,  so 
fruitful  of  events  of  war,  might  not  do  for  him  what  the  most  skillfully-laid 
plans  had  not  been  able  to  effect. 

"Napoleon  was  about  to  throw  himself  on  Laon  when  Blucher  anticipated 
him.  The  latter  had  first  thought  of  sending  half  his  army  against  Marmont, 
believing  his  to  be  our  principal  column. 

"  But  in  his  staff  numerous  voices  were  raised  against  this  project,  and  it 
was  proved  to  him  that,  above  all  things,  he  ought  to  oppose  Napoleon  in  front 
of  the  city  of  Laon.  Blucher,  who  was  ill  that  day,  and  more  inclined  than 
usual  to  yield  to  the  advice  of  his  lieutenants,  had,  therefore,  suspended  the 
prescribed  movement,  and  determined  to  direct  his  efforts  straight  before 
him,  that  is  to  say,  on  Clacy,  whence  Napoleon  threatened  to  turn  his 
position. 

"  At  the  very  moment  that  Napoleon  was  putting  his  troops  in  motion  to 
renew  the  attack,  three  divisions  of  Woronzofs  infantry,  advancing  on  our 
left,  deplo\-ed  around  the  village  of  Clacy,  intending  to  carry  the  place.  Gen- 
eral Charpentier,  who  had  replaced  Victor,  was  at  Clacy  with  his  own  division 
of  the  Young  Guard  and  that  of  General  Boyer,  but  very  much  reduced  in 
number  by  the  late  engagements.     Ney  had  on  his  side  advauced  to  the  left  to 


OH.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1  S  1 4  .  271 

moved  on  Reims,  which  was  carried  without  difficulty,  the 
little  garrison  having  no  great  means  of  defense.  After  this 
exploit,  St.  Priest  remained  at  Reims  intermediary  between 

support  General  Charpentier  ;  he  placed  his  artillery  a  little  in  the  rear  and 
diagonally,  so  that  he  could  take  the  Russian  masses  en  tcharpe  that  were 
about  to  fall  on  Clacy.  At  nine  in  the  morning  an  obstinate  engagement  com- 
menced around  this  unfortunate  village,  whose  site,  happily  for  us,  was  slightly 
elevated.  General  Charpentier,  who  during  the  past  days  had  displayed  as 
much  energy  as  skill,  allowed  tho  Russian  infantry  to  advance  within  musket 
shot,  and  then  received  them  with  a  terrible  fusillade.  The  officers  and  sub- 
officers  exposed  themselves  incessantly,  seeking  to  compensate  for  the  want 
of  training  in  their  young  soldiers,  who  in  every  respect,  exhibited  an  unex- 
ampled devotedness.  Tho  first  Russian  division  was  received  with  so  destruc- 
tive a  fire  that  it  was  driven  back  to  tho  foot  of  the  position,  and  imme- 
diately replaced  by  another  that  received  like  treatment.  The  assailing  troops 
were  exposed,  not  only  to  the  fire  from  Clacy,  but  to  that  of  Marshal  Ney's 
artillery,  which,  happily  posted  as  we  have  just  related,  committed  fearful 
ravages  in  the  enemy's  ranks.  In  truth,  some  of  the  projectiles  from  this 
artillery  knocked  off  some  of  our  soldiers  at  Clacy,  but  in  the  enthusiasm  that 
prevailed  we  only  thought  of  checking  tho  enemy,  and  destroying  them,  no 
matter  at  what  price. 

"  The  samo  attack,  renewed  five  times  by  the  Russians,  failed  five  times 
through  the  heroism  of  General  Charpentier  and  his  soldiers.  The  Russians, 
repulsed,  fell  back  on  Laon.  Napoleon,  again  conceiving  some  slight  hopes, 
and  flattering  himself  with  having,  perhaps,  tired  out  the  tenacity  of  Blucher, 
ordered  Ney's  two  divisions  (Meunier  and  Curial)  to  advance  straight  on  Laon, 
through  the  Pemilly  suburb,  which  we  had  not  evacuated.  Our  young  soldiers, 
led  by  Ney  to  the  hillock,  overturned  everything  before  them,  ascended  one 
side  of  tho  triangular  peak  of  Laon,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  conformation 
of  the  land,  which  here  was  hollowed  and  receding,  they  succeeded  in  attaining 
the  walls  of  the  city.  But  Bulow's  infantry  stopped  them  at  tho  foot  of  tho 
ramparts,  then  pouring  forth  showers  of  grape,  forced  them  to  redescend  this 
fatal  height,  before  which  our  good  fortune  deserted  us.  Napoleon,  however, 
who  did  not  yet  abandon  the  hope  of  driving  Blucher  from  his  position,  sent 
Drouot  at  the  head  of  a  detachment  to  a  great  distance  on  our  left,  to  try 
whether  it  would  not  be  possible  to  advance  along  the  routo  of  La  F<;re,  and 
annoy  the  enemy  sufficiently  to  make  him  let  go  his  hold. 

''Drouot,  whose  sincerity  was  never  called  in  question,  having  after  a  daring 
reconnoissance,  pronounced  this  last  attempt  impracticable,  Napoleon  was 
obliged  to  admit  the  belief  that  Blucher's  position  was  impregnable. 

"The  position  of  each  had  been  so  during  the  last  twenty-four  hours; 
Blucher  had  been  as  powerless  against  Clacy  and  Semilly  as  Napoleon  against 
Laon.  But  Napoleon's  position  would  not  continue  impregnable  twenty-four 
hours  longer,  should  Blucher  execute  his  project  of  marching  en  masse  by  the 
route  from  Laon  to  Reims,  to  drive  Marmont  back  on  Berry-au-Bac,  and  cross 
the  Aisue  on  our  right.     It  was  therefore  impossible   for  Napoleon  to  remain 


272  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXI. 

the  grand  army  of  the  allies  and  that  of  Blue  her  I  saw  that 
it  would  be  easy  to  defeat  this  corps  alone  ;  and,  on  the  thir- 
teenth, put  myself  in  march  on  Reims,  leaving  Mortier  at 
Soissons  with  twelve  thousand  men.  At  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  we  arrived  before  that  city  ;  the  enemy,  surprised 
at  our  abrupt  appearance,  had  scarcely  time  to  take  position 
in  front  of  that  city  on  the  road  to  Fismes.  We  attacked 
him,  and  threw  him  beyond  the  Vesle.  Count  St.  Priest 
was  mortally  wounded  ;  his  troops  were  thrown  into  dis- 
order. While  their  rear-guard  defended  themselves  in 
Keims,  I  turned  the  city  by  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Vesle 
at  St.  Brice.  The  rout  of  the  enemy  v.\l  i  decided  ;  the  mass 
of  his  corps  gained  Bery-au-Bac  ;  tiie  troops  of  the  rear- 
guard scattered,  and  directed  their  flight  by  the  roads  to 
Neufchatel,  Rethel,  and  Chalons.  The  enemy  lost  eleven 
pieces  of  cannon,  two  thousand  and  five  hundred  prisoners, 
one  thousand  and  five  hundred  wounded,  and  seven  hundred 
killed  ;  we  lost  less  than  a  thousand  men  hors-dc-combat. 
I  remained  three  days  at  Reims  to  give  some  repose  to  my 
troops  before  carrying  them  on  the  Aube  and  Seine,  where 
the  grand  army  of  the  allies  had  taken  the  offensive. 


where  he  was  ;  he  was  obliged  to  retrace  his  steps,  and  fall  back  on  Soissons. 
However  painful  this  determination  might  be,  still,  as  it  was  indispensable, 
Napoleon  made  up  his  mind  without  hesitation,  and  the  next  morning,  the 
eleventh  of  March,  he  repassed  the  defile  of  Chivy  and  Estouvelles,  to  fall  back 
on  Soissons,  whilst  Marmont,  posted  on  the  bridge  of  Berry-au-Bac,  defended 
the  Aisne  above  him. 

"  The  enemy  took  especial  care  not  to  pursue  this  angry  lion,  the  thought 
of  whose  return  made  even  a  victorious  enemy  tremble.  Napoleon  could 
therefore  return  to  Soissons  without  disquietude. 

"  These  three  terrible  days — the  seventh  at  Craonne,  the  ninth  and  tenth  at 
Laon — had  cost  Napoleon  about  twelve  thousand  men  ;  and  if  they  cost  the 
enemy  fifteen  thousaud,  that  was  a  poor  consolation,  because  our  adversaries 
had  still  ninety  thousand  soldiers,  whilst  we  had  little  more  than  forty  thou- 
sand, including  even  the  small  division  of  the  Duke  of  Padua,  who  had  come 
to  reënforce  Marshal  Marmont. 

•'But  the  worst  of  all  was,  not  the  numerical,  but  the  moral  loss,  and  the 
military  consequences  of  the  last  opt  rations." 


Cil.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  273 

Operations  of  Schwartzenocrg  on  tne  Aubc. — After  the 
evacuation  of  Troyes,  Prince  Scliwartzenberg  had  continuée] 
his  retreat  to  Chaumont,  where  he  established  his  general 
head-quarters  and  his  reserves.  The  other  corps  of  his  army 
still  remained  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aube,  having  before 
them  Marshals  Macdonald,  and  Oudinot,  the  former  occupy- 
ing Ferté-sur-Aube  and  the  second  Bar-sur-Aube.  Having 
learned  that  I  had  turned  my  efforts  against  Blucher,  the 
allies,  after  consultation,  took  the  initiative.  On  the  twenty- 
seventh  of  February,  Wittgenstein  and  Wrede  attacked 
Oudinot  and  dislodged  him  from  Bar-sur-Aube,  after  an 
obstinate  combat  which  cost  about  three  thousand  men  on 
each  side.  The  next  day  the  Prince  of  Wurtemberg  and 
Giulay  forced  Macdonald  to  abandon  Ferté-sur-Aube.  The 
following  day  the  allies  slowly  advanced  on  Troyes,  where 
Macdonald  had  concentrated  his  army  ;  but  as  this  arm}', 
weakened  by  detachments,  did  not  amount  to  more  than 
twenty-five  thousand  men,  Macdonald  did  not  dare  run  the 
chance  of  a  battle  ;  he  evacuated  Troyes  on  the  fourth  of 
March,  and  retreated  to  Nogent  where  he  repassed  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Seine. 

His  Vanguard  passes  the  Seine  at  Pont.— Prince  Scliwartz- 
enberg, satisfied  with  his  return  to  Troyes,  remained  there 
ten  days  with  his  arms  folded,  waiting  with  patience  for 
news  from  Blucher.  On  the  evening  of  the  fourteenth,  he 
learned  that  I  had  been  repulsed  before  Laon.  This  good 
news  excited  his  ardor  and  determined  him  to  resume  the 
offensive  ;  nevertheless,  this  was  done  with  the  greatest  cau- 
tion, and  only  the  corps  of  Wrede  and  Wittgenstein  crossed 
the  Seine  at  Pont.  On  the  sixteenth,  the  latter  attacked  the 
left  of  Macdonald,  who  evacuated  Provins  and  established 
himself  near  Maison-Rouge,  on  the  road  from  Provins  to 
Nangis  ;  the  allies  did  not  advance  anv  further.  At  the 
report  of  my  return,  Scliwartzenberg  gave  himself  up  again 

VOL    IV. — 18. 


274  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXI. 

to  his  habitual  perplexities  ;  fearing  to  be  taken  in  flank  or 
rear  by  my  handful  of  men,  he  resolved  to  fall  back  on 
Brienne  in  order  to  cover  his  communications  and  the  ground 
between  the  Aube  and  the  Marne.  On  the  seventeenth,  the 
different  corps  of  the  grand  army  put  themselves  in  retreat, 
ascending  the  Aube  and  the  Seine.  The  same  day  I  began 
lay  operations  in  the  direction  of  Troyes. 

The  Empress  and  Regency  remove  to  Blois.  —  As  Paris 
continued  to  be  the  objective  point  of  the  enemy,  I  deemed 
it  best  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  my  family.  Joseph  had 
received  orders  to  remove  with  the  council  of  ministers  to 
the  Loire,  as  soon  as  the  danger  became  pressing.  It  would 
have  been  better,  without  doubt,  in  the  month  of  February, 
when  the  capital  was  threatened,  to  send  the  regency,  the 
senate,  and  administrative  authorities  to  Nevers  or  Clermont. 
Then  probably  affairs  would  have  taken  a  different  turn,  and 
the  occupation  of  Paris  by  the  Kussians  and  Prussians  would 
not  have  had  the  same  importance,  as  in  that  case  there  would 
have  been  no  legal  authorities  there  to  betray  my  interests 
and  those  of  France.  But  I  feared  at  that  epoch  to  alarm 
the  capital,  and  I  had  then  but  little  confidence  in  the 
National  Guards  ;  it  was,  however,  the  senate  and  high 
functionaries  whom  I  ought  to  have  distrusted. 

Operations  of  Napoleon  against  the  Grand  Allied  Army. 
— Being  forced  to  leave  Marin  ont  and  Mortier  on  the  Aisne 
with  twenty  thousand  men  to  hold  the  army  of  Blucher  in 
check,  I  could,  therefore,  take  with  me  only  eighteen  thou- 
sand, notwithstanding  the  several  reënforcements  received 
from  Keims  ;  but  I  expected  to  be  joined  on  the  Aube  by 
the  army  of  Macdonald  and  by  six  thousand  men  whom 
General  Lefebvre-Desnouettes  was  to  bring  me  from  Paris. 
Moreover,  I  had  already  seen  what  terror  was  inspired  by  my 
name  alone  at  the  head-quarters  of  Schwartzenberg.  My 
first  march  was  from  Keims  to  Epernay.     On  the  eighteenth, 


Cil.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  14.  275 

I  arrived  at  Frère-Champenoise,  and  on  the  nineteenth,  at 
Plancy.  My  light  cavalry  passed  the  Anbe  and  advanced  on 
one  side  to  Bessy  and  on  the  other  to  Méry.  The  allies  were 
in  full  retreat  in  the  direction  of  Troyes  and  Lesmont.  If  I 
had  supposed  that  they  would  give  me  battle  between  the 
Seine  and  the  Aube  I  would  have  waited  at  Plancy  for 
Lefebvre-Desnouettes  and  Macdonald,  without  risking  my 
feeble  corps  in  the  midst  of  their  army  ;  but  as  nothing  on 
their  part  indicated  such  a  resolution,  I  determined  to  push 
them  warmly  with  what  troops  I  had  in  hand,  without  giv- 
ing them  time  to  reconnoitre. 

Battle  ©f  Arris.— On  the  twentieth,  I  marched  from  Plancy 
on  Arcis  ;  my  cavalry  ascended  the  left  bank  of  the  Aube, 
and  the  infantry  the  right  bank.  We  found  Arcis  evacuated, 
and  established  ourselves  in  front  of  that  city  on  the  roads 
to  Troyes  and  Lesmont.  The  cavalry  formed  the  right,  and 
the  half  of  the  infantry,  which  had  already  passed  the  Aube, 
established  itself  on  the  left.  The  remainder  of  this  arm 
was  still  on  the  march  from  Plancy  to  Arcis.  I  had  regarded 
this  place  only  as  a  point  of  departure  for  the  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  ;  on  the  contrary,  we  were  obliged  to  sustain  here  a 
decisive  combat. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  began  to  be  wearied  with  the  in- 
decisive movements  which  political  policy  had  assigned  to 
the  allied  armies  ;  it  seemed  to  him  disgraceful  that  the  most 
formidable  armies  of  Europe,  commanded  by  their  soveieigns 
in  person,  should  be  continually  repulsed  by  a  mere  handful 
of  men.  He  had  at  last  declared  in  a  council  that  they  must 
unite  with  Blucher  and  act  in  a  single  mass  on  Paris  to  dic- 
tate there  a  peace  which  they  could  not  impose  on  me  at 
Chatillon.  In  accordance  with  the  deliberations  of  this 
council,  the  allied  army  concentrated  its  forces  on  Arcis  ; 
Wrede's  corps,  which  was  nearest  to  this  city,  received  orders 
to  reoccupy  it.     At  two  o'clock  P.  M.  the  Bavarian  general 


276  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

commenced  his  attack  ;  my  infantry  maintained  its  position 
and  defended  with  success  the  village  of  Graud-Torcy  ;  but 
my  cavalry  was  defeated  by  that  of  the  allies.  The  strag- 
glers threw  themselves  on  the  bridges  of  Arcis  ;  the  moment 
was  critical.  If  the  enemy  should  carry  these  bridges,  my 
left,  deprived  of  all  means  of  retreat,  would  be  destroyed. 
Seeing  the  importance  of  the  moment,  I  made  every  effort  to 
rally  my  right,  and  succeeded  only  by  placing  myself  at  their 
head,  sword  in  hand  ;  the  bridges  were  preserved  and  my  in- 
fantry took  advantage  of  them  to  pass  to  the  left  of  the 
Aube.  The  combat  was  continued  till  midnight  :  We  ex- 
perienced sensible  losses,  but  kept  our  position.  Thinking 
that  Schwartzenberg  had  fought  only  to  cover  his  retreat,  I 
determined  to  pursue  the  enemy  with  my  troops  now  con- 
siderably reënforced.  On  the  night  of  the  twentieth,  I  had 
been  joined  by  the  corps  of  Lefebvre-Desnouttes,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-first,  by  twelve  thousand  men  from 
the  army  of  Macdonald.  The  remainder  of  Macdonald's 
troops  had  not  yet  passed  Plancy.  But  the  enemy,  instead 
of  retiring,  had  united  all  his  army,  and  was  preparing  to 
give  battle.  My  advanced  guard  discovered  this  army  drawn 
up  in  several  lines  from  Chaudrey-sur-Aube  to  the  rivulet  of 
Barbuisse.  The  enemy  had  near  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
and  1  not  thirty-five  thousand.  To  accept  a  battle  with  so 
great  a  disparity  of  forces,  in  a  vast  j)lain  with  a  miry 
river  behind  me,  would  expose  my  last  resources  to  infallible 
ruin.  Imperious  necessity  imposed  a  retreat,  and  I  resigned 
myself  to  it. 

This  retreat,  executed  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  might 
have  been  disastrous  ;  but  fortunately,  Schwartzenberg,  pre- 
occupied with  the  idea  of  our  attacking  him,  did  not  think 
to  pursue  us  till  two  o'clock  P.  M.  The  greater  part  of  my 
army  had  already  passed  the  Aube.  Oudinot's  corps  alone 
remained  on  the  left  bank  in  the  city  of  Arcis  to  cover  my 


Cil.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  277 

march.  This  rear-guard  was  rudely  assaulted  ;  the  allies 
penetrated  into  the  city  nnd  obliged  Oudinot  to  recross  the 
river. 

Remarks  on  Napoleon's  Position, — My  situation  was  now 
eminently  perilous.  On  the  very  day  of  the  battle  of  Arcis, 
the  congress  of  Chatillon  had  dissolved.  The  allied  sove- 
reigns, having  determined  to  overthrow  my  throne,  were  about 
to  give  free  play  to  their  military  force  ;  and  my  father-in- 
law,  wearied  with  the  course  which  he  had  adopted,  less  from 
his  attachments  for  me  than  for  the  interests  of  his  daughter, 
promised  to  offer  no  obstacles  to  this  plan.  Count  d'Artois 
was  at  Vesoul,  and  the  Duke  d'Angoulême  at  Bordeaux  ; 
La  Vendée  was  rising.  Hemmed  in  by  the  enemy's  two 
masses  on  the  Aisne  and  Aube,  the  weakest  of  which  was 
incomparably  stronger  than  all  my  disposable  forces  on  the 
theatre  of  war,  it  was  now  impossible  for  me  to  undertake 
anything  serious  against  either  of  them.  I  had  yet  a  small 
army  in  Italy,  and  strong  garrisons  in  the  north.  I  had 
finally  sent  back  Ferdinand  into  Spain,  and  directed  Suchet 
to  restore  to  him  the  places  which  we  still  occupied  on  the 
Ebro  ;  but  it  had  become  impossible  for  the  armies  of  Spain 
to  come  to  my  assistance,  for  they  were  now  strongly  engaged 
against  Wellington  who,  the  middle  of  February,  had  re- 
sumed the  offensive  and  invaded  Gascony. 

Success  of  the  Allies  in  the  South. — On  the  arrival  of  the 
Duke  d'Angoulême,  who  gave  him  hopes  of  a  point-d' appui 
in  the  provinces  in  the  south,  and  hearing  of  the  departure 
of  two  of  Soult's  divisions,  Wellington  resolved  to  pass  the 
Adour  and  the  Gaves,  as  soon  as  the  roads  became  practica- 
ble. Soult,  having  only  forty  thousand  men,  and  half  of 
these  conscripts,  with  which  to  oppose  seventy-five  thousand 
combatants,  and  being  turned  by  his  left,  was  obliged  to  re- 
treat. He  wisely  resolved  not  to  direct  himself  on  the  in- 
terior of  France,  but  in  a  line  parallel  to  the  frontier  of  the 


278  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XXL 

Pyrenees  ;  he  reached  Orthès,  where  he  decided  to  give  bat- 
tle. This  actiun  in  which  the  English  gained  nothing  but 
the  field  of  battle,  nevertheless  obliged  Soult  to  continue  his 
movement  on  Toulouse.  Wellington,  solicited  by  the  royal- 
ists to  detach  a  corps  on  Bordeaux  had  sent  Beresford  to 
that  place.  This  city,  once  so  celebrated  for  its  patriotism, 
received  the  English  as  the  Romans  received  their  trium- 
phant legions,  and  France  had  the  misfortune  to  see  her  own 
citizens  the  first  to  welcome  the  invaders. 

Bold  Project  of  Xapoleon. — It  will  be  seen  from  this  brief 
review  of  my  situation,  that  I  Avas  now  obliged  to  resort  to 
the  most  desperate  means,  as  nothing  less  than  extreme 
measures  could  afford  me  any  chance  of  safety.  The  fate  of 
France  now  depended  on  me  alone  ;  and  no  place  was  of  im- 
portance except  made  so  by  my  presence.  As  ten  victories 
in  Champagne  had  not  softened  the  hatred  of  the  enemy,  it 
was  necessary  to  remove  the  theatre  of  operations  on  a  point 
where  my  success  would  obtain  more  important  results.  To 
make  peace  and  save  the  Empire,  it  was  necessary  to  replant 
our  eagles  on  the  banks  of  the  Rhine.  This  object  could 
not  be  accomplished  by  combats.  We  were  too  weak  for 
that.  I  had  no  other  resource  than  to  manœuvre  on  the 
enemy's  communications,  at  the  risk  of  losing  my  own.  I 
do  not  deny  that  the  chance  was  hazardous,  but  it  was  the 
only  hope  of  safety  left. 

I  resolved  to  run  this  chance,  throwing  myself  in  mass  by 
St.  Dizier  toward  the  Upper  Meuse  ;  I  there  expected  strong 
reënforcements  drawn  from  the  garrisons  of  Lorraine  and 
Alsace  ;  and  by  raising  the  departments  which  had  been 
overrun  by  the  enemy,  I  would  threaten  the  line  of  operations 
of  the  grand  army,  which  would  be  seriously  compromised. 
By  thus  compelling  the  enemy  to  retrace  his  steps,  I  would 
have  the  advantage  of  drawing  him  on  ground  singularly 
favorable  for   my  strategic   operations.      A   partial  victory 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  279 

might  destroy  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy,  while,  in  case 
of  a  check,  I  could  have  time  to  recruit  under  the  protection 
of  our  fortresses.  I  would  leave  Paris  exposed  ;  but  this 
was  of  little  importance  for  me  whose  capital  was  at  my  own 
head-quarters.  As  this  plan  of  operations  has  not  been  jus- 
tified by  success,  there  are  not  wanting  critics  who  regard  it 
as  absurd  ;  for  parlor  generals,  like  the  vulgar,  judge  every 
thing  by  the  results.  These  same  critics  would  have  praised 
my  combinations  to  the  skies,  if  Schwartzenberg  had  fallen 
back  on  Bale,  as  there  was  every  reason  to  suppose  he  would. 
But  what  better  could  I  do  ?  I  had  no  option.  It  was 
necessary  to  attempt  this  operation  which,  I  confess,  acceler- 
ated my  fall  before  it  was  carried  into  execution,  or  to  re- 
main between  the  Seine  and  the  Marne  before  the  immense 
superiority  of  the  enemy,  and  exposed  to  a  more  slow  but 
more  certain  destruction.  What  impartial  man  will  venture 
to  blame  my  decision  ?  If  I  had  attempted  it  immediately 
after  the  victory  of  Montereau,  and  at  the  same  time  recalled 
Suchet  to  Lyons,  who  will  say  that  I  could  not  have  obtained 
important  results  ? 

On  the  evening  of  the  twenty-first  of  March,  I  pushed  my 
advanced  guard  to  Sommepuis  ;  the  remainder  of  my  army 
echeloned  from  this  town  to  the  Aube.  On  the  twenty- 
second,  I  passed  the  Marne  at  the  ford  of  Frignicourt,  and 
marched  on  Faremont.  Macdonald  came  to  Dosnon.  The 
allies  had  thrown  a  garrison  into  Vitry  ;  I  summoned  the 
place  to  surrender  ;  it  refused.  It  not  being  my  intention 
to  amuse  myself  with  a  siege,  I  passed  on  and  reached  St. 
Dizier  on  the  twenty-third  ;  Macdonald  passed  the  Marne 
at  Frignicourt,  and  arrived  at  Villotte.  On  the  twenty- 
third  I  reached  Doulevent. 

The  news  of  my  retreat  from  Arcis  had  not  produced  the 
effect  on  the  enemy  which  I  had  hoped.  Schwartzenberj;, 
stimulated  by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and   by  the  partial 


280  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXL 

success  gained  over  my  rear-guard  at  Arcis,  and  ignorant  of 
my  projects  upon  his  communications,  did  not  fall  back  on 
Chaumont  as  I  bad  hoped.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  passed 
the  Aube  to  follow  me  towards  Vitry,  as  much  to  watch  my 
movements  as  to  protect  his  line  of  operations,  and  connect 
himself  with  Blucher.  On  the  twenty-second,  the  grand 
army  passed  the  Aube  at  Ramerupt,  Songy,  and  Lesmont, 
pushing  forwards  parties  as  far  as  Vitry. 

Operations  of  Blucher. — Blucher,  on  his  side,  unable  to 
believe  that  he  had  gained  a  victory  at  Laon,  intimidated  by 
the  defeat  of  St.  Priest's  corps,  and  remembering  the  rude 
blows  which  I  had  given  him  the  month  before,  had  remained 
inactive  for  ten  entire  days  behind  the  Aisne.  However, 
when  he  learned  that  I  had  left  Reims,  he  prepared  to  cross 
that  river,  and  resolved  to  detach  Wintzingerode  with  eight 
thousand  horse  to  restore  his  communications  with  Schwart- 
zenberg.  For  this  purpose  a  heavy  body  of  Russian  cavalry 
passed  the  Aisne  on  the  right  of  Marmont,  and  threatened 
to  cut  off  his  retreat.  This  marshal  who,  with  nine  thousand 
men,  found  himself  exposed  to  eighty  thousand,  had  reason 
to  fear  being  surrounded  at  Bery-au-Bac  ;  he  decided  to 
blow  up  the  bridge,  and  fall  back  on  Fismes,  where  Mortier 
joined  him  after  having  evacuated  Reims,  which  Wintzinge- 
rode occupied  on  the  twentieth  without  opposition.  The 
concentration  of  the  two  marshals  at  Fismes  was  very  well, 
on  the  supposition  that  my  enterprise  on  Arcis  had  been 
crowned  with  success  ;  but  was  unfortunate  for  the  execution 
of  my  new  project.  I  could  not  blame  them  as  they  could 
not  have  known  my  present  plan,  and  heretofore  it  had  been 
their  task  to  cover  my  communications  with  Paris. 

Freed  from  the  presence  of  Marmont  at  Bery-au-Bac, 
Blucher  threw  bridges  over  the  Aisne,  and  sent  the  corps  of 
Kleist  and  York  in  pursuit  of  our  columns,  while  Wintzinge- 
rode took  the  road  to  Reims  for  the  object  already  mentioned. 


Cil.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  281 

Everything  seemed  to  combine,  as  if  by  enchantment  to 
destroy  my  project  ;  for,  at  the  moment  when  Schwartzen- 
bcrg  approached  the  north,  leaving  the  road  to  Obaumont 
exposed,  Blucher,  who  before  had  resolved  to  inarch  direct 
to  Paris,  took,  by  chance,  the  resolution  to  move  to  the  south 
towards  the  army  of  Bohemia.  Thus,  the  two  grand  armies 
of  the  enemy,  instead  of  pursuing  diverging  lines,  concen- 
trated their  forces  towards  a  sincjle  line,  at  the  very  moment 
that  my  two  little  masses  separated  from  each  other. 

Marniont  and  Mortier   arc  separated   frooi   Napoleon.— 
The  order  to  join  me  at  Vitry,  it  is  said,  did  not  reach  the 
marshals  till   the  evening    of  the  twenty-first,   after   their 
arrival  at  Fère-en-Tardenois.     On  this  point  must  rest  the 
judgment  that  will  be  given  of  their  march.     In  addition  to 
this  unfortunate  delay  in  receiving  my  orders,  a  still  greater 
contre-temps  now  occurred.     The  Cossacks,  on  the  twenty- 
second,  captured  a  courier  with  my  letter  to  the  Empress 
communicating  my  project.     Blucher  immediately  resolved 
to  push  the  corps  of  Sacken  and  Langeron  on   Eeims  and 
Chalons,  in  order  to  connect  himself  with   Schwartzenberg 
who,  he  learned,  had  marched  in  the  direction  of  Vitry.    This 
circumstance  rendered  the  situation  of  the  two  marshals  very 
critical.       From   Fère-en-Tardenois    they    could   no   longer 
return  to  Keims,  as  that  city  was  in  the  possession  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  corps  of  York  and  Kleist  had  followed  them 
on  Fismes.     They  could  not   expect  to  reach  Chalons  by 
Epernay,  for  Wintzingerode  was  already  master  of  that  road. 
They  therefore  resolved   to  march  on  Chateau-Thierry,  in 
order  to  gain  the  road  to  Montmirail,  and  thus  reach  Vatry, 
an  intermediate  point  between   Chalons  and  Vitry.     This 
circumspection,  very  natural  for  a  corps  of  seventeen  thou- 
sand men  before  two  large  armies,  destroyed  all  my  hopes. 

Many  writers  have  imputed  blame  to  my  lieutenants  :  but 
I  confess  that  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  act  otherwise  than 


282  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

they  did.  Blucber  marched  on  the  twenty- third  to  Reims, 
and  on  the  twenty-fourth  to  Chalons.  If  Marmont  had 
received  my  order  at  Fistnes,  as  has  been  said  by  some,  it  is 
certain  that  he  might  have  forced  his  passage  on  the  twenty- 
second  through  the  cavalry  of  Wintzingerode,  which  could 
not  have  disputed  Reims.  But  if  that  marshal  received  the 
order  only  at  Fere-en-Tardenois,  he  is  blameless  ;  it  was 
difficult  to  precede  Blucher  at  Chalons.  By  marching  on 
the  twenty-second  from  Fère  on  Epernay,  it  was  not 
physically  impossible  to  reach  Chalons  on  the  twenty- third, 
but  Wintzingerode  was  already  there,  and,  being  certain  to 
be  sustained  by  Blucher,  he  would  not  have  abandoned  the 
city.  Moreover  the  road  from  Fere-en-Tardenois  to  Epernay 
is  very  difficult,  and  it  would  have  required  two  hard  days' 
march  to  reach  Chalons. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  decides  to  march  ou  Paris.— 
At  the  very  moment  when  mere  chance  had  given  a  concentric 
direction  to  the  enemy's  masses,  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
having  learned  my  project  by  an  intercepted  letter,  and  cer- 
tain of  the  approach  of  Blucher,  assembled  at  Sommepuis 
those  of  his  generals  in  whom  he  had  most  confidence,  and 
proposed  to  them  the  question^  whether  it  was  most  advis- 
able to  advance  on  Paris,  toithout  troubling  himself  about 
my  movement  on  Lorraine,  or  ivhether  he  shoidd  fall  bach 
on  the  Rhine.  All  agreed  with  him  that  the  first  was  the 
preferable  course.  Even  Schwartzenberg,  who  had  been  left 
free  by  my  new  project,  in  separating  from  the  cabinet  of  the 
emperor  of  Austria  who  had  retired  from  Bar-sur-Aube  to 
Dijon,  decided  for  this  bold  march.  The  information  was 
immediately  communicated  to  Blucher,  and  as  soon  as  the 
allied  sovereigns  were  certain  that  the  junction  of  their  armies 
was  fully  consummated,  they  prepared  to  march  on  Paris  by 
the  roads  from  Yitry  to  Sezanne,  and  from  Chalons  to  Mont- 
mirail.     General  Wintzingerode  with  eight  thousand  horse 


Cir.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1814.  283 

and  more  than  forty  pieces  of  cannon,  marched  from  Vitry 
on  St.  Dizier  to  cover  their  movements,  and  make  us  believe 
he  was  followed  by  the  whole  army.  On  the  twenty-fifth, 
he  occupied  St.  Dizier,  and  pushed  his  advanced  guard  to 
Eclaron  on  the  left  of  the  Marne. 

This  determination  of  the  sovereigns  was  without  doubt 
the  best  which  they  could  have  adopted.  But  I  had  no 
reason  to  expect  so  fundamental  a  change  in  the  principles 
upon  which  they  had  acted  for  the  last  two  months. 

Efforts  of  Napoleon  to  communicate  with  Mortier  and 
Marmont.— I  had  been  joined  at  St.  Dizier  by  Caulaincourt, 
but  I  could  receive  no  news  of  Marmont  and  Mortier.  The 
return  of  my  negotiator  had  redoubled  the  audacity  of  the 
malcontents  at  my  headquarters  :  seeing  my  fall  approach- 
ing, they  began  to  ask  themselves  whether  it  was  necessary 
for  them  to  share  my  fate  by  exposing  themselves  to  the 
same  chances.  It  seemed  that  the  honor  and  the  indepen- 
dence of  France  were  of  no  account  in  this  conflict  where 
each  thought  only  of  his  own  preservation. 

The  army  alone  manifested  true  devotion. 

In  the  mean  time,  to  profit  by  my  new  situation,  I  pushed 
Oudinot  to  Bar-sur-Ornain.  This  was  his  native  country, 
and  he  was  to  raise  Lorraine.  My  light  cavalry  threw  itself 
by  Joinville  on  Chaumont,  from  which  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  was  obliged  to  decamp  in  all  haste  on  Dijon.  I  had 
been  at  Doulevent  for  twenty-four  hours  in  a  painful  state 
of  uncertainty,  when,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  a  considerable 
force  of  the  enemy  was  discovered  approaching  from  the 
direction  of  St.  Dizier.  I  could  not  doubt  its  being  the 
army  of  Schwartzenberg,  and  that  its  unexpected  appearance 
had  alone  caused  the  delay  of  my  marshals.  How  could  I 
imagine  that  it  was  the  army  of  Blucher,  which  I  had  left 
at  Soissons  behind  the  Aisne,  separated  by  the  corps  of 
Marmont   and   Mortier.      I    had  no    time    to  hesitate,   and 


284  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [On.  XXI. 

marched  against  the  enemy  to  defeat  him,  and  open  the  road 
to  Chalons,  thinking  that  I  was  at  last  to  join  my  marshals. 
Sehastiani  and  Milhaud  drove  back  the  squadrons  of  Wint- 
zingerode  to  Bar  and  St.  Mihiel,  and  inflicted  on  them  a 
loss  of  twelve  hundred  men  hors-dc -combat.  What  was  my 
astonishment  when  I  learned  from  the  prisoners  that  it  was 
the  army  of  Silesia  that  I  had  before  me  !  They  even  spoke 
of  the  march  of  two  armies  on  Paris  :  but  I  could  not  credit 
such  a  complication  of  unfortunate  circumstances.  I  stopped 
at  St.  Dizier,  and,  the  twenty-seventh,  made  a  forced  recon- 
noissance  on  Vitry.  Here  all  my  misfortunes  were  con- 
firmed. The  junction  of  the  enemy's  armies  had  been 
effected  on  the  twenty-third,  and  the  report  of  their  march 
on  Paris  was  but  too  well  founded.  A  powerful  party  in 
the  capital  had  invited  them  there  ;  besides,  they  had  just 
gained  a  victory  at  Frère-Champenoise.  Notwithstanding 
this  thunderbolt,  I  still  hesitated  to  renounce  my  plan.  But 
to  execute  it  with  any  hope  of  success  required  the  assistance 
of  the  twenty-five  thousand  men  which  Marmont,  Mortier, 
and  Pacthod  were  to  bring  me.  But  instead  of  adding  to 
the  force  of  my  army  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  the 
Empire,  they  were  likely  to  be  surrounded  and  compromised 
in  the  midst  of  two  powerful  armies  of  the  enemy.  More- 
over, all  my  generals  exclaimed  against  the  imprudence  of 
abandoning  Paris.  For  a  time  I  resisted  all  their  clamors. 
I  feared  less  for  my  own  fate,  than  that  of  my  old  com- 
panions in  arms,  and  finally  yielded  to  these  importunate  and 
pusillanimous  representations.  But  before  speaking  of  my 
return  to  the  capital,  let  me  describe  the  operations  of  the 
marshals. 

These  Marshals  retire  on  Paris.— Marmont  and  Mortier, 
on  leaving  Chateau- Thierry  had  taken  two  different  roads. 
The  first  arrived,  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-fourth,  at 
Sommesous  and  soon  perceived  that  it  was  now  impossible 


Cn.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  285 

to  join  me,  for  his  reconnoitring  parties  discovered  the  pre- 
sence of  an  immense  army  on  the  plains  between  Chalons 
and  Vitry,  and  the  approach  of  the  numerous  columns  that 
marched  against  me.  He  was  obliged  to  wait  the  junction 
of  Mortier,  who  had  taken  the  road  from  Villeseneux  and 
Chaintrix,  ignorant  of  the  vicinity  of  a  formidable  army. 
Marmont,  however,  began  his  retreat  on  Frère-Champenoise 
where  he  waited  for  Mortier's  columns. 

The  allies,  having  received  information  of  the  presence  of 
these  two  corps,  commenced  their  movement,  on  the  twenty- 
fifth,  to  crush  them, — Blucher  from  the  road  from  Montrni- 
rail,  and  Susanne,  and  the  grand  army  by  that  from  Vitry 
to  Frère-Champenoise.  The  last  brigade  of  Mortier's  corps, 
retarded  in  its  march,  was  overtaken  at  Frère-Champenoise 
by  the  cavalry  of  the  allies  ;  and  after  having  received  in 
square  several  charges  sustained  by  artillery,  it  left  the  re- 
mains of  six  battalions  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  corps  of  eight  thousand  National  Guards  which  left 
Montmirail  with  a  grand  convoy  of  artillery,  had  just  arrived 
on  the  Soude,  without  the  marshals  having  received  timely 
notice  of  their  march,  the  orders  for  which  were  issued  di- 
rectly from  my  staff.  Being  attacked  near  Frécon  by  the 
Russian  cavalry  of  the  army  of  Silesia  under  the  orders  of 
"Wassitsckof,  it  reached  Frère-Champenoise  in  the  hope  of 
here  joining  the  marshals.  But,  it  was  now  attacked  by  the 
Emperor  Alexander  who  had  pushed  the  rear  guard  of  Mar- 
mont at  the  head  of  the  reserve  of  the  Grand-duke  Con- 
stantine.  Our  squares  repulsed  repeated  charges  of  the 
enemy  ;  but  in  resuming  the  march  they  fell  into  disorder. 
Two  squares  were  separated  and  broken  ;  the  three  others 
reduced  to  a  single  mass,  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  sixty 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  pierced  and  captured,  notwithstand- 
ing a  resistance  very  honorable  for  militia,  who,  perhaps, 
were  here  under  fire  for  the  first  time. 


286  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

This  unfortunate  check  not  only  cost  me  ten  thousand 
men  and  eighty  pieces  of  cannon,  so  maladroitly  sacrificed, 
but,  deprived  me  of  twenty-five  thousand  combatants  upon 
whom  I  had  counted  to  reënforce  the  army  which  was  to 
deliver  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

The  marshals  had  no  other  course  but  to  retire  on  Paris  in 
all  haste,  and  it  was  very  far  from  certain  that  they  could 
even  reach  there,  for  the  Prussian  corps  of  Kleist  and  York, 
at  Chateau-Thierry,  might  easily  prevent  them.  Fortunately, 
these  Prussians  had  pushed  forward  only  their  infantry  on 
Ferté-Goucher,  having  sent  their  cavalry  in  the  direction  of 
Sezanne  to  communicate  with  Blucher.  The  embarrassment 
of  the  marshals  was,  nevertheless,  very  great,  when  on  their 
arrival  at  Ferté-Goucher,  on  the  twenty-sixth,  they  found 
that  city  in  the  hands  of  the  Prussians,  who  barred  to  them 
the  great  road  from  Sezanne  to  Paris.  Being  too  weak  to 
force  a  passage,  sword  in  hand,  they  turned  off  to  Provins 
where  they  arrived  on  the  twenty-seventh  ;  the  next  day 
Mortier  marched  on  Guignes,  and  Marmont  to  Melun.  The 
same  day  the  allies  entered  Meaux,  and  their  advanced  guard 
pushed  on  to  Ville-Parisis.  These  events,  so  disastrous  in 
themselves,  became  still  more  so  by  the  consternation  which 
they  caused  in  the  capital.  The  dispatches  which  I  received 
proved  that  the  approach  of  danger,  instead  of  electrifying 
all  minds,  seemed  to  completely  discourage  them. 

Difficulties  of  Napoleon's  Situation.— This  news  plunged 
me  into  new  perplexities  ;  wherever  I  cast  my  eyes  all  was 
disaster.  I  first  thought  to  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  allies' 
columns  ;  I  might  undoubtedly  turn  Vitry  by  the  ford  of 
Frignicourt  ;  but  further  information  proved  that  we  could 
scarcely  reach  them  before  they  passed  the  Marne  at  Meaux 
or  Lagny  ;  they  were  sufficiently  strong  to  dispute  with  me 
the  passage  of  this  river  with  a  part  of  their  forces,  while 
the  remainder  attacked  Paris.     There  seemed  then  no  means 


CH.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  14.  287 

of  saving  the  capital.  It  was  possible,  however,  that  by 
directing  my  march  on  the  left  of  the  Seine,  Paris  would 
hold  out  till  I  could  arrive.  To  increase  my  misfortune,  my 
small  army  was  now  scattered.  The  main  body  was  with 
me  at  Vitry  ;  a  considerable  corps  had  pursued  Wintzin- 
gerode  to  Bâr-le-Duc.  All  my  light  cavalry  had  been  pushed 
on  Chaumont,  to  intercept  the  enemy's  line  of  operations. 
The  Emperor  of  Austria,  who  was  there  with  his  diplomatic 
and  administrative  head-quarters,  saved  himself  in  all  haste 
at  Dijon,  hotly  pursued  by  our  partisans.  I  designated 
Troyes  as  the  point  of  concentration  for  all  my  corps.  I 
myself  returned  to  St.  Dizier,  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty- 
seventh,  and  on  the  twenty-eighth,  went  to  Montierender. 

He  flies  to  Defend  the  Capital.— I  had  not  yet  lost  all 
hope  ;  I  thought  that  the  sight  of  the  Cossacks  at  the  foot 
of  Montmartre  would  move  all  hearts,  and  that  the  Parisians, 
forgetting  for  the  moment  their  ill-founded  distrust,  would 
make  it  a  point  of  honor  to  repulse  the  enemy  and  defend, 
to  the  last  extremity,  the  walls  of  the  capital.  This  popu- 
lous city  might  easily  put  on  foot  twenty  thousand  National 
Guards,  who,  with  the  depot  of  the  troops  of  the  line  in 
the  place,  could  form  an  army  of  forty  thousand  men  to 
defend  the  strong  position  which  covered  Paris  on  the  right 
of  the  Seine  ;  positions  for  the  establishment  of  batteries 
had  been  marked  out,  and  with  proper  activity  they  might 
have  been  armed  with  two  hundred  guns.  The  occupation 
of  the  capital  being,  therefore,  not  an  affair  of  a  day,  I  flat- 
tered myself  that  I  might  yet  arrive  in  time  to  revive  its 
defense  by  my  presence  and  the  troops  who  followed  me.  I 
took  the  post,  and  traveling  all  night,  reached  La  Cour-de- 
France.  What  was  my  surprise  at  here  meeting  General  Bel- 
liard  with  Mortier's  cavalry  !  The  army  of  the  marshals 
was  following  near  by  ;  Paris  then  had  fallen  ! 

Battle  of  Paris.— During  the  day  of  the  twenty-ninth,  the 


288  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

allies  had  continued  their  march  on  Paris  oy  the  left  bank 
of  the  Marne,  leaving  the  corps  of  Sacken  and  Wrede  at 
Meaux  to  cover  their  rear.  The  same  night  Mortier  and 
Marmont  had  reached  Charenton,  and,  on  the  morning  of 
the  thirtieth,  occupied  the  heights  which  command  Paris 
from  the  north.  Beënforced  by  all  the  recruits  of  the  depots 
of  the  guard,  they  had  twenty  thousand  men  under  arms  ; 
but  the  National  Guards  furnished  only  five  thousand  men 
to  sustain  the  troops  of  the  line,  and  they  jmt  in  battery 
only  a  small  part  of  the  disposable  garrison-artillery  ;  with 
this  exception,  they  employed  all  the  resources  of  the  place. 
The  brilliant  youth  of  the  Polytechnic  School  and  of  the 
Veterinary  School  of  Alfort,  the  hope  of  an  entire  generation, 
volunteered  to  serve  the  artillery,  which  had  only  mutilated 
invalids  to  point  the  guns.  If  we  compare  this  conduct  with 
that  of  the  inhabitants  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  when  we  en- 
tered these  cities,  we  shall  find  that  Paris  exhibited  still  more 
patriotism  than  they.  The  allies  had  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  men  ;  their  grand  army  attacked  the 
heights  of  Belleville,  while  Blucher  assailed  Montmartre. 
The  combat  began  with  the  day  ;  my  troops,  notwithstand- 
ing their  extreme  inferiority  in  number,  justified  their  ancient 
fame  ;  they  firmly  disputed  their  last  battle-field.  Campans 
covered  himself  with  glory  at  Eomainville  ;  old  Marshal 
Moncey  bravely  fought  at  the  head  of  the  National  Guard 
which  assisted  Mortier  in  the  defense  from  Montmartre  to 
the  Seine.  It  was  not  till  four  o'clock  P.  M.,  that  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  crowning  the  heights  of  Belleville  and  Mont- 
martre, from  which  they  threw  their  projectiles  on  the  fau- 
bourgs. There  was  now  no  resource  but  to  defend  foot  by 
foot  the  streets  ;  but  this  could  not  be  done  without  the 
hearty  cooperation  of  the  inhabitants,  and  the  marshals  were 
doubtful  whether  they  wrere  disposed  to  make  this  effort. 
Moreover  there  was  no  one  amonjj  these  chiefs  of  sufficient 


Ch.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  289 

head  to  conceive  and  execute  such  energetic  measures.  My 
brother  Joseph,  to  whom  I  had  given  the  cominand-iu-chief, 
at  Paris,  was  the  first  to  leave.  The  marshals,  with  his 
authorization,  entered  into  a  treaty  with  the  enemy.  The 
capital  opened  its  gates,  and  the  troops  of  the  line  who  had 
defended  the  approaches  profited  by  the  night  to  fall  back 
on  Essonne. 

Situation  of  France.— I  returned  to  Fontainebleau,  my 
soul  weighed  down  to  death.  By  rallying  all  my  troops,  I 
could  yet  dispose  of  fifty  thousand  men  ;  but  this  force, 
which  would  have  been  sufficient  to  prevent  the  entrance  of 
the  allies  into  Paris,  was  not  sufficient  to  drive  them  out. 
The  news  from  the  south  was  far  from  favorable  ;  the  En- 
glish were  in  possession  of  Bordeaux,  and  the  Austrians  of 
Lyons.  The  Anglo-Sicilian  army  of  Bentinck,  disposable  in 
Catalonia,  came  to  attack  Genoa  ;  my  empire  was  falling  on 
all  sides.  No  human  force  could  retard  its  overthrow,  after 
France  refused  to  unite  her  fate  with  mine.  The  French 
people  had  not  displayed  the  energy  which  I  expected  in  the 
defense  of  their  soil  ;  the  small  number  of  men  who  took  up 
arms  covered  themselves  with  glory  ;  the  rest  well  merited 
the  fate  which  befell  them. 

Want  of  Public  Spirit  in  Paris. — I  must  confess  that 
twenty  years  of  war,  the  conscription,  anticipated  for  two 
years,  the  cohorts  of  the  bans  levied  in  1812,  had  exhausted 
the  class  which  furnishes  the  best  soldiers.  Since  the  year 
1800,  the  word  Patrie  was  no  longer  heard  in  the  streets,  nor 
in  the  salons  of  Paris.  Nevertheless,  the  word  honor,  which 
made  to  vibrate  every  heart  in  France,  supplied  its  place.  The 
remembrance  of  the  grand  movement  of  1793,  was  still  fresh 
in  my  memory  ;  the  independence  of  France  was  so  closely 
connected  with  the  integrity  of  the  soil  that  I  was  unable  to 
conceive  the  apathy  of  the  nation  at  such  a  decisive  crisis. 

The  orators  of  the  tribune  seized  the  moment  of  peril  to 

vol.  iv. — 19. 


290  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

declaim  and  excite  discord,  when  all  resentments  should 
have  been  stifled.  Public  scribblers  with  whom  Paris 
swarmed  and  whom  I  had  subjected  to  salutary  restraint, 
now  applied  their  pens  to  compose  political  pamphlets.  The 
salons,  filled  with  fops  and  old  women  who  wished  to  guide 
the  state,  opened  upon  me  their  noisy  batteries.  In  a  word, 
the  same  nation,  which  in  1793  had  condemned  to  death  the 
young  girls  who  went  to  Verdun  to  compliment  the  King  of 
Prussia,  in  1814,  represented  the  defenders  of  their  country 
as  freebooters,  and  the  soldiers  of  the  coalition  as  heroes  ! 
They  did  not  blush  to  deck  themselves  in  bonnets  à  la  Blu- 
cher  eight  days  before  his  cannon  thundered  on  Paris.  The 
brave  men  who  covered  themselves  with  glory  in  defending 
the  capital  against  a  force  ten  times  their  own,  exhausted 
with  hunger,  found  no  merited  succor  in  traversing  the  city  ; 
but  the  shops,  which  had  been  closed  to  them,  were  thrown 
open  to  the  Pandours  !  All  heads  were  turned.  Bordeaux 
even  excelled  Paris,  and  the  English  were  there  received  as 
liberators  !  Lyons  alone  went  into  mourning  at  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Austrians  !  * 

*  After  describing  the  sudden  change  of  opinion  in  Paris  against  Napoleon, 
Thiers  says: 

"  Such  was  the  fierce  explosion  of  anger  to  which,  by  a  terrible  reaction  in 
sublunary  things,  Napoleon  was  exposed  ;  he  who  during  twenty  years  had 
been  so  servilely  flattered,  he  whose  deeds  had  excited  the  admiration  of  the 
astonished  world. 

"  But  he  was  too  great  not  to  remain  unmoved  by  such  indignities,  whilst  he 
was  at  the  same  time  conscious  that  his  own  acts  had  produced  this  revulsion 
of  public  feeling.  And  the  flatteries  lavished  at  the  same  time  on  the  allied 
sovereigns  made  the  picture  of  humanity  still  more  pitiable. 

"  Alexander,  undoubtedly,  by  his  own  conduct  and  the  example  he  gave  his 
allies,  deserved  the  thanks  of  the  French  people.  But  if  ingratitude  can  not  be 
sanctioned  under  any  circumstances,  gratitude  ought  to  be  measured  in  expres- 
sion when  addressed  to  the  conqerors  of  our  native  land.  Yet  it  was  not  so, 
and  the  Royalists  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  allied  sovereigns,  who  had 
suffered  so  much  from  the  French,  displayed  great  magnanimity,  in  taking  so 
gentle  a  vengeance.  The  flames  of  Moscow  were  every  day  recalled,  not  by 
Russian  but  by  French  writers.  They  were  not  content  with  praising  Marshal 
Blucher  and  General  Sacken,  brave  men,  whose  praise  was  natural  and  well- 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  291 

Conduct  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  in  Paris.— But  I  will 
render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that  are  Caesar's  :  and  I  must 
confess  that  the  sojourn  of  Alexander  at  Paris  contrasted 
with  my  treatment  of  Moscow  and  of  Smolensko  at  my  de- 
parture from  these  places  ;  his  conduct  was  noble  and  gen- 
erous :  it  is  true  that  it  was  for  his  interest  to  seek  to  gain 
the  good  will  of  the  Parisians,  and  that  France  has  paid  dear 
for  that  generosity.  But  as  it  sprung  from  the  heart,  it  is 
none  the  less  worthy  of  eulogy.  His  entrance  into  Paris  was 
more  like  that  of  Henry  IV.,  than  that  of  a  conqueror  who 
came  to  avenge  the  explosion  of  the  Kremlin,  and  the  ravage 
of  his  empire.  An  immense  crowd  saluted  him  with  accla- 
mation, and  crowded  to  see  him  pass.  They  believed  that, 
satisfied  with  my  fall,  he  would  not  enrich  himself  with  the 
spoils  of  the  empire. 

Intrigues  of  the  Factions.— My  reign  had  been  no  field  for 
the  intrigues  of  women.  With  the  exception  of  the  wives 
and  families  of  my  army  whom  I  loaded  with  favors,  they 
loved  me  not  :  mothers  reproached  me  with  the  conscription, 
as  though  that  had  been  my  work  ;  women  of  gallantry 
reproached  my  severity  ;  dowagers  of  the  faubourg  St.  Ger- 
main treated  me  as  a  parvenu  soldier,  and  they  never  could 
pardon  me  for  eclipsing  the  old  régime.  They  received  the 
allies  with  acclamations,  and  waved  their  handkerchiefs  from 

deserved  from  Prussian  and  Russian  lips,  but  these  writers  sought  out  a 
French  emigrant,  General  Langeron,  who  served  in  the  army  of  the  Czar,  and 
related  with  complacency  how  he  had  distinguished  himself  in  the  attack  on 
Montmartre,  and  with  what  well-merited  reward  he  had  been  loaded  by  the 
Russian  monarch.  Thus,  amongst  the  many  changes  of  our  great  and  terrible 
revolution,  patriotism,  like  liberty,  were  doomed  to  reverses  ;  and  just  as  lib- 
erty, the  idol  of  every  heart  in  1789,  became  in  1793,  the  object  of  universal 
execration,  in  like  manner  patriotism  had  now  fallen  into  such  disrepute,  that 
the  act  of  bearing  arms  against  the  natal  soil,  an  act  condemned  in  every  age, 
now  met  laudation.  Weary  days  of  reaction,  when  the  public  mind,  losing  its 
primary  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  rejects  what  it  had  adored  and  adores 
what  it  had  rejected,  and  esteems  the  most  shameful  contradictions  a  happy 
reconversion  to  truth." 


292  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

all  the  windows  of  the  boulevards  through  which  the  cortège 
passed.  Intriguers  presented  this  fortuitous  circumstance  as 
a  manifestation  of  public  opinion.  To  believe  them,  France 
was  sighing  for  the  princes  which  the  same  generation  had 
refused  to  recognize  :  they  pretended  that  these  handkerchiefs 
were  the  oriflamme  of  the  Valois,  the  flag  of  Philip  Au- 
gustus !  !  !  It  was  a  fine  theme  for  the  poetic  heads  of 
demagogues,  and  for  the  machinations  of  the  Talleyrands, 
the  Dalbergs,  the  Fouches,  the  Duponts,  the  Vitrolles,  &c. 
The  club  of  these  gentlemen,  directed  by  the  ex-bishop  of 
Autun,  after  having  moved  heaven  and  earth  to  bring  the 
allies  from  Frankfort  and  Chaumont  to  Paris,  easily  acquired 
credit  with  the  sovereigns  ;  it  persuaded  them  that  the 
nation  wished  me  no  longer  ;  and,  certain  of  finding  support 
among  the  old  men  of  the  senate,  with  whose  conduct  I  had 
not  always  been  satisfied,  they  hastened  to  obtain  from  this 
mutilated  body  a  vote  conformable  to  their  designs.  The 
second  of  April,  the  senate,  which  I  had  created  and  loaded 
with  benefits,  declared  me  dethroned,  and  instituted  a  pro- 
visional government.  It  must,  however,  be  remarked  that 
this  resolution  was  passed  by  a  factious  minority  ;  for  of  the 
one  hundred  and  forty  members  composing  that  body  only 
sixty-six  took  part  in  it,  and  these  were  not  the  men  for 
whom  I  had  done  the  least.  They  were  presided  over  by 
Talleyrand,  whose  name  will  pass  to  posterity  as  the  syno- 
nym of  an  apostate  and  a  sycophant.* 


*  The  following  is  Thiers'  account  of  some  of  Talleyrand's  intrigues  at  this 
epoch  : 

"The  man  destined  soon  to  fill  this  void — M.  de  Talleyrand,  whom  by  a 
secret  instinct  Napoleon  had  foreseen  as  the  author  of  his  fall,  and  whom  the 
public,  by  an  instinct  as  correct,  looked  upon  as  the  necessary  author  of  an 
approaching  revolution, — M.  de  Talleyrand  found  himself  at  this  moment  in  a 
state  of  extreme  perplexity.  In  virtue  of  his  rank  as  Grand  Dignitary,  he 
ought  to  follow  the  Regent  ;  but  by  leaving,  he  rejected  the  great  part  that 
awaited  his  acceptance  ;  and  by  not  leaving,  he  exposed  himself  to  be  taken 
in  an  overt  act  of  treason,  which  might  involve  serious  consequences,  if  Napo- 


Ch.  XXI.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  293 

Abdication  of  Fontainebleau.— The  troops  who  surrounded 
me  at  Fontainebleau,  although  few  in  number,  were  so 
devoted,  and  capable  of  so  much  heroism  that  I  might  still 

leon,  by  a  sudden  stroke  of  good  fortune — always  possible  in  his  case — should 
re-appear  as  conqueror  before  the  gates  of  the  capital.  To  extricate  himself 
from  this  embarrassment,  he  sought  an  interview  with  the  Duke  of  Rovigo  to 
obtain  permission  to  remain  at  Paris,  saying,  that  in  the  absence  of  the  entire 
government,  he  would  be  able  to  render  important  services. 

"The  Duke  of  Rovigo,  suspecting  that  these  services  would  be  rendered  to 
some  other  than  to  Napoleon,  refused  the  desired  permission,  which,  in  fact,  he 
had  not  power  to  accord.  M.  de  Talleyrand  sought  the  prefects,  but  could  not 
obtain  what  he  desired  ;  and  not  knowing  how  to  cover  with  a  specious  pre- 
text his  prolonged  stay  at  Paris,  he  took  the  resolution  of  stepping  into  a  car- 
riage, and  affect  at  least  a  willingness  to  follow  the  Regent.  Towards  the 
close  of  the  day,  as  the  battle  ceased  to  rage,  he  presented  himself,  without 
passport  and  with  great  traveling  pomp,  at  the  barrier  leading  to  the  Orleans 
route. 

"  The  barrier  was  occupied  by  the  National  Guards,  highly  irritated  against 
those  who,  during  the  past  two  days,  had  deserted  the  city.  A  kind  of  tumult 
was  raised  about  M.  de  Talleyrand's  carriage  ;  some  contemporaries  regard 
this  as  a  national  outburst,  others  believe  it  to  have  been  pre-arranged. 

"His  passport  was  demanded;  he  had  none;  a  murmur  was  raised  against 
this  neglect  of  an  essential  formality;  and  then,  with  an  affected  deference  to 
the  opinion  of  the  brave  defenders  of  Paris,  he  retraced  his  steps  and  returned 
to  his  mansion. 

"  The  greater  part  of  those  who  contributed  to  detain  him,  and  who  were 
not  desirous  of  a  revolution,  little  suspected  they  had  detained  the  man  who 
was  about  to  effect  one. 

"  Not  being  fully  satisfied  as  to  the  formality  of  his  conduct,  M.  de  Talley- 
rand repassed  to  the  house  of  Marshal  Marmont,  who,  the  battle  now  over,  had 
hastened  to  his  dwelling,  situate  in  the  faubourg  Poissonnière.  People  of 
every  class  flocked  thither,  seeking,  on  some  side,  a  government,  and  crowding 
round  the  man  who,  at  this  moment,  seemed  to  represent  one,  since  he  was 
head  of  the  only  force  existing  in  the  capital.  Marshal  Mortier  was  subordi- 
nate to  him  on  all  important  occasions. 

"  The  two  prefects,  a  portion  of  the  municipal  body,  and  several  distinguished 
personages  were  present.  Every  one  spoke  of  the  late  events  with  emotion, 
and  according  to  his  individual  sentiments.  Seeing  the  marshal,  whose  face 
was  blackened  with  powder,  and  his  coat  rent  by  balls,  the  assembly  felicitated 
him  on  his  courageous  defense  of  Paris,  and  then  proceeded  to  talk  of  the 
situation  of  affairs. 

"  There  was  a  species  of  unanimity  in  condemning  what  they  called  the 
cowardly  desertion  of  those  that  Napoleon  had  left  in  the  capital  to  defend  it, 
and  against  Napoleon  himself,  whose  mad  policy  had  brought  the  armies  of 
Europe  to  the  foot  of  Montmartre.  The  royalists — and  there  was  a  consider- 
able number  present — did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  French  ought  to  throw 


294  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

have  attempted  some  feat  of  arms.  I,  at  first,  thought  of 
doing  this,  as,  in  the  impossibility  of  conquering,  every  com- 
bat, whatever  its  issue,  would  at  least  add  to  the  eclat  of  my 

off  an  insupportable  yoke,  and  boldly  named  the  Bourbons.  Two  influential 
bankers,  M.  M.  Peregaux  and  Lafitte,  the  one  connected  by  the  ties  of  blood, 
the  other  by  those  of  friendship,  with  the  Duke  of  Ragusa,  attracted  attention 
by  the  vivacity  of  their  language.  The  second  especially,  whose  secular  suc- 
cess had  just  commenced,  and  whose  versatile  and  brilliant  talents  had 
attracted  general  attention,  spoke  strongly,  and  went  as  far  as  to  exclaim,  on 
hearing  the  name  of  the  Bourbous  pronounced  :  '  Well,  be  it  so,  give  us  the 
Bourbons,  if  you  wish,  but  with  a  Constitution  that  will  guarantee  us  against 
a  fearful  despotism,  and  with  peace,  of  which  we  have  been  so  long  deprived.  ' 
This  unanimity  of  feeling  against  the  imperial  despotism,  carried  so  far  as  to 
make  the  upper  bourgeoisie  consider  the  Bourbons,  with  whom  they  had  never 
come  in  contact,  very  acceptable,  produced  an  extraordinary  impression  on  all 
present. 

"  It  was  suggested  in  the  assembly  that  they  ought  not  to  think  exclusively 
of  the  army,  that  the  capital,  too,  ought  to  engage  their  attention.  Marshal 
Marmont  replied  that  he  was  not  empowered  to  treat  for  the  capital  ;  it  was 
therefore  thought  proper  that  the  prefects,  with  a  deputation  from  the  Muni- 
cipal Council  and  the  National  Guards,  should  be  deputed  to  wait  on  the  allied 
sovereigns,  and  demand  from  them  that  treatment  to  which  Paris  had  a  right 
from  civilized  princes,  who,  since  the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  had  announced 
themselves  as  the  liberators,  and  not  the  conquerors  of  France. 

"  Whilst  these  discussions  were  at  the  height,  M.  de  Talleyrand  arrived.  He 
had  a  private  conversation  with  Marshal  Marmont.  He  wished  at  first  to  ob- 
tain something  resembling  an  authorization  of  his  stay  at  Paris,  the  which  no 
person  was  less  in  a  position  to  grant  than  the  marshal,  but  he  began  to  selt 
less  value  on  this  permission  when  he  saw  what  was  passing  around  him. 

"  He  instantly  conceived  the  idea  of  making  this  visit  facilitate  a  denouement 
which  he  now  began  to  regard  as  inevitable,  and  which  should,  of  necessity, 
be  accomplished  by  him.  No  man  was  more  open  to  flattery  than  Marshal 
Marmont,  and  none  knew  better  than  M.  de  Talleyrand  how  to  administer  the 
draught.  The  marshal  had,  during  this  campaign,  committed  serious  errors, 
but  discoverable  only  by  military  men,  whilst  he  had,  at  the  same  time,  dis- 
played heroic  bravery.  On  this  very  day  especially,  the  thirtieth  of  March,  he 
had  acquired  lasting  claims  on  the  gratitude  of  his  country.  His  face,  his 
hands,  his  dress,  bore  testimony  to  what  he  had  done.  M.  de  Talleyrand 
praised  his  courage,  his  talents,  and  especially  his  understanding,  very  much 
superior,  as  he  affirmed,  to  that  of  other  marshals.  The  Duke  of  Ragusa,  as 
usual,  became  very  much  elated  when  told  that  he  was  endowed  with  high 
intelligence,  in  which  his  fellow-commanders  were  deficient,  and  it  must  be 
acknowledged,  that  in  this  respect,  he  possessed  what  they  could  lay  no 
claim  to. 

"He  listened,  consequently,  with  a  sentiment  of  profound  satisfaction  to 
what  the  arch-tempter,  who  was  preparing  his  ruin,  told  him.     M.  de  Talley- 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  14.  295 

fall.  Besides  who  knows  what  would  have  been  the  result 
of  a  retrograde  step  of  the  allies  ?  If  we  could  not  drive  the 
enemy  from  Paris,  it  was  easy  to  fall  back  behind  the  Loire, 
to  rally  Soult,  Suchet,  and  Augereau,  forming  together  a 
mass  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  or  one  hundred  and  thirty 
thousand  men,  throw  them  into  our  frontier  line  of  fortresses, 
and  fight  as  the  Romans  did  in  Spain  when  Hannibal  was 
threatening  the  heart  of  the  republic.    The  marshals,0  wearied 

rand  took  some  trouble  to  point  out  the  serious  position  of  affairs,  and  the  ne- 
cessity of  extricating  France  from  the  hands  that  had  destroyed  her;  he  gave 
the  marshal  to  understand  that  under  existing  circumstances,  a  soldier  who 
had  defended  Paris  so  gloriously,  and  who  had  still  under  his  command  the 
men  at  whose  head  he  had  fought,  possessed  the  means  of  saving  his  country, 
which  had  now  no  master.  M.  de  Talleyrand  went  no  farther,  for  he  knew 
that  no  person  is  seduced  at  the  first  attempt  He  took  his  departure,  and 
left  the  unfortunate  Marmont  intoxicated  with  vanity  ;  and  now,  amid  the 
disasters  of  France  he  sketched  for  himself,  in  imagination,  the  most  brilliant 
destiny,  whilst  the  simple-minded  and  upright  soldier,  who  had  been  his  col- 
league, on  this  same  thirtieth  March,  Mortier,  whose  face,  too,  was  blackened 
with  powder,'  devoured  his  grief  iu  the  loneliness  to  which  his  modesty  and 
uprightness  consigned  him." 

*  Thiers  thus  speaks  of  the  conduct  of  Xapnleon  to  his  officers  at  this  time  : 

"  He  thought  it  very  natural  that  people  should  quit  him,  for  these  officers, 
who  had  always  obeyed  his  commands,  except  on  the  last  day,  were  naturally 
anxious  to  rally  round  the  Bourbons,  in  order  to  preserve  the  rank  which  was 
the  just  reward  of  the  labors  of  their  life. 

"  He  only  wished  they  had  been  a  little  more  frank,  and  to  encourage,  he 
addressed  them  in  the  following  noble  language: — 'Serve  the  Bourbons,' he 
said  to  them,  'serve  them  fiithfully;  no  other  course  remains  to  you.  It' they 
act  wisely,  France,  under  their  rule,  may  be  happy  and  respected.  I  resisted 
M.  de  Caulaincourt's  earnest  entreaties  to  make  me  accept  the  peace  of  Chatil- 
lon.  I  was  right.  For  me  these  conditions  were  humiliating;  they  are  not  so 
for  the  Bourbons.  They  find  France  as  they  left  her,  and  may  accept  her  an- 
cient limits  without  compromising  their  dignity.  Such  as  she  is,  France  will 
still  be  powerful ,  and  though  geographically  diminished,  she  will  be  still  as 
morally  great  as  before,  by  her  courage,  her  arts,  and  her  intellectual  influence 
over  the  rest  of  the  world.  If  her  territorial  extent  is  diminished,  her  glory  is 
not.  The  memories  of  our  victories  will  remain  to  her  as  a  monument  of  im- 
perishable greatness,  and  which  will  always  have  immense  weight  in  the  coun- 
cils of  Europe. 

Serve  France  under  the  princes  who  bring  back  at  this  moment  fortune,  so 
fickle  in  times  of  revolution.  Serve  France  under  them  as  you  have  done  under 
me.  Do  not  make  the  task  too  difficult  for  them,  and  leave  me,  but  give  me  a 
place  in  your  memory.' 


296  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

with  the  war,  thought  differently  ;  they  demanded  to  know 
what  were  my  hopes;  my  resources,  and  the  term  of  their 
sacrifices.     They  spoke  to  me  of  abdication  as  the  means  of 

Napoleon  told  M.  de  Caulaincourt  how  much  he  was  pleased  with  the  con- 
duct of  Marshal  Macdonald,  who,  though  so  long  antagonistic  to  him,  acted  in 
this  trying  moment  like  a  devoted  friend;  he  took  an  indulgent  view  of  Marshal 
Ney's  nobility,  and  speaking  of  the  conduct  of  his  lieutenants  with  a  slightly  dis- 
dainful gentleness,  said  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt  :   -'Ah!  Caulaincourt,  men,  men  1 

"  '  My  marshals  would  blush  to  act  as  Marmont  has  done,  for  they  express 
the  strongest  indignation  at  his  conduct,  but  they  are  very  sorry  that  he  has  so 
far  outstripped  them  on  the  road  to  fortune. 

"  '  They  would  be  very  glad,  without  dishonoring  themselves,  to  do  as  he 
has  done,  to  acquire  the  same  rights  to  the  favor  of  the  Bourbons.' 

"He  afterward  spoke  of  Marmont  with  vexation,  but  without  bitterness. 
'  I  treated  him,' he  said,  ;as  if  he  were  my  own  child.  I  have  often  had  to 
defend  him  against  his  colleagues,  who  did  not  appreciate  his  intellectual  ad- 
vantages, and  who,  judging  him  only  by  what  he  appears  on  the  field  of  battle, 
made  no  account  of  his  military  talents. 

"  '  I  created  him  marshal  and  duke  through  personal  affection  and  regard  for 
the  recollections  of  childhood,  and,  I  may  well  say,  that  I  reckoned  on  his 
fidelity.  He  is,  perhaps,  the  only  man  whose  desertion  I  was  not  prepared 
for  ;  but  vanity,  weakness  of  mind,  and  ambition  have  misled  him.  The  un- 
happy man  does  not  know  what  awaits  him  ;  his  name  will  be  forever  dishon- 
ored. Believe  me,  I  have  no  longer  a  thought  about  myself— my  career  is  fin- 
ished, or,  very  nearly  so.  Besides,  what  desire  could  I  now  have  to  reign  over 
hearts  that  have  grown  weary  of  me,  and  are  eager  to  offer  their  allegiance  to 
another?  I  think  only  of  France,  which  it  is  frightful  to  leave  in  this  state — 
clipped,  crippled,  after  having  had  frontiers  so  vast  1  Oh,  Caulaincourt,  that  is 
the  most  poignant  of  the  many  humiliations  heaped  on  my  head  !  Oh,  if  these 
dolts  had  not  abandoned  me,  I  would  have  rebuilt  the  fabric  of  her  greatness  ; 
for,  be  assured,  the  allies,  maintaining  their  actual  position,  having  Paris  behind 
them  and  me  in  front,  would  have  been  destroyed.  Had  they  left  Paris  to  es- 
cape the  danger,  they  should  never  have  entered  it  again.  The  very  fact  of 
their  leaving  the  city,  at  my  approach,  would  be  in  itself  a  signal  defeat.  That 
unfortunate  Marmont  has  frustrated  this  glorious  result.  Ah,  Caulaincourt, 
what  joy  it  would  have  been  to  restore  the  greatness  of  France  in  a  few  hours  ! 
Now,  what  is  to  be  done?  I  would  have  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men,  with  those  I  have  here,  and  the  troops  Eugene,  Augereau,  Suchet,  and 
Soult  could  bring  ;  but  I  would  be  obliged  to  retire  behind  the  Loire,  entice 
the  enemy  to  follow,  and  thus  extend  indefinitely  the  ravages  to  which  France 
has  been  so  long  exposed,  and  try  the  fidelity  of  many.  who.  perhaps,  would 
not  bear  the  test  better  than  Marmont, — and  I  should  make  all  these  efforts  to 
prolong  a  reign,  which,  I  clearly  see,  is  drawing  to  a  close.  I  do  not  feel  suffi- 
cient energy  to  make  such  efforts. 

"  '  Undoubtedly,  in  prolonging  the  war,  we  should  find  means  of  improving 
our  position. 


Ch.  XXL] 


CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  297 


saving  France  ;  I  felt  that  I  owed  to  my  country  this  sacri- 
fice of  self-love,  and  was  resigned  to  the  measure.     I,  how- 
ever did  not  deceive  myself  as  to  the  results  of  this  abdica- 
tion ;  but  as  this  form  might  some  day  be  of  use  to  my  son, 
I  no  longer  hesitated.     A  numerous  party  was  in   favor  of 
placing  this  child  on  the  throne,  as  the  means  of  preserving 
the   revolution  with   my  dynasty  ;  I  for  a  moment  parti- 
cipated in  this  hope,  and  charged  Caukincourt  and  Ney  to 
offer  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  treat  on  this  basis.     This 
prince  hesitated  :  he  had   had  time    to  see  that    the   mad 
acclamations  of  a  population  of  women,  and  of  a  few  thou- 
sand malcontents  of  all  colors,  were  at  least  very  equivocal 
signs  of  the  national  spirit.    Many  parties  besieged  him  with 
their  fears  and  their  hopes.     He  judged   that  if  the  army 
received  reinforcements  from  the  National  Guards,  and  pro- 
nounced strongly  in  my  favor,  the  position  of  the  allies  in 
Paris  would  become  precarious.     He  was  deliberating  what 
course  to  pursue,  when  it  was  announced  to  him  that  Mar- 
mont  and  his  corps- d'armée  had  abandoned  me.     This  inci- 
dent determined  his  course  ;  he  thought  my  cause  had  now 
become  desperate  in  the  eyes  even  of  the  army.     He  did  that 

•"I  am  informed,  on  all  sides,  that  the  peasants  of  Lorraine,  Champagne, 
and  Burgundy,  cut  down  isolated  parties  of  the  enemy.  Within  a  short  time 
the  people  will  conceive  a  horror  of  the  enemy  ;  the  Parisians  will  tire  of 
Alexander's  magnanimity.  This  prince  is  gracious  in  his  manner.-he  pleases 
women  •  but  so  much  graciousness  in  a  conqueror  soon  becomes  revolting  to 
the  national  pride  of  the  conquered.  Moreover,  the  Bourbons  are  coming,  and 
who  can  foresee  the  consequences. 

"  '  To-day  they  reconcile  France  with  Europe;  but  to-morrow  m  what  state 
will  she  be  in  relation  to  herself?  They  represent  external  peace,  but  internal 
war  You  will  see  what  they  will  have  done  with  the  country  m  a  year 
They  will  not  keep  Talleyrand  six  months.  There  would  be  many  chances  of 
success  in  a  prolonged  struggle,-chances  both  political  and  mihtary,-but  at 
the  price  of  fearful  calamities.  Besides,  at  this  moment,  something  more  is 
needed  than  myself.  My  name,  my  statue,  my  sword,  ^  ^J^ J 
must  vield.  I  am  going  to  recall  the  marshals,  and  you  will  see  their  dehgH 
when  I  extricate  them  from  their  difficulties,  and  authorize  them  to  do  as  Mar 


mont  has  done,  without  compromising 


their  honor.'  ' 


298  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXI. 

army  injustice.  The  brave  men  who  composed  it  were 
attached  to  me  for  life  or  death.  Their  hearts  told  them 
that  after  my  fall,  there  would  be  no  glory,  or  prosperity,  or 
integrity  of  territory,  for  France.  I  was  in  their  eyes  the 
tutelary  angel  of  their  country.  They  had  never  seen  it  so 
beautiful  and  flourishing  as  daring  my  reign.  If,  at  other 
epochs,  I  had  delivered  it  from  the  furies  of  anarchy,  and 
the  odious  presence  of  foreign  troops,  why  might  I  not 
eventually  come  out  victorious  from  this  new  contest  ?  The 
hope  of  saving  France  inflamed  their  noble  courage.  They 
counted  for  nothing  the  fatigues  and  dangers  which  I  had 
shared  with  them,  and  whose  reward  should  be  an  immortal 
glory.  But  intriguers  and  royalists,  compromised  by  their 
first  steps  towards  the  conquerors,  hastened  to  present  the 
dishonorable  act  of  two  ungrateful  generals  as  the  opinion  of 
the  army;  but  so  far  were  the  troops  from  participating  in  this 
defection,  that  it  was  necessary  to  employ  a  ruse  to  get  them 
to  Versailles,  where  they  rose  up  against  the  treason  of  their 
own  generals.  But  whatever  weight  was  thrown  into  the 
scale  in  favor  of  my  dynasty  by  the  energetic  protestations  of 
Marmont's  corps,  the  senate  destroyed  all  by  recalling  to  the 
throne  the  brother  of  Louis  XVI.  All  was  now  lost  for  my 
son  as  well  as  for  myself.  Not  deeming  the  crown  worth  the 
consequences  of  a  civil  war,  as  a  sequel  to  the  existing  foreign 
war,  I  now  signed  an  unreserved  abdication.0 

It  has  been  pretended  that  the  allies  had  no  choice,  and 
that  they  would  have  been  greatly  embarrassed  at  repelling 

*  The  following  is  the  formal  abdication  of  Napoleon  at  Fontainebleau,  dated 
April,  6th,  1814: 

"  The  allied  powers  having  declared  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon  is  the  sole 
obstacle  to  the  reestablishment  of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor,  faithful  to  his 
oath,  declares  that  he  renounces,  for  himself  and  his  heirs,  the  thrones  of 
France  and  Italy,  and  that  there  is  no  personal  sacrifice,  not  even  that  of  life 
itself,  which  he  is  not  willing  to  make  for  the  interests  of  France. 

"Napoleon.'- 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  299 

the  lieutenant  of  the  kingdom  who  had  already  arrived  at 
Nancy,  by  trampling  under  foot  the  principles  for  which  they 
had  been  fighting  for  the  last  twenty  years.  Such  arguments 
are  too  absurd  ;  if  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  had  con- 
sented to  treat  of  my  abdication  on  condition  of  recognizing 
my  dynasty,  and  of  discussing  the  conditions  of  a  definitive 
peace  with  a  council  of  regency,  the  motichoirs  blancs  Avould 
certainly  not  have  prevented  their  doing  so.  They  yielded 
less  to  necessity  and  the  intrigues  of  some  personages,  than 
to  their  own  views  of  convenience  and  of  a  durable  peace. 

In  taking  the  crown  I  had  sheltered  thrones  from  the 
people  ;  in  restoring  it  to  the  Bourbons  they  thought  to 
secure  them  from  successful  soldiers.  The  impartial  states- 
man will  say  that  in  the  universal  shipwreck  of  France,  the 
return  of  the  Bourbons  seemed  favorable  for  the  country. 
Without  that  return,  the  kingdom,  abandoned  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  a  regency,  would  have  been  exposed  to  the  horrors 
of  civil  war,  and  the  country  placed  in  a  situation,  perhaps, 
still  more  delicate  than  on  my  return  from  Egypt.  The 
recall  of  the  legitimate  princes  seemed  calculated  to  save 
France  from  anarchy.  It  was  to  be  supposed  that  twenty 
years  of  misfortune  had  taught  these  princes  some  salutary 
lessons  ;  that  they  had  forgotten  much  and  learned  much  ; 
they  were  better  situated  than  any  one  else  to  reconcile  old 
France  with  new  France  ;  they  required  only  the  head  and 
heart  of  Henry  IV. 

I  felt,  when  too  late,  that  I  had  committed  an  error  in  not 
putting  a  difference  of  religion  between  my  dynasty  and  that 
of  the  Bourbons.  It  was  not  the  mediocrity  of  talent,  nor 
the  political  faults  of  James  and  of  Charles  II.  which  a 
second  time  hurled  the  race  of  the  Stuarts  from  the  throne 
of  England,  but  the  opposition  of  religious  opinion.  If,  at 
the  epoch  of  the  concordat,  I  had  embraced  the  reformed 
religion  with  all  the  men  attached  to  the  public  administra- 


300  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

tion,  all  France  would  have  imitated  my  example,  and  my 
son  would  probably  have  succeeded  me  on  the  throne. 

Kussia  was  not  inclined  to  favor  my  dynasty  :  in  the  first 
place,  personal  animosity  had  succeeded  to  the  sentiments 
which  Alexander  had  entertained  for  me  in  1807  ;  in  the 
second  place,  he  reflected  that  my  son,  as  a  minor,  with. 
Maria-Louisa  as  regent,  would  be  under  the  influence  of 
Metternich,  and  thus  add  to  the  power  of  Austria.  England, 
flattering  herself  that  she  would  be  able  to  exercise  an  ascen- 
dency over  the  Bourbon  refugees,  and  wishing  to  give  a 
triumph  to  the  principles  which  Pitt  had  always  alleged  as 
a  pretext  for  all  his  wars,  was  the  more  interested  in  the 
overthrow  of  my  family,  not  from  affection  for  ihe  princes 
whose  restoration  she  had  more  than  once  opposed,  but  be- 
cause, by  their  return  now,  she  could  accomplish  her  own 
views. 

A  general  peace  followed  the  recall  of  the  Bourbons  ;  but 
its  results  were  hard;  France  lost  everything.  It  was  a 
treaty  in  which  each  one  demanded  ample  indemnifications 
for  his  sacrifices  and  his  expenses;  but  Louis  XVIII.  had 
expended  nothing,  and  could  not  ask,  with  a  good  grace,  for 
anything  in  the  partition  of  my  spoils.  Carnot  has  re- 
proached the  Bourbons  for  having  so  easily  yielded  Belgium; 
but  this  was  a  sine  qua  non,  without  which  England  would 
not  treat  with  them  ;  and  their  return  without  a  maritime 
peace,  would  have  led  to  a  war  still  worse  than  that  to  which 
they  were  putting  an  end.  Moreover,  what  means  had  they 
left  to  refuse  this  cession  ?  The  battle  of  Toulouse  had  just 
completed  the  ruin  of  our  affairs. 

Battle  of  Toulouse. — Soult  was  making  every  preparation 
to  defend  this  city,  when  Wellington  presented  himself  to 
attack  it,  six  days  after  my  abdication.  A  confused  report 
of  the  events  which  had  occurred  at  Paris  was  not  sufficient 
to  deter  this  marshal  from  defending  a  French  city  when  it 


Ch.  XXI.J  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  301 

was  attacked  by  the  English  ;  but  party  spirit,  always  ready 
to  misrepresent  circumstances  and  pronounce  men  guilty,  has 
not  failed  to  accuse  Soult  of  crime  in  making  this  defense. 
They  have  compared  him  to  the  celebrated  William  of 
Orange,  who  fought  the  battle  of  Mons  after  a  treaty  of 
peace  had  been  signed,  and  out  of  pure  animosity  to  Louis 
XIV.  The  comparison  is  unjust  ;  fur  the  Prince  of  Orange 
knew  that  peace  was  signed  ;  whereas  Soult  had  received 
only  vague  rumors  of  the  entrance  of  the  allies  into  Paris  ; 
there  was  still  a  state  of  war,  and  he  repelled  a  hostile  aggres- 
sion."*    He  was  beaten.     It  is  true  that  his  left  and  centre 


*  Napier  says  : 

"  Marshal  Soult  and  General  Thouvenot  have  been  accused  of  fighting  with 
a  full  knowledge  of  Napoleon's  abdication.  This  charge  circulated  originally 
by  the  Bourbon  party  is  utterly  unfounded.  The  extent  of  the  information 
conveyed  to  Thouvenot  through  the  advanced  posts  has  been  already  noticed  ; 
it  was  not  sufficiently  authentic  to  induce  Sir  John  Hope  to  make  a  formal 
communication,  and  the  governor  could  only  treat  it  as  an  idle  story  to  insult 
or  to  deceive  him.  and  baffle  his  defense  by  retarding  his  counter-operations 
while  the  works  for  the  siege  were  advancing. 

"  For,  how  unlikely,  nay  impossible,  must  it  not  have  appeared,  that  the 
Emperor  Napoleon,  whose  victories  at  Montmirail  and  Champ-Aubert  were 
known  before  the  close  investment  of  Bayonne,  should  have  been  deprived  of 
his  crown  in  the  space  of  a  few  weeks,  and  the  stupendous  event  be  only  hinted 
at  the  outposts  without  any  relaxation  in  the  preparations  for  the  siege. 

"  As  false  and  unsubstantial  is  the  charge  against  Soult. 

'•The  acute  remarks  of  an  English  military  writer,  that  if  the  Duke  of  Dal- 
matia  hid  known  of  the  peace  before  he  fought,  he  would  certainly  have  an- 
nounced it  after  the  battle,  were  it  only  to  maintain  himself  in  that  city,  and 
claim  a  victor}',  is  unanswerable  ;  but  there  are  direct  proofs  of  the  falsehood 
of  the  accusation.  How  was  the  intelligence  to  reach  him  ?  It  was  not  until 
the  seventh  that  the  provisional  government  wrote  to  him  from  Paris,  and  the 
bearer  could  not  have  reached  Toulouse  under  three  days,  even  by  the  most 
direct  way,  which  was  through  Montauban.  Now  the  allies  were  in  possession 
of  that  road  on  the  fourth,  and  on  the  ninth  the  French  army  was  actually  in- 
vested. The  intelligence  from  Paris  must  therefore  have  reached  the  allies 
first,  as  in  fact  it  did,  and  it  was  not  Soult,  it  was  Lord  Wellington  who  com- 
menced the  battle. 

"  The  charge  would  therefore  bear  more  against  the  English  general,  who 
would  yet  have  been  the  most  insane  as  well  as  the  wickedest  of  men  to  have 
risked  his  army  and  his  fame  in  a  battle  where  so  many  obstacles  seemed  to 
deny  success.     He  also  was  the  person  of  all  others,  called  upon  by  honor, 


302  LIFE      OF      NAPOLEON  [Ch.  XXI. 

had  repelled  all  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  on  Toulouse.  His 
right,  resting  on  the  rivulet  of  Ers  was  turned  by  Beresford 
at  the  head  of  the  divisions  of  Cole  and  Clinton.  This  gen- 
eral had  marched  with  the  first  of  these  between  the  rivulet 
and  our  redoubts  in  a  parallel,  and,  to  say  the  least,  an  auda- 

gratitude,  justice,  and  patriotism,  to  avenge  the  useless  slaughter  of  his  soldiers 
to  proclaim  the  infamy  and  seek  the  punishment  of  his  inhuman  adversary. 

"  Did  he  ever,  by  word  or  deed,  countenance  the  calumny  ? 

"  Lord  Aberdeen,  after  the  passing  of  the  English  Reform  bill,  repeated  the 
accusation  in  the  House  of  Lords,  and  reviled  the  minister  for  being  on  amica- 
ble terms  with  a  man  capable  of  such  a  crime.  Lord  Wellington  rose  on  the 
instant,  and  emphatically  declared  that  Marshal  Soult  did  not  know,  and  that 
it  was  impossible  he  could  know  of  the  emperor's  abdication  when  he  fought 
the  battle.  The  detestable  distinction  of  sporting  with  men's  lives  by  whole- 
sale attaches  to  no  general  on  the  records  of  history  save  the  Orange  "William, 
the  murderer  of  Glencoe, 

"  And  though  Marshal  Soult  had  known  of  the  emperor's  abdication,  he 
could  not,  for  that,  have  been  justly  placed  beside  that  cold-blooded  prince 
who  fought  at  St.  Denis  with  the  peace  of  Nimeguen  in  his  pocket,  because  he 
'•would  not  deny  himself  a  safe  lesson  in  his  trade." 

"  The  French  marshal  was  at  the  head  of  a  brave  army,  and  it  was  impossible 
to  know  whether  Napoleon  had  abdicated  voluntarily  or  been  constrained.  The 
authority  of  such  men  as  Talleyrand,  Fouché,  and  other  intriguers,  forming  a 
provisional  government,  self-instituted,  and  under  the  protection  of  foreign  bay- 
onets, demanded  no  respect  from  Soult.  He  had  even  the  right  of  denying  the 
emperor's  legal  power  to  abdicate. 

"He  had  the  right,  if  he  thought  himself  strong  enough,  to  declare  that  he 
would  not  suffer  the  throne  to  become  the  plaything  of  foreign  invaders,  and 
that  he  would  rescue  France  even  though  Napoleon  yielded  the  crown.  In 
fine,  it  was  a  question  of  patriotism  and  of  calculation,  a  national  question 
which  the  general  of  an  army  had  a  right  to  decide  for  himself  having  refer- 
ence, always,  to  the  real  will  and  desire  of  the  people  at  large. 

1;  It  was  in  this  light  that  Soult  viewed  the  matter,  even  after  the  battle,  and 
when  he  had  seen  Colonel  St.  Simon. 

"Writing  to  Talleyrand  on  the  22nd,  he  says,  '  The  circumstances  which  pre- 
ceded my  act  of  adhesion  are  so  extraordinary  as  to  create  astonishment.  The 
7th,  the  provisional  government  informed  me  of  the  events  which  had  happened 
since  the  1st  of  April.  The  6th  and  7th.  Count  Dupont  wrote  to  me  on  the 
same  subject.  On  the  8th  the  duke  of  Feltre,  in  his  quality  of  war  minister, 
gave  me  notice  that,  having  left  the  military  cypher  at  Paris,  he  would  imme- 
diately forward  to  me  another.  The  9th  the  prince  Berthier,  vice-constable  and 
major-general,  wrote  to  me  from  Fontainebleau,  transmitting  the  copy  of  a 
convention  and  armistice  which  had  been  arranged  at  Paris  with  the  allied 
powers  ;  he  demanded,  at  the  same  time,  a  state  of  the  force  and  condition  of 
my  army  ;  but  neither  the  prince  nor  the  duke  of  Feltre  mentioned  events  ;  we 


Ch.  XXI.]  AUTUMN     CAMPAIGN     OF     1814, 


303 


cious  movement,  Soult,  who  bad  watched  this  movement, 
threw  upon  them  the  reserve  under  Taupin,  in  two  columns. 
Imitating  my  example  at  Rivoli  when  Lusignan  prolonged 
himself  on  my  rear,  he  cried  out  to  his  soldiers  :  These  Eng- 
lish are  ours,  I  give  them  to  you  ;  hut  fortune  cruelly 
deceived  his  expectation,  and  turned  against  him  the  ma- 
nœuvre on  which  he  founded  his  hopes  of  victory.  Taupin 
leads  his  troops  to  the  charge  by  battalion  ;  he  is  killed  ;  his 
troops  hesitate  :  they  are  exposed  to  a  murderous  fire,  and 
suffer  terrible  losses  without  inflicting  any  injury  on  the 
enemy  ;  finally,  they  recoil  and  retire  in  disorder.  Soult, 
frustrated  by  the  result  of  an  attack  which  he  thought  infal- 
lible, hastened  to  leave  Toulousa  in  order  to  save  his  line  of 
retreat.  The  events  at  the  capital  rendered  these  movements 
superfluous,  and  this  battle,  lost  by  one  of  my  lieutenants, 
reconciled  me  in  some  degree  to  my  abdication. 

Napoleon  retires  to  Elba.— Either  out  of  respect  for  an 
old  warrior,  or  to  make  a  parade  of  their  generosity,  the 
allies  allowed  me  to  select  my  place  of  retreat  ;  I  chose  Elba, 
as  being  near  Corsica,  where  I  was  born,  and  touching  Italy, 
the  first  theatre  of  my  glory.  They  accorded  to  me  the  title 
which  afterward  seemed  to  give  them  so  much  offense."* 
Finally  they  permitted  me  to  take  with  me  a  small  number 
of  my  old  soldiers  with  whom  I  had  run  so  many  hazards,— 
men  whom  misfortune  had  not  discouraged.  Little  did  they 
think  that  one  year  later,  the  emperor  of  the  Island  of  Elba, 
with  this  mere  handful  of  brave  men,  would  again  make  the 
conquest  of  France  ! 

had  then  only  knowledge  of  a  proclamation  of  the  empress,  dated  the  3d,  which 
forbade  us  to  recognize  anything  coming  from  Paris. 

"  -The  10th  I  was  attacked  near  Toulouse  by  the  whole  allied  army  under 
the  orders  of  Lord  "Wellington.  This  vigorous  action,  where  the  French  army, 
the  weakest  by  half,  shewed  all  its  worth,  cost  the  allies  from  eight  to  ten  thou- 
sand men.     Lord  Wellington  might,  perhaps,  have  dispensed  with  it.'  " 

*  The  conduct  of  England  in  1815,  on  this  subject,  exhibited  a  petty- 
meanness  unworthy  of  a  great  nation. 


304  LIFE      OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

I  set  out  accompanied  by  the  commissioners  of  the  allied 
powers.  In  crossing  France  in  order  to  reach  my  place  of 
exile,  I  had  occasion  to  observe  the  difference  of  opinion  re- 
specting me.  If  I  was  cherished  and  regretted  in  the  envi- 
rons of  Paris  and  in  the  East,  I  was  equally  hated  in  the 
South.  They  did  not  even  respect  my  misfurtune,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  put  myself  under  foreign  protection  to  preserve 
my  life  against  the  very  people  who  had  so  often  been  intox- 
icated with  my  triumphs.  A  year  afterward  I  compared 
myself  to  Themistocles  ;  and  I  believe  I  shall  not  be  accused 
of  wanting  in  modesty,  in  putting  myself  on  a  parallel  with 
that  illustrious  Athenian. 

Evacuation  of  Italy.— While  en  route,  I  received  news 
which  it  was  natural  to  expect  ;  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  could 
not  survive  the  empire.  Threatened  by  the  defection  of 
Murat,  and  by  his  march  'on  the  Po  ;  by  the  appearance  of 
the  English  at  Genoa,  and  of  Bubna  on  the  Simplon,  Eugene 
still  kept  up  his  courage.  A  fanatical  revolution  excited  at 
Milan  by  partisans  of  Austria,  and  still  worse,  by  the  news 
of  my  fall,  finally  induced  him  to  conclude  an  arrangement 
for  the  evacuation  of  Italy  by  the  handful  of  French  who 
remained  with  him.  In  political  commotions  there  is  always 
a  class  of  men  who  suffer  ;  those  who  had  had  the  confidence 
of  Austria  before  1796  and  during  the  reaction  of  1799, 
did  not  possess  mine,  and  they  now  aspired  to  a  change 
which  would  restore  their  influence.  Making  a  pretext  of 
the  heavy  taxes  imposed,  they  excited  the  populace  of  Milan 
to  rise  against  the  minister  of  finances,  Pirna,  whom  they 
inhumanely  massacred.  This  movement  gave  me  great  pain. 
Italy  owed  every  thing  to  me,  and  I  had  conceived,  for  her 
future,  projects  the  most  generous;  her  ingratitude  revolted 
me,  although  I  had  already  had  plenty  of  occasions  to  know 
the  human  heart. 

Concluding  Remarks,— However  great  my  fall,  it  does  not 


Ch.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1814.  305 

destroy  all  my  works.  I  leave  it  for  connoisseurs  to  judge  of 
my  campaign  of  1814;  if  they  are  honest,  they  will  regard 
it,  with  those  of  1805  and  1809,  as  the  most  memorable  and 
the  most  scientific  of  modern  times.  Even  making  proper 
deductions  for  the  influence  of  state  policy  on  the  operations 
of  the  allies,  they  will  not  deny  that  my  movements  are 
models  of  activity,  energy,  and  strategic  coup-d'œil.  With 
seventy  thousand  men  in  the  field,  I  held  my  way  against 
more  than  three  hundred  thousand,  and  was  oftenest  vic- 
torious. The  devotion  of  my  brave  soldiers  in  these  alter- 
nate marches  against  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg,  where 
we  had  every  day  to  march  ten  leagues,  and  every  day  to 
fight  new  masses  of  fresh  troops,  confident  and  proud  of 
their  victories  ;  this  devotion,  I  say,  is  not  less  worthy  of 
attention.  The  present  generation 'has  attempted  to  tarnish 
their  laurels  ;  posterity  will  avenge  them  ;  already  it  begins 
to  render  them  justice,  for  their  worst  enemies  no  longer  dare 
to  separate  their  glory  from  that  of  France.  Manes  of  the 
brave  men  of  Montmirail,  of  Champ-Aubert,  of  Montereau, — 
repose  in  peace  1  Your  glory  is  unfading  ;  your  exploits 
will  incite  the  enthusiasm  and  respect  of  ages  the  most 
remote. 

I  must,  however,  say  that  the  demoralization  had,  at 
Brienne,  begun  to  reach  my  head-quarters.  Berthier  and 
his  hangers-on  seemed  no  longer  able  to  conceal  their  fatigue 
and  disgust.  Instead  of  submitting  without  murmur  to  the 
sacrifices  imposed  on  their  rank,  they  were  continually  dis- 
cussing, in  my  antechambers,  the  words  peace  and  repose  ; 
as  though  these  had  been  appropriate  words  when  France 
was  inundated  with  enemies,  and  when  we  owed  to  the  na- 
tion the  example  of  enthusiasm  and  the  most  absolute  devo- 
tion. The  conduct  of  my  marshals  at  Fontainebleau  was 
not  the  result  of  a  spontaneous  despair,  but  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  lamentations  with  which  they  had  eontiuu- 
vol.  iv. — 20. 


306  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXI. 

ally  beseiged  me  after  the  battle  of  Dresden.  I  had  put 
them,  it  is  true,  to  severe  tests,  after  the  fatal  passage  of  the 
Niémen  in  1812  ;  but  from  that  time  there  was  not  a  mo- 
ment in  which  I  had  power  to  arrest,  as  has  been  pretended, 
the  course  of  events.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  had  resolved 
not  to  treat  with  me  without  receiving  guarantees  which  had 
been  for  me  so  many  humiliations.  If  at  Prague  the  media- 
tion of  Austria  had  been  in  my  favor,  that  prince  would  have 
retired  behind  the  Vistula,  but  would  not  have  concluded 
peace,  or  would  have  inserted  such  conditions  that  I  could 
not  have  accepted  it.  Nor  did  England  then  desire  peace  ; 
for  she  even  demanded  of  me  Antwerp,  when  I  still  held 
Dantzic  and  Hamburg.  Austria  made  a  semblance  of  pro- 
posing peace,  because  she  well  knew  that  after  being  driven 
behind  the  Rhine,  I  could  no  longer  defend  Italy,  and  she 
coveted  Lombardy.  The  contest  between  Europe  and  myself 
could  only  be  decided  by  my  fall,  or  by  victories  which  would 
enable  me  to  dictate  peace  to  Germany. 

The  detractors  of  my  glory  have  not  hesitated  to  compare 
my  defense  of  France  with  that  of  Henry  II.  against  Charles 
V.,  and  of  Louis  XIV.  against  Eugene  and  Marlborough, 
and  to  give  me  all  the  disadvantage  of  this  ridiculous  paral- 
lel. Charles  V.  attacked  Metz  with  fifty  thousand  men  ; 
the  place  was  defended  by  fifteen  thousand  under  Guise-le- 
Balafré  ;  the  peasants  of  Champagne  were  sufficient  to  save 
it.  Louis  XIV.  saw  the  power  of  the  emperor  and  of  Eng- 
land waste  itself,  for  six  months,  before  Lille,  and  three 
more  before  the  little  fort  of  Landrecies  ;  it  was  not  an  army 
of  seventy  thousand  men  that  could  subjugate  an  empire  like 
France,  with  such  a  system  of  operations.  It  is  absurd  to 
compare  such  events  with  the  invasion  of  a  million  and  a 
half  of  men,  with  all  Europe  to  sustain  them.  This  inva- 
sion, executed  with  rapidity  and  in  a  few  weeks'  time,  at  an 
epoch  when  no  active  army  could  be  raised  in  France  to  op- 


On.  XXL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1814.  307 

pose  them,  was,  nevertheless,  several  times  on  the  point  of 
failing  from  the  astonishing  activity  of  our  defense.  It 
would,  in  fact,  have  utterly  failed,  if,  instead  of  intrigues 
and  intestine  divisions,  we  had  opposed  to  the  enemy,  union, 
patriotism,  and  devotion. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

CAMPAIGN    OF    1815. 

FROM  NAPOLEONS  RETURN  FROM  ELBA   TO   HIS   EXILE  TO   ST.   HELENA. 

Napoleon  at  Elba — Division  of  Parties  in  France — Course  pursued  by  Louis 
XVIII.  —  Different  Forms  of  Government  —  Defects  of  the  Charter  of 
Louis  XVIII. — Errors  in  its  Administration — Napoleon's  Reasons  for  re- 
turning to  France — His  Departure  from  Elba — His  Reception  m  France 
and  March  on  Lyons — The  Bourbons  prepare  for  Defense — Decrees  of 
Lyons — Ney  declares  for  the  Emperor — Napoleon  resumes  his  Authority 
as  Emperor — Composition  of  his  Ministry — His  Position  towards  Europe — 
General  Coalition  against  him — Declaration  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna — 
Operations  of  the  Duke  d'AngoulJme  in  the  South  of  France — Troubles  in 
La  Vendee — Affairs  of  Naples — Preparations  to  repel  Aggression  upon 
France — Motives  of  Napoleon's  defensive  Attitude — He  refuses  to  adopt 
revolutionary  Measures — The  Champ  de  Mai — Opening  of  the  Chambers — 
Their  Addresses — Dogmatic  Controversies  of  the  Deputies  —  Napoleon's 
Reply — Military  Preparations  of  Napoleon — Preparations  of  the  Allies — 
Napoleon's  general  Plan  of  Campaign — He  joins  his  Army — Plan  of  Opera- 
tions— Opening  of  the  Campaign — Passage  of  the  Sambre.  June  15th — 
Measures  of  the  Allies — Decisive  Movement  prescribed  to  Ney — He  delays 
its  Execution — His  Delay  in  marching  on  Quatre-Bras — Reconnoissance  of 
the  Position  of  the  Prussians — Dispositions  for  forcing  their  Position — Battle 
of  Ligny — Ney  repulsed  at  Quatre-Bras — Position  of  Affairs  on  the  Morning 
of  the  Seventeenth — Grouchy  sent  in  Pursuit  of  the  Prussians — The  Reserves 
and  Left  "Wing  march  against  the  English — Commencement  of  the  Battle  of 
"Waterloo — First  Appearance  of  the  Prussians — Napoleon  hastens  the  Attack 
on  the  English — Ney's  first  Attack  on  the  Centre — Attack  of  the  Left  on 
Hougomont — Ney's  second  Attack — Bulow  debouches  on  Planchenois  — 
General  Charge  of  the  French  Cavalry — Arrival  of  Blucher  and  Bulow — 
Wellington's  Dispositions — Defeat  of  the  French  Right — Last  Efforts  and 
Rout  of  the  French  Army — Operations  of  Grouchy — Manœuvres  of  the  Allies 
The  French  retreat  on  Avesnes — Napoleon's  Return  to  Paris — Military  Re- 
sources of  France — Conspiracies  of  Napoleon's  Adversaries — Dispositions  of 
the  Populace — Napoleon's  second  Abdication — He  retires  from  France — He 
is  exiled  to  St.  Helena — His  Death. 

Napoleon  at  Elba.— Europe,  familiar  for  the  last,  twenty- 
years,  with  uiy  victories  and  gigantic  enterprises,  was  quite 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  300 

astounded  at  the  rapid  foil  of  my  empire,  and  unable  to  con- 
ceive that  six  months  could  be  sufficient  to  bring  the  allies 
from  the  Elbe  to  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  and  to  enable  them 
to  dictate  to  France  the  disgraceful  treaty  of  Paris.  The 
Congress  of  Vienna  endeavored  to  reconcile  the  numerous 
claims,  urged  on  all  sides,  for  a  share  of  the  spoils  of  that 
bold  conqueror,  who,  two  years  before,  had  dared  to  put  one 
foot  upon  Cadiz,  and  the  other  upon  Moscow.  The  task 
was  a  difficult  one  ;  for  this  congress  was  expected  to  re- 
establish the  political  equilibrium  so  strongly  shaken,  and  to 
regulate  the  international  relations  of  Europe,  so  completely 
overthrown  by  the  storms  of  the  French  Revolution.  Fallen 
from  the  throne  of  the  most  powerful  empire  to  the  petty 
sovereignty  of  the  island  of  Elba,  in  consequence  of  my  abdi- 
cation of  Fontainebleau,  and  separated  from  my  wife  and 
son  in  a  manner  disgraceful  to  the  house  of  Austria,  and  for 
which  history  will  one  day  justly  reproach  my  enemies,  I 
retired  in  a  kind  of  exile,  to  Porto-Ferrajo,  like  Scipio  in  his 
asylum  at  Linternum,  more  displeased  with  the  desertion  of 
friends  than  with  the  persecution  of  enemies.  Although 
condemned  to  be  but  a  passive  spectator  of  the  great  events 
of  the  world  which  I  had  directed  for  fifteen  years  by  the 
superiority  of  my  genius,  I,  nevertheless,  felt  a  presentiment 
that  sooner  or  later,  I  should  be  called  to  re-appear  upon  the 
stage  ;  I  understood  men  and  the  times  too  well  to  be  de- 
ceived as  to  the  extent  of  the  embarrassment  in  which  the 
Bourbons  would  be  involved  when  they  resumed  the  govern- 
ment of  a  country  so  much  changed  since  they  had  left  it, 
and  so  deeply  humiliated  by  the  disastrous  circumstances 
attending  their  restoration  to  power.  I  was  therefore  con- 
fident that,  so  soon  as  the  first  intoxication  occasioned  by 
the  general  peace  had  partially  subsided,  the  most  energetic 
portion  of  the  French  nation,  so  deeply  humiliated  by  the 
conditions  of  the  restoration,  would   regret  my  abdication, 


310  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

and  desire  my  return.  But  the  uncertainty  of  the  time 
when  this  would  take  place,  and  my  utter  inability  to  control 
events,  prevented  me  from  forming  any  definite  plans.  In 
the  meantime  I  found  some  consolation  in  projecting  a  his- 
tory of  my  life,  and  in  animating  the  drooping  hopes  of  my 
partisans.  But  important  events  followed  each  other  in  such 
rapid  succession,  that  I  was  drawn  from  my  retirement  much 
sooner  than  I  had  anticipated. 

Division  of  Parties  in  France  .—  Independently  of  the 
private  information  which  I  received  from  Queen  Hortense 
and  others  of  my  faithful  friends,  the  newspapers  furnished 
me  sufficient  information  concerning  the  general  state  of 
affairs  ;  fur,  notwithstanding  the  strict  censorship  of  the 
press,  and  in  spite  of  the  falsehoods  usually  circulated  in  the 
public  journals,  the  different  passions,  of  which  they  were  the 
interpreters,  were  apparent  to  the  least  observing,  and  the 
excitement  which  raged  in  the  kingdom  was  made  known  to 
the  world. 

It  seemed  that  Louis  XVIII.  had  at  first  fully  appreciated 
the  spirit  of  the  age,  and  persuaded  himself  that  the  majority 
of  France  desired  to  consolidate  the  results  of  the  revolu- 
tion. This  prince  judged,  after  twenty  years  of  experience, 
that  his  party  was  too  weak  to  resist  the  wishes  of  the  great 
mass  of  the  middle  classes,  who,  in  a  country  stripped  of 
aristocratic  institutions,  finish  always  by  dictating  law  to  the 
nation.  To  maintain  himself  upon  the  throne,  he  felt  it 
necessary  to  reign  with  this  majority,  that  is,  in  compliance 
with  the  principles  of  the  Revolution  :  Henry  IV.  had  said 
that  Paris  was  well  worth  a  mass  ;  Louis  XVIII.  thought 
the  crown  of  France  well  toorth  a  constitution.  It  was  evi- 
dent that  he  could  not  govern  by  the  ancient  magistracies  of 
the  kingdom  ; — no  vestige  of  them  remained  ;  nor  could  he 
hope  to  rule  the  France  of  1814  by  the  defunct  états  of 
Brittany,     Languedoc,    or   Burgundy.      It    was   necessary, 


Cu.   XX11.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  311 

therefore,  to  reconstruct  the  government  on  an  entirely  new 
basis,  and,  if  he  did  not  submit  to  the  revolutionary  prin- 
ciple, he  must  take  the  alternative  of  doing  over  again  the 
work  of  the  revolution  by  virtue  of  the  divine  right  upon 
which  he  founded  his  claim  to  the  throne.  Pie  decreed  a 
charter.  Many  have  blamed  Louis  XVIII.  for  this  measure; 
and,  judging  of  the  act  by  its  effects,  we  are  compelled  to 
admit  that  it  imperfectly  accomplished  its  object.  If  it  had 
been  possible  to  seize  the  supreme  power  with  a  vigorous 
hand,  and  to  govern  by  means  of  royal  ordinances,  it  is  in- 
contestable that,  for  him,  it  would  have  been  the  safest 
course  ;  but  this  being  impracticable,  it  was  left  for  the 
king  to  decide  what  form  of  government  should  be  substi- 
tuted for  the  one  which  had  just  been  overthrown  by  the 
combined  European  powers.  To  revive  the  parlements  or 
provincial  états,  was  utterly  impossible.  To  substitute  for 
my  glorious  and  energetic  empire  the  absolute  power  of  a 
camarilla  d'tmigrts,  was  the  dream  of  some  wiseacres  ; — 
if  this  course  had  been  adopted  the  restoration  would  not 
have  continued  six  months.  A  lady,  exhibiting  a  superiority 
of  genius  and  penetration  when  discoursing  on  any  subject 
other  than  politics,  has  asserted  that  the  Bourbons  could 
have  taken  the  empire  just  as  they  found  it.  "  The  bed  was 
so  well  made,"  said  she,  "  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  lie 
down  in  it."  This  saying  of  Madame  de  Staël,  which  re- 
ceived so  much  applause  in  the  salons  of  Paris,  was  mere 
nonsense.  How  could  the  brother  and  successor  of  Louis 
XVI.  acknowledge  a  senate  which  had  betrayed  its  owu 
founder,  and  had  twice  disposed  of  the  throne  in  less  than 
ten  years  !  X  legislative  body  which  had  raised  its  voice 
only  when  the  country  was  invaded  by  a  million  of  foreign 
enemies,  and  had  become  a  turbulent  arena  of  party  passions, 
at  a  time  when  all  patriots  should  have  rallied  around  the 
head  of  the  government,  no  matter  what  its  character,  was 


312  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

utterly  unworthy  of  public  confidence,  and  its  reëstablish- 
ment  could  not  have  been  acceptable  to  the  French  people. 
Moreover,  the  imperial  institutions  were  so  little  pleasing-  to 
the  visionary  advocates  of  liberalism  that  these  factious 
leaders  of  the  senate,  who  had  overthrown  my  empire  were 
eager  to  force  upon  the  Bourbons  a  charter  of  their  own  ; 
but  Louis  XVIII.,  having  decided  to  reject  this  illegal  act, 
owed  it  to  the  ruling  opinions  to  grant  another  which  would 
guarantee  the  threatened  interests  of  community. 

Course  to  be  pursued  by  the  iiing.— The  king  had  only 
to  choose  between  two  courses  of  action  ;  the  first,  to  grant  a 
charter,  as  he  actually  did  ;  the  second,  to  govern  pro  vision- 
ally  as  dictator,  and  to  convoke  a  constituent  assembly  to 
form,  in  concert  with  his  ministers,  a  national  compact  which, 
being  sanctioned  by  the  notables  of  France,  should  become 
irrevocable,  and  thus  offer  the  double  advantage  of  securing 
the  interests  of  the  throne  as  well  as  those  of  the  nation. 
The  first  plan  appeared  to  him  the  more  prudent,  as  it  was 
a  voluntary  concession  and  implied  no  acknowledgement  of 
the  principles  of  national  sovereignty — principles  specious  in 
theory,  but  readily  degenerating  into  an  elective  monarchy. 
Moreover,  it  was  doubtful,  to  say  the  least,  whether  any 
complete,  strong  and  well-matured  system  of  government 
could  emanate  from  a  French  constituent  assembly,  no  mat- 
ter how  restricted  in  numbers.  If,  instead  of  an  elective 
assembly,  a  commission  of  some  forty  or  fifty  members  had 
been  selected  by  the  provisional  government,  to  draw  up  and 
decide  upon  the  terms  of  the  national  compact,  as  was 
done  after  the  eighteenth  Brumaire,  what  guarantee  would 
such  authority  have  presented,  or  what  force  could  such  a 
charter  have  had  ?  A  king  has  always  a  right  to  give  laws 
where  none  exist,  but  what  right  has  an  assembly  of  fifty 
lawyers,  stripped  of  all  legitimate  authority,  to  impose  a  con- 
tract  upon  (he  king,  on  the   one  side,  and  upon   the  entire 


CH.XXIL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  313 

nation,  on  the  other,  without  submitting  it  to  the  vote  of  the 
primary  assemblies,  or,  at  least,  to  notables  especially  ap- 
pointed for  that  purpose  by  the  nation?  But  these  two 
means  were  both  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  the  Bour- 
bon monarchy  and  the  interests  of  the  crown.  Holding  all 
my  power  from  popular  election,  I  could  not  establish  my 
government  upon  any  other  basis  ;  but  the  case  of  the  Bour- 
bons was  entirely  different* 

Different  Forms  of  Ciovernment.-When,  in  the  course  oi 
events,  the  government  of  a  country  is  destroyed,  and  a  new 
one  is'  to  be  substituted  in  its  place,  we  are  at  liberty  to 
select  either  of  the  following  :  first,  an  hereditary  absolute 
monarchy,  second,  an  hereditary  monarchy  of  limited  powers, 
third,  an  elective  monarchy,  fourth,  an  aristocratic  or  oligar- 
chic republic,  and  fifth,  a  democratic  republic.     Much  may 
be  said  both  for  and  against  each  of  these  forms  in  the  ab- 
stract, but  in  truth  their  advantages  and  disadvantages  result 
rather  from  the  particular  circumstances  of  their  application 
than  from  any   thing   belonging  intrinsically  to  the  forms 
themselves.    A  government  suited  to  America,  or  to  the  petty 
Swiss  cantons,  would  be  utterly  absurd  for  one  of  the  large 
European  States. 

Defects  of  the  Charter  of  Louis  XVIII.- We  have  shown 
that,  a  new  form  of  government  being  necessary,  Louis 
XVIII  oranted  a  charter  to  the  nation  in  order  to  prevent 
their  forming  one  for  themselves.  This  charter  should  have 
been  a  kind  of  indissoluble  compact,  connecting  the  interests 
of  the  throne  and  the  interests  of  the  nation,  forming,  in 
short  a  kind  of  brief  declaration  of  rights.  Unfortunately, 
it  was  so  framed  as  to  satisfy  neither  party.     The  royalists, 

*  The  author  explains,  in  a  later  edition  of  this  ehapter,  that  his  political 
remarks  have  reference  solely  to  monarchal  governments  of  limited  powers, 
like  that  of  France,  and  that  they  are  entirely  inapplicable  to  repubhean  gov, 
ernments  like  that  of  the  United  States  of  America,  or  to  despotisms  hke  those 
of  Russia  and  Austria. 


314  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXII. 

like  the  Spanish  priests,  wished  a  new  master  who  would  per- 
mit them  to  govern  the  country  according  to  their  own 
pleasure.  The  returned  émigrés  could  see  in  the  restoration 
of  the  Bourbons  only  the  means  of  recovering  their  lost  pro- 
perty and  privileges.  The  clergy  hoped  to  recover  the  an- 
cient wealth  and  influence  of  the  Church.  The  noblesse  had 
been  created  anew,  hut  it  had  no  prerogatives  or  power  ;  it 
was  too  exclusive  to  he  democratic,  and  too  pusillanimous  to 
be  aristocratic  ;  highly  offensive  to  the  nation  in  its.  charac- 
ter, without  even  the  means  of  self-defense.  All  these  par- 
ties were  ready  to  tear  in  pieces  the  charter  at  the  earliest 
opportunity,  because  some  of  its  clauses  were  favorable  to 
the  nation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  stipulations  for  a  na- 
tional legislative  power  were  accompanied  with  so  many  re- 
strictions as  to  afford  good  grounds  for  doubting  the  sincerity 
of  the  new  government  on  this  and  other  points  connected 
with  popular  rights.  If  Louis  had  not  too  much  feared  the 
establishment  of  bad  precedents  in  admitting  dogmas  looking; 
toward  an  elective  system,  he  could  have  increased  the 
strength  of  his  new  edifice  by  giving  it  the  sanction,  if  not 
of  the  whole  country,  at  least  of  the  new  chambers.  For- 
tius purpose  it  would  have  been  sufficient  for  the  king  to 
arrange  a  royal  séance,,  declaring  the  compact  binding  upon 
himself  and  his  descendants,  and  upon  the  nation  and  its. 
deputies  ;  all  swearing  to  maintain  in  its  integrity  the  char- 
ter which  ever  afterward  was  to  be  equally  obligatory  upon 
the  monarchy  and  its  subjects,  and  to  form  a  basis  of  public 
rights  entirely  new. 

Errors  in  its  Administration.— But  instead  of  acting  in 
this  frank  and  open  manner,  the  king  let  it  be  plainly  seen 
that  he  was  merely  yielding  to  present  necessity,  and  that  an 
opportunity  only  was  wanting  to  impose  a  more  despotic 
rule.  Surrounded  by  twenty  thousand  émigrés,  who  were 
clamorous  for  office,  old  imperial  employees,  who  wished  to 


Ch.  XXII.] 


CAMPAIGN    OF     18  15.  315 


retain  office,  Jacobins,  equally  avaricious  of  the  spoils  of 
place,  doctrinaires,  who  believed  themselves  the  only  men  in 
France  capable  of  conducting  the  affairs  of  state,  old  royal- 
ists and  high  clergy,  who  opposed  both  the  constitution  and 
those  holding  office  under  it  ; — under  such  circumstances  the 
only  safety  for  Louis  XVIII.  was  to  pursue  a  firm  and 
straightforward  course,  regardless  of  party  influences.  But 
this  the  king  was  incapable  of  doing.  He  intrusted  the  ad- 
ministration of  affairs  to  a  ministry  which  was  without 
credit  and  entirely  influenced  by  the  coteries  of  the  Tuileries. 
There  was  nothing  but  contradictions  and  inconsistencies  in 
the  system  of  government  ;  words  and  deeds  were  without 
correspondence,  for  at  heart  the  government  was  far  from 
wishing  to  carry  out  the  measures  it  had  promised  in  writing. 
The  émigrés  demanded  back  their  sequestered  property,  and 
to  calm  their  importunities  they  were  promised  ultimate 
satisfaction,  though  in  utter  violation  of  the  charter.  In- 
stead of  putting  down  new  pretensions  and  confirming  the 
existing  state  of  affairs,  they  pursued  directly  the  opposite 
course.  The  purchasers  of  the  national  property  were 
threatened  with  projects  of  restitution  ;  brochures,  attributed 
to  Chancellor  Dambray,  opposed  the  legality  of  these  sales 
and  demonstrated  the  justice  of  restitution.  The  factious 
leaders  of  parties, — the  men  who  had  surrendered  Toulon  to 
the  English,  and  those  who  had  recovered  it,  the  defenders 
of  the  divine  rights  of  the  throne,  and  those  who  had  led 
Louis  XVI.  to  the  scaffold — were  soon  involved  in  the  most 
virulent  disputes.  Fearing  the  consequence  of  such  discus- 
sions, the  government  abolished  the  liberty  of  the  press  and 
of  the  tribune.  In  order  to  quiet  public  feeling  and  to  soften 
down  the  violent  party  spirit  springing  from  the  excesses  of 
the  revolution,  I  had  established  a  public  censorship.  This 
was  not  done  through  any  interest  of  personal  power,  but 
for  the  good  of  the  country.     The  evils  resulting  from  it 


316  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXII. 

were  due  to  its  bad  administration,  rather  than  to  its  prin- 
ciple, for,  on  account  of  the  deadly  feuds  engendered  by  the 
revolution,  a  limited  censorship  will  be  necessary  for  a  time 
in  order  to  harmonize  contending  factions.  But  the  govern- 
ment of  Louis  XVIII.,  instead  of  confining  it  to  the  factious 
partisan  newspapers  of  the  day,  made  the  restriction  far  too 
general  ;  and  as  this  censorship  seemed  contrary  to  the  pro- 
mises of  the  declaration  of  Saint  Ouen,  and  to  the  spirit  of 
the  modified  charter,  the  liberals,  republicans,  and  doctri- 
naires raised  incessant  clamors  and  cried  out  despotism  and 
deception  !  To  other  causes  of  agitation  is  to  be  added  the 
dissatisfaction  produced  by  the  onerous  treaties  with  foreign 
powers.  Every  one  truly  French  at  heart,  and  who  retained 
a  particle  of  national  pride  and  patriotism,  was  indignant 
at  the  readiness  with  which  Count  d'Artois,  even  before 
having  stipulated  any  of  the  conditions  of  peace,  signed  an 
order  to  surrender  to  the  allies  a  hundred  fortresses  still  oc- 
cupied by  French  troops.  The  treaties  of  Paris,  made  by 
the  point  of  the  sword  with  a  rigor  justifiable,  perhaps,  in 
certain  cases,  were  in  this  instance  too  severe  even  for  the 
interests  of  the  powers  imposing  them,  for  they  implanted 
the  seeds  of  bitterness  in  the  hearts  of  all  friends  of  the  em- 
pire and  of  the  revolution.  All  believed,  whether  with  rea- 
son or  not,  that  the  Bourbons  might  have  preserved  at  least 
a  part  of  Belgium,  Savoy,  and  the  line  of  the  Khine  as  far 
as  Coblentz,  if  they  had  not  been  too  eager  to  get  possession 
of  the  Tuileries. 

The  minister  Ferrand,  in  a  discourse  from  the  tribune, 
classed  all  Frenchmen  in  two  categories  : — those  who  had 
pursued  the  right  line,  that  is,  who  had  fought  with  the 
émigrés,  and  in  La  Vendée  ;  and  those  who  had  pursued  the 
curved  line,  that  is,  who  had  admitted  the  Revolution  and 
the  Empire  :  a  strange  apostrophe  to  a  whole  nation,  a  sin- 
gular means  of  supporting  a  law  for  restoring  the  unsold 


Cir.  XXII]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815  317 

property  of  the  emigres .'  The  government  had  retained  the 
soldiers  of  the  empire,  because  it  feared  them,  and  had  no 
others  to  oppose  to  their  influence  ;  and,  in  passing  them  in 
review,  heightened  the  glory  of  their  enemies  ;  crowds  of 
emigre  and  Vendéan  officers  demanded  the  confirmation  of 
their  rank  in  the  very  army  which  they  had  opposed,  thus 
encumbering  the  cadres  of  the  army  and  staff,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  veterans  of  a  hundred  battles.  Thus  military 
dissatisfaction  was  added  to  civil  discontent.  No  one  could 
confide  in  the  existing  state  of  affairs,  for  all  things  seemed 
unstable  ;  there  was  no  security  of  party  interests,  for  all 
seemed  compromised  ;  nor  of  opinions,  for  they  were  stifled  ; 
nor  was  there  any  refuge  in  the  strength  of  government,  for 
it  was  without  head,  or  arm,  or  will.  A  new  contest  seemed 
inevitable,  and  in  the  clash  of  interests  and  shock  of  fac- 
tions, I  again  might  become  the  arbiter  of  the  destinies  of 
France. 

Napoleon's  Reason  for  returning  to  France, —  The  state 
of  affairs  in  France  inspired  me  with  the  desire  and  hope  of 
returning  there,  and  the  information  which  I  received  of  the 
proceedings  at  the  congress  of  Vienna  was  greatly  calculated 
to  strengthen  this  feeling.  The  congress  had  much  difficulty 
in  effecting  a  satisfactory  division  of  the  spoils  ;  Austria, 
France,  and  England  had  agreed  in  the  eventual  treaties  to 
guarantee  Saxony  against  the  pretensions  of  Prussia  ;  Russia 
supported  these  pretensions,  and  the  dissatisfied  sovereigns 
of  these  last  two  countries  already  spoke  of  returning  to  their 
own  capitals  ;  even  the  day  of  their  departure  was  said  to  be 
fixed.  In  return  for  the  support  promised  by  the  Bourbons 
to  Austria  and  England,  they  demanded  the  expulsion  of 
Murat  from  the  throne  of  Naples,  and  the  restoration  of  that 
branch  of  their  own  family  This  demand  was  supported  by 
the  personal  interest  of  the  venal  Talleyrand,  because  the 
restoration  of  the  legitimate  government  of  the  Two-Sicilies 


318  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.   XXII. 

would  secure  to  him  the  incomes  of  the  rich  principality  of 
Benevento.  Moreover,  I  learned  that  the  ministers  of  Louis 
XVIII.  had  proposed  to  the  congress  to  remove  me  from  the 
Isle  of  Elba,  and  to  exile  me  to  St.  Helena.  This  was  a 
gratuitous  violation  of  the  treaty  ôf  Fontainebleau,  for  I  had 
then  done  nothing  to  expose  me  to  the  wrath  of  these  sover- 
eigns.* My  feeble  means  of  defense  were  not  sufficient  to 
resist  the  execution  of  this  scheme,  and  resolving  not  to  await 
their  attack,  I  conceived  the  audacious  project  of  re-ascend- 
ing the  throne  of  France.  Small  as  was  the  number  of  my 
forces,  they  were  stronger  than  those  of  the  Bourbons,  be- 
cause they  were  allied  to  the  honor  of  their  country,  and 
although  that  honor  may  sometimes  slumber,  it  never  dies 
in  the  hearts  of  Frenchmen.  Fully  trusting  to  the  strength 
of  this  support,  I  passed  in  review  the  little  army  which  was 
to  second  me  in  this  great  and  hazardous  enterprise.  These 
soldiers  were  ill-clad  and  ill-supplied,  for  I  had  not  the 
means  even  of  equipping  them.  Our  preparations  were  brief, 
for  we  carried  only  our  swords. 

His  Departure  from  Elba.— Favored  by  the  fortuitous 
absence  of  the  English  commissioner  and  the  English  fleet 
stationed  to  watch  the  Isle  of  Elba,  our  little  flotilla  set  sail 
and,  experiencing  no  accident,  accomplished  the  voyage  in 
five  days.  On  the  first  of  March  I  again  saw  the  coast  of 
France  at  Cannes,  near  the  same  beach  of  Frejus  where  I 
had  landed  fifteen  years  before  on  my  return  from  Egypt. 
Fortune  seemed  again  to  smile  upon  me,  as  I  returned  a 
second  time  to  my  country,  to  raise  again  its  fallen  colors, 
and   to  restore  its  independence.     In   again    touching    the 

*  Joraini  says  that  the  French  government  did  not  pay  the  two  millions 
stipulated  to  be  annually  paid  by  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  but  made  the 
exile  of  Napoleon  from  Europe  a  condition  for  its  fulfillment.  Napoleon  was 
informed  of  these  facts  by  the  Empress  Maria-Louisa,  and  this  circumstance, 
together  with  the  false  information  which  he  received  of  the  dissolution  of  the 
congress  of  Vienna,  decided  him  to  return  immediately  to  France. 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     18  15.  319 

French  soil  I  could  not  but  experience  the  most  lively  emo- 
tions. I  saluted  it  as  the  parent  of  heroism,  and  the  home 
of  genius.  We  debarked  without  obstacle.  I  had  as  yet 
formed  no  definite  plans,  for  I  had  not  sufficient  information 
of  the  actual  state  of  the  southern  departments  upon  which 
to  base  them.  I  was,  therefore,  to  be  guided  by  circum- 
stances. But  it  was  necessary  to  act  promptly,  and  to 
secure  at  the  outset  some  strong  point  of  support.  Grenoble 
was  the  nearest  fortified  town  of  importance,  and  one  well 
suited  to  my  purpose  ;  I  therefore  marched  as  rapidly  as 
possible  in  that  direction,  for  I  well  knew  that  my  ultimate 
success  depended  very  much  upon  the  possession  of  this 
fortress.  At  length  my  little  army  reached  this  point  of 
destination,  having  marched  eighty-four  leagues  in  six  days  ! 
Reception  in  France  and  March  upon  Lyons.— My  recep- 
tion on  the  way  answered  my  most  sanguine  hopes,  and 
seemed  to  double  the  chances  of  my  ultimate  success,  by 
giving  me  the  assurance  that  the  mass  of  the  people,  uncor- 
rupted  by  passion  or  interest,  had  still  preserved  their  pristine 
character,  though  wounded  by  the  national  humiliation.  On 
the  sixth  of  March  I  discovered  at  Vizille  the  first  troops 
sent  out  to  oppose  me  :  they  refused  to  parley  with  my  offi- 
cers. Certain  that  everything  depended  upon  this  first  ren- 
contre, and  accustomed  to  take  a  prompt  and  decided  part, 
I  advanced  fearlessly  in  front  of  these  troops,  and  laid  bare 
my  breast  to  receive  their  fire.  This  act  of  rash  confidence 
strongly  moved  the  feelings  of  these  old  soldiers  ;  far  from 
seeing  in  me  the  audacious  rebel  and  exciter  of  civil  wars,  as 
had  been  represented  by  the  royalists,  they  could  only  dis- 
tinguish their  emperor  marching  at  the  head  of  his  old  war- 
riors who  had  so  often  traced  the  road  to  victory.  They  did 
not  long  hesitate.  This  detachment  of  the  fifth  regiment  of 
infantry  was  soon  followed  by  the  entire  seventh,  commanded 
by  Labédoyère,  who  voluntarily  ran  forward  to  meet  me. 


320  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XXII. 

The  people  and  soldiers  now  welcomed  rne  with  shouts  of 
joy  ;  Grenoble  opened  its  gates,  and  I  advanced  towards 
Lyons  with  five  thousand  men. 

The  Bourbons  prepare  for  Defense.— At  the  first  news 
of  my  debarkation  the  Bourbons  were  struck  with  astonish- 
ment ;  nevertheless,  they  hoped  to  intercept  my  progress  ; 
they  offered  a  reward  for  my  head,  and  proceeded  against  me 
as  against  a  rebellious  subject  in  arms  against  the  state. 
The  Count  d'Artois  and  Macdonald  set  out  immediately  for 
Lyons  ;  the  Duke  d'Angoulême  left  Bordeaux  to  establish 
a  centre  of  royal  authority  at  Toulouse  ;  Ney,  recalled  to 
Paris,  was  sent  into  the  east  ;  and  finally  the  chambers  were 
hastily  convoked  in  extraordinary  session.  It  is  even  said 
that  the  most  fiery  of  the  ministers  of  the  restoration  (M.  de 
Blacas),  wishing  to  employ  against  me  means  more  certain 
than  the  sword,  hired  a  man  named  B  *  *  *  to  assassinate 
me.  This  individual  has  since  published  an  account  of  his 
exploits,  but  I  prefer  to  believe  it  untrue,  or  at  least  greatly 
exaggerated.*  Certain  of  having  glory  and  France  on  my 
side,  I  felt  confident  of  success.  No  sooner  were  the  royal 
troops  brought  in  presence  of  my  own,  than  they  ran  to- 
gether, and  embraced  each  other  with  cries  of  Vive  l'em- 
pereur! Macdonald  escaped  with  difficulty,  and  the  Count 
d'Artois  had  barely  time  to  take  post  and  return  to  Paris. 
The  Lyonnaise  received  me  with  even  greater  enthusiasm 
than  on  my  return  from  Marengo.  This  reception  very 
much  affected  my  feelings,  and  redoubled  my  courage  and 
confidence  in  the  future. 

Celebrated  Decrees  of  Lyons. — At  Lyons  I  issued  several 
decrees  calculated  to  affect  public  opinion.  Much  complaint 
had  been  made  by  the  tiers-état  against  the  restriction  of  the 


*  See  the  brochure  published  by  Moronval,  Quai   des  Augustins,  in  1816, 
which  contains  an  account  of  this  project,  and  the  causes  of  its  failure. 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  321 

press  and  the  privileges  of  the  nobility.  The  condition  of  the 
country  immediately  after  a  revolution  unexampled  in  his- 
tory rendered  this  restriction  necessary  for  public  repose.  I 
knew  well  the  benefits  of  a  free  press,  and  I  appreciated  the 
advantages  of  the  tribune  ;  and  I  also  knew  the  evils  result- 
ing from  these  same  sources.  But  I  hoped  that  the  present 
circumstances  were  such  as  to  enable  France  to  profit  by 
their  advantages,  and  to  avoid  their  evils.  At  any  rate,  I 
determined  to  make  the  experiment.  I  therefore  proclaimed 
the  abolition  of  all  privileged  noblesse,  the  freedom  of  the 
press,*  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation. 

IVey  declares  for  the  Emperor. — Preceded  by  these  memo- 
rable decrees,  I  continued  to  advance  upon  Chalons,  where  I 
was  joined  by  the  troops  which  Ney  had  assembled  for  the 
purpose  of  opposing  me.  This  marshal  was  no  statesman, 
and  all  his  political  religion  consisted  in  avoiding  civil  war 
created  for  private  interests.  This  was  his  motive  at  Fon- 
tainebleau when  he  contributed  to  provoke  my  first  abdica- 
tion. "  Tout  pour  France,  rien  pour  un  homme;'  was  his 
motto  ;  a  dogma  very  respectable  in  appearance,  but  which, 
when  carried  too  far,  may  cause  great  faults,  and  induce  one 
to  forget  the  most  sacred  duties.  At  the  first  news  of  my 
return  Ney  thought  only  of  the  scenes  at  Fontainebleau,  and 
the  dangers  of  civil  war  ;  he,  therefore,  accepted  in  good 
faith  the  appointment  to  repel  me  by  force  of  arms,  and  so 
far  forgot  himself  as  to  utter  imprudent  and  unsuitable 
menaces  against  his  ancient  chief.  But  he  was  soon  con- 
vinced, by  his  journey  in  Burgundy  and  in  Franche-Comté, 
of  the  unanimity  of  popular  sentiment  in  my  favor  ;  his  own 


*  Jomini  thinks  that  the  reëstablishment  of  the  unrestricted  liberty  of  the 
daily  press  is  a  fault,  and  one  of  which  Napoleon  was  the  first  victim.  The 
periodical  press  and  books,  he  says,  ought  generally  to  be  exempt  from  the 
censure,  but  the  daily  press,  he  thinks,  cannot  be  so  in  France  without  danger, 
at  least  in  times  of  great  political  excitement. 

VOL.   IV. — 21. 


322  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXIT. 

soldiers  unfurled  the  national  colors  in  his  presence  ;  two 
officers  sent  secretly  to  him  assured  him  of  my  wish  to  forget 
the  past.  Placed  in  the  same  alternative  as  Marlborough 
between  James  II.  and  William,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  throw 
himself  into  the  ranks  rendered  illustrious  by  his  many  bril- 
liant feats  of  arms.  Yielding  to  a  single  dominant  idea,  he 
acted  with  impetuous  haste,  without  reflecting  that  he  might 
thereby  violate  other  sacred  duties,  from  which  he  might  so 
easily  have  relieved  himself  by  retiring  to  Besançon  till  after 
my  entrance  into  the  capital.  The  striking  contrast  between 
his  proclamation  at  Sous-le-Saulnier,  and  his  promises  to 
Louis  XVIII.,  will  remain  as  an  unfortunate  blot  in  the 
history  of  his  glorious  career,  because  it  gives  a  false  idea  of 
his  character  by  having  all  the  appearance  of  premeditated 
treason, — a  crime  of  which  he  was  utterly  incapable. 

Nothing  could  now  arrest  my  progress,  as  I  pursued  my 
triumphal  march  at  the  head  of  ten  thousand  men.  My 
adversaries  had  no  other  resource  than  the  camp  hastily 
assembled  at  Melun  ;  but  the  soldiers  of  this  camp,  brothers 
of  those  of  Grenoble,  Lyons,  and  Chalons,  were  more  dis- 
posed to  rejoin  their  eagles  than  to  fight  against  them. 
Astonished  at  the  rapidity  of  my  progress,  the  Bourbons 
knew  not  what  course  to  take.  It  is  impossible  to  describe 
the  agitation  and  confusion  which  now  reigned  in  Paris,  and 
particularly  in  the  palace  of  the  Tuileries.  Louis  XVIII. 
preserved  his  usual  calmness  and  resignation  ;  but  yielding 
to  the  advice  of  those  around  him  he  allowed  himself  to  be 
drawn  into  resolutions  the  most  opposite,  and  measures  the 
most  contradictory.  Ou  the  one  side  he  threw  himself  into 
the  arms  of  the  doctrinaires,  and  intrusted  Benjamin  Con- 
stant to  draw  up  royal  proclamations  that  should  gain  for 
him  the  confidence  and  love  of  the  French  !  Placing  him- 
self under  the  aegis  of  the  National  Guards  and  revolutionary 
partisans,  he  made  an  appeal  to  all  loyal  royalists,  and  to  the 


Cn.  XXIT]  CAMPAIGN    OF     18  15.  323 

army  which  he  had  so  ill-treated  !  Even  Fouché*  was  on  the 
point  of  being  ordered  to  the  palace  to  bo  consulted,  when  it 
was  decided  to  arrest  him  ;  but  the  wily  sycophant  made  a 
timely  escape  from  his  hotel,  and  reached  through  a  garden 
the  house  of  Queen  Hortense,  where  he  found  a  refuge. 
Then  followed  a  partial  change  of  ministers  ;  the  police  was 
confided  to  Bourrienne,  formerly  my  private  secretary  and 
the  friend  of  my  youth,  and  now  my  calumniator  and  declared 
enemy  ;  all  received  in  turn  caresses  and  promises  ;  the 
National  Guard  and  Royal  Volunteers  were  appealed  to  ; 
such  were  the  measures  resorted  to  by  MM.  Blacas,  Ferrand, 
and  Dambray,  to  repel  or  capture  the  conqueror  of  so  many 
people  !  The  chambers  which  had  been  convoked  in  so 
much  haste,  met  in  time  to  exhibit  to  the  world  the  utter 
worthlessness  of  public  assemblies  deliberating  in  the  presence 
of  real  danger,  and  to  prove  to  Europe  that  the  time  had 
passed  for  ever  when  senators  awaited  death  in  their  curule 
chairs.  This  meeting  of  the  chambers  had  no  other  result 
than  to  give  some  speakers  an  opportunity  of  repeating  the 
declamations  against  the  imperial  despotism  inserted  by 
Benjamin  Constant  in  the  Journal  des  Débats,  and  to  give 
the  king  an  occasion  to  present  himself  in  state  to  the  cham- 
bers, with  his  brother  and  nephews,  to  take  there  to  the 
charter  an  oath  of  fidelity  which  would  have  been  much  more 
appropriate  at  the  time  of  its  promulgation  ; — an  oath  which, 
on  the  part  of  Count  d'Artois,  was  generally  suspected  to  be 
insincere. — Two  days  after  this  sentimental  but  tardy  homily, 
the  troops  of  the  camp  of  Melun  came  over  to  join  mine  en 
masse,  and  the  next  day,  March  20th,  I  entered  the  Tuileries. 
The  Bourbons  had  barely  time  to  escape  to  Belgium  ;  the 
Duke  d'Angouleme  alone  kept  up  a  contest  for  some  days  in 
the  south. 

Napoleon  reascends  the  Throne. — Thus  was  this  astonish- 
ing revolution  terminated  in  twenty  days,  without  having 


324  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

cost  a  single  drop  of  blood.  France  had  now  changed  her 
aspect  ;  the  nation  restored  to  itself  had  resumed  its  ancient 
bearing.  It  was  free  from  the  yoke  imposed  by  the  foreigner, 
for  it  had  just  performed  the  highest  act  of  free  will  of  which 
any  people  can  be  capable.  The  grandeur  of  my  enterprise 
effaced  the  recollection  of  my  reverses  ;  it  restored  to  me  the 
confidence  of  the  French  people  ;  I  was  again  the  man  of 
their  choice. 

Composition  of  the  new  Ministry.— While  awaiting  the 
formation  of  definitive  institutions  of  government,  it  was 
necessary  to  organize  a  temporary  administration,  by  placing 
men  at  the  head  of  the  several  ministerial  departments.  The 
war  department  was  confided  to  Davoust,  the  marine  to 
Decrès,  the  finances  to  Gaudin,  foreign  affairs  to  Caulain- 
court,  whose  pacific  views  were  well  known  to  the  allies,  the 
seals  to  Cambacérès,  the  interior  to  Carnot,  and  the  police  to 
Fouché.  The  selection  of  these  last  two — old  adepts  in 
Jacobinism — was  a  sufficient  pledge  to  the  mass  of  the  people 
against  all  cries  of  despotism.  Carnot  I  knew  well.  This 
stern  old  republican  had  refused  me  the  empire  in  1815. 
His  mind  was  stamped  with  a  probity  that  no  circumstances 
could  change,  but  to  this  honest  and  energetic  will  there  was 
added  a  love  of .  opposition  and  of  Utopian  theories.  His 
military  arrangements  in  1793  and  1794,  had  given  him  a 
reputation  for  talent  in  military  defense,  and  his  republican 
notions  and  stern  integrity  made  him  another  Cato  in  the 
eyes  of  the  multitude.  It  was  now  necessary  to  animate  the 
courage  of  the  people  for  self-defense,  and  no  one  was  better 
calculated  than  Carnot  to  accomplish  this  object.  Fouché 
had  a  most  decided  character  for  intrigue  ;  he  mistook  craft 
and  roguery  for  great  talent  for  business.  He  was  an  Uto- 
pian demagogue,  and  yet  he  knew  the  shallowness  of  such 
theories.  He  wished  a  strong  government,  and  yet  opposed 
every  measure  calculated  to  give  it  strength.     He  was  popu- 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  325 

lar  with  a  certain  class,  and  I  hoped  to  turn  that  popularity 
to  account.  I  knew  his  character  well,  and  was  perfectly 
aware  that  he  was  unworthy  of  confidence.  But  I  knew  also 
that  he  would  not  remain  a  silent  spectator  of  coming  events. 
I  must,  therefore,  either  use  or  destroy  him.  If  I  locked 
him  up  at  Vincennes  or  exiled  him  without  judgment,  there 
would  have  been  good  grounds  for  suspecting  me  of  des- 
potism. I,  therefore,  determined  to  run  the  risk  of  using 
him,  and  to  counteract  his  intrigues  by  keeping  him  under 
the  strictest  watch.  My  leniency  cost  me  dear.  The  clients 
of  these  old  ex-conventionals,  and  those  that  ranged  them- 
selves under  the  Utopian  banners  of  the  Lafayettes,  Lanjui- 
nais,  and  the  Benjamin  Constants,  proved  more  dangerous  as 
friends  than  as  enemies. 

Napoleon's  Position  toward  Europe.  —  Having  thus  at- 
tended to  the  formation  of  my  council,  I  felt  how  urgent  it 
was  to  look  at  the  aspect  of  foreign  affairs.  I  had  refused 
the  peace  offered  me  at  Chatillon  with  the  limits  of  1792, 
because  I  was  then  on  the  throne  of  France,  and  the  condi- 
tions were  too  humiliating  ;  but  now  there  was  nothing  to 
prevent  me  from  abiding  by  the  conditions  imposed  on  the 
Bourbons  ;  returning  from  the  Isle  of  Elba,  I  could  not  be 
responsible,  either  in  the  eyes  of  France  or  of  posterity,  for 
what  had  been  done  by  others  in  my  absence.  In  informing 
Murat  of  my  departure,  I  had  charged  him  to  send  a  courier 
to  Vienna  to  carry  there  my  engagement  to  abide  by  the 
treaties  of  Paris,  and  to  occupy  myself  only  with  the  in- 
terior of  France.  Unfortunately,  I  then  had  no  suitable 
person  to  send  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  demonstrate  to 
this  prince  how  much  the  rivalry  of  England  would  one  day 
annoy  him,  and  how  important  it  was  for  Russia  that  France 
should  have  a  government  strong,  national,  and  opposed  to 
the  interests  of  England.  As  I  could  no  longer  occupy  my- 
self with  my  former  projects  on  the  Vistula,  and  as  France 


326  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ce.  XXIL 

and  Knssia  could  no  longer  be  rivals,  it  is  difficult  to  say 
what  effect  such  a  mission  might  have  produced  on  the  mind 
of  the  Russian  monarch  ;  but  it  is  unfortunate  that  the  trial 
was  not  made.  At  any  rate  it  is  very  natural  to  suppose 
that  the  positive  assurances  given  by  me  to  the  sovereigns  of 
Europe  would  have  had  some  influence  :  for  Europe,  aston- 
ished at  my  return  and  at  the  energy  of  the  French  people, 
must  have  expected  a  repetition  of  the  scenes  of  the  revolu- 
tion, if  this  people  were  again  provoked  to  employ  all  their 
resources  in  propagandism.  Success  would  have  been  quite 
certain  if  the  congress  had  been  dissolved,  as  I  was  errone- 
ously informed,  so  that  I  could  have,  treated  with  the 
cabinets  separately.* 

General  Coalition  against  Him.— But  the  sovereigns  being 
still  assembled,  they  felt  their  self-love  irritated  \  their  in- 
terests had  so  clashed  since  the  fall  of  my  empire  that  they 
had  found  it  difficult  to  continue  negotiations  ;  but  the  fear 
of  losing  all  these  rich  spoils,  again  united  the  disputants, 
and  all  my  efforts  to  preserve  peace  were  unavailing.  It  was 
in  vain  that  I  protested  my  adhesion  to  the  treaties  ;  they 
refused  to  believe  me.  They  dreaded  the  influence  which 
the  example  of  the  French  people  might  have  upon  their 
own  subjects,  and  therefore  were  inclined  to  treat  my  return 
merely  as  a  military  revolt.  Moreover,  Austria,  trembling 
lest  I  might  dispute  Italy  with  her,  entirely  forgot  the  con- 
nections which  the  events  of  1814  had  already  broken.  Rus- 
sia, thinking  that  she  could  preserve  Warsaw  only  by  allying 
herself  to  her  natural  rivals,  sacrificed  every  thing  to  secure 
this  result.     Prussia  had  been  soliciting;  Austria  to  allow  her 


*  The  conduct  of  the  European  powers  toward  France  in  1830,  would  seem 
to  confirm  the  correctness  of  this  assertion.  Napoleon  had  left  Elba  on  the 
faith  of  articles  written  from  Vienna  by  Latour-Dupin,  and  inserted  in  the 
Journal-des- Débats.  This  paper  announced  the  departure  of  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia and  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  as  certain. 


Ch.  XXII.  j  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  327 

to  extend  her  territory  at  the  expense  of  Saxony,  but  she 
now  eagerly  accepted  what  had  been  offered  her  in  lieu  of 
this,  lest  she  might  lose  all.  England,  governed  at  this  time 
by  mediocre  men,  thought  she  again  saw  my  imperial  eagles 
hovering  over  Boulogne,  Antwerp  and  Egypt,  and  made 
lavish  of  her  subsidies  in  order  to  sustain  herself  against  an 
imaginary  danger. 

The  Congress  puts  Napoleon  under  the  Ban  of  Nations. 
— Thus  all  the  interests  of  these  sovereigns  seemed  opposed 
to  my  existence.  The  declaration  of  the  thirteenth  of  March, 
declaring  me  an  outlaw,  sufficiently  proves  the  fears  inspired 
by  my  name.  If  we  add  to  these  motives  the  fear  felt  by 
Talleyrand  lest  my  return  might  cause  the  sequestration  of 
the  ten  millions  of  Bernese  stocks  held  by  him  in  England 
and  lest  his  fortune  in  France  might  be  compromitted  by  his 
banishment,  it  will  be  easy  to  understand  the  violence  of  that 
famous  declaration  which  has  generally  been  attributed  to 
his  pen.  To  quiet  these  powers  it  was  necessary  for  me  to 
assure  Russia  of  Warsaw,  and  Austria  of  Italy  ;  this  I 
could  have  done  if  the  negotiations  had  been  conducted 
separately  at  St.  Petersburg  and  at  Vienna.  But  the  declar- 
ation of  the  thirteenth  of  March,  left  little  chance  of  success. 
Nevertheless,  I  at  first  hoped  that  this  declaration  was 
mainly  intended  to  second  the  resistance  of  the  Bourbons 
and  to  deter  me  from  any  ulterior  projects  against  Europe. 
Nothing  was  more  natural  than  that  the  powers  who  had 
placed  Louis  XVIII.  on  the  throne  of  France,  should  wish 
to  maintain  him  there  ;  but  since  this  prince  had  been  so 
easily  forced  to  a  second  emigration,  the  nice  of  the  question 
was  entirely  changed,  and  I  had  good  reason  to  hope  that 
the  cabinets  would  be  disposed  to  retrace  their  steps  when 
they  learned  the  rapidity  of  my  triumph  and  the  unheard-of 
success  of  my  enterprise,  and  also  of  my  pacific  intentions. 
Unfortunately,  the  treaties  of  alliance,  offensive  and  defen- 


328  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

sive,  signed  the  twenty-fifth  of  March,  between  the  great 
powers,  soon  destroyed  this  illusion. 

Operations  of  the  Duke  d'Angoulcme.— But  exterior  em- 
barrassments, resulting  from  the  proceedings  of  the  congress 
of  Vienna,  were  not  the  only  ones  I  now  encountered.  The 
Duke  d'Angoulème,  appointed  by  Louis  XVIII.  his  lieuten- 
ant in  the  south,  had  organized  the  royal  government  at  Tou- 
louse, and,  in  concert  with  M.  de  Vitrolles  and  the  Count 
Damas,  had  prepared  to  resist  my  empire.  The  mercantile 
population  of  Marseilles,  whose  love  of  lucre  exceeded  their 
love  of  liberty,  and  the  fanatic  inhabitants  of  Languedoc, 
whose  religious  dissensions  were  closely  connected  with  their 
political  quarrels,  were  easily  induced  to  side  with  the  royal- 
ists. The  duke,  with  their  aid  and  that  of  some  regiments 
which  yet  remained  faithful,  formed  three  columns  with 
which  to  ascend  the  Khone  and  retake  Lyons  and  Grenoble. 
But  the  greater  part  of  his  forces  soon  declared  for  my  cause. 
Dauphiny  declared  against  the  Bourbons,  and  the  tricolored 
flag  again  floated  at  Toulouse  and  at  Montpellier,  and  the 
duke,  surrounded  on  all  sides,  signed,  on  the  ninth  of  April, 
at  Pont-Saint-Esprit,  a  convention  agreeing  to  evacuate 
France.  Grouchy  at  first  refused  to  ratify  it,  but  I  hastened 
to  give  it  my  sanction. 

Troubles  in  La  Vendee. — At  the  same  time  troubles  broke 
out  in  La  Vendée,  and  I  Avas  forced  to  send  there  fifteen 
thousand  old  soldiers.  The  skill  and  activity  of  Generals 
Lamarque  and  Fravot  soon  smothered  the  flames  of  civil 
war.  Larochejacquelin  was  slain  at  the  combat  of  Mathes, 
and  signal  victories  were  gained  at  Saint  Gilles  and  Roche- 
Servières  ;  but,  on  account  of  the  peculiar  localities  and  the 
obstinate  character  of  the  inhabitants,  hostilities  did  not 
entirely  cease  for  a  long  time. 

Affairs  in  Naples. — While  those  events  were  taking  place 
in  France  and  at  the  congress  of  Vienna,  Murat  rendered  my 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  329 

affairs  still  more  complicated  by  his  untimely  commencement 
of  hostilities  in  Italy — an  enterprise  worthy  of  his  whimsical 
and  adventurous  character.  Hearing  of  the  negotiations 
between  France  and  Austria  for  dethroning  him,  he  de- 
manded of  the  latter  power  a  free  passage  through  Italy,  to 
take  vengeance  for  the  menaces  of  the  minister  of  Louis 
XVIII.  ;  of  course  this  was  refused.  Hearing  of  my  de- 
barkation, he  flattered  himself  that  he  could  suddenly  repair, 
in  my  eyes,  his  defection  of  1814.  He  thought  the  moment 
had  arrived  when  he  was  to  play  a  great  part,  and,  by  pro- 
mising the  people  of  Italy  a  national  insurrection,  was  to 
become  the  arbiter  of  great  events.  He  debouches,  on  the 
twenty-second  of  March,  from  Ancona  with  forty  thousand 
men,  drives  the  Austrians  from  Cesena,  and,  favored  by  the 
population  of  Bologna  and  Modena,  rapidly  invades  the 
country  of  the  Po  as  far  as  Placentia,  while  another  column 
invades  the  Roman  states  and  Tuscany.  He  everywhere 
scatters  proclamations,  announcing  that  he  comes  to  unite 
all  Italy  under  the  same  flag  ;  and  takes  formal  possession 
of  the  provinces  which  he  crosses  ;  he  even  meditates  the 
invasion  of  Lombardy  across  Piedmont,  when  he  is  arrested 
by  the  declaration  of  the  English  minister  with  threats  of 
war.  The  Austrians  soon  assemble  and  throw  against  him 
General  Bianchi,  with  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men. 
Leaving  Florence  with  the  mass  of  his  forces,  this  general 
marches  by  Foligno  in  order  to  cut  off  Murat's  retreat,  at 
the  same  time  that  Neipperg  is  to  threaten  him  by  the  route 
of  Ancona.  The  King  of  Naples,  to  avoid  such  a  result,  is 
obliged  to  retire  in  all  haste  ;  a  decisive  rencontre  takes  place 
at  Tolentino  on  the  second  of  May  ;  the  Neapolitan  army  is 
defeated  and  dispersed  in  all  directions.  Murat  reaches  his 
capital  with  only  a  small  escort  ;  he  is  now  deserted  by  his 
warmest  partisans,  and  compelled  to  fly  from  Naples  to  seek 
refuge  in  France  ;    he  debarks  at  Toulon.      A   convention 


330  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

signed  at  Capua,  on  the  twentieth  of  May,  restores  Ferdi- 
nand IV.  to  the  throne  of  the  Two-Sicilies.  Never  was  any 
thing  more  untimely  than  this  operation  of  Murat.  If  Aus- 
tria had  had  the  least  inclination  to  recede  from  the  declara- 
tion of  the  thirteenth  of  March,  this  was  to  render  the  thing 
impossible  ;  and  even  supposing  that  the  cabinet  of  Vienna 
had  resolved  to  persist  in  it,  every  thing  should  have  been 
avoided  that  was  calculated  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  the 
coalition.  In  a  military  point  of  view,  it  was  taking  the 
initiative  prematurely,  for  he  commenced  even  before  know- 
ing whether  or  not  I  could  second  his  operations.  As  a 
diversion,  the  King  of  Naples  could  have  been  of  much  avail  ; 
but  in  attempting  to  act  the  principal  part  in  the  war,  he 
committed  a  great  absurdity.  Thus  twice  did  Murat  com- 
promit the  empire  ;  the  first  time,  (in  1814),  by  declaring 
for  its  enemies  ;  the  second,  (in  1815),  by  taking  arms  mal- 
à-propos  in  its  favor.  He  expiated,  by  a  chivalric  death,  two 
faults  that  precipitated  him  from  his  throne  ;  his  memory  as 
a  soldier  will  ever  be  glorious. 

Preparations  to  repel  Aggression. — But  the  fatal  result 
of  this  premature  opening  of  hostilities  by  the  King  of 
Naples,  the  success  of  the  Austrians,  the  reports  which 
reached  France  of  what  was  passing  at  Vienna  and  in  the 
rest  of  Europe  ; — all  these  were  of  a  nature  to  inspire  a  just 
fear  in  the  least  discerning.  A  formidable  war  was  again 
about  to  threaten  the  national  existence,  and  all  hope  of 
dissipating  the  storm  was  now  gone  ;  I  had  to  decide  either 
to  brave  it,  or  to  fly  from  it  like  a  coward  ;  in  such  a 
dilemma  could  I  hesitate  ?  If  personal  honor  had  alone 
been  at  stake,  I  could  have  sacrificed  it  for  the  future  welfare 
of  France  ;  but  the  honor  of  the  nation  was  more  involved 
than  my  own.  A  people  of  thirty  millions,  which  had  just 
raised  one  of  its  citizens  to  the  highest  power,  could  it,  on  a 
diplomatic  declaration  of  a  foreign  congress,  drive  away  this 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  331 

adopted  chief,  and  submit  to  the  yoke  which  these  foreigners 
wished  to  impose  !  !  !  Some  have  reproached  me  for  con- 
tinuing to  occupy  the  throne  after  the  reception  of  the  de- 
claration of  Vienna.  In  their  opinion  I  ought  to  have 
frankly  exposed  to  France  the  position  in  which  she  would 
be  placed  toward  Europe,  alarmed  and  rushing  to  arms 
against  myself,  and  then  to  have  proposed  to  the  nation  to 
decide  on  one  of  the  three  following  propositions  : 

1st.  To  submit  without  delay  to  the  clemency  of  Louis 
XVIII.  ; 

2d.  To  proclaim  for  Napoleon  II.,  with  a  regency,  or 
some  other  form  ; 

3d.  To  declare  the  nullity  of  the  abdication  of  Fon- 
tainebleau, and  recognize  anew  the  empire  of  Napoleon 
himself  : 

That,  if  the  nation  had  adopted  this  last  part,  then  the 
fate  of  France  had  been  irrevocably  connected  with  my  own, 
and  all  desertions  from  me  would  have  been  cowardice  or 
felony  ! 

The  fervent  and  unreflecting  apostles  of  national  sover- 
eignty may  find  something  specious  in  these  ideas,  but  really 
they  are  without  sagacity  :  in  the  first  place,  I  did  not  de- 
spair of  recalling  Austria,  and  perhaps  Bussia,  to  sentiments 
more  favorable  to  my  cause  ;  I  many  times  renewed  the 
attempt,  and  even  sent  General  Flahaut  to  Vienna  with  this 
intention  :  but  if  such  hope  had  not  existed,  could  I  think 
of  flying  for  ever  from  France,  to  which  Louis  XVIII.  would 
have  immediately  returned  with  the  allies,  and  all  the  men 
who  had  devoted  themselves  to  my  cause  would  have  been 
given  up  to  the  fury  of  the  reactionnaires  ?  Such  a  course 
would  have  been  humiliating  to  the  smallest  prince  in  Eu- 
rope ;  how  then  could  I  submit  to  such  a  proscription  ? 
Moreover,  by  abdicating  in  the  early  part  of  April,  I  should 
have  left  Fiance  without  a  government,  at  a  moment  when 


332  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXIL 

eight  hundred  thousand  men  were  ready  to  fall  upon  her  ! 
There  was  no  choice  :  it  was  necessary  to  fly,  and  to  recall 
Louis  XVIII.,  or  to  fight  !  This  alternative  was  a  hard 
one,  and  the  chances  were  frightful,  hut  there  were  no  others. 
In  adopting  this  alternative  I  felt  certain  that,  if  properly 
seconded,  I  should  triumph  over  these  enemies  of  myself  and 
of  France. 

Other  critics  on  my  course  at  this  time  have  been  as  rash 
as  the  above  were  weak  : — these  pretend  that,  instead  of 
yielding  to  the  approaching  storm,  I  should  have  anticipated 
it,  and  profited  by  the  first  rising  of  the  people  to  show,  by 
invading  Belgium,  and  proclaiming  liberty  throughout 
Europe,  how  redoubtable  was  the  popular  power  ;  whereas 
my  pacific  attitude  stifled  the  popular  enthusiasm  !  Pitiful 
declamation  !  To  throw  a  people  in  working  blouses,  and 
armed  with  pikes  upon  the  warlike  legions  of  all  Europe  ! 
A  large  army  was  requisite,  and  to  obtain  this  it  was  neces- 
sary to  preserve,  with  all  care,  the  precious  nucleus  then 
existing,  and  to  form  around  this  the  people  which  were  then 
being  levied  and  organized. 

The  pacific  attitude  with  which  I  have  been  reproached, 
consisted  in  working  sixteen  hours  a  day  for  three  months  to 
create  this  army.  I  increased  the  cadres  of  the  regiments  of 
the  line  from  two  to  five  battalions,  and  reënforced  those  of 
the  cavalry  by  two  squadrons.  I  organized  two  hundred 
battalions  of  movable  National  Guards,  forty  battalions  of 
Old  and  Young  Guards,  twenty  regiments  of  marines.  The 
old  disbanded  soldiers  were  recalled  to  their  colors  ;  the 
conscriptions  of  1814  and  '15  were  levied  ;  even  the  old  retired 
officers  and  soldiers  were  induced  to  return  to  the  line.  On 
the  first  of  June,  i.  e.,  in  two  months,  the  effective  force  of 
the  French  army  had  been  increased  from  two  hundred 
thousand  to  four  hundred  and  fourteen  thousand  ;  by  the 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  333 

month  of  September  it  would  have  numbered  seven  hundred 
thousand  men  ;  but  for  this  time  was  wanting.* 

Motives  for  Napoleon's  defensive  Attitude. —  It  would 
have  been  absurd,  in  the  midst  of  these  preparations,  for  me 
to  think  of  invading  Belgium  in  order  to  secure  the  line  of 
the  Khine.  This  question  was  discussed  immediately  after 
my  arrival  in  Paris,  but  more  than  one  obstacle  opposed  it. 
At  first  I  had  in  hand  only  forty  thousand  men,  La  Vendée 
was  in  insurrection,  the  Duke  d'Angoulême  was  marching 
on  Lyons,  and  the  Marseillais  on  Grenoble.  It  is  necessary 
to  be  master  of  one's  own  house,  before  attempting  to  rule  in 
others.  A  still  stronger  reason  opposed  this  invasion.  How 
could  I  take  such  a  step  after  writing  the  letter  in  which  I 
had  offered  the  sovereigns  a  sincere  and  lasting  peace.  It 
might  have  been  rash  to  hope  for  the  good  will  of  the  others, 
but  there  were  still  motives  for  trusting  to  that  of  my  father- 
in-law.  In  1814  the  Emperor  of  Austria  had  sought  to 
prevent  my  dethronement  ;  at  the  moment  of  my  return,  the 
discussion  was  becoming  warm  with  Kussia  on  the  partition 
of  Galicia  and  the  fate  of  Saxony.  There  was  then  every 
reason  to  hope  that  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  would  consent,  in 
1815,  to  what  its  negotiator  had  proposed  in  1814  :  to  main- 
tain me  on  the  throne,  if  I  would  consent  to  relinquish  Italy. 
I  proposed  this,  and  in  spite  of  the  famous  declaration  of  the 
thirteenth  of  March,  I  might  still  flatter  myself  that  I  should 
yet  see  the  father  of  Maria-Louisa  return  to  his  former  senti- 
ments. Moreover,  the  French  had  blamed  in  me  a  too  great 
'penchant  for  war  ;  public  opinion  was  in  favor  of  peace,  if 
it  were  possible,  and  would  not  have  sanctioned  a  declaration 
of  war,  so  long  as  there  was  any  chance  of  maintaining  peace. 
Even  admitting  that  it  was  easy  to  foresee  that  these  pacific 
measures  would  not  prevent  a  war,  there  was  but  slight 

*  These  details  differ  in  some  respects  from  those  given  by  Napoleon  in  his 
St.  Helena  dictations. 


334  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

chance  of  gaining  anything  by  marching  upon  Brussels, 
guarded  as  it  then  was  by  the  Germanic  Confederation  with 
an  army  of  occupation  ;  the  fortresses  of  Luxembourg  and 
Mayence  no  longer  belonged  to  France,  but,  together  with 
the  places  of  Holland,  secured  to  the  allies  several  debouches 
on  the  left  of  the  Rhine  ;  under  these  circumstances  it  is  not 
very  certain  that  an  invasion  of  Belgium  would  have  been 
advantageous  ;  it  might  have  transferred  the  first  battle-field 
from  the  Sambre  to  the  Meuse  or  the  Moselle,  but  it  would 
have  done  nothing  more.  Supposing  that  Luxembourg  and 
Antwerp  could  have  been  gained  without  a  siege — a  suppo- 
sition altogether  improbable — it  would  have  been  necessary 
to  garrison  them,  and  this  the  French  were  not  then  in  a 
condition  to  do  ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  these  fortresses  had 
remained  in  the  enemy's  hands,  of  what  use  would  Brussels 
have  been  to  us,  surrounded  as  it  was  by  Maestricht,  Luxem- 
bourg, Berg-op-Zoom,  and  Antwerp  ?  Was  it  not,  under 
these  circumstances,  more  wise  to  retain  the  old  regiments, 
and  so  incorporate  them  into  the  new  organization  as  to 
double  its  effective  power,  rather  than  to  scatter  them  in 
Belgium  ? 

Napoleon  refuses  to  resort  to  revolutionary  Means  of 
Defense^ — Some  deemed  it  necessary  to  commence  a  new 
revolution  in  order  to  profit  by  the  passions  and  blind  devo- 
tion it  might  produce.  Fouché  advised  this,  and  also  Car- 
not,  who  still  remained  a  Jacobin  under  the  mantle  of  a 
count  of  the  empire.  I  knew  too  well  the  difficulty  of 
restraining  popular  storms  within  proper  bounds,  to  again 
destroy  the  fabric  of  social  order.  To  unchain  the  revolu- 
tionary tiger,  is  to  drench  the  country  with  fraternal  blood, 
and  anarchy  is  far  from  infallible  as  a  means  of  saving  a 
nation  ;  it  succeeded  in  1793,  but  it  was  by  a  combination 
of  circumstances  unexampled  in  history,  and  which  probably 
may  never  again  recur.     In  the  coming  contest  I   wished  no 


CH.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  335 

other  than  legitimate  passions, — the  enthusiasm  and  energy 
naturally  resulting  from  a  popular  conviction  that  my  success 
was  inseparably  connected  with  the  glory  and  honor  of 
France.  This  point  the  nation  itself  was  to  decide,  through 
its  electors,  at  the  Champ-de-Mai.  If  they  should  decide  in 
favor  of  the  new  political  organization  and  institutions,  my 
own  fate  and  that  of  France  would  become  inseparable. 

The  (hamp-dc-Mai.— At  length  the  so  much  desired  first 
of  June  arrived  ;  the  ceremony  took  place  with  great  pomp 
in  the  Champ-de-Mars.  Clothed  with  the  imperial  mantle, 
surrounded  by  my  dethroned  brothers  and  the  doctrinaire 
Lucien,  the  great  state  functionaries,  marshals  and  prelates, 
I  was  seated  on  a  superb  throne,  erected  near  the  Ecole  Mili- 
taire. Just  around  me  were  assembled  twenty  thousand 
electors  seated  in  amphitheatre  form  ;  beyond  these  were  the 
deputies  of  the  armies  ;  still  further  on,  were  fifty  thousand 
men  en  grande  tenue  ;  and  then  an  immense  concourse  of 
spectators,  giving  a  magnificent  aspect  to  this  political 
solemnity.  It  was  begun  by  divine  service,  after  which  M. 
Dubois  d'Angers  pronounced  a  fine  discourse  in  the  name  of 
the  electors  of  France,  and  proclaimed  the  acceptation  of 
the  additional  act.  I  replied  to  this  discourse  in  the  follow- 
ing words  : 

' '  Gentlemen,  electors  of  colleges,  and  of  departments  ! 
Gentlemen,  deputies  from  the  army  and  navy  to  the  Champ- 
de-Mai  ! 

"  Emperor,  consul,  soldier,  I  owe  every  thing  to  the  French 
people.  In  prosperity,  in  adversity,  in  the  field  of  battle,  in 
the  council,  on  the  throne,  in  exile,  France  has  been  the  only 
and  constant  object  of  all  my  thoughts  and  actions.  Like 
the  King  of  Athens,  I  sacrificed  myself  at  Fontainebleau  for 
the  people,  in  the  hope  of  seeing  realized  the  promise  of 
thereby  securing  to  France  her  natural  frontiers,  her  honors, 
and  her  rights.     Indignation  at  beholding  those  sacred  rights, 


336  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXIL 

the  fruit  of  twenty-five  years  of  victory,  disregarded  or  for- 
ever lost  ;  the  cry  of  withered  honor,  the  wishes  of  the  na- 
tion, have  brought  me  back  to  a  throne  which  is  dear  to  me, 
because  it  is  the  palladium  of  the  independence,  of  the  rights, 
and  of  the  honor  of  the  French  people. 

"  Frenchmen  !  in  traversing,  amid  the  public  rejoicing, 
the  different  provinces  of  the  empire,  I  trusted  that  I  could 
reckon  on  a  long  peace,  for  nations  are  bound  by  the  treaties 
made  by  their  governments,  whatever  they  may  be.  My 
whole  thoughts  were  then  turned  to  the  means  of  securing 
our  liberty  by  a  constitution  resting  on  the  wishes  and  in- 
terests of  the  people  ;  and  for  this  object  have  I  called  the 
assembly  of  the  Champ-de-Mai.  I  soon  learned,  however, 
that  the  sovereigns,  wTho  resist  all  popular  rights  and  disre- 
gard the  wishes  and  interests  of  so  rnauy  nations,  were 
resolved  on  Avar.  They  intend  to  extend  the  kingdom  of  the 
Low  Countries,  by  giving  it  for  a  barrier  all  our  fortified  places 
in  the  north,  and  to  reconcile  all  differences  by  sharing 
among  themselves  Lorraine  and  Alsace.  We  must,  there- 
fore, prepare  for  war. 

"  Before  personally  exposing  myself  to  the  risks  of  the 
battle-field,  I  have  made  it  my  first  care  to  establish  the 
constitution  of  the  nation.  The  people  have  accepted  the 
act  which  I  presented  to  them.  When  we  shall  have  re- 
pelled these  unjust  aggressions  ;  and  Europe  shall  be  con- 
vinced of  what  is  due  to  the  rights  and  independence  of 
twenty-eight  millions  of  Frenchmen,  a  solemn  law,  enacted 
according  to  the  forms  presciibed  by  the  constitutional  act, 
shall  combine  the  different  provisions  of  our  constitutions, 
which  are  now  scattered,  into  one  body. 

"  Frenchmen  1  you  are  now  about  to  return  to  your 
departments  ;  tell  your  fellow-citizens  that  the  times  are 
perilous  : — but  that  with  union,  energy,  and  perseverance, 
we  shall  emerge  victorious  out  of  this  struggle  of  a  great 


Ou.  XXTT.J  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  337 

people  against  its  oppressors  ;  tell  them  that  future  genera- 
tions will  severely  scrutinize  our  conduct  ;  and  that  a  nation 
has  lost  every  thing,  when  it  has  lost  its  independence.  Tell 
them  that  the  foreign  kings,  whom  I  have  raised  to  their 
thrones,  or  who  are  indebted  to  me  for  their  crowns,  and  who 
in  the  days  of  my  prosperity  courted  my  alliance  and  the 
protection  of  the  French  people,  are  now  aiming  their  blows 
at  my  person.  Did  I  not  know  that  it  was  really  against 
our  country  that  these  blows  are  aimed,  I  would  sacrifice 
myself  to  their  hatred.  But  tell  your  fellow-citizens,  also, 
that  while  they  retain  for  me  the  sentiments  of  love,  of 
which  they  give  me  so  many  proofs,  this  rage  of  our  enemies 
will  be  impotent. 

"  Frenchmen  !  my  will  is  that  of  the  people  ;  my  rights 
are  their  rights  ;  my  honor,  my  glory,  my  happiness,  can 
never  be  distinct  from  the  honor,  the  glory,  and  the  happi- 
ness of  France." 

These  words  were  pronounced  with  a  firm  and  energetic 
voice,  and  produced  the  most  lively  enthusiasm.  At  their 
conclusion,  I  took  the  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  charter,  and 
Cambacérès,  in  the  name  of  the  electors,  swore,  in  the  name 
of  France,  the  fidelity  of  the  French  people  to  the  new 
government.  This  oath  was  repeated  sjjontaneously  by  all 
the  electors  and  deputies,  and  by  the  great  majority  of  the 
spectators  ;  then  followed  the  distribution  of  colors  to  the 
deputations  of  the  army,  to  the  troops  present  and  to  the 
National  Guard.  A  few  days  after,  the  electors  set  out  for 
their  departments,  having  proclaimed  the  acceptation  of  the 
act  additional,  and  appointed  deputies  for  the  new  assembly. 

Opening  of  the  Chambers.— On  the  seventh  of  June,  I 
opened  the  two  chambers  with  the  following  discourse  : 

"  Messieurs  of  the  Chamber  of  Peers,  and  Messieurs  of  the 
Chamber  of  Representatives  ! — For  the  three  months  past, 
circumstances  and  the  confidence  of  the  people  have  invested 


338  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

me  with  unlimited  power.  At  this  moment  the  most  anxious 
wish  of  my  heart  is  accomplished  ;  I  have  just  commenced  a 
constitutional  monarchy.  Men  are  too  weak  to  secure  the 
future;  legal  institutions  alone  can  fix  the  destinies  of  na- 
tions. A  monarchy  is  necessary  to  France,  in  order  to  secure 
the  liberty,  the  independence,  and  the  rights  of  the  people. 
Our  constitutions  are  scattered  ;  one  of  our  most  important 
occupations  will  be  to  consolidate  them  into  one  body,  and 
arrange  them  into  one  simple  system.  This  labor  will  re- 
commend the  present  epoch  to  the  gratitude  of  future  gener- 
ations. It  is  my  ambition  to  see  France  enjoy  all  possible 
liberty  ;  I  say  possible,  for  unrestricted  liberty  leads  to 
anarchy,  and  anarchy  always  resolves  itself  into  absolute 
government. 

"  A  formidable  coalition  of  kings  threatens  our  indepen- 
dence ;  their  armies  are  approaching  our  frontiers.  The 
English  have  attacked  and  taken  one  of  our  frigates  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Blood  has  been  shed  in  time  of  peace.  Our 
enemies  rely  upon  our  internal  divisions.  They  incite  and 
foment  civil  war.  *  *  *  Legislative  provisions  are  ne- 
cessary to  prevent  this.  I  place  unreserved  confidence  in 
your  wisdom,  your  patriotism,  and  your  attachment.  The 
liberty  of  the  press  is  inherent  in  the  existing  constitution, 
and  no  change  in  that  respect  can  be  made  without  changing 
all  our  political  system  ;  but  it  is  necessary  for  the  public 
good  that  there  be  some  restrictions,  especially  at  the  pres- 
ent crisis.  I  recommend  this  subject  to  your  special  atten- 
tion. 

"  The  first  duty  of  a  prince  may  soon  call  me  at  the  head 
of  the  children  of  the  nation  to  fight  for  our  country.  The 
army  and  myself  will  do  our  duty  ;  and  you,  Peers  and  Re- 
presentatives, give  to  the  nation  the  example  of  confidence, 
energy,  and  patriotism.  Like  the  senate  of  the  great  people 
of  antiquity,  resolve  to  die  rather  than  survive  the  dégrada- 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  339 

tion  and  dishonor  of  France.     The  sacred  cause  of  the  coun- 
try shall  bo  triumphant." 

Addresses  of  the  Chambers.— The  chambers  voted  different 
addresses,  both  dwelt  upon  the  necessity  of  submitting  the 
absolute  power  to  constitutional  forms  and  rules.  They  pro- 
mised, in  case  of  reverses,  to  show  perseverance  and  to  re- 
double their  attachment  to  the  imperial  cause,  now  become 
the  cause  of  France.  The  peers  assured  Europe  that  with 
the  new  institutions,  the  seductions  of  victory  could  never 
draw  the  chief  of  the  state  beyond  the  bounds  of  prudence. 
To  this  recrimination  on  the  past  I  replied  : — "The  contest 
in  which  we  are  now  engaged  is  a  serious  one,  the  seduction 
of  prosperity  is  not  the  danger  that  now  threatens  us  :  it  is 
under  the  Caudine  Forks  that  the  foreigner  would  make  us 
pass.  The  justice  of  our  cause,  the  public  spirit  of  the  na- 
tion, and  the  courage  of  the  army,  are  powerful  reasons  to 
hope  for  success.  But  should  we  experience  reverses,  then 
shall  I  expect  to  find  in  the  Chamber  of  Peers  proofs  of  at- 
tachment to  the  country  and  its  chief.  It  is  in  difficult 
times  that  great  nations,  like  great  men,  display  all  the 
energy  of  their  character,  and  become  objects  of  admiration 
to  posterity." 

Posterity  will  agree,  in  reading  this  discourse,  that  I,  at 
least,  foresaw  all  the  dangers  to  which  France  was  exposed, 
and  neglected  nothing  calculated  to  prepare  her  for  the  con- 
test. My  answer  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  still  more 
pointed. 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  threatens  to  engage  in  dog- 
matic Controversies. — This  chamber  did  not  hesitate  to 
exhibit  its  impatience  to  rush  into  the  arena  of  constitutional 
debates.  "  Faithful,"  it  said,  "  to  its  mission,  it  will  fulfill 
the  task  devolving  upon  it  in  this  noble  work  ;  it  asks,  in 
order  to  satisfy  the  public  will,  that  the  national  deliberation 
shall  rectify  as  soon  as   possible,  the  defects  in  our  institu- 


340  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

tions  resulting  from  the  urgency  of  our  situation.  And 
while  your  majesty  shall  oppose  to  a  most  unjust  aggression 
the  honor  of  the  national  arms,  and  the  force  of  genius,  the 
Chamber  of  Representatives  ivill  endeavor  to  attain  the  same 
object  by  immediately  drawing  up  a  pact  whose  perfection 
shall  cement  still  closer  the  union  of  the  throne  and  the 
people,  and  fortify  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  the  guarantee  of  our 
engagements  for  the  amelioration  of  our  institutions." 

This  was  a  clear  annunciation  that  they  intended  to  profit 
by  the  absence  of  the  emperor  to  establish  public  contro- 
versies upon  a  constitution,  without  waiting  for  the  initiation 
of  the  government,  which  still  formed  the  fundamental  basis 
of  the  existing  legislation.  This  assumption  of  authority  by 
the  chamber  was  like  that  of  the  constituent  assembly  of 
1789,  but  under  circumstances  still  more  dangerous  ;  in  a 
word,  it  was  a  revolutionary  act,  changing  the  entire  face  of 
the  government.  This  address  of  the  chamber  indicated 
plainly  enough  that  its  main  object  would  be  to  hamper  the 
new  government,  and  to  reduce  its  sphere  of  action  to  a  mere 
nullity  : — an  absurd  and  dangerous  course  of  conduct,  always 
indicating  either  national  decay  or  approaching  anarchy. 

Napoleon's  rcmarkaMc  Reply.— I  appreciated  this  address 
of  the  chamber  at  its  full  value,  but  preferred  to  show  mode- 
ration in  applauding  the  intentions  of  the  doctrinaires,  and 
at  the  same  time  calling  their  attention  to  the  danger  result- 
ing from  these  untimely  discussions.  "  In  these  grave  cir- 
cumstances," I  replied,  "  my  thoughts  are  absorbed  by  the 
impending  war,  on  the  success  of  which  depend  the  indepen- 
dence and  honor  of  France.  I  shall  set  out  to-night  to  place 
myself  at  the  head  of  my  armies  *  *  *  During  my  ab- 
sence I  shall  be  pleased  to  hoar  that  a  committee  appointed 
by  each  house  maturely  consider  our  institutions  ;  the  con- 
stitution is  our  rallying  point,  and  it  should  be  our  polar-star 
in  these  moments  of  danger.      But  all  public  discussions 


Cn.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  341 

tending  to  diminish  directly  or  indirectly  the  confidence  that 
should  be  reposed  in  the  government  and  its  dispositions, 
will  be  a  national  evil  ;  it  will  be  placing  the  ship  of  state 
in  the  midst  of  rocks,  without  helm  or  compass.  The 
present  crisis  is  all-important  ;  let  us  not  imitate  the  ex- 
ample of  the  Lower  Empire  which,  surrounded  on  all  sides 
by  barbarians,  became  the  jest  of  posterity  by  engaging  in 
abstract  discussions  at  the  moment  when  the  enemy's  batter- 
ing-ram was  thundering  at  the  gates  of  the  capital." 

I  was  truly  grieved  at  the  course  pursued  by  the  chamber, 
for  I  well  knew  that,  instead  of  satisfying  public  opinion, 
these  measures  would  tend  to  fatal  results  ;  phrases  being 
substituted  for  things,  stormy  debates  for  calm  and  firm 
administration,  the  arrogant  assumption  of  authority  by  the 
chambers  could  lead  to  no  other  end  than  a  division  in  the 
state.  Factionists  seized  upon  this  error  of  the  chambers  to 
incite  public  opinion  against  the  government,  at  the  moment 
when  it  was  absorbed  in  devising  means  to  repel  the  invaders. 
Pamphlets  of  all  descriptions,  drawn  up  both  by  the  Bour- 
bonists  and  demagogues  attacked  every  measure  of  gov- 
ernment at  the  moment  when  all  should  have  united  in 
sustaining  these  measures  ;  this  was  not  the  moment  to 
remedy  political  evils,  whatever  may  have  been  their  nature. 
To  such  an  excess  was  the  license  of  the  press  carried,  that 
publications  were  issued  promising  apotheosis  to  those  who 
should  deliver  France  by  what  means  soever  from  the  yoke 
of  Napoleon,  and  that  no  jury  could  be  found  to  condemn 
them  ! 

Military  Preparations. — But  notwithstanding  the  opposi- 
sition  of  the  factions,  the  public  excitement  led  to  beneficial 
results.  The  National  Guards  were  readily  levied,  and 
means  were  found  to  arm  the  inhabitants  of  the  principal 
cities.  Paris  alone  furnished  twenty  battalions  of  tirailleurs- 
fédérés,  a  force  of  little  value  in  the  open  field,  but  which 


342  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

might  supply  the  place  of  regulars  in  garrisoning  the  fortifi- 
cations, aid  the  government  in  executing  its  measures,  and 
assist  in  the  defense  of  the  cities.  My  thoughts  were  made 
sad  at  the  unfortunate  state  of  the  political  interior,  but  I 
hoped  that  the  nation  would  appreciate  its  position,  and 
exert  all  its  energy  to  maintain  its  independence,  and  I 
redoubled  my  exertions  in  stimulating  the  ardor  for  military 
preparations.  The  armories,  abandoned  by  my  predecessor, 
resumed  such  an  activity  as  to  produce  four  thousand  fire- 
arms per  day  ;  the  movable  National  Guards  were  organized 
in  all  parts  of  the  empire,  at  the  same  time  that  the  con- 
scription was  levied.  I  have  already  said  that  the  army  of 
the  line  had  been  doubled  in  two  months  (from  the  first  of 
April  to  the  first  of  June),  and  that  a  vast  system  of  defense 
secured  its  increase  to  seven  hundred  thousand  by  the  first 
of  September. 

Preparations  of  the  Allies. — The  fate  of  French  indepen- 
dence, therefore,  depended  in  a  great  degree  upon  the  possi- 
bility of  postponing  hostilities  till  the  beginning  of  August. 
Far  from  allowing  me  this  time,  the  allies,  profiting  by  the 
lessons  I  had  already  taught  them,  marched  post-haste  to- 
wards the  Khine  and  the  Meuse.  The  English  and  Prus- 
sians exhibited  an  unusual  activity  in  their  preparations,  and 
the  Russians  marched  in  two  months  from  Poland  to  the 
banks  of  the  Rhine.  The  allies,  who  were  disputing  about 
Saxony  and  Cracovia,  were  still  in  arms,  and  with  their 
numbers  equal  to  the  war  complement  ;  they  had  the  match 
already  lighted,  and  it  did  not  require  twenty  minutes  to 
dispatch  from  Vienna,  on  the  same  day,  four  orders  of  march, 
putting  all  Europe  in  motion.  France  had  not  retained  the 
same  formidable  attitude  as  the  rest  of  Europe  :  every  thing 
tending  to  a  national  defense  had  been  abandoned  ;  on  my 
arrival  there  were  neither  soldiers  nor  arms.  Some  have 
attempted  to  draw  a  parallel  between  the  efforts  of  1793  and 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  343 

1815.  In  much  less  time  I  should  have  accomplished  as 
much  as  the  "committee  of  public  safety"  without  having 
recourse  to  a  "Revolutionary  army,"  or  to  the  twelve  guillo- 
tines by  which  it  was  attended  ;  but  the  allies  of  1815  acted 
very  differently  from  those  of  the  first  invasion  ;  they  did 
not,  like  Mack  and  Cobourg,  pass  three  months  before 
Valenciennes  :  the  times  had  in  all  respects  changed.  The 
sea  was  everywhere  covered  with  British  convoys,  bringing 
troops  and  siege-equipages.  The  wealth  of  India,  seconded 
by  the  great  progress  of  manufactures,  had  transformed 
England  into  an  immense  arsenal  which  forged,  with  won- 
derful activity,  artillery,  military  munitions,  and  trains  ne- 
cessary for  the  allied  armies.  There  was  nothing  like  this 
in  1793. 

At  the  end  of  May,  Wellington  and  Blucher  had  united  two 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  English,  Prussians,  Belgians, 
Hanoverians  and  Brunswickers,  between  Liege  and  Courtray. 
The  Bavarians,  Wurtembergers,  and  Badois,  assembled  in 
the  Black  Forest  and  the  Palatinate.  The  Austrians  has- 
tened to  join  them  ;  their  Italian  army  united  with  the  Sar- 
dinians on  the  Alps.  The  Eussians,  by  forced  marches,  had 
already  crossed  Franconia  and  Saxony.  In  fine,  a  million 
of  men  were  ready  to  fall  upon  France  ;  it  might  almost 
have  been  said  of  this  coalition,  that  it  had  found  the  secret 
of  Cadmus,  to  raise  up  men  from  the  bosom  of  the  earth. 

Works  for  the  Defense  of  Paris  and  Lyons.— However 
great  my  activity  in  organizing  the  army  and  frontier  defenses, 
I  still  feared  that  the  allied  armies  would  be  more  numerous 
than  my  own,  if  hostilities  should  commence  before  August  ; 
in  that  case  the  destinies  of  the  empire  would  be  decided 
under  the  walls  of  Paris  and  Lyons.  More  than  once  had 
I  thought  of  fortifying  the  heights  of  Paris  ;  but  the  multi- 
plicity of  other  engagements,  and  fear  of  exciting  popular 
alarm,  had  prevented  its  execution.     There  were  two  modes 


344  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

of  fortifying  this  capital  ;  the  first,  by  a  system  of  detached 
forts  connected  by  field  works,  and  strengthened  by  properly 
manoeuvring  the  waters  of  the  Seine  ;  the  second,  by  an 
enciente  of  field-works  strong  enough  to  resist  a  coup-de- 
main.  The  last  was  adopted  because  it  required  less  time 
than  the  other.  The  capital  of  a  country  contains  the  elite 
of  the  nation  ;  it  is  the  centre  of  public  opinion,  and  the 
depot  of  all  its  wealth  and  strength  ;  to  leave  such  an  im- 
portant point  without  defenses  is  national  folly.  In  times 
of  national  misfortunes  and  great  national  calamities,  states 
have  often  been  in  want  of  armies,  but  never  of  men  capable 
of  defending  their  walls.  Fifty  thousand  National  Guards 
with  two  or  three  thousand  cannoneers,  might  defend  a  for- 
tified capital  against  an  army  of  two  hundred  thousand  men. 
But  these  same  fifty  thousand  undisciplined  men  commanded 
by  inexperienced  officers,  would,  in  the  open  field,  Ik'  put  to 
rout  by  a  mere  handful  of  regular  cavalry.  Paris  has  many 
times  owed  its  safety  to  its  walls  ;  if,  in  1814,  it  had  been 
capable  of  resisting  only  eight  days,  what  a  change  might  it 
not  have  produced  in  the  affairs  of  the  world  !  If,  in  1805, 
Vienna  had  been  well  armed  and  better  defended,  the  battle 
of  Ulm  would  not  have  decided  the  war, — the  battle  of  Aus- 
terlitz  would  never  have  taken  place.  If,  in  1806,  Berlin 
had  been  fortified,  the  army  beaten  at  Jena  would  have  ral- 
lied there,  and  have  been  rejoined  by  the  Russian  army.  If, 
in  1808,  Madrid  had  been  fortified,  the  French  armies,  after 
the  victories  of  Espinosa,  Tudela,  Burgos,  and  Sommo- 
Sierra,  would  never  have  ventured  to  march  on  that  capital, 
with  the  English  and  Spanish  armies  at  Salamanca  and  Val- 
ladolid.  In  fine,  the  fortifications  of  Vienna  twice  saved 
Europe  from  the  Mussulman  sabre. 

I  directed  General  Haxo  to  fortify  Paris.  This  able  engi- 
neer intrenched  the  heights  at  the  north  from  Montmartre  to 
Charonne,  completed  the  canal  of  Ourcq,  so  as  to  cover  the 


Ch.  XXII]  CAMPAIGN    OF    18  1  5.,  C 15 

plain  between  Villette  and  Saint  Denis.  This  city  was  to 
be  intrenched  and  covered  by  the  inundations  of  the  Rouil- 
lon  and  the  Crou.  From  the  western  base  of  Montmartre 
there  was  a  line  of  intrenchments  resting  on  the  Seine  above 
Clichy  ;  at  the  eastern  extremity  the  park  of  Bercy,  the 
spaces  between  Vincennes  and  Charonne  were  also  covered. 
These  works  were  armed  with  seven  hundred  pieces  of  cannon. 
On  the  south,  the  faubourgs  between  the  Upper  Seine  and 
the  Bièvre,  and  from  the  Bièvre  to  the  Lower  Seine,  were 
also  to  have  been  defended  ;  the  enciente  here  had  already 
been  marked  out  when  the  enemy  appeared  before  Paris. 

General  Léry  was  charged  with  the  defensive  works  at 
Lyons  ;  they  were  pushed  on  with  vigor  ;  four  hundred  and 
fifty  ii'on  pieces  of  heavy  calibre,  brought  from  Toulon,  and 
two  hundred  and  fifty  brass  pieces,  armed  the  ramparts,  or 
formed  the  reserve.  Every  thing  seemed  to  promise  that 
the  patriotic  and  brave  inhabitants  of  this  city,  sustained 
by  a  corps-d'armte,  would  make  a  noble  resistance  to  the 
enemy. 

Besides  these  works  I  prepared  to  fortify  Laon,  Soissons, 
and  the  passes  of  the  mountains,  and  had  ordered  immense 
works  for  placing  the  long  neglected  frontier  fortresses  in  a 
state  of  defense.  At  the  beginning  of  June  these  works 
were  all  in  progress,  but  still  very  incomplete,  and  although 
the  effective  force  had  been  increased,  as  has  already  been 
said,  from  two  hundred  to  four  hundred  thousand  men,  a 
large  number  were  still  in  the  regimental  depots  and  in  the 
frontier  fortresses,  so  that  I  now  had  only  one  hundred  and 
eighty  thousand  ready  for  the  field  ;  by  the  middle  of  July 
this  number  would  amount  to  three  hundred  thousand  and 
the  fortresses  be  garrisoned  by  National  Guards  and  a  few 
good  regulars. 

Napoleon  decides  to  fall  upon  the  Anglo-Prussians.— All 
attempts  to  prolong  the  negotiations  proved  vain,  and  I  had 


346  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

now  only  two  courses  to  pursue  :  the  one,  to  march  against 
the  Anglo-Prussians  at  Brussels  or  Namur  by  the  middle  of 
June  ;  the  other,  to-  await  the  allies  under  the  walls  of  Paris 
and  Lyons.  The  latter  had  the  inconvenience  of  exposing 
the  half  of  France  to  the  ravages  of  the  enemy  ;  but  it  offered 
the  advantage  of  gaining  till  the  month  of  August  to  com- 
plete the  levies,  and  finish  the  preparations,  so  as  to  fight, 
with  united  means,  the  allied  armies  when  enfeebled  by  sev- 
eral corps  detached  for  observation.  On  the  contrary,  by 
removing  the  theatre  of  war  to  Belgium,  I  might  perhaps 
entirely  save  France  from  invasion  ;  but  I  might  also  thus 
draw  on  the  allies  by  the  first  of  July,  six  weeks  sooner  than 
they  would  come  of  their  own  accord.  The  army  of  the  elite, 
broken  by  reverses,  was  no  longer  capable  of  sustaining  a  too 
unequal  combat,  and  the  levies  were  incomplete.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  course  offered  the  hope  of  surprising  the 
enemy,  and  was  more  conformable  to  the  spirit  of  the  French 
people.  One  c;m  act  the  Fabius,  like  the  Emperor  of  Kussia, 
with  a  boundless  empire,  or  like  Wellington,  on  another's 
territory.  But  in  a  country  like  France  with  its  capital  at 
seventy  leagues  from  the  frontier,  the  case  is  very  different. 
If  there  had  been  no  political  factions  in  France,  and  the 
entire  nation  had  been  ready  to  rally  around  its  chief,  and 
conquer  with  him,  it  would  have  been  better  to  await  the 
enemy  at  the  foot  of  Montmartre.  But  when  interests  and 
opinions  were  divided,  and  political  passions  ran  high,  and  a 
factious  legislative  body  was  exciting  divisions  and  animosi- 
ties in  the  capital,  it  would  have  been  dangerous  to  there 
await  an  invasion.  A  victory  beyond  the  frontiers  would 
procure  me  time,  and  silence  my  political  enemies  in  the 
interior.  All  things  considered,  it  seemed  advisable  to  attack 
Wellington  and  Blucher  separately,  and  to  endeavor  to 
destroy  successively  the  enemy's  masses  ;  and  the  courageous 
energy  of  the  soldiers  seemed  to  promise  a  certain  victory  ; 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  347 

moreover,  «it  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  a  decisive  blow- 
might  dissolve  the  coalition.  To  accomplish  so  desirable  an 
object,  it  was  important  to  collect  a  strong  force,  but  I  could 
not  strip  the  other  points  of  the  frontier  of  all  defense  ; 
small  corps  were  necessary  at  Bordeaux,  at  Toulouse,  on  the 
Var,  in  Savoy,  at  Béfort,  and  at  Strasbourg.  These  corps, 
though  feeble  in  themselves,  were  important  to  check  the 
enemy's  advance,  and  to  secure  points  of  vast  importance  for 
levying  the  National  Guards,  and  organizing  other  means  of 
defense.  Unfortunately  La  Vendée  still  remained  in  insur- 
rection, in  spite  of  the  success  of  the  movable  columns. 
Civil  war  is  a  political  cancer  which  must  be  extifpated  in 
the  germ,  or  the  safety  of  the  state  is  compromitted.  I  was, 
therefore,  obliged  to  detach  even  a  part  of  my  Young  Guard 
to  reënforce  the  corps  of  General  Lamarque.  These  several 
detachments,  reduced  to  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
combatants  the  force  of  the  principal  army  which  was  to 
assemble  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Sambre,  from  Philippe- 
ville  to  Maubeurge.  Although  the  enemy  had  at  least  two 
hundred  thousand  men  in  Belgium,  I  did  not  hesitate  to 
attack  them,  for  it  was  now  necessary  to  act  promptly,  lest  I 
should  have  all  the  allied  armies  on  my  hands  at  the  same 
time. 

Napoleon  joins  his  Army  and  re-organizes  it.— I  left 
Paris  on  the  twelfth  of  June,  the  next  day  I  inspected  the 
armament  of  Soissons  and  Laon,  and  on  the  fourteenth  took 
up  my  head-quarters  at  Beaumont  !  The  organization  of 
the  army  was  much  modified  ;  I  gave  the  command  of  corps- 
d'armée  to  young  generals  who,  having  their  marshal's  bâtons 
to  gain  on  the  battle-field,  would  show  more  ardor  for  the 
triumph  of  my  cause.  This  bâton  was  bestowed  on  Grouchy, 
who  had  shown  talent  and  vigor  in  the  campaign  of  1814, 
and  in  the  expedition  against  the  Duke  d'Angoulème.  Soult 
was  appointed  major-general  in  the  place  of  Berthier,  who 


348  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXIL 

had  abandoned  his  colors  to  follow  the  Bourbons,  and  who 
precipitated  himself  from  the  window  of  the  palace  of  Bam- 
berg, ashamed,  it  is  said,  to  see  himself  in  the  midst  of  the 
enemy's  columns,  which  were  defiling  below  him  to  attack 
his  country  !*  Davoust  remained  minister  of  war.  Mortier 
was  to  have  commanded  the  Guard,  but  he  did  not  recover 
his  health  in  time.  Ney  and  Grouchy  were  to  command  the 
wings  of  the  principal  army,  as  my  lieutenants.  Suchet 
commanded  the  army  of  Italy  ;  Rapp  on  the  Rhine  ;  Brune 
on  the  Var  ;  Clausel  and  Decaen  observed  the  Pyrenees. 

Plan  of  Operations, — I  had  four  lines  of  operations  from 
which  to  select.  I  could  unite  my  masses  to  the  left  towards 
Valenciennes,  march  by  Mons  on  Brussels,  fall  upon  the 
English  army,  and  drive  it  back  on  Antwerp.  At  the  centre 
I  could  march  by  Maubeurge  on  Charleroi,  between  the 
Sambre  and  Meuse,  so  as  to  strike  the  point  of  junction  of 
the  two  armies  of  Blucher  and  "Wellington.  More  to  the 
right  I  might  descend  the  Meuse  towards  Namur,  fall  upon 
the  left  of  the  Prussians,  and  cut  them  off  from  Coblentz  and 
Cologne.  Finally  it  was  possible  to  descend  between  the 
Meuse  and  the  Moselle,  or  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine, 
to  fall  upon  the  corps  of  Kleist,  who  covered  the  Ardennes 
and  the  communication  of  the  Prussians  with  the  Rhine. 

This  last  operation  would  lead  to  nothing  but  menaces, 
and  against  a  general  like  Blucher,  it  could  produce  no 
decided  results  ;  moreover,  it  led  too  far  from  the  proposed 
object.  An  attack  on  the  Meuse  would  have  been  more  wise, 
but  that  would  have  thrown  Blucher  on  Wellington,  and 
effected  a  junction  which  it  was  important  to  prevent.  The 
inverse  manoeuvre,  by  Mons,  against  Wellington,  would  have 


*  This  is  the  generally  received  account  of  the  death  of  Berthier.  Some, 
however,  have  said  that  he  fell  by  the  hand  of  a  personal  enemy.  His  fate 
will  serve  as  a  warning  to  those  who,  led  astray  by  political  feeling,  may  bo 
tempted  to  oppose  their  country's  cause  in  time  of  war. 


Ch.  XXI I.J  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  349 

produced  the  same  result  in  a  different  way,  throwing  the 
right  of  the  allies  upon  their  left.  I  therefore  chose  the 
centre  where  I  could  surprise  Blucher  en  flagrant  délit,  and 
defeat  him  before  Wellington  could  come  to  his  rescue.  To 
appreciate  the  nature  of  this  plan,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  I  was  not  to  attack  a  single  army,  under  a  single  chief, 
and  with  a  common  interest,  but,  on  the  contrary,  two 
armies,  independent  of  each  other,  having  two  separate  and 
divergent  bases  of  operation  ;  that  of  the  English  being  on 
Ostend  or  Antwerp,  and  that  of  the  Prussians  on  the  Rhine 
and  Cologne  ; — a  decisive  circumstance,  greatly  increasing 
the  chances  of  success  for  a  central  operation  which  would 
divide  them  so  that  they  could  be  fought  separately. 

Beginning  of  the  Campaign.— The  plan  and  commence- 
ment of  this  campaign  form  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
operations  of  my  life.  Nine  corps  of  infantry  or  cavalry 
cantoned  from  Lille  to  Metz,  by  marches  most  skillfully 
concealed,  concentrated  before  Charleroi,  at  the  very  instant 
that  the  guard  arrived  there  from  Paris  !  These  movements 
were  combined  with  so  much  precision  that  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  men  found  themselves  assembled,  the  four- 
teenth of  June,  on  the  Sambre,  as  if  by  enchantment.  Well- 
ington, occupied  in  giving  fetes  at  Brussels,  thought  me  at 
Paris  at  the  moment  my  columns  presented  themselves,  on 
the  morning  of  the  fifteenth,  to  cross  the  river  Sambre.  My 
troops  occupied,  the  night  before,  the  following  positions  : 
the  right  of  sixteen  thousand  men,  under  Count  Gérard,  at 
Philippeville  ;  the  centre,  of  about  sixty  thousand,  under  my 
own  direction,  near  Beaumont  ;  the  left,  of  forty-five  thou- 
sand men,  at  Ham-sur-Eur  and  Solre-sur-Sambre.  So  little 
idea  had  my  enemies  of  these  movements  that  their  armies 
were  not  even  assembled.  Blucher  had  the  first  of  his  corps 
at  Charleroi,  the  second  at  Namur,  the  third  at  Dinant, 
the  fourth,  under  Bulow,   at   Liege,  and   the  fifth,   under 


350 


LIF  E     OF     NAPOLEON 


[Ch.  xxn. 


Kleist,  covered  Luxembourg.  When  I  reached  the  army, 
I  learned  that  Bourmont  had  just  deserted,  (on  the  four- 
teenth), from  Philippeville  to  join  Louis  XVIII.  and  the 
allies.  Blâmable  as  was  such  a  step,  it  is  believed  he  did  not 
aggravate  it  by  divulging  my  plans  of  operation  ;  on  this 
subject  even  a  common  soldier,  in  such  a  case,  should  keep 
silence.  Nevertheless,  under  the  circumstances,  the  simple 
information  of  my  arrival  was  an  important  matter,  for  it 
destroyed  in  part  the  effects  of  the  surprise,  Blucher  having 
immediately  ordered  the  concentration  of  his  forces.*  Well- 
ington's forces  were  still  in  their  cantonments  between  Oude- 
narde  and  Nivelle  on  the  Scheldt,  ready  to  move  at  the  first 
signal.  I  did  not  know  the  precise  composition  and  position 
of  all  the  enemy's  corps,  but  I  was  certain  that  the  mass  of 
the  Prussians  were  cantoned  between  Charleroi  and  Liege, 
and  that  the  Anglo-Belgians  were  between  Ath  and  Brussels, 
with  advanced  guards  towards  Mons  and  Tournay.  The 
road  running  from  Charleroi  to  Brussels  was,  therefore,  the 
point  of  junction  of  the  two  armies,  and  to  this  point  I 
directed  my  operations,  in  order  to  scatter  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  fight  them  separately.-)* 


*  It  has  been  said  that  a  drummer,  who  deserted  from  the  Old  Guard,  gave 
Blucher  the  first  information  of  Napoleon's  approach. 

f  The  following  table  given  by  Jomini  in  his  last  work  exhibits  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  hostile  forces  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign. 


I.— THE  ALLIES. 
1. — Prussians  under  Blucher. 

STRENGTH. 

(  4  divisions   of  infantry  ;  Steinmetz,  \ 

1st  corpa,      3      pjrch  2d>  Jagow  and  Henkel f  32  800 

Ziethen.  (  Cavalry  of  Rodev^  3900 j 

2d  corps       \  4   division3   of    infantry  :     Tippels-  \ 

Pirch,  )  Kircû'  Krafftr  Brause,  and  Langen.  [■  31,800 
(  Cavalry  of  Jurgas,  4,000 . . .  ) 


POSITION. 

On  the  Sambre 
between  Thuin 
and  Auveloy. 

about  Namur. 


Ch.  XXIL] 


CAMPAIGN     OF     1814. 


351 


June  15th,  Passage  of  the  Samhre.  —  Success  depending 
on  celerity,  the  French  army  passed  the  frontier  on  the  fif- 
teenth at  break  of  day,  and  directed  their  march  on  Charleroi. 


STEENGTH.  POSITION. 

3d  corps,      (  4   divisions    of   infantry  :     Borcke,  )  .  About       Ciney 

Thielmann.  ]      Kempfen,  Luck  and  Stulpnagel...  Y    24,000  \  and  Dinant 

'  Cavalry  of  Hobe,  2,500 J 

f 4    divisions   of  infantry;    Haacke,  ] 

4th  corps,     J      Ryssel,  Lostvn.  and  Hiller !     „„  „„  j  „       T., 

Bulow.  ]  cavalry  of  Prince  William  of  Prus-  f    30>300  \  ^  Lieg6' 

I      sia,  3,000 j 

5th  corps,      j                                                                 j  (  Luxembourg, 

*feiW.|about |    30>000  \    andBasto|ne. 

Total,  not  including  Kleist,   136  batta- 
lions, 135  squadrons,  320  cannon 118,900  combatants. 


-Anglo- Netherlander  s  under  Wellington. 


1st  corps, 
Prince  of 
Orange. 


2    English    divisions,    Guards   and 

Alten 

Anglo-Belgians,     Indian     Brigade, 
Divisions   Stedman,    Perponcher 

and  Chassé 

Cavalry  of  Collaert 

5  Anglo-Hanoverians,  divisions  Clin- 
2d  corps,      J  ton,  Coleville,  Picton,  Lambert  and 

Genl.   HillA  Decken 

[_  Cavalry  of  Lord  Uxbridge 


24,300 


4,600 


9,850 


POSITION'. 

j  About  Eghein 
(    and    Subise. 
\  From  Oudeuar- 
(     de  to  Nivelle- 


[■    34,600     \ 


Braine-le -Comte- 
Ath,Renaix,Ou- 
denarde,  Leuze 
and  Brussels. 
From  Ghent  to 
Mons. 


Corps  of  Brunswick — Infantry  and  cavahy. 
Contingent  of  Nassau 


6,750 
3.000 


Brussels,  Mech- 
lin. 
Brussels,  Ge- 
nappe. 
Artillery 6,000  Scattered. 

Total    123   battalions,   114   squadrons,    240   can- 
non      99, 900  Combatants. 


3. —  Other  troops  of  the  Allies. 
The  grand  Austro-Russian  army  under  Barclay  de  Tolly  and  Swartz- 

enberg,  more  than 350,000 

The  Austro-Sardinian  army  in  Italy 100,000 

To  these  must  be  added  the  Swiss,  Spaniards  and  small  German  Contingents, 
making  in  all  but  little  less  than  a  million  of  men  in  arms  against  France. 


352 


LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON, 


[Ch.  XXII. 


The  corps  of  General  Rielle  at  Ham-sur-Eur,  being  nearest 
the  enemy  was  to  pass  the  Sambre  at  Marchiennes,  and  direct 
itself  on  Gosselies  ;  that  of  Erlon,  being  more  in  rear,  at 


II.— THE  FRENCH. 


1st  corps. 
D'Erlon. 

2d  corps, 
Reille. 

3d  corps, 

Vandam  me. 

4th  corps, 

Gérard. 
5  th  corps, 

Lobau. 


1. — Active  Army  in  Belgium. 

BTBENGTH 

4  divisions  of  infantry  :  Guyot,  Don-  \ 

zelot,  Marcognet,  and  Durutte. . .  v    20,600 

1  division  of  cavalry,  Jaquenot ) 

4  divisions    of   infantry:    Bachelu, 

Foy,  Jerome  Bonaparte  and  Girard.  \    22,800 

1  divison  of  cavalry,  Pire , 

3    divisions   of    infantry  :     Ilabert 

Berthezène  and  Lefol 

1  division  of  cavalry,  Morin 

3.  divisions   of    infantry:    Vichey, 

Pecheux  and  Hulot 

1  division  of  cavalry,  Molin 

3    divisions    of  infantry  :    Simmer, 

Jeannin  and  Teste 


Guards.     < 


2  divisions  of  the  Old  Guards,  ' 
Friant  and  Morand 8,000 

1  division  of  Young  Guard,  Du- 
hesme 4.000 

Cavalry  of  the  Guard,  1 9  squadrons 
of  light,  and  13  of  heavy..  4,000 

Engineers  and  artillery 2,400 


POSITION. 

.  At  Solre-sur- 
~i        Sambre. 

]  Ham-sur-Eur. 
16,000     i  Beaumont. 


14,600 


12,600 


Philippeville. 
Beaumont. 


18,400     1  Beaumont. 


2. — Reserves  of  Cavalry. 

Divisions  of  hussars  and  chasseurs,  i 

Soult  and  Subervic j 

Divisions  of  dragoons,  Spraley  and  i 

Chastel j 

Divisions     of     cuirassiers,    "Wotier  \ 

and    Delort ) 

4th  corps,     I  Divisions    of  cuirassiers,    Sheritier  i 
Kellerman-  {      and  Roussel \ 


1st  corps, 

Pajol. 
2d  corps, 
Excelmans. 
3d  corps, 
Milhaud. 


2,800 


3,700 


This  gives  for  the  active  French  army  in  Belgium  and  the  reserves  of  cavalry, 
a  total  of  167  incomplete  battalions,  166  squadrons,  346  cannon,  and  120,300 
combatants. 

3. —  Other  French  corps  in  Garrison  or  Observation, 

Rapp  commanded  the  army  of  the  Rhine. 
Beliard  "        a  corps  at  Metz. 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  353 

Solre-sur-Sambre,  was  to  follow  in  the  same  direction.  The 
centre  or  corps  of  battle,  with  the  reserves  of  cavalry  under 
the  orders  of  Grouchy,*  marched  from  Beaumont  on  Char- 
leroi,  and  the  light  from  Philippeville  on  Catelet,  where  it 
was  to  cross  the  Sambreand  prevent  the  Prussian  division  at 
Cbarleroi  from  retreating  on  Namur. 

These  movements,  although  unknown  to  the  enemy,  did 
not  entirely  accomplish  their  object.  The  corps  of  Reille 
crossed  the  Sambre  with  success  and  reached  the  road  to 
Gosselies,  preceded  by  the  light  cavalry  of  the  guard  ;  but 
that  of  Gérard,  leaving  Philippeville  and  having  a  longer 
march  by  the  worst  possible  roads,  arrived  too  late  at  Catelet, 
to  reach  the  road  to  Gilly  in  time  to  accomplish  its  object. 
The  centre  also  had  very  bad  roads  to  travel  over  from  Beau- 
mont to  Charleroi,  and  Vandamme,  who  was  to  form  the 
head  of  this  column,  left  his  camp  a  little  too  late.f  The 
Prussian  generals  whose  divisions  were  scattered  along  the 
line,  had  on  this  account  much  more  leisure  than  1  intended, 
to  collect  their  forces  and  abandon  Charleroi  ;  two  or  three 
battalions  only  were  overthrown  in  partial  combats.  The 
first  division  of  the  corps  of  Ziethen  wishing  to  retire  from 


Lecourbe  commanded  a  small  corps  of  observation  at  Belfort. 

Suchet  "  the  army  of  Italy  in  Savoy. 

Brune  "  the  corps  of  observation  on  the  Yar. 

Decaen  and  Clausel  commanded  the  corps  of  observation  of  the  Pyrenees. 

Lamarque  commanded  the  corps  of  La  Vendée. 

It  has  already  been  shown  in  the  text  that  these  were  mere  skeletons  of 
corps,  possessing  little  strength  in  themselves,  but  available  for  observation,  for 
assembling  or  organizing  the  new  levies,  and  for  securing  important  strategic 
points. 

*  Grouchy  at  first  commanded  all  the  cavalry,  but  when  the  army  was  com- 
pletely organized,  he  took  command  of  the  right  wing. 

f  Jomini  thinks  the  delay  of  Vandamme  caused  by  an  error  in  the  transmis- 
sion of  orders,  for  he  was  not  a  man  likely  to  be  tardy,  and,  indeed,  at  this 
time  his  ardor,  excited  by  personal  jealousy,  needed  restraint  rather  than 
stimulus. 

vol.  in. — 23. 


354  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON  [Cn.  XXII. 

Piéton  by  Gosselies,  and  finding  this  point  already  occupied 
by  the  advanced  guard  of  Reille,  sought  to  reach  Heppignies. 
The  second  division  re-united  at  Gilly  on  the  road  to  Nanmr. 
The  corps  of  Reille,  having  driven  the  Prussian  division  from 
Gosselies  and  seeing  it  direct  its  retreat  by  Heppignies  on 
Fleurus,  detached  the  division  of  Girard  in  pursuit,  and  with 
the  other  three  divisions  continued  its  march  on  Frasne. 
The  light  cavalry  of  the  guard,  which  preceded  it,  drove  from 
this  town  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Prince  of  Weimar  who 
now  concentrated  his  brigade  on  Quatre- Bras.  The  light 
cavalry  of  Grouchy,  having  debouched  from  Charleroi  on 
Gilly,  fuund  there  the  two  divisions  of  Ziethen,  and  had  to 
await  the  infantry  of  Vandamme,  who  was  debouching  with 
difficulty  by  the  bridge  of  that  city,  which  was  greatly  en- 
cumbered. In  this  position  the  two  parties  exchanged  some . 
cannon  shot.  While  my  columns  were  thus  debouching  from 
the  bridges  of  the  Sambre  in  search  of  the  enemy,  I  estab- 
lished myself  in  advance  of  Charleroi  at  the  branching  of 
the  roads  to  Gosselies  and  Fleurus,  where  I  waited  to  receive 
the  reports  of  my  officers,  and  to  determine  upon  the  move- 
ments to  be  given  to  the  masses  which  had  been  so  suddenly 
and  skillfully  assembled. 

Measures  of  the  Allies. — It  may  be  well,  before  going  fur- 
ther, to  briefly  review  the  measures  taken  by  the  allies  against 
the  storm  which  was  about  to  fall  upon  them.  If  their 
generals  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  surprised,  it  must  be 
confessed  that  they  made  their  preparations  with  skill.  The 
Anglo-Prussians  were  to  take  the  offensive  on  the  first  of 
July,  and,  in  the  mean  time,  every  precaution  was  taken  to 
prevent  this  plan  from  being  counteracted.  All  partial  and 
general  rallying  points  were  well  indicated.  To  prevent  me 
from  manoeuvring  to  separate  their  armies,  Blucher  was  to 
rally  his  army  on  its  right,  in  rear  of  Ligny,  while  Welling- 
ton was  to  rally  his  on  its  left,  on  Quatre-Bras  ;  but,  wise 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  355 

as  were  these  dispositions,  the  celerity  and  impetuosity  of 
my  movements  might,  nevertheless,  defeat  them.  In  rjur- 
suance  of  the  plan  agreed  upon  by  the  allies,  Blucher  dis- 
patched an  order,  on  the  fourteenth  at  midnight,  to  Ziethen 
to  fall  back,  fighting,  on  Fleurus,  and  directed  at  the  same 
instant  the  corps  of  Pirch  to  assemble  at  Sombref  ;  he  or- 
dered Thielman  to  come  in  all  haste  from  Dinant  to  Namur  ; 
■while  Bulow  was  to  assemble  at  Hanut.  These  movements 
were  evidently  based  on  information  received  from  deserters, 
but  Blucher  had  not  counted  on  my  abrupt  passage  of  the 
Sambre  and  on  a  decisive  battle  for  the  next  day. 

Decisive  Movement  prescribed  to  IVey.— I  did  not  at  this 
time  know  all  the  circumstances  of  the  allies,  or  the  de- 
tails of  their  positions  and  movements  ;  but  I  knew  suffi- 
ciently well  that  Blucher  Would  seek  to  collect  his  forces 
somewhere  between  Namur  and  the  road  from  Charleroi*  to 
Brussels  so  as  to  form  a  junction  with  the  English.  To 
anticipate  this,  I  determined  to  seize  upon  Sombref  on  the 
one  side,  and  the  central  point  of  Quatre-Bras  on  the  other  ; 
master  of  these  two  points  I  could  act,  as  occasion  might 
require,  upon  either  of  the  two  hostile  armies,  and  prevent 
their  junction.  I  therefore  gave  to  Grouchy  a  verbal  order 
to  push  on  the  same  evening  as  far  as  Sombref,  if  possible  ; 
Marshal  Ney,  who  had  just  come  from  Paris  by  post,  re- 
ceived orders  to  take  command  of  the  left  wing  formed  of 
the  corps  of  Eeille  and  Erlon,  and  to  march  without  delay 
on  the  road  to  Brussels  in  the   direction  of  Quatre-Bras,f 


*  Those  who  now  visit  Charleroi  may  be  surprised  that  so  strong  a  place 
should  be  so  readily  abandoned  by  the  allies,  and  so  easily  passed  by  Napo- 
leon; but  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  1815  it  was  not  defensible.  The 
strong  works  that  now  partially  surround  this  city  have  been  built  since  the 
peace,  and,  it  is  said,  with  English  money  and  under  the  direction  of  Well- 
ington. 

f  Quatre-Bras  is  a  small  village  named  from  the  meeting  of  four  roads  ;  from 
Naniur,  Charleroi,  Brussels,  and  Nivelles. 


356  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

and  to  push  forward  his  advanced  guards  on  the  three  roads 
brandling  from  that  place,  in  order  to  collect  correct  infor- 
mation of  the  enemy.  Having  learned  at  the  same  moment 
that  the  cavalry  of  Grouchy  had  been  checked  near  Gilly  by 
a  part  of  the  corps  of  Ziethen,  I  hastened  there  to  order  an 
attack  ;  the  enemy,  seeing  the  infantry  of  Vandamme  arrive, 
retired  fighting,  and,  at  the  end  of  a  pretty  warm  cannonade, 
Excelmans  and  Vandamme  dislodged  him  from  the  woods 
of  Soleilmont  and  Lambusart,  where  the  third  division  of 
Ziethen  had  collected. 

Ncy  delays  its  Execution.— In  the  interval  while  this  was 
passing  on  the  right,  Marshal  Ney,  having  arrived  between 
Gosselies  and  Frasne,  and  hearing  the  cannon  thundering  in 
the  direction  of  Gilly,  where  Yandamme  and  Grouchy  were 
attacking  the  second  division  of  Ziethen,  thought  this  com- 
bat might  modify  my  projects,  and,  instead  of  pushing  on 
rapidly  as  far  as  Quatre-Bras,  established  himself  in  front 
of  Gosselies.  I  was  a  little  vexed  at  this,  but  as  night  came 
on  without  the  right  wing  having  attained  its  object,  I 
regarded  the  delay  of  the  left  the  less  objectionable  as 
Quatre-Bras  might  be  reached  in  time  on  the  following 
morning.  The  troops  of  the  corj)s  of  battle  and  the  cavalry, 
bivouacked  between  the  woods  of  Lambusart  and  the  village 
of  Heppignies,  which  was  occupied  by  the  division  of  Girard 
and  the  corps  of  Reille  ;  the  Guard  and  the  corps  of  Lobau 
were  in  reserve  about  Charleroi  ;  the  forces  of  Count  Gérard'"' 
remained  near  Châtelet  ;  and  the  corps  of  Erlon  had  not 
passed  Jumet.  At  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening  I  returned  to 
Charleroi,  where  I  was  occupied  with  the  vexatious  news  of 
the  operations  of  the  chambers  and  Jacobins  at  Paris,  the 
organization  of  my  army  and  the  direction  of  movements 

*  This  general  should  not  be  confounded  with  General  Girard;  the  first 
commanded  the  fourth  corps,  and  the  other  the  fourth  division  of  the  second 
corps. 


Ch.  XXII..1  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  357 

based  on  the  further  information  gained  of  the  enemy.  The 
right  wing  of  my  army  under  Grouchy  was  composed  of  the 
corps  of  Vandamme  and  Gérard,  and  the  cavalry  of  Pajol, 
Excelmans,  and  Milhaud  ;  the  left  wing,  under  Ney,  of  the 
corps  of  Reille  and  Erlon,  with  the  cavalry  of  Val  my  and 
Lefèbre-Desnouettes  ;  the  reserve  of  about  twenty-eight 
thousand  men  was  formed  of  the  corps  of  Lobau  and  the 
Guard.  I  myself  was  occupied  at  head-quarters  early  in  the 
morning  and  left  my  lieutenants,  Ney  and  Grouchy,  to  com- 
plete at  sunrise  the  operations  left  incomplete  on  the  night 
before, — to  occupy  Sombref  and  Quatre-Bras.  To  make 
more  certain  of  these  operations,  I  sent  my  aid-de-camp 
Flahaut  to  Marshal  Ney  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
with  a  written  order  to  march  rapidly  on  Quatre-Bras,  to 
establish  himself  there  strongly,  to  make  an  examination  of 
the  three  roads,  and  then  detach  a  good  division  of  infantry 
with  the  light  cavalry  of  the  Guard  upon  Marbais,  in  order 
to  connect  himself  with  the  right  wing,  which  was  about  to 
establish  itself  at  Sombref.  This  dispatch  was  to  be  pre- 
ceded by  a  similar  one  given  by  the  major-general.  These 
orders  reached  Gosselies  near  eleven  o'clock,  but  Ney  had 
left  to  join  the  advanced  guard  of  Reille  near  Frasne,  so  that 
he  did  not  immediately  receive  them. 

While  these  things  were  taking  place  at  my  head-quarters, 
the  troops  of  Grouchy  drove  back  the  rear-guards  of  Ziethen 
from  Fleurus  ;  they  retired  upon  the  corps  of  battle,  formed 
on  the  heights  between  Ligny  and  St.  Amand,  in  the  presence 
of  which  the  French  troops  found  themselves  near  eleven 
o'clock. 

Ney  again  delays  his  March  on  Quatre-Bras.— I  had  just 
arrived  near  Ligny,  and  was  about  to  observe  the  enemy's 
position,  when  I  learned  that  Ney  had  again  thought  best, 
for  several  reasons,  to  delay  his  march  on  Quatre-Bras,  and 
to  wait  where  he  was  till  he  should  learn  my  decision  on  the 


358  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XXII. 

new  information  sent  to  me.  Thwarted  by  this  deplorable 
incident,  1  reiterated  the  order  for  Ney  to  push  rapidly  on 
to  Quatre-Bras,  it  being  understood  that  he  was  to  detach 
the  eight  thousand  men  upon  Marbais,  as  had  already  been 
directed  through  General  Flahaut.  I  at  the  same  time 
repeated,  that  Grouchy  was  about  to  occupy  Sombref,  and 
that  he  would  certainly  have  to  contend  only  against  the 
troops  coming  from  Brussels.  Walewski,  a  Polish  officer, 
was  the  bearer  of  this  letter. 

Reconnoissance  of  the  Prussian  Position. — While  this 
officer  was  galloping  on  the  road  to  Gosselies,  I  ascended 
the  mill  of  Fleurus,  to  examine  the  Prussian  corps.  The 
position  was  a  difficult  one  in  front,  covering  the  little 
stream  of  Ligny  ;  the  left  extended  to  the  environs  of  Som- 
bref  and  Tongrines  ;  the  centre  was  near  Ligtiy  ;  the  right 
behind  St,  Amand.  This  great  town  formed  of  three  dis- 
tinct villages  (which  were  called  St.  Amand  le  Château, 
St.  Amand  la  Haie,  and  St.  Amand  le  Hameau),  protected 
the  right  wing,  the  flank  of  which  rested  on  Wagnèlc.  The 
second  line  and  reserves  were  between  Sombref  and  Bry. 
Thus  six  great  villages,  four  of  which  were  difficult  to  be 
taken,  on  .account  of  the  stream  in  front,  covered  like  so 
many  bastions,  the  enemy's  line  ;  his  reserves  and  second 
line,  placed  in  columns  of  attack  by  battalions  between  Som- 
bref and  Bry,  could  sustain  it  at  all  points.* 

Dispositions  for  forcinsf  this  Position.— Having  finished 
this  reconnoissance,  I  had  to  chose  between  three  plans  of 
operation  :  1st,  to  stop  immediately  the  march  of  Ney's 
columns  ;  order  the  cavalry  of  Kellerman  to  take  position  at 

*  The  four  divisions  of  Zietheu's  corps  formed  the  first  line;  those  of  Pirch's 
corps  the  second  at  Bry  and  Sombref.  The  left  under  Thielnian,  which  arrived 
only  at  nine  A.  M.,  was  near  Tongrines.  Gourgaud  says  this  reconnoissance 
was  made  at  about  ten  o'clock,  but  Jomini  seems  tp  think  it  was  later.  There 
is  still  some  doubt  respecting  the  details  of  these  operations  of  the  sixteenth, 
The  main  facts,  however,  are  as  related  in  the  text. 


On.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  359 

Frasne  so  as  to  cover  the  line  of  retreat  on  Charleroi  ;  then 
throw  the  seven  divisions  of  Reille  and  Erlon,  by  the  old 
Roman  road,  on  Marbais,  in  order  to  turn  Blucher  and  take 
him  in  reverse,  while  I  attacked  him  in  front.  2d.  To  pre- 
scribe this  movement  to  the  corps  of  Erlon  only,  leaving  that 
of  Reille  with  the  cavalry  of  Kellerman  defensively  in  the 
direction  of  Frasne  and  Quatrc-Bras,  in  order  to  observe  the 
enemy,  and  cover  the  road  to  Charleroi.  3d.  To  prescribe  to 
Key  to  fall  with  impetuosity  on  the  enemy  found  at  Quatrc- 
Bras,  and  drive  him  on  Genappe  in  the  direction  of  Brussels, 
then  fall  back  on  Bry  in  the  direction  of  Nam ur  to  cooperate 
in  the  attack  upon  Blucher. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances,  perhaps,  the  first  project 
would  have  been  most  conformable  to  the  rules  of  the  art 
but  now  it  might  endanger  our  natural  line  of  retreat  on 
Charleroi.  Thinking  that  in  all  probability  Ney,  receiving 
the  orders  dispatched  in  the  morning  by  Flahaut,  had  by 
this  time  rendered  himself  master  of  Quatrc-Bras,  and  might, 
after  having  beaten  the  Anglo-Belgians,  assist  in  the  defeat 
of  Blucher,  I  determined  to  adopt  the  second  plan* 

Battle  of  Lnrny.— I  now  made  my  dispositions  to  attack 
the  Prussians.  The  corps  of  Count  Lobau,  left  at  first  near 
Charleroi,  was  ordered  to  march  in  all  haste  to  Fleuras. 
The  left  of  the  corps  of  battle  under  Vandamme  presented 

*  In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  it  would  seem,  the  following  order  was  dis- 
patched to  Ney  : 

"  Is  Bivouac  befoue  Flftecs,  2  o'clock  P.  M. 

•'  M.  le  Marshal. — The  Emperor  directs  me  to  inform  you  that  the  enemy 
have  united  a  body  of  troops  between  Sombref  and  Bry,  and,  that  at  half  past 
two,  Marshal  Grouchy,  with  the  third  and  fourth  corps,  will  attack  him. 

"  It  is  the  intention  of  His  Majesty  that  you  also  attack  whatever  is  before 
you;  that  of  it  r  having  pushed  the  enemy  vigorously,  you  fallback  to  assist  in 
enveloping  the  corps  just  mentioned.  If  this  corps  were  first  beaten  His 
Majesty  would  then  manœuvre  in  your  direction  to  facilitate  equally  your  ope- 
rations. Inform  the  Emperor  immediately  of  your  dispositions,  and  of  what- 
ever shall  take  place  on  your  front." 


360  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON 


[Cn.  XXII. 


itself  before  the  village  of  St.  Amand  ;  the  centre,  under 
Count  Gérard,  presented  itself  before  Ligny  ;  the  Guard 
placed  itself  in  rear  of  these  two  attacks  ;  the  cavalry  of 
Grouchy  deployed  on  the  right  to  keep  in  check  the  left  of 
the  Prussians,  just  reënforced  by  the  arrival  of  the  entire 
corps  of  Thielman.  The  attack  began  between  two  and 
three  o'clock  at  St.  Amand,  of  which  Vandamnie  got  posses- 
sion in  spite  of  a  vigorous  resistance  ;  but  the  Prussians, 
favored  by  the  village  of  La  Haie,  and  the  heights  command- 
ing it,  advanced  their  second  line  and  retook  it.  Count 
Gérard  experienced  the  same  opposition  at  Ligny,  of  which 
he  could  occupy  only  a  part.  I  knew  from  this  opposition 
that  the  enemy  was  in  stronger  force  than  I  had  at  first  sup- 
posed, which  rendered  it  still  more  important  to  manœuvre 
so  as  to  turn  his  right  flank,  and  prevent  his  falling  back  in 
that  direction.  I  therefore  dispatched  another  formal  order 
to  Ney,':::"  directing  him  to  manoeuvre  with  his  forces  on  Bry 
and  St.  Amand.  I  supposed  that  ere  this  he  had  occupied 
Quatre-Bras,  and  would  be  now  on  his  way  towards  the 
flank  of  Blucher,  so  that  the  order  Avould  reach  him  in  time  ; 
fearing,  however,  that,  from  the  recent  and  unaccountable 
delays  of  the  left  Aving  in  executing  my  orders,  this  also 
might  be  in  some  way  thwarted,  and  knowing  that  the  corps 

*  This  order  dispatched  at  a  quarter  past  three  o'clock,  was  as  follows  : 

'•  In  Bivouac  iîefoke  Fleuris,  from  a  quarter  to  half  past  3,  P.  M. 
"M.  Marshal  Ney. — I  wrote  to  you  an  hour  since  that  the  Emperor  would 
attack  the  enemy  in  the  position  he  had  taken  between  the  village  of  St. 
Amand  and  Bry  ;  at  this  moment  the  forces  are  sharply  engaged:  His  Majesty 
directs  me  to  say  that  you  are  to  manœuvre  immediately  so  as  to  envelop  the 
enemy's  right,  and  to  fall  by  main  strength  on  his  rear;  his  army  is  lost  if  you 
only  act  vigorously.  The  fate  of  France  is  in  your  hands  ;  therefore  do  not 
hesitate  a  moment  to  make  the  movement  ordered  by  the  Emperor,  and  direct 
yourself  on  the  heights  of  Bry  and  St.  Amand  to  assist  in  a  victory  perhaps 
decisive  :  the  enemy  is  taken  en  flagrant  délit  at  the  moment  when  he  seeks  to 
unite  with  the  English. 

"Duc  de  Dalmatœ." 


Ch.  XXII. ]  CAMPAIGN    OF    18  15.  361 

of  Erlon  had  not  yet  passed  Frasne,  I  sent  General  Labe- 
doyère  to  communicate  to  Count  d'Erlon  the  order  given  to 
Marshal  Ney,  and  to  direct  him  to  commence  its  execution. 

In  the  meantime  the  battle  was  continued  throughout  the 
line  with  great  fury.  A  second  attack  of  Vandamme  on  St. 
Amand,  favored  by  the  division  of  Girard  which  had  crossed 
the  ravine,  and  turned  the  enemy,  put  us  in  possession  of 
this  village  ;  but  the  brave  Girard  purchased  with  his  life  a 
success  which  was  of  short  duration  ;  for  Blucher  having 
carried  there  a  part  of  his  reserves,  the  village  of  St.  Amand 
was  retaken  and  disputed  with  great  fury.  They  fought  still 
more  fiercely  at  Ligny,  which  place  Gerard  had  several  times 
carried  without  being  able  to  retain  it  ;  forced  to  leave  the 
division  of  Hulot  in  observation  on  his  right,  and  thus 
reduced  to  ten  thousand  combatants,  he  maintained  himself 
with  a  most  brilliant  valor  against  more  than  twenty-five 
thousand  Prussians,  in  the  lower  part  of  the  village  where 
the  little  stream  cuts  it  in  two.  The  Guard  placed  in  rear 
of  these  two  attacks  disposed  itself  to  sustain  either  as  occa- 
sion might  require.  At  the  extreme  right,  Excelmans 
manoeuvred  skillfully  to  prevent  the  left  of  the  Prussians 
from  debouching  from  Tongrenelle,  while  Pajol  observed 
Soignée,  and  the  cuirassiers  of  Milhaud  sustained  the  right 
of  Gerard.  This  was  the  state  of  the  battle  at  half  past 
five,  and  I  was  becoming  impatient  at  hearing  nothing 
of  the  movements  prescribed  to  Xey,  nor  of  his  operations  at 
Quatre- Bras  (for  the  noise  of  a  violent  cannonade  and  the 
direction  of  the  wind  had  prevented  me  from  hearing  his 
attack),  and  I  was  preparing  to  dispose  of  the  Guard  when 
Vandamme  informed  me  that  a  strong  column  had  appeared 
in  the  direction  of  Wagnèle,  and  that  the  division  of  Girard, 
deprived  of  its  general,  and  at  the  same  time  attacked  by 
superior  forces,  was  obliged  to  retire  towards  St.  Amand  le 
Hameau.     General  Vandamme  announced   that  he  had  at 


362  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

fiist  taken  this  column  for  a  detachment  which  Ney  was  to 
direct  on  Marbais  ;  but  us  it  was  much  longer,  and  as  his 
scouts  had  reported  it  to  belong  to  the  enemy,  he  should  fall 
back  in  retreat  unless  promptly  sustained.  Although  I 
could  not  comprehend  how  a  column  could  thus  slip  between 
me  and  Ney,  nevertheless  it  was  barely  possible  that  it  might 
be  a  reinforcement  sent  from  Quatre-Bras  to  Blucher,  or  a 
corps  of  his  own  army  sent  around  by  the  old  Roman  road 
beyond  Wagnole  to  turn  the  left  of  Vaudamme  ;  it  was 
therefore  necessary  to  ascertain  definitely  the  state  of  the 
case,  and  accordingly  I  sent  one  of  my  aids-de-camp  to 
reconnoitre.  This  officer  reported  in  about  an  hour  that  it 
was  the  corps  of  Erlon,  which,  instead  of  marching  to  the 
north  towards  Bry  or  Marbais,  had  inclined  too  much  to  the 
south  in  the  direction  of  Villers-Peruin,  drawn  there  without 
doubt  by  the  noise  of  two  or  three  hundred  pieces  of  cannon 
which  were  thundering  in  the  direction  of  St.  Amand.  My  main 
attack  had  already  been  too  long  delayed,  but  the  appearance 
of  the  corps  of  Erlon  was  a  sufficient  indication  that  Ney 
himself  could  not  be  far  off,  and  would  now  direct  this  por- 
tion of  the  left  wing  as  had  been  ordered,  and  I  therefore 
commenced  the  march  on  Ligny,  for  it  being  now  half  past 
six,  no  further  time  was  to  be  lost.  By  this  impetuous 
debouch  from  that  village  with  a  division  of  the  Guard,  the 
infantry,  and  the  cuirassiers  of  Milhaud,  the  enemy's  centre 
was  pierced  and  a  part  of  it  thrown  on  Bry,  and  a  part  of  it 
on  So  m  bref. 

The  Prussians  fought  well  during  the  whole  day,  and  the 
battle  was  undecided  when  I  advanced  with  a  reserve  ; 
Blucher  seeing  the  departure  of  the  Guard  from  the  environs 
of  St.  Amand,  and  thinking  this  movement  the  commence- 
ment of  a  retreat,  attacked  himself  what  remained  on  St. 
Amand,  in  the  hope  of  pursuing  the  French.  Being  soon 
undeceived,  he  headed  a  charge  with  the  few  cavalry  he  could 


CH.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  3G3 

collect.  But  of  what  use  was  the  courage  of  a  general-in- 
chief  iu  such  a  meUe  ?  His  horse  having  been  shot  under 
hiin;  he  fell  to  the  ground,*  and  for  some  ten  minutes  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  French  cuirassiers  without  its  being 
known,  and  at  last,  through  the  presence  of  mind  of  his 
aid-de-camp,  Nostitz,  ho  regained  Bry  on  the  horse  of  a 
lancer.  At  night-fall  our  victory  was  complete.  But  before 
noticing  its  results,  let  us  follow  the  operations  of  Ney  on 
the  left, 

Key  repulsed  at  Quatre-Bras. — Ney,  from  the  delays  al- 
ready mentioned,  did  not  reach  his  position  till  two  o'clock, 
with  three  incomplete  divisions  of  Reille's  corps,  Pirch's 
division  of  light  cavalry  and  a  brigade  of  Kellerman's  cuiras- 
siers, and  for  the  first  hour  engaged  the  enemy  in  skirmishes; 
but  at  three  o'clock,  hearing  the  cannonade  at  St.  Amand  he 
took  the  resolution  to  make  a  serious  attack  upon  the  allies. 
But  things  had  here  very  much  changed  since  morning. 
General  Perponcher,  seeing  how  important  it  was,  for  rally- 
ing the  army  of  Wellington  and  effecting  its  junction  with 
Blucher,  to  hold  this  place,  took  position  here  with  his  divi- 
sion and  the  brigade  of  the  Prince  of  Weimar,  in  all  nine 
thousand  men.  These  forces,  commanded  by  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  might  easily  have  been  routed,  had  they  been  at- 
tacked with  two  corps-d'armée  in  the  morning.  At  eleven 
o'clock  Wellington  had  withdrawn  to  this  place  the  advance 
posts  from  near  Frasne,  and,  at  the  moment  Ney  brought 
the  divisions  of  Reille  to  the  attack,  the  enemy  was  reënforced 
by  the  English  division  of  Picton  from  Brussels,  and  the 
division  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick.  Nevertheless  Ney 
fought  with  his  usual  vigor.  The  division  of  Foy  on  the 
left  marched  on  Quatre-Bras  and  Germioncourt,  while  that 
of  Bachelu  attacked   the  village   of  Piermont.      That    of 

*  It  is  said  that  while  Blucher  was  thus  entangled  with  his  horse,  he  was 
actually  ridden  over  by  two  regiments  of  cavalry. 


364  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

Prince  Jerome  attacked,  a  little  later,  the  wood  of  Bossut 
on  the  extreme  left.  Everywhere  the  French  troops  pushed 
the  enemy  with  vigor.  "Wellington,  certain  of  being  soon 
reënforced,  received  these  attacks  with  his  usual  sang-froid  ; 
nevertheless  the  troops  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  and  Picton 
were  driven  from  these  posts  with  considerable  loss.  The 
arrival  of  Brunswick's  corps  restored  the  equilibrium,  and 
the  field  was  disputed  with  great  fury  ;  Brunswick  himself 
fell  pierced  with  balls.  Ney  now  received  the  order  of  the 
major-general  and  heard,  at  the  same  time,  that  Erlon's 
corps  was  directed  on  Bry.  He  had  no  reserve  of  infantry, 
and  most  of  his  cuirassiers  had  been  left  with  Erlon  near 
Frasne.  Kunning  to  Kellerman,  he  said  to  him  :  "  My  dear 
general,  the  fate  of  France  is  here  involved,  and  we  must 
make  an  extraordinary  effort  ;  take  your  cavalry,  and  plunge 
into  the  middle  of  the  English  army  ;  I  will  sustain  you 
with  Pire."  At  these  words  Kellerman  unhesitatingly 
charged  at  the  head  of  his  brigade  of  brave  men,  overthrew 
the  sixty-ninth  regiment,  carried  the  batteries,  and,  piercing 
through  two  lines,  reached  even  to  the  farm  of  Quatre-Bras, 
where  the  reserve  of  English,  Hanoverian,  and  Belgian  in- 
fantry received  him  with  so  murderous  a  fire  that  his  soldiers 
were  forced  to  retreat.  Kellerman's  horse  being  slain  under 
him,  he  remained  dismounted  in  the  midst  of  the  English, 
and  had  great  difficulty  in  escaping  again  to  his  own  army. 
The  French  infantry,  incited  by  so  fine  a  charge,  renewed 
its  efforts  on  Quatre-Bras  and  the  wood  of  Bossut,  the 
greater  part  of  which  was  occupied  by  the  division  of  Prince 
Jerome.  But  at  this  critical  moment,  the  division  of  English 
Guards  and  the  division  of  General  Alten,  coming  into  line 
after  a  forced  march,  gave  Wellington  so  great  a  superiority 
that  Ney  could  have  no  further  hope.  He  had  sent  to  Erlon 
an  imperative  order  to  come  to  his  assistance,  instead  of 
taking  position  on  Bry,  but  this  corps  was  now  too  far  off  to 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  365 

arrive  in  time,  so  that  the  marshal  was  obliged  to  fall  back 
on  Frasne,  with  a  loss  of  four  thousand  men  hors-de-combcub  y 
the  allies,  entering  only  successively  into  action,  had  lost 
five  thousand.  Wellington  pursued  Ney  at  first  with  some 
vigor,  hut  Koussel's  division  of  cuirassiers  protected  his 
retreat.  Erlon,  imperatively  recalled  by  Ney  when  already 
beyond  Villers-Peruin,  marched  to  rejoin  him  with  three 
divisions  and  the  light  cavalry  of  the  Guard,  leaving  the 
division  of  Durutte  between  Villers-Peruin  and  St.  Amand, 
to  cooperate  if  necessary  on  Bry.  This  division  remained 
here  all  night  inactive  on  the  flank  of  the  rear-guard  that 
had  been  left  by  Blucher  in  this  village,  which  it  occupied 
till  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  while  the  corps  of  Ziethen 
retired,  by  favor  of  the  darkness,  on  Grilly,  that  of  Pirch  on 
Gentinne,  and  the  left,  under  Thielman,  took  the  direction 
of  Gemblaux. 

A  fatality  seemed  to  have  presided  over  all  the  operations 
of  my  left  wing.  If  it  had  moved,  as  I  directed,  on  Quatre- 
Bras,  on  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth,  or  the  morning  of  the 
sixteenth,  it  could  very  easily  have  beaten  the  isolated  divi- 
sion of  Perponcher,  have  occupied  the  position,  and  detached 
two  divisions  on  Marbais  and  Bry,  to  complete  the  overthrow 
of  Blucher.  But  when  Ney  received  the  order  in  the  after- 
noon to  march  on  Bry,  the  thing  was  impossible,  for  he  had 
just  engaged  a  superior  force  at  Quatre-Bras.  As  it  was,  he 
had  better  have  remained  at  Frasnes,  for  no  advantage  was 
gained  at  Quatre-Bras,  and  his  recall  of  Count  Erlon  ren- 
dered this  corps  utterly  useless,  at  a  time  when  it  might 
have  had  an  important  influence  on  the  fate  of  Blucher's 
army.  Our  victory  at  Ligny  was  a  glorious  one,  for,  with 
sixty  thousand  men,  we  had  beaten  ninety  thousand.  In 
two  days  the  enemy  had  lost  from  eighteen  to  twenty  thou- 
sand killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  forty  pieces  of 
cannon.     My  army  was  full  of  enthusiasm  and  confidence, 


366  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cli.  XXIL 

ready  to  fly  to  new  victories.  Under  any  other  circumstances 
the  battle  of  Ligny  would  have  been  decisive.  But,  for 
reasons  already  given,  all  my  plans  for  the  cooperation  of 
my  left  wing  failed.  Nor  did  I  know  that  Durntte  passed 
the  night  on  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  line  of  retreat,  so  near 
that  his  advanced  guards  heard  distinctly  the  noise  caused 
by  the  march  of  their  trains,  and  the  confusion  of  their 
columns.  Had  I  known  this  I  should  have  pushed  these 
troops  forward  to  harass  the  retreat,  and,  in  spite  of  the 
darkness  of  the  night,  and  the  failure  of  the  intended  coope- 
ration, I  might  have  gained  much  by  a  well-regulated  night 
pursuit. 

At  break  of  day  the  rear-guard  of  Blucher  had  disappeared 
from  Bry  ;  that  of  Thielman  was  seen  on  the  road  from 
Sombref  to  Corroy-le-Chateau  in  the  direction  of  Gemblaux 
intermediary  between  the  road  to  Namur  and  that  to  Brus- 
sels by  Wavre.  Blucher  had  committed  a  great  fault  in 
accepting  battle,  and  he  now  thought  it  necessary  to  remedy, 
as  promptly  as  possible,  the  influence  which  this  defeat  would 
have  upon  his  army  ;  unable  to  reach  Bousseval  directly, 
he  resolved  to  rally  on  Bulow,  and  seek  to  gain  communica- 
tion with  the  English  by  Wavre.  Consequently  Thielman 
was  directed  on  Gemblaux,  and  Ziethen  and  Pirch  fell  back 
by  Mont-St.-Guibert  on  Bierge  and  Aisemont  ;  and  the 
Prussian  marshal  dispatched  his  chief  of  staff  to  concert  with 
Wellington  some  plan  for  forming  a  junction  either  in  front 
or  in  rear  of  the  forest  of  Soignies. 

The  Morning  of  the  17th.— On  the  morning  of  the  seven- 
teenth, I  waited  with  equal  anxiety  for  Ney's  report  of  the 
operations  on  Quatre-Bras,  and  the  news  from  Paris  of  the 
political  operations  of  the  chambers  and  the  Jacobins.  In 
the  mean  time  I  ordered  the  cavalry  of  Pajol  to  follow  the 
Prussians  on  the  road  to  Namur,  which  was  their  natural 
line  of  operations,  Excelmans  on  the  road  to  Gemblaux,  and 


CH.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  367 

Monthion  in  the  direction  of  Tilly  and  Mont-St.-Guibert.  I 
also  regulated  my  affairs  of  administration  and  visited  the 
field  of  battle  to  succor  the  wounded  of  Loth  parties  ;  this 
care  was  the  more  necessary  as  the  moving  hospitals  {ambu- 
lances) had  been  unable  to  follow  the  armies  in  their  forced 
marches. 

Grouchy  sent  in  Pursuit  of  the  Prussians.— I  at  length 
received,  by  my  aid-de-camp,  Flahaut,  the  details  of  the 
unfortunate  affair  of  Quatre-Bras,  at  the  same  time  that 
Pajol  announced  the  capture  of  some  Prussian  cannon  at 
Mazy,  on  the  road  to  Namur.  I  now  resolved  to  turn  against 
the  Euglish  with  my  reserve  and  left  wing,  and  sent  Grouchy 
with  his  seven  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  corps  of  cavalry 
in  close  pursuit  of  the  Prussians. 

The  Reserve  and  Left  Wing  march  against  the  English. 
— My  advanced  guard  marched  for  Quatre-Bras  near  ten 
o'clock,  and  the  Guard  at  eleven.  The  weather  Avas  terrible  ; 
it  rained  as  though  the  flood-gates  of  heaven  were  open  ; 
-nevertheless,  my  troops  showed  themselves  no  less  eager  in 
the  pursuit. 

The  English  retreat.— On  arriving  at  Genappe,  I  found 
only  the  English  rear-guard.  Wellington,  hearing  accidentally 
of  Blucher's  defeat  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  (the  offi- 
cer sent  with  the  dispatch  lost  his  way  and  was  killed), 
abandoned  Quatre-Bras  and  hastened  to  put  his  impedimenta 
in  retreat  on  the  road  to  Brussels,  covering  it  with  the 
cavalry  of  Lord  Uxbridge.  The  French  followed  in  close 
pursuit  as  far  as  Maison-du-Roi  and  the  heights  of  Plan- 
chenois,  where  the  army  arrived  at  nightfall.  The  enemy  mani- 
fested an  intention  to  maintain  himself  in  front  of  the  forest 
of  Soignies,  but  we  thought  it  was  only  the  rear-guard  cover- 
ing the  retreat  of  the  army  through  the  forest  ;  however  as 
it  was  too  late  to  begin  an  attack  that  night,  our  different 
corps  bivouacked  near  Planchenois.     The  rain  continued  to 


368  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

fall  in  torrents  all  night.  At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  I 
went  the  rounds  of  the  posts  and  assured  myself  that  the 
enemy  had  not  moved  ;  Wellington  had  therefore  resolved  to 
fight  ;  this  was  exactly  what  I  wished  ;  to  meet  and  attack 
the  two  armies  separate]}'  was  the  main  point  considered  in 
the  plan  of  campaign.  Blucher  had  already  been  defeated 
and  forced  to  retreat  on  a  line  diverging  from  the  other  army, 
and  I  had  detached  after  him  a  sufficient  force  to  increase  the 
distance  of  separation  and  effectually  prevent  a  junction. 
The  other  army  was  now  in  the  toils,  and  my  only  appre- 
hension was  that  it  would  refuse  battle. 

Grouchy  ordered  to  occupy  the  Defile  of  St.  Lambert.  — 
Nevertheless,  to  profit  with  security  by  this  happy  chance  it 
was  best  to  entirely  prevent  the  junction  of  the  allied  armies. 
I,  therefore,  dispatched  a  courier,  in  the  early  part  of  the 
night  of  the  sixteenth,  to  Grouchy  at  Wavre  with  an  order 
to  occupy  without  delay  the  defile  of  St.  Lambert,  so  that  if 
he  did  not  take  an  active  part  in  the  coming  battle  by  falling 
on  the  left  of  the  English,  he  could  at  least  give  them  some 
trouble,  and  at  the  same  time  cover  my  flank.  But  at  mid- 
night I  received  Grouchy's  report,  saying  that  he  hadarrrived 
at  Gembloux  at  five  o'clock  in  the  evening  and  was  passing 
the  night  there,  having  marched  only  two  leagues  !  !  This 
delay  was  exceedingly  vexatious,  as  he  might  well  have 
reached  Wavre  about  the  same  time  that  I  had  La-Belle- 
Alliance,  as  the  distance  was  but  little  greater.  But  as  he 
could  not  have  received  the  order  which  I  had  sent  to  Wavre, 
another  was  immediately  despatched  to  Gembloux  hoping 
that  he  would  receive  it  in  time. 

Reasons  for  attacking  the  English.— My  army  had  been 
much  harrassed  by  rains,  bad  roads,  and  forced  marches. 
Under  ordinary  circumstances  it  would  have  been  best  to 
allow  it  some  repose,  and  afterward  to  dislodge  Wellington  by 
manœuvres.     But  other  armies  were  about  to  invade  France, 


Ou.  XXII]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815  369 

and  my  presence  would  soon  be  needed  elsewhere.  Moreover, 
Blncher  would  soon  rally,  and,  with  reinforcements,  again 
attempt  to  force  a  junction  with  the  right  of  the  allies  ;  it 
was,  therefore,  necessary  to  end  with  the  English  as  soon  as 
possible. 

Position  of  the  Allied  Army. — They  occupied  in  front  of 
Mont-St.-Jean,  a  fine  plateau,  the  slope  from  which,  like  the 
glacis  of  a  fort,  was  favorable  for  their  fire  and  offered  them 
a  good  view  of  our  operations.  The  right  extended  to  the 
rear  of  Braine-la-Leud,  and  a  corps  of  Netherlanders  of  fif- 
teen thousand  men  was  still  detached  as  far  as  Halle  to  cover 
the  road  from  Mons  to  Brussels.  The  position  in  itself  had 
great  defensive  advantages,  the  villages  of  Braine  and  Mer- 
bes,  the  chateau  of  Hougomont,  La-Haie-Sainte,  La-Haie, 
and  Frichemont  forming,  as  it  were,  advanced  bastions  which 
flanked  and  secured  the  whole  line  ;  but  it  was  just  on  the 
brink  of  the  vast  forest  of  Soignies,*  with  no  possible  outlet 
for  a  great  army,  with  its  immense  material  and  numerous 
cavalry. 

Plan  of  Attack. — As  the  enemy  had  decided  to  await  bat- 
tle, it  became  necessary  to  determine  the  plan  of  attack.  To 
manoeuvre  by  the  left  to  turn  the  enemy's  right  might  cut 
off  his  retreat  on  that  side  of  the  forest,  but  it  would  sepa- 
rate me  from  the  centre  of  operations,  and  throw  Wellington 
in  the  direction  of  Blucher  ;  moreover  this  wing  was  secured 
by  the  farm  of  Hougomont  (now  converted  into  a  strong 
field-work)  and  the  great  bourgs  of  Braine-la-Leud  and 
Merbe-Braine.  To  attack  with  the  right  to  crush  the 
enemy's  left  was  preferable,  inasmuch  as  it  maintained  a 
direct  relation  on  an  interior  line  with  Grouchy.  But  as  the 
ground  in  this  direction  was  unfavorable,  I,  therefore,  deter- 

*  The  traveler  will  now  find  this  forest  much  changed,  and  far  more  acces- 
sible for  an  army  than  it  was  in  1815.     Much  of  the  timber  has  been  removed 
within  the  last  few  years. 
vol.  iv. — 24. 


370  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

mined  to  assail  the  left  and  pierce  the  centre.  To  attack 
the  centre  only,  as  at  Montenotte,  Eivoli,  and  Austerlitz, 
can  be  done  when  this  point  is  left  unsecured,  which  very 
seldom  happens.  In  the  present  case  the  manœuvre  of  Wa- 
gram  and  Moskwa  was  preferable.  The  mass  of  my  forces 
was  directed  on  the  centre  ;  the  extreme  left  was  to  be  as- 
sailed only  by  the  division  forming  the  right  of  the  corps  of 
Erlon,  which  was  to  attack  Papelotte  and  La-Haie  ;:;:  Ney 
was  to  conduct  the  three  other  divisions  to  the  right  of  La- 
Haie-Sainte  ;*  the  corps  of  Reille  was  to  support  this  move- 
ment at  the  left  of  the  road  to  Mont-St.-Jean  ;  the  divisions 
of  Bachelu  and  Foy,  between  this  road  and  the  farm  of 
Hougomont  ;  that  of  Prince  Jerome,  conducted  by  Guille- 
minot,  was  to  attack  this  farm  which  constituted  the  salient 
point  of  the  enemy's  line.  Wellington  had  formed  loop- 
holes in  the  walls  of  the  chateau  and  garden,  and  secured  the 
enclosure  of  the  park,  occupying  the  whole  with  the  English 
Guards.f  Count  Lobau,  with  the  sixth  corps  and  a  mass  of 
cavalry,  followed  as  a  third  and  a  fourth  line  to  the  centre, 
on  the  right  and  left  of  the  road,  so  as  to  support  Ney's  at- 
tack upon  La-Haie-Sainte  ;  finally  twenty-four  battalions 
of  the  Guard  and  cuirassiers  of  the  Duke  of  Val  my,  forming 
the  fifth  and  sixth  lines,  were  ready  to  bear  upon  the  deci- 
sive point4  I  had  purposed  to  begin  the  attack  early  in  the 
morning,  but  the  torrents  of  rain  which  had  fallen  during 
the  night  and  previous  day  had   so  softened  the  ground  that 

*  These  two  places  must  not  be  confounded  ;  the  first  was  at  the  left  wing 
of  the  allies,  and  the  other  at  the  centre. 

+  The  thick  walls  of  the  house,  chapel,  and  garden,  pierced  with  loop-holes 
and  arranged  for  a  double  tier  of  fire,  were  almost  impregnable  ;  exterior  to 
these  was  a  ditch  with  a  good  embankment  covered  with  a  thick  hedge  ;  and 
the  whole  was  surrounded  by  a  thick  woods,  which  have  since  been  removed. 
The  whole  formed  an  excellent  field  fortification,  which  from  its  position  pro- 
duced a  marked  effect  upon  the  operations  of  the  battle. 

%  Jomiai  says  that  Napoleon  may  offer  ihis  plan  of  battle  as  a  model  to  the 
masters  of  the  art,  for  nothing  can  be  better. 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  371 

it  would  have  been  hardly  possible  for  the  artillery  and 
cavalry  to  manoeuvre.  As  the  weather  began  to  clear  up, 
the  attack  was  delayed  in  order  that  the  ground  might 
become  more  firm  ;  in  the  meantime  the  several  corps  were 
placed  in  position. 

Commencement  of  the  Battle  of  La  Belle-Alliance,  or 
Waterloo,— At  eleven  o'clock  the  attack  commenced  with 
artillery  and  musketry  against  the  farm  of  Hougomont, 
which  Jerome  endeavored  to  carry  ;  a  few  moments  after, 
Ney  presented  himself  near  Frichemont  at  the  opposite  ex- 
tremity of  the  line.  A  few  cannon-shot  were  exchanged, 
when  it  was  ascertained  that  the  stream,  although  narrow 
and  shallow,  was  so  very  muddy,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
turn  to  the  west  of  Smouhen,  it  being  difficult  to  pass  lower 
down  in  face  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  Ney,  obliged  thus  to 
withdraw  a  part  of  his  right  to  the  centre,  at  length  succeeded 
in  forming  these  four  divisions  of  the  corps  of  Erlon,  and  it 
was  only  by  herculean  efforts  that  he  could  form  his  artillery 
in  the  soft  ground  where  the  carriages  sunk  to  their  hubs  in 
the  mud. 

First  Appearance  of  the  Prussians. — The  marshal  soon 
began  a  violent  cannonade  against  the  enemy's  left,  merely 
waiting  for  my  signal  to  fall  upon  it.  I  was  about  giving 
this  signal  a  little  after  twelve  o'clock,  when  strong  columns 
were  discovered  on  the  right  in  the  direction  of  Lasne  and 
St.  Lambert  ;  these  I  supposed  to  be  the  detachment  asked 
of  Grouchy,  though  after  his  report  received  the  night  before 
from  Gembloux,  I  had  hardly  expected  him  so  soon  ;  never- 
theless, by  setting  out  very  early  in  the  morning  he  might 
have  reached  here  by  noon.  To  promptly  ascertain  the  true 
state  of  things  in  this  direction,  I  dispatched  General  Ho- 
mond  with  three  thousand  horse  towards  Pajeau,  where  they 
could  either  cover  our  flank,  or  open  a  communication  with 
Grouchy,  as  the  circumstances  might  require.     They  soon 


372  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Chi.  XXIL 

after  brought  in  a  Prussian  hussar  with  an  intercepted  let- 
ter, announcing  the  approach  of  Bulow  with  a  force  estimated 
at  thirty  thousand  men. 

Napoleon  determines  to  hasten  the  Attack  upon  the 
English. — Notwithstanding  this  vexatious  contre-temps,  my 
affairs  were  still  far  from  desperate  ;  if  Grouchy  had  per- 
mitted Bulow  to  penetrate  between  us,  he  certainly  must  be 
near  at  hand  in  pursuit,  and  if  so,  the  chances  of  the  battle 
were  still  unchanged.  I  therefore  ordered  Ney  to  begin  the 
attack,  and,  to  secure  the  threatened  flank,  I  moved  the  two 
divisions  of  Count  Lobau  in  the  direction  of  Planchenois 
where  they  could  serve  as  a  reserve  to  Ney  or  oppose  Bulow, 
as  the  circumstances  might  require.  The  Prussian  corps,  if 
followed  up  by  Grouchy  as  I  had  every  reason  to  believe  it 
was,  would  thus  find  itself  between  two  fires  in  a  coup-gorge, 
and  would  become  an  additional  trophy  to  the  conqueror. 
Nearly  a  hundred  cannon  were  now  thundering  against  the 
enemy's  centre  to  the  right  and  left  of  La-Haie-Sainte  ;  it 
was  here  that  the  principal  effort  was  to  be  made  ;  and  if 
Ney,  seconded  by  Lobau  and  the  Guard,  should  succeed  in 
penetrating  here  as  he  did  at  Friedland,  I  would  command 
the  road  through  the  forest  of  Soignes,  which  constituted 
the  enemy's  only  chance  of  retreat. 

Key's  first  Attack  on  the  Centre. — Near  one  o'clock,  Ney 
threw  himself  at  the  head  of  the  corps  of  Erlon,  which 
deployed  in  columns  by  division  in  order  to  cross  more 
rapidly  the  space  between  it  and  the  enemy.  This  move- 
ment, executed  with  close  and  deep  masses  under  a  murder- 
ous fire,  and  in  a  horrible  mud,  caused  a  slight  undulation  in 
his  columns  ;  a  part  of  his  artillery  remained  behind,  and 
continued  a  distant  fire  upon  the  enemy's  batteries,  while 
the  infantry  was  passing  the  ravine.  The  extreme  right 
division  of  this  corps  moved  in  the  direction  of  Smouhen  in 
concert  with  the  light  cavalry  of  Jaquinot.     A  brigade  of 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  373 

the  left  attacked  the  farm-house  of  La-Haie-Sainte,  where  it 
met  a  strong  resistance,  and  experienced  considerable  losses. 
The  remainder  of  this  corps,  having  all  the  difficulties  of  the 
deep  mud  and  the  formidable  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery, 
reached  the  part  of  the  first  line  formed  of  the  Belgian  bri- 
gade of  Bylant  (division  of  Perponcher)  and  pierced  it  by  a 
vigorous  charge.  But  they  were  now  suddenly  assailed  by  the 
English  division  of  Picton,  placed  in  the  second  line,  and 
lying  hid  behind  a  rise  of  ground  favorable  for  their  conceal- 
ment. The  combat  now  becomes  furious  ;  the  English  in- 
fantry are  deployed  and  envelope,  with  their  concentric  fire, 
the  compact  corps  of  Ney.  Picton  falls  dead  ;  but  his 
troops  hold  firm,  and  the  French  column,  arrested  by  this 
murderous  fire,  begins  to  waver.  At  this  instant  Lord  Ux- 
bridge  advances  the  English  cavalry  of  General  Ponsonby  to 
charge  it  in  flank  :  emboldened  by  success,  they  charge  in 
the  interval  between  the  second  and  third  columns,  and  pre- 
cipitate themselves  on  Ney's  reserve  of  artillery,  a  part  of 
which  remains  in  rear,  on  account  of  the  mud  ;  they  sabre 
the  soldiers  of  the  train  and  the  cannoneers,  and  carry  away 
the  horses,  thus  depriving  the  infantry  of  a  part  of  its  cannon. 
Seeing  the  operations  of  these  horsemen,  I  throw  out  against 
them  the  cuirassiers  of  Milhaud  and  a  brigade  of  lancers  ;  in 
a  few  minutes  they  are  completely  destroyed,  and  Ponsonby 
is  slain  ;  but  the  French  infantry  has  been  broken,  and  a 
part  of  its  cannon  have  been  rendered  immovable. 

The  Left  attacks  Ilougomont.— While  these  things  were 
taking  place  against  the  left  and  left  centre  of  the  allies, 
Jerome,  seconded  by  Foy,  had,  with  difficulty,  dislodged  the 
enemy  from  the  park  of  Hougomont,  but  all  efforts  were 
vain  against  the  embattled  walls  and  chateau,  where  Well- 
ington himself  conducted  the  reinforcements  to  the  English 
Guards  who  defended  this  important  post  with  the  most 
admirable  valor.     Wellington  was  waiting  for  the  promised 


374  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

aid  of  Blucher,  and  he  sought  every  means  to  prolong  the 
contest.  For  him  there  was  no  hope  of  retreat  ;  he  must 
conquer  or  die.  Seeing  my  efforts  directed  towards  the 
centre  he  hastened  to  close  his  line,  calling  from  Braine-la- 
Leud  and  Merbes  twenty  battalions  of  Belgians  and  Bruns- 
wickers,  and  placing  them  successively  in  reserve  behind  the 
right  and  centre.  He  himself  then  repaired  to  the  defense 
of  Hougomont.  General  Foy,  on  his  side,  wishing  to  second 
the  attacks  made  on  the  chateau  by  the  division  of  Jerome 
(conducted  by  Guilleminot),  sought  to  pass  this  post,  and 
fell  upon  the  line  of  Lord  Hill  and  the  Brunswickers,  who 
were  formed  in  rear  of  a  cross-road  which  ran  along  in  front 
of  the  enemy's  line  from  the  Nivelle  road  to  near  Papelotte. 
But  being  wounded  in  the  shoulder  by  a  ball,  and  seeing  his 
troops  cut  down  by  a  murderous  fire  without  hope  of  dis- 
lodging the  enemy,  Foy  renounced  his  project,  and  the  com- 
bat on  this  point  degenerated  into  a  cannonade  and  skirmishes 
without  advantages  to  either  side. 

Key's  second  Attack. — In  this  interval  Ney  applied  all 
his  energy  and  force  of  character  to  repair  the  check  which 
he  had  received  in  his  first  attacks  ;  his  right,  in  possession 
of  Smouhen,  debouched  on  Papelotte,  and  the  marshal  him- 
self directed  a  new  attack  on  La-Haie-Sainte.  The  division 
of  Donzelot,  sustained  on  the  left  of  the  road  by  a  brigade 
of  Valmy's  cuirassiers,  and  on  the  right  by  a  brigade  of 
Quinot's  infantry,  at  last  succeeded  in  routing  the  Scotch  and 
Hanoverian  battalions  ;  and  at  four  o'clock  his  troops,  after 
the  most  glorious  efforts,  remained  masters  of  these  two 
points.  During  this  contest  I  passed  along  the  lines  of  Ney 
and  Milhaud  amid  a  shower  of  bullets  ;  General  Devaux, 
commandant  of  the  artillery  of  the  Guard  and  reserve,  was 
killed  at  my  side, — an  irreparable  loss  at  the  moment  when 
I  was  directing  him  to  renew  the  decisive  manoeuvres  of 
Wa^rram. 


Ch.  XXIL]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  375 

Bulow  debouches  on  Planchenois.— At  four  o'clock  the 
possession  of  La-Haie-Sainte  and  Papelotte  gave  us  a  decided 
superiority,  and  all  the  chances  were  in  our  favor,  but  at 
this  moment  I  learned  that  Bulow  had  debouched  from  the 
wood  of  Frichemont,  and  attacked  Count  Lobau.  I  now 
feared  that  Grouchy  had  not  followed  this  Prussian  corps, 
and  that  I  should  be  obliged,  unassisted,  to  fight  both  armies. 
But  Bulow  was  unsustained,  and  from  my  central  position 
and  the  advantages  already  gained,  I  still  felt  confident  of 
success,  and  resolved  to  fight  them  successively.  Bulow  had 
now  advanced  so  far  that  his  bullets  reached  the  Charleroi 
road  in  rear  of  my  centre  ;  it  was  therefore  necessary  to 
force  him  to  retreat.  Accordingly,  at  five  o'clock,  I  directed 
against  him  the  Young  Guard  under  the  brave  Duhesme, 
sustained  by  General  Morand  with  a  part  of  the  Old  Guard, 
intending  afterwards  to  fall  upon  Wellington  with  the  united 
reserves  ;  in  the  meantime  Ney  was  merely  to  sustain  him- 
self in  possession  of  La-Haie-Sainte  and  Papelotte. 

Grand  ( hargc  of  the  French  Cavalry.— At  this  time,  the 
marshal,  finding  himself  too  much  isolated  by  the  attack  of 
the  corps  of  Reille  about  the  chateau  of  Hougomont,  urgently 
asked  for  reinforcements.  Having  then  no  infantry  at  my 
disposal,  I  assigned  to  him  the  cuirassiers  of  Milhaud. 
Wellington,  on  his  side,  encouraged  by  the  attack  of  Bulow, 
and  reënforced  by  the  troops  of  his  extreme  right,  conceived 
the  hope  of  regaining  possession  of  the  park  of  Hougomont 
and  the  farm-house  of  La-Haie-Sainte.  For  this  purpose 
the  «Hanoverians  were  directed,  at  five  o'clock,  on  the  latter 
post,  and  at  the  same  time  the  English  under  Lord  Hill  on 
the  former.  At  this  moment,  Ney,  whose  troops  were  suffer- 
ing terribly  from  the  enemy's  fire,  seeing  the  light  cavalry  of 
his  right  forced  by  the  English  horse,  sought  to  get  possession 
at  all  hazards  of  the  plateau  of  Mont-St.-Jean,  and  threw 
his  brave  cuirassiers  on  the  centre  of  the  allies.     Unfortun- 


376  LIFE    OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cn.  XXII. 

ately  his  infantry  was  not  in  condition  to  give  it  more  than 
a  feeble  assistance.  Nevertheless,  these  squadrons,  encoun- 
tering the  Hanoverians  in  march  on  La-Haie-Sainte,  fall 
upon  them,  sabre  a  regiment,  capture  the  enemy's  artillery, 
force  the  German  legion  which  had  formed  in  square,  and 
even  charge  upon  others  ;  the  enemy  forms  his  troops  in 
squares  by  regiments,  rescues  his  cannoneers  and  artillery 
horses,  and,  by  a  well  sustained  fire,  repels  the  efforts  of  this 
heroic  cavalry*,  which,  charged  in  its  turn  by  the  English 
cavalry  of  Lord  Somerset,  rallied  and  resumed  the  attack 
even  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  line. 

This  was  a  glorious  operation,  most  heroically  executed  ; 
but  it  was  ill-timed  ;  it  should  have  been  executed  sooner, 
in  concert  with  the  first  attack  of  Erlon,  or  have  been  deferred 
until  the  return  of  the  Young  Guard,  so  as  to  form  a 
combined  effort  of  the  three  arms  united.  But  the  plateau 
was  crowned  ;  and  it  was  now  necessary  to  sustain  Ney 
where  he  was,  or  to  allow  his  troops  to  be  cut  off.  I  there- 
fore ordered  Kellerman,  after  six  o'clock,  to  advance  with  his 
cuirassiers  to  the  left  of  the  road  to  La-Haie-Sainte,  and  to 
overthrow  everything  before  him.  Unfortunately,  and  con- 
trary to  my  intention,  the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Guard  fol- 
lowed this  movement.  Milhaud,  seeing  these  recnforcements 
renews  his  attacks.  These  ten  thousand  horse  cause  great 
havoc  in  the  enemy's  line,  capture  sixty  pieces  of  artillery, 
force  two  squares,  and  their  progress  is  checked  only  by  the 
infantry  of  the  second  line  ;  the  combined  English,  Belgian, 
Hanoverian,  and  Brunswick  cavalry,  under  Lord  Uxbridge, 
now  charge  upon  the  French  ;  but  these  rally  again  at  a 
little  distance,  and  drive  back  the  allies'  horse  upon  their 
infantry.     The  repeated  efforts  of  this  cavalry  are  glorious 

*  Wellington  himself  assured  the  author,  at  the  congress  of  Vienna,  that  he 
never  saw  anything  more  admirable  than  the  ten  or  twelve  reiterated  charges 
of  the  French  cuirassiers  against  troops  of  all  arms. 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  377 

beyond  description,  and  the  impassible  perseverance  of  their 
adversaries  is  also  deserving  of  the  highest  praise.  But  dis- 
order now  begins  in  the  combined  army,  and  the  alarm  even 
reaches  Brussels,  where  we  are  every  moment  expected  to 
appear.  Bulow,  attacked  by  Lobau,  Duhesme,  and  a  de- 
tachment of  the  Old  Guard  under  Morand,  is  driven  back  on 
the  road  to  Pajeau  ;  finally  Grouchy's  cannon  are  now  heard 
on  the  Dyle,  and,  in  spite  of  all  the  contre-temps,  victory 
seems  certain.  To  give  it  the  finishing  stroke,  I  order,  at 
half  past  seven,  all  the  Guard  to  unite,  and  carry  the  posi- 
tion of  Mont-St.-Jean.  This  effort  must  certainly  incline 
the  balance  most  decidedly  in  our  favor. 

Blucher  debouches  on  Siuoulien,  and  Pirch  and  Bulow 
on  Planchenois. — But  this  illusion  was  of  short  duration  ; 
the  French  cavalry  had  hardly  rallied  its  victorious  squad- 
rons, when  new  columns  of  the  enemy  were  discovered  from 
the  plateau,  coming  from  Chain  :  it  was  Blucher  himself, 
who  had  arrived  with  the  corps  of  Ziethen  in  the  direction 
of  Papelotte.  At  the  same  time,  the  corps  of  Pirch,  having 
debouched  from  Lasne,  was  already  in  action  to  second  Bu- 
low at  Planchenois.  I  could  not  know  the  strength  of  these 
forces,  but  I  feared  that  their  arrival  would  snatch  from  me 
the  victory.  Nevertheless,  I  thought  it  possible  to  restore 
the  equilibrium,  and,  perhaps,  to  force  back  the  English,  by 
refusing  my  right,  which  was  now  threatened  by  greatly 
superior  numbers,  and  direct  my  principal  efforts  by  my  left 
on  Hougomont  and  Mont-St.-Jean  ;  this  was  a  bold,  and  by 
some  considered  a  rash  measure,  inasmuch  as  it  changed  my 
line  of  retreat  from  Charleroi  to  the  causeway  of  Nivelle, 
and  endangered  my  communication  with  Grouchy  ;  but  its 
character  cannot  be  properly  judged  of,  as-  circumstances  at 
the  time  prevented  its  execution.  Disorder  began  to  reach 
the  cavalry,  and  the  division  of  Durutte  was  threatened  by 
triple   forces  on  the   plateau  between    Smouhen  and  the 


378  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII 

chaussée  ;  it  was  important  to  sustain  Erlon  without  even 
waiting  the  return  of  the  Guard  commanded  by  Morand,  and 
some  other  detachments.  I  put  myself  at  the  head  of  the 
division  of  Friant,  which  were  the  only  troops  disposable,  and 
conducted  it  to  La-Haie-Sainte,  at  the  same  time  that  I 
ordered  Keille  to  make  a  new  effort  in  the  direction  of 
Hougomont.  This  attack,  led  on  by  myself,  restored  cour- 
age to  the  French  cavalry  and  to  the  remains  of  the  corps 
of  Erlon  ;  if  the  whole  division  of  Morand  had  been  present, 
there  would  still  have  been  some  chances  of  success  ;  but, 
forced  to  keep  some  battalions  in  hand  towards  Belle- 
Alliance,  I  could  unite  only  four  on  the  summit  of  the  pla- 
teau in  advance  of  La-Haie-Sainte.  Ney,  sword  in  hand, 
led  them  against  the  enemy. 

Wellington's  Dispositions.— In  the  mean  time  Wellington, 
certain  of  the  near  approach  of  Blucher  on  his  left,  thought 
to  regain  the  park  of  Hougomont  and  La-Haie-Sainte  ;  he 
threw  the  division  of  Brunswick  and  a  Belgian  brigade  on 
the  latter  of  these  points  at  the  moment  that  the  few  heroes 
of  the  guard  charged  bayonet  upon  the  line  of  Anglo-Hano- 
verians. The  Prince  of  Orange,  seeing  the  importance  of 
this  movement,  attacked  them  lively  at  the  head  of  a  regi- 
ment of  Nassau,  while  the  division  of  Brunswick  attacked 
them  on  the  other  side  ;  but  the  prince  fell  from  a  shot, 
while  showing  his  men  the  road  to  victory.  The  brave 
soldiers  of  the  Old  Guard  at  first  sustained  the  shock,  but 
being  unsupported  in  the  midst  of  enemies  who  had  just 
been  reënforced  by  the  Belgian  brigade  dc-chasse,  and  ex- 
posed on  all  sides  to  a  murderous  fire,  they  fell  back  to  the 
foot  of  the  plateau  which  already  had  cost  so  much  blood.  In 
the  mean  time  I  succeeded  in  uniting  six  other  battalions  of 
the  Old  Guard  which  had  been  detached  to  different  points, 
and  I  was  making  dispositions  to  second  the  efforts  on  Mont- 
Saint-Jean,  when  the  disorder,  which  began  to  show  itself 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  379 

on  the  right  of  the  corps  of  Ellon,  compelled  nie  to  form 
these  battalions  in  squares  to  the  right  of  La-Haie-Sainte. 

Defeat  of  the  French  Right.— While  these  things  were 
passing  on  the  front  of  the  French  army,  between  the  hours 
of  eight  and  nine,  the  Young  Guard  and  Lobau  were  fight- 
iug  with  rare  bravery  against  the  continually  increasing  forces 
of  the  Prussians.  Seconded  by  the  arrival  of  the  corps  of 
Pirch,  Bulow  succeeded  in  driving  back  these  brave  men  who 
had  been  weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Old  Guard, 
and  were  now  overpowered  by  the  double  opposition  of  Blu- 
cher  and  Ziethen  on  their  left  flank.  On  the  arrival  of  the 
latter,  the  cavalry  of  Wellington's  left  wing  (brigades  of 
Vivian  and  Vandeleur),  which  had  suffered  least  during  the 
combat,  flew  to  the  centre  to  second  his  efforts  there.  Zie- 
then, who  had  debouched  at  eight  o'clock  at  the  summit  of 
the  angle  formed  by  the  French  line  toward  Frichemont, 
easily  crushed  Durutte,  at  the  same  time  that  he  turned  the 
left  of  the  crochet  formed  by  Lobau  and  the  Young  Guard. 
Pirch  turned  Planchenois  and  Bulow  attacked  it  in  front. 
All  this  part  of  the  imperial  army,  broken  and  pierced  by 
forces  quadruple  their  own  numbers,  took  refuge  in  flight. 
Duhesme  and  Barrois  were  severely  wounded  ;  Lobau  was 
taken  prisoner  in  the  act  of  rallying  his  soldiers  ;  Pelet  forced 
his  way  with  a  handful  of  brave  men  which  he  drew  about 
him.  The  heroic  defense  of  these  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand 
French,  against  sixty  thousand  Prussians,  who  were  favored 
by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  has  drawn  a  tribute  of  admira- 
tion even  from  their  enemies.'* 

Last  Efforts  and  Rout  of  the  French.— Wellington,  see- 
ing that  the  attack  of  Blucher  is  giving  the  decisive  blow, 
colleets  his  best  troops,  regains  the  park  of  Hougomont,  and, 
at  about  nine  o'clock,  falls  upon  the  Old  Guard  with  an 

*  Vide  report  of  General  Gneisenau. 


380  LIFE    OF    NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

overwhelming  superiority.  The  combat  is  most  furious  ; 
General  Friant  and  Michel  are  severely  wounded  ;  the 
remnant  of  the  cuirassiers  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Guard  do 
wonders  ;  hut  all  is  in  vain.  Assailed  by  sixty  thousand 
Prussians  assembled  on  the  left  of  Wellington,  the  entire 
French  right  is  driven  back  in  disorder  on  La-Belle- Alliance  : 
the  Guard  is  obliged  to  fight  both  to  the  front  and  rear  ;  the 
cavalry  of  Wellington  profits  by  this  disorder  and  charges 
between  the  corps  of  Eeille  and  the  Guard  which  is  formed  in 
squares,  at  the  same  time  that  Blucher  takes  the  line  in 
reverse.  These  masses  render  it  impossible  to  rally  the 
troops  of  Count  D'Erlon  and  Eeille.  The  Prussian  artillery 
have  so  far  advanced  as  to  reach  with  their  fire  the  chaussée 
to  Charleroi  far  in  rear  of  the  line  ;  this  contributes  not  a 
little  to  the  disorder,  and  the  darkness  of  the  night  finishes 
our  overthrow.  Infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  take  pell- 
mell,  the  road  to  Genappe,  some  even  seeking  to  gain  the 
road  to  Nivelle,  that  to  Charleroi  now  being  occupied.  I 
remain  with  a  few  brave  men  under  Cambronne,  on  a  piece 
of  rising  ground,  endeavoring  to  stem  the  torrent  of  the 
enemy,  and  at  last  am  obliged  to  effect  my  retreat  across  the 
fields,  accompanied  only  by  my  staff,  not  having  left  even  a 
battalion  with  which  to  check  the  enemy. 

Operations  of  Grouchy.— Having  related  the  fatal  results 
of  the  appearance  of  the  Prussians  upon  the  field  of  Water- 
loo, it  may  be  well  to  notice  the  circumstances  under  which 
this  junction,  so  fortunate  for  the  allies,  was  effected. 

Grouchy,  as  has  already  been  said,  left  Gembloux  on  the 
seventeenth  at  noon.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the 
corps  of  Thielman  had  retired  from  Sombref  in  the  same 
direction  for  the  jmrpose,  undoubtedly,  of  forming  a  junction 
with  Bulow,  who  had  just  arrived  there  after  a  forced  march 
of  twelve  leagues,  while  Blucher's  right,  composed  of  the 
corps  of  Ziethen  and  Pirch,  had  retired  by  Mont-Saint-Gui- 


On.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  381 

bert  on  Bierge  and  Aisemont.  Grouchy,  on  his  arrival  at 
Gembloux,  learned,  in  the  evening,  that  Bulow  and  Thiel- 
man  had  united  there  in  the  morning  and  had  afterward 
marched  in  the  direction  of  Wavre,  forming  together  a  mass 
of  fifty- two  thousand  men.  The  corps  of  Gérard,  on  account 
of  the  violent  storm  which  had  drenched  the  troops  and  ren- 
dered the  roads  almost  impassable,  did  not  reach  Gembloux 
till  eleven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  Grouchy  resolved  to 
set  out  for  Wavre  at  six  o'clock  the  next  morning,  with  the 
corps  of  Yandamme,  leaving  Gérard  till  eight  o'clock  to  rest 
his  troops. 

Here  was  Grouchy 's  great  fault.  As  soon  as  Blucher  had 
renounced  his  natural  base  on  the  Meuse,  it  was  evident  that 
his  object  was  to  form  a  junction  with  Wellington,  assume 
the  offensive,  and  revenge  himself  for  the  defeat  he  had  just 
sustained.  Even  admitting  that  my  order  to  Grouchy  was 
to  follow  on  the  heels  of  the  Prussians,  and  that  I  had 
directed  the  pursuit  on  Namur  (as  has  by  some  been  alleged) 
the  order  had  evidently  become  impossible  of  execution,  and 
the  marshal  was  now  master  of  his  own  course  of  action. 
But  the  order  afterwards  transmitted  by  General  Bertrand 
to  march  on  Gembloux,  sufficiently  indicated  the  object 
which  I  wished  him  to  accomplish.  It  was,  most  certainly, 
his  duty  to  pursue  the  Prussians,  but  to  do  this,  it  was  not 
necessary  to  follow  in  the  trail  of  the  retreating  columns. 
To  harass  the  enemy's  rear-guards  with  light  troops,  while 
the  main  force  is  directed  on  the  flank  of  the  retreating 
columns, — or  a  lateral  pursuit,  as  it  is  called, — was  the 
method  followed  by  the  Kussians  in  1812  at  Wiasma,  Kras- 
noi,  and  on  the  Beresina.  The  same  method  has  been 
adopted  with  similar  success  in  other  instances  ;  but  never 
have  there  been  more  favorable  circumstances  for  such  an 
operation  than  in  the  case  of  Grouchy.  His  principal  object 
evidently  was  to  keep  the  Prussians  away  from  the  left  wing 


382  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cil.  XXII. 

of  our  army  ;  to  harass  them  in  their  retreat  was  only  a 
secondary  object.  By  marching  his  infantry  parallel  to  the 
Prussian  columns,  and  at  the  same  time  harassing  their  rear 
with  his  light  cavalry,  he  would  have  attained  the  double 
object  of  preventing  any  junction  with  the  English,  and  have 
avoided  the  danger  of  fighting  in  defiles.  He  had  the  choice 
of  three  principal  routes  :  that  of  the  right  by  Sart-a-Walhain 
which  Blucher  had  followed  ;  that  of  the  left  by  Mont-St.- 
Guibert,  and  along  theDyle  to  Wavre  ;  or,  by  passing  this 
river  at  Moustier,  and  reaching  Wavre  by  the  left,  thus 
avoiding  the  defiles  of  the  right  bank.  All  these  three  routes 
were  nearly  of  the  same  length,  but  the  left  brought  Grouchy 
three  leagues  nearer  the  other  wing  of  the  French  army, 
while  the  route  on  the  right  carried  him  three  leagues  in  the 
other  direction.  The  first,  therefore,  had  the  advantage  of 
nearly  an  entire  march,  and  in  addition  placed  Grouchy 
between  the  two  allied  armies.  There  was  no  reason,  then, 
why  Grouchy  should  hesitate  to  march,  on  the  eighteenth, 
at  the  break  of  day,  in  all  haste,  on  Moustier  with  Excel- 
mans,  Vandamme,  and  Gérard,  directing  the  cavalry  of 
Pajol  and  the  division  of  Teste  on  Wavre,  in  the  pursuit  of 
the  enemy's  rear-guard.  He  could  reach  Moustier  by  ten 
o'clock,  and  could  then  direct  his  infantry  on  Wavre  by 
Limale,  and  the  dragoons  of  Excelmans  on  Saint-Lambert,  or 
march  upon  Lasne  itself,  when  he  heard  the  heavy  cannonade 
of  Waterloo.  Instead  of  taking  this  wise  resolution,  Grouchy 
directed  his  forces  on  Sart-a-Walhain.  The  marshal  was,  ap- 
parently, induced  to  pursue  this  course  through  an  obstinate 
desire  to  follow  literally  in  the  trail  of  the  Prussians,  and 
through  ignorance  that  half  of  the  Prussian  army  had  passed 
by  Gentines  and  Mont-St.-Guibert.  To  this  fault  is  to  be 
added  that  of  a  tardy  departure  in  the  morning,  so  that 
Vandamme  did  not  pass  Sart-a-Walhain,  nor  the  head  of 
Gerard's  columns  reach  that  village,  till  near  noon.    Grouchy 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  383 

had  just  been  joined  by  this  last  general  when  the  sound  of 
a  heavy  and  distant  cannonade  gave  the  signal  of  a  serious 
battle  :  Gérard  recommended  to  Grouchy  to  march  imme- 
diately in  (he  direction  of  the  battle,  persuaded  that  in 
marching  to  the  cannon,  as  Xey  had  done  at  Eylau,  he 
might  decide  the  victory.  "  If  Blucher,"  said  he,  "has 
effected  a  junction  with  Wellington,  we  will  find  him  on  the 
field  of  battle,  and  your  order  will  be  executed  to  the  letter. 
If  he  should  not  be  there,  our  arrival  will  decide  the  battle. 
In  two  hours  we  can  take  part  in  the  engagement  ;  and  if 
we  destroy  the  English,  what  will  Blucher,  already  beaten, 
be  able  to  do  ?" 

This  certainly  was  wise  counsel,  and,  had  it  been  followed, 
might  have  produced  a  decided  influence  on  the  event  of  the 
battle  ;  but  it  must  be  confessed  that  it  could  not  promise 
the  same  advantages  as  if  this  movement  had  been  made  at 
break  of  day  from    Gembloux.      Considering   the  frightful 
state  of  the  roads,  the  bad  condition  of  the  bridges,  and  the 
marshy  defile  of  the  Dyle,  and  above  all,  the  presence  of 
Thielman's  corps  extending  from  the  heights  of  Bierge  on 
Limale  to  oppose  this  passage,  it  may  perhaps,  at  that  hour 
of  the  day,  have  become  impossible  for  Grouchy  to  reach 
Lasne  or  St.-Lambert  before  seven  or  eight  o'clock  in  the 
evening.     But  even  in  that  case,  had  he  arrived  too  late  to 
save  the  battle,  he  certainly  could  have  made  the  defeat  less 
disastrous.     It  is  now  impossible  to  say  what  course  Blucher 
and   his  counselors  would  have   pursued,   if  Grouchy   had 
appeared  in  the  direction  of  Moustier  ;  but  it  is  certain  that 
this  operation  would  have  greatly  embarrassed  the  Prussian 
genera],  and  no  one  can  decide  what  would  have  been  the 
ultimate  results  of  that  embarrassment.     But  whatever  may 
have  been  the  result  of  the  battle,  no  one  can   say  that 
Grouchy  would  have  run  any  risk  in  following  the  advice  of 
Gérard  ;    it  was  one  of  those  operations  that  might  have 


384  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

had  a  very  beneficial  influence,  and  could  hardly  have  pro- 
duced any  evil  results. 

Manœuvres  of  the  Allies. — While  the  army  of  Grouchy 
was  committing  these  fatal  errors,  their  adversaries  executed 
a  manœuvre  both  skillful  and  bold.  The  Prussian  marshal, 
who  bivouacked  on  the  evening  of  the  seventeenth  about 
Wavre,  sent  his  chief  of  staff,  Gneisenau,  to  Wellington,  to 
combine  their  ulterior  operations.  It  was  agreed  that  if  the 
French  should  attack  the  English  in  front  of  the  forest  of 
Soignies,  Blucher,  favored  by  the  Dyle  and  the  direction  of 
its  course,  would  fall  upon  the  French  right  ;  and  if,  on  the 
contrary,  the  attack  should  be  directed  upon  the  Prussians  at 
Wavre,  Wellington  would  march  to  their  assistance,  falling 
upon  the  French  left.  Blucher  seeing  the  false  direction  of 
Grouchy's  march,  and  learning  from  his  scouts  that  the  main 
attack  was  directed  against  the  English,  determined  to  fly  to 
their  assistance.  This  he  could  now  do  without  fear,  Grou- 
chy's  error  having  left  his  operations  in  this  direction  un- 
checked. He,  therefore,  dispatched  the  corps  of  Bulow  and 
Pirch,  at  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  eighteenth,  for 
Saint-Lambert,  and  marched  himself  with  that  of  Ziethen  on 
Ohain,  in  order  to  form  a  junction  with  the  left  of  the 
English.  Thielman  was  left  with  twenîy-ïïvj  thousand  men 
at  Wavre  to  defend  the  Dyle,  with  orders  to  follow  the  ot.ier 
corps  if  Grouchy  should  not  appear.  This  plan  was  well 
conceived,  and  great  praise  is  due  to  the  allied  generals  who 
so  skillfully  took  advantage  of  the  error  of  my  lieutenant. 

In  accordance  with  these  wise  dispositions  Bulow  was 
traversing  Wavre  between  seven  and  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning  when  a  violent  fire  broke  out  in  the  principal  street 
which  was  the  only  passage  through  the  town.  The  ad- 
vanced guard  having  already  passed  this  burning  defile,  con- 
tinued its  route  ;  but  the  artillery  could  not  immediately 
follow,  the  column  being  detained  for  a  time  to  extinguish 


Ch.   XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  15.  385 

the  fire.  Towards  twelve  o'clock  the  advanced  guard,  formed 
at  Saint-Lambert,  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  corps  which 
debouched  between  three  and  four  o'clock  from  the  environs 
of  Pijeau  ;  the  corps  of  Pirch  had  passed  Lasne  between  five 
and  six  o'clock  ;  Blucher  with  the  corps  of  Ziethen,  being 
delayed  by  counter-marches,  did  not  reach  Ohain  before 
seven  o'clock  in  the  evening.  The  part  taken  in  the  battle 
by  these  sixty-five  thousand  Prussians  has  already  been 
noticed  ;  at  the  same  time  the  corps  of  Thielman,  stationed 
on  the  heights  of  Bierge  which  command  the  valley  of  the 
Dyle,  was  watching  for  the  approach  of  Grouchy.  This 
marshal  arrived  at  Wavre  at  four  o'clock,  and  disposed  his 
forces  to  attack  the  enemy's  troops  left  there  to  dispute  the 
passage  of  the  Dyle.  At  five  o'clock  P.  M.  he  received  the 
order  which  had  been  sent  to  him  at  Gembloux  in  the 
morning  ;  he  now  directed  Pajol  with  eight  thousand  men  on 
Limale,  and  with  the  remainder  of  his  forces  attacked  the 
detachment  of  Thielman.  In  this  combat,  which  continued 
from  Wavre  to  the  Bierge  mill,  Gérard  was  wounded.  The 
battle  was  very  creditable  to  our  arms,  but  what  was  passing 
at  Mont-Saint-Jean  rendered  the  success  more  injurious  than 
>  useful. 

Tre  French  Array  retreats  on  Avesnes.— The  wreck  of 
my  army  reached  Genappe  in  great  disorder  ;  in  vain  did  the 
staff-officers  attempt  to  rally  and  form  some  of  the  corps  ; 
all  was  pell-mell.  It  would  be  unjust  for  this  to  censure  my 
brave  troops  ;  never  had  they  fought  with  greater  valor  ; 
but  crossed  by  adverse  circumstances  and  overwhelmed  by  a 
vast  superiority  of  numbers,  they  yielded  only  when  their 
strength  and  munitions  were  entirely  exhausted.  Owing  to 
the  darkness  of  the  night,  and  the  rapid  pursuit  of  Blucher's 
able  chief  of  staff,  Gneisenau,  it  became  impossible  to  make 
a  successful  stand  for  covering  the  retreat  ;  and  the  troops, 
being  checked  and  confused  in  the  barricaded  avenues  of  the 
vol.  iv. — 25. 


386  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  Ch.  XXII. 

defile  of  Genappe,  were  subjected  to  heavy  losses.  In  this 
way  the  disastrous  retreat  was  continued  till  the  fugitives 
were  rallied  under  the  cannon  of  Avesnes.  From  Quatre- 
Bras  I  dispatched  several  officers  with  orders  for  Grouchy  to 
retreat  upon  Namur  ;  I  then  went  to  Charleroi,  directed  the 
scattered  troops,  defiling  through  this  place,  upon  Avesnes, 
and  afterward  repaired  to  Philippe  ville,  in  order  to  he  in 
more  direct  communication  with  Grouchy,  Kapp,  and  the 
forces  on  the  Rhine.  Grouchy  with  his  remaining  thirty-five 
thousand  men  fell  back  upon  Namur  in  order  to  take  the 
road  of  Givet  and  Meziers  ;  Prince  Jerome  had  rallied 
twenty-five  thousand  men  with  two  hundred  pieces  of  can- 
non behind  Avesnes  ;  he  received  orders  to  march  them  on 
Laon.  It  was  also  determined  to  direct  upon  the  same  point, 
the  forces  of  Grouchy,  and  all  that  could  be  drawn  from  the 
interior,  from  Metz,  and  from  the  corps  of  Rapp,  leaving  in 
Lorraine  and  Alsace  merely  enough  to  garrison  the  fortifica- 
tions. 

We  had,  indeed,  sustained  severe  losses,  including  the  pris- 
oners taken  in  the  retreat,  but  still  these  losses  were  less  than 
those  sustained  by  the  enemy.  The  imperial  cause  was 
'shaken,  but  not  yet  lost.  There  was  still  every  reason  to 
hope,  if  all  Frenchmen  would  unite  in  hurling  back  the  in- 
vading armies  of  Europe  with  the  same  courage  as  the  Spar- 
tans of  Leonidas,  the  same  energy  as  the  Russians  in  1812, 
or  the  Spaniards  of  Palafox.  But,  as  unfortunately  for  them 
as  for  me,  internal  dissensions  distracted  their  minds  and 
blunted  their  patriotism. 

Napoleon's  Return  to  Paris.— While  my  forces  were  col- 
lecting at  Laon,  there  was  time  enough  for  me  to  repair  to 
Paris  and  there  organize  the  means  of  national  defense. 
The  council  of  war,  called  at  this  time  were  divided  in  opin- 
ion on  the  policy  of  this  step.  The  majority,  however,  of 
the  members  advised  it,  and  accordingly  I  set  out  on  the 


OH.  XXIL]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  387 

night  of  the  twenty-first  with  the  intention  of  being  back 
by  the  twenty-fifth.  In  six  days  I  could  organize  things  in 
the  capital  for  the  great  national  crisis,  complete  the  de- 
fenses of  Paris,  and  collect  the  reserves  that  could  be  ob- 
tained from  the  depots  and  the  provinces.  This  return,  so 
natural,  to  Paris,  was  misinterpreted  by  my  enemies;  they 
pretended  to  regard  my  departure  from  the  army  as  an  act 
of  cowardice.  I  had  shown  at  Arcole,  at  Eylau,  at  Ratis- 
bon,  at  Arcis,  and  at  Waterloo  even,  that  a  cannon  ball  had 
no  terrors  for  me  ;  and  if  I  had  despaired  of  the  resources 
of  France,  I  could  have  died  at  the  head  of  the  wreck  of  my 
army.  If  I  had  now  left  this  army,  it  was  only  after  it  had 
retreated  beyond  the  reach  of  the  enemy,  into  positions  from 
which  the  lowest  general  of  the  rear-guard  could  conduct 
them  to  Laon  as  safely  as  I  could  ;  but  who  could  supply 
my  place  at  the  helm  of  state,  which  at  this  moment,  un- 
fortunately, was  not  at  my  head-quarters,  but  at  the  Tuil- 
eries ! 

Military  Resources  still  left  to  France.— In  eight  or  ten 
days,  I  hoped  to  return  to  Laon  at  the  head  of  one  hundred 
thousand  men,  and  four  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  to  punish  the 
Anglo-Prussians  for  invading  the  soil  of  France.  This  force 
of  course,  would  not  enable  me  to  disperse  the  armies  which 
the  allied  sovereigns  were  leading  toward  the  defiles  of  the 
Vosges,  but  it  would  give  me  time;  and,  with  the  three 
hundred  thousand  men  to  be  assembled  on  the  Loire  in 
July,  France  might  still  conquer  her  independence  and  save 
her  glory,  for  other  nations  have  rescued,  themselves  from 
still  greater  dangers.  After  the  battle  of  Waterloo  her  con- 
dition was  critical,  but  it  was  not  desperate.  All  arrange- 
ments had  been  made  on  a  supposition  of  a  defeat  in  Belgium. 
The  forces  assembled  between  Laon  and  Paris,  the  troops 
of  the  depots,  and  the  twenty-five  thousand  select  men  un- 
der Rapp,  might  all  be  concentrated  around  Paris  early  in 


388  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

July  ;  by  that  time  the  artillery  would  be  repaired  and 
greatly  increased.  Independent  of  this,  the  capital  had  for 
its  defense  thirty-six  thousand  National  Guards,  thirty  thou- 
sand riflemen,  six  thousand  gunners,  six  hundred  cannon  in 
battery  ;  it  was  formidably  intrenched  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Seine,  and  in  a  few  days  the  engineers  would  render  de- 
fensible the  works  on  the  left  bank.  The  English  and  Prus- 
sian armies,  weakened  by  their  great  losses,  would  cross  the 
Somme  with  very  reduced  forces,  and  would  be  compelled  to 
wait  there  for  the  cooperation  of  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
armies  which  could  not  reach  the  Marne  before  the  middle 
of  July.  Paris  had,  therefore,  twenty  days  to  prepare  for 
defense,  to  complete  her  armaments,  her  supplies,  her  pro- 
visions, her  fortifications,  and  to  collect  troops  from  all  parts 
of  France.  Lyons  also  was  well  armed,  provisioned  and  in- 
trenched. The  defense  of  all  the  fortified  places  was  secured. 
They  were  commanded  by  select  officers,  and  garrisoned  by 
faithful  troops.  Every  thing  might  be  retrieved  ;  but  it  re- 
quired character,  energy  and  firmness  on  the  part  of  the  offi- 
cers, the  government,  the  chambers,  and  the  whole  nation  ; 
it  required  them  to  be  animated  by  sentiments  of  honor,  of 
glory,  and  of  national*  independence — to  take,  as  a  model, 
Eome  after  the  battle  of  Cannae,  and  not  Carthage  after 
that  of  Zama.  Should  France  assume  this  lofty  tone,  she 
would  be  invincible  ;  her  population  was  more  military  than 
that  of  any  other  nation.  The  means  of  carrying  on  the  war 
were  abundant,  and  fit  for  every  purpose. 

Without  recurring  to  the  ages  of  the  Scipios,  there  are 
sufficient  examples  in  modern  history,  such  as  Sj>ain  in 
1808,  and  Russia  in  1812.  Some  will  say  that  the  circum- 
stances of  France  were  different  from  Spain  and  Russia,  and 
that  she  was  too  much  exhausted  in  men  and  resources  to 
hope  for  a  similar  result.  Such  reasons  merit  no  answer  : 
pusillanimous  minds  never  want  pretexts  for  submission,  in 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  389 

preference  to  incurring  the  obligation  of  "  victory  or  death." 
It  is  not  given  to  all  to  think  like  Spartans. 

Conspiracies  of  Napoleon's  Adversaries.— Notwithstand- 
ing these  unfounded  fears  of  the  faint-hearted,  the  army  and 
the  revolutionary  party  were  in  favor  of  resistance,  without 
stopping  to  count  the  sacrifices  it  might  require.  But  the 
factious  leaders  of  radicalism  sought  to  turn  this  feeling  to 
their  own  account,  and  to  separate  the  cause  of  France  from 
that  of  her  constituted  rulers.  Every  thing  was  to  he  sacri- 
ficed to  the  selfish  views  and  Utopian  doctrines  of  these  men. 
They  thought  to  resist  armed  Europe  with  decrees  !  Even 
Lafayette  had  the  credulity  to  believe  that  Europe  was 
fighting  only  against  my  ambition,  and  that  the  allied  sove- 
reigns would  lay  down  their  arms  before  his  Gallo-American 
doctrines  ;  but  he  found,  when  too  late,  that  it  was  precisely 
against  these  same  doctrines  that  the  sovereigns  had  de- 
clared war. 

Great  disasters,  like  volcanoes,  are  announced  by  a  com- 
motion in  the  subterranean  elements.  On  the  twentieth  of 
June  Paris  was  agitated  by  the  most  alarming  reports. 
Fouché  dispatched  his  secret  agents  through  the  capital  to 
promulgate  the  opinion  that  my  abdication  was  the  only 
thing  that  could  save  the  country,  and  at  the  same  time 
assembled  at  his  house  his  friends  of  the  chambers, — Lafa- 
yette, Manuel,  Dupont  de  l'Eure,  Flauguergues,  Dupin,  and 
Henri  Lacoste, — for  the  purpose  of  devising  means  to  secure 
this  abdication.  Fearing  lest  the  dissolution  of  the  chambers 
might  put  an  end  to  their  own  usurped  authority,  it  was 
agreed  in  this  conclave  that  Lafayette  should  propose  the 
next  day  to  the  chamber  to  declare  itself  permanent,  and  to 
pronounce  him  a  traitor  to  the  country  who  should  order  its 
dissolution.  As  a  reward  for  this  the  grand  citoyen  who  had 
accompanied  the  people  from  Paris  to  Versailles  in  1779, 


390  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XXII. 

was  anew  to  be  decorated  with  his  favorite  title   of  com- 
mandant of  the  National  Guards  of  the  kingdom  ! 

While  the  infamous  Fouchc  and  his  friends  were  thus 
secretly  planning  my  overthrow,  and  the  usurpation  of  the 
reins  of  government  by  themselves,  I  arrived,  at  four  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  at  the  palace  Elysée-Bourbon,  where  Cau- 
laincourt  was  waiting  for  me  with  great  impatience.  Instead 
of  speaking  of  dissolution,  the  first  words  spoken  by  me  were 
to  announce  the  project  of  convening  the  two  chambers  in 
extraordinary  session,  in  order  to  lay  before  them  the  true 
state  of  the  disasters  of  Waterloo,  and  to  ask  of  them  the 
means  necessary  to  save  France,  after  which  I  would  hasten 
to  rejoin  the  army.  The  ministers  were  immediately  called 
together  to  deliberate  on  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  save 
the  country.  I  expressed  to  them  frankly  my  own  views  of 
the  resources  of  the  French,  of  their  ability  to  repel  the 
invaders,  and  of  the  necessity,  in  the  present  crisis,  of  estab- 
lishing a  dictatorial  power.  This  power  might  be  established 
either  by  the  emperor  or  by  the  chambers.  A  majority  of 
the  ministers  thought  the  latter  the  most  efficacious  and 
legal  method  of  proceeding.  But  was  there  any  confidence 
to  be  placed  in  this  factious  assembly,  led  on  by  traitors, 
demagogues,  and  men  of  Utopian  and  impracticable  theories? 
Caulaincourt  feared  that  the  dissolution  of  the  chambers 
would  lead  to  the  same  frightful  results  as  in  1814.  Fouché, 
steeped  in  dissimulation  and  treason,  based  all  his  schemes 
of  mischief  and  personal  aggrandizement  on  the  influence  of 
his  party  in  these  assemblies.  Decrès,  on  the  contrary, 
reposed  no  confidence  in  them.  Kegnault  de  Saint-Jean 
d'Angely  himself,  that  obsequious  and  complaisant  orator, 
dared  to  suggest  that  the  chambers  would  undoubtedly  re- 
quire a  new  abdication,  and  even  insinuated  that  if  it  was 
not  voluntarily  given,  they  would  demand  it.  Lucien,  re- 
membering the  eighteenth  Brumaire,  was  of  opinion  that  the 


Ch.  XXII. J  CAMPAIGN    OF    1815.  391 

emperor  should  dissolve  the  assembly,  and  himself  save 
France.  Carnot,  the  old  republican  leader,  best  understood 
the  nature  of  the  crisis,  and  the  means  necessary  for  a  des- 
perate national  defense.  In  his  opiuion  the  French  soil  was, 
at  any  price,  to  be  freed  from  foreign  invaders,  and  the  best 
means  of  accomplishing  this  object,  was  to  constitute  a  dicta- 
torial power  with  all  the  energy  of  the  committee  of  public 
safety  in  1793.  If  Carnot  was  no  great  statesman,  he  at 
least  possessed  the  energy  of  a  real  old  Roman,  and  let  it 
ever  be  remembered  in  his  praise  that  in  the  darkest  hour  of 
French  history  he  shook  off  the  shackles  of  party  prejudice, 
and  thought  only  of  his  country's  honor  and  glory. 

While  these  grave  questions  were  discussed  at  the  palace 
of  Elysée-Bourbon,  and  while  every  exertion  was  made  to 
preserve  harmony  with  the  chambers,  as  the  only  plank  of  pub- 
lic safety,  the  partisans  of  Fouché  were  hatching  their  plots 
of  revolution  and  treason  in  the  assemblies.  Burners  of  dis- 
solution were  perfidiously  circulated  among  the  members,  and 
in  a  moment  of  exeitement,  the  deputies,  influenced  by  jeal- 
ousy or  cowardice,  voted  the  decree  denouncing  as  a  traitor 
whoever  should  dare  to  pronounce  a  dissolution  !  The  disso- 
lution of  the  chambers  was  one  of  the  rights  secured  to  the 
emperor  by  the  constitution  which  these  very  men  had 
adopted,  and  yet  these  pretended  apostles  of  law  and  order, 
assumed  a  power  over  the  constitution  to  condemn  me  in  an- 
ticipation for  the  execution  of  this  very  law  !  To  reach  me, 
they  did  not  hesitate  to  trample  under  foot  the  constitution 
and  laws  of  their  country,  and  to  sacrifice  to  their  own  am- 
bition the  glory  and  honor  of  France. 

This  decree,  in  itself  utterly  illegal  and  revolutionary, 
directed  the  ministers  to  appear  before  the  assembly  ;  Lucien 
accompanied  the  ministers  and  demanded,  in  the  name  of  the 
emperor,  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  take  into  con- 
sideration measures  necessary  to  secure  the  public  safety  ;  a 


392  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Oh.  XXII. 

committee  was  appointed,  it  is  true,  but  it  was  composed  of 
my  bitterest  enemies,  men  of  petty  ambition,  mediocre  talent, 
and  Utopian  views, — Lanjuinais,  Lafayette,  Grenier,  Flau- 
guergues,  and  Dupont  de  l'Eure  ;  this  committee,  instead 
of  seeking  to  secure  the  national  independence  and  save  the 
national  honor,  talked  of  foreign  treaties  and  republican 
principles,  and,  Nero-like,  fiddled  the  tune  of  natural  and 
constitutional  rights,  while  the  enemy  was  approaching  the 
gates  of  the  capital  !  ! 

The  People  side  with  Napoleon.— In  the  mean  time  the 
lower  classes  of  the  people,  distrusting  the  factious  and  trai- 
torous leaders  of  the  chambers,  assembled  around  the  palace 
of  Elysée-Bourbon,  rending  the  air  with  cries  of  "Vive- 
1'Empereur  !"  and  demanding  arms.  Lucien  endeavored  to 
persuade  me  to  profit  by  this  enthusiasm,  and  make  another 
eighteenth  Brumaire,  much  more  legal  than  the  first,  by  or- 
dering a  dissolution  of  the  chambers  in  the  legal  forms,  and, 
if  necessary,  compelling  its  execution.  The  idea  of  saving 
the  country  by  arming  the  lower  classes  of  the  people  against 
the  first  magistrates,  was  revolting  to  my  mind.  I  was  no 
admirer  of  insurrectionary  movements.  Moreover,  this  mea- 
sure, more  like  that  of  the  thirty-first  of  May,  1793,  than 
the  eighteenth  Brumaire,  would  tend  rather  to  divide  than 
to  unite  public  feeling.  The  crisis  demanded  a  union  of  all 
classes,  and  this  alone  could  save  the  country.  It  would  not 
have  been  difficult  for  me  to  crush  the  opposition  and  destroy 
the  weak  and  traitorous  men  who  had  conspired  to  overturn 
my  throne.  But  in  doing  this,  could  I  save  France  ?  While 
striving  Avith  internal  enemies,  could  I  oppose  sufficient 
strength  to  check  the  million  of  armed  men  who  were  strik- 
ing at  the  independence  of  my  country?  could  I  consent  to 
overthrow  the  whole  social  fabric  of  France,  to  satisfy  my 
own  military  vanity  ?  The  foolish  and  factious  leaders  of 
the  chambers  were  insane  enough  to  imagine  that  Europe 


Cil.  XX I  I.J  C  A  M  PAIGK     OF     18  14.  39-'3 

would  hasten  to  lay  down  its  arms  before  their  puny  decrees  ; 
they  thought  to  give  a  triumph  to  their  Utopian  doctrines  by 
sacrificing  the  only  man  capable  of  guiding  the  nation  glo- 
riously through  the  gigantic  contest  ;  these  men,  and  these 
alone,  are  responsible  for  the  humiliations  they  prepared  for 
their  country.0 

His  second  Abdication. — Seeing  that  these  men  had  deter- 
mined either  to  rule  or  ruin  France,  I  had  but  one  course  to 
pursue — to  resign  ;  I,  therefore,  dictated,  to  my  brother 
Lucien  the  following  abdication  in  favor  of  my  son  : 

"  Frenchmen  !  In  commencing  the  war  to  sustain  the 
national  independence,  I  counted  on  the  union  of  all  efforts, 
of  all  wills,  and  of  all  the  national  authorities  ;  I  had  good 
reason  to  hope  for  success,  and  I  braved  all  the  declarations 
of  foreign  powers  against  me.  The  circumstances  seem 
changed,  and  I  now  offer  myself  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  hatred 
of  the  enemies  of  France.  May  they  be  sincere  in  their 
declarations,  and  direct  their  hostilities  only  against  my  per- 
son. My  political  life  is  ended  ;  and  I  proclaim  my  son, 
under  the  title  of  Napoleon  II.,  Emperor  of  the  French. 
The  existing  ministers  will  form  the  council  of  government. 
The  interest  which  I  feel  in  my  son  induces  me  to  invite  the 

*  There  is  no  more  painful  picture  in  the  history  of  nations  than  that  of  a 
people,  in  times  of  great  public  danger,  governed  by  mediocre  men,  by  Utopian 
theorists,  and  factious,  selfish  and  profligate  politicians.  When  great  men  are 
stricken  down  by  party  jealousies  and  party  intrigues,  and  when  good  men 
shrink  from  office  rather  than  come  in  contact  with  the  rottenness  with  which  it 
is  too  often  surrounded,  or  expose  themselves  to  the  partisan  abuse,  increased 
and  intensified  by  the  license  of  the  press,  which  is  poured  upon  them  if  they 
repel  this  corruption,  there  is  little  hope  for  the  nation.  If  it  finally  becomes 
virtuous  and  independent,  it  is  only  after  long  abasement  and  severe    suffering. 

France  in  1814  and  1815,  is  not  the  only  example  in  history.  The  fall  of 
Home  is  the  most  striking  of  all.  This  republic  and  empire  was  undermined 
and  destroyed  by  factious  intriguing  politicians,  who  debauched  the  people  for 
their  votes,  corrupted  public  virtue  in  pursuit  of  office,  and  drove  into  the  re- 
tirement of  private  life  all  who  were  capable  or  willing  to  save  the  country. 
France,  after  great  suffering,  reconquered  her  independence,  but  Rome  was 
utterly  destroyed  by  the  corruption  of  her  own  political  rulers. 


394  LIFE     OF      NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

chambers  to  organize  without  delay  the  regency  by  law.  Let 
all  unite  for  the  public  safety,  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
national  independence  !  !" 

Determined  to  exile  myself  from  Europe  and  go  to 
America,  I  hoped  that  the  allies  would  be  satisfied  with  the 
hostage  I  had  just  placed  at  their  discretion,  and  that  they 
would  leave  the  crown  on  the  head  of  the  son  of  Maria 
Louisa.  This  stipulation  had  been  made  on  an  understand- 
ing with  the  leaders  of  the  chambers  ;  and  I  believed  it  the 
best  means  of  fusing  the  old  and  new  interests,  and  of  pre- 
venting civil  war.  The  republican  leaders  were  utterly  inca- 
pable of  governing  France  ;  the  Bourbons,  if  again  restored 
by  foreign  bayonets,  would  sooner  or  later  be  again  hurled 
from  their  thrones,  for  this  dynasty  had  become  odious  to 
the  French  people.  To  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  scenes  en- 
acted between  1789  and  1804,  it  was  necessary  to  avoid  the 
extremes  of  ultra  democracy,  on  the  one  hand,  and  old  legiti- 
macy on  the  other.  No  government  that  did  not  fuse  to- 
gether these  separate  interests  could  be  of  long  duration. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  views  of  the  allied  sovereigns 
on  this  point;  all  action  on  the  subject  was  dispensed  with 
by  the  singular  course  pursued  by  the  leaders  of  the  cham- 
bers, who  still  flattered  themselves  that  they  could  dictate 
laws  to  France,  and  force  Europe  to  observe  them.  Un- 
willing to  acknowledge  Napoleon  II.,  or  to  establish  a 
regency,  they  hastened  to  form  a  provisional  government, 
in  the  hope  of  seizing  upon  the  reins  of  state,  treating  for 
their  existence  with  the  allied  sovereigns,  and  of  receiving  the 
Bourbon  government  only  on  such  conditions  as  the  cham- 
bers should  impose  ;  an  absurd  dream,  for  could  it  be  sup- 
posed that  Louis  XVIII.  or  the  allied  sovereigns,  armed  for 
the  support  of  legitimate  thrones,  would  consent  to  prin- 
ciples that  struck  at  the  root  of  the  old  dynasties  ?  But  let 
us  return  to  the  military  operations  of  the  allies. 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     18  15.  395 

Informed  by  the  traitor  Fouché  of  my  abdication,  and  of 
the  anarchy  existing  at  Paris,  the  Anglo-Prussians  advanced 
upon  the  capital  with  a  rapidity  and  carelessness  that  might 
readily  have  led  to  their  own  destruction.  In  seeking  to 
turn  the  fortifications  erected  on  the  north  of  Paris,  the 
Prussians  passed  the  Seine  alone  near  Pecq,  while  Welling- 
ton remained  on  the  fight  bank,  unable  to  sustain  them. 
The  French  army,  then  commanded  by  Davoust,  and  en- 
camped iu  the  vicinity,  might  easily  have  fallen  on  them 
with  seventy  thousand  men,  and,  driving  them  into  the 
Seine,  have  utterly  annihilated  them.  I  proposed  to  the 
provisional  government  to  take  the  command  of  the  army, 
and  to  resign  it  when  I  had  conquered  ;  but  base  intrigues 
prevented  me  from  washing  out  the  stain  of  Waterloo,  and 
of  taking  leave  of  France  by  a  victory  which  would  have 
enabled  her  to  treat  honorably  with  the  allied  sovereigns, 
instead  of  surrendering  at  discretion,  as  was  done  by  the 
provisional  government,  to  a  British  general  and  a  Prussian 
marshal.  Instead  of  accepting  my  offer,  Fouchc,  who  was 
in  active  correspondence  with  Wellington,  resolved  to  secure 
my  person,  and  in  fact  I  was  placed  in  a  kind  of  captivity 
under  the  guard  of  General  Becker,  lest  I  might  of  my  own 
accord  place  myself  at  the  head  of  the  army.  Nevertheless, 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  troops-was  so  great,  that  this  miserable 
government  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  suspending  hostil- 
ities, and  General  Excelmans  destroyed  an  entire  brigade 
near  Ville-d'Avray,  at  the  moment  that  the  authorities  were 
exerting  themselves  to  restrain  the  patriotism  and  courage 
of  his  comrades. 

He  retires  from  France.— I  immediately  afterwards  de- 
parted for  Rochefort.  The  minister,  Decrès,  proposed  that 
I  should  repair  to  Havre  where  there  was  an  American  vessel 
ready  to  sail.  But  the  position  of  this  port  on  the  English 
Channel  was  objectionable,  and,  moreover,  it  was  now  too 


396  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

late  to  reach  the  vessel  in  time.  I  purposed  sailing  from 
Bordeaux  in  a  vessel  belonging  to  my  brother  Joseph.  I  was 
deterred  by  my  legal  advisers  from  embarking  in  a  commer- 
cial port,  and  Joseph,  sailing  without  me,  reached  America 
in  safety.  It  has  been  positively  affirmed  that  Fouché  in- 
formed Wellington  of  my  place  of  embarkation,  and  organ- 
ized the  means  of  capturing  me.  Immediately  on  leaving 
Eochefort  I  was  pursued  by  an  English  cruiser,  and  seeing 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  escape,  I  made  directly  for  the 
vessel,  placing  myself  under  the  safeguard  of  British  honor 
and  British  laws.  I  wrote  to  the  Prince  Regent  the  follow- 
ing letter,  which  I  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  cruiser,  and 
the  next  day  embarked  on  board  the  Bellerophon,  being 
received  by  Captain  Maitland  Avith  a  general's  salute  : 

"Your  Boyal  Highness, — 

"  Exposed  to  the  factions  which  divide  my  country,  and 
to  the  hostility  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  I  have  ter- 
minated my  political  career.  I  come,  like  Themistocles,  to 
seat  myself  at  the  hearth  of  the  British  people.  I  put  my- 
self under  the  protection  of  their  laws,  and  I  claim  it  from 
Your  Boyal  Highness,  as  from  the  most  powerful,  the  most 
constant,  and  the  most  generous  of  my  enemies." 

And  is  exiled  to  St.  Helena. — On  reaching  the  shores  of 
England  I  found,  to  my  disappointment,  that  I  had  made 
an  erroneous  estimate  of  British  hospitality  ;  I  was  received 
as  a  criminal,  and  sentenced  to  be  imprisoned  for  life  upon  a 
lonely  and  desolate  island.  To  this  barbarous  treatment  I 
entered  the  following  formal  protest  : 

"I  protest  solemnly,  in  the  face  of  heaven  and  of  men, 
against  the  violation  of  my  most  sacred  rights,  by  the  forcible 
disposal  of  my  person  and  of  my  liberty.  I  came  freely  on 
board  the  Bellerophon.     I  am  not  the  prisoner  ;  I   am  the 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN    OF     1815.  397 

guest  of  England.  Once  on  board  the  Bellerophon,  I  was 
immediately  entitled  to  the  hospitality  of  the  British  people. 
If  the  government,  by  giving  orders  to  the  captain  of  the 
Bellerophon  to  receive  me  and  my  suite,  intended  merely  to 
lay  a  snare  for  me,  it  has  forfeited  its  honor,  and  sullied  its 
flag.  If  this  act  be  consummated,  it  will  be  in  vain  that  the 
English  will  boast  to  Europe  of  their  loyalty,  of  their  laws, 
of  their  liberty.  British  faith  will  have  been  lost  in  the 
hospitality  of  the  Bellerophon.  I  appeal  therefore  to  his- 
tory. It  will  say  that  an  enemy  who  made  war  fur  twenty 
years  on  the  people  of  England,  came  freely,  in  his  mis- 
fortune, to  seek  an  asylum  tinder  their  laws.  What  more 
striking  proof  could  he  give  of  his  esteem  and  of  his  con- 
fidence ?  But  how  did  they  answer  it  in  England  ?  They 
pretended  to  hold  out  an  hospitable  hand  to  this  enemy,  and 
when  he  had  surrendered  himself  to  them  in  good  faith,  they 
sacrificed  him  !" 

His  Death. — Posterity  will  decide  upon  the  character  of 
this  act,  and  I  leave  to  its  judgment  the  treatment  which  I 
received  from  the  English.0 

A  prisoner  upon  another  hemisphere,  I  had  no  other  occu- 
pation than  to  defend  my  reputation  against  the  many  slan- 
ders which  the  malignity  of  party  spirit  invented  against  me, 
and  to  prepare  for  his  lory  the  memoirs  of  my  life.     Death 

*  Lord  Holland  and  the  Duke  of  Sussex  both  protested  against  the  bill  for 
detaining  Napoleon.     The  following  is  the  protest  of  the  former  : 

"Because,  without  reference  to  the  character  or  previous  conduct  of  the  per- 
son who  is  the  object  of  the  present  bill,  I  disapprove  of  the  measure  which  it 
sanctions  and  continues. 

"To  consign  to  distant  exile  and  imprisonment  a  foreign  and  captive  chief, 
who,  after  the  abdication  of  his  authority,  relying  on  British  generosity,  had 
surrendered  himself  to  us  in  preference  to  his  other  enemies,  is  unworthy  of 
the  maguauimity  of  a  great  country;  and  the  treaties  by  which  after  his  cap- 
tivity, we  have  bound  ourselves  to  detain  him  in  custody,  ac  the  will  of  sove- 
reigns, to  whom  he  had  never  surrendered  himself,  appear  to  me  repugnant  to 
the  principles  of  equity,  and  utterly  uncalled  for  by  expediency  or  necessity. 

(tinned)     "  Holland." 


398  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Cu.  XXII. 

surprised  me  while  thus  engaged,  and  the  work  was  neces- 
sarily left  incomplete.*  Nevertheless  I  am  satisfied  ;  I  can 
now  rest  in  pieace  ;  pigmies  may  rise  up  against  me,  hut  they 

*  Most  readers  are  familiar  with  the  history  of  Napoleon's  exile  in  St.  He- 
lena, and  the  petty  annoyances  which  he  suffered  from  the  governor, — a  treat- 
ment as  disgraceful  to  Sir  Hudson  Lowe  personally  as  it  was  unworthy  of  the 
great  nation  which  he  represented. 

The  following  narrative  of  Napoleon's  death,  by  Thiers,  is  brief  and  inter- 
esting : 

"  The  year  1821  came  at  last,  that  year  that  was  to  terminate  the  wondrous 
career  of  Napoleon.  At  the  commencement  of  January  his  health  improved, 
but  only  for  a  few  days.  '  It  is  a  respite,  '  he  said,  '  of  a  week  or  two,  and 
then  the  disease  will  resume  its  course.'  He  then  dictated  a  few  pages  touch- 
ing Caasar  to  Marchand  ;  they  were  the  last  he  wrote.  About  the  same  time, 
he  saw  the  death  of  his  sister  Eliza  announced  in  the  papers.  It  pained  him 
deeply.  She  was  the  first  person  of  his  family  that  had  died  since  he  had  at- 
tained the  use  of  reason.  'She  has  shown  me  the  way,'  he  said,  'I  must  fol- 
low.' The  symptoms  of  his  disease  returned  now  with  greater  violence  than 
ever.  Napoleon's  complexion  became  livid,  his  glance  was  expressive  of  as 
much  power  as  ever,  but  his  eyes  were  sunken,  his  legs  swelled,  his  extrem- 
ities became  cold,  and  his  stomach  rejected  every  species  of  food,  and  these 
ejections  were  accompanied  by  a  discharge  of  blackish  matter.  February 
brought  no  other  change  than  an  increased  intensity  of  the  symptoms.  Not 
being  able  to  digest  any  food,  the  august  invalid  became  weaker  every  day. 
He  was  tormented  by  intense  thirst,  and  his  pulse,  once  so  slow,  beat  with 
feverish  rapidity.  He  wished  for  air,  though  he  could  not  endure  it  when 
admitted.  The  light  pained  him,  and  he  now  never  left  the  rooms  in  which 
were  his  two  camp-beds,  being  removed  occasionally  from  one  to  the  other. 
He  did  not  dictate  any  more,  but  had  Homer  read  to  him,  and  the  account  of 
Hannibal's  war  in  Livy.  not  having  been  able  to  procure  Polybius. 

"  His  health  became  still  worse  in  March,  and  on  the  seventeenth,  thinking 
that  during  a  short  drive  he  could  breathe  more  freely,  he  was  put  into  a  car- 
riage, but  when  brought  into  the  air,  he  very  nearly  fainted,  and  was  borne 
back  to  the  bed  in  which  he  was  to  die.  '  lam  no  longer.'  he  said,  'that 
proud  Napoleon  whom  the  world  has  so  often  seen  on  horseback.  The 
mo.iarchs  who  persecute  me  may  set  their  minds  at  rest,  I  shall  soon  remove 
every  cause  of  fear.'  Napoleon's  faithful  servants  never  left  him.  Montholon 
and  Marchand  remained  day  and  night  by  his  bedside,  an  attention  for  which 
he  showed  himself  profoundly  grateful.  The  grand-marshal  told  him  that 
neither  he  nor  his  wife  would  leave,  and  Napoleon  thanked  him  warmly.  The_ 
grand-marshal  asked  permission  fir  his  wife  to  visit  him.  '  I  am  not  fit  to  be- 
seen,'  he  said;  '  I  shall  receive  Madame  Bertrand  when  I  am  better.  Tell  her 
I  thank  her  for  the  devotion  that  has  kept  her  for  six  years  in  this  desert.' 
******* 

"  Napoleon  devoted  several  days  to  making  these  arrangements,  and  com- 
mitting them  to  writing.     His  labor  suffered  frequent  interruptions  from  pain 


Cil.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1315.  399 

can  never  obscure  my  glory  ;  I  have  gained  in  the  victories 
of  Montenotte,  Castiglione,  Rivoli,  the  Pyramids,  Marengo, 
Ulm,    Austerlitz,    Jena,   Frieclland,    Abensberg,     Ratisbon, 

and  weariness.  All  was  arranged  at  length,  and  with  his  usual  love  of  order 
he  had  a  legal  document  drawn  up  of  the  transfer  of  his  will,  and  all  that  he 
possessed,  to  his  testamentary  executors,  that  there  might  be  no  cause  of  dis- 
pute after  his  death.  He  desired  that  the  rites  of  the  Catholic  faith  should  be 
observed  at  his  burial,  and  that  the  dining-room  in  which  he  was  accustomed 
to  hear  mass,  shoul  1  bo  converted  into  a  chapelle  ardente.  Dr.  Antomarchi 
could  not  help  smiling  as  lie  heard  these  orders  given  to  the  Abbé  Vignale. 
Napoleon  considered  this  as  a  want  of  respect  to  his  authority,  his  genius,  and 
his  death.  '  Young  man.'  he  said  in  a  severe  tone,  '  perhaps  you  are  too  clever 
to  believe  in  Go  1  ;  I  am  not  in  that  position,  a  man  can  not  become  an  atheist 
merely  by  wishing  iV  This  severe  lesson,  spoken  in  terms  worthy  of  a  great 
man  at  the  point  of  death,  overwhelmed  the  young  doctor  with  confusion  ;  he 
made  a  thousand  excuses,  and  made  profession  of  the  most  satisfactory  moral 
principles. 

"  These  preparations  for  death  weakened  Napoleon,  and  perhaps,  hastened 
his  end.  Still  it  was  both  a  moral  and  physical  relief  to  him  to  have  arranged 
his  affairs,  and  secured,  as  far  as  he  could,  the  fate  of  his  companions.  Meeting 
death  with  a  smile  as  dignified  as  it  was  grateful,  he  said  to  Montholon  and 
Marchand  who  never  left  him  :  '  It  would  be  a  great  pity  not  to  die,  now  that 
I  have  arranged  all  my  affairs  so  well.' 

"  The  end  of  April  had  arrived,  and  every  moment  increased  his  danger  and 
suffering.  He  had  no  relief  from  the  spasms,  vomitings,  fever  and  burning 
thirst.  Napoleon  was  relieved  by  occasionally  drinking  some  drops  of  fresh 
water  brought  from  the  foot  of  the  peak  of  Diana,  the  spot  where  he  had 
wished  to  have  a  dwelling  erected.  'I  wish,'  he  said,  'if  it  is  possible,  that  I 
should  be  buried  on  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  or  at  Ajaccio  in  my  family  domain, 
or  should  my  body  be  fated  to  continue  a  prisoner,  at  the  foot  of  the  fountain, 
whose  waters  have  afforded  me  some  relief.'  This  his  friends  promised  with 
tears,  for  they  no  longer  concealed  from  him  a  state  ho  so  well  understood 
himself.  '  You  will  return  bearing  with  you  the  reflection  of  my  glory,  with 
the  honor  of  your  own  fidelity.  You  will  be  esteemed  and  happy.  I  go  to 
meet  Kleber,  Desaix,  Lannes,  Massena,  Bessières,  Duroc,  Ney  I  They  will 
come  to  meet  me.  They  will  experience  onco  more  the  intoxication  of  human 
glory.  We  shall  speak  of  what  we  have  done.  We  shall  talk  of  our  profession 
with  Frederick,  Turenne,  Condé,  Caesar,  and  Hannibil.'  Then  pausing.  Napo- 
leon added  with  a  peculiar  smile,  '  Unless  there  should  be  as  great  an  objection 
in  the  upper  spheres,  as  there  is  here  below  to  see  a  number  of  soldiers 
together.'  This  badinage,  alternating  with  the  most  solemn  discourse,  produced 
a  profound  effect  upon  those  present.  On  the  first  of  May  the  agony  seemed 
to  commence,  and  he  was  in  constant  torture.  On  the  second  and  third,  Na- 
poleon was  in  high  fever,  and  suffered  continual  spasms.  Whenever  his  suf- 
ferings abated  his  mind  wa3  as  radiant  as  ever,  and  lie  spoke  with  clearness 
and  serenity.     During  one  of  these  intervals,  he  dictated  under  the  title  of  first 


400  LIFE     OF     NAPOLEON.  [Ch.  XXII. 

Wagram,  Dresden,  Champ- Aubert,  Montmirail,  Ligny,  glory 
enough  to  efface  the  disaster  of  Waterloo  ;  my  Five  Codes, 
worthy  of  the  approbation  of  the  seven  sages  of  Greece,  will 
remain  a  monument  to  posterity  not  less  creditable  to  my 
geuius  than  are  my  military  feats  ;  the  great  works  of  im- 
provement and  of  art  which  I  have  constructed  in  France 
and  in  Italy,  will  attest  my  greatness  to  the  remotest  ages. 
To  the  reproach  of  ambition,  I  will  say  with  Mahomet  : 

Je  fus  ambitieux     *     *     * 

Mais  jamais  roi,  pontife,  ou  chef  ou  citoyen 

Ne  conçut  un  projet  aussi  grand  que  le  mien."* 

and  second  revery,  two  notes  on  the  defenso  of  France  in  case  of  an  invasion. 
On  the  third  he  became  delirious,  and  amid  his  ravings  these  words  were  dis- 
tinguishable :  '  My  son.  The  arm}-.  Desaix.'  It  would  seem  as  though  he 
had  a  last  vision  of  the  battle  of  Marengo  recovered  by  Desaix.  The  agony 
continued  during  the  entire  day  of  the  fourth,  and  the  noble  countenance  of  the 
hero  was  terribly  distorted.  The  weather  was  terrible,  it  was  the  bad  season 
at  St.  Helena.  Sudden  gusts  of  wind  tore  up  some  of  the  planted  trees.  On 
the  fifth  of  May  there  was  no  doubt  but  that  the  last  day  of  his  extraordinary 
life  had  dawned.  All  his  servants  kneeling  round  his  bed  watched  the,  last 
fliekerings  of  the  vital  flame.  These  were  unfortunately  attended  with  bitter 
sufferings.  The  English  officers  assembled  outside,  listened  with  respectful 
interest  to  the  accounts  the  servants  gave  of  his  agony.  Towards  the  decline 
of  day,  his  life  and  sufferings  decreased  together;  the  cold  extending  from  the 
extremities  became  general,  and  death  seemed  about  to  seize  his  glorious  vic- 
tim. The  weather  had  become  calm  and  serene.  About  twenty  minutes  past 
five,  when  the  sun  was  setting  in  waves  of  light,  and  the  English  cannon  gave 
the  signal  for  retiring,  tlnse  around  the  bed  perceived  that  the  patient  did  not 
breathe,  and  cried  out  that  he  was  dead.  They  covered  his  hands  with  kisses, 
and  Marchand  who  had  brought  to  Saint-Helena  the  cloak  the  First  Consul  had 
worn  at  Marengo,  laid  it  over  his  body.  leavinT  only  his  noble  head  uncovered. 

"  The  convulsions  of  the  death  agony,  always  so  painful  to  witness,  were 
succeeded  by  a  majestic  tranquillity  of  expression.  That  face  so  wondrously 
beautiful,  now  restored  tc  the  slenderness  of  youth,  and  the  figure  clad  in  the 
mantle  of  Marengo,  seemed  to  present  again  to  the  witnesses  of  that  touching 
scene,  General  Bonapan  ;  in  the  meridian  of  his  glory." 

*  Alison  thus  describes  the  removal  of  Napoleon's  remains  from  St.  Helena 
to  France  : 

"  Time  rolled  on,  and  brought  its  usual  changes  on  its  wings.  The  dynasty 
of  the  Restoration  proved  unequal  to  the  arduous  task  of  coercing  the  desires 
of  the  Revolution,  weakened,  but  not  extinguished,  by  the  overthrow  of  Na- 
poleon: a  new  generation  arose,  teeming  with  passions  and  forgetful  of  the 
sufferings  of  former  times  ;  and  the  revolt  of  the  barricades  restored  the  tri- 


Ch.  XXII.]  CAMPAIGN     OF     1815.  401 


EPILOGUE. 

No  sooner  head  Napoleon  ended  his  recital,  than  his  illus- 
trious auditors  declared,  with  unanimous  voice,  that,  although 
he  had  failed  in  the  execution  of  his  vast  projects  he  sur- 
passed them  all  in  his  force  of  genius  and  greatness  of  soul. 

color  flag,  and  established  a  semi-revolutionary  dynasty  on  the  French 
throne. 

"  England  shared  in  the  renewed  convulsion  consequent  on  these  momentous 
events  ;  a  great  organic  change  in  the  constitution  placed  the  popular  party  for 
a  course  of  years  in  power;  a  temporary  alliance,  founded  on  political  passion, 
not  national  interest,  for  a  time  united  its  government  with  that  of  France  ; 
.and  under  the  auspices  of  M.  Thiers'  administration,  a  request  was  made  to  the 
British  to  restore  the  remains  of  their  Great  Emperor  to  the  French  people. 

"This  request,  received  in  a  worthy  spirit  by  the  English  administration,  was 
immediately  complied  with,  in  the  hope,  as  it  was  eloquently,  though  falla- 
ciously said  at  the  time,  '  that  these  two  great  nations  would  hencelbrth  bury 
their  discord  in  the  tomb  of  Napoleon.' 

"The  solitary  grave  in  St.  Helena  was  disturbed;  the  lonely  willow  no 
longer  wept  over  the  remains  of  the  emperor  ;  the  sepulchre  was  opened  in 
presence  of  all  the  officers  of  the  island,  and  many  of  his  faithful  followers  ; 
and  the  winding-sheet,  rolled  back  with  pious  care,  revealed  to  the  entranced 
spectators  the  well-known  features  of  the  immortal  hero,  serene,  undecayed,  iu 
his  now  canonized  military  dress,  as  when  he  stood  on  the  fields  of  Austerlitz 
or  Jena.  The  body  was  re.noved  from  its  resting  place  with  the  highest  mili- 
tary honors;  the  British  army  and  navy  in  the  island,  with  generous  sympathy, 
vied  with  each  other  in  doing  honor  to  their  great  antagonist  ;  and  when  it  was 
lowered  amidst  the  thunder  of  artillery  into  the  French  frigate,  England  felt 
that  she  had  voluntarily,  but  in  a  right  spirit,  relinquished  the  proudest  trophy 
of  her  national  glory. 

"The  remains  of  the  emperor  were  conveyed  in  safety  to  Europe  on  board 
the  Belle  Poule  frigate,  and  landed,  with  appropriate  honors,  at  Havre  de  Grace. 
From  thence  they  were  removed  to  Paris,  with  a  view  to  their  being  interred, 
with  the  other  illustrious  warriors  of  France,  in  the  Church  of  the  Invalides. 
The  re-interment,  which  awakened  the  deepest  interest  in  France  and  over 
Europe,  took  place  on  the  sixth  of  December,  1849. 

"The  day  was  fine,  though  piercingly  cold;  but  such  was  the  interest  ex- 
cited, that  six  hundred  thousand  persons  were  assembled  to  witness  the  cere- 
mony. The  procession  approached  Paris  by  the  road  from  St  Cloud,  so  often 
tnvrsed  by  the  emperor  in  the  days  of  his  glory;  it  passed  through  the  now 
finished  and  stupendous  arch  erected  to  the  Grand  Army  at  the  barrier  of 
VOL.  IV. — 2 P. 


402  life   or    NAroLEox.  [cn.  xxir. l 

Each  in  particular  eulogized  those  traits  which  most  re- 
sembled his  own  : — Alexander  praised  Napoleon  for  his  gen- 
erosity to  his  conquered  foes  ;  Caesar  admired  his  having 
built  up  an  empire  out  of  the  scattered  fragments  of  public 
liberty,  and  established  his  power  with  legions  destined  to 
defend  that  liberty  ;  Frederick  applauded  his  spirit  of  order 
and  economy,  and  was  particularly  pleased  at  seeing  his  own. 
system  of  Avar  receive  such  new  and  extensive  developments. 

From  that  moment  the  four  heroes  became  inseparable, 
and  their  conversations  form  an  inexhaustible  source  of  poli- 
tical and  military  instruction,  and  constitutes  the  principal 
charm  and  delight  of  the  illustrious  shades  who  inhabit  the 
fields  of  Elysium. 

Neuilly  ;  and  slowly  moving  through  the  Elysian  Fields,  reached  the  Invalides 
by  the  bridge  of  La  Concorde. 

"  Louis  Philippe  and  all  his  court  officiated  at  the  august  ceremony,  which 
was  performed  with  extraordinary  pomp  in  the  splendid  church  of  the  edifice  ; 
but  nothing  awakened  such  deep  feeling  as  a  band  of  the  mutilated  veterans 
of  the  Old  Guard,  who  with  mournful  visages,  but  yet  a  military  air,  attended 
the  remains  of  their  beloved  chief  to  his  last  resting  place. 

"An  aged  charger,  once  rode  by  the  emperor  on  his  fields  of  fame,  survived 
to  follow  the  colossal  hearse  to  the  grave.  The  place  of  interment  was  worthy 
of  the  hero  who  was  now  placed  beneath  its  roof:  it  contained  the  remains  of 
Turenne  and  Vauban,  and  the  paladins  of  France  ;  enchanting  music  thrilled 
every  heart  as  the  coffin  was  lowered  into  the  tomb  ;  the  thunders  of  the  ar- 
tillery, so  often  vocal  to  his  triumphs,  now  gave  him  the  last  honors  of  mor- 
tality ;  the  genius  of  Marochatti  was  selected  to  erect  a  fitting  monument  to 
bis  memory  ;  and  the  bones  of  Napoleon  finally  reposed  on  the  banks  of  the 
Seine,  amidst  the  '  people  whom  he  had  loved  so  well.' 

"  Yet  will  future  ages  perhaps  regret  the  ocean-girt  isle,  the  solitary  stone, 
the  willow  tree.  Napoleon  will  live  when  Paris  is  in  ruins  ;  his  deeds  will 
survive  the  dome  of  the  Invalides; — no  man  can  show  the  tomb  of 
Alexander  1" 


«,'.00 

;  URRAÎT* 

GENERAL    INDEX. 


THE  ROMAN  NUMERALS  REFER  TO  THE  VOLUME  AND   THE   FIGURES  TO  THE  PAGE. 

A. 

PAGE 

Abdication  of  Napoleon,  at  Fontainebleau,  in  1814 . .  .iv.  293 

"  "  at  the  Palace  Elysée-Bourbon,  in  1815 iv.  393 

Abensberg,  battle  of. iii-     36 

Aboukir,  battle  of. i.  221-233 

Abrantes,  duke  of,  vide  Junot 

Abruzzos,  occupied  by  St.  Cyr ii.     22 

Adige,  passage  of. ii.  107 

Agra,  fall  of ii.     25 

Ajaccio,  birth  place  of  Napoleon i.     36 

Alba  de  Tormes,  battle  of iii.  178 

Albuera,  battle  of iii.  280 

Albufera,  duke  of,  vide  Suchet 

Alexander,  Emperor  of  Russia,  ambition  of ii.     44 

"  causes  of  his  coolness  towards  Napoleon ii.     45 

"  refuses  to  recognize  the  empire ii.     46 

"  forms  an  alliance  with  England ii.     67 

"  sends  an  ambassador  to  Napoleon ii.     75 

"  goes  himself  to  Berlin  to  treat  with  the  King ii.  105 

"  refuses  to  ratify  the  treaty  made  by  D'Oubril ii.  195 

"  his  reasons  for  doing  this ii.  196 

"  reorganizes  his  army  after  the  campaign  of  Austerlitz ii.  250 

"  intends  to  act  only  as  an  auxilliary  to  Prussia ii.  251 

"  his  interview  with  Napoleon  at  Tilsit ii.  313 

"  "         "  "  "         "  Erfurth ii.  415 

"  his  reception  of  the  treaty  of  Vienna iii.  137 

"  operations  of  his  armies  in  Sweden  and  Turkey iii.  195 

"  favors  Napoleon's  proposals  of  marriage  to  his  sister iii.  202 

"  receives  Napoleon's  pacific  proposals iii.  330 

"  distrusts  their  sincerity iii.  330 

"  sends  his  ultimatum  to  Napoleon iii.  332 

"  sends  Balaschof  to  Napoleon  at  Wilna iii.  349 

"  his  terms  probably  exaggerated  by  Balaschof iii.   351 

"  retires  from  Dnssa  to  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg iii.  357 

"  goes  to  Fiuland  to  confer  with  Bernadotte iii.  365 


404:  GENEKAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Alexander  confers  the  supreme  command  on  Kutusof iii.  383 

"  returns  to  bis  army iv.     47 

"  declines  Napoleon's  overtures  to  become  ibe  arbiter  of  peace,  .iv.  106 

"  negotiates  with  Austria  at  Reicbenbach iv.  no 

"  declines  tbe  command  of  the  allied  army [y.  145 

"  acts  as  mediator  between  tbe  allied  generals iv.  147 

"  opposes  the  attack  on  Dresden iv.  154 

"  refuses  to  act  on  Sehwartzenberg's  plan  at  Leipsic iv.  195 

"  bis  motives  for  invading  France iv.  241 

"  determines  to  go  to  Paris iv.  260 

"  advocates  tins  movement  in  a  council  of  war iv.  275 

"  his  plan  finally  adopted iv.  282 

"  his  entrance  into  Paris iv    291 

"  his  reception  by  the  Parisians iv.  291 

Alexandria  (in  Egypt),  Napoleon's  arrival  at i.  216 

"  landing  of  the  French  army  at i.  217 

"  is  captured  by  Napoleon 1.  217 

"  (in  Italy)  convention  of i.  337 

"         fortifications  of li.     69 

Almaraz,  bridge  of,  destroyed iv.     55 

Almeida,  siege  of iii.  224 

Almonacid,  battle  of iii.  172 

Alviuzi,  endeavors  to  succor  Mantua i.  138 

his  operations  at  Areola : . .  i.  141 

bis  new  attempt  to  save  "Wurmser i.  152 

defeated  at  Rivoli i.  155 

his  loss  in  the  campaign , i.  158 

Amarante,  battle  of iii.   152 

Antwerp,  expedition  against iii.  127 

Aragon,  insurrection  of iL  389 

Aranjuez,  revolution  in ii.  369 

Arcis,  battle  of iv,  275 

Areola,  battle  of i.  141 

Aristocracy  of  France,  character  of ii.     37 

Armistice,  with  Parma  and  Modena i.     96 

"         with  Naples i.  Ill 

"         of  Leoben i.  171 

"         of  Steyer i.  352 

"         of  Treviso i.  354 

"         of  Foligno i.  357 

"         witb  Austria ii.  142 

"        with  the  Saxons ii.  234 

"         with  Prussia iL  239 

"         with  Austria iii  116 

"         of  Neumark iv.  108 

"        proposed  by  Napoleon  at  Leipac iv.  204 

Arzobispo,  battle  of iii.   1 69 

Assey,  battle  of ii.     25 


GENERAL     INDEX.  ,  405 

PAGK 

Auerstedt,  battle  of ii.   212 

"  duke  of,  vide  Davoust 

Augereau,  sketch  of  his  life j.     53 

"         distinguished  at  Castiglione j,    n>j 

"  "  "  Areola j.   \±\ 

"         made  a  Marshal  in  1804 ii.     53 

"         commands  the  7th  corps  in  campaign  of  1805 ii.     82 

"        at  the  battle  of  Jena ii.  210 

"         at  the  battle  of  Eylau ii.   2C6 

*        supersedes  St.  Cyr  in  Spain 111.  191 

"         does  not  justify  the  choice iii.   192 

"         his  operations  in  Catalonia in.  238 

"         is  incapable  of  profiting  by  his  successes iii.   238 

"         is  replaced  by  Macdonald ....  iii.  239 

"        commands  the  9th  corps  in  1813 iv.  136 

"         commands  at  Lyons  in  1814 iv.  259 

Austerlitz,  battle  of ii.   135,  143 

Austria,  invades  France i.     45 

<:       appoints  Beaulieu  to  command  in  Italy ! i.     86 

"       sends  Wurmser  with  a  new  army  against  Napoleon i.  114 

"       places  the  Archduke  Charles  in  chief  command i.   163 

"       agrees  to  peace  at  Campo-Formio i.  188 

"       views  of,  in  1799 1.  240 

"       chances  in  her  favor i.  243 

"      her  alliance  with  Russia i.  243 

"       Councils  of  Salis  call  on  her  for  assistance i.  247 

"       sends  the  Archduke  Charles  against  Jourdan i.   257 

"       blockades  Massena  in  Genoa i.  317 

"      «nters  into  the  convention  of  Alexandria i.  337 

"       sends  St.  Julien  to  negotiate i    339 

"       disapproves  his  acts i.  340 

'       recognizes  the  French  Empire ii.     46 

"       accedes  to  the  new  coalition ii.     74 

"       sends  her  army  into  Bavaria ii.     79 

"       is  deceived  by  Napoleon's  preparations  at  Boulogne ii.     80 

"       takes  the  initiative  too  soon ii.     84 

"       effect  upon,  of  Napoleon's  remarks  at  Ulm ii.     99 

"       asks  an  armistice ii.  Ill 

"       treats  with  Napoleon  at  Presbourg ii.  145 

"       discussions  with,  for  Cattaro  and  "Wurtzbourg ii.  171 

"      the  Empire  of,  declared .  ii.   179 

"       offers  her  intervention  for  peace ii.  276 

"       her  military  preparations  in  1808 ii.  411 

"       incites  insurrection  in  Germany hi.     18 

"       takes  the  initiative  in  the  campaign iii      25 

"       her  plan  of  operations ni.     26 

"       composition  of  her  army iii.     27 

"       the  dilatory  advance  of  her  troops iii.     30 


406  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Austria,  her  army  under  tbe  Archduke  Charles  returns  in  Bohemia iii.     41 

"       is  forced  by  defeat  at  Wagram  to  propose  an  armistice iii.  116 

"       her  motives  for  ratifying  this  armistice iii.   118 

"      concludes  to  make  peace iii.   134 

"       Napoleon's  family  alliance  with iii.  204 

"      forms  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Napoleon iii.  329 

"  assurances  made  by  her  to  Napoleon  on  his  return  from  Russia,  .iv.     GG 

"       her  amicable  protestations  through  Mettermch iv.     G  7 

"       her  good  faith  is  distrusted iv.     G9 

"       while  pretending  peace  she  encourages  the  war iv.     75 

"       declares  an  armed  mediation iv.     77 

"       her  representations  through  Schwartzenberg iv.     91 

41         "  "  "         Bubna iv.     92 

"       her  negotiations  with  the  allies iv.     94 

"       sends  Bubna  to  Napoleon  a  third  time iv.  109 

"       her  negotiations  at  Reichenbach iv.  110 

"       sends  Metternich  to  Napoleon iv.  1 1 1 

"       her  demands  at  Prague iv.  1 1G 

"       her  want  of  good  faith iv.  121 

"       her  forces  in  the  field,  September,  1813 iv.  1 34 

"  secures  the   command  of  the  allied  army  for  Prince  Schwartzen- 
berg  iv.  145 

"       invades  Switzerland iv.  241 

"       her  course  at  Chatillon  and  Lusigny iv.  260 

Avesnes,  Napoleon's  retreat  on,  in  1815 iv.  385 

B. 

Baccioccht,  vide  Eliza  Bonaparte , 

Badajos,  siege  of iii.  265,  279,  308 

Bagration,  sketch  of ii.  112 

Bank  of  France,  crisis  of ii.  157 

Bard,  Fort,  difficulty  of  passing i.  321 

Baraguey  d'Hilhers,  sketch  of. ii.  HO 

Barras,  sketch  of ii.  72 

Bartenstein,  treaty  of ii  287 

Bassano,  battle  of i.  124 

"         duke  of,  vide  Maret 

Battle  of  Ouissant i.  63 

"      of  Dego i.  88 

"      of  Fombio i.  97 

"     of  Lodi i.  99 

"      of  Lonato i.  116 

"      of  Castiglione i.  116,  118 

"      of  Mori,  Roveredo,  and  Cahano i.  123 

"      of  Bassano i.  124 

"      of  Caldiero i.  140 

"     of  Areola i.  141 


GENERAL     INDEX  407 


Battle  of  Rivoli i-  155 

of  Tarvis i.  170 

of  Cape  St.  Vincent i-   181 

of  Gbehreiss i.  219 

of  the  Pyramids i.  219 

of  Aboukir  (naval) i.  221 

of  Mont-Tabor i-  229 

of  Aboukir i-  233 

of  Stockach i.  258 

of  Trebia. i.  270 

of  Novi i-  279 

of  Zurich i.  285 

of  Chiusella i.  324 

of  Montebello i-  321 

of  Marengo i-  328 

of  Copenhagen i-  360 

of  Cape  Fiuisterre ii.     72 

of  Haslach h.     88 

of  Elchingen ii-     91 

of  Ulm ii.  93,  94 

of  Langueuau ii.     96 

of  Caldiero   ii-  107 

of  Diernstein ii.  114 

of  Hollabrunn ii.  122 

of  Austerlitz.. ii.  135 

of  Trafalgar ii-  151 

of  Jena ii.  209 

of  Auerstedt ii.  212 

of  Halle ii.  221 

of  Prenzlow ii.  232 

of  Lubeck. .».  235 

of  Pultusk ii.   255 

of  Bergfricd ii.  264 

of  Landsberg ii.  264 

of  Liebstadt ii.  265 

of  Eylau ii.  265 

of  Heilsburg ii.  304 

of  Friedland ii.  306 

of  Evora il.  405 

of  Vimiera ii.  406 

of  Espinosa ii.  422 

of  Tudela ii.  423 

of  Sommo-Sierra ii.  426 

of  Coruna ii.  434 

of  Ucles ii.  439 

of  Molino  del  Rey ii.  442 

of  Capellados ii.  443 

of  Walseb ii.  444 


408  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Battu>  of  Thann iii.     34 

"      of  Abensberg iii.     36 

"      of  Landshut iii.     38 

"      of  Eckmubl iii.     40 

"      of  Essling iii     61 

"      of  Piavé iii.     76 

"      of  Raab iii     91 

"      of  Gratz iii.     96 

"      of  "Wagram iii.  105 

"      of  Znaim iii.   115 

"      of  Chaves  and  Braga ni.   143 

»      of  Medellin Hi.  146 

"      of  Ciudad-Real iii  146 

"      of  Amarante in.  152 

"      of  Talavera »i.   164 

"      of  Arzobispo ni.  169 

"      of  Almonacid "i.   17  2 

"      of  Tamames iii  178 

"      of  Alba-de-Tormes ni.   178 

"      of  Ocana iii   179 

"      of  Belchite iii  188 

"      of  Busaco iii  226 

"      of  Fuente  di  Honore iii.  274 

"      of  Margalef Hi.  237 

"      of  Albuera iii.  280 

"      of  Saguntum m    303 

"      of  Ostrowno iii    359 

"      of  Smolensko iii.  366 

"      of  Valoutina iii    375 

"      of  Gorodeczno - iii.  378 

"      of  Polotsk iii.   378 

"      of  Borodino  or  Moscowa iii.   387 

"      of  Malojaroslawetz iv.     18 

"      of  Wiasma iv.     21 

"      of  Krasnoi iv.     28 

"      of  the  Beresina iv.     33 

"      of  Wilna iv.     46 

"      of  the  Xiemen iv.     47 

"      of  Leutzen iv.     84 

"      of  Weissig  and  Konigswartha iv.     99 

"      of  Bautzen iv.  101 

"      of  Luekau iv.  109 

"      of  Vittoria iv.  157 

"      of  Yecla  and  Castalla iv,  129 

"      of  Dresden iv.  153 

"      of  Culm iv.  160 

"      of  Gross-Beeren iv.  163 

"      of  Katzbach iv.  168 


GENERAL     INDEX.  409 

PAGE 

Battle  of  Dennewitz iv.  174 

"      of  Leipsic iv.   196 

"      of  Hanau iv.  221 

"      of  Brieune iv.   245 

"      of  Champ- Aubert iv.   251 

"      of  Mo.itmirail iv    252 

,;      of  Chateau- Thierry iv.  252 

"      of  Vaux-Champs iv.   253 

"      of  Etoges iv.   253 

"      of  Nantis iv  256 

"      of  Montcreau iv.   256 

"      of  Craone iv.   204 

"      of  Laon iv.   2G7 

"      of  Reims iv.  2G9 

"      of  Arcis iv.   275 

"      of  Orthes iv.  278 

"      of  Paris iv.   287 

"      of  Toulouse iv.  300 

"      of  Ligny iv.  359 

"      of  Quatre-Bras iv.  363 

"      of  Waterloo iv.  371 

"      of  Wavrc i v.  384 

Bautzen,  battle  of iv.  101 

Baylen,  capitulation  of. ii.  391 

"  "  "  conditions  of,  violated ii.  399 

Beauharnais,  General,  sketch  of i.     53 

Beauharnais,  Eugene,  vide  Eugene , 

Belchitc,  battle  of iii.   18S 

Belgium,  invaded  by  Dumouriez i.     47 

"         conquest  of,  by  the  French i.     63 

Belle-Allianc^,  or  AVaterloo,  battle  of iv.  371 

Belluno,  duke  of,  vide  Victor 

Bonevento,  prince  ofj  vide  Talleyrand 

Benningsen,  sketch  of, ii.  260 

Beresford,  sketch  of ii.  448 

Beresina,  passage  of iv.     33 

Berg,  grand-duke  of,  vide  Murat 

Berlin,  negotiations  at i.  239 

"      Napoleon's  entrance  into ii.   224 

"  "  decree  of ii.  237 

Bornadotte,  joins  Napoleon's  army  in  Italy i.  167 

"  is  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  Austrians  on  Laybach i.  170 

"  character  of ii.     52 

"  commands  1st  corps  in  campaign  of  1S05 ii.     82 

"  at  battle  of  Austerlitz ii.  135-1SÏ 

"  his  bad  conduct  at  Jena ii.  210 

"  neglect  of  duty  at  Auerstadt ii.  217 

"  captures  Halle ii.  221 


410  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Bernadotte,  is  reprimanded  at  Wagram iii.  1 1 2 

"  is  elected  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden iii.  243 

remarks  on  his  subsequent  invasion  of  France iii.  245 

"  his  pompous  bulletin  at  Dennewitz iv.  1T8 

Berthier,  serves  with  Xapoleon  in  1796 i.     S4 

"       proclaims  tlie  Roman  Republic i.  199 

"       escorts  the  Pope  from  Rome i.  200 

,;       made  Minister  of  War i.  308 

"       is  placed  in  nominal  command  of  the  army  in  1800 i.  318 

"       is  made  a  marshal  in  1 804 ii.     54 

"       sent  to  rally  the  grand  army  in  1809 iii.     30 

"       commits  serious  errors iii.     31 

"       bis  faulty  orders  at  Wagram iii.  101 

"       left  in  Russia  as  Murat's  chief-of-stuff iv.     45 

his  treatment  of  Jomini iv.  141 

•'       death  of,  in  1815 iv.  348 

Bertrand,  sketch  of iii.  1 1 0 

"        commands  the  4th  corps  in  campaign  of  1813 iv.  136 

Bessières,  made  a  marshal  in  1804 ii.     54 

1;       has  command  of  cavalry  guards  in  1 805 ii.     S2 

'•■       supersedes  Bernadotte  in  command  of  Dept.  of  the  North. ...   .iii.  131 

■'       charge  of,  at  Austerlitz, ii.  140 

"       "    at  Wagram iii.   107 

death  of iv.     82 

"       remarks  on iv.     82 

Blucher,  after  battle  of  Auerstadt,  retires  on  Mecklenburg ii.  233 

escapes  from  Lubeck ii.  235 

"       is  forced  to  capitulate ii.  236 

•■'       enters  Saxony  in  1313 iv.     75 

[t       is  cut  up  on  the  Mulde ■  . . . iv.     89 

"       refuses  battle  on  the  Bober iv.  143 

"       defeats  Maedonald  at  the  Katzbach iv.  169 

operations  of  Xapoleon  against iv.  183-185 

at  battle  of  Brienne , iv.  245 

faults  of  his  plans iv.  250 

"       is  defeated  at  Yaux-Champs  and  Etoges iv.  253 

marches  on  Meaux iv.  261 

at  battle  of  Laou iv.  267 

"       at  Reims iv.   271 

"       at  battle  of  Ligny iv.  359 

"       his  arrival  at  Waterloo iv.  377 

Balascbof,  mission  of  from  Alexander  to  Xapoleon iii.  349 

Bon,  sketch  of i.  218 

Bonaparte  family,  sketch  of i.  395 

Bonaparte  Charles,  father  of  Xapoleon " i.  395 

"         Maria  Letitia,  mother  of  Xapoleon i.  396 

"         Joseph,  vide  Joseph  Bonaparte 

Xapoleon,  vide  Xapoleon 


GENE  Ii  Ah     INDEX.  4H 


PAGE 


Bonaparte,  Lucien,  vide  Jerome  Bonaparte 

"  Louis,        "     Louis  Bonaparte 

"  Eliza,         "     Eliza  Bonaparte 

"  Pauline     "     Pauline  Bonaparte 

'•  Caroline    "     Caroline  Bonaparte 

"  Jerome      "     Jerome  Bonaparte 

Borghese,  Prince  of i .  404 

"       Princess  of,  vide  Pauline  Bonaparte 

Borodino,  battle  of iii.  387 

Borowsk,  retreat  of  Napoleon  on iv.     16 

Boyer,  captures  Diamond  Rock ii.     61 

Boulogne,  camp  of ii.     27 

Bousmard,  conducts  siege  of  Dantzic ii.  295 

Braga,  battle  of iii.  143 

C. 

Cadore,  duke  of,  vide  Champagny 

Cairo,  Napoleon's  entrance  into i#   220 

"      revolt  of i.  225 

"      Napoleon's  return  to i.  232 

Calabria,  operations  in ii.  ng 

Caldiero,  battle  of,  in  1796 i.   140 

il     1805 ii.   107 

Cambacérès,  made  second  Consul 1.   307 

Campo-Formio,  peace  cf. i.    1 88 

"  its  results L   190 

Cape  Finisterre,  battle  of ii.     72 

Cape  St.  Vincent,  battle  of i.  181 

Capitulation  of  Baylen,  remarks  on ii.  395 

Carnot,  sketch  of  his  life i.     71 

"      made  Minister  of  War  by  Napoleon  in  1800 i.  318 

"      made  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  1815 iv.  324 

"      his  conduct  after  the  disaster  of  Waterloo iv.  391 

Caroline  Bonaparte,  sketch  of  lier  life i.  405 

"  made  Queen  of  Naples  in  18C8 j.  405 

"  died  in  1839.. ;    405 

Castanos,  defeated  at  Tudela jj#  423 

Castiglione,  battle  of 1.   \]Q 

"  duke  of,  vide  Augereau 

Catharine  II.,  of  Russia,  sketch  of j#     45 

Cattaro,  difficulties  with  Austria  respecting ,j,  1 71 

Caulaincourt,  duko  of  Yicenza 

opposes  the  war  with  Russia iii.  319 

"  propositions  of,  to  Alexander  in  1813 iv.     95 

"  envoy  of  Napoleon  at  the  congress  of  Prague iv.  114 

"  made  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations iv.  233 

"  represents  Napoleon  in  the  congress  of  Chatillon iv.  249 


412  GEXEKAL     IXDEX. 

PAGE 

Caulaincourt,  the  younger,  death  of. ui.  394 

Cerrachi,  conspiracy  cf .  .   i.  344 

Champagny,  supersedes  Talleyrand  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs ii.  358 

Champ- Aubert,  buttle  of iv.  251 

Champ-de-Mai,  ceremonies  of iv.  335 

Championnet,  sketch  of i.  252 

"             takes  possession  of  Naples i.  254 

"             efforts  to  save  Coni i.  293 

Charles,  Archduke  of  Austria,  sketch  of i.  163 

"       takes  command  of  Austrian  army i.  163 

"      his  operations  on  the  Piave i-  169 

"       is  reënforced  from  the  Rhine i.  Ill 

"       retreats  on  Vienna i-  If  1 

"      marches  against  Jourdan i-  257 

"       defeats  Soult  at  Stockach i-  258 

"       fails  to  take  advantage  of  his  success i.  262 

"      marches  against  Massena  in  Switzerland i.  267 

"       is  paralyzed  by  the  Aulic  Council i.  268 

"       his  plan  of  operations i-  281 

"       fails  to  establish  his  bridges  across  the  Aar i.  282 

"       marches  on  Manheim i-  284 

"       disagrees  with  Suwarrow i-  290 

"       commands  in  Italy  in  1805 ii-  106 

"      operations  of,  against  Massena ii-  100 

"       is  defeated  at  Caldiero ii-  108 

"       is  forced  to  retreat ii-  109 

"       finally  reaches  Laybach ii-  HO 

"       generalissimo  of  the  Austrian  army  in  1809 iii.  27 

"       organization  and  numbers  of  his  army iii.  29 

"       his  operations  toward  Ratisbon iii.  32 

"       his  faulty  dispositions iii-  34 

"       is  forced  to  return  into  Bohemia iii.  44 

"      his  tardy  operations  to  save  Vienna i-i-  47 

"       attacks  the  forces  of  Davoust iii-  59 

"       turns  his  attack  on  Essling iii-  00 

"       his  orders  disobeyed  by  his  brother iii.  94 

"       disposition  of  his  forces  at  Wagram iii.  103 

is  defeated iii.  HO 

"       his  retreat iii-  HI 

Chasloup  de  Lobat,  chief  engineer  at  Dantzic ii.  295 

"        at  Stralsund ii.  339 

Chastelcr,  operations  cf,  in  the  Tyrol iii.  24 

Chatham,  commands  the  "Walcheren  expedition iii.  127 

Chatillon,  congress  of iv.  243 

1;         the  ultimatum  cf.  rejected  by  Napoleon iv.  205 

Chaves,  battle  of iii-  I43 

Chebreiss,  battle  of '•  210 

Cherasco,  armistice  of '•  9-1 


GENEE  AL     IXDEX.  413 


r  \'.r. 


Chiusella,  battle  of i.  324 

Crauford,  mardi  of iii.   1G5 

Cisalpine  Republic,  account  of i.  378 

Ciudad-Real,  battle  of iii.   146 

Liudad-Rodrigo,  siege  of iii.  223 

"       "      iii.   308 

Clarke,  duke  of  Feltre,  sketch  of i.  186 

Coalition,  against  France,  organized i.     44 

"  "  "       headed  by  England i.     50 

"  "  "       in  1805 ii.     63 

"  "  li       efforts  of,  in  1S13 iv.   133 

Cobentzel,  negotiations  of ii.     78 

Colli,  operations  against,  in  1796 i.     90 

Committee  of  Public  Safety  established i.     49 

Concordat,  character  of i.  307 

objections  to i.  368 

"         is  officially  promulgated i.  389 

Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  organized. ii.  177 

"  "  "       Presidency  of. .. . ii.   181 

Copenhagen,  naval  expedition  against,  in  1S01 i.  359 

"  naval  battle  of i.  360 

"  expedition  against,  in  1807 ii.  336 

"  character  of  the  attack  upon ii.  337 

"  capture  of ii.  338 

Conscription,  French  law  of . i.  247 

Conspiracy  of  Mallet  and  Lahorie iv.     22 

Constantinople,  mission  of  Sebastiani  to ii.   197 

threatened  by  the  English ii.  276 

conduct  of  Sebastiani  at ii.   278 

revolution  at ii.  318 

Consular  government  organized i.  307 

;<  "  members  of i.  307 

"  "  character  cf i.  308 

Consulate,  for  life i.  387 

Continental  system,  its  origin  and  character ii.   327 

Cornegliano,  duke  of,  vide  Moncey 

Coronation  of  Napoleon,  at  Paris ii.     49 

"  "  "         at  Milan ii.     70 

Corsica,  birth-place  of  Napoleon i.     36 

"       hostility  of,  to  the  English i.  136 

"       Napoleon  prepares  an  expedition  for  its  relief i.   137 

"       the  English  evacuate  the  island ...    i.  138 

Coruna,  battle  of t ii.  434 

Craone,  battle  of iv.  264 

Culm,  battle  of i   .   160 

Custine,  sketch  of i.     53 

Custrin,  capitulation  of ii.  233 

Czeruitscheff,  mission  of iii.  328 


414:  G  EXE  K  AL      INDEX. 

D. 

PAGE 

Dalmatia,  duke  of,  vide  Soult 

Dantzic,  siege  of,  in  1807 jj.   294 

"        capitulation  of,  in  1813 iv.  225 

"        duke  of.  vide  Lefebvre 

Danube,  passage  of,  at  battle  of  Essling i.i.     57 

"        new  passage  of,  at  battle  of  Wagram id.     98 

Dardanelles,  passage  of,  by  British  fleet ii.  277 

Davonst,  made  a  marshal  in  1804 ii.     52 

"        commands  the  3d  corps  in  1805 ii.     82 

"        his  march  on  Vienna ii.   112 

"        at  battle  of  Austerlitz ii.  133 

"        at  battle  of  Auerstedt , ii.  212 

"        made  duke  of  Auerstedt .- . . .  .ii.  2 13 

"        at  battle  of  Eylau ii.   2G5 

"        at  battle  of  Friedland ii.  306 

"        at  Eckmuhl hi.     40 

"        at  Essling il     Gl 

"        at  Wagram iii.   105 

"         commands  the  1st  corps  in  campaign  of  1842 iii.  344 

"        at  Yaloutina iii.  375 

"        at  battle  of  Borodino iii.  387 

"        at  battle  of  "Wiasma. . .    iv.     21 

"        at  battle  of  Krasnoi i.-.     23 

,:        commands  at  Hamburg  in  ICI  I' v.   224 

"        made  Minister  of  War  in  1815 iv.  324 

Decaen,  sent  to  the  Isle  of  France ii.     25 

Dego,  battle  of i.     83 

Delhi,  fall  of i:.     25 

Dennewitz,  battle  of iv.   174 

Desaix,  sketch  of  his  life i.  217 

"       his  death  at  Marengo i.  332 

"       his  operations  in  that  battle i.  334 

Dessolles,  sketch  of i.  253 

Diamond  Rock,  capture  of ii.     Gl 

Diernstein,  battle  of ii.   114 

"  Napoleon's  visit  to  castle  of i.i.     45 

Donawerth,  Na;  oleon's  march  on,  in  1805 ii.     83 

D'Oubril,  treaty  of,  rejected  by  Alexander ii.  195 

"        remarks  on  his  conduct i'.   200 

Dresden,  battle  of iv.  153 

Drissa,  camp  of iii.  35G 

Duekforth,  passes  the  Dardanelles  and  threatens  Constantinople ii.  277 

"  his  retreat   ii.  280 

"  his  losses  and  danger ii.  23  L 

Duke  d'Enghein,  arrest  of. ii.     31 

"  his  trial ii.     32 

"  his  execution ii.     33 


GENERAL     INDEX.  415 

PAGE 

Dumosnil,  at  St.  Jean  d'Acre  and  Yiuceunes i.  230 

Dumouriez,  driven  from  Belgium , i.  48 

•'          treats  with  the  Austriaus i.  49 

Duphot,  murder  of,  at  Rome L  199 

Dupont,  capitulates  at  Baylen ii.  391 

trial  of »•  397 

Duroc,  death  and  character  of iv.  10G 


East  India  Company,  policy  pursued  towards  the  native  princes i.  208 

"         "  "  pretext  for  assailing  the  Sultan  of  Mysore L  211 

"         "  "  condition  of,  at  the  time  Napoleon  invaded  Egypt..!.  212 

Echmuhl,  battle  of i".     40 

"       prince  of.  vide  Davoust 

Egypt.  Napoleon's  expedition  into i.  213 

"      hia  returu  from i.  294 

"      Kleber's  proposal  to  evacuate i.  341 

'■      English  expodition  to ii.  293 

Elba,  Napoleon  exiled  to iv.  3o3 

"     Napoleon  at iv.  308 

"    Napoleon's  departure  from   iv.  3 1 8 

Elchingen,  occupied  by  the  Austrians ii.     90 

"  battle  of ii.     91 

"  duke  of,  vide  Ney 

Eliza  Bonaparte,  sister  of  Napoleon,  sketch  of. i.  403 

"       " ii.     71 

"  "  marries  Bacciochi i.  403 

"  "  made  Princess  of  Lucca,  &c ii.  174 

"  "  death  of i.  403 

Empire  of  France,  established ii.     39 

"  "         protested  against  by  Louis  XYIII ii.     43 

"  "  recognized  by  Austria ii.     46 

"  "  Russia  refuses  to  recognize ii.     46 

England,  conduct  of,  during  the  French  Revolution i.     48 

"       heads  the  coalition i.     50 

"       occupies  Porto  Ferrajo i.  137 

"       abandons  Corsica i.  137 

"       affairs  of,  in  1797 i.   180 

"       mutiny  in  her  fleets i.  1 82 

'•       state  of  her  forces  in  India i.  212 

"       her  naval  forces  at  St.  Jean  d'Acre i.  230 

"       forms  a  secret  convention  with  Naples i.  242 

''       tries  to  form  a  new  coalition  against  France i.  249 

"       her  conduct  towards  neutrals i.  343 

"       sends  a  naval  expedition  against  Copenhagen i.  359 

'•       directs  a  descent  upon  Egypt i.  301 

"       négociâtes  with  France i.  370 


416  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

England,  agrees  to  preliminaries  of  a  peace i.  373 

"       makes  the  treaty  of  Amiens i.  382 

"       causes  new  difficulties  with  France ii.     17 

"       conduct  of,  respecting  treaty  of  Amiens ii.     22 

"       her  successes  in  India ii.     24 

"       refuses  Napoleon's  offers  of  peace ii.     26 

"  "  ■'  "  "     ii.     50 

"       proposed  descent  upon ii.     50 

"       maritime  strength  of,  in  1805 ii.  158 

"       Napoleon  negotiates  with ii.  192 

"     .  sends  an  expedition  to  Egypt ii.  265 

"       threatens  Constantinople ii.  276 

"       her  fleet  passes  the  Dardanelles ii.  277 

"       retreat  and  disaster  to  her  fleet ii.  280 

"       offered  mediation  of  Russia  with ii.  355 

"       sends  an  expedition  against  Denmark ii.  336 

"       captures  Copenhagen  and  the  Danish  fleet ii.  338 

"       her  army  under  "Wellington  lands  in  Portugal ii.  406 

"        her  maritime  expeditions iii.  125 

"       her  operations  against  Naples  and  Antwerp iii.  127 

"       war  with  the  United  States iv    325 

"       her  forces  in  Belgium  in  1815 351 

"       exiles  Napoleon  to  St.  Helena iv.  396 

"       her  disgraceful  treatment  of  Napoleon iv.  398 

Essling,  battle  of iii.     61 

"        prince  of,  vide  Massena 

Este,  house  of i.  128 

Eugene  Beauharnais,  sketch  of  his  life ii.     70 

"  "  made  Viceroy  of  Italy ii.     70 

"  "  marries  a  princess  of  Bavaria ii.  155 

"  "  operations  in  Italy  in  1809 iii.     75 

"  "  at  battle  of  the  Piave iii.     76 

"  "  pursues  the  Austrians hi.     77 

"  "  joins  Napoleon  with  his  army iii.     80 

"  "  at  battle  of  Raab iii.     91 

"  "  commands  the  4th  corps  in  Russia iii.  344 

"  "  fights  the  battle  of  Malojaroslawetz iv.     18 

"  "  succeeds  Murat  in  the  general  command iv.     49 

"  "  finally  takes  refuge  behind  the  Elbe iv.     51 

"  "  is  joined  by  Napoleon  in  1813 iv.     81 

"  "  is  sent  to  organize  an  army  in  Italy iv.     91 

"  "  operations  of,  in  1813,  in  Italy iv.  226 

i:  "  "  il  in  1814,        "        iv.  258 

"  "  evacuates  Italy iv.  304 

Eylau,  battle  of ii.  265 

Exile  of  Napoleon  to  Elba iv.  303 

"  "         to  St.  Helena iv.  396 

ii  "        protest  against. . iv.  396 


GENERAL     INDEX.  417 

F 

PAGE 

Federate  States,  system  of,  adopted  by  Napoleon ii.  l  G3 

Feltre,  duke  of,  vide  Clarke 

Finkeustein,  negotiations  at ii.  284 

Foligno,  armistice  of. j.  357 

Fombio,  battle  of i.     97 

Fortifications,  of  Alexandria  in  1805 ii.     69 

"  of  Spain,  capture  of ii,  360 

of  Lyons  and  Paris  in  1815 iv.  343 

"  remarks  of  Napoleon  on  their  importance iv.  344 

Fouché,  duke  of  Otranto,  appointed  Minister  of  Police  in  1800 i.  308 

"  "  "         again  made  Minister  in  1815i iv.  324 

"         character  of iv.  395 

"        intrigues  of,  after  Napoleon's  return  from  Waterloo iv.  389 

France,  before  the  Revolution i.     38 

"       condition  of,  in  1801 i.  363 

"     1802-3 ii.     ]3 

"       public  credit  in  1806 ii.  185 

"       her  internal  improvements ii.   186 

"       her  military  and  maritime  works ii.  187 

"       general  condition  of,  in  1814 iv.  241 

"       invasion  of,  by  the  allies iv.  240 

"      military  resources  of,  after  Waterloo iv.  387 

"       Napoleon's  final  departure  from iv.  395 

French  army,  organization  of,  in  1805 ii.     82 

"         '■  "  "      1806 ii.  204 

"      1809 iii.     21 

"         "        in  Spain  in  1810 iii.211 

"         "        in  campaign  of  1812 , iii.  344 

"         "        in  spring  campaign  of  1813 iv.     80 

"         "        in  autumn         "         "1813 iv.  136 

"         "        in  campaign  of  1815 , iv.  352 

Fuente  di  Honore,  battle  of iii.  274 

G. 

Gaeta,  siege  of ii.  176 

Gandia,  reduction  of iii.  305 

Gantheaume,  admiral,  blockaded  in  Brest ii.     45 

Gavardo.  affair  of i.  117 

Genoa,  Napoleon's  negotiations  with i.  135 

"      Revolution  of,  in  1797 i.  176 

"      constitution  of,  changed i.  178 

"      a  provisional  government  for,  appointed i.   178 

"      Massena  blockaded  in i.  317 

"     his  surrender  of i.  325 

George  III.  of  Great  Britain,  hostile  declaration  of ii.     20 

':        "  "  "        reviews  his  troops  daily  at  Lover ii.     28 

VOL.  IV. — 27 


418  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Georges,  conspiracy  of ii.  30 

Germanic  confederation. ii.  172 

ji.  177 

Germany,  empire  of,  abolished ii.  179 

"         secret  societies  in iii.  189 

Gerona,  siege  of iii.  189 

Girondists,  fall  of i.  50 

Giulay,  operations  of,  in  1 809 iii.  96 

Glatz,  siege  of ii.  297 

Godoy,  sketch  of  his  life ii.  275 

"       intrigues  of,  against  Ferdinand ii.  366 

Gorodeczno,  battle  of iii.  378 

Gratz,  battle  of. iii.  96 

Grisons,  the,  call  on  Austria  for  assistance i.  246 

seized  by  Massena i.  257 

Massena  is  driven  from i.  266 

Grouchy,  at  battle  of  Ligny iv.  360 

"         pursues  the  Prussians iv.  367 

"        errors  of iv.  380 

"        at  battle  of  "Wavre iv.  384 

Gustavus  III.  of  Sweden,  hostile  to  France i.  44 

Gustavus  IV.  of  Sweden,  conduct  in  1804 ii.  45 

"       character  of ii.  46 

H. 

Hallabrdn,  battle  of. ii.  122 

Halle,  battle  of ii.  221 

Hamburg,  defence  of,  by  Davoust .iv.  224 

Hanau,  battle  of. iv.  221 

Hanover,  invaded  by  Mortier ii.     22 

"        operations  of  allies  in ii.  146 

Hardenberg,  sketch  of  his  life .ii.   170 

Hartzfeld,  trial  of ii.  225 

"         remarks  on  his  case ii.  226 

Haslack,  battle  of :   ii.     88 

Haugwitz,  negotiations  of .ii.  129 

"  "  "  ii.  168 

"  sketch  of  his  life ii.  169 

Heilsberg,  battle  of ii.  304 

Heliopolis,  battle  of i.  342 

Helvetic  Constitution i.  195 

Hindustan,  description  of i.  207 

"  conquest  of ii.     25 

Hoche,  defeats  the  allies i.     C9 

"       commands  expedition  against  Ireland i.  149 

Hofer  leads  insurrection  in  Switzerland .i^i.     25 

Hohenlohe,  character  of ii.  205 


GENERAL     INDEX.  419 

PAGK 

fîohenlohe,  operations  of ii.  226 

capitulates  at  Prenzlaw ii.  232 

Holland,  conquest  ol,  by  the  French i.  63 

•'       i\ev olutiou  in i.  244 

"       descent  ol'  the  English  on i.  290 

"       Louis  Bonaparte  declared  king  of ii.  174 

"       reunion  of,  with  France iii.  245 

"      Napoleon's  tour  in iii.  250 

Hougomont,  attack  on,  at  battle  of  "Waterloo iv.  373 

I. 

India,  successes  of  the  English  in ii.  25 

Infernal  machine,  account  of i.  355 

Insurrection  in  Verona  suppressed  by  Victor i.  173 

"           of  Aranjuez ii.  369 

"           of  the  2d  of  May,  at  Madrid ii.  381 

"          general,  in  Spain ii.  384 

Interview  of  Napoleon  and  his  brother  Lucien ii.  359 

"         with  the  Spanish  court  at  Bayonne ii.  375 

"         of  the  Emperors  at  Tilsit ii.  313 

"             "             "          at  Erfurth ii.  415 

Ireland,  descent  of  the  French  on i.  148 

Iron  Crown,  assumed  by  Napoleon ii.  65 

Italian  Republic,  constituted  a  Kingdom ii.  65 

Italy,  Napoleon's  plan  for  the  invasion  of i.  73 

"     army  of,  when  Napoleon  took  command i.  77 

"     state  of,  at  beginning  of  campaign  of  1796 i.  77 

"     new  republics  formed  in i.  128 

"     political  state  of i.  130 

"     reëuforcements  from  the  Rhine  sent  to i.  151 

"     Joubert's  operations  in,  in  1799 i.  278 

"     plan  of  campaign  of  1800  in i.  317 

"     Napoleon  establishes  fortifications  and  camps  in ii.  69 

"     Eugene  made  Viceroy  of ii.  70 

"     Massena's  operations  in,  in  1805 ii.  105 

"     Napoleon's  design  for  improving ii.  363 

"     operations  of  1809  in iii.  75 

"     Eugene  organizes  an  army  in,  in  1813 iv.  91 

"     military  operations  of  1813  in iv.  226 

"         "                 "          of  1814  in iv.  258 

"    evacuated  by  Eugene iv.  304 

J. 

Jacobins,  organize  clubs i.    43 

"         organize  a  committee  of  Public  Safety i.     49 

Jaffa,  capture  of , i.    226 

"     treatment  of  prisoners  at i.  227 


420  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Jaffa,  reported  poisoning  of  the  sick  at i.  231 

Janissaries,  revolt  ui' j;  g -,  g 

"  depose  the  iSultan 1L  3 , 9 

"  corps  oi]  abolished    jj  39q 

Jena,  battle  of. -  9()g 

Jerome  Bonaparte,  sketch  of  his  life i  J{i- 

"  "  enters  the  naval  service i  4f)- 

"  "  marries  in  Baltimore , j  ^g 

"  "'  second  marriage _  j  40g 

"  "  made  King  of  Westphalia j  406 

"  "  is  superseded  in  command  in  1812  by  Davoust iii.  355 

"  "  operations  of,  at  Waterloo iv  371 

"  "  family  of i.  407 

Joseph  Bonaparte,  sketch  of  his  life i.  397 

"  ''  declared  King  of  Naples ii.  173 

"  "  military  operations  of ii.  175 

"  "  made  King  of  Spain ii.  390 

"  "  enters  Madrid ii.  391 

"  "  is  forced  to  retreat ii.  400 

"  "  is  recognized  by  Russia ii.  413 

•'  "  joins  Napoleon  at  Vittoria ii.  418 

"  "  is  left  in  command  in  Spain ii.  419 

•'  "  his  ignorance  of  war ii.  449 

"  "  remarks  on  his  operations iii.  1 74 

"  "  Soult  is  made  chief  of  his  staff iii.  177 

•'  "  fatal  delay  of  in  1810 îiî.  212 

"  "  returns  to  Madrid iii.  214 

"  "  dissensions  with  Napoleon's  generals iii.  263 

"  is  forced  to  leave  Madrid iv.     58 

"  "  retires  from  the  capital  with  his  court iv.     63 

"  "  made  lieutenant-general  of  the  empire iv.  243 

"  "  authorizes  the  marshals  to  treat  with  the  enemy .iv.  289 

"  "  retires  to  the  United  States L  399 

Josephine,  sketch  of  her  life   i.     73 

"  marries  Xapoleon i.     T2 

"  is  divorced iii.  200 

Joubert,  commands  a  division i.  153 

"        at  Rivoli i.  153 

"   i.  155 

"        operations  of,  in  the  Tyrol i.  171 

"        seizes  Piedmont  and  occupies  Tuscany i.  253 

"        commands  the  army  in  Italy i.  278 

"        at  battle  of  Novi i.  279 

death  of i.  280 

'■        Napoleon's  opinion  of i.  260 

Jourdan,  sketch  of  his  life i.  147 

"         commands  the  army  of  the  Danube  in  1799 i.  256 

"        retreats  behind  the  Rhine i.  260 


GENERAL     INDEX.  421 

PAGB 

Jourdan.  resigns  the  command i.  260 

"         character  of ii.     54 

"        made  chief  of  King  Joseph's  staflf ii.  -±-19 

Junot,  sketch  of  his  life ii-  356 

'•       occupies  Portugal ii.  356 

"       position  of,  in  Portugal ii.  401 

"       insurrection  against   ii.  404 

"       is  defeated  at  Vimiera ii.  406 

"       commands  the  8th  corps  in  1812 iii.  344 

"      at  battle  of  Valoutina iii.  377 

"      mental  alienation  of iii.  377 

K. 

Katzbacu,  battle  of iv.  168 

Kellerman,  the  elder,  sketch  of i.     85 

"  «         commands  army  of  reserve  in  the  Alps  in  1796 i.     35 

"  "  confounded  with  his  son i.     85 

"  "  made  marshal  in  1804 i.     85 

"  the  younger,  cavalry  charge  of,  at  Marengo i.  332 

"  "  confounded  with  his  father i.  332 

"  "  made  general  of  division i.  333 

"  "  is  given  a  larger  command i.  333 

"  "  commands  the  4th  cavalry  corps  in  1815 iv.  352 

"  "  charge  of,  at  Quatre  Bras iv.  364 

"  "  charge  of.  at  Waterloo iv.  376 

Kilmaine,  sketch  of  his  life i.  127 

Kleber,'  sketch  of  his  life i.  217 

"       at  battle  of  the  Pyramids. . i.  219 

"      at  battle  of  Mont  Tabor i.  229 

"      is  left  in  command  in  Egypt i.  234 

"       proposes  to  evacuate  Egypt i.  341 

"       is  forced  to  conquer  at  Ileliopolis i.  342 

"       his  death i.  342 

Kosciusko,  sketch  of  his  life i.     65 

"  refuses  to  assist  in  revolutionizing  Poland ii.  246 

"  intended  by  Napoleon  as  King  of  Poland ii.  246 

Krasnoi,  battle  of iv.     28 

Kutusof,  sketch  of  his  life ii_  114 

"        on  the  Danube  in  1805 ii.  114 

"        at  battle  of  Diernstein ii.  115 

"        negotiates  with  Murat ii.  121 

"        at  battle  of  Austerlitz ii.  135 

"        made  generalissimo  of  the  Russian  army iii.  383 

"        at  battle  of  Borodino iii.  387 

"        flank  march  of.  on  Elnia iv.     24 

"        plan  of,  to  cut  off  Napo' eon's  retreat , iv.     26 

"        dispositions  of,  at  Krasnoi iv.     28 

"        at  passage  of  the  Beresina iv.     33 


422  GENERAL     INDEX. 

L. 

PAGE 

La  Costc,  sketch  of  his  life ii.  447 

La  Fayette,  at  the  head  of  the  National  Assembly i.     42 

"  Utopian  views  of,  in  1815 iv.  389 

"  conduct  of,  in  the  Assembly iv.  392 

Laharpe,  sketch  of  his  life i.     83 

death  of i.     98 

Lake,  operations  of,  in  India ii.     25 

Lallemont,  supersedes  Missiessy ii.     59 

La  Modeste,  capture  of,  at  Genoa i.     84 

Landshut,  battle  of iii.     38 

Lannes,  at  battle  of  Dego i.     90 

sketch  of  his  life i.     96 

at  battle  of  Fombio i.     98 

crosses  the  Great  St.  Bernard i.  319 

passes  Fort  Bard i.  321 

defeats  the  enemy  at  Chiusella i.  324 

at  battle  of  Montebello i.  327 

at  battle  of  Marengo i.  328 

made  a  marshal ii.     52 

commands  the  5th  corps  in  1805 ii.     82 

at  battle  of  Austerlitz ii.  137 

at  battle  of  Jena. ii.  209 

at  battle  of  Friedland ii.  306 

at  Tudela ii.  424 

at  siege  of  Saragossa ii.  445 

at  battle  of  Eckmuhl iii.     40 

at  Essling iii.     61 

death  of iii.     08 

La  Valteline,  revolution  in i.  191 

Le  Courbe,  services  and  character  of ii.     55 

Lefebvre,  character  of ii.     54 

"  made  a  marshal ii.     54 

"  at  siege  of  Dantzic ii.  295 

"  Napoleon's  letter  to,  at  Dantzic ii.  295 

"         operations  of,  against  Blake  in  1808 ii.  421 

"         operations  of,  on  the  Tagus ii.  438 

"  commands  the  Bavarians  in  1809. iii.     28 

"         at  battle  of  Abensbnrg iii.     36 

"         at  battle  of  Eckmuhl iii.     40 

"         operations  of,  in  the  Tyrol iii-     83 

"  commands  the  Old  Guard  in  1812 iii-  344 

Leghorn,  occupation  of,  by  the  French i-  H3 

Leipsic,  battle  of,  first  day iv.  196 

"  "         second  day *V-  206 

tbirdday iv.  212 

"       retreat  from iv-  21 8 

Lerido,  siege  of ui-  237 


GENERAL      INDEX.  423 

PAGE 

Ligny,  battle  of iv.  359 

Lille,  negotiations  of i.   182 

Linois,  capture  of ii.  \q\ 

Lintz,  attacked  by  Kalowroth hi.     57 

Lisbon,  treaty  of,  in  1803 ii.     24 

Lobau.  island  of,  occupied  by  Napoleon iii.     69 

Lodi,  battle  of i.     99 

Loison,  at  battle  of  Evora ii.  405 

"         at  Leipsic iv.   208 

•Lombardy,  revolt  in i.   103 

"  iron  crown  of,  assumed  by  Napoleon ii.     65 

Lonato,  battle  of i.   116 

Louis  Bonaparte,  sketch  of  his  life i.  401 

"  "  made  king  of  Holland ii.    174 

<;  "  writings  of i.  402 

"  "  death  of i.  403 

Louis  XVI.,  death  of. i.     47 

Louis  XYIIL,  leaves  Venice j.     80 

"  "         protests  against  the  French  Empire ii,     43 

"  "         is  recalled  to  the  throne iv.  298 

"  "        course  of,  as  king iv.   312 

"  "        defects  of  his  charter iv.  313 

"  "        errors  of  his  administration iv.  314 

"  "        Ins  flight  from  Paris  in  1815 iv.  323 

Louisiana,  ceded  by  Spain  to  France i.  375 

"  "      by  France  to  the  United  States ii.     24 

Lubec,  siege  and  fall  of i'.  235 

Lucca,  given  to  Napoleon's  sister ii.     71 

Lucien  Bonaparte,  sketch  of  his  life i.  399 

"  "         first  marriage  of i.  399 

"  "        second  marriage  of i.  400 

"  "  "  "       " ii.  359 

"  "         daughter  of  intended  as  Queen  of  Spain ii.  359 

"  "        interview  with  Napoleon  in  Italy ii.  360 

"  "        conduct  at  the  18th  Brumaire i.  301 

"         made  Prince  of  Canino i.  400 

"  "        a  prisoner  in  England i.  400 

"  "         advice  to  Napoleon  after  Waterloo iv.  391 

"  "         writings  of i.  401 

"  "         death  of. i.  400 

Luneville,  peace  of L  357 

Lusigny,  negotiations  at iv.  259 

M. 

Mack,  sketch  of  his  life i.  252 

"      awaits  the  French  on  the  Danube  in  1805 ii.  84 

"      Napoleon  turns  his  right ii.  84 

"      retreat  of,  cut  off • ii.  85 


424 


GENERAL      INDEX, 


Mack,  confusion  of. ii. 

"      invested  in  Ulm ii. 

"      conditional  capitulation  of ii. 

"      surrenders ii. 

"      fate  of  the  wreck  of  his  army ii. 

Macdonald,  sketch  of  his  life i. 

evacuates  Naples i. 

returns  on  Modena i. 

defeated  at  the  Trebia i. 

passes  the  Splugen i. 

effect  of  his  junction  with  Brune i. 

anticipates  Moncey  at  Trent i. 

at  the  battle  of  the  Piave  in  1809 iii. 

pursues  the  Austrians iii. 

at  battle  of  Raab iii. 

"         "         "Wagram iii. 

is  made  a  marshal iii. 

'  Napoleon's  order  respecting „ iii 

1  commands  on  the  Ebro iii. 

'  commands  the  10th  corps  in  1812 iii. 

'  at  battle  of  Bautzen iv. 

'  commands  in  Silesia iv. 

'  defeat  of,  at  the  Katzbach iv. 

'         is  succored  by  Napoleon  iv. 

'  at  battle  of  Leipsic iv. 

difficulties  respecting i. 

"       capture  of,  by  Napoleon L 

Mantua,  investment  of,  by  Napoleon i. 

"        Serrurier  charged  with  the  siege i. 


Malta, 


"        succored  by  Alvinzi i. 

"        capitulation  of i. 

Marcoff,  Russian  Minister,  retires  from  Paris ii. 

Marengo,  battle  of i. 

Maret,  Duke  of  Bassano,  sketch  of  his  life i. 

"       made  Secretary  of  State  of  the  Consular  Government i. 

Margalef,  battle  of iii. 

Maria  Antoinette,  death  of i. 

Maria  Louisa,  marriage  of,  with  Napoleon iii. 

"  "       character  of iii. 

Marmont,  at  Lodi i. 

at  Castiglione i. 

at  Marengo i. 

made  a  marshal  in  1809 .iii. 

commanded  2d  corps  in  1805 ii. 

operations  in  Dalmatia ii. 

relieves  Massena  in  Portugal iii. 

operations  near  Cuidad-Rodrigo iii. 


PAGE 

85 


97 
99 
252 
205 
269 
270 
352 
354 
354 
77 
78 
91 
105 
112 
112 
291 
344 
103 
143 
165 
173 
200 
381 
21G 
106 
110 
114 
138 
159 
44 
328 
308 
308 
227 
66 
204 
204 
99 
118 
328 
112 
82 
284 


GENERAL     INDEX.  425 

PAGE 

Marmout,  raises  the  siege  of  Ciudad-Rodrigo iii.  308 

"         again  falls  back iii.  311 

"         fails  to  save  the  bridge  of  Almaraz iv.  55 

"         falls  back  ou  the  Douio iv.  56 

"        operations  at  Salamanca » iv.  56 

"         is  wounded  and  superseded iv.  58 

"        at  Bautzen   iv.  103 

"        at  Dresden iv.  155 

:;         operations  with  Mortier  at  Meaux iv.  262 

,:         is  separated  from  Napolerm iv.  281 

"         retires  on   P  iru    iv.  284 

"        treats  with  the  enemy iv.  288 

Massena,  sketch  of  his  life i.  83 

"        Napoleon's  opinion   of i.  83 

"       at  battle  of  Areola , i.  141 

at  Rivoli i.  153 

"       "     i.  155 

"       seizes  the  Grisons i.  257 

"       is  driven  from  the  Grisons i.  266 

"       evacuates  Zurich i.  268 

"       retakes  the  smaller  cantons i.  281 

"       is  blockaded  in  Genoa i.  317 

"       surrenders  Genoa i.  325 

"       made  a  marshal  in  1804 ii.  53 

"        commands  in  Italy  in  1805 ii.  81 

"       operations  of,  in  Italy ii-  105 

"       operations  of,  in  Naples ii.  174 

"       reduces  Gaeta ii.  176 

"       sent  to  Portugal  with  three  corps iii.  223 

"       operation?  of.    hi-  225 

"        at  battle  of  Busaeo iii.  226 

"       turns  Wellington's  p jsition    iii.  227 

"       embarrassing  position  of iii.  229 

"       asks  for  reënforcements iii.  23 1 

"       sufferings  of  his  army iii.  234 

"       his  critical  position  before  Torres  Vedras iii.  264 

"       evacuates  Portugal iii.  27 1 

"       at  battle  of  Fuente  di  Honore iii.  274 

"       retires  on  Salamanca m-  277 

"       remarks  on  his  retreat m-  278 

Mayence,  siege  of i-  50 

Melzi,  President  of  the  Italian    Republic iL  65 

Menou,  sketch  of  his  life i.  218 

"      succeeds  Kleber  in  Egypt i.  218 

Mequinenza,  siege  of. U1-  238 

Mincio,  the  first  passage  of. i-  105 

"        "    second  passage  of L  1 1 9 

Mirabeau,  in  the  Assembly *■  41 


420  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Missitssy,  admiral,  operat.OL.s  01 , #     ;      59 

Moncey,  duke  ol  Uoruegliano,  Coar<tuter  of ii.     54 

"         detached  trow  the  army  of  the  Rhine i.  319 

"        joiua  iSapoleou  from  the  St.  Gothard i.  319 

"         made  a  marshal  m  1804 ij,     54 

besieges  Saragossa  with  3d  corps  in  1808 ii.  444 

"        succeeded  by  Junot ii.  445 

Montebello,  battle  of i.  327 

"  duke  of,  vide  Lannes 

Mont-Tabor,  battle  of i.   229 

Moreau,  commands  the  army  of  the  Rhine  in  1796 i.   147 

"       operations  of,  on  the  Rhine  in  1800 i.  350 

"       at  Hohenhnden i.  350 

"       banished  from  France ii.     30 

"       death  of iv.  156 

Mortier,  at  the  battle  of  Zurich i.  285 

"       made  a  marshal  in  1804 ii.     54 

"       commands  the  Guards  in  the  beginning  of  1805 ii.     82 

"        afterwards  commands  a  new  corps ii.     82 

"       at  Friedland ii.  308 

"        in  Spain    i;.  445 

"       at  battle  of  Ocana Si.  179 

"       commands  the  Young  Guard  in  1812.    i;;.  344 

"       blows  up  the  Kremlin iv.     16 

"       at  battle  of  Bautzen iv.  103 

"       at  Leipsic iv.  106 

"       operates  with  Marmont  in  1814 V.   262 

"       is  separated  from  Napoleon iv.  281 

"       retires  to  Paris iv.  284 

"       treats  with  the  enemy iv.  288 

Moscow,  taken  by  the  French .  -    ni.  400 

"        the  burning  of iii.  402 

"        evacuated  by  the  French i v.     14 

Moscowa,  battle  of iii.  387 

''         prince  of,  vide  Ney -. 

Murat,  at  battle  of  Mont  Tabor i.  229 

"      in  revolution  of  18th  Brumaire i.  305 

"      commands  expedition  to  Naples i.  356 

"      made  a  marshal  in  1804 ii.     55 

"      commands  the  cavalry  in  1805 ii.     82 

"      errors  of ii.     87 

"      marches  against  Werueck ii-     94 

<:      pursues  the  enemy ii-  1 12 

"      seizes  the  bridges  of  the  Danube ii-   H9 

"      is  deceived  by  Kutusof ii-  121 

"      at  battle  of  Austerlitz ii-  I37 

"      made  Grand  Duke  of  Berg "•  1'* 

"     sent  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians ii-  231 


GENE  K  AL      INDEX.  427 


Murat,  captures  Prenzlow u-  232 

"      Stettin >'•  232 

»      at  Eylau "-285 

"      at  Eriedlaud it.  307 

"      enters  Madrid |j-  3™ 

"      instructions  to,  by  Napoleon "■  3?1 

"      operations  of,  at  Madrid iL  381 

"      suppress .'3  tue    insurrection  of  xuay  2d "•  381 

«      commands  the  cavalry  in  .1812 i».  3-16 

"      at  battle  of  Ostrowno ul-  3°a 

"      pursues  the  liassions  iroui  &uioii.nako id.  373 

"      at  baub  of  Valoatiua m-  3'5 

"      quarrels  with    Davoust '"•  38i 

"      at  battle  of  Borodino U1-  387 

"      lea  by  Napolaoii  iu  command  of  the  army i v.     40 

"      remarks  of  Napoleon  on  his  pursuit  of  the  enemy iv.     43 

"      conduets  the  retreat lv-     4o 

"      gives  up  the  command   to  Eugene 1V-     49 

«      at  Dresden |v-  153 

<;      retreat  of,  on  Leipsic iv.  193 

"      operations  at  Leipsic iv.  196 

"      leaves  Napoleon iv.  219 

"      remarks  on  his  conduct •  •    .'v-  219 

"      marches  on  the  Po  against  Eugene iv.  304 

"      declares  against  the  allies  in  1814 iv.  328 

"      isdefeated  at  Tolentino iv.  329 

"      is  dethroned iv.  330 

"      death  of iv.  330 


N. 


Naples,  armistice  with 

•'        treaty  with 

"       declares  war  in  1799 

"       occupied  by  Ohampionnet 

"       evacuated  by  Championnet 

"       occupied  by  St.  Cyr i 

"       Joseph  Bonaparte  declared  king  of i 

"        Masscna's  operations  in i 

Napoleon,  ancestors  of 

"         birth  of 

"         family  of 

"         education  of 

"         first  appointment  to  the  army 

"        proposes  to  write  a  history  of  Corsica 

"         made  a  chef-de-batallion 

"        his  political  opinions 

"        at  the  sie^e  of  Toulon 


Ill 

133 

251 

254 

265 

22 

173 

175 

396 

36 

395 

36 

37 

37 

60 

61 

61 


428  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGI 

Napoleon,  made  a  general  of  artillery i.     62 

"         attached  to  the  army  of  La  Vendee i.     G7 

"         in  the  affair  of  the  13th  Vendémiaire i.     69 

"         appearance  of,  in  1795 i.     70 

"         marries  Josephine i.     72 

"        is  appointed  general-in-chief  of  the  army  of  Italy i.     75 

"  his  plan  01  operations j.     81 

"         attack  upon  ilia  Pieuinoutese. „ j.     §8 

"        proclamation  to  his  soldiers j.     q\ 

"         enters  into  an  armistice  at  Cherasco j.     94 

"         marches  against  Eeaulieu , i.     95 

"  enters  into  an  armistice  with  the  Dukes  of  Parma  and  Modena.i.     96 

"         at  the  battle  of  Lodi i.     99 

"         euters  Milan i.   100 

"         resigns  his  command i.   101 

"         addresses  his  army i.  loi 

"         treats  with  Piedmont i.  104 

"         passes  the  Mincio i.  105 

"         invests  Mantua i.   110 

enters  into  an  armistice  with  Naples i.  112 

occupies  Leghorn i.  .113 

"         at  Louato  and  Castiglioue i.  110-118 

"         attack  on  his  head-quarters i.  118 

"         at  battle  of  Areola i.  141 

"         besieges  Wurmser  in  Mantua i.  147 

"         at  battle  of  Rivoli i.  155 

"         terminates  the  campaign   i.  158 

"         prepares  for  a  new  campaign i.  162 

"         takes  the  initiative i.  166 

"         his  plan  of  operations i.  167 

"         forms  armistice  of  Leobeu i.   171 

"         goes  to  Milan i.  176 

"         appoints  a  Provisional  Government  for  Genoa i.  1 79 

"         resigns  his  command i.  186 

"         disputes  with  the  Directory i.  187 

"         negotiates  the  treaty  of  Campo-Formio i.  188 

"         returns  to  Paris i.   200 

"         inspects  the  port  of  Antwerp ,  .i.  214 

"         departs  for  Egypt i.  216 

"         captures  Malta i.  216 

"         debarks  at  Alexandria i.  216 

"         marches  on  Cairo i.  218 

"         at  battle  of  the  Pyramids j.  219 

"         enters  Cairo j_  220 

"         goes  to  Syria i.  225 

"         captures  Jaffa j.  226 

"        besieges  St.  Jean  d'Acre j,  227 

"        returns  to  Cairo i.  232 


GENERAL      INDEX.  429 

PA(iE 

Napoleon,  leaves  Egypt  for  Paris i.  295 

his  reception  in  France i.  295 

effect  of  his  return i.  299 

effects  the  Revolution  of  the  18th  Brumaire i.  301 

made  First  Consul i.  301 

proposes  peace  to  England i.  310 

pian  of  campaign i.  315 

crosses  the  Alps i.  319 

at  Fort  Bard    .  .  .  i.  321 

marches  ou  Milan i.  324 

at  battle  of  Marengo i.  327 

negotiates  with  St.  Julien i.  339 

repairs  to  Paris i.  342 

forms  a  convention  with  the  United  States i.  342 

escapes  the  conspiracy  of  Cerrachi i.  344 

escapes  the  Infernal  Machine i.  355 

arranges  the  concordat !•  367 

makes  peace  with  Russia  and  the  Porte i.  374 

acquires  Louisiana  from  Spain i.  375 

agrees  to  the  treaty  of  Amiens i.  382 

eliminates  the  tribune i.  386 

is  made  consul  for  life i.  387 

summary  of  his  works ii.  14 

his  difficulties  with  England ii.  17 

his  conference  with  Lord  Whit  worth ii.  19 

occupies  Naples   ii.  22 

invades  Hanover ii.  22 

prepares  for  a  descent  upon  England ii.  27 

extraordinary  plots  against  him .ii.  28 

causes  the  execution  of  the  Duke  d'Enghein ,ii.  30 

establishes  the  French  empire ii.  39 

his  difficulties  with  Russia ii.  44 

Russia  refuses  to  recognize  him  as  Emperor ii.  46 

is  recognized  by  Austria ii.  46 

invites  the  Pope  to  his  coronation ii.  48 

his  letter  to  the  Pope ii.  48 

offers  peace  to  England ii.  49 

organizes  his  grand  army ii.  50 

prepares  to  embark  for  England ii.  55 

concerts  movements  of  French  fleets    ii.  58 

assumes  the  Iron  Crown  of  Italy ii.  65 

is  crowned  at  Milan ii.  70 

marches  from  Boulogne  for  the  Danube ii.  80 

passes  the  Rhine   ii.  82 

marches  on  Donawerth ii.  83 

invests  Ulin ii.  93 

directs  his  forces  on  the  Inn ii.  101 

passes  the  Inn,  the  Salza,  and  the  Traun ii.  102 


430  GENERAL      INDEX. 

PAGB 

Napoleon,  marches  on  Vienna ii.  103 

at  Lintz ii.   no 

receives  from  Austria  propositions  for  an  armistice ii.  Ill 

enters  Vienna. ii.   117 

surprises  the  great  bridges  on  the  Danube ii.  119 

reprimands  Mural  for  negotiating  with  Kutusof ii.  121 

measure  taken  by  him  at  Schcenbrunu ii.   123 

sends  Savary  to  the  Emperor  Alexander ii.  123 

dispositions  for  the  reception  of  the  Russians ii.  132 

defeats  the  Austrians  at  Austerlitz ii.  137 

returns  to  Vienna ii.   144 

treats  with  Prussia  and  Austria ii.  145 

dethrones  the  dynasty  of  Naples ii.  147 

his  direction  of  naval  operations ii.  148 

returns  to  France ii.  155 

his  reception  at  Kehl ii.  156 

his  reception  at  Paris ii.  156 

investigates  affairs  of  the  bank ii.  157 

punishes  Ouvrard  and  his  partners ii.  158 

has  difficulty  in  forming  alliances ii.  162 

adopts  a  system  of  Federate  Stales ii.  163 

causes  of  his  additions  to  the  empire ii.  163 

has  new  difficulties  with  Prussia ii.  166 

offers  reparation  for  violation  of  her  territory „ ii.  167 

enters  into  a  new  treaty  with  Prussia ii.  170 

has  difficulties  with  Austria ii.  171 

makes  Joseph  King  of  Naples ii.  173 

"      Louis  King  of  Holland ii.  174 

"      Eugene  Viceroy  of  Italy .ii.  174 

"      Murat  Grand  Duke  of  Berg ii.  174 

"      Pauline  Princess  of  Guastalla ii.  174 

"      Eliza  Princess  of  Lucca,  etc ii.  174 

forms  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine ii.  178 

mechanism  of  his  government ii.  183 

restores  public  credit ii.  185 

regulates  the  conscription ii.  185 

erects  public  monuments ii.  185 

makes  internal  improvements ii.  186 

constructs  military  and  maritime  works ii.  187 

negotiates  with  England ii.  192 

treats  with  Russia ii.  195 

is  vexed  at  Alexander's  refusal  to  ratify  it ii.  195 

sends  Sebastiani  to  Constantinople ii.  198 

receives  the  extraordinary  ultimatum  of  Prussia ii.  202 

assembles  his  armies  for  war  with  Prussia ii.  202 

his  plan  of  operations ii.  204 

seizes  the  enemy's  communications ii.  207 

his  movements  in  Saxony ii.  207 


GENERAL     INDEX.  431 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  his  decisive  manœuvre  at  Géra ii.  208 

defeats  the  Prussians  at  Jena. ii.  209 

,:         "  "         at  Auerstedt ii.  212 

marches  on  Potsdam  and  Berlin i.  222 

visits  the  Cabinet  of  Frederick  the  Great ii.  222 

enters  Berlin ii.  224 

his  reception  there ii.  225 

pardons  Prince  llatzfeld ii.  226 

dispositions  to  destroy  Hohenlohe ii.  230 

measures  for  securing  his  conquests ii.  233 

forms  an  armistice  with  the  Saxons ii.  234 

issues  the  Berlin  Decree ii.  237 

advances  to  the  Vistula ii.  241 

plans  the  reestablishment  of  Poland ii.  245 

sends  for  Kosciusko,  who  declines  to  act ii.  246 

reception  at  Posen  and  Warsaw ii.  246 

is  disappointed  in  the  action  of  the  Poles ii.  247 

takes  measures  for  securing  his  rear ii.  248 

position  of  his  army ii.  252 

takes  the  offensive  against  the  Russians   ii.  253 

attacks  Pultusk  and  Golymin ii.  255 

his  army  go  into  winter-quarters ii.  257 

Benningsen  attacks  his  left ii.  261 

re-opens  the  campaign ^ ii.  2G3 

direction  for  movements  of  his  army ii.  263 

defeats  them  at  Eylau ii.  265 

returns  into  winter-quarters ii.  272 

difficulties  of  his  position ii.  273 

is  menaced  by  Spain ii.  274 

negotiates  with  Austria ii.  279 

negotiates  at  Finkenstein ii.  284 

instructions  to  Mortier  in  Sweden ii.  290 

directs  the  siege  of  Dantzic ii.  294 

reproves  Lefebvre ii.  295 

renews  hostilities ii.  298 

marches  to  the  assistance  of  Ney ii.  301 

defeats  the  Russians  at  Friedland i.  306 

meets  Alexander  at  Tilsit ii.  313 

concludes  a  treaty  of  peace ii.  314 

establishes  the  Continental  system ii.  327 

sends  Brune  to  assist  the  Danes ii.  339 

distributes  new  titles  of  nobility ii.  344 

his  object  in  this ii.  345 

suppresses  the  Tribunat )'.  348 

difficulties  with  Portugal .ii.  353 

decides  to  occupy  that  kingdom ii.  355 

treats  at  Foutainbleau  with  Spain ii.  355 

sends  Junot  into  Portugal ii.  356 


432  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  goes  to  Italy ii-  359 

"         b;is  an  interview  with  Lucien  at  Mantua ii.  359 

"         issues  the  Milan  Decree ii.  360 

"         Las  new  difficulties  with  the  Pope ii.  361 

"         his  vast  designs  for  improving  Italy ii.  363 

"        transfers  the  Pope  to  Paris ii.  364 

"         occupies  Pome ii.  365 

"         annexes  Tuscany  to  France ii.  365 

"         renounces  the  alliance  with  Ferdinand ii.  366 

"         occupies  the  Spanish  ibrtitications ii.  366 

"         his  instructions  to  Murat ii.  371 

"         meets  the  Spanish  court  at  Bayonne ii.  375 

"         determines  to  remove  the  present  dynasty ii.  376 

"    '    places  Joseph  on  the  throne  of  Spain ii.  390 

"         difficulties  of  his  position ii.  412 

"         his  chances  of  success   ii.  413 

"         confers  with  Alexander  at  Erfurth ii.  415 

"         sets  out  for  Spain ii.  416 

"        joins  Joseph  at  Vittoria ii.  418 

"         position  of  Ins  forces ii.  418 

"         decides  upon  his  system  of  warfare  in  Spain ii.  419 

'•         intends  to  indemnify  the  people ii.  420 

"         his  plan  of  operations    h.  421 

"         at  battle  of  Burgos ii-  422 

"         defeats  Blake  at  Espiuosa ii.  422 

"  "     Castanos  and  Palafox  at  Tudela ii.  423 

"  "     the  Spanish  reserve  at  Sommo-Sierra ii.  426 

"         enters  Madrid ii.  426 

"        addresses  a  deputation  of  notables ii.  429 

"         marches  against  the  English ii.  433 

"         directs  the  operations  of  bis  generals ii.  434 

"         battle  of  Gorunna ii.  434 

"         difficulties  with  Austria  recall  him  to  France ii.  449 

"         leaves  Joseph  in  command  with  Jourdan  for  adviser ii.  449 

"         condition  of  Spain  at  his  departure ii.  450 

"         returns  to  France ii.  450 

"         reproves  Talleyrand  for  bis  intrigues   ii.  451 

"         preparations  of  Austria  against hi-     17 

"         secret  societies  organized  in  Germany  against in.     1 9 

"         bitter  animosities  of  Chasteler hi-     24 

"         Austria  takes  the  initiative  against iii.     25 

"        organizes  his  army iii-     27 

"  "  «       "      iii.     29 

"  rejects  the  application  of  the  King  of  Bavaria  to  place  his  son 

in  command iii-     29 

"         sends  Berthier  to  assemble  bis  forces 'ii-     30 

"         instructions  to  Berthier iii-     31 

"         arrives  at  In^olstadt m-     32 


GENERAL     INDEX.  433 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  gives  orders  to  repair  the  faults  of  Berthier iiL     32 

battle  of  Thann . iii.     34 

moves  against  iIk-  Austrian  centre iii.     35 

battle  of  Abensoerg iiL     36 

"     ofLandshut iii.     38 

sends  Bessières  in  pursuit  of  Ililler iii.     40 

battle  of  Eekmuhl iii.    40 

forces  the  Archduke  to  retreat  into  Bohemia iii.     41 

marches  ou  Vienna iii.     43 

visit  to  the  castle  of  Diernsteiu iii.     45 

entrance  into  Vienna iii.     49 

makes  dispositions  for  the  passage  of  the  Danube iii.     51 

punishes  a  surgeon iii.     51 

passes  the  Danube iii.     57 

battle  of  Essling iii.     61 

calls  a  council  of  war iii.     66 

at  the  death  of  Lannes iii.     6S 

withdraws  his  troops  to  the  island  of  Lobau iii.     CQ 

opens  communication  with  his  army  in  Italy iii.     75 

is  reënforced  by  Eugene's  army iiL     80 

unites  Rome  and  the  States  of  the  Church  to  the  Empire iii.     88 

is  excommunicated  by  the  Pope iii.     88 

transfers  the  Pope  to  Savona iii.     88 

his  measures  to  repair  the  check  at  Essling. iii.     89 

prepares  to  again  pass  the  Danube   iii.     98 

arrangement  of  the  Archduke  to  oppose  the  passage iii.     99 

prepares  the  bridges iii.  101 

battle  of  Wagram iii.  105 

reproves  Bernadotte iii.   112 

pursues  the  Austrians iii.   1 14 

forms  an  armistice iii.  116 

prepares  for  a  renewal  of  hostilities .iii.  12'2 

invites  Russia  to  take  part  in  negotiations  with  Austria hi.  121 

Stabs'  attempt  to  assassinate iii.  133 

treats  with  Austria iii.  1 34 

destroys  the  fortifications  of  Vienna iii.  138 

sends  an  expedition  against  the  Tyrol iii.  139 

desires  to  consolidate  his  empire iii.  199 

is  divorced  from  Josephine iii.  200 

negotiates  a  marriage  with  the  Princess  Anne  of  Russia iii.  200 

advantages  of  an  alliance  with  Austria   iii.  202 

decides  on  the  latter iii-  203 

negotiates  with  Schwartzonberg iii.  204 

marriage  fetes  in  Paris iii-  205 

character  of  Maria  Louisa iii.  205 

offers  peace  to  England hi.  206 

prepares  for  a  new  campaign  in  Spain iii.  203 

his  reasons  for  not  going  there  in  person iii.  209 

^OL.  iv. — 28. 


•±34  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  his  plan  of  campaign iii.  210 

bis  chances  of  success iii.  222 

his  action  on  Bernadotte's  election  as  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden .  iii    244 

complaints  of  the  Dutch  against  his  Continental  system i,i.  246 

makes  a  new  effort  to  negotiate  with  England iii.  247 

punishes  Fouché's  intrigues .  iii.  :48 

annexes  the  mouths  of  the  Ems,  etc.,  to  the  Empire iii.  249 

makes  a  tour  in  Holland    iii.  250 

incorporates  Rome  into  the  Empire iii.  251 

assembles  a  council  of  bishops iii.   253 

his  relations  with  other  nations iii.   257 

Prussia,  an  alliance  with '.ii.  259 

new  difficulties  with  Russia iii.  260 

his  advice  to  Joseph  on  affairs  in  Spain iii.  26  5 

makes  Suchet  a  marshal  of  France iii.  30  L 

confers  on  him  the  title  of  Duke  of  Albufera iii.  30G 

negotiates  with  Russia ii:.  315 

reason's  of,  for  not  postponing  the  war  in  the  north iii.  317 

opinions  of  his  counsellors iii.  319 

his  chances  of  success iii.  322 

his  opinion  of  the  Russian  army iii.  322 

forms  an  alliance  with  Prussia iii.  327 

efforts  to  arrange  difficulties  with  Russia. . .  .s. . . ,. iii.  .328 

forms  an  alliance  with  Austria. iii.  329 

proposes  peace  to  England iii.  330 

receives  the  ultimatum  of  Russia iii.  332 

repairs  to  Dresden iii.  334 

sends  the  Abbe  de  Pradt  to  Warsaw iii.  336 

difficulties  with  Bernadotte iii.  339 

prepares  to  open  the  campaign  against  Russia iii.  339 

organization  of  his  army iii.  343 

determines  to  pierce  the  enemy's  centre iii.  344 

passes  the  Niémen iii.  346 

enters  Wilna iii.  349 

his  delay  at  Wilna iii.  349 

replies  to  the  mission  of  Balaschof. iii.  350 

replies  to  the  Polish  Deputation iii.  351 

is  dissatisfied  with  the  operations  of  Jerome. . , iii.  355 

advances  on  Polotsk iii.   356 

reaches  the  D  wina iii.  358 

battle  of  Ostrowno iii.  359 

halts  at  Witepsk iii.  362 

calls  a  council  of  war iii.  365 

marches  on  Smolensko iii.  366 

'defeats  the  Russians  in  battle  of  Smolensko iii.  368 

his  interview  with  a  Russian  Priest , iii.  369 

determines  to  march  on  Moscow iii.  372 

battle  of  Ya'ontina .iii.  375 


GENERAL     INDEX.  435 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  battle  of  Gorodeczno hi.  378 

'•'     ofPalotsk iii.  378 

"  "      of  Borodino iii.   387 

"         enters  Moscow iii.  400 

"         occupies  the  Kremlin iii.  401 

"         attempts  to  prevent  the  burning  of  the  city iii.  402 

"         projects  a  march  on  St.  Petersburg iii.  406 

"         attempts  to  open  negotiations iii.  409 

"         embarrassments  of  his  position   iii.  410 

"         awaits  an  answer  from  St.  Petersburg iii.  413 

"         decides  to  retreat  from  Russia iv.     13 

"         leaves  Moscow . . .  ,i v.     14 

"         his  immense  train  of  followers iv.     15 

"         leaves  Mortier  to  blow  up  the  Kremlin iv.     16 

"         retreats  on  Borowsk iv.     16 

"         battle  of  Malojaroslawetz iv.     19 

"        position  of  the  respective  armies iv.     20 

"         has  but  one  road  of  retreat iv.     20 

"        defeats  the  Russians  at  Wiasma iv.     21 

"         condition  of  his  army iv.     22 

"         hears  of  conspiracy  of  Mallet  and  Lahorie iv.     22 

"         arrives  at  Smolensko iv.     25 

"         attempts  of  the  enemy  to  cut  off  his  retreat iv.     26 

"         retreats  on  Krasnoi iv.     27 

"         terrible  condition  of  his  army iv.     30 

"         difficulties  of  crossing  the  Beresina iv.     33 

"         dispositions  for  the  passage iv.     34 

"         terrible  loss  of  life iv.     37 

"         continues  the  retreat   iv.     39 

"         turns  over  the  command  to  Murat  and  starts  for  Paris. . iv.     39 

"        his  motives  for  this  measure iv.     40 

"         causes  of  his  failure  in  this  campaign iv.     40 

"         returns  to  Paris iv.     64 

"         negotiat  ss  with  Austria iv.     66 

"        prepares  for  a  new  campaign iv.     70 

"         remarks  on  his  military  position iv.     71 

"         Prussia  declares  against  him iv.     73 

"         returns  to  his  army iv.     78 

"         advances  on  the  Saale iv.     79 

"         organization  of  his  army iv.     80 

"         effects  a  junction  with  Eugene iv.     81 

"         directs  his  forces  on  Leipsic iv.  '  82 

"         visits  the  monument  of  Gustavus  Adolphus iv.     83 

"        battle  of  Lutzen iv.     84 

"         pursues  the  allies  on  Dresden iv.   '84 

"         sends  Eugene  to  organize  an  army  in  Italy iv.     91 

"         accepts  proposition  for  a  congress i  v.     94 

"         sends  Caulaincourl  to  Russia iv.     95 


436  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGB 

Napoleon,  goes  to  Bautzen iv.     96 

directs  Ney's  movements  to  turn  the  enemy's  position iv.     98 

battle  of  Bautzen iv.  101 

at  Duroc's  death i v.   106 

accepts  armistice  of  Neumark iv.   108 

treats  with  Denmark iv.  109 

receives  a  third  mission  of  Bubua iv.  109 

his  interview  with  Metternich iv.  112 

his  envoys  to  the  Congress  of  Prague iv.  114 

his  interview  with  the  Empress  at  Mayence iv.  114 

his  negotiations  at  Prague iv.  116 

efforts  of  the  coalition  to  crush  him iv.  133 

organization  of  his  army  in  autumn  of  1813 iv.  136 

position  of  his  forces iv.  136 

combinations  from  which  he  had  to  choose iv.  137 

his  preliminary  movements iv.  141 

his  plan  of  operations iv.  142 

marches  against  Blucher iv.  143 

his  instructions  to  Macdonald iv.  143 

his  position  at  Dresden iv.  148 

his  project  to  cut  off  the  enemy  at  Koenigstein iv.  151 

battle  of  Dresden iv.   153 

battle  of  Koenigstein iv.  159 

disaster  of  Culm iv.  160 

"        of  Gross  Beeren iv.  163 

marches  to  Macdonald's  assistance iv.  173 

defeat  at  Dennewitz iv.  174 

remarks  on  his  plan  of  campaign iv.  180 

makes  a  demonstration  on  Bohemia iv.  183 

his  third  attempt  against  Blucher iv.  183 

marches  against  Blucher  and  Bernadotte iv.  185 

profit  of  manceuvering iv.  187 

his  plan  made  impracticable  by  defection  of  Bavaria iv.  189 

marches  on  Leipsic iv.  192 

operations  of  first  day  of  Leipsic iv.   196 

proposes  an  armistice,  which  is  refused iv.  204 

operations  of  second  day  of  Leipsic iv.  206 

determines  to  retreat  on  third  day iv.  212 

neglect  in  preparation  of  bridges iv.  213 

fatal  destruction  of  the  bridge  of  Elster iv.  216 

his  exertions  to  repair  the  disasters  of  this  loss iv.  217 

retreats  on  Erfurth iv.  218 

is  pursued  by  the  allies iv.  218 

is  deserted  by  Murat iv.  219 

the  Bavarians  turn  against  him iv.  219 

Wrede's  attempt  to  intercept  his  retreat iv.  221 

defeats  the  Bavarians  at  Hanau iv.  221 

retires  behind  the  Rhine iv.  222 


GENERAL      INDEX.  437 

Napoleon,  condition  in  -which  he  finds  France iv.  231 

"         changes  his  ministry  to  satisfy  public  opinion iv.  232 

"         his  communication  to  the  legislative  body iv.  233 

"         dissolves  that  body .', iv.  234 

"         prepares  for  defense iv.  234 

"         negotiates  for  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand iv.  237 

"        his  instructions  to  Eugene iv.  238 

"         appoints  Joseph  Lieutenant  of  the  Empire iv.  2  13 

"        takes  the  field  to  repel  the  invaders iv.  243 

"         numbers  of  the  opposing  forces iv.  243 

"         attacks  Blucher iv.  244 

"        battle  of  Brienne iv.  245 

"         sends  Gaulaincourt  to  Congress  of  Chatillon iv.  249 

"         falls  on  Blucher's  left  flank iv.  250 

"         battle  of  Champ- Aubert iv.  251 

"  "      of  Montmirail Iv.  252 

"  "     of  Chateau-Thierry iv.  252 

"  ''      cf  Vaux-Champs iv.  253 

"         is  obliged  to  go  to  the  defence  of  Paris iv.  255 

"         resumes  the  offensive iv.  256 

"         battle  of  Xangis iv.  256 

"  "     of  Montercau >v.  256 

"         forces  Schwartzenberg  to  evacuate  Troyes iv.  257 

"         negotiates  with  the  allies  at  Lusigny iv.  259 

"         marches  against  Blucher ' v.  262 

"         forces  him  to  repass  the  Aisne iv.  263 

"         battle  of  Craone iv-  264 

"         rejects  the  ultimatum  of  Chatillon iv.  265 

"         battle  of  Laon iv-  267 

«      of  Reims iv.  269 

"        directs  the  Empress  and  Regency  to  remove  to  Blois iv.  274 

"         moves  against  the  grand  allied  army iv.  274 

battle  of  Arcis iv.  275 

"         his  perilous  position 1V-  2  '  " 

"        proposes  to  operate  on  the  enemy's  rear iv.  278 

"         is  separated  from  Marmont  and  Mortier iv.   281 

"        his  efforts  to  communicate  with  them »v.  283 

"         he  flies  to  defend  the  capital |v-  287 

battle  of  Paris iv-  288 

"        returns  to  Fontainbleau iv.  289 

"         intrigues  of  the  factions  against  him IV-   291 

"         abdicates  at  Fontainbleau 1V-  293 

"         conduct  of  his  marshals ir-  298 

"         is  exiled  to  Elba iv.  303 

"         his  journey  through  the  south  of  France |V.  304 

"         his  life  at  Elba |v-   308 

"         his  reasons  for  returning  to  France ,v-  317 

"         his  departure  from  Elba ,v-  318 


438  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  lands  at  Cannes iv.  318 

reception  in  France iv.  319 

marches  on  Lyons iv.  319 

his  reception  there iv.  320 

his  celebrated  Decrees  of  Lyons iv.  320 

meets  Ney  at  Chalons iv.  321 

is  joined  by  the   troops  of  the  camp  of  Melun iv.  322 

enters  the  Tuileries,  March  20th i v.  323 

reascends  the  throne iv.  323 

organizes  his   ministry iv.  324 

his  position  towards  Europe iv.  325 

coalition  against  him iv.  326 

the  Congress  of  Vienna  declares  him  an  outlaw iv.  327 

the  troops  in  southwest  declare  for  him iv.  328 

represses  civil  war  in  La  Vendée iv.  328 

his  plans  frustrated  by  premature  operations  of  Murat iv.  330 

prepares  to  repel  the  aggression  of  the  allies iv.  330 

motives,  for  these  preparations iv.  333 

refuses  to  resort  to  revolutionary  means iv.  334 

his  address  at  the  Champ-de-Mai iv.  335 

takes  the  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  charter iv.  337 

discourse  at  the  opening  of  the  Chambers iv.  337 

their  addresses  to  him iv.  339 

his  remarkable  reply iv.  340 

his  military  preparations iv.  341 

fortifies  Paris  and  Lyons iv.  343 

"         other  points iv.  345 

decides  to  fall  upon  the  Anglo-Prussians iv.  345 

joins  his  army  at  Beaumont iv.  347 

reorganizes  his  army iv.  347 

his  plan  of  operations iv.  348 

movements  of  bis  troops iv.  349 

disposition  of  his  forces iv.  352 

occupies  Charleroy iv.  553 

his  orders  to  Ney  in  regard  to  Quatre-Bras iv.  355 

reconnoitres  the  position  of  the  Prussians iv.  353 

battle  of  Ligny , iv.  359 

new  orders  sent  to  Ney iv.  359 

waits  for  his  operations  on  Quatre-Bras iv.  366 

sends  Grouchy  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians iv.  367 

marches  on  Quatre-Bras iv.  367 

pursues  the  English  to  the  field  of  Waterloo iv.  307 

orders  Grouchy  to  occupy  the  defile  of  St.  Lambert iv.  368 

his  reasons  for  attacking  Wellington iv.  368 

his  plan  of  attack iv.  369 

begins  the  battle  of  Waterloo iv.  37 1 

discovers  the  Prussians  on  his  right iv.  371 

first  attack  on  the  centre iv.  372 


GENERAL      INDEX.  439 

PAGE 

Napoleon,  attacks  the  right  at  Hougomont iv.  373 

"         his  second  attack  on  the  centre iv.  374 

"         grand  charge  of  his  cavalry iv.  375 

"         Blucher,  Pircli,  and  Bulow  advance  on  his  right iv.  377 

"         defeat  of  his  right iv.  379 

"         his  last  efforts  and  rout iv.  379 

"         retreats  on  Avesnes iv.  385 

"         returns  to  Paris   iv.  386 

"         conspiracies  in  Paris  against  him .iv.  389 

"         arrives  at  the  Palace  Elysée-Bourbon iv.  390 

"         consults  with  his  miuisters  and  friends iv.  390 

"         his  second  abdication iv.  393 

"         Pouché  seeks  to  secure  his  person iv.  395 

"         retires  from  France iv.  395 

"        embarks  at  Rochefort iv.  396 

"         takes  refuge  on  the  British  ship  Bellerophon iv.  396 

"         his  letter  to  the  Prince  Regent iv.  396 

"         is  exiled  to  St.  Helena   iv.  396 

"         his  protest  against  this  barbarous  treatment iv.  396 

"         protest  of  Lord  Holland  and  the  Duke  of  Sussex  against  his 

imprisonment  and  exile iv.  397 

"         his  occupation  at  St.  Helena iv.  397 

"         his  death iv.  398 

'•         removal  of  his  remains  to  Paris iv.  400 

Naval  tactics,  remarks  on ii.  181 

Nelson,  at  battle  of  Cape  St.  Yincent i.  181 

"       at  battle  of  Aboukir i.  221 

1!       at  battle  of  Copenhagen i.   3G0 

sails  again  for  Egypt ii.     60 

"       returns  to  England ii.     61 

"       before  Cadiz ii.   150 

"       at  battle  of  Trafalgar ii.  151 

"       death  of ii.  152 

'•       sketch  of  his  life ii.   151 

Neiss,  siege  of ii.  297 

Ney,  character  of ii.     53 

made  a  marshal ii.     53 

commands  the  corps  in  the  campaign  of  1805 ii.     82 

repairs  the  faults  of  Murat  at  Elchingen ii.     91 

conduct  of,  at  the  battle  of  Elchingen ii.     91 

invests  Ulm , ii.     93 

attacks  Ulm ii.     94 

at  battle  of  Jena ii.  209 

at  battle  of  Eylau ii.  270 

at  battle  of  Friedland ii.   307 

operations  of,  in  the  Asturias iii.   157 

quarrels  with  Soult iii.   158 

defeats  Wilson - il  174 


440  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Ney,  accompanies  Massena  into  Portugal iii.  224 

"     at  battle  of  Busaco iii.  226 

"    commands  3d  corps  in  campaign  of  1812 iii.  344 

"     at  battle  of  Smolensko iii.  367 

"     his  pursuit  of  the  Russians iii.  373 

"     at  battle  of  Valoutina iii.  375 

"     at  battle  of  Moscow.*. iii.  388 

"    at  battle  of  Krasnoi iv.  29 

"     at  the  passage  of  the  Beresina iv.  35 

"     at  the  crossing  of  the  Niémen , iv.  48 

"    his  reply  to  General  Dumas iv.  48 

"     at  battle  of  Lutzen iv.  85 

"    loss  of,  at  Lutzen iv.  88 

"     attempts  to  turn  the  enemy's  position iv.  98 

"     arrives  at  Klix iv.  100 

"     at  battle  of  Bautzen iv.  101 

"     at  battle  of  Dresden iv.  156 

"    is  defeated  at  Dennewitz iv.  174 

"     at  battle  of  Leipsic iv.  198 

"     declares  for  Napoleon  in  1815    iv.  321 

"     ordered  against  Quatre-Bras iv.  355 

"     his  delay iv.  356 

"     at  battle  of  Quatre-Bras iv.  363 

"     at  Waterloo iv.  37 1 

0. 

Ocana,  battle  of iii.  179 

Oporto,  assault  of iii.  144 

Order  of  the  Trois  Toisons,  instituted ii.  345 

"         "          "           "         objections  to. ....  - il  345 

Orleans  Family,  account  of i.  66 

Ostrolenka,  battle  of ii.  273 

Ostrowno,  battle  of iii.  359 

Oudinot,  Duke  of  Reggio,  sketch  of i.  258 

"         repulse  of,  at  Felkirch i.  258 

"         at  battle  of  Zurich i.  285 

"        belonged  to  Lannes'  corps  in  1805 ii.  82 

"         at  Austerlitz ii.  140 

"        at  Ostrolenka ii.  273 

"         at  siege  of  Dantzic ii.  295 

"        at  Friedland ii.  306 

"         commands  reserve  at  Frankfort iii.  28 

"        joins  2d  corps iii.  29 

"         at  Essling iii.  61 

"        at  Wagram iii.  105 

"        made  a  marshal iii.  112 

"         commands  2d  corps  in  1812 iii.  344 


GENERAL     INDEX.  441 


Oudinot,  operations  of,  on  the  Drissa iii.  363 

"  at  battle  of  Polotsk iii.  378 

"  at  battle  of  the  Beresina iv.  34 

"  commands  12th  corps  in  1813 iv.  80 

"  at  Bautzen iv.  101 

"  defeated  at  Gros-Beeren iv.  1G3 

"  at  Brienne iv.  246 

"  at  Champ- Aubert iv.  251 

"  at  Nangis iv.  256 

Ouissant,  battle  of i.  63 


P. 

Paoli,  rejects  Napoleon's  plan  of  a  history  of  Corsica i.     37 

Parthenopean  Republic,  established i.  255 

Passage,  of  the  Po  in  1796 i.     95 

"  "  "      1800 i.  326 

of  the  Piave i.  169 

of  the  Ticino .i.  324 

"         of  the  Great  St.  Bernard  in  1800 i.  319 

"         of  the  Splugen i.  352 

"         of  the  Rhine  in  1805 ii.     82 

1:         of  the  Inn,  Salza,  and  Traun ii.  102 

"         of  the  Adige  in  1805 ii.  107 

"         of  the  Danube,  before  Wagram iii.     51 

"         of  the  Niémen  in  1812 iii.  346 

"         of  the  Beresina iv.     33 

"         of  the  Niémen  in  the  retreat  from  Russia iv.     47 

Pauline  Bonaparte,  sister  of  Napoleon,  sketch  of  her  life i.  403 

"  "  marries  General  Le  Clerc i.  403 

"  second  marriage  with  Prince  Borghese i.  404 

"  "  death  of i.  405 

Philippeaux,  at  St.  Jean  d'Acre i.  229 

"  sketch  of  his  life i.  229 

Piave,  passage  of i.  169 

"      battle  of iii.     76 

Pichegru,  plots  of ii.     28 

"        death  of ii.     34 

Piedmont,  condition  of,  in  1796 i.  134 

"         provisionally  annexed  to  France i.  378 

Pitt,  sketch  of  his  life ii.  165 

•'    opposition  to  France  in  1805 ii.     63 

"    death  of ii.  164 

Poland,  affairs  of,  during  French  Revolution i.     52 

"       insurrection  of i.     64 

"       condition  of,  in  1807 ii.  245 

"       Austrian  invasion  of,  in  1809 iii.     84 

"      operations  in,  in  1812 iii.  353 


442  GENERAL      INDEX. 

PAGE 

Poland,  De  Pradts  mission  to iii.  336 

"       reestablishment  of,  proclaimed iii.  351 

Polotsk,  battle  of iii.  378 

Pomerania,  occupied  by  the  French iii.  323 

Poniatowski,  operations  of,  in  1809 iii.     81 

"  at  battle  of  Smolensko iii.  366 

"  "  "      Porodino iii.  387 

"  commands  the  8th  corps  in  1813 iv.     80" 

"  at  battle  of  Leipsic. iv.  215 

"  made  a  marshal iv.  216 

"  death  of iv.  216 

Pope  the,  demonstrations  against,  in  1796 L  111 

"        makes  an  armistice, i.  112 

"        discussions  with i.  131 

"        abdicates i.  200 

"        Napoleon's  letter  to ii.     48 

"        at  Paris ii.     48 

"        quarrels  with  Napoleon ii.  361 

"        under  English  influence ii.  362 

"        object  of  his  transfer  to  France ii.   364 

"        bull  of,  against  Napoleon iii.     88 

"        transferred  to  Savona iii.     88 

Porto- Ferrajo,  occupied  by  the  English i.  137 

Portugal,  purchases  her  neutrality  in  1807 ii.  351 

'•       Napoleon's  reasons  for  occupying ii.  353 

"        Junot's  occupation  of. ii.   356 

"        Junot's  critical  position  in ii.  402 

"        general  interest  of ii.  402 

"       sacrifices  imposed  on ii.  403 

".       general  insurrection  of ii.  404 

"       ten  ible  results  of  insurrection  in ii.  405 

"        landing  of  Wellington  in ii.  406 

"       Junot  evacuates ii.  407 

"        advance  of  the  English  from ii.  432 

"        Soult  sent  to ii.  447 

"       new  descent  of  "Wellington  into iii.  153 

"       Massena's  expedition  into   iii.  223 

"        third  invasion  of iii.   225 

"       Wellington's  fortified  position  in iii.  228 

"        Massena's  position  in iii.  230 

"        sufferings  of  the  French  army  in iii.  234 

"       evacuation  of,  by  Massena iii.  277 

"       Wellington  forced  to  retreat  to iii.  2S6 

Pradt,  Abbe  de,  sketch  of  his  life  and  character iii.  337 

"  mission  of,  to  Poland iii.  336 

"  treatment  of,  by  Caulaiucourt,  in  1814 iii.  338 

Prenzlow,  battle  of ii.  232 

Presburg,  treaty  of ii.  145 


GENERAL      INDEX.  443 

PAGE 

Presburg,  bombardment  of iii.  94 

Prussia,  invades  Franco i.  46 

treats  with  France i.  66 

embarrassments  of,  in  1799 i.  239 

threatens  to  join  tbo  coalition  in  1805. ii.  100 

treats  with  Napoleon  at  Vienna  in  1805 - . .  .ii.  145 

perverts  the  terms  of  that  treaty ii.  167 

makes  a  new  treaty ii  171 

condition  of,  in  180G ii.  190 

declares  war  against  France ii.  201 

generals  of ii.  205 

armistice  of  Napoleon  with ii.  239 

refuses  to  ratify  this  armistice ii.  249 

treatment  of,  at  Tilsit ii.  315 

condition  of,  in  1809 iii.  21 

Napoleon's  faulty  relations  with i.i.  258 

secret  societies  in iii.  259 

offers  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance iii.  259 

the  offer  postponed iii.  200 

people  of,  hostile  to  Napoleon iii.  260 

treaty  of  alliance  with,  concluded iii.  327 

declares  war  against  Napoleon,  in  1813 iv.  73 

incites  a  levec-en-masse iv.  80 

Pultusk,  battle  of ii.  255 

Pyramids,  battle  of i.  219 


Qttasdaxowicii,  on  lake  Garda  and  the  Mincio i.  115 

"               surprised  at  Gavardo i.  117 

"               at  battle  of  I3assano i.  1 25 

Quiberon,  expedition i.  68 

R. 

Raaiî,  battle  of iii.  91 

Rampou,  defends  fort  near  Savona i.  87 

Rastadt,  negotiations  of. i.  192 

"         "    continued i.  249 

"        French  ambassadors  murdered  at i.  261 

Regency  of  Maria  Louisa  in  1814  retires  to  Blois iv.  274 

Reggio,  Duke  of,  vide  Oudinot 

Republic,  of  France  proclaimed i.  46 

'•         "    Cisalpine  proclaimed i.  129 

"         "    Cispadane  proclaimed i.  129 

"         "    Trauspadane  proclaimed i.  129 

"         "    Rome i.  199 

"         "    Tarthenopean i.  255 


4:4:4:  GENERAL     INDEX. 

PAGE 

Revolution  in  France,  summary  of .  0  * i.     38 

"  of  Lombardy i.  1U3 

"  in  Rome i.  198 

"  of  the  18th  Brumaire i.  301 

"  of  Aranjuez ii.  369 

Rewbel,  sketch  of  his   life i.     72 

Rhine,  passage  of,  in  1805 ii.     82 

"      Confederation  of,  established ii.   178 

"  "  Presidency  of ii.  181 

Riveras,  définition  and  description   of i.     86 

Rivoli,  battle  of i.  155 

Rogniat,  sketch  of  his  life ii.  445 

"         at  second  siege  of  Saragossa ii.  445 

"         criticism  of,  on  the  battle  of  Essling iii.     70 

Romagna,  expedition  into i.  159 

Romana,  escape  of,  from  Denmark ii.  401 

,:         sketch  of  his  life ii.  410 

"         operations  of,  during  Moore's  retreat  on  Corunna ii.  434 

"  '      controversy  of,  with  the  Junta  of  Seville iii.  184 

;'         character  of iii.   184 

Rome,  demonstration   against i.  Ill 

"     armistice  with i.  112 

"     discussions  with i.  131 

"  "  "      i.  166 

"     revolution  in i.  198 

"     republic  of,  declared i.  199 

"     departure  of  the  Pope  from i.  200 

"     occupied  by  Napoleon  in  1808 ii.  365 

Rugen,  capture  of    by  Brune ii.  339 

Russia,  conduct  of,  during  the  French  Revolution i.     45 

"      int  ïrêst  of,  in  the  state  of  Europe L  239 

"      forms  an  alliance  with   Austria i.  243 

"      interest  of,  in  Malta i.  251 

"      sends  her  army  into  Italy i.  256 

"      her  army  on  the  Trebia i.  270 

"      friendly  relations  with  France i.  391 

"      difficulties  with  France ii.     44 

"      refuses  to  recognize  the  French  Empire ii.     46 

"      negotiations  of,  with  Napoleon ii.     65 

"      alliance  of,  with  England ii.     67 

"      proposes  to  negotiate ii.     75 

"      army  of,    under  Kutusof  passes  the  Danube.". ii.  114 

"  "         is  defeated  at  Austerlitz ii.  140 

"      rejects  treaty  signed  by  D'Oubril ii.  195 

"      army  of,  in  1807 ii.   250 

"      defeated  at  Eylau ii.  265 

"      defeated  at  Friedland ii.  306 

"      the  peace  of  Tilsit ii.  314 


GENEBAL     INDEX.  445 

PAGE 

Russia,  takes  offense  at  the  treaty  of  Vienna iii.  1^7 

war  ot,  with  Sweden hi.  195 

"         "      Turkey iii.  196 

"           "      iii.  254 

hi.  312 

successful  campaign  of,  against  Persia iii.  313 

war  of  1812  with  France,  causes  of iii.  314 

military  chances  of  Napoleon  against iii.  322 

ultimatum  of  sent  to  Napoleon. iii.  332 

army  of,  how  organized iii.  342 

Napoleon's  army  crosses  the  Niémen  into iii.  346 

French  losses  in  tins  war iv.  51 

losses  of,  in  this  war :  iv.  52 

Emperor  of,  vide  Alexander 


Saguntttm,  siege  of hi.  302 

battle  of. iii.  303 

St.  Cyr,  (Gouvion),  at  battle  of  Ilohenlinden i.  350 

"  at  battle  of  Novi i.  279 

"  at  Eylau . , . . h.  265 

"  at  Friedland ii.  30G 

"  operations  of,  in  Catalonia  in  1808 ii.  440 

"  captures  Rosas u'.  441 

"  succors  Barcelona ii.  441 

"  at  battle  of  Cardedeu  ii.  442 

"  at  Molino  del  Rey ii.  442 

"  at  Capeladas  and  Walsch ii.  443 

"  operations  of,  in  Catalonia,  in  1809 iii.  188 

"  at  siege  of  Gerona iii.   189 

"  is  replaced  by  Augereau iii.  191 

"  commands  the  6th  corps  in  1812 iii.  344 

«  at  battle  of  Polotsk iii.  378 

"  madeamarshal iii.  380 

"  at  battle  of  Dresden iv.  153 

"  capitulates  at  Dresden iv.  223 

St.  Cyr,  (Cara),  at  battle  of  Essling iii.     61 

"  at  battle  of  "Wagram iii.  105 

St.  Jean  d'Acre,  siege  of i.  263 

St.  Julien,  negotiations  and  powers  of i.  339 

Salamanca,  Massena  retires  on iii.  277 

u  capture  of iv.     56 

Sardinia,  sues  for  peace i-     92 

Savary.  at  battle  of  Marengo i.  334 

"       appointed  on  Napoleon's  staff i.  334 

Schill,  exposure  of iii-     81 

"       condemnation  of hi.     82 


446  GENERAL      INDEX. 

PACK 

Schcenbrun,  Napoleon's  residence  at ii.  123 

"         occupation  of  Napoleon  at,  in  1805 ii.  123 

"     1809 iii.  133 

"         Stabs'  attempt  to  assassinate  Napoleon  at jij.  133 

Sebastiani,  mission  of,  to  Constantinople ,j    197 

"  character  of ii.  193 

"  dismissal  of,  demanded ii.   277 

"  rouses  the  Turks  to  defend  Constantinople ii.  278 

"  at  battle  of  AlmonaciJ iii.  172 

"  at  Ocana iii.   179 

"  commands  4th  corps  in  1810 iii.  211 

"  takes  Grenada  and  Malaga iii.  213 

Serrurier,  sketch  of  his  life i.     82 

"        made  a  marshal ii.     54 

Seville,  capture  of iii.   213 

Sièyes,  project  of,  a  change  of  government  in  1800 i.  297 

"        at  the  Revolution  of  the  18th  Brumaire i.  302 

"        project  of,  to  establish  a  Grand  Elector i.  307 

Sicilian  Vespers i.  104 

Siege,  of  Mayence  and  Valenciennes i.     50 

"      of  Toulon i.     61 

"      of  Mantua, i.  114 

"      of  St.  Jean  d'Acre i.  263 

"      of  Phillipsburg i.  292 

"      of  Genoa i.  317 

"      of  Dantzic. , ii.  295 

"      of  Saragossa,  beginning  of ii.  399 

"      second,  of  Saragossa ii.  444 

"      of  Gerona iii.   189 

"      of  Ciudad- Rodrigo iii.  223 

"      of  Almeida iii.  224 

"      of  Lerida iii.  237 

"      of  Mequinenza iii.   238 

"      of  Tortosa iii.  239 

"      of  Badajos : iii.   265 

"       "         "       iii.   279 

"       iii.   285 

"       "         "       iii    308 

"      of  Burgos iv.     60 

"      of  Cadiz,  attempt  to  raise iii.  269 

"      of  Tarragona iiL   297 

"      of  Saguntum iii.  302 

"      of  Valencia iii.   304 

"      of  Hamburg iv.   224 

"      of  Dantzic iv.   225 

"      of  other  places  in  1813-1814 iv.   225 

Smolensko,  battle  of iii.  367 

Soult,  character  of ii.      02 


GENERAL      INDEX.  447 


Soult,  is  made  a  marshal il     52 

commands  the  4th  corps  iu  1805 ii.     82 

at  the  battle  of  Austerlitz ii.  133 

his  answer  to  Xapok-on ii.   135 

splendid  attack  of,  on  the  heights  of  Pratzen ii.   137 

at  Jena, ii.  211 

at  Pultusk ii.  256 

at  Bergfried ii.  264 

at  Eylau ii-   265 

at  Heilsberg ii-  304 

at  Coruua   ii-  434 

is  Bent  to  Portugal ii    4-47 

attempt  of,  to  pass  the  Minho iii.  H3 

at  the  battle  of  Chaves  and  Braga iii.  143 

assaults  Oporto iii.  144 

takes  the  left  bank  of  the  Minho iii.  116 

reported  intrigues  of,  to  be  made  king iii.  148 

alleged  cruelty  of iii.  150 

difficulties  of  his  position  on  the  Minho iii.  154 

is  attacked  at  Oporto .iii.  1 55 

is  forced  to  retreat iii.  155 

misunderstanding  of,  with  Ney iii.  157 

attempts  to  cut  off  "Wellington's  retreat iii.   167 

made  chief  of  Joseph's  staff iii.  177 

his  plan  of  campaign iii.  210 

fails  to  take  Badajos iii.  217 

invests  Cadiz iii.  218 

occupies  Andalusia iii.  220 

marches  on  Badajos  and  Olivenza iii.  265 

besieges  Badajos iii.  265 

operations  of,  remarks  on iii.  267 

marches  to  the  support  of  Victor iii.  271 

compels  Beresford  to  raise  the  siege  of  Badajos iii.  280 

at  battle  of  Albuera iii.  280 

directed  to  form  a  junction  with  Marmont iii.  284 

defeats  the  Spaniards  in  Andalusia iii.  286 

operations  of,  in  the  South , iii.  306 

fails  to  save  the  bridge  of  Almaraz iv.     55 

recalled  from  Andalusia iv.     59 

drives  Wellington  from  Madrid iv.     61 

joins  Napoleon  at  Bautzen iv.  124 

is  given  the  general  command  in  Spain iv.  228 

efforts  of,  to  succor  St.  Sebastian iv.  229 

at  battle  of  Toulouse iv.  300 

is  major-general  of  the  army  in  1S15 iv.  347 

Spain,  treats  with  France i.     66 

alliance  of,  with  France i.  120 

intermission  of,  in  1799 i.  251 


•xlS  GEKEKAL      INDEX. 

PAGE 

Spain,  relations  of,  with  France,  in  18C3 h.     23 

declares  war  against  France li.     24 

threatens  Napoleon ii.  274 

course  oij  under  Godoy ii,  35U 

Napoleun's  2>lans  respecting ii.  351 

dissensions  of  the  royal  family  of ii.  357 

general  insurrection  in .ii.  3^4 

Joseph  Bonaparte  proclaimed  king  of ii.  390 

French  reverses  in ii.  41 1 

Napoleon  goes  to ii.  416 

character  of  the  war  in ii.  418 

Napoleon's  plan  of  operations  in il  421. 

the  English  advance  from  Portugal  into iL  432 

Napoleon  leaves  for  Paris ii.  449 

state  of  affairs  of,  in  1809 hi.  142 

operations  of  Suchet  in iii.  186 

preparations  for  a  new  campaign  in iii.  208 

organization  of  French  army  in iii.  2 1 1 

internal  dissensions  in iii.  2 1 5 

general  state  of  affairs  in,  at  end  of  1811 iii.  311 

summary  of  campaign  of  1812  in iv.    124 

Soult  returns  to,  as  general-in-chief. iv.  22S 

summary  cf  operations  in  181 3 iv.  230 

Spandau,  fall  of ii.  230 

Splugen,  Macdonald's  passage  of i.  352 

Stabs,  attempt  of,  to  assassinate  Napoleon iii.  133 

Stadion,  sent  on  a  mission  to  Napoleon ii.   1 28 

"       sketch  of  his  life ii.  128 

Stael,  Madame  de,  sketch  of ii.   18G 

Stettin,  capture  of ii.  232 

Steyer,  armistice  of , i.  352 

Stockach,  battle  of, i.  258 

Stralsund,  capture  of,  by  Brune ii.  339 

Stuart,  General,  occupies  Alexandria ii.     17 

Suchet,  pierces  Melas'  centre  in  1800. i.  325 

marches  to  the  succor  of  Genoa i.  325 

commands  a  division  under  Lanues  in  1805 ii.     82 

at  battle  of  Ostrolenka ii.  273 

supersedes  Junot  at  Saragossa iii.  186 

shoots  the  authors  of  a  panic iii.  187 

at  battle  of  Santa  Maria iii.  187 

at  battle  of  Belchite hi.  183 

brilliant  success  of,  in  Catalonia iii.  236 

at  combat  of  Margalef iii.  237 

besieges  Lerida iii.  237 

"        Mequinenza iii.  238 

"        Tortosa iii.  239 

operations  of,  on  the  Ebro , iii.  291 


GENERAL     INDEX.  449 

PAGE 

Sucbet,  prepares  to  attack  Tarragona iii.  295 

besieges  Tarragoua iii.  297 

"       is  made  a  marshal iii.  301 

besieged  Saguntum iii.  302 

"       invests  and  besieges  Valencia iii.  303 

"      redacts  i'euiscola  and  Gandia iii.  305 

"      is  made  Duke  of  Albiifera iii.  306 

"       operations  ofj  in  1812 iv.     62 

•'       operations  of,  in  1813 iv.  129 

"       is  ordered  to  retire  towards  France iv.  130 

Saltan  of  Mysore,  projects  of i.  211 

Suwarrow,  sketch  of i.  263 

"  advance  into  Loinbardy i.  263 

"  enters  Turin i.  266 

"  on  the  Trebia i.  270 

"  his  plau  of  operations i.  284 

"  passes  the  St.  Gothard i.  286 

"  difficult  retreat  of i-  288 

"  retires  to  Bavaria i-  290 

Sweden,  negotiations  with ii-  289 

"        Bemadotte  elected  Crown-Prince  of iii.  243 

Switzerland,  revolution  in L  193 

"  neutrality  of i.  196 

affairs  of. i-  245 

"  operations  of  the  Archduke  Charles  in i.  267 

"  counter-revolution  in i-  391 

T. 

Tactics,  of  battles,  discussion  of 1U-     ï2 

Talavera,  battle  of "j-  ]64 

Talleyrand,  sketch  of  his  life *•  185 

"  made  minister  of  foreign  affairs i.  185 

"  is  superseded  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs ii.  276 

"  speculations  in  stocks 1-  "86 

"  course  of.  in  regard  to  the  war  with  Spain n.  358 

"  intrigues  of,  in  1814    iv-  -92 

Tamames,  battle  of ih;  J78 

Tarragona,  siege  of uu  " 

Tarvis,  battle  of i.  170 

Tennis-court,  assembly  of  the ; '• 

Thann,  battle  of "j-     34 

Thugut,  character  as  minister 1- 

"        resigns  his  office '• 

Tilsit,  the  emperors  meet  at »•  313 

"      peace  of ii.  31 4-320 

Tippo-Saeb,  fall  of »■   312 

deathof «■     25 

vol.  iv. — 29. 


450  GENERAL      INDEX. 

PAGB 

Torres-  Vedras,  camp  of iii.  183 

"  lines  of iii.  228 

"  fortifications  of,  described iii.  229 

Tortosa,  siege  of iii.  239 

Toulon,  siege  of i.     61 

Toulouse,  battle  of iv.  300 

Trafalgar,  battle  of ii.  151 

Treaty,  of  Vienna  in  1805 ii.  145 

»  "      in  1809 iii.  134 

"     of  Amiens. i.  382 

"      of  Presburg ii.  145 

"      of  Bartenstcin ii.  287 

"      of  Tilsit ii.  314 

"      of  Fontainebleau « ii.  355 

Trebia,  battle  of i.  270 

"      consternation  produced  by  battle  of i.  274 

Treviso,  armistice  of i.  354 

"       Duke  of,  vide  Mortier 

Tribunat,  elimination  of i.  386 

"        suppression  of ii.  348 

"        account  of. ii.  348 

Trois-Toisons,  order  of ii.  345 

Turkey,  makes  peace  with  France i.  374 

"      hesitates  to  acknowledge  the  empire ii.     47 

"       war  with  Russia ii.  258 

"      French  officers  sent  to ii.  260 

"       the  English  threaten ii.  277 

"      demands  of,  by  the  English ii.  277 

"      Sebastiani  urges  the  defense  of ii.  278 

"      government  of,  changed ii.  318 

"       projects  of  France  and  Russia  on ii.  320 

"       negotiations  respecting ii.  341 

"       war  with  Russia hi.  196 

"         "       "         "     continued iii.  254 

"       "         "  " iii.  312 

°      expected  diversion  by,  in  1812 iii.  339 

"      makes  peace  with  Russia iii.  364 

Tuscany,  annexed  to  France ii.  365 

Tyrol,  operations  of  Joubert  in i.  171 

"      operations  in,  by  Ney  and  Augereau,  1805 h.  12G 

"      insurrectionary  state  of iii-     24 

"      affairs  of iii-     83 

"      subjugation  of iii-  139 

U. 

TJlm,  investment  of ii.     93 

11    capitulation  of ii.     -6 


GENERAL      INDEX.  451 

PAGE 

United  States  of  America,  form  a  convention  with  France i.  342 

"         1:       purchase  Louisiana  from  Napoleon i.  375 

"         "       declare  war  against  Great  Britain iii-  352 

"         "       Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  modified  respecting iii.  353 

United  Merchants,  embarrass  the  French  finances ii-  158 

"            "           how  dealt  with  by  Napoleon ■ ii-  158 

V. 

Valoutina,  battle  of iii-  375 

Vandamme,  Count  of  Unebourg,  sketch  of ii-  122 

"           at  Austerlitz ii.  137 

"           commands  Wurtemburg  troops  in  1809 iii.  29 

"           at  Lintz iii-  52 

"           commands  the  1st  corps  in  1813 iv.  80 

"           operations  of,  near  Koenigstein iv.  159 

"           defeat  of,  at  Culm iv.  160 

Vaudois,  the,  invade  Beme i-  194 

Voudemaire,  13th,  affair  of i-  69 

Venice,  situation  and  policy  in  1796 i-  107 

"     i.  164 

"       overthrow  of  the  Republic  of i.  174 

Verdier,  sketch  of ii-  108 

Veronese  Vespers '•  172 

Victor,  Duke  of  Belluno,  sent  into  Roinagua  with  a  division i.  159 

"      life  and  character  of i-  167 

"      operations  in  Venice i.  174 

"      at  battle  of  Montebello i-  327 

"       "       "      of  Marengo i.  328 

,,       u       u      ofFriedland ii.  306 

"      defeats  Blake  at  Espinosa ii.  422 

"      at  Sommo-Sierra ii-  426 

"      defeats  Infantado  at  Ucles ii-  439 

"      defeats  the  Spaniards  at  MedeUiu LI  147 

"      at  Talavera iii-  164 

"      at  Ocana iii-  180 

"      before  Cadiz iiL  269 

"      at  battle  of  Chiclaua iii.  269 

"      is  supported  by  Soult iii-  271 

"      commands  the  9th  corps  in  Russia iii-  344 

"      at  the  passage  of  the  Beresiua iv.  33 

"      commands  the  2d  corps  in  1313 iv.  136 

"      at  battle  of  Dresden iv.  153 

"      at  Leipsic iv.  196 

"      at  Bricnne iv.  245 

"      at  Nogent iv.  254 

Vienna,  Napoleon's  march  on,  in  1005 .  .  .ii.  103 

"       occupation  of,  by  the  French ii-  117 


452  GENERAL      INDEX. 

PACK 

Vienna,  fortifications  of,  in  1805 ii.  118 

treaty  of,  in  1805 ii.  14-, 

Napoleon's  march  on,  in  1809 iii.  43 

second  occupation  by  the  French iii.  49 

treaty  of,  in  1809 iii_  134 

destruction  of  the  fortifications iij_  133 

Villeneuve,  Admiral,  goes  to  the  Antilles ii.  53 

"         attacks  Diamond  Rock ii.  ci 

"          errors  of ii.  74 

"         ordered  to  return  to  Toulon ii,  148 

"          defeated  at  Trafalgar iL  151 

"          commits  suicide ii.  152 

"          sketch  of  his  life ii.  152 

Vittoria,  battle  of iv.  127 

Vuillaumez,  admiral,  loses  his  squadron il  161 

W. 

Wagram,  battle  of. iii.   105 

"         criticism  on iii.   112 

"Walcheren,  expedition .iii.   127 

Waterloo,  battle  of. iv.   371 

retreat  from iv.   380 

"Wellington,  receives  a  military  education  in  France i.     36 

operations  in  India ii.     25 

"  at  Copenhagen ii.  336 

lands  his  army  in  Portugal iL  406 

defeats  Junot ii.  406 

his  second  descent  into  Portugal iii.   153 

attacks  Soult  at  Oporto iii.   155 

advances  on  Madrid iii.   160 

his  system  of  battles iii.   164 

retreats  after  the  battle  of,  Talavera iii.   167 

his  inaction „ iii.  181 

camp  of,  at  Torres- Vedras iii.   183 

fortifies  Torres- Vedras iii.   228 

forces  Massena  to  evacuate  Portugal iii.  277 

renews  the  siege  of  Badajos iii.   285 

is  again  forced  to  retire  into  Portugal iii.  286 

his  winter  campaign  in  Estremadura iii.  307 

captures  Ciudad-Rodrigo,  and  Badajos iii.  308 

enters  Madrid iv.     58 

besieges  Burgos iv.     60 

retires  into  Portugal iv.     61 

his  operations  in  spring  of  1813 iv.   124 

defeats  the  French  at  Vittoria iv.   127 

defeats  Soult  at  Toulouse iv.  300 

position  of  his  army  in  Belgium iv.   343 


GENERAL      INDEX.  453 

PAGE 

■Wellington,  composition  of  Lis  army iv.  351 

"          his  plan  of  opérations iv.  354 

"          his  operatiousat  Waterloo iv.  371 

Weruecii,  lus  operations  on  the  Danube ii.  94 

u        ■«             "             "           "        ii.  90 

Westphalia,  created  a  kingdom ■ i.  406 

"          impositions  on,  by  the  French iii.  21 

"          insurrection  iu m.  81 

Weyrother,  proposes  operations  at  Austerlitz ii.  135 

Whitworth,  mission  of "■  18 

"          interview  with  Napoleon ii.  19 

Wiasma,  battle  of iv.  21 

Winzingerode,  mission  to  Vienna ii-  M 

"             sketch  of u.  121 

"Wurmser,  advances  from  the  Rhine i.  114 

"        retreats  into  the  Tyrol i-  1 19 

resumes  the  offensive  on  the  Brenta  i.  120 

"        marches  on  Mantua i.  121 

"        efforts  of  Alvinzi  to  succor i.  138 

"        besieged  at  Mantua. i-  14=7 

"        Alvinzi  again  attempts  to  save i.  152 

"         capitulates  at  Mantua i.  159 

Y. 
Yecla,  battle  of. iv.  129 

Z 
Zr/Bicii,  battle  of i.  285 


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